THE BOOK WAS DRENCHED

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_162235

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 328.342/ D Accession No. 15[illegible]

Author D[illegible] P. A.

Title [illegible]

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below

THE DOMINIONS AND DIPLOMACY

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. LTD.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, E.C. 4
6 OLD COURT HOUSE STREET, CALCUTTA
53 NICOL ROAD, BOMBAY
167 MOUNT ROAD, MADRAS

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
55 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK
221 EAST 20TH STREET, CHICAGO
TREMONT TEMPLE, BOSTON
128–132 UNIVERSITY AVENUE, TORONTO

THE DOMINIONS AND DIPLOMACY

The Canadian Contribution

BY
A. GORDON DEWEY
M.A (McGILL), PH D. (COLUMBIA), DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC LAW
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

VOLUME II

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
LONDON • NEW YORK • TORONTO
1929

Made in Great Britain

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

CHAPTER PAGE

VI. IMPERIAL FOREIGN POLICY—THE VERSAILLES SETTLEMENT 1

Imperialists and Nationalists demand Dominion participation in the peace settlement; the German Colonies; attitude of the Home Government; the Imperial War Cabinet. Borden's contentions and the basis of representation in Paris; the British Empire Delegation; the issue of Dominion ratification The implications of the Versailles settlement and League membership; dual status of the Dominions. Reactions in the Dominion Parliaments to the settlement.

VII. THE CONDUCT OF HIGH POLICY SINCE THE WAR—THE PERIOD OF CO-OPERATION 62

The Imperial Conference of 1921, the Empire Delegation again functioning; policies in relation to Europe; the Pacific question and the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; relation of the United States to the issue. The Washington Disarmament Conference; Smuts' contentions and the basis of representation; the Empire Delegation still functioning Implications of the Conference; contrasting appraisals by Borden and Salmond. The British Empire Delegation as an agency of Imperial Co-operation. The move for Canadian representation in Washington; Co-operationist and Nationalist phases of the controversy; implications.

VIII. THE NATIONALIST RÉGIME IN CANADA AND ITS INFLUENCE 113

The King Government and the Laurier formula. The Chanak episode; Dominion reactions to the George-Churchill manifesto; purport of the official Canadian attitude. The Halibut Treaty; the issues of its title, signature, and scope and their implications. The Lausanne negotiations; correspondence between the British and Canadian Governments; former's misinterpretation of the latter's attitude; the wider application of the Laurier formula now on trial; Meighen's criticisms; significance of the episode. The Imperial Conference of 1923; changing attitudes in the Dominions; resolution regarding negotiation and ratification of treaties and its purport; vital problem of maintaining contacts between Conference sessions left unsolved. Applications of the 1923 resolution.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

IX. THE LATEST PHASE—THE LABOUR RÉGIME, THE PROTOCOL AND THE LEAGUE 176

Recourse to an opportunist solution for the problem of co-operation; general questions characterised as local and so brought within scope of the 1923 formula. The Labour régime in Britain; recognition of the U.S.S.R.; King again invokes the Laurier formula; the Anglo-Russian Treaty. The London Conference on Reparations and the problem of Dominion representation; changed attitude of the King Government. Macdonald rejects the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee; negotiation of the Geneva Protocol, the Empire Delegation revived; features of the Protocol. Labour efforts to convoke an Imperial Conference; Chamberlain rejects the Protocol and Amery shelves the Conference. Contemporary Dominion attitudes toward the League; the Canadian drive on Article X; Dominion reactions to the Protocol.

X. THE LATEST PHASE—LOCARNO AND THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1926 238

Protocol contrasted with Pact. The Locarno negotiations and settlement; the question of Dominion representation. Comments on the Pact; implications of Article IX; Dominion reactions to the settlement. Dominion opinion prior to the Conference; the Imperial Conference of 1926 and the conduct of Imperial foreign relations.

XI. CONCLUSION—THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH 294

Salient features of the Britannic controversy; significance of the *modus vivendi* reached at Locarno and in 1926, and of the changing international scene. Countervailing tendencies in relation to Dominion Nationalism; factors calculated to promote increased Nationalist attention to world politics. The two main types of antidote to Imperial disintegration criticised as opportunist; need of meeting Nationalists on their own ground; the Co-operationist argument for Empire interdependence. Existing situation of the Dominions in world politics; analysis of alternatives: (*a*) continued "virtual independence"; passive belligerency and neutrality; (*b*) independence; the Monroe Doctrine and the Commonwealth. Crucial position of Canada; alternatives for the future. Vital importance of Anglo-American relations. Conclusion.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 363

INDEX 367*

THE DOMINIONS AND DIPLOMACY

CHAPTER VI

IMPERIAL FOREIGN POLICY—THE VERSAILLES SETTLEMENT

WHEN the Great War broke in upon the Imperial foreign relations controversy it revealed the Empire operating under a *modus vivendi* which had been arrived at by common consent, but which in its most significant aspects was still strongly characterised by Colonialism. By way of summarising the discussion thus far, it may be well to state again the outstanding features of this understanding. The unity of the Empire in international law was as yet unquestioned. Imperial commercial relations with other countries were almost completely decentralised, both in the negotiation of treaties and in the effect of treaty obligations; a great measure of devolution had also been adopted as regards local or separable political questions. But in the most vital aspect of all, the conduct of high policy, the Mother Country retained a free hand, subject only to an agreement to inform and consult with the Dominions when she deemed it expedient. Mr. Borden's declaration of policy and subsequent efforts to secure admission of the Dominions to partnership in foreign affairs had been unavailing. Nationalist assertions of discretion as to the extent of Dominion liability for the consequences of Imperial foreign policies avowedly ignored the major facts of world politics, nor had any steps been taken to revise the more serious treaty obligations of the Empire, entered upon in the previous Colonialist era, in the light of Dominion relationship thereto.

On one point both Imperialists and Nationalists were now in full agreement—that existing arrangements were untenable. It was recognised that whatever might be the theories regarding

the conduct of foreign relations in the future, the predicament of the Dominions was a product of the past. The cataclysm was provoked by occurrences in the shaping of which they had neither directly nor actively shared, yet they were unquestionably involved in its consequences. It was recognised, too, that the Dominions had accepted the situation. Both Nationalists and Imperialists, however, were outspoken in their conviction that such a situation must not recur, that Imperial relations must be so readjusted as to make certain that the Dominions would never again be so compromised without their active consent.

The Dominions demand a Voice in the making of Peace

The first phase of the problem had to do with the relationship of the Dominions to the forthcoming Peace Settlement. The Imperialists, of course, favoured full participation by the Dominions in the formulation of a united Imperial programme to be presented at the Allied Council table. This was merely in accordance with their fundamental principles, and early in the War they began to agitate with this end in view. While presiding at a meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute (on March 24, 1915), Viscount Milner drew attention to certain considerations which many in the Old Country appear to have overlooked, and issued a solemn warning. This statement merits quotation at length :

> It seems a matter of incalculable importance that the first occasion on which the Imperial tie has been exposed to a really great strain is a war in which there is in the Dominions not only complete sympathy with the cause of the Mother Country on account of its righteousness, but also this realisation that their own vital interests are affected and that victory in the struggle means all in all to them. I say that is of incalculable importance, because, remember what the position is—or rather was—a position very peculiar and almost precarious. The Dominions were liable to be involved in the most momentous experience which can befall any nation—that of a great war. They were liable to be involved in this world-wide struggle, and indeed were involved in it, without having any share or the slightest voice or control in the policy which led to that result. That is a position fundamentally unsound and in the long run impossible. It is contrary to all traditions and all the most deeply-seated political instincts of our race, which has always sought to throw the burden of any obligation exclusively on the parties who contracted it. The old saw " no taxation without

representation " is only a crude and rather superficial statement of a great principle. The underlying truth is something far wider and deeper than that. But in the present inchoate condition of Imperial relations the issues of peace and war rest exclusively in the hands of the Mother Country. It is a piece of high good fortune, therefore, that in the present case the action of the Mother Country was one that appealed at once to all the people of the Dominions, and that they were able to follow her lead without a shadow of hesitation. The moral effect of that unanimity of the Empire, apart entirely from the access of material strength which it brought to us, is incalculable, and it certainly has met with most warm-hearted appreciation on the part of the people of Great Britain.

But there is another obligation, besides that of gratitude, which this single-minded espousal of our cause by the people of the Dominions imposes on us. It is not well to go on taking everything for granted. It does not follow, because the Dominions have thrown themselves heartily into a war which they had no share in declaring, that they would be equally prepared to endorse a peace about which they had not been consulted and which they had no share in making. Remember that on a previous and most disastrous occasion it was not war—not the strain of war—which disrupted the Empire, but the aftermath of war. There is a risk here which we ought not to run, and which in my opinion there is no reason and no excuse for running.[1]

Several other contributions from British Imperialists, all urging consultation with the Dominions regarding peace terms, appeared early in the War. Both *The Round Table* and *United Empire* heartily supported this contention. In the *Morning Post* of January 11, 1915, for instance, Mr. Jebb pointed out that the settlement must be made with the sanction and authority of the whole Empire, and that this could only be obtained by a conference beforehand. Commenting editorially (February 1915) upon the suggested postponement of the Imperial Conference due that year, *United Empire* endorsed Mr. Jebb's view, citing Mr. Borden's statement that " it is impossible to believe that our existing status, so far as the control of foreign policy and extra-Imperial relations is concerned, can remain as it is to-day." [2] The May issue carried a strong leader with the same argument.[3] Writing in the same Journal upon " The Dominions and the Peace Settlement," [4] H. E. Egerton quoted Lord Milner's warning, and adverted to the misunderstandings with Australia resulting from British ineptitude regarding New Guinea and

[1] *United Empire*, vol. vi. p. 370.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 81–83.
[3] *Ibid.* pp. 313–315.
[4] *Ibid.* pp. 425–431 (June 1915).

New Hebrides. He cautioned, too, against attempting to use German East Africa to solve Indian emigration difficulties without consulting South Africa. Although without specific territorial problems, Canada, too, had amply earned a voice in the settlement. He suggested personal consultations of the Dominion Prime Ministers with the Home Government, at which each would explain " what is the indispensable minimum without attainment of which there will be a sense of failure and disappointment."

The writer of an article on " The Dominions and the Settlement " in *The Round Table* for March 1915,[1] went further. He pointed out that although consultation with the Dominions on the eve of the War had been impossible, the British Government was pledged by the Conference resolution of 1911 to this when making peace. The Australasian Dominions, in particular, were vitally interested in the Pacific settlement. No repetition of former blunders should be allowed to occur in that region. " The Dominions are spending their blood and treasure in the conflict and they are as vitally concerned as ourselves in the result. . . . They are, moreover, conquering territory by their own efforts, and will rightly demand a voice in the disposal of it at the end of the War." In the absence of a single representative Imperial government, that of the senior British nation must act for all of them, for separate Dominion representation at the Peace Conference would destroy the international unity of the Empire. It would be utterly unreasonable to attempt to solve such serious problems as the post-war settlement would impose by mere interchange of despatches ; only face to face meetings at a preliminary Imperial Conference would meet the situation. The whole trend of Imperial development in the future, he anticipated, would be conditioned by that result :

> We trust to make it a new departure in history, from which the world will derive a better understanding both of national right and of international law. The five self-governing nations of the Empire are fighting with absolute unanimity for that end ; and when British signatures are given to the Peace, they will pledge the faith of all five nations as though they were one. The conditions of peace will therefore not only define our purpose and responsibility as an Empire towards other Powers ; they will also very largely regulate the terms of our own partnership as nations beneath one Crown. Whenever in future

[1] *Round Table*, vol. v. pp. 325–344.

we discuss our joint defence, our common liabilities, our policy as an Empire amid the changing currents of international affairs, these conditions of peace will be the hinge on which all discussion will turn. How can your partnership endure if they are not accepted and endorsed as fully as possible by all ?

Imperialists in the Dominions were as ready as those at home to demand a co-operative settlement. This was merely an immediate objective, which would assist them in the attainment of their ultimate aim. It was the latter, indeed, which they stressed in public utterances. But the Nationalists, too, were determined that the disposition of matters should not be left solely to the discretion of the Home Government. They had contributed too much to step down now behind the lesser Allies who happened to enjoy independent status. What they might do in the future was another matter. A demand for participation in the Peace Settlement, even if eagerly seized upon and exploited by the Imperialists, did not necessarily imply a willingness to commit a Dominion to the co-operative formulation of foreign policies in the future. This point should be borne in mind. It may contribute to an understanding of that cessation of co-operative effort which was to become so noticeable within a few years after the struggle.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the veteran spokesman of the Nationalists, adhered to his principles until the end. The war-time addresses with which he closed his career did not deviate from his oft-repeated assertion that it was for Canada to choose when and how she should participate in Imperial conflicts. In the memorable speech which he delivered in the first war session of the Canadian House he said :

We are British subjects, and to-day we are face to face with the consequences which are involved in that proud fact. Long we have enjoyed the benefits of our British citizenship ; to-day it is our duty to accept its responsibilities and its sacrifices. We have long said that when Great Britain is at war we are at war ; to-day we realise that Great Britain is at war and that Canada is at war also. Our territory is liable to attack and to invasion . . . our commerce has been interrupted, and perhaps the expression would not be too strong if I were to say that it has been to some extent dislocated. . . . More than once I have declared that if England were in danger—nay, not only in danger, but if she were ever engaged in such a contest as would put her strength to the test—then it would be the duty of Canada to assist the Motherland to the utmost of Canada's ability. England to-day

is not engaged in an ordinary contest. The war in which she is engaged will in all probability—nay, in absolute certainty—stagger the world with its magnitude and its horror. But that war is for as noble a cause as ever impelled a nation to risk her all upon the arbitrament of the sword. That question is no longer at issue; the judgment of the world has already pronounced upon it. I speak not only of those nations which are engaged in this war, but of the neutral nations. . . . It will be seen by the world that Canada, a daughter of England, intends to stand by her in this great conflict. When the call comes our answer goes at once and it goes in the classical language of the British answer to the call to duty: "Ready, aye, ready."[1]

On later occasions he maintained the same attitude, but upon the subject of participation in the Peace Settlement he appears to have been silent. The Nationalist's reaction to this latter problem, however, was well exemplified by Sir Clifford Sifton when he said:

Bound by no constitution, bound by no rule or law, equity or obligation, Canada has decided as a nation to make war. . . . We have placed ourselves in opposition to the great world Powers. . . . It will no longer do for Canada to say that they are not fully and absolutely able to transact their own business. We shall not be allowed to do this any longer by the nations of the world. The nations will say, if you can levy armies to make war, you can attend your own business, and we will not be referred to the head of the Empire, we want you to answer our questions directly. There are many questions which we shall have to settle after this war is over, and that is one of them.[2]

The Toronto *Globe* pronounced upon the issue in a manner most ominous for the future of Imperial relations:

When in their exhaustion the war-nations meet in council, Canada and the United States will stand together and speak with one voice. Canada as a combatant in this war, the United States as a neutral, both as sufferers, will speak for North America, and will not speak in vain.[3]

It will be recalled that prior to the War Mr. Borden had definitely assumed the Imperialist position, but had received little encouragement from the Home Government. Now, with the War record of the Dominions as his trump card, he returned to the attack and demanded an effective voice not merely in the

[1] Reprinted in Keith, *Selected Speeches*, vol. ii. pp. 357–367 (August 19, 1914).

[2] To the Canadian Club, Montreal (January 25, 1915), quoted in Curtis, *Problem of the Commonwealth*, p. 9.

[3] (August 21, 1914); quoted in *Canadian Annual Review* (1914), p. 170.

approaching settlement but as a permanent policy, as the final measure of that self-government upon which his parliamentary opponents were so wont to dilate. Addressing the Montreal Canadian Club on December 7, 1914, he said :

Step by step during the past hundred years the development of self-government has proceeded in the overseas Dominions. The enjoyment of these powers has not weakened but rather strengthened the bonds which hold together the Empire. In one respect only evolution has not attained its full development. The citizens of the self-governing Dominions do not directly participate through their Ministers or through their Parliament in the councils of the Empire which determine the issues of peace and war. It would be rash to predict the method by which that great problem will be solved ; but I am convinced that the events of this War will powerfully assist in the hastening of its wise solution.[1]

Later in the day he assured the students of McGill University : " I may see the day, and you young men will certainly see it, when the men of Canada, Australia, South Africa and the other Dominions will have the same just voice in these questions as those who live within the British Isles." [2]

Of similar utterances by his supporters, two only need be cited. In Toronto, during the first autumn of the War, Hon. C. J. Doherty said :

Our recognition of this war as ours, our participation in it, spontaneous and voluntary as it is, determines absolutely once for all that we have passed from the status of the protected colony to that of the participating nation. The protected colony was rightly voiceless ; the participating nation cannot continue so. The hand that wields the sword of the Empire justly holds the sceptre of the Empire ; while the Mother Country alone wielded the one, to her alone belonged the other. When as to-day the nations of the Empire join in wielding that sword, then must they jointly sway that sceptre.[3]

Before the Royal Colonial Institute, Sir George Perley said :

In the self-governing Dominions we have got full autonomy, absolute control over our own affairs within our own boundaries, but we have no voice in foreign policy, nor in the issues of peace and war, nor any of the matters which are of common interest to the whole Empire. The British Empire has been the greatest secular force for good that the world has ever seen. But it is one of the axioms of nature

[1] Canadian Club, Montreal, *Addresses* (1914), p. 87.
[2] Quoted in *Canadian Annual Review* (1914), p. 160.
[3] Quoted in *Round Table*, vol. v. p. 428.

that nothing stands still. . . . If we do not seize the opportunity, I think, according to the law of nature, we must look forward gradually to the time when we shall gradually drift apart. . . . We all look forward in the not distant future to some altered arrangements by which we shall be called to the councils of the Empire regarding really Imperial questions.[1]

From the Antipodes came similar demands for Dominion participation in foreign policy on the broad grounds taken by Mr. Borden. Sir Edmund Barton, for example, argued at a meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute :

If the people of the Dominions are in future wars to risk everything in the cause of the Empire, they must have some voice in guiding its action. Such a right will in all reason be accorded to free men if they are expected to give joint service in the field, though they give their service now ungrudgingly. . . . Trusteeship is not an appropriate power to exercise over those who have so grown up in the family of peoples that they fight by your side. There must, then, be some sort of consultation before as well as after joint action.[2]

In London, on June 23, 1916, Mr. Hughes maintained :

For all practical purposes, save one, the Dominions are really independent nations, bound to Great Britain only by the ties of kinship, of self-interest, and common ideals. The exception to which I refer has very far-reaching effects. On the question whether there shall be peace or war the Dominions have no voice. In the direction of war, when made, they have no share. The position of a citizen of Australia is quite different from that of a citizen of Britain, who, though not directly consulted as to whether war shall be declared, elects those persons who so decide. War being declared by persons over whom a citizen of the Dominions has no control he finds himself involved in all its consequences. There is no real alternative. When Britain declares war, every citizen of the Empire is involved. Obviously this is incompatible with the concept of self-government as understood here and in the Dominions. It will hardly be denied that if Britain has a right to compel the Dominions to incur such a tremendous burden of debt as this war will impose upon all of them, it has for all practical purposes the power to compel them to impose heavy taxation upon themselves ; and if one nation has a right to tax another, it is perfectly clear that the sovereignty or quasi-sovereignty of the latter disappears. This is incompatible with democratic government.[3]

To identify the demand for a voice in the Peace Settlement with an Imperialistic attitude towards the conduct of foreign

[1] *United Empire*, vol. vi. p. 295 (February 23, 1915).
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 531–532 (June 8, 1915).
[3] Quoted in *Canadian Annual Review* (1916), p. 183.

relations would be still more erroneous in the case of Australia and South Africa than in that of Canada, however. These Dominions may justly be considered to have had a more vital interest in the details of the arrangement than the others. Their nearest neighbours were German colonies which they had all along regarded as constant threats to their own national existence. Furthermore, they comprised territories which would prove highly desirable acquisitions were they incorporated within the Dominions which had their eyes upon them. Finally, it was mainly due to the efforts of these Dominions that the colonies changed hands as early as possible in the course of the great conflict. Accordingly, these additions to the Empire must be looked upon as evidence of Dominion rather than British expansionism. All three motives—the strategic, the economic, and national pride of achievement—joined to create an inflexible determination in Nationalists and Imperialists alike that no exigencies of the Home Government should be allowed to effect a restoration of these prizes to their former owner.

General Botha, who represented in South Africa the school of thought of which Sir Wilfrid Laurier has been the chief exponent, was very explicit on this point. Speaking in Johannesburg (August 3, 1915), he said :

> I did not go to German South-West Africa with the object of land-grabbing. But I have changed my views owing to the captured Kaiser's telegram, in which he said : " I shall not only recognise the independence of South Africa, but even guarantee it, provided the rebellion is started immediately." I feel that it is impossible to return the territory to the Germans. Were it given back, endless difficulties would arise. All the serious trouble in South Africa has been due to German intrigue ; and moreover, the German native policy is a source of danger to the Union.[1]

As might be expected, General Smuts was even more emphatically against any thought of undoing the work of the Union. One of his typical declarations was : " The mere suggestion that any part should be returned is, of course, preposterous. I shudder to think what would happen to the native population. The whole of South Africa, East Africa, South-West Africa and Rhodesia would stand aghast at such an idea." [2]

[1] Quoted *op. cit.* (1915), p. 160.
[2] In the *London Chronicle* (March 13, 1917), quoted *op. cit.* (1917), p. 203.

The grievances of Australia and New Zealand regarding the German colonies in the Pacific were of long standing. The earlier phase has already been discussed.[1] Now these Dominions felt that their previous arguments had been vindicated, that it was recognised that a repetition of former blunders would be disastrous to the Empire. The elimination of Germany from the Pacific was accepted as a matter of course.[2] Later hints, that in this they might be taking too much for granted, however, stirred them to strenuous protest. As an Australian writer put it: "Old and not agreeable memories are aroused by the knowledge that, in some quarters at any rate, the Pacific has been indicated as the appropriate field of concessions by Great Britain."[3]

Despite earlier pronouncement by the Home Government, and thorough discussion of the colonies issue in the Imperial War Cabinet and Conferences, certain developments in Allied relationships caused the year 1918, especially, to be marked by vehement protests from Australasia. The New Zealand correspondent to *The Round Table* treated this as the paramount issue in his country in his article of March of that year.[4] The Agent-General for New South Wales, Mr. G. C. Wade, warned the Royal Colonial Institute:

> Australasia has submitted to many disappointments in the present War. She has borne them without protest, feeling that perhaps, with censored information, she was not adequately equipped for criticism, and trusting to the good faith of the military. She fails to understand the tenderness that is exhibited in this country towards the inhuman Hun. But on the subject of the German colonies in the Pacific she is competent to speak with full authority. Moreover, she is entitled to be heard with all seriousness, and the Government that ignores this request will be assuming a very grave responsibility. What would be the response of Britons if, by the terms of peace, Germany was left in possession of the Belgian coast-line—a pistol always pointed at the very heart of the country? It is not one bit more serious than the restoration of New Guinea or Samoa to Germany.

[1] *Supra*, ch. iii.

[2] *E.g.* J. M. Myers, writing on "Australia and the War" (February 1915), said: "One of the results of the War to which it is possible to look forward with confidence is the disappearance of German domination in the Pacific." Assuming this as settled, he confines his attention to the argument that in order to lessen parochialism and increase their sense of Imperial responsibility, Australia and New Zealand should be charged with the administration of these newly-won dependencies (*United Empire*, vol. vi, p. 124; cf. *Round Table*, vol. viii. p. 650).

[3] *Round Table*, vol. v. p. 671 (March 1915).

[4] *Ibid.* vol. viii. pp. 650–652.

To say that they were once German colonies is irrelevant. The German flag was originally hoisted through a blunder of the British Government. We fervently hope that the mistake will not be repeated.[1]

Premier Massey of New Zealand did not mince matters :

It is just as well that the British Government has been told already that we are not going to have the Germans back in these islands in these seas if we can possibly help it, and if any opportunity is given to Germany to reoccupy these islands there is likely to be serious trouble among the people of New Zealand particularly.[2]

He allowed it to be understood, moreover, that he was persuaded to leave the Dominion again, for the long period involved in attendance at the Imperial War Cabinet, only in order to make certain regarding the issue.[3] In London on July 16 Sir Joseph Ward threatened : " Should such a calamity befall us, the majority of our people would feel inclined to despair of the Mother Country and the bonds of the Empire would be brought to a straining point." [4] In New York on May 31 Premier Hughes invoked an American analogy :

If we are to continue free we must have guarantees against enemy aggressions in the future, and this involves an Australian Monroe Doctrine in the South Pacific. " Hands off the Pacific " is the doctrine to which, by inexorable circumstances, we are committed against all predatory nations. We will strive to give this doctrine effect to the last ounce of effort at our disposal.[5]

In London on October 21 he made a further appeal : " When the day comes that peace is declared, as we have fought for Britain and the Allies to secure liberty and safety, so we expect that Britain and the Allies will stand by Australia in all things necessary to ensure her safety." [6]

The demands from the Dominions for an effective voice in the Peace Settlement met with an early and favourable response from the Home Government. In the British House on April 14, 1915, the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Harcourt, made public the promise which had been made in this regard. He quoted from the telegram which he had despatched in January to the Governors-

[1] *United Empire*, vol. x. p. 15.
[2] To New Zealand Chambers of Commerce Conference (November 28, 1917), quoted in *Round Table*, vol. viii. p. 652.
[3] *United Empire*, vol. ix. p. 95 (March 1918).
[4] Quoted in *Canadian Annual Review* (1918), p. 169.
[5] Quoted *ibid.* p. 168.
[6] Quoted *ibid.* p. 169.

General, announcing the postponement of the Imperial Conference which should regularly have met that summer, this statement:

> Will you at the same time inform your Prime Minister that it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to consult him most fully, and if possible personally, when the time arrives to discuss possible terms of peace? I need hardly add that His Majesty's Government intend to observe the spirit as well as the letter of this declaration, which I believe has given complete satisfaction to the governments of the Dominions.[1]

Again, in the House of Lords, on February 8, 1917, Lord Curzon, referring to the Dominions' part in the War, added: "We therefore now regard them as being entitled to a voice in the prosecution of the War to the end which we contemplate, also to arrange the settlement of terms of peace."[2]

On July 15, 1918, Premier Lloyd George said to the visiting Canadian editors:

> This is a war in which we engaged the Empire at a moment when we had no time to consult the Dominions as to policy, and it is perfectly true that the policy which we adopted to protect small nations in Europe was a policy embarked upon without consultation with the Dominions. But you approved it. Henceforth you have the right to be consulted as to the policy beforehand, and this is the change which has been effected as a result of the War; another point in which you have a voice is the settlement of the conditions of peace. We have discussed war aims and the conditions under which we are prepared to make peace at the War Cabinet. We arrived at an agreement on the subject last year with the representatives of the Dominions, and we shall reconsider the same problems in the light of events which have occurred since. Canada and Australia and New Zealand, yes, and Newfoundland, they have all contributed their share of sacrifice, and are entitled to an equal voice with the representatives of these Islands in determining the conditions under which we are prepared to make peace.[3]

Regarding the specific issue of the German colonies, Premier Lloyd George at first made a non-committal reply. At Glasgow (June 29, 1917) he said: "As to the German colonies, that is a matter which must be settled by the Peace Congress. The wishes, the desires and the interests of the people of those countries themselves must be the dominant factor in settling their future

[1] *Canadian Annual Review* (1917), p. 200. [2] *Loc. cit.*
[3] *Ibid.* (1918), pp. 164–165.

government." [1] Mr. Walter Long, on the other hand, came out strongly for the Dominions :

> Let no man think that the struggles for these colonies have been in vain. Let no man think that these colonies will ever return to German rule. It is impossible. Our overseas Empire will not tolerate any suggestion of the kind. . . . A peace that will see these oppressed German possessions started on the road towards progress and prosperity, with a future like that of other British Colonies as their goal, is the only peace in which the world can contemplate with satisfaction.[2]

In the autumn of 1918 Mr. Balfour, Foreign Secretary, represented a wide sentiment when he assured them that :

> I object to giving back to Germany at the end of the War an instrument so powerful for evil as a great colonial empire would be in the German hands. No more potent instrument for disturbing the peace of the world or increasing the miseries of humanity could be conceived. . . . In no other circumstances is it consistent with the safety, the security, the unity of the British Empire, that the German colonies should be returned to Germany.[3]

By the end of 1918 the question appears to have been decided, at least in so far as the Empire was concerned.[4]

We have in the disposal of the German colonies what would seem to be a clear instance of the conditioning of the Mother Country's policy by Dominion insistence, regardless of the complications with foreign countries, such as Kiau-Chau and American wishes, which it entailed. Colonialism had received another blow. Gone were the days of the confident reliance upon their own counsel solely, by which the Home Government had created so much suspicion of their diplomacy in matters touching the Dominions. Did it, therefore, augur closer Imperial relations in the future ? True, the question had been discussed repeatedly in meetings of the Empire Premiers and was settled in concert. Yet it was plain that specific Dominions, where they considered their own interests to be vitally affected, would stick to their guns regardless of wider considerations. Such a settlement was perfectly compatible with the emergence of strikingly, even irreconcilably divergent foreign policies within the Empire on some

[1] *Canadian Annual Review* (1917), p. 202 ; *cf.* an Editorial in still more dubious vein : (*United Empire*, vol. vi. pp. 403 *et seqq.* (June 1915).
[2] Quoted in *Canadian Annual Review* (1917), pp. 202–203.
[3] Quoted *ibid.* (1918), p. 168. [4] *United Empire*, vol. ix. p. 481.

future occasion. The evidence that the separate Dominions were not merely Nationalistic, but had reached the stage of pronouncedly displaying that extrovert nationalism known as economic imperialism, further confirms this possibility.

Not only did the British Government return a favourable response to the specific demand from the Dominions for a voice in the Peace Settlement, but the more comprehensive claim for a revision of the relation of the Outer Empire to the conduct of Imperial foreign policy received early recognition. The regular session of the Imperial Conference (1915) had been postponed, but representatives of Canada and Australia attended the Paris Economic Conference in June 1916, as British Empire delegates, and on December 14, 1916, very shortly after the Lloyd George *coup d'état* and the formation of the War Cabinet, the new Government cabled to the Dominions as follows :

> They therefore invite your Prime Minister to attend a series of special and continuous meetings of the War Cabinet in order to consider urgent questions affecting the prosecution of the War, the possible conditions on which, in agreement with our Allies, we would assent to its termination, and the problems which will then immediately arise. For the purpose of these meetings, your Prime Minister will be a member of the War Cabinet.[1]

The first session of the Imperial War Cabinet was held March 20, 1917, and it adjourned May 2 after fourteen meetings. The second plenary session lasted from June to August 1918, and a third was called the same year, beginning November 20. Owing to the general election, Australia was unable to send a spokesman to the first session. The Dominions were represented by their Premiers, by other Ministers, or by both. Where several other Ministers accompanied the Premier, as in the case of Canada, they attended the Cabinet meetings under a panel system. At the second session a resolution was adopted authorising each Minister to name a colleague, either a resident or a visitor, to act for him at the meetings held between the plenary sessions. This was to allow greater continuity, and the calling of meetings at any time.[2]

[1] Cd. 9005, p. 6.

[2] See *Canadian Annual Review* (1917, 1918), *passim* ; also R. L. Schuyler, " The British Cabinet (1916–19)," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxxv., at pp. 91–93 ; G. M. Wrong, " Canada and the Imperial War Cabinet," *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. i., at pp. 15–20 ; Cd. 9005, Cmd. 325.

The secrecy of the Imperial War Cabinet's procedure deprives us of any exact record of its deliberations, but we have ample testimony from its members as to the importance of the problems which the representatives of the Dominions for the first time in common with those of the Mother Country were called upon to settle. As Sir Robert Borden put it :

> We meet there on terms of equality under the presidency of the first Minister of the United Kingdom ; we meet there as equals, he is *primus inter pares*. Ministers from six nations sit around the council board, all of them responsible to their respective parliaments and to the people of the countries which they represent. Each nation has its voice upon questions of common concern and highest importance as the deliberations proceed ; each preserves unimpaired its perfect autonomy, its self-government, and the responsibility of its Ministers to their own electorate.[1]

British opinion attributed great importance to the part played by the Dominions. " It is common knowledge," the Canadian journals were cabled, " that the Dominion Premiers helped to reconsider and resettle the entire foundation with leading representatives of our Allies. They established, reshaped, rebuilt, unitedly, the foundations upon which the Allied conduct of the War will be waged. Their presence has been regarded by the British Cabinet with appreciation and gratitude."[2] Sir Robert Borden, in another public statement, described the wide variety of activity in which they engaged, and paid a tribute to the value of personal contact in Imperial relations :

> I took up with many Departments of the British Government questions which could not be effectively or thoroughly dealt with by correspondence. Among those with whom important subjects were discussed, I may mention the War Office, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Shipping, the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of National Service, the Ministry of the Air Force, the Ministry of Munitions and the Board of Trade. The organisation of the Canadian Expeditionary Forces both in Great Britain and in France, and more effective co-operation with the Department of Militia and Defence, were also discussed at several conferences with Sir Edward Kemp. Very useful progress was made and valuable results attained. The work of the Imperial War Conference covered a great variety of subjects and in some instances definite and final conclusions were reached ; in other cases Committees representing Great Britain and the self-governing

[1] To the Empire Parliamentary Association (April 3, 1917), quoted Cd. 9005, pp. 8–9.

[2] (July 26, 1918), quoted *Canadian Annual Review* (1918), p. 163.

Dominions and India were set up with authority to investigate and report; in other cases resolutions were passed containing representations to the Governments concerned.[1]

The third session, of course, represented the emergency Conference with the Dominions, necessitated by the Armistice and the immediate problems of the Settlement which it entailed. The objects sought were (1) to formulate, through close co-operation of the Imperial Government and the Dominion leaders, a British basis for the Peace Conference; (2) to deal with the great trade issues involved in the approach of peace and the relations of the Empire with its Allies and the enemy; (3) to develop the schemes for demobilisation already partially arranged.[2]

This development in Imperial relations seemed entirely in the direction sought by Imperialists. It gave them great satisfaction to hear Mr. Bonar Law, at a luncheon to Mr. Hughes, assure them that "there are no secrets while the Australian Premier is here, and the Government and British people are ready to welcome the Colonies to their counsels," [3] also Premier Lloyd George recognise that it had been "of immense advantage to bring to bear upon the vital problems of war and peace, fresh minds and fresh angles of vision from the Overseas Dominions," and even divulge the hope that the experiment would prove "a permanent convention of our constitution." [4] They expressed the most ardent hopes of what the institution would lead to in the future. They overlooked the fact that the situation was anomalous, that there was only one paramount issue, upon which there was general agreement throughout the Empire, that the Imperial War Cabinet was dealing with immediate problems of war and peace, not formulating general lines of foreign policy for the future upon which serious conflicts of interest might arise, and finally, that in so far as they affected the Outer Empire all Cabinet decisions were *ad referendum*, and had no more than advisory force. An admirable opportunity for co-operation and, for the time being, excellent machinery for the purpose were afforded, but there was nothing to preclude the pursuance of radically divergent policies on the part of the several British nations should marked conflicts of interest develop later. The

[1] At Ottawa (August 24, 1918), quoted *Canadian Annual Review* (1918), p. 419.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 420.
[3] (March 9, 1916), quoted *ibid.* (1916), p. 181.
[4] Quoted *ibid.* (1917), pp. 289–290.

net result of the innovation was to signalise the greatly enhanced position of the Dominions in the Empire and in world politics, whatever that might portend. It was this which accounts for the ease with which Sir Robert Borden and other Premiers allayed Nationalist scepticism, and for the hearty support which the new development received from Nationalists as well as Imperialists in the Dominions.

The Rôle of the Dominions at Paris

The rôle played by the Dominions at the Peace Conference was both astonishing and enlightening. At the time the effect was probably more noticeable upon those foreigners (especially the ones reared in the orthodox revolutionary tradition of the United States) who continued to visualise the Outer Empire as struggling settlements, still grasped in the tentacles of Downing Street, than upon those at home who had watched precedent heaped on precedent, and become enured to participation by the Dominions in Empire management during the long War years. To the world at large it was the budding of that plant which, after years of nurture, was to open to their ingenuous gaze at the Imperial Conference of 1926. In retrospect, students of the Britannic Question who recall the somewhat truculent attitude of the Colonial Office in 1907, and the air of absolute finality with which Mr. Asquith enveloped his famous pronouncement of 1911, will regard it as marking the coming-of-age of the Dominions. Incidentally, they will record, as one of the most characteristic features of the episode, the fact that whereas the younger British nations achieved a new and portentous status in world politics, the legal unity of the Empire survived virtually unimpaired, thanks to devices which but further illustrate the British genius for changing the spirit without necessarily disrupting the time-honoured forms of relationship.

Early in the War the Imperialists, as was seen, not only had united in demanding that the Dominions be admitted to effective participation in the Peace Settlement, but had agreed upon the best method of bringing this about. It is perfectly clear that the procedure which they anticipated was not that actually employed. What they had in mind was the holding of a preliminary Conference of the Empire upon the cessation of hostilities at which a

united British programme would be formulated, and then pressed upon the Peace Conference by the emissaries of the Home Government, who in the absence of a representative central authority must speak for all, but under such circumstances might be said to represent a united Empire. Their discussion, in fact, turned merely upon the superiority of the Conference method over that of ascertaining Dominion views by correspondence—although one writer did mention separate representation at the Peace Conference in order to pronounce it impossible, as it would destroy the international unity of the Empire.[1] No stronger recognition of the readjustments accomplished during the War period could be asked than the acceptance by Imperialists of the actual basis of Dominion participation in the Settlement.[2]

The general nature of the Peace terms had been a subject of discussion at every session of the Imperial War Cabinet.[3] When the termination of hostilities was seen to be imminent, the part to be taken by the Dominions in the European Congress became an immediate problem, and several significant interchanges ensued, especially between the British and Canadian Governments.[4] Throughout the discussion of Dominion representation, Sir Robert Borden appears distinctly to have taken the lead, strongly backed by his colleagues in the Canadian Cabinet, and heartily endorsed by public opinion at home. The question involved several difficult and delicate considerations, and no small protest from the other Allies. But Dominion insistence that this was a matter for the Empire itself to settle, and their success in winning the support of the Home Government for their contentions, prevailed over the opposition from outside quarters.

On October 27, 1918, Premier Lloyd George telegraphed Sir Robert, impressing on him the importance of his immediate departure for London in view of the pending Armistice. In his reply two days later, the Canadian Premier put the matter squarely to the British Government. He said :

[1] " The Dominions and the Settlement," *Round Table*, vol. v. pp. 325–344 (March 1915) ; *cf.* also " The Making of Peace," *ibid.* vol. vii. pp. 1–13 (December 1916), and *United Empire*, vol. ix. pp. 492–505 (November 1918).

[2] Nevertheless the endorsation by Lord Milner (in July 1919) of separate Dominion representation was received with a degree of dismay (see Editorial comment in *United Empire*, vol. x. p. 364).

[3] Borden, *Canadian Constitutional Studies*, p. 111 ; *Canadian Annual Review* (1918), p. 420.

[4] Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1919 special session), No. 41j ; see also the useful résumé in *Canadian Annual Review* (1919), pp. 70–86.

There is need of serious consideration as to representation of the Dominions in the peace negotiations. The Press and the people of this country take it for granted that Canada will be represented at the Peace Conference. I appreciate possible difficulties as to the representation of the Dominions, but hope you will keep in mind that certainly a very unfortunate impression would be created and possibly a dangerous feeling might be aroused if these difficulties are not overcome by some solution which will meet the national spirit of the Canadian people. We discussed the subject to-day in Council and I found among my colleagues a striking insistence which doubtless is indicative of the general opinion entertained in this country. In a word they feel that new conditions must be met by new precedents. I should be glad to have your views.[1]

After his arrival in London, Sir Robert's colleagues at home strengthened his hands by further emphasis on his contention. The Acting Prime Minister, Sir Thomas White, telegraphed (December 4):

Council is of the opinion that in view of war efforts of Dominion, other nations entitled to representation at Conference should recognise unique character of British Commonwealth composed of group of free nations under one Sovereign and that provision should be made for special representation of these nations at Conference even though it may be necessary that in any final decisions reached they should speak with one voice; that if this is not possible you should form one of whatever delegation represents British Commonwealth.[2]

A further communication (January 4) dealt with more specific opposition and aligned Canada with the smaller nations at the Conference:

If Peace Conference in its composition is to express spirit of democracy for which we have been fighting, as Council thinks it should, small Allied Nations like Belgium which have fought with us throughout war should be entitled to representation throughout the whole Conference, even if limited to one member, and, if this were agreed, proposal that Canada should have same representation as Belgium and other small Allied Nations would be satisfactory, but not otherwise. Canada has had as many casualties as the United States and probably more actual deaths. Canadian people would not appreciate five American delegates throughout the whole Conference and no Canadian entitled to sit throughout Conference, nor would they appreciate several representatives from Great Britain and Canada none. There will be great disappointment here if you are not full member of Conference. We fully appreciate that you are doing everything in your power to secure suitable representation for Canada.[3]

[1] Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1919 special session), No. 41j, p. 1.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 2.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 3.

The Dominions asserted for themselves at the Peace Conference a dual status which bewildered logicians, but was based on factual premises very difficult of refutation on the part of those who realised how great was the strategic advantage which the junior members of the Empire were proposing to secure for themselves. On the one hand they were indubitably self-governing nations in all but the strictly legal sense, in magnitude and resources, in war sacrifices and achievement, every whit the equal of the lesser Allies. They were convinced that no mere legalistic impediments should rob them of this opportunity to maintain their own identity, and assert their interests through the medium of their own spokesmen. On the other hand they were undoubtedly parts of the British Empire, and were eager to keep whatever advantage would accrue to them from identification with one of the Great Powers which governed the actions of the assembly. It was not enough that they should be asked to file a brief with a committee of the Great Powers when matters in which they had a vital concern were undergoing settlement. Canada, in particular, which had no specific territorial interests, would have been virtually left out in the cold on this basis. There is no more striking feature in the history of the Peace Conference than the success of the Dominions in forcing a recognition of their dual position in world politics upon the other nations.

At the outset it was assumed that actual participation by the Dominions would be limited to the intermittent representation falling to the lot of each through the operation of a panel system which would affect one or two only of the five British places at the Council table. They regarded this as insufficient. On the other hand the status of a lesser Ally was unsatisfactory to Canada. The compromise most acceptable to all would be to secure both. Thereupon the Canadian Premier suggested that in addition to the general representation of the Dominions through the panel system there should be a distinctive representation for each Dominion similar to that accorded the smaller Allied Powers. This basis was eventually accepted by the Imperial War Cabinet.[1] On January 2, 1919, Sir Robert telegraphed to Ottawa the following account of his proposal and his suggestion as to how the objections of the other Allies might be met :

[1] Borden, *op. cit.* p. 117.

In Cabinet to-day I took up question of representation of the Dominions and spoke very frankly and firmly as to Canada's attitude. My proposal, which I consider the most satisfactory solution that is practicable and which was accepted by the Cabinet, is as follows :

First, Canada and the other Dominions shall each have the same representation as Belgium and the other small Allied Nations at the Peace Conference.

Second, as it is proposed to admit representatives of Belgium and other small Allied Nations only when their special interests are under consideration, I urged that some of the representatives of British Empire should be drawn from a panel on which each Dominion Prime Minister shall have a place.

I pointed out that Canada has no special interest such as South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, in respect of additional territory, and that the basis of representation accorded to small Allied Nations would, therefore, be unsatisfactory from Canadian point of view. I emphasised the insistence of Canada on this recognition, and I urged that the British Empire has the right to define the constitutional relations between the nations which compose it and their consequent right to distinctive representation. It is anticipated that British Empire will have five representatives entitled to be present at all meetings of Conference. I expressed my strong opinion that it would be most unfortunate if these were all selected from the British Islands. Probably three will be named and two others selected from the panel for each meeting. The panel will comprise both British and Dominion Ministers. No public announcement can be made until these proposals have been communicated to all Allied Governments and accepted. I shall be glad to have views of Council. My proposal really gives to Dominions fuller representation than that accorded to small Allied Nations such as Belgium.[1]

After securing in this way the backing of the Home Government, the Dominions were in an especially strong position strategically when the question of their status came before the Conference itself. Here again Premier Borden's own words constitute the most effective summary of what occurred at this stage of the proceedings :

When the question of procedure, including that of representation, came before the Peace Conference at Paris on January 12, the proposal for distinctive representation of the British Dominions aroused strong opposition. Again it was discussed in the British Empire Delegation, and the representatives of the Dominions, standing firmly upon the principle recognised in London, declined to accept any inferior status. In the result their insistence prevailed ; and through the combination of the panel system with their own distinctive representation, the Dominions secured a peculiarly effective position. The conditions of

[1] Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1919 special session), No. 41j, pp. 2–3.

peace were worked out through a series of committees or commissions, whose reports and resolutions were eventually consolidated into the Treaty of Peace. In the meetings of the British Delegation, of which the Dominion representatives were members, the report of each commission was thoroughly discussed before final acceptance. On many of the commissions Dominion Ministers had important place and they took no inconsiderable part in the proceedings of the Conference.[1]

In the rules of the Preliminary Peace Conference, the basis of representation was laid down as follows :

1. The belligerent Powers with general interests (the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan) shall attend all sessions and commissions.

The belligerent Powers with special interests (Belgium, Brazil, the British Dominions and India, China, Cuba, Greece, Guatemala, Hayti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, Siam, the Czecho-Slovak Republic) shall attend the sessions at which questions concerning them are discussed. . . .

2. The Powers shall be represented by Plenipotentiary Delegates to the number of—

Five for the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan ;

Three for Belgium, Brazil, Serbia ;

Two for China, Greece, the Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Siam, the Czecho-Slovak Republic ;

One for Cuba, Guatemala, Hayti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama ;

One for Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay.

The British Dominions and India shall be represented as follows :—

Two delegates each for Canada, Australia, South Africa, India (including the native states) ;

One delegate for New Zealand.

Each delegation will be entitled to set up a panel, but the number of plenipotentiaries shall not exceed the figures given above.

The representatives of the Dominions (including Newfoundland) and of India can, moreover, be included in the representation of the British Empire by means of the panel system.[2]

The dual status secured for the Dominions in the Conference is specifically recognised in these regulations. They were included both in the British Empire, classed as a " belligerent Power with general interests " and corresponding special privileges, where they participated under the panel system, and also in the enumeration of " belligerent Powers with special interests,"

[1] Borden, *op. cit.* pp. 117–118.

[2] Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1919 special session), No. 41j, pp. 3–4.

entitled to be summoned in their own right when questions in which they had a concern were being discussed. In addition, Dominion representation on various Commissions dealing with special problems further enhanced their importance in world politics. For instance, Sir Robert Borden sat on the Commission relating to Greece, General Botha on that concerning Poland, Sir Joseph Cook dealt with Czecho-Slovakia, Mr. Massey with the question of War guilt, Mr. Hughes with reparations, and Mr. Sifton with waterways.[1]

The problem of participation in negotiations having been settled to the satisfaction of the Dominions, they went on to register still further claims to recognition when the question of signing the treaties was reached. Here again the Canadian Premier took the lead. At a meeting of all Dominion Prime Ministers which he summoned, he secured unanimous acceptance of a memorandum which he had prepared in this connection (under date of March 12, 1919).[2] This document embodied two specific demands and stated the principles upon which they were based. Each treaty was to be signed personally by the Dominion plenipotentiaries; furthermore, each was to be submitted for approval to the Dominion parliaments and should be drafted accordingly. Sir Robert's proposal was accepted by the British Delegation and by the Peace Conference substantially as made; it merits quotation in full:

(1) The Dominion Prime Ministers, after careful consideration, have reached the conclusion that all treaties and conventions resulting from the Peace Conference should be so drafted as to enable the Dominions to become parties and signatories thereto. This procedure will give suitable recognition to the part played at the Peace table by the British Commonwealth as a whole, and will at the same time record the status attained there by the Dominions.

(2) The procedure is in consonance with the principles of constitutional government that obtain throughout the Empire. The Crown is the supreme Executive in the United Kingdom and in all the Dominions, but it acts on the advice of different constitutional units; and under resolution of the Imperial War Conference, 1917, the organisation of the Empire is to be based upon equality of nationhood.

(3) Having regard to the high objects of the Peace Conference it is also desirable that the settlements reached should be presented

[1] Keith, *War Government of the Dominions*, p. 150; *Canadian Annual Review* (1919), p. 137.

[2] Borden, *op. cit.* pp. 118–119.

at once to the world in the character of universally accepted agreements, so far as this is consistent with the constitution of each state represented. This object would not be achieved if the practice heretofore followed of merely inserting in the body of the convention an express reservation providing for the adhesion of the Dominions were adopted in these treaties ; and the Dominions would not wish to give even the appearance of weakening this character of the peace.

(4) On the constitutional point, it is assumed that each treaty or convention will include clauses providing for ratification similar to those in the Hague Convention of 1907. Such clauses will, under the procedure proposed, have the effect of reserving to the Dominion governments and legislatures the same power of review as is provided in the case of other contracting parties.

(5) It is conceived that this proposal can be carried out with but slight alterations of previous treaty forms. Thus :

(*a*) The usual recital of the Heads of State in the Preamble needs no alteration whatever, since the Dominions are adequately included in the present formal description of the King, namely, " His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India."

(*b*) The recital in the Preamble of the names of the plenipotentiaries appointed by the High Contracting Parties for the purpose of concluding the treaty would include the names of the Dominion plenipotentiaries immediately after the names of the plenipotentiaries appointed by the United Kingdom. Under the general heading " The British Empire " the subheadings " The United Kingdom," " The Dominion of Canada," " The Commonwealth of Australia," " The Union of South Africa," etc., would be used as headings to distinguish the various plenipotentiaries.

(*c*) It would then follow that the Dominion plenipotentiaries would sign according to the same scheme.

(6) The Dominion Prime Ministers consider, therefore, that it should be made an instruction to the British member of the Drafting Commission of the Peace Conference that all treaties should be drawn according to the above proposal.[1]

When these principles had been accepted Sir Robert next took steps to secure the issuance of credentials to the Canadian plenipotentiaries. It was his desire, as he expressed it in a communication to the British Premier, that it might " formally appear on the records that these full powers were issued on the responsibility of the Canadian Government." Accordingly, he telegraphed to Sir Thomas White (April 9) instructing him regarding the issuance of the Canadian Order in Council which would be neces-

[1] Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1919 special session), No. 41j, pp. 6–7.

sary to bring this about.[1] The plenipotentiaries named were Sir Robert Borden, Sir George E. Foster, Hon. Arthur L. Sifton and Hon. C. J. Doherty. This Order in Council requesting the issuance of the credentials was accordingly passed and transmitted to the Home Government, whereupon the necessary full powers were conferred. As such Letters Patent are signed by His Majesty without countersignature, argued Sir Robert, this procedure did not involve constitutional complications or anomaly; in other words, it was a transaction between the King and his Canadian advisers; the British Cabinet did not appear on the face of the record.[2]

The British Empire Delegation was constituted as follows:

United Kingdom	Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George	Prime Minister
,, ,,	,, A. J. Balfour	Foreign Minister
,, ,,	,, A. Bonar Law	Lord Privy Seal
,, ,,	,, George N. Barnes	Minister without Portfolio
,, ,,	,, Lord Reading	Lord Chief Justice
Canada	,, Sir Robert Borden	Prime Minister
,,	Hon. Arthur L. Sifton	Minister of Customs
,,	Rt. Hon. Sir George E. Foster	Minister of Trade and Commerce
,,	Hon. Charles J. Doherty	Minister of Justice
Australia	Rt. Hon. William M. Hughes	Prime Minister
,,	,, Sir Joseph Cook	Minister of the Navy
South Africa	Gen. The Rt. Hon. Louis Botha	Prime Minister
,,	,, ,, ,, J. C. Smuts	Imperial War Cabinet
New Zealand	Rt. Hon. William N. Massey	Prime Minister
,,	,, Sir J. G. Ward	Minister of Finance
India	,, E. S. Montagu	Secretary of State for India
,,	,, The Lord Sinha	Under Secretary for India
,,	H.H. The Maharajah of Bikanir	Indian Ruler[3]

[1] "The treaties concluded at the Peace Conference will be signed in respect of Canada by Canadian plenipotentiaries. Under international practice their full powers are issued by the King, but such issuance should be based upon formal action by Canadian Government authorising it. Order in Council should therefore be passed at once and cabled as well as mailed to Colonial Secretary. In order to provide for an eventuality, such as return of one or more of us before signature takes place, full powers should be issued to each Minister here" (Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1919 special session), No. 41j, p. 9).

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 7–10; Borden, *op. cit.* p. 160. But *cf.* Keith, *Responsible Government*, pp. 881–882, for a contrary view.

[3] *Canadian Annual Review* (1919), p. 74.

Of these the Canadian and New Zealand delegates sat alternatively, as only two of the former and one of the latter were entitled to membership at one time. The Treaty of Versailles, the Protocol, the Rhine Occupation Agreement, and the Allied Treaty with Poland were signed (June 28, 1919) by the following British Plenipotentiaries: D. Lloyd George, A. Bonar Law, Viscount Milner, A. J. Balfour, G. N. Barnes, C. J. Doherty, A. L. Sifton, W. M. Hughes, Sir Joseph Cook, Generals Botha and Smuts, W. F. Massey, E. S. Montagu and the Maharajah of Bikanir. Sir Robert Borden was not present, as he had returned to Canada in May. The Treaty of Peace with Austria, the Allied Treaties with Czecho-Slovakia and Jugoslavia, and some other agreements were signed at St. Germain (September 10) for Canada by Sir A. E. Kemp, Minister of Overseas Forces; for Australia by G. F. Pearce, Minister of Defence; for South Africa by Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary; for New Zealand by Sir Thomas Mackenzie, High Commissioner, and for India by Lord Sinha.[1]

In addition to securing for the Dominions the right of signing the treaties, the Canadian Premier was successful in his demand that they be made subject to ratification by the Dominion parliaments. Putting this principle into effect caused certain minor complications and some interchanges between the British and Canadian Governments. These and the constitutional implications involved will be considered presently. Ratification of the Versailles Treaties by all the parliaments concerned was accomplished by early autumn.[2] On the suggestion of the Home Government the procedure employed was not by bill but by resolution of both Houses approving the treaties; this was followed by an Order in Council informing the Home Government of such approval and requesting ratification on behalf of the Dominion by His Majesty. Thus time was saved, and the necessary legislation could be passed later.[3]

[1] See texts of these treaties and agreements in *Parliamentary Papers* (1919), vol. liii.

[2] Resolutions assenting to the Peace Treaty with Germany passed both Houses in each Dominion parliament as follows: New Zealand, September 2, 1919; South Africa, September 10 and 12; Canada, September 4 and 11; Australia, September 10 and October 1. On October 10 His Majesty formally ratified the Treaty for the Empire.

[3] Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1919 special session), No. 41j, pp. 12–13.

The Implications of the Versailles Settlement

No development in the relation of the British nations to world politics has evoked such controversy as the rôle of the Dominions in the Peace Settlement, and the bearing of the Settlement upon their status. Amid this plethora of discussion four or five considerations seem to deserve special emphasis. In the first place it should be noticed that the most crucial of Imperial issues, the conduct of high policy, had now forced itself upon public attention. Prior to the War the other problems, including the commercial and the local political aspects of foreign affairs, had received more or less definitive consideration, but the *modus vivendi* of 1911–14 had allowed postponement of the most difficult question. Now further evasion had become impossible. Furthermore, there had never been such a necessity on the part of foreign Powers for taking cognisance of developments within the Empire. The Britannic Question ceased to be, as heretofore, essentially a family matter.

Most of the controversy, as was natural, centred about the legal implications of the Settlement. In connection with the discussion it is worth noting that although much of what was called in question was no novelty, and followed the practice established in less significant spheres of Imperial foreign affairs, the international unity of the Empire had not hitherto been a matter of speculation. The doubts adumbrated by Lord Ripon, in his despatch of 1895 regarding decentralisation of commercial relations,[1] did not come to the fore until these principles were applied to issues of world politics. According to the more Imperialistic viewpoint, for instance that expounded by Professor Keith,[2] the international unity of the Empire was not broken by the procedure followed in the negotiation, signature or ratification of the Peace Treaties. On the other hand, the extreme view of the

[1] "To give the Colonies the power of negotiating treaties for themselves without reference to Her Majesty's Government would be to give them an international status as separate and sovereign states, and would be equivalent to breaking up the Empire into a number of independent states, a result which Her Majesty's Government are satisfied would be injurious equally to the Colonies and to the Mother Country, and would be desired by neither" (C. 7824, p. 15; cf. *supra*, ch. iii.).

[2] *War Government of the Dominions*, ch. vii.; *The Constitution, Administration and Laws of the Empire*, pp. 43–53; *Responsible Government*, pp. 877–893.

legal change in Dominion status holds that when a Dominion signed the treaty " she took upon herself the status of a Power involving herself in all rights and obligations of one of the signatories of the treaty," liable to be treated by foreign Powers as an independent state, making war and peace on her own initiative.[1]

Those who would minimise the legal purport of the innovations incident to the Settlement undoubtedly have a strong case. There is the fact that in foreign relations the Crown acted for the whole Empire. Are foreign Powers to take cognisance of the sources of advice which is tendered to the Crown ? There was the identity in status of all the British plenipotentiaries. What was said in an earlier chapter regarding Dominion representatives charged with the handling of commercial treaties also holds true in this case. All the members of the British Delegation acted by authority of Letters Patent from the King in whose name, under the Constitution, the treaties were negotiated and signed. Furthermore, the treaties bound the whole Empire ; not even the ambiguities of partial applicability or optional adhesion or withdrawal were present to complicate the issue.[2] Moreover, queries raised during the ratification debates as to what would have been the effect had a Dominion refused to sign or ratify are disposed of by the fact that none of them refused to complete the work of the Imperial plenipotentiaries.

The Dominions certainly assumed a new status, and one which defies logical exposition. But it is nowhere a status independent of the Empire of which they avowedly in the treaties still form parts. They are recognised merely as sufficiently important parts of the Empire to deserve specific mention. Several liability (if any) is so inextricably involved with joint liability that should the former be invoked by or against a Dominion the latter could hardly fail of being appealed to in return. Even in the matter of status acquired through membership in the League of Nations, the Imperial and the National aspects seem inextricably interdependent, as far as possible legal developments are

[1] W. Downie Stewart, in a question to the Prime Minister in the New Zealand House, quoted in *Round Table*, vol. x. pp. 469–470.

[2] This argument is further supported by the fact that the exception to this principle, the abortive treaty of assistance to France (Versailles, June 28, 1919), specifically excepted the Dominions until they assented thereto.

concerned.[1] Mr. Rowell has elucidated this dual status of the Dominions, to a helpful degree at least. He says :

When the Covenant of the League of Nations was drafted, the right of the Dominions to membership was not only recognised but a new principle was introduced into diplomatic practice and sanctioned by all the nations which were parties of the Treaties of Peace, and by all the other nations which have since become members of the League, viz. that the condition of admission to the family of nations should be not independent and separate sovereignty, but full self-government. Article 1 of the Covenant provides " Any self-governing state, dominion or colony . . . may become a member of the League." This provision appears to have been overlooked by those who think that membership of the Dominions in the League is a step towards separation. It is just the reverse. Membership on the conditions named means that the other nations have recognised the unique character of the Britannic Commonwealth and have admitted the Dominions to the family of nations without involving separation or even the idea of separation from the parent state.[2]

Further light is thrown upon the controversy over the legal aspects if it be remembered that much of the discussion centred about the correct interpretation of certain conventions of the Imperial Constitution, not on the probable attitude of foreign Powers. In other words it dealt with the rights and duties of the Dominions and Mother Country in relation to one another rather than to outside nations, and in all probability would be ignored by the latter in the stress of international rivalry. The characteristic inwardness of the Britannic Question has already been commented upon.[3] Its effect upon discussion of Imperial foreign relations has been almost wholly to obscure the issue in just this fashion.[4]

[1] This is probably the answer to the question raised by Mr. Lapointe during the Canadian debate on the Peace Treaty : " If we are for all purposes separate and distinct members of the League, what would be the position in case of a conflict between Great Britain and another member of the League, in which the Executive of the League should decide against Great Britain and a war ensue ? In that event Canada would have to keep its pledge, redeem its obligations, and side with the other members of the League against Great Britain, and thereby withdraw from the Empire, or else it would disregard and break its pledges under the treaty and take sides with Great Britain " (*Canadian Annual Review*, 1919, p. 106). See also Corbett and Smith, *Canada and World Politics*, ch. v.

[2] N. W. Rowell, *The British Empire and World Peace*, pp. 178–179. The decisive factor in admission to the League was probably membership in the Commonwealth rather than autonomy. See Sir John Salmond's remarks on the latter criterion, *infra*, p. 90.

[3] *Supra*, Introduction.

[4] Many of the arguments, incidentally, were clearly inspired by political partisanship.

No popular audience could be expected to discriminate between claims of international validity and those which could hardly meet recognition save within the Empire itself. The cautious assertion by Premier Borden, that if Canada refused to ratify the treaty she " would stand out of and apart from the rest of the Empire and would be committed to such independent action that she could not be regarded as acting in co-operation with the other nations of the Empire " [1] illustrates this point. So, too, does Mr. Hughes' argument that such abstention by Australia would deprive her of membership in the League of Nations and of her right to a mandate in the Pacific.[2] Had she refused ratification, Australia would nevertheless have been in the League as part of the Empire, though she could hardly have been forced to send delegates to the Assembly. Had she refused the mandate, doubtless the Home Government would have taken care that it was conferred upon the Empire.

The confusion between the internal and external aspects of the question appears in the contention of the Canadian Minister of Justice, Mr. Doherty, that " before that power (to give effect to the treaty) could come to be exercised at all, the treaty would have to become binding upon Canada, and it would only have become so binding by reason of the ratification of His Majesty on advice of the Government of Canada." [3] In view of the absence of specific stipulations in the treaties providing for the optional adhesion of the Dominions, such an argument can scarcely be considered valid as against foreign countries; it hardly amounts even to a restatement of Laurier's assumed discretion regarding participation in Empire wars. The same may be said of the theory that the Dominions were separately parties to the Peace Treaty, and that His Majesty, on the advice of his several Ministries, delivered separate ratifications on their behalf.[4] Had the plenipotentiaries of a Dominion refused to sign, or its parliament to ratify, it would still have been bound by the action of the Imperial government as regards other Powers. Further issues would be between it and the Mother Country alone, unless the Dominion wished to go beyond the treaties

[1] In reply to a question by Mr. Fielding (*Journal*, vol. i. p. 90).
[2] *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 128.
[3] During the debate on the Austrian Treaty resolution (October 24, 1920), quoted in *Canadian Annual Review* (1919), p. 87.
[4] Cf. *Round Table*, vol. x. p. 896.

altogether and secure for itself a completely independent status in international law.

Whatever the complications within the Empire, or whatever the political sequels as regards other nations which might result from the situation of the Dominions at Paris, it appears safe to conclude that the optimists and alarmists who adopted the extreme interpretation went much further than their premises warranted. At the same time it must be admitted that several tentative steps were taken in the direction of distinctive Dominion negotiation, signature and ratification which might well achieve legal recognition in subsequent treaties, and so effect radical innovations in the scope of Imperial commitments in the sphere of high policy. Precedents lay ready to hand in the principles long operative as regards commercial treaties. Now arguments for applying them to political questions of prime importance were being freely broached.

Turning now to consider the implications of the Peace Settlement from the political standpoint, the first feature to arrest the attention is the united participation of the Dominions and Mother Country in the solution of the most serious problems of foreign policy which had ever faced the Empire. Colonialism, even in high policy, was gone—whatever the outcome might be. At the same time, apart from the achievement of Imperial federation itself, no phenomenon could have been more gratifying to the Imperialists than the solid front presented by the British Delegation on this occasion. The Home Government backed the Dominions vigorously, and the younger nations revealed a capacity for compromise, even if somewhat forced. The disposal of the German colonies illustrates both points. They were not internationalised, they went to the Dominions; but they went as mandates, not incorporated territories.[1] This unanimity was further exemplified by the Austrian and Bulgarian Treaties. The Dominions signed and ratified both of these, although they did not choose to participate in the negotiation of either of them.[2] The terms in general, however, had doubtless been a frequent subject of discussion in the Imperial War Cabinet and the British Delegation.

[1] *Cf.* Sir Joseph Ward's criticism of President Wilson and the mandate system at a meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute (*United Empire*, vol. xi. p. 660); see also the articles from Australia and New Zealand (March 1919) in *Round Table*, vol. ix. pp. 602–604, 638–639.

[2] *Cf. Round Table*, vol. x. p. 239.

Despite these gratifying features, there was at the same time a reverse side to this medal commemorating British achievement. It was the noticeable assertion of Dominion individuality in world politics. Even the unity which prevailed during the settlement revealed no inherent guarantee of permanence. That which came from the legal status of the plenipotentiaries promised nothing in itself. More serious still, the hearty co-operation within the Empire Delegation was due to the exigencies of the situation, and was subject to much the same hazards as attended that of the Allies generally. The Mother Country and the Dominions had got into a serious scrape, they were all in the same boat together, and it was to the distinct advantage of each of them to work together until they were safely out of it. Had the Empire been divided, continental jealousies and rivalries would have enabled the United States to dominate the proceedings, and Dominion as well as British aims would have been checkmated thereby.[1] But fourteen British votes constituted no insignificant *bloc* in the Council of Seventy, and conversely the Dominions enjoyed a position of influence attained by no other small nations when decisions formulated in the Empire Delegation were expounded by the British Premier in the Council of Four.[2] True, Dominion imperialism in the matter of the German colonies suffered a partial disappointment, as did that of the other Allies, but where would they have been without British backing ?

All this was clearly realised by the Dominion plenipotentiaries at Paris. It is questionable, however, whether it was as prominent in the minds of the people at home, absorbed as they were with the new status their countries had achieved. Certainly Mr. J. Castell Hopkins, in reviewing these events for Canadian readers, felt it necessary to impress such considerations upon his less Imperialist compatriots. In view of the measure of forgetfulness which public men have subsequently displayed, it is more than ever desirable to quote here his pointed comment on this occasion :

> It would be well at this point in the narrative of the first real share of Canada, Australia, South Africa and India in the foreign politics of the nations to say that the influence which they wielded and the part they took were not based upon their own power or even their own

[1] This point is particularly stressed by the Editor in *Canadian Annual Review* (1919), at p. 73.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 75; Keith, *Dominion Home Rule in Practice*, p. 37; *Round Table*, vol. ix. p. 481.

share in the war—vital and valuable as the latter might seem to be and really was to the British Empire as such. As nations apart from the Empire they were small and far away, they ranked as yet, perhaps unfairly, with the lesser South American countries and the smaller States of Europe; the 100,000 men whom Canada kept in the field, with all their gallantry and their achievements, could not have obtained a successful hearing in the Conference against the representatives of millions of other combatants if their delegates had not been backed by and come from a part of the British Empire. It was this great power behind them which compelled representation at the Congress for Dominions which had no technical place in that body; which placed their representatives on vital committees and made their advice and opinions factors in the settlement of world issues; which compelled the United States delegates to give way and accept their membership in the Conference and in the League of Nations.

Borden, Hughes, Botha, Smuts, Lord Sinha and Massey were able men, but so were Venizelos of Greece, Pessoa of Brazil, Pashitch of Serbia, Vesnitch of Croatia, Chinda of Japan, Bratiano of Roumania, and many more who took little share in the discussions or decisions. But the men of the Dominions represented a great Empire as well as their own countries, and a power and prestige were theirs much greater than the Press of the day in Canada indicated.[1]

If Dominion co-operation with the Mother Country through the medium of the Empire Delegation rested upon an opportunist basis and so presented somewhat dubious prospects for the future, there was no question as to what was implicit in the other aspect of their status at the Peace Conference—that of the lesser Allies, authorised individually and separately to maintain their interests before the Great Powers. The fact that neither position alone would satisfy the Dominions, and that thanks to British backing they secured both, had led to a portentous compromise. On the one hand it presented the spectacle of a united Empire, maintaining a composite foreign policy, in the formulation of which all had shared, and furnished the machinery through which that policy might be expressed. On the other hand it established precedents of the utmost significance and of an entirely Nationalistic purport. The one was not the necessary consequence of the other. When Mr. Massey defended his conduct by asserting that the changes in Imperial relationships came not with the signing of the treaties, but with the admission of the Dominions to the councils of the Empire, the Wellington *Evening Post* hastened to point out that:

[1] *Canadian Annual Review* (1919), pp. 70–71.

The second development is so far from being the logical outcome of the first that the two are in direct conflict with one another. If the invitation of the Dominions to the Imperial War Cabinet was an effective call to the councils of the Empire, and to share in the control of its foreign policy, why do they need to be represented separately and independently of the Empire on an international tribunal? A logical answer to the contention of Senator Johnson and his friends that the British Empire was being given six votes in the League of Nations is not easy to devise. But a much more practically serious difficulty is that the Empire may tend to have six voices on Imperial policy instead of one, and may overlook the call to an effective unity until it is too late.[1]

Which of these aspects of the compromise was to dominate the rôle of the Dominions in the world politics in the future was the question which the Imperialists would have given much to answer. Within a very few years of peace-time experience, they were fated to receive an unwelcome measure of enlightenment on this subject.

The Nationalistic aspect of Dominion participation in the Peace Conference comprised the measure of separate identity accorded the Dominions during the negotiations and in the preambles to the treaties, in the ratification of the treaties by the separate Dominion parliaments, and in the status obtained by the Dominions in the League of Nations. In all these features disintegrating tendencies were implicit. Undoubtedly the political far outweighed the legal significance of these developments. It is reasonably certain that should the issue arise the strictly legal would be subordinated to the political factors in the situation, for international law is but the handmaid of world politics. Purely political contentions, moreover, frequently achieve legal recognition at a later period. This has been noticeably the case in regard to Dominion aspirations in the field of international relations, backed as they generally have been by the full weight of Imperial influence. Hence the political implications of Dominion status at Paris, whatever doubt there may be on the legal side, are distinctly ominous, for in them we find the roots of subsequent developments, many of which have found actual embodiment in treaties. Without Versailles the Empire could not have had Locarno.

The actual achievement in the Peace Settlement was the

[1] (October 20, 1919), quoted in *Round Table*, vol. x. p. 470.

recognition in international affairs of Dominion national *feeling* rather than Dominion national *status*. It meant acceptance of the Dominions' claim that they should rank in world politics as the peers of the other small nations, without at the same time breaking those legal and other ties which bound them to the Empire. The Allied statesmen had proved unable to discover by what logic either aspect of the status claimed for the Dominions by Premier Borden could be denied. At the time this worked out entirely to the advantage of the Empire as a whole as well as the Dominions. It had given them an influence greatly superior to that of the lesser "independent" Allies. It had also proclaimed how much more effective in world politics a united British Commonwealth could be than the mere sovereign government of an Empire speaking for its colonies with their tacit, and probably only passive, consent. At the same time the separate *voice* demanded by the Dominions revealed that politically the British Empire was no more than a confederacy. The several members were bent on maintaining their separate interests, and offered no guarantee of regularly presenting a united policy to the world at large. On this occasion they had done so; later, under altered conditions, there might be less complete agreement. Legal unity in itself counted little—that would still be the attribute of a unitary state torn to the verge of disruption by sectional disputes. What would it avail that the leaders of the six British nations were all legally advisers of a single Sovereign, if they should offer six varieties of advice, and each group of advisers be responsible to a separate electorate which insisted that their recommendations should be adopted as far as they were concerned? At Paris Dominion Nationalism emerged from the shelter of the Imperial Conference, where it had enjoyed the privacy of a strictly family matter, and asserted itself before an international assembly.

Another feature of Dominion participation in the Peace Settlement which was to pave the way for important developments later was the ratification of the treaties by the Dominion parliaments. This was one of Premier Borden's specific achievements at London and Paris. It was a practice for the recognition of which he had frequently clamoured as Leader of the Opposition in Canada, notably in connection with the reference of the Alaskan Boundary dispute (1903),[1] and the International Boundary Waters Treaty

[1] *E.g.* Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, session 1903, col. 14802.

with the United States (January 11, 1909). His consistency in maintaining this position while in office elevates it to the rank of one of his fundamental principles. In the British Constitution, treaty-making is part of the Prerogative, and does not normally require formal parliamentary ratification, although as a rule this is indirectly involved through the necessity of securing legislation to implement the treaty.[1] Throughout his career as head of the Canadian Government Sir Wilfrid Laurier adhered to the strict interpretation of this principle. In contrast, Mr. Borden's contention, as stated in the Canadian House in the autumn of 1909, was that there should henceforth be inserted in all treaties implicating the Dominions a provision making them subject to ratification by the parliaments of the Dominions concerned, if the nature of the treaties was such as to impose any burden on the people, involve a change in the law of the land, require legislative action to make them effective, affect the free exercise of the legislative power, or affect territorial rights.[2]

The issue was thoroughly discussed in the Canadian House in intermittent debates from 1909 to 1911 regarding the International Boundary Waters Treaty. Mr. Borden maintained that as this treaty, to an extent at least, affected territorial rights, it should be submitted to Parliament. Furthermore it was already before the United States Senate, and from American sources had become a matter of public discussion in Canada, which put Parliament in a ridiculous light.[3] Probably from readiness to embarrass the Opposition as well as from unwillingness to raise a difficult issue of Imperial relationships, Sir Wilfrid fully endorsed the traditional constitutional practice. He defended his position by quoting a telegram from Lord Crewe (January 29, 1909) which stated the Home Government's attitude upon the question :

> In this country the treaty-making power is the King, acting on advice of his responsible Ministers, who in cases of treaties which affect a Dominion act of course in full consultation and accord with the government of the Dominion concerned. . . . The fact that the Senate of the United States see the treaty before the parliament of the Dominion, but not before the government of the Dominion, is therefore entirely due to the terms of the constitution of the United States.[4]

[1] Anson, *Law and Custom of the Constitution*, 3rd ed., vol. iii. pp. 102–110; Keith, *Responsible Government*, pp. 922–925.

[2] Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, session 1909–10, cols. 6647 *et seqq.*

[3] *Ibid.* session 1909, cols. 633–634, 1562; session 1909–10, col. 37.

[4] *Ibid.* session 1909, col. 550.

Sir Wilfrid accepted full responsibility for the treaty, incidentally reminding them that Mr. George C. Gibbons, Chairman of the International Waterways Commission, had represented Canada during the negotiations, and held that it was complete without parliamentary ratification.[1]

When the bill implementing the treaty was before the House, Mr. Doherty interpreted the Government's position to be that the treaty was completely binding on Canada, the power of the British Dominion extending only to providing the machinery necessary to make it effective. His own view of the matter was conservative. He deprecated stepping in on the mere theory that ratification could do no harm. If the treaty power were vested in the Crown, sanction of it by Canada would simply be impertinence ; if parliamentary ratification were necessary, surely the Imperial Parliament was alone competent to act. Mr. Borden later agreed that under the circumstances the latter contention was correct. He maintained, however, his view that undoubtedly the Crown could make treaties containing the stipulation that they should not go into effect until ratified by the Dominion parliament concerned.[2] This, of course, meant that Mr. Borden had been impelled into the forward step of demanding the embodiment henceforth of a new principle in the content itself of political treaties of this type—a principle, it will be recalled, which was already in operation as regards commercial treaties.

It should be noted that the International Boundary Waters Treaty (like that disposing of the Alaskan Boundary dispute) dealt with a political question in which a specific Dominion was primarily involved. At this stage, then, the official view of the Home Government was that, in the case of such treaties, ratification by Dominion parliaments was unnecessary and undesirable. Treaty-making was still to be the prerogative of the British Cabinet. Dominion governments, nevertheless, were to be fully consulted regarding their interests, and might be represented through their own Commissioners *ad hoc* during the negotiations, but their powers extended no further. This view was concurred in by the Canadian Government during the Laurier régime, and by public men outside it, but was protested against by the Leader of the Opposition. The principles governing political treaties

[1] Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, session 1909, cols. 639–640.
[2] *Ibid.* session 1910–11, cols. 9128–9129, 9136.

of Empire-wide scope were fixed in the 1911 Imperial Conference. In connection with these the issue of Dominion ratification was not even raised. Thus we see how great a step in advance was projected by Premier Borden in claiming Dominion ratification of the treaties comprised in the European peace settlement. It adds interest to the interchanges between British and Canadian Governments in this connection.[1]

On July 4, 1919, the Colonial Secretary telegraphed the hope that the German Treaty might be ratified by three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers before the end of the month. This brought a terse reply from Sir Robert: "I am under pledge to submit the treaty to Parliament before ratification on behalf of Canada. No copy of the treaty has yet arrived and Parliament has been prorogued. Kindly advise how you expect to accomplish ratification on behalf of the whole Empire before end July." Whether or not Lord Milner meditated an eleventh hour attempt to head off ratification by the several parliaments of the Empire, and with it the creation of a precedent which might promote devolution in the future, does not appear on the face of the record. Nevertheless his reply to Sir Robert's query contains some interesting views upon the subject. He stated:

> I have now consulted with Prime Minister and the Cabinet with reference to your most secret telegram of July 9. Our view is that early ratification, especially now that Germany has ratified, is of the highest importance. In the British Constitution there is nothing which makes it necessary for the King to obtain the consent of Parliament before ratifying treaty. With perfect constitutional propriety the King can ratify on the advice of his Ministers. For a treaty of this far-reaching importance, and one embracing the whole Empire, the King certainly ought to act at the instance of all his constitutional advisers—the Dominion Ministries as well as that of the United Kingdom. But inasmuch as Dominion Ministers participated in peace negotiations, and side by side with Ministers of the United Kingdom signed preliminaries of treaty, we hold that His Majesty if he now ratified the treaty for the whole Empire would have the same constitutional justification in doing so in respect of Dominions as he has in respect of the United Kingdom. The King by a single act would bind the whole Empire, as it is right that he should so, but that act would represent the considered judgment of his constitutional advisers in all self-governing states of the Empire, because it would be merely giving effect to an international pact which they had all agreed to.

[1] Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1919 special session), No. 41j, pp. 10–13.

In short, Lord Milner argued that since the treaties had been the work of so representative a body of Royal Ministers, full participation by the Dominions had already been achieved, and ratification by their parliaments would be a work of supererogation. Nevertheless, in view of the Canadian Premier's pledge, he offered to delay ratification long enough to permit of summoning a special session in Canada for this purpose.

In replying, Premier Borden countered with his own views upon the constitutional aspect of the question :

> It seems to us that there is considerable doubt whether under modern constitutional practice the King should ratify without first obtaining the approval of Parliament. We think that in accordance with recent practice and authorities such approval should be obtained in the case of treaties imposing any burden on the people, or involving any change in the law of the land, or requiring legislative action to make them effective or affecting the free exercise of the legislative power, or affecting territorial rights.
>
> On the other point we fully agree that the King in ratifying the treaty ought only to act at the instance of all his constitutional advisers throughout the Empire, but we do not entirely understand the suggestion that in the case of the Dominions the signature of the Dominion plenipotentiaries is equivalent to the tendering of advice to ratify. Do you regard this as holding good in the case of the signature of the United Kingdom plenipotentiaries ?

He announced his proposal to call a special session for September 4, and his confidence of securing ratification a week later. Answering a subsequent threat that ratification could not be delayed beyond September 11, Sir Robert this time reminded the Colonial Secretary of the political aspect of Imperial relations which was involved. " I cannot emphasise too strongly," he cabled, " the unfortunate results which would certainly ensue from ratification before the Canadian Parliament has had an opportunity of considering treaty." After this warning communications were confined to the technical points of the ratification procedure.

It may appear that undue space has been devoted at this point to the issue of Dominion ratification, in view of the fact that ratification was not begrudged, and that refusal of it in specific cases would doubtless have made no legal difference. This is perfectly true, but ratification by Dominion parliaments of such important treaties created so significant a precedent that Lord Milner's hesitancy to go through with it (assuming such existed)

may readily be understood. The treaties were composite products, the work of Dominion as well as British representatives, yet all of these despite their diverse origin had held the status of advisers to and plenipotentiaries of a single Sovereign. Granted this was largely a constitutional fiction, it was nevertheless one of those cases in which fictions play a major rôle in practical politics. The Imperialist Colonial Secretary might well demur before a radically new and divergent step was taken—that of recognising the principle of ratification by separate parliaments, all avowedly independent of each other, and drawing their effective authority from entirely unrelated sources. To accord the right of ratification implied provision for refusal to ratify in specific cases. To render such a principle effective beyond legal doubt meant going far beyond Mr. Borden's contention during the debate on the Waterways Treaty. It would involve including in treaties even of supreme importance to the Empire definite limitations on their scope, in the form of provision for the optional adhesion of the various Dominions. Within the British Delegation diversity of political control throughout the Empire might be relegated to the background, but by this action it would be proclaimed from the housetops.

The decentralisation of political control in foreign relations and the publication of the situation within the Empire to the world at large were carried a long step further by the grant to the Dominions of separate representation in the League of Nations. These, rather than possible legal complications, were what disturbed Imperialist commentators. Perhaps the compromise embodied in League membership did offer protection against disintegration, and so accounts in part for the support accorded it by Britain. An Empire threatened with early disruption would gladly welcome the measure of stability in world politics offered by such an organisation. The new status would allay Dominion separatism; contact at first hand with international problems might even impress upon them the value of British connections, and meanwhile Imperial influence in the Council would be a valuable counterpoise to the activities of the Assembly.

The British Empire, however, did not seem to have reached such a parlous state, and well-grounded belief that they were plunging into it roused apprehensions in many Imperialists. They deemed it a *sine qua non* that the Empire should speak

with one voice a policy formulated in truly representative fashion. Hence they endorsed the Empire aspect of League membership (which implied *indirect* representation of the several British nations) and exulted over the institution of the British Empire Delegation, which furnished the machinery they had coveted for a generation. Individual membership, which implied a separate and *direct* voice in an international assembly for each Dominion, was the antithesis of what they wanted.[1] This would be like holding a Cabinet discussion on the floor of the House. Furthermore, the whole setting was one to inspire diversity of policy and disintegration rather than Imperial co-operation. Within the Imperial Conference or the British Delegation there might be diversity of opinion, but there would always be, to a sensible degree at least, consciousness of the distinctiveness of the British nations from the world at large. In the Assembly of the League, on the other hand, where the Dominions mingled on a basis of equality with other nations, and held to all intents and purposes a separate and independent status, there was every incentive to emphasise National rather than Imperial interests and policies. Support might be offered and sought here and there upon specific issues as expediency dictated, and members of the Commonwealth might be found aligned against each other.[2] In short the situation was well calculated to promote, as time went on, the individual aspect of the status achieved by the Dominions at Paris, to the eventual submergence, it might be, of the Imperial connection.

Such consideration led many to question Smuts' assurance that the Dominions could retain their place in the Imperial organisation and still vote independently in the League. If their votes were not mere shams, it was urged, they must be backed with all their powers, even against other members of the Commonwealth. Hence arose the suggestion of a limited League membership for the Dominions, which would involve not separate votes but permanent representation in the British Delegation, through which their foreign relations would be carried on.[3] But the time

[1] E.g. *Round Table*, vol. ix. p. 611 ; vol. x. pp. 470, 899.

[2] *E.g.* Mr. Rowell, in the Canadian House (February 18, 1921), commented with satisfaction upon the surprise evidenced in the Assembly at the independent attitude displayed by the Dominion delegates. He cited as an instance the motion for the admission of Albania to the League, proposed by South Africa, and seconded by Canada, against the recommendation of France and Great Britain (*Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 310–311).

[3] *Round Table*, vol. xi. p. 683.

for such proposals was now past. Another expedient, designed both to counteract the disruptive effect of the League upon the Empire and to allay American suspicions of the organisation, was that of regional or group membership, in accordance with which the British nations would constitute a distinct unit, enjoying collective representation (although a single vote) in the Council.[1]

As Dominion reluctance to assume all the obligations implied in the original project became more apparent, a different attitude toward the League gained headway, namely to counteract its disruptive tendencies by a reinterpretation of Imperial commitments along lines more compatible with Dominion wishes. Early in the discussion one writer, for instance, summed up his argument as follows :

1. We should state definitely that our action within the League will be governed solely by our own judgment of every situation as it arises, and we must undertake no general obligations which we may not be able or willing, when the test comes, to discharge.

2. We must in no case commit ourselves to responsibilities which we cannot discharge to the full with our own resources, independent of assistance from any foreign Power.

3. We must definitely denounce the idea that the League may normally enforce its opinions by military or economic pressure on recalcitrant states. It exists to bring principals together for open discussion of international difficulties, to extend and develop the mechanism and habit of international co-operation, and to establish an atmosphere in which international controversies may be settled with fairness and goodwill. These are the essential limits of international action in the present state of national sentiment throughout the world, unless and until the conscience of the nations is once more challenged by some flagrant violation of international right.[2]

As evidence that the Dominions might not follow the Mother Country into all her foreign ventures accumulated, it became apparent that Imperial co-operation could be secured only by a modification of the vigour of British foreign policy, and that the Home Government must either act on its own responsibility upon frequent occasions, or incline once more to her traditional policy of aloofness from European controversies.

The bearing of League membership upon Imperial solidarity was further complicated by the status of the Dominions as

[1] This was proposed, for example, by Mr. Jebb in " Conference or Cabinet ? " (*United Empire*, vol. xi., at pp. 244-245).

[2] " The British Empire, the League and the United States " (March 1920) ; *Round Table*, vol. x., at pp. 246-247.

mandatories. Two alternatives were possible. Presumably the mandates might have been granted to the British Empire and then devolved by the Home Government upon the Dominions which desired them. The latter would then have been responsible for their administration directly to the Home Government. They would not deal with the League authorities direct, and in case any complications arose, an effective buffer would be interposed between them and disgruntled foreign Powers. Such an arrangement would have been calculated to preserve Imperial unity. The other alternative was the acceptance of mandates by the Dominions directly from the Allied and Associated Powers and immediate responsibility to the League for their administration. The second basis implied a much greater degree of Imperial decentralisation than did the first. It was preferred by Australia and the Union of South Africa, while New Zealand at the outset decided upon indirect tenure of her mandate.

In addition to the fundamental issue of policy involved, the procedure of the Dominions in securing their mandates was conditioned by considerations raised by the powers granted them under their respective constitutions. A recent opinion of the Dominion Appeal Court having held that New Zealand could not legislate for territory beyond her limits, the Cabinet, after consultation with the Home Government, determined to avail themselves of an Imperial statute, the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890. Under authority of this an Imperial Order in Council (the Western Samoa Order in Council, 1920) was gazetted March 11, 1920, which declared the jurisdiction of His Majesty in the islands to be vested in the Parliament of New Zealand. Meanwhile the latter, by the Treaties of Peace Act, 1919, expressed willingness to accept the mandate and conferred upon the Governor-General in Council such jurisdiction and authority over the islands as were devolved by His Majesty on the Executive Government of New Zealand. Accordingly the "Samoan Constitution Order, 1920," was gazetted April 1 and civil government established May 1, 1920. On the other hand the Union of South Africa dealt with the matter directly by the "Treaties of Peace and South-West Africa Mandate Act, 1919"; no Imperial authority was sought, and General Smuts refused to admit the existence of constitutional impediments to such extra-territorial legislation. The Australian Commonwealth legislated

in respect of her mandate under authority to govern territory vested in the Federal Government by her Constitution.[1] In contrast, the mandate over the Nauru Island and its rich phosphate deposits was granted to " The British Empire," and was administered under a tripartite arrangement between the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.[2]

The issues involved in the assumption by the Dominions of mandates from the League were succintly stated by the Australian correspondent to *The Round Table* as follows :

> There is a whole world of difference between the New Zealand and the South African notions of a Dominion's status in relation to the mandate territories. According to General Smuts, the mandate is granted direct from the League of Nations to His Majesty in right of the Dominion of South Africa, with no " Imperial " government as an intermediary. South Africa exercises authority in the name of the Crown, but solely on the advice of the King's Ministers for the Union, as responsible to the Union Parliament. Neither legally nor politically has the Parliament of the United Kingdom or the British Ministry, or any other member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, any relation to the matter except as members of the League of Nations, or except as South Africa takes counsel with them. New Zealand, on the other hand, treats her mandate as one received from the King, and therefore (as the King acts only through Ministers) as one received from a government which acts for the Empire. According to this view, New Zealand acts on behalf of the Empire in exercising her mandate ; and, founding her authority legally on this grant and on the powers of an Imperial Act, she admits a responsibility within the Empire and the supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament.
>
> In the case of Australia the question might present itself at any time in an acute form. She exercises her mandate over territories remote from her shores, and in an arena where, even apart from the conflict of interests and aspirations, delicate situations are peculiarly likely to arise. In case of any " untoward incident " calling forth a claim for redress from a foreign state, to whom is the complainant state to address its demand ? To the King ? But to the King as represented by the British Ministry, or to the King as represented by his Ministers of State for the Commonwealth ? To London or to Melbourne ? And which Government is to give the answer on which peace or war may depend ? [3]

[1] The whole problem was discussed before the Royal Colonial Institute (November 2, 1920) by Sir James Allen, then New Zealand High Commissioner ; *United Empire*, vol. xi. pp. 648–663. See also debates on the subject in *Journal*, vol. i. pp. 166–167, 201–218, 552–554, 741–743, and vol. ii. pp. 158–165 ; also Keith, *Responsible Government*, pt. v. ch. xiv.

[2] *Journal*, vol. i. see Index.

[3] Vol. x. p. 897 (June 1920).

New Zealand finally conformed to the attitude of the other Dominions, and in April 1925 officially notified the League that all correspondence should be sent direct, and not through the Colonial Office in London.

Parliamentary Opinion of the Settlement

An analysis of the debates in the several Dominion parliaments upon the resolutions assenting to the Peace Treaties demonstrates the political wisdom of Sir Robert Borden in insisting that such opportunities for airing criticisms and securing avowed acceptance of the Settlement throughout the Empire should be afforded. A point of paramount significance which seems generally to have been ignored is the fact that the War had elevated to the leadership of the various British nations a group of men holding virtually identical views upon the fundamentals of Imperial relationships. The nemesis of Imperial Conferences hitherto had been the absence of such a coincidence of representation. Imperialists would speak for one government, Nationalists for another, and when the succeeding session convened the alignment would have shifted ; thus constructive projects fell by the wayside. This relative agreement at the centre of affairs renders consideration of dissentient opinions overseas all the more imperative. The discussions reveal a diversity of policy which was notably absent among the men who composed the British Empire Delegation. In all parliaments there was an obvious division between those who thought the terms were if anything too mild and those who feared they were unenforceable and bore the seeds of further trouble ; between those who emphasised the achievement in Imperial co-operation and those who saw only tendencies to disruption in what had been done ; between those who were eager to assume the new status and its responsibilities and those who inveighed against the surrender of Dominion isolation and their committing themselves to embroilment in European politics. In addition the debates were specifically characterised in Australia and New Zealand by a preoccupation on the part of all speakers with the safety of the Pacific, and in South Africa by a racial cleavage which interposed itself with pronounced acerbity.

In Canada parliamentary opinion regarding Imperial and

external affairs reveals an interesting evolution when the debates on the European settlement [1] are compared with those on the South African War and the naval issue. By this time all parties had become Autonomist, and the discussion now focussed upon the Dominion's place in world politics rather than upon her relations with the Mother Country, yet differences between them were as evident as heretofore. The Liberal Party had changed least. Their policies were still fundamentally Sir Wilfrid's. It will be recalled that these were briefly: autonomy, aloofness from European embroilments and militarism, yet maintenance of the Imperial tie; hence acceptance of British protection (the need for which was uniformly deprecated) coupled with a claim to full discretion regarding the assumption of Imperial obligations. Under the circumstances of his day, this had been essentially a policy toward the Mother Country, for the consideration of foreign Powers had not yet become imperative. Now the Liberal reaction to the Settlement was coloured by the fear that it invited surrender of the strategic position which Canada had hitherto enjoyed within the Empire as regards outside nations—a position which alone had made possible the vindication of such a policy as Laurier's. Hence they were led to minimise the effects of the treaties upon Dominion status. They were the ones who denied that significant changes had been achieved.[2] They were almost Colonialist in their references to the Imperial connection. The immediate motive for this stand was a desire to mitigate the danger to Canadian autonomy implied in League membership. It was one thing to be represented in foreign affairs by a Home Government, which would not dream of exacting a share of the burden from her Dominion; it was a different matter for that Dominion to enter upon the direct assumption of international responsibilities. The Liberal Party, in short, was still Autonomist-Isolationist, with perhaps greater emphasis now upon isolation than autonomy.

These features of their policy were repeatedly stressed by Liberal spokesmen during the debates on the several treaties. Mr. D. D. Mackenzie, acting Leader of the Opposition, pro-

[1] These debates are summarised in *Journal*, vol. i. pp. 87–105, 322–327, 464–469; and *Canadian Annual Review* (1919), pp. 101–109.

[2] Another potent element in their reaction, no doubt, was a partisan desire to depreciate the Conservatives' title to a notable achievement in Canadian national development.

nounced the status of Canada hitherto to have been thoroughly satisfactory. Under it she had participated in the South African and European Wars entirely of her own free will. Now the intention seemed to be that Canada should act in accordance with a treaty interpreted at Geneva by a Council on which she had no guarantee of representation. Article VIII of the Covenant obligated her to maintain a standing army; Article X might involve her in a petty quarrel between small nations; Article XVI too might place her at variance with the Mother Country. Such was not the correct view of the situation, he insisted. Canada had signed, not as a separate nation, but as a component part of the British Empire, and she was bound only by the constitutional obligations entailed by that connection. The treaty had been signed by plenipotentiaries representing the King; it was already binding, and Canadian ratification was therefore unnecessary. His apostrophe to Imperial unity a few days later, during the discussion of the Austrian Treaty,[1] must be interpreted in the light of the foregoing argument.

Mr. Béland voiced the more pronounced French-Canadian viewpoint. He held that no consequence of any importance to Canada, nationally or internationally, would result from her failure to approve the treaty. Not being a sovereign state, she would have done well to leave it to the British representatives to enter the League. In that event, as an integral part of the Empire, she would have shared the benefits of League membership without incurring the political and military dangers. By joining on the existing basis, Canada would tie her hands and surrender to the Council at Geneva the right of disposing of her troops to quell disorder or carry on war in any of the five continents. It was the duty of Canada to resist this wave of centralisation, and the assumption of international obligations without corresponding international status. Mr. Pacaud and Hon. Rodolphe Lemieux also feared the implications of Article X.

Mr. Lapointe quoted various constitutional authorities to show that Canada had no power either to ratify or refuse; the

[1] "There should be one united body, one united council for the whole of the Empire, with Canada fully represented; there should be one conclusion, one treaty, one signature. . . . The more united we are and the better we understand one another in connection with Empire matters and Dominion matters, particularly when we are facing a foreign foe or foreign complications, and the closer we keep to the statesmen of Great Britain in responsibilities for the whole of the Empire, the better it will be" (*Journal*, vol. i. p. 101).

latter would be tantamount to a declaration of independence. The number of signatory Powers was twenty-seven, not thirty-two, for the Dominions were there simply as portions of the Empire, and the treaty bound the whole Empire, including Canada. In order to make the view that their League connection was purely Imperial a matter of record, he urged a reservation clearly stating that approval of the treaty did not impair the rights of the Canadian Parliament. Hon. W. S. Fielding pronounced the whole procedure of the government in connection with the treaties to be " a colossal humbug, designed to impose upon an innocent parliament and a too credulous people." In his opinion Canadian representation at Paris, as it had been engineered, and the present ratification were entirely unnecessary. He reprobated the foolish attempt of Canada to mix herself up in the foreign affairs of the world. It ought to be sufficient for them that her interests would be safe in the hands of those who represented the British Empire. He denounced this whole demand for separate representation and equal status with the Mother Country as tending to disruption. " I want Canada," he declared, " to have greater freedom within the Empire, greater unity with the Mother Country, because I have abiding faith that the statesmanship that was developed in the past will continue in the future." During the debate on the resolution approving the Versailles Treaty, he moved an amendment (seconded by Mr. Lapointe) which embodied the traditional Liberal attitude towards Imperial commitments.[1]

While discussing isolationist sentiment in parliament, reference should be made to the same attitude on the part of a section of the Canadian press, not merely towards participation in the sessions of the Peace Conference, but even those of the Imperial War Cabinet preceding it.[2] It was urged that the proper place for Canadian Ministers, especially the Prime Minister, was at home attending to the pressing business of their own country, not

[1] " That in giving such approval this House in no way assents to any impairment of the existing autonomous authority of the Dominion, but declares that the question of what part, if any, the forces of Canada shall take in any war, actual or threatened, is one to be determined at all times, as occasion may require, by the people of Canada through their representatives in Canada."—This amendment was negatived 112–71, and the original motion passed without a division (*Journal* vol i. pp. 97, 99).

[2] *Round Table*, vol. VIII. pp. 204–205, vol. IX. pp. 384–386, vol. X. pp. 150–151 ; *Canadian Annual Review* (1918), p. 418 ; (1919) pp. 80–81.

travelling abroad, lured on by the glamour of foreign diplomacy. The Toronto *Globe* argued :

> Is there any reason why the Premier of Canada should remain in Paris in what is manifestly a subordinate capacity until the boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland are arranged, the tangled mess of Balkan intrigue is sorted out, and the last comma is inserted in the Peace Treaty ? Canada's work must be done on this continent. It is a great work, worthy of the best that is in the Canadian people. . . . In 1917–18, and now in 1919, he has found it necessary to answer calls to take part in the larger affairs of the Empire in London or in Paris. His presence on each occasion for a short time was probably necessary, but in the last analysis Canada must be governed by Canadians, for Canadians. The proper seat of such a Government is Ottawa.

The French press was more explicit in its fear of Imperialism. *Le Soleil* of Quebec maintained that the mission of Sir Robert Borden and his colleagues to London and Paris was not merely inopportune, but fraught with grave danger to Canada. *Le Canada* said :

> We took up arms in order to maintain the independence of small nations, and we will never acknowledge that the hour in which we liberate Bohemia and Poland will be the signal for circumscribing Canada in the narrow limits of a centralised Imperialism. As the journalists who went to London know, neither South Africa nor Australia wishes for such a federation, and Canada feels that way too.

A different variety of complaint, on the other hand, was not so much against what was being done, as that the French-Canadian section was ignored in the doing of it. *La Presse* of Montreal, for instance, lamented :

> If this state of things is to continue, we ask at least the men who control the destinies of the country not to render themselves ridiculous in affirming that the victory over the Germans secured liberty to everyone, when, as a matter of fact, the French-Canadian race was never more completely ignored, more unjustly treated and more enslaved than to-day, and this after all the sacrifices they made for civilisation and democracy. The French-Canadian race wishes to interfere with the rights of no one, but who can blame us for wanting our share of honours and influence ?

In contrast to Liberal consistency, the Conservative party in Canada has displayed a very interesting evolution since the beginning of the century. During the South African debates, it will be recalled, their point of view was Colonialist. They

adopted a " theirs not to reason why " attitude towards the sending of Canadian contingents, and denounced Liberal hesitancy and autonomist declarations as verging on disloyalty. During the naval controversy, in contrast, the Leader of the Opposition showed that he had become an Imperialist. He pronounced in favour of definite commitments on the part of Canada in the matter of Imperial defence, and demanded in return an effective voice in the conduct of Imperial foreign relations. What he learned during his visit to London in 1912 and during the war years, however, seems to have modified his view of the attainable. But although they were now Autonomists,[1] the position which he and his colleagues adopted in regard to the external relations of Canada during the debates on the Peace Treaties differed in essential respects from that of the Liberal party.

In the first place their policy was positive, while that of the Liberals was negative. They demanded not merely that Canada should co-operate actively with the Mother Country and the rest of the Empire, but that she should assume an effective part as a nation in world politics. Furthermore, their emphasis on Imperial co-operation led them to disregard the dangers which the Opposition saw in possible disagreement with the Home Government. To them the new status was always a status within the Empire, and legal anomalies were ignored. It marked the attainment of " Britannic equality " and of the opportunity to demonstrate to foreign countries that the Dominions were now in equal partnership with the senior member—albeit on a basis different from that which the Imperialists had visualised. Hence the obligations of League membership failed to appal them. It was more than a mere partisan desire to magnify the achievement of the Government, accordingly, that led them to attribute major significance to separate signature and ratification of the treaties by the Dominions, and to the new status acquired through membership in the League of Nations.

In submitting the resolution of ratification to the House, Premier Borden gave a résumé of what had been done in London

[1] The writer's use of " Autonomist " in this connection has been querulously assailed (*Can. Hist. Rev.*, vol. ix. p. 334). It involves no imputation that any abridgement of existing self-government had previously been sought, but relates to matters which prior to the War were a monopoly of the Home Government, which Imperialists would have placed on a permanent basis of collective management, but which have subsequently been devolved upon the Dominions.

and Paris in order to show the marked progress which had been achieved towards securing a national status for Canada. The same indomitable spirit, he claimed, which had made her capable of such effort and sacrifice during the War had made her equally incapable of accepting at the Peace Conference, in the League of Nations, or elsewhere, a status inferior to that accorded to nations less advanced in their development, less amply endowed in wealth, resources and population, no more complete in their sovereignty, and far less conspicuous in their sacrifice. He maintained that unquestionably the treaties should be submitted to Parliament, taking the ground that His Majesty, in ratifying for Canada, was in such a case acting at the instance of his Canadian, not his British, advisers. Refusal of ratification, he held, would evidence a determination to stand apart from and refuse co-operation with the rest of the Empire, but he did not go into the possible consequences of such a step in relation to foreign Powers. Hon. A. L. Sifton claimed that the Canadian plenipotentiaries had been empowered to act for Canada only, not the whole Empire. He considered that ratification by Parliament, instead of by mere Order in Council, was a radical step constitutionally, but not one which involved the issue of remaining within the Empire; the Government had done everything possible to secure that. Hon. C. J. Doherty, the Minister of Justice, discussing the constitutional implications of ratification, agreed that the United Kingdom was not itself the Empire, all the self-governing nations should participate, nor would ratification by His Majesty be held constitutionally binding upon a part of the Empire which refused its assent. Canada, he maintained, was already a nation. That was not a question of law but of fact. As regards Article X, he had no doubt that, if unjust aggression occurred, Canada would abide by the Council of the League; nevertheless, he insisted, there was nothing in the Treaty or Covenant which superseded the power of the Canadian Parliament to pass upon the expenditure of every dollar, or the raising of every soldier she was asked to furnish.

