UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY
OU_148481
UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 301 / B58M Accession No. 34039

Author Biesanz

Title Modern Society, An Introduction to Social

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

1954

MODERN SOCIETY

An Introduction to Social Science

Contributing Authors

Wilbur B. Brookover, Ch. 15
Edward Carlin, Ch. 19
Douglas Dunham, Chs. 25, 26, 28, 29
Carroll Hawkins, Ch. 31
Melvin J. Segal, Chs. 23, 24

MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE

Maude Fiero, Ch. 16
Max Mark, Ch. 32
Stephen and Vera Sarasohn, Ch. 20
Edgar A. Schuler, Ch. 27
Murray Seidler, Chs. 1, 21

WAYNE UNIVERSITY

G. Lowell Field, Ch. 25

UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

Modern Society

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

John Biesanz
WAYNE UNIVERSITY
and
Mavis Biesanz

PRENTICE-HALL, INC.
New York 1954

Herbert Blumer, Editor

PRENTICE-HALL SOCIOLOGY SERIES

Copyright 1953, 1954, by Prentice-Hall, Inc., 70 Fifth Avenue, New York. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by mimeograph or any other means, without permission in writing from the publishers. Printed in the United States of America. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 54-9891.

TO *Our Mothers*

Maude Berry Biesanz

and

Hilja Lempia Hiltunen

THIS BOOK IS LOVINGLY DEDICATED

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Our primary aim in writing this book has been to present certain basic understandings that a person must possess if he is to approach the issues and problems of modern society rationally and constructively.

We have sought always to write clearly and meaningfully. Many chapters have already been printed in photo offset and tested for content and readability on a great many readers. We have avoided using jargon for jargon's sake, choosing instead to relate genuinely useful new concepts to the reader's own experience wherever possible. At the same time, we have tried to give him perspective by referring frequently to cultures other than his own. We have not quibbled about definitions; we have tried always to offer one clear and generally acceptable definition rather than to enter into controversies over fine points.

We have tried to achieve that elusive quality, integration, by the following devices:

1. *The use of a single general theme.* The underlying theme of this book is "Freedom and control in a complex society."

2. *The cumulative use of words and concepts.* The various chapters build upon previously introduced words and concepts.

3. *Approach.* In most cases, the topics considered lend themselves to an integrated approach. Any one chapter may use the concepts and methods of several of the social sciences. Discussion questions for the various chapters have been phrased to encourage the reader to relate the new material to that previously read. Illustrations have been carefully chosen for interest and pertinence rather than for mere embellishment.

4. *Writing and editing.* This is not a book of readings. All but two chapters have either been written by us or in close collaboration with us. Besides being specialists in their fields, almost all our contributors have long been connected with the general education movement.

Wilbur Mangas, Coordinating Editor of Prentice-Hall, helped immeasurably to prepare the manuscript for publication by working closely with us from the planning stage until bound books were received. We also owe a debt of thanks to Richard Hansen, Associate Editor, for his help and advice. During the long period of planning and writing this book, we were encouraged by Wayne University administrators Don S. Hecock, Victor Rapport, and Edgar A. Schuler. We owe special thanks to our associates in this project, whose contributions are listed on the title page. G. Lowell Field of the University of Connecticut; Max Mark, Stephen and Vera Sarasohn and Murray Siedler of Wayne University; and Edward Carlin, Douglas Dunham, and Melvin J. Segal of Michigan State College made many helpful suggestions, in addition to writing chapters. Theodore Fleming and Leonard Weiss aided greatly in the "Work and Rewards" section; and Charles Adrian, Thomas Hoult, and Leonard Moss at Wayne University offered constructive comments on various chapters. Aliki Karos did a conscientious job of typing manuscript. The Detroit Public Library answered a great many questions courteously and efficiently. The generous help of Mrs. Peter Hiltunen and Elizabeth Hiltunen made it possible for a mother of three children to play an active part in preparing the book.

Iris Egan at the British Information Service aided in selecting many of the illustrations. The Detroit Free Press and the Canadian Consulate in Detroit were also most helpful and generous, as were Burroughs, General Electric, General Motors, Inland Steel, and the UAW-CIO. We are grateful to Herb Block, Daniel Fitzpatrick, Roy Justus, Marty Links, and the other cartoonists whose work makes this a more attractive book. Chapter 30 is reprinted from J. Burns and J. Peltason, *Government By the People: The Dynamics of American National Government* (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952). Chapter 18 is reprinted from G. Williams, *Economics of Everyday Life* (Penguin Books, 1950).

J. B. B. and M. H. B.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE: Culture, Society, and Personality

1 Science and Social Science 1

The Scientific Method, 3. *The "Scientific Spirit,"* 4. *The Position of Social Science,* 5. *Obstacles to the Scientific Study of Human Behavior,* 6. *Promising Developments in Social Science,* 10.

2 The San Blas Cuna of Panama 15

The People, 16. *Villages and Dwellings,* 18. *Village and Family Organization,* 18. *Work and Play,* 20. *Beliefs,* 21. *The Life Cycle,* 23. *Cultural Change,* 26. *The Cuna Way of Life,* 26.

3 The Nature of Culture 27

Characteristics of Culture, 30. *Organization and Integration of Culture,* 38.

4 Culture Growth and Change 47

Means of Cultural Change, 49. *Principles of Cultural Change*, 52.

5 The Functions of Culture 59

What Culture Does for the Individual, 59. *Culture as Social Control*, 62.

6 Ethnocentrism 72

Universality of Ethnocentrism, 72. *Inevitability of Ethnocentrism*, 73. *Advantages of Ethnocentrism*, 79. *Disadvantages of Ethnocentrism*, 79. *Cultural Relativity*, 81. *Value of the Culture Concept*, 83.

7 Society: The System of Group Relationships 85

Social Organization, 85. *Social Interaction*, 88. *Social Change*, 94.

8 From Rural to Urban Living: Our Shifting Population 97

The Growth of Cities, 99. *Ecology of the City*, 107.

9 From Rural to Urban Living: Our Changing Society 112

The Folk Society and the Urban Community, 113. *Heterogeneity*, 115. *Mobility*, 116. *Secondary Contacts*, 117. *Freedom and Control*, 120. *Urban and Rural Influences in the United States*, 123. *Significance of the Urban Trend*, 125.

10 Social Stratification: Class and Caste 130

Inevitability of Stratification, 131. *Systems of Stratification*, 132. *American Beliefs Regarding Class*, 134. *Evidences that We Do Have a Class System*, 135. *Why We Should Understand Our Class System*, 135. *The Class Pyramid in the United States*, 136. *The Criteria of Social Class*, 137. *Variations in Class Structure*, 141. *Social Mobility*, 143. *Classes as Subcultures*, 148. *Class Attitudes in the United States*, 152.

11 **Intergroup Tensions in a Multi-Group Society** 156

Nationality Conflicts, 156. *Religious Differences*, 158. *Interracial Tensions*, 158. *Physical Differences*, 159. *Mental Differences*, 165. *Cultural Differences*, 166. *Prejudices and Stereotypes*, 167. *Discrimination*, 169. *The Costs of Prejudice*, 170. *Reasons for the Persistence of Prejudice*, 171. *Reducing Intergroup Tensions*, 173.

12 **The Formation of Personality** 177

Original Nature, 178. *Motivation*, 181. *Culture and Personality*, 182. *Other Determinants of Personality*, 184. *Socialization*, 185. *The Self*, 187. *Personality Organization*, 194. *Personality Maladjustment and Disorganization*, 199.

13 **Marriage and the Family** 203

Forms of the Family, 204. *Functions of the Family*, 207. *The American Family*, 208. *Changing Functions of the Family*, 209. *American Beliefs Regarding Love and Marriage*, 218.

14 **Stages in American Family Life** 222

Dating, 222. *Courtship*, 224. *Engagement*, 226. *Mate Selection*, 226. *Husband-Wife Relationships*, 230. *Parent-Child Relationships*, 239. *The Empty Nest and Old Age*, 242. *Family Crises and Disintegration*, 243. *Future of the Family*, 247.

15 **Education in American Society** 248

The Formal American Educational System, 251. *Education and Other Social Institutions*, 258. *Social Class and Education*, 262.

16 **Religion as a Social Institution** 266

The Social Functions of Religion, 268. *Religion and Social Values*, 270. *Religion and Other Institutions*, 271. *Religious Diffusion*, 272. *The World Religions or Universal Religions*, 273. *The Universal Religions and the State*, 273. *Religion as a Socializing Force*, 279. *Science and Religion*, 280. *The Meaning of Life*, 281.

PART TWO: Work and Rewards

17 Economic Systems and Culture 285

Wants and Resources, 288. *Decisions of Production,* 289. *Decisions of Consumption,* 292. *Exchange of Goods,* 296. *Who Makes the Decisions?* 299.

18 Price Economy and Planned Economy 301

Scarcity Forces Us to Choose From Among Many Wants, 302. *Price Economy,* 304. *Planned Economy,* 308. *Price Economy vs. Planned Economy,* 311.

19 The Belief System Underlying the American Economy 320

The Relationship Between the Belief System and the Economy of a Society, 320. *Habitual Assumptions Basic to the American Economy,* 324. *Dynamic Beliefs Basic to the American Economy,* 327. *Science and Technology,* 331. *Economic Beliefs in Conflict,* 332.

20 Business Organization and the American Economy 335

Introduction, 335. *The Industrial Revolution,* 336. *Types of Business Organization,* 340. *Rise of the Giant Corporation,* 342. *Monopoly Price,* 346. *The Corporation as a Social Institution,* 350. *Corporations and Government Policy,* 355. *Regulation of Business and Political Reality,* 361.

21 The Laborer in the American Economy 364

Before the Factory System, 365. *The Emergence of Modern Industrialism,* 366. *The Worker and the New Industrial Order,* 366. *Labor Organizes in Self-defense,* 369. *The American Federation of Labor,* 371. *Organized Labor Declines,* 373. *Labor and the New Deal,* 374. *The Birth of the C.I.O.,* 375. *Labor Comes of Age,* 378. *The Culture of the Factory,* 381. *Cooperation and Conflict,* 382. *Labor and Society,* 387. *Collective Bargaining,* 389. *Labor and the Future,* 390.

22 **The Position of the Consumer** 392

Inequality, 393. *Obstacles to Rational Buying*, 397. *Effects of Mass Production, Sales Methods, and Lack of Information and Rationality*, 403. *Measures to Strengthen the Consumer's Position*, 408. *Justification for a Consumer Movement*, 414.

23 **Prosperity Without Inflation: Present Insecurities** 416

Business Cycles, 420. *Seasonal Fluctuations*, 428. *Secular Trends*, 429.

24 **Prosperity Without Inflation: Challenge to the Democracies** 431

Some Business Cycle Theories, 431. *Predicting Business Fluctuations*, 433. *Our Interdependent World*, 440. *How to Control the Ups and Downs of Business*, 443. *Importance of Control*, 453.

PART THREE: The Governing of Man

25 **Social Control Through Government** 457

Morals and Power, 457. *The American Belief System and Social Control*, 465. *Symbolism and Ceremonial Behavior*, 467. *American Beliefs about the Exercise of Power and Authority*, 469.

26 **Popular Control of Government** 472

"We the People," 472. *The Bases of Popular Control*, 473. *Why People Vote as They Do*, 479. *Political Parties. How Do the People Participate Effectively?* 485. *Approaching the Voter*, 498.

27 **Public Opinion and Our Civil Liberties** 504

Role of Public Opinion in Our Society, 505. *Freedom of Speech: The Civil Right Basic to Public Opinion*, 507. *The General Pattern of Public Opinion Formation*, 511. *An Example of Public Opinion Formation and Change: Fair Employment Practices*, 518. *Strategy of F.E.P.C. Campaigns*, 525. *Tactics of F.E.P.C. Campaigns*, 526. *Propaganda vs. Education in Public Opinion Influencing*, 527.

28 **American Government: The Constitution and the Courts** 530

The Constitution, 533. *The Judicial Department*, 541.

29 **American Government: The Executive and Legislative Departments** 550

The Executive, 550. *Organization and Powers of the Executive Branch*, 554. *The Lawmaker and the Legislative Process*, 562.

30 **Big Government, What Next?** 577

The Conservative Answer, 578. *The Socialist Answer*, 583. *A Third Alternative?* 589. *Can Democracies Plan?* 592. *Big Government and Freedom*, 599.

31 **Understanding World Communism** 602

The Strength of World Communism, 603. *Dents in the Red Armor*, 612. *What Should We Be Doing?* 614. *Democracy is the Way to Victory*, 623.

32 **International Politics and American Leadership** 629

International Anarchy, 629. *Nationalism and Imperialism*, 633. *Historic Conflict and Adjustment*, 640. *One World or None?* 643. *America Faces the Problems of the World*, 646.

Notes 657

Questions and Propositions for Discussion 668

Suggested Readings 685

Index 701

MODERN SOCIETY

An Introduction to Social Science

Credits for end-paper photos: General Motors, Wayne University, Detroit Free Press, United Nations, TVA, General Electric, Inland Steel, Ford Motor Co., Detroit Times, Panama Tourist Bureau.

1

SCIENCE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

This is an age of worship at the altar of science. There are very few among us who know what science is, but almost all of us are in favor of it. When the word is uttered, reassuring visions of men in white coats automatically appear, men who industriously go about their laboratories keeping watch over the marvelously colored liquids in their test tubes. Indeed the word "science" has magical qualities. One of the surest ways of gaining support and widespread approval for almost any project is to suggest that it is a *scientific* attempt to do something or other. And what that "something or other" is often looms unimportant so long as the project is associated with science. "Science" is one of the key virtue words of twentieth-century American society. No nation has ever glorified it to a greater extent. One might well wonder whether even religion has greater influence and power over Americans.

But we are inclined to forget that science has not always been looked

upon as good, and that even today it is not held in esteem everywhere. This attitude was charmingly expressed by a Turkish official in reply to the request of an English traveler for information about Turkey:

> My Illustrious friend, and Joy of my Liver!
>
> The thing you ask me is both difficult and useless. . . . I have neither counted the houses nor inquired into the number of inhabitants of [this place]; as to what one person loads on his mules and another stows away on the bottom of his ship, that is no business of mine. . . .
>
> Listen O my son! There is no wisdom unto the belief in God! He created the world, and shall we liken ourselves unto Him in seeking to penetrate into the mysteries of His creation? Shall we say, Behold this star spinneth round that star, and this other star with a tail goeth and cometh in so many years? Let it go! He from whose hand it came will guide it and direct it.
>
> . . . I praise God that I seek not that which I require not. Thou art learned in things I care not for; and as for that which thou hast seen, I spit upon it. Will much knowledge create thee a double belly . . . ?
> O my friend! If thou wilt be happy, say, There is no God but God! [1]

It is clear that the author of the letter did not assume, as apparently did his English friend, that knowledge was to be sought for its own sake. To this Turkish official the outlook that we associate with science would certainly have appeared nonsensical. He viewed the world in a way that seems strange, if not peculiar, to most Americans at mid-century. Science, which was foreign to his scheme of thinking, may be highly praised or frowned upon depending upon the time and place in which a person lives. It is true that scientists attempt to exclude bias from their observations and findings, but this does not alter the fact that the kind of evaluation given to science rises out of group attitudes and preferences. The desire to be impartial or objective is not inborn in man!

No doubt many of you who are now reading this chapter are surprised to find a discussion of science in a text of this sort. You perhaps believe that science is something that can be written about authoritatively only by the chemist, the physicist, or the mathematician. Even though you are enrolled in a course in social science, you may be wondering where science fits into the picture. The major purpose of this chapter is to shed more light on the nature of science and on its relationship to social investigation.

The Scientific Method

Even many scientists would undoubtedly find it very difficult to explain what science is. Scientific workers often become so involved in what they are investigating that they forget that, insofar as science is concerned, it is *how* and in what spirit they are investigating that is important. In other words it is approach rather than content that is the test of science. Chemistry, physics, and biology are considered sciences not because of their subject matter, but because of the *way* in which they are studied. Both astronomy and astrology, for example, are concerned with the position of the stars, but of the two only astronomy can properly be called a science because it is based upon the scientific approach, whereas astrology is not.

Science has been variously defined. Interestingly enough, not even scientists themselves agree on the essential nature of science. Many have regarded it as an "organized body of knowledge," others, more accurately, as an "organized way of obtaining knowledge." [2] Two thoughtful students have arrived at a definition that is best for our purposes. *"Science is efficient inquiry."* [3] Similarly, an eminent anthropologist simply suggests that, "Science is sciencing." [4] The essence of his definition and the essence of what we have been trying to say is that science is a method.

There is no one road to scientific knowledge, but certain fruitful procedures of investigation are basic to the scientific method. And it is well to be familiar with them, provided they are not thought of as a rigid or unalterable plan for scientific work. It is customary to think of scientific investigation as involving four steps:

Making a hypothesis. It is necessary for any investigator to define clearly, at least in his own mind, the thing that he is trying to prove or disprove. A hypothesis in its most basic sense is a statement of the problem to be tackled, and it may often arise out of the researcher's hunch or guess about what is true. It is what is assumed to be correct by the researcher as he begins his study; and depending upon the evidence uncovered as he proceeds, he may alter, abandon, or verify his hypothesis. The formulation of a hypothesis helps scientific workers direct their energies to the task at hand instead of dispersing them in many directions. It sets the stage for a planned voyage of discovery rather than a wandering and wasteful one.

Observing and recording. This step involves very careful scrutinizing of the data being studied. It entails using the human senses to their fullest, aided if possible by precision instruments, so that the matter being

viewed is revealed in all its aspects. Such careful inspection must be matched by the precise description and recording of what is observed.

Classifying and organizing. It is only when observed data have been classified and organized—that is, arranged in logical groupings—that relationships and patterns emerge. To note such phenomena is the main business of science.

Generalizing. This is essentially the step wherein the scientific law is formulated. That is, a formalized statement is made describing the behavior of the data *under certain specified conditions.* It should be remembered that, contrary to popular impression, laws do not remain fixed. Once stated they are constantly subjected to qualification and revision.

The "Scientific Spirit"

As it is generally and properly understood, however, science involves something more than method and the related procedures just described. There is also, as we suggested above, what might be called a scientific spirit or attitude. It is largely a matter of the state of mind of the investigator toward his subject. The notion of a scientific spirit becomes clearer if we think of it as a complex of attitudes, which may be broken down in the following way:

Curiosity. This is simply the disposition to inquire. It is, however, different from curiosity in the ordinary sense. There are many curious people among us, but most of them are not scientists. Scientific advancement depends upon curiosity of a highly disciplined and ordered sort.

Objectivity. Objectivity refers to the way in which the researcher approaches the matter he intends to investigate. It is to be hoped that he will be able to examine his own preconceived notions regarding his research subject and that he will be able to control them. At all times he must be alert to the dangers of distorting his investigation because of his initial bias. He must be willing to consider all relevant facts in dispassionate fashion.

Patience. The scientist must be disposed to take infinite pains. His work should be cautious, careful, and precise.

Courage. The scientific worker must be prepared to state his findings no matter what they are or whom they might displease.

This scientific spirit is not easily or often achieved. The advice of one renowned scientist to "sit down before the facts as a little child, and let them lead you where they will" [5] is a beautiful ideal that scientists have not often attained. Yet it is well for the scientists to set their sights high, for high ideals often lead to high achievement.

The Position of Social Science

Now assuming that you have acquired some further insights into the nature of science, it is important to discuss the position of the social sciences in the realm of science. It must be admitted that not all students of the scientific method, nor even all social scientists, are convinced that the various social sciences such as history, political science, sociology, anthropology, and economics qualify as full-fledged sciences. Certainly, the general public does not accord the social scientist the same kind of hearing that it gives to those who work in the field of the so-called exact sciences. For example, Albert Einstein, the world's most renowned mathematician, is listened to eagerly and reverently when he speaks on international affairs, something about which he may know no more than you or I. But the remarks of a trained international relations specialist will often go unnoticed. The prevalent view in America seems to be that specific training counts for little in understanding social affairs. "The man in the street," who would not dare to venture an opinion on atomic fission, glibly expounds on international relations. No matter how often social scientists proclaim that they are real scientists, most people appear to view them as pseudo-scientists. The attitude of many Americans toward the expert in social affairs was well reflected in the hostility that was directed at the New Deal's "Brain Trust," which was basically composed of university social scientists. The general faith in our social scientists is, to put it mildly, limited.

Indicative of the superior status allotted to such fields as mathematics, chemistry, and physics is that they are usually referred to as the "exact" or "natural" sciences. It would seem that the social sciences have barely escaped becoming known as the inexact or unnatural sciences.

The difference between the "exact sciences" and the "social sciences" perhaps becomes clear if it is remembered that human nature is acquired by men through group living. All the social sciences study, with different emphases, the same reality—man in terms of his relationships with other

men. This is the justification for the word "social." Some of the exact sciences, such as medicine and its many allied fields, also study man. These branches of knowledge, however, are concerned primarily with man as an individual physical organism. Their basic stress is not upon man as a social being. It may be said that the exact sciences—or the physical or natural sciences as they are sometimes called—investigate the physical universe, which man did not make, but of which, as a biological organism, he is a part. The social sciences, on the other hand, deal with the social universe—a network of human relationships—which is a product of man's group life. It should be noted that the social universe is just as real as the physical universe despite the fact that it appears more intangible.

Briefly, it would be accurate to say that the exact sciences attempt to examine the physical universe by the scientific method, and the social sciences attempt to examine the social universe by the same method.

During the present and past century man has made remarkable strides toward bending the physical universe to his will; yet his control over the social universe has not increased proportionately. Throughout the ages philosophers have repeatedly told man "know thyself." Despite this good advice, man has learned more about external things than about himself. We know more about the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the sand we walk on than we do about ourselves.

Obstacles to the Scientific Study of Human Behavior

Difficulty of attaining objectivity. The achievement of a particular state of mind on the part of investigators has had an important bearing upon all scientific progress. A basic tenet of scientific inquiry, as we have already pointed out, is that insofar as possible an objective and dispassionate attitude must be maintained in regard to the materials being studied. A perfect degree of objectivity is probably never obtained in any science. Yet in the fields of mathematics, chemistry, and physics notable advances have been made in that direction. The social sciences, however, have not known comparable success in this area.

This disparity in impartiality stems from the fact that the emotional stake is inevitably larger in the social sciences than in those fields that do not deal with man as a social being. No man is able to study about his fellow human beings without the process of identification affecting, to some extent, his methods of inquiry and his findings. Everyone harbors feelings, and often strong feelings, concerning the various aspects of

human affairs. One person views another in terms of a whole complex of preconceived notions or stereotypes colored by feelings of love and hate and various shades and combinations of these emotions. But, it may be asked, should a change be sought in this situation? "An individual attaining this ideal of an entirely emotionless being, devoid of all human passions and prejudices, probably would present," writes one social scientist, "a well-nigh classical case of pseudo-feeble-mindedness." [6]

Nevertheless, few would deny that it is much easier for individuals to remain neutral when examining the subject matter of the exact sciences than when examining the subject matter of the social sciences. For example, most persons are not inclined to view chemical and physical relationships in partisan fashion. We do not feel that it is immoral for sulphur and mercury to intermix. We do not worry about the fact that atoms are imprisoned within molecules. We do not love one chemical element and hate another. But in the realm of human affairs many of us do frown upon the intermingling of Negroes and whites. We do worry about slave labor camps in Russia. We do exhibit prejudices with respect to race, religion, and nationality.

Headway in any scientific endeavor is dependent upon distinguishing the "self from the not self." [7] Because men tend to identify themselves with other men this is much harder to do in the field of the social sciences than in the exact sciences. However, it should be pointed out that this very fact of identification constitutes an advantage, at least in one respect. An area of reality not available to the physical scientist is available to the social scientist. When the physical universe is investigated, it is always viewed from the outside. Man did not create the physical universe and cannot identify himself with it. Man, collectively speaking, did create the social universe and is able to identify himself with it. For the social universe is, after all, composed of the behavior patterns of men. Man is able, in short, to achieve certain kinds of understandings of the behavior of other men that are closed to him when he examines the natural world.

Despite this particular advantage, the identification process has been, on the whole, the most serious obstacle to the creation of an exact social science. Real progress in the physical sciences was made only when man learned to detach himself from what he studied and to explain the universe in terms of its own workings rather than in terms of his own mind. Along these lines, it has been suggested that scientific understanding developed first in those areas where it was easiest for man to distinguish between himself and the matter he was studying—where what he was studying was least vital to man's existence.

According to one student of science, to be more specific, the exact

sciences developed in the order of their remoteness as factors influencing the behavior of human beings. Hence astronomy, which concerns itself with the behavior of heavenly bodies, developed before physics, which concerns itself with the behavior of things on earth. Likewise, in the field of medicine, anatomy, which is the study of structure, developed before the more vital physiology, which is the study of function. Thus, in terms of this interpretation of the history of science, the social sciences have not yet reached maturity precisely because they deal with matters that are so significant to mankind. It is suggested, in other words, that the more important the subject to be studied the harder it is to be objective.[8]

The problem of formulating "laws." Whether or not the fields of social investigation will develop into full-fledged sciences depends, in the view of many persons, upon social science's success in formulating laws comparable to those of the physical sciences. If this criterion is to have any meaning or validity, the real nature of physical laws must be kept in mind. Such laws are not in any literal sense discovered by man in nature. They exist in the minds of men rather than in the world of nature. For laws merely describe uniformities observed in behavior; they do not constitute behavior itself. Moreover, it is essential to remember that scientific laws do not apply in all instances. They hold good only under certain specified conditions. For example, the deservedly renowned law of falling bodies applies only to objects that are at sea-level and in a vacuum. Thus a *law is a "generalized description of the behavior of a phenomenon under given conditions."* [9] Not all the problems confronting the physical scientist have been resolved by the formulation of precise and meaningful laws. The precision and the definitiveness of the exact sciences often have been exaggerated by unsophisticated students of science.

The problem of prediction. The matter of prediction or the perception of general patterns, assuming that such patterns do exist, would appear to be more difficult in the social sciences than in the exact sciences. The fact that the social sciences deal with living matter helps to explain this. For the same reason, among the exact sciences, predictions in the field of biology are less certain than in the field of physics.

The method of science, it should be understood, is not particularly fruitful when applied to the study of unique occurrences, for in such study there is no opportunity for making comparisons or for noting uniformities. Social science research lends itself best to prediction when it confines itself to the task of studying recurring patterns, events, or situations as they are related to group life. This is substantiated by the

fact that social prediction appears to be most successful in the field of demography, which is the statistical study of population.

Use of the experimental method. Any discussion of the general difficulties relating to the development of a more mature and more exact social science must take into consideration the experimental method. This method has been, to a large extent, responsible for the enormous strides made in the physical sciences. "The fundamental rule of the experimental method is to vary only one condition at a time and to maintain all others rigidly constant." [10] This is usually accomplished in physics and in chemistry with the aid of laboratory conditions and precision instruments. Obviously, the laboratory analysis of human beings in group situations is usually not practicable. Happily, our customs do not allow us to treat human beings as mere guinea pigs. Furthermore, the social sciences are still lacking in precision instruments comparable to those that are used in the exact sciences, although it is true that technical aids are being used increasingly in social science research. Yet it is very clear that the experimental method has not found widespread application in the social sciences.

Need for a precise language. Finally, in our attempt to shed light upon the immaturity of social science, we turn to language. It is debatable whether the present state of social science language is a cause of social science immaturity or merely a reflection of it. But what is certain is that contemporary social science language is not an adequate medium of scientific communication.

No science can prosper without a precise and universal language, a language that is exact and understood by scientific workers the world over. The progress that has been made in fields like astronomy, physics and chemistry has been in no little way related to the fact that these sciences have utilized mathematics as their language. Mathematics well meets the requirements of precision and universality. It facilitates meaningful communication between scientists everywhere. The most notable scientific achievement of our time, the release of atomic energy, was made possible through an international exchange of scientific information and ideas.

It has been suggested by less than friendly critics that the social sciences tell us about things that every person knows in language that nobody can understand. This is hardly an accurate statement. But unfortunately it cannot be denied that social scientists do have real difficulty in communicating with laymen and even with one another. They are confronted by serious semantic problems—that is, problems relating to the meaning

of words. Many words used in social science are also in wide use among laymen. Moreover, these same words are frequently used in quite different ways. To the layman, for example, the word "culture" merely refers to art, literature, and music. To the social scientist, however, culture includes all the man-made aspects of the environment. There are also some identical words that are used differently by persons working in the various social science fields. To the sociologist the word "socialization" means the process whereby an individual acquires human nature; to the political scientist or economist it means government ownership and control of an industry. Similarly the word "value" means one thing to the economist and another thing to the sociologist.

The inadequacy of contemporary social science language has so discouraged some persons that they have concluded that the social sciences will come of age only if and when and to the degree that they adopt mathematics as their language. Others question whether such an adoption would be possible or desirable. In any case the picture is not hopeless. During recent years much headway has been made toward the development of a more precise and more universal language in the social sciences.

Promising Developments in Social Science

Thus far the difficulties that confront social science have been stressed. It would, however, be far from the truth to suggest that the present situation of the social sciences justifies only gloom. Indeed there is much hope to be gleaned from the present and the future looms even brighter. Just as the social sciences appear to be making progress toward the development of a common language, they are also making other very promising developments.

Field work. Perhaps the most significant trend is that in recent years our social scientists have left their armchairs in droves and have actually gone out into the field—into the social world—to look at the phenomena that they have decided to investigate. Just as our anthropologists have found it necessary to live among peoples before making generalizations about them, so our sociologists, social psychologists, economists, and political scientists have also come to examine the behavior of people in real life situations. For instance, the professional political scientist is no longer content simply to study constitutions and various government documents; he now well realizes that there is always a large gap between

adopted rules and regulations and people's behavior. He is more and more concentrating his attention upon the way in which people behave with respect to governmental systems.

This abandonment of the armchair in social science will doubtless prove as revolutionary as Galileo's determination to experiment for himself in physical science. Rather than passively accept Aristotle's apparently true generalization that large bodies fall faster than smaller ones, Galileo climbed to the top of the Leaning Tower of Pisa and simultaneously released weights of different sizes and discovered that they fell at the same rate. Likewise, the increasing unwillingness of our social scientists to accept generalizations that are not based on observed behavior has led to the casting aside of old beliefs and to the embracing of new, more carefully verified ones.

Methods. As social scientists began going out into the field to look at data, they also began to develop methods appropriate to this newer type of research. Among these methods, the two that are perhaps the most fundamental are the case study and social statistics. Many of the newer observational research techniques in social science are related to them.

The *case study* is a form of qualitative analysis involving the very careful and complete observation of a person, a situation, or an institution. It is a variation of the historical method; it is, in effect, the historical method being applied to the present. Thoroughness is the keystone of this method. The case study stresses complete, exhaustive, detailed analysis enabling a person to analyze total situations in comprehensive fashion. The success of the case method depends upon all relationships being noted and all observations being carefully recorded.

The *statistical method* is, of course, quantitative analysis. "Social statistics is mathematics applied to human facts. Statistics call for objective data that can be counted or measured in some way. Statistics means that facts when measured by different observers using the same methods will always yield the same results." [11] One statistician suggests that statistics is essentially a form of reasoning.

The attempt to measure social data is a basic trend in contemporary social science. More and more of our university social science departments are including social statistics in their offerings. Yet it should be remembered that all sound quantitative analysis rests upon sound qualitative analysis. Most competent social scientists would agree that the case method and the statistical method are complementary and interdependent. It is largely the case method, for example, which provides the materials that social statistics attempts to summarize. On the other hand, it is only when case studies and various aspects of them are sum-

marized by statistical procedures that the revelation of uniformities—which is the main business of science—is accomplished. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that qualitative and quantitative analysis are the Siamese twins of science.

Integration. Another significant and hopeful development in social science is the trend toward integration of the approaches and knowledge of the various fields. This trend appears to be affecting university social science instruction and research in every part of the country. Social science integration is based on the theory that our contemporary social world can be comprehended only in terms of a number of the social sciences. Take, for instance, the phenomenon of war in the twentieth century. In order to gain any basic understanding of this problem, it is necessary to turn to at least several of the social sciences. To put it briefly and incompletely, political science informs us about the relationship between war and the national state system; economics shows us how war and international trade are intimately related; sociology and social psychology provide us with information concerning the dynamics of group life as they are related to the development of a war mood. All these avenues of explanation, and others as well, must be considered if war in our time is to be understood.

From the point of view just described, the social sciences are like worms in a can; they are all intertwined. But the social world with which the social sciences deal bears little relation to the kind of social science departmental divisions that have grown up in American education. The attempt to distinguish what falls within the province of economics or sociology or political science has often led to dangerous distortions of reality.

It makes educational sense to view the social world from the vantage point of the several social sciences. An increasingly large number of social theorists and researchers are convinced of this. Of course impressive arguments can be marshaled for a more specialized approach to the social sciences; it is easier to talk about integration than it is actually to integrate. Nevertheless, attempts at integration are headed in the right direction.

In short, the newer tendencies in social science, as exemplified by the abandonment of the armchair, the progress toward a more universal and precise language, and the trend toward integration, all indicate and contribute to the development of a more mature and exact social science.

PART ONE
Culture, Society, and Personality

Detroit Free Press



2

THE SAN BLAS CUNA OF PANAMA[1]

Before inquiring into what culture is and does, let's make an imaginary flight of a few hours from Miami to visit some Indians we know. They live only minutes away by plane from bustling Panama City and the Canal Zone on some beautiful tropical islands where coconut palms grow gracefully out of white sand. Our guides on the trip will be an anthropologist, Dave Stout, and a Canal Zonian, Fred McKim, both of whom lived among these Indians and studied their way of life.

About 20,000 Cuna Indians live on the Archipelago of San Blas, a string of islands along the eastern coast of Panama, which are protected from the turbulent Caribbean by coral reefs. Their crowded villages occupy about thirty islands chosen for their nearness to the mouths of streams on the mainland, where all firewood and fresh water are obtained and agriculture is carried on. The islands are more healthful for living than the mainland, as they are freer of malarial mosquitoes. Many of

the islands are also used for raising coconuts, which are the basis of the Cuna economy.


The People

The Cuna are unusual among American Indians in several respects. They have maintained their tribal identity and a remarkable share of independence and of "breed purity" in spite of having been in contact with conquering Spaniards, of having lived under the flags of Colombia and Panama, and of having traded with ships of many nations for over a century. They never submitted as beasts of burden for the Spanish treasure hunters, and only within the last decade or two have they accepted a degree of Panamanian authority. They still maintain zealous watch over their women lest they be violated by visitors. Only rarely, and with utmost precaution, do they allow non-Cuna men to stay overnight on their islands.

As a result of centuries of close inbreeding, the Cuna are a distinct physical type. Brownskinned and thickset, with powerful shoulders and back and deep chests, which make their legs appear thin and short in contrast, they are among the shortest people in the world. Men average 4 feet 8 inches in height, women 4 feet 5 inches. A most striking feature, noted by visitors since the early Spaniards and buccaneers, is the high percentage of albinos (persons with pale, milky skin, light hair, and pink eyes) among them.

Boys do not bother with clothing until they are somewhere between six and ten years old, when they adopt the simple masculine costume of loose shirt and drill trousers, which are often rolled up to the knee. When making a trip to Colon, the nearest large city, about 80 miles away by boat, men wear ready-made suits, white shirts and neckties, and sometimes shoes.

Little girls, on the other hand, are replicas of their mothers from infancy on. The female costume is striking and colorful, and a delight to the tourist. With a calf-length skirt of dark blue figured material, the woman wears a *mola*, a gaudy blouse of bright cotton, with blue or red predominating, which she has worked into intricate designs in appliqué. From her nose dangles a gold ring. A red or black streak is painted down the middle of her nose and her cheeks may be reddened. Over her straight black bobbed hair she wears a red and yellow scarf that hangs below her shoulders. Her arms and legs are tightly bound for several inches in colored glass beadwork. Around her neck she wears many necklaces, which indulge her fancy and display her wealth. Some of these are of



Panama Tourist Bureau

SAN BLAS CUNA MOTHER AND CHILD

seeds, shells, animal teeth and claws, beads, and scented wood, but she takes most pride in the necklace of silver coins. She may also wear heavy gold ear disks.

The Cuna place a high value on personal cleanliness and may take several baths daily, either in the sea or river or in special bathhouses constructed on the shore.

Villages and Dwellings

Some islands are entirely covered with the thatched-roofed dwellings of the Cuna, the houses being separated by a narrow or wide passageway depending upon the space available. The typical house is a large rectangle, perhaps 25 to 50 feet long, 15 to 40 feet wide, and 12 to 25 feet high, and containing but one room and one story. It is built on a frame of poles stuck into the ground and held together with vines and strips of bark. The walls are of bamboo, reeds, or light poles, set upright and lashed to the frame. There are no windows, but light and air pass through the cracks between the poles, and there is a doorless entrance at each end. The roof is thatched with palm leaves piled a foot thick to keep out sun and rain.

Hammocks are hung for perhaps 12 to 20 persons in such a house. Their belongings hang along the walls, and pushed to the side are one-piece wooden seats, benches, packing-box tables, wooden chests, and storage platforms. The floor is of hard packed earth. A cookhouse 15 by 30 feet adjoins the living quarters. Here a fire burns on the floor, fed by three or four long thick logs radiating like the spokes of a wheel; they are pushed toward the center as they burn, and their ends glow through the night.

Rectangular thatched enclosures built on piles over the water serve as outhouses and bath houses. Each village also has a meeting house.

Village and Family Organization

In this large house lives a Cuna family, which may include three or four generations. Casual observers often jump to the conclusion that the San Blas Cuna are under "petticoat government" because when a man marries he moves in with his wife's family, and each large household is united through the female line. The oldest male, however, is head of the household. Besides his wife and unmarried children,

the household includes his married daughters and granddaughters and their husbands and unmarried children. Each evening the head of the household decides what tasks each man is to do next day. When they go together to the mainland, they are seated in the canoe in a strict order by age, and walk in that same order on the mainland. The same hierarchy holds true for women. The oldest female has authority over the women and girls in the household.

Father and son continue to help each other after marriage, but only with the permission of the head of the son's new household. Any tyrannical tendencies on the father-in-law's part are checked by public objection and censure by the father of the exploited young man; in extreme cases the young man may divorce his wife without paying any penalty to her family. Upon the death of the head of the household, each of the couples may leave and set up their own household, particularly if they have large families. If they choose to remain together, the oldest son-in-law becomes the new family head, unless the deceased man is survived by his wife's sister's husband, a brother, brother-in-law, or son older than any of the sons-in-law and living in the house at the time.

Village government has been described as a "socialized democracy based on individual rights and individual responsibilities." It is headed by a chief chosen by majority vote of the married men; he may hold office for life unless some serious failing moves the villagers to depose him. He must possess an extensive knowledge of the myths, folktales, and legendary history of the tribe. He presides over village meetings, which are of two kinds. At the singing meeting, attended by all, the chief chants allegories based on the myths and legends. These contain morals that set the pattern for good behavior. Among the most important rules for conduct are cooperation in the work of the village and household, truthfulness, modesty, chastity, honesty, and neighborliness. A person who violates any rule is called to the council meeting where he can tell his version of what happened and then must listen to the chief reciting or chanting the appropriate myths or folktales. He is not otherwise punished by the village, but the knowledge that violators are shamed before the villagers is sufficient to keep most people in line. An offender may be punished, however, by the family of an offended person.

The other type of meeting is a "talking" meeting attended by married men, where business of interest to the village is discussed. Other village officials include elders, who act as advisors, a treasurer of village funds, policemen, who summon people to meetings, keep order there, and collect food for feasts, and a number of men in charge of various communal enterprises, such as house-building and communal farms. Every community also includes medicine men, ceremonial chanters, grave diggers,

and a marriage-maker. Learning and experience are considered essential in men who fill the more important posts.

Most of the villages belong to one of two main political parties, each headed by a high chief chosen for life by delegations of village chiefs and other officials. He must above all be very learned in tribal history and tradition. Although each man regards the village of his birth as best, men travel freely among the islands, visit Colon, work in Panama and the Canal Zone, and for decades have served as sailors, often on American ships.

Work and Play

The Cuna regard work as a privilege. When children are allowed to try their hand at adult activities, they feel proud and grown up and learn a cheerful attitude toward necessary tasks. Work is done with zest as a natural outlet for a healthy mind and body; idleness is regarded as a sign of illness. All able-bodied persons are expected to do their share; not even the chief expects to escape manual labor.

The household stirs at cockcrow. After drinking hot chocolate sweetened with sugar cane juice, they leave for the river, silently paddling their dugouts in the growing light. After the sun comes up, they exchange light banter and laughter. The men take the jungle trails to their cultivated plots. If the women have come along, they stay at the stream to wash clothes.

Plots of land have been reclaimed from the virgin forest by hacking the growth with a huge, heavy knife called a *machete* and then burning off the vegetation. Plots are marked off by paths and individually owned, but work is performed cooperatively by groups of relatives or friends. The plantain tree, a cousin to the banana, furnishes the plantain, which is the Cuna staff of life. A staple like bread, it can be cooked in various ways. Sugar cane, rice, yams, corn, the starchy manioc root, pineapple, and bananas are the other chief food crops. Fruit trees are also tended. Dibbles (iron-tipped planting sticks) and machetes are the chief tools used. Fish, game, and chickens raised on communally owned island farms, which each man tends for ten days in his turn, supplement the diet.

The Cuna have a cash crop, the coconut, that has in many respects changed their way of life. They moved to the islands partly because they are ideal places to raise the palms, and since then their economy has changed from a self-sufficient one to one dependent in part on world markets. Money and private property have become more important; more goods such as cloth and utensils are bought rather than made. From trad-

ing schooners the Cuna buy many items for which they pay with coconuts, less often with oranges or eggs. For the goldsmith's products they pay with pigs on the installment plan. All barter commodities have a money value put on them, and United States and Panamanian coins and bills, with the exception of pennies, circulate freely. On nearly every island there is a privately owned store that provides the villagers with kerosene, salt, sugar, soap, and matches in return for money, coconuts, or eggs. Trade between individuals is rare, except for buying canoes and the medicine man's cures.

Nearly everyone—man or woman—owns some crop lands and coconut plantations. Other forms of wealth are jewelry, women's clothing, money, and a great variety of hoarded white man's goods. Almost all wealth is derived ultimately from the possession of coconut trees, though younger men earn cash by working in the cities and the Canal Zone, and women sell *molas* and necklaces to tourists.

After working on the mainland till noon, the Cuna bathe in the river or sea and return to the village. They eat a meal from a "table" of banana leaves spread on the floor and set with gourd utensils. The afternoon may be occupied in a variety of pursuits. Women prepare food, sew clothing, weave hammocks. Men weave baskets, often do their own sewing and mending, make fishnets, sails, paddles, and gourd utensils, fashion canoes out of cedar or mahogany logs, or lesser woods if necessary, go fishing, and cooperate in the building of houses.

Play is not divided from work by a fixed line. While they do their tasks, the Cuna talk, tell folktales, joke, and generally enjoy one another's company. They also enjoy swimming, sailing, visits to other islands, and various ceremonial occasions.

Beliefs

The Cuna conception of the world and their place in it gives them a strong sense of rightness and security. They believe that God created everything including His own wife, and it is from their union that everything and everyone has come. The Cuna were the first created and noblest of all peoples. Besides God and His wife there is also an important deity called Mu who was delegated by God the task of forming human babies and giving them their individual attributes. God is all-powerful and all-seeing. The evidence of all His provisions is that He wants man to be happy. But He does not tolerate sin. Three times He has destroyed the world, by fire, darkness, and flood, and in addition has visited local catastrophes upon earth to show His displeasure. After the

flood, eight hundred years ago, He sent to earth on a plate of gold a superman named Ibeorkun, who explained to the Cuna the name and use of everything and laid down rules of behavior. The most important of these rules is that a person must be a good neighbor. From this it follows that he must not lie, steal, commit adultery, bear false witness—many of the taboos of the Ten Commandments. If these rules, which are taught orally in chants and folktales, are violated, God will punish the offender, either here or in the afterworld, through the agency of evil spirits.

The Cuna conceive of the world as an earth-plane on which people live, with a heaven of eight invisible layers above and an underworld of eight layers below, on the fourth layer of which live the chiefs of the evil spirits. The sky is hemispherical and is pierced at one point. The sun travels around the world on a ship on which certain evil spirits and demons also ride. The moon and certain stars travel on another ship.

All people and everything in nature are believed to have souls or *purbas* that are invisible, but whose existence is proven by shadows, echoes, and reflections. *Purbas* are believed to have an everlasting existence. After death, the time of which is believed to be predestined, a person's soul travels first through the fourth layer of the underworld and then to heaven, where he is resurrected and thereafter lives a life much like that on earth, except that it is much more splendid. Heaven is lavishly furnished with many of the attributes of American civilization, which returning sailors and Zone workers have described in glowing terms.

These beliefs are not given institutional form in any body of priests, ritual, and the like. They are expressed in traditional chants, in the ceremonies of death and puberty, in the folktales and legends that many Cuna know and relate. They are effective in governing conduct because of the unity of the group and the desire to avoid being shamed in a public meeting.

There are, however, two figures in Cuna society who command special power over evil spirits: the *nele* and the *innatuledi*. The highest status in Cuna society is given the *nele,* who is marked for special wisdom and insight by the fact that he is born with a caul (that is, the placental membrane appears to cover his head at birth). Through a course of learning covering many years and culminating in a special eight-day chant, a person born with a caul becomes a seer, a supreme worker with the supernatural, a theologian, and a diagnostician of disease. He is not surrounded with an air of holiness or sanctity, but is greatly respected. There are about ten *neles* among the Cuna.

Most *neles* are also *innatuledis,* or medicine men, but there are many *innatuledis* who are not *neles.* Each island has several *innatuledis,* some

as many as seven. They, too, undergo a long period of training during which they learn many medicines and chants. Their function is to try to cure illness, never to use sorcery for harm. The apparatus of an *innatuledi* consists principally of a great variety of powdered medicines prepared from plants, leaves and herbs, grotesquely shaped tree roots, sections of twisted vines and thorny branches, red paint, resins, cacao beans and several varieties of pepper pods, magic stones (believed to be powerful because they either stay cool when others get warm or vice versa), and small carved wooden fetishes, many in human form. Equally important are the words of chants used in connection with these things, for otherwise they are powerless to cure.

The Life Cycle

Birth takes place within the house in an improvised enclosure from which men and children are excluded. An *innatuledi* standing outside the enclosure chants and supplies the childbirth medicines as the midwife inside reports progress. The mother lies in a hammock, and the child is born into a waterfilled canoe beneath. The midwife buries the umbilical cord in the earth floor of the house. For three days after birth the father keeps to the house.

Infants are kept in a hammock and occasionally carried astride the hip. They are desired and are given much attention, and cared for by all the women of the household. Children often nurse up to age four or even six, unless the mother becomes pregnant again. They are treated leniently, and seldom struck. Although adults are not demonstrative among themselves, they are affectionate toward children. Boys are given great freedom and learn to swim and paddle canoes while very young. Girls are kept closer to home, dressed like their mothers from infancy on, and spend much of their time caring for younger children. Some children now attend the schools that have been established on a number of islands, where they spend a few years learning to speak, read, and write Spanish.

The high point of the girl's life is reached during two ceremonials, the first of which announces that she has reached puberty, the second that she is eligible for marriage. No comparable ceremonies are held for boys. The girls' ceremonies outshine all other observances of crises in the life cycle. They are made the occasion for feasting, drinking, chanting, dancing; thus they serve as recreation and also bind the community more closely by reiterating the traditions of the tribe.

At her first menstruation, the girl is confined in an enclosure of staves

and leaves for four days, and frequently bathed with sea water by her female relatives. On the fourth day a woman who is especially charged with the task cuts her hair; she is painted black with a fruit juice and released. Her future is foretold by two men who dig up land crabs on the mainland and see portents in their behavior. Meanwhile, *chicha,* a fermented drink of corn and sugar cane juice, is being prepared. When it is ready, the ceremony is resumed, with the men smoking long cigars, smoldering end in the mouth, and drinking *chicha* all day long. Near the end of the day the girl serves all the participants a cup of *chicha.* At night the *kantule,* or ceremonial chanter, recites the epic poem that incorporates the girl's life from birth to puberty and reiterates many of the teachings of Ibeorkun, who instituted this ceremony, which is called "The Flowering." The mystic numbers four and eight recur throughout. The *kantule's* assistants play flutes and some of those present dance or dramatize sections of the chant.

One to five years later, a four-day ceremony indicating the girl's readiness for marriage is held. It is even more elaborate and expensive than the puberty ceremony. The family accumulates food and fuel for months in advance; the entire village contributes wood, sugar cane, and bananas. When the necessary huge quantities of *chicha* are ready, the ceremony is begun. The *kantule* directs the episodes. The girl is again confined in an enclosure, long cigars are smoked, and much *chicha* is drunk. To keep evil spirits away, all those present have their faces, the palms of their hands, and the soles of their feet daubed with red paint, and cacao beans are kept continually burning in a number of receptacles.

For three days and nights the *kantule* and his assistants take turns chanting and playing flutes. The chants deal with the origin and history of the ceremony, the story of life from puberty to the grave, the wonders of land and sea, and stories of men and lesser creatures, each with an instructive moral for the education of the girl who is listening in her enclosure. Again there is dancing; animals mentioned are mimicked and events are dramatized. On the fourth day the girl's hair is cut and she is given a permanent name that her mother has chosen from those mentioned in the chants.

Marriages are arranged by parents, with the girl's father usually taking the initiative. If the girl or boy is opposed to the marriage it need not go through; but in the closely knit community, such opposition is rare. When a marriage has been arranged, the fathers notify the marriage-maker, who, with several assistants of his own choice, comes and carries the man to the girl's house, calling "Husband!" as they go. There they are placed in a hammock together. The young man runs away four times

and is brought back again, remaining longer each time until the fifth time he stays all night. (If he is opposed to the marriage, he may refuse to come back the second time.) The two stay awake all night, for it is a bad omen to fall asleep, but no intimacies occur. Next morning he accompanies his father-in-law to the mainland and fetches firewood, an act which serves to seal the marriage. The girl goes to his old home and does some household task. That night the marriage is consummated.

Newlyweds are usually embarrassed for some time after marriage, and the bride, especially, keeps to the house. The Cuna are extremely reticent about sexual matters; not until the marriage does an aunt or older sister instruct the girl in sexual matters. They stress sexual modesty, and exhibit strong feelings of shame concerning the genitals, sexual activity, and excretion. It is considered very improper if not sinful to speak openly of sex. The sexual impulse is regarded as an expression of one's *niga,* a supernatural attribute manifested in potency and strength. Persons are also thought to possess varying degrees of *kurgin,* or inclination to make love.

Marriages are monogamous. They are easily dissolved; the children remain with the mother and the father loses all control over them.

When a Cuna villager dies, he is immediately washed and dressed in his best clothes, laid in a hammock, and covered with a sheet. Mourning begins at once and goes on for a full day and night. A death chanter recounts the song of death, which goes on for hours, detailing the long and arduous journey of the dead soul bound for heaven. Relatives review the life and character of the deceased and speculate on what punishments he will suffer on his journey. Many come to give him messages to their dead friends and relatives.

The second morning, the hammock is tied up and carried on a long pole by two gravedigger-pallbearers to the canoe, in which the closest relatives also ride to accompany the body to the mainland cemetery. There mourning continues while the grave is dug. Near nightfall the hammock is placed in the grave, suspended from two strong stakes that protrude above the ground. Personal articles and models of such things as canoes and bows and arrows are placed in the grave. Over the hammock a platform of staves and leaves is fashioned; then the grave is filled with dirt. Broken furniture and other articles are left on the grave for the use of the dead on his journey. Just before the gravediggers leave, they fasten a string to one of the stakes and lead it down to the river, tying it to a pole on the other side. The first person coming up or down the river must cut the string to prevent evil spirits from harming himself or the dead person and to ensure a less hazardous journey to the afterworld.

Cultural Change

What we have described as the Cuna way of life is today an entirely true picture only where foreign influence has been most strongly resisted. Some islands, such as Narganá, have been "modernized" considerably through the influence of returning sailors, American Protestant missionaries, and Panamanian government agencies. These influences have affected the dress habits, marriage patterns, household arrangements, and beliefs of the Cuna, in varying degrees. These changes will be referred to from time to time in later chapters.

The Cuna Way of Life

In spite of the encroachments of foreign ways of life, most of the Cuna still live by the old traditions. These stress the importance of cooperation, neighborliness, respect for property, sexual modesty and chastity, truthfulness, cleanliness, and modesty concerning one's own achievements. Respect is accorded those who merit it through learning, experience, industry, and obedience to the moral code. The Cuna practice political and economic democracy based on a strong community spirit, individual freedom, and individual responsibility. Their way of life impresses a person as peaceful, orderly and apparently satisfying to their needs and wants.

3

THE NATURE OF CULTURE

In the previous chapter we sketched some of the chief features of the way of life of one group of people. Nowhere else can a group be found that lives quite this way. South Sea Islanders, American Indians, African tribes, even other Panamanian Indians have very different customs and beliefs. Each of these ways of life is a *culture.* The group of people that shares a common culture is called a *society.*

In this chapter we shall inquire into the meaning of culture in general, using illustrations from particular cultures. When we use the word *culture* in the general rather than the specific sense, we refer to the *learned portion of human behavior, the man-made part of the environment.* We do not mean only those aspects of human behavior that indicate taste, refinement, and interest in the "fine arts." Methods of garbage disposal are as much a part of culture, in the social scientist's sense of the term, as symphony orchestras. All human beings have culture, a San Blas house-

wife as much as a bejeweled patroness of the Metropolitan Opera. For culture is the way of life of a group, and all its members share in it to a greater or lesser degree. Each group defines "human nature" in terms of its own particular culture. Some learned behavior, of course, is not cultural. We are referring in our definition to that portion of learned behavior that is shared with and learned from others in the society.

Nor should culture be confused with the usual meaning of *civilization*. The word *civilized*, commonly used in contrast with *primitive*, comes from the Latin *civis*, or town dweller, and implies fairly large societies with complex economic and political systems. Anthropologists have abandoned the word *primitive* to describe cultures that lack these elements, because it implies "backwardness" and a belief in a "ladder of progress" along which all peoples stand at one stage or another. They now favor the word *nonliterate*, indicating the absence of written language. *Preliterate* is also used, but because this word, like *primitive*, implies a line of progress, nonliterate is usually preferred. The San Blas Cuna would be classed as nonliterate. Besides urbanized and nonliterate societies, a third, intermediate category may be described, that of *folk* or peasant societies, which have some elements of each of the others.

Culture is peculiar to man, although society is not. Animals such as the wolf and the bison organize themselves into packs or herds (or animal societies) characterized by division of labor and a system of protecting the group from intruders. Bees and ants are well-known examples of social insects. They are divided into definite classes in order to perform different functions. The queen bee and the drones, for example, produce new generations, the workers build hives and gather nectar, the nurses feed the larvae, and soldiers guard against attack. But bees do not *learn* to do these things; they are born with *instincts*, which are inborn patterns of activity or automatic responses to stimuli. One generation of bees in the same surroundings lives exactly like the one before and the one after. If the conditions alter, the bees perish or adapt only by slow biological changes through many generations. Within each class, there is no individuality; the bees are standardized, interchangeable units.

Man, on the other hand, is at birth little more than a helpless bundle of uncoordinated potentialities. His propensity for living in groups is dictated by his very helplessness; he depends upon the group not only for protection and nourishment, but also for the very qualities that make him human. He has no instincts in the sense of precise inborn patterns of activity. Being mammal, he has certain reflexes related to his organic needs—he does not have to be taught how to suck, for example—and certain drives, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 12. Man

is plastic, flexible, adaptable. He must learn to adapt to the outside environment and to perform certain functions in the social organization. But, because this adjustment is learned, it is neither so perfect as that of the bees, nor so rigid and limited. Man can readjust as conditions change.

Besides being born with instincts, animals and insects are biologically adapted to specific environmental conditions. The polar bear's heavy coat, the elephant's tusks, the rabbit's protective coloring, the fish's fins and gills—all are extremely useful under certain conditions. But few animals are fitted for more than one kind of climate, food supply, or life situation. Man, on the other hand, has no such specific adaptations; he is found pretty well distributed over the face of the earth, in an enormous variety of surroundings. Man has, however, certain biological characteristics that enable him to build culture, which is his own way of adapting to the environment. He has a *thumb which he can oppose to each of his four fingers,* thus making it possible to grasp and manipulate and create with his hands. His hands are freed for work by his *upright posture* (in turn made possible by his curved spine and arched foot, which cushion the shock of walking and prevent injury to the brain). They are made more useful by his *binocular vision,* which can be focussed for different distances. The higher primates, man's distant cousins—the ape family—share these three attributes with him to some degree. But they alone are not sufficient to enable the primates to build culture. Man has, in addition, *a highly complex nervous system including a large brain;* he also has a *vocal apparatus* that can produce a wide variety of sounds. Thus he can symbolize and communicate, learn, think, remember, foresee. Thus he can create culture, acquire it from his fellows, and transmit it to others.


Of course, all that has been said implies that the helpless infant is born into a functioning social group. If he were not, his biological potentialities for culture would go undeveloped. He would never use his prehensile hands to bake a cake or play the piano, nor his brain and vocal apparatus to learn a language. He would not even be human. The first years of his long childhood are crucial for his acquisition of human culture and personality.

Cases of extreme isolation from social contacts help to prove that human nature is a product of social life. Stories of "wolf" children, while interesting, are held by some social scientists to be of dubious accuracy. A few cases of children reared with a minimum of contact with human beings have, however, been authenticated. In considering the histories of two such girls, Anna and Isabelle, Kingsley Davis suggests that after the age of ten or fifteen, an isolated person thrown into contact with human beings is no longer likely to be able to acquire a fully human nature.[1]

Keeping in mind our brief definition of culture as "the way of life of a society," let us inquire further into the nature of culture in order to arrive at a more complete definition.

Characteristics of Culture

Culture is uniform yet variable. Because *homo sapiens* is all one species, with the same physiological make-up, the same organic



needs, and the same essential life experiences the world over, culture exhibits certain similarities in all societies. Every culture has language, for communication is basic to the existence of culture. In addition, every culture has some means of using the natural resources available to provide food, clothing, and shelter—a technology and an economic system. All have a social structure based at least on age and sex, and usually on

a great number of other differentiations. All cultures have some means of ensuring desirable behavior and perpetuating the society—government. All have some explanation, whether mythological or scientific, of the nature of the universe and of man's place in it. All have rituals for dealing with the supernatural and with such problems as death—religion. All have either unwritten folklore or written literature, music, and art for symbolizing and communicating thoughts, ideas, emotions, and aesthetic experiences. Finally, all have recreational or play activities. According to some anthropologists, all have war; but others have found peoples with no warlike activity in their cultures.

Different societies, however, satisfy the same needs in many different ways. Each person may wrest the yams for his food and the grass for his clothing from the immediate environment, as do the Arapesh, in the mountains of New Guinea; or he may be as far removed from the sources of his food and clothing as you and I, who shop for them at grocery and department stores where a great variety of products are offered for sale after having passed through a very complicated system of production and distribution. Some peoples loathe milk and canned foods and eat fried snails or decayed wood or head lice with gusto. The San Blas household is in sharp contrast with the small American family composed of father, mother, and two or three children, living perhaps thousands of miles away from grandparents. A woman may have several husbands, as in Tibet, or a man several wives, as in Moslem countries. The San Blas Cuna insure proper behavior by public shame through the chants of a chief trained in folklore. Americans, too, find that the fear of ridicule keeps most people in line; but we also need laws, courts, policemen, jails, and fines. Voodoo dances and the formal ritual of the mass both deal with the supernatural; gold nose rings and pancake make-up both beautify the female countenance; cockfights and Shakespearean dramas both pass leisure time; tom-toms and violins both produce pleasing sounds; the chants and potions of the *innatuledi* and the penicillin and oxygen of a modern physician are means of coping with disease; dozens of languages and dialects testify to the flexibility of man's tongue. We need not go on, for it should be clear enough that man has as many ways of satisfying the same organic and psychological needs as he has separate groups.

Why this immense variety in cultural behavior? Two possible answers are that each group's culture is dictated by its biological heredity, or by its geographic environment.

If the first were true, then each culture would be manifested by a different race of mankind. There are now about a thousand cultures distinguishable by anthropologists. There is only one true race—the human race—in which we can distinguish perhaps three "races" by differences in

such things as skin color, hair texture, and eye formation. But these racial types are by no means distinct in mental and physical capacity nor in organic drives, and are so mixed all over the world that only a minority conforms to the "ideal" type for each racial group. Within each of these racial groups there are great variations in culture, from simple to complex. Over the centuries no one race has displayed a greater capacity for culture-building than any other. While the Europeans were still wearing bearskins, the Chinese were building palaces and had a highly developed art and literature; and the Egyptians had introduced bronze plumbing. There are greater differences among individuals within a "race" than between races as wholes.

Geographic environment, on the face of it, seems like a more reasonable explanation of the diversity of cultures. There are, however, extremely different cultures in almost identical environments—those of the Navahos and Pueblos in the American Southwest, and the Alaskan Eskimo and the Chukchi of northeast Asia, for example. Few cultures are so strongly influenced by their environment as that of the Eskimos, whose very survival depends upon adaptation to Arctic conditions. "Man's response is never to brute physical facts as such but always to such facts as defined in cultural terms." [2] The most we can say about geographic influence is that it does limit and condition what man can do in any one place—presents him with alternatives, offers possibilities that he may capitalize upon or neglect according to the interests and technology of the culture. Man always alters his environment to some degree. Thus geography has some usefulness in explaining cultural variation, but it is not to be overemphasized.

What, then, is the real explanation of the enormous variety of human behavior? First of all, man is highly flexible and adaptable; his basic needs can be satisfied in any number of ways. His digestive system will tolerate an enormous variety of foods; and his need for clothing can be met by grass, bark, animal or vegetable fibers, furs, skins, and synthetics, in an incredible array of patterns. His housing does not even conform necessarily to our mental picture of four walls and a roof, for it may be a lean-to, a round hut, or a cave. He builds strikingly different social arrangements around the needs for reproduction and protection of the group. His original solution to a problem may be a combination of accident and the possibilities afforded by the natural environment. If it is accepted, it comes to seem right and natural.

Then, too, once man has solved his basic problems, he has lots of creative energy and intelligence left over. He further selects from the "great arc of potential human purposes and motivations," to use Ruth Benedict's phrase, and elaborates certain aspects of his culture at the expense

of others. He may elaborate his technology and science, as Americans have, or his religious ceremonials, as do certain Australian tribes, or his art and architecture, as did the Mayas of Central America. Once he has selected an area of special interest and elaboration, he continues to develop it; thus differences pile upon differences. "The bulk of all cultures consists of what are, from the practical point of view, embroideries upon the fabric of existence." [3] It is of these very embroideries that man is proudest, and it is these that make him most distinctly human.

Not only do solutions of basic problems and areas of elaboration vary greatly from one culture to another, but also different elements are interwoven in different ways. In one culture, marriage may be tied up with religion; in another, with the economic system; in a third, with government.

The differences in cultures make anthropology a highly fascinating subject, but in the long run what really impresses the student is the basic similarity of human behavior all over the world. He comes to realize that each culture seems as right to its members as his own appears to him. He sees the universal patterns emerging from the mass of detail. As Linton said, "The fact that all societies have some sort of family organization is much more significant in the long run than the fact that Tibetan women of the lower class usually have several husbands." [4]

Culture elements are often referred to as material or nonmaterial. Strictly speaking, however, the material elements, the tangible, visible *artifacts,* are not part of culture at all, but are products of or adjuncts to cultural behavior. A child's definition, "A chair is to sit," may illustrate the point. To us a chair has meaning; we associate certain behavior with its production and its use. To someone from another society, whose culture lacks these behavior patterns, however, a chair may mean only a curiously shaped piece of wood to use as kindling, or a weapon, or a platform to put things on.

If germ warfare wiped out all those familiar with American culture without damaging the material objects—the streets, houses, clothes, books, toys, food, radio and TV sets, and the like, which are so essential to our cultural behavior—and a new group of people took them over, we could not say that American culture still existed. The meanings, the behavior patterns associated with the objects, the skills, attitudes, abilities, ideas, knowledge, and habits of the culture-bearing individuals would be gone with them. Some approximation might be pieced together from surviving literature, but it would be only a rough one. Archeologists digging up the relics of ancient cultures can reconstruct much of the way of life of ancient peoples just from the material survivals, but the meaning such

objects held for their original owners must necessarily remain largely a matter of ingenious guesswork.

Let us bear in mind, therefore, that *culture is essentially nonmaterial; it is behavior.* When we refer to "material culture," let us keep in mind the precaution that this term is merely shorthand for "the material products and adjuncts of cultural behavior."

Cultural behavior may be overt (visible) or covert (hidden). We may observe the ritual of a rain dance, but the beliefs and attitudes that motivate it are hidden from us. A foreigner observing an American wedding or funeral may note the ritual with meticulous detail, but if he interprets its meaning in terms of his own culture, he will inevitably produce a caricature of the custom. On the other hand, a really acute foreign observer may be able to detect covert behavior of which we are quite unaware, or which we take so for granted that we cannot explain it except by saying, "Of course . . . it's natural; it's human nature to feel that way."

Culture is socially transmitted, that is, learned from others. It is not inborn or instinctive. Writers who use such expressions as "instinctive good manners" or "instinctively looked both ways as he crossed the street" are being slipshod in their choice of words. Any mother could tell them how much drilling it takes to instill manners and safety precautions into a growing child! Such behavior may finally be so thoroughly learned that it *appears* innate, calling for little or no reflection on the part of the person displaying it, but this is quite different from saying that it is inborn. This use of the word "instinctive" is thus a tribute to the thoroughness of learning or conditioning. Even such a basic organic process as sleep is culturally conditioned. We learn to be comfortable on a soft innerspring mattress well up off the floor. The Japanese learn to sleep soundly on mats with wooden headrests. Each would have to learn all over again to sleep in the other's accommodations.

We learn not only actions, but also thoughts and feelings. We learn to respect the flag as well as to salute it; we learn to feel reverence in church as well as to follow the ritual; we learn our culture's standards of what is good, beautiful, disgusting, wrong, and the like.

So much of this cultural behavior is learned in the first few years of life that by the time a Chinese child is four or five he is stamped with the ways of doing, thinking, and feeling of his culture, as is an American child of the same age. If by some circumstance the Chinese boy had been raised in the United States and the American in China, each would reflect the culture in which he was brought up rather than that of his parents. This actually happened to a son of American missionaries in China.

Orphaned in early childhood, he was brought up by a Chinese family. When he came to the States as a young man, his light hair and blue eyes were all that betrayed his ancestry; his posture, his gait, his language, attitudes, likes and dislikes were all Chinese. He did not feel at home in the United States and returned to China. Identical twins raised in different cultures offer further proof of the powerful influence of culture.[5]

The chief mechanism of culture transmission is language, which has been called "mankind's fundamental institution." It is one of the first items of culture to be learned, and once acquired, it is the key to the rest of the culture. Although sounds and meanings are arbitrarily connected in any language, the fact that a sound carries the same meaning for all who know a language makes it possible for them to communicate ideas with ease and comparative accuracy. They can thus transmit past experiences of individuals or of the group as a whole, and preserve them, particularly if the culture includes a written language. Man can learn how to act in situations that he has never experienced, and can share vicariously far more experiences than he could crowd into a lifetime.

Each language is the outcome of the common experiences of the members of a social group, and as such, reflects their history and interests to an astonishing degree. The English, living on their island, have a language rich in expressions for the sea; the Arabs are said to have about 6,000 words connected in some way with the camel; the American woman's interest in clothes and furnishings is reflected in her vocabulary, which has many more words describing color and texture than her husband's. Even within the same culture, those people who share common interests and attitudes are said to "speak the same language."

In each language, things are organized into systems or categories in terms of their significance for behavior. This is done by means of *concepts,* or verbal symbols. You, for example, are a student. This word "student" isolates one aspect of your personality that you have in common with others, though any body of students differs enormously in physiological make-up, appearance, intelligence, and even in national or cultural background. The concept of culture itself is a symbol for something that can only be inferred from the behavior of human beings as it falls into more or less regular patterns; but as a symbol, it is highly useful. This book will introduce a number of other concepts that the student will learn and share with the instructor and his fellow students. Your agreement on common meanings for verbal symbols will enable you to use them as tools for discussion and thinking.

Culture is socially shared. But different elements of the culture are shared in varying degrees. Theoretically, a culture as a whole is all avail-

able for an infant to learn, but he will not learn all of it by any means. It has often been said that Aristotle was the last man to command all of the knowledge of his time; but he certainly did not have all the specialized skills of the housewife and mother, the blacksmith, the sailor, the sculptor, or the musician at his command. Even in a simple society like that of the San Blas Cuna, the fact of sex limits a person's participation in the culture, as do age, and the special training of the *innatuledis* and *neles.*

Culture elements fall into three categories. When measured by the degree to which they are shared by members of a society, these elements may be referred to as *universals, specialties,* and *alternatives.* The common customs and understandings and emotional reactions shared by practically all the members of a society are *universals.* These are many in a simple and unified society, fewer in a large and complex one. The particular language, the patterns of costume and housing, and the ideal patterns for social relationships are universals in any one society. The most important universals are those values that lie far below the level of consciousness or are so taken for granted that they are rarely if ever expressed in language. Monogamy, democracy, and freedom are examples of such values in American culture. The English language, three meals a day, metal and paper money as the media of exchange, are other universals in our culture. In medieval times in Europe the Christian religion was a universal. Our modern complex society, in contrast, includes many shades of belief and lack of belief.

Specialties are elements shared by certain distinct categories of individuals, such as various classes, occupations, localities, or the devotees of some recreational or scientific or academic interest. They involve certain knowledges and skills shared only by those who belong to the category, although, as in the case of a doctor or a cook, other members of society expect certain definite results from the possession and practice of such skills. Specialties among the San Blas Cuna include the *neles* and *innatuledis,* the *kantule,* the division of labor between the sexes, and a few others. In our complex culture there are innumerable specialties, for even broad categories of occupations are broken down further into specialties. Like universals, specialties are accepted by the participants of the culture, for all share in their benefits.

Alternatives are traits shared by certain individuals, but not common to all members of the society nor even to all the members of any one of its socially recognized categories. Alternatives include a very wide range of elements representing different reactions to the same situations or different ways of achieving the same ends. The San Blas Cuna culture in-

cludes comparatively few alternatives; ours includes a great number. Some alternatives entail free choice at any time. A clerk may write with a fountain pen at one time, with a pencil or a typewriter at another. Or, a businessman may travel by railroad, airplane, automobile, horse, or bicycle. Other choices are more permanent. Once a person has chosen the Baptist religion he is quite unlikely to change to Catholicism, and vice versa. Similarly, a voter switches his party allegiance only after considerable thought. Other members of the culture are somewhat familiar with the forms of other religions and political beliefs, but once they have chosen their own affiliation they remain fairly faithful to it.

A fourth category of habits, ideas, and conditioned emotional responses lies beyond the realm of culture because it is not socially shared. This category embraces *individual peculiarities.* You may be abnormally afraid of thunder because of some harrowing childhood experience. You may concoct your own nightly bedtime snack or eat a most unconventional breakfast in the belief that it will see you through a morning of work better than the usual orange juice, cereal, and coffee.

In general, the cultures of simple societies are more uniform and predictable than those of complex cultures, because simple societies have a larger proportion of universals. When a person refers to a middle-aged San Blas Cuna man, for example, almost everything about this man's interests, habits, activities, and beliefs can be inferred. But such is not the case in complex cultures. It is a feature of complex cultures that they are marked by *subcultures.* Racial and cultural minority groups, occupational groups, religions, and social classes all differ from other groups in many respects and have sufficient elements in common to constitute cultural systems existing within the larger culture. This is the situation that exists in the United States. Different regions of our country display somewhat different cultures. The statement "He is an American" tells us something, but to say "He is a western American farmer" reveals even more by placing the person in an occupational and regional subculture.

Further clues fill in the picture more completely: "He is the son of Swedish immigrants . . . a Republican . . . a prosperous dairy farmer . . . He is twenty-nine . . . a high-school graduate . . . He has three children." As we shall see later, culture and subcultures shape a person's personality to such a great extent that we already know a great deal about this one man. Of course, we do not know exactly what he looks like or what his individual peculiarities are; but knowing what each of these clues means in American life, we are fairly confident of knowing a good deal about his habits, attitudes, and beliefs.

Another useful way to classify culture elements is in terms of folkways, mores, and institutions, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Organization and Integration of Culture

A culture is more than the sum of its parts. A mere listing of customs and material objects would by no means give a true picture of the culture. *Culture tends to be organized and integrated.*

The organization of culture is described in terms of traits, complexes, and patterns. The smallest units by which any culture may be described are *culture traits.* These are to the study of culture what atoms are to physics and cells to biology. A fork, an orange, a dining table, and a plate are culture traits. So is the custom of eating a meal upon arising, and the belief that Vitamin C must be provided in our diet every morning. Together, these and other culture traits (which may be material or nonmaterial) cluster into a set of meaningful interrelationships that function as a unit, called a *culture trait complex,* our dining complex. A sport such as baseball could be analyzed the same way. The dugout canoe is a culture trait among the San Blas Cuna; it is part of the seafaring complex in their culture.

Complexes are grouped into *patterns* around a central interest or theme from which they derive their meaning. Our dining complex is part of our pattern of everyday living. Differences exist among families in the manner of eating, sleeping, and housekeeping; but there is also enough consistency in family traits to indicate a pattern. There is in the minds of the members of a culture an *ideal pattern* for each area of behavior. At the same time, there is evident in their actual behavior a *real pattern* that may be closely related or may deviate considerably from the ideal pattern. Most of us have a mental picture of the ideal pattern of family life. It may be modeled partly upon the real pattern of our own family, but more likely upon precepts we have learned from our teachers, in church, and from other contacts. This ideal pattern serves as a guide in choosing mates, raising children, and establishing other behavior patterns.

A culture is integrated around beliefs, goals, and values. *Integration* means mutual adjustment between culture elements, lack of conflicts and inconsistencies, a unity of beliefs and practices and ideas. It is always a matter of degree; a culture is *more or less* completely integrated, for every culture has some inconsistent elements.

Beliefs. Each culture, says Lawrence K. Frank, rests on four basic conceptions that are ways of ordering and interpreting man's experiences.

1. *The Nature of the Universe*—how it was created and how it is operated, by what power, authority, or control; what makes things happen for his good or his ill; and how he can come to terms with the

power or controlling force for his own needs. Upon this assumption he could develop his relation with the geographical environment for getting food, shelter, and safety. . . .

2. *The Place of Man in That Universe*—his origin and his destiny; his place in, or outside of nature; his relation to the power or authority which rules the world.

3. *The Place of the Individual within the Group*—his relations to the group and to other individuals; his rights, titles, obligations and interests, and his status; "who shall be sacrificed for whom."

4. *Human Nature and Conduct*—man's image of himself as good or evil, or as capable of both, and his beliefs about what he should and should not do, especially in human relations.[6]

These conceptions are expressed in the religion, philosophy, law, and custom of a group, and in its folklore and arts. They are all interrelated, forming a more or less coherent system of belief and knowledge, and the entire symbolic world of meanings and values is based upon them.


Values. Values are those cultural elements that make other cultures most difficult to understand. *Values* are "objects of human desire or appreciation; any objects, conditions, or principles around which meanings have grown up in the course of experience."[7]

Values may be *positive* or *negative,* regarded as desirable or undesirable. Liquor may be a positive value for one person, a negative one for another. Flowers may be a positive value in one culture and utterly ignored in another. Values are essentially psychological realities, for they are ideas of the relative worth or importance of things. An *attitude* held by an individual is his tendency to act in a certain way toward a value.

The most fruitful way to consider values is in terms of their relation to one another, their rating on a *scale of values* or in a *value system* that places them in order of importance or desirability. Heading the list would be the ultimate values that define the chief *goals* of the society. All other values are judged in relation to these. In Nazi Germany, for example, everything was subordinated to glorifying the nation, to securing the fatherland "a place in the sun." During a war the chief value is victory. Protection of freedom might be said to be the ultimate value of American culture in the struggle with the communist world. To a Christian, the ultimate value is salvation of the soul. Many people believe that one of the chief American values is materialistic well-being in this life—getting ahead, or succeeding. These ultimate or universal values within a culture tend to dominate the whole culture. All other values and goals are measured in terms of the dominant ones and oriented toward their fulfillment.







Inland Steel; Arevalo, Costa Rica; British Information Service

BUNI IN ITALY, SOCCER IN COSTA RICA, BABOON DANCE IN KENYA

Values invested with considerable positive meaning in one culture may be absent in another.

"Where will it get you?" is the tip-off to the dominance of the values of material success and progress in our culture. We find it difficult to deal with people of other cultures who lack these values. When we employ Latin Americans who find that a few days of "gringo" wages will provide them with the necessities of life for a time, we are exasperated when they quit until they need more money. One of their dominant values has long been enjoyment of leisure.

There are various methods by which a society's scale of values can be measured. One method is by seeing what its members choose to do, to say, or to buy. Truth and kindness are both positive values; but often truth is sacrificed to kindness to avoid hurting the feelings of others, and we tell a "white lie" about the becomingness of a new dress or the good taste of a new color scheme.

In a society such as ours, one yardstick is what money is spent for. If we rely solely upon this, it would appear that education is a relatively unimportant value in American culture, for while we spent five billion dollars on education in a typical year, we spent eight billion dollars on alcoholic beverages. This represents a disparity between real and ideal culture patterns. Most Americans would place education far above whiskey and beer in the scale of social values. At the same time, perhaps without being fully aware of it, those same Americans part more willingly with money for intoxicants than with money for school taxes and assessments. With 85 per cent of the national budget earmarked for past wars and present armament programs, one might judge war to be high in the American scale of values. Actually, war is a negative value in our culture, but freedom is so high in our scale of values that we choose defensive armanent over pacifism in order to protect it.

Besides choice or preference, we may measure people's values in part by what they say they are; that is, by what they express approval or disapproval of, what they consider worth while. This is also a tricky yardstick, for no person consistently practices what he preaches. But, even when not expressed directly, the values of a people may be inferred from the subjects that arouse them to heated argument, condemnation, or enthusiasm. The folklore, history, literature, and art of a culture are other valuable sources of information.

What commands people's attention? What are their interests? Here are additional clues to the value system. The conversation of a typical group of young married American women reflects the fact that babies, clothes, and recipes are among their common interests. Men, on the other hand, are likely to "talk shop" or politics. Adolescent boys will probably talk about girls and sports; girls about boys, movies, and hit songs. The Bemba of Northern Rhodesia talk about food more than anything else.

The system of rewards and punishments throws more light on the value system. What infractions are most severely punished? An American mother is far more likely to spank her five-year-old son for masturbating than for "sassing" her. Our juries are quicker to acquit a man who killed his wife's lover than one who killed his wife for her insurance. Who are most handsomely rewarded? statesmen? poets? movie stars? professors?

All these factors are useful in detecting the value system of a culture,

CULTURAL VALUES VS EUGENIC VALUES

(IN THE UNITED STATES)

WOMEN AS VALUED **SOCIALLY:**		WOMEN AS VALUED **EUGENICALLY:**
BEAUTY FIRST		BEAUTY UNIMPORTANT
DELICATE FEATURES		STRONG FEATURES
NO "DEEP" INTELLECT		HIGH INTELLIGENCE
VIVACIOUSNESS		SERIOUSNESS
SLIM FIGURE		STURDY FIGURE
TINY WAIST		AMPLE WAIST
SMALL HIPS		BROAD HIPS
DAINTY WRISTS AND HANDS		STURDY WRISTS STRONG HANDS
SLENDER, SOFT TAPERING LIMBS AND SLIM ANKLES		SOLID, STURDY LIMBS AND ANKLES
TINY FEET		GOODSIZED FEET

Graphics Institute for "Sociology" (new edition) by Cuber; Appleton-Century-Crofts

but it is difficult to determine exactly what the system is because many of the deepest values of a culture are so taken for granted that they are rarely expressed verbally.

The value system serves two functions. (1) It laces together a culture, uniting its elements and institutions, making them appear consistent, and justifying and rationalizing them in the minds of its members. This function is so important that a society or community has been defined as a group of persons "adhering to the same ultimate set of values and pursuing the same set of common ends." [8] (2) Values also provide individual

members of the society with a purpose or meaning in life. "Instead of looking at their actions as attempts to satisfy their motives and then examining the worthwhileness of those motives, they think of their actions as attempts to reach goals which are ends in themselves. Those things which have the highest social value to any group become the life goals of its members and provide a reason for existence." [9]

The value system of a culture may be predominantly *sacred* or predominantly *secular.* A sacred culture is based on a systematic theology and is characterized by conservatism, stability, reverence for tradition, and dogmatic answers to all questions. Everything that happens has a religious motivation or explanation; nothing is simply a means to a practical end. Deviation from traditional behavior is severely punished. In a secular culture, on the other hand, ideas and things and people are evaluated in utilitarian terms. Change is easily accepted; in fact, it is sought, encouraged, guided, and called "progress." Instead of passively bowing to divine will, the secular society believes that "God helps those who help themselves."

For a picture of medieval society dominated by sacred values, one has only to read a novel like Edith Simon's *The Golden Hand.* In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, *secularization,* the trend toward secular values, began. The Renaissance and the age of invention and discovery were characterized by a new interest in life on this earth, and a belief in the scientific approach to human problems. Although this trend has continued, many customs and institutions are still sacred to us, and thus our culture is a mixture of sacred and secular elements.

Myth. Values and beliefs are woven into a body of *myth.* In the social scientists' language, the concept of myth does not imply falsity. "By myths we mean the value-impregnated beliefs and notions that men hold, that they live by or live for. Every society is held together by a myth-system, a complex of dominating thought-forms that determines and sustains all its activities." [10] The myth system takes values and beliefs out of the realm of the abstract and into the sphere of the real, and thus provides a faith.


Myths are of varying degrees of importance. There are dominant or social myths and less important ones for minor values and beliefs in the myth-complex. "Every civilization, every period, every nation, has its characteristic myth-complex. In it lies the secret of social unities and social continuities, and its changes compose the inner history of every society." [11] Several great myths have in turn dominated the Western World: the Greek and Roman hierarchy of gods (in fact, this is what occurs to

most of us when we hear the word "myth"); the Christian myth with its accompanying values and beliefs; the myth of the divine right of kings; the Democratic myth that came to the fore with the French and American Revolutions; and the fascist myth and the communist myth, now competing with the Democratic myth for dominance. These myths are identified with ultimate values and with the promise of a good life or a heavenly reward.

Lesser folk beliefs and values are also made stronger and more real by their accompanying myths. The belief that intermarriage of Negroes and whites is wrong is supported by the recurrent myth of the black baby appearing to an unsuspecting husband and his supposedly white wife, who was perhaps adopted as a child. The story is usually couched in terms of "someone a friend of mine told me about." The myth of George Washington and the cherry tree brings the copybook maxim that honesty is the best policy—that is, the *value* of honesty—down to the child's level of understanding. By emotionally identifying themselves with the hero, children are helped to understand the meaning of honesty and remember the moral of the legend. According to their myth of creation, the ways of the San Blas Cuna have a special rightness because God sent Ibeorkun to explain things to them and show them just how everything should be done.

> Myth is the all-pervading atmosphere of society, the air it breathes. . . . Wherever he goes, whatever he encounters, man spins about him his web of myth, as the caterpillar spins his cocoon. Every individual spins his own variation within the greater web of the whole group. The myth mediates between man and nature. Inside his myth he is at home in his world.[12]

Symbols, ritual, and ceremony. Values and beliefs are expressed in *symbols* and periodically reinforced by *ritual* and *ceremony*. The Japanese culture, for example, is integrated around the concept of "honor" symbolized in the person of the emperor. The British regard their queen as a symbol of their highest values and dearest traditions. "Motherhood" is a positive value in our society and is reinforced by the sentimental observance of Mother's Day. Commercialization of the custom does not grate on most Americans because it is in harmony with their materialistic values and because they place high value on gifts as expressions of affection and upon conformity. Most religions make much use of symbol, ritual, and ceremony. The priest's vestments, the order of the mass, the stained glass, flowers, holy water, and altars of the Catholic Church all become invested with meaning in the minds of Catholics. Teaching is



Detroit Free Press

CULTURAL SYMBOLS

Democracy and the Christian-Judaic heritage are symbolized by the Christmas tree, the manger, and the City Hall.

made much more effective by the use of symbols and ritual. The flag is an indispensable support to school lessons in patriotism.

Ritual and ceremony are powerful means of sustaining the social order. A *ceremony* is a formal, dignified procedure that impresses observers and participants with the importance of an occasion. Its most distinctive element is usually *ritual*—a formal, rhythmic series of acts repeated on appropriate occasions. Ritual gives the occasion an air of solemnity, and evokes emotional, unreflective responses. The individual effortlessly associates the appropriate ideas, which come to seem right and inevitable.

> Ritual and ceremony impress without explaining, without reasoning. They convey a feeling of larger realities, of faiths, of unities, of social establishments, of the myths themselves, which can never be fully experienced or wholly comprehended by individuals. "The Church," "the State," "the Law," and "God" are distant abstractions, but the rites of the church, the coronation of the king, the inauguration of the president, the protocol of the court of law, the orderly procession at the grave or wedding, seem to bring near to men . . . these invisible things.[13]

Value of integration. Integration is a matter of degree, a tendency. In a simple and unified society there is general agreement on beliefs and values. In a society embracing many different subcultures, there is likely to be agreement on a small number of beliefs and values, and conflict or at least difference over many of them.


A certain degree of integration makes for smooth functioning in a society. Behavior patterns mesh smoothly when there is general agreement on goals and patterns. A highly integrated culture produces a sense of security and inner satisfaction among its members. There is, however, such a thing as an undesirable degree of integration; for when a highly integrated culture is subjected to pressures of one kind or another, even in only one area, it is likely to become disorganized. A culture in which the various elements are less perfectly coordinated adapts more easily to circumstances that bring about change. A culture can successfully incorporate a number of inconsistencies and conflicting elements as long as there is substantial agreement on ultimate values and on overt behavior patterns. An individual in our complex culture finds himself in groups with different values during the course of everyday living. Even the child away from home finds that the teacher and the play group may hold values quite different from those of his mother. He can reconcile these and choose among them to an amazing extent, or stress certain values in certain situations. If conflict is too great, however, personality problems result. In the same way, conflicts of group values within a culture create social problems.

4

CULTURE GROWTH AND CHANGE

Culture can be preserved and accumulated; thus it is highly stable and continuous. It is not created by any one individual or generation, nor limited to anyone's particular life span. Many of the basic elements of our culture go back to prehistoric times. In fact, the earliest traces of culture—the use of fire and the fashioning of stone tools—developed about a million years before the birth of Christ and represented the bulk of man's material culture for half a million years. Perhaps around 100,000 B.C. man began to make tools of bone. Between 75,000 and 14,000 B.C. he began to live in cave communities, bury his dead, use wood, and draw and paint on the walls of caves. Prehistoric man also invented the wheel, screw, and lever, evolved techniques of hunting and fishing, and used waterways for transport. By 10,000 B.C. the practice of agriculture had begun; plants and animals were domesticated. This last development has been called the first great revolution in the history of the human race; for the shift from hunting and food-

gathering to agriculture made possible an assured and abundant food supply and thus laid the basis for more highly developed economic and social systems, with greater specialization and security. Metal-smelting, the alphabet, arithmetic, astronomy, and other culture elements were evolved by Oriental and Near Eastern civilizations long before the birth of Christ. Many of our beliefs and superstitions, ethical and religious



British Information Service

TRADITION

The British coronation ceremony consists of customs centuries old.

systems, and literary and artistic traditions, too, are rooted deeper in the past than most of us realize.

Why does culture continue generation after generation? Because children are taught to follow the ways of their forebears. Their elders teach them some things with particular emphasis because they consider them

highly important, other things because they know no alternative. Also, many elements of culture continue because people feel more at ease doing things the customary way and tend to resist change, particularly as they grow older.


Every culture, nonetheless, is subject to a continual process of change. In a "static" society, more or less insulated from outside influences, the rate of change may be exceedingly slow, so that a visitor can return a decade or two later and feel that time has stood still. But in a "dynamic" society such as ours, change may be so rapid in many areas that the technology, customs, and attitudes of one generation are strikingly different in many respects from those of their parents.

Means of Cultural Change

Cultural change may originate from within the society, as a result of discovery or invention, or come from outside, via diffusion. *Discovery* is any addition to knowledge, like finding a new continent or island or travel route or discovering that copper ore will melt, and always implies the previous existence of the thing now known. *Invention* is a new application of existing knowledge, such as the combination of the steam engine and the river boat to make a steamboat. *Diffusion* is the spread of elements from one culture to another, and accounts for the great bulk of changes within all but the most isolated cultures.

In connection with discovery and invention, many persons think of great men, geniuses gifted with such inborn intelligence that they added something completely new to culture. But every invention rests on existing knowledge. There has been little if any change in the size and complexity of man's brain in the last 10,000 years, yet invention has proceeded at a constantly increasing rate. No man, however intelligent, can invent anything except on the basis of existing culture. Thomas Edison might have been a great man if he had lived 500 years earlier; but he would certainly not have invented the electric light or the phonograph, because the previous steps that laid the groundwork for these inventions had not been taken. Leonardo da Vinci, for all his fascination with the idea of flight, could never have succeeded in inventing the airplane, for the gasoline engine was still far in the future. Isaac Newton gave credit to the predecessors who made it possible for him to formulate the law of gravity: "If I saw farther, 'twas because I stood on giant shoulders."

Parallel or simultaneous invention proves that invention does not await a predestined genius. Given the proper stage of cultural development, someone is likely to come up with an invention. Ogburn lists 148 inven-



SELDEN PATENTS COMBINED SIX OLD PATENTS IN A NEW COMBINATION

PICTOGRAPH CORPORATION

Based on F. Stuart Chapin, Cultural Change *(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1928).*

THE INVENTION OF THE AUTOMOBILE

The invention of the automobile was a new combination of previously existing inventions.

tions that occurred practically simultaneously without the inventors being in communication. Galileo and three others discovered sunspots; four men introduced the decimal point; two discovered oxygen; two the function of the pancreas; four the telegraph.[1] Thus the old saying that "Necessity is the mother of invention" would express more truth if it were rephrased: "The existing culture is the mother of invention." The same holds true of discovery. If Columbus had not lived, someone else would have discovered America, for the time was ripe. The invention of the compass and the development of other improved navigational devices were enabling men to sail great distances, and the spur of economic rivalry between nations made imperative the discovery of new markets.

Out of the fact that invention depends upon the existing "storehouse of knowledge" rises another highly significant truth: the tendency of culture to accumulate at a geometrically increasing rate. If there are 10,000 elements in a culture and they yield one invention, a culture with ten times that number of elements will yield not ten, but far more, for as the number of elements increases, the number of possible combinations increases at a greater rate. Stuart Chase drives home this point by telling of the farmer who agreed to the blacksmith's proposition that for each of the 32 nails needed to shoe his horse he would pay twice as much as for the previous nail. Since the price of the first was a penny, the farmer agreed. But the total came to $42,949,672.95![2] Anthropologist Robert Lowie likened the progress of mankind "to that of a man one hundred years old, who dawdles through kindergarten for eighty-five years of his life, takes ten years to go through the primary grades, then rushes with lightning rapidity through grammar school, high school, and college."[3]

Thus far we have spoken as if inventions were necessarily material and technological. Actually a very significant number of inventions are so far removed from any material basis that they are called "social inventions." Often they are ways of adapting to changed conditions created by technological inventions, but not necessarily so. The social inventions of minimum wages, maximum hours, and collective bargaining were adaptations to the factory system. Health insurance is a social invention; so are baby-sitting, social security, the cooperative store. Most laws may be classified as social inventions.

Invention is, of course, basic to cultural growth but the great bulk of any rich and complex culture comes from diffusion. The Tasmanians, when first visited by Europeans in the eighteenth century, had a Stone Age culture. Cut off from the rest of mankind about 20,000 years before, they had doubtless produced some minor inventions, but the content of other cultures was not available to them, so change was glacially slow.

Principles of Cultural Change

Not all culture elements, by any means, are accepted wholeheartedly, immediately, or "as is." Culture is *selectively* accumulative. New elements are not added indiscriminately. To take a superficial example, the samba and conga did not merely add to our repertory of dances, but replaced others. Today's college student does not dance the



By permission, Justus and the Minneapolis Star

A CASE OF CULTURAL LAG

Turkey Trot or the Big Apple. The incorporation of new culture elements and the discarding of old ones, or the rejection of new ones and the preservation of old ones, follows certain general principles.

Some aspects of a culture are more hospitable to change than others. Thus we Americans are comparatively eager to accept new "scientific"

discoveries in medicine, labor-saving devices, and mass-produced material things; but we are far less interested in social inventions. In fact, we resist changing our beliefs and institutions to make them fit our technology. This produces a highly important phenomenon called *cultural lag.* A most dramatic instance of cultural lag is our society's encouragement of rapid advancement in the production of atomic weapons, at the same time that many of us consider the idea of a really effective world organization to cope with the problems thereby created an outrage to the sacred principle of national sovereignty. Our ragged patchwork of marriage and divorce laws is another example of cultural lag, as are many other social problems such as inadequate housing and unsatisfactory provisions for the expense of medical care.

In general, aspects of culture with which there is great emotional involvement, such as religion, are especially resistant to change. The Guatemalan Indians have been under Catholic influence for four centuries, but still cling to shreds of the Mayan religion. In Chichicastenango, the priests have wisely adapted their methods of worship to Indian customs and silently tolerate the fact that after praying in church with candles, incense, and rose petals, their parishioners climb a nearby mountain and conduct what appears to be substantially the same ceremony before an ancient stone image. The San Blas Cuna have adopted mass-manufactured utensils and abandoned pottery-making except in the meaningful areas of religion and native medicine in which they still use handmade pottery. Emotional involvement may also be a significant factor in slowing down changes in technology, in economic systems, in education and modes of government, even in customs of dress, speech, and recreation.

Diffusion may be the result of accidental, unplanned contacts between two cultures, of propaganda and advertising, of coercion by government, or of conquest. Most new culture traits have come to the San Blas Cuna as a result of their young men's service as sailors, mostly on American ships, for many decades, and more recently as a result of schooling and employment in the two chief cities of Panama. Missionaries introduce new doctrines, new moral codes, and often other new customs in dress, hygiene, and schooling. Commerce diffuses movies, soft drinks, chewing gum, clothes, utensils, and gadgets of all kinds to all the corners of the earth; and advertising lauds the virtues of these products. Governmental coercion of the Cuna has been attempted by Panama, with little success until recently, when schools, medical services, and police regulation have been increasingly accepted. Dictatorships use strong punishments and threats of punishment to impose their reforms. The Turkish leader, Kemal Ataturk, westernized his Oriental country considerably by means

of decrees backed by strong measures. The young are educated to the new way and know no others; thus cultural change is brought about rapidly. History is also rich in examples of diffusion by conquest, though not in every case was the culture of the conquerors triumphant. The Romans, for example, took over much of the culture of the conquered Greeks.



British Information Service

DIFFUSION

American movies and the British Navy bring Western culture to Calcutta.

Inventions and borrowed elements are more easily adopted during periods of crisis and social disorganization than during periods of comparative stability. During World War II the need for victory spurred a hothouse growth of technology. Nonmaterial changes also occurred rapidly. Women entered previously masculine fields; they drove cabs, operated turret lathes and riveters, even joined the military forces. During

the 1930's, in spite of press and other organized opposition, changes were made in our economic system that five years before would have seemed inconceivable.

New traits are accepted on the basis of usefulness and of compatibility with the rest of the culture. If a new element appears to fill an obvious need, it is usually accepted with ease. Thus the cultivation of maize spread rapidly from the New World to Africa and Europe because there was need for such a grain. But rice-eaters like Orientals and Central Americans show little interest in the starchy potato. Because a culture must appear to be consistent to its practitioners, must "make sense" to them, people are apt to reject elements that conflict with accepted values and adopt those that fit them. The San Blas eagerly adopted American soaps, talcums, and perfumes because such products jibe with their desire for cleanliness and love of fragrance. They also embraced Protestant moral teachings and in many respects Protestant conceptions of the supernatural, because these beliefs were remarkably similar to their own. The sale of coconuts for cash and employment in Panama have largely converted the Cuna to a money economy, but without greatly disrupting many of the old patterns. Coined money has been fitted into the cooperative work pattern; cash payments to the father-in-law or the village are accepted as substitutes for labor; money is now buried with their dead as a "cash payment" for the canoe, which until a generation ago was destroyed upon a man's death.

New ideas are often ridiculed and even bitterly opposed when they are first introduced. Pasteur's germ theory and Harvey's hypothesis of blood circulation are examples. Another is Galileo's discovery that the earth revolved around the sun, which utterly contradicted the established conception of the earth as the center of the universe. Galileo was branded as a heretic and forced to renounce his belief in his new discovery. One generation violently resists "drastic reforms" that may be commonplace to the next. Workmen's compensation is a case in point; national health insurance may prove to be another. The next principle of cultural change largely explains why such "radical" ideas eventually come to be accepted.

Resistance to change is greatest among the older members of a society. "To the young, unformed personalities all habits and ideas are equally new and all can be incorporated with ease," says Linton.[4] He contrasts a boy of 17 and a man of 70 learning to drive a car. Both may become adequate drivers, but the youth will feel much more at home behind the wheel. The present generation of children, growing up with the idea of

space ships, will accept air travel as an everyday affair. This "turnover" in the personnel of a society is a most potent factor in cultural change.

The attitude toward the lending culture affects the willingness to adopt a culture element. American women are well disposed toward Paris fashions and perfumes, men toward London tailoring and leather goods. Although many Latin Americans deplore what they believe is "American materialism and imperialism," they nonetheless admire American productive efficiency and strive to acquire gadgets, household goods, and cars made in our country. They also admire our athletic prowess and have adopted such sports as baseball and basketball. When nationalistic feeling runs high in Panama, which is peculiarly subject to and resentful of American influence, it is not proposed to abandon all elements of American culture. Rather, an attempt is made to Hispanicize the accompanying terminology, for sports and material things often are diffused into the country complete with English terms.

The San Blas Cuna are historically suspicious of Spanish speaking people and clergy. Therefore, attempts by the Panamanian government to incorporate the Cuna into the national culture have met with great resistance. Attempting to institute schools, the Panamanian government, thinking of the Cuna's attitude toward women, sent Catholic priests as teachers, but the old hostility made the first attempt a failure. Protestant missions have been more successful because the San Blas greatly admire American culture.

Form is more easily diffused than meaning or function, largely because of language barriers. Thus the San Blas Cuna buy sheets and pillowcases, but only a few use them on beds. Most sleep in hammocks and hoard the linens as a sign of their wealth and adoption of American culture. The women eagerly scan American magazines for new ideas for their appliquéd blouses, but they use such schemes purely for design and color and have no conception of their meaning. One *mola* the authors bought on a trip to the San Blas islands has several flags arranged in imitation of the United Nations flags, in the midst of aboriginal motifs and modern steamers. Any culture element can adopt a variety of meanings. Black means mourning to us; white means mourning to the Chinese. The hula is a very formal and semi-sacred dance in Hawaii; Americans regard it as a gay and rather wanton form of entertainment. The Navaho borrowed the colorful masked dances of the Pueblo Indians, but associated them with the healing of disease rather than with fertility, rain, and good crops, the original Pueblo interpretations.

Form also persists long after its original meaning has disappeared in any

one culture. The buttons on the sleeves of a man's suit are said to be a vestige of those once put on uniforms to discourage soldiers from wiping their noses with their sleeves! Have these buttons any practical value now? On the Midwestern prairies, farmers continued to build haylofts over barns as they had done against New England hillsides, and then built artificial "hills" to get the hay in. As settlement moved westward to the mountains, people tried to build roads along section lines as they had done in the flatlands. Every year we turn millions of city children out for a long summer vacation "to hoe corn and 'bug' potatoes." [5] Edward A. Ross, a pioneer social scientist, called this tendency of social practices to persist in form after the original justification has disappeared *ossification.* He attributed it to our mental laziness, to the fact that emotions are involved, to our failure to understand the dynamic character of society, and to self-interest.

•

New culture elements will be resisted by vested interests who see them as competitive. French wine interests raised a furor about the introduction of American soft drinks into their country, depicting it as a threat to their cultural integrity. The British movie "The Man in the White Suit" was a satire on resistance to change. The hero invented a non-destructible, radiantly beautiful fabric. At first, both manufacturers and laborers in the textile factory were enthusiastic about its possibilities. Then the laborers decided that it would soon do away with their jobs, and the manufacturers decided to suppress it lest it do away with their business after enough cloth had been produced for everyone. Similarly, in this country shipping interests opposed the construction of the first transcontinental railroad, and in England textile workers fought the introduction of machines that threatened their jobs.

Change in one aspect of a culture almost invariably produces changes in other aspects. These changes may be slight, like the disarrangement of some persons' lives caused by the fact that ostrich plumes for ladies' hats and beaver for men's became outmoded after a heyday of fashion. Or they may be revolutionary, like the invention of the steam engine that made possible the Industrial Revolution or the theory of evolution that produced changes in the interpretation of the Bible. The process of integrating a new trait into the culture is more or less productive of conflicts depending upon its repercussions--how much it disturbs established habits. The money economy introduced to the San Blas has produced a conflict between old values of hospitality and sharing and new ones of individualism and competition. Often people will accept a new element, particularly in technology or economics, as obviously advantageous. Then,

when they begin to see its disruptive effects, they bewail the innovation but rarely will give it up. Thus Americans seized upon the automobile, even though it brought a change in courtship patterns that many found shocking, and created numerous accident, parking, and highway financing problems, among others. A culture's participants typically keep modifying the new trait and preexisting ones until they are sufficiently integrated.

Cultural elements are introduced by individuals and thus enter the fringe of the culture as individual peculiarities. If adopted by others, an element becomes an alternative; it is tried out and compared with preexisting elements. If it proves satisfactory, it becomes established as a specialty or universal, thus entering the core of the culture. The displaced element may persist for a while as an alternative (as in long full skirts among old peasant women whose daughters wear modern dress), then as an individual peculiarity, finally dropping out of the culture entirely. It is conceivable that the gold nose ring may take this path out of the San Blas Cuna culture.

Thus culture can be seen as continuous, yet constantly changing, rebuilt bit by bit as new elements are invented or borrowed and worked over to fit the rest of the culture and as old elements that have become poorly adapted to conditions are dropped.

5

THE FUNCTIONS OF CULTURE

Man's culture serves him in three ways: (1) It adapts man as a biological species to his environment; (2) It provides the individual with ready-made adjustments to his natural environment, his fellows, and his own biological and psychological needs and drives; and (3) It ensures the unity and survival of the social group.

The first of these functions has already been discussed in comparing man's flexible adaptation to his environment with the rigid, inborn instincts and biological equipment of animals and insects. Much that can be said about the second function was implied in our treatment of the nature of culture, but certain points bear emphasis.

What Culture Does for the Individual

Culture provides the individual with a blueprint for behavior, thought, and feeling in almost any situation. The newborn

baby no more analyzes the culture into which he is born than he analyzes the air before he breathes it. The culture is there, and the intimate groups with which the child is associated most closely during his early years—family, play group, school, and church—teach him the ways of the culture as if there were no others. If he questions with a rebellious "Why?" he hears, "Because that's the way it's done."

Culture provides for the satisfaction of the individual's biological needs. He does not have to work out a way to keep warm, to satisfy hunger and thirst, to fulfill his sexual desires, to get his rest. Patterns that regulate and channel these elemental functions are present in the culture and confront the child from infancy on. He is taught how and when and where he may satisfy his needs. He learns the diet pattern of his culture, modesty and hygiene of elimination, proper conduct in sexual affairs, patterns of propriety in dress. Culture heightens man's satisfaction of biological pleasures by building upon them an enormous superstructure of ritual. In our culture, for example, eating is made more pleasurable by concentrating upon the preparation and serving of food; in some cultures feasting and fasting alternate to heighten enjoyment. Sexual restrictions also heighten interest in eventual satisfaction. And nowhere is man satisfied merely to cover his nakedness for the sake of warmth and modesty; style or fashion in dress has been an area of great interest in most cultures.

Culture not only provides patterns for satisfying man's elemental needs, but also *creates* needs. A person's desire for cigarettes or alcohol may be just as compelling as his requirements for food or sleep. His need for success or wealth in a culture where these things are highly valued is often stronger than his sexual drives. The present-day American needs many things that his parents got along without, because many items previously unknown or considered luxuries are now defined in our culture as necessary to the good, full life—a new-model car, a TV set, a one-story house with a picture window, season tickets to the opera or symphony, a college degree, a fur coat.

Culture provides the individual with ready-made explanations of the origin of man, the nature of the universe, and man's role. These may be mystical or superstitious explanations, or they may be in large part scientific. In either case, they answer fundamental questions. Culture determines whether a child asking about a thunderstorm will be told that the god Thor is angry and throwing his hammer across the sky, or that the storm is a natural phenomenon caused by atmospheric pressure and electrical charges. The modern schoolboy may be told the story of Thor as an interesting myth, and may, in spite of his scientific knowledge, also imitate his mother's unreasoning fear of the storm.

Culture defines situations for its participants. It provides them with meanings for things and events. The individual's definitions of what is natural and unnatural, logical and illogical, normal and abnormal, moral and immoral, beautiful and ugly, important and unimportant, interesting and uninteresting, and good and bad, are derived from his culture. In a broader sense, culture gives meaning to life, purpose to existence. It provides the individual with values and goals, hopes and aspirations, "something to live for."

Culture also largely determines a person's fears. In one culture, a strong warrior may quail at the sight of a menstruating woman. His culture defines such an occurrence as dangerous and requires that women be isolated at this time. The early settlers of New England feared witchcraft. A generation ago many Americans feared a penniless old age; today many of us fear that we may not reach old age at all because of such threats as the atomic bomb.

Culture gives men a conscience. This is not an inborn, universally similar trait. It may be a still, small inner voice, but it comes from the group's definitions of right and wrong. It results from the *internalization* of the group's values and standards, their incorporation into the personality. When a person violates these standards, he feels ashamed or guilty, even when there is slight chance of his being found out. Conscience exercises a strong control over his behavior. In our culture, premarital sex relations arouse guilt feelings; in some they do not. A Catholic's conscience will prevent his eating meat on Friday, or trouble him if he does so; but a Protestant does not have this standard to live up to. Both, if members of American society, typically find conscience an effective deterrent to rape, murder, or bigamy.

A common culture gives men a sense of belonging or identification. It binds men together into a "we-group" in contrast to those of another culture. Going over to Europe on a freighter some years ago, I felt I had little in common with several other young fellows making the same trip, and they evidently felt the same way about me. After two weeks of the strange ways of Holland and Belgium, we ran into one another on the street, greeted one another like long lost friends, and spent most of the next several days together. We shared a common language and common understandings. For the same reason, immigrants to America cluster into colonies.

Culture adapts a person to his place in society. Every culture provides means of training persons for their role and position in the group. Patterns exist for a good housewife, a good farmer, a good President, a good teacher, a good clergyman, and so forth.

Culture is the nourishing milieu for personality. Just as the available

foods affect one's bodily condition and growth, determining whether or not the person will reach the potential limit of his stature and strength and good looks, so the available culture is food for the personality. If a person is born into a society where food is scarce and limited, he will probably be small and stunted and weak; if he is born into a culture that is meager, he will have a meager personality. No matter how intelligent, how innately capable of great achievement, the individual cannot surpass the bounds of the culture with which he comes into contact (though he may build inventions upon its existing elements). As Grey's "Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard" says, "Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest, Some Cromwell guiltless of his country's blood." The limited rural culture of the forgotten dead did not give the scope to their innate abilities that the richer life of London would have offered.

A rich and complex culture presents the individual with challenges and opportunities. Just as one may wisely choose from the food available a nutritious and varied and enjoyable fare, or stick to a habitual but poorly planned diet, so an individual may avail himself of the cultural environment in wise and profitable manner or neglect its potentialities and his own.

All that has been said impresses us with the profound influence of culture on the individual. It should not be assumed, however, that all members of a society are mere rubber stamps produced by cultural patterns. Common sense observation shows that this is by no means the case. Within the limits imposed by our culture, which dictates a certain proper apparel for campus wear, certain general types of hairdos, a common language, and a daily routine and etiquette, your classmates are definitely individual personalities. It is not necessary to go into this subject more deeply here. Our purpose is simply to point out that the individual is not merely a sponge soaking up culture. In Chapter 12, it will be seen that because of biological and temperamental differences, unique life experiences, and other factors, one person's version of the culture is different from another's, even if both are members of the same family. Furthermore, the individual is the instrument initiating culture change. Rebellious and unconventional though he may be, the major portion of his personality, nonetheless, reflects the cultural influences already mentioned.

Culture as Social Control

Culture fulfills its third function, that of ensuring the unity and survival of society, by (1) providing patterns for the

behavior of individuals and groups within the society, (2) providing means of teaching individuals to behave according to these patterns, or "rules of the game," and (3) providing means of enforcing correct behavior. (You will notice we have not said, "*Culture* teaches the individual to behave and enforces his correct behavior"; culture is the *pattern,* groups and individuals put the patterns into action.)

All these three very closely related functions of culture are aspects of *social control,* the means by which society establishes and maintains order. Every society has a system of social control. Does this mean that no one living in society is really free? Are not freedom and control contradictory terms?

Since the individual cannot exist without society, and society cannot function without controls, the individual's very existence depends upon social control. A child growing up alone, provided in some fantastic fashion with the biological essentials of life—would he be free? Perhaps he would be, in the sense that an animal is free; but he would not be free to develop his potentialities as a human being. Culture provides that freedom; paradoxically enough, it does so by its very nature as a set of patterns for behavior. The individual masters the routine habits of dressing, eating, walking, getting to and from his place of work, using language in speech and reading and writing, and makes them so habitual that they require little conscious thought and effort. These habits free his mind and energy for more creative thought and action and enjoyment of life. Furthermore, by patterning the behavior of many individuals and groups within a society, culture makes it possible to predict the behavior of others, and thus enables the group to function more or less smoothly. Much wasted effort and conflict are eliminated by the control that culture exercises over the behavior of members of a society.

Obviously the system of social control is different from culture to culture. The patterns vary, the methods of indoctrinating the individual vary, and the methods of enforcing adherence to the patterns vary. In some cultures all the life situations are defined for the individual; in others only crucial ones are defined, and a person is left free to make a number of choices.

The cultural norms, the standards or patterns of behavior expected by a group may be classified as customs (folkways and mores), laws, and the systems of folkways, mores, and laws called institutions. These group expectations govern a great portion of behavior in every society. There is, however, some margin for undefined acts or *permissive behavior* in which the individual chooses his own way of doing things with no fear of social disapproval or punishment. This margin is relatively greater

in urban society than in rural or nonliterate societies. There are also less enduring forms of cultural behavior such as fads, fashions, and crazes.


Customs. Customs are group habits. They are usually classified into two main types, differing not in kind, but in degree of importance to the society and degree of compulsion attached to their observance. These two general types of customs are *folkways* and *mores.*

Folkways. Folkways are behavior patterns that define the proper, accepted way of doing things. They arose long ago, gradually and by chance; and as they were passed from one generation to another, they developed the authority of tradition. (This much of our description also holds true of the mores.) The folkways govern most of the routine of daily living and ordinary contacts with other people. A person who does not conform to the folkways is regarded as rude, ignorant, uncouth, or just "queer."

Many folkways, like language, money, systems of weights and measures, driving on the right- or left-hand side of the road, and the like, are purely arbitrary conveniences. Others are rituals of behavior, like the method of celebrating a girl's coming of age, the number of meals per day (our "three squares" and a snack), or business hours (nine to five, or in Latin America eight to six with two hours in midday when all stores and offices are closed up tight for a siesta). Folkways define "men's work" and "women's work." They set up ideals for gentlemanly or ladylike conduct. They provide patterns for greeting friends, from the casual "Hi!" we Americans so often use to the elaborate hat-doffing, hand shaking, shoulder-patting routine, accompanied by inquiries after one's health and that of one's entire family, which is typical of encounters between middle-class Costa Ricans. The folkways govern our general style of housing, dress, recreation, child-rearing, courtship, and so on. Folkways compose the large underlying body of custom that is strongly rooted in tradition and are by no means superficial or transitory.

Nonetheless, folkways change. The authors can remember when their mothers disapproved of lipstick, nail polish, bobbed hair, and women's smoking; so strongly, in fact, that one might say they considered it not only improper, but verging upon the immoral to use them. Three decades later both mothers use lipstick and wear their hair short; one smokes an occasional cigarette and uses nail polish. Another folkway that is changing is the custom of rising for women on the bus or trolley. Today, probably employing the rationalization that women are competing with them in the workaday world and that even the shopping housewives are







Inland Steel; Canada: National Film Board; British Information Service; Canada: National Film Board



CULTURAL SYMBOLS OF AUTHORITY

St. Peter's in Rome is meaningful to Catholics all over the world; the uniform of Canada's Governor General is traditionally associated with British imperial authority; the Asantehene on the African Gold Coast heads a local hierarchy; the Queen of England personifies British values.

probably less tired than they are (what with all their labor-saving conveniences!), men rarely offer their seats to women. In fact, those who rise for expectant mothers or those with small children, or for elderly or ill-looking women, are most often matrons who can readily sympathize with others of their own sex. From a rational standpoint, strong young men and women, say of high-school and college age, should be the least in need of seats, but they seem to feel that their classmates would regard them as "sissy" if they made such a polite gesture.

Some behavior patterns are of such recent origin and so closely associated with new technological developments that they can hardly be called folkways. A convenient term for them is *technicways*. These are often skills, such as driving an auto and using modern appliances, or behaviors, such as watching movies or TV.

Mores. Mores are those customs that are considered vital to the welfare of the group. Mores are not simply proper, like folkways; they are



"Remember, Harriet, you must be tolerant—They have different mores down here!"

obligatory. They are intimately tied up with the dominant values of the culture, and like values they are often so deeply imbedded in the personalities of individuals, so taken for granted, that they are not verbalized or consciously formulated. The mores define right and wrong, moral and immoral, without having to answer "Why?" Their violation brings strong disapproval, ostracism, or punishment by others, and produces

a sense of sin or wrong-doing in the violator. They may be expressed in terms of "must-behavior" or "Thou shalt"; or they may be negative mores, "Thou shalt not," in which case they are *taboos.*

In our culture, the mores include wearing a certain amount of clothing, having only one husband or wife at a time, and being loyal to our country. Bigamy, murder, theft, treason, and incest are among our taboos.

The mores can make anything right. Like folkways, mores vary from culture to culture. In some cultures it is moral to have several wives, to wear only a loincloth, or to be loyal to a leader whom others would regard as a tyrant. In others it is considered right to kill baby girls or helpless old people. Cannibalism has been considered moral in some cultures. In fact, cannibals are shocked at the conduct of modern warfare—to slaughter our enemies and then allow all those bodies to go to waste! Even incest, which is almost universally tabooed, has been moral in some societies under certain situations. The Ptolemies of Egypt were considered too royal to marry anyone but a brother or sister.

The folkways of other cultures are apt to strike us as interesting, amusing, exotic, colorful, and fantastic. The mores are likely, if they differ sharply from our own, to shock and horrify us; we cannot conceive of such behavior; it is wrong, sinful, immoral. Other peoples often feel the same way about our customs, though anthropologists have found that some presumably primitive peoples are much more tolerant of strange ways than we are.

Mores, like folkways, are subject to change, but somewhat more painfully and slowly than the folkways. Some customs pass from the mores into the folkways, but while they are changing it is hard to tell just which they are. The changing attitude toward women's smoking is a case in point. Some groups in our society still consider the practice immoral; in others it has become a folkway; but in general it is "permissive behavior," open to individual choice. The use of contraceptives is another example. The attitude of the Catholic Church and the legal restrictions put on dissemination of information indicate that contraception is still considered a violation of the mores in a substantial portion of our society. Statistics, however, indicate that the use of contraceptives is passing into the realm of permissive behavior. Premarital chastity is still in the mores, still an ideal pattern, but research shows that the real pattern deviates considerably. Slavery was once considered moral; it is now clearly immoral in our culture. But while the change in attitude was taking place, bitter conflict almost tore American society apart permanently.

There are other less compulsive patterns of cultural behavior. *Convention* and *etiquette* are special kinds of folkways. People are aware that there is no deep meaning to them, but they are matters of convenience in

social relations, they smooth the way and make a person comfortable. Knowing when to wear what clothes, how to invite and reply to invitations, are expectations of certain social groups. A person's standing in the social pyramid is often judged by the ease with which he observes the conventions and rules of etiquette.

Fashions and fads. Fashions and fads are instances of highly transitory patterns of behavior. They, too, are cultural patterns, however, for as Kingsley Davis says, "Curiously, the human animal manages to be a conformist even when he is seeking change." [1] Fashion appears to be most prominent in a complex urban society where the class system is not rigid, where one is judged largely by externals. In our culture, for example, fashions are followed by the majority of women. The wealthy initiate style changes, but in an incredibly short time copies are seen in the windows of low-priced dress shops. Fads are fashions that alternate very quickly, are utterly superficial, and have an irrational and intense fascination, particularly for adolescents. High-school students are especially subject to swiftly changing fads in wearing apparel and dance steps. Crazes are much like fads. Examples are the Pyramid Club of 1949 and the chain letter craze that still pops up occasionally and dies down just as fast. Their fascination for adults is remarkable.

Sally, your college classmate, wears something to cover herself because the mores (buttressed by law) dictate it. For the sake of modesty she would not dream of coming to ciass unclothed. The fact that she wears a sweater and skirt instead of an East Indian sari or a Japanese kimono may be traced to the folkways of our culture. Hearkening to convention, she wears her sweater and skirt to class instead of her Saturday costume of blue jeans and her dad's old shirt. Etiquette will dictate that she change to a long dress, evening slippers, and dainty bag, and wear a corsage sent by her escort when she attends a formal dance. The length of her skirt, the lines of her sweater, and the colors she chooses are dictated by fashion. Her wearing Coronation costume jewelry in the spring of 1953, like a large percentage of the other girls in the class, was a fad. She considered it fun, the latest thing, a sign that she was "hep." In high school she may have worn one red sock and one green sock, or dyed a lock of her hair silver or blue, to be "different" and yet "in the swim."

Laws. The folkways and mores set the pattern for most behavior in a small and unified society. In more complex societies, where different groups within the society have different folkways and mores, a special organization is necessary to formulate laws to coordinate the behavior of these groups sufficiently so the society can continue to function. Although

folkways and mores are usually followed without much conscious reflection, *laws* are deliberately formulated, clearly stated rules of behavior enforced by a special authority. Many laws enforce the mores. Monogamy, responsibility for the welfare of wife and children, and the taboos against murder, theft, and rape are all reinforced by law. But in a dynamic society, new situations constantly arise that are not covered by custom. The invention of railroads, automobiles, radios, airplanes, and television have all necessitated legal regulation. Laws also meet crises in which traditional ways prove ineffectual. During the depression, the old ways of doing business left many people hungry and ill-clothed, and the government had to enact laws to provide for them.

Occasionally laws are enacted that are really contrary to the mores, or if in a moral category, are not backed up by the mores. Their passage comes about through the influence of pressure groups. Drinking was not tabooed by the mores, and as a result many people violated prohibition. Traffic regulations are not a part of the mores; that is why so many people brag about getting away with violations. The most effective laws are firmly grounded in the mores.

Law may, however, be used as an instrument of social reform, especially where the real patterns do not coincide with ideal patterns. Americans like to speak about equality of opportunity. In actual practice we are guilty of discrimination in housing, education, employment, and other fields. Fair Employment Practices Acts and Federal Supreme Court decisions against state-upheld discriminatory practices have operated to bring real behavior more closely in line with the ideal patterns. Often legislation and judicial decisions prove so-called "practical" objections invalid, and thus bring about real social change.

Institutions. Institutions are not distinct from and additional to folkways, mores, and laws. "An *institution* can be defined as a *set* of interwoven folkways, mores and laws built around one or more functions." [2] "It is essentially a *pattern* of usages which define the roles of the participating group members in such a way that their aims may be achieved through the resulting cooperative behavior. . . . Any institution is a pattern that is definite and stable enough to be passed on from one generation to another." [3]

An obvious example of an institution is the family. Clustering around the functions of mating, reproduction, and child-rearing, which are essential to the perpetuation of society, and of gratification of the individual's sexual drives and his need for security and affection, are numerous folkways and mores and laws. In our culture, dates, engagement rings, honeymoons, bridal showers, and homes apart from the in-laws are among the

folkways associated with marriage. Mores include pre-marital chastity, postmarital fidelity, monogamy, and rights and duties of husband and wife to one another and to their children. A legal framework has grown up to support the mores: licenses, legal ceremonies, laws against bigamy and non-support, laws providing for divorce under certain conditions, laws against intermarriage of close relatives, and, in certain states, of members of different racial groups, laws against marriage of children under a certain age without parental consent, and so forth.

Institutions are of two types. The family is a *crescive* institution; that is, it arose and assumed its present form gradually and without deliberate planning. A college, a museum, or a library is an *enacted* institution, deliberately conceived and organized.

The concept of institutions is an extremely fruitful one for the study of culture, society, and personality. Therefore, we shall employ it through a large section of the book, analyzing the chief institutions such as the family, recreation, education, religion, government, and politics, and their relation to one another. "The quickest way to envisage the total social order of a society is to understand its major institutions and the relations between these institutions." [4]

Social control as a supplement to socialization. The folkways and mores, then, buttressed and supplemented when necessary by law and organized around central functions into institutions, are the patterns provided by culture. They are taught to the members of society by a process of *socialization* or enculturation, the most important part of which is accomplished in childhood by the family, the educational system, and the play group. The patterns are taught so early and so thoroughly that they become part of the person's emotional and psychological make-up. He is "good" because he wants to be good, because he has the habit of being good. His ways are the ways of the group. His interests and values are determined without conscious thought on his part.

Of course this process of socialization is not complete and perfect. In a disorganized society with conflicting values and patterns, it may be far from adequate. Therefore, the mechanisms for enforcing proper behavior, the techniques of social control, must be brought into play. These are largely informal in the family and neighborhood, and in simple societies are effective preventives. "What will people say?" is a strong deterrent to improper or immoral behavior, especially in an integrated culture. Parents and teachers use threats, commands, rewards and punishments, praise, and ridicule. Fear is associated with taboos. The threat of force (tar and feathers, or a "necktie party" in the rough-and-ready society of the Old West) may also keep people in line. Public shame or

ridicule is highly effective. Ostracism by a person's family or community or church is resorted to in the case of extremely serious offenses against the mores.

But in a more complex society, public opinion, conscience, and other informal controls are insufficient; and legal authorities must be given the task of detecting and punishing offenses against the mores as enacted into law. In such a society, too, there are many groups with special interests who resort to such deliberate techniques of social control as propaganda. Such methods will be discussed in connection with politics, economics, and other institutions.

6

ETHNOCENTRISM

As the individual is socialized, he comes to feel that "the axis of the earth runs right through his home town." A person's belief that his own group and culture are superior to all others is called *ethnocentrism* (from the Greek *ethnos* or nation).

Universality of Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism is a universal phenomenon; every group sets "us" off from "them." "We" are the center, and all others are scaled in reference to us; *our* ways are "human nature," our motivations inevitable. The Greeks thought those who spoke no Greek "babbled"; hence our word "barbarian." The Finnish immigrants in Minnesota and Michigan speak of all who do not know their language as "toiskielinen"


or "othertongued." The Navahos call themselves "The People," and Eskimos refer to themselves as "Men." The San Blas Cuna believe that they are of the noblest origin and the first created of all peoples. The Chinese called their country "The Middle Kingdom." Walking down a street in Peking with a journalist one day, I (the senior author) heard a child call to his mother as we went by. My companion translated for me, "There go two foreign devils!" Visiting a Japanese schoolroom, I was struck by a brilliantly colored map on the wall. Right in the middle, where the United States belonged (so I felt, for thus I had always seen it) was Japan. The United States was relegated to the fringes of the earth.

We Americans are prone to boast that ours is the richest country in the world, the one with the highest standard of living, the most democratic, the freest, and the most advanced technologically. Our cultural heritage includes a belief in "progress" that many cultures lack. This assurance in turn reinforces the feeling that other groups are inferior and that we are doing them a favor if we change them to fit our pattern. Ethnocentrism does not by any means always include this attitude. Many peoples, although believing they are somehow "chosen," tolerantly ignore other cultures or brush them aside as "different" without any zeal for dominating or reforming them.

Ethnocentrism is not identical with nationalism, though nationalism is the most prominent—and dangerous—form of ethnocentrism today. Belief in the superiority of one's group may range from pride in one's community or home town, one's school or fraternity, to pride in one's state, or to more insidious and socially disruptive forms such as racism, class solidarity and antagonism, religious bigotry, and zealous and belligerent patriotism.

Inevitability of Ethnocentrism

This feeling of the superiority of one's own group, this tendency to judge others by one's own standards, is practically inevitable. Society *teaches* its members to be ethnocentric, both through the informal processes of socialization and social control and through deliberate teaching by school, church, and government. The ways of the group seem natural, right and human; our moral standards, our values, are the only standards we have for judging behavior. We may be willing, as we become aware that there are other groups with other ways, to think in terms of their cultural values; but we are unable to. Our thinking starts from




Reprinted with permission of copyright owner

certain premises, that of participants of other cultures starts from different premises. So with equal logic we and they arrive at different conclusions.

A favorite current topic of jokes and cartoons is the Russian propensity for claiming credit for all major inventions. Their ethnocentrism, de-

"Set It Down Anywhere. We're Overcrowded Already!"



From The Herblock Book, *Beacon Press*

liberately fostered by their leaders, has a lesser counterpart in other societies. Few of us are aware of how little of our own culture we have created. Ralph Linton's classic description of a "100 per cent American" drives home the point that ignorance of a culture's many and varied sources fosters ethnocentrism.

There can be no question about the average American's Americanism or his desire to preserve this precious heritage at all costs. Nevertheless, some insidious foreign ideas have already wormed their way

into his civilization without his realizing what was going on. Thus dawn finds the unsuspecting patriot garbed in pajamas, a garment of Indian origin; and lying in a bed built on a pattern which originated in either Persia or Asia Minor. He is muffled to the ears in un-American materials: cotton, first domesticated in India; linen, domesticated in the Near East; wool from an animal native to Asia Minor; or silk whose uses were first discovered by the Chinese. All these substances have been transformed into clothes by methods invented in Southwestern Asia. If the weather is cold enough, he may even be sleeping under an eider-down quilt invented in Scandinavia.

On awakening he glances at the clock, a medieval European invention, uses one potent Latin word in abbreviated form, rises in haste, and goes to the bathroom. Here, if he stops to think about it, he must feel himself in the presence of a great American institution; he will have heard stories of both the quality and frequency of foreign plumbing and will know that in no other country does the average man perform his ablutions in the midst of such splendor. But the insidious foreign influence pursues him even here. Glass was invented by the ancient Egyptians, the use of glazed tiles for floors and walls in the Near East, porcelain in China, and the art of enameling on metal by Mediterranean artisans of the Bronze Age. Even his bathtub and toilet are but slightly modified copies of Roman originals. The only purely American contribution to the ensemble is the steam radiator.

In this bathroom the American washes with soap invented by the ancient Gauls. Next, he cleans his teeth, a subversive European practice which did not invade America until the latter part of the eighteenth century. He then shaves, a masochistic rite first developed by the heathen priests of ancient Egypt and Sumer. The process is made less of a penance by the fact that his razor is of steel, an iron-carbon alloy discovered in either India or Turkestan. Lastly, he dries himself on a Turkish towel.

Returning to the bedroom, the unconscious victim of un-American practices removes his clothes from a chair, invented in the Near East, and proceeds to dress. He puts on close-fitting tailored garments whose form derives from the skin clothing of the ancient nomads of the Asiatic steppes and fastens them with buttons whose prototypes appeared in Europe at the close of the Stone Age. This costume is appropriate enough for outdoor exercise in a cold climate, but is quite unsuited to American summers, steam-heated houses, and Pullmans. Nevertheless, foreign ideas and habits hold the unfortunate man in thrall even when common sense tells him that the authentically American costume of gee string and moccasins would be far more comfort-

able. He puts on his feet stiff coverings made from hide prepared by a process invented in ancient Egypt and cut to a pattern which can be traced back to ancient Greece, and makes sure they are properly polished, also a Greek idea. Lastly he ties about his neck a strip of bright-colored cloth which is a vestigial survival of the shoulder shawls worn by seventeenth-century Croats. He gives himself a final appraisal in the mirror, an old Mediterranean invention, and goes downstairs to breakfast.

Here a whole new series of foreign things confronts him. His food and drink are placed before him in pottery vessels, the popular name of which—china—is sufficient evidence of their origin. His fork is a medieval Italian invention and his spoon a copy of a Roman original. He will usually begin the meal with coffee, an Abyssinian plant first discovered by the Arabs. The American is quite likely to need it to dispel the morning-after effects of over-indulgence in fermented drinks, invented in the Near East; or distilled ones, invented by the alchemists of Medieval Europe. Whereas the Arabs took their coffee straight, he will probably sweeten it with sugar, discovered in India, and dilute it with cream; both the domestication of cattle and the technique of milking having originated in Asia Minor.

If our patriot is old-fashioned enough to adhere to the so-called American breakfast, his coffee will be accompanied by an orange, domesticated in the Mediterranean region, a cantaloupe domesticated in Persia, or grapes, domesticated in Asia Minor. He will follow this with a bowl of cereal made from grain domesticated in the Near East and prepared by methods also invented there. From this he will go on to waffles, a Scandinavian invention, with plenty of butter, originally a Near-Eastern cosmetic. As a side dish he may have the egg of a bird domesticated in Southeastern Asia or strips of the flesh of an animal domesticated in the same region, which have been salted and smoked by a process invented in Northern Europe.

Breakfast over, he places upon his head a molded piece of felt, invented by the nomads of Eastern Asia, and, if it looks like rain, puts on outer shoes of rubber, discovered by the ancient Mexicans, and takes an umbrella, invented in India. He then sprints for his train—the train, not the sprinting, being an English invention. At the station he pauses for a moment to buy a newspaper, paying for it with coins invented in ancient Lydia. Once on board he settles back to inhale the fumes of a cigarette invented in Mexico, or a cigar invented in Brazil. Meanwhile, he reads the news of the day, imprinted in characters invented by the ancient Semites by a process invented in Germany upon a material invented in China. As he scans the latest editorial pointing

out the dire results to our institutions of accepting foreign ideas, he will not fail to thank a Hebrew God in an Indo-European language that he is a one-hundred per cent (decimal system invented by the Greeks) American (from Americus Vespucci, Italian geographer).[1]

Advantages of Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism is not altogether to be condemned. It has certain definite advantages for the "we-group" and its individual members. It makes for social integration, reduces conflicts within the group (by deflecting many frustrations outward), and promotes cultural stability and uniformity. If what we do is right and natural and human, why change? Joe may be a tightwad and a prude, but he is an American so he's better than any foreigner! In a nation at war ethnocentrism is obviously an asset, and is fostered by various means.

Besides holding the group together, ethnocentrism is psychologically satisfying to the individual. The lowly substitute's ego is enhanced if he is a member of a championship team, however little he may personally have to do with the team's success. Similarly, all America basked in the reflected glory of Charles Lindbergh's successful Atlantic flight. The barefoot Costa Rican coffee worker, riddled with intestinal parasites and weighed down by poverty, is proud, because he has been taught that his country is the most advanced in Central America. A person participates vicariously in all sorts of wonderful things that other members of his group have or do.

Disadvantages of Ethnocentrism

But the harmful effects of ethnocentrism outweigh its advantages, for the following reasons. First, extreme ethnocentrism is accompanied by a sense of satisfaction with the status quo—things as they are—and a resentment toward any healthy questioning of conditions or suggestions of ways to improve the cultural and social order. Social changes, when they come, then prove much more disruptive and violent than a gradual process of intelligently guided change.

Second, our modern society is highly complex, with its parts interdependent, and no group within such a society can live in a vacuum. Extreme ethnocentrism in subcultural groups in our society incites con-

flict *among* them, or at best prevents them from working together as effectively as they might for the good of the whole society. Intolerance and misunderstanding among racial, religious, and nationality groups is due largely to each group's conviction of superiority.

Most important of all, ethnocentrism prevents nations from working together effectively to solve their mutual problems and settle their disagreements. A narrow nationalism is the chief stumbling block to really



British Information Service

OVERCOMING ETHNOCENTRISM

The Asian Club of teachers and students in London quizzes an English novelist; thus East and West achieve greater mutual understanding.

effective world organization. Ethnocentrism, when displayed by people from one culture in their dealings with people from another, breeds ill will. We have heard American tourists who apparently think that any of "these dumb Latin Americans who can't even speak English" will understand them if they just shout loud enough. Only an extreme conviction of the superiority of English over native cultures enabled the British to

rationalize their imperialism in terms of "The White Man's Burden." Europeans and Americans in their contacts with what are now called "underdeveloped" rather than "backward" areas have been especially prone to tread roughshod over the cultures of other peoples, bringing confusion and disorganization to many societies. As the anthropologist Melville Herskovits says, "Acceptance of European beliefs and values, coupled with the withholding of opportunities to achieve an equitable way of life under them—the most common form, over the world, of the contradictory situation that ensues on the imposition of Euroamerican controls—induces bewilderment, despair and cynicism." [2] Fortunately, it seems that Britain and America, at least, have come to realize the importance of respecting the cultures of others and are trying to atone for their unenlightened past. On the other hand, there are still many in our country who insist we must be *more* rather than less ethnocentric, who see the United Nations as a threat to "Americanism" and believe a narrow conformity is essential to true loyalty. This attitude closes the door to effective international cooperation.

Cultural Relativity

The best antidote to the poison of extreme ethnocentrism lies in making an honest attempt to grasp the culture concept in all its implications through reading anthropology and the other social sciences, through travel, and through exchange of students, teachers, and technicians. Thus we can counterbalance our natural ethnocentrism with an attitude of cultural relativity.

Cultural relativity is an attitude of respect for cultural differences. It involves the realization that each culture has its own values and should not be judged by those of another; that each body of custom has an inherent dignity and meaning; that one's own culture is but one among many, which he happens to prefer because he grew up in it.

Cultural relativity does not imply that "all systems of moral values, all concepts of right and wrong, are founded on such shifting sands that there is no need for morality, for proper behavior, for ethical conduct." [3] (This is a crucial point, for upon it rests much of the uninformed criticism of social science.) We are suspicious of relativity, because we are taught morality and truth and beauty in terms of absolutes, of either-or, of black and white, of extremes with little shading between; and we tend to think that to accept the validity of other moral codes is to abandon our own. But to say that each culture develops its own moral codes, its own standards of truth and beauty, is not to deny morality, truth, and beauty.

The set of standards by which each group guides its life is as valid *for them* as our own is for us. Morality, truth, and beauty are values in every culture, though they take different forms.

Nor does cultural relativity mean that an individual need not abide by the codes of his own culture, that he is "emancipated" from social control. The ways that are right for a South Sea Islander are not right for us, because they do not fit into our cultural pattern. We do not read anthropology like a seed catalog, deciding to try this custom and that. The exotic plant would not fit into our garden. An intelligent understanding of cultural differences does not prompt a person to kick over the traces and say, "Oh, boy! What haven't I been missing!" Instead, it impresses him with the necessity of a certain degree of conformity to the code of the group, both for his own satisfaction and for the unity and survival of the group. Although cultural relativity means respect for other ways, it does not mean loss of respect for our own. A person may decide, after rational reflection, that his own ways are the best, or the best for his group, or the best for him to follow, since it is important to adjust to his own group. Even the most objective social scientist is hardly likely to abandon the dominant folkways and mores of his culture. A comfortable, orderly life hinges on a reasonable degree of living according to group expectations. As Clyde Kluckhohn says, anthropology does not destroy standards or "the useful tyranny of the normal."[4] It does teach us, as Ruth Benedict points out, to grant to other cultures the same significance to their participants that we recognize in our own.[5]

Nor does cultural relativity mean that all cultures are equally "good." This would be as dangerous a fallacy as that of extreme ethnocentrism. It is a precarious thing, indeed, to judge cultures, but they can be measured against two criteria: How well do they fulfill the basic functions of protection of the individual and preservation of the society? How well do they satisfy the needs and wants they themselves create; that is, how well do they live up to their own values and goals? Other standards also may be used. We Americans use our own pride in bigness, speed, and material advancement as a yardstick by which we estimate other cultures. The Latin nations judge in terms of art, literature, music, and enjoyment of life. Even anthropologists use measuring devices such as freedom for individual variation, lack of conflict in interpersonal relations, the zest and vigor that the cultural orientation lends to existence, and the absence of indications of maladjustment, such as insanity, family disorganization, and the like. We *can* judge other cultures, but we must be conscious of the criteria we are using and admit that other criteria might produce other results.

Value of the Culture Concept

In spite of the fact that cultural relativity does not emancipate us from the social controls of our own group, there are many advantages to be had from the comparative study of cultures. A person cannot understand human behavior merely from looking at his own culture. Small isolated societies with nonliterate cultures serve as "laboratories of social forms." As various cultures are studied, the importance of cultural conditioning to human behavior becomes apparent, and a person can distinguish somewhat between truly "human," i.e., universal, behavior and that shaped by specific cultures.

An understanding of human behavior gives an individual a more objective attitude toward his own culture. "Those who know no culture other than their own cannot know their own," says Linton.[6] Knowing the possible range of human behavior, a person can look at his own with somewhat more detachment, though he can never escape its emotional values entirely. He can evaluate his own institutions, using those of other cultures as a yardstick. If he still prefers his own, as he probably will because of early emotional conditioning, at least he does so with a more enlightened allegiance. Furthermore, this person grows more tolerant of socially harmless deviations from the pattern, less demanding of rigid conformity to every custom.

A grasp of the culture concept opens up a new perspective on history. As Stuart Chase says,

> Formal history with its Caesars and Napoleons tends to be a record of the abnormal, the geniuses, sports, freaks, and misfits, the glandular cases of mankind. It stands the social pyramid on its apex. The culture concept puts it back on its base. The kings and warriors are dramatic, true enough, but the real story concerns the society which protected its children and organized its food supply down through the ages.[7]

Finally, the culture concept provides a new and more hopeful approach to social problems (quite aside from the important fact that an attitude of cultural relativity will in itself go far toward solving such problems as are based on prejudice). This does not mean that drastic reforms can be accomplished overnight, for culture itself is a brake on social change. In human affairs there is no such thing as a completely fresh start; no one can wipe clean the slate of tradition and past experience. In effecting any reform, the would-be reformer must be realistic and

take into account the values and customs involved. "No reform can ever bear fruit unless it is grafted successfully to the living tree of culture." [8]

Nonetheless, an understanding of culture produces an objective approach to social problems that is essential to their effective solution. A person can study foreign or nonliterate cultures with greater detachment than his own, because his emotions are not involved; then he can see his own more clearly. We tend to become so attached to the dominant traits of our own civilization that they are likely to get out of hand; then there is danger that revision will come only by revolution or breakdown. Inability to appraise our own institutions shuts off the possibility of orderly progress.

The culture concept also encourages optimism regarding the eventual solution of social problems. If the people of a warlike nation were "born that way," little could be done to change them. But they are aggressive because their culture has shaped them that way, and there is hope that eventually they will change and that this change can be intelligently guided. If the rapist, the thief, or the murderer were fulfilling an inborn instinct, there would never be a decline in the incidence of crime. However, he is shaped largely by his life situation, including his culture; under different circumstances he might have been a good citizen.

