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Voting in Democracies

Proportional Electoral Systems

by

ENID LAKEMAN

and

JAMES D. LAMBERT

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To the memory

of

JOHN H. HUMPHREYS

1869–1946

★

This volume is dedicated to the memory of one who devoted his life to securing justice in political and human relationships. For this, John H. Humphreys gave up his own career in the Civil Service and its prospects. Over the long years he made a detailed and world-wide study of the various electoral systems of parliamentary and local government. His unrivalled knowledge was freely placed at the service of others, whether they shared his views or not.

The underlying inspiration of his life work was a deep faith in the moral basis of democracy, by which political institutions, with their methods and systems, must be tried and judged. Believing in fair play for all of sincere convictions, alike for opponents and those with whose views he united, he sought to test methods of representation by the extent to which they secured this fair play. He saw in the use of the single transferable vote the best way by which just representation can be secured to all sections of a democratic community, a way by which even a small minority of citizens may make their vote effective.

From 1905 till his death in 1946 he served as Hon. Secretary and then as General Secretary of the Proportional Representation Society, collecting and making known the results of existing electoral systems and advocating steps for their improvement. He travelled widely and his labours bore fruit in many countries, in Europe, in the Dominions and Colonies, and in the United States of America. His experience and counsel

were of great importance in the establishment of a more effective and equitable system of election in Ireland, as regards both local and national government.

He encouraged and helped all who turned to him and were working for justice and good will in political and industrial life. Cheerful in facing difficulties, courteous towards all, patient in labour, he met checks and disappointment with unselfish courage, with faith in the enduring strength of right. By his life and work he has given inspiration and help to his colleagues and friends and to fellow workers in many lands.

T. Edmund Harvey

Preface

The discussion of electoral problems is apt to be much hindered, and its effectiveness seriously impaired, by the importation into it of three disturbing influences: party prejudice, confusion between ends and means, and sheer ignorance. These are all, of course, closely related, and they aid and abet each other's mischief-making.

There can be scarcely any area of political discussion in which the introduction of party prejudices and the pushing of sectional interests are more out of place than in the field of electoral method. Systems of voting and of counting votes are the mechanism by means of which the country records and measures its reactions to the political issues of the day. As with all recording and measuring devices, therefore, it is important that these systems should be as accurate, as reliable, and as impartial as we can make them. To tamper with them—or to tolerate the continuance of their known defects—in the interests of a particular party or policy should be regarded as one of the things that are simply not done: it is on a par with using false weights and measures.

Here in this country we have been fortunate enough to escape the grosser forms of rigging to which the electoral systems of some of our friends overseas have been subjected; but we suffer much from the subtler derelictions of those who—perhaps hardly realizing what they are about—maintain and defend electoral abuses, under the influence of a mistaken political philosophy, or to serve the vested interests of established party organizations. There is great need of a more widespread sense of responsibility in this matter.

Confusion between ends and means is, of course, a common defect of political controversy; but it is more than usually pernicious in relation to electoral problems, since here the ends involve matters of high principle, while the means are stubbornly technical. Until there is a fair measure of agreement on ends, therefore, it is futile to try to settle means. Unfortunately,

even within the countries that adhere to western ideas of democracy and representative government, there is less agreement than might be expected on the fundamental purpose of political elections. The crucial divergence is between those who think it vital that representation shall be a living reality, and those who think it of little importance so long as we get what they call 'strong government'. This is a clash of opinion that threatens the stability of the whole electoral system, and it needs to be faced more candidly and explored more ruthlessly than it usually is. It seems probable that, if they once really grasped the nature of the issue, most democratically-minded people would become convinced upholders of the representative principle—and would, moreover, be unable to see in it anything incompatible with good and efficient government.

Once the question of ends is settled, there will be little difficulty in deciding on means. The technical possibilities and limitations of the various methods of voting and counting are now pretty thoroughly understood, and they really give little scope for dispute—at least amongst the informed. It is not the methods themselves that cause most of the dissension: it is either the unresolved conflict of purpose behind them, or ignorance of their nature and possibilities.

Sheer, downright ignorance is, indeed, a major factor in the case. It is disturbing to notice how many people—including university dons and members of parliament—talk and write glibly of the alternative vote, proportional representation, and so on, when, as their own words show, they lack even a rudimentary understanding of the processes on which they are so ready to pass judgement. This is particularly noticeable amongst opponents of electoral reform: they condemn out of hand proposals that they have not taken the trouble to understand, and they will not even look at the hard facts on which those proposals have been based. The press, radio, and Hansard are full of examples of this kind of thing.

There is, then, urgent need for a wider interest in, and understanding of, electoral problems; and especially is there need for intelligent men and women, capable of forming their own judgements but in these matters rather at sea, to secure for themselves a sound knowledge of the facts, free from bias and distortion. Here in this book is a storehouse of information and explanation to which such readers may turn with great profit. They will not

ieed, of course, to spend much time on the statistical tables and he finer technical points: it is the general explanations and lescriptions that will best meet their requirements. The speci-ılist, on the other hand, who will pass lightly over these more general passages, will find in the statistics, the historical accounts, ınd the close discussion of technical questions, much that will ɔe of great value to him, especially for reference.

It is beyond dispute that the system of voting and counting employed in this country—and not only here—has great defects. That is widely recognized, even amongst those who are not, as yet, convinced of the urgency of the need for reform. The vagaries, the crudities, and the injustices of the system have been exposed too often and too thoroughly for there to be any doubt about them. Why then is it so difficult to secure a fair hearing for the case for reform? Ignorance, timidity, and the vested interests of party organizations, all obstruct the way. But the most widespread and, in the long run, the most powerful is ignorance. If this book helps to dispel that ignorance, it will do much to recompense the authors for the heavy labours they have put into its preparation, and it will stand as a most appropriate memorial to that apostle of representative democracy, John Humphreys.

J. F. S. Ross

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CHAPTER I

The Purposes of Elections

'The object of our deliberations is to promote the good purposes for which elections have been instituted, and to prevent their inconveniences'—EDMUND BURKE, *Speech on a Bill for Shortening the Duration of Parliaments.*

Nearly a century after Burke considered the purposes of elections, John Stuart Mill was discussing in the first chapter of his *Representative Government* 'to what extent forms of government are a matter of choice'. There exist, he says, two conflicting conceptions of what political institutions are. Some believe government to be a practical art, in which we first decide what purposes we wish to promote and then inquire what form of government is best fitted to fulfil those purposes. Others hold that forms of government are not a matter of choice but must be taken as we find them, as a sort of organic growth from the nature and life of a people. Either doctrine, Mill says, is absurd if held as an exclusive theory. Political institutions are made by man and can be shaped deliberately by man; on the other hand, their success or failure depends partly on circumstances. The best institutions will fail, in any case, if the citizens are unwilling or unable to play their part.

By Mill's time it was already taken for granted that our Parliamentary institutions should rest on a franchise far wider than Burke's contemporaries can have contemplated. During the further century that has elapsed since then, there has been a vast extension of Parliamentary government, but comparatively little study of its electoral foundations. John H. Humphreys' *Proportional Representation*, published in 1911, remains the only comprehensive work of its kind produced in Britain. Since it was written, the voting systems he described have been applied in many more countries and have been put to the test of widely differing conditions. New variations of them have appeared. Women then had no vote; now they are enfranchised on the same terms as men in nearly all democracies. Plural voting and

property qualifications have disappeared. In the United Kingdom the relative strength of the political parties has greatly changed, and the political power of the old 'ruling class' has declined. Some countries that had only colonial status forty years ago are now fully self-governing states, and others are on the same road. On the other hand, the outstanding fact in world affairs today is the existence of a challenge to the whole conception of Parliamentary democracy.

It will be our purpose in the later chapters of the book to show how closely forms of government are influenced by methods of election, and how the political history and idiosyncrasy of different countries have evolved different methods.[1] We shall consider also whether a hundred years of experience of voting methods suggests that any changes are necessary in the interests of good government in our own country. The vagaries of our own system could, we know, produce startling results. Moreover, our unwritten British Constitution gives great powers to a majority in a House of Commons so elected. A discussion of the purposes and methods of election is therefore both timely and far from academic.

For what 'good purposes', in Burke's phrase, have we instituted the election of our Parliaments, our local councils and our club committees? Without at least some measure of agreement on the purposes, we can hardly discuss profitably whether our own or any other electoral system is well or ill designed. Such agreement, however, is not as easy as one might at first suppose.

That we have come some way towards the greatest common measure of agreement is seen in the reasons which have inspired us to adopt a system of election in preference to other methods of selecting our rulers. Two such methods are familiar: inheritance, which fills, for instance, a large part of the House of Lords; and chance, through the drawing of lots, by which, in Britain, individuals are chosen for jury service. Each of these methods has its advantages; heredity limits the holders of office to those bred and trained for it, while the drawing of lots may distribute a certain power and responsibility among all citizens. Neither method, however, is acceptable for general use in the government of modern democratic communities. The hereditary system tends to establish an oligarchy, whose interests may not

[1] 'Institutions mould character, and character transforms institutions' Bertrand Russell, O.M., 'Reflections on My Eightieth Birthday', *The Listener*, 22 May 1952.

coincide with those of the governed, and whose rule (however benevolent) may diverge from the wishes of the majority. It does not ensure that government is vested in the most capable hands, and deprives the state of the services of many capable men. Among the objections to selection by lot is the arbitrary delegation of authority to unwilling or unsatisfactory individuals.

The criticisms which have been made of these two methods of allocating power are obviously based on a general theory of government. This is the theory that the rulers whom the people are expected to obey should not only rule in their interests but also rule according to their wishes; and that the rulers should be accepted by the ruled—this acceptance being no mere acquiescence but conscious choice. A positive meaning is thus given to the 'consent' upon which government is supposed to rest. So it has become increasingly accepted that the governed should elect their rulers, and that they should have power to renew at intervals the authority they give to them. It follows that the elected should be prepared to relinquish their powers voluntarily, and to submit to a new exercise of the electors' will, when they can no longer claim to possess the confidence of the majority.

Though it may be agreed that the composition of the body elected should bear some relation to the wishes of the people whose affairs it is to control, there are wide differences of opinion about how close that relationship should be. Some may be reluctant to accept the wishes of the people, if ascertainable, as the only factor which should determine the choice of rulers. They may distrust the average elector's ability to choose wisely, and wish to protect him from the results of an unwise choice. Some may be chiefly anxious to ensure that a strong and stable administration shall emerge. Such an administration, they would claim, really represents the dominant wish of the electorate, but its attainment might be thwarted if opportunity were allowed for the unlimited expression of subsidiary wishes. So a limitation of choice to two disciplined parties seems to them to be an advantage. This desire for strong government is clearly a reality—so much so that in recent history we have seen popular disgust with weak, irresolute government pave the way for acceptance of a dictatorship. It would be foolish for any believer in democracy to advocate a system of election if its ultimate

result would be to destroy the rightof holding free elections at all.

The modern intensification of the party system in our own country, extending even to local government, and the concentration of power in the hands of the Cabinet, would have surprised political thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is claimed that disciplined party government gives the stability more than ever needed in a troubled world. But such stability may be dearly bought, and may be deceptive, if the penalty of the party system is aggravation of artificial class differences, or a division on political doctrine between opposing parties which cannot afford to admit the existence of common ground.

That the majority should rule is now an accepted axiom; and the British Parliament, having acquired the constitutional right to grant or refuse consent to the laws proposed by the ministers of the Crown, has displaced the old monarchical power, and has in theory become virtually supreme in its own right. Yet in the present conditions of party conflict, particularly in the case of a party government supported by a small majority, worse still a minority, of votes, it is hard to invoke the theory of consent as a basis for the claim of the laws to the obedience of the people. Have the electors supporting the government the exclusive right to speak in the name of the whole people?

Some political writers have spoken of 'The People' as if it were a single person with one mind and one interest instead of a complex mass of individuals with different purposes and conflicting interests. To such writers the problem is easy; the representative body stands for The People and whatever it decides upon, even by a bare majority, is The Voice of The People. We become so accustomed, indeed, to accepting a majority vote that we sometimes forget that the majority principle—though unavoidable for handling practical affairs of daily life—is not necessarily the only right and safe way of resolving a difficulty, particularly when it comes to deciding some great issue of principle or policy.[1]

The weakness today of the theory of 'government by consent of the governed' is that it imposes only a feeble constraint upon the power of Parliament itself. A Parliament may not only be an inaccurate reflection of the real opinion of the country; in Britain, with no constitutional check on its power, the govern-

[1] Cf. Lord Radcliffe, *The Problem of Power* (The Reith Lectures, 1951).

nent of the day, arrogating to itself a temporary authority, may go far beyond the wishes of the people. Some today would therefore like to see an approach to the conception of Parliament as a Council of State' in which greater stress would be laid upon agreement after free discussion. There may be something to learn, in this connexion, from the practice of the Society of Friends in gathering 'the sense of the meeting'. But it is certain that this cannot be achieved in a Parliament rigidly divided by disciplined parties, and in which the doctrine is acclaimed that 'it is the duty of the Opposition to oppose'.

However decisions may be reached and power used by Parliament or by committee, it will be accepted that free elections are an essential feature in the choice of our rulers; what is less generally realized is the extent to which the method of voting will condition the result. As the vote was gradually extended in Great Britain until adult suffrage was achieved, the apparently uncomplicated relative majority system—sometimes called the 'plurality' system, or 'simple majority vote with only one ballot', and in this book referred to as the 'first-past-the-post' system—was retained. With small electorates and relatively simple issues to be decided in earlier days, this was clearly the form in which the counting of votes would naturally start. But in the nineteenth century, when the philosophy of democratic government and its resulting institutions began to be consciously studied and the rights of minorities to force themselves on the attention of political thinkers, it was seen that such crude and simplified methods of consulting the opinions of larger and more heterogeneous electorates failed to do justice to important sections of opinion and impoverished the elected legislature. The existing methods were challenged by Thomas Hare, J. S. Mill and other thinkers in Great Britain, and at the same time and independently by students of the machinery of democracy on the Continent. They saw that so long as the unit of election was a constituency returning only one member, it was impossible to reflect more than one shade of opinion in that constituency, and that from this limitation sprang other inconsistencies and injustices. In place of the first-past-the-post system they therefore proposed systems with multi-member constituencies which would make possible the allotment of representation in proportion to all responsible trends of opinion.

'Today, though few would dispute that the 'Voice of the

People' must be the ultimate arbiter, and that the Voice must be heard through the ballot box, the method and machinery by which this voting is practised differ from country to country, and some still retain the forms of a century ago. We argue in this book that it is to the failure of outmoded electoral systems that many of the confusions and abuses of the present political scene are due, and that a more rational system, directed to the fundamental 'good purposes' of elections, is a necessary and preliminary step to genuine democratic government.

Most shades of political opinion seem to include the following among the 'good purposes' for which elections have been instituted, at any rate to the extent that they would not regard any of them as undesirable in itself. These purposes may be regarded by some as incompatible one with another, and as being of differing relative importance.

(*i*) A Parliament reflecting the main trends of opinion within the electorate.

(*ii*) Government according to the wishes of the majority of the electorate.

(*iii*) The election of representatives whose personal qualities best fit them for the function of government.

(*iv*) Strong and stable government.

A system which achieves all these ends, or, at least comes as close as possible to fulfilling each, will offer us an electoral instrument which can best provide both democratic and effective government. With these considerations in mind, the authors examine the theoretical and practical effects of the principal voting systems used or suggested in modern communities. They conclude that a system can be devised which will substantially meet all the requirements without sacrificing any essential democratic ideal.

CHAPTER II

The First-Past-the-Post System

'The present electoral system, in which the gambling, betting, and sporting instincts of the nation seem to have found their characteristic political expression.'—EGON WERTHEIMER, *Portrait of the British Labour Party*, p. 195.

The system most familiar to citizens of the United Kingdom is the election of one person at a time by a relative majority—the candidate having the most votes being declared elected. This has been aptly named the 'first-past-the-post' system. To what extent does it meet any of the 'good purposes' of elections?

PARLIAMENT AS THE MIRROR

'The virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the nation.'—EDMUND BURKE, *Thoughts on the Present Discontents*.

It does not seem to be disputed by anyone that (whether it ought to be so or not) the British House of Commons is not that 'image of the feelings of the nation' desired by Burke. Almost every election produces startling differences between the nation as reflected in its votes and the House of Commons resulting from those votes. The 'image' is usually like that seen in a distorting mirror: it is true that every feature of the reflection corresponds to something in the original, but one feature may be exaggerated out of all proportion, while another—perhaps equally important in the original—becomes scarcely perceptible.

Among elections from 1885 onwards (1885 being the first in which the single-member constituency was general), only two can be found (1892 and 1923) that do not seriously distort the representation of the major parties as well as of any minor ones.

Admittedly, in 1951 the distortion of the two major parties was small, but it was important in as much as it involved a change of government.

BRITISH GENERAL ELECTIONS 1885 TO 1951


	Conservative		*Liberal*		*Labour*		*Others*	
	Votes %	*Seats* %	*Votes* %	*Seats* %	*Votes* %	*Seats* %	*Votes* %	*Seats* %
1885	44	37	49	50	—	—	7	13
1886	51·5	59	45	28	—	—	3·5	13
1892	47	47	44	41	—	—	9	12
1895	49	61	46	26 5	—	—	5	12·5
1900	51	60	46·5	27·5	—	—	2·5	12 5
1906	44	23 5	55	64	—	—	1	12·5
1910 (Jan.)	47	40 5	43	41	8	6	2	12·5
1910 (Dec.)	46	41	44	40	7	6	3	13
1918	35	54	23	23·5	15	10	27	12·5
1922	39	56	29	18 5	29·5	23	2 5	2·5
1923	38	42	29 5	26	30 5	31	2	1
1924	47	67	18	6 5	33	24 5	2	2
1929	38	42	23 5	10	37	47	1·5	1
1931	55	76	11	12	30	8 5	4	3·5
1935	54	70	6·5	3	37·5	25	2	2
1945	40	33	9	2	48	62	3	3
1950	43	47 8	9	1·5	46	50 4	2	0 3
1951	48	50 5	2 5	1	48 5	47	1	0 5

NOTES. The above figures are taken from the *Constitutional Year Book* up to 1935, from *The Times* after this. Other authorities will be found to differ in detail, but there are no discrepancies that affect the conclusions drawn.

'Conservative' includes Liberal Unionist, National, and other categories habitually voting with the Conservatives. Professor Hermens (*Europe between Democracy and Anarchy*, pp. 18 and 19) gives incorrect figures for 1950: his Conservative seats include the 17 seats won by allies of the Conservative Party, standing under various titles such as National Liberal or Liberal and Conservative, but the corresponding figure he gives for votes is that of votes for avowedly Conservative candidates only. Nearly one million votes cast for their allies are neglected.

'Others' are until 1918 mainly Irish Nationalists. Owing to their concentration in a few constituencies, and to uncontested elections in some of these, the percentage of seats won by Irish Nationalists is high in proportion to their votes and is nearly constant in each of the two periods—up to 1918 when all Ireland sent Members to Westminster, and since 1918 when only Northern Ireland has done so.