Hon. N. W. Rowell was convinced that the Government's view most truly represented sound Canadianism. Those who held that Canada should cut the Imperial tie and become independent certainly did not; neither did the Leader of the Opposition, whose policies would relegate her virtually to a Colonial

status. Canadians were determined on the one hand to maintain their connection with the Motherland, and on the other to exercise the power of a nation within the Empire. They were recognised now as a nation equal in status with the Mother Country and the other Dominions. All that was further requisite was to complete the machinery necessary to the enjoyment of that status, and this was to be the task of the forthcoming Constitutional Conference. He denied emphatically the left wing Liberal contention that Article X of the League Covenant placed Canada at the beck and call of a Council not responsible to her for its actions. Any recommendation affecting Canada would entitle her to representation on the Council itself, whose decision must be unanimous, hence she could not be committed without her own consent. On a later occasion, in order to show that on the other hand Canada was not the mere tool of the Home Government in the League, he cited instances in which her representatives in the Assembly had taken a stand at variance with that of the Mother Country or other Dominions. His own experience in the League Assembly had impressed a very definite conclusion upon him :

> that Canada had a larger liberty, a more real independence and a vastly greater influence as one of the states of the British Commonwealth than she could possibly have as an independent state outside the British Empire. While we claim the fullest freedom for the individual parts of the Empire, we must also keep in view the importance of maintaining the unity of the Empire as a whole. One is just as important as the other. When the forces of disintegration are at work among the various peoples and nations of the world, there is no force existing to-day with such a stabilising influence for law and order and for peace and justice as the British Commonwealth of free nations.[1]

The other aspect of Conservative policy—that Canada should take her full share among the younger nations in constructive internationalism—contrasted as strongly with the continentalism and aloofness which were being expounded from the Opposition benches. This was the argument stressed by Sir Herbert Ames. In a statement to the House on the work of the League (June 22, 1920), he urged them to take advantage of the great opportunity opened to Canada, particularly since the attitude of the other half of the continent had been revealed :

[1] During the debate on the Address (February 18, 1921), *Journal*, vol. ii. p. 311.

May I point out to this House the greatness of Canada's opportunity? Her position is unique. The abstention of the United States was a great disappointment to the framers of the League, but it has turned their eyes to Canada and the other overseas Dominions in greater measure than could otherwise have been the case. . . . For years to come Canada's rôle will be that of helper. We joined the League for what we could give, not for what we could get. . . . As individuals we help the sick, the orphaned, the poor in generous measures. There are sick nations in the world to-day, orphaned peoples and starving states. The Canadian people may be asked to show collectively the same generous characteristics that Canadians as individuals have always evidenced. Again, we shall be asked to give counsel in the Assembly of Nations, in the conferences, in the committees, and we should send of our wisest and best, so that Canadian statecraft will be respected and Canadian statesmen esteemed. We shall be asked for administrators, men who in our free, open land have developed qualities of action and of heart that will make them fit to assume the difficult task of world reconstruction. Already we have given several men of this character, and more will be called for.[1]

Turning from Canada to the Antipodes, we find that there the problem of the Pacific dwarfed all other aspects of the Peace Settlement. Interest in the new status acquired by the Dominions and related constitutional questions was overshadowed by that in the disposal of the former German colonies and the bearing of the League of Nations' mandate principle thereon. The growth of economic imperialism in these Dominions, moreover, was evident throughout the debate. In Australia the discussion[2] centred upon the respective merits of annexation, mandate and internationalisation as modes of dealing with the colonies. The Labour Opposition believed internationalisation would have been a safer and more profitable arrangement. Senator Gardiner feared that Australia had acquired a burden greater than the revenue which would accrue therefrom. Senator Ferricks was suspicious of their promotion in status. There was the danger that if they built up their defences and became more important nationally, they would become embroiled with foreign Powers. The mandate system involved less responsibility and danger than annexation, but internationalisation would have been better. In the House Mr. Catts claimed that Australia was worse off strategically than she had been heretofore. She had been given islands with which she could do nothing, and her frontier had

[1] *Journal*, vol. i. p. 474.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 124–132.

thereby been moved northward, while that of Japan had been brought south, greatly increasing the danger of conflict.

Premier Hughes and his supporters, on the other hand, endorsed the settlement before them as the best which could have been achieved under the circumstances. He cited the reservation in favour of the Monroe Doctrine embodied in the League of Nations Covenant and demanded a similar recognition for the " White Australia " policy. He went on to argue how fatal internationalisation of territory and the consequent establishment of the " Open Door " upon their very borders would have been to Australian existence :

> At the conference it had been difficult to make the Council of Ten realise how utterly the safety of Australia depended upon the possession of New Guinea, New Ireland, and New Britain, etc. And they had sought to obtain direct control over them. But President Wilson's fourteen points forbade it. The principle of the mandate was forced on Australia, and they had to see that it was consistent not only with their national safety, but with their economic, industrial and general welfare. It was sought to couple the mandate with the condition of an open door for men and goods, which meant that Australia's control of trade and navigation would be gone, and that within eighty miles there could come pouring in those who, when the hour should strike, could pounce on the mainland. The mandate, however, as it then stood, gave the Commonwealth government the same rights to make laws over the islands as over the mainland, subject to five reservations. There could be no sale of firearms to the natives ; no native armies raised except for mere defence of the territory ; no sale of alcohol to the natives ; no fortifications ; and no slave trade. These reservations, however, were not limitations at all on the sovereign power which was necessary for Australia's salvation. . . . It had been said that it would have been better had the islands been internationalised. Nothing was surer than that international control would mean the complete demolition of the " White Australia " policy. In the League of Nations Commission, where the question of equality of racial treatment had been decided, there was an overwhelming majority against Australia. They were 5,000,000 people, and they arrogated the right to say to the whole world, " You cannot come in here without our consent," yet Mr. Catts would have them entrust to those who knew nothing of their circumstances, or understood their ideals, control over their destiny. Under international control, Australia could not secure the trade of these islands which legitimately belonged to her. In the allocation of the islands Australia acquiesced in a situation determined by authorities outside. The British Government had asked them to act in a certain way and they had done it.[1]

[1] *Journal*, vol. i. pp. 125, 128.

Replying to the assertion of the Leader of the Opposition that it made no difference whether Australia ratified or not, that the Imperial Government would do so in any case, Premier Hughes argued that if she stood aside, Australia would lose her membership in the League of Nations and her right to the mandate in the Pacific. Later, during discussion of the New Guinea Mandate Bill, he stressed the fact that the " open door " proviso did not apply to " Class C " mandates, so that Australia was free to secure through her administration not merely her safety, but the enjoyment of the great potential wealth of these territories, and an aid to the solution of her returned-soldier problem.[1]

During the debate on this bill in the Upper House, in contrast, Senator Pratten declared himself not altogether convinced that the administration of the islands by Australia was ultimately going to be as successful as would an administration through the Colonial Office in London, and advanced an interesting suggestion as the alternative to imperialistic ventures by the Dominions in the Pacific :

> This territorial and governmental expansion of the Commonwealth to alien races and territories, moving out into the world, was bound sooner or later to create very delicate problems. He was hopeful that, in the not distant future, some attempt would be made to link up the whole of the islands under the British flag in the Pacific into one government. Some considered opinions favoured the seat of government of the islands being placed in Fiji, and that the already British Colonial Office administered Pacific Islands, such as Fiji, Tonga, and the Gilbert and Ellice groups, should branch out and include also the New Zealand administered Samoa and the Australian administered New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.[2]

New Zealand comprised a territory smaller than Australia, she was more isolated in the Pacific, and Nationalism had made less headway there than in any other Dominion. In her reception of the Settlement, accordingly, considerable trepidation was revealed in some quarters as to the possible consequences of the course into which she had been led—fears that the Imperial connection had been so weakened that she might be left self-dependent out in the Pacific.[3] During discussion of the Peace

[1] *Journal*, vol. II. pp. 113–116. [2] *Ibid.* pp. 119–120.

[3] See debate on the Peace Treaties Resolution, the Samoan Mandate Bill, and the Treaties of Peace Amendment Bill (*ibid.* vol. I. pp. 156–177; vol. II. pp. 158–165).

Resolution, both Premier Massey and Sir Joseph Ward (now Leader of the Opposition) insisted that the League of Nations, however worthy of support it might be, did not offer a substitute for the British Navy. Regarding the constitutional aspect, Premier Massey emphasised the passing of the Colonial era, and the establishment of a full Britannic partnership. He was persuaded that there were no separatist implications in the Dominion's part in the treaty. " We signed it not as independent nations in the ordinary sense of the term. We signed it as the representative of the self-governing nations within the Empire ; we signed it as partners in the Empire—partners, with everything that the name implies." No Dominion had the power to make either peace or war. Henceforth the British Empire would make peace or war as a unit—not as the United Kingdom—and in doing so the Dominions would have their full say. All that had taken place tended, not to disintegration, but to closer concord, to the cementing of a unity that could not be destroyed. More exact exposition of the legal position of the country in relation to the Empire and foreign Powers would be impossible until after the forthcoming Imperial Conference had considered these matters.

The Prime Minister's confident pronouncements, however, did not meet unanimous acceptance. It was pointed out, for instance, that separate signature and ratification of the treaties by the Dominions, to say nothing of independent membership in the League, was by no means a corollary to the achievement of an Imperial partnership in the conduct of foreign affairs. Mr. Downie Stewart was the chief parliamentary critic of the constitutional phases of the settlement. He claimed that from the point of view of constitutional lawyers the logical result of the position which they had taken was the assumption of sovereign power in the making of peace and war. There was a grave danger that foreign countries would insist upon treating them as if independent states. This was all the more likely in view of the serious purport of the claims made by General Smuts in South Africa and also by the Dominion of Canada, which had even gone so far as to appoint an Ambassador to Washington.[1] Under the circumstances it was essential that they maintain the view that in international affairs they spoke and acted as part of the Empire, and not as a separate sovereign Power.

[1] This, of course, was at the time still in the discussion stage only.

Closely allied to this question was that of the New Zealand mandate over Western Samoa. Sir Joseph was outspoken in his regret that out-and-out annexation had not been secured, for which he blamed the United States.[1] Failing this, he argued, the mandate should have been left to the Home Government, in order to avoid both the difficulties which would be incurred through New Zealand's policy toward the coloured races, and to lessen the dangers from international rivalries in the Pacific. Another problem related to the source of the mandate. General Smuts held that a mandatory Dominion was entitled, if not bound, to render an account of its stewardship to the League of Nations direct. The Government of New Zealand, on the other hand, made it clear that they assumed the mandate through the Imperial government, which had accepted it on behalf of the League. General Smuts' view came in for strong criticism in New Zealand, notably from Mr. Downie Stewart and Mr. Triggs in the House. They maintained that this was an alarming development, that for a Dominion to take a mandate direct from the Allied Powers or the League, and not through the medium of the Empire, meant the assumption of an independent status and the destruction of Imperial unity.

In the Union of South Africa, the alignment of opinion upon the Peace Settlement, and the political circumstances back of it, were more analogous to the situation in Canada.[2] There was the same preoccupation with Dominion autonomy. There was also a determination on the part of General Smuts and his supporters to emphasise both the recent changes in status, and the desirability of whole-hearted assumption of international responsibilities in co-operation with the Mother Country, similar to that which the Government party in Canada displayed. His Nationalist opponents, like the Liberal Opposition in Canada, refused to admit the achievement of a new international status for the Dominion, or the utility of ratifying the treaties. In their isolationism, however, they more resembled the extreme wing of Canadian Liberals, and outdid them in reprobation of the terms of the Settlement, and in protest at the maintenance of

[1] See his remarks during the Peace Resolution debate (*Journal*, vol. i. pp. 162), but especially his discussion of Sir James Allen's paper on the Samoan Mandate before the R.C.I. (*United Empire*, vol. xi. p. 660).

[2] See *Journal*, vol. i. pp. 193–220, 384–387, 540–554, 741–743; also the article from South Africa in *Round Table* (December 1919).

the British connection. One after another, the Nationalist spokesmen denounced the treaty—it was pillage ; apart from the League Covenant and the Labour Charter it was one of iniquity, violating alike the Fourteen Points and the Geneva Convention ; Milner should be put on trial as well as the Kaiser ; private non-combatants in South Africa had been shamefully robbed ; the League of Nations was merely a confirmation of the *status quo ante*. Their main grievance, however, appeared to be that the War and the Settlement, far from having effected the independence of South Africa, seemed rather to have consolidated the British connection.

Though not united in condemning it, the Nationalists were obviously suspicious of the League of Nations. Senator Wolmarans claimed that the status of South Africa had actually been lowered, since she now had to deal not merely with Britain, but with the League as well. Mr. C. J. Langenhoven asked what value South Africa would get from her contribution to the League—if attacked, would the League come to her aid, and conversely would she be subject to calls to assist the League ? The Premier saw in this an attempt to impale him on a dilemma —if the League would defend South Africa, what need was there then of the British connection—and replied that despite Article XV, British protection had not by any means become nugatory. Mr. Beyers foresaw that League membership would drag South Africa into the European whirlpool. General Hertzog pronounced himself in favour of the League, yet apprehensive that its degeneracy into a mere alliance of the Great Powers was already becoming evident. Nevertheless humanity had achieved something through realising the rights of small nations. On the issue of the transfer to the Union of the German Colony of South-west Africa, the Nationalists made much of consulting the wishes of the inhabitants, urged constitutional and other impediments to the enabling act offered by the Premier, and gave warning that the conquered Germans should not receive treatment like that meted out by Milner in South Africa.

Both the Unionist Opposition and the Labour Party supported the Government upon the Peace Settlement. Mr. Patrick Duncan had no sympathy with the shortsightedness of Nationalist intransigence. The real opposition to the League, he claimed, was due to the fact that it would tend to perpetuate the connection between

South Africa and the Empire, but they said nothing about their country's position should it remain out of the League. The Peace Treaty was not going to bring South Africa into the maelstrom of the world's conflicts—she was already there. As a Republic she would have less independence than as a member of the League—she would not be able to legislate regardless of other parts of the world, as some members suggested, nor could she pass laws affecting Indians and other Asiatics without caring what people thought. Sir Thomas Smartt, the Unionist Leader, considered the treaty severe, but just. The Nationalists had hoped for a stalemate. But what would the terms have been if Germany had won? No country had dealt more generously with its German subjects than had South Africa. As for the British connection, he maintained that the Imperial Conference had done nothing which was not in the best interests of South Africa. Defence was to his thinking the most important reason for the maintenance of the Imperial tie, and he emphasised the fact that during the War the shipment of South African wool had been possible only because of the protection afforded by the British fleet. It was also their duty to render all the support they could to the League of Nations. Colonel Creswell, Leader of the Labour Party, joined the Premier and Sir Thomas Smartt in condemning the incubus of radicalism which lay upon them; he believed the League of Nations would make for the strength and cohesion of the Empire, and favoured acceptance by the Union of the mandate over South-west Africa.

The Prime Minister's exposition of the Settlement was perforce conditioned by the necessity of meeting Nationalist strictures upon his accomplishment. During the debate on the Peace Resolution, General Smuts emphasised first of all the constitutional achievement. What he had said on an occasion years before regarding the report of their National Convention was in the same sense true of the Peace Treaty—the most important thing about the document was the list of signatures at the end of it. The war effort of Canada and Australia had been greater than that of any Power not of the first rank. Although the Dominions had not fought for status, along with victory had come international recognition. For the first time in history they had signed a great international instrument not only with the Ministers of the King, but with the representatives of the Great Powers. This

constituted one of the most important landmarks in the history of the Empire. Henceforth in foreign relations they were to take part for themselves; they were no longer to be bound by the voice and signature of the British Government. In consequence he regarded ratification of the treaties by the South African Parliament to be essential to the vindication of their status:

> The Union Parliament had nothing to do with the fact that the treaty had been ratified by the British Parliament. The Union Parliament stood on exactly the same basis as the British House of Commons, which had no legislative power over the Union. . . . If a farce were being enacted in this House of Parliament then the same farce was being enacted in the British Houses of Parliament and in the Houses of the various Dominions.[1]

As for the League of Nations, said General Smuts, he prized his contribution in this regard more highly than any other achievement of his life. The Dominions had been determined that if a League based on equal representation of the nations were established, they should be included in it. Yet they were equally anxious to see that nothing was done which would loosen the Imperial tie. Fears had been expressed, in South Africa as elsewhere, that the ultimate tendency of the League would be to disrupt the British Empire. That was an entirely misleading idea. "We have secured an inner league and the world has agreed to it." He could well imagine great Dominions arising which would become as important as Britain in the world. Then there would be danger of the Empire breaking up, were it not for the fact of this inner league of nations—"the only successful experiment in international government that has ever been made," as he had characterised it at the Imperial War Conference.[2] A further cause of apprehension to many was the responsibility which participation in world affairs would bring upon them. He had little sympathy with so timorous an attitude.

> There have been other misgivings, too, in regard to our entrance into the League of Nations. There has been the misgiving that we are being drawn in this far-away part of the world into a great vortex of European politics—there is a misgiving that in the League of Nations we shall be drawn into resolutions and decisions that might be affecting other parts of the world. To some extent it must be frankly admitted that, of course, our new status must bring responsibilities; but that

[1] *Round Table*, vol. x. pp. 197–198.

[2] (1917) Cd. 8566, p. 46.

is inevitable—that has been the growth of the world. You cannot ask for recognition and admission among the nations of the world and still think that you can sit on your ant-heap in South Africa and jeer at the rest of the world.[1]

The Premier concluded with an earnest plea for South African unity. The root of Nationalist distrust was a deplorable obsession for complete severance from the Empire. Secession was an evil thing; there had been terrible sacrifices upon its altar in America. For South Africa only two courses were open—mutual co-operation, or the course of blood and tears they had already traversed, which, if renewed, must lead to a broken, discredited South Africa, with the native population outnumbering the whites. "Let us not mope over the past," he urged, "to-day we have every opportunity to build up our nation; and I am standing here to-day to make the strongest, the most urgent appeal to this House and the country to live in the present and the future. Let us get off our ant-heap of grief over the past and let us concentrate on the great things which the future holds for us."[2]

Only one observation, and that in the nature of a caution, need be made here regarding these debates upon the ratification of the Versailles Settlement in the various parliaments. Ample attention has been drawn in every quarter to the unprecedented demonstration of Imperial unity afforded by the labours of the British Delegation, and but little to the evidences of dissent. Acceptance of the Settlement was without difficulty secured in all parliaments. Nevertheless, the fact that dissentient voices throughout the Empire did not turn the hands of their governments or even attract much notice at the time does not mean that they were not making themselves heard, nor justify ignoring them in a discussion of the treaty. Their importance lies in this, that in succeeding years policies now advocated from Opposition benches might find expression in official despatches to the Home Government and so alter radically the complexion of Imperial relations. Very shortly the Dominion of Canada was to take the lead in demonstrating the importance of this consideration.

[1] *Round Table*, vol. x. pp. 193–194. [2] *Journal*, vol. i. p. 198.

CHAPTER VII

The Conduct of High Policy since the War—the Period of Co-operation

The post-War period in the conduct of Britannic foreign relations opened auspiciously from the Imperialist standpoint. Governments under the leadership of Co-operationist Prime Ministers—Lloyd George, Borden (later Meighen), Hughes, Massey and Smuts—were still in power throughout the Empire. Active team-work among the British nations was still the watchword, and during the first two episodes of outstanding importance—the Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Disarmament Conference for which it was the prelude—the British Empire Delegation was revealed in as effective operation as its most ardent protagonists dared anticipate.

The 1921 session of the Imperial Conference is significant in two respects—first, for the final disposal of the Imperial federation issue; secondly, for the formulation of an Imperial policy regarding the future in the Pacific. The contribution of the Conference to the problem of Imperial organisation has already been discussed. Its more difficult and important task was the discussion of foreign relations, during which it fulfilled the functions of what we have become accustomed to call the "British Empire Delegation," even should the place of meeting not at the time happen to be that of an international congress. For the time being, while the responsible heads of the various British Governments were conferring together in person, the normal difficulties in the conduct of foreign relations vanished, and a genuinely Imperial policy, in the formulation of which all could claim a share, and for the responsibilities attending on which all could justly be held to account, became possible. In the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1911 the Premiers had been afforded

information regarding the doings of the Foreign Office but, in accordance with Mr. Asquith's attitude, apparently little voice in regard to them. In London and Paris at the close of the War the Dominions played a very important part in the Settlement, but the circumstances were in a measure peculiar. The degree of co-operative activity in the Conference of 1921, when world politics may be said to have fairly resumed their normal state of uncertainty, was the most adequate criterion hitherto of the Empire's capacity for concerted decision.

The various Prime Ministers on their return gave enthusiastic testimony to their parliaments regarding the comprehensiveness of the discussion and the adequacy of their share in it. On the value of the Conference from the Imperial standpoint to the Home Government, and the range of subjects discussed, Premier Lloyd George said :

> The sole control of Britain over foreign policy is now vested in the Empire as a whole. . . . The advantage to us is that joint control means joint responsibility, and when the burden of Empire has become so vast it is well that we should have the shoulders of these young giants under the burden to help us along. It restrains rash Ministers and it will stimulate timorous ones. It widens the prospect. When we took part in the discussion at the Imperial Conference what struck us was this, that from the mere fact that representatives were there from the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and from other ends of the world, with different interests, the discussion broadened into a world survey. That was an advantage.
>
> Our troubles were Upper Silesia, the Ruhr Valley, Angora and Egypt. They came there with other questions—with the problems of the Pacific, Honolulu, the Philippines, Nagasaki and Pekin. All these problems were brought into the common stock, and a wide survey was taken by all the representatives of the Empire, who would honour the policy decided upon and support that policy when it was challenged. They felt that there was not one of them who was not speaking for hundreds of thousands and millions of men who were prepared to risk their fortunes and their lives for a great Empire.[1]

As to the opportuneness of being able to secure the verdict of the Empire Delegation regarding contemporaneous happenings on the Continent, he said in another statement :

> We discussed the whole of the foreign policy of the Empire and it was an additional source of strength, in going into the Conference last week, to know—the Foreign Secretary and myself—that we represented not merely the views of the United Kingdom, but the views of

[1] *Journal*, vol. iii. p. 10.

the whole British Empire. It was not merely a source of strength to us, but it made an impression upon all those who were there—the knowledge that we represented this very great and powerful Empire that had contributed so substantially to victory in the late War.[1]

The main problem before the Conference was the supersession of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the formulation of an Imperial policy regarding the Pacific. Prior to the War, the defence strategy of the Home Government had focussed on the North Sea, and British diplomacy had been concentrated on the impending struggle in Europe. Now there was a decided transfer of interest to the Pacific. As Archibald Hurd pointed out:

> On two sides of the Pacific the United States and Japan are feverishly building great fleets. The standard expenditure of these two countries is higher than ever known to Europe. That movement cannot fail to influence the British naval policy, since the British Empire is essentially an Eastern Empire, for two-thirds of its population overlooks the Pacific Ocean.[2]

Premier Hughes reasoned that the destiny of Australia lay in the Pacific. Before the War the strategic centre of the world was the North Sea. But the defeat of Germany, the regrouping of the Central Powers, the collapse of Russia, and, of course, the opening of the Panama Canal, had entirely changed the position. It was on the great stage of the Pacific that the great world drama of the future was to be played. The Pacific Ocean had become what the North Sea once was—the world's strategic centre. For Australia the Pacific problem for all practical purposes was the problem of Japan.[3] In discussing Admiral Jellicoe's report upon the defence measures, Premier Massey stated that it had been borne in upon him that the next war would be a naval one, and that the storm centre would be the Pacific.[4] In the opening speeches at the 1921 Conference,[5] moreover, it was obvious that the new importance of the Pacific in Imperial politics had impressed itself upon every one of them. It was especially emphasised by General Smuts and Mr. Massey. General Smuts, who of the Prime Ministers had perhaps the soundest grasp of world affairs, argued:

[1] August 18, 1921: *ibid.* vol. ii. p. 710. The reference is to a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allies in Paris.
[2] *The Fortnightly Review* (June 1921), p. 975.
[3] Quoted from *Journal*, vol. iii. p. 95.
[4] *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 173.
[5] Cmd. 1474, pp. 11–39.

Undoubtedly the scene has shifted away from Europe to the Far East and to the Pacific. The problems of the Pacific are, to my mind, the world problems of the next fifty years or more. In these problems we are, as an Empire, very vitally interested. Three of the Dominions border on the Pacific. There, too, are the United States and Japan. There is also China; the fate of the greatest human population on earth will have to be decided. There Europe, Asia, and America are meeting, and there, I believe, the next great chapter in human history will be enacted.

The Pacific Question and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

Of the two main questions which had been agitating Australia and New Zealand, one—the elimination of Germany from the Pacific—had been settled by the War. As has already been pointed out, British apathy towards the Dominions' representations in this regard had long been their chief grievance against the Home Government, but at the Peace Conference they had secured Imperial support, even against the strenuous opposition of the United States, and had attained their essential objectives, if not the full measure of their ambitions. The other main issue of public policy in Australasia was the colour question.

There was no point upon which all parties both in Australia and New Zealand were more thoroughly agreed on than the preservation of the racial integrity of their population. If not distinctly British, it must at least be white—and, by some at least, Southern Europeans were excluded from this category, a point which will afford comfort to the "Nordic" protagonists in the United States. The Imperialist version of this attitude was set forth by Premier Massey, during the second reading of the New Zealand Immigration Restriction Bill of 1920, when he said:

> The Bill is the result of a deep-seated sentiment on the part of a huge majority of the people of this country that this Dominion shall be what is called often a "white" New Zealand, and that the people who come here should, as far as it is possible for us to provide for it, be of the same way of thinking from the British Empire point of view—I might have said from the Imperial point of view, but I say from the British Empire point of view—and that they shall be people who will be loyal to the Empire, loyal to the Crown, and loyal to this country when they become its citizens.[1]

[1] *Journal*, vol. ii. p. 179.

The Labour version of the same sentiment was tendered by Mr. Holland, who stated that their viewpoint would not bar a man because of his colour or country of origin, but that it was necessary, in dealing with people whose standards of living were lower than their own, to pass legislation not merely to protect the standards of their own people, but the immigrants themselves.[1] The attitude of Australia was forcefully presented by Premier Hughes when he declared in New York for a Monroe Doctrine in the South Pacific, and in his own parliament, that the " White Australia " policy could no more be submitted by them to the arbitrament of the League than could the freedom of the seas, as interpreted by Germany, be submitted by Britain, or the Monroe Doctrine by the United States. Like Britain and America, Australia must be prepared, if need be, to fight to the death in support of that principle, which they believed to be absolutely vital to their own existence. A White Australia was at once the vital part of their policy and the one calculated to prove a most fruitful source of international complications.[2]

Zeal for the integrity of their population led Australia and New Zealand to cast suspicious eyes upon the policy pursued in this regard in other parts of the Pacific. The gradual penetration of the Japanese into various Islands, notably Hawaii and New Caledonia, was from time to time adverted to,[3] and one of the main arguments advanced in favour of Australia taking measures to end the Condominium in the New Hebrides, and acquire full control over this region, was the fear that the French might turn to the employment of Oriental labour.[4] Underlying such an issue one suspects, incidentally, a large measure of economic imperialism, for which the colour question provided a convenient foil. Similarly, a strong point in favour of the sugar tariff was the handicap under which white-grown Queensland sugar lay in competition with that produced by black labour in Natal.[5]

Within the Empire, although the 1918 Imperial War Conference had gone on record as favouring complete control by each British nation over the composition of its own population,[6] the migration of British Orientals was an ever-waxing issue. As yet,

[1] *Journal*, vol. ii p. 181. [2] September 9, 1921 : *ibid.* pp. 124–125.
[3] See especially an article from the New Zealand standpoint in *Round Table*, vol. i. pp. 527–532.
[4] E.g. *Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 877–878.
[5] *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 700. [6] Cd. 9177, p. 8.

however, it affected primarily South Africa. A much more significant manifestation from the Australasian standpoint had been the effort of Japan to secure the inclusion of a clause in the League of Nations Covenant which would have established international racial equality, and so struck a vital blow at the Pacific Dominions.[1] Coupled with this was the movement for internationalisation of the mandated territories and an open door for men and goods, which, said Sir Joseph Cook, could have furnished unrestricted opportunities to menace Australia by crowding the coloured races of the world into their backyard.[2] As regards the main point, Premier Hughes, in a statement to the press on March 27, 1919, made a definite demand that immigration be classed as a domestic question—an issue which was to assume paramount importance later, in the reaction of the Pacific Dominions to the Geneva Protocol. He said :

> We cannot agree to the insertion of any words in the Covenant or in the Treaty of Peace that would impair or even question our sovereign rights in regard to any and every aspect of this question. I cannot but regard the proposed amendment as an effort to establish a principle under which, ultimately, some nations would find their international policy as to immigration and nationalisation challenged by the League at the instigation of one of its members.[3]

Commitment to the White Australasia policy, then, rendered Australia and New Zealand undoubtedly suspicious of Japan, whose position in the Pacific had been considerably strengthened by the War, and the area of whose influence had been extended southwards. There was no indication of gratuitous hostility against that country, however, in the utterances of their public men, nor evidence that, provided adequate guarantees of the integrity of their policy were furnished, other than cordial relations would prevail. They were grateful for Japan's attitude during the War ; they recognised the need of expansion, but they insisted that she expand in directions other than their own.

The second main factor in the situation was the position of the United States. Regarding this there could be no mistake. The underlying motives were doubtless commercial. Even before the " open door " policy was first invoked as the wedge

[1] See Senator Millen's recapitulation of the issue (April 13, 1921), *Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 620–624.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 117.

[3] Quoted in *Canadian Annual Review* (1919), p. 254.

for securing a share in the blessings of the opium war, or Perry's advent had impressed the Japanese with the material excellences of Western civilisation, American business men had their eyes on the Far East, especially China. However pertinent the query whether the individual purchasing power of its inhabitants renders them potential customers for the type of goods America has to sell, viewed in the gross the Chinese market appears immense, to say nothing of the prospects lying north and south of it on that side of the Pacific. Furthermore, the United States is the only Occidental Power which actually borders on the Pacific, which seems really to belong there. European countries seem more distant than the measurement of trade routes would indicate. Even under the "open door" principle, proximity and efficient business connections, as in India, can give the country enjoying them a tremendous advantage. Internationalisation of the German colonies in the Pacific would have been distinctly to the advantage of the United States. Meanwhile the necessity of defending the Philippines supplied American navalists with a never-failing argument. The tide of militant nationalism which had been raised against their great international impediment, the League of Nations, augured well for the jingo section of the country which now seemed in the ascendant.

The only direct and immediate obstacle to American hegemony in the Pacific was Japan. There was an actual Pacific Power. Some talked of an Oriental union against the West, consolidated by Japan. But the chances were rather the other way. America had steadily been cultivating Chinese friendship—of this the remission of the Boxer indemnity, to be employed in the education of young China in the United States, is only one index. In this connection a writer in *The Round Table*, discussing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, said: "The real danger of renewal is that it may lead to a counter-balancing combination between China and the United States. Nothing could be worse for the future of the British Empire or Japan than that they should drift into a position in which they were placed in opposition to the United States and China."[1] No, the rivalry in the western Pacific was now essentially between two Powers, and it looked as if Britain might be forced to decide between them. The European War had greatly accelerated developments. The situation in the

[1] Vol. xi. pp. 95–96 (December 1920).

Pacific in the twentieth century had entered upon a third and radically different phase. The United States had risen to the position of a world Power of the first rank and aimed to become paramount in the Pacific. Certainly no settlement could be undertaken in that quarter which did not allow her at least an equal voice in its making. The mere fact that there existed an arrangement between the two other Pacific Powers, entered into before her advent, and from which she was excluded, constituted on the face of it a snub, if not a threat, to the United States. In the pending readjustment, all possible consideration must be given to her wishes, at least by the British negotiators.

Ever since the secession from the Empire of the Thirteen Colonies, friendship with the United States has been a cardinal point of British policy, and this desire has by no means been confined to the Mother Country. An analysis of the discussions relating to the Pacific problem in all the parliaments of the Empire reveals hardly a dissenting voice upon this point, no matter in what connection the argument is used, namely that, despite their appreciation of their relations with Japan, the wishes of the United States must be met if a satisfactory settlement were to be reached. In Canada, for instance, we find on the whole a tendency to assume that their interests in the Pacific were identical and to follow the lead of Washington in the matter. Mr. Rowell distinguished the problems of the South Pacific, which primarily concerned Australia and New Zealand, from those of the North Pacific, in which Canada and the United States, in relation to Russia, China and Japan, were interested.[1] In Australia, furthermore, we find one Senator, dissatisfied with their assumption of responsibility for mandated territory, urging the especial suitability of the United States for relieving them of this burden, and the desirability of their having so powerful and friendly a country for an immediate neighbour.[2] We find also another Senator eulogising the Monroe Doctrine, and hoping that their representative in the League would advance some scheme there for the control of the oceans of the world by Britain and America jointly.[3] Certainly in the Imperial Conference there would be no lack of consideration for the United States. There would be, however, the dubious problem of effecting a

[1] *Journal*, vol. ii. p. 569; *British Empire and World Peace*, p. 187.
[2] *Journal*, vol. iii. pp. 354–355.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 841.

compromise between the past and the future, and so laying some practicable foundation for peace in the Pacific.

The Pacific Question was brought to a head by the prospect of the early lapsing of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.[1] It should be borne in mind that this Alliance has been the expression of Imperial policy in the Far East and the earnest of Anglo-Japanese relations throughout that most critical period, with its changing alignments, between the close of the South African and European Wars. The purpose of the original treaty (January 30, 1902) was to preserve the *status quo* in the Far East and localise the impending Russo-Japanese struggle. The new and stronger treaty of August 12, 1905, was to meet altered conditions. The elimination of Russia left Britain and Japan paramount in the Pacific, but the rising German menace made a guarantee to the Empire in the East imperative, so that attention could be focussed on the North Sea. Furthermore, an alternative *rapprochement* between Germany and Japan might have been fatal. This Alliance was renewed (July 13, 1911) for a further period of ten years. The first two agreements were negotiated on the sole responsibility of the Home Government, but by 1911 the crystallisation of opinion in the Dominions upon the Oriental problem and their growing demand for a share in Imperial policy led to a consideration of the question of renewal in the Committee of Imperial Defence during May and June of that year. The Alliance was approved (though Australia abstained from voting) so that this third agreement was virtually the work of the Empire as a whole—the first great international instrument to be entered upon in this fashion.

Throughout the vicissitudes of the Great War, Japan lived up to her agreement, contrary to what, it is believed, some of her foremost minds held had become the best interests of their country. Undoubtedly the Anglo-Japanese Alliance fulfilled its essential purpose, and proved of inestimable advantage to both signatories. An able commentator in *The Round Table* says of it :

> It brought Japan into the war on the side of the Allies ; it secured the Eastern possessions of the British Empire from hostile attack, save in a slight degree by Germany itself ; it preserved the peace of the Far

[1] See the excellent articles, at the various periods, on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in *Round Table*: (February 1911) vol. i. pp. 105–152 ; (June 1914) vol. iv. pp. 391–462 ; (December 1920) vol. xi. pp. 87–97.

East. On the other hand it gave to Japan the full opportunity for peaceful development and consolidation which she desired, and led her to taking her place as one of the five directing nations of the world in the Peace Conference of Paris. Only so far as China is concerned has its efficacy been doubtful.[1]

As if, however, the mere fact that an arrangement regarding the Pacific existed in which the United States was not included were not enough to jeopardise Anglo-American relations, the terms of that arrangement were an added reason for concern. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1905 provided that either party should go to the aid of the other in case of unprovoked aggression by a third Power. This caused apprehension both in Australasia and America of British embroilment with the United States.[2] In view of this, and of Sir Edward Grey's hopes of concluding an arbitration treaty with the United States, the agreement of 1911 was modified to include a proviso (Article 4) to the effect that: "Should either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third party, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such a treaty of arbitration is in force." This cannot but be looked upon as an important concession by Japan to the newer trend of events. The Anglo-American treaty of arbitration was thrown out by the United States Senate, but Sir Edward Grey managed to conclude, in September 1914, a treaty with regard to the establishment of a peace commission which was held by the British Government to be in effect a treaty of General Arbitration within the meaning of Article 4 of the modified Alliance, and Japan was formally notified to this effect.

This seems generally to have been accepted by British commentators as effectively precluding the possibility of the Empire becoming involved in difficulty with the United States through trouble arising between the latter country and Japan. Another view of the situation, however, was advanced by Bertram Lenox Simpson, as chief foreign adviser to the President of China, who is reported as arguing that "in the event of war between Japan and the United States, China would intervene against Japan, which would oblige Great Britain to come into the war

[1] Vol. xi. pp. 92–93 (December 1921).
[2] See Viscount Grey, *Twenty-five Years*, vol. ii. pp. 103–105.

as against China, even though protected by express stipulations from so taking part in any such war against the United States." [1] Such an eventuality, it would seem, would render Article 4 of doubtful value, for there would exist no impediment to an immediate declaration of war against Great Britain by the United States. Whatever the possibilities in the situation, it was clear that the Pacific Question in all its aspects must be reconsidered by the Imperial Conference in the light of post-War circumstances. As for the Americans, they seemed to assume that the burden of proof now rested upon the supporters of the Alliance within the Empire.[2]

In order to terminate the Alliance on July 13, 1921, notice of such intention must be given by one of the parties twelve months prior to that date. Failing this, the Alliance would continue automatically until denounced by one or other party upon twelve months' notice. The question arose whether the communication to the League of Nations in July 1921 of intention to bring the Alliance into conformity with the provisions of the League Covenant constituted notice of denunciation within the meaning of the treaty. The view of the Japanese Government was that no such notice had been given. This view was shared by the British Foreign Secretary, but, as doubts existed, after preliminary discussion in the Imperial Conference the matter was referred to the Lord Chancellor, who consulted with the Law Officers of the Crown and then rendered the same opinion.[3] Thus the Imperial Conference, in attacking the problem, found itself in a stronger position than it would otherwise have been as regards the United States, and was spared the consciousness that no *modus vivendi* existed should they fail at once to reach a satisfactory solution.

The meeting of the Conference evoked expressions of opinion on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921 in all the British parliaments. Despite differences of opinion, there seemed to be a consensus at least among the leaders of the various governments as to what were the desiderata of a settlement. In the British

[1] *Canadian Annual Review* (1921), pp. 98–99.

[2] See analysis of the American attitude in "The Imperial Conference from an American Standpoint" (*Round Table*, vol. xi. pp. 835–847; September 1921). See also the references to Canadian-American relations in *Canadian Annual Review* for 1921.

[3] See statement by Premier Lloyd George in the House of Commons, July 11, 1921 (*Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 704–705 and Cmd. 1474, p. 4).

House the issue was discussed June 17.[1] Several members dwelt upon the passing of the conditions which had produced the Alliance and on the urgency of meeting American wishes regarding the Pacific. But Mr. Austen Chamberlain reminded them there were new conditions which called for a constructive policy, and urged his conviction that an altered arrangement could be made which would render possible the continuance of their close and intimate relations with a loyal ally, and yet win the perfect understanding and closest co-operation of the United States—in other words, a new and wider alliance.

Despite the ever-present influence of American magazines and press reports, Canada, apart from British Columbia, was not excited regarding the treaty. The subject was debated in the Commons on April 27.[2] Premier Meighen was non-committal as to his own stand, which was reported to be adverse, but lent ample colour to this belief by his emphasis upon the importance of the issue of renewal to Canada, standing as she did between Britain and the United States, in view of the attitude of the latter country in the matter. Mr. Rowell, like the Premier, accepted Article 4 of the Alliance as adequate for its purpose, hence based his reaction upon sympathy with the general American attitude. He pronounced against renewal of the treaty in its existing form. Mr. E. Lapointe, Liberal spokesman for the occasion, was more interested in Canadian aloofness than in Anglo-Japanese relations. He demanded emphatically that there be inserted in the new treaty, should such be made, a saving clause providing for the exclusion of Canada from its operation, like that embodied in the Franco-British Treaty of Guarantee and later in the Locarno Pact, and questioned the Premier as to his intention of pressing for such a reservation. Regarding the issue in general, he asserted that, beyond safeguarding her own position, Canada had no business telling the United Kingdom whether or not it should enter into a war treaty with Japan.

The ultra-Nationalist viewpoint was presented by another French-Canadian member, who maintained that Canada should shape her future policy as an American nation and conclude a defensive alliance with the United States, the only country able and interested to protect her from being made a second Belgium by Japan. This, he seemed to think, would give her " independence

[1] *Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 455–473. [2] *Ibid.* pp. 537–564.

under the King of England," and was the only alternative to an Imperial partnership which, in contrast, would entail sacrifices and burdens. During a later discussion, Mr. Crerar, Leader of the National Progressives, also expressed his opinion that the Alliance adversely affected Canada, now a Pacific Power, in that it was a source of irritation to the United States, with whom they should preserve the most friendly relations.[1] The more Imperialistic view of Canadian opinion, however, was expressed by the correspondent to *The Round Table*, who maintained that Premier Meighen's reported insistence on abrogation was quite unauthorised either by decision of Parliament or opinion throughout the country. He went on to express grave apprehensions of dissension within the Commonwealth and a deadlock on the issue, due to Canadian intransigence, and raised one very interesting point regarding the future relations of Canada to the Empire on the one hand, and the United States on the other: "If Canada is to be the sole and final authority over all questions arising between this country and the United States, will Great Britain have any responsibility for the execution or observance of any contract into which the Republic and the Dominion may enter?"[2] Happily such an eventuality as he feared did not arise, upon this occasion at least.

The Pacific Dominions, in contrast, were more friendly to the Alliance. Furthermore, despite their emphasis upon America's relation to this issue, there was as yet no evidence of following the lead of Washington in external matters. In the Australian House[3] Premier Hughes flatly accepted Article 4 of the 1911 treaty and the British declaration regarding the Peace Commission Treaty as disposing of all possible grounds for American apprehension. The United States had demanded the greatest navy in the world and was arming herself, with little doubt against whom. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was anathema to her, yet the safety of Australia depended upon it. They had no quarrel with either Japan or America, there was room for all of them, and what he asked of Parliament was authority to renew the Alliance in some form acceptable to Great Britain, to Japan, to Australia, and if possible to the United States—provided there were nothing in it to prejudice the "White Australia" policy.

[1] *Journal*, vol. iii. p. 556. [2] *Round Table*, vol. xi. p. 913.
[3] *Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 609–618, 858–870; vol. iii. pp. 89–100.

Mr. Tudor, Leader of the Opposition, observed that a " White Australia " was now the policy of ninety-nine per cent. of their people. They had preserved this policy inviolate throughout the term of the Alliance thus far, and he saw no difficulty in their continuing to do so were it renewed. He did not wish to do anything to offend the great Republic, so hoped that Mr. Hughes' interpretation of the American attitude was hardly correct, that the thinking people of the United States would not consider Australian support of the Alliance influenced by any desire to prejudice American interests. He would support any treaty that made for peace, though he would not commit himself to any determination of the Conference until their Parliament had passed upon it. Citing Article 4 of the Alliance and the Japanese declaration for stability and the open door in China, Dr. Earle Page (Leader of the Country Party) expressed his assurance that there must be some way, through full and frank discussion, to reach such an arrangement as the Prime Minister had indicated. Mr. Watt (Nationalist) endorsed his sentiments.

In New Zealand the issue was discussed in Parliament prior to both the Imperial and Washington Conferences.[1] Here, though opposition to the Alliance was more vocal than in Australia, the Government was as strongly in favour of renewal. The debates reveal a greater diversity of opinion upon external relations than was observable during the discussion of the Peace Settlement, and merit some analysis at this point. Premier Massey in the House and Attorney-General Sir Francis Bell in the Legislative Council testified to their appreciation of the Empire's obligations to Japan during the War and their desire to retain her friendship —yet without any suggestion of compromise on the colour question. Mr. Massey maintained that, under the treaty, Japan could have stood out of the European War, and the fact that she did not choose to do so was the more to her credit. Mr. Craigie and Sir William Hall-Jones also expressed admiration for Japanese ability and sympathy with her ambitions—in a more northerly direction. Mr. A. S. Malcolm expressed little appreciation for the United States. Ninety-nine per cent. of New Zealand had no thought of turning from the Mother Country in the first place nor to America in the second ; they desired the most friendly relations, but they in the Dominions, far more than in Britain,

[1] *Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 635–661 ; vol. iii. pp. 149–191 *passim*.

resented American indifference to their overtures. In contrast, Mr. Mitchell held that all their sympathies of race, language, tradition and colour were with the Americans rather than with the Japanese, and hoped for an alliance of the English-speaking peoples of the world far stronger than anything between Britain and Japan. Mr. Wilford, Leader of the Opposition, held that Article 4 was no protection. Furthermore, China must be brought in, for the United States had laboured to secure Chinese confidence, the waxing of Japanese influence had hurt her prestige, and that rankled. An alliance of all four countries would best assure peace.

Mr. Triggs revealed a tentative approach to the attitude of Mr. Lapointe in Canada. He admitted that the Alliance had been of service during the War, but now the situation was changed, the centre of action had shifted to the Pacific, with grave possibilities of friction between America and Japan. Any renewal of the treaty must contain an express stipulation that under no circumstances would they be dragged into war with the United States. " Why not keep ourselves free," he asked, " so as to be able to do our best when the time comes, in the interests of the British Empire, and in the interests of civilisation at large ? " Sir Francis Bell countered that such sentiments coming from the lips of the government would have been highly dangerous, and seemingly included the speaker in a general warning to the members against irresponsible utterances in and out of Parliament. H. E. Holland, Leader of the Labour Party, was able to reinforce his general politico-economic views by his sentiments on the colour question. He vigorously attacked Japan as an exponent of militant capitalism, denounced the Alliance as a war treaty, inconsistent with League of Nations principles, liable to bring disaster upon the whole human race by drawing Britain into war on the side of Japan against America, and included a repudiation of it in his amendment to the Address in March, 1921.

In South Africa, General Smuts held the view that, although the Alliance was primarily a Pacific question, and as such did not affect South Africa directly, yet so small had the world become that it was impossible for them to ignore it. Under the circumstances he endorsed renewal provided it did not conflict with what must be the central feature of Imperial policy, amicable relations with the United States. Mr. Merriman favoured renewal. General Hertzog was not reassured by the Premier's

contentions, and urged him to confine himself solely to the affairs of South Africa. What right had they to interfere in such a matter? Whatever advice they gave must work out eventually to their detriment. Should it in ten years prove adverse to the United States, that country would remember their share in it, and at the present time she was opposed to it.[1]

From such backgrounds of opinion, the Prime Ministers came to London. As has been the case with all other crucial Conference proceedings, its discussions were hidden by a veil of secrecy which has not yet been lifted. We have, however, ample reports of Mr. Meighen's general antipathy to the Alliance (backed by Sir Robert Borden), and his own statement that in London he stood for a Conference upon the Pacific problem among the four countries most concerned—Great Britain, the United States, Japan and China.[2] We also have Mr. Hughes' account of his opposition to the abrogation of the Alliance and the alienation of Japan at the behest of a noisy, anti-British and unrepresentative element in America, and his reported assertion that, on the second day of the Conference, he suggested an invitation by Premier Lloyd George to America and Japan for the purpose of negotiating a tripartite treaty to replace the Alliance.[3]

On July 11, 1921, the British Prime Minister made a statement in the House of Commons which, we are told, represented "the general view of all members of the Conference on the main issues of the Pacific, as also on the question of disarmament," and which has been embodied in the report of their proceedings as the official résumé of their deliberations. The principles which guided them were stated as follows:

> The broad lines of Imperial policy in the Pacific and the Far East were the very first subjects to which we addressed ourselves at the meetings of the Imperial Cabinet, having a special regard to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, the future of China, and the bearing of both those questions on the relations of the British Empire with the United States. We were guided in our deliberations by three main considerations. In Japan we have an old and proved ally. The agreement of twenty years' standing between us has been of very great benefit, not only to ourselves and her, but to the peace of the Far East. In China there is a very numerous people, with great potentialities, who

[1] *Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 662–680.

[2] In Toronto, September 2, 1921 (*Canadian Annual Review*, 1921, p. 101).

[3] *Journal*, vol. iii. p. 93 (Statement to the Australian House, September 30, 1921); vol. ii. p. 870 footnote.

esteem our friendship highly, and whose interests we, on our side, desire to assist and advance. In the United States we see to-day, as we have always seen, the people closest to our own aims and ideals with whom it is for us, not merely a desire and an interest, but a deeply rooted instinct to consult and co-operate. Those were the main considerations in our meetings, and upon them we were unanimous. The object of our discussions was to find a method combining all these three factors in a policy which would remove the danger of heavy naval expenditure in the Pacific, with all the evils which such expenditure entails, and would ensure the development of all legitimate national interests of the Far East. . . . I have already explained that the first principle of our policy was friendly co-operation with the United States. We are all convinced that upon this, more than any single factor, depends the peace and well-being of the world. We also desire, as I have stated, to maintain our close friendship and co-operation with Japan.[1]

One of the most significant features of this Conference was its success in reaching conclusions. It " revealed a unanimous opinion as to the lines to be followed by British policy, and a deep conviction that the whole weight of the Empire should be concentrated behind a united understanding and common action in foreign affairs." Such a consensus was not difficult to reach as long as there was agreement among the whilom leaders of the British governments as to essential desiderata, nor when differences on the specific point—the renewal of the Alliance—based as they were upon the probable attitude of the United States, could be resolved merely by subscription to a proposal which was then to be passed on for decision to the source of the difficulty itself. Nevertheless, all circumstances considered, this session of the Conference augured well for Imperial co-operation in foreign policy, and added another notable precedent to a worthy record of achievement.

The other outstanding feature was the completeness with which the programme shortly to be embodied in the decisions of the Washington Conference was worked out. It was, in fact, the preliminary meeting of the British Empire Delegation in this connection. As regards defence, the surrender of the two-power principle was no mere yielding to circumstances, confession of economic decline ; the Empire had by no means lost the power to protect itself as it deemed necessary.[2] It was the supreme

[1] *Journal*, vol. ii. p. 704 ; Cmd. 1474, pp. 3–4. Note that the term here used optimistically to describe the Conference is " Imperial Cabinet."

[2] See Rowell, *op. cit.* Preface, pp. ix–x.

token both of British faith in Anglo-American friendship, and of the sincerity of British professions in favour of general disarmament. As regards the Pacific, it was the Conference which aligned the whole weight of the Empire back of the principle underlying the Four-Power Treaty, and so achieved the solution, for some time to come at least, of one of the thorniest international problems of the day.

President Harding's invitation [1] arrived while the Conference was still in session. It was received with gratification rather than surprise, and heartily endorsed by the Premiers. The British Premier, in reiterating to the House the necessity of securing a satisfactory understanding among the four Powers concerned with the Pacific, if a basis for world peace were to be secured, said of it :

> Nothing would please the British Dominions, as well as the Mother Country, more than a settlement which would make them feel that the British Empire and the United States of America could work side by side in a common partnership for the restoration of the peace of the world—for guaranteeing the peace of the world. I do not know of any guarantee that would be equal to that of the United States of America and the British Empire in agreement upon the great principles upon which world-policy ought to be based. That is an absolute guarantee of the peace of the world, and I am still hopeful that such an understanding as would establish a scheme of that kind will ensue as a result of the coming Conference in Washington. Those are some of the great problems which we have discussed.[2]

The first suggestion of a conference on the Pacific problem appears to have come from the Canadian Government early in February, and negotiations among the Ambassadors, initiated by Britain, were already in progress when the call to Washington was issued,[3] but the great impetus to the success of the conference, arising from the fact that the formal initiative came from the United States, is obvious. The moment was auspicious for a settlement. The Empire had formulated a united policy and was prepared to meet the other Powers more than half way. In

[1] " Accordingly, in pursuance of the proposal which has been made and in the light of the gracious indication of its acceptance, the President invites the Government of Great Britain to participate in a conference on the subject of limitation of armaments, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will also be discussed, to be held in Washington on the 11th November, 1921 " (Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1922, No. 47, p. 49).

[2] *Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 714–715 (August 18, 1921).

[3] *Canadian Annual Review* (1921), pp. 102–103, 106.

the United States the Presidency and a majority in Congress had been captured by the same political party, so that these two branches of the Government would no longer be at loggerheads, and in several other respects the general situation was for the time being favourable.

The Washington Conference and Dominion Representation

The Washington Disarmament Conference was productive of results which gave general satisfaction, although important concessions were required of all the Powers primarily involved. The capital ship ratio agreed upon gave the Americans a position of dominance in the Pacific, and it afforded such recognition to the principle of " parity " with Great Britain that this immediately became in the United States (though with far less justification) a political principle comparable to the " two-Power standard " of pre-War days in the Empire, and which subsequently proved the nemesis of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. On the other hand, as regards the settlement in the Pacific, which was prerequisite to any agreement on disarmament, the objectives of the British Empire Delegation were achieved. A concert of Powers in the Pacific, a substitute more satisfactory than the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had been the foundation of British policy for twenty years, had been secured. Mere abrogation of the Alliance, of course, would have left a vacuum apt to be filled by the booming of the American and Japanese fleets, with the Empire placed in a most dubious, soon a disastrous, position. The diplomatic isolation of Japan had been prevented ; so also had the dangers of a balance of power in the Pacific. Of particular value to Australia and New Zealand, incidentally, were the provision in Article I of the Quadruple Treaty safeguarding questions of domestic jurisdiction, such as immigration and tariffs, and those providing for the maintenance of the *status quo* in the matter of naval bases and fortifications. Perhaps most important of all from the point of view of the Empire, especially the Australasian Dominions, was the fact that, as Lord Lee of Fareham put it :

> The Conference produced a complete change in the attitude of mind of the nations there assembled, and, if I may so describe it, made them think in terms of peace rather than in terms of war. I do not

know how many times in the course of my life I have heard people talk about some "inevitable war" between this country and that, and my experience goes to show that if only you talk enough and think enough about an inevitable war, you are pretty sure to get it in time. Perhaps the most important result of the Conference was with regard to that troubled region, the Pacific, in that it changed the prospect of naval war there into a practical certainty of naval peace. It effected that by the demilitarisation of the possible theatre of operations.[1]

These were the main achievements of the Conference. As regards the actual conduct of Imperial foreign relations, however, its chief interest centres upon the interchanges between the British and American Governments on the subject of Dominion representation, and the bearing of this question upon their international status. The proposal of the United States related primarily to disarmament. The view of the British Delegation was that the attainment of a *modus vivendi* regarding the Pacific was prerequisite to the successful undertaking of such a problem, and desired a preliminary conference to discuss the matter. Moreover, President Harding's invitation had been addressed solely to the British Government, and the Dominion Premiers felt that, in view of their vital interests in the Pacific, they should be present during the discussion. Hence :

In accordance with the suggestion which was believed to have been made by the American Government that the Conference on Disarmament should be preceded by friendly conversations or consultations between the Powers who were principally concerned in the future of the Far East and the Pacific, the Imperial Conference, anxious that for the Anglo-Japanese Agreement should be substituted some larger arrangement between the three great Powers concerned, namely, the United States of America, Japan and Great Britain, and holding the firm conviction that the later discussions on disarmament, to which they attached a transcendent importance, could best be made effective by a previous mutual understanding on Pacific questions between those Powers, devoted many hours of examination to the question how such an understanding could best be arrived at, where the proposed conversations could best be held, in what manner the representatives of the British Dominions, who were so vitally affected, could most easily participate in them, and upon what broad principles of policy it was desirable to proceed. It was difficult for the Dominion Prime Ministers, owing to the exigencies of time and space, to attend at Washington late in the autumn.[2]

[1] In an address on the Washington Conference to the Royal Colonial Institute, May 9, 1922 (*United Empire*, vol. xiii. at p. 379).

[2] Cmd. 1474, p. 5.

Premier Meighen delayed in London much longer than he had intended in hope of this meeting. The Premiers both of Australia and New Zealand were obliged to return home shortly in order to attend the sessions of their respective parliaments, but could have delayed long enough for such a conference. Mr. Hughes, in particular, urged this course before the American Club in London on July 22, 1921. President Harding's advisers, however, objected to this proceeding, although it was understood that they had no objection to preliminary diplomatic conversations upon the subject, at which the Dominion representatives might present their views. American objections prevailed and the preliminary conference was dropped :

> This conclusion was viewed with the utmost regret by the members of the Imperial Conference. At no stage had it been suggested that the results of such a consultation as was contemplated should either anticipate the work or tie the hands of the Washington Conference at a later date. On the contrary, holding as they do the firm belief that without a Pacific understanding the Conference on Disarmament will find it less easy to attain the supreme results that are hoped for by all, the Imperial Conference made the proposal before referred to, anxious to remove every possible obstacle from the path of the Washington meeting.[1]

This decision raised the question of separate representation of the Dominions at the Washington Conference itself, since it had transferred the settlement of the Pacific problem to that dubious environment.[2] Whether President Harding's failure to invite the Dominions *nominatim* to the conference was due merely to a following of traditional diplomatic practice, whether, as Professor Keith claims, it was a " necessary deduction from the refusal of his party to accept the separate voting power allotted to the Dominions in the League of Nations," or whether there were still wider motives, certainly this outstanding constitutional authority correctly pointed out its significance. Writing at the time, he said :

> The episode is of fundamental importance as a reminder that, as far as concerns the United States, the Dominions have not attained the international status which must be recognised as theirs by all

[1] Cmd. 1474, p. 5. See also *Canadian Annual Review* (1921), p. 106.

[2] See on this subject : Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1922), No. 47, Appendix No. 18 ; also *Canadian Annual Review* (1921), p. 116 ; *Journal*, vol. ii. p. 871 ; vol. iii. pp. 104–110, 192–193, 353.

the Powers which ratified the Treaty of Peace with Germany. The inchoate recognition conferred by the negotiations of President Wilson was obliterated by the refusal of the Senate to approve his action, and it must be recognised that the status of the Dominions is still imperfect so long as it is not recognised by the greatest of the world Powers.[1]

The issue of Dominion representation was precipitated by General Smuts, whose political situation in South Africa rendered it imperative for him to register immediate protest against any seeming derogation of Dominion status. On receipt of the invitation the British Government took steps to associate Dominion representatives with those from the United Kingdom as *British* delegates. On October 7 it was announced that there would be six Empire delegates, three of whom would represent Canada, Australia and India respectively. Doubtless under British pressure, the Delegation was later increased to seven, with New Zealand and South Africa included.

General Smuts, however, considered this mode of representation to be a serious step backward from what they had achieved at Paris. He declared that the attitude of the United States was a " direct challenge to Dominion status " which was " fundamental in the present critical Irish negotiations, but also for the future peace and welfare of the whole British Empire," and eulogised the position taken at Versailles, where " in the British Empire Delegation our individual standing was unquestioned, while our team work made us a really effective force," as " a great precedent settling our international status." [2] In short he demanded a restoration of the dual position held by the Dominions at the Peace Conference, where, although part of the Empire Delegation, they no longer spoke through the British Government but for themselves through recognised delegates instructed by their own governments. In a speech at Pretoria he said :

I want the Paris precedent to be followed at Washington and at every subsequent international conference. I want the British Empire represented through its constituent equal states. There is no other way to give it representation. The United Kingdom is not the British Empire, and a United Kingdom Delegation does not become an Empire Delegation merely by slipping in some Dominion statesmen through

[1] *United Empire*, vol. xii. p. 552.
[2] *Canadian Annual Review* (1921), pp. 79–80, 116.

a back door. Unity of action in the Empire means a group of equal states, recognised and represented as equals, free to consult together and to co-operate in their external relations.[1]

He appears to have gone further, and, in addition to his protest to the Home Government, despatched telegrams to his colleagues in the other Dominions, requesting them to decline to go to Washington, or at least make emphatic protest against the omission of individual invitations to the several Dominions.[2] In a statement later to the South African House upon the issue, he pointed out how grave would have been the position in which the Empire was placed at Washington had there been an agreement regarding the limitation of armaments to which one of the Dominions was not a party.[3]

General Smuts' contentions gained a sympathetic response from the Home Government, with the result that the British Prime Minister addressed a communication to the Dominions stating:

> I am completely in accord with General Smuts' views. The Dominions' representatives should hold the same status as at the Paris Conference. With the approval of the Dominions, the Foreign Office proposed, in accordance with that precedent, to give full power to each Dominion representative. If you approve of this procedure I presume your Privy Council or Executive Council will publish a minute sanctioning this action at the conference. The effect of this will be, in addition to the signatures of the British Delegation, the signature of each Dominion delegate will be necessary to commit the British Empire as a whole to anything decided at the Conference.[4]

General Smuts' action was variously received in the other Dominions. In Canada it led shortly to Mr. Meighen being taunted by the new Premier, Mr. Mackenzie King, that: "If Canada was fortunate enough to be represented in the Conference in Washington by her own representative, we have to thank the Prime Minister of South Africa and not the late Prime Minister of our own country for the fact that we have that representation." To this the victim of the recent election retorted that the question of representation had not been settled

[1] Quoted from *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 678.

[2] See statements by Mr. Massey, August 19, 1922, and General Smuts, May 21, 1923 (*ibid.* vol. iii. p. 877; vol. iv. pp. 590–591; also *Round Table*, vol. xiii. p. 229).

[3] *Journal*, vol. iii. pp. 907–908 (July 18, 1922).

[4] *Ibid.* vol. iv. p. 590.

while he was a member of the Imperial Conference, but later by correspondence, in which he had from the first insisted upon separate representation for Canada.[1] Mr. Crerar, the Progressive Leader, also, taking his cue from South Africa, declared during the campaign " we should be represented at Washington in our own right or we should not be represented at all." [2] The Montreal *Star* (August 11) made this pertinent comment upon the issue :

It is not the business of any foreign Power to assume that the British Empire is not a unit in its foreign relations. It would indeed run grave danger of being an offence for any foreign Power to make such an assumption. If that assumption is to be presented seriously to the world, it must be presented by ourselves. We must demand recognition as a separate nation, and be prepared not only to quaff the heady glory of it, but also to bear the burdensome responsibility as well.[3]

In Australia Premier Hughes adopted the South African viewpoint, but this met with adverse comment in New Zealand. There both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition expressed themselves as satisfied with membership in the British Delegation without distinctive representation. Mr. Massey stated that his reply to the telegram of protest had been as follows : " Replying to your telegram of 19th instant, our representative had sailed before your telegram came to hand, but while the point you raise is important from certain points of view, I consider it to be more important that the Empire should speak with one voice and with no uncertain sound." [4] The New Zealand correspondent to *The Round Table* said of the incident :

The resentment expressed by these two Prime Ministers (Smuts and Hughes) excited in New Zealand no sympathy whatever, but rather a deep regret that Imperial statesmen should adopt so anti-Imperial an attitude, and especially that in the name of " team-work " General Smuts should preach a gospel equally opposed to the spirit and methods of a team and to the interests of its members.[5]

The American Government yielded to the insistence of the Dominions and agreed to their being accorded the status and mode of procedure established at the Paris Peace Conference.

[1] *Journal*, vol. iii. pp. 336–337. [2] *Round Table*, vol. xii. p. 394.
[3] *Canadian Annual Review* (1921), p. 80.
[4] *Journal*, vol. iii. pp. 877, 881. [5] *Round Table*, vol. xiii. p. 221.

The British Empire Delegation at the Washington Conference comprised the following members :

Delegates for the British Empire :
Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.
Right Hon. Lord Lee of Fareham, C.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.
Right Hon. Sir Auckland Geddes, K.C.B., British Ambassador to United States.
Canada :
Right Hon. Sir Robert Borden, G.C.M.G., K.C.
Australia :
Senator the Right Hon. G. F. Pearce, Australian Minister for Defence.
New Zealand :
Hon. Sir John Salmond, Judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand.
India :
Right Hon. Srinivasa Sastri, member Indian Council of State.[1]

On October 18 it was announced by the British Premier that " General Smuts has decided to leave the interests of the Union to the representatives of the British Government, who were made fully acquainted with his views at the recent Imperial Conference." [2]

We have, in the report submitted by Sir Robert Borden to the Canadian Government on his return from Washington, a detailed and illuminating account of the proceedings of the Conference in their bearing upon Imperial relationships.[3] The procedure within the British Empire Delegation, he tells us, was that followed at the Peace Conference. Moreover, the formal indices of Dominion status for which he had striven in London and Paris were here recognised. The mode of appointment of Dominion delegates and of issuance of full powers was maintained, so also were the principles relating to the signature and ratification of the treaties :

> The style of the treaties concluded at Washington is also of interest. In their formal aspects—their preamble, their preliminary statement of purpose, their recital of the names of the plenipotentiaries, and finally their signature—they were drafted according to the scheme of

[1] Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1922), No. 47, p. 8.
[2] *Journal*, vol. iii. p. 25.
[3] Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1922), No. 47 (March 15, 1922).

the Treaty of Versailles and the other treaties concluded at Paris. It is "the British Empire" in each case that is recited as one of the Powers that have resolved to conclude the treaty, and that have to that end appointed plenipotentiaries. As the appointment under our constitution proceeds from the King, the usual formal description of His Majesty, which embraces the whole British Empire, follows. Since, however, the assent of their governments is necessary to commit the Dominions, the names of the plenipotentiaries, appointed on their advice respectively and holding full powers as shown above, are set out; and they are preceded in each case by the name of the Dominion as a distinguishing heading. Finally the treaties are signed on behalf of their respective Dominions by the plenipotentiaries so named. A similar procedure is followed for the case of India. . . .

It may be mentioned that in the official lists of the delegations, and wherever in the day to day records the Powers composing the Conference and their respective delegates were set out, the British Empire Delegation was designated under appropriate sub-headings to indicate the special capacity within the Delegation of the respective delegates. . . .

According to custom the treaties are signed subject to ratification; but of course the method of ratification is determined for each Power by its own constitutional practice. The constitutional convention of the British Empire, under which the final act of ratification by the King of a treaty signed on behalf of a Dominion must be based on the assent of that Dominion, was fixed by the practice of recent years worked out between the members of the Empire themselves. As that practice is entirely within the control and determination of the nations of the Empire, the Washington treaties do not affect it. In like case is the question whether the treaties shall be submitted to Parliament for approval before ratification is recommended, although in this respect the practice is determined by each part of the Empire for itself; for example, it appears from the speech of His Excellency at the opening of the present session that, with respect to the Washington Treaties, the Government consider that "the approval of Parliament ought to precede their ratification on behalf of Canada."

Certainly in view of the previous attitude of the United States, and the position of that country as the prominent outsider in international relations, the achievement of this recognition by the Dominions in purely post-War negotiations of such moment constituted a signal victory on their part.

The sequel to General Smuts' action regarding Dominion representation at the Washington Conference appeared in connection with the Conference at Genoa a few months later. In issuing the call for this assembly, the Italian Government addressed separate and direct invitations to the several Dominions,

and received individual responses from them. This, claimed the South African Premier, was the proper mode of action, and showed that the stand made at Washington had, so far as such things could, determined their international recognition. Although all difficulty had not yet been removed from their status, it had now been accepted in principle by all the Great Powers concerned, even the United States, and South Africa could claim that by their action on a critical occasion they had contributed solidly to that result.[1]

General Smuts' contention that separate invitations to the Conference should have been extended to the Dominions, it should be noted, actually went much further than the Paris precedents, and rendered the existing ambiguities in Dominion status still more vexatious. Premier Borden's trump card at the Peace Conference, we recall, had been the argument that the nature of British representation was a matter for the Empire itself to settle, purely a domestic question. General Smuts' demand, in contrast, would make this a matter of international concern. It would still further emphasise and secure recognition for the national aspect of the dual status held by the Dominions in the League of Nations. The contention certainly would lie that if separate invitations were issued and one were refused by a Dominion, or if a Dominion refused to accede to an international instrument negotiated at a conference convoked under such circumstances, that Dominion would not be bound thereby. It would constitute a precedent of paramount political significance. At the same time it would leave in a most dubious position the legal status of a Dominion which insisted on standing out of Imperial negotiations in such fashion. Apparently the difficulty could be resolved only by the inclusion in the treaties of reservations regarding Dominion liability. In other words, General Smuts' action should be regarded as an important step in the direction of the type of Imperial relationship later recognised at Locarno.

Sir Robert Borden in his report raises this important question for consideration, but expresses no definite opinion upon the issue:

> Shortly before the Conference met, the suggestion became prominent that an invitation should have been addressed direct to each Dominion government. Whether in the circumstances the suggestion was

[1] *Journal*, vol. iii. pp. 508–509, 908; vol. iv. p. 591.

timely, whether the idea itself is expedient, what the difficulties might have been in carrying it out, it is no part of my duty to inquire; the point is one of public policy for the Government itself to consider. For the sake of clarification it may be observed, however, that, so far as the immediate practical aspect is concerned, the forms and practices followed at Washington were not affected by the form of the invitation; they developed independently of it, and it seems clear that in any such case they would so develop in the natural course, since it is for the British Empire to determine for itself the manner in which it will enter into obligations with other Powers. While practically the question did not affect the right of the Dominions to participate in the discussions and to signify for themselves their assent to agreements or their dissent, it does seem to involve considerations as to their status and prestige in international affairs. In that aspect it is not without importance, and it will doubtless present itself to the governments of the Empire in the future. Whether the solution lies in the direction of separate direct invitations, or of some other alteration, notified to the other Powers, in the present methods of communication, it should leave the Powers under no misapprehension as to constitutional relationships within this Commonwealth of Nations.

A debatable point of interpretation regarding which he did stress his own view, however, was that of the proper procedure in case a Dominion should prove recalcitrant at the Conference and refuse to accept the conclusions of the other members of the Delegation. The formal arrangements at the Conference and the relation of the British Delegation thereto, he claimed,

illustrated a recognised convention based upon a definite principle. In order to commit the British Empire Delegation as a whole to any agreement reached at the Conference, the signature of each Dominion delegate was necessary in addition to that of the others, and any Dominion delegate could, if convinced or instructed that his duty lay that way, reserve assent on behalf of his government.

It is interesting to contrast with the views of General Smuts and Sir Robert Borden the more restrictive attitude of New Zealand, as exemplified in the report rendered his government by Sir John Salmond (August 16, 1922).[1] Differences both in point of emphasis and of interpretation are illustrated by the following quotations from this document:

Suggestions have been made in certain quarters that, by permitting the presence of the self-governing dependencies of the Crown at

[1] New Zealand, *Parliamentary Papers* (1922), A. 5; *Round Table*, vol. xiii. pp. 223–227; see also *Journal*, vol. iii. pp. 866–877, for discussion of the report; see *ibid.* pp. 565–568 for a similar difference of opinion in the Canadian Senate (June 8, 1922) upon the status of the Canadian delegate.

international conventions, such as those of Versailles and Washington, those Dominions have in some manner acquired a new international status—that they are now recognised for international purposes as independent states, although in their constitutional relations they remain portions of the British Empire. It is not easy to attach any definite meaning to this suggestion ; but, whatever its precise significance may be, there seems no foundation for it in the facts as to the Washington Conference. The true significance of the presence of representatives of the Dominions at that Conference is not that those Dominions have acquired for either international or constitutional purposes any form of independent status, but that they have now been given a voice in the management of the international relations of the British Empire as a single, undivided unity—relations which were formally within the exclusive control of the government of Great Britain.

After noting that the invitation to the Conference was addressed to Great Britain as to any other single Power, not to the separate Dominions, and that the seven British delegates were all appointed by His Majesty in a manner determined within the Empire itself, he attacks the argument that the peculiar status of the Dominions was based on the criterion of self-government by pointing out that Newfoundland, a self-governing Dominion, was not represented at the Conference, whereas India was. " It would appear difficult, therefore," he says, " to base on such system of representation any conclusion as to the acquisition of a new international status by the self-governing Dominions."

Discussing further the implications in the position of the British delegates at Washington, he says :

> The procedure of the Washington Conference was in itself a clear indication that the Dominions were there not in their own right as quasi-independent states, but merely as constituent portions of an undivided Empire. When any question came to be voted upon for the purpose of ascertaining whether there existed that unanimous consent which was necessary for a treaty, the question was put to the British Delegation as a whole, and was answered " Yes " or " No " by Mr. Balfour as the head and spokesman of that Delegation and on behalf of the British Empire as a whole. Although in the process of discussion and negotiation the representatives of the Dominions had, and exercised, the same right of audience as any other delegates, they never voted separately on behalf of their own Dominion on any question. The final decision in every case was that of the British Empire as an indivisible unity.
>
> The position of the Dominions at Washington was essentially different from the position which they occupy at an Assembly of the

League of Nations. By the special and peculiar organisation of that body, self-governing Colonies are admitted as members in their own right as if they were independent states. Although by constitutional and international law such Colonies are merely constituent portions of the Empire to which they belong, they are entitled by express agreement to be treated, so far as practicable, as if they were independent. But no such principle was recognised at Washington, or exists except for the special purposes of the League of Nations. . . .

The British Delegation, therefore, did not consist of seven plenipotentiaries possessed jointly of co-ordinate and general authority. It consisted of three such plenipotentiaries, with whom were associated the four Dominion representatives, each of whom had authority in respect of his own Dominion only. The legal significance of this distinction is, as I understand the matter, that the Dominion delegates were present at Washington for the purpose of being heard and consulted as to all matters there in issue concerning the Empire, and of approving and confirming on behalf of their own Dominions the decisions of the King's general plenipotentiaries, and of testifying such approval and confirmation by signing on behalf of their own Dominions the treaties there negotiated. . . .

These internal negotiations and discussions of the British Delegation proceeded throughout with the utmost harmony, and with the most ungrudging and courteous recognition on the part of the delegates from Great Britain of the right of the Dominion representatives to participate in the international policy of the Empire. No question ever arose on which it was found impossible to secure ultimate unanimity of decision within the British Delegation. If, unfortunately, it had been otherwise, and if any Dominion delegate, either of his own motion or under the instructions of his government, had found himself unable to agree with some proposal which commended itself to the Delegation, it would then have been necessary for His Majesty's general plenipotentiaries from Great Britain to determine in their own discretion the action to be taken.

If they were of opinion that the matter in dispute was of such minor importance, or related so exclusively to the Dominion itself, that the views of that Dominion ought to be acceded to for the sake of unanimity, this result could have been attained either by a modification of the terms of the proposed treaty or by excluding the dissentient Dominion from its operation unless and until it chose through its government or parliament to give its subsequent adherence. If, on the other hand, it was considered that the matter was of such general importance that dissent on the part of a Dominion should be disregarded in the interests of the whole Empire, it would have been within the authority of the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain to assent to the treaty on behalf of the Empire as a whole without regard to such dissent.

The fact that the delegate of one of the British Dominions had failed to sign the treaty on behalf of that Dominion would have had

no effect on the international operation and obligation of the treaty. Any difficulty so unfortunately resulting would have been matter for negotiation and settlement within the borders of the Empire itself, but would have in no way affected the external relations between the Empire and the other contracting Powers.

It will be noticed that Sir John Salmond, viewing the status of the Dominions from the point of view of international law and doubtless as it would be regarded by foreign Powers, has chosen to emphasise the probable right of the representatives of the United Kingdom to decide for and commit the whole Empire should a Dominion prove intransigent at the Conference. Sir Robert Borden considered the same point rather from the internal and political aspect, and asserted the right of a Dominion to reserve its assent to the majority decision. As regards ratification of the treaties, Sir John Salmond also chose the legal feature for emphasis. Like all other treaties, he notes, they come into force only upon ratification. The ratification required by the constitutional law of the British Empire is that of His Majesty, and no action on the part of New Zealand is legally required. In view, however, of the direct participation of New Zealand in the negotiations and execution of the treaties, it might well be thought expedient to submit them to both Houses of the Legislature in order that resolutions approving the ratification of His Majesty might be passed.

These differences of interpretation, mainly of features chosen for emphasis in fact, between Sir Robert Borden on the one hand and the New Zealand delegate on the other are worthy of careful comparison. Sir John Salmond's report is the considered opinion of an eminent jurist and is undoubtedly a more correct interpretation of the status of the Dominions at the time, perhaps even now, in international law, than the more ambitious claims (largely intended for domestic consumption) of others who were preoccupied with the political aspects of the Dominions' position among the nations, or with issues which were matters of determination within the Empire solely. Sir Robert Borden was considering the problems from the point of view of Imperial constitutional convention, as yet in a developmental stage. He does not enter into detailed discussion of the international validity of these conventions. Presumably they may or may not be recognised by foreign Powers as suits their convenience. Later

international settlements, as will be seen, took cognizance of these developments, but the precise extent of such recognition will in all probability remain a matter of controversy until some crisis determines the issue.

The British Empire Delegation as an Agency of Co-operation

The exigencies of the War developed, and the international conferences thus far considered revealed, the most effective working of the British Empire Delegation. This was decreed by the 1926 Conference to be, hence still is, the recognised agency of the Commonwealth for co-operative negotiation in foreign affairs.[1] Although when composed mainly of the Prime Ministers (as at Versailles and in 1921), it has been almost identical in personnel with the Imperial War Cabinet and the Imperial Conference, it is of course distinct from these in constitutional status; its functions are more specific, and whereas the Conference is definitely a meeting of Premiers, the British Delegation is composed of whomsoever the constituent governments may choose to designate for the purpose. As to the status and relation of its members, the view which seems to conform most nearly to the claims generally set forth regarding the achievements of the War era, and to the evidence of the actual working of the institution, is that the Delegation is essentially a communal body, enunciating with one voice a single policy either through its leader or some other member designated as spokesman for the occasion, and that furthermore (save perhaps for the pre-eminence accruing to the leader) the several members are on a basis of equality with one another.

This interpretation does not, however, satisfy either the extreme Autonomists or the centralisers and Austinians. The former demur to the collective feature of the delegates' status and activity. The representatives of each British nation (including those of the United Kingdom), it is claimed, speak for and can commit their own country only. The reply to this is that (as at Versailles, for instance) the Dominions profited by a dual status, Imperial and National, and that as regards foreign Powers the Empire Delegation is the agency for expressing the first but not the second aspect of it. On the other hand, the conservative

[1] Cmd. 2768, p. 25, and *infra*, ch. x.

view, exemplified in this case by Sir John Salmond's report on the Washington Conference, denies the attributes of equality and of distinctively representative character to its members, stressing the presumed right of the head of the Delegation to pronounce in the name of all if this were found desirable. Such a view in effect relegates the Dominions to a subordinate and advisory rôle in Imperial counsels. By its insistence upon the supremacy of the Home Government in the proceedings, it seems to aim at combating two tendencies, that of the Dominions to arrogate to themselves a separate international status, which threatens legal disintegration, and that of claiming equality for the advice rendered to the Sovereign by each component government, which offends by its pluralism and foreshadows chaos in its working. Although it coincides with sentiments expressed on several occasions by Premier Massey in New Zealand, it never met general acceptance throughout the Dominions, and may now be said to have passed with subsequent developments.

In his report on the Washington Disarmament Conference, Sir Robert Borden has given an account of the procedure within the British Delegation which is of especial interest in this connection. The two paragraphs following may suffice to illustrate.

> In the internal economy of the body known as the British Empire Delegation the design and effect were to reconcile the principle of diplomatic unity in the Empire's international relations with the principle of co-ordinate autonomy for each self-governing nation. All the British Empire delegates took part in the meetings of the two main committees of the Conference, and in the Plenary Sessions; while in the sub-committees, whose personnel was always limited to one from each power, a Dominion delegate was frequently designated to represent the British Empire. Frequent meetings of the seven British Empire delegates were held to exchange views, to discuss the Conference problems as they arose, and to reach conclusions; their technical advisers were present to furnish information and advice according to the subject at hand; while the Secretariat, including the Secretaries for the Dominions and India, also attended to assist the meeting, to record the results, and to ensure that any appropriate action should be taken afterward. The agenda of each meeting, with relevant memoranda, drafts and other necessary papers, were circulated to each delegate in advance by the Secretariat. In the ordinary course the chairman was Mr. Balfour; in his occasional absence the other delegates took the chair in rotation. These arrangements were a reproduction of the practice followed by the British Empire Delegation at Paris. . . .

Under these various arrangements the entire Delegation kept under constant review the questions confronting the Conference, and at every stage became aware of developments occurring not only in the formal meetings of the Conference and of its committees and sub-committees, but also in the course of the many informal conversations between members of delegations. The Delegation meetings afforded the means for harmonising the various points of view. They insured that the particular interest of any part of the Empire should be considered by the Conference. For example, the special interest of Canada, Australia and New Zealand were thus taken into account in reaching the formula in the Naval Treaty for preserving the *status quo* in respect of the fortifications of the Pacific Islands; while the special position of India in relation to the Chinese customs tariff on goods entering by land frontiers was similarly treated. Again there was the category of questions of high policy, so-called; questions that by common understanding are felt by the nations to raise directly the fundamental issues of peace or the reverse; questions therefore of general concern to the whole Empire rather than of particular interest to any part; questions such as those involved in the Quadruple Pacific Treaty, in the equilibrium of power defined in the Naval Treaty, or in matters affecting the future position of the Powers in the Far East. Here, too, the delegates were enabled by the meetings of the Delegation to exchange views and to reach in advance conclusions that could be put forward on behalf of the whole Empire. Throughout the Conference each delegate was in touch with his own Government by means of the telegraphs or the posts. Thus no Dominion could be committed without its consent, and each was enabled to state its view and exert its influence in advance of the formulation of agreement with other Powers. It should be added that in many instances the influence of the Dominions contributed very materially to the conclusions finally reached.[1]

All the members of the Empire Delegation derive their official standing from the one source, the Crown. Furthermore, as regards the internal working of the Delegation (just as in standing before other Powers) the part of the Empire from which an individual member may come is a matter of secondary consideration. All are emissaries of the Empire equally—the Dominions have frequently delegated their interests to British plenipotentiaries and might instead have chosen spokesmen from other Dominions; under the panel system representation of the several parts is never complete, but whosoever are chosen speak for all; moreover, it is a recognised practice at international congresses for the Empire to be represented on sub-committees

[1] Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1922), No. 47, pp. 44–45.

or commissions by this or that Dominion delegate. On the other hand there appears to be no warrant for Premier Mackenzie King's contention that, at Lausanne, the Home Government's delegates spoke for the United Kingdom only.[1] Nor can any member of the Delegation communicate formally with representatives of foreign countries save through the official head of the Delegation.[2]

As regards the internal working of the institution, also, the theory that the Dominion members held merely a subordinate status is refuted by their part in the disposal of the German colonies at the Peace Conference and their influence upon the supersession of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Equality in the proceedings was the feature particularly stressed by Mr. Lloyd George. Concerning Paris he said :

> My right hon. friend the President of the Council [A. J. Balfour] and I represented the British Empire inside the Conference, but there was no action taken by us that had not been submitted beforehand to the British Empire Delegation, on which the Dominions and India were represented. We held constant conferences or cabinets in Paris, where the whole of the Empire was represented, where representatives of all parts of the Empire took part in the discussions, and where they had exactly the same voice in determining British policy as any member of the British Cabinet.[3]

Sir Maurice Hankey, who headed the British Secretariat, made the more conservative statement that : " Contrary to what has been stated elsewhere I can assert with confidence that no important decision was taken by the Peace Conference in which the Dominions and India were not represented." [4] As regards Dominion participation in the deliberations at Genoa, Premier Lloyd George asserted : " There was not a step of any kind taken without previous consultation, and the action we took had their unanimous support and was arrived at after the guidance which they gave us." [5] Voluntary deference to the wishes of the senior partner on the part of the Dominion emissaries at international conferences may be frequent or usual, especially in matters touching defence, since her responsibilities in this connection are so great, but it must also be admitted that reciprocity has thus far been the rule. In case a deadlock should occur on

[1] *Infra*, ch. viii. [2] *Round Table*, vol. xi. p. 681.
[3] Statement in the House of Commons, August 18, 1921 (*Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 708–709.
[4] *Round Table*, vol. xi. p. 302. [5] *Journal*, vol. iii. p. 467.

some future occasion, doubtless the points noted by Sir John Salmond [1] and Sir Robert Borden would both hold true. The leader of the Delegation might pronounce for the Empire as a whole, while the Dominion delegate would reserve assent on behalf of his government. Either the difficulty would be resolved by appropriate modifications in the terms of the treaties, or else an anomalous situation like that created by Premier King in relation to the Lausanne Treaty would be the outcome.

In 1911 Mr. Asquith claimed that his refusal to admit the Dominions to participation in the conduct of foreign policy was as vital as recognising mutual autonomy, and when the developments of the War forced an abandonment of this position many still believed that the sole alternative was disruption. It was the British Empire Delegation which alone offered that compromise undreamed of by the statesmen of the former era, which, in the language of its eulogists, made possible the achievement of a greater unity than ever before, a unity in diversity, and which permitted the vindication before foreign Powers of those relationships among the British nations which had heretofore been confined within the Empire and to the Imperial Conference deliberations. A plenipotentiary answerable solely to the Home Government and to the electorate of the United Kingdom could not, save in the strictly legal sense, speak for the whole Empire; a representative Delegation could. Conversely a Sovereign advised by six different Governments would be in an extraordinary situation unless machinery were afforded to reach a consensus among them.

Furthermore, the exigencies of representation at international conferences and the necessary predominance of the Great Powers there preclude participation by the Dominions and small nations in all relevant proceedings. If the Dominions went as independent nations they could make representations but exercise no effective control. At Washington, if it had not been for their membership in the British Commonwealth, none of them would have been consulted at all.[2] Through the medium of the Empire Delegation, however, they made their demands heard even in the

[1] A similar view was enunciated by Senator Casgrain in Canada (*ibid.* vol. v. p. 321).

[2] This is the logical inference from the attitude of the United States towards the proposed preliminary conference which had been suggested primarily to afford Dominion representation.

Council of Four in Paris ; it was the voice of the whole Empire, not of the United Kingdom only, which spoke there.[1] In addition to such mediate representation, effective as it is, the panel system furnishes a means of direct participation in the more significant deliberations which would otherwise be denied them. Thus the several members of the Delegation may fill in rotation the smaller number of places assigned to the Empire as a Great Power.[2] In the League of Nations, not merely can the Delegation machinery strengthen the hands of the Dominions by promoting the organisation of a British *bloc* in the Assembly, but it offers them a means denied to other nations of making their wishes directly heard in the Supreme Council itself.

Not the least among the advantages of the British Delegation is the opportunity it affords for the cultivation of friendly relations and mutual understanding among the nations of the Empire, for emphasising their sense of interdependence, and above all for promoting the *practice* of co-operation. This is what impressed Sir Robert Borden particularly in his experience of its working. In his report on the Washington Conference he sums up his convictions in the following appraisal :

Doubtless the scheme will be susceptible of improvement as time goes on, but speaking broadly I believe the experience of this Conference has again justified it as a means whereby under our present constitutional system the Empire can effectively act at international gatherings. The formal aspects of the treaties and of our appearance at the Conference recognise both the principle of unity and that of co-ordinate autonomy ; but neither could be real without effective means whereby in advance of action the views of all would be fully and frankly exchanged and considered in common. The organisation of the British Empire Delegation provided that means. Given such means and given good will, the experience of this Conference

[1] " Take the Peace Conference. Supposing they had been there as separate independent nations, holding no allegiance to the British Crown. They would not have had one-fifth of the power and dignity they had as representatives of nations inside the British Empire. There was one man sitting on a Commission—the Prime Minister of Canada—deciding questions of the Turkish Empire. There was another sitting on a commission deciding the fate of Poland and the Eastern frontiers of Germany. Why were they there ? If they had been independent nations, they would not have sat so high in the Council Chamber. It was the fact that they were independent nations inside the British Empire which gave them all this power, and they knew it, and they are proud of it. It has not derogated from the individual freedom of any one of them—not one." Statement by Premier Lloyd George in the Commons : August 18, 1921 (*ibid.* vol. II. p. 716).

[2] Sir Robert Borden, for instance, sat in the Council of Ten at Paris (*Canadian Annual Review* (1919), p. 70).

has again shown that agreement and unity may be expected to follow under no compulsion other than that imposed by the common purpose of free and equal voices to maintain a single allegiance and to recognise their international responsibilities. Throughout the Conference a cordial and unvarying spirit of co-operation marked the action of the British Empire Delegation; I refer not only to the relations between the principal delegates, but also to the work of all those who in whatever capacity, whether from Great Britain or the Dominions or India, assisted in the task.[1]

The British Empire Delegation has proved its superiority as an agency of co-operation whenever the will to co-operate has been in evidence. It has been seen in effective operation as a phase of Imperial Conference activity, and in the most portentous international congresses of recent history. Equally crucial has been its application to the work of the League of Nations—in the fifth Assembly, for instance, in connection with the deliberations on the Protocol. As significant testimony from a different angle is offered by the continuing suspicion of the Empire Delegation on the part of foreign Powers. The recognition accorded it by the 1926 Conference, despite its partial eclipse, may be a hopeful augury for the future; but inasmuch as the governments are in no way committed to employ this agency in their relations with foreign Powers, and alternative modes of negotiation which contemplate the formulation of separate policies on the part of the British nations were at the same time endorsed by the Conference, the extent to which it will be utilised henceforth is a matter of speculation.

The Issue of Canadian Representation at Washington

From the Washington Disarmament Conference on, a marked change in the spirit and consequently in the methods of conducting the foreign relations of the Empire becomes evident; Nationalism is henceforth to be in the ascendant. The issue of Canadian representation in Washington, a legacy of the Co-operationists to the Nationalists, so aptly reveals the effects of this transition that it may well be considered at this point. Save where specific negotiations affecting them were imminent, the Dominions have in general been content to entrust the care of their interests in foreign capitals to the diplomatic agents of the Mother Country.

[1] Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1922), No. 47, p. 45.

So obvious have been the advantages of having at their disposal the diplomatic and consular machinery of the Home Government, that, save as regards the United States, moves to supersede this basis of representation were until recently only tentative. The first practical steps in this direction were made under Co-operationist auspices, and earnest if not workable precautions were taken to safeguard the diplomatic unity of the Empire in relation to the United States. Under subsequent arrangements, however, the project assumed a thoroughly Nationalist character, enhanced by proposals to extend its scope to other Dominions and additional foreign countries.

So extensive had foreign contacts become even before the War that a step impliedly in this direction was taken by the Laurier Government in Canada by the creation in 1909 of a Department of External Affairs, under the Secretary of State, but with its own Deputy Minister and otherwise distinct.[1] The wording of this measure was Nationalistic; the Secretary of State as head of the Department was to have

> the conduct of all official communications between the Government of Canada and the government of any other country in connection with the external affairs of Canada, and shall be charged with such other duties as may from time to time be assigned to the said Department by order of the Governor-in-Council in relation to such external affairs, or to the conduct and management of international or intercolonial negotiations, so far as the same may appertain to the Government of Canada.

In speaking of the project Sir Wilfrid Laurier said:

> We have given the matter a good deal of consideration and the conclusion we have arrived at is that the foreign affairs with which Canada has to deal are becoming of such absorbing moment as to necessitate special machinery. Look at the volume of business of an external character which has been transacted during the past year. . . . The volume of foreign affairs has assumed such proportions as to make it indispensable that we should have officers, trained for the purpose, whose business it shall be to deal with such questions and such questions alone.

It should be noted that in the enumeration of the Secretary's duties above, all countries, whether British or foreign, are treated alike, and that Sir Wilfrid's comments appear to adumbrate the eventual creation of a Canadian diplomatic corps. In criticising

[1] See discussion of this proposal: March 4, 1909 (*Canada, House of Commons Debates*, session 1909, cols. 1978–2008).

the measure the Opposition doubted the necessity of a separate Department; the functions, as in Australia, could well be performed by the Prime Minister. They did not discuss possible Imperial complications, save that Hon. George E. Foster remarked "It is not proposed to make any constitutional change; we are thankful for that."

In 1912 the conduct of the Department was transferred to the Prime Minister, its organisation remaining otherwise unchanged, and in 1916 a Parliamentary Under-Secretary was added.[1] Meanwhile in Australia the Prime Minister was also Secretary of State for External Affairs, and in New Zealand, as a consequence of their acquisition of territory by the War, an Act of October 29, 1919, created a Department of External Affairs under a Minister charged with the administration of Western Samoa and the Cook Islands, and with other external matters.[2] The South African Department of External Affairs was constituted June 1, 1927, under the Prime Minister. These departments constitute what might be termed in fiscal parlance important *indicia* of nationhood. They serve, moreover, as the vehicles for intra-Imperial as well as external communications. Instead of the former roundabout route *via* the Colonial Office, despatches now ordinarily pass through the Dominions Office in the case of Britain, and from, say, the Department of External Affairs of the Irish Free State direct to the Departments of External Affairs in the other Dominions.[3]

The issue of Dominion representation abroad was first raised by Canada, and then only in regard to the United States, with which she considered her relations to be exceptional. The predisposing causes in this case were not merely traditional dissatisfaction with the handling by British emissaries of negotiations with the United States relating to Canada, but also the fact that such matters monopolised so great a share of the activity of the British Embassy in Washington. In reviewing his term of service, Ambassador Bryce told the Ottawa Canadian Club:

> A large part, the largest part of the business that I have had at Washington, is connected with Canada. . . . Most of the business

[1] Cd. 6863, p. 16; *Canadian Annual Review* (1916), p. 252.

[2] *Journal*, vol. i. pp. 175–177; by an act of October 13, 1920, the administration of the Cook Islands was restored to the Cook Islands Department (*ibid.* vol. ii. p. 404).

[3] Reply to a question in the *Dail*: April 2, 1927 (*ibid.* vol. viii. p. 674).

of the British Embassy at Washington is Canadian business—I should say at least three-fourths of it. . . . It has been my privilege to sign either eleven or twelve treaties . . . with the United States Government since I went to Washington, and of that whole number nine have been treaties relating to the affairs of Canada.[1]

Despite vociferous tirades from almost every quarter and through long years at the incompetence of British plenipotentiaries, there has been no step which Nationalists have more frequently advocated and yet been more hesitant to take than that of securing direct representation at Washington. The proposal to associate a Canadian representative with the British Ambassador was favourably noted by the Marquis of Lorne in 1885.[2] and resolutions to this effect were introduced by Sir Richard Cartwright in 1889, and by Edward Blake, Mills and D'Alton McCarthy in 1892 (the last-mentioned provoking considerable debate) but there the matter for the time being rested.[3] The régime of Ambassador Bryce afforded an excellent reason for not pressing the issue. Sir Wilfrid Laurier credited him with having " turned a new leaf in the history of the continent of America," [4] and silenced an effort to revive the proposal in 1909 by stating that under existing conditions it was unnecessary, that their affairs were receiving better attention than at any time for the last twenty years, and that Mr. Bryce " has taken no action with regard to Canada except after ample conference and with the full sanction of the Canadian authorities." [5] Not merely by his innovation in paying visits to Canada, but in the administration of his office, Mr. Bryce won general and hearty endorsation. He could claim with justification on his departure that " I am happy to say that I do not think your relations with the United States ever stood upon a better footing than they do now." [6]

The War next intervened to postpone the issue, but it revived again with the conclusion of hostilities. The project was furthered by the close contacts between the two countries necessitated by their activities during this period, especially by

[1] March 8, 1913 (Ottawa Canadian Club *Addresses* 1912–13, pp. 183–184).
[2] Lorne, *Imperial Federation*, pp. 57–58.
[3] Borden, *Canadian Constitutional Studies*, pp. 122–124.
[4] Ottawa Canadian Club *Addresses*, vol. i. p. 27; see a similar expression of satisfaction on the part of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association in *Industrial Canada*, vol. viii. p. 624.
[5] Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, session 1909–10, cols. 1582–1585.
[6] Ottawa Canadian Club *Addresses* (1912–13), p. 183.

the visit of Sir Robert Borden to Washington in February 1918 to confer with British and American officials regarding the conduct of the struggle, and by the establishment at this time of a Canadian War Mission to the American capital.[1] Since, however, formal recognition of Dominion status had not yet been achieved, the instrument empowering the Mission to act was somewhat anomalous. Its chairman was authorised "to represent the Cabinet and the heads of the various departments and other administrative officials in the United States. He was not officially regarded as representing his Government nor as permitted to treat with that of a foreign state."[2] The admission of the Dominions to direct representation in the League of Nations also paved the way for concrete action on the proposal. Despite the acceptability of Sir Auckland Geddes from the Canadian viewpoint, Nationalists could still adduce the same complaint as did Mr. Bayard in 1888, that the machinery for carrying on negotiations between the two countries was unnecessarily circuitous.[3] They could argue with as much reason as heretofore that Canadian relations with their southern neighbour and with the British Embassy in Washington were unlike those of other Dominions or with any other foreign country, and so justified the making of special arrangements in regard to them.

In keeping with other War developments, the project was raised in the Canadian Parliament in 1919,[4] and then seemed suddenly to have been attained when on April 26, 1920, the American Department of State announced that, with the approval of the British Government, definite overtures had been made by Canada for the establishment of direct diplomatic relations and that these were agreeable to the Administration.[5] On May 10 identical statements were made in the British and Canadian Houses and by the Washington Embassy as follows:

> As a result of recent discussions an arrangement has been concluded between the British and Canadian Governments to provide more complete representation at Washington of Canadian interests than has hitherto existed. Accordingly it has been agreed that His Majesty, on the advice of his Canadian Ministers, shall appoint a Minister Plenipotentiary, who will have charge of Canadian affairs, and will at

[1] *Canadian Annual Review* (1918), p. 410; Borden, *op. cit.* p. 124.
[2] *Round Table*, vol. viii. pp. 616–617.
[3] Rowell, *British Empire and World Peace*, pp. 189–190.
[4] *Canadian Annual Review* (1919), p. 115. [5] *Ibid.* (1921), p. 140.

all times be the ordinary channel of communication with the United States Government in matters of purely Canadian concern, acting upon instructions from and reporting direct to the Canadian Government. In the absence of the Ambassador the Canadian Minister will take charge of the whole Embassy and of the representation of Imperial as well as Canadian interests. He will be accredited by His Majesty to the President with the necessary powers for the purpose. The new arrangement will not denote any departure either on the part of the British Government or of the Canadian Government from the principle of the diplomatic unity of the British Empire.

The need for this important step has been fully realised by both Governments for some time. For a good many years there has been direct communication between Washington and Ottawa, but the constantly increasing importance of Canadian interests in the United States has made it apparent that Canada should be represented there in some distinctive manner, for this would doubtless tend to expedite negotiations, and naturally first-hand acquaintance with Canadian conditions would promote good understanding. In view of the peculiarly close relations which have always existed between the people of Canada and those of the United States, it is confidently expected as well that this new step will have the very desirable result of maintaining and strengthening the friendly relations and co-operation between the British Empire and the United States.[1]

Instead of indicating the settlement of the issue, however, these announcements seem rather to have marked the opening of more serious discussion of it; they did, however, from now on place the matter clearly in Canadian hands. For some years the issue was regularly debated in supply and provision for the maintenance of the office agreed to; it was discussed intermittently on other occasions,[2] but first the Conservative, then the Liberal, Government offered reasons for postponement, and it was not until February 18, 1927, after the Minister from the Irish Free State had been installed in Washington, that what had all along been considered an essentially Canadian proposal was actually put into effect, and Hon. Vincent Massey entered upon his duties.[3]

As proponents of the measure, the Conservative Government dwelt on the special circumstances of Canada. They did not anticipate, or at least refrained from considering, the possibility

[1] *Canadian Annual Review* (1921), p. 141; *Journal*, vol. i. pp. 476–477.

[2] See *Journal*, vol. i. pp. 476–485, 662–665; vol. ii. pp. 565–581; vol. vi. pp. 727–730.

[3] See formal announcement by Premier King (*ibid.* vol. viii. pp. 308–309); also *Canadian Annual Review* (1926–27), pp. 167–168.

that the other Dominions would demand the same privilege [1]—surely, too, such a prospect could not have been entertained when the peculiar arrangement whereby the Canadian Minister should act *vice* the Ambassador was devised. They argued that the magnitude of the interests arising between Canada and the neighbour who adjoined them along a boundary of four thousand miles, and with whom they carried on the bulk of their external trade, called for the attention of their own representative. With their increasing population, and from two-thirds to three-fourths of the Embassy business already related to their concerns, it could no longer be claimed that such matters were better entrusted to other hands than their own. Interest, too, was now shifting to the Pacific, in which they had a vital concern and in regard to which they should maintain close contact with American ideals and policies. But the effect of the proposal would not merely be to facilitate their relations with the United States and to remove such misunderstandings as might from time to time arise. Providence had made them a liaison nation. This was a move toward international co-operation, in which Canada should bear her share. It should help greatly in the promotion of that perfect understanding and friendly co-operation between the United States and the Empire as a whole which was so essential to the maintenance of world peace.

The Canadian Minister would carry on all the functions relating to Canada heretofore performed by the British Ambassador. Although acting in co-operation with the latter, he would have an independent status in regard to Canadian matters and would deal directly with the American Government. He would receive his instructions from and be responsible to the Government of Canada. His duties would be to take part in the negotiations of specific questions between the two countries, to watch events, to transmit from time to time to his Government reports upon legislative and administrative acts and to furnish general reports in regard to social, industrial and economic questions. On the other hand, in so far as he acted for the Ambassador, he would be directed by, and answerable to, the Home Government. If a Canadian were British Ambassador at Washington, it was

[1] "It is urged, by way of objection, that Australia and the other Dominions will wish to follow our example. If the conditions were the same there could be no reasonable objection to their doing so, but the conditions are not comparable and never can be comparable" (Rowell, *op. cit.* pp. 190–191).

argued, he would be responsible to the British Government and in a sense to all the governments of the Empire by reason of the consultations upon Imperial matters which were carried on. Should the Canadian Minister act in the Ambassador's absence, he would be in the same position. He would not, however, be subject to recall by the Home Government. Should any differences or conflict of interest thus arise, they would doubtless be settled by conferences among the governments.