Recognizing the great influence of culture on the individual does not mean abandoning entirely the ideas of individual responsibility and free will. In fact, the realization that culture is man-made places the responsibility for man's destiny squarely on his own shoulders. Man does change his culture. Why then should he not be expected to apply the resources and knowledge now at his command in a constructive way, aiming always for the conservation of human values?


7


SOCIETY: THE SYSTEM OF GROUP RELATIONSHIPS


Culture, we noted in Chapter 3, is the way of life of a society. Now we will look at the society itself from another point of view—as a system of relationships among its members.

Social Organization

The word "society," like the word "culture," is used in several ways in everyday language. To some people "society" may refer to the elite who summer in Newport and Bar Harbor, or to an organization such as "The Society for the Preservation and Advancement of Barber Shop Quartet Singing in America." To the social scientist, however, *a society is the organization of social relationships of a group of people sharing a common culture and a sense of common identity.*







William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, Sociology, *2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950).*

PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATION

These charts illustrate how effectively people can operate under adequate organization. 1. Organization of a corporation. 2. Organization of a football play. 3. Army organization on battlefield.

This definition says many things at once and needs further study. Basically, society starts with an aggregate of people, but the mere fact that these people are in physical proximity does not make them a social group. A *social group* exists when two or more people are in contact and mutually aware of one another. This contact may be direct or indirect, but it invariably involves *communication* on a symbolic level, whether by gesture or language, and the behavior of each member modifies that of the others. The members of the group, in other words, stimulate and respond to one another and respond in common to stimuli from outside the group. *This mutual stimulation and response of individuals and groups* is *social interaction.*

When interaction recurs often enough so that we can perceive a pattern of behavior, a *social relation* exists. This relationship is always *reciprocal;* that is, it involves at least two people, and the behavior of each person derives its meaning from his relation to the other person or persons involved. The relationships of father and son, friend and friend, employer and employee, or soldier and enemy are meaningful only when understood as *reciprocal* relationships.

These social relations are *organized* into a pattern of reciprocal statuses and roles. *A status is a collection of rights and duties that goes with a position in a group.* Age, sex, kinship, and marriage define statuses in all societies; in most societies rank, occupation, class, and other considerations also define statuses. The statuses into which a person is born are *ascribed* statuses. An *achieved* status is one an individual may reach by his own efforts or through some stroke of good fortune.

The pattern of behavior that accompanies a status is a social role. Any one individual occupies a number of statuses and plays different roles at different periods of his life and in the different social groups to which he belongs. One man may within one day play the roles of father, son, husband, boss, underling, church member, poker crony, PTA president, customer, neighbor, host, guest, casual acquaintance, intimate friend, and voter depending upon which social relationship is in effect at any particular time. His behavior in any one role is largely patterned by cultural norms—the folkways, mores, and laws of his society that set forth the right and proper and legal ways of doing things. These patterns of group expectations, together with the sanctions that enforce them, are the basis of social organization and enable the society to function and to fulfill its main purposes—protection of the individual and perpetuation of the group itself.

A social group, then, *is "a given aggregate of people playing interrelated roles and recognized by themselves or others as a unit of interaction."* [1] This definition may apply to such small, close-knit groups as







Detroit Free Press; Canada: National Film Board; British Information Service

COOPERATION AND COMPETITION

Competition is a value in American culture, accepted in education as well as in other fields. Cooperation is essential in mountain climbing; it is in itself a value in many cultures, as among these Africans threshing grain.


cause of the interdependence of persons that results from the division of labor. In a small face-to-face group, one is often aware of cooperating, as he helps with the dishes, holds his mother's yarn while she rolls it, works on the school paper, or catches a pass in a football game. In the small nonliterate society of the San Blas Cuna, cooperation is one of the chief cultural values, consciously used to channel the interaction of members in farming, fishing, and housebuilding.

In a highly complex society such as ours, division of labor is carried to such extremes that cooperation is even more necessary than in the small society. Members of the society may not often be aware of cooperating as they go about their daily routine; but all the traffic of a city, the schedule of a university, the buying and selling of the stores, depend upon cooperation. When you stop for a red light, when you appear in class at the same hour as your instructor and classmates, when you answer the telephone or doorbell, even when you reply to an acquaintance's greeting, you are cooperating. In order to get to your destination without being interrupted by a traffic policeman, you must allow traffic in cross streets to go across when the light is in their favor; you and the other drivers are cooperating so all can arrive at their destinations without confusion or danger. The large city would be an impossibility without these arrangements for cooperation.

Competition and conflict. Competition and conflict are social processes that are distinct in certain important respects but so alike in others that sometimes it is hard to tell where competition leaves off and conflict begins. *Competition is the striving of two or more persons for the same goal, which is limited so that all cannot share it.* The competing persons or groups may or may not be aware of one another. Their primary aim is to get the satisfaction for themselves, not to defeat or destroy their competitors. When they are aware of their competitors, as in a football game or a political campaign, the culture has laid down certain rules of fair play for the situation, and the losers are supposed to bow to the decision with good grace.

Like cooperation, competition is present in all cultures. In any society, people will compete for status according to the cultural values. The San Blas Cuna measure status by stored or hoarded wealth and by adherence to the moral norms; therefore the Cuna compete to hoard "white man's goods" and to abide by the mores. In a monastery where piety and austerity are the chief values, status may be won by the monks who most zealously deny themselves physical comforts and spend much time in devotions. Among both the Cuna and the monks, however, cooperation is the predominant value.

Competition is a conspicuous element in much interaction occurring in a society where many statuses can be achieved, whether in jobs, politics, business, school and college, sports, and even in the family ("Mommy, do you love me best?"). Our culture is distinguished for making competition a positive value, a "good thing." We are convinced that while cooperation gets things done, competition assures that they will be *well* done.



By permission, from Sociology, An Analysis of Life in Modern Society, *by Arnold W. Green. Copyright, 1952. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.*

COOPERATION, COMPETITION, AND OVERT CONFLICT

Conflict is "the deliberate attempt to oppose, resist, or coerce the will of another or others." [4] As in competitive situations, a goal may be desired that all cannot share, but instead of impersonally competing to attain it the persons or groups involved direct their efforts at defeating or annihilating the other parties pursuing the same goal. Although a person may

or may not be aware of competitors, he is always aware of the other parties in conflict. A student who gets the only "A" in a small class denies that satisfaction to others who might have won it had he not excelled. He may have been aware of the other good students in the class, but he was not in conflict with them, for his efforts were aimed not at their defeat but at getting the "A" for himself. He used fair tactics, studying hard, passing his exams, writing a good term paper. Winning the hand of a popular girl denies others the privilege of marrying her, but conflict is not present unless two suitors quarrel over her. And the losers are supposed to congratulate the successful suitor and dance at the wedding.

Because the aims and purposes of different individuals and groups are inevitably incompatible, conflict is always present in society. A mother slaps her toddler's hands when he takes books and knickknacks off the shelves. Playmates fight over a toy or come to blows if one of them feels his ego has been damaged by being called a "sissy." A wife calls her husband "darling" before guests with icy sweetness, continuing a conflict begun before they arrived when she reminded him that no one really cared to hear about his hole-in-one again. Racial groups riot in the streets; laborers picket a plant; public figures accuse and counter-accuse through the newspapers; a revolutionary group overthrows a shah or president; one country attacks another and a war is on. Obviously the potentialities for conflict multiply with the number of groups in a society; their incompatible interests and values set the stage for conflict.

Although competition may go on for long periods of time, conflict by its very nature is intermittent. Latent conflict or tension may, however, exist for long periods before erupting into open conflict in the form of riots, strikes, revolutions, or wars. Tension between the native Panamanians and the Forty-niners who crossed the Isthmus and waited for ships to take them to the gold fields of California existed for years. Then a small spark set it off. A rough-and-ready American refused to pay for a slice of watermelon and a riot began that ended in death and injury to many persons.

Conflict may have positive results. The baby coming into conflict with his mother is developing his sense of self. The group in conflict with another group is strengthened in its "we" feeling. Conflicts within the group may dissolve or be temporarily checked by the threat from without. If an outsider attempts to interfere in a fight between two brothers, both may jump on the intruder. Families and nations alike prefer to reserve the right of criticism to their own kind, and band together against criticism from outside. Conflict may also clear the air. When husbands and wives refrain from personal abuse and confine a quarrel to issues, they may eliminate points of tension. By harmlessly expressing envy and resent-

ment, jokes and anecdotes lampooning a boss or a government or gossip about a public figure serve as safety valves to let off steam before emotions can explode into open conflict. During a period of social change, conflict serves to define the status of persons and groups; the labor-management conflict of the last few decades is a case in point.

Much conflict, however, is destructive and breeds more problems than it solves. A conflict of values in a person's mind may result in emotional and mental disturbances. The conflict between generations in a time of rapid change or in a situation such as that of immigrant parents and their American-born children causes deep rifts in a family and much unhappiness among its members. Strikes and lockouts mean lost wages, production, and profits. War and the threat of war mean waste of life and property, grief, insecurity, and hate. For this reason men strive through such agencies as social workers, mediation boards, diplomatic parleys, and the United Nations to resolve conflicts before they become destructive.

Accommodation and assimilation. *Conflict is adjusted by the social process called accommodation.* Examples are the truce, the labor-management agreement, and the "racial etiquette" of the South. None of these measures really makes the interests and ends of the opposing groups compatible, but they are arrangements whereby the groups can go about their business without overt conflict. In one sense, accommodation is the basis of all formal social organization. Government, for example, is designed to harmonize the interests of different groups sufficiently so the society can function effectively. Because the potentialities for conflict, the incompatible values and goals, still exist, accommodation may be called "antagonistic cooperation."

Assimilation is the social process whereby individuals and groups come to share the same sentiments, values, and goals. It commonly refers to the absorption of immigrants into the culture of a large modern society such as the United States. It could with equal accuracy be used to describe the process of adjustment in a successful marriage or even the socialization of the growing child; for, as someone has suggested, every society is continually invaded by hordes of barbarians—newborn infants—who must be incorporated into the culture. The cultural assimilation of new members of a society may or may not be accompanied through the years by a process of biological *amalgamation* in which the physical differences of the incoming groups also disappear through intermarriage with members of the receiving group.

Cultural assimilation and biological amalgamation occur most frequently in multi-group societies such as ours. Cooperation, competition, conflict, and accommodation occur in every society, but they are found



Canada: National Film Board

ASSIMILATION

Cultural assimilation of immigrants need not mean loss of their rich and colorful traditions.

in varying proportions depending upon the complexity of the society and the value placed on any one process. The San Blas Cuna stress cooperation; the Kwakiutl Indians of our Pacific Northwest built their culture around competition; the Comanches glorified the warrior and conflict. Counterparts in modern society might be found in Scandinavia, where cooperation is important, in the United States, where competition is believed to promote efficiency, and in Russia, where class conflict on a world-wide basis is the idea justifying and motivating public policy.

Social Change

Most interaction within a society is channeled or guided by rules and understandings; that is, it is *institutional behavior.*

But these rules and understandings do not stay the same generation after generation. "The old order changeth, giving way to the new."

Change in social organization is part of cultural change, and reflects such other cultural changes as new theories and ideas, discoveries, and technological inventions. Social change has many aspects. The size of the society may change. The pattern of its population as distributed over its territory may change, as may the proportion in different age groups. The nature of the contacts among its people inevitably changes with developments in transportation and communication. As roles or patterns of behavior change, it follows that social relationships are altered, interaction processes are affected, and the groups making up the society and the institutions linking the groups also change.

The mechanism of social change is *collective behavior.* Although in a strict sense all social behavior is collective, the sociologist uses this term to embrace *all the types of behavior that are not channelized by institutional norms, where no rules or understandings exist to govern people's actions.*

"The nature of collective behavior is suggested by consideration of such topics as crowds, mobs, panics, manias, dancing crazes, stampedes, mass behavior, public opinion, propaganda, fashion, fads, social movements, revolutions, and reforms." [5] Such examples of collective behavior as a business panic and a state of war hysteria or any condition of social unrest show the elementary and spontaneous nature of the interaction. All customs and institutions have a career that begins in just such spontaneous and groping interaction.

James Thurber's classic sketch, "The Day the Dam Broke," is a report of a stampede set off by fear of a flood and a rumor. Like the cattle in a stampede, people are stimulated directly by the actions of others; they do not pause to interpret or reflect upon them. Such interaction is likely to occur when established ways of doing things become unsatisfying or are interrupted, and unrest develops.

The crowd, the mass, and the public are elementary collective groupings. The *crowd* acts on the basis of aroused impulse. There is a common focus of attention, a feeling of rapport, and a submergence of individual reasoning power in the collective emotion. A lynching mob is one example. Another type of crowd has no common objective or plan of action, but releases its tension in physical movement. This type of crowd behavior may be seen at a street carnival. It is the same type that may give rise to emotionally expressive religious sects.

People excited by some national event such as a scandal or the appearance of a "flying saucer," people flocking to Florida to buy up real estate or to Texas to get in on the oil boom, or people migrating en masse to a

new land are participating in *mass* behavior. The mass is different from the crowd in that its members may not be in physical contact and carry on little or no interaction among themselves. They represent a great variety of local groups and cultures, and they act separately, as individuals, in response to some common interest or stimulus. In modern urban industrialized society, mass behavior is extremely important. Advertising, entertainment, and much production are guided by mass reactions.

A *public* is a group of people confronted by an issue upon which they do not agree and about which they discuss. It is not an established and permanent grouping, for it comes into existence only with an issue and dissolves when the issue is resolved. Instead of submerging their individuality and losing reasoning power as in the crowd, people's critical powers and self-awareness are heightened by argument.

"A society manages to act by following a prescribed rule or consensus; a crowd by developing rapport; and the mass, by the convergence of individual selections. But the public . . . is actually divided . . . there is disagreement as to what the action should be. The public acquires its particular type of unity and manages to act by arriving at a collective decision or by developing a collective opinion . . ." [6] i.e., public opinion.

The great proportion of interaction in modern society that is not guided by institutional norms but comes instead under the heading of crowd or mass behavior or the formation of public opinion is a significant indication of the rapidity of the continuing changes in our social organization. A great social change going on all over the world is the trend from rural to urban living. Although this trend is primarily a shift in the pattern of population distribution, it has been accompanied by such dramatic changes in social contact and communication that statuses, roles, and patterns of interaction in the new urban society are strikingly different in many respects from those in rural society. Therefore, the urban trend may serve, not as a catch-all explanation for the nature of modern society, but as a convenient focus for the discussion of many concomitant (or accompanying) changes. By contrasting the social organization of rural and urban populations we will gain a perspective that will stand us in good stead when we consider specific institutions such as the family, education, religion, the economic system, and government.


8

FROM RURAL TO URBAN LIVING: OUR SHIFTING POPULATION

If we compare man's estimated million years of existence to a twenty-four hour day, up until seven minutes ago he presented a picture of small bands of men scattered far and wide over the earth's surface. Then he began to congregate in villages and towns and even denser areas, and in the last few seconds he has developed truly enormous cities. In some countries, these cities contain a majority of the population and their ways of life exert a profound influence on people living in other areas.

This change from rural to urban living is going on all over the world. In some countries it is just beginning, and most people still live in small communities, engaging in more or less self-sufficient agriculture. In others, such as England, eight out of ten people live in cities. Our own country has undergone a spectacular shift from an agrarian to an urban industrial society, but it is not nearly so completely urbanized as England and a few other countries.

What is a city? In Egypt when you find 11,000 within the "city limits" you have a city; in our country the census takers say they have a city when there are 2,500 or more in a certain area. From this viewpoint, two out of three Americans live in cities. What is more significant, over half



By permission, from William C. Bagley, Jr., and Richard M. Perdew, Understanding Economics *(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), p. 219.*

THE WORLD IS SHRINKING

The map at the top represents the time when man's fastest speed was ten miles an hour. The steam engine brought travel to sixty miles an hour. The airplane and the jet plane, in recent years, attain speeds of from three hundred to more than seven hundred miles an hour. Modern transportation plays a vital role in the shift from rural to urban living.

the people of the United States are living in "metropolitan areas." Defining such areas in terms of counties with a non-agricultural character and a certain density of population centering around one or more cities of at least 50,000 people, the 1950 census listed 168 metropolitan areas. Useful

as these statistical yardsticks are, they have definite limitations. Different countries use different points for dividing "urban" from "rural." Political boundary lines are not the fortified walls of a medieval town. Detroit's influence does not stop at Eight Mile Road in spite of the "city limits" sign a person sees there. The addition of one new baby to a town of 2,499 people does not suddenly turn it from a rural to an urban environment.

The social scientist uses numbers as only one index of urbanization. He sees urbanism as a distinctive way of life. Its impact on society is far greater than mere numbers would indicate. To study that mode of life and its influence, the social scientist sets out with a working definition of a *city* as "a relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement of heterogeneous individuals." [1] Urbanization is simply the process of change from rural to urban living.

The Growth of Cities

Prehistoric man, like some tribes today, lived by hunting and food gathering, or by tending herds of animals. When man learned to plant seed and harvest his own food, he had taken the first step toward urban living, for he then had a dependable food supply and had to stay in one place to tend it. People then congregated in villages in fertile valleys, on mountain tablelands, and on the plains, going out each day to work the surrounding fields. The earliest of these agricultural villages of which we have traces date back to the New Stone Age. Even today many rural areas present this village-farmer pattern. Our American open-country neighborhoods, with widely scattered farms around a local trading center, are largely a result of our special frontier history.

Until man learned enough about farming to produce a surplus, there could be no true cities. The first cities arose where fertile land was well watered, the climate warm, and transportation easy—in the valleys of the Nile in Egypt, the Tigris and Euphrates in Mesopotamia, and the Indus in India. It is no coincidence that in these cities—Memphis, Thebes, Babylon, Nineveh—men worked out the beginnings of civilization: the alphabet, mathematics, and some rudiments of natural science; for the city and civilization grew up together and civilization functions through the structural framework of the city. Cities arose quite independently in our own hemisphere among the Mayas, Incas, and Aztecs.

Early cities served as forts, religious shrines, and monuments to the vainglory of rulers. They were economic parasites subsisting on the resources of the countryside. The change to a comparatively free economy and a mutually beneficial exchange of services between city and country

appeared with the growth of Greek and Roman cities. Several Greek cities reached a population of 100,000; they were centers of a far-reaching maritime commerce.


Rome, proudest of all ancient cities, had a thoroughly urban system of community life. Its aqueducts and highways, its amphitheaters and public buildings testify to skillful engineering and municipal administration. As the political center of a far-flung empire, Rome had over a million inhabitants in the first century B.C. With the decline of empire, Rome lost population and importance; during the Dark Ages it was a straggling town of some 20,000 people. The scattered, walled medieval towns were centers of the petty power of feudal lords and Church dignitaries, serving as trade centers only for the immediate vicinity.

The Crusades of the late Middle Ages stimulated a revival of trade led by Venice and other coastal cities on the Mediterranean, the Baltic, and the northwest coast of Europe. Commercial cities grew up and broke away from the feudal form of government. The rise of unified nations and comparatively long periods of peace over wide territories made larger cities possible. The discovery of America and the opening of a water route to the Far East stimulated the growth of cities all along the coastal rim of Europe.

Then toward the end of the eighteenth century there began that spiraling series of developments that we call the Industrial Revolution. This involved more than a change in industrial technology; it was accompanied and fostered by new processes in agricultural production, distribution, and transportation.

Beginning with improved machinery for making textiles and with the harnessing of steam to run larger machines, the factory system developed first in England. Released by a revolution in agriculture, people huddled close to the factories and towns sprang up almost overnight. The application of steam to transportation made it possible for the growing cities to trade their manufactured goods for food, raw materials, and the finished products of other cities. People and ideas, too, traveled more swiftly and easily than before. The power press and machine manufacture of paper made it easy to print huge numbers of newspapers, books, and magazines.

New inventions came faster and faster during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Canning and refrigeration made it possible to preserve food during shipment and storage. Swift advances in sanitation and medicine made cities more livable. Telephone, telegraph, and radio speeded up communication. Gasoline engines turned the wheels of autos, uniting farm and city and allowing city dwellers to live farther from work. Electric power also relieved the congestion of factory towns because, unlike steam, it could be transported cheaply over long distances. Economic sys-



The very unequal distribution of the population of the world is due only in part to climate. Manufacturing as well as agriculture has helped to create the congested spots. A map made in 10,000 B.C. would have shown a much different distribution.

tems became ever more complex with work divided up into hundreds of highly specialized jobs. City dwellers became ever more interdependent, not only upon their fellow townsmen, but also upon production in other areas.

Today roughly two-thirds of the world's people still live in rural communities. This fraction is steadily being reduced and subjected to ever stronger social influences from urban areas.

In Western Europe, the great majority of people now live in large cities. Eight out of ten Englishmen live in cities, the ninth in a village, and the tenth on a farm. On the eve of World War II, seven out of ten Germans lived in large cities. France shows a fairly even division between town and country. The Balkans and Scandinavia are mostly rural.

In Asia, where half of the world's 2½ billion people live, rural culture is still dominant. There are huge cities, however. Shanghai, with 4 million people, is only one of seven Chinese cities of over a million population. Japan, like the United States, underwent a swift and spectacular change to urban industrial living within this century. Its "Big Six" seaport cities have a combined population of over 14 million. India and Pakistan have several large cities; but seven-eighths of their 400 millions live in villages or on farms, with such a phenomenally high birth rate that cityward migration does not yet change the proportion of urban to rural.

Africa's 100 million people are mostly agricultural or pastoral, with coastal cities along the Mediterranean and in South Africa. The sparsely settled Near East is also chiefly agricultural or pastoral.

The young continent-nation of Australia is one of the most highly urbanized regions in the world. Over half its people live in cities of more than 100,000 population.[2]


Latin America, although preponderantly rural, also shows a marked trend toward urbanization. In 1940, about one-fourth of the people lived in cities over 5,000 as compared to half in our country and four-fifths in Great Britain. In each Latin American country, a single metropolis dominates, politically, economically and culturally, and is rapidly growing. Mexico City is one of the Western Hemisphere's great cities, but seven out of ten Mexicans still make their living by agriculture. Uruguay, the most advanced country industrially, is also the most urbanized and literate of Latin American countries. Chile is 45 per cent urban (cities over 5,000) but in other characteristics that social scientists regard as primarily urban—literacy, for example—Chile lags behind some predominantly rural countries such as Norway.

Canada's urbanization parallels that of the United States; her cities are

concentrated on the southern border, because of climate, the location of waterways, and the accidents of history.

It is no accident that America has become a land of many and great cities. A subcontinent blessed with a superabundance of natural wealth, favorably located for international trade, and inhabited by an energetic people with a flair for technology, the United States has possessed all the necessary ingredients for a civilization that is thoroughly urban. . . . No other country in the world, save perhaps Russia, rests on such

AMERICA BECOMES A COUNTRY OF CITY DWELLERS



Each symbol represents 10 percent of the total population

PICTOGRAPH CORPORATION

a firm foundation of natural resources—iron, oil, coal, forests, fertile soil, vegetation, waterways, wildlife, and favorable climate. When the American people set their hand to the exploitation of the country's natural wealth, the result was an expansion of agriculture, industry, transportation and trade, together with the universal concomitant of such expansion—the growth of cities.[3]

Our first large cities were all ocean ports: New York passed the 100,000 mark in 1804, followed 40 years later by Boston, Philadelphia, New Orleans, and Baltimore. River towns—Cincinnati, St. Louis, Louisville,

and Pittsburgh—grew up next with the development of the steam boat. After the Civil War, railroad building spearheaded the westward expansion of the country and many towns and cities sprang up along the routes that were laid and at the junctions, starting points, and terminals of lines. This period also saw a tremendous spurt in the growth of cities as a result of heavy foreign immigration.

By 1950 there were 15 times as many rural people in the United States as in 1790—but there were 476 times as many urban people!

We have given some attention to the broad social changes that contributed to the growth of cities—the impersonal ones, so to speak. But where did all the people come from? Why did they decide to live in cities?


In part, the growth of cities stems from an amazing growth in population made possible by new techniques in medicine, sanitation, and nutrition that have cut down the death rate and increased the average life span. In the last 150 years, the human race has more than doubled its numbers. Each morning the sun rises on 75,000 more living human beings than it did the day before; each day 145,000 people die and 220,000 are born.

In 1900, of every 1,000 babies born alive in the United States, 162 died before reaching their first birthday; today only about 31 die. People live 20 years longer; men have a life expectancy of 67, women of 71 years. This decrease in the death rate, coupled with foreign immigration, has doubled our population since 1900. Every 13 seconds our population is greater by one person. The automatic calculator in the lobby of the Department of Commerce Building in Washington passed the 160,000,000 mark in the summer of 1953, and by 1960 there may be over 170,000,000 people in the United States.

Despite a lower urban birth rate, cities all over the world have grown much faster than rural areas. The answer is migration. In the United States, this migration has been of three kinds: immigration, Negro migration, and farm-to-city migration. Foreign settlers came to this country in three waves: in the 1840's and 50's from the British Isles and Germany; in the post-Civil War period of great industrial expansion, from northwestern, southern, and eastern Europe; and from 1900 to 1910 from southern and eastern Europe. Restrictions were put on immigration from other continents after the First World War (see Chapter 11). Most of our immigration has come since then from Canada, Mexico, and Puerto Rico. Negro migration away from the South has been mostly in the direction of large northern industrial cities.

Each year from 1 to 4 million Americans move from farm to city. From 1920 to 1946, over 50 million people left rural areas for the city, but only 30 million (mostly returning migrants) left the city for rural areas. The

greatest migration in American history, when measured in numbers, at any rate, took place, not during the pioneer days that opened up the West, but during World War II. Between December 1941 and March 1945, over 27 million Americans, including 15 million civilians, migrated. Much of this migration was over long distances, and the predominant current was westward. As a result, many western states gained about 50 per cent in population between 1940 and 1950 and many metropolitan areas in Texas and California grew from 50 to almost 100 per cent in that decade (see map of westward movement of population).



Making a distinction between rural farm and non-farm population, the 1950 Census reports that only about one American out of six now lives on a farm. More people are classified as rural non-farm than as rural farm; they rent houses and yards but do no farming, or live in institutions, summer camps, motels and tourist camps, or villages under 2,500 population. The farm population has shrunk in actual numbers as well as percentages. In 1920, over 31 million persons lived on farms; in 1950, only slightly over 23 million did. Not only do most of our people live in or near cities, but also large numbers live in or near *enormous* cities. Half live in metropolitan areas, and 11 Americans out of 100 live within the official limits of cities of 1,000,000 or more inhabitants.

Why do people move to the city? The pull is strongest on young people



Detroit Free Press

RURAL SURVIVALS

The general store and the party line symbolize rural community life.

in their productive years. They think of the city in terms of opportunity: better paying work, freedom from the restrictions of the small community, excitement, an easier life, and a higher standard of living. Those with special talents or ambitions must go to the large city to make a name for themselves in the fields of art, literature, or entertainment. While they are being "pulled" toward the city, they are also being "pushed" off the farm by labor-saving machinery. But the chief lure is economic. During the depth of the Depression of the 1930's, more people left the city for the farm than left the farm for the city.


To sum up the reasons for the growth of cities: Basically, cities depend upon a food surplus, and are a result of specialization and interdependence. The spectacular growth of cities during the past two centuries is attributable to a revolution in industrial production methods, in transportation and communication, and in agriculture, as well as to the growth of large nations capable of maintaining a measure of peace and security —within their own borders, at least. Great strides in sanitation and medicine have made cities livable and fostered a tremendous spurt in population growth. Cities grow at the expense of farm areas because cities offer greater economic opportunity and numerous psychological attractions for rural persons.

Ecology of the City


Ecology, as used in biology, refers to the way plants and animals are distributed over a given area and to their interdependence. *Human ecology* is concerned with the distribution of various functions, groups, and institutions within a given area and the processes involved in that distribution.

If we are to understand the physical and social structure of the city, we must avoid several pitfalls: the notion that the pattern of cities arises out of man's nature as man; the fallacy that economic competition alone determines the pattern; the idea that once we understand American city structure we understand human ecology all over the world. These mistakes stem from a tendency to overlook the importance of culture. It happens that in our culture the money motive is of great importance, but even here its effect on urban structure is modified by other factors. Because ecologists have not studied foreign cities as intensively as they have studied ours, we shall confine our remarks on ecology to the American city.

Ecological processes are the steps by which a city grows and changes. *Concentration* is the drawing of population into a given area; the degree







Detroit Free Press; Ministry of Agriculture, Panama

RURAL AND URBAN LIVING

On the farm, in the small village, and in the city, man's relationship to nature and his fellow man is quite different.

of concentration, or *density,* is measured by number of persons per square mile. *Dispersion,* or scattering of population—the opposite of concentration—is measured the same way. *Centralization* is the drawing together of institutions and activities, the assembling of people to work rather than to reside in a given area. Such areas, though highly centralized, may show a low density of population in census statistics, which are based on dwelling rather than working place. The downtown area is usually the area of greatest centralization, but subcenters scattered through every metropolitan district display the same process. This clustering of activities in outlying sections is also evidence of *decentralization,* for it indicates the spread of activities and dwelling places farther and farther out from the center of the city. *Specialization* refers to the clustering of particular types of institutions and activities in "bright lights" districts, wholesale areas, financial districts, and professional or business office buildings, sometimes called "streets stood on end."

Of special interest to the social scientist are the processes by which "birds of a feather flock together"—segregation, invasion, and succession. *Segregation* is sometimes used synonomously with specialization to refer to functions of different areas. More often we think of it as the drawing together of similar types of people. Whether they want to because of similar background or are compelled to by prejudice and poverty, individuals tend to gravitate to areas where they can compete most effectively and where others of similar race, culture, economic status, and point of view dwell. The "black belt," the ghetto (Jewish immigrant neighborhood), Little Italy, Chinatown, "Nob Hill," the "Main Line," and the "wrong side of the tracks"—known by different names in different cities—are all results of segregation.

These groupings of similar social elements resulting from segregation and specialization are called *natural areas* because they are spontaneous, unplanned results of social and economic forces. Each natural area is somewhat of a unit, with relatively homogeneous population, local color, perhaps its own peculiar traditions, customs, conventions, standards of decency and propriety, and often a language of its own. Each large city has its hobohemia, its Bowery or Skid Row, its Greenwich Village or Latin Quarter where flock the unconventional, erotic, or eccentric, its cultural and racial colonies, its ultra-smart residential area, and its dingy world of furnished rooms.

But these areas are not static. Areas change through the process of *invasion,* the penetration of a segregated area by an institutional function or population group different from the one already there. In a rapidly growing city, the commercial and industrial districts invade residential areas. One racial or cultural group invades an area occupied by another, or an

economically inferior but otherwise similar group may invade an upper-class area, as in the rooming house districts that once were rows of dignified brick and brownstone residences. Invasion may be resisted, as in the case of the Cicero, Illinois, mob (1951) that kept a Negro bus driver from occupying an apartment in a building tenanted by whites. In other cases, invasion is successful and rapid, as happened in Harlem in the 1920's. When an invasion is successful and the new type of institution or population is established in the area, we say *succession* has taken place. One section of Chicago was successively inhabited by Czechs, Jews, Italians, and Negroes. The Black Belt is located in what was once the heart of the ghetto.

These ecological processes produce a pattern that is roughly similar in American cities. Various theories of urban development, none of which we need go into exhaustively, have been advanced. One much-discussed theory is that of *concentric zones,* advanced by Ernest W. Burgess (see chart on page 206). Zone I is the *central business district*—in large cities the "loop," "downtown," or skyscraper district. Here department stores, business and professional offices, financial institutions, hotels, theaters, and restaurants are concentrated. Waves of workers and shoppers flood into the district from all parts of the city every morning and rush out noisily in the late afternoon, with a smaller wave converging on the bright lights district in the evening.

Zone II, encircling this district, is called the *zone in transition.* Often it was an upper-class residential area when the city was much smaller. Now the old mansions have been converted into cheap rooming houses and hotels, offices of the less prosperous business and professional men, pawn shops, eateries, secondhand stores. It is the area of the greatest concentration of vice, crime, delinquency, poverty, and mental breakdown. Often the owners of the property are merely holding on in hopes that the central business district will expand and send the value of their lots soaring. Meanwhile, they allow the zone to become a "blighted area."

Shading off from the rooming-house area is Zone III, an area of deteriorated housing where the poorer foreign immigrants cluster. Slightly better housing is found somewhat further out, in Zone IV, the area of workingmen's homes. Zone V is a middle-class area of apartment buildings and houses with yards and gardens. In the suburbs live upper-middle class and upper-class people, often in business or the professions.

This is a highly simplified concept. In any specific city the pattern is modified by the geographic setting, the historical background (whether it began as a trading center, a break-of-transportation center where rail and water routes met, or a specialized-function city such as a factory or

mining town), its economic development, and occasionally by sentimental preference for a certain area (Beacon Hill in Boston, for example).

In recent years, suburbs have grown much faster than the central cities. There is one suburban dweller for every two inhabitants of a central city. The automobile, the express highway, and the fast commuter train have made it possible to work in the central business district and live many miles away.

Some suburbs are industrial, centering around a factory, but most are populated by members of the middle and upper class. People who make up these classes prefer the suburbs for many reasons. Here they—and often more important, their children—can escape the crowding, dirt, noise, heavy traffic, and perhaps undesirable social influences of the city. Many are conscious of a desire to live according to a definite social status. They are willing to commute for the sake of these advantages as well as for another consideration, which is really a stumbling block to much municipal improvement—they escape municipal responsibilities, including the higher taxes of the central city, while enjoying many of its services.

Some residential suburbs are called "dormitory" or "bedroom" towns because the bread-winner leaves them early in the morning to go to work and does not return until early in the evening—to rest and sleep. Other suburbs are more self-sufficient, giving employment to a majority of their citizens. Some were independent towns before the expanding city engulfed them. Some are part of the city in every way except that they retain political independence. When such units are completely surrounded by the central city they are called *enclaves*. Los Angeles has fourteen enclaves; Detroit has two—Highland Park and Hamtramck.

Besides suburbs of various types, the metropolitan area may also include some satellite cities, which have more tenuous ties with the central city. The satellites have no political connection with the central city but are part of its social and economic sphere of influence as measured by department store charge accounts, newspaper circulation, and travel for recreational purposes.

9

FROM RURAL TO URBAN LIVING: OUR CHANGING SOCIETY

Like all great and sudden changes, urbanization has brought mankind so many new and challenging problems that many people view the city as a man-made monster that will devour society in the end. Man's urge to cluster in cities is blamed for all the woes of the modern era from war on down: crime, the decline of religion, the "breakdown" of the family as evidenced by falling birth rates and rising divorce and desertion rates, overcrowding, dirt, disease, noise, vice, materialism, and the drive to keep up with the Joneses. Like the Hebrew prophets calling down destruction on Tyre and Sidon and Babylon, like the English poets at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution vilifying cities as places "where wealth accumulates and men decay," some modern philosophers see in his rapidly growing cities the seed of man's destruction.

Even in a nation of city-dwellers like ours there is a tendency to regard

urban living as artificial, abnormal, and inferior; our congested metropolises are condemned as "admirably fitted for the habitation of robots." [1] Cherishing a nostalgic picture of an idealized rural life, many Americans are inclined to consider it inherently charming and delightful and city life inherently nervewracking and riddled with insoluble problems.

Social scientists are wary of such blanket condemnation. All social inventions are in one sense "abnormal." Many other social changes have accompanied urbanization; the city is the most tangible one, and therefore the easiest target for blame. An objective point of view demands that we keep in mind the definition of the city as a "large, dense and relatively permanent settlement of heterogeneous individuals," and ask which of the qualities and problems of modern urban life are results of that size, density, and heterogeneity and therefore inseparable from city life anywhere? Which are caused by the strain of the shift from rural to urban living and will disappear once the population is somewhat stabilized? Which are caused by other aspects of modern civilization? What advantages and opportunities does urban living offer society and how can man capitalize on them? Can we salvage any of the rural ways we mourn, or should we concentrate on adapting our attitudes and values to the new way of life?

The Folk Society and the Urban Community

A "short-cut" to an understanding of the urban way of life is to contrast it with the rural. But to contrast the way of life of Chicagoans with that of farmers a hundred miles from Chicago is not very helpful, for the modern farmer uses electricity and power machinery, follows market quotations so he can sell his crop to the best advantage, reads the city paper and listens to the radio and TV, and drives to town for shopping and recreation. In short, he is "urbanized" except for the fact that he does not live in the city. We must, instead, construct an "ideal" picture of a rural society untouched by urban influences and contrast it with an "ideal" urban society—ideal in the sense of being, not perfect, but abstract pictures of communities. Perhaps no actual society will fit either type, but all societies or communities will fall somewhere on a line or "continuum" with the rural at one extreme and the urban at the other.

The rural community, or "folk society," [2] is small, ranging from a few families to a few thousand people. It is isolated; it has little or no contact with other communities. It is self-sufficient, providing its members with all their needs. There is little specialization or division of labor except on

the basis of sex. Its members are all known to one another; all share the same interests and experiences, the same biological and cultural heritage. Statuses are ascribed on the basis of age, sex, and family. Roles are clearly defined by the culture and their interrelationships are fixed; behavior patterns change little from one generation to another. The family is the basis of social organization. Kinship ties of all kinds are formalized and the accompanying roles prescribed.

In the rural community, custom is king; the folkways and mores control most of behavior. No legislation is needed, for informal controls keep members in line. All institutions are crescive rather than enacted. The culture may be described as "sacred" because all values are traditional and not to be questioned. Deviation from traditional behavior is severely punished and nothing is solely a means to a practical end. "All activities, even the means of production, are ends in themselves, activities expressive of the ultimate values of the society." [3] Tradition is unchallenged by science.

The culture is static. It affords a strong sense of rightness and security because its various elements are integrated into a tightly-knit and consistent whole, oriented toward shared values and goals that impart great meaning to behavior. The folk society has a strong feeling of unity and group loyalty.

At the other extreme is the modern city, which is by definition large, embracing thousands and even millions of people within a small area. It cannot be isolated, for its very existence presupposes a network of transportation and communication facilities that will supply it with food, raw materials, and trade goods. It is never self-sufficient, nor is any one of its citizens. The tremendous division of labor makes every city dweller dependent upon many others for the greater share of his needs, and the various specialties are coordinated in a vastly complicated system of production and distribution.

The city is a mosaic of subcultures, for its people have diverse racial, cultural, and religious backgrounds. As a result, there is a variety of values and tolerance of different patterns of behavior. The society is therefore "secular." Few objects are regarded as meaningful in themselves, few activities as any more than means to ends. Much behavior is rational and calculating. Religion is set apart from everyday affairs; sacredness is confined to religion and to a few values such as patriotism, the flag, the king, the constitution. Science challenges traditional knowledge.

City dwellers see many of their fellow citizens daily but recognize very few except in terms of the situation in which they appear at the moment. Many statuses are open to achievement. The culture changes swiftly and roles and their relationships are therefore in flux. People frequently find

themselves in situations and relationships where their roles are not clearly defined by the culture and the old patterns do not fit. As the power of the folkways and mores crumbles, and many groups with conflicting customs and interests are interacting within a limited space, legislation is needed and new institutions must be enacted to define roles and statuses, reconcile interests, and channelize interaction. Formal sanctions are necessary to control behavior. The "we-group" feeling is far weaker than in the folk society.

Either stated or implied in this contrast are the chief traits of the modern city as compared with the rural community: heterogeneity, mobility, and secondary contacts. Largely as a result of these traits, the city is also characterized by voluntary association, secularization, individuation, formal social control, and social tolerance.

Heterogeneity

Rural communities are typically homogeneous, made up of similar people. There is little division of labor except on the basis of sex. Almost all the men are farmers and the women housewives; the village may have in addition a minister or priest or shaman, a storekeeper or two, a doctor or medicine man, and a teacher. On the whole, all the members of the community are of the same racial background. All share the same experiences and define them according to the same cultural norms. Some communities are virtually clans after generations of close intermarriage. There is no very great gap between the poor and the prosperous.

In contrast, the city is *heterogeneous,* populated by an extreme variety of people. It could not exist without specialization and it in turn fosters greater specialization. The jack-of-all-trades does not succeed in the city; he must specialize in order to compete successfully. He may spend the entire working day—usually a certain fixed number of hours—typing letters, selling insurance or handkerchiefs or suits or furniture, filing papers, reporting news. He may render any of a number of highly specialized services: landscaping lawns, disposing of garbage, delivering diapers, directing traffic, answering phones, repairing furnaces, reading meters. He may attach the left rear wheel to car after car as it comes down the assembly line of an automobile factory or inspect parts for flaws without much idea of how those parts fit into the final product. A lawyer may handle only certain kinds of cases; a teacher may teach only one highly specialized subject; a doctor may treat only feet, or only eyes, or only pregnant women. These thousands of specialized jobs are meshed in a highly

complex web of interdependent parts. The urbanite is never economically self-sufficient.

In this complex economic system of which the city is the center, different activities are rewarded with different amounts of the society's goods, and there is a wide range between poverty and wealth, which is accentuated by the possibilities that the city offers for persons to exploit others. Modern cities are often called "melting pots" because they have so many nations, physical types, and cultures represented in their population.

Along with this heterogeneity of occupation, economic status, and racial or national background goes a heterogeneity of beliefs and values. There is little on which all the members of the community would agree, few shared values and goals.

Mobility

Mobility, or ease of movement, is of two types: physical—over the surface of the earth; and social—up and down the social ladder. Rural communities are far more stable than urban communities in both respects. Farm folk and villagers are more likely to stay put; they often develop a close attachment to the ancestral acres and have deep roots in their birthplace. The comparative homogeneity and lack of competitive emphasis in their way of life make them less conscious of social class, less ambitious to climb.

Physical mobility is present to a high degree in any urbanized country, but is most pronounced in ours. The city itself presents a picture of hurry and bustle as people stream through the streets afoot, on bicycles, by bus, streetcar, commuter train, by car and taxi. Urbanites move from city to city or from one section of a city to another with little regret for the place they leave. They expect to move—from the small apartment of the newlyweds to a house with a yard when they have children; farther out to the suburbs when they can afford it; back to a small apartment or away to a warmer climate when the children are grown. Only in the South and in New England do we find many city dwellers who cling to their ancestral homes. During the year preceding the 1950 census, 27,500,000 Americans moved from one house to another. Of these, 3,890,000 moved to a different state.

Social mobility is closely related to ease of physical movement. The shifting nature of the city's population tends to reduce the importance of ascribed status and open more statuses to achievement. The individual is judged far less by his family background—whether or not it is something to be proud of—than by his own appearance and manner, his accomplish-

ments in his occupation and in social and community life. Competition for status is a major preoccupation of urban life. Inequalities are tremendous in the city, but they are not determined by birth so much as by the use one makes of his abilities and opportunities. Even in the cities of India, rigid caste lines tend to break down. It was in the growing commercial cities of the late Middle Ages that serfs became free men.



Detroit Free Press

SECONDARY CONTACTS

The anonymous city crowd brushes impersonal elbows.

Secondary Contacts

In the city when we go out to work or shop, the majority of our contacts are fleeting and impersonal. From the time we go out till we get home, we may rub elbows with hundreds of people, engage in minor transactions or brief conversation with dozens, without knowing their names, their family background, anything at all about them except what they look like and their function in relation to us. Most are

Detroit News; Inland Steel





PRIMARY GROUPS

American college girls living in a dormitory, Japanese men talking in the neighborhood bath, African village elders discussing the day's news, and a French family at dinner are experiencing intimate face-to-face contacts.



British Information Service; Inland Steel



"really like." Secondary relationships are means to ends. The relationship with the other person or persons involved would be little if at all changed were another person to perform his role.

As a member of a political party, a student body, an audience, or as a customer in a store, an individual acts not as a whole person, as he does in the primary group, but in a segmental or partial role. He is a voter, a student, a spectator, or a customer. When he leaves the group there will be no sense of loss or bereavement or loneliness. The group will simply be smaller by one, and anyone else can fill the gap and make up the loss to the party's registration rolls or the store's profits. Instead of an "intimate sharing of common values," the secondary group involves a rational pursuit of common interests, or at least interests that happen to coincide at a certain point.

The trend toward larger, more highly urbanized societies has inevitably meant an ever-increasing importance of secondary groups. Institutions such as governments, churches, schools, and business corporations grow larger, more formal, and more elaborate. Associations spring up about various specific interests, and many of them also fill the need for communication with one's fellow men and for congenial interaction. Americans are a nation of "joiners." The Detroit telephone directory lists hundreds upon hundreds of formal organizations from Alcoholics Anonymous to Zeke Zzzpt, a coined name for a small residential club for bachelors.

Freedom and Control

New forms of *social control* arise of necessity in urban society. The control of the folk society or primary group over its members is informal but highly effective. In the rural community, standards of conduct are passed on from generation to generation. The group is so unchanging, its members so much in agreement, and the problems met by succeeding generations so much alike, that these standards are seldom questioned. Withdrawal of affection or approval is a powerful sanction in the family or play group; gossip and ostracism are the punishments of the larger neighborhood. Everyone knows a person's work habits, his lapses from the mores, his "queer" ways. Each person has a reputation—his family's and his own—to live up to. If he feels restricted, at least he has a sense of belonging, and takes the same interest in the conduct of others that they take in his.

In the heterogeneity, anonymity, and mobility of the city, an individual can escape such controls very easily. If a person has come from

elsewhere, he has left primary group ties and controls behind him and may find his conscience less strong than the new and heady sense of freedom. In the secondary group, too, the lack of sentimental and emotional ties allows a spirit of competition and exploitation to develop. Therefore, the urban society must rely upon formal and organized controls and sanctions. Laws and ordinances, policemen and courts and prisons, the clock, and the traffic signal regulate much of the individual's behavior. To the controlling agencies he is not a whole person, simply a legal and statistical entity.

But even though his public behavior is strictly regulated, the city dweller enjoys great freedom in his private behavior. The heterogeneous groups have different standards of behavior; seeing them all existing side by side, the city dwellers develop a feeling of social tolerance, a blasé, sophisticated, rational attitude toward the behavior of others. "What is it to me?" The primary group of family and close friends, even of neighbors in the numerous places where close social relations still exist in urban neighborhoods, still take an interest in his conduct, of course, and exert control over his behavior. But when close bonds and controls grow too irksome he can escape for a while into the anonymity of the city, knowing eventually he can return to the circle of those who care. He has a double refuge.

But what of the person with no primary group ties? The young person from the farm or village, alone in the big city, finds it can be the loneliest place of all, for no one cares what he does. In the rooming house districts, the anonymity of the city approaches the picture of a "dust heap of unrelated individuals," in the famous sociologist Durkheim's classic phrase. Many of the problems that find their way to police and social workers arise from this "freedom" from primary group ties.

Even for the person with family and friends, these ties are less binding than in the folk society or rural community. Interaction in the city is more and more between members of age and interest groups rather than between family and neighbors. In the densely populated, heterogeneous city, there are hundreds of groups a person may join, hundreds of acquaintances who may become friends. This opportunity for *voluntary association* is another aspect of the freedom of the city. A person may prefer to spend his time with the degenerates of the vice district, the study group at the museum, the crowd at the corner bar, or the neighborhood bridge club. An American city dweller can join stamp clubs, camera clubs, civic clubs, luncheon clubs, bowling leagues, volley-ball teams, Ladies Aids, Junior Leagues. He can attend plays, movies, concerts, horse races, poker games, night clubs, lectures, prayer meetings, revivals, language classes, dancing classes. The possibilities are almost

endless, for every conceivable interest is organized and catered to. This multiplicity of choices permits far more *individuation* than is possible within the circumscribed limits of the rural community, more enrichment of personality in the sense of developing talents and interests.

There is, of course, another side to this freedom from close ties and controls and the voluntary association in other groups. A person is not simply *free* to join. He may *have* to join in order to promote his own



Canada: National Film Board

KIWANIS LUNCHEON

Civic clubs provide an urban substitute for the congenial neighborhood group.

interests, because the individual in the mass of the city is powerless unless he is part of a group. Furthermore, he may feel the need to join because primary group ties are either entirely lacking or are emotionally unsatisfying. He joins "to escape from freedom," for everyone needs some ties that approach the warm personal ones of the primary group. The hearty camaraderie of the luncheon club or convention, the fellowship of the store-front church, the "brotherhood" of the revolutionary cell,

even a nodding acquaintance with a bartender help to fill the void left by the dissolution or weakening of primary group ties. "Group membership in a Rotary club may seem radically different from membership in the American rural neighborhood of a half-century ago, but the loss of the latter has been a substantial factor in the growth of the former." [5] So deep is a person's need for primary interaction that even within the framework of a large and formal secondary organization such as a business office or a factory cliques invariably form. Politicians, employers, teachers, and other leaders of secondary groups try to bring primary group values into the secondary group relationship to strengthen morale. The media of mass communication are used to keep in touch with the other members of a person's society. Although there is disagreement on many basic cultural values, there is an area in which one American knows he is speaking the same lingo as others—the area of nationally publicized ball teams, movie stars, radio and TV comedians, and comic strip characters.

The urbanized society, in transferring many functions from primary to secondary groups, has in general weakened primary group ties, but in one sense the primary group has gained. There is more spontaneous choice, more informality in family life and among friends. Courtship is a matter of individual choice; even parenthood is often voluntary. The group is held together by affection rather than by outside pressure and lack of alternatives.

For a full, rich life, an individual needs both primary and secondary group contacts and relationships.

> The great community brings us opportunity, stability, economy, the constant stimulus of a richer, more varied culture. But living in the smaller community [i.e., the primary group] we find the nearer, more intimate satisfactions. The larger community [i.e., the secondary group] provides peace and protection, patriotism and sometimes war, automobiles and the radio. The smaller provides friends and friendship, gossip and face-to-face rivalry, local pride and abode. Both are essential to the full life process.[6]

Urban and Rural Influences in the United States

Although all men must at one time have lived in rural folk communities, the trend throughout the world is toward urbanized societies. Only in nonliterate societies and isolated rural areas do we

find the traits of folk societies to any great degree. Of our 40 million families, 7 million still live on farms, and 7 million more live in rural areas or villages but do not farm. In few respects are they like the farmers and villagers of half a century ago. The automobile, radio, and television have helped dispel isolation. Commercialized machine agriculture has made many farmers specialists; the wheat farmer sells his wheat and buys "store bread" and prepared cereals for breakfast and studies reports on the national and international markets to determine when to sell. Agriculture has become a competitive enterprise oriented to a world market. It has its insecurities and casualties as does urban industry—its foreclosures, sharecroppers, and technological unemployment. The farm family joins more formal associations and participates in more secondary groups than a generation ago. The farmer's children see the same movies, hear the same radio programs, increasingly watch the same TV performers, wear the same kind of clothes, read the same comics, magazines, and schoolbooks, and even use the same slang as their city cousins use. The farmer's wife yearns for and often gets an automatic washer, wall-to-wall carpeting, and a picture window displaying a fancy lamp, just as does the urban housewife. Mass production, mass education, mass communication, and rapid transportation are erasing the most striking differences in levels of living and social participation between townsman and farmer.

We must not, however, minimize the importance of rural life in American society. Although only 11 per cent of employed adults are farmers, they have, in many ways, an influence out of proportion to their numbers. Our system of representation makes country dwellers powerful in Congress. The smallest farm state has as much influence in the United States Senate as New York, and within a state the urban dweller typically has less voice in state government than the outstate citizen. In Michigan, for example, the Detroiter's ballot is worth only about half that of a fellow citizen in a sparsely populated country district. Farm pressure groups are also powerful; farmers, particularly during hard times, consider their interests to be directly opposed to those of city people.

Many city dwellers grew up on farms and many others were brought up by farm-bred parents. As a result, many rural folkways and mores have been carried over into urban life, even though they may no longer be relevant in the new environment. Examples are the belief in the old maxims "early to bed and early to rise," or "woman's place is in the home," and the idea that everyone should own his own home. The things denounced as "frills and fads," on the other hand, are all urban. Rural values can contribute greatly to strengthening national morale in crises; on the other hand, rural prejudices often block social reforms.[7]

Significance of the Urban Trend

What does the shift from rural to urban living mean to mankind? The prophets of doom are fond of harking back to Rome and predicting that our own Western civilization is heading for a new Dark Ages. They point to the "abnormal city" unsuited for the biological and psychological nature of man, as a sure forerunner of decline and fall. Even those who are less gloomy find much of social change disturbing and painful. They sigh, as people long have sighed, for "the good old days," for a return to the simpler society of their forebears. But there is no going back, and perhaps it is for the best. By considering each of the contrasting traits of the two types of societies (see chart below), we may perceive advantages and opportunities in the new way of life and see its problems as challenges.

Contrasts Between the Rural Folk Society and the Modern Urbanized Society

Rural Folk Society	*Modern Urbanized Society*
Small numbers of people	Great numbers of people
Homogeneity	Heterogeneity
Lack of communication and interaction with other societies	Much communication and interaction with other societies
Personal and group self-sufficiency	Specialization and interdependence of persons and groups
Physical and social stability	Physical and social mobility
Sacred culture	Secular culture
Primary contacts	Great importance of secondary contacts and weakening of primary group ties
Informal associations by family and neighborhood	Formal and voluntary associations—by age and interest groups
Cultural controls: folkways and mores	Formal controls: laws and ordinances
Crescive institutions	Numerous enacted institutions
Static culture and social organization	Rapidly changing culture and social organization
Strong sense of belonging and unity	Comparatively slight sense of belonging and unity
In short: a simple, uni-group society	*In short: a complex, multi-group society*

Great numbers of people. Cities have grown so fast and with so little planning that they are overcrowded. As a result they are noisy and dirty,

are beset with parking and traffic problems, and cannot provide adequate play space for children. There are signs, however, that the trend toward crowding is being reversed. The central city in a metropolitan area is typically declining in population while the periphery is gaining. More and more people are seeking to combine the fresh air and sunshine, space and privacy of the country with the convenience and opportunities of the city. As this trend toward suburban and "rurban" living continues, instead of crowded central cities reaching ever higher skyward we will have larger metropolitan areas of lower population density. Fear of the H-bomb is also a potent stimulus toward decentralization.

Is it abnormal for men to live close together? In a sense, all social inventions, we repeat, are "abnormal." As many people used to say, and some still do, "If God had intended people to fly, He would have given them wings." Until recent decades, it is true, cities were fine breeding grounds for epidemics, and the birth rate was far lower and the death rate higher than in the country. But modern sanitation and increased medical and dental care have changed the situation. The infant mortality rate and the death rate from tuberculosis are lower in cities. Psychological tests show that city children are better adjusted and more adaptable than country children. As for the birth rate as a sign of abnormality, in recent years it has begun to even out. In 1940, there were only 316 children under 5 years of age for every 1,000 urban women between 15 and 49 years of age; nine years later there were 503 children; the number for rural farm women rose much less, from 618 to 631.

Nor are noise, dirt, traffic problems, and lack of play space necessarily inherent in city life. They can be largely eradicated from present cities and avoided in planning future cities or suburbs. The nervous strain of city living—the executive's ulcers—may actually not be due to city life as such, but to competitive emphases in certain cultures. As many visitors to Europe have found, not all cities are pictures of bustle, hurry, honking horns, and jostling crowds. Perhaps none need be.

Heterogeneity offers distinct advantages. Specialization means efficiency in utilizing talents and interests, and thus more goods and services for the members of a society. It also means less self-sufficiency, greater dependence upon a complicated economy. On the whole, most people are willing to accept the material rewards of heterogeneity. Some are disturbed, however, because the self-sufficiency and independence of the rural folk community cannot be carried over "as is" to the urban society. They also are disturbed by the real problem that with a great degree of specialization people may lose contact with one another. A highly specialized education, for example, leaves great gaps in the understanding of many people. Educators are struggling to balance the courses a person

needs to compete in a highly specialized society with those that will make him a good citizen of a democracy and a "rounded" personality capable of human understandings and enjoyment of a full life.

Differences in cultural, religious, national, and racial backgrounds are particularly numerous in American cities. These differences can be used to enrich experience and add color to the culture of the group as a whole. People are "interesting" largely because they are different. Unfortunately, this heterogeneity is a source of difficult problems in modern society. The complex, multi-group society invariably must cope with conflicts based on prejudice, as we shall see in Chapter 11, and with conflicts of interests and values.

Mobility, too, offers certain advantages. In a physically mobile nation, heterogeneity is lessened as regional differences are diminished. A mobile labor force adds to productive efficiency. Mobility means more diffusion of culture traits, more borrowing of ideas and inventions. The migrant has an objectivity that stay-at-homes lack.

On the other hand, the rapid shift from farms to cities creates problems of crowding and unplanned city growth. It is a strain on many persons who find it difficult to adjust to a new environment. Mobility breaks down neighborliness. Many city dwellers do not even know the names of their next-door neighbors; they are "nigh-dwellers," not true neighbors.

Robert Cooley Angell, in studying the "moral integration" of cities—their group loyalty, morale, and civic spirit—found it to be least in cities where the population was most heterogeneous and most mobile.[8] The feeling of belonging is weaker in the city than it is in the rural community. City dwellers tend to think of their city not as a group of people to which they belong but as a place where they happen to live, a statistical and geographical entity commanding little allegiance for itself. They lack a strong feeling of their role in the community, and feel only slightly dependent upon it. They have one foot in the air ready to take off for greener pastures and leave with little sense of loss.

Secularization has been accentuated by urban living. Where so many conflicting values are found, to live together at all people must develop a "live and let live" philosophy, a tolerance of differences, a relativistic perspective. Nothing surprises the urbane city-dweller. The danger here is that he may abandon his own values, perhaps taught him in primary groups in a rural community, and find nothing satisfying to take their place. The sacred values of a folk society are shared by all and are highly effective in fostering and preserving a sense of unity. A multi-group society that is unable to agree on sacred values must still hold together somehow. Is awareness of the rational basis for the society's existence enough?

The breakdown of primary groups in the modern urbanized society is a source of great concern to social scientists. As one student of the human group points out, civilizations have fallen, but never beyond the level of the tribe or village, each of whose members can have firsthand knowledge of the others. Within the tribe, there are few problems of internal social organization; the members are able to cohere, to band together.

In Egypt, Mesopotamia, classical India and China, Greece, and Rome, the ruling class lost the capacity to lead, the formal organizations fell to pieces, faith was lost, and much of the technology was forgotten for lack of the large-scale cooperation needed to put it into effect. All these civilizations fell and the people sank back to a Dark Age "in which the mutual hostility of small groups is the condition of the internal cohesion of each one." Can we, asks Mr. Homans, keep our Western civilization, which grew out of medieval Christendom, from falling too?

Perhaps the solution would be to take whatever it is that makes the small group cohere and apply it to the large group, to produce a feeling of belongingness and eliminate emotional isolation. The myths that weave together values and beliefs do this to some extent; it is the aim of the totalitarian state to make loyalty to the state replace other loyalties. In our own country, we try to solve this problem by means of a complex of democratic inventions—representative government, universal suffrage, the secret ballot, the Bill of Rights—all of which are attempts to maintain the values of the small group on the national level.

"Civilization," concludes Homans, "means centralization. It means that men and women will be related to one another in increasingly large organizations, and that these organizations will be brought more and more under the influence of the central directing body of the society, the government. The real problem is not how to keep social groups (i.e., small primary groups) wholly independent and autonomous but how to organize their relation to central control in such a way that they maintain their own life while contributing to the life of organized society." [9]

If we can eliminate isolation from the rural areas and bring them even more into the cultural and economic life of the urbanized section of the country, the life of the country dweller will be richer. If somehow we can eliminate congestion from city life, strengthen the city dweller's bonds with his fellow men, and give him a sense of belonging and permanence, urban life can also be more satisfying. If we can evolve a set of values upon which the great majority of members of our society agree, and which is in harmony with the circumstances under which our life must be lived, then our society can hang together in spite of its size and complexity.

This last problem, that of conflicting values and goals, is of major importance in our own society, and upon how we treat it depends much of our relation with other societies. Therefore, in the chapters that follow we shall deal with the question of relations among classes and racial, religious, and ethnic groups.

10

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: CLASS AND CASTE

All societies arrange their members in terms of superiority, inferiority, and equality. This vertical scale of evaluation, this placing of people in strata, or layers, is called *stratification*. Those in the top stratum have more power, privilege, and prestige than those below, with each succeeding layer possessing less of these attributes than the one above.

An army is a perfect example of stratification. Two general strata are clearly marked off—officers and enlisted men. Within each of these there is a hierarchy that clearly marks off each position from those above and below in terms of obligations, privileges, power, and prestige. Each status is clearly designated by outward and visible signs—stars, eagles, chevrons, and the like—and the behavior of each person toward every other is governed by his relative status in the hierarchy and is guided by rituals and

taboos. Inferiors must accord their superiors such symbolic acts of deference (to the rank, not the man) as saying "Sir," saluting, and standing at attention.

The army is not, however, a society, for it does not encompass all the life activities of a group of people of all ages and both sexes who share a common culture and a sense of identification. Societies, too, are stratified, some almost as clearly as an army, some into strata with no clear line of demarcation between them.

Inevitability of Stratification

An army must be stratified in order to get its job done. It needs a line of command from the few generals who plan strategy to the thousands of lowly privates who peel potatoes and attack machine-gun emplacements. A corporation must have a few persons on the board of directors to plan production, expansion, and employment policies; it must have many more persons to run its machines and type its letters. On the whole, both army and corporation distribute the greatest rewards of privilege and power and prestige to the few who do the thinking and planning, the coordinating and controlling of the whole organization, with proportionately smaller rewards all down the line.

Less clearly, perhaps, but just as inevitably, social stratification is a means of getting the society's various essential jobs done through distributing differential amounts of prestige and privilege. In a small nonliterate society, there may be little differentiation except on the bases of age and sex, with perhaps a little more prestige for medicine men, good hunters, and strong leaders. As soon as division of labor enters the picture, however, there is differential evaluation of functions and hence stratification. The larger a population grows, and the more complex its technology becomes, the more elaborate is its system of distributing prestige and privilege. There must be some correlation between the rewards held out for the different functions to be performed and the difficulty of finding people with the skill, talent, training and willingness to fill those jobs. There is no necessary correlation, however, between the *importance* of a job and its rewards; if it is easily filled it need not be heavily rewarded.

These rewards are the incentives for doing the jobs that must be done in society. They may be economic, aesthetic, or symbolic rewards, material or psychological satisfactions. Since they must be unequally distributed, stratification results. "Social inequality is thus an unconsciously

evolved device by which societies insure that the most important positions are conscientiously filled by the most qualified persons." [1]

In addition to getting the work of the world done, stratification controls the relations of human beings with one another. Within each stratum, *social distance,* the extent to which individuals or groups are excluded from participating in each other's life, is at a minimum; while between people of different strata there is comparatively little intimate participation, and consequently little sympathy and understanding (i.e., greater social distance). Certain expectations of behavior go with each social status; the desire to climb socially, or to avoid ostracism, may keep persons in line. The phrase "noblesse oblige" (noble rank requires honorable conduct), the concept of a "lady" and a "gentleman," and a person's desire to be esteemed by his equals are powerful influences on conduct.

The dream of a classless state seems doomed, then, by the very nature of society. Even Russia, which was supposed to turn the social pyramid upside down in establishing the "dictatorship of the proletariat," cannot, any more than any other society, escape the necessity of ranking people according to their functions. The criteria of rank have changed along with the values of the society, but they are essentially such as to form a hierarchy of economic and political power with differential rewards for different strata. True, I (the senior author) found as a student traveling on the proverbial shoestring before World War II that classes have been abolished in Russia—but only in the vocabulary. Elsewhere in Europe I had traveled third class. In Russia I traveled in third *category.*

Systems of Stratification

Societies and communities exhibit widely varying systems of stratification. The *number of classes* varies; in some there are only two broad classes such as royalty and commoners, rich and poor, the elite and the masses. In others there is a series of four or five or more distinguishable classes. The *sharpness with which classes are marked off* also varies considerably. In some societies certain outward signs of status differentiate one class from another as clearly as do army uniforms. In others one class merges into another imperceptibly and it is only after weighing several criteria that a person can place any individual in an approximate social status; the class system is a gradient rather than a series of clearly marked strata.

The *criteria* used to place people in their class also vary. In a very small nonliterate society, status may rest on personal achievement. In

larger societies it may be based on differences in birth, race, wealth, learning, occupation, "refinement," or authority, or on a combination of two or more of these factors. The *rigidity* of the structure also varies. In some societies, a person can never change his social status; in others it is comparatively easy to do so.

These possible variations may be more concretely visualized by contrasting two possible extremes of stratification: a caste system and an open-class system. A *caste* society is rigidly stratified into distinct hereditary classes called castes. A person's social status is determined by his being born into a particular caste. He can climb no higher. Status in an *open-class* society is based on personal achievement; a person can easily rise by his own efforts or good fortune. In short, status in a caste society is completely ascribed, in an open class society it is achieved. No perfect example of either kind of society exists; but if we think of the two types as opposite extremes of a continuum, all societies will fall somewhere between. No society relies completely upon either birth or accomplishment to determine how its rewards of privileges and prestige shall be distributed. All combine ascribed and achieved status in varying degrees.

India is the outstanding example of a caste society. For 3,000 years Hindus have been divided into the clean or "twice-born" castes and the unclean or "once-born" castes; the division has been sanctioned by the Hindu religion. The Hindu's only hope of rising to a higher caste has been to fulfill so well the duties of his present caste that he might be born into a higher one in another life (reincarnation). Occupation has been largely correlated with caste. More than two thousand castes, each with its own myth of ancestry, human or divine, and its own rites and rules, have been elaborated from the original four castes: the Brahmans, or priests, the Kshatryas or soldiers, the Vaisyas or farmers and merchants, and the Sudras or laborers. In addition there are hordes of outcastes or untouchables. Taboos define social distance between castes. Certain types of contact are considered to pollute a member of a "clean" caste; if even the shadow of a low-caste falls on him he must perform a long ritual bath to purify himself. Marriage between castes is out of the question. And although a person cannot rise in the world, he can forfeit his right to status and become a pariah or outcaste. This system of inherited inequality functions to maintain the status quo. But it has never been entirely ironclad, and in the new industrial and commercial cities the rituals and taboos are becoming increasingly impossible to observe. New occupations are springing up, and the secondary relationships of the city as well as new ideas from Western democracy are blurring caste lines to some extent. The new constitution has abolished untouchability and

made its practice punishable; but any attempt to legislate social change, as we saw in Chapter 5, is completely successful only when grounded in the mores. Abolition of the caste system will take many generations.

We Americans often consider our own country the perfect example of an open-class society. And indeed it is true that perhaps nowhere else than in the United States has it been easier for people to rise in the social scale. But even we cannot escape the fact that every individual starts life with an ascribed status—that of his family. If it is high, he has an initial advantage in the competition characteristic of a dynamic society. If it is low, he is handicapped in the struggle for status. A completely open-class society is a dream apparently impossible to realize.

American Beliefs Regarding Class

The American political ideology is based on the idea expressed by the Founding Fathers—"All men are created equal." It denies the existence of social classes, and none of our laws recognize such divisions. Our ideas of democracy are based upon the equality of all men.

Reality has forced us to modify this ideal. We interpret it to mean that all men are entitled to equal opportunity to climb in the world. Lincoln is our culture hero, for he was born in a humble log cabin and rose to occupy the White House.

In thus admitting that all men are not born equal, Americans are not really admitting that there are social *classes,* but simply that some *individuals* have achieved higher status than others. And other individuals can do the same, if they but subscribe to the beliefs expressed in the Protestant ethic, the Horatio Alger novels of "rags to riches," and Ben Franklin's proverbs. Hard work and thrift, honesty and perseverance will bring success. Ambition is a good thing. Success is the shining goal, the chief value. A person who succeeds thereby proves his merit. It follows that those "at the top" deserve to be there; those at the bottom of the ladder are just lazy. They would get somewhere if they believed that "God helps those who help themselves," and that "A penny saved is a penny earned."

The last two decades of economic depression and international warfare have punctured many of these fine notions. In the early 1930's, many people who had put money aside for a rainy day and believed that anyone who was strong and willing could always make a living saw their

jobs and savings vanish. Since then the ideal of individual success has lost some ground to the ideal of security.

Evidences That We Do Have a Class System

Many of us Americans, then, take such pride in our traditional belief in equality and democracy that we vehemently deny that we have any class divisions. Identifying the notion with Karl Marx and the class struggle, or with the hereditary inequality from which the early colonists escaped by their migration to the New World, we regard class divisions as practically "un-American."

Yet, as we have seen, no society is classless. We admit its reality in our own society in our everyday speech. Do we not speak of being ambitious, of getting ahead, getting up in the world? Of "big shots" and "high mucky-mucks"? Of "fine old families" whose ancestors came on that crowded ship, the *Mayflower*? Is there not a "country club set" and a "street corner gang" in most cities? Are not some people "born with silver spoons in their mouths," while others grow up "on the wrong side of the tracks?"

Much of the stuff of our novels and dramas, too, comes from the reality of class. Do we not recognize the obstacles to the happiness of the night watchman's daughter, Kitty Foyle, and Wynnewood Strafford VI from Philadelphia's Main Line? Do not the tabloids play up the Cinderella quality of a Rockefeller's marriage to the daughter of an immigrant? A dozen middle-class businessmen we know are epitomized in *Babbitt;* we catch a glimpse of the slums in *A Tree Grows in Brooklyn,* and sympathize with the impoverished and dispossessed migrants of *The Grapes of Wrath.*

Why We Should Understand Our Class System

Since everything points to some ranking of social status in our country, and we know that it must exist in ours as it does in others, any attempt to understand our society must necessarily include a consideration of our class system. Many American values are thrown into clear relief when considered in relation to our social pyramid. Instead of insisting that we have perfect equality (and therefore no

class system) or denying that we have any equality (and therefore our class system means we have no democracy), we might try to appraise the ways in which reality can be brought closer to our ideal. Certainly, as individuals, we may find a better understanding of our own attitudes, ambitions, and problems, and a more realistic orientation toward possible goals than we could without some knowledge of our class structure and how it works.

Social scientists have studied the distribution of prestige and privilege in many communities. Although they disagree on certain points and feel that their research is not yet adequate, there is substantial agreement on some features of our class structure. In our limited space we shall touch upon their chief findings without pausing to qualify our general statements.

The Class Pyramid in the United States

Classes are "inclusive, loosely organized groupings whose members behave toward each other as social equals and toward outsiders as social superiors or inferiors, and who as individuals either stay in the group into which they are born, or rise or fall to different levels depending upon the way their social attributes correspond to the values around which the particular class system is organized." [2]

How many classes are there in the United States? In our complex society, where many deny the existence of class, where social change is rapid, and where there is much variation from community to community, any attempt to distinguish a certain number of classes is necessarily arbitrary. Most students of class have found it convenient to distinguish three broad groups: Upper, middle, and lower. Others make finer distinctions. William Lloyd Warner and his associates have spent years studying class, particularly in Newburyport, Massachusetts, which they call "Yankee City." [3] There they distinguish the following classes:

Upper-upper class—1 per cent of the people
Lower-upper class—1½ per cent
Upper-middle class—10 per cent
Lower-middle class—28 per cent
Upper-lower class—34 per cent
Lower-lower class—25 per cent

Volumes have been written describing and analyzing these classes, but we shall be brief at the risk of being sketchy.

Only "old families" with inherited wealth and several generations of upper-class position belong to the top 1 per cent. Not all communities have this "old aristocracy"; it is most often found in New England and the South. The lower level of the upper class is wealthier, on the whole, than the "upper crust," but its money has not been sweetened by the passage of time. Its members are "new rich" who have made their money in finance and industry and business.

Business and professional men make up the bulk of the upper-middle class. They and their families are solid, highly respected citizens, active in civic affairs, and considered "the backbone of the community."

Below the sixth of the population who form the top three classes comes the level of "the common man"—that catchword of the twentieth century. The 62 per cent of the people who belong to the lower-middle class and the upper-lower class are far removed from the three classes above them. They might be called "the working class." Their chief values are thrift, hard work, honesty, and decency. The lower-middle class is composed largely of white-collar workers, clerks, small tradesmen, and skilled workers. They own small, neat homes but have little other property. The upper-lower class is made up of "poor but honest workers" who more often than not are unskilled or semiskilled. They are anxious to do the right thing, to be respectable, and to offer their children more opportunities than they have had. They are greatly concerned lest they slip into the lowest class.

The lower-lower class is looked down upon as a shiftless lot "from the wrong side of the tracks" or the slums. They are the families of unskilled laborers who go from job to job and live on charity or relief between jobs.

The Criteria of Social Class

What determines a man's position on the social pyramid? "Money," most Americans would answer promptly. And indeed, in our materialistic, highly competitive society, wealth is correlated to a considerable extent with social status. But this is not true of all societies. *The criteria of status are determined by the values of the culture.* In a society that puts a premium on warfare, the warrior who collects the most enemy scalps enjoys the highest status. In some societies the ability to prophesy confers status. Among the San Blas Cuna, being born with a caul ascribes to the newborn child the potential status of a *nele* or seer, which he may later achieve by study and training. No objective criterion



"It's easy to get in this fraternity—All you have to do is submit your father's income tax report!"

is important in itself; it is made important by the *attitudes* of the people.

We say a man is "worth" half a million dollars. This indicates the high value we place on wealth. The distribution of privilege and prestige among the population corresponds in a general way with the distribution of income. A pyramid of incomes would not, however, quite match the classic Egyptian pyramid with which we are accustomed to describe the class structure. It would be very broad at the base and taper off very thin and high. "If we made such an income pyramid out of a child's play blocks with each layer portraying $1,000 of income the peak would be far higher than the Eiffel Tower, but almost all of us would be within a yard of the ground." [4] More than a quarter of American families have less than $2,000 a year to live on; this would correspond roughly with the percentage suggested for the lower-lower class. On the other hand, more than a quarter of the national income goes to less than 10 per cent of the families.

Wealth is, then, of great value as an index of social status. But even more important is the *source* of income. If a person's income comes from clipping coupons on inherited bonds, then he is almost certainly "top level." If from newly successful business ventures, he is probably just below the top. No matter how wealthy a man is, if he is identified with the "rackets" he is outside the pale, probably accepted only in the glittering tinsel world of "cafe" society.


Closely related to source of income is *occupation.* Of every hundred working adults in the country, roughly 40 are in unskilled or semi-skilled labor, 19 in clerical and sales work and the like ("white-collar jobs"), 14 in skilled jobs, 8 are farmers and farm managers (ranging from the poor tenant farmer to the wealthy wheat rancher), 9 are "managers, proprietors, and officials," and 9 are professional and technical workers.[5]

Two other objective indexes of probable social status are the *kind of house* and the *kind of neighborhood* a person lives in. Warner and his associates have worked out a weighted table that gives different occupations, sources of income, houses, and neighborhoods different numerical values. By referring to the scale, a person can determine his probable social status.

The *real* test of social status, however, is "What is the highest class in which I am accepted as a social equal, an intimate friend?" An incident in Sinclair Lewis' novel, *Babbitt,* illustrates the validity of this criterion.

George Babbitt, an upper-middle class businessman, took advantage of a class reunion to invite the lower-upper class McKelveys to dinner. The McKelveys came, but left early. Instead of mentioning a return invitation, Mr. McKelvey remarked that he and George really should lunch together sometime.





Canada: National Film Board; Detroit Free Press

HOUSING AND CLASS STATUS

A middle-class street and a lower-lower class dwelling.

Another classmate, Ed Overbrook, an unsuccessful insurance salesman, invited the Babbitts to dinner. They reluctantly suffered through an evening with the lower-middle class Overbrooks. They left early; at the door George mentioned the possibility of lunching with Ed. The Babbitts decided it would not be fair to invite the Overbrooks to dinner; they would feel out of place.

Variations in Class Structure


It is in a person's own community that class counts most, for his social status determines the range of his associations and his way of life. Class structures show considerable variation from one locality to another. They may vary in the weight given different criteria of status. A rural community may ignore any other criteria but hard work and morality, as was found to be the case in Landaff, New Hampshire.[6] Birth is more important where there is an "old aristocracy;" money is more important in newer communities.

The class levels of different communities are not strictly comparable; what is considered upper class in one might be middle class elsewhere. The "big frog" in the small hometown pond may be considered a nobody by the leading citizens of a large nearby city. One reason so many American tourists jump to the conclusion that there is no middle class in Latin America is that the level of living of the Latin American middle class is far lower than that of the American middle class. But by the criteria of their own countries they are both middle class.

The range of income, power, and prestige is greater in the huge modern city than in the smaller town, but the strata are less clearly marked off from one another. Only in a fairly small community can social status be conceived of in terms of the actual people in each class and their interaction; in the city status is more categorical and impersonal. "Precise and stable discriminations can be maintained in a detailed way only within the confines of a community small enough to be comprehended as a whole. . . . In the larger urban areas, the recognition of prestige differences becomes closely tied to the symbols of wealth and power, and only within the limited circles of more or less intimate association are more complex criteria employed and finer distinctions drawn." [7]

The attempt to depict the American class structure in terms of a neat pyramid runs into another great obstacle—that of minority groups, of which the Negro is an outstanding example. Where does this tenth of our population fit? There are some elements of a caste structure in the

position of the Negro. The taboos against any relationship that implies social equality or intimacy are present, particularly in the South, where separate schools, drinking fountains, and sections of busses and trains are maintained, and the law forbids intermarriage with whites. Skin color, in particular, makes the status hereditary to the extent that Negroes



Life photograph by Margaret Bourke-White

CASTE IN INDIA

Tradition rules every aspect of life. Even in acts of mercy, a person of higher caste avoids pollution from contact with even the shadow of an untouchable.

are identifiable by their color. Other aspects of the Negro's position do not fit the definition of caste, however. Although the mores and the law uphold his status as a "second-class citizen" in many states, religion and political ideology do not sanction it, as they do in a true caste system. In fact, the treatment of the Negro so violates our own democratic ideology,

our insistence that "all men are created equal," that the race issue generates much tension and conflict and has been spoken of as "an American dilemma." [8] In a caste system the lower castes are accommodated to their status; they believe in it because the values and beliefs of the society sanction it. In our country, where the values are directly in conflict with reality, many Negroes are not content; restless and ambitious, they are striving for higher status and resorting to political action.

In the nine decades since emancipation, a class system has evolved among the Negroes themselves. Business and professional men are at the top. There is a middle class of clerical and skilled workers who emphasize respectability, industry, and morality as does the white middle class, and a lower class from which many Americans have derived their picture of all Negroes as shiftless and uneducated.

Social Mobility

Because so much emphasis is placed upon outward signs of status in our culture, we Americans are often accused of having superficial, materialistic values. And indeed there is much in our society to justify this judgment. But most Americans prefer to regard this system of values as having a very laudable aspect. They are proud of the fact that a person is not condemned to stay in the social class into which he was born, that acquiring these outward signs of status can help an individual rise in the social pyramid. And how does a person acquire the fine home, the shiny car, the "responsible position?" By his own efforts, on his own merits, is the American answer. By hard work, sobriety, and thrift anyone can raise himself up by his bootstraps. Most of us accept the competitive struggle because we really believe that we can better our lot as individuals. There is great admiration for the man who makes it the hard way, little for the boss' nephew who, no matter what his abilities, is always suspected of having got his position by "pull."

There is ample historical explanation for this tenacious belief in mobility by individual effort. The immigrants to the New World, from Plymouth and Jamestown on, came partly to escape the restrictions of a hereditary class system. They came to a vast area rich in natural resources, where land could virtually be had for the taking, and many a strong, able, and resourceful man could make his fortune. Their children and their children's children saw Abraham Lincoln go from log cabin to White House, Andrew Carnegie from rags to riches. Technological progress opened up undreamed of new jobs and business opportunities. Although the gap between rich and poor widened, there was always "room at the

top" thanks to an expanding economy and the low birth rate of the upper class. Millions of immigrants "pushed" earlier arrivals upward in the social scale by taking the lowest-paid jobs.

The growth of cities both demanded and promoted mobility. In the competitive, specialized, impersonal city, what a man does and how he looks are more important than who his parents were. In the smaller community, classes more nearly approach the form of self-conscious social groups; in the city they are, with the possible exception of the upper-upper class, more nearly statistical aggregates. In the city a person strives to rise in terms of material rewards and of comparative success as measured against his job colleagues and intimate friends. John P. Marquand wove an entire novel around this contrast (and wove Warner's study into the plot!). Back home in a small Massachusetts town, Charles Gray, the hero of *Point of No Return,* was not considered quite good enough to marry the daughter of the town's leading citizen. In New York, his consciousness of family background receded. He was aware of striving to get up in the world chiefly in terms of competition with a colleague for a vice-presidency of the bank where both worked, and when he got the position he thought of his victory in terms of membership in an exclusive club, better private schools for the children, and social equality with the president of the bank.

Besides emphasizing the nature of urban mobility, this novel illustrates the fact that occupation and income are only *means* of achieving social status, not signs that one has arrived. "Money must be translated into socially approved behavior and possessions, and they in turn must be translated into intimate participation with, and acceptance by, members of a superior class." [9]

Means of mobility. Education is undoubtedly the chief prerequisite to occupational advancement today and thus to higher income and social status. Parents in the upper-lower and lower-middle class are particularly anxious to see their children through high school at least, and then through business school and college if possible, so they will escape the necessity of manual labor and "have it better than we did." Upper-lower class parents are usually content if their children acquire "good" white-collar jobs or become teachers or nurses. Middle-class parents often aim at graduate and professional degrees for their children.

Whatever the occupation, a person is expected to "succeed" in it and to display that success by means of "conspicuous consumption." An individual must look successful not only to convince others that he is successful, but also because "nothing succeeds like success."

Mobility through education and effort is usually step-by-step mobility

within the middle class, often by means of promotions. The civil service employee, the single employee among thousands in a giant corporation, even the doctor or lawyer, rarely rise in spectacular fashion.

Not that the modern era is lacking in rags to riches stories. A barefoot girl in cotton dress and sunbonnet walked into Dallas' most fashionable store not long ago and spent thousands of dollars on a wardrobe; her father had just struck oil. Luck rather than industry would probably be Horatio Alger's theme if he were writing for modern youngsters, for the success stories that appeal to the rising generation are such stories as that of Lana Turner, who was "discovered" while sipping a soda at the drugstore, and of Bing Crosby, who modestly explains his success in his autobiography, *Call Me Lucky*. Luck can happen to *anybody!*

Girls in particular are conscious of the chance to capitalize on beauty and charm by making a "good marriage," for the wife commonly assumes her husband's status. Many girls choose "careers" as nurses or white-collar workers with one eye on their possibilities for contact with desirable men.

Advantages of mobility. The opportunity to rise socially is a distinct stimulus to effort. It keeps a society dynamic, its members optimistic and energetic. An open-class society relies upon competition to get its work done effectively. The prodding of American youth to "Hitch your wagon to a star," to go "Onward and Upward" has helped to make us a people noted for optimism, daring, energy, creativeness, and courage.

Disadvantages of mobility. But the mobile society has many casualties. The stable folk society may be static and stifling, but it is secure. In our modern, highly urbanized society the social elevator goes down as well as up and generates a feeling of insecurity. Many are pushed beyond their capacities or into the wrong field. By preaching the doctrine of ambition to one and all, we encourage many who would be happier and more useful tinkering with engines and machinery to aspire to a career in law or medicine or politics. The son who cannot make the grade feels that he has failed his parents. The Milquetoast who plods along in a clerking job and putters with his hobbies is reproached by his family for failing to get ahead and to provide them with luxuries. There is no room in our culture for a "contented failure." A person who has not managed to maintain at least the same social position into which he was born, or who has not risen as high as his brothers or classmates, is made to feel inferior. Thus mobility exacts a toll in discontent and frustration, in mental illness, in maladjusted and neurotic individuals.

The doctrine of ambition keeps us living for the future, often at the

expense of future as well as present happiness. There is no stopping place on a ladder whose rungs are marked with dollar signs. Each step higher opens up a new vista—new things to buy, a flashier car, a better address, a more exclusive club—all just out of reach unless the aspirant makes it up the next rung. In chasing money and fame, many people lose lasting satisfactions. The hard-driving businessman piling up money to send his children to exclusive schools and to buy his wife a mink coat looks forward to enjoying life after he retires. By then he may be a physical wreck, may have lost contact with his family, and may find that he has never taken time to learn to live. "Success" is often an empty thing.

There is another danger in the starry-eyed preaching of the doctrine of ambition. When young people see that hard facts do not exactly fit the promises held out in "rags to riches" stories, they may turn to ideologies that seem to them more in keeping with reality. It should not be surprising that many young people who were taught "the American dream" in the optimistic 1920's and found that no amount of willingness and strength, intelligence and energy could get them higher than a WPA job or the CCC in the 1930's should have turned—even though temporarily—to communism. The harsh disillusionment they suffered made them easy marks for the ideology of a classless society. Their disillusionment with the Russian perversion of this ideal is another story.

Evidences of declining mobility. "Our social structure is hardening." Thus many social scientists express their belief that actual mobility has declined in our society faster than has our cultural faith in it. They point to the closing of our geographical frontiers, the sharp decline in immigration, the rise of the giant corporation, and the decrease in competition as causative factors.

It has become harder to make spectacular rises in the business world. Many fields, the main province of giant corporations, are denied to small new businesses. Similar situations are also found in farming, where subsidies are given on the basis of *previously* planted acreage, in the professions, where younger men are sometimes barred from lucrative practice by various means, and even in labor, where immigration restrictions and the closed shop sometimes make it hard for newcomers.

"Occupational heredity" is a good index of the degree of mobility. An increasing percentage of men are found to be working in the same occupation as their fathers. This is particularly noticeable in the well-paid professions such as medicine and in the ownership and management of big business. Even where the son's occupation is different, there is often little change in general socio-economic level. Furthermore, most professional men started their careers as professional men, manual laborers

started as manual laborers. The chief rise occurs now among the small businessmen and lower white-collar workers, who rise within the middle-class.[10]

Directly related to the decline of mobility is the fact that a college education has become a prerequisite to real gains in social status in many fields. Although elementary and high-school education is available to most American boys and girls with little effort (though even here many "drop-outs" occur for lack of money), we have not succeeded so far in making a college education available to all who have the ability to profit by it.

"Eighty per cent of the boys and girls in the top three classes get a college education, but only 20 per cent of the lower-middle class students and five per cent of the students from the two lower classes go on to college." [11]

It is possible, of course, to get a college education by waiting on table and shoveling coal, but many who do so feel they have missed out on much of the fun of college. The National Youth Administration helped many who could not otherwise have done so go to college in the 1930's; the GI Bill has done the same for veterans since World War II. The mushrooming attendance at colleges and universities charging a nominal tuition indicates that they fill a real need. Any measures that make it easier for young people with the requisite intelligence to attend college are bringing the "American dream" of equal opportunity for all closer to reality.

The apparent decline in social mobility is offset, at least in part, by the fact that the levels of living of our whole society have advanced (with a few significant exceptions such as people living on pensions, who suffer from inflation). Americans in each class are considerably better off in many respects than were people of comparable status in 1900. More people have the comforts and amenities of life, fewer go without necessities. The shorter work week has given wage earners far more leisure time than their predecessors of 50 years ago would have dreamed of. Not only has the lower class risen absolutely, in terms of real wages, but in comparison with the middle class it has advanced considerably. In fact, the loss of teachers to industry and business, and often to factory work, indicates that salaries of white-collar and professional workers have not kept pace. The semiskilled and skilled workmen are far better off financially in many cases than teachers, nurses, and office employees. Furthermore, minimum wage laws and unemployment insurance have given them greater security than formerly. At the same time, the graduated income tax has brought the peak of the income pyramid considerably closer to the bottom.

Classes as Subcultures

In our mobile society, classes are hard to define, and in some respects our class system is a continuous incline rather than a series of layers. Nonetheless there are other influences besides income and occupation and ancestry that tend to make social classes distinct. These influences produce differences in culture, or way of life, among people of different social status and thus produce social distance between people of different status.

To begin with, a child is born into a family and his initial status must be that of his parents. He learns his version of the culture—such things as table manners, vocabulary, hygiene, games, standards of right and wrong—from his parents, brothers and sisters, and later from his playmates. His playmates are very likely to have parents in approximately the same economic circumstances as his own, for neighborhood housing is usually of similar value. The American ideals he is taught in school may or may not agree with what he learns at home and on the playground. In the upper class there is great stress on being "well-bred"; among the middle class on being "respectable," as neat and well-dressed and well-behaved as one's classmates, and if possible getting better grades than they do; on being clean and hardworking and careful of what the neighbors will say in the upper-lower class; and on being "tough" in the lower-lower class.

When an individual takes a job or goes on to college he continues to associate with those of his own class, or a bit above if he can manage it. When it comes to choosing a mate, he is very likely to marry one of his same general social level and settle in a neighborhood where others of his status live, usually moving to successively better ones if he is fortunate enough to earn more money as the years go by. He and his wife associate largely with others in the same business office or the same profession, at any rate in the same socio-economic level. Thus they reinforce the tendency of people with the same income and occupation to act and think alike.

This limitation of intimate interaction and intermarriage to one's own general socio-economic level produces a tendency for classes to become *subcultures.* The style of life learned in childhood in any one class is so hard to unlearn that it tends to ascribe status in spite of any later rise or fall in income. "The subtle hints of status carried in manner, manners, dress, speech, and social attitudes inform fairly accurately where any individual 'belongs' because of where he was born." [12] Thus it is that an impoverished aristocrat continues to be welcome in upper-class homes, while a "new rich upstart" commits social blunders and must "wait a

generation" before being accepted, usually only after his children have acquired proper polish in the proper schools.

In a general way each social class in our society has the same attitudes, behavior patterns, and ideologies. Let us take a few examples.

Education, for one. How far an individual goes in school and how well he does are tremendously important to the middle class. *Which school* he attends is far more important to the upper class. Among the upper social strata, attending the proper preparatory and finishing schools and colleges is the thing. A Ph.D. from a state university is far less impressive than an Ivy League bachelor's degree. The Lunts appeared in a play with a line pointedly illustrating this distinction. Discussing the granddaughter's new boy friend, they were happy to hear that he was studying at Harvard. Their satisfaction was short-lived, for someone observed, "But he's just a graduate student. Lord knows *where* he got his B.A.!"

In some respects, religion and politics also exhibit class characteristics. The elite tend to shun politics, or are content to stay behind the scenes, while members of the middle class occupy the prominent positions. This is in contrast to England, where members of the upper class are active in government circles, and, in fact, feel it their duty to serve. Denominational affiliation tends to run along class lines to a large extent, from the Episcopalian elite to the store-front sects of the lower class. Family life also is different, as studies of child training, sex behavior, and the birth rate have shown.

Most sports typically begin as upper-class pastimes and filter down the social scale. Tennis and golf are examples. At present, upper-class sports —polo, yachting, owning a string of race horses—are too expensive for there to be much risk of emulation. Summer resorts are also to some extent exclusive, though the days of palatial "cottages" and lavish balls appear to be over.

Formal organizations cut across class lines to some extent. The middle class are the great "joiners." In some activities, such as civic affairs and charities, they work with upper-class people. In informal organizations, cliques and circles of intimate friends, however, class lines are rarely crossed. If a person is accepted as a member of a "clique" of higher-class people, he has passed the test and completed a step upward in the social scale.

Thus frequent interaction and intermarriage occurring among people of similar economic or occupational status tend to turn status groupings into subcultures, with the same style of life, shared interests, and similar attitudes, and to produce social distance between people of different classes. In some countries these tendencies have been at work so long that the different classes are worlds apart. In the United States this is not the

case, for counteracting influences have retarded the separation into distinct subcultures. Mass production, communication, and education have operated to produce cultural homogeneity. When members of all classes read the same magazines and newspapers, see the same TV shows and movies, use the same schoolbooks in grade and high school, eat the same breakfast cereals, and take an interest in the same sports, they "speak the same language" to a great extent. Our heterogeneous racial, religious, and ethnic backgrounds, with important exceptions, cut across class lines. Both geographic and social mobility retard the formation of clear-cut, self-conscious classes, as does the great range of incomes, occupations, and family backgrounds in our comparatively large middle class.

The great cultural stress on informality and democratic manners has also discouraged the formation of clear-cut classes. Even the upper-upper class feels constrained to avoid acting superior in inter-class contacts. Aristocratic birth and manners handicap the politician; newspaper cartoonists made much of the contrast between Roosevelt and Hoover in the 1932 campaign, showing one as a Little Lord Fauntleroy tended by servants, the other as a "barefoot boy with cheek of tan" going off to the fishing hole. One Minnesota housewife who was a delegate to the 1952 Republican convention could find no higher praise for her candidate, Dwight Eisenhower, than that he seemed so "ordinary, so common, just like one of us."

Nonetheless, the differences are there, and people at opposite ends of the social pyramid lead utterly different lives. Here are two hypothetical case histories one sociologist has used to illustrate some of these differences.[13]

Joe Novotnick. A boy born to Czechoslovak parents in a Pennsylvania anthracite town is more likely to die before reaching childhood than a boy born on the other side of the tracks, but Joe manages to survive. His home is a cold shack which lacks the conveniences of running water and electricity. His parents must struggle to keep their many offspring alive, so that they are unable to devote much time or attention to young Joe.

He spends most of his time away from home, in an unsupervised gang. As an American he feels somewhat contemptuous of his immigrant parents, but he soon learns that he is not rated very high by other Americans whose names are more easily spelled. He soon develops habits of aggression and defiance against the police whom he is taught to fear, the Boy Scout troop which does not want him, and the schoolteachers who do not treat him as they do the nice children in his classes. He quits school as soon as he reaches legal working age, for he has learned, as all American children learn, the importance of money

to buy those things they prize. Only through his own efforts can Joe secure those commercialized pleasures which male adolescents want, such as candy, movies, a secondhand automobile, flashy clothes, and spending money for taking out girls.

He has a vague notion that he would like to become a big shot, but he has no knowledge of the terrible price he would have to pay for a most improbable success. It is unlikely that he would be willing to pay that price even if he learned what it is: to deny present desires in order to save and become educated, to change both habits and friends and thereby earn the respect and liking of those middle-class persons whose prerogative it is to grant or to withhold. Joe does not pay that price. He marries early, either through choice or because a certain young woman is "in trouble." The stage is thereby set for another cycle of poverty, many children, and slum living conditions.

Gilmore DePew Belding III. This upper-upper-class boy comes from an old-stock American family which has wealth commensurate with lineage. Since aristocracies always hire others to feed, clean, and discipline their children, Gilmore's relationship with his parents is relaxed and gracious, the two hours a day they spend with him being mutually pleasurable. He never goes hungry, nor will he ever fear unemployment. He is sheltered from aggression, vulgarity, and many shatterings of self-confidence. For him many so-called realities of life do not and never will exist.

He attends St. Paul's School and later, of course, Harvard. After marrying a girl from his own set, he immediately steps into a position that was made for him. He has been trained to realize his high place in the world, to invade the personalities of servants, to treat oldsters of his own class with deference and respect, and to ignore most other people whom he does not have to meet socially. He has been trained to be kind with inferiors, except when his privileges or those of his class are threatened. His manner is one of self-assurance and ease. He regards the law and the police as public servants hired to guard him and his. He may or may not have developed a sense of civic duty, an obligation to repay society for his many material and social blessings.

These two men dress differently. Their manners are different. Their friends, interests, and recreational pursuits are all different. Only in the narrow technical sense do they talk the same language, for their active vocabularies as well as their accents are different. Many of the same words they use have different shades of meaning for themselves and their friends. Granting the virtually impossible, that they should ever meet, each would be unable to understand the other's point of view.

Their temperaments may be similar or dissimilar, but in either case

their social roles and social personalities are different. Even if Gilmore owns stock in the mine in which Joe works, they do not enter the same universe of discourse. To Joe, Gilmore is an unidentified part of the hated company; to Gilmore, Joe is part of the faceless working class which has forgotten its proper place. A strike at the mine to one is labor trouble; to the other it is management trouble.

Their loyalties, identifications, and social attitudes are alien, each to the other. Joe favors soaking the rich to build a welfare state; Gilmore violently opposes it, along with what he regards as excessive inheritance and income taxes. Joe looks up, and envies. Gilmore looks down, and deplores. Beyond this each knows little, and cares less, about the other. In a word, they live in mutually insulated worlds of experience.

Class Attitudes in the United States

When asked to which class they belong, most Americans—87 per cent according to one poll—say "middle class." The reasons lie mostly in our belief system. Most Americans will deny that there are any real strata of any permanence and admit only that there are *individual* differences in prestige and privilege, and that a number of people happen at any given time to have more or less the same amount. Furthermore, it is thought snobbish to claim upper-class status; only 4 or 5 per cent do so. "Lower class" carries a connotation of insult, of immorality. People will admit that they are poor but despise the term "lower class." When the category of "working class" is added to the poll questions, only 40 per cent claim middle-class status, and most of the rest say they are "working class."

Awareness of social status is keenest in regard to those just above or just below a person. The upper-upper class makes much of the distinction between their own kind and the "new rich." Although the new rich are eager to display their wealth, the "old families" are "ostentatiously shabby." They abhor the limelight and avoid being conspicuous. Quiet good manners is their hallmark. Members of the middle class who have climbed or tried to climb several steps upward are keenly aware of such distinctions in status as they themselves have experienced. Members of the lower class are prone to speak of almost all above them as "big shots" or "people who think they're somebody." If they have upper-lower class status, they are sharply conscious of those below and dread the danger of slipping into their class. After studying a town in the Deep South, a team


of anthropologists depicted the attitudes of each class toward themselves and those above and below. (See the chart on page 154.)

Each class tends to think important those things of which they have most, in comparison with other classes, and minimize the attributes of others by speaking of them condescendingly or scornfully. The lower class stresses toughness, being able to "take it," and attributes the position of those above to luck, pull, and inherited wealth. In the upwardly mobile middle class, the values that we think of as "typically American"—the stress on competition, respectability, industry, and education—are strongest. The lower-upper class stresses wealth as the criterion of status while striving at the same time to meet the standards of those above, in spite of loudly voiced scorn for "blue blood." Members of the upper-upper class emphasize lineage, and tend to believe they deserve their higher status because they come from "better stock."

Class solidarity. Those most aware of *group* status, most conscious of their class as having common interests, are those at the extreme ends of the social scale. The small upper class is notably homogeneous in shared political and economic attitudes and interests. They accused the late President Roosevelt of "betraying his class." Class consciousness in the sense of solidarity made little headway among the working class until recent years. In general, the workers have shared the American belief, now typically middle class, that status is an individual matter. The growth of mass industries using machines that require little skill to operate, and of huge labor unions with programs of education and political action as well as their primary purpose of collective bargaining, have tended to make American workers more conscious of themselves as a group, and more concerned with security as a group than with individual advancement in social status. Although they champion social security and collective action, they are not the militant working class envisioned by Karl Marx when he predicted the "class struggle."

Lack of class conflict. Marx predicted that the "proletariat"—the propertyless wage earners—would unite and overthrow the "bourgeoisie" or property owners. His ideology has had great influence on recent history and on events still in the making. His predictions have failed to come true in the United States, however. In discussing the reasons why the "class struggle" in a revolutionary sense has not occurred in the United States we shall be summing up many of the things we have said about our class structure and how it works.

Far from being the two-fold system of bourgeoisie and proletariat de-



From Allison Davis, Burleigh and Mary Gardner, Deep South (Copyright, 1941 by the University of Chicago Press), p. 65.

SOCIAL CLASS PERSPECTIVES IN OLD CITY

How each class looks upon its own members (bold face) and the members of other classes.

scribed by Marx, our class structure may best be described as a continuous incline. Any division into a certain number of classes is necessarily arbitrary.

The growth of clearly defined and self-conscious social classes has been hampered by the ethnic, racial, and religious heterogeneity of all income brackets (although this is least pronounced in the upper bracket). At the same time mass production, mass education, and mass communication have fostered cultural homogeneity among all classes. Physical and social mobility also operate against crystallization into clear-cut groups.

The gap between top and bottom has been narrowed considerably in recent decades by such measures as the graduated income tax, social security, and minimum wage laws. The lower classes have enjoyed a rise in real income, meaning they have more comforts and necessities than before.

The large middle class serves as a stabilizing influence. Its belief in equality of opportunity, thrift, achievement, and industry is shared by most members of the upper and lower classes as well. Possible envy and resentment are counteracted to some degree by a belief in luck that is very strong in the lower class and by the observance of informal, democratic manners in all inter-class contacts. There is a cultural dislike for anyone who "puts on airs." "Aristocratic" birth is a handicap in seeking public office, while easy "everyday" manners draw votes.

In spite of various indications that our social structure is becoming more rigid, there is still considerable opportunity to rise in the social scale, and considerable faith in the future. "If we don't get very far up in the world, our children will"—if we give them a good education. Ambition has moved over only a trifle to make room for security as a dominant American value.

11

INTERGROUP TENSIONS IN A MULTI-GROUP SOCIETY

We have seen that in our heterogeneous, mobile society, distinctions between classes are not particularly clearcut nor productive of tensions. We cannot say the same of distinctions among other kinds of groups—those of different national background, religious belief, and racial type. American history is to a certain extent the story of such tensions and of efforts to alleviate them and to bring them into closer agreement with our cultural beliefs in freedom and equality.

Nationality Conflicts

The story of intergroup tensions in America began with the arrival of the first European immigrants. Upon reaching these

shores, the newcomers almost immediately collided with the only native Americans—the Indians. Bitter campaigns of annihilation and conquest lasting through more than two centuries reduced the Indians to a fraction of their original numbers and many now exist under conditions that, as Americans increasingly realize, flagrantly violate our professed creed of equality and justice.

These early colonists were largely people of Anglo-Saxon stock who impressed their cultural traditions, especially their religious beliefs, on our early history. During the first half of the nineteenth century, many more Europeans came to America to escape religious and political persecution and the want that followed the breakdown of the peasant economy in their homelands. Most of the newcomers were from western and northern Europe and closely resembled the earlier arrivals in appearance and culture. The frontier was still open; there were opportunities for all comers. The new settlers found a place in the growing society with comparative ease.

About 1880, immigrants began to come in greater and greater numbers from southern and eastern Europe. They were culturally different from the earlier arrivals and often physically identifiable as different. With the frontier closing up, they furnished the labor force for the mushrooming industrial cities, each new group of arrivals starting at the bottom of the ladder. When times were hard and jobs few, they were the butt of much discrimination and of such terms as "Wop," "Hunky," and "Polack."

In the century after 1820, about 35 million immigrants came to this country. In 1924 restrictions were clapped on, discriminating against the "new" immigration from southern and eastern Europe and allowing liberal quotas for the old. No longer does the verse at the base of the Statue of Liberty apply freely to all European countries:

> Give me your tired, your poor,
> Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free. . . .

The process of Americanization or assimilation typically began with the newcomers quickly accommodating to the new environment in order to live, for the immigrant was often almost penniless and had to have a job at once. Those immigrants were fortunate who had friends to meet them and help them find jobs and housing, usually in an island of their native culture that eased the shock of adjusting to the new environment. Often the next step was naturalization, perhaps encouraged by political machines hungry for votes (see Chapter 26); naturalization required a minimum acquaintance with the English language and American history. The immigrants' children were usually taught the culture of the Old World at home and that of the New at school. Typically they were

ashamed of one but not quite at home in the other. The story of the conflicts and maladjustments of this generation is a familiar one.

By the third generation, the assimilation process is typically complete, for these children learn only a smattering of their grandparents' language and traditions. In fact, many Americans have come to feel that the process can go too far, that our country should not be the "melting pot" of the tired cliché but should enrich its culture by incorporating what can be salvaged of the colorful and rich traditions of the immigrant generations. Each decade the number of foreign born whites is smaller; from 13 per cent of our population in 1900 it declined to 11 per cent in 1930 and to only 6.7 per cent in 1950. Roughly four out of five of the foreign born live in urban areas. Including both the immigrants and their children, the largest group of foreign stock is German, followed by Italians, Polish, Russians, Irish, Canadians, and English.

Religious Differences

The increasing secularization of our society, together with our historic traditions of religious freedom, has encouraged tolerance among people of different faiths and reduced friction in their personal contacts in many areas of interaction. Most of the 87 million church members in the United States belong to various Protestant denominations. The largest single church enrollment is that in the Roman Catholic Church—about 29 million members, while Jewish congregations include about 5 million members. The 281,500 churches and synagogues dotting the country testify to the continuing strength of the Judaic-Christian traditions of our culture.

There is undeniably religious misunderstanding and prejudice in America, for in a sense the very nature of religion means that each group considers itself possessed of the truth and the others in error. But there is little conflict except in a few areas where religious beliefs and public policy clash—such questions as religion in education, birth control, and the pacifism of a few sects. Often the churches themselves are active in interfaith activities designed to promote understanding and cooperation. The bitterest religious conflicts occur at the personal level, as in interfaith marriages (see Chapter 14).

Interracial Tensions

Most people do not wear their religious beliefs written on their faces, nor, in mid-century America, betray their national origins

by dress or speech. Religious and cultural differences are learned rather than hereditary, and have "low visibility."

But other features are clearly different and are passed from generation to generation in the germ plasm. For complex reasons, certain of these hereditary traits—in our society, dark skin, woolly hair, slanted eyes, a certain shape of nose—mark off their owners as targets for prejudice and discrimination. Such treatment of biologically different groups is "justified" in the minds of the dominant group by "racist" doctrines. These doctrines include the following beliefs: that there are pure races of men, clearly marked off from one another; that these physically distinguishable groups have different mental and emotional traits that can be rated on a scale of superiority and inferiority; that the superior races are destined to lead and dominate; that any individual of the superior race must be superior to any individual of the inferior race; that biological crossing means degeneration or "mongrelization"; and that therefore it is safest to forbid contact between the races. So insidious is this doctrine that it hardly knows any limits. It applies, in the mind of the prejudiced, even to groups with few if any apparent biological differences. It applies to persons whose group membership is betrayed by nothing more than a surname or known family connection.

Obviously there are physical differences among the earth's people. How do biologists and social scientists account for these differences? What importance do they attach to them?

Physical Differences

What races are. A *race* is a large group of people distinguished by inherited physical differences. The term is often confused with but does not refer to people who speak the same language, live within the same political boundaries, or share a common culture.

What races are not. Take the "Aryan race." Originally the term was used to refer to those who first spoke the Aryan language. But no one knew exactly which people these were nor what they looked like. The man who first used the term later took it all back, saying, "To me an ethnologist who speaks of Aryan race, Aryan blood, Aryan eyes or hair, is as great a sinner as a linguist who speaks of a long-headed dictionary or a round-headed grammar." Pretending not to know this, the Nazis used the term "Aryan" to describe themselves as the master race as well as for several other purposes, all of them mistaken. Other examples of the con-

fusion of race and language are references to the "Latin race" and the "Semitic race." Race and language are not the same.

"The French race," "the English race," "the Swedish race,"—such phrases indicate a belief that the people of any one country belong to a common race. Nothing could be further from the truth. No nation is made up of members of only one race. History shows that the French and English are mixed almost beyond belief, and the Swedes, who are often thought of as racially pure Nordics, actually differ so much among themselves that only a small minority have the combination of physical features usually thought of as Nordic. A study of 45,000 Army draftees found only one Swede in nine who was blond, tall, blue-eyed, and long-headed. Less than one in five had both blond hair and blue eyes. Race and nation are not the same.

"I can spot a Jew a mile away," a person in a discussion will occasionally insist. When pinned down he speaks of short people with dark eyes and hair and hooked noses. Then the fun begins. A tall blonde girl says she is Jewish. A pretty little pug-nosed, blue-eyed blonde announces she, too, is Jewish. A young man remarks that because of his name and his nose he is often mistaken for a Jew, but actually his father is a Protestant minister and he knows of no Jewish background in his family.

There is no Jewish race. Jews are a people. They share some common cultural traits. They think of themselves as Jews and are so regarded by others. They are characterized chiefly by their religion, but even in worship there are marked differences among Jews. A substantial percentage of the younger generation no longer hold with the faith of their elders. Yet most of these still think of themselves and are thought of as Jews. They still share a number of the items of their parents' culture.

In addition to the Jews with whom many of us have had contact, there are Negro Jews and Oriental Jews. Jews are found among all the major racial stocks. Jews tend to resemble the people of the country in which they live more than they conform to any supposed Jewish type. In the Caucasus they are round-headed; in Arabia they are long-headed. In Poland and Lithuania they are short; in London they are tall. There is no common Jewish physical type. Race and culture are not the same.

How races came to be. From an original home, probably somewhere in Asia, our earliest ancestors went slowly on foot or by primitive water craft wherever they could find food. They had some crudely shaped stone tools but knew nothing of agriculture or domestic animals other than dogs. Some of these expeditions took hundreds of thousands of years. Some of them succeeded only after many trials. Some were halted for

centuries by jungles, massive mountain barriers, or wide expanses of water. Some groups found themselves unable to get back to where they had come from and were sealed off from the rest of mankind for tens of thousands of years; they were forced to breed only among themselves.

In some of these relatively isolated groups, man underwent slight physical changes. Through inbreeding, some of these changes spread to the entire group. One of the most obvious of these differences is skin color. Skin color is simply a matter of the amount of chemicals—carotene for yellow and melanin for brown—in the skin, along with the pinkish tinge from the blood vessels showing through. Whites have some of these chemicals. Negroes have more. Only the pale, milky-skinned albinos, who are found among all races, have none. These chemicals enable the skin to filter out the actinic rays that are very good for man in moderate amounts but which are overabundant in areas of great light intensity. In regions where there is much sunlight, skin color tends to be dark; in more northern areas, on the other hand, most people are light-skinned and thus able to take advantage of the weaker actinic rays in these areas.


Many times during the thousands of years when modern racial types were developing, isolated groups must have acquired somewhat distinct hereditary characteristics. In many cases, such groups must later have mingled with others and given rise to peoples of more varied and less uniform characteristics. No one knows, or probably ever will know, the history of inbreeding and outbreeding that has produced the modern racial types.

Racial divisions. Three main stocks are usually recognized: the Caucasoid or whites, the Negroid, and the Mongoloid. Traits especially characteristic of Caucasoids are light skin, abundant body hair, hair type ranging from wavy to straight, thin gray lips, and high thin noses. Mongoloids have yellowish-tan skins, eyelid folds, dark eyes, straight black head hair, scanty body hair, and predominantly broad heads. Negroids have dark skin and eyes, dark and kinky hair, red and full lips, broad and low noses, and predominantly long heads.

Actually, populations with these distinct characteristics are clearly present only in three areas of concentration—the Caucasoid in northern Europe, the Mongoloid in east central Asia, and the Negroid in west central Africa. It is customary to extend these three main stocks to include the great bulk of the world's population. Thus the peoples of the area from the Mediterranean to India are usually spoken of as Caucasoids, while the darker-skinned peoples of Africa south of the Sahara are usually grouped as Negroids. The Indian aborigines of the New World as

well as most of the peoples of East and Southeast Asia, although few of them show the eyelid fold in typical form, are usually called Mongoloid.

These larger groupings are basically conventional and no one really knows if all the peoples thus classed in a major racial division are actually more closely related to its typical members than to other main types. Some Caucasoids are darker in skin color than some Negroids. All stocks




From Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 85, The Races of Mankind, *by Ruth Benedict and others.*

THE THREE MAIN RACIAL STOCKS

A *is area of strongest Caucasian development,* B *of Mongoloid,* G *of Negroid. Most people in the world have in-between color skin.*

vary tremendously in skin color and range in height from very short to very tall. Certain groups resist all attempts at classification. Native Australians are as hairy as the Caucasoids, dark as the Negroid, and broad-faced as the Mongoloid.

In spite of the lack of a clear-cut line of demarcation even among these three groups, students have described even smaller groupings of "pure types" within these stocks. Much has been written about the "subraces"



From Anthropology *by A. L. Kroeber, copyright, 1923, 1948, by Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.*

RELATIONSHIP OF HUMAN RACES

Distances between the centers of circles are representative of the degree of relationship.

of the Caucasoid stock in particular. Three divisions are commonly described: Nordics (tall, long-headed, fair-skinned, and blue-eyed) found chiefly in northern Europe; Alpines (darker, shorter, and broad-headed) in central Europe; and Mediterraneans (long-headed, darker, and thinner than Alpines) in southern Europe and elsewhere. No such pure groups can now be found. Possibly they once existed. Today, however, they are very much mixed.

There is no doubt that physical differences can be distinguished among large groups of people. Anthropologists have employed some 50 measure-

ments and marked the minutest variations in tabulating population characteristics. How significant any of these variations are is another question, and one on which we have little undisputed evidence despite a great deal of study. Scientists laboring to classify people into groups and subgroups by physical differences have unintentionally given spurious authority to such fallacies as that of the "superior race," which has been used in recent decades to glorify the "Nordic" peoples in particular.

Our common heredity. In the eager search for race differences, it has been very easy to overlook the similarities found among all men, similarities that spell out an interesting story of human brotherhood. For beneath the skin you cannot tell one race from another; heart, lungs, skeleton, and muscles all are alike. All races are very similar in physical prowess. All four blood types—O, A, B, and AB—are found among all peoples. A white man with type B who needed blood to recover from an illness could not get a successful transfusion from his brother with type A—although his brother is obviously of the same race. But he would be on the road to health after getting blood from a Negro or Mongol with type B. The donor's racial type would make no difference.

Still other items prove our common heredity. The intricate structure of the human foot with its delicate arrangement of muscles, joints, and bones could scarcely have happened twice in quite the same combination. Look at our teeth. All humans have the same number and arrangement of molars, canines, and front teeth. Take the human brain. An anatomist skilled in brain examination and using the finest equipment cannot distinguish the brains of one race from those of another. A scientist at Johns Hopkins University once published a 79-page article detailing his most interesting findings—that the frontal area of the Negro brain was less well developed than the white, and also that there were more convolutions in the white cortex. He was probably honest, but he knew while he was examining each brain from which race it came because it was already labeled for him. Then the doctor under whom he had done the work re-examined the brains just to make sure, but took the excellent precaution of hiding the labels from himself so he would not be prejudiced in any way. Employing this scientific method, the doctor found exactly the same brain development in both the white and Negro groups.

Men of any race can mate with the women of any other race and the hybrid children prove vigorous and healthy. This biological test proves that we are all members of the same single species. The range of variation in the human species is decidedly less than that found in the black bear, and about half that found in a species of South American spider monkeys. When we turn to domestic animals we find the range several times wider

than among man. Only one very obvious conclusion is possible: We are all closely related. "All the peoples of the earth are a single family and have a common origin." What Shylock said about Jews may be said of all mankind.

> "Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? . . ."

Mental Differences

As far back as we can trace what one group has been saying of another, we find them looking down on the other as *mentally* inferior.

"Do not obtain your slaves from Britain," Cicero warned Atticus in the first century before Christ, "because they are so stupid and so utterly incapable of being taught that they are not fit to form a part of the household of Athens."

"Races north of the Pyrenees are of cold temperament and never reach maturity," declared a Moorish intellectual in the eleventh century; "they are of great stature and of a white color. But they lack all sharpness of wit and penetration of intellect."

A century ago the Count de Gobineau wrote his famous *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races.* His work was eagerly read by those anxious to carry "the white man's burden" with a good conscience. Since then, a flood of material has appeared to prove the inferiority of some races and the superiority of others. Psychologists appeared with their new "intelligence tests" and added profound weight to these beliefs, carrying out as they did the "inferiority" of Negroes to whites to three decimal points. Many scholars added a tremendous degree of respectability to the assertion that Negroes were by their very nature inferior to whites. In 1939 a survey by *Fortune* magazine found most Americans believing Negroes intellectually inferior to whites at birth.

As testing improved, it was discovered that the old tests reflected the increased opportunity, incentive, command of English, and schooling that most whites had. The famous scholars pointed out that they had been in error and helped revise the estimates.

We now know that the ratings achieved in so-called "intelligence tests" may change. A child placed in a foster home with a superior family may

raise his score markedly, for he has an opportunity to develop. Negroes in some northern states got higher ratings than whites in some southern states when as draftees they took the same tests in World War I, for the Negroes had had better educational opportunities in those northern states.

Despite centuries of study, there is no real proof of any relationship between level of intelligence and race. If any such relationship existed, surely it would have been found by now, for many have been only too eager to prove it. On the contrary, as Franz Boas said, "If we were to select the most intelligent, imaginative, energetic, and emotionally stable third of mankind, all races would be represented."

Cultural Differences

Psychologists attempting to test racial *intelligence* have thus concluded that no group is superior. Physical anthropologists with their calipers and other measuring tools have also been unable to find *physical* differences among peoples sufficient to rate one group as superior to another. But a point remains that deserves our attention—the so-called *cultural argument.* Whites must have greater intelligence, initiative, and perseverance than other races, goes the argument, for they have achieved greater wealth, education, leisure, and power than the other groups.[1]

There is no doubt that the whites are now "sitting on top of the world" with their unparalleled political might and their great share of the material things of life. But does this fact prove their biological and permanent superiority? Not in the least. It is a recently achieved and probably temporary superiority. Only a matter of a few centuries ago, when the European whites were living in a comparatively primitive fashion, Africans were working iron and the Chinese were living in a manner that astounded European adventurers like Marco Polo.

Nor would everyone agree that the whites are to be envied even at the height of their dominance. Certainly they are far superior in their mastery of the machine and the amount of their material possessions. But many people put other values far above material ones; nor do they envy the whites their power except to resent the misuse they have often made of it.

Even among the whites, many people recognize the importance of nonmaterial values and are turning to so-called "primitive" or "backward" groups in search of clues to such things as emotional security. White groups live in dread of a war that may destroy them and their possessions.

A third telling point against the belief that race and culture are closely related is that within each race there are wide differences in culture. The Incas, who developed art forms of great complexity and beauty, are grouped in the same race as the most primitive American Indians. Many think of the Negro as naturally carefree and happy, yet the West Indian Negro is a worrier who seldom smiles. They also consider the Negro innately musical, yet Negro groups have been found among whom music was utterly lacking.

Finally, the argument that race and culture are related implies that a group remains always the same. This, too, is obviously a fallacy, for history has shown us that groups change, and often change tremendously. The reserved Englishman of today is not the Englishman of "merrie England;" the warlike Swede of several centuries ago has become today's pacifist. Habits, attitudes, beliefs, and behavior are not inborn and unchangeable.

Prejudices and Stereotypes

Biologists and social scientists agree, then, that racial differences are simply the result of mutation and selection within the same species and that they have no inherent relation to the mental or emotional make-up of any individual nor the culture of any group. This is not to say that these differences are unimportant. They are terribly important *if and when they are thought to be important.* Where shades of skin pigmentation and other external traits are held to be unimportant, people who look different live in harmony within the same society. Where these traits are the basis of prejudice and discrimination, they produce intergroup tension and conflict, and have inevitable consequences for social unity and personality development.

Prejudice means, literally, "pre-judgment." It means that instead of withholding judgment on an individual until we know him, we believe we know what he is like simply because of some one distinguishing trait. We carry around in our minds a stereotype based on that one trait. The term "stereotype," taken from the word for metal molds used in printing, refers, in the social scientists' usage, to one group's or individual's preconceived image of what all members of another group are like regardless of their individual characteristics. The trigger-tempered redhead, the absent-minded professor, the thrifty Scot, the jolly fat man, the monocled Englishman—all these are stereotypes. A stereotype may be favorable; a Guatemalan movie fan upon meeting the junior author was sure she could sing like Deanna Durbin—and that all American girls could! Usu-

ally, however, the word "stereotype" refers to unfavorable preconceptions that cloud the judgment of the prejudiced person.

The prejudiced American sees "slanted" eyes and thinks of sly, untrustworthy Orientals who will live on scraps so they can compete unfairly with Americans. He sees a dark skin and thinks the person inside it must be happy, childlike, subservient, ignorant, and shiftless. Or he sees a combination of a certain shape of nose with dark hair and eyes and thinks the person must be selfish and clannish. He would greatly resent it if he were told that anyone thought of him—a white, Christian American—as a materialistic, amoral, pleasure-mad creature with an insufferably superior attitude toward all others. But certainly many foreigners have that stereotype of Americans. Our "typical American" might defend himself, "Perhaps some Americans are like that; I'm not!" For stereotypes typically distort and exaggerate the unpleasant features of a few members of the group and apply them to all without exception.

Although the causes of group prejudice are many and complex—embracing ignorance of the meaning of differences in race, culture, and religion, a feeling that the out-group is a threat to economic or social status, and other elements—any one individual may be prejudiced simply as a result of the normal process of socialization. Prejudice is not inborn. Small children feel no revulsion against people of different appearance until they are taught to feel it, sometimes deliberately but more often in the thousand and one informal and unplanned ways in which attitudes are passed from older to younger children, from parents, teachers, and other culture carriers. A sign of disgust on the part of the parent, a casual remark to the effect that "That's just like a Jew (or nigger or Wop, or what have you)" sinks into the child's consciousness. Nursery tales, scare stories, carelessly interpreted Bible stories, and comedy routines containing jokes that perpetuate stereotypes all instill prejudice slowly and surely.

Racial prejudice, then, is not an inborn revulsion against someone different; we do not find tall men aligned against short, fat against thin, redheads against brunettes. As Lt. Cable replied to Nellie Forbush in *South Pacific* when she expressed the belief that Americans are born with race prejudice:

> You've got to be taught to hate and fear,
> You've got to be taught from year to year;
> It's got to be drummed in your dear little ear,
> You've got to be *carefully taught.*
>
> You've got to be taught to be afraid
> Of people whose eyes are oddly made.

And people whose skin is a different shade,
You've got to be carefully taught.

You've got to be taught before it's too late,
Before you are six or seven or eight,
To hate all the people your relatives hate,
You've got to be carefully taught! [2]

Discrimination

Hand in hand with prejudice goes discrimination. When the prejudice is shared by most members of a dominant group, it is used to justify discrimination against the minority or subordinate group (who may actually be numerically in the majority). Discrimination *may* involve political and legal barriers; it *invariably* involves social and economic barriers. The minority group is restricted to certain menial occupations, if possible, and forced to live in segregated areas, ride in separate parts of public vehicles, drink from separate fountains, attend different schools and places of amusement, even be buried in separate cemeteries. An American Indian killed in Korea was denied burial in an Iowa town. Mob violence kept a Negro family from moving into an apartment they had rented in Illinois. Certain residential areas, hotels, and clubs are "restricted" to white Gentiles. South Africa and the American South (and to a lesser extent some Northern institutions) enforce a policy of *apartheid* or Jim Crow. White Europeans in colonial areas deny the "natives" access to their residential areas; a foreign district in prewar China bore the sign, "Dogs and Chinese not allowed."

Although the white people are a minority—about one-third of the earth's population—the picture of white domination and Negro or Oriental subordination has been world wide. In the era of colonialism and slavery, there was a high degree of accommodation to this arrangement. The dominant group shouldered the "white man's burden" of looking after their "inferiors," while the subordinate group accepted their status with comparative resignation.

Today, however, accommodation has given way to unrest and rebellion. Colonial peoples revolt, South Africans live in a climate of ever tighter restrictions and ever greater fear, Americans wrestle with their consciences and consider the costs of prejudice and discrimination.

These costs are heavy indeed. The burden to the minority group is obvious. The median income for the United States in 1949 was $2,599 per family "or unrelated individual," but for non-whites it was $1,217, less than half. Although only 14 per cent of "families and unrelated individuals" had incomes below $500, when the non-white group was separated, about 25 per cent of them had such low incomes.[3] The consequent difference in the non-whites' level of living, life expectancy, medical facilities, and infant and maternal mortality has been well documented.

But the cost does not fall upon the minority alone. Although individual members of the dominant group may feel that perpetuation of the system ensures their superior jobs and incomes and general level of living, the high rents they can charge, and the low wages they need pay, the economic costs of discrimination can fall heavily upon them as well as upon the whole society. The potential talent and productivity of the minority group are lost. They have less purchasing power, which means a loss to the entire economy. Discrimination and segregation entail great cost for public financing of separate facilities—schools, hospitals, transportation, and the like. They aggravate social problems. There is more disease among all groups, for bacteria show no prejudice and can easily pass from a malnourished person living in a segregated slum to the white person whose house he can enter only by the back door. Society also bears the cost of delinquency and vice that flourish in the frustration and want of the minority group. Much time and effort is spent enforcing segregation and deliberating over policies and problems. The costs of the pseudo-caste system of the South are reflected in the fact that there the median income in 1949 was $1,940 compared to $2,599 for the country as a whole.[4]

Prejudice and discrimination breed destructive conflict—race riots in Detroit and Chicago and Harlem, lynchings in Mississippi, rebellions in colonial areas. They not only give rise to overt group conflict, but also warp the individual personality, often exacting a toll in such destructive emotions as fear, guilt, hate, and anxiety. Although prejudice may serve as an outlet for a person's aggressions, it does him no service in the long run by directing his problems away from their real causes.

Another danger in race prejudice is that when it exists within a multi-group society any group can become its target. Discrimination usually means differential justice, unequal application of laws and standards of behavior. "When laws are misused or ignored, they become weakened, and illegality becomes part of the entire culture. Where a dangerous cultural practice exists, any person or group may become its victim." [5]

Another grave cause for concern is that the American race problem diminishes our country's prestige not only with the non-white majority of peoples in the world, but also with many nations where race prejudice is less apparent and discrimination negligible. In her position as leader of the free world, the United States is often told, in effect, to put her own house in order. Our treatment of those of Oriental background and of the one American in ten who is a Negro provides the Communists with highly effective, ready-made propaganda to use against us in the world-wide struggle for the mind of man.

Reasons for the Persistence of Prejudice

If prejudice is not innate, and if it entails such heavy costs to society and personality, why does it persist? Some of the factors in its persistence we have already touched upon: the "natural" and informal way attitudes of prejudice, like other attitudes, are transmitted in the process of socialization, the lack of knowledge of the unscientific and irrational bases for prejudice, and the fact that most people do not realize its costs.

It persists also because advantages accrue, in the short run, to the dominant group. Material advantages are obvious in the case of colonial exploitation and in the high rents and low wages of a caste or pseudo-caste system. Often when there is a threat to the economic security of one group, they will turn upon a "visible" competing group and blame them for their plight. Factory laborers are notably prejudiced in hard times. The Panamanians have "racist" prejudice toward the West Indian immigrants —although Panama itself has a large group of native-born, Spanish-speaking Negroes—largely because the West Indians speak English and thus have an economic advantage with the Canal Zone Americans. The Panamanians, being in their own country, use their national power to enforce discrimination.[6]

Prejudice may persist because certain people may want it to persist. A dominant group may turn several subordinate groups upon one another, following the principle of "divide and conquer" and diverting attention from their own dominance. Rabble rousers and demagogues know that prejudice can be exploited for their own ends; today the media of mass communication are at hand for such exploitation and magnify its dangers a thousandfold.

The presence of a minority group also gives members of the dominant group, no matter how low their status, a feeling of prestige. There is

someone to look down upon. The poorest white sharecropper feels superior to the best educated of Negroes.

Almost always, in one way or another, the minority serves as a scapegoat. Just as Aaron called down upon a goat all the sins of Israel and sent it off into the wilderness (Leviticus 16:20-22) so a dominant group places the blame for anything that goes wrong on a minority group. In the days of the Roman Empire, whenever anything caused the populace to grow restless and critical of the rulers, it was "To the lions with the Christians!" Hitler whipped a latent sentiment of anti-Semitism to such a frenzy that many of his followers really believed that the Jews were responsible for all of Germany's problems. The presence of a scapegoat minority gives discontented people someone to blame, a target for their hostility, a socially acceptable release for aggression. They can take out their frustrations on this group without acute feelings of guilt.

In discussing the persistence of prejudice and discrimination, it is impossible to escape the formula of the vicious circle. As an Irish observer remarked, "The haughty American nation . . . makes the Negro clean its boots and then proves the . . . inferiority of the Negro by the fact that he is a bootblack." [7] The prejudiced majority forces the Negroes to live apart and do menial or unskilled work, keeps them from getting a good education and from living in comfort and decency, and then points to the fact that they are uneducated, work at menial jobs, and have a low level of living to "prove" that they are inferior.

Another reason for the persistence of prejudice has already been touched upon: its irrational nature. Instead of asking exactly what Negroes—to refer again to our chief minority group—want, and what they are entitled to under our democratic tradition, the prejudiced person jumps from consideration of such civil rights as equal justice, the vote, and a job to the conclusion that the next thing you know Negroes will "expect to marry your sister." Actually, as Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish social scientist who, with a team of American colleagues, took a long look at this "American dilemma," points out, what the Negro wants and what the prejudiced white thinks he wants are very different. If the bars and discriminations that the whites impose are ranked in order of their importance to whites and to Negroes, the order is almost reversed. The whites are most worried about preserving the ban against intermarriage; the Negro's interest in intermarriage is "distant and doubtful," if it exists at all. Second on the list of white anxieties is social segregation in activities implying intimacy and equality; third is segregation in public facilities; fourth, political rights; fifth, equality before the law; and finally, the thing they are least worried about is economic opportunity. And it is jobs and bread the Negro wants most, closely followed by equality before

the police and courts, the right to vote freely, and an end to segregation in public facilities.[8]

Reducing Intergroup Tensions

All over the world more people are becoming increasingly conscious of the costs of prejudice and discrimination. Evidences of this new attitude are many. The American Indian denied burial in Sioux City was buried in Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors. Negroes and whites live peacefully side by side in many cities. South Africans like Alan Paton write masterful novels revealing the costs of *apartheid.* Colonial authority is relinquished, in whole or in part, to more and more native peoples, while those colonial administrators who remain often take native values into account.

More and more Americans, North and South, realize the great cost of prejudice and discrimination to society as a whole and to the individuals of both the dominant and subordinate groups. They have begun to attack the problem on many fronts. In general, these attacks attempt to break the vicious circle previously mentioned in which the attitudes of prejudice that bring about discrimination are reinforced by the low status resulting from that discrimination.

This vicious circle can be attacked at either of two critical points—attitudes or conditions. The problem of attitude change is a complex one. One aspect of it is prevention of prejudice—a sort of immunization against its poison, which, like smallpox vaccine, is best administered very early in childhood and regularly thereafter. Although prejudice is not innate, it is learned very early and very easily. Dr. Ilg, a well-known psychologist, advocates a program that begins with the child at age three, when he should play with children of other racial groups. The four- and five-year-old can be told in simple language about the world and its people, the six- to eight-year-old guarded against absorbing stereotypes from the rhymes and clichés of the culture ("Eenie, meenie, minie, mo, catch a nigger by the toe."). The nine-year-old's horizons can be broadened by such activities as taking him to different churches and temples. At age ten, the "intellectual approach" can reinforce the emotional acceptance that earlier contacts, if carefully guided, inculcated; he can be taught facts about race, minorities, discrimination, and scapegoating. Social scientists are giving serious study to training teachers, for the teacher's role is crucial in any long-range program aimed at changing attitudes.[9]

None of this is effective unless the parents, too, demonstrate healthy





Detroit Dept. of Parks & Recreation; Wayne University

INTERGROUP CONTACTS

Contacts on a basis of equal status in the pursuit of common objectives help to diminish prejudice.

The college student whose class is mixed is more likely to judge members of minority groups on the basis of individual traits and abilities than one whose school excludes minorities, no matter how many fine books both may read on race relations. During World War II, 1,710 white American enlisted men in France were asked this question: "Some Army divisions have companies which include Negro platoons and white platoons. How would you feel about it if your outfit was set up something like that?" Only 7 per cent of the infantrymen in a company that had a Negro platoon said they would dislike it very much and 32 per cent said they would like it; 28 per cent said they would just as soon have it as any other set-up, and 33 per cent answered "Rather not, but it would not matter too much." Infantrymen in other companies in the same regiment were more prejudiced, soldiers in other units in the same division somewhat more so. Significantly, those with the least contact showed most prejudice. A cross section of other field forces units that had no colored platoons in white companies showed 62 per cent saying they would dislike it, and only 2 per cent reporting that they would like it, while 9 per cent would "just as soon have it" and 27 per cent would "rather not." [10]

This brings us to the other chief angle of attack on the "vicious circle" —changed conditions. Fortunately these are easiest to achieve where most urgently desired—in housing and jobs. If asked what they think of fair employment practices, of having Negro sales clerks or bus drivers or teachers or nurses or neighbors, people often object vehemently, predicting dire results and destructive conflicts. But if the policy is put into effect without fanfare, the results are almost always surprisingly contrary to these predictions. Fair employment practices legislation and nonsegregated housing projects have been highly successful where they have been tried. According to a prominent psychologist, Gordon Allport, "Prejudice tends to diminish whenever members of different groups meet on terms of equal status in the pursuit of common objectives." [11] Legislation helps create a changed social climate and thus helps change attitudes. "A *fait accompli* that fits in with our democratic creed is accepted with little more than an initial flurry of protest." [12] When people realize, in other words, that a city's decision to employ Negro bus drivers, a baseball manager's hiring a Negro pitcher, a Supreme Court decision against segregated schools, is designed to bring reality closer to the American creed, most of them accept the action philosophically. And the resultant contacts on a basis of equality help to eradicate prejudice and encourage acceptance of individuals on their own merits.

12

THE FORMATION OF PERSONALITY

We now approach the subject of human behavior from a third angle—that of the individual human being, or person. This approach is merely a matter of emphasis. Culture, society, and personality are so intimately connected that in discussing any one of them we must constantly refer to the other two. Culture, we saw, is possible only because of the potentialities of the human organism; the culture of each society provides patterns of behavior for its members. Society we defined as a system of reciprocal relationships among individuals. So, too, we cannot isolate the individual from culture and society, for he becomes human only through interaction with others in social groups, and this interaction is largely patterned by culture.

Like "culture" and "society," the word "personality" means different things to different people. In everyday speech we often hear one person say that another has "lots of personality," that is, charm, vivacity, attractiveness. For the social scientist, however, every person—every socialized individual—has as much personality as any other. *Personality* is the or-

ganization of a person's habits, attitudes, and traits and arises from the interplay of biological, social, and cultural factors. It is the individual version of "human nature."

"Organization" (to analyze the definition) means the stability or integration of these habits, attitudes, and traits. We expect people to be more or less dependable and predictable, to act in a coherent fashion. When we say we "know" a person, we mean we can with relative certainty predict what his attitudes and behavior will be in certain situations, for on the basis of past experience we have associated certain traits with him.

Habits are persistent ways of behaving or acting. *Attitudes* are relatively enduring tendencies to act in certain ways toward certain values, whether persons, ideas, objects, customs, or social situations. *Traits* are generalized modes of response. All these definitions sound very much alike; in fact, they are so much alike that some students of human behavior speak only of attitudes when they are referring to all three. But the frequency with which all three words are used in everyday speech to mean different things necessitates our using them here to refine our definition of personality. Let us say that someone we know has the *trait* of kindliness. We regard this as a quality, a characteristic of his personality that governs his behavior generally. His *attitude* toward dogs, children, or people in trouble would be a kindly one. He makes it a *habit* to be kind, to speak softly to children, to consider the needs and desires of others. Or the trait of neatness may be observed in a person who has developed the habit of picking things up and keeping them in order. Along with this habit and this trait goes an attitude of dislike of disorder and fondness for order. We call a person unfriendly or friendly, neat or sloppy, careful or careless. These traits we attribute to him because we observe his attitudes expressed in his habitual behavior.

Personality is not inborn. It "arises from the interplay of biological, social and cultural factors." As we saw in Chapter 3, human nature does not develop in the isolated individual. But neither does it develop apart from the biological endowments of the organism, which we shall now consider briefly.

Original Nature

At one time it was thought that a person inherited most of his habits and traits. We still speak of such traits as stinginess or love of music as "running in the family." And sometimes they do—but probably they are learned from parents. The way the genes happen to combine into a nuclear cell at the moment of conception determines all

the "hereditary" aspects of an individual. *Sex* is fixed at this moment by the presence of an X or Y chromosome in the sperm cell. The particular combination of genes also determines a person's probable *appearance*—his eye and hair color, stature, and other physical features (though prenatal and subsequent environmental factors affect his actual stature, weight, muscular development, and the like). Heredity also determines the limits of a person's *intelligence*, and probably has much to do with his *temperament* or prevailing mood. Closely related to growth, temperament, and behavior is the organism's glandular balance.

At birth the individual has certain *reflexes*—automatic and rigid responses—each of which is attached to a given stimulus. The heartbeat, breathing, urination, contraction of the eye in strong light, salivation, and other reflexes are largely involuntary and can be modified only slightly. Although, as we saw in Chapter 3, the theory that human beings are born with certain instincts has been repudiated, the organism does have certain needs or *drives* that must be met. These inborn needs or urges are felt as states of tension or lack of balance; the organism seeks to satisfy the need, to dispel tension and restore equilibrium. Among the organic drives are those of hunger, thirst, oxygen-want, excretion, maintenance of body temperature, the sexual drive, and the need for exercise or random activity and for rest and sleep. Sensory drives are concerned with sense-contact satisfactions: to feel smooth textures, look at pleasing sights, and the like. The primary defense reactions that prepare the organism to deal with dangers and hazards produce emergency responses that many psychologists believe are the basis of such emotions as fear, rage, disgust, shame, and grief. At any rate, emotions appear to be closely linked with the physiology of the organism, for under stress of emotion there are measurable and often striking changes in body functioning. The emotions, like the more distinctly primary or innate drives such as sex and hunger, are subject to considerable conditioning through experience. *Conditioning* means attaching a response to a situation that would not ordinarily call it forth. A baby is emotionally conditioned to love his mother. After being fed, rocked, cuddled, and cared for over a period of time, the infant will respond favorably at sight of his mother or at the sound of her voice.

Some of the potential traits of the organism appear only with physical growth at a given level of development. Until the eye is capable of discerning letters, the child cannot learn to read. Until leg and back muscles are sufficiently developed, no amount of encouragement will persuade the infant to walk. Until the sphincter muscles have developed to the point where they can be controlled, toilet training is futile. This development of the ability to respond to certain stimuli at certain stages of growth is

called *maturation*. Although the rate of maturation varies from one individual to another, it always follows the same developmental sequence; that is, a child sits before he stands, walks before he runs. He is never ready for any stage of development until his organism is ready.

The biological heredity of the individual may predispose personality in certain directions, and set limits to possible development. The favorite topic of high-school debates a generation ago, "Which is more important, heredity or environment?" has been abandoned as fruitless by students of human behavior. Although it is possible to speak of *predominantly* hereditary factors and *predominantly* environmental ones, neither heredity nor environment can be regarded as the sole factor influencing development, nor even the chief factor. By the time any such aspect of the personality as intelligence or temperament can be measured, environment has affected it. In fact, *only* after environment has played upon the organism are these things apparent. Even physical appearance is conditioned by environment. Identical twins reared apart often differ in appearance as well as in intelligence and temperament.

Intelligence. Intelligence is the capacity of the organism to adjust to its environment. As a potential of mankind in general, intelligence is the basis of human culture. As an attribute of individuals, intelligence varies greatly among members of any society. This variation is a function of both heredity and environment. The quality of the brain and nervous system is the inborn potential. It cannot be measured at all accurately; it can only be guessed at from the way the brain functions as a result of an individual's experience.

The capacity to adjust to environment is of three kinds. When we speak of intelligence, we usually mean *abstract* intelligence—the ability to grasp ideas, words, meanings, and symbols, and to think and reason. This is the type of intelligence that the conventional intelligence test tries to measure. *Social* intelligence, or the ability to get along with people, is probably more largely a result of environmental experience. Motor or *mechanical* intelligence, the ability to use effectively things and objects that can be handled, is measured by mechanical aptitude tests.

