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COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

H. D. LEWIS, M.A., B.Litt.

I

IF I were asked to put forward an ethical principle which I considered to be especially certain, it would be that no one can be responsible, in the properly ethical sense, for the conduct of another. Responsibility belongs essentially to the individual. The implications of this principle are much more far-reaching than is evident at first, and reflection upon them may lead many to withdraw the assent which they might otherwise be very ready to accord to this view of responsibility. But if the difficulties do appear to be insurmountable, and that, very certainly, does not seem to me to be the case, then the proper procedure will be, not to revert to the barbarous notion of collective or group responsibility, but to give up altogether the view that we are accountable in any distinctively moral sense.

On this matter more will be said below. In the meantime I should like to insist that the belief in "individual," as against any form of "collective," responsibility is quite fundamental to our ordinary ethical attitudes. For if we believe that responsibility is literally shared, it becomes very hard to maintain that there are any properly moral distinctions to be drawn between one course of action and another. All will be equally good, or equally evil, as the case may be. For we shall be directly implicated in one another's actions, and the praise or blame for them must fall upon us all without discrimination. This, in fact, is what many persons do believe, and it is very hard to uphold any form of traditionalist theology on any other basis. Of late this has been very openly affirmed by noted theologians who, if they seem to do very great violence to common sense, have, at any rate, the courage and consistency to acknowledge the implications of their view, and do not seek to disguise them by half-hearted and

confused formulations. We have thus witnessed recently some very uncompromising affirmations of the belief in "universal sin" or the "collective guilt of man." This does not imply that there are no ethical distinctions of any kind which we may draw. Judgments may be passed upon the outward course of our conduct without prejudice to the view that guilt itself is "universal," and this is why Reinhold Niebuhr, whose influence on religious thinking today is very pronounced, is able to combine with his assertion of the doctrine of universal sin an account of the "relative moral achievements of history."[1] One action may be much more regrettable than another, it may be uglier in some ways, or it may do much more harm to our fellows, and thus we have "the less and more" of our day to day judgments, but where proper moral estimation is concerned there is not "a big sinner and a little sinner." We are all involved in the sins of all.

But this is not at all what we normally think. The distinction between what is outwardly right and the proper estimation of the worth of persons is not, one must admit, always very clearly drawn in our ordinary ethical thinking. And this is very frequently a source of great confusion. There is less excuse for this confusion today than in the past, since ethical writers have thrown the distinction in question into much prominence and stressed its extensive bearing on matters of practice. It has been shown, for example, that the facts of moral perplexity, and the diversities in our views about the problems of practice, admit of no reasonable explanation unless we allow that a person may do what is wrong in some outward sense without being morally to blame, and *vice versa*. For moral ignorance is not itself a moral defect. But while this shows that Niebuhr is perfectly justified in arguing that the "historical" judgments we pass on the effects of actions have little direct bearing on questions of properly moral worth, it gives no solid support to his view that there is "no less and more" where the latter are concerned. On the contrary, the more plainly we draw the distinction between the rightness of the act and the worth of the agent, the more will it also be evident that the main reason for stressing this distinction and the main consideration by which men may be induced to draw it, is that in *addition* to the distinctions we draw between the ethical qualities of actions in their "material" or outward aspect there are even more important distinctions to be drawn in respect of their moral value. We want to be sure that our estimation of moral worth is not prejudiced by considerations relating only to outward action, and it is the former that is usually uppermost in our ordinary ethical judgments. It seems therefore plain that, however prone we may be to confuse the two sorts of ethical judgments which have just been

[1] *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, p. 234.

distinguished, we normally have little doubt that some of our actions are better than others, not merely in their effects, or in some other "material" regard, but in themselves and morally. All our usual ethical thinking presupposes this. And if it is to be argued that, in respect to properly moral worth, there is nothing to choose between the lives of various individuals, then it must be made very plain that this is diametrically opposed to all that we normally think, to the attitudes we adopt from day to day, and to the main body of philosophical reflection on ethical questions; for the latter has been mainly concerned with the problem under what conditions may distinctions between the strictly moral qualities of conduct be drawn. If there are no such distinctions, if the questions we ask about them are without substance, then the greater part of ethical controversy has been a peculiarly vain pursuit of a will o' the wisp.

II

This may be affirmed without prejudice to the further question of whether it is possible in practice to form reliable estimates of one another's moral worth. Subject to certain limitations, it seems to me not impossible to assess the moral worth of another person's conduct and there appear to be some occasions where censure is in order, not merely as directed to outward conduct, or as a means of inducing reconsideration of the rightfulness of the course pursued, but as directed to the moral choice itself. But if this is denied, and if it is also held that the difficulties attending the attempt to appraise one another's moral qualities rule out every prospect of success, it by no means follows that the distinctions themselves are suspect. We can know in a general way under what conditions moral censure is incurred without needing to determine how far those conditions apply in particular cases. There is nothing very disconcerting to ethical theory in having to admit, should that appear necessary, that we have no appreciable insight into the strictly moral struggles of other persons, even in the cases of our friends and acquaintances, or such understanding of the factors involved as would lead to reasonably certain conclusions. It may even be urged that the injunction of the Scriptures, "Judge not, that ye be not judged," holds without exception, and that it is none of our business to determine how any man fares in his inner moral life. For these are matters about which we may hold various opinions without seriously affecting the question whether there really *are* differences of value between different kinds of life. And what we need most to uphold is the reality of the moral distinctions themselves, not our ability to penetrate to the substance of them in particular cases.

Some comment may be added here on the reliability of the estimates we form of our own moral worth. Is fallibility in this regard also irrelevant to the question whether there really are moral qualities of conduct? This appears to me to be a most important question, but I will only venture here to make two observations. Firstly, the view which is commonly held, namely that we are usually wide of the mark in attempts to assess our own worth, seems to me very mistaken. To substantiate this in detail I should have to consider the main ways in which moral worth has been conceived. But it must suffice to note the two main alternatives. We may hold that moral distinctions depend mainly on our motives and characters, or we may relate them to some choice or free effort of will not determined by character. If we adopt the latter alternative it seems impossible that anyone should be in doubt about his own moral worth, for no one can really doubt whether he is making an effort to follow the course which his conscience requires. But if we adopt the former alternative there is room for deception of oneself in so far as we may be deluded about our own motives. But how far is such delusion possible, how far may a person persuade himself that he is contributing to a hospital from benevolent motives when he is really more concerned to ensure the esteem and gratitude of his fellows? It is often thought that we may be seriously mistaken about our motives in such cases, and that it is the business of the preacher and moral mentor to induce a deeper searching of heart and ensure a better understanding of our own characters. Literature seems to bear this out, but I am not sure that an alternative account of the facts usually adduced in this connection would not be possible if the matter were carefully investigated. But if this is denied, and if it is held that we can be widely astray in our understanding of the motives which move us to action, it seems to me that we have here a very formidable argument to advance against the first of the two main alternatives noted above, namely the view that moral worth qualifies character and motives. For, and here I come to my *second* observation, the nature of properly moral value seems to be such that it would be very strange to ascribe it to features of our conduct which we do not fully understand and bring within our control. To affirm that there can be serious delusion about our own moral attainments is thus in effect to cast very grave doubt on the validity of moral distinctions and the reality of moral responsibility.

The belief that we can be mistaken about our own moral worth owes its prevalence in no small measure to failure to distinguish effectively between questions about the "material" rightness of action and the question of the worth of the agent. In respect of the former we are indeed frequently subject to much error and perplexity, and persons of sensitive conscience have often incurred a great deal

of mental pain because the very proper concern which they have felt about the "rightness of their act" became the cause of misgiving also about their own moral worth. But when the issue is clearly confronted, and it is understood that unavoidable ignorance may not be imputed to the agent, it is hard to see how we can entertain doubts about our own culpability or blamelessness in respect to conduct sufficiently recent for us to retain a clear impression of the way we responded to what seemed to be a duty. Nor is our own impression in matters of this sort easily dimmed in the course of time.

It is in respect to other persons that appraisement of moral worth is difficult. For the factors involved are not easily accessible to the outside observer. But there is no cause for misgiving here. For even if we never knew how others fared, our assurance that their actions, like our own, are subject to moral distinctions, would not be a whit affected. But if we surrender the view that there are such distinctions, and substitute for it the notion of some uniform moral quality pervading the whole of humanity, or even the whole of a particular group, we are left with nothing which we can recognize as our workaday ethical ideas; morality has suffered a complete transformation. We seem in fact to have, not morality at all, but the repudiation of it.

III

How, then, does this come about? Partly as a result of confusions which affect our ideas about value in general. We hypostatize abstractions and make them the bearers of value, forgetting that linguistic devices which make for succinctness of expression or poetic and rhetorical effect are not to be divested of their metaphorical and elliptical meanings, and taken as literal truth. We speak for example of sharing in the greatness of a nation, or we take pride in belonging to a musical or scholarly family even where we have no conspicuous claims to distinction in those regards ourselves. No objection can be taken to this provided we are clear what we are about. For the excellence generally attained by members of our nation or family warrants the presumption that we ourselves, having been subjected to the same influences, are not without a measure of the qualities for which others of our group are noted. The achievements of a relative, and especially of a son or daughter, may again reflect credit upon us, even when we have no part in what they have actually accomplished, to the extent that their success may be attributed to the devotion and discernment with which we have furthered their efforts. There is also the presumption that close association with persons of outstanding parts will have developed

our own propensities, especially where general qualities of character are concerned. Men take legitimate pride in this way in their association with the great, or in erstwhile membership of a famous school or college. Our interest in those with whom we have special ties of affection will also enable us to follow their success with a glow of satisfaction as if it were our own. In these, and other ways, we participate in the excellence of others. But this does not mean that we can ever take credit directly for what others have become or accomplished. The worthwhileness of music does not become mine by my being the brother or parent of a gifted musican if I have no ear for music myself. What we are or achieve is affected by our relations to others, and we are emotionally involved in their lives, but what worth our actions and experiences have depends directly on their own nature. So that although we may be proud or ashamed of others, we add not a cubit to our stature; neither do we shrink, through our association with them except in the measure that we ourselves change under their influence.

This holds of all values. But it is peculiarly evident in the case of moral value. For failure may here be brought home to the individual in a very special way in blame and remorse. And this brings us to a further way in which men are apt to lose sight of the dependence of moral value on the individual.

IV

This turns on the definition of responsibility. The etymology of this word suggests that it means "liability to answer," this being, of course, liability to answer to a charge, with the implication that if the answer is not satisfactory a penalty will be incurred. This is certainly the meaning of responsibility in the legal sense, and there can be little doubt that the original meaning of the word must be sought along similar lines, for men have not always distinguished clearly between law and morality—in primitive life both are merged in communal custom. But we do distinguish sharply between them today. It is possible to be legally guilty and morally innocent, and *vice versa*. The question arises, therefore, whether the legal meaning of responsibility provides any analogy to the meaning of the term in the ethical sense. I do not think that it does. It would, no doubt, be easy to point to sanctions which societies impose on their members outside the sphere of State enactment, some of them, for example certain kinds of ostracism, taking very subtle forms, and there are also penalties which individuals are apt to impose on themselves, as recent psychology has shown so well. But these may also be out of accord with ethical requirements. No enactment is morally fool-

proof. A man may thus be morally guilty in respect of conduct to which no sort of penalty attaches. And this only helps to bring out in an indirect way what is in fact equally evident in cases where legal or quasi-legal requirements coincide with the moral law, namely that the mere fact of our liability to suffer a penalty is far too incidental a feature of conduct to constitute moral responsibility. Even if we hold, as do the advocates of the retributive theory of punishment, that wickedness calls for infliction of pain on the guilty agent, this is something *further* which we affirm about moral evil and responsibility, and not the essence of them. Such punishment presupposes the evil to which it is appropriate. We may thus reject the retributive theory of punishment, as I would certainly do, without impugning the validity of moral distinctions. What, then, does responsibility mean? It means simply to be a moral agent, and this means to be an agent capable of acting rightly or wrongly in the sense in which such conduct is immediately morally good or morally bad, as the case may be. But what do we mean by rightness, moral worth, and their correlatives? To this no answer is possible. For here we are dealing with ultimate ethical conceptions not reducible to natural fact. And the sum of this is that responsibility is an ethical conception not to be defined by reference to ideas which are not themselves distinctively ethical. It cannot therefore be conceived in naturalistic terms such as a threat of punishment and our liability to suffer it. But if we overlook this, and come to conceive of moral responsibility in ways not substantially different from our accountability before the law of our State, then it is easy to see how we come also to hold that there are some occasions, at any rate, when we share our responsibility with others and are immediately implicated in their wrongdoing.

This happens in the following way. Normally, the purpose served by the imposition of penalties require the penalties to be inflicted on persons presumed to have offended, and on no others. For if punishment were meted out without discrimination, its deterrent effect would be substantially lessened and, for the most part, reversed. For punishment would then have to be regarded as sheer injury or as "an act of God" unrelated to our own volitions, and, while thus little able to hinder crimes, it would often provoke them. But there are, however, exceptional cases where expediency requires proceedings to be taken against a group as if it were an individual entity. No account will then be taken of the guilt or innocence of individual members of the group. It is in this way that a teacher punishes a class of unruly children when he is not able to discover the real offenders, or when a meticulous apportionment of blame is not practicable. Such procedure may have effect in two ways, either (a) by directly deterring the main offenders or (b) by inducing the

class to deal with them in ways not feasible for the teacher himself. The less recourse is had to such measures the better, both from the point of view of effective discipline and from regard to the ill-effects of a lingering sense of injustice. But there may also be some compensating factors, such as a deepening of the sense of community, which we might profitably investigate if we were concerned with educational problems or the general question of punishment. Suffice it for the present to note that, as a device for the achievement of practical ends, we have sometimes to accept collective responsibility. This is fully acknowledged in law, where a parent may in some respects be held to account for the conduct of children, or where a society or corporation may be proceeded against as a single entity or person. Extending our canvas still wider, we have the imposition of sanctions against a whole nation in the interest of international order, although it is plain that this involves quite as much suffering for the innocent as for the guilty, the former, in a case of this sort, being probably in a very great majority. Reparations and similar measures adopted against an aggressor among nations may also be mentioned here. Such measures may be needed both in the interest of immediate discipline, and as a part of political education, and they may provide means of redress to victims of aggression. But they will involve a great deal of suffering for persons who could not, by any streak of imagination, be held accountable for the culpable acts of the nation, most obviously in the case of infants and babes unborn. Something of this nature is, in fact, unavoidable in most forms of punishment and presents us with some of its most formidable problems. Locke, in consistency with his individualism, tried to show[1] that it could be avoided. He urged that, while the participants in an unjust war could fairly be punished with death, there should be no interference with their property, for that would involve a loss to their wives and dependents. But apart from the well-nigh impossible question of apportioning guilt for participation in an unjust war, once the leaders and authors of atrocities have been reckoned with (and that in itself is a notoriously complicated matter), it is obvious that a man's family may be much more seriously affected, even at the economic level, to say nothing of the deeper personal loss, by the death of a parent or husband than by confiscation of property. Punishment is therefore very likely, in most cases, to fall, in some measure, on the innocent as well as the guilty. But this unfortunate feature of punishment, and the fact that punishment has, in some instances, such as those mentioned above, to be deliberately inflicted, without discrimination, upon a whole group, serves only to show the limitations of the expedients by which society furthers its ends. Perfect justice is not attainable

[1] *Of Civil Government*, Part II, Section 182.

in practice, and even if measures which we normally consider expedient and just, in spite of their involving the innocent in the fate of the guilty, prove more easily avoidable than we are usually disposed to think, there will always be some intermingling of justice with injustice in human relations under any conditions we can anticipate. But what does this prove? Does it prove that the innocent share in the wickedness of the guilty, that the former are morally answerable for the ill deeds of the latter? Surely not. The question needs only to be stated plainly for us to see how foolish it is to allow our view of *moral* responsibility to be affected by imperfections in the ways in which members of society must deal with one another. And yet that is precisely what happens in a great many writings on ethics and jurisprudence, where the ideas of social and collective responsibility are put forward as properly ethical notions under cover of a false analogy with social enactments such as the enforcement of law.

An excellent instance of this may be found in two papers[1] by Professor Gomperz where the writer comes very frankly to the defence of the idea of collective responsibility along the lines just described. But Gomperz is only bringing out what is implicit in most accounts of responsibility in recent times. From Bradley's celebrated chapter on "The Vulgar Notion of Responsibility" in *Ethical Studies* to the symposium on the problem of responsibility at a recent "Joint Session of the Mind and Aristotelian Societies,"[2] by far the most predominant tendency is to define responsibility in terms of a "liability to answer" and to incur blame or punishment. This is how Bradley, like Rashdall, and other thinkers, is able to reconcile responsibility with determinism. For blame and punishment would have significance even if our conduct could not be other than it is in the last resort, provided it conformed to certain other conditions. And in the symposium to which I have referred, while the first and second contributors eschew an unambiguously naturalistic theory of ethics, they both pass easily from the view that a man is responsible because "he can be called upon to answer" (the second writer adding, "by incurring blame or moral disapproval"[3]—a view which, even if it avoids being naturalistic, reverses the proper relation of blame and responsibility, for the latter is prior to the former—) to cases where one person takes responsibility for the action of another, in Mr. Falk's example[4] the case of a Prime Minister taking responsibility for the actions of his Chief of Staff by declaring

[1] "Some Simple Thoughts on Freedom and Responsibility" (*Philosophy*, January, 1937) and "Individual, Collective, and Social Responsibility" (*Ethics*, Vol. XLIX).

[2] *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XIX.*

[3] Op. cit., p. 249.

[4] Op. cit., p. 249.

his "readiness to take the blame." But this particular example serves to show very well on what a misleading course we are set when we conceive responsibility in the way described. For a Prime Minister can never be *morally* responsible for the act of a colleague, he simply cannot "take the blame" *morally*. It may be necessary for the conduct of a war, or for the normal functioning of Parliamentary government where, in our country at least, joint Cabinet responsibility seems to be established, for a minister to allow the action of another to be treated as if it were his own. But his willingness to share the blame in this sense, especially if he puts his own position and career in serious jeopardy, induces us to esteem him highly as a moral person even if it is also a reason for seeking to overthrow his administration. For his "implication" in the follies or misdeeds of his colleagues is not a moral one, but a requirement of certain governmental procedures, and his loyal acceptance of it, at personal inconvenience, redounds to his credit. It would, of course, be a different matter if he had encouraged or condoned the wrongful policy himself, or if he were sheltering a colleague for personal reasons or were retaining him against the interest of the public. He would then be morally responsible, but in respect of his own action. But to accept responsibility for others for practical purposes, to incur certain consequences for what another person has done, is one thing, to be morally accountable is another; and in this last regard we cannot answer for one another or share each other's guilt (or merit), for that would imply that we could become directly worse (or better) persons morally by what others elect to do—and that seems plainly preposterous.

V

The belief that guilt may be shared derives some plausibility also from the loose expressions which normally serve our turn when we need to refer to the contributions of several persons to a joint undertaking. Take a case of burglary. We have first the thieves who actually carried it out. One of these may be the prime mover, a confirmed criminal perhaps, another a novice pressed somewhat reluctantly to be his accomplice. The temptation may have been put in the way of these two, and the opportunity provided, by an acquaintance who bears the victim a grudge but takes no part in the actual robbery beyond supplying useful information. Yet another person may have covered the escape of the criminals or, by hindering the work of detection, have become an accessory after the fact. Finally, we may have a "receiver" who disposed of the stolen goods. Each of these persons is in some way implicated in the crime, and they may thus

be said to share the responsibility for it. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that we have here a single criminal operation the blame for which rests equally on all concerned. Even the law would discriminate sharply in such a case, imposing the heaviest penalty on the habitual criminal, but, in his own case as well as that of the others, reviewing the judgment in the light of extenuating circumstances, previous convictions etc. The instigator who provided the original inducement might easily escape the toils of the law altogether. But at the properly moral level many further factors must be taken into account, several of them, as has been stressed, not easily accessible to the outside observer. And in this reckoning many roles may be reversed, the instigator, possibly, proving the worst offender. What has to be stressed is that the guilt of each is strictly proportionate to his part in the joint undertaking. It is not one crime that we have but many.

This seems very evident in the simple case described. It is just as true, however, in respect to complicated matters, such as social and economic injustices, where the lure of vague collectivist explanations is stronger. Reformers have often reminded us that we need, not merely to hinder the criminal, but also to remove the causes of crime, and, in this connection, it is frequently maintained that society shares the guilt of the criminal. Gomperz instances the case of a poor woman who steals a loaf to feed her starving children, and he contends that society is really as responsible as the woman herself, in as much as society failed to provide for her needs. He even goes so far as to speak of blaming the social "structure." But that, it seems evident, is only meaningful in a figurative sense and as a rhetorical device when concern is to be aroused at distressful social conditions. If taken in the literal sense, as Gomperz appears to intend, it is very misleading. For "a structure" cannot be the bearer of moral responsibility; neither can "society in general," for these are both abstractions which we must be careful not to hypostatize. What should be said, if we are to speak exactly, is this. The guilt of the poor woman is lessened, if not eliminated altogether, by her circumstances. But she alone is to blame, if blame there is to be, for what she herself has done. Others are also to blame, but *for something else*, namely for their part in allowing her to remain in desperate need. But they are responsible for this as individuals, and strictly in proportion to what each might have done, directly or indirectly, to ameliorate her lot.

It has also to be emphasized here that there are severe limitations on the power of the individual to modify social conditions, for normally he can only do so by concerted action, and concerted action, moreover, which requires a consensus of opinion on highly complicated social and economic questions. It is thus very foolish simply to look

about us, as we are prone to do, and, having noted grave and persistent social ills, such as poverty, waste, unemployment, and war, straightway to take these as a measure of human wickedness. For ills of this sort, while they do in some ways reflect the moral life of a community, and provide the basis for *some* generalisations, can not be regarded as an indication of intentional evil until we have considered carefully just what could have been expected of the average individual when confronted with them. Allowance must be made for ignorance, for the need for leadership, and for the peculiar difficulties which attend the corporate effort required for effective social reform. This does not imply that the individual must simply surrender to the drift of events, or acquiesce passively in the policies of a handful of leaders. There is much that he can do, but ultimate success will depend on a great many factors wholly outside his control, no less in a democratic than in a totalitarian country. And therefore we need to be careful not to form exaggerated conceptions of human depravity by looking, not to what could reasonably be expected of the individual, but to society as a corporate entity directly accountable for social and economic ills.

This has a close bearing on the problem of war guilt. This question, it should be stressed, is only one aspect of the general question of the treatment of aggressor nations. For many factors besides that of moral guilt enter into the latter problem. But so far as the properly moral issue is concerned, we do very serious damage to the prospect of eventual reconciliation if we allow a distorted conception of moral guilt to complicate questions which are already bewildering enough, the more especially as we shall not merely form a wrong estimate of the course we should pursue ourselves, but also encourage those pathological conditions to which vanquished peoples are prone, and which, however they may accord with our mood and the immediate requirements of a situation, are certain, if only by being an unhealthy condition unrelated to any rational assurance, to emerge at a later date in ways very little amenable to rational control—whatever the precise direction they take. What we need to ask, in the case, for example, of Germany, is not what is the record of Germany as a nation in the inter-war period or later—or our own record for the matter of that—but just what could have been expected of the average German citizen in the swirling tide of the events which engulfed him and others eventually in the deep vortex of war. This is not to suggest that he was helpless and must be exonerated altogether, and that questions of guilt concern only those who were in positions of power and authority. There were undoubtedly many things which the ordinary citizen might have done, and I can only leave it here for the historian in due course to attempt to determine what they were. But allowance must clearly

be made for tradition, outlook, and environment, for the difficulty of anticipating the course of events (and it is easy for us afterwards, and from outside, to be wise about these), for the very limited influence which the individual, even if he is of a heroic mould, can normally have on the policies of a ruthless totalitarian government, and for the determined opposition to warlike and despotic measures which a certain proportion, at any rate, of the German people showed. Let us seek, by all means, to extend the influence of democratic principles which will enable the individual to give of his best to his State. But in the meantime, let us be fair to him, wherever he is found, by relating the question of guilt, not to some abstract entity in which he and all other individuals are merged, but to what we can reasonably estimate could have been expected of the individual, who is the sole bearer of guilt and merit, in the particular situation confronting him.

I should like to stress again what has already been noted, that no one is morally guilty except in relation to some conduct which he himself considered to be wrong. This seems plain enough in our ordinary encounter with one another from day to day, for circumstances force it more sharply upon us in close and immediate relationships. But it needs to be borne in mind very carefully when we are seeking to form ethical judgments about a vast concourse of people with whom individual and personal ties are slight. Otherwise we shall be inclined to arraign other peoples for follies and misunderstandings which, whatever the measures they may warrant in practice, are, I repeat, no direct indication of *moral* culpability. Again I do not imply that "to understand all is to excuse all." But I insist that we must first understand, and then we can have some indication of guilt. But to understand is very much harder, it calls for more wisdom and patience, when dealing with men in the mass than when we have to do with individuals in relative isolation, the more especially as the normal working of our imagination presents us with a simplified picture in which the nation or group is personified, and, having been given a mind and will of its own, is set to act on a stage very much simpler than the actual stage of history.

We are most prone to these false simplifications of complicated issues in times of confusion and change such as the present. For in such times there is apt to be a recrudescence of primitive ethical attitudes, as the recent history of Europe shows so well. And primitive peoples pay little heed to the individual; the unit is for them the tribe or the family. But reflection upon the affinity between the doctrine of collective responsibility and the undiscriminating "ethic of the tribe" should go a long way to discredit the former.

Failure to take due account of these matters will not only distort

our vision in this or that particular regard, and poison our relationships. It will also give us in general an utterly misleading picture of man and "the human situation." Of this there is ample evidence already in the prevailing fashion of gloomy denunciation of all human endeavour, an indulgence which may show itself before long to be a more serious business than we are inclined to realise. Its immediate progeny are despair and its twin, irresponsibility. But worse may follow.

VI

How far these reactionary estimates of human activity owe their persistence to mistaken philosophical views is not easy to determine. But they have obviously derived much support from "organic" theories of society, such as the celebrated Idealist Theory of the State and the cruder forms of totalitarian theories which prevail today. These latter have not yet taken very deep root in democratic countries, and although the idealist doctrines, whose authoritarian aspect was, incidentally, qualified in important ways, were in the ascendancy towards the close of the nineteenth century in Western thought, they do not accord well with the main tendencies in European culture and civilization, much less with the temper and traditions of the British people. They have been very extensively discredited today so far as philosophical thought is concerned. It is therefore well to remind ourselves that the ideas of a pervasive communal guilt and of collective responsibility are simply the obverse of the tendency to set some abstract good of the community above the wellbeing of its individual members, a tendency whose natural terminus is the ruthless oppression and totalitarianism against which our face is so resolutely set in democratic countries. Most of the arguments which have recently been used so effectively to demolish the ideas of "a common good" and a "general will," as those terms are usually understood in philosophy, hold with undiminished force, *mutatis mutandis*, against any theory of communal guilt.

The advocates of collectivist theories of society, whether they be theories of human good or of human evil, are apt to hold their opponents in contempt on the score of an alleged individualism. But this is very largely a case of hitting at random, and making play with the meaning of a highly ambiguous word. Individualism may mean several things. It may mean that the good which human beings ought to pursue is always a private one, or it may mean, again, that individuals have unlimited and inalienable rights, this latter being, I think, its main meaning in Western philosophy, or it may indicate the general failure to appreciate the dependence of

the individual on his social environment. In all these meanings the term stands for mistaken theories, and theories which have also, unfortunately, wrought very serious havoc in our thought and practice in the past, and which continue at the present time to obstruct very necessary positive reforms. But individualism in these reprehensible senses, has no necessary connection with the view that the individual is the sole bearer of value. We may insist, and the need to do so is as great in many regards today as in the past, that no one can have proper interests of his own unless he has also interests in others, that we are "members of one another" even with regard to properly moral struggles in so far as the attainment or failure of one person is a matter of concern to his neighbours who are *to that extent* involved in his moral attainment or failure. No one lives in a vacuum, no one is, or should be, unaffected by the destinies of others. And where natural sympathies reach their limit, or where the welfare of one is opposed, as in many ways it may be, to the welfare of others, there yet remain our duties to further the wellbeing of others independently of any advantage to ourselves. Although no one is "responsible for" others in the sense that he is answerable for the conduct of others, we are all extensively "responsible for" our fellows in the sense that we have duties towards them—most of our duties are of this sort. But all this may be fully allowed without affecting the principle that value belongs to the individual and that it is the individual who is the sole bearer of moral responsibility. This principle is not individualistic in any way which is incompatible with a true estimate of our essential social relationships. It is not "atomic" in any objectionable sense.

"But," it may be argued, "what of the individual's dependence on his society; is not our conduct shaped by our environment?" My answer here is that anyone who holds that the individual is never free to choose his action in a way not determined by factors outside himself should surrender the idea of properly moral responsibility; the position cannot be saved by extending our responsibility to our environment, and the attempt to do so is an excellent *reductio ad absurdum* of the view that morality is compatible with determinism. To bring this out fully would require careful discussion of the uniqueness of moral value and of other matters which cannot be brought within the scope of this paper. It must suffice here to note that the doctrine of freedom as "self-determination" makes no substantial difference to the present issue. For the fact that determination is of a special kind, and involves a peculiar assimilation into the character of the agent of the forces which affect him, still leaves the determinist with the view that factors from outside ourselves have gone to the shaping of conduct. And if the notion of responsibility is to be retained at all in such a case, it is hard to see

how we can avoid extending it to these further factors[1], an embarrassment that does not arise in connection with non-moral values which do not carry with them the notion of guilt and a correlative merit. The determinist thus finds himself extending the blame for wrongful actions to our environment, and eventually to the whole of reality. There arises in this way the notion of a principle of evil in the universe at large; and this notion has a wide currency at the present time. It derives much support from uncritical accounts of the findings of recent psychology, and it also encourages capricious play with the mythologies of primitive religion. This also contributes to the dissemination of irrational and despondent estimates of human attainment. But it seems evident that the quietus to such reactionary tendencies cannot be finally given until moral philosophers turn with much greater resolution than at present to the much neglected problem of moral freedom. This is the crucial problem today for religion as well as for ethics and politics. But here again I am touching on matters which cannot be effectively brought within the compass of this paper. Neither has it been possible to comment on the more specifically religious aspects of the problem of collective guilt, although these are in many ways the most important.

[1] Sir David Ross, for example, argues that a person's "responsibility for acts is divided" because "other people by teaching and example, the writers of the books he has read, and so on, have all helped to mould his character into that form of which his action is the expression." *Foundations of Ethics*, p. 248.

EXISTENTIALISM

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To treat existentialism as *a* philosophy is no more possible than to treat idealism as *a* philosophy. The reason is obvious. Jean-Paul Sartre is an existentialist and Gabriel Marcel is also an existentialist; but the philosophy of Sartre is not the same as the philosophy of Marcel. One can no more speak of the philosophy of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel and Berdyaev, as though they maintained the same system, than one could speak of the philosophy of Plato, Berkeley and Hegel, as though one philosophy was common to the three thinkers. Of course, if one took idealism in the sense in which the Marxist uses the term, as meaning the doctrine that mind is prior to matter, i.e. as opposed to materialism (with the suggestion that realism and materialism are equivalent), one would have a definite theme to consider; but one would be forced to recognize as idealists thinkers who would never call themselves by that name and who would not be generally recognized as such. Similarly, if one said that existentialism is the doctrine that man is free and that what he makes of himself depends on himself, on his free choices, one would doubtless have mentioned a doctrine which is common to the existentialists and which they insist upon; but one would at the same time be forced to include in the ranks of the existentialists philosophers whose inclusion would be manifestly absurd. It is very difficult, then, to assign to existentialism any doctrinal content which would be common to all those who are generally recognized as existentialists, but which would at the same time be peculiar to them. M. Sartre has asserted that existentialism "is nothing else but an attempt to draw all the consequences from a consistent atheist position,"[2] while Berdyaev is reported to have exclaimed, "*L'existentialisme, c'est moi*!" But Berdyaev is no atheist, while Sartre is not Berdyaev: the positions are obviously incompatible. According to Sartre, that which all existentialists have in common is the fundamental doctrine that existence precedes essence;[3] but though this may be a doctrine common to all existentialists, it does not seem to be peculiar to them, if one regards its essential meaning. It means in effect that man has no given character which determines his actions, but that he is free, and while this doctrine would distinguish existentialism from all forms of determinism, it would not distinguish it from other philosophies which also deny determinism.

[1] This paper represents a lecture given at Oxford on May 23, 1947.

[2] *L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme*. p. 94. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

M. Sartre may say, and indeed does say, that his meaning is that man has no essence antecedently to his free choices, to the essence he creates freely; but since he is able to delimit man as the object of his existential analysis in such a way that chickens are excluded, it is difficult to take him altogether seriously or to suppose that the proposition, "existence precedes essence," amounts to much more than an emphatic assertion of liberty and an emphatic denial of any form of physical or psychological determinism. In the case of M. Sartre the proposition is certainly bound up with atheism, in the sense that he denies the existence of any archetypal idea or divine idea of man, which is realized or unfolded on the plane of created existence; but if the proposition is understood in a sense which would be acceptable not only to Sartre and Camus, but also to Marcel, it can hardly involve atheism, though it would involve the rejection of that determinism which seems to be implied by certain theistic systems, by that of Leibniz, for example.[1]

Nor does it seem that we can define existentialism in general in reference to what one might call "personal thinking." Kierkegaard was certainly a personal thinker, in the sense that he philosophized on the basis of his personal experience (a knowledge of his relations with his father and with Regina Olsen is by no means irrelevant to an understanding of his thought), and so far from attempting to construct an "objective system," he directed a great deal of his polemic precisely against "the System" and against "objectivity;" but one could hardly say the same of Heidegger, who sets out in *Sein und Zeit* to construct an ontology, to investigate the problem of being. In a letter to Jean Wahl, Heidegger protested that his philosophy was not *Existenzphilosophie*, that his investigation of human existence or of the being of human existence was but a preparatory stage to an examination of being in general, and that his philosophy should not be confused with that of Karl Jaspers who considers the concrete possibilities open to the human being, without aiming at the development of any general theoretical ontology. It is true that Jaspers has declared that it is the task of the philosopher to awaken man to the possibilities of choice and that existentialism as a general theory, is the death of the philosophy of existence; but he is much more of an observer, a philosopher of philosophies, than a personal thinker in the sense in which Kierkegaard was a personal thinker.

Nevertheless, even if it is difficult to find a doctrinal content which is common and at the same time peculiar to the existentialist philosophies, we all know that the word existentialism has objective reference and that it is not unreasonable to group together Kierke-

[1] Leibniz defended "liberty," it is true; but not all would recognize as liberty what he regarded as such.

gaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, Marcel, however great and however important the differences between their respective philosophies may be. I suppose that in the first place one can link them together by their common rejection, explicit or implicit, of all forms of "totalitarian" philosophy, using the word "totalitarian" not in its political sense (primarily at least), but as signifying any philosophy which minimizes the position and importance of the individual as the free, self-transcending subject and as the central datum of experience. One does not need to labour the point that Kierkegaard, for whom, owing to the circumstances of his university education, philosophy meant the Hegelian system, revolted against the Hegelian exaltation of the Idea or Absolute at the expense of the individual and against the Hegelian insistence on mediation and on the synthesis of opposites. The primary fact is the individual, and it is simply comical if the individual strives to strip himself of his individuality and to merge himself in the universal consciousness or cosmic reason. True philosophy is not objectivity, but it is the fruit of passionate interest; in other words, thinking is personal, not impersonal, and its value lies in its clarification of choice and its appeal to choose, the ultimate object of choice being the self in its relation to the Transcendent, to God. Similarly, Jaspers insists that the function of philosophy is not to teach a *Weltanschauung*, but to make clear to the individual the possibilities of choice and what authentic choice is. In the limiting situations, particularly in face of contingency and death, man recognizes the enveloping presence of the Transcendent; but the deciphering of its nature depends on an act of choice, and the study of the life and thought of men like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche serves to make clear the personal character of the choice of *Weltanschauung*. It might seem that Martin Heidegger constitutes an exception since, as already remarked, he sets out to develop an ontology; but in point of fact since he actually starts with man and ends with man, he falls into line with the other existentialists. Heidegger lays his emphasis on authentic choice, though for him this choice is really the choice of the self as the being doomed to death, *das Sein-zum-Tode*. As to Sartre, although he gives as the subtitle of *L'Être et le Néant Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique*, the emphasis is on man as *projet*, as the being which creates itself by free choice, as the possibility of its own transcendence, and this theme reappears in plays like *Les Mouches* and novels like *Les Chemins de la Liberté*. Although Sartre makes considerable use of Hegel in *L'Être et le Néant*, particularly in regard to the power of the negation, he is at one with the other existentialists in insisting on the individual. He declares that his starting-point is the subjectivity of the individual (and that for strictly philosophical reasons), and that the first and basic truth is the *Cogito, la verité absolue de la*

conscience s'atteignant elle-même.[1] For Camus, again, though he insists at length on the absurdity of the world and of human life (as in *Le Mythe de Sisyphe, L'Étranger, Le Malentendu, Caligula*), the real problem is how the individual is to conduct himself in an absurd world. Of Marcel's philosophical writing one can say that a great part of it is devoted to revealing to man what he is and what his spiritual activities, his truly human activities, imply.

Although it is not formally true of Heidegger, it is actually true of all the existentialists, therefore, including Heidegger, that they take man as the central theme of philosophy, and that by man they mean the free, self-creating, self-transcending subject. Looked at under this aspect existentialism may be regarded as a revolt against absolute idealism (at least so far as Kierkegaard is concerned, and the same is partly true, I believe, of Marcel) and as a revolt against positivism, materialistic determinism and psychological determinism, against any form of philosophy which would reduce man to an item in the physical cosmos, so far as this would imply determinism, and against any form of philosophy which excludes a consideration of man's inner life and destiny. (To assign as the central theme of philosophy man's inner creation of himself by his free choices is to turn one's back on logical analysis, for example, as a sufficient subject for the philosopher.) Again, existentialism, by insisting on the individual, on the free subject, is also a reaction against the tendency to resolve the individual into a number of functions, such as citizen, taxpayer, voter, worker, trade unionist, civil servant, etc. This theme is developed particularly by Gabriel Marcel. In other words, existentialism is the re-assertion of the free man against the totality or the collectivity or any tendency to depersonalization, and in this respect it is akin to personalism and pragmatism.

Before proceeding further it might be as well to anticipate an objection against the mode of treatment of existentialism adopted in this paper. I can well imagine a Marxist saying that existentialism is the philosophy of the dying bourgeoisie, the last convulsive effort of an outmoded individualism, and in point of fact M. Naville (though I do not think that the latter is a Marxist) suggested to M. Sartre that his philosophy was really a resurrection of radical-socialism adapted to present social conditions. *La crise sociale ne permet plus l'ancien libéralisme; elle exige un libéralisme torturé, angoissé.*[2] The Marxists have called M. Sartre the philosopher of the misfits, *l'écrivain des ratés*, and they wonder what the phenomenological analyses of *L'Être et le Néant* have to do with history. Moreover, many critics, whether Marxists or not, might be tempted to observe that it is a mistake to treat existentialism abstractly, that

[1] *L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme*, pp. 63–64. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

one should treat it in relation to its historical and political circumstances, in relation, for example, to the fall and liberation of France and the ensuing social and political conditions, or even that one should treat it as a literary, and not as a philosophical phenomenon. However, while it is doubtless legitimate to treat a philosophical movement in relation to political and social circumstances, it is also legitimate, and in my opinion a good deal more relevant, to treat any philosophy which professes to be a philosophy as a philosophy, i.e. abstractly. Anyone who is prepared to allow the possibility of attaining philosophical truth must admit this. Moreover, the consideration of political and social conditions is more relevant to explaining the popularity and vogue of a philosophy than to settling the question of its truth or falsity. Existentialism cannot be explained simply in terms of the last war, if for no other reason than that Marcel was writing long before the war began, while Sartre published *La Nausée* in 1938; but it may very well be that recent and present conditions in France help to explain the vogue of existentialism, the interest it has aroused. It would certainly be absurd to exclude the social and political approach as altogether illegitimate; but if one is entitled to treat dialectical materialism as a philosophy and not simply as the transient expression of passing historical circumstances, one is also entitled to consider the thought of M. Sartre from the point of view of its truth or falsity rather than as affecting or not affecting the welfare of the proletariat. As to the literary approach, I would remark that the use of the drama and the novel by Sartre, Camus and Marcel certainly helps to explain the wide interest taken in existentialism; but the significance of those plays and novels for the philosopher consists in their philosophical import, and any student of Sartre is aware that his popular productions can be properly understood only in the light of his general philosophy.[1]

To return, then, to my abstract treatment of existentialism. It seems to me that the existentialist starting-point, man as free subject, is a legitimate starting-point, considerably more legitimate than some principle which is postulated as ultimate, though its existence cannot be known *a priori* and though to presuppose it is to presuppose a whole philosophy. The excuse for starting with an ultimate and presupposed ontological principle is that if the philosophy built on it or deduced from it constitutes a complete and coherent account of reality, its justification is evident. But apart from the fact that this seems to involve a further presupposition concerning the character of reality and the power of the human mind, the history of philosophy appears to show that facts of ex-

[1] In the case of Gabriel Marcel special consideration should indeed be given to his idea of the relation of drama to philosophy; but I cannot embark on that subject here.

perience are not infrequently distorted or slurred over in order to fit in with the preconceived principle, and not the least important of these facts is precisely the human consciousness of personal freedom. It may be objected that the existentialist presupposes freedom, whereas it ought to be demonstrated; but in view of the initial consciousness of freedom, it is the determinist, not the maintainer of freedom, who should be called upon to demonstrate his position. M. Sartre deals with certain determinist arguments in *L'Être et le Néant*, the argument, for example, that motives determine conduct, and he attempts to show that a conscious being must be free, that the *pour-soi*, as opposed to the *en-soi*, must be free owing to its ontological structure, that it does not simply possess liberty, but is its liberty[1]—does not Orestes say in *Les Mouches*, "I *am* my liberty?"—but in any case he evidently thinks that liberty is a datum of immediate experience and that the determinists are trying to evade the recognition of a truth of which they are, to some extent at least, inevitably aware; they are in *mauvaise foi*, they are *les lâches*.

Secondly, I think that it is to the credit of Heidegger and Sartre that in their insistence on the free ego they do not at the same time create the Cartesian gulf between the ego's self-consciousness and its knowledge of the world and of other selves. Their datum is not the self-enclosed consciousness, but the self in the world. *Dasein* or *la realité humaine* comes to know itself in and through its experience of the *milieu* and of other persons, and to separate off the consciousness of the ego from the original total experience, in such a way that it becomes necessary to prove the existence of extramental objects and of other selves, is, they recognize, to create an artificial problem which is hardly capable of a satisfactory solution, since the premisses are themselves unsatisfactory. *Par le je pense, contrairement à la philosophie de Descartes, contrairement à la philosophie de Kant, nous nous atteignons nous-mêmes en face de l'autre, et l'autre est aussi certain pour nous que nous-mêmes.*[2] Whatever one may think of M. Sartre's protracted discussion of our knowledge of other selves and the phenomenon of *le regard*,[3] it is a matter for rejoicing that he does not allow his insistence on the *Cogito* to blind him to the artificiality of Descartes' procedure. If the free self in M. Sartre's philosophy tends to be a closed self, this is due, not to any adoption of the Cartesian gulf between the self-enclosed consciousness and the external world, but rather to the fact that he tends to concentrate on those activities which turn the person into a thing and which render impossible true personal relations, those activities which

[1] Cf. *L'Être et le Néant*, pp. 508 ff.
[2] *L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme*, p. 66.
[3] *L'Être et le Néant*, Part 3, Chap. I, *L'Existence d'Autrui*.

belong to the sphere of what Marcel calls *Avoir*, as distinct from the sphere of *Être*. Marcel, who also avoids the Cartesian gulf by his insistence on the primary fact of *incarnation*, embodiment, concentrates on those spiritual activities of man, such as love and fidelity and hope, which involve the relationship of person to person, thus revealing the self-transcending subject or self as essentially "open," not as self-enclosed.

The starting-point of existentialism may, therefore, be called a realist starting-point; M. Sartre insists that knowledge is always knowledge of something and consciousness always consciousness of something; neither knowledge nor consciousness creates its object. The world is the object of knowledge and is not created by the knower in regard to its being. The world is phenomenal in the sense that what we mean by the world is that which appears; but it does not follow that we can reduce the being of phenomena to *percipi*. If the being of phenomena consisted in *percipi*, the percipient would exist outside himself, since to perceive is to perceive something and this implies a distinction between subject and object. One can speak, therefore, of the trans-phenomenal being of phenomena (in the sense that the object has being independently of the percipient), though this transphenomenal being is simply the phenomenon in itself, not an unknowable noumenon underlying the phenomenon.

But though Heidegger and Sartre are to that extent realists, their realism is none the less a post-Kantian realism, in that they both emphasize the part played by the subject in the constitution of the world of experience. For Heidegger the organization of the world into a system of relations depends on the interests, the preoccupations (*Besorgen*) of the subject. Man, *Dasein*, is essentially orientated towards the other than himself, and each object appears as a *Zeug* or tool, its meaning or essence residing in its tool-relation, its relation to the preoccupation of the subject. According to the interest or preoccupation of the subject there is the world of the physicist, the world of the ethician, the world of technique and so on; but all these worlds are included in a total system, of which we have a kind of preview or anticipation. This concept of world in general, of an intelligible totality, an inclusive *Umwelt*, is the creation of *Dasein;* it is the system of relations created by the multiple possibilities of *Dasein*, the unified field of those possibilities, though it is due, not to an *a priori* category of the understanding, but to the first characteristic of *Dasein*, its being-in-the-world, its orientation towards the other than self in terms of interest and development of possibilities. This view of the world is obviously strongly reminiscent of Fichte's conception of the world of objects as the field for the self-realization of the ego, the field of the ego's moral activity, though Heidegger does not mean to imply that the brute existence of things is con-

stituted by the ego (he is not an idealist in that sense), but that the intelligible being of things, their meaning, their organization in an intelligible system, is constituted by man's possibilities of self-transcendence. *Dasein* and *Umwelt* are really two aspects of one reality, being-in-the-world. To interpret the world is to construct the world, but this power of construction is limited by the very finitude of man.

The same theme is present in the philosophy of Sartre. It is man, *la realité humaine,* who makes the world to arise, as an organized and intelligible system. Consciousness (*le pour-soi*) does not create being as such, unconscious being (*l'en-soi*), but it organizes it into a system, marking off, as it were, individual objects, and determining their mutual relations in terms of its own interests. Distance, being far away or near, really depends on the interests of the *pour-soi:* America, for instance, is far away to the displaced person in Germany who would like to go there but cannot, while it is nearby to the millionaire who can go there by plane whenever he likes, while to a person who has no interest at all in America it is neither near nor far, it is simply "there". Similarly, the future can be understood only in terms of the possibilities of man: *c'est par la réalité humaine que le futur arrive dans le monde.*[1] In itself *l'en-soi* is opaque, gratuitous, unintelligible: it owes its differentiations and its intelligibility to consciousness, to *le pour-soi.*

But if the Kantian and Fichtean elements in the philosophies of Heidegger and Sartre, together with their peculiar insistence on liberty, might lead one to class them as (partly) idealist philosophies, there is another important element in virtue of which they are more akin to materialism. Original being, *l'en-soi,* is, according to M. Sartre, non-conscious; it is simply itself, opaque, self-identical: *l'être est ce qu'il est.* We really cannot say anything about it except that it is; the ideas of activity and passivity, for example, are human ideas, and being in itself is beyond activity and passivity. Moreover, we are not entitled to apply the category of necessity and say that it is the necessary being, the Absolute. It did not create itself, it is true; but it is simply there, gratuitous, *de trop.* In fine, all we can say of *l'être en-soi* is that it is and that it is what it is. Perhaps it cannot be formally described as material, but that is obviously what it is to all intents and purposes. The shade of "father Parmenides" can be discerned in the background.

Being-in-itself is thus gratuitous, *de trop*; but how does consciousness, *le pour-soi,* arise? At this point Hegel is dragged in from the wings to take his place on the stage. As for Hegel being, emptied of determinate content, passes into not-being and gives rise to the category of becoming, so for Sartre consciousness arises from non-

[1] *L'Être et le Néant,* p. 168.

conscious being through the power of the negation. Consciousness means distance from and presence to at the same time; it is the negation of being-in-itself, but it presupposes being-in-itself and is separated from it by . . . nothing. Being-in-itself contains no negation; it emerges (i.e. *le néant*) only through consciousness, which secretes its own nothingness. To be conscious means to exist at a distance from oneself as present to oneself, and this distance from oneself is no thing: consciousness, then, arises only through a "fissure," a negation, being introduced into being, and it is *le pour-soi* itself which introduces this negation, so that it is in this sense its own foundation. That there is consciousness at all is a contingent fact, for which the "ontologist" can give no certain explanation; but we may say that being-in-itself, which is gratuitous, attempts to found itself (that it is *projet de se fonder*) and that it can do so only through the emergence of consciousness which aims at becoming its own cause or adequate foundation, at attaining the status of *l'en-soi-pour-soi*. In plainer language we may say that brute being has an aspiration to overcome its gratuitous and contingent character by becoming the conscious Absolute, and human consciousness emerges as the means of realizing this aspiration. But this aspiration is doomed to frustration: consciousness is being constantly grasped by the *en-soi*, by that contingency which it cannot escape. Man is a *passion*, a desire to escape from his original contingency, a flight before the past (with its invasion of *facticité*) towards the goal of becoming the Absolute without thereby losing consciousness, i.e. towards the goal of becoming God. But the idea of God, of the *en-soi-pour-soi* is impossible, and as man begins by birth, so he ends by death and relapses into *facticité*. If we look merely at man, at his aspiration to become God, we must admit that he is *une passion inutile*,[1] while if we regard the emergence of individual consciousness as a means whereby *l'en-soi* endeavours to become the conscious Absolute, we must admit that gratuitousness and absurdity have the last word as they had the first word.

In so far as M. Sartre is serious in putting forward this remarkable piece of mythology, one may say that he is proposing a kind of Hegelianism *manqué*: being-in-itself is the aspiration towards the realization of absolute consciousness, but it is doomed to frustration: *l'en-soi* is the alpha and omega, and human life is vain, absurd. Stripped of all Hegelianism, however, M. Sartre's contention is simply that being is meaningless, *de trop*, inexplicable, that consciousness is a mere passing epiphenomenon,[2] and that human life and human history are vain and absurd. It is really at this point

[1] *L'Être et le Néant*, p. 708.

[2] According to M. Sartre, l'âme *est* le corps en tant que le pour-soi *est* sa propre individuation. *L'Être et le Néant*, p. 372.

that the characteristic theme of Sartre and Camus begins, the problem of conduct in a world which has no given significance, in which there are no universal and absolute values, but in which man is free and cannot evade the total responsibility of choice and the creation of values which is involved in choice. But leaving aside for the moment this humanistic theme, I wish to draw attention to the dogmatism contained in the initial presuppositions of M. Sartre. M. Sartre affirms dogmatically the priority of being-in-itself over being-for-itself. That human consciousness reveals itself as consciousness *of*, that it presupposes an object, I have no wish to dispute; but that this implies the derivation of consciousness from non-conscious being does not follow. It is not an evident fact by any manner of means that consciousness is derived from the non-conscious, still less that the non-conscious is, in general, prior to the conscious, to mind; and to suggest that non-conscious being has a kind of urge to become God or the conscious Absolute is to suggest a mythological hypothesis. M. Sartre asserts that being-in-itself is gratuitous, *de trop;* but what is this but an initial and gratuitous presupposition of atheism? Sartre does indeed attempt to show that the idea of God as self-identical consciousness is contradictory, since consciousness involves distinction; but it does not necessarily follow from the fact that finite human consciousness reveals itself as involving distinction, that all consciousness necessarily involves distinction. The logical positivist might remark that no other form of consciousness can have any significance for us, since our idea of consciousness is founded on the only consciousness we experience, human consciousness; but when the theist says that God is infinite selfconsciousness, he is saying that God cannot be less than the consciousness we experience: he does not pretend to have (and indeed cannot have) a clear and adequate idea of what infinite consciousness is in itself, but he has a clear idea of what "not less than" means. In any case, if we leave God out of account and speak simply of the necessary Being, by what right does Sartre affirm, as he does affirm, that there is no such being and that it could not explain contingent being? I am not aware of any philosopher of the first rank who has adopted this strange position. Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza and Hegel no doubt differed in their views as to the character of the necessary Being; but they did not suppose that the notion of such a Being can be dispensed with. If, moreover, it be asserted that the category of necessity is a purely human category, one could obviously make the retort, as far as Sartre is concerned, that in this case the category of contingency is in the same boat, and that instead of declaring that being is *de trop*, M. Sartre would do much better if he observed a discreet and modest agnosticism.

From his initial atheist position M. Sartre draws the conclusion

that there are no absolute values, but that values are the creation of man, the individual man, who in fixing his own ideal creates his own values. However, as the foundation of all values is liberty, it would appear that liberty must be itself a value independently of choice, since man did not choose to be free, but is "condemned" to be free, as M. Sartre puts it. To deny consistently the objectivity of values is not such an easy task as M. Sartre seems to suppose. Heidegger and Sartre distinguish authentic choice and unauthentic choice, and it is very difficult to avoid the impression that the former, authentic choice, is considered to be superior in value to the latter. If there are no objective values, it should make no difference whatever, from the valuational standpoint, what one chooses or how one chooses.

The dogmatism of Martin Heidegger is probably more disingenuous than that of Sartre. He makes play with ideas like contingency and dereliction, insisting on *die Geworfenheit des Daseins*; but the question of a "Thrower" he does not raise, passing it by silently, though it is clear that to a man of Heidegger's particular upbringing the problem must have been present.[1] He does not speak in Sartre's somewhat airy fashion of God and religion; he does not fulminate passionately like Nietzsche; he hardly speaks of the matter at all, and the most he does is to observe that man's concept of being is finite. But what does this prove? That man's apprehension of the Infinite must in any case be a partial and finite apprehension; it certainly does not prove that man can have no knowledge that the Infinite exists or that he cannot even raise the question of the Infinite

I mentioned that Sartre calls *l'Être et le Néant* an essay in phenomenological ontology. The use of the phenomenological method is common to the existentialists (as a rough generalization at least, this is true), and in my opinion its use constitutes in some respects a strong point and in other respects a very weak point of existentialism. The phenomenological method of Husserl means the objective analytic description of phenomena of any given type. Husserl himself applied the method to the invariable structures of psychic experience (such as "intention," being conscious of, perceiving); but the method can be applied in various fields, to religious or aesthetic experience, for example, or to the perception of values. Husserl regarded the application of this method as a necessary propaedeutic to ontology, which it should precede. For instance, the phenomenologist will consider the essence of "being conscious of," without presupposing any particular ontology or metaphysic, but letting the psychic phenomenon speak for itself. Whether it is possible in practice to exclude all such presuppositions and, if it is possible,

[1] I am speaking of Heidegger as author of *Sein und Zeit*. I have heard it said that his views have changed since, but I do not know if this report is correct or not.

how long it is possible to persevere in the suspension of judgment concerning the existence or mode of existence of the object regarded (the Object of religious experience, for example) is obviously disputable; but the application of the method certainly has its value and some of the existentialists have made a fruitful use of it. Thus in the course of *L'Être et le Néant* M. Sartre gives long, descriptive analyses of time or temporality, of "bad faith," of *le regard*, of love, while Gabriel Marcel has practically done the same for faith (not in the theological sense), hope, love, *disponibilité*; and one can say that the phenomenological analyses of Heidegger, Sartre and Marcel, and of half-existentialists like Lavelle, are admirable pieces of intellectual work. Although Kierkegaard indeed was dead before Husserl was born, and his works were written long before Husserl and Scheler applied the phenomenological method to their respective themes, one can say that he applied the method to phenomena like *Angst* or dread, and it would doubtless be profitable to trace out and compare the different analyses of dread, *Angst*, *angoisse*, as given by Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre. The use of this method is legitimate enough in itself, and the actual use of it made by the existentialists constitutes, I suggest, one of their strong points.

On the other hand, if one chooses to use the phenomenological method of Husserl, one should either adhere closely to the *epoche*, or, if one does proceed to make existential judgments, one should note carefully the transition from phenomenology to ontology. As an example of what I mean, I shall refer to Sartre's treatment of *la nausée*. In the novel of that name Antoine Roquentin, sitting in the public gardens of Bouville, is depicted as having an experience, i.e. an impression, of the gratuitousness, the inherent contingency of the things around him and of himself; they and he himself appear to him as *de trop*, gratuitous, without rational justification for their existence. Now, I should certainly not deny that an impression of this kind is possible as a subjective experience, and M. Sartre has a perfect right, as a novelist and indeed as a phenomenologist, to describe it; but I suppose that it is clear to every intelligent reader of *La Nausée* that Roquentin's subjective experience is assumed by the author to have objective reference, that it is, implicitly at least, described as corresponding to reality, as affording information about the character of being. But this involves an illicit passage from description to positive doctrine, from phenomenology to ontology. It may be said that M. Sartre proves his doctrine elsewhere. But does he? It is true that in *L'Être et le Néant* he distinguishes ontology from metaphysic;[1] but it is also true that he assumes from the very

[1] By ontology he means phenomenology applied to the structure of being revealed in experience; but ontology in this sense could obviously do no more than reveal the finite and contingent character of actually experienced being.

beginning the gratuitousness of being, the epiphenomenalistic character of consciousness, the finality of death, and indeed all those supposed facts which bring out the absurdity of the world, and of human life in particular. In the exercise of his powers of description and of analysis he shows great virtuosity, intelligence and ability; but when he plays the part of an ontologist, I do not think that it is unfair to call him a dogmatist. To do him justice, one must admit that, like Heidegger (who, as intending to pursue a strictly ontological investigation, does not pretend to employ the *epoche*), he sets out to give a phenomenological ontology and not to act as a phenomenologist pure and simple; but it remains true that he tends to slide from descriptive analyses of subjective experience into existential judgments concerning the objective reference of those experiences as adequate apprehensions of reality. In my opinion he does this because he has already chosen his philosophy. This leads him to single out for description those phenomena which will lend support to the assumed position. That a philosopher should select and dwell on those aspects of reality which illustrate and support his main position is only to be expected (Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, all do this); but if a philosopher builds his system on certain aspects of reality and then supports the system by reference to those aspects, slurring over other aspects, he involves himself in a vicious circle.

Albert Camus proceeds in a similar manner. In *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* he describes and analyses *le sentiment de l'absurde*, and the absurdity of life is illustrated or portrayed in the concrete by dramas such as *Le Malentendu* and stories like *L'Étranger*. The dramas and stories, however, illustrate a thesis which is assumed and not proved, which is taken for granted. Gabriel Marcel has written plays and has subsequently distilled philosophy from them and it may be said that Camus' plays portray life in the concrete and are a legitimate generalization from experience; but one can obviously reply that life has many aspects and that if one consistently chooses only certain aspects for portrayal, one does so in virtue of a preformed judgment as to what life is. Moreover, the possibility of the world and human life having a meaning and purpose which, partly at least, transcends the world, cannot be ruled out legitimately from the beginning; the denial, like the affirmation, of such a meaning and purpose stands in need of some proof; it can neither be taken for granted nor based simply on certain selected aspects of life. To speak of Platonism or Christian theism or of pantheism as escapism, as a refusal to face the facts of life and of the world in general may sound very well in the ears of those on whom any appeal to psychology acts like the voice of the Siren; but it is of little value from the philosophical standpoint, unless first of all the arguments of

the Platonist or of the theist or of the pantheist have been adequately refuted.

So far I have referred mainly to the atheist existentialists, and I have suggested that when Sartre says that atheism is for them a *point de départ*, he must be taken seriously. Atheism is for Sartre a *point de départ*, a dogmatic assumption, though it would perhaps be more accurate to say that it is the fruit of a certain mentality and intellectual atmosphere. He shows no sign of feeling the problem of God in the way in which Nietzsche felt it. For Kierkegaard, on the other hand, man's relation to God is all-important; the supreme choice is the choice of oneself as a creature in relation to the infinite and personal Absolute, God. In spite of their contradictory views on the God of Christianity, Kierkegaard is more akin to Nietzsche than is Sartre, inasmuch as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were both personal thinkers, whose thought can hardly be understood apart from their lives. But one result of Kierkegaard's intensely personal standpoint is that, while he is able to describe in an admirable manner man's possible attitude to God, man's submissive choice of his God-relationship, man's defiance and sin, the aesthetic and moral planes of existence, and so on, and while he is able, in the name of *Existenz* and "subjectivity," to conduct a polemic against the Hegelian mediation of opposites and the synthetic merging of finite and infinite, he omits altogether to prove objectively the existence of God and the rational justification of the leap of faith; indeed, he expressly denies the legitimacy of natural theology or the metaphysical approach to God. To turn this point into a reproach against Kierkegaard may seem to be an unfair procedure and to involve a misunderstanding of his dialectic, since by faith he does not mean an attitude or activity which could be attained by way of metaphysical speculation. This last point is doubtless true; but from the philosophical standpoint, which is the standpoint with which we are now concerned, one cannot justifiably demand acceptance of an object the existence of which has not been demonstrated. Kierkegaard may indeed be chiefly occupied with the question how one becomes a Christian, i.e. a true Christian, and his words may very well be of value to the Christian; but none the less from the speculative standpoint he demands a leap, and his affirmation of God, when regarded from that standpoint, is a dogmatic affirmation. The words of a twelfth-century Scottish philosopher and theologian, Richard of St. Victor, are here relevant: "I have read concerning my God that He is eternal, uncreated, immense, that He is omnipotent and Lord of all . . . all this I have read; but I do not remember that I have read how all these things are proved. . . . In all these matters authorities abound, but not equally the arguments . . . proofs are becoming rare." If Sartre and Camus dogmatize as to the

absurdity of the world and human life, Kierkegaard dogmatizes as to the existence of God. This may seem a hopelessly abstract and high-and-dry attitude of criticism; but I do not see how any philosopher can deny its relevance.

Gabriel Marcel, the Catholic existentialist, is possibly in the same boat as Kierkegaard; whether he is or not, seems to me to depend on the answer to the question whether he regards his philosophy as simply a phenomenology of *la realité humaine* or as also an ontology and metaphysic. Elsewhere I have suggested that Marcel is pretty well as much a "leaper" as Kierkegaard;[1] but I do not feel quite sure that the accusation is just Let me take an example, to illustrate my meaning. "It is doubtless true to say that there is no other metaphysical problem than the problem, 'What am I?', for it is to this that all the other problems are reducible."[2] Now, if I analyse man, I can find in him the demand for or the hope of immortality, at least as implied in such activities as fidelity to another. If a loved one has died, it depends on me, on my interior attitude, to maintain his or her "presence," without letting this "presence" be degraded to the status of an image, a mere memory; creative fidelity demands this.[3] Is such a line of argument meant to be a description of certain human spiritual activities which imply a hope of immortality, or is it supposed to be a proof of immortality? If the former, one cannot accuse Marcel of dogmatism; if the latter, it would appear to me that he leaps from the desire or hope of immortality to the assertion of immortality, and I should agree with Duns Scotus, who adorned this University centuries ago, when he maintains that one cannot argue from the desire of an object to the actuality of that object; one has first of all to show that the attainment of the object is at least possible. If one could discern with certainty a natural desire for immortality, one might argue to the fact of immortality, provided that one has first shown the rationality of the universe and of natural desires, which in practice means proving the existence of God. If the world were such as Sartre and Camus depict it, the desire of immortality would certainly not show that the human soul actually is immortal.

Again, it is rather difficult to know whether Marcel regards his analysis of man's spiritual activities as constituting a proof of God's existence or not. It may be that an activity such as love implies the presence of the Transcendent in and through which human beings can communicate as persons in the mutual giving and self-sacrifice of love, and one might try, by arguing along the lines indicated by

[1] *"Existentialism and Religion,"* in the *Dublin Review* for Spring, 1947.

[2] *Homo Viator*, p. 193.

[3] *Positions et Approches Concrétes du Mystère Ontologique,"* in *Le Monde Cassé*, p. 290.

Marcel, to show the "irrationalists" like Sartre and Camus that they have not really thought out their position and its implications, and that the problem of God is more real than they suppose; but it is doubtful if one could prove God's existence, in any strict sense of the word "prove," by reflections such as those of Marcel. Moreover, his distinction between a "problem" and a "mystery" would appear to involve a position analogous to that of Kierkegaard in regard to the proofs of God's existence. Guido De Ruggiero asserts roundly that Marcel's procedure involves a series of leaps to undemonstrated conclusions, and his contention may be true; but if one regards Marcel's philosophy not as a "system" in the ordinary sense, but as an endeavour to reveal to man what he is and to awaken in him the perception of the "meta-problematical," of what Marcel calls the "mystery" of being, the question of the leap and of dogmatism hardly arises. And, even though Marcel's distinction between "mystery" and "problem" is spiritually akin to Kierkegaard's insistence on "subjectivity," I now regard this second line of interpretation as the right one.

According to Guido De Ruggiero,[1] "at bottom, Marcel knows from the beginning where he wants to arrive, and, seeking, he has the air of a man who has already found." But Marcel did not begin as a Christian philosopher, and he claims that his reflections on human existence opened the way to the definitive conversion which took place in 1929, a claim the truth of which one can have no adequate reason to doubt, though it does not necessarily follow, of course, that the considerations which weighed with Marcel would appear probative to another type of philosopher. As to wanting to arrive at a certain conclusion, what would be proved by the existence of such a wish, supposing that it was present? Insistence on "wishful thinking" is so often irrelevant, as can be seen from an example Lord Russell, in his *History of Western Philosophy*, emphasizes the fact that when St. Thomas Aquinas undertook to prove God's existence, he was already convinced of the truth of the conclusion at which he arrived and that he wanted to arrive at that conclusion This is quite true; but the relevant question for the philosopher is not what St. Thomas' wishes happened to be, but whether his proofs were cogent or not. It may be that Marcel wanted to arrive at a theistic conclusion and Sartre at an atheistic conclusion; but the relevant question for the philosopher is whether either of them proves his position. As regards Sartre, I am quite sure that he dogmatizes, in substance if not in form; as regards Marcel, I do not feel certain, for the reason which I have indicated. It may be objected that I persist in criticizing the existentialists from a standpoint which is not their own but then it is precisely their standpoint which I find inadequate.

[1] *Existentialism*, p. 40.

M. Sartre claims that existentialism is a humanism, and I want finally to consider existentialism, under this aspect. M. Sartre rejects the humanism which takes man as an end, since man is always something to be made, not something already made (to practise a cult of Humanity after the style of Auguste Comte is, for Sartre, ridiculous); but he claims that the existentialist doctrine that man is free, that he is the being which transcends itself and creates itself by free choice, that he is his own legislator, unfettered by any absolute values or universal moral law, constitutes a true humanism. Obviously a great deal depends on what one understands by humanism. If by humanism is meant a doctrine about man, then M. Sartre's philosophy is certainly humanistic and M. Sartre himself, as a student of human nature, is a humanist; but if humanism be taken to imply devotion to human interests or concern with human interests, it may well be doubted if the Sartrian existentialism is humanistic. A conviction that man is totally free, that there are no absolute values and that man is responsible neither to God nor his fellows may seem to open up that boundless ocean of possibility of which Nietzsche spoke; but is the liberation more than apparent? Man must choose, he is "condemned" to be free, he cannot but make something of himself (even if he commits suicide, he chooses, he draws a line under his life and says, "that is what I am"); but it makes not the slightest difference ultimately what he chooses, what he makes for himself, since man is *une passion inutile.* A Hitler or a Francis of Assisi, a Nero or a Buddha, what does it matter? If values are the creation of the individual and depend on his choice, there is no standard of valuational discrimination between different types of men or between the ends they set themselves, their ideals. As to authentic and unauthentic choice, authentic choice, if there are no absolute values, is no more valuable or praiseworthy than unauthentic choice, whereas if on the other hand authentic choice is more valuable in itself than unauthentic choice, if, for example, it is objectively better to be a Communist or a Christian as the result of a choice proceeding from an authentic act of the will than simply out of social conformism, there must be an objective standard of value and values are not simply the individual's creation. One cannot have it both ways. M. Sartre might learn something from Plato in this matter. The atheist existentialists seem to attach a value to clear knowledge and decisive choice and action, just as Nietzsche, who theoretically denied the existence of absolute and universal values, clearly thought the "noble" type of man objectively better than the "ignoble." To act with resolution, even with the clear perception of death as the inevitable and final end, seems to constitute a value for Heidegger, while revolt against the absurdity and meaninglessness of existence is admired by Camus, and Sartre attaches value to *engagement.*

Sartre might say that it is not a question of *engagement* having a value antecedent to choice, but that it owes its value simply to the individual's liberty; but does not the affirmation of a value by the individual presuppose the perception of value? The logical consequence of atheism may be, as Sartre, following Nietzsche, says it is, the negation of absolute values; but the conclusion is valid only if the premiss is valid, and if there is an awareness of value which precedes the acceptance or affirmation of value, the premiss is at once rendered doubtful: at any rate it cannot legitimately be taken as a *point de départ.*

In any truly humanistic philosophy account will be taken of all sides of human nature; but if a being from another world were to gain its knowledge of human nature from *L'Être et le Néant, La Nausée, Les Chemins de la Liberté, Le Mur, Huis-clos, La Putain Respectueuse* and *Morts sans Sépulture,* that being would have a very one-sided idea of man. If one touches on this theme, one runs the risk of being misunderstood; it may appear that one is simply moralizing, that one is objecting to a novelist or dramatist introducing certain themes into his novels and plays; but I am not concerned to lay down rules of censorship for novelists and dramatists, but rather to point out that a philosopher who claims to analyse and describe *la realité humaine* and who at the same time omits or degrades man's higher spiritual activities is unfaithful to his task as a philosopher. A novelist, considered as such, may legitimately confine his attention to certain types of people or certain aspects of human nature; but a philosopher of man should possess a comprehensive vision. If he does not possess it, his picture of man will be inadequate, and if he proposes to erect a general philosophy on his analysis of human existence, his general philosophy will be correspondingly inadequate. It requires no great experience of human nature to know that the phenomena which appear to fascinate the attention of M. Sartre actually occur; but if one were to compare the analysis of love, for example, as given by Sartre with that of Gabriel Marcel, one would have to admit, if faithful to the total data, that a level of spiritual activity to which Marcel's eyes are open seems invisible to those of M. Sartre, for whom love is, at best, *une duperie.* This makes more difference than may appear at first sight. Sartre dwells on those aspects and activities of man which illustrate his theory that man is *une passion inutile* and that life is absurd, whereas Marcel discerns those spiritual activities of man which imply at least an appeal to the Transcendent, even if they do not strictly prove its existence. Similarly, whatever one may think of Kierkegaard's rejection of natural theology, it remains true that he discerned and emphasized those activities and attitudes of the spirit which imply a "vertical" transcendence, in contrast to Sartre's exclusively "horizontal"

transcendence. If the philosopher recognizes the existence of those activities and attitudes, he will concern himself seriously with the question of their objective implications; but if he is blind to them, he will naturally pass over the question. Nicolai Hartman, in his great work on ethics, spoke of a blindness to values; M. Sartre seems to me to be one of the myopic in this respect.

In conclusion I should say that existentialism, in spite of its important defects, is of value in that it draws attention to the human person as free and responsible. A rough definition of existentialism, so far as one can give one, might be that existentialism is the descriptive analysis of man as free, self-transcending subject, a descriptive analysis which is itself designed to promote authentic choice. Whether adequate or not, such a definition does at least bring out the fact that the existentialist deals with man as subject, and as free subject; he starts, as Sartre says, with subjectivity. The system of Hegel himself can scarcely appear to us in the same dangerous and threatening light in which it appeared to Kierkegaard, but there are other systems of philosophy, one of which at least is of great practical importance, the effects or implications of which in regard to the human subject are no less dangerous than those which Kierkegaard, rightly or wrongly, considered to follow from the Hegelian system. But if one wishes to protest against such systems in the name of the human person, it is essential to have an adequate idea of the human person, and in this respect Heidegger, and still more Sartre, are radically deficient. Kierkegaard and Marcel have a deeper insight into the nature of the human person, and in that respect their philosophies are superior to those of Heidegger, Sartre and Camus (though, as I mentioned earlier, the phenomenological analyses of Heidegger and Sartre are often excellent). But existentialism as such can, it seems to me, have little future, unless an adequate and faithful descriptive analysis of man-in-the-world is made the basis for, or is united with, an unprejudiced attempt to construct a rational ontological and metaphysical system. Heidegger and Sartre really prejudge the issue from the start, while with Kierkegaard and possibly Marcel subjective impressions and experiences tend to take the place of objective reasoning. Philosophic reasoning can quite well begin with the human person; but without a sustained effort of reasoning no durable philosophy can be developed. Phenomenological analyses, however brilliant they may be, are an insufficient basis for a philosophical system. Moreover, it is one thing to start with "subjectivity" and another thing to surrender to subjectivism; however great the faults of the system, Hegel's insistence on objectivity and "impersonal" thought is not altogether devoid of value.

THEISM [1]

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THEISM is a modern word, meaning belief in God. But there is no unanimity about the attributes of God. The Greek *theos* meant a superhuman and in particular an immortal Being. For the Platonists he was a "Soul," and there may be more than one soul. The Christian Fathers—Augustine as well as the Greeks, could say without reproach that God became man in order that man might become divine. The Logos in the Fourth Gospel is God, but not the Godhead. "My Father is greater than I."

But in this essay it will be convenient to accept modern definitions of what we mean by Theism. A. E. Taylor says, "Theism is the doctrine that the ultimate ground of things is a single supreme reality which is the source of everything other than itself and has the characters of being intrinsically complete and perfect and an adequate object of unqualified adoration or worship." To the same effect Flint defines Theism as "the doctrine that the universe owes its existence and its continuance in existence to the reason and will of a self-existent Being, who is infinitely powerful, wise, and good."

These definitions exclude several theories about the nature of God which have been held by many who do not deny His existence.

The Epicureans believed that the gods live their own life in calm enjoyment, not interfering in any way with human affairs. As Ennius says: "Ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dico coelitum, sed eos non curare opinor quid agat humanum genus." Other sects naturally said that this is practically atheism. Aristotle seems to have taught that the relation of man to God is the desire of the moth for the star. He attracts the creatures like a magnet. There is no reciprocating love on God's side. Aristotle has been called the father of Deism. Spinoza also said that we must love God without expecting Him to love us in return—a harsh saying which I think is inconsistent with his later view. The Deism of the eighteenth century practically made God a *roi fainéant*. He created the world, but leaves it to run its own course. All theories which make God purely transcendent and not immanent, including Barth's unfortunate phrase that God is "wholly other" than ourselves, belong to the same type. We can enter into no relations with a Being who is utterly different from ourselves. "In the image of God created He them," says the Book of Genesis.

[1] Series, *Contemporary World-Outlooks* (III).

Polytheism is excluded, since there can be only one Being with the attributes ascribed to God. But a subordinate polytheism certainly exists in popular Catholicism, and in other Christian bodies the doctrine of the Trinity has often been held in a manner which might be called tritheism. In the later Paganism religion was monotheistic without denying minor gods and spirits. The supreme Being may employ superhuman agents.

Metaphysical dualism is obviously excluded. We cannot, if we are theists, believe in an anti-God. It was perhaps the influence of Persia which brought Satan into Judaism and so into Christianity, though for us Satan is pictured as a fallen angel, not as a rival Deity. But, as I shall say presently, we human "amphibia" live and think on different levels. The moralist, as moralist, must be almost a Manichean. We are combatants in a cosmic duel, wrestling, as St. Paul says, not against flesh and blood but against principalities and powers, the world-rulers of this darkness, against spiritual wickedness in heavenly places. Some of the later Platonists, taking advantage of an ambiguous phrase in Plato, believed in "an evil world-soul," but there is certainly no devil in Plato. Modernist theology wishes to abolish the devil; but, as McNeile Dixon says, if we do, belief in God fades at once. "In yes and no all things consist." It is only when we ascend in thought from this world of claims and counter-claims to the eternal realm where God sitteth above the waterflood, that we can contemplate the victory over evil already won. The eternal world is the realm of which we are "citizens": but here we are strangers and pilgrims, *in via*, not *in patria*, as the old theologians said.

To the psychic level belongs the idea of a limited, striving Deity, which has been defended by Mill and more recently by Rashdall and H. G. Wells. It has been associated with a theory which does not necessarily go with it, that of an evolution of God. This theory belongs to a climate of opinion which is perhaps beginning to change under the influence of the dark patch in history which we have now reached. It is the child of the perfectibility theory which began in the eighteenth century and luxuriated in almost insane vapourings in the nineteenth, and of the doctrine of evolution associated with the name of Darwin. Evolution became the frame into which all events had to be fitted. It was forgotten, though Kant had made it quite clear, that evolution—the mechanical unpacking of what was present in germ from the first, and epigenesis, which recognizes the action of new creative activities, are incompatible theories. The first denies, the second asserts, the reality of change. The problem of change is one of the most difficult in philosophy; in mathematics there is identity between the problem and its solution; time does not come in; a sum may be worked backwards as well as

forwards. We may suspect that the popular word "emergence," as used by Lloyd Morgan, Alexander, and others, is well chosen to mask or combine two contradictory theories.

The coalescence of the assumed law of progress and of the method of evolution gave birth to the fantastic notion of a *nisus* towards perfection in nature, or at any rate in human nature. The absurdity of arguing from the historical progress of humanity—assuming that this can be proved—to progress as a law of the universe, becomes more apparent the more we think about it. The human race, after perhaps half a million years of almost stable equilibrium, discovered the use of tools a few thousand years ago. *Homo faber* has made no biological progress; the Cro-Magnon skeletons were those of taller men with larger brains than the modern European; but civilization has made discoveries in the arts of life which I, at any rate, have no wish to disparage. During a comparatively short episode in his career man has made astonishing changes in his habits. Will this era of "progress" continue? We cannot tell. There may be new flowering times of civilization, more golden ages like those of ancient Athens, mediaeval Italy, and I should add the reign of Queen Victoria. But it now seems possible that mankind will commit co-operative suicide; in which case our successors, if we have any, or the theologians of the planet Venus, will doubtless say that the extinction of this noxious species is a strong argument for the providential government of the world. It is even more likely that we shall follow the social insects, who must at one time have been vigorously progressive and inventive, in arriving at a stable equilibrium, which may last for millions of years. For a few generations it would be necessary to liquidate sporadic thinkers; but in time this disturbing variation should be eliminated, and we should be guided only by the frozen intelligence which we call social habit or instinct. The socialist planners will then have won their victory.

However that may be, there is not the slightest reason to suppose that there is any tendency to progress in the universe as a whole—an absurd and "blasphemous" idea, according to Bradley—or in any part of it that we know except in the recent history of the white-skinned section of the species to which we happen to belong. The *nisus* to which Alexander gives so much importance seems to be imaginary. Stability is the rule; change a rare exception.