"This is not a step in the disintegration of the Empire," urged Sir Robert Borden; "it is merely carrying into effect the principle that where the interest lies there must be the responsibility and there also the action." No departure from the principle of the diplomatic unity of the Empire was involved. The appointment would be made by the King and not by the Canadian Government, albeit at the behest of his Canadian, not his British, advisers. His Majesty, who was Sovereign in Canada as in Britain, had the undoubted right to appoint a plenipotentiary to concern himself specifically with the affairs of that Dominion in relation to any foreign country. This step was merely the logical outcome of developments in Canada during the past twenty years, of the establishment of the International Joint Commission and the conduct of other negotiations, of the War and the Peace Conference, and their new status in the Empire. It was a fact of supreme importance that each successive development had added liberty, power and importance to the outlying portions, and strength, unity and solidarity to the Imperial fabric as a whole. It did not follow, moreover, that because they took this step in relation to the United States they should do so as regards other nations, although that might follow in the distant future, for their relations with their next-door neighbour were exceptional.

Mr. Crerar, for the National Progressives, heartily supported the proposal, on the grounds that every extension of self-government had resulted in a closer understanding with the Mother Country, and that their relations with the United States were peculiar and so close as to necessitate the attention of their own representative. Mr. Woodsworth endorsed the scheme in principle, but hardly on the scale proposed by the Government.

The Liberal Opposition on the other hand advanced a variety of objections to the innovation. During the discussion following

the formal announcement, Mr. Fielding and Mr. Mackenzie King inveighed against the secrecy, the haste and the lack of public discussion which had vitiated the launching of it,[1] and the former advanced a motion for delay pending full information, which was defeated by only five votes. It was argued that the proposed step meant little substantial good and would sow the seeds of future trouble. They should know where they were going; why not wait until the Imperial Conference had met? Since Mr. Lionel Curtis claimed that the Dominions could not have diplomatic representatives unless there were an Imperial parliament to which they would be responsible, would the Premier assure them that this move would not furnish an argument for Imperial federation? Only sovereign states could accredit diplomatic officers, hence Canada could not. The proposed Minister would be controlled by Downing Street; he would be subordinate to the Ambassador and exert less influence than the British Consul. The inaction following the initial announcement was due to protests from the Home Government, and hence probably the Minister would never be appointed—statements which evoked categorical denials from the Government.

The effect of this proposal would be to loosen the ties with the Mother Country. Concentration of responsibility in foreign affairs was the A B C of international law, and by this move Canada might sooner or later be involved in international problems and conflicts of interest with the Mother Country, as in the case of the Alaskan Boundary dispute. Their interests were well enough looked after by the British Ambassadors in Washington; they avoided a great deal of responsibility thereby and had behind them the full force of the Empire. If they were going to cut loose from the wisdom and experience of British diplomacy and their own inexpert diplomats got into trouble, what guarantee was there that the British Army and Navy would back them up? What Canada needed was keen Trade Commissioners, and Washington was not a commercial centre. As for diplomatic negotiations, the circuitous channel of communication which was alleged existed no longer. They had not the slightest difficulty in securing contacts through the Ambassador, and their business would be better handled as now, by the visit

[1] The Premier had stated that the confidential nature of the correspondence on the matter precluded its submission to the House.

of a Cabinet Minister fresh from Ottawa, than through the agency of a permanent representative with only nominal power.

The Opposition centred their most serious attack, however, upon what was clearly the weakest feature of the proposal as outlined, namely that the Canadian Minister should act *vice* the British Ambassador during the latter's absence. Here Nationalism and opposition to the Government could easily be reconciled. Mr. Meighen's argument, that since the Canadian Minister would be second in authority at Washington he would naturally take charge during the Ambassador's absence, was plausible yet failed to explain away the anomaly in his status. As the *Toronto World* put it: "It will be a triumph of diplomacy indeed to instal a Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington who will represent two nations, without being finally accountable to either. War is teaching us many things." [1] If while acting for the Home Government during some sudden complication mistakes were made, who would discipline him? Might he commit Canada under such circumstances? This was the feature which Mr. Mackenzie King found particularly objectionable in the proposal. There was danger in it. He was sure Canadians would not care to have their representative deal with questions affecting the relations of all parts of the Empire with the United States or with the affairs of Europe. It would be better in foreign relations that Canada should manage her own affairs, in co-operation with Britain and the United States. Mr. Lapointe in turn failed to see how such dual responsibility could avoid involving the Home Government in the appointment of the Canadian Minister to the detriment of their autonomy.

The solution of the problem, however, was soon taken out of Canada's hands. The Irish Free State anticipated her in the appointment of a representative in Washington, though without manifesting a desire that he should understudy the Ambassador, and it appeared that Australia and possibly the other Dominions would soon follow suit. This seemingly unanticipated development gave Conservatives such as Sir Henry Drayton the argument against the proposal (now sponsored by a Liberal Government) that it was disruptive of the Empire, and not likely to stop with Canadian representation at Washington. Was it not really better that the family should stay together and have their rows—as

[1] Quoted in *Round Table*, vol. x. p. 660.

they would have them—behind closed doors, and do the best they could in the common interest ? [1] " To anyone who knows Washington," said Dr. Parkin, " the prospect of having a number of minor embassies there, each working for its own ends in great diplomatic negotiations, which need behind them the force of a united Empire, is not altogether a satisfying or pleasing prospect." [2]

This move on the part of Canada met both favourable and adverse comment throughout the Empire. As regards Britain, there was an impression in some quarters in Canada that the delay in putting the measure into operation was due to opposition from Downing Street, which was fostered perhaps by Sir Robert Borden's refusal to submit papers regarding the appointment or to be more specific in his statements to Parliament.[3] But this was emphatically denied by the Government, and there is ample evidence of hesitancy and division of opinion in Canada itself to account for such dilatoriness. *United Empire* said editorially : " This is a distinct constitutional step forward and obviously in conformity with the new status of the Dominions . . . Criticism of the new arrangement, curiously enough, comes from Canada, but on this side there is approval only." [4] Lord Curzon on the other hand, in opposing the corresponding Irish measure in the House of Lords, stated that the Canadian proposal had been viewed with great apprehension by the Foreign Office and acquiesced in only with great reluctance, that it had fallen to the ground almost immediately, the Canadian Government themselves having begun to doubt the wisdom of the prerogative granted them, and that, furthermore, when the matter came up in the Imperial Conference, it was found that the Prime Ministers of the other Dominions had the strongest objection to anything of the sort.[5]

The Irish Free State promptly took steps to secure separate representation in Washington.[6] This move was defended by the Labour Government in Britain on the ground that having already

[1] R. B. Bennett, now leader of the Conservative party in Canada, has also expressed strong disapproval of the move for the same reason (*Journal*, vol. viii. pp. 576–577 ; April 13, 1927).
[2] To the Toronto Canadian Club (quoted in *Round Table*, vol. xii. p. 170).
[3] *Round Table*, vol. xi. p. 158.
[4] Vol. xi. p. 274.
[5] June 25, 1924 (*Journal*, vol. v. p. 477).
[6] See *Journal*, vol. v. pp. 473–478, and Cmd. 2202, June 23–25, 1924.

been accorded to Canada it was included in the Irish Agreement, but this specific argument was contested and the proposal itself condemned as tending to disruption by several members, especially in the House of Lords. A new complexion, of course, had meanwhile been given to the issue by the action of the other Dominions besides Canada. In Australia the Government officially announced in the Senate on May 12, 1920, its intention of securing separate representation in Washington.[1] In South Africa General Smuts pointed to the Canadian move as a new and far-reaching precedent regarding Dominion status, which opened the way for any Dominion to demand representation at any foreign capital, and necessitated reconsideration of the whole question.[2] General Hertzog and Mr. Beyers held that South Africa should have her own representatives, not only in America but in Europe as well.[3] In New Zealand, on the other hand, this development met with little favour. The Government saw in it the inauguration of a general system of Dominion representation at foreign capitals which they emphatically repudiated. Sir Francis Bell expressed their view as follows:

> I should be one of the last to admit the possibility of the creation of such diplomatic relations, because I follow Mr. Massey in his insistence on the duty of maintaining the integrity of the Empire and the recognition of the practical impossibility of the creation of diplomatic relations with foreign nations without a corresponding assertion of independent sovereignty.[4]

The original proposal, based on the assumptions that the relations of Canada and the United States were peculiar and that the other Dominions would recognise this fact, would have preserved the forms of Imperial diplomatic unity. As regards the internal aspect, it is true, the Canadian Minister would be appointed by and answerable to the Canadian Government, but as regards foreign nations, he would be a member of the British Embassy at Washington, appointed by the same authority as the other members of the staff, outwardly holding the same status and empowered to fulfil the same functions, although normally charged with the conduct of Canadian business only. Such an arrangement was calculated to facilitate Imperial co-operation in

[1] *Journal*, vol. i. p. 693. [2] *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 547, vol. v. p. 476.
[3] *Ibid.* vol. iii. p. 212; vol. iv. p. 620.
[4] Quoted in *Round Table*, vol. xi. pp. 972–973 (June 1921); *cf.* the emphatic statement of the New Zealand contributor (*ibid.* vol. xii. p. 453).

Washington ; that may have been the intention in arranging that he be authorised to act for the Ambassador upon occasion. It implied, however, a much closer relation to Downing Street than Nationalists could stomach and involved a very confused and possibly unworkable experiment from the administrative point of view.

The system actually adopted was in effect more Nationalistic. The basis of Dominion representation as regards foreign countries is set forth in the letter from the British Ambassador to the American Secretary of State (June 24, 1924) announcing the establishment of the Irish Free State Ministry, as follows :

Under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that it is desirable that the handling of matters at Washington exclusively relating to the Irish Free State should be confided to a Minister Plenipotentiary accredited to the United States Government. Such a Minister would be accredited by His Majesty the King to the President of the United States, and he would be furnished with credentials which would enable him to take charge of all affairs relating only to the Irish Free State. He would be the ordinary channel of communication within the United States Government on these matters.

Matters which are of Imperial concern or which affect other Dominions in the Commonwealth in common with the Irish Free State will continue to be handled as heretofore by this Embassy.

The arrangements proposed by His Majesty's Government would not denote any departure from the principle of the diplomatic unity of the Empire. The Irish Minister would be at all times in the closest touch with His Majesty's Ambassador, and any question which may arise as to whether a matter comes within the category of those to be handled by the Irish Minister or not would be settled by consultation between them. In matters falling within his sphere the Irish Minister would not be subject to the control of His Majesty's Ambassador, nor would His Majesty's Ambassador be responsible for the Irish Minister's actions.

In communicating to you these proposals, which His Majesty's Government trust will promote the maintenance and development of cordial relations between the British Empire and the United States, I have been instructed to express the hope that the United States Government will concur in the appointment of an Irish Free State Minister to Washington on the footing I have indicated above.[1]

Further information regarding the proposed working of the arrangement from the Empire viewpoint was furnished by

[1] Cmd. 2202.

Colonial Secretary Thomas, in a statement to the House of Commons two days later :

The proposal upon which we arrived at an agreement is that, while the Free State Minister would be the official channel of communication with the United States Government for dealing with matters exclusively affecting the Free State, the principle of the Resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1923 as to the negotiation, signature, and ratification of treaties and, in particular, of that part of the Resolution which related to the conduct of matters affecting more than one part of the Empire, would apply generally to all questions with which he dealt.

If any doubt should arise whether a particular question exclusively concerned the Free State, the point would, if possible, be settled by consultation between the Free State Minister and the Ambassador. If the matter could not be settled by such consultation, it would be referred to the British Government and the Free State Government. In order to meet the possibility that any particular question might in its initial stages be exclusively of concern to the Free State, and might subsequently prove to be of concern to other parts of the Empire, the Free State Minister would keep in close contact with the Ambassador.

While the Free State Minister would not purport to deal with matters affecting the Empire as a whole, the assistance of the Ambassador and his staff would be at his disposal, if desired. The Ambassador would not, however, be in any way responsible for action taken by the Free State Minister, nor would the latter be in any way subject to the Ambassador's control.[1]

It will be seen from these pronouncements that the British Delegation in Washington is to remain formally a unit, and decisions as to whether questions relate exclusively to this or that Dominion or are matters of Imperial concern rest with the Empire, not with the foreign Powers involved. Nevertheless, the recognition that the emissaries of the various British nations are not mutually responsible for their actions, the opportunities afforded each of the several governments for the direct presentation of its own views to the American Department of State, and the fact that Dominion Ministers will be answerable each to his own government and not to any central authority, all indicate the inauguration of a high degree of decentralisation in the conduct of Imperial foreign relations at perhaps the most important of foreign capitals. There is no assurance of concerted action. Such can be attained only through voluntary co-operation among the emissaries of the several governments as a local British Empire Delegation.

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. pp. 474-475.

CHAPTER VIII

The Nationalist Régime in Canada and its Influence

The next two episodes in Imperial foreign relations—Chanak and the Halibut Treaty—as well as that over the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne which immediately followed the Imperial Conference of 1923, were all precipitated by Canada, and present on the face of the record many Gilbertian features, but considered as signs of the times they acquire a deeper significance. Certainly in Canada the Chanak incident was erected into an issue of major importance—not less so for inspiring Mr. Ewart to write another characteristic pamphlet on Canadian-Imperial relations.[1] The diplomatic antecedents of the Near East Crisis need not be recapitulated here, nor is it necessary to appraise the personal share of the British Prime Minister in them. The essential factors from the Imperial point of view seem to be about as follows: The British Government found itself diplomatically isolated, and faced at Chanak with the immediate decision of defending the neutral zones and Constantinople against the advancing Turks, and thereby in all probability avoiding a conflagration of alarming proportions. The situation presented all the features of that emergency in foreign relations which obsessed Imperialists—one calculated to test the machinery, even the will, for Imperial co-operation to the utmost. The desirability of the Empire presenting a united front was patent from every angle. Yet almost a year had elapsed since the last Conference session, and circumstances had changed meanwhile. Consultation must be by cable, and the Home Government prepared, if need be, to act on its own responsibility.

The Dominions, however—and this was a point stressed by the Home Government[2]—had participated in the Near East

[1] J. S. Ewart, *Canada and British Wars*.

[2] *E.g.* by Premier Lloyd George: August 4, 1922 (*Journal*, vol. iii. p. 716).

Settlement decreed by the Peace Conference. They had signed the Sèvres Treaty of August 10, 1920, though not the Tripartite Agreement between Britain, France and Italy regarding Anatolia, the Bagdad Railway and commercial concessions. More important was Canada's part in the partition of Turkish territory. This was arranged by a commission upon which Sir Robert Borden acted as British representative. It might well be argued that the Dominions, and Canada not least, had assumed responsibility for the maintenance of this settlement. On the other hand, it might equally well be argued that many devious occurrences in which they had not shared had intervened to vitiate their original commitments.[1]

On Friday, September 15, 1922, the British Prime Minister cabled to the governments of the several Dominions notifying them that a grave situation had arisen in the Near East, that the British Cabinet had decided to resist Turkish aggression in Europe, and asking whether they desired to associate themselves in this course of action through the despatch of a contingent. Almost simultaneously—and here was the rub—the substance of this communication, couched in more rhetorical language, and constituting in effect a manifesto calling for public support, was given to the press and published in the Dominions. Apparently the Prime Minister's request was intended primarily for Australia and New Zealand, which had a closer interest both strategic and sentimental in the Dardanelles than had the other Dominions, but following the regular practice it was sent to all of them. The despatches transmitted by the American Associated Press to Canada, moreover, were briefer and less specific than those to Australia.[2]

The British Premier's appeal was received by the Australian Government on Sunday afternoon, September 17. The action taken in response was reported on the following day in a public statement by Mr. Hughes as follows :

> I have received a cable message from Mr. Lloyd George informing me that the British Cabinet has decided that the situation in Turkey demands action and asking whether the Commonwealth Government desires to be associated with the steps Britain is taking, and whether we desire to be represented by a contingent.

[1] This latter point is argued at length in Ewart, *op. cit.*
[2] See *Canadian Annual Review* (1922), pp. 174–189.

Mr. Lloyd George, in his telegram, emphasised the gravity of the position, pointing out that, altogether apart from the freedom of the Straits, for which such immense sacrifices were made in the War, Britain could not forget that the Gallipoli Peninsula contained more than 20,000 British and Anzac graves. That these should fall into the ruthless hands of the Kemalists would be an abiding source of grief to the Empire.

The announcement that all or any of the Dominions were prepared to send contingents, even of moderate size, would, he said, in itself undoubtedly exercise a most favourable influence on the situation, and might conceivably be a potent factor in preventing actual hostilities.

Immediately on receipt of the message I consulted all of my colleagues whom I could reach, and the Government has decided to notify Mr. Lloyd George that it desires to associate itself with the British Government in whatever action it deemed necessary to insure the freedom of the Straits and the sanctity of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and would be prepared, if circumstances required, to send a contingent of Australian troops.

I have informed Mr. Lloyd George that the matter will be brought before the Parliament of the Commonwealth on Tuesday (to-morrow), in order that it might express its opinion on the whole matter.[1]

Premier Massey in New Zealand received his cablegram late on Saturday night during the progress of a public ceremony at Government House. He at once consulted with several of his colleagues who were present, and within an hour telegraphed in reply that: "Government of New Zealand desire to associate themselves with action being taken, and will send a contingent."[2] Delay for the purpose of consulting Parliament, as the Leader of the Legislative Council put it, would have consumed at least three days; then what would the world at large have said—that New Zealand had taken three days to make up its mind, instead of the three minutes actually required?[3]

In Canada, Parliament was prorogued from June 27, 1922, until January 31, 1923, hence unlike Australia and New Zealand, the Cabinet was solely in charge during the crisis. The British communication was received within a few minutes of midnight Friday. A special meeting of the Cabinet was held on Monday the 18th, after which the following statement was issued to the press:

As already mentioned, the only communication which our Government has thus far received with respect to the situation in the Near

[1] *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 95. Note Australian time.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 138–139; *Round Table*, vol. xiii. pp. 453–454.
[3] *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 144.

East from the British Government is a cable despatch marked secret, the contents of which, without the sanction of the British Government, we do not feel at liberty to make public. It is the view of the Government that public opinion in Canada would demand authorisation on the part of Parliament as a necessary preliminary to the despatch of any contingent to participate in the conflict in the Near East. The Government is in communication with members of the Cabinet at present in Europe as Canada's representatives at the League of Nations, and with the British Government, with a view to ascertaining whether the situation that exists in the Near East is one which would justify the summoning of a special session of Parliament.[1]

Premier Mackenzie King later stated that he also signified to the British Government his willingness to hold daily sessions of the Cabinet, if need be, while the crisis lasted, and his readiness to receive the fullest information. He further stated that in reply to his communication he was informed that there appeared to be no necessity for the summoning of a special session of Parliament.[2]

The official reply of the Union Government was not given until a week after the British appeal reached South Africa. Premier Smuts happened at the time to be absent in Zululand. On his return he found besides the original communication a despatch stating that it had been sent to them *pro forma*, and was intended primarily for the two Dominions which had been so closely associated with the Dardanelles. Moreover by this time the crisis appeared to have blown over, and the necessity for specific action to have passed.[3] The Cabinet approved the decision to hold the Straits and hoped that military intervention on the part of the Empire had become unnecessary, but also made the following statement upon the issue of general policy involved :

> As far as the Union is concerned, very important questions of policy would be involved by any decision of the Union Government to take part in military operations in Eastern Europe, and the Union Government feel that such a step should not be taken without calling Parliament together. The Union Government venture to express the opinion that the future régime for maintaining the freedom of the Straits should be placed under the League of Nations.[4]

The action of their Governments in the crisis was at once submitted to the verdict of Parliament in Australia and New

[1] *Canadian Annual Review* (1922), pp. 180–181.
[2] *Journal*, vol. iv. 274–275.
[3] Statement by General Smuts : May 21, 1923 (*ibid.* p. 591).
[4] *Round Table*, vol. xiii. pp. 199–200.

Zealand. On Tuesday, September 19, Premier Hughes made a statement to the House,[1] in which he outlined the nature of the communication received from the Home Government and of the action taken upon it. He went on to emphasise the direct and intimate relation between the freedom of the Straits and the maintenance of the British Empire. The interests of the Empire in Mesopotamia, Arabia and India were bound up in the possession of the Straits by a friendly Power. Those who held the Dardanelles guarded the gateway to the East and, if they were hostile, menaced by their presence the Suez Canal, the possession of which was a matter of life and death to Australia. Since they had been asked merely to associate themselves with the rest of the Empire in the maintenance of the *status quo* as outlined in the Sevres Treaty, pending a conference to reconsider its provisions, there seemed to be no reasonable alternative to the course taken.

Nevertheless, the outbreak of another war would be a calamity, and it was not proper that the Commonwealth be dragged behind the chariot of Constantine's ambition. Accordingly they had thought it proper to ask the British Government for the fullest information and a statement of the objectives which the Allies had in view. Their own were limited to the preservation of the Empire, the maintenance of the *status quo* at Constantinople, and the inviolability of the peninsula; beyond that they were not prepared to go. They had shown their loyalty to Britain and the Empire in hundreds of ways, but did not intend to embark on any filibustering expedition. Hence they had asked their representatives at Geneva, acting in concert with the other representatives of the Empire, to bring the controversy before the League. Australia desired peace, and the dispute between the Kemalists and Greece interested them not at all, beyond its relation to the welfare of the Empire. Ten days later Mr. Hughes announced that the situation was still critical, and reiterated his endorsation of the enforced and solitary rôle of Great Britain as international policeman, also his assertion that Australia, as a signatory to the treaty, was bound to fulfill her obligations and supply her quota.

Mr. Matthew Charlton, Leader of the Opposition (Labour) said he was amazed not merely that they had been asked to

[1] See statement and discussion in *Journal*, vol. iv. pp. 94–104.

participate in a further war against the Turks at the instigation of the British Government, but that in stating his case the Prime Minister had given them only the purport of the cablegrams he had received. There had been too much secret diplomacy throughout the world. The time had come when the citizens of Australia should receive the fullest information upon such matters of importance; the Prime Minister had not shown that matters were so urgent as to preclude his consulting the House with a view to placing the issue before the people themselves, by a referendum, before troops were despatched. As for the League of Nations, he pointed out, Lloyd George had ignored it, and it had been left to their own representative, Sir Joseph Cook, to urge submission of this dispute to international arbitrament.

He was supported in the Upper House by Senator Gardiner, who claimed that more serious than the issue of the Straits was the fact that their Prime Minister and Government should, off their own bat, pledge Australia to war. War was practically the everyday business of Great Britain, and it was regrettable that both in and out of Parliament there was a sentiment which would tie Australia to Britain, and therefore to continuous war. A republic would be cheaper—"much cheaper, because then we would develop as the United States developed. We should be left to our own resources. We should be obliged to defend ourselves, and we would cultivate that spirit of independence that is so necessary for the progress of every nation." This assertion brought the immediate retort from Senator Drake-Brockman that Australia was a white man's country, but could not continue so for a year under the conditions advocated; it was the British connection alone which made a White Australia possible.

Dr. Earl Page, Leader of the Country Party, supported the Prime Minister. It had been the deliberate attitude of the Commonwealth to allow the foreign policy of the whole Empire practically to be determined by the Imperial Government, and while that was the policy of the British Commonwealth it was their duty to go to the assistance of the Home Government whenever it found itself involved in war. They were, however, entitled to the fullest information, not only of the views of their own and the British Government, but of the other Dominions as well. He thought, furthermore, that they should suggest such a revision of the Treaty of Sevres as would meet with the

approbation of India and Egypt. Sir Robert Best (Nationalist) argued that Lloyd George's message had merely reminded them of their new status, of their right to be consulted. He pronounced the referendum demanded by the Labour Party to be utterly impracticable and futile.

In New Zealand, resolutions confirming the action taken by the Government were submitted to both Houses and heartily adopted.[1] Premier Massey read extracts from Lloyd George's cablegram and his reply to it, also the return message of appreciation from the Home Government. Nothing else could have been done, he claimed, to avoid the prospect of the greatest war they had ever seen. He was gratified to find that the Australian Government had answered in terms almost identical with their own and hoped the other Dominions had done likewise. He considered the British Premier's appeal to the Dominions for aid to have been both the natural and proper course to pursue. Mr. Wilford, Leader of the Opposition, who seconded the motion, congratulated the Prime Minister for his action, as what every loyal Britisher should endorse. Even if in the Sevres settlement unwarranted concessions had been made, yet they must all back up the Mother Country in her need. Mr. A. S. Malcolm (Reform) said that the chief interest in the question was its bearing on the constitution of the Empire. If one of the Dominions should refuse to participate in such a crisis, they were no longer an Empire. It was impossible to carry on with six Executives each having an equal voice. If they were to have an Empire that was to continue and to be ruled by one Executive, then the Dominions must agree to be bound not only in common action, but in payment for that action, like Britain herself. Sir William Hall-Jones complained in the Upper House, however, that although they had received the call and must fall into line, the British Prime Minister had been remiss in his clear duty, in an Empire such as theirs, of keeping the Prime Ministers of the Dominions properly in touch with so important matters as had been transpiring.

On the other hand, Mr. Holland, Leader of the Labour Party, expressing himself as horror-struck at the prospect of another

[1] See *Journal*, vol. iv. pp. 138–145. On November 22 the Minister of Defence announced offers of nearly 12,000 men for a New Zealand contingent, also applications to serve from the Maoris and the Cook Islands.

war—in this case they had been called upon to side with the Greeks against the Turks, who were armed by the French—claimed that the Prime Minister should have submitted the matter to Parliament before replying. He refused to admit the right even of her Parliament to make war for New Zealand. Far from endorsing the Government motion, he submitted the following one of his own :

> That this House disapproves the action of the Government in committing New Zealand to military obligations without the authority of the Parliament and people of New Zealand, and is of opinion that preliminary to discussion and decision on any proposal to engage this country in further war all information in possession of the Government should be placed before Parliament and the country. This House further urges the Imperial government to submit all the questions at issue between the Allied Powers and Turkey to the League of Nations for settlement.

This motion was defeated by 57 votes to 10. Premier Massey's action also met strong criticism from Labour organisations and the League of Nations Union, on the ground that insufficient urgency had been disclosed to warrant his failure to consult Parliament beforehand, since it was in session.[1]

Under the circumstances the Chanak episode did not constitute in South Africa an issue of major importance. General Smuts handled the matter in masterly fashion. His own action was such that the Nationalists had little or nothing beyond the British press *communiqué* to exploit. At Johannesburg (October 18) the Prime Minister stated that he had no fault to find with the attitude of the British Government. He skilfully took the ground that it was bound to notify the Dominions of what was going on :

> They asked the Dominions—they did not invite them to do anything—whether they wished to associate themselves with Great Britain in case war broke out with Turkey, and there was nothing in this to which exception could be taken. . . . If Lloyd George hadn't done what he did he would have failed in his duty to the Dominions. . . . The British Government has acted with great firmness and has saved, without bloodshed, the Empire and the world from a very grave trouble.[2]

The semi-official *Pretoria Press* held that the incident illustrated the independent status of the Dominions, who must now be

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xiii, p. 455.
[2] *Canadian Annual Review* (1922), p. 187.

invited to participate in any war, and deduced that henceforth any Dominion might issue a call for aid to the others, including the Mother Country.[1]

This episode was discussed in the South African House in April and May 1923, prior to the Imperial Conference of that year, in the course of debates upon the general relations of the Union and the Empire. General Hertzog and Mr. F. W. Beyers, for the Nationalists,[2] inveighed against the conduct of the British Government in appealing directly to the people of the Dominions. Did the Prime Minister approve of this ? What would have been the result had the country already been in an excited condition ? Communications as from state to state should first have been directed to the Union Government. If the Premier's reply that he must first consult Parliament had been sincerely meant, then the Nationalists would support him heartily. Nevertheless if it were true that the Union had a status equal to that of the United Kingdom, he should immediately have lodged an emphatic protest against the conduct of the British Government. His failure to do so was all the less comprehensible in view of the fact that he had been the first of the Premiers to declare that in case of war South Africa might remain neutral. Now there was great pressure for an Imperial Conference, the cause of which was the imminent prospect of a new conflict in Europe, and the purpose of which was to insure that the Empire would speak with one voice—the policy of Lord Milner—hence the time had come for them to say how far they would go, and for the Premier to back up his words by deeds.

In reply, General Smuts[3] assured them of the good faith of his message to Britain. Consultation with Parliament prior to commitments of such a nature was the position which his Government had taken and intended to maintain. He went on to state that it was not their intention to intervene in the troubles and future wars of Europe. Nevertheless it was their duty, no longer as a Colony, but now as a member of a group of states, to make their contribution to world peace. They could not be indifferent to developments in Europe, for if Europe went they must go too. As for the incident of the *communiqué*, he maintained the view that this had been a matter of newspaper bungling,

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xiii. p. 200.
[2] *Journal*, vol. iv. pp. 586, 619–621.
[3] *Ibid.* pp. 588–593.

not a deliberate attempt on the part of the British authorities to go over the heads of the Dominion governments.

In Canada the attitude of the Conservative Party was, as might be expected, critical of the dilatory course of action pursued by the Government. Speaking on September 20, Mr. Meighen said: "This being a grave question of foreign policy, it is the duty of every good citizen to give the Government every opportunity to live up to the sterling aspirations of the British Empire. I am giving them that opportunity." [1] Addressing the Toronto Business Men's Conservative Club on the 23rd, he made a specific declaration of policy:

> Let there be no dispute as to where I stand. When Britain's message came, then Canada should have said: "Ready, aye ready; we stand by you." I hope the time has not gone by when that declaration can yet be made. If that declaration is made, then I will be at the back of the Government. . . . Can anyone divine what is to be the result of a policy by which we determine for ourselves whether or not we leave to Britain, or share with her, the defence of treaties to which the honour as well as the signature of the country is pledged? Can anyone divine where it is going to lead us? or what will be the effect of the procrastinations of this week we are passing through? [2]

As to the despatch, he did not think it implied the sending of a contingent overseas. "What Britain sought was simply a declaration of solidarity from the component parts of the Empire." On the 26th he issued a formal statement from Ottawa claiming that Canada was a party to the Treaty of Sevres, and that Parliament had ratified it, in that Senator Dandurand, for the Government, had claimed ratification to be the object of the bill relating to the treaty when it had been introduced.[3] The same attitude was exemplified by *The Montreal Star*, which argued:

> A scattered Empire, such as ours, has no choice at a sudden crisis like this save to trust its leaders. If the British Government, with its special sources of information, decides that a firm stand must be taken on the Dardanelles, it would be an act of mad and egotistical folly for a journal or government three thousand miles away to set up a different view.[4]

The issue was at once raised during the debate on the address when Parliament reassembled in February 1923.[5] The mover of

[1] *Canadian Annual Review* (1922), p. 184.
[2] Quoted from *The Ottawa Journal* (September 23, 1922) in J. S. Ewart, *op. cit.* p. 5.
[3] *Canadian Annual Review* (1922), p. 185.
[4] Ewart, *op. cit.* p. 6.
[5] See *Journal*, vol. iv. pp. 268–283.

the Address (Mr. Putnam) adverted to the criticism levelled at the Government from certain quarters, characterised it as unfair, and claimed that had the Prime Minister done otherwise than state that Parliament must first be consulted, he would have offended not only the well-established principle of responsible government, but the spirit of the League of Nations, to which Canada was a party. Mr. Meighen focussed his attack mainly upon this issue :

> The Speech from the Throne makes no reference to an effort of the British Government to join the whole forces of the Empire to make still more secure the peace of eastern and southern Europe. I noticed in the speech of the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Putnam) that he applauded what was said to be the action of the Government in refusing to submit a policy until Parliament met. I find the Speech (from the Throne) as barren of any suggestion of submission of policy to Parliament as the Government was barren when other parts of the Empire answered in September last.

He went on to urge the duty of the Government to bring down all the papers on the matter, so that Parliament might know exactly the circumstances surrounding them within the Empire and before the world, and be better able to determine the duty of their country.

Mr. Meighen's own policy further illustrated that positive attitude towards participation in world affairs which had characterised Sir Robert Borden's stand during the debate on the Peace Settlement. Taking the ground that a prime requisite for the restoration of sounder agricultural conditions in Canada was the preservation of stability in Europe, he said :

> We want peace, we want prosperity ; but do not let us just keep on yearning for peace and the consequent prosperity always at the expense of someone else. There is, I know, on this continent a feeling in which, unfortunately I think myself, one great nation places too much reliance, a feeling that here in America our safest and best course in the general interests of the world is to hold ourselves intact, to refrain from all participation in the economic rehabilitation of the old world. From that position I believe there is a tendency to-day to recede, and Canada is in no position to point a finger at another country so long as we ourselves, as part of the British Empire, maintain that selfish part ourselves. I do not say there is any major part we can play ; but we can play a part commensurate with the part we have played before, and it is the duty of this country to do its full share, joining with other countries of the world to bring about those sure securities

for peace and consequently those sure securities for economic recovery in those portions of the world that have suffered.

One of his supporters, too, upon the same theme, demonstrated a mixture of Imperialist policy with a Nationalist background coloured by the influence of the traditional American attitude towards Europe, which is well worth quoting:

> Do not merely talk about calling Parliament together when practically all the issues are determined, and there will be only one thing for us to do if Parliament is called together, but let us as a nation try to strike at the very root of this accursed European diplomacy and insist upon taking part in the very inmost counsels of the Empire and having our share in determining, not at the moment when war is about to burst upon us, but long, long before, and let us have our say about the path that the Empire shall tread, and the direction in which it shall lead the feet of the people. . . . My proposition is simply that the Government should endeavour to have direct representation, not merely of a high trade commissioner, but direct representation by someone of Cabinet rank and authority, who would sit in the inner counsels of the Empire, would give his views, and report to Canada what was being done, so that long before war would even be in prospect, we would know whether or not all had been done to avoid a possible conflagration.

Unlike General Smuts, Premier Mackenzie King did not meet attack by counter-attack, but remained on the defensive. He placed the entire onus of his failure to be ready with the documents relating to the crisis upon the Home Government's unwillingness to allow their publication.[1] He explained that after the appeal from the Home Government reached the Governor-General within five minutes of midnight Friday, it had to be decoded and did not reach his office until the middle of Saturday afternoon, he himself being absent from Ottawa at the time. Meanwhile, the press despatch had been published in the Saturday newspapers, as also the announcement that New Zealand had promised a contingent. Immediately on his return, Sunday, he had despatched a request to the British authorities for an explanation as to how it came about that before any communication had reached the Government, the press of the country had been given

[1] It might be mentioned that when, just after the change of Government, Mr. Meighen asked the new Premier to request from the Home Government authorisation for a full report by the former to Parliament on the proceedings of the 1921 Conference, the latter appears to have refused point-blank to be a party to any such derogation from their status as an equal member of the Commonwealth (see *Journal*, vol. iii. pp. 345–46).

a statement on the matter. At the same time, in order that they in Ottawa might have the benefit of their counsel, he had forwarded a copy of the British communication to his colleagues who were in Geneva attending the sessions of the League.

Premier King excused his inaction first by the argument that the appeal had been intended primarily for Australia and New Zealand, citing General Smuts as authority for this assumption; secondly, because of the entirely unheralded character of the British announcement. On this point he was particularly insistent, stating:

> May I say in reference to this despatch that this was the first and only intimation which the Government had received from the British Government of a situation in the Near East which had reached a critical stage and with respect of which there was reason to anticipate the necessity of making any kind of appeal for military assistance. I want it to be clearly understood that nothing in the way of an official communication respecting a critical situation in the Near East was received by our Government from the British Government prior to our receipt of the particular despatch of which I have given the substance.

The Prime Minister concluded with an enunciation of general policy which, seemingly, was intended to be a reaffirmation of the Laurier tradition and was accepted as such by his followers. It was expressed as follows:

> As regards the part which our Government has taken in this matter, I would say to my right hon. friend (Mr. Meighen) that we have felt and feel very strongly that if the relations between the different parts of the British Empire are to be made of an enduring character, this will only be through a full recognition of the supremacy of Parliament, and this particularly with regard to matters which may involve participation in war. It is for Parliament to decide whether or not we should participate in wars in different parts of the world, and it is neither right nor proper for any individual or for any group of individuals to take any step which might limit the rights of Parliament in a matter which is of such great concern to all the people of our country.

Mr. Robert Forke, Leader of the National Progressives, and the Rev. J. S. Woodsworth, representing Labour, heartily endorsed the attitude of the Prime Minister. Mr. Forke stated his general position in the following words:

> Just a word in regard to our national status. I would like to say here that I like to count myself a loyal citizen of the British Empire.

I am proud of that connection and I hope that nothing will ever occur to make me feel less proud of it. At the same time, I agree with the steps taken by the Prime Minister and with his Government's reply to the telegram that was sent from the Prime Minister of Great Britain last fall. I hope that, whatever measures may be taken, nothing will be done to retard the progress of Canada as a nation controlling her own destinies within the British Empire.

Mr. Woodsworth drew attention to several points worth noting. He expressed gratification that the country was not to be plunged into war without the consent of Parliament, but at the same time pronounced the maintenance of a negative attitude towards Europe impracticable. He inveighed against secret diplomacy, especially secrecy at the behest of the Home Government regarding their interchanges with Canada. He argued, moreover, that frequently what passed as the policy of Great Britain was in reality that of a small section of the country, that with the changes in governments resting on such bases policies also changed, and that they in Canada would be in a foolish position if they felt in honour bound to endorse these shifting minority opinions. He concluded with an expression of what may be considered typical of the more evangelical type of the new Nationalism :

> My greatest ambition for this country of mine is that Canada, lying side by side with the great American Republic, a friendly country, allied also by ties of blood and sentiment with the great Mother Land, and allied, I am glad to think, with other nations of Europe, should not follow weakly the policies of older nations and older periods, but take a foremost place in bravely blazing a path to that better day to which I believe we are all looking.

The Implications of the Chanak Episode

In view of the fact, therefore, that the crisis had virtually passed before General Smuts was in a position to act, it was the attitude of the Canadian Government which gave the Chanak episode its significance in the history of Imperial foreign relations. Before attempting an analysis of this, reference should be made to the share borne by the purely partisan strategy of domestic politics in the situation. Despite the wider issue of policy involved, this was undoubtedly a factor, in view of the uncertain domestic alignment at the time. It might be argued, in partial explanation at least, that a centre party in search of a cohesive

issue could find it easiest by becoming the party of Canadian national autonomy, even if most of the ogres to be demolished during their quest had bodies of straw, and that under the circumstances the Chanak affair and succeeding episodes were godsends, and exploited in full measure.

Colour is lent to such a view by the fact that in face of a call to declare for or against Imperial co-operation in principle, the Premier retorted with a constitutional platitude which answered the question only by implication, but which had great significance from the standpoint of domestic consumption in certain quarters. It is doubtless fair to characterise his course as distinctly negative ; it was calculated primarily to avoid giving offence to either section of his supporters, and the maxim which he enunciated was one which could hardly evoke strong criticism from his opponents. One inclines to read approvingly the following appraisal of his action by the Canadian correspondent to *The Round Table :*

> Mr. King's policy has, therefore, been successful ; but it has only succeeded because the crisis passed rapidly, before the absence of leadership had time to bring disastrous results. His favourite doctrine of entrusting the formation of policy to Parliament rather than undertaking it in the Cabinet would not have been prejudiced if the reply to the British Government had been prefaced by a declaration in general terms of sympathy and solidarity. Mr. Lloyd George by his sudden message strained the machinery for co-operation in foreign politics ; Mr. King by his answer has given no guidance for the future. The Government followed the line of least resistance, and is lucky to discover that for once the counsels of weakness and the counsels of prudence coincided.[1]

The significance attributed to the vindication of parliamentary control on such occasions as this at times verges on the ludicrous. Time and again in the Dominions the same antithesis was assumed—that the choice lay between taking orders direct from London and self-government expressed through decision of their own Parliament. Mr. Ewart, for instance, prefaces his observations on the Chanak episode by setting forth the following propositions :

> The invitation of the British Government to Canada (September 17, 1922) to engage in a war which was thought to be imminent in connection with a squabble in the Near East, has raised in clear and concrete form the old question whether Canada ought to exercise

[1] Vol. xiii. p. 177.

judgment before sending her sons anywhere to kill and be killed, or whether, without hesitation or consideration, she ought to reply, " Ready, aye ready ! " True Canadians answer one way. Imperialists answer the other. The issue is now clearly defined. Let it be definitely settled. The recent crisis is happily passed. Another may arise at any time. And what our Government ought to do should not be left undecided. Are we to engage when our Parliament says so, or merely when requested by a British Government ? Like bull-terriers, are we to fight when whistled for ? Or like intelligent human beings, are we to investigate and for ourselves determine (1) whether the stated cause is just ; (2) whether, from Canadian point of view, it is worth a war ; and (3) whether war is unavoidable. Fight, say the Imperialists ; inquiry is disloyalty and hesitation a crime.[1]

The function of the responsible Dominion Cabinet in the determination of foreign policy is ignored. Judgment upon an issue of external policy is confused with the purely constitutional problem of parliamentary control over the Cabinet in the conduct of foreign relations. Moreover, it was this confusion which veiled the purport of Premier King's reply to the British cable, and which gave it its effectiveness from the point of view of political strategy.

Under the British parliamentary system a Prime Minister and Cabinet are presumed to command a working majority in Parliament and to assume responsibility for the formulation of the policies which that Parliament shall enact. When a decision such as that demanded by the George-Churchill communication becomes necessary, the responsibility rests with the Cabinet, and if the response is to be in the affirmative the course pursued in Australia and New Zealand is the correct one.[2] Leadership is expected and will be endorsed by their parliamentary majority, though wisdom prescribes that the request for such endorsation be not too long delayed. Stating, on the contrary, that the matter must be reserved for the decision of Parliament cannot under the circumstances be interpreted otherwise than as a refusal to recommend affirmative action, as a refusal on the part of the Dominion government to co-operate. Herein lies the significance of the Canadian Prime Minister's response to the appeal of the Home Government, and not in the alleged constitutional issue.

[1] Ewart, *op. cit.* p. 5.

[2] For the weakness in the Canadian Premier's contention, from the legal standpoint, see Corbett and Smith, *Canada and World Politics*, pp. 90–91.

The purport of the Canadian Government's attitude—refusal of co-operation—was readily grasped, and this accounts for the consternation caused by the Chanak episode in Imperialist circles. Nevertheless, despite the seemingly elementary character of the point involved, the discussion of it, at least in Nationalistic quarters, was distinctly, probably deliberately, confused. It was assumed to be a reiteration of the policy enunciated by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1900, and maintained by the Liberal party ever since. The essence of the old leader's principle, however, was the refusal of all prior commitments in Imperial foreign relations, the reservation to the Canadian Government, Parliament, or people (he drew no rigid distinctions here) of full authority to decide for themselves upon the course of action when the need arose. This policy had been in operation for a quarter-century, but it had not hitherto prevented vigorous participation in every Imperial emergency which had arisen. Premier King's pronouncement, in contrast, was not merely a reaffirmation of the Laurier principle. It was a utilisation of the relationship created by his former master in order to refuse co-operation on this occasion, a refusal veiled by the assertion of an entirely different proposition, namely the supremacy of Parliament in foreign relations, or, it might be said, the relegation to Parliament of the onus of decision in such matters. Actually it marks the first outstanding case in which a Dominion was placed in the position of avowedly refusing to stand by the rest of the Empire in such a crisis.

It might be well to mention, incidentally, that one important reason for the emphasis on parliamentary control by the Opposition generally, and more especially by minority groups such as the left-wing Nationalists in Canada, and the various Labour parties, was the desire to secure this most important of forums for the airing of their objections and the incidental opportunities of hampering the activity of the Government. An added reason, in the case of Nationalists and non-co-operationists in general, was that the dilatory procedure promoted by reference to Parliament best served the negative policies they desired to follow.

The Chanak episode invites two further comments bearing upon the future of Imperial foreign relations. In the first place it has especial significance from its association with the advent

to power of the first of the Nationalist Oppositions whose policies were forecast during the debates on the Versailles Settlement. Premier Hughes was to be succeeded by Mr. Bruce, a more thoroughgoing Imperialist than he, but General Hertzog was soon to supersede Premier Smuts, and President Cosgrave was threatened by an administration less enthusiastic for the British connection. With the coming into office of governments which disbelieved in united counsels, or even founded their external policy while in opposition upon a repudiation of Imperial co-operation, a new era in the conduct of foreign relations would be ushered in, and decentralisation would become the keynote for the Commonwealth.

The behaviour of the Home Government itself in connection with the episode was equally portentous, and, as interpreted by its critics at any rate, every whit as promotive of decentralisation. The Imperial Conference had adjourned, after expressing the consensus of the Empire upon the broad lines of foreign policy. The machinery in the interim, it was agreed, was to be the machinery of the British Foreign Office, but a Home Government sincerely committed to Imperial co-operation would be guided by the principles enunciated by the Conference in so far as they remained applicable, and as regards current developments would initiate as full consultation with the Dominions as the existing postal and cable facilities rendered practicable. In other words, they would do their utmost to minimise the prospect of being placed in a position where the discretion reserved to them for an emergency, of acting on their own responsibility in the name of the whole Empire, must be invoked. Above all, they would avoid any appearance of involving the Dominions in the consequences of a policy which was plainly that of the Foreign Office alone.

There appears to be little question that the British Cabinet, or those of them responsible for the course taken by the Government, laid themselves open to the charge of remissness in the above respects, of failure adequately to take the Dominions into their confidence prior to the crisis, and consequently of ill-advised and precipitous action when it arose. In view of the accepted *modus vivendi* for the conduct of foreign relations, the initiation of overtures for consultation with the Dominions, and the responsibility for supplying them with information,

rested essentially with the Home Government. It might well be argued, as a Liberal newspaper in Canada did with regard to Premier King, that, with the Treaty of Sevres before him, with the press for weeks carrying reports of Greek vicissitudes, Turkish success and ambition, and French policies, the time for a Dominion Prime Minister to ask for information was before events had reached a critical stage.[1] In this particular case it may be that the will was lacking. It stands to reason that a Dominion Premier, eager for concerted action within the Empire, would maintain the closest possible touch with developments abroad, even without pronounced encouragement from the British Cabinet of the day, in order to be ready for all eventualities. Whether he should despatch periodic calls for information upon this or that phase of the Home Government's activity is a different matter and a delicate one. It would seem that the initiative should here rest with Downing Street.

The other matter for comment is the action taken by the British Cabinet—or perhaps more correctly by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill—in face of the emergency. Mr. Bonar Law criticised it strongly, and set forth what is undoubtedly the sound British tradition in such matters. Speaking in London on October 7 he said :

> When I read that manifesto, I thought, and I said to a friend, " It is utterly impossible that this or any Government should have made such an appeal without previous confidential correspondence with the Prime Ministers of the Dominions." What was my amazement to find in a few days that not only was there no such consultation with the Dominions, but that this extraordinary manifesto had been issued with the knowledge of only three or four of the Cabinet, and that none of the others knew anything about it. Just consider what appeal to the Dominions meant. The whole relationship of our Empire is one of the most solemn things in connection with our whole social and political life. I believe I am right in saying that never in our history up to now had we made an appeal to the Dominions for help, but that the offers of help have come invariably from the Dominions without an appeal from us. To suddenly throw, as a bolt from the blue, this appeal for help, when not one of the Dominions had the remotest idea that there was any need of it, and when it was well known that their help could not come in time to be of any assistance in the crisis, was to risk, in my opinion, one of the greatest assets of the Empire. It was to take a risk with our Dominions, which no wise

[1] *The Toronto Star*, cited in *Round Table*, vol. xiii. p. 394.

man would have taken, and which I think was not more foolish than it was wrong.[1]

Viscount Grey of Fallodon condemned it in the House of Lords, at the same time pointing out the proper mode of avoiding such eventualities:

> It would be very ominous if some day a call were issued to the Dominions to help us with regard to some commitment about which they had not been consulted. It occurs to me as a possible way of clearing up this situation that, when there is an opportunity of consulting the self-governing Dominions, the Government should take them into their confidence as to what our Imperial commitments really are to be, so that we shall not be put in the position of having commitments which involve great liabilities, and which at the same time may not have behind them the full support of the Empire.

He went on to suggest a further remedy, more peculiar to that school of thought which would avoid the necessity of appeals to the Dominions by a curtailment of Imperial obligations:

> In that way we might possibly get some order in this matter, and I hope the Government will approach it from the point of view that, exhausted as the Empire has been by the War, it ought to be the policy of the British Government to curtail existing commitments if possible, and certainly not to undertake new ones.[2]

Despite these criticisms, if it were not for the apparent sins of omission prior to the crisis, it would be difficult from the Imperialist viewpoint to find grounds for censuring the actual appeal, couched as it was in the form of a mere request for information as to whether the Dominions desired to associate themselves with the action being taken, coupled with a reference to the effectiveness which the display of a united front would have under the circumstances. There is much to be said for General Smuts' contention that, from the Imperial standpoint, it was the only proper thing to do. The traditional principle of waiting for unsolicited offers from the Dominions belongs to a pre-War era in Imperial relationships, when the responsibility and authority in foreign affairs rested solely with the Home Government. Yet the action certainly did not imply any theory that the Dominions were bull-terriers to be whistled for when wanted—Mr. Ewart's metaphor is absolutely unjustified. Even

[1] Quoted from *The Ottawa Citizen* (October 8, 1922) in Ewart, *op. cit.* at p. 48. Mr. Ewart discusses the whole issue at length.

[2] *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 11 (November 23, 1922).

if the Commonwealth were viewed as a loose tacit alliance of independent nations, such a request to one's allies would be quite in order. The right to appeal to the whole Empire for support, however, does imply a communal policy to be upheld. If it was in this case a risky thing to do—especially risky in view of the avowed attitude of the whilom Canadian Government—if, as several commentators claimed, it strained Imperial relations to the point of danger, that was essentially because of the Home Government's previous neglect effectively to consult with the Dominions, and their willingness to launch upon a one-government policy in the name of the whole Empire, just as Lloyd George appears to have done on a former occasion in the case of Poland. The proper deduction from the Chanak episode, then, would seem to be, not the omission of such appeals in the future, but adequate preparation against the necessity for them.

The much-discussed press *communiqué* is in a somewhat different category. The Imperialistic editor of *The Canadian Annual Review* said of it: "It certainly was a unique incident, and absolutely new to British diplomacy and Colonial Office policy; there was no precedent except in the quite frequent action of the United States Government in its foreign relationships." [1] Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, who was not one of those consulted in the matter, declared he read it "with consternation," [2] and Viscount Grey pronounced it "a mistake." [3] The author of an article in *The Round Table* upon the crisis delivered the following trenchant criticism:

> Both in its tone and in the manner of its appearance the manifesto of September 16 invited misconception. In Mr. Asquith's phrase, "it sounded the double note of provocation and panic." It had all the faults of a statement written for one purpose and a limited audience, and applied through carelessness or in haste for the reading of the whole world. A firm declaration of British policy was imperative: this was more than firm, it was aggressive. An announcement was required that the Dominion Governments had been apprised of the position; instead of that the Prime Ministers of the Dominions read in the press an appeal for their help, which they had received only a few hours before as a secret telegram, and to which they could not possibly have had time to reply. Worse still, the Governments of the Dominions were exposed to the suspicion of having concealed from their own Parliaments and peoples a crisis which, in fact, they had

[1] *Canadian Annual Review* (1922), p. 185.
[2] Ewart, *op. cit.* p. 49.
[3] *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 11.

not been authorised to reveal. On different grounds from those advanced by Lord Grey, we can still subscribe to his criticism of this manifesto as a " terrible mistake." [1]

One explanation of this dubious and irregular action places the responsibility on the Secretariat of the British Cabinet—which was much restricted in function shortly afterwards by the Bonar Law Government.[2] General Smuts took the ground that the statement was issued for the guidance of, not publication by, the press and misused.[3]

In any case the coincidence of the public appeal with the confidential despatch had the appearance of a deliberate attempt to influence Dominion opinion over the heads of their governments, and was keenly resented for this reason by a section in Canada and South Africa at least. Such tactics might prove extremely effective in an emergency. It will be recalled how Sir Wilfrid Laurier's hand was virtually forced by public opinion during the South African War ; appealing over the heads of the Government to the people was a fundamental element in President Wilson's strategy during the European War,[4] and during the episode under discussion there was a notable ebullition of sentiment in Canada markedly at variance with the attitude of the Government, indices that the sequel might have been even more marked in the case of Mackenzie King than in that of Laurier, had the Near East crisis assumed more alarming proportions.[5] Assuming that the publication of the press despatch was deliberate, it would appear that the motive was to produce an immediate effect, and insure in so far as possible that the appeal, since it had been decided upon, should be completely effective. Such tactics, however, must be of doubtful wisdom, a reprehensible device for repairing the effects of previous neglect, and liable to produce an aftermath of general dissatisfaction. The Nationalists made large capital of the whole episode, especially this feature of it ; the Imperialists likewise exploited it as a portentous lesson in foresight and co-operation for the future.

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xiii. pp. 18–19.
[2] *Canadian Annual Review* (1922), p. 180. [3] *Journal*, vol. iv. pp. 592–593.
[4] The distinction between the German Government and people, and the absence of a Canadian quarrel with the latter was, however, clearly set forth by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in his speech during the first War session in the Canadian House, August 1914 (see Keith, *Selected Speeches and Documents*, vol. ii. at pp. 363–364).
[5] See *Canadian Annual Review* (1922), pp. 181–184, for a résumé of Canadian opinion and offers of enlistment.

A reference may well be made at this point to the Montagu incident, since it arose out of the relation of India to the settlement in the Near East, and raises some interesting constitutional points. It will be recalled that the resignation from office (March 9, 1922) of E. S. Montagu, Secretary of State for India in the Lloyd George Cabinet, followed immediately upon the publication of the views of the Indian Government regarding the modification of the Sevres Treaty. It appears that the Indian Government telegraphed to London the nature of certain substantial concessions to Turkey urged on behalf of its Moslem subjects, asking permission to publish these in India, that these were circulated to the Cabinet, but no decision taken, and that, on receipt of a second request, Mr. Montagu had on his own responsibility given the necessary authorisation.[1]

In his letter accepting Mr. Montagu's resignation, Premier Lloyd George is reported to have argued :

> If the Governments of the Empire were all to claim the liberty of publishing individual declarations on matters which vitally affect the relations of the whole Empire with foreign Powers, the unity of our foreign policy would be broken at once, and the very existence of the Empire jeopardised. The constitutional impropriety of the precedent which your action, if unrepudiated, would have set in this respect must surely be apparent to you as a matter quite unconnected with the right of the Government of India to urge its views on any particular question or the particular merits of that Government's case.
>
> The moment chosen for your action, moreover, is indefensible from the standpoint, which must govern our action, of broad Imperial interest. A conference on the Near East is about to take place. The questions that will be there discussed are of the utmost delicacy ; the weight of responsibility which the Foreign Secretary will have to carry will, in any case, be most serious ; and your action has added considerably to the difficulties of a task which was already difficult enough. The public consequences of this course of action must inevitably be serious.[2]

On March 15 Mr. Montagu made a statement in the House of Commons, the main point of which has been conveniently summarised as follows :

> What the House must remember, the right hon. gentleman went on to say, was that for the purpose of this matter India could not be correctly described as a subordinate branch of His Majesty's Government.

[1] See *Annual Register* (1922), pp. 33–35 ; *Journal*, vol. iii. pp. 302–305.
[2] *Round Table*, vol. xii. p. 594.

India was a state member of the League of Nations. The Treaty of Sevres was signed on behalf of India independently, as well as on behalf of Great Britain and the Dominions. It was the greatest folly to suggest that a great Dependency, Dominion, or whatever they liked to call it, which had been given Dominion status for that purpose, a party to the original treaty, should not be allowed to express its views as to modification. If it was allowed to express its views, what was the use of hushing them up ?

It was not true to say that the Government of India were dictating to the people or Government of Great Britain, or that they sought to determine the terms of the Peace Treaty. What they did seek to do was to have their views given the fullest weight or authority, and taken into the fullest consideration. They would be the first to recognise that their views would have to be harmonised with other and wider views.

" All I have to say," remarked Mr. Montagu, " is that India is entitled to a predominant share in the peace with Turkey, because there is no other country whose well-being is so intimately affected by that peace. There is no country which played so great a part in defeating Turkey as India did. I do not believe it will hamper the British Government ; I believe it will help it. . . . If the Government could have found it possible to publish my telegram in answer they would have seen that I myself recognised that it was impossible for the Allies to fulfil all the terms." Mr. Montagu added that his resignation at that moment did not mean a rejection of the right of consideration of the terms put forward on behalf of the Moslems of India.[1]

Mr. Montagu's position was anomalous. Without drawing invidious comparisons between this episode and that of the Chanak manifesto just discussed, it should be pointed out that he was a member of the British Cabinet—what is more, of Premier Lloyd George's Cabinet—and hence subject to all the constitutional conventions established for the preservation of Cabinet solidarity. Viewed from this angle, the resignation would be a matter of course. But at the same time Mr. Montagu was one of the official spokesmen for another Government of the Empire. Had he been the Prime Minister of a Dominion, no exception could have been taken to his airing the views of his Government before the world. But India was not in this position. The issue raised by Mr. Montagu was whether the Government of India could speak only with the permission of the British Cabinet, and whether its spokesman in the United Kingdom could voice its sentiments only within the Cabinet itself or by its leave.

[1] *Journal*, vol. iii. p. 305.

Premier Lloyd George acted in the name of Imperial solidarity. In order to make the action effective, certain constitutional conventions were utilised which had to do with the internal government of the United Kingdom, but which the dual position of the Secretary of State for India rendered it possible to invoke in his case as well. In the process India, it must be admitted, was reduced for the time being to the status of the veriest Crown Colony, not of a quasi-Dominion and separate nation in the League. Furthermore, the Empire was treated to another instance of the seemingly high-handed enforcement of a policy which was the British Government's own, of decentralisation promoted from Downing Street itself. The inexpediency of exhibiting divided counsels to the rest of the world is obvious, but it is not worse than creating the feeling in one vitally interested Government that those through whom it speaks have been ignored. The remedy lies in giving due weight to all of them, not in the imposition of the will of one.

The Halibut Treaty with the United States

The next episode, that of the Halibut Treaty between Canada and the United States, had to do at the outset with the mere matter of a signature, but through his failure to reckon with the United States Senate, this gesture of Premier Mackenzie King in vindication of Canadian autonomy almost involved him in an interesting predicament before it was over. The treaty, signed at Washington on March 2, 1923, was for the preservation of the halibut fisheries in the Northern Pacific, including Behring Sea. It provided for a close season each year from November 16 to February 15, and for certain dispositions to enforce this restriction. It provided further for the appointment of a commission composed of two representatives of each country, to study the life-history of the halibut and report to both governments as to the best methods for preserving the fisheries. The treaty was to run for five years, after which it might be denounced by either party on two years' notice.[1] The points of interest here relate first to the title and British signature to the treaty, and secondly to its extraterritorial features as regards Canada.

As submitted by the United States, the treaty was entitled :

[1] Cmd. 2377.

" Convention between the United States of America and Great Britain concerning Halibut Fishery." In communications to the British Ambassador at Washington and the Colonial Secretary (January 15 and 16), and to the Government of the United States, the Canadian Government intimated the desire that the words " The Dominion of Canada " be substituted for the words " Great Britain " in the title of the Convention. To this the Ambassador replied (February 12): " Having regard to the fact that the treaty as signed will bear no title, its object being plainly expressed in the preamble of the document, I have, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, omitted from my note to Mr. Hughes . . . the substitution in the title." The Home Government also informed them that the title thought most suitable was: " Convention for the regulation of halibut fisheries on the Pacific Coast of Canada and the United States." To this the Canadian Government replied (February 17) that the " modifications suggested (were) concurred in by the Canadian Government." The King Government had surrendered their first point.

The matter of the signature was discussed at the same time in these interchanges. In their communication of January 16 to the Colonial Secretary, the Canadian Government requested the issuance of full powers for the purpose of signing the treaty to Hon. Ernest Lapointe, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, and received an affirmative reply. On February 13 the British Ambassador informed them of his understanding that " in the signature of the treaty the Canadian Minister of Marine will be with me," and on the following day, of an inquiry by the American Department of State whether Mr. Lapointe would sign with him. The Canadian Government requested the Ambassador (February 17) to inform the Department of State that " Mr. Lapointe will sign this treaty," and on the 21st notified him of their opinion: " That, as respects Canada, signature of the treaty by Mr. Lapointe alone will be sufficient, and that it will not be necessary to you to sign as well." To this the Ambassador replied: " I have been instructed by His Majesty's Government to sign treaty in association with Mr. Lapointe."

A few days passed, and on the 27th he informed them of the American Government's anxiety that the treaty be signed soon

enough to secure ratification by the Senate before the Congressional session ended on March 4, and also of an inquiry from the State Department "whether I can sign the treaty to-morrow on behalf of Canada." He added, "I presume, however, it would be more satisfactory that Mr. Lapointe should sign with me." On the following day the Canadian Government notified both the Colonial Secretary and the Ambassador that "The treaty, being one of concern solely to Canada and the United States, and not affecting, in any particular, any Imperial interest, the signature of the Canadian Minister should be sufficient." They went on to state that the Home Government had apparently assumed a desire on the part of the Canadian Government to have the signatures of both the British Ambassador and their own representative, whereas in requesting the issuance of full powers to Mr. Lapointe they had proceeded on the assumption that his signature alone would be sufficient. Hence the notification from Sir Auckland Geddes that he had been instructed to sign was received "with some surprise," and they requested "that His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington be instructed accordingly." The Colonial Secretary informed the Canadian Government (March 1) that their wishes were being telegraphed to the Ambassador, with the result that Mr. Lapointe signed the treaty alone on the following day. The King Government had won the second point.[1]

It will be recalled that the last episode of this nature had been the Franco-Canadian Commercial Treaty of 1907, in connection with which considerable speculation and controversy had arisen over the fact that a Canadian representative had actually signed the treaty in association with the British Ambassador.[2] Now, it appeared, the King Government had resolved upon a marked advance on the position taken by Sir Wilfrid Laurier. This was a political rather than a purely commercial question. Until enlightened by the American Senate, however, they obviously proceeded upon the assumption that it was entirely a matter between Canada and the United States. Accordingly they seized upon it as an opportunity of making an out-and-out Canadian treaty. More attention seems

[1] See Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1923), No. 111a; *Journal*, vol. iv. pp. 300–303, 801–814; *Round Table*, vol. xiii. pp. 629–631.

[2] *Supra*, ch. iii.

to have been attracted by the issue of the signature than by the perhaps more important point involved in the effort to modify the title of the Convention. Had not the Home Government found a satisfactory compromise, apparently Mr. Ewart's "Kingdom of Canada" theory [1] would have received formal recognition, and some difficult legal points would doubtless have been raised.

The same point was implied in the resolution ratifying this treaty, which was introduced by Premier Mackenzie King on June 27. It was described as having been "signed on behalf of His Majesty, acting for Canada, by the plenipotentiary therein named."[2] Mr. Meighen in discussing this claimed that the records of Parliament would be searched in vain for any previous reference to His Majesty "acting for Canada" by a plenipotentiary. He held that these words should come after "plenipotentiary" not "King"; it was the former, not the latter who acted for Canada. Every previous treaty, moreover, had been made between the United States (if that were the country) and the King, not the Dominion of Canada.[3]

It would seem that any changes thus entailed in the process of treaty-making were purely formal and internal to the Empire. Certainly there was no alteration in the status of the Dominion representative. Professor Keith, in arguing that no important constitutional point was involved, that the treaty was complete, binding the Imperial Crown and the whole Empire, claimed that the full powers must have been granted by His Majesty on the advice and responsibility of the Imperial Government.[4] Premier King's supporters, on the other hand, insisted generally that in such cases the full powers were issued on the advice and responsibility of the Canadian Government, in virtue of Canadian Orders in Council, and that the British Cabinet was not involved even by implication. Such a question, however, was scarcely the concern of foreign Powers. The scope of the treaty, it

[1] J. S. Ewart, *The Kingdom of Canada*. [2] *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 801.

[3] *Ibid.* pp. 802–803. It was worth noting that the formula to which Mr. Meighen took exception was also used in the preamble to the Hungarian and Turkish Treaties of Peace Bill introduced June 24, 1922 (*ibid.* vol. iii. p. 558), but that Premier King's resolutions (May 1, 1925) ratifying the Canada-United States Boundary Treaty and that regulating the level of the Lake and the Woods (both signed February 24, 1925) described them as having been signed "on behalf of his Majesty *in respect of Canada* by the plenipotentiary therein named" (*ibid.* vol. vi. pp. 730–732).

[4] Letter to *The Times* (London), cited in *United Empire*, vol. xiv. p. 196.

would seem, would depend on its terms, not on the presence or absence of the British Ambassador's signature.

Viewed as a Nationalist challenge, however, the action of the King Government in excluding the Ambassador was portentous for the Empire, and from the point of view of outside nations it must have important political significance. As the *Montreal Star* commented sarcastically :

> There never was a better day's work done for Imperial unity . . . than on the day when Mr. Lapointe successfully insisted upon signing the Halibut Convention, single-handed and alone as Minister of the King. . . . When Canada insists upon signing for herself . . . she reduces the weight behind her signature from that of the greatest Empire in the world to that of a small nation of eight odd millions.[1]

On March 4, 1923, the United States Senate ratified the Halibut Treaty, as a " Convention between the United States and Great Britain," but with the following reservation : "Subject to the understanding, which is hereby made a part of this resolution of ratification, that none of the nationals and inhabitants, and vessels and boats, of any other part of Great Britain shall engage in halibut fishing, contrary to any of the provisions of this treaty." Despite the peculiar designation, the intention obviously was to embrace the whole Empire within the scope of the treaty, so that by this reservation it at once lost the character of a question pertaining solely to Canada and the United States, and Premier King's main contention became so much oratory. Secretary Hughes expressed to Ambassador Geddes his Government's " hope that His Majesty's Government will accept the understanding." The latter in a despatch to the Canadian Government (March 9) invited their observations, and advised them that as " the effect of this action on the part of the Senate is to widen the scope of the treaty so as to embrace the Empire as a whole, instead of Canada alone, to which it is understood the Dominion Government intended the treaty to refer," he had transmitted Mr. Hughes' note to the Foreign Secretary " in order to ascertain the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to this understanding."

Of course ratification of the amended treaty might be refused on the part of His Majesty. Were it accepted no legal points would be involved, but politically the matter would pass out of

[1] Quoted in *Canadian Annual Review* (1923), p. 54.

the sole jurisdiction of Canada; it would become an avowedly Imperial treaty, and the convention that the assent of the other Dominions must be secured would be invoked. This would seem to be the solution most in keeping with accepted principles of Imperial relationships. The King Government, however, sought to preserve the Nationalistic character of the transaction by a still more Nationalistic course, and to resolve the difficulty by indirect means. The procedure they proposed to adopt was explained to the House by Mr. Lapointe (March 20), in reply to an inquiry from Mr. Meighen, as follows:

The MINISTER OF MARINE: The United States Senate ratified the treaty on the understanding that the nationals of "other parts of Great Britain"—the phraseology is rather queer—would also be prevented from fishing halibut in those waters. This is very easy to do. As far as the territorial waters are concerned both countries, the United States and Canada, will prevent any halibut fishing. As far as the extra-territorial waters are concerned no vessel from any country can carry on halibut fishing without using either United States or Canadian ports. It will be easy in the legislation which will have to be enacted by the United States Congress and by the Parliament of Canada to close Canadian and American ports to any vessel carrying on halibut fishing. Consequently, I do not see any difficulty in the ratification of the Treaty.

Mr. MEIGHEN: Do I understand that the Canadian Government proposes to carry out the terms of a treaty which, by the ratification, is applicable to British citizens generally and not to Canadian nationals alone, by means of prohibitive Canadian legislation against other British citizens and not by securing the voluntary concurrence of those other citizens by means of the signature of the Ambassador of Great Britain?

The MINISTER OF MARINE: The fishing of halibut will be prohibited in those waters and the restrictions which will be enacted by the Parliament of Canada will apply to everybody in the world.[1]

Thus the Canadian Government planned to circumvent the limitation of their territorial jurisdiction, which now became important in view of the wider scope of the treaty, by taking advantage of the physical impossibility of carrying on halibut fishing without access to the ports. They planned, moreover, to evade the Imperial character of the undertaking by treating the citizens of other parts of the Empire as foreigners. So at least their critics alleged. These suggestions were reiterated by the Prime Minister and Mr. Lapointe during the debate on

[1] *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 302.

ratification (June 27). Nevertheless, in asking parliamentary approval, they expressed the hope that the Senate reservation would be withdrawn and the treaty accepted in its original form, more especially as Mr. Lapointe now admitted that otherwise it would have to be submitted to all the other governments of the Empire.[1] The original treaty was passed by the United States the following year,[2] Canadian autonomy was vindicated, and this phase of the episode was closed.

The Halibut Treaty was discussed in all the Dominion parliaments. In the Canadian House Premier King and Mr. Lapointe devoted their efforts mainly to a defence of their action in face of Opposition criticism. Mr. Forke supported them in what he held was a laudable step to a full national existence. Mr. Meighen, for the Conservative Opposition, affirmed that the conduct of the Government merely offered a lamentable affront to the British Ambassador without enlarging Canadian autonomy in the slightest degree; the action of the American Senate, too, had shown the question to be no mere matter of Canadian concern. He could see no justification for the dilemma they had got into:

> All that is ever done by the British Ambassador, I presume, is to see that any proposed treaty contains no terms that affect such general policy as all parts of the Empire are interested in. This being conceded as having been the practice for years, what more do we want? Why should we continue this process of offering one affront after the other in order, if possible, to magnify and emphasise before the world our desire to disassociate ourselves from the Empire in general? We are in something of a quandary now.[3]

Sir Henry Drayton endorsed these sentiments. While admitting their absolute right to sign for themselves, he claimed that the addition of the British signature did no harm, lent dignity and strength to a treaty, and should be retained. Their first duty might well be to Canada, but he added:

> I also think that besides that first duty to Canada, that the best future, not only for Canada, but the best and greatest future, yes, not only for the British Empire too, but for civilisation in this world, is that Canada ought to continue to act, not as a unit, but as a partner in a real partnership, that our influence for good and for peace is

[1] *Journal*, vol. iv. pp. 802, 805.
[2] *Canadian Annual Review* (1924–25), p. 79.
[3] *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 804.

infinitely stronger if it be in joint union with the other kingdoms of the British Empire.[1]

The new developments did not meet with the entire approval of the older school of Liberal thought either. Sir John Willison, veteran historian of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party, voiced his apprehensions in an article in *The Canadian Historical Review*.[2] Their representative in Parliament, W. S. Fielding, Premier King's Minister of Finance, had declared on April 21, 1921: "We cannot make a treaty without the Ambassador of Great Britain. I am not saying anything in a controversial sense, but my own view is that we have to-day in the making of commercial treaties all the powers that we ought to have or that are any good to us."[3] He negotiated the Italian Trade Convention with Canada, signed (January 4, 1923) by both British and Canadian representatives, and when, during the debate on its ratification, Mr. Meighen twitted the Government on the double signature, which must in their view mean submission to a great indignity, the following interchange ensued:

MINISTER OF FINANCE: Whatever others may have said, it appears to me that the name of the distinguished Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs . . . rather added to the heavy weight of this document, and I was glad to have it there.

Mr. MEIGHEN: I thoroughly agree with the Minister and I congratulate him. I am sorry that his counsel as well as his sentiments did not prevail later.[4]

In Australia Premier Bruce regarded the Halibut Treaty episode as of vital importance, and a fit question to be discussed at the forthcoming Imperial Conference.[5] Premier Massey in New Zealand described the position as "awkward" and the arrangements regarding the treaty as "peculiar." He dissented from the basic principle implied, claimed that such a treaty involved matters which concerned the whole Empire, and awaited the Conference decision upon the issue.[6] On the other hand Mr. Charlton, Leader of the Opposition in Australia, asked what right they had to interfere with any other Dominion simply because it formed part of the Empire.[7] Mr. Beyers, too, for the

[1] *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 808.
[2] "*A Treaty and a Signature*," vol. iv. pp. 145–149.
[3] Quoted *ibid.* p. 146.
[4] *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 816 (May 2, 1923).
[5] *Ibid.* p. 835.
[6] *Ibid.* vol. v. p. 115.
[7] *Ibid.* vol. iv. p. 845.

South African Nationalists, expressed admiration for Canada's attitude as an assertion of absolute equality with England. If, in contrast, their own Prime Minister upheld Professor Keith's view that in such cases the King was advised by the English Government, then their vaunted equality was mere theory, not practice.[1]

Clearly the action of the Canadian Government in connection with the Halibut Treaty was assumed by those who emphasised its political implications to be a matter of grave concern to the Empire—much more significant than it appeared to those who considered rather its bearing upon Dominion status. In short its importance lies not in the registering of any momentous step, any vital precedent, but in the spirit in which the action was taken, the motives back of it, the policy it revealed. The demonstration itself almost proved a fiasco. If more attention has been devoted in the present discussion to the comments of its critics than of its supporters, the reason is merely that the latter in general confined themselves to vague apostrophes to Dominion nationhood, whereas those who saw only temerity and presumption in the course pursued took pains to point out the reasons for their dissent. Making due allowance for the political predilections which it reveals, the following appraisal of the episode may, perhaps, without marked injustice, be quoted by way of conclusion :

> The King Government seems to be in a fair way of achieving that success which usually crowns the efforts of those who go out looking for trouble. The situation which has arisen as a consequence of the British Ambassador's exclusion from participation in either the negotiation or execution of the halibut fisheries treaty is developing awkward possibilities. The procedure at Washington involved no constitutional departure ; in that respect nothing has been either gained or lost, but the circumstances, nevertheless, suggest that the King Government meant mischief, meant to weaken, in appearance if not in fact, the existing Imperial bond. What was done was in the nature of a gesture, and that gesture indicated a desire, if not a purpose, namely to carry the principle of Dominion autonomy one step further. Technically, nothing was accomplished. Mr. Lapointe signed the treaty and, in so far as one of the contracting parties was concerned, he signed alone, but he signed as an accredited plenipotentiary of His Majesty, the King, replacing, for this occasion and purpose, the British Ambassador. It is not the first time, nor is it likely to be the last, that a special representative has been or will be chosen to execute an international agreement of this character. In

[1] *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 619.

this instance the British plenipotentiary was a Canadian Minister because the treaty affected, primarily, Canadian interests. The point, therefore, is not what was actually done, but as to the way in which it was done and the interpretation which is to be placed upon the course adopted by the Canadian Government.[1]

The Halibut Treaty precedent regarding the signature of treaties appears to have become established practice, with consequences no more revolutionary to the Commonwealth, up to the present at least, than attended that of the Franco-Canadian Treaty. There were various other local negotiations during the period, but they do not present especially noteworthy features. Another, though less discussed, assertion of Nationalism on the part of the King Government was the move, in the summer of 1922, to supersede by a Canadian-made treaty the historical Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 concerning disarmament on the Great Lakes. Despite contemporaneous assertions of parliamentary supremacy in foreign affairs, the Premier and the Minister of Militia departed for Washington in July 1922, within a fortnight of prorogation, in order to discuss this matter and several other problems with the American Secretary of State. In a statement to a press delegation the Premier asserted Canada's right to negotiate her own treaties and informed them that in the present negotiations they had the entire approval of the Imperial Government and the assistance of the British Chargé d'Affaires. The reasons he alleged for seeking a new treaty were that the time seemed auspicious in view of the recent Disarmament Conference and that since this one-hundred-and-five-year-old Agreement was subject to cancellation on six months' notice by either party, it lacked " that element of certainty and permanency which is all important with respect to matters pertaining to defence."[2] Certainly the replacement on Canadian initiative of a treaty so honoured by time and sentiment would constitute a notable achievement, worthy of a place in the school history texts. Yet in favour of the existing treaty it might be argued that if relations had become so strained as to invite denunciation, six months' notice would appear sufficient to allow cabling for the British fleet.

Although under the circumstances this move would not

[1] Quoted from *The Montreal Gazette* in *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. iv. at p. 148.

[2] *Canadian Annual Review* (1922), pp. 96–98; *Round Table*, vol. xiii. pp. 394–396.

appear to involve any great difficulty, especially as the Imperial Government was in close touch with the negotiations, yet the subject matter, disarmament, was one calculated to test the bargaining power of any nation. Hence the Government's action in broaching such a subject evoked a trenchant protest from Senator Loughheed, Opposition Leader in the Canadian Upper House, that of all treaties between Britain and the United States, the Rush-Bagot Agreement was the most satisfactory; why then disturb it at present? Why should the Prime Minister on his own authority go to Washington and throw another treaty into the cockpit of the United States Senate, there to be opposed by all elements antagonistic to Britain? If they were to maintain proper relations with the United States, they should proceed through the traditional channels. This latter argument was endorsed by Senator Casgrain, but Senator Dandurand retorted that it overlooked the evolution in Canada's status, that they had outgrown the stage of asking London to attend to Canadian affairs, and should have their own representative at Washington.[1]

Canada and the Lausanne Negotiations

The next occurrence in this series, the refusal of Mackenzie King's Government to ratify the Treaty of Lausanne, was technically recorded and became a matter of public concern after the session of the Imperial Conference in 1923. However, in view of its affinity with the episodes just discussed, and since the crucial steps in the matter had been taken before the Conference met and were before them during their deliberations, it may well be considered at this point. The action of the Government placed Canada in the ambiguous position of refusing to accept a treaty by the terms of which they at the same time admitted being bound. Here again, as was the case with the previous happenings, the temptation is to dismiss the incident with the easiest and most obvious explanation, namely that it was in the nature of a political stunt, intended essentially for consumption in certain domestic quarters, which could all the more opportunely be carried out in view of the remoteness of the issue from Canadian concern and the consequent unlikelihood of embarrassing consequences recoiling from abroad upon the heads of the Government.

[1] *Journal*, vol. iv. pp. 284–285.

Such an explanation, even if correct as far as it goes, is nevertheless inadequate, for it fails to analyse, first, the significance for the Empire of the fact that bodies of opinion to whom such tactics and policies would prove appealing should be sufficiently influential to determine the conduct of the party in power, and secondly, the import for the future in the establishment of such precedents. Nor, in fairness to the Government, can it be denied that, despite the complications it might have caused under the circumstances, a principle worth vindicating was involved.

On March 24, 1924, in reply to invitations from the Home Government (February 22 and March 21) to ratify the Lausanne Treaty, the Governor-General of Canada telegraphed to the Colonial Secretary:

> Canadian Government, not having been invited to send representatives to the Lausanne Conference, and not having participated in the proceedings of the Conference either directly or indirectly, and not being for this reason a signatory to the treaty on behalf of Canada (see my telegram of December 31, 1922, to your predecessor), my Ministers do not feel that they are in a position to recommend to Parliament approval of the Peace Treaty with Turkey and the Convention thereto. Without the approval of Parliament they feel that they are not warranted in signifying concurrence in the ratification of the treaty and the convention. With respect to ratification, however, they will not take exception to such course as His Majesty's Government may deem it advisable to recommend.[1]

In a statement to the House on April 2, Premier King took strong exception to a reported assertion by the British Prime Minister on the previous day that Canada had agreed to abide by the basis of British representation at Lausanne and the decisions there made,[2] and gave a detailed résumé of the correspondence between the two governments on the matter.[3] In the course of the debate upon the treaty (June 9) he further stated:

> In the presence of the Prime Ministers of the other Dominions and the members of the British Government, I made it clear that because we were not represented, and because we had no part in the Conference, this Government did not feel that it could bring into the House a treaty negotiated as this treaty had been negotiated, and expect to have the approval of Parliament of the obligations it carried with it. I made that clear, but I also made clear that we did not intend to

[1] Cmd. 2146, No. 12.
[2] See *Journal*, vol. v. pp. 234–235.
[3] Cmd. 2146.

embarrass the British Government in the matter when it came to the final ratification of the treaty, and that whatever position the British Government might wish to take with regard to it, we would raise no objection. In other words if the British Government recommended the ratification of the treaty, so far as Canada was concerned, we were quite prepared that ratification should bind us. We never raised the question as to Canada not being bound by ratification. . . . It is one thing for the Government to be represented, as we were at Versailles, by Ministers who were given full powers in virtue of an Order in Council passed by the Government of Canada, requesting that such full powers should be given by His Majesty's Ministers, who were present at Versailles through all stages of the negotiations, who understood the Canadian position and the Canadian attitude, and saw that it was maintained, and then signed with full powers given by the King with authority to sign in respect of the Dominion of Canada. It is quite a different matter where a treaty is negotiated, drafted and concluded as this was by a conference which had been arranged before any member of the Government knew it was being called, and at which no representative of Canada was present to take any part in the proceedings. . . . I think as respects treaties which bind this country in a manner which may lead to participation in future foreign wars, hon. members will agree that there is only one way in which such treaties should be negotiated from the first stage to the last, and that Parliament will insist to see that all precautions are taken in matters that mean the assumption of such great obligations. . . . I hope I have made it clear that the Government in its attitude on this matter has been trying to maintain logically and consistently the position which was fought for, gained and held by Canada's representatives at the Versailles Conference, which was followed in subsequent treaties, which was followed in the international conference that was held at Washington on the question of armaments, and which was followed in the conferences at Genoa and the Hague. If we had departed from that procedure we should, in our opinion, have been justly entitled to such measure of criticism and censure as this House might have seen fit to pass upon us. We were simply seeking to maintain that equality of status which had been gained, and which we had been in the habit of asserting as between the self-governing Dominions and the Mother Country in matters of a kind that are supposed to affect us all.[1]

In view of the reasons alleged by the Canadian Government for its stand, it is well to examine somewhat in detail the question of representation at Lausanne and their action thereon.[2]

On October 27, 1922, the Colonial Secretary (Devonshire) despatched telegrams to the Dominions announcing that

[1] *Canadian Hansard*: unrev. (June 9, 1924), pp. 3046–3049.

[2] See Cmd. 2146; also Premier King's statement of April 2, 1924 (*Journal*, vol. v. pp. 322–327) and the debate of June 9 on the Treaty (*ibid.* pp. 501–511).

invitations had been issued for the Lausanne Conference to the governments concerned, and stating:

Dominion governments will be kept informed from time to time of the general lines of policy on which British plenipotentiaries propose to proceed and of the course of negotiations, and, as in the case of the other treaties arising out of the Peace Settlement, they will of course be invited to sign new treaty and any separate instruments regulating status of the Straits.[1]

In their reply the Canadian Government set forth the principle they had made famous during the Chanak episode, as follows:

As, however, it is proposed to keep our Government informed from time to time of the general lines of policy on which British plenipotentiaries propose to proceed and of the course of the negotiations, and to invite us to sign a new treaty and any separate instrument regulating the status of the Straits, we deem it advisable to avail ourselves of the earliest opportunity to inform His Majesty's Government that in our opinion extent to which Canada may be held to be bound by the proceedings of the Conference or by the provisions of any treaty or other instrument arising out of the same is necessarily a matter for the Parliament of Canada to decide, and that the rights and powers of our Parliament in these particulars must not be held to be affected by implication or otherwise in virtue of information with which our Government may be supplied.[2]

Apparently misapprehending the purport of this, the Colonial Secretary assured them that any treaty resulting from the Conference would be submitted to the Canadian Parliament before final ratification,[3] but was informed that this was not the issue. The King Government wished to have it clearly understood that their warning related on the contrary to Canada's assumption of obligations under the treaty:

Our Government has not expressed a desire to have any treaty with Turkey which may result from Conference submitted to Canadian Parliament for approval before His Majesty is advised to ratify it, nor do we wish to be understood as preferring any such request. My message was intended to make clear that we had no exception to take to Canada not being invited to be represented at the Conference, but, inasmuch as we had been informed that we would be invited to sign a new treaty and any separate instrument regulating status of Straits, we wished to make it perfectly clear that in our opinion extent to which Canada may be held to be bound by the proceedings of Conference or by provisions of any treaty or other instrument arising out

[1] Cmd. 2146, No. 1.
[2] *Ibid.* No. 2 (October 31).
[3] *Ibid.* No. 3 (November 16).

of the same was necessarily a matter for the Parliament of Canada to decide. We deem it of utmost importance that there should be no misunderstanding as to our position with respect to Canada's obligations in this and kindred matters. In our opinion Parliament will desire as respects treaty with Turkey and any other instruments arising out of Lausanne Conference to reserve to itself the right to decide upon the merits of the case what action on the part of the people of Canada is right and proper. In this connection we shall be pleased to have authority to place before Parliament all the information with which we may from time to time be supplied.[1]

It will be noted that a month had thus been consumed, during which the Canadian Government had been occupied purely with the effects of the treaty, quite irrespective of the procedure adopted for negotiating it. The correspondence records no protest from them regarding the basis of representation, nor any suggestion of its improvement from the Canadian standpoint. The position of the King Government was merely a somewhat amplified version of the Laurier attitude regarding Imperial commitments—let the Home Government do what it pleased how it pleased, and Canada would use her own discretion as to the outcome. The way having been thus prepared, the issue of representation was dealt with more directly, but from the same viewpoint, in subsequent communications.

The next telegram from the Colonial Secretary revealed the two governments still at cross purposes.[2] He stated: "Any treaty resulting from Lausanne Conference will, of course, replace treaty of Sevres, and until it comes into force a state of war between the British Empire and Turkey will technically continue. The treaty must therefore be binding on the whole Empire when ratified." The desire was also expressed that the new treaty should follow the Paris precedent and include signatures on behalf of all the Dominions. On the matter of parliamentary decision as to Canadian obligations under the settlement, he did not see any departure from the practice followed in Britain, and suggested that it would be covered by submitting the instruments emanating from Lausanne to the approval of Parliament. Meanwhile it did not appear possible to publish interchanges as they contained confidential matter.

In their reply[3] the Canadian Government now invoked the

[1] Cmd. 2146, No. 4 (November 25).
[2] *Ibid.* No. 5 (December 8).
[3] *Ibid.* No. 6 (December 31).

issue of representation. They pointed out that the Paris and Washington precedents postulated four essential features—direct representation at the Conference by plenipotentiaries holding full powers in respect of the Dominion from His Majesty: their formal signing of the treaties; approval by the Dominion Parliament, and assent by the Dominion Government to the final act of ratification by His Majesty. In so far as each stage was necessarily dependent on that preceding, and in view of the absence of either direct or indirect Canadian participation at Lausanne, they could not see how Canada as respects signing could be held to follow these precedents. The Canadian Government's motives, especially for their failure to take exception to the course thus far pursued, were explained in the following significant paragraph:

> Your Grace is quite right in assuming that, as regards the treaties in which Canada is supposed to have a direct or immediate interest, the procedure here outlined is the one which our Government would wish to follow. In the case of main political treaties concluded since the War, in general the rule seems to have been followed that, wherever the Dominions could be said to have a direct or immediate interest, the procedure was shaped to include their participation and signature of the proceedings. That in the case of the Conference at Lausanne a like procedure has not been followed with respect to representation and participation by Canada, has been regarded by us as evidence that, in the opinion of the countries by whom invitations to the Conference at Lausanne were extended, Canada could not have been believed to have the direct and immediate interest which she was supposed to have in the Conferences at Versailles and Washington.

On January 27, 1923, the Colonial Secretary telegraphed his acceptance of the Canadian suggestion that the Lausanne Treaties be signed only by the British plenipotentiaries who negotiated them. In response to his inquiries the governments of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa signified their concurrence in this arrangement—as did that of Canada for a different reason, in reply to a follow-up telegram from the Home Government (June 7).[1] Then followed the requests of February 22 and March 21 for ratification (J. H. Thomas being now in the Colonial Office), and the refusal of the Canadian Government already cited to submit the treaty to Parliament.

The King Government, then, both in their later interchanges

[1] Cmd. 2146, Nos. 7–9.

with the Home Government and when they met Parliament subsequently, professed to take their stand squarely on the issue of representation at Lausanne. Obviously their contention that the Paris and Washington precedents had not been followed was correct. The Empire was represented by Lord Curzon and Sir Horace Rumbold, not by a British Delegation comprising plenipotentiaries accredited in virtue of Orders in Council emanating from their own governments, and receiving specific designation in the treaties which they signed. Not merely was the Empire committed by the British negotiators alone, but the treaty and the Straits Convention were made inseparable; there was no saving clause allowing Dominion discretion regarding acceptance of the latter. Formally the first at least was a distinct backward step.

It is after all not surprising to find that this, the Imperial aspect of the question, received the most attention in the Parliament of the United Kingdom itself. There in the two main discussions of the treaty, debate focussed upon the issue of Dominion representation.[1] The criticism came from the Liberals. On April 1, 1924, Sir Edward Grigg, supported by Ramsay Muir, moved that the House decline to proceed with the second reading of the Treaty of Peace (Turkey) bill until given assurance that the Dominions had been fully informed of their liabilities under the settlement and were prepared to ratify the treaty with the Straits Convention included. He argued, with Chanak obviously in mind, that this convention raised an issue of great importance to Imperial unity. It involved the whole Empire in important commitments whether the Dominions approved or not, since it departed from the practice now universal of exempting them unless they chose to accept the obligations of their own motion. He claimed furthermore that the United Kingdom was becoming more concentrated on Europe while the Dominions were moving the other way, which indicated a very dangerous tendency within the Empire—hence his amendment. On June 6 he renewed the attack, maintaining that the Lausanne Treaty was the only peace treaty not signed by the Empire as a whole, and that the main responsibility rested with the British Government for its failure to invite Dominion representation; the moment they accepted any reason for not

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. pp. 228–240, 405–415.

bringing an entire Empire Delegation, they surrendered the status achieved for the British League of Nations. It should be the first principle of British statesmanship to avoid putting the Dominions in a dilemma in which they must choose either war at Britain's behest, not their own, or else neutrality and secession. The sole way of avoiding this was by making sure when treaties of such importance were negotiated, that the responsibility was in reality assumed by the whole Empire through the action of a British Empire Delegation, not laid on British representatives alone ostensibly speaking for the Empire.

Mr. Lloyd George, as one who had played a leading rôle in the Chanak tragedy as well as at Versailles, stated that he could not conceive of a more important subject for discussion in the Imperial Parliament, one which involved the whole constitution of the Empire and Imperial relations. He pronounced the course pursued at Lausanne to be " a reversal of the whole process by which the unity of the Empire has been advanced during and since the War, and a serious one." It was " a very grave departure from a sound decision," rendered inevitable by the conditions of the Great War, which had superseded the older system of negotiation by the Imperial Government without direct representation of the Dominions, and which had brought the Dominions for the first time into the arena of foreign politics. During the negotiation of the treaties which followed the War, the Dominions were represented on equal terms with Great Britain and every other belligerent nation, and felt that in consequence they assumed the same obligations. He emphasised particularly that this had been the case with the Treaty of Sevres, from which the Lausanne settlement departed in vital respects.

Mr. Baldwin rose to the defence of the treaty: it was a remarkable feat to have secured one at all. He stated further that when his party left office they had no idea but that the Dominions were in complete agreement with the Mother Country. As for the gravity of the guarantee in the Straits Convention, it was as nothing compared with that entered into by the Dominions when they accepted Article 10 of the League Covenant. Mr. McNeill denied that any departure from universal precedent or grave constitutional offence had been committed, and drew attention to the indifference of the Dominions which had

allowed the Sevres Treaty to be signed merely by their High Commissioners, and to the failure of Canada to object to the course pursued by the Home Government at Lausanne or the absence of invitations to the Dominions.

Premier Ramsay MacDonald, who had found the treaty already printed and awaiting him on assuming office, urged in regard to Colonel Griggs' motion that it was inconceivable that any Dominion Prime Minister, jealous as they all were of their status, could receive daily telegrams during the negotiations, have the complete documents before him for three months, then attend the Imperial Conference, and yet remain ignorant of the nature and extent of the obligations to be incurred. In reply to Lloyd George's strictures on the retrograde step which had been taken, he argued that the Dominions had not actually taken part in the negotiations which led up to the treaties of peace with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, or of Sevres, although these had been signed on their behalf, but this contention was at once questioned by Sir Edward Grigg and Mr. Fisher. He seems, furthermore, to have misunderstood the purport of the stand taken by the Canadian Government, and to have believed that they were entirely willing to support the action taken, for he said :

> Canada replied that she would agree to what His Majesty's Government did. She raised one or two constitutional points, which I do not think in this respect were really meant by Canada to have much substance, but were a sort of safeguard and a certain expression of reticence and reserve regarding the possible extension of a principle granted in relation to a specific point without a warning being given to us that Canada would require to maintain for herself certain rights of decision over and above Imperial rights of decision. The Irish Free State had no difficulty. . . . Canada, I am perfectly certain, accepts the obligation, having been represented by Lord Curzon at Lausanne, with her full knowledge and consent.[1]

Later, when the situation became clearer, he made this comment :

> I cannot say that I have any grievances with Canada, because I have none. The only thing that I think everybody will regret—and I am sure that Mr. Mackenzie King will regret this as much as I do—is that there has been a lack of clear, definite statement, that if it had been known right away from the beginning that the Dominions really objected to what was proposed, then it would have given the Government of the day an opportunity of reconsidering their decision. I

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. pp. 234–235 (April 1, 1924).

think, perhaps, there was more politeness than definiteness in the opening moves of the game. Then what do we find? We find that as stage after stage is reached the opposition becomes more and more definite, but it reveals itself at points when it is impossible to go back and rectify any mistake that may have been made. That is the criticism that I should make, in the most friendly and, I hope, understanding way, of what actually produced the situation which I had to face when I came into office.[1]

The difference of opinion, then, as to the propriety of the action taken turned upon the question whether the Lausanne settlement was sufficiently important from the Dominion point of view to warrant insistence upon complete Empire representation. On the one hand, with all the controversy provoked by the Chanak episode fresh in mind, it would seem as if the course dictated by cautious Imperial statesmanship would demand every precaution to remove ambiguity from the relation of the Dominions to the settlement. On the other hand it might well be argued that the Dominions by their attitude hardly appeared to share the serious view professed by Lloyd George on this occasion. There had already been numerous instances within the new era where they had entrusted the care of their interests to representatives of the Home Government. Even at the Washington Conference the then most doughty champion of Dominion status had deputed to Earl Balfour the function of spokesman for South Africa. But in this case he demonstrated his dual position by signing twice, and the other criteria of separate recognition for the Dominions were observed. The Treaty of Sevres was signed for Canada and Australia by their High Commissioners, for South Africa by the Acting High Commissioner, and for New Zealand by the British Ambassador at Paris. That of October 28, 1920, recognising Roumanian sovereignty over Bessarabia was signed for Canada by the Earl of Derby. These are only two of several cases where the Dominions appeared to look upon certain treaties as of secondary importance and either designated their High Commissioners to watch the negotiations or devolved this function upon some British plenipotentiary who happened to be available. It would seem that the Lausanne Treaty supplies such an instance, since three of the Dominions took the attitude that they could without loss

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. pp. 412–413 (June 6, 1924).

of dignity accept British auspices, or at least in view of the international complications refrain from creating a major issue from the circumstances. In Australia, for example, some discussion was provoked by the Leader of the Opposition regarding their commitment to war under Imperial treaties, but the issue of representation at Lausanne did not play a part in it.[1]

During the debate on the treaty (June 9, 1924) Premier King for the first time informed the Canadian House that the reasons for their failure to secure individual representation of the Dominions had been given him in confidence by the Home Government.[2] In the course of an address to the Royal Colonial Institute, Sir Hamar Greenwood said: "It is an open secret that one reason why the Dominions were not invited to take part in the proceedings that led up to the Treaty of Lausanne was because of the objection of a foreign, though a friendly Power,"[3] and during the discussion in the British House a member called attention to statements widely made in Canada that the reason why the Home Government had agreed to representation by two plenipotentiaries only was a threat on the part of France to meet an Empire Delegation with a complete one of her own, including the Sultan of Morocco.[4] This would appear to be a further instance of unwillingness on the part of foreign Powers to recognise the new status claimed by the Dominions. It would have been interesting to observe the reaction of the latter in such an eventuality, nor would it have been surprising to discover that they viewed it as a greater derogation from Dominion status than the course actually pursued. In any case numerous complications would have been entailed, and the challenge, if such it was, was not accepted.

Commentators in general seem to have accepted Dominion representation as the real point at issue in the Lausanne episode. They appear to assume that, had the strict canons of representation been observed, the Canadian Government would have co-operated heartily in the proceedings and willingly have undertaken the consequent obligations. Accordingly, they have focussed their criticisms upon the Governments of the United Kingdom, attributing to their remissness the decline in Imperial interests

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. pp. 600–602 (April 3, 1924).
[2] *Canadian Hansard*, unrev. (June 9, 1924), p. 3042.
[3] *United Empire*, vol. xvii. p. 33 (November 8, 1925).
[4] *Journal*, vol. v. p. 406.

since the Washington Conference[1]—the Near East crisis occurred during the administration of Lloyd George, the Lausanne negotiations were conducted under Tory auspices, and Ramsay MacDonald was at the helm when the action of Canada became an issue. The leaders in the British Parliament also appeared to believe that the solution of the difficulty rested primarily on the Home Government. It does not derogate from the importance of the discussions of Imperial co-operation just reviewed, nor mitigate the responsibility of Downing Street for avoiding even the appearance of acting irrespective of Dominion wishes, to raise the question whether lack of effective representation was not the pretext rather than the reason for the stand taken by the Mackenzie King Government, whether we are not dealing on the contrary with a further manifestation of Nationalistic aloofness quite antithetical to the demands for effective participation in Imperial counsels set forth by Borden, Hughes, or Smuts.

The published correspondence we are told is not complete,[2] but had the Canadian Premier been bent on making the Lausanne Treaty a truly Imperial act it is reasonable to assume that he would have taken some such course as did General Smuts in relation to the Washington Conference, or at least entered his formal exception upon the record, neither of which should have entailed such secrecy as to leave no trace. Pointing rather to the opposite conclusion, there is first his reiterated assertion that he took no exception to the basis of representation at the Conference—the corollary of which seems to have been overlooked by the Home Government; second, his observations regarding determination of obligations under the treaty by the Dominion Parliament, which were also misconstrued by Downing Street; and third, his statement regarding Canada's lack of interest in the subject-matter of the negotiations. Viewed from the Nationalist standpoint, these pronouncements, together with the subsequent gestures of refusal to recommend acceptance of the treaty by the Canadian Parliament and of indifference to its ratification on behalf of the whole Empire by His Majesty,

[1] *E.g.* comments in *Round Table*, vol. xiv. *passim*, especially "Should we Guarantee a European Settlement?" and "Imperial Diplomacy"; also R. Jebb, *The Empire in Eclipse*, chap. ii., and Keith, *Responsible Government*, pp. 904-906.

[2] *Canadian Hansard*, June 9, 1924, pp. 3038, 3055.

are all consistent steps in the establishment of a certain relation to the Lausanne settlement—a relation which, though doubtless it could be vindicated within the Empire itself, would seem indefensible in international law and as regards foreign Powers.

The motives and conduct of the Government were thoroughly discussed before the Canadian House in Committee of Supply on June 9, 1924. The Prime Minister (supported by Mr. Lapointe, now Minister of Justice) on the one side, and Mr. Meighen, the Leader of the Opposition, on the other, made the principal contributions to the elucidation of this relationship which, for the first time since the War, was officially set forth by the Government of one of the British nations. Premier King's argument was founded upon the thesis that Canada was unrepresented at the Lausanne Conference, upon an emphatic denial that Curzon and Rumbold had been Imperial representatives, in fact anything more than spokesmen for the United Kingdom alone. The invitation to the Conference had been addressed to the United Kingdom, there was no separate mention of the Dominions; a confidential communication had explained why Canada was excluded, and in order to avoid embarrassment to the Home Government their reply had concurred in this exclusion; it had certainly not recognised the two British plenipotentiaries as Imperial representatives, assertions to the contrary notwithstanding:

> These statements are entirely erroneous. Canada was not represented at Lausanne. I was not, as this editorial says, any party to representation. No word was sent to us in any despatch asking us if we would accept Lord Curzon or Sir Horace Rumbold as "Imperial representatives." Language of that kind was not used in any of the despatches. We were told that Lord Curzon would represent the Government of Great Britain and we were given reasons why Canada could not be represented. These were the facts as they were before us at the time we were considering what reply we should send to the despatch that had been received.[1]

The war with Turkey had been entered upon by British Ministers and presumably could be ended by them, which was the announced purpose of the Conference. The intimation, however, that new obligations might be entailed, had led to the reply that the determination of such matters, in so far as they concerned Canada, must rest with her Parliament. Nevertheless

[1] *Canadian Hansard*, p. 3044.

they had never questioned the fact that the treaty, when made, would bind the whole Empire. Furthermore, and on this the Premier was equally emphatic, the stand they were now taking was no recent decision or sudden change of front. They had made their position plain to the Home Government at least six months before the treaty was signed, and plainer still at the Imperial Conference, and at two recent subsidiary conferences. This course of action, the Premier claimed, was in accordance with the principles laid down by Sir Robert Borden in his report on the Washington Conference, and with those enunciated by the 1923 Imperial Conference. His motive, he concluded, was the vindication of the status which Canada had gained among the nations of the Empire :

> I have been taking my stand from the point of view of Canada a nation within the British Empire, not Canada a Colony, not Canada in any inferior or subordinate position, but Canada a country which has gained and which merits equality of status with other Dominions and with the Mother Country in these inter-Imperial relations.[1]

Prompted by questions from various quarters, the Prime Minister explained the seeming inconsistencies in the Government's action. If Canada was admittedly bound by the treaty, how might she refuse to recognise obligations arising from it? The key lay in preserving the distinction between the internal and external aspects of the situation, and between legal and moral obligations.