Innate intelligence sets limits to the capacity to learn, limits, which in the case of "feeble-minded" people, are very low. About 5 per cent of the population is feeble-minded or borderline. This covers a range from the idiot, who has almost no capacity to learn, to the high-grade moron, who is able to get along somehow in normal life. About the same proportion of people have very superior intelligence. But rarely if ever is man's intelligence used to its full limit. A barren culture limits the use of the innate capacities of many people; even in richer cultures teaching meth-

ods and motivations are often inadequate, and certain kinds of knowledge are neglected or tabooed.

Motivation

As already mentioned, organic drives and emotional tensions motivate activity by producing a state of disequilibrium in the organism. These drives are always socially and culturally conditioned. Students of human behavior also distinguish motivation that arises out of human experience and is not clearly tied to any physiological basis. A useful way of analyzing such motivation is in terms of "the four wishes" —the desire for new experience, the desire for security, the desire for response, and the desire for recognition. These wishes or desires are unconsciously learned and may be satisfied in any number of ways. They are not specific, conscious wishes for concrete things; rather they are *kinds* of wishes.

The desire for *new experience* leads people to want change and variety. Much human behavior is explainable in terms of escape from boredom. The desire for *response,* the need for intimate companionship or affection, is best satisfied by primary group contacts. The desire for *recognition* is manifested both in the ambition of people to be heroes or successes and in the bully's recourse to misbehavior in order to attract attention, if he can't get it through more approved means. The desire for *security* helps to explain such traits as conformity, diligence, and thriftiness.

In any one situation, two or more of these motives may be present. A person may enter college because new knowledge and contacts will satisfy his desire for new experience, because a degree will help him attain economic security, or because success in earning the degree and the career it leads to may win him recognition and please those upon whose affection he depends. All these motives influence the behavior of every person, though not in equal strength. To one man, economic security may be the chief motive; to another, money may matter far less than the prestige to be won by writing, research, or breaking a speed record. One woman may value the affection of her family above everything else; another is restless unless she is constantly meeting people and traveling, seeing new plays, and reading new books. It is apparent that the relative importance of these wishes in the behavior of any one person is intimately tied up with that person's scale of values.

Obviously it is not always easy or possible to satisfy the drives or wishes that motivate the person to action. He is often blocked in his efforts to satisfy a need or achieve a desired goal. A child is necessarily frustrated as

he is weaned, toilet trained, made to wait for feedings, and occasionally denied cuddling and attention. The degree of his frustration depends upon the cultural and family practices of child care; some students of human behavior see tremendous importance for adult personality in the form in which these frustrations are imposed. We live most of our lives hedged in by restrictions or occupied with plans and desires that are never fulfilled. An adult is not allowed unrestricted sex expression, cannot say just what he pleases when he pleases, suffers failures and disappointments, sees dreams fade and goals evade him.

Tensions that go unsatisfied must somehow be released. If the tension is not great, another activity may be substituted. Often frustration begets hostility or aggression, which may or may not be expressed. If it is expressed, then the tension is released. If it is smothered, the tension may continue to exist and break out later against an object other than the one producing the frustration. In such cases, frustration may produce neurotic conflicts and anxieties, which we shall discuss later.

Culture and Personality

Culture, we said in Chapter 5, provides the individual with a blueprint for behavior, thought, and feeling in almost any situation. It defines situations, giving meaning to things and events. It defines the role that goes with each status. It sets up standards of what is right and wrong, proper and improper.

In a small, stable, and homogeneous society, this blueprint is sharp and clear and is handed down from generation to generation. The lack of choice, the unchanging traditional definitions of roles, the uniform patterns of child rearing—all these combine to produce great similarity of personality within such a culture. Ruth Benedict, in a brilliant comparison of four cultures, showed how each had a different conception of the ideal personality and how most people came to approximate that type naturally and with ease.

The Plains Indians rewarded self-reliance, initiative, individualism, and ability to see visions. The warrior and visionary were their ideals. As a result, men cultivated frenzies and ecstasies and endured danger and discomfort in order to win prestige.

The Zuñi Indians of New Mexico, on the other hand, discourage individualism, violence, and power. They value moderation and self-effacement and suspect anyone who likes to wield authority of practicing witchcraft. They stress the oneness of the universe.

The Dobuans, who live on rocky volcanic islands off the New Guinea

coast, make virtues of ill will and treachery. Existence appears to them as an unending struggle for each of the goods of life against deadly antagonists. Suspicion, cruelty, animosity, and malignancy are traits of most Dobuans.

The Kwakiutl Indians, who lived on the Pacific Northwest Coast, defined everything that happened in terms of triumph or shame. Triumph and superiority for one of them meant ridicule and humiliation for others. Life was a constant struggle to put one's rivals to shame by piling up and then giving away or destroying more material possessions than they did. The defeated resorted to sulking or to acts of desperation.[1]

We usually consider certain traits "masculine" and others "feminine," as if they necessarily go with the biological fact of sex. Another comparative study of personality in different cultures by Margaret Mead shows how little sex actually has to do with personality, and how much more important are the cultural definitions of these differences. Comparing three New Guinea tribes, she found two that make no personality distinctions between men and women. Among the mountain dwelling Arapesh, the cultural goals are growing yams and rearing children. Both men and women act in a fashion we would call "feminine." Both are cherishing, gentle, maternal, mild. Not far away live the fierce, cannibalistic Mundugumor. Both men and women of this tribe act in ways we would call predominantly "masculine." Both "are expected to be violent, competitive, aggressively sexed, jealous and ready to see and avenge insult, delighting in display, action, and fighting." [2] The things that give greatest satisfaction are fighting and the competitive acquisition of women. Every man is against every other, including his father and his brothers. Children are unwanted. The world is charged with hostility and conflict.

Instead of ignoring sex differences in personality, the third tribe, the Tchambuli, define male and female roles in a way that is the reverse of ours. Women manage and dominate. Men gossip, wear curls, and go shopping, are emotionally dependent upon and less responsible than women. The people live chiefly for art, the event celebrated by a ceremony being less significant than the elaborate and lavish ceremony itself.

Mead and Benedict believe, along with most students of human behavior, that such differences are not inborn. Although the same range of hereditary differences is probably found in every society, each of these societies has chosen one type of temperament and built its culture upon it, expecting all its members to conform to it. Some exemplify the basic personality type perfectly, most accept the pattern easily enough, while a few find it utterly at variance with their inclinations, whether these inclinations are inborn or the result of chance conditioning that did not

fit the cultural pattern. Some societies have no room for deviants, ostracizing or punishing them. Others provide alternatives for them; some of the Plains Indians, for example, permitted men who felt temperamentally unfit for the role of boastful warrior to wear women's clothing and perform women's roles.

Normality, then, is largely a matter of cultural definition. The ideal person of one society is the misfit of another. The gentle Arapesh would be scorned by the Mundugumor; the violent Mundugumor would be a puzzle to the gentle Arapesh. The vision-seeing, frenzied Plains Indian and the chronically suspicious and hostile Dobuan would be regarded as mental cases if transplanted to our society.

Other Determinants of Personality

Culture, then, is a highly important determinant of personality. But it is by no means the only one. If it were, all personalities occupying a given status in the same society would be identical. We know this is not the case. In fact, the very word "personality" carries a connotation of uniqueness, of individuality. Forces that produce such differences within a society include (1) differences in heredity, (2) sub-cultural influences, (3) the "social climate," and (4) unique experience. We have already considered differences in hereditary potential—in the strength of various drives, in limits of capacity, and in temperamental inclination.

In our complex society, many differences can be accounted for by the influence of subcultures. As we have seen, people of different social status have different values and ways of life. Studies of training, weaning, discipline, and the like, have shown that the methods of bringing up children differ from one social class to another. Minority group status, religion, national background, regional culture, occupation, and educational experience are equally important in establishing differences.

Even within any sub-cultural group, families differ greatly in personality types and patterns of interaction. One way of analyzing these differences is in terms of the "social climate," which is highly important to personality development. The late Kurt Lewin experimented with two social climates—the authoritarian and the democratic—either of which may predominate in a given society, home, or schoolroom. Two groups of children, age ten and eleven, were chosen for a mask-making club. The democratic group chose its activities freely; at its meeting, the autocratic group was strictly supervised and ordered to do what the other group


had freely chosen to do. The leader consciously acted in a democratic fashion in one group, in a dictatorial manner in the other.

Members of the authoritarian group were more hostile, demanded more attention, and were more critical of one another than the democratic group. The democratic group exhibited more praise and cooperation and made more constructive suggestions. Children in the democratic group were more submissive toward one another and less submissive to the leader than in the other group. There was more "we" feeling in the democratic group, and yet there was greater individuality. In the autocratic group, the children resorted to scapegoating, blaming one particular child for all offences committed in the group. When one child from each group was switched to the other, his behavior changed to mirror his new social climate. When the type of leadership was changed, the personalities of the children reflected it—dramatically when a democratic group had suddenly to submit to authoritarian leadership, more slowly when an autocratically controlled group was switched to a democratic pattern. "Autocracy is imposed upon the individual. Democracy he has to learn." [3]

Even within the same family, children have different heredities and different experiences. No two children in a family (with the possible exception of identical twins) are born into exactly the same family situation. The first child in our society usually has young, inexperienced, and doting parents. The second child introduces the element of rivalry. Each succeeding child is born into a larger family and to parents who have meanwhile undergone changes. Chance incidents may turn two sisters in different directions. An older sister is praised for her fine piano playing. The younger sister may feel, after several trials in which she suffers by comparison, that it is useless to compete; she may become a tomboy instead. Add to this the multitude of unique experiences that can happen inside and outside the home—an injury, a narrow escape from death, a moving sermon, a meeting with someone who becomes a person's mate, or enemy, or friend, and many less dramatic occurrences that influence the interests, goals, and values of a person—and we realize why human personality displays such endless variety.

Socialization

There is no more fascinating or vital subject than *socialization*, the process whereby the individual organism is transformed into a person, the human animal into the human being. Only through socialization can society perpetuate itself, culture exist, and the indi-



Copyright, 1952. The Curtis Publishing Company

"How are you, Mary Lou?"
"How are you, Mary Lou?"

"I'd like very much—"
"I'd like very much—"

"To have you come—"
"To have you come—"

"To my birthday party Saturday."
"To my birthday party Saturday."

vidual become a person. Socialization is the common meeting ground of biology, sociology, anthropology, and psychology, and the focus of interest of educators, religious leaders, and parents. In spite of its tremendous importance, no one yet understands the subject thoroughly.

In the process of socialization, the individual learns culturally approved habits, ideas, and attitudes. He is fitted into the social group by being taught the rights and duties of his position. His drives are guided into approved channels of expression; the cultural rules and restrictions

are so internalized that they become part of his personality. Probably most people resist socialization to some degree because it interferes with the pleasurable satisfaction of drives, but it is remarkable how narrow a gap there is between what most people want to do and what society would have them do. Those who cannot compromise with society without great resentment and frustration are said to be maladjusted.

The story of an American woman who spent the winter alone in an Alaskan mining camp illustrates the power of internalized culture patterns. Expecting a baby in February, she was accidentally left to fend for herself until the ice broke in the spring. Her journal, kept as a way of communicating with her family if she should die, relates how she decorated a Christmas tree with materials at hand, how she summoned all her ingenuity to apply what she had learned to surviving through the winter and bearing her baby alone, how she held a christening ceremony with friendly animals as audience, and how she kept up her morale by constantly thinking of the attitudes of others.[4]

Socialization occurs only through social interaction. If the communication essential to interaction is impossible, there can be no socialization. Animals, feeble-minded people, and the insane do not meaningfully communicate; therefore they are incapable of being socialized. The interaction that is most significant for the socialization process occurs in the family in early childhood.

The Self

The rise of the self. The process of socialization may be described in many ways, but probably the most illuminating approach is in terms of the rise of the "self."

The infant has no conception of himself as an individual set apart from other individuals. Only as he interacts with his mother and others does he gradually become aware of his separate identity. The very frustrations that are part of every child's experience as he learns that his drives must be satisfied only in certain ways and at certain times contribute to the development of a "self." Roughly at the age of two the child begins to use the pronouns "I," "me," and "you," indicating that he is conscious of self and of other persons as individuals like himself.

A famous psychologist, George H. Mead, described the rise of the self in terms of "taking the role of the other." Only man can perceive roles and their relationships. As the child observes and responds to his mother and others in the household, they become objects to him, meaningful objects that bring him pleasure, frustration, security, and the like. In



Canada: National Film Board; Detroit News



Canada: National Film Board; Burroughs

SOCIALIZATION

Parents, teachers, and peers often provide varied types of socializing experiences that aid in building a satisfying self-conception.

order to win from these people the responses he wants, the child must learn their attitudes. He gradually takes on their responses and attitudes toward him, that is, he "takes the role of the other." In so doing, he becomes an object to himself.[5]

Anyone who has watched a small child at play knows that he "tries on" various roles, switching from one to another with ease, addressing himself as storekeeper and answering himself as shopper, or playing mother and child. When several children play together, each adopts a role. As they grow older and participate in games with rules, where each person is expected to respond in a certain way to a given stimulus, the conception of the self in relation to others becomes more clearly defined. The child of eight or so playing baseball must carry in his mind a knowledge of the roles all others play in the game. In order to do what he should do, he must know what behavior to expect from them.

Like the ball game, society is an organized system of roles. As the process of socialization continues, knowledge of the roles and attitudes of others becomes more generalized. The child is aware not only that "Mother says it's not right to do this," but also that "It isn't right to do this." A larger, more inclusive "other" now controls his actions. He is aware of the moral voice of the community as a whole; he has internalized its mores and values; he has acquired what Mead calls a "generalized other," which in everyday language is often referred to as "character." At this point, the basic design of the self has been established. "As the individual incorporates into himself the system of mutually related attitudes in the community with reference to the common activities and goals of the group as a whole, he becomes a complete self, a social product in the fullest sense." [6]

The self-conception. The self-conception is the result of a person's differentiation of himself from others and his awareness of their attitudes toward him. The self as determined by the attitudes of others is called "the looking glass self," a term first used by a pioneer social scientist, Charles Horton Cooley.

> As we see our face, figure, and dress in the glass, and are interested in them because they are ours, and pleased or otherwise with them according as they do or do not answer to what we should like them to be; so in imagination we perceive in another's mind some thought of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously affected by it.
>
> A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of

his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification.

. . . we always imagine, and in imagining share, the judgments of the other mind. A man will boast to one person of an action—say a sharp transaction—which he would be ashamed to own to another." [7]

All his life the person who is not barred from social interaction through mental deficiency or mental illness is conscious of the attitudes of others. He never has an entirely accurate picture of them, but if his self-conception is too far removed from the evaluation of him by others, he is a misfit. "Seeing ourselves as others see us" is impossible (and even a close approximation is often a shock), but the person who sees himself very differently from the way others see him is the bore who thinks he is the life of the party, the ineffectual male who exhibits unwarranted feelings of superiority, or the pretty girl who suffers from a conviction that she is unattractive.

One of the chief duties of parents is to help the child build a sound and satisfying self-conception. By giving him a feeling of belonging, by accepting him, the family gives him the self-confidence and security that he needs to adjust to other people and to meet new situations easily and with assurance.

Dynamic nature of the self. Although many people strongly believe that every man is master of his fate, others just as strongly believe that the person is helpless in the face of social and cultural influences. By picturing the individual as a passive recipient of outside influences, a person can blame his or another's faults and misfortunes on something external, completely denying the older idea of free will. This is a false interpretation of the findings of social science. If it were true, no one would be responsible for his actions. But the socialized individual is in large measure able to choose and decide, to set goals and strive to reach them. The goal of socialization is to make him able to direct his choices and his efforts for his own best interests and those of society. "Personality is a unity, a purposeful, striving unity, at the core of which lies the self-conception. . . . [Its chief motivation is] to attain and maintain a stable and flattering self-conception and to strive for certain goals, within a range of inner limitations and outer circumstances." [8] This interpretation of personality does not deny that in some situations persons have less opportunity to succeed in making such choices and achieving such goals than do those in more favorable circumstances, but it is more constructive and optimistic than either the notion of entirely free will or entire passivity.

Defending the self-conception. The person often encounters threats to his self-conception from changes, from criticism or pressure from other persons and groups, or from failures or other frustrations. He may meet these threats on a rational, conscious level, or he may resort to unconscious psychological mechanisms of adjustment to defend his self-conception.

Rational action rests upon intelligent choices. Need we try to please everybody, or should we decide which people's opinions really matter? Which values are highest in the scale? Which goals are most important and reasonably sure of attainment? How can they best be reached? By answering these questions clearly and decisively, a person can avoid the consequences of action that is irrational, guided simply by tradition or inability to see alternatives, or dictated by such emotions as anger and hostility. He will be spared the need for relying too heavily upon unconscious and sometimes costly and dangerous methods of adjustment.

These unconscious mechanisms, like other habits, are socially acquired. Insofar as they reduce conflicts and tensions within the individual, they help the person adjust. If they fail to reduce tensions or if they lead to harmful self-deception, they become "neurotic" devices signifying maladjustment. We shall mention here some of the most familiar mechanisms of self-defense.

Rationalization occurs when a person, fearing disapproval from others or himself, gives "good" reasons rather than real reasons for his actions. These reasons are emotionally satisfying and prevent self-condemnation and ward off criticism by others. The person who says "Sour grapes" is rationalizing. When a student has made up his mind to study for an examination and an inviting opportunity to go out arises, he may rationalize that "I will feel fresher if I get my mind off the subject for a while." He may repress his awareness of the real reason for going out, thus avoiding guilt feelings. By preventing self-condemnation, rationalization may contribute to mental health. If carried too far, however, it becomes self-deception and fosters an inability to face reality.

Repression refers to the unconscious denial of impulses that would lead to behavior disapproved by society. Socialization necessarily induces much repression. Because it generally tends to produce tension, one school of thought has advocated "no repression" for growing children, but most people in our society repudiate this notion.

Sublimation is one means of consciously gratifying an unconscious wish or impulse. Forbidden urges are directed into socially acceptable behavior. The unsatisfied sexual urges of an unmarried woman, for example, may be sublimated in nursing, teaching children, or devoting herself to art or music.



"You're beautiful, sophisticated, lovely—What do you care if you got 'D' in history?"

Compensation is a way of making up for inadequacies by emphasizing assets, real or imagined. The inadequacies may exist in the personality, in the environmental situation, or in biological appearance or constitution. A man who failed in college may take satisfaction in piling up more money than do the honor graduates. A physical weakling may compensate by studying hard, an unattractive girl by cultivating interests that will make her an interesting conversationalist. The poor family may take

pride in the fact that they are hardworking, honest, and respectable. Compensation helps to relieve the tension induced by frustration; it also serves to conceal from others and from the person himself his own inadequacies or weaknesses. It is a constructive mechanism of adjustment insofar as it helps a person keep his self respect and/or stimulates him to achievement. If it is based on fancied assets, however, it is not constructive.

Fantasy is normal in childhood; the small child playing at different roles is indulging in fantasy. Adults also use fantasy to solve their frustrations in several ways. "Daydreaming" may or may not be productive. The boy daydreaming of accomplishments may be setting goals for himself; but an adult "Walter Mitty" is merely escaping from reality. If overdone, indulging in fantasy is very wasteful and unproductive. Some mental illnesses are characterized by continual fantasy. A boy pretending he is Napoleon is usually playing at trying on a role; the man who insists he is Napoleon is put in a mental hospital. In some cases, fantasy may be highly productive. The imagination of a talented mind may produce inventions, books, music, or great works of art.

Identification results from emotional conditioning. It means assuming another person's values and sharing his feelings and moods, or feeling personally identified with an institution, place, or idea. Identification takes several forms. A moviegoer may identify herself with the heroine, feeling the emotions the actress is displaying. An ambitious young man may identify himself with someone highly successful in his field, and set him up as a model to imitate. A student may feel an emotional identification with his school. The advocate of an unpopular idea is emotionally involved with his beliefs. A Negro child becoming aware of prejudice usually identifies himself with his group.

Projection explains much interpersonal and group misunderstanding and conflict. It means that a person attributes his own faults, his own unacceptable urges, to others, as a means of reducing his own anxiety. It is the psychological device upon which scapegoating is based. It helps to explain unreasonable jealousy. It may with equal accuracy refer to the tendency of a naive and trusting person to believe everyone else is good and trusting, the belief of a materialistic person that everyone is out for all he can get, and a man's insistence on his son's becoming a doctor because he himself could not afford to attend medical school.

Displaced aggression or deflected hostility is often based on the projection of unacceptable urges, and also helps to explain scapegoating. When hostility in regard to one person or group must be repressed, it is often taken out on another. The frustrations of the German middle class help

to explain why they so eagerly seized upon a chance to vent their spleen on the Jews. The disgruntled employee who must repress his hostility at work "takes it out on the dog" at home.

Arrest of personality development at an immature level is called *fixation*. It may refer to some means of gratifying pleasure-seeking impulses or to an exaggerated emotional dependence upon one or both parents persisting into adulthood. After a mature form of adjustment has been attained, there may be *regression*, i.e., return to an earlier immature mode of adjustment. A woman may burst into tears when frustrated, a toilet-trained child revert to soiling when emotionally upset. Both fixation and regression are products of tension and anxiety aroused by serious threats to the self-conception.

Desire for self-enhancement. Besides defending his self-conception, the person is motivated to enhance it. This is especially true in our competitive society where a man is measured against others, even one child against another. The emphasis on ambition and success, on striving for goals and achieving them, makes the desire for self-enhancement strong. "Therefore in our society the well-adjusted individual is one who not only conforms to the standards of the group but competes with others for a place in the sun . . . [and] behaves not only as the community wishes but in ways which will give him the greatest degree of self-expression." [9]

A person's desire for self-enhancement is related to the goals he chooses as he interacts with others, and he measures his success or failure only in those areas of achievement that he has come to consider worthy of his efforts. If he sets his sights too low, he derives little or no satisfaction from reaching his goal; if too high, he is bound to experience the frustration of failure. Rational behavior means that a person will evaluate his capacities and possible accomplishments before determining how high he will aspire.

The self-conception, then, can be understood in terms not only of what a person believes himself to be, but also in terms of what he would like to be and the ways in which he goes about achieving this ideal. Some of the mechanisms of self-defense already mentioned serve to conceal failures in self-enhancement.

Personality Organization

Integration. An integrated personality is one lacking in contradictions, conflicts, and inconsistencies. Like cultural integration,

personality integration is a matter of degree, never completely realized. A relatively high degree of integration exists if: (1) the person plays only roles that are clearly defined and compatible, (2) holds compatible attitudes, (3) pursues goals that are not mutually exclusive, and (4) is a member of groups with compatible cultures and values.

All these criteria of integration are easily measured up to in a stable, sacred society where one set of values is held in common by the homogeneous group and where roles and goals are clearly defined by tradition. In a changing, complex society, however, personality integration becomes a problem. Many groups with different values compete for the person's allegiance. Definitions of roles and goals break down. In such a society, a person must make choices and achieve a satisfactory personality organization or suffer much tension, frustration, and anxiety.

The roles of good father and church member, of good mother and good wife are compatible. Harder to reconcile would be the roles of father and gambler, or—a more common dilemma in modern society—good mother and breadwinner.

The problem of compatibility of attitudes is more complex. Actually, a person can quite unconsciously and without serious cost to his personality hold two diametrically opposed beliefs, such as a belief that "Business is business" and anything goes, and that "Honesty is the best policy." These inconsistencies bother intellectuals or "thinkers" more than others; most people do not reflect upon their attitudes. But when incompatible attitudes toward the same value are strongly grounded emotionally—for example, love and hate of the same person—we speak of *ambivalence.* The growing child typically loves his mother deeply and dislikes her for frustrating his urges. Most people harbor some degree of ambivalence, such as love of the mother and mild resentment of her dominance, without much tension. But the adult who combines strong love and strong resentment of the same person has a serious personality difficulty.

The question of mutually exclusive goals is a typical problem of adolescence. Undecided about the future and confronted with a wealth of possibilities, the youth often wants to be "all things to all men." He wants to be approved of at home and approved of by the "gang." A boy may want to be a successful lawyer, an accomplished musician, and a rich playboy. Or a girl wants to marry and have children, pursue a career in art, *and* be a glamorous social butterfly. Either may be acutely conscious of what everyone may be thinking of him as he rides a bus or walks down a street. He has not learned that most people are only slightly aware of him and very little interested if at all. He has not narrowed down the number of those he wants to please. A sign of maturity is the ability to

choose goals that can reasonably be reached together, and forego the others without too much regret. Many a chronologically adult person still has not achieved such maturity.

The problems heretofore mentioned—of choosing compatible roles, goals, and attitudes—confront most people in urbanized society. The fourth, that of incompatible cultures, is less often a question of making choices. In modern society, it is visited upon millions of people by circumstances. It is often a result of mobility. This mobility may be social; a man of lower-class status who achieves great success in business and moves to the upper-middle or lower-upper class is often ashamed of his background but not quite at home in his new situation.

More frequently migration produces "culture shock." Within our own country, migration from rural to urban or from southern to northern areas is a strain on the personality. A newcomer to the metropolis from a tightly-knit rural community may come first to the area of cheap lodgings, where he feels anonymous and isolated. The city is indifferent to him. The freedom he longed for is his, but he has no sense of belonging, of security. The standards of proper behavior back home do not fit here, and there is no one to enforce them by caring what he does. He may develop no new standards and feel no restraints and drift into unconventional or delinquent behavior.

In *The Gold Coast and the Slum,* Harvey Zorbaugh depicts Chicago's "world of furnished rooms" as "a mobile, anonymous, individual world, a world of thwarted wishes, of unsatisfied longing, of constant restlessness, a world of atomized individuals, of spiritual nomads." [10] He tells of a girl from Emporia, Kansas, who went to Chicago dreaming of a career in music but found she had to live in miserable rooming houses and take any kind of work. After she was told she had no future in music, she felt she belonged to nothing and no one. She tried a church, but found it impersonal, went to a social agency and was treated as a rag doll. She felt "like an atom whirled about with three million other atoms." When a chance came to accept the companionship of a man, she took it.[11] Obviously she had not been trained in the values and choices of a complex urban society. She had no moorings in a primary group. When the verdict that she had no real musical talent came, it was a great shock to her self-conception, and she had no one to build up her self-esteem and offer response and security.

A person identified with two cultural groups but not wholly at home in either is called a "marginal man." The most common example of the marginal man in our society has been the immigrant. A European peasant, transplanted after a difficult journey to the land of his dreams, has been socialized in one culture and now must learn to live in another. The

strain is evident in the fact that the rate of suicide and murder is highest among immigrants. Their children, too, suffer from the same problem, for they are taught one language and one set of standards at home and are exposed to another in the school and the street. Delinquency and crime rates among immigrants' children are significantly higher than among children of native-born parents.

Marginality has also been imposed upon many "native" cultures by Western man whether he went as conqueror, missionary, or trader. Whatever elements of his own culture he introduced, and no matter with what good intentions, they were frequently so incompatible with the native culture as to entail disorganization and demoralization. Minority groups within a culture also suffer from marginality. The "emancipated Jew" brought up in an orthodox home, feeling more identified with the Gentile culture but not accepted fully by Gentiles, and the mixed-blood mulatto or Eurasian not fully accepted by either racial group suffer the tensions of living in two incompatible cultures.

Being confronted with incompatible roles, values, and cultures is sometimes a stimulant to achievement. It gives a person a sense of objectivity lacking in the stable and secure personality that has never been offered a bewildering variety of choices. Some immigrants have achieved great success in business and the arts. Many Jews have profited from their experience in two or more cultures and become eminent social scientists and anthropologists. Negroes have contributed richly to our art and literature in part because of their experiences with marginality. Many tales of urban success, too, began on the farm, for although the city threatens the newcomer with culture shock, it also offers great opportunities for those who can overcome the strain of adjustment.

Mental health. According to a very simple definition, the mentally healthy person is one who is "happy and responsible." He is happy because he has no serious mental or emotional conflicts; he has achieved a stable and satisfying self-conception. He is responsible in that he performs his social role as he is expected to, conforms to group values, and pursues acceptable goals—in short, he is adjusted to society. Being adjusted to society does not, however, rule out some dissatisfaction and constructive attempts to solve social problems.

The chart on page 198 lists the characteristics of people with good mental health.

Personality Maladjustment and Disorganization

A maladjusted or disorganized personality, to reverse our simple definition of mental health, is "unhappy and/or irresponsible." If unhappy, he lacks sufficient integration of his goals, roles, and values to function without much tension and conflict. He may carry on, outwardly conforming, but actually be full of mental conflicts and possi-



Detroit Free Press

PERSONALITY DISORGANIZATION

Skid Row is the haunt of many who have lost group ties and self-esteem.

bly of physiological symptoms induced by his emotional disturbance. On the other hand, he may be perfectly at ease within himself, but not capable of social living. He does not perform his social roles well enough to fit into normal society. Or he may be both unhappy and unable to keep contact with reality.

Probably no one escapes mild and temporary disorganization as he faces crises, bereavements, failures, and new and strange situations.

Somewhat more chronic and severe than these situational troubles are "personality problems" that impair happiness and adjustment. Most of us probably have one or more of these problems—shyness, tactlessness, feelings of inferiority, sexual maladjustment, irrational fears and worries, laziness, cynicism, dissatisfaction with our work, extreme ambition or lack of it, and any of a long list of other traits and attitudes.

Maladjustments that impair a person's happiness and usefulness more or less severely are *neuroses.* The term *neurosis* "refers to a self-conception which is so damaged, so beset by cross-purposes and contradictory goals, that any action, forward or backward, is painful. The neurotic personality is so loaded with guilt and anxiety that it cannot determine what its desires are." [12]

The late Karen Horney, a psychiatrist, sought to explain neurotic conflicts in cultural terms. The American emphasis on competition takes exaggerated form in the neurotic personality. A neurotic may constantly measure himself against all others, whether or not the situation calls for it. Not only does he want to be better or greater or more important than others, but also he wants to be the only one who attains the pinnacle. If he is discouraged in one area of competition, he tries another and another. He feels intensely hostile toward his competitors, real or imagined. The exaggeration of competition in our culture makes for a diffuse hostile tension among individuals, and an emotional isolation. Love is regarded as the solution for all problems; the neurotic in our society has a great need for affection but is incapable of really loving others.

A neurotic displays a certain rigidity of reaction. Although a normal person may be suspicious under certain circumstances, a neurotic may be suspicious under any and all circumstances. The same goes for fear, spitefulness, indecision, or any other attitude. All neurotics have anxieties. They may try to escape these by interpreting them as rational fears. The chronically worried and over-protective mother may point out the fact that children do get run over as a reason for keeping her seven-year-old confined to the yard. Or the neurotic may deny the existence of his anxiety, but certain "psychosomatic" symptoms appear that he may interpret as symptoms of organic illness. He may try to drown his anxiety in drink or work or drugs or sleep or excessive sexual activity. He may withdraw, avoid all situations that arouse anxiety. If such withdrawal is unconscious and automatic, it is called an *inhibition,* which "consists in an inability to do, feel, or think certain things; and its function is to avoid the anxiety which would arise if the person attempted to do, feel, or think those things." [13]

Neurotic anxiety springs from repressed hostile impulses of various kinds. Very often this repressed hostility is traceable to a childhood in

which "the basic evil is invariably a lack of genuine warmth and affection. A child can stand a great deal . . . as long as he inwardly feels wanted and loved." [14]

The psychiatrist is trained to help people resolve their emotional conflicts by looking back of the symptoms of fear, anxiety, and unhappiness, to their roots in past experience. Understanding the causes of these anxieties often helps the person get rid of his tensions and conflicts.

Psychoses (commonly called insanity) are not merely more severe forms of neurosis. The neurotic has not lost touch with reality; he knows how he should function in society, but his effectiveness is diminished by inner tensions. The psychotic may know how to function, or he may not; at any rate he cannot do so. He is likely to require institutional care. If there is a physiological basis for the psychosis, it is called *organic;* that is the case in mental illnesses associated with alcoholism, drug addiction, syphilis, glandular changes, senility, and the like. Organic psychoses are responsible for almost half of the patients in mental hospitals. Psychoses in which there is no traceable organic change are called *functional.* There are three chief types: schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis, and paranoia. We shall go no further into the subject than to mention a few characteristics of each.

Schizophrenia or split personality, also called dementia praecox, is characterized by a withdrawal from contact with others, preoccupation with the self, inability to concentrate, and dulling of emotional response. It comes on gradually and often strikes young adults. Alternating attitudes of deep depression and maniacal excitement characterize the manic-depressive psychosis, which often strikes in middle adult life. The paranoic harbors delusions and hallucinations, but he may appear to be highly intelligent and emotionally adjusted to reality and may not be recognized as psychotic. In fact, he may attain such high position as to go down in history.

There are still other types of personality disorganization and maladjustment that we might mention. Some social types—the beggar, the vagrant, the criminal, the prostitute, the alcoholic—may be perfectly content with their roles and live according to the code of their group but still be definitely misfits in the eyes of the society as a whole. Others are psychopathic personalities of various kinds, including the sexual deviant. The shocking figures often cited—that one out of twenty Americans will at one time or another require hospitalization for mental illness, that almost two out of five men were rejected or discharged by the armed services in World War II as unfit for neuropsychiatric reasons—hint at the complexity and seriousness of the problem.

Our society is becoming increasingly aware of the problem of mental

health and increasingly concerned with the prevention and treatment of personal maladjustment and mental illness. We shall not consider here the possibilities of mental hygiene clinics, psychiatric help, group therapy, and psychoanalysis. But because the early years of childhood are crucial years for the formation of the self-conception, and because the process of socialization touches every individual intimately and in varying degree for all his life, we shall take up next three social institutions charged with the task of fitting the individual into society and making him a happy and responsible person—the family, the educational system, and religion.

13

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

The family is the basic and universal institution. Upon it depends the survival of every society. Everywhere the family produces new raw recruits for society in the form of newborn infants and socializes them sufficiently so they can play adult roles in the other institutions of the society and in turn establish their own families.

The family is the most "primary" of primary groups, for it receives the infant first and keeps him during the years most crucial for the formation of his personality. It is the group with the most intimate interaction and the most frequent and continuous face-to-face contacts.

Need we define the family? Do we not have a mental picture of it as a rosy-cheeked father and mother with a rosy-cheeked son and daughter, gaily eating the latest breakfast cereal in a shining kitchen? This idea of the family as a man and woman and their children comes close to reality in most societies; but in order to apply universally, our definition must be more carefully fashioned. A family really has its origin in the fact that

the human infant is born after nine long months of gestation, during which the mother is hampered in her ability to provide for herself; and for a long period after birth the child requires constant care and supervision. Thus the family may in one sense be defined as "a woman with a child, and a man to look after them." This man is usually the child's father, but in some cultures it is the woman's brother. Our definition then, to include the essential elements of all families everywhere, is "the family is the institutionalized social group charged with the duty of population replacement." [1]

Every society recognizes marriage as the legitimate way to found a family, though its rites for signalizing this step may consist only of wrapping a blade of grass about the fingers of a man and a woman. Marriage is a "formal and durable sexual union of one or more men with one or more women within a set of designated rights and duties." [2]

Forms of the Family

Number of spouses. Families vary from culture to culture in different ways. The number of spouses, as we noted in our definition, may be "one or more." Man has, interestingly enough, hit upon all the possible combinations—one man with one woman, one man with more than one woman, one woman with more than one man, and two or more men with two or more women.

We are most familiar with *monogamy,* the marriage of one man and one woman. The natural balance between the number of males and females makes this the most common form of marriage even where other forms are permitted. *Polygamy,* or plural mating, includes *polygyny,* the marriage of one man with two or more women, *polyandry,* the marriage of one woman with two or more men, and *cenogamy* or group marriage. Least common is the last type, in which two or more men are mated with two or more women. Where this arrangement is found, it is by no means promiscuous and unregulated. It is usually practiced only among "age mates." Among one group in New Guinea, all men born within a given period of time share duties and privileges, including the sharing of individual wives. Another group in Africa arranges similar reciprocity among all males circumcised at the same time.


Polyandry is rare; among the few places where it is practiced are the arid highlands of Tibet, where it takes several men to support a family. The husbands of one woman are usually brothers. Polygyny is somewhat more widespread, but even where it is sanctioned monogamy is also practiced. Our mores commend monogamy. Most Americans consider polyg-

yny brutal and immoral, and jump to the conclusion that men take several wives only because they are over-anxious for sexual variety. We feel that wives must be unhappy and jealous in such an arrangement. Actually, in most societies, desire for sexual variety may be satisfied in other ways. The decision to take another wife may stem from one or all of the following motives that one anthropologist, Edward Ward, found among the Yoruba tribe in Africa—the desire for children, the desire to prove virility, a taboo against sexual relations for three years after the birth of a child, lucky inheritance of a wife, usually from a brother, the death of men in warfare, the economic usefulness of wives in bargaining and labor, and the fact that the number of wives indicates a man's wealth and prestige.[3]

Americans, using their own cultural values as a basis for judgment, are sure that when two or more women are married to the same man there must be a lot of friction. Actually such marriages appear to work quite well in societies where they are approved. The women are often sisters. Usually each woman has a separate hut for herself and her children, and the husband must spend time with her periodically. Women do not appear to be disturbed about the arrangement, some even encouraging their husbands to acquire more wives; after all, it means less work and more prestige for the wife. Also, among nonliterates, where women often far exceed the number of men, almost all women are thus assured of a husband. It is true that the woman does not have the claim on her husband that she would in our society, but then she has not been brought up to expect it. Jealousy appears where a person senses a threat to his dominance or security in a personal relationship, but where plural marriages are permitted, emotional attachments between man and wife do not have the intensity characteristic of our society.[4]

Authority. The family also varies in the location of authority. In a *patriarchal* family, the father's word is almost law to wife and children. The mother or grandmother controls a *matriarchal* family. In an *equalitarian* family, decisions are jointly made and control is shared between husband and wife, with children also having a voice in family affairs. This type of family is also called "democratic" in contrast to the "authoritarian" family where one of the parents holds the reins tightly. Some cultures actually have child-centered families or very nearly so. Margaret Mead relates in *Growing Up in New Guinea* that if a three-year-old Manus child refused to go home from a visit, the mother would resignedly stay and await his pleasure. She saw in this a parody of some American families.

Ernest Burgess found different kinds of families predominating in the



From Ernest W. Burgess and Harvey J. Locke, The Family, From Institution to Companionship, *2nd ed. (New York: American Book Company, 1953), p. 101.*

THE THEORETICAL PATTERN OF URBAN ZONES AND OF FAMILY TYPES

Zone I. Central Business District: transient population, cheap hotels and flophouses, homeless men—nonfamily type.

Zone II. Rooming-house Region: mobile population, rooming houses, excess of young people —emancipated family type.

Zone III. Immigrant Neighborhoods: foreign stock, homes lower class, deteriorated housing, poverty and dependency, juvenile delinquency—small patriarchal family type.

Zone IV. Workingmen's Area: independent workingmen's population, upper-lower class and lower-middle class—patricentric family type.

Zone V. Apartment-house District: typically native American population, middle class, multiple dwellings—equalitarian family type.

Zone VI. Suburban Area: native American population, upper-middle and upper-class population, single homes—matricentric family type.

various ecological areas of the city. In the rooming-house district, where social controls are few and the population is mobile and predominantly young, the emancipated family predominates. It is characterized by childlessness, instability, and gainfully employed wives. The patriarchal family is most common in immigrant areas. In the area of workingmen's homes, immigrant and rural-American traditions are strong, and the father is head of the house; the family is "patricentric" or "father-centered." Equalitarian patterns prevail in the apartment-house area. Because of the father's long absences at work in the city, suburban families are centered around the mother. (See chart on page 206.)

Extent of kinship. Some societies are organized on the basis of extended families or clans where kinship is reckoned very exactly to distant relatives, often, however, by only the mother's or only the father's blood line. At the other extreme is our society where the typical unit is husband, wife, and children living apart from in-laws and sometimes so far away that ties are broken with all but the closest relatives. This is the smallest family unit in history. In between these two extremes are larger households of three or four generations, as among the San Blas Cuna and some subcultures of our own nation. The American rural and small town family of a few decades ago was an extended family.

Functions of the Family

Reproduction is, of course, the basic function of the family in all times and places, with *socialization* of the young child also the responsibility primarily of the parents. In one way or another, society instills in its members the desire to have children, reinforcing the powerful sex drive with injunctions to "Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth."

Another primary function of the family in every culture is to provide for *socially approved expression* of a powerful organic drive—that of *sex*. Usually the only outlet, or the one distinctly preferred, is that between married couples. Among many peoples, including the Manus water-dwellers of New Guinea, the San Blas Cuna, and in our own ideal culture pattern, there is no other approved outlet. The mores decree that an individual be chaste and innocent until marriage, and after that he be faithful to the mate. Sex taboos exist in every society and always with reference to the family organization.

As the group in which children are born and reared and in which sex

expression is permitted, the family is the primary group with the highest degree of intimate interaction and thus the closest emotional ties, the least social distance, and the most sympathy and understanding. It is the chief source of satisfaction for two of the primary motivations—*response and security*. This is true even where husband and wife are mutually hostile, as among the Manus and the Dobuans of New Guinea. Among these island people, affection is expressed toward children and brothers and sisters.

Traditional functions. In most societies the family performs various other functions as well. In folk societies the family is the cornerstone of social organization. It is the chief unit of *economic* production and consumption, *social control, protection, education, recreation,* and *religion,* and the basis for *assigning social status.* We may call these the traditional social and economic functions.

The American Family

Few aspects of American life have been the target of more criticism than the family. We find in traveling abroad that from movies and magazines foreigners have garnered many curious notions about our family folkways and mores. They are sure that unchaperoned dating is synonymous with sexual license, that marital fidelity is neither expected nor desired by American husbands, who look on benignly while their wives dance with other men, that most marriages end in divorce, and that our palatial homes are mere stopping places on a gay round of pleasure. These impressions are usually greatly altered when students and other visitors are invited to American homes, most often of middle-class families. They are amazed that the husband does not consider it beneath his dignity to help with the dishes or put the baby to bed, that married couples can enjoy mutual friendship and joking relationships with other couples without jealousy, that many parents enjoy companionship with their children, and that a girl who accepts an invitation to go to a dance with a man is not compromising her reputation.

But of cries of woe from Americans themselves there is no end. On the one hand clinging and overprotective "Moms" are blamed for most of the problems of our society, while on the other, parental neglect is decried as the cause of juvenile delinquency. The fact that in recent years there has been one divorce decree granted for every four marriage licenses issued is viewed with great alarm as a sign that the American home is crumbling. Reports of scientific studies of sex behavior, which need careful interpretation, are used to boost the circulation of magazines and stir up heated

controversy over our sex morals. Journalists, psychiatrists, judges, and ministers combine to give the impression that premarital chastity, parental wisdom, respect for parents on the part of children, marital fidelity, and family unity are at the vanishing point. Many of these critics give the impression that the only solution is to return to the old patriarchal rural family, the solid, stable household of turn-of-the-century America.

After looking long and hard at the American family, social scientists agree that its forms and functions have changed in many ways, and that the values and attitudes of Americans toward marriage and family life have changed along with them, though not always consistently. They see no rational basis, however, for the plea that all we need do is revive the old type of family. That is gone, along with the rural society of which it was a part. The changes that critics decry, social scientists see as part of the process of social change. True, this process is painful, but present disorganization does not bode the eventual end of all family life. Disorganization, they say, is a prelude to reorganization.

Many students of the family hold out the optimistic theory that a new kind of family, better suited to our modern way of life, is emerging from the ruins of the patriarchal rural family. Meanwhile, as new forms and functions emerge, there must necessarily be some confusion and disorientation, for disorder accompanies change in any institution. So many patterns of behavior exist that it is difficult to isolate any one mode of behavior upon which the majority of Americans might agree. In their valuable volumes on the family, social scientists are careful to point out that there is no such thing in our heterogeneous society as a "typical" American family, for there are variations between social classes, rural and urban areas, geographical sections, and between different racial, ethnic, and religious groups. Where some average or typical family is implied in their studies, however, it is usually the urban middle-class family.

Besides trying to trace the trends in family life, social scientists have made numerous studies that can be useful to the young person searching for a mate, the adult wishing to make his marriage more satisfying, the parent anxious to raise his children to be happy and useful members of society, and the adult approaching old age or coping with the problem of aging parents.

Changing Functions of the Family

Economic function. The rural family in folk society is a production unit, largely self-sufficient. The home is a veritable fac-

tory. Bread and butter are made there (or whatever their cultural equivalents may be); clothes are fashioned there, perhaps from handwoven cloth; soap and preserves and fuel and many tools are made and used right on the premises. Each member contributes to the work of house and farm at an early age, and when he is past his physical prime he still pulls his own weight by doing small but necessary tasks. Even the toddler contributes; he can feed the chickens, gather eggs, and haul firewood on his little sled. As he grows older, he tends the herds and learns to help with the planting and harvest. Therefore, the peasant welcomes children. As the Latin Americans say, "Each baby brings his own bread under his arm." In rural America, children were a financial asset, and a widow with a number of children was a matrimonial prize.

The small urban family is no longer a production unit except in the most limited sense. Usually one person—the breadwinner—is "independent," and the others are "dependents." The breadwinner goes out of the home daily to work for some secondary group—a business, a school, a protective agency—and returns with periodic cash wages that pay for most if not all of the family's needs. Many household jobs have been taken over by commercial agencies—laundries, bakeries, and so forth—or at least eased by modern appliances—electric sewing machines, washers, driers, vacuum cleaners, water heaters and automatic furnaces. The little chores that make children genuinely useful are few in the city home. There may be a lawn to mow, a baby to tend, trash to carry outdoors, the table to clear and set; but there is little really *productive* work in which the average child can take pride.

This transfer of economic functions to outside agencies or automatic "servants" has convinced many people that the average American housewife has almost nothing to do. This is certainly not the case, especially where there are children. In some ways her tasks are far harder than her mother's, for there is no unmarried sister or aunt or widowed mother in the typical home to ease the isolation and confinement that paradoxically enough is one of the urban housewife's chief problems. Nor do even the best of automatic servants run themselves. Although they ease the back-breaking work, they force housekeeping standards ever higher and, in fact, bring back into the home many of the functions that for a time were frequently delegated to outside agencies. The family is still the chief consumption unit, and on the wife falls the main burden of distributing the available cash to best advantage.

In the old rural society there was little place for the unmarried adult; in fact, he or she was economically at a disadvantage and usually dependent upon married relatives. The single male in urban America is, in contrast, better off financially than the married man with a family. Many

businesses seek to cater to his needs and wants. Nor does the American girl need a husband to support her. When a young couple marry after a period of economic independence, they find their standard of living drops unless the wife continues to work. Children are economic liabilities for whom parents must buy food and clothes, pay baby sitters and pediatricians, and provide space helmets, music lessons, and an education. And for all this, no economic return nor even any easing of the burden can be expected until the law permits the children to work or until their long education is complete and they can support, not their parents, but themselves.

Of 19 million women working at regular jobs today, more than half are married. Twenty-seven married women out of 100 work outside the home. It is obvious what a departure this is from the traditional ideas that men are the providers and that woman's place is in the home.

Other traditional functions. State and local governments have taken over many of the protective functions that used to be the province of the family. Fire departments, police departments, welfare agencies, and social security systems all give a measure of security that the small family cannot provide. The religious function has been left largely to Sunday school and church; grace at meals and evening prayers are not often part of the family ritual. Education, too, is regarded by most parents as the province of the schools. The home still plays a large part in inculcating attitudes toward religion and education, however, and can to a large extent either reinforce or nullify what is learned outside.

In urban society, recreation and social participation are largely by age and sex groups. The husking bees, harvest festivals, and holiday "gatherings of the clan" have few if any counterparts in urban life. In the city, Junior goes to Cub Scouts, Big Sister to a dance, Mother to her bridge club, and Dad to the bowling alley.


As was pointed out in the discussion of our class system, every person's initial social status must be that of his family. The function of assigning status also has been weakened by the anonymity of urban life, for what a person does and how he looks are often more important than what kind of family he came from.

The American family, then, has relinquished many of its traditional social and economic functions. What of the inescapable functions of bearing and rearing children and satisfying the sex drive and the psychological needs of its members?

Reproduction. In the past century and a half, the birth rate has shown a spectacular decline. The number of children per fertile married woman

has dropped from 7.8 to 3.5 since 1790, while the size of the average family (defined by the census as a group of related persons living together in the same household) has dropped from 5.7 to 3.5. The accompanying graph shows the sharp and steady decline from 1871 to the mid-thirties, and the trend since then.

This represents a revolutionary change in the reproductive function of the family. In traditional rural society, every additional child was wel-




From Burgess and Locke, The Family, From Institution to Companionship, *2nd ed., p. 456.*

THE NUMBER OF BIRTHS PER 1000 POPULATION, 1871-1952

comed as an asset. Only in recent decades has the impact of newly invented methods to prevent conception of children been registered in a sharply declining birth rate. The decline has been greatest among urban, upper-income, and non-Catholic groups.

Urbanization is significantly associated with acceptance of the idea that married couples may decide if they want children at all, or how many they want and at what intervals. Everywhere the urban birth rate is lower than the rural. In our country, about one married woman out of



"And this is my father's checkbook—the source of all our happiness!"

Reproduced by special permission of the Detroit News and Consolidated News Features, Inc.

seven never bears a child; probably half of these are involuntarily childless. Although only one farm woman out of ten is childless, in urban areas one woman out of five is childless; and in general, the larger the city, the greater the percentage of childless women. In 1940, for every 1,000 urban women ever married and having passed their childbearing period, 2,430 children had been born. Rural non-farm women had had 3,188 children per 1,000 women and rural farm women, 4,130.[5]

There is also a class differential in the birth rate. It is not, however, strictly a gradient from a high birth rate in the lower class to a low birth rate in the upper class. Instead, the middle class appears to have the low-

est birth rate, the upper class somewhat higher, the lower class the highest. This may be explained by the distribution of the rewards and penalties of parenthood. Children are a drag on the ambitions of the upwardly mobile middle class, an economic liability interfering with the high standard of living, an obstacle to individualistic pleasure-seeking. Nonetheless, most middle-class couples desire one or two children for various reasons, such as the desire to appear respectable and stable, the desire to enhance the ego and have the affection of children, and the belief that children are necessary to a full life. Members of the upper class can well afford children. Unlike the middle class they feel the economic penalties neither of inadequate housing, the mother's inability to work outside the home (or the lack of profit from it if she hires someone to care for home and children while she works), and the strain on the budget of rearing children according to ever higher standards of health, appearance, and "advantages." Nor do children hamper their parents' recreation very much, for a maid or nurse in the home is a "built-in baby sitter." Furthermore, upper-class males usually want to carry on the family name. The lower class has far less knowledge of medically approved contraceptives than the middle class, less ambition, less tense awareness of the responsibility of bringing children up by the latest methods, a more easygoing attitude toward having children, which may reflect the fact that they themselves often came from large families, and a tendency to emphasize living in the present rather than for the future.

If the declining birth rate in the urban middle class reflected a changing system of values, then the fact that the birth rate has risen—and contrary to all predictions, has continued to rise long after the post-war spurt was expected to be over—may also be explained in terms of changed values. The birth rate in 1950 was about 24 per 1,000 population, roughly the same as in 1920. During the forties the urban birth rate rose 77 per cent, the rural rate only slightly. In 1940, of every 1,000 urban women between the ages of 15 and 49, only 369 had children under age 5; nine years later the number had risen to 503. The number of women with small children rose from 618 to 631 on farms, and from 516 to 632 in rural non-farm areas.[6] The urban middle class is, in part, more prosperous than formerly, and also, some observers think, many people faced by war and postwar insecurity decided that the only real security was in the emotional haven of a home and children.

Care and socialization of children. Although Americans are having fewer children than formerly, they devote more thought and care to those they do have. With the aid of medical science and improved nutrition and sanitation, for every 1,000 babies born alive only 30 die before their

first birthday as compared to 100 in 1915. The psychological and social sciences, too, have contributed to the welfare of children by exploring the nature of their needs and the ways they can be socialized with best results for individual happiness and the good of society. They have by no means arrived at "all the answers." In fact, in some respects they have made socialization a heavier burden to conscientious parents haunted by the dicta that "A child's personality is fixed by the time he is five" and "There are no problem children, only problem parents." Swings in the fashion of child care leave some parents confused. The young mother may be told by her mother to "Let him cry it out," for that was the fashion a generation ago. But her grandmother believes in rocking and cuddling and feeding a child when he is hungry. Today the swing is back to Grandma, with the blessing of the scientists. Mothers consult their books by Dr. Spock, a pediatrician, and Dr. Gesell, a child psychologist, to find out how to handle problems of care and discipline. The latest admonition is that they are taking their job too seriously: "Relax, be spontaneous, follow your impulses." For the character of the total relationship between parent and child—one of rejection or acceptance, of affection or ambivalence—is in the long run more important than any detail of technique.

Psychological functions of the family: response and security. The individual in urban society has lost so many of the relationships that afforded him intimate response in the extended family and rural neighborhood that he depends upon the immediate family almost entirely for satisfying his wish for response. Happiness has become the criterion of success in marriage. Children are desired chiefly for ego satisfaction and affection.

Security, too, is found in the family. "Home," says Robert Frost, "is the place where, when you have to go there, they have to take you in." [7] The homeless are social misfits, highly vulnerable to mental and emotional disorders. In most families a person is sure of an affectionate welcome and knows that interest will be shown in what he is doing. Though feelings may be ambivalent and a person might not choose members of his own family as friends, still there is a tie that can be broken only with much distress and grief.

Many social scientists believe that the stability of the family will depend increasingly upon its ability to satisfy these psychological needs. "Mutual affection is becoming the essential basis of marriage and the family." [8]

Channelization of the sex drive. Although the sex urge is natural and powerful, it is susceptible to social control. Every society has standards of sexual behavior, and although no society is completely successful in



Loaned by the Detroit Free Press. From 1953 Graflex Photo Contest

A SOLDIER'S WELCOME

Response and security are the basis of the modern family.

keeping sexual behavior within the mores, in a stable society with primary group controls strongly operating, there is comparatively little deviation.

In a changing society, however, the real and the ideal culture patterns may be far apart. Certainly this is true of our complex society. We still subscribe to the mores of premarital chastity, marital fidelity, and modesty in public behavior. The only approved sexual outlet is between a man and his wife. Observation shows, and scientific studies prove, that many Americans either furtively violate these norms while giving them lip service, or openly flout them. About half the women interviewed by

Kinsey and his associates had engaged in premarital intercourse (although of these, 53 per cent confined their intimacy to the man they later married). The average American male, according to the same team of researchers, is unfaithful at least once after marriage. Mass media of communication and entertainment play up sex heavily in a way that would have shocked Americans of a generation or two ago.

Many forces operate to channel the sex drive into the socially approved outlet of marital relations. Among these are the idea of romantic love, which supposes that you find the one and only mate and live happily ever after; gossip and social ostracism for those known to deviate; pressure to marry; and the constant advice of church, school, and parents. But the counter pressures are strong. The heterogeneity of our society makes for disagreement on what is moral and immoral behavior. Its mobility and anonymity make it possible to escape the control of the primary group. The auto whisks young people miles away from the scrutiny of parents and neighbors; the motel asks few questions; birth control techniques are more efficient; fear of the loss of heaven and pain of hell seems to be diminishing.

Add to this the sexual stimulation and the contradictory views with which Americans are constantly bombarded by the movies, books, magazines, advertisements, and various forms of entertainment, and it is little wonder that "the average American—in fact, virtually every living American—is completely muddled, mixed-up, and messed-up in his sex views, feelings, and acts." [9]

This confusion may be at least partly explained by our cultural tendency to think in terms of opposites, extremes, either—or. Heterosexual love is regarded as either spiritual or physical rather than as a blend of the two. If a person does not subscribe to Victorian prudishness, he must be an advocate of "free love." Morality is made to sound somehow grim, unattractive, puritanical; the sign of sophistication is supposed to be either frivolity or brutal frankness. From the hush-hush attitude of a few decades ago we have apparently swung to a frankness that bandies about terms like "orgasm" in mass-circulation magazines. This ambivalence almost invariably strikes observers from cultures where sex is accepted as part of the mature person's life, but is not so heavily emphasized, as an evidence of immaturity.

Social scientists and psychologists are trying to guide Americans toward a new criterion of acceptable sexual behavior that will supply both the demand for biological pleasure and release and the demands of the two personalities for a mutually satisfying, meaningful relationship.[10] They would like to divest normal, socially approved sexual relationships of the medieval aura of guilt and sin, which brands sex even in marriage as

somehow nasty and unclean. They advocate a long-range program of sex education—a process that begins with giving the infant a feeling of love and acceptance, continues through childhood with frank answers to specific questions, and finally prepares the young adult for marriage with a balanced exposition of the emotional as well as the physiological aspects of sex behavior.

American Beliefs Regarding Love and Marriage

"The sun is slowly sinking into a translucent sea. A concealed orchestra softly strums a languorous melody of love. A man and a woman stand clasped in each other's arms, exchanging vows of eternal and passionate devotion. Then the lights blaze on, the audience regretfully rises to its feet, and the illusion is over. But not forgotten. For romance has penetrated the drab lives of the shopgirls, the waitresses, the shoe clerks, and the messenger boys. The ecstasy of that final embrace, vicarious though it be, lingers in their hearts as they jolt home on the streetcar. *Their* love, they vow, will be even as this was, sweeping aside such trivial and prosaic barriers as money, social position, cultural dissimilarities, and parental objections. For love, romance, is the greatest of life's gifts. Marriage to the mate of their dreams is the be-all and end-all of existence. Once they have met this mysteriously preordained affinity, once they have spoken the magic words before priest, minister, or justice of the peace, their lives will go on, blessed with a cooing baby at judicious intervals. Silver-haired, they will descend the hill together, as deeply and ideally devoted as the day they were wed." [11]

The ideal of romantic love is as old as our literary heritage, perhaps older. We find it in Homer's epics and Sappho's lyrics, in the medieval tales of knights and ladies, in the sighs of Elizabethan poets. But only in a few countries, and almost exclusively in modern times, has romantic love been associated with marriage.

The cult of romantic love has flourished in the United States, where individualism and the belief in happiness as a life goal furnish fertile soil for its growth. From childhood on, Americans are taught its creed and its code. Our movies and magazines and popular songs all reflect and promote this cultural belief. We may distinguish several articles of this creed.

Belief in the "one and only"—a perfect mate for each of us decreed by fate as "the right one," the "somebody who" we are destined somewhere, somehow, to meet.

Belief in "love at first sight"—when the fateful moment of meeting comes.

"Some enchanted evening,
You may see a stranger,
There may be a stranger
Across a crowded room,
And then you'll know . . ." [12]

Closely related to this belief is the idea of love as happening suddenly on the basis of *physical attraction.*

"Heart and soul
I fell in love with you,
Heart and soul,
The way a fool would do,
Madly
Because you held me tight
And stole a kiss in the night." [13]

Therefore romantic love emphasizes *external characteristics* that can be appreciated at once: physical beauty, youth, glamour, vivacity.

"Hair of gold
Eyes of blue
Lips like cherry wine." [14]

Most of us do not, even with the aid of fashions, cosmetics, elevator shoes, and padded shoulders, measure up to the ideal of "tall, dark and handsome men" or "glamour girls." How, then, do most of us manage to find mates? Because *love is blind,* and under its spell and magic we idealize the beloved.

Love overrides all considerations of differences in social status, family background, and the like. In fact, great differences and difficulties only make the affair more "romantic," adding interest to the period between "boy meets girl" and "boy gets girl." *Love is all that matters;* "love conquers all."

How do you know it's love? Because there is an *ecstasy,* a *thrill,* that lifts the relationship out of the realm of the ordinary. You can't eat, you can't sleep, you think about nothing but the lover. You are "crazy" about each other.

"I couldn't sleep a wink last night . . ." [15]

The love affair is carried on in an unreal atmosphere of moonlight and roses, of glamour and excitement. What about sexual intimacies? The long-

established romantic code does not sanction them; they must wait for marriage. Of late, however, popular songs, like other elements of mass entertainment and communication, play up sex more and more heavily.

The love affair leads to marriage and a rose-covered cottage filled with healthy, happy babies. But here, too, there is ambivalence. In our American culture you find two diametrically opposed ideas—often subscribed to by the same person. One is that youth is the time for love and romance, marriage and adulthood a drab anticlimax. "Have fun while you're young; these are the best years of your life. Time enough to settle down later," oldsters advise young people. On the other hand, the ideal marriage is one in which the romantic excitement of courtship is carried on, in which the two never never take one another for granted, in which souvenirs and places and dates are surrounded with sentiment and ritually remembered. If love "degenerates" into anything as colorless as conjugal affection, then the marriage is considered a failure.

To question this intense cultural belief in romantic love almost amounts to heresy. But many social scientists have done so. Some gleefully demolish "the romantic fallacy" as appealing principally to emotionally insecure adolescents and immature adults. One writer calls it "a sort of socially approved and temporary insanity . . . a pleasant form of mass delusion," and remarks that in many cultures cases of such violent emotional attachment are regarded as pitiable, disgraceful, and tragic.[16]

They admit that romantic love serves a useful purpose in our society. It is a "definition of the situation" and as such a means of social control. People behave according to its expectations because they have been taught to do so. It is a cultural modification of the sex drive, providing adolescents with a means of sublimation and redirection of this impulse.[17] But certain elements in the romantic complex place serious obstacles in the way of wise mate selection and successful marital adjustment.

There are perhaps hundreds of people with whom each of us might achieve a satisfactory marriage relationship, provided we ourselves are good marriage risks. The belief that there is only one, and sooner or later we are fated to meet him or her, minimizes the importance of adjustment. When problems arise in marriage, it is easy to decide that it was all a mistake, and this was not the right one after all; the marriage must therefore end so the person can go on looking for the right one.

The belief in love at first sight and the stress on external attributes emphasize physical attraction while minimizing traits of character and personality, cultural and social background—factors that social scientists have found to be more important to successful adjustment than is powerful initial attraction on the basis of sex.

The belief that marriage is a failure unless it preserves all the ecstasy

and thrill of courtship is an obstacle to adjustment, for adjusting to another person in an intimate relationship means forming interdependent habits of life, which inevitably creates the comfortable routine and "taking for granted" that the romanticists deplore.

All this does not mean that social scientists do not believe in love nor in the importance of sexual attraction. Physical attraction is the strong foundation of most marriages. But love is far more than sex; it involves emotional identification, sympathy and understanding, tenderness and affection. Such love requires *time* to develop. There is such a thing as strong mutual attraction upon short acquaintance; our culture has prepared us to interpret it as "love at first sight." But only as a couple becomes really well acquainted and discover "mutual interest, enjoyment of each other's company, a certain measure of agreement on life goals and values, and the absence of personality traits that cause irritation or quarrels between the two" [18] can they be said to have the kind of love necessary to successful marriage.

14

STAGES IN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE

In considering the life cycle of the family, we could begin with almost any stage from infancy on. But let us start with the first groping steps toward formation of a new family, as seen in the almost peculiarly American custom of dating.

Dating

In almost all societies the selection of a mate is the business of parents, matchmakers, or other designated adults. The young person may be betrothed even before he reaches puberty, and may not even see his mate until the wedding night. In many countries, even today, young people meet only under strict supervision, and choice of a mate is restricted to those considered acceptable by the family.

In our society, by long tradition, each person is supposed to be free to

choose his own mate on the basis of love. Our belief in individualism and the pursuit of personal happiness tolerates no interference from others in the course of true love. The impersonality of city life and the loss of many primary contacts have not only removed mate selection from many primary group controls, but also made necessary some way in which young people could get to know one another. Dating has been the American answer.



"Plymouth, convertible, 1949, no radio!"

A date is a social engagement with a person of opposite sex. Dating begins at different ages in different subcultural groups; in general, it begins earlier in the city, often roughly coinciding with puberty. Dates are usually planned around specific recreational activities such as parties, movies, picnics, and dances.

Although dating has overtones of courtship and romance, the fact that it is often a preliminary to courtship and marriage is not especially important during adolescence. It is primarily a vehicle for having fun and

getting acquainted. But it serves other very important ends. Dating is a socializing process, one of the ways in which young people acquire understandings and social skills that later prove valuable in adult life. It affords an opportunity for becoming acquainted with various types of people and deciding which kinds are most congenial. It is a time for "window shopping . . . with no commitment to buy the merchandise on display." [1]

In short, dating plays an important role in personality development, helping a person mature socially and emotionally. It is our society's way of giving young people a chance to look over the field of potential mates. Young people who have been forbidden to date by their parents often make impulsive and unwise choices of mates. Not that dating always guarantees a happy choice, any more than seeing the selection of dresses in all the stores guarantees that a girl will choose a becoming garment. But grabbing the first dress that fits rules out many other possibilities that might have been better.

Dating is a matter of extreme importance to young people, for much of their recreational life and their status with friends and schoolmates depend upon the number and nature of their dates. This is perhaps most apparent on college campuses. One social scientist found much campus dating connected with status considerations. Girls won prestige by dating fraternity men with cars, money, ability to dance, smooth manners and clothes, and a good "line," while boys rated available dates according to popularity, smart clothes, ability to dance well, a smooth line, and sorority membership. Although doubtless somewhat exaggerated, this study does emphasize the prestige function of dating.[2]

In some schools, the frustrations of competitive dating are avoided by the practice of "going steady," which does not necessarily imply romantic interest but assures couples of dates for all the important school and college social affairs.

Some dates are exploitative in nature. The "wolf" pretends emotional involvement in order to exploit the girl sexually. The "gold digger" feigns interest for the sake of status, good times, or expensive presents. Young people are on their guard against this possibility, wary of "falling for a line." Most dates, however, are arranged for the sake of fun and friendship, with increasing likelihood as time goes on of emotional involvement and courtship.

Courtship

It used to be that if a boy walked a girl home from prayer meeting twice, he was considered to be courting her. Today dating

carries no necessary implication of courting. But it is expected that after a certain number of years of "having a good time," a person will "fall in love" and "take someone seriously."

"Courtship" is not in the vocabulary of the average young American. "Dating," "going steady," and "being engaged" (with perhaps an intermediate stage of being "pinned" or "engaged to be engaged") are the steps leading to marriage, to judge from the terms commonly employed. In spite of the extravagant language of the movies and popular songs, the American is loath to refer to his "sweetheart" or even his "fiancée." He prefers to call her a "girl friend." Nonetheless, he rarely balks at public demonstrations of affection and often is convinced that he is "in love," that this is "the real thing." A person may be in love several times before he marries, but according to at least one study the heartache over a broken romance does not ordinarily last long.[3] Our romantic complex invests each such affair with thrills, doubts, excitement, and anxiety. It "defines the situation" in terms of questions: "Love or infatuation?" "Is he the one?" If it comes to marriage, then he is the one, and it is love. If the affair ends, then there are ego-salving explanations: It was infatuation; he was not the right one.

The confusion in American sex attitudes is perhaps felt most strongly during the period when a person is ripe for emotional involvement, with the thought of marriage always in the picture. It has been found that the sex drive in men is strongest at age 18, long before most are ready to marry. With sexual stimulation bombarding the couple from every side, with social controls weakened, and with the confusion of values already referred to, self-control becomes a real problem. Many individuals make it much more difficult for themselves by indulging in successively greater intimacies.

What do social scientists say about this aspect of dating and courtship? They admit that a number of societies, perhaps a majority, permit premarital experimentation, but they warn against using that as a justification for practicing the same custom in our society. The taboos are still strong, and consequently can be violated only with feelings of guilt and shame even if no punishment from society ensues. Premarital intercourse is no guarantee that a couple will thus assure themselves of sexual compatibility in marriage; in fact it may work against satisfactory adjustment. There is also the possibility of pregnancy. Mr. and Mrs. Landis suggest that dates be planned in such a way as to minimize the possibility of overstimulation. They are convinced that many young people recognize their responsibility and are forming codes of their own to regulate courtship behavior.[4] As another student of the family sums up his discussion of the problem, "Except for the matter of temporary physical pleasure, all argu-

ments about gains tend to be highly theoretical, while the risks and unpleasant consequences tend to be in equal degree highly practical." [5]

Courtship is ideally a pleasant period for two people to get to know one another. The aura of romance and glamour and the emphasis on commercial recreational activities for dates, however, hamper this process, for the prospective mates are always seen at their best and in leisure time pursuits. Social scientists advise more interaction with one another's families, and dating in a variety of situations that reveal different interests, abilities, and values.

Engagement

The decision to marry is formalized by announcement of the couple's engagement. With society notified of the marriage plans, the two can spend more and more time together. If they are not determined to shun every issue on which they might disagree—which merely postpones quarrels till after marriage—they discuss such questions as where they will live, whether or not the wife will work outside the home, their attitudes toward parenthood, and how they should handle the money. None of these questions would have come up half a century ago, for roles then were clear-cut and choices few.

Social scientists have found that happy marriages are usually preceded by a fairly long engagement period, with about two or three years the ideal length. The couple then has time to test their compatibility. This is regarded as the function of engagement today. Broken engagements are not, as they previously were, considered broken contracts. Most Americans think it is best to break off if either person decides he was mistaken in his choice.

Mate Selection

How can a man and woman be certain they are "right" for one another? By waiting, and by using this time and all the aids that advisers can give them to determine what their chances are of building a successful marriage.

The field of choice. Although few Americans lose faith in most elements of the romantic complex entirely, as they continue to mature and to associate with different types of people most abandon the less defensible tenets of the creed. Only the perennial adolescent insists on the same

"man of her dreams" at twenty that she vowed she must find at fourteen. She realizes that externals are comparatively unimportant, but she is likely to feel there is something wrong about weighing the character and background of prospective mates rather than relying on emotional attraction alone.

Convinced that sooner or later the right man will come along, she criticizes the girl frank and realistic enough to admit that she chooses her school, her job, and her leisure time pursuits largely with an eye to the matrimonial prospects available. But it may be a mistake to limit oneself only to chance contacts. Even in a large city—perhaps especially in a large city—a person's circle of friends is small. There is every reason to try to meet more people, particularly for the recent arrival from another city or from rural areas. Y.M.C.A.'s and Y.W.C.A.'s provide many activities for young adults of both sexes. Hobby clubs, hiking clubs, youth hostels, and church groups all further the same end. In the larger cities and on some college campuses there are carefully run "date bureaus" that match prospective dates by various characteristics. Matrimonial agencies, some discreet and some blatant, exploit the loneliness of men and women who, because of age, isolation, widowhood, or shyness find their marriage chances slim.

The sex ratio indicates that women will be more successful in finding a mate in the West, in small towns and rural areas, and in the South. The college woman's chances of marrying are somewhat lower than average, for the boys she dates on campus are likely to wait a few years to get established before marrying, and then to choose younger girls. Her independence may scare off prospects, or she may just not meet them in her job. When she does marry, however, she is more likely to be happy than the girl with less education.

Many of us, wondering what one person "sees" in another, fall back on the old cliché that "opposites attract." Like many clichés, this one is just not true (except for opposite sexes!). Social scientists find that like tends to marry like, in racial, religious, and ethnic background, in intelligence and temperament, and in general physical characteristics. Men tend to marry girls three years younger than themselves. The average age at which girls marry is 22 and for men, 24. Surprisingly enough, even in large cities many people marry someone whose home is near their own. This is less surprising when we consider that neighborhoods are usually composed of families of the same general background.

Predicting success in marriage. Among those who have studied happy and unhappy marriages are sociologists Ernest W. Burgess and Leonard S. Cottrell, working as a team, and psychologist Lewis M. Terman. Their

data can be helpful in analyzing some of the important factors in the adjustment of American middle-class couples. Their statistical findings are probably most useful in screening out the worst likely combinations and pointing out the best. Individual couples fill out the prediction schedules of Burgess and Cottrell not only when they are dubious about marriage, but also because they want to go into it with eyes wide open. When they are aware of likely points of friction, they can deal with them in an intelligent manner. Here we shall merely mention the chief conclusions of these two studies, which were in substantial agreement.

1. *People are conditioned from childhood on to be good or bad marriage risks.* Those whose parents were happily married and who had a happy childhood are more likely to succeed in marriage. A wholesome attitude toward sex must be cultivated from childhood; tendencies to frigidity or promiscuity indicate deep-seated factors that can be changed only with patient effort. Other values and standards of choice are also built into the personality from childhood on.

2. *Similarity of background eases marital adjustment.* Although biologists have found no ill effects resulting from racial intermarriage, the social difficulties that arise from such marriages in our society are enormous. International marriages are also risky, because of differences in language, cultural values, and customs and manner of living. Interfaith marriages were found to be successful by Burgess and Cottrell, but no one in their sample had been married longer than six years. It is when children come along that the parents feel both churches and both families pulling at them. Terman found this was a serious hurdle, and most social scientists agree. They point out that although a Catholic and a Protestant might agree on basic theological doctrines, their values and philosophies may be irreconcilable in the intimate relationship of marriage. The same applies to Jewish-Gentile unions. Judaism is more than a religion; it is a whole way of life, and a difficult one for the Gentile to adjust to, even when both partners have renounced their childhood faith. Only when husband and wife are exceptionally mature and tolerant and when circumstances are such that they neither feel much social disapproval nor much pressure from in-laws, do mixed marriages appear to stand much chance of success.

3. *Certain personality traits are distinctly favorable to successful marriage.* Among these the chief one is happy temperament, the "habit of happiness." Other important traits are adaptability and the ability to identify with others in a spirit of sympathy and tolerance. A positive approach to problems is also an advantage to adjustment. Those qualities that indicate emotional instability, immaturity, or neurotic tendencies are hazards to marital happiness.

4. *The sociable, conventional person is a good marriage risk.* These qualities may be tested by such facts as attendance at Sunday school and church, number of years of education, membership in several organizations, and residence in a neighborhood of single-family houses, where stability is greater than in areas of multiple-family dwellings.

5. *Similar interests and values are very important.* There should be substantial agreement on such things as the proper role for women, handling money, sexual behavior, having children, leisure time pursuits, and religion. This is one reason why social scientists advocate fairly long engagements with plenty of opportunity to observe the other person in different situations.

6. *A moderate income at marriage rather than a low or high one is associated with happiness, as is a regular work record and a degree of security.* But economic factors are given very low weight in predicting failure or success in marriage because others are regarded as more important.

7. *Age at marriage is important, largely as one indication of emotional maturity* (though many girls of 18 are more mature emotionally than others of 25) *and because older couples have probably had more time to test their compatibility.* Marriages between very young couples do not turn out as well as marriages between older couples. The best age appears to be between 21 and 25 for women and for men, nearer 30.


8. *Certain occupations also appear to be more likely to make for success in marriage than others.* Men who do not travel or do not come into contact with many other women under conditions where few social controls are operating—professors and farmers, for example—are likely to make better husbands than do traveling salesmen and actors.

9. *But what about love?* The reader may conclude from what has gone before that he should go about with a list in hand checking off prospects against all these factors and finally settling on the person with the highest score. But a person can be careful without being cold and calculating. The authors know a young college couple who were very much in love and thinking of marriage but very conscious of the importance of determining compatibility before marriage as much as possible. They filled out Burgess's prediction schedules and mailed them in. After analyzing them, Professor Burgess replied that they were likely to have a happy marriage but there was one serious lack. In answering the question, "Why do you want to marry this person?" neither one had mentioned love! We shudder to think what might have happened to the affair if one of them had given love as a reason and the other had not. As it was they laughed off their omission as stemming from college courses in which they were gravely warned against being trapped by the romantic fallacy! [6]

Even when a couple marries with everything statistically in their favor, with a long period of testing their compatibility behind them, there are many adjustments to make. They must learn to live together in the day-by-day intimacy of marriage. This learning process begins on the honeymoon, eased by the rosy glow of romance and discovery. The fact that the two are away from family and friends and usually in a very pleasant environment eases the transition from the excitement of courtship to the routine of married life.

Chief areas of adjustment. Not all honeymoons, however, are idyllic. Newlyweds sometimes find to their dismay that even sexual adjustment takes time. In fact, according to a study by Judson Landis of the time it took 409 couples married an average of 20 years to reach an adjustment in six major areas, only about 53 per cent of the couples said that they achieved a mutually satisfying sex relationship right from the start. In many cases, it took months or years to reach adjustment, and in one case out of eight such adjustment never was achieved. It took longer to adjust sexual relationships than to agree on money, social activities, in-law relationships, religious activities, and mutual friends.[7] (See Graph on page 231.)

This does not mean that almost half these couples were biologically mismated and should never have married. Biologically speaking, satisfactory sexual relations are possible between almost all couples. But the solid facts of life are the facts of the imagination, and each person approaches marriage with some convictions on what is right, proper, and necessary in sex, and some attitudes and emotions regarding it. The man may, consciously or otherwise, subscribe to the Victorian notion that women are passive and men dominant, and that his own gratification is all that matters. His wife may shrink from the relationship because she considers sex degrading and shameful, and just a necessary concession to the brutal nature of the male animal. Or she may find it unsatisfactory because he does not try to gratify her needs, which are just as real as his, although she may be slower to respond. Or dissatisfaction with the sex act may be the result of tensions in other areas, for it is impossible to separate the psychic aspect of sex from the physical. The only way to achieve a fully satisfactory sexual relationship in most marriages is to resolve conflicts in other areas first. Often a marriage counselor can help, or the couple may find the answers to puzzling questions in some of the excellent books on marriage. It is worth taking pains to achieve a satis-



Adapted from Judson T. Landis, "Length of Time Required to Achieve Adjustment in Marriage," American Sociological Review, Vol. 11, No. 6, December 1946, 668, and reproduced in Seba Eldridge, et al., Fundamentals of Sociology (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1950), p. 675.

PERCENTAGES OF 409 COUPLES REPORTING LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE MARITAL ADJUSTMENT

factory sex adjustment, for an adequate sex relationship between husband and wife is one of the most complete forms of fulfillment known to humans. It spreads over into and colors all other areas of life.

But sexual union is only one of a complicated set of relationships and activities affecting marriage. Conflict in other areas sometimes causes a marriage to fail, even though the husband and wife have reached a satisfactory sex adjustment.

The question of money takes almost as long as that of sex to adjust in most marriages. Two simply cannot live as cheaply as one. Often there is a sudden drop in the standard of living of both bride and groom. The





FEMININE ROLES

The responsible partner, the wife and mother, the gay companion—many women try to play all three roles.



General Motors; Detroit Free Press; Canada: National Film Board

manage marriage and a career, too. Many girls prepare to be nurses or teachers but expect to work only a year or two. This is often a waste of time, money, and training, for they may not work as well as they would have if they really had planned a long-term career, they may never work at all, or they may find after marriage that they cannot keep up their skills for lack of part-time employment. Americans are proud of the fact that few if any fields are closed to women; but controversy is now raging on whether colleges are doing an adequate job of preparing women for their inescapable role in the home. As one college graduate put it, she learned in college how to be a successful man, but had to learn by herself how to be a successful woman.

Clifford Kirkpatrick has neatly explained much of the confusion over the status of women by describing three possible roles in terms of privileges and obligations.

(1) The *wife-and-mother* role is the traditional role of the married woman. It implies as privileges security, the right to support, alimony in the case of divorce, respect as a wife and mother, a certain amount of domestic authority, loyalty of the husband to one who has borne him children, and a more or less sentimental gratitude from husband and children. Corresponding obligations include bearing and rearing children, making a home, rendering domestic service, loyal subordination of self to the economic interests of the husband, and acceptance of a limited range of interests and activity.

(2) The *companion* role is essentially a leisure-class phenomenon. The privileges pertaining to this role include sharing pleasures with the husband, receiving a more romantic emotional response, being the object of admiration, receiving funds adequate for dress and recreation, having leisure for social and educational activity, and the receiving of a certain amount of chivalrous attention. On the other hand, it implies as obligations, the preservation of beauty under the penalty of marital insecurity, the rendering of ego and libido satisfaction to the husband, and the cultivation of social contacts advantageous to him, the maintenance of intellectual alertness, and the responsibility for exorcising the demon of boredom.

(3) Finally, there is the *partner* role, corresponding to a new definition of the cultural situation which is gradually emerging. This entails the privileges of economic independence, equal authority in regard to family finances, acceptance as an equal, exemption from one-sided personal or domestic service to the husband, equal voice in determining locale of residence, and equality in regard to social and moral liberty. The obligation side of the balance sheet would include renouncing

alimony save in the case of dependent children, complete sharing of the legal responsibilities of the family, willingness to dispense with any appeal to chivalry, and equal responsibility to maintain the family status by success in a career.[9]

This multiplicity of roles contributes to personality conflict and marital discord in four ways. Women have difficulty in choosing which role they will play; they feel frustrated because in many ways these roles are mutually incompatible and yet they may be expected to play two or three. The young girl may have to shift roles. She may "play dumb" and act the clinging vine with men whereas actually she is a sturdy oak. Or she may be urged by her family to prepare for a career and in the same breath told to be feminine. Women may perform one role through duty or habit while yearning to play a different one. They may disagree with their husbands on which role is right for them. Finally, a woman may assume the obligations of more than one role without being given the corresponding privileges, or she may demand the privileges of a role she does not perform.

> There are women who want to be respected as mothers without bearing children, receive gratitude without earning it, have security as parasites rather than helpmates, be admired in spite of obesity and careless dress, be thought attractive in spite of ignorance and stupidity, and to receive half or more of the family income without any creation of goods or services. On the other hand, there are women who bear children, perform household drudgery, work as many hours outside the home as the husband, maintain personal charm, and demonstrate intellectual equality but who are without gratitude, security, affection, or recognition. Naturally, it is easy for husband and wife to regard the distribution of obligations and privileges from different points of view. There is reason to think that there is a disposition for women to desire the privileges of more than one role and for men to be ethically inconsistent in expecting the fulfillment of obligations in more than one role.[10]

This confusion of roles explains much marital discord and much feminine unhappiness. A *Fortune* survey in 1946 found that 25 per cent of the women questioned wished they had been born men while only 3 per cent of the men were dissatisfied with their sex.

The role of the homemaker. Biology decrees that most women must play primarily the wife and mother role, though they may at different times of their married life—or even at the same time—play the other

roles as well. (See illustration "Feminine Roles" on page 233). Adequate performance of the wife and mother role is so essential to the happiness of the home and the welfare of society that it behooves us to ask why there is so much dissatisfaction with it and what can be done about it.

First of all, the role is by no means an easy one. Even with automatic servants, much housework is just plain drudgery. The woman "knows that she is the unhired help doing the hack work of the world." [11] Ever higher standards of cleanliness keep women sighing that "there is always something that can be done." And trying to keep a clean and orderly house is often incompatible with another obligation—the care of small children. In the family with two or three small children, the mother "whether she has a fourth-grade education or a Ph.D. in philosophy, has less freedom and less leisure than anyone else in our society, . . . she works hours which have long been illegal for anyone in industry. . . . Never, even in her deepest sleep, is she entirely free from her responsibility. Consequently, a woman is almost always tired during these years, if not actually ill and this alone makes her an unhappy and unfit companion for her husband and children." [12] She is also alone, more isolated in the city than was the farm wife in the extended family, where aunts and grandmothers were often part of the household, providing adult companionship as well as willing hands. The radio, TV set, and telephone are poor substitutes for primary contacts.

Second, she has not been prepared for her role in terms of either skills or attitudes. Life in the typical middle-class small family affords little training in child care and housekeeping. Mothers often inadvertently instill in their daughters the idea that housework is menial and degrading. Either they give them the lowliest chores to do, such as dishwashing and dusting, or tell them to "run along and study," or "run along and have a good time." All through high school and college, the girl is guided toward earning a living outside the home.

Finally, the role is neither clearly defined nor, in American society, given enough respect. The very fact that one day is set aside as "Mother's Day" and on this day husbands and children make penitential offerings and women proudly tell one another of gifts and celebrations, is testimony to the fact that on the other 364 days of the year Mother does not get the appreciation that is her due. She apologetically gives her occupation as "just a housewife." "Do you work?" "No, I am just a housewife." Father indulgently asks, when he comes home and flings himself into a chair after a hard day at the office, "Well, and what have you been doing all day?" His frequent assertion that if she ran the house as efficiently as he does his business she would find it a snap is material for


comedy (when he finds himself by force of circumstance thrust into her role for just a day), but the husband's lack of appreciation of her problems is one of the reasons he may find she nags and complains.

What can be done to make this role more satisfying to women and more satisfactorily performed by them?

The role can be redefined and given greater respect in our society. "If the home is indispensable to society, then homemaking is a first-rate calling. . . .The material and psychic components of family life, seemingly of such different orders, are actually interacting and interdependent, and successful home management therefore includes the total, organized, cooperative effort to make the home function to the greatest satisfaction and best interests of all its members and of the larger social group of which it is a part." [13] One step, seemingly a minor one, would be to substitute the term "homemaker" for "housewife" as having more dignity and meaning. Schools and colleges are giving attention to training women for this role as well as for work outside the home. A number of women's magazines inculcate pride in homemaking and motherhood. The feminist emphasis on the rights of women as something to be wrested from men has left a belief that the sexes are competitive; patient re-education of both sexes is needed to impress them with the fact that the sexes are actually complementary.

Girls can be prepared for this role in both attitudes and skills. Certainly the girl who seriously wants to use her brains and talents in some other career should not be denied that opportunity, but if the role of homemaker is defined as at least as essential as that of breadwinner, then it follows that it deserves as much preparation. Courses in home economics, child psychology, and marriage and family living should stress not only the skills involved—important as these are to the home—but also the importance of an atmosphere of love and well-being. Certainly these homemakers should be trained to know what is going on in the world and to take a responsible part in it; but citizenship, like charity, begins at home.

Some progress—but very little—has been made in inventing agencies and techniques to ease the monotony and isolation of housework and child care. Cooperative nursery schools are increasingly popular. Some homemakers trade baby-sitting and even some household tasks. Some social scientists advocate the establishment of "community work centers" where mothers can meet to iron, wash, sew and mend together, while their small children play together. A common scene in campus housing projects after World War II was a young father in faded suntans hanging out the wash or taking baby out in the stroller to do the marketing. As



Reproduced by permission of L. A. Grier, Jr. from The Saturday Evening Post, May 3, 1952.

the work day is shortened, more and more fathers help with the house and children. The "partner" role can be played by men at home, too, thus giving women more time and energy to be companions.

Accommodation and release of tensions. When two personalities live together in the continuing intimacy of marriage, tensions and conflicts are almost bound to arise. Furthermore, many people use the marriage partner as a target for release of frustrations that have nothing to do with family life. (See the cartoon above.) Resentments that a man cannot

"take out on" the boss or his colleagues at work may emerge at home as snapping at his wife. She in turn may bewilder the children by turning on them with a sudden order or reprimand.

The family can, of course, serve as a "shock-absorber" by providing a place where a person feels understood and at home and need not be on his best behavior at all times. But it is a mistake to take out tensions on the family. Many families have worked out effective techniques for relieving frustration. Postponing serious discussions until after the evening meal, working on a family "woodpile" or punching bag or absorbing hobby, asking permission to excuse oneself when he is becoming overwrought, agreeing on distress signals that gently warn husband or wife that one is "touchy" all act as safety valves to prevent quarrels and blow-ups. Many young parents need to go out together more often, for "getting away from it all" helps keep tensions from piling up.

When more serious tensions arise, often the best solution is to seek help from a trained and objective marriage counselor. Some cities provide this service for families who cannot afford private counseling. Many marriages have been saved even when neither partner could see any hope for reconciliation. But prospects for happy solution of problems are best when help is sought early.

Parent-Child Relationships

When a child comes along, the marriage becomes a family. Every aspect of interaction is affected by the new roles of parents: the way they spend their time and money, their interests, their affection for each other, their time together, and especially their recreation. There is more noise, confusion, work, and expense. Many parents are totally unprepared for this; when they thought of children it was of cuddlesome and cooing babies in pink and blue nurseries, of "cute" mother-and-daughter dresses, of pals who would play football and go fishing with Dad.

Modern education does little to prepare for parenthood the young people from small families; stress is on earning a living. Financial security is regarded as the criterion of readiness for parenthood. Most young people are supremely confident that they can handle the job of parents. It is not long before they realize how totally unprepared they are to meet the lusty demands of growing children who soon present numerous problems of health, discipline, and guidance, to say nothing of demands on time and money.

This responsibility appears to weigh very heavily on modern middle-

class parents, as was pointed out previously. Many tense and anxious parents feel that they have been cheated, that they are missing something, for they have always heard that having children is one of the most rewarding experiences in life. And indeed it is. When they find it is also one of the most demanding, these individualistic, happiness-pursuing products of American culture find it difficult to retain their perspective. In too many cases they leave much of the task of socialization and care to others—in which case it may be done badly—or they may decide that "the children are all that matters." Of the self-sacrificing mothers who boast that they "live for their children" one writer has this to say:

> If the purpose of an adult human being is to rear a child or two so that those children can in turn rear children, ad infinitum, then life is unquestionably the absurd treadmill it sometimes seems. . . . How can the mother who believes she herself does not matter rear her children *for* anything? The only bearable theory is that we bring our children up to adulthood because we believe in adulthood—in its satisfactions and in the possibilities it offers for infinite growth and development.[14]

How can parents bring up their children to well-adjusted adulthood and at the same time enjoy the experience of parenthood? Psychologists and sociologists have many constructive suggestions to make, of which the following are perhaps the most important.

First of all, a good parent is himself a happy adult. He has too much respect for himself to let the child feel his own wants are paramount.

The total relationship is more important than any one aspect of it or any one technique of dealing with the child. Children develop best when they feel wanted, accepted, and loved. An atmosphere of emotional security is of utmost importance to the growing child.

Parents who accept the child as he is and let him feel they are proud of him are giving him this security. They do not "rush" him, understanding that maturation must take place before a child is ready for another step in development, and that each child develops at his own pace. The competitive atmosphere, heavy in many middle-class homes, produces neurotic tendencies.

A democratic home atmosphere is more likely than an authoritarian one to produce happy adults and responsible citizens. This does not mean that children should run the home with no restraint or repression. One of the primary lessons for the citizen of a democracy to learn is that freedom does not mean anarchy, that there are limits to what he can do (see Chapter 25). Psychologists believe that the child who is aware that there are limits to his conduct, and that his parents will let him know

clearly what those limits are and why they are there, is far more secure than the one who is allowed to do just as he pleases with no regard for others. Children should be taught to act by principle rather than impulse. That discipline is most successful which is internalized and becomes self-control.

The parent's job is to make himself progressively less necessary to the child and to help the child become progressively more independent by giving him new freedom as he shows himself to be ready for it. Qualities of great importance to this independence are consideration for others (the parents who let the child believe his wants come first are doing him no favor, for he is due for rude shocks outside the home), initiative, responsibility, and self-reliance. Parents also, whether or not they are aware of it, pass on to the child a system of values that influences his attitudes toward money, possessions, honesty, and the like.

The democratic philosophy of child rearing pays its biggest dividends in the period of adolescence, when in our society many children are confused and rebellious, many parents bewildered and dismayed. In many societies children do not suffer a stormy and uncooperative adolescence. This is in part because values hold steady from one generation to another, and because status is clearly defined, with tribal rites marking passage from one status to another. In our changing society, the confusion of values presents youth with many problems, and the fact that their role is not clearly defined in terms of privileges and obligations frustrates both them and their parents. There is no gradual easing into duties at the parent's side. Instead the teenager sees ahead years of dependence and schooling, and yet feels strong drives for ego satisfaction and sexual expression. He is told in one breath that he is old enough to do something, in the next that he is still a child. He is given considerable leeway, then is caught up short. The patterns are not clear. In urban society, parents are particularly vulnerable to the plea that "everybody does it." Only when they manage to get together and agree on rules for their adolescent children concerning hours, places where they may go, and the like, can they defend themselves against this argument and its often unpleasant consequences. Those parents are most successful who have established a habit of family agreement on important policies while leaving the youngster increasingly on his own as he shows he can handle more freedom.

Patterns of interaction. A happy family life is something that does not just happen; it must be achieved. Perhaps it happened more easily in the rural family, where pressures from the community reinforced the cooperation of the farm family in building unity and stability. Today parents

must consciously try to create family unity by establishing patterns of pleasant interaction in many situations. Mealtimes vary greatly from one family to another. They can, with conscious effort, be a pleasant interlude of relaxation and affection in the day's routine, a time for sharing ideas and experiences; or they can be hasty affairs with little aesthetic attraction and little real communication among members. "Families make family meals what they are, but it is equally true that family meals make families what they are." [15]

Another aspect of family living that both reflects and shapes the character of family members is the pattern of conversation. One family bickers most of the time, another gossips, the members of another compete for the floor so they can show off and perform, while others talk about external affairs, persons, and events, reminisce, and share thoughts and experiences. Family rituals may be almost nonexistent, or they may be part of meals, bedtimes, holidays, birthdays, and special "family evenings" such as Sunday nights with popcorn in front of the fire.

The family council is nothing new, but its form in the modern democratic family is new. Its basic implication is that "the family is a united group of interacting personalities, in which each member has his rights, roles, and responsibilities." [16] The successful family council gives its members a feeling of belonging and of status within the family group. Other aspects of family life that promote integration and personality development are entertaining and visiting, the care of household pets, and shared vacations and recreational activities.

A psychiatrist suggests that parents should take the trouble to convey to their children, by word and deed, that the pleasure of living together and having children is of greater emotional intensity than the worry about them and the responsibility and expense of having them. "In spite of the increasing speed of our existence, it is doubtful if we will prosper unless we learn the importance of pausing frequently to come in touch with each other more tenderly and wisely." [17]

The Empty Nest and Old Age

With the period of child-rearing shortened as families grow smaller, and with life expectancy lengthening, many parents find themselves in their forties or fifties with an "empty nest." This very often is a shock to the mother who has devoted years to home and children. Many of the difficulties of the menopause, doctors now believe, are associated with this loss of one role and the inability to replace it with

another and equally satisfying one. Many in-law troubles also arise from the fact that parents are unwilling to relinquish the privilege of dominating their children and want to go on "living their lives for them." The mother who has used her spare time to cultivate other interests, whether talents, hobbies, civic and women's clubs, charities, or politics, is fortunate indeed when her children no longer need her. If she has not allowed her job or professional skills to get rusty she may put them to use. At least one book on family life advocates that trained women be provided with part-time jobs during the child rearing years so that they will be happier, and benefit society by using their training.[18]

The husband-wife relationship also depends largely upon the way it was developed or neglected during the years of child-rearing. If the two drifted apart in recreational and other interests, always speaking of the time they would have to do things together later on, they may find they no longer have the same interests. The nest is empty all too soon. This should not be forgotten during the busy years of active parenthood. If it is not prepared and planned for, this period may be one of emptiness and frustration.

An increasing proportion (over 13 million) of our population are over age 65. In many respects there is inadequate provision made for the aged in our society. The emphasis on youth, which is an outgrowth of our pioneering days when youth and strength were distinct assets in the difficult task of building a new country, has prevented us from adopting a sensible attitude toward aging. We fight every wrinkle and despair over each gray hair. Employers draw the line unreasonably low, often refusing to hire women over 40 and men over 45 for many kinds of jobs, and retiring them at age 60. Students of the subject of aging insist that one man of 70 may actually be age 50 in terms of physical condition and alertness, while a man of 50 may be a decade or two older in these same terms.


The feeling that a person is too old to be useful is a distinct blow to his self-esteem. Forced retirement is so often followed by steady physical decline and death that observers think the psychological stimulus of a job is one thing that keeps people alive. The person facing retirement is in the same situation as the mother facing the empty nest. He should cultivate other interests, perhaps developing a hobby or avocation into a part-time job, or working at some civic or community project.

Family Crises and Disintegration

All families face crises. But no critical period or occasion—be it desertion or death or loss of the job or the discovery of un-

faithfulness—is exactly the same for one family as it is for another. An equation useful in understanding this variation is as follows: "A (the event) ⟶ interacting with B (the family's crisis-meeting resources) ⟶ interacting with C (the definition the family makes of the event) ⟶ produces X (the crisis)." [19]

When Mr. Brown lost his job, his family held him blameless. The family had a conference and everyone pitched in to see what he could do.



By Ida Scheib for Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 135, Broken Homes, *by George Thorman.*

FACTORS LEADING TO DIVORCE

Mother found a part-time job clerking. Big sister took care of little brother. There was no nagging, and economies were practiced cheerfully. As a result father's self-confidence remained high, and although times were bad he found another good position in two months.

Mr. Smith had the same type of job as Mr. Brown. When he lost his job a big quarrel with Mrs. Smith took place in front of the children in which Mrs. Smith said she had married a failure. Smith's anxiety was further

increased by this quarrel and the subsequent loss of face with his wife and children. He began to drink. The antagonism was reflected in a decrease in sexual relations with his wife. This family's definition of the loss of his job, added to its lack of crisis-meeting resources, intensified the tragedy of the original event and led to a major crisis in which the Smiths broke up and finally were divorced.

Divorce. Most marriages end in death or divorce. Either represents a severe crisis in the family, although in the case of divorce the crisis may have long since passed, the legal decree being merely formal recognition of it. In 1890 death and divorce together terminated 33 marriages out of 1,000; in 1948 only 31. So in a sense the family is more durable than it used to be. But in 1890 only 3 of these terminations were by divorce, while in 1948 there were 12 divorces and 19 deaths per 1,000 marriages.[20] The decrease in premature death means that the family is less likely than formerly to have to face this crisis. Not only does the increase in divorce nearly offset this gain, but also divorce in some ways is a more serious problem.

For society has organized to meet the emotional needs of the bereaved; but when divorce occurs, the emotional needs of those concerned are increased rather than met, and they are left to work out their own solutions. There is often ill will and bitterness; friends take sides; children may be fought over (in 1948, children were involved in 42 per cent of all divorce cases); and there are still those who think of any divorcee as an evil woman. Many people have religious scruples about divorce, regardless of the difficulties encountered in the marriage. Court procedures are such as to put the weight of guilt on one party. Finally, divorce is damaging to a person's self-esteem, for it is an admission of failure in an important area. Thus there are bound to be emotional scars.

Our divorce rate has increased phenomenally since 1867, almost ten times as fast as the population. There are a number of ways of computing the divorce rate, none completely satisfactory. A crude measure often used is the ratio of divorces to marriages in a given year. If the fact that rarely does a divorce dissolve a marriage within the same year is kept in mind, this index can be useful. In 1870 there was only one divorce for every 32.1 marriages; in 1900 the rate was 1 to 12.7. Just before World War II the ratio was 1 to 6. In 1946 a sharp postwar rise in the divorce rate brought the ratio to one for every 3.8 marriages. In 1951 the rate was one for every 4.2 marriages. Why is this rate so high? Many think they know the answer: "Liquor," "gambling," "other women," "lack of religion." Others look at the legal reasons for granting divorces and conclude that cruelty, desertion, and adultery are the chief causes of divorce. The legal

reasons and the real reasons, however, often have little relation to each other (because the real causes of friction are so often not the grounds on which a judge can legally grant a divorce). Nor does the rise in the divorce rate necessarily mean fewer marriages are happier now than formerly, any more than additional hospitals are an index of a decline in health.

The high divorce rate is in part the result of historic trends that have changed the functions and values of the family. In the past, many things kept even unhappy marriages together: moral and religious convictions about the evil of divorce, the social control of the extended family and neighborhood, and economic interdependence that made it difficult for either husband or wife to get along without the help of the other. All these influences have all but disappeared in urban living. The family has lost many traditional functions; today affection is the chief bond. Our individualism and the emphasis on romantic love and happiness has made us expect a high degree of personal happiness in marriage as something that just naturally should come with it. In this connection, easy divorce laws may contribute to the high rate of divorce by presenting an easy way out for those who are disillusioned with romantic love and not mature enough to realize they must work toward building a successful marriage. "The point is sometimes made that in former times, when divorce was not socially acceptable, many people suffered through life in unhappy marriages because they had no escape. That is true. It is also true that many marriages now end in divorce that formerly would have been successful. If they had no easy way out, the partners in these marriages would recognize the necessity for working through problems." [21] The fact that most divorces now occur in the second or third year of marriage bears out this argument.

What can be done about it? A noted judge, Paul Alexander of Toledo, advocates new divorce laws—not more rigid, but more human, and certainly more uniform from state to state. Present laws are wildly unrealistic. They carry the idea of blame; one party must be innocent, the other guilty. A large number of divorces actually do occur by mutual consent, but to admit this in court would invalidate the divorce. "Disagreeing disagreeably is all right, agreeably is illegal." [22] Positive measures would include establishing a family court much like modern juvenile courts, with special judges trained in family problems who would try to give advice or direct quarreling couples to marriage counselors. Instead of labeling a case "John Doe versus Mary Doe," Judge Alexander would call it "In the Interest of the John Doe Family."

But even the best of divorce laws treat the symptoms rather than the basic causes of divorce. "The big problem is not to keep people who want divorce from getting it but to keep more people from wanting it." [23]

Our society needs a new philosophy of marriage. If affection is to continue to be the chief bond holding families together, then we must train people to choose their mates more carefully, to expect no more from marriage than they are willing to put into it, and to replace the absurd tenets of love at first sight and of romantic ecstasy as the criterion of marital success with more realistic values. This would in no way rob courtship and marriage of their beauty; in fact it would add new meaning to both. But of course, all this is a large order in our culture, dominated as it is by the notion of individual happiness. Education for successful marriage begins in infancy. Upon the success of today's families depends the success of those established a generation hence.

Future of the Family

The future is far from bleak. People still enter marriage with the idea that it will last. Americans believe in marriage as completely as they believe in anything. More Americans are marrying than ever before and are marrying younger than ever. College students want more children when they marry than did college students before World War II. Social scientists are looking into the causes of happiness and unhappiness in marriage. Twenty years ago this wasn't considered respectable. In the long run there is good reason to hope that marriages will be better adjusted than they are now, although this does not necessarily mean that divorce will decrease.

We know that marriage and family living will continue to change, just as everything changes, but if the social scientist can make any long-range prediction he can predict that marriage and the family will continue to exist as long as man exists. "In the Götterdämerung which over-wise science and over-foolish statesmanship are preparing for us, the last man will spend his last hours searching for his wife and child." [24]

15

EDUCATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

Education is a common topic of conversation in America. Most people have some knowledge of the educational system and many feel free to speak with authority about it. Such discussions usually assume that a particular type of education is the standard for all societies as well as for an individual's own community. To correct this misconception, we shall consider the nature of education in general and make some brief comparisons between education as we know it in America and as it functions in other societies.

In a broad sense, *education* is the process by which any society transmits to its new members the expected ways of behavior. Through education, society is able to perpetuate its particular beliefs, values, and skills—in short, its culture. In a primitive agricultural society, these would include the value of land and tools, beliefs about the proper ways to farm, and the skills involved in planting and harvesting particular crops. They


might also include a wide range of beliefs about the usefulness of a particular crop. In a modern industrial society, the values, beliefs, and skills would, of course, be different from those of an agricultural society.


A certain degree of stability is maintained in every society by transmitting to each new generation the proper manners, language, and a multitude of culturally approved habits. In some societies, the degree of stability is very high, and values, beliefs, and skills are handed on from generation to generation practically unmodified. In other societies, such as our own, a great deal of change occurs from one generation to another. In our society, there is no fixed pattern nor universal agreement with regard to what the educational system shall transmit from one period to another. In spite of the change, however, there is always a basic core of values, beliefs, and habits that adult members of the society expect the children to acquire. Women's dress and hair styles change rapidly, but every girl is taught to wear clothes and comb her hair.

These basic values and beliefs cover a wide variety of social phenomena. Generally they include some knowledge of the family, the economic system, government or the system of social control, religious beliefs, and the norms of interaction between the sexes, between adults and children, and between persons in different status positions. Thus, in our society every child is expected to learn about the proper roles of males and females, husbands and wives, and parents in relation to children. Every child also learns that the position of the doctor or the minister is different from that of the factory laborer and that different positions are accorded greater or less power and prestige. A whole set of beliefs about property, contracts, the value of work, and many other areas of behavior are also gradually acquired.

When education is viewed in this broad sense, it is essentially synonymous with the socialization process. It includes teaching and learning any behavior that inducts the child into group membership. It is the cultural process through which the newborn child becomes a member of his society. This is not a process that ends at a particular time, however. It begins when the child adjusts to a family feeding or sleeping schedule. It continues as long as the individual functions in the group.

Although this process is common to every society, there are many variations in the social mechanisms through which it is accomplished. In many societies, no formal system of education can be identified. The Manus of New Guinea, for example, do not teach children specific aspects of the culture. The children are expected to learn for themselves. Approval and disapproval may be used to force them to learn, but unlike our own society, there is no conscious or planned attempt to teach any-





British Information Service; Inland Steel

A WORLD-WIDE PHENOMENON

As the urban trend influences societies all over the world, formal education becomes increasingly important. Children of the cattle-owning Masai tribe in Kenya, Africa, are being taught Swahili, a language widely spoken in Africa. In Jamshedpur, India, a steel-worker teaches adult education classes.

one. In Chapter 2, we also saw that the San Blas Cuna had no formal educational system until it was imposed on them by the Panamanian government.

In the United States and many other highly industrialized societies, specific institutions, the schools, have been organized to carry on a part of the educational process. It must be recognized, however, that even here most of the child's learning is acquired in social situations outside the school. The child learns to walk, talk, eat, and dress himself, and acquires a multitude of other skills as well as most of his beliefs and important values in the family or immediate neighborhood play group. Still other elements and values are acquired through mass communication and secondary group contacts. No attempt is made here to evaluate the relative importance of these in the total educational process. It seems clear, however, that a large share of the socialization process occurs outside the school. In societies that have not instituted a formal educational system, all education occurs amid such relationships.

This emphasizes the fact that all education is a social process. It always involves interaction between a teacher and a pupil even though they are not identified as teachers and pupils in many cases. The roles may be continually shifted; the teacher of one instance may in another become the pupil, but in any case communication or interaction between persons is the medium through which education occurs.

Although we recognize that education in the broad sense is almost synonymous with socialization, this is not the American notion of education. In America, education refers to schools and the behavior that teachers attempt to communicate to youth in the school situation. In the remainder of this chapter, we turn our attention to this portion of the American educational process.

The Formal American Educational System

Americans place great value on education, on the instruction of youth in schools. But there are great variations in the type of education advocated by different segments of the population. These differences, in part at least, stem from the rather diverse and conflicting origins of our educational system.

Early development of education. In its earliest form, education in formal schools in America was designed primarily for the training of ministers and children of the upper classes. The English class system im-

ported into the American colonies recognized sharp differences between the educated or aristocratic class and the masses of farmers and laborers. Although the early grammar schools did not explicitly exclude the children of lower classes, the cost and social barriers prohibited all except a very select few from attending. The college programs were dominated by English traditions of classical learning. Their purpose was to train clergymen and provide a genteel classical education for the sons of aristocratic families.

The only early foundation for mass education in America was the requirement that children of the poor learn acceptable and valuable trades through apprenticeships. Families also were encouraged to teach their sons and daughters the rudiments of reading and arithmetic. Edwards and Richey summarize our European educational inheritance as follows:


> From England, then, and to some extent from the continent of Europe, the colonists inherited a class system of social arrangements and an educational system which reflected those arrangements. In the colonies, as in the old world, secondary and higher education served primarily the needs of a small directive class. Schools concerned with the teaching of reading and writing in English were primarily terminal schools for the masses. They were designed to teach the children of the common people to read, to grasp the principles of some religious sect and to socialize youth in terms of the existing principles of social organizations.[1]

They then go on to add:

> A democratic school system in America was neither an inheritance, nor as often supposed, a gift of Puritan New England. It has been an achievement, perhaps the most significant cultural achievement, of the American people. It springs from, and is part of, the democratic way of life. Through the centuries it has taken its form and expanded its purposes to meet the needs of an evolving democracy.[2]

Thus we see that our system of mass education has developed in a peculiarly American fashion. Training in religious and practical skills has played its part, but other forces have also influenced the growth of modern American education.

In the period between the American Revolution and the Civil War, a great movement toward a democratic social structure occurred. In this period, exponents of public education for all children became numerous and vocal. Some people even went as far as to advocate that the federal government should provide for general education throughout the states, although they were never able to gain widespread acceptance of their



Data from the Biennial Survey of Education, *U. S. Office of Education.*

GROWTH IN EDUCATION

This chart shows growth in enrollment and in average daily school attendance among children 5-17 years of age, 1870-1950.

view. Since the Constitution had not included public education as within the province of the federal government, provision for it had come to be regarded as an accepted function of state governments. As early as 1799, Thomas Jefferson had proposed to the Virginia Assembly a bill for the more general diffusion of knowledge that provided for state support of education in all the counties. Although the measure was not passed, the seed had been planted. The idea of state encouragement and support of education gradually gained acceptance until by the end of the nineteenth century elementary schools were almost universally provided by the

states. It was not until the present century, however, that the great influx of students into public elementary and secondary schools occurred.

Belief in education. Average daily school attendance among children 5 to 17 years of age in the United States in the past eight decades has grown tremendously. Today almost all children in this age group attend formal schools during most of the year as compared to about 57 per cent in 1870. The great growth in mass education at elementary, secondary, and higher educational levels demonstrates that Americans have great faith in formal education. Education is believed to be good for almost any child or adult who can attend formal school programs. It is not clear, however, just what Americans expect from education or believe education should do for the student.

Varied expectations: The question of religious teaching. Different groups have different ideas concerning the role education should play in our society. A brief examination of two or three issues on the American educational scene will demonstrate several levels of disagreement. One important issue involves the teaching of religion in the public schools. This conflict stems in part from the religious character of early public education, particularly in New England where religious instruction was an integral part of the school curriculum and colleges were, as already mentioned, charged primarily with training ministers. This New England tradition is reflected in the current demand for religious instruction in the schools and in the extensive organization of parochial schools by Catholic, Lutheran, and other religious groups.

The New England system remained feasible, however, only as long as a community remained religiously homogeneous. In towns or cities where everyone practiced the same religion, none would object to religious instruction, narrowly sectarian though it might be. But as new religious denominations and sects appeared, the system had to be abandoned. The schools were physically incapable of offering instruction in all faiths, and to have taught one or a few at the expense of others would have alienated those whose religion had been slighted. The state-supported schools that developed in the nineteenth century were therefore non-sectarian. But the question remains: Should it be the duty of the schools to offer religious instruction? Many Americans regard Bible teaching and moral instruction as essential and necessary adjuncts of the regular school curriculum; and the church and religious leaders maintain close watch on the school programs, expecting them to conform with certain fundamental moral precepts they believe to be important. But what Bible should be used—Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish version? Who should

have the final word on what constitutes "our most fundamental moral precepts?"


In recent years, the "released time" method of offering religious instruction in schools has become very popular. Under this system, pupils have been excused from school to attend religious instruction in some church or other building, instruction being given by ministers or by teachers provided by the various denominations. Children whose parents object to the arrangement remain in the school. This plan was ruled unconstitutional in 1948 by the Supreme Court in the famous McCollum case, but in this instance instruction was actually given in the school itself. More recently, in New York, religious instruction that was given under the same circumstances but outside the confines of the school was upheld by the Court.

Varied expectations: Academic versus vocational training. Another controversy exists between the proponents of the traditional academic curriculum and those who wish a more varied and practical school program. To some extent, this difference in opinion arises from the early differences that distinguished the "classical" education provided for the children of the upper class from the apprentice training offered to lower-class youths. Parents in the higher strata of society are less concerned with vocational training in the elementary and secondary schools. It is taken for granted that their children will receive such training in college or professional schools. Upper-class parents generally do not object to vocational training for lower-class youth, but for their own children they demand concentration on the basic skills—reading, writing, and arithmetic—as a foundation for higher education. Along with this, they demand training in languages, history, and other subjects that are considered essential preparation for college.

It does not follow from this that the lower classes are vocal opponents of the traditional school program. Rather, they regard education in a different light from the upper classes. The majority of lower-class children will begin working immediately after leaving high school, some perhaps even earlier. Thus, their parents are somewhat less concerned with academic subjects and more with vocational and technical training that will prepare their children for some trade.

The difference in educational values and expectations among higher and lower status families illustrates the varied demands that Americans make on public education. It does not indicate that any class is opposed to public education, but rather that the different classes approach the problem from the standpoint of their own particular interests and expectations.

Varied expectations: The role of the school in social change. Many people also look differently upon the schools' function as an agent of social change. We noted at the beginning of this chapter that education is essentially the process of transmitting the cultural heritage to the new generation. In highly homogeneous and stable societies, this function is rarely the subject of different interpretations. The rural farm neighborhood of a few decades ago was characterized by a homogeneous set of beliefs and behavior patterns. The local school teacher knew intimately the values and the beliefs of the entire social group and usually had been




By permission, George Baker and the Detroit News

conditioned to accept them. In this type of society, the school was a fully integrated part of the neighborhood socialization or cultural transmission process. No one suggested that it should attempt to change the society.

The situation is different in an urban industrialized society. Here diversified cultural traditions and patterns flourish side by side. Competing attitudes and beliefs seek to become the established way. In such a situation, it is inevitable that people will develop different attitudes regarding the role that schools should play in society. Many will expect them to preserve the traditional ways. Some will expect the schools to preach defiance of the existing social system. Others will look upon the schools

as an agency of social change. Note the following comments of an automobile mechanic to a new school board member:

> It don't make much difference about me, but I want my kids to have the chance I missed. I wouldn't want to live in the big city, except only so that my boy could get a free college education which he can't get here. But what he learns in high school is good stuff. He can talk about things that I can't hardly understand. The future for us is in our kids. I hear they want to cut down on the schools. Don't let them do it. Maybe the education they are getting won't straighten out everything in the world, but if they can think clear, that'll be a big part of the battle for something better than we have had in the last few years.[3]



From Report No. 21, National Opinion Research Center, University of Denver, 1944, 14.

THE PUBLIC LOOKS AT EDUCATION

Responses of a national sample to the question, "What is the most important thing children should get from their education?" expressed in percentages.

Accepted functions of the school. In spite of these and other differences, most Americans agree on some educational practices and goals. Perhaps the largest core of agreement is found in the belief that the schools should teach the basic *skills* in one way or another. It will be noted from the bar graph above that 34 per cent of a national sample indicated that mastery of subjects such as reading, arithmetic, history, and science was the most important thing children could get from their education. Most others considered it important, but did not place this category first. There are few if any, however, who would not include such training as important, even though they might disagree on methods of teaching.

The same poll indicated that a similar proportion felt the most important thing the schools could contribute was character building. This probably means training in the moral codes or norms such as honesty, integrity, and other values thought essential by our society. Here again, most consider training of this kind highly desirable, if not most important.

Third in importance in this poll was vocational training. Most people expect such education to be given at one level or another. Some want it in the secondary schools; others would postpone it until college or professional school.

These three areas represent a common core of expectations that Americans share in regard to education. How such training is to be best accomplished and what else is to be included in the list is another aspect of the question. It is not likely, however, that a universally acceptable educational program could ever be designed for a heterogeneous and changing society. In communities of this sort, the school program of necessity will vary from classroom to classroom and from generation to generation to satisfy the needs of the many separate groups represented.

Education and Other Social Institutions

In the past, it was fairly common to regard the schools as being independent of and separate from the communities in which they existed. Some educators, no doubt, encouraged this separation for it relieved them of many day-to-day problems and activities. Today, however, most teachers and school administrators seek to relate the school as much as possible to the ongoing community functions. The new approach sees the schools not as something divorced from the community but as an actual part of it. The community with all its institutions is a kind of laboratory offering immediate and practical problems with which the school may deal. It was almost inevitable that such a development would take place. At no time in its history has American education been in any sense free of influence or independent of other social institutions.

Government and education. In most societies where education is the function of a specially designated organization, the governmental authorities control it. By virtue of the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the states all powers not delegated to the federal government, the control and administration of education in the United States has become a

state function. The state administers tax funds and sets standards for the schools.

Immediate control is vested in a local school board or other local officials organized and elected in different ways. Because they elect the school board, are aware that in many school districts most of the public money goes for schools, and because most have children in the public schools at one time or another, Americans feel that what the school teaches should meet with their approval. Not only through their votes, but also through pressure on the school board and teachers by such agencies as churches and veterans', manufacturers', and farmers' organizations, they try to influence the educational process.

In many cases, parents who are taxed for public schools prefer to send their children to private or parochial schools where they can exercise close control over their social contacts or their religious training. Such schools are subject to state regulation concerning teacher qualifications, curricula, and the like. All states require that children attend school up to a certain age, which varies from 14 to 18 but in most states is set at 16.

Relation of economic institutions to education. Many corporations, labor unions, and other bodies with essentially economic functions, such as farm organizations, carry on continuous educational programs. These organizations usually are interested in trying to enlist popular support for the positions they take on various matters. They have at their disposal all the media of mass communication—radio, television, newspapers, and the like.

In addition, many groups seek to influence and modify the educational programs of the schools. This may be done by providing movies, slides, books, or other materials or by exercising direct pressure on the school program. In other cases, such economic groups may try to influence school boards, teachers, and school administrations by personal persuasion.

Certainly most teachers recognize that their position is endangered if they teach values and beliefs contrary to the ones that underlie and support the economic system. The values of private property, hard work, and individual initiative, which are basic to the American economic system, are constantly reiterated in American schools. This is not to say that teachers and school people do not support these beliefs; it merely indicates the close relationship between the program of the school and the economic system. Teachers are probably more vocal exponents of our basic economic values than most any other group. It must be recognized, however, that not all people agree on the way our economic system can be most efficiently run. The schools frequently become, therefore, the targets of contradictory demands from different economic pressure groups.





Detroit Public Schools

LEARNING BY DOING

From traffic safety in kindergarten to home and family living in high school, the urban educational system is at many points closely related to other social institutions.

Relation of the family to the schools. When America was almost exclusively a rural society, education was primarily a family or neighborhood function. Fathers taught their sons the basic skills of agricultural production and farm management. Mothers instructed their daughters in cooking, baking, sewing, and general home management. The children learned by observation and through day-to-day experiences within the family and were conditioned to the neighborhood values and in the roles they would be expected to assume as adults. The "little red schoolhouse" was simply an extension of the family circle. The teacher supplemented the home training with instruction in the basic skills—reading, writing, and arithmetic, and perhaps some geography and history—and with added advice on the proper manners and customs of the neighborhood. The school was primarily a neighborhood organization with close ties to the students' families. The teacher "boarded around" with local families if he was not a native of the neighborhood. This "neighborhood school" can still be found in some parts of America. But on the whole the situation is very different today, with many other educational functions previously performed in the home now assigned to the school.

Children no longer learn occupational skills from their parents. Boys in a modern city seldom associate with their fathers on the job. Many have little or no knowledge of their fathers' occupational duties. To a lesser extent, the same is true of the mother-daughter relationship. Daughters still learn some housekeeping skills from their mothers, but the school does not take this for granted, and offers classes in homemaking. Many mothers are employed outside the home, but do not pass on to their daughters the skills needed in office, store, or factory. As a result, the demand that schools provide some vocational training has been increasing over the past years. Not only do the high schools of a typical large city offer "commercial" courses and shop or manual training, but many also list courses in occupational and social skills such as pre-flight training, automobile driving, radio broadcasting, social dancing, watercolor painting, modern languages, baby sitting, and numerous other special fields.

The decrease in continuous family interaction as it occurred on the farm has also resulted in the transfer of many other educational functions to the school. Training in the moral codes that the family and community accept—character education—is, as we have already noted, believed by many Americans to be one of the most important functions the school has to perform. Many educators, in fact, think too many parents rely entirely on the schools for character education.

The increasingly longer school year and the extension of compulsory education to both older and younger age groups is associated with the

changing family structure in American society. The school becomes an agency to teach those things that society can no longer be sure will be taught in the home or neighborhood. This is known as the residual function of education.

On occasion, of course, there are differences in the values and skills taught at home and those taught in the school. Teachers may find language habits learned at home very hard to change. Training in community mores often falls on deaf ears if no start has been made at home. Parents may be amused or dismayed by some of the things on which their children cite the teacher's word as law, from correcting Dad's grammar to contradicting pet notions about health and hygiene, or in rare cases reporting teachings that the parents feel are contrary to sound economic or moral beliefs.

Social Class and Education

In Chapter 10 we analyzed the stratification of American society and noted the nature of its social classes. Much evidence has been gathered to prove that school attendance and school experiences are associated with the class position of the family. Children of lower-class families are more likely to drop out of school soon after reaching the compulsory age limit than are children from middle- or upper-class families. When middle- or upper-class youth fail to complete high school and forego a college education, a loss of status is likely unless an acceptable reason is provided for the failure. Children of middle- or upper-class families are given every possible encouragement and assistance to get as much education as possible. The correlation between level of school attendance and other criteria of social class is so high that "school years completed" is frequently used as an index of social class position.

The difference in school attendance among children of different social class groups is not entirely the result of economic conditions, although the need for additional family income and the cost of education are factors. Lower-class families in America believe education is good, but it is not absolutely essential in their minds. Higher-status families, on the other hand, consider it a disgrace if their children do not complete high school and go on to college. School curricula and other school programs are generally more oriented to the interests and demands of middle- and upper-class families than to the lower classes. The type of English usage expected, the manners, and the required school subjects are all essentially middle-class. Lower-class children are therefore less able to adjust to the

secondary-school environment. They do not value school attendance as highly as the upper classes because it does not fit the expectations of the social group with which they associate.

Social class and curriculum. Some effort has been made to adapt the school program to the interests of lower-class youth. Vocational training and the adoption of general curricula are steps in this direction. Undoubtedly this differentiation in school programs has been a factor in the increasing level of school attendance. But at the same time this development serves to intensify the differences between higher- and lower-status youth. Upper- or middle-class children are enrolled in the academic or college preparatory curricula in a much higher proportion than are the children of lower-class families. The vocational curriculum is known as lower-class education while the college preparatory course has higher status. Dwell for a moment on the comments of an Elmtown senior.

> If you take the college preparatory course, you're better than those who take the general course. Those who take the general course are neither here nor there. If you take the commercial course, you don't rate. It's a funny thing, those who take college preparatory set themselves up as better than the other kids. Those that take the college preparatory course run the place. I remember when I was a freshman, Mother wanted me to take home economics, but I didn't want to. I knew I couldn't rate. You could take typing and shorthand and still rate, if you took a straight commercial course, you couldn't rate.
>
> You see you're rated by the teacher according to the course you take. They rate you in the first six weeks. The teachers get together and talk, and if you're not in a college preparatory, you haven't got a chance.[4]

This student recognizes the tendency to stratify youth in terms of their high-school program. To the extent that the class affiliation of high-school years is continued into adult life, the high school assists in stratifying the community. Children from varying social strata are provided different socializing experiences that further distinguish them from one another.

It is also clear from this that a student feels his academic aptitude and grades are related to class position. Hollingshead found school grades in Elmtown closely correlated with a family's class position. It is not likely that teachers knowingly make such distinctions. Rather, higher-class youth are more likely to do well in skills and learning considered important in most secondary schools. Such differentiation is less likely to occur at the elementary level.

Social class and school activities. Just as there is evidence of differentiation in the formal school curriculum, so there are class differences in

out-of-class school activities. Some activities such as band, orchestra, and other musical organizations commonly attract more middle- and upper-class boys and girls than lower-class children, and children of higher social status are more likely to participate in such activities as student government, school newspapers, yearbooks, and other related activities. It is commonly assumed that athletics cuts across social classes more than other out-of-class activities. But some studies indicate a disproportionate share of our high-school athletes come from middle- or upper-class families. Youmans found a significantly higher proportion of Michigan twelfth-grade boys from white-collar families participating in athletics than of twelfth-graders from manual worker and farm families.[5] It is well known that some lower-class boys who excel in athletics achieve higher status through this activity. But in Michigan, and perhaps in other states, white-collar seniors are more likely to participate in athletics than their classmates from lower social strata. No doubt a partial explanation is that lower-class youths often have part-time jobs.

Every student body includes many friendship or clique groups. Both in and out of school, boys and girls concentrate their associations on a small circle of friends. Most members of a "crowd" that runs around together tend to come from the same or almost the same social strata of the community. Higher-status youth are generally aware of their parents' objection to association with boys or girls from the "wrong crowd." Girls and their parents seem to be more sensitive to class differences among their associates than are boys. This applies to dating relationships as well as to clique and friendship situations.

Although many aspects of school society are related to the community's class structure, the school provides the means by which some youths are able to change their social class position. The lower-class boy or girl who excels in school activities both in and out of the classroom may achieve higher status in the community. Teachers generally are anxious to help and encourage such youths. Often the interest and encouragement of a sympathetic teacher motivate a capable lower-class student to achieve higher status.


In most European countries, the relationship between education and class position is even more noticeable than in America. Students are selected early in their elementary-school career for different types of training. Upper-class youths are channeled into an educational program that will prepare them for a position in government or one of the professions, while lower-class youths are generally directed to vocational training schools. In England, as well as in other European countries, the selection is increasingly made on the basis of objective examinations. This does not, however, guarantee lower-class youth the same opportunity for edu-

cation. The selective examinations are geared to those subjects and academic skills in which upper-class children are more likely to excel. Lower-class children have neither opportunity nor motivation to learn the sort of things necessary to enter college preparatory or related academic curricula.

As we noted in Chapter 10, Americans frequently see education as the guarantor of an open-class democratic society, and indeed, education is a primary means of achieving higher status. It is clear from our discussion, however, that to some extent our educational system tends to perpetuate the existing social structure and to assist other agencies in the stratification of youth. Certainly it does occasionally provide opportunity for youth to move from one stratum to another, but, at the same time, it acts as a barrier to many more.

Socialization in American schools. We have noted that Americans expect different things from education, and that children from the various social strata have decidedly different experiences in the schools. Some educators have sought an educational program that would provide all youth with essentially the same education. The urban and segmentalized character of our contemporary society, however, makes this a difficult task. Nor do all educators agree that standardized education is desirable or possible. Certainly the schools should provide some common core of basic skills and cultural values, but there are too many differences among children insofar as aptitudes, interests, and abilities are concerned to think that one curriculum could ever be devised to meet the needs of all.

Many other things make it impossible to standardize American education beyond a certain point. The most important factor is the changing and heterogeneous nature of our society. Varied needs and expectations necessitate different types of educational programs.[6] Neither teachers nor parents know what experiences will best prepare our youth to live in a rapidly changing and complex world. But almost everyone is agreed that such preparation is a prime function of the schools.



Detroit Free Press; British Information Service; Inland Steel

The same is true for all other cultures. Life in the great subcontinent of India is incomprehensible to us without some knowledge of Indian religious concepts. The miracle of Gandhi, for example, will remain concealed from a Westerner who has not read deeply from the *Bhagavad-Gita* and other sacred devotional scriptures of the Indians. And the unique place that the Emperor holds in the affection and esteem of the Japanese people cannot be understood unless we know something of Shintoism, the national religion of Japan.

Because of its universality, "religion" is a most difficult word to define. And since we are approaching the question of religion only from the standpoint of its social significance, our definition must be quite limited in scope. We are attempting to understand the part played by religion in man's social life. Therefore, religion is here defined not in theological terms but in sociological terms. Sociologically defined, religion is one of the great institutions of mankind. It is part of the universal culture pattern. *It is the institution through which individuals and groups in every culture formulate systems of belief and faith concerning the fundamental meaning of life and practice certain rituals and ceremonies associated with these beliefs.*

The Social Functions of Religion

All institutions are functional. That is, they serve certain fundamental needs of human beings. An institution that no longer satisfied any human needs would cease to exist. Thus, when we find an institution that has flourished in some form throughout human history, we may safely infer that it has satisfied and still satisfies human needs. In other words, it functions. This is not to claim that these needs may not be mistaken, or that they cannot be satisfied in any other way, or that time and history do not alter them, or that they are bound always to exist, or that all persons experience these needs or if they do, experience them similarly or with equal intensity. All that is claimed is that these needs have evidently been felt in all ages by great numbers and that they have been and are more or less satisfied by religion. This is a sound, scientifically demonstrable fact.

Thus, the first question before us is this: What are the functions of religion? What human needs does it satisfy? To make any effective or meaningful answer we must seek to discover, if we can, the fundamental characteristics, the so-called common denominators, of all religions, under

whatever guises religions flourish or have flourished. These common denominators must be present in the religions of all peoples.

Careful investigation has revealed that religion deals in all ages and among all peoples with certain basic questions that human beings have felt the need to try and answer. Their efforts have varied greatly, running the gamut from very simple nature myths to the profundity and erudition of great theologians and philosophers. In our day, some questions, which were at one time answered entirely by religious myth, are now answered in part by science. Thus we see that it is the questions rather than the answers that we must study, because it is only the questions that always express the needs and remain practically the same, while the answers change or are now given by science.

What, then, are the questions that mankind longs to answer? Note that we now speak in the present tense, because in spite of scientific findings mankind today longs for some of the answers as much or more than ever. One of the world's leading novelists, Arthur Koestler, has recently written a book, *The Age of Longing,* which is rather grim and terrible. He gives no answers, but he makes crystal clear that modern men and women are still asking some of the same old questions in an agony of spirit and with an intense longing for satisfying answers.

The questions can be divided into three categories. First, man has apparently always believed in some final reality much greater than himself and of which he himself is only a part. He has always sought after this reality and has applied to it various names such as spirits, gods, the great spirit, the one true god, and the like. (To cover all such concepts we shall at times use the term *Numen,* which may be applied equally to the Christian concept of God or to the god concepts of an African pigmy.) Man has always sought the answers to questions about the *nature of the Numen* (or final reality), its power, its characteristics, its existence, and its relationship to the universe, to our world, and to human beings.

The second category consists of questions about the *nature and destiny of man.* What is man's place in the universe? What is his significance? Whence did he come? Whither is he bound? What is his relationship to other men?

The third category concerns questions that deal with the *nature of the universe,* its creation, its parts, its relationship to the Numen.

In answering these questions, religion has dealt with those departments of knowledge, speculation, and scientific investigation that we now subdivide into such subjects as theology, philosophy, anthropology, psychology, biology, chemistry, and physics. Because all speculations, all answers to these questions, were at first given in religious terms, we sometimes

speak of religion as the mother of philosophy and science. To illustrate, let us refer to the Bible, although other sacred writings also could be used.

In Genesis I: 1-31, are found some answers given by Hebrew writers to the three important sets of questions. The Numen is called God. He is the creator of the universe and all its parts. He is that reality that transcends all else. All life derives from Him. Man came from Him, created in His own image. "He breathed into man the breath of life and man became a living soul." To man, He gave dominion over all other forms of life. Man's place in the universe was thus established and took on significance and meaning.

There is another very important statement contained in this section of the Bible. God looked upon His creation and called it "good." The influence of this pronouncement upon the Western World has been profound. It has imparted a strong quality of faith, optimism, and perfectionism to our religious and philosophical concepts in spite of other predominantly sombre and pessimistic beliefs that distinguish much of our theology. From this belief in the goodness of God's creation has sprung the idea of redemption, redemption not only in the religious sense of ultimate deliverance from sin, but also in the social sense of eventually guaranteeing more of the fruits of this life to greater numbers of people. So strong has our faith and hope become that at times we seem overly optimistic; we are certain that "progress," for example, is good, but we are not quite sure just what the word means.

Religion and Social Values

The statement has been made that the religion of a people embodies the final meanings that sustain their lives and on which they build all other meanings and relationships. Let us see if we can make sense out of this insofar as our own fundamental values are concerned. We have fought two great wars, and are now involved in a world-wide struggle with communism. Of course, many things are involved in the contest—nationalism, economics, political power, personal ambitions, and the like. But just what is basic in all this terrible struggle? For us, it is the preservation of our ideals of political democracy—the dignity of human beings, the essential equality of men. The roots of these ideas can be traced back to our Judaic-Christian heritage. Early Hebrew and Christian scribes had much to say about God—and His relationship to man. Before God, all men are equal. God is a father, mankind His children.

God is a god of love, to whom each human soul is of inestimable value. If this is true, men are related one to another as brothers. This idea, working through the centuries, led eventually to the idea of the equality of man. If God values each person of and by himself, then the individual has dignity and meaning.

The concept of the equality of individuals was reinforced by the idea of man's responsibility for his fellow men. Let us take as an example the story of Cain and Abel. Cain slew Abel. The blood of Abel cried up from the ground and God heard the cry. And God said to Cain, "Where is thy brother Abel?" And Cain cried out, "Am I my brother's keeper?" God's answer was clear—"Yes!" It was inevitable that these early religious concepts would eventually find their way into politics, economics, and morals.

Religion and Other Institutions

Throughout history, religion has interacted with other institutions. The family has, in most cultures, been hedged about with religious significance. The great events of life such as birth, puberty, marriage, and death have usually been marked by religious ceremony and meaning.

The same may be said about economic institutions. When man in nonliterate and folk societies tended his herds or sowed seed, it was not just an economic undertaking; it was a religious act. The gods were appeased and thanked. Our Thanksgiving really had its beginnings thousands of years ago. The gathering of the harvest and its bounty depended upon the beneficence of the Numen. Today, the influence of religion still pervades economic affairs. Some of our beliefs and attitudes about money, profits, and labor can be explained adequately only in connection with the Protestant ethic (see Chapter 19). Similarly the economy of India reflects Hindu beliefs.

Political institutions also have been closely associated with religious institutions throughout history. The idea of separation between church and state is a fairly recent development. The chieftain or the king at first acted either as an intermediary between gods and people or was himself regarded as a god. In ancient Babylon and in other early centers of civilizations, the kings were vested not only with political powers, but also carried out religious rites as priests. Religion was tribal or national during the greater part of human history. But the constant diffusion of religious ideas finally brought about the birth of the world religions of

today. We call them universal religions because they spread across the boundaries of states and races.

Religious Diffusion

When one tribe or nation conquered another, the religion of each immediately reflected the political change. Either the gods of the conquered people were succeeded by the gods of the conquerors, or a blending of the two religions occurred and a new pantheon or family of gods was established.

An interesting example of diffusion is seen in the history of the adoration of the Virgin in Christianity. When Christianity entered Europe, it came in as a small Jewish sect. Over a period of centuries it gradually spread, in spite of persecutions and great political upheavals, until it became the officially recognized religion of the Roman Empire. During this long period of development, while doctrines and organization were constantly building up, Christianity met and absorbed or destroyed a great variety of so-called pagan religions. These religions often centered about one great goddess who was regarded as the mother and guardian of life. There were, for example, Isis, the Egyptian goddess of life and fertility; Ishtar, her Asian counterpart; Athena, the Greek goddess of wisdom; and Diana, the Roman goddess of the wood and helper of women at childbirth.

Mary was the Mother of Jesus. As time passed Christian doctrine came more and more to emphasize her motherhood, with all its implications of love, tenderness, and life-giving qualities. She was referred to as Queen of Heaven, Our Lady, and Holy Virgin. She became an interceder at the throne of God, a protector, an embodiment of human kindness and mercy raised to divine heights. As Christianity superseded pagan religions, so Mary superseded the pagan goddesses. The local goddess became the local Virgin, or Madonna, so to speak. To the simple peasant, the Holy Virgin is often identified with his neighborhood. He carries her image in the religious procession. She is his Madonna and belongs very much to the locale. To him, fine-spun theological arguments mean nothing. When you visit some local shrine dedicated to the Virgin in Europe or in Mexico, you cannot escape the very obvious history before your eyes. Here once reigned a local goddess to whom men and women offered prayer and sacrifice. Mary, the Mother of God, entered and conquered. The old goddess was forsaken; her very name has been forgotten; and the human needs she formerly satisfied are now carried to the Virgin for fulfillment.

Thus throughout history countless gods and goddesses have perished. Complicated religious ceremonies have vanished with the tribes that sustained them and were sustained by them. Religious ideas and rites have blended, or have been exterminated by war and conquest. Often all that remains are the ruins of the temples where the religious rites were practiced. Angkor, Karnak, the Acropolis, and the Pyramids stand as great monuments to dead religions that perished with the tribes and nations of which they were a part.

The World Religions or Universal Religions

As we have mentioned previously, during most of history religions were local, tribal, or national. Each tribe, each people, had their own gods. A man's religion was determined by kinship, by tribe, or by nationality, as well as by belief and faith. The Old Testament shows that the God of the Hebrews was first conceived of as a tribal and then a national God. Then gradually, religious horizons broadened. Prophets arose whose conceptions of the qualities of their God became ever more noble and more profound. Loving kindness, compassion, justice, mercy, were among His attributes. He became the one true God and, by extension, the God of all peoples and nations. Thus was prepared the foundation upon which have been built two of the universal religions of our modern world—Christianity and Mohammedanism.

A universal religion is neither tribal nor national. It spreads beyond ties of kinship. The faithful are held together by a spiritual bond—common belief and faith. No boundaries are recognized, no racial or social differences are taken into account. As a result, universal religions are dynamic and expanding. Thus Buddhism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism have spread their influence and authority over large sections of mankind.

The Universal Religions and the State

It is important that we understand in some measure the significance of the present-day relationships between the great national states and the non-national universal religions. They are both centers of great power when viewed as mediums of social control. To get a clear picture, we must at times go back a bit in history. We must analyze

more clearly the facts about universal religions, and we must center our attention on Christianity as the world religion with which we of the Western World are most familiar.

All universal religions have certain similarities. The religion has a founder who speaks a message for all mankind. It starts as a small band of disciples who, on the death of the founder, zealously carry on his teachings. His message, his words, and his person are unique and sacred. As time passes and converts are made, either through persuasion or by the sword, organization and doctrine become more and more defined. The new faith actually creates a new world for its followers. New moral precepts emerge; all relationships are interpreted in terms of the new faith. As already noted, the new faith takes precedence over all ties of blood and politics. Thus, sooner or later a collision occurs between the new faith waxing strong in numbers, full of zeal, and usually intolerant, and the political order.

Christianity and the state. The story of Christianity and its relations with secular authority is a long and complex one. Christianity began in the most obscure province of the Roman Empire—tiny, turbulent Palestine. Through missionary zeal and its message of hope to the slave and the hopeless, it spread gradually throughout the Roman Empire. In general, the Romans were extremely tolerant of foreign religions. Almost without exception the peoples conquered by Rome were permitted to worship their own gods. All people within the Empire, however, were expected to take at least a nominal part in the imperial cult—a man might worship any god he pleased, provided that his worship did not prevent him from carrying out his ordinary duties to the state. Except for Christianity and Judaism, all national religions within the Empire were polytheistic, and to a man who worshipped many gods, the nominal observance of the imperial cult offered no difficulties. But the Christians, strict monotheists (believers in one God), presented a special problem. They refused to worship or deify the emperor and would not take the military oath or serve in the Roman legions. Above all, they were accused of stirring up local disorders because of their intolerance of certain practices that went counter to their moral concepts. The long years of oppression began. It should be recognized, however, that the Christians were not persecuted as religious believers *per se* but as a subversive group that threatened the stability of the state. In spite of persecutions, the faith continued to grow in prestige, influence, and power till it became the official religion of Rome. Then it, in turn, became the persecutor and began to stamp out other religions.

When the Roman Empire finally fell, the Christian Church was the

most highly organized institution remaining in the West. Amid the turmoil of the fall of Rome and later during the Dark Ages, the church lived on, a center of some order in an age of chaos. When Western Europe finally emerged with new states formed or forming, there was one faith and one church. Of course, there were heresies, splinter sects, but the overwhelming majority of Western Europeans were members of the one Christian Church, recognizing the great councils and accepting the headship of the Pope. Therefore, as the new states emerged—England, France, Spain, the German Principalities, the Italian States—their official religion was Catholic (meaning Universal) Christianity. Rome was now the religious capital of Western Europe.

There soon began an historic struggle between state and church. In the beginning, the contest had nothing to do with faith. All rulers were Catholic; all recognized the spiritual authority of the church and fiercely defended the faith against heresy. The real clash centered about the question of *power* or social control. In the eleventh century, Pope Gregory VII claimed the superiority of spiritual over secular authority. This claim was a logical outgrowth of the church's attempt to impose unity in Christian society at a time when little unity existed. But as the church advanced in power and organization, such social control was bound to be challenged by secular authorities. Ambitious monarchs sought to use the power of religious authority for their own ends. The church tried to dominate the state; the state tried to dominate the church. All universal religions have had similar histories. This historic struggle is *still* in process in a number of places.