From the table, or more clearly from the diagram, it will be seen that there is a general tendency to exaggerate the representation of the largest party and to reduce that of the smaller


BRITISH GENERAL ELECTIONS 1885 TO 1951
Conservative
Liberal
Labour
Others
Votes %
50
40
30
20
10
0
Seats %
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1885
1886
1892
1895
1900
1906
1910
1910
1918
1922
1923
1924
1929
1931
1935
1945
1950
1951

ones. The large Parliamentary majorities for the Liberals in 1906 and for the Conservatives in 1931 and 1935 were backed by only small majorities of votes; the Conservatives in 1924 polled a little under half the votes but got a two-to-one majority in the Commons, and in 1945 this position was reversed to the benefit of the Labour Party. There is, however, no consistent relation between the largest party's support in the country and its strength in Parliament. In 1892 (one of the rare examples of a true 'image'), 47 per cent of the votes gave the Conservatives 47 per cent of the seats; in 1910 it gave them only 40·5 per cent, but in 1924 it gave them an overwhelming majority. The Liberals polled slightly better in 1929 than in 1918, but won less than half as many seats. For Labour, a 30 per cent poll meant in 1923 the assumption of office as a minority government, in 1931 electoral disaster. Although the over-representation of the party polling the most votes is common, it is not the invariable effect: in 1929 the Conservatives were the largest party among the voters but only the second largest in the Commons, and in 1951 the Conservatives secured a clear majority in Parliament though polling rather fewer votes than Labour.

In some elections, the established parties are of less importance than some other grouping; for instance in 1918 and again in 1931 the main division in the electorate was for or against the coalition government. Both the pro- and the anti-coalitionists included members of several parties, and two of the major parties had candidates in both camps. If we examine the figures of votes and seats obtained by the two groups instead of those for the parties, we find the same lack of even a rough correspondence between the wishes of the voters and the composition of the House of Commons. The result in each case was a great exaggeration of the popular majority: in 1918 a very small majority of votes for the coalition gave it more than three-quarters of the seats, and in 1931 a two-to-one majority of votes secured a nine-to-one majority of the seats.

	Coalition		*Anti-Coalition*	
	Votes	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*
1918	5,101,167 = 52%	472 = 78%	4,674,007 = 48%	130 22%
1931	14,539,403 = 68%	554 = 90%	6,865,330 = 32%	61 10%

The British system, which, it is not generally appreciated, is used in only a few other countries, has produced similar results there. Three successive Canadian general elections gave the Conservative Party, which had most votes, first, nearly its proportional share of the seats, second, fewer seats than the party having the second largest number of votes, and, third, a disproportionate majority of seats.[1] More recently, the Liberals have had substantial majorities of votes, which gave them overwhelming majorities of seats.

CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS, GENERAL ELECTIONS

		Votes	*% Votes*	*Seats*	*% Seats*
1925	Conservative	1,467,596	46·5	117	48
	Liberal	1,266,534	40	101	41
	Progressive, etc.	282,599	9	25	10
	Ind., Labour, etc.	140,842	4 5	3	1
1926	Conservative	1,504,855	46	91	37
	Liberal	1,421,804	43·5	118	48
	Progressive, etc.	261,420	8	31	13
	Ind., Labour, etc.	68,429	2	5	2
1930	Conservative	1,009,955	49	138	57
	Liberal	1,714,860	44	87	35
	Progressive, etc.	173,838	4 5	15	6
	Ind., Labour, etc.	99,342	2 5	5	2
1940	Liberal	2,411,197	54	181	75
	Conservative	1,396,749	31 5	39	16
	C.C.F. (Labour)	370,710	8 5	8	3
	Social Credit	119,038	2·5	10	4
	Others	161,167	3 5	5	2

The greater representation of the small parties, as compared with Britain, is accounted for by their local concentration.[2]

In New Zealand, the system has on the whole given a truer reflection of the votes cast, though there also majorities tend to be exaggerated. For example, in the 1951 election (in which 99·8 per cent of the votes were shared by the two major parties), the Nationalists won 54 per cent of the votes but 63 per cent of the seats. The only other Dominion using the

[1] H. McD. Clokie, *Canadian Government and Politics* (Longmans, Green & Co., 1944), p. 82.

[2] A party of 30,000 voters all in one constituency will win one seat; 3,000,000 voters distributed evenly over Britain will win no seats.

first-past-the-post system—South Africa—has on the other hand suffered from extreme distortions, causing the Malan government to assume and retain office against the will of a majority of the voters.[1]

Elections for the United States' House of Representatives take place under the same voting system as those for the House of Commons. The results, taken over the country as a whole, do not as a rule show very large divergences between the votes polled by either of the major parties and the seats won by it, but this is due partly to another feature of the first-past-the-post system which is even more marked in America than in Britain—that is, the existence of solid blocks of constituencies that never change their party representation. In the "solid south", the Democratic majority wins every seat, while parts of the north are monopolised by the Republicans to almost the same extent. This means that neither party is likely to achieve a victory so sweeping as that of the British government in 1931, but it also means that the differences between north and south are exaggerated—that the opposition between the two halves of the country is made to appear in the House to be sharper than it really is.[2]

THE BLOCK VOTE[3]

Another form of the first-past-the-post system is used in multi-member constituencies with each voter having one vote for every seat to be filled. This leads to even greater distortion than the single-member constituency form used for elections to the British House of Commons and often results in all the seats being won by the party gaining a relative majority. The method is widely used for local government elections in Britain, particularly in the Metropolitan Boroughs.

In any election where political parties or analogous groups are an important factor, it almost invariably results in the candidates of one such group being elected *en bloc*, just as if the electors had voted for Party A, Party B or Party C under a rule

[1] See below, pp. 68–9.

[2] See below, p. 63.

[3] This term gives rise to some confusion, for it is applied also to the casting by a Trade Union delegate of as many votes as there are members of his union (whether those members are unanimous on the matter in question or not), but it is certainly appropriate as a description of the results obtained. The Trade Union method could be better described as the Branch Block Vote.

awarding all the seats to the party obtaining the most votes.[1] The sharing of seats between parties occurs only when those parties are nearly equal in strength. The London boroughs elect anything from two to nine councillors in each ward, the most usual number being three or six; in their three most recent elections, the number of contested wards returning councillors of one party only was 244 out of 262 in 1945, 289 out of 301 in 1949 and 316 out of 326 in 1953.

The prevalence of this one-party representation is due to the fact that to most electors party is the factor that primarily determines their votes: they vote for a poor candidate of the 'right' party rather than a good candidate of the 'wrong' one. Given this tendency on the part of the voters, we can see from an imaginary example how the method must inevitably give a 'block' result. Suppose that a ward electing three councillors is contested by two parties, having candidates A, B, C, and L, M, N respectively; further that, of these candidates, A, B, and L are much more distinguished than the others, and finally that, out of 1,000 voters, 600 support the first party, 300 support the second, and the remaining 100 vote irrespective of party for the three candidates known to be personally the most suitable. Thus, candidates A, B, and C will each get one vote from each of their 600 party supporters and L, M, and N one from each of the second party's 300, while A, B, and L will each get 100 personal votes, and the result will be:

Elected:	A.	600 + 100 = 700
	B.	600 + 100 = 700
	C.	600 + 0 = 600
Not elected:	L.	300 + 100 = 400
	M.	300 + 0 = 300
	N.	300 + 0 = 300

Clearly, if the two parties were more evenly balanced (for example with 475 and 425 votes respectively) the personal votes given to L would suffice to secure one seat for the smaller party, but this is a comparatively rare occurrence.

The following are some typical examples of results in block vote elections. They could be multiplied indefinitely. The complete exclusion from representation of a large minority is seen for instance in the 1949 election for the Borough of Bethnal Green or for the Norland ward of Kensington:

[1] As in American Presidential elections.

BETHNAL GREEN, 1949

	Votes	*Seats*
Labour	60,122	30
Others	44,029	0

KENSINGTON—NORLAND WARD, 1949

	Conservative	*Labour*
Votes	2,556	2,493
	2,545	2,484
	2,529	2,481
	2,526	2,466
	2,510	2,457
	2,498	2,448
Total	15,164	14,829
Seats	6	0

In a contest as close as this latter, it is clear that a trifling turn-over of votes will have a great effect: if only six of the Conservative voters had failed to vote, the first Labour candidate would have been elected, and if 55 of the 2,500 Conservative voters had been induced to vote Labour instead, all six seats would have gone to Labour. An example of a complete change in the representation of a ward while nine-tenths of the voters remained of the same opinion is the South-east St. Andrew ward of Holborn:

	November 1945		*May 1949*		
	Labour	*Conservative*	*Labour*	*Conservative*	*Independent*
Votes	1,152	901	979	1,167	115
	1,138	859	945	1,151	
	1,102	841	924	1,147	
	1,078	840	924	1,146	
	1,077	838	913	1,131	
	1,073	838	911	1,126	
	1,061	830	902	1,116	
	1,053	819	896	1,106	
	1,046	789	890	1,095	
Total	9,780	7,555	8,284	10,185	
	56·5%	43·5%	45%	55%	
Seats	9	0	0	9	

There are also cases where a minority has won more seats than the majority. This can easily happen in one ward when more than two parties contest it:

FULHAM (LILLIE WARD) 1949

	Votes		*Seats*
Conservative	16,023		6
Labour	14,864	16,401	0
Liberal	1,537		0

Over a whole borough, moreover, a minority may win even though each individual ward be won on a clear majority.

LIVERPOOL 1953

	Votes	*Seats*
Conservative	349,288	52
Labour	343,112	65
Others	28,524	3

This minority victory occurred in spite of the fact that a "split vote" affected only one ward, and in spite of a redistribution just carried out to make wards as nearly as possible equal in electorate.

The importance given to party as compared with a candidate's fitness is apparent from the above Kensington and Holborn figures. The worst candidate of the largest party defeats the best candidate of any other, and the consequent exclusion of outstanding people from council service is a commonplace. Hence the 'alternative government' is often ill-equipped to take over; when a new party gains control of a council, it may happen that even its ablest councillors are handicapped by having had no previous experience.

Just the same effects are obvious in Parliamentary elections under the block vote, in Greece at various periods, in Turkey (1950 and 1954) and in New Brunswick. Turkey voted in constituencies coinciding with the Vilayets (provinces) into which it is divided, each Vilayet returning one member for each 40,000 of its population. This number varied from one member in Hakiari to 27 in Istanbul, and each elector was entitled to exercise as many votes as there were seats in his constituency. In each constituency the largest party swept the board, and the result over the whole of Turkey in 1950 was as follows:

	Percentage of votes	*Seats obtained*	
		Number	*Percentage*
Democrats	55	408	84
People's Party	40	69	14
Independents	5	9	2
Nationalists		1	
	100	487	100

In New Brunswick, the 1948 election for the Provincial Parliament gave a degree of distortion similar to that in the British general election of 1931, the Progressive Conservatives being reduced to an impotent Opposition of five Members. In the subsequent election, in 1952, that Opposition increased its poll heavily, to slightly more than that of the Liberals, and won a two-to-one majority of seats. The Liberal leader and most of his Cabinet lost their seats.

		Progressive Conservatives	*Liberals*
1948.	Votes	145,028	332,321
	Seats	5	47
	Seats in proportion to votes	16	36
1952.	Votes	358,295	330,387
	Seats	36	16
	Seats in proportion to votes	27	25

MAJORITY RULE, STRONG GOVERNMENT AND THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

Defenders of the British electoral system often maintain that it is neither necessary nor desirable for representation of different groups within the electorate to be mathematically exact; it is sufficient if the composition of the elected body reflects broadly the main trends of opinion. "If we avoid a minority in the country getting a majority of seats, and if our political manners . . . give the minority a chance of effective debate and the majority the ultimate ruling force, we have done all we need to do."[1] It is not clear from the context of this quotation whether the writer has in mind an absolute or a relative majority. Whichever is meant, however, examination of British election results shows that the first-past-the-post system gives no assurance of majority rule. As the table opposite shows, only two governments since 1910 have been backed by more than half the votes cast in a general election (the 1931 and 1935 coalitions). Two had not even a relative majority; in 1929 and 1951 the Government party polled fewer votes than the largest single opposition party.

It may be argued that the winning of an election by a party with less than half the votes results merely from a division among that party's opponents; that is, from the existence of

[1] Herman Finer, Fabian Tract No. 211, *The Case Against Proportional Representation*, p. 7.

more than two parties. But the first-past-the-post system, it is said, will reduce the number of parties to two, and therefore minority rule will be only a temporary condition. These assumptions, however, are far from being justified. In the first place, although in Britain the system does seem to operate against the survival of a substantial third party, even in this country the limitation of parties to two has never been absolute, and in Canada (as formerly in Denmark under the same system) there are four main parties, none of which shows any signs of disappearing. (See page 29.)

Election	*Government*	*Votes*		*Seats*	
		Government	*All other parties*	*Government*	*All other parties*
1910 (Jan.)	Liberal	2,873,251	3,794,553	275	395
1910 (Dec.)	Liberal	*2,290,020	*2,944,273	270	400
1918	Coalition	5,180,641	5,602,046	485	222
1922	Conservative	5,500,387	8,893,250	344	271
1923	Labour	4,438,508	10,110,013	191	424
1924	Conservative	7,854,523	8,786,256	412	203
1929	Labour	8,389,512	14,258,863	288	327
1931	Coalition	14,532,519	7,123,851	554	61
1935	Coalition	11,810,552	10,215,152	433	182
1945	Labour	11,992,292	12,981,006	393	247
1950	Labour	13,295,736	15,173,741	315	310
1951	Conservative	13,718,069	14,878,620	321	304

* Figures from *Constitutional Year Book*. Other authorities differ substantially but the differences do not affect the relative positions of the parties.

In the second place, even if there be only two parties, election of one member by a majority for each constituency affords no guarantee that the party with the majority of votes will win the majority of seats. A recent example is provided by the 1948 South African election. In this election, the United Party led by General Smuts agreed with the Labour Party not to oppose each other in the constituencies, and the Nationalist Party of Dr. Malan made a similar pact with the Afrikaner Party. The effect was to make the election virtually a straight fight between the Smuts and Malan groups; only eleven seats were contested by other candidates in addition, and even these were each won by a candidate having a clear majority over all his opponents combined. Yet the result was to turn a sub-

stantial majority of votes on Smuts' side into an equally substantial majority of seats on Malan's,[1] as the following table shows.

		Votes		*Seats*	
Smuts Parties:	United Party	515,273	547,437	54	60
	Labour Party	32,164		6	
Malan Parties:	Nationalist Party	400,453	442,338	69	78
	Afrikaner Party	41,885		9	
Others			76,279		0
			1,066,054		138

Malan's Parliamentary majority was reduced by the unopposed return of twelve members, eleven of whom belonged to the United Party, but on the other hand these unopposed returns must be regarded as evidence that popular support for Smuts' government as against his opponent was even greater than the voting figures indicate—for it is obvious that a party's candidates will not be left unopposed unless they are considered to be certain of a large majority. A similar minority victory occurred in the next election, 1953.

In 1886, a British election turned largely on a single issue: should Ireland be granted Home Rule or not. The votes cast for the Gladstonian Liberals and the Irish Nationalists on the one hand and those for the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists on the other, were almost equal, and indeed the former group may have been in a slight majority.[2] Yet, their opponents had in the House of Commons a majority of 104 seats. This represented a crushing defeat for Mr. Gladstone and his Irish policy, and caused the urgent question of Home Rule to be shelved for many years.

[1] For a detailed examination of how this came about see pp. 68–9.

[2] The *Constitutional Year Book* gives the following figures of votes:

Conservative	1,037,779	Gladstonian Liberal	1,241,357
Liberal Unionist	385,986	Irish Nationalist	99,774

from which we get these totals of votes on each side:

anti-Home Rule	1,423,765	pro-Home Rule	1,341,131

But there were 216 uncontested seats. J. Rooke Corbett, M.A., of the Manchester Statistical Society, read a paper before that Society (*Transactions*, 12 December 1906; see also the Proportional Representation Society's pamphlet No. 14, April 1910), in which, for general elections from 1885 onwards, he made an adjustment for the uncontested seats. This he did by assuming that the percentage shift in opinion since the previous general election was the same in the uncontested as in the contested constituencies—a basis accepted as sound by the Royal Commission that reported in 1910. With this adjustment, the total electoral support for the two sides comes to be:

anti-Home Rule	2,049,137	pro-Home Rule	2,103,954

Such an election result may satisfy those to whom the first essential is "strong" government, meaning that there should be one party with a majority in the House of Commons large enough to ensure that it shall be able to carry out its policy unhindered. Those who take this view hold that even if such a majority rests on a minority of votes, this is better than a position of stalemate.[1] The first-past-the-post system certainly does often produce such a large parliamentary majority when a system giving a truer mirror of opinion would lead to a very small majority for one party or to none. Instances have already been mentioned. Failure to produce a large Parliamentary majority is, however, much more common than many suppose. Both British general elections of 1910 left the government party dependent on support from one or both of two small parties that were more or less in agreement with it. In 1923 and 1929, three parties each obtained a substantial share of the seats, the smallest in each case holding the balance between the other two. In 1950, the winning party had a majority of only five seats over all other parties combined and only 17 seats over its nearest rival alone—a precarious majority which was a source of continual anxiety to the Whips. Thus, five elections out of the last twelve have failed to justify the trust placed in the system by advocates of single-party government.

Some European countries in similar circumstances have modified their electoral law with the avowed object of inflating the largest party's Parliamentary majority.[2] No such measures, however, have been proposed in Britain. In this country, advocates of the one-party majority prefer to rely on the general tendency of the first-past-the-post system to produce such a result more often than not; its failures in this respect they ascribe to circumstances which they expect to be only temporary.

PERSONALITIES AND PROGRAMMES

In form, a British general election is still the selection by each locality of a representative to consult with the representatives of other localities what action shall be taken in the various affairs of the nation. In fact, an election has become a plebiscite to

[1] The justification of this opinion is discussed in Chapter VIII.
[2] See for example Mussolini's law of 1922, p. 189.

decide whether one party or another shall be empowered, for the next few years, to govern the country as it sees fit.[1] The elector is asked for a general vote of confidence in a party, in its leaders as a potential government, and in its policy as a whole. He cannot accept one item of policy and reject another. True, if the election is dominated by one question of outstanding importance, the voters may justly be held to have given a decision on that particular matter. But they have no opportunity to express their wishes on other items of policy of the party for which they vote.

It may be argued that it is impossible, and indeed undesirable, for the electorate to pronounce on particular questions of policy; to have an intelligent opinion on such matters may demand technical knowledge which the ordinary citizen does not possess. That is the case against the referendum, against the modern tendency of political parties to submit detailed programmes, and in favour of the Conservative Party's resistance to that tendency; it is the case in favour of the conception of a general election as the choice of men and women who are committed to certain broad principles and who can be trusted to act in any particular situation in accordance with those principles.

If we accept this position, however, it is surely of the first importance that the electors should be able to choose their M.P. because he is, for example, a person of deep convictions on the important principles, of sufficient intelligence to apply those principles to any problem of government that may arise, and of sufficient integrity to act on those principles even when they happen to conflict with his own immediate interests. As Professor Laski says,[2] 'the problem of democratic government is not less a problem of finding men apt to the use of its machinery than the problem of a monarchy is to find a race of kings fitted by their endowments to benefit the State'.

Does our electoral system fufil this requirement? On the Continent of Europe there is a widespread impression that it does,[3] and it will certainly be generally admitted that British public life has attracted the disinterested service of men and

[1] Compare Jennings, *The British Constitution* (3rd ed.), p. 162; 'A general election is in reality the election of a Prime Minister.'

[2] *Grammar of Politics*, p. 17.

[3] See for example *Der Wähler* (organ of the German Wählergesellschaft), 1951, No. 2, p. 39.

women of very high calibre and has on the whole shown a high standard of integrity. Nevertheless, instances are by no means lacking of outstanding personalities who have been unable to win or to retain a seat in Parliament, or who owe their presence there to something other than the choice of the voters. It is in practice not the voters who decide which man or woman shall be sent to Westminster, but a party, or perhaps some other powerful body such as a trade union.