Even the most hopeful of wishful thinkers know that as Lucretius says we are only leaseholders on this planet. The time will come when our home will be no longer habitable. For the last hundred years it has been believed by physicists that not only our globe but the whole universe is doomed. The Second Law of Thermodynamics, which the French call the principle of Carnot, commits us to believe in an irreversible process which must end in the extinction of all

life everywhere. It may be that science has not yet said the last word on this subject. The activities of the cosmic rays have not yet been fully explored. If the accepted view is right, the clock which is now running down must have been wound up at some date which we could name if we knew it; and presumably whatever power wound it up once may wind it up again. But if there is any recuperative agency in nature, it has not yet been discovered. Origen, who accepted as revealed truth the end of the existing cosmic order, believed that there has been and will be an infinite series of worlds following each other. It seemed to him hardly credible that God would allow a time to come when nothing will happen any more. There can be no revelation on such a subject, but at present we have no right to believe that life in the universe will last for ever. It follows that if God is "organic with the universe," if the world is as necessary to God as God is to the world, the time will come when God will cease to exist, or will pass into a dreamless sleep, "lost to time and use and name and fame." Such a Being would not be the God of religion. Of course, if time is unreal, the problem need not be stated in this way; but many thinkers have felt that if time is "the moving image of eternity," the time-form of eternity must be perpetuity, and the idea of a dead universe, with a temperature of -273 degrees centigrade, is hard to reconcile with belief in an intelligent Creator. This however is not conclusive. The nature of time may exclude perpetuity.

Christianity teaches quite definitely that though the creation may be the necessary result of the character of God, it is not an essential part of His nature. As Coleridge put it, if G = God and W = the world, then for Christianity $G - W = G$. Some have thought that the relation of an artist to his works is perhaps the best analogy of the relation of God to the world. There is nothing illogical in unilateral dependence. Platonism asserts this quite as strongly as Christian theology.

Besides the influence of the supposed cosmic law of progress, which the Catholics call the last Western heresy, and the idea of evolution as the key to history, we have to reckon with modern democratism, which dislikes the picture of God as an absolute monarch. It is not polite to smile at our friends while they are at their devotions, but an American on democracy sometimes talks like a fool. "God is not known, He is used. If He proves Himself useful, the religious consciousness asks for no more."[1] "The higher man will not tolerate old-fashioned theism."[2] "Whatever the God of heaven and earth is, He surely can be no gentleman."[3] "God may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity."[4]

Christian Theism is also incompatible with the fashionable anti-

[1] Leuba. [2] W. James. [3] *Idem.* [4] G. H. Johnson.

intellectualism. "Distrust of the intellect," says Radhakrishnan, "is the characteristic note of recent philosophy. To-day we have nothing else than contempt for the tribe of thinkers. It has become the fashion to idealize impulse over reason, sentiment over thought, and to denounce all system-making." This is not overstated. "Truth," says William James, "is merely a preliminary means to other vital satisfactions." "It is a mark of great coarseness," says Le Roy, "to wish to be right. It shows a great want of culture." "All our decisions," says James again, "have as their sole meaning a better promise for the world's outcome. Be they false or be they true, the meaning of them is their meliorism." This is pragmatism, the doctrine that we may believe what we choose as our beliefs at our own risk, since truth has no other meaning than what suits us. "An idea," says Vaihinger, the author of the notorious *Philosophie des Als-ob*, "in spite of its theoretical nullity, may have great practical importance."

This looks like the extreme of scepticism. It is quite inconsistent with the Christian belief in the Holy Spirit, whose gifts are "wisdom and understanding, counsel and might, knowledge and the fear of the Lord." It denies either the existence of absolute truth or our power of reaching it. Plato's brave act of faith that the wholly real is wholly knowable, though not wholly known, is far nearer the Christian position. We may wonder that philosophers should so utterly contemn and distrust the instrument with which they do their work. Perhaps the main explanation is that these men have made the elementary mistake of identifying two very different faculties of the mind, those which the Greeks called *Nous* and *Dianoia*, the Latins *Intellectus* and *Ratio*. The lower reason or understanding, with which natural science does its work, is by no means to be despised or distrusted. We are often told that natural science, being an abstract study, for its own purposes disregards all the higher values. This is not true. Science is a disinterested pursuit of truth, which is an ultimate value. But it is an abstract study, because it is concerned only with quantitative measurements, which are not applicable to intellectual and spiritual realities. What the Greeks called *Nous* and the schoolmen *Intellectus* is the whole personality acting under the guidance of its highest part, a faculty which, as Plotinus says, all possess though few use. The Platonic *Nous* is almost the same as the Pauline *Pneuma*, and I think we may say with the Indian *Atman*. It is the Soul become Spirit, the self transfigured in a life of discipline by the indwelling Spirit of God, which Christians, following St. Paul, identify with the Spirit of Christ, whose last words on earth, according to the Gospel of Matthew, were, "Lo, I am with you all the days, even to the end of the world." The Soul become Spirit has not renounced the duty and

privilege of earnest thinking, which makes us men. William James congratulates Bergson for having finally killed "that beast," the intellect. Such language is unworthy of a philosopher, unless he has quite misunderstood the meaning of "intellect." Pragmatism has the sin of wilful self-deception, though some of its adherents, like Schiller of Oxford, were really very honest thinkers. Pascal's words, *il faut s'abêtir*, have shocked many of his admirers; I do not think that they fairly represent his position. The submission of the intellect, demanded by Catholics, is another thing. No one has protested more energetically against the prevalent anti-intellectualism than the ablest Catholic writers; but Catholicism is a religion of authority, exacting obedience liké that of soldiers on a campaign. Catholics are not willing to admit that events in the past and future, like the creation of the world in time and the day of judgment, cannot be supernaturally revealed.

When Bergson says that the superficial ego is intelligence and the profound ego is intuition, he ought to have said that the superficial ego is reason and the profound ego is intelligence.[1] From this initial misunderstanding the confusion continues in all his writings. He has a sympathy with mysticism as an intuitional type of religion; but though many mystics have not been philosophers, nothing can be more alien to the spirit of mysticism than to base faith on the wish to believe. Faith begins as an experiment and ends as an experience; but though the truths which religious experience reveals to us are not within the purview of natural science, they are assuredly within the province of the intellect, if we know what the word means.

Pantheism, as expounded in Pope's *Essay on Man*, "as full, as perfect, in a hair as heart," is of course incompatible with Theism. Reality is a kingdom of values, and values are essentially hierarchic. Some Indians, and certainly Emerson, who was much under their influence, have sought to attain unity by wiping out all distinctions, an error which has inevitably lent itself to caricature. Krause was the first to coin the word panentheism, the doctrine of divine immanence, in contrast with pantheism. Panpsychism, the theory that all things are in various degree possessed of life, is not inconsistent with theism. The difficulty of reconciling the world of values, which must contain negative as well as positive values, with the neutral world as known to science, must be dealt with briefly when we come to the problem of evil. The man of science has no right to blame the parasite or to lecture the cuckoo; but it may be that perception, as distinguished from sensation, always has an element of valuation.

Immanence, as opposed to identification, implies transcendence. It also implies that the world of space and time, in which we live

[1] Sheen, *God and Intelligence*, p. 64.

and within which we have experience of the presence of God, is not sundered from reality. The world as we know it is only a shadow of the world as God knows it, but as the Quaker Isaac Penington says, "though every truth is shadow except the last, every truth is substance in its own place, though it be but a shadow in another place. The shadow is a true shadow as the substance is a true substance." Some thinkers, like Spinoza, have been accused of atheism, though they might more plausibly be accused of acosmism. The modern disciples of Heracleitus, like Bergson, who picture the world as a perpetual flux, a shoreless ocean in which all is movement without anything that moves, and the modern disciples of Parmenides, among whom we may reckon Bradley on one side of his thought, are in danger of reducing appearance to an appearance of nothing. The latter deny real change and real movement, and give us a world in which nothing happens. For Plato, time is a moving *image* (εἰκών not εἴδωλον) of eternity. The image must resemble its archetype as far as its nature allows. The sensible world is, we may say, a sacrament of the intelligible world. The monism which makes the eternal world alone real sucks all the reality out of our pictures of the spiritual. Nirvana has no qualities. In grasping at infinity these thinkers find only zero. Some Christian mystics have followed the "negative road" too far.

Among all else which threatens to disappear under this treatment is personal existence. The problem of personality is exceedingly difficult. The ancients needed no word for it, and on the whole I agree with those who have said that the importance of self-consciousness has been over-emphasized in modern philosophy. Our personality is in the making; Lotze says that personality in the full sense is an attribute of God only. Keyserling in his admirable early book *Unsterblichkeit* says that mysticism always ends in an impersonal immortality. This judgment must not be disregarded; but impersonal is a negative word, and personality has no well defined meaning. From the point of view of the present essay the most important question is this. The spiritual life is a growth or transformation of the soul into spirit, and the Spirit of God is one. "We are all made to drink into one Spirit." The mystics have always made union with God their ideal. The dialectic of mystical philosophy demands that since reality (the intelligible world) is a unity in duality of thought and its object, we must think of an absolute unity "beyond existence" in which even this duality is transcended. In rare moments of ecstasy, many of them thought, we may even pass out of our finite selves and be "alone with the Alone." Such rare and transient experiences cannot be judged by those who have not had them. Personally I do not think that we can ever lose ourselves so completely as this. I value the words of Plotinus, who himself believed in

the possibility of such a state: "to try to rise above *Nous* is to fall outside it." But the question which I wish to put is this: do we in prayer and meditation ever leave behind the "I" and "Thou" relation in our approach to God? When we speak of personality in God—we had better not say that God is a Person[1]—is not this what we mean—"Speak to Him now, for He hears, and spirit with spirit can meet; closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet"? If "God is love," love is an ultimate, and if personality can be transcended, love is not an ultimate, for we cannot love ourselves, even if we believe that we do not exist. "Mike, have you seen Tim lately?" "Yes, I saw him yesterday, on the opposite side of the street. But when we got to the middle of the road, faith, it was neither of us." The two Irishmen cannot have found much to say to each other after that discovery. From my own poor experience I should say that prayer is neither a dumb-bell exercise nor a soliloquy.

We are addressing a Being who is not ourselves but with whom we can have communion. "In Heaven" our personalities remain distinct though not separate. Spiritual growth enlarges our circumference without abolishing our centre.

One of the chief difficulties in accepting Theism comes from the failure to follow Eckhardt in distinguishing between the Godhead and God. Eckhardt in his popular preaching speaks of them as if they were separate Beings, which was not his intention. But it is important to recognize that the God of religion is not the Absolute who "dwelleth in the light which no man can approach unto." The God whom we worship is God as He reveals Himself to us in His attributes as perfect Goodness or Love, Truth, and Beauty, and with whom we may have communion in prayer. It is strange how much confusion has been brought into philosophy by not acting on this obvious truth. For example, many modern commentators on Neo-Platonism represent the Plotinian Absolute whom that philosopher calls the One, the First Principle, or the Good (the Perfect would be a better translation, since moral goodness is not thought of in the Supreme) by the word God which Plotinus does not use of the Absolute. The result of this gratuitous mistake is to throw the whole philosophy out of gear. The goal of the Platonist is certainly not to "swoon into nothingness." His heaven is not Nirvana, but the full and rich realm contemplated by Spirit, our own world apprehended in its complete meaning. It would be a mistake to compare the so-called Platonic Trinity—the Supreme, the Intelligence, and the Soul of the World, with the Christian Trinity; but there are resemblances. The attributes of the Logos are very much like those of the Platonic *Nous*, especially if with St. Paul we regard the

[1] Goethe says, "Der Professor ist eine Person, Gott ist keine."

glorified Christ and the Spirit as One Being. In the later dogmatic controversy the Church decided that no divine honours were too great to be paid to Christ in His relation to the Father. St. Paul, as is well known, taught that as the result of His self-sacrifice for man He was invested with higher honours—"equality with God"—than He had before. This is contradicted in the Fourth Gospel. Some have thought that a consistent Platonist would have been content with the Arian Christ. But I wish to insist that we think on different levels. On what St. Paul calls the psychic level, on which we mostly live, we see everywhere that tension—"like that of the bow or the lyre," as Heracleitus says, that strife of contending principles which some modern thinkers would have us regard as ultimate truth. In this sphere "we see not yet all things put under God"; "the prince of this world" is, for the Johannine Christ, the devil. On the level of Spirit, the battle is already decided, but this is not the "vale of soul-making" in which our probation is passed. As for the sphere of the Godhead, "whom no man hath seen or can see," we are wiser to say nothing. It is in the second plane, not in the first or the third, that "reality" is to be found. The Absolute is beyond existence; the world of space and time is the real world polarized and displayed in an imperfect medium. In thus admitting the imperfection of our knowledge, we are making no concessions to irrationalism. There is nothing irrational in recognizing that there are many things which we neither know nor can expect to know. Providence gives us enough light to live by; our needs are provided for, but not our curiosity.

What do we mean by revelation? We mean a truth, or a body of truths which we could not arrive at ourselves, but which is imparted to us by an authority which we are bound to regard as infallible. Historically, within the life of the western nations, four seats of authority have been recognized; the dogmas promulgated by an institutional church, which claims to be protected against error by divine inspiration; a sacred book, dictated by supernatural wisdom and immune from error in all its parts; the discoveries of human reason, for a time in logical argument and then in the progress of natural science; and what is called the inner light or the testimony of the Holy Spirit. I postpone the discussion of this last till I come to the ontological argument. The other three are now generally admitted to be indefensible. I need say no more about the infallible Church and the infallible book. The conflict between religion and science in the nineteenth century was a battle between dogmatic materialism and materialistic dogmatism. Both, we may hope, are dead and buried. No philosophy can be erected on materialism, a world-view illegitimately based on naïve realism, and now abandoned by the ablest leaders in the natural sciences. Biology and psychology are not content to be brought under the laws of the inorganic world.

Matter itself has been defecated to a transparency. Relativity has brought uncertainty into the arguments of Euclid and even of Newton. The very existence of laws of nature has been called in question; they are alleged to have only statistical validity. Incidentally I deprecate the attempts of some religious apologists to make capital out of "indeterminateness." Those who try to find God in gaps will be in a tight place when the gaps begin to close. On the other side it should by this time be plain that suspensions of the laws of nature require a proof which for events of long ago is not available, and that if they could be established they prove nothing of value for religion. Miracle may be, as Goethe said, the dearest child of faith; it can never be the parent of faith in the higher religion.

What subjects are capable of being revealed, in the sense I have given to the word? Events in the past and in the future cannot be so revealed. *Mundum incepisse sola fide tenetur*, says Thomas Aquinas. How could such a fact be revealed? I do not think that Christ ever claimed to reveal facts about the future. If He was fully man, as we believe, He knew no more about the future than we do. That He was willing to aocept the current Hebrew ideas about Paradise, Hades, and Gehenna need not surprise us. All eschatology is symbolic; from the nature of the case it must be so. This means of course that I regard the time-honoured proof from prophecy, which was the sheet-anchor of primitive Christian controversy against the Jews, and which has obviously modified in several places the narrative of the Gospels, as wholly worthless. Attempts are now being made to establish the possibility of "precognition." I do not believe a word of it.

Are we then to admit that there is no such thing as revelation? I am far from thinking so. In the first place there is the solid and coherent evidence of the mystics, who have had visions of God in many different parts of the word, in many periods, and in many religions. I have studied their testimonies for many years, and they are far too cogent, and far too similar to each other, to leave any room for doubt that they are what they claim to be. Their descriptions are often indistinct; how should they not be? A man can hardly be inside and outside the mystical state at the same time; he is attempting to describe what language was never meant to express. But he knows that the vision was authentic. As for the objection that the value of this testimony is subjective and not transferable, it is nonsense. As I have said before, if a dozen honest men tell me that they have climbed the Matterhorn, I am satisfied that the summit of that mountain is accessible, though I shall never get there myself. We are not all equally gifted as contemplatives, any more than as musicians. But want of attention is the chief obstacle. The still small voice does not shout at us. If we spend a perfunctory

five minutes a day in thinking about God and the spiritual world, what can we expect? The testimony of the mystics cannot establish Christianity, but it is a strong and I think sufficient argument for Theism, since all the contemplatives are agreed that what they have experienced was not a figment of their own imagination, but spiritual communion with a living Being.

But besides this, I maintain that some of the attributes of ultimate reality are revealed to us in what are called the absolute or intrinsic values, Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. There is good authority for this belief. Windelband says: "Logical, ethical, and aesthetic values make up the entire range of the human value-activity which can lay claim to general recognition and the necessity of actual unconditionedness. In each of these provinces the empirical mind has a significance which transcends the mind itself. In its metaphysical significance it is a rational community of spiritual primary reality that transcends all experience. There can be no further universal values beyond these three." And Bradley: "Goodness, Beauty, and Truth are all there is which in the end is real. Their reality, appearing amid chance and change, is beyond these and is eternal. In whatever world they appear, that world so far is real." These are the attributes under which we know God; this is the real world in which His thoughts are objectified.

These three ultimate values are "a threefold cord not quickly broken." They have each their own characters, and cannot be either identified or made subordinate to each other. The sense of duty speaks to us in the imperative, and sets the "ought-to-be" against the "is." In this it differs from Truth and Beauty. But they are alike in this, that they depend on nothing beyond themselves; they have an absolute quality. "If a man seeks the good life for anything outside itself," says Plotinus, "it is not the good life that he seeks." Of course we may be in doubt what is our duty; we may make mistakes in seeking the truth; we may be poor judges of beauty; but when we know what is right we must do it, "in scorn of consequence"; when we know what is true we must believe it; when we know what is beautiful we must admire it. To say "where ignorance is bliss 'tis folly to be wise"; or "Evil, be thou my good"; or "Fair is foul and foul is fair," is blasphemy against the God who has under these three attributes made Himself known to us.

Some have suggested a fourth ultimate value—Holiness. But Holiness is rather the feeling of reverence which we feel towards any of the three ultimates; and Life, which Bergsonians would like to add, is not admissible as an ultimate value. There are some things which we would all die rather than do.

These are for me sufficient reasons for believing in God. God reveals himself to us by degrees. Knowledge of self and knowledge

of God proceed *pari passu*. Self-knowledge means self-transcendence. The self of the psychologist and of ordinary political and ethical theories is, as Ritchie says,[1] "a product of bad metaphysics and bad science." We may learn something from the Indians here. Our religion should deliver us from isolation, which is a terrible thing, and it is in and through God that we come to know ourselves, each other, and the world.

The classical four arguments, ontological, cosmological, teleological and moral, are somewhat under a cloud, but we cannot reject them as worthless, and something must be said about them.

The original form of the ontological proof was that the greatest object that we can conceive must exist, because existence is a necessary part of perfection. Every schoolboy can chuckle over Kant's remark that to have a hundred dollars in my mind is a very different thing from having them in my purse. But the argument was meant to refer only to our thought of God, not of a hundred dollars. Thomas Aquinas, as is well known, rejects the argument as sophistical, but in spite of his immense reputation only two of the schoolmen follow him in rejecting it.[2] Modern Catholic writers are shy of it. The Catholic doctrine is that belief in God is a "valid inference"; but that direct incontrovertible knowledge—what they call ontologism—is not to be claimed. Some of the Thomists possibly claim too much for logic and too little for inspiration. It is the nature of religious experience that we are in contact with something far beyond the categories of the understanding. "Thou criedst unto me from afar," says Augustine, "and I heard as the heart heareth." But it seems to me that the ontological argument, when rather differently stated, is valid and valuable. It is really one which Aquinas himself uses: *impossibile est naturale desiderium esse inane*. Our highest intuitions and aspirations cannot be in a conspiracy to deceive us. In every philosophy we reach a point where a man must trust himself. Strictly, the alternative is not impossible; it is only, to use a word which Lotze employs, intolerable. Pringle Pattison says very well: "that our ideals themselves should perish, that nothing worth existing should have any pledge of continuance or growth, that the world of values, in short, should have no relation to the world of facts—that is the one intolerable conclusion. Because it has nothing to do with any private hopes or fears, we feel that the refusal to entertain it is a judgment of objective validity."[3] The intuitive form of the argument is well developed by Lossky, the Russian philosopher.[4] Our minds when they are at their best turn to God; this is ground for a reasonable act of faith that God is not a will of the wisp.

[1] *Philosophical Studies*, p. 231.
[2] A. E. Taylor in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia*.
[3] *The Idea of God*, p. 45. [4] *The World as an Organic Whole*, p. 79.

The argument is easily combined with the mystical confidence in the inner light, and here it is worth remembering that the mystics did not regard this illumination as infallible; they warn us frequently against "the false light."

The cosmological argument from the "contingency" of the world to a first cause seems to me defective, though Taylor and others defend it. We should have to turn it and say not "because the contingent is, therefore the necessary being is," but "because the contingent is not, therefore the necessary being is." We have an almost instinctive desire to turn from the many to the one, from the part to the whole, from the doubtful to the necessary. This may be the source of the theory of a *nisus* already referred to.

The teleological argument, often called the argument from design, is treated with great respect by Kant, who calls it "the oldest, the clearest, and that most in harmony with the common reason of mankind." The word teleology should properly mean the science of the perfect, not the science of finality; it is not inappropriate to an organic view of processes. There has been an unending debate between the mechanical and the vitalistic theories of causation. It would be impossible in this short essay to give even a summary of the attempts made to establish one at the expense of the other, or to reconcile them. Between the mechanical theory that the whole is the product of the parts in mutual interaction, and the dualistic theory of intervention in the natural order by a supernatural power, comes the organic theory that the whole is ideally prior to the parts and causes the actions and reactions of which the mechanicists cannot give a satisfactory explanation. The Socrates of Xenophon uses the argument from design from the human standpoint. Plato does not encourage this argument; he pictures the Demiurge as bringing harmony out of chaos, partially imparted by natural "necessity." Aristotle does not greatly differ. He is contemptuous of the materialist atomists who ascribe the activities even of living beings to accident or chance. He believed in an immanent principle working towards an end; mechanism is the servant of teleology. This is an organic theory, but dominated by acceptance of final causes. Stoicism may perhaps be called pantheistic naturalism. "Necessity" is ubiquitous, as Democritus had said, but we must venerate the laws of nature as the laws of God. It has been said that Calvinism acknowledges only one Will in the universe. Calvinism is the Christian form of Stoicism.

Augustine makes history teleological; it is the method by which providence is to bring mankind into the City of God. This is a dangerous theory, which has led many in modern times to think that the course of events must be a progress from the worse to the better, and a progressive self-realization of an immanent Spirit.

Spinoza blames those who attribute natural phenomena, and

especially injurious events, to the will of God, and argues that an omnipotent Being cannot act purposively. But his *scientia intuitiva* recognises that the world which God has made must be good.

The Deism of the eighteenth century has now few supporters. Pope's *Essay on Man* assumes that the order of nature is ordained by God, and that all partial evil is universal good. "If plagues and earthquakes break not heaven's design, Why then a Borgia or a Catiline?" The argument of Bishop Butler's *Analogy* follows that line. It is fatally easy to turn it into an argument against natural theology instead of a defence of revealed religion. Here teleology is closely connected with the problem of evil, which remains to be considered. Voltaire's *Candide*, an ironical satire on the optimism of Leibniz, is a famous refutation of such superficial attempts to justify the ways of God to man.

Shaftesbury's aesthetic teleology is interesting as an argument for Theism from the beauty and perfection of the natural order. We cannot follow him in the complacency and confidence which we find in most writers of that cheerful period, when all problems seemed to have been solved; the appeal from the beauty of the world—and we may remember that industrialism had not yet disfigured the face of one of the most gracious parts of Europe—is quite justified. Plotinus had not forgotten Plato's belief that we may ascend from the contemplation of visible beauty to its invisible prototype. "What can be more beautiful," he asks, "than the world Here except the world Yonder?"

This is not the place to discuss the deistic school from Herbert of Cherbary to Toland and Collins. It has been unduly forgotten and disparaged, for the protest against resting faith on external authority only was sound enough. But whereas when the Cambridge Platonists said, "We oppose not reason to religion, for religion is most rational," they meant by reason *intellectus* not *ratio*, the Deists maintained that there is nothing "mysterious" in Christianity. In other words, they were rationalists who rejected Platonism and mysticism, and rationalism so interpreted easily becomes irreligious.

Attempts to reconcile mechanicism with teleology have been made by Kant, and especially by Lotze, who shows, in his own words, "how universal is the extent and how subordinate is the significance of the mechanical in the structure of the world." Without discussing this very difficult problem, I will suggest a few principles which seem to me important.

The existence of directive purpose, what Paley called prospective contrivance, in nature, as opposed to chance or accident, cannot reasonably be disputed. It is sometimes supposed that nineteenth century science was opposed to teleology. Nothing can be more untrue. Kelvin wrote: "Science positively asserts creative power.

There is nothing between absolute scientific belief in creative power and the acceptance of the theory of a fortuitous concurrence of atoms." Darwin wrote: "Our minds refuse to accept the grand sequence of events as the result of blind chance. The understanding revolts from such a conclusion." Francis Darwin said: "One of the greatest services rendered by my father to the study of natural history is the revival of teleology." Asa Gray said: "Let us recognize Darwin's great service to natural science in bringing back to it teleology." Huxley, too, recognizes that there is a wider teleology which is not touched by the doctrine of evolution, but is actually based on the fundamental proposition of evolution.[1] Divine power may be adduced to account for everything or nothing; it cannot be called in to account for some things and not others. Science cannot work with such a dualism.

Directive purpose is sometimes below, sometimes within, and sometimes above consciousness.

Purpose belongs to the time-series, within which God carries out His finite acts of will. In eternity there are no unfulfilled purposes.

The notion of a single purpose in creation is untenable. What connexion can there be between happenings on our planet and those on another inhabited world a million light years away from us? The universe was not created for our sakes. Every purpose is necessarily finite, with a beginning, middle, and end. An everlasting purpose is everlastingly frustrate. To say that God foreknows what is going to happen does not imply that it could not have happened otherwise. Foreknowledge is not the same as predestination.

The teleological argument has a real value against the notion that no *mind* is discernible in nature. I do not think we need be disturbed by recent opinions that the laws of nature are only statistical, and that in the ultimate elements of matter real indeterminacy may prevail. Planck warns us against the attempt to rehabilitate chance. But this argument does not lead us all the way to the God of religion, for nature's contrivances are not always beneficent; nature shows no signs of moral purpose.

The moral argument, which alone is fully accepted by Kant, is on a different footing, because moral obligation depends on one of the ultimate values, which stand in their own right, and are, as theists believe, a real revelation of the nature of God in relation to His creatures. No more need be said about it here.

We come lastly to the difficulties in the way of theistic belief. There are some questions which we cannot answer and must leave alone. We do not know why there is a world. We do not know the relation between the Godhead as absolute and the creation, though

[1] Alfred Noyes, *The Unknown God*, pp. 68 *seq.*

we must decisively reject the popular theory that God is "organic with the world" and has no reality outside that relation.

We do not know whether Space and Time, whether taken separately or together, are finite or infinite, or whether Kant's "antinomy" is in its nature insoluble. I am disposed to think myself that Space and Time in themselves have no qualities, being the warp and woof of the canvas on which we draw pictures of external reality.

We are unable to picture the eternal and spiritual world except under symbolic forms which we know to be inadequate and often misleading.

That the external world is sacramental, a "moving image" of the spiritual world, we believe; but how, if at all, do events in time affect—we may say alter—the world above time and space? They are not two separate worlds, but we do not fully understand the relation between them.

These are examples of problems which do not invalidate our belief in God, because they are plainly beyond our knowledge, and we have no claim to know things which do not concern us as human beings. But there is one great problem which does trouble us because we think we ought to know the answer to it, and we are not satisfied with the answers which are made. This, I need not say, is the problem of evil. There is no doubt that this is the great obstacle to faith in the minds of our contemporaries. It has become more urgent in consequence of the terrible events of the last thirty years, which have brought home to us, as never before, the extremities of human wickedness and human suffering which from time to time are disclosed on the pages of history. It will therefore be necessary to consider this problem at some length, though we shall not be able to offer any complete solution of it. To expose the inadequacy of some answers which have been given may make the nature of the problem more clear.

The problem has been stated plainly and candidly by Augustine. "Either God is unwilling to abolish evil or He cannot. If He is unwilling, He is not good; if He cannot, He is not omnipotent." Lucretius says that the world cannot be directed by divine power; it is so full of faults—*tanta stat praedita culpa*. Mill, in a well-known passage, refuses to call any Being good who is not what he means by good when he applies the word to his fellow-creatures; and if there is a Being who can send him to hell for not so calling him, "to hell I will go." And, he says: "in sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another are nature's everyday performances. Nature has hundreds of hideous deaths in reserve, such as the cruelty of a Domitian never surpassed. All this nature does with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and of justice."

But for whom is evil a problem? Science is morally neutral. It describes and sometimes tries to explain; but to justify the ways of God to man is none of its business. It is not a problem either for optimists or pessimists. The former is a barometer stuck at set fair; the latter is a barometer stuck at stormy. No sensible man would give sixpence for either of them. The optimist, we are told, is a man who would buy from a Jew and sell to a Scot and expect to make a profit; the pessimist is a man who of two evils chooses both. The former shouts with Browning, "God's in his heaven, all's right with the world"; the latter agrees with Schopenhauer that this is "a really wicked way of thinking, a bitter mockery of the unspeakable misery of humanity." From this latter point of view one might write a plausible essay on "The Problem of Good." Optimism and pessimism are largely temperamental. The optimist is usually satisfied not so much with the world as with himself; sometimes, however, he sings to keep up his spirits. The pessimist, if he is not neurotic, is a man who dislikes being disappointed; life for him may be a series of pleasant surprises. Different types of pessimism, due to very different causes, may be studied in von Hartmann, Leopardi, James Thomson, Cowper in his fits of religious mania, and Thomas Hardy.

Nor is evil a problem for the Manichean or Zoroastrian, for whom God and the Devil are pitted against each other in a never ending battle. Good and evil are equally real; "in yes and no all things consist." Reality is so constituted. For the theist evil is a problem, perhaps the greatest of all problems. Let us consider briefly the solutions which have been offered. "What we call moral goodness is a human attribute, and not a divine." God is not solely a moral Being; He has other interests which do not concern us. For morality, we are told, evil is unconquered; for religion God is supreme. No doubt this is true, and the distinction already insisted on between the God with whom we have communion and the Absolute must here be remembered. The outcome of this view is the complete resignation to a power which seems to be neither just nor merciful. This is the moral of the book of Job. But even this noble poem ends like a Victorian novel. The patriarch recovers his prosperity, and is consoled for the loss of his first family by the presence of the three ladies Dove, Cassia, and Eye-paint. Akin to this attitude is the proud submission of Stoicism and Calvinism. The pot has no rights against the potter. This creed does not discourage benevolence, but it does extinguish pity, which can hardly be felt by God, if He wills the existence of beings who are only unhappy means to an end which does not interest them. Stoical courage may end in Promethean defiance, like that of Bertrand Russell's *A Free Man's Worship*.

The most terrible aspect of this treatment of evil is not as an explanation of earthly suffering, to which a brave man may steel

himself, but in the acceptance of an eschatology which outrages our feelings of what we have a right to expect from a God who has revealed Himself as love. We are sometimes amazed to find in Christian casuistry no mention of cruelty among the deadly sins. But such as men are, such will God appear to them to be; and the converse is equally true. Dante has no doubt that divine "love" created his horrible inferno, for the inmates of which "there is no hope of death." *Questi non hanno speranza di morte.* Christian apologists must not extenuate the appalling evils wrought by the doctrine, held with equal determination by Catholics and Protestants, that an immense number, probably the majority of mankind, are doomed to an eternity of unimaginable torture. St. Thomas Aquinas thought that the spectacle of these torments will augment the happiness of the saved; Peter Lombard says the same; Jonathan Edwards says: "the view of the misery of the damned will double the ardour of the love and gratitude of the saints in heaven." "You cannot stand" (says this amiable divine) "before an infuriated tiger; what will you do when God rushes upon you in his wrath?" "God holds sinners over the mouth of hell like so many spiders; He hates them and will trample them beneath His feet with inexpressible fierceness." This dreadful fate awaits all who do not belong to the "true" Church. The Romish "popular catechism" of Cardinal Perrone says that Catholics who become Protestants "are damned irremediably for all eternity." Their virtues will not avail them at all.

I know that these doctrines may be supported from some passages in the New Testament; but I do not think that the future has been or can be revealed to man, and I do believe that Christ came to reveal God as love. In the Church of England, at any rate, these threats have withered away, and I am far from regretting it.

Traditional Christian eschatology is horribly cruel and unjust. Surely we are all "over bad for blessing and over good for banning." Such doctrines only aggravate the problem of evil. "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" is a question which rings through the whole of the Old Testament, and there can be only one answer to it. As regards future compensation for the ills of this world, we know very little; but surely both reward and punishment must be *in pari materia.* We cannot really picture beatified spirits living in a state of "solid comfort," in the words of a nineteenth century hymn, still less indulging in "the shout of them that triumph, the song of them that feast." And the penalty for being a bad man is to become a worse man, not to be baked in an oven. We can understand the wish of religious teachers to paint the choice between good and evil in bright and lurid colours, but I am convinced that these crude symbols do more harm than good. The Russian theologian and philosopher S. L. Frank says: "There is not the slightest need

for me to try and peep into the future of my soul after death, and this indeed is impossible, to say nothing of the fact that the word future loses all definite meaning when applied to what lies beyond the confines of earthly time. I know with complete certainty now that I am eternal."[1]

A favourite solution is that God is not omnipotent. He may be limited by spiritual powers of evil, who will ultimately be defeated (modified dualism), or obstructed by some intractable material, such as "matter." Or He may be only *primus inter pares*, partially dependent on the cooperation of souls, who according to some theories are co-eternal with Himself.

Those who believe that God is "organic with the world," and that He has no existence apart from the creation, are almost obliged to adopt one of these explanations. For the Christian, none of them is acceptable or necessary. We do not know how or why God created an imperfect world; we cannot expect to know. But it is plain that we have to live in a world of tension, forces pulling against each other, and that but for this strife, on which Heracleitus laid so much stress, we could hardly be moral or intelligent beings. In the spiritual life we can "ascend in heart and mind" to a higher plane of reality; but while we live here, "on our probation" as Christians say, we are combatants in the arena. As William Blake says:—

"Joy and woe are woven fine,
A clothing for the soul divine.
It is fit it should be so;
Man was made for joy and woe;
And when this we rightly know
Safely through the world we go."

Another expedient is to deny the reality of evil, which is said to be only negative, a *privatio boni*. We have mentioned the shallow assertion that all partial evil is universal good. We are reminded that a good picture contains shade as well as light, and it is suggested that what seems to us evil may enhance the beauty of the whole. This was urged by Soame Jenyns in his *Free Enquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil*, (1757): "The beauty and happiness of the whole depend on the just inferiority of the parts." The book is remembered now by the indignant protest of Dr. Johnson: "The author and Pope perhaps never saw the miseries which they imagine thus easily to be borne." There may, Jenyns thinks, be "numberless intermediate beings who have power to deceive, torment, or destroy us for the ends only of their pleasure or utility." Johnson replies: "Many a merry bout have these frolick beings at the vicissitudes of an ague,

[1] *God with us*, p 50.

and good sport it is to see a man tumble into an epilepsy, and revive and tumble again, and all this he knows not why. As they are wiser and more powerful than we, they have more exquisite diversions, for we have no way of procuring any sport so brisk and so lasting as the paroxysms of the gout and stone, which must undoubtedly make high mirth, especially if the play be a little diversified with the blunders and puzzles of the blind and deaf."

Idealists who believe in an immanent Absolute have argued that evil needs only to be supplemented and rearranged, in order to take its place in the universal order. This theory is hard enough to believe when we consider the undeserved sufferings—not of ourselves but of others. But when we are asked to regard moral wickedness as the mere negation of good, such a notion is quite opposed to our experience. Pope's chosen villains, a Borgia or a Catiline, were not merely imperfect men. Some of the worst men—we may choose, if we prefer it, Nero, Ivan the Terrible, or Goebbels, have not been nugatory characters at all. Whatever a metaphysician may say, a moralist must admit that disvalues are as positive as values. This does not mean that the bad have no redeeming qualities. Perhaps none is utterly bad. "Wickedness is always human, being mixed with something contrary to itself," says Plotinus. "To step aside is human," says Robert Burns. The mystics, as is well known, are agreed that at the centre of the soul there is a "spark which never consents to evil." Even Tertullian, who was no mystic, agrees that "there remains the original good of the soul, which is akin to it and in the true sense natural. For that which is from God is not so much extinguished as obscured. In the worst there is something good, and in the best there is something of the worst." This however does not imply that "all will be saved at the last," a belief which is condemned by our Articles of Religion, but is very widely held now, since many Protestants have virtually changed hell into purgatory in which they profess not to believe. A man may lose his soul, but not the soul which would have been his if he had not been a bad man. The "bon Dieu" whose métier it is to pardon everybody is not the God of Christianity.

I am inclined to think that all the Greeks, including the Platonists, made too little of the evil of sin. Their word *hamartia* means properly a bad shot. Purification for them was like scraping off the dirt from a statue. The real self is sinless. The later Neoplatonists thought that their master Plotinus went too far here. "If the will sins," they asked, "how can the soul be sinless?" Mystical philosophy tends to an ultimate monism, and is in danger of reducing happenings in time and place to an unreal phantasmagoria. This may lead to an apparent heartlessness in contemplating such disasters as are now troubling the world. "What matters it? The actors change

their masks; that is all." Our wounds cannot be healed so slightly as this.

The "offence of the Cross," which is "foolishness to the Greeks," as St. Paul says, points to a partial solution of the problem. Vicarious suffering, not vicarious punishment, is a law of life. If God is love, He must reveal Himself in the supreme activity of love, in self-sacrifice. We do not fall into the error of "Patripassionism" when we say that the self-sacrifice of Christ was the act of a Divine Being. If the most sublime manifestation of the Divine nature in relation to His creatures is not power or justice but love, this must also be our ideal. Our religion, unlike most of the higher religions and philosophies, does not promise to make us invulnerable. Love often hurts. Love makes no claims for compensation; love offers itself willingly. Nor must we make any demands for individual justice from God. The Christian regards it as a privilege to "fill up, for his part, what was lacking in the afflictions of Christ, for His Body's sake." There is no thought here of a forensic transaction. Rather, we discard altogether the monadism which regards the self of our surface consciousness as a "windowless" entity, like the atoms of Lucretius, *solida pollentia simplicitate.* Personality is an ideal; the self-centred individual is not yet a person. Plotinus himself says that the indifference of the soldier to death proves that the soul knows itself to be immortal. I think this is true.

It is a hard lesson. Even the holiest may for a moment think that God has forsaken him, and more often that God has forsaken the world. But in communion with God we rise above these doubts—St. Paul, who had little enough to encourage him in the heroic enterprise which made him a greater conqueror than Alexander, could rejoice in the confidence that "our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh in us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory, while we look not at the things that are seen but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporary, but the things which are not seen are eternal."

Alfonso the Wise, of Spain, once said that if the Creator had consulted him he could have suggested several improvements in the world. A loud clap of thunder prevented him from putting his plans on record. The world that we know is certainly not the kind of place which we should have made if we had had the choice. But life "as it organizes itself apart from God"—Bishop Gore's definition of what the New Testament means by "the world"—is not reality as God sees it, and as His saints have seen it. We have free access to the world of eternal values, which are at least as real as the world of stars and atoms. We have faith, which is the resolution to stand or fall by the noblest hypothesis, a venture which justifies itself as we advance in the spiritual life. We have hope as an anchor of the soul,

hope, often disappointed but never killed, since no pure hope can ever wither except that a purer may spring out of its roots. And we have love, in which, as St. Bernard says, God reveals Himself directly and not merely symbolically, love which is stronger than death, and the hierophant of the divine mysteries. "Now we see in a glass darkly"; but we may rise, if we are willing to pay the price, *ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem.*

DISCUSSION: (I) *Philosophy Without Science*

I. VISCOUNT SAMUEL

The appeal is often made to our philosophers not to disregard the conclusions of natural science, when relevant to their discussions. Everyone agrees that this is sound in principle. But not everyone acts upon it in practice. I have lately been reading Prof. A. J. Ayer's book, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*,[1] and have found it a striking example of the burden imposed on philosophy when matters properly belonging to physics and physiology are discussed in terms of logic and linguistics.

Prof. Ayer's treatise opens with a section entitled, "The Argument from Illusion." In an acute analysis, extending to over fifty pages, he recalls the many examples given by earlier philosophers to show that what we perceive are never "real" material things, but only "sense-data" within our own minds. Locke, Descartes, Bradley, and some contemporary thinkers are quoted. We are reminded of the straight stick standing half in water, which the eye sees as bent; the colours of leaves and flowers which may be different for one person and for another; the strange phenomenon of mirage; the case of a man whose leg has been amputated but who still sometimes feels a pain in its foot. Prof. Ayer treats these illusions, and the theory of "sense-data" based upon them, as matters for serious philosophic study. But if these and similar cases were given to a present-day scientist to examine, his answers would show at once that they give rise to no philosophic problem, and present no "argument." The whole of this ancient controversy fades away into nothingness.

As to the stick in water, the scientist could not fail to point out that the description is incomplete. We are not merely "looking at a stick." We are seeing half a stick through the medium of air, and the other half through the media first of water and then of air. Light-rays travelling from water to air are refracted; so that, while the stick is continuous, its image on the retina of the eye is discontinuous. The ordinary man, knowing little of light-rays, media and refraction, says that he sees a bent stick. When everyone becomes familiar with the facts about light transmission, no-one will give the matter a second thought.

We say that the quality of colour belongs to the leaves of a rose-bush, which are green, and to the flowers, which are red. But science tells us that those words—"quality," "colour," "green," "red"—are nothing more than convenient, and no doubt indispensable, means invented by us to describe or to account for our own sensations. They do not indicate anything that is in the object itself. What does reside in the object is the capacity to reflect certain wave-lengths of the spectrum of white light and to absorb the rest: the surface of the leaves of the rose-bush reflecting predominantly rays of the wave-length about 5,000 angstroms and the flowers about 6,500 angstroms.[2] (This would be the description in accordance with wave-theory; quantum-theory would express it differently.) When a normal human eye is in the path of a stream of these rays its receives impulses—through the retina and the attached nerves—which give rise to impressions in the brain that we term

[1] Published by Macmillan & Co., 1940.
[2] Or 1/20,000 and 1/15,400 of a centimetre.

"seeing something green," or "seeing something red." A "colour-blind person" —one whose ocular organ is abnormal—may not be able to distinguish between those two regions of wave-length; he is subject to the "illusion" that the leaves and the flowers are the same "colour."

Again, Prof. Ayer says that "when a man sees a mirage in the desert, he is not thereby perceiving any material thing; for the oasis which he thinks he is perceiving does not exist." But he *is* perceiving material things; only they are perceived in an unusual fashion—distorted or magnified or reflected. I have myself several times observed mirages in the deserts of the Middle East. The lakes that appear so realistic are reflections of the sky; and the supposed palms in the distance are magnifications of sparse groups of little stick-like plants, with tufted tops, in the foreground. Anyone who will take the trouble to read the page of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* which deals with Mirage will find that such appearances are the consequence of abnormal heating of the sand, causing the neighbouring air to expand; so diminishing its density and altering its "refractive index." The reasons, with diagrams, are given for the astonishing phenomenon that results. Any traveller may see it whenever the special conditions of landscape and atmosphere are present.

Ask any physiologist how it is that a man can feel a pain in his foot although it had been amputated, perhaps years before: he will explain that, normally, certain nerve-threads, running from the foot through the leg to the spinal column, convey to the brain, when there is some injury, a sensation of pain; this pain the mind has learnt by experience to refer to the foot. After that nerve-thread has been severed by the amputation, any irritation that may occur higher up in the body, but along the same nerve-path, will give rise to a similar sensation; and the mind, wrongly but naturally, will continue to attribute it to a now non-existent foot.

It is not surprising that in pre-scientific times philosophers, grouping such mistakes together, should have founded upon them an "Argument from Illusion," and have built up a formidable metaphysical problem of "Appearance and Reality." But it is surprising that nowadays thinkers should continue a discussion that is obsolete.

In a later section of the book,[1] Prof. Ayer examines the question of "sense-data" in connection with sounds. But he does not stay to consider what sounds actually are. Had he taken as his starting-point the fact that a human voice-organ, or a musical instrument, or whatever it may be, is so constructed as to be able to set up rhythmical vibrations in the atmosphere, and that the human ear is so constructed as to receive those air-waves and to transmit corresponding sensations through appropriate nerve-fibres to the brain, he would at once have realized that to discuss the matter as a subject for philosophic reasoning is beside the mark. The word "sound" like the word "colour," does not describe anything actually extant in the objective universe. It is one of our verbal devices for summing-up the total effect of some purely physical events—a series of electro-magnetic radiations, or air vibrations, or the like—when combined with a receiving mind and the sensory apparatus that serves it. Let the radio be left on in a room with nobody there, and there would no longer be any "sounds" in the room, only certain air-vibrations. A dictaphone left there might make a record of the vibrations, but it would not "hear" them. In the same way, there are obviously no "sounds" in a telephone wire which is transmitting a conversation: intermittent electric currents travel along the wire and actuate the diaphragm in the receiver, reproducing there the sets of air-vibrations which have emanated from the human voice and

[1] Pages 252–58.

have actuated the transmitting diaphragm, and the ear senses the new set of vibrations.

Apart from the ear there are no sounds. If human beings, and all other organisms, were deaf, it is plain that there would be no sounds; and if blind, no colours. Probably nature has many manifestations for which we have no words, because we are not aware of them, having no sense-organs able to detect them, even with the aid of lenses and electrical and other appliances.

The scientific approach gives us a simple answer to another of the problems which have vexed abstract philosophers—whether "sense-data" are each of them private to a single observer,"[1] or whether they are "public." The scientist would say that the electro-magnetic radiations of light or heat, the air-vibrations of sound, the minute material particles conveying odour, the inter-atomic attractions which make things "solid," and the like—all these are there for everybody; they would still be there "When there's no-one about in the Quad." On the other hand, the sensations of a mind, through eye, ear, nose or finger, are individual. At the originating end the events are common and public, and the same for everyone. At the perceiving end they are personal and private, and may differ according to idiosyncrasy.

To quote one other example: in the course of a chapter on Causality and Perception, Prof. Ayer examines a proposition, put forward by the late Prof. G. F. Stout, that in order to explain "causality" it is necessary to bring in the notion of "active tendency." "The illustration that he (Prof. Stout) gives to show how he would make use of this notion is that of a stretched bow. 'We say that there is a tendency for the bow to unbend.' " From this Prof. Stout ultimately deduced "the conclusion that 'it is required that mind shall through and through enter into the constitution of nature.' "[2]

Prof. Ayer does not accept this thesis; but he rejects it only after several pages of respectful examination; meeting Prof. Stout on his own ground, recurring to Hume's ideas on Causation, and treating the whole subject as one proper for logical analysis. Yet is it not clear that the problem presented by a stretched bow is simply an inquiry as to the nature of elasticity? Many substances possess that property, in varying degrees. Wood is among them; as we may observe every time we see the branches of the trees swaying in the breeze. The problem, being one of molecular arrangement and attraction, is for the physicist and chemist, and not for the philosopher. It has, in fact, been exhaustively studied by industrial chemists, particularly in relation to the molecular composition of rubber. The outcome has been the invention of synthetic rubber. Would Prof. Stout have held that a band of rubber, natural or artificial, stretched round a bundle of papers, exhibits some metaphysical "tendency" to contract, which is to be accepted as evidence that "mind enters through and through into the constitution of nature?" The case of the stretched bow is no different. To speak of a "tendency in" the bow is sheer scholasticism—very belated three hundred years and more after Francis Bacon published the *Novum Organum*.

When the question is asked, Do we perceive material objects directly?—the answer therefore must be, Yes; if by these words we mean what present-day knowledge tells us that they should mean. Material objects, we now know, are systems of atoms, organized into molecules, which form gases, liquids or solids; capable of emitting or reflecting electro-magnetic radiations or air-vibrations, and of attracting or repelling one another. And perception means

[1] Ayer, *op. cit.*, p. 2. See also pp. 153–61.
[2] G. F. Stout, *Mind and Matter*: and "Mechanical and Teleological Causation," *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Proceedings*, 1935. Quo. A. J. Ayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 186–99.

that a mind is affected, whether consciously or unconsciously, by such material objects.

On all these matters Prof. Ayer appears ultimately to arrive at much the same conclusions as the scientific approach would have led to[1]—but at the cost of how much mental labour, after the fatigue of how many circuitous wanderings! It is surely a mistake to pay attention to the speculations of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers, and none to the discoveries of nineteenth- and twentieth-century scientists; to write on "The Constitution of Material Things" and "The Elementary Construction of the Material World," as if Dalton, J. J. Thomson, Rutherford, Max Planck, and Niels Bohr had had nothing significant to tell us on those subjects. It is as though astronomers of the Ptolemaic school, who had for centuries been engaged on immensely complicated calculations of the movements of the planets and the stars, based on the assumption that all the astral bodies were being carried by "spheres" which revolved around an immovable earth—as though they had persisted with such labours for centuries more, after Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler had proved that the assumption was false; that, in fact, the astronomer himself, with his mind, his eye, and his telescope, was being whirled around, relatively to the planets and stars, on a globe that revolved daily on its axis and yearly round the sun.

This line of approach brings us to the conclusion that the true dichotomy is not between appearance and reality, as the idealist philosophers have presented it; nor yet between ideas and matter. It is rather between the material universe as related to ourselves, and the universe not so related.

There is a single physical universe constructed of atoms and their constituents, radiations, and gravitational forces—that is, of energy. Our bodies are an integral part of it. For us the universe is full, for example, of "solid" objects: that is to say, it contains systems of molecules so closely coherent that they exclude other such systems—our bodies among them. Or, as commonsense says—more simply, "it doesn't do to run your head against a brick wall." Yet we may sit in a room listening to a self-contained radio set with no outside aerial, and we realize at once that the broadcasting rays are passing through the brick walls, so solid relatively to our bodies, almost as though they were not there. Whenever we draw back our curtains in the morning we see that the window-panes are both solid and not solid—solid for ourselves, or the birds or the bees, and not solid for light-rays. Indeed, during all the centuries that men have known the use of glass they have had the clue to the whole matter literally before their eyes, if they had only known.

If I am asked whether this is anything better than a philosophy of naïve realism, I would answer—it is realism, but not naive realism. It is realism corrected by the observations and experiments, discoveries and verifications of science.

Yet this is not to assert that science is now able to give us an answer to the whole of our problem about perception. Far from it. Science, most helpfully, takes us part of the way—and then stops. It shows us (though indeed with some gaps in the explanation) sequencies such as—sun-rays, reflection of selected wave-lengths from the surface of objects, transmission through the eye, minute electric currents passing along the attached nerves, effects upon the cells in a particular area of the brain-cortex. Mind then takes over from brain. But what that last process is, science as yet can offer no explanation. It stops at the most exciting part of the story. It cannot even promise "Another thrilling instalment in our next number."

[1] For example, see *ibid.*, pp. 26, 57.

Sir Charles Sherrington, who has pushed exploration in this field farther than any man, in his great book, *Man on His Nature*,[1] says: "Reference to the brain at present affords little help to the study of the mind. Ignorance of the 'how' of the tie between the brain and the mind there makes itself felt. That is no fault of those who study the mind or of those who study the brain. It constitutes a disability common to both of them. A liaison between them is what each has been asking for. That there is a liaison neither of them doubts. The 'how' of it we must think remains for science as for philosophy a riddle pressing to be read. . . . So our two concepts, space-time energy sensible, and insensible unextended mind, stand as in some way coupled together, but theory has nothing to submit as to how they can be so. Practical life assumes that they are so and on that assumption meets situation after situation; yet has no answer for the basal dilemma of how the two cohere." And in his Rede Lecture, *The Brain and Its Mechanism*,[2] Sherrington was constrained to say, "Strictly, we have to regard the relation of mind to brain as still not merely unsolved, but still devoid of a basis of its very beginning."

As he says, philosophy can do no better. In the final phase in perception, when mind takes over from brain, you may say if you choose that mind is dealing with "sense-data" created for it by the percipient organs, including the relevant part of the brain. But to use that term does not appear to add anything or clarify anything.[3] It makes no difference, of course, to what is going on, and it brings us no nearer to an explanation. So long as this is so, it would appear that there is a second dichotomy to be studied. Not only are we obliged, by the requirements of our nature, to consider the material universe sometimes as it is relatively to ourselves, and sometimes as it exists—and has existed for untold aeons—irrespective of ourselves. We must also realize that there is a mental element, strangely mixed up with that material universe, but, so far as we can tell, not identical with it.

Philosophy certainly can find no answer to the brain-mind problem by going to the other extreme; by adopting the scientific approach with so much fervour as to believe, as an article of faith, that the solution is sure to be found some day in a perfected physics and chemistry. That is materialism—surely of all generalizations the crudest and least likely to be true. Watch a chess-player, cogitating for half-an-hour whether to move his queen here or his bishop there—is there any possibility that his reflections and decisions are the product merely of electric impulses and molecular combinations? Or consider the working of your own faculties as you read and think over a paper such as this: not all the Pavlov experiments on the flow of saliva in the mouths of hungry dogs will convince you that the opinions you may form as to its value or non-value are the outcome of conditioned reflexes. Biophysics and bio-chemistry may indeed help us on the way. But it is the Bios that is important here. And what do we mean by Bios?

Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies,
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but *if* I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

[1] Cambridge University Press, 1940, pp. 240, 350. [2] *Ibid.*, 1933, p. 32.
[3] Prof. Ayer agrees that it does not add, but thinks that it may perhaps clarify. (*Op. cit.* p. 57.)

PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT SCIENCE

II. Professor A. J. AYER

Lord Samuel takes me to task for writing a book on the philosophical problems of perception, without paying sufficient attention to the discoveries of modern physics. He thinks that these discoveries have made it unnecessary for philosophers to go on bothering their heads with questions of logical analysis. Let them go to school with the physiologists, and then devote their energies to the unsolved problem of the relation of body and mind.

My answer to this is that Lord Samuel has clearly failed to understand what the philosophical problems of perception are. In dealing with the argument from "illusion" for example, he assumes that the philosopher is puzzled to account for such phenomena as the appearance of the bent stick in water or the pain felt in an amputated leg, and he remarks, quite correctly, that the scientist has a satisfactory explanation for them. But this is not the point at all. The philosopher dwells upon these cases of illusion, not because he is at a loss to explain them, but because they are held to refute the philosophical theory of Naïve Realism. Whether they do refute it is a matter for discussion, and I have sympathy with those, like Lord Samuel, who find such discussion laborious. But the labour cannot be avoided by a mere appeal to scientific text-books. For the discoveries of scientists are themselves based upon sense-perception. If perception were not a source of knowledge, there would be no reason to believe in any scientific hypothesis. Now I agree with Lord Samuel that we are justified in accepting the scientific picture of the external world. But how we are so justified, and what this acceptance logically involves, are philosophical questions of a quite different order from those that the scientist is concerned to answer. Lord Samuel makes the mistake of looking on the philosopher as an amateur scientist; and accordingly rebukes him for not having turned professional. If he did he would be able to give a much more up-to-date description of nature. But that is not his object. A philosophical "theory" of perception is not a theory at all in the scientific sense. It is not used in the same way as a scientific theory: it does not enable us to make any predictions that we could not have made without it. Its function is to bring out and evaluate the implications of the scientific account of the external world and of the common-sense account which, in trusting his instruments, the scientist presupposes. And since this is a question of logic and not of physiology or physics, I maintain that the proper technique for handling it is that of logical analysis.

The dangers of forsaking logic for physiology are well manifested by Lord Samuel's paper. He says of his own philosophy that "it is realism, but not naïve realism": but in fact it is not realism, and it is naïve. For I take it to be characteristic of any realist account of perception to hold that material things are directly perceived. And while Lord Samuel says that he holds this, he at once goes on to explain that what he means in this context by the word "directly" is "indirectly." According to him, the sounds and colours which we directly perceive exist only in our own minds: "the word 'sound' like the word 'colour' does not describe anything actually extant in the objective universe." Material things are "systems of atoms," and if we talk of perceiving them, what we must mean by this is that they "affect our minds" in a certain fashion. But this is to say that we do not directly perceive them. Our knowledge of them is, on this theory, wholly inferential: they are treated as the hypothetical causes of our sensations and it is held that our sensations do not themselves reveal to us the existence of an external world.

In short Lord Samuel holds a causal theory of perception. Except that he is more knowledgeable about the atom, his view is the same as that of the

seventeenth century philosopher, Locke, and it is open to the same objections. For what reason can he possibly have for believing in the existence of these physical causes which *ex hypothesi* are never themselves observed? If his senses inform him only of what is going on in his own mind what evidence can he have that anything exists outside it? The scientific theories in which he puts his faith are supposed to be verified by sense-experience: but if his interpretation were correct they would not be capable of being verified at all. Lord Samuel reproaches me with paying too much attention to the views of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers. But I think that he might have avoided some of the weaknesses of his own position if instead of stopping short at Locke he had considered the arguments of Berkeley and of Hume.

In rejecting the causal theory of perception, I do not wish to imply that the physicists and physiologists do not give a true account of the causes of our sensations. The question at issue is how their account is to be interpreted. And it is here that Lord Samuel seems to me naïve. For he assumes that science gives a strictly literal description of an external world: and then he finds himself with two worlds on his hands, a supposed external world of scientific objects which are made inaccessible to direct observation, and our everyday world of perceptual objects which is thrust back within the mind: and in this way he makes the question how we ever come to know the truth of any scientific proposition unanswerable. It is no wonder, therefore that he is perplexed by the problem of the relationship of matter and mind. But had he been less contemptuous of logical analysis, he might have seen that the acceptance of scientific hypotheses about the causes of our sensations does not entail accepting a causal theory of perception. These scientific statements are at a different logical level from common-sense perceptual statements, and at a different level again from statements about sensations. Consequently the sense in which they refer to "objects" is different. They do not refer directly to phenomena, but this does not mean that they describe a mysterious realm of scientific objects, literally existing "outside" phenomena. The world of the scientist is a rational construction, which furnishes a means of correlating phenomena, and the scientific account of the causes of our sensations is itself an instance of such a correlation. There is thus no problem about the relationship of different worlds, common-sense and scientific, or mental and physical, or whatever the dichotomy may be thought to be. All empirical statements refer ultimately to phenomena, but they refer to them in different ways. How they do so is a question for analysis. And it is this, rather than the compilation of a scientific encyclopaedia, that seems to me the proper undertaking of philosophy.

III. Professor HERBERT DINGLE

I have been asked to comment from the scientific point of view on the foregoing papers by Lord Samuel and Professor Ayer. I willingly do so, but I must say at the beginning that there is unhappily no unique "scientific point of view" on these matters, the philosophies of scientists being far more diversified than their practice. This, I think, is due less to considered differences of belief than to indifference to belief. The average scientist knows from his training how to go to work, and he does so competently and critically and produces results of value; but if he is asked what ultimate significance is to be attached to the results which he produces he either refuses to answer or else replies in terms of a naïve realism which he has acquired not from his science but un-

consciously from his ordinary everyday life. There are some exceptional scientists, indeed, who do seek to formulate the philosophy implied by their practice, but while the views at which they arrive show some measure of compatibility they still differ too greatly among themselves to justify the use of a phrase like "the scientific point of view." It should be understood, therefore, that the views I express here are in the last resort only my own, though I think they would be acceptable in the main to some other scientists as well.

The main purpose of Professor Ayer's book was to consider the question whether our knowledge of the "external world" should be expressed in terms of material things or of sense-data, and he reached the conclusion that this was entirely a matter of convenience; "material things" and "sense-data" were elements of two different languages between which a one-to-one correspondence could be established. If you choose the language of material things you are faced with the problem of showing how sense-data are related to them, and if you choose the language of sense-data, which Professor Ayer himself found the more convenient, you must then construct material things out of such data.

Lord Samuel maintains that the matters into which Professor Ayer is led in his discussion have already been settled by scientific inquiry, and that no useful purpose is served by treating them as Professor Ayer does. His answer to Professor Ayer's question would be that the external world consists of material things, whose structure science has largely revealed to us, and that sense-data are the effects produced in our minds by the impact on them of physical emanations from these material things. How sense-data (or our consciousness of sense-data—the distinction is negligible) arise from the arrival of the last physical impulse at the proper set of brain cells is still unknown. It is this problem, and not the obsolete one of the nature of the external world, that should chiefly engage our attention.

Professor Ayer replies that Lord Samuel's theory of perception has already been refuted by philosophers, and the problem of constructing a better one remains. It is that problem that concerns him, and while he is prepared to accept the scientific account of things he is not satisfied with a naïve interpretation of that account. He regards the scientific world as a rational construction which furnishes a means of correlating phenomena, not as a description of a mysterious realm of scientific objects literally existing "outside" phenomena. Consequently there is a question left over as to the logical relation between scientific statements, ordinary commonsense statements, phenomena and so on, and that is the question to which he addresses himself.

I confess that my preference would be to let the disputants fight the matter out to a conclusion while I stood by and cheered, but I have a promise to redeem so I will first of all state my conclusion and then try to explain it. It is that I agree with Lord Samuel that Professor Ayer has overlooked the relevance of scientific inquiry to his problem, and my ground for that view is that I hold Professor Ayer's interpretation of the scientific picture and not Lord Samuel's. I have already expressed my attitude to Professor's Ayer's book in a review of it,[1] and do not wish to repeat myself more than is necessary. I will therefore begin by suggesting that his view (expressed in his reply to Lord Samuel but not, I believe, in his book—at least, not so explicitly) that "the world of the scientist is a rational construction, which furnishes a means of correlating phenomena, not a description of a mysterious realm of scientific objects literally existing 'outside' phenomena"—which I accept—is in-

[1] *Nature*, 147, 286 (1941).

consistent with the conclusion of his book that the languages of material things and sense-data are, apart from convenience, equivalent.

In any rational argument we must proceed from evidence to conclusion; if the reverse also were possible the argument would be circular and therefore irrational. Now sense-data are evidence for material things, but material things are not evidence for sense-data. If I say, "There is a star up there," I can properly be asked for evidence; and if I reply, "I see a point of light, I hear my friend say that he also sees one, and when I photograph that region of space I see on the plate a small dark circle" (in other words, "I have certain sense-data") my statements are relevant, whether or not they are conclusive proof. But if I am asked for evidence for my statement, "I see a point of light," and I reply, "I see it because there is a star up there," my reply is not relevant because I can be immediately asked, "How do you know that there is a star up there?" and I can only give the circular answer, "Because I see a point of light." In short, we accept sense-data as primary, as data in fact, but we do not accept material things as data but as inferences (or constructions), which may be right or wrong (or useful or futile). Consequently Professor Ayer's conclusion that material things and sense-data are logically equivalent seems to me irrational. Whatever the relation between them may be it is uni-directional, irreversible, unsymmetrical—choose your own term. One must come before the other, and in a rational construction that one is sense-data.

If this be granted, we must regard all rational pictures of the "external world" as logical creations, and clearly various such creations are possible, between which—provided that they do, in fact, represent sense-data faithfully—our choice will be determined simply by the purpose for which we make them. Two dominate our thoughts at the present time, namely, what I may call the commonsense world and the scientific world. The commonsense world consists of material things such as chairs, stones, clouds, planets, nebulae, etc., distributed in space and enduring with a greater or less degree of permanence in time. The scientific world consists of electrons, protons, photons, sound waves, genes, the unconscious and so on, some of them eternally situated in various kinds of space. With these as ultimate constituents we build up our two worlds, and the world we work with on any given occasion is that most suited to our purpose on that occasion. If we are engaged in buying, selling, eating, drinking, playing, fighting and generally behaving as the highest of the apes, we adopt the commonsense world, and no one but an idiot would attempt to do otherwise. But if we are engaged in relating together as completely as possible the various sense-data that are our primary elements of consciousness, then the enormous success which the scientific movement has had in this effort, and the potentiality which it still appears to possess, indicate that we would be at least quixotic if at this time of day we adopted any world other than the scientific one.

I think that Professor Ayer might now agree with this, but my quarrel with his book is that in it he has not only adopted the commonsense instead of the scientific world when knowledge and not use is in question, but has also not recognized that the two worlds are so distinct from one another that the very meaning which we must attach to the word "sense-datum" is different in relation to the one from what it is in relation to the other. Before we can start to build the scientific world we must take sense-data in their most elementary form. Thus, the sense-data associated with what we call a piece of sugar are a white colour, a cubical shape, a weight, a hard feeling, and so on, and these, as primary data, are quite independent and distinct. But Professor Ayer's meaning of the word "sense-datum" in this connection would be something in which all these are combined—a complete representative, so to speak, of one per-

ception of the commonsense piece of sugar—and the way in which he constructs the sugar is to combine a large number of different perceptions—from different points of view, in different lights, etc., to use commonsense language—and extract something like the highest common factor. To this is given the name of a material thing, and it is regarded as a necessary element in every perception of the piece of sugar.

The scientific procedure is quite different. To begin with, it does not associate together the elementary sense-data involved in a perception of the sugar. On the contrary, it associates the white colour with other colours—the green of a leaf, the red of sandstone, etc.—into a field of study which it calls "optics," and it forms a conception of "light" as a means of correlating all the sense-data within that field. The cubical shape it associates with the round shape of the Earth, the conical shape of a tree-trunk, etc., into a field of study which it calls "geometry," and forms a conception of "space" as a means of correlating all the sense-data within that field. The weight it associates with the pressure of the air, the falling of rain, etc., into a field of study which it calls "mechanics," and forms a conception of "force" as a means of correlating all the sense-data within that field. And so on. The piece of sugar is not constructed at all, but all that went to the making of it is used more effectively (from the point of view of obtaining knowledge) in other ways. Perhaps the best-known example of this process is Newton's correlation of the downward motion of an apple with the elliptical motion of the Moon by means of the conception of "universal gravitation," the colour, shape, etc., of the apple and the moon having nothing whatever to do with the matter. All the conceptions so formed make up the scientific world, and in terms of these any particular sense-datum can be not only expressed but also related with any other in the same field of study, while still further research enables the initially separate fields of study to be amalgamated—as, for instance, mechanics with geometry in the theory of relativity.

When, therefore, Professor Ayer writes a book with the main purpose of resolving the philosophical problems concerning "our knowledge of the external world," and restricts his consideration to the relation between the commonsense world of material things and the not-inevitable associations of sense-data which make the construction of material things possible, he seems to me to be writing the play of *Hamlet* without the character of the Prince of Denmark. The commonsense world is merely the Bernardo of the play. It has served to introduce the problem to us, and should then fade out, for when we are engaged in knowing the external world rather than exploiting it there is no comparison between the effectiveness of the scientific approach, which in three hundred years has discovered so much, and that of the commonsense approach, of which the most imposing achievements during the preceding two thousand years were alchemy, astrology and the Ptolemaic system of astronomy. (I am speaking throughout, of course, only of the realm of sense-data, not that of other parts of our experience.)

I agree with Professor Ayer that he has a problem, distinct from that of the scientist, which is worthy of his attention. The scientist has to devise an external world that will represent the relations he finds between phenomena; it is not his concern to discuss the logical status of that world among the various concepts which the human mind creates, to estimate the scope and limitations of his method of procedure, or to pronounce on the implications, if any, of his findings in relation to human behaviour—to ethics, in a word. These are matters no less important than pure science, and they are matters with which the philosopher can properly be expected to deal. What can also be expected of the philosopher is that he should first acquaint himself with the true

character of the scientific achievement, and there is little evidence that he has done this. For one of the outstanding differences between the relation of percepts to the commonsense world on one hand, and that of elementary sense-data to the scientific world on the other, is that in the former there is, in the main, a direct relation between the material thing—a penny, say—and the various percepts of the penny, a relation which is quite independent of other percepts. We do not frame our concept of the penny to conform to percepts of the Hallelujah Chorus because the commonsense method of approach reveals no relation whatever between seeing a penny and hearing the Hallelujah Chorus. But in the scientific world things are entirely different. The concept of an electron is not related merely to percepts of an electron—it is, in fact, not related to them at all, because there are no percepts of an electron. It is related to sense-data in the fields of optics, electricity, magnetism, heat and so on, and the conception of an electron which a physicist holds is in part determined by phenomena in all these fields. In short, while the scientific world is derived from sense-data, there is, at the present advanced stage of development, no simple connection between a particular sense-datum and a particular scientific concept, and it is misleading to discuss the problem as though there were. It is necessary to take the scientific world as a whole and sense-data as a whole, and consider their relation comprehensively.

That this necessity is unappreciated even in the most enlightened quarters is shown in the clearest manner in Lord Russell's recent Henry Sidgwick lecture on "Physics and Experience" Unlike Professor Ayer, Lord Russell specifically takes the world of physics, and not that of commonsense, as his "external world," but he discusses it as though its relation to sense-data were the same as that of the commonsense world. He chooses, as an example, sound waves as the constituent of the physical world which corresponds to percepts of sound. Let me quote from my review[1] of that lecture.

> "It is undoubtedly right to say that the physical world is brought into being in order to account for the very dissimilar world of percepts, but it is much less accurate to say that a particular element of the physical world is brought into being in order to account for a particular percept. Sound waves were not postulated to account for hearing, for, in fact, they do not account for it any better than a hypothesis of sound particles would do. Sound waves are part of a much larger body of hypotheses formed to account for a much larger field of experience, including, for example, the connection between the 'velocity of sound' and the principal specific heats of the medium. If (as is by no means inconceivable since of the links in Lord Russell's causal chain from violin to percept the final one—from nerve disturbance to percept—is the one of which we know least, namely nothing) it should be found that the percept of hearing required sound particles rather than waves, we would not give up sound waves; they would still be needed to account for the specific heat relation, and we should probably picture something like particles carried by waves, as was proposed in the somewhat analogous dilemma concerning light. . . . The moral of all this seems to be that the construction or inference of the physical world from the world of percepts is such a complex matter, involving such an intricate network of connections, that the picking out of any single causal chain is highly artificial. Problems arising therefrom are arbitrary rather than inevitable. For instance, Lord Russell's original question: How can we infer from the world of percepts the very dissimilar world of physical objects? is at least a plausible problem, but the question: How can we infer from the

[1] *Proc. Phys. Soc.*, 59, 511 (1947).

perceptual Sun the very dissimilar physical Sun? in so far as the dissimilarity of premises and conclusion is conceived as involving a difficulty, is not even that. At the first step, from percept to nerve disturbance, the resemblance is completely lost, and if there is a problem it is rather why the physical Sun ultimately arrived at should have recovered rather than lost so much resemblance to the percept. But it is hard to see what can be gained in any way by analysing the network into separate threads."

To sum up, then, I repeat what I said earlier, that I accept Professor Ayer's view of the general character of the relation between the "external world" and sense-data in preference to that of Lord Samuel. Nevertheless, in spite of his disadvantageous viewpoint, Lord Samuel has, I think, properly identified the weakness of Professor Ayer's treatment of his subject, which arises from failure to appreciate the significance of the scientific achievement in relation to the problem of "our knowledge of the external world." The acumen and clarity which are evident throughout Professor Ayer's work would, if properly directed, have given us a really valuable book.

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(It may be of service to readers to remind them that according to Professor Whitehead's theory there are two *modes* involved in perception; (a) Primitive causal efficacy, (b) Presentational Immediacy; and that in the normal perception of colours, sounds, tastes, etc., the two modes are fused. Before coming to a conclusion in respect of the problem of Perception, students are advised to consult Whitehead's book on *Symbolism*.—Ed.]

DISCUSSION: (II) *A Study of History*[1]

The present reviewer lacks an indispensable qualification for judging an abridgment: he has not read the original. I can only say that I should not have guessed this work to be an abridgment if I had not known it to be so, and that I was inspired with confidence in the editor's care, skill, fidelity, and understanding.

I propose to review the book as though it were an original, and I hope the author will forgive me if I am sometimes betrayed into judgments which a fuller acquaintance with his work would have caused me to correct.

It seems to me an illuminating book. I don't think anyone can put it down without feeling that his eyes have been opened and his understanding widened; and if I concentrate in what follows upon certain fundamental problems which it seems to me to raise (on the bony skeleton, rather than on the flesh and blood with which it is clothed) I hope I shall not conceal the wealth of instruction and enjoyment which it offers.

Mr. Toynbee has set out to write a natural history of civilizations. There have been twenty-one civilizations in the world so far and his object is, from a comparative examination of them all, to discover the laws, if there are any, which govern the growth and decay of civilizations in general.

The new and illuminating thing about Mr. Toynbee's treatment is that although he adopts this method of natural history, he avoids some naturalist assumptions with which it has commonly been conjoined. Thus, for example, his standpoint has much in common with that of H. G. Wells, who sees human history as the latest chapter in the story of the evolution of life on this planet; but Mr. Toynbee sees clearly that human history is something more than animal life, and cannot be understood in purely biological terms. Again, his method has obvious similarities with that of the anthropologist; but he recognizes (and this is the starting-point of his whole investigation) that the twenty-one civilized societies which have appeared in the world in the last 6,000 years are not merely so many further examples of the primitive human societies which must have existed during the whole 300,000 years in which there has been human life upon the earth, and which still persist on some parts of the earth's surface. Civilizations are a different species of human society from primitive societies, and exhibit their own peculiar properties and laws. Mr. Toynbee is thus immune from the error of describing civilizations as though they were really only different forms of savagery.

Mr. Toynbee asks what is the genesis of civilization. Having shown convincingly the insufficiency of certain pseudo-biological answers[2], he gives his own solution, from a clue presented by mythology. Civilizations are brought into existence by the response of a people to a challenge. The challenge may be that of physical environment (e.g. the Egyptiac civilization was a response to the desiccation of Africa), but it may also arise from external enemies or from internal social problems. A civilization comes into existence when a people responds creatively to a challenge. The creative response is not the only response adapted to secure biological survival. The primitive inhabitants of Egypt, faced with loss of their hunting-grounds by the progress of desiccation,

[1] A. J. Toynbee: *A Study of History*, abridgement of volumes I–VI by D. C. Somervell. Pp. xii and 617. Oxford University Press. Price 25s.

[2] Pp. 51–9, 67–8.

could retreat southward into the monsoon belt, and preserve their accustomed way of life by escaping the drought. Some of them adopted this solution, and it secured them survival so effectively that their descendants are living on the Upper Nile still, exhibiting to this day a social development probably unchanged since that early migration.[1] But the creative response was that made by those other Egyptians who moved their habitat into the Nile Valley, subdued the jungle-swamps by the works of man, and transformed their own way of life from that of hunters to that of cultivators. The Egyptiac civilization sprang from this response.

In a growing civilization a successful response gives rise to a new challenge, and a civilization continues in growth so long as each new challenge evokes a creative response. Breakdown of a civilization comes when the creative response fails.

Mr. Toynbee speaks of his empirical method, but like all empirical methods, it rests upon assumptions. Perhaps the most important task for a reader is to draw these assumptions to light and to consider their truth.

His story of the rise of civilizations is conceived as an epic of the achievements of man. Man is the hero of the story—Man the Pioneer, Man the Conqueror of Nature, Man the Creator. The progress of mankind is an adventure like that of scaling a steep cliff (pp. 49–50). Between the Lower and Upper Paleolithic Ages "sub-man succeeded in turning himself into man" (p. 197). Each civilization which has arisen thereafter has sprung from the striving of mankind to reach the goal of human endeavour. "The geneses of all civilizations . . . . could be described in the phrase of General Smuts: 'Mankind is once more on the move' " (p. 51). Cultures, arts, sciences, and religions are "feats of human prowess" (cf. p. 93).

The essential thing about Mr. Toynbee's presupposition is that it is humanist and not theistic. He avoids the narrowness of materialism, but he will not admit the supernatural. Professor C. H. Dodd has pointed out[2] that there is a likeness between Mr. Toynbee's interpretation of history, and that of the Old Testament prophets. According to the prophets also, God's manner of dealing with peoples is through the challenge of an historical situation. The result depends upon their response. But the difference between Mr. Toynbee and the prophets is that for him the challenge is presented by nature (or by undirected historical forces), for them it is presented by God.

His rejection of supernaturalism shows itself throughout Mr. Toynbee's account of the growth of civilizations. The role of creator is ascribed throughout to man, not to God. Sub-man, as we have seen already, "succeeded in turning *himself* into man." The whole of civilization is due to an activity of creation, but it is man who is the creator. Even mystics, though their importance is exalted (pp. 209–16) are valued as "creative personalities," not as persons who are in touch with the supernatural. Even the Bible, which purports to be a revelation of God, is valued as a creation of man (p. 86), and the development of the "particular conception of God which is common to Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam" is described as one of "three great feats which stand to the credit of the Syriac Civilization" (the other two being the invention of the Alphabet and the discovery of the Atlantic).

The question presents itself whether this denial of the supernatural can be maintained consistently. Thus, for example, the discovery of monotheism is described as a "feat of human prowess" (p. 93) and is ranked as an "immense discovery" (p. 263). But where is the prowess if monotheism is not true? If God does not exist, how is it an "immense discovery" to come to believe that he does?

[1] P. 72.

[2] *The Bible To-day*, pp. 126ff.

But if God does exist, how much must that picture of the Ascent of Man be redrawn? It is not, as Professor Hodges has shown in a penetrating pamphlet,[1] that we shall be called upon to reject any of the conclusions of physical science, or of the theory of evolution or of historical research. But if God made both man and the nature which man has conquered, if he both presented the challenges and equipped man with the resources with which he has been able to meet them, and has stood at man's elbow throughout the course of his struggle, then it looks as if there has been some naïve braggadocio in the story which man has told of himself. He is more truly to be thought of not as a pioneer, but as a child. According to the naturalistic view "man is a being of great intelligence and power; he explores nature, he makes himself, he is constantly reaching out into the unknown. But on a Christian view the context is wider. As man develops away from unreflective instinct he moves not into unknown territory, but towards a higher power which was there from the beginning, and from which all intelligence and power are derived. He is not so much a pioneer as a child learning to know his parent."[2] And if God created nature, man has been wrestling not only with nature, but in a sense with God also all the time. A child trying to negotiate haphazard impediments in its path is wrestling with nature; but if the impediments have been placed there by his parents to develop his resource, they serve as a point of interaction between their will and his.

It would be a false contrast to say that whereas the humanist attributes genesis and growth of civilizations to man's efforts, the Christian attributes them to God's effort. The Christian may well hold that all the civilizations which exist or have existed have been to a large extent products of man's own efforts and he may agree entirely with Professor Toynbee's account of their origin and growth. After all, it is the Christian doctrine that man has "usurped the place of God in an endeavour to order his own life after his own will" (W. Temple), i.e. that he has done exactly what Mr. Toynbee's account describes him as doing. He will differ from the Humanist in the way he judges their growth, and especially their subsequent disintegration. The Humanist thinks man is right to rely on his own efforts, and that he is fulfilling his true nature in his conquests and successes. When these give place to decay and failure, he is driven to the despair which is beginning to be the prevailing temper of our times. The Christian thinks that it is an error for man to rely on himself since he was made to rely upon God; and that all that he achieves by his own efforts will bear the marks of this fundamental error. All civilizations so far achieved come in this category. He does not therefore regard their destruction with quite the same eye as the Humanist. For the Humanist a decay of civilization represents a defeat of mankind when engaged upon his proper task; and it leaves him alone among the ruins in an alien universe. To the Christian it is the failure of an enterprise in which man's energies were misdirected; and it leaves him among the ruins, but still in God's hands, and perhaps nearer to the true goal for which he was destined.