Universal religions are immensely virile. New ideas, new interpretations of organization and faith create conditions that breed heresy, schism, controversy. Some people want to return to the first simple faith, others clamor for innovations. The more virile the religion, the more changing conditions in politics and economics and the arts will stimulate these divisive tendencies.

Nowhere has this been better illustrated than in Western Europe during the sixteenth century. The exploration of the world, encouraged by new scientific and navigational discoveries, the influx of new ideas in practically all fields of learning, the development of commerce, and the rise of national dynasties were challenging the medieval authority of the church and the institutions that upheld it. Innovation bred innovation; strange commodities and strange lands, new ideas and opportunities offering adventure and sudden wealth challenged men of enterprise and spirit. Science, literature, music, and art found new patrons as aristocrats, old and new, less concerned now with salvation in the afterlife, sought to make their earthly existence as pleasant as possible. This reawakening of

Western Europe from the pall of the Dark Ages historians have called the Renaissance. It prepared the way for the great religious upheaval known to us as the Reformation.

The struggle for power between state and church combined with the Renaissance and Reformation to bring about the breakdown of the spiritual unity of the West and to usher in the terrible wars of religion, which were really "political-religious" wars. Each state felt that a choice had to be made between the old religion and one of the new Reformed faiths, because the tradition of "one faith, one church, one King" still prevailed. At first glance, this would appear to hearken a return to the early national religions that were bound by ties of kinship, race, and boundaries. This was true, however, only in a limited sense. Rather, it was testimony to the inescapable tie-up between two great institutions of social control and the difficulty of grasping and implementing a new set of relationships between the two. The cardinal point of the church's argument against the state during their long struggle was that the state's power was limited to the secular field, that there was a higher power over which the state had no authority. However, the idea of a separation between state and church, with a resultant clear distinction between citizenship in the state and membership in a religious body had not yet been conceived.

Separation of church and state. The factors that combined to bring about the idea of separation of church and state are too involved to describe in this brief chapter. Suffice it to say that ideas of political liberty and religious liberty are branches of the same tree and have *mutually* supported each other. The political ideas of liberty are based on the conception that the state is limited in power, under law, even in the secular field. A man is more than a citizen. He is an individual, a member of a community with many relationships, responsibilities, and rights, which the state is bound by law to respect. This belief is given formal expression in our famous Bill of Rights—the first ten amendments to the Constitution (see Chapter 28). Since a society is composed of many people with conflicting needs, few rights are absolute, but the right to hold any religious view is one of these few. When the Bill of Rights was adopted, the religious wars were still fresh in people's memory. New England, Maryland, and Pennsylvania had all been settled by nonconformists who had suffered political discrimination and persecution because of their opposition to a state-established church. The problem of religious liberty was a vital one to the new nation. The solution of it was propounded by men who themselves followed varied faiths. Article VI, Section C, of the Constitution reads:

> The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

It could not have been phrased more plainly. A man's citizenship, with its rights and responsibilities, is clearly separated from his religious affiliations. The First Amendment to the Constitution adds the following:

> Congress shall make no law respecting establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Of these rights none has been more zealously protected by the Supreme Court than the freedom of religion. A religious sect may be raucous and combative, and the behavior of its members may irritate others. They may forbid their children to salute the flag, may refuse to be drafted for military service, may form a community that shuts itself off as much as possible from the larger community. But unless they flagrantly violate the laws of moral decency or endanger human life in their religious practices the law protects them. The sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses often rouses the ire of other segments of the community by being intolerant of other religious bodies and by using language that to many seems contrary to certain sacred traditions. They have been repeatedly hauled into court by irate citizens. But the Supreme Court has fairly leaned over backwards to protect them. Why? Because in protecting Jehovah's Witnesses the Court is really protecting all of us against the encroachment of the police power of the state into an area of our lives that is peculiarly personal.

It is extremely significant that no modern totalitarian state permits any of these four freedoms—speech, press, religion, and assembly. They are the first to go if they ever existed in the nation, and they go together. The very nature and meaning of a totalitarian state makes this inevitable.

Many problems about the relationship between church and state are still with us. These problems are always very important. Nothing can bind a group so closely as a common faith and nothing can so disrupt it as a struggle based on religious differences.

Communism as a secular religion. Before we close this section on religion and the state, we must consider the meaning of the greatest challenge

to our four great freedoms that we have ever faced—with the possible exception of the dangers that threaten us from within in the form of our own follies and failures to be true to our basic values. This threat is modern communism. We shall look at the over-all problem of communism in much greater detail in Chapter 31. Here we will be concerned with one particular aspect of communism that imparts much dynamism to the movement.

Communism in one of its aspects is a pseudo religion, or as some have called it, a *secular religion.* According to one eminent theologian, it is in a sense a *Christian heresy.* This needs careful explanation. Some of its basic ideas were borrowed from Christianity; it is exclusively a product of the Western mind. From Christianity it borrowed the concept of the brotherhood of man—with the fatherhood of God left out. The red flag of communism is a symbol of the blood brotherhood of all men. Communism also borrowed the idea of redemption or salvation, a salvation to be realized on this earth, through the party. Another aspect of Christianity borrowed by communism is the idea of great and eternal "realities." The realities are to them economic determinism and the perfectibility of human society through political and social action. Communism borrowed the idea of "evil," which must be fought and overcome. To a communist, evil exists only in false social structures and in class exploitation that, when communism is finally established, will be eliminated. The idea of a heaven has also been utilized by communism. The communist establishes this heaven on earth, to be realized at some future date when the party will have saved the peoples of the world from the devilish domination of the "exploiters." The Christian is supposed to hate the evil men do but to love the sinners. The good communist must hate the imperialist, exploiting, ruling classes of the world. He must destroy them and thus save mankind. It is his highest moral obligation and *any* means are justified in carrying out the task. When he lies and cheats and steals for his faith, he feels justified. When he ruthlessly destroys millions of human beings, he feels justified. What do millions of human beings count when the salvation of humanity (this humanity is always plural, not singular; abstract, not concrete) is at stake? He alone has the true faith. The party line alone is truth. To it he owes blind obedience. It is his God on Sinai delivering the law. Any deviation from the dictates of the party line must be confessed as a sin. To a communist, the state is the all-powerful, all-embracing Numen. The party leaders are high priests and exercise the enormous social control of a priesthood.

Religious freedom as we conceive it is impossible in the totalitarian state, because religious freedom is the cornerstone of individuality. Religious freedom implies that there are areas of a man's life that are sacred

from state interference. This in turn implies that the state is not all powerful, that there are powers higher than the state, that there are realities more potent than the state, that a man may have obligations and follow a light beyond the state.

Religion as a Socializing Force

Religion, whether tribal, national, or universal, has always been a means of social control because it deals with man's ultimate needs. The sacred knowledge is necessary to man's welfare; the sacred rites are important to his well-being. Therefore, those who possess and interpret the sacred knowledge and administer the rites are bound to exercise great authority and influence in the affairs of men. In time of stress, in sorrow, in the important events of life, such as birth, marriage, and death, religious believers turn to the guardians of their faith for help, for guidance, for confirmation of their faith. The sacramental duties of the priesthood are important factors contributing to the influence of religion. The guardianship of the sacred knowledge is an important element in the social control exercised by the church.

Participation in religious worship is in itself a great socializer. The sense of fellowship created as people gather in groups to offer prayers, to listen to and take part in religious rituals, to receive admonitions and advice about the deepest human concerns, promotes a sense of unity, friendliness, and shared experiences. Religion has been and still is, even in our secularized society, an important factor in the education of the young. Sacred objects and images are still part of the early experiences for children in many families. In earlier societies, the father often performed the function of priest for the family. In our society, there is still family worship—and Bible reading—although the practice is not so wide-spread as formerly. The churches provide special religious education for youth and adults. They express the mores of society in terms of good and evil, purity and sin, salvation and damnation. One of the chief problems of a secular society is training young people with no church connections in the mores of the culture.

Religion has usually been celebrated in community life with festivals, music, drama, processions, and all kinds of social activities. The decorative designs on the Parthenon, many fragments of which now rest in the British Museum, depict scenes from ancient Greek religious festivals. In our own day, many churches carry on very active social programs for youth, for the middle aged, and for old folks.

Science and Religion

Mention has been made of the fact that science has given answers to many questions about man and his world that were formerly answered by religion. As our scientific knowledge has expanded, our whole way of life has been affected. Every institution has been modified; no part of the culture has escaped the impact. Through scientific knowledge we have conquered time and space, controlled disease, lightened the harsh tasks of producing the necessities and comforts of life. Our knowledge about man, the cosmos, the earth, and all its properties has increased at a tremendous rate. It is not surprising then that this has caused considerable confusion in the minds of many people who seek to reconcile the new knowledge of science with their religious beliefs and attitudes.

But there is one area with which religion alone remains competent to deal. Religion gives *meaning* to our lives as a whole. It answers questions that science does not answer but which man insists on asking. The answers of science in the end can have no meaning if man's life as a whole has no meaning. There never has been a time in human history when men have so needed answers to those questions that concern the ultimate meaning of their lives.

These are troubled and perilous times. Danger threatens on every hand. From our political and our religious leaders come grim warnings. We have endured within this generation two terrible wars. Just at the moment when we believed mankind was on the march to a better and ever better life and that cruelty, misery, and all senseless suffering were about to be conquered by reason and knowledge, these holocausts burst upon us. This generation has witnessed horrors and cruelty and human misery compounded. New methods of mental and physical torture have been devised that pale the simple savagery of a Genghis Khan.

In the face of such terrors and disappointments, the deep "folk wisdom" of the people stirs and comes to life. They turn to something that is "not of today or yesterday, but from all time." This folk wisdom may often be fumbling, crude, sometimes unlettered. It may seek expression in strange sects, inspirational books, or a return to the old churches. It may often be vague, other-worldly, unrealistic by modern standards. It may be marred by prejudice and self-deception, but it is basically a form of wisdom such as many a learned man does not possess. It represents the people's yearning for meaningful answers to the riddle of their lives in the face of senseless and wholesale destruction, violence, and the quest for power.

As a result of scientific knowledge, instruments have been invented that are giving man ever-increasing control over his physical environment. We are now attempting the scientific study of man's mind and his social structures with the acknowledged intent of giving man more control over his own destiny. But science apparently cannot determine whether in the end these controls will be used for man's salvation or his destruction. For example, psychology can be used to heal and liberate man's mind, or used equally effectively to enslave it—and we are witness to this fact in this twentieth century. Read the prophetic novel *1984*. It wasn't dreamed up in a vacuum. It was based on things that are actually happening or that could happen in our modern world.

The Meaning of Life

William Shakespeare was the first *great* modern writer. The measure of his genius rests in part on the fact that, standing at the threshold of a new age, he gathered the essence of its spirit that has come to flower in our day. Ponder on these words:

> Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
> Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
> To the last syllable of recorded time,
> And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
> The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
> Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
> That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
> And then is heard no more; it is a tale
> Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
> Signifying nothing.
>
> *Macbeth,* Act V, Scene V

> Our revels now are ended. These our actors,
> As I foretold you, were all spirits and
> Are melted into air, into thin air;
> And, like the baseless fabric of this vision,
> The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces
> The solemn temples, the great globe itself
> Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve
> And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,

Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.

The Tempest, Act IV, Scene I


Here is expressed a profound pessimism about man and the meaninglessness of his life and struggles. Underneath the dreams of progress and the exaltation of modern man's powers of knowledge and reason, there has developed a basic pessimism about the meaning of man's life as a whole. On such pessimism, no great civilization has ever been built, but with some such pessimism, many have perished.

What we believe about the meaning of our life as a whole is bound to be reflected in our social outlook and therefore in our social philosophy.

> Religious thought is able to affect social outlook, because religion is our relation to what concerns us ultimately. Religion at its center is ultimate, unconditional, inescapable concern. Therefore, religion is the expression of the meaning of our life as a whole. It is related to every realm of human existence. . . . It is the ultimate concern in all preliminary concerns, the center of all theoretical and practical activities, the inexhaustible meaning in everything that has meaning.[1]

PART TWO
Work and Rewards

General Electric



17

ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND CULTURE

"Economics" is a word that scares many people. They think of it as an abstract science involving complicated graphs and charts and employing a jargon understood only by financial wizards who buy and sell millions of dollars worth of stocks and bonds a day in a fabled street in New York.

But an *economic system* is simply a means through which our wants are satisfied by the supply of goods and services. It is not something apart from the rest of the culture; nor can any individual—especially in our highly materialistic society—name many things he does during the day that are not in some way tied up with the economic system.

We may not use the natural resources around us as directly as does a South Sea Islander cultivating his yam patch or his wife weaving a grass skirt, but hour by hour we are doing things that reflect and affect our own American system of satisfying human needs and desires. Your breakfast of Frosty Grove Orange Juice, Peppo Flakes, and Stimulo Coffee;

your decision to try that new green toothpaste or to send a suit to the cleaners; your trip to the campus by streetcar or auto; your reading of ads en route; your certainty that the streetcars would run on schedule and the milkman would come in time for breakfast—these simple aspects of your daily routine are but a few examples of how you, as a consumer, are part of a vast and intricate system that caters to your needs and stimulates your wants along certain lines. Even in pursuit of "higher learning" in the somewhat set-apart ivied walls of a college campus, you are oriented to our economy. You are probably preparing for a type of job that you have chosen largely because of its promise of money and security, perhaps rejecting one more suited to your tastes "because there's no future in it."

The economic system not only is very much a part of a person's daily life, but also is interwoven and "integrated" with all other aspects of a culture. It is difficult in many cases to say which is cause and which is effect in analyzing the relationship of an economic system to a society's system of government, its religion, family organization, schooling, and recreation. However, it is certain that all these reflect the influence of the economy and in turn affect it.

In India, among the Hindus, for example, people respond much more readily to religious beliefs than to hard economic facts. Hinduism teaches the sacredness of all life and forbids the slaying of cattle and the eating of beef by the natives. As a result, the groundwork for what might have become a prosperous native livestock industry was never laid. More subtle has been the influence of the Puritan ethic upon the rise of American capitalism. Puritan instruction consecrated the effort to become wealthy and preached the virtues of individual responsibility, thrift, and hard work with such devotion and intensity that these traits are still regarded by many Americans with much veneration and pride (see Chapter 19).

Where two patterns conflict, the society must make some attempt to integrate them or to eliminate the one most at variance with its traditions or its interests. These conflicts are numerous in a rapidly changing society such as our own. During the Great Depression, many people were compelled to accept relief, a necessity that produced psychological conflicts in those who subscribed to our cultural value of individualism and our theory that "a man with any gumption can always make a living." It was because of this conflict that public works projects and the food stamp plan were more compatible with our cultural values than the "dole." Changes in technology also may affect the other aspects of a culture profoundly. Industrialization, mechanization, and standardization have helped make our society urban and secular, and the rise of large corpora-

tions has been followed by government regulation of many aspects of business and legalization of trade unions, even though such changes long appeared to be inconsistent with our traditional cultural beliefs in individualism and free enterprise, as we shall see in Chapter 19.

Why, then, do we study the economic aspect of culture separately? Because the economic system can be described as an institution—a complex of patterns clustering around one central function. Because any scientific approach must *analyze*—examine component parts—while not losing sight of the whole.


In fact, why study economics at all? As already mentioned, each of us is affected by and affects our economic system. An understanding of that system can be of *personal value* to us and our families in our everyday lives. Although a knowledge of economics won't necessarily enable us to make a fortune on the stock market, it can certainly help us to handle our own financial affairs.

In addition, a study of economics will help us *understand culture* in general, our own culture, and ourselves. Most adults spend most of their waking time working to satisfy their wants; no study of culture can afford to minimize this preoccupation. Certainly a culture like ours, dominated by an interest in material things and money-making, cannot be understood without paying special attention to its economic institutions. And since we reflect our culture, it follows that to understand ourselves we must understand this aspect, too, of our culture. It is a rare member of modern society who is not at least dimly aware that his fortunes are inextricably tied up with many things over which he appears to have little or no control.

Finally, a study of economic institutions will prepare us for *action as citizens.* An economic system is made by men—and can be changed by men. No given system is preordained, natural, inevitable. To vote intelligently, people need understanding and information about basic economic problems of the day.

As just one example of a question on which most Americans are confused, take foreign trade. We hear the slogan "Trade, not aid"—that sounds fine. Then we are bombarded with arguments that this industry and that needs "protection" against competition from foreign meat, wheat, textiles, and the like, and wonder if we shouldn't retain some tariff walls. The argument that high tariff barriers turn our potential allies toward Russia swings us back in the other direction. It seems impossible to decide. Yet to this bewildering question and to many others there are good, clear answers to be found. With some knowledge of the basic principles of economics and some "digging" in a library, a person can be well informed about such knotty problems and use his vote and his influence to have them intelligently handled.

esthetic desires as well as biological needs? They are if they demand for their satisfaction the use of the scarce resources available—the time and energy of people, the use of capital, and the use of natural resources. Any goods or services that can be tagged with a price tag are economic commodities.




These illustrations and the ones similar to them in this and following chapters are from Basic Economic Concepts, Economics Filmstrip Series, correlated with Samuelson's Economics. *(Copyright, 1950). By permission of the publisher, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.*

Decisions of Production

Every society must make some basic decisions about its producing and consuming. First of all, *what shall be produced?* The society channels productive resources into the desired and needed types of goods. These may or may not be in proportion to the wants of individuals. At times the society must put group survival first, and demand

esthetic desires as well as biological needs? They are if they demand for their satisfaction the use of the scarce resources available—the time and energy of people, the use of capital, and the use of natural resources. Any goods or services that can be tagged with a price tag are economic commodities.



These illustrations and the ones similar to them in this and following chapters are from Basic Economic Concepts, Economics Filmstrip Series, correlated with Samuelson's Economics. *(Copyright, 1950). By permission of the publisher, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.*

Decisions of Production

Every society must make some basic decisions about its producing and consuming. First of all, *what shall be produced?* The society channels productive resources into the desired and needed types of goods. These may or may not be in proportion to the wants of individuals. At times the society must put group survival first, and demand

production of those things that will insure survival at the expense of those that satisfy individual wants not essential to group survival. In our society in peacetime, the dollar votes of consumers guide production, on the whole. In wartime, however, our government restricts production of civilian goods to insure an adequate supply of war materials and to discourage inflationary spending by people with swollen incomes. In World War II, our economy proved so flexible that through the full use of resources our level of living suffered little; on the whole we had both more guns and more butter, though some wants, such as cigarettes, nylons, and housing, were inadequately taken care of.


To get the goods and services it considers desirable, a society may encourage some types of production with subsidies, tax exemptions, medals, and other rewards, and discourage others by the imposition of quotas and high taxes. Some production may be tolerated because it does not seem wise or easy to interfere with it; some, such as coining money and making bootleg whiskey, may be forbidden.

The *method of production* must also be decided upon. Techniques vary. One man could take $1,000 worth of equipment to put 40 acres of fertile land into soy beans and through ignorance and error end up with a crop smaller than the number of seeds he had planted. By using other techniques the same man might produce a fair-sized crop, and through still other techniques a bumper crop. (We will assume weather conditions are the same in all instances.)

What method or technique then will be used? In our society we will generally use the technique that will bring us the greatest output in harmony with our mores and technology. If we find some better way, we are pretty sure to use it. Not all peoples feel the same way. Native peoples in the Pacific are said to have managed tolerably well with the American axes and shovels that they learned to use during World War II, but after they returned to their villages they, for the most part, again took up their own far less efficient but more customary tools and continued working much as they had before.

Among the mountain-dwelling Arapesh of New Guinea, each man plants several gardens, each one in cooperation with a different group of friends and relatives. They may be miles apart. He is host in one garden, guest in the others. Most of his time is subject to the plans of the "hosts" in the other gardens. This arrangement seems incredibly inefficient to us, for it is costly in terms of time and effort. There is no real physical need for cooperative gardening, but the Arapesh do not value individualism, efficiency, and competition. They consider warm human relationships, sociability, and cooperation more important.[2]

Still another problem involves the proportioning of *land, labor, capital,*



From U.S.A.: Measure of a Nation (*New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1949*).

MACHINE POWER: SECRET OF PRODUCTIVITY

Back in 1850 men and animals supplied most of the energy for our work. By 1960, with machine power supplying 96 per cent of the power we use, we can turn out six times as much per man-hour of work. Future progress lies in raising our output per man-hour through increasing use of machine power.

and *enterprise*—the four basic resources or *factors of production*[3] available to man. To some extent, more of one and less of another can be used, depending upon how efficient each factor is in relation to what it costs. For example, let's say a farmer can produce 100 tons of hay with *one-half* man-year and *75* acres, or *one* man-year and *50* acres, or *two* man-years and *30* acres. If capital and enterprise costs are the same in all cases, the most profitable of the three choices can be determined by figuring which combination of land and labor is least expensive.

In our country, labor is expensive and employers substitute labor-

saving machinery at every opportunity. In the Orient, however, labor is so inexpensive that big jobs, such as dam construction, are less costly when done chiefly by human labor rather than by machine. In any country a farmer may be land poor—have more than he can work efficiently. Enterprise, too, may be wasted. Henry Ford II, for example, could doubtless run a small foundry superbly well, but confining himself to such a small task would surely be a disservice to himself and his country.

From time to time and place to place, the proportions in which to combine land, labor, capital, and enterprise must be decided. One combination of the four factors of production will usually yield a greater return for each dollar spent than any other combination. Any enterpriser has a tremendous advantage over his competitors if he can come closer than they can to the most profitable combination. Those whose guesses or estimates are repeatedly poor will lose money and eventually be eliminated from production.

Decisions on what to produce and how to produce are not the only questions of production that have to be answered in every society. "*Should a society produce for the present* (fish) *or for the future* (fishing boats)?" is another decision that has to be made continually. Obviously both present and future must be provided for, but where should the emphasis lie? In their five-year plans, the Russians concentrated on turning out machine tools, the "tools of production," rather than consumer goods such as refrigerators, carpets, and autos.

Where should we produce? In Los Angeles or Detroit, or both, or elsewhere? Where labor is inexpensive, or where it is dear but efficient, or where natural resources lie near at hand? Why are some industries located in one area and others scattered everywhere? And why do those industries that concentrate pick precisely the locations they do? Although few businessmen would think of building boats in a desert, many other less obvious but very costly errors in choosing a location can be made. The history of Panama is loaded with the tragedies of American enterprisers who thought they had discovered El Dorado only to lose what capital they had invested. Obviously the location that seemed so promising was not the best place for them to invest their money.

Decisions of Consumption

In the nursery story of the Little Red Hen, none of the other farm animals were interested in helping her plant or harvest the wheat, mill it into flour, or bake bread. However, all were eager to help *eat* the bread, but since they had had no share in its production,

the Little Red Hen decided that only she and her chicks should consume it.

Like the hen, each society must answer the question: *Who gets the goods?* And there are many different answers ranging all the way from Captain John Smith's (and the Little Red Hen's) "No one eats who doesn't work" to "We'll take ours and the others be damned!" Deciding who gets what becomes especially pressing when there isn't enough to go around, where inequality is seen and resented, and where stress is placed on material things and great prestige is attached to getting them (see Chapter 18).

Society is deeply concerned with the division of goods. And quite rightly so! In Chicago, for example, people in certain upper-income areas live an average of ten years longer than people in certain poor areas. In Central America, near mid-century, farm laborers were toiling from dawn to dusk for as little as ten cents a day while some plantation owners lived like princes. Australia has a high level of living and almost as much land as the United States, but fewer than 8 million people. Northwest of Australia lies Java, only one-sixtieth the size of Australia, but with over five times as many people! Inequalities are glaring, both within and between countries.

Many people believe that extreme inequality is part of the natural order of things. They are sure that among all groups everywhere some have a lot and most have a little, and if everything were divided up equally, before long everybody would be right back where he started, "because that's human nature." Nonliterates, according to popular notion, are "savages" ruled only by "the law of the jungle." The strong members of the tribe are supposed to decide matters by sheer strength, to take what another has if they wish, to know no rule but "survival of the fittest." This is taken to prove that competition and inequality are universal.

Numerous studies of nonliterate groups show that nothing could be further from the truth.[4] Amassing wealth is a way to acquire prestige in some societies; to have more cattle or wives or shells or money than the next person is to be more respected and important. Among many other peoples, however, there is no lasting advantage to be gained from acquiring more than others have. Among the Dobuans, who live on a group of rocky islands near New Guinea, the couple with a rich harvest may be considered sorcerers; they remove their crops stealthily at night to avoid the suspicion of their neighbors. An unusually successful Arapesh gardener eats no better than his neighbors; he paints his yams and heaps them outside his door to be admired by all, and gives a feast at which the entire pile is given away for seed. In spite of the fact that possession

brings no great prestige, nonliterates work hard and do not feel frustrated through failure to amass a fortune.

The tradition is universal among nonliterate peoples that *none should want in the midst of plenty.* The hunter who returns with his catch over his shoulders sees that families of unlucky hunters also eat. He wouldn't think of doing otherwise.

With land ownership, *title rests on use.* If the owner isn't cultivating a particular field, others may do so. Few tribes will let a man avoid work by living on an income made by others who till his land for him.

Such customary rules are fairly consistent in guaranteeing that land benefits the group as a whole. They also operate effectively in regard to other property. If use of the particular property is essential to the welfare of the tribe, the owner usually becomes a sort of custodian. He may be recognized as owner of a canoe, for example, but if a fishing party is organized on which he does not go along, he has no right to prevent the group from using his canoe.

Most nonliterates do a good part of their work cooperatively. House raising is often one big party in which the host provides the building materials, food, and liquor, and his friends and relatives put up his house with no charge for their labor. Much heavy field work is done in the same way. Often a group sings or chants to keep time with the rising and falling of their hoes as they move abreast down a field. In this way even the dullest and hardest sort of work is made lighter, and all share in its rewards.

Finally, nonliterates do not wake up one day to the realization that they are out of a job and in danger of starving. There is always work to be done.

Thus we can use nonliterate societies to clarify our ideas about "human nature." Obviously it is not inevitable that within a society there should be sharp competition for goods and services and great inequality in their distribution. Why is it that inequality is so widespread in modern society?

Certainly industrial technology offers far greater potentialities for production than are conceived of in the simple economies of non-literate societies, and thus of greater material well-being for all. In the process of industrialization, however, many of the values of simpler societies were lost, and the struggle to regain them is only slowly bearing fruit. The Industrial Revolution turned the worker into a wage-earner utterly dependent upon the job offered him by the producer and so far removed from the natural resources that if he lost his job all he could do was to try to find another. Cooperation and the sharing of wealth were usually replaced by competition and the desire of each member of society to "get

his." As societies became larger, embracing more population and territory, their members tended to lose a sense of identification with those around them, except in certain periods of crisis such as war. Society has thus been faced with the problem of helping people identify with the larger unit in day-to-day living as well as during crises.

In American society, a number of factors have kept the rich from identifying with the poor. A person could once acquire great prestige in piling up vast wealth almost regardless of how the money was accumulated and what he did with it after he got it. Our Puritan ethic identified virtue and success as almost one and the same thing, and the rich usually felt no compulsion to better the lot of the poor. Churches preached humility and patience and the rewards to come after death.

But important changes are occurring in modern American society. More and more Americans are convinced that to have a real political democracy we must have a fair and just economic system, and are even realizing that as leaders of the free world we cannot afford to ignore widespread poverty and disease anywhere. The "public be damned" attitude on the part of businessmen is no longer condoned, nor is the once widely held belief that millionaires make their money solely by their own efforts and contributions to society. To win public acclaim these days, the tycoon must be known not only for his wealth and ability, but also for his civic interests and charities and for an enlightened approach toward his employees. In any society, talent will tend to concentrate on the offices and positions that bring recognition, and thus through giving or withholding applause the public can do much to turn potential exploiters into desirable leaders.

Along with this shift in attitudes has come pressure for a more equitable distribution of wealth. As laborers have become literate and organized, they have done just what the upper classes so long feared—demanded a bigger share of the goods. And the churches have become much more interested in the rewards that people may win in this world. As most people have come to think of themselves as likely to remain in the employee class, they have brought many pressures to bear upon government for increased social services. These pressures have resulted in a great expansion of public services such as schools, parks, and care of the needy. These are paid for in part by a steeply progressive income tax that allows a man who makes over a million dollars a year to keep less than one dollar in ten. Compare that with 1900, when Andrew Carnegie took in 23 million tax-free dollars!

Like all social changes, this trend toward equalization of wealth has met bitter resistance from the groups who stood to lose most. Some employers claim that a steeply progressive income tax discourages enterprise

and initiative. Business seems, however, to be doing very well in attracting men of these talents. Management has become what amounts to a trained profession, rewarded not merely by salary, but also by such devices as corporation expense accounts and by nonmonetary rewards of prestige.

And finally, although this discussion may have led you to believe that if labor gets more, management is sure to get less, this is by no means the case. Time and time again we have found it possible for both to get more. The real hope for a greatly improved level of living lies in increased production. Fortunately, both management and labor are learning—although sometimes very slowly—that cooperation in raising output is both possible and profitable.

Exchange of Goods


It was early discovered that the jack-of-all-trades is the master of none. No doubt in many groups fat folk did much of the fishing, lean men did the hunting, and dreamers were the artists. Then, through exchange, all could get more and better things than if each did everything for himself.

Every group has at least an elementary division of labor. No society has ever been found where all the tasks that either men or women could do were shared by both.[5] But usually, specialization is extended much beyond the category of sex. One man may devote all his time to making pottery, another may be especially adept at woodcarving. But the potter and carver cannot eat and wear their products. Somehow the surplus built up through a division of labor must be exchanged. There are many culturally determined ways of distributing goods—by exchanging gifts, by pure trade, or by some system with elements of both. Whatever the method, sooner or later a person gets back from somewhere something in return.

Considerations of prestige are uppermost in those societies where goods are distributed by exchanging gifts. To many present-day Americans, the idea of a man's taking yams he has grown to a friend's hut, where he is given more yams grown by his friend, seems as pointless as carrying coals to Newcastle. But important social values are involved—friendship, prestige, pride in one's providence and generosity. The Kwakiutl tribe, which lived in the Pacific Northwest, practiced an even more fantastic form of gift-giving that emphasized competition. Individuals sought to shame their rivals by outdoing them in distributions of property, and

to avoid disgrace the recipient had to return each gift with 100 per cent interest!

Where exchanges are frankly in terms of trade, whether barter or cash purchase, everyday utilitarian values are usually stressed. Trade occurs only when people want things that others have and are willing to give up what others want. The price, or rate of exchange, fluctuates according to the possessor's notion of the relative worth of what is desired to



what is given up. An individual may have to give a house to get something he wants at one time; at another time a knife may be enough. What one group regards as all important may mean little to another. No matter what the price, so long as exchange occurs both sides gain. Trade occurs only because each party feels he receives something worth more to him than what he gives up.

Neither division of labor nor exchange can be very efficient without

money—pieces of convenient form, stamped by public authority, and issued as a *medium of exchange and measure of value.* These "tickets" come in large and small amounts and greatly increase the flexibility of an economic system. Using them as a *medium of exchange,* a person can sell for money, knowing that he can in turn buy what he wants for money. Money also serves as a standard or *measure of value,* for all ex-



British Information Service

SOAP FOR COINS IN AFRICA

Money greatly increases the flexibility of even the simplest economies.

change values can be expressed in terms of it. The reader probably has a fairly good idea of the prices of several hundred goods and services. Without money it would be almost impossible to estimate these values, and exchange would be slow and infrequent. In addition, money serves as a *store of value;* it is usable at any time, present or future. Parents may pay for their children's education with money that was saved long before. Finally, money also serves as a *standard of deferred payments,*

which means that a person can judge by the present what he will owe or receive in the future. The national debt and the mortgage on your house are examples of deferred payments. In order to serve effectively as a store of value or standard of deferred payments, the value of money must remain stable over a comparatively long period of time.

It was once thought that nothing could serve as money unless it was desired as a commodity or good quite apart from its value as a medium of exchange, but this is not true. As long as it is generally acceptable in exchange, anything at all may be used as money—coconuts, wampum, shells, salt, cigarettes, cattle, coins, or paper bills.

Who Makes the Decisions?

Although decisions of production and consumption and the means of exchange between producer and consumer must be made in all cultures, the methods by which they are made are extremely diverse.

Custom is king in the sacred, homogeneous society. Most things economic are done the way they have always been done, and there are few decisions to make. What will be produced and when and where, and who is to get it, are matters that are governed quite satisfactorily, in the opinion of the group, by the ways of the past.

But we live in a secular, heterogeneous society. In present-day urban societies of this type there are two chief systems of control: the laissez faire or *free price system* and the *planned economy*. These are two different methods for parceling out goods when there are not enough for everyone.

It is important to know about the free price system because it has been part and parcel of the American ideology, and as a myth it is still important. Moreover, although we don't have a 100 per cent free price system, the economy we do have is a patched-up version of it.

For our society relies to a considerable extent on individuals making independent decisions guided mainly by prices and the desire for profit. This rather unusual economic system implies social goals, personal motivations, and legal institutions that are not universal. Despite the multitude of seemingly unconnected decisions, the system is not a chaotic one.

In brief, the key to the ideology of the free price system is that the social control of economic matters is left to the "natural results of unfettered individual decisions." Man is assumed to be a rational being moved by the desire to get the greatest possible satisfaction out of life. While acting in a purely selfish way, he will do the things that will

also bring the greatest possible satisfaction to society. "If we let these rational beings alone, everything will be fine," is the basis of this philosophy. Obviously advocates of this system want a minimum of government. "Less government in business and more business in government," is the way they often express it.

The planned economy, on the other hand, is run by government. Thus those who believe in complete planning subscribe to another ideology, and are moved by different myths. But the economy of no big state is completely managed by government, although some come rather close to it.

In fact no economy is all free price or all planned; all economies are mixed to some extent. Our own American economy is certainly a mixed one. Over the decades we have been talking price economy but becoming more and more of a planned economy. The Eisenhower administration has promised to reverse this trend.

This entire section on "Work and Rewards" will analyze the American economy against a background of the free price ideology. But the issue of price versus planned economy is such a controversial one, both politically and economically, that we are going to turn briefly to England to compare and contrast the functions of the two systems, for we can do this with more objectivity and perspective than if we were to turn immediately to American issues. The English economy, like our own, is a mixed one of both free price and planned elements, consisting somewhat more of planned elements than our own system at the moment, but through and through a system that has evolved democratically just as has our own. Gertrude Williams, a professor at the University of London, has recently written one of the clearest analyses of the price versus the planned economy in her description of the English economy, which she has permitted us to present in the next chapter.

18

PRICE ECONOMY AND PLANNED ECONOMY

The words "rations," "points," and "coupons" have come to play a large part in our conversation in England, for ever since World War II the amounts of many commodities that we could consume have been strictly limited by the government. In some cases, a maximum amount per person has been fixed for each individual or household, for example, butter, sugar, or coal; in others, such as groceries and clothes or candy, the quantity available to each of us has been restricted, but we have been given freedom of choice within the group; in still others, eggs, milk, vitamins, domestic help, and so on, the right to obtain the commodity or service has been limited to certain types of consumer—children or old people or the sick. But whatever the method employed, the objective has been the same—to ration in as fair a way as possible a scarce supply of something that is wanted by a great many people.

Does this mean that before World War II, when there was no rationing in the present meaning of the term, we could all have as much of these things as we wanted? Could we slap on the butter and jam with a lavish hand and throw away our clothes as soon as we grew tired of them or they showed a sign of wear? Of course not. Most of us had no more of these things before the war than we have now, and many had considerably less. The difference is that before the war the rationing was done by prices and now it is done by government decree. Before the war, we were perfectly free to buy as much of a commodity as we liked, provided we could pay the price asked for it, and we rationed *ourselves* to the amounts we thought we could afford. Now we are not allowed to buy more than a certain amount, whatever the price we might be ready to pay. These are two different methods of sharing out goods in short supply, and there is a good deal of difference of opinion about which is the better way of the two.

Scarcity Forces Us to Choose Among Many Wants

Scarcity is not created by war; it is a permanent characteristic of all human society and is the basis of the problem that faces, and always has faced, the human race whatever its form of organization. It springs from the fact that the material resources of the world are limited and that our ability to make use of those resources is even more limited by our ignorance. Everything that we need to satisfy our wants has to be derived finally from two sources—the natural resources that are available and the human ability to make use of them.

As our knowledge grows and we increase our skill, we can exploit more and more of the opportunities that nature offers to us. The increase in communications, for example, has brought within our reach the resources of vast areas that were closed to us before; the development in scientific knowledge has made accessible many valuable minerals from depths below the earth's surface that could not be reached by earlier generations. Railroads, steamships, and aircraft have vastly extended the "neighborhood" on whose resources we can draw, and our increasing skill—both of techniques and of organization—enables us to get more out of what we can reach.

But whatever the rate of development may be, there is, at any one time, a limit to the total that can be produced. Here and now, there is only so much of the material resources of the world accessible to us and only so many people endowed with the capacities and skills to work these

resources. We may know that there are immense mineral deposits waiting to be tapped in the Arctic Circle, but until we find out how to get them, they might as well not exist as far as the satisfaction of our present wants is concerned. No doubt we waste a lot by stupidity or foolishness; but even if the very best possible use is made of all the resources we can reach, there is still a limit to what can be produced out of them, and it is out of that total that we must all satisfy our wants.

If our wants were smaller than the amounts we could produce, we should not, of course, be faced with any problem of choice and, indeed, in some very simple societies, this is the case. Where the pattern of life is both rigid and simple and nature is fairly generous, as was the situation in some parts of Africa and the South Seas before the advent of the white man, the adjustment of wants to the wealth available is so much a matter of unchanging custom, often endowed with religious significance, that neither the group nor the individual finds it necessary to make a conscious choice. But the moment this unvarying rigidity of pattern is subject to change, the problem of choice presents itself, and in the type of civilization with which we are more familiar, in which we are acutely conscious of an unending series of wants clamoring for satisfaction, the problem of choice is only too obvious to us.

Very early in our childhood we are taught that you can't have your cake and eat it, and this is only putting in another way the fact that you can't use the same resources to produce two separate things at the same time. If you want to grow cabbages on a bit of land, you cannot also use the land for a tennis court; if you spend a couple of hours in a movie, you can't also use them for digging the garden or painting a picture or mending your boots. You have to choose which of the many possible uses to which you could put the same materials or the same time, in the knowledge that the price you pay outweighs all the other alternatives you have thereby given up.

This inescapable fact has nothing to do with any particular form of economic or social organization; it is part of human experience. As far as we can judge, there is no limit to wants; in fact, the growth of civilization is largely the development of new wants or new kinds and varieties of old wants—physical, intellectual, emotional, aesthetic, spiritual. Our desire for any one object may be quickly satisfied—even the heartiest eater finds that his stomach's capacity is limited—but for wants as a whole there seems no end. We get more choosey and want more different kinds of satisfaction, greater varieties of food; houses with rooms for specialized purposes such as sleeping, washing, cooking, playing, reading; clothes suitable for various occasions; music, pictures, books, churches, tennis racquets and golf clubs and all the rest of the paraphernalia for

recreation; or more leisure to sit and stare. All these different wants are jostling for preference and competing for the limited productive resources available. Whatever we do—or don't do, for doing nothing uses up time and wears out clothes and tables and chairs—has to come out of the wealth whose total is fixed by our resources and effort.

Some method has to be evolved to decide the order of priority in satisfying these many wants—whose wants shall be satisfied first, which wants shall be satisfied first, how much of one want shall be satisfied before starting on another, and so on—and it is principally in the different methods that have emerged for this purpose that the main differences between present-day economic societies consist. Two rival ways of doing the job have developed; in one, the decision is made by state regulation, i.e., the planned economy; in the other, it is left to the pull of individual choices, i.e., the price economy.

Price Economy

In a price economy, the things that are produced are those for which consumers are willing to pay enough to make it worth somebody else's while to put them on the market. It is assumed that the amount we are ready to pay is an indication of the value we put on a thing, so that the more important it is to us the more we are willing to pay. We have, of course, to learn by experience and we may make mistakes, but most of us are sufficiently alert to our own interests not to go on buying something that we don't like or to pay more for it than we have found it to be worth.

The prices we are ready to pay for different things do not remain the same forever, but as our desire for the things changes, so too do the prices we are willing to pay, and we can thus make known our individual idiosyncracies. If I decide that I should like to be vegetarian during the summer months, I can use the money I save on meat to buy more butter and eggs than I do in the winter and then change back again when the warm weather is over. If I bother to give careful attention to my budgeting, I can make sure that I never spend any money on, say, the movies, money that will give me more pleasure if I spend it on something else, e.g., a few cigarettes, some ice cream, or put it toward my savings for a new radio or the needs of old age. In this way I can get from my income the maximum amount of the kinds of satisfaction that appeal to my particular needs and tastes.

It is true that there are certain things that figure in practically everybody's expenditure because they are part of the customary way of living

in one's country, but there are almost as many variations on the theme as there are individuals in the community. Some people get a lot of pleasure from being well dressed, some from having seen the latest film, some from food or the evening drink at a tavern or playing the horses, some from the sense of security that comes from adding to the nest egg, or from the knowledge that the family is well provided for; and the price system allows each person to lay out his income according to his fancy by buying more of one thing and less of another.

If you think of your own experience as a consumer, you will realize that I have over-simplified the buying process. We don't, as a matter of fact, ever think of the various lines of expenditure as being in direct competition with one another. We don't think of saying to ourselves "I prefer stylish dressing to food, so I'll live on bread and water and put all my money into clothes." It is rather "I won't buy chicken if it is expensive, but eat lamb stew instead and spend the money I save in that way on an extra pair of stockings." As with all our purchases, we are always considering the little more or less. If the price of something we like goes up, we don't stop buying altogether, but we buy a little less than we did before; and if the price goes down, we buy a little more. But the "little more or less" is not always the same. The more important a thing is to us the more difficult we find it to cut down our consumption of it and the less effect do changes in its price have on the amount we buy.

Such demands, which respond only slightly to changes in price are called "inelastic." The price of cigarettes has multiplied threefold in recent years, but the number of cigarettes bought has not fallen much, for the habit of smoking has become so ingrained that many people find it easier to sacrifice other things that they used to buy in order to have enough money left for cigarettes. There are other things, however, that you buy gladly if you can get them at a low price, for example, peaches or books; but you cut down your purchases without a pang if the price rises even a little. *Such demands are said to be "elastic" because they stretch out or shrink greatly when the price alters.*

I have purposely chosen these particular commodities for my illustration because of another point on which it is important to be clear. Many people think of inelastic demands as being associated with "necessities" and elastic demands with "luxuries." This is not true unless we remember that the term "necessity" itself requires definition. What is essential to one person is a luxury to another and a matter of no concern at all to a third. How we value an article depends upon (1) the customs of the country, (2) the stage of social and economic development, (3) our own income, and (4) our personal tastes. All these can be better appreciated by illustration.

(1) In England, bread made of wheat is one of the staple foods, but in India and China, rice, not wheat, is the prime necessity. We groan if the price of bread goes up but willingly do without rice pudding; in the East it is the other way around. Changes in the price of tea matter much more in England than in France, where coffee has pride of place. In England, wine is considered a luxury for the rich; in France, it is the normal drink of the laborer and peasant.

(2) The customary pattern of living is not fixed once and for all, but changes as circumstances and new techniques bring different goods within the scope of the more modest incomes, so that articles of consumption that were once thought of as the greatest luxuries for the rich, or which were not known at all, come to be looked upon as basic necessities of life. We have only to compare the number of foods that enter into even our restricted post-war diet with the budget of a working class family of the early part of the century to realize how rapidly and widely the constituents of the category "necessities of life" change from one generation to another. Or think of clothing. The introduction of mass-production methods into the clothing industry reduced prices before the war so much that the working girl could follow fashion almost as quickly as the debutante, and silk stockings and smart rayon dresses became items in customary expenditure throughout the female population. In fact, when we speak of the rise in the standard of living of a community we mean just that—that a larger number and variety of goods have entered so gradually into the consumption of all classes that they have come to be looked upon as essentials in the pattern of living usual in that population.

Radio, movies, tobacco, and beer cannot be claimed as physiological necessities, lack of which would lead to disease or death, but they have certainly grown to be *conventional* necessities, which play so large a part in the way of living that is accepted as usual by the majority of the community that any appreciable reduction in their consumption involves a more radical alteration of habit than most people are prepared to make without suffering and protest. Hence the demand for all of them is highly inelastic.

(3) and (4) On the basis of these two common factors, we introduce our own personal variations arising from our income and our own tastes. To the rich man, a house of a particular type or size, conforming to recognized standards in its furnishing and equipment, is considered as much a necessity as are the geraniums in the window and the radio in the parlor by a person of more modest means. Before the war, when our right to buy was restricted only by our incomes, butter and meat were a necessity to the rich but a luxury to the poor. If prices of these articles

went up, the rich continued to buy almost as much as before, but the poorer people substituted margarine and cheese. And within each income range, individual tastes and idiosyncrasies have to be reckoned with. The scholar will go without dinner rather than without books; the ordinary reader won't.

We can put the whole thing briefly by saying that *the easier we find it to discover a substitute for something, the less essential do we consider it to be and, therefore, the more elastic will our demand for it be.* There are some types of goods that we look upon as substitutes for one another, but the group of which they form a part seems to be essential. For example, we may not mind whether the Sunday roast is beef or lamb, but we would be disappointed if there were no roast at all and we had to make do with fish or cheese. We would not rate either beef or lamb as "necessities," but we would put meat in this class. Or we might think of gas and electricity as equally pleasant and convenient ways of heating the house, so that although neither would be considered as a necessity by itself, some easily maneuvered means of heating would be. During the war, thousands of people chose a "novel by the fireside" in preference to an "outing in the blackout" as their recreation; after the war, the demand for recreation remained the same but the relative evaluation of methods of satisfying it changed, so that the post-war demand for novels is more elastic than it was during the war.

So far we have been considering prices simply from the point of view of the consumer who has so much money to spend and is thinking of how he might get the best value. But prices have an additional job to do. *Prices are an indication to the producer how best to allocate productive resources.* If more men decide that they prefer woolen shirts to cotton shirts, the price of the former goes up and of the latter comes down. Woolen shirt manufacturers need more wool, more workers—spinners, weavers, and the like—more machinery, building space, more packers and distributors, more transport; in fact, more of everything that is included in the making and disposal of their goods. And, because they expect to get bigger sales than before, they are prepared to compete against other industries wanting similar factors of production by offering higher prices for them. As a result, more of all these factors are taken up in their industry and others have to cut down their use of them.


Who decides which uses shall be curtailed? Nobody and everybody. Thousands of separate persons make their independent assessment of the demand there is likely to be for the things they make and settle in their own minds how far they can profitably go in bidding for the resources they require for their products. They are not, of course, completely in the dark in making their guesses; they have the experience of the past to guide them, and there are collections of facts that act as pointers to

them in making their decisions. But finally they have to guess; for goods have to be produced in *anticipation* of a market (since production takes time) and the producers cannot know for certain that purchasers will, in fact, buy the goods when they have been made. One of the most important functions of the "businessman" in a price economy is just this, of estimating consumers' demands for the thousands of different things that could be produced at varying prices so as to ensure that productive resources go into the channels where they are likely to be used to make the things the public wants and is prepared to buy.

It is very unfortunate that the chances of conversational terminology have come to apply the term "unplanned" to the economy in which this important work is done. The term "planned economy" has come to have a very special significance, denoting not simply that plans are made for the production and distribution of wealth, but also that the machinery for making such plans is of a particular type; and "unplanned" naturally came to be used for other kinds of organization. But because of the associations of the word, many people have fallen into the mistake of thinking of the price economy as completely haphazard and find it difficult to understand that there may be very efficient organization, even if there is no supreme command to which a person can point as the "brains" of the system. The businessman who knows from experience that his livelihood depends upon the skill with which he anticipates and meets the wishes of consumers is well aware that his work involves planning and management of a very high order. The measure of the skill with which the businessman provides the public with what it wants, where it wants it, when it wants it (as shown by the willingness to buy what he offers) is brought home to him very sharply by the amount of profit he makes on the job, and he is inclined to think somewhat ruefully of the use of the word "unplanned" for an activity that demands so much foresight, calculation, and good judgment.

Planned Economy

In a planned economy, on the other hand, using the term in its modern accepted sense, the decision on what shall be produced—and, therefore, the order of priority of wants to be satisfied—is made by authority. The planning authority may make its decisions in any way it thinks good. It may, for example, try to arrange that the things produced are just the ones that people would have bought if left free to spend their incomes as they liked; but this is improbable, because there would be little point in deliberately planning a scheme of produc-



British Information Service

BRITISH ECONOMY

Nationalized industry (an English coal mine), the stall and private shop (London), a consumer cooperative (Malaya), and the price economy of the market (Kenya). Like the British economy, the American economy includes all four.

tion if the aim is to make it exactly as it would have been if no planning had been introduced. The more usual aim of a planned economy is to use the productive resources to make a rather different pattern from the one that would have resulted from the pull of prices, that is, to produce certain things, or to produce them in larger quantities, than individual purchasers would have been willing to pay for, and consequently, to cut down the production of other things that consumers would have bought if they had been free to do as they wished.

A corollary of this control is the necessity for the authority to determine what share of the amount it has decided to produce shall be the share of any individual. This does not mean that the individual gets his share without any payment (though this may be so, as is the case, for example, with the education of children under fifteen) but that the size of the share does not depend, as it does in a price economy, on the price a person is prepared to pay, nor does the amount produced depend upon the total that consumers are willing to buy. Even the richest man cannot legally buy more than the rations allowed him by the regulations of the Ministry of Food, and no desire on the part of consumers to have more butter will increase the total available to them unless the Minister of Food judges that more butter shall be produced or imported.

We can see now why the area of the planned economy increased so greatly during the war years. There were certain things that had to be produced in immense quantities and with no avoidable waste of time if the war was to be waged successfully—tanks, airplanes, guns, fighting forces and their equipment, ships, civil defense, and the like—and all these, like everything else, could be produced only out of the total supply of natural resources, human effort, and ingenuity. They could be made only if there were a proportionate reduction in many of the kinds of production in which these resources had been used in peacetime and, hence, a similar cutting down of consumption. Unless this smaller amount available for consumption had been allocated by government rationing, only the richest people would have been able to get a share of these goods. In the more "normal" times before the war, a rise in the price of an article induced increased production and thus tended to get rid of both the high price and the scarcity that had caused it; whereas in wartime, no price, however high it rose, could have made the slightest difference to the amount produced, as the government was using the resources that would have been needed for the increase for other purposes.


In some countries, e.g., Soviet Russia, the government exercises this control as part of its normal routine and not simply as a war-time measure. The government decides what shall be produced and in what quantities and does not allow the amount of production to be determined by


the preferences of consumers, as shown by the prices they will pay for different amounts. And even in our pre-war world, we did not leave everything to the control of prices. Some things are undertaken by the state and supplied to us without consideration of how much we are willing to pay. For example, schools and hospitals, libraries and roads and parks, and many other things are provided by public authorities and we may make what use we like of them. Of course, we pay for them out of rates[1] and taxes, but the amount of our rates and taxes does not depend upon the use that we, as individuals, make of these things. We still pay the same amount in rates, even though we have no children to attend the schools or play in the parks provided by the local authority. So the contrast between us and Russia is largely one of degree. On the whole, we leave the greater part of our production to be determined by price movements but have a big and growing section in which the state makes the decisions without regard to prices, whereas in Russia the emphasis is the other way around.


When we try to compare the two systems, we have to remember that the issues are not purely economic; they also involve our ideas of what constitutes a "good society," and it is in determining what we mean by "fair" and "reasonable" and "just" that the main difficulties arise. The following section is an attempt to state some of the considerations that must be taken into account in deciding which of the two we prefer.


Price Economy vs. Planned Economy


1. At first sight, it seems that the price system ensures that goods are distributed most economically because they go to the people who want them most. The more eager you are to have a thing, the more you are prepared to pay to get it, and as the more you pay the more likely you are to be able to buy it, scarce goods presumably will get into the hands of those who really want them. But one of the greatest bothers about this is that the same price means such different things to all of us; it depends upon the size of our income and the number of people who are dependent upon us. For example, a bachelor with $3,000 a year can lightheartedly spend $2 on a whim, whereas a man with $1,000 a year and a wife and three children to look after must consider carefully before he can spend $1 on something as necessary as the Sunday dinner. To the manufacturer who is trying to estimate the market for his goods, it does not matter that one man's $1 represents more sacrifice than another's $2; he cannot know this. So if we leave everything to prices, the



PROFITS
Under capitalism, the answers are given by an economic system motivated by the incentive of profit.
1



REGULATION EXPENDITURE
TAXATION
Private enterprise, moreover, is not wholly private. Government modifies it through regulation, taxation and expenditures.
5



This system operates under conditions of competition for markets...
2


PROFITS
REGULATION
TAXATION
MIXED ENTERPRISE
PRICES
SUPPLY
MONOPOLY
DEMAND
Thus, ours is a 'mixed' enterprise economy – a blend of competition and monopoly, with both private and public control.
6


PRICE
SUPPLY
DEMAND
...and is guided by a price mechanism responding to the forces of supply and demand.
3


What is produced is determined by what consumers buy. Dollar purchases serve as 'votes' shaping future production.
7


PRICES
MONOPOLY
This system, however, is not perfectly competitive. Monopoly elements influence it by permitting control over supply and prices.
4


How things are produced is determined by a competitive search for cheaper methods and input-combinations.
8



rich man's whims will be attended to before the more urgent wants of the man with a smaller income. The building industry, for example, will find it more profitable to build week-end cottages for the rich man who already has one or two houses to live in instead of homes for the worker who has nowhere to live.

2. On the other hand, a person has to remember that what may seem to be strictly equal treatment (as, for example, when each person has a ration allotted to him) may be just as unfair as the effect of prices just discussed. In order to ensure that the quantity allowed to each person by a quantitative ration is available, the production of other commodities has to be curtailed. Suppose that I dislike meat and bacon and would prefer, if left free to choose, to spend my money on cheese and oranges. Under the rationing system, I seem to be getting as fair a share of food supplies as anybody else but, in fact, I am not. I get the same weight of food, but it represents less satisfaction to me than it does to those who happen to like these foods best. Or take another example. During the severe fuel crisis in England in 1947, people were urged to cut down their consumption of gas and electricity. There is no doubt that the most

effective way of doing this would have been to raise the price of both gas and electricity very sharply so that those who insisted upon having a fire during breakfast (one of the peak periods) would have realized how much it cost. Opinion was opposed to such rationing by price, however, because it was thought wrong that the sick and the aged, or families with young children, should be prevented from getting necessary warmth on account of the heavy cost. The result was that careless people, or those with less sensitive consciences, wasted a lot of fuel because it was cheap, but during the almost daily breakdowns in the service, which were the consequence of this extravagance, the sick and aged had to leave their most urgent wants unsatisfied, not because they could not afford the price but because the supply was turned off at the mains.

This is not an argument for abandoning all rationing or for conserving fuel by raising prices; it is merely a warning against the danger of being taken in by appearances. What seems to be absolutely equal treatment may turn out on further examination to have the same faults as the admittedly unequal method of sharing through the medium of prices.

3. Is it really fair to say, as I have said here, that sharing through the medium of prices is "admittedly unequal?" The inequality does not arise from the fact that we get our share by buying it, but from the fact that we have unequal money incomes. If we all had the same amount of money to spend, nobody would think it unfair that some of us were prepared to pay more for beef and others more for lamb. All that the price system does is to translate our unequal money incomes into unequal shares of consumable goods and what we are, in fact, complaining about is not the price system but the inequality of incomes.

But, as was pointed out previously, our judgments about our economic organizations are not based on purely economic grounds, and we often criticize part of our economic setup for social rather than economic reasons. Even if we don't want complete equality we shrink from allowing differences in income to have their full effect on the life of the individual citizen. There has never been any time in the modern world when the person who had no income at all was left to starve, and in the last half century or so a larger and larger part of the wealth of the community has been shared out among its members on the basis of their common citizenship rather than according to the size of their incomes. Education, health services, housing, and many other common services fall into this category; and the more accustomed we become to getting a share of goods and services on this civil basis, the readier we grow to criticize the price system for not doing something that it was never intended to do, i.e., share everything out equally among us all.

4. Some people argue in favor of a planned economy, saying that, because our productive resources are limited, we should use them first on necessities for all before we have any luxuries. The problem here is to decide what is a luxury and what is a necessity (see the earlier section on elastic demands). During the post-war years, we all know that we have to cut down our imports from America because we do not have enough dollars, and it is generally agreed that only essential food and raw materials should be bought. How does tobacco rate in this? To the non- or casual smoker, reducing tobacco imports seems an obvious way of cutting our commitments, but to the millions of habitual smokers the continued import of tobacco is as essential as that of basic foods.

Moralists have always complained that a good deal of poverty is due to wasteful expenditure and that persons of small income have only themselves to blame for their condition if they do not concentrate their buying on the most important elements of healthy living. Others might answer that nobody can go on working unless he has some fun out of it and that a glass of beer or a dollar on the football pools or the horse races may be a psychological necessity. Even though life could be maintained in a person's body without these pleasures, would there be any incentive to work if an individual could never let up for a moment? One man's meat is another man's poison remains as true as ever, and we all feel rather superior when we think how our neighbors waste their time and money.

5. But many people will still insist that there is nevertheless a fairly general consensus of opinion about the importance of certain things for healthy living (as is evidenced by the general agreement on the commodities that should be rationed during the war scarcities) and that it would be best to make sure that these were produced in sufficient quantities without bothering about prices, even if there were wide differences of opinion on the relative importance of all the rest. There are some foods that the dieticians have shown to be necessary to health; there are certain standards of housing and clothing that custom has decreed as the minimum acceptable to the community. Here at once you have an enormous area in which personal assessments of necessity and luxury are irrelevant and that could, therefore, be produced without regard to price.

But here, too, there is the problem of the "little more or less." Everybody would agree that playing tennis is not as necessary as bread is. Ought we then to dig up all our tennis courts in order to grow wheat on them and bake millions more loaves? Every extra batch of loaves is less and less a necessity; every tennis court dug up leaves less and less opportunity for healthy exercise and relaxation. Which loaf ceases to be a necessity and which tennis court becomes one?

6. There is another difficulty. Suppose we agree that bread is a necessity and must be produced in "adequate" quantities without bothering to define too carefully what we mean by adequate. Digging up the tennis court is not the only way to increase the bread supplies. I might prefer to keep the tennis courts and have fewer gardens or cabbages or factory sites.

The great advantage of a price system is that it enables each person to make his own individual assessment of the relative "essentialness" of things to him, to judge for himself which of his comparative luxuries he would prefer to give up and how much of each he would prefer to give up in order to get for himself more of the things he values more highly.

That is the difficulty of giving up the price mechanism. Faulty as it is, we have not yet discovered any other method of measuring relative values more accurately. A planning authority has, in fact, to guess and to hope that it guesses in a way that, on the whole, satisfies the ideas of the majority of the people. But every bit you take out of the price mechanism and put into state planning, the more difficult guessing becomes, because you have fewer freely indicated preferences to act as guide. Moreover, a "guess" made by the state has much wider repercussions than the decisions made by individuals. If 10,000 independent producers attempt to guess the public likes and dislikes, they may guess wide of the mark, but it is unlikely that they will all go wrong in the same direction, so that on balance the total may not be far out. But if a government official, even with more information available to him than any one of the 10,000 guesses wrong, there is no other wrong guess that can possibly compensate, and his wrong judgment may direct productive resources into a more wasteful channel than they would have gone into, if left alone.

7. Is it true that we get the best out of our money if we are left to spend as we like? Do we really make these delicate assessments so carefully that we always get the greatest possible amount of satisfaction from our incomes? We have to admit that some people are better managers than others and we all know the remarkable difference in standards of living that seem to be enjoyed by families who have the same income. (Remember there is danger in such judgments, for we may be imposing our particular views of what constitutes a good standard and assuming that everybody must accept the same valuation. Mrs. Smith may be an excellent housewife who gets the most amazing value out of her husband's wages, while Mrs. Jones, whose husband earns the same amount, does not find it worth while to spend so much time and energy on bargain hunting, but prefers to play with the children and laugh at her husband's jokes. Who is to say, except their respective families, which woman is the better manager?)

But allowing for differences of judgment about what is worth having, we know from our own experience—if we are honest enough to admit it —that we often buy from habit, and that we are both too conservative and too lazy to change, even though it would be to our advantage to do so. This is particularly true when the sacrifice we have to make (in the form of the price paid) is immediate, whereas the benefit accrues over a long period, as is the case with education or health facilities. During the war, many careless parents did not use the milk and orange juice and cod liver oil provided for their children, even though there was no charge for it; and it is certain that the health of the children, as a whole, would not have been so triumphantly maintained during those difficult years, if the state had not taken the initiative in ensuring the supplies of food of this type, and if it had not fed them direct to the children without asking their parents to take such responsibility for them. And could we be certain that every child would get an education if the choice was left to its parents and the fees had to be paid regularly to cover the cost of schools and equipment and teachers' salaries?

We have to agree that in many ways the state can spend our money in a way that is more conducive to our welfare than we could. The problem here is to know where to draw the line. When the welfare of children is in question, the matter is not so difficult, for we can argue that since the child cannot make his own decisions and cannot trust to some adult, it is the duty of the government to protect those children who might suffer through being in the charge of an ignorant or careless or selfish person. But an adult is in a very different position. I might be convinced that Mr. X is wasting his money on silly pleasures that do him no good and a great deal of harm, but what right have I, or anybody else, to impose my ideas on Mr. X? There is no more insidious vice than that of interfering with one's fellow man in the guise of "doing him good," and we have to be careful not to become dictators with the best intentions. One of the freedoms for which most of us would be prepared to die is the right to go to the devil in our own way, rather than to Paradise by government direction. It is very difficult to reconcile the liberty of the individual to go on in his own crass, muddleheaded way—but a way that pleases himself and does no harm to anybody else—with the wish to see every member of the community living a healthy, efficient life.

The British Broadcasting Corporation is a good illustration of this problem of reconciling the likes and dislikes of the individual with what other people think is good for him. If we paid for each radio program as we tuned into it, as we do when we go to the movies or the theatre, the ups and downs of the market would determine the proportion of symphonies and crooners offered to us. But, as it is, the British Broadcasting

Corporation has to make up its mind, as a matter of policy or planning, whether to give us an opera or a variety show or a talk on international affairs or anything else that can be transmitted by radio, and, in consequence, angry letters pour daily into Broadcasting House complaining that too much time is given to talks, to light music, to classical music, to highbrow plays, to comics, and to everything else. Some people argue that they won't pay their $2.80 a year for nonsense and noise, that they want to be educated and elevated; others insist equally warmly that they have a right to be entertained and don't want to be "improved." The British Broadcasting Corporation (I think sensibly, but you may take the opposite view) takes a middle course. It takes the line that grown-up people have a right to use their leisure as they like, so it provides for all kinds of tastes more or less in the proportion that its Research Department shows such tastes to exist—highbrow, lowbrow, and mezzo, and all the shades in between. But at the same time, as a public service, it places itself just a little, but not too far, ahead of public tastes and interests and experiments with plays and music and discussions that listeners would not have asked for themselves but that they gradually learn to appreciate.

8. There are many things that are of benefit to the community as a whole but that would be impractical for us to pay for individually as we make use of them—for example, national defense or roads. Moreover, there would be a danger in leaving the provision of these to the stimulus of individual preferences as shown by prices because we should not have the permanent basic organization that is essential to further their development in case of need.

In conclusion, a warning is necessary. In this chapter, I have been dealing only with the methods of deciding how scarce productive resources shall be distributed among the many uses to which they might be put, i.e., how the choice shall be made of which wants and whose wants shall get priority. I have not been concerned with the *organization* of production. There are many people who argue that a publicly constituted body can organize production more efficiently and more economically than a number of privately owned and competing firms. This is a matter of "techniques" and we lack room to discuss this subject here; but the fact that an enterprise is publicly owned or controlled does not, of itself, mean that it is unrelated to the price mechanism.

Experience has shown that there are many advantages to be gained by having your streetcars or buses or gas supply provided by the local authority, but this does not mean that they do not conform to the price mechanism. It all depends upon how they are run. The local authority might be anxious to persuade people to live in the country away from

the congested industrial part of the town and might decide to run bus services at a loss and make up the losses out of the rates. In this case, the authority would be determining the production of transport by other criteria than the price consumers were prepared to offer, and would thus be "planning" the allocation of resources in the sense defined previously. But if the authority provided bus and streetcar routes only if they paid their way by the fares charged to those who used them, the transport system would still be part of the price economy. The point is that the *fact* of public ownership does not of itself constitute planning or take production out of the price mechanism; it depends on the *policy* of the publicly owned concern.

19

THE BELIEF SYSTEM UNDERLYING THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

The Relationship Between the Belief System and the Economy of a Society

Every society, whatever its religious, political, or social orientation, has a common set of beliefs shared by its members. Man must believe in something or somebody. The things he believes in, the way these beliefs grow and change, determine and sustain all the activities of the society. To understand a society, we must first understand its belief system.

But a word of caution: One society cannot be evaluated in terms of the beliefs, values, and sentiments of another. Beliefs vary from culture to culture and from epoch to epoch. We can hardly expect to understand the culture of ancient China, for example, if we seek to interpret it according to the faiths of our own Christian-Judaic heritage.

We have already seen in Chapter 2 that the elaborate belief system of the Cuna is fundamental to an understanding of the peculiar place the *neles* hold in Cuna society. Among many other nonliterates, the absence of economic behavior characteristic of the modern market can be comprehended only if we realize that members are bound by religious and kinship ties and place no importance on the motive of commercial gain. There may be no money or common denominator of value. Goods and services may be exchanged as an expression of good will and in large part as incidents of ceremonial and ritual acts. We are not concerned here with questioning the validity of such beliefs and activities. The significant fact is that these are arrangements to be found among many nonliterates and if we are to understand these people, we must understand the beliefs upon which these arrangements rest.

If understanding the belief system is essential to understanding the society as a whole, it follows that any interpretation of a society's economy must begin with the beliefs upon which it rests. In Chapter 17, we explored the basic economic decisions that must be made in every society. A little reflection will reveal that each of these decisions is closely related to the beliefs, sentiments, and values of the society. For example, the decision that resources shall be used for the construction of a totem is clearly a development of a particular set of beliefs. Not quite so obvious, perhaps, but just as close, is the association between a society's beliefs and the decision to allocate some 50 billion dollars to the production of armaments.

We must understand the belief system underlying an economy (1) if we are to view the economy in its own terms, (2) if we are to see the differences between one economy and another, and (3) if we are to understand the rate of change within an economy.

The belief system of a society is important if the economy is to be evaluated in its own terms. Goals and values of a society are in large measure a product of the beliefs of the society. The first step toward understanding the operation of an economy is to understand what its values are and which of these have higher priority. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown tells of one society where the dominant market principle was price stability. The fact that yams might be scarce in relation to fish had no effect upon the price for which these two commodities were exchanged. If one yam equaled ten fish at one period, it would do so at another regardless of the comparative quantities of yams and fish available. An American businessman might find the operation of such a market very puzzling. The significant fact is that in the simple market of which Radcliffe-Brown wrote, stability of price was considered so important that changes in supply were not allowed to affect it.

Differences in belief systems help us understand the differences between economies. This fact is quite generally recognized, but unfortunately, from the point of view of the analyst, ethnocentrism frequently makes such a comparison difficult. The simple approach frequently runs along the lines that Economy A is better than Economy B because the value system of A is better than that of B. Such may or may not be the case. The important consideration for the social scientist is to distinguish the differences between economies that are due to differences in the systems of beliefs. For example, two societies with similar physical resources may use them in quite different ways. In one society we might find the members engaged in agricultural pursuits and in another in the making of pottery. To make the case clear-cut, we might assume that the agriculturalists did not make pottery although clay was available, and the pottery-makers did not raise crops although the soil would support them. Analysis of such societies might disclose that in the former, great prestige and high status were accorded the successful husbandman while in the latter, such prestige and status went to the adept craftsman. The differences in the use of labor and in the ensuing product under these circumstances could be attributed to the differences in belief.

Finally, the belief system of a society can shed light upon the rate of change within the economy. Social change, including economic change, occurs in all societies, but it occurs more rapidly in some than in others. Although the causes of social change are only dimly perceived at present, it seems evident that the beliefs that people hold are important in evoking that change. Certain types of belief incline people to be receptive to particular changes and resistant to others. The relationship between the belief system and social change has become a matter of increasing importance to the more industrially developed countries of the West, as they have turned their attention to the underdeveloped areas of the world. The successful introduction of western techniques into the economies of these undeveloped areas depends upon the receptivity of the people in these areas to such changes. Failure to recognize which change is likely to be accepted and which is not may defeat the entire program. The differences in belief between Americans and the people of Southeastern Asia, for example, indicate that it would be a gross error to expect that the Asians would accept technological change in the same areas and to the same extent that we have.

When we consider the belief system of the American economy, the first problem that faces us is the heterogeneous nature of the society itself. It is difficult enough to generalize about the belief system of a homogeneous, nonliterate society; it is vastly more difficult to generalize about a society as complex and dynamic as that of the United States.

Because American society is so heterogeneous, many beliefs, although important, do not find universal acceptance. In addition, different interpretations exist in regard to the beliefs themselves. For example, a belief in private property rights is one element of our economic belief system, but people disagree on exactly what constitutes a private property right. Different social, class, religious, and cultural groups hold varying opinions of the relative meaning and worth of such values as individualism, cooperation, competition, and thrift.

What we will attempt in this chapter is an analysis of the *dominant* beliefs that have a direct bearing upon the American economy. Not all Americans, probably not any one American, would embrace all these beliefs. Furthermore, certain significant beliefs may contradict certain others. In many places throughout this book, we shall stress the point that a belief system need not be wholly consistent; even the belief system of a single individual may have internal inconsistencies. Bearing in mind these considerations, we may now turn our attention to certain beliefs that have been extremely influential in our economic history.

What follows will be considered from two points of view. In the first place, American society, just as any other, functions on the basis of a certain number of generally accepted premises or habitual assumptions. For example, a grocer who contracts with a wholesaler for a delivery of bread expects that the contract will be fulfilled. A large, profitable sale may depend upon the fulfillment of the agreement. But there are also a number of beliefs that are quite likely to bring about certain changes in the premises themselves—beliefs that encourage change and therefore are likely to be accompanied by change. For example, the American belief in the worth of science has led us to discard traditional ways of doing things when scientific evidence disclosed that a different method was more likely to be successful. The chemical industry is one example of the tremendous changes that the acceptance and exploitation of scientific findings can bring about. Whether a particular firm of that industry makes its large investments in research primarily for the purpose of performing a public service (as is frequently claimed) or because it fears the possible findings of its competitors (as some observers have been unkind enough to suggest), it remains true that changes in the industry have resulted from the acceptance of scientific findings as a basis for action.

Because in the American economy change has played a most important part both in terms of the material progress of the economy and in terms of the problems that change has brought about, we shall consider the *dynamics* of the economic belief system as well as the *habitual assumptions.*

Habitual Assumptions Basic to the American Economy

Property rights. A basic element of our economic belief system is the concept of property rights. The term "property" is commonly thought to refer to some physical object, such as a house or car. As used here, however, the term refers not to the object itself but to the relationship between an individual or individuals and the object. *Property* represents a collection of rights, responsibilities, and duties. When these rights, responsibilities, and duties are exercised by the society as a whole, we speak of *communal* property. When they are exercised by individual persons, we speak of *private* property.

"Property" refers not only to material objects, but also to intangibles. For example, published material—books, speeches, poems, songs, and the like—is protected by copyright laws to prevent its use by unauthorized persons.

The subject of private property rights has intrigued lawyers, political scientists, and economists, among others, for a very long time. Much has been written to "prove" that private property is or is not a result of Divine or "natural" law. But these arguments need not concern us here. The important point for our purpose is to note the strong American belief in private property. This is not to say that all property rights in America are in fact private or even that Americans believe they should be private. There are broad areas where *private* property rights do not exist—such as the public school system, public roads, and certain types of water power developments. The property relationship in these areas is between the objects involved and the people as a whole; that is, it is *communal* property.

The property concept as understood in the United States embraces not only private property and communal property, but also a special form of private property that is designated "private property clothed with a public interest." This concept is necessarily a vague one but has been used to indicate that in certain instances the use to which private property is put is of such public interest that particular regulations must be imposed. This applies to private property in such "public utilities" as communications, transportation, and power. Such property, although it is still assumed to be private as distinguished from communal, includes a smaller number of rights from the property owner's point of view. The direct governmental regulation of prices, investment, and service in the railroad industry, for example, rests upon the assumed peculiarities of the private property in this industry. Although there are numerous explanations for the designation of particular industries as being within

this public utility concept (i.e., industries whose property is "clothed with a public interest"), no one of these explanations is logically consistent with respect to the industries that are included and those that are not. The definition of what does and does not constitute property clothed with the public interest has in the past rested with the judiciary. Typically, the courts have avoided a hard and fast definition, but in general have been moved by such considerations as the existence of a "natural monopoly," or of an industry upon which all other industry in a particular area must depend.

One American economist, John R. Commons, developed a classification of property rights that can be very useful in clarifying the relationship of this belief to the American economy. Commons divided property rights into three categories. The relationship between an individual and a physical object he called a *corporeal* property right; the relationship between an individual and some representation of a material object an *incorporeal* property right; and the relationship between an individual and his expectation of some future return an *intangible* property right.

The fact that the concept of property includes not only the businessman's buildings (*corporeal property*), but also the bonds he holds in his safe (*incorporeal property*) and his right to do business and his trade name (*intangible property*) indicates how powerful this concept is in the American economy.

Americans tend to think of private property as fixed. That is, they expect that because a private property right has been recognized, the same right will continue to exist indefinitely. This expectation is not without some foundation because the courts have been zealous in interpreting the Constitution in such a way as to protect property rights and have given the concept a kind of sacrosanct quality. But at the same time, the idea of property itself has changed. That is, the areas where private property rights are recognized have shifted from time to time. This has brought about certain conflicts not only with respect to the definition of property itself, but also in the settlement of conflicting property claims. One of the more fortunate features of American society has been the acceptance of *due process of law* as a means for settling such conflicts.

The flexibility of the American concept of property together with the acceptance of *due process* has meant that private property has been an exceedingly tough and enduring idea. This has been particularly true as men have placed increasing emphasis upon *intangible property rights,* because by their very nature intangible property rights open up a vast variety of property relationships that go far beyond the mere relationship between an individual and some material object or its representation. Intangible property rights generally have included such protection

as the right to continue to do business and the right to the expectations from a trade name. In recent years, the right to a particular job has also been included in this category. It should be kept in mind that like all property rights in America, *intangible property rights* are not absolute but are subject to certain limiting conditions and are actually always in the process of change.

Contracts. Closely related to our firm belief in property rights is the sanctity we accord the right of contract. A fundamental assumption underlying the operation of the American economy is the idea that a person has the right to enter a contractual relationship with another person. Here again the relationship is subject to broad restrictions. Before discussing the restrictions, however, it will be useful to examine the nature of the contractual relationship itself.

A *contract* is a transaction whereby one individual agrees to provide another with a good or service in return for another good or service, usually at some future time. Every exchange involves a contract. Some contracts (like buying and selling a candy bar) may be entered and consummated in a matter of minutes or less. Others (like a mortgage, or an actress's contract with a studio) may extend over a period of many years. The matter of time is very important in contract relationships, because a contract is an attempt to project present conditions into the future. We will consider some of the difficulties that this situation has created shortly. The important thing for us to remember here is that Americans believe that they have the right to enter into contracts and that these contracts will be enforced by higher authority. This belief is central to the vast number of transactions that take place within the economy every day.

To understand the significance of contracts, imagine what would happen if some morning the nation awoke with no memory of the contractual relationship at all. Transactions of all kinds would cease. Or suppose that for some reason contracts could not be extended for a period beyond 24 hours. All credit transactions would be affected, and most of them would collapse. Wages, rents, and interest payments could not be projected into the future. Such speculation is idle, but it enables us to understand better the importance of that aspect of the American belief system that underlies the contractual relationship.

Not everyone can enter into a contract with another person. Age and mental competency restrictions exist. The subject matter of the contract also must be legal. As an absurd example, a contract involving murder would be illegal, to say nothing of its other difficulties.

The question of who may legally enter a contract and the situation a

contract may cover are areas where change takes place and consequently where conflicts develop. For example, until 1932 a contract between an employer and an employee entered into at the time of employment and stating that the employee was not a member of a labor organization and would not during his employment join such an organization was enforceable in the federal courts. Further, any individual who encouraged such an employee to join a labor organization was likely to find himself charged with conspiracy to break a contract. By making such contracts unenforceable in the federal courts, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 substantially changed this particular type of contractual relationship.


Sometimes, because of unexpected and sudden changes that affect the economy as a whole, it becomes necessary to change the original terms of a contract, to declare a moratorium on the contract for a certain time, or to extend the original expiration date of the contract. For example, during the depression of the 1930's the terms of many mortgage contracts could not be carried out without seriously damaging the entire economy. The principle that was applied in these cases was that the letter of a contract would be changed without changing the substantial rights of the parties. The changes were made through due process of law. That is, in final form the changes reflected the views of the judiciary after arguments for and against the proposed solution had been heard.

Dynamic Beliefs Basic to the American Economy


When we spoke of the attitudes and beliefs that Americans hold toward property rights and contracts, we mentioned that social change often considerably modified these beliefs. This relationship, however, is not reciprocal. Beliefs in property rights and the right of contract are *not necessarily* contributory to social change. Although it is certainly true that the American conceptions of property and contracts have proved flexible enough in the past to enable a tremendous amount of change to take place, it is conceivable that a society with this same set of beliefs with respect to contracts and property might demonstrate a much smaller capacity for change. In the remainder of this chapter we will turn our attention to *dynamic* beliefs, those that do initiate social change and that play a significant part in directing the economic orientation of a society.

Individualism. Americans have long placed great stock in the idea of individual freedom and initiative.[1] Only an individual free from state

A NEW AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS



The right to work, usefully and creatively through the productive years;



The right to fair pay, adequate to command the necessities and amenities of life in exchange for work, ideas, thrift, and other socially valuable service;




The right to adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care;




The right to security, with freedom from fear of old age, want, dependency, sickness, unemployment, and accident;



The right to live in a system of free enterprise, free from compulsory labor, irresponsible private power, arbitrary public authority, and unregulated monopolies;



The right to come and go, to speak or to be silent, free from the spyings of secret political police;



The right to equality before the law, with equal access to justice in fact;



The right to education, for work, for citizenship, and for personal growth and happiness; and



The right to rest, recreation, and adventure; the opportunity to enjoy life and take part in an advancing civilization.

PICTOGRAPH CORPORATION

interference, it is felt, can develop his talents and abilities to the utmost. This belief has been supported by the conviction that the individual is best able to judge his own self-interest and that therefore a society functions best when the individual is given the widest possible area in which to pursue this interest. It is felt that there is no necessary conflict between the individual interest and that of society, because competition among individuals forces each individual to meet the societal needs in order to achieve personal gains. It has been assumed that with profit as his main incentive, the entrepreneur must offer something the public wants, his technique must be more efficient than those of his competitors, and his prices must be lower. To increase his profits, he must seek out and develop larger markets, and must adopt mass-production techniques. Thus, while the individual furthers his own self-interest, he simultaneously engages in useful and productive economic activity that benefits the whole society.

The American belief that social benefits result from the pursuit of individual self-interest assumes a competitive economy. This assumption of competitive conditions points to another aspect of the American belief system that is very closely associated with individualism, namely, the belief that competition is a good thing in its own right. The connection is clear, because it is only when competition exists that self-interest can be trusted to perform its function as the automatic regulator of economic activity. The American acceptance of individualism, therefore, has provided fertile ground for the development of the doctrine of laissez faire. It is not necessary at this point to examine the adequacy or the possibility of laissez faire as government policy (see Chapter 30). The point is that laissez faire has been an important article of American economic faith, and that it has been supported by the fundamental conviction that the individual should be allowed to follow his own self-interest if the interest of society as a whole is to be served. That the interests of society as a whole may not be served by allowing each individual to pursue his own interests, or that laissez faire has frequently operated to the advantage of powerful groups in the economy and to the disadvantage of the less powerfully situated is beside the point when we are calling attention to the existence of the belief. It is very doubtful that laissez faire could have attained a position of such extreme importance had it not been widely supported. It is also doubtful that it could have been so widely supported without a deep rooted belief in individualism.

The Puritan ethic. As we shall see later in this chapter and in subsequent chapters, there are many behavior patterns in American society that cannot be reconciled with, or that considerably modify, this indi-

vidualistic conception of the social order. But before turning to a consideration of such contradictions and modifications, we will examine another aspect of our economic belief system that supports and reinforces individualism. In Chapter 17, the importance of the *Puritan ethic* was mentioned. Many books have been written on the relationship between the Protestant revolt and the rise of capitalism. It is not possible within the limited space of this chapter to examine the subject in detail. Instead, we will stress those aspects of the creed that have become widely accepted in our society and that affect the economic behavior of a large part of the population.

The first of these aspects is that *work is good for its own sake.* Hard work has been equated with virtue and laziness with sin. This belief is so widely held that even those who work very little or not very hard have been forced to rationalize their lack of industry or to give the impression that they really work very hard. It takes courage to be a "bum" in the United States. A person has only to look about him to see all kinds of evidence that work is considered virtuous. The wealthy man tries to convince others that he has earned his wealth "by the sweat of his brow"; the student tries to convince his instructor that whatever his accomplishments, they were associated with grinding, laborious effort. And, although it is probably true that many people merely try to give the appearance of effort, it is also true that in a society where work is considered a virtue at all levels, much gets done.

If work is a virtue, and if work is expected to yield results, it follows that such results cannot be condemned. In the American belief system this is the case. It is expected that work will yield some tangible benefits and, as a matter of fact, the value of the work itself is frequently equated to the outcome. Thus the second aspect of the Puritan ethic is that *the acquisition and possession of material success* is not only acceptable, but also *indicates moral respectability.* A man of substance is commonly assumed to be moral until proven otherwise.

And third, the Puritan ethic has clothed *savings and thrift* in moral garb. It would be difficult to overemphasize this aspect of the Puritan ethic, because it placed a force behind saving and thrift much more powerful than the anticipation of an economic return alone. Our fondness for quoting proverbs such as "A penny saved is a penny earned" or "Waste not want not" reveal our aversion of the wastrel and the prodigal. The compulsion to save and be thrifty has even transcended changes in the interest rate.

There is some evidence that the drive toward thrift and saving has become less powerful in recent years. The long period of prosperity during the 1940's and early 1950's, the tax structure, and the growth of social

security and pension plans may be weakening the individual's inclination to save. The evidence in this area is not conclusive at present, but it seems probable that a continued period of inflation will seriously weaken the individual's propensity to save when it becomes apparent that dollars will always buy less in the future than they will at present. If inflation continues, the propensity to consume out of current income can be expected to encourage "conspicuous consumption" and "ostentatious display."

Science and Technology

Although science and technology are quite different things, Americans tend to accept both the findings of science and changes in techniques without reservations. We assume that science holds the key to all improvement and advancement and that new techniques are always better than the old. This attitude sometimes leads us to expect that the new will be better simply because it is new (see Chapter 1).

But this attitude is not an unmixed blessing. It has enabled science to flourish, but it has also promoted almost every conceivable myth in the name of science itself. We have only to consider the extravagant claim of some toothpaste or cigarette manufacturer, claims buttressed by "irrefutable scientific evidence," to understand how the high prestige accorded science and scientists has been exploited to support conclusions that are themselves in conflict with scientific evidence.

The widespread acceptance of the methods and findings of science has been a powerful force for change in the American economy. The conclusions of scientific investigations have frequently offered a challenge to established beliefs and ways of behaving. This has been a source of tension within the society and even within particular individuals themselves. An individual's attitude toward science is frequently ambivalent. He may accept the methods of science but reject particular findings if the findings are opposed to some cherished belief he holds.

Americans are prone to approach new techniques in much the same way. We will accept some new way of producing goods, for example, on the ground that it is more efficient. Efficiency has high prestige. However, when the more efficient method interferes with the traditional method—as it is bound to do—it is not unusual to find that the very individuals who in a general way support more efficient techniques will reject those that threaten their own vested interests. The southern laborer who welcomed improved sanitation devices fought against the introduction of the mechanical cotton-picker because it threatened his livelihood.

Economic Beliefs in Conflict

A belief system, we noted previously, includes a number of conflicting elements. In order that a society avoid flying to pieces, these beliefs must be reconciled or rationalized. As an example, let us for a moment look at the American belief in equal opportunity as opposed to the doctrine of individualism and note how these two ideas have been reconciled.

The powerful personality may very often, in the course of exercising his own potentialities, deny equal opportunity to others. It became apparent during the last quarter of the nineteenth century that if equal opportunity was to be protected, the very individualism that allowed a man or a group of men to conduct business activities in any manner they saw fit within existing laws would have to be curtailed. Thus, in the name of preventing monopoly, toward which unrestricted individualism seemed to be moving, restrictions were introduced in the form of the Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890. This Act embodies the idea that freedom of opportunity also implies a rejection of power concentrations.

As long as it was felt that the only concentration of power to be feared was that exercised by the government, there was no necessary conflict between individualism and freedom of opportunity. When it was discovered, however, that private concentrations of economic power had developed, the conflict became very real, because such concentrations undermine the competitive market that had been relied upon to reconcile individual self-interest with social welfare. In order to preserve equality of opportunity for all, Americans have seen fit to modify, when necessary, the idea of unbridled individualism. This has not necessarily weakened the appeal of the latter theory. Many large and important segments of the population still regard individualism as akin to holy dogma.

The growing concentration of economic power has produced other conflicts in the American belief system. In certain industries, more efficient methods have been accompanied by, and have probably been a by-product of, increased size. This has raised the important and as yet unresolved question of whether a business firm should be allowed to develop to whatever size is consistent with efficient production or be forced to restrict its size lest it develop a monopoly position and thus stifle the free play of competition. Although efficiency itself is a value of high rank, the fact that the enormous size of a business firm may curtail competition constitutes a threat to an equally important aspect of the American belief system.

Another area where the belief in equal opportunity clashes with the belief in individualism is in profits and wages. In a truly individualistic society, there would be no such thing as exorbitant profits or sub-standard wages. Profits and wages received would be considered just simply because they existed, no matter what their respective levels might be. In America, however, this is not the situation; we hear much talk about "decent wages" and "fair profits." Granted that the terms are loose, in fact, probably meaningless in any scientific sense, such concepts have had a powerful effect on our economy.

The idea of a "fair profit" assumes that profits should exist but that they should not be larger than some undefined level. This idea has been used both to justify the curtailment of profits in particular areas, such as public utilities, and at particular times, such as in wartime. It has also been used by entrepreneurs either to justify existing profits or as a basis for the claim that profits should be higher. However the concept of a "fair profit" is used, it weakens the individualistic interpretation that profits are an independent, objective measure of individual competence.

The idea of a "decent wage" also is inconsistent with a strictly individualistic conception of the social order. The fact that minimum wage laws cover broad occupational areas indicates that a standard has been introduced that is independent of the individualistic conception of the employer-employee relationship. Individualism is not relied upon to set minimum wage levels, and to that extent individualism is modified.

Americans aspire to, and many achieve, a high standard of living. This standard has included the possession of large quantities of material goods, especially goods that contribute to the comfort and ease of those who possess them. Frequently Americans acquire such goods through installment buying or some other form of consumer credit. This kind of behavior, of course, is inconsistent with the belief that savings and thrift are paramount virtues. And it sometimes leads to seemingly irrational behavior. An individual will make deposits in a savings account that pay him 2 or 3 per cent interest in order to satisfy the urge to "save something," but at the same time he will borrow at a much higher rate of interest to pay for some article that fits into his "high standard of living."

Although the emphasis upon a "high standard of living" may produce conflict and ambivalent behavior among Americans, it also results in economic change. The continued emphasis upon comfort and convenience has stimulated the development of such industries as electrical appliances, heating, transportation, communication, and power. If a person should need proof that the belief in a "high standard of living" is important to the American business community, he need only view the

advertisements in our newspapers and magazines. The advertiser's appeal is based upon his conviction that we wish to attain the level of comfort and convenience promised by his product.

Although the heterogeneity of beliefs in American society makes it very difficult to tie the American belief system into a neat little package, this very heterogeneity has in the past been a source of great strength. The number and complexity of the beliefs that underlie the economy have not only offered a wide choice of beliefs to fit particular situations, but the conflicts among them have made it difficult for a single dogma or complete explanation to arise. In other words, the very flexibility of the belief system and the resulting lack of dogma are important aspects of any explanation of the development of the American economy.

20

BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

Introduction

In an earlier chapter of this section, Gertrude Williams pointed out that in a price economy the parceling out of goods and services is determined largely by the "pull of individual choices" in the market place. This she distinguished from a planned economy where the distributing is determined by government authority.

Price economy is the system upon which the principles of American economic life are founded. This, indeed, is no cause for surprise. Traditional American respect for freedom of individual action and opposition to centralized control make it only logical that this nation should believe in the freedom of each person to buy and to produce what he chooses.

The theory of price economy was first laid down by economists such as the Scotsman Adam Smith in the late eighteenth century when economic

conditions were far different from what they have become in the mid-twentieth. The independent artisan of Smith's day has been replaced by the giant industrial corporation, his few neighborhood customers by a market of national or international size, his journeyman or apprentice helper by large numbers of workers in highly organized unions, his simple tools by power-driven machinery. These changes have modified the validity of price economy theory. This chapter will consider the modifications and note the ways in which society has adjusted to the new situation.


The Industrial Revolution

An essential element of the price economy theory is that businesses shall be perfectly competitive. This means that there must be enough sellers bidding for the customer's patronage to give him a wide choice among them and enable him to turn to the one offering the desired service at the lowest price. Only in this way can the money that each individual has to spend bring him the greatest possible return. Under no circumstances must one business unit become large or powerful enough to develop exclusive control or *monopoly* over the production of any good or service and thus get more of the customer's money than would be the case under competitive conditions.

All this was more than theory in 1776 when Adam Smith wrote *The Wealth of Nations,* and it was a particularly apt description of actual conditions in frontier America. The independent artisan made and sold his products to those within a few miles of his doorstep. If the quality of his workmanship declined or if he failed to use his own labor and that of his hired man, his simple tools, and his raw materials in the most efficient combination, thus forcing his price to rise, it was a comparatively simple matter for a rival to set up shop and lure his business away. Competition between the two, or even the prospect of such competition, assured the consumer of the lowest possible price.

Smith's book was hardly off the press, however, when a fellow Britisher named James Watt set in motion a chain of events that was profoundly to alter the entire structure of economic life. To his contemporaries, what Watt accomplished in 1777 was hardly startling. The principle that steam contained power to turn wheels and move levers had long been known. But when Watt applied that principle to a practical engine that pumped water from a flooded Cornish mine, the Industrial Revolution was born.

The years sped by and the wheels turned faster. The power of steam



British Information Service

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION REACHES ASIA

The Sikh engineer with a turbo-prop engine and the Indians producing munitions testify that industrialization is a world-wide trend.

was joined by power from the black liquid that could be made to gush from the earth and power created by falling water. This power applied to manufacturing during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries completely changed the picture that had confronted Adam Smith. It now became possible for one business unit to turn out a supply of goods undreamed of in Smith's day. The number of shoes that one cobbler could make in a week by hand, for example, was multiplied more than a thousand-fold by the use of power-driven machinery to cut the leather, stitch the soles, and drive the nails. The same held true for virtually any article one could mention—books or bicycles, chairs or chandeliers.

The most efficient combination of the factors of production has become, in the last 175 years, therefore, not the skill of the individual artisan and his simple tools changing the raw material into a finished product, but rather the application to the raw material of complex, power-driven machinery. Capital rather than labor is now the key. The independent artisan, unable to compete, has gradually disappeared from the scene, making his way to the factory where the output of goods has been concentrated around the machine.

But the new type of capital has done more than just destroy the independent artisan. The new machines are expensive to build and maintain. It has not been economically possible, therefore, for them to be operated by relatively small business units. The maintenance or *overhead* costs are prohibitive unless the machines are used almost continuously. Thus, as the machines have developed, they have been concentrated in a few large plants, each producing a large share of the total market requirement.[1]

Of course, if the market of each business unit had remained confined to its immediate neighborhood, such concentration could never have taken place. But the same power that was applied to manufacturing has also been applied to transportation, and in the course of years ribbons of steel, later of concrete, and finally of invisible air have bound all sections of the nation and large parts of the world together. Over these ribbons, goods can be transported from one source quickly and cheaply. The contemporary development of means of preserving perishable items in transit has also increased the area that can be served by one producer.

Thus the application of power to transportation and manufacturing has permitted a great reduction in the number of business units. A smaller number of firms is able to turn out a greater number of products and distribute them over a wider area than was possible before. Against the consequent ability of the large business unit to take advantage of the full use of power machinery, its smaller competitor is at a serious dis-

advantage. And this disadvantage is intensified by the ability of the larger unit to utilize its size in still other ways.

Because its output is so great, the large unit may, for example, have each individual worker specialize in only one phase of the total operation. Time and motion studies have shown that constant repetition of the same task, rather than doing several different jobs, puts less strain on the worker's attention, reduces fatigue, and enables him to work faster. Specialized personnel may also be hired for managerial functions, purchasing supplies, and selling the finished product.

In addition to specializing personnel, the large firm may, with the aid of its machines, standardize its output. Making all products from the same mold reduces the cost of design. Making the parts interchangeable lessens the cost of breakage or spoilage.

The large firm may also reduce costs by purchasing raw materials in bulk quantity and developing a large-scale distribution system. Greater output may make it feasible to employ a research staff to find ways of increasing quality and reducing cost of production. And the larger unit, because it controls an appreciable percentage of the market, may be better able than its smaller counterpart to adjust its output to shifts in demand, thus avoiding either being caught without enough goods on hand to supply a rising market or with an over-large inventory when demand has dropped.

And then, of course, the larger business may use advertising and public relations campaigns to build consumer good will, thus increasing sales at the expense of smaller competitors who cannot afford this outlay. Although there are dozens of cigarette brands on the market, how many of us think of cigarettes other than the five or six varieties whose smoke is puffed at us regularly from our television screens? Although there are numerous brands of watches, all of which run with reasonable accuracy, how many of us would buy a make other than one of those that tell us the time every half hour on the radio?

All these advantages of large-scale operation, combined with the development of power machinery, have contributed to reducing the number of individual units doing business in our American economy. And although we have been discussing the advantages in terms of manufacturing alone, they are equally applicable to *all* processes necessary to getting a piece of raw material to the consumer not only in the *form* that he wants it, but also at the *location* he wants it and at the *time* he wants it.

Types of Business Organization

To utilize fully the advantages of greater size, American business units had to undergo a drastic change in their basic organization. The small business unit of pre-Industrial Revolution days, the type whose dominance was largely assumed by the price economy theorists, was the *single proprietorship*, owned and to a large extent operated by one individual. Although the owner or proprietor sometimes hired others to work for him, he alone provided the tools, and he assumed the entire risk of success or failure. The size of each business unit therefore, and its amount of capital, was limited by the amount of money that its proprietor could raise for investment, either from his own funds or from those he might borrow from others. As most proprietors also acted as their own managers, the size of each unit was further limited by the ability of one man.

With the development of expensive power machinery, it became acutely necessary to obtain more funds than the single proprietor himself could raise. One answer to the problem was the *partnership* in which two or more individuals pooled their resources and assumed joint responsibility for the business. The partnership did mark an improvement over the single proprietorship in that more money could be obtained for capital equipment and managerial functions could be shared among the various partners, each assuming responsibility for the job he could do best. But two factors prevented the partnership from growing large enough to take full advantage of the economies of large-scale operation.

First, its future was uncertain because it was legally dissolved with the death or withdrawal of any one partner. Thus, should more than a handful of individuals participate, the business would be subject to constant reorganization. But even more serious than the threat of dissolution or reorganization was the fact that each partner was legally responsible to the extent of his entire personal resources for actions taken by any other partner in the name of the business. This meant that if one partner were to make a foolish contract on which money was lost, and there was not enough in the firm's treasury to cover the loss, each of the other partners might be sued to the full extent of his personal wealth, whether such wealth were invested in the business or not. If business activity were not to be hampered, therefore, by constantly referring all decisions to all partners, this *unlimited liability* required unlimited confidence on the part of all concerned. And since no man is likely to risk his home, automobile, and personal savings account to the actions of others with whom he is not intimately acquainted, the partnership was also unable to ex-

pand sufficiently to meet the financial demands of large-scale operation.

There was, however, one form of business organization that was ideally suited to almost unlimited expansion. This was the *corporation* or, as it was sometimes called in its early days, the *joint stock company*. Because the corporation has today become the typical form of large-scale business enterprise, it will be worth while to examine its structure in some detail.

Unlike a partnership, which is simply a collection of individuals joined to do business, a corporation is an independent legal "person" whose life stems from a state government *charter*. Because of this independent existence, the corporation does not end with the death or withdrawal of one of its owners. There may be an unlimited number of these owners, and they may come and go at will without affecting the life of the business.

The owners of the corporation hold what are called shares of *stock*. Each owner risks only the amount of money that he invests in his stock, and he is in no danger of losing his other assets if the corporation should go into debt beyond its ability to pay. The stockholders elect a board of directors to supervise the operation of the corporation, each stockholder having as many votes as he owns shares. The board of directors in turn hires trained executives to carry on day-to-day business. Profits earned are distributed by the directors to the stockholders in the form of *dividends* at so many dollars per share.

Because a corporation can issue as many shares of stock as it requires to get the funds for needed capital equipment, it can meet the requirements of large-scale operation more easily than can the partnership or single proprietorship. But it is not limited merely to attracting those who might wish to become partial owners through the purchase of shares. There are actually three types of *securities* the corporation may issue: *bonds, preferred stock,* and *common stock*. The bond is not a certificate of ownership but is an evidence of indebtedness. The bondholders are, therefore, not owners of the corporation but creditors to it. As a reward for lending their money they receive, not dividends, but *interest*. Interest is not a share of the profits but a cost of doing business to be deducted before there are any profits at all. Should the corporation default on the payment of interest and other business obligations for an extended period and thus go *bankrupt*, the bondholders are the first to receive their investment back from the resulting sale of corporation property. The bond, then, is the safest type of security to purchase. But, because of its safety, it offers the lowest return. It is an ideal type of investment for those who wish to receive a modest income without great risk.

Preferred stock offers a somewhat higher reward for those who are willing to assume a greater risk. The preferred stockholders are owners of

the corporation, although they generally are not allowed to participate in electing the board of directors. They have first claim on profits after the business costs, including interest on bonds, are paid. Frequently their claim must also be met for preceding years in which no profits were made. But, because of these safety features, the preferred stockholders are limited to a specified maximum dividend and do not receive the full benefit of large profits.

Those owners of the corporation assuming the greatest risk are the holders of *common stock,* who receive no dividends at all until bondholders and preferred stockholders have been satisfied. But for this risk they receive both the right to elect the board of directors and also the prospect of unlimited dividends should profits so warrant. For those who are willing to take the greatest chance with their money for the greatest possibility of reward, common stock is, therefore, the favorite investment.

Rise of the Giant Corporation

Because it can attract large amounts of money for the purchase of capital equipment and can also hire trained executive personnel, the corporation has provided the vehicle for enlarging the business unit. It has, indeed, become almost the only type of organization for firms of extensive size, and for most of those of moderate size as well whose owners wish to avail themselves of the *limited liability* feature.[2] Business units organized as corporations are responsible for *over 80 per cent* of the total production of goods, workers employed, and wages paid in this country.[3]

Under the corporate form, American business units have expanded to the size most suited to the requirements of large-scale operation. This expansion has generally been in one or more of three directions: *horizontal, vertical,* and *lateral. Horizontal expansion* involves enlargement of plant capacity in order to produce more items or the establishment of control by one corporation over a number of formerly independent companies engaged in the same business. For example, one large corporation might supply a world-wide market for its products from one plant in the United States, or a large railroad might consolidate the activities of a large number of smaller independent lines.

Vertical expansion involves the establishment of unified control, not over an extension of the same activity, but over related activities leading toward the creation of a finished product. Thus the large American steel companies operate mines to extract iron ore from the earth, blast fur-

naces to reduce the ore to molten iron, mills to temper and finish the iron into steel ingots, and railroads to transport the metal in its various stages from process to process.

Lateral expansion involves the bringing of different and often unrelated activities under the same management thus securing economies in financing, purchasing, distributing, advertising, management, and research functions. Thus the General Motors Company manufactures not only automotive products but also refrigerators, washing machines, and household appliances.


So extensive has been the expansion of corporations that an overwhelming amount of America's business has come to be concentrated in the hands of the largest. Some figures are appropriate to make the point clear. There were 536,833 corporations in the United States in 1950, but only 4,839 of these (less than 1 per cent) were large enough to have assets of $10,000,000 or more. Yet this tiny group earned over 46 per cent of the total gross receipts of all corporations.[4] Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, the United States government's Temporary National Economic Committee undertook a study of the increasing concentration of business activity in the hands of large corporations. It was revealed at that time that in the field of manufacturing alone, three companies produced 61 per cent of all the nation's steel, three companies made 80 per cent of the cigarettes, and three companies put out 86 per cent of the automobiles.[5]

But we need not rely on figures alone to understand the extent of concentration. Let us take a short walk and count the number of autos parked at the curb or passing on the street. How many of them have come from the assembly lines of Ford, General Motors, or Chrysler? What has happened to the cars of yesteryear when the industry was younger and the advantages of large-scale operation not so apparent? Where are the Graham-Paige? Oakland? Reo? and Stutz-Bearcat? Who but Jack Benny still drives a Maxwell?

It should not be inferred from the foregoing that large-scale operation has taken over every phase of the economy. Concentration is, of course, greatest in fields such as mining, transportation, and the manufacture of products for which demand is large and variety not required. For a product with a small demand, such as snuff, there is no point in increasing plant size. Where style dictates an infinite variety, as in women's evening dresses, maximum standardization would result in many unsold items. Where transportation costs are prohibitive, as in the construction of houses, it would be impractical to concentrate manufacturing at one location. And if the consumer's convenience requires a large number of small shops near at hand, as in retail trade, concentrating solely in de-

partment stores at central locations would be to ignore a large potential business.

The extent of concentration in different fields is shown in the graph on this page, which compares the percentage of firms with assets of over $10,000,000 and their percentage of total gross receipts for the fields of manufacturing and mining on the one hand and trade and construction on the other. It will be seen that in manufacturing and mining a greater percentage of the firms are of large size and these large firms do a greater percentage of the business.[6]



EXTENT OF CONCENTRATION

This chart compares the percentage of firms in manufacturing, mining, trade, and construction with assets of over $10,000,000 and their percentage of total gross receipts.

We might also note that in contrast to the extreme concentration in the manufacturing of steel, cigarettes, and automobiles revealed by the Temporary National Economic Committee, it was discovered that the four largest manufacturers of women's clothing produced only 2 per cent of the total output.[7]

But our table shows that some concentration exists even in fields where decentralization seems logical. Improved rapid transit may bring the suburban housewife easily to the department store in the city, or the store may go to her through branches in out-lying areas. The use of mass-production techniques in the building of homes, as seen in the Levittown developments, to say nothing of light, prefabricated structures built in the factory and transported cheaply to the building site, have made the construction industry susceptible to large business organization.

Even the providing of summer holidays, long the prerogative of the individual innkeeper, has become large-scale through the development of hotel chains. An Englishman named Butlin has provided thousands of his fellow countrymen with cut-rate holidays by moving them en masse to resorts as far distant as Bermuda.

Furthermore, the fact that many businesses are owned and operated on a small scale may not mean that they are really independent of larger organizations. The local automobile salesroom, the gasoline station around the block, and the drugstore on the corner may be owned by their proprietors, but they are subject to easy control by the large automobile, petroleum, or drug manufacturers whose power to withhold their products can spell economic ruin to the small businessman.

There is some disagreement among social scientists whether the expansion of business units will continue, and if so, how far. Clearly, large-scale operation can be extended beyond the point where it is profitable. Making work too specialized or routine may deteriorate the morale of the employees and render them less efficient; the managerial ability of the executive staff may be overtaxed by too complex an operation; and it may not be worth the cost to expand into the production of all parts and equipment needed to make the finished product. Thus not one of the "Big Three" automobile companies makes its own paint and finishes and only one makes its own steel. These products can be more economically purchased from independent producers who manufacture them on a scale larger than that required by any one of the auto firms. Evidence has also indicated that concentration has been set back somewhat since the Temporary National Economic Committee study. In the year 1939, the 139 largest manufacturing corporations held 49.6 per cent of the total assets of all manufacturing corporations. But in 1947 the 139 largest held only 45 per cent of the total.[8]

Despite any relatively minor adjustments, however, the Industrial Revolution has clearly altered the pattern of American economic life by making it more practical to produce goods through a relatively small number of large business units rather than through a large number of small ones; and an overwhelming share of enterprise has been concentrated in the hands of the large units. This concentration has become particularly strong in the United States where no tariff walls cut off part of the potential market as happens so often in Europe.

The concentration of business activity has brought many blessings to the consumer by placing goods and services, which under any other system would be considered luxuries available only to the wealthy, within reach of the most modest pocketbook. And new products, designed to make life easier and happier, emerge from the research laboratories of

the large corporations. A small businessman may conceive an idea that would be useful to society and make him a nice profit; but he rarely has funds for the experimentation necessary to perfect it. Large units, on the other hand, can set some of their income aside to investigate new ideas; and the fruits of their study range all the way from power steering and color television to Nylon stockings and Dacron suits.

Although he came upon the scene relatively late in the history of the Industrial Revolution, no one more truly symbolized its universal impact than did Henry Ford. Before his time the automobile, or "pleasure wagon" as it was sometimes called, was a toy for the rich. It chugged along the cobblestone streets of the town and dirt roads of the countryside, attracting some awe and much derision. To this seemingly useless luxury, Ford applied the techniques of mass production: the moving assembly line, standardized and interchangeable parts, an output of tremendous quantity that cut the cost of each unit to the bone.

"You may have any color car you want," he said, "so long as it's black." And the critics laughed. But the black Model T's flooded the inadequate roads of the land, and the roads were made adequate to handle them. City dwellers, no longer forced to live within a short distance of their work, moved farther out, and stores, movies, and city services went with them. People traveled over the length and breadth of the land in their own automobiles, and the hotel, the motel, and the tourist industry went with them. Trucks rumbled swiftly over distances of hundreds or thousands of miles, and the varied products of America were made more cheaply available to all.

Yes, the critics laughed. But Ford kept selling those black cars until someone figured out how to vary the color without disrupting the steady progress of the assembly line. And a visit to River Rouge or the plants of any of the other great auto manufacturers provides the perfect picture of industrial America. Down the long main line move the steel frames of the car bodies. From subsidiary lines the parts join them and are fitted together with the barest twist of the human wrist. Each part arrives at the proper time at the proper place and in the proper color. And, after less than an hour, the steel frame has become an automobile driven off the line ready for delivery at a price the consumer is willing to pay.

Monopoly Price

But what of Adam Smith in Henry Ford's America? With business concentrated in large units, what of the picture of perfect competition with the price of goods determined by the free play of the

market place? This early picture, substantially true in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, has been profoundly altered in the twentieth. Let us see what has arisen in its stead.

There are, we have observed, limits to the advantages of concentration. Yet the growth of corporations has not always halted at the point where it becomes more economical for them to let further production be handled by someone else. *The reason for their continued expansion has been an attempt to overcome the hazards of a market price by creating a monopoly in which exclusive control is held over the production of an economic good or service.*


According to price economy theory, business units in competition with others each produce to the limit of their capacity and place their products on the market, where the price is determined by the relationship of the total supply to the total amount demanded by consumers. Those business units that cannot operate profitably at the price determined in the market are forced from the field. But if one business unit can develop a monopoly, it need not worry about the effect on price of goods placed on the market by competitors. It can, in fact, set the price to suit itself by determining at what point the greatest profit will lie. Thus, if the monopoly is in cigarettes, it may be calculated that 10 million packs per week can be sold at a price of 15¢ each, 8 million at 20¢, and 5 million at 25¢. The higher the price, of course, the fewer sold. But the fewer produced and sold, the lower the total cost of labor, equipment, and material. The monopolist can, therefore, adjust both production and price to the point where he is receiving the greatest possible return.

It should also be observed that monopoly may exist in purchasing as well as in producing and selling goods. If there are a number of small tobacco farmers but only one manufacturer of cigarettes, the manufacturer can set the price that he will pay the farmers for the raw material as well as the price that he will charge the consumer for the finished product. And the same is true, of course, for labor. If there is only one employer in the field, the worker cannot dicker over wages but must take or leave what is offered him.

Here then, in the ability to manipulate both production and price, lies a goal for the expansion of business units over and above the advantages accruing from the economies of large-scale operation. It is not even necessary that one business unit achieve one hundred per cent control. The same results can be obtained under a situation of *monopolistic competition* where the overwhelming amount of production is concentrated not in one but in a handful of large corporations.

Competition among a few giants is far different from competition among a number of small producers in that it is based primarily upon

TYPES OF MARKET SITUATIONS




PERFECT COMPETITION

Many buyers and sellers, with an undifferentiated product or with substitutable ones. No individual's supply or demand, if removed from the market, is sufficient, by itself, to affect price.




PERFECT MONOPOLY

Many buyers and one seller, with no competing substitutes, creates perfect selling monopoly. Obviously such a seller can fix the price which suits him best and vary supply accordingly.



MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

A few sellers, who may actively compete for sales, yet may cooperate more easily than a larger number of sellers, to influence price and control supply.



MARKET LEADERSHIP

Another example of monopolistic competition. Here again there are few sellers, but one seller is large enough so that the others follow his leadership.

Graphics Institute for "The Challenge of Democracy" by Blaich and Baumgartner: McGraw-Hill Book Co.

quality and advertising rather than price. Each firm attempts to produce a better product or render more efficient service than that offered by its competitors and then to convince the consumer of that superiority and general desirability. But one firm rarely makes a significant effort to undersell its competitors. Take cigarette manufacturers, for example. We are told that one brand outsells all others, that another tastes better, and that still another is the choice of famous people. When we enter the corner drugstore, however, we discover that all brands almost always cost the same. And we might note that the advertisements never tell us that one brand is less expensive than the others.

Now it is obviously not coincidence that makes monopolistic competitors charge the same price for their products. It is, rather, enlightened self-interest. Why, reason the cigarette manufacturers, to continue using that product as an example, should we engage in price-cutting that will only harm all of us by forcing us to accept lower profits? Rather, let us all charge the same price and compete by improving the quality of our respective brands and proclaiming their superiority to the public through advertising.

A 1940 study indicated that this indeed was the reasoning of the cigarette manufacturers when it reported that during the preceding 17 years, two leading cigarette companies had charged identical wholesale prices and that two other companies had joined in the practice for the previous twelve years. Sometimes one, sometimes another of the companies would assume the *price leadership* by initiating the change, but the others would invariably and quickly follow suit.[9] It is, of course, a moot point whether or not there was actual collusion in establishing the price. The economic advantages were plain enough to all even without discussion.

This kind of price-fixing is impossible where production is divided among large numbers of small business units, because some of them would be ever ready to reap the advantages of a cut. But when the field is restricted to a few large corporations, it is a simple matter for them to realize the advantages of cooperating in matters of price and even in quotas of production in order to gain the same advantages that would be possessed by a single firm with a monopoly. An important agent of such cooperation is often the *trade association* to which all the competitors belong and which gathers supply and market information. Cooperation through the association also serves to develop strategy against the occasional small or new producer who refuses to hold the price line or adhere to a production quota. Although price warfare against such dissidents springs up periodically in situations of monopolistic competition, its almost inevitable result is victory for the already established large corporations. Being few in number and great enough in financial reserves to operate temporarily at a loss, they can in concert undersell the price-cutter until he is driven from the field or bid up the price of his raw materials, labor, and equipment until it becomes impossible for him to operate at the lower price.

Since monopolistic competition carries with it the ability to establish a monopoly price, the tendency of corporations is to seek to expand at least to a size necessary to fix such a price. This expansion has occurred in many essential areas of American business, changing the nature of competition therein from a concentration upon price to a concentration

upon quality. And the theory of price economy is, therefore, no longer completely valid in those areas.

The Corporation as a Social Institution

The significance of the large corporation in American society extends far beyond its economic position. In their drive for size, corporations have become social institutions of prime importance whose structure and functions must be understood if we are to comprehend fully the American way of life.

Up to this point we have discussed the corporation as a form of business organization that differed from the single proprietorship and the partnership only in its ability to expand to greater size. Such a description suffices for the early corporation whose stockholders never rose above a few hundred, where a relatively few individuals held a majority of the shares of stock, and where all owners took personal interest in the operation of the business even if they did not participate actively in it. The description is not sufficient, however, for the gigantic modern corporation whose need for additional finances has extended the number of its stockholders to the hundreds of thousands and even, on occasion, above the 1 million mark.

The average stockholder in a modern giant corporation holds such a small percentage of the shares that he cannot conceivably, alone or in combination, have a significant voice in policy direction. But over and above the lack of ability to control is lack of desire to do so. The average shareholder buys his stock not to acquire a voice in the business, but because he considers it a good investment, likely to return high dividends. Or the purchaser may not look upon the stock as an investment at all, but rather as a speculation. In this case he buys stock only because he thinks that others will soon desire it and offer him a higher price than he paid. Buying and selling shares in large corporations has become, therefore, an activity in its own right. Huge *stock exchanges* have been established as central points where the shares of many corporations may be quickly bought and sold. And there has appeared upon the scene the *broker,* whose specialty it is to advise investors and speculators about the possibilities for rise and decline in the value of stocks and then to handle their transactions in return for a fee.

With the bulk of a corporation's shares thus scattered among great numbers of people who are interested only in guessing what the results of

business policy will be rather than in influencing that policy, the overwhelming majority of common stock is hardly ever voted in the election of the board of directors. It is possible, therefore, for those with only a relatively small financial investment to elect the board and thus control policy. Often as little as 5 per cent of the total stock will be sufficient.

Thus we can see that despite the fact that giant corporations are widely owned, they are narrowly controlled, the control lying with those who have a significant portion of the common stock. Such a significant portion may be owned by a small group of individuals, perhaps a single family, or by an *investment banking house,* which handles the issuance of a corporation's securities and perhaps keeps for its fee a modest but controlling percentage of the common stock.

Narrow control of major corporations facilitates cooperation within the field of monopolistic competition. It becomes easier to reach broad understandings upon price and production quotas than if many stockholders in each corporation had to be persuaded. It is also simpler to agree not to compete at all, even by product improvement or through advertising, but instead to set up a *pool,* wherein each corporation is given exclusive rights in a particular area of the country, or even a *cartel,* where exclusiveness is assigned on an international level.

In addition to such understandings, the relative ease of obtaining corporation control has led to further consolidation of erstwhile competitors in order to approach a more complete monopolistic position. A favorite means of such consolidation in the nineteenth century was the *trust,* pioneered by John D. Rockefeller and Standard Oil. Under the trust arrangement, controlling stockholders of competing corporations surrendered their shares to a board of trustees and received in exchange trust certificates that paid dividends but carried no voting power. The trustees would then vote the shares of the former competitors in electing boards of directors that would pursue a unified policy. Trusts as such have long been outlawed, but their name has attached itself in popular parlance to all devices for reducing competition and establishing centralized control in a particular industry.

A device similar to the trust in final effect was the *interlocking directorate* by which the controlling stockholders of different corporations would elect boards of directors with overlapping membership. Also outlawed, at least in regard to competing corporations, the interlocking directorate remains of importance among corporations not in direct competition, where it undoubtedly helps create a community of interest that leads to cooperation in matters of mutual concern, particularly political. Thus, of 3,544 directorships among 250 large corporations in 1935, one-

third were held by 400 men. One hundred fifty-one of the companies interlocked with three or more others, and ten interlocked with 26 or more.[10]

Of more direct modern concern as a device for consolidation is the *merger,* which takes place when the stockholders of different corporations turn in their shares for shares in a new and united company. But this is usually a slow and cumbersome process as the charters issued to corporations may prescribe a considerable waiting period before several firms may be joined together. It is far easier for the directors of one corporation to use business funds to purchase just enough of the stock of another to elect its board of directors. A corporation that owns the stock of another is called a *holding company.* And although some holding companies engage in the production of goods and services, perhaps even in competition with the corporations whose stocks they hold, others are concerned merely with buying and voting shares. Thus, by owning 19 per cent of the common stock of United States Rubber and 23 per cent of that of General Motors, several holding companies, working together, dominate both of those large corporations. The holding companies in turn are controlled by the famous du Pont family, which actually owns only a fraction of the stock of each. The du Ponts, therefore, control an industrial empire with assets of over 5 billion dollars, although their own investment is estimated at only one-tenth to one-fifth of that amount.[11]

The tendency of those in control of large corporations to cooperate and consolidate is increased by a similar tendency among those entrusted with active business management. It has been observed that one of the great advantages of the corporate form is that it permits the hiring of expert managers. The modern corporation is so vast and requires so much executive leadership that there has arisen what might almost be described as a new social class, the corporation executive, whose role must not be ignored.

The young man who makes his career within a large corporation has a far different life ahead of him from the one who strikes out on his own. The corporation offers him much in the way of security, opportunity to rise to positions of great responsibility, and higher salaries than might be made in independent business. But it demands in return not so much initiative and daring, qualities that might be cultivated if he were on his own, as loyalty to the organization, learning the ropes, and playing the game. Once instilled, these qualities are re-enforced by the fact that the corporate executive almost of necessity lives practically his entire business and social life in contact with others who have similar values. Not only does the corporation absorb his working hours, but by moving him



By permission, George Lichty and the Chicago Sun-Times Syndicate

"You'll fit in nicely here, Sneedby! . . . This organization will swallow you up in no time! . . ."

frequently from one area of the country to another, it often prevents him from sinking roots in any single community and absorbing characteristics of those not involved in his way of life.

This type of training leaves its mark on the executive when he reaches a position of major responsibility. For men who have learned to play the game and have social contact with and respect for their opposite numbers in other corporations, the "cut-throat" competition of a price economy holds no thrills. The corporation manager thus is conditioned

by experience to supplement the financial interest of the controlling group in eliminating and playing down competition, a conditioning that the manager or owner of a smaller business unit would rarely have undergone. Indeed in many corporations the top management is almost identical with the controlling owners. If no significant bloc of stock is held by a group of individuals or an institution, the corporation officers can frequently dominate the election of the board of directors by voting the few shares they themselves own and soliciting *proxies,* or authorizations to vote, from other stockholders.

The stress on work within large-scale organizations rather than in smaller enterprises has an effect beyond the purely economic. It is for one thing a great leveling device. The widening of American educational opportunities has made engineers, accountants, and lawyers of rich and poor, farmer and city dweller. And it is these who are hired as executive personnel. The corporation places them in the same mold of experience, and they all come out very much alike. Many of the differences of our society are thus smoothed over and upward social mobility is increased. Opportunities to advance to positions of power and prestige are extended to more people than ever before.

For the American community in a broader sense, it is also significant that an increasing proportion of its leaders, men who wield economic power and its attendant social prestige, are those trained to live within organizations, to cooperate rather than to compete. As they set the pattern that the rest of us imitate, the free-wheeling individualist, the eccentric and non-conformist, whose imagination has often pioneered new fields in literature, art, and science, is losing his formerly high prestige. Even in the field of scholarly and scientific research, the modern stress is on large-scale projects undertaken by teams of experts rather than on the work of individuals such as Edison, Bell, or Marconi. This stress has, of course, been aided not only by the example of the large corporation, but also by the fact that corporation grants frequently subsidize research teams and large-scale projects appeal to the men who dispense the money.

Success in many phases of life has become the result, therefore, not of individuality and daring, but of adjusting to the rules of the game. America is bound to gain much from an emphasis on cooperation and teamwork over the days when the erratic and the unconventional were relied on to pave the way. But it will lose something, too, no doubt, something in flavor and glamour. It was, after all, much easier to get excited about the "Lone Eagle" who first flew the Atlantic than about the "committee" that finally scaled Mt. Everest.

Corporations and Government Policy

We have now seen that American economic life is far different from what we like to picture it. Not only has free price competition been replaced by the giant corporation and the cooperatively determined price in many areas, but the spirit of organization with its attendant stress on teamwork and large-scale activity has also pervaded elements of our society beyond the economic.

The actualities of life thus do not square with the theory of price economy, and we are confronted with the alternatives of readjusting the facts to fit the theory or developing a new theory to fit the facts. To alter the facts would mean restoring price competition by destroying those large-scale business organizations that can, either alone or through cooperation, establish monopoly. To alter the theory would mean abandoning the no longer valid notion of a freely determined market price and recognizing that our economy is now based primarily upon giant corporations engaged in monopolistic competition. Once that recognition has occurred, society must, of course, take steps to insure that such corporations do not use their power irresponsibly.

Either the breakup of large-scale business organizations or their regulation requires action by government, and it is to this action that we now turn. We must remember, however, that in any field, democratic government moves primarily in response to the demands of different groups in society; and that in the field of business concentration the action that has been taken is the result of pressure by interested parties: in this case, small business, the controlling, managing, and investing groups of large corporations, consumers, and labor organizations.

As might have been expected, the earlier attempts to make fact and theory correspond centered about restricting the size of business units so as to insure price competition. From the very first the growth of corporations has been resisted by smaller businesses that have quite naturally feared the greater competitive advantages of larger units. Small businessmen have been joined frequently by consumers who have feared monopoly price and by workers who have sought to resist arbitrarily set wages. These opponents of corporate growth have entered the political arena in an attempt to induce government to restrict expansion; they have taken their case to the people in the name of the traditional American ideal and called for the intervention of government to maintain free competition.

Their arguments were quite effective in the early and middle years of

the nineteenth century; and the states, in issuing corporation charters, set up rigid controls on the activities in which the new business units might engage and the size to which they might grow. Almost invariably, for example, they prohibited one corporation from owning the stock of another. But as the years went by, the different states began to compete for the fees that were paid for the right of incorporation as well as for the prosperity and employment that came whenever corporations located within their borders. Corporations, too, began to play a significant role in state politics, throwing their support to governors and legislators who promised to undo restrictive regulation. Both of these factors combined to make charters progressively more liberal, and by the end of the century several states, particularly Delaware and New Jersey, had eliminated practically all restrictions on corporate size and activity.

The opponents then turned their attention to the federal level, and it is there that the major battle against business concentration has been waged. In 1890 Congress, in response to the urging of small businessmen, adopted the *Sherman Act,* which was designed to restore the principles of price economy by outlawing "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states," and by prohibiting persons from monopolizing or attempting to monopolize any part of such trade. In 1914 the *Clayton Act* prohibited some of the specific practices that large corporations used against smaller competitors when their use was such as to "substantially lessen competition." Prohibited were *discriminatory pricing,* by which certain retailers who had an opportunity to deal with a competitor were given cheaper rates than retailers who did not have such an opportunity, and *tying contracts,* whereby a retailer might be forced to purchase all his goods from the corporation in order to obtain some one item. The act also outlawed holding companies, interlocking directorates, and mergers, when designed to "substantially lessen competition." Finally, in 1914, Congress also created the *Federal Trade Commission,* authorizing it to investigate complaints of "unfair methods of competition" and to order offenders to "cease and desist."

The Sherman and Clayton acts and the act creating the F.T.C. have been the basis of the federal government's efforts to restrict the growth of monopoly power. But the government has used its authority in other ways as well to foster competition. The *Reconstruction Finance Corporation,* for example, which from 1932 to 1953 had the power to make loans to new business, has made funds available to newcomers in such fields as automobile manufacturing, shipbuilding, and housing. Government contracts for military and other supplies are frequently issued in such a way as to favor smaller business units, and the *Atomic Energy Commis-*

sion is forbidden to license any firm to use fissionable material where the license might maintain or foster monopoly.

Despite these and related activities, however, governmental restriction of the growth of monopoly has not been particularly successful. A major reason for its lack of success has been the counter-pressure set up by the large corporations who have also entered the political arena in the name of free competition. It has been their contention that American tradition calls not for the intervention of government to maintain price competition but for the absence of government interference with expansion. In their political efforts, the large corporations have had the advantage of having learned to cooperate in the field of economic activity and also small controlling groups in each corporation, united with others in common policy through such devices as the interlocking directorate and trade association, have been able to direct the campaign. Later chapters will consider the devices of politics, including pressure group tactics, the spending of money on election campaigns, and the influence on public attitudes of the various communication agencies that are themselves big business. Suffice it to say here that when a relatively few persons can turn vast wealth to this type of activity, the potentialities for their success are great. This is particularly true when the opposition is composed of a great many smaller organizations, each of which must be consulted and convinced before concerted action can be taken.

The success of the political efforts of the larger units can be seen primarily in the manner in which the acts seeking to restrict monopoly have been enforced. In its interpretation of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court of the United States has adopted what is known as the *rule of reason*. Under this philosophy, no combination in restraint of trade is illegal unless it offends the Court's sense of reasonableness. Thus, the mere fact that a monopoly exists is no reason for ordering its dissolution, so long as the methods by which it has been established seem fair and the price it charges, though admittedly higher than a price determined by competition, is not outrageous. The same effect as the rule of reason applied to the Sherman Act is achieved by the phrase in the Clayton Act restraining only those practices designed to "substantially lessen competition." Here, too, there is room for wide latitude of interpretation. And the Federal Trade Commission, it will be remembered, is authorized to ban only those practices that it considers "unfair."

What all this means in effect is that the attempt to restore the price economy has been placed in the hands of government attorneys who bring cases and of judges and commissioners who hear them. These men are, after all, products of our culture. When our society is under the influence of small business, when it is particularly aroused by some well-

publicized monopolistic practice engaged in by a large corporation, the F.T.C. and the courts will hold very strict ideas of what is unfair or unreasonable. On the other hand, in periods such as that immediately following World War I, when Americans have great faith that the giant corporation will pave the way to universal prosperity, the corporation's argument that the free economy is best maintained by leaving it alone has great weight. At these times, whatever tactics may be employed in competition or pricing are regarded as eminently reasonable. It has been said that during the 1920's:

> (A corporation) . . . was free to act on the assumption that what it did would be considered to be mere good, clean fun so long as it abstained from conduct of the nature proscribed by the pulpit. If it roughed up a competitor, it was able to count on receiving no more than a judicial reprimand with an understanding aside that boys will be boys.[12]

In addition to attempting to neutralize the enforcement of laws designed to restrict their activity, large corporations have, despite their attacks on government interference, pressured Congress into passing legislation with an effect precisely contrary to the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts. Thus the *Webb-Pomerene Act* of 1918 exempted from the earlier laws associations among businesses engaged in export trade as long as such associations interfered only with foreign rather than domestic competitors. The *National Industrial Recovery Act* of 1933, declared unconstitutional after only a brief life, permitted within each industry the development of codes of practice designed to lessen competition. And the *Miller-Tydings Act* of 1937 permitted the producers of goods bearing a brand name or *trademark* to set the retail price within each state provided the state government consented and one retailer within the state agreed.

Combined with the political power of the giant corporations in nullifying governmental attempts to restore price competition has been the obvious economic advantage of large-scale operation. Failing, therefore, to readjust fact to theory, American society has proceeded to recognize the role of the large corporation in our economy and to regulate its activities in the interest of the groups with which it deals.

Here, too, action has usually been attempted first on the state level. But as some corporations have extended beyond the borders of their legal homes, it has become increasingly impractical to regulate them from the state capital. In the matter of regulation, therefore, as in the matter of size, the struggle for and against legislation has been concentrated more and more in Washington.

The divorce of control and management from ownership has been recognized in the *Securities Exchange Act* designed to force the disclosure to prospective shareholders of the actual financial conditions of the corporation and to prevent certain financial manipulations by which corporate earnings can be withheld from distribution as dividends and rather manipulated so as to increase the power and profits of the controlling and managing groups. Many states had already enacted so-called *blue-sky laws,* making it a crime to offer for sale securities representing nonexistent gold mines, oil wells, or other properties, in short, securities standing for little more than the bright blue sky.

In order to protect the worker in his dealings with the large corporation, laws have been enacted establishing minimum standards of wages and working conditions and guaranteeing the right to form unions. These laws will be considered in greater detail in the next chapter.

The consumer has been protected through increased power given to the Federal Trade Commission and the *Food and Drug Administration* to insure him not only products of reasonable quality, but also honest presentation of the facts in advertising. These matters, too, will be covered in detail in a later chapter.

The major issue in all cases has been, of course, just how much regulation and what type. That question has been answered in the long run by the respective strength of the different interest groups in the community. Just as the small investor, the labor union, and the consumer have demanded more stringent controls on the activities of the large corporation, so the managing and controlling groups have demanded less. The end result has been compromise ranging from almost total governmental regulation in some industries to its almost total absence in others.


Generally speaking, the most extensive regulation is exercised in those areas that are clearly recognized to be monopolies. There are certain industries where competition would be extremely wasteful: communications, for example. To have two competing telephone companies would necessitate two sets of wires and cables and require most people to have two phones in order to keep in touch with all their acquaintances. The same thing is true of gas and electric companies, streetcar and bus service, and in some cases railroads, trucks, and airlines. Inasmuch as most of these activities are *public utilities,* of extreme importance to the daily life of the community, government usually forbids competition altogether and instead grants monopolies or franchises to particular corporations. In return for its *franchise,* the corporation must agree to render service to all who require it at a rate that the government deems to be fair. And since it can exist only by its franchise, such a corporation is also in a weak position to resist other demands that may be imposed on it at the

A MORE COMPLEX

LIFE MEANS MORE

"GOVERNMENT

IN BUSINESS"



From Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 90, The American Way, *by Maxwell S. Stewart.*

request of investor and labor groups regulating its financial and employment policies.

However, a monopoly established through consolidation and cooperation may be as complete as one granted by franchise. But the picture is not so obvious, inasmuch as some competition at least appears to exist; and it is far easier for corporations to resist regulation in the name of traditional freedom from government restraint. Here too, of course, circumstances vary. Shipping is dependent to a large extent upon government contracts. Broadcasting can exist only so long as government prevents chaos by parceling out wave lengths. In many fields, governmentally imposed tariffs grant protection from foreign competition. In such areas, of course, corporations are in a weaker position to resist stipulations in regard to their financial, rate, and labor policies than are those that are completely independent of government.

Outside of the public utility field, therefore, and even to a certain extent within it, the battle over how much and what kind of regulation is a running fight among competing interest groups, with state and federal authorities bending first one way and then another in response to the greatest pressure at the moment.

The final step of regulation is, of course, government ownership and operation of an industry. Like lesser forms of regulation, this has most frequently taken place in the case of public utilities where the choice has been between a public monopoly and an obvious private one. Thus in the United States, as in the United Kingdom, we frequently find the local water, gas, electric, or transportation company publicly owned. But in these industries, as in businesses not obviously of a public utility nature, the issue is not settled on the basis of abstract political philosophy, but on the competition of interest groups. If the consumers of electricity in a particular community, for example, are convinced that they can get cheaper rates from a publicly owned company than from a privately owned one, and their political strength is greater than that which can be mustered by the private company, it is likely that the city will take over the production of electricity. *And it may be expected that government will enter any business where the political pressure for it to do so is greater than that exerted in a contrary direction.*

Regulation of Business and Political Reality

In the battle among interest groups over government regulation and ownership, the great political strength of the large cor-

porations, which has helped defeat a breakup of concentration, is thrown to the support of the controlling and managing groups who want as little regulation as possible. Although labor unions, as will be seen later, have grown to the point where they can pose as effective counterweights, most of those seeking regulation, including small investors and consumers, have not organized into groups of anywhere near comparable power. And it should also be remembered that the fight is not a clear-cut one with controllers and managers invariably lined up on one side, and labor, consumers, and small investors arrayed against them. Each of the latter groups is concerned primarily with its own problems, and may oppose regulation relating to the others. Thus the small investors frequently feel a community of interest with managers and controllers on the question of governmental regulation of labor conditions, and the labor unions occasionally join them on issues of consumer protection.

Finally, it must be borne in mind that the battle is carried on within the context of the price economy theory. The average American, who after all must be convinced if government is to act, has been reared on this theory and is reluctant to forsake it. He distrusts big government, and he is coming more and more to respect the large corporation that plays such an important role in society. To this corporation he has transferred much of the same friendly feeling which his ancestor felt for the independent artisan and small businessman.

This does not mean that the average American is unaware that economic conditions have changed since the Industrial Revolution. He is, we have seen, ready to accept a certain amount of government regulation, particularly where monopoly is obvious, to assure himself that economic power will be exercised responsibly. He is also aware of the necessity for a virtually completely planned economy in time of war with direct price control, rationing, and allocation of materials and manpower in order to assure adequate supplies for the armed forces and a fair distribution of civilian goods.

But over the long pull, the tendency of the man in the street to think in terms of the price economy places at a disadvantage those who advocate more governmental control in the economic field. Steps in the direction of greater regulation are taken slowly, reluctantly, and only after their necessity has been clearly demonstrated. And they are, in most cases, less complete than in nations where price economy theory has not held sway quite as strongly. In the United Kingdom, for example, government owns and operates such industries, not obvious monopolies, as coal production and radio broadcasting. This type of control, accepted by the British, runs so counter to American tradition that it cannot be expected here in the foreseeable future. Far more in accord with our his-

tory and philosophy have been our attempts to destroy business concentration; and, failing that, our efforts to live with it so long as it conducts itself in a fashion considered reasonable.

To summarize: Although price economy remains the theoretical basis of the American economic system, it has been profoundly modified both by private monopoly and government regulation. What has emerged defies classification as either simple price or planned economy. It has aspects of both: areas in which the pull of individual choices still prevails, areas in which goods and services are allocated exclusively by government, and intermediate areas where private monopolies make the decisions under varying degrees of government supervision. It is a complex economic system for a complex and mighty nation. It adheres to no abstract theory but is rather the result of years of experience and the interaction of countless political pressures.

21

THE LABORER IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

One of America's most eminent historians, when writing of the ten happenings "that most profoundly shaped and shook history" during the first half of the present century, placed the "upsurge of labor" third on his list.[1] Some of our citizens view labor's increase in power during the twentieth century as an ominous trend; others view it as a hopeful one. But whether a person approves or disapproves, the hard fact that the organized labor movement has come to play a dynamic role in contemporary American and world society cannot be denied. No adequate understanding of modern economic systems and political systems or of the cultures of which they are a part is possible without constant reference to the subject of labor.

Before the Factory System

The *free price system* or the laissez faire theory assumed that individual workers would be able to bargain effectively with their employers over wages, hours, and other conditions of work. It further assumed that almost automatic economic processes would assure to workers their fair share of the fruits of production. For the most part, these laissez faire assumptions concerning the position of labor, as we have seen to be the case for other laissez faire generalizations, operated more in the realm of theory than of reality. They never corresponded exactly to the economic facts of life.

Yet it is true that prior to the Industrial Revolution, which dramatically began to remake human society in the late eighteenth century, workers individually could bargain with their employers much more effectively than at a later period. Before the factory system prevailed in Western society, most manufacturing and business operations were carried on by small concerns. As a consequence, relationships between employers and employees were frequently highly personalized and intimate. The owner of the small shop was aware of his employees as individual personalities. He called them by their first names and took a paternal interest in their personal lives. At the very least, he knew of the weddings, births, and deaths in their families.

Moreover, before the establishment of the factory system, workers were usually not completely dependent upon their jobs for earning a living. During hard times, many of them fell back upon farming, hunting, and fishing as a means of support. Competition between employers was keen and genuine, and thus the likelihood that they would establish agreements to keep wages low or otherwise disadvantage employees was not very great.

Workers generally produced a complete product rather than merely one part of it. The craftsman who produced a whole shoe probably derived a kind of satisfaction from his work that is unknown to the worker in a modern shoe factory who perhaps spends his whole working day attaching heels to shoes. Formerly the all-important factor in the manufacturing process was individual skill, and it gave to the worker who possessed it a sense of pride and independence.

It is, of course, easy to idealize this vanished relationship of employer to employee and worker to product. Nostalgia for "the good old days" should be tempered with the realization that modern factory life, with all its demand for readjustment, has given factory workers a dramatically higher level of living than the independent artisan formerly enjoyed.

The Emergence of Modern Industrialism


Modern industrial society and the various patterns of living and working that we associate with it certainly did not appear on the scene like a flash of lightning. It emerged rather as a process that took place over a period of years. In the United States, this process was almost constantly stimulated by the general scarcity of labor that was an ever recurring theme in early American history. The Civil War with its huge demand for war supplies also stimulated the industrialization of American society. In the years that followed the war, Americans proved themselves to be more eager than any other people on the face of the earth to accept and devise new ways of manufacturing in almost every field. Such behavior cannot be understood apart from the fact that America was a young nation largely lacking in the strong sense of tradition that almost invariably impedes the acceptance of the new. During the 50 years that followed the Civil War, modern industrialism emerged in the United States with a great flourish. American life was radically transformed. It was a period of great triumph for the industrial way of life and for the industrialists who had helped to bring it into being. The era was climaxed during the first decade of the twentieth century by the introduction of the assembly line that heralded the subsequent marvels of mass production.

The Worker and the New Industrial Order

The onward march of industrialization profoundly altered the situation of the wage-earner in the United States. Many manufacturing and business establishments grew so large that employees became useful to their employers as groups rather than as individuals. The widespread development of the corporate form of business organization further depersonalized relationships between employers and employees. The characteristic situation that now prevails in our important industries is one in which very remote and impersonal stockholders own factories about whose workings they usually know little. Their basic function, apart from providing capital, is hiring managers to direct production, and even this is accomplished through procedures that the average stockholder only vaguely understands (see Chapter 20). Thus it is that nowadays we more frequently speak of "labor and management" disputes than of "labor and capital" disputes. The separation of the

owner and manager function constitutes one of the most significant themes in the industrial history of the twentieth century.

Probably this modern industrial setting is conducive to patterns of mutual exploitation. All the parties concerned are psychologically able to evade moral responsibility with relative ease. Not infrequently managers respond to charges that workers under them are being mistreated by saying, in effect: "I only work here myself. I don't make all the policies of this company. My main job is to earn money for the stockholders." When similar complaints are registered with stockholders they often say something like this: "To tell you the truth I don't know much



From Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 142, Power, Machines, and Plenty, *by Gloria Waldron and J. F. Dewhurst.*

about the business. What do we pay managers for, if not to work out things like that?" In different but comparable ways, workers in modern industrial situations have also been prone to behave irresponsibly. It is not so much a case of passing the buck, as it is with the stockholders and the managers, but rather an "I don't care" sort of attitude. The modern factory is often so large and impersonal that workers would appear to say to themselves more often than is generally realized: "What difference does it make if I loaf on the job or waste materials? I'm not hurting anybody, and besides the company's so big and wealthy it surely isn't going to collapse because of what I do or don't do."

The emergence of modern industrialism had an especially important impact upon the situation of the skilled worker. Many highly trained artisans found that the jobs that they had once performed were rapidly

being taken over by efficient and untiring, if inartistic, machines. An abundance of skill or training is not necessary to watch over machines. Henry Ford once judged that 43 per cent of the jobs in his plants could be learned in a day and that only 15 per cent of the jobs required as much as a month's training. Many of the dislocations that were involved in the mechanization of industry were, of course, temporary in nature. Moreover, even though severe individual hardship was frequently involved, industrialization did, in the long run, promote general social well-being.