The more an election under the British system is looked upon as a plebiscite between two potential governments, the more must this be true. The election becomes something very like that of the American President, in which voting is nominally for members of an electoral college but nobody cares what kind of persons those members may be: all that matters is whether they, in their turn, are pledged to vote for Mr. A or Mr. B as President. Similarly, the British voter in general makes up his mind which of two or more party programmes he prefers, and votes for the candidate who is pledged to support that programme; the candidate's personality is irrelevant. The voter often does not even consider the relative merits of the candidates as persons; he sometimes even hardly considers their names, and has to ask on arrival at the polling booth which candidate stands for which party. If he does consider their personal merits, he is unlikely to be swayed by them, for what would be the sense in voting for the most admirable candidate if he is going to support in Parliament measures that the voter believes would be disastrous? Better a nonentity of the 'right' party than a brilliant man of the 'wrong' one.

The great majority do in fact vote for a party, no matter who its candidate may be. A party agent,[1] discussing what factors affect the results of elections, has estimated the influence of the candidate's personality to be 5 per cent, which others consider an overestimate, and the apparent absence of any discrimination between one candidate and another of the same party appears wherever it is possible to make such a comparison. When different candidates contest the same constituency in similar circumstances, they poll their party's strength, without noticeable addition or subtraction on account of their own merits. One instance (which will be referred to again) is that

[1] *Labour Organiser*, December 1945, pp. 4–6.

of the City of London in 1906, when the ex-Prime Minister polled in a by-election 15,474 compared with 15,619 in the general election a few weeks earlier for the party colleague who resigned in order to give his leader the seat. Another is West Walthamstow, where a back-bench Labour candidate polled 65 per cent of the votes cast in 1945 and his popular Prime Minister polled 62 per cent in 1950, the Labour poll over the whole country having fallen in the interval from 48 per cent to 46 per cent. Party voting is even more strikingly seen in any British Parliamentary or local government election in a constituency returning two or more members (except those for the universities from 1918 to 1945—see p. 202). The few two-member constituencies that remained until they were abolished by the Act of 1948 gave results of which this for Stockport in 1945 is typical:

Gridley	(Conservative)	31,039
Hulbert	(Conservative)	30,792
Stamp	(Labour)	29,674
Casasola	(Labour)	29,630
Sutherland	(Liberal)	14,994
Malbon	(Liberal)	14,942

In the same election, the result for County Antrim was:

O'Neill	(Ulster Unionist)	57,259
Haughton	(Ulster Unionist)	57,232
Holmes	(Labour)	18,403

Sir Hugh O'Neill was an ex-Speaker of the Northern Ireland Parliament, thirty years an M.P. at Westminster, ex-Under-Secretary for India and Burma, while Major Haughton was a newcomer who sat only in that one Parliament, but if more than 27 out of the 57,000 Ulster Unionist voters made any distinction in their minds between the two, their votes fail to show it.

In Parliamentary elections, most people seem to take such Party voting for granted, with only occasional expressions of regret; where local Councils are concerned, it is much more common to hear the opinion that 'what we want on the Council is the best men and women, regardless of Party'. This quite widespread attitude, however, makes little difference to the results. First in London, and then to a gradually increasing extent in other counties, boroughs, urban districts and even rural districts, elections have given results like this:

BOROUGH OF BETHNAL GREEN, 1949
(EAST WARD)

	Labour candidates	*Liberal candidates*	*Conservative candidates*
Votes	3,238	1,543	466
	3,194	1,512	456
	3,193	1,504	436
	3,179	1,502	435
	3,177	1,474	418
	3,159	1,463	414
	3,147	1,450	405
	3,098	1,445	392
	3,077	1,428	383
Total	28,462	13,321	3,805
Seats	9	0	0

BOROUGH OF HAMPSTEAD, 1953
(KILBURN WARD, 6 seats)

	Labour candidates	*Conservative candidates*	*Liberal candidates*
Votes	2,382	1,790	362
	2,299	1,650	338
	2,288	1,641	317
	2,190	1,607	276
	2,184	1,600	261
	2,166	1,594	260
Total	13,509	9,882	1,814
Seats	6	0	0

The distinguished citizen at the head of the winning party's poll is elected, but so is the last candidate of that same party —perhaps a man who has been persuaded to accept nomination reluctantly for no better reason than that the party must have *some* name to fill a last-minute gap in its list of candidates.[1] The nonentities on the other parties' lists are defeated, but so are any among their candidates who may have outstanding qualifications. It is evident that a candidate's chance of election has come to depend almost solely on the strength of his party in that constituency, and that in a very large number of elections we can apply either Mr. Herbert Morrison's remark to the London Labour Party in 1946 or its Conservative equivalent: 'We have reached a point when, however unsuitable a candi-

[1] See below, p.43.

date, if he has the Labour ticket he is bound to win.' Other instances of the eclipse of personality by parties (or other groups) occur in trade unions and other unofficial bodies using this voting system. In 1948, for example, members of the Musicians' Union were disturbed to find that every member of their new Executive was a 'straight' musician, the dance band musicians (including some who had given valued service to the Union) being entirely excluded. Such examples of impersonal voting could be multiplied indefinitely.

Because of this tendency for the worst candidate of the largest party to defeat the best candidate of any other party, bodies elected by the block vote are often deprived of the services of people with outstanding personal qualifications. Instances of this can be found in most British towns, and in Greece and Turkey under the same system. The Turkish general election in 1950 returned an excessive number of inexperienced members and excluded the former Parliament's leading personalities. President Inonu himself (the man most responsible for there being free elections in Turkey at all) lost his seat in Istanbul and remained in Parliament thanks only to the law that allowed him to stand also for his own home town. Such results do not necessarily imply indifference on the part of the voters to the personal qualities of candidates; they arise from an electoral system that masks the personal element in voting.

If there are two vacancies and an elector has two votes, he may give one of these to a candidate whom he personally admires; what of his second vote? If parties are contending, he will probably give this to a candidate of the same party as his favourite—hence the two candidates of any one party will poll nearly the same number of votes, even if one be distinguished and the other obscure. If there are no parties, the result may reflect quite accurately the voters' opinions of the candidates, but there is no certainty that it will do so. One reason is that a voter who has, say, five votes and approves of six of the candidates, does not necessarily omit the candidate he considers least meritorious; he may decide not to "waste" a vote on a candidate he believes everyone will support. Another reason is that such a voter casts one vote *for* the candidate he most wants and four votes *against* him, that is to say for four of his opponents; this may cause the defeat even of a candidate considered by a substantial majority to be the best.

Such a defeat may be avoided if that candidate's supporters agree either not to use all their votes or to use them in a certain manner. The system, therefore, puts a premium on organisation; it may cause electors to organise on party lines even though their inclination is to consider only personal merit. To secure the election of one person it may be necessary for his supporters to nominate as many candidates as there are seats and campaign on behalf of this group *en bloc*. If the desire is to elect candidates of a certain party, that party must also refrain from nominating more candidates than there are seats; else it will lose by splitting the vote. Hence, a party cannot give its supporters a choice between candidates of different personal merits. When only one member is to be elected, as in a British parliamentary constituency, the party is forced to nominate one candidate, and only one. Therefore some selection committee has to choose a candidate; the local party organization has to ratify this choice or substitute some other candidate; the voters must either accept that candidate or not support the party at all. Certainly, those responsible for the selection will take into account the probable opinions of the voters, preferring a candidate whose personal qualities are likely to attract votes rather than one likely to be unpopular. This indirect effect of the voters' preference may, however, be decisive only where the result of the election is in doubt. If the majority at the previous election was only a few hundred, the 5 per cent or so of votes swayed by the candidate's personal qualities will be vital; in a constituency where such conditions exist there will be competition for good candidates. Where, however, the majority is large, there is nothing to compel consideration of voters' reactions; the party organization can then give the seat to whom it wishes, as a reward either for real merit or for services to the party or for nothing better than a large contribution to its funds. Even the most unpopular candidate would hardly jeopardize the 37,000 Labour majority in Hemsworth or the Conservatives' 25,000 majority in South Kensington. Hence we find that among the safe seats only a small proportion are held by nationally known and widely respected Members.[1] On the other hand, people of just that type are very often defeated, and defeated, not by their chief critics, but as a rule by comparative nonentities. Gladstone, Harcourt, Morley, Balfour, Churchill, Asquith, Samuel, Amery, Beveridge,

[1] See below, p. 97.

Sinclair, Byers, Smuts in South Africa, and many other leaders have been lost to Parliament, temporarily or permanently, by a decline in their party's vote, although at the time of their defeat the bulk of the electorate would certainly have echoed the *Manchester Guardian's* verdict on Amery: that if any member of his party should be in the House, he should.[1] When a party loses heavily, the members it loses are not necessarily the mediocre ones who could well be spared; they are quite as likely to be the pick of that party's talent. Thus, in the landslide of 1931, the Labour Party lost all but two of its Cabinet Ministers, and the 52 M.P.'s who remained to it were not those whom the electorate could be supposed to have selected as the most worthy to survive. Sometimes it is a re-elected government's strength that is impaired by election losses (in 1950, for example, the Labour Government lost its Solicitor-General, its Colonial Secretary and Under-Secretary, and its Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs) but most often the effect is to weaken the Opposition. The recognized position of the Opposition in British Parliamentary practice is an admission that responsible criticism of the Government is desired, yet the value and effectiveness of such criticism are often reduced by the absence from the House of Commons of some whose talents and experience qualify them particularly well for the role of constructive critics.

In one recent instance, the government itself has taken prompt steps to repair such a loss: the Labour government of 1945, committed to the Beveridge Plan as a major item in its programme, found the main author of that Plan deprived of his seat in the House of Commons; it gave Parliament the benefit of his advice by elevating him to the Lords.

More usually, the victim's party (if it is in a position to do so) offers him a safe seat elsewhere, in a by-election either occurring conveniently or created for the purpose. One instance has already been mentioned.[2] In 1906, the Conservatives' poll dropped by only 7 per cent as compared with the previous election, yet they lost 244 seats, including that of their leader, A. J. Balfour. The Hon. Alban Gibbs, who had been elected for the City of London with 15,619 votes, promptly resigned, and Balfour was elected, with almost exactly the same number of votes

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 27 October 1950.

[2] P. 40.

(15,474), in the by-election which followed. Similarly, Field-Marshal Smuts, the defeated Prime Minister of South Africa, was returned unopposed for Pretoria East a few weeks after losing his seat at Standerton in the 1948 general election. Instances involving less prominent ministers are common. Sometimes the probable defeat of a leader is foreseen and his party arranges for him to transfer to a safer constituency. For example, in 1950 the Foreign Secretary would have risked defeat if he had remained in Wandsworth Central and was given instead the safe Labour seat of Woolwich East. That a government may be forced by the voting system to such subterfuges, in wishing to retain the services of a distinguished man, is neither dignified nor democratic.

THE RUBBER STAMP

Examination of such cases serves to emphasize that, in a modern British election, the selection of the men and women who are to serve as representatives is made, not by the electors whom nominally they represent, but by party organizations (local or national). The tendency was already evident in 1861, when John Stuart Mill wrote[1] that 'it is becoming more and more difficult for any one who has only talents and character to gain admission into the House of Commons. The only persons who can get elected are those who possess local influence, or make their way by lavish expenditure, or who, on the invitation of three or four tradesmen or attorneys, are sent down by one of the two great parties from their London clubs, as men whose votes the party can depend on under all circumstances.' Today, dependence on party is even greater. No Independents have been elected (or even come near being elected) in the last two general elections, and every Member depends for his seat on the party that supported him.[2] If the party refuses to nominate him again for his present constituency or for some other where it has a majority, his Parliamentary career is probably ended.

The effects of electoral systems on the conduct of elected bodies will be discussed more fully in chapters viii to x, but it should be pointed out here to what a great extent this depen-

[1] *Representative Government*, ch. vii.

[2] 'In 1761 not one Parliamentary election was determined by party, and in 1951 not one constituency returned a non-party Member.' Lewis B. Namier, *Monarchy and the Party System* (Romanes Lecture, Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 4.

dence on party support has caused our Parliament to depart from the ideal of selected citizens bringing their own minds to bear on the problems of government. What Burke regarded as intolerable servitude is a commonplace today: 'These politicians suppose . . . that you are blindly to follow the opinion of your party, when in direct opposition to your own ideas; a degree of servitude that no worthy man could bear the thought of submitting to; and such as, I believe, no connexion (except some court factions) ever could be so senselessly tyrannical as to impose'.[1] In the present century, Lord Birkenhead[2] expressed a similar opinion, without Burke's confidence that the state of affairs he feared was improbable: 'I believe that the darkest menace to our freedom would come in that moment when it was definitely pronounced that a man was compelled in the House of Commons to give a vote irrespective of the debate upon which that vote was given, because he had received orders which, as a condition of his livelihood, he was compelled to obey'. Whatever may be the reasons for which he does so, it must be admitted that it is now common for an M.P. to vote with his party even when he disagrees with it, and that the result of any division can usually be foretold before the debate from a knowledge of how many members of each party will be physically capable of entering the division lobby.

No member can be expected to be in agreement with his party on every occasion. He may, however, vote with it, even when in disagreement, for either of two reasons: (1) because failure to do so might bring about the defeat of his party, and with it of projects more important than the matter in question, and (2) because he is subjected to some form of coercion. The possibility of coercion results from the fact that the member has little, if any, hope of being re-elected without the support of his party.

Especially since the narrow majority of 1950 led to the imposition on M.P.'s of more than usually rigid discipline, there has been much criticism of the unreality of debates that are not expected to influence Parliamentary votes.[3] The critics, however, do not usually suggest any means of putting it beyond the power of the party to impose an excessive degree

[1] *Thoughts on the Present Discontents*, 1770.
[2] Speech to the Sphinx Club, London, December 1910.
[3] See for example Christopher Hollis, M.P., *Everybody's Weekly*, 12 January 1952.

of discipline, for instance by transferring the selection of the member from the hands of a party caucus to those of the voters.

THE GAMBLE

"There is no greater gamble on earth than a British general election."

James Middleton (Secretary of the Labour Party), *Contemporary Review*, January 1936.

In previous sections it has been shown that an election under the first-past-the-post system frequently fails to reflect in the elected assembly the various opinions of the electorate, or the main political tendencies when these are represented by two parties or coalitions.

A further characteristic of the system is that the result of a general election may depend on a very few votes; if the contest is close, it may be decided by a small turnover of votes in certain marginal constituencies. On the other hand, in 'safe' constituencies a considerable fluctuation will make no difference. A party which loses a few votes in these vital marginal constituencies can be unjustly penalized despite the fact that it has made up leeway in others, and that, over all the country, a change in public opinion has been negligible.

In the British election of 1950, for example, the smallest majority was 28 for the Conservative in Stroud and Thornbury, and the largest 37,680 for the Labour candidate in Hemsworth. A mere fifteen people changing from Conservative to Labour in Stroud and Thornbury would have given the seat to Labour, whilst in Hemsworth 18,839 could desert the Labour candidate for the Conservative without causing him to lose his seat. A change in representation could, indeed, take place without any change in opinion at all. For example in the neighbouring constituencies of Stroud and Thornbury and of South Gloucestershire, twenty-nine Conservatives moving from the former to the latter would have caused their party to lose a seat, yet their votes in their new constituency could have brought it no compensating advantage.

	Stroud and Thornbury		*South Gloucestershire*
Conservative	24,874		18,320
Labour	24,846		24,458
Liberal	7,518		7,342
Conservative majority	28	Labour majority	6,138

For this reason, the seats that will be won by a party will not depend simply on that party's total votes; it is possible for the totals of all parties to remain unchanged from one election to another and yet for the seats won by them to alter. In the three general elections between 1922 and 1924, the changes in public opinion were small, yet the government passed from Conservative to Labour and back to Conservative.[1] In 1923, each of the three principal parties polled within one per cent of what it had done thirteen months before, but the Conservatives lost 90 seats. Butler[2] points out that the parties' support did not really remain as constant as the figures of total votes suggest: the numbers of candidates nominated on behalf of the various parties changed, and a better measure of their popular support is the number of votes obtained *per candidate*. This is a valid criticism, but if we do examine the average votes per candidate we still find that the changes in them are small compared with the changes in seats and may even be in the opposite direction. In 1923, Labour candidates in constituencies contested by them obtained an average vote that was 2·8 per cent better than their 1922 average, the total of votes for all parties having also risen by 2·8 per cent; but Labour won 188 contested seats instead of 138, an increase of 36 per cent.

Butler contends that British general elections are not a gamble because it is possible to predict results by the "cube law".[3] According to that "law", if the great majority of the votes are shared by only two parties (which was not the case in 1922–24), if those parties are not far from equal, and if the distribution of their support over the country is similar, the ratio of the seats won by those parties will be the cube of the ratio of the votes cast for them.[4] If one party is heavily concentrated in certain districts, the votes it wastes by piling up large majorities must be allowed for by subtracting a certain proportion of its total before cubing. Thus, in the British general election of 1951, to determine how many seats each party would win for a given number of votes, it was necessary

[1] In 1922 and 1924 the Conservatives had a clear majority of seats over all other parties (see p. 26); in 1923 they lost this majority and Labour formed a minority government with Liberal support. Compare Canada, p. 29.

[2] *The Electoral System in Britain*, p. 177.

[3] Ibid., p. 191.

[4] J. Parker Smith, evidence before the Royal Commission on Systems of Election, Cmd. 5352, 1910, p. 81; *British Journal of Sociology*, 1950, Vol. i, No. 3; the *Economist*, 13 October 1951. *Observer*, 7, 14, 21 and 28 October 1951.

to subtract one-twentyfifth from the Labour votes. From the Gallup Poll totals of votes when thus adjusted, the result in seats was predicted with high accuracy.

This, however, does not dispose of the charge that the British electoral system contains a large element of the gamble. The cube law itself is an admission that changes in the composition of the House of Commons are out of all proportion to changes in public opinion—that small causes may produce great effects. The conditions attached to the law are further admissions that the success of either of two parties depends on factors other than the degree of public support for it—on whether that support is evenly or unevenly distributed over the country, on whether a gain or a loss of support occurs in one district or in a different one, on whether or not a third party intervenes effectively, and on where it does so. A party whose success depends not only on its ability to win over the electors but also on extraneous circumstances can fairly be said to be taking part in a gamble.

FOUND WANTING

The first-past-the-post system is thus seen to be unreliable as a means of attaining any of the objects held to be desirable. It cannot be relied upon, either to give a Parliament reflecting all the main trends of opinion, or to place in power a Government backed by a majority of the electorate, or even by the largest single body of voters. It frequently excludes from Parliament men and women whose contributions to it would be most valuable. It cannot be relied upon, either to give one party power to govern unhindered according to its own ideas, or on the other hand to produce government by consent.

Whatever may be our views of the purposes of elections, the existing British system fails to meet them with any certainty.

CHAPTER III

Variations of the First-Past-the-Post System

> 'The science of government is an experimental science, and like all other experimental sciences it is generally working itself clearer and clearer and depositing impurity after impurity.'—MACAULAY

Like other human institutions, the election of representatives has always been the object of criticism and of suggestions for its improvement, but such suggestions have as a rule been directed to the remedying of one particular fault in the existing system (usually the one most obvious in the circumstances of the time) and have as a rule been put into effect only when the fault was such as to penalize the party then in power.