Let us turn to Mr. Toynbee's account of the breakdown and disintegration of civilizations.

In a growing civilization the creative response has always been the work of a minority within a people. The masses conform by *mimesis*, subdued by the charm of the superior. Their conformity is not imposed by force, but adopted through attraction; which uncivilized peoples on the frontier also feel, and admire and imitate.

When the creative power fails, force takes the place of charm. The creative

[1] *The Christian in the Modern University*, pp. 11–13. University Pamphlets, S.C.M. Press.
[2] Hodges, op.cit. P. 12.

minority, no longer creative, becomes a dominant minority, and imposes its power upon the masses both within and without its borders. The masses feel themselves increasingly alienated, and come to form an internal and an external proletariat. The standard pattern of disintegration is a horizontal schism which splits a society into the three fractions of dominant minority, internal proletariat, external proletariat.[1] Each fraction then creates its characteristic institution: the dominant minority a univeral state; the internal proletariat a universal church; the external proletariat makes a hostile appearance as barbarian war-bands. The formation of a universal state represents a rally by the dominant minority to arrest the processes of disintegration (as the Roman Empire arrested the decay of the Graeco-Roman civilization). Hitherto it has never succeeded in arresting them more than temporarily (the Roman Empire succumbed at length to the sapping of its energies by the internal proletariat, which produced the Christian Church, and to the pressure of the barbarians upon its frontiers).

The same question which we raised before presents itself more strikingly when we consider Churches. Let us accept all that Mr. Toynbee tells us of their origin, that they arise when civilizations disintegrate, and draw their membership initially from those (the proletariat) who have ceased to feel the attractive power of the civilization. It will still make a great deal of difference whether we regard the church as a natural or as a supernatural society. If the former, then it is nothing but a sociological phenomenon symptomatic of decay. But those who hold that a Church is essentially a society related to a supernatural reality, though they may accept the account of historical origin, may give a different interpretation of it. They may say that peoples, like individuals, have commonly been found to turn to God when success in this world has been denied them, or has turned to ashes in their mouths. If this is so, then the Church, though it may arise from the disintegration fo a secular society, will be something more than merely a symptom of disintegration, and may have a value which the secular society missed.

I do not know where Mr. Toynbee would take his stand in face of this question. There are passages which seem to treat the church as a merely sociological phenomenon. The early Christian Church, e.g., is described as "the Syriac wing of the internal proletariat of the Hellenic world" (p. 452), Christ is a "Galilean Jewish prophet" (p. 485), and in the section entitled "The Sense of Unity" (pp. 495–505) it is explained how the belief in Monotheism arises as a psychological response to the phenomena of disintegration. Indeed, I cannot help thinking that this notion is really implied in Mr. Toynbee's initial conception of his task. To set out to write a natural history of human societies assumes that human societies are natural phenomena.

But statements in other places imply quite a different conclusion. In the same section last cited, there is a reference to "the profound and elusive *truth* of the unity of God" (p. 505. My italics). If the unity of God is a truth, then the development of monotheism is set in quite a different light; for whatever psychological and sociological causes may have co-operated in producing the belief that God is one, there will now be besides them another ground which must in some way have contributed to it, namely the fact that God is one. Further, a society or Church, which is based on a monotheistic belief, *if we grant that that belief is true*, can no longer be explained as a product merely of historical causes, for its belief brings it into relation with a supernatural reality.

Other passages, especially in the latter part of the book, tend to a similar

[1] P. 368.

conclusion. "The only society that is capable of embracing the whole of mankind is a superhuman *Civitas Dei*: and the conception of a society which embraces mankind and nothing but mankind is an academic chimera" (p. 496). "The Jews made the . . . . tremendous discovery of the existence of the Kingdom of God" (p. 522). (This idea is described as that of a Kingdom which "is not in time at all but is in a different spiritual dimension, and . . . . just by virtue of this difference of dimension, is able to penetrate our mundane life and to transfigure it") (p. 525).

These fragmentary excerpts do no justice to the passages in which the nature of religions, especially of Christianity, is treated with much penetration and it seems to me, with much truth, but they may perhaps illustrate the point of view from which these subjects are treated. This treatment implies a judgment about Churches quite different from anything which the beginning of the book prepared us for. It is not merely that the Churches are found to be creators of cultures higher than those attained by the secular civilizations, and must therefore be regarded as something more than phenomena of decay; it is that a Church is found to be in its essential nature not a creator of culture at all, but a society dependent for all the value that it has upon a real supernatural being. A monotheistic faith is not a cultural product, which entitles its holders to be ranked among creative civilizations; it is a recognition of truth, which puts its holders at once into relation with something they have not created.

Mr. Toynbee himself raises the question "whether Churches can really be comprehended in their entirety in the framework of the histories of the civilizations in which they make their historical appearances, or whether we have not to regard them as representatives of another species of society, which is at least distinct from the species 'civilizations' as these latter are distinct from primitive societies?" (p. 368; cf. particularly pp. 530–31 and ch. xxii), and defers its discussion to later volumes which are still to appear. It is premature, therefore, to canvass his final opinion on this topic. But I think it is clear that there has been a development in his views within the compass of the existing work, and that the earlier part would have been conceived differently if it had been written in the light of the later.

Mr. Toynbee seems to me to be at his subtlest and best in the long chapter XIX entitled "Schism in the Soul." He sketches there the alternative ways of behaviour, feeling and life which are developed in disintegrating societies as substitutes for the happy integration of soul which they enjoyed in the period of growth. The four alternative ways of life (pp. 505–30) are entitled Archaism, Futurism, Detachment, and Transfiguration. The first three are all attempts to escape from the present, Archaism into the past, Futurism (which includes all secular Utopianisms and is exemplified in the Jewish Zealots of New Testament times and in modern Marxism) into the future. They are both "attempts to break away from an irksome present by taking a flying leap out of it into another reach of the stream of time without abandoning the plane of mundane life on earth"; and they "resemble one another in being *tours de force* which prove, on trial, to have been forlorn hopes" (p. 515). The way of detachment is an attempt to escape from the mundane order altogether. It has been practised by the Stoic philosophers of the West and, more ruthlessly, by the ascetic disciples of Buddha in the East. This way also is pronounced to be a *cul-de-sac;* only the fourth way, that of transfiguration, leads right onward (p. 530). The way of transfiguration is a way of withdrawal indeed, but of withdrawal in order to return. It is the discovery of a kingdom, the Kingdom of God, which is "not . . . . a dream of the future, but . . . . a spiritual reality interpenetrating the present" (p. 529). Mr. Toynbee traces the development of this conception through the gradual recognition by the Jewish

people of the bankruptcy of Futurism, until it was finally realized in Christianity (p. 520–6).

Consideration of this passage seems to me to throw some doubt upon the method of investigation which the author began by adopting, and I should like to conclude by a few remarks on this point.

Mr. Toynbee set out to write a natural history of civilizations and to employ the methods proper to natural history. These are to distinguish the various species of the creatures to be investigated, and by examination of instances to establish the specific characteristics and general laws of behaviour of each species. The subject-matter of Mr. Toynbee's study being human societies, he distinguishes the two species, primitive societies and civilizations, and sets out to establish generalizations about the latter by investigating the behaviour of its instances. (He finds reason in the course of his study to distinguish a third species of society, namely Churches.)

The question is whether the method of generalization is appropriate to this subject matter. The first thing which may lead us to doubt it is that the instances of the species to be studied are so limited in number that they can be counted. In the natural sciences, in which generalization is normally employed, we are accustomed to expect each species to have an indefinite number of instances. Primitive societies, of which there must have been thousands, are numerous enough to make us feel that the method can be naturally applied to them; but we feel a certain premonition of oddity when it is applied to a species of which we have counted all the instances to date, and have found them to total twenty-one.

This oddity shows itself in a more striking form when we come to the disintegration of civilizations. For example, we have related how Archaism, Futurism, Detachment, and Transfiguration are presented as four alternative forms of reaction against a socially disintegrating world. If we are to remain true to our method, we shall regard these as four species of escape, and shall expect to find each exemplified in a number of historical instances. We do in fact find several instances of each of the first three, but of the fourth, transfiguration, it appears that there is one instance only, namely Christianity. Thus Mr. Toynbee, in describing the saviours appropriate to each type of escape, presents his conclusions in the form of general laws: "The saviour-archaist will try to reconstruct an imaginary past; the saviour-futurist will attempt to leap into an imagined future. The saviour who points the way to detachment will present himself as a philosopher taking cover behind the mask of a king; the saviour who points the way to transfiguration will appear as a god incarnate in a man." (p. 534). But in the profound short section in which this last alternative is treated (pp. 544–47), it appears that this law has received only one instantiation, namely in the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ. Are we to regard this as a general principle which for accidental reasons has had no more than one instantiation?

Further, the four methods of escape should be co-ordinate species, but are found to be related to one another in a different way than this; the first three, namely, are related to the fourth as the less perfect to the more perfect. "Three of them are *culs-de-sac* and . . . . only one, which we have called transfiguration, and illustrated by the light of Christianity, leads right onward" (p. 530). Mr. Toynbee's comparison of the different saviours, too, shows them as representing not merely different kinds of salvation, but different degrees of perfection. "This is in truth the final result of our survey of saviours. When we set out on this quest we found ourselves moving in the midst of a mighty host, but, as we have pressed forward, the marchers, company by company, have fallen out of the race. The first to fail were the swordsmen, the next the

archaists and futurists, the next the philosophers, until only gods were left in the running. At the final ordeal of death, few, even of these would-be saviour gods, have dared to put their title to the test by plunging into the icy river. And now, as we stand and gaze with our eyes fixed upon the farther shore, a single figure rises from the flood and straightway fills the whole horizon. There is the Saviour; 'and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand; he shall see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied.' " (p. 547). The saviours are not related to one another as different co-ordinate species of a general type, but as many, in varying degrees imperfect, to one perfect. This must affect the proper method of our comprehension, which will be no longer to elicit a specific type from consideration of particular instances; but rather to understand the imperfect in the light of the perfect (and conversely to gain a better understanding of the perfect from seeing the less perfect approximations to it—a thing which Mr. Toynbee's book is admirably adapted to help us to do).

Thus Mr. Toynbee himself quite thoroughly abandons the generalizing method of natural history when he comes to this stage of his work. But I can imagine a disciple of his who would be willing to surrender this later post-scientific phase of his master, and to justify his earlier method of generalization as applied to civilizations. "The appropriateness of the method," he might argue "is sufficiently proved by its success. Mr. Toynbee has in fact revealed most striking identities of pattern repeated in diverse civilizations; indeed they are so constant that tables can be constructed which exhibit their common structure. This being so, it is merely a verbal dispute to argue whether these similar instances can constitute a 'species.' What is a species, except a group of similar instances?"

I should sympathize with a great deal of this. I don't know what historians say about it, but I am sure no layman can read this work without being impressed by the recurrence of pattern which it exhibits in different ages and civilizations, (e.g. the pattern of Withdrawal and Return, pp. 217–40). But such recurrence of pattern may be indicative of other relationships than that of specific identity. Mr. Toynbee has given an example of this in his account of the saviours, who are related as forerunners to fulfilment. Mr. C. S. Lewis illustrates a similar relationship when he says: "In the Christian story, God descends to re-ascend.... In this descent and re-ascent everyone will recognise a familiar pattern; a thing written all over the world. It is the pattern of all vegetable life .... It is the pattern of all animal generation too .... Death and Re-birth—go down to go up—it is a key principle.... The doctrine of the Incarnation, if accepted, puts this principle even more emphatically at the centre. The pattern is there in nature because it was first there in God. All the instances which I have mentioned turn out to be but transpositions of the Divine theme into a minor key."[1]

I suggest that this notion may be extended from nature to history, and that recurrence of a similar pattern both in nature and in history may be a mark of what Mr. Lewis calls elsewhere the divine idiom. Similarly the works of an artist, throughout the various phases of his development from immaturity to his prime, will exhibit a certain recognizable identity of style throughout all variations. In virtue of this identity, these works *can* always be classed together as similar instances, and the common elements of their structure could no doubt be elicited and tabulated. But such a method of understanding would be less adequate than one which, mindful of the temporal order in the artist's production, traced the development of his style through the successive phases of his artistic life.

Similarly, although it may be shown to be possible to generalize about such

[1] "Miracles" Pp. 135–36.

historical phenomena as civilizations and Churches, it may still be true that this is a less than adequate method of understanding them. Suppose that the course of world-history is not, as the natural historian assumes, the unfolding of an indifferent, homogeneous, temporal back-cloth, against which specimens of civilizations are exhibited in an indefinite recurrence; suppose it is something more like a drama, which has had a beginning and a climax, and will have an end. In the latter case the various episodes will indeed exhibit a specific likeness to one another, since they will bear the marks of the same author's handiwork; but for their adequate comprehension something more will be needed, they will need to be understood in the light of the development of the plot.

The analogy of drama is in one respect a dangerous one. It suggests that the plot of history can be rendered lucid to the reason; that all that happens could ideally be seen to have its own necessity in the light of an intelligible theme; that the apparent contingency of historical fact is due only to the defect of our understanding. This view gives rise to those rationalizing "Philosophies of History," which are as suspect to professional historians as they are alien to Christian doctrine. But if we discount the analogy where it is false, if we insist that history is history and not drama, it may still be true that historical time falls into periods in a way analogous to that in which a drama falls into acts. It may still be true that the Incarnation forms such a turning-point that all that has happened after it belongs to a fundamentally different period from what happened before, (namely to the period between the Resurrection and the Second Coming).

Mr. Toynbee dismisses this as an absurdity in his early pages. "This dichotomy of historical time" (sc. into B.C. and A.D.) "is a relic of the outlook of the internal proletariat of the Hellenic Society, which expressed its sense of alienation from the Hellenic dominant minority by making an absolute antithesis between the old Hellenic dispensation and that of the Christian Church,[1] and thereby succumbed to the egocentric illusion, (much more excusable in them with their limited knowledge, than in us), of treating the transition from one of our twenty-one societies to another as the turning-point of all human history" (p. 38).

I think it safe to say that what Mr. Toynbee rejects as absurd is not especially the notion that the Incarnation should be the turning-point of history, but the notion that history as a whole should have a turning-point at all. But why is it absurd? It seems to be so only if you start with the opposite assumption, that of the natural historian namely, which seems to imply the homogeneity of time and its indifference to the phenomena occurring in it. But I am out of my depth and am unable to state the problem clearly. I will end by uttering two suspicious which I cannot substantiate. The first is that Mr. Toynbee has imported from the sphere of science an assumption which has now been superseded within science itself. The method which he professes is not only that of a natural historian but of a pre-Darwinian natural historian. The second is that in the passage about the Saviours which I have quoted earlier, he has himself moved implicitly to a different point of view.

M. B. FOSTER.

[1] It is not relevant to the argument, but surely this is an error of fact. According to Christian belief the coming of Christ marks the division between the dispensation of the New Testament and that of the Old Testament, not between the Christian and the *Hellenic* dispensations.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

THE crisis of the war, and of the values heightened by the war, is beginning to make itself felt in Italian philosophical thought. In a recent book by Antonio Aliotta[1] we see contrasted two modes of logic, and, depending on these, two ethics. The logic of abstract intellectualism, which is the logic of the natural sciences, is a construction that takes its rise from the instinct of conservation and the will to exercise power over things. From such a point of view individuality is of no importance: the things of nature are of equal value if they can satisfy certain of our needs in equal measure. This logic is doubtless legitimate if it is applied to things as interchangeable means, homogeneous in their instrumental utility. But the chain of means cannot be continued to infinity; a halt must be made at an end that has value in itself, and with regard to which alone there is sense in speaking of means. Just such an end is the personality, which is irreplaceable in value, and cannot and ought not to be treated as a thing.

Now, for the individual a different logic from that which derives from the will to conservation and to power is appropriate, and, according to Aliotta, it is the logic of sacrifice. This sacrifice is in the very essence of life, which goes ever beyond the individual towards a higher unity: it does not aim at its own conservation, but transcends it in the direction of the conquest of a higher form of life, which is realized through suffering and death. Sacrifice is not understood as an absolute annihilation of the individual in universal being: the logic of life is not indeed the logic of abstract identity. The higher forms are not realized by erasing the individuality of the lower organisms, but by making them participators in a higher life. That which dies is the egoistic being, the living for self of the individual, but the individual survives as an element in a vaster whole.

For the logic of quantity sacrifice is diminution of being; but in reality it is the conquest of a greater spiritual wealth, as is taught by Christianity, which, in the humbling of the individual in his surrender of himself, sees his elevation and enrichment. The will to power is betrayed in the spiritual poverty of an ego incapable of escaping from itself; it may deceive itself with the illusion of enlarging its dominion, but the value of the personality and of the end to which that power is directed remains qualitatively unchanged, however much the material domain may be increased. In sacrifice, on the other hand, the ego issues forth from its closed circle; its life-beat is multiplied in a thousand harmonious vibrations.

On sacrifice Aliotta seeks to base a complete ethic and a philosophy of religion. In order to support so vast a construction the idea of sacrifice naturally needs to be amplified, and the author in fact enlarges it to the extent of understanding creation itself as an act of sacrifice. God does not choose egoistically to enclose and exhaust in Himself all being and all power (in the quantitative sense) but limits His own being and His own power, in order to leave a possible domain for conquest by his creatures. Perfection does not exclude, rather it implies, the suffering of sacrifice, as the divine incarnation shows us.

[1] A. Aliotta, *Il sacrificio come significato del mondo*, Perrella, Rome, 1947, pp. 176.

Aliotta develops very profound considerations about this central nucleus of his thesis; nevertheless they do not succeed in making the mind of the reader oblivious to the fact that the basis of the whole edifice is too narrow.

What influences has philosophy undergone through the profound revolution that has been accomplished in the last few decades, and which is still in progress, in the field of the natural sciences and particularly of pure physics? This problem, which absorbs equally scientists and philosophers, is the subject of a small but compact volume by Antonio Carrelli, professor of physics in the University of Naples.[1] At the heart of his essay are the problems of quantum physics, of which the current solutions revolutionize the old deterministic conception of the world to which the science, and with it the philosophy, of the nineteenth century had accommodated itself. The principle of indetermination is, in particular, that which to-day most demands the attention of philosophers in as much as it demolishes one of the barriers that the philosophic tradition had created between the subhuman and the human worlds. Another barrier is that which epistemology had raised between the subject and the object of consciousness; and even in this barrier a breach is made by the quantum theory of the present day which shows that, in the microscopic grade, the subject influences the object by the very fact of observing it. We are therefore in the presence of an interdependence and relativity very different from that of traditional epistemology, which assumed the subjective origin of sensible qualities. Here, on the other hand, it is a question of the modification of the objective structure of atomic complexes, by the active intervention of the subjective instruments of observation.

Other philosophical revisions are necessitated by the new physical doctrines of space and time; still others by the final antinomy in which science contends between the wave theories and the corpuscular theories, neither of which succeeds by itself in giving a complete interpretation of the universe, though in their very opposition they necessarily alternate.

But, in spite of these recognitions, the conclusion to which Carrelli's book finally comes is that the fundamental lay-out of the great philosophical problems is not radically altered by the new orientations of the physical sciences. The successes obtained, he says, ought not to lead to mistaken intellectual positions. More cannot be obtained from science than science is able to give, and if the results are extremely important from a practical point of view they do not provide a solution of the fundamental problem, which we must always rediscover within. There is no element in this development of thought to modify the classical scientific process; it is only a somewhat more complicated science, but the process remains the same.

The reason for the limits that Carrelli assigns to the philosophical validity of the new scientific concepts lies in the fact that he attributes to science a pragmatic character, that is purely "economic," that leaves unprejudiced the ultimate meaning of things. But it seems to me that this view is in conflict with the partial conclusions which I have already indicated, which show that the results of scientific investigation, especially those of quantum physics, have a profound bearing on the very nature of things. On this account there would seem to be more coherence in Eddington's conception, which distinguishes the purely structural interpretation, given for example by the doctrine of relativity, which does not go beyond the limits of an "economic" description of reality, from the quantum interpretation, in which can be seen an effort by science to penetrate into the inner nature of things.

[1] A. Carrelli, *Limiti e possibilità della scienza. Considerazioni filosofiche di un fisico*, Bari, Laterza, 1947, pp. 133.

Finally, I bring to the notice of the English public a recent translation into Italian of the *Enneads of Plotinus* by V. Cilento.[1] Of the two volumes of which the complete work will consist, the first has been published, which comprises the first four Enneads, preceded by the life of Plotinus written by Porphyry. The work is important, not only for the accuracy of the translation, but also for the copious critical apparatus with which it is accompanied.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(*Translated from the Italian by Beatrice Allen.*)

[1] *Plotino, Enneadi, prima versione integra e commento critico*, by Vincenzo Cilento, Laterza Bari, 1947 pp. xvi, 461.

NEW BOOKS

Corrigendum.—Readers are asked to note that in the review of Bertrand Russell's *A History of Western Philosophy, and Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, in the last issue of PHILOSOPHY, by Professor C. D. Broad, reference to the English edition of this book was inadvertently omitted. Messrs. George Allen & Unwin have asked us to state that they are the publishers of this book throughout the world (ex. U.S.A.), that their edition was issued over twelve months ago, and that a reprint of over 30,000 copies has recently been distributed to booksellers.

Creative Man. The Romanes Lecture 1947. By the RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT SAMUEL, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L. (Oxford University Press. Pp. 30. Price 2s.)

This lecture, in consistency with the tradition of the Romanes Lectures, is addressed to a wide public. Touching on some of the main ills of the present time, it centres attention on the misuse of imagination. The writer shows, with a wealth of examples ranging from primitive animism to the superstitions and political mythologies of recent times, how prone we are to delude ourselves by hypostatizing abstractions. The most important examples are the teaching that the State is a "real entity" over and above the wills of its individual members, the personification of History and the submission of our lives to some "undefined supernatural force" or over-riding Destiny, and the notion of an Economic Man, the latter being put forward originally as fiction and coming "to be treated as actual." Some of these fictions have their uses, but many have nothing to compensate for the confusions they engender, and they lead to grave disaster. "In religion, in philosophy, in politics, there is nothing more dangerous than a 'fable that hardens into a dogma,' or an illusion masquerading as an ideal" (p. 17).

This warning is extremely timely. But one wishes that the author could have made some reference to theological dogmas, such as the doctrines of the Fall and of original sin, which afford peculiarly telling illustrations of the main theme of the Lecture. The omission is all the more remarkable because the ideas of "universal sin" and the guilt of "man" in which all participate independently of any individual action is the cause of grievous confusion, not only in religious thought, but also in ethics and politics. They are also among the outstanding causes of the despair which Lord Samuel singles out especially as the main obstacle to the bold undertakings for which our present situation calls.

More serious than this admission is the proneness of the author to carry his point too far. He very properly objects to the notion that there is some Goodness or "The Good" distinct from particular good actions or good experiences. But that is no warrant for concluding that "values are human inventions." For all that the author shows to the contrary, the goodness which qualifies particular acts and experiences may be quite objective. Likewise, in denouncing the view that Space is an "entity," Lord Samuel is apt to suggest, although I am not sure that this is his real intention, that Space and Time are "purely mental concepts" and "not real elements in the universe."

On its more constructive side, the Lecture offers, in very brief outline, a theory of value based on "the elementary proposition that men in general desire their own welfare" (p. 23). Welfare "is built up from many interconnected elements," and experience teaches us what they are. "Experience shows that health is better than disease, comfort than penury, knowledge than ignorance," etc. But it is highly questionable whether experience can do this apart from independent judgments of value; nor is it easy to believe that a sufficient reason why men "should do right when to do wrong is pleasanter" may be found in sanctions imposed by society and "the pressure of public opinion." One doubts also whether such a view affords adequate protection to the individual. Does not Lord Samuel tend to revert surreptitiously to the oppressive theories which he himself deplores, when he concludes that "the creativity of man culminates in the Moral Law" (p. 25)?

But in raising these objections we must not be thought to stint our praise for the achievements of this important Lecture in respect of the more critical matters which are its main concern. H. D. LEWIS.

The Basis of Criticism in the Arts. By STEPHEN C. PEPPER. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1945. Pp. 177. Price $2.50).

Professor Pepper's book (composed of lectures given at Harvard, with an Introduction and a Supplementary Essay) is twice welcome. It offers to the art-critic a "reason of the hope that is in him"—a too-often blind hope that his criticism is something more than a subjective impression. And it helps the British philosopher—if the British philosopher will inform himself of this important subject—to see how a comparative study of critical aesthetic judgments can reveal the general metaphysical assumptions on which they are based, and can also reveal, perhaps, their need of fresh criticism, revision or reconstruction. This last, however, will have to be worked out by philosophers themselves (if so minded) for it is the application of philosophy to criticism which is the author's main aim.

This does not mean "the objectionable 'aesthetics from above' decried by Fechner." Of two evils, sheer impressionistic criticism is far less objectionable (it is at least facing empirical facts) than regulation-by-order emanating from metaphysical bureaucrats. But that impressionistic criticism can stand by itself is as much self-delusion as is the repudiation of all metaphysic by positivists. One must pre-suppose, and what one selectively perceives is determined partly by one's pre-suppositions. It is better to acknowledge pre-suppositions, to face them, to think them out and relate them to the empirical field, than to deny and repress them (which can cause, one observes, a whole ferment of chilly emotions). This thinking is metaphysics, and Professor Pepper, staunch empiricist though he is, is not afraid of them. The Professor is an empiricist; the definition of what is and what is not aesthetically valuable, is to be discovered only through constant consultation with competent and expert judgment, and if a definition does not fit this it must be modified or abandoned. Yet, the empirical aesthetic material once so defined (the author gives an interesting account (pp. 27–35) of the bearings of different types of definition), one's attitude to it will inevitably be affected by what Professor Pepper calls a "world hypothesis."

The *Introduction* refers to the four most considerable "world hypotheses" described in Professor Pepper's earlier book of that name. They are labelled *Formism, Mechanism, Contextualism, Organicism.* The first is derived from Plato and Aristotle: in aesthetics it stresses *normality.* Mechanism, of which Santayana is the best-known representative, puts first *pleasure* enjoyed within

the organism. *Contextualism*, the youngest of the hypotheses, as expounded by James, Pierce, Schiller, Bergson, Mead, Dewey, which is "operationalism in science, instrumentalism in logic . . . objective relativism in ethics and social theory," means in aesthetics that the more vivid and extensive and rich the intuition of *quality*, the greater its aesthetic value is. *Organicism* is objective idealism and its application to aesthetics was made in what Professor Pepper regards (most justly in my opinion) as a masterpiece—Bosanquet's *Three Lectures on Aesthetic.*

We are faced with an obvious difficulty at the outset. The four world hypotheses are *different*, and in important respects contradictory, hypotheses: how then can we get a single standard of criticism? Why not four? The answer is possibly severalfold. We can't help it, it might be much worse; the four world hypotheses are attempts to think connectedly about *all* the empirical evidence—so that in spite of fundamental metaphysical disagreements, there is a wider and better basis for criticism here than in mere *ad hoc* judgments. Again, the hypotheses are *hypotheses*, and challenging differences in their aesthetic implications might lead to their restatement and perhaps synthesis. Again, since the hypotheses are not final, it is quite legitimate to take what we can get of the several criticisms based upon them, emphasising different aspects, and to put them together. This is very effectively done in the final lecture, from which any critic, especially a literary critic, may learn much. Professor Pepper here applies each of the four methods in turn to two poems—one the sonnet of Shakespeare beginning:—

"When to the sessions of sweet silent thought"

the other a sonnet of Hopkins:—

"I wake and feel the fell of dark, not day."

The mechanist's evaluation will be in terms of the pleasures of the senses (sound, rhythm, etc.), of association, of design, of pattern, of recognition of the familiar types. To these the *contextualist* will add the vividness of quality which makes them important in the poem. The hedonistic mechanist, for example, may shrink, wrongly, and because it contains unpleasant bitterness, from the *quality* of irretrievable loss in the line:—

"For precious friends hid in death's dateless night."

Or Hopkins' poem may be judged bad by the mechanist because it contains much that is obscure, repelling and unpleasant. By the contextualist's standards these attributes are a positive help in the expression of the quality of torture of a religious soul at the midnight hour. The *organicist*, on the other hand, has much to say upon ideas (e.g. money and debts in the Shakespearean, judgment and witness in the Hopkins poem) vowel-sequences, etc., which *integrate* the poem. Finally, the *formist* asks, How well does it represent its culture? Does it fulfil its *genre?* How satisfying is it to the fully developed, highly discriminating man? *His* judgment on the two poems is that Shakespeare succeeds in these things whilst Hopkins fails.

The final criticism must be an inclusive one. On all four views Shakespeare's poem is superlatively good. Only on the contextualist view is Hopkins' so. Now though we cannot reduce criticism to numerical units or assess it by votes, the practical critic who is well-informed enough to include all these criteria, will hold them together and direct them discriminatingly upon the work. Add to this the facts—made clear in a really admirable Supplementary Essay on the "aesthetic work of art"—that there is a physical continuant in all arts except perhaps the dance, that men have similar biological constitutions, that works

of art are made and enjoyed within a common culture, that aesthetic judgment is "founded" or built up from a consecutive series of perceptions, that there is a "convergence" effect among the perceptions of many different subjects, and we may conclude that the aesthetic work of art or the work as maturely perceived, is not a mere private affair and that very considerable objectivity of judgment may be achieved.

We must, however, keep clear a distinction between the judgment of aesthetic perception (a judgment of fact as to what the perceptual content actually is), and the judgment of aesthetic value. About the first there may be very wide, discriminating, agreement. Yet, assuming such agreement on the matter of fact, there is likely to be divergence about value. It is upon the values rather than the facts that "world hypotheses" have bearing,—though opinion about values may also affect perceptual judgments of fact (the organicist will, e.g., criticise the hedonistic mechanist for failing to perceive that dissonances "are actually transformed by integration into the meaning of the whole"). An objective idealist is bound to have a different idea of "importance" from a mechanist's.

Even so, there is an enormous stride forward from the welter of subjectivist art-criticisms. Philosophers may disagree, but we can see pretty clearly where the broad differences lie, and in relating critical divergence to these underlying philosophies, Professor Pepper deserves our warm gratitude.

The chief trouble lies in the pluralism. Here are four bases, not one basis. Yet even here, if the (aesthetically) critical implications of a metaphysic can be shown to be compatible, or not compatible, with experienced aesthetic judgment, it is thereby so far verified, or shown, perhaps, to need modification. The forging of this link between metaphysics and criticism can help to strengthen both.

LOUIS ARNAUD REID.

Puritanism and Democracy. By RALPH BARTON PERRY. (New York: The Vanguard Press. 1944. Pp. xviii + 688. Price $5.00.)

The theme of this book is the religious and intellectual foundation of the civilization of the United States of America. It is, and is intended to be, a book for the times. It was written during the war; its background is the scepticism which since the beginning of this century has been corroding American ideals; and, in effect, it is a reasoned reassertion of the creed of America. But its genuine learning and the quality of its reflectiveness make it something more than a mere *livre de circonstance*. Indeed, there can have been few occasions when a philosopher of high repute has more profitably turned his mind to the needs of his generation and has produced a book so illuminating and so much to the point.

Puritanism and Democracy are, for Professor Perry, the two systems of ideas which united to determine, not the whole, but a large part of "the distinctively American tradition, culture, institutions, and nationality." The first is "the creed of certain Englishmen in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries;" the second is "the creed of certain colonial Americans who waged a war of liberation, and created a new political constitution, at the close of the eighteenth century." Both have their roots in European culture.

The plan of the book is straightforward. The first of the three parts into which it is divided is mainly historical. Puritanism and Democracy as historic systems of ideas are examined and their contribution towards the "making of the American mind" traced in detail. The Puritanism with which Professor Perry is concerned is not merely the doctrines which are peculiar to the Puritans, it is the whole complex system of ideas which had its roots in

mediaeval Christianity. And the Democracy with which he is concerned is "the political and social creed which was the professed ground of the American Revolution of the eighteenth century," a creed which derived from the philosophy of the Enlightenment. But the first part is only an introduction to the real theme of the book, which is a long and elaborate analysis and appraisal of both Puritanism and Democracy in the American tradition. The spirit in which this is undertaken is indicated in the following passage:

> "Puritanism and Democracy, under these or other names, form a substantial part of the heritage of Americans. The chief source of spiritual nourishment for any nation must be its own past, perpetually rediscovered and renewed. A nation which negates its tradition loses its historical identity and wantonly destroys its chief source of spiritual vitality; a nation which merely reaffirms its tradition grows stagnant and corrupt. But it is not necessary to choose between revolution and reaction. There is a third way—the way, namely, of discriminating and forward-looking fidelity."

Here Professor Perry appears not merely as the historian of a tradition, but as a critic with a keen eye for its shortcomings. Yet, as he expounds it, the tradition itself is seen to have a certain power of self-criticism; while Puritanism and Democracy often re-enforce one another's errors, they also correct and complement one another's limitations.

There is in these pages, which compose the bulk of the book, much to admire and little to regret. Their outstanding merit is that, whatever one may think of the conclusions, one becomes certain as one reads that Professor Perry will waste no time before getting to the essential topics to be considered and will argue his point of view with lucidity and enthusiasm.

One matter of some importance may perhaps be remarked upon. In his analysis of what may be called the philosophy of American democracy (the central argument of which is contained in a chapter called "The Supremacy of Reason and Conscience") the whole emphasis is placed upon its generation from the optimism of the philosophy of the Enlightenment—the confidence that from tolerant discussion "the truth would emerge and prevail on its own merits," the confidence in human reason. Historically, no doubt, there is considerable evidence for this view of the generation of democratic theory. Nevertheless I think it is a mistake to identify democratic theory with optimism of this sort, and even historically it is a view that needs to be corrected by a recognition that much that is characteristic of democracy is a reflection of scepticism (doubt not only concerning the power of human intelligence to arrange a satisfactory state of society, but also concerning the whole idea of a permanently good society) rather than of intellectual optimism.

MICHAEL OAKESHOTT.

Works of Love. By S. KIERKEGAARD. Translated from the Danish by David and Lillian Swenson. (Oxford University Press. Pp. xiv + 317. Price 18s. net.)

It is generally held that there can be a duty to do an act, but not to do it from a certain motive. Then how can love, if it be a way of feeling, be also a duty? Does "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" make sense as a categorical imperative? Perhaps no one has quite answered this; but in the "Reflections" collected together in this book, Kierkegaard adds his testimony to that of others within the Christian tradition who have described a kind of love which is not primarily a way of feeling and quite different from romantic

passion, but which has its roots in *conscience*, religiously interpreted. But to love one's neighbour "as a matter of conscience" does not mean just coldly to do him good out of a sense of duty. It means seeing him as a person, to be respected in his mysterious separateness from ourselves, and yet as our equal "before God." We may go on and ask whether, if we respect another in this way (seeing him, in Kantian terms, as "an end in himself") it necessarily follows that we are moved by outgoing good will and affection towards him. "Thou shalt *love* thy neighbour as thyself." As a fact of experience, with some people at any rate, it seems to happen so, and this is impressive. But it does not seem to be entailed, and Kierkegaard does not discuss this. He does however bring out that love needs to be grounded in the kind of objectivity and respect for another person which is expressed in the idea of duty. "Only when love is a duty, only then is love eternally secure," whereas romantic and passionate love is notoriously insecure, and can even pass ambivalently into hatred. "And because man, even in relation to the beloved woman, is primarily her neighbour, and she is primarily his neighbour, therefore both he and she must be asked severally" (i.e. in the marriage service) "whether they have consulted with their conscience. . . . Primarily your wife must be your neighbour; the fact that she is your wife is then a closer definition of your special relation to each other. But that which is at the foundation of the eternal must also lie at the bottom of every expression of the special."

Kierkegaard's voluminous writings are the outpourings of a lonely genius, who seems to have felt the need to try to say what he had to say over and over again in different ways. But those who are not deterred by his repetitiveness and occasional perversity will find some penetrating remarks in this book concerning that familiar, but after all rather strange saying "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

Wisdom and Responsibility. By WALTER FALES. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. vii + 166. English price 14s. net.

A good deal of profound and original thought is packed into this slender volume. Mr. Fales writes in a pleasant, scholarly style and his work is obviously the product of a mature and capable mind. His main contention is that all thought and action is governed, consciously or unconsciously, by what he calls "final ends." These are felt as "responsibility," a term which appears to include such various compulsions as the urge to self-preservation and the obligatory force of duty. Mr. Fales seems to avoid positing any strictly non-biological ends, whether as "emergents" or as the result of another order of being manifesting itself in human behaviour—what might be expressed (to use Platonic modes of thought) as the functioning of that part of the human personality which belongs to the world of reality. Mr. Fales devotes a good deal of space to "values" and the function of evaluating in the processes of human behaviour but it is not easy to discover his idea of the nature and origin of values nor of their relation to the final ends. Thus, the pursuit of truth, goodness, and beauty can hardly be called a biological end, but I think Mr. Fales would include these values among his final ends, as motivations of human action and thought.

The chapter dealing with the process of learning is one of the best in the book. The author shows how any increase in knowledge pushes the frontiers of the mind further into unknown country, thus bringing with increase of knowledge a corresponding increase of ignorance. He recognises the function of "intuitive thinking" in learning, that flash of inspiration where analytical

thought gives place to a synthetic act of the mind in which data are seen as a "whole" and the intellect takes hold of a new concept. There is much in the book reminiscent of Gestalt psychology.

Mr. Fales is least successful when he grapples with the idea of God. He never seems to visualize a Reality to which the modes of being we are accustomed to are merely analogical. He rightly points out the contradictions to which Anselm's ontological argument gives rise if the perfections therein posited of God are taken as merely human attributes. But did Anselm intend them to be taken in this way?

Mr. Fales comes very close to subjective idealism. Towards the end of the book we are startled by echoes from Fichte and Schelling and even Plotinus. "Man takes his world, not for a *fait accompli*, but for a task." In a way, the world is our own arrangement. "What (man) actually does is to *copy*" (the italics are mine) "the organization which manifests itself in his ultimate duties and beliefs. . . . He is able to create because he is a creature. . . . He creates the idea of a world which is the virtual scene for the accomplishments of his final ends." I. M. HUBBARD.

Essays in Science and Philosophy. By ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947. Pp. 348. Price $4.75).

This book consists of a selection of lectures, addresses, and essays given and written at different periods in the long career of a distinguished mathematician and philosopher. Some of the lectures and papers have previously appeared in either English or American journals, and the two well-known lectures "Immortality" and "Mathematics and the Good," contained in *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, "Library of Living Philosophers" (published by Northwestern University Press, 1941) have been reprinted. The book is divided into four sections, Part I is entitled "Personal," Part II "Philosophy," Part III, "Education," Part IV "Science."

The book opens with his charming "Autobiographical Notes,"[1] followed by a delicious chapter on "Memories," disclosing the naïve impressions made upon a small boy's mind by the events and persons in his environment, with delightful sketches of the characters of some of the folk in his father's parish sixty years ago, and of visitors to the vicarage.

Part II, the section dealing with Philosophy, contains, among other chapters, a lecture entitled "Immortality," originally delivered in April 1941 as the Ingersoll Lecture at the Harvard Divinity School, an essay on "Mathematics and the Good" and another on "The Analysis of Meaning."

The discussion of the subject of "immortality" is based upon the presupposition that all entities or factors in the universe are essentially relevant to each other's existence. The view put forward is that there is an eternal aspect of the universe which is related to the temporal aspect, and that the temporal aspect impresses itself upon the eternal.

The two sides of the universe, Whitehead calls "The Two Worlds." Each world considered by itself is an abstraction, since the concrete universe requires both worlds. Consequently an adequate description of one World includes characterizations derived from the other. The two worlds are called respectively "The World of Activity" and "The World of Value."

The World which emphasizes the multiplicity of mortal things is "The World of Activity." This is the World of origination, of creation. The "World of Activity" needs the other World to give it meaning. This other World is

[1] See the review of *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, PHILOSOPHY, Vol. XVII, No. 67.

the "World of Value." This World emphasizes Persistence. Value is in its nature timeless and immortal, and a finite, mortal thing is only valuable because it participates in the immortality of some value whose essence is eternal.

When we turn our attention to the "World of Value" we find that this World, in its turn, needs the other world of Origination and Creation, and for this reason. The notion of "effectiveness" cannot be divorced from the concept of value, and value only has effectiveness in its commerce with the active side of the universe. Cut off from its relation to the "World of Activity," the "World of Value" is a realm of abstract entities performing no function. It is saved from this futility of abstraction by its impact upon the process of Creation. The World of Activity aims at value, and the World of Value satisfies its aspirations.

The question now raised is whether temporal fact, by realizing value which in its essence is timeless, acquires thereby the "immortality" of value? The topic of the immortality of man is a side issue of the wider topic of the immortality of realized value. Whitehead's view is that the understanding of the universe requires that the World of Activity and the World of Value should each exhibit the impress of the other. This leads him to say that the realization of value in the World of Change should find a counterpart in the World of Value. Such a view means nothing less than that temporal personality in the World of Activity involves immortal personality in the World of Value.

It is natural for us to ask what is the evidence for such a belief. Whitehead is unable to enlighten us very much in this matter. The only answer he can give is "the reaction of our own nature to the general aspect of life in the Universe." He is dissatisfied with traditional philosophic thought which presupposes *independent* existences, and the possibility of an adequate description of a finite fact. He considers that this claim of "exactness" is a fake. I think we are meant to draw the inference that a finite being needs for its adequate understanding the World of Value as well as the World of Activity, and that in some way or other not clear to us, it shares the immortality of the former.

The next topic discussed is the connection between modern mathematics and the notion of the Good. Can mathematics elucidate this notion? In the first place Whitehead asserts that no finite entity enjoys self-sufficiency: it cannot be divorced from its relation to the unbounded universe, and its very meaning is derived from its relevance to this infinite background. In the second place, it is pointed out that "Pattern" is a partial disclosure of reality with an essential reference to this infinite background. In the third place, it is maintained that all value is the gift of finitude (since the infinite has no properties) and that value is the necessary condition of activity. Seeing that activity means the origination of patterns of assemblage, and that mathematics is the study of pattern, it will be seen why mathematics is claimed to be related to the study of the good and the study of the bad.

It is generally admitted that "pattern" is important for civilization. For example, every art is founded on the study of pattern. But social systems involve the maintenance of patterns of behaviour, and advances in civilization depend upon the fortunate modification of such behaviour patterns. Thus, says Whitehead, "the infusion of pattern into natural occurrences, and the stability of such patterns, and the modification of such patterns, is the necessary realization of The Good" (p. 109). But it is emphasized that the notion of pattern is meaningless except as a reference to the background of feeling, within which the pattern arises. A pattern can only exist in virtue of its doom of realization, and this "doom" "consigns the pattern to play its part in an

uprush of feeling which is the awakening of infinitude to finite activity" (p. 111). Such, we are told, is the nature of existence: it is the acquisition of pattern by feeling.

The relevance of mathematics in respect of the notion of The Good comes then to this. In the experience of Good or Evil, pattern plays a part in the unit of feeling which includes the enjoyment of the pattern. Mathematics is the study of the pattern in abstraction from the particulars which are patterned.

In the chapter on *Process and Reality* (pp. 114–19), the author reveals the secret that led him to write the book. It was that Philosophers had taken too easily the notion of "perishing." Being and Becoming had received voluminous attention, but "perishing" had been covered up as a sort of scandal. He remarks that almost the whole of *Process and Reality* can be read as an attempt to analyse perishing. "The notion of prehension of the past means that the past is an element that perishes, and thereby remains an element in the state beyond, and thus is objectified" (p. 117). If we get an adequate notion of what is meant by perishing, we have accomplished an apprehension of the meaning of memory and causation. And the meaning is this—because things perish, they are immortal.

Whitehead here re-iterates his views on permanence and transience. He thinks that the universe has a side which is mental and permanent. This side is what elsewhere he has called "the primordial nature of God." It is a non-temporal but actual *nisus*. This permanent actuality passes into and is immanent in the transient side. The permanent side is the appetitive vision of all possibilities of order, "possibilities at once incompatible and unlimited with a fecundity beyond imagination" (p. 118). Finite transience stages this welter of possibilities, according to their relevance, in a flux of epochs. Our epoch illustrates one special type of order, which will pass into another type of which we have not the faintest notion. Then our present theories of order, if remembered, will be regarded as trivialities, "gradually fading into nothingness" (p. 119).

There is an interesting discussion on the *Analysis of Meaning* (122). John Dewey had asked Whitehead to decide between the "genetic-functional" interpretation of first principles and the "mathematical-formal" interpretation. Whitehead declines to make this decision, because the present problem is the fusion of two interpretations. The historic process of the world requires the genetic-functional interpretation, which in its turn requires for its understanding an insight into those ultimate principles of existence which express the necessary connections within the flux (p. 123).

In this discussion Whitehead is concerned to emphasize the fusion of necessity and accident in our observation of Nature. Owing to the vagueness of our insight, our metaphysical notions are only an approximation. They represent such disengagement of necessity from accident as we are able to attain. Our knowledge is always haunted by alternatives. But necessity permits no alternative.

The source of our vagueness is deficiency of language. We can discern the variations of meaning of a word, although we cannot verbalize them in a decisive manner, and are thus misled in our thought by the deceptive identity of the repeated word. The method of algebra embodies the greatest discovery for the partial remedy of defective language. But even this method leaves us with the infusion of necessity with accident, since the principles of algebraic symbolism express the concurrence of mathematical formal principles with accidental factors.

Whitehead informs us that, in the algebraic method, the basic *connectives*

are the relevant mathematical formal principles. The real variables are the unspecified accidental factors. But, it is to be noted, the connection of the accidents is not a mere mathematical-formal principle. It is the concrete accidental fact of those accidents as thus connected. Hence we have a suffusion of the connectives by the things connected. This suffusion is the most general expression of the genetic-functional character of the universe. It is this suffusion of mathematical-formal principles with accidental factors which is responsible for the vagueness of our metaphysical insight. "To hold necessity apart from accident, and to hold form apart from process, is an ideal of the understanding. The approximation to this ideal is the romantic history of the development of human intelligence" (p. 131).

The chapter on "Uniformity and Contingency" first appeared in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. 23, 1922–23. It deals with the general problem as to whether, on the ground of experience, it is possible to deduce any systematic uniformity in nature in respect of types of entities or throughout the relations between them.

The argument proceeds as follows. We are aware of a dominant space-time continuum, and reality consists of the sense-objects, such as colours, shades, sounds, smells, touches, bodily-feelings "projected" into that continuum. But "projection" implies a sensorium which is the origin of projection. This sensorium is within our bodies, and each sense-object can be described as located in any region of space-time—say in any "event," by reference to a simultaneous location of a bodily sensorium. The process of projection consists in our awareness of an irreducible many-termed relation between the sense-object in question, the bodily sensorium, and the space-time continuum. We are also aware of the continuum as stratified in layers of simultaneity whose temporal thickness depends on the specious present. This awareness of the "ingression" of sense-objects amidst the events of a dominant space-time continuum, constitutes our apprehension of nature. Because any *part* of the scheme of relations determines the scheme as a *whole*, the scheme must have a systematic uniformity.

Whitehead next deals with Hume's contention that we have no arguments to convince us that objects, which have in our experience frequently been conjoined, will likewise in other instances be conjoined in the same manner; and that our inference that such objects will be conjoined, rests upon nothing but custom. He says that clearly "the key to the mystery is not to be found in the accumulation of instances, but in the intrinsic character of each instance." This overlooked character of the single instance must be its significance of something other than itself. Now every sentient being passes from awareness of sense-objects to the *perceptual* object indicated by that instance. How do we pass from the ingression of sense-objects to perceptual objects? Whitehead's answer is that the ingression of sense-object *signifies* the perceptual object, and a perceptual object is a true Aristotelian adjective of some event which is its situation. The relation of the sense-object to its situation is entirely different from that of a perceptual object. The sense object is derived from its ingression into nature, which is an irreducible many-termed relation. But a perceptual object is not describable as a many-termed relation. Perceptual objects such as houses, trees, stones, etc., are really the "controls" of ingression. As Aristotelian adjectives, they are free from the reign of relativity, since they are just adjectives of the events which they qualify and no others. Thus perceptual objects are sharply distinguished from sense-objects, whose ingression involves all sorts of events, in all sorts of ways.

But if the very nature of perceptual objects is to be "controls," have we not in them the missing character whose supposed absence led Hume to remove

causation from nature into mind? In modern scientific language, a perceptual object means a present focus and a field of force streaming out into the future. The present focus is the perceptual object in its relation to the future.

This discussion on "sense objects" and "perceptual objects" leads on naturally to the problem of induction. Since there are a finite number of perceptual objects within a region of space-time, and this finiteness still remains as we pass from our vague experience of perceptual objects to the more precise scientific objects, such as electrons and protons, valid induction is possible. As Mr. J. M. Keynes says in Chapter XXII of his *Treatise on Probability*: "if the premises of an argument permit us to assume that the facts or propositions, with which an argument is concerned, belong to a finite system, then probable knowledge can be validly obtained by means of an inductive argument."

Part III consists of various lectures and addresses on Education. One on "The Study of the Past—its Uses and its Dangers" was printed in the *Harvard Business Review* for July 1933. Another, "Education and Self-Education," was delivered on Founders Day, February 1st, 1919, to the Stanley Technical School and Coventry & Son, Ltd. An address entitled "Mathematics and Liberal Education" was printed in the *Journal of the Association of Teachers of Mathematics for the South-Eastern Part of England*, Vol. I, No. 1 (1912). Finally, a lecture on "Historical Changes," given to the Radcliffe College Alumnæ Association, appeared in *Radcliffe Quarterly*, January 1930. All these addresses disclose the author's penetrating grasp of principles and his wide knowledge of the great movements in world history.

The final section of the book, Part IV, dealing with Science, is for the most part technical. There is a chapter on "The First Physical Synthesis," dealing with that great epoch in the development of science of about one hundred years, whose centre was 1642, the year in which occurred the death of Galileo and the birth of Newton. This is followed by chapters on "Axioms of Geometry," "Mathematics," Non-Euclidean Geometry," reprinted from the 11th issue of *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Then there is a paper on "Indication, Classes, Number, Validation," which appeared in *Mind*, 1934. The final chapter of this section is on "Einstein's Theory," which appeared in *The Times Education Supplement*, February 12th, 1920. The purpose of the original article was to suggest an alternative explanation of Einstein's great achievement.

The book is attractively produced and there is an adequate index.

SYDNEY E. HOOPER.

Books also received:

L. CRANMER-BYNG, F.R.S.A. *The Vision of Asia* (An Interpretation of Chinese Art and Culture). With a Foreword by the Rt. Hon. R. A. Butler, M.P. London: John Murray. Pocket Edition, 1947. Pp. xiv + 306. 6s. net.

A. H. ARMSTRONG. *An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy*. London: Methuen & Co. 1947. Pp. xvi + 241. 15s. net.

FUNG YU-LAN, Ph.D. *The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy*. Translated and Edited with an Introduction by E. R. Hughes, M.A., Reader in Chinese Philosophy, Oxford University. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1947. Pp. xiv + 224. 15s. net.

SIDNEY SPENCER, B.A. *Shall We Follow Karl Barth?* London: The Lindsey Press. 1947. Pp. 59. 1s. 6d. net.

E. G. RUPP. *Studies in the Making of the English Protestant Tradition.* Cambridge University Press. 1947. Pp. 220. 8s. 6d. net.

GEORGE SEAVER. *Albert Schweitzer The Man and His Mind.* London: Messrs. A. & C. Black, Ltd. 1947. Pp. viii + 346. 18s. net.

KURT LACHMANN. *The Renaissance of the Individual.* London: Charles Skilton, Ltd. 1947. Pp. xvi + 143. 7s. 6d. net.

DAGOBERT D. RUNES (Ed.). *The Selected Writings of Benjamin Rush.* New York: Philosophical Library, Inc. 1947. Pp. xii + 433. 5 dollars.

MAURICE J. SHORE: *Soviet Education in Psychology and Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Library, Inc. 1947. Pp. xxii + 346. 4 dollars 75 cents.

HERBERT DINGLE. *The Missing Factor in Science.* (Inaugural Lecture as Professor of History and Philosophy of Science, University College, London.) London: H. K. Lewis & Co , Ltd. 1947. Pp. 18. 2s.

NORMAN H. BAYNES. *The Thought-World of East Rome.* A Lecture delivered in Westfield College on October 15, 1946. London, New York, Toronto: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1947. Pp. 45. 2s. 6d. net.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

A Meeting to celebrate the gracious according of the title "Royal" to the Institute by H.M. The King, was held at the Royal Society, Burlington House, London, W.1, on Thursday, November 27, 1947, at 5.15 p.m. Addresses were given to a crowded audience by Field-Marshal Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa, Viscount Samuel, President of the Institute, Lord Lindsay of Birker, Master of Balliol College, Oxford, and Vice-Chairman of the Institute, Professor C. D. Broad, Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge, and Professor E. A. Milne, Rouse Ball Professor of Mathematics in the University of Oxford. Messages of goodwill were read from H.M. The King, Signor Benedetto Croce, the distinguished Italian thinker, M. Jacques Maritain, French Ambassador to the Vatican, and Professor Niels Bohr, President of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters.

It is proposed to arrange the letters and addresses in the form of a Brochure, and members will receive a copy in due course.

Members are reminded that the following lectures will be given in the Lent Term at University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, W.C.1, at 5.15 p.m.:

Monday, January 26th.	"Existentialism." Professor H. J. Paton (University of Oxford).
Friday, February 27th.	"The Organic State." G. R. G. Mure, M.A. (Warden of Merton College, Oxford).
Friday, March 12th.	"Truth." Professor A. J. Ayer (University of London).
Friday, April 16th.	"Philosophy and Personal Commitment." Professor J W. Harvey (University of Leeds).

There will also be two Evening Meetings at the Eugenics Theatre, University College, Gower Street, W.C.1, at 7.30 p m :

(1) Friday, February 13th.	"The Philosophic Basis of Modern Physics." Dr. Robert Eisler.
(2) Wednesday, March 3rd.	"Philosophy and Religion." John Hartland-Swann, Ph.D.

SPECIAL NOTICE REGARDING A NEW CLASS OF MEMBERS OF THE INSTITUTE, CALLED "ASSOCIATES"

In order that the Institute's Journal, PHILOSOPHY, shall be easily available, at a nominal cost, to students at the various Universities, the Council has decided that there shall be a new Class of Associate Members. Students at any institution or organisation for higher education are eligible for admission to the rank of Associates for a period not exceeding three years, at a cost of 8s. 6d. per annum. Associate membership carries with it all the privileges of membership except that of taking part in the government of the Institute.

Trinity College

PERROTT STUDENTSHIP

in

PSYCHICAL RESEARCH

The Electors to the Perrott Studentship are prepared to receive applications from candidates.

Psychical Research is defined, for the purpose of the Studentship, as "the investigation of mental or physical phenomena which seem *prima facie* to suggest (*a*) the existence of supernormal powers of cognition or action in human beings in their present life, or (*b*) the persistence of the human mind after bodily death."

The Studentship is open to any person who shall have completed his or her twenty-first year at the time when the election takes place. A Student may be re-elected once, but not more than once.

The Studentship is tenable for one year, and the Student will be required to devote a substantial part of the period of his tenure to investigating some problem in Psychical Research. The Student shall not, during the tenure of his studentship, engage in any other occupation to such an extent as would in the opinion of the Electors interfere with his course of research.

The Studentship will be of such value, not exceeding £300, as the Electors may award after considering the nature of the research which the candidate proposes to undertake. The emolument will, in general, be paid half-yearly, and the first instalment will be paid on the quarter-day on which the tenure of the Studentship begins.

The Student shall, during the tenure of his Studentship, pursue to the satisfaction of the Electors the course of research proposed by him in his application; provided that such course may be altered with the consent of the Electors. The Electors will appoint a Supervisor with whom the Student is to keep in regular touch. If the Electors shall report to the Council of Trinity College, Cambridge, that the Student is failing to pursue his course of research with due diligence, the Council may, if they think fit, deprive him of his Studentship.

Applications from candidates should be sent to Professor C. D. BROAD, Trinity College, Cambridge, before May 3, 1948. In making his application a candidate should state his qualifications and claims, and his proposed course of research; he may also submit any work which he has written, published or unpublished. No testimonials are required from candidates who are graduates of Cambridge University or women students on whom a title of a degree has been conferred by that University. Other candidates must submit the names of three referees, and the Electors will not award the Studentship to any such candidate until they have had a personal interview with him.

The election to the Studentship will take place in the Easter Term of 1948, and, if a candidate be elected, his tenure will begin at Michaelmas following the election.

October 31, 1947.

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THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

APPEAL FOR NEW MEMBERS AND DONATIONS

THE Council appeals to members to do all in their power to introduce new members in order to extend the benefits of the Institute and to increase its revenue.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the Journal, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from annual subscriptions. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

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PHILOSOPHY

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DUTY[1]

PROFESSOR A. MACBEATH

THE tendency towards analysis and criticism, realism and pluralism, which has been evident in general philosophy during the present century has had important effects on recent ethical discussion. Its influence is to be seen in the two theories which on account of their prominence and the number of their disciples may be said to be most characteristic of the period—Ideal Utilitarianism and the New Intuitionism—theories which no less an authority than Sir David Ross described as the rival theories. However different these theories are in many respects they have a tendency towards ethical pluralism, if not atomism—a tendency not only to emphasize distinctions but even to harden the distinguishable elements into independent, if not even unrelated, entities. The one leaves us with a series of independent goods and the other with a series of *prima facie* duties, with the result that neither gives us any unitary principle to help us in one of the principal tasks of the moral life, the attempt to discover what in particular circumstances we ought to do.

It seems to me not without significance in this connexion that these two theories, though by very different routes, arrive at the common conclusion that doing one's duty has as such no value, that indeed a man who has done his duty may in doing it have shown himself a morally bad man, and that for doing the action, which it was his duty to do, he may be morally blameworthy. The Ideal Utilitarian, whose appreciation of the value of moral goodness leaves something to be desired, says we have just to accept this paradox. The New Intuitionist, who recognizes the uniqueness of the value of moral goodness, is rather more uneasy about the position, but he sees no way of escape from it. To me such a conclusion seems not only paradoxical but in direct contradiction to the deliverance of the unsophisticated moral consciousness. For if there is anything

[1] Paper read before the Metaphysical Society of Trinity College, Dublin.

about which men who are not out to support a theory are agreed, it is this: To say of an action that in doing it a man has done his duty is to attribute moral value or worth to it. Some would go further and say that it is to attribute the highest or even the only moral worth to it. And while, as Aristotle tells us, we have in discussing ethical questions something to learn from both the many and the wise, when the two are in conflict, as they seem to be in this matter, the final appeal is to the many.

In this paper I propose to consider certain questions regarding the nature of duty and its relation to the other fundamental ethical concept, the good, questions which I think have largely arisen from the tendencies I have mentioned, and which have been prominent in recent ethical discussions. I want to submit tentatively, and without much elaboration, a view which seems to me to leave room for the distinctions and truths explained by recent theories, and at the same time to provide a principle which brings order and coherence into the moral life, a principle which, however difficult to apply in detail, gives us hope that the more we reflect the more likely we are to arrive at a right decision as to what we ought to do. That there is such a principle seems to be implied in our strong conviction of the reasonableness of moral action. It may be that monistic and idealistic ethics arrived at such a principle too easily, but, if we are not to be content to regard the moral life as a disorderly chaos, there seems to be no alternative to the belief that there is such a principle.

While construction rather than controversy is my aim, I shall develop my positive contentions by contrasting them with the New Intuitionism of Sir David Ross, not only because no one writing on ethics to-day can hope or deserve to carry conviction unless he comes to terms with the positions which Ross has explained and defended with such clarity and candour, but also because the theory which I wish to propound became much clearer for myself through this contrast, and especially because I wish to acknowledge how much I have learned from his stimulating treatment of ethical questions and his insight into moral facts, however much I may dissent from some of his conclusions.

In my discussion I shall try as far as possible to take the point of view of the moral agent faced with a practical situation calling for decision and action, rather than that of the external observer passing judgement on the actions of other people. Too much reliance on the latter point of view is apt to lead to the atomism which is characteristic of so much recent ethical theory. Only a person who adopts it, or so at least it seems to me, could come to the conclusion that actions performed with different motives are the same, provided the change initiated by them is the same.

Let us begin with the idea of good, and confine ourselves to what

is good not merely as a means but as an end or in itself. Of anything good in this sense we can, at least, say that it is an object of the pro-attitude, that is, it is an object enjoyed when present (taking enjoyment as the common element in admiration, approval, satisfaction and liking), longed for when absent and desired when absent and believed to be capable of being achieved by our efforts. Among things good in this sense are the pursuit and attainment of knowledge, the promotion and enjoyment of friendship, the production and experience of beauty, the enjoyment of health and some measure of the conditions of material well-being. The goodness which we attribute to such things seems to me incapable of being understood except in relation to the nature, the needs, and the interests of human beings. For example, if man were not a social being, the production of friendship would not be good. If he were not curious, the pursuit of knowledge would not be good. If he did not dislike pain, there would be no goodness in attempts to alleviate it. The goodness of such things is a relational property depending on their capacity to satisfy certain elements in human nature.

But, on account of the limitations of our nature, we cannot pursue all these goods at once, nor should we pursue any of them all the time; nor yet can we decide which of them we ought to pursue here and now merely by considering which of them taken by itself in isolation is best. In this connexion, there seems to me to be a serious defect in such a comparison of goods as that made by Ross in his *Foundations of Ethics*. According to such a comparison one good, e.g. knowledge, is considered intrinsically better than another, e.g. pleasure, with the suggestion that in any circumstances in which we have to choose between goods the intrinsically better should be chosen. But it seems to me that in actual life circumstances arise in which it is my duty to pursue, e.g. the conditions of material well-being rather than knowledge, even though I am satisfied that there is a sense in which knowledge when considered by itself is better than material well-being. How then am I to discover which good I ought to promote here and now?

When the self-conscious being reaches a certain level of maturity he builds up for himself a plan or policy of life which, as a whole and every element in which in its context, he believes will sustain the pro-attitude. I have no time to discuss the process by which the self builds up this ideal, but I think we can make the following assertions about it. (1) It is the result of experience—partly the experience of the race taken over by the individual, partly the experience of the individual himself. (2) It can be understood only in relation to the nature and needs of the individual: it is what he believes will enable him to realize his capacities and satisfy his needs. (3) Its unity is derived from the unity of the self's interests: it is

what he believes will satisfy his self as a whole. (4) As the self is social as well as rational, this ideal has a social as well as a personal side: it is an ideal of personal development in an ideal community. No doubt, at any given moment, this ideal or policy may be neither clearly articulated nor completely unified and the community to which it refers may be very circumscribed, but it is the nature of a self-conscious being to have such an ideal; and the more reflective and enlightened the individual, the more unified and comprehensive his ideal.

Now it seems to me that it is in the light of such an ideal or policy that we judge which goods we ought to promote here and now. What the realization of the ideal requires in particular circumstances we call right or fitting or suitable. It is not only good in the sense that, considered by itself, it is an object of the pro-attitude, but in the circumstances it is best; and in these circumstances anything else, even if considered by itself it is an object of the pro-attitude, is bad, and the pursuit of it is wrong. If this is so, consideration of the relative values of different goods in the abstract or apart from a plan of life is misleading. While all the goods I have mentioned are worthy of being pursued at some time or in some context, and while, human nature being what it is and having the needs and interests it has, the ideal which is to satisfy it must include these goods, nevertheless the limitations of our nature prevent us from realizing them or pursuing them all at once; and, therefore, in a given situation we may have to choose between one and others. We choose between them, not by considering their merits in the abstract, but by considering them in relation to a whole or system into which they do or do not fit and with which they are or are not harmonious. What should be realized here and now is not only good in the sense of being an object of the pro-attitude, that is, relative to the satisfaction of some element in human nature, but also suitable or fitting relative to the good of the self as a whole and relative to the requirements of an ideal social order. For, man (1) has particular needs, (2) is reasonable or self-conscious and (3) is social.

The goods, the objects of the pro-attitude, the elements in the ideal, which I have so far noticed, belong in the main to the personal side of the ideal; but there are others which are specially bound up with the relations of men to one another and so belong to the social rather than to the individual side of the ideal. Such are truth telling, benevolence, gratitude to benefactors, promise keeping, etc. These also considered by themselves are objects of the pro-attitude in the sense that, other things being equal, a community whose members act in these ways is considered good. Such actions, however, are good, not as the Utilitarians contend in the sense that their consequences considered in the abstract are good, but in the sense that

in relation to the whole situation, including what has happened in the past as well as their consequences, they are objects of the pro-attitude. For example, other things being equal, an act of giving ten pounds to a rich man when I might have used it to relieve the distress of a poor man, and when I am not able to do both, is not good in the sense that the state of affairs which results from my action is good. But, if the payment to the rich man is the fulfilment of a promise or the repayment of a loan, other things are not equal. As the Intuitionist contends, it is the fact that I have made a promise (not the consequences of the act of keeping it considered in the abstract) that makes the act of keeping it good or fitting; but if it were not for the fact that I had made the promise, my act now would not be an act of promise keeping but just the production of a state of affairs which could be considered by itself and judged good or bad. But when I have in fact made a promise the state of affairs in relation to which my act has to be considered is "promise made and kept by me,"—not the state of affairs produced by my act without relation to the fact that I made a promise. And, when we consider it in relation to the total actual situation, the act of promise keeping is good in the sense of being an object of the pro-attitude.

In the same way, my spending money on the education of a stranger may produce a state of affairs as good as my spending money on the education of members of my own family, and perhaps better if the stranger is likely to profit more by the education, but our attitude to the acts is different when we consider them in their contexts in relation to the whole state of affairs, that is, the relation of parent to his own children in the one case, and the relation of parent and stranger in the other; and perhaps also in relation to the present arrangements of our society in such matters.

It seems to me that it is only the atomizing tendency which considers such acts only in relation to one aspect of the situation, and not in relation to the total situation, which prevents the New Intuitionists from recognizing that the total state of affairs resulting from such acts is good as well as the acts themselves right.

And, just as in the case of personal goods, so in the case of these inter-personal goods, while each considered by itself is an object of the pro-attitude, it does not follow that it is so in every context or that it should be promoted on every occasion. We may have to choose between the promotion of different goods; and, then, which we should promote here and now can only be determined in the light of a policy or plan of life.

The same considerations apply to another class of goods which consist not so much in the promotion of positive goods as in the removal of evils and defects, such as, the relief of distress, the alleviation of pain, the removal of ignorance, the curing of disease;

though in many, if not most, such cases, it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between them and the production of positive goods. For the same act often removes evil and promotes positive good. Such goods also, when considered in the abstract, are objects of the pro-attitude, but in particular circumstances we may have to choose between one and another; and our choice can only be determined in the light of an ideal or policy of life.

And, not only may any of the goods in the different classes of goods I have mentioned come into conflict with another of the same class; but, partly because of the limitations of our nature which make it impossible for us to promote all goods at once, partly because of defects in our own or other people's past conduct as, e.g. when we have made incompatible promises, and partly because of circumstances beyond our control such as the desire of a person who is seriously ill to know a truth which might prejudicially affect his health, similar conflicts arise between goods in the different classes. We may, e.g. have to choose between the pursuit of knowledge and the relief of distress, between the promotion of friendship and telling the truth, between the production of beauty and the alleviation of pain; and we cannot decide which we should promote in particular circumstances merely by considering the different goods in abstraction, but only by considering the requirements of the ideal or policy. In other words, none of these goods is good unconditionally in the sense that it is a suitable object of the pro-attitude in every context. They are all good in the sense that, considered by themselves, they are suitable objects of the pro-attitude; and, therefore, each has its place in the ideal. Only the ideal itself can continuously sustain the pro-attitude. Other goods can sustain it only in their context as what is required by the ideal in particular circumstances. The goodness which an act or state of affairs has as being here and now the expression of the ideal we call its rightness. Its rightness, thus, depends on its fitting into a scheme or policy, the conceived good of the self as a whole.

Now it may be said that what is right is not only fitting or suitable, but that it is so in a unique way, a way not further definable, which can only be described by saying that it is *morally* fitting or suitable. The uniqueness of this kind of fittingness I do not doubt, but its uniqueness does not seem to me to prevent us from describing it further. What I want to suggest is that by morally fitting we mean fitting into a whole which is good and ultimately into the good of the self as a whole, just as by aesthetically fitting we mean fitting into a whole which is beautiful, and by intellectually fitting we mean fitting into a whole which satisfies the intellect or a whole of truth. In other words, by morally right or fitting we mean fitting into or required by the good of the self as a whole. What is fitting in this

sense is not only good but best. The ideal, which we use as a criterion in determining what is right or fitting in this sense, we sometimes call the moral ideal or moral end; but there seem to me to be serious objections to these descriptions, and especially to the latter. One objection is that the term "end" suggests a condition of affairs which is in the future and can be attained all at once; whereas the realization of the good of the self as a whole cannot be attained all at once but has to be spread out in time, and it can be partially realized in the present as well as in the future. Another objection is to calling it the *moral* end, for this ideal seems to me to consist of non-moral elements and not to be itself morally good at all. It is rather the non-morally best. Its relation to moral goodness will appear later.

When we contemplate this non-morally best or the good of the self as a whole, we not only take the pro-attitude towards it but we recognize that it has a claim upon us that we should try to realize it, in so far as it is possible to do so by our action. This claim, especially when it is opposed by other elements in our nature, as, e.g., by some of our inclinations and desires, is what we call the sense of obligation or the sense of duty. The sense of duty is, thus, the recognition or belief that something, which is in our power and opposed to our inclination, is best in the circumstances, that is, the expression of the ideal, and therefore right or fitting; together with the feeling of obligation or the desire to do it which this recognition or belief produces in us. If this is so, our particular duties are the requirements of the ideal or best, the good of the self as a whole, in particular circumstances; and these duties cannot be understood except in relation to the nature and needs of man. If that nature or those needs were different, the ideal would be different, and our duties would be different. The better we understand the nature of man and his needs, the more adequate our ideal and the more enlightened our conception of our duties. This is not to say that the sense of duty is not unique or that it can be analysed without remainder into other experiences. It is unique in being itself, and it requires a special term or terms to describe it, such as ought, obligation, duty. We can only describe it as the experience which a self-conscious being, who is also a creature of desires and inclinations rooted in natural instincts, has in the situation which I described above. If we put ourselves actually or in imagination in a situation in which what we believe to be best, not in its consequences but as fitting into our policy or ideal, is within our power and opposed to our inclination, the experience which we have is a sense of duty.

As has often been pointed out, we use the term "duty" and other similar terms like "ought" and "obligation" in more than one sense. For example, when in a particular situation I am trying to discover

what my duty is, I am thinking of what is called my objective duty, that is, the act which would be the initiation of what is in fact the best or most fitting state of affairs in the circumstances. Duty in this sense is what I should recognize as best, if my knowledge of the circumstances and of the consequences of my action were entirely accurate, and if my insight into human nature and what it requires for its satisfaction were entirely adequate. It is what an omniscient and perfectly enlightened human being would regard as his duty. But I have complete knowledge neither of the facts of the objective situation nor of what my own nature requires for its satisfaction; and, for either or both of these reasons, I may make a mistake as to what my duty in this objective sense is. I may believe that something is my duty which in fact is not objectively best in the situation.

Now what I believe to be my objective duty is called my subjective duty; and my subjective duty is my actual duty here and now. What I believe to be objectively best is my operative ideal whose claim I recognize as binding on me. The difference between these two senses of duty is seen in the statement, "It is my duty to do what I believe to be my duty, even if I believe wrongly." In the first case duty means actual or subjective duty, whereas in the second case it means objective duty. So far I am glad to be able to claim the support of Sir David Ross, as against the position, which he once took and which others still take, that objective duty is actual duty; and, therefore, I do not propose to argue the question or to call attention to the paradoxes to which the latter position leads.

What I want to suggest is rather that both the meanings of duty, which we have so far considered and which are the only meanings which Ross recognizes, while quite normal and legitimate meanings of the term, are really elliptical and give us only one of the conditions which a dutiful act must satisfy. It is true that no act which does not satisfy this condition, that is, no act which does not aim at producing what is believed to be objectively best or to be objective duty, is a dutiful act; but an act may satisfy this condition and not be a dutiful act.

Moreover, it is true that, when I want to do my duty and am trying to discover what my duty is, this is the important condition; because in these circumstances the other condition, namely, the desire to do my duty and to do it because it is my duty, is normally satisfied. I am then, under the influence of the sense of duty, trying to discover the state of affairs which is objectively best and which my act should aim at initiating. This side of duty is the only one that can be seen by the external observer. It is the outward and visible side of duty, the side of duty with which alone the law is concerned, because it alone

can be enforced. But the act of duty has also an inner and spiritual side. It is the expression of a state of mind which is open only to the introspection of the agent. This side is what distinguishes an act from an event or occurrence which may also be the initiation of a state of affairs.

So much is common ground. It is also common ground that acts of duty are not only the expressions of states of mind but that they are consciously directed to ends. They are done with intentions and from motives. Where differences of opinion arise is when we ask what elements in these states of mind are included in the act of duty, in the sense of being relevant when we ask the question, "Have I done my duty?" Ross now admits, as we saw, that my *belief* as to what I ought to do is relevant. This is involved in his accepting the view that subjective duty is actual duty. Moreover, in reply to the criticism that his earlier view reduced the act of duty to an event or an occurrence, the initiation of a state of affairs, he admits the relevance of a further element in the agent's state of mind, namely, his *intention*. He points out that the act of duty is an intentional act, an act in which I consciously set myself to initiate a state of affairs. Accordingly, Ross's latest view admits that, when we are considering whether a person has done his duty, it is relevant to consider his belief and his intention; but he still denies that it is relevant to consider his motive; and he holds that, as long as the state of affairs intended by him is the same, the agent's act is the same whatever the motive.

This still seems to me unsatisfactory; and I would suggest that the line of argument which has led Ross to include belief and intention in the act of duty makes it necessary to include motive as well. It is, no doubt, true that it is difficult to get any satisfactory and generally accepted line of demarcation between motive and intention. The intention is sometimes said to be the foreseen consequences, the motive those of the foreseen consequences for the sake of which the action is done. At other times, the intention is said to be the nearer and the motive the more remote foreseen consequences. In either of these senses it is difficult to see why the intention and not the motive should be included in the act of duty. Sometimes, however, by motive is meant an emotion or feeling or desire, and then different considerations arise. But without going into these questions, we may for the present confine our attention to one motive—the sense of duty. If we consider a situation in which X which it is within my power to produce is right (i.e. my objective duty), Ross would describe my sense of duty, or my sense that X is my duty, as the belief (or recognition) that X is right, together with the desire to do X which this produces in me. If there is no such belief (or recognition) on my part, it is not my subjective or actual duty to do X. If with

this belief I do X which is an intentional act, I do it believing it to be right or my duty, that is, I do it as my duty. If, however, I do X, not as right or as my duty, but as the cause of Y, my act is a different act even if to the outside observer it appears the same; and I have not done my duty. If, for example, I pay a man ten pounds which I owe him as the payment of a debt, believing it to be right or my duty to do so, I have done one act; and I have done my duty. If, on the other hand, I pay the same ten pounds to the same man, to whom I owe it, not as the payment of a debt or a duty but as a means of inducing him to gamble, I have done a different act; and I have not done my duty. In other words, in order that I may be said to do my duty I must do the act which I believe to be my duty, as my duty, and not as a means to something else. If I do not believe an act to be my duty, I have no subjective or actual duty; and if I do not do it recognizing it to be what it is (i.e. my duty), I have not done my duty.

If an agent initiates a series of events or occurrences A, B, C, D, E, etc. the only way in which we can discover which of these are included in his act is by considering his state of mind at the time. His act may be A or B or C or D, etc. If I set myself to press the trigger of a rifle believing that it is not loaded, my act is A—pressing the trigger of a rifle. If I set myself to do A knowing that the rifle is loaded, my act is B—firing a rifle. If I set myself to do B believing that it will kill a man, my act is C—killing a man. If I set myself to do C believing that the man is a traitor, my act is D—killing a traitor. If I set myself to do D believing that it is right to kill a traitor, my act is E—an act of duty. From the point of view of the external observer, all these acts may be regarded as the same act, that is, the initiation of the same state of affairs, but from the point of view of the agent, the only point of view relevant to morality, each is a different act.

Now it seems to me that the minimum on which we can pass moral judgement is a whole act, that is, the initiation of the whole series of events foreseen by the agent. In the whole dutiful act in this sense there must be included the motive as well as the belief and intention. This I shall call the full sense of duty, as distinct from what I have called the elliptical sense. The latter is also a normal and legitimate sense, but it gives only one of the conditions which the complete act of duty must satisfy. The other condition which is equally necessary is that the act should be done from a sense of duty, that is, recognized as my duty and done for that reason.

The point on which I differ from Ross in this connexion may seem only a question of the use of the term "duty," but I think it is a great deal more. It is a question of the grounds on which we pass moral judgement. Even if there is a sense in which we might say that the

act irrespective of motive is right, I don't think we can say that it is morally right, as Ross does. Only the whole act, including motive, seems to me a proper subject of moral predicates of any kind; and an act done as my duty and the same act (i.e. the initiation of the same state of affairs) done for some other reason is not the same act, in any sense that is relevant for morality.

Duty in the full sense of the term seems to me to mean at least the minimum response to a situation that is required from a moral agent. I do not say it is all that is required of a moral agent (i.e., the ideal response of a moral agent) because, according to a commonly accepted sense of the term duty, it is my duty, e.g., to be just but not to be generous. Duty in this sense is what others have a right to expect of me; and, therefore, duties are roughly correlative with rights. If, however, we use the term duty, as we sometimes do, to mean the ideal response of a moral agent to a situation (or all that I should demand of myself) it may include more than others have a right to expect of me. For example, I may consider it my duty to forgive injuries, but others have no right to expect me to do so.

Now Ross refuses to accept either of these senses of duty (as either the minimum response that I can make to a situation and be moral or the ideal response of a moral agent) when he refuses to regard motive as part of the dutiful act. But both seem to me to be not only senses in which we regularly use the word but perfectly legitimate senses. Why then does Ross take the opposite view? He admits that there are certain facts, the natural interpretation of which seems to be that it is my duty not only to do a certain act but also to do it from a certain motive. "Suppose," he writes, "that a certain man pays a debt, but does it not from a sense of justice but solely in order to avoid a legal action against him; or suppose that he does it in order to tempt his creditor to reckless speculation with the money repaid; it seems natural to say that such a man has not done what he ought; that in the first case he has not done what he was obliged to do, and that in the second case he has done what he was definitely obliged not to do." (*Foundations of Ethics*, p. 115.) Here the natural interpretation seems to be that I have not done my duty unless my motive is good as well as my act directed to bringing about that which is right. But Ross rejects this interpretation of the facts on the ground that it leads to certain awkward consequences. It is these consequences and these alone which lead him to reject the natural interpretation of the facts illustrated in the example which I have quoted from him.