The advantages that were derived from the new modes of production, however, were distributed in a strikingly uneven way. The owners of industry frequently received fabulous returns from their investments, but the workingmen whose toil and sweat lay behind the value of these investments received no corresponding gains in wages or in other conditions of work or living. Wages generally tended to lag behind prices. Many important industries came under the dominance of monopolies and semi-monopolies. Thus workers frequently had to buy goods that were monopoly priced, but they had to continue to sell their services under competitive conditions. The general result was that industrial workers did not receive sufficient wages to allow them to live in health and decency, even according to the standards of the time. To make matters worse, urbanization, which was part and parcel of industrialization, made it virtually impossible for workers to supplement their incomes in the traditional ways. Hunting, fishing, and farming were hardly possible on a meaningful scale in the urban setting.

The mechanization of industry eventually meant shorter working hours, but the dawn to dusk hours of the farm were initially carried over into the factory. Such long hours were doubtless difficult for agricultural workers to bear, but they involved much greater hardships for industrial workers who were constantly trying to keep pace with machines in noisy, poorly lighted, and poorly ventilated buildings that were totally lacking in anything resembling adequate eating or sanitation facilities. These conditions were conducive to a high industrial accident and disease rate. Yet during the early years of industrialism, safety devices and regulations were virtually unheard of, and injured workers received little or no compensation. One of the sorriest aspects of the situation was that women and children were frequently subjected to the same conditions.

The beginning period of modern industrialism has not infrequently been characterized as one of the most depressing eras in the long history of man's cruelty to man. Since the beginning of this new era, thoughtful observers have wondered whether the machine was slave or master of

man. Perhaps the most distressing feature of modern industrialism was that it was accompanied by periods of depression and unemployment on a vaster scale than ever before known in recorded history (see Chapter 23). When large numbers of men starved and went without the necessities of life in earlier eras it was usually because of crop shortages or other natural disasters. Modern depressions have been more tragic and less necessary in that they have been characterized by starvation in the midst of plenty. Men have gone hungry while they were almost literally knee deep in grain.

The machine age worked havoc with the older economic principles and institutions. The finely spun theories of the laissez faire economists crumbled before it. Of course, among the various groups in society who were adversely affected by depressions, it was the workers—the group that did not fare well even during normal times—who invariably suffered the most hardships. The lot of the industrial workers was difficult not only in the sense that they faced privation, but also because of the general sense of insecurity inherent in their situation. Men engaged in agriculture, at least those who have been self-employed, have usually known where their next meal was coming from. Industrial workers in the event of depressions or even more temporary situations such as layoffs, shut downs, or strikes have not even had this assurance.

Labor Organizes in Self-defense

Enough has been said to indicate that the organized labor movement developed as a self-defense reaction to the ravages of modern industrialism. Every modern industrial society has an organized labor movement of one variety or another. The origins of the labor movement have been traced back to the beginning of the factory system. The lone worker was a helpless creature in the face of modern industrial conditions typified by the impersonality of the giant factory. As an individual, he could not, by any stretch of the imagination, eliminate low wages, long hours, unsafe and unsanitary working conditions, chronic insecurity, nor effect almost any other improvement in his lot. It was inevitable that he should join together with his fellow workers in order to attempt to make a better life for himself and his family. The consolidation of industry led to the consolidation of labor.

The labor movement is world wide. The basic stress of this chapter is upon the American labor movement, but some of the patterns that we shall point to will have application for labor unions throughout the world. Whether you look upon labor unions as a blessing or a curse,

it is well to remember that they constitute an essential part of the social fabric of modern society. That more than 125 million of the world's people now belong to trade unions is strong testimony to this fact.[2]

Prior to the Civil War, there were only short, sporadic developments in the organized labor movement in the United States. It was not until after the close of the war that a nationally significant labor movement developed. The building of a trade union movement in the United States was no easy task. The early organizers of American labor were confronted by serious obstacles that required long years to overcome.

Early union leaders were attempting to organize persons of widely different backgrounds and traditions. American workers spoke different languages, practiced different religions, and had different nationality and racial backgrounds. To unify such a heterogeneous group was no easy undertaking.

Another obstacle to labor unity was that most American workers, as we saw in Chapter 10, have been lacking in what is frequently referred to as *class consciousness.* That is, they have been to an unusual degree unaware of themselves as belonging to a distinct and separate group in society. The facts and myths concerning the great oportunities to climb the ladder of success in America have tended to make the average worker look upon his status as something very temporary, and traditionally he has been prone to think of himself as a member of the middle class. Tomorrow or the next day he expected to be a boss himself or at least to have gone up a rung or two in the social and economic ladder. Men imbued with this kind of psychology, who did not identify closely with their fellow workers, were not inclined to be interested in helping to organize or even in joining labor unions.

American federalism also made the task of improving the lot of the workers slow and difficult. In an era when it was not thought proper for the federal government to intervene in the nation's economic and social affairs, labor organizers would occasionally succeed in winning legislative concessions in particular states that would perhaps outlaw child labor or make employers assume responsibility for industrial accidents. But frequently the industries would merely move to other states where there were no laws or the laws were not so stringent. Thus the struggle to benefit workers via legislative channels had to be approached nationally.

Probably the most important obstacle that had to be overcome by those workers who wished to organize was a climate of public opinion that was generally unfriendly to the trade union movement. The dominant power in late nineteenth-century American society was wielded by businessmen; especially important in the scheme of things were the

so-called "captains of industry." Business ways of thinking and doing were assumed to be correct by most Americans, and the supremacy of business was hardly challenged until the opening of the twentieth century. The suspicion and hostility with which the business community viewed the idea of workers organizing themselves into trade unions came to be shared by large numbers of Americans. It also was reflected in the attitudes and actions of the national and state governments. If and when government intervened in labor disputes during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, it almost invariably sided with capital as against labor. Two keen students of the American past have suggested that there came into being at this time "a double standard of social morality," one for capital and another for labor.

> Combination of capital was regarded as in accordance with natural laws; combination of labor as a conspiracy. Monopoly was good business, and business men denounced or evaded the Sherman Act, but the closed shop was un-American. It was the duty of government to aid business and to protect business interests, but government aid to labor was socialistic. That business should go into politics was common sense, but that labor should go into politics was contrary to the American tradition. Property had a natural right to a fair return on its value, but the return which labor might enjoy was to be regulated strictly by the law of supply and demand. Appeals to protect or enhance property interests were reasonable, but appeals to protect or enhance labor interests were demagogic. Brokers who organized business combines were respectable public servants, but labor organizers were agitators. The use of Pinkerton detectives to protect business property was preserving law and order, but the use of force to protect the job was violence. To curtail production in the face of an oversupply of consumers' goods was sound business practice, but to strike for shorter hours in the face of an over supply of labor was unsound.[3]

The American Federation of Labor

Despite the obstacles that had to be overcome, a powerful organized labor movement did develop in America. Among the several nationally significant labor organizations that came into being in the second half of the nineteenth century, the American Federation of Labor was destined by all odds to be the most important. It was founded in 1881, but it was reorganized and given its present name in

1886. The A.F. of L. almost completely dominated the American labor movement during the half century that extended from the time of its birth to the mid 1930's. Through 1920 the organization knew a rather steady increase in numbers and in general power and influence. By that year its membership included 4 of the 5 million workers who were then unionized.[4] With the exception of some of the railroad brotherhoods, who maintained close relationships with it, virtually all the major unions in the United States were affiliated with the A.F. of L.

Throughout its history, the A.F. of L. has been primarily concerned with the organization of the skilled worker. Most of its unions, though by no means all of them, have been of the craft variety. A *craft union,* sometimes called a horizontal union, is organized on the basis of the skill that a particular group of workers possesses or in terms of the type of task that they perform. The building industry is a good example of a highly unionized and important industry that is organized along craft lines. The various persons who work in the building industry do not all belong to one union but rather hold membership in separate A.F. of L. unions on the basis of the trade that they follow. Thus there is a bricklayers' union, a plumbers' union, a painters' union, and so on. And the membership of these unions is open only to persons working at these trades.

The *industrial union* or the vertical union is the other basic form of union organization. It organizes all the people working in a given industry into one union. For example, the C.I.O's United Automobile Workers is an industrial union. Its membership is open to all automobile workers regardless of the specific task that they perform or whether they are skilled or unskilled. It includes in its ranks foundrymen, machinists, painters, body polishers, upholsterers, janitors, and all other workers who are involved in the manufacture of automobiles.

The A.F. of L., as its name suggests, is organized along federal lines. Each member union has its own constitution but theoretically subscribes to the general policies laid down by the parent body. But the Federation has never been a highly disciplined organization, and the affiliated unions, especially the larger and more powerful ones, have not hesitated to overlook its rulings when they so desired.

Many of the trade union organizations that had preceded the A.F. of L., as well as some that were its contemporaries, advocated a complete alteration of the economic, social, and political status quo. They often envisioned, among other things, a new social order wherein industry would be cooperatively or state owned. The Federation's leadership, however, did not look to the founding of a new society. Its orientation was essentially a conservative one. It favored cooperation with the estab-

lished economic system, but, of course, it encouraged workers to struggle for as large as possible a share of the fruits of production. The general social outlook of the A.F. of L. was well summed up by one of its founders. "We have no ultimate ends. We are going from day to day. We are fighting only for immediate objects." [5] The spirit of gradualism dominated A.F. of L. thought and action.

This attitude was well reflected in the Federation's traditional position on politics. It shunned the idea of identifying itself with any particular political party or group. Its leaders advocated trade unionism pure and simple. They apparently feared that extensive involvement in politics would lead to disharmony among the member unions and ultimately divert organized labor's energies from its main goal—securing for workers higher wages, shorter hours, and other improvements in working conditions. Its advice to workers at election time was nonpartisan: "Reward your friends and punish your enemies." The A.F. of L.'s official position was that it preferred to achieve its ends through its own means without government intervention. The Federation was never quite as removed from political life as it officially claimed to be, but it did have a real and justified fear of governmental action in labor disputes, intensified by long years of government strike-breaking activities.

Organized Labor Declines

The policies just outlined seemingly served the A.F. of L. well until the 1920's. This decade, which has been described as the "era of normalcy," was one of stagnation and decline for organized labor. It was an era during which there was a well-organized and well-financed employer offensive against the trade union movement. An attempt was made to convince workers as well as the American people at large that unions were unnecessary and even un-American. Employer groups were frankly intent upon destroying unionism. They were seeking to establish the *open shop,* that is, the non-union shop, the country over. They attempted to lure workers away from bona fide trade unions by organizing company-dominated employee organizations of one kind or another. With this apparent innovation, employee associations, recreation clubs, insurance plans, and even stock purchasing plans were founded. The open-shop movement combined with company paternalism was heralded, at least in employers' circles, as the American Plan.

There is room for considerable argument concerning the whys and wherefores of organized labor's decline during these years, but there is no doubt that between 1920 and 1930 American unions lost more than a million and a half members.

Labor and the New Deal

In the opening years of the 1930's, the state of the labor movement went from bad to worse. Prosperity appeared to have drugged it, and the Great Depression appeared to be dealing it a death blow. Neither extreme in economic climate seemed to favor its survival. By 1933 the A.F. of L. had sustained, by comparison with 1920 figures, an almost 50 per cent loss in membership. The morale of organized labor was indeed low.

Organized labor, however, was soon to experience a revitalization that was fundamentally related to new forms of governmental action. A new era in relationships between government and labor was to be inaugurated. The federal government, which was once regarded in labor circles more as a foe than a friend, was now to become labor's great benefactor and protector. Even before the New Deal was officially launched in 1933, a new deal for labor had begun. The onset of the new era was marked by the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act, which was signed by President Hoover in 1932. This Act restricted the use of the labor *injunction,* which is in essence a court order that can restrain unions or other groups or individuals in society from engaging in specified activities. The injunction was hated by organized labor as the instrument by which many strikes had been broken. The Act also asserted the principle that workers should have the right to join organizations of their own choice. It also outlawed, in effect, the so-called "yellow dog" contracts. These were agreements that workers often had to sign as a condition of employment stating that they did not belong to a union and that they would not attempt to organize one while they were on the job.

A basic goal of the New Deal's economic recovery program was to increase the purchasing power of the mass of the American people. It deliberately set out to promote the development of a strong labor movement in an attempt to stimulate the economy. The theory was that the unionization of workers would tend to force wages up.

The first piece of New Deal legislation that importantly affected labor was Section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. The historic significance of this part of the act was that for the first time *collective bargaining* was given legal sanction by the federal government of the United States. Section 7a stated that employees should have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. It also forbade employer interference in the unionization process and prohibited employers from attempting to use coercion to prevent their workers from joining unions.

In 1935 the National Industrial Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. But in the same year the National Labor Relations Act, better known as the Wagner Act, became law. This statute, which has with reason been referred to as labor's magna carta, not only included all the provisions of Section 7a, but also in greater detail protected workers from possible anti-union activities on the part of employers. Moreover, it created the National Labor Relations Board with powers to investigate unfair employer labor practices and to conduct elections in order to determine what unions should represent the various groups of workers as rightful collective bargaining agents.

Among the various pieces of New Deal legislation, probably none had more significance for wage earners than the Social Security Act of 1935. Its provisions embody a complex pattern of federal-state cooperation designed to relieve the insecurity that industrial wage workers have traditionally experienced. It set up a federal-state system of unemployment compensation and a federal system of old-age insurance. Its provisions also included arrangements for aid to the physically handicapped and to dependent children and the improvement of the public health. Though many European nations had adopted similar social security programs at a much earlier date, such legislation was unprecedented in American history. It signified a new form of governmental concern with the general welfare in the United States.

The Birth of the C.I.O.

The encouragement that the New Deal gave to organized labor set the stage for the revitalization of the American labor movement. Unionization became so powerful a trend that from 1933 to 1935 workers in many parts of the nation spontaneously organized themselves and sent telegrams to the A.F. of L. requesting admission. The most rapid trade union growth in American history got underway.

Organized labor's new vitality was to revive an old issue, an issue loaded with dynamite, which had haunted the house of labor for long years. Throughout the history of the A.F. of L., there had been groups within it who maintained that the craft union form of organization was not appropriate to the new industrial era. The gist of their argument was that it was pointless to put so much emphasis upon craft unionism when by far the greatest number of persons employed in the mass-production industries were unskilled or semi-skilled rather than skilled workers. They argued that the great task before the A.F. of L. was to organize the un-

organized and that this could be accomplished only via industrial unionism. Every attempt, they observed, by the A.F. of L. to organize the workers in the important mass-production industries had failed. They charged that these failures arose from the fact that the craft union approach had involved, in the attempts to organize the automobile and steel industries, for example, dividing workers into dozens of different and competing unions. The duty of the A.F. of L., maintained the advocates of industrial unionism, was to unite workers and not to divide them along unrealistic craft lines.

Craft unionism versus industrial unionism was heatedly, sometimes violently, debated at the 1935 convention of the A.F. of L. Most aspects of the controversy were fundamentally related to a struggle for power that was raging within the Federation, but there was, nevertheless, genuine disagreement between the disputants concerning organizational principles. Just after the close of this stormy convention a group of important Federation leaders formed the Committee for Industrial Organization. The avowed purpose of the C.I.O.—as it was soon to be known to the American people—was to promote the industrial organization of the mass-production workers of the country under the auspices of the A.F. of L.

The new organization that was brought into being by the leadership of the United Mine Workers, the International Ladies' Garment Workers, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and of several other important unions was equipped with all the things necessary to the achievement of its purpose. It possessed a workable idea, an able and experienced leadership, large financial resources, and a challenging task. With "Let's organize the unorganized" as its battle cry, it succeeded where the A.F. of L. had failed. In three years it had unionized large segments of the steel, automobile, and rubber industries. During these first years, the C.I.O. remained within the A.F. of L. but functioned much as an independent organization. By the autumn of 1938, after three years of controversy between the C.I.O. leaders and those labor leaders who had remained more loyal to the A.F. of L., the C.I.O. formally emerged as an independent federation of labor organizations. The C.I.O., which had become well known to the American people, changed its name but not its initials. The Committee for Industrial Organization now became the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

The significance of the C.I.O. extended far beyond the industries that it organized. The C.I.O.'s successful organizing campaigns impressed the whole world of labor, including the staunch craft union leaders. The result was that as the years went by many of the craft unions altered their structures so as to include larger numbers of semi-skilled and un-



Detroit News; UAW-CIO; Canal Zone Administration

UNION ACTIVITIES

Unions bargain or strike for things they want from the "boss," but for many, unions also mean political action, friendship, sports, family vacations, and other objectives that members can obtain through cooperation.

skilled workers within their ranks. Thus it was ironical that as the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L. moved farther apart, their organizational practices became more alike.

These two giant federations of labor unions are similar in many ways. The general structure of the C.I.O. was clearly modeled after the A.F. of L., and it maintains a similar pattern of relationships with its member unions. But the C.I.O. exercises a somewhat greater degree of control over the behavior of the unions that are affiliated with it. And the C.I.O. has had a less conservative orientation than the A.F. of L. That is, it has been more disposed to challenge the economic, political, and social status quo in America. Indeed, it would be hard to name any group in contemporary American society that is more deeply involved in American political life on both national and local levels than the C.I.O. The developments that led to its birth rose out of governmental action, and quite naturally the C.I.O. has always taken a keen interest in politics.


Labor Comes of Age

By the time of America's entry into World War II, most of the mass-production workers in the United States had been successfully unionized. The great goal was won. Organized labor had come of age. One eminent American economist even goes so far as to argue that "A laboristic society is succeeding a capitalistic one." [6] Such a conclusion had not yet been well supported by evidence. Most social scientists are inclined to argue that the power of labor is still surpassed by the power of business and government. But no student of American life would deny that organized labor constitutes one of the most important power centers in the United States. It exerts a tremendous influence upon our collective destinies. The evidence of organized labor's newly acquired status in America is abundant.

The membership increases that organized labor has known in recent years are in themselves striking. From 1933 to 1953 union membership increased almost six-fold, from less than 3 million to almost 18 million. Or, to put it differently, by the middle of the century one out of three nonfarm employees belonged to a union. Moreover, it should be noted that organized labor indirectly affects the wages, hours, and other conditions of work of an additional 20 to 25 million workers.

Another important indication of organized labor's new position in American life is that its representatives have an unprecedented access to and influence over government in the United States. Apart from the large

staff of paid lobbyists that unions have stationed at Washington and at numerous state capitals, it is a commonplace nowadays for labor leaders to request and receive audiences with high government officials. In fact, they are frequently invited to confer with government officers. Similarly, the representatives of labor meet with representatives of business on a footing of greater equality than ever before in American history. Also, as union treasuries become larger, organized labor is increasingly gaining access to the mass means of communication, which were once almost



Reprinted and updated from Basic Data of the American Economy, *3rd ed., by Nelson Peach and Walter Krause, copyright 1950 by Richard D. Irwin, Inc.*

completely monopolized by business. Unions now sponsor a number of radio and television programs on both national and local levels. They publish a variety of newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets. They are also now financially able to purchase considerable amounts of paid advertising space in non-union papers. Thus labor unions are now in a position to present their point of view to the public with a reasonable degree of effectiveness.

An important aspect of labor's coming of age is that more and more

of its leaders are looked upon as respectable civic leaders rather than as bogey men to be feared. There was a time, and it was not very long ago, when labor leaders were looked upon by large numbers of Americans in terms of a much less than flattering stereotype. They were thought to be rabble rousers, who had dirt on their clothes and under their finger nails, shaved infrequently, had bloodshot eyes, and spoke the poorest sort of English. Fortunately, these and similar distorted notions concerning labor leaders are not as prevalent today as they once were in America.

What is the typical labor leader actually like? There is no simple answer. A basic but inadequate generalization is that the leaders of the large and powerful labor unions are becoming increasingly like the executives of the large and powerful corporations. The following profile of one of America's important labor leaders is a telling description of what one union leader is like, and it also sheds much light upon the characteristics that the newer generation of labor leaders are developing.

> . . . what has happened . . . in general is that to a considerable extent, he has slipped into the character mold of the American managerial type: the personality of neutral efficiency. [His] private personality has increasingly been absorbed by, or become a function of, his social role. As he has consolidated his power in the [union] he has unwittingly, perhaps unavoidably, taken on a number of characteristics and outlooks of the managerial caste which functions in large areas of American industrial life. The way he dresses, the way he talks, the large, almost frightening emphasis on *efficiency* in his recent statements would all seem to support this hypothesis.[7]

It is hardly surprising that labor leaders are now frequently dubbed "The New Men of Power." [8] Trade union leaders not only have an important influence upon the lives of their followers, but also have an important influence upon the whole of our economy. And their influence increases in proportion to the steady growth that the labor movement is at present experiencing. Leaders of the larger unions speak, at least formally, in behalf of very large groups of men and women. Many individual unions have several hundred thousand members; several approach or surpass the million mark.

The problems inherent in the workings of the mammoth union are not unlike those that afflict mammoth business organizations and mammoth government. To put it mildly, bigness and democracy are difficult to reconcile. Many union leaders have a suspiciously long tenure of office. It is not an unusual situation for union officers to run in elections where no opposing candidate is put up. There are instances in which unions

have denied their members the most elementary civil liberties. Yet there is little evidence to indicate that democracy is functioning less well within unions than within business or government. Such a conclusion, of course, offers nothing but a negative sort of consolation. The truth of the matter is that we are still sorely lacking in effective techniques for making executives who function in situations of bigness behave responsibly toward those who have granted them their authority. But it is not simply a case of lack of techniques. At the heart of the problem we find an apathetic citizenry. It would be idle to expect persons who pay but scant attention to politics and elections in society at large to behave as effective citizens within unions. Sheep who are willingly led to the slaughter must bear some responsibility for their fate.

The Culture of the Factory

Understanding the role of the laboring group in contemporary American society requires more than a discussion of their formalized organization into trade unions. The behavior of men in group situations is determined as well by processes that are not so formal or tangible as the labor union and the various patterns of behavior that we associate with it. Social science is just as much concerned with informal means of social control as with formal means of social control.

The large modern factory can be accurately viewed as a society that possesses a culture, much as does the larger society of which it is a part. Factory cultures, for example, exhibit folkways and mores that regulate the behavior of industrial workers. That workers can and do use informal social control devices to curtail or increase output has been well established by industrial psychologists and sociologists.[9] In most factory situations, the new worker soon learns that his fellow employees are likely to resent him if he produces too much or too little. Both the "eager beaver" and the slacker are sure to bump up against group resentment.

It has also been established that a worker's basic attitude toward his job, whether he works with zest or indifference, may be determined by the quality of his social relationships with his fellows. Patterns, either of cooperation or of hostility, as between one employee and another or between employer and employee may be so thoroughly internalized by the members of a factory society that they may dominate the whole picture of industrial relationships. All who have had much work experience know that some places of employment are characterized by a feeling of

togetherness or a strong we-feeling, while in others it is each man for himself.

The culture of the factory can also be said to contain a system of social stratification. Members of a factory society, just as members of every other human society of which we have knowledge, enjoy differential social status. Positions of social superiority and inferiority exist that are determined by whether a person belongs to the management group, the foreman's group, or the ordinary workers' group. There are also differences in the social status and prestige that are accorded to the white-collar or the office worker, as distinct from the person who actually works among the machines and gets his hands dirty. These differences, however, do not loom as significant as they once did, for the trend would now seem to be that plant workers, being the better organized of the two groups, generally receive higher wages than office workers. Hands that hold money appear somewhat less dirty. Industrial unionism has tended to have an uplifting effect upon the social position of the unskilled worker, yet it remains true that the skilled worker continues to enjoy a higher status in the industrial hierarchy than the unskilled worker.

The factory has been well described as a society of unequals.

> Every person except one within the structure has a boss; and every boss in turn, has his boss, until finally at the top of the heap we find that rare and practically sacred individual, the president, the owner, the big-shot-who-has-no-boss. . . . The whole structure forms a neat pyramid, with the Big Boss at the top and each rank of lesser bosses increasing in numbers as they decrease in importance. . . .[10]

Cooperation and Conflict

During the last several decades, the study of labor-management relations has emerged as one of the important areas of social science research in the United States. This trend clearly reflects the fact that our whole society now exhibits a deep interest in industrial relations. Labor-management disputes receive headline attention in our newspapers and in our radio and television newscasts. Labor "problems" are discussed on street corners, in buses, in barber shops, at social gatherings, and almost everywhere Americans come together. But it is unfortunate that many of these discussions shed more heat than light. Most Americans have taken sides, and it is not uncommon for arguments concerning labor-management relations to resemble disputes between the fans of different baseball clubs.

The central theme of these discussions is "How can labor and management work together?" It is somewhat of a paradox that the American belief system, which emphasizes the sanctity of competition in economic life, at the same time assumes that cooperation between labor and management is both necessary and possible.


The relative lack of class consciousness among American workers, which has already been discussed, has probably increased the possibilities for labor-management cooperation in the United States. Workers who do not quite look upon themselves as workers are not likely to be the most enthusiastic trade unionists. The fact that only half of the American workers who are eligible for trade union membership in terms of the nature of their employment belong to unions tends to substantiate this generalization. In fact, a person is justified in concluding that a sizable number of workers, but, of course, not all non-union workers, are anti-union in their outlook. It is doubtless true that some American workers identify themselves more closely with their employers than with their fellow workers.

In our heterogeneous society, the most intense forms of conflict occur between workers of different racial, nationality, religious, and regional backgrounds. Antagonisms between Negro and white workers, between foreign-born and native workers, between Catholic and Protestant workers, between northern and southern workers are widespread in the United States. There is another form of conflict between workers, namely, rivalry between different union organizations. Thus we have the spectacle of bitter *jurisdictional* disputes between unions that attempt to organize the same group of workers. For example, over a long period of years the Brewery Workers' and the Teamsters' unions were literally at each other's throats over which union should organize the truck drivers who hauled beer. The Brewery Workers claimed jurisdiction over them by virtue of the fact that they were working in the beer industry, and the Teamsters based their claim on the fact that they were truck drivers. It also should be kept in mind that workers are divided among themselves by the patterns of social stratification that exist within the factory.

In short, despite the fact that organized labor is a powerful factor in contemporary American life, and growing stronger as the years go by, the solidarity of all labor, the grand goal to which unionists have aspired, is a long way from achievement. Moreover, despite the existence of the National Association of Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and other employer associations, it would be hardly accurate to suggest that management is a highly united group in the United States. The consequence of this absence of a very high degree of unity among either labor or management has been that in the sphere of labor,

relations we have had *group conflict* rather than *class conflict* in the United States. We have never had the situation in which all workers have been pitted against all employers or all management. Rather it has been individual groups of workers as against individual employers or groups of employers.

The degree to which labor and management can cooperate funda-



Graphics Institute for Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 151, Can Labor and Management Work Together? *by Osgood Nichols and T. R. Carskadon.*

mentally depends upon the goals that both sides have in mind. Precisely what these goals are is extremely difficult to determine. Indeed, it might well be questioned whether the members of the two groups are certain in their own minds about their goals. Nevertheless, social scientists have attempted to make generalizations concerning these goals, and it is well to be familiar with some of their conclusions. One of America's most prominent public opinion analysts, after carrying on a ten-year study

of workers' attitudes, concluded that the basic goals of workers could be summarized in four points:

1. *Security.* He defined this as "the right to work continuously at reasonably good wages."
2. *A Chance to Advance.* Described as "just the good old American chance to get on in the world, to go from one job to the next higher job."
3. *Being Treated Like a Human Being.* He said this was rather intangible and hard to define, but manifested itself in an insistence that management recognize that "workers, too, have daily lives, personal problems, temptations, ambitions, loves, and hates."
4. *A Desire for Simple, Genuine Human Dignity.* Defined to mean that "most workers want to feel that they are personally performing creditably in a job which contributes something to the aggregate of human security, advancement or happiness." [11]

Another important social scientist and labor relations expert, after interviewing 60 leaders of management, summarized management's goals under four headings:

1. *The Economic Welfare of the Company.* The first objective of industrial relations, like that of every function of management, is the economic welfare of the particular company.
2. *Good Relations With Its Own Employees.* Industrial relations are primarily and basically a matter of relations between management and employees, its own employees.
3. *Freedom to Manage.* Industrial relations arrangements must leave unimpaired management's prerogatives and freedom essential to the meeting of management's responsibilities.
4. *Businesslike, Responsible Relations.* All parties to industrial relations should be businesslike and responsible.[12]

Not only have social scientists endeavored to outline the respective goals of management and labor, but an interesting attempt to mark out certain stages in union-management relations has also been made. These stages may be summarized in the following way:

Opposition. This stage characterized the situation through the late 1930's in the United States, until the major industries such as steel and automobiles were organized. There was great mutual hostility between organized labor and management. Management was determined to block unionization at almost any cost, and labor was equally determined to unionize. Both sides were inclined to use extreme methods to accom-

plish their ends. The emphasis here was almost completely upon the distribution of the fruits of production. Each side struggled to increase the size of its share of the pie.

Toleration. This stage came into being after the unionization of the mass-production industries. Management and labor lost no great love upon each other, but each was resigned to the existence of the other. Each side continued to emphasize, almost exclusively, the matter of how large its share of the pie was to be.

Cooperation. This is the stage that is now theoretically in the process of emerging. But, of course, there are still many areas in American industrial life where the first and second stages prevail. Where the third stage prevails, management and labor have come to view each other somewhat more objectively. The attitude of toleration has become one more closely approximating an attitude of acceptance. Both labor and management are supposed to be on the point of forgetting old antagonisms. Both parties have adjusted their behavior to the fact that the union is now a permanent factor in the industrial process. Labor relations have, so to speak, matured. Unions behave in less aggressive fashion since they no longer have to carry on a struggle merely to exist. Likewise, employers are less aggressive in that they have been forced to abandon dreams of union busting. Finally, according to this theory of stages, labor and management are now beginning to emphasize not only how much of the pie they should receive, but also to concern themselves with increasing the total size of the pie to be shared, and are orienting their behavior toward that end.[13]

Certain cautions are in order at this point. Both the goals of labor and management and the stages in the development of their relationship that are listed above should be viewed with a critical eye. Labor relations are complex and changing and such attempts to define goals and stages as those just mentioned inevitably simplify and thus to a degree distort. Both series of generalizations would appear to be founded on the assumption that genuine and thoroughgoing cooperation between labor and management is possible—an assumption that some students of labor relations are not ready to accept.

Those who view labor-management relations in a less optimistic light argue that labor and management are two opposing groups that have quite different interests. They say that what helps one frequently hinders the other. They agree that increasing productivity would be advantageous to both parties, but they are quick to add that there is only one pie and if management gets a larger piece it follows that labor gets a

smaller one and vice versa. Their general conclusion is that cooperation between labor and management is possible only on the most superficial level.

Moreover, it should be pointed out that cooperation between labor and management can conceivably take the form of cooperation against the rest of American society. Or it can manifest itself as cooperation between union leaders and management at the expense of workers. Indeed, some conflict between labor and management is probably to be desired. Each group now, for example, performs the socially valuable function of carefully observing the behavior of the other group and making the public aware of its shortcomings.

A realistic and democratic goal for our society in the sphere of labor relations would be to minimize industrial conflict rather than to eliminate it. Most of us have at one time or another been personally inconvenienced and perhaps angered by strikes. Some persons react to strikes by demands for vigorous action. They talk of abolishing all strikes. They frequently make the unwarranted assumption that strikes are almost always the fault of organized labor rather than management. They overlook the fact that strikes are rarely called for minor reasons and they almost invariably involve more severe and more direct hardships for the workers concerned than for either management or the rest of society. When all is said and done, it is usually the workers who have to tighten their belts.

Moreover, those who talk of doing away with strikes fail to consider that such an end could be achieved, given modern industrial conditions, only if society were completely dominated by either business, labor, or government. Few Americans would prefer total dominance by any of these three powers to the occasional strikes that we now know. After all, conflict as well as cooperation is probably basic to the functioning of a free society.

Labor and Society

Let it be clear that we are not maintaining that every instance of conflict between labor and management is desirable. Though it is probably true that the social costs of strikes and other labor disputes have been exaggerated, especially by the enemies of organized labor, nevertheless, they are real and should not be too easily dismissed. Not only do workers and owners lose out when labor disputes stop the wheels of production, but also the whole of society loses the product that

might have been produced. In some cases, moreover, lost production can never be regained. Also, it is obvious that in a highly complex and interdependent economy such as our own strikes in key industries can paralyze the whole of society.

Thus it is that the positive intervention of government in industrial relations is taken as a matter of course by most Americans. During recent decades, society has intervened to regulate the behavior of both management and labor. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which encouraged labor to organize and which forbade employers to interfere in the process, was modified by the National Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, more widely known as the Taft-Hartley Act. This legislation was founded on the assumption that organized labor had too much power and that employers and the general community had to be protected from union abuse of it.

Few pieces of legislation in recent years have been the subject of so much public controversy. The Taft-Hartley Act loomed as a major issue in the presidential campaigns of both 1948 and 1952. Probably its most significant provision resulted in the outlawing of the *closed shop.* That is, it banned labor-management agreements that made it necessary for workers to join unions before they could be hired on a job. Furthermore, it rigidly restricted the *union shop,* wherein individuals have to join the union immediately upon receiving employment or at some specified period thereafter. Its other provisions included granting wider powers to the federal government in situations where strikes affect vital services or industries, outlawing strikes by federal government employees, prohibiting unions from making financial contributions to political campaigns in national elections, and requiring union officials to sign noncommunist affidavits.

The basic significance of the Taft-Hartley Act lies in the fact that it apparently indicates that the pendulum has once again swung in the field of relationships between government and organized labor. If government once deliberately facilitated the growth of the trade union movement, at this juncture in our history it seems determined to regulate some aspects of union behavior. A person might quarrel with specific pieces of legislation, but society clearly has the right and sometimes the duty to undertake such regulation. Labor unions are no longer merely private associations in any realistic sense. They are clearly semi-public organizations that wield enormous power over the community, and this exercise of power must at times be controlled.

Yet such control should be applied cautiously and judiciously. The aim should be to regulate, not to cripple or destroy. A strong and free labor movement is a prerequisite to social and economic democracy in

modern industrial nations. The degree to which a society is totalitarian or democratic can often be measured by the health of its labor movement. The darkness that is totalitarianism is quick to engulf the free trade union movement. In the setting of the democratic society, free labor movements flourish.

Collective Bargaining

During the last two decades, remarkable changes have taken place in the pattern of labor relations in the United States. The picture that was so recently one of anarchy and jungle law has changed to one wherein a large degree of order prevails. This is not to suggest that the struggle between labor and management has ceased. Nor can it be safely assumed that an era of genuine cooperation between labor and management is about to begin. More accurately, it would appear that the rules of the game have been learned. Conflict between labor and management continues but it continues within the framework of rather well-established collective bargaining procedures. In effect, collective bargaining has become an institutionalized process whereby wages, hours, and other conditions of work are determined.

It is important to realize that collective bargaining does not function only when representatives of management and labor sit down in order to negotiate contracts. The notion of collective bargaining includes the procedures that have grown up in the sphere of industrial relations for the adjustment of disputes between labor and management that occur on a day-to-day basis. In fact, labor-management agreements now almost invariably outline what are usually referred to as *grievance procedures.* They are written into contracts in order to give the worker some recourse in the event that he concludes that management is not living up to its bargain. Moreover, even the best of agreements fail to anticipate many conflict situations that arise and that require adjustment. The general practice is for workers to choose a steward or a shop chairman to represent them in grievance matters. Such persons are frequently granted special immunities from layoffs to encourage them not to be unduly submissive to management. In this connection, it should be pointed out that a fundamental fact that helps to explain the growth of unionization in the mass-production industries is that workers were seeking relief from situations in which foremen or other varieties of bosses abused the power that they possessed. At present, probably the most important day-to-day activity of unions is the administration of contracts, which is in large measure a matter of helping to settle grievances.

Most industrial disputes are successfully adjusted by negotiation between representatives of labor and management without the intervention of outsiders. In the vast majority of union-management contracts, however, provision is made for the referral of unadjusted union disputes to *arbitration*. This process varies from agreement to agreement, but it usually entails the selection of an impartial person as an arbitrator who becomes chairman of a committee composed of an equal number of representatives of both labor and management. The essential feature of arbitration is that both parties to the dispute agree in advance to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding. But, of course, each side is given the opportunity to present its complete case to the arbitrator before he arrives at his decision.

Mediation is similar to arbitration as a process for settling labor disputes. Mediators, like arbitrators, are outside persons. The basic difference is that mediators only have the power to assist in the settlement of controversies. They do not possess the arbitrator's power actually to lay down the terms of settlement. The keystone of mediation is that it is a voluntary way of adjusting labor disputes. Arbitration, even though it comes about through mutual consent, is clearly less voluntary.

Labor and management are both opposed to *compulsory arbitration*. This type of arbitration is not the result of voluntary agreement. Rather, it is the situation wherein a third party, namely government, intervenes and hands down decisions in labor disputes without being invited to do so by the parties concerned.

Collective bargaining in its various forms is still far from being a perfected process. Yet it has considerably reduced the unexpected elements in labor-management relations. Each party, now that there are some rules to go by, is better able to predict the behavior of the other. Consequently, strain and bitterness are no longer so prevalent in labor relations as they once were. For example, strikes of major proportions have occurred in the post-World War II period, but they have been notably lacking in violence. And the greatest likelihood is that labor relations will continue in this non-violent pattern now that the institutionalization of collective bargaining processes has taken place.

Labor and the Future

It has already been pointed out that the future will undoubtedly bring more regulation of labor unions in the United States. It does not follow, however, that the power of the American labor move-

ment will decline. On the contrary, labor unions in all probability will play an increasingly important role in the lives of their members, in the industrial community itself, and in American society as a whole.

American labor unions are in the process of becoming much more than "bread and butter" organizations. They are no longer merely content to fight for higher wages and shorter hours. Now, in increasing numbers, they are expanding their functions to the point of offering educational, recreational, and health services to their members. They are well aware of the fact that man is more than an economic animal.

Now that the older goal of collective bargaining in large segments of American industrial life is an accomplished fact, organized labor has set its sights toward a new goal. The end that it has in mind is the achievement of social security in its various forms for American workers. During recent years, considerable headway has been made toward the achievement of the new goal. Employer-financed health and pension plans have already been won in many of our major industries. It appears that unions are already putting into motion a major campaign for the establishment of a yearly salary or a *guaranteed annual wage* for industrial workers. Union leaders justify such a demand on the ground that workers are entitled to have what members of the management staff have enjoyed for long years, namely, the sense of security that the prospect of regular paychecks brings.

If and when organized labor secures the guaranteed annual wage, its quest for improving the lot of American workers will not end there. The reach of organized labor has always exceeded its grasp. In future years the labor movement will doubtless develop new goals and confront American industry with new demands.

22

THE POSITION OF THE CONSUMER

> Satisfactions of consumption provide the criteria for evaluating the whole production process. . . . It is only with final consumption that the whole economic process takes on significance.[1]


"Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production," said Adam Smith, a century and a half ago.[2] The free price system is based on the theory that each individual buyer or "economic man," equipped with a supply of wherewithal, will buy what he needs on the open market with a canny concern for his own welfare, after he has deliberately decided what his most important wants are. He knows the comparative values of the different products and services available. In pursuing his own selfish interests, he will buy from the producer who gives him the best quality for his purposes at the least cost, and thus he will encourage competition and the smooth functioning of the free price system.

But this ideal picture is a far cry from the actual position of the con-

sumer. How many people buy as coolly and rationally as the "economic man"? How many know all about the comparative worth of different goods and services? How many have paused to examine their personal scale of values as reflected in the ways they spend their money? And to get down to real fundamentals, how many have the wherewithal to satisfy their most important needs?

Inequality

Let us consider the last question first. Income levels vary greatly from country to country, especially from the modern industrialized countries to those in "underdeveloped areas." In contrast



Adapted from United Nations, Statistical Papers, Series E, No. 1, 1950.

with the United States income per person of about $1,453 in a recent year is the average income of $80 in such areas. (See graph above.)

These underdeveloped areas, which include nearly half of the world's 2,400,000,000 people and half the earth's surface, are part of "the free world," that is, not under communist domination and therefore part of America's problem as leader of the fight against communist imperialism. Their tiny income obviously forces them to live at levels "which deny them a reasonable freedom from preventable disease, a diet adequate to physical well-being, a dwelling that meets basic human needs, the educa-

tion necessary for improvement and conditions of work that are technically efficient, economically rewarding, and socially satisfactory." [3]

Agriculture—often a very primitive agriculture based on methods centuries old—is the chief support of these people. Increasing population, war, and political disturbances have made their food sources even more scant than before. The poorer a family is, the larger the portion of its income that goes for food. In many countries, nine-tenths of the family's income is spent on food, and sometimes this is not enough to keep them from starving. The average diet is 20 per cent below minimum health standards. In contrast, Americans long spent a quarter of their incomes for food, and now since food prices have risen out of proportion to other prices, they spend slightly over 30 per cent (see chart on page 395). Obviously this leaves a greater margin for comforts and luxuries. Modern industrial countries have more doctors and hospitals and a greater life expectancy, in some cases more than double that in the poorer countries. They have more teachers, less illiteracy, more leisure and recreation, more telephones, radios, autos, and miles of railroad in proportion to the population.


Travel in 50 countries has convinced the senior author that a people's level of living shows up most obviously in food and clothing (though data on infant and general mortality, length of life, and occurrence of disease are equally revealing to the armchair traveler). The vast majority of the world's people have appallingly poor shelter. Most homes consist of one dim, unheated, glassless, and unscreened room crawling with insects. In some countries, only a fraction of the inhabitants have shoes. Most people can be marked out by their dress as lower class. In only a few countries, and ours is one, is the level of living so high that the lower classes dress in the same street fashions as the middle and upper classes. "But where are your poor?" visitors to the United States ask.

These comparisons with other countries are too likely to make Americans feel a bit smug and complacent; in fact, you may be wondering right now why we should bother about a chapter on consumer problems if we are as well off as we seem to be.

We may look at worldwide poverty from two points of view. First, we may ask whether the poor are satisfied because their culture does not teach them to want more, but rather stresses resignation, the beauty of poverty, and the rewards of the hereafter? By this criterion, many people, especially in Asia, are content with their lot. But as the world shrinks and they see other ways of life, they are likely to feel stirrings of discontent, as many already have under the prodding of communist propagandists. Therefore we need to measure their level of living in terms of our own standards of health and decency. Inadequate nutrition, housing, and

sanitation are reflected in ill health, shortened lives, and lowered efficiency. The strongest allies of communism are poverty, hunger, and disease. As a leader of the free world, the United States cannot afford to be complacent about poverty and inequality among its potential allies.

Our government has recognized this fact and stated a policy for dealing with it in the much-discussed "Point IV" of the Act for International Development:




The peoples of the United States and other countries have a common interest in the freedom and in the economic and social progress of all peoples. Such progress can further the secure growth of democratic ways of life, the expansion of mutually beneficial commerce, the development of international understanding and good will, and the maintenance of world peace.

Based on this policy is a program for helping these peoples to raise their own level of living by improving their agriculture and industry.

Our government has sent technicians to guide them in programs aimed at "grass roots" improvements.

Even in our own relatively prosperous country there is still great inequality of incomes. Over a period of years one family out of five has received as much income as the other four families put together. Although there has been some tendency toward equalization of income since World War II, partly as a result of a progressive tax program, full employment, and an increased number of wage earners among lower income groups, the top fifth still receives about 47 per cent of the total income. About a



quarter of American families have less than $2,000 a year to live on. Half our 40 million families earn from $2,000 to $5,000 according to the 1950 census, 8 million over $5,000, and 10½ million less than $2,000 (see illustration on "American Family Income").

We often speak of "the American standard of living" with pride, as if it were something most of us had really achieved. Actually it is a sort of goal, an ideal culture pattern of which a person can get a fairly accurate picture by leafing through a slick-paper women's magazine. The *real* culture pattern is our actual *level of living.* For only about one-third of American families does it meet the "American standard" of comfort, with

adequate amounts of the basic necessities, an ample quantity of semi-luxuries, and cultural advantages.

If our level of living is so much higher than that of other countries, why should we be so concerned about this inequality at home? So long as a person has enough to keep him healthy, the general level of incomes matters little, perhaps, from a coldly practical point of view. But if his income is lower than those of his associates, the individual is unhappy and feels relatively poor. If he cannot be sure even of that meager income, whether because of changes in the value of money or war or unemployment, he feels insecure.

In discussing culture, we defined a "good" culture as one that satisfies not only the basic biological and social necessities, but also the wants and desires created within the culture itself. In a society like ours, where the "good life" is identified with material abundance, and "getting ahead" with financial success, where the rich are conspicuously rich, where wants are created and fostered by producers and distributors, the majority of people cannot satisfy the wants created by their culture. That is why economists consider inequality the Achilles' heel of our economy. When 80 per cent of the people hold only 7 per cent of the savings, and operate pretty much on a hand-to-mouth basis, says Roger Babson, the manufacturers and labor leaders who depend upon the mass market must reduce their costs to fit the mass pocketbook, or their days are numbered.[4]

We cannot, then, afford poverty and extreme inequality either in Podunk or in Pakistan. It is not compatible with democracy within a country nor with our mission as leader of the free world.

Obstacles to Rational Buying

In addition to inequality of income and savings, there is another major respect in which the theoretical picture of the economic man does not fit reality. The great majority of consumers find it difficult to evaluate the differences between various goods and services. Nor do they determine their wants with any such degree of rationality as the "ideal" economic man would employ. In part this situation is the price they pay for the marvelous benefits of mass production.

Mass production has put on the market a *bewildering variety of goods* sold in numerous stores. Shopping takes a heavy toll of time and energy even when the buyer does not pause to compare prices and values from store to store. Most present-day Americans, of course, enjoy all the wonderful things on the market, even when a plate glass window inter-



Detroit Free Press; Canada: National Film Board; Inland Steel; Burroughs

CONSUMER CHOICE

The insistent ads of a London street, the ample stocks of a Canadian farmer's market, the food supplies of post-war Germany, and the jammed shelves of an American supermarket all demand intelligent choices on the part of customers whose wants usually exceed their means.

venes, and would not care to return to the "good old days" of 50 years ago when supplies were simpler and fewer and were almost all concentrated in a "general store." But it was much easier to pick and choose when the variety of goods was limited, when the primary group pressures of a closely-knit neighborhood controlled merchants who were also neighbors, and when about the only times farm and small-town families were exposed to high-pressure sales talk were the annual visits of the itinerant peddler and the covered-wagon purveyor of "Indian medicine."

Ever greater specialization has made the typical consumer a producer of only one good or service. He spends the money he earns to buy everything else he needs. He has, therefore, *no background of producer experience* from which to judge butter or cloth or apples or furniture. Some of us can remember the wonderful hearty bread our mothers and grandmothers made, and spurn the grocery's "glorified mattress stuffing" with its radiant whiteness, exaggerated softness, and artificially preserved freshness. But more and more people take grocery bread for granted because it is available in such abundance and they have no standard for comparing it with other types.

New types of goods, which even the all-around farmer-producer would find it impossible to judge, are constantly appearing on the market. The weaver of wool cannot judge the new synthetic fabrics; the metalworker or cabinet-maker is as much in the dark as anyone else about what makes one TV set better than another; the housewife who has always been proud of her sparkling laundry but wants to eliminate some of the labor involved finds it difficult to choose from among the various automatic washers on the market and may select a brand simply on the basis of her favorite comedian's recommendation.

Since the beginning of World War II, however, there has been a significant trend reversing this over-specialization. More and more, the housewife and homeowner, finding it impossible to pay plumbers, painters, carpenters, seamstresses, and odd-jobs men (a vanishing species) the high rates of current wage scales, are learning to handle tools with increasing competence; and with the advent of books and materials to help them do so, are largely dispensing with such services. Resin-based paints, ready-pasted wallpaper, drapery-making gadgets, simplified patterns for clothing, and books for the handyman all indicate this trend. Someone in most modern households knows how to replace a leaky washer in a faucet, repair an electric outlet, slipcover a chair, or refinish a chest of drawers. Surprisingly many can install kitchen cupboards and appliances, make lamps and furniture, and turn out beautifully tailored clothes. Those who stress the vanishing of production from the

home have not noted this trend, possibly because it has been eased and encouraged by modern appliances.

Mass production in bringing abundance has practically eliminated the made-to-order market except in shops catering to the wealthy. Under the old system, a customer went to the tailor or dressmaker, cooper or smith, bootmaker or cabinetmaker and ordered just what he wanted. Now *goods are first produced in huge quantities, then buyers are sought.* This entails *advertising* and other kinds of *sales pressures.* Mass production means a high overhead, for it is achieved by means of expensive factories and machinery; only on the sales the producer makes beyond the break-even point does he realize a profit. With most large producers of retail goods this means reaching a national or even an international market through advertising.

American advertising is big business. It costs between 6 and 7 billion dollars a year. In 1951, newspapers, which depend on advertising for two-thirds of their revenue, took in $2.2 billion; direct mail $920 million; radio (entirely dependent on advertising) $710 million; magazines $570 million; and television $390 million, almost twice the TV intake of the preceding year. In 1952, advertising revenues rose 10 per cent.

This business, often much maligned by foreigners and occasionally resented by Americans themselves, is very much a part of the American scene. It performs certain very appreciable services for the American consumer.

Local advertising is especially useful to the consumer. He scans the daily paper for news of sales and seasonal merchandise, for classified ads and for listings of current attractions at the theater and movies.

Advertising foots the bill for much of our entertainment and news in the press and on radio and television. Some of us would groan if we had to pay a direct tax for the privilege of using a radio, as the English do. (The English, on the other hand, have preferred the tax, but are now experimenting with commercial radio and television.)

Much of our information about new products and the different varieties of commonly used items comes from advertising. National advertising often amounts to a guarantee of quality and gives the buyer confidence in the product. By stimulating steady demand it tends to reduce waste in production and distribution. Through promoting increased sales, ads *may* make lower prices possible, although price-cutting on competitive brands is not customary. Advertising draws money into circulation and keeps us working for the many things held enticingly before us (though some may question the ultimate value of this incentive!). As the advertisers themselves say, it "scientifically promotes new wants," and thus keeps the economy expanding.

Often the consumer is not conscious of the fact that he "wants" something until he sees it advertised, but then he is sure it will fill a definite need or satisfy a desire. Whether or not this is a worth while function is an arguable question. "Making a man unhappy and then making him happy again is no great social service." [5] On the other hand, it is this very function of advertising that is seen as a lubricant to the economy, a stimulant to work and production, and thus one contributor to our great material abundance.

The "scientific promotion of new wants" employs thousands of people trained as practical psychologists through courses in marketing, retail selling, and public relations. Their first job is to attract the attention of the passerby on street or highway, the reader, the radio or TV fan. Catchy singing commercials, flashing neon arrows, arrays of electric bulbs that produce moving pictures and slogans, fluorescent colors that catch the eye blocks away, huge handsome billboard men blowing smoke rings, little cartoon men scrubbing the sink or cavorting around a box of cereal on the TV screen—the devices are highly effective.

Once they have the prospective customer's attention, advertisers appeal to his emotions and to culturally created desires to put him in a receptive mood. One surefire way to thaw out a customer is to play upon his love of children. Occasionally this may backfire, as in the case of a campaign in 1950 picturing children in homes without TV sets as drooping from neglect, but with a stiff upper lip never letting their parents know they had failed them. This drew criticism from many parents, and prolonged their resistance to their own children's pleas for TV, which, contrary to the ads, were highly articulate! "Love" and "beauty" are magic words to the sellers of soap, cosmetics, jewels, and clothing. A picture of a fetching girl in a bathing suit draws attention to any number of things having nothing to do with the beach; it merely identifies the product advertised with something that is sure to win attention and a favorable attitude. Advertisers also find it profitable to exploit the American desires to display one's wealth, taste, discrimination, superior knowledge or breeding, and to keep "in the swim."

The attention-getting device and emotional appeal are often accompanied by a very reasonable sounding argument, which on analysis may turn out to have little or no factual content. Or they may furnish the cue for an oft-repeated slogan or the spelling out of the brand name. It is a rare ad that appeals to intelligence; most ads in fact try to sidetrack it. We may think of rational behavior as Impulse—Reflection—Act; advertisements seek to eliminate the middle step and reduce behavior to Impulse—Act. The wind-up of the typical ad is an "action stimulus" of some kind. "Don't delay! Buy a tube *today*."

So effective are these devices, especially when repeated over long periods of time, that many brand names have become household words, commonly used to mean the type of product rather than the particular brand itself.

Obviously advertising would not be such big business if it did not effectively convince the American consumer to choose the brands advertised. Most Americans accept advertising as part of the order of things; beyond occasionally complaining about a tiresome commercial or good-naturedly spoofing a slogan, they do not think about it much. If they do, they are pretty sure it "convinces the other fellow" but has little to do with their own choices. A minority resent the clever emotional appeals of the ads and are irritated by repetitious commercials and critical of the enormous amounts spent for ballyhooing luxuries of questionable value, "competitive" brands that are really very much alike, or downright harmful products.

Although some federal agencies have a limited amount of power to punish fraudulent advertisers, there is still a crying need for more stringent regulation of patent medicine advertising. Many reputable newspapers and magazines refuse to accept the patronage of the more blatantly misleading advertisers who have given the whole business a black eye. But a person can hardly escape seeing their ads here and there, with their sweeping promises to help a host of diseases and ailments. Court orders may cause a small amendment to be put in tiny print below all the wonderful claims. "If headache persists, see your doctor," or "Continuous use may be injurious." Such products can do great harm by convincing a patient that he feels better for a while and need not see a doctor; meanwhile a serious disease may be progressing beyond the curable point.

Not in the same class of harmful products, but infinitely wearisome to parents of small children, are the premium offers on such products as breakfast cereals. Cupboard shelves are loaded with cereals sneaked into the supermarket cart because of games, prizes, contests, cutouts on the box. Any actual breakfasts that come from some of these boxes are so much velvet. So far has this gone that a man formerly in charge of premiums for a leading company caricatured the rivalry in a speech to his colleagues:

> You can't offer a ring to a kid, or even a ring with a secret compartment. It's got to be a magic ring with a secret compartment, concealed by an explorer's compass, housed in a shiny brass case, equipped with an unbreakable plastic lens, with a polished signal mirror attached to one side and a supersonic whistle for your dog on the other.[6]

Advertising would not be as successful as it is in "promoting new wants" were it not compatible with American values. *Our cultural values do not encourage rational choice.* Americans tend to think more of increasing their earning power than they do of getting the maximum satisfaction out of a limited income. Frugal homemaking is not highly regarded as an art. The good life is identified with an abundance of this world's goods, progress with more of the same. "Keeping up with the Joneses" is a powerful motive for spending money where it shows —on cars, clothes, and home furnishings. This desire for "conspicuous consumption" leads to an emphasis on style rather than durability. The urbanization of society, with emphasis on secondary relationships, has fostered this attitude, for in fleeting contacts people are judged by appearances, and to be successful in some fields a person must above all *look* successful.

It is true that in no society are wants limited to the simple satisfaction of elemental needs; every culture *creates* desires. But in our culture wants multiply so fast (thanks to "scientific promotion" and our own material values), that our earning capacity cannot keep pace with our *yearning* capacity.

We are all consumers, but *few of us are aware of a "consumer problem."* In spite of the fact that they are frequently weary from shopping, are dissatisfied with goods they have bought, feel let down after acquiring something they have wanted because the neighbors have it, or are vaguely dissatisfied with the struggle to earn more and more, most Americans fail to recognize such a problem. Most of them are firmly confident that "you get what you pay for"—a misleading slogan if there ever was one. Most of them do not think of themselves as consumers; they are much more conscious of their role as producers, and much more anxious to improve their earning capacity in that role than to improve the buying power of their dollars. Often their dual roles conflict. When a question of taxes or higher wages comes up, they are much more concerned with its immediate effect upon their income than with its ultimate effect upon the buying power of their dollars. That is why consumers are not a pressure group like laborers, farmers, or manufacturers, and why their interests are so often neglected.

Effects of Mass Production, Sales Methods, and Lack of Information and Rationality

"The establishment of standards is the fundamental protection for consumers upon which all the other devices for protection

rest."[7] *But uniform standards of quality are almost entirely lacking in most lines of goods and services.* Goods are inadequately or even misleadingly labeled. Such terms as "extra fancy" and "select" sound like top grades; actually they are not in many cases. A person buys a can of ripe olives marked "Select" and finds them to be tiny things; to get respectable-sized ones he would have to buy "Jumbo"; the largest are "Colossal."

This situation is not the result of lack of knowledge of how to grade goods. Some private grocery companies use definite grade labels. Large businesses have purchasing departments and demand that the goods they buy meet certain requirements. This ultimately benefits the consumer, of course, but the buyer has no definite yardstick of quality with which to compare brands. Manufacturers insist that the brand name is a guarantee of quality, and to some extent this is true; but sales pressures so becloud the issue that the average consumer finds out which brands are best by costly and slow trial-and-error if at all.

The United States Bureau of Standards sets up scientifically determined standards for all government purchases. These are not, however, available to consumers. If they were, says a high official of a large mail order house, the average person's level of living could be raised as much as 25 per cent with no increase in production.

Curbs on price competition raise prices to the consumer. There is far less real price competition in American business today than most consumers imagine.

> In each field of enterprise there are at least three strong competitors who carefully avoid any mutual agreement that might be interpreted as an attempt at monopoly or restraint of trade. Each concern is a "bona fide" rival of the others in the eyes of the law. But the rivalry between them is strictly confined to competition in sales methods. Competition that involves prices is avoided by all hands with almost desperate unanimity.[8]

Two rather informal arrangements that operate in the direction of price-fixing are trade associations and price leadership (see Chapter 20). Producers fear that any price competition may lead to a ruinous price war; nonetheless, these agreements not only curtail free competition, but also tend to shelter the less efficient producers and prevent full use of plant capacity, thus working to the detriment of the consumer.[9]

Although federal anti-trust laws are designed to prevent price-fixing, other federal laws actually operate to keep a floor under prices. Not only are there some industries that are monopolies because of ownership of patents, but also federal and state "fair trade laws" force the retailer

to charge the price fixed by the manufacturer. The validity of these laws is currently being challenged by such large retailers as Macy's in New York. Tariffs and agricultural quotas and subsidies are other government measures that favor producers and thus raise prices to consumers.

There is a lack of any reliable correlation between price and quality, particularly in drugs and cosmetics, less so in food, clothing, and furniture. Laboratory tests of 130 brands of toilet soap sold during the depression of the thirties found the most expensive brand, which sold for 35¢ a cake, deficient according to one federal specification and very much like a soap that sold for 5¢ a cake. In 1953 the same laboratory tested 102 brands of soap ranging from 5¢ to over $2 a cake and reported, "They'll all get you clean." Most soaps do a fairly good job of cleaning but little if anything else, no matter what the ads say about guaranteeing that a girl will be a lovely bride, or be accepted at the bridge club, or be protected around the clock. If they smell good, agree with a person's skin, and cost little, they are usually good buys.[10]

Producers have one eye not on this sale but the next; they *make things just good enough,* but not so durable that they will not need replacement within a short length of time.[11] Most things could be made to last much longer than they do. Many who brought home or bought from surplus stores such things as woolen Army blankets and clothes, shoes, and towels find they wear amazingly well. Neither the manufacturers nor the consumers apparently want things to "wear forever." Manufacturers would rather push style changes and consumers are anxious to keep up with the current fashions. Thus we see changes not only in clothing fashions, jewelry, and cosmetic colors, but also in the shape and color of bathtubs, in the type of lamps and tables and rugs that mark a person as sophisticated, in modern cars and appliances.

The consumer is tempted, because of sales pressures and the irrational nature of his wants, to mortgage his future income at a high rate of interest in order to have goods *now.* This is made easy for him by *installment loans* not merely on large and durable items such as cars, appliances, and furniture, but also on "total purchases of $25 or more." This practice is certainly not compatible with the rational nature of the "economic man." It usually results in a cost of about $12 to $20 more per $100 than would buying at cash. Not only that, but cash purchasers often are granted discounts and can take advantage of good buys or special sales.

Many buyers are convinced that the carrying charge is negligible. They are unaware that interest should always be calculated on the *unpaid balance.* If a person buys a $100 item at 6 per cent carrying charge, he

may really believe he is paying only 6 per cent. But if he pays in twelve equal payments, at the end of six months he has paid half, and is still paying interest on the full amount for the next six months. Thus his interest is really closer to 12 per cent. Most things bought on credit come even higher. And should the buyer fail to keep up his payments, the seller can repossess the goods, even if only one or two months' payment is still owing.

For people who cannot seem to save ahead for large purchases, perhaps it is an advantage to buy on credit; this is the only way they can acquire large and durable items and buy better ones than they otherwise would. But buying an eight-cylinder car on a four-cylinder income is not wise, especially when carrying charges are added!

Closely related to installment buying is borrowing money; in fact, installment purchases may be lumped with cash loans as "installment credit." The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the average city family in 91 cities of various sizes had about $4,300 income after taxes in 1950 but spent $4,700. Some of this extra $400 came from savings and gifts or inheritance, but much of it was debt.

There are many reasons for borrowing money, from emergencies to careless management of income. Some people have the "debt habit," taking on new debts as fast as they pay off the old. "Credit cannot take the place of income. It can only alter the time when income is spent." [12] One reason why many people acquire the debt habit is that they have never stopped to analyze how expensive it is. Credit unions and banks charge about 12 per cent a year on the unpaid balance; licensed small loan companies charge about 30 per cent (but it may be as high as 42 per cent), and "loan sharks" or illegal lenders trap the unwary borrower into an interest rate of 240 per cent on the average, and sometimes as high as 1,200 per cent! [13] How much wiser to pay oneself the money regularly (instead of a store or loan company), putting it in the bank each month, then buying what one needs with cash.

This is very difficult for many people to do, however; and of course there are such things as emergency appendectomies, sudden moves to another city, and other unforeseen turns of events that can sometimes be met only by borrowing money. In such cases it is best to patronize a credit union, if a person is eligible for membership in one, or the small loan department of a bank, or to borrow on one's life insurance. In some cases, a small loan company is the only recourse, for it makes loans on little or no security, and makes smaller loans than some agencies with lower rates are willing to bother with. Whatever the source of a loan, the borrower should borrow only from a licensed lender and understand very clearly just how much cash he must pay in return, what security he

is putting up and on what terms, and read carefully whatever he signs.

The matter of life insurance is another highly important one on which many consumers lack adequate information. Most Americans feel that insurance is a good thing—and indeed it is, when properly understood and carefully bought.

Not only are there differences in premium costs from one company to another, but also there are very important variations in policies; not all are good buys for everyone. The buyer should be well aware of these differences and sure that the policy he buys is the one that fits his needs and his budget. Most young fathers—the group who most need to provide for their families in case they die—should regard insurance simply as protection and not try to combine it with a savings plan. For those with a moderate or limited income, term insurance is the best buy during the first two crucial decades of married life. Savings and investment may be more profitably made in other forms. Nor should children ordinarily be insured; instead more protection should be placed on the breadwinner.

In later years, the head of the family may wish to purchase another form of insurance. Or he may belong to a group with a low-cost annuity plan which combines savings with protection.

Many low-income families own policies for small amounts, but pay a weekly fee to an agent who collects; this is a highly expensive way to buy insurance. Often the company for which a person works can offer a cheaper plan with deductions from the paycheck.

Although life-insurance experts agree that insurance is not a profitable investment, they point out that it is the only form of savings that many people with small incomes have, and if they were not forced to pay insurance premiums regularly, they would not save or provide for the future at all. When hard times come, however, it is these very families who let their policies lapse, thus forfeiting all their previous "investment."

Because of his lack of organization and information, the *consumer is discriminated against in much legislation.* Sales taxes, which weigh heaviest on the poor, are a prime example; there has even been some talk of a federal sales tax. Excise taxes on luxuries are legitimate sources of revenue—except when baby oil is defined as a "cosmetic!" High tariffs, quotas and subsidies, and "fair trade" laws are examples already mentioned.

The consumer's dollar, then, still votes; but in some cases this vote is comparable to a dictator's plebiscite where there is only room for "Yes" on the ballot, and in other cases his vote is given blindly. *How can the voting power of the consumer's dollars be increased?*

Measures to Strengthen the Consumer's Position

The classic phrase, *caveat emptor* ("Let the buyer beware"), has obviously been outmoded by mass production and organized sales pressures. More and more consumers are waking up to the weakness of their position and are seeking to strengthen it. Their organized efforts have taken three general directions: pressure on the government for protective legislation, improvement of buying habits through education and information on scientific testing, and consumer cooperatives. Business has responded with some degree of standardization and improved labeling. As individuals, too, consumers find that they can improve their buying habits in several ways.

Protective legislation. Federal, state and municipal agencies give the consumer considerable protection, but not as much as they give the farmer, laborer, and businessman. There is no cabinet department to represent the consumer; possibly the new Department of Health, Education and Welfare may be persuaded to act strongly in the consumer interest if subjected to sufficient pressure.

The two chief federal agencies operating in the consumer interest are the Food and Drug Administration and the Federal Trade Commission. The FDA administers the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, which was amended and broadened in 1938 to include cosmetics and curative devices, packing conditions of food, and drug labeling. It has greatly reduced the amount of spurious, adulterated, and injurious merchandise on the market, mostly by providing for factory inspection. In 1952, the FDA prevented more than 18 million pounds of contaminated food from reaching the market. In 1953, however, the right of mandatory factory inspection was revoked, and how much harmful goods reached the market is anybody's guess. In most cases the producer can be charged only with the fault found with the seized shipment; he pays a light fine and may go on selling the same quality of goods, risking another negligible fine. Publicity could be very valuable in curbing such disregard of the spirit of the law; but news of cases is often not released until long afterward, and even then newspapers play it down for fear of offending the all-powerful advertisers. If consumers applied sufficient organized pressure, such agencies would work more effectively. Often they are handicapped by lack of sufficient appropriations to provide inspectors.

The other major agency working for consumers is the Federal Trade

Commission. It was originally established to protect businessmen from unfair methods of competition, but its powers have been broadened to punish unfair and deceptive acts that hurt the consumer. It can restrain producers from false advertising, enforce labeling of the different ingredients of wool and rayon products, enforce the truth of any labels guaranteeing against shrinkage (though the use of such labels is not mandatory), and promote "fair trade" practices (though this last is really a guarantee against competition and thus not a pro-consumer measure).

Several agencies of the Department of Agriculture work in the interest of consumers. The Production and Marketing Administration operates the school lunch program and provides a standardization and inspection service for processed foods. Some manufacturers take advantage of this service and can also use the label "US Grade A, B or C." The Department of Agriculture inspects meat entering interstate commerce and offers a valuable and inexpensive grading service, which has not been mandatory since the death of OPA. Since grading costs meat packers only about a fiftieth of a cent per pound, consumers should demand graded meat. The department's Bureau of Human Nutrition and Home Economics provides bulletins and other informational and educational service to both rural and urban consumers. Its Extension Service is responsible for the valuable work of county agricultural agents, home demonstration agents, and 4-H clubs.

Though the Constitution gives Congress power over weights and measures, the situation is a patchwork of differing state laws with varying standards of what makes a bushel and varying degrees of enforcement. The consumer is given short weight and measures more often than he suspects, especially where there are not enough inspectors to keep tab on retailers and wholesalers. In one large city, we were continually given short weight by the neighborhood grocer, and found it impossible to interest the local Bureau of Weights and Measures, even after we had made the several phone calls necessary to locate their office!

State and city governments work with the federal agencies, especially the Food and Drug Administration, and, in addition, provide licensing and inspection for such services as restaurants and dairy farms, and control liquor sales, gambling, and utility rates. Some states have gone much further than others in establishing standards and providing consumers with information on such foods as milk, eggs, and butter, and other local goods. North Dakota has perhaps the best such laws in the country and backs them up with sufficient money for enforcement.

On a worldwide scale, the Economic and Social Council of the United

Nations is working through its World Health Organization and its Food and Agriculture Organization to raise living standards and improve health and sanitation.


Education and information to improve buying habits. As people learn to choose merchandise wisely, either by finding how to judge quality themselves or by relying on impartial and scientific tests, they can bring pressure to bear on industry to increase the supply of goods of dependable quality at reasonable prices. Our schools are doing something, though not nearly enough, to train students in choosing wisely. Some women's clubs, both local and national, have consumer education programs, as do some cooperatives and professional organizations.

Perhaps the most valuable service now being performed in supplying consumers with reliable information about specific products, as well as in educating them to standards, is that of Consumers Research (Washington, New Jersey) and Consumers Union (38 East 1st St., New York 3, N. Y.). These are nonprofit testing organizations founded in 1929 and 1936. They depend on subscriptions, and did not become really popular until after World War II. They publish monthly magazines and annual buying guides for their 600,000 subscribers (100,000 in Consumers Research and 500,000 in Consumers Union). A smaller organization, the Inter-Mountain Consumer Service, has its headquarters in Denver.

Many mass-circulation papers and magazines refuse ads from these testing organizations, perhaps because they puncture many of the extravagant claims in the ads that keep these publications going. Educators and other professional people who know the social and economic need for such services have steadily supported them and regard them as a significant social invention.

The staff of such an organization decides what to test by questioning subscribers and making surveys. Shoppers who do not reveal their jobs buy items off the shelf in ordinary retail stores, never accepting manufacturer's "samples." These are then scientifically tested in the laboratory; in some cases "actual use" tests are also necessary, for many items cannot be tested by laboratory methods alone. They are scaled as "Best Buys" (the most for the money); "Acceptable" or "Recommended" (usually in order of quality without regard to price, or in order of increasing price); and "Not Acceptable" or "Not Recommended." The tests used are described. Each brand is further described in terms of any significantly good or undesirable qualities, and reasons for the "Best Buys" and "Not Acceptable" ratings are explained in detail.

These services are headed by scientists of unquestioned integrity, and are scrupulously free of connections with any manufacturer, distributor,



or other commercial interest. They do not allow use of their findings in advertising.

In spite of a few drawbacks (many items are not tested, and "Best Buys" are not always available all over the country), these organizations perform a valuable service in consumer education and information. Besides testing specific brands, they explain what to look for so the subscribers themselves can check and judge. A sure indication of their

value is the fact that they are imitated by many commercial interests that boast "consumer services," "seals of approval," and "scientific laboratory tests," although usually with less impartiality and scrupulous regard for scientific techniques.

Consumer cooperatives. A democratic "middle way" has become a significant part of the economy in a few countries. This is the cooperative movement. "Co-ops" are retail stores owned and managed by the customers, who supply the capital and share the earnings in amounts proportional to their purchases. In other words, they engage in nonprofit-making self-management of economic enterprises, eliminating the middleman and the advertiser. Each member has only one vote regardless of the number of shares he owns. Return on shares is small, for most of the surplus is divided on the basis of purchases at the end of the year. Cash sales, grade labeling, and lack of sales pressures are typical of consumer cooperatives. Though cooperatives usually begin with a retail store, they may expand into other lines according to need —credit unions, gas stations and garages, creameries, meat curing plants, telephone companies. They organize into wholesale units and even set up some manufacturing plants of their own. In theory there is no limit to application of the cooperative principle.

Although 6 million Americans spend over a billion dollars a year in co-ops, this is only a tiny fraction—1½ per cent—of retail business in our country. Co-ops are found mostly among the Scandinavian and Finnish colonies in Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin. In Finland, they do one-fourth of the retail business; in Denmark and England (where the idea originated in 1844) they do 15 per cent; in Sweden 10 per cent. One reason for the limited acceptance of the idea by Americans is our emphasis on greater earning capacity rather than on "petty" saving. In addition, some Americans are inclined to suspect that cooperatives are somewhat leftist. There is no basis for this in fact except that occasionally cooperatives do get entangled with other movements. In spite of its relative smallness in our country, the cooperative movement is significant. It gives people a feeling that they have something to say about managing their own purchases. It promotes consumer education and information, serves as a check on private industry, and encourages international cooperation.

Business-connected agencies. Although a clear and uniform system of standards and labels upon which the consumer can rely is still lacking, some progress has been made by various commercial agencies. To mention a few examples, the American Institute of Laundering has pro-

moted the use of labels indicating the washability of clothing; the United States Testing Company allows use of its findings by its commercial clients; underwriter's laboratories guarantee the safety of gas and electrical appliances; and some large chain stores have their own system of grade labeling—A & P uses "Ann Page" for Grade A, "Sultana" for Grade B and "Iona" for Grade C. Better business bureaus in the larger cities warn citizens against fraudulent activities.

Individual improvement in buying habits. Aside from joining testing organizations, consumer cooperatives and study groups, and a local chapter of the National Association of Consumers, which tries to centralize the various uncoordinated parts of the consumer movement, the individual can improve his own satisfaction as a purchaser in several ways.

The fundamental step is to examine his own system of values, to ask himself what he really wants out of life. Is he placing material success above all else and sacrificing to its attainment such other values as enjoyment of family life, travel, art and literature, hobbies, sports, music? Is he so weary from chasing after the almighty dollar that he has no energy left for anything else? Does he find himself at a loss for a way to fill his leisure time; does he "kill time?" Does he feel the urge to keep up with—or somewhat ahead of—the Joneses? A cartoon in a popular magazine well expressed the futility of this national sport. Two women were chatting over the backyard fence. Said one to the other with an expression of astonishment, "And all the while *we've* been trying to keep up with *you!*"

That ideal picture of the "economic man" at the start of the chapter is not to be understood as a goal for all consumers to aim at. A perfectly cool and rational purchaser would get little fun out of life! People need variety, emotional release, an occasional sense of "a fling." But too many fritter money away so they have none left for the things they really want. A widely-traveled professor said her friends envied her memories of the Taj Mahal, the Louvre, and the colorful Indians of Guatemala, and marveled at how she was able to manage so much travel. "I just don't buy a pretty handbag or scarf whenever one catches my fancy," she explained.

Time and energy are to be weighed, too, when considering the expenditure of money. Perhaps Consumers Union reports that the best buy in shirts is at one store, the best in shoes at another; but the stores are far apart and a person's time is limited. He must make compromises. The housewife who chases from supermarket to supermarket buying only the specials may pride herself on saving pennies, but she is prob-

ably wasting time and energy, or confessing that she has little in the way of more interesting activity on which to expend them. "A perfectly rational 'economic man'—one who decides every purchase rationally—would have to be not only very wise and judicious but endowed with the vigor of ten ordinary men to stand the nervous strain of choosing his purchases." [14]

A sensible, not too rigid budget on which the family democratically agrees is a standard recipe for happy management of family finances. Families and individuals can also try to avoid wasteful installment buying, carefully investigate sources of necessary loans, cultivate more pride in management of money and use of goods, recognize that top quality is not invariably necessary, nor price necessarily indicative of quality, and adopt an attitude of healthy skepticism toward advertising claims and the blandishments of salespeople.

The individual conscious of the importance of his role as a consumer should also realize that he has a duty as a citizen to ask for and support legislation that fights monopoly, improves price competition, and forbids the sale of inferior or dangerous goods. He can best do this by joining consumer organizations that can bring pressure to bear upon government and industry.

Justification for a Consumer Movement

There are those who tend to be suspicious of any attempt on the part of consumers to organize and bring to bear such pressures. They are comparable to those who damned the labor movement in its embryonic stages. The Consumers Union board of directors stated the case for a consumer movement within the free price system admirably when answering charges that they did not believe in private enterprise and were undermining faith in American business:

"So deeply is the philosophy of Consumers Union based on the free market, the competition of products, and the free choice of the consumer who wants to buy the best for his money—all mechanisms which are essential to the free enterprise system—that it is utterly obvious . . . where we fit into the scheme." After mentioning that business and government set up purchasing departments and testing laboratories, the directors went on to say:

> It appears to us unarguable that consumers [also] have the right and the need to provide themselves with such an information service to help themselves in dealing with the free market. Today more than ever,

with all the rich variety of products made available by our industrial system, it takes more information than any one person can amass for himself to choose wisely. . . .

An organization like CU is hardly conceivable in other than a free enterprise society . . . (It) is a characteristic expression of the American tendency to seek solutions to problems wherever possible through voluntary action. It is our aim to strengthen our economy, and hence our democracy, by giving consumers impartial and accurate product information which will lead to wiser choices. . . . We are opposed to the authoritarian guidance of production and consumption.[15]

The acid test of any economic system is, "Does it satisfy the wants of the consumer?" Economic processes are not ends in themselves; they are means by which the ends of human living may be served. Our version of the free price system, coupled with an abundance of natural resources and other advantages, has produced the highest average level of living in the world. As long as most Americans aspire to a standard achieved by relatively few, however, the system cannot be said to satisfy completely the needs and desires created in our culture. A more equitable distribution of income, a system of uniform standards, encouragement of true price competition, and an adjustment of value systems would relieve many of the stresses and pressures that endanger the continuation of the system itself.

23


PROSPERITY WITHOUT INFLATION: PRESENT INSECURITIES

We Americans have achieved a remarkably high level of living. This record has been partly due to our tremendous natural resources, the many talents of our immigrant ancestors, our type of class system, and the emphasis within our culture on things economic. It has also been due in part to the tremendous incentives that our particular economic system offers our people to "get up and go."

Yet no economic system is perfect. The outstanding weakness in any economic system that is largely free enterprise is that it is subject to violent fluctuation from prosperous periods to serious depressions. There have been times, such as the Great Depression of the 1930's, when the amount of unemployment was tremendous. In 1933, one out of every four workers in the United States was unemployed. For the most part

these people without jobs were able and willing to work. But no work was to be had.

From 1929 to 1933, total money income payments to individuals were cut by almost half. Loss in national income ran to hundreds of billions of dollars. But dollar losses stated in billions are quite meaningless. There is no way to describe in quantitative terms the total impact of



Graphics Institute for "Economics for the Citizen" by Oxenfeldt; Rinehart & Co.

major business fluctuations on families, individuals, and institutions. Of course, we know many of the facts. There was a decline in divorce (divorces are expensive) but an increase in desertions (the poor man's divorce). Birth rates decreased (families could not afford to raise as many children as they had formerly). During the worst of the Great Depression there was a movement away from the cities back to the farms, not because of any need for agricultural workers, but because the land


offered the only opportunity for scratching out some kind of an existence. Since the extra labor was not really needed on the farms, there was considerable "hidden unemployment" and "underemployment" in agriculture.

A major depression is particularly troublesome for young workers with limited or no work experience, older persons, and members of minority groups such as Negroes, "the last to be hired and the first to be fired." Such persons have a most difficult time finding jobs. One of the greatest dangers of depressions is that these people will become frustrated and will, together with other unfortunates who have also lost confidence in the economic and social systems, fall prey to demagogues, ambitious and ruthless men who take advantage of the insecurity of the times to set class against class, race against race, and group against group. Solely to further his own selfish designs, the demagogue attempts to place the blame for the suffering that results from violent economic fluctuations on minority groups. An idle man, confused and insecure, may be tempted to surrender his freedom in exchange for the demagogue's promises of security and employment.

Even if he does not succumb to the wiles of a demagogue, an idle man is likely to be psychologically injured. Due to our *ideology* or belief system, he and his family are likely to blame his unemployment and reduced living standards on himself. Because we learn in childhood that economic success depends largely upon the individual's own efforts, he will lose his self-respect and the respect of others. Long after the depression is over, these emotional scars remain with him and he continues to feel insecure.

Inflation and particularly hyperinflation are also dangerous to our economic system and to a democratic society. *Inflation* means a rise in average prices. Prices in the United States almost doubled on the average from 1939 to 1952. This price rise almost cut in half the real income of families living entirely on savings and other forms of fixed money income. The effects of inflation on fixed money income groups are grossly unfair and contrary to our ideas of justice.

Hyperinflation means an extremely rapid rise in prices such as occurred in Germany after the First World War and in China and Hungary after the Second World War. Galloping inflation was so bad in Germany in 1923 that a retired teacher could hardly buy sufficient postage stamps for a letter with his entire monthly pension check. Department store prices rose hourly, and workers' wives with baby carriages full of money would rush out on pay day to spend it before there was another price rise. This disastrous flood of hyperinflation wiped out the middle class. Only a few speculators profited.



Inland Steel; Detroit Times

POVERTY: PRESENT INSECURITY

Both mass poverty, as that of India, and personal poverty, as seen in the substandard American dwelling, can and must be remedied.

The rise of fascism in Italy and nazism in Germany are classic examples of the effect of business fluctuations on social and political institutions. Fishing in the troubled economic waters, Hitler appealed to the deposed members of the middle class who had lost everything in the hyperinflation, to the unemployed generally, and to the many whose living standards were declining as a result of the depression. The Nazi leader condemned businessmen, bankers, foreigners, Jews, "decadent democratic socialists," and "internationalists" as responsible for the hyperinflation and depression. Using unscientific concepts of racial superiority, Hitler played upon the ethnocentrism of the German people, ridiculing western concepts of liberty and individual freedom—as the communists do today. He offered the people security in exchange for freedom. He was able to obtain full employment by drafting men into the army and by building a war economy that absorbed the jobless. Dictators can always "solve" the unemployment problem by going to war as a last resort.


It is generally agreed that the hyperinflation of the 1920's plus the world-wide depression of the 1930's were fundamental factors responsible for the Second World War and the post-war spread of totalitarian communism. Some thoughtful persons believe that the American economic system or any type of democratic system will go under and be replaced by a totalitarian organization if major business cycles cannot be controlled.

Business Cycles

Business cycles are "recurrent but not periodic" fluctuations in general business activity found in economies in which a free price system prevails. This statement indicates that economic activity goes up and down in some sort of a pattern, but no two business cycles are alike. Some last a long time; others a short time. Some are marked by short and minor depressions; others by long and deep depressions. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that economists have become accustomed to using the phrase "business cycles" for it has helped to spread the misconception that all cycles are regular and identical. The cycle described in the following paragraphs is a *model* and not an *actual* cycle. The details of cycles differ; no one cycle is the same as another. The order of events and the events themselves vary; but there is sufficient that is characteristic to indicate a pattern.

Business cycles last from more than one year to ten or twelve years. Minor cycles average approximately three and a half years and major

cycles slightly over eight. But it is only fair to warn the student that averages made up of such extreme differences are not too useful. The business cycle that started with the 1939 recovery period is exceptional inasmuch as it lasted more than twelve years, unless the slight downward movement in economic activity in 1949 can be called the end of the cycle, and the second half of 1950 a recovery period starting a new cycle.




Reprinted by permission from Basic Data of the American Economy, *3rd ed., by Peach and Krause. Figures after 1948 from Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1953.*

Business cycles are a recent phenomenon and occur only in free price economies. From Biblical times, through the slave economies of Greece and Rome, and down to the medieval manorial system, there were periods of plenty when the harvest was abundant and periods of famine when the crops failed, but there were no business cycles as we know them today. In those days the economy was based on subsistence farming; variations of output arose from such causes as flood, fire, drought,

and war, not from the business activities of the people; and profits, prices, money, and markets were unimportant to the economy. There were no recurrent patterns of (1) *depression*, (2) *recovery*, (3) *prosperity*, and (4) *recession*—the four phases of the business cycle. (See "Model of a Business Cycle" below.)

Depression. During a depression there is considerable unemployment of the factors of production. Labor unemployment is particularly notice-



MODEL OF A BUSINESS CYCLE

able, and only the most efficient and cooperative workers hold their jobs. The *producer goods* (*capital goods*) and *consumer durable goods* industries are hardest hit. In the midst of a depression, not even the most optimistic businessman would think of investing heavily in capital goods

such as tools and machinery with the demand for his product practically at a standstill. Capital goods industries such as steel, locomotives, and machine tools are known as "prince and pauper" or "boom and bust" industries because they have such violent fluctuations in production, profits, and employment.

As for consumer durable goods—such things as automobiles, refrigerators, and automatic dishwashers—people stock up on them during prosperity. Since they last for years they do not have to be replaced during hard times. Also, these products are usually expensive and people whose incomes have shrunk during a depression will think twice before buying a new car, for example, and then, more often than not, will resist the temptation.

The slump even strikes *semi-durable goods* such as clothing; people will wear clothes longer during a depression and repair old things rather than buy new ones. Soft *consumer goods* or perishables show the least decline in production and sales because such articles are used up rapidly—and people have to eat regardless of the phase of the business cycle. Battle Creek, Michigan, which produces breakfast foods, would have relatively lighter unemployment during a depression than a steel center such as Pittsburgh or an automobile city such as Detroit.

Another reason why unemployment is so great in producer goods, and in all durable goods lines, is that imperfect competition usually prevails in these industries. Many of them are *oligopolies*—three to less than a score of producers dominate the industry. As a result, these industries can reduce production, lay off workers, and minimize price reductions when depression threatens or sets in.

Prices are at rock bottom during a depression, particularly the prices of such goods as agricultural commodities, which are competitively determined. Wages and interest rates are also at a low point. But because of lack of confidence in the future, banks are reluctant to lend money to businessmen, and responsible business leaders themselves hesitate to borrow funds for investment purposes.

At the bottom of a depression, with unemployment high, the number of dues-paying trade union members drops sharply. As in the case of all other economic groups, organized as well as unorganized workers try to protect their jobs, their wages, and working conditions by various devices. Skilled craft workers, in order to protect the jobs of their employed members, make it difficult for other workers to join their unions. At the trough of the cycle, strikes are few because with many unemployed workers willing to take any kind of job, even if it means breaking a strike, there is little chance of a union victory. The strikes that do take place

are frequently bitter and violent and they generally result in trade union losses. Such disputes may have revolutionary overtones as workers become increasingly dissatisfied with the economic order.

Dissatisfaction with the organization of society spreads to other groups during a depression—the intellectuals and the farmers as well as the workers and the unemployed. Frustrated intellectuals may furnish their organizational and propaganda skills to set the unemployed against the *status quo*. Farmers find themselves caught between low selling prices and high costs of debt payments, taxes, and goods such as fertilizer and agricultural machinery. During the early 1930's, farmers in the American Middle West threatened to lynch court officials who attempted to foreclose mortgages. In major depressions, rural voters have shed their traditional conservatism and become more radical, demanding that the government actively intervene in the crises. At such times they have supported various types of inflationary measures, such as the Greenback and Free Silver movements in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Farmers and other victims of the depression blame bankers, big business, and the government for their troubles. The political party in power is likely to be defeated at the polls and the opposition is given an opportunity to govern. Moreover, more radical parties grow in strength and win new adherents as the depression lingers on.

Recovery. How does the economy go from depression to recovery? Durable and semi-durable consumer goods eventually wear out. Sooner or later inventories are depleted. Capital goods such as plants and machines depreciate or become obsolete, and increased spending for replacements may be of sufficient volume to start a recovery.

Other factors may provide the stimulus. Through an extensive public works program, the government may "prime the pump" sufficiently to start the economy upward, or as in 1940, war or the threat of war may reinvigorate the industrial machine. More and more people are put to work filling military orders. Incomes rise and spending increases, stimulating employment and output in non-defense industries. As more and more young men are drafted for military service, the unemployment pool is further reduced.

It may happen that enterprising businessmen come across an invention that has profitable possibilities, and their investments in such a project may initiate a recovery. Large investments in railroads were an important factor in pulling the United States out of depressions during the latter part of the nineteenth century. And the development of the automobile industry kept the relatively minor depressions of 1924 and 1927 from becoming major catastrophes. The building of automobile

plants and the manufacture of cars stimulated a host of other industries, including motor parts, hard roads, and roadside businesses. These industries used large amounts of labor and capital equipment and had a vigorous impact upon the economy, particularly during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Perhaps the development of home air-conditioning units, prefabricated housing, family owned aircraft, or some other invention might bring the economy out of a future depression, especially if large amounts of labor and capital are needed to set the new business in motion.

The discovery and development of new lands may also stimulate a recovery. The development of the American West acted as an economic tonic to the United States and western Europe in the nineteenth century. Large investments, particularly by British, western European, and eastern American capitalists, made use of savings that otherwise might have remained idle. The dynamic increase in population in the new areas also had an invigorating effect and tended to bring about business revivals to meet the settler's ever-increasing needs for clothing, housing, food, and education.

Most of the factors described above explaining how an economy moves from depression to recovery are essentially non-economic in nature. Wars, new inventions, the discovery of new lands, and population growth are called *external* factors because they exist outside the business cycle. But once recovery begins, mechanisms within the economic system begin to work in a self-generating, cumulative manner. Especially during recovery (and recession) these *internal* factors seem to have a "snowball" effect. For example, recovery seems to feed upon itself and to work on its own momentum. The very fact that business improves leads to further economic expansion, which leads to still greater economic expansion, and so on.

During recovery, retailers find that goods are moving more rapidly and that their relatively small inventories are being depleted. They soon discover that they must reorder from the wholesalers and manufacturers. Moreover, since business has picked up, retailers may decide to carry larger stocks and hire more clerks. Manufacturers may have to open up plants and buy new machinery if there are sharp increases in orders. As a result, more workers are hired to build plants and equipment and to operate the machines.

The newly hired workers with increased money incomes begin buying durable and semi-durable consumer goods. Their spending induces retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers to hire more labor and purchase more inventories, plants, and machinery.

With the upward surge in business, prices begin to rise, but some move

more rapidly than others. Since wage and interest rates are "sticky" and lag behind other prices, enterprisers are able to make substantial profits. Rising prices also invigorate the economy. Once prices begin to rise, people suspect that they might go up even further. With increasing purchases, prices advance in a self-generating fashion, stimulating further increases in production and employment.

An optimistic psychology begins to pervade the economy. At the start of recovery, bankers are somewhat reluctant to make loans because memories of business failures during the preceding recession and depression still remain. But their reluctance vanishes as business profits continue. Businessmen seeing opportunities for lucrative investments are now anxious to borrow funds for expansion of plant, machinery, and inventories. As confidence increases, credit is extended to workers who begin again to buy on the installment plan.

Business periodicals carry encouraging articles about rising national incomes. *Gross National Product* or *G.N.P.* (total amount of goods and services produced in the country) is rising. So is *Net National Product* or *N.N.P.* (G.N.P. minus depreciation). *National Income by Distributive Shares,* which indicates the amount of wages and salaries, profits, rent, and interest earned over a period, is also growing as is *Personal Income,* or the amount of earned and unearned income received by individuals. Most encouraging of all the indicators, as far as prediction of consumer spending is concerned, is the rise in *Disposable Income* or personal income after taxes. With many of the accepted business indexes rising, such as carloadings, steel ingots, and common stock prices, there is some talk about a permanent high plateau of employment. Articles are written expressing the thesis that there will be no more recessions and depressions. Optimistic rumors spread and have a cumulative psychological impact on employment, production, and prices. Indeed, exaggerated rumors sometimes lead to mass optimism that eventually reaches fantastic heights at the close of the prosperity period. An example of this strange phenomenon of mass psychology is the 1929 stock market boom (and crash) when students working their way through college, bootblacks, and newsboys bought stock on money largely borrowed from brokers to make (and lose) fast paper fortunes. Further study by social psychologists working with economists is needed to understand the interrelationships between mass psychology and business fluctuations.

With recovery in employment, trade union membership rises. Workers who have suffered the insecurity of unemployment see in union membership a safeguard against future calamity. Since money wages increase more slowly than prices during recovery, workers feel that their real income is being endangered by the rise in living costs. Moreover, labor

is in a good position to negotiate for higher wages because unemployment pools are drying up and business profits are generally satisfactory. As a result, there are many strikes during this phase of the business cycle, but they usually are brief and are frequently won by the unions.

Prosperity. Eventually recovery passes into prosperity. National income and employment reach high levels. At the peak of a major prosperity period, there are very few unemployed, except for those changing jobs (frictional unemployment). In fact, some persons not previously in the labor market—housewives, retired workers, and school children, for example—are lured into taking jobs by the promise of high wages. Other individuals, formerly considered unemployable because they were thought to lack the ability or willingness to work, also find employment.

Since many of these persons are less efficient than the longer employed workers, wage costs increase. Because of the pressure of trade unions and the improved bargaining position of individual workers, wages rise until they begin to threaten profits. Moreover, costs increase because many plants are operating beyond their normal capacity, and inefficient plants, which in normal times would be closed, are also producing goods.

Interest rates also rise throughout the prosperity period as bankers find that the amount of their loans is passing the safety limit in relation to their reserves. Increasing interest rates are another cost factor cutting into profits. Businessmen find bankers increasingly wary of further extensions of bank loans.

Moreover, as new factories are completed and as an increasing amount of all types of goods appears on the market, salesmen find a growing resistance on the part of consumers who have been buying large amounts of durable goods. Many people have extended installment credit, mortgages, and other types of borrowing to the limit. With rising costs, increased supplies, and growing buyer resistance, the stage is set for a recession.

Recession. Perhaps the failure of a large business firm in some faraway country will furnish the push to start the economy toward its downward phase. Or a bank, finding itself short of cash reserves and worried about some of its loans, may demand repayment. In order to meet such demands, businessmen may be forced to dump goods on the market at reduced prices.

These activities may initiate a general decline in prices. Consumers and producers will stop buying in anticipation of further price reductions. Fearing inventory losses, businessmen are likely to dump more goods on the market, thus making the price situation even worse. Economic

activity will move cumulatively downward with banks calling in loans, prices receding, and sales resistance growing.

However, wage and interest rates continue to lag, making it difficult for employers to reduce costs and cut down losses. It will be recalled that oligopolistic industries can resist price changes by cutting back production and laying off workers. So can other industries in imperfect competition, protected by patents, copyrights, or other devices such as price maintenance laws, which make it possible for manufacturers to set certain retail prices. But in the more perfectly competitive segments of the economy, prices decline precipitously unless they are controlled by the government.

During the 1929 recession, agricultural prices declined considerably more than non-agricultural prices. Millions of farmers competing with one another were unable to limit production and consequently their prices continued to drop throughout the recession and depression. Caught in the squeeze between declining prices for their agricultural products and high, "sticky" prices for fertilizer, agricultural equipment, and other oligopolistically produced goods that farmers buy, as well as other rigid costs such as property taxes and interest, the farmers' share of the national income dropped substantially. Indeed, competitive agriculture did not share in the prosperity that generally prevailed during the 1920's, and the declining farm purchasing power was a factor in dragging the economy into the 1929 recession and the Great Depression. Some students believe that agricultural price declines, unless controlled, might again be a factor in causing a recession and depression.

As production is cut back, workers are laid off, and their incomes are sharply reduced. It becomes harder for them to pay for food and rent. Purchases of automobiles and new houses are drastically reduced. As more people are thrown out of work, spending is reduced, prices are depressed still further, and more unemployment results.

As in the case of recovery, mass psychology seems to have a cumulative effect. With continuous drops in prices, production, and employment, businessmen and consumers become increasingly pessimistic. Even conservative business plans are shelved. Growing pessimism pervades the economy until the trough or dead center of the depression is reached.

Seasonal Fluctuations

The business cycle is the most important type of economic fluctuation because such "booms" and "busts" constitute a grave threat to our free enterprise economy and to our entire society. But there

are many other kinds of fluctuations that may be noted. Count the number of students paying fines at the college library and you will have an interesting study in hourly, daily, weekly, term, and annual fluctuations.

In addition to business cycles, the other important types of fluctuations are (1) *seasonal* changes, and (2) *secular* trends. Some industries such as clothing, toys, and building construction have marked seasonal movements every year. The clothing industry has two peaks of activity preparing for the winter and spring markets. The toy industry is extremely busy before Christmas and then suffers a serious letdown. There is a relatively dull period in agriculture in the winter, but activity is intensified during planting and harvesting. Building also tends to be inactive in the winter months.

However, seasonal fluctuations are not generally a serious threat to the economy. Icemen can (or did) deliver coal in the winter. Managers of summer resorts in New York can operate winter resorts in Florida (or sell New York as a winter paradise, perhaps at off-season rates). With the appearance of closed cars, the invention of anti-freeze, and improved road maintenance, seasonal fluctuations in automobile production have diminished. Introducing new models in the winter and moving back the dates of auto shows to the off season has also helped to even out production and employment. In recent years, there has been an increase in building construction in winter months. Apparently little can be done to alleviate seasonal problems in the women's clothing industry as long as fashions, fads, and style changes make advance production extremely hazardous. Nor can much be done in agriculture, where climatic conditions determine activity. But toy manufacturers can eliminate some of their seasonal fluctuations by improving warehousing procedures and offering discounts to retailers for off-season purchases.

Secular Trends

The third major type of business fluctuation is the *secular trend,* which consists of long-term upward and downward movements of business that cover many years. For example, for the past half century, the automobile industry has experienced an upward secular trend while the carriage trade has suffered a long-run downward movement. These two trends were primarily due to technological changes, but other factors such as population increases (or decreases) may cause a secular trend as, for example, in the housing industry.

If the economy as a whole experiences an upward secular trend, de-

pressions will be mild and prosperous periods will last longer. But not all groups in the economy will prosper from the upward trend. Technological improvements, such as those that made possible the mass production of the automobile, generally have a beneficial effect on our national income in the long run. However, improved technology when applied to the making of automobiles meant that highly skilled woodworkers, harness-makers, blacksmiths, and a host of other workers lost their jobs. The automobile industry turned out to be a tremendous user of labor and other resources. The industry employs many more people than were ever occupied in the horse and buggy trades—and at higher average real wages. But knowledge that national income, employment, and real wages would rise in the long run would have been of small comfort in 1910 to the expert harness-maker who had spent a lifetime perfecting his skills, only to see them outmoded, or to the village blacksmith who found himself with idle hands.

If the economy experiences a downward secular trend, periods of prosperity will be short and incomplete while depressions will grow longer and more severe. Some outstanding economists in the 1930's, perhaps discouraged by the seriousness of the Great Depression, predicted that the United States was facing a long-run downward trend. These economists advanced what is called *the mature economy* hypothesis. According to this pessimistic hypothesis, short of war or heavy government spending, the economy was in for long-run unemployment, declining national income, and severe depressions. Adherents of the hypothesis based their stand on the fact that the United States no longer had a frontier nor any large labor-using and capital-consuming industries such as railroads or automobiles to develop. Furthermore, they argued that if the decreasing birth rates of the thirties continued, there would be a dearth of adventurous young people who would invest in risky undertakings and develop new ones. An older population, it was suggested, is too conservative or too tired to keep the economy dynamic. Not only baby carriage suppliers and all other industries catering to the demands of children and their young parents would suffer, but also the whole economy would decline. It was predicted that unless older people and their governments would spend sufficiently to offset this decline, the economy would undergo a downward secular trend with minor eras of prosperity and major depressions.

24

PROSPERITY WITHOUT INFLATION: CHALLENGE TO THE DEMOCRACIES

Some Business Cycle Theories

The mature economy theory is but one among a host of business cycle "theories." (Perhaps the word, "hypotheses" would be better because for the most part business cycle theories have not been subjected to rigorous, empirical tests.) In 1932-33, during the bottom of the depression, it seemed that almost everybody had a pet theory for explaining the depression and a pet plan for getting out of it.

The *classical* economists, or laissez faire theorists, argued that the economy would always function at full employment levels *if* the government would not interfere with business and *if* businessmen would really compete. No worker need be unemployed, they said, if he is willing to take wage cuts, because at *some* wage it will be profitable for an enterpriser to hire him. Under perfect competition, demand and supply

will determine wage rates, interest, and other prices so that there will be no unemployment of the factors of production. According to these assumptions, there will always be some price for labor, although it may be at a minimum of subsistence—or a starvation wage.

The classical theory can apply only to the extent that its assumptions are valid. Unfortunately, its basic assumption of perfect competition does not fit the real world of imperfect competition and oligopolies. Also, the theory assumes flexibility of prices whereas actually many prices are "sticky" and resist changes. Moreover, according to the classical theory, wage and price cuts are supposed to eliminate unemployment, but in real life decreases in wages and prices often depress business activity because further decreases are expected.

The *Marxian* theory on business cycles is important partly because of its wide acceptance outside of the United States among democratic socialists and communists. Its chief significance, however, lies in the fact that the theory, modified by Lenin, Stalin, and other Soviet theoreticians, is basic to an understanding of Soviet policy toward the United States.

The analysis, introduced by Karl Marx and refined by Marxian scholars in later years, is essentially an under-consumption theory. According to Marxian analysis, workers do not get sufficient wages to purchase consumer goods because of their lack of bargaining power. The Marxists argue that the workers are the only producers and therefore deserve the total national income. All payments of interest, profits, and rent are unearned incomes or, to use Marxian terminology, are "surplus value." During periods of recovery and prosperity, the capitalists invest part of their surplus values in plants and new equipment, thus keeping the workers employed. But after the capital goods are acquired and operating and the wares start rolling off the production lines, inventories pile up. The workers cannot buy the goods because of inadequate wages, and an economic crisis develops.

During these crises, small businessmen, members of the middle class, are forced into bankruptcy and become part of the laboring class ("the proletariat"). With each succeeding crisis, the proletariat grows more numerous, and the capitalist class ("bourgeoisie") becomes numerically smaller but with greater control over wealth and income. Because of the growing maldistribution of wealth and income, depressions become worse, and capitalists have an increasingly difficult time in finding profitable domestic outlets for their savings. As a result, they invest in underdeveloped areas in competition with the capitalists of other countries. Such competition, it is argued, brings about wars and cyclical fluctuations of increasing intensity. The Marxists generally predict that in a final "cataclysmic" depression the capitalistic system will break down.

Perhaps assisted by a violent revolution, the alleged workers' representatives will take over the economy and establish what they claim is "the dictatorship of the proletariat."

Although this theory has tremendous appeal to some workers and some intellectuals outside of the United States, it has certain weaknesses. One is that the middle class in the United States does not seem to be disappearing, as the Marxists predicted it would in all capitalistic countries. Indeed, most of our population claims identity with this class, and its ideology is dominant in our society. The growing number of managerial, professional, service, and other white-collar employees, added to the small businessmen who form the primary group Marx conceived of as the middle class, comprise a substantial proportion of the population. It seems to be true, however, that where the middle class is weak or nonexistent, the free enterprise ideology and the capitalistic system may not survive. It is also evident that no democratic system, whether it be the free price system or democratic socialism, can withstand constant wars and violent economic fluctuations with hyperinflation followed by mass unemployment.

Another Marxian prediction—that depressions would become increasingly severe as the capitalistic system developed—has failed to materialize. Although the Great Depression of the 1930's seems to have been the most severe catastrophe the capitalistic system has suffered, especially in regard to unemployment, there is no statistical evidence to indicate that depressions are becoming worse. There is also no evidence that they are becoming milder. However, economists have developed techniques to control cyclical fluctuations, and these will be discussed later in the chapter. If these techniques are properly applied, future cyclical fluctuations may be alleviated.

Predicting Business Fluctuations

There is no lack of hypotheses about business cycles and their causes, but there is great need for testing them carefully. Fortunately, some of this work is now being done at the National Bureau of Economic Research in New York City. For more than a quarter of a century, members of the Bureau have concentrated on the scientific study of business fluctuations, and have been able to develop income statistics and other modern tools for economic analysis. Perhaps with the aid of these and other methods, future economic conditions will be more accurately predicted. Predictability is a basic aim of all science, yet it must be

admitted that at present, business forecasting is less reliable than are short-run weather predictions.

One of the least reliable methods is to predict on the basis of the *average cycle.* Since every cycle is different, such procedures result in serious errors. Even when more acceptable methods are used, business forecasting is at best hazardous. Only a few forecasters accurately predicted



By permission, Justus and the Minneapolis Star

"WHO ME?"

the 1929 recession. Many believed that stock market price indexes would give advance notice of business declines—as they generally had in the past. Unfortunately, measures of stock prices were among the last of all the figures to turn downward. Many economists foresaw a major depression shortly after World War II, due to a marked decrease in government spending—but no serious economic decline took place. In spite of past

failures in forecasting, we may hope that, as a result of the intensive study of business fluctuations now going on, more reliable techniques and tested theories of greater scientific value will be developed.

National income analysis. The approach to economic fluctuations that is now receiving the most intensive study by economists is called national income analysis. It concentrates on determining the income for the entire economy (macro-economics) rather than for one firm or industry (micro-economics). The latter type of analysis was highly developed by the classical economists; the study of macro-economics was greatly aided by the development of national income statistics and the theoretical work of John Maynard Keynes.[1]

The basic concept of macro-economics is that national *income and employment depend upon total spending.* My income and yours are the result of other peoples' spending. For statistical and analytical purposes, spending may be divided among four major types: (1) consumer spending, (2) business spending (called investment), (3) foreign investment, and (4) government spending.

Consumer spending, of course, depends upon consumer income and borrowing. For the purposes of our analysis, the most important fact about consumers is that some of them do not spend all their incomes. The part not spent is saved. An obvious fact about saving is that most of it is done by the rich. The wealthy are in the fortunate position of being able to save with little effort. Moreover, they refrain from spending all their income in order to maintain power and prestige for themselves and their children. Also, they are accustomed to saving a portion of their income and so are the business corporations they own. In general, the poor are not in the habit of saving. They must spend all their income to maintain even a relatively low level of living.

What do the consumers do with their savings? They may keep some in a sock, but most savings are placed in institutions such as banks or insurance companies. If business is active, the banks or insurance companies will make extensive loans to enterprising businessmen seeking credit. If times are bad, and there are only a few sound loans to make to private business, they will probably buy government bonds and maintain larger reserves.

Business spending is called *investment* or *capital formation.* Business spends to erect plants, build machinery, and produce inventories of raw materials, semi-finished goods, and finished articles. The amount of investment fluctuates greatly during the business cycle because it depends to a great extent upon businessmen's ideas about future business prospects.

Capital formation requires savings. In order to produce capital goods, people must refrain from spending their entire income on consumer goods. For example, the railroads built in the United States during the nineteenth century needed large amounts of capital that came from the savings of eastern United States and western European capitalists. These savings made it possible for the laborers on the railroad projects to be paid so they could buy consumer goods—food, clothing, and shelter. These savings also provided for the purchase of iron rails, spikes, shovels, pick axes, and all the other equipment necessary to build a railroad.

In the Soviet Union, there is heavy concentration on capital formation, that is, on the building of equipment such as steel mills, dams, roads, and munition plants. These five-year plans, as they are called, require a huge amount of savings. In other words, the Russian people must refrain from spending a large amount of their national income on consumer goods. They are forced to keep their consumption of food, clothing, shelter, and especially luxuries, down to the lowest possible level so that land, labor, capital, and management resources can be concentrated on the building of capital equipment.


How is this large amount of savings accumulated in the Soviet Union? Propaganda is extensively used. Citizens are constantly warned that it is necessary to get along with a minimum of consumer goods so that most of their efforts can be devoted to building capital goods for the production of arms and munitions. Such production, they are told, is necessary to defend themselves against "the encircling capitalistic warmongers." The government also attempts to sell the people on the idea that if they concentrate on the erection of factories rather than on the purchase of consumer goods, their children will have a higher standard of living.

In addition, the government carries on extensive and continuous bond campaigns. Factory managers frequently boast that 100 per cent of the workers voluntarily purchased bonds. (The words "100 per cent" and "voluntary" seem somewhat inconsistent.) These drives, accompanied by a heavy tax program, sop up a considerable amount of consumer income. Other devices to "force savings" include the maintenance of low wages, the widespread use of "slave labor," limitations on the amount of consumer goods produced, and a high price policy for articles of consumption. Such measures for inducing savings and investment can be carried out only in a totalitarian system. The people may be discontented with the low levels of living but there seems to be little that they can do about it.[2]

Importance of savings and investment in determining national income. But how are savings and investment brought about in the United States? We have no planning board to determine detailed savings and invest-

ment schedules. According to laissez faire economics, the amount of savings is brought into balance with investment by the rate of interest. If the supply of savings increased and the demand decreased, it was argued that the rate of interest would go down. A low rate of interest was supposed to discourage savers and encourage businessmen attracted by low costs for loans.

However, in the real world, demand and supply do not seem to work so well in bringing savings and investment into balance or "equilibrium"



Adapted by permission from Economics: An Introductory Analysis, *2nd ed., by Paul A. Samuelson. Copyright, 1951. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.*

HOW SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT DETERMINE NATIONAL INCOME

as the economists call it. It appears that many people save regardless of the rate of interest. Many simply have the savings habit, and would not feel right if they were not regularly laying something aside. People may refrain from spending their entire income, regardless of the interest rate, so that they will have something for a rainy day, or for retirement, or for their children's education.

Businessmen borrow funds not because of low interest rates but because of prospective opportunities for profits. If the chances for profits seem

good, they will borrow even at high interest rates. If the outlook appears bad, they will refuse to borrow even at low rates.

Since savings and investment are made by different persons, and the motives of savers and investors vary, it is possible for individuals to *attempt to save more than businessmen wish to invest.* Under these circumstances, *national income* will decline.

A study of the illustration on page 437 will show why this is so. The pump at "I" represents investment. As we have already learned, technological change, population growth, industrialization of new areas, and wars will encourage businessmen to invest, that is, to keep the pump handle moving up and down. Businessmen will be encouraged to build plants and machines for which they will make large payments of wages, interest, rent, and profits to the factors of production (upper pipe). Thus, national income will be high when the investment pump is going at a rapid rate.

But there is no guarantee that the national income stream will remain high. Income can be drained off at the spigot "S," which represents savings. The greater the amount of income that goes through the spigot in the form of savings, the less is left for consumer spending (lower pipe). If the amount paid out by businessmen is not received back in consumer spending plus investment spending, business will decline. In such circumstances, business firms are paying out more than they are receiving, and enterprisers will discover that inventories are piling up and business is slow.

The main point in the illustration is that the *savings spigot and the investment pump are not connected.* All savings are not automatically invested. However, if the pump is working rapidly, and the amount flowing out of the spigot is equal to the amount being pumped into the pipes, we will have a high national income. On the other hand, if the pump is barely moving and large amounts of income are going down the savings outlet while only a small amount is going around through the lower pipe representing consumer spending, a smaller and smaller national income can be expected.

There are those who think that all savings are harmful; that they represent a leak that is bound to cause a low national income and great unemployment. That is nonsense. As long as businessmen are willing to invest an amount equal to the savings of individuals, the income stream is not reduced. But it is just as foolish to think that savings and investments can never be too high or too low. If *individuals attempt to save more than businessmen will invest,* the national income will decline until the spigot is turned down or the pump is worked more vigorously.

It may also happen that *investment is greater than the amount people*

expect to save. These conditions occur during recovery and prosperity when businessmen are optimistic about the future. Such a rise in investment is made possible by our banking system. Banks in this country can make loans up to approximately five times their cash reserves. When banks make a considerable amount of loans, businessmen obtain fat checking accounts (which are really a form of money since checks are acceptable to most people). This money is invested by business in capital goods. The increased spending of business might cause inflation, particularly if there is already full employment and no more goods can be produced to match the increase in money. If there is less than full employment, increased investments will swell national production.

It is not likely that consumer habits will change so rapidly that they will initiate an increase in national income. Increases in consumer spending largely depend upon increases in income that in turn are often dependent upon rises in investment. Investment is frequently the dynamic or variable factor causing changes in national income. Increases in investment may result in a greater increase in national income. Such an effect can be traced to the *multiplier:* an increase (or decrease) in investment brings about a larger increase (or decrease) in national income.

In political debates, the multiplier is often referred to as "pump priming." Just as farmers put a little water in a pump to get it started, so the government, it is argued, should increase spending during a depression to start up the "economic pump" again. For example, if the government spent a billion dollars erecting a dam, the workers, businessmen, and others who received the billion might spend two thirds of their earnings. The recipients of the $666,666,666.67 might spend two thirds of that, and so on. If you work this out to the bitter end, you would find that the national income had increased by 3 billion or that the multiplier is 3.

In real situations, the multiplier may not work because of *ideological* factors. We have been brought up to believe that government spending, except in certain limited areas, is bad because it may result in government debts, higher taxes, government controls, loss of individualism, and so forth. Businessmen might be so frightened by government investment, for example, in electrical power or housing developments, that they would cut back their own spending. This reaction to government spending may have occurred to a degree during the first eight years of the New Deal. At least the "pump priming" did not have as much effect as some economists predicted. It was not until the extremely heavy government spending of the forties for military purposes that the multiplier seemed to be fully effective.

The pump illustration clarifies the relationship of business and consumer expenditures to total economic activity, but for purposes of simplicity, foreign investment and government spending were omitted. Let us now turn to *foreign investment,* leaving government spending for the last section. If an American businessman erects a branch plant in France, he has made a foreign investment. If the United States government lends a billion dollars to the British government, we can also count that as an investment. A third type of foreign investment would take place if citizens of the United States sold more goods and services to the British than they sold to us. These three cases illustrate foreign investment because as a result of the transactions, we expect foreigners to pay Americans income in future years.

As we have pointed out, the investment pump in our economy must be continually active in order to keep our national income and employment at a high level. We are accustomed to save a significant proportion of our national income. If consumer spending is not increased so that savings are reduced, large investments must be made in this country and abroad or we shall face declining national incomes, growing unemployment, and depressions.

Most of the world today is suffering from an acute shortage of investment. The underdeveloped areas need substantial funds for all sorts of capital goods from simple farm tools to hydro-electric plants. These investments would eventually increase standards of living. Of course, low standards of living are not solely due to a lack of investment. Ideological systems that emphasize traditional methods of production, rigid caste and class barriers, inequitable systems of land ownership, population pressures, and lack of technical knowledge are some of the other factors responsible for low living standards in underdeveloped nations.

Levels of living are so low in underdeveloped regions that the people are easy prey to demagogic propaganda. In Asia, for example, promises of higher living standards are one of the effective weapons in winning over the dissident, suffering populace to the communist cause. The partial success of communistic propaganda in Western Europe may also be due in large part to low levels of living among the working classes.

Communist success would probably have been greater if the Marshall Plan had not been adopted by the United States in 1948. Under this plan, the Economic Cooperation Administration distributed billions of dollars to rebuild the European economic machine after the Second World War. These investments made possible the increases in national income and levels of living that apparently are necessary for the maintenance of demo-

cratic institutions. But the Marshall Plan was a partial failure in Italy and France because American funds did not reach the masses of people in terms of sufficiently higher levels of living. A substantial portion of the funds remained in the hands of the dominant business groups who generally oppose mass production methods, high wages, low prices, competition, and other dynamic aspects of a free enterprise system. Unlike the working classes of other countries in Western Europe, large numbers of Italian and French workers continue to be attracted by the Communist Party.

Besides improving their economic institutions, Western European nations have the additional task of building coordinated miltary defenses to thwart Soviet expansion. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been formed for this purpose, and as a member of N.A.T.O., the United States has furnished its quota of men and material.

Although there may be differences of opinion among reasonable men on the effectiveness of N.A.T.O. or the success of the Economic Cooperation Administration, the necessity for international cooperation among democratic nations can hardly be questioned. If a substantial portion of the world should succumb to any form of totalitarianism, it would be unlikely that the United States could go it alone and maintain any semblance of a system combining order and freedom. It is also clearly evident that our world is so economically interdependent that depressed conditions in any one of the free countries would affect all the others, and a depression in the United States would be particularly harmful since it is economically the dominant state among the democratic nations.

As long as the United States remains prosperous, there are workable solutions to international economic problems. If we maintain a high level of national income and employment, the rest of the free world can sell in our markets. At such times the argument that tariff walls are necessary to alleviate unemployment can be resisted and it is even possible to lower trade barriers. If we accept imports, we will encourage private American investments in foreign countries because under such conditions foreigners can pay their debts. As our experience after the First World War proved, foreigners cannot pay their debts if we erect tariffs and refuse to buy their goods in sufficient quantities. Such policies are a major cause of depressions. After the Second World War, we also lent money and sold goods abroad. Will we again refuse to buy foreign goods, thus causing defaults on loans and helping to create a world depression?

For in the final analysis, foreigners can pay their debts only by earning dollars through the sale of goods and services to Americans. Moreover, if people in the rest of the world are prosperous, the danger of revolu-

tions is lessened, and American businessmen can make investments without fear of confiscation by revolutionary regimes.

There is, obviously, not much incentive for a large amount of private investment in the underdeveloped regions where there is an ever present danger of revolution against intolerable social, economic, and political conditions. But grants or loans by the United States government or the United Nations can be made for such public investments as roads, sanitation systems, and hospitals. Although such expenditures may not be profitable in the business sense, they are necessary if higher standards of living are to be realized. There is also a great need for educational programs. If the people in these areas are to achieve their goal of better living standards, they must learn that such standards depend upon high production and high production, in turn, depends upon many other factors, including scientific methods of production. Technicians are needed to teach improved productive techniques. Anthropologists and other social scientists who understand the importance of various cultures are also needed so that development programs can be made consistent with the belief system of the society. For example, it would be foolish to train farmers to improve beef production in an area where religious beliefs forbid people to eat beef.

Thus, the greatest need in the underdeveloped areas is for an intelligent program to help people help themselves. This idea underlies Point IV (see Chapter 22). Under the Point IV program, the Technical Cooperation Administration has been established to send trained personnel and equipment to underdeveloped areas for the purpose of teaching modern production techniques. Our government is also carrying out an investment program under the auspices of the Mutual Security Administration, the successor to the Economic Cooperation Administration. The M.S.A. is responsible for all foreign economic aid to friendly nations, including grants for public investment purposes.

The major responsibility for maintaining stable international economic conditions belongs to the United Nations. Unfortunately we lack space to describe the work of the U.N. Secretariat, the Economic and Social Council and its economic commissions, and the specialized agencies in this area. Most U.N. assistance to underdeveloped countries is conducted by its Technical Assistance Board at the request of the underdeveloped country. It sends out survey missions and establishes training centers for personnel needed in economic development. Through the World Health Organization, the Board has provided underdeveloped countries with health serums, D.D.T., and many kinds of drugs.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a specialized agency of the United Nations, makes long-term loans to aid

international economic development and world stability. It is empowered to provide loans to governments in the event that private investors are unable or unwilling to do so. For example, a loan for a series of dams may be necessary for the economic development of a country, but it may not be a prudent private investment since such a loan can be liquidated only over a long period of time.


Another important function of the United Nations is the preparation of research projects in the field of international economics. One of its best known studies in this area is entitled "National and International Measures for Full Employment." This 1949 study discusses the importance of a sound public policy for controlling the ups and downs of business.

How to Control the Ups and Downs of Business

Joseph of the Old Testament is sometimes referred to as the first economist because he advised the Pharaoh of Egypt on how to alleviate bad times. According to his plan, storehouses were to be filled with grain during the seven years of good crops so that wheat could be distributed to the inhabitants when the crops failed. Of course, Joseph's advice was given many centuries before the development of the complex problems associated with business cycles that present-day economists are attempting to analyze.

Our society can afford minor cyclical fluctuations. At any rate, they cannot be completely eliminated in a free price economy. Indeed, some kind of a case can be made for a slight inflation because a gradual price rise has a stimulating effect on the economy. But large drinks from the bottle of inflation resulting in wild spending sprees followed by complete economic breakdowns have tragic results. Perhaps something also can be said for mild recessions. At least a few people argue that minor recessions, which put inefficient businesses "through the wringer" into bankruptcy, make labor and management more efficient. However, all social scientists agree that major depressions are extremely dangerous to a free society. Fortunately the government has made some efforts to alleviate the ups and downs of business.

The Employment Act of 1946 is of great importance in this regard. Under this Act, the President of the United States, aided by his Council of Economic Advisers, makes an economic report with recommendations at the opening of each session of Congress. These economic studies are analyzed by a Joint Congressional Committee that may introduce appropriate legislation to stabilize business conditions.



By permission, Richard Erdoes, New York City

STABILIZERS THAT WILL HELP BOLSTER THE AMERICAN ECONOMY WHEN DEFENSE SPENDING LEVELS OFF

Exports that will probably increase, contracts that keep up wages, farm price supports, and public works.


The Act does not contain detailed blueprints stating how depressions or inflations are to be handled. But the significant fact is that both political parties supported a law that gives the federal government a major responsibility for controlling business fluctuations. The public policy in this Act indicates a marked change in the American ideology. Before 1929, each individual was considered solely responsible for his own employment and income. Now it has become the obligation of the federal government to provide in a free enterprise system conditions of full employment and high national income.

"Built-in stabilizers." Built-in stabilizers are another device that dampens down economic fluctuations. An excellent example of a built-in stabilizer is unemployment compensation. During full employment, employers contribute to unemployment compensation funds. These "forced savings" reduce inflationary pressures. During periods of mass unemployment, workers receive government checks that make possible some spending, just when it is most needed.


Another example of built-in stabilizers is the parity price system under which farmers receive government checks during depression when prices of their basic crops fall below prices of goods that they must buy. Under this system, growers of certain crops are guaranteed a percentage of "parity" by the federal government. Essentially, "parity" means a fair price relationship between a farm commodity and the goods and services that farmers buy. In writing "parity" legislation, Congressional majorities have, in the past, concluded that the purchasing power of agricultural commodities was fair and equitable during the years from 1910 to 1914, and generally the parity formulas have been based on those years. For example, if the average price of a certain type of wheat was one dollar from 1910 to 1914, and the prices of goods that farmers buy rose two and one half times since that period, the parity price for such a grade of wheat would be $2.50. If legislation guaranteed farmers 90 per cent of parity, the price would be $2.25. Such a guarantee would help to maintain agricultural incomes and spending, and therefore it would tend to limit the impact of a business recession.

Monetary and fiscal policies. *Monetary policy,* another method of controlling business fluctuations, consists of *trying to get banks to lend more money during depression and less during inflation.* There are several money and banking procedures that might check inflation and depression if properly applied. In times of recession or depression, the Federal Reserve Banks, which are bankers' banks or central banks, may lower the *rediscount* rate. Lowering the rediscount rate or "the wholesale interest rate" will make it easier for banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System to lend money at low interest rates. For if the Reserve Banks make loans to member banks at lower interest rates, the member banks, in turn, can make loans to their customers at lower rates. The Reserve Banks may also lower the *reserve requirements,* that is, they may reduce the amount of reserves that banks are legally required to carry. Lowered reserves will make it possible for banks to increase their loans.

The Federal Reserve Banks can follow a policy of buying government bonds from individuals. (Such a policy is called *"buying in the open*




Government expenditure means goods and services bought from and produced by private enterprise. 1




Taxes cut income and spending, reducing demand for the private goods on which productive resources are working. 5




Government expenditure also means public payrolls, creating demand for business products and providing public services. 2



Released from private activities, these resources now produce for government and are paid with tax money. 6




Federal expenditures may be paid with funds from taxes, loan financing, and the issue of new currency. 3




When the government prints new money, it does not cut private spending or divert productive resources. 7



The economic effects of these methods vary. Let us assume full-employment and full use of productive resources... 4



Instead, it outbids the present users of productive resources, thereby boosting wages, rents and prices. 8



market" or "open market operations.") The payments for these bonds give individuals money for spending. Of course, the Federal Reserve banking system cannot guarantee that the individuals will spend the money. Nor can they make member banks lend money or force businessmen to borrow. But they can make conditions more inviting for banks and business to increase loans and expenditures.

If inflation threatens, the bankers' banks follow policies just opposite to those mentioned in the last two paragraphs. They sell government bonds to individuals, thus "sopping up" money and credit that may be forcing prices upward. By raising rediscount rates and reserve requirements, the Federal Reserve Banks may force bankers to increase interest rates, thereby discouraging borrowers.

Such central banking devices may also have a psychological effect. For if the Federal Reserve Board, top management of the Federal Reserve System, follows a policy of raising rediscount rates, increasing reserve requirements, and selling government bonds "in the open market," it is clear that officials responsible for the American banking system believe that inflation must be stopped. Since the opinions of the top management

of the Federal Reserve System, especially if backed up by action, are influential in banking and business communities, they are likely to be effective in retarding further inflation.

A modern basic instrument for controlling business fluctuations is *fiscal policy,* which involves the use of *government taxation and spending powers to control economic fluctuations.* Since depressions are essentially due to a lack of spending, and inflation to too much spending in relation to the amount of goods and services available, proper government expenditure and taxation policies may alleviate cyclical extremes.

According to modern fiscal policy, the government should reduce taxes and increase its expenditures during periods of low national income and high unemployment. On the other hand, when there are inflationary dangers present, the government should increase taxes and cut down spending.


Why should taxes be reduced during a depression? Because tax reductions would furnish people more money to spend and invest. But suppose people do not spend the money? Experience indicates that the poorer groups will spend it because they have a "high propensity to consume." In plain English, some are not in the habit of saving, and others would be forced to spend additional income because of basic needs, so reduced sales and income taxes on low-income groups will undoubtedly increase spending.

What will the higher-income groups do with their additional income resulting from decreased taxes? If the income goes into additional savings that are *not* invested, the economy will remain depressed. But if the upper-income classes spend the money—no matter how recklessly—or invest it in factories, the economy will be stimulated. Perhaps a system could be worked out whereby income recipients would receive tax rebates only if they promised to spend or invest their funds.

Why should taxes be increased during inflation? Because there is too much spending, especially too much consumer spending, in relation to the available supply of goods and services. Investment spending will eventually provide factories, machines, and inventories for a larger flow of consumer goods. But it probably would be better to have these investments made later when there is a recession or a depression. Since the lower-income groups have a high propensity to consume, it may be considered desirable from a purely *economic* viewpoint to tax them most heavily during an inflationary period in spite of the manifest injustice of such a policy. Taxes on all groups should be raised during recovery and prosperity to release the pressure on prices. If it is politically impossible to raise taxes sufficiently, government bond drives, especially aimed at

consumers, may be instituted in order to remove excessive purchasing power.

Taxation is only one side of fiscal policy; *government spending* is the other. During recession and depression, fiscal policy experts recommend that governments should take positive steps to increase expenditures on roads and buildings, including schools, prisons, hospitals, auditoriums, asylums, and so forth. These and other types of federal, state, and local expenditures should be effective in helping to stimulate the economy to recovery and prosperity. During recovery and prosperity, governments should postpone all possible expenditures to reduce inflationary pressures.



CONTROLLING UPS AND DOWNS OF BUSINESS BY MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES

Examining monetary and fiscal policies. Although monetary and fiscal policies would help to correct inflationary and deflationary movements, such programs are not easy to carry out. In the first place, there is a cliché to the effect that politicians vote for expenditures (especially for their own districts) but against taxes. Practically everybody likes prosperity, and the slight intoxication resulting from mild inflation is approved by nearly all groups—except those who live mainly on fixed incomes such

as pensions or insurance. When there is danger of inflation, it takes political courage to advocate making installment buying more difficult or increasing taxes and reducing appropriations.

In the second place, there is a group of problems relating to the question of *timing*. For example, when should "the brakes" be applied to avert inflation? It may be argued that the predicted inflation will not actually develop and that the steps taken to avoid inflation will bring about deflation and depression. It does appear that the brakes available to stop inflation are more powerful than the acceleration mechanisms so far devised to speed up recovery.

Some economists have suggested that if the index of consumer prices goes up 1 per cent per month for three months, deflationary monetary and fiscal policies should be followed. Some have also recommended that when unemployment in the United States passes some arbitrary figure such as 5 million, measures should be taken to bring about recovery. Unfortunately there is a lag between the diagnosis of the economic chill or fever and the time it takes for monetary and fiscal drugs to be effective. Even with the most modern statistical devices, it takes several weeks to determine the amount of unemployment and the cost of living in the United States. Raising or lowering rediscount rates or reserve requirements may not have an effect on interest rates or credit for a long period. Tax and appropriation bills are ground out slowly and it takes more time before the revenues are collected and expenditures are made.

Democratic procedures take time. Before federal spending takes place, there must be hearings, debates, and voting on authorizations and appropriations. In addition, building projects must be planned, blueprints made, land acquired, and contracts prepared before an expenditure program can get under way. But some advance preparations can be made. For example, prepared blueprints can be put on the shelf ready to be put into operation at the first sign of a recession.

The suggestion that income tax rates be automatically adjusted depending upon changes in cost of living and employment indexes would probably not be welcomed by a Congress jealous of its constitutional prerogatives. But if properly aroused, as was the case during the Second World War, Congress can pass appropriations and tax legislation with relative speed.

Another difficulty, illustrating the problem of timing in governmental expenditures, is that once a large development is under way it cannot easily be stopped merely because the depression is over. It is neither economically nor politically feasible to postpone a nearly completed highway or slum clearance program until the next recession. Moreover,

certain government needs cannot wait until the next recession. As a result of sudden rises in the birth rate or population movements, schools must be built regardless of cyclical fluctuations. Yet it is regrettable that so much state and local building is done during prosperity. If these governments would coordinate their construction programs with federal policies to control business fluctuations, it would have a healthy effect on the economy.

During a depression, government expenditures may also be increased by *direct payments to consumers.* A direct relief system ("the dole") or work relief, may be instituted. Indeed, if a comprehensive public works program is not carefully planned in advance, it may be necessary to depend mainly upon direct relief or a pseudo work relief program such as "raking leaves" or any other plan that can be quickly improvised.

Programs of this nature are repugnant to some aspects of our ideology in which waste and idleness are condemned, hard work is highly valued, and government spending suspected. Government expenditures for building programs are somewhat more consistent with our values since generally under such programs *private* contractors erect buildings that are customarily owned and operated by governments.

Are stamp plans consistent with our ideology? Stamp plans provide free or nearly free commodities, which are held in excess supply by the federal government, to persons on relief. Such plans may be more consistent with our value system than direct work relief because they permit a group of our own population to use excess foods that otherwise might spoil. Moreover, these foods are distributed through *privately* owned stores.

Direct controls. Monetary and fiscal policies are often called *indirect controls* because they indirectly affect general price rises and declines. Most consumers and some businessmen do not realize that changes in rediscount rates, reserve requirements, and open market operations can control general price increases and decreases. Nor are they always aware that government tax and spending policies can affect inflation and deflation.

Direct controls are government regulations establishing maximum prices and rationing to prevent inflation. (Theoretically, direct controls can also establish *minimum* prices to prevent further price declines during depression, but our actual experience with general minimum price controls is limited to the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, declared unconstitutional in 1935.)

During great emergencies such as an all-out war, direct price controls are necessary to avoid the danger of runaway prices. As we have already

learned, indirect controls work slowly and they cannot be expected to handle a sudden crisis. Indirect controls reduce the pressure on prices by decreasing incomes, thus reducing spending. But if rumors of shortages develop, there is likely to be a run on certain goods, driving up their prices to fantastic levels regardless of indirect controls. Rainy-day savings will be used or other payments put off.

Rationing also may be needed during emergencies when there is an intolerable pressure on prices. For example, suppose that there are a million pounds of sugar available on the market at 15 cents a pound. Let us assume that the government believes the price is too high inasmuch as it prevents the lowest-income groups from obtaining a sufficient amount of the article without undue sacrifice. So government officials set a price of 7 cents. But at the reduced price, people demand 2 million pounds. How are these 1 million pounds to be rationed?

The grocers may have riots on their hands as people pour into stores to get their sugar before it is gone, and as a result we might have price controls causing anarchy. Merchants might put the sugar under the counter, saving it for their old customers. If price controls for sugar are set below the free market rate, creating substantial shortages, the grocer must work out some system of rationing or the government must step in with rationing controls. The government might allow each person a certain amount with special allotments for children and the sick.

Whenever there is a shortage of goods there must be some form of economic controls. Generally the free price system is the economic control we use for distributing goods. Prices ration Cadillacs and carrots. But during a great emergency such as a war, when the amount of money available increases much more rapidly than goods, it is necessary to institute both direct and indirect governmental controls to prevent inflation.

It is unlikely that a society in a major war could exist without price and rationing controls. During the Second World War, when patriotism was high, direct controls played a major role in reducing the pressure on prices. But after the close of the war in 1945, the attitudes of our people toward price and rationing controls changed rapidly, particularly after an expensive and well-organized campaign against government restrictions was initiated. As people came to believe less and less that such controls were necessary, "black markets" developed, regulations were weakened or removed, and prices rose rapidly.

It seems that price and rationing controls are only acceptable to us during the great emergencies of war. Only on such occasions do we acknowledge the necessity of stringent government regulations strictly

limiting the freedom of wage earners to bargain and of businessmen to set prices. Government establishment of maximum prices is, generally speaking, contrary to our ideology, which places a high value on the free market. Moreover, price and rationing machinery requires a substantial number of government employees for regulation and enforcement purposes, which is also repugnant to our ideology. No wonder that we more readily accept indirect economic controls that are a much less obvious governmental interference.

Importance of Control

If we are to maintain our freedom, violent economic fluctuations must be brought under control. A major depression or inflation would not only disastrously affect us but might ruin democracies everywhere. It could well mean victory on a world-wide scale for various kinds of totalitarianism.

With the growing complexity and increased interdependence of our economic life, there must be an adjustment in our values and beliefs if we expect to maintain freedom without anarchy. A dogmatic adherence to the intense rugged individualism of extreme laissez faire is dangerous because it fails to take into account that orderly freedom in our day requires some governmental controls of economic activity.

There are indications that public opinion in the United States recognizes that changes in our economic system require changes in economic policy. The people will, at least during a "shooting war" emergency, accept price and rationing controls if they are properly explained. The Employment Act of 1946 marked a momentous change in our ideology. When this Act was passed, both political parties went on record as supporting legislation making the federal government responsible for maintaining conditions necessary for full employment and a high national income without inflation.

These changes in ideology and public policy have been accompanied by advances in economic techniques. Monetary and fiscal policies have been developed that, if properly applied, can maintain the economic stability necessary for democracies. When democracies face great emergencies such as war, techniques for directly controlling prices can be effectively used.

We must be constantly reminded of the two following points: (1) Modern democracies require economic stability with high levels of em-

PART THREE
The Governing of Man



25

SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH GOVERNMENT

Morals and Power

Two ways in which society controls conduct. Human living always takes place under *social control,* the process by which standards held by groups influence individual conduct. Conformity to group expectations makes individual behavior meaningful and acceptable. We have already considered forms of social control found in all social groups (see Chapter 5). These include the *mores,* or beliefs of right and wrong conduct shared within a group. Merely by being members of such groups as families, village communities, small churches, or social cliques, individuals come to accept the valuations of these groups. Their need for being accepted obliges them to accept and most of the time to conform to group standards. Although pressures and informally imposed penalties encourage conformance, the individual polices his own conduct to a

remarkable degree, for during the process of socialization the values of the group are internalized. Informal control of this sort, in which the necessities of social life bring the person to fairly complete acceptance of group standards and to a real desire to conform to them, may be called *moral control.*

In a complex social order, formal control is constantly exerted over personal life. When persons conform to others' expectations without fully accepting the standards involved, but chiefly to avoid a penalty, they are yielding to power. Power is used by employers and dominant relatives, but in modern societies its most conspicuous expression, the enforcement of rules of conduct by the threat of formal penalties, tends to be monopolized by the state. A second form of social control is, therefore, *political control.*

Political control less effective than moral control. If it were possible to set up systems of moral control deliberately, there would be no point in political control or in other forms of control by power because moral control is always more effective. This will not be clear unless the reader recognizes that effective control involves much more than the mere ability to impose penalties. Whenever a parent spanks a child or a wealthy relative disinherits an heir or an employer fires an employee or the government imprisons or puts to death a convicted criminal, control by power has *failed* to regulate the conduct of the person punished. Moral control, however, simply arises in respect to matters on which closely associated groups have evolved common standards. Since a complex society teems with conflict situations for which moral standards are lacking or are widely different among participating groups, political control must be imposed. If such control is to be wisely employed, we must understand how it differs in its effectiveness from moral control.

When a person accepts certain standards as right and just and knows his friends do also, he is strongly motivated to conform to them and will seldom consider violating the standards openly or even secretly. Individuals do occasionally go against their own standards but usually only under pressure of compelling circumstances or great emotional stimulation. Thus in a closely-knit social group with strict standards of property rights and of sex morals, persons might steal under the pressure of hunger or engage in illicit sex relations as a result of momentary passion; but a series of planned thefts or a prolonged secret love affair would be very unlikely. Unless we can admit to ourselves and to our friends that we don't believe in certain standards, our conduct is likely to be controlled rather closely by such standards.

If standards appear as externally imposed controls, the case is entirely different. In such cases, there will always be a certain amount of deliberate and planned evasion since what the regulated person is likely to fear is the penalty and not, as is the case with moral control, the fact of violation itself. We all know persons who freely admit violating laws they evidently don't regard as morally binding. Many boast of exceeding speed limits or of evading customs regulations. In such cases, moral control is absent. The individual feels no serious guilt and does not expect that his attitude will cause his friends to reject him, as they would do if he boasted of infractions they regard as serious moral offenses.

When *only* political control is operating (as also in cases when *only* the wishes of an employer or of a dominant relative are involved), a person who wishes to act in a forbidden way often coolly calculates his chances of getting caught. If these seem slight or if the probable penalty is a light one, he often deliberately violates the law. In the extreme case of the professional criminal, moreover, the individual belongs to a social group that excuses or approves many actions that in other circles would be thought highly immoral.

Government of nonliterates. All peoples have some ways of regulating affairs that concern the group. In many small, homogeneous groups, uniform custom takes care of most internal control and deliberate methods of governing are informal or rudimentary. The Eskimo and the Logoli, Tallensi, and Nuer of Africa are examples of people practically without formal political organization. As societies become larger and more heterogeneous, however, even among nonliterates, institutions resembling courts of justice or other formal governmental organs evolve. But political institutions of nonliterates are usually only slightly developed by comparison with those of technically advanced peoples.

Most nonliterates have a social organization that strongly emphasizes groupings of common descent. The family, usually extended to include adults of more than one generation, and broader kinship groups, called clans, are the basic control groups. Two or more clans, intermingled within the same area and sharing a common language and culture, often make up a tribe. Besides the kinship groups, organizations similar to lodges or secret societies are common. Sometimes several such groups specialize in different phases of tribal ceremonial or magic lore. Sometimes a single order embraces all adult males or females. Among some peoples, age-groups or generations (persons initiated at one time) preserve a distinct organization throughout their lives. Non-kinship organizations admit members by formal initiations, usually painful and humiliating, and try to keep from the rest of the community certain magic

secrets. Custom prescribes the permissible ceremonial and practical relations between members of different kin, age, or ceremonial groups.

Nonliterate social organization is sometimes very complex, but headmen with accepted powers of coercion are rare. Of course, large or extended families have heads. Clans often do, too, in some cases the most direct descendant from the clan's mythical human or animal ancestor. Such a person presides at family gatherings or councils and has the various rights that custom allows. Tribal authority may be represented by a council of clan or family heads or elders. This council may be primarily a negotiating or mediating body among the kinship groups. It may have definite authority in disputed cases to interpret the tribal lore of proper behavior in the mores. In such cases, it would closely resemble a court of justice. Sometimes a single individual, whose position is roughly hereditary, may dominate the tribal council and exercise powers of territorial rulership. Among nonliterate peoples, persons often hold titles or "offices," but usually as participants in ceremonies or as possessors of special magical powers rather than as political rulers. As we saw in Chapter 2, the chief of a San Blas Cuna village exerts control through his knowledge of the tribal lore.

Political institutions are relatively undeveloped among nonliterates because the mores are uniform within the tribal group, and because life, following accustomed ways, less often raises questions about the conduct proper in a given situation than in complex communities. When an unusual or particularly knotty problem arises, the elders may settle it by recalling or pretending to recall how their ancestors solved some similar problem. Warfare, if practiced, is often engaged in on a private basis by groups of young men who choose a leader for the occasion. Migration may be undertaken in bad times by certain family groups on their own. Among a people whose productive techniques are simple and whose lives are occupied in necessary food gathering and in supposedly necessary magical ceremonies (the patterns for both activities being fixed by custom), few questions seem to require deliberate decision.

Political control necessary in a complex society. But moral control, largely adequate in small, unified communities, is insufficiently uniform or developed to assure by itself orderly social relations in complex societies.

As soon as agricultural techniques and a favorable environment combine regularly to produce a considerable surplus beyond the absolute necessities of the producing families, various social complications arise. The further development of productivity by improved transportation

and by industrial practices increases the problem. Complications produced by higher productivity include (1) new social divisions, and (2) a higher frequency of novel situations.