This tendency to piece-meal reform has sometimes blocked any reform at all. For instance, in 1905 Balfour introduced a Bill for the redistribution of seats, unaccompanied by any reform of the franchise. This measure was met with the cry of 'gerrymander' and its disappearance with the fall of the government was regretted by few. In 1907 the Liberal Government attempted to deal with the franchise apart from any scheme of redistribution. It endeavoured, in Harcourt's complex Plural Voting Bill, to give effect to the principle of 'one man one vote'. This Bill was strongly opposed on the ground that the reform proposed was partial in character, and its rejection by the House of Lords raised comparatively little public feeling. Opponents of the Bill argued that, if it was unfair that one elector should have twelve votes and another only one, it was also unfair that the electors in one constituency should have the same representation as twelves times as many electors in another constituency. This logical argument, however, no more convinced the Government than did the similar argument in 1948 that, if it was right to take great pains to remedy the position of 14,055 electors in N. Southwark having one M.P., whilst 109,762 electors in Wirral also had only one, then we ought to attempt to remedy the

position of 29,000 Labour voters having at that time one M.P. while 197,000 Liberal voters also had only one.

Reform both of the franchise and of constituencies has been carried to its logical conclusion by degrees over a period of little more than a century. Beginning with a modest extension of the franchise by the Reform Act of 1832 and ending in 1929 with its extension to women on the same terms as men, we have given the right to vote to every adult citizen except Peers, lunatics and criminals. 'One man, one vote' became a fact when the last remnants of plural voting disappeared under the Representation of the People Act, 1948. The gross inequality of constituencies received its first blow with the disfranchisement of Old Sarum in 1832, and the Boundary Commission of 1947 took great pains to make constituencies as nearly equal in electorate as was considered practicable; under the House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Act, 1949, these constituency boundaries now have to be revised at intervals of not less than three and not more than seven years. Inequalities, indeed, still exist, but in general the reasons for them are accepted and they are not felt as a serious injustice. In part, these inequalities are due to the decision that the representation of Scotland and Wales should not be reduced; in part they represent a difficulty inseparable from single-member constituencies. Division of the country into 625 equal constituencies would be possible only if we ignored the natural unities of towns or counties or of areas unified by easy communications, and it is generally felt that to do this would be a greater evil than to tolerate some inequality. Hence, we have a variation between (in England) the extremes of 39,000 electors in Gateshead West and 79,000 in Dartford.

Thus, the three ancient causes of complaint against our representative system have been substantially remedied.[1] Yet complaints remain. Various proposals are put forward to cure the different defects which critics still see in the system, and these proposals will now be examined.

MINORITY MEMBERS

Ever since it became common for more than two candidates to contest a single seat, it has been obvious that simply to declare

[1] A comprehensive study of changes since 1918 will be found in D. E. Butler, *The Electoral System in Britian.*

elected the candidate having the highest number of votes may grossly misrepresent the wishes of the voters in that constituency.[1] For instance, in the general election of 1950 the figures for Conway were:

Jones	Labour	15,176
Price-White	Conservative	14,373
Hodson	Liberal	9,937

That is to say, the Labour candidate was elected with 15,176 votes, whilst 24,310 votes were cast for his opponents. For all that the voting figures show to the contrary, it might well be that an 8 to 5 majority of the voters would have preferred one of the others to represent them rather than the man who actually went to Westminster in their name. Most people appear to be agreed that such a result is indefensible, and, since it became common for a member to be elected on a minority vote (187 were so elected in 1950), various attempts have been made to find a remedy.

One obvious possibility is to induce one of the three prospective candidates to stand down, so as to leave a straight fight between the other two. This was the solution adopted in the South African election of 1948[2] when agreements between the United Party and the Labour Party on the one hand, and between the Nationalist Party and the Afrikaner Party on the other, secured the election of every member by a clear majority. In Britain, before the Labour Party established itself as a power in its own right, candidates standing as representatives of the working class secured by agreement with the Liberal Party straight fights against Conservatives in certain constituencies, but since then no party (and few individual candidates) has been willing to forgo its right to champion its own views, save in emergency conditions that have given rise to a coalition. In the 1930's, repeated attempts were made to form a Popular Front of Liberals and Labour to defeat the Conservatives who then dominated the government, but although both parties were united in believing that the most important single object was to reverse the then Government's foreign policy, they could not bring themselves to ignore the other questions on which they disagreed. Similarly, before and during the general election of

[1] Particularly bad cases were Portsmouth in 1922, when the elected candidate secured only 26·8 per cent of the total poll, Northwich in 1929 (34·3 per cent), and Caithness and Sutherland in 1945 (33·4 per cent).

[2] See pp. 35 and 56.

1950, the Conservative Party made equally unsuccessful efforts to promote an anti-Socialist front against the Labour Government.

THE SECOND BALLOT

Those who either think it undesirable that any political party should be dissuaded from seeking popular support at the polls, or recognize it as impracticable to prevent its doing so, wish to amend the voting system in such a way that, no matter how many candidates may be nominated for a single seat, the successful one must have a majority of votes over all his opponents combined.

Reverting to the election in Conway, the former Conservative member, who on that occasion lost his seat to Labour, probably attributed his defeat to the presence of a Liberal candidate, believing that in Hodson's absence most of his supporters would have voted Conservative rather than Labour and would thus have wiped out the small Labour majority. This may be true, but there is no means of proving (or disproving) it except by *asking* the Liberals concerned. That could be done by holding a second election between Jones and Price-White, those who voted originally for Hodson being free to support either of these, or, if they disliked both equally, to abstain.

This method—the second ballot—has been tried in many European countries and in Britain by trade unions, but has been abandoned almost everywhere except for some French elections. It has minor variations which do not affect the principle. Trade unions, which may have a large number of candidates for one office, eliminate them one at a time, holding a series of exhaustive ballots among all the candidates except the bottom one[1] until some one candidate has more votes than all his remaining opponents combined. Clearly, this may be a very long process, troublesome, costly, and liable to cause such loss of interest on the part of the voters that the poll decreases considerably each time and the final winner may end with fewer votes than he had on the first count.[2] Using this method, and

[1] Two or more candidates may be eliminated together if their combined votes are fewer than those of the candidate next above.

[2] A three-ballot election of the United Patternmakers Association took from November 1946 to February 1947. The number voting fell from 980 in the first ballot to 344 in the third, and the winner was elected with only a few more votes than the lowest of the four candidates had polled in the first ballot.

taking three successive ballots, the French Upper House in January 1947 took nearly five hours to elect its President from among four candidates. In the United Nations, elections by the same system notoriously take many days, if not weeks, to complete, with delicate negotiations between the ballots. The second or exhaustive ballot may be a simple and convenient procedure when the vote can be taken by show of hands at a meeting, but not when it involves the printing of ballot papers and possibly their distribution and return by post.

The process is sometimes shortened by limiting the number of ballots to two (or perhaps to three or four), the candidate leading in the final ballot being elected whether he has a clear majority or not. Thus, in the French Parliamentary elections of 1928–36 the second ballot was final. In those elections, no limit was placed on the number of candidates in either ballot, nor was candidature in the second ballot limited to persons nominated for the first. Usually, some of the candidates least successful in the first ballot withdrew, but they were not obliged to do so. The second ballot was generally contested by the most popular of the original candidates, but sometimes if two or more candidates had similar views they would withdraw in favour of a new candidate considered more likely to rally that block of opinion. An example of this is the first division of Saint Etienne in 1936 (the last general election of the Chamber of Deputies in which the second ballot was used).

		First ballot	*Second ballot*	
Thibaud	(Communist)	7,081	9,160	
Dubreuil	(Left Republican)	4,542	—	
Vernay	(Radical Socialist)	3,895	—	
Besson	(Left Independent)	3,239	1,029	
Robert	(Socialist)	1,453	3	
Pinay	(Independent Radical)	—	10,861	(elected)

* Prime Minister, 1952.

In Germany from 1870 to 1913, the second ballot was restricted to the two candidates leading on the first ballot.

THE ALTERNATIVE VOTE

The cumbersomeness of the second ballot (or exhaustive ballot) can be removed by taking the successive votes in a single operation—that is, by asking the voter to indicate, on his

original and only ballot paper, how he would vote if his favourite candidate were defeated and he had to choose again among the remaining candidates. This is the alternative vote. The name suggests a limitation to two choices, but that is misleading; the number of choices that may be expressed is limited only by the number of candidates.

Under the alternative vote, an elector of Conway, for example, would have been invited to place a '1' against the name of the candidate he most wished to see elected, and '2' against the name of the candidate he would vote for if his first preference were defeated. The Returning Officer first sorts the papers according to which candidate is marked '1'. If at this stage any one candidate has a clear majority of the votes (i.e. more than all his opponents combined), he is declared elected. If, however, no one candidate has a clear majority, the Returning Officer declares defeated the candidate who is lowest on the poll and transfers the votes of that candidate's supporters to whichever of the remaining candidates they have marked '2'. If there are more than three candidates, it may be necessary to transfer from the candidate then lowest on the poll to the next available preference; transfers are continued until some one candidate has more votes than all his remaining opponents combined.

The working of the alternative vote can be illustrated by an election in which there is little doubt which of the two leading candidates would be preferred by the supporters of the third. In the 1945 general election, the figures for the Northern division of Midlothian and Peebles were as follows:

Lt.-Col. Lord J. Hope (Cons.)	24,834
J. Lean (Labour)	23,657
Mrs. K. Wintringham (Common Wealth)	3,299
	51,790

Under the alternative vote, the Common Wealth candidate, being at the bottom of the poll, would be declared defeated and each of her votes would be transferred to whichever of the other two candidates was marked as that voter's second preference. Suppose about four-fifths of the Common Wealth voters (2,700) had expressed a second preference (the other 599 papers being non-transferable). Then if 1,939 of them showed a second preference for the Labour and the other 761 for the Conservative candidate, Labour would win.

	First count	*Second count*	
Hope	24,834	+ 761	25,595
Lean	23,657	+1,939	25,596
Wintringham	3,299	−3,299	0
Non-transferable		+ 599	599
			51,790

As Common Wealth had a great deal in common with Labour, there is no doubt that the real distribution of second preferences would have been still more favourable to Lean. In this instance, therefore, the transfer of votes would have caused a different candidate to be elected.

This procedure certainly does achieve two objects desired by those who seek by party agreements to bring about a straight fight in every constituency: the winning candidate is elected with the backing of a majority of those voting in the final stage (though he may, as in Lean's case, fail to get the support of a majority of all who go to the poll), and people of different parties who agree on some aim are enabled to combine for that purpose without foregoing their right to nominate separate candidates in the first place.

Those two objects, however, are usually desired only as a means to a third; those who agitated in 1950 for an 'anti-Socialist alliance' did so with a view to defeating the Labour candidates. Their underlying assumption was that the anti-Labour voters were in a majority and that, therefore, if there were a straight fight against Labour everywhere, its opponents must win. That this assumption is false is proved by the South African election of 1948. The anti-Malan majority of votes there far exceeded any estimate of the anti-Labour majority in this country in 1950. Yet it was Malan who won.

MAJORITY MEMBERS AND MINORITY GOVERNMENTS

To ensure that each individual M.P. is elected with a clear majority of the votes in his constituency does not ensure that the government placed in power as the result of a general election has the support of a majority of the voters. Still less does it secure representation of majority and minority in accordance with their voting strength.

MAJORITY M.P.s: MINORITY GOVERNMENTS

The impression that in British elections the over-representation of a party is always due to its winning seats on a "split vote" will not stand up to examination. In all elections since 1918, the Conservatives have had the largest number of seats won on a split vote (usually more than all the other parties combined), even when, as in 1945, they have been badly under-represented. The greatest exaggeration of the largest party's representation occurred in 1931, when the number of minority seats was smallest (33), while the nearest approach to a proportional result was in 1923 when the number of minority seats was the second largest in the period (216). The party with the second largest number of votes won the 1929 election, when there was the record number of 315 minority seats, but the second largest party also won in 1951 when there were only 39.

SEATS WON ON A MINORITY VOTE

	Con.	*Lab.*	*Lib.*	*Others*	*Total*
1918	51	12	21	10	94
1922	95	54	17	10	176
1923	96	70	49	1	216
1924	78	31	9	2	120
1929	149	125	40	1	315
1931	21	4	7	1	33
1935	32	17	7	2	58
1945	95	74	2	6	177
1950	106	76	5	0	187
1951	25	14	0	0	39

What would have happened in those general elections if the split votes had been eliminated must be largely a matter of conjecture. It is, however, practically certain that the exaggerted Labour majority in 1945 would have been made even larger, for of the 241 seats for which there was a straight fight between Labour and Conservative (or National) candidates, Labour won 201.

Where the second ballot or the alternative vote has been applied, the results have been no more a "mirror of opinion" than they are in Britain. The reader who wishes to study for himself the effects of these systems in use in various countries will find a list of their applications in Appendix i, page 234; here it will suffice to give a few examples.

Except for some French elections and some in British trade unions, the second (or exhaustive) ballot has been abandoned

and little consideration need be given to it here. One example from the last second ballot election of the French Chamber will serve to show that this system does not prevent, but may even increase, the distortions of the voters' wishes that occur under the first-past-the-post system. The following table shows the result in the 24 single-member constituencies of the Département du Nord, the last column giving the numbers of seats that would have been won by the parties if each seat had gone to the candidate leading on the first ballot.

DÉPARTEMENT DU NORD, 1936

	Votes (First ballot)	*Seats (Final)*	*Seats (f.p.p.)*
National Front	191,908	4	10
Popular Front:			
Radical Soc.	31,521	0	2
Soc. Republican Union	10,132	1	0
Socialist	161,540	13	8
Communist	104,804	6	4

The Communists polled not much over half as many votes as the National Front, yet won more seats. The parties allied in the Popular Front polled 1·6 times as many votes as their opponents but won five times as many seats, while under the first-past-the-post system they would, as it happens, have won much more nearly their fair share—14 seats against 10.

Clearly, the second ballot affords no guarantee that the elected body will reflect the wishes of the voters. Though in some circumstances its results will be more representative than those of the first-past-the-post system, in other circumstances they will be less so. Nor does the alternative vote hold out any certainty of fair representation. Results under this system are as unrepresentative as those of a British general election. They vary from the comparatively mild distortion of the 1949 Australian House of Representatives election (a large Parliamentary majority for the Liberal-Country Party alliance with a tiny popular majority) to the extreme exaggeration of the 1948 Alberta election (a clean sweep for a party with 58 per cent of the total vote). Each of these two results is typical of elections in Australia and Alberta.

AUSTRALIA, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1949

(The six States, excluding the Territories which have representation without voting power in the House.)

	Votes	*Percentage of votes*	*Seats obtained*	*Seats in proportion to votes*
Liberal	1,813,782	39·4	54	48
Country Party	500,349	10·9 } 50·3	20 } 74	13 } 61
Labour	2,117,088	46·0	47	56
Lang Labour	32,870	0·7	0	1
Communist	40,941	0·9	0	1
Independent	99,359	2·1	0	2
Total	4,604,389	100·0	121	121

ALBERTA, CANADA, PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT, 1948

(Country constituencies—the towns of Calgary and Edmonton vote by a different system; see p. 211.)

	Votes	*Percentage of votes*	*Seats obtained*	*Seats in proportion to votes*
Social Credit	122,665	58	46	27
C.C.F. (Labour)	43,127	20·5	0	10
Liberal	39,046	18·5	0	9
Others	6,891	3	1	1
Total	211,729	100	47	47

(The one successful candidate listed under 'Others' was Independent Social Credit, polling 1,658 first preferences.)

No alternative vote election of which we have record has given a result that is even an approximately accurate reflection of the votes cast. The usual tendency is to over-represent the largest party and exclude the smallest; but there is nothing to prevent its giving a reversal of the popular will such as occurred in South Africa with each candidate elected on a clear majority: such a reversal did occur in the 1922, 1928, 1934, and 1937 elections for the Australian Senate:[1]

[1] Also in the 1954 election to the House of Representatives: Labour, 2,292,881 votes, 57 seats; all other parties, 2,263,557 votes, 64 seats.

AUSTRALIAN SENATE ELECTIONS

Date	*Party*	*Votes (first preferences)*	*Seats won*
1922	Labour	715,562	11
	All other parties	850,421	8
1925	Ministerial group	1,537,282	22
	Labour and others	1,267,720	0
1928	Ministerial group	1,449,169	12
	Labour and others	1,456,664	7
1931	United Australia–Country Party	1,737,611	15
	Labour and others	1,397,712	3
1934	United Australia–Country Party	1,579,471	18
	Labour and others	1,708,360	0
1937	Labour	1,577,370	16
	All other parties	1,645,456	3
1940	Nationalist and Country Party	1,831,138	16
	Labour and others	1,801,679	3
1943	Labour	2,110,099	19
	All other parties	1,733,174	0
1946	Labour	2,133,273	16
	All other parties	1,964,254	3

(In 1949, the method of election was changed: see below, pp. 61 and 209.)

In the period covered by these figures, each Australian State was one constituency returning six members to the Commonwealth Senate, half of these members being elected every three years, and the alternative vote was applied to the election of all three (or, in the event of casual vacancies, more) in each constituency.

In applying the alternative vote to a multi-member constituency (a method used also by the National Union of Mineworkers and the National Union of Railwaymen), one candidate is first elected by a clear majority by the usual alternative vote procedure. All the papers are then recounted to elect the second in the same way, those papers marked '1' for the first successful candidate being given immediately to the candidate marked '2', and the process is repeated until all the seats are filled. It will be evident that the papers which elected the

first member are used *again* to elect the second, the effect being as though the same people voted three times in three single-member constituencies.[1] If 51 people out of 100 support candidate A, they must elect him; if the same 51 people give their next preference to candidate B, he in his turn will also have a clear majority and must be elected. It did in fact almost always happen in Senate elections that the same party won all the seats in any one constituency. If the same people had been divided among three single-member constituencies (each elector casting a vote in one of those constituencies only, instead of in all three), there would not have been the same certainty of a monopoly for the majority party, for a smaller party, if its strength happened to be concentrated in a particular district, might have a majority in one of those single-member constituencies.

Representation of parties in the Senate, therefore, was much more distorted than that in the Lower House, and much more liable to drastic change on account of a very small turnover of votes: for a party to drop from 51 per cent to 49 per cent of the votes in any one constituency meant a loss not of one seat but of three. This accounts for the Australian Government's decision in 1949 to combine with the enlargement of their Parliament the abolition of this voting system for the Senate and the substitution of the single transferable vote form of proportional representation. In the previous election, the Government party, with a very small majority of votes, had won all but three of the Senate vacancies; in 1949 it was faced with the virtual certainty of a loss of votes which, if the old system were retained, would mean losing every one of the larger number of seats then to be contested. Under the new system, polling a little under half the votes, it held just half the contested seats.

If election of each member by a clear majority does not guarantee a representative Parliament, neither does it guarantee strong or stable government. Experience under the second ballot indeed, suggests the contrary. In the 1930's, only one country still used the second ballot for its Parliamentary elections, and that country—France—was the one looked upon by the rest of the world as the outstanding example of weak and ever-changing governments, with a multitude of little parties unable to practise any lasting co-operation amongst themselves. Other countries which had previously used the second ballot had ex-

[1] As was done in British Columbia's provincial election of 1952.

perienced similar tendencies. In Germany, with marked differences in other political circumstances, the same excess of splinter parties and the same lack of co-operation among them existed.

There is insufficient evidence to show whether those conditions were actually produced by the second ballot or would have existed under the first-past-the-post system. It would be expected that the number of small parties contesting elections (though not necessarily the number winning seats) would be increased by a system under which candidates who have little hope of election can stand in the first ballot without fear of 'splitting the vote', but we must remember that no country would introduce the second ballot or the alternative vote unless it already had more than two parties.