I want to suggest (1) that if we distinguish between the different senses of duty which I have mentioned, and grant one further condition, these awkward consequences do not in fact follow; and (2) that still more awkward consequences follow from Ross's own

view that I have done my whole[1] duty if I have done the act which is my duty, even if I have done it from a bad motive. The chief of these is that, according to his view, I can be said to have done my whole duty in cases in which my acts in doing it are not merely valueless but morally reprehensible. With his usual candour Ross admits this consequence, but it seems to him less serious than those which seem to him to follow from making it my duty to act from a motive. What, then, are these awkward consequences? Ross mentions two.

The first is based on the generally accepted principle that "I ought implies I can," and that, therefore, it is never my duty to do what is impossible. Now at a given moment I either have a given motive or I don't have it; and if I don't have it I cannot call it into existence at a moment's notice by an act of will. Therefore, if I haven't got it, it cannot be my duty to act from it here and now.

With this argument I am in entire agreement (though I believe that in the process of deliberation we can at times influence our potential motives or even produce new ones), but what precisely does it prove in the present connexion? Nothing at all, it seems to me. For according to Ross's own theory, in any circumstances in which I have an actual duty I have the best of motives for doing it, namely, the sense of duty, which he himself rightly regards as the highest moral motive. His own description of the sense of duty is (1) the belief that a certain act is my duty (i.e., objective duty), together with (2) the desire, strong or weak, which this produces in me to do the act. I think that Ross would admit that where (1) is present (2) follows. Indeed he often uses the term "sense of duty" of (1) alone.

Now, we already saw that my actual duty here and now is my subjective duty, i.e., to do what I believe to be my objective duty. Unless, therefore, I have the belief that X is my duty I have no actual duty to do X. But if I have such a belief, I have a sense that it is my duty to do X. So that in any case in which I have an actual or subjective duty I have a sense of duty; and, therefore, it is not necessary for me by an act of will to produce a motive from which to act. The motive sense of duty is there already.

But Ross's argument seems to imply that, even if the sense of duty (or any other motive) is present, it may not be strong enough to stimulate me to action; and that if it isn't I cannot by an act of will so strengthen it as to make it prevail; so that it may remain a potential and not become an actual motive at all. That, in fact, is the position which Ross as a consistent determinist is bound to take,

[1] It is true that Ross admits (*Foundations of Ethics*, p. 112) that the man who does his duty from a bad motive has not performed the whole duty of man: he has failed to do one of his most important duties, that of cultivating in himself the sense of duty. But that refers to the man's past. His whole duty here and now is to do an act irrespective of motive.

and when we combine with this position the principle that it is never my duty to do what is impossible, the conclusion follows that it is never my duty to act from a sense of duty (or from any other potential motive). This conclusion, however, follows not from the principle "I ought implies I can" but from that principle combined with the assumption of determinism; and to deny the conclusion it is enough to deny one of the premises. I am not, of course, going to discuss the question of freedom and determinism here; but the assumption of freedom in the sense of freedom called "the freedom of open alternatives" is the one condition which I referred to above as necessary, if the awkward consequences to which Ross has called attention are not to follow from the position which I am defending. For the minimum of such freedom which has ever been claimed by its defenders is freedom to make or not to make the effort of will required so to strengthen the sense of duty, when it is weak, as to enable it to prevail over other potential motives, that is, freedom to make or not to make the effort required to turn the potential motive sense of duty into an actual motive. Granted such freedom, there is nothing in Ross's first argument to prevent motive from being regarded as a part of duty. For whenever we have an actual duty the sense of duty is there to act as a motive. If, therefore, it is always possible for me by an effort of will to turn this potential motive into an actual motive, it is possible for me not only to do the act which is my duty but to do it from a sense of duty.

Ross's second argument to prove that it cannot be my duty to act from a motive applies only to the motive sense of duty. It runs as follows. If I say "It is my duty to act from a sense of duty" and make my statement definite, I find that it contradicts itself; and when I try to amend my statement so as to avoid the contradiction, the statement is found to involve an infinite regress. For it reads "It is my duty to do act X from the sense that it is my duty to do act X, from the sense that it is my duty to do act X, from the sense etc. . . . . ad infinitum." (*Foundations of Ethics*, pp. 117–18).

These difficulties, however, are based on the assumption that I am using the term "duty" in the same sense in the different parts of my statement, and they disappear if we distinguish between "my whole duty," "my subjective duty" and "my objective duty." For then the statement reads "It is my whole duty (i.e., what is morally required of me in the situation) to do my subjective duty (i.e., what I believe to be my objective duty) from the sense (i.e., my motive for doing it being the sense) that it is my objective duty." Here there is neither contradiction nor infinite regress but the simple statement that it is my duty to do what I believe to be right because[1] I believe

[1] "Because" here gives not my reason for believing it to be right but my motive for doing it.

it to be right. To recognise the distinctions mentioned above is only to carry one step further the line of argument used by Ross himself when he accepts the view that the belief of the agent enters into the act of duty. That view, too, appears to give rise to a contradiction and would in fact do so, if we were using the term "duty" in one sense only; as, for example, in the statement "It is my duty to do what I believe to be my duty." Ross avoids this contradiction by drawing a distinction between objective and subjective duty. A further distinction between these and whole duty avoids the contradiction to which he calls attention in the above argument.

The same distinction provides the answer to two other arguments which Ross puts forward in support of his view. (*Foundations of Ethics*, p. 123.) In both of these arguments Ross is discussing considerations which arise when I am trying to discover what my duty is. He is, therefore, dealing with objective duty and easily shows that motive does not enter into the content of duty so understood. But if we make the distinction between objective duty and whole duty, we cannot argue from the fact that motive is not part of the former to the conclusion that it is not part of the latter, any more than we can argue, according to Ross's own doctrine, from the fact that belief is not part of objective duty to the conclusion that it is not part of subjective duty.

I conclude, therefore, that none of the awkward consequences that led Ross to reject the view that motive is a part of the dutiful act do in fact follow, provided only that man is free. Granted that proviso, we have no reason to reject what Ross himself regards as the natural interpretation of the facts, namely, that it is my duty not only to do a particular act but to do it from a sense of duty; and we are confirmed in this interpretation by the awkward consequence, already noted, which follows from the opposite view as worked out by Ross himself.

I want to conclude this paper by considering the relation of moral goodness to the dutiful act and to the ideal in the light of which we determine what our particular duties are, an ideal which I have hitherto described in non-moral terms. This ideal is usually called the moral ideal, and though, for reasons which I have already stated, I consider the description misleading I shall continue to use it. Moral goodness seems to me to stand in a quite different relation to this ideal from that in which other goods stand to it. Moral goodness is not something at which we aim directly, though we may aim at conditions which facilitate it. It is rather something which finds expression or is manifested in our pursuit of other goods. What is morally good is the good will, and the good will finds expression in the pursuit of the non-morally best, i.e. whatever is in the circumstances believed to be required by the good of the self as a whole.

If this is so, the dutiful act is good both in the moral and the non-moral sense. It is in fact the meeting point of the non-morally best, the good of the self as a whole, and the good will which alone is morally good and which alone is good in every context. The act of duty is directed towards or aims at producing the former; and it is an expression of the latter. It aims at initiating the state of affairs which is right or fitting—a state of affairs which is the best in the circumstances but the non-morally best; and it aims at initiating it from a sense of duty and so is morally good.

Such a reading of the situation seems to me not only to account for the main facts of the moral life in a way which avoids the difficulties and paradoxes of many other theories. It even helps us to see the sources of these difficulties and paradoxes. In the first place, it enables us to avoid the vicious circle which has often been pointed out in the teaching of Kant and Green and many idealists who hold that the object of the good will is the good will, or, as it is sometimes put, that the moral ideal is the pursuit of the moral ideal. As against this position, I suggest that the good will finds expression in the pursuit of non-moral goods, when these are pursued because they are best in the circumstances. There is a sense in which it is our duty to be morally good, but we cannot be morally good in the abstract. To be morally good is to perform our particular duties in the spirit of duty. In other words, to be morally good is to manifest a good will; and a good will is manifested in setting oneself to initiate the particular state of affairs which here and now seems best, in the sense of being what the moral ideal or the good of the self as a whole here and now requires. It may be an act of kindness, the fulfilment of a promise, the pursuit of knowledge, the relief of distress, the production of beauty, or whatever else the ideal here and now requires. Moreover, the good will does not derive its goodness from the particular goods or ends at which it aims but rather from its own nature as being the conscious pursuit of the best. But it is its nature to try to realize particular ends, though not as such but as the expression of the ideal.

In the second place, this view gives to moral goodness the unique position claimed for it by the moral consciousness and by most ethical writers. For, according to it, moral goodness not being part of the end aimed at, but rather realized in the pursuit of the end, does not come into conflict with other goods. We are not called upon to choose between the pursuit of knowledge or beauty or pleasure and moral goodness or virtue. We are called upon to choose between the different non-moral goods, that is, to choose between the different goods other than virtue or moral goodness; and when we choose whichever is best, and pursue it for that reason, we realize or express our moral goodness in the pursuit, and the pursuit is morally good.

There are, in fact, no duties which are not moral duties but there are no duties which are merely moral duties, that is, duties to be moral and nothing more. Our moral duties are also duties to do particular acts. This explains why a theory, like the New Intuitionism, which insists on comparing moral goodness with other forms of goodness, as if we had to choose between the different kinds, gets into the paradoxical situations to which Ross calls attention (*Foundations of Ethics*, p. 284) but from which on his theory we cannot escape. The paradoxes arise from the fact that, according to such a theory, it is legitimate to ask such questions as "whether in any given situation it is rather our duty to promote some good moral activity or some good intellectual activity in ourselves." On the view which I am defending such a question is not legitimate. For, if in any given situation it is my duty to promote some good intellectual activity, it is my moral duty to do so; and, therefore, in promoting the good intellectual activity I am in the same act promoting a good moral activity. So that there can be no conflict between the two. The alternatives with which actual life presents us are, for example, between a good intellectual activity and doing an act of kindness or a piece of social service or taking a rest in the interests of our health. The alternatives are never between any of these and doing our moral duty. If in the circumstances it is best or right that I should engage in some intellectual activity, then it is my moral duty to do so; and the other so-called duties are not my actual duties at all but what would be my duties, if the circumstances were different and if it were not here and now my duty to engage in intellectual activity.

It seems to me no small advantage of the theory I am advocating that it saves us from unreal paradoxes of this kind, paradoxes which arise from theories which regard moral goodness as one among several goods between which we may be called on to choose. According to such theories, moral goodness must be comparable, if not even commensurable, with other goods; and yet the deliverance of the moral consciousness compels them to regard it as "infinitely superior" to all other goods. The present theory takes the view that no conflicts between moral goodness and other goods arise; so that no choice or comparison between it and them is necessary. It is good in a different sense or a good of a different order from all other goods.

In the third place, this theory enables us to reconcile two convictions of the moral consciousness which many theories seem to find in conflict. The one is that in the good life there are other goods besides moral goodness, that it includes, for example, such goods as knowledge, aesthetic experience, happiness, friendship, etc. The other is that morality is concerned with the whole of life and has jurisdiction over all of it. According to the present theory, moral

goodness and these other goods enter into the good life in different ways and not only do not conflict but are necessary to one another. The latter are the ends to which it is directed, the former is realized in the pursuit of them. On the other hand, in any set of circumstances there is something that is right or best, and the good will is revealed in the pursuit of that, whatever in detail it happens to be; so that there is no situation in which the good will cannot be realized, because there is none in which moral considerations are irrelevant.

In the fourth place, in the conception of the moral ideal as the conceived good of the self as a whole, this theory provides a unitary principle for the determination of our duties; and at the same time it leaves room for progress in the moral life; for, according to it, we are in the moral life engaged, in the spirit of adventure and experiment, on a task which can never be completed.

And, finally, it enables us to account for and understand the enormous differences between the things which different men and different nations at different stages in human history have regarded as good, and pursued in the confident belief that they were right, and in the no less confident belief that in pursuing them they were themselves being morally good—facts which are difficult to reconcile with the intuitionist theory.

BUDDHA AS A REVOLUTIONARY FORCE IN INDIAN CULTURE

PROFESSOR A. R. WADIA

FEW people would care to deny, whether within India or without, that Buddha is the greatest Indian of all times. Whether from the standpoint of the purity of his life, the daring originality and novelty of his thought, or the extent of his influence in shaping the culture of the world, it would be hard to beat the record of Buddha. Even making every allowance for the common idea that no man is a prophet in his own land, it is difficult to believe that for the last thousand years Buddha has been practically an exile from the land of his birth. It is nothing short of an irony of history, and nothing short of a tragedy for India, that the great unifying force that he represented in his time and does represent even to-day has been allowed to run waste and the great moral stamina that he sought to supply failed in its historic mission.

It is the purpose of this essay to study this irony of history and to explain it in terms of the paradox that Buddha was too un-Indian for his thought to take root in India; in short, that his thought was so revolutionary that it came to be accepted for a time only by compromising with his fundamental ideas and sometimes even by giving them up altogether. And a time came in the history of Buddhism in India when the inner decay synchronized with the environmental forces, and a strangling of Buddhism in India became inevitable.

The history of every religion goes to show a certain continuity of thought, and the greatest prophets have come not so much as revolutionaries but as reformers. Zoroaster in ancient Iran claimed to revive the old faith in Ahura Mazda as the one and only God. The Old Testament goes to show how every Hebrew prophet only claims to protest against the worship of the false gods that had been insidiously corroding the life of the Israelites, and to lead them back again to the pure worship of Jahweh. Even Christ did not disclaim his Hebrew heritage. He was well versed in the Prophets and could quote them to justify his own teaching. He was conscious of his historic position when he frankly proclaimed: "I have come to fulfil, not to destroy." Mahomed the Arab drew his religious inspiration from the Jews and the Christians and the Zoroastrians. His teaching did mark a total revolt against the old Arabian paganism, but he could establish his religion in Arabia only by adapting his new religion to some of the old customs of Arabia. The sanctity of

the Kaaba, the limitation of polygamy to four wives, the continuance of slavery, the maintenance of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca are some of the features of Islam rooted in the history of pre-Islamic Arabia, and are intelligible only in the light of this history.

So too with Buddha. He was born a Hindu in the Kshatriya caste. He inherited the old belief in the doctrine of Karma and the transmigration of souls: the two main ideas on which he raised the superstructure of his own philosophy.

He accepted in a naive fashion the popular ideas of heavens and hells and gods, but without attaching the slightest importance to them. In fact, if any great teacher can be charged with agnosticism, not with definite atheism, it is Buddha. Whether he was the founder of a religion or of a philosophy is a vexed question and it turns very much on what exactly we mean by religion and philosophy. If by religion we mean faith in some power beyond us and a certain number of dogmas to be accepted as revealed truths, Buddha was certainly not the founder of a religion, though in subsequent centuries his followers did deify him and dogmatically accepted his dicta as unchallengeable truths. Buddhism did become a religion but this was the work of his followers, not of Buddha himself. He certainly sought to preach his own doctrines logically and as pure rationalism, and so he was certainly the founder of a philosophical system.

His early upbringing was on normal orthodox lines. By every law of psychology and eugenics he should have grown up a normal orthodox Hindu, but by all the undiscovered laws of the psychology of genius he did not. Through his own efforts he outgrew the limitations of his own education and attained Enlightenment and became the Buddha, a great thinker, but also a great rebel in the cultural history of India.

I

We shall now proceed to bring out the revolutionary nature of Buddha's teaching. The flame of the torch he lighted flickered and shone at times with intensity in India till it passed on its light to Eastern Asia, but died out in its own homeland. All his main teachings went against the grain of Hindu psychology and so could not take an abiding root in India.

(1) Orthodox Hinduism ultimately rests on the divine authority of the Vedas. In the last resort the *Śabda pramāṇa*—the authority of revelation as in the Vedas—is the basis of Hindu religion and of Hindu philosophy as well. Though a few thinkers may have tried to be purely logical in their arguments, at one stage or another they

would bring in the authority of the Vedas as the final rounding up of their logical conclusions. Even the Upanishads, which are so markedly different from the Vedas in their method and in their contents, are looked upon as a part of the Vedas. An orthodox Hindu expects every non-Hindu to take this at its face value, when it is not difficult to see that the Upanishads themselves have effected a silent revolution against the whole naive mentality of the Vedas. All the best systems of Hindu thought seek to establish themselves on the safe rocks of the Authorities, even when the original authors of the Authorities would not be able to recognize their own thought in the subtle commentaries of the philosophers, who are afraid to emphasize and proclaim openly the novelty of their own thought. Not so Buddha. From the very beginning he struck the note of revolt when he repudiated all authority and all traditions. In the *Aṅguttara* he is reported to have said: "Do not accept what you hear by report; do not accept tradition; do not accept a statement because it is found in our books, nor because it is in accord with your belief, nor because it is the saying of your teacher."[1] Buddha throws a heavy responsibility on his hearers when he expects them to think for themselves, when it is ever so much easier to quote some authority and avoid the trouble of thinking. The subsequent history of Buddhism shows how difficult this advice was found to be, and Buddhism itself became a mass of authority hardly distinguishable in its method from the orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy. In fact in this respect the Buddhism of the Buddhists marks a distinct reversion to the type of thought typically Indian.

(2) More than any other people in the world the Hindus are metaphysical. The Hindu mind revels in the subtleties of logic within the framework of the Authorities, and is never so happy as in discussing metaphysical problems, even though such discussions involve merely endless discussions of the original authorities. Oddly enough Buddha was not a Hindu enough to be interested in metaphysical questions. But his immediate environment was Hindu to the core, and his immediate followers were Hindus by birth with centuries of metaphysics ingrained in their blood. Their mind could not rest content without probing into the ultimate mysteries of the universe. They would go to Buddha as their ancestors had gone to the Upanishadic seers, but Buddha was no Janaka or Yājñavalkya. The metaphysical inquirers got a cold douche: "Of what use are these questions? How do they make a man more moral? How do they help a man to gain salvation (nirvāṇa)?" And so the Enlightened One brushed aside these inquiries as we tend to brush aside our children's perplexing queries, however natural they be. Buddha aimed at being scientific and precise, and preferred to have his feet

[1] As abridged by Pratt on p. 15 of his *Pilgrimage of Buddhism*.

on the terra firma of his own experience. Hence the great paradox that in the nation of metaphysicians its greatest teacher was content to be a non-metaphysician.

(3) The Vedas sing of gods, some intrinsically good and righteous, but all of them mighty, all of them liable to be cajoled through prayers, and at times even made subservient through the magical force of incantations, and *tapas* or ascetic religious devotion. Orthodox Hinduism, especially of the teeming masses, is inconceivable without its gods and goddesses, its temples and its priests. But now comes Buddha and he makes light work of all these mighty gods and goddesses: Do they exist at all: Indra with his Apsarases, the Asvins and the Maruts, Aditi and the Ādityas? Perhaps they do! Buddha is not concerned to deny their existence. So far as his recorded assertions are concerned, he cannot be said to have been a confirmed atheist. Perhaps he may be better described as an agnostic. Their existence or non-existence does not interest him, for man's salvation does not depend on them. For him man is literally the architect of his own fortune and in his last address to his disciples he boldly proclaimed: "Therefore be ye islands unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge unto yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the truth as an island (of security). Look not for shelter to any one besides yourselves." If this was Buddha's teaching, what need was there to bother about the existence or non-existence of gods? Perhaps there is an element of exaggeration when Dahlke declares that "Buddhism stands in opposition to all other religions without distinction, in that these are only differently moulded forms of belief; it alone is unbelief, given a habitation and a name."[1] It is an exaggeration, because it is a case not so much of unbelief as of indifference. This attitude of indifference is reduced to a *reductio ad absurdum* in a later Buddhistic legend when the idols of Indra and Shiva and other gods are represented as leaving their pedestals to bow before the Buddha! It is open to anyone to conclude that gods that can bow before mortals cease to be gods. But it is also possible to conclude that the superiority of Buddha is brought out all the more effectually when the gods are not denied their existence, but are shorn of all their pride and glory.

A religion without a god is an impossibility, and if in theistic India Buddhism was to have any place at all, it had to develop into a religion, and it did so not by reinstating the old Vedic gods, but by creating a brand new god in Buddha himself. The deification of Buddha finds no justification in the life or teaching of Buddha himself. But the logic of religion necessitated this transformation when the human process of venerating the mortal relics of Buddha, his teeth and his bones, blossomed forth into Mahāyāna Buddhism It

[1] *Buddhist Essays*, p. 358.

means that the Buddhists lost faith in their own self-help, and in the agony of their helpless souls deified Buddha, raised colossal statues to him and bowed down before them to secure his grace. There was a certain logic in this process. The man that had taken birth an endless number of times as a Bodhisattva just to help, not merely human beings, but even hares and tigers and lions, cannot be looked upon as having lost all that old spirit of helpfulness merely because he had become a Buddha. Surely a Buddha should be more powerful and influential than a mere Bodhisattva. If so, what can be more natural than to pray to that unseen Buddha, made visible through the genius of painters and sculptors? And so the world has witnessed the most wonderful phenomenon in the history of religion: the transformation of the agnostic Buddhism of Buddha into the full-blooded theism of the Mahāyāna Buddhists. Buddhism has become a religion of deliverance: the Buddhist ceased to be a lamp unto himself. It was Buddha himself that had to be a lamp to all the world, to be the refuge of the ill and the suffering. Buddha the man of love and mercy became the god of love and mercy.

It remains an open question how long agnostic Buddhism could have survived. But through its theistic transformation it certainly gained a fairly long lease of life in India, and has survived as a vital force till this day in the lands of the rising sun. The humming of *OM MANI PADME OM* by the Buddhist monks makes us alive to the fact that Buddhism still lives, and in it the man Buddha, who was perhaps the greatest single force to free man from the fear of the gods. Even his erstwhile enemies, the orthodox Hindus, tried to make peace with him by honouring him as an *avatar* of Vishnu, but not to be worshipped. In the temple at *Gayā* and the rock-cut temples at Ajanta, bells rang and litanies were sung before the images of Buddha, but that was a thousand years ago. To-day the bats in their love for darkness haunt those sacred places, and the tourist pays his casual visit and wonders at the glory that was Buddha, at the nothingness that is Buddha in India to-day. Was this the Nirvāṇa that the Master hunted for through countless centuries of births and deaths? Anyway, through his beautiful images he seems to smile in benignity at the follies of men, who deified him against his will and clear teaching, and have now left him to the company of bats and the assiduous solicitude of the archaeologists.

(4) Ascetics have a tremendous fascination for the orthodox Hindu mind. The power of the *tapas* (austerities) and the wonders it can bring about even to the extent of making the gods in their heavens tremble with fright are all a part and parcel of the religious folklore of India. The ascetics are still a power in this ancient land of ours. The Vedic age was much nearer to the time of Buddha than it is to us. No wonder if even he felt the lure of asceticism and tried

to win his way to Enlightenment through the most austere practices that he could think of. The result, however, was a tremendous disappointment and is graphically described by Buddha himself:

> "I remember when a crab-apple was my only daily food. I remember when a single grain of rice was my only daily food. And by only partaking of a single grain of rice a day as my food, my body became extremely thin and lean; like dried-up withered reeds became my arms and legs; my hips like a camel's hoof; like a pleat of hair my spine. As project the rafters of a house's roof, so raggedly stuck out my ribs. As in a deep-lying brook the watery mirror beneath appears so small as almost to disappear, so the deep hollows of my eye-pits, my eye-balls, wellnigh wholly dis appeared. As a gourd becomes shrivelled up and hollow in the hot sun, so did the skin of my head become parched and withered. And pressing my stomach, my hand touched my spine, and feeling my spine, my hand felt through to the stomach in front. And when I rubbed my limbs, the hair upon them came out rotten at the roots. And yet with all this rigorous mortification I came no jot nearer to the rich supernatural felicity of clearness of knowledge."

It would be hard to beat such a wonderful word-picture. If, however, a man is so dense as not to be able to visualize what Buddha must have looked like after this diet of a single grain of rice a day, he has only to visit the museum at Lahore, and he will see there a small statue of emaciated Buddha, which must have been inspired by this wonderful word-picture of the Master himself.

Buddha was disillusioned by this extreme type of asceticism. It paved the way for his immortal discovery of the Middle Path, the beauty of the golden mean: neither too much nor too little. But he did not fail to grasp one important truth which underlies every ascetic endeavour: that it is a means to self-discipline, and to that extent it is a means of training the body to serve the higher purposes of the spirit. In one place he says: "Though my body is sick, my mind shall not be sick! Thus must you train yourself." Asceticism of the right kind is an attempt to conquer our lower self: "If one man conquer in battle a thousand times a thousand men, and if another conquers himself, he is the greatest of conquerors." "A knife, if it be caught by the blade, cuts the hand. Asceticism wrongly practised leads to the downward path," and so says Buddha: "I preach asceticism inasmuch as I preach the burning away of all conditions of the heart that are evil. One who so does is a true ascetic." And so in the *Dhammapada* the Bhikshu is thus described:

> "Restraint in the eye is good, good is the restraint in the ear, in the nose restraint is good, good is restraint in the tongue. In the

body restraint is good, and good is restraint in speech, in thought restraint is good, good is restraint in all things. A Bhikshu, restrained in all things, is freed from all pain. He who controls his hand, he who controls his feet, he who controls his speech, he who is well controlled, he who delights inwardly, who is collected, who is solitary and content, him they call Bhikshu. . . .

Let him live in charity, let him be perfect in his duties; then in the fullness of delight he will make an end of suffering."[1]

There are indeed certain passages in the *Dhammapada* which hover dangerously near a certain type of selfishness, may be enlightened selfishness, but selfishness all the same. The fact that Buddha did not write set essays, but propounded his teaching in the form of dialogues and parables, is apt to make for some apparent inconsistencies, such as we find in Plato's *Dialogues*. But in all such cases we have to look to the general spirit of a particular master's teaching, and in Buddha's case there can be no possible getting over the fact that his first and foremost interest was morality. Morality is essentially social, it can have no meaning for the solitary recluse, and this we find confirmed by the beautiful statement of Buddha: "The odour of flowers travels not against the wind, nor that of the sandal, nor the fragrant powder of frankincense or jasmine. But the sweet odour of good men travels with the wind and against it." We shall bring this out all the more clearly when we come to speak of Buddha's Ethics.

(5) Much as Buddha wished to avoid metaphysics, he could not completely do so, and we find this in his somewhat negative doctrine of self: *anatta*. That man has an immortal soul is one of the cardinal principles of all great religions. The Upanishadic doctrine of *Ātman* implies some sort of entity which does not die with the physical body, but which has the power of being reborn in other physical bodies. The nature of this rebirth is governed by one's past actions: as a man sows so must he reap. The Zoroastrian eschatology of heaven and hell has been borrowed by the Jews and Christians and the Muslims alike. The Vedic eschatology also provides for a *svarga* (heaven) and *naraka* (hell). But by the time of the Upanishads the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul came to be well established. The Upanishadic seers were alive to the sense of suffering and they sought a way out of this cycle of births and deaths. They proceeded on the assumption that there is an entity called an individual *ātman* which in the last analysis is identical with the ultimate *Ātman*. And when this identity is realized whether through jñāna (knowledge) or karma (actions) or bhakti (prayers and devotion), the travail of the individual soul or *ātman* is ended and there is *Moksha* (salvation).

[1] Max-Müller's translation.

BUDDHA AS A REVOLUTIONARY FORCE

Buddha accepted the idea of rebirth and it was open to him to follow the beaten path of accepting the soul entity as well. But he was nothing if not original and even revolutionary. Buddha in his attempt to avoid metaphysics tries to give a purely psychological account of self. He accepts the old Upanishadic account of the five *khandhas* ("aggregates of bodily and psychical states which are immediate with us"[1]) comprising body, feeling, conceptual knowledge, *sankhāras* ("synthetic mental states and the synthetic functioning of compound sense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts"[2]), and lastly consciousness. Over and above all this is *taṇhā* or craving, which leads to actions, and the results of these actions are stored up as individual *karma*[3] and lead to rebirths. That the quality of rebirth is moral in the last resort there can be no question. But that this rebirth is not of an entity but of *karma* is the novel feature of Buddha's teaching. If it is argued that a continuity of births must necessarily imply the continuity of an entity we are confronted with the analogy of a torch lighting other torches or of a river flowing continuously, though the water is continually changing. So too, it is asserted, a man's *karma* determines the body it builds up for its abode. Buddha was conscious of the difficulty of making others grasp his meaning. "This *dhamma* is profound," says he, "recondite, hard to comprehend, rare, excellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, only to be understood by the wise." And even the wise have found it a difficult knot to unravel. He is questioned on this by one wandering ascetic, Vaccha, and Buddha asks him whether he knows where the fire goes after it goes out—does it go east or west, north or south? Vaccha protests that the question is not fairly put, for the fire goes out when there is no more fuel to sustain it. And the Enlightened One takes him at his word and discourses: "Just in the same way, Vaccha, all things material—feelings, perceptions, forces, consciousness—everything by which the Arahant might be denoted, has passed away from him. Profound, measureless, unfathomable is the Arahant (finally emancipated) even as the mighty ocean, reborn does not apply to him nor not-reborn, nor any combination of such terms." We seem to be lost in the proverbial mazes of metaphysics. Individual *karma* in the sense of actions may be as fleeting and transient as the flame of a torch or the waters of a river, but if it has to bear fruit in a moral rebirth, it must have some sort of unity, the actions cannot all be hanging loose, for after all they are the actions

[1] Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 93. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 94.

[3] It should perhaps be explained to the European reader that "karma" is the Indian (Hindu as well as Buddhist) technical term for the sum total of the individual's actions *plus* their particular and general consequences. It is a *collective* term, properly used only in the singular in this sense. When the plural is used at all (Sanskrit *karmāns*) it refers to any actions of an individual without the specific impute of *fateful* actions.—ED.

of one and the same individual, whom in his fleeting existence we call Rama or Gopal, John or George. We may not be able to describe that unity in terms intelligible to all, for even the idea of an immortal soul or *ātman* is a hypothesis necessitated by the demands of our moral and social life. That is why scholars like Pratt and Stcherbatsky are driven by the logic of life to admit that some sort of unity must be presupposed, if the doctrine of transmigration is to have any meaning. Sir Charles Eliot finds in the doctrine of *anatta* "not a speculative proposition, nor a sentimental lament over the transitoriness of the world, but a basis for religion and morals. You will never be happy unless you realize that you can make and remake your own soul."[1] But in this very justification of *anatta*, which literally means "not oneself," Sir Charles has been constrained to use the word *soul*, and the question immediately arises: is soul a mere summation of actions or is it something organic which has the power of welding together these actions into a unified whole? And the question takes us back to where we started. One wonders whether Buddha was trying to play a joke upon his metaphysical countrymen in order to drive home to them the futility of metaphysics. But one thing is certain that the whole idea of *karma* is central to his conception of self, and *karma* is to be understood only in terms of morality.

(6) A code of morality is a *sine qua non* for every society. No society can subsist without it. From this standpoint it would be foolish to deny to Hindu society the credit for a high code of morality. Yet in a sense it would not be incorrect to say that Hinduism does not allot to morality the same high place that theistic religions like Zoroastrianism, Christianity and Islam do. In the Vedantic schools the Hindu love of metaphysics is so dominant that morality as such finds a secondary place. It is forced to yield in importance sometimes to *jñāna* (knowledge), and sometimes to *bhakti* (prayer and devotion) and sometimes to *karma* in the sense of religious ritual. No student of Hindu culture can be blind to this fact. The Advaitin looks upon morality as phenomenal, as belonging to the world of *māyā* (appearance almost in the sense of illusion), and to the *jñānī*, who has attained perfection through knowledge, the moral distinctions between the good and evil come to be transcended. Hence the claim that some knaves do not hesitate to put forth that as they have attained *jñāna* or knowledge, they are above good and evil, which in plain language implies that they can literally take moral holidays, and can do whatever evil they like. It is, of course, a travesty of Advaita ethics, but as a bare fact it cannot be denied. Similarly, the Bhakti doctrine has often ended in erotic excesses, which are justified on the ground that the love of God purifies all relationships. This too

[1] *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. i, p. xxi.

may be a travesty, but as a bare fact of Hindu life it cannot be denied. Nor can it be denied that so ritualistic a religion as Hinduism revels in ceremonies and measures the orthodoxy of a man in terms of the ceremonies he performs, not in terms of the good he does. Recently a case came to my notice where a man punctiliously has his cold-water bath early in the morning at four o'clock, spends two to three hours on religious ceremonies, and begins his worldly duties by beating his wife. He has now driven her away and married another without the slightest compunction. And he certainly passes for a pious man. This too may be a travesty of genuine morality, but unfortunately it is not uncommon. The *Bhagavadgītā* is usually regarded as the greatest book on Hindu Ethics, and yet it is much more metaphysical than ethical. The *Dharma Śāstras* are supposed to be moral treatises, and yet it is notorious that they are more legal codes than systems of pure morality.

It is necessary to mention all this, for only in the light of it can we be in a position to appreciate the real revolution sought to be effected by Buddha. The core of his philosophy is to be found in his sublime ethics revolving round the love of man, and in this respect he is perhaps the only great Indian teacher who has exalted morality above everything else. His example has indeed been followed by theistic teachers like Kabir and Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Gandhiji, all theists, but they can hardly be said to have had the same influence on the moral and religious life of the world that Buddha had.

As Buddha recognized no god, there is no room for ritualism in his ethics. His famous insistence on the Middle Path is a glorification of the golden mean in life. It expresses itself negatively in the five precepts: not to kill, not to steal, not to be unchaste, not to lie, and not to drink intoxicants. Positively it expresses itself in the Noble Eightfold Path, covering rightness in views, aspiration, speech, behaviour, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and concentration.

Attempts have been made indeed to show that his ethics is centred in his view of Nirvana, and that it is pessimistic in its endeavour to annihilate all craving. But these are attempts inspired by metaphysical motives. All such attempts, however, are doomed to failure, for nothing can tarnish the purity of Buddha's moral teaching. If we take away this teaching there remains really nothing worth treasuring in him. It is only in the light of his ethical teaching that we can ever hope to understand the abstruse portions of his psychology or of his metaphysics or whatever can be called metaphysics in his thought. Practically all the Jātaka stories seek to establish some moral principle. There is, for example, the parable of the quails and the fowler to show how the fowler was foiled in his work by the united cunning of the quails, but when they began to quarrel among themselves, the fowler has his chance and he could net them easily.

There is the story of how Dīghāvu reaped wealth and position by showing love to his enemy. And so it goes on birth after birth of the future Buddha, the very quintessence of morality. In spite of the intrinsic greatness of his teaching, for two centuries the Buddhists continued an obscure sect till the great Asoka felt its charm and made it a world movement. Asoka's edicts all go to show that what he valued most in Buddha's teaching was his emphasis on moral principles. The highest morality must always imply a love for others. That Buddha's ethics was not self-centred is abundantly proved by his historic life, even if we discard the tales of his previous births as mythological. He declared that he aimed at enlightenment not for his own sake but that he might enlighten others. The catholicity of his outlook has been equalled perhaps by Christ, but not surpassed by anyone. If there are a few passages here and there which point to the need of rooting out desires, let us not forget passages where he shows how "with the aid of craving does one eliminate craving." If Buddha taught an indiscriminate elimination of all desires, he should be held up as a dreamer ignorant of what life means or what morality means. But he was nothing of a mere dreamer. He knew that man does not and cannot live for himself. A man's love for his fellow-beings is the most redeeming feature of human life, and no teacher can claim to have probed the depths of humanity, who has not made this truth part and parcel of his own life and teaching. Buddha was among the earliest teachers of mankind to have mastered this truth, and in this sphere he reigns supreme with but few peers. There is no metaphysics about it, and if there is, it is possible to dissociate it for the purpose of appealing to the masses. The tone of high ethics that marked Buddha can be illustrated by nothing better than by his gentle, yet cutting, retort to the Brahmin that had come to abuse him.

BUDDHA: "When thou receivest visits from friends and colleagues, dost thou make food ready for them?"

BRAHMIN: "Yes, Master Gotama, sometimes I do."

BUDDHA: "But if they do not accept thy hospitality, whose do those things become?"

BRAHMIN: "If they do not accept them, those things are for us."

BUDDHA: "Even so, Brahmin. That wherewith thou revilest us, who revile not, wherewith thou scoldest us, who scold not, abusest us, who abuse not, that we accept not at thy hands. 'Tis for thee only, O Brahmin, only for thee."[1]

The atmosphere of good will and love that we find for all in the ethics of Buddha is something that we miss in the Hindu tales of the wrath of gods and cursing rishis, and the perpetual degradation of those people who had been reduced by the haughty Aryans to the

[1] Pratt's *Pilgrimage of Buddhism*, p. 11 footnote.

status of polluting Shūdras and Panchamas. This was the most revolutionary part of Buddha's teaching. If it had been accepted in its totality, India could have been a new country. But it was not to be, and India is what she is. Caste still rules. It has affected all who have come into touch with Hindus. Its unholy touch has corrupted every community in India, the Christians and the Muslims and the Zoroastrians not excepted.

(7) It has been a frequent charge against Buddhism that it overemphasizes sorrow and is therefore through and through pessimistic. That it is fully alive to the existence of sorrow and suffering cannot be gainsaid. Whether therefore it should be called pessimistic is an open question. In this respect it challenges comparison with Christianity. The religion of Christ too, at least as preached by missionaries, is acutely charged with a sense of sin, but Christ is presented as showing a way out of it, and if thereby Christianity can escape the charge of pessimism, the same logic must apply to Buddha, and he too must be absolved from the charge of pessimism, for he too shows the way out of the misery that is life. And here we come face to face with the most intriguing concept in Buddha: *Nirvāna.* If sorrow is the result of our attachments, and attachments lead to *karma* and *karma* leads to rebirths, it is surely a vicious circle to build up *karma* which can only end in rebirths. It is an easy temptation therefore to say that rebirths can end only with the cessation of *karma,* and therefore it is logical to put an end to *karma*—and the result would be *Nirvāna.* This easy path of interpretation has been followed and it has been argued that since life is evil, no-life or death must be good, and therefore cessation of life with no possibility of rebirth must be good, and this is what *Nirvāna* is made to mean: just nothingness, total extinction. If this interpretation is correct it exposes Buddha to a double criticism: (i) If the supreme end of life is no-life, or death without rebirth, what is the worth of morality? It may at best alleviate sorrow, it cannot extinguish it and therefore it only leads to a mere protraction of life and therefore of sorrow. If therefore in spite of this Buddha exhorts people to follow the Noble Eightfold Path, he is recommending a cure which protracts the disease of sorrow instead of curing it. (ii) If the end of life is nothingness, mere extinction, Buddhism must be dismissed as an essentially negative creed. How can anyone be content with the contemplation of so negative an end?

These two criticisms are mutually destructive, but each of them taken by itself has some point in it. It is doubtful if any person who sees any good in life will ever be content with the total annihilation of it. If life is partly evil, our moral practices should rid it of evil and make life worth living. The possibility of this negatives the fundamental assumption that life is wholly evil. Could so great a

teacher as Buddha have been guilty of so palpable a contradiction? The only solution of this impasse is to retrace our steps and restate the problem in its proper perspective. Both quantitatively and qualitatively Buddha's teaching is so charged with morality that we must make it the basic point in our examination of his philosophy. If we are exhorted to be moral, surely it must be for the good of mankind. It certainly makes life worth living, and gives a certain positive content to it, and to that extent it cannot all be *duḥkha*: sorrow and suffering. If morality implies an assertion of life, the end of morality cannot be something negative; it must be positive, and since Nirvāna is promised as the fruition of good life, Nirvāna itself must be positive, and not negative. It cannot be so negative as the complete extinction of life. This is just the conclusion which forces itself on a dispassionate student of Buddha's teaching. He himself has said: "The destruction of greed, the destruction of hate, the destruction of illusion—this, O friend, is what is called *Nibbāna.*" [1] The Buddhist formulation of Nirvāna emphasizes the consciousness that "birth is at an end, that the higher life has been fulfilled, that all that should be done has been done, and that after this present life there will be no more becoming." So Nirvāna does imply extinction, not of life, but of lust, ill-will, ignorance, anger, fear, and everything that makes life a burden. He who has attained this state is an *Arahant,* he has attained *Nirvāna.* The *Arahant* may go to heaven or not, that is a matter of very secondary importance, if of any importance at all. Mrs. Rhys Davids, one of the most outstanding European scholars in the field of Buddhism, analyses the state of Nirvāna and finds it involves mental enlightenment, mastery of self and equanimity of mind. The Upanishadic *Shānti* (peace) and *Ānanda* (bliss) are there. If it involves so many positive qualities, it cannot be mere nothingness. It is the consciousness of life's work done well and it carries its own reward. It sees the end of the cycle of births and deaths, and this has been the religious quest of India through the ages. It bears a likeness to the Advaitic conception of *Jīvan-mukti,* emancipation even in this life. Perhaps the Upanishadic *Moksha* means nothing more than Buddha's *Nirvāna,* but with this difference: it is achieved not as mere *jñāna* with morality as an adjunct, but through the hard toil of a moral life, through the forgetting of one's self in the sorrows and tribulations of others. Anyone imbued with this spirit can take up the burden of a Bodhisattva, face life and death again and again to be ever at the side of those that need his help. That is the lesson taught us by the Jātaka stories: Buddha was the willing bearer of the world's sorrows and postponed his Buddhahood for countless ages. Here in this concept of Nirvāna we touch the high watermark of Buddha's teaching.

[1] *Nibbāna* is the Pālin form of Saskrit *Nirvāna.*

(8) Buddha discovered the secret of life. In fact he was hunting for it to enlighten others. He must spread the knowledge he had gained, and he did spread it during his life. But what would happen after his death? His discovery must not die with himself or even with the death of his immediate disciples. He had to found an organization that could carry on his work and carry his gospel to the four corners of the earth. And so he issued his appeal:

> "Fare ye forth, brethren, on the mission that is for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, to take compassion on the world, to work profit and good and happiness to gods and men. Go no two of you the same way.[1] Teach ye the truth lovely in its origin, lovely in its progress, lovely in its consummation. Both in the spirit and the letter proclaim ye the higher life in all its fullness, in all its purity. Beings there are whose eyes are dimmed with dust, perishing because they hear not the truth."

If this was the settled intention of Buddha, he had to take steps to carry it out, and the idea of the *Saṅgha* was the result. That the *Saṅgha* as an organization of the Buddhists was actually brought into existence and that it did excellent work in the early history of Buddhism is all a matter of history. Its essential aim was to spread the doctrine, and this necessitated missions going to places far and near. This sort of life could be followed only by those who had no encumbrances in the form of wives and children. In other words, celibacy was inevitable. It was also logical that they should eschew all possible incentives to sexual life, e.g. dancing, singing, attending theatrical and similar performances. They had to avoid the use of garlands, scents and ornaments, comfortable beds and money, for the lure of money would lead to corruption. That the life of the monks was ascetic in the sense of rigorous discipline cannot be denied. That such a life had a purpose and that purpose was the spread of the gospel of morality and Nirvāna among the people at large is equally certain. That it was to serve as a refuge from the world and foster a life of laziness and dependence, was quite against the grain of Buddha, and if in later ages the *Saṅgha* did degenerate into such a gathering of idlers and social parasites, it could only be regarded as a most unfortunate perversion of Buddha's teaching. That Buddha was against the idea of beggary is beautifully illustrated in his parable which goes to show how a beggar is never loved by anyone.[2] It is shown equally by his own life of strenuous work: preaching and helping all and sundry. None was too low or abandoned for him, for,

[1] This passage is interesting from the comparative-religion point of view as illustrating the opposite of Christ's practice as mentioned at Mark vi. 7: "He began to send them forth by two and two."—ED.

[2] Burlingame's *Buddhist Parables*, p. 68.

like Christ, he too saw that no one is so abandoned that he or she could not be reclaimed. This attitude, too, is in striking contrast to the haughty attitude of orthodox Hindus, the "holiest" of whom dread to lose their "holiness" through the touch of the impure, whereas genuinely holy people like Buddha and Christ were conscious of the redeeming power that they possessed whereby their touch could sanctify even sinners.

(9) The place of women in the *Saṅgha* constitutes an interesting chapter in the history of Buddhism. Buddha's own attitude to women was in marked contrast to the orthodox Hindu attitude. Hindu religion for good or for evil fully recognizes the feminine element in religion. No god is complete without his wife as his *śakti* (power) and is most easily approachable through her. Buddha knew no god and therefore the need to recognize his spouse did not arise at all. But it could not be denied that Buddha was always a little suspicious of women. His advice to Ānanda as to how he should avoid women amply bears this out, and he justifies his attitude thus:

> "Women are soon angered, Ānanda; women are full of passion, Ānanda; women are envious, Ānanda; women are stupid, Ānanda. That is the reason, Ānanda, that the cause, why women have no place in public assemblies, do not carry on a business; and do not earn their living by any profession."[1]

Ānanda was more chivalrous in his attitude towards women and it was only under his pressure that Buddha agreed to organize a *Saṅgha* for women, but not without the tragic premonition that their inclusion would hasten the decay of the religion by a good five hundred years, a premonition which was duly fulfilled, for when the *Saṅghas* became the haunts of laziness, the devil gave ample opportunities to the monks and nuns to make their celibacy a cruel farce.

But in spite of his low opinion of women, Buddha was always just and kind to them. He would befriend even a harlot and saw no wrong in accepting a prostitute's invitation to dinner. For he had the consciousness of his mission, and he could not keep out anyone from his mission without stultifying his own teaching. He did not deny the possibility of a woman rising above the infirmities of her sex and showing her worthiness to benefit through his teaching. Here again he showed the excellence of the Middle Path, for he neither deified woman as some Hindu cults have done, nor did he debase her and exploit her as so many of the later Dharma Sastras tended to do, and as modern Hindu Law has succeeded in perpetuating her inferiority.

(10) Buddha's treatment of caste has given rise to conflicting opinions. Sir Charles Eliot permits himself to make a surprising

[1] Quoted on p. 162 in Coomarswamy's *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism.*

statement: "And though he (Buddha) denied that the Brahmans were superior by birth to others, he did not preach against caste, partly because it then existed in a rudimentary form."[1] This is a double-edged argument, for if in Buddha's time caste had not developed its evil tendencies, there was indeed no reason why he should raise his voice against it, but it does not follow that he believed in, or countenanced, caste. In fact the whole tendency of his teaching, explicitly and implicitly, militated against caste. It was his glory to say: "As in the ocean all the great rivers lose their name and being, so in my doctrine all the castes merge."[2] In a similar strain he once said: "My doctrine is like the sky. There is room for all without exception: men, women, boys and girls, poor and rich." In the *Dhammapada* he gives an ethical interpretation of the Brahmin in the same strain as Yuddhiṣṭhira in the *Mahābhārata*:

> "He who is thoughtful, blameless, settled, dutiful, without passions, and who has attained the highest end, him I call indeed a Brāhmana. . . .
>
> Him I call a Brāhmana who does not offend by body, word or thought, and is controlled on these three points.
>
> A man does not become a Brāhmana by his plaited hair, by his family or by birth; in whom there is truth and righteousness, he is blessed, he is a Brāhmana.
>
> What is the use of plaited hair, O fool! What of the raiment of goat-skins? Within thee there is ravening, but the outside thou makest clean.
>
> I do not call a man a Brāhmana because of his origin or of his mother. He is indeed arrogant and he is wealthy. But the poor who is free from all attachments, him I call indeed a Brāhmana."[3]

In the *Āmagandha Sutta* of the *Sutta Nipāta* it is stated that defilement does not come from eating this or that, prepared or given by this or that person, but from evil deeds and words and thoughts.

In the face of such explicit passages it would be futile to argue that Buddha countenanced caste in the sense in which it has become a fetish with the orthodox Hindus during the last thousand years and more. Rhys Davids in his Introduction to the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* points out how Buddha's Order contained people of all castes: Upāli was a barber, Sunīta was of a low tribe, Sati belonged to the fisherfolk, Nanda was a cowherd, and the list could be multiplied. Thus it is clear that Buddha was the first rebel against the tyranny

[1] *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. i, p. xxii.
[2] Dahlke's *Buddhist Essays*, p. 59.
[3] *Dhammapada*, translated by Max Müller, pp. 62–3.

of caste, even though in his time caste was much more fluid than it has since become. If his message of human equality had taken root in the Indian soil, Indian history might have been a record of great patriotic victories instead of defeats at the hands of every foreigner who has tried his luck at gathering the gold of India. The ugly truth has to be accepted that the whole organization of the Hindu society has been built up on the unabashed recognition of the aristocratic principle. Every Hindu must belong to a caste, not of his choosing, but the one in which he happens to be born. Every caste except of course the highest, the Brahmins, admits the superiority of some other caste, but it as scrupulously regards itself as superior to some other caste, an excellent exemplification of the simultaneous working of the superiority and inferiority complexes, so much so that even the most despised outcastes have developed their own aristocracy in the form of the Right Hand people and the Left Hand people, each priding itself on its own superiority. Buddhism was far too democratic for such a society. Whatever the precept and the example of Buddha himself his followers failed to eschew caste completely, and in the subsequent centuries caste corroded the Buddhist society as much as it has succeeded in corroding the life of the Christian Churches in recent times; even Islam, the most democratic religion, has allowed itself to be influenced by caste so far at least as Islam in India is concerned. This perhaps explains the paradox that Buddhism found a more congenial soil wherein to flourish in China and Japan than in aristocratic India.

II

It is a fascinating historical problem to find out why Buddhism was ultimately driven out of India. One or the other of three reasons has usually been assigned for this, and it would be interesting to examine the cogency of each of them.

(1) The Rev. Anagārika Dharmapāla of the Mahābodhi Society does not hesitate to lay the chief blame at the door of Muslim fanaticism and writes categorically: "In the eleventh century Buddhism found its dread foe in Baktiar Khilji, the great Vandal, who destroyed the libraries of Nalanda and Odantapuri."[1] Sir Charles Eliot is more cautious in his judgment: "There is thus every reason to suppose that in the twelfth century Buddhism still flourished in Bihar, that its clergy numbered several thousands and its learning was held in esteem. The blow which destroyed its power was struck by a Mohammedan invasion in 1193. In that year, Ikhtiyar-ud-Din Muhammad, a general of Kutb-ud-Din, invaded Bihar with a band of only two hundred men and with amazing audacity seized the capital, which,

[1] *The Life and Teachings of Buddha* (G. A. Natesan & Co.), p. 7.

consisting chiefly of palaces and monasteries, collapsed without a blow. The monks were massacred to a man."[1] But he denies that the Muslim conqueror had any special animus against Buddhism, and goes on to explain why Buddhism did suffer so much: "But whereas Hinduism was spread over the country, Buddhism was concentrated in the great monasteries and when these were destroyed there remained nothing outside them capable of withstanding either the violence of the Moslims or the assimilative influence of the Brahmins. Hence Buddhism suffered far more from these invasions than Hinduism."[2] This is palpably as bad as it could have been, but he refuses to assert that persecution was the main cause of the decadence of Buddhism, and does not look upon it even as "very important among the accessory causes."[3] He diagnoses the case admirably when he says about Buddhism that "when its temples and monasteries were demolished it did not live on in the hearts of the people, as did Hinduism with all its faults."[4]

Muslim fanaticism in open defiance of the noble teachings of the Prophet Mahomed has indeed been a recurrent feature of Muslim conquests in all lands. But nowhere has it succeeded in totally rooting out rival religions of a really high order. In Iran Zoroastrianism has persisted right down till the present day, and this in spite of frequent persecutions and endless religious and political disabilities. In India, too, Hinduism after centuries of Muslim rule still continues the dominant religion. Persecution has often had in human history exactly the opposite effect of fanning the smouldering embers of some ancient or new faith. The history of early Christianity in the Roman Empire abundantly proves this and so does the history of Sikhism in India.

On the whole we have to reject categorically the theory of Muslim persecution as the cause of the Buddhist exile from India.

(2) A far more satisfactory explanation of the decay of Buddhism in India is to be found in the steady deterioration of the Buddhist morals and morale. It is very sad to reflect that this process set in almost immediately after the death of Buddha, when his ashes and bones were distributed among the faithful, and over each of them arose a stupa, magnificent from the standpoint of archaeology, but ruinous from the standpoint of the life-work of Buddha himself. He had foreseen the decay of his teaching through ceremonialism, as every other religion too has decayed through the cunning machinations of unscrupulous priests. Even the Buddhist monks failed to live up to the ideal laid down by their Master. They were originally brought into being as missionaries, but as the piety of the laity brought them magnificent viharas to live in and plenty of food, they

[1] *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. ii, pp. 112–13.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 119. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 120. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

degenerated into idlers. Sir Charles Eliot points out how Buddhism was affected even by the eroticism of Tantric Śaktism. As the worship of the Bodhisattva Avalokita came more and more into vogue, the worship of *Tārā* as female deity also became fashionable. "The Buddha or Bodhisattva is represented as enjoying nirvāna because he is united to his spouse. . . . The devotee may imagine that he enters into *Tārā* as the embryo and is born of her as a Buddha. More often the argument is that since the bliss of the Buddha consists in union with *Tārā*, nirvāna can be obtained by sexual union here and we find many of the Tantric wizards represented as accompanied by female companions. The adept should avoid all action, but he is beyond good and evil and the dangerous doctrine that he can do evil with impunity, which the more respectable sects repudiate, is expressly taught."[1]

One can see in this a parallel to the history of the Roman Catholic Church in medieval Europe, but with a characteristic difference. The immorality of the popes and monks in Europe produced a Wycliffe and a Luther. There was an open revolt which was the means of reasserting the purity of Christian morals. The Protestant Reformation incited a Counter-Reformation within the Catholic Church itself, and this partly accounts for the interesting fact that even to-day the Roman Church is the most compact and the most well-organized religious organization in the whole world, and it claims the largest number of followers within Christendom itself.

Buddhism failed to produce a Luther, though it did not fail to produce a host of metaphysicians. Buddhism lived true to the type of the Hindu philosopher, and like Hinduism it lost its moral vigour. Subtleties in verbal logic came to be the order of the day and the relative importance of morality and metaphysics came to be reversed in the Buddhism of the Buddhists as distinguished from the Buddhism of the Buddha himself. This double lapse into barren metaphysics and dangerous religious ritualism undoubtedly offers a plausible explanation for the decay of Buddhism, but not for its total disappearance from India. After all the history of every religion shows an almost inevitable decay sooner or later, for the heights of the prophets cannot be maintained by an organized or hereditary priesthood for whom religion has become a profession, and not a mission. But such a decay does not imply a total eradication, and therefore in the history of Indian Buddhism its ultimate extinction has to find some other explanation.

(3) It has been suggested that Buddhism performed its historic mission but its atheism was not based upon a sound metaphysics, and therefore as soon as a great philosophic genius like Śankara arose, the best in Buddha's teaching was absorbed by him and all its

[1] Sir Charles Eliot's *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. ii, p. 123.

angularities rounded off into a smooth, logically perfect, metaphysics, which the world has come to know as Advaita Vedānta. Śankara himself has been sarcastically described by his opponents as Prachanna[1]-Buddha, and behind this sarcasm lies a great amount of truth. Logically Śankara was as much a confirmed agnostic as Buddha himself, but he had the Hindu astuteness to conceal it from the masses under the guise of countenancing every practice as suited to the ill-developed brain capacity of different individuals. It has been said of a follower of Śankara to-day that he confirms each man in his stupidity. The expression is not inapt in the case of Śankara himself, and that is why we find that while Śankara's brilliant intellect helped to rout the Buddhist metaphysics, and succeeded in giving a fillip to the worship of Shiva and the observances of caste practices, he failed to give his generation that moral vigour which was the supreme service of Buddha to his generation.

It is a common popular idea that Śankara drove Buddhism out of India. But it would be far truer to say that Śankara freely adopted what he liked from the armoury of Buddha, including *ahiṁsā* (non-violence) and vegetarianism. And so, in a sense, Buddhism still lives in India, though in a new garb, but only at the cost of its soul; for Advaita, as Neo-Buddhism, failed to tackle the problem of caste and untouchability, or to weld together the teeming castes of India, though Śankara gave a certain semblance of religious unity to Hinduism by establishing his Mutts in the four corners of India. That Śankara the agnostic should have done this is as much a paradox of history as the extinction of Buddhism in India. Śaṅkara's triumph was indeed at the expense of Buddhism, but it would be bad history to credit Śankara alone with the conquest of Buddhism. He was but a mirror of India's soul. He had the genius to grasp the psychology of the ignorant masses and adapted himself to their needs by trotting out the *paramārthika*[2] and the *vyavahārika*[3] like a practised dialectician to suit the nature of differing audiences. It is a supreme irony in India that in succeeding centuries right down till our own times Śankara has been revered and worshipped as a man of religion, while the keen logic of his thought effectually exposed the pretensions of *Īśvara*[4] as nothing more than a fragment of the world of *māyā*.[5]

(4) The reasons dealt with above are generally advanced to explain the disappearance of Buddhism from India, but we have tried to show that none of them is completely satisfactory. The real reason lies much deeper and is really to be found in the psychology of the Hindus. We have tried to show in the first part of this essay how every important teaching of Buddha was through and through

[1] Concealed. [2] Relating to the ultimate soul.
[3] Relating to the world. [4] Personal God. [5] Appearance.

revolutionary and more or less repugnant to the Hindu mind. The extreme emphasis on pure morality without its roots in the divinity of gods failed to make a lasting appeal, and that is why the Buddhists deified him, and the Hindus made him an avatar[1] of Vishnu and laid the flattering unction to their soul that thereby they had done all for Buddha that they could be reasonably expected to do. Similarly in the matter of caste neither the teaching nor the example of Buddha had any appreciable effect. If it be true, as asserted by some, that in his time caste had not developed into a rigid institution, it is all the more distressing that even its tendency to rigidity failed to be checked. As a matter of mere history we cannot but come to the conclusion, disappointing though it be, that Buddhism as Buddha conceived it almost died with Buddha, and the Buddhism that lived a chequered career in India for a millennium and a half was not so much a way of life as a creed. As a force against the traditional Hinduism it had to be itself transformed into metaphysics or religion: just the two things that Buddha was most suspicious about and did his best to avoid.

But if Buddha failed in India he succeeded in China, for China with her simple and direct emphasis on morality and her freedom from the subtleties of metaphysics offered a genial soil for the growth of Buddhism. The Chinaman is a hard-headed, hard-working, practical man, devoted to his good earth and rooted in his soil. He knows no artificial divisions of society. The Chinese society is essentially democratic. In the worst days of imperial absolutism entrance to public services was controlled through a rigorous system of public examinations. Ability, not birth, opened the gates of public service. In a country so fond of children as China ascetic celibacy could hardly be expected to flourish. But, after all, even Buddha had aimed not at producing recluses, but active missionaries free from the trammels of family life. He did not want them to be self-centred, self-mortifying ascetics. A monk after Buddha's pattern required just a certain amount of discipline to heighten his moral energy, and the practical Chinaman could take up the role of a Buddhist monk.

Chinese Buddhism has deviated from the teaching of Buddha only in one respect predominantly, and that is in the direction of theism. But even this has been done so beautifully and so logically that Buddhist theism in China stands self-justified. In one of his last discourses to his favourite follower, Ānanda, Buddha related how on a previous occasion he had resisted the temptation to enter into Nirvāna, and narrated his reply to Māra:

> "I shall not go into Nirvāna, thou evil one, before I have monks as hearers, wise, disciplined, experienced, well-informed, who

[1] Rebirth.

possess the doctrine of salvation, who have the calm corresponding to the doctrine of salvation; not until these themselves, after commencing their teaching office, impart, proclaim, teach, determine, explain, expound, correct; not until they proclaim the doctrine of salvation with tokens of wonder, after having suppressed the protests of others which can be suppressed by the aid of the doctrine of salvation. . . .

I shall not go into Nirvāna, thou evil one, until this irreproachable conduct of mine has succeeded and bloomed widespread, known to many and richly multiplied, so that it has been beautifully manifested to men."[1]

The development of the doctrine of the Bodhisattva is perfectly consistent with the spirit of this passage, though not with the teaching of Buddha as the gospel of self-help. In one of the Mahāyāna books we come across the following resolve and vow of the Bodhisattva to save all beings:

"I take upon myself the burden of all sufferings, I am resolved to do so, to bear them. I turn not back, I do not flee, I quake not, neither do I tremble. I fear not, I yield not, nor do I hesitate. And why? Because I must take upon me the burden of all beings. It is not my free will. The deliverance of all beings is my solemn vow; all beings will have to be delivered by me. By me must the whole world of living creatures be delivered. From the wilderness of birth, from the wilderness of age, from the wilderness of sickness, from the wilderness of death, from the wilderness of all kinds of misfortune, from the wilderness of the evil forms of existence, from the wilderness of the entire circulation of rebirths, from the wilderness of all heresies, from the wilderness of the loss of the good religion, from the wilderness arising out of uncertainty, from all these wildernesses I must save all beings. . . .

I work for the establishment of the incomparable kingdom of knowledge for all beings. I take pains not only for my own redemption. For all these beings must be brought by me from the river of Samsāra (earthly existence) in the boat of thought to omniscience. From the great abyss I must raise them, from all calamities I must deliver them, I must lead them out from the river of Samsāra. I must take upon myself the whole burden of the sufferings of all beings. As far as I am able, I will taste all the sufferings of all the evil forms of existence, as they are borne in all parts of the world. And no being must be deceived by me as to the root of the good. I have resolved to live in every single evil form of existence for countless millions of ages. And as in one evil form of existence, so there is reason for me to deliver all beings in all the evil forms of

[1] Quoted in Söderblom's *The Living God*, p. 145.

existence without exception in whatever part of the world they occur. And why? It is surely better that I alone suffer than that all beings should come to the places of evil existence."[1]

It would be difficult to hunt for a more exalted passage than this one, and if any being deserves to be deified, it is surely such a Bodhisattva. No wonder that this conception, though of Indian origin, found a more congenial soil for its acceptance and development in China. If such a view has detracted from the manliness of self-help, it has at least tended to give a broad catholic basis and held out a hope to all that they need not despair, and in China through the ages has gone up the cry: "Reverently and confidently I take refuge in Amitābha."

III

Western critics of Indian life and thought are fond of dwelling on the tone of pessimism they find in India. Hindu thinkers resent this charge and fondly dwell on the joyousness of the Rigvedic hymns and the serenity of the Upanishadic speculations. If they plead guilty to the charge of pessimism at all they trace it to the influence of Buddha almost as an alien force in the history of Hindu culture. For the millions of Hindu masses the antics and loves of Krishna have had a far greater fascination than the sombre life of Buddha, who gave up power to go about with the beggar's bowl. Even the legendary myths of Shiva and Pārvatī have a sway over the Hindu mind which the gentle love of Yaśodhara for Buddha has never had. As in metaphysics, so in popular religion in India, Buddha and his message failed to impress themselves. That is the story of the past. Is the future likely to tell a different tale?

What really are the chances of a Buddhist revival in the India of to-day? The establishment of the Mahābodhi Society in Calcutta, the consecration of the beautiful new temple at Sarnath, and the attempts persistently made in recent years by the Buddhists to regain possession of the temple at *Gayā*, all undoubtedly bear witness to a revival of interest in Buddhism in India. Whether all this will bear fruit on any vast scale remains to be seen. The psychology of the people, which has been so markedly anti-Buddhistic, has not changed materially. But modern conditions have affected at least the life of the educated sections to an appreciable extent. The political situation has created a sympathy for the untouchables among the political-minded Hindus, as neither ethics nor religion ever succeeded in doing in the past. Western education has certainly and profoundly affected the religious outlook of the educated youth, whether in the direction of an honest agnosticism or of a purified

[1] Quoted in Söderblom's *The Living God*, pp. 151–2.

monotheism. Pure theism is not having an unchallenged existence in India any more than in Europe or America, and if spiritual values are not to disappear under the pressure of materialistic thought, some substitute must be found which could mitigate the effects of a naked materialism, and such a substitute may reasonably be found in Buddhism. Sixty millions of untouchables labelled as Buddhists may not solve all our political problems. But if they could be raised to that level of education where they could see in Buddha a great moral uplifter, and not a mere dispenser of ready-made redemption, we can have a new society in India in which the oppressed of yesterday can command recognition and respect of the oppressors themselves. If Buddhism can transform the lives of untouchables it is bound to have a most healthy reaction on all sections of Indian society. Perhaps even the caste-ridden Hinduism may succeed in capturing the moral vigour of Buddha, and then the mission of Buddha will have been truly fulfilled, whether his image is worshipped or not in a million temples. Perhaps after twenty-five centuries of political humiliations and the crudities of caste, and soul-killing superstitions and ignorance, Indians may yet learn that life is much more than religious ceremonials and ideas of conventional purity. If there be any truth in the idea that a people's life in the last resort is governed only by their philosophic outlook, there can be hope for India only when every Hindu can extend a hand of fellowship to every other Hindu, be he a Brahmin or an untouchable, and when every Indian can see a brother in every other Indian, whether he be from the North or the South. Buddha showed the way. It is for the Indians to accept the way.

WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY: THE WORLD AS *PROCESS*[1]

SYDNEY E. HOOPER, M.A.

THIS paper will endeavour to present an outline of the Organic Philosophy associated with the name of Whitehead. Whitehead resembles Spinoza and Leibniz in that he is a philosopher who has tried to construct a world-outlook that will do justice to science and to the other aspects of life and knowledge. Moreover, just as in his day Leibniz was an eminent mathematician and scientist, so Whitehead in our day enjoys the same distinction. But Whitehead's philosophy differs both from that of Spinoza and from that of Leibniz. Spinoza based his philosophy upon the monistic substance, of which the actual events in the world are the inferior modes. Whitehead bases his philosophy upon the actual events themselves and derives the solidarity of the world as a whole from their mutual interplay. Thus the organic philosophy is pluralistic in contrast with Spinoza's monism. In comparing Whitehead's philosophy with that of Leibniz, we find that they agree in both being pluralistic, but they differ in the emphasis placed upon the notion of mentality. Leibniz's monads are best conceived as generalizations of the notion of mentality, and the conception of physical bodies only enters into his philosophy subordinately and derivatively. Whitehead, however, in his philosophy of organism endeavours to hold the balance between the physical and mental more evenly, and thus does justice to both aspects of reality.

The exposition of Whitehead's philosophy given in this paper is derived for the most part from the four books, *Concept of Nature*, *Science and the Modern World*, *Process and Reality*, and *Adventures of Ideas*.

The fundamental ideas of the organic philosophy are "Creativity," "Actual Entity," "Eternal Objects" and "God." At the outset I wish to emphasize the importance of a clear understanding that the four ideas to be discussed presuppose each other, so that in isolation they are meaningless. That is to say, the fundamental notions of the organic philosophy are not capable of abstraction from each other. This does not mean that the separate ideas are definable in terms of each other; it means that what is *indefinable* in any one of the ideas cannot be abstracted from its relevance to the other ideas. The pre-supposition of the scheme of thought at the base of the organic philosophy is that no entity can be conceived in complete

[1] Series, *Contemporary World-Outlooks* (IV).

abstraction from the system of the universe as a whole. Consequently the fundamental ideas employed in the description of the universe pre-suppose each other. It will be observed that in this scheme of ideas, the "substance-quality" concept is avoided, being replaced by the description of the world as dynamic process. I will first consider the notion of "creativity."

Creativity

In introducing the notion of "Creativity," the author of the organic philosophy reminds us that in all philosophical theory there is an ultimate which is only capable of characterization through its *embodiment,* and apart from these embodiments is devoid of actuality. That is to say, there is no pure or "eminent" activity (as some theologians have thought), but only activity embodied in the events of the world. In the organic philosophy this ultimate is termed "Creativity." Later on we shall learn that the ultimate has a primordial non-temporal character which is termed "God" and that in respect of the individual facts or "creatures" of nature, defined by certain forms, Creativity is the ultimate behind all forms and is itself inexplicable by forms.

The Organic Philosophy at the outset emphasizes a fundamental principle of the universe, namely, that it is of the innermost nature of things for the "many" to enter into complex unity. (We find, for example, that atoms are components of molecules, and that separate cells are components of organic bodies.) On the abstract level of philosophic thought, the "many" are the universe regarded as a multiplicity of discrete things, and it lies in the nature of these many things to come together to form a new sort of unity. "Creativity" is the ultimate principle by which the many discrete things, which are the universe disjunctively, become through a process of synthesis, a new individual actual entity which is the universe conjunctively. The phrase "the universe conjunctively" means that the novel actual entity, which creativity has brought into being, unifies all the separate entities of the universe into a "togetherness" from its own perspective or point of view. It is to be noted that, by unifying the many separate entities of the universe into a new creature, creativity produces a novel actual entity different from any of the entities which it unifies. That is to say, by the function of creativity the many discrete entities of the universe are synthesized into a new individual, and are therefore increased by one. Whitehead expresses this "growth" of the universe in these words: "the novel entity or synthetic unity, is at once the togetherness of the many which it finds, and also 'one' among the disjunctive many which it leaves."[1] Creativity thus

[1] *Process and Reality,* p. 29.

discloses itself as the principle of novelty responsible for the creative advance of nature.

Perhaps the most vivid way of conceiving the notion of "Creativity" is to think of it as the pure notion of the activity of the universe conditioned by what Whitehead calls the "objective immortality" of the actual world. The world is always changing, though at the same time it possesses a certain stable element of divine ordering. The changing world, which is never the same twice, we experience as the "passage" of nature. Now in physical science, there are certain quantities called "vectors," i.e. quantities that are "passed on." These are more fundamental than "scaler" quantities, which are constructs derivative from vectors. In the Organic Philosophy the notion of "passing on" or vectors employed in physical science becomes "creativity," bearing the meaning "to bring forth," "to beget," "to produce." No actual entity in the world can be divorced from the notion of Creativity. Indeed, as we shall see later, every actual entity must be thought of as a "mode" of the ultimate creativity which it conditions by its own unique achievement.

"Creativity" is thus the ultimate notion of highest generality at the base of actuality. It is the universal of universals. It cannot be characterized because all characters are more special than itself. If we wish to learn anything further concerning creativity, we must pay regard to its "creatures," since it is they which constitute its shifting character. This transcendent Creativity is, as we have said, conditioned in its activity by the occasions of the actual world. It is also qualified by God, who is at once the outcome of creativity, the foundation of the world's order, and the goal towards novelty. Its two attributes are (1) that of pluralizing itself into a multiplicity of finite individual actual entities, and (2) the realm of possibility, which we shall see later is the realm of eternal objects corresponding to Plato's realm of "Ideas."

Actual Entities

We now turn to consider the idea of an "Actual Entity" and its place in the system of the Organic Philosophy. What is an actual entity? At the outset it is well to be put on our guard against the temptation to think of actual entities, in the Philosophy with which we are concerned, as "substances" such as silk or wood or iron. They are not static substances with certain qualities, but "processes." Another name for an actual entity is an "occasion of experience," and an occasion of experience is described as being a "prehensive unity." It will, therefore, help us to understand the nature of an actual entity, if we can give an example which shows how an "occasion of experience" is also a "prehensive unity." Briefly it may

be said that "prehension" is a way of experiencing other things as *constitutive* of the actual experience of an occasion.

Imagine two young men, John and William, on a walking tour in the English counties bordering on Wales. John knows the district well, to William it is novel. On reaching the summit of a hill, John points to a distant building visible from where the two are standing, and asks William how the building appears to him. William replies that, at the distance he is from it, the building indicated seems only a small round tower. John then tells William that he knows the building, and has many times visited it; that, in reality, it is no small round tower, but a large square building with battlements and turrets, which apparently William does not see. The two young men begin to discuss the disparity between what the building is in its own "place" or separate setting, several miles away, and what it is from the place where they are now standing. They come to the conclusion that the object which William strictly and properly perceives by sight cannot be the thing which is several miles distant because "a small round tower" is one thing, and "a large square building with battlements and turrets" another.

The illustration I have just given is one example of an "occasion of experience" which is also a "prehensive unity." We can see at once that William's perception is an occasion of experience, since it is one of the events in his life-history. But the occasion of experience is also a "prehensive unity." The "small, round tower" which William sees from the hill where he is standing is a unity, *from a certain standpoint,* of "aspects" of *other* things in *other* places. That is to say, it is a prehensive unity of aspects of the "large square building with battlements and turrets" situate some miles from William's place of vision. Such an "occasion of experience" is what is meant by an "actual entity" in the Organic Philosophy. It will be observed that the notion stands for a unit of experience mirroring other aspects of the world from its own unique point of view. When, for example, a person is looking at a distant castle, or cloud, or planet, the things which are grasped into a realized unity, here and now, are not the distant castle, cloud, or planet in themselves, in their own separate settings, but rather "perspectives" of the castle, cloud, or planet from the standpoint of the prehensive unification.[1] A prehensive occasion of experience is, thus, a process of unification of aspects of other things, and such a process is an actual entity. Every actual entity "takes account of" the essential character of other things, and this "taking account of" is its

[1] "Prehension" is a technical term which can most simply be explained as meaning "apprehension" without the "ap-," i.e. without awareness. Whitehead points out that Bacon regarded objects as all "perceiving" one another to the extent that they affected each other.

prehension of aspects of other entities as constituents of its own becoming.

At this point we may call attention to the assumption that has dominated the philosophy of science throughout the modern era, called by Whitehead "the fallacy of simple location." It is the view that a piece of matter is in a definite region of space and throughout a definite duration of time, apart from any essential reference of the relation of that thing or quality to other regions of space and to other durations of time. This view is based on the error of considering space and time as the "loci of simple locations." But space and time are simply abstractions from the totality of prehensive unifications, mutually patterned in each other. If, as we have seen, an actual occasion of experience is a prehensive unity of *perspectives*, the things that are prehended into a realised unity *here and now* are aspects of things in other places *from the special point of view of the percipient occasion.* That is to say, the notion of the primitive entities of Nature being "prehensive unities" shows that the assumption of 'simple' location is a fallacy.

Perhaps an illustration will make this clear. Imagine you are perceiving a single *sense-object* "green" in a blade of grass. Now the theory of prehensions implies that the green is not simply at the place where you are perceiving it, nor in the blade where it is seen, but must be regarded as *at the point of view of the percipient occasion* (i.e. yourself), with its mode of location in the blade.[1]

Actual entities, then, are processes prehending aspects of other things into novel occasions of experience.[2] The example we gave of William on the brow of the hill prehending the distant castle in the form of a small, round tower as one of the occasions constituting his life history, was from the high-grade organism we call "Man." Can we say that the actual entities constituting nature as a whole are also occasions of experiencing? The Philosophy of Organism asserts that we can. It contends that all natural entities, forming star systems, planets, rocks, molecules or atoms are generically of the same kind. All the actual entities constituting the varied universe are ultimately occasions of experience, although comparatively few of them are "conscious." They are prehensive unities, the gathering of aspects of other things into the unity of an individual atomic

[1] Consider a percipient event (P) at region A. Now the *mode* of a sense-object "green" at A (abstracted from the sense-object whose relationship to region A the mode is conditioning) is the aspect from A of some other region B. The sense-object "green" relates region A to region B. That is to say, the *mode* of the sense-object "green" at A is expressible as location elsewhere.

[2] Whitehead maintains (as did Leibniz) that, while consciousness is a rare character in the universe, only found in association with high-grade organisms, "experience" is universal, because all actual entities prehend one another.

experience. The realization of natural entities is a process of synthesizing into the unity of a prehension, perspectives of other things from the standpoint of a novel creative synthesis. According to this line of thought natural entities are processes of prehension culminating in individual unities of experience. Each prehensive unity mirrors the universe from its own unique standpoint.

We may here ask how this view of nature, as a whole of individual prehensive occasions of experience, is reached by the Organic Philosophy? The answer is as follows. Whitehead starts from our own psychological field. He takes our psychological experience to be the self-knowledge of the total event we call our body. That "self-knowledge" he affirms, discloses itself as a prehensive unification of prescences of entities *beyond* self-awareness. He now makes a generalization, and employs the principle that the total bodily event is, as far as nature is concerned, on the same level as all other events "except for an unusual complexity and stability of inherent pattern." Whitehead considers that this method avoids an arbitrary break in nature. It implies a principle of continuity from the level of human consciousness down the scale to inorganic matter, and leads to the "organic" conception of nature. Thus, in the Organic Philosophy, nature is conceived as a structure of evolving processes.

Before we come to an end of this section on actual entities, we shall have to ask some such question as this. If the Organic Philosophy asserts that "reality is the process," how are we to think of those things in the world which have the character of "endurance," for there certainly are enduring things? We shall return to this question later. In the meantime, let us learn a little more detail concerning actual entities.

"Actual entities" or "actual occasions" are said to be the real things of which the world is made. They are atomic and individual in their nature, not substances but processes. The process is a growth from phase to phase ending in a definite achievement. It is a way of bringing various elements into a real unity, and this is accomplished by a genuine creative synthesis. An actual entity "mirrors" the whole world from its special standpoint as a unity of experience, though not necessarily as a "conscious" experience. Aspects of all the other occasions of the world are synthesized according to the "principle of relevance" in every new occasion, and the synthesis of perspectives of the world from the standpoint of the given novel occasion *is* the new actual entity or new atomic creature. The means whereby other actual occasions are brought together into a novel unity, is through the functioning of eternal objects (to be discussed later). It is they that relate one occasion to another, thus effecting a new synthesis.

Actual entities as understood by Whitehead are fundamentally teleological, that is, they all seek goals. In this aspect they are called

by Whitehead "subjects"; but when their goal is reached they still retain their efficacy although of a different kind, and in this aspect are called "objects." As objects, they exercise efficient causation in the form of data offered to a new occasion as material for a fresh synthesis. That is to say, the new occasion prehends these data, and from this it follows that prehensions are intermediate phases between the data and the final unity of the process which is the subject. This view is reminiscent of Leibniz's attempt to show how both final and efficient causes operate without being inconsistent one with the other, and his view that all monads have perceptions. For Whitehead, as for Leibniz, the world of actual entities is a world of subjects enjoying experiences.

These experiences are called "prehensions" or "feelings" (as has already been briefly indicated). The term "feeling" does not necessarily imply consciousness, but it does imply the logically prior concept of experience. "Feeling" or "prehension" is a neutral term used for the operation of passing from the objectivity of the data presented for the synthesis, to the subjective immediacy of the actual entity—from publicity to privacy. A prehension, then, is an operation whereby aspects of *other* actual occasions are absorbed as components of a novel self-creating actual entity. Consequently an analysis of any given actual entity discloses it to consist of prehensions. But these prehensions which are components of an actual entity, are not independent entities, since they are all prehensions of one "subject" to which they belong and from which they cannot be torn.

Actual entities are "modes" of the ultimate creativity of the universe. They are units of experience mirroring the universe from their unique points of view. Since they aim at mirroring the universe from their own special standpoints, they must be regarded as "self-creative." In achieving the "ends" or "satisfactions" at which they aim, each actual entity attains a value which none other can share. Thus an actual entity can be analysed into (1) activity, (2) conditioned potentialities there for synthesis, and (3) an aesthetic value representing the outcome of the synthesis. Whitehead informs us that "the unity of all occasions forbids the analysis of activities into *independent* entities. Each individualized activity is nothing but the mode in which the general activity is individualized amid the imposed conditions. . . . The general activity is not an entity in the sense in which occasions or eternal objects are entities. It is a general metaphysical character which underlies all occasions, in a particular mode for each occasion. Its attributes are its character of individualization into a multiplicity of modes, and the realm of eternal objects, which are synthesized in these modes."[1] It will be obvious

[1] *Science and the Modern World*, p. 245.

that there is nothing in the temporal world with which we can compare the ultimate general activity, since all activities in the actual world must necessarily be more special than the ultimate activity.