> So far as the British Empire is concerned, internationally in relation to Turkey and other countries, the action of the King in signing this treaty to my mind binds the whole Empire. As to the extent of obligation arising between different parts of the Empire, in other words, considered intra-Imperially, in the carrying out of its provisions, the Government takes the position that it will be for this Parliament to decide what, should occasion arise, in the light of all the circumstances, and in the light of the manner in which this treaty was negotiated, and the discussion we are having at the present time, its obligation may be under the terms of the treaty. . . .
>
> There is a distinction to be drawn between the purely legal and technical position in which this Dominion may be placed and the moral obligations which arise under treaties depending upon the manner in which such treaties are entered into, upon the parties who are present, and the representative capacities in which they acted while negotiations were proceeding. Legally and technically Canada will be bound

[1] *Canadian Hansard*, p. 3054.

by the ratification of this treaty; in other words, speaking internationally, the whole British Empire in relation to the rest of the world will stand as one when this treaty is ratified. But as respects the obligations arising out of the treaty itself, speaking now of inter-Imperial obligations, this Parliament, if regard is to be had to the representations which from the outset we have made to the British Government, will in no way be bound in any obligation beyond that which Parliament of its own volition recognises as arising out of the situation.[1]

These two pronouncements furnish an intimation of what would seem to be the motive for the several steps comprising the course taken by the Government. It was claimed that the relation to the settlement thus established for Canada was very different from that imposed upon the United Kingdom—the one which had not participated in negotiation, signature or ratification was bound to a much less extent than the other which had. From such a viewpoint the denial of parliamentary ratification becomes the most important step in the series—if the nature and extent of Canada's obligations under the treaty were to be determined solely by her Parliament, and that Parliament had refused to approve the instrument which was the source of these obligations, what was the prospect for the future? This attitude was made still clearer in further statements by the Premier:

Mr. MEIGHEN: Does the Prime Minister consider Canada as much bound by the treaty as Great Britain?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I certainly do not. I thought I had made that clear. . . . Great Britain, in deciding what steps she will take, will have regard for the fact that her Minister Plenipotentiary was present, that he conducted the negotiations, that he signed the contract, and this was all done with the full knowledge of her Government from beginning to end; and the Government of Great Britain will naturally be expected to recognise to the full every legal and every moral obligation arising therefrom. I say in that regard, the position of this country is very different, its Government not having been represented, not having been invited to be present, not having had anyone with authority to speak in the name of Canada. That is the position I take. . . . Let me repeat. We have not in the past, we do not now hold the view that Canada as a part of the British Empire will not be legally bound by this treaty when it is ratified, but we do say that the moral obligation resting upon this Parliament and country under this treaty, when it is ratified, will be vastly different to the moral

[1] *Canadian Hansard*, pp. 3046–3047, 3052.

obligation which is imposed upon the country under the Treaty of Versailles, having regard to the different manner in which the whole negotiations were carried on.[1]

As thorough an Autonomist as the Premier—in fact he claimed to be a much better one—Mr. Meighen attacked the conduct of the Government from the standpoint of those active Co-operationists who were still in power throughout most of the Empire, and who had made of the British Delegation so effective an instrument at Versailles and Washington. He believed that the Prime Minister had voiced the deeper aspirations of the Canadian people when he had held up to them a future as a self-governing nation within the British Empire. They believed that within the realm of Empire they avoided more perils than they would encounter and could play a more effective part in the attainment of world peace. But if one cornerstone upon which the world must be built was complete autonomy, let them not forget that the other was co-operation. Neither of these, he maintained, had been lived up to in the Lausanne negotiations.

The Prime Minister had not vindicated Canadian autonomy. He had sacrificed the position they had gained as an equal member of the British Commonwealth. Separate invitations had not been issued to the Dominions either for Paris or Washington, yet they had been represented there. The secret communication had cited a certain obstacle to Canadian representation at Lausanne. The reason given was not new. The obstacle had been met and surmounted on former occasions and might with no greater difficulty have been on this. On the face of the record the British plenipotentiaries spoke for the whole Empire and admittedly they had involved it.[2] Thus by his inaction, by his failure to claim distinctive representation in reply to the

[1] *Canadian Hansard*, pp. 3052–3054.

[2] "What reason was there why we should not have been there to advise the British representatives of the viewpoint of Canada? We knew right well that whatever those British representatives did they did as representatives of this Empire. Does the Prime Minister mean to say that they did not sign that treaty as representatives of this Empire? They certainly did.

"Mr. MACKENZIE KING: They signed as representatives of Great Britain.

"Mr. MEIGHEN: I have the treaty. It is not made between Great Britain and all these other countries, it is made between the British Empire and all these other countries. I do not know that anything more is necessary to make clear not only that we are bound, but that the signatures appearing there are signatures representing the Empire, which is a party to the treaty" (*ibid.* pp. 3060–3061).

first notification from the Home Government, the Prime Minister had thrown overboard the whole achievement of the past few years. He had acquiesced in the re-establishment of a purely Colonial treaty. Asked what Canadian representatives could have done had they been present, he argued that they might at least have secured the insertion of a clause providing that no Dominion was to be bound by the treaty unless they ratified it. They might have gone further, and asserted the positive aspect of equality with the Mother Country. In his opinion the commitments in the treaty were scarcely wise from the Imperial standpoint. The Home Government was inclining to view world politics from too narrowly a United Kingdom angle. Canadian influence might have broadened their outlook and thereby helped the Empire—the conversion of the British authorities by Canada in the matter of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was such an instance—now after the initial surrender it was too late to remedy the situation.

The Prime Minister's failure to reveal a spirit of co-operation had been equally marked. He had allowed the Home Government to misunderstand his attitude. In fact he had kept everybody in the dark as to his intention of refusing parliamentary approval—or else he had changed his mind! If he had disapproved so emphatically of the treaty, he should have made the course he proposed to follow clear to the Imperial Conference, or if the published record of their proceedings misrepresented him on that point, it was his business to have seen to it. He should also have been frank in his interchanges with the Home Government. What did the request for information to lay before Parliament mean if ratification were not the object? To argue that it was with a view to action at some future date when the question of enforcement should arise was an absurd contention.[1] Truly the action of their Prime Minister had placed Canada in an unenviable light:

> We not only willingly, but apparently gladly, stepped aside and let the British plenipotentiaries, or as the Prime Minister chooses to describe them to-day, the representatives of Great Britain, take what line they liked. We received day by day communications informing us of all that was going on. We laid them to one side. We offered no presentation of view at all; we offered no assistance; we contributed

[1] In the view of the present writer this is, however, the correct interpretation to place upon the request.

not the least to directing the policy of the Empire upon lines that we considered safe and secure. We simply stood aside and said: "Go on at your own risk; if you run into the marshes, you are there, we are not; if you run into fire, you are there, we are not; we are not involved in any degree." Is that a spirit of co-operation? As a consequence where are we now? We have a treaty that is binding upon us; we have a treaty that is equally binding on every part of this Empire—in the words of Mr. Keith, whom the Prime Minister quoted, in the negotiation of which treaty we have not had a single word to say, in the terms of which we have never had the least breath or word. All of those obligations binding upon us, legally as the Prime Minister insists, although not morally, are framed aside from us and we have never ventured even to express our views.[1]

Of Mr. Meighen's criticisms, the charge that the Mackenzie King Government had, by their conduct, relegated Canada to a Colonial status should command the interest even of those among whom his appeal for Imperial co-operation would rouse only amusement—for it was well founded. The position assumed by the Premier was merely a restatement of the traditional Laurier attitude of pre-War days. It is not easy to see how the attempt to apply these principles in an age when the relations of the Dominions to the Mother Country had ceased to be a matter of purely domestic concern, and were continually being taken cognizance of politically by foreign Powers, can be characterised as other than Colonialistic.[2]

The essential features of the Laurier policy were all present—the legal unity of the Empire under the treaty was admitted; the process of negotiation, signature and ratification had been left entirely to the Home Government; the decision of obligations under the treaty was reserved to the Canadian Parliament. The assertion of the latter principle, moreover, could be valid only within the Empire, for there was nothing that a foreign Power could be expected to recognise to support the contention that the British plenipotentiaries had spoken for the United Kingdom only. That would have meant attributing to the Mother Country a status of national aloofness from the rest of the Empire comparable only to that claimed for their own countries by ultra-Nationalists within the Dominions, and entirely novel to the rest of the world. But now times had changed. The Dominions

[1] *Canadian Hansard*, p. 3057.

[2] For the legal effects of Canadian action in relation to the Lausanne Treaty, see Corbett and Smith, *op. cit.* pp. 94-98.

had achieved a status undreamed of at the time of the 1911 Conference discussions. Foreign Powers were now actively interested in it. The Co-operationist position was exemplified in the demands made by Borden in regard to the peace negotiations and by General Smuts in connection with the Washington Conference, or by this same Premier's defence of the Chanak summons before the South African Parliament. The Nationalists, too, could no longer maintain their position as Sir Wilfrid had done, by mere verbal understandings and abstention from participation in Imperial counsels. They were now forced to carry their contentions into international congresses, and there secure recognition for them in the form of optional clauses specifically embodied in the treaties. To secure this would seem to involve either direct representation through their own plenipotentiaries or a distinct understanding with those of the Mother Country.

It would appear that Premier King neglected to take such steps and that hence Mr. Meighen's charge is justified; that if the vindication of Canadian autonomy was the Premier's object, he went about it in the wrong way. He does not seem even to have made the position which he actually took clear, for the Home Government gave verbal indication of failure to comprehend it. Although the general purport of the Canadian despatches to the Colonial Secretary should readily be grasped by anyone versed in the Laurier tradition, the Home Government ought surely to be excused if they did not appreciate the restriction on the function of their plenipotentiaries claimed by Mr. King, nor if, accustomed as they were to the definite acceptance or rejection of international commitments, they failed to grasp the idea that the parliament of a country legally bound by a treaty should assume from time to time to decide whether or not they would recognise the existence of obligations under it. There appears to have been a misunderstanding here which more zealous exposition might have obviated.

So much for Opposition comments on the Government's action. Perhaps Mr. Lapointe's contention during the debate was correct, that the obstacle to Dominion representation at Lausanne was quite unlike those faced at Paris and Washington and involved too delicate a situation to be forced.[1] It may be

[1] *Canadian Hansard*, p. 3076.

that the only way open to the Co-operationist was that followed by the other Dominions. On the other hand there is little doubt that Premier King's course represents the reaction of that school of thought regarding Imperial problems in which co-operation holds the minor place, and must be so interpreted in forecasts of the future. As for the lessons for the Empire to be drawn from the Lausanne affair, they have been well stated as follows :

> The consequences of this change of procedure both in negotiation and signature deserve careful attention in this country. Canada, though she is technically bound by the treaty, has declared that she accepts no obligations under it. What this means in practice is that, if Britain has to defend the demilitarised zones around Constantinople and the Straits, Canada will not regard herself as bound to participate in British action, although she, like the rest of the Empire, must suffer many of the consequences of the state of war in which Britain will be involved. In South Africa there has been no debate ; but no sensible person can doubt that the Nationalist party, if it is returned to power at any time, will endorse the Canadian attitude. The Australian Labour Party takes the same standpoint. The net result of the procedure adopted at Lausanne is therefore this—that if Britain is at some future date called upon to honour the undertaking given in the Straits Convention, two or three Dominions will be placed in the dilemma of finding themselves involved in a state of war by an obligation which their parliaments have never endorsed, or else declaring their neutrality and thereby detaching themselves from the Empire. That is the consequence of the departure from the Paris and Washington precedents sanctioned at Lausanne. It has been brought about on the one hand by the failure of British Ministers to realise that the Dominions cannot be excluded from complete association with British policy in great negotiations without endangering the moral unity of the Empire in some future emergency, and on the other by the failure of Canadian and other Dominion Ministers to realise that they cannot in reality disinterest themselves in such negotiations as those conducted at Lausanne without jeopardising either their national liberties or their partnership in the Empire.[1]

Could traditional Laurierism, which in its day had affected only the internal affairs of the Empire, be still applied under changed conditions in which its consequences might not be so confined, or perhaps restated, without disrupting the whole edifice ? This was the problem which had emerged since the last Conference session, and was now the most insistent which faced the Premiers as they reassembled.

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xiv. pp. 513–514.

The Imperial Conference of 1923

The procedure at the 1923 Conference (the first, by the way, attended by representatives of the Irish Free State) followed in general that inaugurated in the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1911 and standardised at recent Conference sessions. After the opening speeches on October 1, of which the British Prime Minister's constituted a general survey of developments since they had last met, there were full statements by the Foreign Secretary on the international situation ; [1] by Lord Robert Cecil and the Dominion Premiers on the League of Nations ; by the Colonial Secretary on the Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories, and by the Lord President of the Council, as Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence, upon that phase of Imperial relations. At the sixteen plenary sessions, the eleven meetings of committees, and the less formal discussions, which continued until November 8, the numerous internal and external problems of the Empire were considered exhaustively. Perhaps the most important of the former was the status of British Indians in other parts of the Empire, especially South Africa, but it does not concern us here ; their decisions regarding the status of Dominion High Commissioners have already been noted. Among foreign problems debated were reparations and the Ruhr, the Turkish settlement, the status of Egypt (in which Australia had a vital interest), the Singapore base, foreign debts, the smuggling of liquor into the United States, and the question of separate Dominion representation in that country.

Two complementary statements upon the position of the British Empire among the nations made in the course of the opening addresses to the Conference are worthy of special notice. Premier Baldwin said :

> A political writer of the sixteenth century remarked : " Henceforth the world is one Commonwealth." In a sense his words were prophetic. Our ever increasing control of natural forces has so knit the nations together that whatever affects one for good or ill affects them all. They are as organs of one body. But the mastery achieved over physical forces has completely outdistanced the control acquired over human forces. The fact is that our minds learn far more quickly

[1] The publication even of those parts of his address relating to the Turkish Treaty, reparations, and the Ruhr alone was itself a noteworthy innovation.

than our characters change ; so the social and political structure of the world has not kept pace with the growth of its knowledge. I am not saying that no progress has been made in applying moral ideas to political facts. Before me I see men who together can speak for a world Commonwealth containing one-quarter of mankind. The peoples you represent are drawn from all the continents, from all their races, from every kind of human society. Like a network of steel embedded in concrete this Commonwealth holds more than itself together. It held through the greatest cataclysm that has ever shaken the foundations of the world. Dissolve those ties and civilisation itself would collapse.[1]

General Smuts likewise, despite the handicaps which burdened him at home and his serious view of the world situation, still founded his hopes upon what a united Empire might achieve :

Let me say this here and now ; I have the feeling that our Commonwealth is a very great and powerful one. The British Empire can exert a force such as possibly no other agency on earth to-day to pull the world together, and I am anxious, so far as it can be done with goodwill and firmness, that whatever influence there is in this Empire, this greatest machine on earth, should be used to the full in order to assist the settlement of Europe. We have no reason to speak with bated breath. For centuries this country has, on every critical occasion in the history of Europe, spoken with the voice of authority, and the other nations have always in the end had to listen to that voice.

My feeling and my desire is that on a unique occasion like this, without using threats or violent language, and in a spirit of complete goodwill, we should once more do what has been done before and speak with a voice that will be listened to in the affairs of the world.[2]

Far from being, as some critics asserted, a futile session, the positive achievement of the 1923 Conference from the standpoint of Britannic relationships was of marked significance, and (whatever Co-operationists may think of the tendency it embodied) a considerable advance on that of 1921. The main work of the 1921 Conference on the constitutional side was negative. The session in 1923, in contrast, made a notable contribution in the enunciation of specific principles to govern henceforth the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of treaties relating to the Empire. A somewhat optimistic interpretation of its purport avers that : " It marked the close of a definite period of Imperial development. The system of Imperial co-operation, long regarded as the *summum bonum* of Imperial attainment, was

[1] Cmd. 1988, p. 11. [2] *Ibid.* p. 16.

at last put into full untrammelled effect. It perfected the machinery of the British Commonwealth according to the ideals of the Co-operationist school of Imperial thought." [1]

A committee of the Conference, under the Chairmanship of the British Foreign Secretary and assisted by Sir C. J. B. Hurst, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, was charged with the task of formulating these principles. The following resolution embodying their recommendations was drawn up and agreed to :

The Conference recommends for the acceptance of the Governments of the Empire represented that the following procedure should be observed in the negotiation, signature and ratification of international agreements.

The word " treaty " is used in the sense of an agreement which, in accordance with the normal practice of diplomacy, would take the form of a treaty between heads of states, signed by plenipotentiaries provided with full powers issued by the heads of states, and authorising the holders to conclude a treaty.

I

1. *Negotiation.*

(*a*) It is desirable that no treaty should be negotiated by any of the Governments of the Empire without due consideration of its possible effect on other parts of the Empire, or, if circumstances so demand, on the Empire as a whole.

(*b*) Before negotiations are opened with the intention of concluding a treaty, steps should be taken to ensure that any of the other Governments of the Empire likely to be interested are informed, so that, if any such Government considers that its interests would be affected, it may have an opportunity of expressing its views, or, when its interests are intimately involved, of participating in the negotiations.

(*c*) In all cases where more than one of the Governments of the Empire participates in the negotiations, there should be the fullest possible exchange of views between those Governments before and during the negotiations. In the case of treaties negotiated at International Conferences, where there is a British Empire Delegation, on which, in accordance with the now established practice, the Dominions and India are separately represented, such representation should also be utilised to attain this object.

(*d*) Steps should be taken to ensure that those Governments of the Empire whose representatives are not participating in the negotiations should, during their progress, be kept informed in regard to any points arising in which they may be interested.

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xiv. p. 226. Consult this whole article " Afterthoughts on the Imperial Conference," also " Imperial Diplomacy " (*ibid.* pp. 225–241, 649–666).

2. *Signature.*

(*a*) Bilateral treaties imposing obligations on one part of the Empire only should be signed by a representative of the Government of that part. The full power issued to such representative should indicate the part of the Empire in respect of which the obligations are to be undertaken, and the preamble and text of the treaty should be so worded as to make its scope clear.

(*b*) Where a bilateral treaty imposes obligations on more than one part of the Empire, the treaty should be signed by one or more plenipotentiaries on behalf of all the Governments concerned.

(*c*) As regards treaties negotiated at International Conferences, the existing practice of signature by plenipotentiaries on behalf of all the Governments of the Empire represented at the Conference should be continued, and the full powers should be in the form employed at Paris and Washington.

3. *Ratification.*

The existing practice in connection with the ratification of treaties should be maintained.

II

Apart from treaties made between heads of states, it is not unusual for agreements to be made between Governments. Such agreements, which are usually of a technical or administrative character, are made in the names of the signatory Governments, and signed by representatives of those Governments, who do not act under full powers issued by the heads of the states: they are not ratified by the heads of the states, though in some cases some form of acceptance or confirmation by the Governments concerned is employed. As regards agreements of this nature the existing practice should be continued, but before entering on negotiations the Governments of the Empire should consider whether the interests of any other part of the Empire may be affected, and if so, steps should be taken to ensure that the Government of such part is informed of the proposed negotiations, in order that it may have an opportunity of expressing its views.

The Resolution was submitted to the full Conference and unanimously approved. It was thought, however, that it would be of assistance to add a short explanatory statement in connection with Part I (3), setting out the existing procedure in relation to the ratification of treaties. The procedure is as follows:—

(*a*) The ratification of treaties imposing obligations on one part of the Empire is effected at the instance of the Government of that part:

(*b*) The ratification of treaties imposing obligations on more than one part of the Empire is effected after consultation between the Governments of those parts of the Empire concerned. It is for each Government to decide whether Parliamentary

approval or legislation is required before desire for, or concurrence in, ratification is intimated by that Government.[1]

This statement gives formal recognition to the various precedents which had been established of recent years. To this extent it is a milestone in development comparable in its way with the famous Resolution I of the 1907 Conference. Even if the principles as set forth recognised a large measure of decentralisation, and so were disappointing to Imperialists, these same concessions could do much to allay the apprehension in Nationalist quarters and with it much of the opposition to co-operation.[2] Furthermore, despite the events of the past two years, Imperial co-operation is still the keynote of the resolution. True this is a principle to which it is both easy and expedient for even the least ardent to render lip-service, especially since its application to specific cases is for the individual government to determine. Nevertheless its unanimous acceptance does lay upon each member nation the moral obligation of zealously maintaining it.

The influence of the more recent episodes, the Halibut Treaty and Lausanne, appears to loom larger on the face of the Conference resolution than do the older established principles of Versailles and Washington. Britannic equality as well as Imperial co-operation is the burden of the document. No distinction is made between the Government of the United Kingdom and those of the Dominions. The right of any of them to negotiate a treaty is specifically recognised; so also by implication is the validity of its plenipotentiary's signature alone, although no objection is recorded against the addition of a British Ambassador's signature to that of the Dominion representative if desired. In the case of treaties implicating more than one government, full interchange of views before and during negotiations is especially enjoined in detailed provisions—virtually the only limitation on the treaty-making power, and one binding the Mother Country equally with the Dominions.[3] The superiority of the British Empire Delegation as the vehicle of such interchanges at international conferences is recognised, but it is worth noting that the possibility of the absence of such adequacy of representation, as at Lausanne, is also admitted and provided for.

[1] Cmd. 1987, pp. 13–15.

[2] See comment regarding South Africa in *Round Table*, vol. xiv. p 400.

[3] See discussion of this point in the Australian House, August 3, 1926 (*Journal*, vol. vii. p. 823).

It should also be observed that although the amended provisions regarding ratification imply obtaining the prior consent of all governments involved, the resolution is silent as regards such an eventuality as was shortly provoked by Canada in regard to the Turkish Treaty.

This resolution, then, records a forward step inasmuch as it gives formal recognition to recent precedents; these cease to be moot points. It falls short, nevertheless, of offering solutions for at least two of the most insistent problems in the conduct of Imperial foreign relations. In the first place, as probably no exact criterion can be offered as to whether a treaty implicates only one or certain parts of the Empire, it fails to render adequate safeguards against action at cross-purposes by the several governments. No mere resolution, however, could be expected to supply the place of that zeal for co-operation and jealous consideration for the wishes of sister members of the Commonwealth upon which alone the success of Imperial relations must rest.

On a second all-important matter the resolution is entirely silent. True it provides in detail for a process of negotiation, signature and ratification of treaties which would be adequate for the needs of a group of independent allies. The British Commonwealth, however, demands more than this. Yet there is no attempt to provide more adequate machinery for Imperial co-operation, for the formulation of a united policy either before international congresses or in negotiation through the ordinary diplomatic channels. Despite the efforts of the League, instability in world affairs will doubtless continue and the necessity for sudden and decisive action remain; the sending of unforeseen telegrams may still be anticipated. The enhancement of decentralisation in negotiation promoted by the very resolution itself is calculated enormously to increase the complexity of this problem in Imperial relations. In this respect the Conference decision was a concession to Nationalism, and as in the nature of things the Mother Country is more immersed in foreign complications than are any of the Dominions, it might well be that the resolution, if interpreted by a Home Government inclined to independent action, and to the identification of their own interests with those of the Empire as a whole, would, in spite of itself, lend colour of regularity to repetitions of the Chanak

incident. It may well be also that these provisions for separate negotiation rendered inevitable the eventual establishment of separate diplomatic representation for the Dominions, the crucial steps to which have already been taken.

The principles governing the negotiation of local treaties by the Dominions which were asserted in the matter of the Halibut Treaty and received formal recognition in the resolution of 1923 have been applied frequently during the past few years. Some four or five important treaties have been concluded between Canada and the United States which were signed by representatives of the Dominions alone. These include the Smuggling Treaty of June 6, 1924, in which obligations are assumed expressly in the name of the Government of Canada and not of Great Britain; an Extradition Treaty of January 8, 1925, supplementing that of July 12, 1889, with Great Britain, and having no application to any part of the Empire save Canada; the treaty of February 24, 1925, relative to the boundary between the two countries (the prior boundary treaty of April 11, 1908, incidentally, was merely with Great Britain), and another treaty of February 24, 1925, to regulate the level of the Lake of the Woods, in which the Canadian Government as such assumes certain obligations.[1] It is worth noting also, that the Convention of July 3, 1924, between Canada and Belgium was signed in Ottawa, apparently the first to be concluded within a Dominion as well as under its own auspices.[2]

The injunction in the 1923 resolution of consultation with the Mother Country and other Dominions prior to the conclusion of treaties evoked some Nationalist criticism and explanation in the South African House. Dr. Stals demurred to its application to commercial treaties. Consultation, especially if it involved their own produce and assets, meant abandonment of the principle that their first concern should be South Africa. If Canada, as represented by Mr. Ewart, claimed the right of independently negotiating political treaties, they should at least reserve the same independence regarding their commercial arrangements. Premier Hertzog assured him that the consideration he deprecated was reciprocal, and announced the principle that South Africa stood in a particularly friendly relation to the rest of the Empire

[1] Cmd. 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513.
[2] *Journal*, vol. vi. p. 65; vol. vii. p. 532.

and that mutual consultation in order to avoid detriment to any part of it was only right under such circumstances.[1]

The Conference resolution raised the fundamental problem of distinguishing bilateral treaties which imposed obligations on one part of the Empire only from those which imposed obligations on more than one part. This came in for considerable discussion, though but a slight measure of clarification, during the debate in the Canadian House on the Liquor Convention with the United States.[2] The treaty had been a subject of consideration by the Imperial Conference. It was signed by the British Ambassador, Sir Auckland Geddes, and Mr. Hughes, the American Secretary of State. The consent of the various Dominions was secured prior to ratification by His Majesty. In their reply the Canadian Government made their assent subject to approval by Parliament, and also intimated their desire that in the application of the clause relating to the seizure of vessels, the British representative on the board of adjudication should, in cases involving vessels on the Canadian registry, be a person nominated by Canada, to both of which reservations the Home Government agreed.

Quoting the terms of the resolution regarding the classification of treaties, Premier King cited the Halibut Convention as an example of one purely local in application, and the present agreement as one more general in scope. The latter, then, should be signed by one or more plenipotentiaries on behalf of the governments concerned. In view of the fact that all six Dominions had approved the terms of the treaty and the mode of signature, it had been deemed sufficient that the British Ambassador should be sole plenipotentiary on this occasion. Furthermore, in accordance with the resolution, ratification might be either by executive act or resolution of Parliament as the several governments should determine. They had chosen the latter method, as earnest of their desire to promote friendly relations with their nearest neighbour.

Mr. Meighen proposed three questions to the Premier: How was the issue whether a treaty affected one or more parts of the Empire determined, and what precautions were taken in this regard?—Would this treaty entirely fail of effect should a single

[1] *Journal*, vol. vi. pp. 608–609.
[2] *Ibid.* vol. v. pp. 327–332 (March 21, 1924).

Dominion refuse to ratify it ?—In the case of a treaty affecting one part of the Empire only, upon whose advice would His Majesty act in authorising its execution by the Dominion representative ? The Premier was unable to give any conclusive answer to the first query. The decision would be based upon the terms of the treaty itself, its subject-matter, and conference between the different parts of the Empire :

> If that course is pursued, I think it will soon become apparent to any particular self-governing Dominion or the Government of the United Kingdom whether the treaty which it proposes to negotiate is one that concerns only one part of the Empire or more than one part. In these, as in all matters, common sense has to govern in the last degree ; hard and fast lines cannot be laid down ; but the broad intelligence that is usually applied to matters of this sort would soon, I think, make it quite apparent and clear whether a self-governing Dominion or the Government of the United Kingdom would be justified in regarding a treaty as imposing obligations only upon itself.

Regarding failure to ratify, the Premier assumed that the Home Government would reconsider the terms of the treaty, perhaps obtaining exemption from its provisions for the country concerned. The saving feature here, of course, is the possibility of securing amendments to a treaty prior to the final act of ratification, which may itself be refused—a practice freely indulged in by the United States Senate. The third question provoked a colloquy upon that somewhat academic yet apparently very tender point in constitutional theory already noted.[1] In an effort to vindicate the maintenance of Imperial unity the Leader of the Opposition asserted that the British Cabinet, in acting as the channel for the transmission of Dominion recommendations, impliedly if not actively participated in the rendering of advice to His Majesty regarding local negotiations, whereas the Premier, claiming the weight of an Imperial Conference decision for his contention, insisted that the Home Government was in no sense a party to the proceedings.

[1] *Supra*, ch. v.

CHAPTER IX

The Latest Phase—The Labour Régime, the Protocol and the League

What might be termed the first post-War period in Imperial relations, that of the Versailles Settlement, the 1921 Imperial Conference and the Washington Disarmament Conference, was characterised by the effective functioning of the British Empire Delegation and a readiness to co-operate in the formulation of decisions upon questions of "high policy." That immediately following, which culminated in the Imperial Conference of 1923, was marked on the whole by a preoccupation on the part of each member of the Commonwealth with matters of local concern, and by the creation of important precedents for the handling of foreign negotiations alleged to be of this nature. The chief work of the 1923 Conference was the validation of these precedents. This left open, as has been seen, the difficult problem of distinguishing between matters of purely local concern and those of Imperial import, and since, furthermore, the initiative in deciding the question in specific cases was left with the government most immediately involved, it implied a tendency to treat as merely of local concern matters which a few years earlier and under different auspices might readily have been admitted to involve the whole Commonwealth. Instead of being assumed from the outset by the Imperial Conference or Empire Delegation, as in the case of the supersession of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the crucial stage of negotiation was liable to be undertaken solely on the responsibility of one government. Subsequent consideration in a gathering of the Empire, if any, might come long after decisive action had been taken, and could acquire no more than the character of ratifying *faits accomplis*.

The operation of this tendency has been the salient feature of the latest phase of Imperial foreign relations. It has within the

last five years or so been noticeably at work in the sphere of what is admittedly "high policy." In several instances the avoidance of seemingly insurmountable obstacles has been sought by the expedient of calling the issues "local," and so bringing the negotiations within the scope of the 1923 resolution. This, no doubt, will enhance the importance of this resolution in Imperial history, but such a compromise has cost the surrender of Imperial diplomatic unity, the virtual abandonment of the effort to formulate a truly Imperial policy in foreign relations. It is worth noting, furthermore, that the period now to be considered comprises two antithetical administrations in Britain, the first Labour Government and the last Tory Cabinet, and that this time the United Kingdom has apparently taken the initiative in furthering the process of decentralisation. Meanwhile, also, the balance of power in the Dominions had been shifted by the accession to the Nationalists of the Free State representatives and of the Hertzog Government in South Africa.

The Labour régime in Great Britain is characterised by four main episodes in Imperial foreign relations—the Anglo-Russian Treaty, the Inter-Allied Conference in London, the abortive efforts of the Labour Government to convoke an Imperial Conference, and most important of all, the launching of the Geneva Protocol. A general treaty with the Soviet Republic was signed, along with a commercial agreement, on August 7, 1924, at the Foreign Office by Premier MacDonald and Arthur Ponsonby on the one hand and the five Russian emissaries on the other. In important respects it is reminiscent of the Halibut Convention between Canada and the United States and offers certain interesting features.

The Labour Government and the Anglo-Russian Treaty

The negotiations were preceded by the *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government by that of Great Britain. This step was taken by Premier MacDonald on February 1, 1924, very shortly after assuming office, without either seeking the approval of the British House or consulting the Dominions on the matter.[1] The former omission illustrates the wide discretion still vested in the

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. p. 785; A. B. Keith, *Journal of Comparative Legislation*, vol. vii. pp. 105–106.

Crown as regards the conduct of foreign affairs;[1] the latter marks a serious tendency in Imperial relations. The interest of the Mother Country was keener than that of the Dominions in the issue, which doubtless prompted Mr. MacDonald's independent action in this regard—so at least Premier Bruce explained it. The Australian Premier stated also that subsequent assurances from the Home Government of their desire for the closest consultation indicated that the course adopted on this occasion would not form a precedent for action in the future.[2] Perchance also the fact that in the Dominions the Labour parties were still out of power was taken into consideration in this case. Nevertheless, since the attitude of other Powers to the Soviets is still a major issue in world politics, neglect to reach a consensus throughout the Empire on the question of recognition, and the decision on the part of the Home Government to pursue its own course instead, must be regarded as an important instance of decentralisation in policy. As regards the treaty itself, it was treated as a case of local negotiation provided for in the Conference resolution of 1923. The Dominions did not participate in the four months' discussion which preceded the signing. They were, however, kept informed of the negotiations and the texts of the treaties were transmitted to them.[3]

An important point relates to the scope of the recognition accorded the Russian Government. Did recognition by the Home Government carry with it recognition throughout the Empire or were the Dominions free to exercise their own discretion in the matter? As regards Canada, in reply to a question on the point from a Labour member (March 20), Premier King said:

> The Canadian Government will take its own position in regard to the Soviet Republic just as they would take their position with regard to anything else. . . . When Great Britain takes a certain position in an international matter, the Dominion Government may, for the same reason, take a similar position; but so far as the question of whether or not Canada in any particular matter affecting its own people and their relations with other countries is concerned, we will exercise in these matters the same rights as the Parliament of Great Britain would exercise in relation to their people and their relations

[1] On this point see Keith, *Constitution, Administration and Laws of the Empire*, Preface, p. xiv.

[2] *Journal*, vol. v. p. 785.

[3] *Ibid.* pp. 785–786; vol. vi. p. 140.

to other countries. . . . Let me say that what I am saying at the moment is the position I took at the recent Imperial Conference in England.[1]

Canada's formal recognition of the U.S.S.R. was conveyed to their official representative at Montreal in a letter from the Prime Minister on March 24, almost two months after the Home Government had acted.[2] Professor Keith holds that the step taken by Premier MacDonald "is one which under international law clearly bound the whole of the Empire," and that Canadian action "was internationally neither necessary nor effective." He concludes that the latter may be regarded "in the light of an assertion of the necessity of due consultation, and an effort to remedy the irregular action of the Imperial Government in binding the whole Empire without securing the assent of its several parts."[3] Premier King answered the question raised in this case by a formula which has become stereotyped, and which has become a most convenient political slogan. It is a formula, however, which does not carry the same implication in every case to which it is applied. It meant one thing to invoke it as Sir Wilfrid Laurier did regarding the despatch of contingents to South Africa or as Mr. King did in the analogous episode at Chanak. It means much more to apply it to the recognition of foreign states, and the Canadian Premier's assertion taken literally constitutes a much broader claim than the explanation of it just cited would imply.[4] It is strange in view of the serious international questions which would be involved in the inauguration of a system of separate policies and acts of recognition among the governments of the Empire, that the issue precipitated by Premiers MacDonald and King has seemingly attracted so little attention.

Another point which, although of no greater importance, evoked more comment was the form in which the treaties were drawn up. The usual preamble setting forth the high contracting parties, the list of plenipotentiaries and the heads of the states from whom they derive their authority is omitted. The agreements are not concluded in the name of His Majesty but between

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. p. 341.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 747.
[3] *Journal of Comparative Legislation*, vol. vii. p. 106.
[4] Of course "recognition" is not a parliamentary concern at all. Invalidity in existing constitutional or international law does not, however, abate the significance of Premier King's contention.

" The Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." Hence its legality was questioned by a writer to *The Times* (London), who pointed out, however, that in any case it must be ratified by His Majesty before becoming law.[1] The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs gave the following explanation of this point in the British House :

> The British signatories signed in virtue of full powers given under the sign manual in the usual form. There are numerous precedents for omitting the name of the Sovereign in international engagements, concluded under full powers and requiring ratification. I might mention the Convention between Great Britain and France regarding Tunis of September 18, 1897; the Convention between Great Britain and Germany for the settlement of the Samoan question of November 14, 1899; and the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, Roumania and other states, relative to the frontiers of those states, signed on August 10, 1920. I do not see that there is any reason in this case why those precedents should not have been followed, more especially as in this case it was more convenient to make it between the Governments, because in the Soviet Union there is no individual head of the state.[2]

A further explanation offered for the novel procedure is that the Labour Government, perhaps in order to repair their neglect to arrange the matter of Dominion representation during the negotiations, or at least to assure the exemption of the latter from the terms of the treaty, omitted the Sovereign in order that it should not become presumably at once automatically binding on the whole Empire, and adopted this new formula in order to make it plain that one of the British nations only was implicated. Nevertheless it was argued that Dominion bondholders had a direct interest in the provisions of the general treaty relating to the redemption of Russian bonds, and to the nationalisation and cancellation of industrial businesses, and might be left out in the cold and forced to accept an unsatisfactory settlement because their Governments were not parties to the proceedings.[3] The commercial treaty, in contrast, contained

[1] Cited from the *New York Times* (August 9, 1924).

[2] *Journal*, vol. v. pp. 666–667. Reference should also be made to the title for the Halibut Convention suggested by the Canadian Government, and that finally agreed upon, and to the resolution of the 1923 Conference, *supra*; see Keith, *Journal of Comparative Legislation*, vol. vi. p. 135.

[3] See " The Dominions and the Anglo-Russian Treaty " (*United Empire*, vol. xv. pp. 537–538); also *Round Table*, vol. xiv. p. 684; Keith, *Responsible Government*, p. 903.

express provision for the accession of the Dominions should they so desire.

The course followed by the Home Government in regard to the treaty was fully in line with Premier King's theory of Imperial relationships, nor does it appear to have evoked adverse comment in South Africa. Premier Bruce expressed no dissatisfaction; he argued that Australia had no interest in the general treaty and should not presume to interfere in the commercial arrangements of another part of the Empire even if affected thereby.[1] In New Zealand, however, both Premier Massey and Mr. Wilford seemed much perturbed at the apparent set-back to the principle of a united foreign policy and the assault on the prerogatives of the Crown.[2] Mr. Baldwin assured the British House that the relations between the Empire and Russia would come under review at the forthcoming Imperial Conference.[3]

Dominion Representation at the London Conference

The Anglo-Russian negotiations exemplify the consummation of a local treaty under Labour auspices, and like the Halibut Convention demonstrate the difficulties involved in an effort to divorce the interests of one nation of the Empire from those of the whole Commonwealth. The problems relating to effective Dominion representation at international congresses reasserted themselves in connection with the Inter-Allied Conference on Reparations at London in the summer of 1924. This episode is characterised by resort to the panel system in order to secure representation of the Dominions, and by the noteworthy contrast between the attitude shown by the Canadian Prime Minister on this occasion and that in connection with Lausanne. Furthermore, the obstacles due to the necessity of restricting participation in the Conference within workable limits and to foreign opposition to full Empire representation were again in evidence, but as usual details regarding the latter are not available.

The lessons of the Lausanne Conference were impressed upon Premier MacDonald from both the other sections of the House. During the debate on the Turkish Treaty, Mr. Lloyd George reminded him of the Dominions' interest in the approaching conference, and asked whether they would be consulted,

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. pp. 784–786.
[2] *Ibid.* vol. vi. p. 140.
[3] July 21, 1926; *ibid.* vol. vii. p. 728.

whether he would invite them to be present, and what steps were being taken to ascertain their wishes in the matter.[1] In reply to a similar inquiry from the Unionist side on June 23, whether in view of the correspondence with Canada regarding the Lausanne Treaty the Dominions were to be asked to participate in the Inter-Allied Conference, the Premier said :

As a matter of fact we are now in communication with the Dominions. I think I had better just give this assurance that, without committing myself as to details as to how it is to be done, the Dominions will be completely consulted, so that they may feel that they are in fact partners with us in everything that we do. The point that I should like to make clear is that in settling the question of putting the Dawes Report into operation we shall certainly undertake no responsibilities by which either this country or the Dominions will be mulcted in seeing carried through.[2]

It was the Canadian Government, however, which took a positive stand regarding representation on this occasion. This was made the subject of a somewhat heated debate on July 17.[3] Prompted by Mr. Woodsworth, the Prime Minister made a statement in the House summarising the negotiations between the two Governments on the matter. Mr. King affirmed that the first intimation he had received of any intention to hold the conferences was the report in the morning papers of June 24 of the British Premier's statement cited above. On the 29th the Government had received a formal invitation to be represented at a preliminary conference of representatives of the Home Government and Dominions in London early in July to decide upon Dominion representation. In their reply they had expressed regret that lack of time precluded the sending of a Cabinet Minister, but that the High Commissioner, Mr. Larkin, would be instructed to act. They had maintained, furthermore, that the Versailles and Washington precedents of separate Dominion representation should be followed.

In a style much more reminiscent of Smuts and Borden than of his own stand regarding the Lausanne Conference, the Prime Minister continued :

It appeared at that preliminary conference that its purpose was not so much to arrange for separate representation of the Dominions as to inform the Dominions of the nature of the representation which had

[1] June 6, 1924 ; *ibid.* vol. v. p. 411. [2] *Ibid.* p. 403.
[3] *Ibid.* pp. 730-737 ; *Canadian Hansard* : unrev. (July 17, 1924), pp. 4854-4860.

already been decided upon. It was intimated that it would not be possible for more than three representatives of the British Empire to be present at the Inter-Allied Conference and the despatch rather suggested that the three in question would necessarily be members of His Majesty's Government. We intimated that this would not be satisfactory to the Dominion; that in our opinion this Parliament would expect that precedents set at Versailles and Washington should be followed, and that our Government would expect that a Canadian representative with full powers from His Majesty in respect of Canada should represent this country as a member of the British Empire Delegation. We drew attention to the fact that the internal organisation of the British Empire Delegation was a matter, in our opinion, for the British Empire itself to decide; that any objection from other nations as to the manner in which representation was arranged within the Empire was something that was none of their affair, if I may use the expression, but that it was for the British Empire itself to arrange the manner in which it should be represented at any conference at which British Empire delegates would be present. We pointed out that we could see no objection to the delegates of the several Dominions arranging with the delegates of His Majesty's Government such order of procedure and representation within the British Empire Delegation at the Inter-Allied Conference as they might see fit.

Moreover, when it was learned that the United States contemplated sending a representative to the Conference:

> Our Government felt that, having very similar questions to consider on this continent to those which interest the United States, there was a double reason why someone who was wholly familiar with the Dominion point of view should represent Canada and have power to act, in the name of His Majesty, in respect of Canada in the manner I have described.

This was no longer Colonialism, but an assertion of Nationalism that the Premier was enunciating. Furthermore, it had a tone of active rather than negative isolationist Nationalism which would have boded a new policy for the future had it been sounded in connection with a conference dealing more directly with international commitments. Mr. King went on to explain that the Home Government interpreted this communication as endorsing a panel system under which one Dominion representative would be present at each day's sessions. This the Canadian Government took to be an acceptance of the basis of representation laid down at the Paris Peace Conference. Accordingly they requested issuance of full powers to Senator Belcourt as their emissary, for which purpose the requisite Canadian Order in Council had been passed. The Colonial Secretary had signified

his concurrence, but up to the present no further communication had been received from him.

At this point there ensued an unpleasant incident, aggravated by recollections of the Chanak episode, which illustrates what has happened more than once and is liable to recur under the existing secretive and often dilatory methods of conducting official intra-Imperial correspondence. Mr. Meighen first endorsed the stand taken by the Government regarding representation at the Conference. He then went on to quote from a despatch just received through the Canadian press to the effect that action on representation was now halted pending further information from Canada. This provoked a heated protest from the Premier, in which he said among other things :

I want to bring to the attention of this House and of the British Government the fact that at this moment we are receiving information with respect to what is being done in London as to the representation of Canada at the Inter-Allied Conference, through a press despatch given to the House through the lips of the Leader of the Opposition, while no communication has reached the Prime Minister. . . . What I take exception to is, not that my hon. friend has certain information, but that that information should come to the people of Canada through the press or any other channel before it reaches the Prime Minister and the Government of Canada as to matters which directly concern this country and as to which we are corresponding with the Imperial authorities. . . . I am not finding fault with the press. I am trying to make as plain as I can that I think where communications are passing between Governments, whatever Governments they may happen to be, these communications should be in the hands of the respective Governments before they are in the hands of the press of the country and published to the people of the country.

The flurry subsided on the acceptance of a private member's suggestion that the press intimation in question was probably nothing but a newspaper man's guess. Questioned on the following day in the British House regarding this incident, the Colonial Secretary said :

I saw that statement and I very much regret it. I can only conclude that if Mr. Mackenzie King made that statement it was certainly contrary to the facts, and it may have been due to his being unaware that we were communicating with his High Commissioner. There was no delay whatever. On the contrary, the Commissioners have been sitting daily, including Canada, to help to straighten out the situation, which is now happily settled.[1]

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. p. 500.

It appears from this that the Leader of the Opposition was not unwilling to demonstrate an instance of dilatory and half-hearted attention to Canadian representation on the part of the Government, that the Premier feared another newspaper appeal as in the case of Chanak, and that the Colonial Secretary was inclined to think that the High Commissioner might have been slow in communicating developments to Ottawa. This incident is typical. It is difficult to see how such occurrences can be avoided as long as the prevailing secrecy in intra-Imperial as well as foreign relations is maintained, unless a course which would be highly undesirable even if practicable were adopted, that of preventing all press releases until the subject-matter had been issued in public documents. Whether or not the function of the press was abused in the Chanak affair, it will be recalled that publication of the appeal in the press prior to perusal by the Prime Ministers of Canada and South Africa was due in both instances to their absence from their capitals when the messages were received. Oppositions, at least in the Dominions, are shown by the parliamentary debates to be chronically in an attitude of speculation as to the course of events, even as to occurrences in Imperial Conferences. Insinuations and retorts, charges and counter-charges continually fly, amid sparring for party advantage. The veto of a single Premier can prevent the publication of data to which all are reasonably entitled, and there is then no recourse in an effort to reconcile the frequently contradictory statements emanating from different quarters in the Empire.

On July 18, the afternoon following the Canadian debate, the Colonial Secretary was able to announce that a basis of representation at the Conference had been agreed upon. He said :

> There have been several communications with the various Dominion Governments concerned, and it was found impossible to arrive at definite arrangements before the Inter-Allied Conference opened. I have now the great pleasure of announcing that it has been settled that representatives of any of the Dominions so desiring, and of India, shall become members of the British Empire Delegation at the Conference on the panel system, and it has also been arranged for the representatives so appointed to be present at the meetings of the Conference on days when it is not their turn to sit as members of the British Empire Delegation. This will ensure that they are fully

acquainted with all that goes on in the Conference. The plan adopted is a special one for this particular Conference and is not to be regarded or quoted as a precedent. The reason for informing the House at this stage is that there has been an unfortunate controversy taking place in Canada and statements have been made also in the press here. It was within the last hour that we not only settled a plan but got Canada to acquiesce, and everything is now straightened out.[1]

This statement was communicated to the Canadian House the same evening by the Premier, who in reply to a query from Mr. Meighen, added the following explanation :

The British Empire Delegation will consist not only of representatives of His Majesty's Government but also of such Dominion representatives as are in attendance at the Conference. The entire British Delegation will therefore consist of seven or eight, and from that number there will be selected for each day's session three persons to represent the British Empire Delegation. Two of these will be members of His Majesty's Government and one will be chosen from the Dominion representatives who are members of the British Delegation. They will be the active members, but representatives of any Dominions, not of the three who participate in the business of the Conference from day to day, will have opportunity to be present and hear the general discussion.[2]

The Leader of the Opposition pronounced the arrangement to be " quite satisfactory." Accordingly at the second plenary session of the Conference, on July 23, Premier MacDonald submitted the basis of Empire representation agreed upon to their approval, as a " very hurried and very temporary settlement of that question amongst ourselves," and introduced Senator Belcourt, who was to sit on that day as the representative of Canada. He added this reservation to his statement :

The plan adopted is a special one in view of the exceptional character of this Conference, and differs from that adopted at the Peace Conference at Paris and at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments. It is therefore not to be regarded or quoted as a precedent. I may add to that that this arrangement does not in any way increase the representation of Great Britain at this Conference ; it is only a method of substituting one delegate for another.[3]

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. pp. 498–499. [2] *Ibid.* pp. 736–737.

[3] Cmd. 2270, p. 22. Actually, Senator Belcourt sat as a member at the second, seventh, and eighth of the eight plenary sessions, and the representatives of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India at one each of the others. Beginning with the third session, representatives of from two to four of the Dominions also attended as observers.

The Inter-Allied Conference at London presents a compromise as regards Dominion representation between the methods followed at Paris and Lausanne. The Lausanne basis was in fact that first decided upon for this occasion. A small assembly was considered essential, and the other Powers objected to the allotment of more than three delegates to the British Empire. Hence it was suggested that Mr. Thomas as one of these should be the representative of the Dominions and India. The other Dominions appear to have been content with this arrangement; it was the protest of the Canadian Government which induced a reconsideration of the problem, and the securing of a measure of distinctive representation for the Dominions.[1] The other countries participating were France, Italy, the United States, Belgium, Japan, Jugoslavia, Greece, Portugal and Roumania. Of these the first three had three delegates each, Japan and Belgium two, and the four last mentioned were represented by their resident ministers in London. This episode illustrates as well as any the peculiar difficulties, internal and external, involved in securing adequate Empire representation at international gatherings of this nature. The method finally adopted violated the principles of Britannic equality by according two of the three places on the Delegation continuously to the United Kingdom, and relegating the third only to be shared by all the Dominions in rotation. Furthermore the Dominions were not admitted in addition, as at Paris, to separate membership in their own right, although their representatives were allowed to attend as auditors those sessions at which it was not their turn to sit as members.[2]

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. pp. 682, 735–736. The attitude of South Africa toward the final arrangement was officially stated as follows: "In view of the urgent necessity to put the Dawes Report into operation, it was arranged that the British representatives at the Inter-Allied Conference would keep in continuous consultation with the High Commissioners or other representatives appointed by the Governments of the Dominions and India during the course of the sittings of the Conference, and that the Dominion Governments would be kept fully informed. The High Commissioner for the Union has been instructed by the Government to take his place as member of the British Empire Delegation at the Conference on the panel system in turn with representatives of the other Dominions, subject to the reservation that nothing would be done whereby the freedom of action of the Union Parliament may be hampered. The above arrangement has been made in view of the exceptional character of the Conference, and will not be regarded or quoted as a precedent" (*ibid.* p. 854).

[2] J. H. HARRIS (Lib.): "Do we understand that the representatives will attend both the Commissions and the Plenary Sessions?"

COLONIAL SECRETARY: "The arrangement is that they will have an

Mr. Bourassa in the Canadian House pronounced this panel arrangement to be one of the most absurd things he had ever heard of, and asserted flatly that the reason for its adoption had been the opposition of foreign Powers, which, realising the tremendous possibilities which might accrue from that evolution in the constitutional relations of the Empire, had begun to challenge the right of the Dominions to separate representation. If the British Empire were several nations it could not at leisure act as one or as six or seven, according to its fancy.[1] The basis of representation also came in for trenchant criticism in the British House,[2] both from Mr. Amery, who adduced the now well-known argument that it ought to be made clear to the rest of the world that it must take the Empire as it found it and that they could not diminish the status of their own Dominions merely to suit the convenience of the other Great Powers, and from Mr. Lloyd George, who reiterated the strictures he had made on the Tory Government's handling of the Lausanne negotiations. The kith and kin argument, he warned, did not cover millions of loyal subjects of the King even in the Dominions; if one read between the lines of some of the discussions in the Canadian Parliament during the past year, it might readily be seen that any mishandling of a matter of such moment as this might produce results disastrous to the unity, strength, even the continued existence of the Empire. He insisted that the Conference might have been organised on a scale large enough to admit of full Dominion representation:

> May I suggest that it would have been possible to carry out the Versailles precedent without in the least interfering with the business of the Conference. I can quite understand that when you come to discuss details you cannot have a large body, but, then, whenever there was a plenary session where Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia and Greece were represented, the Dominions were put on the same basis as those countries and were always present, and at the plenary sessions the Dominions might have been represented without interfering in the least with the smaller Commissions that discussed the details of business.

opportunity of being informed of everything that is taking place. It does not help to show differences, and Canada and the others acquiesced in the special arrangement made, which ensure their attendance as British Empire delegates and also their attendance as listeners to the general debate" (*Journal*, vol. v. pp. 499–500).

[1] *Ibid.* vol. vii. p. 787.

[2] During discussion of the Colonial Office vote, July 29, 1924 (*ibid.* vol. v. pp. 677–685).

Nevertheless the London Conference was not an omnibus gathering like that at Paris, where *prima facie* claims to representation may be liberally construed but the real decisions are made within a select circle. It was one of a type which is necessarily the usual one, and in which Mr. Lloyd George himself had been called upon to participate more frequently than most Premiers. Membership is apportioned more or less in accordance with the weight of interest which the various countries have at stake, and is for sound practical reasons limited in number to a body which can transact business effectively as a whole. Certainly the weight rather than the size of a delegation is what counts, yet the element of prestige is no mean factor, and foreign Powers cannot be expected to make a regular practice of sending to such conferences delegations twice as large as those they would otherwise have despatched for no other reason than to accommodate themselves to the internal difficulties of the Empire. They cannot be expected either to suffer themselves to be outnumbered or to match in point of size Empire delegations large enough to afford separate representation to all the Dominions simply because the domestic exigencies of the Premiers of one or two of them demand it. This was the situation which Mr. Thomas had been called upon to face, and he defended his course of action as follows :

Anyone with any knowledge of the European difficulty arising out of the Dawes Report would admit that we could not turn that Conference into a mass meeting. If you were going to be business-like you had to make it as small as possible, and the difficulty of that was not only our own difficulty, but the difficulty of the other Powers represented. We immediately applied ourselves to the difficulty. We cabled to the Dominions and said to them, " Here is our difficulty. We want you to have the same representation as at Versailles, but there is a difficulty for this Conference. Will you help us ? " During the whole of these negotiations we made it perfectly clear to them that on no consideration would they be committed in any way by any representatives of the British Government without full discussion and agreement. They all accepted it readily with the exception of Canada. We may as well be perfectly frank in this matter. The strength of the British Empire is that we can be frank with each other without unpleasantness. Mr. Meckenzie King, speaking for his Government, was frank. He said : " No, I believe that accepting anything less than the principle agreed to at Versailles is lowering our status."

In view of the more extreme Nationalists' intimations that

complete equality with the Mother Country is their condition for remaining within the Commonwealth, it is pertinent to speculate what would have been the basis of representation had their alternative of disintegration already been achieved. It must not be forgotten that the United Kingdom and dependencies, the British Empire in the narrower sense, is a Great Power in her own right, and would have been accorded representation equal to any other at this Conference. Would any of the Dominions have been admitted to participation as independent nations? Perhaps Canada, if not vetoed by the United States—it being reasonable to assume that the attitude of the latter Power would be determined by the degree of affinity with her own viewpoint which Canada displayed. As for the other Dominions it is problematical whether they would have been heard, so that membership in the Commonwealth, even on the Lausanne basis of representation, was all to their advantage. For these various reasons, it is extremely doubtful whether separate Dominion representation, as nations either within or outside the Empire, could become a recognised practice at the normal type of international conference, of which that at London is taken as representative.

Should the Home Government, in deference to Britannic equality, have made available to the British nations all three places at the Conference, reserving to itself only an equal share, that is one place each alternate session? This would doubtless have proved hugely amusing, even welcome, to foreign Powers, but it would not have fulfilled Premier King's requisite of distinctive membership for Canada, nor would it have admitted any gradation of interest in the proceedings, which would seem as worthy of recognition among British nations as among foreign Powers. Perhaps the offer of two places for the Dominions might have been tactful, but it was not sought by the other Dominions, nor would it have satisfied Canada, whose real aim could be met only by an enlargement of the Conference.

The arrangement actually adopted, however—and this is an important consideration—does admit of the fullest possible consultation among the representatives of the various parts of the Empire, and the reaching of a consensus upon matters of common interest. In other words it does not hinder the assembling of a British Empire Delegation while the conference is in session. Mr. Thomas assured the House that: "Just as in Paris every

day, before committing the Dominions to anything there were consultations, so every day here in this Conference there is consultation taking place and everyone knows as much about the case as the other." [1] Neither the number of places available at the conference table nor the issue of separate representation for the Dominions have necessarily any direct bearing on the utilising of the British Empire Delegation, which is essentially an agency for the formulation of a united Empire policy, to be enunciated in the conference by Imperial plenipotentiaries, but which operates outside the conference chamber and whose members accordingly need not all be recognised members of the conference itself. If foreign opposition to delegations large enough to admit of distinctive Dominion membership proves insurmountable, the only solution of the problem would seem to be recourse to the Empire Delegation in conjunction with the panel system, the Dominions sharing say two of the three places available. Should any Dominion even then prove intransigent, the terms of the agreements must be so drawn as to exclude that Dominion from their operation until it signify its concurrence.

Abortive Efforts to Convene a Conference on Representation

Mr. Thomas, for the Labour Government, expressed as keen dissatisfaction with the outcome of the problem of Dominion representation at the London Conference as did Colonel Amery for the Unionists or Mr. Lloyd George for his section of the House, and announced that steps were already being taken to find a remedy. One full delegate only at each session was inadequate for Dominion needs. "That in itself is not a solution," he maintained. "That in itself is something which must be altered, and we are determined to alter it. That is why we are inviting the Dominions to a conference which, we hope, will take place in October of this year. We want the conference to take place, so as to explore the whole situation, and avoid, if possible, the difficulties with which, unfortunately, we have had to deal up to now." This was especially desirable, the Colonial Secretary continued, in order to disabuse nations regarding the seriousness of their internal dissensions:

We want, I may say, outsiders to understand that these domestic

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. p. 683.

differences are not going to weaken us. They are inclined to take advantage of these difficulties; they are inclined to gloat over the kind of discussions that took place a few weeks ago over this Conference. We want them all plainly to understand that they are not going to take advantage of these difficulties, because we are going to remedy them in the future.[1]

The other motive which impelled the Labour Government's overtures to the Dominions for the convocation of this conference was dissatisfaction in the Outer Empire at the fate of the Imperial Preference resolutions adopted at the Economic Conference in 1923. Their desire to secure continuity in Empire policy inspired in this connection the most serious of many efforts to give a non-partisan (or perhaps more correctly a multi-party) complexion to the composition of the Imperial Conference. Discussing this issue at the Empire Chambers of Commerce banquet on July 2, the Colonial Secretary said:

> In questions so vital and far-reaching, the time has arrived in which, just as in foreign politics, we shall know no party in Imperial and Empire affairs. I would take the risk in future of inviting to Empire conferences not only the Government of the day but the leaders of the responsible Opposition. Thus you would get continuity of policy. I can say on behalf of the Government that we are now taking the necessary steps to explore the whole situation with a view to avoiding these difficulties in the future.[2]

The plan of inviting leading members of the Opposition to participate in the Conference had frequently been broached in the various parliaments, but this is apparently the only time it had been sponsored by one of the governments of the Empire. It would secure continuity of policy in that by committing both sides of the House in advance it would provide against a change of government in any quarter. It would not to any great extent dissipate responsibility, since whatever party were in power would be bound to carry out the Conference resolutions. It would, however, seriously impede the reaching of a consensus on any really contentious, that is important, issue, and would in all probability greatly lessen the effectiveness of the Conference thereby. In any case the project, despite the auspices under which it was launched on this occasion, met with as little official favour as it had heretofore received.

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. pp. 683–684.
[2] *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (July 4, 1924).

Correspondence on the subject of the proposed conference [1] was inaugurated on June 23, 1924, by a lengthy telegram from Premier MacDonald transmitted through the Colonial Office to all the Dominion governments. Commencing with an endorsation of the principles governing Imperial relations which were laid down by the Conference of 1917, this communication pointed out that the basis thus far worked out still left unanswered the insistent problems relating to action during the intervals between Conference sessions, and proposed, not a formal session of the Imperial Conference, but a meeting of say two representatives of each British nation, versed in constitutional matters, to seek solution for these persistent questions. The Premier suggested that the first aspect of the problem—provision for the necessity of immediate and decisive action in foreign affairs—might be met by an examination of the Conference resolution of 1923 relating to the negotiation of treaties, with a view to interpreting and supplementing its provisions and extending them to other phases of foreign policy. In regard to rendering Conference decisions more effective, especially in view of possible reversals of policy through changes of government, Mr. MacDonald advanced two proposals. One was the inclusion of representatives of Opposition as well as Government in the Conference membership. This, he admitted, was open to the objection that it would tend to hamper frank discussion and the interchange of confidential information. The other was " to continue representation of governments only, but to arrange for each government to obtain from its own parliament beforehand a general approval, within sufficiently wide limits, of the attitude to be taken up by its representatives." This in turn was subject to the criticism that it would diminish the flexibility of Conference procedure.[2] He invited the comments of the Dominion governments upon these suggestions, as well as regarding the practicability of holding such a Conference next October.

The immediate answer of the Canadian Government to this invitation [3] was to the effect that they were busy winding up the business of the session, but after prorogation would give the matter

[1] Cmd. 2301.

[2] See discussion of parliamentary control over Conference activities, *supra*, ch. v.

[3] Cmd. 2301, No. 3. Copies of each Dominion's reply to the Home Government's invitation were despatched to all the others.

careful consideration. Later (August 7) they sent a detailed reply,[1] concurring in the desirability of more definite understanding on the problems raised, but at the same time stressing the impossibility of final decision in the matter, and the difficulty "inherent in the existence of several self-governing communities scattered over the globe with, in large part, different neighbours and different problems." Consideration of the problem of further extending the principle embodied in the resolution on negotiation was pronounced "helpful," but the other proposition was declared not to be feasible. Reversals of policy though inconvenient must be accepted as long as separate parliaments existed and electors remained free to express their wishes. Furthermore the suggestion savoured too strongly of an Imperial Council superior to the several parliaments[2]; each government should accept responsibility for its attitude and the Opposition remain free to criticise it. "As to approval by Parliament in advance of the attitude to be taken by our representative, we feel that this could be given only where Parliament had knowledge in advance of specific questions to be considered and in the light of the then existing circumstances." Even this might diminish the flexibility of the Conference. They concurred also in deprecating a revival of the proposal to hold a Constitutional Conference or a regular session of the Imperial Conference as yet, but were willing to participate in such a preliminary discussion as had been suggested.

The response of the Australian Government (July 16)[3] comprised a full analysis of the situation. The registering of decisions by Imperial Conferences and their subsequent ratification by the various parliaments constituted an adequate basis for the formulation of Imperial policy. The problem of emergency decisions in the intervals between sessions was, however, in a

[1] Cmd. 2301, No. 6.

[2] "Proposal to have all parties represented in the Imperial Conference with a view to preventing policy agreed upon thereat being rejected by existing or future parliaments would seem to imply setting up a new body supreme over the several parliaments. We regard the Imperial Conference as Conference of governments of which each is responsible to its own parliament and ultimately to its own electorate and in no sense as Imperial Council determining the policy of the Empire as a whole" (*ibid.* p. 12). During the debate on the Lausanne Treaty, moreover, Mr. Lapointe adverted to the proposed Conference in terms which indicated suspicion that it implied a revival of the Constitutional Conference project broached in 1917 and renounced in 1921 (*Canadian Hansard* unrev.: June 9, 1924, p. 3077).

[3] Cmd. 2301, No. 5.

different category. Here no alteration of the fundamental principle regarding consultation at present operative seemed practicable, but considerable improvement could be made in the existing machinery for this purpose :

These improvements should be on lines of (*a*) a closer liaison between the Foreign Office and Dominion governments, which could be effected by the establishment by the Dominions of a Foreign Office branch in their High Commissioners' offices under the control of an officer of such standing and character as to enjoy the confidence of the Foreign Office ; such a representative would be in a position to keep his Prime Minister informed in regard to current events and atmosphere in connection with foreign policy, in addition to information which is conveyed by cable to the Prime Minister and by information at present sent from time to time by the Foreign Office. (*b*) Fuller and more regular advice in regard to all questions of foreign affairs, both by cable and mail, than is at present forwarded to the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions. (*c*) Greater efforts to anticipate questions which are likely to arise and require urgent decision, with a view to ascertaining the views of the Dominions in advance in place of informing them of decisions after they have been arrived at and acted upon or when it is too late for any alternative action to be submitted.

As for questions other than foreign policy, the Australian Government reasserted in emphatic terms its faith in the project for an Imperial secretariat which had been unsuccessfully launched by Mr. Deakin in 1907. Regarding Premier MacDonald's second proposition, while affirming their belief that Imperial questions should be raised above the level of party politics, they felt unable to endorse the inclusion of Opposition representatives in the Conference membership, as more calculated to promote dissension than effective operation. Furthermore they considered the system of parliamentary ratification of Conference decisions to be more satisfactory than that of prior delimitation by parliament of their representatives' activity. In view of these conclusions on the problem raised, Premier Bruce's Government failed to see any advantage in the appointment of representatives to the suggested preliminary conference, but undertook to explore any further suggestions during the interval prior to the next regular Conference session.

The Government of New Zealand replied briefly on June 28 [1] to the effect that neither the Premier nor any other Minister

[1] Cmd. 2301, No. 4.

could expect to leave home for probably eighteen months, but that they saw no objection to the appointment of a committee for preliminary investigation, whose report would be considered by the various governments prior to the next Imperial Conference. The essential thing, meanwhile, was to ensure that nothing would be done in the direction of weakening the unity of the Empire. The Government of Newfoundland (August 16) deprecated the suggestions of the bi-partisan Conference and preliminary instruction by parliament. They agreed, however, that the other matters were too complicated to be settled by correspondence, and signified their readiness to be represented at the Conference when a date satisfactory to the other Dominions should be fixed.[1] Premier Hertzog's Government did not respond to the first communication from the British Premier. In reply, however, to a follow-up telegram (August 18) summarising the views of the other Dominions, they stated that as the contemplated preliminary conference offered little promise of furthering the eventual decision of the points at issue, it was thought inadvisable to send representatives.[2] Meanwhile Mr. Thomas paid a visit to South Africa as Chairman of the Delegation of the Empire Parliamentary Association, and it is a striking tribute to the value of personal consultation in such matters that he was able to secure a reversal of the Union Government's decision. On September 5 they, too, signified their willingness to send a delegate to the conference, although no Minister would be able to attend.[3]

On August 18 the Home Government despatched telegrams to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa,[4] summarising the replies thus far received, noting that in view of recent events they desired to include representation of the Empire at future international conferences among the subjects to be considered, and also stating that it now appeared doubtful whether the meeting could be convoked before the latter part of November. Australia now intimated its willingness to participate in the preliminary inquiry, if held late in November,[5] and the Irish Free State, which had hitherto apparently vouchsafed no response, added its concurrence on October 10.[6] Meanwhile, however,

[1] Cmd. 2301, No. 8.
[2] *Ibid.* No. 13.
[3] *Ibid.* No. 15.
[4] *Ibid.* Nos. 9–12.
[5] *Ibid.* No. 14.
[6] *Ibid.* No. 23.

the prospects of the conference had in reality steadily declined. The Canadian Government had contemplated being represented through their delegates to the Assembly of the League, and when it appeared that the meeting could not be arranged for the middle of October at the latest, pronounced in favour of indefinite postponement[1]; moreover the South African suggestion that February of 1925 be the date fixed rendered the situation well-nigh hopeless.

Then came the dissolution of the British House. The Colonial Secretary accordingly announced to the Dominions (October 13) that under the circumstances no date could be decided upon, but expressed the opinion that the situation need not hinder the governments going on with the project.[2]

On December 2, however, the new Colonial Secretary, Colonel Amery, sent a despatch to all the Dominions which definitely shelved the proposal.[3] This set forth that, although the preliminary conference had been agreed to in principle by all the Dominions prior to the dissolution, inability to agree upon a time of meeting had prevented its convocation, that the present Government, while admitting the importance of the issues involved, doubted the utility both of Mr. MacDonald's suggestions and of the contemplated preliminary inquiry, and that in their opinion insufficient time had elapsed to warrant a re-examination of the Conference resolution of 1923. Hence they had decided not to pursue the matter further. At the same time they desired to assure the Dominions of their eagerness to avail themselves of every opportunity for personal consultation with the Dominion Ministers or other representatives, especially in regard to one pressing matter upon which they intended to communicate at an early date, the Geneva Protocol.

The vicissitudes of the Labour Government's project furnish a very pertinent illustration of the difficulties which almost invariably beset attempts to convoke conferences of the Mother Country and Dominions for the purpose of discussing problems of common interest, no matter how important these may be. An analysis of this long-drawn-out correspondence, especially of the time element involved, at the same time demonstrates the serious limitations which the method of long-range consultation

[1] Cmd. 2301, Nos. 20 and 22.
[2] *Ibid.* No. 24.
[3] *Ibid.* No. 25.

imposes. Invariably one or more Dominions will meet overtures from other governments with protracted and disconcerting silence. Frequently, too, these are the ones whose views upon the issues involved are most essential under the circumstances. This episode, furthermore, affords another instance of the consequences of a change of government in the Empire. In view of the Canadian Government's attitude regarding the Lausanne Treaty and the London Conference, in view of the serious complications for the Empire in the Geneva Protocol, and the reversal in foreign policy already contemplated by the Home Government, the dropping of Mr. MacDonald's proposal to consider further the principles governing the conduct of foreign relations was a serious responsibility for the new Cabinet to assume. The Labour Opposition took pains to remind them of this upon every convenient occasion, and the ensuing debate on the Colonial Office vote, but especially those soon to follow on the Geneva Protocol and the Locarno Agreements, afforded them early opportunities of pointing their moral.[1]

The Launching of the Geneva Protocol

The reception accorded the Geneva Protocol within the Empire serves not merely to illustrate further the contrast between both the Imperial and foreign policies of the Labour and Tory Governments of Britain, but also to reveal an extension of this contrast to the parliaments of the Outer Empire, especially in the solidarity of their Labour parties with that in the United Kingdom. The twin problems now agitating the deliberations of the League of Nations were security and disarmament, and it was recognised in responsible international circles that distinct progress in solving the former was prerequisite to any successful discussion of the latter. The attainment of security was sought from two opposing directions, on the basis of two conflicting theories. One was the method of regional pacts between specific Powers. This was exemplified by the long negotiations for a treaty of mutual guarantee between France and Britain which culminated at Locarno, and was the policy with which Mr. Lloyd George at Cannes and the Baldwin Government identified themselves. It met with the greater favour in the Dominions because

[1] See *Journal*, vol. vi. pp. 5, 212, 679–686; vol. vii. pp. 10, 736–737.

of the saving clause exempting them from its operation.[1] It evoked criticism, however, on the grounds that it raised difficult problems concerning the international status of the Dominions, tended to divide the Empire by sectional agreements, and marked a reaction to the pre-War system of competing alliances.[2] The other method was essentially inclusive. It relied upon the general extension of the principle of arbitration, and attained recognition in the Geneva Protocol, to which the Labour Government was committed. Here also the reactions of the Outer Empire demonstrated how far from whole-hearted acceptance of the original hypotheses of the Covenant the Dominions now were.

Premier MacDonald signalised his attitude by rejecting the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance sponsored by the Fourth Assembly of the League in 1923.[3] This decision was communicated in a letter to the Secretary-General on July 5, 1924,[4] and confirmed later in a speech which he delivered before the Fifth Assembly at Geneva on September 4.[5] In his letter the Premier argued that neither were the guarantees embodied in the treaty sufficient to justify a state in reducing its armaments nor were the obligations imposed of such a nature that the nations could conscientiously engage to carry them out. The ability of the League Council in the event of a crisis to determine by unanimous vote which nation constituted the aggressor was problematical, and other elements likely to involve delay made effective action uncertain. So precarious an arrangement was calculated to involve an increase rather than a decrease of British armaments. It implied, too, an undesirable extension of the powers of the Council, which now became an executive instead of merely an advisory body, and might provoke conflicts between individual governments and the Council. Furthermore, the project superimposed upon a general treaty a system of partial treaties liable to result in the formation of competing groups and the reappearance of that system of alliances and counter-alliances which in the past had proved such a serious menace to the peace of the

[1] Not, however, embodied in the Pact of 1923.

[2] See "Should We Guarantee a European Settlement?" (*Round Table*, vol. xiv. pp. 495–523: June 1924).

[3] Cmd. 2015, Report of British Delegates to the Fourth Assembly; Cmd. 2200, No. 1 (Text of Treaty).

[4] Cmd. 2200, No. 2

[5] *Verbatim Record*, 6th Plenary Meeting.

world. In his Geneva address, Mr. MacDonald reiterated this latter criticism and proceeded to outline his own views as to how security might be achieved. Military alliances were no remedy. A military alliance was like the grain of mustard seed, which might grow to overshadow the whole earth and create the conditions of 1914. No, in general arbitration lay the real solution, and willingness to arbitrate was the effective criterion in assigning responsibility. But the League, if it would have the authority necessary to afford security by this means, must become more inclusive. The adhesion of the threatening, or so-called threatening nations must be secured. Both sides must be there if it would achieve its purpose.

The attitude of the Dominions towards the proposed treaty was also unfavourable. It should be noted that this undertaking, unlike the Tripartite Treaty of 1919, the Cannes project, or the Locarno Agreement, did not include an optional clause exempting the Dominions from its operation, which was doubtless a major factor in determining their reaction to it. In defending this course from criticisms launched by Earl Grey and Viscount Cecil in the Upper House (July 24), Lord Parmoor insisted that since all the Dominions with the exception of Ireland had expressed opposition to it, no other course but rejection was tenable—an assumption to which Lord Cecil demurred.[1] Premier MacDonald laid special emphasis in his letter to the League upon the stand taken by Canada in the matter. The Canadian Government had transmitted its rejection to the League on June 19, and it was this, not any communication to himself, that the Premier cited. Their letter averred that the intention of the Pact was to limit the obligation to render assistance in principle to countries situated in the same part of the globe, and Canada was part of the North American Continent. She was at the same time a nation within the British Empire, and it seemed difficult to devise a scheme giving due effect to these conflicting considerations.[2] Furthermore, it was very unlikely that the Canadian people would, under present circumstances, consent to an agreement binding them to render the assistance contemplated to other nations. This attitude was fairly conclusive, not merely in relation to this proposal, but as a forecast regarding any comprehensive

[1] House of Lords, *Debates*, vol. lviii, cols. 955–1006.
[2] See Article 5 (*b*) of the Draft Treaty.

project for the attainment of a mutual guarantee. The emphasis upon situation in the continent of North America, moreover, was especially significant.

The Fifth Assembly of the League, which sponsored the Protocol, has been termed the most important world gathering of responsible statesmen since the Peace Conference. There were in attendance no fewer than seven Prime Ministers (including those of Britain and France) and sixteen Foreign Secretaries, as well as numerous other Cabinet Ministers.[1] For this reason, and from the tone given to the deliberations by Premier MacDonald's frankness in his initial address, the Assembly more closely resembled a parliament than a diplomatic congress of the old type. The principle that security and disarmament were interdependent had been fixed by the Third Assembly in 1922. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was projected by that of the following year. When this proved unacceptable to the British Government, Mr. Herriot nevertheless had agreed to a liberal policy toward Germany at the London Conference on Reparations on the assurance that the problem of French security would be dealt with by the Fifth Assembly. Aided by the debates in the Assembly, the threshing out of details was undertaken by two committees (on each of which the forty-seven nations participating were represented), the First dealing with legal and constitutional questions, and the Third occupied principally with disarmament. The resultant "Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes" embodied in reality a theory antithetical to that upon which the work of the previous year had been founded. It dealt with arbitration, security and disarmament. The first of these subjects is the key to the other two, for a number of nations proved unwilling to accept a system of international military guarantees without the addition of compulsory arbitration to ensure the limitation of their application to a genuinely aggressor state. The sequel to these efforts was to be an international conference on disarmament in the summer of 1925.[2]

The core of the Protocol, and its most original and constructive

[1] For the first time the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acted as a member of the Council.

[2] See Cmd. 2273, text of the Protocol, resolutions of the Assembly and report of the First and Third Committees; Cmd. 2289, report on the Protocol of British delegates to the Fifth Assembly.

feature, was the definition of the aggressor in an international quarrel set forth in Article 10 of that document.[1] Unless the League Council by unanimous decision should declare otherwise, any state should be presumed to be an aggressor which refused to accept summons to submit the dispute to pacific settlement as provided in the Covenant and Protocol, to abide by the award of the Court or arbitration tribunal or unanimous pronouncement of the Council, or to observe an armistice enjoined by the Council pending its decision as to the aggressor. This for the first time furnished the practical criterion for lack of which proposals to outlaw war as an instrument of policy had thus far come to nothing. The mode of determining aggression was so to speak automatic, and obviously far in advance of the reliance upon political expediency implied in the recourse to an affirmative decision of the Council stipulated in the draft treaty of 1923, an expedient which might deprive an innocent nation of protection through lack of a single vote. Resort to judicial process was further assured by Article 3 of the Protocol, which made it obligatory on signatory states to accept the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court as compulsory in all "justiciable" matters. Furthermore, though questions found by the Court to be domestic were reserved from its competence and from arbitration (Article 5), if the *situation* created by such questions involved a menace of war, it became a matter for mediation or conciliation by the League Council or Assembly.

While aggressive war was thus branded as an international crime, defence as defined by this standard was declared legitimate, nay, further, co-operative defence—the duty of the nations to come to the aid of the victim of aggression—was insisted upon (Articles 11 and 12). Although the inclusiveness of this obligation to co-operate was a cardinal feature of the Protocol, the powers of the Council were limited to suggesting how this might be fulfilled. It was left to the several states to determine in what ways they would assist, with due regard to differences in geographical position and particular situation as regards armaments. Thus the Protocol, as its name implied, was a supplement to the League Covenant. It aimed, by removing ambiguity in a vital

[1] This criterion was adumbrated in a report on limitation of armaments by an American committee of private citizens submitted at the June meeting of the Council, and made a public document of the League; see *International Conciliation*, No. 201 (August 1924), and D. H. Miller, *The Geneva Protocol.*

matter and by reinforcing certain weak points, to put the basic principle of that instrument into effective operation. This is the principle of collective responsibility for the maintenance of world peace, and is fundamentally at variance with that of regional pacts and limited commitments. Hence, although the measures by which the Protocol sought to create that general feeling of security and confidence which is prerequisite to conscientious efforts at disarmament were calculated to render easier the assumption of collective obligation, it encountered on its launching all those obstacles arising both from the tenderness of "national honour" and from suspicion of inclusive, inevitably vague commitments which the original proposal had evoked.

The British nations are represented in the League of their own right by separate delegations, not as in *ad hoc* international congresses by a single Empire Delegation.[1] During the deliberations of the Fifth Assembly and its committees on the Protocol, however, close contact was as usual maintained between them. The report of the British delegates at this session[2] contains numerous references to the procedure followed, which are worth citing as indices of the difficulties facing Imperial co-operation in the League and the ways in which these may be met. In general the report states:

> During the whole period of discussion the British Delegation kept in close touch with the Dominion and Indian delegations, who were consulted on all points of difficulty, and who were given every opportunity of expressing their views. This was done, not only by means of private consultation, but also at fourteen formal meetings of the delegations.[3]

Sir Littleton Groom of Australia was elected Chairman at the first plenary meeting of the First Committee. One of the first difficulties faced in the work of this body was the implication for the Empire in extending the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court to British disputes with neutrals arising from belligerent naval operations.[4] The Dominion and Indian delegations were especially consulted concerning a proposed British reservation in this regard, and undertook to telegraph

[1] Delegates of the Home Government were, however, designated in the official proceedings as representing the "British Empire"; *e.g.* the British representatives on the Fifth Sub-Committee of the First Committee were styled "Mr. John O'Byrne (Irish Free State), Sir Cecil Hurst (British Empire)."

[2] Cmd. 2289.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 10.

[4] *Cf.* New Zealand's objections to the Protocol, *infra.*

their respective governments on the matter. The fundamental problems forming the basis of Articles 1–4 of the Protocol were entrusted to a sub-committee of the First Committee, meeting in secret session, and on which (although " the closest possible touch " was maintained with the other delegations) the only Empire representatives were Sir Cecil Hurst and the Attorney-General of the Free State, who was obliged to return home before the conclusion of its deliberations. Hence the former secured the submission of the sub-committee's discussions to the full Committee, on which the Dominion and Indian delegations were all represented, where they were fully discussed in five public sessions.

A serious question arose in connection with Article 5 of the Protocol, safeguarding matters of domestic jurisdiction.[1] The whole British Empire Delegation held the view that such matters should be referred to the Permanent Court, whose decision should be binding. The Japanese Delegation, however, had advanced first a strong, then a modified provision implying the intervention of the League Council in such cases, and later proposed modifications in the definition of an aggressor state set forth in Article 10, on the plea that it was unjust that a nation, injured by the action of another in a sphere lying within its domestic jurisdiction, should be denied pacific redress by the League and then be branded as an aggressor if it took steps to defend its legitimate interests by force. When the Japanese proposals came up for discussion in plenary session of the First Committee, the British Delegation requested postponement in order to consult with the Dominion and Indian delegations. Three full meetings of all these representatives were held to consider the issue, which so vitally affected the Pacific Dominions, and throughout the ensuing negotiations " the closest co-operation " was maintained. In fact, the report refers continually in this connection to the " opinion of the British Empire Delegation " into which, on this specific problem at least, the separate delegations appear to all intents and purposes to have merged. In view of the reaction later of Australia and New Zealand to the settlement reached, it should be noted that attention was drawn to the difficulty under which several delegates laboured, through inability to consult their governments, and that the delegates of

[1] Cmd. 2289, pp. 18–20; *cf.* objections of Australia and New Zealand, *infra*.

Australia and several other countries stated that although they accepted the text of the arrangement they could not commit the governments in any way.

The reports of the First and Third Committees were submitted to the Assembly of the League and received the assent of every delegation present. Resolutions approving the Protocol and submitting it for acceptance by member governments were also adopted unanimously. Before their departure from Geneva the representatives of France and ten other states signed the Protocol; France also signed the special protocol accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court. Lord Parmoor did not sign the Protocol before leaving, but expressed the hope that the British Government would see the way clear to do so shortly.

The problem of the Protocol was a legacy to the Baldwin Government which called for immediate attention. Postponement of consideration by the Council of the League was requested pending study and consultation with the Dominions,[1] and correspondence with the latter was at once entered into.[2] Efforts were first directed to the convocation of an Imperial Conference in March 1925 for the purpose of reaching a collective decision in the matter.[3] The Premiers of Canada and Australia replied to the Home Government's inquiry in characteristic fashion. The one stressed the desirability of the adoption by the British nations of similar attitudes toward the Protocol; the other, how important it was that the Empire have a single policy and speak with a single voice. Both, however, emphasised the difficulty of arranging for their representation at a conference, and their desire that, if at all practicable, the question should be settled by correspondence. New Zealand and Newfoundland hoped to have spokesmen present; General Hertzog telegraphed that it would be impossible for him or any of his colleagues to attend a conference before the middle of August, and the Irish Free State sent no reply. Accordingly, the Home Government announced that the conference was abandoned and resort must be had to correspondence alone.

[1] Cmd. 2336, p. 14; report of the British Delegate (Mr. Chamberlain) on the 52nd session of the Council.

[2] Cmd. 2458; Protocol . . . correspondence relating to the position of the Dominions.

[3] *Ibid.* No. 2, December 19, 1924.

As regards the Protocol itself, the Canadian Government replied to the effect that they would give wholehearted support to the League in its work on conciliation, co-operation and publicity. They did not, however, " consider it in the interests of Canada, of the British Empire, or of the League itself to recommend to Parliament adherence to the Protocol, and particularly to its rigid provisions for application of economic and military sanctions in every future war." In this conclusion " the effect of non-participation of the United States upon attempts to enforce sanctions and particularly so in the case of contiguous countries like Canada " was an important factor. They were, nevertheless, willing to accept compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court with certain reservations and were ready to participate in any disarmament conference which did not involve prior acceptance of the Protocol.[1]

The immediate reply of the Australian Government advised that the Protocol should not be rejected save for cogent reasons and on the basis of an alternative policy, that they could not allow any abrogation of their rights with regard to immigration, and that it was most essential in formulating the Empire's policy to ascertain the real views of the United States Government on the proposal. This was followed by a lengthy analysis in a telegram of March 5. They now maintained the view that on its adoption the principle of compulsory arbitration would tend to supersede the existing alternative of inquiry by the Council, which offered great advantages in flexibility and adaptation to present public opinion, thus completely altering the method of the Covenant for the settlement of disputes, and transforming the League from what was essentially a moral force into a coercive agency. Since there were grave dangers in a system of compulsory arbitration to which powerful states were not yet parties, and since the burdens of member nations were thereby made relatively heavier than was originally contemplated in the Covenant, the progressive incorporation of these Powers should precede, not follow, the assumption of the additional obligations prescribed by the Protocol. Furthermore, the proviso in Article 10 regarding matters of domestic jurisdiction was unacceptable to the Commonwealth Government. There was no logical justification for putting acts of aggression in that regard on a special footing, nor was it

[1] Cmd. 2458, No. 11 (March 4, 195).

conducive to international goodwill. Moreover, to enforce an armistice enjoined by the Council the League must have organic control on the spot, which would present exceptional if not insuperable difficulties in a remote theatre of operations. Hence the Protocol embodied principles and provisions inapplicable to the existing circumstances of international life, nor could mere amendments remove the objections to it. Efforts would be better directed to gradually strengthening the weak points of the Covenant rather than to recasting the essential principle on which it was founded.[1]

While stating that he must largely be guided by the Home Government in his final decision, the Prime Minister of New Zealand expressed the opinion that the whole proposal was mischievous. Detailed criticism was offered in an emphatic memorandum of January 6.[2] He took strong exception, in the first place, to the precipitancy with which the proposal, involving as it did "matters of substantive, singular and almost unexampled importance," had been submitted. New Zealand would never consent to be bound by the Protocol in its present form, and he believed that the whole Empire would be endangered if the signature of Great Britain were appended to such a document. He did not believe, however, that there was such urgency as to preclude the withholding of a final decision until a conference and adequate consultation with the Dominions could be arranged. More specifically, Mr. Massey registered strong objection to accepting the determination of the Permanent Court as to what constituted a matter of domestic jurisdiction. They were unwilling to submit the New Zealand immigration law to such a hazard. More alarming still was the admission of the Court as the deciding factor in Britain's belligerent rights at sea. Such questions would be raised by neutrals, not by belligerents under League auspices, hence acceptance of the Protocol was tantamount to the surrender of privileges essential to the defence of the Empire. Furthermore, while the Protocol implied an undesirable enhancement of the power and authority of the League Council, it weakened Articles 8 and 10 of the Covenant, in that it was devoid of any provision entitling a nation not itself attacked to come to the aid of a friendly nation which was the victim of aggression, save through the dilatory process of

[1] Cmd. 2458, Nos. 5 and 12. [2] *Ibid.* No. 8.

authorisation by the Council. Finally, asserted the Premier, it was no exaggeration to state that all the objections which the late Government of Britain had advanced against the Treaty of Mutual Assistance were equally applicable to the terms and effect of the Protocol, in fact paraphrased the objections of New Zealand to the latter document.

The reaction of the South African Government was also unfavourable.[1] In declining to accept the Protocol or recommend it to Parliament they urged that it would render more difficult the adhesion of the League to countries at present standing aloof, notably America, whose co-operation was essential if it were to attain its real object, and consequently would enhance the contrary tendency to make of the League a mere political alliance seeking to maintain a balance of power. It was impossible even approximately to calculate the obligations direct and indirect and the international complications which might accrue from acceptance of the Protocol; no nation adhering to it, however, could rightly be said to retain its full measure of sovereign rights, which was a matter of grave concern to the weaker nations, in that they could not give weight to their own interpretations of the obligations assumed. Although public feeling in the Union strongly favoured a "genuine League of Nations," the peculiar position and interests of South Africa demanded that they assume no international obligations "which may entail a participation and interference by the Union in matters which do not, or only remotely, concern her, and whereby her real and proper interests may eventually be jeopardised." Moreover, it did not appear that any amendment or substitute to the provisions of the Protocol would be acceptable unless it involved an expansion of the obligations and responsibilities of the Covenant which they were unwilling to accept. Hence the Government had no suggestions to offer.

Supported by such expressions of opinion from four of them which had by that time responded,[2] the Home Government, on March 3, despatched telegrams to all the Dominions, announcing that as a statement could no longer be withheld they were about to reject the Protocol, and the text of the proposed announcement

[1] Cmd. 2458, No. 7.

[2] The Government of Newfoundland was consulted concerning the Imperial Conference but not, of course, in regard to acceptance of the Protocol.

by Mr. Chamberlain to this effect was forwarded to them on the following day. Within a week replies endorsing the statement were received from Canada, New Zealand and Australia. It was then enunciated formally to the Council of the League on March 12. The Government of the Irish Free State had meanwhile refrained from participation in these interchanges, but on May 13 the Minister of External Affairs made a statement in the *Dail* upon their attitude to the Protocol, which was officially transmitted to the Colonial Secretary five weeks later, and by him circulated to the other Dominions.[1]

The reaction of the Free State Government to the Protocol reflected domestic conditions as strongly as did those of the other parts of the Empire. Adopting, like South Africa, the standpoint of a small nation obviously interested in the maintenance of world peace, they criticised first of all the League organisation itself, as suffering in prestige among the smaller nations owing to the preponderance of the Great Powers in its deliberations, and as enjoining sanctions which, although they might be enforced against a relatively small state bent on aggrandisement, would prove unworkable if invoked to restrain oppression by a larger Power or to prevent a war of world magnitude. The provisions regarding sanctions, calculated as they were to maintain rather than to reduce armaments, were among the least valuable parts of the Covenant, and the extension of these principles contemplated by the Protocol was the least profitable avenue of exploration towards improvement. In any case the Irish Free State, because of its geographical position, the reduction of its armed forces to a minimum, and the clause in its constitution requiring parliamentary consent to participation in war, could not be regarded as a material factor in the enforcement of sanctions. The avowed intention to exclude from the new method of pacific settlement all disputes arising from existing territorial delimitations also detracted seriously from the efficacy of the Protocol, and to insistence upon this principle might be attributed much of that unwillingness on the part of certain powerful states to participate in League deliberations which so contributed to the persistence of international uneasiness and distrust. Their suggestion was that the road to world peace should not be sought in an endeavour to close some fissures in the Covenant by

[1] Cmd. 2458, No. 16.

elaborate definition or drastic sanction, but rather " in an effort to enhance the moral influence of international conscience."

The point of view of the Government of India was briefly expressed in a letter from the India Office to the Secretary-General of the League on August 5, 1925.[1] This announced the conclusion that the Protocol would be inimical to the interests of India in that her " geographical position and particular situation as regards armaments " would " mark her down as a nation on which the League, under the Protocol, would ordinarily call to apply immediate sanctions against a recalcitrant state in the East." This would lay upon her a burden heavier than she could bear, and might subject one or other of her many communities and religions " to a strain to which it would be improper to subject them."

Thus the Dominions assigned various, even conflicting, reasons for their rejection of the Protocol, and revealed that in the various parts of the Empire different considerations dominated. Canada showed in this regard an adhesion to " Continentalism," a willingness to follow the lead of the United States.[2] Australia and New Zealand feared that their peculiar interests were insufficiently safeguarded by the provisions dealing with matters of domestic jurisdiction in the Protocol. The Irish Free State, on the contrary, deemed these provisions too inclusive in a certain respect, and stressed dissatisfaction with existing territorial settlements. The Dominions all agreed, however, in reprobating the assumption of any additional obligations under the League, any commitment to act in certain eventualities, in fact what seems originally to have been understood in most quarters as the basic principle of the Covenant itself. For this reason they did not dwell on the respective merits of regional pacts as against an all-inclusive mutual guarantee. Their general attitude of aloofness lent strong support to the policies of the Baldwin Government as expressed in the Locarno Pact, from the obligations of which, be it remembered, the Dominions were expressly exempted.

The Council of the League met for its thirty-third session at Geneva on March 9. On the 12th the British delegate, Mr. Chamberlain, read his statement of the views of the British Government on the Protocol.[3] The purport of this was the

[1] Cmd. 2492. [2] See *infra*, ch xi. [3] Cmd. 2368.

repudiation, with the consent of the Dominion governments, of the project for which his predecessor in office was perhaps more than anyone else responsible. Commencing with a vigorous defence of the rôle heretofore played by Britain in the search for world peace, and a perhaps less convincing declaration of sympathy with the objects which the Protocol purported to attain, the Foreign Secretary proceeded to consider *seriatim* their principal criticisms of the proposal. Objections to compulsory arbitration, he held, had been increased rather than diminished by those reservations in Article 15 of the Covenant which were designed to prevent interference by the League in matters of domestic jurisdiction. As regarded the enhancement of responsibilities of member states, the changes effected by the Protocol, far from being formal rather than substantial, were calculated enormously to increase the problems entailed in the application of sanctions, and the occasions when these should become an issue. The non-inclusion of certain powerful states, notably America, had made of the League a very different organisation from that contemplated by its framers, and transformed the situation in regard to the application of (especially) economic sanctions.

The provisions in Articles 7 and 8 of the Protocol, designed to maintain the *status quo* militarily between the outbreak of a dispute and its adjudication, were more likely to embarrass the victim than the aggressor, who would have made his preparations before forcing the issue. These articles raised even more embarrassing problems when applied to the case of forces at sea. Since the whole value of a fleet depends on its mobility, and its distribution is quite different in time of peace from that under threat of war, to enjoin immobility upon it directly a dispute arose was "asking the threatened state to make a surrender of its inalienable right of self-defence, to which it is never likely to submit." A further objection to these clauses was their obscurity, the impossibility of distinguishing by paper definition military movements genuinely intended for defence and those with some ulterior aggressive purpose. Article 15, which charged the aggressor with the full cost of the war he caused and at the same time guaranteed his frontiers from alteration and his internal affairs from interference, was also objectionable.[1] The former provision was too rigid and the latter inequitable.

[1] But compare Article 10 of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

To his specific criticisms Mr. Chamberlain added this more general arraignment :

> The Protocol purports to be little more than a completion of the work begun but not perfected by the authors of the Covenant, but surely this is a very inadequate description of its effects. The additions which it makes to the original document do something quite different from merely clarifying obscurities and filling in omissions. They destroy its balance and alter its spirit. The fresh emphasis laid upon sanctions ; the new occasions discovered for their employment, the elaboration of military procedure, insensibly suggest the idea that the vital business of the League is not so much to promote friendly co-operation and reasoned harmony in the management of international affairs, as to preserve peace by organising war, and (it may be) war on the largest scale.

Although war conducted by, and with the approval of, members of the League might become a tragic necessity, brooding over such an eventuality was more likely to hasten than hinder it. Would not these objections to the Protocol be outweighed by the blessings of disarmament sure to follow its adoption ? He felt no such assurance. Doubtless the Covenant, if kept, afforded ample security. But the fear that in a crisis it would not be kept, that brute force was the ultimate reliance, still remained to militate against disarmament, and he did not see how this situation was bettered by the Protocol. It was in fact aggravated as regards aggressors outside the League. Those within it were accounted traitors before mankind, the others were not. Though refusing its jurisdiction, their specific cause might be just, yet the machinery of the League would be invoked against them, and the Protocol, an instrument of peace, might serve only to extend the area of war.

In anticipation of the obvious rejoinder that those who denounced the Protocol were bound to advance a better plan, the Foreign Secretary adumbrated the measures which his Government were about to take :

> To this challenge His Majesty's Government might be content to reply that as between the Covenant unamended and the Covenant amended by the Protocol they have already given reasons for preferring the former. But they are unwilling to conclude their argument on a purely critical note ; and though they cannot believe that " security " can be reached by the route so carefully explored by the First and Third Committees of the League in 1924, they are willing to consider whether some approach to it may not be made from the side unsuccessfully attempted in 1923.

All sanctions depended on treaties, and there was no recourse but to reliance on the plighted word. It was futile to amplify the machinery of the Covenant with a view to preserving peace in all conceivable cases—the Protocol did not give security, it multiplied offences but did not strengthen remedies. Yet the sanctions in the Covenant could with advantage be supplemented in certain cases for certain purposes. The resort of his Government, therefore, would be to regional pacts :

> Since the general provisions of the Covenant cannot be stiffened with advantage, and since the " extreme cases " with which the League may have to deal will probably affect certain nations or groups of nations more nearly than others, His Majesty's Government conclude that the best way of dealing with the situation is, with the co-operation of the League, to supplement the Covenant by making special arrangements in order to meet special needs. That these arrangements should be purely defensive in character, that they should be framed in the spirit of the Covenant, working in close harmony with the League and under its guidance, is manifest. And in the opinion of His Majesty's Government these objects can best be attained by knitting together the nations most immediately concerned, and whose differences might lead to a renewal of strife, by means of treaties framed with the sole object of maintaining as between themselves an unbroken peace. Within its limits no quicker remedy for our present ills can easily be found, nor any surer safeguard against future calamities.

In conclusion Mr. Chamberlain announced that the Dominions with which they had been in telegraphic communication concurred in the rejection of the Protocol, and would, as they saw fit, make their views known to the League.

On April 10 Mr. Ramsay MacDonald made a spirited rejoinder to the Foreign Secretary's pronouncement [1] which concluded with this asseveration : " The moral leadership of Europe was a great asset for us to possess. Mr. Chamberlain's speech has wantonly thrown it away." The late Premier and Foreign Secretary denounced the partisanship, cynicism, short-sightedness and lack of faith with which their successors had first determined to repudiate the Labour Government's work and then studied it to find reasons for their action. He denied *in toto* the contentions upon which Mr. Chamberlain had claimed to act, and in trenchant phrases drew a comparison between Protocol and Pact highly detrimental to the latter. Pacts were essentially

[1] From text reprinted in *International Conciliation*, No. 212 (September 1925).

military pacts, postulated on brute force and the myth of military security. But pacts breed counter-pacts and by their ramifications among non-member nations might create another Serajevo episode. They dealt with war under certain circumstances, not with war itself; they represented pigeon-holed agreements liable to be repudiated by succeeding governments, not a living system which could become part of the moral standards of the world and create new habits of honour among the nations. They implied the right of mutual interference in military policy to see that the agreement was lived up to, and a mutual guarantee of good behaviour. They involved either the surrender of a nation's judgment as to which was the guilty party and the use of its forces perhaps against its will, or else the reservation of liberty in these respects, which made the agreement so much waste paper. In contrast the Protocol, for the first time in the history of international policy, embodied the idea of national security of a general kind, struck at war as a method of settling grievances, and substituted a peace system by international compact. It brought into diplomacy a new moral obligation, inculcated new habits of negotiation, and gave a security immeasurably greater than that of any pact:

> The effect of the Protocol would be of exactly the same kind as the withdrawal of the power of life and death from territorial magnates, and within a few years of its acceptance a nation determined upon war would be regarded in the same way as a Lord of the Manor would now be if he meditated the murder of one of his dependents.

Much emphasis had been laid upon the multiplication of obligations and sanctions in the Protocol. This was erroneous. He had never regarded the sanctions as of importance, for "the new order of the Protocol will be its own sanctions"—a conception difficult for the old order of politicians to grasp. Dealing with increased obligations, Mr. MacDonald incidentally pointed out the fundamental reason for the transformation which the original League had undergone. He said:

> As a matter of fact there is no responsibility imposed by the Protocol which is not specifically or by implication contained in the Covenant, and no nation which has signed the Covenant can object to the Protocol unless it means that the indefinite parts of the Covenant are to be taken advantage of for the purpose of shirking obligations. . . . The Covenant means obligation; when we ratified it I must assume that

we knew what we were doing. On such assumptions Mr. Chamberlain's contention that to any substantial extent the Protocol puts new burdens upon us is false. His objections to the Protocol are objections to the Covenant.

As for the allegation that the Protocol stereotyped the boundaries fixed by the Treaty of Versailles, it did nothing of the kind. It did not affect the provisions in the Covenant enabling such questions to be reopened, in fact the security it gave would probably make justice in this respect easier, while a pact would increase the difficulty. These objections went to the root of the Protocol. They constituted a declaration that the Tory Government declined to end war by arbitration, saw no alternative to war, had itself no proposals to offer, and declined to support those offered by others. Moreover in declaring its distrust of arbitration it impeached the good faith of other nations. There was, too, a touch of insincerity in all its protesting against military sanctions, because they now knew that the Government wished to substitute for the Protocol a purely military agreement plainly based on brute force. He summed up with the following comment on the opposition which the foreign policies of the Labour Party had encountered :

> It is precisely the kind of opposition that every reformer and pioneer, proved by time to have been right because he had a grip on realities, had to meet when he began his work- the opposition which comes from the faithless belief that there can be nothing new under the sun, and that to trust to honour, common sense, and decent qualities is weakness.

The debate in the British House (March 24) upon the Government's rejection of the Protocol rang changes upon the opposing arguments just cited.[1] Mr. Henderson led off for the Labourites. He denounced the condemnation of the Protocol without a hearing in Parliament and the return to the discredited and dangerous policy of separate and limited alliances and undertakings, aimed to meet the immediate needs of Great Britain rather than to avoid war in all circumstances. The objection that the Protocol would make the British Navy the tool of a non-British body was unfounded since the extent to which their forces should be called upon was solely a matter for their own Government to determine. Mr. Chamberlain answered that the late Government's policy

[1] *Journal*, vol. vi. pp. 201–213.

of superseding regional agreements by a vast scheme of international insurance had never been that of the governments with which they were dealing. Moreover the Protocol was framed with a view to the special needs of states with land forces and land frontiers. It was not with the objects but with the effects of the Protocol that they found fault; the Dominions were with them in their stand; the United States, too, would probably view it as a possible incentive to rather than security against war. They could not accept the universal extension of obligations of so serious a nature, but it was their hope that by stabilising the western frontiers they would promote security in the east as well. Recent German overtures looking to the voluntary guarantee of what had hitherto been accepted under the compulsion of the Versailles Treaty promised a most helpful basis of discussion, and the essence of such a settlement was the entry of Germany into the League.

Among the other participants in the discussion, the Marquis of Hartington (Unionist) regretted the Foreign Secretary's uncompromising attitude and his achievement of a position of not splendid isolation, but hoped that the Pact could be so extended to other Powers as to become all-embracing. Mr. Lloyd George joined in the appeal not to turn down the principle of arbitration, but pronounced the eastern frontiers a serious menace uncared for by the Protocol. The latter he dismissed as "a booby trap for Great Britain baited with arbitration." Mr. MacDonald enlarged upon the advantages of the living, inclusive principle of the Protocol over that of the Pact, and appealed to the Government not to bang the door against arbitration. Mr. Dalton (Labour) claimed that Mr. Chamberlain's contention at Geneva regarding questions of domestic jurisdiction directly contradicted the opinion rendered by Sir Cecil Hurst during the debates in the Assembly to the effect that Dominion control in this regard was in no way weakened by the Protocol. In his own opinion their control over immigration was in fact strengthened, since they could now invoke a decision on the basis of international law, in which no right was more clearly recognised than this. Mr. H. A. L. Fisher expressed regret that the Government had not seen fit to follow Canada's lead in adopting a sympathetic attitude towards accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court and towards improving the provisions dealing

with non-justiciable disputes. Premier Baldwin emphasised the Government's efforts to secure personal consultation with the Dominions in view of the further developments which they anticipated.