PARTY BARGAINING

The second ballot and the alternative vote are clearly often responsible for unhappy effects on the relations between the parties. Under either of them the successful candidate owes his election to the support of some other and smaller party, and is therefore to some extent its prisoner. The small party may spontaneously transfer its votes to a larger one with which it has a great measure of agreement, or it may sell its support for the promise of some concession. Such bargains are more likely when time elapses between the first and second ballots than when (by the alternative vote) both are taken together, for the first ballot makes it known for certain which candidates are in the running for first place and which have no chance. Moreover, in the time between the two ballots the parties can concentrate all their propaganda on persuading the electors to accept the desired combinations. Where the second ballot is not automatically restricted to the leading candidates, negotiations to decide who shall withdraw may cause just as much trouble as attempts to avoid a 'split vote' under the first-past-the-post system. The alternative vote has the advantage of eliminating all occasion for withdrawals.

Either system, however, may involve party combinations that are quite incongruous and dictated by nothing more than political opportunism. In the last second ballot election in Belgium, there was an instance of contradictory alliances within the same constituencies. In Verviers, the Socialists, having a

grievance against the Liberals, spoiled the latter's chances of election to the Senate by voting in the second ballot for the Clericals, while in the election for the Lower House the Liberals retaliated by also voting Clerical to keep out the Socialists. The result was to give the Clericals every seat in both Houses for that district. In France a few years later (1908), in a series of by-elections, reactionary Conservatives brought about the defeat of Radicals by Socialists. In the second ballot, they voted for the latter on the ground that they, the Socialists, were enemies of the Republic which these Monarchist Conservatives wished to destroy. There is no reason to think that similar incongruous combinations would be impossible in our own country.

In Belgium, the evil effects of the second ballot were intensified by the dual nature of the state, a union of devoutly Roman Catholic Flemings, predominantly engaged in agriculture, with French-speaking Walloons, who are largely urban and industrial and inclined to be anti-Clerical. If such a state is to survive and prosper, it is clearly desirable to avoid anything that will accentuate these divisions, and set one group against the other. But that is precisely what the old voting system did: it was made to appear that political differences coincided strictly with religious and racial ones. Thus, the French-speaking districts, though they contained many members of the Catholic Party, were represented almost solely by Liberals and Socialists, while Flanders, though containing many Liberals and Socialists, returned only members of the Catholic Party.[1] Professor Hermens[2] admits this evil, but ascribes it to the fact that the second ballot was applied in constituencies that nearly all returned several members each; he suggests that it could have been remedied by adopting single-member constituencies. It is true that this might have improved the position, but it would not necessarily have done so; everything depends on whether the minority was so distributed as to be a majority in certain

[1] The same pattern reappeared in 1950, in the referendum on the return of King Leopold (necessarily a majority vote).

In the U.S.A., a similar suppression of minority representation by the first-past-the-post system was a major cause of the Civil War (see *Unanimous Report of Select Committee on Representative Reform*, presented to the Senate, 2 March 1869). Northern and Southern States each contained a minority sympathetic to the views of the other, but these minorities had little voice in Congress. An instance of the unifying effect of proportional representation is Czechoslovakia after the first world war, where representation of their respective minorities prevented what might otherwise have been a sharp cleavage between Bohemia and Slovakia.

[2] *Europe Between Democracy and Anarchy*, p. 99.

places.[1] While this was the case in some of the rural districts of Wallonia, it was not so in the industrial areas or in Flanders. Of the nine single-member constituencies that did exist, the five in the province of Luxembourg did return representatives of both sides, but the four in Flanders all elected Catholics (by very large majorities). Figures for 1936 showed the Socialists to be the largest party in 24 out of the 28 cantons of Liège.[2]

The drawbacks of the second ballot caused it to be denounced in the strongest terms by leading citizens of the countries using it. A German, Karl Blind,[3] said that the *Kuhhandel*, or bargaining between parties before the second ballot, 'brings out the worst symptoms of intrigue and political immorality'. In France, Raymond Poincaré declared that it would be of no use 'to replace one kind of constituency by another if you do not, at the same time, suppress the gamble of the majority system and the jobbery of second ballots', while another Frenchman of very different political complexion, the Socialist Jean Jaurès, pleaded for its replacement by a proportional system which would 'make such unnatural alliances impossible'.

The alternative vote has roused less vehement denunciation; partly because voting in the one operation offers less opportunity for the more blatant forms of *Kuhhandel*, partly because the only countries where it has been used for Parliamentary elections (Australia and the Canadian Provinces of Alberta and British Columbia) have a less stormy political background. It does, however, share with the second ballot the essential feature that it makes a member's election depend on the support of some party smaller than his own, and involves the major parties in angling for the second preferences of those groups that have least support in the electorate. For this reason, Winston Churchill[4] described it as 'the worst of all possible plans . . . the stupidest, the least scientific and the most unreal. The decision . . . is to be determined by the most worthless votes given for the most worthless candidates'.

[1] Compare the position in the English county of Sussex, which is divided into eleven single-member constituencies. In each of those constituencies there is a Conservative majority; consequently, their Parliamentary representation is exactly the same as it would be if the undivided county elected its eleven Members by the block vote.

[2] Centre d'Etudes pour la Réforme de l'Etat; report of committee on electoral questions, 1937, p. 557.

[3] *Nineteenth Century*, March 1907.

[4] In a speech on the Alternative Vote Bill; House of Commons, 2 June 1931.

These two methods of securing that each member is elected by a clear majority, the second ballot and the alternative vote, are no improvement on the first-past-the-post system as regards faithful reflection of the nation's wishes as expressed in its votes, or as regards the absence of uncertainty in the result.. Furthermore, neither method provides any cure for the failure of personal merit to carry weight in elections.[1] The best conceivable candidate of a smaller party will still lose to a much inferior candidate of a larger one.

THE WASTED VOTE BOGEY

A genuine advantage of the alternative vote over the first-past-the-post system is that, although it does nothing to improve the relation between the votes cast and the total result, it may improve the relation between the votes cast and the real wishes of those casting them. It used to be assumed that if an elector votes for a given party, he prefers that party to any other, but the suspicion has been growing that this is not necessarily true, and the suspicion becomes a certainty if we compare totals of votes with the other measures of public opinion that are now available.

Before the 1950 election the following question was asked in a Gallup Poll: Would you vote Liberal if you thought the Liberals could win? To this question, no less than 38 per cent replied 'yes'—28 per cent more than then intended to vote Liberal and 29 per cent more than actually did so.[2] That is to say, the votes of more than one-quarter of the entire electorate were determined less by what they themselves wanted than by what they guessed most of the other electors to want. Knowing that this was so, the larger parties (especially on

[1] Only in the event of a party's being divided on its candidate will the personal factor become important; the alternative vote then has a real advantage in as much as members of a party who think their candidate a thoroughly bad one are no longer forced to put up with him for fear of 'splitting the party's vote'. For example, when in 1950 the Hampstead Conservative Association was divided between re-adopting its sitting Member and choosing a new candidate, there would have been no need for the public dispute that in fact went on over the matter: both candidates could have been nominated without harming the party's chances, for if one of them were at the bottom of the poll his supporters would be able to transfer their votes to the other, so that whichever turned out to be the more popular with the electors would poll the entire Conservative vote, just as if he had been that party's only candidate. In practice, however, such revolts against the official choice are of rare occurrence.

[2] *News-Chronicle* 25th Jan. 1950.

this occasion the Conservatives) devoted much of their efforts to the capture of potential Liberal votes, not by extolling their own virtues or by attacking any feature of the Liberal programme, but by persuading the electors that the Liberal candidates had no chance—'a vote for the Liberal is a vote wasted'. The argument is extended from the constituency to Parliament as a whole, the suggestion being that it is a waste to elect a spokesman of a particular point of view, if that member cannot expect to form part of a Parliamentary majority.

The potency of the wasted vote argument is due to the fear of letting in on a 'split vote' the candidate one most dislikes: for example a Liberal of strongly anti-Socialist views may fear a result like that of Conway[1] and may therefore vote for the Conservative as the candidate he believes to have the better chance of defeating Labour. But, as we have seen in the examination of that election, such a course becomes pointless under the alternative vote, because, in the event which that elector fears, his vote will be transferred to the Conservative: he can safely vote '1' for the candidate he really prefers, even if he is convinced that this candidate will receive no other vote at all.

It is therefore probable that the alternative vote would cause candidates to receive votes much more nearly in accord with their true popularity with the electors. Small parties and Independents would probably get more votes than they do now. This, however, need not mean that the seats won would be any better reflection of the voters' wishes—nor need it mean, as is often assumed, that the alternative vote would greatly favour the Liberals because they would get second preferences from both Labour and Conservatives voters. Suppose it to be true that all Conservatives prefer a Liberal to a Socialist and all Labour voters prefer a Liberal to a Conservative, the effect of this under the alternative vote would depend on how many people voted Liberal as their *first* preference. In 1950, most Liberal candidates were third on the poll—the position in which, under the alternative vote, they would be eliminated without ever having the chance to profit from being preferred by both Conservatives and Labour to one another. The alternative vote gives no chance at all to the candidate who is everyone's second choice.[2] If the extra votes obtained by

[1] See p. 52.
[2] For a method which does, see Appendix ix, p. 288.

Liberals with the 'wasted vote' bogey removed were insufficient to raise them above the third place, they would not obtain one single extra seat; if, on the contrary, they were second on the first count (and neither of the others had a clear majority) they would be bound to win—unless there were a Labour-Conservative alliance against them.[1]

Our only guide to the possible extent of the rise in the Liberal vote is the Gallup Poll[2] which indicates the potential support of 38 per cent of the electorate. It is clear that if this 38 per cent were fairly evenly distributed over the country[3] and if the other two major parties were nearly equal, it would be possible for the Liberals to be at least second in every constituency and consequently to win every seat for just over one-third of the votes! It will be noticed, however, that this conclusion depends on several assumptions, any or all of which may prove true or false. The effect of introducing the alternative vote in 1950 conditions would have been therefore extremely uncertain. The result for the Liberal Party could have been anything from the loss of the five seats it won on a minority vote to the winning of virtually every seat in the House.

HOW THE MINORITY WINS

At this point we must consider why it is that to eliminate so obvious a source of unfairness as the minority vote should do nothing to make the relation between votes polled and seats won any closer or any more predictable than it is in a British election now.

Many people find difficulty in believing that if the result of an election is as fair as it can be made in each constituency individually, the result over the whole country can yet be very unfair; and especially that, if each seat be contested only by two parties it is possible for the smaller of the two to win. Thus, when it was seen that this had happened in South Africa, it was widely assumed that the reason lay in a variation in the size of constituencies. Even so conscientious an organ as the *Manchester Guardian*[4] made this assertion without feeling itself obliged to test its truth.

[1] See p. 63.
[2] See p. 65.
[3] For discussion of the effects of the distribution of a party's strength, see p. 69.
[4] 10 November 1948.

VARIATIONS OF THE SYSTEM

It is of course quite obvious—and has been so since the days of Old Sarum—that it is unfair for a very few electors in one place to elect as many representatives as a very large number of electors in another, and that if the places of very small electorates return members of a particular party, this party will thus obtain more representation than if the constituencies were equal. This was why[1] the Conservative leaders in 1905 were alive to the need for redistribution. The over-representation of Labour in the 1945 Parliament was attributed by some to this factor: a number of safe Labour seats in East London had electorates very much below the average number. A block of five safe Labour (or Communist) seats in Poplar and Stepney had a total electorate of only 91,730, while a block of five safe Conservative seats in Surrey between East Surrey and Farnham had 380,073 electors. Clearly, this factor must have had some influence on the total result, but equally clearly it cannot suffice to explain it, for this same discrepancy in electorates had existed in almost as great a degree in the years preceding the second World War, when the Conservatives were even more over-represented than Labour was in 1945.

In the 1948 and 1953 elections in South Africa, it was perfectly true that the Nationalist Party and its ally the Afrikaner Party were strong in districts that had relatively small electorates, while the United Party and its ally the Labour Party were strong in the districts with larger electorates; this 'weighting' of constituencies did favour Malan's side. It is, however, quite easy to see from the 1953 figures that the effect of the 'weighting' was far too small to account for the anomalous results.

The figures for the 1953 general election were as follows:

	Votes		*Seats*	
Nationalists		598,685		92*
United Party	571,124	608,166	39**	43**
Labour Party	37,042		4	

* *plus* 2 unopposed. ** *plus* 18 unopposed.

Thus, the party with the fewer votes won, in the contested constituencies, more than twice as many seats as its opponents. The difference in the size of the constituencies could account for this only if the 'weighting' were so great that the electorate in constituencies won by Nationalists averaged less than half the

[1] See p. 50.

electorate of constituencies won by their opponents. In fact, the average electorates (taking the latest figures available in London at the time of the election) were 9,727 for the Nationalists and 11,148 for the Opposition—the ratio of the electorates was not 1 to 2 but 32 to 37. If the uncontested constituencies were included, the difference would be somewhat larger, but so would be the Opposition majority of votes.

The 'weighting' of electorates, therefore, can have been only a minor contributory factor, not the cause of Malan's victory in 1953. Still less could it account for the similar result in 1948, for the 'weighting' then was smaller: the six Nationalist constituencies of South West Africa, whose electorates average only about 4,000, were not included in the 1948 election.

What then did account for the victory of the minority on both occasions? It becomes obvious if we arrange the successful candidates in the order of their majorities: most United Party candidates polled many votes that were wasted in piling up huge majorities, while most Nationalist candidates slipped into their seats by small majorities. In 1948, the largest United Party majority was 6,388, or 79 per cent of the total poll in that constituency, and there were 17 United Party or Labour majorities larger than the largest Nationalist majority of 4,025 (50·5 per cent of the total poll in that constituency), while of the majorities below 1,000 the Nationalists had 28 and their opponents only 12. In 1953, this contrast was even more marked: the United Party achieved a record majority of 8,503 (Durban North, electorate 11,158) but elected only 6 candidates with majorities below 2,000, compared with no less than 52 Nationalists having majorities of from 1,976 down to 47 (Brakpan, Transvaal, electorate 11,232). The reason for the reversal of the voters' wishes in these two general elections is that a majority of 47 (0·48 per cent of those voting) confers upon a party just as much advantage as a majority of 8,503 (83 per cent of those voting). Since one majority, no matter how large or how small, returns one candidate, a party whose votes are so distributed as to give small majorities in many places will win more seats than a larger party whose votes are concentrated in a few places.

Among similar examples from British general elections is the group of seven West London constituencies in 1950, where the largest party won two seats by huge majorities while a smaller party won five seats by small majorities:

	Conservative	*Labour*	*Independent Labour*	*Liberal*	*Communist*
Chelsea	*23,471*	9,987		3,116	
Kensington, S.	*32,870*	8,002		4,079	
Kensington, N.	17,991	*21,615*		2,522	551
Fulham, E.	16,233	*18,998*		2,214	399
Fulham, W.	17,292	*20,141*		1,949	
Hammersmith, N.	10,406	*13,346*	8,457	1,402	
Hammersmith, S.	16,161	*18,825*		1,400	
Total votes	134,424	110,914	8,457	16,682	950
Total seats	2	5	0	0	0

If the Press discussion of the cube-law[1] did nothing else, it was worth while as a means of bringing home to the public that a party's success in a general election under a majority system depends not only on the votes it gets but also on how those votes are distributed over the country. No matter what care may be taken to avoid other sources of unfairness, the largest party will lose to a smaller one if its voting strength is sufficiently concentrated in certain districts.

Occurrences such as the clean sweep in Alberta or the reversal of the voters' will in South Africa cannot be prevented if each constituency elects only one member, no matter whether that election be by the first-past-the-post method or by an absolute majority. Even if it were possible to eliminate completely all three-cornered fights and all variations in electorates, the same vote could still give any result between the one extreme and the other, as shown in the following example of five imaginary constituencies, each having exactly 1,000 voters:

	Election I		*Election II*	
Constituency	*Party A*	*Party B*	*Party A*	*Party B*
Central	*630*	370	*820*	180
East	*600*	400	400	*600*
North	*720*	280	*850*	150
South	*530*	470	450	*550*
West	*520*	480	480	*520*
Total votes	3,000	2,000	3,000	2,000
Seats	5	0	2	3

[1] See above, p. 48.


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
The result of any election under any majority system depends in fact not only on the way people vote but on the way their votes are distributed among the constituencies—or in other words, the way the constituencies are distributed over the country. To take a simple example, imagine a town whose electorate entitles it to three members, and a conscientious Boundary Commission trying to divide this town fairly into three constituencies. Two possibilities are:

(*a*) to follow obvious lines of communication, using as boundaries main roads leading to the centre, or

(*b*) to follow the division of the town into a manufacturing centre, a residential suburb north of the river, and a residential suburb south of the river. Either is a reasonable arrangement which anyone might adopt without ulterior motive, but either may result in gross distortion of the town's wishes. Again assuming that there are only two parties, and that it is possible to make constituencies exactly equal in electorate, we may have the larger party with its strength heavily concentrated in the industrial centre, and the smaller party concentrated in the suburbs; arrangement (*a*) may then deprive the large minority of all representation whatsoever, while (*b*) may give it two seats to the majority's one.



	Party A	*Party B*
N.E.	*27,000*	23,000
S.E.	*27,000*	23,000
S.W.	*26,000*	24,000
Votes	80,000	70,000
Seats	3	0



	Party A	*Party B*
C.	*32,000*	18,000
N.	24,000	*26,000*
S.	24,000	*26,000*
	80,000	70,000
	1	2

It is evident that a prejudiced Boundary Commission may deliberately manipulate the boundaries so as to favour the one party or the other, and that it may be suspected of having done so even when it is completely innocent of any such intention. An admitted instance of this manœuvre has given the name of gerrymander to this form of fraud: Governor Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts was responsible for the law of 1812 which provided for the division of the State into new Senatorial districts and resulted in the election of 29 Senators by 50,164 voters of Governor Gerry's party, while 51,766 voters of the opposing party elected only 11. The new boundaries ignored all natural and customary lines and produced constituencies of odd shapes; when one such shape was compared to a salamander, the editor of a local paper replied: 'I call it a Gerrymander.'[1]

While the intentional gerrymander is rare in our time and country, the suspicion of its existence may seriously embitter relations between parties. Especially is that so in a country like Northern Ireland, where a political minority, which coincides largely with a religious minority, believes (rightly or wrongly) that it is deliberately deprived by the majority of even that share of power to which its numbers entitle it. English electors usually have more confidence in the impartiality of Boundary Commissions, and accept as part of the natural order of things that, for instance, the creation of the new constituency of Poole offered Labour the prospect of a seat in a county where it had never had one before.

When no movement of boundaries is taking place, suspicions may arise concerning the movement of people. In Northern Ireland it was alleged that a new municipal housing estate was placed on a site highly inconvenient to the tenants in order that the predominantly Nationalist inhabitants should find themselves in a ward where they were in a hopeless minority instead of in one where they would have had a chance of electing councillors. English local authorities also have sometimes been accused of similar manœuvres.

The result indeed of a general election under the British system depends on the distribution (accidental or planned) of majorities; and this must remain true so long as election is by a majority in single-member constituencies. Returning to the

[1] See W. R. Ware, *The Machinery of Politics*, 1872.

imaginary example on p. 70, it should be clear that the lack of any correspondence between votes and seats arises from the fact that in each constituency the larger party wins one seat and the other none, quite irrespective of *how much* larger the first party may be. In the second election, the supporters of Party A in East, South and West are almost as numerous as those of Party B, but they can get no representation, while on the other hand their huge majority in the Central Division brings them no more representation than did their very small majority in the West Division in the first election.

No escape from this position is possible so long as only one representative is elected at a time. At best, we can ensure only that he represents the majority; the minority, even if it be only one fewer than the majority, can have no representative, and the majority can have no more than one, even if it should amount to 99 per cent of the voters. If, on the other hand, our imaginary town with its five divisions were to vote as one unit for its five members, it would then become possible to ensure that the larger party should have the larger share of representation and that the smaller party should have a smaller share. Also, if there are no longer any boundaries to be drawn within the town, the possibility of gerrymandering disappears so far as that town is concerned.