There are two types of feeling in an actual entity, "physical" and "conceptual." Its "physical" feelings are its prehensions of other actual entities functioning as potential data for its synthesis: its "conceptual" feelings are derived from its prehensions of eternal objects functioning as forms of definiteness. In consequence of these two types of feeling, every actual entity is said to have a "physical pole" and a "mental pole." The potential data offered to a novel actual occasion for synthesis, function as "efficient" causes, whereas the "end" at which the concrescent actual occasion aims is the "final" cause. Thus an actual entity both suffers efficient causation and enjoys final causation.

From this description of an actual entity, it will be readily discerned that its nature is essentially "social." Its very being consists of prehensions of occasions other than itself as components. An actual entity has "concern" for other occasions both in the present and in the past. It mirrors within itself modes of its contemporaries as a display of immediate achievement; and it also mirrors modes of its predecessors as "memories" within its own present. It also reflects within itself such aspects as the future throws back into its present as "anticipation." Thus an actual entity has commerce with the past, present, and future.

Summing up this account of actual entities, we can say that it discloses nature to be a structure of evolving processes. The most ultimate universal is "Creativity," the notion which stands for the underlying activity of realization, individualizing itself into an interlocked plurality of modes. Each actual entity is a finite achievement, a definite matter of fact, issuing from the individualizing of the ultimate underlying activity of nature as a whole, into a system of interlocking concrescent processes, each realizing its own appropriate value. Space and Time exhibit the general scheme of interlocked relations of this system of prehensions, no one of which can be torn from its context. Nevertheless, each occasion or actual entity has within its context genuine reality, for each occasion, from its own standpoint, unifies the modalities belonging to the whole universe. Moreover, since each actual entity mirrors within itself the past, present, and future, we must think of the world as containing memory of the past and anticipation of the future as well as immediacy of realization of the present.

Enduring Things

The time has come to deal with the question raised earlier as to the way in which we are to think of enduring things. If nature is

a structure of processes, how comes it about that there are things, such as molecules and mountains, which last for a very long time? The answer to this question given by the Organic Philosophy is as follows:

An enduring thing, such as a molecule or a mountain, is really a *society* of actual occasions or actual entities, enjoying a special type of "order." First of all let us be clear in our minds as to the meaning of the term "society" of actual occasions. A "society" of actual occasions is a nexus of occasions with a common element of form, the common element of form being the "defining characteristic" of the society. This form is really a complex eternal object, illustrated in each member of the nexus, each member inheriting it from those other members genetically preceding its own concrescence. A "society," then, is a group of actual entities, each member of which participates in a common form. Now an enduring object is a society of actual occasions enjoying a specific type of order termed "personal." "Personal" order means that the genetic relatedness of the members of a society of occasions imposes a "serial order" upon them. This "serial order" enjoyed by certain societies of occasions has an important effect. It secures that there is one single line of inheritance of the defining characteristic of the nexus from one occasion to the other. A society, enjoying "personal" order as defined above, is an enduring object.

It should be observed that the characteristic of an enduring object is that it sustains a certain character by reason of the special genetic relations subsisting among the members of the society. It can be said that "Endurance" is a device by which each actual occasion in a society is bound by a line of physical ancestry. The "likeness" between the successive occasions of an historic route or chain of events procures an identity in respect of their contributions to the chain, and this emphasizes the imposition of conformity. In other words, an historic route of occasions with personal order tends to prolong itself into the future in consequence of the weight of uniform inheritance derived from its members. The result is an enduring object, which is nothing else but a route of occasions or chain of actual entities propagating the same "form" throughout the route or chain. For example, a corpuscle is an enduring object, constituted by a chain of antecedent and subsequent occasions, throughout which a permanent form is propagated from one atomic occasion to another —rather in the same way as a stick of sugar-rock, which children love, has the same pattern reiterated in every part of the stick.

The conception of an "enduring object" is, therefore, bound up with the notion of the reiteration of a pattern of shape and value throughout a route of occasions forming a society enjoying personal order. The shape of value is, as we have seen, the reflection of a

complex eternal object. The reiteration of a particular shape of value occurs when the event as a whole (say a mountain) repeats some shape which is also exhibited in each of a succession of its parts, i.e. in the succession of occasions constituting the life-history of the mountain. The point to make clear is this. The mountain throughout a thousand or a hundred years of its history, throughout a year, throughout a day, throughout a minute, throughout a second and so on, exhibits the same pattern or defining characteristic. That is to say, the mountain, in realizing itself under the guise of an "enduring thing," lasting it may be for thousands of years, displays in the total event the same pattern as is exhibited in each of the occasions constituting its life-history. Consequently in the total event which *is* the mountain, there is a "memory" of the pattern dominating its antecedent life-history as having formed an element of value in its genetic environment.

The conception of an "enduring object" as a serial route of occasions forming a society with a common "form" or pattern amongst its members, is analysable into two abstractions, namely: (1) the enduring society which has emerged as a real matter of fact to be taken account of by other things, and (2) an underlying eternal energy in whose nature there stands an envisagement of the realm of all eternal objects. Whitehead wishes us to understand that this *envisagement* is the growth of the individualized "thoughts" or "ideas" which emerge as "aspects" grasped within the life-history of the subtler and more complex enduring patterns.

This mention of an eternal energy envisaging the realm of eternal objects, leads us to the second part of our lecture dealing with the eternal aspect of the universe.

Eternal Objects

Any scheme of thought purporting to be an analysis of Nature must face the two facts of "change" and "endurance." This has been done by the Organic Philosophy in its treatment of actual entities and enduring things. But there is a third fact to be taken account of in the analysis of Nature which we may call "eternality," and this fact now claims our attention.

"Eternal Objects" are described as "pure potentials for the specific determination of fact" or "forms of definiteness." That is to say, eternal objects are forms which determine the *kind* of feeling the subject of any occasion experiences. Occasions or actual entities are, as we have seen, "processes": Eternal Objects constitute the "howness" of the process, and this "howness" of the concrescence determines the "whatness" of the actual entity. Consequently as Whitehead says, "the things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal."

An example of something that is eternal is colour. Contrast a colour with a physical existent such as a mountain. The latter may endure for ages, but given a sufficient lapse of time, it gradually wears away and finally disappears. A colour, on the other hand, say a specific shade of blue, is not a physical event like a mountain, and therefore, is exempt from the ravages of time. A colour is something that transcends physical events. It "ingresses" into nature to lend its quality to any event that may require it for a period, but when its function for the time being is over, it disappears, to return when its presence is again relevant. But, when it returns, it is the *same* colour. Once more, consider the shapes we call "round" and "oval" or other geometrical forms. These forms do not emerge from nature, although nature requires them to give definiteness to its processes. They "ingress" into nature to give their forms to transitory events. When the events which they characterize have passed away and perished, the specific shapes also disappear, but the *same* shapes "roundness" and "ovalness" reappear when they are again required by nature. It is, therefore, clear that such entities as colour and shape are different from temporal things. They are not processes and consequently belong to a realm different from the temporal. They are, in fact, pure "potentials," or in other words eternal "forms."

We can discern the "transcendence" of eternal objects in this way. Suppose an eternal object—say a definite shade of red—is in a certain actual entity the colour found with a round shape (another eternal object). The actual occasion in which the shade of red and the spherical shape are mutually implicated does not prevent the same colour and the same shape from characterizing *other* occasions either together or separately at different times. That is to say, many occasions may be both red and spheroid, or, again, many occasions may be informed of a spherical shape, but not be red. This being so, it is clear that an eternal object is not exhausted by its ingression into any particular occasion. It can ingress into a multitude of occasions at the same time, or at different times and different places, as it is required. This means that eternal objects are transcendent in respect of particular spatio-temporal events. Now it will be apparent that what transcends particular processes must be quite different from specific matter of fact. The mode of being of eternal objects is such as to be unaffected by the flux of events which come and go. Although they determine the "forms" of events, they, themselves, are not events. They are potentials determining the "howness" of occasions constituting matters of fact, but they, themselves, are not matters of fact. Indeed the defining characteristic of an eternal object is that it is an entity that does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world. In brief, entities of this kind are "eternal."

Eternal objects, then, are such entities as colours, sounds, tastes, touches, geometrical characters. When conscious feeling is concerned, they define the varying kinds of emotion and intensities of feeling, and the different sorts of pleasures and pains. In their function as determinants of feeling, they indicate "how" feeling is felt, and consequently "what" the feeling is. As an example of an eternal object functioning in the realm of emotion, we may mention "pity." In the sphere of moral conduct the term "goodness" stands for an eternal object; and "justice" is another eternal object applicable to a society whose behaviour is equitable. Both the latter are patterns of human values informing the behaviour of persons or of a society.

Eternal objects also come to light in untrue but *significant* propositions. For example, if I assert of this blue lupin that it is yellow, I am saying something untrue, but significant, significant because lupins *can* be yellow. That is to say, untrue propositions, provided they are predicated *significantly* of a given occasion "A," are alternative suggestions, and such alternative suggestions inform us that the occasion "A" is set within a realm of alternative interconnected entities. All the untrue, significant propositions concerning an actual occasion, reveal to us this wider interconnected system in which "A" has its place. But this means that the understanding of *actuality* requires a reference to *ideality* and this ideality is the realm of alternative suggestions disclosed by untrue but significant propositions. Now the realm of alternative suggestions is the realm of eternal objects—it is the realm of possibility contrasted with the realm of actuality. Both realms are intrinsically inherent in the total metaphysical situation in which any given actual entity is involved.

The realm of eternal objects is called a "realm" because each eternal object not only has an *individual* essence, i.e. its being a specific shape, colour, sound or feeling—but also a "relational" essence. By "relational" essence it is meant that an eternal object, considered as an abstract entity, cannot be divorced from its "internal" relationships to all other eternal objects. A part of its very nature, i.e. its relational character is constituted by this system of relations. Because of this inter-relatedness of eternal objects, any actual entity prehends, either positively or negatively, either as being or non-being, the whole realm of eternality.

If we are seeking to know "what" a given actual entity is, we must be able to say "how" a selection of eternal objects ingress into the actual occasion and how this selection is graded. The principle governing the realization of eternal objects is called "the principle of the degrees of relevance," which operates thus. In a given occasion some eternal objects will be realized in respect of their full essence, others will be realized in respect of some only of the relations that constitute their essence, whilst others may be entirely

excluded. In the latter extreme case, the relations which constitute the relational essences of the excluded eternal objects, may still be thought of as ingredient in the actual occasion, though in a negative way. They are ingredient as "unfulfilled alternatives." They do not contribute to the aesthetic synthesis of the actual occasion, but they do contribute features to its final emotional tone. These "unfulfilled" possibilities "might" have been realized, but in fact, in the given occasion are not. But, like those citizens excluded from sharing in the wealth of the state, they, nevertheless, by their very exclusion, exercise an influence on the minds of the privileged, even if only that of self-reproach.

There are certain distinctions among eternal objects themselves which I may mention but not elaborate. Some eternal objects are "simple" as, for example, the specific shade of Cambridge Blue, or the form of a circle; whilst others are of various grades of complexity. A complex eternal object of a low grade can be conceived in the following way. Let A, B, C, be three definite colours (red, orange, and green) with the spatio-temporal relatedness to each other of a regular tetrahedron *any where at any time*. Then R (A, B, C,) is an eternal object of the lowest complex grade. It will be obvious that there will be eternal objects of successively higher grades, since the possible combinations of eternal objects with each other are infinite. There are also two distinct *classes* of eternal objects, (1) the "objective," (2) the "subjective" class. The "objective" species are limited in their function to supplying forms of definiteness to data. By a necessity of its nature, an eternal object of the objective class is an *agent of relation*. It links the old occasions of the world, which have attained their ends, with new occasions which are in process of self-creation. Whitehead says, "the solidarity of the world rests upon the incurable objectivity of this species of eternal objects," and he identifies them with the mathematical platonic forms. The "subjective" species of eternal objects may enjoy a two-fold rôle. Primarily they supply the forms of the subjective feelings of actual entities. But an eternal object of the subjective species can also function as an agent of *relation* by objectifying a subjective feeling of an actual occasion A, as a datum for the feeling of a subsequent occasion B. The second class of eternal objects thus functions not only subjectively but also relationally.

Physical Science, in its analysis of nature, seems unable to deal satisfactorily with the "subjective" species of eternal objects, though competent to handle eternal objects of the "objective" species. The reason is this. Physical science is concerned not with the concrescent *subject* in the phases of its growth, but only with the *achievement* of the process, namely, "matter of fact." It is not concerned with the "genetic becoming" of an actual entity in which final causation is

operating; it merely analyses its complexity in its function of efficient cause. But an actual entity, as a subject reaching out after an end, must be credited with final as well as efficient causation. Because of this, there is elbow room in the universe for freedom.

The description given above of the realm of eternality will, we hope, bring home the truth that actuality is in essential relation to an unfathomable possibility. Eternal objects inform actual occasions with hierarchic patterns, included and excluded in every variety of discrimination. Every occasion is a synthesis of all eternal objects *under the limitations of gradations of actuality*, and because actuality is through and through "togetherness," every actual entity is likewise a synthesis of all occasions under the limitations of gradations of types of entry. Thus each occasion synthesises the totality of content under its own limitation of "mode."[1] This "graded envisagement" of the full sweep of eternal relations which each actual occasion prehends in its synthesis, involves the acknowledgement that (in one sense) *non-being* (i.e. the realm of eternal forms) is a positive factor in the achievement of every actual entity. In the language of Whitehead "it is the source of error, of truth, of art, of ethics and religion. By it fact is confronted with alternatives."[2]

It follows from what has been said, that in order to understand the spatio-temporal world, it is necessary to take account of the realm of eternality. It is this realm which provides what is permanent in the general flux of events. The universe is both a passage and something that is permanent. The passage is the interlocked system of processes which we have called "occasions of experience." Its permanent features are the "eternal" forms which ingress into the flux of events and give them a definite and determinate character. Apart from them, the world would be "without form and void," and *value* would be non-existent. Hence the things that are temporal need for their being the things that are eternal, and a metaphysic of the universe must include, as complementary facets, both the realm of the actual and the realm of the ideal.

God

Before proceeding to an exposition of the line of argument by which Whitehead arrives at the conception of "God," I wish to warn the reader that Whitehead's conception differs from the traditional view of Western theology. In the organic philosophy, God is not the omnipotent creator of the universe, but rather its infinite ground of rationality, and the supreme principle persuasive of ultimate unity. In other words, God is not *before* all creation, but *with* all creation. He must not be identified with the Creativity

[1] Cf. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 245. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

of the universe which transcends, not only any actual entity in the world, but also God. Whitehead reminds us that if, in accordance with traditional Western theological thought, God is regarded as the creator of the world, then, as the supreme author of the play, we must ascribe to Him the origin of all evil as of all good. But if He is conceived, not as the world's creator, but as the supreme ground for limitation, the principle of rational order, and the ultimate conservator of values, then it follows that it stands in His very nature to divide the good from the evil, to establish the supremacy of reason within her own domain, and to be persuasive of ultimate harmonious unity through the patient operation of His own invincible rationality.

I will first explain the notion of God as the principle of limitation, treated by Whitehead in *Science and the Modern World.* This will be followed by an account of his development of the idea of God in *Process and Reality*, as the non-temporal actual being endowing the realm of eternal forms with effectiveness and an order of relevance for realization in the temporal world. And, finally, I will attempt to show how Whitehead conceives the multiplicity of values achieved in the world of rugged existence as being received into God's eternal nature and there co-ordinated into a harmonious unity.

In the section dealing with "Creativity," we learnt that eternal possibility and modal differentiation into individual multiplicity, are its two attributes. Now, in the general metaphysical situation it is disclosed that Creativity, in its attribute of modality, is *limited* in two distinct ways. In the first place, Creativity is embodied in an actual course of events which might be otherwise as far as eternal possibility is concerned. This limitation takes the three forms of (*a*) conformation to logical relations, (*b*) the selection of causal relations, and (*c*) the "particularity" of events. Hence the first limitation is one of selection from an indefinite range of possibilities. Metaphysically speaking, there might have been an indiscriminate pluralism without logical or other limitation. But in that case there would not have been the modes that there are, "for each mode represents a synthesis limited to conform to a standard."[1] It can be said that limitation has been imposed as the price of *value.* That which is merely possible and unlimited has no value. Value arises only with the actualization into finite entities. This factor of "value" leads to the second limitation. There cannot be value without antecedent *standards* to enable the envisaging activity to discriminate, for acceptance or rejection of what is before it. Thus, there is also a limitation and selection among possible values based upon certain standards. There is, therefore, a metaphysical need for a principle of limitation.

[1] *Science and the Modern World*, p. 249.

The principle of limitation in the general metaphysical situation is one aspect of what is subsequently called "The Primordial Nature of God." It is an element in the attribute of the ultimate activity. This element provides the limitation "for which no reason can be given, as all reason flows from it"—the ultimate irrational ground of rationality. Such briefly is Whitehead's account of God as the principle of limitation.

Let us now consider the "eternal" aspect of God's nature, and its function in the scheme of things. The "ontological principle," fundamental to the organic philosophy, asserts that the only *reasons* for things are actual entities. In the previous section we learnt that the realm of eternal objects is the general potentiality of the universe. What actuality, then, is the reason for this general potentiality? Whitehead's reply to this question is that it is "the primordial nature of God," who must be regarded from the abstract point of view of our present approach, as a non-temporal actual entity. "The things that are temporal arise by their participation in the things that are eternal," and the two sets of entities, (1) actual occasions, and (2) eternal objects, are *mediated* by a unique entity combining the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential. This non-temporal actual entity[1] is both the principle of concrescence in the universe, "the principle whereby there is initiated a definite outcome from a situation otherwise riddled with ambiguity," as well as the effective source of its potentiality.

Whitehead reminds us that the plurality of eternal objects, regarded in their bare isolated multiplicity, lack any *existent* character. They are only possibilities. Consequently to be "efficacious" they require to be related to the primordial nature of God as the non-temporal actual entity "conceptually" realizing them as an efficacious function in the multiple unifications of the universe by self-creative actual entities. We may say that "the primordial nature of God" is the acquisition by the ultimate activity of the universe, of a primordial character functioning as the unlimited conceptual realization of the wealth of potentiality. In this aspect "He is not *before* all creation, but *with* all creation." Moreover, in this abstract aspect He is deficient in actuality in two ways. In the first place, as "primordial," His feelings are *conceptual* only. In the second place, He is devoid of consciousness, since "conceptual" feelings (i.e. feelings of eternal objects), apart from integration with physical feelings, are not accompanied by consciousness.

The "primordial nature of God" is thus the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feelings at the base of things, providing an "order"

[1] The most fruitful way of conceiving God's "eternal" nature is to think of it as a vision and "valuation" of the realm of eternal forms, accompanied by an urge for their actualization in an orderly way in finite things.

in the relevance of eternal objects to the process of creation. It is to be noted that God's unity of conceptual operations is untrammelled by reference to any *particular* course of things. "He is deflected neither by love nor by hate from what in fact comes to pass. The particularity of the actual world presupposes it: while it merely presupposes the general metaphysical character of creative advance. . . . The primordial nature of God is the acquirement by Creativity of a primordial character."[1] As the "envisager of relevance" of the creative advance of the world, the primordial nature of God establishes the *initial* phase of the subjective aspect of each actual entity. But the initial phase *only*, since in respect of the subsequent phases of concrescence the actual entity is self-creative. The primordial nature of God also constitutes the metaphysical stability of the universe. He is the "ground" enabling the actual processes of the temporal world to exemplify general principles of metaphysics, and to attain the ends congruent with specific types of emergent order. Were it not for God's primordial valuation, there would be a complete disjunction of eternal objects unrealized in the temporal world, and novelty would be inconceivable.

We are now in a position to proceed to an understanding of God in His complete nature.

The "consequent" nature of God

In the Organic Philosophy, the "primordial nature of God" is only one aspect of His full being. The other aspect is termed the "consequent nature of God," which is the notion of God as receiver and co-ordinator of values. It is explained thus. By reason of the relativity of all things, there is said to be a reaction of the temporal, physical world upon God's primordial nature, completing it by the addition of physical feelings derived from the actual world. The temporal world, constituted of occasions or processes, is "objectified" in God as His physical feelings. "This prehension into God of each creature is directed with the subjective aim, and clothed with the subjective form wholly derivative from His all-inclusive valuation."[2] Although God's "conceptual nature" is unchanged by this weaving of physical feelings upon His primordial concepts, the reception of feelings from the temporal world endows Him with full actuality and consciousness. Moreover, God's "consequent nature" links Him with the temporal world, since this is derivative from the creative advance of the world.

It is important to realize that the "consequent nature" of God implies that although God and the world may be opposed in our thought, they cannot in reality be torn apart. The following quotation will drive this truth home.

[1] *Process and Reality*, p. 487. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 468.

> "God and the world stand over against each other, expressing the final metaphysical truth that appetitive vision and physical enjoyment have equal claim to priority in creation. But no two actualities can be torn apart: each is all in all. Thus each temporal occasion embodies God, and is embodied in God. In God's nature, permanence is primordial and flux is derivative from the World: in the World's nature, flux is primordial and permanence is derivative from God; also the World's nature is a primordial datum for God, and God's nature is a primordial datum for the World. Creation achieves the reconciliation of permanence and flux when it has reached its final term which is everlastingness—the apotheosis of the World."[1]

Let us pause for a moment and consider the meaning of this passage. In the first place it declares that the world is as necessary for God, as God is for the world, and that both God and the world are necessary for Creativity. Apart from God and the realm of eternal forms, the world is meaningless; apart from Creativity and the world of actual entities, God is meaningless; and apart from God and the turbulent active world, Creativity is meaningless. This mutual interdependence of the various aspects of the universe is the reason why the fundamental ideas employed in the description of the universe presuppose each other. In the second place, we are told that Creation achieves an ultimate reconciliation of permanence and flux in a state of unity called "everlastingness." Now this state of unity which is the final term achieved by the movement of Creation, is what is meant by the Consequent Nature of God. So that the Consequent Nature of God is the notion of the completion of the ideal unity of vision of the realm of eternal forms seeking realization in physical multiplicity, by the prehension into God of the actual entitles of the real world. This reception of the world into God's eternal nature and its unification with that nature, is what is meant by the phrase "the apotheosis of the World." In the third place, we learn that there is no final static completion of the universe. Both God and the world are in the grip of the fundamental metaphysical ground—the creative advance into novelty. That is to say, the world is ever expanding by the becoming of novel actual entities, and God is likewise ever enlarging His heaven by the reception of the new values which these actual entities achieve.

The notion of "everlastingness," which is the property of combining creative advance with the retention of mutual immediacy, involves the view that every actuality is prehended into a perfected system. All the events of the turbulent, physical world, with their sufferings, failures, and triumphs, are ultimately woven into a

[1] *Process and Reality*, pp. 493–4.

harmony of universal feelings which is "always many, always one, always with novel advance, moving onwards and never perishing."[1] Destructive evil, purely self-regarding, is dismissed by the supreme harmonizer into the triviality of mere individual facts. But all the values in the world of occasions which can be saved from perishing, are woven into a whole of harmonious feeling enriched by the variety of contrasts. This is the judgement of tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. Thus God, from this point of view, may be regarded as the "poet" of the world, saving it by His vision of truth, beauty, and goodness.[2] God does not create the world, but saves it. He is persuasive of ultimate harmonious unity through the patient operation of His over-powering rationality.

At this stage, it is pertinent to ask what exactly is the status of the individual on being prehended into God. Does he continue, an "end" for himself, or is his status only that of a "means" for the enrichment of God's experience? This is how Whitehead answers this question. In the ultimate whole of harmonized feeling which is "everlastingness," the function of being a "means" is not disjoined from the function of being an "end." We are told that "the sense of worth beyond itself is immediately enjoyed as an overpowering element in the individual self-attainment,"[3] so that sorrow and pain are transformed into an element of triumph, very much as discords in art contribute to the aesthetic value of a great work. Moreover, in the perfected actuality in which the many are everlastingly one, there is no loss "either of individual identity, or of completeness of unity." We learn that the temporal actuality, on its reception into God's nature, does not "pass away," but is transmuted into an ever-present fact. The element in God's nature corresponding to each temporal actuality is not temporal actuality, but the *transmutation* of that temporal actuality into a living immediacy. If we ask how it is possible that the past survives in God's nature in full immediacy, Whitehead suggests that it occurs in somewhat the same way as a person's past survives, not in mere memory, but as summed up in a person as he is *now*: "This element in God's nature inherits from the temporal counterpart according to the same principle as in the temporal world, the future inherits from the past. Thus in the sense in which the present occasion is the person *now* and yet with his own past, so this counterpart in God is that person in God."[4]

Conclusion

Our exposition of the Organic Philosophy has disclosed three creative phases in the universe. The first phase is that of "conceptual origination," infinite in the adjustment of valuation but

[1] *Process and Reality*, p. 489.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 490.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 495.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 496.

deficient in actuality, which has been described as the "primordial nature of God." The second phase is the self-creation of actual entities, fully actual, but lacking in the harmony of individuals with each other. The third phase is the "consequent nature of God," in which the many actual occasions are one everlastingly, without loss of individual identity or of completeness of unity. But there is a fourth and final phase. In consequence of the relativity of all things, the "consequent nature of God" floods back again into the temporal world as the special providence for each occasion. This is the view of Him as "the great companion, the fellow sufferer who understands."

One final word. The doctrine of the objective immortality of actual occasions as "potentials" for the creation of novel actual entities is fundamental in the Organic Philosophy. But the final application of this doctrine in the speculation that the occasions in the life of each creature, though perishing in the temporal world, nevertheless, albeit transformed, live everlastingly in the being of God, is bound, in the writer's view, to be a matter of acute criticism. The question will no doubt be asked, whether the principle of relativity can be made so all-embracing. Whitehead admits that in his discussion of what the metaphysical principles of the Organic Philosophy require, there is nothing of the character of "proof." He says, "there is merely the confrontation of the theoretical system with a certain rendering of the facts." But, seeing that the report upon the facts, and the system itself, is confessedly inadequate, the deductions from it as to the nature of God should not be regarded as more than "suggestions as to how the problem is transformed in the light of that system."[1] It is frankly acknowledged that whatever cogency the argument may have, depends upon certain exceptional experiences usually classed as moral and religious intuitions. But whether moral and religious intuitions can be made to bear the weight of the metaphysical claim of the immortality of perishing temporal occasions in the being of God, is a question that many will find hard to answer in the affirmative with confidence. In support of the doctrine Whitehead reminds us of "the insistent craving that zest for existence be refreshed by the ever-present, unfading importance of our immediate actions, which perish and yet live for evermore."[2] Is the nature of Reality such as to justify this insistent craving? In other words is God not only the "reservoir of potentiality" and the source of ideals, but also the "co-ordinator of achievement" as the doctrine suggests? It is around this question of the ultimate unity of the world of temporal occasions in the being of God, that the debate will be most concentrated. In this debate it must never

[1] *Process and Reality*, p. 486. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 496.

be forgotten that "existence, in its own nature, is the upholding of value-intensity." Every pulsation of actuality has some value. But since no unit exists in isolation, every actuality not only has value for itself but for others and the whole of which it is a perspective. Consequently, as Whitehead says—"Everything that in any sense exists has two sides, namely, its individual self and its significance in the universe; either of these factors is a factor of the other."[1] The understanding of the universe requires that both the eternal world and the temporal world should exhibit the impress of the other.

I have now reached the end of my exposition of Whitehead's philosophy of the world as process. You will have gathered from this exposition that the universe is both a passage and something that is permanent, both temporal and eternal. On the one hand there is the general flux of events; on the other hand there are the eternal forms (the source of qualities and values) which ingress into the flux of events and provide them with a definite and determinate character. Also at the root of things, there is God, the ground of whatever rationality there is in things. Hence the things that are temporal need for their being the things that are eternal, and a Metaphysic of the universe must include as complementary facets both the realm of the actual and the realm of the ideal.

[1] Lecture on "Immortality" in *The Philosophy of Alfred Frank Whitehead* (North-Western University Press, 1941).

NEW BOOKS

Space and Spirit: Theories of the universe and the arguments for the existence of God. By SIR EDMUND WHITTAKER, F.R.S. (Nelson, 1946. 6/–.)

There are two strands of thought and intention in this book, unequally developed. To begin with it is a clear historical account of Hellenic, Hellenistic, and medieval concepts of matter, substance, space, etc., with some contemporary theological associations Christian and non-Christian but not including the theologies of other great institutional religions. The account is carried forward into an equally clear history of some more modern aspects of the concept of causality, down to the present day. Sir Edmund's skill in drawing examples from his unrivalled mathematical experience blends curiously with his vigorous dislike of Neoplatonists, possibly because he suspects them of indecisive segregation of their empirical from their mystical interests concerning numbers, and of missing a genuine logical treatment between these. Neoplatonists were not alone in this vice, to which many of Sir Edmund's theological heroes were also addicted. He is not fair to the Neoplatonists, many of whom, such as Nicholas of Cusa, played as honourable a part in pre-modern science and philosophy as the names rescued by this book and introduced so intriguingly to a wider than specialist public.

Beyond the clarity in expounding this early history itself, a feat of considerable originality for which the book will be widely read, the most distinctive individuality is the rewriting of the famous medieval "proofs" of theism into modern language: this will be universally welcomed. But at numerous places the author goes so far as to hint that concepts in modern physics can turn this "re-translating" into a genuine "reinforcing": that will not be at all universally agreed. For the symbolic and provisional validity claimed by the fluctuating concepts under which an external world is regarded today accord ill with the frozen and inflexible certainties of medieval thought, and it does not come readily to most contemporary scientific philosophers to flatter themselves that they have proved anything at all beyond the forms of their knowledge. To leap from this form to theorems of the existence of the somewhat anthropomorphic deity argued by medieval ecclesiastics is a mental athleticism which feels acrobatic and strained. The attempt to graft today's cosmological physics, of whatever school, upon the curiously artificial intricacies of the Aquinean logic, is as if a painter were to try to reproduce the exquisite Dutch interiors of the seventeenth century under a post-impressionist, cubist, or even surrealist manner. The approach is foreign and the result bizarre, and any theological apologist inclined to hail this gift from science may well pause and fear the aliens *et dona ferentes*. The misfit is inevitable: today "proof" is not a desideratum so much as a horrendum in the philosophy of religion. For a thinking majority now recognize that personal or even mystical conviction comes home to the modern scientist and non-scientist more vividly than any argued "natural theology," whereas it is natural theology, not personal theology, with which Sir Edmund is exclusively concerned. We believe in something that we each cherish as sacred, but "belief" today is not a logically directed act of intellectual assent: whether we symbolize our individual conviction of the sacred by embodying it in spatial concepts or not, few now derive those concepts from any of corresponding name in the physical sciences. In fact, the question of what kind of spatial concepts are required, by the

epistemology of a physical or of any other external world-model, is apt to be answered on grounds aesthetic rather than rigidly binding as were the proofs in which the medieval theologians framed their neat and tidy but imprisoning foundations of theism. It would seem a gallant but unavailing effort to retell those proofs except as items of anthropological interest, and definitely repugnant to associate them with the very different meanings assigned in modern physics to "space," "matter," and other terms which merely sum up definite measurement rather than describe "things."

Strangely enough, in sections 32–36, where Sir Edmund offers a very readable and brilliantly compressed account of "the observable," "the measurable," and other terms dissecting the concepts of indeterminacy and causality in recent physics, there can be discovered the very reasons why there is no analogy between the cosmology of today and that of the medieval mind: the old theologian took his cosmology from a science which he supposed was a description of entities only differing in size from objects of perception, whereas today, as Sir Edmund himself so ably shows, the rational is symbolic rather than descriptive. What Whitehead called the "scientific object" has not the same epistemological or metaphysical status as the "perceived world" from which the medieval mind built its "natural theology," and it is doubtful whether Aquinas could have utilised our world of physics at all.

This is why we suspect that the second topic of this book, the modernization of medieval theistic arguments, will not have the lasting value of its first topic or the brilliant historical survey of what the medieval actually thought in his day before there was any modern philosophy or science.

MARTIN JOHNSON.

Ethical and Political Thinking. By E. F. CARRITT. (Oxford University Press. Pp. 186. Price 10s. net.)

The nature and purpose of the ethical thinking, which is described in this work and which occupied a prominent place in the studies of teachers and pupils in Oxford in the inter-war years, might, I think, be briefly summed up: clarity the end, analysis the means, and "definition and discrimination" of ethical terms the method. To-day doubts are being expressed in many quarters as to the adequacy of this programme. Its scope is believed to be too narrow and its objective too limited. We are told that "clarity is not enough," that "analysis should be supplemented by synopsis and synthesis," that we should move "towards a new moral philosophy." Whether or not these doubts are well grounded, the time is opportune for a clear and concise statement of the scope, method and problems of these enquiries and of their considerable achievements in analysis and clarification. No one is better qualified to do this than Mr. Carritt who, as he tells us, has, during nearly fifty years, spent some 15,000 hours discussing these problems with pupils and colleagues. The main conclusions at which he has arrived as the result of these discussions are presented in this work with freshness and vigour, as well as subtlety and ingenuity.

The main lines of the argument are familiar to students of moral philosophy from the author's earlier writings, especially his *Theory of Morals*, as well as from those of Ross and Prichard—to mention only the senior members of the New Intuitionist School; and no attempt will be made to summarize them here. Indeed, as the chief merit of the work is the analysis and clarification of what are largely matters of detail, any summary statement of the conclusions arrived at would be, and would be regarded by the author as being, bound to be misleading. It should, however, be added that though

much of the ground covered is familiar the work is no mere repetition of previous arguments. It is rather a fresh rethinking of the whole position and shows some important changes in the author's views, as well as differences between him and other members of the school.

The work is divided into three parts. Part I, which covers more than three-quarters of the total, is concerned with pure ethics, its purpose being to clarify our moral thinking or our use of ethical terms. Part II deals with political thinking or the application of ethical principles to problems of government; and its main contention is that "our duties to our state do not differ in kind but only in degree of complexity from most of our other duties to our neighbours."[1] Part III, consisting of 12 pages, deals with "morals and aesthetics" and is concerned to refute the argument, sometimes used against Intuitionists, that by admitting the subjectivity of beauty they have given away the case for the objectivity of moral judgement.

Part I traces the development of the moral thinking of the reflective moral agent, and the account of this development is based on two assumptions: that we cannot understand the rightness of the right solution until we have seen the wrongness of the wrong solutions, and that the thinking of the student of morals passes through the same stages, though not necessarily in the same order, as the historical development of ethical theories. Following this plan, Mr. Carritt divides ethical theories other than those of his own school into two kinds, which he discusses in turn. Under the title "Non-moral theories of conduct" he deals with theories which "deny the reality of obligation." The ethical views of Professor Ayer and the different varieties of psychological hedonism are regarded as the main representatives of this class and discussed at some length. All other moral theories are classed under the dyslogistic heading of "Crude moral theories," though it is admitted that some are more crude, others less so. Considering that this title covers not only some contemporary ethical theories but all or almost all held before the present century, it seems as inaccurate as it is dyslogistic. False in whole or in part all of them may be, but crude some of them are not. They seem to suffer rather from over-subtlety and refinement. The account given of many of them is so brief as to be misleading; and I cannot help feeling that it might have been better to omit it altogether and to refer the reader to the fuller, if not more sympathetic, treatment of them in the author's *Theory of Morals*. But this would no doubt be inconsistent with the assumptions regarding the development of ethical thinking on which the plan of the book is based.

In the light of the conclusions which emerge from the discussion of wrong theories, Mr. Carritt gives a classification of types of good and types of obligation and an account of the relation of goodness and obligation to desire. There are also chapters on punishment and freedom, but they differ little from the corresponding chapters in the *Theory of Morals*.

In the last sentence of his *Theory of Morals* Mr. Carritt tells us "my opinions upon these matters have suffered a pretty constant development, and I have no reason to fear that this has ceased." What main developments in his views, then, have taken place since this was written?

(1) More subtle analyses have resulted in further distinctions, with corresponding changes in terminology. To give only one instance, he now distinguishes not only between objective and subjective duty, but within the latter, as the term is used, e.g. by Ross and Broad, he draws a further distinction between subjective duty (by which he means what a morally infallible being would regard a situation as he believes it to be as demanding)

[1] P. 172.

and putative duty which is what I with my fallible moral insight believe the situation, as I think it, to demand. I am not sure that this distinction has added much to the clarity of the discussion. Its only merit, so far as I can see, is that it calls attention to the double dose of subjectivity in what is usually called subjective duty.

(2) Having made this distinction, Mr. Carritt, though with some hesitation, takes the view, contrary to other members of the school, that "real" duty is objective duty. Whether by "real" duty he here means what he formerly[1] called "paramount" or "actual" duty or, as he sometimes prefers to call it, simply duty is not clear. He admits that it is only in respect of doing his putative duty that a person is subject to praise or blame; that we can never know our objective duty, and that we can only do it by accident or luck. Is it not paradoxical to say that it is my "real" duty to do an act which I do not believe to be my duty, an act for not doing which I incur neither remorse nor censure and for the doing of which I may incur both? Having carefully distinguished different senses of duty, all of them normal and legitimate, as Mr. Carritt is at pains to do, why assume that one of these is its "real" meaning and that in all our use of it it has this "real" meaning? May it not be that when I am trying to discover my duty I am thinking of objective duty, that is, trying by a careful survey of the situation and the exercise of my moral reason to get as near as I can to what is objectively right; while when I ask myself whether I have done my duty, that is, all that was morally required of me, I am thinking of putative duty?

(3) More important is a change in terminology which, though he admits that it is a departure from normal usage, enables Mr. Carritt to give a much neater analysis of both right and duty and to state his position with greater ease and clarity. He uses the term obligation to mean what Ross calls *prima facie* duty and Prichard calls claim; and he confines the term claim to the "right" of the person to whom the obligation is due to have his "claim" considered. Duty in any situation, then, becomes the strongest obligation to which that situation gives rise; and corresponding to a duty we have, on the part of the person to whom the strongest obligation is due, a right. According to this terminology, we have two pairs of correlatives, obligations and claims, duties and rights. An obligation as such is not a duty: only the strongest obligation is. A claim is not a right, except in the sense of a "right" to have one's claim considered and weighed against other and, it may be, stronger claims.

(4) Using this terminology I shall try to state the most important change in Mr. Carritt's ethical doctrines since he wrote his *Theory of Morals*, a change which brings him much nearer to the position of Ross and Prichard. In 1928 he wrote: "I cannot persuade myself that I first morally apprehend the obligation of several rules (i.e. rules of *prima facie* duties or what he now calls simply obligations), then intellectually apprehend one of the alternative actions to be an instance of one and the other of another. . . . I rather think that I morally apprehend that I ought now to do this act and then intellectually generalize rules."[2] In other words, he then held that obligations are not immediately apprehended but are generalizations from particular concrete actions our duty to do which is so apprehended. Now he tells us that "our reason immediately apprehends that what is assumed to be the situation gives rise to obligations."[3] These obligations are "as self-evident as the axioms of mathematics, the law of causation, or the principles of logic."[4] However hard we try, we cannot doubt them.[5] We see their necessity.[6]

[1] *Theory of Morals*, p. 114.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 116, cf. pp. 30–1, 70, 138.
[3] P. 4.
[4] P. 3.
[5] P. 43.
[6] P. 44.

Mr. Carritt offers no explanation of how he came to apprehend immediately the necessity of the obligations of which he was unable to persuade himself in 1928. Perhaps in a case like this where the apprehension is immediate and no process is involved we should not ask for an explanation. All we can have is testimony that the necessity is immediately apprehended. Those of us who are still unable to see the necessity may console ourselves that Mr. Carritt also was in our condition in 1928. We may even dare to hope that if we continue to meditate on these problems for 15,000 hours the light may dawn. Meantime, I think we have a right to expect rather more tolerance from Mr. Carritt for "our deficiency of moral reason."

So far the account is quite clear, whether or not we find it acceptable. It is the account of what happens when we are trying to discover our duty in a particular situation, what was formerly described as a process of immediate apprehension, but is now regarded as a weighing of the comparative strength of obligations, that I find difficult to follow. Obligations may and do conflict and then our duty is the strongest obligation. What are we to understand by the strength of an obligation, and by what principle or standard are we to measure it? The difficulty is that while reason immediately apprehends the obligation, its apprehension of it seems to be only partial. It apprehends its necessity, but apparently not its strength or at least its comparative strength when measured against another obligation. The comparative strength of obligations does not seem to be determined by their grounds; for while all obligations have grounds, the grounds of different obligations are different, and have nothing in common which could provide a basis of comparison. It is not determined by their degree of necessity, for necessity does not seem to admit of degrees. It is not determined by the urgency of the feelings they produce in us; for it is regarded as an objective characteristic of obligations. It is not determined by the goodness of that which we are obliged to do; for the results of some actions which we are obliged to do are not good.[1] We are told that in moral reflection, in trying to discover what our duty in a particular situation is, it is on the obligations to which the assumed situation gives rise that we reflect.[2] We are also told that in this process we are liable to make mistakes,[3] but about the basis of comparison we are told nothing. Yet the point seems crucial; for if there is no principle or standard of measurement for this work of comparison on which we are engaged in moral reflection, what is the value of such reflection, and is there any guarantee that the more we reflect the more likely we are to discover our duty?

There is another point on which I find it difficult to be sure that I understand Mr. Carritt's argument. He devotes a good deal of attention to the nature of moral philosophy and the relation of ethical theory to moral practice. His general contention is that while ethical theory originates in the perplexities of moral practice, the hopes of practical solutions with which many students embark on it are doomed to disappointment, and they continue it, if they continue it at all, out of intellectual curiosity. The real business of moral philosophy is to clarify our ethical or moral thinking (sometimes the one term is used, sometimes the other) and particularly our use of ethical terms. But the term moral thinking is capable of being used in two different senses, and I am not sure that Mr. Carritt always distinguishes clearly between them. Moral thinking may mean the thinking of the moral agent trying to discover what his duty is or it may mean (though in this case ethical thinking seems the more appropriate term) the thinking of the ethical

[1] P. 93. But inconsistently with this position, Mr. Carritt infers the goodness of pure aesthetic experience from the fact that we feel an obligation to cultivate it (p. 87).
[2] P. 56. [3] P. 60.

theorist trying to understand or explain what the moral agent is doing or thinking. The moral thinking of the moral agent especially, as Mr. Carritt puts it, his "more considered judgements are the moral philosopher's only data;" and like other scientists the ethical theorist "must not juggle with his facts"[1] or data. But it would appear that the facts or data of the moral philosopher are not so definite as those of other scientists; for Mr. Carritt thinks that the moral philosopher "may contradict them . . . by still more careful analysis of their meaning"[2] Now if the ethical theorist can under any circumstances contradict the more considered moral judgements of the moral agent and tell him that he is wrong, this looks more like clarifying the moral thinking of the moral agent than the ethical thinking of the theorist. What this suggests is that the data of ethics are not so definite or at least so easily accessible as many moral theorists seem to assume, and that it is more difficult to draw a clear line of distinction between ethical theory and the reflective thinking of the moral agent in his more considered and critical efforts to discover his duty than Mr. Carritt at times suggests. The point seems to me a difficult one, and I do not find Mr. Carritt's position in regard to it free from ambiguity.

If in this review I have dealt largely with points where I find Mr. Carritt's argument difficult to follow, this must not be taken to mean that I do not fully appreciate the careful and critical analysis of a work which it would be presumption on my part to praise and which every student of moral philosophy should read and master for himself. A. MACBEATH.

[1] P. 6. [2] *Ibid.*

Morals and the New Theology. By H. D. LEWIS. (Gollancz. London. 1947. Pp. 160. Price 7s. 6d.)

It may be doubted whether philosophers today pay much heed to what theologians are thinking or writing; not only have they problems enough of their own to occupy their attention, but they have a profound and possibly well founded suspicion that the modern theologian is still trying to live in a traditionalist Paradise, while making one or two wholly inadequate concessions to the changed modes of thinking on religious problems which the growth of psychology, anthropology and sociology, and the all-round expansion of scientific horizons, have fostered among a large, and increasing, number of intelligent men and women. Nevertheless, many would no doubt agree with Dr. Pringle-Pattison that "it is the proper office of philosophy, or let us say of the critical reason generally, to purify religious belief and practice by teaching men to discard intellectually untenable or morally unworthy conceptions of the divine." And it is to an important aspect of this task laid on philosophers that Mr. H. D. Lewis has addressed himself, with clarity and vigour, in the book under review.

Now philosophers, it seems reasonable to hold, need not necessarily be worried when a theologian produces apparently naive or even irrational doctrines, since it is generally taken for granted that he is appealing to his own particular sources of knowledge, namely, revelation and authority. And though these sources have no attraction for philosophers as such, there is frequently a disposition to admit that they have some validity in the sphere of religion. Unfortunately, however, many of the fine-spun arguments of theologians have immense consequences for both metaphysics and morals, and it is when such arguments set out deliberately to challenge rational speculation, or to menace the foundations of morality, that philosophers are apt to register a sharp protest.

Certainly some philosophical correction seems called for in connection with the remarkable orgy of pessimism in which many theologians have been lately indulging. Thus Mr. Lewis quotes from the recent *Report of the Oxford Conference* where it is maintained that the war against evil in society represents a struggle "against a destructive principle in the universe itself, and against superhuman powers of evil," and that in this conflict, "we cannot in our own strength contend successfully against satanic powers." (p. 116). Even worse is the invitation to self-vilification which Mr. Lewis has noted in a book warmly commended in a Foreword by the Bishop of Hull (*Divine Judgment in Human History*, by D. R. Davies). Here all human endeavour is implied to be futile, and the claim is made that "whatever originates from the will of man remains self-destructive." (p. 117). "That crudities of this sort," comments Mr. Lewis, "so utterly lacking in historical or philosophical analysis, should have won for the writer a high place in the esteem of religious leaders and, as I understand, a large following among humbler ranks, is a sobering thought. It should give us pause before we assume that the theories which isolate religion from life will be slow to ally themselves effectively with the forces of reaction in the more democratic and liberal countries." (p. 118).

The chief offenders in Mr. Lewis's eyes, however, are the leading representatives of the "New Theology" such as Brunner, Barth, and Niebuhr. It is these theologians, with their apparently wide audiences, who wish to trample on reason, foist on man a sort of spiritual masochism and undermine the whole basis of ethics by insisting that "the freedom which we normally associate with the idea of obligation must be straight way identified with bondage to sin', that "all men are *equally* sinful" and that other no less distasteful paradoxes which play havoc with the deliverances of a normal conscience must be unreservedly accepted. But if they *are* accepted, then, says Mr. Lewis, "the very springs of individual responsibility are dried up in an apathetic surrender to oppressive doctrinal fictions" (pp. 70–71).

Thus Mr. Lewis's theme is that the "New Theology," in its desire to make a sensational appeal to those who have lost faith in reason, has tried to distort ethics for its own fell purposes, without realizing that it is cutting the ground from under its own feet—since it is *only* a theologically independent ethic that will provide the basis on which theology may build up its own superstructure. In short, Mr. Lewis is pleading for the autonomy of ethics, and for theologians to realize that "mature persons have a proper awareness of moral distinctions quite independently of their adoption of any religious faith." (p 24).

So far as philosophers are concerned (with the possible exception of neo-Thomists), Mr. Lewis is talking to the converted; but perhaps some theologians—and especially those who jump into the philosophical arena without the necessary training and knowledge—will profit by his lessons, and be saved from themselves. Nevertheless, one feels that theologians are deserving of our sympathy, as well as our censure, due to a basic difficulty which has bedevilled so much theological argument and may well account, in part at least, for the present aberrations which Mr. Lewis has so ably castigated.

Briefly put, the difficulty is this. Encouraged by the apparent success of the Thomist synthesis, theologians have, understandably enough, tried to obtain the best of two worlds—the world of doctrinal orthodoxy, and the world of rational speculation—without realizing that the chasm between them cannot be bridged, that dogmas erected on primitive behaviour compulsions (to borrow a term from Dr. Thouless) cannot be rationalized and fitted into some coherent philosophical system. But—and here is the great

dilemma—if they were entirely to cease hankering after incompatibles and follow the path laid down for them by Scotus and (more particularly) Occam, if they were to withdraw all religious truths from the sphere of reason and rely on their own evidential guarantee of revelation mediated by authority (a policy that would at least be consistent and, if cautiously pursued, render them invulnerable to philosophical attack)—they would at once lose the support of more intelligent mortals who demand at least some rational basis for the dogmas they are asked to accept and who cannot follow Tertullian's (and Pascal's) advice to believe them *because* they are absurd. Unwilling, therefore, to relinquish the advantages of either world, theologians have incessantly fallen between two stools, and have earned the inevitable reward of those who cannot make up their minds to which side of human nature—the rational or irrational—they will appeal. Liberal Protestantism, putting its money more on the rational side, has sought to discard as much as possible of the more "anti-scientific" and mythological aspects of the cultus, in a desperate endeavour to attract intelligent minds back to the fold. But this appeasement has apparently not gone far enough—either because the hold of traditionalism is still too strong, or (what is more likely) because it is realized that too many concessions to modernist views will emasculate Christianity and reduce it to a mere lesson in morality. Hence it seems that, as a reaction against this well-intentioned if unsuccessful attempt to reconquer lost territory by sweet reason, the New Theologians have gone to the other extreme and appealed to man's irrational side, and in such a way as to offer a direct challenge to philosophy on its own ground. This has for some, we must suppose, a certain dynamic attraction: they feel that, with the approbation and encouragement of religious leaders, they may vindicate their right to treat reason with contempt. All credit, then, to Mr. Lewis for exposing some of these theologians' most palpable errors within the brief compass of 160 pages.

J. HARTLAND-SWANN

The Moral Sense. By D. DAICHES RAPHAEL. (Oxford University Press: London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1947. Pp. 201. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book is, in the words of its author, "concerned with the views of four eighteenth-century philosophers on the epistemology of morals" (p. 1). The writers selected for discussion, "as those of the British moralists who were most affected one way or the other by the empiricist theory of knowledge" (p. 2), are Hutcheson, Hume, Price and Reid. The author's interest is not solely historical. He is impressed with the degree to which the eighteenth-century controversy between the advocates of "sense" and "reason" in morals resembles the present-day debate between emotionalists and intuitionists; and it is from the standpoint of his own, intuitionist, position, briefly summarized in his concluding chapter, that he criticizes the views of the four writers mentioned.

Mr. Raphael's first chapter is largely concerned with pointing out that the "exercise of the moral faculty" does not resemble smelling, hearing and tasting in the ways in which smelling, tasting and hearing both (i) resemble one another (and touching and seeing) and (ii) differ from other types of experience. In this he is plainly right, but I do not know (nor does Mr. Raphael tell us) of any philosopher who held a "moral sense" theory which entailed a contrary view. To hold a "moral sense" theory is not to believe that moral qualities are sensible qualities.

Mr. Raphael then turns to Hutcheson, whom he charges, I think justly,

with defining the word "sense" so widely that it would be not incorrect to speak, say, of a "logical sense" (p. 19). He also charges him, I think unjustly, with confusing the *discernment* of rightness and the *motives* to it (p. 22); but surely the absence of a rigid distinction between them is no confusion on a view such as Hutcheson's, which might fairly be summarized in modern terms as the insistence that there occur disinterested desires and impulses ("benevolence") whose fulfilment (by the self or others) produces the feeling of approbation (of the self or others) and whose frustration induces the feeling of disapprobation (of the self or others). Mr. Raphael is clearly right, however, in saying that Hutcheson's main concern in the *Inquiry* is to refute the psychological egoist (p. 30). In his later *Illustrations on the Moral Sense* Hutcheson recognizes the existence of "rationalist ethics" and, against equating rightness with "conformity to reason" or "fittingness," takes the usual line that, while it is proper to speak of actions as being "fitting" in the sense "well adapted to achieve their end," the ultimate choice of ends, and the ultimate ground of approbation, must be non-rational. This calls forth a strong reaction from Mr. Raphael, who wants to base "ultimate approvals" on the rational intuition of a necessary connection between non-moral and moral (relational) characteristics. He complains that Hutcheson "never considers the possibility that reason may be a faculty of immediate apprehension" (p. 34); and adds that the fundamental moral relation (obligation, fittingness) is "logically entailed" by the situation in which it is manifested (p. 41).

Phrases such as these let us know where Mr. Raphael stands. Naturally, he is unmoved by Hume's arguments against reason as the source of moral judgments; and concludes that "Hume has not shown that in moral reasoning we . . . cannot start from self-evident axioms about goodness and obligation" (p. 71). He does more justice than some commentators have done to the subtleties of Hume's general analysis; and seems right in maintaining that Hume's account of obligation is unsatisfactory, though he does not give any valid reason for supposing that feeling-theories could not accommodate a unique, introspectible *feeling* of obligation. From this chapter on Hume, it is clear once again that the author rests his case against "feeling-theories" mainly on his belief that we know certain synthetic entailments concerning moral concepts (p. 84).

Turning from Hutcheson and Hume to Price and Reid, Mr. Raphael finds himself among philosophical allies; and, though he perhaps at times strains his author's meaning to stress the bonds of alliance, these two chapters are, on the whole, the best in the book. The work of Price is easily shown to contain striking anticipations of arguments and distinctions familiar to readers of Moore and Ross. Any definition of "right," for example, Price rejects on the ground that it is always significant to predicate the word of the proffered definition (p. 111). Price goes yet further in the desired (intuitionist) direction by claiming for rational intuition the function of perceiving universal and necessary truths. Yet Mr. Raphael finds his final arguments inconclusive and his theory "insufficiently worked out." Why did Price not clinch the question by declaring that general moral principles are "apprehended by the understanding as necessarily true"? This final illumination was denied him, according to Mr. Raphael, because, lacking the modern "solution" of "prima facie obligations," he was daunted by the problem of conflicting duties and the consequent apparent lack of universality of ethical principles (pp. 144–5).

From the firm ground of ordinary language and common sense, Thomas Reid attacks both the theorists of feeling and the extremes of rationalist ethics. Mr. Raphael presents this part of his case with admirable clarity;

though he might have made it plainer that Reid, in defending a "reasoned" choice of ends as well as of means, was not drawing attention to any facts which Hume had overlooked. His main criticism of Reid is that he fails to maintain consistently the epistemological distinction between the necessary axioms (general truths) of morality, and the particular judgments of "instantiation" of moral characteristics (p. 173); and consequently fails to arrive at Mr. Raphael's distinction between the act of rational intuition by which we apprehend the former, and the particular moral judgment which, while presupposing the apprehension of the relevant general truth, does not generally involve any explicit reference to it unless the particular judgment itself comes to be questioned (pp. 189–93).

The theory of moral judgment of which the outlines emerge from Mr. Raphael's criticism of his four chosen philosophers is all too briefly summarized in the concluding chapter. The fundamental moral concept is taken to be that of obligation (an unanalysable relation); and Mr. Raphael makes great, but not (for me) very illuminating use of the familiar distinction between a "prima facie obligation" (which I shall write "obligation") and a duty proper or actual obligation (which I shall write "Obligation"). One would have thought that "prima facie obligation" (obligation) would be definable in terms of "obligation" (Obligation); and that some knowledge of the latter would be the pre-condition of any knowledge of the former. For Mr. Raphael the converse is the case, at least as regards knowledge. I know I have an Obligation to do X only if I know both that I have an obligation to do X and that this is my only or preponderant obligation I judge that I have an obligation to do X only if I see (intuit) now or have previously seen (intuited) that the existence of circumstances of such-and-such a kind entails the existence of an obligation of this kind. From circumstances I can (deductively) infer obligations; and from obligations I can infer Obligations (deductively if there is only one obligation, inductively if there are more). And this is the only way in which I can come to know either obligations or Obligations; for these are "consequential relations" (derivative concepts), not to be known except as synthetically entailed by other characteristics. Mr. Raphael modifies the fabulous intellectualism of this account by allowing that ordinary particular moral judgments generally involve, not explicit intuitions of entailment, but an unreflective "taking for granted" that, say, an action is Obligatory as falling under a previously intuited rule about the obligatoriness of actions of that type. Habit helps us to make the transition from circumstances to Obligations without the mediating intuitions. But the intuitions must have occurred at one time, as the pre-conditions of moral judgment, as the foundations of the habit. (It is not quite clear whether they are also the pre-condition of moral emotion.)

The objections, both of a general and of a detailed nature, to this account, seem to me overwhelming. It commits the prima facie absurdity of making the concept of "obligation" derivative from that of "prima facie obligation" instead of conversely—an absurdity perhaps always implicit in this deceptively "helpful" notion. It raises for Mr. Raphael the problem of how we know, in the case of conflict, which of our obligations is our Obligation; a problem which he conspicuously fails to solve by the suggestion that we know it by induction. I could, in a given case, pick out my Obligation from my conflicting obligations inductively, only if there had occurred other cases of conflicting obligations in which I had known my Obligation independently of my knowledge of my obligations. But, in the first place, this would be an instance of a non-inductive picking out of an Obligation from conflicting obligations; and, in the second place, this hypothesis contradicts Mr. Raphael's

thesis that knowledge of Obligations is always mediated or preceded by the intuition of obligations as entailed by circumstances.

Both critics and defenders of intuitionism in morals, however, will find Mr. Raphael's attempt to solve the "epistemological problem" instructive. Nor do the interest and stimulus of his book depend upon this attempt alone, but owe most to the care and skill which Mr. Raphael gives to the detailed presentation and criticism of his authors' arguments and points of view. To these features of the book I have not been able to do anything approaching justice in a short notice.

P. F. STRAWSON.

Causation and the Foundations of Science. By J. O. WISDOM. (Hermann & Co., Paris. 1946. Pp. 54.)

This work is interesting as an attempt to find a *via media* in regard to causation between the empiricism of the regularity view and thoroughgoing rationalism and also for its discussion of the possible philosophical bearings of the principle of indeterminacy. The author is not satisfied with the fashionable empiricism which reduces causality to regular sequence, but insists on the need for necessity. The strongest argument against the former view is, he thinks, that on such a view "the cause has no bearing on the production of the effect, since the regular recurrence has a merely *de facto* basis. Thus when hydrogen and oxygen are united by a spark, the proportions of the gases and the spark contribute in no way to the fact that they lose their independent existence and are succeeded by water. The action of a cause has" [on the regularity view] "to be thought of as *an action that does nothing*" (p. 41). Dr. Wisdom is also influenced by the difficulty of defending induction on the regularity view, but he failed to make it clear how this difficulty is to be met on his own view. Fundamental for him is the distinction between macroscopic and miscroscopic causation, the regularity view being true of the former but not of the latter. He is a believer in causal necessity but he refuses to regard this as involving logical necessity. The difficulty about that in my mind is to arrive at any clear conception of a necessity that is not logical or at the very least to avoid admitting features which make it so analogous to logical necessity that an important truth is expressed by calling it "entailment," and I cannot say that the account given has helped here. But in other respects it is very interesting and suggestive especially in the criticism of the rival regularity and entailment views and the use of the distinction between microscopic and macroscopic. The length of the work is naturally not sufficient to deal adequately with the very thorny and complicated problem of induction. The account of the philosophical bearings of the indeterminacy principle is very interesting and the analysis of the relevant points given is highly instructive. The author, however, seems to waver somewhat on this point so that it is difficult to obtain a consistent view of his account. Sometimes it would seem that he regards the principle as very relevant, sometimes as largely irrelevant to philosophy.

Dr. Wisdom has produced a very interesting and stimulating little manual, the 54 pages of which are crammed with material. The work must also have an interesting history, though this is only alluded to very briefly at the end. It was printed and published in France, and the proofs having been corrected in 1940, the type remained in being in Paris all through the occupation apparently undisturbed to bear its belated fruit now (subject to a few alterations). However this circumstance can hardly excuse the large number of minor misprints. The book could with profit be read both by elementary and advanced students of the subject.

A. C. EWING.

PHILOSOPHY

The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy. By H. J. PATON, F.B.A. (Hutchinson's University Library. London. 1947. Pp. 283. Price 21s.)

This book, I must say at once, is a contribution of the greatest importance to the understanding of Kant's ethics, and is certainly the best and fairest account I have read of the subject. It will not appeal to those who prefer to regard Kant as a man of straw in overthrowing whom they may display a facile dialectical skill; but without any unfair whitewashing it provides an admirable exposition and defence of the main principles of the *Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals* and of the ethical as distinct from the theological part of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. It certainly does for these works what *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience* by the same author did for the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and helped by a less intractable subject-matter it surpasses Prof. Paton's former book in terseness and lucidity, while not inferior to it in power of thought and judicial balance.

The main stock criticisms directed against Kant's ethics are largely due to its very formal character, but, Prof. Paton insists, we cannot blame Kant here for being too formal, because he was just concerned here with the form of ethical judgments, and not with the matter, which he leaves to the *Metaphysic of Ethics*. We cannot blame Kant for studying the form even if we happen not to be interested in it ourselves, and we must remember that he has also written a book in which he deals with the non-formal aspects of ethics. Prof. Paton vigorously and very rightly opposes the interpretations according to which Kant's ethics is vitiated by taking no account of consequences. "Kant makes it clear that there is no question of deducing particular duties merely from the empty form of universal law. On the contrary, we have to consider the *matter* which has to be fitted into this empty form. The matter consists of our ordinary material maxims based on inclination for definite objects; and what we have to do is to accept or reject these maxims by the principle of universality."[1] Similarly, he rejects the interpretation according to which Kant is supposed to have held that no actions which accord with our desires could have moral worth.[2] And he ably defends Kant's doctrine that the good will and the good will alone has unconditional value, while leaving some conditional value for other parts of our nature. He leaves in the reader's mind a kindlier and humaner picture than has been fashionable of Kant's ethics, and incidentally of Kant's personality.[3]

The most widely known feature of Kant's ethical doctrine is perhaps his conception of moral laws as strictly universal and his use of this conception as a criterion of what is right. Prof. Paton dispels the idea that this is more than a negative criterion, failure to comply with which makes an action wrong.[4] Any action which complies with it, he thinks, Kant would have regarded as permissible, thus leaving scope for a decision according to our desires provided we did not transgress the assigned limits. But he lays most stress on the sense in which universality is implied by any rational ethical judgment, i.e. if it is right at one time or for one man, it must under the same conditions be right at any time and for any man. The principle will seem to some too formal to be of any value, but it is yet presupposed in the most simple ethical reasoning from one case to another (c.f. science and the uniformity of nature), so Paton does right to emphasize it; but he should, I think, have also given a thorough discussion of the less defensible sense of universality in ethics which led Kant to maintain that it was wrong to tell a lie even in order to mislead a would-be murderer. His views of universality

[1] P. 73. [2] Chap. III. [3] Pp. 197-8 [4] Pp. 141-2.

as a criterion are summed up as follows: "Kant's solution is that the actions which can and ought to be willed in obedience to moral law are those whose maxims, if conceived as a law of nature, would further a systematic harmony of purposes among men, or at least would do nothing to destroy such a systematic harmony. . . . Indeed it may well be doubted whether it is possible to work out a systematic moral philosophy on any other basis, even although we may hold that Kant's own attempt to work it out is in many respects faulty."[1] Prof. Paton, to me very surprisingly, insists that Kant made the good prior to the ought, not vice versa.[2] I think this interpretation requires much more justification than is given.

The most difficult part of Kant's ethics is his discussion of the connection between moral obligation and freedom and his half-hearted attempt to justify ethics by an argument from outside. Prof. Paton rejects the latter argument and holds that by the time he wrote the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant had reached the view that the moral law must be accepted as an object of immediate insight.[3] But he draws an illuminating parallel between theoretical and ethical knowledge which perhaps expresses what was predominant in Kant's thought when he discussed these topics. If we are to think rationally, our thought must be determined not just by previous events but by timeless logical principles, and similarly if we are to act rationally in the full sense—which for Kant means acting morally—our action must be determined by a timeless moral law, and not by the natural causation which connects it with earlier events.[4] This, Prof. Paton insists, does not prove ethics or freedom, but it helps us towards accepting our moral insight as we accept our theoretical insight. He thinks that Kant should have stopped here with a timeless law and not introduced the nation of timeless acts on our part, a view with which most readers will no doubt agree. While his account deals admirably with most of the subtleties involved, I must confess that on two points I feel dissatisfied: 1. his discussion of the antithesis between analytic and synthetic propositions; 2. the rather too cursory way in which he deals with Kant's identification of free and moral action, which presents perhaps the acutest and most long-standing problem in the whole of Kantian ethics.

I conclude by mentioning two omissions. It seems to me that in the present climate of thought the book would have been more useful if it had brought out more the exact nature of the opposition between Kant's view and the views which are nowadays expounded under the headings of naturalism and subjectivism. In this connection it is unfortunate that the author seems to commit the mistake of assuming that any naturalist view must reduce moral judgments to judgments about pleasure and pain.[5] Secondly, I am surprised that he makes no apparent use of Kant's published *Lectures on Ethics*. No doubt he has read the work but there are no references to it, and though he might say that it is concerned rather with applied ethics than with the form of ethics it is difficult to believe that no citations from it would have been helpful. But in any case we may congratulate Prof. Paton on his excellent book and recommend it very heartily as essential to all serious students of Kant's ethics.

A. C. EWING.

[1] P. 163. [2] P. 104. [3] P. 203. [4] P. 217 ff. [5] P. 20.

Language, Truth and Logic. By A. J. AYER. (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd. 1946. Pp. 160. Price 9s.)

This book, first published in 1936, is now issued in more austere form, with no alteration of text, but with a new introduction of 21 pages, in which Mr. Ayer discusses some questions arising out of his views, and notes some changes

in his views during the interval. The two main topics he deals with in this introduction are the principle of verification, and the nature of philosophical analysis; and there are briefer notes on *a priori* propositions, on propositions about the past and about other minds, and on the emotive theory of values.

Most of his discussion of the principle of verification is concerned with technical details designed to improve the exposition of the argument and the expression of the principle itself; but he now makes it clear that he does not expect it to be accepted as a self-evident proposition about the only possible conditions under which any statement could be said to have meaning. He now describes it as a definition of one proper use of the word "meaning"; and even if metaphysical statements have no meaning in this sense, he no longer expects metaphysicians to admit straightway that what they are saying is altogether senseless. "Although," he says, "I should still defend the criterion of verifiability as a methodological principle, I realize that for the effective elimination of metaphysics it needs to be supported by detailed analyses of particular metaphysical arguments" (p. 16).

I should prefer to express what Mr. Ayer is now saying by describing the principle of verifiability not as a proposition but as a proposal: as an attempt to persuade investigators who wish their work to be fruitful, to consider only certain types of statement and not waste time on other types. Proposals can be argued for or against, though they cannot be shown to be true or false. Proposals do not invalidate propositions, though if you can get people to accept certain proposals you can get them to reject certain arguments. And this it seems to me is all that can be hoped for from the principle of verifiability.

It should be noted that, as Mr. Ayer expressed it, the principle of verifiability did not result in an explicit definition of the meaning of a statement, but merely showed under what conditions a statement could be said to have meaning. A statement has meaning (of the approved kind) only if it is capable of being verified or falsified by a procedure of a particular kind. This does not, so far, identify the meaning of a statement with the procedure for its verification. It leaves open the question of how the meaning of a statement is to be determined. The methods of determining whether it is true or not that there is a chair in the next room are not, so far, regarded as furnishing an account of what it means to say that there is a chair in the room. A distinction is still left possible between the conditions which must be satisfied if a statement is to have meaning, and the procedure for determining what the meaning of the statement is.

This latter procedure was indicated in Mr. Ayer's account of the nature of philosophical analysis. In the text of 1936 this account resulted in a very close connexion being made between the conditions necessary for a statement to have meaning and the procedure for determining that meaning. The new account of philosophical analysis seems to make this connexion much less close. In 1936 he held that it was the function of philosophical analysis to show how statements containing certain types of expression can be replaced by equivalent statements not containing these types of expression; to show, e.g. that statements about material objects, such as tables, trees, etc., could be replaced by equivalent statements containing no reference to such material objects, but referring only to actual or possible observations. He expressed this by saying that "the philosopher is primarily concerned with the provision, not of *explicit* definitions, but of definitions *in use*" (p. 60). The effect of this account was that the meaning of statements about material objects would be expressible entirely in terms of actual or possible verificatory statements. He would now prefer to speak not of replacing statements of one sort by *equivalent*

statements of another sort, but rather of showing how the statements of one sort are *related to* statements of another sort.

This is a significant difference; as is indicated by the fact that he now thinks that it is impossible to define what we mean by the phrase "a material thing" in terms of observation statements. "What one can do, however, is to construct a scheme which shows what sort of relations must hold between sense contents for it to be true, in any case, that a material thing exists" (24).

It would be possible to take this new account as indicating a move away from phenomenalism. The new account would prevent anyone from saying that material things are nothing but sets of sense-contents, or that making statements referring to material objects is only a compendious way of making statements about actual or possible sense-experiences. To say that a material thing exists would be to say something different from what can be said by speaking about sense-experiences. The latter would be evidence for the former, but not part of its meaning. Thus the new account of the nature of philosophical analysis would justify and exploit the gap left in the statement of the principle of verification between the conditions under which a statement can be said to have meaning and the determination of that meaning.

There is, however, a paragraph on pp. 14–15 with a contrary tendency. In this paragraph Mr. Ayer does make it clear that he thinks that the principle of verification allows us, in our theories, to introduce terms which do not "designate something observable." He insists that statements which confirm a hypothesis need not be part of the meaning of the hypothesis. While this is so, however, he holds that it is a necessary consequence of the principle of verification that a statement "does not have any other factual meaning than what is contained in at least some of the relevant empirical propositions" (p. 15). In the case of a statement about a material thing, "although its generality may prevent any finite set of observation-statements from exhausting its meaning, it does not contain anything as part of its meaning that cannot be represented as an observation-statement" (p. 15).

It is true that in this paragraph it is Mr. Ayer's primary intention to make clear that not all the evidence for a statement is part of the meaning of the statement. But it seems to result from the paragraph that there can be no part of the factual meaning of a statement which "cannot be represented as an observation statement." And this seems to be different from what he said in the passage already quoted from p. 24. While not necessarily inconsistent with that passage, it considerably diminishes the significance I suggested that passage might have. There is at least a certain tension between the two passages. They pull in opposite directions.

This tension seems to be evidenced by Mr. Ayer's discussion of other minds, brief as it is. He accepts the evidence of linguistic usage as decisive for the conclusion that it is a necessary proposition that two persons do not own the same experience. If this is so, then the statement "P is owning experience E" would have to mean something different from any set of observation-statements capable of being made by persons other than P, if they were to be able to make it at all. One half of Mr. Ayer's doctrine as I have presented it would allow for such difference, while leaving it possible that the observation-statements could be confirmatory evidence justifying them in making the statement about P. The other half of his doctrine would rule out any possible difference, and would thus make it meaningless for anyone to say that another person was owning an experience. In the conclusion he reaches tentatively the latter half seems to prevail. "I am inclined," he concludes, "to revert to a 'behaviouristic' interpretation of propositions about other people's experiences." "But," he adds, "I own that it has an air of paradox which prevents

me from being wholly confident that it is true" (p. 20), which seems to show that the former half of his doctrine is not completely forgotten.

But this kind of tension is a good augury for future progress.

I have no space to discuss the remaining points in the introduction. The re-issue of the volume is to be welcomed, and the new introduction enables Mr. Ayer to pick up the threads of the argument as they were left before the war, and tidy them up in the process. What was noteworthy before was the vigour with which the doctrines were expressed, the swiftness and economy of the writing, the sureness with which Mr. Ayer could pack his sentences with content, without making them unwieldy. The new introduction shows that while Mr. Ayer has matured, he has lost none of his old skill.

L. J. RUSSELL.

Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil. By THOMAS HOBBES. Edited with an introduction by MICHAEL OAKESHOTT. (Basil Blackwell. Oxford. 1946. Price 8s. 6d. (cloth), 7s. 6d. (paper).)

Hobbes's "opponents divide themselves into two classes: the emotional and the intellectual," says Mr. Michael Oakeshott in his introduction (p. *l*) to this fine edition of the *Leviathan*. The present reviewer must confess himself to belong to the first class, although he has tried hard to graduate into the second. It is not an exaggeration to say, however, that Mr. Oakeshott's introduction has enabled one to make what is almost completely a fresh start in trying to understand Hobbes. In about seventy pages of lucid, arresting, and epigrammatic English he has expounded the essential facts of Hobbes's life, the context of the *Leviathan*, the characteristics of Hobbes's thought, and the argument of his book. There is a freshness about the whole thing which enables the reader coming to the *Leviathan* again to enter with enthusiasm and a sense of direction upon the task of following and appreciating the long and difficult argument of the author. And perhaps the greatest tribute to Mr. Oakeshott's introduction is that it leads one on to the reading of the book; it does not give that false sense of knowing already what is to come, which is so often the effect of introductions. "The argument is finished: but let no one mistake it for the book," says Mr. Oakeshott at the end of one section of his introduction. It is good to be able to say that at no time does the introduction produce that false impression and result. It succeeds admirably in what it sets out to do—it introduces.

To say this is to say that Mr. Oakeshott has achieved his purpose brilliantly. He may hope to do a little more—to meet the criticisms of the opponents of the second class, and to make some amends for the fact that Hobbes's few defenders are, as he says, "not conspicuous for their insight into his meaning." But this is harder work, and it is difficult to attempt it in the few pages of an introduction. And, to quote his own words once more, "it is not to be expected that it can be accomplished quickly or all at once." (p. lii). What Mr. Oakeshott has to say in defence of Hobbes is always cogent and clear. It will lead the student to see that there is much more in Hobbes than he thought. Whether it will take him further than that, whether it will lead him to exclaim as Mr. Oakeshott does (p. viii) that "the *Leviathan* is the greatest, perhaps the sole, masterpiece of political philosophy written in the English language" is less certain. Let us hope that before he takes a final decision on this question the student will look at two companion volumes in this series of Mr. Blackwell's political texts—Mr. Gough's edition of Locke's *Second Treatise* and *A Letter concerning Toleration*, and Mr.

McCallum's edition of Mill's *Liberty* and *Representative Government*. May the reviewer be permitted to go beyond the confines of the volume he is considering and offer a word of thanks and appreciation to Mr. McCallum and his colleague as general editor of this series, Mr. C. H. Wilson, and to Basil Blackwell for their courage and enterprise in making available to students these great texts, so fit for these times. Mr. Oakeshott's volume sets the highest of standards. K. C. WHEARE.

Between Man and Man. By MARTIN BUBER. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. (Kegan Paul. 1947. Pp. 208. 12s. 6d.)

Martin Buber's *I and Thou* was published in Germany in 1923 (English translation 1937). *Between Man and Man* contains five subsequent essays, written 1925–38, which develop the same leading thoughts into fuller expression, bearing more distinctly on contemporary problems. To appreciate this volume a reader need not be acquainted with the earlier work; and in many respects the fuller treatment provides an easier introduction to the subject, in spite of the greater proportion here of technical and historical discussions of philosophy.

"Dialogue" (*Zwiesprache*), which stands first in the book, comes nearest to *I and Thou* in its compressed and mystical language. It is a study of the heart that is "open" to all things and events, and to men, and to God; and that meets the "word" said to it everywhere in return. The next essay, "The Question to the Single One" (*Die Frage an den Einzelnen*) contains a sympathetic but critical exposition of Kierkegaard and a more decided criticism of some related writers; and this historical survey is enlarged and extended (ranging now from Kant to Scheler) in the final section of the book. This section, "What is Man?", consists of the author's inaugural course of lectures (1938) as Professor of Social Philosophy in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. It is preceded by two addresses on education given to conferences of teachers; one in 1925 at Heidelberg, the other in 1939 at Tel-Aviv.

It is impressive to see how well the general doctrine bears expansion; and Professor Buber's gift of illustration, and his subtlety and sanity of thought, appear still more clearly now that more space is allowed them. Mr. Gregor Smith's translation (so far as I can judge without having seen the original) seems altogether admirable, and the author and translator together supply us with some memorable passages.

A few quotations may help most to give an idea of what the book offers.

"Kant's question *What is man?* whose history and effects I have discussed . . . can never be answered on the basis of a consideration of the human person as such, but (so far as an answer is possible at all) only on the basis of a consideration of it in the wholeness of its essential relations to what is. Only the man who realizes in his whole life with his whole being the relations possible to him helps us to know man truly. And since, as we have seen, the depths of the question about man's being are revealed only to the man who has become solitary, the way to the answer lies through the man who overcomes his solitude without forfeiting its questioning power" (p. 199).

"Individualism understands only a part of man, collectivism understands man only as a part; neither advances to the wholeness of man, to man as a whole. . . . With the former man's face is distorted, with the latter it is masked" (p. 200).

"The body politic, which is sometimes also called the 'world,' that is, the human world, seeks, knowingly or unknowingly, to realize in its genuine formations men's turning to one another in the context of creation. The false

formations distort but they cannot eliminate the eternal origin. Kierkegaard in his horror of malformation turns away" (p. 60).

"Kierkegaard behaves in our sight like a schizophrenist, who tries to win over the beloved individual into 'his' world as if it were the true one. But it is not the true one. We, ourselves wandering on the narrow ridge, must not shrink from the sight of the jutting rock on which he stands over the abyss; nor may we step on it. We have much to learn from him, but not the final lesson" (p. 55).

"Good and evil, then, cannot be a pair of opposites like right and left or above and beneath. 'Good' is the movement in the direction of home, 'evil' is the aimless whirl of human potentialities without which nothing can be achieved and by which, if they take no direction but remain trapped in themselves, everything goes awry. . . . As a condition of the individual soul evil is the convulsive shirking of direction, of the total orientation of the soul by which it stands up to personal responsibility before God. . . . The passionate man refuses by his passion, the indolent man by his indolence. . . . The real historical daemonias are the exploiting by historical powers of this shirking" (pp. 78–9).

"Lyric poetry is . . . the tremendous refusal of the soul to be satisfied with self-commerce. Poetry is the soul's announcement that even when it is alone with itself on the narrowest ridge it is thinking not of itself but of the Being which is not itself, and that this Being which is not itself is visiting it there, perplexing and blessing it" (p. 180).

"In my thoughts about the life of dialogue I have had to choose the examples as 'purely' and as much in the form of paradigm as memory presented them to me in order to make myself intelligible. . . . But I am not concerned with the pure; I am concerned with the turbid, the repressed, the pedestrian, with toil and dull contrariness . . . in which the man, whom I pluck at random out of the tumult, is living and out of which he can and at times does break through. Whither? into nothing exalted, heroic, or holy, into no Either and no Or, only into this tiny strictness and grace of every day, where I have to do with just the very same 'reality' with whose duty and business I am taken up. . . . And now, in all the clanking of routine that I called my reality, there appears to me, homely and glorious, the effective reality, creaturely and given to me in trust and responsibility. We do not find meaning lying in things nor do we put it into things, but between us and things it can happen" (pp. 35–6).