The Dominions, the League, and the Protocol

The reactions of the Dominions to the Protocol directly reflect their general attitude toward the League of Nations, which had undergone considerable clarification and modification since the establishment of that institution, and should be considered in the light of it. In the case of Canada this is especially important, for her attitude to the League reveals, more than ever any other aspect of her external relations, the effects of " Continentalism." By this is meant a point of view which emphasises the supposed solidarity and distinctness of American interests in relation to the rest of the world, especially Europe, and displays, if not a pronounced willingness to follow the lead of the United States in the formulation of policies in this regard, at least a striking similarity in standpoint to that of her overshadowing neighbour. More will be said of this later; as yet, however, its implications for Canada and the Empire do not seem to be recognised as a problem worthy of serious consideration. The more conservative, cautious attitude of the older Liberals toward the League was exemplified by Hon. W. S. Fielding, when he evinced the apprehension that a separate existence for the Dominions in the League would militate against Imperial unity, would mean airing their internal differences before the world for the delectation of their enemies, and urged that, although Canada should always be represented by Canadians, Dominion spokesmen should always be representatives of the Empire as well, and should go into conference with other nations as a unit.[1] But this point of view had passed with the elder statesmen and with the earlier views of the rôle which the League was to fill, and a more Nationalistic attitude now characterised all parties.

There were, of course, general expressions of satisfaction at the part taken by Canadian delegates in the work of the Assembly, at chairmanships and places on important committees offered them, especially at the election of Senator Dandurand to the

[1] During the debate on the Address (March 3, 1921); *Journal*, vol. ii. p. 325.

Presidency of the Sixth Assembly.[1] More or less definite views both as to the rôle which the League should fill and regarding Canada's relation to its activities, however, early took shape. A not unimportant index of the trend of attitude was opposition led by Canada to the proposal originating with Italy and Switzerland in the Second Assembly (1920) for an examination of the problem of monopolies in and the equitable distribution among the nations of raw materials. Great Britain in the Council had consented to such an inquiry, but the Canadian stand was supported by the other Dominions and India.[2] There was also Mr. Rowell's opposition in 1921 to plans for the organisation of the League Commissions on Finance, Health and Transportation on the grounds that they tended to remove these bodies from the control of the Assembly to that of the Council dominated by the Great Powers, and that, as this was ostensibly a world not a European League, the fact that nations on the spot would tend to control these bureaux was inimical to more distant countries. The League should confine its activities to its primary function, the prevention of war.[3]

Although Canada claimed equality with Great Britain, a first-class Power, at international conferences, she did not do so in the matter of contributions to the support of the League, and led the agitation of the Dominions for a readjustment of the ratings within the Empire in this regard. It was during a debate in Supply on this item[4] that Mr. Lapointe joined Mr. Rowell in the contention (apropos of the Barcelona Conference) that none of the money contributed by Canada to the League should go to defray the expenses of the technical and other Commissions, in the proceedings of which they had no share and on which they were not represented. The principle of no taxation without representation, said Mr. Lapointe, applied to the League of Nations as to any other constitutional body. Mr. Woodsworth (Labour) from time to time voiced apprehensions that the League would become merely a union of victors, that as at present constituted it offered little guarantee of peace, but to be effective must be dissociated from the iniquitous Versailles Treaty and enlarged to include all nations, and that

[1] *Journal*, vol. vii. p. 88 (Governor-General's Speech).
[2] *Ibid.* vol. ii. pp. 308–309.
[3] *Canadian Annual Review* (1921), p. 84.
[4] *Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 789–796 (April 20, 1921).

under Article 10 of the Covenant they in Canada could not escape from their responsibilities and were obliged to maintain an impossible position.[1] He was insistent, however, against warnings that provincial rights were involved, that the eight-hour-day and similar labour conventions should be adopted as corollaries of the Peace Treaty.[2]

The debate on the Permanent Court of International Justice Act (April 14 and 28, 1921)[3] evoked discussion of various points from time to time mooted but all sooner or later decided upon Nationalistic lines, such as the power of delegates to the League Assembly to bind their governments, the question as to whether His Majesty in Canadian matters acted upon the advice of the British Cabinet or solely upon that of his Canadian Ministers, and the effect of Canadian refusal to ratify the Protocol creating the Court. Hon. C. J. Doherty, in charge of the Bill, noted that so many delegates had favoured compulsory jurisdiction that an optional clause providing for this had been inserted in the Protocol (Article 36, section 2). As regards Canada, however, he maintained that they should see what other states accepted this before doing so themselves—a stand which evoked no criticism. The chief point of interest in the discussion lies in an expression of the extreme Nationalist viewpoint by Mr. Cannon. Defending Isolationism on the grounds of Colonial status and affinity to the United States, he argued that Canada should have nothing to do with the Court, that:

> They were, as a Dominion, part of the British Empire, and the British Empire as a whole, that was Great Britain and the Dominions overseas, was a single nation so far as the other nations of the world were concerned. Therefore they could not be interested in any international problem submitted to this Court, and if they were not interested, why should they elect one of the judges of the Tribunal? He thought the people of Canada had had enough of their interference in European problems. Canada was an American country; should Canada take part in the decision of European problems when their all-powerful neighbour to the south refused to do so? They had enough of their own domestic problems, and enough Imperial problems, without poking their noses into matters with which they had absolutely nothing to do.

As time passed and the former argument lost its validity, it

[1] E.g. *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 820; vol. vi. p. 752.
[2] *Ibid.* vol. vi. pp. 78, 737–738.
[3] *Ibid.* vol. ii. pp. 797–805

dropped from Nationalist briefs, and main reliance was placed upon presumed lack of interest in the affairs of Europe.

The most significant indication of Canada's attitude, however, not merely to the League, but to world politics in general, was the fact that she took the initiative among the nations in urging the amendment of Article 10 of the Covenant.[1] In answer to a question in the House on April 20, 1921, the then Minister of Justice, Mr. Doherty, categorically denied that making the League more palatable to the United States formed any part of their motive in advancing the proposal. He pointed out that they had opposed the insertion of this provision in the Covenant at Paris, and had come within an ace of succeeding.[2] Whether in this move Canada took her cue from the United States, or whether it resulted merely from a coincidence of attitude due to similarity of situation in relation to world politics, is after all a secondary consideration. The manifestation of Continentalism is the important factor as regards Imperial relations.

During the debate on the Versailles Treaty the Liberal Opposition had offered a reservation to the implications of Article 10, but it was rejected by the Government. At a meeting of the League in December, 1920, Mr. Doherty for the Canadian Government moved to strike the Article from the Covenant, and as League procedure required, the proposal was referred to a special Commission of the Council for consideration and report to the next Assembly. The matter was put over, however, and in the Third Assembly Mr. Lapointe (representing Liberal policies) pressed, not for the entire elimination of the provision, but for its interpretation and amendment. Their proposal was to add to the clause of Article 10 empowering the Council to advise concerning means of fulfilling obligations under the Covenant the proviso ". . . taking into account the political and geographical circumstances of each state," and to append the following new paragraph :

The opinion given by the Council in such cases shall be regarded as a matter of the highest importance, and shall be taken into consideration by all the members of the League, which shall use their utmost endeavours to conform to the conclusions of the Council, but no member shall be under the obligation to engage in any act

[1] See report of British delegates to the Fourth Assembly, Cmd. 2015, pp. 5–8.

[2] *Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 794–795.

of war without the consent of its parliament, legislature or other representative body.[1]

In substance this amendment is virtually identical with the United States' reservation to the Article. The Canadian Delegation on this attempt secured the passage of a resolution calling for thorough study of the problem in the interim under the auspices of the Council and its reference to the Fourth Assembly.

Replies of the member states to the request for expressions of opinion on the amendment showed differences of opinion, but a preponderance of opposition to weakening or tampering with so important an Article. Favourable responses were based on the grounds that it merely clarified what was already implicit in the text or that such clarification was desirable. Discussion in the Fourth Assembly (1923) was at first deferred pending the opinion of the Third Committee which was dealing with the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, but Sir Lomer Gouin pressed for a decision, expressing his preference for the amendment, but also his willingness to accept an interpretative resolution instead. The latter was favoured by the British Government and in general by the Third Committee. Accordingly, by a vote of twenty-six to four, the adoption of the following pronouncement was recommended to the Assembly :

> It is in conformity with the spirit of Article 10 that in the event of the Council considering it to be its duty to recommend the application of military measures in consequence of an aggressor or danger or threat of aggression, the Council shall be bound to take account, more particularly, of the geographic situation and the special conditions of each state.
>
> It is for the constitutional authorities of each member to decide, in reference to the obligations of preserving the independence and integrity of the territory of members, in what degree the member is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces.
>
> The recommendation made by the Council shall be regarded as being of the highest importance and shall be taken into consideration by all the members of the League with the desire to execute their engagements in good faith.[2]

The report of the British delegates to the Fourth Assembly contains this comment on the above resolution :

> The third paragraph of this text was originally drafted in the following form : " It is, however, the function of the constitutional

[1] Cmd. 2015, p. 6. [2] *Ibid.* p. 7.

organs of each member to decide *whether the circumstances do give rise to* the obligation of preserving the independence and the integrity of the territory of members, *and* in what degree the member is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces." This draft appeared to us, as it did to certain other delegations, to show a dangerous tendency towards lessening the force of the obligations imposed by Article 10 by allowing of discretion on the part of individual governments, not only as to the action to be taken to carry out their obligations, but as to the actual existence of an obligation in any particular case. We, therefore, proposed the amended form shown above, which met with widespread acceptance and was not opposed by the Canadian Delegation.[1]

The essential difference between the amendment to Article 10 offered by Canada and the modified interpretative resolution was that the former placed the responsibility of determining obligations squarely with the member governments and parliaments, whereas the latter vested it still in the Council, though laying down what was in effect a guiding principle to determine the recommendations of that body. In the judgment of a commentator in *The Round Table*[2] the latter compromise is less desirable in that the sole discretion it leaves with national parliaments is that of honouring or refusing to honour the obligations laid upon them by the Council. " It is indeed evident," he says, " that the amended formula embodies, as amended formulæ often do, not a clear interpretation of a doubtful point, but a compromise between two incompatible interpretations." It is of course obvious that the burden of proof, so to speak, in justifying a course taken lies very differently upon the member governments under the two propositions, and that the amended formula was preferred as the one better calculated to evoke concerted (if not always wholehearted) action by the League. The writer cited proceeds to express his regret that the original Canadian amendment was not supported by the whole Empire Delegation, in view of its significance as manifesting democratic insistence in the Outer Empire on parliamentary and popular control over national commitments. The present writer submits that this was, in the case of Canada just as in that of the United States, not a manifestation of democratic sentiment, but merely the formula chosen to proclaim the Isolationist viewpoint,[3] which

[1] *Loc. cit.*
[2] " Should We Guarantee a European Settlement ? " vol. xiv. pp. 507–508.
[3] *Cf.* comment on Canadian Government's reply to Chanak appeal, *supra.*

puts the action of the other Empire delegates in a different light.

Be all this as it may, the Canadian attitude to League obligations was clear enough. The amended resolution was supported in the Assembly by the other British delegations, and by France. It was, however, vehemently opposed by Panama and Persia. When the proposition came to a vote, of forty-three states represented, twenty-nine signified acceptance, Panama and twelve others abstained from voting, and the Persian delegate, on categorical instructions from his government, recorded his dissent. Unanimity being required, the resolution failed of binding effect, but commentators agree that its influence upon the conduct of member nations will nevertheless be potent. An analysis of the opposition is revealing. The status of Persia is obvious; of the thirteen abstentions, five are states which like Canada lie within the inner orbit of the Monroe Doctrine, but which unlike Canada are inconspicuous and outside the Empire.[1] The others (save Liberia) are medium or small "buffer states."[2] To these fourteen nations the vitality of Article 10 meant essential protection; to Canada, reclining upon satisfactory relations with the United States on the one hand and membership in the Empire on the other, it meant liability to gratuitous obligation.

Since this episode, Article 10 has caused but slight comment on the part of Canadian public men. Commenting on this decision, Mr. C. G. Power, representing the extreme Nationalist wing, argued that Canada should withdraw from the League, for if Articles 10 and 16 meant anything, they bound her to engage in war without consulting Parliament, hence she had no business in the League. If they did not, the League sank to a mere debating society, for attendance at which they could not spare their best men every year.[3] Later, in warning against accepting the real obligations of the Locarno Pact, Mr. Bourassa argued that the broad and vague obligation in Article 10 had now in practice been discarded by the Dominions, in virtue of the protests registered successively by Sir Robert Borden and Mr. Doherty (Conservatives), then by Sir Lomer Gouin and Mr. Lapointe (Liberals),

[1] Columbia, Costa Rica, Hayti, Panama, Venezuela; in a sense also Liberia.

[2] Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Esthonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Siam.

[3] *Journal*, vol. iv. pp. 822–823 (June 15, 1923).

and finally by the resolution which all but passed the Fourth Assembly.[1]

In the light of such a background of opinion towards the League of Nations, the reply of the Canadian Government to the request from Downing Street for an expression of their views upon the Geneva Protocol is not surprising. Their official rejection was transmitted by Premier King to the Secretary-General of the League on March 9, 1925, and was identical in substance with the despatch to the Home Government.[2] This decision was made on the sole responsibility of the Government, not by authorisation of Parliament, in fact during the debate on the Address a month previously the Premier had defended the omission of any reference to the Protocol in the Governor-General's speech and gave no inkling of his attitude on the question. The criticism had been voiced by Mr. Meighen, who apparently feared acceptance of the Protocol without reference to Parliament, for he went on to state his own view as follows :

> I do not think that we have yet arrived at the time by many years when the League of Nations, of which I am a sincere supporter, can become anything in the nature of a superstate or other than a new and better method of conducting international affairs ; and I think it would be a very grave step on the part of this country so to contribute its own view as virtually to advise Great Britain to underwrite the security of the world.[3]

On March 12 the Premier brought down the papers and made a statement upon their decision, which, since it conformed to the views of the Leader of the Opposition, provoked little comment beyond Mr. Meighen's reference to the discrepancy between this attitude and that of their delegates in the Assembly. This criticism was dismissed by the Minister of Justice with the explanation that the latter had merely adopted a resolution of submission to the governments and had no power to commit Canada. The Minister of Defence in the House and the Leader of the Senate, who had represented Canada at Geneva and the latter of whom had there made a brilliant speech in support of the Protocol, endorsed this explanation.[4] On a later occasion

[1] *Journal*, vol. vii. p. 539 (June 21, 1926).
[2] *Ibid.* vol. vi. p. 317.
[3] *Ibid.* pp. 304–306.
[4] *Ibid.* pp. 316–318, p. 312. Senator Dandurand served on the First and Fifth Committees of the Assembly and Hon. E. M. Macdonald on the Third and Sixth.

Mr. Woodsworth, representing Labour, stated that although the Protocol was fostered and put before the world by the Labour Premier of Britain, he felt that they in Canada would not endorse it, and was glad that the Government had not asked them to do so.[1]

In the Senate, however, the veteran Sir George Foster voiced an emphatic defence of the Protocol.[2] He accused the Government which was so vociferously opposed to committing the country to war without consent of Parliament of having done something perhaps worse, of having without reference to Parliament involved Canada in weakening, it might be in striking down, what so many peoples of the world after long strivings had come to consider as the high water-mark in the assurance of peace. Since Parliament had been in session for more than a month would it not have been more in accordance with constitutional procedure and democratic principles to have given some information and held some consultation as to what stand Canada should take? He went on to explain the aims and implications of the Protocol, maintaining that it did not presume to supersede the Covenant, added little if anything to the obligations already assumed under that instrument and nothing at all to the series of sanctions it provided. He emphasised the contention that the Council of the League could merely make recommendations, while the member governments retained the right of determining action to be taken. The fact that Great Britain was herself a member of the Council refuted the argument that she as the naval Power would be called upon to do all the policing, to the neglect of her proper duty of Imperial defence. Apprehensions regarding their control of immigration were unfounded, for the right of the several nations in this matter was the clearest of all tenets of international law.

He proceeded to offer a succinct statement of the Co-operationist argument, of that positive Nationalism which had superseded the older Imperialist stand:

> Then comes the Empire side of the matter. Here we are, outside Dominions and a Mother Country. Will this Protocol, if it is established and becomes workable, help in keeping and making firmer those relations that exist between us, or will it have the effect of disturbing these relations and weakening them and maybe of destroying

[1] *Journal*, vol. vi. pp. 722–723.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 318–322.

them? Let us carefully look at that question. We Overseas Dominions have been members of the League of Nations for five years. We have had upon us all those obligations for five years, just as Great Britain has. At any time within those five years, if sanctions had been called for, we should have had to have taken all responsibilities. And why should we not? Does Canada have great aspirations to wear a national name and pride herself on her independence in all affairs, and her status as a nation, and does she propose to have it all without any obligation? If she is going to be a nation, she must grow to a nation's stature and take her responsibilities as a nation.

Sir George followed up this line of argument by emphasising certain considerations which were sedulously avoided by the exponents of the Isolationist, negatively Nationalist, viewpoint. Was, or was not the Protocol to the advantage of Canada, he asked:

In any disputes that might arise between her and the United States, was Canada looking forward to having full liberty to watch over and settle the matter by war? If she had trouble with Japan, was she anxious to keep herself free to fight out the issue? Or if with the Esquimaux to the far north, did she want to keep herself free to march her army north? Canada had everything to lose by aggressive warfare and everything to gain by its being banned from the surface of the earth. Without the Protocol and without the Covenant, in a dispute between herself and the United States, or a dispute with Japan, she would have to depend on herself. If she still remained British she would get some advantage and help from the British power; but outside she would not have the help of the world of nations. Under the Protocol in any aggressive warfare made by any other country in the world on Canada, the world of the League of Nations would be loyally co-operating in her defence and in her support. Canada would have nothing to fear, in the first place, by a declaration against aggressive war, and in the second place, a declaration in favour of settling disputes by arbitrations and peaceful means. What other method was there so reasonable?

Despite this fervent attempt to stem the tide, it would nevertheless seem that the stand taken by their Government on the Protocol was more consistent with the trend of developments since the Versailles Treaty, and more accurately reflected the general sentiments of Canada toward foreign commitments at this time.

The problem of the Pacific had by no means been solved by the Versailles and Washington settlements. The League Covenant and its corollary, the Geneva Protocol, and to an extent also the

Washington Four-Power Treaty, represent a new philosophy of international relations, but a philosophy which had not as yet attained general acceptance and to which many of its professed adherents rendered only lip-service. Many, perhaps most, of the sincerest well-wishers of the League among practical men of affairs felt at the bottom of their hearts, and when the moment for decision came demonstrated their belief, that after all a balance of power in one's favour affords real security, whatever else may be superadded by the adoption of more idealistic expedients. It is this which gives to statements based upon so-called pre-War assumptions in international relations their representative character. In an address to the Royal Colonial Institute (May 13, 1924) Sir Hugh Denison gave a notably frank analysis of the apprehensions which still weighed upon Australia and New Zealand.[1] Under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he reminded them, Britain had virtually withdrawn her Far Eastern naval forces and left to Japan the responsibilities in this quarter. On the outbreak of war it became necessary to proceed against enemy possessions in the Pacific, chiefly to prevent their being used as bases for raiders against their shipping :

> What happened ? While the Australian navy was capturing German Samoa, Savaii, Upolu, Bougainville, German New Guinea and other enemy possessions in the Pacific south of the Equator, the Japanese cruisers pushed off rapidly and captured the Caroline Islands, including Yap, the Marshall Islands, and the Ladrone or Marianne group of Islands ; and before that fatal year of 1914 had closed, Japan, with the consent of Great Britain, was in full possession of strategical islands which may eventually give her the hegemony of the Pacific. A glance at the map will reveal the importance of these particular islands and, as Australians are momentously concerned in everything appertaining to the Pacific, because it is the principal gateway of her commerce, it can be understood what she feels when she realises that right athwart her trade routes a new Japan may arise whose interests must inevitably at some time or other clash with hers.

What was more natural than for this rapidly expanding commercial nation to seek in the Pacific outlets for her surplus population, increased trade facilities, and bases for her ships in the event of trouble with other states bordering upon it ? The resentment of America at Japan's assumption of these islands by mandate was well known, " and that advantage to

[1] " Australia and the Pacific " (*United Empire*, vol. xv. pp. 360–369).

Japan is a colossal disadvantage to Australia also," for any conflict between Japan and the United States over the latter's possessions in the Pacific could not fail to have the most momentous consequences for Australia and New Zealand. He was convinced, furthermore, that of the two Powers involved, they had nothing to fear from the United States, so closely akin to them in language, civilisation and outlook, and so little interested in territorial expansion. The two safeguards he proposed for them were an influx of white population and a strong naval base to guard the Pacific, the Singapore project.

Other exponents of the problem, especially within the Australian and New Zealand Parliaments, perhaps displayed less temerity in pointing out this aspect of it, seemed more neutral in their attitude to the prospective combatants, and were less inclined to make a bogey of Japan. Yet with a different emphasis they arrived at the same conclusions. They were more apt to dwell upon the consequences which their irrevocable commitment to the "White Australia" policy held in store for them. Premier Bruce maintained as undeviating a stand upon this principle as had his predecessors. "The White Australia policy is one which we hold sacred above everything else in Australia," he said. But at the same time, he warned them, this policy was a challenge to the whole world. "We arrogate to ourselves the right to say that only those of white descent shall live within our territory. On that policy we stake our national existence; but it carries with it great and grave obligations, one of which is that we must be prepared to fight, if need be, for its recognition." [1] The problem of the Pacific, said Senator Millen, was the problem of Japan. Australia had refused admission to the Commonwealth to the Japanese. The United States had adopted a similar attitude. They must admit that a new phase of the situation had already been opened up, and it looked as if the Washington pact had gone by the board. Where were the overflowing millions of Japan to find room? Their ideals could never be mixed with those of the Asiatic people, but this might mean fighting for them.[2]

The anxiety of Australia and New Zealand regarding the future of the Pacific was amply demonstrated by their keen interest in the construction of the naval base at Singapore, which had been

[1] *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 578 (June 14, 1923).
[2] *Ibid.* vol. v. p. 813 (August 8, 1924).

endorsed by the 1923 Conference, but the work on which was halted by the British Labour Government. The "White Australia" policy and the apprehensions it aroused also appear to have been fundamental determinants in the attitude of these Dominions to the League of Nations and the Geneva Protocol. In New Zealand the persistent query seems to have been as to the solvent effect which separate League membership might have upon Imperial unity, that is, upon Imperial strength. In Australia Premier Bruce, like ex-Premier Hughes, perennially reminded them that the League Covenant was no assured substitute for prudence regarding their own defence, nor for the protection which membership in the Empire afforded them.[1] There was no Monroe Doctrine as yet for the Pacific as for Canada. No such comforting lotus flower befogged their attitude towards the hazards of world politics.

The relation of the race question and immigration to the Protocol was still more specific. The proposed amendment to the definition of an aggressor in the first draft created an atmosphere of suspicion hardly favourable to the reception of the document itself. As set forth by its Japanese exponent, it roused immediate hostility in Australia.[2] It evoked anxious inquiry upon two occasions from Mr. Wilford, Leader of the Opposition in New Zealand, and the assurance from the Premier that Sir James Allen had been cabled to watch the issue carefully and that New Zealand did not propose to arbitrate the question of coloured immigration, League or no League.[3] So also when the Federal Council of the League of Nations Union in Australia, at their meeting in December 1924, subjected the Protocol to a searching discussion of nearly six hours' duration, almost the whole of their attention was devoted to the right of a state under the scheme to control matters of domestic jurisdiction. They disposed of the issue of sanctions, which roused most concern in Britain, Canada and South Africa, with the conclusion that heavy as was the price under the Protocol, it was far lighter than that exacted by the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Their observations on the main problem were noteworthy in that they drew attention to a neglected point, namely that the supposed safeguards for the

[1] E.g. *Journal*, vol. ii. p. 356; vol. iv. pp. 335, 571–572.
[2] *Round Table*, vol. xv. p. 378.
[3] *Journal*, vol. vi. pp. 140–142.

" White Australia " policy were actually much weaker under the existing Covenant than had been assumed, and were probably placed on a surer footing in the Protocol.[1]

The point of view of the Australian Government itself has already been outlined. The Governor-General's speech (June 18, 1925) noted their decision not to recommend the Protocol to Parliament for approval. In referring to this, both Mr. Charlton and ex-Premier Hughes commented with varying emphasis upon the settlement of so important an issue without consulting Parliament. The latter stated, however, that on the Protocol itself his views were the direct opposite of those held by the Leader of the Opposition in that he was opposed to it root and branch.[2] During the ensuing debate,[3] Mr. E. A. Mann (Nationalist) took the stand that as regards immigration, merely assuring the League that this was a matter of domestic jurisdiction would not meet the dangers from the wounded susceptibilities of another country, and that for this reason the additional negotiation, discussion and delay enjoined by the Protocol were to their advantage. As regards sanctions, however, he held that the proposal threw such a burden upon the Empire—say the duty of intervening against Japanese aggression in China, which might leave them in a dangerously weakened state as against other Powers—that it was unacceptable. Mr. Thompson, supporting the Government, argued that it would have been a waste of time to summon Parliament on so clear an issue as this. No member on either side would consider submitting the " White Australia " policy to any international tribunal whatsoever, and the fact that Japan had rejected the Protocol because it would have subjected the racial issue to arbitration should furnish them with all the argument they needed.

The discussion was resumed on August 14, when the report of their delegates at the Fifth Assembly was submitted by the Attorney-General, Sir Littleton Groom.[4] He spoke favourably of the principles upon which the Protocol was based, but concluded that it needed further consideration and revision, especially the clauses establishing presumption of aggression, and those

[1] H. Duncan Hall in *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (March 6, 1925).
[2] *Journal*, vol. vi. pp. 583, 586–587. [3] *Ibid.* pp. 778–780.
[4] *Ibid.* pp. 781–792. The Australian delegates were Sir Littleton Groom (Attorney-General), Matthew Charlton (Leader of the Opposition), Sir Joseph Cook (High Commissioner in London), Sir Wm. McBeath and Mrs. S. M. Allan.

declaring that an aggressor nation must bear the full costs of its action and yet preserve intact its territory and political independence. Although he admitted that the determination of domestic jurisdiction lay with the Permanent Court, he was confident that there was no danger of a decision adverse to Australian interests upon such a point. Mr. Charlton, for the Labour Opposition, defended the Protocol as strongly as he had denounced its summary and high-handed rejection by the Government for partisan reasons and without reference to Parliament. He dwelt particularly on the issue of domestic jurisdiction, endorsing the Attorney-General's exposition thereof, and maintaining that the controversy and opposition in this regard were due to preconceptions and misunderstandings arrived at before the actual provisions had been made available in Australia. As regards sanctions, he insisted that they would not be obliged to send a military force abroad, since the decision on such a matter rested with themselves, not the League Council. Although the requisite ten nations had already accepted the Protocol, only one of these, France, was a member of the Council, instead of four as required, and he much regretted that Britain, with its prestige and influence to uphold, had in this case played a negative rôle.

In New Zealand, as in the other Dominions, the decision of the Government in regard to the Protocol was made without consultation with Parliament. Such secrecy was pronounced by Mr. Holland, Leader of the Labour Party, as " wholly unsatisfactory and dangerous." [1] The issue did, however, come up for discussion on September 28, 1925, in connection with the Security Pact proposals,[2] prior consideration having been prevented by the illness of the late Premier. The Minister of Justice restated the gist of the Government's position by quoting from their despatch to the Home Government the conclusion therein regarding the status of their immigration law :

> Whatever the jurists of Geneva may think, the law advisers of the Crown in New Zealand believe that there is grave danger that the Court of International Justice at the Hague, consisting mainly of foreigners, might hold that the New Zealand law is contrary to the comity of nations, and that the New Zealand system is not a question of merely domestic jurisdiction. And our law advisers believe that, if a question

[1] *Journal*, vol. vi. p. 848.

[2] *Ibid.* vol. vii. pp. 143–152.

arose for determination under the Protocol, the permanent Court might decide: firstly, that the right of foreigners to reside in New Zealand was not a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of New Zealand; and secondly, that as a matter of international law we must admit them or reduce the restrictions on their admission.[1]

Premier Coates added his argument that the Protocol jeopardised Britain's immemorial rights on the sea. The only protests came from the Labour Opposition. Mr. Holland was appalled that on such a subject so little interest should be evinced, and that a project, the central idea of which was the prevention of wars, should have been turned down long since without reference to people or Parliament. As for the immigration question it was positively wrong to speak of a Court on which Great Britain was represented as a Court of foreigners. Furthermore, the Australian Labour Party was more pronouncedly for a "white" policy than any other party in the world, yet its leader, who had been the Government's representative at Geneva, had refused to accept the idea that Article 3 of the Protocol would in any way endanger the "White Australia" policy. Another Labour member averred that the Government's attitude embodied in their despatches to Downing Street was wholly discreditable to them, and that the overwhelming fault of the Protocol in the eyes of their own and the other governments was its attempt to put into operation the original Covenant subscribed to at Versailles. He pointed out that not a single Labour Government was in power when the Dominions were consulted on the proposal and asserted his belief that any effective agreements in the future must be founded upon it.

Turning now to consider viewpoints in South Africa, it may fairly be said that the attitude of hostility on the part of Nationalists to the League was a corollary to their dissatisfaction at the treatment accorded Germany under the Versailles settlement. On May 29, 1923, for instance, Senator Reitz moved that notice of the withdrawal of South Africa from the League be given in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Covenant.[2] In support of his demand he argued that the time had come when the Union should dissociate itself from a document which was not only a disgrace to humanity but a danger to those whose signature it bore. He outlined the history of the War and

[1] *Cf.* Cmd. 2458, No. 8.

[2] *Journal*, vol. iv. pp. 582–584.

arraigned the Treaty of Versailles, concluding with the query by what law the League claimed to hold dominion over the German colonies. Senator Langenhoven, the seconder, maintained that not a single South African interest could be served by remaining in the League, merely those of other nations—perhaps not Britain, but certainly France.

The enthusiasm of General Smuts for the League and his general arguments in support of it need no elaboration here. He was especially wont to invoke the small-nation plea, however, in face of Nationalist criticisms. Answering an earlier attack by Dr. Malan on the ground that the League had been prostituted by the Supreme Council, the Premier retorted that by this argument the critic had largely answered his own case. Here was an infant hardly able as yet to take care of itself, and alongside it were the Great Powers, fighting tooth and nail for the ground they stood on, and doubtless fearing that the infant might grow up. "Don't let us fight the League of Nations," he exclaimed, "let us fight the Supreme Council." [1] Replying to Dr. Reitz on this occasion, the Premier insisted that the League was not an organisation for carrying out the penal clauses of the treaty; that was the work of the Council of the Great Powers. Furthermore, the theory that South Africa was too small a nation to be interested in League affairs was mistaken. All nations were now equal before the law; should they abandon this right which had taken thousands of years to acquire merely because they were a small nation? "We cannot despair at this stage without despairing of the whole of civilisation," he argued. "It is really the small nations, such as we are, that should be represented in the League of Nations, because we are the ones who require protection." The motion was withdrawn.

When General Hertzog assumed office he adopted the attitude of provisional acceptance of the League. He admitted that from the beginning he had not been very much taken up with it, because it was not constituted in the right way and wore too much the character of an alliance of Great Powers, ready if war broke out, rather than of a body actually to preserve peace. Unless its character altered it could never attain its object. Meanwhile it could only do its best to prevent explosions and engage in humanitarian activity. He was not prepared to say that it

[1] *Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 678–679.

by a few Great Powers and the weaker countries are forced as it were to group themselves about some one or other of these like satellites about a planet and to follow its lead in external affairs. This would seem to be supported by the declining significance of the " equality of states " in international law, and politically by the mutual relation of the members of the British Commonwealth (*pace* the Equalitarians), by the dominance of the United States over the Pan-American Union, by that of Russia over the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and by the relation of France of recent years to several of the smaller states of Europe. On the basis of this assumption that of the ultra-Nationalists would be impossible of realisation.

At the 1902 Conference the First Lord contended that if independent each group of Dominions " would find itself within the orbit of a great naval Power. The Dominion of Canada would have to frame its naval policy with a view to the navy of the United States." [1] If, as it was popularly interpreted, this meant that Canada must compete in armaments with her neighbour it would be ridiculous. What it does mean is that an independent Canada, a small nation under the aegis of the Monroe Doctrine, must assimilate not merely armaments but policies to those of the Republic. As the Toronto *Globe* pointedly remarked :

> It is often said that Canada enjoys the status of a nation in all but foreign relations. But if we look at things rather than forms and names, we discover that Canada enjoys as much independence in regard to foreign relations as many countries which formally rank as independent. The smaller nations of Europe enjoy just as much or as little independence of action as the bigger ones choose to allow. Belgium would probably have been part of France or Germany if one Power had not been jealous of the other and Great Britain determined that Belgium should be annexed to neither. The new states are creations of the Supreme Council representing the strong Powers. But when foreign relations are considered no nation can be said to be independent.[2]

For a Dominion to swing outside the orbit of the Empire means being drawn by irresistible attraction within that of the dominant neighbouring Power. Such has been the effect of Continentalism on Canada under Nationalist auspices that it is at present doubtful

[1] Cd. 1299, p. 19.
[2] August 19, 1921 ; quoted in *Canadian Annual Review* (1921), p. 76.

what the situation of that Dominion would be in the event of trouble in the Pacific, and worse than doubtful should the relations between Britain and the United States become strained. Australia and New Zealand would have to choose between Japan and the United States—although the former alternative may seem out of the question.

Even under existing circumstances a situation might well develop which would subject these Dominions to painful torsion. Canada, Australia and New Zealand all border on the Pacific, in which the United States has a dominant interest; Great Britain does not. What would be the position of these Dominions were the United States to take the initiative over the Empire in embarking upon a major struggle in this region, say because of the race question, and Great Britain appear to have determined upon the maintenance of neutrality? It is hardly likely that they would not have been concerned in much the same fashion as the United States with the antecedents of such a conflict, and in that case the attractive force of the principal participant would tend to draw them into it. In war-time a Great Power dominates its lesser allies—if the evidence of the late struggle be any guide. Not merely their military machines but the very organisation of their national life tend to be submerged by the senior partner. Belligerency under such circumstances would mean for these Dominions secession, declarations of independence and transfer from the British Commonwealth to the American group of nations.[1] If the entanglement of the Dominions in a struggle for the Pacific appeared inevitable, the Mother Country's interest in the preservation of the Commonwealth would impel her to participate and forestall these eventualities. But if during the prelude to hostilities she manifested an inclination to remain neutral, it would behoove these Dominions to ponder well whether following the Mother Country's lead would not secure greater advantages to themselves as well as to the Empire as a whole, than would allowing themselves to be drawn into an American war.

All these considerations are particularly apposite to Canada.

[1] Back in 1907 Mr. Ewart said: "Another possibility is that we may unite with our neighbours to the south. I do not know the future. In some far-off year, under some unforeseen circumstances, such may be the destiny of Canada. A racial war with the Asiatic millions may throw us into war-union with the United States, and battle-comradeship may lead, as it often does, to political partnership" (*The Kingdom of Canada*, p. 357).

should not be supported, as the possibility existed, even the probability, that it would develop into a League of Nations in the true sense of the word.[1] Mr. Pearce, for the Labour group, criticised him for accepting, as a legacy from the late Government, and spending money for representation in a League which was practically akin to the international capitalism so ably defended by the Opposition. The Government had adopted the principle of racial inequality in Africa yet contributed to the League in which Oriental nations met them on equal footing, indeed, he believed, exerted more power than they could as a mere Dominion. This was hypocritical. In deference to the lessons of history they should have a strong league, but of nations on the same level of civilisation as their own.[2]

On May 6, 1925, in the course of the debate on the Estimates, Premier Hertzog made a statement to the House upon their attitude to the Protocol, and summarised the arguments for rejection which had been offered in his despatch of January 26 to the Home Government—that a country as remote from the danger zone as South Africa could not think of extending its obligations under the Covenant, that the tendency of the Protocol to make of the League a super-state increased the antipathy non-member nations would feel towards joining it, and that, with these nations still outside, he feared it would prove to be less a League for peace than an old-fashioned political alliance.[3] In view of the declared attitude of the Nationalists towards world politics, and the type of arguments invoked in Parliament, even by General Smuts, regarding the League, it is not surprising that the announcement of the Government's action was made in this casual fashion and provoked no heated debate.

The reaction of the Irish Free State Government to the Protocol was adequately set forth in the statement of the Minister of External Affairs in the *Dail* already cited. The general attitude of the newest Dominion to the League of Nations may be illustrated by reference to a single episode, the controversy over the registration with the League of the Agreement of December 6, 1921, between the British Government and Ireland. The Free State Government took the stand that this constituted a treaty within the meaning of Article 18 of the Covenant, and

[1] *Journal*, vol. vi. pp. 594–595. [2] *Ibid.* vol. vii. pp. 625–626.
[3] *Ibid.* vol. vi. pp. 593–594; Cmd. 2458, No. 7.

proceeded to register it with the League on July 11, 1924, in accordance with the requirements of that Article. The Home Government responded with a protest addressed to the Secretary-General of the League (November 27) in the following terms :

Since the Covenant of the League of Nations came into force His Majesty's Government has consistently taken the view that neither it nor any conventions concluded under the auspices of the League are intended to govern the relations *inter se* of the various parts of the British Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government consider, therefore, that the terms of Article 18 of the Covenant are not applicable to the articles of the agreement of December 6, 1921.[1]

The Free State Cabinet met on December 15 to consider the issue, and the Minister of External Affairs then made a statement of their attitude on the matter. Quoting Article 18 of the Covenant he said :

This Article means that every treaty and international engagement entered into after January 1920 shall be registered. The Irish Free State, as a member of the League, as well as every other member of the League, is bound by this Article. As the treaty is the basis of the Irish Free State's relations with the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, it was pre-eminently our duty to register it. To have failed in this would have been to repudiate the Covenant, which can be done neither by the Free State nor by any other member of the League.[2]

The situation met the attention of the British House on December 17,[3] when in reply to a question from a Labour member, Mr. Chamberlain explained the stand taken by the Home Government. A difference then arose between Lieut.-Com. Kenworthy and certain members as to whether or not the Agreement in question constituted a " treaty," and the former exclaimed : " It is a treaty. In that case why should not the high contracting parties to that treaty be entitled to appeal to the League if they so desire ? "

Thus an important constitutional point was raised by the Free State contention and a somewhat delicate situation had been created. The Free State, or what might be called the equalitarian, view, analogous to that of the more pronounced Nationalists in Canada, implied that Britain and Ireland were

[1] League of Nations *Treaty Series*, vol. xxvii. p. 449.
[2] *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (December 19, 1924).
[3] *Journal*, vol. vi. pp. 47–48.

separate members of the League, bearing the same relation to one another as all other members, irrespective of the peculiarities involved in common membership in the Empire, in which case Mr. Kenworthy's assumption that each might appeal to the League against the other would seem to be correct. Such a view presents ominous possibilities to a believer in the maintenance of Imperial integrity. The more conservative British view would avoid these by refusing to admit that agreements between members of the Commonwealth constitute "treaties" in international law, and the fact that the Dominions do not yet appear to be "sovereign states" should lend weight to this contention. Such lack of "sovereignty" implies an element of subordination in Dominion status, however, which as long as it persists will constitute a grievance to the Nationalists more fundamental than those to which they have been devoting their principal attention of recent years, but the removal of which by international recognition would presumably mark the complete legal disintegration of the Commonwealth. The stand taken by the Home Government in their protest to the League does not raise this issue directly, but approaches it from a different angle. It would seem to constitute rather the pointing out of a fundamental interpretative reservation to the Covenant on the part of the Empire—that questions touching the relations of the several members of the Commonwealth to one another, notwithstanding their separate League membership, are domestic questions as far as the League is concerned.[1]

There does not appear to be any record of consultation with the Dominions on the matter prior to the lodging of the British protest. Professor Keith assumes that in view of the long interval which had elapsed (July 11 to November 27) such interchanges occurred and points out how important, in view of the fact that the status of the Free State is based on that of Canada, would be Canadian acceptance of the Irish viewpoint.[2] Until the Free State's action, however, the Home Government's contention appears to have been accepted at least tacitly throughout the Empire. Certainly the analogous thesis that the mode of representation of the Empire in relation to foreign countries is a matter for the Empire itself to determine has been maintained

[1] See further Corbett and Smith, *Canada and World Politics*, ch. v.
[2] *Journal of Comparative Legislation*, vol. vii. pp. 108–109.

by Governments representing both parties in Canada and all three in the United Kingdom on numerous occasions, nor does it appear that the implications against which the British reservation was recorded could gain acceptance unless foreign Powers were willing to force the issue by according formal recognition of independent status to the Dominions. The registration of the Halibut Treaty by the Canadian Government with the League (February 2, 1925) is hardly in the same category as the Free State's action, as this was a treaty made in approved fashion with a foreign state, nor does Canadian initiative in this matter raise any very fundamental issue.

CHAPTER X

The Latest Phase—Locarno and the Imperial Conference of 1926

The next major episode in Imperial foreign relations is the Locarno Conference. The characteristic features of this achievement render it unnecessary for us to consider here more than the implications for the Empire in what was accomplished. The Geneva Protocol was essentially the work of the Fifth Assembly of the League and, as regards the Empire, of the Labour Government in Britain. The Pact marks the culmination of a series of negotiations dating back to the abortive Tripartite Treaty of 1919, which need not be recapitulated at this point, and is founded upon a theory of attaining security antithetical to that embodied in the Protocol, but which has been continuously advocated by the more conservative, "practical" diplomatists since the Versailles settlement. The Protocol represents the Radical, the Pact the Tory solution. The Protocol was distinctly the work of the League of Nations, proceeded strictly upon the basis of the Covenant, and sought to revivify that organisation. The Pact was framed independently of League machinery, during 1925 overshadowed public interest in the work of the latter, and was based on principles which many considered subversive of the Covenant. The one presumed a League which was to be an active, effective agency in the enforcement of peace; the other an organisation virtually devoid of regulatory function, devoted instead to humanitarian activity, and to the awakening if possible of an international conscience.

The Protocol aimed to attain universal security through the general acceptance of a single inclusive agreement; the Pact proceeded more gradually from the opposite direction. It sought what was considered a more promising because more restricted *modus vivendi* regarding the most critical "sore spot,"

the western frontiers, among the states immediately concerned, hoping by this to bring about indirectly a more stable situation to the eastward as well, and to pave the way for the achievement of general security through the gradual establishment of a network of such pacts. The idea of the Pact, as has been seen, was always present as a competing principle during the discussions of the Protocol. Furthermore, the discussions at Locarno were conducted under more favourable auspices than had attended the launching of the Protocol, owing to the recent overtures looking to the assumption of definite undertakings by Germany and to the admission of that country to League membership. Finally, and to most people perhaps the most essential difference of all, the Pact was ratified and put into operation, the Protocol was not. At the same time the inclusion of Germany gave to the Locarno Agreement a character radically different from that worn by the antecedent efforts of this nature—and far more promising.

The Conference met at Locarno from October 5 to 16, 1925. There were in attendance the German Chancellor, and the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy, who were joined later by those of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, with Premier Mussolini at the final session. Drafts framed at a meeting of Allied and German experts in London during the preceding September formed the basis of discussion. The most important prelude to the Conference was the offer in February from Germany to France and Britain to enter into a mutual obligation with the Powers interested in the Rhine region not to wage war against one another, to sign a pact guaranteeing the existing territorial status, and to negotiate arbitration treaties with other states. The assumption (a comparatively recent one in post-War politics) underlying the negotiations was that Germany and France both needed guarantees of security. An understanding was also reached that the victor-vanquished relationship would further be obliterated by the admission of Germany to League membership with a permanent seat on the Council. The principal document emanating from the Locarno Conference was the Pact of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy. There were also four arbitration treaties between Germany and Belgium, France, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia respectively, a draft collective note to Germany interpreting Article 16 of the League

Covenant, and French treaties with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia in effect guaranteeing the German arbitration treaties with the latter.[1] Thus all of these documents are interdependent.

As is stated in its preamble, the Pact is based on the theory underlying the ill-fated treaty of 1839 which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. It did not embody the definition of an aggressor nation which was the outstanding feature of the Protocol. Germany and France, and Germany and Belgium, however, mutually undertake not to wage war on one another save in exercise of the legitimate right of defence or in pursuance of Articles 15 and 16 of the Covenant, and to settle their disputes by peaceful means through reference to judicial decision, a conciliation commission, or the Council of the League according to circumstances; also the contracting parties undertake to render aid in case of flagrant violation of these provisions. The most pertinent clause from the Empire standpoint is Article 9, which reads: "The present treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the British Dominions or upon India, unless the government of such Dominion, or of India, signifies its acceptance thereof." Furthermore, the draft collective note regarding Article 16 of the Covenant set forth that each member of the League is obligated by that provision only "to an extent which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account."

The Significance of Locarno for the Commonwealth.

The first problem of importance to be considered in connection with negotiations involving the Empire is the extent to which participation in such negotiations is truly Imperial. The Protocol was the work of the League Assembly, or rather of two of its Committees, in which every Dominion as well as the United Kingdom was represented, and throughout the discussions not merely did the several delegations consider matters fully, but the fullest contact and consultation were maintained between them, in fact they seem in a sense to have merged informally into an Empire Delegation. The Empire did not participate as a unit as at Versailles and Washington, but its several parts

[1] See texts in Cmd. 2525, *Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference 1925 and Annexes.*

co-operated so as to achieve virtual unity; dispersion was evidenced in the action of the several governments on their delegates' recommendations. The Locarno Conference, on the other hand, was not a League meeting but was more like that at Lausanne. The agenda were known to concern a specific region and a project with which the United Kingdom was primarily interested and the responsibilities of which would rest mainly, if not wholly, on her shoulders. Efforts on the part of the Home Government to convoke an Imperial Conference to advise upon the policy they intended to pursue had proved abortive; furthermore, the purpose of the Locarno assembly was the fixing of obligations. Hence we do not find demands for separate representation from Canada or the other Dominions recorded, as in the case of the London Conference. It is fairly safe to assume, however, that Article 9 of the Pact was agreed upon beforehand as the alternative. Thus there was no Empire Delegation at Locarno; Mr. Chamberlain handled the negotiations for the Empire. The Dominions were nevertheless "kept informed," though apparently not "consulted" during the progress of negotiations.

The basis of procedure was accepted by the Dominion governments. In Canada Premier King took the attitude that the negotiations were purely the concern of the United Kingdom. In answer to a question from Mr. Woodsworth on June 10, he stated that the Canadian Government had been kept informed of the negotiations between Great Britain and France, but their opinion had not been asked upon them, they had not been requested to express any view as to what Canada's position might or might not be, nor did they propose to intervene in a discussion of which they had no knowledge beyond that received in the manner described.[1] On June 26 he supplemented this with the statement that the negotiations were primarily and essentially between the governments of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany "with respect to certain matters which are confined entirely to Europe," that at no stage had any of these countries made any request to or asked the opinion of any of the Dominions, that in view of its non-participation the Canadian Government did not feel it should either offer advice or take exception to anything that was being done, that the Foreign Secretary had

[1] *Journal*, vol. vi. p. 519.

stated in the British House that no Dominion could be asked to do anything without the sanction of its own parliament, and that although quite conceivably an agreement might be reached wholly independent of their parliament, he was sure that " no agreement will be reached which will commit in any way our country without the explicit condition that parliament approves of whatever action is taken." [1]

The statements in the Australian and New Zealand Houses upon this point were as characteristic of their Premiers' attitudes as was that of Mr. Mackenzie King. Premier Bruce announced (January 14, 1926) that although the agreements had been entered into without the participation of the Dominions, they had been fully informed of the progress of negotiations and of the action contemplated. Britain had signed the treaty because she considered it necessary for her own security, the peace of Europe and stable conditions. It was so framed that the Dominions might become signatories, but none had signed or been asked to do so. The matter was of such importance as to warrant discussion by representatives of all parts of the Empire in conference, who should have in mind the views of their own parliaments regarding it, after which it should be resubmitted to these parliaments for final determination.[2] Premier Coates stated (September 28, 1925) that the British Government had carried on the negotiations. They in New Zealand could offer little advice, but could express their opinions quite definitely. If in their opinion the arrangements were not in the interests of New Zealand they said so, but if it was then decided to go ahead, they told the Home Government, after knowing all the facts in the case, that they were prepared to stand by the settlement. It was true, however, that they could refuse to become parties to it.[3] In South Africa General Smuts registered a strong protest at the method by which the negotiations had been conducted. The Empire had not presented a united front during the negotiations, hence it was doubtful whether all the Dominions were likely to adhere to the Pact *ex post facto*. This case would constitute a precedent for the future, and " the tendency would be for the British Empire Delegation to disappear from the field of diplomacy." [4]

[1] *Journal*, vol. vi, p. 723.
[2] *Ibid.* vol. vii. pp. 328–329.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 152.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 11.

In contrast, the omission of the Dominions from participation in the negotiations evoked as much comment during the debate on the Pact in the British House (November 18, 1925)[1] as did the terms of the treaty itself. In view of the recognition of limited Dominion liability, it is not strange that the chief protests should have emanated from the Home Parliament. Mr. Percy Hurd was of the opinion that Dominion indifference to Mr. Chamberlain's communications had been due to preoccupation with domestic problems and that the remedy must be found in improving the machinery for consultation. Mr. Lloyd George reiterated the criticisms he had made regarding the Lausanne negotiations. He thought the failure to bring the Dominions into consultation was a serious error which might have grave consequences. During the War the new policy that foreign relations must henceforth be conducted on the basis not of trusteeship but of partnership had been adopted, and every great treaty up to Lausanne had been negotiated upon the principle of full consultation with the British Empire Delegation. As for Labour's handling of the problem, it was true the Dominions had been represented at Geneva, but that was because of their attendance at the session of the League. He much regretted that the Foreign Secretary had in the present case followed the perilous Lausanne precedent. There had been a break in the diplomatic unity of the Empire, a sacrifice of that achievement of the War which had brought the Dominions within the orbit of their foreign policy and made of it an undertaking for which all felt equally responsible. He would not say that the Dominions were liable to desert them in an emergency, but they could not be expected to come now with the same alacrity and unanimity as they might have showed. This constituted an element of peril to the Empire.

The late Colonial Secretary, Mr. J. H. Thomas, scented partisanship, and averred that when his successor announced the abandonment of the Conference which the Labour Government had been arranging, he had thrown over the only means available for meeting the difficulty. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald maintained that the Government had not faced the problem nor did the course they followed offer a solution for it. In framing the Protocol day by day and week by week, clause by clause and stage by stage, the official representatives of the Dominions and India at Geneva

[1] *Journal*, vol. vii. pp. 1–18.

had considered it and agreed to accept it. But as soon as consultation with the Dominions encountered obstacles, the present Government had merely cut the knot and left the Dominions out of both the negotiations themselves and the resulting settlement. It was deplorable that, although twelve months had elapsed and the problem was not a new one, they had settled it on the basis of immediate convenience and without a thorough exploration of it. The situation within the Empire and in relation to the rest of the world had become indeed serious, he warned :

> Everyone knows that the settlement of foreign affairs and the conduct of the foreign policy of this country, not merely as an island, but as representative of an Empire scattered all over the face of the earth, has within the last three or four years, especially since the end of the War, reached a point which could almost be described as the point of breaking down. . . . One of the most constant problems that we have to face now is how we are to make arrangements by which our moral authority in the councils of Europe will not be merely our own moral authority, but the moral authority which we have as representative, not of these islands, but of the whole British Commonwealth of Nations. Let that go, and then I am not quite sure what authority we may have. It is not only the prestige apart from moral authority, it is the fact that the bulk of it as well as the right of it has a good deal to do with it.

Mr. Chamberlain voiced again his regret at the non-participation of the Dominions. In defence of the Government's course he stressed its efforts to bring about a conference with them, not so much for the purpose of deciding upon the Protocol, about which the Empire was in agreement, but in order to obtain their views regarding the policy which it was essential to offer as an alternative thereto. These efforts had failed. But the affairs of the world would not stand still, the situation was critical, it was impossible for the representative of an Empire, the heart of which lay so close to Europe and its perils, to go to meeting after meeting of the League Council and confess that Britain had no policy because they had been unable to confer with the Dominions; they had to take some action. All that they had been able to do regarding the Dominions was to keep them fully informed of all developments and to safeguard their freedom of action under the treaty. Hence the Government had followed the precedent established in the Anglo-American Treaty of Guarantee at Paris when the Dominions' representatives had been present. As his father's

son no man desired more strongly than he to pursue a policy not merely in close consultation but in close harmony and agreement with the Dominions at every stage. "Such is my desire to-day and such will always be my desire," he concluded, "but the circumstances of this particular case were circumstances which did not allow us to remain without a policy." Explanation on behalf of the Government in similar terms was offered by Earl Balfour in the House of Lords a few days later.[1]

The only outstanding protests, then, against the basis of representation at Locarno came from the Opposition in Britain and from General Smuts, also in opposition, in South Africa. While fully admitting the seriousness and validity of these criticisms, it is difficult to see how, in view of the general acceptance of the course followed, the Versailles and Washington precedents could have been applied. It is clear on the one hand that the Home Government had its own policy, that is a British not an Imperial policy, which it was determined to apply in regard to western Europe. It is equally clear on the other hand, in view of their reaction to the Protocol, that the Dominion governments were willing to accept such a decentralisation of foreign policy as the alternative to an enhancement of their international obligations. Such being the situation, the argument that the Conference should be small, informal, and reach an immediate decision, and that the Home Government should not seem devoid of a programme, acquires validity. The breakdown of the British Empire Delegation thus appears to be the result not of oversight but of agreement, however, which renders it all the more serious from the Co-operationist point of view.

In view of the relation of the Dominions to the settlement, its actual merits as a device for bringing security to western Europe received much closer analysis in the Home Parliament[2] than in the Outer Empire. Sectional treaties had all along been regarded by the school of thought opposed to them as inherently provocative of counter alliances and conflict, as merely the pre-War system of balance of power in thin disguise. The extent to which they were recognised in the Protocol had been a subject of anxious debate in the Committee of the Fifth Assembly.[3] They had been

[1] *Journal*, vol. vii. pp. 19–20.

[2] See *ibid.* vol. vi. p. 209; also debates of June 24 and July 6; November 18 and 24 (*ibid.* pp. 423–435, 655–657; vol. vii. pp. 1–21).

[3] See Cmd. 2289, pp. 23–28.

the constant bogey of the Labour Party [1] and it was from this angle that Mr. MacDonald now attacked the Foreign Secretary's policy, reiterating his arguments as to its inferiority in comparison with the Protocol. In particular the Pact offered no guarantee as regards the eastern frontiers, because of which the Empire might be dragged into war without being a controlling factor in the situation. Having Germany in the League, however, was worth twenty Pacts, and the situation on the Continent had improved. Mr. Ponsonby pronounced the regional feature to be the root objection to the scheme, and offered an amendment to the Foreign Secretary's motion for ratification expressing regret at the omission of provisions for disarmament. In contrast to his strictures at the ignoring of the Dominions, Mr. Lloyd George approved the basic principle of the Pact, warning in the earlier debate against indefinite commitments and in the later discussion declaring that two features of the settlement—the admission of Germany to the League and the application of the principle of arbitration—drowned all criticism.

For the Government, Mr. Chamberlain stressed their determination that any new obligations undertaken must be specific and strictly limited to the maintenance of existing territorial arrangements on the western frontiers, that they should enter a mutual pact, not a unilateral alliance against some other nation or group of nations, and that Germany should join the League, assuming the rights and obligations of every other member of that society. The Locarno agreements conformed both to the letter and spirit of the Covenant; they did not undermine the League, rather they strengthened it in important respects. He did not think that their obligations could have been more narrowly circumscribed to the conditions in which they had a vital interest. Furthermore, although doubtless the guarantors would confer together if action became necessary, each government remained the judge of what action it should take. Questioned by Mr. MacDonald, he averred that the Pact was not engineered for the purpose of uniting western civilisation against Russia, nor aimed to win Germany from that country to a European *bloc*. As for the eastern frontiers, he maintained that Britain had incurred no obligations in addition to those embodied in the Covenant, but

[1] See an early criticism by G. N. Barnes, apropos of the Washington Conference (*Journal*, vol. iii. p. 246).

that the work at Locarno had produced a *détente* in that quarter which would contribute greatly to securing peace there also. Finally, although disarmament could not be dealt with at the Conference, he believed that the spirit of goodwill and confidence it had engendered would further this ideal.

The Imperial implications of the settlement, in contrast, received less attention in the various parliaments than might have been expected, and much less than from commentators outside. The striking feature in this respect about the Foreign Secretary's exposition of his policy was his concentration upon the circumstances and interests of the United Kingdom in relation to the Continent rather than upon those of the Empire in relation to world politics as a whole. This was the natural result of a policy which was founded upon this narrower basis, which is in fact the most outstanding case since the War of a course of action in foreign relations pursued by one nation of the Empire virtually irrespective of the others, the most striking and far-reaching instance of decentralisation in Imperial foreign policy. He argued that the Protocol was a Continental pact framed for Continental conditions, hence unsuited to the circumstances of a world-wide Empire which it nevertheless implicated. At the same time that part of the Empire for which they were immediately responsible, so the British Government had held, was inevitably involved in Europe. Hence they had undertaken this limited commitment. Mr. Lloyd George expressed a similar view, that Britain had her own responsibilities and difficulties in Europe which must be faced whatever stand the Dominions took. They were pledging the whole strength and resources of their country without the Dominions. This was a very dangerous thing to do, for it might mean driving them into the ambit of American foreign policy, but they must take the risk, because after all they had an interest in Europe. Mr. MacDonald, also, critical as he was of the lack of inclusiveness in the Pact idea, stressed its shortcomings in this respect from the world-wide, not the Imperial, point of view.

Instead of drawing in this way a point-blank distinction between British and Imperial interests and affirming the necessity of caring for the former at all costs, those in the Upper House who touched on this phase of the settlement endeavoured to stress the vital interest of the Dominions in it, and to win their support. Viscount Grey, for instance, maintained that the future of all

Europe depended on this settlement, and the future of Britain upon that of Europe. They were a part of the Continent now in a way they had never been before. Furthermore, they were the only possible centre for the British Empire; if they went under it would disappear. He hoped the Dominions would realise this, and that, although the Outer Empire might be unwilling to undertake definite obligations, yet it was essential to the Empire that it interest itself in the affairs of Europe. Earl Balfour struck the most optimistic note, and made an earnest plea for Dominion support in the Government's undertaking. He said:

> If anybody asks me whether I have any misgivings as to the results of the fact that the Dominions are not bound more than they choose to be bound by the Locarno Treaty, I may say that I have not. I am perfectly certain, in the first place, that it will be realised throughout the King's Dominions that this is a great effort on the part of the Home Government to secure peace, and I am equally sure that there is no interest the Dominions possess which they are more deeply conscious of than the necessity of preserving peace. In the second place, they will see, if ever war is forced upon this country because it is carrying out the spirit and letter of the Locarno Treaty, that the whole of the moral forces of the world will be behind us, that the war will be obviously, on the face of it, a defensive war, and that, equally obviously, it will be war intended to check brutal and unnecessary aggression.
>
> Not merely all the feelings of patriotism, not merely all the feelings of common kinship will move the Dominions to sympathise with the Mother Country, but also all the elements of the higher morality to which they are singularly alive.
>
> There is, I think, a third result to be expected. They will realise that this war, unjust as regards the conduct of our opponents, unprovoked from the very nature of the case, is a war in which the very existence of the Mother Country and of the Empire is really involved. There can be no war under the Treaty of Locarno in Western Europe which is not both an unjust war and a war which menaces the very heart of the Empire. If they realise all those things—and they will realise them—let nobody tell me that, so long as the British Empire exists, it will not act as a single body when that great moment comes and that we shall not see in the future, as we have seen in the past, an absolutely united Empire, joined together, working with a single purpose for a single end in the cause of peace and in the cause of public international morality.[1]

Despite its hopeful tone, recourse to such an argument clearly indicates a serious situation within the Commonwealth.

[1] *Journal*, vol. vii. p. 20.

It is associated with the attitude toward the conduct of Imperial foreign relations revealed by Lloyd George during the discussion of the Irish Free State settlement, and frequently expressed by other public men in Britain.[1] In effect it implies that hope of co-operative effect has, for the time being at least, been abandoned, that as in the pre-War era Imperial foreign policy shall be conducted by and in accordance with the views of the Home Government only, on the assumption that in the event of crisis the circumstances will be such that the Dominions will rally spontaneously to the aid of the Mother Country as of yore.

Whether frank admission of decentralisation in foreign policy on the one hand or efforts to give an Imperial character to the proceedings on the other be preferred, the line drawn between the interests, policies and responsibilities of the United Kingdom and those of the Empire as a whole remains the outstanding feature of the Locarno settlement, and beside the Pact the Halibut Treaty and other " local " negotiations in connection with which the principle of the 1923 Conference resolution was invoked shrink to insignificance. Sir Halford Mackinder stated this succinctly to the Royal Colonial Institute when he said :

> The significance of Locarno seems to me to be this, when regarded from an Empire point of view, that whereas on former occasions now this and now that overseas Dominion has found its local interests at some variance with the Imperial outlook, on this occasion it is the great Mother Country herself which is subjected to that stress.[2]

This situation within the Empire received formal recognition in Article 9 of the Pact. Briefly, the political phase of the difficulty had, by general consent, been solved by the acceptance of Nationalism all round.

What the basis of settlement implied was pointed out in strong protests at the course of Imperial diplomacy voiced by General Smuts. Among these was a statement to the press in which he argued that not only did the Pact tend to stereotype and entrench the Versailles settlement and offer a less flexible and secure foundation for Europe than did the Covenant itself, but it also implied a grave menace to the integrity of the Empire :

[1] *Journal*, vol. iii. p. 10; *supra*, vol. i. pp. 329–330. For pointed comments on this theory of Imperial relations see Hon. Clifford Sifton, " Some Canadian Constitutional Problems " (*Can. Hist. Rev.* vol. iii. pp. 3–23) and Prof. Wrong, " The Foreign Relations of Canada " (*ibid.* vol. vi. pp. 4–14).

[2] November 10, 1925 ; *United Empire*, vol. xvi. p. 731.

It is proposed that, under the Pact, Great Britain shall dissociate herself from the Empire and, in a matter of cardinal foreign policy, take a line of her own, leaving the constituent states of the Empire to decide their own policies. Under the circumstances I feel certain that at least some of them will not follow her. As one who believes in the British Empire as the greatest human institution on earth, I cannot acquiesce in this departure with equanimity. The Pact may well become a turning-point, a fatal parting of the ways, in the Empire. British statesmen who adhere to the new Holy Alliance may yet find that they have not only fatally dissociated their country from the progressive forces in the new Europe, but that they have cut the heart out of the Empire.[1]

Again, in a speech at Pretoria on Armistice Day, 1925, he warned:

More and more the foreign policy of the British Empire would become simply that of Great Britain. The day might come when the Dominions might feel that they had little in common with such a policy and would begin their own foreign policies in their own interest There were natural and inevitable centrifugal tendencies at work in the Empire, and he feared that Locarno had given some impetus to them. A fear was sometimes expressed, which he did not share, that the League of Nations must inevitably weaken the links of Empire. Incidents like Locarno were far more likely than the League to sow seeds of dissension and division. The Empire was a priceless blessing, and was to-day, with American abstention from the League, the main force supporting the advance of great human causes and ideals in the world. The maintenance of solidarity and a united front were therefore essential.[2]

The Leader of the Opposition in South Africa was, however, almost alone among Dominion parliamentarians in dwelling upon such considerations. Those in the United Kingdom were convinced that the Mother Country must meet her problems in her own way, with or without Dominion aid, those in the Dominions accepted the situation. Few cared to enter upon the wider aspects of the problem or to stress the possibilities for the future which Article 9 implied. It may fairly be said that the following criticism of General Smuts' standpoint, from the attitude of mind which it reflects, from its light-hearted ignoring of those considerations which the South African statesman deemed crucial,

[1] Quoted from *The Times* (London), July 13, 1925, by Jebb, *The Empire in Eclipse*, p. 111.

[2] Quoted from *The Times* (London) in *Round Table*, vol. xvi. p. 19, and by Lloyd George in the British House, (*Journal*, vol. vii. p. 12).

may be taken as far more typical of the reaction throughout the Commonwealth :

It is an understood thing, so far as that Conference is concerned, that it is a matter in which the Imperial Government is alone responsible. None of the Dominion governments is concerned in it, and none will be bound by whatever results that Conference may arrive at. They will be perfectly free, actually and morally, in regard to any trouble that may arise out of it, if any trouble does come at all. Although the sole object is to prevent any trouble, they will be free from any necessity of engaging in any consequences that might ensue from that Pact. And that being so, your complete liberty of action remaining unimpaired, where is the necessity for such a distinguished man as General Smuts, occupying such a high position in the councils of Europe, having regard to the part we all know he played during the War and at the Peace Conference—where, I say, was the necessity for him at that stage to give public utterance to such an opinion ?[1]

The Imperial implications of Locarno have been perhaps most adequately discussed by *The Round Table* in several articles on the settlement,[2] and some reference might well be made to the considerations noted by this journal. The dilemma facing the Home Government and a warning of the wider concerns which should be borne in mind were set forth as follows just prior to the opening of negotiations :

Great Britain, subject to consulting the Dominion governments at every stage of the negotiations, must take the primary responsibility for deciding whether in the interests of her own security and the stability of Europe she should give such a guarantee. To try to run the Empire on the basis that no step in foreign affairs shall be taken unless the signature of all its six member states has been obtained would paralyse its foreign policy altogether, and so bring about the very wars and disasters which an active foreign policy is designed to avert.

The very fact, however, that the ultimate responsibility for action must rest on Great Britain, because no Dominion will take the responsibility either of signing itself or of protesting against a signature by Great Britain, makes it all the more imperative that the Imperial aspect of the issue should be kept steadily in view. As already pointed out,

[1] Sir Frederick Dutton to a joint meeting of men's and women's Canadian Clubs at Ottawa (October 12, 1925) ; *United Empire*, vol. xvii. pp. 78–79. For similar appreciative comment on the Pact, representing the Conservative viewpoint in Britain and apparently assuming that the Dominions would adhere to the settlement, see editorial comment in the *United Empire* from October to January, 1925–26 ; *ibid.* vol. xvi. pp. 598, 645–646, 698–699 ; vol. xvii. pp. 2–3.

[2] See vols. xv. and xvi. *passim*.

the strongest pressure is being put upon Great Britain by European Powers to undertake European commitments. No corresponding pressure is being put upon her to remember her Imperial responsibilities. No Dominion statesman has come to London. No Imperial Conference has been in session. General Smuts' telegram has been a lonely voice in the wilderness of Imperial silence.[1]

Although it would be an exaggeration to characterise the comments on the settlement itself as a post-mortem on Imperial diplomatic unity, there is, nevertheless, no spurious optimism in their tone. It was pointed out on the one hand that Great Britain, " in defiance of a very ancient diplomatic tradition," had become involved " far more deeply in the internal politics of Europe than she has ever been since the abandonment of Hanover," that she had to a great extent abandoned her freedom of choice and the advantages of her geographical position :

> We are now, to all intents and purposes, making the frontiers both of France and Germany in the Rhineland part of the frontiers of the British Empire, and to that extent putting it within the discretion of European Powers to determine when Great Britain is to go to war on the continent of Europe.[2]

She had incidentally implicated herself indirectly in any major conflict on the eastern border as well—and all this despite the consideration that :

> It is surely also obvious that for permanent purposes she must stand outside the day-to-day internal political life of Europe, so that while she is concerned with those aspects of it which are of general world concern, she is not part and parcel of its internal political system or balance of power. It is only by maintaining this relative detachment that she can gain that freedom necessary to fulfil her functions in other parts of the world.[3]

This step, therefore, not merely failed to recognise the anomalous position of Great Britain in relation to the internal affairs of the Continent, but it also marked the adoption of a European rather than an Imperial policy regarding the problems of that region.[4] Hence a tremendous blow had been struck at the theory of the diplomatic unity of the Empire—that since it was a unit for defence, it must also present a united front in diplomacy, at least on all matters of first-rate importance—which

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xv. p. 638.
[2] *Ibid.* vol. xvi. p. 10.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 464.
[4] *Ibid.* pp. 16–22, 674–679.

had been the basis of Imperial policy since the first meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917. This theory had been the cause of the controversy induced by the various episodes of recent years, and had been badly strained thereby. Now the assumption that six self-governing nations could consult together sufficiently continuously and effectively to formulate a common policy for which they might assume joint responsibility appeared to have been abandoned—their external relations seemingly had become too diverse to be forced within so narrow a system. But the result could not fail to be an increased divergence between the foreign policies of Great Britain and the Dominions. Moreover, such disunion not only lessened the security of every part of the Commonwealth, but struck at the root of that influence which, with the whole weight of the Empire back of it, might have so contributed to the maintenance of peace and order in the world. Unfortunately no solution for the problem seemingly could be offered save pious advice. A clearer distinction should be drawn between questions of local and Imperial concern, complete liberty of action should be accorded the several members of the Commonwealth regarding the former, while co-operation in the latter should be stressed.

> The reasonable basis of association is surely that the nations of the Empire should recognise that they are equally concerned with world problems, with problems which may end in general war, and with problems which concern the vital interests of any member of the Commonwealth or the Commonwealth as a whole. With such problems they ought to deal collectively and with joint responsibility. Local international problems might be dealt with by each member nation on its own, informing its fellows of what is going on, but not expecting them to share responsibility until they are called in to share in the direction of policy also.[1]

It was assumed in general, apparently, both in Britain and the Dominions that Article 9 of the Pact secured legal recognition among the nations for the political settlement within the Empire—or at least few ventured to disturb the general satisfaction at the achievement of the *modus vivendi* by raising doubts as to its validity in international law. The principle of Article 9 had been in effective operation as regards commercial treaties, as we have seen, for more than half a century,[2] and this should lend

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xvi. pp. 474, 679.

[2] *Supra*, ch. iii.

support to the argument of its applicability in general treaties. Yet the nature of the analogy in the two cases deserves close examination. There had been, moreover, numerous precedents in the latter regard of recent years (albeit in treaties which had not become operative). Such a proviso had been embodied in the Tripartite Guarantee Treaty of June 28, 1919.[1] This was adhered to by Australia and New Zealand, but failed to become operative owing to American abstention. It attracted little notice at the time, although in the words of one commentator, " for the British Empire, the non-approval of Canada and South Africa had an even greater significance than that of the United States." [2] Mr. Lapointe urged the insertion of a similar stipulation in respect of Canada in any treaty replacing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, offering the same line of argument as that upon which the Locarno settlement was based,[3] and the failure of their Premier to adopt the same views in this connection was commented upon adversely by the Leader of the Opposition in Australia.[4] The draft treaties submitted by Lloyd George and Briand respectively at Cannes (January 12, 1922) both contained a reservation of Dominion obligation—a reservation which was strongly deprecated alike by Mr. Malcolm and Premier Massey in New Zealand.[5] But the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923, on the other hand, did not follow these precedents. Finally, it may fairly be contended that the embodiment of Article 9 in a general treaty of first-rate importance which actually became effective does mark the recognition in international law of decentralisation and limitation of liability as regards the members of the British Commonwealth. It remains to inquire into the degree of limitation which is therein implied.

The failure of the earlier agreements to become operative postponed the issue until Locarno, yet these provoked certain murmurs of apprehension. One writer, for instance, contended as follows regarding the position of the Dominions under the Tripartite Treaty: " Yet how could they make good their rights, and escape the consequences of belligerency to their nations and trade, save by a declaration of secession? It is

[1] This was the only one of the Peace Treaties not signed by Dominion plenipotentiaries.

[2] *Round Table*, vol. xiv. p. 501.

[3] *Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 548–549, 562 (April 27, 1921).

[4] *Ibid.* p. 868 (July 21, 1921).

[5] *Ibid.* vol. iii. p. 375.

surely obvious that the precedent of the Treaty of 1919 is far too dangerous to be repeated."[1] So in discussing the Locarno Pact Lord Parmoor doubtless had this alternative of secession in mind when he warned that the Dominions would still be belligerents if war broke out, hence should not be left in a position to claim they were not bound because not consulted in the first instance.[2] He probably stated the position of the Dominions under the treaty accurately when he said :

> It is true that Mr. Chamberlain inserted a clause protecting Dominion interests, so that the Dominions were not obliged to send troops or any form of assistance in the event of war arising from the Locarno Treaty ; but if Britain goes to war, the rest of the Empire automatically goes to war, and no general election in Canada or vote by the Canadian Parliament can alter this international fact, but under international law she still remains the enemy of Britain's enemies.[3]

Mr. Jebb in commenting on Article 9 advances another view as follows :

> According to the popular and possibly official idea it assures the right of a Dominion or India not to become an active belligerent, except by its own choice, in the event of a British war arising out of the treaty. But since the Dominions have long possessed and exercised this right, no such provision was necessary in their case. Surely the true effect of the wording is to exempt non-participating Dominions or India from the " obligation " of even passive belligerency, and to give them automatically the status of neutrals.[4]

The present writer cannot accept this argument. It is too reminiscent of the assumption upon which so many less serious commentators proceed—that recognition of a convention in Imperial constitutional law automatically makes it part of the law of nations. Granted that the Dominions' right of passive belligerency has long been admitted within the Commonwealth, is it wise to assume that Article 9 does more than mark the first instance of international recognition of this right ? At all events it would appear unsafe to conclude that mere silence upon the wider issue constitutes acceptance of the more extreme Nationalist claim, or to place other than the strictest construction upon the

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xiii. p. 688 ; *cf.* regarding the Cannes proposals, Sifton, "Some Canadian Constitutional Problems," in *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. iii. p. 16.
[2] *Journal*, vol. vii. p. 21.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 780.
[4] *Op. cit.* p. 114.

terms of the treaty. It is especially noteworthy that when Mr. Lapointe (March 30, 1927) was interrogated specifically upon this issue in the Canadian House, he refused point-blank to commit himself beyond the assertion that no active obligations were involved.[1]

The limitation of Dominion liability in the Locarno settlement, then, seems to go thus far and no farther. A distinction must be drawn between their active obligations and their legal status. The Dominions are not guarantors of the treaty, unless they expressly so desire. They are not bound in relation either to the Mother Country or other nations to participate actively or render assistance in case of breach of its provisions. But Article 9 apparently goes no farther than this and throws no light on the problem lying beyond. It would seem that the Dominions remain legally parts of the Empire and would automatically become involved in war under the treaty, unless they chose to secede and could secure recognition for their secession. There is another aspect to the question which should be considered. A Canadian Nationalist is quoted as saying: "I do not foresee a major war in which England will be concerned which will not be a League of Nations war as well, in which case we shall be doubly called upon to take part in it."[2]

The possibility of Dominion "neutrality" in case of conflict, of their ability to assert as against foreign nations that discretion regarding participation in Empire wars which has been claimed by Nationalists from Laurier on, will be discussed presently. The probability is that in a localised dispute such a question would not arise, and Article 9 would prove fully effective for its purpose. In the case of a major conflagration, however, the Dominions could hardly avoid being dragged in for one reason or another—Article 9, theories of imperial relationship, or asser-

[1] Mr. LAPOINTE: "In any case where any other government may be involved in active obligations—and the hon. member is referring to a case in which there would be such obligations—then the definite assent of the government involved must be given."

Mr. GARLAND: "Is this the implication of the Minister's remarks, that Canada in future will hold a neutral position unless she has given her assent to participation in such a treaty?"

Mr. LAPOINTE: "The discussion of that phase of the matter would lead me into a long argument."

Mr. GARLAND: "But it is so essential." (Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, vol. lxii. p. 1803.)

[2] *Round Table*, vol. xvi. p. 707.

tions of neutrality notwithstanding. Or, on the other hand, assuming the theory that Article 9 automatically gives the Dominions the status of neutrals could be vindicated, international law would thereby impose such conditions as would immediately and effectively entail the disruption of the Commonwealth.

Upon whichever horn of the dilemma they may chance to become impaled, a serious situation has been created—in this case by the action of the Home Government. It does not appear, however, that such considerations have been thoroughly debated and weighed in any of the parliaments, nor has the recognition of and assent to this aspect of the situation on the part of the Dominion governments been made a matter of public record. Such decisions have been relegated to future developments. Once more the comment of *The Round Table* upon this problem may well be cited :

> If the foreign policy of the Empire is no longer to be regarded as one to which its six nations have jointly agreed and for which they are jointly responsible, this means that Great Britain—or any Dominion—in pursuit of her own external policy can commit her partners to belligerency without their consent—a state of affairs inconsistent with the doctrine of responsibility. . . . That does not mean that every treaty such as that of Locarno should necessarily be approved by all the parliaments of the Empire before it is ratified, though that is highly desirable, for such formal approval would be very difficult to obtain and would be tantamount to the assumption of an obligation to co-operate actively in warlike action to enforce the treaty, which is a different question. But it does mean that no part of the Empire ought in future to enter into any obligation involving the liability of war unless it had the formal answer of the other parts as to whether they consent to its doing so. So vital a step should never be undertaken unless it has been made perfectly clear whether the other parts are willing to accept the consequences of formal, though not active, belligerency, which its signature may involve.[1]

The factors here considered are primarily political, and if a major crisis should arise, it would doubtless be determined on the basis of such considerations by all parties, so that in comparison with the legal questions, the political implications of the Locarno settlement for the Empire are of transcending importance. Further light upon the political situation may be afforded by some notice of the reactions to the issue in the Dominion parliaments.

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xvi. pp. 676, 684.

Reactions in the Dominions to the Locarno Pact

The attitude, especially the official attitude, of Canada at this time toward Imperial commitments was exemplified in two significant debates. The first (March 22, 1926) was on motion of J. S. Woodsworth (Labour): "That in the opinion of this House, Canada should refuse to accept any responsibility for complications arising from the foreign policy of the United Kingdom." [1] It is important not because of the general and representative character of the discussion, but because the silence of the Government under the circumstances seems to place it in the position of endorsing the sentiments voiced by the proponents of the resolution. Mr. Woodsworth has as a rule been distinctively willing to recognise the impossibility of thoroughgoing Canadian aloofness from world politics, but in this case his suspicion of British Tory machinations was controlling, and he stood forth as an Isolationist. Incidentally he pointed out that if Canada was to assert her autonomy in external relations, it behooved her to have a foreign policy, whereas, with the Government permitting no discussion of the subject until after midnight of the last sitting during the previous session, no one seemed to know whether Canada had a policy or not.

Mr. Bourassa had during an earlier debate expressed his opinion of the relation of Canada to the Locarno commitments by the observation that:

> The eight million people of Canada had less say in the destinies of the Empire, less say in the framing of such Imperial policies, which their forefathers had the wisdom to avoid, but into which they had thrown themselves up to the neck since the South African War, than the humblest sweeper in the streets of Liverpool or the poorest cattle-drover on the roads of Scotland.[2]

He now devoted his principal attention to the reprobation of those Canadians who, in view of such a situation, had so far lost their sense of British citizenship, of equality of status and obligation, as to demonstrate their eagerness for responsibilities which the Home Government would not think of imposing upon them. In concluding, he made a statement upon Imperial relations which may, however, remove certain misapprehensions regarding his policies. He said:

[1] *Journal*, vol. vii. pp. 777–792. [2] *Ibid.* p. 297.

I stated twenty-five years ago at the time of the South African War, and I state again to-night with the same conviction, that I am not longing for secession. I believe we need for a long time, not the protection of Great Britain—I do not think Great Britain can afford us any protection that we are in need of—but I prize the association with Great Britain. . . . I believe the association with Great Britain is a great help to us if we view it in the right way, and if we act upon it with the same British spirit of self-determination and self-respect. . . . We have a duty to perform by Canada ; the Australian has a duty to perform by Australia, and the British have a duty to Great Britain which no other country can accomplish. If we only revive these principles, those elementary truths in the minds of the people of this country, or in other portions of the Empire, I am quite sure that this great problem of inter-Imperial relations will soon be solved.[1]

The Britannic controversy turns largely upon the issue whether the ultra-Nationalist mode of achieving such a purpose will not, in view of the characteristic self-assertiveness of foreign Powers, defeat its own ends. W. W. Kennedy (Lib. Con.) maintained that the resolution was unnecessary in that there was no more doubt as to Canada's status than as to how she stood upon such questions, that behind it there was a purpose to stir up dissension and discord, and that far from adding to her status as a nation, the declaration it called for was thankless and degrading. It was left to Sir George Perley (after charging the Premier with indifference or neglect in his relations with the Home Government, and urging the detailing of a Cabinet Minister to London to maintain contact and consultation) to fill the rôle taken invariably by the Premier in the days of Sir Wilfrid Laurier towards resolutions of this nature as well as those of the Imperialists. He took exception to the form of the motion, pointing out that it called for the repudiation of a responsibility they had never been asked to assume, and involved the future status of the Dominion, which should not be dealt with in this indirect way. Thus he secured the adjournment of the debate.

In the second of these debates, which occurred on June 21,[2] the Conservative side of the House was almost as conspicuous for its failure to participate actively as the Government had been in the first. Premier King, although the outstanding advocate in the Empire of parliamentary decision in matters of foreign policy, had not as yet been conspicuous in the application of it.

[1] *Journal*, vol. vii. pp. 788–789.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 530–549.

Now, however, following Australia's example, he moved that the House register formal approval of the 1923 Conference resolution and furthermore record its opinion that before the Canadian Government advised ratification of any treaties affecting Canada or involving military or economic sanctions, parliamentary approval should be obtained. The Premier explained his purpose in introducing the resolution as follows :

> One reason as to why it appears to be desirable at this time that Parliament should give its approval to the course of procedure recommended is that at the proceedings of the forthcoming Imperial Conference matters may come up with respect to existing agreements or treaties in which the representatives of the Dominion of Canada will be asked to express their views and may possibly be asked as to commitments which it may be thought desirable to have made in the name of the country. One case in point is that of the so-called Locarno Agreement. The British Government has intimated that it is intended that at the Imperial Conference all phases of these agreements and their significance with respect to the Empire as a whole and to the different parts of the Empire shall be discussed. It is important therefore that this House of Commons should say whether or not it desires, before any binding agreement is entered into on the part of Canada with respect to the Locarno Pact, Parliament shall be consulted and shall be given an opportunity of approving before action is taken by the Government in this regard.

Dealing more specifically with the Government's attitude toward the Locarno Pact, he continued :

> Up to the present the Government has seen no reason why it should at this time assume obligations which it is not obliged to assume under the Locarno Pact, more particularly as the British Government itself has expressed the desire that a final decision in this matter be not reached until after the whole question has been fully discussed at the Imperial Conference. . . . It has also been felt by the British Government that before arriving at any final judgment the governments of the Dominions would desire the fullest possible information as to the situation created by the treaty in relation to the whole field of foreign policy and defence. It has been suggested that there should be a general examination of the whole situation, and that such examination should be deferred until there had first been an opportunity of discussion between Ministers of Great Britain and the representatives of the Dominions and of India, such as would be afforded at the Imperial Conference which has been now fixed for the month of October. Up to the present time the Government has not signified its acceptance of the Locarno Agreement, and the Government does not propose to reach a final decision in the matter until after the Imperial Conference.

The point I wish to bring out very clearly in this regard is that this Government, if representing Canada at the Imperial Conference, will take the position with respect to the Locarno Agreement, regardless of what decision may be reached, that Parliament will be asked to approve of the acceptance of the Locarno Pact before the Dominion of Canada becomes a party thereto.

Such an attitude involved no recommendation upon his part, nor did he offer one. The Premier next turned his attention to the opposing leader's notorious Hamilton speech,[1] from which he quoted the crucial statement :

> If ever the time should come when the spectre of 1914 should again appear, I believe it would be best not only that Parliament should be called, but that the decision of the Government, which, of course, would have to be given promptly, should be submitted to the judgment of the people at a general election before troops should leave our shores.

This, Mr. King maintained, meant ignoring Parliament, the one body representative of the nation as a whole, and the precipitation by the Government, after it had reached its decision, of a " khaki election " with all the attendant dangers of civil war—a policy which the present administration and the Liberal Party heartily repudiated.

Whatever may have been thought of his logic at times, Mr. Bourassa had always been one of the best-informed members of the Canadian House upon external relations, and was now, perhaps, pre-eminent among them in this respect. Partly from the softening of time and the consciousness of achieved objectives, but more from the evolution in his countrymen's attitude since the War, he had become far more representative of Canadian opinion than was the intransigent of twenty-five years back. He pronounced the Premier's resolution—warning as it did the Home Government that it could not count upon Canadian support in advance in external matters—satisfactory on the face of it, but already violated in spirit by the withholding from Parliament of the various interchanges relating to Locarno.[2]

[1] This speech, delivered at Hamilton, Ontario (November 16, 1925), seemingly was intended as a prelude to the breaching of a " solid Quebec " by the Conservative Party. It is generally recognised as most unfortunate and by no means met unanimous endorsation from other leaders of his party, see *Canadian Annual Review* (1925–26), p. 49.

[2] Mr. Bourassa had raised (January 22 and March 15) the question of bringing down the despatches between the Home Government and the

Was there to be no expression of opinion from them prior to the Conference? The treaty had been discussed in every other Dominion parliament, and not the "spirit of Locarno" but the terms in which that spirit was expressed had been rejected save by Britain. Canadian acceptance would not merely be in face of those pronouncements but of her own course regarding Article 10 of the League Covenant. The settlement itself imposed additional obligations, and because it was tied to the Versailles Treaty and left the Near East question unsettled precluded lasting peace. Fortunately the Home Government had not bound the Dominions to such an arrangement. In the case of Canada there was the additional objection that nine chances in ten it meant British intervention on the side of Germany against France.

Mr. Bourassa proceeded to consider the wider issue of Imperial relations and Canada's future. Always a foe of economic imperialism (especially British imperialism) he was now able from the increasing dissociation of British from Dominion policies to attack his bugaboo without entailing at confusion with the other "Imperialism" which had marred his utterance of bygone years. "One Imperial policy!" he exclaimed. "Have we the same interests in Irak and Mosul the oil-hunters of England have?" Why should they not go back to the old common-sense policy of their forefathers—Canada first and last? Perhaps this was a parochial policy. He did not call it an Isolationist policy. Rather it was the exercise of their responsibility according to their situation, political, geographic and economic—a policy which, it was important to realise, the Englishman habitually applied to his own situation. Though he would choose British Imperialism rather than annexation to the United States, just as he would prefer independence to close Imperial partnership, yet they should remember that regarding the great issue of foreign policy Canada was British by accident but American, geographically, for ever, and that Sir Esmé Howard Lord Grey and Lord Fisher, if Canadians themselves did not

various Dominions relating to Locarno, intimating that the obstacles to such publication seemed to have been interposed by one of the Dominions, but was informed by the Premier that the Home Government considered publication would be prejudicial to the free interchange of opinions as confidential information relating to the views of foreign governments was involved (*Journal* vol. vii. pp. 303–305).

recognised that the Monroe Doctrine must be the basis of their policy.[1] In characteristic style he argued :

> From a Canadian point of view, or from a British point of view, let us serve notice to the world at large, not in any spirit of animosity toward Great Britain, but in full consciousness of what we owe to our people, that Canada is prepared to uphold morally any real move for peace which may be taken in Europe or anywhere, but that Canada is not prepared to arm her youth and to spend her millions for the sake of any foreign policy with which we are not connected by necessity and from which Canada is disconnected by all the exigencies of her natural situation. . . . If we are to save Canada from internal dissension, from the turmoil of European politics or from American absorption, it will be by bending all our energies . . . to make the different sections of this country one united people for Canada. . . . To subscribe to undefined and unlimited engagements, or even defined and limited engagements which go beyond the sphere of our action . . . is wrong. There, I say, British, yes, but Canadian first ; if necessary secession from Britain rather than sacrifice of Canada ; Canada alongside of Britain so long as it is possible, but Canada first and for ever.

Taking the circumstances all told surrounding this debate into consideration, Mr. Bourassa's statement may fairly be taken as reflecting the attitude of the Government itself. They assumed a purely receptive attitude, although Mr. Morin, a pronounced Nationalist later called to the Cabinet, maintained that since Canada had rejected the Protocol surely she should not assume greater risks under the Locarno Agreement, denounced the incurring of obligations to conduct police wars, and on the legal aspect, held that under Article 9 Canada would in case of war become merely a passive belligerent, whereas ratification of the Pact would involve active participation, and since they had taken no part in framing it, would impair their status. On the Conservative side Mr. Cahan expressed himself as at one with the Premier in upholding the supremacy of their Parliament in Canadian affairs, though he earnestly desired the maintenance of the British connection, deprecated the precipitation of an election in case of war, and hoped that the Locarno Treaty when submitted to Parliament would be discussed in a non-partisan spirit. Ex-Mayor T. L. Church of Toronto as usual delivered a good

[1] In dealing in the earlier debate with the argument that they owed support in return for British protection, he had also cited Lord Fisher to the effect that Canada must look to the Monroe Doctrine and the United States for that (*Journal*, vol. vii. p. 788).

old-time Imperialist speech, denouncing the Chicago Drainage Canal and Canadian efforts to settle this question unaided, annexation, separation and the resolution which implied it, or any change in their status, and declared :

> If the British authorities recommend the Locarno Treaty as necessary for the defence of the Empire, I think Canada should sign it. If Britain tells us our safety depends upon it, that settles it ; let us adopt it unanimously. After accepting the rights, privileges and prerogatives of British protection, Canada should be prepared to accept some of the responsibilities and burdens. We should show our self-respect in that way and no longer permit the British taxpayer to provide for our maritime protection.

The elements represented by the National Progressive Party in Canada have been much more interested in domestic problems than in external relations. Their leaders have been markedly Autonomist, at once Isolationist and favourably disposed toward the British connection, though in somewhat uncritical fashion, and it cannot be said that they have contributed notably to the elucidation either of issues of foreign policy or problems of constitutional relationships. On this occasion Mr. Forke, for instance, began with the complaint that they were not as yet in full control of their national destinies, in that Parliament was powerless to change the distribution of powers under their federal system or to undertake Senate reform—although neither issue actually involved Canadian autonomy, since the obstacles in both cases were purely domestic. Regarding Imperial relations, he understood how fears for their own safety out in the Pacific should incline Australia and New Zealand to closer bonds with the British Parliament, but as for Canada he held that Canadians would best serve the interests of the whole by developing their own country. They should consider well before becoming embroiled in European entanglements, and though something more might perhaps be done as regards naval defence, yet their only danger seemed to be through the Imperial connection. Mr. Garland rejoiced that Canada had passed from slavery to freedom, in war as in economic life. The war unity of the Empire had gone and its diplomatic unity was going. Article 10 of the League Covenant should be drastically amended or eliminated. The Locarno commitments were far more serious than those of the Sèvres or Lausanne Treaties in which they had

taken no part and Canada should remain free to act as occasion arose. Though they would freely render aid to Britain if need arose, Canada would remain a more friendly part of the Commonwealth as an independent nation within it than under conditions entailing inevitable participation in all the complications in which Britain was herself involved.

In the Australian House the main discussion of the Locarno Agreement was on January 14 during the debate on the Address and on August 3 and 4 in the course of a debate on the forthcoming Imperial Conference.[1] The mover of the Address in reply averred that if they came to the conclusion that Britain had entered into the Pact on defensive grounds and that Australia's safety depended on British power, their course was clear. Premier Bruce himself assumed a favourable attitude. This treaty was the most helpful sign of the continuance of peace that they had had in Europe since the War, it had been welcomed by all political parties on the Continent and in Britain, it was in conformity with the Covenant and in reality strengthened the League of Nations, and it might open the way to disarmament. The question of Australian adhesion thereto, however, called for their serious consideration. So important an issue called for a Conference of the Empire in which the views of the several parliaments should be given weight, after which it should be submitted again to them for final decision. They should not flatter themselves that because of Australia's remoteness from Europe they were immune from its troubles. Britain's only danger at present came from her exposed flank in that region, and their own security in Australia for some time to come would be wrapped up with that of Britain. Hence they had a direct interest in the disarmament and pacification of Europe and they should do all in their power to further these aims.

The Prime Minister went on to enumerate his views regarding Imperial relationships—views which still constituted an important counterpoise to the contemporaneous utterances of Mackenzie King and Hertzog. With the War there had emerged a new realisation of the obligations of the Dominions as part of the Empire, and of the necessity of consulting with them and allowing them a voice in framing its foreign policies. They could never again be placed in the position of being involved in war without

[1] *Journal*, vol. vii. pp. 321–329, 820–835; see also pp. 578–584, 814–820.

having been consulted or having been put in possession of information as to the causes of conflict. Full partnership within the Empire was now recognised, but the new basis of relationship had created problems and evoked demands in certain quarters for a clearer definition of Dominion status. The Dominions were completely independent as regards their domestic affairs, and the only limitation on their external relations was the injunction to co-operate and consult regarding negotiations affecting more than one part of the Empire—a limitation which applied to Great Britain as well as to the Dominions. The Imperial Conference furnished an effective agency for all ordinary questions of foreign policy, and in the intervals the Premiers were kept fully informed of Britain's every act in relation to foreign affairs. Since this consultative system existed, and since they availed themselves of it to their entire satisfaction, it followed that they should be prepared to endorse policies about which their advice had been asked and which they had a share in shaping. The Dominions were at a disadvantage, however, in cases of sudden crisis, in which the entire outlook changed suddenly. Here the High Commissioners, he suggested, might fill the rôle of Ambassadors, be informed of all developments and so keep their Governments in touch with them. This was a problem for the Imperial Conference.

One point raised a serious difficulty calling for their earnest consideration—the question of their position in the event of war. When the King was at war all his subjects were at war, although it lay with each Dominion to determine the extent of active participation. The suggestion that the Dominions should communicate to the World Powers a declaration of international independence and claim recognition as separate international units, though it had met a measure of academic endorsement from certain British statesmen, was hopelessly irreconcilable with the idea of unity of the Empire. The dismemberment of the Empire would not merely be tragic to itself, but would mean the dissolution of the greatest force making for peace which the world then knew:

> Australia's aspiration must be a closer linking together of all the self-governing portions of the Empire, with as full a recognition of the independence of status of all the self-governing Dominions as is compatible with the recognition of our mutual British nationality, and the

maintenance of the closest possible relations between the English-speaking peoples. That, I believe, is the view which this community takes to-day. . . . Our safety is ensured by the fact that we are part of the British Empire, and our surest line of defence is co-operation with Great Britain. I suggest that it is impossible for us to escape our obligations whilst we remain inside the British Empire, and that it is impossible to make a declaration of independence.

Applying this principle to Article 9 of the Locarno Pact, although they might remain aloof from the treaty by their silence, or might decide to have nothing to do with it by express declaration, although they had neither informed the Home Government that they approved it nor had opposed it during the negotiations, yet they should remember that any flagrant act of aggression would set the whole of western Europe aflame and possibly jeopardise the security and existence of Great Britain, in which case they could not suggest neutrality on their part.[1] There should be the fullest discussion of these problems at the Conference, and if possible all parts of the Empire should adopt the same attitude towards them.

[1] The Premier's expression of opinion involved him in the following colloquy:

"THE PRIME MINISTER: While we may not have anything to do with the treaty by express declaration, we cannot escape from its consequences should the malice of circumstance bring it into operation, otherwise than by leaving the Empire and claiming to be an independent state. In the circumstances I have envisaged, we could not be indifferent to Great Britain's fate, because, apart from other considerations, our security and that of Great Britain are inseparably bound up with each other.

"Mr. CHARLTON: Canada and South Africa do not adopt that attitude, nor have we ever done so before.

"Mr. WATT: That may make our position awkward, but it does not make it wrong.

"THE PRIME MINISTER: My understanding of the British Commonwealth of Nations is that it is governed by an unwritten treaty of mutual guarantee, and therein lies its strength. The different parts of the Empire mutually guarantee one another.

"Mr. CHARLTON: The right hon. gentleman proposes to take away our option and make our guarantee compulsory."

"THE PRIME MINISTER: We have to consider what are the advantages in our maintaining silence in respect of this question, or in our frankly affirming and making it known beforehand that we intend to stand by Great Britain in the fulfilment of her guarantee.

"Mr. CHARLTON: The right hon. gentleman had better wipe out the League of Nations altogether. That is what he is coming to.

"THE PRIME MINISTER: I think that the effect of the treaty will be to strengthen the League. In the present position of our relationship with Great Britain, I think that silence on this matter cannot conceivably, in the final analysis, diminish our obligations . . . At the Imperial Conference there should be the fullest opportunity to consider the position of the Dominions regarding all such treaties. If possible, all parts of the Empire should adopt the same attitude in regard to these matters." (*Journal*, vol. vii. p. 826.)

Ex-Premier Hughes was even more emphatic than Mr. Bruce on the subject of Dominion status and more Imperialistic in his attitude to the Pact. The argument that the Conference might completely alter the status of the various nations of the Empire rested on a thorough misapprehension. They were in all but name independent; they could even secede from the Empire, though not under the terms of the Constitution. Nothing could be done to give them greater freedom than they now had, so that the only way in which they could alter their status was by diminishing their powers. Hence he was as strongly opposed as ever to any attempt to reduce the Imperial Constitution to writing. Australia was part of the Empire, and by no means at their command could they hope to defend themselves alone now or within the next quarter-century. Fortunately for them they were a member of a league of nations in fact, not on paper, and in his opinion the proper basis for Imperial defence was a *per capita* levy on the white populations of its various parts, although he did admit that Britain, because of her other possessions overseas, should pay relatively more than the Dominions. He believed also that the Locarno Treaty should be ratified. It represented a distinct advance, removed the greatest danger to the peace of Europe, and they knew that what disturbed Europe must disturb Britain and therefore imperil their own peace. Out of the foreign policy of the Empire might come war, hence they should have a share in moulding it. This would involve them in no greater responsibility than at present, for if Britain was at war, they too were at war, and the idea that Britain could be at war and Australia at peace was absurd. Mr. Watt endorsed these sentiments. If, as had been suggested, the Empire should declare that its component parts were not only separate but entirely independent, though allied entities, outside nations would laugh. Intended as a gesture, it would be regarded as a jest. The world's concept of the Empire still was clearly that it was one entity, and the strength of the Dominions was centred in that belief, that the British people were as unanimous and united as if they still lived in the Homeland.

In contrast to these expressions of opinion, the attitude of Mr. Matthew Charlton, Leader of the Opposition, was strongly Nationalist. He disapproved not merely of Australian adhesion to the Locarno Pact, but of the settlement itself. Replying on the

Address he refused as yet to commit himself, but launched a general attack on the principle of pacts between nations similar to that voiced by the Labour Party in Britain. With the example of the western nations to support them, Russia and Turkey had recently made an agreement; such competing alliances were not conducive to world peace; rather there should be a world conference to discuss international problems, and every nation should be urged to support the League. Hitherto Australia had been free to take such action as she liked in the event of the Mother Country becoming involved in war, but agreements of this nature were liable to implicate them whether they approved or not, and the experience of the Great War should be a lesson to them.

In the August debate he was more emphatically against becoming compromised with the settlement. It was well known that the Premier advocated an alteration of their present relationships to the extent of giving them a voice in Imperial foreign affairs. He joined issue with him on that. This could only mean compelling them to fight in all of Britain's wars, to send forces overseas without consulting their own people, and would tend to the disintegration of the Empire. In support of this contention he quoted as follows from the Melbourne *Age* of March 27:

> The persistently repeated statement that Australia demands a voice in the settlement of each item of Britain's foreign policy is an utter misrepresentation. . . . Were we to be mixed up in all of Great Britain's foreign troubles, largely arising from the business of British investors and manufacturers, causes of differences between the Commonwealth and the Mother Country . . . would become numerous and serious enough to threaten Imperial disruption.[1]

Clearly the Home Government did not wish to compel any of the Dominions to become embroiled in troubles arising out of her treaties; it was well known that Canada and South Africa would not subscribe to the Pact, and they would be well advised to adopt the same attitude. Under a policy of non-interference from the Home Government Australia had made wonderful progress. They had never been compelled to take part in any dispute between Britain and a foreign nation; they had always responded readily, but of their own free will. Why depart from a policy which had served them so effectively? It was incorrect

[1] *Journal*, vol. vii. p. 830.

to argue with the Premier that because of the Great War they were henceforth closely identified with the concerns of Europe; they must work out their own destiny in their own way and could not afford to become embroiled in this fashion.

On June 25 a similar discussion had occurred, in which Mr. Charlton was able to adduce a concrete illustration to enforce his point.[1] In accordance with arrangements providing for exchanges to facilitate training, H.M.A.S. *Brisbane* had been attached to the China squadron, and while serving with this unit appeared to have taken part in current operations connected with disturbances in China. When this was called in question, the Premier excused it on the ground that no state of war existed and no complications would properly ensue. Mr. Charlton, however, took a serious view of the situation. The Australian Navy had been created for the defence of Australia, not for the purpose of interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries. They had opposed the Protocol for threatening their domestic policy, then what of this interference on their part? The Australian Navy was to have been under the control of Australia; they had the right to decide for themselves regarding participation in British disputes, but in this case they had been dragged in without knowledge or consideration of its merits. Furthermore, serious international complications were implied in a system which permitted them to be thus compromised in operations in a war zone. He, for one, protested at the establishment of such a precedent. Mr. Hughes, although he appeared to excuse the operations in China on the ground that Sovietism should be attacked wherever found, on this occasion came to the support of the Leader of the Opposition with a strong protest that allowing their navy to pass from their control in this fashion constituted a grave departure from the sound principles laid down at its founding. Imperial partnership did not necessitate becoming involved in a policy of adventure. If the measures adopted in Chinese waters did not constitute an act of war, then what did? But the mere existence of a state of war did not cause their ships to pass to British control; it was for their own Government to decide what should be done with them.

It appears from these discussions that certain elements which in the Canadian House had recently been conspicuous for their

[1] *Journal*, vol. vi. pp. 793–799.

silence were not merely still vocal in Australia, but occupied the Government benches there and had the Premier for their spokesman. There was the same alignment as in Canada between aloofness and active co-operation, the same phenomenon of essential agreement as to the fundamentals of their status combined with differences of emphasis which resulted in the drawing of antithetical conclusions from these assumptions. It was due primarily to the contrast in the (presumed) situation of these two Dominions as regards defence, so it would seem, that in the one Co-operation was still dominant and in the other Isolationism. There was nothing new in Premier Bruce's utterances; they embodied principles recognised as Co-operationist since Versailles. Hence he emphatically denied any intention of altering the basis of Imperial relationship; he merely sought improvement in the methods of consultation in order to make that relationship, as he understood it, more effective.[1] Mr. Charlton, on the other hand, apparently still felt that apprehension voiced by Canadian Nationalists prior to the 1921 Conference and even later at times—the forthcoming Conference might engineer some arrangement whereby the Dominions would contract themselves out of their existing freedom, as now secured by Article 9, and the Australian Government might signalise this by adhesion to the Locarno Pact.