CHAPTER IV

Semi-proportional Systems

'Every European state contains within itself linguistic minorities; small states and nations are minorities among bigger states and nations, and even the greatest states and nations in the last resort are a minority in comparison with the whole of mankind. Therefore, a proper solution of the problem of minorities is the presupposition of a better and more cosmopolitan organization in the world.'—THOMAS MASARYK; quoted by Robert Birley in his Masaryk centenary address, 7 March 1950.

We have seen that, whilst single-member constituencies can give no guarantee of any of the objects considered desirable in an election, one of these at least (the reflection of party strength among the voters by the number of the parties' representatives) does become possible when we have constituencies returning several members. This object, however, is not attained under the block vote. Also, the multi-member constituency, in which each party usually nominates several candidates, should give the voter an opportunity of exercising a personal choice, but the block vote, as we have pointed out, prevents him from taking the opportunity. Hence attempts have been made to modify it.

THE LIMITED VOTE

The first such modification is a reduction in the number of votes allowed to be cast. It should have been clear from the discussion of the block vote on p. 31 that the almost invariable monopoly of all the seats by one party, and the small influence of the candidate's personal qualities, are both due to the elector's being able to exercise one vote for each seat that is to be filled. If, in the example on p. 31, the electors had had two votes each instead of three, it might be expected that most of the first party's supporters would give those two votes to its best candidates, A and B, so that the less popular candidate C would have fewer votes than the second party's best candidate L, and would

lose the third seat to him. This device—the limited vote—is thus capable of giving due representation to both majority and minority, and of securing that each shall be represented by its most popular candidates. Unfortunately, it does not achieve those objects with certainty. We have had some experience of the method in Great Britain, and an account of that experience will suffice to indicate its merits and defects.

The limited vote was first proposed by Mackworth Praed in debates on the Reform Bill in 1831 and 1832. Up to that time, most constituencies returned two members apiece. The Reform Bill provided that a third member should be added to the representation of each of seven counties, and that certain other counties should each be divided into two or more two-member constituencies. Praed proposed that these members should be added without any sub-division of counties, and that in constituencies returning three or four members an elector should not be allowed to vote for more than two candidates. His object was to enable large minorities to obtain representation.

Praed's proposal was not adopted, but it was revived by Lord Aberdeen's Government in 1854, in a Bill extending three-member representation to more counties and boroughs. This Bill had to be shelved owing to the Crimean War. The limited vote was, however, applied to 13 constituencies under the Representation of the People Act of 1867, an amendment similar to Praed's being introduced by Lord Cairns and carried. The system remained in force until the Redistribution Act of 1885, when three-member constituencies were abolished. The table (p. 76) shows that it did secure the representation of minorities. The 'probable results' are based on the hypothesis that if each voter could have given one vote to each of three candidates (or four in the City of London), each of the parties would have nominated three candidates (four in the City of London), and that, as the electors would for the most part have voted on party lines, the larger body would have secured all the three (or four) seats. In fact, a clean sweep by one party occurred in only two constituencies (Birmingham and Glasgow) where the minorities were small. Elsewhere, except in one case,[1] the Conservatives obtained one representative where the Liberals were in a majority, and the Liberals had one representative in each of the constituencies with a Conservative majority.

[1] See page 77 below.

BRITISH ELECTIONS UNDER THE LIMITED VOTE

	1868		*1874*		*1880*	
	Actual results with limited vote	*Probable results without limited vote*	*Actual results with limited vote*	*Probable results without limited vote*	*Actual results with limited vote*	*Probable results without limited vote*
	L. C.	L. C.	L. C.	L. C.	L. C.	L. C.
Berkshire	1 2	0 3	1 2	0 3	1 2	0 3
Birmingham	3 0	3 0	3 0	3 0	3 0	3 0
Buckinghamshire	1 2	0 3	1 2	0 3	1 2	0 3
Cambridgeshire	1 2	0 3	1 2	0 3	1 2	0 3
Dorsetshire	1 2	0 3	1 2	0 3	1 2	0 3
Glasgow	3 0	3 0	2 1	3 0	3 0	3 0
Herefordshire	1 2	0 3	1 2	0 3	2 1	3 0
Hertfordshire	2 1	3 0	1 2	3 0	1 2	0 3
Leeds	2 1	3 0	1 2	0 3	2 1	3 0
Liverpool	1 2	0 3	1 2	0 3	1 2	0 3
London (City)	3 1	4 0	1 3	0 4	1 3	0 4
Manchester	2 1	3 0	1 2	0 3	2 1	3 0
Oxfordshire	1 2	0 3	1 2	0 3	1 2	0 3
	22 18	19 21	16 24	9 31	20 20	15 25

This minority representation, however, has in it an element of uncertainty. The limited vote does not guarantee that majority and minority will always get their fair share of seats, and the reason will be appreciated by an examination of the 1880 figures for Birmingham. The Liberals won all three seats, the figures being as follows:

P. H. Muntz (Liberal)	22,969	Maj. F. Burnaby (Conservative)	15,735
John Bright (Liberal)	20,079		
Joseph Chamberlain (Liberal)	19,544	Hon. A. C. G. Calthorpe (Conservative)	14,208
	62,592		29,943

The Conservatives obtained just under one-third of the total votes and failed to obtain one of the three seats. They might very well have got one, however, if the Liberal vote had been less evenly divided among their three candidates: had a larger proportion of the Liberal voters given their two votes to Muntz and Bright, Chamberlain might easily have polled fewer votes than the higher of the two Conservative candidates. To reap the full advantage of their numerical superiority, it was necessary

for the Liberal organization to make an extensive canvass of supporters, to ascertain their numbers as accurately as possible, and to give the voters in each district precise instructions as to how they should vote.[1] But had there been a mistake in their calculations, and had the polls disclosed a larger number of Conservatives than was expected, the nomination of three Liberal candidates would have meant disaster. This did happen in Leeds, where the result in 1874 was as follows:

Carter (Liberal)	15,390	Wheelhouse (Conservative)	14,864
Baines (Liberal)	11,850	Tennant (Conservative)	13,192
Lees (Liberal)	5,994		
Total votes	33,234		28,056
Seats	1		2

Had the Liberals confined themselves to two candidates, it is highly probable that both would have polled more than the lower Conservative and would therefore have been elected, but the attempt to win all three seats resulted in giving the minority party the larger share of the representation. It was not safe for a party to nominate three candidates unless that party could be sure that its supporters numbered at least 60 per cent of the electorate, and that those supporters would vote as ordered.

The uncertain operation of the limited vote can be seen also in Gibraltar, where that system is used to elect the City Council. Each elector is entitled to exercise four votes for the election of seven councillors. In 1945, the largest party, by dividing its votes economically among its seven candidates, elected all of them. Two Independents each secured one-quarter as many votes as the lowest successful candidate, and one or both of these might have been elected if a larger proportion of the dominant party's votes had been concentrated on its four most popular candidates.

The minority, on its side, can be sure of representation in a three-member constituency if it numbers more than two-fifths of the voters, and if it does not nominate more than two candidates. The more the vote is limited, the greater becomes the opportu-

[1] 'One ward voted for A and B, another for A and C, a third for B and C, a fourth for A and B, etc. The voter who had left the selection of the three candidates to the general committee was also to renounce the privilege of selecting from them the two which he preferred. "Vote as you are told" was the pass word.' Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties*, 1903, Vol. i, p. 162.

nity for minorities to obtain representation. In a four-member constituency, if each elector has three votes the minority must number three-sevenths of the voters before it can obtain a representative; if, however, each elector is limited to two votes, the minority need only exceed one-third of the voters to be sure of returning a member.[1]

THE SINGLE NON-TRANSFERABLE VOTE

If the number of votes per elector is reduced to one, the result is likely to be still more representative. The chief test of this method (the single non-transferable vote) has been in Japan, where it has given, in all the free elections that country has had since 1900, results much more nearly reflecting the wishes of the voters than those in the United Kingdom. The 1952 Diet was elected in constituencies each returning from 2 to 10 members, according to their population, and the result was as follows:[2]

	Votes	*Seats*	*Seats in proportion to votes*
Liberal	16,700,919	242	221
Progressive	6,510,805	89	86
Socialist, Right Wing	3,865,805	60	51
Socialist, Left Wing	3,446,353	56	46
Communist	882,632	0	12
Labour and Farmer	261,072	4	3
Independents and Others	3,306,933	15	47
Total	34,974,519	466	466

This method clearly is open to the same sort of objections as is the limited vote. For example, a party hoping for, but not certain of, a large increase in its vote dares not nominate as many candidates as the country may wish to elect, for fear that

[1] Suppose that in a four-member constituency the number of voters is 21,000, and that there are two parties, having 12,000 and 9,000 supporters respectively. If each elector has three votes, the larger party will get 36,000 votes in all, or 9,000 for each of four candidates if they were divided exactly evenly. No candidate of the smaller party can get more than 9,000 votes. Hence, if the larger party just exceeds 12,000 voters out of 21,000 it can win all four seats, but if the smaller party just exceeds 9,000 it must win at least one seat. If, however, each elector has only two votes, the corresponding position is reached when the parties have respectively 14,000 and 7,000 supporters: the larger party will then poll a total of 28,000 votes, or 7,000 for each of four candidates if they are evenly distributed.

[2] Figures supplied by the Japanese Embassy.

by dividing its votes among too many candidates it may cause some, or even all, of them to fail. The method has therefore tended to produce stagnation, each party hesitating to run the risk of nominating more candidates than were successful in the previous election. A further objection is that the voters may resent being limited to expressing an opinion about only one candidate, out of perhaps a dozen or more who offer themselves for election. The method is simple, and suitable for use in an illiterate electorate; in such circumstances the candidates can be represented on the ballot paper by symbols.

THE CUMULATIVE VOTE

The cumulative vote is another device to improve on the block vote. As under the latter, the elector has as many votes as there are seats to be filled in his constituency, but he is not obliged to give one vote to each of that number of candidates; he may give two or more votes to one candidate. This has the obvious advantage of enabling the voter to express quite emphatically his preference for a particular individual, and to do so without necessarily depriving himself of the opportunity to support any other candidate in addition. Like the limited vote, it does promote the representation of minorities and the return of the most popular candidates, but is uncertain in its operation.

The name 'cumulative vote' appears for the first time in 1853,[1] but three years earlier the system was recommended by a committee of the Privy Council for preventing the monopoly of colonial Legislative Councils by one party[2] and was applied to Cape Colony. It continued to be used there for the election of the Legislative Council until that Council disappeared under the new constitution of the Union of South Africa in 1909, and Lord Milner[3] contrasted its effects most favourably with those of the majority system used to elect the House of Assembly (Lower House). In the Assembly, the division between Dutch and British stock was accentuated, for one part of the Colony returned only Boer representatives, the other part only non-Boers; in the Legislative Council, on the contrary, the minority

[1] In an open letter entitled *Minorities and Majorities: their Relative Rights*, by James Garth Marshall to Lord John Russell.

[2] See Earl Grey, *The Colonial Policy of the Administration of Lord John Russell*, Vol. 2, Appendix, p. 362.

[3] House of Lords, 31 July 1906.

in each region had representation. Lord Milner was convinced that this had 'a great bearing upon that development of better feeling between the two great races of South Africa whom we are all agreed in desiring to see ultimately amalgamated and fused'.

An attempt by Robert Lowe to introduce the cumulative vote into the Electoral Reform Bill of 1867 failed, and the only practical application of the system in the United Kingdom has been in School Board elections. It was introduced into the Education Act of 1870 by a private member, Lord Frederick Cavendish, with Government support. This Act gave London eleven electoral divisions, returning from four to seven members each, whilst large towns such as Manchester or Birmingham each constituted an electoral area returning a Board of about 15 members. The Scottish Education Act of the same Parliament had similar provisions. The object of the method (the representation of minorities) was undoubtedly achieved. This is shown by the figures of any School Board election, and the last in London (1900) will serve as an illustration. The results were as follows:

Constituency	*Votes obtained*			*Seats won*		
	Moderate	*Progressive*	*Independent*	*Moderate*	*Progressive*	*Independent*
City	4,572	2,183	—	3	1	—
Chelsea	7,831	5,408	2,144	3	2	0
Finsbury	7,573	7,239	837	3	3	1
Greenwich	6,706	6,008	3,375	2	1	0
Hackney	5,438	9,130	1,579	2	3	0
Lambeth East	4,370	9,913	1,313	1	3	0
Lambeth West	8,709	14,156	54	2	4	0
Marylebone	9,450	7,047	536	4	3	0
Southwark	2,636	3,430	2,328	1	2	1
Tower Hamlets	6,199	7,437	5,495	1	3	1
Westminster	4,829	2,354	—	3	2	—
	68,313	74,305	17,661	25	27	3

In each constituency, the minority was enabled to obtain some representation, and although in most cases the representation was still confined to the two main parties, yet it was possible for an Independent to succeed, as in the Tower Hamlets, or a Roman Catholic, as in Southwark. In securing the representation of minorities, the cumulative vote facilitated the working of the

Education Act. Evidence by several witnesses before a Select Committee of the House of Commons was that 'it would not have been possible to carry the Act into effect, and certainly there would have been more friction, if the cumulative vote had not been in existence',[1] and the Royal Commission reporting on the Elementary Education Acts in 1888 strongly advised retaining a system of minority representation.

The cumulative vote was also adopted by the State of Illinois for the elections to the State House of Representatives. Each constituency returns three members, and the elector may cumulate or divide his votes, giving one vote to each candidate, or one and a half votes to each of two candidates, or three votes to one candidate. 'As a result', says Professor Commons,[2] 'both parties have representatives from every part of the State instead of from the strongholds only, and there are no hopeless minorities of the two main parties. Every citizen who has business before the Legislature has some member of his own party to transact that business.' Constituencies returning three members are, however, not sufficiently large to do justice to this method of voting.

The cumulative vote, whilst securing representation of the minority, does not necessarily secure the representation of majorities and minorities in their true proportions. As with the limited vote, the party organizations, if they desire to make use of their polling strength to the fullest advantage, must make as accurate an estimate as possible of the numbers of their supporters, and must issue explicit directions as to the way in which votes should be recorded. To nominate more candidates than the party can carry may end in disaster. In the first School Board elections in Birmingham the Liberal organization endeavoured to obtain the whole of the representation, and nominated fifteen candidates. The party polled a majority of the votes, but, as these votes were distributed over too many candidates, the Liberals succeeded in returning only a minority of the representatives.

Every School Board election furnishes examples of the waste of a party's strength by the excessive concentration of votes upon certain candidates. For instance, in the Glasgow School Board election of 1909, for 15 members, the total number of votes

[1] Patrick Cumin, Permanent Secretary of the Education Department.

[2] *Proportional Representation*, p. 94. See also *National Municipal Review*, Sept. 1953, p. 410.

polled was 602,516 and one-fifteenth of this (40,167) would have been amply sufficient to ensure any candidate's election. The most popular candidate, however, obtained more than twice that number (81,109), whilst the lowest successful candidate had only 18,619 votes and the runner-up 18,534; it is clear that if some of the most popular candidate's votes could have been distributed to better advantage, the result might well have been different.

THE POINTS SYSTEM

Although not usually recognized as such, the points system is a method closely akin to the cumulative vote. While the latter gives the elector (say) 15 votes and allows him to give larger numbers of these to some candidates and smaller numbers of them to others, the points system gives the elector (say) 55 points, of which he gives 10 to the candidate he considers the best, 9 to the next best and so on. That, at least, is the effect; the actual operation of the method consists in requiring the voter to number the candidates from 1 upwards in the order of his preference. The Returning Officer either awards the appropriate number of points for each preference and adds them up, or, if each voter is obliged to number every candidate, adds up the preferences each candidate thus receives and declares elected those with the *lowest* totals. There is clearly something arbitrary about this method—there is no reason save that of convenience why the values of preferences (starting with the lowest) should be 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . and not 1, 2, 4, 8, . . . or any other series, and the relative values of preferences may vary from one election to another according to the number of candidates.

The essential similarity of the two methods makes it clear that the points system is bound to share the merits and defects of the cumulative vote; it will secure minority representation but not necessarily a definite correspondence between votes cast and seats won. Examples showing how the system breaks down are given in Appendix viii;[1] its essential weakness is that a second (or later) preference necessarily counts *against* that voter's first preference.[2]

[1] P. 285.

[2] Contrast the single transferable vote, p. 105.

THE POINTS SYSTEM

Norway uses a form of the points system for determining the order of election of candidates within each party. On the ballot paper, the candidates' names are grouped according to their party. The elector may exercise one or more votes, up to the number of seats to be filled in that constituency, and does so by numbering candidates in the order of his preference. Most voters may confine their votes to candidates of one party, but they are not obliged to do so. The total of all votes cast for candidates on a given party list determines the number of seats that party obtains.[1] The first such seat is filled by whichever of that party's candidates has the largest number of first preferences, the second by whichever of its remaining candidates has the largest total of first and second preferences together, and so on.

[1] By the d'Hondt system; see below, p. 87.

CHAPTER V

List Systems of Proportional Representation

'Celui-ci tuera celui-là. Voilà la formule du scrutin d'arrondissement.

'Ceux-ci tueront ceux-là. Voilà la formule du scrutin de liste sans la représentation proportionnelle.

'Ceux-ci et ceux-là auront leur juste part. Voilà la formule du scrutin de liste avec la représentation proportionnelle.'
—JEAN JAURÈS.

Whilst in our country a series of modifications have been introduced or suggested in order to remove or mitigate certain drawbacks of our majority system of voting as changing circumstances have drawn attention to them, the countries of Continental Europe have nearly all carried out a radical change aimed at removing one outstanding feature of all majority systems, namely the lack of any certain relation between a party's strength in the country and its strength in Parliament. The existence of parties is given legal recognition, and they are treated as the units for which fair representation is sought.[1] Some of the variations of the system now to be discussed may appear complicated to readers who are not students of the subject. The quite different method of the single transferable vote, described in Chapter VI and more generally advocated in the English-speaking countries, is, however, very simple.

FAIR SHARES FOR THE PARTIES

The fundamental idea is simple enough. It is accepted that if (and only if) a number of seats are filled by the same voting operation, those seats can be distributed among two or more parties in proportion to the total number of votes that each of those parties receives. For instance, if we were to treat the whole of the United Kingdom as one constituency electing 625 mem-

[1] Pioneers of this system include Thomas Gilpin (Philadelphia, 1844) and Victor Considérant (Geneva, 1846). A good summary of the early history of the subject is given by Dr. Karl Braunias in *Das Parlamentarische Wahlrecht*, Vol. ii, p. 195.

bers, the Labour Party, polling in 1951 13,948,385 out of the 28,602,323 votes cast, would have $\frac{13,948,385}{28,602,323} \times 625$ seats, or 305 seats to the nearest whole number, while the Conservatives and their allies, with a total of 13,724,418 votes, would have $\frac{13,724,418}{28,602,303} \times 625$ seats, or 300 seats to the nearest whole number. The actual result was: Labour 295 seats, Conservatives and allies 321. Alternatively, if we take as one constituency the imaginary town used as our example on p. 70, the party polling three-fifths of the total votes will return 3 out of that town's 5 members; the party polling two-fifths will return 2 members. The party composition of the Parliament will then reflect the party composition of the electorate with a considerable degree of accuracy in five-member constituencies and ultimately reach the theoretically possible limit as the size of the constituency is increased until it covers the whole country.