As productivity increases, new divisions of occupational specialization and of different degrees of prestige and status supplement and eventually replace older kinship and ceremonial groupings. Division of labor, except for a customary one between the sexes, is almost undeveloped among peoples leading a simple life. Each individual acquires most of the mechanical techniques and most of the nature lore of his culture, and each family is self-sufficient. Even the ceremonial leader or the clan chief is likely to hunt and farm and make tools and utensils for himself. Few if any persons are exempt from all manual labor (see Chapter 17).

As production increases, many persons become specialists in certain activities and acquire skills the rest of the community lacks. The status that once attended ability in some part-time task now attaches itself to the special occupation. Different kinds of work come to be defined as honorable or as degrading. As weaker neighboring peoples are forced into paying regular tribute, or as slaves are captured in large numbers to do the more degrading work, certain individuals are freed entirely from lowly labor. Greater prestige and higher status are the mark of those in the leisured class or in the preferred occupations. A division of this sort, as we saw in Chapter 10, means that different parts of society live different lives with quite different opportunities and with different types of problems. Thus the mores come to differ among the various levels of the social order.

Higher productivity also increases the novelty in life. As new ways of doing things are discovered, people often have to act in situations for which custom provides no guide. Modern technical improvements necessitate constant social innovations. Craft divisions and their relationships in building a traditional house have no place in erecting prefabs. Such disruptions of social patterns have taken place, although not so often, ever since man began to improve his tools and productive techniques. Purely social developments also produce new situations. The rise of a family to dominance in landholding in a previously equal community produces problems of social relationships on which local custom is silent.

Thus at the same time that the mores become different among different groups in a more productive society, they also become less reliable because situations increase in which they do not apply or are unclear. Out of these two circumstances *government,* or *the deliberate ordering of social relations by authoritative rules enforced by formal penalties,*

develops. Government is a means of holding the more complicated communities in some tolerable degree of order.

The circumstances that make necessary the high degree of governmental regulation found in modern civilized communities are summarized in the following paragraphs.

(1) ***The morals of different classes or other groups are not uniform on important points.*** For instance, in professional and often in governmental circles, accepting favors that lead to obligations out of line with a person's occupational duties is wrong. But in business or laboring circles similar conduct usually raises no moral question. Minor forms of stealing and fighting in personal disputes are much more serious offenses against the mores of the rich or moderately well-off than against those of the poor. Usually, also, unconventional sexual relations are more serious breaches of the accepted moral code among the middle levels of society than among either the rich or the poor. Since much fluidity occurs in all complex societies, individuals of different backgrounds frequently deal with one another and persons often move into roles governed by mores different from those they acquired in their upbringing. Governmental rules must therefore often be used to define at least a minimum level of acceptable conduct.

(2) ***Custom cannot define the numerous borderline cases arising constantly in a complex society.*** This is true even of moral questions on which people are well agreed, such as the prohibition against taking a human life. For what exactly is justifiable killing in self-defense? What degree or kind of negligence causes a death? What if a doctor lets a patient with a painful and incurable disease or a child with a hopeless defect die somewhat sooner than is strictly inevitable? The decision of precisely what is, or is not, an offense falls to the government. Also, in property and business relationships, just what is ownership or just what makes for liability are often very complex questions. Only government, by deliberate action, can provide the technical rules for solving these questions.

(3) ***In a rapidly changing society, new situations are not adequately regulated by customary morality.*** Government must usually step in and provide some sort of standards. What are the obligations of employees to employers, and *vice versa,* in an area in which wage-earning has only recently become a common way of earning a living? Now that driving at high speeds makes quick stops impossible, is the driver or the injured pedestrian responsible for a given type of accident? The whole idea of

"negligence" has been introduced into the morals of Western society in the last hundred and fifty years through the efforts of government officials to deal with similar situations. Before the appearance of high-powered vehicles and fast-moving machinery, the modern idea of negligence had no meaning. When a person was injured, it was taken for granted that the accident was either his own fault or else deliberately caused by someone else.

But today rapid choices must often be made for the orderly regulation of new situations. These are unlikely to be reached quickly enough by the mere evolution of custom. Are drivers to keep to the right-hand or the left-hand side of a highway? Should they give the right of way to oncoming or to entering traffic? When a debt is due on a Sunday or a holiday, must it be paid the day before or is payment on the day following equally acceptable? Government must decide.

(4) ***Different interest groups, if free to do so, would develop such conflicting moral claims on other sections of society as to make peaceful social life impossible.*** Since mores become definite only among closely associated and homogeneous groups, general community morality can hardly settle the respective privileges of interest groups in a complex and rapidly changing society. Among farmers alone, or laborers alone, or businessmen alone, or the members of some profession by themselves, it seems easy enough to justify claims for income, privilege, government subsidy, or exclusive rights to do certain work that other groups would consider unfair.

Political institutions are means of compromising such claims of interest groups on a basis that permits orderly social life to go on. When social change is rapid, government is constantly redefining in detail the privileges of different groups. Thus, ideally, each group comes to feel powerful enough to get some adjustment of status when sufficiently aroused, and no group feels completely at the mercy of other groups. This balancing of claims is the essence of politics, since in the long run rulers maintain their authority and avoid revolution or defeat in elections only by a judicious parceling out of concessions. Although most governments in history have been very partial to special interests, any successful ruler or politician knows he cannot afford to favor any one interest and ignore all other groups. This is the most fundamental function of government since if it were not provided, civilized society, which necessarily involves many interest group divisions, would be impossible.

For reasons such as the foregoing, all human communities except the very simplest have had political institutions. Thus, under threat of

penalty, rulers and officials have been able to demand conformance to *laws,* or *governmentally formulated rules of conduct enforced by special authorities* (see Chapter 5). These laws provide a sort of substitute moral framework for the whole community. They seldom correspond exactly to the mores of any particular homogeneous segment of society. Occasionally they seriously conflict with the morality of certain groups.

Government as organized power. Governmental institutions organize *power, the ability to control conduct by threats of penalties for the violation of prescribed rules.* No human community can dispense entirely with the use of power in social control. In a complex society, chaos would result if any prominent organization or individual were equally able to threaten punishment for disapproved conduct. This situation is avoided by the tendency of governmental institutions to monopolize the more conspicuous forms of the exercise of power. Often this monopoly of governmental power is in the hands of a small ruling clique. But not necessarily. In our government, for example, labor and farmers and big business all have tremendous political power as groups, but no one group gets everything it wants, and in fact each gets considerably less than it wants, for government is subject to the pressures of all three groups and of others, and maintains its monopoly of power by guaranteeing, through force if necessary, the rights of all.

The monopoly of power by a few persons is a serious matter. Power has social dangers as well as social uses. Experience shows it is most dangerous when most concentrated. The effects of power are primarily suppressive or restrictive. Power cannot of itself produce superior, conscientious performance of tasks, much less high levels of really creative or original activity. These higher levels of conduct must be motivated by values that the individual personally holds and shares with groups with which he associates closely. If power is too widely resorted to and too crudely and readily applied, these higher levels of performance are seriously endangered.

Moral integrity is undermined in any group in which too many decisions have to be made simply to avoid penalties. A powerful ruler or even a prominent business executive runs the risk of becoming surrounded by flatterers and favor seekers. It is so easy to excuse a refusal to face the wrath of a powerful personage, even when an individual believes that that person is taking a morally wrong position, that persons constantly associating with such an individual all too readily lose habits of integrity. In circles closely associated with persons who exercise unrestrained power, power itself, properly only a means to various ends,

easily becomes a supreme value. Appeasing the powerful and seeking a share in power may easily become the sole aim of life. When, as in certain modern dictatorships, the exercise of arbitrary power comes to pervade all areas of social life, the general community readily becomes corrupted by the same exclusive regard for power that historically was more usual only among the immediate associates of a ruler.

Since power, although a necessity in social life, has the dangers just discussed, good governmental organization demands that some sort of balance be reached. There must be sufficient concentration of power in various agencies so that the tasks of government can be efficiently performed, but at the same time governmental power as a whole must be divided or diffused so that its more harmful forms will be discouraged.

The American Belief System and Social Control

To many of us, the authority and organized power of governmental or political control may seem rather distant and remote. The clerk working at his desk, the student in a classroom, the chemist in his laboratory, and many others in their ordinary day-to-day activities may be only dimly aware of many things they do that are in some way related to government.

As an American, you are affected directly or indirectly by several levels of political control. These levels may variously protect your person and property, control your behavior in both a prohibitive and permissive sense, or offer you services of one kind or another. Your local town or city government employs a police force to protect you against lawlessness. Its regulations may permit or prohibit certain kinds of driving or particular kinds of land use. Your state government functions similarly. And your national government provides defense against aggression, protects you while you travel abroad, and conserves the nation's natural resources for your use and for the use of future generations. In addition, it performs a tremendous variety of service functions, from offering you free publications on the care of bees to aiding you financially in dependent old age. Government is all around you. It is not something restricted to Washington or the state capital. It is here on every turn not to be ignored or pushed aside. Lack of interest in our government does not make its effect on us any less powerful. Power and authority are dynamic forces that are always and everywhere with us.

This all-embracing institution of social control gives rise, through the exercise of authority and power, to particular patterns of behavior

and reflects a system of attitudes and beliefs. Although institutions of social control are universal, there are marked differences of types between cultural areas. Therefore, an analysis of American political control will reveal some more or less universal systems of behavior required of all Americans, as well as various alternatives and special patterns permitted or demanded in some situations. Closely associated with the exercise of power and authority are symbolic and ceremonial behavior (see Chapter 3).

Political behavior encompasses all the many and varied aspects of our behavior associated with the exercise of power and authority through government. It involves the amount of popular participation in government, the attitude toward the extension or curtailment of governmental power, the symbols and myths we believe in and use to impart sacredness and popular acceptance of government, and the methods we use to safeguard what we believe to be the proper functioning and operation of the governmental machinery. Political behavior means much more than being "politic"—behavior thought useful in accomplishing some particular goal—or "behaving like a politician."

Political behavior must be constantly located within the context of the social climate. It affects and is affected by the cultural heritage—the mores and folkways of the society, the standards and norms of the group, the attitudes, sentiments, and beliefs of the people. Although these forces are constantly shaping and influencing our political behavior, we may be only dimly conscious of their impact, perhaps only dimly conscious of their existence. Yet these forces are persistently present, acting on us and through us.

Nor does political behavior exist apart from or exclusive of other social institutions such as the family, school, and church. Our political behavior affects these other institutions and they affect our political behavior. There is, for example, a close correlation between the authoritarian family and the authoritarian political structure. A harsh, domineering parent may influence his children to embrace, when they mature, a political philosophy that venerates power, force, and strength. On the other hand, democratic ideals are promoted in a society where the family, church, school, and business and industrial organizations teach, practice, and promote equality and freedom.

This is the situation in our country. Even in the field of religion, where statements of principle and the choosing of high church dignitaries and leaders are not referred to direct vote of the people, democratic ideas are inculcated. Many of the basic principles and functionings of our democracy were first elaborated by religious dissenters who settled here early in the seventeenth century. The Puritans, for example, by


emphasizing the importance of individual conscience and by advocating the covenant feature of formal church organization—that the church be based upon agreement of all members—established a procedure that later was carried over into the civil area.

Political behavior is learned. We are not born democrats. Our society makes a conscious effort to socialize and indoctrinate us in what is considered proper in this area. This is to be expected since we have already seen that one of the persistent problems confronting all societies is shaping new members of the group in line with common expectancies of the society. This does not mean that we are all gradually molded into a society of mechanical robots each thinking and doing everything "by the numbers." Indeed, one of the common expectancies of our society is individualism and diversity.

Symbolism and Ceremonial Behavior

Like all institutionalized behavior, political behavior is perpetuated and preserved through language and varieties of ceremonial behavior and symbolism. The ceremonies and symbols not only assist in the educational process aimed at socializing us in our society's ways of thinking and doing, but also continually remind all of us in high and low places of things we have learned but have perhaps momentarily forgotten. We may point to the symbolic meaning of the colors of our country's flag or the words of the national anthem. The American eagle, fearless, undaunted, and free-soaring monarch of the skies, symbolizes our government's power and authority and our people's love of freedom.

One of the most striking phenomena in the history of the American political belief system has been the growth of such symbolism. Because of limitations of space, we cannot launch into any extended treatment and history of American symbolism as such. However, the veneration we accord our great national heroes and the reverence we attach to our basic historical documents are examples of the way our society reinforces our faith and trust in democracy. It might be well to pause here and examine as a case in point the symbolism that has grown into a veritable cult around Abraham Lincoln. To most Americans, Lincoln has become the personification of democratic faith, a man who rose from the poverty and bleakness of backwoods Kentucky and Illinois to the first office in the land. This sentiment has added significance when it is considered that Lincoln wielded greater power than any President before him. In



Detroit Free Press; Photo by Rinehart, Courtesy National Park Service

AMERICAN POLITICAL SYMBOLS

Although laws are necessary, cultural beliefs are the heart and soul of a democracy. The Statue of Liberty and the flag are symbols of American beliefs.

spite of his command of great armies, Americans have created an image of a President who remained sincere, humble, patient, kindly—a true democrat. He is represented as a man to whom the fundamental moral law of the Constitution was sacred, who gave new meaning to the doctrine of freedom. His speeches and writings are often quoted as the best expression in our language of the meaning of democracy and of America.

Comparable pictures of other national heroes may also be drawn. In paying homage to such men, we tend to solidify our belief in those qualities that have come to be known as the essence of the American way.

American Beliefs about the Exercise of Power and Authority

As the foregoing paragraphs have implied, one of the major aspects of political behavior is the *ideology*. This simply means the belief system that accompanies the exercise of power and authority. It refers to certain fundamental assumptions that we make with respect to social control through government. It is therefore pertinent to ask, what do we as Americans believe about the exercise of power and authority?

The American belief system is democratic. As is true of all belief systems, there are many examples of discrepancies between what we believe and what we practice. Critics of democracy, of course, belabor this point as evidence of the weakness of our belief system. The real significance of discrepancies of this sort rests in the fact that they are more often than not accepted uncritically generation after generation with a sort of "Well, what can we do about it?" attitude. Slavery, for example, was never seriously questioned by generations of democrats as being particularly in violation of their basic principles. When the point finally became of national significance, elaborate arguments were advanced to support the moral righteousness of slavery. By the same token, today many Americans are inclined to accept such discrepancies as race inequality and the like simply because such conditions have long existed. In fact, when attacks are made on these situations, equally vehement arguments in support of the situation are advanced. Rather unusual interpretations of democracy are used to defend the "democratic" nature of the discrepancy itself.

Although you have merely to look around you to find numerous gulfs between theory and practice, we do have certain fundamental values

that tend to set the tone and character of the exercise of authority and power. They are all part and parcel of our belief in democracy.

Democracy stresses the dignity and worth of the individual person, i.e., it is based upon the belief that there is something of supreme worth in every human being. Of all facets of democratic theory, this doctrine of "individualism" has been most continuously expressed. This viewpoint conceives of all government and all private institutions as existing to protect, promote, and defend the integrity and dignity of the individual. The state or any institution has no meaning except in terms of the welfare of the individuals who compose it.

Also basic to democracy is the *equality of human beings.* To the democrat, all persons, regardless of rank, race, or religion, have equal rights in respect to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The rights and liberties of one person are no more important than the rights and liberties of any other person.

Finally, democracy emphasizes *freedom,* the freedom to choose and accomplish one's aim, to make decisions that will lead to this end, to decide and to discriminate in the process. We believe that freedom and liberty are the keys to all progress and the only means whereby truth can be winnowed from error.

The implications of these basic beliefs are many and varied and from them have emerged concepts concerning the exercise of power and authority in our society.

The democrat views government as essentially a *means to an end.* As already mentioned, government is an instrument, a creature of the people to insure freedom and to promote the general welfare. To Theodore Roosevelt, the duty of government was to see that "each man obtains the chance to show the stuff that is in him."

Following logically from his belief in government as a creature of the people, the democrat also believes that government should be *limited by a constitutional framework.* There should be limits to the authority of those who govern as well as to the authority of those who choose the governors. Officials have only those powers that are expressly delegated to them. Even a government that speaks for a majority is limited insofar as it must respect the rights of the minority. Thomas Jefferson stated it as "the sacred principle that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights which equal law must protect." But it is not *any* majority whose will is to prevail, only one that has come to power after free and open deliberation in which all citizens are free to participate.

The democrat also believes that *justice should prevail.* This concept

permeates our other convictions, for it is closely related to our belief in the dignity and worth of the individual. We have rejected the slogan of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Our belief in justice for all implies observance of and respect for the "unalienable rights" of individuals. We have no concise definition of justice in our belief system. We arrive at a meaning of justice by citing various behaviors that we describe as "just" and by evaluating other behaviors as "unjust." Thus our concept of justice is rather generalized. We think of it as existing in any situation where the greatest possible growth of the individual is permitted within the limits of the rights and privileges of others. Fair play is an integral part of the American ideal of justice. In the operation of law, justice implies such things as trial by jury, the assumption of innocence until guilt is proved, a speedy and public trial, prohibition of double jeopardy, writs of habeas corpus, due process of law, and the like. Thus, though vague and generalized, the concept of justice is of great significance in the exercise of political control in our society.

Finally, the democrat believes in *orderly change*. Though we tend to hold certain aspects of our belief system as sacred, nonetheless we recognize that we live in a changing society and not a static one. And if, in order to accomplish what we believe to be fitting and proper, changes must be forthcoming, then we believe such changes should be made through the regularly constituted machinery and according to the expressed will of the majority. We place great value on government by precedent and experience but not to the extent that it should thwart the achievement of the basic values mentioned above.

These beliefs are of great significance in an analysis of social control through government in American society. They in large measure give us insight into why certain things that we do "politically" have become institutionalized and perpetuated. In a negative sense, they also explain why certain political behaviors of other societies are considered unacceptable for us. Democratic government, we believe, is best for us. Democratic government means popular government, based upon the freely given consent of the people who choose their elected officials, and free and frequent elections in which all citizens have the same voting power and are all equal before the law.

26

POPULAR CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT

"We, the People"

American cartoonists are prone to personify "we, the people" as a somewhat undernourished little fellow labeled "John Q. Public," who demonstrates all the strengths and all the weaknesses of human behavior (American variety). This "average American" is pictured as constantly confused and amazed at the "goings on" in his society. He can at one breath point with pride to his country's accomplishments and with the next view with alarm its shortcomings. He applauds vigorously when his side wins a political battle, but bemoans his fate and prophesies all sorts of dire results when his side loses. While investing millions in the latest mechanical gadgets and driving himself to accumulate more and more material things, he whimsically recalls the "good old days" when life was simple. His enthusiasm for a national hero knows no

bounds, but he chortles with glee when an overrated person gets his "comeuppance," and he sides invariably with the underdog. He is at one moment rash and heedless of consequences and at the next moment cautious and calculating. He is sentimental and warmhearted, yet coldly aloof and practical.

The people are all these things, whether pictured as the cartoonist draws them or spoken of in more academic terms as "the body politic" or "the citizenry." The people are a congressman's constituents or his "fellow Americans." They are "My friends" or "Americans all." The people are "you and your fellow students." Our Constitution speaks of "we, the people" irrespective of "race, color, previous condition of servitude or sex." Depending upon the value judgment of the observer, the people may be the final repository of all wisdom and goodness or they may be the "masses," not to be trusted. But whoever or whatever they may be, here in the United States the people control the exercise of authority and power. If, therefore, we are to understand American government properly, we must give some thought to the people and to their characteristic patterns of political behavior before we examine the structure and function of the institution through which the people rule.

The Bases of Popular Control

Popular control of authority and power rests upon three essential aspects of the institution of government. The first is the *belief system* that sanctifies the right and the ability of the people to govern themselves well. The second consists of the *constitutional provisions and legal machinery through which that control can take place.* This involves voting qualifications and procedures and the nomination of candidates for office. The third aspect refers to *the ways employed by the people to make their participation in government an effective force.* These include political parties and other methods whereby otherwise disorganized masses of voters make their influence count.

The belief system. Basic to our democratic ideology, as we saw in the last chapter, is the assumption that government by the consent of the governed is superior to other forms of political control. We have premised this belief on another paramount element in our democratic ideology—the belief in the dignity and innate worth of the individual. The people are but a collection of individuals, therefore the people, we

feel, are capable of wisely exerting the power to control. Yet although our belief system asserts the general principle that the people can and shall rule, it has had to be refined considerably to determine what people shall do the ruling. Our belief system does not clearly indicate who shall compose the electorate.



By permission, Justus and the Minneapolis Star

"BOSSISM" IN AMERICA

The constitutional and legal machinery for participation—voting qualifications. The right to vote evidently was not a burning issue during the Colonial Period. The Declaration of Independence ignored the question, and the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, with but few exceptions, favored restricted suffrage. But the climate of opinion changed, not suddenly but surely.

Universal suffrage was forged as a result of economic and social change. Property restrictions were accepted in the East; in this area people still

clung to a sense of position and rank. But the concept could not withstand the leavening democracy of the frontier. State after state was carved out of the western wilderness and joined the Union with no voting restrictions. It was not long before this influence made itself felt in the East as well. Particularly did political leaders of this section look hungrily upon the large pool of immigrant and workingmen voters as a means by which they could tighten their hold on political office. And the people themselves were willing to fight if necessary for the right to vote. In the 1840's, the issue provoked conflict in Rhode Island and so frightened the ruling elements in the state that the new constitution of 1843 considerably broadened the suffrage.

By the middle of the nineteenth century the property qualification had all but vanished.[1] Attempts by some states to substitute tax-paying requirements for the property qualification could not stem the tide. The Fifteenth Amendment, by 1870, had guaranteed the Negro the right to vote, and in 1920 the Nineteenth Amendment extended the franchise to women.

As we have already seen, the great majority of the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention favored a restricted suffrage. But they could not agree on the kind and amount of property that should be set as a condition for voting. Finally, it was decided to allow the states to set the requirements in both national and state elections. With the exception of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, *all qualifications are left to the states to decide. We do not have a nation-wide, uniform basis for determining who shall vote.*

Suffrage requirements differ from state to state, but in general all have qualifications referring to (1) age, (2) citizenship, and (3) residence. Although voting age has traditionally been set at 21 years, there are movements underway in many states to lower it to 18, and one state, Georgia, actually has lowered the requirement to 18. The theory behind this move is that a person old enough to bear arms is old enough to vote. All states have citizenship requirements and the resident requirements vary only in detail of the time required in residence. And all states disqualify inmates of mental institutions and persons convicted of certain crimes who have not been pardoned or restored to their full civil rights.

Beyond these common requirements there are some differences to be found. Literacy tests are used in 20 states, although the purpose of the tests and the way in which they are administered vary. In some states the tests are supervised by election officials and are obviously designed to prevent Negroes from voting. In others, and New York is an example, the tests are aimed at preventing illiterates from voting and are scrupu-

lously administered to prevent their subversion for political purposes. Some states resort to the poll tax to exclude voters, particularly Negroes. But in spite of these restrictions, it still may be said that among the adult population a broad popular suffrage does exist in the American system.

Voting procedures—how may those qualified exercise their privilege? The voting machinery is also largely in the hands of the states. The Constitution authorizes Congress to set the time, place, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives provided that the day be the same throughout the United States. In line with this authorization, Congress has prescribed that the election of presidential electors, senators, and representatives shall take place on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Otherwise, national officers are elected according to the dictates of the particular election laws of each state. These state laws embody two major aspects of election machinery, in addition to the qualifications already discussed in the preceding paragraphs. These aspects involve, first, the registration of the qualified voter and, second, the administration of elections.

Registration. Each state establishes a system of registration of qualified voters. Suppose that you are a qualified voter. If you wish to vote you will, within a specified time, report to the proper authority and register. Your state may have *permanent registration* where once registered your name will continue to appear on the list of qualified voters as long as you retain the same address or do not otherwise disqualify yourself. Some states will disqualify a voter who fails to vote in two successive elections and will require that person to re-register. On the other hand, you may be required to register before each election if your state employs *temporary registration* procedures. The rapid urbanization of our society has made the registration requirement a vital means of insuring the legitimacy of an election. In a rural society, it was easy to identify the would-be voter because he was usually well known as a resident of the community. However, the modern concentration of peoples in urban areas, where the individual is relatively unknown outside of a small group of friends, has made the registration lists essential as a means of identification. They may be used to prevent unqualified individuals from voting and others from voting more than once. Thus registration procedures have greatly reduced chances of corruption at the ballot box.

Administration of elections. Though the details vary from state to state, the general pattern for the administration of elections is similar. Communities are ordinarily divided up into wards or precincts to facilitate voting operations, and the various polling places throughout these

districts are determined by law. A bipartisan election board presides at each polling place to open the polls, to distribute ballots to qualified voters, and to count the votes after the polls are closed.

Because elections are so partisan in nature, political parties sometimes assign "poll watchers" to each polling place. These individuals can challenge any voter who they believe is not qualified and can sit in on the counting and challenge the validity of any ballot. In addition, they also keep track of the names of known party members who have voted. If the turnout is low, they will alert party headquarters to that effect. The party officials then start encouraging people to get out and vote.

The Australian or secret ballot is used in all American elections, with some variations in physical form. A majority of states use what is known as the *party-column type ballot* or *Indiana ballot. On this ballot, all candidates of a given party for all offices are listed in a vertical column under the party name and emblem.* This type of ballot encourages you to vote the "straight ticket" merely by placing your mark in a circle or box opposite the party name. If you wish to "split" your ballot by casting votes for a candidate or two in a different party, you omit marking the circle or box at the top opposite the party name and cast your ballot individually for each candidate irrespective of column. Some party-column type ballots omit the circle or box at the top opposite the party name, thus requiring you to mark each individual candidate's name if you wish to vote a straight ticket.

The second major form is the *office-block* or *Massachusetts ballot.* Here the party is designated for each candidate for a given office and *the names are arranged on the ballot according to the importance of the office being sought rather than according to party.* You therefore must vote specifically for each candidate of your choice for each office, a process that requires careful attention. To vote a straight ticket, you would have to go systematically from office to office checking the candidate of your chosen party. This type of ballot encourages split-ticket voting, but it is a fatiguing ballot to mark. Frequently no votes are cast for minor offices that bring up the foot of the ballot.

The problem of absentee voting was raised during World War II when thousands of otherwise qualified voters were serving in the armed forces. Congress attempted to handle the problem by authorizing absentee voting in 1942, but because of numerous administrative headaches the law was repealed in 1946. Today absentee voting is left to each state to work out. If you are called into military service and wish to claim your voting privilege you will have to check your state laws regarding

absentee voting requirements. Civilian absentee voting procedures are generally similar.

The use of voting machines is becoming increasingly popular in urban centers. This not only facilitates counting the vote, but also cuts down the chances of error. The machines are arranged so the voter can pull a master lever and thus record a vote for all the candidates of his party, or he may record his vote for various candidates simply by pulling the lever by each candidate's name.

If no candidates have been named for an office that must be filled, each voter may, if he wishes, write in the name of the person he desires. Write-in votes may sometimes seriously affect the election outcome. In the 1952 presidential primaries in Minnesota, the write-in vote for General Eisenhower was a significant factor indicating his popularity since he had not formally entered the contest.

Initiative, referendum, recall. Though not present on the national level three other devices for popular control exist at lower levels of government. They are the initiative, referendum and recall. Through the first two means the people may have a direct hand in the making or unmaking of laws; through the third they can exercise close control over elected officials.

The *initiative* is a means through which the people themselves may actually enact law. By securing the number of signatures required by law on a petition, a proposed measure may be placed on the ballot for public reaction. If the response is favorable, the proposal becomes effective.

The *referendum* enables the people to become the final arbiter on laws passed by the regularly constituted lawmaking body. Before taking effect the law may be submitted to the people at the next election. If the people reject the action of the lawmakers, then the proposal is null and void.

Recall is a device whereby the people may safeguard themselves from continued mismanagement or indicate serious disapproval of the policies of a public official. This procedure requires that, upon petition of a specified number of voters, a special election be called. At that time the people indicate whether they wish the official in question to continue in office for the remainder of his term or whether they wish him to be removed.

Keeping in mind the American belief in self-government and the legal and constitutional machinery through which the voters express themselves, we will devote the rest of the chapter to the actual working out of these beliefs and arrangements through party organization, campaigns, and voting.


Why People Vote as They Do

The familiar story of the tremendous build up of candidates, the millions spent during campaigns to reach the people via the press, radio, and television, and the thousands of workers in every major campaign raises a pertinent question. Is it worth it? In other words, do these things change people's minds or do they merely confirm opinions that existed prior to the campaign? Paradoxically, the answer to both questions is a qualified "Yes." American voting habits as described below will indicate why no clear-cut answer can be given to this problem.

Numerous studies of the behavior of the American voter have been made. They all reveal pretty much the same story. Roughly, the potential voting population can be grouped into three categories: (1) the non-discriminating voter, (2) the discriminating voter, and (3) the non-voter. These groupings cut across all the diverse sections of our society.

Although the make-up of the two major parties reveals a coalition of all elements in our society, the policies pursued by the respective parties do reflect down through the years a somewhat different approach to the common problems of government. Therefore, the people in a given social class or economic bracket may vote Republican because they believe the policies of the Republican Party best protect their interests. Others may vote the Democratic ticket for the same reasons. Thus business and industry and professional groups and farmers from the Midwest have tended to be Republican, though there are plenty of big industrialists, businessmen, and midwestern farmers who are Democrats. White-collar workers, salaried employees, and organized labor in the big urban centers have tended to vote Democratic, though there are Republicans in these groups too.

The non-discriminating voter—voting by tradition. In many areas of the country, it is traditional to be a Republican or a Democrat. Thus there is continuous pressure to vote the way one is expected to vote. In Maine or Vermont, voting Republican is almost a foregone conclusion. In the South, the tradition of voting the Democratic ticket is equally strong. Another aspect of this kind of voting is family influence. Sons and daughters grow up tending to vote the way their parents do. This is perhaps because they consistently hear only one side of the issue in family conversation. Father, a good Republican, talks about those rascally Democrats during the evening meal, or if he is a good Democrat he may refer to those money-grabbing Republicans. As a result,



From James M. Burns and Jack W. Peltason, Government by the People, The Dynamics of American National Government *(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 282.*

WHY WE VOTE AS WE DO

the children grow up thinking in terms of "rascally Democrats" or "money-grabbing Republicans." Children learn their politics, just as they learn other beliefs and values, from their parents. A poll was conducted in a class of typical college students in a midwestern university during the peak of the 1952 presidential campaign. The class division into Republicans and Democrats tended to follow the state-wide ratio of Republicans to Democrats. When the question was posed why they were expressing the preference that they did, many were not able to give a really meaningful answer. As the class discussed this interesting revelation, it became increasingly apparent that many of the students were favoring this or that candidate simply because "my folks are Republicans" (or Democrats). This seemed particularly true among the younger students who were going to vote for the first time. Several generations of rock-ribbed Republicans or staunch Democrats in a family are by no means unusual. It is a factor that counts heavily in making a given state almost consistently Republican or traditionally Democrat.

The non-discriminating voter—the machine voter. The machine voter represents another type of non-discriminating voter; he votes one way for the specific, tangible benefits to be gained from keeping the machine in power. The techniques used in bossism and machine politics to be described on pages 488-490 will bear out this point. If the machine is defeated, then personal benefits may likewise cease. This voter makes no effort to discriminate beyond determining who the machine candidate is and then voting accordingly.

The non-discriminating voter—the biased and prejudiced. A third type is the individual who pays scant attention to the issues involved or the qualifications of the candidates. He votes the way he does for reasons quite extraneous to the policies and men concerned. Many of his reasons reveal personal dislikes or prejudices. Some examples will illustrate this point. Many persons voted against Al Smith for President in 1928 simply because he was a Catholic. A whispering campaign had it that the Papal organization had its suitcases all packed and ready to move from Rome to Washington if Smith should be elected! Others voted against Franklin Roosevelt in later elections because they didn't like Mrs. Roosevelt ("A woman's place is in the home") or because of the marital difficulties of the Roosevelt children. During the 1952 pre-convention Republican campaign, one individual was strongly in favor of the late Senator Taft "because it would be so nice for him to live in the White House again where he lived when he was a little boy when his father was President."

These examples are perhaps humorous, but the experienced politician knows the vote of such an individual counts just as much as the vote of the most discriminating voter. Thus every word about a candidate must be studied from all angles before it is released to the public. The candidate's speeches must be carefully edited lest a slip occur that will prejudice the voters. James G. Blaine, Republican candidate for the Presidency in 1884, learned to his misfortune the force of the non-discriminating voter at the polls. The political accident of an over-zealous Blaine supporter in classifying the Democrats as the party of "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion" so angered large segments of the people that political observers afterwards felt it was a crucial point in tipping the scales toward Cleveland.

The non-discriminating voter—the vacillating voter. This is the individual who possesses, at best, only a superficial familiarity with the issues involved. He listens attentively to one side and it sounds good so he decides to vote that way. Then the next day he listens to the other side and that sounds good too so he changes his mind and decides to vote that way. Thus the last person to talk to him before he goes to the polls may easily win this voter to his side.

This would appear to be a rather sad commentary on a large percentage of our voters. The very techniques employed in approaching the voter testify to the numerical strength of the non-discriminating voter. The discussion of campaign methods on pages 498-502 will well illustrate this point.

The discriminating voter. The discriminating voter is one who utilizes several ways to enable him to vote intelligently. He may be predominantly Republican or Democrat or he may simply call himself an independent. He may cross party lines on various occasions to vote for the men he feels best suited for the position or he may vote for a policy if two equally strong individuals are running for office. This raises the question of how to vote in a discriminating fashion. Several steps are involved. First, the voter must be aware of the requirements of the office, its duties, and the special skills it demands. This, of course, is a rather large assignment because of the great number of elective offices that appear on the ballot. This situation has given rise to the argument that we stack the cards against discriminating voting by offering the voter so many choices that he finds it impossible to know everything about all the offices or candidates. It is held by some that only policy-making offices should be left to the people's choice. This would cut down appreciably the number of positions on which the voter is asked to

express an intelligent choice and thus enable him to study the requirements of each office.

Having gathered the information on the office, the voter should study the qualifications of each candidate, then make a choice irrespective of party.

Yet even this is not enough where policy-making is involved. If both

"You Mean Some Can And Don't Do It?"




Herblock in the Washington Post

candidates are equally qualified, then their programs become the point of discrimination. This then requires a study of the policies and issues that separate the candidates. The discriminating voter can decide the way he will vote on a purely self-interest basis; that is, after studying the proposals he may vote for the side that he believes will do him the most good. On the other hand, he may take a larger perspective and

vote for what is good for the country as a whole. The two ideas are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they may be.

The task of the discriminating voter is a big one, but it is essential to the proper functioning of the democratic system that more citizens take this task upon themselves. Political parties are out to win. If this fact is kept in mind, the voter will weigh carefully the implications of campaign oratory that promises him the moon, and seek all relevant information.

The non-voter. Our election statistics indicate that large percentages of the populace do not exercise their voting privilege. Lack of interest



Adapted from the New York Times

THE POPULAR VOTE SINCE 1912

apparently is the chief reason qualified voters fail to appear at the polls. A rain that would not ordinarily spoil a person's plans for going to the movies or a party may keep him home on election day. Many do not make the effort to vote. When a major issue is at stake and tempers are high, interest in voting is proportionately high and the turnout is good, but even then politicians and civic-minded individuals and organizations must work diligently to "get out the vote."

Lack of familiarity with the voting procedure keeps some people away from the polls. The thought that one vote doesn't count much is certainly a factor. A thousand individuals each feeling that his single vote doesn't count much may mean 1,000 fewer votes for a given cause or person. Failure to register, illness, absence from home, and the like, swell the number of non-voters.

Is a big vote a good vote? The student of government is inclined to think so. The politician may or may not agree. If there is a large urban turnout, then, of course, it is not good for the party hoping that the out-state vote will overbalance the urban vote. If a small vote all the way around favors a given cause, then that is good for those who favor the cause. A small vote for one party may be favorable to the other party. Recognizing this fact, the politicians and campaigners who fear a small vote work especially hard to overcome that probability by "getting out the vote."

Political Parties. How Do the People Participate Effectively?

The political party is an integral part of the American system of social control. The nature and function of political parties, the characteristics of party organization, and the role of the party in nominating the candidate and conducting the campaigns therefore need some analysis.

The nature and function of political parties. Essentially, parties are the means by which associations of citizens compete for the right to exercise power and authority. In our highly complex society, if the will of the people is to rule there must be some means of crystallizing and organizing the wishes of the majority. Our political parties provide the machinery through which people who agree with each other in a general sort of way can unite to control political authority. They offer candidates for the people's choice and propose policies to be executed by the candidates elected.

The American political scene has been dominated by two major parties. Third-party movements have never been particularly successful in this country because when a third party strikes a popular note one or both major parties quickly adopt that program thereby removing the reason for the third party. Furthermore, third parties have never been able to devise a program broad enough and attractive enough to draw people away from their traditional party affiliations.

The presence of two major parties does not mean that our society is divided into two distinct groups. Rather, each party is actually a coalition of diverse interests held together by a common desire to control the machinery of government and to institute policies that are deemed beneficial to them and to the country at large. The American belief system sets the general pattern within the context of which these coalitions compete with each other. Therefore, there are many broad areas of agreement between the parties. This has resulted in a tendency to avoid a clearly defined position on issues involving principles, since such a position would indicate a basic difference that does not really exist. The differences tend to be those of means rather than ends. In some instances, even the means are not clearly a point of issue. The policies of both parties have tended to change along the same general lines as social changes have occurred. Often the contest between parties is little more than the "outs'" vs the "ins," and the campaign becomes a battle of personalities seeking to gain or stay in office.

Because the political parties are so similar, points of contention have to be almost "manufactured." That is, a conscious selection is made of some item in the record that can be built up into an attractive vote-getting proposition. Thus at various times in our history, "corruption in government" or "party responsibility for an economic depression" has been the rallying point. On other occasions, the exigencies of the moment have been utilized most effectively in attracting votes. Out of such a contest rise the political party slogans, "Time for a change" or "Don't change horses in the middle of the stream." A dispute with Great Britain over the boundaries of the Oregon territory in the 1840's was parlayed into a winning "54-40 or fight" slogan in a contest in which few issues were brought before the public.

This seeming lack of issues about which people feel very deeply is perhaps caused by the heterogeneous nature of our society. Lines of class consciousness and economic interest are not as tightly drawn in this country as in some of the older European societies. Thus no one group can amass enough votes to carry an election. This point should be kept in mind when we hear any one party referred to as the party of business and industry or the party of labor. This, by the very nature of our political party setup, is not realistic. Farmers unite with industrialists, laborers with businessmen, and religious groups with other religious groups to attract voters to their standard. Thus each party represents a cross section of the major segments and interest groups in our society.

Party organization. Each party has developed organizational machinery to accomplish its chief objective: to win elections and gain control of government.

The national committee is at the head of the party organizational structure. Its members are drawn from all states and territories and are usually prominent men and women of the party. Their principal task is to make all necessary arrangements for holding the national convention. The chairman of the committee, though nominally elected by the committee if the party is not in power, may be replaced by the personal choice of the presidential nominee during the campaign. The national committee chairman is for all practical purposes the campaign manager for the party standard bearer in an election year. Through him the national committee aids in carrying out plans for speakers bureaus, publicity, radio programs, television shows, and all the other tasks associated with a political campaign.

Each party also maintains on the national level senatorial and congressional committees to assist in the election of senators and representatives in Congress and on the state level a central committee that concentrates its efforts on electing a slate of state officers and helps plan the state party conventions. Below the state level, county and city central committees are set up to handle particular campaign problems such as organizing volunteer party workers, "door bell pushers," and voter registration committees.

The principal functions of all committees are to publicize their slate of candidates, inform the voters of their candidates' qualifications, point out the record of their party and that of their opponents, and particularly to get out the vote. More will be said about the various methods and techniques of approaching the voter on pages 498-508.

Despite the large number of volunteer workers, it costs money to maintain party organization and to conduct campaigns. Party finances are always a major problem. All campaign funds are donated by loyal party members or organizations who wish to support a particular candidate or party or are secured through special fund raising projects such as the Democrat's Jefferson Day Dinner or the Republican's Lincoln Day Banquets that often cost the party faithful about $100 a plate or more.

Soliciting funds to maintain party organization and conduct campaigns is now subject to both state and national regulations. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 requires publicity on expenditures, source of income, and amount spent. The Hatch Act of 1939 forbids all federal employees except those holding policy-making positions to take active part in political campaigns for federal office.

Bossism—the machine politician. One of the unique developments on the American political scene has been the emergence of a colorful figure known as the political boss. His rise has paralleled our country's urbanization, for only in centers of heavy population concentration can a political boss and his machine function effectively. Though old fashioned "bossism" is on the decline, no picture of our political scene would be complete without some mention of this aspect of American politics.

The boss himself may never hold public office, but his machine exerts a tremendous power on the choice of candidates to be offered to the people. The primary election, then, becomes the focal point of attention. Bossism can flourish if it can control the candidates at primary election time and thus offer only machine candidates to the people at the general election. Thus the machine is functioning efficiently if all political aspirants are aware that they cannot even get their names on the ballot unless they play ball with the political boss of their respective party to get his support in the primary or at the convention. The successful machine candidate is therefore indebted to the boss for his position as mayor, councilman, legislator, or U. S. Senator.

The successful candidate is, of course, expected to pay back his political debt. It is up to him to see that friends of the machine are taken care of when appointments are made and to vote as the boss wishes on a particular issue. Perhaps a little influence in securing a nice government contract for the boss' company or for his friends might balance the debt a little. The successful candidate usually expects to run for office again, so he must stay in the good graces of the machine if he expects to be re-elected.

The power of the machine to "deliver the votes" and thus control its candidates and office-holders depends upon two things: efficient organization and the judicious distribution of favors and patronage.

From the precinct chairman, the ward heeler, the district chairman, and on up through the various levels of the party hierarchy, the political boss keeps a tight rein of control. The heaviest responsibility for delivering the vote rests upon the precinct and ward chairmen. They are the ones who know the people personally. By recommending certain people to be appointed to jobs on election day, or by selecting the polling place to be rented for a nice figure, or by hiring with machine funds varieties of messengers or runners, and the like, the chairman can guarantee a large number of votes. He can be fairly sure that the families of the people who enjoy his largesse will vote favorably. Also, he can count on the friends and families of the candidates themselves who happen to live in the precinct or ward. The total of these almost certain votes in every precinct in the city or county is significant.

In the days when swarms of immigrants were coming to the United States and settling in our industrial cities, they were the prime target of the political machine. Bewildered and lost in an alien land, they turned to anyone who would help them. The astute precinct leader or ward boss saw to it that as many as possible obtained jobs working for the city or for friends of the machine. Even though the machine created a lot of jobs out of thin air and charged the bill to the city taxpayers, the political boss did a very real service for these people by enabling them to survive. Furthermore, the machine frequently arranged for naturalization papers and thus enabled the newcomers to vote. Living in a little island of their own culture in a teeming city, they were completely baffled by American politics. Who but the precinct chairman or ward boss who had already helped them in so many ways could now help them to vote the right way?

If someone in his precinct or ward has a brush with the law, the precinct chairman does what he can to smooth out the affair. Maybe a little financial aid to a sick family here and there, or Thanksgiving baskets, a load of coal, or an outing for the children of the neighborhood will guarantee a few more votes. Such favors pay off at the ballot box.

The political machine often sponsors a social club or ward club open to all comers. The building is equipped with pool tables, card games, a bar, and a large public room for holding meetings or big social gatherings like a Saturday night dance. Obviously politics can be brought into a pleasant conversation and visitors to the club can be reminded of who is sponsoring the club by strategically placed signs here and there. The machine plants the names of their candidates and the community grapevine does the rest. These clubs sponsor picnics, boys' clubs, recreational programs, sandlot baseball teams, and the like. Through such activities, the ward club and the political machine behind it achieve a considerable air of respectability.

When all else failed, the "old time" machines resorted to "stuffing" the ballot box. People voted more than once, using names of dead or non-existent voters. Returns were falsified when necessary.

By various tactics the Hague machine in Jersey City and Hudson County, New Jersey, controlled 100,000 votes. Frank Hague began as a janitor in city hall, a patronage job that he received for good work in the lower levels of the party hierarchy. Ten years later he was still at city hall—but now as mayor. His hold over 100,000 sure Democratic votes made him the most powerful figure in state Democratic circles. No other individual had an organization that could deliver such a block of strength. He became the maker of state legislators, governors, con-

gressmen, and U. S. Senators. Hague people were picked to head most of the state commissions and bureaus. They were named to important legal positions and thus infiltrated the court system, which was helpful if a machine stalwart ran afoul of the law. Hague men made the law in the legislature and Hague men interpreted and applied the law in the courts. Hague himself became wealthy and used to spend his winters in Florida while mayor of Jersey City, running the city via long-distance telephone.

Men like Hague, Tom Pendergast of Kansas City, the Kelly-Nash duo in Chicago, and Tweed of Tammany Hall were bosses of the old school. Today just as powerful political machines exist, but they have been forced to be a little more discreet in their activities. Machine politics is not necessarily rife with graft and corruption, though popularly it is thought to be. Strict enforcement of registration and election laws makes it increasingly difficult to stuff the ballot box or to engage in the other nefarious practices of earlier day bossism. The advent of the secret ballot aided materially in erasing outright intimidation or dictation on the way a person should vote. The use of the direct primary makes it more difficult to control the nomination of candidates than was the case under the older convention system. Political bosses are not necessarily the products of city slums who rose to power by hook or crook. Political machines may be headed by such polished gentlemen as the late Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts or Thomas E. Dewey of New York. These modern machines are as effective as in the old days though they lack some of the glamour and romance of the rough and tough political wars that used to mark the clashes between contending machines.

Nominating the candidates. Political parties have assumed a major role in selecting the slate of candidates to present to the people for their approval. This role they have assumed from their beginnings, and it has given them a unique place in our governmental setup.

The caucus was one of the first devices for naming candidates, appearing soon after the period of colonization and playing a significant part in pre-Revolutionary politics. A group of like-thinking colonials simply got together and drew up a list of names to be voted upon by the people. But as the population increased and spread farther westward, transportation and communication difficulties made it next to impossible for the people in outlying districts to get together and help draw up a slate of candidates. The solution to this problem was the *legislative caucus.* The legislators were already together at the capitol and could easily meet and name the candidates for the various state offices. Although the legislative caucus had considerable merit, it did not survive long. Counties or dis-

tricts unrepresented in the legislature were denied a voice in naming the candidates. Furthermore, there were those who felt that the legislative caucus gave the law makers altogether too much power.

In the election of 1824, a vigorous campaign against "King Caucus" was led by the supporters of Andrew Jackson. Although some efforts were made to make the caucus more representative, it gradually gave way to a system of *party conventions.*

By 1832 the convention method of choosing candidates had gained virtual nation-wide acceptance. In addition to nominating the party candidates, the convention also debated and adopted a platform and generally sought to whip up party enthusiasm and support.

But the convention method in turn, although it democratized the nominating process considerably, revealed serious faults. Conventions were not above the "deals" and "bargaining" that had been one of the major criticisms of the caucus, and the powerful political machine found the convention fairly easy to manipulate. Machines could virtually name their own delegates to the convention. The power of non-machine delegates was diminished by several devices. One way was for the machine to engage a hall that was too small to hold all the delegates. The machine delegates were, of course, seated and the non-machine group was left outside, unable to participate. Another ingenious device was suddenly to change the hour for holding the convention, the machine delegates being the only ones notified. By the time the other delegates were aware of what had happened, the business had been completed and the convention adjourned.

Such abuses as this created demands for more reforms in nominating procedure. The result was the *direct primary,* which is a system whereby all the party members may participate in naming those who will seek office under the party emblem. There are two kinds of primaries. In the *open* primary, you do not have to state a party preference at the time of voting. You are simply given the various nominating ballots of all parties participating. The *closed* primary requires you to state a party preference at the time of voting. After having identified yourself with the party of your choice, you are given the ballot of that party only.

The 1932 election: a case study of nomination for the Presidency. In order to understand clearly the nomination of candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the United States, let us look at Franklin D. Roosevelt's successful campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1932. This study will also illustrate some of the activities of an important figure on our political scene—the campaign manager.

A candidate's political ambitions are not lately born; usually plans

for pushing his candidacy will have started a year or two before the nominating convention is to meet. With Roosevelt, the ball was put in motion immediately after his smashing re-election to the governorship of New York in 1930. All campaigns are generally similar, and they fall into rather well-defined periods. First comes the "build-up" of the aspirant. Then strategies for selling the candidate to his party are developed. Finally, maneuvering for political advantage at the convention and lining up delegates takes place. Of course, the first two periods in the campaign are oriented toward the achievement of the last step, but because they represent successive stages they may be treated separately.

Experienced political campaigners know that there are two ways to *build up the candidate.* One way is to make contacts quietly with political friends and keep the candidate's name before the public with press releases that stress his "availability." The other way is to seize the initiative immediately and proceed at high speed. The latter course was followed by Roosevelt's managers, James A. Farley and Louis M. Howe.

Their first step was to send out a small booklet to prominent party leaders throughout the country detailing the organizational setup of the Democratic Party in New York and listing the names of key Democratic leaders in the state. This device was admittedly a "feeler," designed to establish contacts as a prelude to enlisting future support. While these initial connections were being established, the managers were busily compiling lists of the state conventions and state primary dates for 1932 and noting the number of delegates that each state would send to the Democratic convention.

Perhaps at this point a word should be said about the nature of presidential primaries. They are essentially contests for positions as delegates to the national convention of a given political party. Two kinds of competition may be involved. First, individuals may be competing for a seat among the allotted number of delegate positions authorized for their state. In this case, the delegation would be "uninstructed" since it was not pledged to any particular candidate. Second, individuals pledged to support rival candidates may be contesting for the available seats.

Of course, many a pledged slate of delegates ultimately changes its position and the candidate going into the convention with the largest number of pledged votes does not necessarily come out the winner. Nevertheless, the campaign manager whose candidate wins the primary election in a key state plays up this victory as an extremely significant indication of his candidate's strength. He tries to use the victory as a psychological weapon to influence the voters in other primaries around the nation and to win the support of uninstructed delegations before

convention time. By the same token, the managers of the unsuccessful candidate play down the outcome and write it off publicly as the result of some particular local contest in that state rather than as any real test of national strength or weakness for either candidate. Some presidential aspirants do not even have their supporters place a list of pledged delegates on the primary ballot. They prefer instead to make their major fight for delegates at convention time.

Now to return to the Roosevelt story. With people in each state pledged to support Roosevelt and a national organization in the making, Farley and Howe turned to the task of *selling their candidate to the party*. Important party personnel previously "felt out" on their positions were now earnestly solicited to help Roosevelt's campaign in their home states. An intensive letter-writing campaign was undertaken, and Roosevelt began to meet and talk with prominent party leaders from other states, discussing his plans with them and asking them for suggestions that might make his campaign more effective. Meanwhile unpaid "scouts" and observers were touring the country, measuring the political barometer and keeping an eye out for the interests of their candidate.

When a candidate's campaign begins to attract national attention, the enemy forces make their move. Farley and Howe soon learned that opposition elements within the party, headed by Jacob Raskob, National Committee Chairman, were trying to place the National Committee on record as favoring repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment and thus embarrass Roosevelt. Such a stand would have seriously endangered Roosevelt's chances in the South, where anti-repeal sentiment was very strong. Farley went into action. As state Democratic chairman, he called a meeting of the central committee and succeeded in having a resolution passed charging that the national organization did not have the right to commit the party to this particular course of action. He then went to Washington where he spoke to many national committeemen and rounded up enough support to prevent the proposed resolution from ever coming to a vote. This was the first big national test for the Roosevelt organization, and it weathered the storm.

But victory was not the signal for rest. Farley decided to attend the national Elks' convention in Seattle, Washington. Before his departure, he, Roosevelt, and Howe mapped out a carefully planned itinerary that took Farley into 18 states in almost as many days. Farley met and talked to other national, state, and local candidates of the party, impressing them with Roosevelt's nation-wide appeal and mentioning the possibility of riding into office on his popularity. The astute campaign manager knows that a would-be candidate for state office pledged to a particular

candidate often can be influential in delivering the vote of the convention delegation. Farley also tried to nip in the bud any "favorite son" candidates in the states he visited. Favorite son delegations are usually not very serious about their support but can frequently deadlock a convention.

Once the build-up has been successful and efforts to sell the candidate to the party have begun to show results, campaign headquarters begins to assume an air of business-like confidence. Farley and Howe began to speak optimistically of Roosevelt's chances, even hinting that he might be nominated on the first ballot. All this has its place in the scheme of things. People who had heretofore not even heard of Roosevelt began pricking up their ears at mention of his name. The Governor became the most talked-about man in his party. Even the opposition press began to show some fear of him. This was, of course, exactly the response Farley and Howe had been hoping for. It emphasized the growing strength of their candidate.

The next step was to make some inroads into national committee offices. The secretaryship was vacant, and the Roosevelt forces were able to name their man to the position. In addition, important senators and representatives of the party were constantly being approached with convincing evidence of Roosevelt's popularity among the rank and file of the party as well as with the leaders.

Having been in the process of building an organization for nearly a year and a half, Roosevelt finally made the first public announcement of his candidacy for the nomination. This was done in order that he might have his name entered in the North Dakota primaries in January. This was the season of state primaries and state conventions to name the delegates to the summer convention in Chicago. The results of the primaries and state conventions showed that there would be a real fight on the floor of the convention and gave a fairly good indication of the various alignments of delegates.

Now the day was rapidly approaching for the convention to meet. Soon the big question would be answered— Had all the long months of work been sufficient to insure Roosevelt's victory? The strategy now focused on maneuvering for position at the convention and lining up delegates.

The permanent chairman of the convention is in charge while nominations are made and balloting takes place. He can affect a nominee's chances by using his parliamentary rulings to forestall or permit maneuvers in favor of one candidate as against another. The Roosevelt camp had already been alerted that their opponents were bent on getting control of the convention machinery. The first clash occurred when

the Committee on Arrangements for the convention met to name the temporary chairman and "keynoter" for the convention. The Roosevelt forces were backing Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky for the job, but the old guard of the party, headed by Raskob, wanted Jouett Shousse of Kansas. A tentative compromise was worked out whereby Barkley would be temporary chairman and Shousse would be "commended for the position of permanent chairman." The Roosevelt followers, however, were determined to fight to prevent Shousse from winning the post, for the Kansan was in league with Raskob to stop Roosevelt.

High strategy meetings were then called to map out the course of action for the convention. The choice for chairman of the Resolutions Committee, which draws up the platform, was decided upon, an agreement was reached to support Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana for permanent chairman, and the strategic position of floor leader was filled.

Finally the appointed time arrived. The convention was opened by the national committee chairman. Senator Barkley delivered the keynote address, describing Democratic accomplishments and objectives in glowing terms, heaping scorn and ridicule on the Republicans, and generally infusing the convention with enthusiasm and hope.

During the early stages of a convention, while the various committees are meeting and prominent party members make speeches, convention strategists proceed with their bargaining and maneuvering. Often this goes on right on the floor of the convention hall during speeches by lesser lights. Meanwhile, from the candidates' hotel headquarters issues a stream of claims and counterclaims on number of pledged delegates, rumors, denials, accusations, and defenses. If one candidate has already received pledges of powerful delegate support, the other candidates often will combine forces in an effort to stop him. For if the convention can be deadlocked, a stampede may start toward a dark horse candidate. The person controlling delegate votes must estimate precisely when the hour will be ripe to cast his votes for a particular candidate—perhaps switching them from a favorite son to one with more chance of winning. If he jumps too soon, he may waste his advantage on a candidate who might lose in the end. If he hesitates too long, some other delegation may beat him in tipping the scales for the eventual victor. A prize political plum, the Vice-Presidency, for example, may fall to the state whose vote is changed at the right time.

The order of business apt to stir up the biggest fight is the report of the Credentials Committee on the seating of official delegates. Often, rival delegations from the same state, but pledged to different candidates, will demand that they be seated to the exclusion of the other. The fights



Detroit Free Press; Detroit Times

FAMILIAR AMERICAN POLITICAL SCENES

Campaign workers hear their candidate has won. The bandwagon contagion of a national convention begins to spread.

on the rulings of the Credentials Committee are regarded as early tests of strength in the convention, and this is why they are conducted in such a violent, no-holds-barred fashion.

In the 1932 convention, a major fight occurred over the seating of the Louisiana delegation. Huey Long headed the pro-Roosevelt delegation, which was opposed by a group led by the former Democratic governor of Louisiana, J. Y. Sanders. After much fencing and tilting, the Long delegates were seated. This represented an important victory for the Roosevelt forces.

Once the Credentials Committee has finished its work, the Platform and Resolutions Committees make their reports. These reports rarely occasion much of a stir, though in 1932 a fight threatened over the inclusion of a "wet plank" in the platform advocating repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment.

With these matters disposed of, the convention settled down to the task of choosing the candidates. The Roosevelt forces, meanwhile, had succeeded in pushing through Senator Walsh to be permanent chairman.

The names of nine candidates were placed in nomination in the 1932 convention, each nomination being accompanied by demonstrations in which each faction strove to outdo the others in terms of noise made and time consumed. But the real in-fighting started after the balloting began. Roosevelt's task as the leading contender was not an enviable one. He had to fight both a defensive and an offensive battle—to secure enough strength on each ballot to prove his position and to increase his total on each ballot to show that he was gaining support.

In an all-night session, three ballots were taken, each state being polled on its choice. Thanks largely to Farley's herculean efforts Roosevelt had jumped from 666¼ votes on the first ballot (more than a majority but short of the two-thirds required at that time) to 677¾ votes on the second. However, he had gained but 11½ votes on the second and only 5 on the third, and many delegates began to think that he had passed his peak. Finally, a motion to adjourn until evening was carried at 9:15 A.M., and the weary delegates left the hall for a few hours' rest.

The press and radio make much of the bargains and deals that take place in the famous, or infamous, "smoke filled rooms." What followed the morning adjournment was an example of this typical "behind the scenes" activity. Farley, conferring with the Texas and California delegations controlled by John Garner, managed to bring them over into the Roosevelt camp by holding out the Vice-Presidency to Garner as bait. This switch broke the back of the opposition and Roosevelt was nominated on the next ballot.

The choice of Vice President is almost entirely a matter of political

expediency. The person chosen may be a most competent individual, but usually his residence in a key state or his popularity with an important bloc of voters overrides other considerations. Choice of a running mate takes far less time than the nomination of the Presidential candidate.

Approaching the Voter

From convention time until election day the American political scene is most colorful. Much of what goes on baffles and disillusions the foreign observer or unrealistic American who has a mental picture of a campaign as a rational debate over the specific issues upon which the parties differ.

That campaigns rarely if ever come close to this ideal is understandable in the light of two things already mentioned: the heterogeneous make-up of each party (and the accompanying lack of any deep ideological differences between them) and the strength of the non-discriminating voters. Campaign techniques and issues are determined by what pays off at the ballot box. Almost anything goes that wins votes.

The party standard bearer. The delegates and party bosses want a candidate who will appeal to all types of voters. Anyone who has been too clearly identified with one specific group or who has notably antagonized any large bloc of voters is not apt to be chosen. This is perhaps one of the principal reasons the Republican Party did not choose the late Senator Taft in 1952. Though he was "Mr. Republican," he had antagonized considerable portions of the voting populace. A middle-of-the-roader is chosen more often than not. At times an individual has been nominated for the Presidency who was so obscure politically that both parties were in doubt about whose side he was on until he declared himself. Since such a candidate's stand on issues is not too clear, he conducts his campaign largely as an endorsement of the prepared party platform. Personal popularity is a great factor in winning elections. Many capable men who are widely known for their political accomplishments and who might make excellent Presidents (or governors, or mayors) are by-passed if it is thought that their personalities would not be attractive to voters.

The party platform. The wording of party platforms also grows out of the nature of American political parties and the habits of the American

voter. After reiterating in glowing terms their faith in and support of the American ideology, parties set down the policies they propose and support. Here they seek to appeal to the widest possible number of voters. Any specific commitment to a particular policy is generally avoided. Thus the party, once in power, is free to maneuver and to modify its stand if need be without obviously violating the platform. Many a successful candidate has lived to regret the day when he promised specific things in his pre-election campaign. Circumstances over which he has little or no control may prevent him from carrying out his promises. To those who voted for him on the basis of such promises, however, such excuses ring rather hollow. Be the man a Democrat or a Republican, the opposition party is quick to seize this point as an indication of failure to carry out campaign pledges.

The phrasing of a party platform not only gives the candidate room to maneuver and interpret according to his audience, but also permits the opposition to read into their opponent's platform most anything they desire, thus hoping to attract voters over to their side. Once in power, however, a party can defend itself against charges of not carrying out its pre-election promises by hiding behind the general phrasing that committed them to little if anything specific. They can parry the thrust by saying in effect "We meant what we are now doing," or "We never meant what our opponents say we meant."

In order to gain real insight into the activities of a political party, the discriminating voter must study the record of legislation and policies proposed and carried out by the party. The platform does not necessarily provide this information.

Campaign strategy. Winning an election in our society calls for all the ingenuity and strategy a party can muster. Campaign managers must not overlook any vote-getting possibilities. Records of past campaigns, won or lost, are carefully studied to ascertain points of strength and weakness. The professional politician is a skilled manipulator who relies on a variety of techniques to win an election.

Confusing the issues. Campaign strategy sometimes dictates that the issues be deliberately confused. This technique avoids a clearly defined clash. Its aim is to divert attention from major points of controversy and to focus thoughts on something else. For 40 years following the Civil War, the Republican Party engaged in what historians have called "waving the bloody shirt." Pressing questions of monetary policy, Reconstruction, tariffs, and the like, were submerged under a barrage of



Once the candidate has entered the race he must please everyone .



A sore throat and temperature of 102 cannot keep him from the hustings . . .



He must be against the Taft-Hartley Law and a champion of labor . .



A few ill-chosen words on the golf course can kill the church vote . . .



and at the same time finance his campaign with management's contributions . . .



and a moment of absent-mindedness will cost him the support of the vets . . .

By permission, Roy Doty and the New York Times

THE CANDIDATE RUNS FOR OFFICE



He can lose the election by being seen in a non-union barber shop.



Is it all worth it? Only the returns on election day can tell.

charges that the Democrats were responsible for the Civil War. In recent campaigns, the Democratic Party has consistently raised the bugaboo of "Mr. Hoover's depression." The conscientious voter has difficulty wading through charges and counter charges of such loaded phrases as "graft and corruption" and "communism in government." This strategy pays off and therefore will probably continue to be a part of the campaign manager's handbook. It plays on the emotions and fears of the non-discriminating voter rather than appealing to his reason. Every campaign has its demagogues. There is usually enough truth in the charges to enable the campaign strategists to exploit them fully and to build a very convincing case for the unwary voter who does not objectively sift through the arguments and carefully weigh their validity.

Not always are issues confused. Particular issues may be clearly and forthrightly stated and the outcome of the election may turn on a clear-cut division of sentiment among the people.

Creating an image of the candidate. The interrelatedness of our political behavior and our value system is readily apparent when you examine those qualities and characteristics considered most desirable in a candidate. To win an election, the party candidate must be a well-liked person. In state and local elections, the candidates are apt to be fairly well known personally by a considerable number of people. Here the problem of creating a favorable image of the candidate is less difficult. On the national level, however, the heterogeneous nature of our population confronts the campaign strategist with the problem of creating a

picture of the candidate that will appeal to everyone from a society matron to a fishmonger and from Maine to California.

In the few short months between the nominating conventions and the election, the results of the campaign manager's handiwork begin to emerge. The American voter is offered a choice between two candidates, each of whom apparently personifies the American value system. The candidates become stereotypes of all the virtues and personality traits that are called "American" and are liked by Americans. Log cabins are hard to find these days but "lowly beginnings in a modest home" may do as well. The candidate should own a farm somewhere, like children, be a good father and family man, attend church (preferably Protestant) and be trustworthy and a man of integrity. His character should read like the twelve Scout laws. Americans want a man of the people, yet they want him to be able to hold his own with kings and queens. They want him to have a sense of humor and be subject to all the little human failings that beset them all. Anecdote writers have a heyday digging into the past of the candidate (and his wife), and nothing is too sacred if it will win votes.

Reaching the people. Modern means of mass communication have changed the character of our political campaigns somewhat, but the veteran campaigner knows that nothing quite takes the place of meeting the people face to face. Though the major parties spend enormous sums on radio and television programs, publish tons of literature, and plaster the countryside with billboards, they still put their trust in the personal contacts of the cross-country tour and "whistle-stop" campaigns.

Modern campaigning demands a great deal of physical stamina to survive the exhaustive pace set by campaign managers. Speeches must be given every day during the peak of the campaign. Innumerable "whistle-stops" must be made as the candidate's special train rolls through the countryside. Every section of the country must be covered at least once; doubtful areas may be visited several times.

Mail campaigns, block workers, "doorbell pushers," and speakers bureaus supplement the personal appearances of the candidate. Editorials, newspaper advertisements, and comic-book biographies add to the volume of literature and the variety of ways of reaching the people. A more complete analysis of the manipulation of public opinion will be given in the next chapter.

Despite all the fanfare and almost circus-like atmosphere of conventions and campaigns, political parties play an essential role in our insti-

tution of government. In many respects they are the adhesive which holds our diverse society together politically. They have become the vehicle through which the consent of the governed is made known and exercised. Parties are simply "we, the people" geared for action on the battlefield of politics.

27

PUBLIC OPINION AND OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES

In the preceding chapter we considered the ways in which, through the use or non-use of his vote, the American citizen expresses his opinion on government. The way in which he makes up his mind—or has it made up for him—and the ways in which those interested in securing his vote for their own candidate try to influence his decision are part of the subject with which this chapter is concerned—the formation of public opinion.

A *public* is a vaguely defined number of people who for a time share a particular interest, such as concern about some controversial issue. As was pointed out in Chapter 7, a public is one of the specific types of social mechanisms that exhibit "collective behavior;" it is not organized and regulated in accordance with the kinds of rules and understandings we find governing the "institutionalized behavior" that characterizes religion, education, and government. A public is not a fixed

or permanent group, but changes as the interests and attitudes of the individuals composing it change.

The public through discussion and argument strives to arrive at *public opinion*—a collective opinion or collective decision on the issue about which the public has formed. Although it is not unanimous nor even necessarily the will of the majority, public opinion is nonetheless a collective product.[1]

In this chapter we shall examine the nature and role of public opinion in our society, and the fundamental importance of our civil liberties, especially freedom of speech, to public opinion formation. We shall also try to see how public opinion is formed on particular issues, how special interest groups function in such cases, and how propaganda is used to influence attitudes and opinions.

Role of Public Opinion in Our Society

In an authoritarian society, the only opinion that really matters, we often assume, is that of the dictator or the governing body, and dissident opinions among the mass of people are to be punished or disregarded. It is apparent from history, however, that even a tyrant cannot completely disregard the opinion of the people. Sometimes his task is made easy by the fact that from infancy on his subjects have been conditioned to bow submissively to authority. This was the case in Nazi Germany, for example. The dictator, nonetheless, to keep control, works hard to convince the people that what he does is right.

In a democratic society, however, government is supposed to serve the will of the people, and this will should be open to free expression through all the various channels of communication. We Americans tend to take for granted the fact that our opinions are supposed to count for something in the larger affairs of community and nation. In part this is because from childhood on most of us have participated in making collective decisions more often than we have been forced to submit to arbitrary authority.

In a family conference, all members have a voice in shaping the final decision on which movie to see, how the living room should be redecorated, or which college Jim or Susan should attend. In most American schools, too, children are given practice in governing themselves through arriving at collective decisions—where to go on an excursion, who shall be "Queen of the May," who shall be president of the class. In the university, elections for officers of student government may involve use of

many of the media and devices found in campaigns for election to public office—rallies, parades, planned "spontaneous" demonstrations, slogans, posters, handbills, sound-truck music to attract and speeches to persuade, planted rumors, and personal solicitations.

Meanwhile, as our horizons broaden to include the newspapers, radio, and television, we are bombarded with conflicting points of view and competing pleas for different lines of action, from corporations wishing



By permission, Justus and the Minneapolis Star

A FREE PRESS: CHECKMATE TO TYRANNY

to sell their products, interest groups wishing to sell their positions on an issue, political parties wishing to "sell" their candidate, even government officials wishing to explain their policies. As we are pushed and pulled, harangued and cajoled, flattered and threatened into being pro on this issue and con on that, buying this instead of that, we are being convinced anew that how we feel, what we say, and what we do *counts.*

This is good training for the role of adult citizens in a democracy.

Public opinion is inestimably important to the functioning of our society. The citizen's responsibility is not, however, a simple and easy one, for efforts to influence public opinion are varied and unceasing. As was pointed out in the preceding chapter, the task of the discriminating voter (to take only one aspect of the citizen's role) is not taking the line of least resistance. The responsible citizen must participate in identifying the truly significant issues confronting the public, and must bring to this task all the information he can garner and the courage to express his own opinion. So that citizens can fulfill this task, it is vital that a democratic society have freedom of conscience, of opinion, of investigation, and of publication, and freedom to associate and discuss issues. Only if the channels of information and communication are thus kept open can a truly informed public opinion arise to serve the best interests of the society as a whole.

Regarding the most controversial issue of our time, President Eisenhower well advised the Dartmouth College graduating class, "Don't join the bookburners." [2] Communism, he said in effect, must be understood if it is to be fought successfully, and such insight cannot be gained if we are afraid of, or prevented from, reading and hearing ideas with which we may not agree. With this much by way of introduction, let us now take up the civil liberty so essential to the sound functioning of public opinion in a democracy—freedom of speech.

Freedom of Speech: The Civil Right Basic to Public Opinion

Our Founding Fathers considered civil liberties so essential to a democracy that they refused to ratify the new Constitution until ten amendments, the famous Bill of Rights, were added to it. The First Amendment reads as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Behind this formulation were centuries of conflict and controversy over two points of view on the relation of government to the people. One view is that government shall be master over the people. The other, which is embodied in the Bill of Rights, is that government shall serve the will of the people.

Americans tend to take these freedoms for granted as basic human rights. We are so accustomed to hearing "freedom of speech" mentioned as one of the fundamentals of democracy that we tend to consider it

only natural that all free peoples should endorse it as such. The fact is that not everywhere is freedom of speech taken for granted, nor even considered basic. Even among the members of the United Nations' Committee on Human Rights there has been much discussion on what the "rights of man" really are. To us Americans, confident that we shall not



Fitzpatrick, in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch

AS AMERICA GOES, SO GOES THE WORLD

suffer for lack of food, clothing, shelter and medical care, the phrase "human rights" means just such civil and political rights as freedom of speech. To those who inhabit the great underdeveloped areas of the earth, however, the phrase means, first of all, solid guarantees that more tangible values will not be denied them: "the right to work, to appropriate conditions of work, to social security, to special protection of ma-

ternity, children and the family, to food, clothing and housing, to an adequate standard of living, to health, to education, to science and culture, and to forming and joining trade unions." [3] The Committee on Human Rights found that it had to recognize the satisfaction of these rights—the "economic, social and cultural rights"—as prior in many countries to the civil, political, and personal rights that we assume to be traditional. All over the world today an adequate standard of living is a primary concern.

Should we, then, concentrate first on these rights and only when they are secure worry about such "frills" as freedom of speech? Not at all. Let us recognize clearly that man concerned only with physical well-being is not far removed from the animals. We who have a large measure of security in creature comforts must not, while helping others attain such security, neglect the less tangible end set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948: realization of the "inherent dignity and equal and unalienable rights of all members of the human family" as fundamental to "freedom, justice, and peace in the world." This same Declaration, while recognizing the importance of the right to physical well-being and security, stresses that governments are obliged to respect and promote other human rights and freedoms, among them "the right to hold opinions without interference . . . the right to freedom of expression . . . . (including) freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds." These rights may be limited only as provided by law when necessary out of respect for the rights and reputations of others and the protection of national security or public order, or public health or morals.[4]

The fact that this statement was arrived at only after long discussion of various views on the rights and nature of man may serve to remind Americans that their civil liberties are not to be taken lightly by anyone who believes in the democratic process. They are not rights that, once won and embodied in constitutions and declarations, are ours forever. "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance." In our lifetime, we have seen book-burnings, propaganda ministries, and not only the suppression of newspapers that dare to criticize a regime, but also "purges" of individuals guilty of the exercise of what should be a basic freedom. We have had wartime censorship, which we accepted as necessary to security. Today in the United States we are confronted by an uneasy period of formal armistice or truce between ourselves and Russia. The climate is one of tension, suspicion, and fear, in which freedom of speech and opinion is being sorely tested. So uneasy are many people in the face of this situation that they dare express only the perfectly "safe" points of view.

This curbing of free expression in the name of democracy is in fact a denial of democracy and a threat to the continuance of the basic freedoms.

Clearly, what we must guard against is closing our minds or permitting the various channels of communication to be closed to any facts or points of view simply because they are unpopular or may be regarded by some as dangerous, unwise, or untrue. Under our system of government, the citizens collectively are sovereign. Nobody else is so much more intelligent, or is so much better informed, as to be in a position to do the citizens' thinking for them. Only by doing their own thinking can the people enjoy true self-government. Hence it is that attempts to censor and suppress various points of view by certain individuals and groups who fear that American public opinion may be misled, themselves violate our most basic principles.

Even when such threats to freedom of speech do not exist, freedom of communication is never absolute. Social influences are always present in modern society, operating in support of this, against that. Any commercial type of communication—the sponsored radio or television show, the motion picture designed for profitable showing at home and abroad, the typical daily or weekly newspaper, or the textbook being prepared for a nationwide market—is subjected to various pressures to avoid offending any person or group.

We have stressed the importance of freedom of speech to the democratic process and pointed out some of the dangers and difficulties that, in modern complex society, obstruct the process of public opinion formation by blocking complete communication of ideas. Often spoken of as another freedom, but part of the same interrelated group of civil liberties—indeed basic to their existence—is "academic freedom." This means the freedom of students and teachers to investigate, to inquire, to speak out on practically anything and everything without fear of punishment by religious or governmental authorities. We almost forget, simply because political thought is the issue currently involved in any discussion of civil liberties, that as recently as July 1925, one of the most famous civil liberty trials of modern times concerned the right to teach the theory of evolution in the public schools of Tennessee.

Suppose one of these interrelated freedoms were suddenly denied. Suppose, for example, it were suddenly decided that all college students were to be "protected" from exposure to economic and philosophical beliefs that were different from their own, or that the only point of view books and teachers could present to them would be the one currently popular with the political group in power. This limitation would

seriously curtail a student's ability to decide issues intelligently. His understanding of the basic and long-range issues that confront him and his generation would be limited. He would become less sensitive to situations that demand reform, but at the same time would fall victim to all manner of quack political nostrums. The climate that encourages interest in significant issues and ensures an intelligent approach to them is found not only in a free academic environment, but also in community forums, discussion groups sponsored by public libraries, such radio programs as "Town Meeting of the Air" and the "University of Chicago Round Table," and such television programs as have been presented over WOI-TV, at Iowa State College, for the stimulation of community self-evaluation and improvement.[5]

But freedom of communication alone is not enough. To keep his perspective amid all the pressures and counter-pressures of our complex society and really make up his own mind, the citizen would do well to try to see behind the scenes of the drama of his times, to surmise with deeper insight who is pulling which strings and why, and to understand how such manipulation of the puppet-actors is accomplished.

The General Pattern of Public Opinion Formation


At the risk of over-simplification, let us reduce the pattern of public opinion influencing to six parts:

1. *Who* (the initiator, the *"influencer"*)
2. *Uses which* (of the possible media, such as TV, radio, press)
3. *How* (using what "psychology"—what pattern of incentives, motives, loves, hates, fears, rational appeals, and so forth)
4. *To get whom* (the relevant *public* or publics)
5. *To do what* (the ultimate change of *behavior,* the end for which all the build-up of desired attitudes, facts, opinions, and the like, is simply means)
6. *With what results? (evaluation:* effectiveness in anticipated and desired directions plus the unanticipated and non-desired by-products).

Here, in a nutshell, is the whole complex story. In the limited space available here, we shall only try to point out some of the more typical and obvious aspects of this general pattern of public opinion formation. The fact that a general pattern of this type exists in our culture is what makes it possible, and useful, to talk in very general terms here and now. The specific behavior sought by the person or group employ-

ing the general pattern of public opinion influencing may involve anything from making a purchase, casting a ballot, or "buying" an idea, to making a blood donation or doing some other worthy act.

1. ***Who?*** Always, at the beginning of this pattern, *someone* has an idea —a conception of a goal and the broad means for achieving it. To carry out the idea, however, an organization is almost invariably required. For our purposes, it doesn't matter whether the initiating "who" is a



Graphic Associates for Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 67, Government Under Pressure, *by Donald G. Blaisdell.*

person, a governmental unit, a private organization, or an organization of organizations such as a trade association.

Though it is not always apparent, the units and processes of any society are always interrelated; we can isolate a single person or group only in a rather limited context. For example, when we see high above us the smoke trail of a sky-writing airplane we say, "Who's selling what now?" and are satisfied who the "who" is when we see the name of a familiar automobile or television set spelled out against the sky. But if we were to notice similar or identical editorials on some currently

controversial topic in the pages of several independent newspapers, we couldn't help but wonder, "Who's really *behind* this? Who's pushing this line?"

To understand completely the "who" type of phenomenon it is necessary to recognize the various, and often conflicting, forces at work in a democratic society. Thus an article on the proposal to establish a Missouri Valley Authority (comparable to the T.V.A.) by David Lilienthal would have a quite different point of view from one on the same subject by a representative of some privately owned electric power and light company. The "Letters to the Editor" section of a major newspaper or newsmagazine will provide interesting and constantly changing examples for the student of public opinion. What "Irate Citizen" or "Thoughtful Citizen" has to say is usually clear enough, but to figure out whom he is really speaking for would require a knowledge of the stand taken by the various groups, classes, and segments of the community or the nation on the issue under discussion.

2. ***Which media?*** The second element in the general pattern involves choosing one medium or combinations of the various *media*. You doubtless have had firsthand experience with major commercial, political, or philanthropic campaigns that "hit you from all sides." There are at least two good reasons for conducting campaigns in this way. First, the cumulative effect of repetition, so long as it fails to create the antibodies of boredom, irritation, or resentment, can be very potent. Second, no single medium of communication can be counted on, in our complex kind of society, to reach everyone. In order to "saturate" the public, all media—television, radio, newspapers, magazines, outdoor billboards, "car cards" on streetcars and busses, house-to-house or direct mail canvassing with specially prepared literature, big public meetings, demonstrations, parades, and so forth—must be used.

Often, of course, the public or audience to be reached is much more limited, in which case the problem is to find which channel is likely to be most effective per dollar invested. Hence, not only is there competition among the various media for the publicist's dollars, but also within any given medium each enterprise attempts to demonstrate the advantages it alone has to offer. Only in the case of "house organs," which theoretically reach non-competitive audiences of employees, is this rivalry absent.

Usually these campaigns are short-range; that is, no attempt is made to influence future adult behavior by appealing to children. But such campaigns have been waged, not only in totalitarian societies, but also within our own society in the past, and in all probability are continuing,

subtly refined, today. Probably one of the best organized of these has been the campaign, at its height during the 1920's, against public ownership and operation of power-generating and distributing facilities. Another example is to be found in the efforts of various groups to make sure that America's schools, colleges, and universities will present only orthodox views on economic and political questions; the line between what is and is not acceptable varies greatly from one person or group to another.

This long-range type of effort can be put to highly constructive uses. One example is found in Chicago, where civic consciousness is apparent in public support of such projects as beautification of the lake front. Decades ago, in 1911, the Chicago Commercial Club initiated a plan to impress the value of such beautification on the citizens while they were still school children. The Chicago Plan Commission distributed 165,000 copies of a well-written and illustrated pamphlet explaining architect Daniel H. Burnham's plans to the children, and the city is still reaping the benefits.[6]

3. ***How?*** The third component of the general pattern involves the "psychology" employed in the influencing campaign. This is the pattern of offering rewards and/or threatening punishments by playing on the endless variety of specific verbal appeals, arguments, and nonverbal representations that are designed to evoke the desired feelings and eventual behavior. Naturally, since people vary with regard to sex, age, intelligence, nationality background, religion, education, economic status, political affiliation, recreational interest, and the like, it may be wise to plan artfully appropriate campaigns taking these differences among publics into account. To take a simple example from the economic field, we should not expect the virtues of automobile "X" to be presented in quite the same way in magazines of such diverse readership as *The Woman's Home Companion, Esquire, Fortune,* and *Seventeen.* Similarly, in psychological warfare, it is necessary to know intimately the publics or groups to be influenced. Otherwise the entire operation may fail or yield results quite different from those desired. In promoting American aid to Europe, for example, it has been appropriate to emphasize humanitarian reasons among religious organizations, benefits to agriculture among farmers, gains for business and industry within these circles, and the workingman's stake in European recovery in appealing to organized labor.

4. ***Whom?*** The fourth element is the *public* to be influenced. A "public" may range in size all the way from the total adult population of a



Inland Steel; British Information Service; Burroughs

PRESS, RADIO, AND TELEVISION

Media of public opinion provide entertainment and spread ideas in every country of the globe.

community, a state, or a nation to highly selected interest groups such as Dinah Shore fans, Brooklyn Dodgers supporters, or "hot rod" enthusiasts. Generally speaking, the *political scientist* is chiefly interested in publics consisting of potential voters on controversial issues. The *sociologist* concerns himself with publics consisting of any substantial number of persons who (a) share a significant interest over a reasonable minimum period of time, (b) are dispersed in space (that is, are connected by some regular channel of communication but are not typically in a face-to-face relationship, as in an audience or a crowd), and (c) are not formally organized. And the communication specialist, often a *social psychologist,* deals with publics consisting of those persons who share some medium of communication, such as a particular newspaper, magazine, or radio or television station.

The main point to be kept in mind about the concept of the public is that it has no simple, objective, generally accepted criteria for membership. "Belonging" to a public has been defined with varying degrees of inclusiveness and precision according to the purposes of the definer. To clarify this point, take a moment to think back over the dominant interests you have had during past years—say since your twelfth birthday. You will probably recall a sequence of changing interests. Also, you may recognize how these major interests have served to direct your attention, time, and money, first to one pattern of reading, listening, viewing, and association with persons sharing this interest, and then to another, depending upon how your hierarchy of interests has evolved. But it would be hard for you to tell precisely when the interest that captivated you at age twelve was replaced, in dominance, by the next. For that matter, the very fact that you had these earlier interests means that you are, today, different from what you would have been otherwise. In reading the newspaper, some items leap out at you because they are so very meaningful to *you,* so reminiscent of experiences that you have had, whereas your brother or sister gives these same items scarcely a glance. Similarly, have you noticed that there is sometimes keen competition among members of your family over whose favorite TV show is going to grace the living room of a Monday evening? If each person had his own receiver, each would be viewing a different program. In other words, in terms of the program choices available at the time, you happen to belong to different publics.

You can easily pick out some of the publics of which you, personally, are a member. If you are a woman, there is a "woman's section" of the paper prepared especially for you, while the sports section is aimed chiefly at men. The automobile designer has the woman in mind when he makes cars attractive and easy to handle, while the power, efficiency,

and durability of the engine and its economy of operation are developed to appeal to the potential male buyer. If you are a teen-ager, certain magazines and merchandise are angled directly to you as a member of the "teen-age market." If you are a Roman Catholic, you are a member of different groups from those you would belong to as a Hebrew. If you are a homemaker, your interests and outlook on life are widely different from those of a career girl. Thus age, sex, religion, and marital status, as well as economic position, political beliefs, nationality origin, hobbies, and so forth, each determine some of the publics of which you are a part.

This same multiplicity of publics exists for the political scientist, but his publics have a much more marked pattern in time, being associated with specific political campaigns culminating in elections and hence being capable of periodic quantitative checks at the polls.

Similarly, newspapers, magazines, radio and TV stations, and networks attempt to count noses, from time to time, to keep track of their changing constituencies. Circulation figures do not tell the whole story, nor does a sample study made during some special event, such as the national convention of one of the major political parties. Research is being carried on continuously to attempt to keep track of the changing size and characteristics of the various reading, listening, and viewing publics. In fact, the "Gallup Poll" and the "Hooper-rating" have become matters of common knowledge to all of us, so widespread is the interest in such measures.

5. ***What?*** Fifth in the general pattern is the ultimate goal sought by the initiating social force. What specific pattern of behavior should show up in the lives of the people being influenced if the total operation is successful? The use of slogans, motivating appeals (e.g., appearance of tall, dark, and handsome young men in advertisements for girls' bathing suits, and conversely, of curvaceous cuties in ads for men's after-shaving lotions), and verbal and non-verbal symbols of all kinds, are directed only incidentally at inculcating certain attitudes, expectations, desires, and intentions. Eventually the criterion of success involves overt behavior—whether or not a person obeys the exhortation to "Vote for Mr. X" or "Buy SCRUBBO toothpaste." We should not be misled, therefore, into supposing that public opinion concerns only ideas in people's heads. It involves also what people say and do, how they invest their time, their money, and their influence.

6. ***Results?*** This brings us to the sixth and final element in the general pattern: *evaluating* the results of the operation designed to influence "public opinion" in a certain manner. As a voter, for example, you

should recognize that all the good intentions in the world are not enough to elect your candidate. In the final analysis, nothing counts but the validly cast ballots of qualified voters. To bring about the desired result will require action on your part. And the sum total of individual acts adds up to an endorsement for candidate A instead of B, and for political party X instead of Y. This represents success for one group of political workers and failure for the others. In the same way, the effectiveness of most public opinion influencing campaigns can be evaluated in terms of the ultimate individual or group actions sought. When the Tea Bureau, for example, carried out an experimental television and national magazine promotional campaign, the criterion of success was the increased sales of tea in the TV-blitzed community. And the real measure of the effectiveness of Kate Smith's marathon broadcast in 1943 was the approximately 39 million dollars' worth of pledges to buy U. S. War Bonds she obtained during an 18-hour period.[7]

Research methods, techniques, and skills in the field of attitude and opinion measurement have been improving and gaining strength in recent years. The first periodic national sample studies were begun less than 20 years ago, launched at about the same time by George Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion and Elmo Roper's *Fortune* magazine survey. There are now several national and international organizations engaged in professional public opinion research. Significant articles and research reports in this field appear not only in various social science and journalism publications but also in *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. New studies are being launched daily. Although the strictly commercial investigations are reported confidentially, for the benefit of the employing client, the list and variety of the clients who use the professional skills of the public opinion specialist grow constantly.

In spite of the 1948 public opinion poll fiasco, in which the pollsters indulged in amazingly confident but incorrect predictions regarding the national presidential election, the findings and interpretations of specialists in this field continue to attract interest and respect. Scarcely a ripe and mature field, public opinion research is growing and undoubtedly will continue to do so for some time to come.

An Example of Public Opinion Formation and Change: Fair Employment Practices

Now that we have examined the general pattern by which public opinion is influenced in our society, let us illustrate the process by using a current example: the campaign in Michigan to pro-

mote non-discriminatory labor policies and practices, better known as F.E.P.C. legislation (Fair Employment Practices Commission). The term derived from the famous wartime Executive Order No. 8802, issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on June 25, 1941, which appointed the Commission on Fair Employment Practices "to enforce a policy of non-discrimination in employment in industry engaged in defense production."

Let us begin by making sure that we have a clear idea of the basic pattern characterizing F.E.P. laws in those states where they are now in force.[8] Essentially these regulations, which cover labor unions and employment agencies, as well as employers, prohibit discrimination in employment for reasons of race, color, religion, or national origin or ancestry. The laws stress education and conciliation as methods to work out the problems involved, but provide for court intervention if all other recourses fail.

If an individual feels that he is being illegally discriminated against, he may register his complaint with the proper agency, which then investigates the charge. If the complaint appears to be well founded, attempts to work out a compromise solution agreeable to both the complainant and the person or firm complained against—the respondent —are made. But if such informal procedures fail, the agency may hold a formal hearing and, if necessary, issue an order calling for appropriate action on the part of the respondent. Such an order is enforceable in the courts and subject to review by them. It should be noted that this entire procedure is aimed at eliminating overt behavior of an illegally discriminatory nature; it does not attempt to legislate subjective *prejudice* out of existence, nor does it tell the employer whom he must hire.

Now that we have defined broadly what F.E.P. legislation is, the campaign in Michigan may be examined in the light of the general pattern of public opinion formation as outlined on page 511.

(1) *Who* is interested in having this legislation enacted?

Let us consider the special agencies set up to secure passage of an F.E.P. law. The Michigan Committee on Civil Rights, which serves as a coordinating agency for civic, religious, labor, fraternal, ministry, and professional groups, is particularly interested in promoting such legislation. Other liberal organizations such as the Y.W.C.A., League of Women Voters, Consumers League, etc., are also diligent in using their influence to get this bill passed.

What are such groups properly called? The answer might well depend upon how the person questioned feels about F.E.P. objectives. If he is opposed, he will probably use the slightly tainted labels of "pressure group" or "lobby." If he approves, he might say it is a good example of

grassroots democracy, social action, or an "action group." If he wants to be strictly neutral, he might call it simply an "interest group."

(2) *What* means are used?

Let us next take as an example one of these "interest groups," the Michigan Committee on Civil Rights,[9] and examine its brochure entitled "F.E.P.C. for Michigan, a Message to the Members of the House of Representatives and Senate, State of Michigan." The brochure begins as follows:

> The Michigan Committee on Civil Rights (M.C.C.R.), a statewide association of individuals and cooperating organizations, was founded in order to carry forward the recommendations of the Report of the President's Committee in the State of Michigan. The Michigan Committee on Civil Rights through its various chapters and associated organizations has been able to witness at close range the many violations of civil rights which are constantly occurring in the State of Michigan. It has studied various legislative efforts throughout the United States aimed at ending such violations.
>
> The M.C.C.R. is convinced that effective fair employment legislation represents the primary requirement for dealing with the most degrading and harmful aspects of discrimination in this State. We have prepared this message to the members of the Legislature and Senate in the form of answers to commonly asked questions on F.E.P.C.
>
> It is a fundamental principle of the American free enterprise system that each individual shall have the opportunity of contributing to our economy to the utmost of his ability. We hope that Michigan will soon join the growing list of forward looking States which have guaranteed the observance of this principle by effective legislation.
>
> MICHIGAN COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS
>
> Most Rev. Bishop Francis B. Haas,
> *Honorary Chairman*
> George Schermer,
> *State President*
> Mrs. Olive R. Beasley,
> *Executive Secretary*
> ORIGINAL SPONSORS: (Partial List)
> Mrs. Alfred Ackerman, Rabbi
> Morris Adler, Fred Allen . . .
> Morton Zimmerman.

(3) *How* is the appeal slanted?

Note that in addressing the members of the Michigan Legislature, generally controlled by a strongly Republican majority, the "free enterprise system" is given as a justification for enacting F.E.P. legislative guarantees. Such tailoring of material to fit the known values of the prospective voters is a characteristic technique of practically all public opinion influencers. The use of a list of names is likewise a typical device that helps the reader find out whether the persons who sponsor the proposal are the kind of people he wants to line himself up with, or not. Ordinarily the reader will recognize some but not all the names in such a list. Hence it is common practice to make use of some identifying label, such as the voluntary organization, business firm, governmental agency, or occupational group to which a person belongs. "Reverend," "Rabbi," "Father," "Bishop," "Judge," "Professor," "Honorable," "Senator," "Doctor," are generally regarded as titles of prestige and attach importance to what the individual endorses, even though he may not be well known to the person reading the brochure.


To continue with our analysis of the brochure as a typical document of persuasion, next we find in bold capitals (further emphasized by being set off in generous areas of white space) such captions as "What is F.E.P.C.?" "How It Started," "Is Legislation Necessary?" "What Should a Bill Provide?" "The Critics were Wrong," and "Who is for F.E.P.C.?" together with brief, clear, and direct answers or textual explanations. Of special interest, in view of the considerations pointed out in the preceding paragraph, is the concluding section, "What Business has to Say," which begins as follows:

> It is particularly important to note the increasing recognition which business leaders throughout the country are giving to the desirability of laws against employment discrimination.

Then come endorsements of the principles of F.E.P.C., implicit or explicit, by such notables as Nelson Rockefeller, Henry Luce, Paul Hoffman, a former President of the Real Estate Board of New York City, the President of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, the general counsel for the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, and the President of the American Marketing Association.


On the back cover appear the post office address and telephone number of the Michigan Committee on Civil Rights. Such identifying information should always be included if the document is to be regarded as a responsible presentation. Unless the authors and sponsors are willing to be publicly identified regarding their role in the matter, the publication might just as well be tossed aside as too biased to be worthy of careful consideration. Anonymously presented material always raises the

DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT MEANS...



From To Secure These Rights, *Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights* (*Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947*), *pp. 142-143.*

FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES WOULD HELP BRING...



question: Who is trying to hide what, and why? It implies that if sponsorship were clearly indicated, the message would lose its weight.

One serious omission in the case of the M.C.C.R. brochure is the lack of a publication date. The content can be judged fairly only if the reader knows when the manuscript was produced, for the national "picture" regarding F.E.P.C. is constantly changing. But we cannot even tell whether potentially available material has been adequately utilized in the Michigan publication if we do not know when it was prepared. From other sources we know that this particular item was used in the unsuccessful campaign of 1949. Attempts to introduce and pass an F.E.P. bill were made during every legislative session from 1941 to 1953. Each time, except in 1952, the bill died in committee (see Chapter 29 for an explanation of legislative procedures). In 1952, the proposal reached the floor of the House of Representatives; the vote was 46 against, 45 in favor; but 51 votes are required to pass a bill. The same year companion bills in the Senate died in committee. Supporters of the proposal are hopeful of success the next time it is introduced.

(4) *Whom* is the Michigan Committee on Civil Rights trying to persuade (5) *to do what?*

It has already been pointed out that the purpose of this Committee's campaign was to influence the conservative Republican majority in the Michigan Legislature to pass a Fair Employment Practices law. But at the same time, the Committee attempted to influence public opinion in favor of such a law. The basis for determining precisely who shall be counted as a member of a given public will depend largely upon the opinion manipulator's purpose. It may be the electorate of whatever governmental jurisdiction he happens to be interested in—municipal, state, or federal, or it may be the voters and articulate citizens who write letters to legislators.

But whatever the group or body to be influenced, there is another complication. The "opinion" part of public opinion is as many-sided as the "public" part. The study of public opinion today may include verbal reports on such data as attitudes, values, prejudices, preferences, perceptions, interests, intentions, past experiences and behavior, knowledge, opinions, beliefs, hopes, fears, aspirations, and so on. Since we are concerned with all matters affecting a specific kind of behavior—voting on a proposal to initiate F.E.P. legislation—it is clear that a variety of types of data, in addition to the one pamphlet we are analyzing, might have an important bearing.

(6) What were the *results* of this campaign?

"Almost-but-not-quite" describes the outcome of these efforts. As already mentioned, in 1952 the measure was defeated in the lower House.

In 1953, it failed to be reported out of committee by a 5-4 vote. In 1954, it passed the Senate, but the House refused to call it out of committee. The vote, however, was not along party lines.

Although success or failure in this particular instance was measured by the voting behavior of state legislators, what other kind of action could be taken by a group having such an objective? A recent study gives us precisely what we are looking for in the summary materials on strategy and tactics to be used in F.E.P.C. campaigns. Although the quotation is long, it is all to the point of our discussion.

Strategy of F.E.P.C. Campaigns

The use of a *state committee* to integrate the work of the proponents and lend direction to the campaign has been found to be the most efficient method of coordinating such a campaign. Some state committees established *local committees* throughout the state, and this permitted wider and more intensive coverage. Such an arrangement also enables the proponents to exert political pressure in the home constituencies of those representatives who express opposition to F.E.P.C., and this is the type of pressure that is most effective.

Generally, two types of *strategy* have been employed—*"grass-roots"* and *"top-level."* The former relies upon the development of mass public support as a base for political pressure; the latter upon dealings with key legislators and party leaders. Both strategies have succeeded, and both have failed. . . .

When a legislature is in the substantial control of one party, proponents will have to work through the *majority party* if they hope to succeed. When power is more evenly divided, proponents may choose to work with one of the parties, or rely upon a *bipartisan* approach. In such a situation, the bipartisan approach has one advantage, in that the majority party is usually not solidly in support of F.E.P.C., and therefore the proponents will have to rely upon the support of some members of the minority party.

Proponents of F.E.P.C. have dealt with the problem of *"left-wing" support* in many ways. Opponents will make use of every opportunity to describe F.E.P.C. as "communist-inspired," and the proponents as "communist-tools." Realistically, there is little that can be done about this, except to repudiate such support. . . .

Proponents have found it a distinct advantage to have an F.E.P.C. committee in existence continuously, rather than merely during the year when the legislature is in session, even though that committee consists only of a few people. If this is not possible, proponents should begin to plan before the legislative elections, so that F.E.P.C. may be made an *election issue.* Party conventions can be asked to *endorse* F.E.P.C., as can candidates for election.

Tactics of F.E.P.C. Campaigns

The facts alone are not sufficient to pass F.E.P.C., but such legislation will not be passed without them. The two most important sets of facts are those dealing with 1) *employment discrimination* in the states; and 2) the *experience* of F.E.P. Commissions and employers in other states. These are necessary to counter the arguments that F.E.P.C. is not needed "here," and that "it won't work."

Public meetings of a general nature have been found to be of little value. They involve too much time and money, and reach too few people not already convinced of the need for F.E.P.C. They may, however, be instrumental for purposes of *organization* and to build *morale* among those who are disposed to support the measure but need the confidence that they are not alone. . . .

Little use has been made of *newspaper advertising* because of the expense, and there is no gauge of its effectiveness. . . .

Radio stations do not editorialize, and often will give free time to both sides of a public issue. . . .

Extensive use has been made of *printed materials* of all kinds. Little attempt has been made to determine the relative effectiveness of this literature, but proponents are of the opinion that such material should be prepared with *special audiences,* for example, *labor, church groups,* etc., in mind. This literature should concentrate on bringing out the following points: the need for F.E.P.C. in the state; description and explanation of the bill; the results and effects of F.E.P.C. in other states.

The main *tactic* of the opposition, and this should be differentiated from the *arguments* used, has been to *stall* on the F.E.P.C. bill, so that the legislative session will end without action having been completed. This also permits legislators to express support for the bill,

"White Is Black. Black Is White. Night Is Day—"



From The Herblock Book (*Beacon Press*)

without having to vote for it. Proponents must anticipate such maneuvers, and their intent.[10]

Propaganda vs. Education in Public Opinion Influencing

In the foregoing discussion, no mention was made of two terms that in our society are loaded with emotional freight: education and propaganda. Ever since the latter part of the First World War, the term "propaganda" has been almost everywhere regarded as bad, in contrast with "education," which is regarded as "good." Previously there had been no such widespread negative use of the word "propaganda." It had referred exclusively to the missionary activities of the Roman Catholic agency, the *Congregatio de propaganda fide* (congregation

for propagating the faith), which was founded in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV. In the general usage of today, however—and this is the usage here employed—the term is applied mainly to subtle, indirect, misleading, or dishonest efforts to influence public opinion, and especially to any such activities carried on by groups, or for objectives, to which an individual is opposed. In other words, it is a fighting term—the label applied to the "enemy" regardless of what the conflict may be about—by a person who is trying to secure public support for an issue.

On the other hand, an effort carried on to help others "see the light"—that is, accept the point of view a person is interested in promoting—is likely to be called an "educational" activity. This black and white kind of polarity between the activities an individual opposes versus those he endorses is a convenient over-simplification. It is easily and typically resorted to in a conflict situation, for under such conditions a person's emotions are aroused, and the "grayness" of the actual, complicated situation tends to pull apart into the sharply contrasting "blacks" and "whites" of enemy and friendly points of view.

To call a public opinion molding campaign an "educational" effort, of course, does not make it genuinely educational. This label is sometimes used simply to gain the prestige that generally attaches to educational efforts in our culture, a relative advantage at least in comparison with propaganda activities. In such cases, the objective is to promote or inculcate a previously determined point of view; it is definitely not intended to stimulate original, independent, critical thinking and consequently unpredictable behavior. The real goal is to achieve predictable behavior on the part of those to be "educated."

A truly educational experience always calls for independent and original effort on the part of the person acquiring that education. This process introduces novel elements into the total learning situation and the results, consequently, become quite unpredictable. Such results may be thoroughly frustrating or disturbing if a person approaches education merely as a means to implement already existing prejudices or beliefs. Innovation is a possibility whether the search leads into the past, as in an historical inquiry, or whether it involves a more candid view of the contemporary scene.

In any case, a genuinely liberating educational adventure is consistent with our most cherished value—freedom to think. But we must recognize that even the hardiest search for truth, for underlying meaning and reality, will not necessarily lead to agreement and harmony. For the clarification of conflicting points of view, the interpretation and evaluation of a given set of facts may merely underscore the fundamental nature of a conflict in philosophies, in basic assumptions, and implicit

valuations. The open-minded approach represented by the scientific method, founded on tested knowledge and directed by fruitful hypotheses, appears to be the best basis for understanding what the actual situation is, how it got that way, and what the possibilities are for change. It offers the indispensable common core of fact and understanding from which the basic agreements or issues may be developed.

28

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS


Our government has its roots in two famous documents, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The yellowed originals rest under glass in Washington, and their words are repeated in most schoolbooks dealing with our history and government. We regard them as sacred symbols of our democratic way of life and frequently invoke them to justify or to condemn some measure or action. Our notion of what they say and what they mean, however, is often quite different from what the words actually say, and from what the Founding Fathers thought they meant.

One day, a newspaper reporter asked passersby on the street to sign a "petition," which was actually a copy of the Declaration of Inde-

pendence. Many who read it refused to sign it, muttering that it was "subversive," that it advocated the overthrow of the government. None recognized it. Yet most Americans would say they hold the Declaration sacred and believe it to be one of our greatest historic documents. They feel the same about the Constitution, which outlines our system of government, and are quick to use the charge that "It's unconstitutional" to demolish any measure of which they happen to disapprove. The writer recalls that a city council sought to pass an ordinance limiting the number of cats that a homeowner might keep on his premises. One particular feline fancier who had thirty-seven cats in her home was most vociferous in charging that the proposed ordinance was "unconstitutional"—that it violated her "constitutional rights" as an American citizen. Someone asked her if she had ever read the Constitution. Her answer was "No—but I know my rights and that cat ordinance is just plain unconstitutional." The moral of this cat tale is that the Constitution has become such an integral part of our belief system that it is used by all kinds of people to support or condemn any particular measure that they favor or oppose. Politicians are quick to dub any measure they dislike as "unconstitutional." The argument is usually rather effective because many persons have never read the Constitution or its companion document, the Declaration of Independence. Yet they believe in them.

The basic premise upon which our Constitution rests is that government should not depend on the whims and caprices of those in power at the moment. There must be a set of rules agreed upon by the governed. Of course, the existence of this set of rules on paper (usually called a constitution) does not guarantee that the government will follow them. Certain Latin American countries have constitutions closely modeled upon ours, but their dictators treat them as mere scraps of paper, even promulgating new ones to justify their power. A constitutional government can, in fact, exist without any rules set down in black and white. England's constitution is unwritten, but just as powerful as ours. Its strength rests in the fact that every school child is taught the history of the English system of government as a long series of struggles against the arbitrary exercise of power. And public opinion keeps that unwritten but very real constitution in force.

Because our young nation had no comparable tradition (though its roots were in the Magna Carta and other English documents), the founding fathers wanted the rules set down in black and white. But the fact that the Constitution is set down on paper and is agreed to be the foundation of our government does not mean that our Constitution is rigidly followed to the letter. It is open to varying interpretation and



AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

subject to amendment, and in the course of our history it has become clear that our Constitution is what we think it is. Some of us may think it is too rigid, others may think it is too flexible, but always it serves as a primary point of reference for judging what those in power do.

The Constitution

The story of the adoption of the American Constitution is a fascinating one, but if fully told would require many more pages than we have at our disposal here. Rather than try to tell the whole story we will concentrate instead upon those features of the document that illustrate the essential characteristics of American constitutional government.

Checks and balances. The debate and wrangling that marked the ratification of the Constitution soon died away as the forces that had clashed over its adoption now tried to outdo one another in praising the document. Soon it became the object of almost outright worship, something akin to higher law, and consequently, a symbol around which the young nation could rally. But more than a symbol, the Constitution was also an instrument, enabling the government to control the people and the people to control the government.

This dual nature of the Constitution—that it is a device for limiting national power and at the same time a support for national power—will not appear too strange if we pause for a moment to consider the underlying motives of the framers. The specter of unbridled governmental authority still haunted them, but they also wanted to guard against the government's falling into the hands of a popular majority. Accordingly, they set out to allot in a rather general way certain powers to the national government and to reserve the rest to the states. And they divided power among the three branches of government—executive, legislative, and judicial.

Checks and balances, in American practice, does not imply that all governmental power can be neatly packaged into three separate compartments, however, nor that the three government departments can be rigidly categorized according to function. Checks and balances, American style, involves an *overlapping* of powers; each department is given some of the duties of the other two and each is granted some leeway in controlling the actions of the others. Thus, Congress makes the laws, but the President can veto them, and Congress can, in turn, override his veto. The Supreme Court can strike down a law passed by

Congress and signed by the President, but the President, with the consent of the Senate, appoints the justices.

But what of the other eventuality feared by the framers? What if a majority should get control of government and begin to ram through partisan legislation? The Constitution-makers decided to stagger the terms of office for the House, Senate, and Presidency. Thus a popular

"In Two Words, Yes And No"



Herblock in the Washington Post

majority might win control of the House in an off-year election, but the President's term would still have two years to run and with his veto power and authority might be expected to keep the majority in check. And if the majority captured the Presidency, minority forces might still control the Senate. Only an exceptionally strong majority could hope to control all three branches of government at the same time, especially since all three were to be chosen by a separate electorate—the Presi-

dent by presidential electors, senators by the various state legislatures, and representatives directly by the people. The system represented an elaboration of the checks and balances theory never before seen in the political history of man.

Actually the system has not prevented a major share of power from passing to the executive branch of government. In addition to initiating policy, the executive department has increasingly come to enact policy through administrative agencies and executive agreements. And changes in electoral methods, such as the direct election of senators, and the establishment of agencies whose functions cut across all three departments have further modified the checks and balances theory. But in general, division rather than concentration of power characterizes the national government.


Establishing national power. As the delegates to the Constitutional Convention assembled at Philadelphia in 1787, a number of things were clear to them. A confederation system of government, one operating through the states and formed by a compact among the states but having no influence over individuals, had failed the young nation. But the majority of the populace, and many of the delegates, were still firmly attached to their state governments. A federal government seemed to offer the only solution—a government, like a confederation, in which powers were divided between the national and state governments, but one in which the central government operated through its own agents, not through the states, and directly upon individuals. But the solution itself gave rise to two difficult questions: How much power should be allotted to the central government and who would have the final say on what was or was not a legitimate exercise of power?

It is the first question that concerns us here. The framers left it unanswered. They contented themselves with a rather general statement of the powers to be exercised by the central government and left it to future generations to provide specific answers as the need arose. The need would arise soon.

In 1819 the famous case of *McCulloch vs. Maryland* was brought before the Supreme Court. Presiding over the Court at this time was John Marshall, ardent nationalist and liberal interpreter of the Constitution. The case had arisen over McCulloch's refusal to pay a tax levied by the state of Maryland against the branch of the Bank of the United States located in Baltimore, McCulloch being the cashier of the branch at the time. The immediate questions before the Court were whether the government had the authority to create a bank and whether a state could tax an agency of the central government. But also at issue were

more fundamental propositions: whether the American nation was a union of states or of people and whether the Constitution derived its authority from the people or was merely a compact among the states.

Maryland based its case on a strict interpretation of the Constitution, arguing that the power to create a bank was not expressly delegated to the national government by the Constitution and that no such power could be implied from the powers that had been set down. The central



Adapted from Ogburn and Nimkoff, Sociology, *2nd ed., p. 409.*

government, the reasoning continued, was an agent of the states and was responsible to the states, and its powers should be determined by the strict wording of the Constitution.

But Marshall would have none of this line of argument. The powers of the national government should be liberally interpreted, he declared, and Congress had a wide latitude in choosing the means to make its powers effective. The Constitution was not a compact among the states but a law ordained by the people. In now famous words he summarized:

Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution are constitutional.

Recent years have seen power centralized in the hands of the federal government at a rapid rate. Primarily this growth has resulted from new social forces that have revolutionized our thinking about the proper role government should play in our everyday lives. We look more and more to the national government for aid and assistance in a variety of areas—social welfare, unemployment compensation, and others—and less to the states. The very nature of our society has "nationalized" the problems of government. Developments in transportation and communication have knit the country into a complex whole, requiring that the exercise of power and authority be consolidated in one government rather than dispersed among many.

Judicial review. Judicial review is purely an American contribution to the art of government. In the British constitutional system, for example, Parliament not only initiates legislation, but also applies and interprets it. There is no Supreme Court in the English system to declare acts of Parliament invalid. Nor is it the duty of the prime minister to review legislation. Parliament's word is final.

But judicial review was not specifically provided for in our Constitution. How then did the concept arise, and why?

Certainly the framers of the Constitution were aware of the idea of judicial review, and some, Hamilton in particular, were outspoken in favoring its inclusion in the Constitution. But there were others, Jefferson and Madison among them, who opposed the idea just as strongly.

The issue came to a head in a rather roundabout way. In 1800, following their defeat by the Jeffersonian Republicans, the Federalists, fearful for the safety of the country under its new leaders, sought to retain some control over the future conduct of government by creating a number of new circuit judgeships and justiceships of the peace for the District of Columbia. The task of delivering the new commissions fell to John Marshall, then Secretary of State but recently appointed to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. However, in the last minute rush of clearing up the affairs of his old office, Marshall could not find time to deliver all the commissions. Jefferson was enraged at these Federalist maneuvers, and when he took office he instructed Madison, his new Secretary of State, not to deliver the remaining commissions.

One of the new appointees thus deprived of his job was William

Marbury. Obviously much set on taking over his new position, Marbury began to examine all existing legislation that might pertain to his case and finally hit upon Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gave the Supreme Court power to issue writs of mandamus where the law warranted to officers of the United States government. A *writ of mandamus* is a court order requiring the person to whom it is delivered to perform an official act. The section seemed to cover Marbury's case perfectly. Madison was an officer of the government and the delivery of the commissions was an official act. Marbury decided to carry his case to the Supreme Court.

After hearing all arguments, Marshall proceeded to deliver the Court's opinion, undoubtedly one of the most important, if not the most important, the Supreme Court has ever given. Marbury was entitled to his commission, the Chief Justice declared, and the Court could issue the writ to Madison requiring the Secretary to deliver it. This statement did not provoke much surprise but what followed did. Marshall went on to state that although Section 13 gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases such as this, the Section was in conflict with Article III of the Constitution, which gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction only in those cases involving an ambassador or other foreign minister or a state. According to the Constitution, Marshall continued, the Court had no jurisdiction in this case. Obviously the courts could not enforce any act of Congress that conflicted with the Constitution. Then Marshall answered the real question: Why should the Court's interpretation be accepted over that of the President and Congress? Because, said Marshall, the Constitution was law; the proper function of judges was to interpret the law; therefore judges should interpret the Constitution rather than Congress or the President.

Today the power of judicial review is a central point of our constitutional system, buttressed by the belief that the Constitution cannot be left to the mercies of contending political factions, that such hallowed possessions as our civil rights cannot depend upon the shifting sands of political success or failure.

Changing the Constitution. The framers saw clearly the need for a flexible constitution, one that could adapt itself to change. Accordingly, they set up two ways by which amendments could be proposed to the Constitution. The first, and the only method ever used, is by two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress. The second way is by a national convention called by Congress at the request of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. The Constitution also provides two ways for ratifying amendments. An amendment may be adopted after being approved by three-

fourths of the state legislatures or by specially called conventions in three-fourths of the states.

Because of its flexibility, the Constitution has not required much formal amending. Probably the best known of all the amendments are the first ten, which are commonly grouped together as the Bill of Rights.

When the Constitution was submitted to the people for ratification, the absence of adequate safeguards for certain basic rights caused considerable opposition. Many states that did ratify did so only with the understanding that certain amendments would be added to the Constitution to limit the power of government over the individual. The Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution a few years after it was adopted.

In brief, the Bill of Rights provided the following guarantees. Congress was prohibited from passing laws abridging freedom of speech, press, religion, and the people's rights to petition for redress of grievances and to assemble peacefully. Nor could the right to keep and bear arms be infringed, for such a right was deemed necessary to the proper maintenance of a sound militia. Mirroring trials experienced under the British, the Bill provided that no troops were to be quartered on an individual's property in peacetime without his permission and in time of war only in a manner prescribed by law. And the people were to be secure in their persons, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Legal safeguards were also added. Trial by jury was guaranteed and no person could be tried twice for the same offense. The famous Fifth Amendment declared that no person could be compelled to be a witness against himself and established that no person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Speedy and public trials and prohibitions against excessive bail or fines and cruel and unusual punishments were other legal safeguards added.

These are formally listed rights. We should note, however, that these rights are not absolute. Freedom of speech, for example, does not entitle a person to slander another nor to incite panic or riot in the streets. Freedom of religion does not include practicing religious rites that demand human sacrifice. All our civil rights are premised on the belief that a person in the exercise of his rights shall not violate the equally valid rights of others. The writer once heard a college dean illustrate this point while speaking to a group of incoming freshmen during orientation week. He pointed out that there were relatively few regulations that the university imposed upon the students, but quickly added that a person's right to do as he pleased had definite limitations. "You have the right to swing your fists as much as you want to around here," he said, "but your freedom ends where my nose begins."

The remaining amendments may be grouped according to the follow-

ing classification: (1) those governing voting procedures and methods, the voter, and elected officials; and (2) those relating to the national government, the states, and the constitutional structure of government. This arrangement is attempted for convenience only; the separation is not everywhere valid because some amendments overlap the classification.

Under the first heading we may group the Twelfth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-second amendments. The Twelfth Amendment, adopted in 1804, provides that each elector shall vote separately for President and Vice-President, the man with the majority of votes in each case being elected. The Amendment was passed to prevent a recurrence of the presidential election deadlock of 1800 when each elector cast one vote for Jefferson and one vote for Aaron Burr, thus throwing the decision to the House of Representatives, which was controlled by the opposition Federalists. The Fourteenth Amendment gave citizenship to former slaves and protected them in their civil rights, and the Fifteenth gave them the vote. The Seventeenth Amendment provided for the direct election of senators, and the Nineteenth extended the franchise to women. Previous to the passage of the Twentieth Amendment, a President elected in November did not take office until the following March and congressmen not until the following December. Meanwhile the people continued to be represented by officials not of their own choosing. Under the Twentieth Amendment, a President and congressmen elected in November begin their terms the following January. The final amendment in this category, the Twenty-second, limits the President to two terms in office.

The amendments comprising the second category are the Eleventh, Thirteenth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-first. The Eleventh withdrew from the jurisdiction of federal courts those cases begun by an individual against a state; the Thirteenth gave Congress the power to abolish slavery; the Sixteenth granted the government power to levy an income tax; and the Eighteenth gave the federal government equal power with the states to control the manufacture, sale, or transportation of alcoholic beverages. This last amendment was superseded by the Twenty-first, which returned control over liquor to the states.

A flexible Constitution. The English Constitution, as we said previously, is not a written document. It is a loose collection of rules, regulations, and precedents that have accumulated through centuries of English history. This difference in form has led many people to believe that our Constitution is much more rigid than its British counterpart. Such, however, is not the case. Our Constitution has proved remarkably adapt-

able and flexible. Since its adoption, it has required formal amending but 22 times, and the Bill of Rights was added so soon after ratification that many authorities look upon it as part of the original document. This picture disturbs many people who would much prefer that we follow the letter of the document, rather than continually interpret and modify it informally. Such an argument has some merit. In terms of our personal liberties, it may be alarming to think that what we regard as secure one day may be altered significantly the next. But, we repeat, the mere presence of a set of written rules does not insure that the rules will be followed. A strong public opinion must support the rules, written or unwritten, and prevent dictators from making a mockery of them. At the same time, a constitution must grow along with the nation it serves, otherwise it will be discarded. A constitution must, as we have seen, enable the government to control the governed and still respond to the people's needs and demands.

The Judicial Department

Americans have great faith in law. But as people we are also notorious lawbreakers. This does not mean that we are all criminals, but it reflects a strange paradox in our behavior. We urge the passage of laws but then proceed to ignore many of the laws we do pass. The key to this strange attitude lies in our concept of "law" as something prohibitive. Laws and the agencies that enforce laws have an air of authority and compulsion that conflict with our beliefs in liberty and freedom of action. We are usually quite incensed if we are caught violating a simple law. If a policeman asks us to move on when we are parked in a no-parking zone, we become resentful and sometimes even surly. We staunchly support the principle of laws, but mostly because we believe the other fellow needs them.

We encounter "the law" in numerous circumstances. Laws, like government, are all around us. Laws regulate how we drive, determine where and how we build our homes, safeguard the things we eat, and so forth. Many of us have had firsthand contact with the courts that enforce the law, appearing either as plaintiff or defendant in court actions or serving as jurors. Hollywood and our pulp mystery thrillers have created a stereotype of our courts and judicial system. The "long arm of the law" is portrayed as inflexible and stern; courts are invariably associated with punitive action of some kind; attorneys are shrewd, opportunistic, impersonal. This picture is both false and incomplete. Actu-





Malak, Ottawa; British Information Service

THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

Every society has some sort of legal system. The judicial function is one of the most essential aspects of the system of social control. Here, the Supreme Court of Canada and a local tribunal in Nairobi, Kenya, are shown in session.

ally, the courts of the United States are not necessarily "something to stay out of" nor are they all busy trying young ladies for murdering their aunts. The judicial function is one of the most essential aspects of our whole system of social control.

The function of the courts. People desire the security that government by law provides. Our belief in government by law lies behind the establishment of our judicial system. We want more than a written constitution or rules and regulations on the statute books. They in themselves mean nothing unless they are properly applied and interpreted. We expect the courts of the country to give us some degree of security by *enforcing law* in a consistent and certain way. For example, if we enter into a legal contract we can expect that if necessary the contract will be enforced by the courts. Without the degree of certainty that courts provide, life would be chaotic indeed.

Courts also settle conflicts between individuals and between government and individuals that arise out of differences of interpretation of law or from outright violation. In cases such as these the court acts as an *impartial arbiter in disputes.* In a contract case, the courts would hear both sides of the argument and in theory impartially render a decision.

Another function performed by the judicial system is to *build a body of interpretations and meanings* of various laws to serve as guideposts for future court decisions, for legislative bodies, and for private citizens.

Courts also safeguard the individual from actions that once committed could never be undone. Suppose, for example, that your neighbor threatened to cut down some of your trees. If you were powerless to stop the act, it would be useless to go to court to claim redress from your neighbor after the damage had already been done. An award of legal damages would not restore your trees, and your neighbor might figure he had won anyway, that damages were a small price to pay to get rid of the hated trees. However, the courts can, upon application, issue a restraining order to prevent irreparable damage from being done. In our example, the penalty for violating a court order would probably be enough to forestall the threatened damage to the trees.

Various levels of law. Our courts apply many different kinds of law. The supreme law of the land is of course *constitutional law,* which takes precedence over all other kinds. Court action in interpreting constitutional law has already been noted briefly in this chapter. These continuing interpretations and modifications have given our Constitution a flexibility that has fitted it to the dynamic nature of our society.

Statute law refers to the various acts passed by local, state, and national legislative bodies. Statute law must defer to constitutional law. However, our legislative bodies do not search the Constitution for a specific grant of power to enact particular statutes. The courts have ruled that if the power is there by implication then the statute may be considered constitutional.

But statute law and constitutional law do not cover every possible situation. This does not mean that a legal void exists. Many instances are covered by long established customs and usages that have become so rigid and fixed that they are recognized as legally binding and are known as *common law.* This gives us a level of law that is part of our judicial system but subordinate to constitutional and statute law.

In the days before constitutions and parliamentary bodies and formal systems of law, these customs and usages were the principal source of reference for decisions handed out by "judges." These men were often elders in the community or other dignitaries respected for their wisdom and fairness. Once a decision was made, it then became the basis for future decisions in similar cases. Thus in the areas where no statutory provisions were applicable, these customs and usages emerged as legally binding. Even today, where there are no statutory provisions to cover the situation, these common law principles are recognized by our courts. It is therefore expected that once the common law has been so recognized by a court, it shall be followed in all similar cases involving situations where existing statute law is not relevant. The legal principle for this close adherence to the precedent of earlier decisions is known as *stare decisis.*

It is not to be construed that only in common law does this principle apply. Common law is non-statutory precedent and comes into application only where there is no statute to cover the case in question. *Stare decisis* is also a major principle adhered to in helping courts decide how statute and constitutional law should be applied. Similar cases that have been decided by the courts in the past are studied for their relevancy and application to the question at hand. It makes the decision of judges of higher courts binding not only on all lower courts in the same judicial system, but also on their successors in the higher court.

The use of precedent, of course, insures greater consistency in making, applying, and interpreting law. If each case were decided independently, confusion would result and the degree of uncertainty would be considerably higher. Statutory precedent takes supremacy over non-statutory precedent or common law.

In addition to this classification based on rank, law may also be

grouped according to the specific field it deals with, such as property law, contract law, criminal law, equity law, maritime law, and the like.

The structure of our judicial system. Article III of the Constitution states that the "judicial powers of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."

The Supreme Court has come to occupy a unique position in our belief system. Since it is the "court of last resort" with final power to interpret our basic document, the Constitution, it has become an almost sacred institution. So deep seated is our belief in the sanctity of the Supreme Court that at various times in our history, when certain strong presidents have tried to bring pressure to bear on the Court or have proposed "packing the Court" with new and additional appointments, the public has reacted very strongly. One of the most famous of these attempts came in 1937 when President Roosevelt sought to reorganize the Court by asking Congress to pass legislation that, among other things, required compulsory retirement for justices at age seventy. The Court had invalidated a number of key New Deal acts. Roosevelt charged that the Court must be modernized in keeping with modern problems of government. But the President suffered what was probably the greatest political defeat of his career when the people and Congress, ignoring party lines, came to the vigorous defense of the "nine old men" and defeated the proposal.

Theoretically the Supreme Court is supposed to be above politics. To try and insure this feature, the Constitution provided for life tenure for the justices of the Court, hoping to free them from any pressure that might influence their decision-making.

But the theory has not worked out as planned. The economic and political philosophy of the men on the court is bound to be reflected in their decisions. And there are political overtones to appointments made to fill vacancies that occur on the Court. No President, Republican or Democrat, will appoint a man to the Supreme Court who will not be sympathetic to the political program the President has adopted. Furthermore, the Supreme Court does not deliberate in a vacuum sealed off from all the political winds that blow. The justices are subject to the will of the people to the extent that public pressure would not long tolerate a Court, sacred or no, whose decisions consistently thwarted their wishes.

Political implications usually arise in connection with those Court decisions involving the constitutionality of a law or the definition and

interpretation of a generally worded law. The best example is to be seen in the famous "rule of reason" decision respecting the Sherman Anti-trust Act. This statute, passed in 1890, stated that combinations in restraint of trade were illegal. The Court was subsequently asked to rule on a case brought by the government against the Standard Oil Company for violating the Act. The Court, in arriving at its decision, defined a combination in restraint of trade as "illegal" only if it were an "unreasonable" combination. The implications of the word "unreasonable" are many and varied, and thus the effectiveness of the law was lessened considerably by courts that were hostile to the principle of government regulation in the first place.

The Supreme Court has both original and appellate jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction refers to those cases that may be tried in the first instance before the Court. The Constitution gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in "all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party." Appellate jurisdiction pertains to those cases that are carried on appeal from lower federal courts or the highest state courts to the Supreme Court for decision. The majority of the work of the Court involves appellate cases.

If the Supreme Court had to pass on all cases from the lower federal courts or from the highest state courts, however, it would still be deciding cases that had arisen decades ago. The Court will decide cases carried on appeal from the highest state courts only if a constitutional interpretation or a federal law or treaty is involved, and only if its decision on such a point is essential to settling the case. If the state court declares a federal law or treaty unconstitutional or upholds a state law against the charge that it conflicts with a federal law or treaty or the Constitution, the Supreme Court must review the case if petitioned by the individual who has received the adverse opinion in the case. In all other questions involving federal questions, however, the petitioner has only the right to ask for a writ of *certiorari,* an order to the state court to hand over the records of the case. But the Supreme Court will not grant a writ unless at least four justices think that the question is of sufficient public interest to warrant their attention.

The Court will review cases from *lower federal courts* only if such a court has struck down a state law contrary to federal law, treaty, or the Constitution and then only if the petitioner's writ of *certiorari* has been approved. The Court refuses about 80 per cent of all petitions for writs, basing their decisions upon the same public interest principle described in the preceding paragraph.

In arriving at a decision, a majority of the Court must concur. It has

become customary to file with the decision a long documentary opinion showing the legal logic behind the decision. Those judges not concurring also may file a dissenting opinion in which they set forth their reasons for disagreeing. Sometimes these dissenting opinions are extremely important in influencing later decisions, and many in time become accepted as the law. In the event that a tie vote results (six justices must be present to hear a case), the Court may order the case re-argued or it may merely let the decision of the lower court stand.

One of the most difficult decisions that the Court is periodically called upon to make is one involving the famous "due process of law" clause. This clause appears in the Fifth Amendment where it applies to the national government and again in the Fourteenth Amendment where it applies to state governments. The clause states that no person may be "deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." It has become one of the great guarantees of liberty, but nowhere is it clearly defined. As a result, each case involving due process must be tried on its own merits. Due process may be applied in a *procedural* sense: that is, a decision is made determining whether or not the methods used to deprive a person of the rights mentioned previously were proper and legal. Or it may be applied in a *substantive* sense in respect to the nature of the control itself over persons and property. This latter interpretation means that the Court considers the "rightness or fairness" of the control being exercised by the law in question. In the minds of the judges, due process is not only a matter of procedural correctness, but also a matter of evaluation of the nature of the control. If the policy is considered fair and just and the procedures followed are deemed correct, then there is no cause for throwing out the law. But though the procedural steps may be in order, an unjust or unfair control over a person or his property violates the concept of due process of law and is therefore an illegal invasion of his rights to life, liberty, and property. Since this precedent has forced the judges to evaluate the nature of the control itself, the political implications are tremendous. It has made the court the final judge of the reasonableness of laws. As applied to property rights, this substantive interpretation of "due process" has given the Court great economic power.

Congress, under its constitutional power, has established a system of lower federal courts. At the base are the district courts. The great bulk of federal cases are heard in the 84 district courts in this country and in the territorial district courts in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Alaska, and the Virgin Islands. District courts have original jurisdiction—they hear and decide cases firsthand that involve disputes between citizens of different states, crimes against the United States, suits brought under federal laws,

and suits to justify civil rights. District judges also supervise the management of bankrupt companies.

The circuit courts of appeals, unlike the district courts, have only appellate jurisdiction. These courts review most of the cases that are appealed from the district courts and oversee some of the activities of important governmental agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission.

The task of prosecuting persons accused of violating federal laws falls to the Department of Justice, more specifically to the Attorney General and to the many United States attorneys and assistant attorneys throughout the country. United States attorneys also help initiate civil actions for the government.

In addition to the Supreme Court, the district courts, and the courts of appeals, mention also should be made of the various legislative courts Congress has created to carry out federal government functions associated with customs, patents, and the like. Important government agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission also hear and decide cases and exercise what virtually amounts to judicial powers.

The federal courts are not superior to the state courts. Although federal courts enjoy exclusive jurisdiction in some areas, there are other areas in which the state courts are supreme. And in some cases the state courts and federal courts have equal jurisdiction.

Controversies and differences among individuals and among governments are inevitable. In order to safeguard the rights of individuals and to perpetuate our federal system of government we have established courts to arbitrate these differences. Equal justice impartially administered by the courts of the land is a fundamental belief of the American people.

But we have already noted that judges do not operate in a political vacuum. They are human beings subject to all the pains, pleasures, frustrations, and biases that other people have. Every judge brings to the bench his own philosophy of life and his own political opinions, and the decisions he hands down will reflect them. Our belief in impartial justice for all has not always found actual expression. Organized labor in its infancy, for example, hardly enjoyed the benefit of impartial justice from the courts. Extreme critics of our governmental system hold that equal justice is available—if you have the money to pay for it. Where is equal justice, they ask, in a situation where one party can afford the finest legal talent in the country to present his case, while his opponent can barely hire a lawyer at all? They also point out that few individuals can afford to defend their rights if a long drawn-out

case is in prospect; that superior wealth eventually determines who shall receive "justice," in such a case.

Both these charges are extreme. There are many who worry over the independence the judiciary enjoys. In the long run, however, the courts must adapt themselves to public opinion, to the demands of the people, or face the prospect of being destroyed. It is true that political pressures may often influence a court decision or series of decisions, but the very fact that our courts are not wholly immune to outside influences forces them to keep an eye on the state of opinion prevalent in the nation and to adapt to it accordingly. And the political majority can bring its weight to bear on the judiciary through the selection of judges by popularly elected presidents and senators.

29

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENTS

The Executive

The delegates to the Constitutional Convention were faced with a difficult problem when it came to setting up the executive branch of government. It seemed apparent to many that the executive should be strong enough to guarantee stability and vitality to the new government. But just how strong should the executive be? Executive tyranny had already caused one revolution in the colonies. A compromise was finally worked out. The President was given powers to administer the laws and formulate policy but was also surrounded by an elaborate system of checks and balances. Some of these checks were discussed in the preceding chapter. The President was given veto power over acts of Con-


gress, but Congress could override the veto. His appointments were made subject to senatorial approval. And his powers issued only indirectly from the people, for he was to be chosen by a complicated electoral arrangement. We have already seen that in spite of these precautions more and more power has accrued to the Executive Department through the years. It now remains for us to look a bit more closely at the actual operation of this branch of government.

Under our Constitutional system, we do not vote directly for presidential candidates. We cast our ballots instead for presidential electors, allotted to each state on the basis of congressional representation. These electors then assemble in December following the November elections and vote for the various candidates. The electors so named may theoretically vote for anyone they choose, but the force of custom insures that they will vote for the candidate of their own party. There are no split electoral votes from a state. A popular plurality for one candidate in a given state means that all the electoral votes of that state go to him. This situation prompts candidates to concentrate their campaign efforts on the big, closely divided states. The popular plurality rule also means that it is possible for a candidate to win an election though he does not receive a majority of the popular votes cast. For example, in 1860 Lincoln received only 40 per cent of the popular vote yet he emerged the victor by winning the electoral votes of every northern state. The successful candidate may show a tremendous margin in the electoral college count though the popular vote may be quite close. In the event that no candidate receives the necessary majority of the electoral votes, the election is thrown into the House of Representatives, which then votes by states for President.


In January following the election, the President and Vice President are sworn into office. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court administers the oath of office in a colorful ceremony on the steps of the Capitol. In his inaugural address, the President outlines in broad general terms what the policies and goals of his administration will be.

Unlike the premier or prime minister in a parliamentary system, the President of the United States remains in office for a fixed term of four years, after which he may seek re-election for one more term only. In the parliamentary system, the chief executive remains in office only so long as he can command a majority in the legislative branch of government, for it is assumed that the parliament accurately reflects the will of the people. Thus the prime minister and his cabinet must resign at any time parliament gives them an adverse vote. This feature has the advantage of making the chief executive and the administration particularly sensitive to changing public opinion.


I. UNITED STATES: PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM WITH JUDICIAL REVIEW




II. GREAT BRITAIN: TWO-PARTY CABINET SYSTEM



III. FRANCE: MULTI-PARTY CABINET SYSTEM




IV. SWITZERLAND: CONCILIAR EXECUTIVE SYSTEM




SEPARATIONS OF POWER

Arrows show checks. Capitals indicate popular election.


I. A UNITARY STATE (the usual arrangement, e.g. Chile, France, Japan)



II. A Federation (e.g. The United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia)



III. A Confederation (e.g. The United Nations)



GEOGRAPHIC ARRANGEMENTS OF POWER

Either a unitary state or a federation may be called a state. Constituent states in two federations, the United States and Australia, are also referred to as states. A confederation consists of governments of states but is not itself a state.

The parliamentary system works well if there are only two strong parties dominating the political scene. But if several major parties are contending for control, none strong enough to command a majority in itself, every administration must form a coalition of all parties in order to command a majority and to govern. Often the balance of power will reside with one small group whose defection on any one issue will cause the government to fall. This political tight-rope walking results in

frequent changes in government and makes it very difficult to name a new premier who can get support for his policies from the many diverse elements in the parliament. France is a good example of this unstable governmental situation.

Organization and Powers of the Executive Branch

The President of the United States is assisted by both a formal and informal set of advisors. He chooses a Cabinet to head up the various departments of the executive branch of government, and usually surrounds himself with unofficial advisors—his staff—each chosen for his competence in some particular field. The Cabinet members not only administer their respective departments, but also serve in an advisory capacity to the President. With his approval, they may also set policies in their departments. Their status is fixed by custom and the will of the President; the Constitution does not mention a cabinet. Members of our Cabinet are not members of Congress; in the parliamentary system they are. Should the Secretary of Agriculture, for example, desire to see a particular bill become law, he cannot (as is permitted a cabinet member in the parliamentary system) actually support it in debate on the floor of the House or Senate. American cabinet members must work through senators and representatives chosen for their leadership and for their support of the President and his administration.

The President's Cabinet is ordinarily made up of members of his own political party. However, in times of crisis, such as during a major war, the Cabinet may be reorganized to permit members of the opposition party to hold important positions. This is done in the interests of political unity. In World War II, President Roosevelt, a Democrat, named Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, two prominent Republicans, to positions in his Cabinet.

Various Presidents have had different conceptions of their roles as policy-makers. Some conceived their role to be that of a vigorous leader proposing and carrying through policy. Men like Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson, and the two Roosevelts were typical of this group. Others, like Harding and Coolidge, saw themselves merely as administrators or "business managers" of government, and were content to carry out the policies and wishes initiated and carried through by Congress.

The power and prestige of the presidential office make it the most sought after political position in the land. A President's power turns on

constitutional, political, and psychological factors, as we shall see in the pages that follow.

Foreign relations. A number of factors have consolidated the President's position as the chief formulator and conductor of foreign policy. He has, for example, access to a great variety of information sources. A steady stream of reports from diplomatic missions abroad, from domestic and foreign agents of the government, from specialized agencies, and from numerous other channels pour into his office daily to be analyzed by State Department experts. When the President speaks, he does so with an authority buttressed by this impressive informational background. In addition, much diplomacy must be conducted with speed, and the President can act swiftly, much more swiftly than Congress can, for example. Finally, diplomacy must frequently be conducted in secret and the President can act secretly.

Naturally the President does not act as a completely free agent in the conduct of foreign affairs. He works through his Secretary of State and with the respective foreign relations committees of the two houses of Congress. Occasionally Congress has tried more forcibly to enter the foreign policy picture. One outstanding example was the passage of the neutrality legislation of the 1930's that seriously limited the President in his actions with respect to our rights as a neutral nation. Another more recent attempt is the Bricker Amendment, which would control the treaty-making powers of the President.

The foreign policy powers of the President are such that he can often create a situation that forces a reluctant Congress to go along with him on a particular policy. Theodore Roosevelt sent the United States Navy on its famous world cruise early in the twentieth century, well knowing that naval appropriations for that year were not sufficient to finance the trip. He also knew, however, that Congress would not leave the navy stranded on the other side of the world. Faced with this fact, Congress had no alternative but to vote additional money. The President, as Commander-in-chief, can also order the disposition of armed forces to various places merely to implement his foreign policy. In so doing, he can actually "make" a war, though only Congress can "declare" war.

In addition to formulating policy, the President is empowered to make treaties "with the advice and consent of the Senate." The ratification of a treaty, usually a long tedious process, requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate. In recent years, executive agreements have become increasingly popular as a means of by-passing the Senate under certain

conditions. An executive agreement is simply an act of the President not calling for Senate-House participation. Though these agreements are assumed to be binding on the existing administration only, they frequently commit the succeeding executive to a particular policy. One of the more famous executive agreements in recent times was the so-called "Destroyer-Bases Agreement" of September, 1940. By executive agreement, President Roosevelt acquired from Great Britain the right to lease and build naval and air bases in various British possessions in the western Atlantic in return for 50 of our over-age destroyers. Of course, executive agreements may be disapproved by Congress, but if they are not they have the same legal validity as treaties.

The President also appoints ambassadors and ministers to represent our nation in foreign capitals, and he receives the credentials of the ambassadors sent to this country from foreign nations. Allied with this power is the President's complete discretion to break off relations with or accord recognition to foreign governments.

In the event of war, the President may ask Congress to declare a state of war to exist. Actually modern wars usually begin without a formal declaration. Hence, Congress' jealous guarding of its power to declare war is largely an academic formality. We were at war with Japan the moment Pearl Harbor was attacked on December 7, 1941, although the official declaration that war existed did not come until the following day. During times of war or grave national emergency, Congress may see fit to grant the President broad emergency powers to facilitate action when time is short and quick decision is essential.

A person might assume from the preceding paragraphs that checks and balances do not operate in the foreign policy sphere. It should be remembered, however, that much of the President's power depends upon his ability to persuade Congress to approve—or at least finance—his program.

Patronage. The power of patronage or the appointive power is one of the prizes for which political parties contend. Although a large segment of the governmental bureaucracy is under the merit system, practically all policy determining positions are appointive. Thus the victorious party expects to fill these positions with deserving party members through presidential appointment. Since senatorial approval is required for major appointments, it has become customary for the President to consult with party leaders in the Senate concerning possible federal appointees. This is particularly true if the federal position happens to be in the home state of the senator or if the possible appointee resides in the senator's state. "Senatorial courtesy" is observed in permitting the

senators of a given state to virtually name to the President the individual whom the Senators wish to receive the appointment. Rarely is anyone appointed and approved by the Senate if the appointee is personally displeasing to a senator from that state.

Patronage is very important to both political parties, because through it they can strengthen and consolidate their positions among the voters. More often than not, political expediency dominates the choice of appointees.

Administration of the law. The Constitution charges the Executive Department with the responsibility of seeing to it that the laws are "faithfully" executed. This places the President at the head of a vast bureaucracy geared to the administration of law and the carrying out of the multiple functions of government. Since the President cannot possibly be familiar with all the details involved in our many-sided government, he must rely heavily on the advice and suggestions of department heads and other subordinates. He must see that the various departments within the Executive Branch cooperate and function with as little friction as possible. On many an occasion the President may play the role of an arbiter.

Bureaucracy tends to characterize the administration of law. This is the inevitable result of the growing multiplicity of governmental functions. The President today heads an establishment of about 2 ½ million employees, working in approximately 1,900 departments, agencies, and bureaus located in this country and abroad. And once established, governmental bureaus tend to entrench themselves even at the expense of other departments or agencies. This makes reorganization of the Executive Department particularly difficult to achieve. No department head or his staff wish to be consolidated with another department, even though such an arrangement might be more efficient.

The red tape involved in dealings with governmental agencies is at once a source of frustration and of humor. To the man in the street, governmental agencies and their procedures seem unnecessarily involved and complicated. In fact, it sometimes seems that some governmental agencies are more interested in maintaining the "system" than they are in providing the service for which they were originally established. Efficiency is sometimes equated with the maintenance of certain mechanical operations of the agency rather than with the degree of effectiveness with which the agency performs its function and achieves its objectives. At times it would seem that the mimeograph, the typewriter, and the printing press are the most indispensable products of our technology when it comes to governmental administration.