In New Zealand what still appeared to be the dominant opinion offered a further marked contrast in attitudes within the Commonwealth. Far from viewing the contemporary process of decentralisation with complacency, it met what was occurring in the other Dominions with perennial expressions of apprehension, and the main theme of discussions of Imperial foreign relations was still the necessity of devising machinery of consultation adequate to stem this tide. When asked by Mr. Holland (July 1, 1925) whether he favoured allowing the Dominions to contract themselves out of the Pact, Mr. Parr replied for the Cabinet with an emphatic negative: "No, certainly not; once allow that and we cease to be a united Empire."[2] The attitude of the Government toward the treaty was expressed as follows by Premier Coates at a public function on November 17:

As far as this Dominion is concerned the Pact will be submitted in due course for ratification by our Parliament; but we have already

[1] *Journal*, vol. vii. p. 830. [2] *Ibid.* vol. vi. p. 847.

intimated to His Majesty's Government that the New Zealand Government has been satisfied to leave the negotiations in their hands, and that we will fall in behind them in whatever course seems to them necessary to ensure peace among the nations of western Europe.

Ratification by New Zealand Parliament is necessary, because the Dominions are expressly exempted by the terms of the Pact from its obligations, unless they elect to ratify it. Those obligations only exceed the Covenant of the League, to which New Zealand is a signatory, by the guarantee to Germany against attack by France—a negligible addition to our existing covenant to come to the aid of France, Belgium and Italy against an attack by Germany. But if our responsibilities were materially increased by the Pact, I do not believe that any true New Zealander would desire to sever our country from the credit of the great achievement of the Locarno negotiations.[1]

The Government's attitude upon the conduct of Imperial foreign relations in general was succinctly stated by the Premier on a similar occasion in June, when he said :

While New Zealand reserved the right to be consulted in matters of negotiation with European Powers, when New Zealand had expressed its opinion, it left it to the Imperial authorities to make what arrangements they thought best. The Homeland was our guard and protection, and it was essential that the Dominion should render her every assistance, particularly just now when Great Britain was suffering an industrial depression and struggling to regain her trade supremacy.[2]

Sir Francis Bell supplemented this with the contention that sudden crises in foreign affairs, such as Chanak,

can be dealt with only by one body, His Majesty's Government at the seat of the Empire, and any interference on our part with the Imperial Government in its dealing with emergency cases with foreign Powers is mischievous and not useful. What New Zealand has said consistently for the last thirteen years . . . is that we wish to be consulted about matters that absolutely affect us individually, but with regard to the Empire's foreign affairs, we are content to follow and act under the advice and conform to the action of His Majesty's Government in London.[3]

[1] Quoted in *Round Table*, vol. xvi., at p. 443.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 441.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 214. *The Dominion*, Wellington organ of the Reform Party, criticised this utterance from an even more Imperialistic standpoint as follows : "The statement quoted certainly cannot be regarded either as accurately reflecting the view generally taken in this country, or as representing a practicable basis for policy. It is, in fact, impossible to divide Imperial affairs into categories, one of them embodying questions in which this country or any other Dominion is concerned, and the other those in which it is not concerned. The Dominions are virtually concerned in every development of the Imperial foreign policy" (*ibid.* p. 215).

As much, perhaps, on account of the attitude adopted by the Government toward the negotiations, as because of the delay due to the illness of the late Premier, the discussion both of the Protocol and the Pact in New Zealand was notable for the long official silence maintained upon these issues.[1] Mr. Chamberlain in killing the Protocol had said he did so with the concurrence of all the Dominions, which constituted one piece of information. There were references to the Pact during the debate on the Address in the House on July 1, on which occasion the Labour members, invoking the attitude of the same party in Britain, expressed aversion to the whole principle.[2] It was not until September 25, 1925, however, that the papers were brought down and a debate was afforded upon both proposals simultaneously.[3] There was also further discussion of Imperial relations and the forthcoming Conference during the debate on the Address in June.[4]

The burden of the argument of both Opposition Leaders was, as might be expected, the importance of full opportunity for Parliamentary discussion of external relations. Mr. Holland, Leader of the Labour Party, which in 1926 became the official Opposition, cited Mr. Chamberlain as saying that all the Dominions save New Zealand had been kept fully informed of all proceedings in relation to the Pact, but that the latter had left the decision in the hands of the Home Government. Now, just as the Protocol had been rejected on behalf of the Dominions without Parliament's sanction or the people's approval, so had the Pact been accepted. It seemed as if the New Zealand Government had given the Foreign Secretary a blank cheque. This was a most dangerous policy for them to pursue. On fundamentals, on the other hand, the attitude of the other Leader, now Mr. Forbes, was strikingly in agreement with the Government. He maintained that the feeling in the country was for giving the statesmen in the Old Land the freest possible hand in Imperial questions; no doubt there was frequent necessity for quick decisions and no one expected the contents of confidential cables to be divulged. Furthermore, Imperial matters should not be treated as party questions. Yet it was essential that the House should discuss foreign questions, so that the Home authorities

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xvi, pp. 439–440. [2] *Journal*, vol. vi. pp. 847–850.
[3] *Ibid.* vol. vii. pp. 143–152. [4] *Ibid.* pp. 863–870.

might know the mind of the country and act accordingly. An agreement for joint action on the part of the New Zealand Government would be of little value without the confidence and support of the people behind it. Present methods for such expression of opinion were inadequate and he thought that a Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs would assist matters. As for the Security Pact, if it made for better understanding, there was no objection to it, but, if it meant added responsibilities, differences were likely to arise, as they did not want to become involved in war over European boundaries. The approaching Conference, in his opinion, would be one of the most important thus far held, for although they in New Zealand had heretofore been willing to abide by the decisions of the statesmen at home who understood and could control the situation on the spot, it was now evident that the policy in connection with the Dominions as a whole had reached a point where some change was needed. As compared with utterances in the other Dominions this was surely a remarkably temperate pronouncement.

In South Africa the Nationalists were in power, Isolationism was the accepted policy, and the Locarno issue—save for the protests of General Smuts already cited—was hardly accorded a modicum of Parliamentary attention. As emphatically Isolationist as the more extreme wing of their Canadian exemplars, the Nationalists here were even more preoccupied with constitutional issues with the Home Government, with the legalistic aspects of the attainment of equality, to the neglect of international affairs and the external implications of their policies. But the Premier indicated that he intended carrying his conception of equality and independence further and demanding recognition for it outside the Commonwealth, among foreign nations, for he contended :

> Let us make it clear that we stand for freedom and independence, not in words, but in deeds. And then we must make it clear to the foreign Powers that each of us, each of the Dominions, is a Power the same as they are. And if that is done, then I say that you will be bringing about, that you will have brought about, the true spirit of a commonwealth of nations—a different spirit from the one existing to-day. You will then create a real, healthy and lasting commonwealth of nations.[1]

[1] *Journal*, vol. vii. p. 630.

This was further than Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Mackenzie King had gone, and assimilates the attitude of the South African Government to that of the more extreme Nationalist opinion in Canada.

In the Irish Free State parliamentary opinion corresponded to the Nationalism of Canada and South Africa, rather than to the attitude of Australia and New Zealand. This was the only Dominion thus far to have embodied the Laurier policy in express terms in the Constitution. In view of their proximity to Europe, however, the utility of this proviso was no mere academic question, and the interpretation of Article 9 of the Locarno Pact became vitally important.[1] They did not by any means feel safe to assume, as the other Dominions seemingly had done, that this condition exempted them from liability for British difficulties. The Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Thomas Johnson, urged the Minister of External Affairs to take the matter up with the other countries and the League in order to arrive at some understanding thereon. The view which he himself expressed was that taken by Premier King in connection with the Lausanne Treaty. He maintained :

> It is of very grave importance that some demur should be entered against the phraseology of the British representative's statement when he speaks of the British Empire being a very composite and peculiar political unit, consisting of a partnership of six nations standing on a footing of equality, and that there must be solidarity of action in any matter which affects the independence or honour of any one of the six. When we entered into the League of Nations we entered into obligations as an independent state. I understand that when the term " British Empire " is used in the discussion at the Assembly and in all the phraseology of the official documents of that Assembly it refers to Great Britain, her Dependencies and Crown Colonies, and not to the British Dominions or the Irish Free State. The representative of the British Government speaks in that statement as though these states, though independent members of the League of Nations, all comprise one political unit for purposes which might involve war. My view is : It is of the utmost importance to their security and to our freedom from liability to attack that the freedom of our citizens should not be involved in a war when the independence or honour of any one of the six nations is in jeopardy.[2]

[1] See the debates in the Dail of February 5 and June 2–3, 1926 (*Journal*, vol. vii. pp. 392–401, 676–681).

[2] *Journal*, vol. vii. p. 394. The reference is to a statement by a British delegate in the League Assembly 1925. Another Labour member insisted that the most effective way of asserting their status was by staying away from the Imperial Conference altogether.

Mr. Grattan Esmonde raised the very pertinent question of the apparent conflict between the obligation to render harbour and other facilities to Britain in case of war or strained relations imposed on them by Article 7 of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the exemption provided in Article 9 of the Pact. Was the former superseded by, or did it override the latter? On this point Professor Magennis acutely observed that no Great Power at war with England, and knowing of these obligations, would refrain from attacking them. Therefore it was necessary that their position be cleared up; it should be well understood that the Free State demanded precisely the same international footing as was claimed for themselves by South Africa and Canada. It was possible that through negotiation they might secure some guarantees, and that the Dominions, particularly South Africa and Australia, would support them in this effort. The Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Fitzgerald, was not able to contribute any definite pronouncement upon the question. He asserted emphatically, however, that not the British representative but only the Irish representatives were entitled to speak for the Irish Government and people in international gatherings. He agreed with Mr. Johnson that the term "British Empire" comprised merely Great Britain, and those states and dependencies directly or indirectly administered by it, and that the British Empire and the several Dominions were separate members of the League.[1]

He agreed, furthermore, that the reservations embodied in the Anglo-Irish Treaty, Article 49 of their Constitution and Article 9 of the Pact, created a position full of anomalies, and that in the event of a European war paper guarantees would prove worthless and doubts be resolved by brute force:

> It would be a valuable thing to have it established that the Free State would not be even technically at war, but from the point of view of utility the position of the Falkland Islands would be much more effective. I can only say that the general growth of opinion is towards the point . . . that it would be possible for Great Britain to be at war and other Dominions not to be even technically at war.[2]

He hoped that the forthcoming Imperial Conference would assist

[1] It should be noted, however, that neither of these contentions has necessarily any validity outside the Commonwealth itself.

[2] *Journal*, vol. vii. p. 679.

in clearing up the situation. A further important question raised by Mr. Johnson, that of their relation to treaties entered into by Britain prior to the establishment of the Free State,[1] Mr. Fitzgerald admitted to be a matter calling for further discussion and serious consideration. He himself took the view that they were bound by these prior commitments but their status was not abridged thereby, since as a sovereign entity they could denounce anything done in their name in the past.

The 1926 Conference and the Conduct of Foreign Policy

This brief survey of Parliamentary opinion throughout the Empire may perhaps serve to indicate the evolution in points of view which had taken place since 1921, even since 1923. The Co-operationist governments of the immediate post-War period still remained in power in the two Pacific Dominions, but there the Opposition, though favouring adhesion to an international settlement far less menacing to the integrity of the Commonwealth than the Locarno Pact, was Nationalist in general outlook. In the other Dominions Nationalism and aloofness were in the ascendant, and the erstwhile governments had modified their emphasis if not their objectives to the exigencies of the domestic situation. What leadership governments can exert in the education of electorates—and this is by no means insignificant in the case of issues remote from the average voter's ken—was in those cases thrown upon the side of the scale adverse to effective Imperial co-operation.

Three or four characteristic passages from the opening speeches of the Premiers may serve to illustrate the tone in which the Conference deliberations opened. Premier Baldwin, anxious as he was to secure the support of the Dominions for his colleague's experiment in foreign policy, emphasised the community of interests and interdependence of the members of the

[1] "Does the Minister accept the position that all conventions which were entered into by Great Britain before the Treaty of 1921 have been accepted by the Irish Free State? Are we reckoned to be parties, as an independent state, to these conventions which were entered into by Great Britain before the Irish Free State came into a separate existence? If that is the case with one convention, if it is deemed that we are automatically parties to those conventions, we shall understand the position But if they require a separate formal agreement confirming decisions, treaties and conventions which were entered into by Great Britain, then we ought to know how many of these conventions we have formally confirmed" (*Journal*, vol. vii. p. 674).

Commonwealth. In his welcome to the overseas representatives he reminded them :

We have gradually built up a whole network of contacts, extending throughout the entire fabric of our respective national organisations, official and unofficial. If we examine the matter we shall find that this network extends from the Crown which unites all by a common bond, through the whole range of government activities, justice, foreign policy, defence, finance, trade, communications, migration, education, and so forth, and is completed by a thousand social links—of race, religion, language, science, literature, drama, sport. From these we derive those common ideals, interests and mutual sympathies which put us as a group of nations in a family apart, whose several members stand in a relation to each other differing in kind as well as degree from that in which each stands towards the nations outside the family.

Continuing, he drew their attention to an interesting feature in the evolution of the conduct of Imperial foreign relations. At the meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1911, Sir Edward Grey had said :

If the action of the forces in different parts of the Empire is determined by divergent views of foreign policy, it is obvious that there cannot be union, and that the Empire would not consent to share an unlimited liability the risks of which it cannot gauge, because the liability would be imposed upon it by different parts of the Empire having different policies. Therefore the first point I want to make is this, that the creation of separate fleets has made it essential that the foreign policy of the Empire should be a common policy. If it is to be a common policy, it is obviously one on which the Dominions must be taken into consultation, which they must know, which they must understand, and which they must approve ; and it is in the hope and belief that the *foreign policy of this country* does command the assent and the approval, and is so reasonable that it must command the assent and approval, of the Dominions, that we wish to have a consultation, and I wish to explain as fully as I can the present situation of foreign affairs and what our views and prospects are.

In quoting this passage, Mr. Baldwin observed :

You will note Sir Edward Grey's reference to the " foreign policy of this country." The change that has taken place since then is aptly illustrated by the fact that it is now by universal admission no longer only a question of the foreign policy of this country. The problem before us is how to reconcile the principle of self-government in external as well as domestic affairs with the necessity for a policy in foreign affairs of general Imperial concern which will commend itself to a number of different governments and parliaments.[1]

[1] Cmd. 2769, pp. 7–8.

In his reply, in contrast, Premier King stressed diversity in the Commonwealth, a fitting prelude to arguments for diversity in foreign policy later in the proceedings. He said :

In this historic room are gathered representatives from every continent and all the Seven Seas, owing allegiance to a common King. Such a gathering makes one realise how great an error it would be to overlook in our plans and forecasts either the differences in situation and outlook of these several nations or the deep and lasting things they share in common. This diversity is sometimes left out of account in the habit we have formed of speaking of all the countries of the Empire whose representatives sit on this side of the table under the collective term of " the Dominions," as if they were not individual countries so much as examples of a type, and the differences between them were unimportant in comparison with the distinction between them all and the Mother Country. And yet a moment's reflection indicates how distinct they are in historical background, in racial composition, in economic organisation, in neighbours and neighbourhood relations, and perhaps increasingly in national character. On the other hand our very presence here indicates that we share in common many great problems, many commanding opportunities, many proud memories—the moving ceremony we witnessed this morning commemorates the greatest of these common memories—and, not least, common standards of public life and private conduct. In more senses than one we speak the same language in countless ways, in trade, in markets, in migration, one part needs and complements the other.[1]

General Hertzog on his part paid more attention to the constitutional situation, and adumbrated an exposition of the more extreme Nationalist attitude thereon.[2]

Following the opening speeches, the Conference, as had become the established practice, immediately proceeded to the consideration of foreign affairs :

On the 20th October the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made to the Conference a comprehensive statement on foreign affairs, and on the invitation of the Conference His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt attended and made a more detailed statement on the position and prospects in that country.

These statements were followed on the 25th October by a general discussion on foreign affairs, in which the Prime Ministers of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and Newfoundland, Mr. O'Higgins for the Irish Free State, Lord Winterton on behalf of the Indian Delegation, and Mr. Lapointe

[1] Cmd. 2769, p. 16.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 24–25.

for Canada, took part. General appreciation was expressed of Sir Austen Chamberlain's review.

Opportunity was also taken to explain those aspects of foreign relations with which the Dominion governments had been specially concerned during the last three years, in particular the various matters on which negotiations had been carried on between His Majesty's Government in Canada and the Government of the United States of America.

As in 1923, emphasis was laid on the vital importance to the British Empire of the maintenance of the route to the East and South Pacific *via* the Suez Canal, and attention was directed to the bearing of these interests on the conduct of foreign relations.[1]

The object of such discussions was, of course, to formulate a united Imperial policy upon the various international issues pending, as had been so successfully achieved in 1921. In this case, however, no such positive consensus was reached, as is indicated by that inevitable comment when, as in 1902, fundamental differences of opinion have obtruded themselves : " It was decided not to publish any part of the Foreign Secretary's statement or the resulting discussion." As regards procedure in the conduct of foreign negotiations, on the other hand, the Conference was able to record a notable measure of positive achievement.

The chief interest in the 1926 session of the Imperial Conference—ranking perhaps next to that of 1902 as a milestone in the evolution of the Commonwealth—has centred upon its pronouncements regarding internal constitutional relations.[2] Its decisions upon the mode of conducting Imperial foreign affairs, however, have been equally significant and appear to dispose of the problems involved more conclusively. It will be recalled that the resolution of 1923 had purported to deal with the negotiation of essentially local questions, but had established no certain criterion for distinguishing these from Imperial concerns, and moreover had failed to grapple with the insistent problem of machinery of co-operation. The 1926 Conference appointed a sub-committee under the chairmanship of the Canadian Minister of Justice, Mr. Lapointe—an ardent and level-headed Nationalist, and certainly one of the most competent men in the King Cabinet—to examine the working of this resolution during the past three years and to " consider whether the principles laid

[1] Cmd. 2768, p. 30.

[2] *Supra*, ch. v.

down with regard to treaties could not be applied with advantage in a wider sphere."

As regards one aspect at least of the conduct of foreign relations the Conference achieved a marked advance on the work of 1923. The problem of determining whether or not negotiations were purely local in their bearing was to be resolved henceforth in accordance with the principles laid down in the following important recommendation :

> It was agreed in 1923 that any of the Governments of the Empire contemplating the negotiation of a treaty should give due consideration to its possible effect upon other Governments, and should take steps to inform Governments likely to be interested of its intention.
>
> This rule should be understood as applying to any negotiations which any Government intends to conduct, so as to leave it to the other Governments to say whether they are likely to be interested.
>
> When a Government has received information of the intention of any other Government to conduct negotiations, it is incumbent upon it to indicate its attitude with reasonable promptitude. So long as the initiating Government receives no adverse comments and so long as its policy involves no active obligations on the part of the other Governments, it may proceed on the assumption that its policy is generally acceptable. It must, however, before taking any steps which might involve the other Governments in any active obligations, obtain their definite assent.
>
> Where by the nature of the treaty it is desirable that it should be ratified on behalf of all the Governments of the Empire, the initiating Government may assume that a Government which has had full opportunity of indicating its attitude and has made no adverse comments will concur in the ratification of the treaty. In the case of a Government that prefers not to concur in the ratification of a treaty unless it has been signed by a plenipotentiary authorised to act on its behalf, it will advise the appointment of a plenipotentiary so to act.

This superseded by a workable criterion the vague injunction of due consideration for the interests of other parts of the Empire set forth in 1923. Hitherto the location of responsibility had not been clear, but it appeared that the determination of the probable scope of commitments rested primarily with the government initiating the negotiations. Now the principle was reversed. The intervention of other members of the Commonwealth whenever they deemed their interests to be involved was expressly invited, and to assure the opportunity of their doing so, all members were to be kept informed of all negotiations. The occasion of much criticism, especially of Downing Street, could

now be removed, for the responsibility of watching its own case was placed squarely with each government. Furthermore an incentive was offered to overcome some of the dilatoriness which had hitherto rendered to a great extent nugatory most efforts at long-range consultation. No remedy however was offered, and probably none exists, for the assumption of an attitude of entire aloofness on the part of any Dominion, such as that of Canada towards the Lausanne negotiations.

True, the repudiation of the formal hegemony of the Home Government in the conduct of foreign relations is more explicit than in the 1923 Resolution, hence to some this statement of principle may seem a regrettable recognition of disintegration. The situation of which it takes cognizance had long been a fact, however, and failure to accord formal recognition to it had constituted a grievance which impelled Nationalistic governments to adopt an intransigent attitude toward negotiations in order to justify their position. Inasmuch as such doubts were now resolved, and unwillingness to co-operate could no longer conceal itself under the guise of vindicating Britannic equality, the effect of this Conference pronouncement should on the whole be rather to promote co-operation among the members of the Commonwealth in the future.

Britannic equality receives further recognition in the Committee's observations regarding the procedure to be followed in drawing up treaties.[1] An anomaly still persisted in the form of treaties which was the result of the compromise adopted in drafting the Versailles Treaties and the League Covenant. Whereas the Dominions received separate mention, the United Kingdom, with Northern Ireland, the Colonies and Protectorates, were all grouped under the term " British Empire." The scope of the latter expression, too, was open to question. It will be recalled that in connection with the Lausanne negotiations Premier King, without apparent warrant based on recognition by foreign Powers, had taken the view that the plenipotentiaries representing the " British Empire " had spoken for the United Kingdom only, not for the Dominions.

" This practice," the memorandum notes, " while suggesting

[1] On this subject see Toynbee, *Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations*, pp. 83–110; Keith, *Responsible Government*, pp. 909–918, 1231–1235; Corbett and Smith, *Canada and World Politics*, pp. 153–159.

that the Dominions and India are not on a footing of equality with Great Britain as participants in the treaties in question, tends to obscurity and misunderstanding and is generally unsatisfactory." To overcome this difficulty it was recommended that all treaties (other than agreements between governments, but including treaties negotiated under League auspices) should be made in the name of heads of states rather than as between lists of contracting countries, and that :

> If a treaty is signed on behalf of any or all of the Governments of the Empire the treaty should be made in the name of the King as the symbol of the special relationship between the different parts of the Empire. . . . In the case of a treaty applying to only one part of the Empire it should be stated to be made by the King on behalf of that part.[1]

It was further stated that, in accordance with a principle held by the Legal Committee of the Arms Traffic Conference of 1925, to underlie all international conventions :

> The making of a treaty in the name of the King as the symbol of the special relationship between the different parts of the Empire will render superfluous the inclusion of any provision that its terms must not be regarded as regulating *inter se* the rights and obligations of the various territories on behalf of which it has been signed in the name of the King.

The same principle governed the recommendations regarding the issuance of full powers to plenipotentiaries, representation at international conferences, ratification of treaties, and the conduct of foreign policy in general. The practice of representation through separate and independently appointed negotiators (all, however, deriving their status from the one source, the Crown) was reaffirmed. Efforts to secure separate representation for the Dominions at international conferences were enjoined, and it was recommended that (in the case of multilateral treaties negotiated under the auspices of the League of Nations and requiring a certain number of ratifications to render them operative) ratification by the several Dominions should count as ratifications by separate League members.

[1] In the preambles and signatures to treaties the plenipotentiaries were to be grouped as follows : " Great Britain and Northern Ireland and all parts of the British Empire which are not separate members of the League ; Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the Irish Free State and India." In form this tends to a recognition of Mr. Johnson's contention in the Free State Parliament.

The purport of this section was obviously to avoid a recurrence of the Lausanne *impasse*. It implied that all governments would conscientiously co-operate in making their position clear and then abide by the settlement. It was stated, for instance, that:

> It is for each part of the Empire to decide whether its particular interests are so involved, especially having regard to active obligations, that it desires to be represented at the Conference or whether it is content to leave negotiation in the hands of the part or parts of the Empire more directly concerned and accept the result.

Finally, as a general principle to govern the conduct of foreign policy, it was decreed "that the governing consideration underlying all the discussions of this problem must be that neither Great Britain nor the Dominions could be committed to acceptance of active obligations except with the definite assent of their own governments." On the subject of so-called "passive" liability the memorandum is notably silent. The Conference, in short, recognised its limitations. In so far as the British nations were competent so to do, it pronounced upon the international relations of the Commonwealth. Unlike the popular exponents on the hustings and in the various parliaments, however, it did not enter into detailed exposition of matters which lay entirely within the determination of foreign Powers.

The formal and complete surrender of the principle of Imperial diplomatic unity may appear the salient feature of these pronouncements. There is nothing in them, actually, to preclude the voluntary or enforced isolation of one member of the Commonwealth by the terms of a treaty provided the others concur therein. The scope of treaties was now to be so clearly delimited, Mr. Lapointe maintained, that the inclusion of a saving clause such as Article 9 of the Locarno Pact would no longer be required.[1] Yet the chief significance of the Conference decisions, perhaps, is that they intervened to co-ordinate and circumscribe the results of a series of inchoate experiments in the conduct of British and Dominion foreign relations which would otherwise have been mainly disruptive—especially so in that these sudden demonstrations of action at cross purposes regularly involved foreign countries as parties to the internal disputes of the

[1] *Journal*, vol. ix. p. 587.

Commonwealth. Once again, in fact, the British Commonwealth presents itself to the world as a coherent organisation, with an ascertained set of principles to govern the external relations of its members. Instead, for instance, of the general declaration to foreign Powers denouncing the mutual liability of the British nations, which had been projected in certain quarters, there is a series of very different purport, reaffirming their constitutional interrelation and distinctiveness. In a very real sense, furthermore, treaties are to be the work of the Commonwealth as a whole—not necessarily applicable to the whole territory or involving all its governments, but negotiated in the name of a common Sovereign, and though perhaps made on the initiative of a single member, yet definitely understood by foreign Powers to have been taken cognizance of by all.

The Conference memorandum clarified certain important points regarding the status of Dominion plenipotentiaries which were still matters of controversy. Specifically it was decreed that: "Plenipotentiaries for the various British units should have full powers issued in each case by the King, on the advice of the government concerned, indicating and corresponding to the part of the Empire for which they are to sign." Furthermore, the practice by which a government finding it inconvenient to be directly represented authorised the spokesmen of one of the others to act in respect of it was recognised. This pronouncement regarding the appointment of plenipotentiaries, together with that declaring: "It would not be in accordance with constitutional practice for advice to be tendered to His Majesty by His Majesty's Government in Great Britain in any matter appertaining to the affairs of a Dominion against the views of the government of that Dominion," clearly delimit the competence of negotiators in so far as the constitutional usage of the British nations *inter se* is concerned.

Heretofore, as Mr. Jebb points out, British plenipotentiaries have in practice represented the whole Empire, whereas Dominion plenipotentiaries have been entitled to speak for their own Dominion only.[1] From the point of view of foreign Powers, it would seem, the scope of the full powers and the fact that they

[1] R. Jebb, *The Empire in Eclipse*, pp. 310–311. Premier King's thesis in connection with the Lausanne negotiations, it will be recalled, directly repudiated this.

are derived from the one source, the Crown, should prove a more important consideration, legally, than the part of the Empire which negotiators avowedly represent. "That an international personality exists for each self-governing State of the Empire can no longer be doubted," says Professor Wrong in commenting on the Halibut Treaty.[1] But this status reveals itself rather in the character of the negotiations and in the scope of the treaties. It does not really concern foreign Powers whether it happens to be a Canadian emissary who implicates the whole Empire at Washington, or one from the British Isles who returns the favour at Lausanne. Conversely, a British envoy from Auckland or Pretoria could doubtless be empowered to sign a treaty involving action by the Canadian Government only. These Conference pronouncements, then, could not accord any enhancement of external status to the Dominions. Nevertheless they will undoubtedly have an important bearing on the conduct of negotiations in the future, and the constitutional principle they embody will be found reflected in the terms of the treaties which will result therefrom.

Dominion emissaries, then, although all appointed by the Crown, are responsible solely to their own governments. Their relation to the latter of course is that of instructed delegates, not representatives. They do not express their own opinions but the decisions of those who send them. Hence they have power to commit their governments and have the weight of those governments behind them. If it were not for its decision upon this point, the League of Nations would be merely an irresponsible debating forum.[2] For this reason, however, they do not possess the same measure of discretion available to the Premiers at an Imperial Conference. They must be continually in communication with the sources of their authority, and in the case of an Empire Delegation composed of other than Prime Ministers, the reaching of a consensus would be correspondingly more difficult. Nevertheless, where a group of emissaries have assembled together, the opportunities for adjustment in points of view and for influencing governments by the representations resulting therefrom are of the utmost importance. One of the points most

[1] Geo. M. Wrong, "The Foreign Relations of Canada," *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. vi. pp. 4–14.

[2] See Mr. Rowell's discussion of this point in his report on the League to the Canadian House: February 18, 1921 (*Journal*, vol. ii. p. 307).

stressed, for instance, by Sir Herbert Ames in his report to the Canadian House on his mission to the First Assembly of the League was the importance of preliminary consultations among the representatives of the various British nations for the purpose of mutual study and decision upon the questions which were to come up—in other words, of constituting themselves an Empire Delegation at Geneva.[1]

In the 1926 Conference memorandum three modes of co-operative negotiation were recognised, as follows :

> Where more than one part of the Empire desires to be represented three methods of representation are possible :
> (1) By means of a common plenipotentiary, or plenipotentiaries, the issue of full powers to whom should be on the advice of all parts of the Empire participating.
> (2) By a single British Empire Delegation composed of separate representatives of such parts of the Empire as are participating in the conference. This was the form of representation employed at the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921.
> (3) By separate delegations representing each part of the Empire participating in the conference. If, as a result of consultation, this third method is desired, an effort must be made to insure that the form of invitation from the convening government will make this method of representation possible.

Of these three, the first, that of common plenipotentiaries instead of a full delegation, was the device employed at the Lausanne Conference, but misunderstandings regarding the status of the British representatives vitiated its effectiveness. Although this experience will doubtless prevent such complications in the future, the basis itself militates against the effectiveness of Dominion representation. Nevertheless, recourse to it is to be anticipated in the case of negotiations in which Dominion interests are less vitally implicated and the inconvenience of more direct participation is an important factor. Furthermore it will probably continue to be the only practicable type of representation at the normal (*i.e.* small) conference of Great Powers, in which the major decisions of world politics will still be made, and from which, if independent, the Dominions would of course be entirely excluded. True, they were represented by separate delegations of their own at the abortive Disarmament Conference of 1927, and received separate invitations for the negotiation of

[1] *Journal*, vol. i. p. 474.

the Paris Peace Pact. But the former merely exemplified the dominance of the Great Powers in vital matters, and in the latter case the subject-matter and the wholly innocuous character of the proceedings weaken the prospect that this will overrule the Lausanne precedent. Nevertheless, to reiterate, restriction in the size of an international congress does not preclude the effective functioning of the British Empire Delegation outside though in conjunction with the official deliberations.

The third mode of representation endorsed—separate Dominion delegations—involves a more specific recognition of Dominion status than the other two. It marks a far greater degree of decentralisation in the conduct of negotiations, and if invoked for other than League congresses, might evidence unwillingness to co-operate within the Empire, for were co-operation the end in view such separate delegations would in actual operation merge into a single Imperial body, despite the wording of their credentials. The latter, in fact, has been what actually occurred upon crucial occasions within recent years. It was the situation, for instance, in the Fifth Assembly of the League during the discussions of the Geneva Protocol. On March 23, 1926, Sir Austen Chamberlain testified that throughout the sessions of the League Council just past (the Assembly being simultaneously in session) representatives of all seven British nations were in closest consultation with him, meeting almost daily in his room, and that communications of the most confidential character passed among them more than once a day.[1] Such a statement is reminiscent of the negotiations at Versailles and Washington. The British Empire Delegation clearly has distinct advantages over either of the other devices sanctioned, not merely from the

[1] *Journal*, vol. vii. p. 202. In reply to questions (February 17, 1926) as to consultation with the Dominions regarding admission of new members to the Council, the Foreign Secretary made a statement which throws further light upon Empire relations within the League: "By the terms of the Covenant a permanent seat on the Council is attributed to the British Empire, but the extent to which that representative can speak on behalf of the Dominions depends upon the circumstances of each particular case and the character of the communications which have passed between His Majesty's Government and the Dominion governments. The Dominions have separate representation in the Assembly and their representatives there act on the instructions of their own governments although frequent consultations of all the Empire delegates take place. As regards the future, I can readily assure my hon. Friends that we shall pursue the same policy of consultation with the Dominions with reference to other applications for permanent membership as in reference to any other international issue of importance" (*ibid.* p. 218).

point of view of co-operative action, but actually as a means of securing Dominion representation—in this case continuous representation on the Council of the League, an opportunity which is beyond the reach of other small nations.

The Conference memorandum proceeds to consider the matter of separate Dominion Legations at foreign capitals. After stating that as regards the conduct of foreign affairs generally: "It was frankly recognised that in this sphere, as in the sphere of defence, the major share of responsibility rests now and must for some time continue to rest with His Majesty's Government in Great Britain," a non-committal reference is made to the ventures of the Irish Free State and Canada at Washington. The following general comment is then made on this development:

> We felt that most fruitful results could be anticipated from the co-operation of His Majesty's representatives in the United States of America, already initiated, and now further to be developed. In cases other than those where Dominion Ministers were accredited to the heads of foreign states, it was agreed to be very desirable that the existing diplomatic channels should continue to be used, as between the Dominion governments and foreign governments, in matters of general and political concern.

The logical outcome of the establishment of separate Dominion representation in Washington would be the extension of this principle to foreign nations in general.[1] The proponents of the original Canadian proposal refrained from considering any such eventuality, as did also their critics save, notably, Sir Henry Drayton, when the issue had assumed its later complexion. Throughout the rest of the Empire generally, however, the Washington question was discussed in its relation to the wider problem. Protagonists of Dominion autonomy claimed separate representation as a matter of right, an integral feature of the new status; its critics saw in this move a disintegrating tendency even more dangerous than separate recognition in treaties or in the League of Nations. Premier Massey believed it would lead to "worse than chaos";[2] Sir Henry Drayton cited the obvious

[1] As early as 1870 Sir Alexander Galt moved in the Canadian House: "That it is expedient to obtain from the Imperial Government all necessary powers to enable the Government of the Dominion to enter into direct communication for such purpose with each British possession and foreign state." Sir John Macdonald opposed this proposal as tending to weaken the ties with the Mother Country (*Journal*, vol. ii. p. 566).

[2] *Ibid.* vol. iii. p. 188.

satisfaction at the suggestion among those abroad who were interested in the dismemberment of the Empire.[1] The Earl of Selborne, presiding at a meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute, analysed the proposition thus :

> The arrangement would permit of something like six or seven different British ambassadors in each of the great capitals of the world. It is quite true that neither Canada nor South Africa, both of which, through their representatives, had a great deal of responsibility in this matter, have yet taken advantage of their constitutional opportunity. But the Irish Free State has, and I would only ask you to think of what might be the present inconvenience if, besides appointing an Ambassador to Washington, the Irish Free State had appointed a Minister at Cairo. I only indicate that to show what are the implications of this constitutional opportunity, and to express my intense desire that the statesmen of the Dominions and of this country will really think out the implications of the position and come to a solution before difficulties have arisen which even the good will of the nations of the Empire may not be able to solve.[2]

In so far as decentralisation in machinery denotes an adaptation to progressive diversification in policy throughout the Empire, the possibilities which the Earl of Selborne apprehended may indeed be promoted by the establishment of separate Dominion representation, but such a tendency cannot be counteracted by opposition to changes in mere machinery. On the other hand separate representation does not necessarily militate against Imperial co-operation. *The Round Table* in endorsing this principle has at the same time pointed out how such co-operation may be maintained :

> Nor do we see any objection to Dominion representatives being stationed for the same purpose in foreign capitals, provided there is previous agreement with all the other Commonwealth governments at the Imperial Conference about their powers and functions, and provided it is clearly recognised that no government in the Commonwealth can enter into engagements with any foreign Power, save in minor matters of purely local effect, without full consultation with and the assent of the other nations of the Commonwealth whom its acts commit. In the opinion of *The Round Table* the more direct the contacts of all parts of the Commonwealth with the realities of the international world the better, provided always that the cardinal rule of consultation and agreement before the engagement or action is observed.[3]

[1] *Journal*, vol. vi. p. 728.
[2] November 24, 1924 (*United Empire*, vol. xvi. p. 33).
[3] Vol. xiii. pp. 697–698.

The final sentence in this comment is worthy of special attention.

Since the action of the Irish Free State and Canada as regards the United States, it appears to have been convenience rather than decision upon a principle of Imperial relationships which has thus far restrained other Dominions from following suit. Moreover, there do not seem to be valid grounds for anticipating that, with the growing interests of the Dominions abroad, they will not seek to extend their representation in foreign capitals. Even under the Laurier régime Canada had taken more than tentative steps in maintaining an emissary in Paris who was in close touch with the British Embassy and attended to minor matters of a diplomatic character.[1] Within the past year not only has this office been raised to the dignity of a Legation, but similar representation has also been arranged at the Japanese capital. It is indeed a far cry from the present situation to the cautious, narrowly restricted, and avowedly exceptional basis of representation at Washington projected under Co-operationist auspices in 1920, and now forgotten. The reciprocal action by the foreign countries concerned is equally portentous.

The final step in rounding out the system would be the establishment of direct and official foreign representation in the Dominions. Semi-officially, and strictly speaking irregularly, foreign consuls have long acted as their countries' diplomatic representatives in the Dominions. For instance, during the tariff war between Germany and Canada, negotiations (apparently quite independent of the Home Government) were carried on between the Premier and the German Consul-General at Montreal which resulted in an agreement between the two countries in 1910.[2] Commercial agreements were also made in the same fashion with Italy during this period.[3] The Japanese Consul-General in Ottawa participated actively in the negotiations consequent on the Vancouver riots of 1907 and in those relating to the adhesion of Canada to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1911.[4] In 1921 the United States Consul-General at Auckland acted for his government in connection with alleged discrimination against

[1] *Journal*, vol. i. pp. 664–665.
[2] *Canadian Annual Review* (1903), p. 260; Cd. 5125, pp. 7–8.
[3] *Canadian Annual Review* (1910), pp. 619–620.
[4] *Ibid.* (1907), pp. 384–398; Borden, *Canadian Constitutional Studies*, p. 127.

Armour and Co. of Australasia.[1] The question of the status of foreign consuls was raised in the Canadian Parliament on at least two occasions during the Laurier régime.[2] In both cases the Premier commented upon the irregularity of and the necessity for the performance of quasi-diplomatic functions on the part of these officials, in view of the lack of adequate diplomatic representation, and appeared to favour granting them some formal recognition of this nature. In contrast the direct negotiations regarding the Armour episode roused apprehensions in New Zealand as to their effect on Empire unity, and the Acting Prime Minister hastened to state that when the Consul-General's observations were found to emanate from Washington, he had placed the matter in the hands of the Imperial Government.

These instances denote eventualities arising out of the circumstances in the Dominions and independent of the move to establish Dominion Ministries abroad. The latter has obviously given a different complexion to the issue and fostered its development. When the appointment of a Canadian Minister to Washington was at length announced, the Coolidge Administration through the " White House Spokesman " at first denied that they contemplated reciprocal action, holding that the American consular service in Canada adequately covered their needs.[3] During the following year, however, Hon. Wm. Phillips, formerly American Ambassador to Belgium, was appointed to represent the United States Government in Ottawa, and Hon. Frederick A. Sterling as Minister to Dublin. It is worth noting that the credentials in such cases are presented to the Governor-General, but addressed to His Majesty.[4] The problem of co-operation among the Dominion emissaries at the various foreign capitals may be solved, it has been suggested, by their constituting local Empire Delegations. A somewhat different situation would arise from the presence of foreign envoys at the several Dominion capitals, one which tends still more to decentralisation. If, however, there are to be in addition at each of these headquarters representatives of all other nations of the Empire, contact might

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xi. pp. 970–973; vol. xii. pp. 225–227.

[2] Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, session 1909–10, cols. 853–855; Borden, *loc. cit.*

[3] *New York Times* (November 7, 1926).

[4] *Journal*, vol. viii. p. 422; Corbett and Smith, *op. cit.* Appendix IV. Moreover the Conference decreed that the exequaturs of foreign consuls *de carrière* in the Dominions should be countersigned by a Dominion Minister.

still be maintained. Under such circumstances historians of the future will at least credit the British Commonwealth with having made a unique contribution to the annals of world politics.

The concluding section of the 1926 Conference memorandum comprises references, of distinctly negative and non-committal purport, to three current problems of foreign policy. As regards acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, it was felt that acceptance of this obligation would be premature. However, "a general understanding was reached that none of the governments represented at the Imperial Conference would take any action in this direction without bringing the matter for further discussion," which savours of the attainment of unity of policy in the Commonwealth by the expedient of according a *liberum veto* to its most reluctant member. As regards the conditions laid down by the United States for adhesion to the Permanent Court, it was ascertained that the views of the various governments represented in the Imperial Conference accorded with those expressed by their representatives at Geneva in September. Upon the third point the nadir was reached. One of the main purposes of the 1926 Conference was to discuss the relation of the Empire to the Locarno Pact and reach a consensus thereon. The results of their deliberations were recorded as follows:

> The Imperial Conference was fortunate in meeting at a time just after the ratifications of the Locarno Treaty of Mutual Guarantees had been exchanged on the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. It was, therefore, possible to envisage the results which the Locarno policy had achieved already, and to forecast to some extent the further results which it was hoped to secure. These were explained and discussed. It then became clear that, from the standpoint of all the Dominions and of India there was complete approval of the manner in which the negotiations had been conducted and brought to so successful a conclusion.
>
> Our final and unanimous conclusion was to recommend to the Conference the adoption of the following resolution:
>
> "The Conference has heard with satisfaction the statement of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with regard to the efforts made to insure peace in Europe culminating in the agreements of Locarno; and congratulates His Majesty's Government in Great Britain on its share in this successful contribution toward the promotion of the peace of the world."

CHAPTER XI

Conclusion—The Future of the Commonwealth

In the foregoing chapters an attempt has been made to trace the course of the Britannic Question throughout the period wherein it has been most actively under discussion in practical politics. The Imperialist attack and the Nationalist counter-attack have been chronicled. With a view to understanding the background of the present situation, the principal episodes in its development, the conflicting viewpoints from which each of these was met, and, in so far as possible, the implications have been analysed. The present writer has no intention of launching into speculation as to the future of the Commonwealth, nor has he the temerity here to undertake an analysis of the forces, centrifugal and centripetal, which are at present operative within it. It is practicable, however, to distinguish certain prepotent factors underlying the existing situation and to draw attention to the outstanding considerations involved in their operation. As a result some probable changes in points of emphasis regarding the circumstances of the British nations in the nearer future may perhaps be adumbrated.

Three features of the controversy have seemed to the present writer in the course of the foregoing survey to have been most salient. There is first of all the determined effort to remove all evidence of the actual or formal subordination of the Dominions to Downing Street which brought about the transformation of the old Colonial Empire into the present Commonwealth of equal British nations. Secondly, there is the preoccupation of all participants in the discussions with the internal constitutional aspects of Imperial relations rather than with the external contacts of the several members—and this despite the professed indifference of Nationalists to the Empire on the one hand and the apprehensions of Imperialists on the other at the international significance of the various developments. The purport of both these

features would seem to be that the members of the British family are still very much concerned with one another indeed—far more so than with any strangers, and far more than they realise or are prepared to admit—that their quarrels are essentially family quarrels, and that they may come to appreciate this more and more fully as they turn their gaze to the outer world about them. In the third place, save for brief digressions at Versailles and Washington, world politics have been regarded as essentially European politics and the relations of the Commonwealth have been worked out on the basis of this assumption. The tradition of the pre-War era has been carried on into the most recent period. This outlook and these relations, therefore, could not but be markedly affected by an alteration of the international landscape.

In view of the importance of these three features in its development, it seems reasonable to expect that the problem of the Commonwealth is again entering on a new phase. On the one hand the principal internal issues still outstanding were resolved at the 1926 Conference and a *modus vivendi* regarding the relation of the British nations to Europe was also reached at Locarno. The particular controversies which have the held stage for many years and which culminated in these settlements are now closed. On the other hand, the international scene is plainly undergoing a transformation. Certain developments during the past decade are now becoming more clearly observable —since the earlier chapters were written, in fact within the past twelve months, the scene has been rapidly changing as regards the place in it of one Great Power at least. Foreign politics are once more becoming world politics, and the adequacy of recent adjustments in Britannic relationships must now be tested in a wider sphere than those who were primarily responsible for them had in view. The British nations will face a radically different world prospect in the coming decade than in that just past; it may be that the Dominions will find themselves for the first time in their history in the very middle of things, in any case their interests can hardly fail to be more directly involved in world affairs than formerly. If these two inferences be correct, it would seem to follow that despite all assertions of aloofness on their part, the Dominions must devote far more attention to their foreign relations than heretofore, and that hence the question of

the actual interdependence of the British nations will be more adequately considered. Existing tendencies may be greatly enhanced or they may be diverted, at any rate they must be profoundly influenced thereby. Since apparently it is upon these factors that the future of the Commonwealth must turn, they warrant somewhat more detailed examination here.

The Changing Scene within the Commonwealth

At the outset of this study it was suggested that the most outstanding feature of the Britannic Question has been its "inwardness"; it has thus far been essentially a family matter. Although throughout its history, especially within the present century, the Imperialists have always striven to arouse some sense of the foreign portents, the Nationalists have obdurately refused to consider the foreign complications involved. The whole Nationalist position in Canada, for instance, is founded on the assumption that no foreign danger could menace her from any quarter. Their emphasis has been, and still is, upon the internal rather than the external aspects of Imperial relations, on the vindication of mutual independence rather than on the possible need of mutual support. The bulk of the Nationalists have, in fact, been almost entirely preoccupied with their relations to the Home Government, not with foreign affairs in a real sense at all. The same holds true of the more extreme Nationalist position. Membership in the Commonwealth is looked upon almost entirely from the point of view of the obligations entailed, and the tendency has been to minimise whatever contributes to the recognition of that membership, in order to escape the admission of such obligations. Thus, although they have paid more attention to external relations, they have considered only one aspect of the situation.

It is reasonable to expect that much of this confusion will be straightened out, and much of the tension relieved by the principles laid down within the past few years, especially in Article 9 of the Locarno Pact and in the Conference memorandum of 1926. It is now axiomatic that all discussions of Imperial relations shall proceed on the assumptions of complete Dominion autonomy and of full equality of status among the British nations, and that the principles governing their intercourse shall be those

inherent in the confederate basis of organisation. The settlement of this problem should have a very important bearing henceforth upon the mode in which Dominion Nationalism manifests itself, and upon the general attitude of the Dominions toward world affairs. There should henceforth be less preoccupation with the internal aspects of the problems of the Commonwealth, and considerations touching external relations which have hitherto been overlooked should come in for the attention they deserve. Article 9 of the Locarno Pact went as far as the Commonwealth could toward securing recognition for the limitation of Dominion liability in foreign affairs; further steps will bring the Dominions face to face with world Powers. The 1926 Imperial Conference settled most of the outstanding constitutional issues. The result of this completion of Dominion autonomy is, in the first place, to fix responsibility for the affairs of each Dominion squarely upon its own government, and to remove what has more than once been invoked as an alibi in face of Opposition criticism. As Sir Robert Borden has pointed out, it was once thought by British statesmen that the grant of responsible government to the Colonies was the first step towards disintegration, whereas it has had precisely the contrary effect. Now criticism for errors in administration focusses upon the Dominion government itself, not as formerly upon the Governor and Colonial Office which controlled it, and a better feeling has been the result.[1]

In the second place, with the removal of the last anomalies which seemed to belie the complete equality of the members of the Commonwealth in their mutual relations, Dominion autonomy and Britannic equality should cease to be live issues in politics. The professed objectives of most Nationalists will have been attained. Many of these, doubtless, will from now on devote themselves mainly to the domestic concerns of their respective countries, and so will thin the ranks of aggressive Nationalism. A clarification of the Nationalist position should also result. Opposition to Colonialism has hitherto served to unite many degrees and varieties of dissent. Secessionists, Canadian annexationists and mere irreconcilables will henceforth be distinguished from genuine Autonomists and obliged to declare their further objectives. Furthermore, Nationalists who continue will carry

[1] *Journal*, vol. ii. p. 540.

their campaign into the international field and be forced to take notice of certain considerations which have thus far agitated the Co-operationists only. It will be found, for instance, that the British Empire in the narrower sense, that is the United Kingdom with the Crown Colonies and Dependencies, still exists and would persist irrespective of the Dominions, that it constitutes a Great Power in its own right and will continue to be recognised as such by the other world Powers. Whatever the Dominions may or may not achieve by their own efforts among the nations, they cannot attain this eminence, and consequently veiled threats of secession to redress alleged denials of equality and to secure a more effective voice in foreign affairs will lose their rhetorical force. In short, the settlement of the constitutional relations of the Commonwealth may be expected to end the confusion between internal and external issues which has hitherto beset discussions of the Britannic Question, and to allow frank consideration of it in its purely international bearings.

These are eminently practical considerations. There are others which may seem academic, but the ultimate importance of which is no less great even if less ponderable. The theoretical justification of the whole Nationalist case is founded upon an interpretation of Colonial history which cannot be said to have met with progressive vindication as the study of the subject has advanced. The relief of tension within the Commonwealth should afford a more favourable opportunity than has heretofore existed of presenting revised conclusions and of still further examining certain traditional views upon the relations of the Dominions and the Mother Country. Colonial history (certainly that of Canada) in general, and the course of the Britannic Question in particular, have suffered from much misunderstanding and misrepresentation, for which historians and publicists are largely to blame. In Canada, for instance, the old-fashioned "political" history, based on the readiest materials available, has over-emphasised the official relations between the Colonial governments and that of the Mother Country. Hence there has been built up a tradition of hard-won liberties, and of a struggle with the Home Government, which has become the historical foundation of Dominion Nationalism. The tendency of newer history writing should be to balance and it may be to submerge this feature by emphasis upon other considerations, such as the

domestic class struggles in the Colonies, to which the intervention of the Colonial Office, instead of being the paramount factor, bore rather an episodical relation.[1] Such a change in emphasis may well prove one of the unexpected bye-products of enhanced Dominion Nationalism which Co-operationists could turn to their advantage. The traditional Canadian view of British diplomacy relating to their interests is a still more striking case in point. In no other connection has the inwardness of the Britannic Question been better exemplified than this. Not only has Canadian dissatisfaction at failure to secure the full extent of their claims been vented almost solely on the Home Government; American circumstances and ambitions and the alternative of Canadian bargaining without British support have been ludicrously ignored. In consequence such episodes have had a great and lamentable effect upon Imperial relations. Fortunately the result of historical research has been on the whole to correct this tradition so effectively exploited by Nationalists. Still more could be done by approaching the subject from the point of view of contemporaneous American history.

So it has been with the popular presentation of the Britannic Question itself. This controversy has been essentially between Colonialists or Imperialists and Nationalists, all of whom have had active adherents throughout the Empire. It has not been a struggle between Home Government and Dominions. Nevertheless it has been given the appearance of having the latter character, which has been an important determinant of the outcome. Furthermore, as the present writer has done his best to emphasise, the Britannic Question can be fairly understood only on the basis of a triple, not a dual, classification of viewpoints and objectives—Colonialist, Imperialist, Nationalist. The confusion of Imperialism both with Colonialism on the one hand and with Nationalism on the other, and the steadfast refusal to admit a third possible choice between Colonialism and Nationalism, has been the other principal determinant of Dominion reactions. Here the work of the historian and political scientist will serve to

[1] The present writer is not here speaking of "history with a purpose," *i.e.* propaganda. All history writing, nevertheless, implies a point of view, the emphasis of certain phases of the subject. Hitherto the favourite topic selected for interpretation by Canadian historians has been the attainment of responsible government, which has given a certain tone to the bulk of their writing. It is suggested that other aspects may henceforth be accorded the treatment they deserve.

reset the controversy in its true light. The history itself has been made, and the lines of settlement of the Britannic Question have been definitely drawn. But the future of the Commonwealth depends on the degree of willingness to co-operate which is manifest, and on the interpretation of that history, on the removal of unwarranted impressions, such willingness can to a great extent be made to turn. The other great factor in that willingness is the feeling of interdependence in the Commonwealth. This is founded upon a study of international relations, of the forces operative in the world to-day, so that here again the teacher and publicist find a duty to perform. None of the foregoing considerations, of course, are calculated to diminish the intensity of Dominion Nationalism. It is merely suggested that they may point to its having approached its climax as an essentially negative, disruptive force within the Commonwealth, and that it may, by losing its preoccupation with past and present grievances, by coming into more direct contact with world affairs, and hence by acquiring a wider outlook, render Britannic co-operation easier.

The final discarding of all Colonialist implications from the internal relations of the Commonwealth has likewise an important bearing upon the operation of centrifugal forces within it. There are serious and persistent conflicts of interest among the various British nations. Moreover, the dominant and most vital domestic issues in the different parts of the Empire fail to coincide, which militates against community of feeling. The resultant of these centrifugal forces has been Dominion Nationalism. The most difficult of them to reckon with in efforts to preserve the unity of the Commonwealth are doubtless the economic ones. In contrast to the United States, the operation of economic forces within the Empire has tended to local consolidation but not to Imperial unity. The Constitution of the United States was established and the first steps toward making a nation of the thirteen Colonies were taken under the impetus of organised economic groups " conscious of a solidarity of interests transcending state lines." [1] Joseph Chamberlain, viewing the whole Empire as his nation, would have knit that Empire by ties of mutual interest. In his case Imperial interests coincided with those of the newer industrialism which he led. Had such coincidences been more numerous throughout the Commonwealth the result might have

[1] E. S. Corwin, *John Marshall*, p. 126.

been different. Sir Wilfrid Laurier pointed out to the 1911 Conference how diversity of economic interest inevitably tends to diversity of policy in external relations,[1] and more recently Mr. Jebb has again impressed this fact upon our attention.[2] The question now is whether Mr. Chamberlain's tariff reform campaign did not come at a decisive period, and whether, barring a revolution in the international situation, the recent resurrection of this movement has not come a quarter-century too late to be fully effective. But the struggle for Imperial economic unity and the analysis of the operation of economic forces within the Empire and upon its members constitutes a vast study in itself, and can receive no more than this reference to its crucial importance here. Nevertheless, it should be noted that for the Dominions the alternative to Britannic co-operation in the economic field is fighting their battles for their shares of world industry and commerce separately and alone against the organised economic resources of great nations.

The rivalry of the several branches of the producing interests, especially of the manufacturers entrenched behind their respective tariff walls, although perhaps the major factor in the consolidation of Dominion national feeling, is only one type of obstacle to the attainment of unity in policy. The geographical dispersion of the Empire immeasurably intensifies that sectionalism which besets any large political area. For instance, the most apparent conflict of interest prior to the War concerned the strategy of naval defence. The Home Government continually visualised a definitive struggle at the heart of the Empire, and relying upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance concentrated its preparations in home waters. In the Antipodes a corresponding concern for the safety of the Pacific impelled Australia to adopt a conflicting policy, while the strategic situation of Canada in turn produced a third type of outcome. At the present time the defence problem is entirely subordinated to that of the conduct of foreign policy, and the main factor is the attractive force of adjacent Great Powers upon the Dominions, with the possibility of reliance upon other than Imperial support. Prior to the War the unifying influence in defence was the existence of a single great menace, and now it may be that only the emergence of a great naval Power which is recognised to be a common enemy could effect

[1] Cd. 5745, p. 335.

[2] *The Empire in Eclipse*, p. 275.

reunion among the British nations in this respect. Only such an enemy, on the other hand, could bring about the violent disruption of the Commonwealth.

Another outstanding occasion of divergent interests is the immigration problem. This in its various aspects has been merely a source of embarrassment to the Mother Country, the integrity of whose population is not at issue, but it is a vital matter to Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The "White Australia" policy has been an irritating cause of divergence in the attitude towards Japan of the United Kingdom and the Pacific Dominions, and an increasing bond of sympathy between the latter and the United States. The same is true in great measure of Canada. At the same time the attitude of Canada, and to a much greater degree that of South Africa, to the migration of British Asiatics has continually imposed upon the Home Government a perilous dilemma. True the question of British Asiatic immigration has been resolved thus far at the expense of India, which is an unhappy augur. Yet the 1921 Conference proved that an Imperial consensus could be reached upon the Pacific question without alienating Japan, and a continuance of the tact and mutual consideration which has thus far governed the situation should preserve friendly relations during a long future. In any case recognition of the full autonomy of each Dominion in such matters [1] should relieve the tension on the Home Government, and should impress upon the Dominions the seriousness of the responsibility in relation to foreign nations which they have assumed. The two main considerations in the problem of Oriental expansion would seem to be on the one hand the relative strength of the Pacific Dominions within the Empire and alone, and on the other the attraction of the pronounced views of the United States upon this subject.

There is, moreover, the problem of dual nationalism in Canada and South Africa.[2] Intensified in the one case by a religious difference, in the other it exacerbates the cleavage between capitalist and agrarian and so also the party struggle. It is a major factor in impeding co-operation for Imperial migration schemes. The French-Canadian, like the Afrikander, has all

[1] Cd. 9177, p. 8.

[2] See an excellent article, "Afrikander Culture and Politics" (*Round Table*, December 1928), which explains a situation analogous in many respects to that in Canada.

along suspected a racialist ingredient in Imperialism, and sees in the systematic effort to promote migration from Britain an organised plot to submerge him politically at home by building up the other section of the population. In Canada, although Ewart's suggestion that the Fashoda incident threatened civil war there[1] would seem far-fetched, yet there was notable sympathy on the part of the French-Canadian press with the French rather than with the British attitude toward the occupation of the Ruhr.[2] In South Africa dual nationalism manifested itself in Nationalist strictures on the Versailles settlement, pointed efforts to promote trade with European countries other than Britain,[3] and blunt queries as to what concern an Imperial Economic Commission had with the natural resources of South Africa.[4]

Nevertheless, as countervailing factors in this nationalism problem, it should be noted that the white population of South Africa, though divided, must maintain together their foothold in a black wilderness, and that the reiterated contention of the French-Canadians that they constitute the true nucleus of Canadian Nationalism and the main bulwark against absorption by the United States would prove very difficult of refutation. The passing of the Imperialist movement and with it, presumably, the apprehension of a racialist drive on the part of the Home Government should put a new complexion on the national minority problem. Their status in the Commonwealth becomes recognised as purely a domestic issue within these Dominions. In the case of Canada, furthermore, it is not inconceivable that this should produce a reaction in favour of the British connection, since on the one hand the attitude of a section of the English-speaking ultra-Nationalists has hardly been favourable to the special privileges of French-Canada,[5] and on the other so marked is the contrast which French-Canadian Nationalists see in the privileges they enjoy under the British North America Act and what they profess to expect from the United States, that

[1] *The Kingdom of Canada*, p. 28.

[2] *Round Table*, vol. xiv. p. 134. The suggestion is here noted that "the influence of the Quai d'Orsay may not be confined to the press of France."

[3] *Journal*, vol. iii. pp. 213–216, 450–453. For a comment on the recent South African treaty with Germany, see *Round Table* (March 1929).

[4] *Journal*, vol. i. p. 551.

[5] Several of the speeches demanding the right of Canada to amend her own Constitution, for instance, clearly foreshadow a drive on provincial rights, and hence have roused marked opposition from French-Canadian Nationalists.

whatever enhances their interest in the foreign relations of Canada should increase their reliance upon continued membership in the Commonwealth.

Two statements are especially worthy of quotation in this connection, as they were made by recognised leaders of the more Anglophile and the ultra-Nationalist viewpoints in French-Canada respectively, and in the midst of one of the hottest controversies involving racial prejudices of recent Canadian history at that. The first is by Hon. Rodolphe Lemieux :

> You, my compatriots, have been told that you owed nothing to Great Britain. You have been told that Sir Wilfrid Laurier was a traitor to his race and his creed. The time has come for plain speaking. Let me tell you that in so-called Catholic countries in Portugal and Spain, yes, and in France, religious orders have been expelled. Where have they taken refuge ? Here in Canada, in England itself, in South Africa, in British possessions the world over, where they enjoy the fullest liberty possible. You did not know these facts, but I challenge any man to deny them. Now that you know under what benign rule we French-Canadians have lived and prospered, would you still object to doing our share—a good share, yes, an enthusiastic share—not only in defence of Canada but in defence of Great Britain whenever and wherever there may be an hour of trial ?[1]

The other is by Henri Bourassa. At a Congress of the French language in Quebec, also in the summer of 1912, he said :

> We have been told we are more French than Catholic. Perhaps ; but, if so, it is because we know we must guard our faith. The maintenance and propagation of the French language in every province in Canada is the sole means by which the Confederation can be preserved from the evil influence, moral and political, of Americanism. The Confederation will not remain except in the measure that equality of language and race is recognised. It is time English-speaking Canadians opened their eyes to the danger from the invasion of American ideas, habits and mentality. Quebec is more Canadian and more British than Montreal, Montreal than Toronto, Toronto than Winnipeg. The reason the cities of the east were protected was the conservation of their language and habits, which, as well, kept out the influence of Americans. If you Anglicize French-Canadians they will not become British, they will become American. At present they love British institutions, but the moment you destroy their identity by destroying their language the majority of French-Canadians would rather throw in their lot with the million and a half French-

[1] At a meeting in Northern Ontario during the summer of 1912, quoted in *Round Table*, vol. iii., at p. 139.

Canadians in the States than remain under the British Government. This would not be the case with myself, for I prefer British institutions and British rule, but it will be so with the majority.[1]

The influence of offshoots of other nationalities in the Dominions deserves notice also. For instance, the influence of their Ukrainian population impelled the Canadian Government in 1921 and 1922 to move for the recognition by the League of Nations of the independence of Eastern Galicia. This provoked discussion in the British House but failed to win the support of the Home Government.[2] The necessity of moulding these alien elements into integral parts of their population, and the futility of the British tradition and connection to aid in this respect, is a major argument of Canadian Nationalists for the development of a separate and distinct patriotism of their own.[3] In view of the policy of restriction adopted by the United States this problem will probably become more serious in Canada from now on. At the same time it is, to say the least, not obvious why emphasis upon Canadian Nationalism to the detriment of membership in the Commonwealth should, as has been argued, prove essential to the effective assimilation of these alien elements.

These are some of the main factors which have contributed to the intensification of Dominion National feeling and so to divergence in policy among the members of the Commonwealth. They represent persistent Dominion interests and, in so far as they are divergent, the sources of recurrent differences. Nevertheless a *modus vivendi* has been reached in relation to all of them as far as the Commonwealth itself is concerned, so that the vindication of these fundamental Dominion policies has entered upon a new phase. Since they must henceforth be maintained directly against foreign Powers, and not mediately through the Home Government, they cease to be merely sources of differences within the Commonwealth and become issues against the world. As regards each basic Dominion interest the same question now presents itself—can it be most satisfactorily secured within the Commonwealth and in co-operation with other British nations, in isolation, or in conjunction with some neighbouring foreign

[1] Quoted in *Round Table*, vol. iii., at p. 147.
[2] *Canadian Annual Review* (1922), p. 61 ; *Journal*, vol. iv. pp. 224, 305.
[3] See "Why Canadian Nationalists are Dissatisfied with the Status of Canada," in *Round Table*, vol. xvi. pp. 368–376.

Power? Were international problems to remain as localised as of recent years, these questions might still remain in abeyance, but if, as seems more probable, world Powers more closely situated to the Dominions are to become active in the near future, it is difficult to see how under the circumstances the latter can avoid becoming directly involved in major controversies and so forced to take stock of their situation. The result, then, of the recent settlement within the Commonwealth should be to enhance Dominion interest in world politics. Thus the very consolidation of Dominion Nationalism may imply certain countervailing tendencies, conducive to co-operation in external affairs rather than to Isolationism.

Besides the internal settlement there have been various other developments of recent years which are calculated to test the correctness of this assumption. The most important of these is probably the more pronounced manifestation of economic imperialism on the part of the Dominions—not merely an awakening of interest in the exploitation of foreign markets and in the protection of their sea-borne commerce but in the acquisition of colonies as well—which has followed the War. Dominion imperialism has been a factor long operative. It was observable on the part of the Pacific Dominions as far back as the 'eighties. For years proposals for the annexation of the British West Indies have found favour in Canada, especially with the Canadian Manufacturers' Association,[1] even on the ground that the interest of the Dominion in the Panama Canal route necessitates a foothold in the Caribbean.[2] The operations of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa against the neighbouring German possessions during the War were, as has been already emphasised, evidence of Dominion not British imperialism. Any move to restore these territories to their former master would at once unite all three mandatories in opposition to it, and woe to the Mother Country should she seem to waver in her support of

[1] See *Industrial Canada* (organ of the C.M.A.), *passim.*

[2] "Canada at present has no tropical territory, and if she is to approach an equal footing with the United States, with respect to variety of climate and products, she will need to include within her Dominion these rich tropical Islands. Lying, as they do, at the crossing of the trade routes between Europe and Panama and North and South America, and owing to the fact that through their zone there must in the future pass much of the world's trade, they are of great strategic importance" (H. J. Crowe, "Canada and the West Indies," *United Empire*, vol. ix., at p. 426).

them in such a juncture. This expansionist effort has been a consequence both of the operation of centrifugal economic forces within the Empire and of concern for essentially local problems of defence strategy. In both respects it may well be regarded as evidencing Dominion Nationalism's coming of age and as an essentially disruptive manifestation. Nevertheless, the possible effect of the acquisition of colonies by the Dominions in increasing the sense of interdependence among the members of the Commonwealth deserves serious consideration.

Various arguments have been advanced in support of the latter view. Sir Charles Lucas endorsed Dominion imperialism on the ground that it tended to develop "a balance of power within the Empire," that is, to equalise in a measure the importance of the British nations and mitigate the relative preponderance of the United Kingdom.[1] As he put it:

> Is not the clue to this strange, illogical Empire, Realm, Commonwealth, concatenation of endless diversities—call it what you will—the constant striving after and working for an even balance? And what it leads up to, what it is working out to, is not an Empire of Motherland and Dependencies, which has already partially gone for ever, not an Empire under a centralised legislature, which is to me a mischievous dream, but a League of equal partner units which have become nations under a common Sovereign as the symbol of unity in diversity.

Regarding Canada in particular he said:

> Personally, I wish that Canada had been so geographically situated as to have had new territory allotted to her. With her vast area she does not need, and probably does not desire, more, but it would make for balance within the Empire if all the Dominions were called on to take up on a smaller scale the same kind of work and exert the same kind of power as the Mother Country. Canada is a very great unit, and will be infinitely greater within her present borders. Still, in my zeal for the large units, I should not be sorry if at some future date the West Indies were to elect to throw in their lot with the Dominion. Short of that, the formation of a single West Indian unit would be another step forward in stabilising the Empire.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore drew attention to another aspect of the matter in the Home Parliament. He expressed surprise that the Imperial Conference of 1921 had failed to devote its attention

[1] "Balance of Power Within the Empire," address to the Royal Colonial Institute: December 13, 1921 (*United Empire*, vol. xiii. pp. 17–26).

to the relation of the Dominions to the enormous responsibilities of the United Kingdom regarding the Crown Colonies and Dependencies, and continued :

> Unless the Dominions come along and help us in this matter, unless they get some of our experience and some of our traditions, then I can foresee considerable difficulties in the future. I am one of those who rejoice that Samoa is to be administered by New Zealand, and New Guinea by Australia. These two great Dominions will thus have direct experience in the administration of less forward peoples.[1]

The handing over to India of colonies in German East Africa or Mesopotamia, in this case as outlets for her surplus population, has even been proposed.[2] The most important implication in the acquisition of colonies by the Dominions, however, is the resultant influence upon their outlook toward foreign affairs. A concrete justification of this argument in the case of New Zealand appears in the Governor-General's speech of June 14, 1923, in which there is a statement to the effect that : " New Zealand, by its position in the Pacific Ocean, by its government of distant islands, and by its administration of Western Samoa under the King's acceptance of the mandate of the League of Nations, was intimately concerned with certain aspects of British foreign policy." [3]

Already three of the Dominions have become in a small way colonial Powers, and doubtless their understanding of and sympathy with the Mother Country's problems will have been increased thereby, but a " balance of power " within the Empire is not yet in sight. On the other hand possession of non-contiguous territory perforce increases immensely the need of an interest in world affairs. If Canada, for instance, had for the past decade or so been responsible for the British West Indies, it is highly doubtful whether she would have adopted that complacent attitude toward foreign dangers and responsibilities which has characterised her policies of recent years. She would have been forced among other things to take cognizance of the Caribbean policy of the United States and to consider the Monroe Doctrine in a new light. Probably nothing could be better

[1] *Journal*, vol. ii. p. 720.

[2] See adverse comment in *Round Table*, vol. xii. pp. 347–348. Granting India an outlet in Southern Africa would have tended to anything but harmony in the Commonwealth.

[3] *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 862.

calculated to jolt her out of her Isolationism into facing the facts of world politics than the acquisition of these islands. Dominion imperialism, like economic imperialism in general, is basically Nationalistic. Nevertheless when small countries launching out in this fashion find themselves faced by Great Powers, a feeling of loneliness and a search for allies is apt to result. Perhaps Canada will not follow the lead of these other Dominions in territorial expansion. She is, however, developing a pronounced interest in foreign markets, notably the Far East,[1] which carries a similar implication. For this reason the effect of Dominion imperialism should be, as its protagonists anticipate, greatly to enhance the realisation of the interdependence of the Commonwealth.

Antidotes to Imperial Disintegration

Virtually at every session in each parliament of the Empire someone has arisen to sound a note of alarm at the process of disintegration which seemingly has been steadily going on. Some of these appear to have been merely conservatives who feel the tremors in the foundations of the only world they know; others are moved purely by devotion to the Empire; many have a reasoned conviction that the break-up of the Commonwealth would remove the greatest single force for the maintenance of peace and civilisation existing in the world to-day; not a few sincere Autonomists are equally convinced that existence apart from the Commonwealth will not only thwart the working out of their own destiny but jeopardise their very national existence. All of these, however, are either unrepentant Imperialists or else their modern successors, the Co-operationists. Nationalist indifference to all such considerations has been as strikingly in contrast to this attitude as have the theories to which that indifference has given rise. Much of this perturbation has been occasioned by episodes not in themselves of prime significance, such as the withdrawal of the Home Government's emissaries from direct participation in the negotiation of local treaties. Moreover, the Imperial problem has to a great extent been treated

[1] An interesting incidental comment on this development is the fact that while, for instance, Columbia University has within the past two years established a comprehensive course on Far Eastern Civilisation, McGill University in Montreal has taken similar steps in the School of Business, and has also collected one of the finest Chinese libraries on the Continent.

as one of machinery, and surprisingly little attention has been paid to the evidence of divergence in interests and policies throughout the Empire, in many cases on fundamental issues, and to the analysis of underlying centrifugal forces, of which the deprecated phenomena are merely symptoms. Much serious effort, however, has been directed to avoiding the occasions and mitigating the effects of conflicts in external policies.

The treatments which have been prescribed for allaying the symptoms of which the Commonwealth complains have been of two main types. The first would conceal discrepancy in foreign policies within the Commonwealth by subdividing the international landscape into geographical sections, and by declaring that these divergent policies are each the one most appropriate to the region concerned; the policy of each member is to be dubbed the policy of the whole for that part of the world. In the other mode of reaction one scents the avoidance of divergences in policy through the avoidance of policy altogether. Isolationism on the part of the whole Commonwealth would obviate the occasions of differences within it. The former type of expedient has been the recourse of harassed statesmen faced with the necessity of reaching an immediate settlement of a specific problem whether or not a consensus of the member nations could be obtained. The latter appears to have been advocated rather by publicists more aloof from the rough and tumble of world politics. Both have been considered in the light of their bearing upon the relation of the Commonwealth to the League of Nations.

The first of these antidotes has been optimistically propounded as follows:

> The Canadian suggestion is that it ought not to be impossible to devise a workable system based upon the idea that each part of the Empire should be primarily responsible for dealing with the international problems of its own area, but that directly these problems began to assume an aspect which affected the other parts, or which threatened to result in war, the matter should become one for the Empire to deal with collectively. This, indeed, is the idea which is implicit in the Imperial Conference resolution about foreign policy of 1923. Under such a system Great Britain would be primarily responsible for dealing with European problems and would no longer try to maintain the fiction that the Dominions took any real share or any real responsibility for dealing with them; Canada would deal with its North American questions, South Africa with its African problems, Australia and New Zealand with their Pacific questions,

as in fact they do to-day ; but as soon as any really serious issue arose anywhere affecting the Empire as a whole, or threatening general war, they should instantly take counsel together and act collectively, through the League or otherwise as circumstances required. It is suggested that an arrangement of this kind would fit the realities of the present world situation, would get rid of the " colonial " status difficulty, and yet would preserve the unity of the Commonwealth in all fundamental issues.[1]

This is the theory underlying the Locarno settlement, and it might seem an admirable working compromise, were it not for the perilous incentive it involves to submerge the idea of community of interest through emphasis upon regional affiliations.

Regionalism in policy has long been advocated in several quarters, with Canadian Continentalism taking the lead. Mr. Rowell, for instance, objected to Canadian expenditure for the support of the permanent League Commissions on the ground that they were primarily for the benefit of Europe. The same motive inspired the Canadian drive on Article 10 of the Covenant, and Sir Lomer Gouin's interpretive resolution prescribed that in the application of sanctions " account will be taken notably of the geographical situation and special conditions of each state." Moreover, the Canadian Government's rejection of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was based on the incompatibility of situation on the North American Continent with the assumption of obligations in Europe as part of the Empire. General Smuts endorsed the Washington Four-Power Treaty on the ground that it created a League of Nations for the Pacific,[2] and the Hertzog Government rejected the Protocol because of the " peculiar position and interest of South Africa " and the need of avoiding commitments regarding matters in which they had little if any concern. Conversely the Government of India held that her geographical situation would, under the Protocol, involve her beyond her means. The great triumph of geographic sectionalism was, of course, Sir Austen Chamberlain's policy and the Locarno Pact which exemplified it. From time to time theoretical justifications of this principle, of which the logic of events was forcing recognition, have been enunciated, as when a writer in *The Round Table* argued :

The League of Nations is really inappropriate for the settlement of purely European questions. . . . Directly any question of obligation

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xvi. p. 472. [2] *Journal*, vol. iii. p. 905.

or responsibility is involved (non-European states) will one and all refuse to have anything to do with the problems of Europe. The reverse is no less true. Europe will certainly not allow its affairs to be settled by American or Asiatic Powers who take no responsibility for the consequences. . . . The truth is that the League of Nations is designed as a world association, and is only suited for the consideration of business which affects all the world.[1]

This tendency, however, has not lacked critics who see what it implies in world politics as well as in relation to the integrity of the Empire. In the first place, the original idea of the League was certainly that " business which affects all the world " meant simply this and that difficulty here and there which—since if ignored it might assume formidable proportions—necessarily became the concern of all from its inception, even if the settlement of the trouble were locally administered. Similarly the basic theory of the Empire has always been that what touched one part affected all. Regionalism, therefore, is a radical departure from both these principles. A very plausible explanation of the Brazilian veto on the admission of Germany to the League Council was that it constituted a protest against the increasing dominance of that agency by European Powers, its approximation, that is, to an essentially European League.[2] Mr. Amery's suggestion in March 1926 that the Latin-American countries form a separate League of their own appears to have been keenly resented by their delegates at Geneva.[3] The most reiterated criticism of the Pact idea was that regional pacts provoke counter-alliances and imply a return to the discredited system of balance of power in world organisation.

The principle of recognising regional interests as paramount affects the Empire in two vital respects. In the first place it implies, as *The Round Table* puts it,

the comfortable but dangerous fallacy that the guarantee of the British Empire can be parcelled up on the limited liability principle into continental zones. . . . It parcels up by continents the obligations resting upon the British Empire, ignoring altogether the fact that if one nation in the Empire is at war, the others must be at war, whether or not they consent, and whether or not they actively participate.[4]

This consideration is especially important in view of the fact that the Empire is primarily a sea Power, and would most likely

[1] Vol. xii. p. 241 (March 1922).
[2] *Ibid.* vol. xvi. p. 462.
[3] *New York Times* (March 23, 1926).
[4] Vol. xiv. pp. 509, 517.

be called upon to utilise measures involving naval blockade. The adoption of a solution for international difficulties which would involve Britain in the liability to go to war while the Dominions were left free to dissociate themselves from all the consequences, it has been urged, would end the British Commonwealth when the next serious crisis should arise.[1] A correlative effect of applying this principle, furthermore, would be the rapid development of a feeling throughout the Commonwealth that each member must pull its own chestnuts out of the fire. This would rapidly cause a cessation of all pretence at co-operation in the determination of policies, and would render disintegration a fact perhaps long before some crisis should demonstrate it to the world at large.

Whatever its convenience as a device for meeting immediate difficulties, the regional principle is the very negation of the Commonwealth. The theory upon which the Empire rests is that it is essentially a world-wide organisation—a League of Nations in itself, as General Smuts has so often described it—that all its members are far more closely bound to one another than to any neighbouring Power, and that the influence which they may exert in their own part of the world is derived mainly from the prestige which membership in the Commonwealth affords. Thus they may intervene effectively in local questions touching their interests, but without being absorbed by the balance of power dominating that region. In proportion, furthermore, as regionalism in policy tends to weaken Imperial ties, so it tends to strengthen the attractive force of the neighbouring great foreign Powers upon the Dominions. Mr. Lloyd George recognised this when he admitted that the Locarno settlement might drive the Dominions into the ambit of American foreign policy.[2] This proposition will be discussed presently. Although it has as yet attracted little or no attention from commentators, it would seem to merit their most serious consideration in the future. Certainly an opportunist policy which proclaims that the several British nations have more in common with their neighbours than with their sister members of the Commonwealth would seem suicidal on the face of it.

The other main proposal for counteracting tendencies to disintegration is the assumption by the Commonwealth as a

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xiii. pp. 686–687. [2] *Journal*, vol. vi. p. 430.

whole of an attitude of aloofness from the specific controversies which agitate the international scene, particularly in Europe. The considerations underlying this viewpoint appear to be that since such an attitude has already been adopted individually by most of the British nations the United Kingdom might well join them and so bring about unanimity in this respect, and further, that each occasion of active intervention in world affairs is liable to provoke an incident within the Empire calculated to strain relationships and reveal evidence of disunion. Although the launching of the policy embodied in the Locarno Pact brought the issue to a head, the problem has been throughout its course involved with that of the relation of the Empire to the League of Nations, out of which the deprecated entanglements seemed directly to proceed.

From the inception of the League its possibly disintegrating effects upon the Empire have furnished grounds for anxiety. The legal difficulties involved in separate Dominion membership, the prospect of the airing before a jealous world and the consequent exaggeration of the internal problems of the Commonwealth, and the incentive which such an international forum would offer for the development of divergent policies among the separate and equal British members of the association have all come in for apprehensive comment in many quarters. The belated suggestion was even offered that the Dominions should accept a limited and indirect League membership and should speak therein only through a single Empire Delegation.[1] On the other hand the Dominions, elated with the new status attained at Versailles, which they had sought as a counterpoise to the movement for Imperial centralisation, had assumed obligations under the original League Covenant which (since they appeared several as well as joint commitments) were, in fact, greater than those to which they would have been subjected as integral parts of a federated Empire. It was natural, therefore, that a reaction should have set in, and that the Dominions, especially Canada, should have been foremost among the nations which sought to interpret the spirit of the Covenant along the same lines as had the United States. We have accordingly such utterances as those already cited in the Dominion parliaments—dissatisfaction with the League " as at present constituted," belief in a " genuine "

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xi. p. 683 (April 1921).

League of Nations, and hopes that it would be directed to the fulfilment of its "true" functions. Yet the Protocol was a direct product of the League, and such episodes as Chanak, the Ruhr and finally Locarno, if not actually connected therewith, were yet constant reminders of League commitments, hence this organisation continued to be involved in proposals for the solution of Imperial foreign problems.

Since devolution seemed the prevailing tendency, one line of argument was to counteract both regionalism and the dangers of League obligations by emphasising the distinctness of the Commonwealth as an entity in world politics. Hence we have strenuous protests from Premier Massey and others in New Zealand at the trend of the times, and the recurrent emphasis of Premiers Hughes and Bruce in Australia on the fact that the League offered no sufficient guarantee of their safety. Not only from General Smuts, but from all quarters came repeated reminders that the Empire was itself a League of Nations, and one resting on far deeper foundations than that at Geneva:

> And, finally, there is another great area which will settle its affairs without the League of Nations, and that is the British Commonwealth! It covers more than a quarter of the earth's surface and contains more than a quarter of the earth's people. Yet it is a single Commonwealth, and has a machinery of its own for dealing with the relations and problems of the many nations and races and civilisations which compose it.[1]

The Empire was still a fact, while the League was as yet a project, and the time had not yet come to minimise the interests and functions of the one through preoccupation with the other. Although the Empire had interests in and obligations toward Europe and its primary interest was in promoting world peace, yet it was a world Power of its own right, and its relations with the United States were at least as important as those with Europe.[2]

In any case, so supporters of this viewpoint maintained, the Empire's course was clear. If the ideal of a united Commonwealth in foreign affairs was to survive, if, as Mr. Meighen had put it, such principles of foreign policy were to be laid down in matters affecting the whole Empire as would appeal to all its widely

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xii. p. 244.
[2] *Ibid.* vol. xiii. pp. 481–483; vol. xv. p. 22.

scattered communities,[1] that policy must be essentially a compromise and largely a negative one. Neither the Dominions nor Britain should enter into any commitments to which the others were unwilling to lend support; the Imperial aspect of all issues must be kept uppermost. At the same time active participation in foreign affairs on the basis that no step should be taken without the active consent of all members would paralyse the conduct of foreign affairs. Hence the compromise of a general attitude of aloofness on the part of the whole Commonwealth was adduced, the internal affairs of Europe being the case in point. Through its active attempts to settle international difficulties, the League was in danger of becoming a purely European institution. It was not the proper function of the League to govern Europe, and no world league could. Much better it would be to devolve the settlement of these problems upon some regional body within or without the League, and to concern its members only with matters of truly world importance.[2] From the Imperial standpoint, continued connection with a League so modified in aims, devoted primarily to humanitarian rather than to political activity of a regulatory nature, would offer little cause for concern, and utterances in the Dominions on the whole supported such a policy of readjustment.

The Round Table, an outstanding exponent of this viewpoint, states the matter thus:

> Practically, then, we seem to have two alternatives. On the one hand we may attempt to behave as a distinctively European Power, either joining with France, in response to what seems the constant invitation of her policy, to secure the hegemony of Europe, or forming a combination against her, and running in either case far-reaching risks of our own seeking. For this alternative in either form there seems indeed nothing to be said.
>
> On the other hand—and there is no third course—we are left with this. Recognising our true posture to be that of an island Power and of a system intermediary between the great regions of the earth, and avoiding all special bonds with any of them, we share with America the veto function which sea power in insular hands is capable of properly exercising in world affairs. This posture implies that we hold an active brief in the councils of the world, but normally only a watching brief in the councils of Europe. It looks primarily to our own security, but it is also the only one from which we can play a "moderating and mediatorial rôle" toward the affairs of the Continent

[1] *Journal*, vol. ii. p. 547.

[2] *Round Table*, vol. xiii. p. 691; vol. xvi. p. 462.

or of the world; for, though the British Empire and American Delegations seem to have overlooked it at Paris, one can scarcely be a true mediator if he is bound to one side or the other of the dispute needing mediation. It seems calculated in the long run to give us a greater influence in the world than any other posture. Finally, it leaves room, as and to the extent that opinion everywhere permits it, for the development of the present League of Nations or of some other mechanism devoted in the true sense—indeed in the words of the Covenant—to "the peace of the world"; though meanwhile it indicates that the Empire, while making use of the machinery of the League and declaring at all times for the promotion of the idea for which it stands, should, on the political side, walk no less warily than when it is using our older methods of negotiation. In both, regard must always be had for our place in relation to the various regions of the earth, and for the true limits of our responsibility and of wise intervention.[1]

A more extreme statement of this general position and from a different angle comes from the able pen of Mr. Jebb. Among "Principles of Recovery" discussed in the final chapter of his most recent work, he examines the relation of the Empire to Europe and the League.[2] "In Europe," he argues, "the Covenant is held to be a solemn contract to go to war in certain contingencies . . . In Britain and the Dominions, on the other hand, it is regarded as little more than an expression of goodwill, and of the general intention to settle disputes amicably if possible; but involving no obligation to fight in another's quarrel." The former view, he holds, is more in keeping with the letter and the spirit of the instrument itself, but is prompted by the urgent necessities of a distracted continent. Instead, then, of visualising the future of the League as that of an essentially world-wide, non-regulatory association, he takes the other viewpoint, that it is "primarily and essentially a European institution, . . . a regional association, charged with the task of bringing the European states into some form of political union for the sake of their own peace." From this standpoint the logical conclusion follows that the Commonwealth in the interest of its own integrity should retire from the League:

To get rid of the embarrassments of the Covenant and to promote the future development of the League of Nations as a regional authority

[1] "A Basis for an Imperial Foreign Policy": March 1924 (*Round Table*, vol. xiv. pp. 288–289); *cf.* "A Plea for an Independent Foreign Policy": December 1928 (*ibid.* vol. xix. pp. 1–25).

[2] *The Empire in Eclipse*, pp. 298–308.

for Europe, should be an aim of the Britannic states, both for their own sake and in the general interests of world peace. The simplest way for them to do it would be by quitting the League, in accordance with the procedure which is provided in the Covenant. The Britannic Commonwealth could then assume the same attitude as the United States, of friendly detachment; refusing to take sides in the disputes of Europe, but ever ready to respond to her collective appeal for specified assistance in specific circumstances; such as financial aid, or the provision of an impartial chairman for important commissions. In addition to services of this kind the Britannic Commonwealth, like the United States, should be willing to support the subsidiary activities of the League, especially the International Court of Justice and the various inquiries into social questions of universal importance. Some kind of associate-membership seems to be needed to admit of co-operation with the League without the formal obligations of the Covenant.

To supplement this negative recommendation, Mr. Jebb proceeds to endorse the regional principle in world politics, and the policy already cited of meeting this by a correlative emphasis upon the Empire as a distinct entity in international affairs, having special interests in relation to the United States. He argues:

As matters stand, the League tends to divert public interest and political effort from the Imperial Conference; and, moreover, the Covenant has placed its Britannic signatories in an utterly false position, to the detriment of closer co-operation with the United States on the one hand and harmonious relations with Europe on the other. From the outset the dangerous inconsistency of the position was noted by interested observers. . . .

Leading champions of the League, both here and in the Dominions, sometimes protest that they would readily transfer their support to any other plan which seemed more likely to secure world peace. The alternative and more hopeful plan exists. Its theory is that world organisation should be based on regional associations of states rather than on the individual states themselves, discarding the fallacy that the small states are the "equals" of the larger for any practical purpose; and it is further postulated that a written covenant is neither necessary nor desirable for ensuring whatever measure of co-operation is really practicable from time to time. . . .

So far the conclusion is that Britannic foreign policy should aim at security in the Pacific, where the only visible danger exists; abstention from further commitments in Europe; and withdrawal from the League of Nations (unless a form of associate-membership can be arranged) with a view to promoting the interests of world peace by a better mode of international collaboration. It happens that all these aims coincide with the principles of American policy, and thus

form the broadest foundation for co-operation between the Britannic Commonwealth and the United States.

The adoption of these principles, he believes, would secure two great advantages. On the one hand by minimising the chances of crises the insistent problem of Imperial machinery would be virtually eliminated. At the same time a vital aspect of Imperial policy in the future would be provided for :

> A Britannic policy on these simple lines would not appear to require any machinery of continuous consultation, provided the Imperial Conference met at least every second year. In relation to Europe the British Government might then continue to act in the name of the Empire and with its support, instead of being forced, as lately, to play a lone hand. In relation to the United States the Canadian Minister at Washington, when at last he is appointed, might take a leading part in harmonising the policies of the two great Commonwealths, acting in the name and collective interest of the Empire instead of being required to dissociate the Dominion. Thus the attractive idea of Canada as the liaison state, which hitherto has not been warranted by any constructive action, would have the opportunity of fruitful fulfilment.

The present writer admits that he is still an unrepentant adherent to the principles of the League Covenant as originally propounded, and hence has no sympathy with the tendency to make of it an essentially European institution or with the proposal that the Empire should withdraw therefrom. He believes, for instance, that the acceptance of the Protocol would have gone far to solve the external problems of the Commonwealth along with those of the world at large, and that its rejection, owing to concatenation of political circumstances and tactics as well as misunderstandings, has prevented the establishment of a basis of international relations, the lack of which will be keenly felt by the Empire in the not so distant future when the political scene has shifted. In the first place no nations have a more immediate interest in the maintenance of international stability and peace than have these of the Empire. It is now too late to decry the Covenant for according separate recognition to the Dominions and breaching the diplomatic unity of the Empire—the old-time unity has gone, and the League was not the cause but the vehicle for the expression of new developments. Although the *consciousness* of external menace has proved a most potent consolidating force throughout history, in the case of the British nations,

awareness of such dangers (assuming they exist) is not sufficiently strong or general at present to exert a unifying influence. The obligations rather than the benefits of Imperial and League affiliations have accordingly monopolised attention, and the effect of recent crises has been disruptive. Hence the fewer of these episodes which occur the more satisfactorily can the Commonwealth bridge this period of transition in world politics.

Furthermore, the view that world politics are essentially European politics and the concern of no member of the Commonwealth save the United Kingdom is dangerously myopic. True, Australia and New Zealand have demonstrated their recognition of the possibility that at some future date they may find themselves on the defensive, but the contrast in the reaction of Canada and of the Central American countries to Article 10 of the Covenant is highly significant in this respect.[1] Were a major conflict to threaten within the coming decade, the nations of the Commonwealth would find that the existence of a set of relationships such as the League was intended to establish, did they rest on the solid foundations of several years application, would prove of inestimable value. Were an effective criterion of the "aggressor," such as the Protocol affords, recognised, it might prove of vital importance, in view of the significance of public opinion, especially neutral opinion, under such circumstances. In this latter respect at least, the fact that certain Great Powers have refused to limit their discretion by rendering themselves liable to the attention of an international organisation should not be an important factor, however crucial it may be in the application of economic sanctions. Meanwhile, it is entirely to the advantage of the Commonwealth to keep alive the ideal of the League as a truly world organisation, even if the intensive must be subdued to the extensive emphasis in its activities, and the regulatory to the promotive functions, even if the actual prevention of disputes must be undertaken by regional settlements related by a courteous fiction only to the Covenant itself. In this direction lies the hope that the League will ultimately become an effective agency in the enforcement of world peace. Meanwhile, also, continued association with world affairs should tend to wean the Dominions from the tradition of preoccupation with the problems of their constitutional relations with the Mother

[1] *Supra*, p. 223.

Country, and to a consideration of neglected factors in their foreign contacts and a weighing of alternatives for the future.

So much for the attitude of the Commonwealth toward the League. The policy of negation and aloofness in general, too, offers little promise. The Commonwealth cannot live of itself alone unless it is sufficiently integrated to do so, which it is not. The American Empire is in a different situation, and could. Even if the United Kingdom were to sacrifice other considerations and strive by Isolationism to approximate Dominion attitudes toward Europe, there is no assurance that the Dominions will not suddenly become involved in difficulties of their own with their several great neighbours. Something more positive than this is demanded. On the other hand no policy is better calculated to disrupt the Commonwealth than the promotion of Regionalism—which now constitutes perhaps the greatest single menace to the integrity of the British nations—and the only effective counterpoise to it would seem to be emphasis on the Commonwealth as a distinct entity in world politics, held together by ties which cut across all regional entanglements. A further serious consideration is the fact that neither of these propositions meets the Nationalists upon their own ground.

Factors in the Relation of the Dominions to World Politics

Both these types of suggested remedy for the present situation approach the problem from the traditional Imperialist angle—that is, they presuppose a united Commonwealth, successor to a unitary Empire, and a single Commonwealth policy in foreign affairs. They seek to preserve such a composite policy, if at times only in theory and by resort to patent fictions, by obviating as far as possible the occasions for as well as the manifestations of divided counsels. It should be remembered, however, that large bodies of opinion throughout the British nations have never been Imperialist and are not even Co-operationist, and especially that it is to these sections of the population that Co-operationist arguments must primarily be directed in the future if they are to prevail. The exponents of this viewpoint never presupposed other than a group of separate, equal, and independent British nations, each with its own distinct interests and policies in domestic and foreign affairs. Moreover, the actual fact of the

matter is that the principles for the conduct of foreign policy laid down by the 1923 and 1926 Conferences formally abandoned the older view and proceeded on the basis of the Nationalist assumption. Hence at present we have to consider not the formulation of an Imperial foreign policy in the sense contemplated by Borden and Smuts, but the foreign policy of this or that British nation, determined upon, it is to be hoped, after consultation with and in accordance with the wishes of the other members of the Commonwealth. Incidentally, most of the agitation during the past few years ostensibly for the preservation of an Imperial foreign policy has in reality aimed at securing Dominion support for the policies of the Home Government—that is, of one of the British nations only.

Since the conduct of foreign policy now rests upon this basis, it would seem profitable to change the point of approach to the problem from that of emphasis upon the preservation of seeming unity to that of examining the other courses of action which face the several British nations—in other words, treating co-operation not as a presupposition to be vaguely and indiscriminately attacked by Nationalists, but on its merits as a policy in face of other alternatives. Mere force of iteration is certainly a device of no mean effectiveness in perpetuating belief in the interdependence of the Commonwealth. It can, however, have no more than a retarding effect upon the operation of centrifugal tendencies. The hope of the Co-operationists in the future depends upon the measure of their success in supplementing this by two undertakings. There is demanded both a thorough analysis of the forces operative in world politics—which means more than observations upon the contemporary ills of Europe—in order to demonstrate the ultimate interdependence of the members of the Commonwealth, and a study of the forces making for disruption, with a view to counteracting them as far as possible. Propaganda campaigns would then rest on a surer basis.

With all the dignity and grace with which the Admiral sought the seclusion of his cabin on H.M.S. *Pinafore*, independent Canada retired from the Wrangell Island argument. Despite the brave language which it evoked in Parliament,[1] the episode was a minor one and is now almost forgotten. It was not as

[1] See *Journal*, vol. iii. pp. 571–573; vol. iv. pp. 513–515; vol. vi. pp. 520–521.

important as the disputes over the boundaries of Maine, British Columbia and Alaska, or the fisheries question between Canada and the United States. Yet it is worth recalling, if only as a reminder that a still more recent and serious incident is not the first, and will not be the last, of a type of Dominion adventure into world politics which is best calculated to test the significance of their new and much vaunted status among the nations. The Dominions are now "on their own" in world politics. They have passed from an era of speculation to one of the enforced meeting of concrete situations; they have brought themselves face to face with foreign Powers. No longer can their governments plead the familiar alibi, and capitalise popular resentment at the assumed shortcomings of a Foreign Office which they cannot control. Canada in particular, who has all along taken the lead in effecting the transition, has in the Chicago Drainage Canal issue and the St. Lawrence Waterway negotiations excellent scope for her youthful vigour. She has achieved full opportunity of testing the truth of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's contention that: "In our relations with foreign countries we would do better by attending to the business ourselves rather than having it trusted to the best man that can be found in Great Britain." [1]

Three possible choices face each of the Dominions—continued membership in the Commonwealth and a co-operation with the other British nations which becomes progressively more active as their external interests and participation in world politics grow, independent isolation alike from the Commonwealth and foreign Powers, and thirdly, a swing from the Imperial constellation into the orbit of some neighbouring Great Power. As has already been suggested, it would seem that the most significant consequence of the recent settlement within the Empire should be an ending of that preoccupation with internal relations which has hitherto characterised discussions of the Britannic Question, and a corresponding diversion of Dominion attention to their actual situation as regards foreign Powers. Certain other developments were also adduced which seem likely to enhance this interest. It should thus be possible as time goes on to examine more dispassionately than heretofore the thesis which has been steadily upheld by Imperialists and Co-operationists alike, and of which even ultra-Nationalists may eventually be forced to take

[1] *Industrial Canada*, vol. viii. p. 272, and *supra*, ch. iii.

cognizance. This is, briefly, that to-day the independent nation no more exists than does the independent man, that the vaunted "equality of states" in the etiquette of diplomatic procedure proves but a pitiful fallacy when it faces the facts of world politics, and that the several parts of the Empire are too dependent to permit of long-continued individual action. Each British nation faces local dangers which make a guarantee of outside support when needed imperative. Furthermore—whether the machinery be that of union, alliances, or mere understandings—these local conditions are such that seeking this support within the Commonwealth rather than elsewhere would seem inevitable. In view of the changing international scene, the first part of this contention should prove easy to vindicate. It is the latter part of it which involves the most serious grounds of apprehension.

If Nationalists in general have been prone to ignore consideration of the interdependence of the Empire, and the more extreme exponents of this viewpoint have even founded their arguments on the assumption that the only source of danger to the Dominions lies in the Imperial connection, Colonialists, Imperialists and Co-operationists in turn have all emphasised more than any other factor the inevitable dependence of the several members of the Commonwealth on one another for mutual support in face of foreign nations. In an earlier day it was sufficient to base their argument on the unity of the Empire in international law, and the liability of all its parts to attack by a common enemy. This was irrefutable on the premises. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, with all his assertion that Canada reserved full discretion regarding participation in Empire wars, freely admitted it. An up-to-date Nationalist connotation might even be given the contention, as is illustrated by the following war-time appeal from one of its veteran exponents:

> In 1879 I wrote: "In the event of England's going to war with any continental nation, Canada would immediately become an object for the attack of that nation; she would require to defend herself; to plunge into all the heavy expenditure required in modern warfare, and would become liable to devastation and pillage; and all this, not from any quarrel of her own, not because she had decided to go to war, but simply because she is part of the British Empire." What we see going on to-day confirms the absolute truth of those words, that described quite accurately the position of Canada to-day.
>
> . . . All this has been done to defend herself from a rapacious and

inhuman enemy, an enemy that would, if victorious, desecrate the fair plains and the peaceful villages of Canada in the same bestial and savage fashion that she has shown in Belgium and Northern France. Do not let it be forgotten that Canada's part in the War is not only—as some in this country seem to think—to help the Motherland; it is primarily to defend herself.[1]

In the post-War era, however, the effectiveness of this argument declined. It proved a boomerang in the sense that the more extreme Nationalist adduced it to justify his separatist activity—if the Imperial connection were the source of liability to international complications, then let the connection cease. Hence he directed his energies to securing in so far as possible international recognition for the disintegration of the Commonwealth, and succeeded to the extent at least of rendering its legal unity open to question in important respects. Accordingly, Co-operationists now inclined to stand upon the surer ground of policy. They stressed the political rather than the legal interdependence of the British nations; they boldly faced the alternative of separation and pronounced it suicidal. The prospect from their viewpoint was succinctly stated, for example, by a New Zealand paper as follows:

> As international society is now organised the British nations cannot afford to do without each other. The loss of the Dominions would be a serious blow to the United Kingdom. The loss of the United Kingdom would be an irreparable blow to the Dominions. It would leave them helpless in an unfriendly world, unable to stand alone, or even together, and forced to seek safety in a foreign alliance which might, and probably would, contain more real subservience than ever marked the relations of the Dominions with their parent state. The Empire might passively drift into such a separation; it is impossible to suppose that British peoples would ever actively seek it.[2]

In Australia and New Zealand the principal consideration was defence. Above all else the need of Empire support in the maintenance of the provocative "White Australia" policy was

[1] G. C. Cunningham, *Wake Up, England!* (1919), pp. 62–63.

[2] Quoted in *Round Table*, vol. xi. p. 732 (February 1921). As *The Round Table* itself puts it: "The real alternatives are between the nationhood which is ready to play an active and responsible part in world affairs and the sort of moral inertness of some of the neutrals of the late War. Independence is not so much a matter of status as of thinking, responsibility and action. We believe that the British nations, when they come to deal with international affairs, will find that they have more real independence, and more power as active members of the directing group of the British Commonwealth than in any other way" (*ibid.* vol. xiii. p. 492).

stressed. Premier Bruce, like his predecessor Hughes, made this his principal argument against any loosening of Imperial ties. Left to their own resources the Pacific Dominions would be helpless; the League of Nations was too uncertain a reliance, and in a united Commonwealth alone were they assured of adequate security. Second only to this in importance was the protection of their trade routes, which to the Co-operationist meant reliance on and support of the British guarantee of the freedom of the seas.[1] Both the Chanak episode and the discussion of the Egyptian settlement were seized upon by Premiers Hughes and Massey as occasions for emphasising the vital interest of these Dominions in the Near East and the safeguarding of their communications through the Suez Canal.

In South Africa Smuts and his party were tireless protagonists of active co-operation between the two sections of their white population, among the members of the Commonwealth, and in the society of nations. Their paramount concern was the schism in the white race at home. General Smuts was invoking a favourite argument when he exclaimed: "In Europe civilisation is like a person walking in his sleep on the edge of a precipice. That is the position in the whole world; and what is our position, how precarious is our position here? A handful of whites torn by internal division."[2] Secession in their view was a futile dream. On this subject his Minister of Finance, Mr. Burton, said:

> In my own country we have had to battle a long time against a sort of propaganda of isolation. It is a dreary and barren issue. It is impossible either for individuals or nations now to live isolated. South Africa like every other part of the world must necessarily have an association with others. Even the Nationalists, who, I regret to say, are still coquetting with the idea of separation from the British

[1] "No Dominion has such strong reasons for desiring the maintenance of the Imperial tie as New Zealand. We boast of the size of our exports per head of population. Reduced to plain language this means that the bulk of what we produce is sold in Britain, while for many of the necessities and even more of the luxuries of life, we are dependent on imports from Britain. The freedom of the seas is vital to us. Yet we leave the responsibility to Britain, and content ourselves with a contribution so entirely inadequate that it can only be called shabby. Consultation will inevitably lead to contribution. It is a form of insurance for which we should be as ready to pay as for insurance against other perils of the sea. If we intend at any time to be a nation we must shoulder the responsibilities entailed thereby. We cannot indefinitely lean on Britain." Quoted from the Auckland *Star* (February 7, 1925) in *Round Table*, vol. xv. p. 634.