Upon this very simple foundation, however, some very complicated structures are built. The complications arise from two distinct aims: (*a*) to relate as accurately as possible the number of seats held to the polling strength of the parties, (*b*) to permit an opportunity for the voter to express an opinion on the personal merits of the candidates.

THE LARGEST REMAINDER

It is not usually practicable for a number of reasons to treat a whole country as one constituency. The method is therefore adopted for constituencies with smaller numbers of seats, and in order to ensure that each party shall obtain its proportion in relation to the votes it polls, the number of seats is divided into the total votes cast. By this a 'quota' is established, which will entitle a party to a seat. For example, if a constituency has five seats and the total number of votes cast is 300,000 the quota will be 60,000. Each party will be entitled to one seat for every 60,000 votes it polls. A complication, however, arises from the fact that there will generally be remainders of votes left over after the quota has been divided into each party's total.

One method of dealing with this difficulty is to allot any seats still available in turn to the party or parties with the largest remainder. This method of the largest remainder (*le plus fort reste*) was used in the earlier applications of party list

proportional representation, but was soon found to be less fair than at first appears. In the Swiss Canton of Ticino, the Conservatives were able to win more than their due proportion of seats by dividing their forces in two,[1] a procedure whose effects will be clear from the following simple example: Assume that three deputies are to be elected, that the grand total of votes is 3,000 and that the party votes are as follows:

Party A	1,600 votes
Party B	1,400 ,,
	3,000 ,,

The quota would be 1,000 votes. Party A, having the larger remainder, would obtain two seats, and Party B only one seat; but if Party B should present two lists and arrange for the division of its voting force, the following result might ensue:

Party A	1,600 votes
Party B1	750 ,,
Party B2	650 ,,
	3,000 ,,

The quota would still be 1,000 votes, but Party A would only obtain one seat, whereas Party B would obtain two, because each of its two lists would show a remainder larger than A's remainder. This possibility led to a modification of the rule, and the seats remaining after the first distribution were allotted to the largest parties. But this also was far from satisfactory, as will be seen from the following example taken from a Ticino election:[2]

Conservatives	614 votes
Radicals	399 ,,
	1,013 ,,

The constituency to which the figures refer returned five members; the quota therefore was 202, and the Conservatives obtained three seats on the first distribution, and the Radicals one. As, by this modification, the remaining seat was allotted to the largest party, the Conservatives obtained four seats out of the five when, obviously, the true proportion was three to two.

[1] Cf. Denmark, p. 281.

[2] *Rapport de la Commission du Suffrage Universel*, 1905, p. 45.

THE D'HONDT RULE

The rule subsequently devised[1] aimed at reducing the importance of remainders in the allotment of seats. The total of each list was divided by the number of seats plus one. This method yielded a smaller quota than the original rule and enabled more seats to be allotted at the first distribution. The final improvement, however, took the form of devising a rule by which the seats would be allotted to different parties in such a manner that after the first distribution no seats would remain unallotted.

THE D'HONDT RULE OR LARGEST AVERAGE

This method is commonly known as the d'Hondt rule, after its inventor, Victor d'Hondt of the University of Ghent; its nature is indicated by its French name, *la règle de la plus forte moyenne*—the largest average. The object is to secure that, when all the seats have been allotted, the average number of votes required to win one seat shall be as nearly as possible the same for each party, and the procedure can be illustrated by the figures for the French Department of Calvados in the general election of June, 1946. The Department formed one constituency, returning five members.

The votes cast for each party are ascertained and those totals are each divided in turn by the numbers 1, 2, 3, and so on as far as may be necessary, thus:

	Mouvement Républicain Populaire	*Parti Républicain de la Liberté*	*Communistes*	*Socialistes*	*Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines*
Dividing by 1:	74,931	34,797	29,856	27,381	14,099
„ „ 2:	37,465	17,398	14,928	—	—
„ „ 3:	24,977	—	—	—	—

The five highest numbers (five being the number of vacancies to be filled) are then arranged in order of magnitude as follows:

74,931
37,465
34,797
29,856
27,381

[1] By H. R. Droop, see p. 129.

The lowest of these numbers, 27,381, is the 'common divisor' or 'electoral quotient' and forms the basis for the allotment of seats. The number of votes obtained by each of the lists is divided by the quotient thus:

74,931	divided	by	27,381	=	2	with	a	remainder	of 20,169
34,797	„	„	27,381	=	1	„	„	„	7,416
29,856	„	„	27,381	=	1	„	„	„	2,475
27,381	„	„	27,381	=	1	„	„	„	0

The total for the first list contains the electoral quotient twice, that of the second, third, and fourth lists once, and the five seats are allotted accordingly. Each party obtains one representative for every quotient of voters which it can rally to its support, fractions of the quotient being disregarded. The *Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines* has less than the quotient and gets no seat.

The connexion between the object and the rule used to attain it may appear to the reader obscure; it should become clear if we follow the allotment of seats one by one. It is obvious that the largest party must have at least one of the seats—that in the Calvados example we shall be quite safe in giving the first seat to the M.R.P. party. Should we then give the second seat to the second largest party? If we do, the P.R.L. will have one seat per 34,797 votes and the M.R.P. only one seat per 74,931 votes. If, on the other hand, we give this second seat to the M.R.P., they will have two seats for their 74,931 votes, or one per 37,465, and if the *third* seat then goes to the P.R.L. the number of votes per seat for the two parties will be as nearly equal as is possible. The same process may be pictured as continuing with the fourth and subsequent seats, the question being asked on each occasion 'which of the parties, if it is allotted this seat, will then have the largest average of votes per seat?'

The final allocation (in which the seats obtained by each party give them an average vote per seat of 37,465, 34,797, 29,856, and 27,381 respectively) is one on which it would be difficult to improve. It is also, in this instance, the same as would be obtained by the method of the largest remainder. If, however, the number of seats in this constituency were only three, the result would depend on which of the two methods were used—the d'Hondt method would give the M.R.P. two seats and the P.R.L. one, while the method of the largest remainder would give the M.R.P., P.R.L., and Communists one

seat each. In the latter case, the quotient of total votes divided by seats is 181,064/3=60,355, and this divided into the party totals gives

M.R.P.	1	and	14,576	remainder
P.R.L.	0	,,	34,797	,,
Comm.	0	,,	29,856	,,
Soc.	0	,,	27,381	,,
R.G.R.	0	,,	14,099	,,

One seat thus goes to the M.R.P. and the remaining two to the two lists with the largest remainders—P.R.L. and Communists.

It will be seen that in such cases the tendencies of the two methods are opposed: whilst the largest remainder favours small parties (whether genuine or fabricated for the sake of electoral advantage), the d'Hondt method favours the larger ones.[1] This is often felt to be an advantage in discouraging the excessive growth of splinter parties which is a common ground for complaint in some countries (notably Germany and France), but the small parties naturally take a different view. In Germany under the Weimar Republic, the handicap against small parties was removed by what amounted to the extension of the constituency to cover the whole country. That is, the remainders (the votes that did not contribute to the election of a member in any constituency) were totalled for each party (first over each province and then over the entire country) and were used to elect additional members.

The existence of many splinter-parties, each with its remainder of votes, may give rise to a substantial waste of votes over the whole country and to a distortion of representation if the votes for a certain opinion-group are split among several parties. This effect can be mitigated by *apparentement*; that is, by allowing two or more parties to declare that they are contesting the election as an alliance. The unused votes of all the parties to such an alliance are then pooled, so the votes of a party too small to elect a candidate of its own may contribute to the election of a representative from an allied party. This is quite practicable so far as electoral mechanism is concerned, but is open to much the same objections as the party alliances already discussed;[2] the electors dislike being committed by their party leaders to the

[1] For the use made of this fact in the French electoral law of 1951, see p. 195.
[2] See pp. 52, 62.

support of some other party. Modifications of this kind are, therefore, a political rather than a mathematical question, and will be discussed below.[1]

In Sweden, the feeling grew that it was wrong for parties that would not ally themselves voluntarily on account of their real affinities to be driven to do so in order to get their fair share of seats. Consequently a committee was appointed to explore the possibilities of modifying the electoral law in such a way as to avoid the need for *apparentement*. This committee suggested a modification of the d'Hondt rule under which division would be by successive odd numbers[2] instead of by 1, 2, 3, etc. (thus giving a smaller electoral quotient). This, however, was felt to give too great an advantage to the smaller parties, and the committee therefore suggested excluding from a share in the seats any party polling less than 60 per cent of the total vote divided by the number of seats. The government proposed to attain the same end by dividing by 1·4, 3, 5, etc. instead of by 1, 3, 5, etc.; the effect of this is to exclude from the seats any party that is only just large enough to secure a seat on the division of the votes by 1. This plan (with abolition of *apparentement*) was adopted experimentally for the general election of 1952; it did not produce any substantial change in the accuracy with which the parties' votes are reflected in their seats,[3] and therefore appears (from this one trial) to have fulfilled its purpose of giving a fair result without *apparentement*. This system was also adopted by Norway in 1952.

In practice, the exact method of calculation used will affect the result only in a minority of the constituencies, and, in those constituencies, will rarely affect more than one seat. If the constituencies are large, returning, say, 10 members, the fact that the allocation of the tenth seat is sometimes questionable will have little effect on the composition of the Parliament. As will be seen from the examples in appendix ii, all party list systems of proportional representation give the parties a percentage of seats closely approximating to their percentage of votes; the discrepancies are extremely small compared with those under majority systems.

So far we have considered only the number of seats each

[1] See pp. 112, 116, 195–6, 223.
[2] Sainte-Lague's formula.
[3] See Appendix ii, p. 243.

party is to have; the party list systems were designed to give each its due proportion, and that object, as we have seen, they do achieve. Each seat, however, has to be filled by some individual man or woman; how is he or she to be selected?

SELECTION BY THE PARTY

The simple form of the list system which does not attempt to give the voter any personal choice within the party list is that which was used in France for the general elections of 1945 and 1946. In any given constituency, each party nominates as many candidates as there are seats to be filled; the party decides the order in which it wishes the candidates to be elected, and their names are printed in that order on the ballot paper; each party has a separate ballot paper. The voter selects the paper of the party he wishes to support, places it in an official envelope, and drops the closed envelope into the ballot box. If the number of envelopes containing, for example, the Socialist list amounts to one d'Hondt quota, the Socialist candidate whose name appears first on the list is declared elected; if the party gets twice as many votes, its second candidate will also be elected, and so on. The voter as such (apart from any influence he may exert as a party member) has no voice in the selection of the *person* who is to represent him; he may prefer the last candidate on the list (whose chance of election is nil) to the first, but there is nothing he can do about it.[1]

In actual practice, the system differs very little in this respect from the existing British method (which is really a non-proproportional party list system in which each list is limited to one name) though it appears to do so. As we have seen[2] the average British elector votes primarily for a party nominee. He may or may not admire the candidate his party has chosen for that particular constituency, he may much prefer the one fighting a hopeless seat in the next division, but there is nothing he (as a voter) can do about it. The British elector has an advantage over the user of a list system only if he is one of the few who vote for the candidate they consider the most suitable per-

[1] A change in the law before the election of November 1946 did permit the French voter to mark his preferred candidate, but since a candidate had to be selected by a majority of his party's voters to affect his position on the list, this provision was ineffective.

[2] P. 39.

son, with little or no regard to his party. For example, an enthusiastic admirer of Churchill, who would not give a vote to any other Conservative, may (if he has the luck to live in Woodford) vote for him. Under the French system that vote could be counted also for Churchill's party and might help to elect a person to whom that voter is violently opposed.

A British ballot paper nevertheless (bearing as it does only names of people, with no indication of their party) has a deceptive appearance of personality; so much so that foreign observers often mistake the appearance for reality, and even those most familiar with its working often overlook its preponderantly party nature.

CHOOSING FROM THE LISTS


Most countries using list systems of proportional representation have modified them so as to give the voters a choice between candidates in a more or less effective form.

The simplest of such modifications is the Belgian, in which the elector may vote either for one party's list of candidates as it stands or for one particular candidate within that list. All the lists are printed side by side on the ballot paper, and it will be noticed that the parties do not necessarily present as many candidates as there are seats to be filled; there are in the example given[1] two short lists (list 3—Socialists dissatisfied with their party's official list 5, and list 4—small tradesmen) and even an Independent. The *suppléants* are a device to avoid by-elections: a casual vacancy is filled by the leading *suppléant* of the same party. This is not an essential part of the system; it would be possible to fill the vacancy by the candidate next on the main list, or to hold a new election for that seat. The elector votes by blacking out either the white spot at the top of a list (indicating that he votes for that party's candidates in the order in which they are printed) or the white spot beside the name of one of its candidates (indicating that he supports this party but prefers that candidate to the rest of his party colleagues). The voter may also, if he wishes, indicate in the same way which of the *suppléants* he prefers.

After the number of seats each party is to have has been determined by the d'Hondt method, the candidates who will fill those

[1] Taken from the first proportional election in Belgium, 1900.

A Belgian Ballot Paper



seats are selected as follows:—All the votes marked in the space at the top of a list, i.e. list votes, form a pool from which the candidates of that list draw in succession as many votes as are necessary to make their individual total equal to the electoral quotient, the process continuing until the pool is exhausted. Suppose for example that the electoral quotient is 3,750, that list 1 includes three candidates, A, B, and C in that order, and that votes for this list have been cast as follows:

List votes	4,000
Preferential votes for A	500
„ „ for B	500
„ „ for C	3,000
	8,000

Since the party has polled twice the quotient (and 500 votes over), it will have two seats.

Candidate A, being the first in order on the list, has the prior claim on the votes recorded for the list. The electoral quotient is 3,750, and A's total of 500 is raised to this number by the addition of 3,250 votes taken from those recorded for the list. This secures his election, and there remain 750 list votes which are attributed to candidate B, this candidate being the second in order on the list. B, however, has also had 500 votes recorded against his name, and his total poll therefore amounts to 1,250. But candidate C has obtained 3,000 votes, all recorded for himself personally, and as this total exceeds B's total of 1,250, C will be declared elected. The two candidates chosen from list 1 would, in this case, be A and C. The successful supplementary candidates are ascertained in the same way.

It will be seen that the candidate placed by his party first on the list has a great advantage, and he is in practice nearly always the first to be elected. It is, however, not unusual for the second on the list to be displaced by the third, as in the above example; the Belgian voter has appreciably more power to determine the personnel of his Parliament than has the British.

It will also be seen that should the Belgian voters refuse to give any list votes at all, the order of election of the candidates would be determined solely by the voters' preferences[1] without regard to the wishes of the party organization except in so far as

[1] The order in which the candidates would then stand would not necessarily be their true order of popularity—see pp. 65, 110, 124.

the approval of the latter is necessary for a candidate's appearance on the list in any position. This would be the situation if the *case de tête* (the spot at the head of the list) were abolished—which has been done in certain other countries, for example Sweden.[1] A possible further development would be to allow the voter to indicate his preference for more than one of his party's candidates; this modification also is incorporated in, for example, the Swedish and the Finnish systems.[2]

A still greater departure from the list system pure and simple is by *panachage*, the voter's choice being no longer confined within whichever one list he may select. This feature is found, for example, in Switzerland. The desirability of *panachage* is hotly debated, the general opinion in some countries being that voters belonging primarily to one party ought not to influence the election of candidates of another party, while others hold that the infinitely variable views of the citizens ought not to be confined within the rigid, and perhaps arbitrary, boundaries of parties.

The best example of a list system with complete freedom for the voter to indicate preferences for a number of candidates, of one or more parties, is the Swiss. For elections to the Conseil National (the lower house of the Swiss Parliament), each canton (or in three cases half a canton) is one constituency, returning one Deputy for each 24,000 of its population.[3] The cantons so small as to be entitled to only one member elect him by the British method; the rest elect several Deputies by a proportional system.

Any 15 electors in a constituency can nominate a list of candidates, not exceeding in number the seats to be filled; they may also indicate that they wish their list to be considered as allied with one or more other lists (*apparentement*, see pp. 89 and 90). Each elector has as many votes as there are seats to be filled, and may distribute them as he pleases among all the candidates nominated, not necessarily confining himself within one list; he may also cumulate two votes on one candidate. The first operation in the count is to total the votes cast for the candidates of each list (or combination of allied lists) and allot seats in

[1] See Appendix vi, p. 280.
[2] See Appendix vi, p. 280, and Appendix vii, p. 282.
[3] To keep the total membership of the council roughly constant, this quota is revised from time to time in accordance with census figures. It was raised from 22,000 to 24,000 just before the 1951 election.

proportion to these totals. The seats are then filled by the candidates of those lists in the order of the number of votes they have received. Only in the event of a tie is the order in which the candidates' names appear on the ballot paper taken into account; thus, control over which persons are elected passes very largely out of the hands of the party organizers into those of the voters.

MIXED SYSTEMS

A mixed system was evolved in 1946 for the first post-Hitler election in Western Germany, and is still in use there. This consists in electing a certain fraction of the members exactly as in a British general election, and correcting any misrepresentation of the parties by adding members from separate lists so as to bring the total representation of each party as nearly as possible up to proportionality.[1]

This does give (see Appendix ii) results which are very fair to the parties, but its personal element is illusory: just as in Britain or in France, the successful candidates are those whom their parties nominate for the safest seats or as heads of lists.

Other rather similar ideas have been propounded in Britain[2] with the important difference that instead of having two classes of members, as in Germany, it is proposed to fill all seats on a proportional basis, using the votes cast in single-member constituencies as at present. The avoidance of two classes among M.P.s would appear to be an advantage; so also is the fact that a party cannot, as occasionally happens in Germany, get more than its proportional share of seats by 'direct election'. The main attraction, however, is that, no matter how drastic might be the changes in other respects, systems of this

[1] The details of the method have been modified from time to time and in the various Lander. For the 1953 election of the Bundestag, each elector could exercise two votes, the first for a particular candidate in his constituency, the second for a party. This, by making it possible to vote for a man without necessarily supporting his party, could have introduced into the voting a substantial personal element, but in practice it made little difference; the very popular Chancellor Adenauer, for instance, received very few more votes than did his party in the same constituency. See also Denmark, pages 159 and 281.

[2] J. W. Gordon, Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on Systems of Election, 1910, p. 166, and Thomas Devine, private communication to the Chairman of the Liberal Party, January 1948. A similar system was put forward in Saxony and in Württemberg; see Rudolf Linkenheil, *Ein Neues Wahlverfahren fur den Wurttembergischen Landtag* (F. Wurz, Schramberg, 1913).

type would not disturb our existing constituencies or the marking of our ballot papers, and would involve no enlargement of the House of Commons.

These systems would work essentially as follows: Voting to take place exactly as now. Votes for all candidates of a given party to be added together over a large constituency (anything from ten single-member constituencies up to the whole country), and parties to be allotted seats in proportion to their total polls in that area. Those seats to be filled by the party's candidates in the order of the number of votes they receive (or, to eliminate variations in the size of the poll, in the order of their percentage of the total vote in their constituencies). This would undoubtedly give a House of Commons reflecting very faithfully the voting strength of the various parties, but those who support the idea on that ground must not suppose that they would at the same time be securing the election of those candidates within each party whom the voters prefer.

As already pointed out,[1] the votes obtained by a candidate are no measure of his personal worth or popularity; they depend almost solely on his party's strength in that constituency and on which of the other parties run candidates there. This fact appears incontestably in the percentage polls of leading Conservative candidates in the general election of February, 1950: Churchill's poll of 62 per cent was exceeded by at least 22 Conservatives (and far exceeded by many Labour candidates, led by Shinwell with 89 per cent against Attlee's 60 per cent), of whom very few can be regarded as eminent.