The rules and regulations, the forms and blanks that must be filled out in triplicate, and the procedural requirements in most government agencies are enough to stagger the imagination. It takes pages and pages of specifications for the government to order ping pong balls for recreation centers for the armed services. Yet the system functions. This is perhaps because of the characteristics of bureaucratic relationships themselves. It is the informal-personal relationships existing within and alongside the formal bureaucratic structure that make the complex machinery function. It is not being facetious to say that the most important people in Washington to know are the secretaries. They can cut across and through the red tape to get something done, and then for the sake of the record send you the forms and blanks to fill out later. Mabel in the Department of Agriculture can call up her friend Maizie in the Department of Interior and find out in a matter of minutes how many acres of government parks are in grasslands. It would take weeks to receive the information formally "through channels."

The bureaucracy is an integral part of the executive branch of any government and in many respects provides administrative continuity in the face of periodic political changes.

The President and his relations with Congress. We have already seen in the preceding chapter how the constitutional principle of checks and balances operates between the Executive and Legislative departments. Checks and balances involves a blending of power, giving each department some responsibility for the other's functions and some control over its actions. Thus, not all legislative power resides in Congress. The President can influence legislation both directly and indirectly.

The Constitution states that the President shall "from time to time give to the Congress information of the State of the Union and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." It has been customary for the President to present his State of the Union message at the opening of Congress following its organizational meetings. In this address he reviews the national situation, calls attention to particular areas such as public health or civil rights that he believes warrant attention, and outlines his program, recommending the legislation that he believes essential to accomplish that program. The influence that the President has in thus outlining a program for Congress to follow is considerable.

Should a piece of legislation be proposed in Congress to which the President is opposed, he may bring to bear all the prestige of his office to prevent its passage. In 1916, for example, Woodrow Wilson used all the power and influence of the Executive Department to prevent the

passage of a resolution in Congress that would have seriously hampered his conduct of foreign relations. Franklin Roosevelt was a master at using his personal popularity and the prestige of his office to control Congress. President Eisenhower brought all guns to bear to beat down a congressional attempt to force through a tax cut in the 1953 session of Congress when he deemed the action to be ill advised.

The power of the President also places him in an excellent bargaining position. No member of Congress would appreciate administration disapproval of some particular pet measure of his. Hence, in return for the administration's approval of a congressman's bill, or at least its consent not to fight it, the President can often get that congressman's support of the administration's position for or against some other proposal. Another reason Congress often goes along with the President's wishes is that it fears that if Congress does not act, the President will.

Pressure can be brought to bear by the President through informal contacts at White House luncheons or teas. An invitation to a conference in a sort of man-to-man get together at the White House is also used as a device to put across the administration's views.

By virtue of being head of his party, the President also wields great influence over his party colleagues in Congress. He is consulted concerning various party appointments such as the national committee chairmanship; and the fact that he is a successful vote getter, that many of his fellow party members in Congress "rode into office on his coattails," gives him a certain advantage in lining up congressional support for his policies. No congressman wants to face a re-election fight under the weight of administration disapproval.

The President's powerful influence on public opinion may also effectively promote or prevent congressional action. If the President holds office by virtue of a personal victory rather than a party victory, he is in an especially good position to "crack the whip" over recalcitrant congressmen. He can go to the people via the press, radio, and television and crystallize enough sentiment for or against a particular measure to bring Congress effectively into line.

Although the President constantly makes use of these informal devices to carry out policy or prevent action he deems unwise, he always holds in reserve the formal weapon of the veto. In many cases the mere threat of veto may be sufficient to kill a proposal. Congress respects the power of the President and it is aware of the difficulties involved in obtaining the necessary two-thirds vote in both houses to override his veto. As long as Congress remains in session, the President must act one way or another on all measures submitted to him. He has three courses of action open to him: (1) He may sign the bill; (2) He may allow it

to become law without his signature; or (3) He may veto it. If he vetoes it, he returns the bill to the House in which it originated, usually stating his reasons for turning it down. On the other hand, if Congress has in the meantime adjourned, the President may allow the measure to die simply by failing to sign it. This is known as a "pocket veto."

The President can also exert pronounced pressure on Congress by calling them into special session for a specific purpose. Only the President has the power to convene the legislative body in special session. He may announce his intention of calling a special session some time in advance, and announce his reasons for doing so, thus preparing the stage so that the voters know what he is expecting from Congress. Then having alerted public opinion, he calls Congress into session and confronts them with a proposal on which the people have already had time to take a position.

Of course, the checks and balances system and other factors operate to modify the President's powers; none are absolute. If Congress can mobilize enough strength to override a presidential veto, for example, it can virtually take over control of the government, provided the opposing coalition can be maintained for any length of time. And just as the President can act to ward off legislation he thinks will be damaging, so Congress can maneuver to lessen the likelihood of a presidential veto. The usual practice is to attach riders—unimportant measures—to important pieces of legislation. Even though the President may find the rider personally distasteful, he must accept it or in vetoing it lose the important legislation as well. Also, no President has ever been able to control his party completely; he has little voice in naming local and congressional candidates, for example. Even the President's patronage power—the power of appointment that makes the office so attractive politically—must wait upon senatorial confirmation. Usually senatorial consent is readily forthcoming, although a recent controversy over the Secretary of Defense's financial holdings in a large corporation holding defense contracts from the government caused considerable argument before the appointment was approved. And, as already noted, individual senators have the final say on important federal appointments in their home states. If the senator opposes the candidate or if he has not been consulted beforehand on the choice for office, the Senate will almost always reject the appointment.

Other aspects of the Presidency. The office of the President of the United States involves far more than a legalistic-mechanical setup for carrying out the various powers and functions described in the preceding pages. There is another side to this office that, although not structured

in the Constitution, is of particular importance in understanding the Presidency and the Executive Department. The President is a politician.

The President is the head of his political party. He is therefore interested in maintaining his party in power, and to accomplish this goal he must maintain a working relationship with the people. He wields great influence among the other leaders of his party. Thus he is "Mr. Democrat," or "Mr. Republican," as the case may be.

This identification places the President in a position fraught with great possibilities for success and accomplishment on one hand, defeat and failure on the other. One essential characteristic of the relationship between the President and the people is that *the people hold him personally responsible for whatever occurs during his term of office.* For example, if the Secretary of State places the United States in an awkward position in foreign affairs, it is the President who must bear the brunt of the blame in the minds of the people. If the bottom drops out of the stock market, or if farm prices begin to fall rapidly, it is the President who is responsible. Herbert Hoover has been identified for years in the minds of many as the author of the Great Depression of the 1930's. On the other hand, if trends are prosperous, the people tend to credit the President with bringing about this pleasant state of affairs. And the President, being a politician, naturally claims credit for it, too. His party does all that it can to remind the people of this connection. The 1952 Democratic national convention theme song "Don't Let Them Take It Away" or the slogan, "You never had it so good," are examples of this technique.

When a foreign or domestic calamity occurs, the party in power tries to break the connection between their party and the unpleasant state of affairs. Actually it makes very little difference whether the administration can take credit or must share the blame realistically. What the people believe is the important thing. No amount of careful analysis of economic trends could erase what the people thought about the responsibility for the depression of the 1930's. By the same token, volumes of logic and statistics have little effect on the thinking of the people when the opposition party tries to detract from the credit being assumed by the incumbent administration. The President continually walks a tightrope of public opinion.

Another side of this relationship with the people is the tremendous number of ceremonial and symbolic duties that Americans expect the President to perform. Conscious of the implications for his own political future, the President finds time for many of these demands above and beyond the call of constitutional duty. In a given day, he may be photographed purchasing the first Crippled Children's seal, greeting a

delegation of clubwomen from Iowa, and throwing out the first ball to open the major league baseball season. Often these activities may be part of a planned effort to have the President live up to the image that was created of him during the campaign. But also involved is the tendency of the people to rely upon him. People must believe in something or somebody, must have something or someone to whom they can turn for comfort and assurance in times of stress and confusion. In America, the President has become a political protector, the living symbol of an otherwise impersonal governmental authority, reflecting a deep longing on the part of the people for a leader. The very fact that his powers are flexible makes him better able to fill that role.

The Lawmaker and the Legislative Process

Who are our congressmen? It is hard to describe a "typical" senator or representative. Studies of the personnel of various congresses have been made, however, and their findings all reflect the same general characteristics. The "average" congressman (there are very few women in Congress) is middle-aged. He probably has had some college education; a considerable number of congressmen have earned professional degrees. Law is the most frequently listed occupation of our congressmen; business, banking, teaching and agriculture are represented in appreciable numbers. Labor is rarely listed as an occupation.

Most congressmen have had some previous political experience, either in Congress itself or at the state and local level. Except when a major shift in political sentiment occurs, the same men are returned election after election. One representative from a midwestern state was returned to Congress for 17 years but not once did he ever make a speech or participate in a floor debate.

In recent years, an increasing percentage of our congressmen have had some military service. A majority indicate a Protestant affiliation followed in order, though in much smaller proportion, by members of the Catholic and Jewish faiths. Negroes have had little representation in Congress from members of their own race. The few Negroes who have been elected have represented large northern industrial cities.

Some senators and representatives become so prominent that they are sometimes referred to as "national" congressmen. So secure are they in their position that they are consistently re-elected more on the basis of their national record than for what they do specifically for their home

constituencies. The late Robert Taft of Ohio and Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan were such men. Senators and representatives reflect the political orientation of the states they represent. In areas where sentiment on certain critical questions is fairly evenly divided, the men chosen may represent opposite sides of the issue. In numerous instances a given state has sent both a liberal and a conservative senator to Washington.

Why do congressmen vote as they do? Every congressman incurs a number of obligations. High on the list is the debt he owes to his constituents—the people who elected him and who anticipate that he will vote without prejudice to them or to the district or state he represents. Of course, it is impossible for a congressman to know exactly what the wishes of all the people who voted for him will be or even who his particular supporters are. Public sentiment is always changing and some of the people who voted for him today may be opposing him tomorrow. But the voters will keep him in office or turn him out. The congressman must always keep one ear cocked for prevailing political sentiments "back home" and try to accommodate his voting record to district or state sentiment insofar as possible.

Some of the congressman's most effective support during a campaign may have come from a particular interest group—farm, management, labor. These groups are interested primarily in legislation that touches upon them and the interests of their members directly. In return for their endorsement, these groups expect the congressman to vote favorably for bills that will confer benefits upon their members. And the congressman, especially if not too much is involved in the issue, will frequently go along with the wishes of the group. Interest groups keep a sharp eye on the voting records of members of Congress and before elections some of them publish the names of those lawmakers whose voting records are unacceptable to them. These lists are widely circulated, especially in the senator's or representative's home state or district.

At this point it might be well to take a closer look at the workings of pressure groups and lobbying activities. Lobbying is the means employed by special interests to influence the decision of legislators on matters of policy. If the amount of money spent on lobbying is any indication of its effectiveness, it evidently influences the votes of many congressmen. Lobbying is popularly regarded as undemocratic or irresponsible. This may be true in some cases, but congressmen often find that lobbyists can be quite helpful in supplying vital facts and statistics that would require weeks to dig from government files. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 now requires lobbyists to register with the Clerk of

the House and Secretary of the Senate. Paid lobbyists must file reports showing the names of all contributors to these activities and the amounts given.

In addition to his constituents and the various interest groups, the congressman is also obligated to those party leaders and to those friends who worked most closely with him during his campaign. Party leaders will expect as their reward favors and patronage. And the congressman will be careful to avoid antagonizing the friends and associates who contributed most to his victory. It may be that his control of patronage will be limited, but he will have a few jobs to dispense and he will be approached from all sides by people eager to fill them.

Then, of course, the national party must be satisfied; it looms more and more important as the candidate's national prestige increases. A congressman who is out for bigger and better things must establish himself as a "party regular" on most important issues if he hopes for national party support on his climb up the political ladder. A congressman who has established a national reputation and is beginning to bloom as a presidential prospect or a likely candidate for other high national office will vote in such a way as to consolidate further his national position. Local constituents, although they may not always agree with the way their congressman is voting, will still support him largely as a matter of local pride.

The way a congressman votes will also be influenced by his own political beliefs and ideals. He may believe, for example, that the voice of business should be curbed in the halls of Congress or that the growth of federal power should be halted. Or he may look upon himself as a political maverick, an independent, who will weigh all issues in each case carefully before casting his vote for or against a resolution.

At various times in our history, charges of graft and corruption have been leveled at Congress. The voting record of some representatives has been influenced by bonuses or chances of personal gain that would accrue to them upon passage of a particular measure. The famous Crédit Mobilier scandal associated with the construction of the Union Pacific Railroad just after the Civil War revealed that numerous congressmen stood to gain financially through grants of government aid for railroad construction. In general, however, few congressmen have been willing to sell their power for personal gain.

In all fairness, we should look at the problem of voting through the eyes of the congressman. Our national legislators frequently find themselves in the age-old dilemma of trying to please all the people all the time. Therefore, most congressmen vote a sort of middle of the road course. If they do not have deep seated convictions against a proposal

or their constituents are not particularly concerned one way or the other, they go along with their party's position in the interest of party unity. If they definitely feel that the proposal is an unwise move both from a practical and a political point of view, they will probably vote their convictions. On other occasions a legislator may simply follow the wishes of his constituents in a given instance even though it may be against his better judgment. To repeat, the congressman's vote is usually influenced by the effect it will have upon the voters back home.

Congressional sessions. The plan of representation in Congress represents a compromise. The Founding Fathers chose to combine equal representation with proportional representation. The small states had held out for equal representation, contending that only in such a system could they save themselves from being dominated by the larger states. The larger states urged proportional representation on the grounds that they deserved a greater voice in government by virtue of their size and population. Both ideas are to be seen in our Congress; equal representation is the rule in the Senate and proportional representation governs the House of Representatives. This compromise necessitated the establishment of a bicameral or two-house legislature. Although the original intent of the framers seems to have been that a bicameral setup would provide a system whereby the Senate could check the actions of the House of Representatives, in actual practice this has ceased to be the case. The two Houses are remarkably similar; contrary to general impression, the Senate does not appear to be more conservative and deliberative than the House.

Congress is required to meet once a year. Thus "a congress" is considered organized for the two years between elections. A congress comprises a "first session," which begins in January following the November elections and a "second session," which meets the following January. Congresses are numbered according to the number of organized congresses that have convened since the founding of the government under the present Constitution. Thus the 1949-1950 Congress was the 81st, the 1951-1952, the 82nd, and the 1953-1954, the 83rd Congress. Each session of Congress tries to complete their business in time for a summer recess. In times of war or other emergency, Congress may stay in session almost continuously.

The second session of a congress is usually strongly oriented toward politics. All members of the House of Representatives are up for re-election as are one-third of the Senators. Hence this session is often conducted with an eye toward the coming elections. Unpopular legislation like an increase in taxes or lowering of the draft age would never be

proposed if at all avoidable during an election year session. And, as might be expected, some very essential but potentially unpopular measures are by-passed in the interests of political expediency. Proposals for cutting taxes, lowering the federal budget, bonuses for veterans, and the like, often come to the fore in an election year congress. Whether such proposals become law or not, congressmen can at least go home and tell their constituents that they tried to have them passed.

The second session is relatively short. By a sort of gentlemen's agreement, Congress usually winds up its work early to enable its members to get home and mend their political fences. To be sure, the lawmakers have not ignored their constituents while Congress has been meeting. They constantly try to keep their names before the public. They may ask that "extension of remarks" be granted so that "speeches" of theirs may be placed in the Congressional Record. Then they may distribute reprints of the speeches to their constituents. And while he is in Washington, the congressman acts as a sort of official welcoming agent to visiting homefolks.

Frequent visits home are always in order. The lawmaker's office staff is kept busy writing replies to letters from the voters back home. One congressman kept his name before his constituents by sending back a recorded message to a local radio station every week. He usually started out his recording in a folksy sort of way such as "Hello there, John, I was glad to get some news about you from a friend of yours this week." Every "John" in the district would swell with pride at the thought that his congressman remembered him and make a mental note to vote for him come election time.

Organization of Congress. The internal organization of the national legislature is determined by that body itself. The Congress is organized for a two-year period. Because many senators and representatives are returned to Washington session after session, the job of organization frequently amounts to filling vacancies or moving members from one committee to another as they gain seniority privileges.

The members of the Congress caucus by party just prior to the first session and select their slate of officers and appointments for the various committees. Since the advent of political parties, the Speaker of the House has been chosen from among the prominent members of the majority party. The office of Speaker is a very influential position. As presiding officer, he serves as a formal, nonpartisan chairman, but because he is a powerful figure in his party he may exert considerable pressure on his party colleagues. His power of recognition is an important instrument of his role, though custom dictates that he shall

not be overly partisan in giving the floor to members of his own party.

The Speaker does not, by virtue of his office, forfeit his right to represent his state and his own constituents. He may leave the chair to participate in debate on the floor if he so desires, and he also retains his right to vote as an ordinary congressman. Since the Speaker does not regularly engage in floor debates, whenever he does choose to make a speech his influence is considerable.

Over in the Senate, the Vice President of the United States presides. Since he does not represent the choice of his colleagues but holds his position automatically, he does not ordinarily exert very much influence. If he was once a senator himself, he may serve as a major liaison between the President and the Senate. In such a situation, his influence may be considerable. As President of the Senate he cannot participate in debate, and he may vote only to break a voting deadlock. When the Vice President travels on official business, the Senate elects one of its own members as temporary chairman.

Committees. The extensive use of committees is a major characteristic of the American legislative process. It is here that the partisan nature of the organization of Congress is to be most clearly seen. Each party has a Committee on Committees that determines the membership on the standing committees. The ratio of party membership for each committee is first determined by the majority party; it corresponds roughly to the over-all ratio in the respective Houses. The question is sometimes asked, "If the Republicans control Congress, why do they allot places for Democrats on the committees?" The answer rests in the force of precedent and the value we place on the right of minorities to be heard. The majority party always retains a majority of the positions on committees in order to ensure the enactment of its policies and to provide leadership in legislation. The committee chairmanships are also always in the hands of the majority party.

Because of the nature of the legislation they handle, certain major standing committees—finance, appropriations, foreign affairs—are more important than others. The rule of seniority determines in large measure what senator or representative will be named to these committees. Seniority is a sacred rule even though at times it results in a somewhat awkward situation. For example, in the organization of the 83rd Congress in 1953 many southern Democrats who had long been in office were able, by virtue of seniority, to represent their party on the more important committees. Yet many of these same southern Democrats had bolted their party and had supported General Eisenhower in the November elections. Thus the Democrats who had remained loyal to their

party and candidate found that the men chosen to represent them on the major committees had not even supported the Democratic Party platform nor its candidate. On other occasions, men of national prominence (but without seniority) are forced to give way to much lesser lights who have seniority.

Congressional committees are of three kinds: (1) permanent or standing committees that carry over from session to session (though the personnel may change and party control may be reversed), (2) joint committees containing members of both houses of Congress, and (3) special committees appointed for a specific period of time to handle particular problems. Many of the investigating committees fall into the latter category although some of them have become permanent committees.

The investigating activities of Congress have mushroomed far out of proportion to other committee functions in recent years. Corruption has been exposed, harmful stock practices uncovered, and other evils brought to light. Many congressmen have stepped from the chairmanship of investigating committees into the national political limelight. Senator Truman, head of the Truman Committee that probed into waste and inefficiency in World War II, became Vice President in 1944. Senator Estes Kefauver, chairman of the Senate Crime Investigating Committee, was a prominent contender for the presidential nomination on the Democratic ticket in 1952.

Some of the investigations have all the air of a carefully planned theatrical production. Under the glare of newsreel and television klieg lights, amidst the popping of flashbulbs of press photographers and the jostling of crowds in conference rooms, the committee seeks to conduct its hearings. But it is precisely in such publicity that the real danger of these investigations lies. Some Congressmen have been so eager to uncover something sensational that they have resorted to smear tactics and outright bullying and intimidation of witnesses. Others have gone off on wild tangents in the mere hope that something would turn up. There are many who are genuinely alarmed at the development. Proposals have ranged all the way from closer regulation of hearings to relieving Congress of their investigative functions completely. But the investigative function is indispensable to our form of government. Safeguards must be erected to keep the process fair and free of abuses. The mixed commission, exemplified by the Hoover Commission, has been suggested as a solution to the problem.

The Procedural Rules governing the House and Senate are carefully prescribed. They must allow the majority to carry out its function of formulating a legislative program and at the same time insure the minority's right to be heard.


In addition to the prescribed set of rules, there are a great variety of procedures that function along the lines of "gentlemen's agreements." This is particularly true with respect to the ways in which the prescribed rules will be applied and interpreted. Although it is feasible within the framework of the rules to force a bill out of committee for discussion on the floor, it is understood that the chairman of the committee in question has the right to hold the bill as long as he sees fit. In the 1953 session of the 83rd Congress, a tempest was stirred up when administration forces sought to force a bill out of the Ways and Means Committee in the House against the vehement opposition of the chairman. The division of opinion on the question cut across party lines as representatives opposing the move shouted that it violated precedent and custom and would reduce committee chairmanships to a minor position.

It has become customary to allow almost any procedure that will facilitate the legislative process to be employed, providing no member objects to it. In case of objection, the House or Senate can fall back on the prescribed rules. Anyone who has participated in a meeting where parliamentary rules are followed knows that the business at hand can be hopelessly tangled up by perfectly legitimate parliamentary maneuvers or by someone's insistence on following the rules to the letter. Sometimes the only way out is to agree unanimously to suspend the rules for the moment in order to get on with the business. Because the smooth functioning of the legislative process is so dependent upon a reasonable adherence to a set of rules, membership on the respective rules committees is a very important position.

Partisan offices. Partisan political offices in Congress function alongside the formal organizational framework. Through these positions, the political parties provide effective leadership and direction to what might otherwise be a disorganized debating society. Each party names a floor leader in each house who helps plan party strategy, confers with other party leaders, and tries to keep other party members in line. Assisting each floor leader are the party whips who serve as liaison between the party leaders and the rank and file.


How does a bill become a law? The citizen who has never seen Congress in operation is likely to have a mental picture of two legislative bodies conducting their business with great decorum in an air of solemnity punctuated by ringing speeches and learned debates. He may picture every congressman in his seat weighing carefully the pros and cons of each measure. Actually this is not the true picture, and unless a person understands the way Congress works, he may be quite disillu-

How a bill...




1 Most bills can be introduced in either house. The procedure by which a bill becomes a law is much the same regardless of where the bill originates.


In this story, the bill is first introduced in the Senate. It is given a number and referred to the proper committee.




2 The committee holds public hearings on the bill.




3 The full committee meets in executive [closed] session to consider the facts. It may kill the bill, approve it with or without amendments, or draft a new bill.




4 The committee recommends the bill for passage. It is then listed on the calendar.






5 The bill comes up for debate. Depending on the degree of controversy, debate may last from a few hours to several weeks. Amendments may or may not be added. The bill is then voted on.

6 If it passes, it goes to the House of Representatives for action. It is referred to the proper committee.




7 Hearings may be held.




8 The committee rejects the bill, prepares a new one, or accepts the bill with or without amendments.

Reprinted from the Journal of the National Education Association



11 It goes before the entire body, is debated and voted on.


12 If the bill is passed by the second body but contains major differences, either house may request a conference committee. The conferees meet and try to reconcile their differences. Representing both parties, five conferees are usually appointed from each house.



13 Generally, they reach an agreement. They report back to their respective houses. The report is accepted or rejected.



10 The Rules Committee is one of the most powerful of the committees in the House of Representatives. After a bill has been recommended for passage by the committee to which it was referred, the Rules Committee can block it or clear it for debate before the entire House.





14 If the report is accepted by both houses, the bill is signed by the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate, and is sent to the President of the United States.

9 The committee recommends the bill for passage. It is listed on the calendar and is sent to the Rules Committee.





...Becomes a law.

15 The President may sign or veto the bill within 10 days. If he doesn't sign within 10 days and Congress is still in session, the bill automatically becomes law. If Congress has adjourned before the 10 days have elapsed and the President has not signed the bill, it does not become law. This is known as a "pocket veto." If the President returns the bill with a veto message, it may still become law if passed by a two-thirds majority in each house.

sioned on his first visit to Washington. The Senate or House chambers are rarely full. Some congressman is perhaps addressing a half empty room or a clerk is drearily droning through a reading of a resolution. Those present may be reading newspapers, looking through their desk drawers, talking with their colleagues, or even dozing. Some may be getting up and leaving, others may be drifting in, waving to friends in the gallery, doing almost anything except paying attention to what is going on. This is hardly what one would expect from one of the most powerful and successful legislative bodies in the world.

This picture is more amusing than alarming if one recognizes that the work on the floor of Congress constitutes only a small fraction of the labors of a congressman. The real legislative spadework is done in committee. By the time a bill reaches the floor for debate, most of the controversies have already been ironed out. Except for attempts to sway a few undecided or uninformed colleagues or to impress the constituents back home, ringing speeches and fiery oratory are rare.

Congress seeks to initiate and to implement policy through legislation. The majority party has committed itself to a specific program that it hopes to enact.

The volume of bills introduced in a given session is so great that only a small percentage of those presented is actually considered. Most bills are rejected at the committee level before they even reach the floor for debate. Many of these bills may represent efforts by particular congressmen to fulfill obligations or promises to their constituents. In order to insure their being passed, congressmen sometimes engage in a little gentlemanly horsetrading known as "log rolling." It boils down to an agreement between colleagues—"If you vote for my bill, I'll vote for yours." Bills may also represent the outgrowth of committee investigations or they may be administration sponsored measures. A large share of New Deal legislation, particularly in the first special session of Congress in 1933, was sponsored by the Roosevelt administration and introduced to Congress by chosen senators and representatives. The Constitution requires that taxation measures and impeachment resolutions originate in the House of Representatives. Otherwise any kind of legislation can be introduced in either house.

Once a bill has been introduced, it is assigned a number on the calendar and is referred to the proper committee. The committee may hold hearings on the measure to secure additional information, after which the bill may be re-written, amended, or left unchanged. Or the bill may be "pigeon-holed"—the committee may kill it by failing to take any action on it. Bills are named for the committee chairmen who sponsor the bill in each House, i.e., the Taft-Hartley Act or the Hawley-

Smoot Tariff. In case an important individually sponsored bill is introduced, it frequently goes by the name of sponsor. After emerging from committee, the bill goes back to the floor where it will come up for debate at the time determined by the order of business. More changes and amendments may be made from the floor. If it becomes apparent that the bill is being markedly changed by amendments, or if it has small chance of passing this session, its sponsors may move that the bill be sent back to committee rather than accept the bill as amended or to make a fight for it and run the risk of failing. Sending a bill back to committee is tantamount to "killing" the bill for the session.

The House of Representatives limits debate on the measure to a time agreed upon in advance. In the Senate, however, members are free to speak as long as they wish. This makes a delaying action known as a filibuster possible only in the Senate. A filibuster is an attempt to "talk a bill to death." A filibustering senator hopes that his talking will consume so much time that his colleagues will finally agree to send the measure back to committee (thereby killing it) in order to get along with other pressing business. Sometimes the mere threat of a filibuster is enough to send a bill back to committee. The filibuster does not have to deal with the subject at hand. As long as a senator has the floor, he can talk about anything or read orally anything he chooses. Recipes for southern fried chicken, excerpts from the Bible, the filibuster's life history are all legitimate in a filibuster. The Senate has had a cloture rule since 1917 by means of which a filibuster could be cut off by a two-thirds vote of senators on the floor at the time. In 1949, however, this rule was considerably weakened when a revision was added that requires a two-thirds vote of the entire Senate membership, or 64 Senators, to invoke cloture.

After the deliberations on the floor have been completed, a vote is taken. If the measure passes, it is then sent to the other House where a generally similar procedure is followed. Any changes made by the second house must be cleared with the House in which the bill originated. This is another example of checks and balances in operation. A joint committee is instituted to discuss the changes, and any compromises that this committee makes to rectify the differences must be accepted by both houses before the bill is sent to the White House for Presidential action. So important are the various committees in the law-making process that at times legislation appears to be simply ratification of committee recommendations.

The informal side of the lawmaking process cannot be overlooked, for the legislative process is not all one of mechanistic rule-following. Conversations in the Senate barbershop or the cafeteria may be far more

effective than a major address on the floor. Congenial conversation at a cocktail party or a dinner engagement may smooth out a lot of things that might delay action on the floor of either chamber of Congress. Some time ago the newspapers reported an incident that illustrates this informal side of the legislative process. It also reveals the informal side of relationships between the Executive Department and Congress. The wife of a senator found herself paired with the Budget Director as a dinner partner. The Budget Director is extremely important in drawing up the federal budget for the coming fiscal year. The various branches of government submit estimates of need to him. He then, in consultation with the President and other advisors, approves or disapproves major requests before submitting the proposed budget to Congress for action. Hence the Budget Director is a good man to know if a congressman has some important budget item he wants to see included. Being fully aware of this, the senator's wife made the most of her strategic position. During the conversation, the Budget Director asked the senator's wife about her husband. She replied that her husband was most unhappy about the budget. The solicitous Director immediately asked the cause of the senator's plight. The senator's wife replied that her husband was particularly upset about an item cut out of the proposed budget that was intended to finance a giant reclamation project in his home state. During the week following the dinner party, a federal budget item involving millions was restored to the proposed budget to be submitted to Congress. The lawmakers passed the budget bill with this item in it, and presumably the senator, his wife, and the senator's constituents were now happy.

Congress and the interpretation of the law. The increasing complexity of our society makes lawmaking a difficult job. It is impossible for Congress to include in a given measure all the possible details to cover every case to which the law might apply. As a result, laws that are passed tend to be rather generally worded, and the practice of establishing an administrative agency within the Executive Department to do the interpreting and actual detailed implementing of the law has become fairly common. As a result, it invariably falls to the courts to determine and define in the last analysis what they think Congress meant in passing the law (since Congress didn't spell out its intentions in detail). This situation enables Congress to dodge responsibility to some extent. If in a test case the courts decide one way about legislative intent, and as a result the law becomes unpopular with the people, Congress can blame the courts for making the law into something that Congress "never intended it to be," or the administrative agency (and indirectly

the Executive Department) for improperly administering the law. During the controversy over price control, for example, many a congressman blamed the Office of Price Stabilization for improper administration. The complaints were all aimed at the OPS rather than at Congress for drawing up an unclear law.

We have already taken a passing glance at administrative law in the

"There Must Be Some Better Way We Can Run This"



Herblock in the Washington Post

preceding chapter. Administrative law comprises the rules and regulations of government bureaus that have the force of law in the sense that violation may bring prosecution in the courts or failure to comply may result in withholding any benefits under the law. Concern is sometimes expressed at the growing volume of administrative law that affects our lives at so many points. It is a kind of law that is not enacted by

the chosen representatives of the people but by an agency over which the people have no direct control. It has also been a factor contributing to the increase in power of the Executive Department at the expense of Congress.

Congress under attack. Picking Congress apart has been a favorite national pastime since the beginning of the Republic. The stereotype of the long-winded, frock-coated, flowing-haired congressman pursuing his narrow-minded legislative way, intent only upon remaining in office, is familiar to everyone. He has been reviled, scorned, ridiculed, pilloried, blasphemed.

Much of the abuse springs from our failure to grasp the complexity of the congressman's job. Congress often appears confused, without purpose or direction. But a congressman's duties are legion and in recent years have become increasingly more burdensome as the economy grows and more and more problems are called to his attention. Also, the intricacies of the legislative process itself contribute to the seeming chaos. But this is not the most serious of the charges that we often hear leveled against Congress.

Many people mistake the apparent confusion of Congress for inefficiency. Granted, confusion is present, but on the other hand Congress completes an enormous amount of work on a bewildering variety of topics. And from time to time the legislators have themselves set in motion various reforms, such as consolidating the work of various committees, that have improved the functioning of the legislative process.

Another complaint is that Congress is not representative of all the people. Referring back to our "typical" congressman, we note that most of the legislators have had some college education; but the majority of the people they represent have not. Also, the various occupational groups are not evenly represented, and so on. It is true that Congress does not represent a cross section of the nation, but it is highly representative in the sense that most minority groups have a voice there. And it is probably not important that some occupational groups are not represented there. Many congressmen who have never blistered their hands on a construction job or loaded bales of cotton on a freighter speak out strongly for the many Americans who have.

Probably the most valid charge that can be leveled against Congress is that it allows itself to be hamstrung periodically by such minority weapons as the filibuster. This situation is productive of all sorts of tensions and conflicts—between congressmen themselves, between Congress and the President, and between Congress and the people. What can be done to remedy the situation still remains to be seen.

30

BIG GOVERNMENT, WHAT NEXT?

Like blind men feeling and fingering an elephant, most of us see our government only from our own narrow viewpoints. Just as the different blind men each thought of the elephant as all trunk or all tail or all columns, we tend to look on government in terms of the services we use. Either that, or we think of government in terms of stereotypes—as a lumbering hostile giant taking the country over, or as a friend of the poor, or as a waster of the taxpayers' hard-earned money, or as a sucker being outsmarted by European diplomats.

This part of the book has tried to picture government—or at least our national government—as much more complex than this. We have seen that it is not a monolithic unity, but a rather loose cluster of men and traditions and agencies and laws and services reaching across the nation and throughout the world. It is called a welfare state or a regulatory state or an administrative state—it is all this, and much more. And

it is in a constant process of change as new problems and new demands arise.

However described, our national government has come to have a powerful effect on our daily lives and our future hopes. Preceding chapters have discussed the *functions* of government. Each of these functions is also a *power* of government—power to shape our lives in some way. To assess the extent and nature of its total influence would be impossible. Recent chapters have tried, however, to give an idea of the national government's economic role. To recapitulate, we have seen that government:

1. Can, by regulatory powers, prevent persons from doing certain things and compel them to do other things.
2. Can use its promotional powers in both positive and negative ways.
3. Can achieve its purposes in certain areas by directly taking over and managing enterprises.
4. Can virtually manage the economy by means of its power over taxes, spending, credit, prices, wages, and development of resources.

These powers delimit the economic role of our government in the middle of the twentieth century. Where does big government go from here? This is one of the burning issues of the time, and many answers are offered. Some want to go back to a time when the government's economic functions were simple and small and relatively unimportant. Some want to go ahead at a much faster rate. Some have other ideas. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss several of the main approaches to this problem.

The Conservative Answer

The keynote of conservative thinking today is opposition to government intervention in the economy. Talk to a local merchant, listen to a spokesman for the N.A.M., watch a session of the American Medical Association—and in a few minutes this fact becomes clear. Indeed, we have become so used to conservative opposition to government that we take it for granted. We naturally expect a conservative talking about government to shout "regimentation," "bureaucracy," "stifling of private enterprise."

It is necessary, however, to remember two things. First, its attitude toward government is only a small part of conservative thought. Actually, conservatism is a well-rounded philosophy based on a particular view of human nature, freedom, political power, the role of habit, the nature of man and society. The governmental aspect is stressed here

only because it is directly relevant to our topic. Second, conservatism has not always been hostile to government. On the contrary, many of the great conservative thinkers, such as Edmund Burke and Alexander Hamilton, saw a vital role for government. In the United States, the conservatives—Federalists, Whigs, early Republicans—believed in positive government. The liberals—Jeffersonians, Jacksonians, Democrats—generally opposed bigger and more active government. As we shall see shortly, conservatism as meaning do-nothing government is a fairly recent development in this country.

And even today, as previous pages have indicated, many conservatives oppose increased government as a general matter but favor more governmental control of certain activities. Nevertheless, this general opposition of conservatives toward big government is extremely significant today. It affects our domestic politics, our foreign relations, our handling of our own economy, our whole thinking about the world we live in. This attitude deserves closer examination.

The state as night watchman. The origins of the attitude go far back, but it can be traced most directly to new ideas that swept Europe and America during the eighteenth century. Foremost of these was the creed of individualism. For centuries men had been held subject to the iron rules of state and of church. They had been imprisoned in rigid thought systems. Mighty forces of unrest had been dammed up which spilled out in the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment. One result of these stirrings was the exaltation of the individual. It was proclaimed that he had natural and basic rights that no government could take away. Some had always had such rights, but now *every* man was born with them. Moreover, individualism fitted the times. The middle classes of merchants and small manufacturers were restless under the yoke of government. They wanted freedom to grow, to experiment, to take risks, to be free of nuisances such as heavy taxes and bothersome regulations.[1] Of course, they admitted, some government was necessary. Indeed, these businessmen turned to government for help as readily as did their descendants a century or two later. But as a general matter, they said, government must only police the economy in a negative way. It must be only night watchman.

No one captured this spirit better than the Scottish professor Adam Smith, to whom we have already referred in the chapters on economics. Three generations after Smith, John Stuart Mill, another brilliant economist-philosopher, borrowed heavily from the Scotsman's thinking. Mill found a broad sphere of private activity upon which neither government nor other persons should trespass. *Individualism* was the cherished value,

and private property was important in sustaining individualism. But Mill was not concerned merely with economic progress. To him, individualism was important because it fostered a greater value, *liberty*. His famous essay *On Liberty* (1859) was a classic defense of freedom of thought and expression. He saw a close link between these values on the one hand and individualism and governmental noninterference on the other. Indeed, so solicitous was Mill for the sphere of private judgment that he was somewhat worried that the great mass of people might repress the individual. He would put liberty before majority-rule democracy.

A third English thinker wrote in the tradition of individualism, but he took a somewhat different road. This was Herbert Spencer, an English philosopher of the late nineteenth century. From childhood, Spencer was interested in biology, and he evolved a theory of organic evolution that he applied to the question of the role of government. The ideal state of society, Spencer said, was one of a static balance between man and his surroundings. Man develops his abilities and his individuality only by trying to adapt himself to his environment and achieving the necessary balance. Government must not interfere in this process: its only job—at least in advanced societies—is to maintain order. This philosophy led Spencer to a belief in a "ruthless laissez faire." Government must not regulate industry or pass social legislation or run the postal system or provide for education. It must not even administer poor relief or public sanitation, for such actions might interfere with the "wise severity of natural laws." [2]

These men are long since dead, but their ideas live. When your uncle talks about the automatic and beneficial workings of the market, he is —perhaps unconsciously—borrowing from Adam Smith and others. When your teacher says that economic liberty is necessary for political liberty, Mill is talking too. When the retired executive next door grumbles about governmental paternalism and says that a return to laissez faire would weed out the unfit, there is a bit of Herbert Spencer in him.

But something very important has happened in the century since Mill. Ideas are weapons; they have certain uses for certain people and tend to be discarded or changed as the need arises. Many of Smith's, Mill's, and Spencer's ideas suited perfectly the purposes of the businessmen of their day, for those ideas vindicated businessmen's opposition to governmental interference, and—even better—vindicated that opposition on the basis of great moral values and the general good. Adam Smith was not a dogmatic believer in absolutely free competition or individual rights.[3] As the years passed, Mill increasingly saw the need for governmental action to foster justice; ultimately he became a reformer and

virtually a socialist. Ignoring these facts, the conservatives took the individualistic core of Smith, Mill, and others and, with the philosophical backing of Spencer, fashioned a powerful creed of rugged individualism. Laissez faire, however, was never fully realized, for government can never be completely divorced from the economy. But the United States probably came as close to laissez faire in the late nineteenth century as any large nation ever has.

Conservatism revised. The Great Depression is often blamed—or credited—for having shaken the old ideas of rugged individualism and laissez faire. Undoubtedly it did play a great part. But it is worth remembering that there had been stirrings and soul searchings long before. The strain of "liberalism in conservatism" represented by Mill had never died out; it merely had been overshadowed by the vigorous supporters of extreme laissez faire.

Consider, for example, the views of Herbert Hoover, writing as early as 1922. He did not look on individualism simply as a way of getting ahead or keeping the economy running. He saw it as the yearning for self-expression, the desire to create something. Our whole progress, he said, depended on the creative minds of people with imagination and administrative intelligence. Such people could rise only "through the selection that comes from the free-running mills of competition." He concluded:

> While we build our society upon the attainment of the individual, we shall safeguard to every individual an equality of opportunity to take that position in the community to which his intelligence, character, ability, and ambition entitle him; that we shall keep the social solution free from frozen strata of classes; that we shall stimulate efforts of each individual to achievement; that through an enlarging sense of responsibility and understanding we shall assist him to this attainment; while he in turn must stand up to the emery wheel of competition.[4]

Did all this mean do-nothing government? Not at all, said Hoover. Government must combat "autocracy of economic power." In order to preserve equality of opportunity it must curb monopoly and restraint of trade. The Adam Smith type of capitalism cannot be maintained. Government must not, on the other hand, directly intervene in the "production and distribution of commodities and services." Government must be regulator, not manager.

Here was a view that opened the gates for a considerable amount of regulation and policing by government. During the 1930's—years of

depression and New Deal—conservatives had to revise their thinking. Some, of course, stuck to their guns and argued that a return to laissez faire was the only way to end the depression. But others saw the need for collective action through government. Conservative politicians found that only a revamping of their thoughts and deeds could produce majorities on election day.

The heart of revised conservatism has been the acceptance of the need for promotional policies on *behalf of all groups,* including the underprivileged, rather than business alone. Conservatives, in short, broadly accept the welfare state. They may protest its excessive spending, worry over the effect of paternalism on the masses, groan under the tax burden it imposes—but still they accept it in large measure. Consider, for example, the Republican and Democratic party platforms in 1948. Both platforms promised aid for slum clearance and low-rent housing, broadened social security, aid to veterans, help for small business, flexible support prices and increased soil conservation for farmers—to name but a few. There were, of course, differences in tone and emphasis, but essentially both were "me-too" platforms.

How can conservatives justify this much governmental intervention? Quintin Hogg, a brilliant young British conservative, has put the case well.[5] Conservatives, he says, refuse to treat either the government or the individual as absolute. If private enterprise cannot provide adequate living for certain groups of people, then the government must step in. Moreover, widespread sharing of property is vital in maintaining economic and political stability. Everyone who has some property, that is, a stake in the existing system, will think carefully before embracing radical ideas. Basic in revised conservatism is the recognition by intelligent conservatives that by accepting moderate changes now they may prevent radical changes in the future.

All this does not mean that forward-looking conservatives are simply liberals in disguise. Genuine differences separate the two camps. Unlike many liberals and socialists, conservatives:

Would limit the trend toward bigger and bigger government. They accept a broad measure of governmental promotion and regulation, but wish to move at a much slower rate.

Would curb rule by popular majorities. Unchecked majorities, conservatives fear, may destroy property rights, suppress individual liberties, and establish a tyranny. "Freedom is more important to creativity and thereby, in the long run, to the whole human race than a leveling majoritarianism," says Peter Viereck, a young American conservative and poet.[6]

Would foster wide diffusion of power in government. This belief, of

course, is part of the conservative's antimajoritarianism, and it was written into our Constitution. Conservatives fear that a more centralized and unified system of government may speed up the trend toward a powerful state. Divide up power, they say, and big government will be curbed.

Would maintain procedural safeguards. All democrats, whether conservative or radical, believe in the rule of law and civil liberties. But conservatives advocate procedural methods to give the widest possible protection to individuals dealing with government. For example, conservatives support elaborate procedures for reviewing administrative decisions, and they would limit the delegation of power to the bureaucrats.

The essence of the conservative case is *liberty.* Their idea of liberty is freedom from interference by the government. "Political liberty is nothing else," says Hogg, "than the diffusion of power," and can be secured only by "splitting up of political and legal power into different parcels." [7] Liberty is the *absence of governmental restraint.*

It is precisely on this fundamental point that socialist democrats take issue with conservative democrats.

The Socialist Answer

Individual liberty? This is our main goal, say the socialists. But, they add quickly, liberty is not simply the absence of governmental restraint. Individual liberty can be threatened by a church or an employer or a tyrannous head of a family as well as by government. Indeed, government, wisely used, can be the great weapon for *enlarging* liberty.

Clement Attlee, leader of the British Labor Party, put the case well:

> State action is advocated by Socialists not for its own sake, but because it is necessary to prevent the oppression of an individual by others, and to secure that the liberty of the one does not restrict that of others, or conflict with the common good of society. Those who attack Socialism on the ground that it will mean the enslavement of the individual belong invariably to the class of people whose possession of property has given them liberty at the expense of the enslavement of others. . . . The liberty which Socialists desire is liberty for all.[8]

Clearly, the socialist, unlike the conservative, looks on government as a neutral weapon that can be used either to *create* or to *destroy* individ-

ual liberty. Everything depends on how this weapon is used. What, then, is the socialist plan for the uses of government?

To answer this question we must look briefly at the rise of socialism. In doing so, it is well to keep the problem in perspective. Socialism has never had a large following in the United States, nor does it today. As a set of political beliefs it has been outside the main stream of American thought. Why, then, does the socialist approach deserve attention here? The answer is threefold. In the first place, American politicians have systematically borrowed socialist ideas (such as municipal ownership of utilities) even while denouncing socialism as such. Second, we live in an age of socialism—both enemy and friendly nations abroad have socialist governments of one sort or another, and if we are to understand our friends and enemies it is vitally important to know what kind of socialism we are talking about. Finally, the word "socialism" is used as a term of political abuse in American politics; if we dissect its meaning perhaps we can turn it into a meaningful, descriptive word (see Chapter 31).

The rise of socialism. Although some students have seen evidence of socialist thinking in ancient thinkers like Plato and Moses, socialism is essentially a modern and Western development.[9] It arose largely out of unrest and hardship. One of the early English movements was that of the *Diggers,* who agitated during the English Civil War (1642-1652) for a sort of agrarian communism. A century and a half later the *Equals* in France denounced individual property in the land during the French Revolution, and demanded a community of goods. But it took the Industrial Revolution and the factory conditions of the nineteenth century to produce socialism in its modern form.

Two strands of socialist thinking weave through the nineteenth century. The first was *utopian socialism,* developed by a group of thinkers in England and France. One of these was Robert Owen, a wealthy and humane industrialist who operated a textile mill in Scotland. Owen argued that competition between man and man stood in the way of a joint effort by all mankind to develop the riches of the world for the welfare of the people. Headed by Owen, a large working class movement agitated in the 1830's to do away with the employing class and to reorganize industry on the basis of cooperative self-government. Many Owenites, however, rejected political action (hence their name utopians). In later years, the Chartists preached the same goals as the Owenites but emphasized that the workers must gain political rights—a whole charter of rights, including the ballot—before they could abolish private property and establish socialism.

The second strand was *Marxist.* Many people had attacked capitalism;

it took Karl Marx, a brilliant German thinker and revolutionary, to develop a systematic theory that was at the same time a critique of capitalism, a theory of history and economics, and a program of action. The nature of the economic system, said Marx and his followers, determines the nature of the whole society—the class system, politics, government, even religion and art. Under capitalism the class system is composed of a great mass of wage earners at the bottom and a few capitalists at the top. Capitalism operates in such a way that the proletariat gets poorer and poorer and the plutocrats richer and richer. Since the state is a product of the economic system, its main role is to safeguard the existing class systems. Thus under capitalism, government protects private property.

What did the Marxists want? First of all, they wanted an end to capitalism, which, they felt, embodied all that was evil. But the state itself cannot overthrow capitalism, because the state is merely the instrument of the capitalists. The job can be done only by a revolution that would bring to power a new ruling class and create a new government. The revolution might be peaceful but probably would be violent.[10] Once in power, the workers would take over the means of production. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, banks, factories, transport, and so on, would be taken from the capitalists and collectivized. Now only one class would be left. Since there could be no class struggle, there would be no further need for the state. So the state would gradually wither away.

Democratic socialism has borrowed heavily from both the utopian and the Marxist socialists. To oversimplify a bit, it has borrowed from the utopians a deep humanitarianism and a belief in the feasibility of achieving socialism through the parliamentary, constitutional form of government rather than revolution. From the Marxists, it has developed a systematic attack on capitalism and a belief in militant political action. It is impossible here to follow the tortuous trail of the socialist movements of the last century. It is enough to say that a basic split took place between socialists who believed in revolutionary action and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and socialists who urged a gradual transition to a collectivist economy.

This split has had momentous consequences for the world today. The former group, described today generally as *communists,* have taken power through revolutions and conquest in Soviet Russia, China, and smaller countries (see Chapter 31). These communists are not democrats; they will use any method—war, assassination, lies, the degradation of the individual—to gain their ends. They are socialists only in the sense that they use a socialist technique—governmental control of the

economy—as one way of maintaining their power. The other group—generally called *socialists*—ruled or still rule through constitutional means in Great Britain, Australia, Scandinavia, India, and other lands. These socialists are democrats first and socialists second, or more exactly, they see socialism as a vital means for achieving democratic ends. Socialism and communism are at opposite poles. Communists are not merely more radical socialists; socialists are not merely mannered and educated communists. The difference is one of kind, not of degree.

In any event, socialism, whether we like it or not, obviously has become an important fact of life today. Unlike many socialist parties abroad, the Socialist Party in the United States is small and almost powerless. Its program is important, however, because it serves as a source of policies for the major parties and as a standing challenge to more conservative ways of thought in this country.

What the socialists want. The program of American Socialists was well summed up in the 1948 national platform of the Socialist Party U.S.A. Basic socialist demands, according to the platform, include the following:

1. The natural resources of the nation—minerals, oil, electric and atomic power—are the property of the people. Their preservation for future generations and their management by the people for social purposes can be achieved democratically under socialism.

2. The basic industries, public utilities, banking and credit institutions—all the economic facilities necessary to satisfy the basic needs of the people—must be socially owned and democratically managed.

3. Socialism will democratize the economic life of the nation by the joint representation of workers, the working management, and the consuming public, in the management of socialized enterprises; by the guarantee of popular control of enterprise through as much decentralization as possible and the use of various types of organization, particularly the public corporation and the voluntary cooperative; and by the preservation of labor organization and of consumer choice.

More specifically, the Socialists demanded the expansion of the nation's productive facilities through the establishment of public corporations, a broad expansion of social services including larger old-age pensions, higher minimum wages, more health services, higher educational standards, production of houses by the government, the strengthening of civil liberties, and an agricultural program based on maximum production as against the "New Deal idea of agricultural scarcity."

How much government does all this mean? Socialists answer that they neither want nor need a huge bureaucratic system. Most small businesses

would be left alone. Much economic activity could be carried on by cooperatives. The government would take over major industries, but these would keep a degree of autonomy much like the Tennessee Valley Authority. Nevertheless, it is clear that socialism involves a considerable increase in the size and scope of government. For not only would a socialist regime operate major industries; it would also greatly extend social services and regulation.

Democratic socialism does not necessarily involve, however, a sudden and drastic expansion of government almost overnight. Most democratic socialists prefer to move slowly—to socialize the economy in small bites. This belief in *gradualism* stems partly from Fabian socialism, which has been a major factor in socialist thinking. The Fabians, taking their name from the famous Roman general who used the tactics of delay against Hannibal, believe that political power must be achieved peacefully and constitutionally, and that once in power the socialists must proceed firmly but gradually to control the economy. It is significant that the Attlee government in Britain waited over five years before nationalizing a vital industry, steel.

Socialism on the defensive. During recent years, democratic socialism has scored electoral successes. At the same time, as a doctrine it has been on the defensive. Being in power, socialists have had to prove their ability to bring about the better conditions they long advocated. The attack on socialism has consisted largely of two main arguments: first, that *socialism is incompatible with liberty;* second, that *socialism is not an efficient principle on which to run an economy.*

The first argument runs as follows: Socialism inevitably calls for bigger government and more governmental power. A socialist government will use its power to interfere with individual liberties. Even Fabian socialism will gradually encroach on liberty until none is left. Socialism is especially damaging, the argument runs, to economic liberties—the right of the consumer to choose among products and of the worker to get a job where he wants. More than that, in trying to carry out their platform the socialists will be unable to tolerate democratic procedures and ideals. They will inevitably reduce the legislature to a cheering section, violate the rule of law, curb the opposition, and even infringe on civil liberties. Ultimately the socialist "road to freedom" becomes in fact the "high road to servitude." [11]

Socialists see these arguments as bogies to scare the innocent. Government, they say, can be used to *create* liberties. No one lacks liberty more than a sick man tied to his bed; socialism would seek to increase the health of the people. No one lacks liberty more than a man without a

job; socialism seeks to provide employment for all able to work. Moreover, democratic socialism respects procedural safeguards and the rule of law as much as do capitalist democracies, if not more. Finally, socialism would bring new freedoms by ending discrimination against Negroes, by curbing the power of employers, and by providing equal opportunity and security for all.

To the extent that arguments can be proved by observing facts, the socialists appear to have won this argument. Under British and other examples of democratic socialism, free speech, free elections, constitutional procedures, minority rights, and the rule of law have been maintained and to some extent strengthened. Socialism may not have created all the new freedoms that its supporters promised, but there is little evidence that it has suppressed the old.

The second argument is not so easily refuted. It holds that socialism in practice prevents the very kind of economic progress that it advocates in theory. For one thing, socialism would destroy individual incentive. Instead of rewarding individual creativity, it would grind everyone down to a dull level of mediocrity. Again, according to this argument, socialism could not utilize resources rationally. Under capitalism, the price system provides a basis for planning production; under socialism, government-controlled prices would not perform this task. Most important, socialism would spawn hordes of bureaucrats in order to take over private enterprise. Inevitably government enterprise would be inefficient, partly because of the huge and unwieldy character of the bureaucracy, partly because in government the worst always come to the top. Socialism, in short, would stifle the dynamic and creative role that private enterprise, whatever its defects, provides under capitalism.

It is too early to assess this argument on the basis of experience in socialist democracies. Undoubtedly the truth lies somewhere between the fervent claims of the socialists and the dire claims of their critics. In Britain—the only large western democracy that has tried socialism—governmental ownership and control of coal, transport, electricity and other industries did not lead to gross inefficiency. Nor, on the other hand, did it dramatically improve conditions in the nationalized industry (except perhaps coal). Socialists had hoped that under government ownership the workers would be inspired by new incentives, that they would have a far more active role in running their industries, but these hopes were not realized.

Socialism has not as yet been proved a failure; it has simply not lived up to advance billing. Undoubtedly the cause has been in part the nature of the age we live in, and it may be that given time socialism could achieve its goals. In the meantime, men are searching for a way to realize

the broad humanitarian aims without taking over the device of government ownership and bigger bureaucracies. Is there a middle way between the conservative way and the socialist way?

A Third Alternative?

More specifically, can a democratic people master their economic system without stifling it? Can we find the right balance between a supergovernment and a do-nothing government? Can we establish a measure of equality without leveling down to a plane of mediocrity? In short, can we control our economic fortunes without regimenting ourselves in the process?

The answer, according to a third school of thought, is, "decidedly yes —if we use the method of democratic planning in the economic sphere." Such planning, they say, means the "technical coordination, by disinterested experts, of consumption, production, investment, trade, and income distribution in accordance with social objectives set by bodies representative of the majority." [12] This third alternative to socialism and laissez faire has attracted wide interest in the last decade or two. It offers one of the most challenging answers to the question, "Big government, what next?"

Economic planning. The argument of the economic planners runs like this: Capitalism in its early stages was a highly unplanned system, largely free from governmental interference, acting mainly on its own in accordance with the rise and fall of supply, demand, and prices. The world was an economic jungle; the strong survived and the weak were crushed. Early capitalism showed tremendous dynamic and creative power, but it was also very wasteful of both men and resources. In an increasingly industrial and urban society, the old individualism was found wanting. In order to protect themselves, people tended to band together in corporations, trade unions, and other associations.

This process of organization has gone a long way, but in a sense it has not gone far enough. Increasingly our economic life is being planned, but who is doing the planning? Corporations, labor unions, trade associations, government agencies, and other organizations. Corporations and unions determine production and price policies; trade associations influence policies for whole industries; government agencies have a wide range of economic functions.

But "such measures of planning as the above are separate and disconnected; they are not integrated into a unified whole. The result is

that the processes of industry are not yet well articulated. Indeed, the plans effective in one part may work at cross-purposes to those in another." [13] Organized groups force the passage of laws that may be inconsistent with one another. Regulation by different government agencies has not brought order in the economic system; often it has made for disorder.

Clearly—so the argument goes—some kind of central, over-all direction is needed to keep our economy running harmoniously. Only the national government can do this job, because it alone has the necessary power, national scope, and democratic responsibility.

What would the national government do? Its main job, say the economic planners, would be to help maintain full employment, maximum productivity, and a high standard of living for all the people—in short to meet the commitments laid out in the Employment Act of 1946 (see Chapter 24). Its chief instrument would be control over fiscal and monetary policy, including taxation, government spending, and credit.[14] The heart of the plan would be a vast program of governmental investment in housing, urban development, resource development, transportation, recreational facilities, education, health, nutrition, and so on.[15] Instead of leaving people to the mercy of the business cycle, the plan would put the resources of government behind efforts to stabilize the economy. During a period of stagnation, the government might spend more, tax less, ease credit regulations, promote spending and investment. During inflationary times, it would do the opposite.

What would the national government *not* do? Most economic planners insist that manipulating the over-all controls would be the full extent of government's role under a planned economy. Washington would not interfere in a major way with the price system; on the contrary, demand and supply would be an important guide in making economic plans. Washington would not try to regiment consumption; it would merely try to forecast it correctly. Indeed, the essence of the plan would be to create a favorable economic climate for private enterprise and to help businessmen make decisions based on facts and plans rather than guesswork. Instead of issuing arbitrary orders, the government would enlist the cooperation of private individuals by proving that it was to their advantage to make their individual plans in terms of the national plan. Washington, in short, would merely command the strategic points instead of poking into every nook and cranny of the economy.

Advocates of economic planning rest their case mainly on the need for greater economic stability and prosperity. But they see an even broader role for democratic planning. They see it as an attempt by modern industrial peoples to regain control of their environment. They see it

as a means of preventing the "escape from freedom" that man resorts to when confronted with baffling decisions; they see it as a means of achieving a "political community" in which all citizens have faith because in it they have a stake. By substituting rational plans for blind chance man can achieve a freedom impossible in a haphazard economic system. The task, said the great sociologist Karl Mannheim, is "to integrate men without antagonizing them." [16]

Planning machinery. We already have in the national government the rudiments of planning machinery. The Council of Economic Advisers studies the nation's economy, makes economic forecasts, and advises Congress and the President. Elaborate studies of particular fields are conducted by the research staffs of large agencies. One of the most significant planning agencies, however, no longer exists. This was the *National Resources Planning Board.* During the 1930's, the N.R.P.B. was responsible for gathering and analyzing basic data on natural resources, and it served as a clearinghouse for state and local planning agencies. The board took a broad view of resources, however, and some of its reports were brilliant treatments of broad economic problems. As a result of congressional hostility, the N.R.P.B. was abolished in 1943. Today the National Security Resources Board exercises some of the functions of the N.R.P.B., but its work is largely military.

Full national planning would require an expansion of this machinery. At the top would be a national economic planning agency headed, perhaps, by a cabinet officer. This agency would submit to the President and Congress final plans based on proposals drawn up by industrial planning councils. These councils, composed of members democratically chosen to represent management, labor, investors, and consumers in key industries, and assisted by economists, statisticians, accountants, and other experts, would be the links between local economic groups and national planning. Their function would be to "gather data concerning plant capacities, available labor and materials, and possible outputs in their respective branches of production. They would make estimates of the probable growth of the industry and of its requirements for new capital and labor. On the basis of these data they would formulate tentative plans for the industry." [17] Essentially, these plans would represent the industry's own estimate of what it could do. The final plan, as accepted by Congress, would combine these particular proposals with plans based on over-all domestic and international expectations, including the nation's fiscal and monetary program. The result would be superplans covering one year or longer.

Supporters of comprehensive national planning stress the democratic

methods that would be used. The industrial councils would represent all the major groups in the economy. Democratic procedures would be followed in drawing up the plan. There would be publicity at every stage, and full opportunity to criticize. Elected officials—that is, the President and Congress—would make the final decisions. Administering the plan would not need to be arbitrary. Use could be made of democratic procedures like the ballots taken in running the farm program.

National planning would have to hook in with international planning. Here again some machinery is already available in the form of the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Organization for Food and Agriculture, and the Social and Economic Council of the United Nations. Conspicuously lacking, however, is a world political body with power to enforce economic decisions reached by a majority of the nations.

One word of caution. Like supporters of laissez faire or of socialism, planners differ widely among themselves as to the best type of planning. Their plans come in all shapes and sizes. Some stress comprehensive governmental controls and machinery. Others favor far more limited controls by the government, with much more power remaining in the hands of private groups. Still others believe that their goals can be met largely through one type of governmental control—that over spending, saving, and investment. They have been greatly influenced by the Keynesians (see Chapter 24). Even the supporters of comprehensive planning hope that planning activity can be delegated and decentralized so that millions of people can have a role in the planning process and so that planning will not become divorced from the people.

Can Democracies Plan?

Advocates of comprehensive economic planning marshal many arguments for their approach. It would, they say, bring order and control into the economy without crushing the dynamic and creative values of free enterprise. It would be a collective national effort in happy contrast to the anarchical aspects of rugged individualism. It would be thoroughly democratic in both aim and method. By promoting economic stability and security, it would create new opportunities and freedoms for the people, but it would not threaten any of their present freedoms, such as civil liberties or procedural rights.

Economic planners feel that their approach is much superior to that

of the socialists. In the first place, they say, economic planning is a far more flexible instrument than socialism. The latter calls for a set method of government control—the public ownership and operation of key industries. Economic planning, lacking the doctrinaire basis of socialism, can rely on a mixed system of controls. In some cases, existing regulatory and promotional techniques may turn out to be the best methods of planning, and these can be maintained. In other cases, public ownership may be necessary. In the second place, according to the supporters of economic planning, their approach lacks the element of class hostility that permeates socialism largely because of the Marxist influence. Frightened by the socialist attack on private property, capitalists may resort to desperate measures or, at the very least, offer passive resistance. Economic planning, on the other hand, need not stir up class antagonisms because it does not threaten any particular group.

Despite these arguments, planning has been subjected to powerful attacks from thoughtful observers during recent years.


Planning and freedom. The strictures against planning, like those against socialism, consist basically of two arguments: first, *that central planning is undemocratic,* and second, *that central planning is inefficient.*

The first argument usually assumes that limited over-all planning, as described in the last few pages, is impossible, that ultimately partial planning turns into complete planning of every aspect of our economic lives, and then goes on to dominate our social, cultural, and political lives. No planned economy, according to opponents of the idea, has yet operated without suppressing free speech, destroying representative government, robbing the consumer of free choice, and virtually abolishing private property. "Central planning," says one critic, "ultimately turns every individual into a cipher and every economic decision into blind fumbling, destroys the incentives through which economic progress arises, renders the economic system as unstable as the whims of the few who ultimately control it and creates a system of wire-pulling and privilege in which economic justice ceases to have any meaning." [18] Economic planning, in short, means totalitarianism.

The anti-planners, as we have seen in our survey of conservative thought, accept a good deal of government intervention. Government, they agree, may tax for purposes of social reform, make laws in behalf of the underdog, attack monopoly, and intervene broadly in the economic system, provided it does so to insure the conditions of a free market. But other things government must *not* do. It must not try to

control prices on any extensive scale, or use priorities and allocations as methods of economic control, or try to force labor into new channels, or try to direct the production and distribution of goods.

The planners hastily answer that they, too, hope government need not do all this even under central planning. They preach "the inevitability of a minimum" range of controls, "not the desirability of a maximum." [19] But, they say, suppose that planning did become fairly comprehensive. Suppose, for example, that price control and rationing had to be established. Without doubt such controls would make necessary an army of



Wayne University

GOVERNMENT AS A CAREER

A complex society needs university-trained specialists in public administration.

officials and countless rules and regulations, and they would infringe on the consumer at every turn. At the same time, however, price control —if properly operated—enlarges the consumer's freedom in other respects. It frees him from unpredictable scarcities; it guarantees him a minimum share of goods; and it assures him a fair distribution of what there is.

Is there any difference, the planners ask, between this situation and, say, the restraints put on us as motorists? Under price control, the consumer exchanges one freedom for another. As motorists we exchange

our freedom to drive as fast and freely as we wish for the freedom to survive on the highways.

Nevertheless, advocates of planning hope and expect that government controls will be as limited as possible. They hope that planning would allow for considerable freedom for the *consumer,* that is, that he would

"It's Sure Hard To Get Help These Days"




From The Herblock Book (*Beacon Press*)

have wide liberty of personal choice as to what he would buy with his money. They hope for freedom for the producer—that labor will have wide choice of jobs and the right of collective bargaining (perhaps within a framework set by government), that businessmen will retain some freedom to go into business on their account and to make and sell

what they think the public would buy.[20] But everything depends, admit the planners, on the skill of the planners.

Who shall plan the planners? The skill of the planners. This is the nub of the problem. Planning will always be fatally inefficient, it is argued,



TVA

GOVERNMENT PLANNING

The Tennessee Valley Authority's effective organization of a large river valley gives evidence of man's capacity to control his environment.

because the worst always get to the top, because even the best are not wise enough to plan, and because democracies by definition cannot plan intelligently.

power is lodged in government the unscrupulous and uninhibited are likely to get the top positions.[21] Such people can provide fast, determined action, but they may not be wise or democratic rulers. At the same time, the minor officials, carrying out the orders of the top planners, will tend to be incompetent, lazy, arrogant—in short, bureaucratic. In either case, planning will be arbitrary and faulty.

It is not easy to assess this argument. On the one hand, democracies have been notably successful in bringing talent to the top; one need think only of Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee in Britain, of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Thomas E. Dewey, Dwight Eisenhower in the United States. And many officials of the second rank have shown matchless foresight and judgment in the face of exceedingly delicate and complex problems. On the other hand, democracies do have trouble recruiting able people for the top levels. One difficulty is the pay. Governments simply cannot compete with private firms who offer jobs to administrators at five or ten times their salaries. Another is the atmosphere of big government. Many people of talent and originality dislike working amid the impersonality and red tape of a huge bureaucracy, whether public or private. A third is the brickbats that are showered on the government official, especially if he is of independent mind and character. Many an able bureaucrat has left Washington because he could not stand the intemperate attacks (many of them emanating from Congress) directed against both his public and private life.

"Even the best are not wise enough to plan." Walter Lippmann has argued that men simply cannot understand the whole process of their social existence. Intelligent planning demands an understanding of the whole complex life of the nation, but man's approach must be partial, fragmentary, for his mind evolved in the course of mastering limited, specific problems. Lippmann imagines the planner at breakfast:

> He [the planner] knows that his breakfast depends upon workers on the coffee plantations of Brazil, the citrus groves of Florida, the sugar fields of Cuba, the wheat farms of the Dakotas, the dairies of New York; that it has been assembled by ships, railroads, and trucks, has been cooked with coal from Pennsylvania in utensils made of aluminum, china, steel, and glass. But the intricacy of one breakfast, if every process that brought it to the table had deliberately to be planned, would be beyond the understanding of any mind.[22]

In the years since Mr. Lippmann wrote this, events have given new evidence of man's capacity to control his environment and to carry out successfully the most elaborate and complex plans. The T.V.A. has effectively organized a large river valley. During World War II, Britain and

the United States planned and organized their war economies with considerable success. Since the war the British government achieved significant success in using over-all economic controls. Military planning has achieved even more spectacular results. Months before the battle of Okinawa—to take one example—American commanders planned to load over 150,000 troops of all types and over half a million tons of supplies into about 400 ships at eleven different ports stretching 6,000 miles from Seattle to Leyte; to deliver this force off Okinawa early in the morning of a particular day; and to send men and materiel ashore in a precise sequence of action. Despite the weather, enemy opposition, and the limitations of the human mind, this is exactly what was done.

"Democracies by definition cannot plan intelligently." This is the most damaging charge against planning, especially in the United States.

The essence of the argument is that planning is incompatible with democracy. Planning demands a long-range, stable, carefully prepared, continuous program—one that is not open to constant changes. Democracy, on the other hand, means rule by the people and the right of people to change their minds as often as they wish. A constantly changing plan is not real planning. Even worse, not the people as a whole but organized groups would dominate the planning. First one group, then another, would take over the planning process. Over-all planning would degenerate into a heterogeneous collection of individual plans that would push the economy—and the people—now in one direction, now another. Instead of an orderly scheme of economic and social reconstruction we would have a vicious "polity of pressure groups." [23]

This criticism of planning has a good deal of merit. The American form of government, as previous pages have tried to make clear, is highly responsive to shifting alliances of organized groups. Public opinion is skittish and fickle; political attitudes lack stability and tend to shift rapidly from one mood to another. Our frequent elections, reflecting shifts in public opinion, repeatedly bring changes in the personnel of top policy-makers, especially in Congress. Presumably a long-term plan needs the political backing of a majority of the people. But in the absence of a strong party system, our majorities tend to fall to pieces. Clearly, planning is a *political* as well as an economic problem. American planners may draw up, with the help of experts, the finest plans imaginable; they may have the economic weapons to put the plan into effect, but lacking *political* power they may be impotent.

Yet the prospects of democratic planning are not entirely hopeless. American government has elements of strength and stability. The President is powerful; he commands a highly organized bureaucracy staffed with many able men; he can give central direction to the development of

plans and their execution; and he can plan on a certain number of years in office. Britain in recent years has planned its economy effectively without violating democratic principles. It has succeeded largely because of its firm party system, cohesive executive leadership, able civil service, and its elevation of the national interest over minority interests.

We can conclude, then, that democracy and planning are not incompatible. But a particular type of democratic government—such as France and Italy have in extreme form and the United States has in modified form—may have severe difficulties in trying to plan comprehensively. Which means that any American who chooses the planning way over the laissez faire or socialist ways must consider seriously whether our political and governmental system will permit wise and sustained central planning.

Big Government and Freedom

What answers can be offered to the central question, "Big government, what next?" This chapter has discussed three main approaches to the problem, which may be summarized briefly. One is the conservative's. He fears the size and power of modern government; he yearns for the time when government was merely night watchman. He may not believe in rugged individualism, but he does believe that the government should leave the economy alone—aside from basic police powers—and let individual initiative and enterprise have full sway.

The democratic socialist offers a different answer. Big government, he says, can be the friend of the people, not its enemy. Socialism can guarantee that everyone has the liberties that under capitalism have been reserved for a select few. The solution is to take key industries away from private owners and put them in the hands of the people. There's nothing wrong with big government if it is socialist government.

A third approach is central planning. Supporters of this method reject the conservative idea that the economy can operate best without major governmental interference. Unlike the socialists, they feel that public ownership is, at best, only a part of the answer. The main goal, they say, is to give the people control of the economy through the planned use of a variety of governmental economic weapons. Big government does not need to remain big in personnel or expense; but it must be a controlling factor in the crucial economic decisions that affect the lives of all of us.

The American way. Most Americans would reject each of these answers *in toto* and would take a combination of their own. The average think-

ing American, that is, is something of a conservative, something of a planner, and even something of a socialist. He grumbles about the size and cost of big government, thinks the T.V.A. has worked out pretty well, and wishes Washington would stop shilly-shallying and start following a consistent policy. If the man in the street believes in any sort of general approach, he probably believes in some sort of mixed economy —one that is partly planned by the government, partly owned by the people, but largely left in private hands.

Americans, in short, tend to reject doctrinaire solutions. The history of our efforts to control the economy reflect a practical, trial-and-error approach. Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism was a philosophy of limited national economic controls. Trust busting is "futile madness," said Roosevelt; large corporations should be regulated in the public interest, not broken up. Yet his actual achievements were mainly minor reforms. Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom was not a program of basic change but an attempt to enlarge the opportunities of the working man and the small businessman by limiting centralized economic power in private hands. His policies had something for labor, something for small businessmen, something for farmers; they did not amount to a program of economic reconstruction.

Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal reflected a curious mixture of economic ideas. Early in his first administration, Roosevelt compared himself to the quarterback in a football game. The quarterback knows what the next play will be, but beyond that he cannot plan too rigidly, for "future plays will depend on how the next one works." The New Deal was not a long-term consistent doctrine but a collection of programs, sometimes antithetical programs. The N.R.A. was a form of economic planning by organized businessmen. The large-scale spending programs represented a Keynesian approach to fiscal policy. The stepped-up trust-busting of the late 1930's constituted a reversal of N.R.A. policy. The reciprocal trade program reflected traditional economic liberalism, but the farm program was a form of central economic planning.

It seems likely that future economic programs will—for better or for worse—incorporate different strands of economic and political thought. Whatever the inconsistencies, however, these programs probably will be based on the assumption that governmental power can be used to bring some order into the economy, to iron out the violent ups and downs of the business cycle, to plan the best use of our resources, human and material. They will be based on the assumption that we are not at the mercy of invisible factors that force us to have depressions, slums, mass ill health, insecurity. They will assume, in short, that government can be a major means of reaching men's goals. The programs may not be

doctrinaire, yet they are likely to be strongly affected by the prevailing doctrines of laissez faire, socialism, and planning.

The future of big government. Like most Americans, the authors reject a doctrinaire approach. They suggest, however, that the following fair guesses might be kept in mind in considering the future of big government:

First, the size and power of American government will be shaped largely by considerations over which we have limited control, that is, the security of the United States in an anarchical world. A return to laissez faire, even if otherwise desirable, will be impossible as long as we are mobilized for possible war. The shape of big government will be formed largely by the dictates of sheer survival.

Second, in a large and diverse economy there is room for a mixed system of laissez faire, socialism, and central planning. As government grows bigger and bigger, planning may grow increasingly important simply in order to maintain coordinated programs. But planning, in its broad sense, can be used to safeguard areas of laissez faire as well as to provide central direction to the economy. For example, government today helps protect the free operation of the stock exchange through the regulatory powers—that is, the planning—of the S.E.C.

Third, there is nothing innately undemocratic in conservatism, socialism, or planning, at least as these concepts are defined here. Democracy is not an economic system—although everyone has his own ideas whether a particular system is likely to lead to more or less democracy.

Finally, more government does not necessarily mean less freedom. This chapter has tried to make clear that government action can create freedom as well as destroy it. Everything turns on what government does and *how* it does it. Through bold and intelligent foreign and military policies, government can protect our freedom as a nation. Through dogged devotion to civil rights, it can extend our basic freedoms. Through wise domestic policies, it can strengthen freedom from poverty and insecurity. Through regulation, it can defend the freedom of the people against the threats from those holding excessive political or economic power. Through following democratic procedures, it can protect our freedom against arbitrary governmental action. In this sense, freedom and order are not opposites; on the contrary, we can achieve diversity and individuality *through* the process of living together and governing ourselves.

Government *can* do all this. It *can* do just the opposite. Everything depends on the way we use our government. Ultimately, we the people make or unmake our freedoms.

31

UNDERSTANDING WORLD COMMUNISM

The Russian-led communist movement, which is the principal threat to America today, is in many respects the most powerful social force of the twentieth century. It controls more lands and peoples than does democracy. Additional states within the non-communist zone may fall under its banner. Already in this zone the Communists enjoy the mass support of millions of fanatical and disciplined followers.

In the light of such facts, an understanding of communism requires more than an exposure of its sinister characteristics. We need to know why and how communism has captured the imagination of millions. And to combat communism successfully we must also understand our own democratic tradition. We must consider how to dramatize this tradition to our potential allies, put our own house in order, and make our belief in democracy triumph over our fear of communism.

The Strength of World Communism

Communists claim to possess the explanation for the past and present. They assert that their doctrine also can predict the future. The writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *as interpreted by Lenin and Stalin*, are the communist keys to such understanding.

We have already examined in some detail the essentials of the theory elaborated by Marx and Engels (see Chapter 30). Marxism, as the theory came to be known, made a great impression upon an age that had become disenchanted with capitalism. The vision of a happy, healthy society as the outcome of "scientific socialism" appealed to many humanitarian people, particularly to many intellectuals. In the years prior to the coming of Lenin, Marxist socialism in various shades colored the principal European socialist parties. However, these parties were, with few exceptions, devoted to the idea of establishing socialism through democratic means.

The Bolshevik version of Marxism. Lenin's interpretation of Marxism, which is called Bolshevism, emphasized the necessity of using violence. Marx had admitted the possibility of socialism being peacefully attained in those few countries where democratic institutions were developed, but Lenin flatly rejected this thesis. He said that capitalism was now so firmly entrenched in the "bourgeois" democracies that only force could destroy it. Lenin called the twentieth century the age of imperialist capitalism. He asserted that the world was run by the few big capitalist powers. Through conflicts among those nations and the creation of a world-wide class division, Lenin said, the world was moving toward the final conflict between capitalism and the new socialist order.

A greater emphasis upon the use of force, restricting the party to a small band of professional revolutionists bound by an iron discipline and unquestioning obedience to the power-controlling leaders, concentrating all authority in the party—these were the new features Lenin added to Marx's original doctrine. In contrast to orthodox Marxism, the people, according to Lenin, would be led to socialism by a separate political elite. This small group was not responsible to the masses but rather was dedicated to the task of making the revolution for the people. Taking power in an industrially backward country (in contrast to the tenets of Marxism), the communists monopolized political power, another change from Marxism. Representative democracy was denounced as capitalist or bourgeois. All Marxists who did not accept Bolshevism, i.e., Lenin's version of Marxism, were vilified.[1]

Stalin, in the course of his long years as the top communist, made several alterations in Leninism without, however, abandoning the essential elements of Leninism—use of force, opportunism, deceit, and strict party discipline. As a matter of fact, Stalin carried Leninism to its ultimate totalitarian extreme. One result was the strengthening of the power of the omnipotent state in disregard of orthodox Marxism. The state instead of weakening would, according to Stalin, remain "unless the capitalist encirclement is liquidated." Another principal feature of Stalinism was the complete Russian domination of the world communist movement. In deference to Stalin, communist doctrine is today called Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. Loyal communists everywhere profess allegiance to this doctrine.

The communist appeal. To anyone brought up in a liberal society, it is fantastic that this tyrannical creed should have the dynamic appeal that it does undeniably possess. But when it is remembered that the message is preached against a background of other social factors (including poverty, exploitation, ignorance of free political institutions, and hopeless psychological frustration) the initial driving force of the appeal becomes more understandable.

Communist ideology gives to its true believers the exhilaration of being members of the vanguard of the future. Believing as they do, they *know* that they are fighting against a decaying, exploiting order, that they have been chosen by history to liberate mankind; they *know* that the future is on their side; that no matter how tenaciously capitalism seeks to maintain itself, it must eventually collapse. Under such a belief system, leaders can confidently demand great sacrifices from their followers. The ruthless discipline and centralized controls are accepted as necessities in a war against the capitalist enemy.

Another powerful attraction of communism lies in its stern "religious" and humanitarian appeal (see Chapter 16).

Certainly the United States does not practice the oppressive political and economic despotism that has driven people into communism in other parts of the world. But America has its share of lonely, bitter, frustrated, dissatisfied, and sensitive people. Some are social misfits. Some are gifted idealistic people, indignant against the materialism and injustice that they believe exists here. Ironically, some, albeit a very small number of the population, may turn to communism or support communist programs because this doctrine brings meaning into their lives. It fills a spiritual vacuum. It joins them together in a great liberating crusade. The Soviet Union, which they regard as leader of the crusade among the nations of the world, thus captures their first loyalty.

If communist doctrine has appealed to some men and women even in the United States, it is easier to understand the magnetism of its appeal to other peoples who do not share all our benefits. This will be best appreciated if the tactics of political warfare, which the communists bring along with their doctrine, is understood.

Communist organization, strategy, and tactics. Communists base their organization and policies upon the structure Lenin built for the Bolshevik Party. The essence of this structure is the combination of a firmly united membership and an extremely flexible policy. Power is concentrated in a small group. No difference in viewpoint is tolerated once a policy matter has been decided by the leaders. There can be no compromise concerning the end—the achievement of power—and no compromise concerning the fundamental correctness of the party program. Compromise is encouraged *as a tactical device only*—as a means of gaining a position.

In executing party policies, any and all means to achieve the end sought are fostered. This includes all legal and legitimate methods, where possible, along with conspiracy, unification with opposition elements, including reactionaries and fascists, or going completely underground. It helps explain the bewildering shifts and turns made by world communism during the past quarter century. The Leninist strategy and tactics of the Bolshevik Party have become those of world communism. The cardinal rule is through every shift, compromise, or retreat to remain faithful to the ultimate end—preparing for the ultimate local revolution and the defense of the Soviet Union.

This combination of ruthless unity in organization and extreme fluidity in methods has, in many instances, "paid off." It was chiefly responsible for the Bolsheviks' capture of Russia in October 1917. They knew exactly what they wanted, while the other revolutionary parties did not. This certainty of goal and the rigid control that is exercised explain why in repeated instances all over the world, whether as a small minority or as a mass party, the communists have succeeded in carrying through their policies. It is a principal reason why in the face of the greatest odds, including anti-communist terrorism, communist parties have so frequently survived. It helps explain how today the communists can mobilize and use vast human and natural resources all over the world in simultaneous propaganda campaigns.

Communist organization, strategy, and tactics reveal weaknesses that will be discussed later. But as we know, this program has contributed to successful political gains and control by communism both within and outside Russia. For these are the organization, strategy, and tactics best

suited to any army at war. And we must never forget that the communist movement is continuously and tirelessly at war with any society that it does not control.

Terrorism. Addiction to violence is ingrained in communist theory and practice. The doctrine holds that an opposition does not yield to the logic of peaceful persuasion. History proves to the communist that the only way to achieve and maintain power is through force and violence. Communists regard terrorism, moreover, as not only necessary, but also as highly justifiable. It is terrorism used to preserve the interests of the masses of men. It is terrorism against a class regarded as historically doomed to destruction, a class that resists the inevitable.

There is no need to go into any detail concerning the grisly record of communist terrorism both inside and outside the Red parties, and inside and outside Russia. Purges, imprisonment, torture, seizure of power by violence whenever the chance presents itself, and the use of planned terrorism to maintain control—this is the familiar story. It has been the pattern in post-war eastern Europe, in communist China, and in Korea. Modern weapons of destruction being what they are, the monopoly of power in a communist state makes it virtually impossible for the people to revolt successfully without outside assistance. Terrorism commands their obedience. It is the first law in their lives.

Economic and social injustice. Economic distress in itself does not produce communists. It must be combined with other factors, including knowledge of the Bolshevik program of action. It is a truism, however, as old as history that impoverishment is one significant cause of revolution. As long as there exists economic distress, the communists will strive to turn it to their own advantage.

Communism also fattens upon the social inequities that prevail in a society. In the democracies especially, any social injustices that belie the promise of these societies, help explain why some people are attracted to communism or support communist programs.

Seizing upon real or imagined social injustices, upon alleged contradictions of democracy, communists are able to divide and confuse many people. It sometimes appears to some liberals as if the communists were the only true practitioners of democracy.

Intellectuals and communism. "Intellectuals" are those people in society who have an occupational concern with thinking about the nature and purpose of life. As the "idea" men and women of their communities,

they exercise considerable influence. Intellectuals are the clergymen, teachers, artists, writers, scientists, journalists, and philosophers.

The communist movement has always included a number of intellectuals. The reasons are not difficult to discover. Marxism itself, despite its errors, is very suggestive in its social analysis. The breadth of its learning cannot fail to impress its critics as well as its adherents. It was Lenin who gave communist intellectuals a prime position in the making of revolution. They were ordained to lead the masses to the promised land of socialism. Moreover the communists are aware that the dissatisfied intelligentsia, and not the proletariat, have often provided the social ferment for revolution. In communist countries today the intellectuals who support communist doctrine are a specially favored group.

In Europe, most intellectuals have traditionally taken the side of the workers and have been in the forefront of movements that have improved the lot of the laborers. Intellectuals have been "of the Left" largely for humanitarian reasons. Moral indignation against capitalism is their heritage from the nineteenth century. As the communists have succeeded in identifying themselves with this humanitarian Left, they have attracted many European intellectuals.

Most intellectuals who support the Reds are not communists, but fellow travelers in the fringe groups surrounding communism. Fellow travelers have never been numerous among American intellectuals and today even this small number has dwindled sharply, but their influence has been considerable. Seeing the communists as the most dynamic of the workers parties, opposed to some of the shallow aspects of the middle-class way of life, such intellectuals are important in confusing society about the true, brutally authoritarian nature of communism. The sensitivity to non-communist injustice is joined with a curious blindness to communist tyranny. The well-intentioned views that the majority of these "fellow-traveling" intellectuals undoubtedly display do not excuse the fact that they are all the more effective agents of communist infiltration. But in blaming them the critic must not forget the social conditions that may have helped direct them into communist hands.

The very small minority of American and European intellectuals who are ardent communists or fellow travelers, however, present a different picture. They are zealous votaries who are helping to destroy democracy. They are the better armed for their subversive work because of their admitted intellectual achievements, their incisive, critical observations of society, and their devotion to the cause of the workers *as they see it.* For these and other reasons, many liberals do not realize that these dedicated ones are really enemies of democracy. Some ardent communist

intellectuals do not themselves understand the nature of their treachery until an overt instance close to them personally drives home the facts of betrayal. Then they may become remorseful and repentant. For the small hard core of "true believing" intellectuals, however, there is no such awakening. For them communism is the future salvation of the world. These are truly dangerous people. On the whole, however, members of this small, fanatic group are not to be found in our established and respected universities, churches, and publications.

The impact of two world wars. World War I raised modern communism to power. The war sapped the last strength from the crumbling Russian Tsarist regime. Out of the chaos that followed, the Bolsheviks, by virtue of their disciplined organization, their ruthless will to power, and their understanding of the immediate desires of the people, were able to seize control of Russia.

Between 1919 and 1923 Red hopes were high for the success of communist revolutions all over Europe. These expectations were not realized, but the post-war world saw the development of mass communist parties in several important European countries and the birth of several local communist parties in the Far East.

World War II was to make communism the increasingly powerful world movement that it is today. Into the European vacuum left by the war, the Soviet union thrust her victorious legions—into the Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Balkan areas adjacent to Russia, and eastern Germany. In Italy and France, powerful communist parties emerged enjoying great popular support, particularly in Italy because of the leading role the communists had taken in directing underground resistance against the nazis and fascists, but only *after* Russia was forced into the war by Hitler's attack. The decline of France, and especially Britain, as great powers stimulated the extreme nationalism and anti-Western feeling existing in most of the Middle East. In these countries, no real alternative has yet appeared between the dominance of the foreign or native rich and a communist-oriented party.

Communism's greatest gains following World War II came in the Far East. The defeat of Japan enabled the Chinese Communists, with Russian cooperation, to move into northern China and Manchuria, formerly controlled by the Japanese, and to set the stage for the final push in the recurrent civil war that brought the great Chinese nation into the communist fold. The defeat of Japan also saw Korea, a Japanese colony since 1911, divided into pro-communist and anti-communist areas. From the northern communist area was to come the first major communist military challenge to the West. In other countries of Asia, whether

the Reds were able successfully to assert their power or not, the chaos following the war brought the communists to the fore. In several countries, as in China, they were quick to identify themselves as the leaders of a genuine national revolution.

The existence of revolutionary conditions. The social ferment that is convulsing the Far East and much of Africa and the Middle East has not yet run its course. It is supplemented by nationalistic outbreaks in those countries still controlled by the old imperialist powers. What the Soviet Union and the local communists have done and are doing is to fasten upon these explosive forces and use them for their own benefit.

In the Far East, the natives created their own revolutions, which the native communists with their organized and disciplined party sought to infiltrate. In the eastern European states, the Russian army dominated the situation.

What was common in practically all these countries now under communist control was a hatred and apathy toward the older order. Russia and the communists appeared posing as opponents of the older order. They also prevented other groups, such as democratically minded liberals and socialists, who were also opposed to the old order, from taking action. The people looked upon the communists as liberators or as the creators of a possibly better future. Many non-communists joined the Reds in an effort to get rid of the factions and cliques that had ruled for years indifferent to the fate of the people. Later they would discover that they had replaced one despotism with another.

One of the common features of these areas in which revolutions have helped bring the communists to power is the lack of any strong "middle way" between communism and the reactionaries who previously ruled. The old order suppressed all opposition. When the revolutions came, the communists with their success in maneuvering into power were the beneficiaries.

It is ironic that despotic communism has profited by legitimate revolutions against oppression. But given the state of the world, the natives' confusion with regard to Russian and communist purpose, and the failure thus far of the United States to recognize these revolutions and help guide them into democratic channels, the Reds are likely to gain still further from revolutions still seeking to be born.

The might and prestige of the Soviet Union. World communism benefits by the recent emergence of the Soviet Union as a power to be reckoned with in Europe and Asia and as one of the two commanding powers in the entire world. The admiration, as well as fear, which Russia

excites throughout the world stems mainly from the part she played in defeating the Nazi armies in World War II and also from the concurrent decline of other great European powers.

The Soviet Union still maintains its hold upon the feelings of millions of non-communists throughout the world. In war-weary Europe particularly, Russia became identified for many as the protector of peace. The false image of a peace-loving government whose atomic discoveries are directed to the pursuits of peace is put forth by the local communists and their supporters in various countries. Millions of non-communists have accepted the communist story that the Soviet Union is the bulwark against American designs upon Europe and Asia. And for the vast number of Europeans who would prefer not to take sides in the Cold War, there is always the reminder that Russia is capable of overrunning most of the continent to hold them in an uneasy allegiance.

In the Orient, Russia's power and prestige are marked. It is not only that China, the natural leader of Asia today, acknowledges the influence of Russian leadership. But Russia's "official" or surface non-opposition to the post-war social and national revolutions elsewhere in Asia, in contrast to American policy, benefits the Soviet Union, as will be seen later.

World-wide mistrust of America. An unpleasant truth of today's Cold War is that in many quarters Americans are not liked or respected. We are feared and mistrusted by millions who have little sympathy for communism. We are hated by other non-communist millions who are drifting toward communism.

Americans are puzzled and angry when they realize this. Three times since 1917 we have sent our youth overseas in wars to stop aggressive tyrannies. We have given away our wealth to feed the starving and bolster the economies of foreign nations.

That much of the anti-American attitudes may be unfair matters much less than that it exists, to our detriment and communist profit. Envy, resentment, and misunderstanding on the one hand, American thoughtlessness and egoism and failure to implement our democratic ideas fully on the other hand, contribute to building this attitude.

Europeans and Latin Americans resent the diffusion of the cheaper aspects of American culture as well as their own economic dependence upon the United States, and view our racial conflicts as a sign that we are not yet civilized. In addition, the Latin Americans remember past interference by "The Giant of the North" and are not sure those days are over.

The fact that the words "capitalism" and "socialism" mean quite different things to Europeans and Americans engenders much misunder-

standing. Capitalism on the continent of Europe has not been the flexible system open to the impact of democracy that it has been in America. Certain spokesmen for capitalist America frequently lump socialists and communists togther. This careless confusion infuriates many potential allies; many European socialists are devoted to demo-

"I Don't Know What I'd Do Without You, Mister"



From The Herblock Book (*Beacon Press*)

cratic institutions and, having spent their lives fighting the communist tyranny, represent for millions the strongest and most constructive opposition to communism.

In Europe there is also doubt, among people in all classes, of America's ability to offer the leadership that the world needs, and of our devotion

to peace. We are accused of relying too greatly upon military means in our approach to cold war problems. Europeans also are suspicious of our methods for combating internal subversion. In some quarters, America is regarded as the victim of a fear hysteria that is destroying our traditional freedom.

In Asia, we are feared and despised by many as the supporters of reaction or as the new exponents of colonialism. There, ironically, in contrast to the Soviet Union, we appear to be seeking to thwart the success of genuine native revolutions. We have supported some of those who have sought to suppress these revolutions by military force. We have assumed *from the beginning* that any revolution that communists led or participated in was bound to serve Moscow's interest. Elsewhere, Americans have at times shown a complete ignorance of the feelings of people who are naturally intoxicated by their emergence from colonial or semi-colonial status. In the Middle East, periodic anti-American outbreaks arise from a deep feeling that America's post-war intervention in that area means that the Moslem nations will continue to be treated as the pawns of the larger powers.

Meeting the challenge. Americans may dislike being forced to bear the new responsibility of leading the West in international affairs. But no other free nation can command the military or economic power in which leadership resides. The alternative to active American leadership is the further advance of Soviet power. Under such circumstances we must earn the leadership that history has thrust upon us.

With or without war with Russia, the conflict with communist aggression will go on for many years, upon many fronts. But there is no need for fear or pessimism, much less for panic. The Soviet Union and international communism display weaknesses as well as strength. And the potential resources of the West are much greater if properly deployed. Let us now look at some of the weaknesses in the communist structure.

Dents in the Red Armor

The initial driving zeal of communist ideology is bound to evaporate in a society after the realities of actual totalitarian rule begin to be realized. Where uniformity is demanded, the inspiration for fresh ideas necessary to progress cannot be created. Communist society is held together on the basis of force and fear of domestic police

and outside enemies. This is not the brave new energetic world that the communist faith promised man.

The Bolshevik organizational pattern serves remarkably well as long as a state of domestic and international tension and crisis can be maintained. But with the passage of years a people subjected to unending jitters becomes jaded by these repeated shocks. Moreover, the rigid organization requiring absolute obedience to the elite is a goad to men of spirit who on occasion cannot agree with the party. This is one of the reasons for the many Red purges. The communist state eliminates many dissenters who would bring a needed vigor into the nation's councils. Among the top leadership, moreover, there is periodic evidence of conflicts that *might* some time cause a major national disturbance. (It must be admitted, however, that Russia has successfully weathered several serious inner-party conflicts.)

Lenin fused this party organizational pattern with the international communist movement. Stalin made it mean the subservience of all communist states to Russia. But in many countries this Bolshevik type organization may not prove enduring, for it is too contradictory to established tradition and custom. People do not need to possess a democratic tradition to desire freedom, scorn leader-worship, or be indifferent to exacting demands for efficiency. This fact is evident in Yugoslavia. It may some day become evident in Red China and other communist countries.

In the matter of Russian demand for obedience to Moscow by all good communists there is the obvious illustration of Tito to suggest what *could* happen. "Titoism" is a heresy that keeps the Kremlin leaders awake nights. So far this heresy has not captured any communist nation other than Yugoslavia, and it would be unwise to put too much trust in it as an immediate, serious threat to Moscow. But there have been rumblings of discontent among the eastern European satellites, as the mass demonstrations in Eastern Germany in June 1953 vividly illustrated. The passing of Stalin might lead to an eventual loosening of Moscow's hold over international communism. There is no way of telling how much incipient Titoism exists under cover among the world's communist leaders. This is something both we and the Kremlin would like to know.

Nationalism, traditional suspicion of Russia, and intra-party intrigue among the people and leaders of the new communist nations could lead to devastating friction within the international communist movement itself. For Russia has always insisted upon submission to her direction in the big questions concerning the policies pursued by communists

everywhere. If ever China challenges Russia's leadership of the communist world, this may work to the advantage of the West.

Subservience to Moscow often weakens the position of communists in non-communist countries. This weakness, of course, is obvious in nations like Britain and the United States. In non-communist countries where the communists enjoy great popular support, such as France and Italy, it is a touchy subject between the party and its non-communist supporters. A person may also wonder if within the French and Italian communist leadership there is the unity upon the all-prevailing first loyalty to Moscow that is periodically publicly intoned.

Several serious errors in Stalin's predictions of future events can be pointed out. Stalin believed that Hitler's rising Nazi movement in the late 1920's would be a brief prelude to a communist triumph in Germany. His strategy for world communism at the time helped Hitler to power, decimated the German Communist Party, and almost led to the downfall of the Soviet Union in World War II.

The Kremlin flashed the green light to her North Korean satellite in June 1950 in the belief that America would not take up a challenge that meant a "minor" war. The result was not only the reverse of what was expected; the Kremlin also succeeded in convincing the American public of the urgent need for speedy rearmament.

This list of serious blunders in strategy and tactics could be enlarged. It tells us what our brief analysis of communist strength reveals: Although it would be disastrous to underestimate the variety of resources at the Kremlin's command, it would also be dangerously stupid to build up the enemy as an impregnable, trouble-free, and all-wise Goliath. (When we also remember the definite military and economic weaknesses of the communist world, we should be the more relieved.) If we and the non-communist world can buckle down to a political campaign of attrition and deploy our diplomatic and our ideological, as well as material, resources correctly, the future should be ours.

What Should We Be Doing?

Military rearmament and commitments. As the leader of the non-communist world, we know that we must, wherever it is necessary, use our armament and our men to contain aggressive communism. Russian-directed aggression has forced upon us the reluctant acceptance of the hard-headed Roman axiom, "To preserve peace, prepare for war." In a world that is still far removed from the establish-

ment of an effective international government, we must be militarily strong.

We know that the Kremlin's rulers are hard-headed realists. They venerate and respect power. In Europe and in the Middle East, in the early years after the war, when America stood demobilized, and therefore temporized in the face of Russian aggrandizement, the Russians pressed their advantage. They overran eastern Europe, provoked civil war in Greece, put pressure upon Turkey, and sent troops over the border into Iran. The Truman Doctrine in the Spring of 1947, which committed American military support to Greece and Turkey, halted Soviet aggression. Later, American reinforcements in Germany and our Berlin airlift broke any immediate plans that Russia may have had to forcibly drive us from Berlin.

When Moscow shifted its attack to Asia and tested our readiness by outright military aggression in Korea, American arms and men effectively blocked this thrust. The future judicious use of American might, plus our own positive diplomacy, may prevent an all-out military war with Russia.

Military aid to our allies. There is no question about the necessity of our supplying arms to those who are resisting communist aggression. We should, however, make our military aid available in such a fashion that it helps bring us the support and respect of the various countries we aid. The problem in Europe is different from the situation that confronts us in the Far East.

In Europe, we have a formal bond of alliance with governments that are for the most part long established and democratic. With Portugal, Spain, and Yugoslavia, however, we have a special problem. We must always make it clear that our military aid to these three countries does not mean we approve of their present forms of government. We must not give the people of any of these countries the impression that in exchange for their government's adherence to our alliance against Russian aggression we have pledged support to dictatorship.

In the Far East, we deal with a more complex situation. There, the question of sending military aid to those who resist communism is entangled with the question of successful or continuing post-war native revolutions. As already mentioned, we have been prone to assume that these revolutions are subservient to Moscow; therefore we have often put our military support behind outmoded regimes and antagonized or made indifferent many Asiatics who otherwise might have been our friends. This problem will be discussed further in Chapter 32.

What should we do concerning support to dubious Asiatic allies? We

shall have to continue supporting those who resist communism, for Asian communism is, at present, closely aligned with Moscow. But it may well be that these regimes never could receive the support of the people in an honestly conducted election. Therefore, the military support given to them must be thought of as a *temporary necessity and never as approval of the political order.*

In our relations with our allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, difficulties are bound to arise. Communist propaganda works tirelessly to exaggerate differences that naturally develop between us and our European allies. Many Americans, for example, are concerned about sending large members of our men overseas. We are told by some authorities that we should restrict ourselves largely to sending air force personnel to Europe. The question of the "fair share" of ground troops that America should commit around the world also arose during the Korean war. Because of the heavy proportion of Americans among non-Asiatic U.N. troops engaged, much was said in the United States about saving American lives and getting more foreign troops into the Korean front lines. In both cases, communist propaganda seized the chance to hurt America in the eyes of our allies.

As the only free nation strong enough to lead, it is essential that we put our best foot forward. If we are to inoculate Europe with the will to resist Moscow's pressures, we must show a willingness to deliver the men as well as the goods. This is the most effective answer we can give to those "neutralists" in Europe who argue that America will fight to the last European.

The presence of American troops in Germany is the backbone of the West Berliners' heroic resistance to Soviet machinations in the Cold War; it is positive proof that we believe the defense of Europe is vital to our national security. Does anyone imagine that if the communist armies struck tomorrow we would not for the third time since 1917 send troops to Europe in vast numbers?

Although we were, and still are, justly concerned over the loss of our boys in Korea, we must also remember several other things. First, French and British troops are engaged in large numbers in fighting communists in Southeast Asia. The American attitude appears to many Europeans to indicate a willingness on our part to sacrifice their sons for ours. Our natural concern for our men gives an impression that American lives should have top priority. As a consequence, our leadership of the free world suffers. We appear unwilling to bear our responsibilities as leader of the free world.

Our goal should not be mutual admiration between us and our allies

but mutual respect that grows out of joint participation against a common danger. We must always lead in the tedious task of working for cooperation. But we must never forget that we have to win respect for our leadership. Europeans and Asiatics are sick of wars; they have been too close to too many. They know that we are not rearming them because we like them. They are skeptical, but not cowardly or inferior people. If we give them adequate military support combined with an effective program, we can rightfully demand that they carry their share of the common burden.

Peace—and diplomatic warfare. While Russia prepares for war, she very shrewdly, through communist international front groups, propagandizes for peace. These peace proposals are designed to publicize those disarmament plans and international policies that would benefit Russia and the communist world at our expense. The same old charges that the United States was responsible for the war in Korea and that the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, and the Mutual Security Pact represent American warmongering continue to be made by various international "people's peace congresses."

This spurious peace campaign is a vivid example of the communist use of psychological warfare. The Reds parallel their "peace" campaigns with continuing "hate America" campaigns. *Our* possession of the atom bomb and *our* rearmament are offered as proof that we are an imperialistic nation bent on war. But no delegates to the various Red world peace congresses have voiced any criticism of the military or political situation behind the Iron Curtain.

Belatedly the United States has awakened to the fact that in the stress of hurrying to defend ourselves against Russian aggression we had neglected to proclaim our interest in the preservation of peace. We had overlooked an important sector on the psychological front where the conflict is for the minds and hearts of people.

The world is apprehensive about another widespread carnage. We must adopt the thesis that an outright military war with the Soviet Union is not inevitable. The Soviet Union, for a variety of reasons—her own internal weakness, the belief in the long-run inability of capitalism to maintain itself, her limited influence over satellite armies, and so forth—will in all likelihood continue to conduct her world-wide aggression primarily by methods short of large-scale war. While we counteract the Soviet method of subversive warfare, we must identify ourselves before the world as a peace-loving nation. Through our rearmament, a show of force when necessary, and by an alert, enlightened, and active

diplomacy, we must seek to prevent any further Russian or Russian-sponsored aggression that could lead to World War III. We can now assume the offensive on the moral and psychological front.

We must tell the world that the more we find it necessary to rearm ourselves and our allies, the more we are also willing to prove ourselves interested in peace. Above the counter-claims and assertions of the communists are these facts: We liquidated our tremendous military machine at the close of World War II; only after Russian aggression made clear her intentions did we start to rearm. In sponsoring the Baruch proposal, we presented a plan for international control of atomic weapons to the United Nations and saw it overwhelmingly accepted, only to be blocked by Soviet Russia. As President Eisenhower's atomic control plan further shows, we seek *definite international agreements* of such a nature that the use of horrible weapons of destruction will truly be outlawed. The Russian-sponsored plans are based upon the promises of *sovereign nations* not to use such weapons. A sovereign nation is, at bottom, the only judge of whether or not it will keep its promises.

Communist psychological warfare has been so successful in picturing us as a trigger-happy nation piling up atomic bombs that it will take constant hard work to erase that image. We should not neglect to publicize the numerous ways in which we are developing atomic research for peaceful pursuits. We have already mentioned that communist tactics built up a climate of opinion that neutralized our freedom of decision concerning the use of atomic weapons in Korea. We should turn the tables against the enemy and exploit the propaganda advantages of our decision *not* to use the bomb. (At the same time we would make it clear that until we can secure cooperation from the Reds in the matter of an effective ban upon atomic and hydrogen weapons, we will not be propagandized into foregoing any possible use of these weapons in the future.)

Our willingness to participate in the three years of truce talks in Korea, despite communist obstructionist tactics, should be built up as another example of America's sincere desire to achieve peace.

Over and above the strident accusations hurled back and forth around the globe, our propagandists should exploit the significant difference between the philosophies of democracy and any kind of modern totalitarianism. Ours is a philosophy that assumes the probability of an essential good will among men. It conceives of differences being ironed out by discussion and compromise—indeed it makes compromise a principle. Liberal democracy is also a philosophy that regards the use of force only as a means of last resort.

No matter how much we err in our practical allegiance to this heritage

"Thank You!" "Thank You!" "Thank You!"



From The Herblock Book (*Beacon Press*)

of Western Civilization, we are firmly attached to it. A totalitarian philosophy, at bottom, runs to the contrary. It stresses class or national antagonisms. It regards compromise as merely a tactic in an eternal conflict against a flagrantly evil opponent. It believes that force is the natural handmaiden of change.

Our psychological warfare for peace will have the difficult task of stimulating the people against the communist evil, yet holding the reins so that there is no great moral crusade launched that might lead to war. We must not view our power struggle with Russia and world communism solely as a struggle between all that is good and all that is evil.[2] A moral crusade assumes that no area of negotiation with Russia, or China, is

possible. War, then, becomes inevitable. The assumption that war is necessary to root out the evil is a dangerous and wrong assumption. The immorality of all forms of totalitarianism is clear to democrats. Yet we do not assume that we must forcibly destroy all those nations whose governments are totalitarian. We could not, if we would, run all over the world exorcising all the political and social evils we despise. It is only when the actions of a powerful nation or alliance threaten our security that we must look to our arms as one possible defense. In our struggle for the minds of the world, we must give strong support to the United Nations. No matter what criticisms can justly be made of the U.N. it remains the one great world forum of public opinion (see Chapter 32).

It is a pity that the intensity and bitterness generated by the Cold War atmosphere in America has so far interfered with the use of what could be an effective anti-Communist propaganda device—appeal to the sense of humor. There is much that is comical, for example, in communist-exaggerated claims of scientific and cultural world leadership, in the naive Red picture of American workers and capitalists, in the history of the American comrades' frantic efforts to wiggle into the correct position after each flip and flop of the Moscow line. Communists take themselves so seriously that they are particularly open to ridicule. French and Italian anti-communists have long known this and have acted accordingly. These anti-communists, moreover, have also not hesitated on occasion to laugh at their own exaggerations. Americans should display a bit of their own sense of humor to relieve the tension and to help keep a sense of balance concerning the true nature of the Red threat.

A campaign for mutual understanding and respect. If Russia captures the world mind, communism will win without any vast military war. Our counter-attack must first create those conditions from which a better *common* understanding of ourselves and foreign peoples will emerge. Mutual respect will come later. Mutual admiration will follow last of all.

When we look more closely at the global anti-Americanism that exists, we discover that *it does not necessarily mean a pro-Russianism.* Indeed, it is often more exactly revealed as an anti-war, anti-poverty feeling. We should be encouraged by this. For as we prove ourselves to be the enemies of war and poverty we will win people to our cause.

Some roads to better understanding. Throughout the world we must try to understand the social revolutions that are in existence, or struggling to be born. Economic and technical assistance affords one magnificent opportunity to bring to the less fortunate millions in underde-

veloped areas positive proof that we are their friends. Through such aid we get the chance to work at the people's level. It gives us the opportunity to teach and to learn. We can demonstrate that we are not seeking to stabilize and reclaim for the benefit of landlords. We must base this reclamation upon *mutually shared* experience. We can clearly show that the war against disease, poverty, hunger, and illiteracy—the breeders of communism—is the only war we seek.

The Point IV program can be one avenue toward mutual understanding. It should not be regarded as a "give away" project nor is it the cure-all that can solve all the world's problems (see Chapter 32). But it can make for mutual respect. Mainly through "the Point IV way" lies our chance to promote *our idea* of revolution in place of the Russian idea.

We must show to the world, and Europe in particular, that American capitalism should not be identified with the cartel ridden and rigid European variety of capitalism. We must educate our socialist allies to the fact that in America capitalism and democracy have prospered together. The names of Paul Hoffman, Nelson Rockefeller, and Henry Ford II should be used to illustrate this. We must positively acquaint foreign intellectuals with the existence of such business-established agencies as the Committee for Economic Development and the Ford Foundation that aid and subsidize unbiased, honest research in the fields of polities and economics. It is particularly important that the Ford Foundation's grants to scholars for travel and study abroad and its support of research in the area of civil liberties be brought to the attention of foreign anti-communist intellectuals of the Left. For already Moscow is disturbed by the Ford fellowship scholars abroad. Communist broadcasts label these scholars as spies.

On the cultural front, we face a task that requires a good deal of humility without any groveling servility. We can readily admit that our country has not given sufficient encouragement to creative artists. We should acknowledge the cultural debt we owe to Europe, Asia, and Latin America. We can wryly agree that one of the consequences of freedom and mass production has been a flood of trash.

Having done this, we can present the better side of the case for American culture. We are a nation that *does* encourage the interpretative artist. Our symphonies, libraries, and universities are handsomely endowed. Millions of copies of inexpensive paperbound classics cover our bookstalls along with the trash. We are not cultural vulgarians, but a young, rapidly maturing people.

In this struggle for the minds of men, America will have to give up its suspicions of foreigners and its feeling that most of the world is a lesser

breed, naturally given to indolence or to radicalism. We will have to alter our immigration laws, which continue to flaunt a conception of "master races" that are completely inconsistent with our democratic ideals.

We should continue, by actively working through the United Nations wherever possible, to indicate that we have no desire to dominate, but every interest in seeing established some form of world government (see Chapter 32).

A special concern—the Russian people. Finally, we should not neglect the Russian people. Like any people, they are loyal to their government. Their physical welfare has slowly but steadily been improved. But the intensity of their loyalty should be investigated. The initial dynamism of communism is now gone. In its place is the steady plodding under the urging of party bureaucrats whose chief incentives are those of force and fear. The Russians have been through much travail since 1917. The question arises: How much further can a people be driven before they turn on their tormentors?

We should not call for any civil war within Russia. Such a policy would not go well with much of the world pacifist opinion we seek to win. Moreover, as in the case of the people of the east European satellites, any active resistance program at this time would be repressed by a ruthless totalitarian government. What we *should* do is remind the Russians *and our own people* that, when they have had the chance, the Russians have chosen freedom. We should tell the world about the period following the overthrow of the Tsar when the Russians, after centuries of ignorance and poverty, started on the road to democracy, only to have their revolution against tyranny seized from them by a ruthless minority who masked tyranny behind the slogans of peace, bread, and land.

The struggle to capture the mind of the world will take a lot of doing. It will mean a drastic revision of much State Department practice. It will mean putting men into foreign places who actively seek contact with the plain people. Among other things, it will mean listening to, and consulting more with, our own intelligentsia on the humbler levels who study, move, and live among the peoples overseas. It should mean fewer receptions for prominent traveling American businessmen, politicians, and generals and more for American creative artists or labor leaders. It must seek to defeat communism by putting into practice the democratic ideals of equality, freedom, and justice. The reward will be the acceptance of America, rather than Soviet Russia, as the leader of the world.

Democracy is the Way to Victory

Our democratic tradition and today's world. Ours is the tradition of liberal democracy. The elements of that tradition are faith in the people, tolerance, the encouragement of freedom, a belief in equality, and responsible government (see Chapter 25). Democracy holds that although the people can be wrong and the few right, it is better in the long run to trust the people rather than the few. Democracy says that although unregulated freedom can lead to disorder, and restraint is necessary to preserve the conditions for social existence, freedom, and not restraint, is the higher good. Democracy asserts that although men are naturally unequal in talents, initiative, and in numerous other ways that must be recognized, their most essential characteristic is their common humanity.

Democracy builds its concept of government upon these elements. It is the only form of government that affords all the people the opportunity to express their views concerning the policies of their rulers. It is the only form of government in which the rulers hold office because they periodically win from an uncoerced people the privilege of governing.

This way of life and political system is the product of centuries of development. Throughout history the forces making for democracy have had to combat continuously those who have sought to negate it—those who stress order as the highest good, law as the rule of arbitrary might, and government by coercion instead of by will of the people. Present-day communism represents the latest and most serious threat to democracy.

Through the logic of history, America has now become the champion of the democratic world. Americans have long been identified with the practice of freedom and equality. Freedom was the supreme end that our government was instituted to secure. Equality before the law and equality of opportunity brought millions of downtrodden people to our shores and gave them respectability. Both as means and as ends, freedom and equality have been the indelible marks of America's greatness. The demonstration of our faith in democracy is our greatest weapon in the present struggle with communism.

Fighting communism by practicing democracy at home. A suspicious world watches and weighs our actions against our claims that we are the greatest democracy on earth. In truth, in our fight against communism, our actions at times have shown a mistrust of democracy. Our fear of in-



British Information Service; Detroit News

COMMUNISM IN THE DEMOCRACIES

"I do not agree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."—Voltaire. One of democracy's greatest strengths is its determination to let the opposition tell its story. Soap box orators in Hyde Park, London; the Daily Worker sold openly on American streets; British communist leader speaking to workmen.

ternal communism has led to many self-inflicted wounds upon freedom. An exaggerated infectious fear of communism creates a social atmosphere that stultifies freedom. Men are afraid to speak their minds. We thus stand to lose one of our greatest assets in our struggle with communism, namely our resourcefulness in meeting new problems and changing situations, a trait that is generated by freedom.

The communists *do* present a special problem. They are the agents of a foreign power. They are difficult to identify because they seldom operate openly. We must have effective laws to suppress those who plot to commit acts of sabotage and espionage. But freedom is one great end of a democratic society as well as a means for preserving that society. Force, for believers in democracy, is a matter of last resort. The United States is in no danger of accepting communist ideas if we utilize the techniques of freedom to fight subversion. Let us fight communist thought with free thought.

In passing, let us remember that combating communism at home also requires a positive program for securing equality of opportunity. Democracy can mean little to citizens who are not guaranteed the chance for a decent future.

An even greater center for communist breeding, which demands further positive democratic action, is to be found among American minority groups that suffer discrimination. The accomplishments of America in recent years fortunately show a definite trend toward equal treatment for the Negroes and other "second-class citizens," but many of us have still to learn to live in mutual respect with people whose skin color, nationality, or religion is different from our own.

Fighting communism by practicing democracy abroad. When we look abroad, we see again the evil consequences that a policy based upon an obsessive fear of communism can produce. Fear of communism is part of our alliance with reactionaries all over the globe. Especially in Asia, in countries emerging to greater freedom or to full independence after years of unhappy experiences with the West, has this been the case.

It is no easy task to support the cause of freedom in the underdeveloped areas of the world. Few people there know anything about democracy. Often the only organized alternative force to native communism has been the unwanted government of an unwanted old social system. We have had pitifully small pickings from which to develop a freer society.

There is, however, no use denying the fact that in Asia our fear of communism contributed greatly to the present mess. Moreover, in Central and South America, in Europe, and the Middle East we continue, for

reasons of expediency, to deal with people who hate democracy and seek to use our fear of communism as a means of blackmail.

These distasteful facts of life are so potentially harmful to American prestige before the world that the suggestions previously made in these pages merit repeating. In the few instances where our security demands working with reactionary governments, we must make it clear to the people that we do not approve of these governments. We are still paying heavily for whitewashing Stalin in World War II. Wherever such governments are dependent upon us we can enforce our own terms. These should mean that the price of our aid is the benefit of the people. Everywhere our policy should be to seek the friendship of *the people,* not only the alliance with their governments.

Point IV points to the democratic way. It is by winning the trust of foreign peoples that we strengthen democracy's cause throughout the world. Here is where the Point IV program, or something similar, is so crucially important within our entire active program of political warfare. For the United States cannot defeat the idea of communism with dollars or bullets. Ultimately the battle will be decided on the psychological and moral front. Point IV seeks to bring American capital and scientific knowledge to the underdeveloped areas of the world. The object of Point IV is to help the people help themselves. In order to encourage private business to invest in the underdeveloped lands, the American government assumes some of the risks of the investment. But if the cooperative effort between Americans and foreign peoples is realized, the investment can be economically as well as politically profitable.

Point IV is, therefore, a most constructive part of our foreign policy. Our rearmament, which must go on because of Russian aggression, is of no constructive value. The peasants of Asia cannot grow rice with our bayonets and airplanes. But the American agricultural extension specialist can help create improved methods of rice cultivation. He has become the missionary to reclaim the peoples of three continents for democracy's cause.

Point IV is ordinarily thought of as an economic weapon by means of which we hope to compete successfully with the powerful appeal that communism makes to hungry people. *But it is much more than that.* Potentially the "Point IV way" is a vibrant example of the democratic way in practice. Ordinary people working together, sharing their problems, coming to an understanding, participating jointly in the decisions taken—this is Point IV at its best. Mutual respect is engendered. We help people to help themselves and they see that we have come among them as friends, not as profiteering foreigners seeking to dominate them.

Americans learn to understand that these despoiled masses are people like ourselves. We learn to see their problems through their eyes and adjust ourselves accordingly. This means that from the beginning we seek to learn and to follow, as well as to teach and to lead. Since most



U. S. Dept. of Agriculture

HELPING PEOPLE HELP THEMSELVES

An American and two Salvadoreans, working under Point IV, test soil fertility.

of these underprivileged masses are "colored," we learn also to overcome prejudices that have so bedeviled our cause around the world. As we help people toward technical modernization we can, by examples, seek to have them evolve in the direction of constitutional democracy. Moreover, the ideas of human brotherhood, the respect for group rights,

the village independence from the central government, are characteristic of the oriental areas. These native traits are the best foundation for the governments of these newer countries. The eventual democracy that can come must grow from native roots.

The Point IV way, then, can check communism by extending democracy. Already in many modest projects it is suggesting its potential value. If we identify ourselves with those forces upon three continents that seek to free the people from bondage, we will prove that in the end our belief in democracy triumphed over our fear of communism. For democracy means faith in the people. And the true measure of victory over tyranny anywhere is what the people feel and believe in their hearts and minds.

32

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND AMERICAN LEADERSHIP

International Anarchy

Conflict, the stuff of politics. Politics in general deals with conflict and adjustment. Where a high degree of social cooperation exists among people, few conflicts occur and only minor adjustments are required. Rarely, however, does such harmony exist, and although social life is never pure conflict, neither is it ever pure peace. Thus man is continuously engaged in politics and is almost constantly absorbed in trying to conciliate and arbitrate the conflicts that arise between individuals, between groups of the same society, and between different societies. Occasionally, and this is particularly true on the international level, the efforts for peaceful settlement fail and adjustment is achieved by violence—if adjustment it can be called.

Conflicts have various causes. Conflict between the individual and

society, for instance, sometimes results from the individual's seeking to use society for his own ends, but being prevented from doing so by barriers of custom, convention, and law that have evolved or have been erected to protect the interests of the many. Conflicts between individuals or groups or societies may result from different *interests,* from conflicting *ideologies,* and from *the need for resolving frustrations.*

A conflict of interest quite common in a modern industrial society is that between employers and employees over wages. For the worker, the wage is the main factor determining his level of living; he wants to have a high wage. But to the employer, wages represent a sizable part of his costs of production, which he wants to keep as low as possible. The need for resolving frustrations is, for instance, involved in race conflicts. Here certain fears, frustrations, and insecurities find their outlet in aggressions. Typical ideological conflicts are religious conflicts. They are characterized by great emotional intensity and uncompromising attitudes.

It is, of course, impossible to make a neat separation of the factors of ideology, interest, and frustration. A conflict situation is usually complex, involving all three factors, although with varying degrees of emphasis. Let us take an anti-Negro riot as an example. Here we have the element of frustration among whites of low status. Then there is the "ideological" element: "Negroes are an inferior race." These two elements will have "loaded" the situation. If there is now an influx of Negro workers into a community, the element of interest (in this case fear of competition) is added and the situation may explode.

It is noteworthy that to the participants, conflict will more often than not appear to be ideological. People hate to admit to themselves that they are frustrated. They also have the urge to rationalize their conflicts of interest. People usually want to have both advantages *and* a feeling of righteousness. They will therefore try hard to convince themselves that their aspirations are identical with the best interests of society or mankind.

This is not to deny that ideals exist and move people or that people may have conflicting ideals. Yet the only rational approach in the case of conflicting ideals is for a person to defend his own ideals or the truly identical ideals of others, but not to try to impose his beliefs upon people or societies that are different. It should always be realized that societies can share common ideals only if they have much else in common. A person should not be deceived by the fact that all people use such terms as "justice" and "liberty" to express their aspirations. These words are very broad abstractions whose real meaning is provided only by the concrete setting. In a free-enterprise society, freedom will mean the

absence of government interference; in a socialist society, freedom will mean positive government interference to protect the individual from want. Both use the same words but actually speak a different language. Although both may use these terms in good faith, it should be noted that not every idealistic profession of a politician or of a nation is made in good faith. Quite often such professions are mere rationalizations to cover aspirations for power.

Is conflict bad? It depends. Conflicts give a certain dynamism to society. If each individual were content to adjust readily to the society in which he is born, the world would change very little. If management had been satisfied with its profits and labor with its wages, production would have been very slow to increase. Yet conflict ceases to be meaningful if its end result does not greatly outweigh its attendant evils.

Adjustment of conflict. Conflicts are adjusted either peacefully or violently. In the first case, adjustment is a matter of negotiation and compromise; in the second case, the solution is imposed by force. Within a society (disregarding revolution), the overriding common interest in the continued existence of the community and the presence of a government keeps conflict within peaceful confines. If there is a strike, police and the courts prevent people from leaping at one another's throats; and often during periods of great international crises an appeal to contending domestic factions that the country is in peril from an external enemy will have a sobering effect upon both sides. The absence of such restraints at the international level encourages adjustment by violence.

Whether a conflict is easy or difficult to adjust depends very often upon how it is viewed. If it is seen as a conflict of interests, it is more easily settled than if it is viewed as a struggle between virtue and wickedness. For a person can compromise interests, but cannot compromise with evil. As long as management viewed labor organizations as violating God's order, labor disputes were not negotiable. George F. Baer, president of the Reading Coal and Iron Company, declared during the strike of the anthracite coal miners in 1902, "The rights and interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared for, not by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in His infinite wisdom, has given control of property interests of the country." But as soon as this idea was replaced by the view that conflict between management and labor was a conflict of interests between two groups, both of which have a right to existence and protection, the sting was taken out of their mutual relations. On the international level, if a conflict is seen as one between good and evil, only a fight to the finish can result. But if it is accepted as a conflict of interests, chances for diplomatic adjustment

of the issue are greatly improved. If we here recall what we said before about the place of ideals in politics and particularly international politics, we shall see that there is seldom any need to view a conflict in terms other than those of interest.

The place of force in international relations. Within a domestic society, government restrains a person or group from using force against others. Thus the physical force that an individual can command within a society is of little significance and carries with it little prestige. No person can coerce another, nor is an individual compelled to resort to force to defend himself.

But the restraints that exist at the domestic level do not operate at the international level. Nobody guarantees the survival of a nation, and nobody can restrain the powerful from attacking the weak. There is no world government that would assume toward nations the same role a domestic government assumes toward its nationals. The survival of a nation depends basically upon its own strength or the strength of other countries interested in its survival. Since there is no super government with a monopoly of force, each nation can arm itself (international agreements notwithstanding) as much as it wishes or can afford. Since it is possible to command such force, there is often the temptation to use it for other than protective purposes.

On the domestic level, since it is impossible to coerce somebody else to serve us, individuals must exchange services. In order to get the maximum benefit from the exchange, a person must maximize his own contributions; he must develop special skills. Thus the nature of a domestic society forces an individual to sublimate his power drives. On the international level, however, such sublimation is not required. It is possible for one nation to coerce another nation into working for it without offering much in return. The result is that from both aspects, that of self-protection and that of coercing others, physical strength is at a premium. This accounts for the crudity of international politics. Among states it is not an Albert Einstein who counts, but a Rocky Marciano.

To understand the international situation better, let us pause for a moment and try to imagine what would happen in a city from which the police and the courts had disappeared. Would an eminent artist or a strong muscle man be the person most sought after in such a community? Would you as a parent encourage your son to develop artistic skills or would you try to make him handy with a gun?

In a society from which law and order had disappeared, morality would surely suffer. By and large there is a connection between security

and morality. If somebody faints in the street, everyone rushes to help him. But very few people would volunteer their services if they were likely to be shot at while ministering to the victim. This same general feeling of insecurity accounts for much of the moral perversion that marks the conduct of international relations.

Yet in some cases, international relations have been forthright, honorable, and friendly. Man can occasionally rise above his circumstances. International relations is one of those areas where proper perspective can be gained not simply by seeing how much better things could be, but also by realizing how much worse they could be.

Nationalism and Imperialism

Nations and nationalism. The organization of the world into nations is taken so much for granted that many people think of the nation as a natural unit. Yet no social organization, with the exception of the family, is "natural." People have lived in tribes, in a theocratic universal state, in national states, and one day may live in a world state.

The modern state is of comparatively recent origin dating from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Medieval man had no notion of a state as we conceive it today. He had two loyalties, a secular loyalty to his immediate feudal superior and a spiritual loyalty to the Pope in Rome. True, there were kings and princes during medieval times, but they were not important in the lives of most people. As far as the ordinary man was concerned, his welfare depended upon the local baron more than upon anybody else. That people spoke the same language did not create a sense of community, nor did the fact that others spoke a different tongue make them an out-group. Pride in a person's own language was completely unknown in medieval times. Medieval man believed that language differences were the result of man's wickedness. God had confounded man's speech because man had been so immodest as to try to build a tower, Babel, reaching into heaven. (This is an example of the fact that the significance of things is very often derived from the fact that people *believe* them to be significant.)

The fragmentation of the political order was of little significance as long as the economy was a simple agrarian one and products locally available were considered satisfactory. But when in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries trade routes were extended, feudal barriers became a nuisance, particularly for the new merchant class that was waxing

influential as a result of commercial ventures. This class became interested in establishing political conditions that would allow doing business over large areas. At the same time, the kings and princes began to reassert their authority. Almost inevitably a kind of unspoken alliance developed between the merchant (middle) class and these kings and princes. After long years of bloody fights and intrigues, some dynasties were able to defeat other dynasties and emerge on top. Later on, early in the sixteenth century, the Protestant Reformation cut or seriously weakened the ties with Rome. Ultimately the secular loyalty of medieval times expanded, the spiritual loyalty contracted, and both merged in the person of the king. The dynastic struggles not only decided who would rule, but also determined the borders of various countries.

Thus when people started on their way to nationhood, they were Frenchmen or Spaniards solely because they were ruled by one king. *The political unit based upon loyalty to a particular ruling house is a dynastic state.* Soon each people were being made conscious of their own particular achievements in the arts, sciences, and other fields and were led to believe that no other language could compare with their own. (What had before been a sign of wickedness now became one of pride.) The emphasis upon language and culture and in some cases on religion as distinguishing marks created a new sentiment, that of nationalism. The political unit that came to be based upon this sentiment is called the *national state.*

In some cases, the legal-geographical concept of the state became of greater significance than its ethnic-cultural content. People of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds developed a loyalty to the state in which they lived. (The many immigrants who entered the United States, although continuing to follow their old ways of life and to speak their native languages, nevertheless established a loyalty to the United States.) Thus in the United States and Great Britain, the term "nation" came to mean the body of "citizens," and the term "nationality" was reserved to signify ethnic background. But in many states, ethnic groups, particularly if assigned the status of inferior citizens, maintained their identity and sought to establish independent states of their own. This was the case, for instance, with the Czechs and Hungarians in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is significant that where this development took place, the term "nation" retained its original meaning. Thus if a Central European speaks about his nation, he does not necessarily mean his citizenship. He often uses the term "nation" where we would use the term nationality.

Nationalism, then, means two things: the intense loyalty of a citizenry

to its state or the intense desire of a group to form a political union exclusively and peculiarly its own.

Sovereignty. With the emergence of the dynastic state there also arose new legal concepts, pertaining to the new creation. As always, these legal concepts reflected a political fact. The new rulers had carved out their realms, had defeated their enemies, and had cut or weakened the ties with Rome; and all this was now expressed by the concept of sovereignty. *Sovereignty means that a government within a state has supreme authority over its citizens and is independent of any outside interference.* The rise of nationalism seemed to endow the concept of sovereignty with a certain justification, lending support to the belief that a nation should be permitted to develop as it saw fit, without interference from any outside sources. Then along came liberalism and transferred the idea of the freedom of the individual to the relationships between nations. The fallacy, of course, was that whereas individuals were checked and restrained by a government acting from above, the states themselves were not. Liberty without authority—freedom without control—is anarchy, and anarchy has been the curse of the modern state system.

National state and international economy. As already mentioned, one cause of the disintegration of the medieval order was the rise of the new middle class and the demands of this group for political change. It became clear that political authority must be as wide as the area of economic activity. Yet the nineteenth century saw the emergence of a world economy on the one hand and an intensification of nationalism on the other. But even though nations were often at odds with one another politically, the "magic hand" of Adam Smith seemed to be working in the economic sphere. This situation seemed to confirm notions generally held at the time that the economic order was independent of the political order.

This was a fallacy. Actually, the functioning of the world economy in the nineteenth century, in spite of increasing nationalism, was due to certain circumstances that made Great Britain something of an integrating center:

> The colonization of the empty spaces, the development of machine-driven industry dependent upon coal and the opening up of world-wide communications through railways and shipping services proceeded apace under British leadership. . . . The counterpart of this "expansion of England," was the free market provided in Britain from the

eighteen-forties onward for the natural products, food stuffs and raw materials of the rest of the world. . . . It was the existence of this national market which made the so-called international system work. . . . The prestige of the Sterling, proudly anchored to the gold standard by the Bank Act of 1844, made it the only serious candidate for the role of international money. The Bank of England, as custodian of the integrity of sterling, found itself unwillingly and for the most part unwittingly the final arbiter and court of appeal and the central executive authority of the international system of trade and finance. . . . The fetishism of the gold standard made sterling a real international currency. The foreign financier or merchant dealing with, or established in, London enjoyed all the benefits of the system, was treated on his merits and suffered no disability or discrimination. . . . The London market did not seek to serve British interests in any narrow or exclusive sense; the commerce of the world was a British concern. Nevertheless the control exercised from London . . . the control which made the whole system work was autocratic, without appeal, and completely effective. . . . It was precisely because economic authority was silently wielded by a single highly centralized autocracy that political authority could safely be parcelled out in national units. . . . When the British commercial . . . supremacy was first seriously challenged in the nineties, ominous cracks soon began to appear in the structure. When this supremacy . . . was broken by the first world war, the 19th century economic system collapsed in utter and irretrievable ruin. Subsequent struggles to restore it merely showed how little its essential foundation had been understood.[1]

The conditions that raised Great Britain to a pre-eminent position in the nineteenth century do not exist today. Those who want to bring back the economic system of the nineteenth century not only misunderstand what made that system work, but also are unaware of how much the world has since changed.

The dynamic tendencies of states. All states have had a tendency to exert influence beyond their own borders. If the energies of a people cannot be absorbed by domestic activities, or if people feel that they have developed ideas of universal significance, they will project their energies or ideas into the outside world. This mood will find a constant stimulus in the very psychological foundations of nationalism. "Not only are *we* better than you, but since we are better than you, we have every right to interfere with you. We are enlightened; you are benighted; it is therefore our duty to take care of you." The essence of this ethnocentric

tendency has perhaps best been illustrated by Rudyard Kipling who, during the nineteenth century, epitomized in his writings England's spirit of power, prestige, and imperialism, and sang of England's mission to civilize backward peoples as the "White Man's Burden."

Where people live under a democratic form of government, where ample economic opportunity exists and society is highly mobile, the aggressiveness of nationalism is reduced. But where authoritarianism creates escapist attitudes, as it has in Russia and Germany, where people cannot look forward to improving their social positions and therefore seek vicarious gratification through identifying themselves with the grandeur of their nation, then the nation is exalted as the be-all and end-all of existence, its folkways become the essence of all wisdom, and expansion is regarded as a holy mission.

The dynamic tendencies of states can be physical, economic, or ideological. Usually all three types of expansion operate simultaneously and are closely intertwined. Which one is emphasized depends upon the character of the expanding society. A business society will be interested in expanding economically, using physical expansion only where it is necessary to protect its economic aspirations, and being only mildly concerned with ideological appeals. A revolutionary society gets its main impetus from the conviction that it has to export the revolution, while physical and economic expansion will appear to it as necessary means to carry out or support its revolutionary mission. Yet whatever the emphasis, in all cases the availability of physical force plays a large part in creating the necessary prestige for expansionism. A revolution in Bali will not create a great stir in the world and other people will hardly bother to imitate it, but if a revolution occurs in a country like France or Russia, it is bound to have world-wide repercussions.

Modern imperialism and the colonial peoples. Among the historic examples of dynamism of states, the imperialism of the latter part of the nineteenth century deserves special consideration in view of the great repercussions it has had in our own time. This imperialism took the form of a mad race among the great powers of the world for colonies and spheres of influence. The whole of Africa and great parts of Asia were partitioned. This phenomenon has invited many comments. Some authorities believe that this type of imperialism represents the traditional lust of nations for power and that once one country has started on the imperialist road, the rest must follow in order to maintain their relative power positions. But this is certainly not the whole story. The suggestion has been made that an important element in this drive was economic need. The great industrial nations, it is asserted, had reached a point

in their economic development at which in order to remain competitive, they were forced to look overseas for markets and for inexpensive sources of raw material and labor. There is a strong element of truth in this explanation. But it may be doubted whether these economic considerations were the exclusive driving forces as the Marxists and others assert. In any event, we are more interested in the impact that this imperialism has had upon the colonial peoples.

The following description of this impact should not lead you to believe that many of the bad effects were deliberately planned or even anticipated. Very often measures were taken with the best of intentions but worked to the contrary not only because it was not realized that concessions and adaptations might have to be made simultaneously on many levels in order to be beneficial, but also because concepts of a foreign culture were superimposed upon the native cultures and dislocations inevitably resulted.

Let us take as a concrete example, the countries of Southeast Asia (Burma, Indonesia, Indo-China, and Malaya), a region that today is in an explosive ferment. Before the coming of the European, the peoples of this area lived upon subsistence farming and some native handicraft industries. The people were organized in village communities and the land was jointly owned. Tribal warfare and disease kept the population at a level supportable by the available food resources. But then the colonial administration stepped in, eliminated epidemics and controlled tribal warfare, and as a result, the native populations increased tremendously. Indonesia, where the population swelled from 10 million in 1845 to 78 million in 1952, furnishes a good illustration of this growth.

But the new commercial economy that was fast gaining ascendancy in the area was not geared to absorb such an increased population. And in many cases, where the traditional food crops were commercialized, speculation and profiteering became standard practice. Usually the farmer was persuaded to switch from cultivating food crops to producing industrial crops such as rubber for export. As a result, the native was exposed to the fluctuations of the world market whose operation he could neither understand nor control. If the commercial crop he raised found a ready market, he earned enough money to buy rice for his table, but if world market prices slumped, he found himself unable to buy as much rice as he could have raised for himself on his own small plot of ground. Although great planters could protect themselves by cartel agreements, the small farmer was fully exposed to the hazards of the world market.

The new economic system not only shattered the traditional native subsistence farming, but also undermined the native artisan class. In

the colonial scheme of things, there was no place for a healthy native manufacturing complex. Colonial manufactures were regarded as a potential threat to home industries and the maintenance of a favorable balance of trade. The colonies were merely to furnish raw materials and provide exclusive markets for the finished products of the mother country.

As manufactured goods from abroad poured into the colonies, the native artisan found his former markets steadily slipping away. Desperately he turned to agriculture as the only means left to make his living, thereby further increasing the pressure on the already overburdened land. But there were no other avenues of relief. Colonial industry was mainly extractive; mining and the growing of industrial crops drew wealth from the country but attracted little in return. Profits in most cases went to foreign owners. Often cheaper labor was imported from neighboring areas to work the mines and fields, displacing the native workers and adding to the dislocation of society. Under such conditions, living standards were adversely affected and the accumulation of native capital became impossible.

The new economic setup also produced a new social pyramid. At the bottom of the social scale were the natives; occupying the middle position were the Chinese and Indian traders who had moved into the area together with the Westerners and were able through their superior skill to take advantage of the inexperience of the natives in money matters; at the top were the Europeans. In Indonesia, in 1938, the Europeans, representing less than one half of one per cent of the population, accounted for almost 64 per cent of the total income subject to income tax. The foreign Asiatic group, 2 per cent of the population, received almost 24 per cent of the taxable income. Finally, the native element, although representing 97.5 per cent of the population, accounted for only 13 per cent of the taxable income.

Another characteristic of the colonial setup was that it left little room for a native intelligentsia. If people operate on a marginal level, they do not need lawyers and college professors. As far as colonial administrative positions were concerned, these were almost wholly reserved for the nationals of the governing country. Thus a native, even if he was a university graduate, had his ambitions thwarted. The system attempted to concentrate in the hands of the colonial powers all the productive capacity of the area. Native communities whose social and economic organization was thrown out of balance by the superimposed culture systems of the Europeans became centers of unrest. Progress is possible only by simultaneous development on many levels. Improvement on only one level may actually mean a worsening of conditions in general.

What good was it to lower the native mortality rate, for example, when the increased population was unable to make a living?

Historic Conflict and Adjustment


Tensions and wars. The dynamism of states and the anarchy of international relations have already been discussed. It can easily be appreciated how these two factors separately or jointly created tensions among nations and eventually led to wars. Yet the underlying causes of these tensions and wars cannot be completely understood without some reference to the rigidity of the state-system.

When the various nation states emerged from feudalism, some found themselves in a better position than others in terms of location, resources, population pressure, and the like. Changes had, of course, occurred within the countries. The population of some declined, that of others increased. Yet there never has existed any permanent orderly process by which initial inequalities could be reduced or changed conditions could find expression in peaceful political change. The state system has resembled a closed class society where no possibility exists for an individual of a lower class to improve his position. Within a society, such a system usually breeds revolution. In international politics it breeds war.

The balance of power. Since the conduct of international relations has been so unsettled, it is rather surprising that nations have not been constantly at war with one another. Periods of peace, where they have existed, have been due largely to the fact that international anarchy made necessary a *balance of power.* The *balance of power* means that no country can permit its relative power position to decline. An example of the principle in operation would be this: There are three countries, A, B, and C, and A wants to attack B. Confronted with this situation, C has to come to the aid of B, for if B is crushed, A will turn against C. The essence of the balance of power is that if one country becomes aggressive, other countries will combine to thwart her. But the balance of power has worked only imperfectly. Miscalculation, hesitation, and deceit have worked to defeat the principle. At the present time, there exists in the world a bi-polarization of power in which no third power or combination of third powers is able to exert a restraining influence upon the main antagonists.

International law. When considering the problem of international anarchy and its consequences, people often ask the question: Why did not the nations establish laws and agree upon rules of conduct that would have made the world a better place in which to live? The answer is that laws are not 'made.' Law is a formalized type of custom, and

BALANCE OF POWER AND BIPOLARITY



From Political Science, An Outline *(1951) by G. de Huszar and T. Stevenson. Used by permission of Littlefield, Adams & Co.*

Allies A and B balance allies C and D; both alliances compete for E and F. The USA with allies A, B, C, D, and E is one pole; the USSR with satellites G, H, I, J, and K is the opposing pole.

custom reflects a certain pattern of behavior. Where there is no society there is no custom, and also no law. To put the case differently, any society must reach an agreement on a wide range of do's and don't's before it can exist. When a person is born, he becomes, through the process of socialization, an unwitting partner to the agreement. True,

issues constantly arise in a society that cannot be taken care of under the existing agreement, or upon which no agreement can be reached. Yet a law can be effectively established only if there exists a minimum agreement.

Let us pause for a moment to consider the issue of federal antidiscrimination legislation. Such legislation may, at the present time, be feasible because many Americans believe that discrimination is evil and another group, formerly in favor of the practice, has become more enlightened in its approach to the question. But suppose that the overwhelming majority of Americans still favored discrimination. Then no law could be passed; or if it were passed, it would remain a dead letter.

Let us take another example. Although there has been sufficient agreement on minimum wages to establish a legal floor under wages, there is no absolute agreement among people on what constitutes a fair wage. Consequently, if a wage dispute arises between management and labor, it is not settled by law but by bickering and wrangling. Because there is no minimum agreement on the way such an issue should be settled, there can be no workable law. If a law should be passed in such an area, it would be considered arbitrary and tyrannical, and people would defy or ignore it at the first opportunity.

In a democratic society there are always tendencies at work to bring new issues under some kind of an agreement. Old issues are constantly re-opened if the group at whose disadvantage an old issue has been settled becomes vocal enough to demand and eventually to obtain a different settlement.