[2] *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 383 (January 24, 1923).

Commonwealth, are bound to admit that if they should by any chance —which God forbid—obtain that separation, they would still have to seek association with some other Power, and that in all probability that Power would be the British Empire.[1]

In Canada dependence on the Empire for protection was less stressed than in the other Dominions, for to do so would involve discussion of a possible change in relations with the United States, and gratuitous speculation about possible occasions of misunderstanding between friendly nations is a mischievous occupation. From time to time, however, it would be emphatically pointed out that the invisible boundary between the two countries had been kept inviolate only through the restraining influence of the British fleet, and some irrepressible member would declaim against the futility of attempting to vindicate Canadian rights in the Chicago Canal issue without invoking active British aid.[2] Nevertheless the alternative of independence was summarily disposed of. Sir Robert Borden epitomised the Canadian co-operationist viewpoint when in introducing his Naval Bill in the Canadian House on December 5, 1912, he said:

> If we should neglect the duty which I conceive we owe to ourselves, and if irreparable disaster should ensue, what will be our future destiny? Obviously as an independent nation or as an important part of the great neighbouring Republic. What then would be our responsibilities, and what would be the burden upon us for a protection on the high seas much less powerful and less effective than that which we enjoy to-day?[3]

Again, during a debate antecedent to the 1921 Conference he reiterated his credo:

> I believe that Canada has the highest opportunity for development, influence and usefulness in every sense, as a nation within the British Empire. . . . We cannot accept the status of nationhood without accepting also its responsibilities. I earnestly hope that the burden of providing for defence will be much less in the future than in the past. But, whatever the burden may be, I believe it will be less upon this country as a nation of the Empire than if we stood separate as an independent nation.[4]

[1] At a Royal Colonial Institute dinner; London, October 2, 1923 (*United Empire*, vol. xiv. p. 650).
[2] E.g. *Journal*, vol. vi. pp. 64, 313–314; vol. vii. pp. 300–301, 545, 773–777.
[3] Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, session 1912–13, col. 690.
[4] *Journal*, vol. ii. p. 542 (April 27, 1921).

Their opponents, as has been seen, took issue with the very assumptions upon which the Co-operationists' case was founded. The Nationalists ignored and the ultra-Nationalists flatly denied the mutual dependence of the members of the Commonwealth. The latter, too—in Canada at least—were wont to argue that British support was truly a broken reed to lean upon; it had failed them in the past and should be expected to do so again, since the traditional policy was to favour their potential enemies rather than the Dominions who sought Britain's aid. Both groups held out the complete independence of their respective nations and aloofness from international and Imperial concerns as the solution, the only road to permanent security. Throughout the history of their agitation Imperialists continually declaimed against the "policy of drift," the general attitude of complacency with the state of Imperial relations which ignored the existence of the "Britannic Question" altogether, and there is much weight in their contention. In constitutional crises precedents are created and new principles laid down; so it is in international relations. But such decisions are mainly determined by the forces operative and the course of action pursued during the antecedent period of clear sailing. Hence the earlier the Dominions, especially Canada, take stock of their situation, and inaugurate whatever systematic studies would be of value in indicating the trend of events,[1] the better. In this way only can the data essential to the vindication of one or other of these incompatible policies be secured, and the resolution of the controversy must not be left in the hands of foreign Powers.

Meanwhile, certain conclusions regarding the question of Empire interdependence may be drawn from the patent facts of world politics to-day, even without the aid of elaborate researches. Discussions of Imperial foreign relations have the distasteful characteristic of perpetually holding in the foreground the eventuality of war, but this is necessitated by the gravity of the stake involved. The question eventually to be decided is whether the traditional Laurier policy, enunciated as a guide for the internal relations of the Commonwealth, can be applied

[1] For instance, an organised inquiry into the nature and implications of American economic penetration of Canada would throw more light upon the prospects of that Dominion than all that the efforts of parliamentary orators have achieved thus far.

effectively under the conditions of to-day. The purport of Article 9 of the Locarno Pact may be most succinctly stated as an effort to embody this policy in an international agreement, to secure international recognition for a contention hitherto admittedly valid only within the Empire—that the nature and extent of Dominion obligations in relation to Empire wars is for themselves to determine. Just how this would work out in actual application, however, is open to speculation, and involves especial consideration of Nationalist contentions regarding " passive belligerency," neutrality and secession.

The conduct of Imperial foreign relations and defence cannot be disposed of as were the other issues—solely as matters of arrangement between the Dominions and the Mother Country—nor are they susceptible of indefinite postponement or glossing over. Purely legal considerations doubtless could be adjusted satisfactorily enough, particularly within so amorphous a sphere as is that of international law. Law waits on politics, and the political considerations in this case are vital. If the British nations alone were concerned, the Nationalistic solution, to which all were becoming committed before the issue became vital, would undoubtedly be the most convenient. But foreign Powers remain to be heard from. The boasted exercise of discretion regarding participation in Imperial wars may yet be put to the test—a boast, be it remembered, which was directed by Dominion Nationalists against the Home Government, not to foreign countries generally. " Dominion neutrality " has never been experimented with, nor has refusal to participate in an important struggle hitherto been attempted. The consequences of a variety of foreign policies within the Commonwealth have still to develop, and the bargaining power of an individual Dominion against some major foreign Power has never really been forced to a trial.

The first proposition in this regard, which has already engaged the serious consideration of Co-operationists, and would appear to merit the earnest attention of Nationalists as well, is that despite the pretensions of the latter the legal disintegration of the Commonwealth is not yet by any means as complete as they assume. It is contended that whether or not it be a welcome thought the legacy of Imperial history still persists in a fact situation which the Dominions inevitably must face in the event of crisis. It

has already been suggested that Article 9 of the Locarno Pact implies no more than freedom to the Dominions from the moral obligation of taking active measures to enforce the guarantees set forth in the treaty, and offers no suggestion that their situation in case of a declaration of war by or against Great Britain would be in any way different from that hitherto recognised in international law. With Britain at war the Dominions would also be at war, and correlatively one Dominion can embroil the whole Commonwealth in the same way. Although in either case the Laurier formula might well be invoked, it could apply only within the Empire itself. Furthermore, the Locarno Pact implicates a few Powers only. The United States, Japan and Russia alone are highly important exceptions, and the first of these has been outstanding for its reluctance to recognise the alleged new status of the Dominions. In speculating as to what would ensue under these circumstances in the event of a crisis, distinctions must be drawn between general and localised conflicts, and as regards the latter between cases where the scene of trouble is close to or far removed from the borders of a specific Dominion.

In the case of a local war in a distant region, inaction on the part of a Dominion need not necessarily raise serious problems. The failure of Canada, for instance, to despatch troops to the South African War would neither have disrupted the Empire nor jeopardised her own safety. Similarly, as regards League obligations, tacit recognition of the injunction that due consideration must be given to the geographical and military situation of member states would operate in the international sphere as the correlative of the Laurier principle within the Commonwealth. In case a localised conflict broke out in the neighbourhood of a Dominion, however, the Imperial connection, the obligations of League membership, and concern for its own interests would all conspire under existing circumstances to involve that Dominion in the controversy, nor does it appear that the situation would likely be much different were it an independent nation. Furthermore, a study of the map raises the question whether, in view of the location of the various Dominions, a crisis could arise near any one of them which could fail to become at once the concern of Great Powers and threaten a general conflict.

The probable situation of the Dominions in the event of a struggle between Great Powers whether or not Britain herself were involved raises the most serious problems of the Commonwealth, and at the present stage of Imperial development it is only fair to consider them, not from the Laurier standpoint, but in the light of the more extreme Nationalist contentions, and on the basis of a comparison between existing relationships and the alternative of complete Dominion independence. In the first place, were Britain to be engaged in a major conflict, could the Dominions avoid becoming involved therein? During the late European War a section of French-Canadian opinion, for instance, maintained that the Dominion should adopt an attitude of passive belligerency, defence measures should be limited to the protection of their own territory and no troops should be sent overseas. Similarly it is held that non-ratification of the Locarno Treaty assures for the Dominions the position of passive belligerents.[1] The further suggestion has been frequently broached that in the event of war any Dominion might issue a declaration of neutrality and so secure immunity from its consequences. It is maintained that this might well have been done in 1914. In the case of a major conflict efforts either to maintain an attitude of passive belligerency or to win recognition for a declaration of neutrality would be conditioned as to their success by the same factors, but there are technical differences between the two courses of action. The one implies, if betrayal of the Commonwealth, at least remaining within it, the other means avowed secession. Passive belligerency involves liability to attack, while neutrality secures immunity therefrom, but would call for internment of ships and military forces, deprivation of posts and naval bases, and the granting of equal privileges to the enemy in Dominion territory. Under the conditions of ocean transport during modern warfare, the respective advantages to Dominion commerce in either case would depend upon which belligerent held command of the sea.

It is futile to discuss such questions save on the basis of concrete cases. Could either course have been vindicated in 1914? Could a policy either of passive belligerency or neutrality be successfully maintained by Canada in the event of trouble

[1] *E.g.* Mr. Morin in the Canadian House: June 21, 1926 (*Journal*, vol. vii. p. 544).

between Britain and the United States ?[1] The success of either course of action on the part of a Dominion would be determined by the immediate circumstances of the conflict and the prospects of ultimate success as they appeared to the enemy. It is a truism that international law is least effective when it is needed most. The present circumstances of the Empire are such that a foreign Power may place virtually what interpretation it likes upon the legal status of the Dominions. As long as British control of the sea remains a certainty, the enemy would probably welcome either passive belligerency or a declaration of neutrality from a Dominion, but were this in jeopardy and the prospect of successfully invading the Dominion to exist, Imperial Conference resolutions, parliamentary speeches, even alleged Locarno guarantees would become so much waste paper, and neutrality proposals be met with derision. It has been argued that it would not be to the advantage of a foreign Power, victorious over Britain, to make an enemy of a Dominion and inflict upon it the penalties of the loser.[2] The circumstances of the victor, the attitude of other Powers and suchlike motives of expediency might well dictate such moderation. Again they might not. In either case the determining factors would be beyond the Dominion's control.

It would seem that immunity from the consequences of belligerency on the part of another member of the Commonwealth could be guaranteed only by securing general recognition by the nations of a declaration of independence prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In accordance with this view, therefore, some Nationalists would provide beforehand for eventualities and remove all doubts as to freedom from Imperial entanglements. They have proposed that formal notification be transmitted to

[1] The notion that Canada could remain " neutral " in the event of trouble between the United States and Britain is too naive to bear even a half-page of scrutiny. Canada has been the outstanding cause of friction between these two countries since 1763, and Anglo-American tension would promptly resurrect the languishing annexationism of the Republic. How Canada in the light of past history, with an area larger than the forty-eight states, lying within the temperate zone, rich in natural resources (especially nickel) indispensable to a belligerent, yet so thinly populated and strategically so helpless, could vindicate any such declaration against her overshadowing neighbour when her existing status in international law is so susceptible of diverse interpretations, passes understanding. The exigencies of the United States if faced by any serious struggle would force that country to avail itself of all legal ambiguities, treat Canada as an integral part of the Empire, and proceed at once to annex her territory.

[2] *E.g.* by Mr. Power as regards Canada ; *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 290.

foreign nations that a declaration of war by Britain did not commit the Dominions to belligerency, but that separate declarations on the part of their own governments were necessary.[1] Obviously such a course must win formal acceptance from at least the major Powers to acquire any validity. Obviously, too, it would involve a marked extension of the limitation embodied in Article 9 of the Pact, which apparently still recognises the legal unity of the Empire. It would be tantamount to asserting the international independence of the Dominions and claiming for them recognition as separate international units, that is the formal dissolution of the Commonwealth.[2] This, in turn, would mean exchanging the benefits and obligations of the Imperial connection for all those stresses and strains to which the smaller nations of the world are subjected by their more powerful neighbours. At the present time, however, there does not appear to be any serious prospect that the minority favouring so extreme a course will find substantial support in their efforts.

In view of the broaching of suggestions which imply a repudiation by the Dominions of all responsibilities arising from the Imperial connection, it is wise to examine certain considerations touching their relations with adjacent Great Powers, which would apply with still greater force were they to become independent than while mitigated as at present by the factor of Dominion membership in the Commonwealth. The inevitable starting-point of the discussion, the crux of the whole issue, is the validity of the assumption upon which the Nationalists base their entire case. They hold that for the Dominion the alternative to the Imperial connection with its liabilities is complete, perduring independence, unfettered liberty to pursue a policy of aloofness or any other attitude in external relations at will, as well as complete economic and constitutional autonomy. It is submitted that this prospect is chimerical. For an indefinite time to come the Dominions will rank among the smaller, weaker nations. The effective decisions in world politics to-day are made

[1] See comment in *Round Table*, vol. xvi. p. 677; also Mr. Johnson's contention in the Dail (February 5, 1926). The distinction which both the Leader of the Opposition and the Minister of External Affairs during this debate (*Journal*, vol. vii. pp. 392–401) insisted on drawing between the British Empire (Great Britain with the Colonies and Dependencies) and the British Commonwealth (Great Britain and the Dominions) holds ominous possibilities should it attain international recognition.

[2] See comment by Premier Bruce; *Journal*, vol. vii. pp. 823–824.

Canadian Nationalists seem obsessed with the idea that wars are the peculiar indulgence of European Powers and that the history of the nineteenth century furnishes adequate models for their policies in the twentieth, oblivious to the prospect that the heart of the next great conflict may be on their very borders. In a vital struggle feeling runs high, so that those who are not ardently for us appear to be against us. A belligerent cannot appreciate the attitude of a neutral neighbour, and in this case the friendship of the two countries would be ended. Moreover their economic interdependence is such that, apart from the recrudescence of American annexationism which the situation might well provoke, the United States is in a position to apply economic sanctions which would rapidly reduce the Dominion to an attitude of agreement with her policies. Even the minimum measures America would find essential to the prosecution of a serious conflict would be ruinous to Canada if not counteracted by vigorous support from the rest of the Empire. As Sir Robert Borden warned of a less critical eventuality than this : " Suppose Canada says to the United States. ' We're going to leave it to you to carry the burden.' ' All right, then,' says the United States, ' if we've got to carry the burden and there is a shortage of available materials, we'll keep them at home so that we can carry the burden.' If the United States took that attitude it would paralyse industrial operations in Canada. Men who talk of shifting burdens to the United States know not whereof they speak." [1]

The Monroe Doctrine and Canada

This leads to consideration of the significance of the Monroe Doctrine to Canada. For upwards of a generation the principal argument adduced by a large section of Canadian opinion in justification of their coldness toward all Imperial defence projects and efforts to bring about closer co-operation in foreign affairs has been the thesis that Canada needs no other protection than the Monroe Doctrine. The case has been rested with this mere unsupported assertion. There has been no suggestion of inquiring into American views upon the subject, nor has there been any analysis of the Monroe Doctrine itself. Least of all

[1] In Toronto (December 8, 1917) ; *Canadian Annual Review* (1917), p. 604.

has there been any hint that dependence on American protection might imply reciprocal obligations to the United States, even the manifestation of willingness to undertake a proportionate share of her own defence. Similarly, critics of this argument have hardly attempted to analyse its implications. They have merely repudiated it as too cowardly for consideration, as unworthy of British traditions or Canadian nationhood. This aspect of the question may be allowed to speak for itself. It is more pertinent to meet the contention upon its own plane, in the light of realistic considerations which would apply to any Power situated as is the United States, even Britain herself included.

Its Canadian protagonists invariably interpret the Monroe Doctrine in the original and restricted sense in which it was propounded. Mr. Ewart offers the salient illustration. In an essay entitled "The Canning Policy, Sometimes Called the Monroe Doctrine," he argues at length that to George Canning, not President Monroe, the authorship of the policy should justly be credited, that it has proved very beneficial in preventing war in the western hemisphere, that Canada is protected by it just as the South American republics are, and has no more reason than they to feel humiliated thereby or obligated to contribute to the maintenance of the British fleet. The suggestion that invocation of the Monroe Doctrine might involve payment for American assistance he dismisses with the retort that the function of the policy is to prevent wars and it has caused none.[1] All this may be very fine, but it is nevertheless true that Canning is dead and so is his policy, that Mr. Ewart and his associates are not discussing the pertinent features of the Monroe Doctrine at all, and that the application of what there is of the Canning ingredient in it to-day would unquestionably involve Canada in obligations at least as great as are implied in the Imperial connection and against which no Laurier policy could be vindicated.

The Monroe Doctrine is based on the assumption which was perfectly valid a century ago that the western world may be regarded as an area distinct in itself and separate from Europe, and on the postulate that this region shall not be used for purposes of colonisation by European Powers. Certain deductions have been drawn from these premises which in the course of a century of changing circumstances have submerged the original content

[1] J. S. Ewart, *The Kingdom Papers*, No. 6, vol. ii. pp. 169–188.

of the Doctrine and become its vital ingredients. The obsolete injunction against colonisation has been replaced by one precluding active intervention by outside nations in the concerns of the Americas. It is assumed that a vacuum is thus created which the United States alone can fill—the Monroe Doctrine has never been a self-denying ordinance. Hence the supplementary doctrines of "paramount interests," "right of intervention," and even occupation of territory by the United States to forestall seizure by another Power. As might be expected with so fluid a concept, definition of the specific content of the Monroe Doctrine has been avoided by the United States, as when this was sought by Salvador in connection with her joining the League of Nations.[1] It is a tendency rather than a formulated creed, a tendency to regard the western hemisphere as a region distinct, the affairs of which are the concern not of the society of nations but of the United States, and to assert the hegemony of the United States within that region.

The important consideration, however, is what implications an invocation of the original or defensive aspect of the Monroe Doctrine would have for Canada. First of all there is the question of its effectiveness. There could be no more crucial test than that of the late War. On the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the situation of Canada at that time, ex-President Taft, now Chief Justice of the tribunal which has the ultimate decision in questions of American public policy, is reported as holding:

> A consistent pursuit of the policy would not require us to object to any warlike measures under the rules of lawful war which England's enemies might take against Canada. [Canada had already furnished aid and taken an active part in the conflict.] On what theory, therefore, could we justly object to Germany's taking counter measures and carrying the war into a country which is waging war upon her? All that the Monroe Doctrine would consistently require of us would be to insist that *when the war is over*, if Germany were successful, she could not overthrow the Canadian Government and establish her own there, or take any oppressive measures which would have a similar effect. But we could not object to her exacting an indemnity if she were the victor.[2]

Obviously this declaration places serious limitations on the theory that the Monroe Doctrine suffices for the protection of Canada.

[1] *Cf.* the more recent demands of Costa Rica.

[2] To the Outlook Club, Now Jersey, *New York Times* (November 28, 1914).

On the face of it Germany would have been allowed a free hand until peace terms were drawn up, and if the experience of Belgium is any criterion, much could have transpired in the interval. Actually, no doubt, the United States could not have risked mere reliance upon the eventual filing of a demand to be heard at the council table in order to secure the ousting of so dangerous a neighbour, and would have engaged Germany in what could hardly have been other than a war between them for the possession of Canada. The fact that Canada had taken active measures to participate in the conflict would seem to be a secondary consideration. "Passive belligerency" would not have been respected had the enemy secured command of the sea, and the United States would still have been faced with the alternatives of standing by until the peace conference or of anticipating an invasion of the territory adjoining it.

Recourse to the Monroe Doctrine for the defence of Canada thus offers three possibilities. The United States might remain passive, which would mean the ruin of the Dominion, or it might adopt the opposite extreme and apply what would in effect be a doctrine of prior occupation of territory to prevent seizure by another Power. In view of the identity in many respects of the policies, even the interests of the two countries, a third recourse would be most probable, that is, engaging on the side of Canada as an ally. This would be more than a probability should Canada become embroiled, say, with Japan. What would be the outcome? It is merely flouting the truisms of human nature and world politics to presume that a Great Power, least of all one based on popular suffrage, will expend millions in men and money in order to extricate a neighbouring small nation from a scrape in which it has involved itself without demanding some assurance against a repetition of the occurrence, in the nature of control over that country's external relations. The fact that the rescuer might have served well its own policies abroad by its action would be apt to prove a very weak countervailing argument. In short it is difficult to see how Canada, after recourse to the Monroe Doctrine, could fail of becoming a virtual protectorate of the United States.

Actually this aspect of the Monroe Doctrine has never been applied nor have these considerations become other than academic because full responsibility for the defence of Canada, as part of

the British Empire, has always been and still is avowedly assumed by the Mother Country. Loss of British control of the sea during the late War, however, would at once have made the issue a pertinent one, and the same would be true should British power languish through lack of Dominion support in the future. Similarly because Canada is a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations on most excellent terms with the United States, she has not as yet been confronted with the more modern developments of the Monroe Doctrine. Were she, however, to become "independent," to sever completely her connection with the major unit in world politics to which she belongs, she would become one of several relatively minor nations in the western hemisphere over which the doctrine of paramount interest prevails, and what is still more to the point, would be well within the effective radius of that doctrine. The same would be true of Australia and New Zealand, were they to become independent and the Monroe Doctrine be extended to the Pacific, save that its effective enforcement there would be subject to more uncertainties. Should, for instance, the "White Australia" policy provoke tension, it is not unlikely that meanwhile the United States would itself have been subjected to the same causes of tension. Under such circumstances it might be constrained to utilise the peril of the Pacific Dominions as a ground of intervention, and so create much the same situation as would ensue from a difficulty in which Canada had become involved.

Whether or not this be the case, whether or not it be true that the four Dominions—Canada, Newfoundland, Australia and New Zealand—must inevitably choose between membership in the Commonwealth and the leadership of the United States, nevertheless these considerations must be noted and weighed in connection with any efforts to extend the scope of the Laurier principle beyond that of a mere constitutional convention valid only within the Empire and to secure definitive recognition for it among foreign nations. As has been suggested already, such efforts, as well as the settlement of the outstanding constitutional issues of the Empire, may have the important incidental effect of impelling the same interest in these considerations on the part of ultra-Nationalists as the Co-operationists have heretofore displayed, with perhaps a tendency to the reconciliation of attitudes towards

them. In any case there would be no possibility of evading them in the event of wars in which the Dominions were liable to become involved, and they must constitute henceforth the determining factors in all discussions of Imperial relations.

Canada and Continentalism

In the foregoing discussion attention has been focussed upon the probable circumstances mainly of one Dominion and almost exclusively of one foreign Power. As far as can be foreseen at present the future of the Commonwealth turns upon two interdependent considerations, the destiny of Canada and the future rôle of the United States in world politics. Among the Dominions the position of Canada is at once the most crucial and her future most definitely at issue. She has throughout the course of the Britannic controversy taken the lead in opposition to centralisation and in the consolidation of national feeling. She alone among the Dominions is the immediate neighbour of a great foreign Power, and of them all her situation is that best calculated to test the strength of Imperial ties and the capacity of a Dominion to pursue an independent existence. Nationalists in general presume for Canada an indefinite future as an independent nation on this continent, working out her own destiny in her own way, preserving her separate heritage and individuality irrespective of her southern neighbour. Co-operationists are as convinced that annexation to the United States is the sole alternative to the maintenance of the Imperial connection. Even assuming that the latter need not necessarily follow, and that Canada could remain technically as independent as any other small nation to-day, comparison between her existing and potential situation should afford Nationalists ample food for thought. In view of her geographical location, the severance of existing ties could not fail to affect profoundly her status and prestige on the American continent even more than in world politics, her friendship with the United States, her opportunities of maintaining a distinctive national development, and (since it would imply a swing from the British to the American orbit) even her independence, in the sense of her capacity to remain the actual arbiter of her policies.

The favourite rôle envisaged for Canada of recent years has

been that of interpreter of Britain and the Commonwealth to the United States, of what a new country can find most adaptable in the heritage of an older civilisation.[1] As Mr. Rowell put it: "No nation has an opportunity of making a finer contribution to international peace than has Canada by means of her ability to act as an interpreter and reconciler between the Britannic Commonwealth and the United States."[2] And again:

> Providence has made us a liaison nation. In the course of our political development we have retained our connection with the Mother Country, and that enables us to understand their view, their attitude, their ideals and their policies on international questions as the people of the United States do not understand them. On the other hand, our close contact and constant intercourse with the American people enables us to understand them and their ideals in a way that the people of the Mother Country do not understand them. . . . If we fail to take advantage of it we shall lose one of the greatest opportunities that has ever come to us or ever will come to us to assist in maintaining a good understanding between the British Empire and the United States, not only for the benefit of Canada and the British Empire, but for the peace and progress of the world.[3]

The fulfilment of such a function alone would mean a notable contribution on Canada's part to civilisation, worthy of the best in any Native Son, and surely affording her meanwhile a position of distinction in her own quarter of the world and among the nations she would not otherwise possess.

Politicians on both sides in Canada are wont to bemoan the steady exodus southward of their country's most promising material and blame one another for it. There is a corresponding migration from the United States. The one represents perhaps more largely the product of Canadian universities and the other that of mid-western farms. The late Andrew Carnegie compared the relation of the two countries not inaptly to that of Scotland and England.[4] The young Canadian medical man finds greater scope for specialisation in New York than in Montreal or Toronto, the engineer finds wider opportunity in the United States, and the scholar can rise higher in his chosen field in one of the great

[1] See especially Sir Robert Falconer's notable course of lectures, *The United States as a Neighbour* (1925).

[2] N. W. Rowell, *The British Empire and World Peace*, p. 182.

[3] *Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 570–571.

[4] His language was somewhat effusive: "Canada, the Scotland of America, is to play the part of Scotland and annex her southern neighbour as Scotland did, and boss it for its own good, as Scotland also did . . . and as she still does" (*Ottawa Canadian Club Speeches*, vol. i. p. 97: April 28, 1906).

American university centres than at home. Men of less marked ability in these walks of life, particularly in higher education, can also find openings not as yet available to them in a country whose material resources are not so highly developed. Whatever German bankers may have been accomplishing in their way in the United States since the War, or German-American societies in combating the Pan-Angles, Canada in the cultural sphere at least is fulfilling the function which has been proposed for her, of interpreting to the western world the contribution of the Commonwealth to contemporary civilisation. The performance of that function, be it added, depends on her retaining membership in the Commonwealth, for how could she continue to interpret that which she has ceased to represent ?

It is equally probable that the maintenance of existing friendly relations with her southern neighbour depends largely upon this same factor. The combined efforts of Great Britain, Canada and the United States have produced a relationship between the two adjoining countries which is unrivalled among the nations. But this has not always been the case. The excellence of the understanding between Canada and the United States has been strongly reinforced thus far by the high esteem which Great Britain has held in the eyes of the Republic, in fact is in no small degree a reflection of it. Certainly the influence of Britain has been a restraining one on the acerbity of Canadian-American disputes, so much so that it has been contemptuously dubbed " ever recurring kowtowing to the United States " [1] and suchlike by Canadian Nationalists. Considering the relative importance of the two countries, the pretensions of Great Britain and Canada may, in the American view, be said to have typified respectively dignity and impudence. Whether under such circumstances Canada, unsupported by British influence, could maintain the present basis of relationship in the handling of questions which from time to time are bound to arise, such as the Chicago Drainage Canal difficulty or the St. Lawrence Waterway negotiations, is a matter of speculation.

It would seem, furthermore, that not only the vigour and distinctiveness of Canadian national development, but the very soundness of its foundations depends on the maintenance of the British connection. The growth and consolidation of Canadian

[1] J. S. Ewart, *The Kingdom of Canada*, p. 367.

nationality has thus far been alone made possible by the existence of ties which at once divorce her from her immediate neighbour and link her to a Mother Country three thousand miles away—too far removed to mould her development directly. The perpetuation of British traditions, modified as they are in the new environment, still operates to promote this distinctiveness, while separation would render tendencies to duplicate American attitudes dominant. The traditional antipathy to Britain based on the constitutional struggles of the Colonial era and the handling of Canadian boundary disputes would, for instance, become a fixed heritage. The influx of alien elements and efforts to Canadianise these would complete the analogy to American experience. Thus Canadian, like American, culture would tend to become founded on a denunciation of European backgrounds.

But a heritage from the ages is not repudiated either with ease or with impunity. There is the time and effort devoted to purely negative activity which in another situation would be employed in further building. In the United States many such heritages have been imported, but all must be avowedly rejected in favour of that which is newer than any of them, and which therefore requires much artificial standardisation and inculcation. For Canada within the Commonwealth such a course has been unnecessary. This accumulated capital may still be most profitably utilised ; nationalistic philosophy does not call for its destruction. There has been no formal rupture with the past and its achievements to become the official starting-point and condition the whole tone of national endeavour, and it would entail great sacrifice henceforth to Canada were such a cleavage to occur. Herein lies the fundamental difference between the spirit of Canadian and American national development. It is the very basis of Canada's claim to a nationality distinct from that of the United States, and without it absorption by her overshadowing neighbour would seem inevitable. Yet it is shortsightedly ignored by those who argue that the circumstances of the two countries are identical and that Canada should therefore duplicate American procedure.

Herein lies the essential basis of distinction between English-speaking Canada on the one hand and the United States on the other, and it is in this direction—in view of undoubted similarities in other respects and especially economic attraction—not that of

the Mother Country, that the chief menace to Canadian national integrity lies. Nevertheless, Nationalists seem determined upon focussing their attention overseas instead, and arguments are continually adduced to the general effect that a repudiation of the British connection, if not of British antecedents, is essential to the development of a healthy indigenous patriotism. It is assumed that the one is necessarily the negation of the other, but the grounds of that assumption, if any, are never stated.[1] Apparently it is due to what in popular psychological jargon is known as an "inferiority complex," acquired from broodings over alleged colonial status.

The other principal basis of Canadian national distinctiveness is also, it seems, ignored by English-speaking Nationalists—that is, French Canada. In this case there has been a break with the Motherland but not with the past. France has become France of the Revolution, the Concordat and the Separation Laws; French Canada is old France which has been transplanted, but which has grown deep native roots and has flourished in the new world—not, as its protagonists claim, *the* nucleus of Canadian nationality, but certainly one of its dual foundations and perhaps the more firmly embedded of the two.[2] Despite Manitoba and Ontario school questions, *Ne Temere* controversies and suchlike differences in the past, Canada presents one of the two or three instances in the modern world of the successful working of dual nationalism. It is based on mutual understanding and concession among those of the two nations who must co-operate actively, and mutual tolerance, if aloofness, on the part of the rest. Both sections in Canada are utterly interdependent. French Canada could not exist as a separate nation without the support of the larger section of the country and those guarantees which the Canadian constitutional system affords. English-speaking Canada has grossly underestimated not only the cultural heritage which Quebec contributes to the common stock—it alone would justify Canadian claims to nationhood—but also the political bulwark of her national integrity which their compatriots present.

[1] The article already cited, "Why Canadian Nationalists are Dissatisfied" (*Round Table*, vol. xvi pp. 368–376), is an excellent illustration of this general position.

[2] See in this connection a discussion by Prof. MacMechan of the "spiritual bondage" of Canada to the United States, and F. J. Audet's rejoinder on behalf of French Canada (*Canadian Historical Review*, vol. i. pp. 347–353; vol. ii. pp. 69–72).

The foregoing factors, not her wheat crop, constitute Canada's chief claims to national distinction, especially in relation to the United States. Were they sacrificed, she would be face to face with the Republic and Continentalism would have full scope. She could hardly avoid throwing in her lot with what would henceforth become in a real sense an " American " group of nations and her independence in external affairs could not fail to be profoundly affected thereby. One of the historical survivals which is least justified by the logic of contemporary circumstances is the notion that " America," " the western hemisphere," must be regarded as a region distinct in world politics. Even historically the streams of colonisation from Europe to the " new world " were separate save for intermittent encounters in the Ohio Valley or on the Spanish Main. At the present time there are at least three regions divided politically and with incompatible cultural backgrounds. There is first of all a World Power, " America " or the United States. Then there is the Latin-American group, the members of which seem progressively desirous of becoming more closely associated politically owing to their common relation to that Power. Thirdly, there is Canada, separate because of her membership in the Commonwealth, still able for that reason to maintain her much underestimated cultural distinctiveness and to pursue her own course politically without question. She is in reality much more closely connected with Britain than with the United States and far more so with Europe than with Latin America—in fact Canadians know more of China than they do of the latter region. " Pan-Americanism " under these circumstances is a myth, or shall we say, an inchoate aspiration. Owing to the absence of Canada from any concern in the proceedings, it often seems a euphemism for the controversy between the United States and Latin America. Should the prepotence of Continentalism in Canada impel her to swing within the American orbit, however, this decisive gap would be closed, and an entirely new complexion would be given in world politics to pretensions regarding the distinctiveness of the western world.

It will readily be seen why the United States should take the lead in promoting this theory of new world solidarity and distinctiveness. The sole justification for Pan-Americanism would seem to be American foreign policy. Its basic assumption is American hegemony in the western hemisphere, the formal

agency for its expression is the Pan-American Union, and its vital principle is the Monroe Doctrine. Just as the scope of business enterprise is extended for those in control by the device of the joint-stock company, so the more closely the relations of an American group of nations could be consolidated under its leadership, the more greatly would the power and prestige of the United States in world politics be enhanced, and the more completely would this whole region become a field for American economic activity. The very confusion of names in this connection is significant. The name "America" is perforce employed in the wider sense as a designation in school textbooks in geography, and in the more usual special sense as denoting the United States. Emigration to "America" means to the United States, otherwise it would be to "Canada" or "Argentina." A citizen of the United States is an "American"; a Canadian is not. Usage would seen to decree that if ambiguity is to be removed, it must be by dropping the more extensive not the narrower application of the term.[1] Pan-Americanism, however, would furnish a justification for both uses—and an index of the relation between them.

In Canada, meanwhile, there have been numerous manifestations of the reciprocal attitude which has here been termed "Continentalism." There have been frequent if intermittent assertions of the solidarity of North American interests in relation to Europe on the one hand and the Far East on the other, that the most vital external interests of Canada coincide with those of the United States and that hence she should homologate her foreign policies with those of the Republic. For instance, during the debate on the Versailles Treaty one Nationalist described Canada as "a great state on the North American continent," and affirmed that in settling her future: "We must have even more regard for this continent than for our European connections and alliances. It is the democracy of America, as exemplified by the United States and Canada, that is the saving grace of the world to-day."[2] During the discussion preceding the 1921 Conference another contended that: "They should set their future policy as an American country, so as to conclude a

[1] A measure of international recognition appears to have been given this contention by the mode of designating the signatories to, and the order agreed upon of signing, the Paris Peace Pact.

[2] *Canadian Annual Review* (1919), p. 107.

defensive alliance with the United States, the only nation which could or to whose interest it was to protect them against Japan which could at a given moment make of Canada a second Belgium."[1] Owing to lack of concern with Latin-American vicissitudes, this attitude has not been exactly Pan-Americanism, but it is certainly the logical prelude thereto, since it assumes the solidarity and distinctness of North American interests under the leadership of the United States. The contrary policy—of treating all non-British countries as equally foreign—as well as American efforts to inculcate a feeling that the Republic occupies a special position in relation to Canada, was well illustrated by an earlier incident. In 1907, when Canada first launched out into the independent negotiation of political questions abroad, American papers commented adversely on Mr. Lemieux's ignoring their Ambassador at Tokyo, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier was impelled to reply to those criticisms by a statement in the House to the effect that the Canadian emissary was instructed to confer with the British Ambassador and the Japanese authorities, not the Ambassador of any other country.[2]

It is essential to note that these manifestations of Continentalism in Canada have been provoked almost wholly by opposition to centralising projects and efforts to involve the Dominion in world politics. There is far more of denunciation than of positive attraction in these gestures of embracing America and all that is involved therewith. They are essentially appeals to the example of the United States, which happens to be at once their nearest neighbour and for the time being the foremost exponent of their own viewpoint in international relations. Beyond this basis of common policy the Nationalist analysis of the situation does not go. Nevertheless they constitute declarations that Canada should commit herself permanently to follow the lead of the United States in foreign policies and to transfer her affiliations from the British to the American group of nations.

Two principal considerations are involved in such a course. In the first place the Nationalists are governed by the assumption that the United States will not modify its position in relation to world affairs, and the relative situation of the two countries

[1] *Journal*, vol. ii. p. 564; *cf.* also the King Government's observations on the Protocol, Cmd. 2458, p. 18.

[2] *Canadian Annual Review* (1907), p. 394; Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, session 1907–08, col. 1585.

internationally is ignored. The tenets of traditional American foreign policy have been adopted in its own interests by a Great Power which desires to retain a free hand in international relations and is able to maintain its stand by force or to change it at will as circumstances may dictate. Not so Canada. She would never be in a position to vindicate a policy which had become at variance with that of the United States unless it were at the same time an Imperial policy, for that would mean the end of the friendly relations upon which the Nationalists stake their whole case. The motive for Nationalist Continentalism plainly is avoidance of external obligations. How could this be achieved by commitment to follow an American policy which had become positive instead of negative? Would not the obligations in such a situation be far more real than inhere at present in the Imperial connection?

Equally serious for Canada is the fact that the transfer of her affiliations from the Commonwealth would involve her as a third party in the increasingly tense situation developing between America on the one hand and the Latin-American countries on the other, and immerse her in a slough of politics from which she can now afford to remain aloof. One of the most significant comments of recent years upon the external relations of Canada was made in this connection, and by a man whose grasp of the realities of such problems is unsurpassed among his countrymen, the veteran Sir George E. Foster. On March 11, 1927, he asked in the Senate for copies of correspondence regarding Canadian relations with the Pan-American Union.[1] His observations were summarised as follows:

> Mr. Foster was surprised to hear that on several occasions representations had been made to the Government of Canada, or to Ministers of the Government, with reference to Canada's assuming a seat which, it was said, had been prepared and was waiting for her in the Pan-American Union. The statement had been made and broadcast that now that some change had been made in Canada's relations and an ambassadorial representative of Canada would find his place in Washington, that seat would be offered to Canada, and it was hoped that it would be accepted. The second point in his motion was that it might be taken somewhat in the nature of a caution as to their attitude in dealing with such an invitation if it had really been given and was being considered by the Government. There was no truth

[1] *Journal*, vol. viii. pp. 579–581; cf. *Canadian Annual Review* (1919), p 113.

which came to one with greater pertinence than the fact that considerable importance might be attached to a remark or promise, perhaps thoughtless or unfounded, and that it might be called up years and years afterwards for fulfilment.

Might he say with the strongest sentiments of goodwill towards the people of the United States, with full recognition of the relations that had hitherto existed, they must not forget that they had in Canada their own history, traditions and antecedents, with a rising and growing national feeling, and that it was their bounden duty to guard those traditions, that growth of national feeling, to the utmost extent. Before they or their Government lent any support to the proposal that they should take a seat in the Pan-American Union, it was in his opinion their duty to investigate very carefully these questions : What is the Pan-American Union ? What are its aims ? What are its dominating influences at the present time ? Not only would they find that it contemplated the growth and improvement of good relations and international fellowship among the different Powers on the South and North American continents, and that it did in large measure busy itself with the encouragement of communications among the different countries, but they would find that it went further, and that in it there were factors, cultural, racial and political, which it would be well for them to explore before committing themselves to becoming a member of what was called a Union of the Republics of the two American continents.

The Leader of the Senate (Hon. Raoul Dandurand) replied to the effect that :

He had met in Geneva many delegates from South America who expressed their desire that Canada should join the Pan-American Union. He noticed that what was uppermost in their minds was the presence of another North American Power. They seemed to feel that, turning northward, they had been facing only the United States, and they expressed themselves quite clearly to the effect that they would like very much to hear Canada's voice occasionally heard.

Perhaps Canada might fill the suggested rôle of added counterpoise to American influence in such a body. To do so would hardly contribute to increasing cordiality with her neighbour, yet to pursue another policy than this would be fatal to her own independent development. Why should she accept the gratuitous imposition of any such dilemma ? It would seem more advisable for her to avoid the perils of embroilment in the politics of the so-called American group of nations, to her an uncharted sea, and with which she has no sympathy or necessary connection, and rest satisfied with membership in the British group where only she is by long association thoroughly at home.

It would seem that, divorced from the Commonwealth, the duration of Canadian "independence" as the Nationalists understand it would depend on two factors—the continuance of traditional American foreign policies and of the present relations between that country and the Dominion—neither of which is subject to Canadian control. Under the circumstances it is unnecessary to devote much attention here to the other alternative, annexation to the United States. There has been a striking change in the American attitude upon this question. Until recent times the forcible acquisition of Canada was an ever-recurring element in American expansionism. It will be recalled that the enlargement of Canadian boundaries by the Quebec Act of 1774 to enflank the thirteen Colonies was a count in the indictment of George III embodied in the Declaration of Independence and made the conquest of Canada a principal objective of the Revolutionary War. Whatever may have been the immediate issues of the War of 1812, the same ambition lay at the root of the trouble.[1] It appeared again in the Oregon Boundary dispute, the Fenian raids, the settlement of the Alabama claims and the Venezuelan controversy, and was not absent during the Alaskan boundary trouble. "Peaceful penetration" has now superseded attempts at armed invasion, yet annexationism is by no means dead in the United States. It crops up intermittently on occasion, as during the reciprocity discussions of 1910–11, and proposals that Canada be ceded in satisfaction of British war debts may appear fatuous but denote a popular undercurrent in certain quarters which could be exploited.[2] There is a perfectly comprehensible wish that the Stars and Stripes may eventually

[1] See J. W. Pratt, *The Expansionists of* 1812 (New York 1925). As stated in the Introduction, the problem examined is: "That the United States went to war with Great Britain in 1812 at the insistence of western and southern men, and over the opposition of the north-east, is a fact about which there has never been any doubt. There was a paradox here which apparently gave little concern to the older historians. If the real grievances which caused the war were interference by Great Britain with American commerce and the rights of American sailors, why was war to redress those grievances opposed by the maritime section of the nation and urged by the inland section, which they scarcely affected?" See also a conspectus of this history by Hon. Justice Riddell of Ontario, *Empire Club Speeches* (1912–13), pp. 45–47.

[2] *Cf.* an argument in *The Forum* of March 1921 that the cession of Canada to the United States is postulated by the Monroe Doctrine and should be demanded in satisfaction of British war debts; also a resolution introduced by Senator King on February 10, 1922 (S. Res. 235, 67th Congr. 2nd sess.), calling for cession of Canadian territory in connection with the St. Lawrence Waterway project.

fly from the Mexican Gulf to the Pole, which reveals itself unexpectedly on all sides by spontaneous references in conversation. To Americans the continued divorce of these two peoples seems anomalous and the Canadian desire to maintain a separate existence, in face of what is held to be their obvious material advantage, past understanding. The United States, then, is perfectly willing to incorporate Canada, although the time when coercion was talked in responsible quarters is long since passed.

As regards Canada, times too have changed. Whereas in bygone days there were one or two annexationist movements based on supposed material interest, the last reciprocity campaign was made the occasion of a popular referendum on the repudiation of any such tendency, and with marked results. The self-consciousness of the small nation is keenly alive at present, so much so that references to considerations such as the following by a Canadian observer are rare, but all the more worthy of mention in the present connection :

> Thinking of Canada alone, the dominating considerations are geographical. Canada has but one neighbour, with whom she shares almost the whole of the North American continent. Relative to hers the population of the United States is approximately as thirteen to one, and the ratio of wealth is certainly no more favourable to Canada. The boundary line between the two countries is more than four thousand miles long, and for the greater part of its length is unmarked by any natural feature. Of Canada's population of eight and a half millions, about five-sevenths live within one hundred miles of this boundary, and even this narrow strip of occupation is not continuous. A break occurs between East and West, where, north of Lake Huron and Lake Superior, there are through five hundred miles of rock and forest almost no inhabitants except in isolated mining settlements and railway outposts. Imagine a Switzerland only a little more than doubled in population and extending a hundred or more miles in width round the western, southern and eastern boundaries of France and Germany together, . . . it is obvious that such a Switzerland would neither conceive nor meet its problem of defence as the real Switzerland has done in reliance upon its compactness and its mountains. The paramount interest of this imaginary Switzerland would doubtless be assumed to be good relations with its French and German neighbours, and thus far towards a solution of Canada's relations with the United States most Canadians have gone. . . . Danger of so acute a dispute with the United States as to lead to war comes within the mental horizon of so few Canadians that no public man could make it

the basis of a defence policy, even if the soldiers could conceive practical and possibly effective preparations to meet it.[1]

Strategically, Canada lies at the mercy of the United States should relations by any conceivable blundering become strained. The same geographical factors underlie the ceaseless attraction of the economic forces operating upon the two countries, but these comprise a study in themselves. The complete economic dependence of Canada upon the United States was formerly much stressed,[2] but it is certainly less marked to-day. In proportion, however, as Canada asserts her own interests and discretion in the disposal of natural resources which are becoming increasingly vital to the United States—such as pulp-wood, water-power, or nickel—so do the possibilities of friction between the two countries multiply. Conversely, co-operative exploitation of these resources would tend to merge their economic life, increase interdependence, and promote absorption of the weaker nation. Political sectionalism [3] combined with the alien influx to the Canadian West would also prove no mean factor were British connections repudiated, to say nothing of the influence of American magazines and press services. On the basis of considerations such as these Co-operationists argue that the maintenance of Imperial ties alone constitute an effective guarantee of separate Canadian national development.

So thoroughly has this prospect been ignored, however, that no attempt to set forth the pros and cons of annexationism as a policy or to make an adequate survey of the forces operative appears to have been made. The inwardness of the Britannic Question has focussed attention upon relations with the Mother Country, not the United States. The struggle was between Imperialism and Nationalism, and the Imperial federation controversy, for instance, is devoid of comparisons between the prospective situation of Canada as part of an Imperial and of the American federal system. The latter alternative was flouted, and the fact ignored that Canada, as a state of the Empire, under a central government of the narrowly restricted powers proposed,

[1] *Round Table*, vol. xii. pp. 866–867. For a still more detailed and trenchant analysis of this subject see Corbett and Smith, *Canada and World Politics*, Appendix V.

[2] For a scathing statement of this, see Andrew Carnegie, *Imperial Federation*, pp. 10–11.

[3] See A. Bramley-Moore, *Canada and her Colonies*.

would have immeasurably greater "local autonomy" (to say nothing of liability to a much smaller contribution to federal activities, including defence) than if submerged as several states of the American Union. Not merely would the powers of the central government of the United States be much greater than would those of an Imperial federal parliament, but Canadian control over it would be much less effective. Annexation would merely assure her the grant (denied, it is true, were she independent) of representatives who would constitute a permanent minority in the least important branch of that government. Canadians could never hope to control either the Presidency or the Supreme Court which really rule the country. Incidentally, whatever guarantees of language and religion were afforded Quebec in the original compact of admission would prove futile against a constitutional amendment imposed by a wave of militant Protestant Americanism in the older States.

Annexation does not appear to have been advocated in any quarter save purely on grounds of material advantage. This is not without significance. That large section of Canada which adheres to the economic theories best exemplified by the Canadian Manufacturers' Association will energetically deny that any material advantage would accrue from union with their southern neighbour. Those to whom the Canadian tariff offers grievances would benefit by a free influx of American goods, but this end could be attained by an increase in the British preference. Certain other economic grievances, now bases of sectionalism, would be remedied by the merging of the two countries perhaps, but most of the arguments one hears in this connection, especially as regards the Maritime Provinces, are, to say the least, extraordinary. The influx of capital does not seem to depend on the political factor, and as for immigration, the present restrictive policy of the United States should be most to her advantage were mere numbers the desideratum. As for the non-material factors in the situation, they seem to be considered as serious arguments for the continued separation of the two countries. Annexationism as a deliberate movement in Canada is no longer to be anticipated unless conditions change radically. If absorption is to be apprehended, it will probably come, so to speak, by inadvertence, by a gradual interlocking of interests which will stifle Canadian Nationalism in spite of itself, and so alter viewpoints

that union will be welcomed—by the victory of Continentalism, in short. This means that the task of Co-operationists is to forestall this by building up an attitude of awareness instead, which can only be achieved by systematically studying, constantly drawing attention to, and in so far as possible directing the forces now operating within and upon the Dominion. The Fathers of Confederation mastered greater obstacles than these.

America and the British Commonwealth

Thus the destiny of Canada turns upon the nature of her contacts with the United States in years to come. It is fairly safe to go further and state that the whole future of the Commonwealth is peculiarly bound up with that of Anglo-American relations and the part to be played by the United States in world politics. In relation to both, the great Republic itself would seem at present to be passing through, if not a critical period, at least an important stage in its evolution. During the Civil War era the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie of the North-eastern States destroyed not merely the political power of the agricultural aristocracy which had during the preceding period offered the most persistent obstacle to their dominance, but the economic foundations of that power as well, and ushered in the era of "triumphant plutocracy." Supported in the governmental sphere by the benefits of constitutional protections unique among contemporary state organisations, and by the agency of a party which has controlled the political life of the nation almost continuously throughout the ensuing years, they extended their direct sway over almost half a continent and established an indirect but in most cases preponderant influence over the remaining areas. The Spanish-American War was the prelude to their real irruption into world politics during the recent conflict.

At present it would seem as if the United States were again approaching a parting of the way. On the one hand, the country has passed in three bounds to the very front rank among world Powers. This it has achieved successively through the material benefits of the period of neutrality, the mobilisation of resources and the unique and astounding regimentation of national life

incident to participation in the struggle,[1] the somewhat Draconian return to " normalcy " after the War, and the studied rejection of all limiting and entangling projects of international organisation. Those in control of its government have demonstrated their capacity to organise effective power. As a factor in world politics, America seems immune from those internal weaknesses which achieved the downfall of the Imperial German Government. On the other hand, two epoch-making events have adumbrated a change in the domestic situation. The corner-stone, one might say, of American economic and social life is the doctrine of unlimited economic opportunity—the shoe-black or office-boy may become the millionaire. The first of the events referred to was the official notification of the passing of the " frontier " in the later 'eighties [2] ; the second was the Dillingham Immigration Restriction Law of 1921. The one pointed to the limitation of internal expansion and of available natural resources, the other to the development of an indigenous proletariat ; both forecast restriction of economic opportunity in the future and a revision of the traditional American credo. The time factor involved may be long or short ; the turning-point, however, appears to have been reached. Among the consequences of progressive limitation of economic opportunity are the progressive stratification of society, increasing class-consciousness, effective efforts toward the achievement of economic democracy, and the basic reorganisation of economic life.

The most effective means of postponing the operation of these tendencies would seem to be expansion into adjacent and similar territory—if Canada, for instance, were added, the area of the United States would be doubled and its natural resources tremendously increased. A second means would be markedly enhanced industrialisation, with the consequent necessity for adequate foreign markets—the course of economic imperialism with all its attributes. At present there appear to be two competing policies in the United States, one (now in the ascendant) which would take this road, the road travelled by Britain, and the other which would establish an even balance of economic interests,

[1] In France and Britain, for instance, the generation which fought the War had grown up under the shadow of the German menace, and the direction of their efforts during the crisis presented no formidable psychological difficulty. Not so the United States.

[2] F. J. Turner, *The Frontier in American History.*

particularly between agriculture and industry, would enable the country to live of itself, and would render imperialism, war, even foreign politics unnecessary.[1] These are some of the considerations which must determine the future position of the United States among the nations. In any case the chances of an early modification of traditional foreign policies are excellent.

From the strategic point of view, the United States occupies a unique position in relation to the Commonwealth. It lies in the midst of four Dominions and is in effect closer to them than the Mother Country herself. Canada constitutes a fringe attached to its northern border and is, as has been pointed out, in a peculiarly dependent position toward her neighbour, much more so than in relation to the United Kingdom. Australia and New Zealand are alone in the Pacific, in which the United States is the dominant Power and the avowed rival of Japan. Trouble in this region, in the earlier stages of which Britain did not participate, and in which the hands of these Dominions as well as Canada would be forced, but not by the Mother Country, is more than a bare possibility. The economic attraction of the United States is now greater than that of Great Britain upon Canada and might become so in the case of the Pacific Dominions as well. What of Newfoundland? Briefly, America is the one Power which is in a position—and that a strong one—to rival the Mother Country as the focus for the external life of these four Dominions and as their mentor in foreign relations.

It has often been said that Anglo-American friendship has been a fetish in Great Britain. Judging by expressions of opinion in the Dominions, it ranks there second only to loyalty and affection for the Mother Country, and would seem to outrank even these on the part of many Canadians. It is not only a matter of fixed policy with all the British governments, it is as much a part of the social heritage of the population at large as is the traditional view of England which school history texts have inculcated in the masses in the United States. The Commonwealth has everything to gain from close Anglo-American friendship and co-operation. These two Powers, acting in concert, can exercise a veto on any disruptive movements in

[1] See an address by Dr. Chas. A. Beard to the Institute of Politics, Williamstown, Mass. (August 2, 1927), reprinted in part in New York *Nation*, vol. cxxv. pp. 150–151.

international relations. There is no course of action for which unanimity would be more difficult to secure within the Commonwealth than one of antagonism to the United States, should any of the British nations become embroiled therewith. America is the sole alternative to Britain as a planetary Power to which Canada and the Pacific Dominions could attach themselves. It is unnecessary to expatiate on the world tragedy which war between these two Powers would entail.

One school has envisioned " Anglo-Saxon " reunion, even political reunion. This was a dream too futile to merit discussion. It positively refused to be bound by the tyranny of facts, not least of all those relating to its major assumption of common " race." The important point is that the measures which these Pan-Angles advocated as pre-requisites to the attainment of their ideal were by no means calculated to promote either Anglo-American friendship or peace within the Commonwealth meanwhile. Andrew Carnegie, for instance, once stated them in a nutshell :

> The ground once cleared of " Empire Trade League " efforts to array one part of the race against the other part, and equally of " Imperial federation " aims which would shut out the vast majority of the race and limit the Motherland's connection to the smaller portion, and especially if the division of the race upon the North American continent were healed by union, upon the advice of the parent, the efforts of all could then be concentrated upon realising what Mr. Bolton calls " that grand idea, the confederation of all the nations which have sprung from the race nurtured in these isles." [1]

To Canadians such sentiments imply intended treachery on the one hand and annexationism on the other, and their only effect could be to furnish ammunition to a vociferous faction in that country which is more anti-British than Nationalist. As regards America such an avowed ambition is as short-sighted as was the colonial policy of the Georgian Tories who failed to realise how deeply the roots of Colonial Nationalism had grown in a century and a half of self-dependence. It offers no practicable goal to compensate for the suspicion and opposition it breeds and merely affords plausible grounds to the anti-British elements for misrepresenting and fighting more promising moves toward Anglo-American *rapprochement*. The case for friendly co-operation,

[1] *Imperial Federation*, p. 32.

even alliance, between the Commonwealth and the United States is a perfectly adequate one when founded—as founded it must be—on pragmatic grounds. It may well be marred, however, by appeals to obsolete racialist arguments and Procrustean interpretations of American history.

The future of Anglo-American relations from the American standpoint affords more grounds for uncertainty. The existing *entente* possibly rests on a relatively narrower foundation of popular support than in the case of the Commonwealth. The bottom has largely fallen from Fenian agitation, but the German-American element is never negligible and never pro-British. Some suggestions have been hazarded which may point to changes in the external relations of the Republic and these may conceivably implicate the Commonwealth. The worst prospect which the future can hold forth is a rivalry between the two Powers analogous to that between Germany and Britain before the War. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the Commonwealth and the Republic have been and are more closely related—at least as regards ties which are healthy and conducive to mutual respect—than any two other Powers in recent history. A common medium of expression is promotive of mutual understanding, it is true, but it also serves to reveal and exaggerate dissimilarities in the popular view—so much so that the great preponderance of grounds of sympathy over fundamental differences, as compared with other nations about which little or nothing is known, is lost sight of. This is particularly apposite to the United States and Britain.

Were American external policies to reassume an expansionist character, Canada might well find herself, as in the past, among the first countries implicated. In such a case this erstwhile foremost exponent of Dominion Nationalism and aloofness might turn to Britannic reunion, and the policies of Borden rather than Laurier attain the ascendant throughout the Commonwealth. Meanwhile it does not appear that Anglo-American relations could benefit from any tendency to Imperial disintegration. On the contrary, the more united the Commonwealth the greater its influence and the higher the esteem of the several British nations. Let it be reiterated—the mere factor of propinquity alone decrees that the more Canada inclines from the British family to America the less capable is she of acting as that

liaison nation which is so vital a link in the existing chain. Her very title to distinction in America depends on the preservation of her British connection and her own individuality. As Senator Dandurand argued, the absence of the United States from the League of Nations renders it all the more imperative that Canada participate actively therein.[1] As members of a united Commonwealth the Dominions are not (as has been frequently argued) looked down upon as mere colonies, they are effective factors in international relations; separate, they become mere pawns in the perilous game of world politics. The respect and friendship of foreign Powers must be earned; a nation must prove itself worth cultivating in order to gain them.

As a concluding observation regarding the future of the British nations themselves, it is perhaps most fitting to point out that what is true of Anglo-American relations applies still more forcibly within the Commonwealth—the identities, the bonds of sympathy are far stronger and more numerous than are the points of difference. Throughout the preceding chapters the course of the Britannic Question has been traced, and it has been above all else a truly Britannic controversy, to which foreign Powers have had the merest incidental relation. Imperialists consistently stressed unity, and later the Co-operationists, shall we say, community. The Nationalists on their part as continuously dwelt upon the incompatibilities in the circumstances of the several British nations. But this was largely intended as a counterpoise to Imperialist agitation. Moreover, it was always differences within the Empire which were emphasised; never did they adduce a still stronger affinity to some foreign country. In the course of arguing the various issues these differences inevitably attracted the principal attention; not merely the active participants in the controversy, but the people in general became preoccupied with them, whichever side they favoured. Mutual sympathies were after all taken for granted, and the fundamental contrast between the relations of the British nations to one another and of those with any foreign country was simply forgotten in the stress of argument.

It is the faith of the present writer, at least, that as the Britannic Question loses its inwardness, as the eyes of the Dominions are turned outward to consider their prospects in relation to foreign

[1] *Journal*, vol. v. pp. 741–742.

Powers, and as the international scene changes, the result will be a growing realisation that the similarities immeasurably outweigh the differences, that all the members of the Commonwealth have far more in common with one another than with any other nation, and that this realisation will become the paramount factor in determining future relationships. The non-British peoples likewise will consider—the French-Canadians are already doing so—the relative security of their principles within the Commonwealth, as minorities in independent nations, and under the aegis of foreign Powers. We have evolved from an Empire to a Confederacy ; co-operation, not integration, has been adopted as the basis of action. All major political transformations rouse misgivings ; few have the imagination to grasp their purport, for it seems merely that the old foundations are crumbling. It is of undoubted significance, however, that the possibility of close association and co-operative activity without central coercive machinery is far more clearly understood within the Commonwealth than outside it. This is but a further illustration of the community of the British nations. The existing basis of relationships is the result of a long process of development, each major step in which, save one, has made for steady improvement. Why should not the tale of the future be that of the past ? Nevertheless, much profit can be derived from skilful, systematic and assiduous reminders of Britannic community and interdependence in the face of an alien world.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

I. THE most important documentary source for the study of the Britannic Question is the British *Parliamentary Papers*. An enumeration of those bearing on Imperial relations may be found in "The Dominions and Colonial Office List" (*e.g.* at pp. 545–574 of the 1929 issue). The most essential of these are the records of the Imperial Conference sessions, as follows:

(1887) C. 5091.	Minutes of Proceedings.
(1894) C. 7553.	Earl Jersey's Report, Minutes of Proceedings, and Correspondence.
(1897) C. 8596.	Abstract of Proceedings.
(1902) Cd. 1299.	Abstract of Proceedings and Papers Laid.
(1907) Cd. 3523.	Minutes of Proceedings; Cd. 3524 Papers Laid.
(1911) Cd. 5745.	Minutes of Proceedings; Cd. 5746, 1–2 Papers Laid.
(1917) Cd. 8566.	Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings and Papers Laid.
(1918) Cd. 9177.	Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings and Papers Laid.
(1921) Cmd. 1474.	Summary of Proceedings.
(1923) Cmd. 1987.	Summary of Proceedings; Cmd. 1988 Appendices.
(1926) Cmd. 2768.	Summary of Proceedings; Cmd. 2769 Appendices.

In addition at least the following Papers should be cited:

(1895) C. 7824.	Lord Ripon's despatch on the Colonies and commercial treaties.
(1906) Cd. 2784.	Mr. Lyttelton's despatch on the future constitution of the Conference and the replies thereto from the Dominions.
(1908) Cd. 3795.	Lord Elgin's despatch on the reorganisation of the Colonial Office.
Cd. 5273.	Replies to same from the Dominions.
(1909) Cd. 4948.	Imperial Defence Conference; Correspondence, Proceedings, Papers Laid.
(1910) HC. 129.	Return of correspondence (1892–1909) on the constitutional position of the Dominions in relation to treaties.
(1914) Cd. 7347.	Correspondence, representation on the Committee of Imperial Defence.
(1917–18) Cd. 8462.	Dominions Royal Commission, Final Report.

(1923) Cmd. 1990. Imperial Economic Conference, Summary of Conclusions ; Cmd. 2009 Proceedings and Documents.

(1924) Cmd. 2416. Correspondence with the Canadian Government—Peace Settlement with Turkey.

(1925) Cmd. 2289. Report of the British Delegates to the Fifth Assembly of the League.

Cmd. 2301. Consultation on matters of foreign policy and general Imperial interest, correspondence with the Dominion Governments.

Cmd. 2458. Protocol—correspondence relating to the position of the Dominions.

The British Papers must frequently be supplemented by reference to those of the Dominions, for which consult the various cumulative index volumes. The following more recent Papers are essential :

Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1919 special session) no. 41 j ; Correspondence and Documents—Treaty of Peace with Germany.

Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1922) no. 47 ; Washington Arms Conference, Report of the Canadian Delegate.

New Zealand, *Parliamentary Papers* (1922) A. 5 ; Washington Arms Conference, Report of the New Zealand Delegate.

Irish Free State ; Anglo-Irish Agreement (December 6, 1921) ; Constitution.

Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1923) no. 111a ; Correspondence, Halibut Fisheries Treaty.

Canada, *Sessional Papers* (1924) no. 309 ; Inter-Allied Conference, Exchange of Telegrams.

II. These Papers must be read in conjunction with the *Parliamentary Debates* in Great Britain and the several Dominions. An inestimable convenience to all, and a vital service to those students to whom these debates are not readily accessible, has been rendered by the Empire Parliamentary Association through their quarterly compilation, *The Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, beginning with the debates on the Versailles Treaty.

III. Collected speeches of many of the chief participants in the Britannic controversy are available in published form. Among them, *Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches*, C. W. Boyd, ed. (2 vols., London 1914) ; Viscount Milner, *The Nation and the Empire* (London 1913) ; Rt. Hon. Sir R. L. Borden, *The War and the Future* (London 1917) ; Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts, *War-time Speeches* and *The League of Nations* (London 1917, 1918) ; Rt. Hon. W. L. M. King, *The Message of the Carillon* (Toronto 1927), and Rt. Hon. S. Baldwin, *Our Inheritance* (London 1927), should certainly be consulted. A. B. Keith, *Selected Speeches and Documents on British Colonial Policy* (2 vols., London 1918), contains much well-chosen and valuable material. In addition, many significant addresses have been delivered before the Royal Colonial Institute and reported in *United Empire* ; also before the Empire Club, Toronto, and the Canadian Clubs of Montreal, Toronto, and Ottawa, and reported in annual volumes issued by these organisations.

IV. As regards the general background of opinion, the quarterly articles from the various Dominions in *The Round Table* will be found helpful. An indispensable reference series for students of Canadian and Imperial affairs in the present century is *The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs*, which amplifies a full chronicle of events by copious extracts from important public utterances and press comment. Even more significant data on the moving forces in politics may be gleaned from the annual reports and other official publications of the organised economic interests in the various countries, the Chambers of Commerce, industrial, agrarian, and labour organisations (e.g. *London Chamber of Commerce Journal*, and for Canada, *Industrial Canada*, *Grain Growers' Guide*, *Labour Gazette*, and the *Annual Reports* of the Montreal and Toronto Boards of Trade); if the Executive Committee *Proceedings* of such bodies are available, so much the better.

V. The general literature of the Britannic Question is not only so extensive but of such diverse applicability and merit, that a brief yet adequate selection is difficult. A very useful source from which a bibliography on both Canadian and Imperial affairs since 1896 may be compiled is *The Review of Historical Publications Relating to Canada*, continued as *The Canadian Historical Review*. Only a very few representative titles may here be cited:

BORDEN, Sir R. L.: *Canadian Constitutional Studies* (Toronto 1922). *Canada in the Commonwealth* (Oxford 1929).
Brief but informing discussions.

BOURASSA, H.: *Que Devons-Nous à l'Angleterre?* (Montreal 1915). *Hier, Aujourd'hui, Demain* (Montreal 1916).
Representative of the leading spokesman of French-Canadian ultra-Nationalism.

BURT, A. L.: *Imperial Architects* (Oxford 1913).
A survey of the earlier projects of reunion.

CORBETT, P. E., and Smith, H. A.: *Canada and World Politics* (Toronto 1928).
A significant recent discussion by two competent legal authorities.

CURTIS, L.: *The Problem of the Commonwealth* (London 1916).
The best detailed discussion of the problems of Imperial federation.

DENISON, G. T.: *The Struggle for Imperial Unity* (Toronto 1909).

EGERTON, H. E.: *A Short History of British Colonial Policy* (7th ed., London 1924).
The standard work in this field.
Federations and Unions within the British Empire (Oxford 1924).

EWART, JOHN S.: *The Kingdom of Canada* (Toronto 1908). *The Kingdom Papers* (Ottawa 1911–17). *Canada and British Wars* (Ottawa 1923). *Independence Papers* (Ottawa 1925).
These essays constitute the most widely known statement of the ultra-Nationalist position.

FALCONER, Sir R.: *The United States as a Neighbour* (Cambridge 1925).

HALL, H. D.: *The British Commonwealth of Nations* (London 1920).
An admirable discussion of the problem prior to the Conference of 1921.

HALL, W. P. : *Empire to Commonwealth* (New York 1928).
A recent popular American account of the more spectacular features of the past thirty years.

HURST, Sir C. J. B., *et al.* : *Great Britain and the Dominions* (Chicago 1928).

JEBB, R. : *Studies in Colonial Nationalism* (London 1905). *The Imperial Conference* (2 vols., London 1911). *The Britannic Question* (London 1913). *The Empire in Eclipse* (London 1926).
A most valuable series of discussions, paying due attention to the economic factors.

KEITH, A. B. : *Responsible Government in the Dominions* (2nd ed., 2 vols., Oxford 1928).
The standard treatise on Imperial constitutional law.

KENNEDY, W. P. M. : *The Constitution of Canada* (London 1922).

LOWELL, A. L., and Hall, H. D. : *The British Commonwealth of Nations* ; World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol. x, No. 6 (Boston 1927).
Contains handy extracts from recent documentary sources.

NATHAN, M. : *Empire Government* (London 1928).
An outline of the system prevailing in the British Commonwealth of Nations.

PARKIN, G. R. : *Imperial Federation* (London 1892).
Perhaps the best statement of the Imperialist case.

ROWELL, N. W. : *The British Empire and World Peace* (Toronto and London 1922).

SKELTON, O. D. : *The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier* (2 vols., Toronto 1921).

TOYNBEE, A. : *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations* (London 1928).
An excellent succinct analysis, quoting liberally from documentary sources.

ZIMMERN, A. : *The Third British Empire* (London 1926).

INDEX

ABBOTT, Sir John, i. 167
Admiralty memoranda on naval defence, i. 218 f., 240, 241 *n.* 1, 258, 274
Africa, British East, suggested grant of colony in to India, ii. 4, 308 and *n.* 2
Africa, German South-West, issue of disposal of, ii. 9 ff.; South African mandate over, 43
Age, The (Melbourne), quoted, ii. 269
Agents General, Colonial, *see* High Commissioners
"Aggressor nation," criterion of in Geneva Protocol, ii. 202 f., 206 f., 211 f., 229 f., 320
Aglionby, Maj. A. H., quoted, i. 58
Agrarian attitude in Canada to Imp. defence, i. 26 f.
Alabama claims, i. 190, 200; ii. 351
Alaska Boundary Convention, i. 204; ii. 35
Alaska boundary dispute, negotiations, i. 203 ff.; failure of Canad. efforts, 203, 205; personnel of tribunal, 204 and *n.* 2; Canad. criticisms of the award, 188 ff.; implications, 67, 132 *n.* 4, 205 f.; ii. 107, 351
Albania, divergence of Brit. and Dominion attitudes on admission of, to L. of N., ii. 41 *n.* 2
Allen, Col. Sir Jas., i. 298, 303, 362; ii. 229
Alverstone, Lord, i. 188, 193 ff., 205 f.
"America," use of term, ii. 346 f.
Amery, Rt. Hon. L. S., on Brit. intervention in Dominion concerns, i. 370 *n.* 2; on Dominion representation at London Conference, ii. 188; abandons proposed Imp. Conference, 197; suggestion of Latin-American L. of N. resented, 312
Ames, Sir Herbert, on Canada's opportunity in L. of N., ii. 52 f.; stresses co-operation among British delegations in, 287
Anglo-American relations, as factor in Imp. foreign policy, i. 29 f., 191, 198; ii. 69 ff., 216, 302, 335, 343, 357 ff.; Canad. Nationalists on, i. 191, 198; ii. 343, 357; strained during Amer. Civil and S. African wars, i. 200 f., 204; importance of in world politics, ii. 315; attitude of U.S. to, ii. 343, 359; prospects of, ii. 357 ff.; general arbitration treaty, ii. 71; liquor smuggling, i. 344; ii. 167, 174; Pan-Anglo aims, i. 188 *n.* 1; ii. 343, 358; Canada as a liaison nation, ii. 342 f., 359; U.S. as alternative focus for Dominion external relations, 313, 335 f., 340 f., 353, 357. *See also* Canada, relations with U.S.; Dominions, relation to world politics
Anglo-Irish Agreement, Dominion status in, i. 332; registration of, with L. of N., ii. 234 ff.; relation to Locarno Pact, 276; 1926 Conference on, 283
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, effects of Russo-Japanese War on, i. 250, ii. 70; Dominions discuss renewal of (1911) in Com. of Imp. Defence, i. 297; ii. 70, 96; comment on, ii. 69 ff.; implications Article 4 of, 71 ff.; renewal (1921) debated, 72 ff.; attitude of U.S. a factor in, 71 ff.; Lapointe for optional clause in, 254; relation to Imp. defence strategy, 227, 301; action of 1921 Conference on, 77 ff.; co-operative settlement of, 176
Anglo-Japanese treaties (1894), i. 174 f., (1911), 175; ii 291
Anti-militarism, as ingredient in Nationalism, i. 26 ff., 45, 260 f.

Armour & Co. of Australasia, N.Z., proceedings against, ii. 291 f.
Arms Traffic Conference 1925, legal committee of, on optional clauses, ii. 283
Ashburton Treaty, i. 190
Asquith, E. of Oxford and, general attitude to Imp. issues, i. 10, 128 f.; rejects collective responsibility for foreign policy, i. 56, 65, 87, 142, 280, 291 f.; ii. 17, 63, 97; on Ward's federation proposal, i. 128 f.; refuses direction of Imp. Secretariat, 130; on 1909 Defence Conference results, 253; consults with Borden on defence, 299; on work of Com. of Imp. Defence, 301, 303; on appeal to Dominions in Near East crisis, ii. 133
Austinians, theories of Imp. relations, i. 1, 67, 341
Australia, Commonwealth of, fiscal autonomy achieved, i. 151 *n.* 2, 158 ff.; assumption of mandate by, ii. 43 f.; delegates to 5th L. of N. Assembly, 230 *n.* 4, official attitude of, on: Imp. Council, i. 103, 106 ff., 128; Imp. Secretariat, 103, 115 *n.* 2, 122, 132; commercial treaty commitments, 158 f., 169 f., 175 ff., 181; consultation on foreign policy, 132 *n.* 2, 199, 278 f., 281 f., 287 ff.; 1902 naval agreement, 223, 244 f., 246 f., 255; German colonies issue, ii. 10 ff.; Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 77; Near East crisis, 114 f.; Geneva Protocol, 205 ff.; Parliamentary opinion on: Versailles settlement, ii. 53 ff.; Pacific question, 66 f., 74 f., 227 ff.; Near East crisis, 117 f.; L. of N., 226 ff.; Geneva Protocol, 229 ff.; Locarno Pact, 265 ff.
Austria, British commercial treaty with (1858), i. 181
"Autonomist," note on use of term, ii. 50 and *n.* 1
Autonomy, Dominion, *see* Dominion autonomy
Autonomy, fiscal, *see* Fiscal autonomy
Aylesworth, Sir Allen, on N. Atlantic fisheries arbitration, i. 192, 207 f.

BAGEHOT, Walter, on "dignified" and "efficient" aspects of the constitution, i. 366 f.
Baldwin, Robert, i. 152
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley, on Lausanne treaty episode, ii. 154; on community within the Commonwealth, 167 f., 277 f.; on Anglo-Russian treaty, 181; on relation of Dominions to conduct of Imp. foreign policy, 217, 278
Balfour, Earl, on problem of machinery of co-operation, i. 347; favours Dominions in German colonies issue, ii. 13; at Peace Conference, 25, 26, 96; at Washington Conference, 86, 156; hopes for voluntary Dominion support of Brit. foreign policies, 248
Barnes, Rt. Hon. G. N., ii. 25, 26, 246 *n.* 1.
Barton, Rt. Hon. Sir Edmund, i. 244; ii. 8
Batchelor, Hon. E. L., on Declaration of London, i. 288
Bayard, Thos., F., i. 156, 165 f., 201; ii. 103
Beard, Chas. A., contributions to study of nationalism, i. 71 and *n.* 1
Behring Sea dispute, i. 202
Belgian and Zollverein treaties, issue of Colonial release from, i. 141, 167 ff., 171, 173, 180. *See also* Treaties, commercial
Belgium, Brit. treaty with (1862), i. 141, 167 ff., 171; Canad. convention with (1924), ii. 173; treaty guaranteeing neutrality of, 240
Béland, Hon. H. S., ii. 47
Belcourt, Sen. N. E., i. 343; ii. 183, 186 and *n.* 3
Bell, Rt. Hon. Sir Francis, on Dominion representation in Britain i. 360, 363; on Anglo-Japanese Alliance, ii. 75 f.; on Canad. Minister to Washington, 110; on conduct of Imp. foreign policy, 272
Bellemont, Lord, quoted, i. 43 f.
Bennett, Hon. R. B., on Imp. patriotism, i. 15, 20; deprecates Canad. diplomatic representation abroad, ii. 109 *n.* 1
Best, Sir Robert, ii. 119
Beyers, Hon. F. W., on Imp. connection, i. 325, 344; attitude to L. of N., ii. 58; endorses Dominion diplomatic representation, 110; on Near East crisis, 121; on Halibut treaty, 144 f.
Bikanir, H.H. the Maharajah of, ii. 25, 26
Bishop, Hon. H. K., i. 309 *n.* 1
Blachford, Lord, quoted, i. 62
Blackstock, G. T., i. 193

Blaine-Bond Convention (1890), i. 157, 208, 280
Blake, Hon. Edward, i. 190 *n.* 3, 228 *n.* 1; ii. 102
Board of Trade (U.K.), memorandum on commercial treaties, i. 176 f.
Boards of Trade (Canad.), deputation to Laurier (1902), i. 146
Bond, Sir Robert, reply to Lyttelton's despatch, i. 104; appeal to 1907 Conference, 142, 279 ff.
Bond-Hay Treaty (1902), i. 157 *n.* 5, 280
Borden, Sir Frederick, i. 18 *n.* 1, 250, 296
Borden, Rt. Hon. Sir R. L., evolution of his attitude on Imp. relations, i. 64, 265, 285, 293; ii. 50, 322; makes defence aid conditional on voice in foreign policy, i. 56, 216, 273 f., 283 ff., 293 f., 311; demands Canada assume fair share of defence burden, 266; on admission India to Imp. Conference, 138 *n.* 4; favours publicity of Conference proceedings, 140 *n.* 2; distinguishes "legal power" and "constitutional right," 148 *n.* 1, 346; on Alaska boundary award, 194 f.; naval policy of, 224 f., 265 ff.; on S. African War, 228; on Empire interdependence, 267 *n.* 2, 268 *n.* 1; criticises Laurier basis of naval co-operation, 271 f.; assumes Imperialist position, 285, 293, assumes office in Canada, 274, 293, visits Britain (1912), 274, 298, 358; efforts to vindicate his policies in Britain, 293 f., 298 f.; ii. 1; on Com. of Imp. Defence, i. 296, 298, 302; resolution in 1917 Conference, 314 ff.; statement of Co operationist principles by, 323; criticises constitutional settlement of 1921, 330; on status of Governor-General, 373; demands post-war readjustment in conduct of foreign policy, ii. 3, 6 f.; on work of Imp. War Cabinet, 15 ff.; secures Dominion representation at Paris, 18 ff.; at the Peace Conference, 23, 25, 114; absence from Canada criticised by Nationalists, i. 359; consistent advocacy parliamentary ratifications of treaties, ii. 35 f.; principles governing submission of treaties, 36, 39; interchanges with Milner on, 38 f.; on Versailles settlement, 30, 50 f.; attitude to Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 77; report on Washington Conference, 86 ff., 160; on Dominion status at Washington, 86 f, 88, 92; on work of Brit. Empire Delegation, 94 f, 98 f.; on Canad Minister to U.S., 106, 109; attitude to Article 10 of League Covenant, 223; on Dominion autonomy as a cohesive influence, 297; on destiny of Canada, 327; on Canad. economic dependence on U.S., 336
Botha, Gen. Louis, similarity to Laurier in circumstances and viewpoint, i. 63, 291; ii. 9; influence of, on Britannic Question enhanced by S. African union, i. 64; opposes tendencies to Imp. federation, 112, 117, 128, 133; on most-favoured-nation treaty restrictions, 181; on Imp. General Staff project, 250; on participation in foreign policy, 290 ff.; tribute to Com. of Imp. Defence, 303; on German colonies issue, ii. 9; at the Peace Conference, 23, 25, 26
Bourassa, Henri, as exemplifying ultra-Nationalist view-point, i. 6, 11, 29, 44, 46, 50; ii. 261; resolutions on S. African War, i. 3, *n.* 1, 230, 237; influence of 6, 11; ii. 261; defines Imperialism, i. 11; on Imp. defence, 29, 46; anti-militarism of, 29 f.; on Dominion economic imperialism, 48; on Brit. protection, 49 f.; opposition to Laurier, 134; on Alaska boundary award, 193 f.; criticises Jos. Chamberlain, 194, 232, 237; on S. African War, 230 ff.; appreciation of English Liberalism, 324; ridicules "panel" system of Dominion representation, ii. 188; on secrecy of intra-Imperial interchanges, 261; on Article 10 of League Covenant, 233; on Locarno Pact, 258 f., 261 ff.; evolution viewpoint of, 261; on Imp. relations, 262 f.; on French Canada as a bar to Americanisation, 304
Bowell, Sir Mackenzie, i. 113 *n.* 3
Braddon, Sir E. N. C., i. 94
Brazil, vetoes admission of Germany to League Council, ii. 312
Briand, Aristide, ii. 254
Brisbane incident, ii. 270
Britannic equality, Nationalist concept of, i. 7 ff., 48 and *n.* 2, 260, 334 f., 343 f., 372; Imperialist concept of, 16 ff., 55, 107 *n.* 3;

views on contrasted, 54 ff.; recognised in Imp. Conference organisation, 136 f.; in Imp. Conference pronouncements, 314 ff., 318 f.; 328, 339 f.,; ii. 174, 282, 284. *See also* Laurier; Laurier policy
Britannic Question, "inwardness" of, noted, i. 8; ii. 27, 284, 294, 296 ff., 320, 323, 353, 360; precipitated by Imperialist efforts, i. 35; complacent attitude towards, condemned by Imperialists, i. 15 f.; ii. 328; ultra-Nationalist influence on, i. 6, 10 ff.; salient features in evolution of, i. 67 f.; ii. 27, 35, 176 f.; 294 f.; pre-War developments crucial in, i. 68 f., 182 ff., 217, 304; ii. 31; Imperial wars and, i. 30 f., 65, 68 f., 95, 304; pre-eminent rôle of Canada in, i. 259; ii. 341; not a conflict between Mother Country and Dominions, ii. 353; emphasis on constitutional issues in, i. 23 ff., 54, 259, 324 f., 333, 337; ii. 294, 296, 360 f.; probable effects of 1926 constitutional settlement on, ii. 296 ff., 323. *See also* British Commonwealth
Britannic Question, factors in: geographic, i. 42, 61, 85 *n.* 3, 357; sea power, 61, 218 f., 221, 241; ii. 312; economic, i. 22, 37 f., 57; ii. 300 ff. 326 *n.* 1; discrepancies in Dominion economic evolution, i. 41 f., 63, 169 f.; influence of organised economic interests, 145 f., 171 f., 224 f.; legal unity of the Empire, 23, 43, 54,; ii. 329 f.; political pre-eminence of U.K. in, i. 9, 42; ii. 298, 334; traditional interpretation of Colonial history and policy, i. 62 f., 268 f.; ii. 298 f., 344; British diplomacy relating to the Dominions, i. 63 and *n.* 1, 187 ff.; ii. 299, 344; misrepresentation of nature and aims of Imperialism, i. 11, 13; partisan politics, i. 140 f.; ii. 29 *n.* 4, 126 f., 147 f., 213, 232, 243; Little-Englandism, i. 15, 26, 62, 64, 82; German menace, 24 and *n.* 1, 227, 238, 250 ff.; S. African and European Wars, 30 f., 65, 68 f., 95 f., 227 f., 238 f., 304 ff.; transition from Co-operationist to Nationalist ascendancy, 329, 334; ii. 61, 130, 171, 176 f., 277, 322; systematic study of factors in imperative, ii. 300, 322, 325, 328, 361
Britannic Question, conflicting attitudes towards, confusion of, i. 10, 13, 30; admixture of, 30, 129 *n.* 2, 171, 222, 315, 317, 320; contrasted, 5 f., 19, 21 f., 23 ff., 30 ff., 50 ff., 198 f., 250, 329; ii. 360; triple not dual classification of, i. 13; ii. 299; conflicting views of world politics as basis of, i. 23 ff., 259, 261, 266; lack of common basis for discussion, i. 90 ff., 259, 261, 266; ii. 321, 324; influence of European War on, i. 30 f.; relation of, to party alignments, 31 f.; strategy of, 56–67; relation of, to types of Imp. organisation, 30, 72. *See also* Colonialism, Imperialism, Nationalism
Britannic Question, issues comprising, i. 35 ff.; reactions to, compared, 39–56; interdependence of, noted, 35, 56 f.; résumé disposition of, 58 ff.; preoccupation with constitutional issues, 23 f., 54, 259, 324 f., 333, 337; ii. 294, 296, 360 f.; chief post-War constitutional issues, i. 335; confusion Imp. relations with domestic concerns of Dominions, i. 335 f., 369 f. *See also* Imp. defence; Imp. federation; Imp. foreign policy; Imp. economic organisation
British Commonwealth, contrasted with present Brit. Empire, i. 10 *n.* 1; ii. 275 f., 282 f., 333 *n.* 1; now in period of transition; ii. 294 f.; characterised as L. of N., i. 321, 326, 356; ii. 60, 303, 313, 315; pre-eminence of U.K. in, noted, i. 9, 42; ii. 298, 334, legal unity of, i. 23, 54; ii. 329 f.; roots of constitutional controversy in, i. 23 ff.; confederate features in organisation of, noted, i. 30, 72 and *n.* 2, 134 ff., 142 ff., 148, 347; Imp. Conference decisions on organisation of, 94, 96, 124, 314, 319, 328, 334 ff.; Imp. Conference discussions on (1897), 94, (1902), 97 f., 240, (1907), 107 ff., 113 ff., 123 ff., (1911), 125 ff., (1917), 314 ff., (1918), 317 ff., (1921), 328 ff., (1926), 334–75; existing constitutional organisation of, i. 134–49, 338–75; written constitution for deprecated, 332 f.; "personal union" theory of, noted, 8, 335, 341, ii. 30, 140. *See also* Constitution, Imperial; Constitutional controversy
British Commonwealth, future of:

alternatives noted, ii. 323, 326; probable main factors in, 295, 341; centrifugal and centripetal forces in, i. 22, 61; ii. 264, 294, 300 ff.; systematic study of imperative, ii. 309, 322, 325, 328, 361; sea power as bond of Empire, i. 61; ii. 312; foreign menace as, ii. 301 f., 319 f.; changing international scene as factor in, i. 27 f.; ii. 295, 361; crucial position of Canada in relation to, ii. 341 ff.; maintenance of connection with, held essential to Canad. national integrity, 343 ff., 353 f., 359 f.; factors calculated to enhance Dominion interest in world politics, 296 ff.; Anglo-American relations, 341, 355 ff.; co-operationist argument for maintaining integrity of, ii. 309, 321 ff.; stress community of Brit. nations, 167 f., 277 f., 360 f.; and interdependence of, i. 23, 43, 54 f., 291; ii. 32 f., 97, 98 *n.* 1, 117, 119, 121, 190, 226, 312 f., 324 f., 328 ff.; Nationalists stress diversity of interests, i. 24 f., 48, 151, 260; ii. 279, and deny interdependence, i. 24 f., 48; ii. 328; issue discussed, ii. 322–36; ultra-Nationalist indifference to disruptive tendencies in, i. 5 f., 24 f., 65, 91 f., ii. 309, 321, 328; solutions proposed for, regionalism, ii. 310 ff., 321; aloofness from world politics, 132, 295, 313 ff.; comment on, 319 ff. *See also* Anglo-American relations; Dominions, relation to world politics.

British diplomacy relating to the Dominions, traditional view of, characteristic of colonial era, i. 187 f.; an incentive to Nationalism, 63 and *n.* 1, 67, 187 ff., 199, 281; ii. 299, 344; Canad. criticisms of, i. 25 f., 188 ff.; ii. 101; defences of, i. 192; complaints regarding Pacific, i. 196 ff., 281 f., 287 ff.; ii. 3 f., 10, 66; Canad. and Australian reactions to, compared, i. 199, 281; Imperialist reaction to, 193; appeals to Imp. Conference against, 279 ff., 287 ff.; devolution diverts criticism to Dominion governments, 183 f.; ii. 297, 299, 323

British Empire, salient features of, in nineteenth century, i. 1 f., 341; legal and diplomatic unity of unquestioned, 2; held ended by European War, 325, 334. *See also* Brit. Commonwealth

British Empire Delegation, at Peace Conference, ii. 25, 32 f., 45, 61; personnel of, 25; 1921 Conference functions as, 62 f., 302; at Washington Conference, 86 ff.; personnel of, 86; at London Conference, 185 f., 190 f.; in Geneva Protocol negotiations, 243 f., 288; in connection with L. of N., 41, 99, 203 f., 243 f., 288; not employed at Locarno, 240, 242 f.; contrasted with Imp. Conference, 93; procedure in, 86 f., 89, 91, 94 f., 96; status Dominion members of, 93 ff.; status dissident Dominion in, 89, 91 f., 94, 97; effectiveness of, as agency of co-operation, 62, 97 ff., 102, 190 f., 243 f., 286, 288, 302; contrast agreement in wit[illegible]versity of parliamentary opin[illegible]9, 45, 61; official recognition [illegible], by 1923 Conference, 169, 171; by 1926 Conference, 93, 287

British Prime Minister, urged as President of Imp. Conference, i. 109 f., 137; as head of Imp. Secretariat, 118 f., 130

British protection, *see* Dominions, value of Brit. protection to

Brodeur, Hon. L. P. i. 155 *n.* 3, 163, 207, 213, 246

Brodrick, W. St. J. F., i. 241

Brown, George, i. 152, 154

Bruce, Sir Frederick, i. 152, 153

Bruce, Rt. Hon. S. M., submits 1923 Conference resolutions to parliamentary ratification, i. 350; criticises rejection of, by Brit. Labour Government, 352; revives Imp. Secretariat project, 355; on Dominion representation in U.K., 359; Imperialist attitude of, ii. 130; on Halibut treaty, 144; on recognition U.S.S.R., 178; on Anglo-Russian treaty, 181; on modes of improving machinery of co-operation, 195; attitude to Geneva Protocol, 205 ff., 230; reaffirms "white Australia" policy 228; on Locarno settlement, 242, 265 ff.; reprobates suggested declaration of Dominion neutrality, 266; affirms L. of N. an insufficient reliance for Australia, 315, 326

Bryce, Rt. Hon. Jas., diplomatic services to Canada, i. 192, 202, 207 f.; ii. 101 f.

Burrell, Hon. Martin, i. 270, 272 *n.* 2, 298

Burton, Hon. H., on secession issue in S. Africa, ii. 326 f.
Buxton, Sydney, i. 178 f.
Byng, Lord, dissolution issue in Canada, i. 370

CABINET, problem of, in an Imperial federal system, i. 75 f.
Cabinet responsibility, in a federal state, i. 75 f.; in Brit. Constitution, 117, 123 f., 351; ii. 128, in relation to Imp. Secretariat, i. 117 f., 123 f., 130 f., 357, Montagu incident, ii. 136 f.; function of titular Executive in relation to, i. 366 f.
Cahan, C. H., ii. 263
"Call us to your councils," alleged Laurier utterance, i. 236, 239, 311
Campbell-Bannerman, Rt. Hon. Sir H., i. 136 *n.* 3, 216, 283
Canada, Dominion of, important rôle of in Brit. Question, i. 64, 106, 259; ii. 19 ff., 113, 166, 187, 341; fiscal autonomy achieved, i. 150; effects of priority among Dominions in economic development, 41 f., 63, 109 f.; attitudes of organised economic interests in to Imp. issues, 3, 26 f., 146, 172, 189, 191 *n.* 1, 224 f.; ii. 300 f., 306, 354; war activities, i. 358; ii. 103; delegates to 5th L. of N. Assembly, ii. 224 *n.* 4. *See also* Constitution, Canadian
Canada, official attitude of, to: S. African War, i. 229 f., 233 ff.; Alaska boundary dispute, 195 f., 204; Imp. Council project, 66, 83, 97, 101 f., 127; ii. 194 and *n.* 2; Imp. Secretariat, i. 105, 118, 133 f.; Imp. fiscal relations, 41 *n.* 1, 151, 240; ii. 354; Imp. defence, i. 48, 49 *n.* 3, 50 f., 225, 243 f., 246, 249 ff., 256 f.; Canad. naval issue, 259 ff.; commercial treaty commitments, 151, 158 ff., 163, 167 f., 174 f., 178 ff.; consultation on foreign policy, 49 *n.* 3, 282 ff., 289 ff., 293 ff.; representation at Peace Conference, ii. 18 ff.; Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 73 ff.; Near East crisis, 115 f.; Lausanne negotiations, 147 ff.; recognition U.S.S.R., 179; London Conference, 182 ff.; Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 200, 311; Geneva Protocol, 205 f., 348 *n.* 1, 258 ff.
Canada, parliamentary discussion of: S. African War, i. 230 ff.; Alaska boundary issue, 193 ff.; Canad. naval issue, 251, 258–74; Versailles settlement, ii. 45 ff.; Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 73 f.; Washington legation, 104 ff.; Near East crisis, 122 ff.; Halibut treaty, 143 ff.; Lausanne treaty, 157 ff.; London Conference, 182 ff.; League of Nations, 51 ff., 217 ff.; Geneva Protocol, 224 ff.; Locarno Pact, 258 ff.
Canada, foreign relations of: early commercial negotiations, i. 152 ff.; fisheries questions with Newfoundland and U.S., 142, 157 and *n.* 5, 165 f., 192, 200 f., 206 ff., 279 ff.; criticism Brit. diplomacy relating to, 188 ff., 198 f.; early diplomatic ventures of, 200–15; Department of External Affairs created, ii. 100 f.; issue of legation at Washington, i. 362; ii. 101 ff., 167, 289 ff.; Co-operationist and Nationalist phases of, contrasted, ii. 100, 110 f., 291; legations at Paris and Tokyo, 291; Amer. Minister accredited to, 292. *See also* Canada, relations with U.S.; Continentalism; Monroe Doctrine
Canada, relations with U.S.: influence of proximity to, i. 29 f., 188; ii. 124, 341 ff.; strategic dependence on, ii. 334, 352 f.; situation in event of Anglo-American friction, 332 and *n.* 1; economic dependence on, 336, 353; Amer. economic penetration of, 351, 353, 357; study of imperative, 328 *n.* 1, 335; immigration and emigration, 305, 342, 356; influence Amer. press on public life of, 73, 114, 353; influence of Amer. foreign policy on, i. 29 f., 188; ii. 124; Amer. opposition to enhancement Dominion status, ii. 57, 81 f., 97, *n.* 2, 99, 191, 330; Canada as interpreter of the Commonwealth to, 342 f., 359; U.S. as alternative focus for external relations of, 313, 335 f., 340 f., 346 ff.; Pan-Anglo aims and, i. 188 *n.* 1; ii. 343, 358; annexationist efforts, ii. 332 *n.* 1, 336, 351 f.; annexationist tendencies, i. 204; ii. 341, 346 ff., 356, 359; Canad. interest in Caribbean, ii. 306 and *n.* 2, 308; relations with Pan-American Union, 346 f., 349 f.; early commercial negotiations, i. 152 f., 180, 185, 305 f.; reciprocity issue, 152 f., 180, 185, 305 f.;

fisheries questions, 157 and *n.* 5, 165 f., 192, 200 f., 206 ff., 279 ff.; early political questions, 200 ff.; Alaska boundary, 67, 132 *n.* 4, 188 ff., 203 ff.; ii. 107, 351; Joint High Commission, i. 202 f., 205; International Joint Commission, 208 ff.; Halibut treaty, ii. 137 ff.; other recent negotiations, 103, 146 f., 173; issue of legation at Washington, i. 362; ii. 100 ff., 167, 289 ff.; Amer. Minister accredited to, ii. 292. *See also* Continentalism; Monroe Doctrine
Canada, future of: alternatives noted, ii. 323, 341, 351; independence, 333 f., 340–51; problem of Canadianising alien immigrants, 305, 344 f.; factors in Canad. national integrity, 343 ff.; maintenance Brit. connection essential to, 343 ff., 353 f., 359 f.; annexation to U.S., i. 264; ii. 332 *n.* 1, 336, 341, 346 ff., 351 ff. 356, 359; comparison local autonomy under Imp. federal system with, ii. 353 f.
Canadian Manufacturers' Association, i. 3, 28, 172, 189, 191 *n.* 1, 193, 225; ii. 306, 354
Canadian Militia Act, i. 226, 229, 232, 233
Canadian Naval Bill (1912), i. 274
Canadian naval controversy, i. 258–75; resolution of March 29, 1909, 251, 256 f.; Liberal policy, 257, 259 ff., Conservative policy, 265 ff., ultra-Nationalist attitude, 49 *n.* 4, 262 f.; provisions for control of fleet, 258, 271, 274 f.; issue of construction of, in Canada, 224 f., 257, 274; Admiralty memorandum on, 274; relation of, to conduct of Imp. foreign policy, 259 and *n.* 2, 273 f.
Canadian Naval Service Act (1910), i. 257 ff.
Canadians, French, *see* French Canadians
Canning, George, relation to Monroe Doctrine, ii. 337
Cannon, Hon. Lucien, ii. 219
Cape Colony, arranges customs union with Orange Free State, i. 157; attitude on Imp. Council and Imp. Secretariat, 103, 106 ff.; on Imp. defence, 227, 242, 246, 249, 253 and *n.* 1, 254
Caribbean region, Canad. interest in, ii. 306 and *n.* 2, 308
Carnarvon, Lord, i. 174
Carnegie, Andrew, i. 188 *n.* 1, ii. 342 and *n.* 4, 353 *n.* 2, 358
Cartwright, Sir Richard, i. 203, 230 ff.; ii. 102
Casgrain, Sen. J. B., i. 343; ii. 147
Catts, J. H., ii. 53, 54
Cecil, Lord Robert, ii. 167
Cecil, Viscount, ii. 200
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Sir Austen, on Pacific question, ii. 73; rejects Geneva Protocol, 209 ff.; on registration of Anglo-Irish Agreement, 235; on effectiveness of Brit. Empire Delegation, 288 and *n.* 1; on basis of representation at Locarno, 244 f.; defends Locarno Pact, 246, 311
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, earlier fiscal proposals, i. 4; on Imp. patriotism, 5, 14, 16; on Little-Englanders, 5, 59; on Britannic equality, 17; on Imperialist aims, 32, 37, recognises economic factors in Imp unity, 37; ii. 300; on relation Imp. defence and trade, i. 57; on Imp. federation, 58, 60; Imp. Council projects of, 93 ff., 123; on composition of Imp. Conference, 137; on Belgian-Zollverein treaties issue, 171; links defence and foreign affairs, 216; on Imp. defence, 226 f., 230 f.; S. African War policy, 229; criticised by Bourassa, 232, 237; offer of participation in foreign policy, 239 f.; accepted by Borden, 283, 285
Chamberlain-Bayard negotiations, i. 165 f., 192, 201 f., 206
Chanak episode, *see* Near East crisis
Channels of communication, Imp. Conference decisions on, i. 129 ff., 317 ff., 356, 328 f., 374; Colonial Office, 114, 119, 318 f.; Brit. Premier, 318 f., 354; Governors-General, 130, 342, 371, 373 f.; Dominion High Commissioners, 129 f., 356 f., 360 ff.; ii. 182, 184 f.
Charlton, John, i. 203, 238
Charlton, Matthew, on Near East crisis, ii. 117 f.; on Halibut treaty, 144; on Geneva Protocol, 230 f.; on Dominions and Empire wars, 267 *n.* 1; on Imp. relations and Locarno, 268 ff.; on H.M.A.S. *Brisbane* incident, 270
Chicago drainage canal issue, i. 209; ii. 323, 327, 343
Chipman, Warwick, quoted, i. 34
Chisholm, Thos., i. 183 f.