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

The Second Treatise on Civil Government and *A Letter concerning Toleration.* By JOHN LOCKE. Edited with an Introduction by J. W. GOUGH. (Basil Blackwell. Oxford. 1946. Pp. xxxix + 165. 8s. 6d. net.)

Mr. Gough has given us an excellent edition of a political classic which a generation familiar with totalitarianism in practice should esteem more highly than the complacent later nineteenth century. For to that generation in England Locke was too often a solemn propounder of commonplaces and shallow half-truths, who had had in the eighteenth century far more than his due measure of reputation as a political thinker and whom it was meet to contrast to his disadvantage with the "far more coherent logic" (the phrase is Bosanquet's) and the far more brilliant writing of Hobbes. Nowadays perhaps we are not too much impressed by a political logic that leads straight to despotism, and we merely regret that such a pungent style was put at the service of so disastrous a doctrine as Hobbes expounded.

With Locke at least we are safe—and sound as well as safe. He is whole-

some even in his hesitancies, and when he evades an issue (as that of the limits of toleration) it is often because he refuses to slash drastically through a knot that no one has to this day unravelled. Perhaps it is just as well that some (not all) of the fundamentals of liberal democracy should have been first authoritatively stated with so little sparkle of paradox, but soberly, tentatively, unpontifically.

Mr. Gough's estimate of Locke is likewise sober. He shows us his weaknesses as well as his merits. He brings out well the special significance of Locke's conception of government in *fiduciary* rather than traditional contractual terms. The reader has also the great advantage of seeing where the later editions of the Treatise, which Locke preferred, differ from the first version of it. But on the whole one is struck by the constancy of Locke's ideas. As Mr. Gough points out the essence of the doctrine of 1690 is in the early draft of the "Essay Concerning Toleration" of 1667.

There appears to be a slip on p. xxxv. Speaking of Locke's not very satisfactory discussion of the problem of how the citizen is to act if the civil government enjoins something that conflicts with his conscience, Mr. Gough says: "Locke simply recommends passive obedience," when it is clear that passive *dis*obedience is intended. The citizen should refuse to obey, but accept the duly authorized punishment for disobedience. After 250 years we have not got far beyond that.

One question which must occur to the readers of Locke remains unanswered by his latest editor. Why does Locke never refer openly to Hobbes? That he has the doctrine of *The Leviathan* repeatedly in mind is, as Mr. Gough says, clear enough. Why then no overt reference to it?

If this curious reticence is to be explained by a decision not to present his own constructive theory in a way that would suggest a piece of topical polemics, then he succeeded to perfection in writing what within a generation had become the standing and accepted exposition of the Whig political faith.

I should like to quarrel with one of Mr. Gough's critical comments. He complains (xxxi) of the "artificiality" of Locke's theory. Certainly Locke had, no more than any of his contemporaries, a conception of social or political evolution or growth. But he does recognize that constitutional government is at any rate "natural" in the sense of being an expression of human need finding its normal expression in the satisfaction of natural faculty. Ordered government *is* after all an artifice: the important thing to stress is that it is not a violent *tour de force* for which nothing in raw human nature would have prepared us, but an inevitable contrivance in which human nature finds itself. "Man is born free as he is born rational," etc. Burke was at any rate faithful to Locke's thought when he wrote that "Art *is* man's nature."

J. W. HARVEY.

The Nature of Art or The Shield of Pallas. By ARTHUR LITTLE, S.J. (Longmans Green & Co. Pp. 264. 8s. 6d.)

It is an intriguing experience, chastening and perhaps salutary, to read a book with whose main conclusion on the nature of artistic experience (though not on the nature of beauty) one agrees while finding none of its arguments for that conclusion at all convincing. This main conclusion is that our experience of significant art is the contemplation of the volitional activities of the human soul (p. 75), it is "emotion recollected in tranquillity" (p. 83).

The main arguments are of the kind once profanely called "high priori." As Lord Russell has said of the vaunted French "logicality," it develops with

impressive demonstration the implications of premises merely assumed to be acceptable. To take a crucial instance: the beauty of significant art consists in its expressiveness of the emotions of the human soul. But this is referred to the alleged fact that the human soul is the most "beautiful" object with which we are directly acquainted. Everything that is real is said to be beautiful (though human beings are incapable of perceiving the beauty of most things) since everything real is orderly or self-consistent, and such order *is* beauty. Surely the force of reason could no further go, To make things such she just defined them so. From this it follows that the beauty of significant art is a very different kind of beauty from that of reality, for its beauty consists in its expressiveness of the imperceptible and inexpressive beauty of reality. But what is expressive or significant to one man may easily not be so to another who speaks a different language and has a different culture or a different coloured skin (pp. 126, 150). Yet all beauty is said to be objective, a quality of things not an experience of ours. Manifestly here is a difficulty calling for serious discussion: is the beauty of art a quality of the work or only a capacity to stimulate a valuable activity (acquaintance with the human heart) in people of a certain character, while one equally valuable might only be stimulated in others by other means? And if the latter, may not the same be true of all beauty, say (to take the author's example) that of an amphora? May not its curves be expressive of human feeling to some persons who are insensitive to those of a Chinese bronze, and *vice versa*? No doubt when we call things beautiful we unreflectively *mean* to attribute a quality to them, as when we call them pleasant, but are we justified? This real difficulty is passed over with surprising levity. We are referred to "the devastating criticism" of subjectivism in ethics in Dr. C. E. M. Joad's *Guide to Philosophy*. There is no discussion of the contrary opinions of Richard Price, Coleridge, Rashdall, Ross or of Croce whose account of beauty agrees so closely with the account of "significant art" for which the author claims originality. Indeed, in spite of the claim upon the wrapper that "all the main theories are outlined and debated," the only one adequately discussed is that of Maretain; Kant is touched but, I think, misinterpreted. There is no discussion of whether the value of aesthetic experience—goodness of taste—may not depend upon its frequency, vividness and purity rather than upon the stimulus; as innocence and peace of mind depend upon having done what we honestly thought our duty in what we supposed to be the situation and not upon what we ignorantly did.

When the author discusses the "unsignificant beauty" of an amphora (and I suppose the same would apply to nature) we are told that its beauty is objective, consisting in the mutual necessitation of its lines. But since the alleged necessitation is neither causal nor logical it must, I suppose, be aesthetic; there must be these curves *if* this particular beauty is to be achieved: the argument, once more, is circular.

The sub-title is explained by a rather obscure apologue of Perseus. The author has not remarked upon the striking resemblance, as well as difference, of his conclusions with those of Ruskin's *The Lance of Pallas*.

The book is developed from lectures; some pedagogical puns and facetiousness, suitable enough for its first purpose, might perhaps have been dropped.

The definition attributed to Blackstone on p. 48 is in fact quoted by him from Sir Thomas Smith some two centuries earlier.

The main effect of the book is that by its insistence on the "objectivity" of beauty, which seems to me extremely dubious, it tends to revive, as in logical positivism, the analogy between beauty and goodness drawn by Hutcheson and Hume, which has led alike to an unfounded scepticism of morality and to an unjustifiable dogmatism in taste. E. F. CARRITT.

NEW BOOKS

God, Man, and the Absolute. By F. H. CLEOBURY, Ph.D. (Hutchinson. Pp. 148. Price 15s.)

Bertrand Russell has said that perhaps the chief service of philosophy today is to enable us to live effectively without certainty. That may rather be the function of faith—not confined to philosophers. But one service it does render is to prevent us taking the latest cult in thought for the last and ascribing finality to a contemporary fashion. Thought has its dialectical movement, in which by putting down the right foot and then again the left, it maintains constant motion if not assured progress. Our own day has put down the mighty Rationalisms and Idealisms of the nineteenth century from their seats and exalted various schools of Realism and Irrationalism to high degree. "Whirl" has become king in the realms of art, poetry, life, and thought. Lately, however, tender shoots have appeared which may be the presage of a returning Spring for ancient Reason and that "out-moded" Idealism which once availed to nourish spiritual faith and social enthusiasm with Hegelian juices particularly in Oxford and Glasgow.

Many may get from the very title of this book by Dr. Cleobury a creepy feeling that Hegel and his English prophets, long believed to be dead and buried, are again walking and speaking like gibbering ghosts in their unknown tongue, and they may think that anything which can now be said from that platform must be flat, stale, and unprofitable. In the present instance such a prejudice would itself be batty. True it is Hegel, Bradley, and Bosanquet who walk the ramparts; but Dr. Cleobury views the apparition with eyes in which there is speculation and alert critical faculty. Besides, a philosophy like a wine may be none the worse, if it is freshly decanted, for having lain a generation or two in the cellar so that the bottles smell musty and look cobwebby. Why prefer to sport with Minerva on raw spirit distilled earlier the same day? Dr. Cleobury informs us that this book is "the result of a conviction that the time is now ripe for a re-consideration and defence of the outmoded Oxford Idealism," and his enterprise should command the wistful interest of philosophers and thinking people at a time when Scientific Humanism and Logical Positivism are contracting the whole alphabet of cosmic utterance within the alpha and omega of time, ending, as they must, in nihilism redeemed only by the stoic dignity with which final despair is to be defied.

He reaffirms, supported by revised arguments, the cardinal theses and principles of Absolute Idealism, holding that Reality is experience and that "the notion of an existent or a subsistent or a real which no one, God or man, is conscious of" is one to which he can attach no meaning (p. 10). As all the motley of existence is not relative to finite percipience it must be present in an Infinite or Absolute experience and to the *explicit cognisance* of God, (p. 13) who has no subconscious. Absolute Reality is one eternal, all-embracing, perfect, and harmonious Whole, a rational, systematic, self-consistent Unity, into which all phenomena enter, including finite selves, and of which they are parts, and nothing can fall outside it (p. 15).

The succeeding chapters offer a closely reasoned theory, based on acute and penetrating analysis, of Finite Selfhood, of the Moral Consciousness, Human Freedom, Error and Appearance, with a discussion in the last Chapter of the main doctrines of Christian theology such as Incarnation, Sin, Responsibility—a treatment designed to show how the integrity of all our temporal values and particularities can be preserved in the Idealistic conception of the Absolute as here interpreted and expounded. In Bradley's Absolute all "appearances" are transmuted so that their peculiar "as suchness" in time and space disappears in the total context. In Dr. Cleobury's Absolute every

characteristic of phenomena is there; it remains, as such, a constituent of the Absolute. The dilemma is that with Bradley the finite peculiarities cannot squeeze in without losing their shape and so wander like displaced persons in an inconceivable limbo, while with Cleobury the network of completed relations in the Absolute leaves the particular "appearances" intact. This, though necessary if nothing whatever is to be left outside, seems impossible on the Idealistic theory of things and relations. Cleobury wrestles with the problem and seeks its solution in a special handling of that hardy principle of the Idealistic Logic, "Identity-in-Difference." Selfhood is of course the most obstinate stickler for its own inviolable rights and here he manfully tries to wangle out of the bunker by his doctrine of the "concrete ego" (p. 31), which he illustrates by the analogy of a circle with its centre, area, circumference (34, 36). But does the analogy do its job, where the centre is just an abstract part of the circle, in the same plane with it, whereas the ego is a living agent *appropriating* its experience like a trade-union imposing a "closed shop?" And moreover we find in Chapter II, and in Chapter IV, where human freedom is the issue, that the ego is assigned a transcendental character and status above the general process of nature, history and its own experience, where causality and determinism reigns (p. 144). This point is crucial, in our opinion, and we cannot see, in spite of the elaborate argument of Chapter II, that the "separateness" of finite selves from each other and from the divine spirit is expressible in terms of "dissimilarity of content" merely (p. 144), and "similarity of content" is not the same thing as numerical identity. I enjoy an uninfringed monopoly of my own toothache.

Space makes it impossible to set forth all Dr. Cleobury's applications of "Identity-in-Difference" as interpreted by him to the solution of inveterate Idealistic problems, nor his argument in various connexions for a realistic acceptance of the total inclusiveness of the Absolute, of such sort as explains why man can literally become *one* with God and his consciousness part of the Infinite or Universal Consciousness, so that It actually thinks and acts and lives in us and we in It, in the measure in which our thoughts, acts, and lives deepen and widen to embrace God's and express our own truest selves. Such conception and speech are indeed the current coin of religion and have profound meaning and value but whether we can exchange it into hard ontological cash is perhaps another story. The last Chapter on Christian theism and theology in relation to the Philosophy of the Absolute strikes us as in parts the weakest and least satisfactory. There is the author's authentic touch in his remarks on Kant's moral argument for man's immortality (137, 138) and the argument from values is, we believe, valid in a general way, but his doctrine of the good and bad man in respect of survival of death is left with sore obscurities, and on p. 141 it is given an intellectualist twist which rather makes us rub our eyes. But in the old Christian tradition, the difference between sheep and goats was itself a pretty subtle one on which to apportion destiny. Most questionable of all is the equation throughout of the metaphysical Absolute with the God of Theism, quite a different Being answering to very different human needs and with temporal activities and functions, which appear to be impossible for the Absolute though Dr. Cleobury speaks of it as an *active* Absolute. His identification of them requires more elucidation and justification than it gets.

In any case, the real value of the book, challenging attention, consists not only in its revision, in certain respects original, of the classic presentments of Absolute Idealism and the effort to put right some of its assumed implications, but in the author's clear-sighted appreciation of the difficulties raised by his own arguments and his honest refusal to dodge them in a strife for triumph

more than truth. We may congratulate him on a work which embodies intense persistent thinking and on the clear sinuous style in which it is written. No German professor could thus have made the crooked straight and the rough places plain. R. NICOL CROSS.

The Medieval idea of law as represented by Lucas de Penna. A Study in Fourteenth-Century Legal Scholarship. By WALTER ULLMANN.

At the end of the last century the study of both the Common Law and the Canon Law in the Middle Ages was revolutionized for English scholars by the great work of F. W. Maitland. His books are still studied and he laid foundations upon which Holdsworth, Z. N. Brooke, and others in England and America have built. In comparison the Civil Law has been badly neglected. We have the articles in the *Cambridge Medieval History* and *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*, we have Vinogradoff's *Roman Law in Medieval Europe*, and, more recently, Kantorowicz's *Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law*. Dr. Ullmann's book is therefore a welcome help in the cultivation of a neglected field. It is prefaced by an introduction on "The Legal and Political Ideas of the Post-Glossators" by Professor Hazeltine who summarizes many of the points which the author later develops more fully in connexion with the work of Lucas de Penna. The importance of the Civilians for political theory has already been demonstrated in the Carlyles' great work, but it is useful to have it developed in more detail as expounded by one particular lawyer. Dr. Ullmann emphasizes strongly Lucas's moral outlook. At the end of his discussion of the foundations and nature of law he writes: "Lucas's main idea is that law cannot serve as a means to cover unjust, evil intentions. Rights are granted only for a specific purpose, and the bearer of a right cannot plead the cause of law and right when his intentions are in opposition to those of the legislator. This fundamental thesis reveals a mind which is permeated with the spirit of morality rarely—if ever—to be found among jurists. The hypocritical idea of an "objective nature" of law, a slogan of modern jurisprudence, is plainly rejected. Lucas would certainly not have justified the coinage of the trite dictum "Juristen sind böse Christen." Nor would Shylock have found any support from our jurist." One wonders whether in all this Lucas is quite so distinctive among the medieval civilians as Dr. Ullmann seems to imply. Further it must be emphasized that although the civilians were definitely Christian lawyers yet their outlook is markedly different from that of the canonists. The two laws were, for example, in contradiction over the performance of certain kinds of contract. Guido de Baisio (1313) explains the difference by saying that Canon Law tends to apply equity in relations between individuals and does not occupy itself with the subtleties of Roman Law. Antony de Butrio (1338–1408) puts the case more precisely: *Dico quod ideo, quia ius civile principaliter non insequitur finem iuris divini sed finem publicae utilitatis.* The English lawyer and the ecclesiastic may, by a perusal of Dr. Ullmann's book, be strengthened in their conviction of the superiority of their respective systems of the Roman Civil Law, but they will be none the less grateful to him for helping them to understand wherein this superiority lies. ERIC KEMP.

PHILOSOPHY

Old Age. Its Compensations and Rewards. By A. L. VISCHER. Translated by Bernard Miall. (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1947. Pp. 200. 12s. 6d. net.)

In this book little is said of the strain and stress of growing old, and not very much directly about the "compensations and rewards" of old age. But then such strain and stress can only be experienced, and may not be told, and reward or compensation is a grace which a man must find as he may. And "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must keep silence."

Too often we tend to forget the inscrutable livingness of both youth and age, and we make of them problems, put them into fast categories, and dogmatize about them. Strangely enough we do not generally dogmatize about middle age, and the middle-aged are suffered to follow their individual pursuits with no gloss from the theorist, though perhaps the modern cult of the "common man" indicates even here a bias towards the abstract. Now it is an outstanding merit of this book that in it Dr. Vischer neither sets himself a problem nor propounds a theory. He is entirely undogmatic on the subject of old age, but what he does—and this is of the utmost value—is to release old age from its categorical fastness and to put it back into the open spaces of ordinary living, to reveal it as continuous with its past, and not as a limit of that past. "How good is our life, the mere living."

Dr. Vischer has seen that there is no definite point in time at which a man becomes old, and he shows old age as a shifting thing, shifting as between man and man, and shifting too within the span of one man's lifetime. We should perhaps say of a man not that he is seventy years of age, but rather that he is seventy years of *his* age. And at seventy he may well be younger in some respects than he was at sixty.

Life does not conform to the measure of years, and Dr. Vischer makes a nice point when he suggests that anniversaries may play a rather sinister role in the clamping down upon him of a man's age.

Life is organic, and old age is part of the close-knit involution of the physical, psychical, social and spiritual elements in the whole of life. As a scientist Dr. Vischer investigates the symptoms and causes of physical decline in the ageing man, but he maintains that such symptoms and causes do not form a closed system, that there is ingression and interference by all the circumambient elements, psychical, social and spiritual, and that the result of this interpenetration is something which is not susceptible to scientific analysis.

Dr. Vischer is a scientist, but he has the eye of an artist, and his work is imbued with something of the active passivity of those who seek not to prove but to see. "Il faut être voyant, toujours voyant."

And he makes a very wide survey, observing old age horizontally in all parts of the world, and vertically down the centuries of time. There is the pre-eminence of youth in ancient Greece, and the cult of age in China now; there is old age in the remote past of Judaism and old age in the Vatican to-day. And, in the passage, from one country to another, from one century to another, many curious and interesting things are brought to light. There is Metschnikoff's method of rejuvenation from Bulgaria, there is a table giving the ages of German rulers from the year 800 to the present time, there is a chapter on old age and longevity in the animal world, there is a consideration of old age in primitive peoples, and there is a record of the incidence of centenarianism.

Many strange facts emerge, but there is a constant transition from the factual to the meditative, and the interludes of meditation are both helpful and illuminating. About memory in old age Dr. Vischer says "It does not simply become worse; it becomes more fastidious. What is actually essential

comes to the fore, what is unimportant is not retained, is indeed barely remarked. In the thought of the old man the substance of what is perceived fades from view, while the conceptual acquires greater significance. Thought becomes less ample, but more economical. The world is seen with a different vision; it appears poorer in colour and tone, but for that very reason clearer and more transparent." And on the question of old age and its sense of the future we have: "In old age we find that the awareness of the future and with it the sense of life, undergoes all kinds of changes. It may be directed forwards, in undiminished hope, and assurance of new experiences. But if there is no such forward orientation, or if no compensation for it exists, the concrete structure of time that serves as a frame for the anticipation of life collapses, and amid the débris of this structural decay there remains, as the sole temporal fabric, the banal division of time into days, and the discharge of the animal functions."

One would like to linger over this question of the relation and aspect of time to old age, one would like to linger over many other such passages in this book, but with his sure instinct for the individual and the personal the author beckons us on to the survey of a long gallery of portraits, portraits of men and women who, full of years, were still able to serve their generations, and in many instances to do outstanding work in their latter days.

In this gallery are Titian, Renoir, Goethe, Voltaire, Fontane, Verdi, and Ninon de Lenclos—and to such a list of honour we ourselves may well add names illustrious "in England now."

There is no retiring age for the creative artist or for the leader of a salon, but it is otherwise with the majority of men, and when we give up our job not only do we cease to contribute useful work to the community, but too often we suffer diminishment of personal being. The curse of old age, Dr. Vischer says, is boredom, *d'ennui mortel.* Old people so often feel bored, but a boredom which is unacknowledged and even unrecognized may surely yet also sap a man's vitality, and increase the drag of the years!

This problem of boredom is a specific one, and Dr. Vischer points to a solution. He would have not only a Bernard Shaw producing works of art at the age of seventy or eighty or ninety, but an old woman in a home for the aged engaged upon some work within her powers, and which she feels to be useful—helping, say, in a neighbouring hospital or infirmary.

With the increase in numbers in the higher age-groups which is a feature of the modern world it may well be that older—and yet older—men may find work in industry or administration, work in which their qualities of experience, disinterestedness and responsibility may supplement the quicker reactions, the larger adaptability and the greater physical strength, of younger colleagues.

Dr. Vischer gives interesting examples of such experiments in adapting work to the powers of older men, to the great benefit of the men themselves and to the business in which they engage. Such a method means material gain in that it constitutes an increase in man-power for a nation, but more than this is its spiritual value, for it may mean an extension to many of a chance of securing that serenity of mind which should be the dower of age. "For every stage of life has its own psychic modality, its own beauty, its own right to exist, and is a section of life full of a significance of its own."

E. M. ROWELL.

PHILOSOPHY

The Vision of Asia. By L. CRANMER BYNG. With a Foreword by the Rt. Hon. R. A. Butler. (Pocket edition.) (John Murray. Pp. 306. 6s. with index.)

It is not easy to review this book for philosophers. To begin with, Mr. Cranmer Byng's generation, now passing on, is under a real debt to him for the vision he had of a "Wisdom of the East" series and for translating that vision into fact at so moderate a cost to the purchaser. In 1932 the editor of the series appeared in *propria persona* to give his own reactions to the study of Eastern philosophy; to him Asia is essentially the home of the mystic wisdom. He comes, therefore, under the suspicion of being an escapist. But he roundly affirms that he is not. What he dislikes in the West is the tyranny of technical science with the life of the individual sunk in the gelatinous existence of the mass, herded as it is in tenements and stream-lined production shops. He has found what he looked for in the Upanishads, in the Buddha, in Confucius and Lao Tzu. The last-named would appear to be the most congenial to his soul. From these writers he went on to consider the part played by artistic intuition in China and Japan, particularly in the great flowering periods of the T'ang and Sung eras.

It is to Mr. Cranmer Byng's credit that he has tried to put his theories to the test of history. The trouble here is that, having a better knowledge of Western history he looks at it with jaundiced eyes, having a less knowledge of Chinese history he sees it through rose-coloured spectacles. Further, I cannot believe that he uses the same uncritical judgment for the early legends of European history as he uses for those of China's cultural origins. He accepts all that the scholars of the old tradition believed about sage kings back in the 4th millennium B.C. without any reference to modern criticism or archaeological discoveries.

Altogether, therefore, though the book has its charm with its mannered prose style, it is not to be recommended to the analytically minded philosopher. But then of course that is not what Mr. Cranmer Byng sets out to be. His aim is to show how faith in the eternal verities can be revivified by sipping at these Asiatic springs; and this he does in a way which readers of his Wisdom of the East series will appreciate. E. R. HUGHES.

La Pensée de Ghazzālī. By A. J. WENSINCK, professeur à l'université de Leiden. (Adrien-Maisonneuve, Paris VIe. 1940. Pp. ii + 201. Price not stated.) 11 Rue St. Sulpice.

For the sake of convenience (the printer's as well as my own) I propose to call the subject of this book Algazel, the name by which he was known to the medievals. He lived from 1058–1111 A.D. and represented a reaction against the rationalising tendencies introduced into the Mohammedan world by Alfarabi and Avicenna. Having exposed the opinions of these two philosophers in a work which was mistaken by the medievals for an exposition of his own ideas, he proceeded to a *Destruction of the Philosophers,* to which Averroes later replied with a *Destruction of the Destruction.* His chief work was the *Renewal of the Religious Sciences.*

Professor Wensinck (who died in 1939) gives us a study of Algazel's thought in regard to God, man, cosmology, angels, faith and certainty, asceticism and mysticism, death and the future life, omitting any biographical sketch and not really discussing Algazel's relation to his predecessors. The author of a book is, of course, fully entitled to delimit his subject matter as he chooses; but the second omission is perhaps to be regretted, since one of the chief points of interest in regard to Arab philosophy is the tension between theolo-

gian and philosopher, between the Coran on the one hand and Aristotle in Neo-platonic vestments on the other. It is interesting to compare the changing relations between theology and philosophy in the medieval Arab world and the medieval Christian world. However, the author has given a careful and systematic account of Algazel's thought, with many quotations (in French happily) and references, though he might well have had compassion on those of us who know no Arabic by supplying the French translation of the Arabic titles of Algazel's works as mentioned in the bibliography.

Professor Wensinck contends that Algazel was first of all a Mohammedan. This is undoubtedly true. Algazel insisted on creation, on the divine omnicausality and on predestination, thus upholding Mohammedan orthodoxy against what he considered to be the dangerous tendencies of the followers of Aristotle. On the other hand there are obvious Neo-platonic elements in Algazel's thought, which might appear strange in the case of a destroyer of the philosophers. But Algazel was not simply a critic of the unorthodox; he was a mystic, a Sufi, and Sufism incorporated Neo-platonic and also Christian elements. In other words, Algazel the mystic softened the harshness of Mohammedan orthodoxy by fusing it with a mysticism and moral doctrine drawn from Neo-platonism and from Christianity. (Algazel quotes directly from the New Testament.) Neoplatonism was thus enlisted in the service of mysticism rather than in that of speculation. In regard to purely philosophic speculation Algazel was critical and even somewhat sceptical; but a large dose of scepticism in philosophy is by no means incompatible with mysticism.

The mystical teaching of Algazel led him to use expressions which savour of pantheism, though, as an orthodox Mohammedan, he certainly did not mean to deny the divine transcendence. That he approximated to pantheism, in expression at least (perhaps it would be better to speak of panentheism) is really no matter for surprise, since the doctrines of strict predestination and divine omnicausality, especially when fused with a mystical doctrine strongly emphasised, can hardly lead to anything else. (The stress laid on love, however, as in Christian mysticism, prevents complete pantheism.) Professor Wensinck puts the matter as follows. "For pantheism God exists only by the universe; for Algazel the universe scarcely exists, God being the only existence. The doctrine of Algazel is the Semitic monotheism seen through Neo-platonism." Yet did not Hegel say that Spinoza was an acosmist rather than a pantheist, although few would wish to deny that the system of Spinoza is a pantheistic system? One should not, however, be lavish with accusations of pantheism; Algazel's motto was really "God versus Aristotle," and by God he did not mean the world, nor did he deny creation. The Neo-platonic elements in his thought were seen in the light of his own experience, which postulated distinction from God as well as union with God. (I do not mean to imply that one can justly call Plotinus, for example, a pantheist, even if there are elements in his system which would seem to lead to pantheism.) The thought of Algazel was thus not simply a theological reaction to philosophy; it was also the protest of religious mysticism against rationalism. Parallel phenomena can be seen in the history of Christian medieval thought.

F. C. COPLESTON, S.J.

PHILOSOPHY

Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism. By GERSHOM G. SCHOLEM. (Schoken Books, New York. 454 pp. $5.50.)

Professor Scholem of Jerusalem has issued a revised edition of his monumental work—approximately 200,000 words—on Jewish mysticism. He wishes to remove a common impression that Judaism, the religion of a book, of formalism and legalism, has always been alien to mysticism, using the word as defined by Thomas Aquinas, *Cognitio Dei experimentalis.* In Judaism, as in Islam, which Westcott called petrified Judaism, the transcendent God blazes in solitary splendour, like the sun over the desert, as Christopher Dawson says. Can such a God be known as an experience?

The author is certainly right, as regards prophetic Judaism, which transformed the older Bedouin religion about the same time that a great spiritual awakening took place in China, India, Persia, and Greece. Jeremiah's hope of universal personal inspiration, the second Isaiah's visions, Ezekiel's ecstasies, above all many of the Psalms, belong to the literature of mysticism.

Persian influence, so often underestimated, was not decidedly mystical. But the potent influx of Hellenistic thought, Platonic and Gnostic, left a strong and enduring effect on Judaism from Philo to the Spanish Jew Ibn Gebirol (Avicebron), whose *Fons Vitae,* a Neoplatonic treatise, was greatly admired by Duns Scotus. I am surprised that Scholem hardly mentions him.

Jewish religion has always been cramped by excessive reverence for the Torah, which has been commented on with fantastic disregard of the obvious meaning of the text. Scholem distinguishes between allegorism and symbolism. The latter, he says, gives a sacramental value to the symbol, which not only suggests a spiritual truth but in a sense enshrines and effectuates it. God Himself, it was said, studies the Torah. The author recognizes that with sacramentalism the danger of magic is not far off.

What are the distinctive features of Jewish mysticism? In the first place it has been almost exclusively masculine. This differentiates it from Catholic mysticism, in which the names of women are as prominent as those of men. Autobiographical and personal experiences are not common in the writings of Jewish mystics, and they are comparatively free from the *Schwärmerei* and sublimated eroticism of many female contemplatives.

And yet sex has intruded even here. In the Talmud there is no hint that the Shekhinah represents a feminine element in God. But this idea is prominent in Kabbalism. It is a Gnostic fantasy, strictly incompatible with Jewish monotheism, and rightly rejected by the Christian Church; but in Catholicism as in the Kabbala the popular desire for a feminine object of worship established itself. In the symbolic world of the Zohar the Shekhinah becomes a symbol of the eternal womanhood, and embodies the mystical idea of afflicted Israel, Rachel weeping for her children.

The Shekhinah in the world is an "exile," in consequence of Adam's fall, which broke the unity of heaven and earth. There is here something like the Platonic picture of life in time as a moving image of eternity. The divine Shekhinah is mystically present in history, in part banished from union with God.

The Zohar, Scholem says, for the first time in rabbinical Judaism, glorifies the state of poverty, as the Old Testament often does. Asceticism in Judaism differs from Catholic asceticism in that while it inculcates chastity, like that of Joseph, who resisted Potiphar's wife, it does not exalt celibacy or virginity. Marriage is not a concession to human weakness, but one of the most sacred mysteries, "a symbolical realization of the union of God and the Shekhinah."

Scholem's words that mysticism is a "phase" in the history of religion do not satisfy me. If we take the word in the sense of the definition of Aquinas,

quoted above, it is both the beginning and the end of personal religion. As such, it is almost identical in all deeply religious persons, irrespective of time, place, and creed. It may be doubted whether a stubbornly institutionalist religion like Judaism is favourable to the independent and sometimes rebellious spirit of mysticism. There has not been much persecution of heretical mystics in Judaism, but there has been some, and we may remember the furious curse with which Spinoza was expelled from the community. Still, Professor Scholem has amply vindicated his thesis. W. R. INGE.

Books also received:

LEON CHWISTEK, Ph.D. *The Limits of Science.* Outline of Logic and of the Methodology of the Exact Sciences. With an Introduction and Appendix by Helen Charlotte Brodie, M.A. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. (for the International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method). 1948. Pp. lvii and 347. 30s net

JANKO LAVRIN. *Nietzsche: An Approach.* London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1948. Pp. v + 146. 7s. 6d. net.

A. H. SMITH. *Horace William Brindley Joseph,* 1867–1943. From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume XXXI. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. Pp. 24. 5s. net.

M. MERLEAU-PONTY. *Humanisme et Terreur—essai sur le problème communiste.* Paris: Librairie Gallimard. 1947. Pp. 208. 325 fr.

S. DE BEAUVOIR. *Pour une Morale de l'Ambiguité.* Paris: Librairie Gallimard. 1947. Pp. 223. 245 fr.

EDGAR DE BRUYNE. *Études d'Esthetique Medievale.* 3 vols.: I. De Boèce à Jean Scot Erigène. II. L'Époque Romaine. III. Le XIIIe Siècle. 1946. Pp. xiv + 371; x + 420; x + 400. Published by the University of Ghent. No price quoted.

ROMANO GUARDINI. *The Death of Socrates.* An Interpretation of the Platonic Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Phaedo. Translated from the German by Basil Wrighton. London: Sheed & Ward. 1948. Pp. xiii + 177. 10s. 6d. net.

CHARLES MAYER. *Matérialisme Progressiste.* Preface by André Maurois. Paris: Société Française de Presse. 1947. Pp. 176. 150 fr.

GERHARD FUNKE. *Maine de Biran.* Philosophisches und politisches Denken zwischen Ancien Régime und Burgerkönigtum in Frankreich. Bonn: H. Bouvier u. Co. Verlag. 1947. Pp. vii + 432. Price RM. 22.

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PAUL WEISS. *Nature and Man.* New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1946. Pp. xxii + 287. 2 dollars 80 cents.

WILLIAM W. HAMMERSCHMIDT. *Whitehead's Philosophy of Time.* New York: King's Crown Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1947. Pp. ix. + 108. 11s. 6d. net.

The late HAROLD H. JOACHIM. *Logical Studies.* Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1948. Pp. 296. 18s. net.

Editor: VERGILIUS FERM. *Religion in the 20th Century.* New York: Philosophical Library, Inc. 1948. Pp. xix + 470. 5 dollars.

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HARALD EKLUND. *Die Würde der Menschheit* (Über die erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzungen der Religionsphilosophie bei Kant). Upsala Universitets Arsskrift: A. B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln. (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz.) 1947–8. Pp. 144.

SEBASTIAN J. DAY, O.F.M., Ph.D. *Intuitive Cognition. A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics.* New York: The Franciscan Institute. 1947. Pp. xlii + 216.

INSTITUTE NOTES

In accordance with the powers granted by the Extraordinary General Meeting of the Institute on February 11, 1948, the Council has passed a Resolution raising the annual subscription payable by members of the Institute to £1 10s. from April 1, 1948, with the proviso that members may have the option of entering into a Deed of Covenant for seven years in favour of the Institute at the original rate of £1 1s. per annum.

The Council has also passed a Resolution increasing the subscription payable by future Life Members to £15.

Xth INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

It is now possible to give further information concerning the Xth International Congress of Philosophy, to be held at Amsterdam from August 11 to 18, 1948. The Conference will be in accordance with the following scheme: (1) Central Theme: Man, Mankind, Humanity, (2) Metaphysics and General Ontology; (3) Theory of Values (Ethics, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Law, Economics); (4) Logic and General Methodology; (5) Philosophy of Science (Mathematics, Nature, Biology, Psychology, Sociology, etc.); (6) The Age of Spinoza and Leibniz; (7) History of Philosophy; (8) Oriental Philosophy.

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2. Subsidiary Members (subscription fl. 15) have access to all scientific and social meetings on the same footing as acting members.

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Those persons who would like to have full particulars of the Xth International Congress at Amsterdam sent to them are asked to apply direct to Prof. Dr. E. W. Beth, Bern. Zweerskade 231, Amsterdam-Z., Holland.

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THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

APPEAL FOR NEW MEMBERS AND DONATIONS

THE Council is willing to receive applications for membership of the Institute from all those who are interested in philosophy.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the Journal, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from annual subscriptions. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

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CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGIES

J. D. MABBOTT, M.A.

This paper contains the substance of a lecture delivered to the Institute under the title "World Peace and World Morals" in November 1947. It is now published in *Philosophy* on the suggestion of members of the audience at that lecture.

INTRODUCTION

THE Harriman Report on United States aid to Europe included the following passage:

"We all know that we are faced in the world to-day with two conflicting ideologies. One is a system in which individual rights and liberties are maintained. The opposing system is one where iron discipline by the State ruthlessly stamps out individual liberties and obliterates all opposition."

This picture of international relations has been kept steadily before our eyes in recent months. Indeed the question seems no longer whether there is such a conflict but whether or how soon it will lead to war. In such circumstances, political philosophers must have read with special interest Mr. T. D. Weldon's recent work, *States and Morals*, in which he shows how the basic political differences between States rest on divergent moral beliefs. It would appear that differences of ideology, of moral standards or values, are the main causes of our present unrest and threaten, as nothing else does, the peace of the world. This is the thesis I wish to examine.

ILLUSTRATION FROM PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

It may help to clear the issues if we consider how far divergences of moral standards contribute to personal conflicts in private life; and then (reversing Plato's order) proceed from the small and familiar letters of private conduct to the larger and less familiar

letters of international affairs. There are four types of personal conflict to be distinguished here.

(i) Personal conflicts are usually due to immoral actions; that is, to the fact that one party or both do not live up to their own moral standards. Theft, assault, blackmail, bribery—these are usually committed by people who are well aware that they ought not to commit them.

(ii) Personal conflicts are often due to non-moral (not to immoral) action. They arise when the motives of the parties are neither moral nor immoral. Competition, the struggle for existence, the duel between two suitors for a lady's hand, the crushing of an economic rival, the cutting down of a wage rate, the pressure to push it up; these are all cases in which the combatants do not think of themselves as breaking moral laws in their actions. Nor, however, do they think of themselves as upholding or crusading for moral codes. They accept neither praise nor blame, whether they succeed or whether they fail.

(iii) Personal conflicts sometimes arise because both contestants accept the same moral standard, but the standard itself is such as to bring them into conflict. Two fathers each unselfishly striving for the good of his own family may thus clash; or two headmasters each loyally upholding the claims of his own school to some contested field or building or endowment. Such contestants would usually be proudly conscious of their own moral rectitude, and claim moral credit for such a struggle or for success in it.

(iv) Finally there are a few personal conflicts which are due to differences between the moral codes of the parties. Examples may be seen when a disciplinarian father and a libertarian mother come to loggerheads about bringing up their children, or where a man with a strong sense of truth or justice tries to achieve these ends at all costs, while a colleague of his, more sensitive to suffering or more appreciative of peace, tries to stop him.

The great majority of personal conflicts fall in the first two classes. They are due to immoral or to non-moral action. The moral standards of the disputants do not help to cause them. In the few cases where moral standards cause the trouble they come in by two different routes. The disputants may have the same moral standard, but the standard may be such as to bring about conflict. Or they may have different moral standards and the difference is the cause.

The Types of International Conflict

There are two reasons why international conflicts are more likely to involve moral standards than personal conflicts are. Most personal conflicts involve direct contact, and people in direct contact have

usually grown up in the same social setting and tend therefore to agree in their moral standards. But States are less likely to share the same moral standards. Moreover, individuals may frequently act immorally. But a government has to try to get its own people behind it for any conflict, and it is not easy for it to do this in support of any action which violates the moral standards of the people in question. It is rare, therefore, that peace is threatened by overtly immoral action. In the second type of conflict the disputes were due to non-moral factors. In the international field this may certainly occur. Economic forces such as starvation, population pressure, competition for markets may generate disagreement. With these causes of conflict I am not concerned in this paper. On the whole it seems unlikely that such factors should lead to war without the additional backing of some moral or ideological element. This leaves the last two classes of conflict distinguished in the previous section. So now the problem can be stated more clearly. It is to be divided into two problems. (i) Is there any moral belief whose adoption by one or more States is liable to threaten peace? (ii) Are there any cases in which differences of moral belief are liable to threaten peace?

Moral Beliefs Which Endanger Peace

No belief can endanger peace unless it is adopted by a government as a basis of national policy and supported by the people living under that government. There are some peculiar moral beliefs (such as vegetarianism when it rests on moral grounds) which are not likely to be so adopted. There seems indeed to be only one moral belief which in its own intrinsic character threatens peace and which is liable to be adopted as a basis of governmental policy. That belief is exclusive nationalism. It is the belief of a government or people in the intrinsic superiority of that people, with the corollary that the interests of that people form the only or the paramount claim upon them. It cannot be denied that the interest of one's fellow-citizens constitutes *a* moral claim on a citizen and an even stronger moral claim on a government. It is not the recognition of this claim which is the danger, but its expansion to include all morality or to eliminate or overide all other moral claims. "My country right or wrong" is the slogan of this creed. So far as Nazism appealed to anything moral in its followers this was its appeal. The corollaries were clearly drawn. The two pillars of western morality might be said to be pity and justice. Hans Frank on different occasions defined them both. "Justice is whatever benefits the German people, injustice whatever harms them." And again, "As a matter of principle we shall have pity for the German people and for no one else in the world." Himmler said to the German generals on the eve of the Russian campaign,

"What happens to a Russian or a Czech does not interest me in the slightest . . . Whether these nations live in prosperity or starve to death, interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our *Kultur*. Whether ten thousand Russian females fall down dead from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch, interests me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished."

It may be questioned whether this is a moral theory. It was no doubt often a mask for brutal sadism or for the lust for power. But it certainly is a moral theory, and unless it could have been presented as such to the German people its chances of success would have been greatly lessened. "Sacrifice all for Germany" is a moral principle determining what acts are to be held right and what wrong, what states of affairs deemed good and what bad.

Nationalism in this extreme form does not seem at present to be an acute danger. But there are factors in the present situation which may revive it. In a world of shortages and dislocation, governments are being increasingly drawn into the economic field. This tendency is an inevitable one, though it may be reinforced and intensified by positive socialistic ideals. For only inclusive territorial units can exercise on their members the compulsion necessary to carry out a rationing scheme, to impose quotas on imports, or to implement credit agreements. This means that the State is increasingly looked upon by people as the unit of economic life, and other States are regarded as units important to me either as hostile or as helpful to my own well-being. For this reason economic co-operation between States, desirable enough on economic grounds, is also a salutary counter-weight to the tendency of the ordinary man to picture the world as consisting of national units which are either helping his country for their own ulterior purposes or are bent on its destruction.

Nationalism, then, seems to be the one ideology which in its own nature threatens international peace. It is to be noticed that the threat is accentuated when the number of addicts increases. If our enemies had won the war, there would then have been two states (or perhaps three, including Italy) equally devoted to the creed of expanding and aggressive nationalism. It is obvious that their agreement on moral principle would have been inclined to make conflict between them more rather than less likely.

Moral Differences Which Endanger Peace

Here the obvious example would seem to be the opposition between communism and the ideology of the western democracies. There are two questions. Is this a *moral* conflict? Are the ideologies such as inevitably to lead to conflict or even to war? Mr. Weldon, in his book

States and Morals, maintains that all basic political differences are really moral differences. He draws from this some important corollaries. It is no use arguing with the upholder of a rival political system. No one ever changed his fundamental moral convictions as a result of argument. It is no use being morally indignant with him, for he is (like a conscientious objector) standing by moral convictions of his own and as conscious of his rectitude as you are of yours. It is no use trying to sell him your political system or to impose it upon him by constitutional machinery, for his moral standards will always reject it or operate to prevent it from working effectively. It is no use trying to co-operate with him in any organized international association, for the aims and methods of political action of the two rivals could never be harmonized within a single system. Mr. Weldon, moreover, holds in moral philosophy the doctrine that there is no absolute or objective standard of moral value. From this additional (if dubious) doctrine more political corollaries follow. Since no moral principle is inherently superior to any other moral principle, no political ideology is right and the others wrong. I said above that you could not argue anyone out of his political creed because that would mean arguing him out of his moral convictions, which is impossible. But you might hope that he would nevertheless change his moral convictions by "conversion" and that you might work to bring this about by "re-education." This will not do, for words such as "conversion" and "re-education" suggest an awakening to truth, and the claims this implies are unjustified if all moral attitudes are equally defensible. The only grounds for such efforts would be the aim of having a more comfortable neighbour or a more reliable ally.

The practical applications of these conclusions is striking. They explain why the conflict between east and west seems so intractable. We ought to realize that it is no good evincing moral disapproval of Soviet policy. We must just agree to differ. Nor should we try to impose our conception of democracy on Bulgaria or Yugoslavia, unless we are sure that the peoples of those countries hold the moral beliefs appropriate to that conception. This is sometimes put in the form "Bulgaria is not yet ready for democracy." But on Mr. Weldon's view this expression indicates spiritual pride. It suggests that our sort of system is the political expression of a correct (or mature or developed or civilized) moral attitude, while the present political methods of the Bulgarians rest on moral attitudes which are low or backward or barbarian. "Bulgarians are not ready for democracy." One might as well say "Bulgarians are not yet ready for rough cider." No wonder the United Nations Organization has failed. For both in its aims (the four freedoms, world-revolution) and in its methods of work (discussion, the veto, the rights of small nations) any world organization would be bound to split on such basic moral

issues. Many observers of the international scene must surely see in these corollaries drawn from a general theory a vivid description of actual fact. Indeed the cap fits so well that the theory is greatly confirmed by this correspondence with fact.

The Ideology of the Soviet Union

What is the basic political theory of the U.S.S.R.? Mr. Weldon says it is the Organic Theory of the State. On that theory, the State is more important than the individual. Individuals are instruments or organs only; their acts are to be morally judged and their lives used in State service. No other service counts. The citizen or government of the State has no obligations towards the citizens of other States. He must treat them, too, as tools or instruments for the good of his own State (since all his acts are to be judged by that standard). Now there is much in internal Soviet policy which suggests this view. Soviet authorities (military or political) show a marked indifference to individual lives and a ruthless vigour in pressing home the State's needs and interests. Similarly in international affairs the impression grows that Russian interests are held by Soviet statesmen to override all other obligations and to justify any action. Mr. Weldon sees no difference between the ideologies of Nazi Germany and of the Soviet Union. "Germany first; Germans nowhere. Germany first, other States nowhere." Substitute "Russia" for "Germany" and you have the Soviet creed.

This analysis is open to doubt. It may be questioned whether Germany or Russia has exemplified the Organic Theory. In Nazi Germany the State was an instrument for the triumph and supremacy of the German race. It was not an end in itself. The basic creed of Germany was the *Herrenvolk,* or Master-Race doctrine. Hitler was primarily Führer of the German people—of Germans everywhere, in the Sudetenland, in Roumania, in the Argentine, in the United States—and only secondarily Head of the German State. "Führer and Chancellor"—the order is significant.

Now there are very great similarities between the Nazi State and the Soviet Union: the organization and the special position of "the Party," the elimination of other parties, the secret police, the propaganda machine, the censorship, the purges, etc. This is natural, for Hitler copied much from the Soviet Union. But all these are resemblances in the ways in which power is organized, retained, increased, and applied. The basic difference lies in the ends to which power is directed. In Germany the end was the unification and the world-domination of the German race. There is no such creed in Russia. No doubt during the recent war it was convenient to appeal to memories of Russia's national heroes. But neither the Russian

leaders nor the Russian people suffer from *Herrenvolk* delusions. They often have a deep sense of being Russian, but this does not lead them to persecution of non-Russian minorities at home, nor to the enslavement of non-Russian peoples abroad, in the name of the intrinsic moral and cultural superiority of their own race.

If, in Russia, the State is not an end in itself, what is the end to which Russian State action is directed? The obvious answer is communism. Let us suppose this is the correct answer. The next question is this: Is communism in its own nature essentially a threat to peace, as the *Herrenvolk* doctrine and the *Lebensraum* (Living-space) doctrine of the Nazis certainly were? Communism is primarily an economic theory of the control of the means of production. It is not necessarily or intrinsically a force for international aggression. There are, however, two possible developments which might make it appear to be so.

First, there is the possibility that a government might adopt communism as its religion and regard itself as having a mission to convert the world. Christianity is not intrinsically a doctrine of war and aggression. But when a government regards itself as having a duty to spread Christianity by political methods—by force and fear—then you get Crusades. In the early days of the Soviet Union there were signs that this crusading spirit lay behind Soviet policy. It was the view of the "Westerners"—the group of returned exiles of whom Lenin and later Trotsky were the leaders—that Soviet Communism was principally of importance as the precursor and spearhead of World Revolution. This group was completely eliminated by purge or exile; Stalin, under the banner of "Socialism in a single State," won the day. It is true that there are three different explanations of Stalin's policy at that time. One is that he really believed in his slogan—that he was then and always has been primarily interested in Soviet communism and has no crusading zeal for communism outside the Union. The second is that he was just as earnest a crusader as Lenin or Trotsky, and that his slogan was only a matter of tactics. World revolution remained the goal, but the revolution must be secured in Russia first. Russia could not afford to go crusading until her own conversion was a securely accomplished fact. The third explanation is that the Stalin-Trotsky battle was a straightforward power-conflict, like the similar battle which ended in the Roehm purge in Germany. Neither side cared about communism except as a means to power, and the two slogans were pure "window-dressing." It is obvious that the choice between these three theories will affect our view of the world as a scene of conflict between rival ideologies. But in all three cases it is clear that communism is a threat to world peace, if it is so, only because the Soviet Government have decided that it shall be so, and not because

of anything in the communist creed itself. Christians do not now believe that their government has a duty to propagate Christianity by political methods throughout the world. There is no reason why any communist should believe this of communism.

There are, however, two routes by which communism might lead to aggression. It is always tempting for a government to try to heighten the loyalty of its subjects and increase the spirit of unity in its country by the use of some non-political faith as a rallying point and a driving force in its own support. It is also always tempting for a government, beset by difficulties at home and compelled to keep its people under rigid and brutal controls, to provide them with foreign conquests to keep them quiet. On this interpretation of Soviet policy, the Soviet leaders are using the communist crusade as a piece of political tactics. The second line of development is this. A communist might hold that communism in a single State is insecure because such a State will always be open to attack from the ring of capitalist States which would encircle it. Communism itself would be a peaceful and non-aggressive creed, if it were not constantly menaced by crusading and aggressive capitalist States bent on its destruction. The annexation of border territories, the erection of puppet-governments in neighbouring States, the support of communist parties abroad, all these would then be security measures dictated by fear.

I do not attempt to judge between these various guesses at the Russian enigma. What I am interested in is the connection between them and the picture of the ideological conflict from which I started. It may be said that the choice makes no practical difference. On the crusading view of Soviet policy, the Comintern was and the Cominform will be the official Soviet instrument for world-revolution. Its support would be a first priority in Russian policy. Its aim would be to spread communism, to train leaders who would preach and finally practise communism in their own countries. On the security view, the Comintern was and the Cominform will be an instrument of Soviet pressure, a tool for weakening foreign States, for espionage, and for the furtherance of Soviet interests. But on either view the Comintern was and the Cominform will be an attack on national sovereignty or even a school for traitors. What difference does it make? Again, on the crusading view, the Soviet Union set up puppet communist governments in Poland and Roumania because communism is the true religion and its triumph the goal of Soviet policy. On the security view, she set up these régimes so as to have a buffer or "glacis" against future attacks, so that any invader would have to fight his way through a thousand miles of alien territory before he violated Russian soil, so that his fighter-bases would be beyond reach of Soviet towns and aerodromes. But, again, what does it

matter? Poland and Roumania had to swallow their communist pill either way. But it does matter. For if the motive is crusading communism, it is a genuine ideology—something with which no compromise is possible. Wherever it halts, it fails. But if the Soviet quest is one for power and security, we may expect it to advance here and retreat there with a realist recognition of the forces against it.

The Ideology of the Western Democracies

The two natural claimants for the title of "Ideology of the West" are Christianity and Democracy. First, Christianity. Communism would seem to be its irreconcilable rival and both appear to be positive religious forces. For various reasons it is not easy to see the struggle in these terms. It is true that communism both in Marxist theory and in practice has been anti-Christian. But there are obvious historical reasons for this. The Christian Churches in Europe have, more often than not, been conservative in character; and in many cases they have been active political opponents of left-wing parties. In Russia, in particular, the Church was closely identified with the Czarist régime. But there is nothing in the basic aims of communism which is anti-Christian. There is nothing anti-Christian about collective farms, the control of factories by workers' councils, the collective ownership of the means of production, or the principle "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need." There is a parallel here in the Marxist theory of the State. Marx's definition of the State as the instrument for exploitation of the workers was partly provoked by the behaviour of the actual governments of his own day. But the doctrine that, with the disappearance of classes, the State would wither away is obviously bound to be scrapped as soon as communism captures the State machine. The anti-State features of Marxism then are an historical accident; it seems possible that the anti-religious features are an historical accident also.

But, it may be objected, communism is anti-Christian because it is materialist and because it requires from its supporters a fanatical devotion beside which no other religion could possibly live. Here also, I think, are historical accidents. The materialism of communism, deeply rooted as it is in official text-books, seems to be a purely accidental excrescence. This Marxist view of history, of science, and of the world is a piece of dated and unconvincing dialectic which even communists might well come to regard as any philosopher now regards the dialectic of Hegel, to which Marx owed so much, as a museum-piece and an historical curio. The fanatical devotion to communism seems also curiously démodé in Russia. A revolutionary creed which has to make its way in the world may be well advised

to require of its handful of early believers that they should be communists first, last and all the time; but when communism is in full control of a State it is not only unnecessary but impossible to maintain its status as an all-devouring Moloch and a fanatical faith. In Russia only the Party (subject to constant purges and reductions in number) is supposed to make this high demand. It is the priesthood—faith absorbed and single-minded. And even in the Party it is obvious that there must be many members wholly absorbed in some technical or administrative task. When your faith is the *status quo* it is not easy to go on being fanatical about it. And, as for the ninety-nine per cent of the population who are not members of the Party, there is not even a pretence that they need be fanatical communists. Thus the opposition between communism and any other religion is weakened also. In fact it would not surprise me to find developing a Christian communism claiming for this economic and political creed (as has been claimed for so many others and sometimes with less plausibility) the authority of Christ himself.

Looked at from our side of the curtain, too, Christianity does not seem a good candidate for the place of protagonist. Christianity is a spiritual faith. When it has descended into the political arena and become (or backed) a single political party it has always suffered degradation. This is equally true on the international plane. Christian spy services, Christian naval bases, a Christian monopoly of the atomic bomb, Christian dollars for Turkey, Christian tanks for Greece: these features of western political action are necessary and desirable but they do not look comfortable under that banner. (While many people here recognized the necessity and effectiveness of the intensive bombing of German towns, many among them also felt uneasy when they heard this policy preached from pulpits or backed by Bishops.) The selection of Christianity as the ideology to be set against communism also weakens the anti-communist forces. For under which banner should Arabs or Indians or Chinese be enrolled? Even our present support of Turkey against Soviet aggression looks a little odd if it is regarded as a blow for Christianity.

The usual alternative ideology is democracy. But a form of government does not seem to be the sort of thing that could serve as a creed. Moreover democracy can be claimed by all sides and with some justice everywhere. If we try to define it or to look for the special features we think particularly democratic, we shall find difficulty in regarding them as more than means to ends. Plebiscites, referendums, elections, many-party systems, the majority principle—all these look like machinery not like supreme moral values. (This is true also of dictatorship, which was once regarded as the opposite of democracy. Dictatorship, too, is no ideology. Any threat it presents

to peace lies not in dictatorship itself but in the policy a given dictator adopts. It is no doubt true that Franco's government in Spain was put into power by foreign aggression and is maintained in power by oppression and terror. But the original resolution on Spain passed by the United Nation's Organization—that Franco's government is at present a threat to world peace—was absurd. Even more absurd would be the view that it was such a threat because it was a dictatorship. For on that view the Salazar government in Portugal must be a threat to world peace also.) Thus I cannot see in democracy an ideology or a moral creed which can serve as a bulwark against communism or Soviet hegemony. An added reason for rejecting democracy as our basic and central faith is that all the processes we call democratic could be used to destroy those values which, as I shall show below, I regard as the essential features of our way of life.

Perhaps our question is unnecessary. No single ideology is required. It suffices that we all reject communism or Soviet hegemony. Similarly it was sufficient that our late allies should agree with us in disliking the prospect of German domination; and events have shown that this was indeed all that we were agreed about; for as soon as we came to devise those positive policies which Germany's defeat made necessary we could agree on nothing at all. It does not need two ideologies to make a war. One is enough, provided that it is sufficiently aggressive and sufficiently objectionable. So perhaps we have no western ideology and need none.

Yet, it would be said, this will weaken our position. How can we attract allies if we have no positive aims to put before them? How can we call for sacrifice and loyalty if we can provide no idols to worship? Many critics could say that what we lack is a single dynamic creed, comparable to fascism and communism, a creed to whose acceptance all our children can be educated, to whose service all our young people can be dedicated, something to bind us together into a single living unit, to close our ranks and direct our march. How very tempting it all sounds! But in fact it is a sign of our political maturity that we have no such single political faith to dominate our lives.

Yet, among the many things that we value, we can count some which go unrecognized beyond the curtain. We recognize the intrinsic value of knowledge and of beauty, while elsewhere art is propaganda and truth must toe the party line. We see that these things can only survive if their adherents are left free; so we use repression of opinion and censorship of art with regret and sparingly and never as an instrument of positive policy. We have a special regard for the dignity and value of individual personality. The Russians must be genuinely puzzled about our reactions to the question of the "Soviet

wives." They would agree with Stalin that a matter concerning fifteen citizens is settled at a very low administrative level. Stalin thinks in millions. Why should not Mr. Bevin do so too? They would be equally astonished at the Archer Shee case (dramatized recently in *The Winslow Boy*). That the highest legal authorities in the land should be invoked, that Parliament should turn aside from the disposal of millions of pounds and the fate of millions of people to spend hours discussing the question whether a small boy was justly or unjustly expelled from his school—this would seem another of those English lunacies in which we suddenly lose all sense of proportion. The Russian could sympathize with the French critic who read on a Piccadilly poster "Disaster to England," and rushed to buy a paper, only to find that Hobbs was out for a duck.

The values we prize (which all together may be called Liberty or, better, Liberties) come as near as we can get to a political ideology. But they form no single creed nor even any very coherent pattern. We constantly have to adjust them one against another and all of them against the welfare of the people. Thus they do not form an ideology which can unify a nation; still less can they act as a positive and dynamic inspiration to a government. For most of them operate, and operate rightly, to curb governmental action or remove from its grip whole fields of human endeavour. Least of all can they lead in themselves to a clash with other governments or to an aggressive foreign policy. Quite the reverse. It is in their name that we withdraw from India and Burma and Egypt, that we set self-government as the goal of our colonial development, that we reject the temptations to set up puppet States abroad. So far as we are true to our ideals we practise tolerance, non-intervention, *laissez-faire*. Thus our reaction to other and aggressive ideologies is normally a negative one; and this is even truer of the United States. The Soviet picture of the United States as an expanding, aggressive, imperialistic power bent on conquest and crusading for capitalism is ludicrously false. It is only the violence and pertinacity of Soviet expansion which has averted the isolationism of 1919 and kept the United States continuously and increasingly interested in Europe.

I indicated in the preceding section of this paper that it is very doubtful whether we are faced with an ideology which is intrinsically aggressive. This belief is confirmed when it is realized what are the features of life in the U.S.S.R. and her satellite countries to which we most object, and which offend most obviously against the values I have described as coming nearest to a "western ideology." These features have nothing particular to do with communism, as is shown by the fact that all of them were found in Hitler's Germany and many of them are found in Franco's Spain. The purge, forced labour, compulsory transfers of population, concentration camps, arrest

without warrant, punishment without trial, the use of children and neighbours as spies and informers, the method of ensuring a man's surrender by threatening his relatives, the corruption of truth and beauty and education, the readiness to violate any obligation and to use any tools—these are the things we dislike. This (and not the collectivization of farming or industry) is the fate we fear for Czechoslovakia, as we feared it with equal justice in 1939. Now all this does not add up to an ideology. All of it would be defended by communists as it was by fascists as being means to ends. The quotation from the Harriman Report with which I introduced my subject claims to describe "two conflicting ideologies." So far as it describes our western attitude, I have shown I agree with its emphasis on liberty (and not on Christianity or democracy). But its description of "the opposing system" is clearly not a description of an ideology.

Conclusion

I may now sum up this paper. I have tried to show that it is doubtful whether Soviet policy is inspired by any ideology at all; and that, if it is, that ideology is not in its own nature such as inevitably to lead to conflict or to war. The reasons why the U.S.S.R. push forward any such ideology by aggression or by methods which they share with Fascism are therefore not themselves ideological. I have argued that we in the West have no unified political ideology; that such ideology as we have is not strictly speaking political; that, so far as it enters politics, it comes in as a limiting negative, inhibitive force and not as a dynamic, aggressive, expansive doctrine; and that it is opposed essentially, not to anything ideological in the eastern world, but to features which are (for a communist or a fascist) means to ends. I conclude that, however dark and dangerous the outlook may be, it is not well described as a clash between moral standards or between opposing ideologies. And this, if true, should be to some extent reassuring. For such a clash would be the most inevitable and intransigent cause of conflict. There are many factors which tend to war at present—including even now that fear and suspicion which Hobbes saw to be inevitable in a world of unlimited national sovereignties. No doubt there are other forces too—the desire for power, the hope to cover oppression at home by aggression abroad, the pursuit of resources, markets and raw materials. But I do not find among the present causes of war that most recalcitrant of all causes, the head-on collision between irreconcilable crusaders for incompatible moral creeds.

THE CHOICE OF A WORLD OUTLOOK[1]

PROFESSOR DOROTHY M. EMMET.

I TAKE it that my part in this series is not to set forward some particular world outlook, or even to describe different kinds of world outlook. That will have been done already much more adequately by the lecturers who precede me. My part is to discuss what in general is meant by world outlooks, why it is so difficult to arrive at agreement on them, and what kind of considerations should be taken into account in deciding for one rather than another.

The expression "world outlook" is not very satisfactory, but it is perhaps the best translation we can get of the more satisfactory German word *Weltanschauung*. The word has been given its present sense in philosophy by certain German thinkers, notably by Dilthey. (English readers will find a discussion of "world outlooks" in this sense in Albert Schweitzer's *Civilization and Ethics*, the translation of the second volume of his *Philosophy of Civilization*.) Prof. Hodges in his *Introduction to Dilthey* (p. 160) defines *Weltanschauung* as "a complex of ideas and sentiments, comprising (*a*) beliefs and convictions about the nature of life and the world, (*b*) emotional habits and tendencies based on these, and (*c*) a system of purposes, preferences, and principles governing action and giving life unity and meaning." If this definition is to be wide enough to cover world outlooks which are pessimistic, (*c*) might have to consist in an attitude of e.g. fortitude or rebellion.

"World" is thus here being used in a somewhat vague and very inclusive sense. It certainly does not mean just our earth (the *orbs terrarum*). Nor does it mean simply the physical universe as studied by natural science. In this lecture I shall never be talking about the "world" in the former sense; and when I am talking about it in the latter sense, I shall call it "nature." But the expression "world outlook" includes much more than this, and more than a cosmology. It includes man's interpretation of himself as related to his world, the latter comprising his social and possibly his supernatural as well as his physical environment. It includes what is sometimes called an "attitude towards life," and by this is here meant not just something like "the American way of life," or what is nowadays sometimes called a culture pattern, but the connection of this "attitude towards life" with an intellectual scheme. So Christianity and Marxism could be described as "world outlooks."

The expression "choice of a world outlook," as implying conscious

[1] Series *Contemporary World Outlook*, (V).

selection, is of course open to challenge. Ought we to imagine ourselves browsing about among possible world views, displayed to invite our custom, and choosing one and rejecting others, as one might choose a hat? There is something dilettante about the suggestion. Should we not rather say that, of alternative world outlooks, one must be true, or at least contain more truth than the others, and that we have therefore no choice but to accept this and reject the others? Or the phrase "choice of a world outlook" may be challenged from the opposite side. It may be said that our world outlook is ultimately determined by social or by temperamental psychological factors beyond our control or even beyond our awareness, and therefore it is an illusion to hold that we can exercise any real choice in the matter. The first challenge would come from those who maintain that there should and can be a universally agreed objective system of metaphysical knowledge. The latter challenge comes from those who say that, while world views may be expressive of attitudes of mind, there is no way in which canons of objective knowledge can apply to them: *quot homines, tot sententiae.*

Against the former challenge I shall urge that there are real difficulties in the view that metaphysics can be a "science" whose results can command general agreement. But having made this much concession to relativism, I shall urge against the latter party that there are considerations to be weighed, arguments to be pursued with intellectual candour in coming to a world outlook, and that, therefore, if such views are not scientific hypotheses, neither are they simply the expression of socially or temperamentally determined attitudes of mind.

The educated layman who asks philosophers to help him to reach a reasoned outlook on life (if this is what he asks), presumably holds in effect some such mid-way position. He is apt to be distrustful of "metaphysics" (all too easily a word of abuse), and yet he is disturbed if he is told that fundamental beliefs about the world cannot be in some sense true or false. In his Inaugural Address, *Clarity is Not Enough*, given to the first Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association held after the late war, Prof. Price considered this "consumer's demand." He made a stocktaking of the trends in philosophy between the two wars, and showed that while on the whole the criticisms levelled at the "analytic" preoccupations of most contemporary philosophers were misdirected, yet that the latter could justly be criticized for failing to do much to satisfy the "consumer's demand" for help in forming a unified and reasoned outlook on the world. If, he said, we do not accept the contention that it is in principle impossible to satisfy the consumer's demand; if we can be disabused of the idea that a "world outlook" is necessarily an attempt to establish matters of fact by wholly *a priori* reasoning without reference to experience, then it may be possible

to turn once more to consider the possibilities of this synoptic type of philosophy.

There is plenty of evidence that there is a demand for synoptic thinking. We see it in the widespread complaints against "over-specialization," and the plea for more unity and breadth of vision in, for instance, university teaching. But the very intensity of specialization against which complaints are made makes the corrective more difficult to attain. A few generations of close specialization have made us distrustful of generalizations. Those who try to take wider and more inclusive views are therefore pretty sure to burn their fingers, especially if they are unfortunate philosophers, who will be told that they are talking about things they do not properly understand. Perhaps we should not be too afraid of this; on the other hand, we must often have an uneasy feeling that the accusation is true. For the result of specialized and detailed research has been to make standards of evidence, whether in the natural sciences or in subjects like history, more and more exacting. Hence, except among the few theorists in physical science, we get a tendency to concentrate on the piecemeal establishment of matters of fact; and if a general world outlook is implicit in such a tendency, it might perhaps be symbolized by the saying, "The world is the totality of all that is the case" (I borrow Wittgenstein's saying without raising the question of what he himself means by it). But as standards of evidence for establishing matters of fact become more exacting, the question of what constitutes evidence when we pass outside the sciences becomes more difficult to answer. Obviously there are methods of determining evidence, for instance in historical research, which do not depend solely on *sensory* verification; neither is sensory verification the whole of the story in establishing scientific theories. But the temper produced by specialized training is one which breeds distrust of generalization. If we are seeking a synoptic world outlook we must therefore face the Scylla of Positivism, the contention that what constitutes evidence is always in the last resort an appeal to empirical matters of fact.

Scylla may perhaps be escaped by showing that the idea of empirical matter of fact is not altogether simple and straightforward, "The totality of all that is the case" would comprise hosts, perhaps an infinite number, of events. "Matters of fact" for science or history must consist of some relatively isolable events, and to isolate them we must make some selective judgment as to what is interesting or important. Moreover, when we say that something is a fact we mean that it has certain at least relatively permanent characteristics (it won't suddenly vanish or undergo a complete transformation), and that it has causal connections with other things. Is it a fact that there is a black cat on the mantelpiece or am I just "seeing things"? It

will, of course, be a fact that I am having an experience which feels like seeing a cat, but if I am to know whether "in fact" there is a cat, I make certain assumptions about tests of objectivity. These assumptions may not necessarily be universal categories (as Kant thought Substance and Cause to be), but it may be that we make some demands of a general kind on any phenomenon which is to pass for a "fact." The Scylla of pure positivism may therefore be avoided by showing that the possibility of verification by appeal to "fact" depends on a background of presuppositions and assumptions.

Some of these presuppositions are postulates which we see must be allowed in order that a particular kind of inquiry may go on. But when we come to anything as complex as a world outlook, we must take account not only of methodological postulates, but of a whole background of general assumptions about what is and what is not reasonable. So if we avoid the Scylla of pure positivism, we may be engulfed in the Charybdis of saying that a world outlook can be no more than an ideology. By an "ideology" is here meant a complex of ideas, convictions, and valuations which are ultimately derived from the social and psychological heritage of the person who holds them, and which he merely attempts to rationalize in his conscious philosophizing. Hence it may be said that our outlook on the world depends in the end on irrational factors beyond reach of criticism. So we may seem to be in a dilemma: either we stick to piecemeal investigations concerning matters of fact, without inquiring too closely into the assumptions on which our procedure is based, and without venturing out on wider schemes of interpretation. Or we try to unearth our ultimate presuppositions and present them in the form of a world outlook, only to find in the end that this is merely a socially and psychologically conditioned ideology. Or even if it may be possible to affirm some group of presuppositions as our own by an act of conscious decision, as I believe the "Existentialists" would say, yet it may be impossible to bring any objective or critical judgment to bear on them.

But are these the only alternatives? This would be vigorously repudiated by those who hold that there can be a systematic and universally valid science of metaphysics. The best-known upholders of this view at present are the neo-Thomists. I believe that for many people at the present time neo-Thomism is one of the main intellectual alternatives; they see in it the one coherent and rational philosophy in an age of unreason. For this reason, and also because it can serve as a notable example of a metaphysics which claims to be a "science," I shall now spend a little time in commenting on it. I cannot, of course, give any detailed exposition,[1] since my purpose here is only

[1] I have attempted a fuller discussion in Chapter IX of my *Nature of Metaphysical Thinking*.

to try to call attention to some of the main issues in considering world outlooks. Even so, the points I shall be raising may seem rather technical. But Thomism is a highly technical and exacting intellectual discipline; and those who declare for the Thomist world outlook ought to be prepared for close and systematic reasoning. It is a world outlook which least of all should be adopted as a kind of party line by those not prepared to make the effort to follow rigorous metaphysical argument. Students of Thomism may feel that my difficulties can be satisfactorily answered in terms of their own philosophy. If so, good luck to them. But I have not myself found any satisfactory answer in Thomist literature. This may well be due to my own ignorance, but if there are such answers, I shall be grateful to have my attention called to them.

My first difficulty is one of principle. Can there, in fact, be such a thing as "ontology," or a "science of pure being"? A science must have some definite subject-matter marked out from other subject-matters. But in the notion of "pure being" we come to something so general that there is nothing about it to distinguish it from anything else (cf. R. G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics*, pp. 13 *et seq.* on this). Can the philosophers of "being as such," from Parmenides to the Thomists, therefore, when pressed tell us much more than that "It is what it is"?

What more the Thomists do try to tell us depends on their analysis of Being in terms of the Aristotelian conception of Actuality and Potentiality. But I find it difficult to see that this is a satisfactory analysis of beings as we know them in the world of nature and human life. I cannot help thinking this analysis is bound up with the Aristotelian view of the world as containing a limited number of fixed kinds or species, all growing towards the realization of their specific essences. But does this allow there can be real novelty within nature or indeed human nature? A process or an action would always be the realization of so much potency, thought of as the fulfilment of a fixed type. This seems to commit us to a view of real specific essences; and does this allow sufficiently for the possibility of the emergence of new species, or even for the facts of individuality; and does it allow for the extent to which any process of development depends, not just on the unfolding and the subject's own inner potencies, but on its interrelation with other processes going on in its environment, which may be "ingredients" (to use a word of Whitehead's) in its development? I think Whitehead puts the point when he asks whether we should look on the study of nature as a study of the "procession of forms" or of the "forms of process." Thomists must be able to convince us that once we give up the conception of fixed species in nature it is possible still to hold to the idea of real essences; or indeed that the belief in real essences is itself justifiable.

Another difficulty I find is this: Thomists claim to give a rational explanation of the world, by saying that it is an empirically given fact that the world exists; that its existence is contingent, i.e. it is logically conceivable that it might not have existed; and that therefore there must be a *cause* of its existence in a Necessary Being which must exist, as it were, in its own right. But this argument raises various questions, such as whether we can properly apply the notion of Cause, which is a notion of inductive explanation applicable to sequences of events within the world, to the world as a whole. Of course you may say, need we necessarily restrict the word in this way? But in view of the difficulties that have been found in the notion of Cause by philosophers in the last two generations, I think we must agree that William James was abundantly justified when he remarked that "Causation is too obscure a principle to bear the whole superstructure of Theology." Moreover, even though any empirical existences within the world taken severally may be contingent, yet it is conceivable that the world as a whole might be found to be a necessary system, so that we should have not the First Cause of Thomist theologians but something like the *Deus sive Natura* of Spinoza.

It might then be said that some other system of rationalist metaphysics, for instance the system of Spinoza, might succeed where the Aristotelian–Thomist system fails (if we admit that it does fail). Spinoza's system is based on the belief that the world as a whole is ultimately self-explanatory, and he puts this by saying that the world as a whole, which can be called *Deus sive Natura*, is a single Substance, and that by Substance is meant that which exists in itself and is explained through itself (*id quod est in se et per se concipitur*). But is there any way of demonstrating that the world as a whole *is* a Substance of this kind, any more than of demonstrating the Thomist analysis of the world into finite contingent substances dependent on a First Cause which is a transcendent Necessary Being? I am far from saying that the difference between these two types of view is merely a verbal one depending on different ways of defining the term "Substance." They represent alternative ways of looking at the world, and arguments can be brought forward for both. But since the arguments of neither are conclusive as against the other, can either claim to be a logically demonstrable science of Being?

But need we admit that all that exists is logically necessary (as with Spinoza)? Or, if we say that something exists and might not have existed, can we pass from that to the conclusion that something else must exist (as with Thomism)? Is there not another alternative, namely to accept the fact that "something exists" with what Professor Alexander called "natural piety" and then give the best general description we can of it? This, of course, might be called "irrational"

by a rationalist metaphysician, since it gives no explanation of the existence of the world as a whole. But we can raise the question of whether a "world outlook," if it is to be rational, must give an explanation for the existence of the world as a whole.

It is often claimed that it must. But we have to face the obvious difficulty that the world as a whole can never be an object of consciousness, and so hardly in any exact sense an object of study. Our empirical knowledge is limited *de facto* to those ranges of happenings in space and time which have at any given time been studied by scientific method: it may also (as the Principle of Indeterminacy suggests) come up against certain limits in principle. If we try to extrapolate from this knowledge so as to say something about the world as a whole, we are either having to assume that something like our local cosmic conditions and the ideas which we find appropriate to interpret them hold universally, or we have to make these ideas so general that they hardly tell us anything at all.

It may be, then, that we cannot demand of a world-outlook that it should give us an "explanation" of the world as a whole. The word "explanation" and the word "hypothesis" are too closely associated with inductive procedure for this; that is to say, they isolate the phenomenon to be explained, treat it as an instance of a kind, and relate it causally or statistically to other phenomena. So perhaps it will be better to consider world outlooks not as hypotheses or explanations of the world as a whole, but as *interpretations*, that is to say attempts on the part of someone occupying a particular standpoint within the world, to find "meaning" in the world as he sees it. This would mean making a considerable concession to relativism, for it suggests that there may be different standpoints and different interpretations. I believe that we must be prepared to grant this: which brings us back to our question of whether, if we are not convinced by the arguments for a universal science of being, there are any alternatives save to stick to piecemeal investigations or to be plunged into a mere conflict of ideologies.

Are we back, that is to say, between Scylla and Charybdis?

Let me own that I think the belief in the dependence of "world outlooks" on historical conditions (in a very broad sense of the term "historical") has established itself so deeply in the modern consciousness that no metaphysics which has not come to terms with this relativism and acknowledged the truth which it contains is likely to make any headway. It is perhaps significant that the title for this series of lectures is "World Outlooks," and not "Metaphysics." Metaphysics, even if it is not, for good reasons or bad, looked on as a term of abuse, is often identified with the idea of a universal "science of being," the possibility of which we have seen can be questioned. I do not believe "metaphysics" need be so restricted (it

is obviously not in the work of, for instance, Alexander and Whitehead) but meanwhile there may be something to be said for reconsidering some of its possibilities in a humbler way under this title of "world outlook."

We have seen that, following Dilthey, a world outlook can be defined as a complex of ideas and sentiments, comprising (*a*) beliefs and convictions about the nature of life and the world, (*b*) emotional habits and tendencies based on these, and (*c*) a system of purposes, preferences, and principles governing action and giving life unity and meaning. Our question is how far these fundamental beliefs and convictions can be a matter of conscious selection and reasoned judgment: is there anything to prevent them from being mere ideological preferences?

First, I suggest that perhaps we are more likely to escape Charybdis if we treat Scylla with respect. We may be shipwrecked on Scylla if we accept the idea that knowledge consists simply in the piling up of presuppositionless matters of fact. But Scylla has taught us the lesson that we must cultivate a conscience for accuracy in questions of empirical fact. This may not be so simple as it sounds, if we remember that our estimate of "facts" may depend in the end on assumptions we are making in a wider frame of reference. But this should not be made into an excuse for not recognizing that to seek objectivity in questions of fact is a primary obligation. There are sophisticated theories which, arguing that no truth is quite true and no falsehood quite false, and that the notion of what is meant by "fact" is a very obscure one, explain away our simple conviction that *sometimes, at a certain level* truth means correspondence with fact, and whatever our ultimate philosophical theory of truth, this simple conviction should be taken up into it and not made meaningless. As Lord Russell has said somewhere of the proposition, "Bishop Stubbs died in his bed," either he did, or he didn't; and of "Bishop Stubbs was hanged for murder," either he was or he wasn't (whatever the manner of his death may mean in the context of the Absolute). There is therefore a discipline of accuracy in dealing with empirical evidence, whether in the sciences or in an arts subject like history, and because this is so a very real measure of agreement and collaboration is possible between people who disagree on wider issues of interpretation. The liberal tradition of "presuppositionless research," even if it was wrong in not recognizing the importance and perhaps inevitability of wider schemes of interpretation, made a very great achievement in insisting that we should cultivate accuracy in empirical investigation. This kind of conscience may therefore be one of the correctives which can prevent our world view from being a mere ideology. For without it we can easily indulge in feats of special pleading or of explaining things away in the interests of our

world view. It may be that no world view of a metaphysical kind (such as Theism or Dialectical Materialism) can ever finally be verified or falsified by appeal to empirical fact. But we must be ready to ask whether, in order to maintain a particular view, we find it necessary to ignore or explain away certain ranges of empirical facts. It is, of course, possible to go to considerable lengths in explaining away; for instance the old marine biologist father in Edmund Gosse's *Father and Son* managed to square the facts of the fossils he discovered in his scientific work with a world outlook which contained a fundamentalist view of Genesis by saying that the Lord may have created the world as a going concern, containing fossils with all the signs of great age (that He may, as it were, have been a skilful faker of antiques). Let no one think that this kind of argument is restricted to the pious. Voltaire found that the presence of molluscs and seashells on the tops of inland mountains was being used as evidence for a real Flood (as recorded in Genesis). So he brought forward a number of ingenious explanations of how they could have got there; such as that they might have been cockles dropped from the hats of pilgrims, or have once formed part of a gentleman's collection. But sooner or later, if we go on facing empirical fact, this kind of theory will labour under a strain which may be found to be unbearable, and the critical point may occur when it becomes clear to us that we must alter our fundamental convictions. It may be that to recognize when this point has been reached is not merely a matter of recording further observations, but is a judgment of conscience. The relation between empirical facts and wider schemes of interpretation is a very difficult question: it may in fact be the main way in which the problem of what used to be called "metaphysics" comes home to us. But I do not believe that any solution of this problem is satisfactory which does not fully recognize the necessity of the discipline of taking account of empirical fact as far as it will take us.