On the international level we do not have a society. There is no process of socialization of nations. Rarely have nations been able to reach a minimum agreement on how certain vital matters should be handled. Consequently, the portion of international law which is the result of mutual and noncoercive agreement deals chiefly with essentially noncontroversial matters like the establishment of a speed limit in a domestic society, for example. The more important controversies on the international level are comparable to labor-management disputes over wages, for which there can be no laws.

Sometimes nations compromise; sometimes their disputes erupt into open warfare. If the latter, the solution is imposed by the victor upon the vanquished in the form of a peace treaty. Unlike the case of domestic contracts, coercion in international relations does not invalidate an agreement. But how really durable such an "agreement" is, can well be imagined.

International law is not the creation of a society and therefore does not vary with accepted changes within the society. It is the result of

agreements between parties, forced or otherwise, and remains law as long as both parties do not agree upon a new settlement. But the party that benefits under the old agreement will not be anxious to change it. As a result, international law becomes static and may be at odds with the sense of justice of many people. Suppose Morocco should bring its case for independence from France before the International Court of Justice. The court, if it declared itself competent, would have to rule that the protectorate's treaty of 1912 (which, incidentally, was imposed upon Morocco) was still valid since France was unwilling to cancel it. Thus the independence of Morocco would never be possible under "law."

One World or None?

Total war and the need for world government. International anarchy, with its resulting arms races and inevitable wars, was endurable so long as there were strict limits to the extent of destruction that man could accomplish. Now, however, science has made available atomic and bacteriological weapons that can be delivered to any spot on earth by long-range aircraft. No country in the world is immune to such an attack. Confronted by such dangers, what would be more natural than that men should think the time had come to establish a world government? What are the chances of such a government?

Government arises out of society. This means that before a world government can be established, a world society must be realized. But the creation of such a society seems a long way off. A world society implies much more than merely shaking hands with foreigners. It means teaching the peoples of the world the elemental lesson of the essential kinship of mankind and man's identity of interest. It also entails free movement among peoples of the world, and this in turn presupposes the achievement of an equal living standard for all peoples so that one nation with a substantially higher standard of living than others would not attract a disproportionate number of immigrants.

But, a person may ask, given the fact that wars may bring the end of civilization, does not this in itself create some kind of a society? Unfortunately, common fear does not necessarily create a sense of common interest. This point, as well as some others related to our discussion, will be established by the following illustration.

The newspapers sometimes carry stories about fires in theaters and their tragic consequences. More often than not people are "unnecessarily" killed and injured. In the first panic-filled moments somebody shouts


"Fire!" There is a mad rush for the exits; in no time the doors are jammed; people inside pile up; and then. . . . A bystander, viewing the holocaust, remarks upon the foolishness of people and wonders why they didn't organize to save themselves. The psychological fact is that fear created a situation in which everybody was for himself, partly because of selfishness and partly through uncertainty of other people's cooperating. Because so many started out to save themselves, nobody was saved.

But suppose there had been a man with a machine gun standing in the lobby, who, when the panic started, had shouted that whoever moved out of turn would be shot. There probably would have been no panic and no lives lost. But how to get the man with the machine gun? A homogeneous audience in places threatened by panic may be able to agree upon such a man. But suppose the audience is composed of Chinese, Syrians, Americans, and others. Who should be entrusted with the gun? Suppose the gun is given to a Syrian. The possibility exists, or at least some people feel that it exists, that he will shoot only at non-Syrians who move out of turn, conveniently overlooking what his own people do. The same fear will apply to all others.

The United Nations Organization. We can, in the absence of a world society, have no world government. The United Nations Organization is not a world government. The principle upon which the success of the United Nations as a peace organization depends—the principle of collective security—is an unrealistic one. It presupposes that all nations are basically law abiding, or, to put it less legalistically, that all nations want to maintain the status quo and that a challenge to it will be something exceptional and have as a consequence the concerted reaction of all others. But the truth is that the world is a dynamic place in which a number of nations always are against the status quo. Even those who are for it will vary in their efforts to maintain it, depending upon where the challenge occurs. The United States is for a number of reasons particularly concerned with the Far East, Great Britain with Southeast Asia. A threat to the status quo in the Far East will evoke only a half-hearted response from Great Britain, while the same thing will be true for the United States with regard to Southeast Asia. Thus though Great Britain perhaps showed less fervor in Korea than we did, she has vigorously prosecuted the war against the communists in Malaya. But the American public, instead of acknowledging the British effort in Malaya, did not cease to complain about British lack of enthusiasm in Korea. The fact of the matter is that Malaya is more important for Great Britain than Korea, while for us the reverse is true.

In addition, the veto power of the permanent members of the Security

THE UNITED NATIONS



Courtesy the United Nations

Council (Great Britain, France, Nationalist China, the United States, and the Soviet Union) must also be considered. So long as the veto power remains, no collective action can be undertaken by the great powers unless they agree unanimously. No minor power will challenge the status quo without the connivance of a great power. If the question of collective action arises, the conniving great power will block it through its veto. It is useful to bear in mind in this connection that collective action by the UN in the Korean situation was an exceptional case, made possible by the absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council at a crucial moment. We cannot look forward to a repetition of this case. If a great power is the aggressor, it can veto sanctions against itself.[2] Involved here is a very practical consideration: Sanctions against a great power mean World War III and the end of the UN.

The veto has been repeatedly attacked and its abolishment demanded. But it should be pointed out that the veto is a symptom, not a cause. It is a symptom of a certain stage of development in international relations. Only through the acceptance of the veto was it possible to establish the UN in the first place. The sad truth is that the UN cannot guarantee the security of its members. For that they still have to depend upon their own strength and the device of alliances.

What *can* the UN do? It can provide a permanent diplomatic meeting place for the nations of the world. It can organize something of a world public opinion, which may at times be a deterrent against certain actions of powers, particularly if these powers do not feel the action worth the risk of incurring world-wide resentment. In its nonpolitical activities, the UN weaves a certain pattern of international cooperation that will help create the basis for a world community.

What is the answer? There is no simple answer to today's problems. We live in a perilous world, a tense situation that seems likely to continue for a long long time. But this does not mean that nothing should or can be done. There may be problems with which we can cope. Eventually there may also arise great opportunities for those who are bold and farsighted. Let us see now what some of these opportunities are.

America Faces the Problems of the World

America as a leader. The United States has been catapulted into world leadership almost overnight. To some extent the his-

torical experience of the United States has ill prepared the country for such important responsibilities. The traditional policy of the United States has been more or less isolationist. This policy was made possible by the security afforded by the two oceans and by the attitude of Great Britain, whose economic interests in the Americas made it advisable for her to prevent European encroachment into the Western Hemisphere. She herself had become reconciled to the loss of the American colonies, and, in addition, the United States had in Canada a hostage for British good behavior.

This realistic basis for American isolationism has been generally misunderstood in this country. That the United States was left in peace was considered the result of her leaving others in peace. A notion of superior American virtue developed. Power politics was considered a matter of choice and not necessity, and Europe was condemned as a quarrelsome continent. Thus we did not come to accept conflict as a natural part of international relations, but, at least subconsciously, assumed that harmony among nations was the normal state of affairs. This is particularly ironic in a nation that boasts of its high competitiveness. At present, given our outlook on international politics, we are often irritated by our European friends who seem to take international tensions much more in stride than we do.

The success of certain values in the American experience created an intense feeling of their absolute validity. This applies particularly to our fervent belief in individualism in the economic sphere. We are inclined to consider any system other than capitalism as an aberration and incompatible with democracy as we understand the term. What we have failed to see is that an economic system is not always a matter of choice, but sometimes one of necessity. Many Americans would be surprised to see how much economic planning the British Conservatives have accepted. The Socialist-Conservative controversy in Britain is mainly concerned with the degree of planning and ways of administering a planned economy, not over planning as such. As far as socialism and democracy are concerned, no one can deny that the Scandinavian countries are democracies, although they have had socialist governments for decades. True leadership requires a clear distinction between fundamentals and incidentals (see Chapter 30).

Since physical power has played such a small part in the consciousness of the American people, we have failed to realize that big powers are viewed with alarm regardless of their intentions. As we assume harmony among nations to be the normal state of affairs, so we believe that nations can be loved and are upset by any signs that we as a nation are not loved. Yet the truth is that little love is lost in international rela-

tions. This applies particularly to a great power. It is an occupational hazard of being a great power to be disliked. The question we should ask ourselves is: Are we less disliked than others?

We are also not a very patient people; we are a nation of go-getters. But international problems do not lend themselves to neat and quick solutions. A lot of patience is necessary to head a democratic alliance. A leader must prod, but must stop short of antagonizing. He must be willing to accept criticism, to have his motives misunderstood, and still stick to the job.

One important asset for American leadership is the idealism of the American people. There is nothing cynical about American motives. Rather, the danger is that ideals may be pursued out of their environmental context. We may mistakenly assume that every country represents fertile soil for the growth of democracy. As already mentioned, common ideals can exist only between societies that have much else in common. Failure to heed this truism will easily lead to frustration. If we do not have much in common with another society, if we do not accept its members as equals, an appeal to them in the name of a common ideal will appear hypocritical. If, for example, we profess to support Chiang Kai-shek in the name of democracy (and we won't argue the question of whether the Chinese environment is suitable for it) and at the same time refuse a former officer of Chiang's army a home in a white neighborhood in San Francisco, our professions do not ring true. We must learn to be realistic about our idealism. *Where our idealism is significant, we should invest it heavily. Otherwise we should not hesitate to frame our foreign policy on the basis of our national interest, pure and simple.*

The issues. There are several sets of problems in the present-day political world. One set involves the perennial problem of international politics: imperialism and general insecurity. This is the most difficult problem we face at present because, as already stated, its solution depends upon the creation of a world government, which in turn depends upon the establishment of a world society.

A second set of problems concerns the industrial nations of Western Europe, their ills and possible cures.

Still a third set of problems is connected with rising nationalism and social revolutions in colonial or formerly colonial countries. The rumblings of these events had been felt long before World War II.

While on this topic, it may be worth while to note that not all our problems can be traced to the Soviet regime and communism. Even if the communist leadership in Russia were to be eliminated tomorrow,

we would still be confronted with traditional Russian aspirations toward the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, the Middle East, and the Far East. Even if communism as an ideology disappeared, we would still have to concern ourselves with the economies of Western Europe and with the nationalist aspirations of peoples in Africa and Asia.



Fitzpatrick, in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch

INTO WHOSE HANDS?

Although it is true that communism has given a certain dynamism to a number of revolutionary movements, it is only fair to acknowledge that it has capitalized upon pre-existing ills to the same degree that it has created new ones.

The problems of Western Europe. The most important and perhaps most easily handled problem (given insight and boldness) is that of

Western Europe. Shortly after World War II, the notion was current in this country that the sure way to bring about the recovery of Western Europe was to rebuild her war-shattered economy. The Marshall Plan was put into effect, other aid was given, and as a result European production is nearly 50 per cent higher today than it was in 1937. But in spite of this, the economic troubles of Europe still exist, primarily because the economic assumptions upon which we have operated in trying to solve Europe's woes, the theories of the classical economist, have not proved valid.

The classical economist conceived of a world composed of a number of states, none of them of preponderant strength and all responsive to market forces, so that a state that practiced prejudicial policies could be isolated and corrected by the others. But he did not anticipate that a situation might arise in which one country would be so infinitely stronger than the others as to make their economic welfare dependent upon the behavior of this economic giant. Also, in the nineteenth century the world economy functioned not because of or according to the assumptions of the classical economist, but because, as the quotation from Carr has shown, of the behavior of Great Britain and the presence of a world setting that made this behavior both possible and meaningful.

Today's greatest economic power, the United States, does not behave as Great Britain did in the nineteenth century; today's general world setting is also quite different. A great part of the world, the Soviet orbit, operates as a self-contained economy under planning. Many formerly agrarian countries have started upon a process of industrialization, and the free world has become dependent upon the United States for the supply of many essential commodities.

All this means that the United States must pursue a conscious and responsible economic policy. She must be aware at all times what the effect of her policies will be upon her friends. Since she is infinitely stronger than the rest of the free world, she cannot be restrained from following an obnoxious policy, as the classical economist conceived to be possible.

The United States has become the sole supplier for a number of commodities to the free world. If the European countries are to pay for their imports from the United States, they must be permitted to export to the United States. But they are continually running afoul of American tariffs, quotas, and a cumbersome customs procedure. Under the Buy American Act of March 3, 1933, for instance, government agencies are permitted to make purchases abroad only if the cost of domestic products is "unreasonable." The General Services Administration has

established as a rule that if the sum of the original foreign bid (exclusive of duty) is increased by another 25 per cent and if it is still below the equivalent domestic price, only then is the domestic price "unreasonable." (Not very helpful to foreign bidders!) Out of the discrepancies between imports and exports there has arisen the so-called "dollar gap," which in the past has been taken care of by aid from the United States. Yet aid is no real solution of the problem, nor would stringent import restrictions by European countries on goods from the dollar area help anybody. The only real answer is a free flow of trade. Our government has been aware of the problem. A number of committees have made reports recommending that our import regulations be relaxed. But so far these recommendations have remained pious professions with little action having been taken.

Our European friends are affected by what happens within our economy as well as by our trade policies. Any slight recession in the United States, a recession that would hardly be felt in our country, drastically affects their export opportunities. In 1949, for example, a minor recession in the United States brought in its wake a decline of imports from Europe that for some countries amounted to 40 or 50 per cent of their previous exports to this country.

The establishment or expansion of markets for European goods outside this country will require certain investments of a trail blazer nature that can come only from the United States. Given the great investment opportunities at home, the export of American capital abroad is more important from the standpoint of the European economy than from that of the American.

The crucial problem of Europe is not the inability to produce but the problem of markets. It is only fair to acknowledge in this connection that some European countries could go far toward solving their problem by instituting social and economic reforms that would make possible the expansion of home consumption. We touch here upon some basic problems that beset the Western economy as a whole but that are more serious for Europe than for the United States. The following words of the Secretary-General of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation are well descriptive of the situation:

> Although I do not share the opinion that there is in the capitalist system a tendency toward stagnation, I cannot help being struck by the fact that in the spring of 1950 in Europe, not to mention the United States, the rise in production was not very rapid and we seemed to be approaching a ceiling imposed not by lack of capacity or lack of real needs but by inadequacy of demand. Is it really neces-

sary that we remain more or less where we are unless external circumstances such as those of 1950 [the Korean war] take control? I have no theory about this and I would not wish to say that it is inherent in our economic system, but there is certainly a disturbing factor here which merits our attention and deep consideration.[3]

The new nationalism. The impact of colonialism has been mentioned earlier. It was inevitable that the colonial peoples should one day rebel



By permission, Justus and the Minneapolis Star

THE DAWN COMES UP LIKE THUNDER

against their treatment as inferiors, against exploitation by others, and against their misery in general. It should be clearly understood that the nationalism of the colonial peoples is not merely a move toward *political* independence. Such independence would mean little if the lot of the natives continued as before, or if the economy of the country remained in the hands of foreigners and through them continued to

be geared to benefit foreign interests. The rising nationalism of the peoples of Asia and Africa contains a strong element of the demand for social and economic change.

It is an unpleasant fact that communism has played a large role in nationalist movements in colonial countries. Unfortunately, there is no democratic tradition in these countries, and communism has come to appeal to many people as the answer to all their troubles. Thus we are at a disadvantage with Russia in the ideological struggle for men's minds. In addition, the economic development of the West has had little significance for backward countries. The working of capitalism presupposes higher incentives from investment in industry than in land. But given the scarcity of land in most of the backward countries, the highest profits are to be had from investment in land. Yet such investment does not expand the economy, does not raise the living standard of the people. Furthermore, in the West a functioning democracy is able to control the abuses of an individualistic economic order. In the backward countries no such opportunity exists. Lastly, it is undeniable that the West has suffered from a racial superiority complex that still plagues us in our relations with the peoples of Asia and Africa.

In dealing with the nationalist aspirations of the colonial or former colonial countries, we should be sympathetic and free of condescension. We will have to recognize that social change is necessary. By opposing it, we will drive the peoples of Asia and Africa straight into the arms of Russia. We will also have to acknowledge that the economic development of these people will be different from our own, that government will have to play a much larger part in the economy than it has done in the United States. In this connection, we also must realize that economic help pure and simple cannot do the trick alone. Laudable as Point IV is, there is no magic to it. Why should a tenant farmer be interested in increasing the yield of his crop if the landlord comes along, takes most of it, and leaves the farmer as poor as before?

Soviet imperialism. It has already been stated that the imperialism of Soviet Russia stems only in part from the fact that it is a communist country. Although communism provides a certain momentum to Russian dynamism, it also encourages restraint. The communists believe that they are riding the crest of an inevitable historical development that will end eventually in the downfall of the capitalist countries, and that therefore there is no hurry to force a showdown. If our socio-economic system does not collapse in the near future, the Russians may be tempted to delay the showdown until postponement has actually

become abandonment. Of course, all this does not mean that we should neglect our defenses. Weakness always invites aggression, communism or no communism.

The interests of the United States are global. But even a country as strong as the United States is not all powerful. We do not have the means to pursue each and every desirable end at one and the same time. We must therefore establish priorities. Asia is certainly important for us. No one can suggest that we should write it off. But it is a vast continent in ferment. We can do very little to influence this fermentation process. What we can do and should do is to see to it that the spilling over of the revolutionary process going on in Asia does not threaten our vital interests. We must act here with care and discretion.

Many believe that the overriding problem for us at this time is the economic health of the West. It is a manageable problem simply because the Western areas are under Western control. In spite of the political division of the world, in spite of the uncertainties of Asia, there are enough opportunities left to make it possible for the Western nations to live and to have their living standards raised, provided, of course, that conscious efforts are made toward integrating the economy of the West. The process of creating an integrated economy in the West will also open up avenues for political cooperation that may lead to the establishment of an Atlantic Union—the great challenge and opportunity now beckoning us.

We should not delude ourselves into thinking that the only way for Russia to take over Western Europe is by military power. Local unrest capitalized upon by internal communist parties and their hangers-on or economic dependence on the Soviet orbit followed by political strings later on may do the same trick.

Thus for us to be content with a military balance of power with Russia is not enough. We must also pursue a positive policy with regard to Europe. We should not mislead ourselves into thinking that we can get rid of communism by ceremonial incantations such as nonliterates use to drive out evil spirits.

NOTES, QUESTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS, SUGGESTED READINGS

NOTES

Chapter 1

[1] William James, *Principles of Psychology,* Vol. II (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1890), pp. 640-641, as quoted by Howard Becker, *Through Values to Social Interpretation* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1950), p. 294.

[2] C. West Churchman and Russell L. Ackoff, Methods of Inquiry: *An Introduction to Philosophy and Scientific Method* (St. Louis: Educational Publishers, 1950), p. 10.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Leslie A. White, *The Science of Culture* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Company, 1949), Chapter 1.

[5] Attributed to Julian Huxley by Herbert L. Searles, *Logic and Scientific Methods* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 126.

[6] Harry Elmer Barnes, *A History of Historical Writing* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1938), p. 272.

[7] White, *The Science of Culture,* p. 66.

[8] *Ibid.,* pp. 68-69.

[9] George A. Lundberg, *Social Research: A Study in Methods of Gathering Data* (New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1929), p. 6.

[10] Ernest Greenwood, *Experimental Sociology: A Study in Method* (New York: Kings Crown Press, 1945), p. 28.

[11] Emory S. Bogardus, *Sociology* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 546.

Chapter 2

[1] This account is based on David B. Stout, *San Blas Cuna Acculturation: An Introduction* (New York: The Viking Fund, Inc., Publications in Anthropology, No. 9., 1947). Consulted as a supplementary reference was Fred McKim, *San Blas, An Account of the Cuna Indians of Panama* (Goteborg, Sweden: Etnografiska Museet, Etnologiska Studier No. 15, 1947).

Chapter 3

[1] Kingsley Davis, "Final Note on a Case of Extreme Isolation," *The American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 52, March 1947, 432-437. Reprinted in Edgar A. Schuler, Duane L. Gibson, Maude L. Fiero, and Wilbur B. Brookover, eds., *Outside Readings in Sociology* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952), pp. 92-100.

[2] Clyde Kluckhohn, *Mirror for Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949), p. 69.

[3] Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1936), p. 310.

[4] Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1945), p. 29.

[5] Horatio H. Newman, *Multiple Human Births* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1940), pp. 189-199.

[6] Lawrence K. Frank, *Nature and Human Nature* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1951), p. 82.

[7] Edward Byron Reuter, *Handbook of Sociology* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1941), p. 163.

[8] Kingsley Davis, *Human Society* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 143.

[9] By permission of The Macmillan Company from J. S. Slotkin, *Social Anthropology* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 62.

[10] By permission of the Macmillan Company from R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 4.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 39.

[13] From R. M. MacIver and Charles H. Page, *Society: An Introductory Analysis* (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1949), p. 152.

Chapter 4

[1] William Fielding Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1922), pp. 90-102.

[2] Stuart Chase, *The Proper Study of Mankind* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 114.

[3] Robert Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology* (New York: D. C. McMurtrie, 1917), p. 78.

[4] Linton, *The Study of Man,* pp. 292-293.

[5] Edward A. Ross, "Ossification," *The American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 25, March 1920, 529-538. Reprinted in Schuler, Gibson, Fiero, and Brookover, eds., *Outside Readings in Sociology,* pp. 268-273.

Chapter 5

[1] Davis, *Human Society,* p. 76.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

[3] Robert L. Sutherland, Julian L. Woodward, and Milton A. Maxwell, *Introductory Sociology,* 4th ed. (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1952), p. 26.

[4] Davis, *Human Society,* p. 72.

Chapter 6

[1] Ralph Linton, "One Hundred Per Cent American," *The American Mercury,* Vol. XL, 427-429.

[3] Melville J. Herskovits, *Man and His Works* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948), pp. 69-70.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[4] Kluckhohn, *Mirror for Man*, p. 41.

[5] Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 1946), p. 33.

[6] Linton, *Cultural Background of Personality*, p. 125.

[7] Chase, *The Proper Study of Mankind*, p. 65.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

Chapter 7

[1] Robin M. Williams, Jr., *American Society, A Sociological Interpretation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951), p. 446.

[2] Logan Wilson and William L. Kolb, *Sociological Analysis* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1949), p. 681.

[3] By permission from *Sociology, An Analysis of Life in a Modern Society*, by Arnold W. Green. Copyright, 1952. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

[5] Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," in Alfred McClung Lee, ed., *New Outline of the Principles of Sociology*, p. 167. Copyright, 1946, by Barnes & Noble, Inc., and reprinted by their permission.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 190-191.

Chapter 8

[1] Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, July 1938, 8.

[2] This material is adapted from Noel P. Gist and L. A. Halbert, "Urbanism as a World Phenomenon," Chapter 2 in *Urban Society* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company), 1949.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

Chapter 9

[1] Lewis Mumford, "The Intolerable City: Must It Keep On Growing?" *Harper's*, February 1926, 283-293. Reprinted in Schuler, Gibson, Fiero, and Brookover, eds., *Outside Readings in Sociology*, pp. 612-628.

[2] In this analysis, we are using the term "folk society" to apply both to nonliterate societies and to peasant societies.

[3] Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society," *The American Journal of Sociology*, January 1947, 293-308.

[4] Davis, *Human Society*, p. 294.

[5] Williams, *American Society, A Sociological Interpretation*, p. 470.

[6] From MacIver and Page, *Society: An Introductory Analysis*, p. 11.

[7] Adolph S. Tomars, "Rural Survivals in American Urban Life," *Rural Sociology*, December 1943, 378-386.

[8] Robert Cooley Angell, "The Moral Integration of American Cities," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LVII, July 1951, Part 2.

[9] George C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 466-467.

Chapter 10

[1] Davis, *Human Society*, p. 367.

[2] Reprinted from Sutherland, Woodward, and Maxwell, *Introductory Sociology*, 4th ed. Copyright, 1952, by J. B. Lippincott Company, Chicago, Illinois.

[3] See W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941); and W. Lloyd Warner, Marchia Meeker, and Kenneth Eells, *Social Class in America* (Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc., 1949).

[4] Paul A. Samuelson, *Economics, An Introductory Analysis* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951), p. 63.

[5] Based on 1950 census as reported in *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1952*, p. 186; 1 per cent not reported.

[6] Kenneth MacLeish and Kimball Young, *Landaff, New Hampshire* (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1942).

[7] Williams, *American Society, A Sociological Interpretation*, p. 122.

[8] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944).

[9] Warner, Meeker, and Eells, *Social Class in America*, p. 21.

[10] Williams, *American Society, A Sociological Interpretation*, p. 107.

[11] W. Lloyd Warner and Mildred Hall Warner, *What You Should Know About Social Class*, Life Adjustment Booklet (Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc., 1953), p. 37.

[12] Green, *Sociology, An Analysis of Life in a Modern Society*, p. 294.

[13] By permission from *Ibid.*, pp. 271-273.

Chapter 11

[1] This discussion follows Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1940), pp. 292-297.

[2] Copyright, 1949 by Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein 2nd. Reprinted by permission.

[3] U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952*, 73rd ed. (Washington, D. C.), p. 42.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Arnold Rose, *The Roots of Prejudice* (Paris: UNESCO, 1951), p. 24.

[6] John Biesanz, "Cultural and Economic Factors in Panamanian Race Relations," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XIV, No. 6, December 1949, 772-779.

[7] Kenesaw M. Landis, *Segregation in Washington, A Report of the National Committee on Segregation in the Nation's Capital* (Chicago: 1948), p. 54.

[8] Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, pp. 60-61.

[9] See Lloyd Allen Cook, *College Programs in Intergroup Relations* (Washington, D. C.: The American Council on Education, 1950); and *Intergroup Relations in Teacher Education* (Washington, D. C.: The American Council on Education, 1951), Vols. I and II of the College Study in Intergroup Relations.

[10] Research Branch, Information and Education Division, Hdqtrs., ETO Report, ETO-82, June 1945.

[11] Gordon W. Allport, "Resolving Intergroup Tensions, An Appraisal of Methods," in Lloyd Allen Cook, ed., *Toward Better Human Relations* (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1952), p. 51.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

Chapter 12

[1] Benedict, *Patterns of Culture.*

[2] Margaret Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies* (New York: Mentor Books, 1950), p. 158.

[3] Kurt Lewin, "The Consequences of Authoritarian and Democratic Leadership," in Gertrude W. Lewin, ed., *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945), pp. 74-82. Reprinted in Schuler, Gibson, Fiero, and Brookover, eds., *Outside Readings in Sociology,* pp. 214-219.

[4] Martha Martin, *O Rugged Land of Gold* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953).

[5] G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 135 ff.

[6] Davis, *Human Society,* p. 211.

[7] Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902), pp. 151-153.

[8] Green, *Sociology, An Analysis of Life in a Modern Society,* pp. 138-139.

[9] Hubert Bonner, *Social Psychology* (New York: American Book Company, 1953), pp. 130-131.

[10] Harvey Warren Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 86.

[11] *Ibid.,* pp. 76-81.

[12] Green, *Sociology, An Analysis of Life in a Modern Society,* p. 149.

[13] Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1937), p. 53.

[14] *Ibid.,* pp. 79-80.

Chapter 13

[1] Green, *Sociology, An Analysis of Life in a Modern Society,* p. 346.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Robert Lowie, *Social Organization* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 119-121.

[4] Ralph Linton, "The Natural History of the Family," in Ruth Anshen, *The Family: Its Function and Destiny* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), pp. 18-38.

[5] *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952,* p. 42.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 41.

[7] "The Death of the Hired Man," *Complete Poems of Robert Frost* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 49-55.

[8] Ernest W. Burgess and Harvey J. Locke, *The Family, From Institution to Companionship,* 2nd ed. (New York: American Book Company, 1953), p. 25.

[9] Albert Ellis, "Sex—the Schizoid Best Seller," *The Saturday Review of Literature,* March 17, 1951, 44.

[10] Luther E. Woodward, "Sexual Behavior, What Is Acceptable?" *Journal of Social Hygiene,* Vol. 36, 1950, 1-31. Reprinted in Judson T. Landis and Mary G. Landis, eds., *Readings in Marriage and the Family* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 409.

[11] Mabel Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization,* 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 366. Reprinted by permission.

[12] "Some Enchanted Evening." Copyright, 1949, by Williamson Music, Inc. Used by permission.

[13] Frank Loesser and Hoagy Carmichael, "Heart and Soul." Copyright, 1938, by Famous Music Corporation.

[14] Sunny Skylar, "Hair of Gold." Copyright, 1948, by Robert Music Co.

[15] "I Couldn't Sleep a Wink Last Night." Copyright, 1943, by T. B. Harms Company. Used by permission.

[16] Francis E. Merrill, *Courtship and Marriage: A Study of Social Relationships* (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1949), p. 34.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] Judson T. Landis and Mary G. Landis, *Building a Successful Marriage,* 2nd ed. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953), p. 46.

Chapter 14

[1] Robert F. Winch, *The Modern Family* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1952), p. 436.

[2] Willard Waller, "The Rating and Dating Complex," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 2, 1937, 727-734.

[3] Clifford Kirkpatrick and Theodore Caplow, "Courtship in a Group of Minnesota Students," *The American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 51, 114-125. Reprinted in Landis and Landis, eds., *Readings in Marriage and the Family,* pp. 79-90.

[4] Landis and Landis, *Building a Successful Marriage,* p. 69.

[5] Henry A. Bowman, *Marriage for Moderns,* 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1948), p. 216.

[6] Ernest W. Burgess and Leonard S. Cottrell, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939); and Lewis M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1938).

[7] Landis and Landis, *Building a Successful Marriage,* p. 259.

[8] Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness,* p. 99.

[9] Clifford Kirkpatrick, "Inconsistency in Marriage Roles and Marriage Conflict," *The International Journal of Ethics,* Vol. XLVI, 1936, 444-460. Reprinted in Landis and Landis, eds., *Readings in Marriage and the Family,* pp. 386-392.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] Della D. Cyrus, "What's Wrong With the Family?" *The Atlantic Monthly,* Vol. 178, 1946, 67-73; and "Why Mothers Fail," *The Atlantic Monthly,* Vol. 179, 1947, 57-60. Excerpted in Landis and Landis, eds., *Readings in Marriage and the Family,* under the title, "Problems of the Modern Homemaker-Mother," pp. 392-402.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] By permission from *Marriage and the Family,* by Ray E. Baber. Copyright, 1953. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

[14] Cyrus, "Problems of the Modern Homemaker-Mother," in Landis and Landis, eds., *Readings in Marriage and the Family,* p. 401.

[15] James H. S. Bossard, Eleanor S. Bell, and Winogene P. Sanger, "Some Neglected Areas in Family Life Study," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 272, 1950, 68-76.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] O. Spurgeon English, "How Family Forces Affect the Individual," *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic,* Vol. 14, 1950, 66-74.

[18] Sidonie M. Gruenberg and Hilda Sidney Krutch, *The Many Lives of Modern Woman: A Guide to Happiness in Her Complex Role* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1952).

[19] Willard Waller and Reuben Hill, *The Family* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1951), p. 460.

[20] "Have Broken Families Increased?" *Statistical Bulletin,* Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Vol. 30, November 1949, 1-3.

[21] Landis and Landis, *Building a Successful Marriage,* p, 5.

[22] Paul W. Alexander, "A Therapeutic Approach to the Problem of Divorce," *University of Illinois Law Forum,* 1949, 105-108, 168-172. Reprinted in Landis and Landis, eds., *Readings in Marriage and the Family,* pp. 360-374.

[23] Baber, *Marriage and the Family,* p. 527.

[24] Linton, "The Natural History of the Family," p. 38.

Chapter 15

[1] Newton Edwards and Herman Richey, *The School in the American Social Order* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), p. 14.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *America's Free Schools,* Democracy in Action, #5 (New York: Council for Education), p. 3.

[4] Reprinted with permission from A. B. Hollingshead, *Elmtown's Youth,* pp. 169-170. Copyright, 1949. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

[5] Grant Houmans, "An Appraisal of the Social Factors in the Work Attitudes and Interests of a Representative Sample of 12th Grade Michigan Boys," Ph.D. Thesis, Michigan State College Library, 1952-1953.

[6] W. B. Brookover, *Sociology of Education* (New York: American Book Company, 1954). See chapters 12 and 13 for a detailed analysis of the multiple types of socializing experience provided by our schools.

Chapter 16

[1] Paul J. Tillich, "Trends in Religious Thought That Affect Social Outlook," in F. Ernest Johnson, ed., *Religion and the World Order* (New York: The Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1944), p. 17.

Chapter 17

[1] We are grateful to Leonard Weiss, economist, for substantial help on this chapter.

[2] Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies,* pp. 25-27.

[3] Labor includes all the productive efforts of humans whether employed by others or working for themselves. *Land* refers to all the resources provided by nature, including soil, topography, climate, minerals, waterways, and location. *Capital* embraces all the means of production made by man—buildings, machinery, stocks of raw materials, fuel, finished or semi-finished products, improvements on the land, man-made waterways, roads, planted forests, and so forth. It does not include stocks and bonds, doctor bills, life insurance policies, or bank deposits. *Enterprise* refers to planning, risk-bearing, and decison-making, and is often listed as a fourth factor of production. The general terms for payments to the factors of production are *wages* (for labor), *rents* (for land), *interest* (on capital), and *profits* (for enterprise).

[4] Herskovits, *Man and His Works,* Chapter 17; and *The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1940).

[5] With the great modern storehouse of knowledge and machines, present-day *division of labor* is infinitely more rewarding than it once was. It makes possible more efficient production by (a) making use of *special talents* (b) *minimizing* the *training* necessary

for a particular amount of production while providing maximum training for each person in his particular skill; (c) *eliminating time lost* in moving from job to job; and (d) *reducing the tools necessary* to perform a total productive process since each specialist need not duplicate the tools of other specialists.

Chapter 18

[1] Taxes on property for some local purpose (editor's note).

Chapter 19

[1] See Chapter 30 for a discussion of the origins of the concept of individualism.

Chapter 20

[1] The manner in which expansion of output through the introduction of machinery can stimulate still further expansion may be illustrated in the following way. Suppose a shoe manufacturer buys one machine that will cut leather for 1,000 pairs a day, another that will stitch the soles of 750 pairs a day, and a third that will nail shoes together at the rate of 500 pairs a day. If he stops there, one or more of the machines will be idle a good part of the time. To get full value for his money, he must produce not 1,000 but 3,000 pairs each day by installing three cutters, four stitchers, and six nailers. See George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, *Monopoly and Free Enterprise* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1951), pp. 57-58.

[2] Those who follow the comic strip *Gasoline Alley* will remember that the partnership of Wallet and Bobble was recently changed to Wallet and Bobble, Inc., because Skeezix was anxious to avoid unlimited personal liability for any venture into which the erratic Wilmer might enter.

[3] William H. Husband and James C. Dockery, *Modern Corporation Finance* (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1947), p. 20.

[4] *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952,* p. 446.

[5] David Lynch, *The Concentration of Economic Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 117.

[6] *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952,* p. 446.

[7] Lynch, *The Concentration of Economic Power,* p. 117.

[8] A. A. Berle, Jr., "The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration," *University of Chicago Law Review,* Vol. 19, No. 4, Summer, 1952, 641.

[9] Stocking and Watkins, *Monopoly and Free Enterprise,* pp. 142-143.

[10] Marshall E. Dimock and Howard K. Hyde, "Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations," *Monograph #11* (Washington, D. C.: Temporary National Economic Committee, 1940), p. 7.

[11] Stocking and Watkins, *Monopoly and Free Enterprise,* pp. 431-432.

[12] J. G. Van Cise, "The Modern Corporation and Anti-Trust Laws, From Trust to Distrust," *University of Chicago Law Review,* Vol. 19, Summer, 1952, 671.

Chapter 21

[1] Arthur M. Schlesinger in *The Washington Post,* January 1, 1950, as quoted by J. B. S. Hardman and Maurice F. Neufeld, *The House of Labor: Internal Operations of American Unions* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), p. 52.

[2] It should be noted that reliable figures concerning the world trade union membership are almost impossible to secure. The above estimate includes both the communist and anti-communist unions.

[3] Samuel E. Morison and Henry S. Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 153.

[4] A. F. of L., Report of Proceedings (1936), p. 41; Florence Peterson, *American Labor Unions: What They Are and How They Work* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 62.

[5] Attributed to Adolph Strasser by Morison and Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic,* p. 158.

[6] Sumner H. Slichter, *Trade Unions in a Free Society* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 5.

[7] Irving Howe and B. J. Widick, *The UAW and Walter Reuther* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1949), p. 200.

[8] See C. Wright Mills, *The New Men of Power: America's Labor Leaders* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1948).

[9] See Fritz Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson, *Management and Worker: An Account of a Research Program Conducted by the Western Electric Company, Hawthorne Works, Chicago* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1939).

[10] Burleigh B. Gardner, *Human Relations in Industry* (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1945), pp. 7-8.

[11] Osgood Nichols and T. R. Carskadon, *Can Labor and Management Work Together?* Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 151 (New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 1949), p. 8.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 15.

[13] See Clyde E. Dankert, *Contemporary Unionism in the United States* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948), pp. 466-467.

Chapter 22

[1] Persia Campbell, *The Consumer Interest: A Study in Consumer Economics* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), pp. 2, 189.

[2] Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations,* 2nd Cannon ed., Vol. II (London: Methuen, 1920), p. 159.

[3] Dr. Julia J. Henderson, Director of the Social Welfare Division of the UN, quoted in the *New York Times,* November 20, 1952.

[4] Roger Babson in *Commercial and Financial Chronicle,* October 9, 1952.

[5] John Ise, *Economics,* Rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 309.

[6] Used by permission of Sidney Silleck, Jr., Kenyon & Eckhardt, Inc., New York.

[7] Lewis D. Stillwell, "The Consumer," in Robert E. Riegel, ed., *An Introduction to the Social Sciences,* Vol. I (New York: D. Appelton-Century Co., 1941), p. 434.

[8] *Ibid.,* pp. 438-439.

[9] Earl R. Sikes, "The Price Mechanism," in Riegel, *An Introduction to the Social Sciences,* Vol. I, pp. 126-127.

[10] *Consumer Reports,* Consumers Union, April 1953.

[11] Stillwell, "The Consumer," pp. 420-421.

[12] Le Baron R. Foster, *Credit for Consumers,* Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 5, Rev. ed. (New York: The Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 1950), p. 12.

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 18.

[14] Ise, *Economics,* p. 308.

[15] *Consumer Reports,* April 1953, p. 142.

Chapter 23

[1] J. M. Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1936).

[2] Although recently, the Russian government has taken steps to provide the Russian people with more consumer goods.

Chapter 26

[1] In some kinds of elections, those involving local bond issues, for example, property or tax-paying qualifications may still be required.

Chapter 27

[1] Blumer, "Collective Behavior," p. 191.

[2] See the *New York Times,* June 15, 1953, p. 10, for the text of his remarks as recorded by the Columbia Broadcasting System.

[3] Charles Malik, "Human Rights in the United Nations," *United Nations Bulletin,* Vol. XIII, No. 5, Sept. 1, 1952, 250.

[4] "Draft Covenants on Human Rights," *ibid.,* 257.

[5] W. F. McDermott, "Have You Been on TV Yet?" *Reader's Digest,* Vol. 62, February 1953, 145-148.

[6] *Chicago's Greatest Issue—An Official Plan* (Chicago: The Chicago Plan Commission, 1911).

[7] Robert K. Merton, *Mass Persuasion* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946).

[8] Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington. Wisconsin, Indiana, and Kansas do not have enforcement provisions. A total of 30 cities have F.E.P. ordinances but they vary widely in content. Those of Cleveland, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia are perhaps the most effective. This data, as of January 1954, were kindly supplied by Mrs. Olive R. Beasley.

[9] Not to be confused with the organization of very similar name, the Michigan Civil Rights Federation, which was included on the U. S. Attorney General's list of subversive groups in 1951.

[10] *The Dynamics of State Campaigns for Fair Employment Practices Legislation* (Chicago: American Council on Race Relations and the Committee on Education, Training and Research in Race Relations of the University of Chicago, April 1950), pp. 5-7. According to the author of the Preface, Louis Wirth, the study is the work of Mr. Bernard Goldstein. Italics in the passage quoted have been added by the present writer.

Chapter 30

[1] Crane Brinton, *Ideas and Men* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), Chapters 8-12.

[2] C. E. M. Joad in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 14 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), pp. 295-296. See Herbert Spencer, *The Man versus the State* (London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd., 1884).

[3] Brinton, *Ideas and Men,* p. 373.

[4] Herbert Hoover, *American Individualism* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1922).

[5] Quintin Hogg, *The Case for Conservatism* (West Drayton, England: Penguin Books, 1947).

[6] Peter Viereck, *Conservatism Revisited* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 19.

[7] Hogg, *The Case for Conservatism*, p. 62.

[8] C. R. Attlee, *The Labour Party in Perspective—and Twelve Years Later* (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1949), pp. 108-109.

[9] P. M. Sweezy, *Socialism* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 91 ff.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 130.

[11] F. A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 27.

[12] Max Lerner, *It Is Later Than You Think* (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1943), p. 139.

[13] R. T. Bye, "The Role of Government in Economic Planning," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November 1939, 126-132.

[14] For a lucid brief description of the nature and uses of these instruments see Emile Despres, Milton Friedman, A. G. Hart, P. A. Samuelson, and D. H. Wallace, "The Problem of Economic Stability," *American Economic Review*, September 1950, 505-538.

[15] A. H. Hansen, *Economic Policy and Full Employment* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1947), pp. 14-28.

[16] Karl Mannheim, *Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 21.

[17] Bye, "The Role of Government in Economic Planning," 129.

[18] John Jewkes, *Ordeal by Planning* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1948), p. 9.

[19] Sir Oliver Franks, *Central Planning and Control in War and Peace* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1947), p. 24.

[20] Barbara Wootton, *Freedom Under Planning* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1945), Chapters 3-8. The title of the following subsection is taken from this excellent volume.

[21] Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, p. 135. For a brilliant exchange, see this book and Herman Finer, *Road to Reaction* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1945).

[22] Walter Lippmann, *The Good Society* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1937), p. 30.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

Chapter 31

[1] As a consequence of this position, communists regard socialists as their deadliest enemies. In turn, socialists are vigorous in their opposition to communism.

[2] See Chapter 32 on the difficulties of adjusting a conflict regarded as being between good and evil.

Chapter 32

[1] E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1945), pp. 13-17. By permission of author and publisher.

[2] A party to a dispute must abstain from voting, but if the question of sanctions against a permanent member of the Security Council comes up, this member, although a party to the dispute, can vote and exercise a veto.

[3] Robert Marjolin, *Europe and the United States in the World Economy* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1953), pp. 30-31.

QUESTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS FOR DISCUSSION

Chapter 1

1. Do all societies regard science highly?
2. How can scientific investigation be distinguished from non-scientific investigation?
3. How do you account for the fact that the chemist, for example, enjoys more prestige in contemporary American society than does the sociologist?
4. Distinguish between the scientific spirit and the scientific method.
5. How would you qualify the notion that suggests that science is an "organized" body of knowledge?
6. What is the greatest obstacle to the achievement of a more mature and exact social science?
7. Why is the scientific method not very appropriate for studying events that occur only once?
8. How would you justify the integrated approach to the social sciences?
9. How are qualitative and quantitative analysis interrelated?
10. What relationship does a natural law have to the natural world?

Chapter 2

1. Before reading further, set down your reactions to the San Blas Cuna way of life. What did you think of the way they look? Their marriage customs? Their government? Their interpretation of the universe and of their place in it? Their ways of dealing with ill health? The puberty ceremonies? What things do you find shocking? Surprising? Queer? Admirable? Ridiculous? Superstitious? Wise?

Sensible? Natural? Right? Wrong? Moral? Immoral? Beautiful? Ugly? Disgusting? Pleasing? Save your notes to refer to after you have read the next four chapters.

Chapter 3

1. What biological and social factors make man "The only animal with culture?"
2. "Human nature is the same all over the world." In the light of the discussion of the uniformity and variability of culture, how would you qualify this statement?
3. Of what subcultures are you a member? What beliefs and values do you share as a result of this membership?
4. Explain why values are the fundamental differences between cultures.
5. Is culture everything people do or is it a set of patterns for their behavior?
6. Give examples of social problems in our country that reflect lack of cultural integration.
7. Discuss the function of ritual as seen in a coronation, a presidential inauguration, a scout meeting, a formal tea, a christening.
8. Cultural integration is always relative, never absolute. Discuss.
9. Explain why culture is a concept or abstraction, not a tangible reality.

Chapter 4

1. Is present-day American culture an accumulation of all past culture traits?
2. Relate the development of atomic energy to the third principle of culture change, with special emphasis on the direction this development has taken.
3. In the light of the discussion of invention, would it have been possible to keep the atomic bomb a secret indefinitely?
4. What people in our society are most likely to change culture by their introduction of individual peculiarities? Relate to fashions, language, and the like.
5. Discuss the effect of television upon our culture in terms of (1) resistance by interests viewing it as competitive, and (2) its influence on recreation patterns, language, and other aspects of our culture.
6. Why is there a lack of understanding between generations during a period of rapid cultural change?
7. What social inventions have been proposed and strongly resisted in recent years? Who advocates them? Who opposes them? Why?
8. Is a secular or a sacred culture more likely to change rapidly?
9. Why did early automobiles resemble horse-drawn buggies?
10. Was penicillin discovered or invented? Account for its rapid diffusion.

Chapter 5

1. Compare your "needs" with those of your parents when they were your age. Relate the differences to cultural change.

2. What fears do you have that a San Blas Cuna Indian would share? What fears does he have that you lack? What do you fear that he does not?

3. Social control is essential to individual freedom. Discuss.

4. Which of the following behaviors violate the folkways? Which violate the mores? (1) Giving classified material to alien spies; (2) Going to church without a necktie; (3) Getting a Mexican divorce and marrying someone else at once; (4) A woman smoking a cigar; (5) Eating peas with a knife; (6) A man staying home with the children while his wife works.

5. Employing the principles of cultural change discussed in the previous chapter, explain why fashions usually originate with the upper class.

6. Reconcile the following statements: "Those laws that are firmly grounded in the mores are the most effective." "Law can initiate social reform." Prove that these statements are not contradictory.

7. Are there mores in our culture that have not been enacted into law? Are there laws that have no inherent relationship to the mores?

8. How does San Blas Cuna culture serve as social control without formal laws?

9. Why are informal techniques of social control insufficient in modern society?

10. Distinguish between San Blas Cuna folkways and mores.

Chapter 6

1. Refer back to your impressions of the San Blas Cuna. Have they changed as you read the subsequent chapters on culture? How would you analyze the change in your attitude in terms of ethnocentrism and cultural relativity?

2. How does Ralph Linton's sketch of the morning routine of the 100 per cent American illustrate the importance of cultural diffusion?

3. What would a map of the U. S. look like if drawn by an ethnocentric inhabitant of your home town?

4. With what "we-groups" do you identify yourself? What advantages do you derive from this feeling of belonging? Does cultural relativity mean abandonment of your loyalties?

5. Which of these types of "we-group" feeling do you consider harmful? Which add interest to life without being particularly dangerous? (1) Family loyalty; (2) Neighborhood pride; (3) Racist beliefs; (4) School spirit; (5) California vs. Florida; (6) Nationalism; (7) Patriotism; (8) An immigrant's pride in "the old country."

6. Read one of the suggested books on America by a foreigner and analyze your reactions and his observations in terms of ethnocentrism.

7. Do you consider progress in other countries synonymous with their adoption of American culture?

8. Reconcile these statements: "Ethnocentrism is inevitable." "Cultural relativity is essential to harmonious living in a multi-group society."

Chapter 7

1. Are the following social groups? (1) The population of Chicago; (2) Members of a social science class; (3) American females age 30; (4) The Smith family next door; (5) Passengers on the same bus; (6) Children playing in the back yard.

2. What social processes are paramount in a football game?

3. Some social scientists find it useful to distinguish between helpfulness and cooperation and between competition and rivalry. Discuss in terms of awareness of other persons and groups.

4. What elements of competition besides those mentioned would you guess are present in San Blas Cuna society?

5. Why does assimilation of immigrants often take three generations?

6. Would cooperation or competition be more likely to prevail in a society where most statuses are ascribed? Where they are achieved?

7. Analyze a typical day or week in terms of the roles you played, institutions participated in, types of collective behavior participated in.

8. Is our cultural belief in competition unlimited? What reasons can you give for your answer?

Chapter 8

1. Does your city fit the "concentric zone" pattern that social scientists have perceived in Chicago? If not, try to account for its ecology.

2. How do you account for the existence of enclaves? Is it rational? Is it selfish? Is it ethnocentric?

3. Is the growth of suburbs a reversal or a continuation of the urban trend? Discuss.

4. What urban influences reach most American farmers?

5. Cite examples of concentration, dispersion, segregation, invasion, and succession in the city with which you are most familiar.

6. Is the slum a natural and inevitable phase in the growth of the city?

7. Why is city planning so difficult?

8. What cultural changes produced the urban trend? What social problems do we usually associate with cities?

9. Discuss the reasons for having a unified governmental setup for metropolitan districts rather than the present arrangement of central cities surrounded by politically independent suburbs and satellite cities. What obstacles would such a plan encounter?

Chapter 9

1. The city is blamed for causing many trends that it merely accompanied or of which it was itself a product. Explain.

2. Which aspects of city life as we know it are inseparable from the nature of cities as large, dense settlements of heterogeneous individuals?

3. Which aspects of city life are more directly attributable to the rapidity of urbanization and to lack of planning?

4. Does San Blas Cuna society fit the picture of the "ideal" folk society in every respect?

5. Why is loneliness a common complaint of urban dwellers in spite of the presence of great numbers of people in cities?

6. Compare the methods of social control in primary and secondary groups.

7. Are primary or secondary contacts more numerous in your daily life? Which are more meaningful to you? With which would you dispense if you had to choose?

8. How can a multi-group society hold together if there is no agreement on sacred values?

9. What efforts do you see to produce a feeling of belongingness in the city, to banish emotional isolation? What problems are such efforts ultimately aimed at alleviating?

Chapter 10

1. Does stratification impress you as a deliberately and rationally planned method of getting society's job done? What are the evidences that it is not?

2. What are the indications that our social structure is becoming more rigid? Do most Americans accept or deny this fact? Why?

3. Frederick Lewis Allen in *The Big Change* said, "We Americans are all middle class." Discuss.

4. Why is it so difficult to analyze the American class structure?

5. What elements of caste are present in the situation of the American Negro? What elements are unlike those in a true caste system?

6. Where would you place the following in our social class system? George Apley of Marquand's novel? Ma Joad of *The Grapes of Wrath*? A "typical" movie actress? The president of the bank in a town of 8,000 people? A Texas millionaire? The Mayo brothers? Dr. Ralph Bunche? Your milkman? A street car conductor? The owner of a neighborhood grocery store?

7. Would you find it easy to construct a more or less "typical" middle-class youth to fill the gap between Joe Novotnick and Gilmore De Pew Belding III?

8. From your experience in your own community, could you construct a chart similar to the one reproduced from *Deep South,* using the phrases with which each class describes itself and others?

9. A class may or may not be a social group in any one community. Discuss.

10. Why is wealth alone not an adequate criterion of social status?

Chapter 11

1. Why is there so much confusion in the use of the word "race?"

2. Why do Americans exhibit more prejudice toward Negroes than toward Indians?

3. What are the difficulties in the way of establishing a national policy in regard to intergroup relations?

4. Is it instinctive for human beings to like people similar to themselves and to hate people who are different?

5. What can an individual do to combat prejudice and discrimination?

6. What headway has been made in recent years toward alleviating our minority-group problems?

7. "Race is a fact, like sex." Discuss, pro and con.

8. Race differences are not important. In what sense is this true? In what sense is it not true?

9. To what extent is race discrimination grounded in our mores? To what extent does it violate our mores?

10. Why are race riots more frequent in the North than in the South? Why have lynchings occurred more often in the South than in the North?

Chapter 12

1. Some students of human behavior find a very definite relationship between methods of toilet training, weaning, feeding and baby care in general, and the basic cultural personality type. Discuss.

2. H. Warren Dunham and Robert E. L. Faris found the highest rate of mental disorders in Chicago in the rooming-house districts, in the area of homeless men, in deteriorated Negro areas, and in immigrant slums. Explain why.

3. "The solid facts of life are the facts of the imagination." Discuss.

4. Why do the three kinds of intelligence tend to go together?

5. Is there a basic rural personality type in our society? A basic urban personality type?

6. How do the definitions of sex roles of the Arapesh, Mundugumor, and Tchambuli differ from our own? How are they similar?

7. Discuss: "A person's character is his generalized other."

8. Give examples of the use of defense mechanisms from literature, movies, or personal experience.

9. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of marginality in terms of ethnocentrism, emotional security, a stable and satisfying self-conception, compatibility of roles and values.

10. Discuss our attitudes toward mental illness as an example of cultural lag.

11. "There are no problem children, only problem parents." Discuss.

12. How is lack of cultural integration reflected in personal disorganization?

13. "His grandfather and father before him were drunkards; naturally he's an alcoholic. It runs in the family." Discuss.

Chapter 13

1. How have the criteria of success in marriage changed?

2. Although they work well among the Yoruba, why do polygamous marriages work out poorly in those sects in our society that have tried them?

3. Explain why different types of families are found in the different zones of the city.

4. From what category of women are those who charge the American housewife with idleness generalizing? With what justification?

5. How do you account for the fact that more urban women than rural women are childless and that urban families are smaller than rural families?

6. Recalling the discussion of personality in the previous chapter, account for the "back to Grandma" trend in child rearing.

7. Is there a class differential in the idea of whether or not romance continues after marriage? Discuss.

8. The famous anthropologist, Ralph Linton, compared our "romantic Hollywood hero" to the Arab epic hero, who is always an epileptic. He said most people are about as capable of acting like the Hollywood hero as they are of throwing a genuine epileptic fit. Discuss.

9. Explain the confusion in sex attitudes in our society.

10. Although in rural America there was little place for the unmarried adult, the marriage rate is now higher than it was in 1900. How do you account for this change?

Chapter 14

1. Why is the folk belief that "opposites attract" not borne out by the facts? Why do so many people believe it?

2. Discuss the socializing function of dating in terms of the self-conception.

3. From your experience, would you say that dating is a clearly defined institution or one that is still undergoing definition?

4. Why is the rate of failure high in hasty marriages, very young marriages, and wartime marriages?

5. What relationship is there between the changing function of marriage and the changed attitude toward broken engagements?

6. Discuss our treatment of the aged in terms of cultural lag.

7. Explain why divorce is a more severe crisis than death in terms of the self-conception and in terms of the social definition of the situation.

8. A juvenile court judge finds the least delinquency in children from families who "do things togther." Why is this probably a valid conclusion?

9. What does the current confusion in regard to feminine roles mean for the personality organization of many women in modern society?

10. Discuss the problems of adolescence in terms of role confusion.

11. Do you think rivalry and conflict between brothers and sisters is "natural" and inevitable? Or is it so intense in our culture because of such cultural values as competition, the emphasis on affection, lack of cooperative ventures in a family production unit, and the like?

12. Why is there so much emphasis on anniversaries, "our song," souvenirs, and harking back to courtship days in our culture?

13. Should young men and young women have radically different college curricula?

14. Why is "internalized" discipline so essential to modern society?

Chapter 15

1. Compare and distinguish between education and socialization.

2. Indicate some reasons for the great increase in school attendance during the past half century.

3. Divide the students in your high-school class into three groups—those who dropped out of school before graduating, those who graduated but did not go to college, and those who went to college. Compare the social position of the families of these three groups using such indexes as father's occupation, type of house, and section of community in which they live.

4. Make a list of topics on which your teachers favor change from the *status quo* and a list on which they would not advocate change.

5. Being as objective as possible, indicate as accurately as you can what you and your family expect to achieve from your high-school and college education.

6. If you were the high-school principal in your home community, who would you want to be sure approved your work? What positions do these people hold?

7. What proportion of the local taxes in your home community are used for education?

8. Analyze the social class structure of your community and note the type of high-school program children from each class followed. Did you rate the various curricula like the senior from Elmtown?

9. If you were a school administrator, what type of educational program would you try to provide in order to prepare youth for life in our society?

Chapter 16

1. Even in our secular society the priest, the religious leader, and the mystic still have great influence in human affairs. How do you explain this?

2. How meaningful are church membership statistics? Do they give an adequate picture of the real conditions of religious faith in our society?

3. No religion can be completely tolerant. If it were it would no longer be a faith. Discuss.

4. What are the characteristics of a world religion?

5. What are some of the religious elements in world communism?

6. In what parts of the world is the struggle between church and state still a very lively issue?

7. Why is it so difficult to offer any kind of religious instruction in our public schools?

8. Why do non-church members have many of the same moral and ethical ideals as do church members?

9. What are some of the needs that people seek to satisfy when they join one of the many peculiar religious sects that flourish in the U. S.?

Chapter 17

1. List some of the ways in which the economic system is interwoven and "integrated" with other aspects of a culture.

2. Some young women expect to work for a living for only a short time before they marry and settle down. Would such a person benefit from a knowledge of economics?

3. What are the basic economic problems faced by any society?

4. Are the following economic wants: (1) a college degree, (2) a beautiful church, (3) a golf game, (4) a clean and orderly home, (5) a pretty complexion, (6) well-pressed trousers?

5. Give examples of production that our society encourages, tolerates, and forbids.

6. Discuss the proposition that modern society is attempting to regain some of the economic values of nonliterate societies that were lost during the early decades of the Industrial Revolution.

7. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the division of labor.

8. Write down what you consider to be the chief features of the American economic system, including beliefs and practices. Refer again to your notes after reading the next two chapters.

9. What are the four chief uses of money? Give an example of how you or your parents have employed money for each of these uses.

10. Why does money serve less well as a store of value than a measure of value?

Chapter 18

1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of studying price economy and planned economy in England rather than in the U. S.?

2. Why is the problem of choice so complicated in modern society where people are so well off and relatively simple in societies where people have little?

3. List commodities for which demands are elastic and inelastic. Does the degree of elasticity vary from society to society? From time to time?

4. On what four factors does our valuation of an article depend? Take two or three articles that the author does not mention and decide how you value them in terms of these four factors.

5. In what way is it misleading to speak of a price economy as "unplanned?"

6. Who decides what shall be produced and how is it decided (1) in a planned economy? (2) in a price economy?

7. Why do societies usually increase the area of the planned economy in war years and decrease the area in time of peace?

8. Has our country been tending more toward a price economy or more toward a planned economy in the present century? Why?

9. Is one type of economy more "democratic" than another? Why or why not?

10. Why is no large society either entirely price or entirely planned?

Chapter 19

1. What evidence is there that intangible property rights have been extended into the area of employer-employee relationships? Mention particular cases.

2. How might businessmen attempt to extend intangible property rights into the area of pricing? Can you think of any examples of such efforts?

3. You might expect social class to influence the intensity with which individuals hold certain beliefs. Set up a series of hypotheses on this problem and indicate how you might go about testing them.

4. "Competition is a value of high order in the American economy." Discuss this statement in terms of what Americans say and in terms of what an investigation into behavior might disclose.

5. Make a list of the various ideas (values) that make up your own economic belief. Write the ideas down rapidly as they occur to you. When you finish, have a friend evaluate them in terms of consistency.

6. Although contracts may actually be modified in many ways, it is necessary that people believe that a contract will be enforced if the day-to-day transactions of the American economy are to be carried out. Evaluate this statement.

7. What are some of the ways in which the idea system affects the demand for goods? The supply of labor? The method of production?

8. Movie stars and sports heroes often receive salaries amounting to several thousand dollars a week; but a skilled, industrious, hard working farmer or carpenter or white-collar employee ordinarily will not earn much more than $5,000 a year. How is this condition reflective of our belief system? How do you regard this situation?

Chapter 20

1. Show how the development of power machinery affected price competition.

2. Why has the price-economy theory been particularly strong in the U. S.? In what ways has that theory been modified through the development of large-scale business organization?

3. Business units have often sought to expand to a size greater than that warranted by the economies of large-scale operation. Discuss the reasons why.

4. What have been the advantages to the consumer of business concentration? What have been the disadvantages?

5. Discuss the differences between price competition and monopolistic competition.

6. What are the advantages of the corporation over the single proprietorship and partnership in an era of large-scale business operation?

7. Discuss some of the advantages of horizontal, vertical, and lateral expansion of business units.

8. It has been said that large modern corporations are widely owned but narrowly controlled. Explain this seeming contradiction.

9. What are the qualities cultivated by the young man who embarks upon a career as an executive in a large corporation? How do these qualities differ from those cultivated by a man who starts out in a small business of his own?

10. In what ways has the growth of the giant corporation affected the belief pattern of the American community as a whole?

11. What have been the causes of government's attempts to regulate the size and activity of corporations? Discuss the reasons for the success or failure of various types of regulation.

12. Why is it unlikely that the U. S. will go as far as the United Kingdom in government ownership and operation of business? Do you believe that the factors holding the U. S. back will grow stronger or weaker in the future?

Chapter 21

1. How is the development of the organized labor movement related to the development of the factory system?

2. Why did organized labor experience so marked a growth in prestige and power during the 1930's?

3. What was the nature of the obstacles that confronted the early organizers of American labor?

4. In what respects are the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L. alike and in what respects are they different?

5. What evidence is there to indicate that factories possess systems of social stratification?

6. On what grounds can the social regulation of organized labor be justified?

7. How do you account for the fact that violence in labor disputes has been considerably reduced during recent years?

8. Would it be socially desirable to eliminate all conflict between labor and management in contemporary American society?

9. Distinguish between arbitration, mediation, and compulsory arbitration.

Chapter 22

1. Why need the U. S. be concerned about extreme poverty and inequality elsewhere in the world?

2. Try to reconcile these two statements: "The dollar votes of consumers determine what shall be produced." "Goods are produced first, then buyers are sought."

3. Discuss the proposition that advertising is essential to our present economic system.

4. Cite examples of how advertising plays upon the "four wishes" and upon organic drives.

5. Do you rely on brand names for standards? Do you shift brands easily?

6. Why is conspicuous consumption more associated with urban than with rural society?

7. What elements of our belief system work against rational buying, cooperative buying, and consumer organization?

8. With what elements of our traditional belief system do installment buying and borrowing conflict? Does their widespread use indicate a change in our values?

9. What "social inventions" have arisen to strengthen the consumer's position?

Chapter 23

1. Discuss how a major depression might bring about a fundamental change in our economic and political system.

2. What economic groups gain from inflation? What economic groups suffer as a result of inflation? Explain.

3. Distinguish between inflation and hyper-inflation.

4. "It is perhaps unfortunate that economists use the term 'business cycles'." Why?

5. "Business cycles are only two hundred years old." Explain this statement.

6. What stage of the business cycle are we in now? Why do you think so?

7. Distinguish between internal and external factors in business cycles.

8. What factors may bring about a recovery? A recession?

9. Distinguish cyclical, seasonal, and secular fluctuations.

10. Critically evaluate the classical and the Marxian theories of the business cycle.

11. Show why capital formation requires savings.

12. Evaluate the following statement: "All savings are harmful because they cause a reduction in spending."

13. "A major cause of business depressions is that people may attempt to save more than businessmen wish to invest." Explain this statement using the "pump" illustration.

14. Under what circumstances would a rise in spending fail to increase employment and output?

Chapter 24

1. Evaluate the success of the Marshall Plan.

2. How can foreigners pay their debts to us?

3. What is the significance of the underdeveloped areas to the U. S.?

4. Why are anthropologists necessary in a government investment program in underdeveloped areas?

5. "A little inflation may be a good thing." Do you agree? Discuss.

6. It is said that the Employment Act of 1946 marked a change in American ideology. Why?

7. Give an example of a "built-in stabilizer" and show its impact on business fluctuations.

8. What monetary and fiscal policies would you recommend to combat a depression? An inflation?

9. Discuss the effectiveness of monetary policies alone in combating depressions.

10. "An economic case can be made for high taxes on low income groups during inflationary periods." Do you agree? Discuss.

11. What groups have a high propensity to consume? Why is knowledge of propensity to consume significant in the determination of fiscal policy?

12. Indirect controls are more consistent with our ideology than direct controls. Why?

13. If you had the responsibility for correcting inflation, what criteria would you use to decide when action should be taken?

14. Under what conditions would price controls be effective in a democratic society? Explain.

Chapter 25

1. What is democracy?

2. In what ways might the discrepancies between what we believe and what we practice affect our relationships with other countries, particularly in the present state of world affairs?

3. What is the relationship between our belief system and the requirement found in most states that public schools must offer courses in American history and in civics or government?

4. Discuss the relative importance of the family, the school, and the church to political behavior.

5. The statement that "We believe in freedom" raises the question of "How much freedom?" What seems to be the position of our society on this point?

6. The Industrial Revolution brought about tremendous alterations in our whole way of life. Investigate some of the more prominent changes and evaluate their effect on what we believe with respect to the role of government as a means to an end.

7. Discuss the concept of "justice" in the American belief system with respect to "justice for whom?" Relate it to examples of discrepancies between what we believe and what we practice.

8. What is the relationship between the aura of sacredness that we impart to our beliefs and the attitudes of many toward critics of our system?

9. Discuss some of the ways in which you were taught those things that Americans believe with respect to the exercise of power and authority.

10. It has been said that a belief system or a form of government is on the road to destruction when it feels called upon to defend itself loudly and vigorously before its accusers. Comment.

Chapter 26

1. Evaluate the following statements:
   a. We should have compulsory voting laws.
   b. The convention system being what it is, presidential nominees should be selected by the people through direct primary elections.

c. We should have fewer elections and fewer elective officers so the people could vote more intelligently.
d. During political campaigns, the press, radio, and other means of mass communication should be required to give equal and fair coverage to all candidates.
e. Political parties and their campaigns should be financed by federal tax revenues distributed equally among the major parties.

2. Would the merit system for government office holders spell the end of the political machine in America?

3. How effective do you think campaign oratory, books and pamphlets, and the like, are in winning votes?

4. Discuss ways and means of improving the voting habits of the American people. Can you think of any advantages in bloc voting, i.e., voting as members of a religious group, for example?

5. In what ways do some of our suffrage procedures and provisions clash with our belief system?

6. Examine a recent political campaign in your own community and select examples of the methods and techniques used in appealing to the voter.

Chapter 27

1. Consider the most recent student body election on your campus. What proportion of students participated? Why were there so many, or so few? Is this good, or bad, or doesn't it matter?

2. Consider the most recent national, state, or municipal election. What were the most significant issues? What do you *know* about the circumstances surrounding these issues and the history behind them? Which facts came to you from the radio, newspapers, magazines, and books that you read "on your own" and which did you learn as a student working on some course?

3. How might an individual's personality affect his political opinion? How might residence in a small town or in an urban area influence the opinions a person forms on issues?

4. In national politics, do you generally agree with your father? Your mother? Why and why not?

5. List a few of the most important local, state, national, or international issues you can think of. Have any of these failed to secure the attention you think they deserve in your college classes? If so, why do you think this is so? Should anything be done about this situation? Who should do what, and why?

6. What are the main uses and limitations of public opinion polls? Should they be subject to regulation? By whom? In what way?

7. What responsibilities, if any, accompany freedom of speech? Does the situation differ between peace and war? Why or why not?

8. What is the most recent case of economic discrimination (based on race, religion, nationality, and so forth) that has come to your attention? How did you happen to learn about it? Is anyone doing anything to improve this condition? If so, who, and with what effectiveness? If not, why not? What is your own personal position or convictions on this issue? If so, were you born with them? If not, where did you get them?

9. For the biggest city in your state, find out (1) the circulation of each major daily newspaper published there, (2) which political party is supported by each partisan paper among these major dailies, and (3) how the vote went at the last national election. What do your findings show about the "power of the press?"

10. Did members of your family see any of the television showings of the last Republican and Democratic national conventions? If so, were they significantly impressed in any way by these programs? How, and why?

Chapter 28

1. Discuss the statement: "The people have no recourse in the operation of judicial review."

2. What have been some of the significant developments in the constitutional principle of separation of power?

3. Discuss the problems involved in achieving "equal justice for all."

4. What has been the role of our judicial system with respect to the application of constitutional law?

5. What is the significance of the statement: "Legislators do not search the Constitution for specific grants of power for every law they enact?"

6. What are the major safeguards in our Constitution against the whims and caprices of the masses?

7. What is meant by the dual nature of the Constitution?

8. Does the Constitution recognize that the tyranny of the majority may be just as alien to democracy as the tyranny of a minority?

9. Develop arguments pro and con for a loose or strict interpretation of the Constitution.

10. Discuss this statement: "The student of American government would not get a really true picture of the operation of his government by reading solely the Constitution."

Chapter 29

1. Discuss the potential problems that may arise from the dual role of the Chief Executive as President of all the people and as leader of his political party.

2. What are the difficulties involved in reorganizing the bureaucracy of government?

3. Should the President lead Congress and his Cabinet or follow them in matters of policy determination?

4. Discuss the impact of present world conditions on the relationship of the President to Congress in the conduct of foreign affairs.

5. Should Congress have fewer committees?

6. Discuss the implications of the growth of congressional investigations.

7. Do the people really want their congressmen to be statesmen?

8. Should the patronage power be removed and all appointments be based on a merit system of some kind?

9. Should lobbying be outlawed?

10. Discuss the effect of the various obligations a congressman has on his voting performance.

Chapter 30

1. What is the keynote of conservative thinking today? Has it remained the same for several centuries?

2. What were the chief contributions of Smith, Mill, and Spencer in relation to the conservative answer? What use have contemporary conservatives made of their thinking?

3. What were some of the chief injunctions or slogans of laissez faire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?

4. In what ways does conservatism today differ from the earlier conservatism? Are there still genuine differences separating the liberal from the conservative camp?

5. How do socialist democrats take issue with conservative democrats on the subject of liberty?

6. How do you decide that a person is a socialist? A communist? Is a socialist a close cousin to a communist?

7. State the "third alternative." What are its chief features?

8. Can democracies plan? What are the obstacles and the possibilities as you see them?

9. What is the American way? How does it differ from the various doctrinaire solutions?

10. What fair guesses about the future of big government do the authors suggest?

Chapter 31

1. What do Marxists mean when they call their doctrine a *scientific* theory of history? What is helpful to the student of history in this claim? How may it be challenged?

2. Why do some people regard it as important to distinguish between Marxism and Bolshevism? Is this distinction of any real importance to people who believe in democracy?

3. Several of our political leaders consider socialism and communism to be twin dangers. What do you think?

4. Select some country that has become communist since 1945 or which is presently threatened in some manner by communism. Why has communism been successful there?

5. Make a list of problems that show how difficult it can be to combat communism and at the same time preserve democratic practices.

6. If communists are committed to the eventual destruction of the non-communist world, why should the United States attempt to negotiate with the Soviet Union?

7. What are some of the important differences that have arisen between

Great Britain and the U. S. concerning world communism? Why should two democratic countries have these different views?

8. The communists are violent revolutionists, but so were the British in 1648, the Americans in 1776, the French in 1789. What, then, is wrong with being a communist revolutionist?

9. Most Americans believe that capitalism is necessary for democracy. Millions of Europeans believe that socialism is necessary for democracy. What is the relationship between an economic and a political system?

10. From your local newspapers, clip reports that indicate some of the problems confronting Americans in their efforts to make democracy work. See if you can also find any information concerning ways in which communists use such incidents in their propaganda. Utilize these clippings for a class discussion.

11. Invite a foreign student to tell your class his reactions, favorable and unfavorable, to America.

Chapter 32

1. How does international politics differ from domestic politics, and why?

2. What are the deficiencies of international law in contrast to the law of a domestic society?

3. Define nationalism.

4. What accounted for the functioning of the world economy in the 19th century?

5. Why is collective security an unrealistic concept?

6. How does the "veto" operate in the Security Council?

7. What are the advantages of having the United Nations Organization?

8. Discuss the impact of imperialism upon colonial countries.

9. What is meant by the "bi-polarization" of the world?

10. What are the economic problems of Western Europe and how is the U. S. a determining factor in their solution?

11. Why does communism appeal to the people of underdeveloped countries?

12. Why is it necessary for us to establish priorities in the conduct of our foreign policy? What are the commonly suggested priorities?

SUGGESTED READINGS

Chapter 1

Beard, Charles A., *The Nature of the Social Sciences* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934). Offers a provocative introduction to the whole social science field. It contains several challenging sections on science and social science.

Gee, William, *Social Science Research Methods* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950). A useful but not especially original general introduction to social science methodology.

Lundberg, George A., *Social Research,* Rev. ed. (New York: Longmans, Green & Company, Inc., 1942). A classic work on social science investigation.

Standen, Anthony, *Science is a Sacred Cow* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1950). Written by a chemist. A clever antidote to science worship.

White, Leslie A., *The Science of Culture* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1949). Includes many interesting observations concerning the nature of science and the possibility of developing a more mature social science.

Chapter 2

McKim, Fred, *San Blas, An Account of the Cuna Indians of Panama* (Goteborg, Sweden: Etnografiska Museet, Etnologiska Studier No. 15, 1947). Very readable.

Stout, David B., *San Blas Cuna Acculturation: An Introduction* (New York: The Viking Fund, Inc., Publications in Anthropology, No. 9, 1947). Perhaps the best single study of the Cuna.

Chapter 3

Benedict, Ruth, *Patterns of Culture* (New York: Pelican Books, 1946). This fascinating comparison of three cultures offers voluminous proof of the variability of culture and an interpretation of it.

Kluckhohn, Clyde, *Mirror for Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949). This book on "the relation of anthropology to modern life" is written for the layman by a noted anthropologist. Highly readable and stimulating.

Linton, Ralph, *The Study of Man* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1936). A classic textbook on culture.

Mead, Margaret, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies* (New York: Mentor Books, 1950). Extremely interesting accounts of the values and behavior patterns of three tribes, which though living in the same general area present striking personality and cultural contrasts.

Chapter 4

Gillin, John, *The Ways of Men* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1948). Chapter 25, "Conditions and Processes of Cultural Change," and Chapter 26, "The Contact of Cultures," develop points touched upon in this chapter.

Linton, Ralph, *The Study of Man.* Chapters 17-21 deal with cultural content and cultural change.

Ogburn, William F., *Social Change* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1922). A thorough treatment by a long-time student of the subject.

Stout, David B., *San Blas Cuna Acculturation: An Introduction.* Following the description of Cuna culture, the effect of various influences in producing cultural change is discussed.

Chapter 5

Allen, Frederick Lewis, *The Big Change* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952). This book, written for the layman, notes many changes in American folkways, mores, and values since 1900.

Benedict, Ruth, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946). Shows how culture serves as social control by setting patterns of behavior for the Japanese.

Davis, Kingsley, *Human Society* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949). Chapter 3, "Social Norms," is an excellent discussion of culture as social control. For the serious student.

Frank, Lawrence K., *Nature and Human Nature* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1951). Difficult but thought-provoking reading.

Sumner, William Graham, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1906). This classic account of folkways, mores, and law is still interesting, though some of its viewpoints have been modified by later social scientists.

Williams, Robin M., Jr., *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951). Chapter 11 is an excellent discussion of American values. The entire book is very helpful for the serious student.

Chapter 6

Barzini, Luigi, Jr., *Americans Are Alone in the World* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1953). According to one reviewer, this "intelligent and observant outsider is able to find in the activities of the [American] daily routine characteristics and revealing features of which those involved are frequently unaware."

Kluckhohn, Clyde, *Mirror for Man.* Written in clear and simple style especially for the purpose of explaining what an understanding of the culture concept can contribute to modern society. Especially valuable in counteracting ethnocentrism are chapters 1, 2, 9, and 10.

Gorer, Geoffrey, *The American People: A Study in National Character* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1948). An interesting exercise in "seeing ourselves as some see us," though we may not agree with many of this English anthropologist's interpretations.

West, James, *Plainville, U. S. A.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945). Chapter 3 discusses the ethnocentric attitudes found in a Midwestern town.

Chapter 7

Blumer, Herbert, "Collective Behavior," in Alfred McClung Lee, ed., *New Outline of the Principles of Sociology* (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1946). A leading authority on collective behavior discusses the crowd, the public, the mass, and social movements.

Green, Arnold, *Sociology, An Analysis of Life in Modern Society* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1952). Chapter 3, "Society," and Chapter 4, "Interaction: the Social Processes," are especially pertinent as supplementary readings on social interaction and social organization.

Merrill, Francis E., and H. Wentworth Eldridge, *Culture and Society, An Introduction to Society* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952). Part Four, "Collective Behavior," and Chapter 25, "Social Interaction and Social Processes," are more comprehensive treatments of subjects touched upon in this chapter.

Chapter 8

Barnes, Harry Elmer, and Oreen M. Ruedi, *The American Way of Life* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950). Chapter 23, "Rural Society Enters the Machine Age," and Chapter 24, "American Society Moves into an Urban Pattern," treat the history and problems of the urban trend in detail.

Gist, Noel P., and L. A. Halbert, *Urban Society,* 3rd ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1949). A widely accepted text. Readable and informative.

Mather, William G., Jr., "Littletown," reprinted from *Harper's* in Edgar A. Schuler, Duane L. Gibson, Maude L. Fiero, and Wilbur B. Brookover, eds., *Outside Readings in Sociology* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952), pp. 599-612. The life cycle of a New England town.

Landis, Paul H., *Social Policies in the Making,* Rev. ed. (New York: D. C. Heath & Company, 1952). Chapter 2 traces the growth of cities and its effect upon personality and social control.

Smith, T. Lynn, "The Role of the Village in American Rural Society," reprinted in Schuler, Gibson, Fiero, and Brookover, eds., *Outside Readings in Sociology,* pp. 592-598. The village is defined as the link between urban and rural worlds.

Wirth, Louis, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," in Schuler, Gibson, Fiero, and Brookover, eds., *Outside Readings in Sociology,* pp. 628-636. Masterful interpretation.

Chapter 9

Alegría, Ciro, *Broad and Alien is the World* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1941). Prizewinning novel depicting the impact of secondary groups upon a tightly-knit, tradition-ruled Indian farm village in Peru.

Landis, Paul H., *Social Policies in the Making.* Chapters 3-5 treat mobility, secularization, and the shift from primary to secondary relationships.

Miner, Horace, *St. Denis: A French Canadian Parish* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939). Excellent study of the values and relationships of a peasant society.

Williams, Robin M. Jr., *American Society, A Sociological Interpretation.* Chapter 12, "American Social Organization," is excellent supplementary reading for this chapter.

Chapter 10

Davis, Allison, and Burleigh and Mary Gardner, *Deep South* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1941). Class and caste in a Mississippi community. Scholarly and readable.

Dollard, John, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937). A classic.

Hutton, J. H., *Caste in India: Its Nature, Functions, and Origins* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1946). Written by one who knows the subject thoroughly.

Warner, W. Lloyd, and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941). Describes research methods and the cultural life of Newburyport, Massachusetts. Chapter 7, "Profiles from Yankee City," will be especially interesting to the beginning student.

Williams, Robin M. Jr., *American Society, A Sociological Interpretation.* Chapter 5, "Social Stratification in the United States," is a thought-provoking analysis that refers to the most important sudies of social class in America.

Chapter 11

Allport, Gordon W., *A B C's of Scapegoating,* Rev. ed. (Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 1948). A clear analysis of psychological factors in race relations.

Benedict, Ruth, and others, *The Races of Mankind,* 2nd Rev. ed. (New York: Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 85, 1951). Like most Public Affairs Pamphlets, this is easy and interesting reading on an important subject.

Berry, Brewton, *Race Relations: The Interaction of Ethnic and Racial Groups* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951). A detached, scientific, but readable treatment of this timely and emotion-charged subject.

Kluckhohn, Clyde, *Mirror for Man*. Chapter 5, "Race: A Modern Myth," is written in the same clear and lively style as the rest of the book.

Myrdal, Gunnar, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1944). This voluminous and valuable study was made by a team of scholars.

Rose, Arnold, *The Roots of Prejudice* (Paris: UNESCO, 1951). A brief but masterful exposition of the causes of prejudice.

Chapter 12

Dewey, Richard, and W. J. Humber, *The Development of Human Behavior* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951). A good text on social psychology. The student will probably find most interesting the sections on age and minority group membership in their relation to personality.

Gesell, Arnold, and F. L. Ilg, *The Infant and Child in the Culture of Today* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1943). The process of personality development is so vividly traced that parents find this book an excellent guide.

Lewin, Kurt, "The Consequences of Authoritarian and Democratic Leadership," in Schuler, Gibson, Fiero, and Brookover, eds., *Outside Readings in Sociology*, pp. 214-219.

Linton, Ralph, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1945). An excellent assessment of the relationship of culture, society, and personality.

Mead, Margaret, *Growing Up in New Guinea* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1930). A readable and interesting account of how the Manus tribe brings up its children, and how these methods of socialization are related to the personalities and culture of the Manus.

Newman, Horatio H., "How Differences in Environment Affected Separated One-Egg Twins," in Schuler, Gibson, Fiero, and Brookover, eds., *Outside Readings in Sociology*, pp. 49-57.

Chapter 13

Baber, Ray E., *Marriage and the Family*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1953). An excellent text. Chapters 1 and 2 treat the family in transition and describe early American family life.

Beers, Howard W., "A Portrait of the Farm Family in Central New York State," in Schuler, Gibson, Fiero, and Brookover, eds., *Outside Readings in Sociology*, pp. 558-568. Affords excellent perspective for consideration of the modern family.

Burgess, Ernest W., and Harvey J. Locke, *The Family, From Institution to Companionship*, 2nd ed. (New York: American Book Company, 1953). An authoritative volume.

Landis, Judson T., and Mary G. Landis, eds., *Readings in Marriage and the Family* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952). The first section, on the con-

temporary American family, includes pertinent selections by five social scientists.

Queen, Stuart A., and John B. Adams, *The Family in Various Cultures* (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1952). This survey of 11 family systems affords excellent cultural and historical perspective.

Yang, Martin C., "Intrafamilial Memberships in a Farm Village of Shantung Province, China," in Schuler, Gibson, Fiero, and Brookover, eds., *Outside Readings in Sociology*, pp. 569-581. Family roles are related to the form and function of the Chinese family.

Chapter 14

Baber, Ray E., *Marriage and the Family*. Authoritative and readable.

Burgess, Ernest W., and Leonard S. Cottrell, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939). A pioneer and still very valuable study in this field.

Landis, Judson T., and Mary G. Landis, *Building a Successful Marriage*, 2nd ed. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953). Presents in readable form scientific knowledge about mate selection, courtship, and the adjustment problems of marriage. Authoritative and useful.

———, *Readings in Marriage and the Family*. An excellent collection of materials from a variety of sources.

Chapter 15

Hollingshead, A. B., *Elmtown's Youth* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1949). Excellent social class analysis of the youth and schools in one community.

Lynd, Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1929, and *Middletown in Transition*, 1937). Classic community studies with an excellent analysis of the educational system.

Robbins, Florence G., *Educational Sociology* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc.). An analysis of the school in the total socialization process.

Stendler, Celia Burns, *Children of Brasstown* (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1949).

Chapter 16

Boisen, Anton T., "Religion and Hard Times: A Study of the Holy Rollers," in Schuler, Gibson, Fiero, and Brookover, eds., *Outside Readings in Sociology*, pp. 430-439. Studies relationship between economic and social frustrations and religious expression.

Cantril, Hadley, "The Kingdom of Father Divine," in Robert W. O'Brien, Clarence C. Schrag, and Walter T. Martin, eds., *Readings in General Sociology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), pp. 285-291. Excellent description of a religious sect.

Kirkpatrick, Clifford, *Religion in Human Affairs* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1929). Chapter 1 is a discussion of the beginnings of religion.

Martindale, Don, and Elio Monachesi, *Elements of Sociology* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), pp. 462-481. Theories of religion clearly and concisely discussed.

Melish, William H., "Religious Developments in the Soviet Union," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 9, June 1944, 279-286. How religion survives in Russia despite governmental persecution.

Pusey, Nathan M., "A Religion for Now," *Harper's,* Vol. 207, December 1953, 19-22. The President of Harvard University sees religious leadership as our greatest need.

Sutherland, Robert L., Julian L. Woodward, and Milton A. Maxwell, *Introductory Sociology,* 4th ed. (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1952), pp. 402-418. Good discussion of church in community.

Chapter 17

Bunzel, Ruth, "The Economic Organization of Primitive Peoples," in Franz Boas and others, *General Anthropology* (Boston: D. C. Heath & Company, 1938), pp. 327-408. A careful analysis. For the serious student.

Herskovits, Melville J., *The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples,* 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953). Scholarly text by a noted anthropologist. For the serious student.

Richards, A. I., *Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939). Details how one group (but there are many others) spends most of its waking time thinking about and working for something that occupies only a fraction of our own time—food.

Slotkin, James S., *Social Anthropology* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950). Although many chapters can be read with profit in connection with *Modern Society,* Chapter 11, "Types of Economy," is especially good at this point, for it provides overwhelming evidence from various cultures that economics does not abound with rigid "laws."

Chapter 18

Chandler, Lester V., *A Preface to Economics* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947). A readable analysis of price economy.

de Schweinitz, Karl, Jr., and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Man and Modern Society* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1953). See especially de Schweinitz's lucid analysis of the price system (Chapter 3); also Part II, "Industrial Society and the Problem of Choice."

Ise, John, *Economics,* Rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950). Part VII, "The Other Isms," and Part VIII, "An Appraisal of Capitalism." Balanced and objective.

Samuelson, Paul A., *Economics,* 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951). Chapters 3 and 35 describe the chief economic systems.

Chapter 19

Boulding, Kenneth, *The Organizational Revolution* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953). Gives evidence that organizational techniques have advanced

to the point where earlier notions of efficient size no longer hold. Boulding feels that this condition is having a drastic effect on the ideas and actions of all economic groups.

Commons, John R., *The Economics of Collective Action* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950). Emphasizes the importance of ideas in the development of American economic life. His work on the property concept is particularly useful.

Veblen, Thorstein, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1899). A penetrating and critical analysis of American economic motivation that has continued to be a source of valuable insight for over half a century.

Weber, Max, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* translated by T. Parsons (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1930). The classic study of the relationships between the Protestant Reformation and the rise of capitalism.

Wright, David M., *Capitalism* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1953). An optimistic view of the ability of the American economy to maintain competitive conditions without governmental regulation.

Chapter 20

Lilienthal, David E., *Big Business—A New Era* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953). A new and interesting evaluation of the problem of bigness by a prominent public figure.

Stocking, George W., and Myron W. Watkins, *Monopoly and Free Enterprise* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1951). Comprehensive, scholarly, and very readable.

The American Road, 16 mm. sound, 44 min., black and white, Ford Motor Company. An absorbing excellently produced film on the development of mass production techniques in the auto industry and their effect on various phases of American life.

Chapter 21

Daugherty, Carroll R., and John R. Parrish, *The Labor Problems of American Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952). A good text on industrial relations.

Dulles, Foster Rhea, *Labor in American Life, A History* (New York. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1949). The best recent history of the American labor movement.

Hardman, J. B. S., and Maurice F. Neufeld, *The House of Labor: Internal Operations of American Unions* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951). Provides important insights into the internal workings of American labor unions.

Mills, Charles Wright, *The New Men of Power, America's Labor Leaders* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1948). Offers many keen insights into contemporary labor leaders and the bureaucratic structure in which they operate.

Peterson, Florence, *American Labor Unions: What They Are and How They*

Work (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952). A brief but authoritative general work on American trade unions.

Schultz, George P., and John R. Coleman, *Labor Problems: Cases and Readings* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1953). A very readable and original text on labor relations.

Chapter 22

Campbell, Persia, *The Consumer Interest: A Study in Consumer Economics* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949). Readable and valuable.

Ise, John, *Economics,* 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), Chapter 21. An analysis of the problems of consumption by an able economist. For the serious student.

Public Affairs Pamphlets (New York: The Public Affairs Committee). Many of these pamphlets, which are well written by experts, deal with the consumer and his problems.

Stillwell, Lewis D., Part VII, "The Consumer," in Robert E. Riegel, ed. *An Introduction to the Social Sciences* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1941), pp. 407-453. Simply written, but interesting and hard-hitting analysis of the problems of the consumer.

Troelstrup, Arch W., *Consumer Problems* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952). Practical guide to consumer problems from the cradle to the grave.

Chapter 23

Estey, James A., *Business Cycles,* 2nd ed. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950). A modern text on business cycles.

Haberler, Gottfried, *Prosperity and Depression* (New York: United Nations, 1946). An authoritative survey of business cycle theories.

Mitchell, Wesley C., *Business Cycles: The Problem and its Setting* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1927). A classic.

Samuelson, Paul A., *Economics, An Introductory Analysis.* Chapters 11-13 deal with the determination of national income, Chapter 13 with business cycles. A popular text by a leading American economist.

Schumpeter, J. A., *Business Cycles,* 2 Vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939). A *magnum opus* on business fluctuations during the last two centuries with emphasis on secular trends.

Upgren, Arthur, and Stahrl Edmunds, *Economics for You and Me* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953). Explains business cycles from the point of view of gross national product. A serious subject treated with a light touch.

Wector, Dixon, *The Age of the Great Depression, 1929-1941.* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948). A fascinating and accurate account of the United States during and after the Great Depression.

Chapter 24

Beveridge, William H., *Full Employment in a Free Society* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1945). An adviser to the British government analyzes business cycle controls consistent with political freedom.

Hansen, Alvin, *Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949). An American Keynesian presents the case for vigorous monetary and fiscal policies to avoid the dangers of economic maturity.

National and International Measures for Full Employment, United Nations Document #1584 (New York: United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, 1949). Prepared by eminent economists appointed by the Secretary-General of U. N.

Oxenfeldt, Alfred R., *Economics for the Citizen* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1953). Chapter 21, "Causes and Possible Cures for Depression." Written for the beginning student.

Robinson, Joan, *Introduction to the Theory of Employment* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1937). A classic primer.

The Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress January, 1954 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954). Published together with the *Annual Economic Review* by the Council of Economic Advisers as required by the Employment Act of 1946. Current data on economic activity and recommendations for maintaining full employment without inflation in our mixed, free-enterprise economy.

Chapter 25

Bishop, Hillman M., and Samuel Hendel, eds., *Basic Issues of American Democracy,* 2nd ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951). Section II, "What is Democracy?" and III, "Democracy in a Changing World." Contains important insights into the various interpretations of the concept of democracy.

Commager, Henry Steele, *The American Mind* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). A penetrating examination of ideas that have been dynamic factors in our thinking since 1880. The closing chapter on the twentieth-century American is particularly good.

Laski, Harold J., *The American Democracy* (New York: The Viking Press, 1948). A careful and sometimes critical analysis of American political structure.

MacIver, Robert M., *The Web of Government* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947). Contains a brief but excellent analysis of the influence of myths or "value impregnated beliefs" upon government and society.

Randall, John H., *The Making of the Modern Mind* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940). An excellent account of the various factors that contributed to the development of western democratic thought.

Snyder, Richard C., and H. Hubert Wilson, eds., *Roots of Political Behavior* (New York: American Book Company, 1949). A fine series of readings on American ideology and American character.

Chapter 26

Lazarsfeld, Paul F., *The People's Choice,* 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948). An account of how the voter makes up his mind in a presidential election year.

Merriam, Charles E., and Louise Overacker, *Primary Elections* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1928). A careful analysis of primary elections, their history and performance, with a chapter on presidential primaries.

Overacker, Louise, *Presidential Campaign Funds* (Boston: Boston University Press, 1946). An excellent little volume that deals with the financing of party activities and the regulatory measures associated with financing campaigns.

Chapter 27

Chaffee, Zechariah, Jr., *Free Speech in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941). The standard work on this very important subject.

Gallup, George H., and Saul F. Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1940). One of the first popular treatments of public opinion polls.

Kesselman, Louis C., *The Social Politics of FEPC: A Study in Reform Pressure Movements* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948). Analyzes the movement for a permanent national F.E.P.C. to deal with discriminatory practices in employment.

Lee, Alfred McClung, *How to Understand Propaganda* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1952). Readable, informative, and short.

Lippmann, Walter, *Public Opinion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1922). A classic on the subject. Now available in low-cost, paper bound edition.

Ruchames, Louis, *Race, Jobs, and Politics, The Story of FEPC* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953). Explodes widely held myths, showing what really happens when fair employment practices are established by law.

Schriftgiesser, Karl, *The Lobbyists: The Art and Business of Influencing Lawmakers* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1951). Reviews the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act and the long history that led up to its passage in 1946.

The President's Committee on Civil Rights, *To Secure These Rights* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947). Reviews the promise [of freedom and equality], the record [which falls considerably short of the goal], and government's responsibility to help secure the rights. Spells out a recommended program of action.

Chapter 28

Bishop, Hillman M., and Samuel Hendel, eds., *Basic Issues of American Democracy*. Part II, "The Living Constitution," presents a series of readings that are a fine source for discussion.

Burns, James M., and Jack W. Peltason, *Government by the People; the Dynamics of American National Government*, 2nd ed. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954). A textbook analysis that is highly readable. The material on the Constitution is particularly appropriate.

Frankfurter, Felix, "Supreme Court, United States," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. XIV, p. 474. Shows the structure and operation of the Court.

Kelly, Alfred H., and Winfred A. Harbison, *The American Constitution* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1948). Comprehensive and authoritative.

Moley, Raymond, and Schuyler C. Wallace, eds., "The Administration of Justice," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. CLXVII, May 1933. This entire issue deals with various aspects of the judicial process.

Swisher, Carl, *The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946). Examines the dual nature of the Constitution.

Chapter 29

Binkley, Wilfred E., *President and Congress* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1947). An historical treatment of the struggle for supremacy between President and Congress.

Burns, James M., *Congress on Trial* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949). An analysis of the legislative process with suggestions for improvements.

———, and Jack N. Peltason, *Government by the People.* The chapters on the executive and legislative departments are particularly appropriate.

Corwin, E. S., *The President: Office and Powers* (New York: New York University Press, 1940). Particularly good for an analysis of the President's Cabinet.

Hyneman, Charles S., *Bureaucracy in a Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950). A thorough discussion of the problems of administration.

Lubell, Samuel, *The Future of American Politics* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952). An interesting exposition of the thesis that a new political era is emerging in which old rules no longer fit and where new party alignments are taking place.

Chapter 30

Brinton, Crane, *Ideas and Men* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950). Gives historical perspective on issues that are still important.

Hayek, F. A., *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944). An attack upon government planning.

Schlesinger, A. M. Jr., *The Vital Center* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949). Diagnosis of liberal tradition and statement of program to secure action.

Simons, H. C., *Economic Policy for a Free Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). Believes capital and labor monopolies must be destroyed so free enterprise can be re-established.

Wooton, Barbara, *Freedom Under Planning* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1945). Defense of planning for full employment; response to Hayek.

Chapter 31

Barth, Allan, *The Loyalty of Free Men* (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1951). A vigorous presentation of the case for combating communism with freedom, and a warning about the various threats to liberty existing in contemporary America. Also available in low-cost, paper bound edition.

Chambers, Whittaker, *Witness* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1952). Valuable insights concerning clandestine communist operations in the United States, the religious appeal of communism, and the workings of the communist mind.

Salvadori, Massimo, *The Rise of Modern Communism* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1952). An excellent brief historical survey that takes the story of international communism up to recent years.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., *The Vital Center.* A liberal's examination of the problems of post-war America in which issues involving the Cold War and domestic communism are analyzed.

Seton-Watson, H., *From Lenin to Malenkov* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1953). An analytical history of communism as a world movement by a British historian who is an acknowledged authority on Eastern Europe.

Chapter 32

Carr, E. H., *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1945). Traces the rise and decline of nationalism through three historic periods and examines the prospects for internationalism.

Kennan, G. F., *American Diplomacy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951). Also available in low-cost, paper bound edition. Collection of essays on American foreign policy by the architect of our policy of containment of Russia. The essay, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," states the assumptions of this policy.

Marjolin, Robert, *Europe and the United States in the World Economy* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1953). Three lectures by the Secretary General of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation on the economic problems facing the United States and Europe in their mutual relationships.

The United Nations at Work, Basic Documents (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1947). Contains the charter of the United Nations, the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and excerpts from the constitutions of the specialized agencies.

Wright, Martin, *Power Politics* (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Relations, 1946). An excellent brief analysis of the workings of international politics.

INDEX

INDEX

A

Absentee voting, 477-478
Abstract intelligence, 180
Academic curriculum, American attitude toward, 255
Accommodation:
  as process of social interaction, 93-94
  defined, 93
Act for International Development, 395
Administrative law, 575
Advertising:
  and business organization, 339
  devices, 401
  effectiveness of, 402-403
  obstacle to rational buying, 400-413
Age, and success in marriage, 229
Age of Longing, The, 269
Aggression, displaced, as defense of self-conception, 193-194
Alger, Horatio, 134, 145
Allport, Gordon, 176
Alpine, division of Caucasoid race, 163
Alternatives, element of culture, 36-37
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 376
Amalgamation, biological, 93
Ambivalence, 195
America:
  problems of, as free world leader:
    idealism as asset, 648
    impatience as disadvantage, 648
    international politics, 648
    nationalism of colonial peoples, 652-653
    Soviet imperialism, 653-654
    Western Europe, 649-652
American economy:
  and business organization, 355 ff.
  assumptions basic to:
    contract, sanctity of, 326-327
    property rights, 324-326
  belief system underlying, 320 ff.
  dynamic beliefs basic to:
    individualism, 327-329
    Puritan ethic, 329-331
  influence of belief in science and technology on, 331
  laborer in, 364 ff.
American Federation of Labor, 371-373
American Institute of Public Opinion, 518
American Medical Association, 578
Anarchy, characteristic of international relations, 629 ff.
Angell, Robert Cooley, 127

Apartheid, 169, 173
Arapesh, 183, 184, 290
Arbitration, of labor disputes, 390
Aristotle, 11
Assimilation:
  as process of social interaction, 93-94
  defined, 93
Ataturk, Kemal, 53
Atlantic Union, 654
Atomic Energy Commission, 356-357
Attitudes, 39, 178
Attlee, Clement, 583, 597
Australian ballot, 477
Authoritarianism, effect on personality development, 184-185

B

Babbitt, 135, 139
Babson, Roger, 397
Background, and success in marriage, 228
Baer, George F., 631
Balance of power, 640
Ballot:
  kinds of:
    Australian, 477
    Massachusetts, 477
Bank of the United States, 535
Barkley, Alben, 495
Baruch Plan, 618
Behavior:
  ceremonial, symbolism, 467-469
  collective, 95-96
  cultural, 34
  human, 6-10
  political:
    learned nature of, 467
    relationship to other social institutions, 466-467
  voting, reasons for, 479-485
Beliefs:
  American:
    toward power and authority, 469-471
    toward social control, 465-467
  and organization and integration of culture, 38-39
  dynamic, basic to American economy, 327-331
  economic, in conflict, 332-334
Belief system:
  basis of popular control of power, 473-474
  fundamental to understanding of a society, 320-321
  relationship to economy of a society, 320-323
Bemba, 41
Benedict, Ruth, 32, 82, 182, 183
Bhagavad-Gita, 268
Bill of Rights, 276, 507, 539, 541
Blaine, James G., 482
Blue-sky laws, 359
Boas, Franz, 166
Bolshevik Party, 605
Bolshevism:
  as dictated by Lenin, 603
  Stalin's refinements of, 604
Bonds, 341-342
Bossism, 488-490
"Brain Trust," 5
Bricker Amendment, 555
Built-in stabilizers, 445
Bureaucracy, 557 *passim*
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 406
Burgess, Ernest W., 110, 205, 227, 228, 229
Burke, Edmund, 579
Business cycle:
  average, used for prediction, 434-435
  defined, 420
  phases of, 422-428
  theories of:
    classical, 431-432
    Marxist, 432-433
    mature economy, 430
Business fluctuations:
  controlling:
    built-in stabilizers, 445
    direct controls, 451-453
  Employment Act of 1946, 443-444
    importance of, 453-454
  monetary and fiscal policies, 445-451
    problem of timing, 450-451
  predicting:
    average cycle basis, 434-435
    national income analysis, 435-439
Business organization:
  factors affecting:
    advertising, 339
    application of power to transportation and manufacturing, 336-338
    combination of factors of production, 338
    liability, unlimited and limited, 340, 342
    Industrial Revolution, 336-339
    monopoly, 336 ff.
    specialization, 339

standardization, 339
types of:
corporation, 341-342
partnership, 340
single proprietorship, 340
Business spending, 435-439
Buy American Act, 650

C

Cabinet, U. S., 554
Call Me Lucky, 145
Campaign strategy:
confusing the issues, 499-501
creating image of candidate, 501-502
reaching the people, 502-503
Candidate, political, ideal, 498
Capital:
factor of production, 290-292
formation in Russia, 436
Carnegie, Andrew, 143, 295
Caste society:
defined, 133
in India, 133-134
Caucasoid, race, divisions of, 162-163
Caucus, 490
Centralization, ecological process, 107
Ceremony, and integration of culture, 44-46
Certiorari, writ of, 546
Charter, corporation, 341
Chartists, 584
Chase, Stuart, 51, 83
Checks and balances, 533-535
Chiang Kai-shek, 648
Chicago Commercial Club, 514
Chicago Plan Commission, The, 514
Christianity:
elements of, borrowed by communism, 278
history of relations with secular authority, 274-276
Chukchi, 32
Church and state, separation of, 276-277
Churchill, Winston, 597
Cicero, Illinois, 110
City:
attraction of, 106-107
defined, 99
ecology of, 107-111
growth of, 99-107
during Middle Ages, 100
during nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 100-102
early centers of civilization, 99-100
effect of Industrial Revolution on, 100
migration as factor in, 104-105
reasons for, 107
Civilization, defined, 28
Class, American beliefs regarding, 134-135
Class attitudes:
in U. S., 152-155
class solidarity, 153
lack of class conflict, 153-154
Class conflict, lack of in U. S., 153-154
Classes, defined, 136
Class pyramid, in U. S., 136-137
Class solidarity, in U. S., 153
Class structure:
and attitudes toward parenthood, 213-214
variations in:
among minority groups, 141-143
among Negroes, 142
case studies, 150-151
rural and urban community, 141
evidences of in U. S., 135
importance of understanding, 135-136
Clayton Act, 356, 357, 358
Cleveland, Grover, 482
Closed shop, 388
Collective bargaining, 374, 389-390
Collective behavior:
as mechanism of social change, 95-96
defined, 95
examples of, 95-96
Colonialism, characteristics of nineteenth-century, in Southeast Asia, 638-639
Columbus, 51
Comanches, 94
Committee for Economic Development, 621
Committee for Industrial Organization, 376
Committees, congressional, 567-568
Commons, John R., 325
Common stock, 341-342
Communism:
as secular religion, 277-279
elements borrowed from Christianity, 278
combating:
by practicing democracy abroad, 625-628
by practicing democracy at home, 623-625

through economic and technical assistance, 620-622
global psychological warfare, 617-620
increasing understanding between ourselves and foreign peoples, 620-622
military aid to allies, 614-617
testing loyalty of Russian people, 622
strength of:
ability to exploit economic and social injustice for own advantage, 609
ability to exploit revolutionary conditions for own advantage, 609
appeal of doctrine, 604-605
appeal to intellectuals, 606-608
impact of two world wars, 608-609
military might of Russia, 609-610
mistrust of America, 610-612
organization, strategy, tactics, 605-606
weakness of:
effect of totalitarian rule, 612-615
internal dissension, 613-614
military and economic, 614
nationalism within satellites, 613
past errors in strategy and tactics, 614
Communists, 585 *passim*
Compensation, as defense of self-conception, 192
Competition:
as process of social interaction, 90-93
defined, 90
perfect, element in price economy, 336
Compulsory arbitration, of labor disputes, 390
Concentration:
corporate:
advantages of, 344-345
future of, 345
ecological process, 107
Conditioning, 179
Conflict:
adjustment of:
balance of power, 640
international law, 641-643
United Nations, 644-646
as process of social interaction, 90-93
causes of, 629-630
defined, 91-92
nature of, 92
results of, 92-93
tensions and wars, 640
Congress:
and interpretation of law, 574-575
criticism of, 576
organization of, 566-569
committees, 567-568
partisan offices, 569
procedural rules, 568-569
relations with executive, 558-560
sessions of, 565-566
Congressional Record, The, 566
Congressman:
national, 562-563
reasons for voting, 563-564
"typical," described, 562
Congress of Industrial Organizations, 376
Conservatism:
essentials of position, 578-580
revised, 581-583
Constitution, U. S.:
amending, 538-541
methods, 538-539
checks and balances, 533-535
compared with English, 540
establishing national power, 535-537
flexibility, 540-541
judicial review, 537-538
Constitutional Convention of 1787, 535, 550
Constitutional law, 545
Consumer:
devices to strengthen position of:
business-connected agencies, 412-413
consumer cooperatives, 412
education and information to improve buying habits, 410-412
improved individual buying habits, 413-414
protective legislation, 408-410
discriminatory legislation against, 407
Consumer cooperatives, 412
Consumer movement, justification for, 414-415
Consumer spending, 435
Consumers Research, 410-411
Consumers Union, 410-411, 413, 415
Consumption, decisions of, 292-296
Contract:
defined, 326
sanctity of, in America, 325-326
significance of, 326
who may enter, 326-327
yellow dog, 374
Contract law, 545
Convention, 67-68
Cooley, Charles Horton, 189
Coolidge, Calvin, 554
Cooperation:
as process of social interaction, 88-90

labor-management, 386-387
place of in complex and simple societies, 90
Corporation:
and government policy toward:
early efforts, 355-356
principles governing, 359-361
recent history, 356-359
as a social institution:
effect of wide ownership and narrow control, 350-351
effect upon managerial class, 352-354
expansion of:
horizontal, 342
lateral, 343
vertical, 342-343
Costs, overhead, 338
Cottrell, Leonard S., 227, 228
Council of Economic Advisers, 443
Courts:
function of, 543
kinds of, 547-548
Courtship, function of, 224-226
Craft union, 372
Crédit Mobilier, 564
Criminal law, 545
Crosby, Bing, 145
Cultural behavior, 34
Cultural change:
attitude toward lending culture, 56
effect of language on, 56-57
function of individual peculiarities in, 58
means of:
diffusion, 49, 53-54
discovery, 49
invention, 49-51, 54-55
principles of, 52-58
reciprocal aspect of, 57-58
resistance of older members of society to, 55-56
resistance of vested interests to, 57
Cultural differences:
factor in intergroup tensions, 166-167
learned nature of, 159
Cultural lag, 53
Cultural norms, 64-65
Cultural relativity:
as antidote for ethnocentrism, 81-82
defined, 81
Cultural traits, adoption of new, 55
Cultural values, as determinants of status, 137-138
Culture:
and individual peculiarities, 37
and economic systems, 285 ff.
and geographic environment, 31-32
and neurotic conflicts, 200
and personality, 182-184
and race, 31-32
as social control, 62-71
characteristics, 30-37
defined, 27-28
elements:
alternatives, 36-37
specialties, 36
universals, 36
functions of, 59-71
for the individual, 59-62
learned nature of, 34-35
man's ability to build, 29
material and nonmaterial elements, 33-34
nature of, 27-46
of rural society, 114
of the factory, 381-382
of urban community, 114-115
organization and integration of:
beliefs, 38-39
myths, 43-44
symbols, ritual, and ceremony, 44-45
values, 39-43
selective accumulation of, 52
social sharing of, 35-36
social transmission of, 34-35
stability and continuity of, 47-49
universal patterns in, 30
value of integration, 46
Cultural concept, value of, 83-84
Culture trait complex, 38
Culture traits, 38
Cultures:
differences among, 31-33
similarities among, 30-31
simple and complex, 37
Customs, defined, 65

D

Dartmouth College, 507
Dating, function of, 222-224
da Vinci, Leonardo, 49
Davis, Kingsley, 29, 68
"Day the Dam Broke, The," 95
Decentralization, ecological process, 109
Declaration of Independence, 531, *passim*
Demand:
how effected by substitutes, 307

types:
elastic, 305
inelastic, 305
Democracy:
effect on personality development, 185
elements of, 470-471
spread of, anti-communist device, 623-628
Democratic planning:
essentials of theory, 589-591
machinery for, 591-592
possibilities of, 592-599
freedom, 593-596
planning the planners, 596-599
Democratic socialism, 585-587
Department of Agriculture:
Bureau of Human Nutrition and Home Economics, 409
Production and Marketing Administration, 409
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 408
Department of Justice, 548
Depression:
and rise of totalitarianism, 420
description of, phase of business cycle, 422-424
effect on family, 417
effect on farmer, 424
effect on intellectuals, 424
effect on labor, 416-417, 423
effect on minorities, 418
effect on money income, 417
effect on prices, 423
effect on youth, 418
Destroyer-Bases Agreement, 556
Dewey, Thomas E., 490, 597
Diffusion, element in cultural change, 49, 53-54
Diggers, 584
Direct primary:
kinds:
closed, 491
open, 491
Discovery, element in cultural change, 49
Discriminating voter, 482-484
Discrimination, as factor in intergroup tensions, 169
Dispersion, ecological process, 109
Disposable income, 426
Dividends, from securities, 341
Division of labor, and exchange of goods, 296
Divorce:
causes, 245-246
rate of increase since 1867, 245
suggestions for curbing, 246-247
Dobuans, 182-183, 184, 293
Dole, 451
"Dormitory" towns, 111
Due process, 547
in settling property conflicts, 325
Durbin, Deanna, 167
Durkheim, Emile, 121
Dynastic state, 634

E

Ecological processes:
centralization, 109
concentration, 107
decentralization, 109
dispersion, 109
invasion, 109-110
segregation, 109
specialization, 109
succession, 110
Ecology:
human, 107
of city, 107-111
Economic beliefs, conflict of, in America, 332-334
Economic Cooperation Administration, 441, 447
Economic man, 392
Economic systems:
and culture, 285 ff.
decisions of production in, 289-292
defined, 285, 286
reasons for studying, 286-287
Edison, Thomas, 49
Education:
American belief in, 254
and other social institutions:
economic, 259
family, 260-262
government, 258-259
and public opinion influencing, 527-529
and social class:
curriculum, 263
in Europe, 265
school activities, 263-264
and socialization, 249
as means of social mobility, 144-145, 147, 149
as social process, 251
defined, 248

different systems of, 249-251
early development of, 251-253
varied expectations toward:
academic vs. vocational training, 255
religious teaching, 254-255
social change, role of school in, 256-257
Edwards, Newton, 252
Eighteenth Amendment, 493, 540
Einstein, Albert, 5, 632
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 478, 507, 559, 597, 618
Elastic demands, 305
Elections, administration of, 476-478
"Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard," 62
Eleventh Amendment, 540
Employment:
during prosperity, 427
during recession, 428
Employment Act of 1946, The, 443, 453, 590
Enclaves, 111
Engagement:
function of, 226
length of, relation to successful marriage, 226
Engels, Friedrich, 603
Enterprise, factor of production, 290-292
Environment:
and culture, 31-32
animal's adaptation to, 29
factor in personality development, 180
man's adjustment to, 29
Equalitarian family, 205
Equity law, 545
Eskimos, 32, 73, 459
Esquire, 514
Essay on the Inequality of Human Races, 165
Ethnocentrism:
advantages of, 79
cultural relativity as antidote for, 81-82
defined, 72
disadvantages of, 79-81
inevitability of, 73-79
universality of, 72-73
Etiquette, 67-68
"Exact sciences," 5 ff.
Experimental method, problem of applying to study of human behavior, 9
Executive, U. S.:
as politician, 560-562
compared with English, 551-552
compared with French, 552
different concepts of office, 554
how chosen, 551
organization and powers of:
administration of law, 557-558
Cabinet, 554
foreign relations, 555-556
patronage, 556-558
relations with Congress, 558-560
Executive Agreements, 556

F

Fabian socialism, 587
Factory, culture of, 381-382
Fads, 68
Fair Employment Practices, campaign in Michigan to promote, example of public opinion formation, 518-527
Fair trade laws, as obstacle to rational buying, 404-405
Family:
American:
criticism of, 208-209
future of, 247
reorganization of, 209
stages in:
courtship, 224-226
dating, 222-224
crises and disorganization, 243-247
engagement, 226
husband-wife relationships, 230-239
mate selection, 226-229
parent-child relationships, 239-242
old age, 242-243
and the school, 260-262
changed functions of:
care and socialization of children, 214-215
channelization of sex drive, 215-218
in economic sphere, 209-211
in traditional sphere, 211
reproduction, 211-214
defined, 203-204
differences among, in different city areas, 205-207
effect of depression on, 417
forms of:
extent of kinship, 207
location of authority, 205-207
functions of:
primary, 207-208
traditional, 208, 211

future of, 247
origin of, 203-204
Fantasy, as defense of self-conception, 193
Farley, James A., 492, 493, 494, 497
Fashions, 68
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, The, 487
Federalists, 537, 579
Federal Reserve Board, 447
Federal Reserve System, monetary and fiscal policies, 445-448
Federal Trade Commission, 356-359, 408
Field work, in social science, 10-11
Fifteenth Amendment, 475, 540
Filibuster, 573
First Amendment, 507
Fixation, 194
Folk society, contrasted with urban community, 113-115, 125
Folkways:
defined, 65
in rural society, 114
Food and Drug Administration, 359, 408, 409
Force, place of, in international relations, 632-633
Ford, Henry, 345
Ford, Henry II, 621
Ford Foundation, 621
Foreign spending, 440-443
Fortune, 165, 235, 514, 518
Fourteenth Amendment, 540
Frank, Lawrence K., 38-39
Franklin, Benjamin, 134
Freedom:
and big government, 599-601
and democratic planning, 593-596
Freedom of speech:
and public opinion, 507-511
dangers of curbing, 510-511
Free price system:
and labor, before factory system, 365
ideology of, 299-300, *passim*
Frost, Robert, 215
Frustration, effect on personality development, 181-182

G

Galileo, 11, 51, 55
Gallup, George, 518
Gallup Poll, 517
Gandhi, Mohandas, 268
Garner, John N., 497
General Motors, 343
General Services Administration, 650
Gesell, Arnold, 215
Goals, of labor and management, 385
Gobineau, Count de, 165
Gold Coast and the Slum, The, 196
Goods:
division of:
among nonliterates, 294
importance of equitable, 295-296
exchange of:
among Kwakiutl, 296-297
by trade, 297
division of labor, 296
function of money in, 297-299
kinds of:
consumer, 423
consumer durable, 422
durable, 424
producer, 422
semi-durable, 423, 424
new types, obstacle to rational buying, 399-400
variety, obstacle to rational buying, 397-398
Government:
and union pressure, 378-379
as organized power, 464-465
attitude of democratic planners toward, 589-599
conservative attitude toward, 578-583
ownership of industry, 361
policy toward corporations, 355-361
popular control of, 472 ff.
problem of bigness, 599-601
socialist attitude toward, 583-589
spending, to control business fluctuations, 443-454
world, need for, 643-646
Grapes of Wrath, The, 135
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, The, 413
Greenback movement, 424
Gregory VII, 275
Grey, Sir Thomas, 62
Gross National Product, 426
Group relationships, system of, 85-96
Growing Up in New Guinea, 205

H

Habits, defined, 178
Hague, Frank, 489-490

Hamilton, Alexander, 537, 579
Harding, Warren, 554
Harvey, William, 55
Hatch Act, The, 487
Hawley-Smoot Tariff, 572-573
Heredity, factor in personality development, 178-181
Herskovits, Melville, 81
Heterogeneity, characteristic of urban community, 115-116
Hitler, Adolf, 172, 420
Hoffman, Paul, 521, 621
Hogg, Quintin, 582, 583
Holding company, 352
Homans, George C., 128
Homer, 218
Hoover, Herbert, 374, 581
Horizontal expansion, of corporation, 342
Horney, Karen, 200
House of Representatives, U. S., 565 *passim*
Housing, as criterion of social class, 139
Howe, Louis M., 492, 493, 494
Human behavior:
  obstacles to scientific study of:
    difficulty of obtaining objectivity, 6-8
    need for precise language, 9-10
    problem of formulating laws, 8
    problem of prediction, 8-9
    use of experimental method, 9
Humor, as anti-communist device, 620
Hyperinflation, 418-419

I

Identification, as defense of self-conception, 193
Imperialism:
  and colonial peoples, 637-640
  Marxist interpretation of, 637-638
Income:
  and success in marriage, 229
  during prosperity, 427
  during recession, 428
  importance of savings and investment in determining national, 436-439
Individual peculiarities, as function of cultural change, 58
Individualism:
  American belief in, 327-329
  relationship to laissez faire economics, 329
Individuation, 122
Industrial Revolution, 100 *passim*
Industrialism, effect on labor, 366
Industrial union, 372
Inelastic demands, 305
Inequality:
  of income:
    in U. S., 396-397
    world, 393-395
Inflation, 418
Inhibition, 200
Initiative, device for popular control of government, 478
Innatuledi, 22, 23
Installment loans, as obstacle to rational buying, 405-406
Institutional behavior:
  as mechanism of social change, 95
  defined, 95
Institutions, defined, 69-70
Integration:
  and personality organization, 194-197
  in social science, 12
  of culture, 38
    value, 46
Intellectuals:
  and communism, 606-608
  effect of depression on, 424
Intelligence:
  abstract, 180
  factor in personality development, 180-181
  mechanical, 180
  social, 180
Interest rates, during recession, 428
Intergroup tensions:
  cultural differences, 166-167
  discrimination, 169
  interracial, 159
  mental differences, 165-167
  nationality, 156-158
  physical differences, 159-165
  prejudices and streotypes, 167-169
  reducing, 173-176
  religious, 158
Interlocking directorate, 351
Inter-Mountain Consumer Service, 410
International anarchy, 629 ff.
International Court of Justice, 643
International economics, problems of, 441-443
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, 376
International law, 641-643
Invention:
  as stimulus to economic recovery, 424-425

element in cultural change, 49-51, 54-55
Invasion, ecological process, 109-110

J

Jackson, Andrew, 491, 554
Jacksonian Democrats, 579
Jefferson, Thomas, 470, 538
Jeffersonian Republicans, 537, 579
Johovah's Witnesses, 277
Jews, synagogue enrollment of in U. S., 158
Joint stock company, 341
Judicial Department:
  function of courts, 543
  structure of, 545-549
Judicial review, 537-538
Judiciary Act of 1789, 538
Jurisdictional disputes, between labor unions, 383

K

Kefauver, Estes, 568
Keynes, John M., 435
Keynesians, 592
Kinsey, Alfred, 217
Kirkpatrick, Clifford, 234
Kluckhohn, Clyde, 82
Knox, Frank, 554
Koestler, Arthur, 269
Kwakiutl, 94, 183

L

Labor:
  and emergence of modern industrialism, 366
  and society, 387-389
  and the future, 390-391
  and the New Deal, 374-375
  before the factory system, 365
  effects of depression on, 416-417, 423
  effects of Industrial Revolution on, 365
  factor of production, 290-292
  goals of, 385
  influence in government, 378-379
  organization of:
    A.F. of L., 371-373
    C.I.O., 375-378
    decline, 373
    difficulties encountered, 370-371
    early history, 370
  relations with management:
    cooperation, 386-387
    opposition, 385-386
    toleration, 386
Labor leader, characteristics of typical, 380-381
Land:
  factor of production, 290-292
  ownership, among nonliterates, 294
Landaff, New Hampshire, 141
Landis, Judson, 230, 232
Language:
  effects of, on cultural change, 56-57
  of social science, problem in study of human behavior, 9-10
Lateral expansion, of corporation, 343
Law:
  administration of, by executive, in U. S., 557-558
  American attitude toward, 541-543
  congressional interpretation of, 574-575
  kinds of:
    administrative, 575
    common, 544
    constitutional, 544
    contract, 545
    criminal, 545
    equity, 545
    maritime, 545
    property, 545
    statute, 544
  passage of congressional, U. S., 569-574
  problem of formulating when studying human behavior, 8
Legislation, to protect consumer, 408-410
Legislative caucus, 490-491
Lenin, V., 603, 605, 607, 613
Level of living, 396 *passim*
Levittown, 344
Lewin, Kurt, 184
Lilienthal, David, 513
Limited liability, 340
Lincoln, Abraham, 143, 467, 554
Lindbergh, Charles, 79
Linton, Ralph, 55, 76, 83
Lippman, Walter, 597
Lobbying, 563-564

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 490
Logoli, 459
"Log rolling," 572
Long, Huey, 497
Love:
  American beliefs regarding, 218-221
  and success in marriage, 229
Lowie, Robert, 51
Luce, Henry, 521
Lunt, Alfred and Lynn, 149
Luxury, 305

M

Machine politics:
  in nineteenth century, 489
  Jersey City, New Jersey, 489-490
  nature of, 488-489
Macro-economics, 435
Madison, James, 537, 538
Magna Carta, 531
Management:
  goals of, 385
  relations with labor:
    cooperation, 386-387
    opposition, 385-386
    toleration, 386
Mandamus, writ of, 538
"Man in the White Suit, The," 57
Mannheim, Karl, 591
Marbury, William, 537, 538
Marbury vs. Madison, 537-538
Marciano, Rocky, 632
Marginality, 197
Maritime law, 545
Marquand, John P., 144
Marriage:
  American beliefs regarding, 218-221
  and the family, 203 ff.
  areas of adjustment:
    income, 231, 232
    in-law relationships, 231, 232
    mutual friends, 231, 232
    religion, 228, 231, 232
    sex, 230-231
    social activities, 231, 232
  defined, 204
  forms of:
    monogamy, 204
    polyandry, 204
    polygamy, 204
    polygyny, 204, 205
  predicting success in, factors, 227-229
  role confusion of female, source of discord in, 232-239
Marshall, John, 535-538
Marshall Plan, 440, 617, 650
Marx, Karl, 135, 153, 154, 585, 603
Marxian socialism, 584-586
Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, 604
Massachusetts ballot, 477
Mass production, effect on rational buying 404-405
Mate selection, importance of, 226-227
Matriarchal family, 205
Maturation, 179-180
Mature economy, theory, 430
McCulloch vs. Maryland, 535-537
McKim, Fred, 15
Mead, George H., 187
Mead, Margaret, 183, 205
Mechanical intelligence, 180
Mediation, of labor disputes, 390
Mediterranean, division of Caucasoid race, 163
Mental differences, factor in intergroup tensions, 165-167
Mental health, and personality organization, 197-198
Merger, 352
Methods, of social science, 11-12
Michigan Committee on Civil Rights, 519, 520, 521, 524
Micro-economics, 435
Mill, John Stuart, 579, 580, 581
Miller-Tydings Act, 358
Minorities, effects of depression on, 418
Mobility:
  characteristics of urban community, 116-117
  physical, 116
  social, 116-117, 143-147
Money, uses of, 297-299
Mongoloid, race, 161-164
Monogamy, 204
Monopoly, 336 ff.
Monopoly price:
  how established, 346-347
    in cigarette industry, 348-349
Mores:
  defined, 66-67
  in rural society, 114
Moses, 584
Motivation, factor in personality development, 181-182
Mundugumor, 183, 184
Mutual Security Administration, 442

Myrdal, Gunnar, 172
Myth:
  defined, 46
  importance in organizing and integrating culture, 43-44

N

"National and International Measures for Full Employment," 443
National Association of Manufacturers, 383, 578
National Bureau of Economic Research, 433
National income analysis, 435-439
National Income by Distributive Shares, 426
National Industrial Recovery Act, 358, 374, 375, 451
Nationalism:
  defined, 634-635
  development of concept, 633-634
  of colonial peoples, problem for America, 652-653
National Labor Relations Act, 388
National Labor Relations Board, 375
N.R.A., 600
National Resources Planning Board, 591
National Security Resources Board, 591
National state:
  and international economy, 635-636
  defined, 634
Nationality, factor in intergroup tensions, 156-158
Navahos, 32, 56, 73
Necessities:
  conventional, 306
  psychological, 306
Negro, social status of, 141-143
Neighborhood, as criterion of social class, 139
Negroid, race, 161-164
Nele, 22, 137
Net National Product, 426
Neurosis, defined, 200
New Deal, 439, 572, 582, 600
New Freedom, 600
New Nationalism, 600
Newton, Isaac, 49
Nineteenth Amendment, 475, 540
Nominating candidates:
  case study, 491-498
  early history, 490-491
  recent developments, 491
Non-discriminating voter, 479-482
Nordic, division of Caucasoid race, 163
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 326, 374
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 441, 616, 617
Nuer, 459

O

Objectivity, difficulty of assuring, in study of human behavior, 6-8
Occupation:
  and success in marriage, 229
  as criterion of social class, 138
Office of Price Stabilization, 575
Ogburn, William, 49
Old age, problems of, 242
Oligopoly, 423
On Liberty, 580
"One Hundred Per Cent American," 76-79
Open-class society, 133-134
Open shop, 373
Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 651
Original nature, and formation of personality, 178-181
Owen, Robert, 584

P

Parent-child relationships, 239-242
Parity, in agricultural prices, 445
Partnership, 340
Party conventions, 491 *passim*
Party platform, 498-499
  Socialist Party U.S.A., 1948, 586-587
Pasteur, Louis, 55
Paton, Alan, 173
Patriarchal family, 205
Patterns, of behavior:
  ideal, 38
  real, 38
Pearl Harbor, 556
Pendergast, Tom, 490
Permissive behavior, 64
Personal income, 426
Personality:

and culture, 182-184
and intelligence, 180-181
and motivation, 181-182
and original nature, 178-181
and rise of the self-conception, 187-189
and success in marriage, 228
defined, 177-178
disorganization, 199-201
extent of, 199-200
kinds of, 200-201
effects of frustration on, 181-182
habits, traits, and attitudes, 178
organization:
integration, 194-197
mental health, 197-198
other determinants of, 184-185
Physical differences, factor in intergroup tensions, 159-165
Planned economy:
compared with price economy, 311-318
expansion of in wartime, 310
ideology of, 300
in Britain and Russia, contrasted, 311
in Russia, 310-311
Planning, democratic, possibilities of, 592-599
Plato, 584
Point IV, 395, 442, 621, 626-625, 653
Point of No Return, 144
Political parties:
finances, 487
nature and function of, 485-486
organization of, 487
role of, in nominating candidates, 490-498
Polo, Marco, 166
Polyandry, 204
Polygamy, 204
Polygyny, 204
Power:
American beliefs regarding, 469-471
bases of popular control of:
belief system, 473-474
initiative, 478
political parties, 485-491
recall, 478
referendum, 478
voting qualifications, 474-478
national, establishing in U. S., 535-537
Prediction, as problem in studying human behavior, 8-9
Preferred stock, 341-342
Prejudice:
as result of socialization, 168
costs of, 170-171
defined, 167
factor in intergroup tensions, 167-169
irrational nature of between whites and Negroes in U. S., 172-173
reasons for persistence of, 171-173
President of the Senate, U. S., 567
Price economy:
and perfect competition, 336
compared with planned economy, 311-318
defined, 304
effect of monopoly upon, 349-350
modifications in, 355 ff.
relationship of demand to, 305, 307
workings of, 304-308
Price leadership, as obstacle to rational buying, 404
Prices:
during depression, 423
during recession, 427-428
function of, 307
Primary contacts, characteristic of rural society, 118
Primary groups, 118
Private property, 580
Production:
decisions of, 289-292
in free price economy, 307-308
in planned economy, 308-310
factors of:
influence on business organization, 338
importance of increased, 296
Projection, as defense of self-conception, 193
Propaganda, and public opinion influencing, 527-529
Property:
communal, 324
private, 324
Property law, 545
Property rights:
and concept of public interest, 324-325
belief in America, 324-326
kinds:
communal, 324
corporeal, 325
incorporeal, 325
intangible, 325-326
private, 325
Prosperity:
effect on interest rates, 427
income and employment during, 427
wages during, 427
Puritan ethic:
aspects of, 330

influence of, in America, 329-331
Protestants, church enrollment of in U. S., 158
Psychoses:
defined, 201
functional, 201
organic, 201
Psychosomatic symptoms, 200
Public:
defined, 96, 504-505
kinds of, 513, 516
multiplicity of, 516-517
Public opinion:
and freedom of speech, 507-511
example of formation and change, case study, 518-525
media of, 513-514
pattern of formation, 511-518
propaganda vs. education in influencing, 527-529
role of in democracy, 505-507
role of in dictatorship, 505
Public Opinion Quarterly, The, 518
Public works, as stimulus to economic recovery, 424, 451
Pueblos, 32, 56
Puritans, 466

R

Race:
and common heredity of man, proof of, 164-165
and culture, 31-32
and level of intelligence, 165-166
defined, 159
factor in intergroup tensions, 156 ff.
mistaken notions about, 159-160
Races, where and how originated, 160-161
Racial divisions:
relationships among, 163
types:
characteristics, 161-163
where located, 161-162
"Racist" doctrines, 159-165
Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., 321
Raskob, Jacob, 493, 495
Rational action, as defense of self-conception, 191
Rational buying, obstacles to:
advertising, 400-403
fair trade laws, 404-405
installment loans, 405-406
lack of correlation between price and quality, 405
lack of uniform standards of quality, 404
mass production, 404-405
new types of goods, 399-400
price leadership, 404
trade associations, 404
variety of goods, 397-398
Rationalization, as defense of self-conception, 191
Rationing, 451-452
Reading Coal and Iron Company, 631
Recall, device for popular control of government, 478
Recession:
employment during, 428
income during, 428
interest rates during, 428
prices during, 427
wages during, 428
Reciprocal relationships, 87
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 356
Recovery:
stimuli for:
discovery and development of new lands, 425
new investments or inventions, 424-425
optimism, 425-426
public works, 424
war, 424
Referendum, device for popular control of government, 478
Reformation, 276, 634
Registration, voting, 476
Religion:
and other institutions:
economic, 271
political, 271-272
and science, 280-281
and social values, 270-271
as socializing force, 279
communism as secular example of, 277-279
defined, 266-267
diffusion of, 272-273
factor in intergroup tensions, 158
freedom of, guaranteed by Constitution, 276-277
social functions of, 268-270
teaching in schools, American attitude toward, 254-255
Regression, 194

Renaissance, 276
Repression, as defense of self-conception, 191
Reproduction, as changing family function, 211-214
Resources, relationship to satisfaction of wants, 288
Richey, Herman, 252
Ritual, and integration of culture, 44-46
Rockefeller, John D., 351
Rockefeller, Nelson, 521, 621
Roles, feminine, confusion in, 234-238
Roman Catholics, church enrollment of in U. S., 158
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 153, 481, 491-498, 519, 545, 554-555, 559, 597, 600
Roosevelt, Theodore, 470, 554, 555, 600
Roper, Elmo, 518
Ross, Edward A., 57
Rule of reason, 357, 546
Rural society:
  freedom and control in, 120-123
  influences of, in United States, 123-124

S

San Blas Cuna:
  beliefs, 21-23
  dress, 16-18
  life cycle:
    burial practices, 25
    care of children, 23
    marriage ceremony, 24-25
    puberty, ceremonies of, 23-24
  physical characteristics, 16
  village and family organization, 18-20
  villages and dwellings, 18
  work and play, 20-21
Sanders, J. Y., 497
Sappho, 218
Satellite cities, 111
Scarcity, relationship to satisfaction of wants, 302-304
Schizophrenia, 201
School, accepted functions of, 257-258
Science:
  and religion, 280-281
  and social science, 1-12
  and technology, 331
  attitude toward, in twentieth century, 1
  method of, 2-4
"Scientific spirit:"
  essentials of, 4-5
Seasonal fluctuations, 428-429
Secondary contacts, characteristic of urban community, 117-120
Secular trends, 429-430
Securities:
  dividends from, 341
  kinds, 341-342
Securities Exchange Act, 359
Securities Exchange Commission, 601
Segregation, attitudes toward in U. S. Army, 176
Segregation, ecological process, 109
Self-conception:
  defending:
    compensation, 192
    displaced aggression, 193-194
    fantasy, 193
    identification, 193
    projection, 193
    rational action, 191
    rationalization, 191
    repression, 191
    sublimation, 191
  defined, 189-190
  desire to enhance, 194
  dynamic nature of, 190
  rise of, 187-189
Senate, U. S., 564 *passim*
Senate Crime Investigating Committee, 568
Seventeen, 514
Seventeenth Amendment, 540
Sex drive, channelization, changed function of family, 215-218
Shakespeare, William, 281
Sherman Anti-trust Act, 332, 356, 357, 358
Shousse, Jouett, 495
Single proprietorship, 340
Sixteenth Amendment, 540
Smith, Adam, 335, 336, 338, 346, 392, 597-581, 635
Smith, Al, 481
Smith, Kate, 518
Social acceptance, as criteria of social class, 139-141
Social change:
  mechanisms of:
    collective behavior, 95-96
    institutional behavior, 94
  role of school in, 256-257
Social class:
  and education, 262-265
  criteria of:
    housing and neighborhood, 139

in simple societies, 137
occupation, 138
social acceptance, 139-141
wealth, 138
factors discouraging formation of in U. S., 149-150
Social classes, as subcultures, 148-152
Social control:
American beliefs regarding, 465-467
among nonliterates, 460-461
as supplement to socialization, 70-71
contrast between rural and urban, 120-123
defined, 64
effectiveness of moral and political, 458-459
in a complex society, 460-462
reasons for, 462-464
kinds of:
moral, 457-458
political, 458
Social disorganization, influence in cultural change, 54-55
Social distance, 132
Social group, defined, 87-88
Social intelligence, 180
Social interaction:
defined, 87-88
processes of:
accommodation, 93-94
assimilation, 93-94
competition and conflict, 90-93
cooperation, 88-90
Socialist Party U.S.A., 1948 platform, 586-587
Socialism:
democratic, 585-587
essentials of theory, 583-588
Fabian, 587
rise of, 584-587
under attack, 587-589
utopian, 584
Socialization:
and education, 249
as cause of prejudice, 168
defined, 185-186
of children, changed function of family, 214-215
Social mobility:
advantages of, 145
disadvantages of, 145-146
by individual effort, 143-144, 145
evidences of declining, 146-147
means of, 144-149
Social processes, defined, 88
Social relation, defined, 87
Social role, defined, 87
Social science:
and science, 1-12
language of, problem in study of human behavior, 9-10
methods:
case study, 11
statistical, 11-12
position of in realm of science, 5-6
promising developments in:
field work, 10-11
integration, 12
methods, 11-12
Social status:
expectations of behavior associated with, 132
outward signs of in U. S., 143 ff.
Social stratification:
defined, 130-131
inevitability of, 131-132
in the factory, 382
systems of, 132-134
Social values, and religion, 270-271
Society:
and labor, 387-389
belief system, fundamental to understanding of, 320-321
defined, 27, 85-86, 88
South Pacific, 168
Sovereignty, 635
Speaker of the House, U. S., 566-567
Specialization:
and business organization, 339
ecological process, 109
Specialties, element of culture, 36
Spencer, Herbert, 580
Spending, types of:
business, 435-439
consumer, 435
foreign, 440-443
government, 443-454
Spock, Benjamin, 215
Stalin, Joseph, 603, 604, 626
Standard Oil Company, 546
Stare decisis, 544
State:
and religion, 273-279
dynamism of, 636-637
kinds of:
dynastic, 634
national, 634
State of the Union Message, 558
Statistical method, 11-12
Status:

achieved, 87
ascribed, 87
defined, 87
Statute law, 544
Stereotype:
defined, 168
factor in intergroup tensions, 167-169
of political candidates, 502
Stimson, Henry L., 554
Stout, Dave, 15
Subcultures:
as social classes, 148-152
effect on personality development, 184
Sublimation, as defense of self-conception, 191
Subraces, 162-163
Substitutes, relationship to demand, 307
Suburbs, growth of, 111
Succession, ecological process, 110
Suffrage, history of movement in U. S., 474-476
Supreme Court, 545 *passim*
Symbolism, 467-469
Symbols, and integration of culture, 44-46

T

Taft, Robert A., 481, 498, 563
Taft-Hartley Act, 388, 572
Tallensi, 459
Tasmanians, 51
Taxation, as device for controlling business fluctuation, 448-449
Tchambuli, 183, 184
Technical Cooperation Administration, 442
Technicways, 66
Technology, and science, 331
Temporary National Economic Committee, 343, 344, 345
Tennessee Valley Authority, 513, 597, 600
Tenth Amendment, 258
Terman, Lewis M., 227
Terrorism, communist, 606
Thirteenth Amendment, 540
Thurber, James, 95
Tito, 613
Titoism, 613
Trade association, 349
as obstacle to rational buying, 404
Tree Grows in Brooklyn, A, 135
Truman, Harry S., 568
Truman Committee, 568
Trust, 351
"Town Meeting of the Air," 511
Twelfth Amendment, 540
Twentieth Amendment, 540
Twenty-first Amendment, 540
Twenty-second Amendment, 540

U

Unionization:
A.F. of L., 371-373
and the New Deal, 374-375
C.I.O., 375-378
decline of, 373
difficulties encountered, 370-371
early history, 370
Unions:
membership, present, 378
types, 371-372
Union shop, 388
United Mine Workers of America, 376
United Nations:
and adjustment of world conflict, 644-646
Committee on Human Rights, 508-509
Economic and Social Council, 409-410, 442
defects of, 644-646
General Assembly, 509
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 442, 592
International Monetary Fund, 592
International Organization for Food and Agriculture, 410, 592
Social and Economic Council, 592
Technical Assistance Board, 442
Veto, criticized, 644-646
World Health Organization, 410, 442
United States Chamber of Commerce, 383
United States Testing Company, 413
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 509
Universal religions:
and the state, 273-279
Christianity, 274-276
defined, 273
Universals, element of culture, 36
"University of Chicago Round Table," 511
Unlimited liability, 342

Urban community:
characteristics:
heterogeneity, 115-116
mobility, 116-117
secondary contacts, 117-120
contrasted with rural society, 113-115
freedom and control in, 120-123
Urbanization:
and attitude toward parenthood, 213-214
concentric zone theory of development, 110-111
defined, 99
influences of, in United States, 123-124
in Africa, 102
in Asia, 102
in Australia, 102
in Canada, 102-103
in Latin America, 102
in the United States, 103-107
in Western Europe, 102
modification of pattern of, 110-111
problems of, 112-113
significance of, 125-129
Utopian socialism, 584

V

Values:
and organization and integration of culture, 39-43
and success in marriage, 229
cultural vs. eugenic, 42
factors determining, 305
how measured, 41-42
internalization of, 61
positive and negative, 39
scale of, 39
Value system:
function of, 42-43
sacred, 43
secular, 43
Vandenberg, Arthur, 563
Vertical expansion, of corporation, 342-343
Veto:
in United Nations, criticized, 644-646
presidential, U. S., 559-560
Viereck, Peter, 582
Vocational training, American attitude toward, 255
Voluntary association, 101
Voter:
approaching, 498-503
types of:
discriminating, 482-484
non-discriminating, 479-482
non-voter, 484-485
Voting:
absentee, 477-478
behavior, reasons for, 479-485
machines, 478
procedures:
administration of elections, 476-478
ballots, kinds of, 477
registration, 476
qualifications, 474-478

W

Wages:
during prosperity, 427
during recession, 428
Walsh, Thomas, 495, 497
Wants:
factors determining, 288
luxuries and necessities, 305
relationship of scarcity to satisfaction of, 302-304
Warner, William Lloyd, 137
Watt, James, 336
Wealth, as criterion of social class, 138
Wealth of Nations, The, 336
Webb-Pomerene Act, 358
Whigs, 579
Williams, Gertrude, 300, 355
Wilson, Woodrow, 554, 558, 600
Woman's Home Companion, The, 514
Worker, and modern industrialism, 366-369
World government, 643-646

Y

Yellow dog contract, 374

Z

Zorbaugh, Harvey, 196
Zuñi, 182