Church, T. L., ii. 263 f.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S., policy of naval concentration, i. 219, 275 ff.; on procedure in appointing Governors-General, 368
Clarendon, E. of, on Colonial treaty-making power, i. 154
Clark, Sir Wm., Brit. High Commissioner in Canada, i. 374 *n.* 3
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, i. 193 ff., 204 f.
Coates, Rt. Hon. J. G., on Geneva Protocol, ii. 232; on basis of representation at Locarno, i. 3 *n.* 1; ii. 242, 271 f.; on conduct of Imp. foreign policy, 272
Cockshutt, W. F., i. 188 *n.* 2
Colonial Conference, *see* Imperial Conference
Colonial Conference, 1887, on naval defence, i. 225
Colonial Conference, 1894, on Imp. Secretariat, i. 113 *n.* 3; on commercial treaties, 158 ff., 166, 279
Colonial Conference, 1897, on Imp. federation, i. 94; on commercial treaties, 171; on Imp. defence, 226 f.
Colonial Conference, 1902, a critical session, i. 96; attitude of Canada to, 66; on Imp. federation, 97 f., 240; resolution on, 96; on commercial treaties, 175 f.; resolution on, 175; on Imp. defence, 240 ff.
Colonial Conference, 1907, on Imp. organisation, i. 107 ff., 123 f.; on Colonial Office and Imp. Secretariat, 113 ff.; "resolution I" of, 124; ii. 171; on commercial treaties, i. 175 ff.; resolution on, 178; on Imp. naval defence, 245 ff.; on military defence, 139 *n.* 3, 248 ff.; resolution on Com. of Imp. Defence, 250; on Imp. foreign policy, 278 ff.
Colonial history and policy, British traditional view of, a factor in Dominion nationalism, i. 62 f., 268 f., 299 f.; ii. 298 f., 344
Colonial Laws Validity Act, i. 1, 335, 345
Colonial Naval Defence Act (1885), i. 256
Colonial Office: administrative relation of, to Dominions, i. 114, 130; relation of, to Imp. Conference, 107, 109, 135, 141; as channel of communication, 114, 119, 318 f.; attitude of, to Dominions criticised, 114 f.; reorganisation of, demanded, 114 f., 119 ff., 129 ff., 142, 319; creation Dominions Department, 121 and *n.* 2; extensive duties of, 130; Dominion reactions to, 122; further reorganisation, 354
Colonial Secretary, convokes and presides over Colonial Conferences, i. 107, 109, 135, 141; Vice-Chairman Imp. Conference, 110; takes additional title of "Secretary for Dominions," 354
Colonialism: characteristics, i. 2 ff., 187; neo-mercantilism and, 9 ff.; perdurance of, in ultra-Nationalism, 30, 44; in defence and foreign affairs, 30 f., 42 f., 45, 278; ii. 46 ff.; evidenced by Brit. Government (1907 and 1911), i. 280, 297, 299 ff., 329 f.; by Canad. Conservative party (S. African War), 230 f., 265; by Canad. Liberal party (Versailles); ii. 46 ff.; neo-Colonialism in Britain, i. 9 f., 128 f., 305; Imperialists take initiative in denunciation of, 16, 55 f., 107, 187; Imperialists and Nationalists demand ending of, after War, 90; ii. 1 ff., partial victory for (1907), i. 119, 123; final discarding of, in 1926, 338 ff.; ii. 297, 300
Colonialists, attitude to Imp. federation, i. 39; to Imp. economic organisation, 2 *n.* 2, 40 f.; to defence and foreign affairs, 42 ff.
"Colony," meaning of term in economic sense, i. 38 *n.* 2
Commercial negotiations, Dominion, *see* Treaties, commercial
Commission, Joint High, *see* Joint High Commission
Committee of Imperial Defence: contrasted with Imp. Conference, i. 131, 146 *n.* 2, 294; organisation and functions of, 250, 294 ff., 301 f.; ii. 167; issue of Dominion representation in, i. 250, 296 ff., 357; dominance of Brit. Government over, 295, 299 ff.; branch committees in Dominions endorsed, 298; surveys defence needs of Australia, 245, 296; discussion of Imp. foreign policy in, 257, 283, 297; ii. 62; tributes to work of, i. 302 f.
Commonwealth, British, *see* British Commonwealth
Commonwealth of Australia, *see* Australia
Concurrent legislation, Dominion

negotiations calling for, i. 153, 157, 163
Confederacy, distinctive features of, i. 72, 148; Brit. Commonwealth as, 30, 72 and *n.* 3, 134 ff., 142 ff., 148, 347
Confederation. Convention (Australia), reprobates independent treaty-making, i. 158
Conference, Imperial, *see* Imperial Conference
Conservative Party (Canad.), evolution in attitude to Imp. defence and foreign affairs, i. 3 *n.* 1, 259, 265; ii. 49 f.; attitude to S. African War, i. 230 ff., 238, 265; to Canad. naval question, 265–74; to Versailles settlement, ii. 50 ff.
Constitution, British, features of evolution of, i. 67, 117 f., 313; "dignified aspect" of, 366 f., 371; parliamentary system in, 117, 123 f., 351, 357; ii. 128, 136 f.; power of dissolution in, i. 370; right of recognition in, 177, 179 *n.* 1. *See also* Crown
Constitution, Canadian, issue of power to amend, i. 324 *n.* 3, 336 f.; dissolution issue, 336, 370; French-Canadian privileges under, i. 264, 310; ii. 303 f., 354, 361; threatened by Anglo-Canadian Nationalists, i. 336; ii. 303 and *n.* 5
Constitution, Imperial, pre-War characteristics of, i. 1 f.; existing organisation, 135 ff., 338 ff.; features of evolution of, 67 f., 147 f., 329, 331; ii. 17; chief issues in, i. 335; Imp. Conference resolutions as part of, 147 *n.* 1; law and custom of, 148 *n.* 1, 335, 346; written constitution deprecated, 326, 331; ii. 194; relation establishment Irish Free State to, i. 331 ff.; confederate features of, 30, 72 and *n.* 2, 134 ff., 142 ff., 148, 347; "personal union" theory of, 8, 335, 341; ii. 30, 140; right of "recognition" in, ii. 177 ff. *See also* Brit. Commonwealth, Crown
Constitution of U.S.: establishment of, i. 71 and *n.* 1; ii. 300; Civil War controversy, i. 23; "checks and balances system" in, 75 *n.* 2, 367 *n.* 1; judicial review in, 79, 336 *n.* 3; effects of rigidity of, 336 *n.* 3; "dignified" and "efficient" aspects merge in, 367 and *n.* 1
Constitutions, "written": circumstances necessitating, i. 331; deprecated for Brit. Commonwealth, 326 f., 331; ii. 194
Constitutional Conference, agitation for (1921) and apprehensions of, i. 321 f.; deprecated, 326 f.; ii. 194; 1926 Conference as, i. 338
Constitutional controversy within the Commonwealth: undue emphasis on, i. 23 f., 54, 259, 324; ii. 294, 296, 360 f., roots of, i. 23–32; confusion Imp. relations and domestic issues of Dominions, 335 f., 369 f.; chief post-War issues, 335; implications 1926 settlement, 338 f.; ii. 17, 295, 297 f. *See also* Brit. Question, Crown
Consuls, foreign, in Dominions, quasi-diplomatic functions of, i. 163; ii. 291 f.; exequaturs of, 292 *n.* 4
"Continentalism" in Canada, ii. 341–55; definition of, 217, 347 f.; specific manifestations of, 6, 52, 69, 73, 200, 206, 210, 217, 220, 311, 347 f., 348 *n.* 1; repudiations of, 220, 226, 348, 349 f.; as a phase of regionalism in Imp. foreign policy, 311; relation to Pan-Americanism, 347 ff.; Nationalist motives in espousing, 348 f.; weakness in basic assumption of, i. 53; ii. 348 f.; as promotive of annexation to U.S.; ii. 354 f.
Contributions, Colonial, for Imp. defence, i. 44 f., 226, 239, 248, 265, 266 *n.* 1, 270, 273 f.
Cook, Rt. Hon. Sir Jos., ii. 23, 25, 26, 67, 118
Coolidge, Pres. Calvin, ii. 292
Co-operation, in Imp. foreign policy, evident in Eur. War and following period, ii. 31 f., 62, 176 f.; coincidence of Co-operationist control throughout Commonwealth and, i. 32, 65; ii. 45, 62, 129 f.; recent decline of, ii. 176 f., 277; due to accession to power of Nationalist governments, i. 329, 334; ii. 61, 99, 130, 171, 176 f., 277, 322; future prospects of, ii. 295 ff., 320, 323, 360 f.
Co-operation, machinery of, within the Commonwealth, i. 347–75; in foreign relations, ii. 93 ff., 280–93; Imperialist emphasis on, i. 346 f., 375; ii. 310; need, of for interim Conference business stressed, i. 116, 135, 354 f., 361; ii. 113, 130, 172, 310; failure of 1923 Conference to provide, ii. 172; action 1926 Con-

ference on, i. 346, 373 f. ; ii. 280 ff.; superiority conference to correspondence, i. 132 *n.* 4, 144 *n.* 1 ; ii. 196 f. ; need of Brit. ambassadorial representation in Dominions, i. 372 f. ; secrecy of intra-Imperial interchanges, ii. 185, 261 *n.* 2. *See also* Brit. Empire Delegation ; Channels of communication ; Colonial Office ; Dominions, representation of, in Britain ; Governor-General ; High Commissioners ; Imp. Conference; Imp. Secretariat
Co-operationists, successors to Imperialists, i. 31, 65, 305, 325 ; ii. 46, 309 ; viewpoint enunciated, i. 31 f., 325 ; ii. 117, 121 ff., 163 f. ; 225f. ; significance of co-operationist era in Imp. foreign relations, i. 32, 65 ; ii. 45, 62, 129 f.; argument of, for maintaining integrity of the Commonwealth, ii. 309, 321 ff. ; stress community of Brit. nations, ii.167 f., 277 f., 360 f. ; and inter-dependence of, i. 23, 43, 54 f., 291 ; ii. 32 f., 97, 98 *n.* 1, 117, 119, 121, 190, 226, 312 f., 324 f., 328 ff. *See also* Imperialism, Imperialists
Cosgrave, Pres. W. T., ii. 130
Costa Rica, ii. 338 *n.* 1
Council, Imperial, *see* Imp. Council
Craigie, J., ii. 75
Crerar, Hon. T. A., ii. 74, 85, 106
Creswell, Col. F. H. P., i. 350 ; ii. 59
Crewe, Lord, on parliamentary ratification of treaties, ii. 36
Crowe, Sir Jos., i. 157
Crown, the: status of, in an Imp. federal system, i. 74 ; sources of advice to, in Dominion affairs, i. 8, 67, 340 ff. ; ii. 35, 94, 97, 140, 145, 175, 219, 285 ; " personal union " theory of, i. 8, 335, 341 ; ii. 30, 140 ; alteration in title of (1926), i. 340 ; discretion in granting dissolution, i. 370 ; full powers issued on authority of, i. 164, 183, 345 ; ii. 28, 95, 140, 283 ; formula of ratification by, in Canad. treaties, ii. 140 and *n.* 2; right of " recognition " vested in, ii. 177, 179 *n.* 1. *See also* Constitution, Imp.
Crown Colonies and Dependencies: Imperialist attitude towards, i. 18 ; status of, in an Imp. federal system, 77 and *n.* 5 ; relation of, to Colonial Office organisation, 121 *n.* 2 ; plea for greater Dominion interest in administration of, ii. 307 f.
Cunningham, G. C., quoted, i. 4 *n.* 1, 33 ; ii. 324
Curtis, Lionel, cited, i. 73 *n.* 1, 80 *n.* 2 ; ii. 107
Curzon, Lord, ii. 11, 109, 133, 153, 159

D

Dalton, Hon. H., ii. 216
Dandurand, Sen. Raoul, i. 343 f. ; ii. 147, 224, 350, 360
Davies, Sir L., i. 203
Deakin, Hon. Alfred: Imperialist attitude of, i. 64 ; on organisation of Imp. Conference, 111, 137, 140 *n.* 3 ; favours admitting press to, 140 ; notes lobbying at, 145 ; criticises neglect interim business of, 116, 176 ; criticises Colonial Office attitude, 114 f. ; on Colonial Office re-organisation, 119 f., favours Imp. Secretariat, 115 f., 118 f. ; ii. 195, on commercial treaty obligations, i. 175 ff., 180 f., 185 ; denounces Little-England policy in Pacific, 197 ; dissatisfaction with 1902 naval agreement, 223, 244, 247 ; favours Imp. General Staff, 249 ; action in 1909 naval crisis, 251
Declaration of London, i. 132 *n.* 2, 142, 282, 297 ; discussed in 1911 Conference, 287 ff.
Defence, Imperial, *see* Imperial Defence
Delegation, British Empire, *see* British Empire Delegation
Denison, Sir Hugh, on Pacific question, ii. 227
Derby, E. of, ii. 156
Devonshire, Duke of, i. 373 ; ii. 149
Dicay, A. V., i. 147 *n.* 1
Dillingham (Immigration Restriction) Act, ii. 356
Diplomacy, Brit. relating to Dominions, *see* British Diplomacy
Diplomacy, early Canad. ventures in, i. 200–13
Diplomatic unity, Imp., unquestioned prior to War, i. 2 ; early care for, 154 ff., 160 ff., 288 ff. ; denounced by S. African Nationalists, 325 ; weakened by Versailles settlement, ii. 34 f. ; and by separate membership in L. of N., 40 ff. ; effects of 1926 Conference decisions on, 284 ff. ; loss of noted, 319
Disarmament, dependence of, on security recognised by L. of N., ii. 198, 201

Disraeli, Benj., E. of Beaconsfield, Crystal Palace speech cited, i. 43 *n.* 3
Doherty, Rt. Hon. C. J., on Dominion voice in foreign policy, i. 284; ii. 7; on sources of advice to Crown, i. 343; at Peace Conference, ii. 25, 26; on parliamentary ratification of treaties, 30, 37, 51; on compulsory jurisdiction of Permanent Court, 219; efforts to eliminate Article 10, 220, 223
"Domestic jurisdiction," issue of, in relation to immigration and Geneva Protocol, ii. 204, 206 f., 229 ff.
Dominion, The (Wellington), cited, ii. 272 *n.* 3
Dominion autonomy, achieved in fiscal matters, i. 150 f., 158 ff.; relation of: to Imp. federation, 82 ff., ii. 353 f.; to membership in L. of N., i. 324; ii. 29 *n.* 2, 90, 314; comments on, i. 82 ff., 179 f., 183 f., 260, 273, 323 f.; an Empire link, i. 97, 128, 261, 324, 327; ii. 297 f., 361, adjacent Great Powers as menace to, ii. 323 f., 333 ff., 340 f., 346, 351, 353, 356 ff.
Dominion economic imperialism, undeveloped in pre-War era, i. 42; early evidences of, in Pacific, 48, 196 ff.; ii. 306; manifest in German colonies issue, ii. 9 ff., 13 f., 32; in relation to mandates in Pacific, 53 ff., 66; in Canada, 306 and *n.* 2, 308, 309 *n.* 1; bearing of, on future of the Commonwealth, 306 ff.
Dominion High Commissioners, *see* High Commissioners
Dominion neutrality, *see* Neutrality
Dominion of Canada, *see* Canada
Dominion plenipotentiaries, status of: early Brit. official views on, i. 154 ff., 160 ff.; Laurier on, 212; at Versailles, ii. 20 ff., 51; at Washington, 86 ff.; 1926 Conference on, 283, 285 f.; Dominion orders in council empowering, i. 211, 215; ii. 24 f., 183; contention Brit. delegates speak for U.K. only, ii. 96, 159, 161 f., 164, 284 *n.* 1, 288; comment, i. 165 f., 183, 211, 213; ii. 28, 95, 140
Dominions, title recognised by Imp. Conference (1907), i. 113
Dominions, constitutional status of: Nationalist pre-occupation with, i. 23 f., 54, 259, 324; ii. 294, 296, 360 f.; confusion internal and external status, ii. 29 ff.; roots of controversy regarding, i. 23–32; implications establishment Irish Free State, 331 ff.; confusion Imp. relations and domestic issues of Dominions, 335 f., 369 f.; review of Dominion legislation, 1, 179, 280, 324, 335, 340, 345; extra-territorial jurisdiction, 1, 335, 340; ii. 142; sources of advice to Crown on Dominion affairs, i. 8, 67, 340 ff.; ii. 35, 94, 97, 140, 145, 175, 219, 285; status and functions of Governors-General, i. 336 ff.; intra-Imp. agreements, ii. 234 ff., 283. *See also* Constitution, Imperial
Dominions, international status of: confusion with status within the Commonwealth, ii. 29 ff.; legal unity of the Empire as factor in, i. 23, 54; ii. 329 f.; opposition foreign Powers to enhancement of, ii. 57, 81 f., 97 *n.* 2, 99, 157, 162, 165, 181, 191, 330; early debates on, i. 158 f., 163 ff.; implications for, of Versailles settlement, ii. 27 ff., 46 ff.; of Washington Conference, 86 ff.; of Lausanne episode, 151, 153, 156 ff., 161 ff.; status dissident Dominion discussed, 28, 30, 84, 88 f., 91 f., 97; Dominion "passive belligerency" and neutrality discussed, 121, 255 ff., 266, 274 ff., 284 f., 329 ff.
Dominions, consultation with, on commercial treaty commitments, i. 175 ff.; on high policy, 56, 132 *n.* 2, 263, 287 ff.; ii. 178, 293; in Com. of Imp. Defence, i. 257, 283, 297; ii. 62; High Commissioners utilised for, i. 304 f.; ii. 182, 184 f.; Nationalist attitude to, i. 263, 289 f.; effectiveness of, questioned, 348; contrast "information" and "consultation," 56 *n.* 1, 131, 302, 348 f.; ii. 62 f.; superiority of conference to correspondence, i. 132 *n.* 4, 144 *n.* 1; ii. 196 ff.; secrecy of interchanges, i. 353; ii. 124 *n.* 1, 184 f.; 1902 Conference on consultation, i. 175, 1911 Conference on, 287, 291 f.; enjoined by 1926 Conference, ii. 293. *See also* Imp. Foreign Policy
Dominions, factors in relation of, to world politics, systematic study of, imperative, ii. 300, 322, 325, 328, 361; proximity Canada to U.S., i. 29 f., 188; ii. 124, 332 and *n.* 1, 341 ff.; changing international

scene, i. 27 f.; ii. 295, 361; individual weakness of Dominions, i. 43; ii. 32 f., 97, 98 *n.* 1, 190, 226; foreign opposition to enhancement Dominion status, ii. 57, 81 f., 97 *n.* 2, 99, 157, 162, 165, 181, 191, 330; attractive force of adjacent Great Powers, i. 61; ii. 313, 321, 323 f., 333 f., 340 f., 346 f., 353, 356 f.; Anglo-American relations, ii. 341, 355 ff.; settlement of constitutional issues, 295 ff.; tendencies to enhanced Dominion interest in world politics, 296–309, 323; probable effects of, 300, 320, 360 f.; future alternatives, 323 ff. *See also* Brit. Commonwealth
Dominions, representation of, in Britain, i. 357–65; need of, 346 ff., 351, 354; difficulties of, 357 ff.; High Commissioners for, 129 ff., 356 f., 360 ff.; ii. 182, 184 f.; cabinet ministers for, i. 357 ff.; a quasi-ambassadorial function, 357, 361, 363 ff. *See also* Channels of Communication; High Commissioners
Dominions, representation of, at international congresses: pre-War congresses, i. 214 f.; Versailles, ii. 17 f., 20 ff., 48 f., 186 f., 288; Washington, 81 ff., 183, 186, 288; Genoa, 87 f., 96; Lausanne, 148 ff., 157 ff.; London, 181 ff.; Locarno, 240 ff.; L. of N., 28 ff., 40 ff., 198 ff.; other, 14, 287 f.; 1923 Conference on, 169 ff.; 1926 Conference on, 287 f.; status of Dominion plenipotentiaries, i. 154 ff., 166 ff., 183, 211 ff.; ii. 20 ff., 86 ff., 95 f., 159, 161 f., 164, 283 ff.; restricted size of conferences a factor, ii. 97, 181, 187, 189 ff., 288; opposition foreign Powers to, 57, 81 f., 97 *n.* 2, 99, 157, 162, 165, 181, 191, 330; "panel" system, 20 f., 83, 98, 181, 183, 185 ff., 188; separate delegations, 203, 287 f.; Dominions separately invited to, i. 215; ii. 87, 287 f.
Dominions, representation of, at foreign capitals, ii. 99–112, 289–91; Dominion Departments of External Affairs created, ii. 100 f.; issue of Canad. legation at Washington, i. 189, 362; ii. 100 ff., 167, 289 f.; Co-operationist and Nationalist phases of, contrasted, ii. 99 f., 105, 108, 110, 112, 289, 291; Irish Free State legation established, 104, 109, 111 f.; other moves, 291; foreign representation in the Dominions, 291 f.; Brit. attitude to the issue, 109, 112, 290; attitude of other Dominions, 110, 289; 1926 Conference on, 289; status of Dominion ministers, 111 f.
Dominions, value of Brit. protection to, Imp. and ultra-Nationalist views on, contrasted, i. 25 f., 49 f., 193, 269; ii. 55, 59, 325 ff., 333
Dominions Department, created (1907), i. 121; extensive duties of, 130; expansion of (1925), 354
Drage, Geoffrey, i. 123
Drago, L. M., i. 207
Drake-Brockman, Senator, ii. 118
Drayton, Sir Henry, ii. 108, 143, 289
Duncan, Patrick, ii. 58
Dufferin, Lord, i. 157
Dutton, Sir Frederick, ii. 251

ECREMENT, A., i. 263 f.
Egerton, H. E., i. 39; ii. 3 f.
Egypt, ii. 167, *see* Suez Canal
Elgin, 8th E. of, i. 152
Elgin, 9th E. of: on Imp. Council project, i. 105; on Imp. Conference organisation, 110, 112, 137; on parliamentary responsibility, 117 f.; opposes Dominion interference with Col. Office organisation, 119 ff., 142; re-organises Col. Office, 121 *n.* 2; on transmission of information regarding commercial treaties, 176
Elgin-Marcy reciprocity treaty, i. 152 f.
Empire, Brit., *see* Brit. Empire
Empire Club of Canada, endorses constitutional convention, i. 321
Empire Day, official recognition of, in U.K., i. 311
Equality of States, ii. 324, 334
Equivalent contributions argument, in relation to Imp. defence, i. 45 and *n.* 2, 246, 268
Esmonde, O. Grattan, on conflict Anglo-Irish Agreement and Locarno Pact, ii. 276
European War, effects of, on Brit. Question, i. 30 f., 304; ii. 2 ff.; stimulates Imperialism, i. 68, 305 ff.; stimulates Dominion Nationalism, 308, 310; diversity of motives for Dominion participation in, 308 ff.

Evening Post (Wellington), cited, ii. 34
Ewart, John S.: as exemplifying ultra-Nationalist viewpoint, i. 6, 11, 30, 44, 53; influence of his writings, 6, 173; conception of Britannic relations noted, 8, 335, 341; ii. 30, 140; on Imperialism, i. 5, 11; attacks Imperialist concept of Brit. equality, 17; on Imp. federation, 40, 73 *n.* 1, 84 *n.* 1, 93 *n.* 1; on Ward's Imperialism, 129 *n.* 2; on Brit. diplomacy relating to Canada, 25 f., 188, 191 f.; on danger of Brit. connection to Canada, 25 f., 49 *n.* 5, 53; on consultation on foreign policy, 49 *n.* 3, 348; on Governor-General, 367, on Chanak episode, ii. 127 f., 132 and *n.* 1; on Fashoda incident, 303; on prospect of annexation Canada to U.S., 335 *n.* 1; on Monroe Doctrine, 337
External Affairs, Dominion Departments of, established, ii. 100 f.

FEDERALISTS (U.S.), comparison Imperialists and, i. 13, 60, 70 f.; economic background of, 71 *n.* 1; ii. 300
Federalist, The, quoted, i. 81
Federation (federal system), contrasted with unitary state and confederacy, i. 71 f.; essential features of, 73, 81 f., 127
Federation, Imp., *see* Imp. federation
Fenian raids, i. 190, 200 f., 226; ii. 351
Ferricks, Sen. M. A., ii. 53
Fielding, Hon. W. S., i. 163, 178 *n.* 1, 213; ii. 48 and *n.* 1, 144, 217
Fiscal autonomy, Dominion, grant of, i. 150 f., 158 ff.; relation of, to commercial treaties controversy, 150 ff.
Fisher, Rt. Hon. Andrew: on consultation with Dominions, i. 56, 287 ff.; Nationalist viewpoint, 64; criticises Ward's federation scheme, 128; on limitations of Imp. Conference authority, 143; attitude to most-favoured-nation treaty restrictions, 178, 181; action in 1909 naval crisis, 251; criticises Declaration of London, 278 f.; resolution on consultation with Dominions, 287, 291 f.; Australian High Commissioner, 362
Fisher, Rt. Hon. H. A. L., ii. 216
Fisheries question, Canada-U.S.: in Treaty of Washington, i. 200; Chamberlain-Bayard negotiations, 165 f., 192, 201 f., 206; Behring Sea dispute, 202 f.; N. Atlantic arbitration, 192, 206 ff.; Newfoundland fisheries question, 142, 157 and *n.* 5, 208, 279 ff.
Fitzgerald, Hon. Desmond: on status of Governor-General, i. 373; on Geneva Protocol, ii. 209; on relations with the Commonwealth, 235, 276
Fitzgerald, Hon. Nicholas, i. 158
Fitzpatrick, Rt. Hon. Sir Chas., i. 206
Fleet unit scheme, i. 219, 253 ff., 275 ff.
Fleming, Sir Sanford, i. 113 *n.* 3, 124
Forbes, Hon. G. W., ii. 273 f.
Foreign policy, Imp, *see* Imp. foreign policy
Foreign policy, parliamentary control of, i. 353; ii. 127 f., 177 ff., 185, 273 f.; Brit. constitutional practice, ii. 36, 92, 128, 177, 179; Labour Government's action on, i. 353; treaty ratification, ii. 26, 28, 30, 35 ff.; secrecy criticised, 185, 261 f., 273
Forke, Hon. Robert, ii. 125, 264
Forrest, Hon. Wm., i. 41, 169
Foster, Rt. Hon. Sir Geo. E.: Imperialist attitude on fiscal issue, i. 4, 42; on misrepresentation of Imperialism, 12 f.; on co-operation in defence and foreign affairs, 54 *n.* 1; favours publicity in Imp. Conference proceedings, 140; on limitations of Conference authority, 143; on Belgian and Zollverein treaties, 141, 169 f.; on status Canad. plenipotentiaries, 151, 157 *n.* 3, 164, 166, 212, 279; on Canad. treaty-making power, 158 f., 164, 208; on S. African War, 230 ff.; insists on positive rôle for Canada in world politics, 267; deprecates defence contributions, 265; criticises Liberal basis of naval co-operation, 272 f.; on local autonomy, 273; at the Peace Conference, ii. 25, 26; defence of L. of N. and Protocol, 225 f.; deprecates Canad. entanglement with Pan-American Union, 349 f.
France: Canad. commercial treaty relations with, i. 155 ff., 161 f., 164,

183 ; ii. 139, 146 ; relation French Canada to, ii. 303 and *n.* 2, 345 ; opposition to Dominion representation at Lausanne alleged, 157, 162, 165 ; Canad. legation at Paris, 291. *See also* Security Pacts
Franco-Canadian commercial treaty (1907), i. 161 f., 164, 183 ; ii. 139, 146
Free State, Irish, *see* Irish Free State
French Canada, contrasted with modern France, ii. 345 ; French influence on, 303 and *n.* 2
French Canadians, suspicion of racialist Imperialism, i. 11, 63, 126 and *n.* 2, 232 ; ii. 303 ; Anglophile and ultra-Nationalist wings contrasted, i. 310 *n.* 1 ; ii. 303 ; attitude to S. African War, i. 232 f, 237 ; to Versailles settlement, ii. 47, 49 ; special privileges of, i. 264, 310 ; ii. 303 f., 354, 361 ; Anglo-Canad. Nationalist dissatisfaction with, i. 336 f. ; ii. 303 and *n.* 5 ; as bulwark of Canad. Nationalism, ii. 303, 345

GALICIA, Eastern, Canada seeks recognition independence of, ii. 305
Galt, Sir A. T., i. 150 ff., 361 ; ii. 289 *n.* 1
Gardiner, Sen. A., i. 29 *n.* 2 ; ii. 53, 118
Garland, E. J., ii. 256 *n.* 1, 264
Gazette, The (Montreal), quoted on Halibut treaty, ii. 145 f.
Geddes, Sir Auckland, ii. 86, 103, 138 f., 141, 143, 174
General Staff, Brit., memoranda on Imp. defence, i. 219 f., 248, 252
General Staff, Imp., *see* Imperial General Staff
Geneva Disarmament Conference, ii. 287 f.
Geneva Protocol, ii. 198–220 ; negotiation of, 198 ff. ; Dominion reactions to, 205 ff., 245, 348 *n.* 1 ; Chamberlain's rejection of, 209, 211 ff. ; MacDonald's rejoinder to, 213 ff. ; Brit. debates on, 215 ff. ; Dominion debates on, 224 ff., 230 ff., 234 ; criterion of "aggressor" in, 202 f., 206 f., 211 f., 229 f., 320 ; relation to Brit. belligerent rights, 203, 207, 232 ; issue of "domestic jurisdiction" in, 204, 206 f., 229 ff. ; Permanent Court Protocol, 203 ff., 231 ff.
Genoa Conference, i. 87 f., 96
German colonies issue, evidences Dominion economic imperialism, ii. 9 ff. ; early phase of, i. 196 ff. ; ii. 65 ; disposition of, at Peace Conference, ii. 9 ff., 68, ; Dominion influence in, 12 f., 31 f., 54, 96
German menace, as factor in Brit. Question, i. 24 and *n.* 1, 227, 238, 250 ff ; divergent views as to imminence of, 24, 217, 266 f. ; in Pacific, 196 ff. ; ii. 65 ; crisis of 1909, i. 250 ff.
Germany, issue of Zollverein treaty, i. 141, 167 ff., 171, 178, 180 ; colonial establishments in Pacific, 196 ff. ; ii. 10, 65 ; Canad. tariff war with, i. 163, 173 ; ii. 291, ; S. African treaty with, ii. 303 *n.* 3 ; German-American influence in U.S. 343, 350
Gibbon, Geo. C., ii. 37
Globe, The (Toronto), cited, ii. 6, 49, 334
Gouin, Hon. Sir Lomer, efforts to modify Article 10 of League Covenant, ii. 221, 223, 311
Gourley, S. E., i. 190
Governor-General, evolution of the office, i. 1, 67, 366 ; status and functions of, 365–74 ; as agent of Brit. Government, 1, 130, 342, 371 ff. ; as titular Executive of the Dominion, 366 ff. ; as Empire link, 366, 370 f. ; power of dissolution, 330, 370 ; selection of, 367 ff. ; Nationalist attitude to the office, 367, 369 ; 1926 Conference on status of, 373 f.
Grain Growers' Guide, cited, i. 27
Great Brit., *see* U.K.
"Great Compromise," the, in Amer. federal system, i. 75
Great Powers, attitude of, to Dominions, *see* Canada, relations with U.S. ; Dominions, relation to world politics
Greece, Brit. treaty with, i. 171 *n.* 2
Greenwood, Sir Hamar, on Imp. economic organisation, i. 38
Grey, 4th Earl, on Imp. patriotism, i. 14 f.
Grey, 5th Earl, ii. 200
Grey of Fallodon, Viscount, despatch on commercial negotiations (1907), i. 161 f., 165 ; interprets effect of Belgian and Zollverein treaties,

167; on most-favoured-nation treaty commitments, 181; on N. Atlantic fisheries dispute, 206; defends Declaration of London, 288 f.; on consultation with Dominions, 289, 301; attitude on conduct of foreign policy, 297 *n.* 3; ii. 278; on sources of advice to Crown, i. 343; on Anglo-Japanese Alliance, ii. 71; on Near East crisis, 132 *f.*; on Locarno Pact, 247 f.
Grey, Judge Geo. (U.S.), i. 206
Grigg, Sir Edward, ii. 153 f.
Groom, Sir Littleton, ii. 203, 230

Haldane, Viscount, i. 18 *n.* 1, 248, 295 *n.* 1
Halibut treaty episode, ii. 137-47; issue of title and signature, 137 ff., 180 *n.* 2; implications of, 139 ff., 145; Canad. action on U.S. Senate reservation to, 141 ff.; parliamentary discussion of, 143 ff.; an example of "local" negotiation, 171, 173, 181, 249; registered with L. of N., 237
Halifax and Esquimalt, naval bases at, assumed by Canada, i. 226
Hall-Jones, Sir Wm., ii. 75, 119
Hamilton, Alexander, on essential federal power, i. 81
Hankey, Sir Maurice, on Dominion influence at Paris, ii. 96
Hannan, Lord, i. 202
Harcourt, Rt. Hon. L. V., proposes standing committee of Imp. Conference, i. 129 ff.; on Dominions and Com. of Imp. Defence, 298 ff., 358; on consultation with, on peace terms, ii. 11 f.
Harding, President W. G., invitation to Washington Conference, ii. 79 and *n.* 1, 81 f.
Hartington, Lord, ii. 216
Hay, John, i. 204
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, i. 193 ff., 204 f.
Hazen, Hon. Sir J. D., i. 298, 358
Henderson, Admiral, reports on naval defence of Australia, i. 257
Henderson, Rt. Hon. Arthur, ii. 215
Herriot, Ed., ii. 201
Herschell, Lord, i. 203
Hertzog, Gen. J. B. M., on Brit. equality, i. 8; suspicion of "London atmosphere," 322, 349 f.; on secession, 324; on Imp. constitutional relations, 337; ii. 279; attitude to L. of N., ii. 58, 233 f.; on Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 76 f.; endorses Dominion legations, 110; on Near East crisis, 121; Nationalism of, 130, 173, 265; attitude to Geneva Protocol, 205, 208, 234, 311; advocates declaration of independence in foreign policy, 274
Hicks-Beach, Sir M., i. 55
High Commissioners: Dominion personnel, i. 133; status and functions, 360 ff.; post-War enhancement of, 362 *f.*; ii. 167; relation to Imp. federation projects, i. 361; to Imp. Secretariat proposal, 100, 117, 122, 133 ff.; proposal to utilise as official Dominion spokesmen in U.K., 129 ff., 356 f., 360 ff.; consultation with, 364 f.; ii. 182, 184 f.
High policy, conduct of, *see* Imp. foreign policy
Hodgins, Thos., cited, i. 188 *n.* 1
Holland, H. E., on representation at Imp. Conferences, i. 350; on oriental immigration, ii. 66; on Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 76; on Near East crisis, 119 f.; on secret diplomacy, 231; on Locarno Pact, 271, 273
Hopkins, J. Castell, on Canad. foreign relations (1907), i. 212; stresses value of Empire support to Dominions, ii. 32 f.; on Near East crisis, 133
Hughes, Hon. Chas. E., ii. 138, 141, 174
Hughes, Rt. Hon. Wm. M., on channels of communication, i. 318; opposes written Imp. constitution, 324, 327, 331; demands post-War readjustment in conduct of foreign policy, ii. 8; on Australian "Monroe Doctrine" for Pacific, 11, 54, 66; at the Peace Conference 23, 25, 26; on Versailles settlement, 30, 54 f.; on importance of the Pacific, 64; on L. of N. and "White Australia" policy, 54, 66 f., 315, 326; on Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 74, 77; on representation at Washington, 82, 85; action in Near East crisis, 114 f., 117; opposes Geneva Protocol, 230; on Imp. relations and Locarno, 268; on H.M.A.S. *Brisbane* incident, 270
Hurd, Archibald, on Pacific question, ii. 64

Hurd, Percy, ii. 243
Hurst, Sir Cecil J. B., i. 344; ii. 169, 203 *n.* 1, 204, 216

IMMIGRATION, policies of Australia and N.Z., i. 126 f.; ii. 65 ff., 228; of S. Africa, 66 f., 167; as a "domestic question," 67, 80, 204, 206 f., 299 ff.; 1918 Conference on, 66, 302; opposition, French-Canad. and Afrikander Nationalists to Imp. migration schemes, 302; the Imp. connection and the "Canadianisation" problem, 305, 344 f.; Canad.-U.S. relations, 305, 342, 356
Imperial Commission, Sir F. Pollock's proposal, i. 101 f.
Imperial Committees, i. 355
Imperial Conference, designation "Imperial," i. 98 *n.* 1; described as "Conference of Governments," 109, 136 and *n.* 3; contrasted with Com. of Imp. Defence, 131, 146 *n.* 2, 294; contrasted with Imp. War Cabinet, 313; described as "Imp. Cabinet," ii. 77, 78 *n.* 1; superiority of conference to correspondence noted, i. 132 *n.* 4, 144 *n.* 1; ii. 196 ff.; Nationalist suspicion of, i. 322, 349 f., 353; positive achievements of, 134 ff., 141 f., 146 ff.; tributes to, 144 *n.* 1, 149
Imperial Conference organisation: resolutions on, i. 94, 96, 124, 138 *n.* 4; Conference discussion of, 107–13, 123 f.; described, 135 ff.; Brit. Premier as President, 109 f., 137; multi-party representation in, suggested, 99, 138; ii. 192 ff.; frequency of sessions, i. 94, 96, 112 f., 135 f., 348; title debated, 109; recognised as a "Conference of Governments," 109, 136 and *n.* 3; as a permanent institution, 110 ff.; place of meeting, 136; admission of India to, 138 *n.* 4, 314 *n.* 1; Brit. equality recognised in organisation and procedure of, 136 f.; membership debated, 137 f.; subsidiary Conferences authorised, 96, 125, 146; relation to constituent governments, 141 ff., 349 ff.; ii. 193 ff., 260; problem of interim Conference business, i. 116, 135, 361, 354; ii. 113, 130, 172, 310; standing committee of, discussed, i. 129 ff.
Imperial Conference status and functions: pre-eminence of, as agency of co-operation, i. 113, 135 ff., 142 ff., 314 and *n.* 1, 348 ff., 354; appealed to as forum for Imp. issues, 113, 141 f., 278 ff., 287 ff.; lacks authority to implement its decisions, 140 *n.* 3, 142 f.; repudiation decisions of, 349 ff.; ii. 192, 229; parliamentary ratification decisions of, 194, 260
Imperial Conference procedure: order of business, i. 139 ff.; secrecy of, noted, 60, 96, 177, 240, 281 f.; ii. 124 *n.* 1, 280; issue of publicity of, i. 96, 140 f.; noticeable differences of opinion, 81, 94, 120, 122, 127 ff.; effort to preserve unanimity, 105 f., 109, 118, 129, 139 f., 248; avoidance of "party politics," 140 f.; attempts to limit discretion of delegates, 349 ff.; ii. 193 ff.; socio-political pressure on, i. 141 ff.
Imperial Conference sessions: list of, i. 136 *n.* 1; use of term "Imperial," 98 *n.* 1; postponement of 1915 session, ii. 3, 12, 14; abortive efforts to convene Conferences in 1924 and 1925, 191 ff., 205, 243. *See also* Col. Conference 1887, &c.; Imp. Conference 1911, &c.; Imp. War Conference
Imperial Conference 1911, on Imp. federation, i. 125 ff.; on continuity of Conference business, 129 ff.; on most-favoured-nation treaties, 177 ff.; on Imp. defence, 257 ff.; on Declaration of London, 287 ff.; resolution on consultation on foreign policy, 291 f.
Imperial Conference 1921, Imperialist hopes and Nationalist apprehensions of, i. 320 ff.; Dominion opinion prior to, 322 ff.; action of, on Imp. organisation, 326 ff.; resolution on, 328; comment, 329 ff.; ii. 62, 168; acts as Brit. Empire Delegation, ii. 62 f., 78, 80, 93; action of, on Pacific question, 77 ff.
Imperial Conference 1923, comment on, ii. 167 ff.; resolution of, on negotiations, 169 f.; parliamentary discussion of, 173 ff.; submitted to parliamentary ratification in Australia, 194; in Canada, 260; contrasted with 1926 session, 280 f.; Premier King's attitude at, i. 352 f.; ii. 148, 160
Imperial Conference 1926, constitutional settlement by, i. 334–75;

implications of, 338 f.; ii. 17, 295, 297 f.; report of Imp. Relations Com. of, i. 67, 68, 334, 339, 346 f.; on Brit. equality, i. 339 ff.; on sources of advice to Crown, 340, 345; ii. 285; on machinery of co-operation, i. 347 ff.; on conduct of Imp. foreign relations, ii. 277–93; significance of, 284 f.; on Imp. foreign policy, 279 f., 293; on distinction of Imp. and local concerns, 281 f.; on conduct of negotiations, 282 ff.; on Dominion legations, 289 ff.

Imperial Conferences, subsidiary, resolutions providing for, i. 96, 125, 146. *See also* Imp. Defence Conference

Imperial Council project: relation to Imp. federation, i. 92 f.; legislative and advisory types of, 93, 95, 98; Nationalist suspicion of, 93 *n.* 2, 104 f., 109, 133, 311; ii. 194 and *n.* 2; proposals for, i. 93 ff., 98 ff., 106 ff., 125 f., 311, 327

Imperial defence: conflicting attitudes on, i. 23–30, 43–56, 233, 259 ff.; merging of, as regards U.K., 222; main issues of, decided prior to War, 217, 277; relation of, to conduct of foreign policy, 216, 274, 278, 283, 293 f.; issue of Colonial contributions for, 44 f., 226, 239, 248, 265, 266 *n.* 1, 270, 273 f.; "no taxation without representation" argument, 40, 47, 55, 231, 233, 237, 265; ii. 2 f., 218; "equivalent contributions" argument, i. 45 and *n.* 2, 246, 268; strategy of, i. 55, 217–25; opposing factors, 222 ff.; ii. 301; relation, naval to military, i. 219 f.; Nationalist lack of, 217; lessons of S. African and Russo-Japanese wars, 241 f., 248, 250; reservations in Anglo-Irish Agreement debated, ii. 276; factors in foreign menace, i. 24 and *n.* 1, 227, 238, 250 ff.; conflicting Imperialist and Nationalist views as to imminence of, 24, 217, 226 f.; sea power, 61, 218 f., 221, 241; ii. 312, strategic dependence of Canada on U.S., i. 29 f.; ii. 334, 352 f.; disproportionate burden on U.K., i. 54, 226, 240 f.; political, i. 219, 223 ff.; preponderant interests of U.K., 42 f., 222

Imperial Defence Committee, *see* Com. of Imp. Defence

Imperial Defence Conference 1909: antecedents, i. 250 f.; decisions, 252 ff.; action on, 257; discussion of foreign policy in, 283; "precedent" of invoked, 297 and *n.* 2

Imperial Economic Conference 1923: neglect Imp. preference resolutions of, i. 351; ii. 192; criticised, i. 349, 352

Imperial economic organisation: problem of, i. 37 ff., 88, 177; ii. 300 f.; attitudes to, compared, i. 40 ff.; relation Dominion fiscal autonomy to, i. 150 ff., 158 ff., 184; relation Imp. commercial treaties to, 166 ff. 175 ff., 182 ff.

Imperial federation: essentials of, i. 71–81, 127; conflicting attitudes to, 39 f.; criticisms of, 80–92; focus of Imperialist effort, 56, 70, 360; affords most adequate machinery of co-operation, 56, 70, 357, 360 f., 364; crisis in campaign for, 96 f., 314 ff., 320, 328; problems of Imp. constitution, 73 f., 79 f.; governmental organisation, 74 ff.; distribution of powers, 77 f.; status Crown Colonies, 77 and *n.* 5; local autonomy, 81–90; ii. 314, 353 f.

Imperial federation, projects of, i. 92–134; entering wedges for, 73; Chamberlain, 93 ff.; Pollock, 98 ff. Lyttelton, 102 ff.; Deakin-Ward, 106 ff., 123 f.; Ward, 125 ff., 305; admission Colonial representatives to Brit. Parliament, 72 *n.* 1; Imp. Council, 93 ff., 98 ff., 106 ff., 125 f.; Imp. War Cabinet, 311 ff., 320, 359; ii. 14 ff.; constitutional conference, i. 321 f., 326 f., 338; ii. 194. *See also* Imp. Conference

Imperial foreign policy, conduct of: contrasting views on, i. 43 ff.; ii. 50, 57; underlie Constitutional controversy, i. 23 ff.; Colonialist, 42 ff.; Imperialist, 22 ff., 53 ff., 217; Nationalist, 24 ff., 44 ff., 283 f.; ultra-Nationalist, 25 f., 44 ff., 48 ff., 53, 233, 262 f.; ii. 296; evolution attitudes on, i. 30 f.; ii. 270 f., 274, 277; relation of, to Imp. federation, i. 278 f.; to Imp. defence, 216 f., 274, 278, 283, 293 f.; appeals to Imp. Conference on, 142, 279 ff., 287 ff.; the salient post-War issue, 375; ii. 301, "no taxation without representation" argument, i. 40, 47, 55,

231, 233, 237, 265; ii. 2 f., 218; mode of conduct of, not the concern of foreign Powers, ii. 85, 87 f., 140, 188; secrecy in, 185, 261 f., 273; Brit. policy in guise of Imp., 130 f., 133, 137, 178, 180, 244, 249, 313, 322; hopes for voluntary Dominion support of, 247 ff.
Imperial foreign policy: evolution conduct of, summary, i. 187, 259, 265; ii. 176; comment, i. 216 f., 225, 259, 262, 265, 278 f., 283, 302, 304, commercial negotiations issue, 152–66; determines later developments, 173 ff., 182 ff.; ii. 31, conduct of high policy prior to War, i. 225–44, 278–303; S. African War and, 228 ff.; 1902 Conference on, 239 f.; Canad. naval issue and, 259 ff., 273 f., 283; 1907 Conference and, 279 ff.; 1909 Conference and, 283; 1911 Conference and, 286 ff.; Asquith's ultimatum, 286; *modus vivendi* of 1911, 292 f.; ii. 1, 38; Borden's efforts, i. 293 f.; post-War readjustment in, demanded, ii. 2 ff., 14 ff., contrast Co-operationist and Nationalist phases of, 31 f., 62 f., 176 f., 277; 1923 Conference on, 169 f.; 1926 Conference on, 277–93; devolution focusses responsibility on Dominion governments, i. 183 f.; ii. 297, 299, 323; Brit. efforts to localise effects of decentralisation, i. 184 f.; ii. 176 f.; antidotes to suggested, ii. 309 ff.
Imperial foreign policy: factors in conduct of, legal unity of Empire, i. 23, 43, 54; ii. 329 f., 332; foreign danger, i. 24, 227, 238, 250 ff.; ii. 301, 319 f.; effects of Brit. diplomacy in Dominions, i. 25 f., 63 and *n.* 1, 187 ff., 196 ff., 279 ff., 287 ff.; ii. 3 f., 10, 101; influence of commercial treaties controversy, i. 82 ff.; ii. 31; conflicting interests of Brit. nations, i. 22; ii. 264, 301 f., 309 ff.; interdependence of, ii. 312 f., 322 ff.; problem of distinguishing Imp. and local concerns, i. 184 ff., 198 f.; ii. 172, 174 ff., 180 f., 281 f.; period of co-operationist control, i. 32, 65; ii. 45, 62, 129 f.; advent of Nationalist governments, i. 329, 334; ii. 61, 99, 130, 171, 176 f., 277, 322, U.K. as a Great Power, i. 9; ii. 298; opposition of Great Powers to enhancement of Dominion status, ii. 57, 81 f., 97 *n.* 2, 99, 157, 162, 165, 181, 191, 330; restricted size of international congresses, 97, 181, 187, 189 f., 288; shifting international scene, i. 27 f.; ii. 295, 361; attitude of U.S., i. 29 f., 191, 198; ii. 69 ff., 216, 302, 343, 357 ff.
Imperial General Staff project, i. 227, 248 ff., 253 and *n.* 1, 258
Imperial Parliament, dominance of, in 19th century, i. 1, 340 f.; project of admitting Colonial representatives to, 72 *n.* 1
Imperial patriotism, as ingredient of Imperialism, i. 13 ff.
Imperial Relations Committee, report of, i. 67, 68, 334, 339; comment on, 346 f. *See also* Imp. Conference 1926
Imperial Secretariat, comment on, i. 119, 133 f., 354 ff.; action of 1894 Conference on, 113 *n.* 3; proposed by Pollock and Lyttelton, 100 ff.; by Deakin, 115 ff., 318; by Ward, 129; revived by Bruce, 355 f.; ii. 195; issue of responsible supervision of, i. 117 ff., 123 f., 130 f., 357; Brit. Premier urged as head of, 118 f., 130
Imperial unity, essentials of, i. 35 ff.; economic aspects of, 22, 37 f., 57; ii. 300 ff., 326 *n.* 1
Imperial War Cabinet, comment on, i. 311 ff.; ii. 16; suggested continuance of, i. 312, 320, 359; sessions of, ii. 14 ff.; formulates Brit. Empire peace terms, 15 ff., 18
Imperial War Conference 1917, on admission of India, i. 138 *n.* 4; on organisation of the Commonwealth, 314 ff.; ii. 176, 193; "Resolution IX" of, i. 314
Imperial War Conference 1918, on channels of communication, i. 317 ff.
Imperialism: characteristic features of, i. 10–20; as a wider Nationalism, 13 ff.; popularly confused with Colonialism, 10 ff., 18; ii. 297; contrasted with Nationalism, i. 24 ff., 198 f., 250, 329; ii. 360; admixture Imperialism and Nationalism, i. 315, 317, 320; racialist ingredient in, 11, 63, 126, 232; ii. 303; Imp. culture and, i. 19 f.; becomes co-operationism, i. 31, 65, 305; ii. 46, 309. *See also* Imperialist movement, Imperialists

Imperialism (economic), Brit. expansionism criticised by ultra-Nationalists, i. 11 f., 49; ii. 262. *See also* Dominion economic imperialism
Imperialist movement: as stimulus to Canad. Nationalism, i. 63; analogy to that of Federalists in U.S., 70 f.; Empire wars as stimuli to, i. 30 f., 65, 68, 95, 304 ff.; strategic weaknesses of, 21 f.; strategy of, 22, 56 ff., 68 f.; summary of 68 f., 305; importance of, in study of contemporary nationalism, 69; renaissance of, 305 ff.
Imperialists, aims of, i. 32–39; divisions in ranks of, 58 f.; lack of continuous leadership, 64 f.; condemn complacent attitude to Brit. Question, 15 f.; ii. 328; concept of Brit. equality, i. 10 ff., 107 *n.* 3; attitude to India and Crown Colonies, 18; to local autonomy, 84 f; to Imp. federation, 56, 70, 300; to Imp. economic organisation, 4, 37 f., 40; ii. 300 f.; to defence and foreign relations, i. 23–32, 36, 54 ff., 217; stress Empire interdependence, 23, 43, 54, 291; ii. 32 f., 97 f, 117, 119, 121, 190, 226, 312 f., 324 f., 328 ff.; defence strategy of, i. 55, 217 ff.; emphasis on sea power, 61, 218 f., 221, 241; ii. 312; on unity in naval command, i. 55, 218 ff., 245 ff., 255, on uniformity in military preparations, 220 f., 226 f., 248 f.; demand Dominion participation in peace settlement, ii. 2 ff.; proposed basis of, 17 f.
India: Imperialist attitude to political progress of, i. 18; Imp. Conference on status of, 138 *n.* 4, 314 and *n.* 1; ii. 167; suggested grant of colonies to, ii. 4, 308 and *n.* 2; reaction on government of, to Geneva Protocol, 210, 311; Montagu incident, 135 ff.; represented at international congresses, 22, 25 f., 86, 90. *See also* Immigration
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, i. 336
Industrial property, convention for protection of, i. 214 f.
Inter-Allied Conference, *see* London Conference
International Boundary Waters Treaty, i. 208 ff.; ii. 36 ff.
International congresses, *see* Dominions, representation at
International Joint Commission, Canad.-U.S., i. 208 ff.
International Seal Conference, i. 202
Interprovincial Council, Quebec, i. 152 ff.
Irish Free State: Dominion status and, i. 331 ff.; Anglo-Irish Agreement, i. 332; ii. 234 ff., 276, 283; constitution of, i. 333; ii. 275; legation at Washington, ii. 104, 109, 111 f., 291; attitude: to Geneva Protocol, 209 ff.; to L. of N., 234 ff.; to the Commonwealth, 275 ff.
Irish Home Rule, Canad. resolution of sympathy for, i. 232, 238
Italy, treaty relations with, i. 163, 181; ii. 144

JAMESON, Dr. L. S., on Brit. equality, i. 107 *n.* 3; on scope of Imp. Conference, 110, 113; on Imp. Secretariat project, 115, 118 f.; on lobbying at Imp. Conference, 145; on representation on Com. of Imp. Defence, 250
Japan, relation Brit. Colonies to treaties with, i. 174 f.; ii. 291; Canad. relations with (1907), i. 210 ff.; ii. 291; rivalry with U.S. in Pacific; ii. 64, 68, 80; Australian apprehensions of post-War expansion of, 54, 66 f., 277 f.; Canad. legation in 291. *See also* Anglo-Japanese Alliance
Jebb, R., recognises importance of economic factors in Brit. question, ii. 301; on naval control issue, i. 57 *n.* 1; attitude to Imp. federation, 58, 82; on bureaucratic victory in 1907 Conference, 119; on autonomist features 1909 naval agreement, 253; on attempted *coup d'état* 1911 Conference, 297; on sources of advice to Crown, 343; doubts reality of consultation on foreign policy, 348; endorses Dominion participation in peace settlement, ii. 3; on liability of Dominions under Locarno Pact, 255; on status Dominion plenipotentiaries, 285; on relation of Commonwealth to L. of N., 42, 317 ff.; endorses regionalism, 318 f.
Jellicoe, Lord, report on Imp defence, ii. 64
Jersey, E. of, i. 143, 170

Jetté, Sir Louis, i. 194, 204 *n.* 2
Johnson, Thos., on Imp. relations, ii. 275 ff., 331 *n.* 1
Joint High Commission, to settle outstanding issues Canad.-U.S. (1898), i. 202 f., 205
Judicial review, in an Imp. federal system, i. 78 f.; in U.S., 79, 336 *n.* 3

KEITH, A. B., on Imp. War Cabinet, i. 313 *n.* 2; on sources of advice to Crown, 342; views criticised by S. African Nationalists, 344; ii. 145; on value of Imp. Conference activities, i. 348 *n.* 1; on legal implications of Versailles settlement, ii. 27; on Dominion status at Washington Conference, 82 f.; on Halibut Treaty, 140; on recognition U.S.S.R. by Canada, 179; on registration Anglo-Irish agreement, 236
Kemp, Sir A. E., ii. 26
Kennedy, W. W., ii. 259
Kenworthy, Lt.-Com., ii. 235 f.
King, Rt. Hon. Wm. L. Mackenzie, Nationalism of, i. 47 *n.* 1, 334 f.; ii. 265, 279; reassertions of Laurier policy by, ii. 115 f., 125, 150 f., 178 f.; on Brit. equality, i. 8; ii. 148, 160; on pre-War defence "emergency," i. 46; on sources of advice to Crown, 343 f.; attitude to Imp. Conference, 349 f., 352; dissolution incident, 370; on representation at Washington Conference, ii. 84; on Canad. legation at Washington, 108; attitude during Near East crisis, 115 f., 124 f.; criticisms of, 122 ff., 127 ff; attitude to Halibut Treaty issue, 138 ff., 143, 145; on Rush-Bagot agreement, 146; attitude on Lausanne issue, 148 ff., 157, 159 ff.; denial Brit. delegates represented Empire, 96, 159, 161 f., 164, 282, 284 *n* 1; comments on i. 53; ii. 275; on distinction Imp. and local concerns, ii. 174 f.; on recognition of U.S.S.R., 178; protests appeals through press, 125, 184; on representation at London Conference, 182 f., 185; contrast in attitude to Lausanne and London Conferences, 181, 183, 189; attitude to Geneva Protocol, 205 f., 224, 348 *n.* 1; on basis of representation at Locarno, 241 f.; moves parl. ratification 1923 Conference resolution, 259 f.; on Locarno Pact, 260 f.; denounces referendum on war, 261; emphasises diversity in Commonwealth, 279
King, Senator (Utah), demands cession Canad. territory, ii. 351 *n.* 2
Kingston, Royal Military College at, i. 253 *n.* 1
Kitchener, Lord, reports on military defence of Australia, i. 257

LABOUR, organised, in Dominions, attitude to Imp. defence, i. 27
Labour Government, first Brit., attitude to parl. control of foreign policy, i. 353; to Dominion legations, ii. 109; régime of, in Imp. foreign relations, 177; efforts to convoke an Imp. Conference, 191 ff.
Labour parties, solidarity of, in Empire, noted, ii. 198, 273
Lake of the Woods, treaty regulating level of, ii. 173
Lammasch, Dr. H., i. 207
Lang, Wm., i. 307
Langenhoven, Sen. C. J., ii. 58, 233
Lansdowne, Lord, i. 204
Lapointe, Hon. Ernest, on French Canad. privileges within the Empire, i. 246 f.; on Canad. relations to L. of N., ii. 29 *n.* 1, 218; on Versailles settlement, 47 f.; on Pacific question, 73; on Canad. legation at Washington, 108; signs Halibut Treaty, 138 f.; discusses implications of, 142 f.; on Lausanne episode, 165; deprecates constitutional conference, 194 *n.* 2; seeks amendment of Article 10, 220, 223; on Geneva Protocol, 224; advocates optional clause in Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 254; on Locarno Pact, 256 and *n.* 1, 284; services in 1926 Conference, 280
Larkin, P. C., i. 362; ii. 182
Lash, Z. A., on Imp. federation, i. 77 *n.* 5
Latin-America, relations U.S. and, ii. 223, 334, 337, 346 f.; relations Canada and, 346 f., 349 f. *See also* Monroe Doctrine
Laurier, Rt. Hon. Sir Wilfrid: continuous leadership of Nationalists, i. 51, 64, 106; theory of Imp. relations, i. 47 f., 50 ff.; contrasted with ultra-Nationalist atti-

tude, 50, 52, 261 ff.; advised by Canad. Boards of Trade on, 146; policy of mutual non-interference among Brit. nations, 8, 48 and *n.* 2, 65 f., 133 f., 179 f., 238, 282; suspicion of racialism, 63, 126 and *n.* 2; affinity for Botha, 63 f., 291; domestic political difficulties, 45, 133; strategy of, 61, 66, 179 f., 185; attitude to Imp. economic organisation, 41 and *n.* 2, 77; to Imp. federation, 48, 61, 77, 83, 97, 127; on Brit. equality, 7, 260; on Imperialism, 12; on local autonomy, 83, 260 f.; on waxing Canad. Nationalism, 264; on Imp. Conference organisation, 112, 136 *n.* 3, 137; opposes publicity of proceedings of, 96, 140; attitude to appeals to, 179, 282; on adequacy of contact by correspondence, 132 *n.* 4; tribute to work of Conference, 149; attitude to Imp. Secretariat, 118 f., 133, 144; on Dominion High Commissioners, 301 f.; on relation of fiscal autonomy and commercial treaties, 151; ii. 301; on Canad. treaty-making power, i. 67, 163, 196; ii. 323; on commercial treaty restrictions, i. 41, 175, 177 ff., 180 f.; criticises Brit. diplomacy relating to Canada, 189; on Alaska boundary award, 195 f., 205 f.; connection with negotiations, 203 f.; caution regarding independent ventures in diplomacy, 204, 212 f.; on Lemieux's status in Japan, 212; ii. 318; on Declaration of London, i. 289; on Canad. diplomatic representation abroad, ii. 100; tributes to Ambassador Bryce, i. 192; ii. 102; on status foreign consuls in Canada, ii. 292; anti-militarism of, i. 28, 47; stresses dissimilarity Canad. and European conditions, 28, 47, 260; admits Canad. liability in Imp. wars, 23, 51, 261, 267 *n.* 2; ii. 324; asserts discretion as to participation in, i. 51 f., 260 f., 289; on S. African War, 51, 228 ff.; on European War, 52; ii. 5 f.; refuses Imp. commitments, i. 48, 248; endorses Imp. co-operation, 262, 348; attitude to Canad. association in Imp. foreign policy, 48, 283 f., 289 f., 291; "call us to your councils," 236, 239, 311; introduces Canad. Naval Service Bill, 257; deprecates parl. ratification of treaties, ii. 36. *See also* Laurier policy

Laurier policy, essentials of, i. 24, 28, 44 ff., 48, 50 ff., 260 ff; ii. '46, 324; asserted by Laurier, i. 48, 50 ff., 234 ff., 259 ff., 289; recognised by Imp. Defence Conference, 252 f.; reaffirmed by Mackenzie King, ii. 115 f., 125, 150 f., 178 f.; parl. endorsation of, sought in Canada, i. 48 and *n.* 1, 333 *n.* 3; embodied in Free State Constitution, 333; ii. 275; relation Locarno Pact to, ii. 328 f.; comment on, i. 52 f., 291; ii. 30, 129, 164 ff., 328 ff.

Lausanne Treaty episode, i. 333; ii. 113, 147–66, 171 f., 181; attitude of Canad. Government, ii. 147 ff.; interchanges with Brit., 150 ff.; attitude of other Dominions, 152; Brit. debate on, 153 ff.; Canad. debate on, 159 ff.; comment on, 151, 153, 156 ff., 161 ff.; discussion of, in 1923 Conference noted, 167; 1926 Conference on, 283 f.

Law, Rt. Hon. Andrew Bonar, deprecates rigid Imp. Constitution, i. 332; on consultation with Dominions, ii. 16; at Peace Conference, 25, 26; on Near East crisis, 131 f.; restricts Cabinet Secretariat, 134

League Covenant, Article 10 of, Canad. parl. discussion of, ii. 47 f., 51, 223; Liberal reservation to, 48 and *n.* 1, 220; Canad. efforts to secure amendment of, 220 ff., 311; reaction Latin-American countries to, 223, 320

League Covenant: joint interpretative note on Article 16 of, ii. 330

League of Nations, Brit. Commonwealth compared to, i. 321, 326, 356; ii. 60, 303, 313, 315; self-government as criterion for admission to, ii. 29 *n.* 2, 90; relation of delegates to their governments, 224, 280; principle of regional settlements as menace to, 311 f., 320; Dominion status in, i. 324; ii. 90 f., 236; mode of representation in, ii. 203 and *n.* 1; implications of separate Dominion membership in, 28 f., 40 ff., 312, 314 ff.; instances of divergent Brit. policies in, 41 *n.* 2, 218; instances of direct communication with, 45, 200, 210, 224, 234 ff., 237; Dominions as mandatories,

30, 43 f., 53 ff., 57, 306; insufficiency of, for protection of Dominions urged, 56, 229, 325 f.; limited and indirect membership in, suggested, 41 f., 314; aloofness or withdrawal from, suggested, 42, 315 ff.; value of, to Brit. Commonwealth, 319 f.; general attitude of Dominions to, 51 ff., 58, 217–37, 314 ff.; to Permanent Court, 203 ff., 219, 229 ff., 293; Canad. attitude on contributions to, 218, 311; to Article 10, 47 f., 51, 220 ff., 311; Fifth Assembly of, 201, 203, 238; joint note on Article 16, 330
League of Nations Secretariat, i. 124, 356
League of Nations Union (Australia), debates Geneva Protocol, ii. 229
League Permanent Court, Canad. debate on, ii. 219; Geneva Protocol and, 203 ff., 231 f.; jurisdiction in domestic matters, 204, 206 f., 229 ff.; 1926 Conference on, 293
Lee of Fareham, Lord, ii. 80 f., 86
Legations, Dominion, *see* Dominions
Lemieux, Hon. Rodolphe, mission to Japan, 1907, i. 210 ff.; ii. 348; on Fr. Canad. privileges within the Empire, i. 264, 310 *n.* 1; ii. 304; on Canad. legation at Washington, i. 362; suspicion of Article 10, ii 47
Liberalism, English, as ingredient in Dominion Nationalism, i. 26, 260, 324
Liberal Party (Canada), attitude to S. African War, i. 229 f., 233 ff., 238; to Canad. naval question, 259 ff.; to Versailles settlement, ii. 46 ff.; older Liberals and Imp. relations, 217
Liquor Convention, 1924, i. 344; ii. 174
Little-Englanders, Imperialist criticisms of, i. 3, 5, 59, 197
Little-Englandism as a phase of Nationalism, i. 5, 9; influence of, on Brit. question, 15, 26, 62, 64, 82, 197
Lloyd George, Rt. Hon. D., on weakness of Dominions apart from Commonwealth, i. 98 *n.* 1; on Imp. constitutional relations, 326, 329 f., 332; principles for conduct of foreign policy, 330; ii. 189; on relation of Dominions to Peace Settlement, ii. 12; on Imp. War Cabinet, 16; interchanges with Borden on representation at Paris, 18 f.; at the Peace Conference, 25, 26; on effectiveness of Brit. Empire Delegation, 63 f., 96; on Pacific question, 77 ff.; on Dominion representation at Washington Conference, 84; 'invitation to Dominions in Near East crisis, 114, 120 ff., 158; comment on, 130 ff.; on Montagu incident, 135; on Lausanne Treaty episode, 154, 156; on Dominion representation at London Conference, 181 f., 188; criticises Geneva Protocol, 216; protests basis of representation at Locarno, 243; on Locarno Pact, 246, 313; Cannes project, 254
Locarno Pact: regional pacts contrasted with inclusive agreements, ii. 198 ff., 203, 212 ff., 238 f., 245, 296, 311 f.; contrast Protocol and Pact, 238 f.; Locarno Conference and treaties, 239 f.; basis of representation debated, 240 ff.; Imp. implications of, i. 330; ii. 34, 247 ff., 311 ff; Brit. hopes for Dominions' adhesion to, ii. 251 *n.* 1; Dominion reactions to, Canada, 258 ff.; Australia, 265 ff., N.Z., 231, 271 ff.; S. Africa, 274; Irish Free State, 275 f.
Locarno Pact, Article 9 of, ii. 200, 249, 263, 267, 271, 275 f.; purport of, examined, 253 ff., 297, 329 ff., 333; 1926 Conference and optional clauses, 283 f.
Lodge, Sen. Henry Cabot, i. 204 *n.* 2, 205
Lohman, A. F. de S., i. 207
Long, Rt. Hon. Walter, i. 144 *n.* 1; ii. 13
London Conference 1924, issue of Dominion representation at, ii. 181 ff.; comments on, 187 ff.
Lorne, Marquis of, i. 361; ii. 102
Loughhead, Sen. Jas., on Rush-Bagot Agreement, ii. 147
Louisiana, status of French in, commented on by Lemieux, i. 264
Lucas, Sir Chas., on Brit. equality, i. 16; on Dominion economic imperialism, ii. 307
Lyons, Lord, attitude to Colonial negotiations, i. 152, 155, 161, 164
Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred, Imp. Council project, i. 64, 102 ff., 112

MACDONALD, Sir Claude, i. 210
Macdonald, Hon. E. M., ii. 224

Macdonald, Rt. Hon. Sir John A., i. 192, 200 f., 280, 289 *n.* 1
MacDonald, Rt. Hon. J. Ramsay, deprecates rigid formulae of Imp. relations, i. 333; declares Imp. Conference decisions not binding on constituent governments, 350; on Lausanne Treaty episode, ii. 155 f.; recognition of U.S.S.R., 177 ff.; on Dominion representation at London Conference, 182, 186; proposes subsidiary Imp. Conference, 193 ff; rejects Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 199 f.; rejoinder to Chamberlain on Protocol, 213 ff.; protests basis of representation at Locarno, 243; on united foreign policy, 244; criticises Locarno Pact, 246 f.
Mackenzie, D. D., ii 36 f.
Mackenzie, Hon. Thos., i. 275, 363; ii. 26
Mackinder, Sir Halford, ii. 249
Maclean, W. F., Nationalist creed of, quoted, i. 6 f.
Macphail, Sir Andrew, quoted, i. 59
Mahan, Capt. A. T., cited, i. 218
Malan, Hon D. F., ii. 233
Malcolm, A. S., on sources of advice to Crown, i 342 *n.* 2; attitude to Imp. Conference, 350; on relations with U.S., ii. 75; on Near East crisis, 119; deprecates optional clauses in Imp treaties, 254
Mandates, Dominion, ii. 30, 43 f., 53 ff, 57, 306
Manitoba Grain Growers' Association, i 27
Mann, E. A., ii. 230
Massey, Hon. C. Vincent, ii. 104
Massey, Rt. Hon Wm. F., on admission of India to Imp Conference, i. 138 *n.* 4; inclines to local navy, 276; on 1917 Conference resolution, 317; on channels of communication, 318; on constitutional retrogression since the War, 327; on sources of advice to Crown, 342 *n.* 1, 343; on parl. ratification of Imp. Conference decisions, 350; visit to Britain 1916, 357 *n.* 2; on German colonies issue, ii. 11,; at Peace Conference, 23, 25, 26; on implications of Versailles settlement, 33 f., 56; on Pacific question, 56, 64 f.; on Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 75; on status of Dominion plenipotentiaries, 94; action in Near East crisis, 115, 119; on Halibut Treaty, 181; attitude to Geneva Protocol, 207, 210; opposes decentralisation of foreign policy, 254, 289, 315; illness of, 273
McBride, Sir Richard, on Canad. navy, i. 269 *n.* 2
McCarthy, Dalton, ii. 102
Meighen, Rt. Hon. Arthur, on local autonomy, i. 327, 344; on appointment of Governor-General, 368; connection with dissolution issue, 370; attitude to Anglo-Japanese Alliance, ii. 73 f., 77; on Dominion representation at Washington Conference, 82, 84 f.; on Canad. legation at Washington, 108, on Near East crisis, 122 f.; on Halibut Treaty, 140 ff.; on Lausanne Treaty episode, 161 ff.; interrogates King on effect of treaties, 174; on Canad. representation at London Conference, 186; on L. of N. and Protocol, 224; Hamilton speech, 261 and *n.* 1
Mercantilism, i 3
Mercier, Hon. H., i. 45
Merriman, Rt Hon. John X., ii. 76
Merritt, Hon. W. H., i. 152
Migration, Imp., problem of, i. 38 f.; ii. 302 f.; opposition national minorities to projects for, i. 63, 126 and *n.* 2; ii. 303. *See also* Immigration
Military defence, Imp, relation military to naval, i. 219 f.; uniformity in organisation stressed, 220 f., 226 f., 248 f.; services of Colonies in own defence, 226; Imp. Conference discussions of (1897), 226 f.; (1902), 241 ff.; (1907), 248 ff.; (1909) 252 f.; General Staff memoranda on, 219 f., 248, 252; issue of Dominion reserves for overseas service, 227, 241 f., 249, 252; Imp. General Staff project, 227, 248 ff., 253 and *n.* 1, 258. *See also* Imperial defence; Wars, Imp.
Millen, Sen. E. D., on Pacific question, ii. 228
Mills, D., ii. 102
Milner, Viscount, on Imp. patriotism, i. 14; on Imperialist aims, 33; on post-War Imp. organisation, 320 f.; ii. 2 f.; attitude of S. African Nationalists to, i. 325; ii. 58; at the Peace Conference, ii. 26; on ratification of Peace Treaties, 38 f.
Minto, Earl, i. 229

Mitchell, G., ii. 26
Monck, Viscount, i. 152
Monet, D., i. 233
Monk, F. D., i. 44, 192, 193 *n.* 2, 212, 262 f.
Monroe Doctrine: Canad. Nationalist reliance on, i. 29, 44, 49, 50, 53; ii. 262 f.; appeals to deprecated, i. 264, 268; ii. 336 f.; bearing of, on attitudes to Article 10 of League Covenant, ii. 223; general misinterpretation of, 336; content of, 338 ff.; implications of for Canada, 308, 334, 338 ff.; for the Pacific Dominions, 69, 229, 340, 357; invoked as pretext for annexation of Canada, 351 and *n.* 2; Hughes advocates Australian Monroe Doctrine for Pacific, 11, 54, 66. *See also* Anglo-American relations; Canada, relations with U.S.
Montagu, Rt. Hon. E. S., ii. 25 f., 135 f.
Montagu incident, ii. 135 ff.
Montenegro, Brit. treaty with (1882), i. 174
Montreal Star, The, on Canad. legation at Washington, ii. 85; on Near East crisis, 122; on Halibut Treaty, 141
Moor, Hon. F. R., i. 18 *n.* 1, 112
Morier, Sir Robert, i. 156
Morin, Hon. R., ii. 263, 331
Morris, Sir E., i. 128, 181, 207
Myers, J. M., ii. 10 *n.* 2

NATAL, i. 103, 242, 253 and *n.* 1, 254
National minorities within the Commonwealth, problem of, i. 306, 325; ii. 45, 302 ff; suspicion of racialist Imperialism, i. 11, 63, 126 and *n.* 2, 232; ii. 303; opposition to Imp. migration schemes, i. 63, 126 and *n.* 2; ii. 303; special privileges of, in Canada, i. 264; ii. 354, 361; Anglo-Canad. Nationalist dissatisfaction with, i. 336 f.; ii. 303 and *n.* 5; attitude of S. African Nationalists to Imp. relations, i. 324 f., 333, 337; ii. 65, 303, 326
National Progressive Party (Canad.), attitude to Imp. issues, ii. 264
Nationalism, phenomena of modern, economic basis of, i. 71, 224; ii. 300 f.
Nationalism: factors in Dominion, economic, i. 9, 151, 224 f.; ii. 300 f.; anti-militarism, i. 26 ff., 45, 260 f.; English Liberalism, 26, 260; proximity Canada to U.S., 29 f.; Imperialist movement, 69; traditional view of Colonial history and policy, 62 f., 268 f.; ii. 298 ff., 344; of Brit. diplomacy relating to the Dominions, i. 63 and *n.* 1, 187 ff., 199, 281; ii. 299, 344; S. African and Eur. Wars, i. 227 f., 238 f., 308, 310; national minorities, i. 11, 63, 126 and *n.* 2, 306, 325; ii. 45, 302 ff.; possible effect of 1926 constitutional settlement and changing international scene upon, ii. 296 ff
Nationalist attitude, characteristic features of, i. 4 ff.; contrasted with Imperialist, 24 ff., 198 ff., 250, 320; ii. 360; with ultra-Nationalist, i. 5 f., 50 ff., 262 ff.; "Little-Englandism" the Brit. aspect of, i. 5, 9; prospective modification of, ii. 296 ff.
Nationalists, Dominion: concept of Britannic equality, i. 7 ff., 334 f.; misrepresentation of Imperialism, 10 ff.; preoccupation with constitutional issues, 23 f., 54, 259, 324, 333, 337; ii. 294, 296, 360 f.; attitude to Imp. federation, i. 40; to Imp. economic organisation, 41 and *n.* 2; to Imp. defence and foreign affairs, 24 ff., 44 ff., 289 f.; strategic advantages of, over Imperialists, 56 ff.; enhanced by S. African union, 64; strategy of, 60, 65 ff.; divisions in ranks of, 65; oppose collective settlement of Imp. issues, 48, 65, 179 f.; oppose embroilment in European politics, 24, 26 ff., 31, 45 ff., 260; restricted view of world politics, ii. 309, 320, 326; view of nature of Commonwealth, 321 f.; assume initiative after European War, i. 334; effects advent to power of on Imp. co operation, i. 320, 334; ii. 61, 99, 130, 171, 176 f., 277, 322. *See also* ultra-Nationalists
Nauru Island, Brit. mandate over, ii. 44
Naval agreements (1887), i. 225 f.; (1902), 241 *n.* 1, 242 *n.* 2; Australian dissatisfaction with, 223, 244 f., 246 f., 255; (1909), 219, 255 f., 275 ff.; (1911), 257 f.
Naval crisis of 1909, i. 250 ff.
Naval defence, Imp.: admiralty memoranda on, i. 218 f., 240, 241 *n.* 1, 252, 274; Imperialist emphasis

on unity in command, 55, 218 ff., 245 ff., 255; need of ships rather than men stressed, 246; system of separate conferences with each Dominion regarding, 240 *n.* 4, 245 *n.* 2, 254; Imp. Conference action on (1887), 225; (1897), 226 f.; (1902), 239 ff.; (1907), 245 ff.; (1909), 253 ff.; (1911), 257 f.; naval agreements, 219, 225 f., 242 and *n.* 2, 255 f., 257 f.; Australian dissatisfaction with 1902 agreement, 223, 244 f., 246 f., 255; crisis of 1909, 250 ff.; Canad. resolution of March 29, 1909, 251, 256 f., 265, 269 f.; Canad. naval controversy, 258–75; Churchill's policy of naval concentration, 275 ff.; surrender of Two-Power standard, ii. 78 f.; issue of Brit. belligerent rights at sea, 203, 207, 232; Singapore base, i. 352; ii. 167, 228 f. *See also* Imp. defence; Wars, Imp.

Naval defence, Dominion: navies, political factors, i. 219, 222 f.; ii. 301; local economic interests, i. 224 f.; emphasis on local needs, i. 222 f., 247; ii. 301; "fleet unit" plan, i. 219, 253 ff., 275 ff.; problem of control of, 254 f., 263, 270 ff.; provisions for control, 256 and *n.* 1, 258, 271, 274 f.; issue of construction of, in Dominions, 224 f., 257, 274; Canad. naval controversy, i. 258 74; Liberal policy, 257, 259 ff.; Conservative policy, 265 ff.; ultra-Nationalist attitude, 49 *n.*4, 262 f.; Admiralty memorandum on, 274

Naval reserves, Dominion, i. 242 *n.* 2, 247, 256 f.

Near East crisis, i. 333; ii. 113–34, 156, 172, 184 f., 315, 326; action of Brit. Government in, ii. 113 f.; Dominion attitudes, 114 ff.; Dominion debates on, 117 ff.; press communiqué issue, 114, 120 f., 125, 133 f.; comment on Canad. attitude, 126 ff.; implications, 130 ff.

Neutrality, Dominion, ii. 121, 255 ff., 263, 275 f., 329 ff., 332 and *n.* 1; suggested general declaration of, 258, 266, 274, 276, 285, 333

Newfoundland, official attitude of, on Imp. Council, i. 103 f., 128; on Imp. Secretariat, 103, 132; on Imp. defence, 104, 255; on commercial treaty restrictions, 181; on consultation on foreign policy, 291; fisheries questions with U.S. and Canada, 142, 157 and *n.* 5, 165 f., 192, 206 ff., 279 ff.; Foreign Fishing Vessels Act, 206, 280

New Guinea, German colony in, i. 196; issue of disposal of, ii. 10 ff.; Australian mandate over, 43 f.

New Hebrides Convention, Australian grievance regarding, i. 197; ii. 66; debated in 1907 Conference, i. 142, 279, 281 f.

New Zealand, attempted expansion in Pacific, i. 48, 196; attitude to Imp. relations contrasted with other Dominions, 324, 327, 333; ii. 44, 57, 271; procedure as regards mandate, ii. 43 ff., 57; official attitude of, on commercial treaty restrictions, i. 158 ff., 172, 179, 181; Imp. defence, 241 f., 245, 247, 249, 251, 255, 257, 275 f.; Imp. Council, 103, 106 ff., 125 ff.; Imp. Secretariat, 103, 129 ff., 132; consultation on foreign policy, 199, 278 f., 291, 298; German colonies issue, ii. 11,; Near East crisis, 114 f., 119 *n.* 1,; Geneva Protocol, 207; Locarno Pact, 271 f.; parl. opinion on: Versailles settlement, ii. 55 ff.; Pacific question, 65 ff., 75 f.; Near East crisis, 119 f.; Geneva Protocol, 231 f.; L. of N., 56 f., 231; Locarno Pact, 271 ff.

Niobe and *Rainbow*, Canad. naval vessels, i. 257, 269 *n.* 2

North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration, i. 192, 206 ff.

OLIVER, F. C., *Alexander Hamilton*, cited, i. 70

"Open Door" policy of U.S., ii. 67 f.

Oregon boundary dispute, i. 188; ii. 351

Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W., ii. 180, 307 f.

PACAUD, L. T., ii. 47

Pacific Question, preoccupation of Australia and N.Z. with, ii. 45, 53, 65 ff., 230 ff.; German colonies and, i. 196 ff.; ii. 9 ff., 31 ff., 54, 65, 68, 96; transfer of interest to (1921), ii. 64; Amer. foreign policy as a factor in, 67 ff., 302, 335; post-Washington phase of, 226 ff.; future of, 302, 335. *See*

also Anglo-Japanese Alliance, "White Australia" policy
Page, Hon. Earle C. G., ii. 75, 118
Panama, Republic of, opposes Canad. effort to weaken Article 10, ii. 223
Panama Canal, in relation to Pacific, ii. 64; Canad. interest in, 306 and *n.* 2
Pan-Americanism, artificiality of, ii. 346 f.; Canada and, 346, 349 f.
Pan-American Union, dominance U.S. over, ii. 334, 346 f.; issue of Canad. relations with, 349 f.
Pan-Angles, i. 188 *n.* 1; ii. 343, 358
Paris Economic Conference (1916), Dominions represented at, ii. 14
Paris Peace Pact (Kellogg Pact), ii. 288
Paris, Treaty of (1783), Ewart's criticism of, i. 191
Parkin, Sir Geo. R., Imperialist outlook, i. 14, 16; on Brit. equality, 19; on Imperialist aims, 33 f.; on Canad. legation at Washington, ii. 109
Parliamentary responsibility (Parliamentary System), *see* Cabinet responsibility
Parmoor, Lord, ii. 200, 255
Parr, Sir Jas, i. 363; ii. 231, 271
Party politics, probability of, in an Imp. federal system, i. 76; influence of, on Imp. issues, i. 140 f.; ii. 29 *n.* 4, 126 f., 147 f., 213, 232, 243
Passamaquoddy Bay, frontier delimited, i. 206
Passive belligerency, Dominion, ii. 284, 329 ff.; distinguished from neutrality, 331
Patrie, La (Montreal), quoted, i. 233
Peace Conference, Dominion participation in, demanded by Imperialists and Nationalists, ii. 2–11; Home Government concedes, 12 f.; basis of, contemplated by Imperialists, 17 f.; basis adopted, 20 ff., 48 f., 186 f., 288; dual status of Dominions, 20, 22 f., 32 f., 41, 93, 187; precedents of, invoked, 86, 149, 183, 187 f., 190; departures from, noted, 149, 153, 240; form and signature of treaties, 23 f., 26 and *n.* 2, 31, 156; issue of Dominion ratification, 26, 28, 30, 35 ff. *See also* Versailles Settlement
Peace Conference, preliminary, rules of, on Dominion representation, ii. 22
Pearce, Rt. Hon. Geo. F., i. 178; ii. 26, 86, 234
Perley, Sir George, on Canad. motives in European War, i. 309 *n.* 1; on Dominion representation in U.K., 359, 364; as Acting High Commissioner, 362; on need of readjustment in conduct of Imp. foreign policy, ii. 7; opposes weakening of Imp. ties, 259
Permanent Court of International Justice, *see* League Permanent Court
Persia, opposes Canad. effort to weaken Article 10, ii. 223
Peterson, Sir Wm., Imperialist outlook of, i. 14, 16, 84; on S. African War, 239
Phillips, Hon. Wm., appointed U.S. Minister to Ottawa, ii. 292
Pollock, Sir Frederick, on local autonomy, i. 83; scheme of Imp. organisation, 99 ff.; visits Canada, 123
Ponsonby, A. W., ii. 177, 246
Pope, Sir Jos., i. 202, 211
Power, C. G., ii. 223, 332
Pratt, J. W., *Expansionists of 1812*, cited on causes of War of 1812, ii. 351 and *n.* 1
Pratten, Sen. H. E., ii. 55
Presse, La (Montreal), quoted, ii. 49
Pretoria Press, on Near East crisis, ii. 120
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, *see* Geneva Protocol

Quebec Act, 1774, extension of Canad. boundary by, i. 191 f., 351
Queensland seizes part of New Guinea (1883), i. 196

Race (colour) question in S. Africa, i. 325 f.; ii. 326
Racialism, as element in Imperialism, Nationalist suspicion of, i. 11, 63, 126 and *n.* 2, 232; ii. 303
Radiotelegraphic Convention (1912), i. 214 f.
Rainbow and *Niobe*, Canad. naval vessels, i. 257, 269 *n.* 2
Reading, Lord, ii. 25
Rebellion Losses Bill, i. 150
Reciprocity, Canad.–U.S., i. 152 f., 180, 305
Regional pacts, contrasted with inclusive agreements, ii. 198 ff.,

203, 212 ff., 238 f., 296, 311 f.; recourse to, in Imp. foreign policy, i. 184 f.; ii. 176 f., 310 ff., 321
"Regionalism" in Imp. foreign policy, as antidote to decentralisation, i. 184 f.; ii. 176 f., 310 ff.; criticism of, ii. 312 f., 321. *See also* Continentalism
Reid, Sir George, i. 84
Reid, Whitelaw, i. 206
Reitz, Sen. F. W., motion for withdrawal of S. Africa from L. of N., ii. 232 f.
Reserves, Dominion, military, i. 227, 241 f., 249, 252; naval, 242 *n.* 2, 247, 256 f.
Ripon, Marquis of, on 1894 Conference recommendations, i. 170 f.; despatch on Colonies and commercial treaties, 158, 160 f., 165; ii. 27 and *n.* 1
Robinson, Sir J., *The Colonies and the Century*, cited, i. 3
Roosevelt, Pres. Theodore, attitude during Alaska boundary dispute, i. 204
Root, Hon. Elihu, i. 204 *n.* 4, 207
Round Table, The, on Mr. Ewart's theories, i. 192 *n.* 1; on Churchill's departure from 1909 naval agreement, 276 and *n.* 3; abandons Imp federation (Dec. 1920), 305 *n.* 1; on Canad. Nationalism, 1921, 323; on representation of Dominions in Britain, 363; on need of Brit. representation in the Dominions, 372 ff.; endorses Dominion participation in the Peace Settlement, ii. 3 f.; on German colonies issue, 10; on relation of Commonwealth to L. of N., 42, 311 f., 315 ff.; on assumption of mandates by Dominions, 44; on Canad. efforts to amend Article 10, 222; on Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 68, 70, 74; on Imp. diplomatic unity, 85; on Near East crisis, 127, 133; on Lausanne treaty episode, 166; on achievements 1923 Conference, 168; on implications of Locarno Pact, 251 ff., 257; endorses Dominion legations, 290; on regionalism in Imp. foreign relations, 310 ff.; on Anglo-American relations, 315; on Dominion independence, 325 *n.* 2; on strategic dependence of Canada on U.S., 352
Rowell, Hon. N. W., on relations within the Commonwealth, i. 318 f., 357; on Canad. relations with L. of N., ii. 29, 51, 218; on divergence of Brit. and Dominion policies in, 41 *n.* 2, 52; on Pacific problem, 69, 73; on Canada as interpreter of the Commonwealth to U.S., 342
Rumbold, Sir Horace, ii. 153, 159
Rush-Bagot Convention, Amer proposals to end, i. 203; Mackenzie King's move to supersede, ii. 146 f.
Russell-Grey Enabling Act (1846), i. 150
Russo-Japanese War, influence of, on Imp. defence strategy, i. 248, 250; on Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 250; ii. 70

SAFETY of Human Lives at Sea, Convention for, i. 215
Salisbury, Marquis of, i. 155, 202
Salmond, Sir John, at Washington Conference, ii. 86; on status of Dominion delegates at, i. 343; ii. 89 ff.
Salvador, enquiry as to Monroe Doctrine, ii. 338
Samoa, Western, acquisition of, by Germany, i. 197; issue of disposition of, ii. 10 ff.; N.Z. mandate over, 43
Sastri, Rt. Hon. Srinivasa, ii. 86
Schreiner, Hon. W. P., on S. African motives in European War, i. 309 *n.* 1
Sea power, as a link of Empire, i. 221; as a factor in Imp. defence, 61, 218 f., 241; ii. 312; Admiralty memoranda on, i. 218 f.
Secretariat, Imp., *see* Imp. Secretariat
Secretariat of British Cabinet, ii. 134
Secretariat of L. of N., i. 124, 356
Security, relation to disarmament, ii. 198, 201
Security pacts: regional pacts contrasted with inclusive agreements, ii. 198 ff., 203, 212 ff., 238 f., 245, 296, 311 ff.; optional clauses in, regarding Dominions, ii. 28 *n.* 2, 200, 254, 283 f.; Tripartite Guarantee Treaty 1919, ii. 28 *n.* 2, 200, 238; Cannes projects, 1922, 200; Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance 1923, ii. 199 f., 208, 211 *n.* 1, 212, 221, 229, 311. *See also* Locarno Pact
Seddon, Rt. Hon. Sir R. J., favours Imp. federation, i. 97; project of Dominion reserves for overseas service, 241 ff.

Selborne, Earl of, on maritime spirit as link of Empire, i. 221; on Imp. naval defence, 240 f.; on Dominion legations, ii. 290; on strategic dependence of Canada on U.S., 334
Senate, problem of, in an Imp. federal system, i. 75 and *n.* 1
Sèvres Treaty, ii. 117, 118, 131, 135, 151, 154, 155, 264; relation of Dominions to, 114, 122, 136, 155 f.
Sifton, Hon. A. L., ii. 25, 26, 51
Sifton, Hon. Sir Clifford, ii. 6, 23
Simpson, Bertram L., on Article 4 of Anglo-Japanese Alliance, ii. 71 f.
Sinclair, Sir John, i. 359
Singapore Base: discussed at 1923 Conference, ii. 167, 228; interest of Australia and N.Z. in, 228 f.; construction halted by Brit. Labour Government, i. 352; ii. 229
Sinha, Lord, ii. 25, 26
Smartt, Sir Thos., i. 249; ii. 59
Smith, Lee, i. 158
Smith, Ralph, on defence contributions, i. 266 *n.* 1
Smuggling treaty, Canada-U.S. (1924) ii. 173
Smuts, Rt. Hon. J. C.: rejects Imp. federation, i. 315, 325; views on Imp. relations, 315 ff., 325 f., ii. 130, 322, 326; criticised in N.Z., ii. 56 ff.; characterises Brit. Commonwealth as L. of N., i. 326; ii. 313, 315; programme for future of S. Africa, i. 326; stresses co-operation among whites in S. Africa, i. 326; ii. 326; criticises failure of Brit. Government to carry out 1923 Conference resolutions, i. 349, 352; on status of Governor-General, 368, 373; on German colonies issue, ii. 9; at Peace Conference, 25, 26; on Versailles settlement, 59 f.; on secession, 61; on relations with L. of N., 41, 60, 233; on Pacific question, 64 f., 76; protests basis of representation at Washington Conference, 83 f., 87 f.; on Genoa Conference, 88; endorses Dominion legations, 110; attitude during Near East crisis, 116, 120 ff., 132; on the opportunity of the Commonwealth, 168; protests basis of representation at Locarno, 242, 252; deplores implications of Locarno settlement, 242, 249 f., 274; attitude criticised, 251; on Washington Four-Power Treaty, 311
Soleil, Le (Quebec), quoted, ii. 49
South Africa, Union of: Nationalist position strengthened by union of, i. 64; analogy political situation of, to that of Canada, 291; ii. 57; persistent emphasis on constitutional issues in, i. 324 f., 333, 337; secession issue, 324 f., ii. 65, 326; race question, i. 325; ii. 326; immigration question, ii. 67; assumption mandate by, 43; official attitude of, on Imp. federation, i. 128, 316; Col. Office organisation, 129 f.; Imp. defence, 253 *n.* 1, 254; consultation of foreign policy, 291, 299; German colonies issue, ii. 9; representation at Washington Conference, 83 f.; at London Conference, 187 *n.* 1; Near East crisis, 116, 120 f.; Geneva Protocol, 208 f.; parl. discussion of Imp. relations, i. 324 ff.; Versailles settlement, ii. 57 ff.; Pacific question, 76 f.; L. of N., 58, 208, 232 ff.
South Africa Party, programme of Imp. relations (1920), i. 325 f.
South African War, as stimulus to Imperialism, i. 68, 95 f.; to Canad. Nationalism, 227 f., 238 f.; relation of, to Imp. defence problem, 227 f., 238 f., 241 f., 248; conflicting attitudes to, 228 ff.; Canad. debates on, 230 ff.; exemplifies local Imp. war, ii. 330
Spain, Canad. commercial treaty relations with, i. 155 f.
Spanish-American War, i. 204; ii. 355
Stals, Dr, ii. 173
Standing Com. of Imp. Conference, Mr. Harcourt's proposal, i. 129 ff.
Star, The (Auckland), on Imp. connection, ii. 326 *n.* 1
Sterling, Hon. Fredk. A., appointed U.S. Minister to Dublin, ii. 292
Stewart, Hon. W. Downie, ii. 28, 56 f.
St. Lawrence Waterway project, ii. 323, 343, 351 *n.* 2
Suez Canal, vital interest of Australia in, ii. 117, 167, 280, 326
Sullivan, R. B., i. 152
Suttor, Hon. F. B., i. 158, 166, 169

TAFT, Chief Justice W. H., on application of Monroe Doctrine to Canada, ii. 338

Tariff reform associations in U.K., appeal to 1907 Conference, i. 145
Tarte, Hon. I., attitude during S. African War, i. 230, 231, 233
"Taxation without representation" argument, in relation to Imp. defence and foreign affairs, i. 40, 47, 55, 231, 233, 237, 265; ii. 2 f., 218
Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. H., proposes multi-party representation in Imp. Conference, i. 138 *n.* 3; ii. 192; on Irish legation at Washington, ii. 112; on Dominion representation at London Conference, 184 f., 187 and *n.* 2, 189, 191; tribute to Brit. Empire Delegation, 190 f.; visit to S. Africa, 196; protests basis of representation at Locarno, 243
Thompson, Sir John, i. 201, 202
Thompson, V. C., ii. 230
Thornton, Sir E., i. 155
Thynne, Hon. A. J., i. 169
Times, The (London), on Governor-General, i. 372
Treaties, commercial: relation fiscal autonomy to, i. 150 ff., 158 ff., 184; relation of, to political questions, 182 ff.; ii. 31; evolution negotiation of, i. 152–66; relation of Dominions to Imp. treaties, 166–82; Imp. Conference resolutions on, 171, 172, 175, 176 f.; attitude of commercial interests to, 171 f.; modification of, in Dominion interests, 171, 174 f., 181 f.; principle of optional Dominion adhesion and withdrawal recognised, 173 ff., ii. 180; issue of Belgian and Zollverein treaties, i. 141, 167 ff., 180; other most-favoured-nation restrictions, 175–82; prior consultation with Dominions on, 175 ff.; relation of Australian and British shipping to, 178 f.
Treaties, parl. ratification of, Brit. constitutional practice, ii. 36, 87, 92; evolution of the issue in Canada, 35 ff.; demanded for Peace Treaties, 26, 38 ff.; implications of, 28, 30, 37 ff.; Borden's principles regarding, 36, 39. *See also* Lausanne Treaty
Treaties, political. relation of the Dominions to, influence of the commercial treaties controversy on, i. 182 ff.; ii. 31; principle of optional adhesion to, ii. 199 and *n.* 1, 200, 253 f.; Premier King on pre-conditions of adhesion, 152; on distinction: moral and legal obligations under, 160 ff.; implications Article 9 of Locarno Pact, 253 ff., 297, 329 ff., 333; Lapointe holds optional clauses now superfluous, 283 f.; relation Dominions to existing Imp. treaties, 277 and *n.* 1; form of treaties, 169 f., 179 f., 283 f.; inter-governmental agreements, 170, 180, 283; status of Dominion negotiators, i. 165 f., 183, 211, 213; ii. 28, 95, 140, 169 f., 283 ff.; 1923 Conference on political treaties, ii. 167 ff.; 1926 Conference on, 281 ff.
Triggs, Hon. W. H., ii. 76
Tudor, F. G., ii. 75
Tupper, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles, commercial negotiations conducted by, i. 150 f., 164; on Brit. diplomacy relating to Canada, 189, 192; on fisheries negotiations of 1888, 201; on S. African War, 230 ff.; Canad. High Commissioner, 280, 361
Tupper, Hibbert, i. 302
Turner, U.S. Sen., i. 204 *n.* 2
Tweedmouth, Lord, on naval defence, i. 245 ff.

UITLANDERS, Canad. parl. resolution of sympathy with, i. 229, 232
Ukrainians in Canada, influence of, on Canad. foreign policy, ii. 305
Ultra-Nationalists: contrasted with Nationalists, i. 5 f., 50 ff.; influence of, in moulding Nationalist doctrine, 5 f., 10 ff; colonialism of, 30, 41; suspicion of racialist imperialism, 11, 63, 126 and *n.* 2, 232; ii. 303; indifference to disruptive forces in the Commonwealth, i. 5 f., 65, 91 f.; ii. 309, 321, 328; attitude to the Brit. connection, i. 11, 25 f., 49 *n.* 5, 53; ii. 305; criticism Brit. economic imperialism, i. 11 f., 49; ii. 262; attitude to Imp. defence and foreign affairs, i. 25 f., 44 ff., 48 ff., 53, 233, 262 f.; ii. 296; reliance of, on Monroe Doctrine in Canada, i. 29, 44, 49 f., 53; ii. 262 f. *See also* Continentalism, National Minorities
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, recognition of, by Brit. Labour Government, ii. 177 ff.; Brit. treaties with, 177, 179 ff., 181
Union of S. Africa, *see* S. Africa

Unitary State, defined, i. 72 ; 19th century Brit. Empire as, 1
United Empire, policy of, i. 10 ; reflects evolution of Brit. Question, 305 *n.* 1 ; editorial comment on Imp. problems, 275, 309, 312, 320, 321 ; ii. 3, 109
United Kingdom: relation preponderant interests of, to Brit. Question, i. 9, 42 ; ii. 298 ; self-interest of, in relation to Dominions emphasised by Nationalists, i. 11 f , 49 ; ii. 262 ; intervention government of, in Dominion concerns, i. 1, 67, 335 f., 340 ff., 370 and *n.* 2 ; diplomacy of, in relation to Dominions, 25 f., 63 and *n.* 1, 187 ff., 196 ff., 279 ff., 287 ff. ; ii. 3 f., 10, 101 ; foreign policy of, in the guise of Imp. policy, ii. 130 f., 133, 137, 178, 180, 244, 249, 313, 322 ; need of ambassadorial representation in the Dominions, i. 372 f. ; official attitude on Imp. Council, 93 ff., 102 ff., 112 ; Col. Office organisation, 117 ff., 129 ff. ; Col commercial negotiations, 153 ff , 160 ff. ; commercial treaty commitments, 170 f., 173, 175 f., 178 f., 181 f. ; Col expansion in Pacific, 196 f. ; Imp. defence, 216 ff., 225 ff., 240 ff., 245 ff.,, 250 ff., 275 f , 283 ff. ; consultation with Dominions on foreign policy, 175 f., 216, 239, 283, 286 ff., 296 ff , 329 f ; ii. 11 ff., 193 ff. ; German colonies issue, ii. 12 f ; Dominion representation at Washington Conference, 84 ; at London Conference, 182, 185 f., 189 ; Dominion legations at Washington, 103 f., 111 f. ; action in Near East crisis, 113 f. ; criticised, 130 ff. ; parl. discussion of, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, ii. 73 ; Lausanne Treaty, 153 ff. ; London Conference, 188 f. ; Geneva Protocol, 215 ff. ; Locarno Pact, 243 ff.
United States: Amer. revolution and Brit. col. policy, i. 188 ; German-American influence in, ii. 343, 359 ; rupture with past a distinctive feature in development of, 344 ; evolution in public life of, 355 f. ; doctrine of economic opportunity in, 356. *See also* Constitution of U.S.
United States, foreign policy of, as a factor in Brit. Question, i. 29 f., 191, 198 ; ii. 69 ff., 343, 357 ff. ; in Pacific Question, ii. 67 ff., 302, 335 ; "open-door policy" of, 67 f. ; relations with China, 68 ; attitude to L. of N., 68 ; bearing of recent changes in Amer. public life on, 355 f ; relation to Latin-America, 223, 334, 337, 346 f., 349 f. *See also* Anglo American relations ; Canada, relations with U.S , Monroe Doctrine.
U.S Senate, rejects Chamberlain-Bayard Treaty, i. 201, 206 ; rejects Bond-Hay Treaty, 157 *n.* 5, 280 ; reservation to Halibut Treaty, ii. 141 ff. ; resolution offered in demanding cession of Canad. territory, 351 *n.* 2
Universal Postal Union Convention, i. 214 f.

VENEZUELA boundary dispute, i 195, 203 ; ii 351
Versailles settlement, Dominion voice in demanded, ii. 2 -13 ; Brit. terms for, framed by Imp. War Cabinet, 15 ff. ; German colonies issue in, 91 ff., 31 f., 54, 68, 96 ; rôle of Dominions in, 17–26, 54, 96 ; dual status of Dominions in, 20, 22 f., 32 f., 35, 41, 93, 187 ; issue of ratification of, by Dominions, 26, 28, 30, 35 ff. ; implications of, for the Empire, legal, 27 ff., 314 ; political, 31 ff. ; disintegrating features of, 34 ; Dominion re-actions to, 45, 130 ; Nationalist criticisms of, 58, 218 ; Dominion parl. debates on, 45 61 ; Canada, 45 ff. ; Australia, 53 ff. , N Z , 55 ff , S. Africa, 57 ff. *See also* L. of N. ; Peace Conference; treaties, parl ratification of
Villiers, Sir Henry de, i 169

WADE, G. C., on German colonies issue, ii. 10
Walker, Sir Edmund, i. 11
War Cabinet, Imp , *see* Imp. War Cabinet
War of 1812, Canada in, i. 226 ; causes of, ii. 351 and *n.* 1
Wars, Imp.: effects of, on Brit. Question, i. 30 f., 304 ; ii. 2 ff. ; as stimulus to Imperialism, i. 68, 95 f., 305 ff. ; as stimulus to Nationalism, 227 f., 238 f., 308, 310 ; diverse motives for Dominion participation in, 228 f , 308 ff. ; Dominion discretion as to

participation in, asserted, 233 ff., 260 f., 289; ii. 267 *n.* 1, 324; questioned, i. 267 f.; ii. 329; Dominion passive belligerency and neutrality argued, ii. 121, 255 ff., 263, 266, 274 ff., 285, 329 ff.; situation of Dominions in relation to future wars, 329 ff. *See also* Laurier Policy
Ward, Rt. Hon. Sir Jos., on Britannic equality, i. 17, 55; condemns Colonialism in foreign relations, 55, 279, 291; leadership of Imperialists, 64; on need of coercive authority in an Imp. federal government, 81 *n.* 2, on "bogey of local autonomy," 82, 85, 317; tribute to Laurier's influence in Imp. Conference, 100; urges Brit. Premier as Pres of Imp. Conference, 109 f.; urges permanent Imp. Conference, 110 f.; endorses Imp. Secretariat project, 117 ff., 132, 134 *n.* 1; Nationalism of, noted, 129 *n.* 2, 179; Imp. Council resolution (1911), 125 *n.* 2; Imp. federation proposal (1911), 60, 125 ff., 286, 305; racialism of, 126 f.; on need of continuity of Imp. Conference, 132 *n.* 3; on composition of Imp. Conference, 137; on admission India to, 138 *n.* 4; urges admission of Press to, 140; on limitations of Conference authority, 143; resolution on Imp. treaty commitments, 172; on most-favoured-nation treaty restrictions, 179, 181; on local defence, 223; endorses 1902 naval agreement, 247; endorses Imp. General Staff project, 249; endorses unity in naval command, 255; proposes Dominion representation in U.K. through High Commissioners, 298, 357; reiterates demand for Imp. federation (1917), 317; on channels of communication, 318; on German colonies issue, ii. 11, 31 *n.* 1, 57; at Peace Conference, 25; on insufficiency of L. of N. protection, 56
Washington, Dominion legations at, *see* Dominions, representation of, at foreign capitals
Washington Arms Conference, preliminaries to, ii. 79 f.; achievements of, 80 f.; issue of Dominion representation at, 81 ff., 183, 186, 288; status of Dominion delegates at, 86 ff.
Washington Four-Power Treaty, ii. 80, 227
Washington, Treaty of (1871), i. 190, 192 f., 200
Watt, W. A., ii. 75
West, Christopher, *Canada and Sea Power*, cited, i. 27
West, Sir Lionel Sackville, i. 201
West Indies, British Canad. interest in, ii. 306 and *n.* 2, 308
White, Sir Thos., i. 298; ii. 19, 24
"White Australia" policy, relation of: to shipping legislation and commercial treaties, i. 179; to German colonies issue, ii. 9 ff.; to Pacific mandates, 53 ff., to Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 65 ff.; to Geneva Protocol, 204, 206 f., 228 ff.; postulates Imp. support, 56, 229 302, 325 f.
Wickett, Dr. S. M., i. 172
Wilford, Hon. T. M., i. 350, 359; ii. 76, 119, 181, 229
Willison, Sir John, on Halibut Treaty, ii. 144
Wilson, Sir H., i. 306 f.
Wilson, Pres. Woodrow, policies regarding German colonies criticised by Ward, ii. 31 *n.* 1, 57; by Hughes, 54; use of popular manifestos, 134
Winnipeg Free Press, on 1921 Conference, i. 322 *n.* 1
Winter, Sir James, i. 201, 203
Wise, Hon. B. R., i. 321
Woodsworth, Rev. J. S., on distribution of powers in Canad. federal system, i. 336 and *n.* 1, on Near East crisis, ii. 126; questions by, on Canad. representation at international conferences, 182, 241; on Versailles settlement, 218 f.; opposes Geneva Protocol, 225; motion repudiating Canad. association with Brit. foreign policy, 258 f.
World, The (Toronto), on Canad. legation at Washington, ii. 108
Wrangell Island episode, relation Canada to, ii. 322
Wrixon, Sir Henry, i. 113 *n.* 3, 143, 158
Wrong, Geo. M., on international status of Dominions, ii. 286

ZOLLVEREIN, issue of colonial release from Brit. treaty with, i. 141, 167 ff., 171, 173, 180. *See also* Treaties, commercial

Printed in England at THE BALLANTYNE PRESS
SPOTTISWOODE, BALLANTYNE & CO LTD.
Colchester, London & Eton