How far will it take us? It might be said that as far as it takes us we have science in the broad sense. And therefore it could be said to follow from what I have said that a world outlook should include a general account of the knowledge of nature supplied by science up to date. In principle I believe this is right, but in practice it is questionable whether there is a unified scientific account of the world, or whether there are not simply *sciences*, describing different bits of nature and perhaps describing them at different levels. That there should be some unified general picture emerging from the work of the sciences is highly desirable. Whether we can have one at the present time is a question for philosophically minded scientists to answer. The difficulty, as it appears to a non-scientist like myself, is that it looks as though some of the basic presuppositions of science were undergoing a fairly drastic overhauling. (I have in mind con-

cepts such as the "uniformity of nature," "causality," "natural law," the concept of matter), and until this process has gone rather further and the new fundamental ideas have been more clearly established, it is hard to see just what the "scientific world outlook" consists in. Moreover, it seems necessary to accept, and not to obscure, the real diversities between the different levels on which nature is studied, and which are generally called matter, life, and mind. It is, of course, possible that new border-line sciences such as biophysics or biochemistry may at any time throw more light on the relations between at any rate the two former, and make possible some new generalization, for instance showing us nature as consisting of different types of organized activity, in a way which will do justice to the real diversities of these different types, and yet show the relation between them in some intelligible way. But I think we must say that this is still speculative, and we cannot yet really speak of a "unified scientific view of the world."

And even if we could, would this take us all the way? This is perhaps where the philosopher comes in. For the philosopher is concerned to point out that "the scientific outlook" is an interpretation given by the mind of man to his empirical discoveries about the world in which he lives. In the last resort therefore it is necessary to re-unite the scientific account with the existence of man as thinker and agent. To do this, our world outlook will have to take account not only of nature as science describes it, but also of the other ways, such as the ethical, aesthetic and religious, in which man as thinker and agent experiences his world. There are, of course, many different ways of trying to explain or interpret these forms of experience, and it is not my job here to pronounce on them. But I should say with emphasis that no world outlook can stand which ignores their existence, or fails to give a plausible account of their distinctive characteristics. There are, of course, attempts to account for them all in terms of what are believed to be general scientific ideas, the most widely known of which at present is C. H. Waddington's. Those who are considering this world outlook should be prepared to reckon seriously with the objections to it which have been pointed out by thinkers such as C. D. Broad and A. D. Ritchie, and be quite sure that they have a satisfactory answer to them. It will not do to call a world outlook "scientific" because it can bring natural and ethical phenomena under the same concepts, if those concepts were in fact derived from analogies with human actions and purposes in the first place and read back into the natural world. The concept of "evolutionary progress" may be a case in point.

This brings me to another test which should be applied to a world outlook: will it stand up to a very close critical scrutiny of its fundamental concepts? We can learn a great deal here from following the

thinking of the older metaphysicians. For all too often world outlooks may be drawn in terms of loose concepts; analogies and metaphors used without realizing that they are analogies and without therefore looking to see whether they are good analogies. Amongst a few of those in vogue at present which need watching, I would instance "dynamic," "evolution," "field," "pattern," "dimension."

The next corrective against letting a world outlook be a mere ideology I believe lies in our having a genuine concern for truth and reality. I have spoken of the discipline of empirical accuracy; I now want to go on and say something more "metaphysical" than this. It may be difficult to see what is meant by a concern for truth and reality in any "metaphysical" sense if we are prepared to say that a world outlook must be based on our experience; that experience is always partial and fragmentary, and that our interpretations are bound to be coloured by personal factors and also by the conditions and climate of thought in which we live. But when we have allowed that, for all these reasons, we must be prepared for a certain relativism in world outlooks, I believe that there is still a real dividing line between those who are content that their world outlook should be simply the expression of an attitude of mind, and those who are attempting to make it, for all its partial nature, into an attempt to express truth. What is meant here by "truth" is a very difficult question; it may be argued that there cannot be a complete verification, or *possibly* a complete falsification even for any empirical statement, and so how much more difficult it is to see how a "world outlook" as a whole can be verified or falsified? But I think that here we can distinguish between *verification* and the recognition that we have an obligation to truth, and that this obligation still stands, even if verification is impossible. This may sound paradoxical, but I believe that it is no more than a recognition of the situation in which finite human beings are always placed. In morality similarly we recognize that we have an obligation to do what is right, but we can never know for certain that what we believe we ought to do is what is right in an objective sense. This point was put religiously by Father Kelly of Kelham, when an earnest student asked him, "But how do we know what the Will of God really is?" and he answered, "That's the giddy joke: we don't." I believe that our world outlooks, as well as our moral decisions, are involved in this giddy joke. But just as in morality there is a real difference between those who just accept relativism, and those who, while recognizing our fallibility, yet accept the obligation of conscience that they should do their best in each situation, so also in forming a world outlook there is a real difference between a mere relativism, and the kind of thinking which, in spite of being incomplete and partial, is yet carried on under the recognition of a transcendent obligation.

Obligation to what? It might be said to "truth": but there is a view of truth which identifies it with the internal coherence of our interpretations of experience. I therefore said advisedly a little while ago that one of the questions concerning a world outlook is whether it expresses a genuine concern for *truth and reality*. Now "reality" is a large word, and a slippery word. It sounds impressive, but what does it mean? I am obviously meaning by it here not simply "the totality of all that is the case," since I am considering an obligation to seek something more than just empirical accuracy.

I believe that there is a real issue to be decided as between the world outlooks of those who believe that there is a transcendent reality over against us, which is what it is, and the views of those who are only concerned to achieve internal consistency. You may say that to assume the former begs a very large question: but what I am concerned to do at present is to say that I do not believe that the question is a merely verbal one, as if we were to say that the choice is merely which language we find most convenient, for instance a "material object language" or a "sense datum language." Moreover, Phenomenalism (i.e. the theory that statements about material objects can be analysed into statements about sense data, without reference to transcendent entities) is plausible as a spectator's philosophy: but when we pass from contemplation to action, our conviction that we are set in an environment on which we act and are acted upon by other things is irresistible. Perhaps Dr. Johnson was seeing this in his crude way when he tried to refute Berkeley by kicking a large stone "till he rebounded from it." It was, as Professor Price has said, a "bilateral dynamic transaction." The stone kicked back.[1] I believe, therefore, that when we come to consider *action* and not only states of consciousness, that the burden of proof rests with the people who deny that we have any reason to say that the objects of experience transcend experience. I am well aware that this raises all sorts of questions which I cannot go into here. I can only put the issue as one which I believe is much more than a verbal one. In weighing different kinds of world outlook we can distinguish those which make some kind of unity out of our experience and leave it at that, and those which, while allowing that our experiences are all we have to go on, yet also hold that through them we are trying to interpret reality other than ourselves. World views written in this latter spirit should be able both to convey a sense of their own incompleteness (that "leagues beyond those leagues there is more sea") and yet at the same time be rooted in an absolute obligation to respect reality.

Of course I cannot claim to be able to say that only a world outlook

[1] Cf. H. F. Hallett, "Dr. Johnson's Refutation of Bishop Berkeley," *Mind*, April 1947.

which asserts some kind of ultimate realism will do. All I can ask here is whether this type of view does or does not express the human situation more adequately than those which are concerned simply with the development of internally coherent systems of thought. My own conviction about our "human situation" is that the more we think about it, the more we must be conscious that world outlooks are partial and incomplete, and since none can be all-inclusive, each will tend to put emphasis on the kinds of interest round which it is written. But the fact that we can be critically aware of these limitations means that we are conscious of an obligation both to acknowledge them and to correct them in whatever degree may be in our power. This recognition of obligation is the absolute point in any world outlook, and can be the point of stability which differing world outlooks find in common. So if I were asked to name a "unifying principle," I should say that at any rate we can find one in the mutual recognition of *conscience* among responsible thinkers. There can be no escape from complete relativism for world views which deny the authority (which is not the same as the infallibility) of conscience. For conscience is the capacity to recognize obligation, and therefore the condition for responsible thinking.

But when we have said that we must recognize both that we have a transcendent obligation and also that any world outlook will be partial, we must obviously then go on and try to make this world outlook as coherent an interpretation of experience as possible. Hence it seems that the possibility of a world outlook depends on our being able to find some unifying principle in another sense than that in which we find it in conscience, namely, we must find a co-ordinating principle of interpretation. I believe that this is generally done by taking concepts expressing relations found within certain ranges or thought or experience and extending them by analogy to others, to see whether some co-ordinated scheme can be achieved by this means. So Plato suggests that the reality of things is to be looked for in intelligible formal elements: an extension of the idea of pure forms as grasped in logic and mathematics; Aristotle finds his clue in the teleological categories of his biology. He sees the world as a hierarchy of processes, developing towards the actualizing of their complete nature. One could go on instancing particular world outlooks written round a particular type of relationship which has been selected as a unifying principle.

But since our experience is, as we have said, partial and fragmentary, and since it discloses real diversities not easily reduced by unifying principles, such principles, built as they are on analogies, are likely to become strained and break when we stretch them far. We may refuse to see this, and develop a one-sided outlook in which principles derived from the interpretation of one kind of experience

are made to dominate others without any attempt to do justice to the characteristic differences of these others, and therefore to the limitation of our analogies. We then get a kind of ideology. Such as would be the inability of some of the theologically trained to discuss any problem in, for instance, politics, economics or science except in theological language; or the attempt to give a "scientific" account of ethical or aesthetic experience by leaving out the characteristically ethical or aesthetic elements. (Perhaps Freudianism is a case in point.) Correctives to this kind of ideology would be a sensibility for different kinds of experience, and the metaphysical conviction which I have mentioned—namely that reality is what it is. These two correctives are likely to make us suspicious of unifying schemes, since we shall realize that any such scheme must involve a high degree of simplification. Will they prevent us achieving one at all? I think we must acknowledge that any world outlook is only possible by means of selective simplification. If therefore we are not to rule world outlooks out of court altogether we must ask at what point simplification becomes (dyslogistically) over-simplification. Here I should say that simplification is legitimate if it brings out what is important and omits or dismisses into the background what is trivial or mere matter of detail. This holds whether we are presenting a subject in words or in painting, or whether we are trying to give an "interpretation" of the world. For most people are not interested to be told that reality "is what it is," nor to be told that empirically it is "the totality of all that is the case." What they want when they talk about "reality" are some pegs on which to hang their thinking; something they can feel is important, and in Lord Balfour's phrase "really real." Otherwise if they feel that nothing is important, that nothing really matters, the sense of triviality soon slides into a sense of unreality.

Unreal City
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn,
A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many,
I had not thought death had undone so many.

Eliot writes in *The Waste Land* that epitome of the modern sense of triviality. Wordsworth had also felt baffled and confused amid the vastness of London. The picture of the great city was "unmanageable," yet he found

It is not wholly so to him who looks
In steadiness, who hath among least things
An under-sense of greatest; sees the part
As part, but with a feeling of the whole.[1]

Is not this exactly what people ask of a world outlook? They feel that our accumulated mass of factual information has become

[1] Prelude VII, 733–36. My attention was called to this latter passage by Professor J. W. Harvey.

"unmanageable." They want not just an intellectual scheme, but something which gives them a sense of the relative importance of things, which gives them among least things "an under sense of greatest," which will help them, as we say, to see things in proportion. But can this be supplied? For it may be said that the feeling for what is important may be amongst the most subjective of our judgments, and may we not just be reading our interests and preferences into the universe?

But does "importance" always mean an emphasis put on something because it is relevant to some interest or purpose in our part? Often it is so; if I want to catch my train it is important for me to leave the house now. But is it important that I should catch my train? Yes, perhaps, as a means to my carrying out some plan or engagement. But is the plan or engagement important? We shall be driven back in the end to the question of whether it is possible to say that some ends or purposes are absolutely more important than others, or whether the word "important" simply expresses our own emotional preoccupation. I think that we are quite sure that sometimes it must mean more than this. I am quite sure that the success of the Peace Settlement is more important than my success in this lecture, although at the moment I am emotionally preoccupied with the latter. On what kind of objective grounds can we justify this conviction? First, I should say that which is important makes a difference; it may make a difference to a number of other things, and make it in a decisive way. On the other hand, "that which makes no difference" can be taken to be the vanishing point both of importance and of reality. *It does not really matter.*

There are various ways in which things can make a difference. It may be by creating commotion and disturbances; it may be occasionally (even in these days!) by creating possibilities of order. When we pass from events or occurrences to *ideas*, we can also say that an important idea is one which makes a difference in a decisive way, as, for instance, Copernicus' hypothesis of the motion of the earth. Other ideas or theories have to be interpreted or reinterpreted with reference to this as a key idea; but it itself cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of the others.

The ideas which serve as unifying principles in world outlooks have to be "important" ideas in this sense. It has to be possible to show that a co-ordinated map of our knowledge of the world can be achieved by reference to these as key ideas. (So Alexander uses the key ideas of space-time, emergence and quality.) But of course it is always possible that the unifying principles may be too narrow, or that the philosopher's power to produce a co-ordinated world outlook in terms of them may reduce itself to his ability to create a skilful composition. I believe a corrective here is what I have called the

realist sense: that in the end reality is what it is, and although we must inevitably base our *interpretation* of reality on some selective judgment of what we hold to be important, we must not use these judgments as *definitions* of what is real. I believe that the latter tendency is found in some idealistic world views, which tend to define reality in terms of Value, or "to seek in what should be the ground of what is" (Lotze). But if we restrict our ideas of reality to what we judge to be important, reality itself may give us some unexpected shocks.

Another consideration may be to ask whether there is not another aspect to "importance." An important idea may be one which can be shown to be a possible co-ordinating idea; this is theoretical importance. There is also practical importance, which I have suggested may be described in terms of making a difference on a wide scale, or in a decisive way. But I think importance may sometimes have another aspect, which I shall call "achievement," and contrast with triviality. The sense of triviality, we have said, can be the most devastating form of scepticism. Hence it is often allied with the sense of unreality. If nothing really matters, then perhaps nothing is real, or at any rate "really real." But a corrective to the sense of triviality is to appreciate something which has achieved some measure of excellence. When this is on a sufficient scale we call it greatness. So among the things which we can judge important in an absolutist sense, i.e. we can say that they "really matter," are not only those which make a difference, but those which are in some sense achievements of excellence. If we think of the specific kinds of excellence proper to human beings, we can name achievements in character, in the products of the imagination, as in art or literature, and in actions which shape decisively man's life in society. In all these "importance" can mean not only relevance to some end or interest, but some measure of definite achievement. For its proper contrast would be not the irrelevant but the trivial. I believe that no world outlook can stand which does not sustain our sense of the importance of these things. This does not necessarily mean that we "read our values into the universe." For unless we are very blind or lacking in candour we must, I think, admit that some things or actions do achieve a quality which calls for admiration (not often, perhaps, but sometimes). And therefore, being human, our part in the world should be to cherish or promote these things. Here let me say that, while I do not think that we ought to expect a world outlook to entail a particular programme, I believe that it ought to help us to define our attitude to political and social action by clarifying the kinds of things we think are important in the sphere of "human values," which is the sphere with which politics is so concerned. But neither do I believe that a world outlook should be so parochial as only to be interested in "human values." It

should try in some way to see them in relation to the non-human universe. In this regard I should say that I do not believe that "human values" are logically dependent on a theistic metaphysics, They can be sustained by various types of world outlook. But I believe that there is a difference between the world outlooks which, in recognizing the importance of these values, are centred in man, and those which are able both to sustain our sense of that importance, and yet at the same time to express a sense of man's dependence on a greatness in the universe other than that of his own achievements—a sense expressed in some of the religious world outlooks by the word "creatureliness." I do not think that even such world outlooks are necessarily theistic, at any rate in the ordinary sense (it may be that the nicest thing ever said of any metaphysician was said to Alexander by Claude Montefiore, "You walk so humbly with your funny God"). But whether they can be labelled "theistic" or not, I believe that there is a recognizable difference between the world outlooks which convey this quality and those which do not. And those which do so can sustain our sense of importance without its being tainted by self-importance.

Philosophy is often popularly held to be a means of making us realize our insignificance, "that we are not particularly important." There is a truth in this, if it means that it should find ways of bringing home to us a sense of the incredible vastness of the world both in space and time. The sense for this has certainly not grasped the popular imagination, or even the imagination of many philosophers. Some world outlooks might even be suspected of being protective mechanisms against it. But I believe that no world outlook which presents man's life in the universe as merely trivial can be adequate: not just adequate to our self-esteem, but adequate to the facts of the achievements of certain lives and minds which call out our admiration (unless we are, I believe, not really too humble, but too conceited to be willing to admire).

Of course the people interested in world views will not only be philosophers and metaphysicians, and a good deal of what I have said may have sounded somewhat technical, and relevant only to the particular concerns of philosophers. But I have been trying throughout the discussion to disentangle some considerations which may be brought to bear on any world outlook. The discussion is therefore addressed to those who want seriously to weigh and judge world outlooks, and not simply to toe the party lines of fashionable ideologies. I have admitted that I do not believe that there is any decisive way in which world outlooks can be verified or falsified. Nevertheless I have tried to find certain considerations which can relevantly be applied in judging them. Let me summarize these.

(i) The respect shown for empirical facts in so far as these can be established by experiment and research.

(ii) The respect for objectivity, as shown not only by respect for empirical fact, but also by a belief that there is reality beyond ourselves. This sense may best be conveyed if it is possible to sustain a realist metaphysics, in which the objects of experience transcend experience. But any world outlook, whether realist or not, ought to convey the impression of being an "open system."

(iii) The willingness to recognize that, since a world outlook must depend on an interpretation of experience, and since experience is always partial, a world outlook must be to some extent partial and incomplete. It will also be affected by the kind of thought forms available to the thinker.

(iv) Along with this should nevertheless go a recognition of obligation to truth which will make the thinker critical of his own partiality, though he knows that he can never completely transcend it.

(v) Since the obverse side of a critical awareness of our own partiality is an awareness of obligation, no world outlook which includes a view of man such as would make it impossible for him to recognize obligation can be a critical view.

(vi) In presenting a world outlook we must not ignore the fact that it is a construction of thought, and therefore we must be able in the end to include man himself as thinker and agent in the picture.

(vii) A world outlook may be presented in terms of certain key ideas drawn in the first place from the interpretation of one kind of experience, and it must be shown to be possible to extend these as co-ordinating principles without doing violence to the known diversities between different kinds of experience.

(viii) A world outlook, if it is to be presented or grasped at all, must be a simplification drawn up by means of a selective judgment as to what is important. It should be possible to defend this judgment by showing that other things are explicable with reference to those on which attention has thus been focused.

(ix) There may be some things which we judge to be important because they call out the special admiration due to excellence. The meaning of the world may not be exhausted by, or even centred in, the particular excellences open to human beings. But nevertheless, since we are human beings, these things are our special concern, and therefore no world outlook which does not convey a concern to foster them can be adequate.

(x) A world outlook should sustain the sense that life is im-

portant and not merely trivial. But importance is not the same as self-importance.

Of course I should not claim that this list is complete. You may be able to add to it, and I shall be very glad if you can. You may also dispute some of my points. But if any considerations such as these I have mentioned enter into the choice of a world outlook, I think we can say that it can be a matter for reasoned and responsible judgment. It need be neither a merely arbitrary decision nor just the result of temperamental predilection. Even though we may not be able to claim logical certainty in our ultimate convictions, as was claimed by some of the older metaphysicians, we need not be given over in such matters to complete irrationality.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE MORAL PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME[1]

W. J. H. SPROTT, M.A.

THE title of this lecture, as it stands now, is "Psychology and the Moral Problems of Our Time." When I received the extremely flattering invitation to address you, the proposed title was "Light from Psychology on the Moral Problems of Our Time," and as I am not by any means sure that Psychology throws a very clear light upon our problems, I begged that the title might be toned down. I say this at the outset, because I am afraid that you may be disappointed by the emptiness of the psychological cupboards—at any rate so far as illumination upon the moral problems of our times is concerned, and if I were to appear before you claiming to be a torch-bearer, you would be justified in accusing me of false pretences.

To begin with, I was myself taken in by the sonorous simplicity of the latter half of the title: "Moral Problems of Our Time." Surely, I thought, they are obvious enough. The austerity we endure is not a virtuous exercise in self-denial, it is attributed to the wickedness and culpable stupidity of other people. The uneasy suspicion which pervades the intercourse of statesmen in international affairs, the fear of war, the atom bomb, all these, it may be said, show that there is something wrong, and we readily pass to the proposition that if only men were more good, then things would not be as they are. The fact is, so men say, that our moral stature does not match our scientific knowledge.

Now, if I may make a personal confession: I find that I always start by accepting the sonorous, and then I find myself eyeing it with deepening suspicion. To speak of the moral problems of our time seems to imply that there are problems of a moral nature which are special to *our* time and not to other times, and there is, I think, a faint hint that we are somehow worse now than men of past ages, that there has been a decline in morality. If this *is* meant, I am not at all satisfied that it is true. I should have thought that never were more people disturbed by, and interested in, the welfare of more people. The enormous increase in our social services and the enthusiasm with which young men and women take up social work of all kinds: the probation service, the services of hospital almonery, the profession of personnel management and so on, ought not to be ignored. Nor should we forget the reasoned and sympathetic attitude which an

[1] Lecture delivered at the Royal Institute of Philosophy, October 31, 1947, in the series "Moral and Political Conflicts of Our Time."

increasing number of persons take towards the proper treatment of criminals, both old and young, and the time and money which we are prepared to expend in improving the institutions in which such persons are treated. No one who has lived near a prisoner of war camp can fail to have noticed the sympathy aroused by the prisoners, and, I would add from my experience, the *reasoned* sympathy, not mere soppiness, but a sympathy which takes account of the claims a victor nation may have on the nationals of the conquered one to repair the damage they have done. And this sympathy and interest finds expression in all classes of the community. Furthermore, I would urge that those who accuse our time of being one of degenerating morality, are sometimes influenced by what is, in fact, a sign of the reverse, namely, the enormous fuss that we make nowadays about cases of brutality, cruelty, and negligence which are brought to our notice. We have no comparative studies by means of which to check our criticism. We deplore, and rightly, broken homes, but what evidence have we that there is, in fact, a greater proportion of broken homes to-day than there were, say, one hundred years ago? We may quote the comparative statistics of divorces, but we know perfectly well that divorce is not the only way in which homes are broken. Finally, in our reflections about foreign peoples—I do not say "foreign affairs"—the amount of intelligent and sympathetic weighing of the moral issues involved in their fate does no small credit to the ever-increasing number of persons who turn their attention to such things. And I repeat that in my experience this generosity, this attempt to weigh claims justly, this striving after an enlightened attitude towards other people is to be found in all classes of the community.

I must not, however, take up any more time handing round rose-coloured spectacles. All, I would say, is not ill, but at the same time all is not well. It may be objected, for example, that although we might agree that people are generous enough, perhaps more generous than they used to be, when they contemplate the ill-fate of distinguishable groups of other persons: prisoners, displaced persons, prostitutes, homo-sexuals, Jews, Germans, the sick, the workers in factories, and so on, nevertheless, people are talking of the threat of war, and when it comes to putting self last and the general welfare of the country first, there is a regrettable lack of co-operative enthusiasm. Spivs and drones, strikes and short hours—we shake our heads: if only. . . . If only what? If only everyone were imbued with a selfless devotion to duty and to service, if only they would put sectional disagreement and sectional advantage aside, if only—in fact—everyone approximated to the ideal type of the professional classes, *then*, though economic difficulties would have to be overcome, at least we should put up a better show than we are doing. That, I

think, is at least one of the things which people have in mind when they think of the moral problems of our time.

What points of psychological interest arise? I do not propose to discuss the problems of international relations, because I think the psychological problems are extremely obscure. I am not unaware of the importance of the theories which assert that our attitude towards other countries is partly determined by the fact that we use them as targets for the displacement of our domestic hates and guilts. In so far as this hypothesis is true, statesmen can rely on the efficacy of certain forms of propaganda. But I do not think that such theories, valuable as they are, go very far. We enter a world of personalities in which general psychological inquiry is of very little use, and in which our evidence is at a minimum. All we know is that fewer people can do more damage than ever before, and what will happen depends, so far as I can see, on the purposes and motives of a relatively small number of persons. And I feel that the psychological problems involved are so intimately connected with unknown details about the persons concerned that one is floored without a great deal more information.

I therefore turn to the other problems, delinquency and the absence of a selfless devotion to toil, and I want to begin with a descriptive formula of human personality. I would provisionally describe a human personality as a more or less integrated hierarchy of purposes operating in a setting of beliefs. Such a simplified framework does not, of course, cover all that psychologists are interested in, but I want here to emphasize certain aspects of persons. The "purposes" of which I speak are, at this descriptive level, to be considered as conscious purposes, formulated before the mind in varying degrees of concreteness. A fuller account, for which there is no time here, would distinguish between such degrees of concreteness. A man may have as his purpose, consciously presented, the giving of a good education to his children, or sending his son to a particular school next term; a man may want to get something to eat, or go to a specific restaurant; and so on. What I wish to emphasize is that a man's purposes at the descriptive level have some concreteness, in the sense that they are couched in terms of the possibilities open to him in the society of which he is a member. The desire for food, the desire to make money are, I suggest, never abstract, but always present themselves either in terms of a specific mode of satisfaction, or as implying in the background certain relatively concrete alternative modes of satisfaction.

By "hierarchy" of purposes I mean (*a*) that some purposes *in fact* prove dominant over others in the sense that they consistently triumph in the case of conflict, and (*b*) that a man regards certain purposes as having higher value than other purposes. By "integra-

tion" I mean the degree to which there is consistency in a man's general conduct, the degree to which certain dominant purposes are pursued, so that other purposes, while having their time and place in a man's life, do not interfere with those upon which he sets most store.

Now psychologists, who have turned their attention to this aspect of human behaviour, have formulated hypotheses in terms of which the actual purposes of which a man is aware, and which he certainly thinks he is aiming at, are to be interpreted. We have at least three kinds of theory: (1) Theories which classify purposes on the basis of crude similarities, such as food-getting ones, assertion ones, aggressive ones, and so on, and then put forward the hypothesis of determining tendencies, urges or instincts which correspond to the classification, and are regarded as the dynamic energies forcing people to act in certain directions. (2) A second type of theory is like the first, but the classification is much less expected. Purposes which appear to be very unlike one another are said to be energized by the same so-called "real" motive, whether we recognize it or not—and usually not. The evidence for such hypotheses is, of course, extremely complicated, and the content of such hypotheses varies from one school of thought to another. (3) A third type of theory interprets our purposes in terms of social forces: class warfare, it may be, or a culture-pattern which imposes itself upon us. Now I wish to say emphatically that all these types of theory have been of very great value in rendering human purposes intelligible. Such investigations are of the utmost importance, but there is a danger, I think, of losing sight of the concrete purposes as they present themselves in consciousness, and I believe these to be of importance, too. It may well be that a person thinks he is pursuing a certain purpose, while his actions give the lie to his protestations, and the discovery of the unconscious motivating agency is of enormous value, but we run the risk of ignoring the fact that he not only cannot acknowledge his so-called "real" motive, but that he *does* have to present himself with a purpose which he regards reputable. The fact that men have to justify their actions in their own eyes, and feel they must also do so in the eyes of others, seems to me of importance. To say that he is really "*only*" satisfying a motive so discreditable that he cannot face up to it because his super ego is threatening to castrate him if he does, is only to tell part of the story. Again, to turn to two very different theories but of the same type, I am not satisfied when M. Sartre tells me that if I do not consciously despair, it is because my condition is so parlous that I dare not contemplate it, or when Dr. Fromm tells me that if I do not feel lonely it is because I am so unnerved by my real solitude that I must thrust it from my mind. I am still old-fashioned enough to think that what I am conscious of

is not wholly worthless as a testing-ground for psychological hypothesis.

Turning to the first of my types of theories, the simple instinct theory: it keeps closer to conscious experience, and, admittedly, loses thereby in interpretive interest, but even here there are dangers. Instincts or urges are recklessly multiplied, and the multiplication is not uninfluenced by the notion of what would be advantageous if it were true. I have read, for instance, of an instinct or urge to work, and the suggestion has been made that personnel management is a device to remove the obstacles which thoughtless employers have put in the way of that urge finding full expression. I should require a good deal of evidence in terms of conscious purpose before I accepted that hypothesis. Finally, I fight shy of social determinants which represent members of societies as puppets moved by social forces. I cannot deny such forces, but I think we ought to seek explanation in terms of the interactions of individual purposes before we fall back upon such unverifiable entities.

On these grounds I feel that in spite of the vast importance of the hypothesis of unconscious motivating forces we shall do well not to ignore the common-sense level of conscious desire.

Now let me return to my picture of the personality as a more or less integrated hierarchy of purposes. We have, I think, as a kind of ideal, a man whose dominant purposes are those which he and we regard as respectable, and so far integrated that he pursues these righteous ends without interference from purposes of a lower order. People often talk as though the achievement of such an integrated personality were the easiest thing in the world, and express astonishment when others fall short in any marked degree. To my mind, it is far more remarkable that so many of us are as admirable as we are, than that there are several people who have not made the grade. With all the intellectual ability at our disposal, and the fact that we are not likely to be suspected, it does us credit that we behave as well as we do. Now one of the ways in which psychology is concerned with the moral problems of our time has to do with the factors which prejudice this development. The problem is two-fold: what prejudices integration, and what prejudices the establishment of reputable purposes? The inquiry may be pursued under four headings: (1) constitutional factors may be involved; (2) a factor of maturation may be involved; (3) personal relations between child and parent are undoubtedly involved; and (4) the opinions, beliefs, conduct, opportunities, and assumptions a child comes across inside and outside his home are undoubtedly involved. There may be constitutional factors of emotionality or emotional instability, which make integration difficult where such factors are found, and the technique of factorial analysis combined with genetic theory is of importance in this

context. The maturation factor is, I think, of interest, and I would remind you of the "follow-up" studies of the Gluecks,[1] who wanted to find out whether juvenile penal institutions in America really were responsible for such successes as they claimed. They came to the conclusion that the evidence of reformatory influence was by no means clear, and they made the suggestion that perhaps social adaptation is something which proceeds, as it were, by "nature" in most of us, that some of us are retarded at certain significant ages, but that in a matter of some seven years the retarded can catch up, having, as they put it, "gotten delinquency out of their system." The third factor, the personal relations between a child and its parents, is obviously important as facilitating or impeding integration, particularly when one contrasts consistent behaviour of both parents with inconsistent behaviour on the part of one or both, or behaviour in one which is inconsistent with that of the other. I think it is generally agreed that the stability of a personality is facilitated if the immediate family environment is stable. These factors which may be concerned in the achievement or otherwise of satisfactory integration are doubtless powerful, but, from the point of view of "our time" as distinct from any other time, I think the fourth factor, the opinions, beliefs, assumptions, expectations, and evaluations which a person meets with in the behaviour and expressions of people with whom he comes in close contact is of greater interest. At this point I wish to put the following rough generalizations before you: (1) If a variety of alternative ways of behaving are presented as equally possible, it is harder to centre our purposes round one single aim; (2) if among this variety there is a contrast between immediate satisfactions of what a person may regard as a "lower" nature, and remoter satisfactions of a "higher" nature, the immediate satisfactions have a strong attractive force, the attraction is the greater, the more intense the satisfaction, and, again, it is harder to achieve an integrated personality, whose main purposes are these remoter and "higher" ones (3) if money is a preoccupation among those about you, as a standard of value, then enterprises which bring easy money, or the chance of winning a fortune for sixpence will have a pull; and (4) if these attraction competitions can be backed with plausible argument they are thereby rendered the stronger in their appeal; (5) so far from their being an urge to work, as such, any excuse is better than none to undermine the force of those purposes, the carrying out of which demands distasteful activity.

These generalizations are very rough; they require more elaborate formulation, and I cannot pretend that they are in any way profound. I have set them forth, however, because I think that they

[1] Glueck, S. and E. T.: *After-Conduct of Discharged Offenders*, University of Cambridge English Studies in Criminal Science (Macmillan, 1945).

operate particularly in our time. I suggest that those of us who have achieved some sort of integrated law-abiding personality which, with some kind of consistency, puts conscientious service to our jobs or to the community before cheating or striking, are fortunate in having been brought up with people who took that kind of thing for granted and never seriously considered any alternative. The professional classes, the civil servants, have developed a code, which excludes a great many purposes, not merely as courses of action to be contemplated but rejected, but as, in some sense, "*unthinkable.*" They have accepted their own professional code, and what we might call the "gentry tradition," with its long history of paternal responsibility for public affairs, and its assumption of being the ruling class, and therefore involved, however indirectly, in the affairs of the nation. What I am suggesting is that we are as good as we are largely because it has never *seriously* occurred to us to do anything else. When my friend Norman, a window cleaner, who has done many other things, said to me the other day: "I say, as a matter of fact, how much can you fiddle on your job?" I had to admit that I had never given the matter any thought. He looked at me with friendly pity: a spiv *manqué.* Now in other walks of life, what with scientific progress, increased communication, gas meters, and the heightened mobility of ideas, a far greater range of enterprises is opening up than ever before. It is not merely a matter of lads robbing an orchard, you can get a car and carry off sacks full; you know someone who did it and got away with it, and made a pretty penny. And why not? "Whose apples are they, anyway? What right has old so-and-so to have so many apples? I bet he fiddles with his income tax return." This trivial example is merely to be taken as a paradigm of my contention that a wider range of seriously thinkable purposes, near-legal and illegal, present themselves nowadays. The immediate returns are larger; you can make quick money and therefore feel that you have scored over the mugs; there are plenty of plausible excuses current, and all this makes good law-abidingness more difficult to achieve. This, I believe, to be the case particularly in the economic field, and I think it would be a mistake to generalize over the whole field of human activity and relationships. Norman, again, was instructing me about how to cheat customers if I went into the firewood business in which he was then engaged—all about delivering 12 bags when 14 have been paid for, and the misleading but ingratiating gestures you should make. I said: "But it sounds to me like stealing two bags." "Oh, no," says he, scandalized, "it's in the way of business. I mean everyone in the way of business has got to fiddle; it's how they make their living." Now as a *bon père de famille,* as a companion and among friends, Norman is as impeccable as any other delinquent.

While, however, I think that consistent goodness is more difficult to achieve, for the reasons I have given, I do not know how far consistent badness is on the increase. The wide guy, who measures *everything* by its contribution to his width, is, I should have thought, rarer than is often supposed.

Turning now to the problem of working for the community, we are, I suggest, faced with much the same factors in a different context, but with an important additional one. There are those, as I have said, who perpetuate the conscientious social service—though they may not call it that—of a responsible ruling class. Business men doubtless preserve their high regard for work, and a sense of identification with the nation and Empire, the prosperity of which is so closely linked with their own, though here excuses for inaction are accumulating: "I should like to do what I can, but the Government won't let me," or "Wot, more forms?" And I suspect that if one looked, one would find a growing sense of apathy and hopelessness, due to frustration. It is when we come to the vast multitudes of working men and women that we find new hitherto unthought-of alternatives presenting themselves once more. In the past, I suggest, the masses of the people worked because they had to, because life was like that. There was no widespread sense of the real possibility of doing anything else, or materially altering your conditions of labour. All that has changed. They are organized and can make themselves felt; they are articulate, and they have an idea of themselves as exploited. The notion of a sensible working man as being one who does as little work for as much as possible is widely current. The irritating sense of being patronized by people who come to do them kindnesses—which finds expression in the defensive: "I don't mind," or "You *can* do," when assistance is offered—has given place to a demand for such services as a right; they must be *free* in every sense, why should we work for them? There is a sort of parvenu spirit abroad: "They're not going to mess us about any more; we'll show them who is boss now." The old class structure has gone haywire; incomes no longer parallel status even to the extent that they did in the past, so that new luxuries and new standards of life are envisaged.

There has, too, been a change in the cultural climate of the working classes. Anyone who has had much to do with adult education will recognize the old stalwarts of the movement. Those who survive are in their sixties or seventies, products, perhaps, of the 1870 Act. In their day they were serious-minded, conscientious, working men; they had a sense of craftsmanship; they were influenced by nonconformity and rationalist humanitarianism; they had high ethical aspirations, and accepted the cultural standards of the middle classes; they wanted to improve themselves; they belonged to the "Lit. and

and Phil.", or the Mechanics Debating Society; they read Carlyle and Emerson, and for them socialism and trade unionism were of the order of a moral crusade. Furthermore, they formed an aristocracy of labour, and they were respected by those less intellectually inclined than themselves.

Now the position is different. The ethical fervour of the nineteenth century has decayed. The desire to improve oneself has given way to the desire to better oneself. A friend of mine tells me that during a discussion on freedom with some young working men, one of them exclaimed: "B—— freedom, we want security; freedom's a bourgeois idea." In this connection we must remember than in 1925 the proportion of children from elementary schools entering grammar schools was 8·5 per cent, while to-day it is something like 16 per cent, and in some areas as high as 25 per cent, and before 1925 it was very much smaller than 8 per cent. This means that an intellectual cream is being lost to industry altogether. In the world of trade unionism, the *movement* has grown into the bureaucratic organization, providing avenues out of overalls into black coats. The organiser, the trade union official in large unions must be trained for his job, and might even be drawn from outside industry altogether, in those unions in which officials are appointed rather than elected—a device which stymies the efforts of a certain well-known group who are particularly assiduous in their attendance at branch meetings. The result is that whereas in the past the centre of gravity among the rank and file lay towards the intellectual élite, now it lies lower down towards the masses, who are beginning to feel their power, and are suspicious of their official leaders, who have moved away from them.

To this we must add that the grouping of workers in enormous industrial categories tends to reduce the sense of individual responsibility, making the problem of leadership of prime importance, while the aggregation of operatives in large face-to-face groups may well tend to heighten the suggestibility, and all the opportunities that crowd psychology offers to the orator. Such traditions as there were, favourable to work, have broken down, and those which have survived are against it: hostility and suspicion of the employer. Furthermore, the negotiator in the trade union world who is, in any case, separated from the workers, is subject to the divided loyalties of all negotiators; he must do his best for those whom he represents, and he must do the right thing for the country, on whose prosperity the welfare of everyone depends, but it is ridiculous for him to make an agreement which there is no chance of the rank and file respecting. In all this, I suggest, we see old horizons receding, and new effective alternatives presenting themselves, which were, at most, only dreamt of in the past.

The other factor, which I mentioned as being important, is this: I doubt whether the bulk of working men have ever identified themselves with the country at large. To mention the Empire usually provokes an undue use of the second letter of the alphabet. When we reflect that such concepts as "the country" and "the Empire" are mental constructs, it is not surprising that they are, as it were, constructed differently in the minds of members of different classes of the community. During a war, perhaps, whether because they are frightened and want it to stop, or because they have displaced their aggressive attitude, outside the country, and are therefore consolidated with released libido, there may be some sense that they are Englishmen and in a common danger, but an economic crisis is no such apparent, exciting, frightening affair. How can it be? It is not so real as a bomber, and it is the fault of the authorities anyway, let *them* get us out of the mess. The dream of the British Empire is one which has inspired another section of the community, and it is, for that reason, suspect to the one we are considering. There *is* a dream, and one we have all heard of: when a miner was asked whether he was going to work harder after some agreement or other had been made, he replied: "Ah! on one condition—good relations with Soviet Russia. I would work fifteen hours a day for Soviet Russia."

I have not mentioned as a factor the hidden hand. I have no evidence that there is a hidden hand at work, daily sabotaging our efforts, but even if there were the significant thing would be that it had an effect.

We hear of enthusiastic rebuilding abroad, in Jugoslavia, for instance. How far this is widespread among the population it is impossible to say, but if it be present the question arises: why there and not here? I suggest these relevant differences between such a comparatively immature nation and one which has the complexity of our own: the youth and homogeneity of the surviving population, the fact that there are no obstacles in the way of identifying themselves with their nation, the absence of a history of economic friction, and the fact that rebuilding for them is a more tangibly obvious affair than it is with us. However, in the absence of evidence, such speculation is valueless, but the problem is one of psychological importance. And when it comes to speculation, it may be said that I, myself, have been generalizing in too speculative a way about our own working classes. This I admit. I agree that all I have said requires verification, and indeed I would urge that if we intend to persuade the working classes to work harder and not to strike, we must first find out whether I am right, or, if I am quite wrong, what are the facts of the case. That is why I have stressed a study of conscious purposes; I feel that much of our propaganda cuts no ice whatever, because it is

formulated in complete ignorance of what working men and women think and feel about their work.

When it comes to speculation about a possible future, we are indeed at sea. It may be that with a deepening crisis and experienced privation a different situation will confront us, eliciting different responses, perhaps an abject submission to a leader with all that that implies. Before we accept such a future as inevitable, there is, I think, one more thing to say. I have stressed the *difficulties* of achieving an integrated personality centred round desirable selfless purposes. I painted a black picture, and perhaps one too black. There is, however, one aspect of human conduct of which we should never lose sight, and that is the need people feel to justify their actions in terms of justice. Even the crude: "You've got to look after number one because no one else will," is a weighing of a claim. Strikers may justify their action by the weighing of a neglected claim. I venture to suggest that when claims are issues for the first time, and taken seriously for the first time, they are bound to bulk over-large in the eyes of the claimants. The point is that an element of assessment takes place. I am, you see, suggesting a feature which accompanies and softens the crude self-seeking which is first noticed, and in that, I think, lies our hope. My experience has been that the sophisticated protest that no one but a fool would do more than the minimum is accompanied by a certain uneasiness: the claims of others are not wholly disregarded, though they may well be underestimated. I think that our hopes may lie in the extension of this sense of fairness to other people, supposing our economic predicament gives us time. Of a so-called "change of heart" I am sceptical. Of a recrudescence of religious belief I am sceptical, because I very much doubt whether the majority of men deduce what course of action they should pursue from a set of beliefs about the nature of the Universe and man's place in it. Of blind enthusiasm I am positively afraid. I have, however, a certain respect for the efficacy of the human reason as an agency engaged in the making of choices, though I am only too well aware of the sectional interests against which it has to fight. One of the main obstacles to rationality, and one of great psychological interest, is the frequent absence of any common ground for rational discussion. Disagreement is naturally common enough, but disagreement implies discussability. What I am referring to is that one sometimes finds oneself in an atmosphere in which discussion itself is impossible—a world of counter-utterances and *ignoratio elenchi*—a world in which the general rules of evidence and inference simply are not. If this is merely a first stage of articulateness, well and good, but if it goes deeper than that we are, indeed, sunk. In any case, I am sure that our propagandists would do well to take note of the problem.

What I have attempted to do is to suggest that the moral problems

of our time centre round the multiplicity of choices with which we are confronted, and to emphasize the need for psychological research into the way in which these choices are consciously faced by the people who have to make them. I am convinced that psychologists can only contribute to the solution of our moral problems if they do some field-work among men and women in industry and elsewhere, as well as developing ingenious hypothesis which are often—so it seems to me—based on comparatively little evidence.

"THINKING AND MEANING"[1]

PROFESSOR H. H. PRICE.

PROFESSOR AYER'S lecture is not only a most auspicious inauguration; it is also an important contribution to philosophy. It is perhaps the best and the most exciting work he has written, and that is saying a good deal. There is a certain theory about thought and its objects which is often hinted at in the utterances and the writings of contemporary empiricist philosophers, but so far as I know it has never before been stated in print. Mr. Ayer has stated it, clearly and in detail, with all his well-known force and felicity of style. It is a strange and rather shocking theory, very different (in appearance at any rate) from the one which most philosophers hitherto have believed. But if we are shocked by it, the shock will be salutary. The dragon has at last come clearly into view. If we resolve to accustom ourselves to it and treat it kindly, we may hope that it will transform itself by degrees into a nice gentle domestic pet, as other philosophical dragons have before.

The aim of the lecture is to discover what is meant by the statement "someone is thinking." Professor Ayer begins by formulating what he calls the most widely current view, according to which the situation described by this statement contains five different factors: (1) the person who is thinking; (2) the instrument with which he thinks, the mind or, in some versions of the theory, the brain; (3) the process of thought itself, consisting of mental acts of various kinds; (4) the medium in which he thinks, images or words; (5) the object of the thought. Mr. Ayer considers that this analysis is far too complicated, and he proposes to simplify it by getting rid of the unnecessary entities which it mentions. By the time he has done with it, only two of the original five items are left: (1) the person, and (4) the medium. The other three have been analysed away. Even the object of thought is got rid of in the end, though for a time it maintains a precarious existence as the *significatum* of the words or images which constitute (4). As for item (1), the person who thinks, I take it that this would ultimately be resolved into a logical construction out of mental events (including organic sensations), though it is not relevant to Mr. Ayer's purpose to say so. And then there would be nothing left of our original five items but a series of mental events, some of which are symbols.

[1] Professor A. J. Ayer's Inaugural Lecture, published by H. K. Lewis & Co., Ltd., London. 1947. Pp. 28. 2s. 6d. net.

The first unnecessary entity to be removed is (2) the mind, the supposed instrument with which one thinks. Professor Ayer does not of course deny that there are mental events. Their distinguishing character, he says, is that they are private,[1] and that they are not located in physical space; for example, feelings and images are mental events (p. 4). But he does deny that there is any entity, called the mind, which "underlies" such events. Even if there were, he says, it could not be the instrument with which one thinks; not because we think with something else, but because the question "What does one think with?" is a misleading question. One may ask what we see with, or hear with; and one may properly answer, with our eyes or our ears. But if somebody asks the parallel question about thinking, the proper reply is that in this case there is no "with" at all. Thus the notion that there is a kind of charlady, called the mind, which does people's thinking for them, is a delusion. And the notion that there is something called a thinking faculty which does it—or that there are faculties at all—is only a more refined form of the same delusion (pp. 5–7).

Now it seems to me that we do sometimes use the word "mind" in something like the sense which Mr. Ayer objects to. We say, for example, that Jones has a good mind, or a first-class mind, or a powerful mind; and it would be agreed that such statements are sometimes true. What are we to make of them? In view of what he says later, I think Mr. Ayer should reply that "the mind" in this usage refers to our capacity for using symbols, a capacity partly innate and partly acquired. Some people are very good at using symbols, and they are said to "have good minds"; others are less good at it. A capacity, to be sure, is not something which one uses as one uses a pair of tongs, or even as one uses one's eyes. To suppose that it is, was just the mistake of the Faculty Psychologists. But still it is something which one *has*, in an intelligible sense of the word "have." Nor is it altogether true that in the case of thinking there is no "with" at all—nothing "with which" we think. It is natural to say that we think with (by means of) symbols. A symbol, and still more a system of symbols such as the Arabic numerals, surely *is* something which we use, though not just in the way we use a pair of tongs. Lastly, I think that Mr. Ayer's attack on faculties is somewhat overdone. As we shall see, he has a good deal to say about *dispositions* in the later part of his lecture. A faculty is nothing but an innate or unacquired disposition. Can it be denied that every human being does have unacquired dispositions? For example, the disposition to learn from experience cannot itself be learned from experience.

[1] Private *to whom* or to what? If one holds that persons are logical constructions, this question will demand some consideration.

We may now turn to items (3) and (4) on our list: the process of thought, on the one hand; on the other, the symbols which are supposed to be its "medium." Professor Ayer is inclined to identify the two. He admits that people *may* sometimes have thoughts which they are unable to express. But this admission does not amount to much. For as he explains later (p. 10) such thoughts, precisely because they are unsymbolized, would have no objects. If so, one wonders how they can be thoughts at all. Mr. Ayer does not tell us how they can be. Perhaps he really holds that they are feelings which have a tendency to cause thoughts, without actually being thoughts themselves? However this may be, he does explicitly maintain that when a thought *is* expressed, i.e. symbolized, "the expressing and the thinking merge into a single process" (p. 7). Indeed, this is one of the central contentions of the whole lecture.

It might be supposed that Mr. Ayer is here identifying thinking with talking, or with other sorts of overt symbol-using, e.g. writing, making gestures, making signals. But surely we often think without expressing our thoughts by speech, writing or gestures? Moreover, when we do speak, surely there is a distinction between talking *without* thinking and talking *with* thinking (likewise when we write, gesticulate, etc.)? But those objections would be unfair. As to the first, we must distinguish between private and public symbol-usings. Certainly we may think without uttering public noises, or making public marks on paper, or public gestures. But we are still using symbols privately. For example, we may be talking to ourselves subvocally. Or we may be using verbal imagery, whether auditory or visual or kinaesthetic. Or we may even be using non-verbal imagery, as when I think of Paddington Station by means of a visual image resembling a view of that object from the south-west. (Mr. Ayer does admit that such pictorial images may be symbols, though he says very little about them.)

As to the second objection, we might be tempted to suppose that when we talk intelligently—not like a parrot or a gramophone—there are two distinct processes going on: first an inward process of thinking, and then an outward process of noise-making which is somehow controlled by it. To this Mr. Ayer would reply, like the philosophical child who was told that she must always think before she spoke, "But how can I know what I think until I hear what I say?" Of course people do sometimes think before they speak. "But all this comes to is that before saying certain words aloud they say them to themselves." A person's conversation may be "interspersed with private rehearsals" (p. 8). But they too are symbol-usings, though private ones. Are we to say that they in turn are interspersed with second-order rehearsals which are still more private? Surely not; and if we did, we could not avoid a vicious infinite regress, because these

second-order rehearsals would themselves be symbol-usings. At some stage or other we must come upon a symbol-using process which is *un*rehearsed, i.e. to the using of symbols without the help of any previous use of symbols to "prepare" it. Then why not admit the obvious empirical fact that our public symbol-usings too are very largely unrehearsed? In other words, Mr. Ayer is pointing out that we do not just think and then produce our symbols afterwards. We think *in* producing them. And this is true whether the symbols produced are public or private.

But of course it might be suggested that there are still two distinct processes, even though concurrent: talking on the one hand (whether public or private) and thinking on the other. If the second is absent, am I not talking like a parrot after all? And if my parrot-talk happens to be private and consists entirely of auditory or kinaesthetic images, that will not make it any better. To this Mr. Ayer roundly answers that there are not two distinct processes at all. The best way to formulate his view, perhaps, is to use some adverbial expression like "thinkingly." According to him, we do not talk and at the same time perform some separate activity called thinking. We just talk thinkingly, or intelligently, whereas a parrot does not. Or we may put it the other way round and say we think verbally. At any rate, he holds that we are not producing words *and* doing something else as well. We are just producing words in a certain manner: in an intelligent or understanding way.

This brings us to the next and most devastating slash of Professor Ayer's razor, the abolition of *objects* of thought (item 5 in the traditional list with which we began). For I suppose that the main reason why philosophers have wanted to say there are acts of thinking, as well as utterances, was not that they professed to discover such acts by introspection. It was rather that when talking, privately or publicly, they claimed to have certain objects "before their minds," over and above the words; and from this they concluded that there must be certain acts of awareness directed upon such objects. Mr. Ayer will not have this at all. Instead, he suggests that all this theorizing about objects of thought is just a misleading way of telling us that symbols have meaning. "To say of a thought that it has an object is merely another way of saying that certain symbols are meaningful" (p. 11). This is perhaps the most exciting suggestion in Mr. Ayer's lecture. It is one of these suggestions which seem so obvious, once they are stated, that we wonder why nobody has ever put it in quite that way before; and this, I think, is one of the marks of true philosophical originality. It is clear that if Mr. Ayer is right, many of the epistemological problems which have plagued philosophers for centuries will simply vanish away.

He proceeds to explain very well what different sorts of symbols mean in different ways; for example, names in one way, descriptions in another. But what if the symbols are meaningless, like those alleged to have been used by Jacob Boehme when he described the unutterable? The objects of *his* thought "cannot be identified with what that relevant symbols designate, for the reason that they do not designate anything" (p. 12). One would expect Mr. Ayer to conclude that Boehme was not thinking at all, i.e. was talking unthinkingly; in which case there would be no need to ask what objects his thoughts had. This, I believe, is what Mr. Ayer would have said in the old days, when he was crusading against the metaphysicians. But he has now become more tender-hearted. He is prepared to admit that such expressions as "the Absolute" are not exactly nonsensical. He says "we have a use" for this expression, "in the sense that there are certain sentences in which it is allowed to have a place" (p. 12). Moreover, such sentences can be translated; there are other sentences, in the same or another language, which are equivalent to them. He adds that there are certain others in which the expression is *not* allowed to have a place. It would be against the rules to say "the Absolute is going short of food" (i.e. this really *would* be nonsense), though it would be in accordance with them to say "it transcends human reason." So we may allow that such expressions are "quasi-symbols" and that the sentences in which they occur express "quasi-propositions." But Mr. Ayer still insists firmly that such sentences are neither true nor false; hence the prefix "quasi-". I think this is because the rules for the use of such words as "the Absolute" are merely rules for joining those words to others, or forbidding them to be joined, and neither are nor are reducible to rules of the ostensive kind (though Mr. Ayer does not explicitly say so). I must confess to an uneasy suspicion that in this important respect they are rather like the syntactical symbols of Logic and Mathematics, such as "or" and "plus."

But we have not yet finished with objects of thought. Our thinkings are ordinarily of the kind which is expressed in a complete sentence, not in a single word or phrase. Mr. Ayer therefore proceeds to discuss what Lord Russell calls "propositional attitudes"—knowing, believing, wondering, doubting, etc. The traditional view is that each of these words stands for an act, or occurrence, and that these acts have objects. Here again Mr. Ayer proceeds to abolish both the acts and the objects. He first points out that in ordinary English the words "know," "believe," "doubt," etc., are *dispositional* words. If we say of someone "he believes that p" we do not ordinarily mean that he is at present engaged in an act called believing. What, then, do we mean? According to Mr. Ayer, we are making a series of hypothetical statements about what the man *would* do *if* he were in circum-

stances to which the truth of *p* was relevant, about the words he would utter if asked whether *p*, or some proposition entailed by *p*, is true, about the emphatic tone of voice in which we would utter them, etc. To take Mr. Ayer's own example: suppose one believes that the Labour Party will be returned to power at the next election. Then believing this consists in being disposed to utter these words when the subject arises, and generally in "behaving [being disposed to behave?] in a way that, in the relevant situations, is more likely to be successful if the prediction is true than if it is not" (p. 15), where "behaving" of course includes the production of various sorts of public symbols, and I think it *should* also include the formulating of them sub-vocally, and even in images (though this last is oddly called "behaviour").

This is only the beginning of Mr. Ayer's analysis, but I should like to make some comments on it at once. Suppose I am asked, not "is *p* true?" (Mr. Ayer has provided for that), but "do you believe *p*?" How shall I answer? According to this analysis, I shall only be entitled to reply, "I *think* I believe it." I cannot say more than that. For according to Mr. Ayer I cannot discover by direct inspection what my own beliefs are. I learn that I myself believe *p* exactly as I learn that other people believe it, by an inductive process; by observing what I say and what I do in circumstances to which the truth of *p* is relevant,[1] and thence inferring a general rule about my utterances and actions. And the induction may well be a pretty weak one. For circumstances of the required sort may not occur at all frequently; for example, they occur very seldom with regard to the belief that the sun is larger than the moon, unless the believer happens to be an astronomer. I can indeed be pretty sure that I do have a disposition to *say* "*p*" (or some equivalent sentence) and to say it emphatically. I can at any time perform the experiment of asking myself the question "whether *p*" even though no one else happens to ask me. But although this disposition is a part of the belief-disposition on Mr. Ayer's view, it is far from being the whole. There must also be dispositions to perform various actions, and perhaps to feel certain emotions also, for example, to feel shocked to the core if I read the sentence "not *p*" in the newspaper. I may *think* that I should act and feel thus if occasion arose, but I may very easily be mistaken; and therefore I can only think—not know—that

[1] Should this be "to which I *believe* the truth of *p* to be relevant"? If I mistakenly believe it to be relevant when in fact it is not, I shall talk and act in the required way. If I mistakenly believe it not to be relevant when in fact it is, I shall not speak or act in this way. But if so, the analysis seems to be circular. There is a similar difficulty about the phrase "likely to be successful" at the end of the previous paragraph. What matters is that I should *believe*, however irrationally, that the behaviour is likely to be successful.

I have the belief in question. Now there are two difficulties about this. One is that the word "think" is itself a synonym for "believe" (or "believe mildly"). And secondly, it seems obvious that we do sometimes know by inspection what our beliefs are. At any rate, almost all philosophers hitherto have supposed so. They have admitted, of course, that we often do not know whether *p* is in fact true. But, they have claimed, we know at least that we do believe *p*. Even the wildest sceptic, it is supposed, must admit that he can at least know this much, merely by attending to his own state of mind. He cannot, of course, know that he will *go on* believing *p* in future—though he may think he will, he may easily be mistaken—but at least he can know that he does believe it now.

Have philosophers been wholly wrong in making this claim? They have claimed in effect that there are *acts* of believing, and that these acts are sometimes detectable by introspection. Well, perhaps these acts should not be called acts of *believing*. The phrase is a technical one, and we may admit that the word "belief" is ordinarily used in a dispositional sense. Let us speak, instead, of acts of *assenting*, as Locke did. It seems to me clear that there are such acts (or occurrences, if the word "act" is too much to swallow), and that we are sometimes directly aware of them by introspection. And they are not just acts of utterance either, not even of emphatic utterance. For I may utter something emphatically when I am lying, or in a merely playful or dramatic manner.

But this is not the whole story. I think there *are* beliefs to which Mr. Ayer's dispositioned analysis, or something like it, does apply very well. They are what we call "unconscious" beliefs, i.e. beliefs such that their holder cannot know by introspection that he has them, and may even think erroneously that he does not have them. If we nevertheless say that he does have them, I think we are talking about the dispositions manifested in his utterances and his actions; and likewise in the images, dreams, day-dreams, emotions and the hallucinations (if any) which he experiences (for I do not think that the dispositions in question are so entirely behaviouristic as Mr. Ayer would have them). Moreover, I discover my own unconscious beliefs —when I do manage to discover them—in very much the same way as I discover the unconscious beliefs of my neighbour: by observing what I myself say, feel and do, especially when I am off my guard, and then drawing the appropriate inferences. What is wrong with Mr. Ayer's dispositional analysis, then, is this: he has supposed that what is true of "unconscious" beliefs is true of all beliefs, or that "unconscious" beliefs are the only ones there are. And in this he seems to be mistaken.

These objections are not considered by Mr. Ayer. We may now turn to one which he does consider (p. 15–16). If I believe *p*, must I

not sometimes actually *think of p*? Must I not have done so at least once in the past? For otherwise the dispositions, in which my belief is supposed to consist, could never have been formed. And when I did think of *p* on that occasion, must I not have thought of it with a *feeling of confidence?* If I had not thought of it with this feeling, but with some other one, e.g. a feeling of suspicion, or with none at all, the resulting disposition would not have been a belief-disposition. But this would amount to saying that there can be no belief-disposition without a previous *act* of believing (what I called an act of assenting above). Mr. Ayer replies that he is not himself sure that there is any feeling which can properly be called a feeling of confidence. It seems to me clear that there sometimes is; though of course it is not an organic sensation like a stomach-ache, and if anybody wants to identify all feelings with organic sensations, he must call this one by another name, such as "enjoyed attitude" or the like. In general, Mr. Ayer appears to hold that the question how a particular belief disposition originated in a purely psychological one, of no epistemological importance (p. 15, *ad fin.*). But if this be said, what becomes of the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable beliefs? This is not the same as the distinction between belief and knowledge, which we shall come to presently; a perfectly reasonable belief may still be false. It is clear that the word "reasonable" is not a purely psychological adjective. But it is equally clear that when we call a belief reasonable we are saying something about the way the disposition was set up. We are saying that it was set up by a certain sort of cognitive act, or series of acts; namely, by considering the evidence in favour of *p* and the evidence against it, and then deciding or making up our mind in accordance with the balance of the evidence. A belief *not* formed in this way is unreasonable, or at any rate non-reasonable, even though what is believed may happen to be true. It is very odd that Mr. Ayer says nothing at all about the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable beliefs.

We now turn to knowledge. This, too, is a disposition, not an act, according to Professor Ayer. He is inclined to think that on its subjective side it does not differ from belief. At any rate, he maintains, the actions, utterances, etc., which are its occurrent manifestations do not differ from those which manifest belief. But in other ways, he says, there is an important difference. First, a man cannot be said to know that *p*, unless *p* is in fact true, whereas what we believe may be either true or false. Secondly, in this case it is essential to ask how the disposition was acquired. We shall only say that the man knows, if the disposition was acquired "either as a result of having some experiences which justify *p*, or of his accepting certain other propositions which constitute evidence for *p* and are themselves directly or

indirectly justified by his experience" (p. 19). In the second clause I think Mr. Ayer should have said "constitute *conclusive* evidence for *p*" or "evidence sufficient to *establish p*" (not merely sufficient to make it more probable than not). Otherwise we shall not be able to distinguish between knowledge and reasonable belief which falls short of knowledge. But what are we to think of those "experiences which justify *p*"? They look to me very like what old-fashioned philosophers, in their ignorance and insensitivity to English idiom, have called "acts of knowing"! If this phrase is barred, let us call them acts of *noticing* or *discovering* instead. To put the same point another way, Mr. Ayer's word "justify" is a somewhat tricky one. If I have a certain sort of series of sense-experiences, of seeing a table from various sides and from different distances, bumping into it, etc., then the proposition that there is a table in the room will be "justified" in one sense of the word; in the sense that if those sense-experiences did occur and were sufficiently numerous and varied, and inter-related in certain ways, then the proposition that there is a table is as a matter of fact certain. But do I thereby *know* that there is a table? Not necessarily. My whole attention might be occupied in composing a sonata. It is not enough that I do in fact have those "justifying" experiences. It is also necessary that I should *notice* them or inspect them, or recognize them (I am tempted to say "know that they are occurring," but I had better forbear). Nor will it be enough if I notice them one by one. I must remember the earlier ones when the later ones are occurring. And finally—or is this too shocking?—I must perform the act which Kant called "synthesis" upon the whole lot; at any rate, I must *notice* that the contents of these successive experiences are related to each other in a certain systematic way, and it will not be enough that they are *in fact* thus related. I suggest that when we inquire into the origins of a knowledge-disposition, we shall always find that it originated in one or more acts of "noticing" or "discovering" or "recognizing." I have to put it like that, because Mr. Ayer forbids me to call them acts of knowing. But that is what they always used to be called before the year 1930; and if I were not so timid, I should like to call them that still. At any rate, whatever you call them, they are certainly *occurrences*. And it is not enough to say just that they are experiences, as Mr. Ayer does.

But what about "knowledge of"—knowledge by acquaintance as opposed to "knowledge that"? Mr. Ayer is very severe about this. No doubt the verb "to know" does sometimes govern an accusative, which is, or appears to be, the name of an entity of some kind. But in every case, he says, it can be shown that this alleged knowing of an entity is reducible either to knowing how to do something, or else to knowing that something is the case (p. 18). Now I admit that it

may be misleading to speak of *knowledge* by acquaintance; and sometimes, as when we say "he knows the way to the station" or "he knows Latin," we do mean that he knows how to do something—how to get to the station, or how to translate Latin sentences. All the same, I think that the word "acquaintance," even though not the phrase "knowledge by acquaintance," is a useful one; and I do not see how we can get on without it, or some equivalent (Mr. Ayer's own equivalent is "experience"). Moreover, even though acquaintance is not itself knowledge, it does seem to be an indispensable precondition of knowledge *that* so and so is the case, at any rate where the knowledge is empirical.

We may now turn to consider Mr. Ayer's views about what is known; we must remember that "knowledge" is now restricted to knowledge *that*, since knowledge by acquaintance has been abolished. It used to be said, in the old Realistic days, that "facts" are what we know. Mr. Ayer is very severe about facts too, and here his severity seems to be just. We do not want two worlds—the ordinary world of things and events, and another world of facts existing or subsisting alongside of it. Of course we may use the word "fact" if we like; in ordinary English we often do. "But," says Mr. Ayer, "it is a mistake to think of the facts as being 'out there' waiting to be known. For what is to be regarded as a fact will depend partly on what symbols we use" (p. 20). Partly, but of course not wholly. It will also depend upon "certain non-symbolic occurrences" (*ibid*). In other words, when we talk of "a fact," we are really referring to a certain relational property which these non-symbolic occurrences have, the property of rendering a certain sentence true and other sentences false; and we are not referring to a peculiar entity, which somehow exists or subsists alongside of the non-symbolic occurrences. But then, I would add, there *is* after all something "out there"; and if it is not "waiting to be known," it is at any rate waiting to render our sentences true or false; and probably this is all that the Realistic philosophers wanted when they said—ill-advisedly—that facts themselves were out there and waiting to be known.

We now come to Section V of Professor Ayer's lecture (pp. 20–25). The issues which he raises here are so interesting and so important that they cannot be dismissed in a paragraph or two. I intend to discuss them in some detail; though I am afraid this will leave me no time to discuss the last section of all (pp. 25–28), in which even the attenuated ghost of the object—the shadowy status which it still had as that *significatum* of a symbol—is finally dissolved. (Mr. Ayer there maintains that to say "what a symbol means" is merely to interpret it in terms of *other symbols*, but denies that we are thereby "imprisoned in language" as some philosophers have supposed.)

As we have seen, the main purpose of the lecture is to abolish the act-object relation. Mr. Ayer is trying to convince us that when we talk about acts of knowing, believing, doubting, etc., we are really referring to dispositions; and that when we talk about the objects of such acts, we are really referring to the fact that symbols have meaning. But it may be objected, he says, "that the use of symbols which are meaningful is itself just such a mental occurrence as I am trying to eliminate. . . . It is necessary that the signs in question should be taken to refer to something. And must not these objects of reference be apprehended by the mind?" (p. 21). If so, the fact that symbols are meaningful cannot be used to abolish the act-object relation; for whenever a symbol is meaningfully employed, the act-object reliation must already be there.

I think that this is the most formidable objection which Mr. Ayer has to meet; and he himself admits that it is not easy to answer. Obviously there is some difference "between talking intelligently and merely babbling" and likewise "between understanding what another person says and merely hearing the noises that he makes" (p. 21). But what makes the difference? Not the presence or absence of any cognitive act. For what sort of cognitive act could it be? Not an act of imaging. It is empirically false that images are always present when we use symbols with understanding (p. 21). And even if they were, it would not help; for such images "must themselves be symbols if they are to do the work required of them" (*ibid*). I do not wish to defend the Imagist theory of thinking, but I doubt whether Mr. Ayer has done full justice to it. Its advocates would say that the images here in question are *natural* symbols, whereas words are only conventional ones; and this, they would insist, makes all the difference. They would admit that images are not always present, but would say that when they are absent we are using words in an *uncashed* manner, merely as substitutes or counters, which we might —or might not—be able to cash with images on demand.

But to continue. Mr. Ayer agrees that if I am to understand a symbol, I must in some sense "know what it stands for." But this, he says, does not imply that anything is actually going on in my mind. It implies only that I have certain dispositions or capacities. Thus if I understand a sentence which I am uttering or hearing, I am capable of describing the situations which would make my sentence true (i.e. of substituting other equivalent sentences for the present one), and I am capable of recognizing such situations when and if they turn up. I am *capable* of doing these things, but I am not actually doing anything now, over and above the uttering of—or listening to—the words themselves.

Likewise, when I talk intelligently (whether in public or in private), I certainly "know what I am saying." But this knowing again, accord-

ing to Mr. Ayer, is not a cognitive process or activity independent of the saying, and occurring alongside of it. If it were, it would itself involve the intelligent use of symbols; and then we should have an infinite regress, as we have seen already (p. 22). A similar difficulty would arise if we said that when I talk intelligently, I *intend* to make the noises I do make. For such intending, if regarded as a separate act, would itself be a piece of symbol-using. No; my knowing what I am saying is not this sort of thing at all, according to Mr. Ayer. It is not any sort of cognitive process concurrent with—still less preceding—my utterances. On the contrary, it is "something for which the criteria are to be sought in my *behaviour*. It consists in the way in which I formulate the signs, or in the tone in which I express myself, or in my being able subsequently to recall what I have said, or in the way in which I make my discourse hang together" (p. 22; my italics). I think that Mr. Ayer's use of the word "behaviour" here is a little odd. (Or perhaps the trouble is that Dr. Watson has spoilt the word for us.) Recalling what one has previously said is not what most people would call "behaviour." It is surely a cognitive act, if anything is. And what about "the way I make my discourse hang together"? This can be called behaviour if my discourse is a public one which I speak aloud, or write on paper or on a blackboard. But my discourse might be private, conducted entirely in auditory or kinaesthetic images; and yet I may make it hang together quite well. Would this be behaviour even in the most elastic and pre-Watsonian sense of the word?

Professor Ayer now considers another objection. It might be argued that even though no special sort of cognitive *act* is needed, yet we cannot explain the intelligent use of symbols without introducing the notion of a persisting cognitive *state*: the one which the present writer has called "familiarity with universals" (p. 23). I think that this, or something like this, is what any old-fashioned philosopher would say when first confronted with a theory such as Mr. Ayer's. He might not mind so very much about "acts." But he *would* want to say that in order to use symbols with understanding, it is not enough to have dispositions of various kinds, nor yet to be actually behaving in various ways, nor both together: one must be actually *aware* of something. And this something, it would be said, is certainly not just the symbols themselves, not even if they are mental images; it is what is variously called a universal, or a concept or an abstract idea—or a set of those, as the case may be. It would further be said that Mr. Ayer's adverb "intelligently" covers two different things which he has not distinguished—namely skill on the one hand, and understanding on the other. One may use words or other symbols skilfully, but this (it would be said) is not the same as using them with understanding. The two things may go together.

They certainly do in Mr. Ayer himself; perhaps that is why it has not occurred to him to distinguish them! But they do not always go together. One may use words very clumsily, with very little dexterity, as most of us frequently do; and yet one may be using them with understanding. And if one does, it is because one "has one's eye on the object," as we say; that is, because the concepts which the words refer to are actually before one's mind. On the other hand, a man may talk or write very skilfully without "having his eye on the object" at all, though he may have had his eye on it long ago, when his skill in word-concatenation was being acquired.

These are the objections which Mr. Ayer has to meet. Let us now consider his reply to them. He is quite willing to let people talk about "familiarity with universals" if they like. Since class-symbols do have a meaning, we may if we please introduce the word "universal" as a way of referring indefinitely to what they mean (p. 23 *fin.*). For example, it is a fact that some things are yellow; so we can say, if we like, that there is a universal called yellowness. The objection to this way of speaking, in Mr. Ayer's view, is not that it is wrong, but that it is unilluminating. "We do not in any way *explain* the fact that some things are yellow by saying that they are instances of the universal 'yellow.' . . . We merely re-state it in a more mystifying way" (p. 24, my italics). Again, "it is not *because* I am familiar with the universal 'manhood' that I am able to think, or talk intelligently, about men. My familiarity with this universal just consists in the fact that I am able to use the word 'man' correctly" (*ibid.*, my italics). And this ability in turn consists partly in being able to combine the word with other words in accordance with the conventional rules for its use; and partly in being able to apply the word to the appropriate objects when and if I observe them—in other words, in "being able to recognize a man when I see one."

Now what does Mr. Ayer mean by the words "explain" and "because" which I have italicized? What is he complaining of when he says that this talk about universals such as "yellowness" does not explain the fact that some things are yellow, but merely restates it in a more mystifying way; and likewise that this talk about being familiar with universals does not explain the intelligent use of symbols? Is he asking for a *causal* explanation of these two things? But of course that is not what these philosophers are offering him. They are offering him a philosophical analysis of the proposition "some things are yellow," and of the proposition "the symbol 'yellow' is being used intelligently." Mr. Ayer complains that they have merely re-stated the facts in a more mystifying way. A cynic might comment that this is just what philosophical analysis consists in ("He told us what everybody knew in words that nobody could

understand"). Of course the cynic would not be altogether right. But I am afraid we must admit that words like "clear" and "illuminating," with their contraries "obscure" and "mystifying", have something *relative* in their meaning. What is clarifying for one philosopher may perfectly well be mystifying for another. What you find mystifying depends on what you find *un*mystifying to start with. To Mr. Ayer the fact that we use symbols meaningfully is not at all mysterious, or not much. So when other people try to re-describe this fact in quite a different terminology—e.g. by talking about awareness of universals—they seem to him to be substituting a mystery for something which was initially *un*mysterious. But with old-fashioned philosophers it is the other way round. To them, the existence of conceptual cognition—the conceiving of concepts, or universals or abstract ideas—does not appear mysterious, or not very; whereas the fact that we use noises, marks, etc., to "refer to" what we do not at the moment feel or see does appear very mysterious indeed. They therefore proceed to clarify what is, to them, more mysterious in terms of what is, to them, less so. They analyse symbolic reference in terms of awareness of universals. And it will not do for Mr. Ayer to reply that at any rate his starting point is more empirical than theirs. For it is an empirical fact that conceptual cognition occurs, however you analyse it; just as it is an empirical fact that the meaningful use of symbols occurs, however you analyse it.

If there is anything in this line of thought, it should be possible to show that the two analyses (Professor Ayer's and the traditional one) are not so different as they look. They look different because their starting-points really are different; what is initially mysterious to the one party is initially unmysterious to the other, and *vice versa*. But if both analyses were fully worked out, should they not meet in the middle? Neither of them, perhaps, has been fully worked out as yet. Still, it should be possible, even now, to see that they "converge" towards agreement despite differences in terminology and emphasis. Can this be seen? Perhaps it might be, if we reflected a little more on the key notion of Mr. Ayer's analysis, the notion of a disposition or capacity; and especially on the capacity for *recognizing*, e.g. our ability "to recognize a man when we see one."

The trouble with Mr. Ayer's account of the meaningful use of symbols—or rather the incompleteness of it—lies in this: the dispositions in which knowledge of the meaning of a symbol is to consist are, as it were, placed side by side, without any explanation of the relations between them. My knowledge of the meaning of the word W consists of a number of *different* dispositions: the capacity to recognize objects of which W is (for me) the name; the capacity

to combine it with other words into sentences which make sense; to utter or to image other sentences equivalent to these, or entailed by them; the capacity to give a nominal definition of W, or at any rate to accept a good nominal definition offered by other people, and to reject a bad one; the capacity to produce images or pictures on paper which will "cash" that word so far as images and pictures can, and to correct them if they are inadequate; the capacity (with some words) to produce actual "real life" instances which cash the word, as I could do with the word "walk" and as a golfer could do with the phrase "mashie-shot"; the capacity to perform appropriate actions, both utterances and others, when an object of which W is for me the name is perceived and noticed by me. Not all these dispositions are indispensable, of course. I could know the meaning of the word "man" even if I had no visual imagery and could not draw pictures. But some of them, and I think a pretty large sub-group of them, must exist in me if I know the meaning of a word.

It will be seen that I have mentioned more dispositions than Mr. Ayer has; but I think he would accept my list, and very likely he would agree that it could be made still longer. Now the various acts to which these dispositions dispose us are just what old-fashioned philosophers would call "occurrent manifestations of our awareness of a universal"; and Mr. Ayer might agree to call them "occurrent manifestations of our knowledge of the meaning of a word." Where is the difference? It is this. The old-fashioned philosopher would say that one of those dispositions is fundamental and the others derivative. He would say that all the others *depend upon* the capacity to recognize instances. If we did not have this, we obviously could not produce the images, pictures, models or "real-life" instances, which cash the word in question; nor could we perform the intelligent actions which are appropriate in the presence of the object. For example, I could not intelligently open a door if I did not recognize that it was one. More important still, the capacity to combine the word W with other words into sentences, phrases, etc., which make sense, the capacity to produce other symbols equivalent to it, in short the capacity to operate with the word in the *absence* of perceived instances—all this likewise depends on the capacity to recognize instances when they are present. It is true that even though we were unable to recognize instances where present, we might still be able to combine W with other words *as if* we understood it, just as a parrot can. We might have been very well-drilled in the requisite talking habits (or writing habits!) and our neighbours might not be able at once to detect our deficiency. But for all that we should not then be talking with understanding, and the word W would not be for us a symbol, but only a noise combinable with other noises which are.

Now Mr. Ayer has not himself said that the disposition to recognize instances is fundamental, and the other dispositions derivative. But I do not see why he should not. And if he did, he would have gone quite a long way to meet the "believers in universals"; so long as the universals they believe in are merely the mild and harmless *universalia in rebus* and not the transcendent universals of the Platonists.

He would have gone still further if he could be persuaded to modify his excessively Behaviouristic account of recognition itself ("The criteria for my recognizing an object lie wholly in my behaviour," p. 25). It is true that if I wish to discover whether *someone else* recognizes a door when he sees one, I shall have to examine his behaviour, including his utterances. But is this what I do when I wish to discover whether I myself am recognizing something? Do I observe the physical actions I am doing and the words I am uttering, and conclude "Oh, well, then it seems that I must be recognizing this object"? Surely not. And if I did, there would be a vicious infinite regress. For if it were a case of applying "criteria," must I not *recognize* that my own behaviour and utterances are of the sort which the criteria prescribe? Sooner or later we must come back to an act, or occurrence, which is not merely behaviour, but is irreducibly cognitive: an act of *noticing* or *becoming aware*—I dare not say "knowing"—that something is of a familiar sort, however the phrase "of a sort" is to be analysed. Then why not admit straight off that I just *notice* what sort of thing the particular object is, and that this is precisely what recognizing amounts to? It may be that the noticing never exists without expressing itself in some kind of behaviour or some kind of symbol-production, public or private. But it does exist nevertheless, and is something irreducibly cognitive. Moreover, it is something which *occurs* and has a data; it is not a disposition, but is the occurrent manifestation of one. Would Mr. Ayer feel happier if I called it an act of *verifying*, instead of recognizing? I will if he likes. To recognize something as being ϕ is nothing more nor less than verifying $\exists x \phi x$. Would he want to maintain that even verifying is to be analysed in a purely Behaviouristic way? I cannot believe that he would. Surely verifying is an irreducibly cognitive act if anything is?

But I should like to ask one further concession of him, which he may be more reluctant to make. He has assumed, I think, that at any given moment a disposition is either fully actualized, or else not actualized at all (i.e. entirely latent). It appears to me, on the contrary, that there are degrees of actualization. As some people have put it, a disposition may be *sub*-activated. It may manifest itself by influencing the course of our utterances or imagings or actions, although the conditions for its complete actualization are

not at the moment fulfilled. My capacity to recognize a man if I see one is not *fully* actualized until I do see one. Nevertheless, it does seem to exercise some control over the way I use the word "man" in absence. It exercises a kind of guidance—both positive and inhibitory —upon the way I combine this word with other words, upon my choice of equivalent words if demanded, and upon my acceptance or rejection of equivalents offered by others; when and so far as it does so, I am said—metaphorically—to be talking "with my eye on the object," or to know what I am talking about, but otherwise not. And finally it exercises a control or guidance upon my production of images or pictures on paper which partially "cash" the word. This, or something like this, is what is meant by saying that the capacity to recognize instances is sub-activated—though not completely actualized—when one uses a word in absence but with understanding. (It is the point which Hume made in his own way when he explained how the members of a class may be "present to the mind in power" even though not present in fact, and how we may avoid talking nonsense in the uncashed use of words which stand for very complex ideas.*) I should like to hope that Mr. Ayer could be induced to accept this point also. If he did, he would *almost* have met the "believers in universals" half-way.

[1] *Treatise*, Book I, part i, section 7, of "Abstract Ideas" (Selby-Bigge pp. 20, 23. Everyman, pp. 28, 31.)

ON THE FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATION OF FINITE CLASSICAL ARITHMETIC

G. J. WHITROW, M.A., D.PHIL.

" 'TELL me, Protagoras,' he said, 'does a single grain of millet or the ten-thousandth part of a grain make any sound when it falls?' And when Protagoras said it did not, 'Then,' asked Zeno, 'does a bushel of millet make any sound when it falls or not?' Protagoras answered that it did, whereupon Zeno replied, 'But surely there is some ratio between a bushel of millet and a single grain or even the ten-thousandth part of a grain'; and when this was admitted, 'But then surely,' Zeno said, 'the ratios of the corresponding sounds to each other will be the same: for as the bodies which make the sounds are to one another, so will the sounds be to one another. And if this is so, and if the bushel of millet makes a sound, then the single grain of millet and the ten-thousandth part of a grain will make a sound.' This was the way Zeno used to put his questions"[1]

Despite the vast literature which has been devoted to the study and elucidation of Zeno's paradoxes, that of the millet seed appears to have been unduly neglected. Aristotle[2] dismissed the matter with the brief comment, "Therefore Zeno's argument is not true, for there is no part of a grain of millet that does not make a sound: for there is no reason why any such part should not in any length of time fail to move the air that the whole bushel moves in falling." More recently, the author of the article "Zeno of Elea," in the thirteenth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, remarked, "It is indeed difficult to understand how so acute a thinker . . . should neglect the imperfection of the organs of sense."

It is notorious that the paradoxes of Zeno have stubbornly defied all attempts at resolution. Both the tantalizing subtlety of the arguments and the profound importance of the problems raised have endowed these paradoxes with a phoenix-like character. The most famous, of course, are those concerning motion, in particular "Achilles and the Tortoise." They introduce the difficult concept of the infinite process. The "Millet Seed," however, does not involve this concept. For this reason most critics appear to be unaware of its subtlety and significance.

It seems to me that the core of this typical "threshold" paradox concerns the associated problems of "creation" and of "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts." Consequently, I believe that Zeno intended that his argument should be interpreted as follows.

[1] Simplicius, 1108. 18.

[2] Aristotle, *Physics*, H5,250 a19.

Logically, a non-zero magnitude cannot be generated by combining a finite number of zero magnitudes, "*ex nihilo nihil fit.*" Experientially, however, it appears that an audible sound can be produced by the combined effect of a finite number of inaudible sounds; in other words, "something" is produced by a *finite* set of "nothings." Thus there would appear to be a complete contradiction between reason and experience.

If I am right in this interpretation, the criticisms advanced by Aristotle and by the author of the article in the Encyclopaedia are beside the point. Their refutations are successful only against the shallower aspects of the paradox, for it can be regarded as existing at various "levels." Thus, Aristotle considered only the "dynamical level." Similarly, the author of the article in the Encyclopaedia considered only the "acoustic level." At these levels the paradox is trivial and of no interest. It becomes much more interesting and difficult at the "arithmetical level" considered by Zeno.

At this level, as I have already remarked, the problem concerns the creation of "something" out of a finite set of "nothings." The "sum" of a finite number of inaudible sounds is an audible sound, so that in this case the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The paradox at this level is thus clearly associated with the concept of "addition."

In a recent article[1] on "Mathematics and Tautology," I have re-examined the celebrated proposition discussed by Kant, that $7 + 5 = 12$. J. S. Mill believed that this statement is an empirical law of Nature. On the other hand, the logical positivists maintain that it is analytic; so that the contrary proposition, that seven plus five is not equal to twelve, would be self-contradictory. As I have shown, *in our present state of dubiety concerning the foundations of arithmetic*[2] this point of view is indisputable only if "twelve" is regarded merely as another *name* for "seven plus five"; but from this point of view mathematics is no more than a potentially endless catalogue of synonyms. Once we pass beyond this stage and attribute *meanings* to the various symbols, the character of the proposition becomes less obviously tautological.

What do we mean by "addition"? *What is the scope of the laws of finite arithmetic?* Until the nineteenth century it was assumed that there is only one logically possible system of geometry and one logically possible system of arithmetic and algebra. We now believe that both these assumptions were false. The existence of non-Euclidean geometries has long been well known. The existence of different types of arithmetic and algebra has become familiar only recently with the advent of quantum mechanics. In classical arith-

[1] Whitrow, *Polemic* (to appear).

[2] Cf. Weyl, *Am. Math. Monthly*, January 1946.

metic and algebra, we know that the sum of a finite number of objects is independent of the order of counting; and, in general, the act of counting is non-cyclic, so that for example an equation of the type,

$$a + a + a + \ldots + a = a,$$

where there is some definite number (greater than one) of a's on the right-hand side, is possible only if a is zero. Moreover, if a is zero, the equation *must* be satisfied.

Now, consider the bushel of falling millet seeds. Let the sound which is heard when one falls be denoted by a, the sound when two fall by $a + a$, and so on. Then we have

$$\begin{aligned} a + a &= a, \\ a + a + a &= a, \\ \ldots & \ldots \end{aligned}$$

and so on, until finally we have for some definite number of additions,

$$a + a + a + \ldots + a > a.$$

The propositions, $a + a = a$, *etc.*, would appear to imply that a is zero. The proposition

$$a + a + a + \ldots + a > a,$$

would appear to be possible only if a is not zero. Hence, we get a contradiction or paradox, which can be resolved only by assuming that, in the present context, the symbols "a" and "$+$" do not obey the laws of classical arithmetic.

The lesson of Zeno's "Millet Seed" is now evident: *the laws of classical finite arithmetic are not appropriate to all objects of thought*; for in considering the auditory effect of dropping millet seeds, for example, it is clear that they do not apply. The total effect is greater than the classical arithmetic sum of the separate effects due to the dropping of each seed. We thus see that, so far from being one of the most trivial of Zeno's paradoxes, the "Millet Seed" is in fact one of the most fruitful; for it directs our attention to the fundamental problems of the meaning of the concept of addition, of the construction of various types of addition, and of discovering which types apply to which sets of objects. For example, granted, for the sake of argument, that $7 + 5 = 12$, irrespective of whether this proposition is analytic or synthetic, *a priori* or *a posteriori*, to what class of "objects" does it apply?

Consideration of Zeno's paradox suggests that the process of counting is intimately associated with the concept of time. If the bushel of millet seed is allowed to drop so that each seed falls at a different instant, and if these instants are not too close together, then no sound will be heard. Hence, in this case there will be no paradox and

no apparent violation of the laws of classical arithmetic. Hamilton,[1] Helmholtz,[2] and Brouwer[3] have all stressed the intimate relation between our construction of the system of integers and our intuition of time. As far as I know, none of them appear to have considered the relation between the time-factor and the *application* of arithmetic to objects. The "Millet Seed" suggests that the classical process of counting applies only to objects considered *sub specie aeternitatis*. Time does not enter into the *application* of classical arithmetic any more than into that of geometry. At first sight this statement may seem paradoxical. The addition process appears to take place in time. Nevertheless, ordinary counting has the characteristic property of a purely spatial concept; for, unlike the flow of time, it is reversible, so that the sum of a set of objects is independent of the *order* of counting. Moreover, it is the same yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow. Pegasus, Bucephalus and Incitatus[4] *are* three, although the first is mythical and the other two never co-existed. In general, classical arithmetic appears to apply to objects considered *sub specie aeternitatis*. However, even in this case there may be exceptions. For example, Whitehead[5] has drawn attention to a significant legend of the Council of Nicea. "When the bishops took their places upon the thrones they were 318; when they rose up to be called over, it appeared that they were 319; so that they never could make the number come right, and whenever they approached the last of the series he immediately turned into the likeness of his next neighbour." To bishops of this type it is clear that the classical process of counting does not apply; and as Whitehead has pointed out, "Whatever may be the historical worth of this story, it may safely be said that it cannot be disproved by deductive reasoning from the premisses of abstract logic," for "it is perfectly possible to imagine a universe in which any act of counting by a being in it annihilated some members of the class counted during the time and only during the time of its continuance."

The problem of applying classical arithmetic becomes more difficult when we turn from the summation of objects, regarded *sub specie aeternitatis*, to the summation of processes. In one sense, we can regard processes as similar to the three horses, but this is not the sense in which we usually want to regard them. Instead, we often require the sum of a set of processes to be equivalent to the resultant process. Thus, for example, the sum of the inaudible sounds produced by the falling seeds separately should be equivalent to the

[1] Hamilton, *Dublin Transactions*, XVII, II (1835).
[2] Helmholtz, "Von Zahlen und Messen" (Leipzig, 1887).
[3] Brouwer, *Bull. Am. Math. Soc.*, XX (1913).
[4] Suetonius, "Lives of the Caesars," IV, 55.
[5] Whitehead, "Mathematics," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 13th Edition.

sound produced by the bushel. Now, if the seeds fall separately at widely spaced epochs the resultant sound will be inaudible; on the other hand, it will be audible if the seeds fall simultaneously. Hence, in this case the sum of the individual processes of sound-production depends on the time-factor; and, because of this dependence, the addition of processes can, and in this case does, differ from the type of addition on which classical arithmetic is based.

Numbers can be considered either as static concepts or as processes.[1] In applying mathematics to physical phenomena, it is often necessary to consider numbers from the latter point of view. In this case, the ideas of addition and multiplication depend on the time-factor. Thus, if a number of processes occur simultaneously, it is often convenient to regard the resultant process as their "sum." If a number of processes occur consecutively, the resultant process is often regarded as their "product." The arithmetic and algebra of processes is not unique, and in particular can differ from arithmetic and algebra. For example, multiplication can be non-commutative, so that $b \times a$ is not the same as $a \times b$. Indeed, this feature characterized the first non-classical algebra, that of quaternions, invented by Hamilton in 1843. He discovered that, in the algebra of rotations about three mutually perpendicular axes in space, multiplication is non-commutative. Similarly, non-commutative addition can be illustrated by vector displacements in non-Euclidean space. In the case of those simultaneous processes the resultant of which is interpreted as their sum, addition is commutative; but, as the "Millet Seed" indicates, the classical rule,

$$0 + 0 + 0 + \ldots + 0 = 0,$$

is not always valid.

The situation arising when the simultaneous addition of a *finite* number, $n > n_0$, of zero magnitudes gives rise to a non-zero magnitude is a typical "threshold" phenomenon. Throughout the history both of natural science and of philosophy, men have continually sought to explain away the apparent creation of "something" out of "nothing." "There is nothing new under the sun" is the theme of most philosophers. Similarly, men of science are for ever seeking principles of permanence beneath the apparent flux of phenomena. Thus, they have evolved one conservation theorem after another. Nevertheless, knowledge as it grows continually overflows the moulds in which men seek to confine and shape it. The law of the conservation of energy, for example, in its classical dynamical form is valid only in conservative fields of force; in a more general form it was found necessary to include thermodynamic phenomena; and with the advent of Einstein's theory of relativity it was found neces-

[1] Whitrow, *op. cit.*

sary to include inertial mass. To-day the law can be retained in *all* known atomic processes only if the existence of the neutrino is postulated; so far, this appears to be a purely *ad hoc* concept with no observable properties. Similarly, in chemistry the indestructible atom of Dalton has had to be replaced by the radio-active atom of Rutherford; and in biology the changeless species of Linnaeus has been discarded for the changing species of Darwin and Mendel.

To the hyper-rational mind, "creation" appears to be inexplicable. Thus Zeno presumably resolved the paradox of the millet seed by denying the reality of the world of the senses. On the other hand, the followers of Bergson can resolve the paradox by rejecting the whole process of analysis, regarding each phenomenon as indivisible. Indeed, for them the paradox need never arise. But for men of science, who follow neither Zeno nor Bergson, the paradox is not resolved. Instead, we are made to realize the limitations of finite classical arithmetic.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

WITH the new development of physical science the problem of the revision of traditional epistemology becomes ever more acute. In an essay composed with great perspicacity Professor Luigi Scaravelli[1] poses the question whether the *Critique of Pure Reason*, based as it is on Newtonian physics and on the three-dimensional conception of space, is consistent with the views of the physics of relativity and quanta. Relativity, as Cassirer had already shown, offers much smaller difficulties to an attempt at reconciliation than does the quantum theory, which runs counter to the idea of the continuity of space-time schemes.

Scaravelli sees a possibility of reconciling the latter with the *Critique of Pure Reason*, showing that in both the idea of reality does not depend on the intuition of space-time, but inheres directly in sensation, as a "degree of intensity" incapable of being reduced to extension. And this degree is compatible with the discontinuous nature of the quanta. The thesis is disputable, but it is developed with a penetrating discussion of the Kantian texts. From the comparison of these there emerges much interesting information on the nature of the sensible consciousness according to Kant, which enriches the excessively schematic notion of sensation as a mere "datum," beyond the possibility of investigation, which is the point where Kant's commentators generally call a halt.

Francesco Albergamo traces the history of the logic of mathematics from the Greeks to our own days,[2] in an effort to corroborate Croce's thesis on the practical rather than theoretical character of these studies. The ancient and medieval part of this history is treated very briefly; but the author expatiates widely on the modern part from Kant to Poincaré and Croce. Whoever accepts the purely conventional character of mathematics and of the conception of nature derived therefrom may find in Albergamo's book a copious review of all the arguments that have been used in support of this thesis in the course of history. However, the reading of it gives the impression that the thesis itself is too hasty and that it skates rapidly over too many problems which have had and still have a profound speculative interest and which reveal the inability of pragmatism to give an adequate representation of the mathematical procedure.

From an analogous point of view, but with more direct scientific experience, a chemist, Michele Giua,[3] has written a history of science. In an introductory section the relationship between the history of science and epistemology is studied; the historical investigation that follows stresses chiefly three names—Galileo, Boyle, and Planck, representing for the author three decisive turnings in the evolution of scientific thought.

The relationship between the individual and the mass—and hence between the two forms of life and civilization based on these two terms—is one of the crucial problems of our age. Bandini, who had attacked it a few years ago in a volume of polemic intent directed against the degeneration of our present-day

[1] L. Scaravelli, *Saggio sulla categoria kantiana della realtà*, Florence, Le Monnier, 1947, p. 194.
[2] F. Albergamo, *Storia della logica delle scienze esatte*, Bari, Laterza, 1947, p. 359.
[3] M. Giua, *Storia delle scienze ed epistemologia*, Turin, Chi antore, 1945, p. 297.

mechanical civilization, returns to it now with a volume of more constructive intention.[1] He favours the individualistic and liberal conception, but not dissociated from social exigencies, which ought to occupy a subordinate position if man is not to be degraded to an animal existence.

In this book, too, some polemical points are developed very effectively. For example, Bandini gives the name of "privatism" to a tendency of the modern man which, while it is antithetic to prevailing socialism, is at the same time a consequence of it. "Privatism," he says, "is a necessary product of the forms of life that are peculiar to that type of economistic civilization which is one of our terms. It is closely linked with what could be referred to as the "giantism" of our civilization. In the over-large modern city, in the too distant and too complex civic administration, in the centralizing and universally providing state, the individual finds himself excluded from those forms of public activity to which he is nevertheless called by spontaneous tendencies and innate interests of the human mind." And he therefore confines himself to his own concerns, in the narrow circle of his private interests, and becomes indifferent to public affairs.

To complete the work on Romanticism published in 1943 my volume on Hegel now sees the light. It contains a detailed critical exposition of the whole Hegelian system, and an historical review of the literature concerning Hegel.[2]

[1] L. Bandini, *Uomo e Valore*, Turin, Einaudi, 1942; *Dalla Massa all' individuo*, Florence, Le Monnier, 1947.
[2] G. de Ruggiero, *Hegel*, Bari, Laterza, 1948, p. 309.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by Beatrice Allen.)

NEW BOOKS

The Philosophy of David Hume. By NORMAN KEMP SMITH. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1941. Pp. xxiv, 568. Price 25s.)

The lateness of this notice of so important a work is unfortunate. The task of reviewing it was committed at the time of publication to someone who has been prevented by very onerous duties from carrying it out. Having taken over the task at short notice, I have not had the opportunity of doing justice to the book in its rich detail. I shall therefore at the outset do it justice in general terms by declaring it to be, so far as I am competent to judge, the most careful and illuminating exposition of Hume's philosophy that has so far appeared, in any language. Perhaps a Scot was required to understand a Scot, though the Scotsmen before Professor Kemp Smith have all failed. If the contentions of the book are accepted—and in my view they should be, on the whole—our text-books will have to be revised; in any case, every future expositor will be very negligent if he does not reckon with this radical re-orientation and re-examination of Hume's philosophical writings. Hume's *Treatise* is a really difficult work, abounding in both subtleties and inconsistencies, and tantalizing because the general merit of it requires us to make something of these. What we have been wanting is a point of view from which Hume's precocious masterpiece becomes, whether acceptable or no, humanly intelligible; and such a point of view has now been given to us. The masterpiece has not hitherto been dealt with well. It has been praised too much with a praise that is facile because resting on little but agreement with its method and apparent conclusions; and it has been belaboured too much with a criticism that is tiresome because inspired by antipathy. Professor Kemp Smith has contented himself with the basic task of trying to see what Hume really meant. When he allows himself a judgment, it is a piece of immanent criticism only.

The outstanding, because unusual, virtue of his patient study is that it seeks to interpret Hume's mind by taking the *Treatise* as a whole, and by considering the two *Enquiries* along with it. Even the tedious Book II of the earliest work, and the weak *Dissertation on the Passions*, are kept in view. By nothing less than all these must the interpretation be tested. Hitherto Hume has been read most often in Book I only of the *Treatise*, and in consequence he has been represented as starting from Locke's *Essay*, and as doing little more than trying, with some help from Berkeley, to make Locke's conclusions more consistent with his presuppositions and methods. The resultant convention has been to depict him as first and foremost an epistemologist, who revelled, and loved to revel, in the negations of an almost complete scepticism. That is certainly a very one-sided and distorting picture. The distinctive general contention of this new study of Hume is that that approach is false in history and falsifying in exposition. Hume, we are now told, began his intellectual struggles—for such they were, not pastimes—on the problems of ethics, so that Books II and III are to be regarded as earlier in conception, and to some extent in execution, than Book I. Further, he pursued his ethical thinking originally and chiefly under the influence of Hutcheson. In the process he became interested in the epistemological problems handled in Locke's seminal *Essay*, and detected the possibility of applying in this field the same Hutchesonian principle that had inspired his ethics. This principle is that "reason" is the servant of feeling. As widened by Hume, it means that not

only our beliefs in values but also our most general beliefs in matters of fact are not determined cognitively. The general gist of Book I of the *Treatise*, then, is not that belief in external material things, and belief in their being causally connected, are unevidenced and are therefore to be philosophically rejected, but that, insusceptible though they are of either logical or empirical proof, they are inexpugnable functions of our nature and indispensable for all our living. Hume's indictment is not of those beliefs, but of the sort of philosophical thinking that claims to rationalize them. That is the general point of view offered to us by Professor Kemp Smith.

That Hume regarded himself primarily as a moral philosopher, indeed as a practical moralist as well, is an impression that grows if we forget the traditional character, move through the full circuit of his writings, and live with him in his letters. It is well-known that he counted his *Principles of Morals* as his best work—"incomparably the best" is his own expression—but the significance of this judgment has rarely been explored. Whether his view of religion be right or wrong, his frequent attacks upon it, in reasoned argument or in disparaging asides, are clearly motivated by the desire to defend the autonomy of morality: he will not have simple human decencies suspended in the name of anything alleged to be better than our natural sympathies as educated by experience and reflection. There is at least as much of the moralist as of the theorist in his political inquiries, and as much of the moralist as of the artist in his *Essays* and his *History*. In his own restrained, unapostolic way—fashionably shunning "enthusiasm"—he had a genuine concern about the social tendencies of his time, and wrote not simply to clarify ideas for clarification's sake, with the integrity of the thinker, but in addition to vindicate and commend, with the integrity of the moralist, a broad humanitarian outlook and practice. At any rate, that is the cumulative impression which I get from reading Hume as a whole. Professor Kemp Smith has much the same impression. But it has led him, as it had not led me (lacking his acumen), into a re-examination of Hume's epistemology. What launched him on this extraordinarily instructive line of research was his recognition of the primacy of the influence of Hutcheson. The fruitfulness of this *ben trovato* is displayed convincingly.

The evidence of the strength and extent of Hutcheson's influence is, of course, circumstantial, and therefore cannot be effectively summarized here; it must be collected piece by piece from a hundred scattered places in the book, and then be brought together. The interest of it goes beyond the bare establishment of an historical link to the giving of a clue to the exposition of Hume in general and in detail. Professor Kemp Smith rightly allows that his broad thesis stand or falls according as it does or does not remove, or otherwise illuminate, some of the problems of exegesis which have often been slurred over, or even adduced as proofs that Hume was too superficial to be taken seriously. No man handling a large realm of discourse at the philosophical level can achieve perfect consistency, but there are apparent inconsistencies in Hume that call for an explanation less obvious than that of human infallibility, and more adequate than that of incompetence, since Hume proves his competence, within the limits of his times, on page after page of all his writings. Why, for example, does he think biologically, in terms of an original complexity of instinct in us, in Book III of the *Treatise* (his ethics), and yet in Book I think like a mechanist, in terms of the external association of simple perceptions? Why does he pulverize the idea of an abiding self in Book I, and frankly assume and appeal to it in Book II? What is his purpose in exposing the flaws in the current arguments for a really external world, and for real causal connections within it, while yet claiming the right to

affirm that world and its network of causes and effects as realities? What are we to make of his apparent explaining away of the idea of necessary connection among matters of fact in terms of a process of association that is explicitly said to involve causal determination? Professor Kemp Smith candidly supposes that these, and other difficulties to which he draws attention, demand explanation, and explanation that is fair both to Hume's intentions and to his philosophical acuteness; and he finds the explanation by detecting the influence of Hutcheson alongside, and in certain respects persisting beyond, that of Locke and Newton. From Locke, Hume took over the principle that all ideas can be traced back to simple impressions; from Newton he caught up the notion of gravitation or attraction, and generalized it, under the form of association, into a principle of comprehensive philosophical applicability; but before he took these two principles in his hand he had already thought out his ethics under the inspiration of Hutcheson, following the latter's view that moral (and aesthetic) beliefs are not affairs of rational insight, but spring from our inherited emotional constitution—and are none the worse for that. Given these three lines of influence instead of one or two, we are better equipped to understand the divagations, and the disparities of assumption and method, that face us in Hume's works; and given the primacy of Hutcheson's influence, we have a special clue to the reasons for some of Hume's second thoughts in the appendix to the *Treatise* and in the two *Enquiries*—it helps us, for instance, to see why his ethics emerged in the revision virtually unchanged.

I have dwelt on these most general contentions of the book because they have at least a liberating value. They free us from reading Hume through the old spectacles, and it is time anyhow that these were changed. On the detail of the book I cannot, because of haste, be expansive, though it is so full that even without haste the consideration of it would not be adequate within the limits of a review. Virtually every topic of Hume's epistemology and ethics is closely and luminously scrutinized. His dissection of the passions, his analysis and classification and grounding of the virtues, his unsatisfying views of space and time, the relation of the *Treatise* to the *Enquiries*, are all examined with unusually helpful results. There is an excellent vindication of the charge against Hume that he was a panderer in his revisions, accommodating his views to the prejudices of the reading public, as though his confession of "love of literary fame, my ruling passion," had to be understood with the help of nothing but a dictionary; and there is a perfect answer to the occasionally expressed opinion that on reaching his full powers Hume "deserted philosophy" for politics and history. Long notes printed as appendices to their relevant chapters are full of instruction on particular points; the shorter footnotes, when they are more than references, are littered with valuable information and comments.

For the rest, it will probably be useful to give Professor Kemp Smith's interpretation of the supposedly familiar Book I of the *Treatise*. Every reader will, I imagine, rise from his chapters with the suspicion that that Book has not been familiar to us at all. A new light is made to play upon it. Its inconsistencies are uncovered amply enough, in particular those faults of exposition with which Hume gives us every excuse for misunderstanding him; but these are explained in terms of the main tendencies of his thought, the incompatible influences to which he was responding. The following bare summary of the resultant cleansed account of his epistemological doctrine is all that I can give. It will convey no idea of the wealth of detailed analysis and sympathetic insight with which that account is constructed and evidenced.

Book I of the *Treatise* deals with belief, this term being used by Hume in the special sense of assurance of matters of fact as distinguished from know-

ledge in the Lockian sense of apprehension of the necessary connections of ideas. There are two general beliefs, one in a continuing independent material realm, the other in causal connections within this realm. Hume's investigation is not really with the question whether these are valid or no. We are natively realistic, and cannot by any amount of philosophizing reason ourselves out of that attitude. Philosophy can correct that native realism at one point only, namely, by proving that the immediate objects of awareness are not extra-mental but subjective entities, "ideas" in Locke's sense. The proof, however, itself proceeds on our native realistic assumption, which alone set the current philosophical problem and alone gave meaning to it, the problem of how from momentary subjective objects we can validly infer an abiding external order. Hume's answer is, on his "sceptical" side, that we cannot; on his positive side, that we have no need to do so, since the two beliefs will hold their ground against all logic, being inevitable in operation and necessary for both thought and practice. The first thing philosophy can do is to make this position clear. Hume is here applying in a new sphere the Hutchesonian principle which he has applied in his ethics, namely, that our basic beliefs (which on a few occasions he unfortunately calls "reason") are determined for us—determined, he says, by "feeling," meaning antecedently to and independently of all rational insight. This is Hume's naturalism. Whether the beliefs are "valid" or no may be a question of terminology. We cannot get rid of them either in philosophy or in practice; and having a belief *means* holding its content as true.

The second thing philosophy can do is to analyse out the natural factors in those beliefs. Hume's work on belief in causality being the more distinctive, we may confine ourselves to that, though it should be remembered that the other belief is presupposed, causality being understood by him to be a relation between realities, not between ideas (except when these are being regarded as mental realities). His problem here, set by his acceptance of Locke's principle that all ideas are reducible to impressions, is to find the origin of the idea of causality, to trace out its natural history. It is not the idea of uniform but of necessary connection. No amount of sensory observation can discover any such connection, there being no more to be seen, on the side of the object, in many instances of a causal connection than in one. But in many instances the uniformity of the connection sets up an association in the mind, such that given one of its terms in impression the other term, in idea, springs up. In the resultant sense of inner compulsion, of determined transition, in this process, Hume finds the source of the idea of causality—in an impression of reflection, after having failed to find it in an impression of sensation. It may be objected that this makes causal inference not inference at all, not a passage of cognitive insight but simply a caused mental process; but that is precisely the conclusion which Hume was claiming to establish. It may be objected also that he is assuming a causal determination in the process on which he is resting the very idea of causality; but that is in order because the validity of the idea is not in question but only its origin, and also because the "natural belief" in causality operates as inevitably in our thinking about mental as of any other sort of process. His doctrine is, then, that uniformity generates a habit, and that habit generates a sense of forced transition of thought, the former being a pre-condition of the idea of causality, and the latter being its impressional source and therefore its meaning, *constituting* it. The argument is not, as is commonly supposed, one in which Hume is denying causal agency, for that, he holds, it is impossible to do (except in mere words). What he is denying is causal *inference*. In what is so called, the mind is not intuiting anything, but is simply working according to its own original causal nature. The idea of

causality has not a logical ground; it has a cause; and Hume has given what he regards as the manifest cause, refraining on principle from seeking or inventing an occult one.

The analysis is not yet complete. Habit or association would account for nothing more than expectation: having experienced A and B frequently together, the re-occurrence of A would lead us to expect B. But the fact to be causally accounted for is *belief* in B. To explain this, Hume brings in his view of belief as a peculiar kind of liveliness that can be attached to ideal contents but belongs originally to impressions. Following the secondary mechanistic (Newtonian) line of his thinking, he declares that the liveliness original to impressions is naturally communicated, like motion from one body to another on impact, to any idea firmly associated with it. His deeper view, however, Hutchesonian in spirit, is that belief is an *attitude*, and an outward-facing one, spontaneously projective or realistic, and under this view he came later to transfer his emphasis from the mechanistic notion of communication of liveliness to the ultimate naturalness of *belief* in causality as a complex attitude which we are born to have and use. He holds to a similar original complexity in the realistic belief that accompanies all sensation, for sensation taken strictly is only, for him as for Locke, an immediate *awareness* of subjective impressions.

In this sustained insistence—in his mechanistic as in his biological moods—that all our assurance about matters of fact is not evidenced apprehension but natively prompted belief, Hume was drawing tightly the limits of reason. Yet he regarded himself as a sceptic in only a very modified sense. For him dogmatists and sceptics alike assume that belief without reasons is to be rejected. He distinguishes himself from both by denying that assumption. Reason has its critical function in the logical purging of particular beliefs, but it is within the sphere of natural belief that it rightly operates. It cannot either reject the natural beliefs in their generality, or go altogether beyond them without losing the contact with reality which they alone can and do give. By believing in reason as sovereign in demonstrative thinking about the relations of ideas, and as a necessary auxiliary in thinking about matters of fact, Hume was not a sceptic—despite his unguarded statement (one of many) that custom is king.

Such, as clear as I can make it, is Professor Kemp Smith's interpretation of Hume's epistemology. If it is not clear, and suggests no novelty, the fault is mine. I only wish that I could have given a more adequate indication of the probing skill and the human and philosophical insight expressed in this remarkable fundamental study of Hume.

T. E. JESSOP

Critical Thinking. An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method. By MAX BLACK, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell University. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946. Pp. xv + 402. Price, $5.)

"Logic," says Professor Max Black in his Preface, "ought to be easy, interesting, and enjoyable." He has given us in this book an introduction to Logic which is all these things, without any sacrifice of rigour or seriousness. It is a real beginner's book, and no trouble is spared to familiarize the reader with the elementary concepts and processes of logic. It is also a book which the teacher of logic can enjoy on account of the skill displayed in the presentation of the material and in the devices used to elucidate or illustrate particular points. Each chapter is followed by a summary, a comprehension test of the modern intelligence test type, and exercises, many of them quite intriguing. It

seems to me altogether admirable; and one can only regret that the dollar situation must for the time being restrict its use in this country.

There are three parts, dealing with Deductive Logic, Language, and Induction and Scientific Method. In Part I Professor Black, rightly in my view, puts in the forefront conditional arguments, and arguments involving alternatives, exercising the student in them very thoroughly, before going on to a consideration of subject-predicate propositions and to categorical syllogisms. The whole of this is in a thoroughly modern spirit, but without any great departure from tradition. There is one surprising omission. Singular propositions do not come under the head of subject-predicate propositions as defined by Professor Black, and in consequence they are not treated anywhere in the book, either in the chapter on propositions or in that on syllogisms.

In the treatment of the syllogism, which is commendably brief, while the general rules of the syllogism are given, and used to show how to determine the validity of particular syllogisms, the whole discussion is closely linked with the use of Venn's diagrams, and there is no time wasted on a discussion of figures and moods, or of reduction of the other figures to the first figure. A general treatment of the theory of the syllogism, to determine all the possible valid moods in the various figures, is relegated to the appendix. The method of exposition in this appendix is not new, but is very neatly expressed, and occupies very little space. I do not know of any treatment elsewhere in print which is quite so neat. But the whole business belongs to the past rather than to the present.

In the system of classification adopted by many libraries Logic has the classmark BC. This is appropriate, in a subject where tradition counts for so much, and modern improvements are so discounted. If students of Arithmetic were still taught to add, multiply, and divide, using Roman numerals, carefully avoiding the technical improvements made possible by Arabic numerals, we should have in Arithmetic something similar to what we have in the traditional logic as still taught, and mathematics would suffer as much as logic has done, through want of a sufficiently large body of students trained in advanced processes.

If I were producing an elementary book on logic I should cut out the theory of the syllogism entirely, and deal with subject-predicate propositions on modern lines. This reform seems to me vastly overdue. Professor Black has not done this, but he has at least cut out a great deal of the purely B.C. stuff. And there is nothing in this part of his book, dealing with Deductive Logic, which would unfit a student to go ahead with the modern developments, as his next stage in the subject. That is something.

It should be noted that in this part Professor Black has concentrated on getting students technically efficient in handling deductive processes. He has not raised any of the wider issues, which might be called philosophical, such as the question of the nature of propositions, the relation of propositions to sentences, whether deduction can give new truth, and so on.

Part II, dealing with Language, has a similar practical purpose, to make students consciously aware of the variety of ways in which language is used and the nefarious purposes to which it can be put. As Professor Black says, he is not attempting "any systematic account of the nature of language and its relation to the objects of thought," but merely undertaking "the relatively modest task of developing just so much theory of language . . . as will be useful in criticizing the types of reasoning we are likely to encounter. This part of the book may therefore be regarded as a practical handbook *to the linguistic problems which arise in the criticism of reasoning.*" The italics are

Professor Black's; and I have quoted this passage because it expresses so well the general practical attitude which characterizes the book as a whole.

After a general chapter on the Uses of Language, this section has chapters on Ambiguity, on Definition, and on Assorted Fallacies. As throughout the book, there are admirable illustrations in the text taken from current books and periodicals, and a large variety of exercises.

Part III, entitled "Induction and Scientific Method," is interesting because of the way in which the subject is dealt with on various levels of accuracy and generality, starting with commonsense generalizations, and proceeding gradually to the more complicated procedures followed by the sciences. The chapter on Scientific Method contains half a dozen fairly long specimens of modern scientific investigation, with a discussion of the principles involved in them, the whole being rounded off by two chapters, one on Scientific Data and one on Scientific Theory. The treatment is fresh and stimulating, with none of the usual text-book taint, and always directed to getting students to understand what scientists are doing, and why they must do it if their generalizations are to be sound.

There are a number of small misprints—difficult to avoid in a book of this kind—but they can easily be corrected by an attentive reader. The book is rounded off by a glossary of technical terms explained with Professor Black's usual clarity and conciseness, a list of suggestions for further reading, and a satisfactory index. Paper, printing, general layout, and binding are excellent, and the book is pleasant to handle.

If students don't like Logic, it won't be Professor Black's fault.

L. J. RUSSELL.

Philosophy and Politics. By BERTRAND RUSSELL. Fourth National Book League Lecture. Delivered at Friends House, London, October 23, 1946. (Cambridge University Press, 1947. Pp. 29. Price 2s. 6d.)

Lord Russell distinguishes between philosophy, pursued as a study among other studies in the universities of the Western democratic world, and the "historically usual sense" of the word, the sense to which philosophy has "owed its social and political importance," in which it has "resulted from the attempt to produce a synthesis of religion and science, or, perhaps more exactly, to combine a doctrine as to the nature of the universe and man's place in it with a practical ethic inculcating what was considered the best way of life." The former view of it is a "very modern" view, and "even in the modern world exceptional." It is to the latter that Lord Russell directs his attention in this essay. In this sense "most philosophy has been a reaction against scepticism; it has arisen in ages when authority no longer sufficed to produce the necessary minimum of belief, so that nominally rational arguments had to be invented to secure the same result. This motive has led to a deep insincerity infecting most philosophy, ancient and modern" (8–10).

Plato and Hegel are the leading examples of this. "That Plato's Republic" —"this totalitarian tract"—"should have been admired on its political side by decent people" Lord Russell calls "the most astonishing example of literary snobbery in all history" (13). Plato's ideal of a static perfection, embodied in his theory of ideas, is "one which is now generally recognized to be inapplicable to human affairs." "Man needs for his happiness not only the enjoyment of this and that, but hope, and enterprise, and change." Among philosophers "the ideal of unending and unchanging bliss has been replaced by that of evolution," as part of "the substitution of dynamics for statics which began with Galileo, and which has increasingly affected all modern

thinking, whether scientific or political" (14). Science, it is true, offers only change, "a purposeless see-saw"; and philosophers have not been content with this, and "have professed to discover a formula of progress, showing that the world was becoming more and more to their liking" (15). The formula discovered, the public is adjured to join the winning side, and those who do not do so are condemned as "unphilosophic, unscientific, and out of date." "At the same time the winning side, for reasons which remain somewhat obscure, is represented as the side of virtue" (16). Hegel is the first fully to develop this point of view. His philosophy "is so odd that one would not have expected him to be able to get sane man to believe it, but he did. He set it out with so much obscurity that people thought it must be profound" (16). Four pages devoted to its analysis do not make it much less obscure, but that is perhaps not their intention.

Lord Russell proclaims his own sympathy with empiricism, which he equates to the scientific outlook, and which is "the only philosophy that affords a justification for democracy in its temper of mind" (20). Its affinity is with liberal, rather than with extreme democracy, and the bond is in the realization of the provisional character of hypotheses. The empirical mind will not wish to carry political action beyond demonstrable necessity, and will fight shy of inflicting present and certain pain for distant and speculative ends, whether these be put forward in the name of religious, of social, or of racial dogmatism. Order without authority may be taken as the motto both of science and of liberalism (23). It is commonly urged that in a war between liberals and fanatics, the fanatics are sure to win, but "all history, including that of the last few years," is against this belief (25). Dogmatic societies are weakened by the antagonisms they incur, and by the sacrifice of responsiveness to fact and reality that the dogmatic temper entails. "For these various reasons it is not to be expected that, in the long run, nations addicted to a dogmatic philosophy will have the advantage over those of a more empirical temper" (26). But in an atomic age the run may not be very long, and since "only through a revival of liberal tentativeness and tolerance can our world survive" (24), it is necessary that "in the nations which still uphold liberal beliefs, those beliefs should be whole-hearted and profound, not apologetic towards dogmatisms of the right or the left, but deeply persuaded of the value of liberty, scientific freedom, and mutual forbearance" (27).

It would thus seem that Lord Russell's final appeal is to faith in the nineteenth-century formula of science, liberty, and progress (cf. 11). Such a formula represents the things he finds to his liking in the world; he is satisfied of its social strength; and he asserts its moral superiority (26). It does not, however, seem to be on any very different plane of cogency from the philosophies that he rejects. It may also be felt that his implied picture of science cooing with considerate respect for other modes of feeling and thought, if it is meant to represent history and not ideal, is somewhat overdone. Science, and scientific liberalism too, have had their days of dogmatism. The scientific economics of Ricardo bears an equal responsibility with Hegelianism for Marxian dogmatism. It may be argued that the mark of our time is the supercession of religious revelation as the spiritual discipline of society by political apocalypticisms claiming scientific warranty for their truth, and that in the latters' lack of human balance lies the root of our political excesses. Anticlericalism was a vital element in the nineteenth-century liberal movement in Europe which failed, and so far as liberalism is reviving there, it seems to be growing off the religious root. In England, on the other hand, religious impulses made a vital contribution to liberalism—as to all shades of politics, without defining any—with the result not only of a more tolerant climate of

opinion, but of a more catholic outlook on human nature—exemplified in the relative absence of "block thinking" which Lord Russell notes (7)—which is not without its part in that power of English society to take a strain to which Lord Russell refers (26). It may be that Baal, in the shape of a proper scientific scepticism, can cast out Baal in the shape of pseudo-scientific social apocalypses. Many who welcome Lord Russell's conclusions will feel, however, that a more catholic faith is necessary; conceivably one less insulated from the historic religious discipline of Western society than his, and readier to acknowledge indebtedness to the philosophic tradition that he attacks.

W. D. HANDCOCK.

Philo. Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. By HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON. Two volumes. (Harvard University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1947. Pp. xvi + 462, xiv + 532. $10. 55s. net.)

In 1929 Dr. Wolfson published through the Harvard University Press under the title *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle* a work which, though still almost unknown in England, opened for medievalists a wide field for inquiry and consideration. It was followed naturally enough in 1934 by two volumes on *The Philosophy of Spinoza* for reasons which students of Crescas at any rate are not likely to under-value. But from the conjunction has taken rise the project of an undertaking so stupendous as to leave the admiring spectator at least in doubt if without a large amount of co-operation it can ever be accomplished. In a sense the new instalment of nearly one thousand pages mainly, though by no means exclusively, devoted to Philo of Alexandria might claim the right to stand by itself as an independent work: it certainly exceeds in bulk all contributions made to such studies over a long terms of years. But anyone who during those years has been reading and analysing Philo for himself without Dr. Wolfson's dominating conception in mind may, perhaps must, ask himself if the result can be fairly judged until at any rate one or even two more of the proposed sections of the building have been fitted into place, lest the criticisms which suggest themselves in respect of method and treatment should prove to have been otiose if not wholly illegitimate or irrelevant. For it must be borne in mind that very large claims are being made. After an almost breathless page of rhetorical questions we are told: "If the answer given by us is correct, then Philo will emerge from our study as a philosopher in the grand manner, not a mere dabbler in philosophy. He did have the power of intellect to be able to reject the theories of other philosophers and to strike out a new and hitherto unknown path for himself. He is to be given credit for originality in all the problems dealt with by him, for in this particular set of problems he was the originator of every fundamental concept which continued to be discussed thereafter throughout the history of philosophy. . . . It is most remarkable that without a group of official disciples his teachings became the most dominant influence in European philosophy for well-nigh seventeen centuries." We have already learnt: "That he was a good preacher—in fact, the founder of the art of preaching as we know it—and perhaps the greatest philosophic preacher that has ever lived, can be readily admitted," and may be allowed to take the decision *ad avisandum*. In regard to Philo's philosophical achievement Dr. Wolfson at once excites and disarms by setting out a list of authorities who take a view or series of views in which it appears under far less favourable guise; and it is in fact in the working out of his own thesis in thirteen chapters, leading up to the triumphant conclusion "What Is New in Philo?" that the real zest and stimulus of his long investiga-

tion is to be found. Incidentally it may be noted that the last section of most chapters gives under the caption "Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation" at least a foretaste of the use that is to be made of the results in the companion volumes as yet unborn. At present a comprehensive survey of them all hardly produces so optimistic an impression as might be desired, but that, as has been indicated, may be doing the writer injustice at this stage, even if we have to confess that the Palatium Veritatis if ever constructed on these lines seems likely to have a curious resemblance to a famous Jesuit's reconstitution of Noah's Ark seen through seventeenth-century eyes.

Dr. Wolfson's plan serves to maintain the reader's interest as the scheme of treatment is unrolled before him. In three preliminary chapters making nearly half of the first volume we are given under the headings "Hellenistic Judaism and Philo," "Handmaid of Scripture" and "Scriptural Presuppositions" a summary of the main problems and conditions of treatment as affected by what may be conceived to be Philo's reactions to the intellectual and physical environment and his own upbringing and natural predilections. In regard to some of these matters a writer must almost inevitably be indicating his own acceptance or rejection of the conclusions of others: in some he may be marking out a line of his own which may not be the less important because it is stated in such apparently unexciting dicta as the statement that Philo "uses terms borrowed from the mysteries in the same way as he uses terms borrowed from popular religion and from mythology, all of them because they were part of common speech." Again the depth and range of Philo's knowledge in various directions including his knowledge of Hebrew, the meaning, use and limitations of allegory, and the grounds for regarding him as "a critic of Stoicism and a reviser of Platonism" are all natural subjects for discussion upon which a good deal is found worth saying and is well said even if later on the reader may come to wonder if the correlation of "Chaldæans" and "Stoics" cannot be seriously overdone. These chapters lead on to discussions in the first volume of such topics as "God, the World of Ideas, and the Logos," "Creation and the Structure of the World," "The Immanent Logos, Laws of Nature, Miracles," "Souls, Angels, Immortality" and "Free Will"; and it is upon these that the reader's judgment upon Philo, upon Dr. Wolfson's view of Philo and upon Dr. Wolfson himself as interpreter will most intimately depend. No one expects a work crammed full with references to be easy to handle, especially when, as too often, little if anything beyond a bare reference is given, though much may depend on the turn of a phrase and the correction or confirmation of an impression as to the justice or injustice of the description of Philo's treatment whether of the Logos and powers and ideas or of angels as "systematically coherent" may entail hours of work. Most of us would admit that it is time well and interestingly spent, while feeling that here and there the writer might have lightened the labour especially where, as in regard to the Logos, the acceptance or rejection of his conclusions cannot but vitally affect the estimate of his whole thesis. There is at times a fatal fluency which induces a doubt if the position can really be so simple, and while it may seem to some that the author has been successful almost beyond belief in producing order out of chaos, an uneasy feeling persists that the Harvard Philo is much too tidy a person to have been at home in Alexandria, Egypt, and that the looseness of speaking which is allowed on occasion in extenuation of apparent inconsistencies is an indication of greater looseness of thinking than Dr. Wolfson's remarkable ingenuity as an apologist is often prepared to concede. And failure to admit that consistency which he seems at times so anxious to clamp down upon Philo will of course have a bearing on the interesting contrasts with Spinoza and his "overthrow of all

those principles which as formulated by Philo became the common preamble of faith in all the religious philosophies in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam." The "hypothetico-deductive method of text study," to borrow a phrase of the author's own invention, has its dangers as well as its advantages, and frankly after collating in the mind scores of passages which Dr. Wolfson has also used, and remembering the enormous advantage which his own training and chosen studies give him in forming a judgment on such questions, we find it almost incredible that any author making, as Dr. Wolfson contends Philo did, philosophy the handmaid of Scripture, ever set out to perform on the ancient philosophers the series of surgical operations and readjustments with which he is here credited. Eclecticism is admitted—it could not indeed be denied—but one can hardly help thinking that greater allowance might fairly be made for development and the same contrasts be recognized in Philo's works as are noted now and again at least in those of Plato.

The six chapters which make up the second volume deal *inter alia* with Knowledge and Prophecy, Proofs of the Existence of God, the Unknowability of God and Divine Predicates, Ethical and Political Theory with sections on the Ideal Constitution and the Messianic Age—the latter compared and contrasted into the Stoic conception of the universal state. Like the curious and highly ingenuous disquisitions on miracles in the previous volume, the treatment of several of these topics has an interest for present-day discussions which can hardly fail to be noticed. In the sphere of ethical theory the student may at times be tempted to think that he is confronting a different Philo because less ingenuity has to be exercised in interpretation when we are dealing, for example, with repentance than has been found necessary in regard to metaphysical questions or the perhaps unduly tortuous discussion of prophecy in its various aspects. The examination in Chapter XI of the "Unknowability of God and Divine Predicates" develop arguments which Dr. Wolfson has advanced earlier, and in its wider aspect raises questions interesting for the archaeologist and the historian as well as for the theologian and metaphysician, in which connection the writer's main concern is to show that Philo expresses himself "in terms not used by others before him about God," just as earlier he is at equal pains to insist that "the expression intelligible world . . . which Philo gives to his totality of ideas is not known to have been used before him," and "was probably coined by Philo himself." It is perhaps less unfortunate than characteristic of Philo that it had to be pointed out in the earlier chapter on "God, Ideas, Logos" that the new expression so far as the word "intelligible" was concerned had to be interpreted in two different senses.

In regard to political theory, attention is called, though not for the first time, to the instructive analogies which can be traced between the treatment of such problems by Polybius and Philo. This gives occasion incidentally for a consideration of the place to be assigned to Fortune, as to which Dr. Wolfson rather surprisingly maintains that the "fortune" of Polybius is "nothing but what the Stoics would call God or nature or universal law or fate or providence or the Logos of the world, all meaning nothing but the fixed immutable order of nature or the concatenation of cause and effect," while he indulges in quite a lengthy exposition of what he supposes Philo to have meant by saying that changes in states and governments are due to "that divine Logos which most people call fortune." In his concluding chapter the writer constructs a "synthetic medieval philosopher, made up of all the common elements of the Christian, the Moslem, and the Jewish philosophers," and invites us to follow in the track of his reasoning as he proceeds to revise Greek philosophy. It is not possible to accompany him further in the limits of a review; but it would

be ungenerous to close without acknowledgment of the service rendered by the series of indexes which add so greatly to the value of a notable book. Is it, however, ungenerous to inquire whether or not the English price of fifty-five shillings for the two volumes fairly represents the ten dollars which they cost in the United States, and on which side the addition is made?

CLAUDE JENKINS.

A Study of Goethe. By BARKER FAIRLEY. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1947. Pp. 250. Price 15s.)

This book is primarily a psychological study of Goethe as an "Erlebnisdichter": nevertheless it deserves the serious attention of anyone who is interested in the philosophical problems that arise from artistic creation and from the attempt to define the boundary between metaphysical speculation and scientific inquiry. Professor Fairley provides exact translations of all the prose passages, and adequate summaries of all the verse passages, he quotes from Goethe; consequently the reader who knows no German can gain a good deal from the book as a whole, and in particular from the chapters dealing with Goethe's "Nature Philosophy."

Goethe lived through and was profoundly influenced by one of the most important philosophical movements since the Renaissance: he repeatedly confessed his debt to Kant, especially to the *Critique of Judgment*, and his influence on Hegel is obvious, not only in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Hence it is quite natural that much of his poetry and imaginative prose should have been read, in Germany and elsewhere, as a kind of illustrative supplement to post-Kantian idealism. *Faust*, *Wilhelm Meister* and the poems entitled *Gott und Welt*, for instance, must have inspired thousands of intellectually bewildered readers during the past century with a vague reverence for "the whole"—a reverence that comforted the heart if it failed to direct the conscience; again Goethe's writings must have led thousands of readers to believe in paradox as the wicket-gate to all "higher truth" and in certain vague "laws of development" manifested equally in Nature and in the artistic, social and political activities of men. On the other hand, Goethe's most characteristic ideas are well worth considering on their own merits and in relation to his own personal development; and this is why Professor Fairley's book is of importance to philosophers. It provides an admirable account of how Goethe's "Nature Philosophy" grew from three streams in his many-sided thought—his intense preoccupation with his own wayward poetic gifts, his capacity for devising imaginary models to explain certain aspects of the variety of nature, and his struggle to achieve a balanced personal morality and Weltanschauung.

Professor Fairley's book, however, is by no means confined to this side of Goethe's achievement; and, if only to indicate how Fairley puts Goethe's philosophy into the general setting of his life, the following brief survey of the book's contents may be useful. The first part, "Before Weimar," seems to me a masterpiece of appreciative criticism; it consists in the main in tracing out the implications of Goethe's famous "chameleon image," and it culminates in the paradoxical conclusion that Goethe, the most intellectually gifted of the world's great poets, suffered, at least till his thirtieth year, from a really dangerous "arrested intellectual development." The second part of the book, "Before Italy," also contains some remarkably illuminating criticism; particularly in connection with the "Charlotte poetry" of Goethe's early Weimar years. Professor Fairley's most original conclusion here is that during the period Goethe came to live vicariously, and to express vicariously in some of

his very finest poetry, e.g. *Iphigenie*, the somewhat second-rate, certainly second-hand, "spirituality" of Charlotte von Stein's personal philosophy. The third part, "Italy and After," contains, as well as the prolonged discussion of the inter-relations of Goethe's poetic, scientific and philosophic interests, important chapters on Schiller, on Goethe's short-lived cult of Greek metrical forms, and on Goethe's "political dilemma." The last of these seems to me remarkably well-balanced. Goethe *was* aware of a kind of impotence in himself with regard to the major political movements of his day; and he was tragically envious of those young Englishmen whom he admired so much in his old age—young men who found themselves born into a liberal, and politically intensely active, society.

We can now turn to the central theme of Professor Fairley's book: Goethe's "arrival" as a poetic, scientific and philosophical sage. There are here four main questions: (1) Was Goethe a genuine scientist, or simply a gifted amateur, dabbling in geology, botany, comparative anatomy and the theory of colour vision? Fairley comes down strongly—and I think absolutely rightly—for the view that Goethe had a genuine passion and capacity for natural science, which, far from being an off-shoot or aberration of his artistic genius (as Helmholtz and others have suggested), remained wholly unrelated to his artistic interests until he had reached middle-age. Fairley brings out the important fact that Goethe's scientific interests were "unprofessional" only in the sense of being remarkably fresh, unbookish and developed, for the most part, in the teeth of a stagnant "professional" tradition. I wish, however, that Fairley had discussed the reasons that have led many historians of science since Helmholtz to belittle Goethe's scientific achievements. (2) In what ways did Goethe's scientific interests come eventually to affect his poetry? Goethe himself was never tired of insisting that his scientific studies had helped him, as a poet, to concentrate "on the object" to express the individual push and go of outward things, instead of treating these simply as targets for, or barriers to, the surges of his own personal feelings. Professor Fairley accepts and elaborates Goethe's judgment on the point. I think, however, that it is worth remarking that this influence of Goethe's scientific interests on his poetry was very indirect; certainly it did not result in his writing poetry which in any marked way expressed his own original scientific ideas. In this connection the main point to stress, I should have thought, was not so much that Goethe brought his scientific interests to bear on his poetry, as that he succeeded in writing magnificent poetry (e.g. *Die Metamorphosis der Pflansen*) on scientific subjects.

(3) Was Goethe in any important sense a philosopher, and, if so, how is his philosophical position best described? On this question, Professor Fairley's discussion disappointed me. He brings together many of Goethe's most interesting sayings; he mentions the features in Goethe's thinking that are most relevant to the issue; but his summing up, to the effect that Goethe's principal beliefs were in science, in objectivity and in unity seems to me banal and unilluminating to a degree. Curiously enough Professor Fairley makes no mention in this part of his discussion of Goethe's attitude to the philosophies of Kant and Hegel. This is a subject that would reward careful study (Ernst Cassirer has made a limited contribution to it) and that would, in my belief, help to explain why Goethe never tried to develop his own philosophical ideas systematically. The question remains—and Professor Fairley's book has the merit of *suggesting* it—what kind of systematic philosophy would have satisfied Goethe; what kind of philosophy could combine, for instance, Goethe's sympathy with the intention and approach (though not the results) of Kant's great critiques, Goethe's monism—based, it is worth emphasizing, largely on

empirical considerations and Goethe's preoccupation with what he called "polar concepts"?

(4) Does Goethe deserve the title of "philosophical poet," and, if so, in which of the various senses in which this phrase has been used? On this point Professor Fairley writes vigorously and, as against those who have claimed that after his Italian journey Goethe "lost his poet's soul," quite conclusively. Fairley discusses, with admirable illustrations, the wholly original, and indeed unique, qualities of the best of Goethe's later poetry: its remarkable combination and interplay of conception and imagery, of lucidity and riddle, of paradox and magisterial certainty of diction. On the other hand there is an important sense of "philosophical poetry" which applies to none or at most to very little, of Goethe's later verse. There is hardly, I think, a single great philosophical utterance in all Goethe's verse that cannot be matched by an almost equivalent, and usually equally suggestive, statement in his prose-writings and conversations. In other words, Goethe's philosophical poems express conclusions which he had reached by processes independent of his poetic inspiration. In this respect Goethe's philosophical poetry lacks something which we find, for instance, in the most illuminating and original poems of Hölderlin, Baudelaire, Rilke and Yeats.

Since it is written as a vindication of Goethe's poetic achievement, Professor Fairley's book has some of the onesidedness of a counsel's defence. Unpleasant traits in Goethe's character are glossed over. Goethe was, among other things, a bit of a prig, a bit of a humbug, a wordly compromiser, and just a little *too* successful. ("The old egoist" as Heine said so incisively.) It is much more important, however, especially to-day, to recall what was original, what was heroic, and what, for all his faults, was throughout his life so remarkably attractive and lovable in Goethe. He never staled. This is why one can return to his writings again and again, not only for wisdom and instruction, but for nourishment and delight. W. B. GALLIE.

Giornale di Metafisica. Anno II. Numero 4–5. July–Sept., 1947. Turin.

This recently founded periodical, appearing every two months and edited by Dr. M. F. Sciacca of Pavia University, represents Roman Catholicism, and prints only invited articles. The present number is a symposium on the nature of metaphysics and on its most general problems. The sixteen contributions have come from six countries. Most of them are in Italian or French, two are in Spanish, and one in English. The whole is an interesting venture in collaboration, displaying a rich variety of statement of roughly the same philosophical position. There is the Augustinian note here and there as well as the Thomistic, but the most striking feature is the extent to which not only the vocabulary but also even the mode of argumentation has been influenced by the Italian idealism of Hegelian inspiration. The recurrent ideas or motives are the defence of metaphysical speculation, the necessity of a transcendent reality, and the rightness of the *a posteriori* method. Instead of following the articles *seriatim*, I shall attempt a rough grouping.

The editor leads off (*Metaphysics and its Problems*) with a consideration of the tendency in certain quarters to reject metaphysics outright, and draws the distinction between the anti-metaphysical and the merely non-metaphysical attitudes. After a swift review of the history of modern philosophy he concludes that this has culminated in the kind of metaphysics that exists as a solution of spiritual problems. Since it used to be the common neo-Scholastic criticism of the grand line of philosophy from Descartes onwards that it started from the self instead of from Nature, it is worth noting that whether the start-

ing-point should be the one or the other appears occasionally in these papers to be now a matter of recognized dispute. C. Boyer (*What is Metaphysics?*) says outright that metaphysics rests on the fact of self-knowledge. A mediating position is taken up on this issue by F. Amerio (*What is Metaphysics?*), who avers that metaphysics is a study neither of the physical nor of the spiritual, but of "primordial experience," that is, experience at the level where the specification into physical and spiritual has not yet arisen. He submits that the constitutive notions of that level are contingency, absoluteness and causality. Another mediating position is put forward by A. Carlini (*Towards the Grounding of a Critical Metaphysics*), namely, that metaphysics is the science in which the knowing self is seen to be co-involved with the reality known, this recognition being "critical" in the philosophical sense. This aspect of the problem is carried further by M. De Corte (*Metaphysics and the Metaphysician*), who makes his article turn on Fichte's famous dictum that an individual's philosophy is determined by what the individual himself is. The writer endorses this to the extent of insisting that the philosopher must think with his whole mind. He adduces as a parallel St. Thomas's saying that "strictly speaking, sense and intellect do not know, but the man by means of them."

The relation of the transcendent to the given is examined in its epistemological aspect by G. Berger (*What is Metaphysics?*): we are driven to the transcendent, he says, because we find that which is given in experience to be insufficient, with ragged edges, open or in the air. He notes that since the given is strictly only what is *now*, we transcend it in all our thinking. His principle being that a datum is necessary for anything that is to be called knowledge, he excludes the knowledge of God and of human destiny from metaphysics on the ground that in regard to them the data are given in revelation. A. Guzzo (*What is Metaphysics?*) seems to argue in another way to the same conclusion. His starting-point is not the insufficiency of the given but the sense of creatureliness: it is a mark of the Christian as of the Platonic philosophy not to postulate the "incommensurability" of man and the divine but to insist on this relation as a fact of experience—we are aware of an "inattingibile vicinissimo," an intimate presence that is essentially beyond our reach. On the same general theme A. Forest (*Convergences of Doctrine in Metaphysics*), examining historically the metaphysical tradition, finds its unity or continuity in the persistent discovery of the transcendent *in* the given.

Metaphysics as the quest for unity is the aspect emphasized by J. R. S. Lange (*What is Metaphysics?*), who regrets that the contemporary European thinkers (he writes from Argentina) are slipping away from the European tradition. The same emphasis is made by L. Stefanini (*The Metaphysics of Form*). Beginning with the Gestalt-theory, he maintains that it is the very nature of the mind to unify, the indefeasible unity of the subject being related to its objects in a formative way. For him metaphysics is the study of forms understood as structures, seen as "compenetrating," and seen also as pointing to an all-inclusive divine Form.

The remaining articles lie outside the above grouping. A. G. Alvarez (*The Approach to Metaphysics to determine its Essence*) champions nominalism: since all that exists is individual, all knowledge is intuitive, even the knowledge of God, who "cannot be contained in any generic concept." The knowledge of God is necessarily analogical. That the method of analogy should be re-examined and tried out with empiricist scruples is recommended, after a mention of Whitehead, by I. Collins (*Metaphysics in an Empirical Climate*) in an illuminating and sensitive survey of the philosophical temper in the United States. L. Lavelle (*Epitome of a Spiritual Metaphysics*) propounds an

idealism of the Fichtean kind: nothing but mind exists except by and for mind, matter being necessary to mind as its limit and instrument. The only article that concentrates on the problem of values is R. Le Senne (*Outline of Axiological Metaphysics*): all our usual values, he observes, so far as they are determinate, are negative, so that in practice it is fanatical to devote oneself to any one of them exclusively, and in theory it is necessary to go beyond them all to the Absolute Value (God) that specifies itself in them and therefore is characterized by them. C. Mazzantini (*The Metaphysical Horizon of the Philosophy of the Potential*) formulates a friendly difference of opinion with the editor's opening article, but with so many parentheses and footnotes that I have not been able to catch his contention. U. A. Padovani (*The Aristotelico-Thomist Metaphysic and Modern Thought*) contributes an outline of Aristotelianism and claims that in its Thomistic form it is superior to all modern systems by avoiding any tendency towards immanentism.

Among the usual reviews the two longest are of A. E. Taylor's *Does God Exist?* and D. M. Emmet's *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking.*

T. E. JESSOP.

The Individual, the State, and World Government. By A. C. EWING. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. Pp. viii + 322.)

Dr. Ewing explains that his task in the present book is to see whether, as a philosopher, he can make some contribution towards the possible solution of certain great practical political problems of the present day—the problems of the State and the rights of the individual, of democracy, and of the prevention of war. Accordingly, after a brief introductory chapter, he deals first in Chapter II with the civil rights of the individual, e.g. the right of free speech, rights connected with family life, etc., and then in Chapter III with political rights, and the arguments for and against a democratic form of government. Chapter IV is concerned with the analysis of the concept of the State, and finally there is a long chapter on international government and the prevention of war. The book is designed as much for the general reader as for the professional philosopher. "I should be very sorry," the author remarks, "if it were read only by professional philosophers."

The first two chapters of the book raise some interesting problems. In the first chapter political philosophy is said to be "in the main, a branch of ethics," and shortly afterwards the author remarks that he assumes one thing, "namely, that some ethical judgements are true and others false, and that we are capable of deciding between them." To this assumption he attaches the greatest importance—"if this is not the case it is useless for me to write a syllable more." Nevertheless, little more is said about the assumption itself, and the student of philosophy, aware of present controversies in ethics, may feel that more should have been said. It has, however, to be remembered that this is a book designed to help the general reader in deciding practical political issues. Why, then, weary him with too much about presuppositions? That this reply is not altogether satisfactory may perhaps be seen in the second chapter, which is concerned with the rights of the individual. This begins with a discussion of general theories of rights, and then turns to particular rights—property, free speech, etc. The view that the individual has "any absolute positive rights" is rejected, as is the view that the individual has no rights except those that the State gives him, and the final choice is made to lie between a utilitarian view of rights and the view that the individual has natural rights which are not based merely on the general good, but these are not absolute, but only *prima facie*. Much of this argument is not easy. If the general reader is to follow it intelli-

gently, one feels he must have more clues as to the presuppositions involved, the precise issues at stake, and the method by which these issues might be settled. Rights at the outset are defined in terms of right—"powers or securities of a kind such that the individual can rightly demand of others that they should normally not interfere with them." This, however, does not in itself provide much guidance, since it is followed by the brief remark that right itself is indefinable, and in any case is a matter for general ethics; and the position seems to be further complicated by the footnote on p. 30 distinguishing three meanings of right, a point which occurs again in the discussion on p. 77. All this is, I think, simply to express a wish, which both general reader and philosopher may share, that Dr. Ewing in this chapter on Individual Rights had begun farther back and told us more about the bases from which political arguments begin and on which political judgements are made. This preliminary clearing of the ground seems most important; in this respect particularly the philosopher might well be able as a philosopher to help in political issues.

Space is not available for comment on the third chapter, where the arguments for and against democracy, most of them fairly familiar, are lucidly and concisely expressed. Comment on various points in the fourth chapter on the State, including an interesting discussion on whether one has any strong special obligation to one's own country, must also be omitted. It is, however, necessary to say something about the long final chapter, "International Government and the Prevention of War." This is an admirable piece of work. It begins with a discussion of the treatment of Germany distinguished by its clarity of analysis, and the wisdom and moderation of its conclusions. In the subsequent discussion of the international machinery which may secure peace the same qualities are apparent. In particular, the concise analysis of the difference between a league and a federation, and the comparison of the League of Nations with the San Francisco Charter, could in the space available hardly be bettered. Here philosopher and non-philosopher alike will find much to profit them.

I found few misprints. On p. 25, l. 19 "legislators" should perhaps be "legislatures"; on p. 61, l. 4 for "or" read "of"; on p. 172, last line, for "it" read "is," and on p. 179, l. 14 for "it" read "is." There is an excellent index.

R. C. Cross.

Science versus Idealism. By Maurice Cornforth. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. No date. Pp. 267. Price 12s. 6d.)

Mr. Cornforth is a Dialectical Materialist. His book is not, as the title might suggest, an examination of the relation between science and idealist philosophy or a defence of science against idealism. It is an attack on philosophers of the school of logical positivism and logical analysis, whom the author regards as disguised idealists. He takes it for granted that idealist philosophies arise to defend religion. Nothing of note is said about religion. It is assumed to be "a bad thing": and the reader who doubts this must presumably read his Marx and Engels. The Marxist standpoint sometimes obtrudes itself in the author's habit of quoting commonplace remarks of Engels and Lenin as though they were philosophically illuminating. Among the wilder Marxist interpretations is the assertion that Hume's logical atomism represents "the reflection in philosophical theory, of the economic position of the individual in capitalist society" (p. 256).

In spite of the Marxist bias, however, the book is well worth the attention of anyone interested in modern positivist movements. It is clear and intelligible on difficult problems. It is written in a fresh and lively style, if a little desultory, and contains some amusing remarks (e.g. the note on Mr. Drury's

toothache, p. 152, and the comparison, p. 157, of Carnap's amending Wittgenstein to Hume's amending Berkeley, with the comment that history repeats itself, "on the second occasion, as farce").

In a brief review I can only hope to outline the argument, including points of difficulty. Part I, consisting of Chapters 1–6, deals briefly with philosophical development from Bacon to Mach, regarded as a prelude to philosophical analysis. Bacon and Hobbes are out and out materialists; Locke is a confused materialist (maintaining both that knowledge is about our ideas and that material substance exists); Berkeley is the arch-criminal, the philosopher who reconciled science and religion by giving up the materialism of Bacon, Hobbes and Locke and developing a pure empiricism, on which the logical positivists have hardly "advanced a step" (p. 49). Although Hume did not "care a fig for religion" (p. 59) his philosophy is criticized for being compatible with religious faith. Kant is a more confused Locke, trying to reconcile idealism and materialism. Mach is a confused Hume, with a new terminology, in which "element" replaces "perception" and minds and bodies are different combinations of these "neutral" elements. There are three things wrong with pure empiricism: (1) The failure to realize that "we gain our knowledge by doing things" (p. 77) and not "by contemplating sensations" (p. 76), (2) the atomic view of experience, (3) the solipsism which follows from neglecting the co-operative nature of science.

Part II, the larger part of the work, deals with the logical positivists of to-day. In Chapter 7, "Logical Analysis as a Philosophical Method," an excellent account is given of Russell's "scientific" method in philosophy, which is found to be an amalgam of Descartes and Occam, yielding results already obtained by Mach and Berkeley. The analysis of the statements of common sense and science, practised by Moore, is criticized on the ground that it claims to give more ultimate knowledge than science. [The analytical philosophers would presumably reject this criticism by saying that to analyse propositions (or sentences) so as to reveal the ultimate elements of the facts they express was not the same as to obtain more ultimate knowledge. Mr. Cornforth might have done more to counter this claim.] Chapter 8, "Logical Atomism," treats the way in which Russell's analysis of propositions led on to Wittgenstein's doctrine of atomic facts, a doctrine which the author regards as an ungrounded *a priori* assertion, since no one has ever produced a proposition which states an atomic fact. Chapter 9, "The Philosophy of Wittgenstein," examines the views set out in the *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*. Mr. Cornforth rightly perceives that the Verification Principle, in its simple form, is as hostile to materialism as to idealism. He objects to Wittgenstein's solipsism on the grounds that the solipsism of philosophers, though self-consistent, is "not consistent with the facts of their social life. We live in society. We take part in affairs, we are born, grow up, reach maturity, and die" (p. 160). Solipsism, then, is untrue because it conflicts with our knowledge of certain facts. Propositions are verified not by experience, but by action; and the action is co-operative action. "We verify whether our ideas about the world are right or wrong by changing the world in accordance with our ideas of it" (p. 161).

The truth of the Marxist doctrine lies no doubt partly in its insisting that experiment dominates observation in the advanced sciences, and that experiment is a social affair. But what verifies in experiment is still the observation which comes at the end; and Mr. Cornforth does not make clear the role of action in verification, which is the hub of Marxist epistemology. He instances my verifying that there is coal in the scuttle by (1) looking into the scuttle, (2) putting what I see there on the fire. But he omits to mention (3) looking

to see whether there are flames or not. Now (1) and (3) verify; (2) serves the purpose of putting me in a position quickly for (3). "Had we but world enough, and time" we might wait until a self-engendered conflagration reached the scuttle. If some live coals accidentally fell in the scuttle, verification would be effected without any action on my part.

Chapters 10, 11 and 12, "Logical Positivism," deal with doctrines of Carnap. The author attacks Carnap for excluding from all consideration in logical analysis the reference of words and sentences to a reality other than themselves; and hence making verification consist in comparing the statement awaiting verification with the "records" of scientists, the so-called protocol-statements, which need no justification themselves. As a good Marxist the author also rejects physicalism and the unity of science, on the ground that it fails to recognize that there is a hierarchy of organization in the material world. The history of purposive life, for instance, cannot be written in physical terms. [Is this Marxist doctrine really consistent with materialism?] In Chapter 12 there is an excursus on Time, in which the author argues that there is a sense of time in which it is meaningful to ask: "Did time have a beginning? If so, when did it begin?" But I have failed to follow the argument or to be convinced that the question is a reasonable one. Some very odd things are said about measurement. It is argued that because by using an elastic measuring-tape I can make two sides of a triangle together *not* greater than the third; therefore, they "are or are not greater than the third according to the method of measurement we adopt" (p. 210). Both views, the author implies, are equally true. [It would be as reasonable to argue that I can make twopence and twopence add up to threepence by stealing a penny.] The author's point is that contradictory statements about the world may result from the *choice* of different operational methods. One method is usually "better for most purposes" (p. 212). [But surely it *is* better because it is in accord with the facts. At least a different view wants more argument than it gets here.] There is an interesting, and I think sound, passage in which the author shows that Carnap's test for the meaningful character of statements—the possibility of translation from the material into the formal mode of speech—leaves metaphysical statements unscathed.

In Chapter 13, "The Interpretation of Science," the author takes logical positivism to task for making science consist in formulating predictive rules from the data of experience. The purpose of science, he urges, is control over nature, and this requires theory as well as rules. [The positivists *have* failed to account for the emphasis which the scientist lays on the distinction between empirical formulae and theory.] There is some robust sense on that old shibboleth, Occam's Razor: "In attaining to scientific knowledge, theory posits just those entities, and so many entities, as are known to exist and whose existence is verified" (p. 253).

The concluding chapter gives Mr. Cornforth's own account of philosophy as scientific materialism. So viewed philosophy has to show the connection of the sciences, their importance to man, and their provisional character. It has also problems of its own in the field of logic and epistemology. Presumably, moral philosophy and metaphysics are excluded as reflections of the economic scene, though this would leave the difference, for example, between the metaphysics of Bradley and Spencer inexplicable.

I have noticed the following misprints: p. 38, l. 4 *detail* for *detailed*; p. 80, l. 4 *word* for *world*; p. 92, l. 24 *racts* for *facts*; p. 219, l. 23 a comma appears instead of an *l* in the word *conclusions*; p. 245, note 1 *Wolfe* for *Wolf*; p. 246, l. 1 *Copernician* for *Copernican*; p. 247, l. 9 *Compte* for *Comte*.

WINSTON H. F. BARNES

The Limits of Science, Outline of Logic and the Methodology of the Exact Sciences. By the late LEON CHWISTEK, with an Introduction and Appendix by Helen Charlotte Brodie. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd. pp. lvii + 347. Price 30s.)

This is said to be the first book on philosophy which has been translated directly from Polish into English. As such it will be received with much interest. For the works of Lukasiewicz and Tarski which are accessible in German or English and the summary of Polish achievements in logic which was published during the war by Mr. Jordan in a series on Polish Science and Learning have established a high reputation for the Polish school of logicians. Unfortunately the reader's good will towards the book may not survive his reading of it.

The Polish original appeared in 1935. In 1938 an outline of the symbolic system which forms about half the book was published by Chwistek and his collaborator Hetper in the *Journal of Symbolic Logic* under the title "New Foundations for Formal Meta-mathematics." Although the present publication is for the most part a translation from the Polish of 1935, it contains some new material supplied by the author in English. Apparently he was in communication with the editress during the early stages of the preparation of the new edition but died before he could give final approval to the text. On the whole the English reads fairly well. But there are a few howlers such as the pseudo-Latin words *"formuli"* (pp. 230 and 273) and *"apparati"* (p. 266); and there are a number of references to Polish works on the history of philosophy which seem quite pointless in an English edition, since they deal with matters about which an English reader can inform himself much more easily elsewhere, e.g. Kant's views on formal logic (p. 105). It is also rather surprising that the statement about Albert the Great on page 101 was allowed to stand uncorrected; the passage of Prantl mentioned in the footnote shows that the reference should be to Albert of Saxony, who lived a hundred years later. The introduction and the appendix by Miss Brodie give some help towards an understanding of Chwistek's thought and also some indications of its shortcomings. The detached and critical tone of the introduction would, indeed, have seemed rather curious had the book been published during the lifetime of the author. If the whole work is disappointing, the fault does not lie with Miss Brodie or the American philosophers who helped her with advice.

In the first three and the last two chapters Chwistek deals with the need for logical analysis of the concepts of mathematics and the exact sciences. He finds anti-rationalism rampant in all quarters, and offers what he calls a method of "sound reason" for eliminating philosophical muddles. Since the other five chapters, which contain his symbolical system, are extremely difficult to follow, it is likely that many readers will base their opinion on what they read at the beginning and the end; and it is almost certain that they will come to the conclusion that Chwistek had a bad temper and a poor judgment. Every philosopher may be allowed one or two hates, but a philosopher who discovers anti-rationalism or idealism or worse in almost all his predecessors and contemporaries does not inspire confidence. Some offensive references to his Polish colleagues Lesniewski and Kotarbinski and several wild remarks about politics suggest that Chwistek was obsessed by local feuds. He obviously wanted to combine positivism with a Marxism freed from Hegelian relics, but nothing clear emerges from what he says about the limits of sound reason and the "problem of reality."

The symbolical system of the middle chapters has no very close connection with the rest. It is based on a discipline which Chwistek calls rational seman-

tics. This has nothing in common with the semantics of Tarski, but is rather a general theory of syntax considered as part of the study of arrangements. He starts with two marks, "*c*" and "*", The first of these he calls an expression (although it is, in fact, a mere mark without meaning), and the second he uses as a concatenation sign by means of which more complicated expressions can be constructed. Thus "**cc*" is an expression according to his explanations, and so too is "***ccc*." The first is the concatenation of two occurrences of "*c*," and the second is the concatenation of the expression so constructed with another occurrence of "*c*." It is clear that we can construct expressions *ad libitum* with these materials, and also that we can prove some quite general theorems about their relations. For the formulation of his theory Chwistek uses the notion of substitution, writing "(*EFGH*)" as an abbreviation for "*H* is the result of substituting *G* for *F* in *E*." Having developed the system some way in this abstract fashion, he then proceeds to introduce familiar symbols of formal logic and mathematics (e.g. numerals) as abbreviations for certain complex expressions. His selection of expressions to correspond to familiar symbols is, of course, not wholly arbitrary, since he intends these latter to retain their customary relations. There is, however, a good deal that is arbitrary in the establishment of correspondences, and the result is not a system of explanatory definitions, but rather a code which might help in the consideration of meta-mathematical questions such as those raised by Hilbert. Whether it can in fact be used to advantage remains to be seen.

Chwistek's exposition is extremely difficult to follow. At times he seems to glory in obscurity, as for example when he writes on page 95 of one relatively small difficulty "I see no reason for abandoning the notation of Lukasiewicz merely because the ordinary notation is more familiar. Symbolical language requires the elimination of so many habits that there is no reason to give the habit of using the ordinary method of notation special consideration." For my own part I confess that I have found his explanations insufficient to show what he is doing in certain parts of his book, but I have a strong suspicion that a good deal of what he says is vitiated by a failure to distinguish consistently between the use and the mention of symbols. When he writes on page 295 "If *E* and *F* are expressions **EF* is an expression," does he intend the capital letters to mark gaps where we can insert the *names of expressions* or rather gaps where we can insert *expressions* themselves? In a note on the next page he says that they are variables which can be replaced by expressions, but a little later he begins to make free use of the phrase "*H* is the result of substituting *G* for *F* in *E*" as though he were dealing with variable names of expressions. The difference is important. For it makes sense to say " '$\sqrt{3}$' is the result of substituting '3' for '2' in '$\sqrt{2}$'," but "$\sqrt{3}$ is the result of substituting 3 for 2 in $\sqrt{2}$" is just gibberish.

WILLIAM KNEALE.

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OBITUARY NOTICE

Alfred North Whitehead

The distinguished British philosopher, Professor Alfred North Whitehead, O.M., died at Cambridge, Massachusetts, on December 30, 1947, at the age of eighty-six.

Whitehead was born at Ramsgate on February 15, 1861, the son of Canon Alfred Whitehead. He went to Sherborne and became in due course Captain of the School. In 1880 he entered Trinity College, Cambridge. In 1883 he was bracketed fourth Wrangler, and in the following year was placed in the first class of Part III of the Mathematical Tripos. He was elected a Fellow in the same year by his College, and later became Senior Mathematical Lecturer. In 1914, after spending a short time as lecturer in Applied Mathematics and Mechanics at University College, London, he was invited to become Professor of Mathematics at the Imperial College of Science. He held this post until 1924, when he accepted the Chair of Philosophy at Harvard. He and Mrs. Whitehead made America their second home, and spent many happy years there, surrounded by friends who both admired and loved them.

As is well known, Whitehead was the joint author with Bertrand Russell of *Principia Mathematica*, which appeared in three volumes between 1910 and 1913. This work holds a dominating position in the history both of logic and mathematics.

Whitehead gave much thought to education, and in 1929 his reflections were published in *The Aims of Education*. He also took a deep interest all his life in history, and papers on this subject appeared from time to time in various journals. A profound knowledge of history is revealed by his later philosophical books. As a mathematician he naturally gave much consideration to the theory of relativity, and in 1922 *The Principle of Relativity* gave an alternative rendering.

The last twenty years of Whitehead's life were largely given up to the adumbration of philosophic thought. First there appeared *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge*, shortly followed by *The Concept of Nature*. His philosophy was fully given in three later books, *Science and the Modern World*, *Process and Reality* and *Adventures of Ideas*, which portrayed the ultimate entities of nature as organic processes in which teleological as well as efficient causes play a part. Aspects of this "Organic Philosophy" were also dealt with in *Religion in the Making*, *Symbolism*, *The Function of Reason* and *Modes of Thought*. Since a number of articles on Whitehead's Philosophy have appeared in Philosophy during recent years, readers will be acquainted with his view that the universe is both a passage or *process*, and something that is permanent, both temporal and eternal, and that an adequate metaphysic must include as complementary facets of the universe both the realm of the actual and the realm of the ideal.

All who knew Whitehead are agreed that not only was he endowed with outstanding intellectual gifts, but that he also was blessed with the kindliest of natures and great charm. May Britain continue to produce similar sons from her genial soil.

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