The reader of this chapter, and especially of the associated appendices, may feel that list systems of proportional representation exist in bewildering variety, some being themselves of bewildering complexity. All, however, have this feature in common: that every vote (whether or not given in the first instance to an individual candidate) is, automatically and without further reference to the voter's wishes, added to the total of the list on which that candidate appears. This feature is entirely absent from the system of the single transferable vote to be described in the next chapter.

[1] See p. 39ff.

CHAPTER VI

The Single Transferable Vote

The voting systems described in the preceding chapter are all based on the assumption that the voter is primarily concerned with the support of a party, and that parties as such should be given representation in proportion to their size. In most countries using list systems, the voter is given opportunities to indicate his views on other matters as well, particularly on the relative merits of individual candidates within his chosen party, but these opportunities are secondary and involve modifications of the basic system.

In English-speaking countries, on the other hand, the approach to proportional representation is fundamentally different. Those who first advocated the single transferable vote were concerned less with the fortunes of parties than with giving greater freedom to the individual voter. The system is designed to make every vote as effective as possible, whether used to support a party or not. It will be seen in what follows that if the electors are guided largely by party considerations the parties will obtain proportional representation, but this will be only as a consequence of the voters' choice. The object of the single transferable vote is to enable each citizen to take part as freely and as fully as possible in the selection of his own representative, in the belief that this is the essence of true democracy.

VOTES WITHOUT VALUE

To give every citizen a vote is not necessarily the same thing as to give him a share in choosing his representatives. Before the Reform Act of 1832 began to widen the franchise, the ordinary citizen living in South Shields had no vote but was free to agitate by any legal means for the return of a Tory to represent the county in Parliament. After that date he may

have found himself able in addition to cast a vote for the Tories —but he did not then acquire one whit more influence on the result of the election than he had before: from that day to this, no Conservative has ever become M.P. for South Shields, and the representation of that constituency has been, in every Parliament, precisely the same as it would have been if every Conservative living there (at present about one-quarter of the electorate) had been permanently excluded from the electoral register. The same applies to Labour voters in other parts of the country (for example in all the twelve constituencies of the county of Sussex), to Liberals in very many places since 1918, and to supporters of small parties almost everywhere.

In the United Kingdom, 135 constituencies were represented by an M.P. of the same party in every Parliament from the redistribution of 1918 to that of 1948 (some of them even longer); in those constituencies, containing 7,684,514 people on their 1945 electoral registers out of the national total of 32,836,419, all the supporters of any other parties might as well have had no vote, for all the difference they made to the composition of the House of Commons, and the result of any election in those constituencies is a foregone conclusion.

Whenever an election is held, complaints are made by people who, by the carelessness of a registration official or from some similar cause, have been deprived of the opportunity to vote. Is there not much more ground for protest in the fact that a Conservative living in Poplar or a Socialist in Putney is deprived of the opportunity to be represented by an M.P. (or even a Borough councillor) of his own choice not in one election only but throughout his life?

In a typical general election the total of 'wasted' votes is not far short of half the entire number cast; in 1950, with 28¾ million people voting, the figures were:

Labour	4,928,922
Conservative	5,232,036
Liberal	2,475,391
Others	239,347
Total	12,875,696 = 45%[1]

This, moreover, takes no account of the 'waste' of votes for the opposite reason—of the fact that, of Shinwell's 38,367 sup-

[1] Figures supplied by Dr J. F. S. Ross.

porters in 1950, 29,394 could have stayed at home without making any difference to his election.[1]

Why is it that the vote intended to give us an influence on the election of our representatives so often fails of its purpose? And is there a remedy? The reason lies in our use of an electoral system under which the whole representation of any one constituency goes to the majority (relative or absolute), and, in particular, our use for Parliamentary purposes of single-member constituencies in which nothing else is possible. One M.P. can be the choice of only one body of electors—at best of a clear majority; the minority, even if only one fewer, cannot possibly elect anyone. If the votes of the minority, as well as of the majority, are to have any effect on the result, it is essential to elect several representatives who can be shared among at least two political groups. And to secure minority representation is essential if we want to make sure of majority rule.[2]

GIVING THE VOTE ITS VALUE

Having by multi-member constituencies made it *possible* for the votes of two or more bodies of citizens to become effective, we can make it *certain* by the same principle which ensures that a pound note will buy one pound's worth of goods: by allowing the owner of the pound, who finds that his first choice is for one reason or another unavailable, to choose again as many times as may be necessary. The majority in Leeds[3] under the limited vote got less representation than the minority because its votes were distributed unfavourably among its three candidates; it should be clear that if the section of the majority that supported its third candidate had been able to remedy this maldistribution and utilize their otherwise ineffective votes by transferring them to its second candidate, the majority would have had two seats to the minority's one.

This is the principle of the single transferable vote, the method

[1] Easington, 1950:

Shinwell (*Labour*)	38,367
Macfarlane (*Cons.*)	8,972
majority	29,395

[2] J. S. Mill, *Representative Government*, ch. vii: 'If democracy means the certain ascendancy of the majority, there is no means of insuring that, but by allowing every individual figure to tell equally in the summing up. Any minority left out, either purposely or by the play of the machinery, gives the power not to the majority, but to a minority in some other part of the scale.'

[3] See p. 77.

invented by Thomas Hare in this country in 1857 and, independently, by Andrae in Denmark two years earlier. Hare's original proposals are discussed in Appendix iii; it will be seen that these have since been modified very considerably, but the modifications concern only improvements in detail or adaptation to special conditions, not any change in essentials. The greater part of this chapter will therefore discuss the system as it is usually applied at the present time, with subordinate references to its more important variations.

The essential principle of the system is probably most easily understood by reference to an election carried out by open voting without ballot papers, and this example should be kept in mind whenever considering the mechanism. Rowland Hill (famous in the history of the Post Office) records that, when he was teaching in his father's[1] school, his pupils were asked to elect a committee by standing beside the boy they liked best. This first produced a number of unequal groups, but soon the boys in the largest groups came to the conclusion that not all of them were actually necessary for the election of their favourite and some moved on to help another candidate, while on the other hand the few supporters of an unpopular boy gave him up as hopeless and transferred themselves to the candidate they considered the next best. The final result was that a number of candidates equal to the number required for the committee were each surrounded by the same number of supporters, with only two or three boys left over who were dissatisfied with all those elected. This is an admirable example of the use of the S.T.V.

In any ordinary election by this method, ballot papers take the place of the living voters and move as Rowland Hill's boys did, according to directions given by each voter. Those directions are given by numbering the candidates in the order of the voter's preference; thus, a paper marked as below:

7 Bill
4 Charlie
2 Fred
George
1 Jack
Jim
5 Roger
6 Sam
3 Tom

[1] Thomas Wright Hill. See Appendix iii, p. 245.

would be a boy's instruction to the Returning Officer that he wished to vote in the first place for Jack, but if Jack were either so popular as to have no need of his vote or so unpopular as to have no chance of election, the vote was not to be wasted but was to be used instead to help Fred. Similarly, if Fred were either already elected or out of the running, the vote should go to Tom, and so on until it reached a candidate it could help to elect. Our voter has numbered all the candidates except two—either not knowing enough about either of these two to have any opinion about them, or else disliking both so cordially that he will in no circumstances vote for either.

This example has been chosen deliberately to emphasize the contrast between the single transferable vote and all party list systems: nowhere in the above account is there any hint of the existence of political parties or of any analogous divisions. These, which are the indispensable foundation of the list system, are in no way essential to the working of the single transferable vote. Neither are they, however, irrelevant. If all, or nearly all, the votes cast are made effective by their transference from a candidate they cannot help to a candidate they can help, it must be expected that the total result will reflect the opinion of all, or nearly all, the voters; if so, in a Parliamentary election it certainly should reflect their opinions about anything so important as a party. How it comes to do so should be clear if we imagine that all of Jack's supporters are also Fred's; in that case, if Jack has twice as many votes as he needs, the surplus will go to Fred and secure his election also, while, if the two between them have only enough to elect one, the less popular will be eliminated and the transfer of his votes will secure the election of the more popular.

It is not necessary to this result that the solidarity of Jack's and Fred's supporters should be that of a political party; according to the circumstances of the election, their bond may be that of a common religion, or occupation, or indeed a common interest of any kind. The voters group themselves spontaneously on whatever lines seem to them the most important. Examples of such groupings will be given later;[1] we will now examine the mechanism of the system in more detail, basing our explanation on an actual Parliamentary election in which parties are a vital factor.

[1] See pp. 112, 118.

A convenient example is the five-member constituency of Cork City in the Irish General Election of February 1948. For the five seats there were sixteen candidates; four of what was then the Government party, Fianna Fail, four of the chief Opposition party, Fine Gael, three of the New Republican Party, the Clann na Poblachta, two each of Labour and National Labour and one Independent. This gave one of the longest ballot papers in the country, but few votes were invalid, and there seems to have been no confusion between the two candidates with identical names (who were distinguished on the ballot papers by their addresses).

44,875 valid votes were cast. The first operation is to sort the 44,875 papers according to the candidate marked '1'; this is equivalent to the initial action of the schoolboys in placing themselves beside the candidate they liked best. In Cork, the result of this sorting was:

Allen	(Fine Gael)	911
Anthony	(Labour)	2,688
Barrett	(Fine Gael)	1,496
Casey	(Labour)	987
Fennessy	(Clann na Poblachta)	1,423
Furlong	(Fianna Fail)	3,601
Hickey	(National Labour)	4,507
Lynch	(Fianna Fail)	5,594
MacCarthy	(Fianna Fail)	2,747
McCarton	(Clann na Poblachta)	2,346
McGrath	(Fianna Fail)	5,092
O'Dubgaill	(National Labour)	260
O'Higgins	(Fine Gael)	7,351
Sheehan, Michael	(Independent)	4,898
Sheehan, Michael	(Fine Gael)	409
Stack	(Clann na Poblachta)	565
		44,875

Several things are apparent from this first count: that most of the votes have gone to the candidates of the two principal parties, though others have a substantial number; that Fianna Fail has more support than any other single party, but less than the other four parties and the Independent combined; and that within each party there is a great difference in the popularity of its candidates. Contrast the figures for any of the parties running two or more candidates with those in any block vote election.[1]

[1] See pp. 32, 40, 41.

Fine Gael candidates in Cork, 1948	*Conservative candidates in Greenwich, S.E., 1949*
7,351	3,036
1,496	3,033
911	3,028
409	3,021

To stop at this point would be applying the single non-transferable vote as in Japan;[1] the five leading candidates, O'Higgins, Lynch, McGrath, Sheehan (Ind.), and Hickey would be declared elected. The result is open to the same kind of objection as the election of a British M.P. by a minority vote (e.g. Conway p. 52), for it might perhaps be contended that the 17,433 supporters of the eleven defeated candidates would all prefer any of these to any of the five elected. The only way to settle that question is to ask the people concerned whether that is so or not; this is what is done in the subsequent counts.

We therefore proceed to the second count, equivalent to the first movement of the schoolboys from their original positions. It will be remembered that in the example given this first movement was that of boys who realized they were unnecessarily supporting a candidate so popular as to be elected without their help. Is there such a candidate in Cork, and, if so, how many surplus supporters has he?

To answer those questions, we must first determine how many votes a candidate has to have before he can be certain of election. It may at first appear that, there being five vacancies, this number ought to be one-fifth of the total votes. Clearly, any group of people amounting to one-fifth of the voters should be entitled to one out of the five representatives. That, indeed, was the original proposal both of Hare and of Andrae,[2] but a little consideration will show that one-fifth of the total is not the *smallest* number of votes that must certainly secure a seat. The smallest number is what is known as the Droop quota, the reasoning behind which will be clearest if we consider first the filling of a single seat. In a single-member constituency, it is obviously unnecessary for a candidate to poll every vote; he is certain of election (no matter how many other candidates there may be and what support they get) if he has one vote more than half the total. Two candidates can each get half the votes, but only one candidate can get more; therefore anyone who has

[1] See p. 78.
[2] See also p. 129.

even one vote more than the half must be elected. Similarly, in a five-member constituency, six candidates can each get one-sixth of the total votes, but only five can get any more; therefore any candidate who polls even one vote more than one-sixth of the total must inevitably be one of the five elected members. The general rule for a constituency of any size is:

$$\text{Droop Quota} = \frac{\text{Total votes}}{\text{Total seats} + 1} + 1$$

In Cork, the quota was $44{,}875/6+1=7{,}480$—if five candidates each get this number they will have together 37,400 votes, leaving only 7,475 for any sixth candidate.

A glance at the figures of the first count will show that no candidate has reached this quota, though one, Higgins, is very near it. The first movement therefore must be that of voters who, if they stay in their original position, will be wasting their votes on a candidate who has no chance of election. Obviously such a candidate is O'Dubgaill,[1] and the Returning Officer in effect says to his supporters 'Your candidate cannot succeed, but there are fifteen others still in the running; would you like to choose one of these instead?' That is, he examines each of O'Dubgaill's 260 papers to see which candidate is marked '2' and transfers the paper to that candidate. From the columns headed 'second count' in the result sheet (p. 106) it will be seen that each of the 260 voters has given a second preference, the largest number (151) giving it to the other candidate of the same party.

Sheehan (Fine Gael) is then lowest on the poll and his votes are transferred in the same way, but since a paper marked '1—Sheehan, 2—O'Dubgaill' cannot be given to a candidate who has been eliminated, it goes to the 'next available preference', which in this case will be the candidate marked '3'. It will be noticed that eight of Sheehan's supporters have recorded no further preferences—either because they have not understood that they may do so, or because they regard him as the only candidate worth their support, or because they imagine that they can help him by 'plumping' for him. This last idea is mistaken, for these papers remained with Sheehan just so long as they could be of any use to him; now that he is past help, they could do him no harm by being transferred to some other candidate.

[1] For a possible objection to eliminating this lowest candidate first, see Appendix ix, p. 288.

GENERAL ELECTION 1948, BOROUGH OF CORK

(Five vacancies; quota: 7,480)

	1 Count	2 Count		3 Count		4 Count		5 Count		6 Count		7 Count	
		Transfer of O'Dubgaill's votes	Result	Transfer of Sheehan's votes	Result	Transfer of Stack's votes	Result	Transfer of Allen's votes	Result	Transfer of O'Higgins' surplus	Result	Transfer of Casey's votes	Result
Allen, D.	911	+ 4	915	+ 38	953	+ 4	957	−957	—				
Anthony, R. S.	2,688	+ 7	2,695	+ 50	2,745	+ 10	2,755	+158	2,913	+ 14	2,927	+607	3,534
Barrett, S. D.	1,496	+ 10	1,506	+ 31	1,537	+ 3	1,540	+422	1,962	+146	2,108	+ 29	2,137
Casey, J.	987	+ 5	992	+ 3	995	+ 16	1,011	+ 15	1,026	+ 1	1,027	−1027	
Fennessy, J. J.	1,423	+ 5	1,428	+ 3	1,431	+221	1,652	+ 9	1,661		1,661	+ 69	1,730
Furlong, W.	3,601	+ 5	3,606	+ 15	3,621	+ 4	3,625	+ 13	3,638	+ 1	3,639	+ 29	3,668
Hickey, J.	4,507	+151	4,658	+ 32	4,690	+ 18	4,708	+ 31	4,739	+ 1	4,740	+ 91	4,831
Lynch, J.	5,594	+ 13	5,607	+ 25	5,632	+ 8	5,640	+ 12	5,652		5,652	+ 43	5,695
MacCarthy, S.	2,747	+ 6	2,753	+ 14	2,767	+ 8	2,775	+ 6	2,781	+ 2	2,783	+ 8	2,791
McCartan, P.	2,346	+ 12	2,358	+ 12	2,370	+220	2,590	+ 10	2,600	+ 1	2,601	+ 64	2,665
McGrath, P.	5,092	+ 7	5,099	+ 31	5,130	+ 20	5,150	+ 8	5,158	+ 1	5,159	+ 20	5,179
O'Dubgaill, S.	260	−260	—										
O'Higgins, T. F.	7,351	+ 12	7,363	+101	7,464	+ 9	7,473	+201	7,674	−194	7,480		7,480
Sheehan, M.	4,898	+ 12	4,910	+ 46	4,956	+ 31	4,987	+ 52	5,039	+ 22	5,061	+ 51	5,112
Sheehan, M.	409	+ 6	415	−415	—								
Stack, L.	565	+ 5	570	+ 6	576	−576	—						
Non-transferable papers				+ 8	8	+ 4	12	+ 20	32	+ 5	37	+ 16	53
Totals	44,875		44,875		44,875		44,875		44,875		44,875		44,875

	8 Count		9 Count		10 Count		11 Count		12 Count		13 Count		14 Count	
	Transfer of Fennessy's votes	*Result*	*Transfer of Barrett's votes*	*Result*	*Transfer of MacCarthy's votes*	*Result*	*Transfer of Furlong's votes*	*Result*	*Transfer of Lynch's surplus*	*Result*	*Transfer of McGrath's surplus*	*Result*	*Transfer of McCartan's votes*	*Result*
Allen, D.														
Anthony, R. S.	+ 64	3,598	+ 647	4,245	+ 102	4,347	+ 91	4,438	+ 20	4,458	+ 52	4,510	+1,027	5,537
Barrett, S. D.	+ 19	2,156	-2,156											
Casey, J.														
Fennessy, J. J.	-1,730													
Furlong, W.	+ 32	3,700	+ 49	3,749	+ 373	4,122	-4,122							
Hickey, J.	+ 85	4,916	+ 126	5,042	+ 83	5,125	+ 229	5,354	+ 27	5,381	+ 100	5,481	+ 872	6,353 (5th)
Lynch, J.	+ 31	5,726	+ 61	5,787	+ 966	6,753	+2,170	8,923	-1,443	7,480		7,480		7,480 (2nd)
MacCarthy, S.	+ 128	2,919	+ 42	2,961	-2,961	—								
McCartan, P.	+1,249	3,914	+ 192	4,106	+ 136	4,242	+ 100	4,342	+ 109	4,451	+ 30	4,481	-4,481	—
McGrath, P.	+ 20	5,199	+ 34	5,233	+ 965	6,198	+1,237	7,435	+1,226	8,661	-1,181	7,480		7,480(3rd)
O'Dubgaill, S.														
O'Higgins, T. F.		7,480		7,480		7,480		7,480		7,480		7,480		7,480 (1st)
Sheehan, M.	+ 66	5,178	+ 580	5,758	+ 211	5,969	+ 202	6,171	+ 61	6,232	+ 380	6,612	+ 879	7,491 (4th)
Sheehan, M.														
Stack, L.														
Non-transferable papers	+ 36	89	+ 425	514	+ 125	639	+ 93	732		732	+ 619	1,351	+1,703	3,054
Totals		44,875		44,875		44,875		44,875		44,875		44,875		44,875

Dated this SIXTH day of FEBRUARY,

Michael J. C. Dempsey,

Deputy Returning Officer.

Thus, a later preference can in no circumstances count against an earlier one.[1]

After two more lowest candidates have been eliminated, we find that O'Higgins has 7,674 votes to his credit at the end of the 5th count, or 194 more than the quota. 194 votes are therefore available for transfer which would otherwise be wasted by remaining with a candidate who does not need them. The question immediately arises, *which* 194 out of the whole 7,674 should be transferred? In an open election we may imagine that it is the last 194 people arriving in O'Higgins' group who find there is no need for them and go elsewhere; the equivalent procedure with ballot papers would be to transfer the last 194 added to O'Higgins' pile, i.e. the top ones. If the number of papers is large and if they are well mixed, it is probable that papers selected in that way will be a sufficiently fair sample of the whole; it is, however, possible that they might happen to be, for instance, the only 194 papers indicating a next available preference for Anthony. The chance of such a gross distortion of the voters' will is remote, but, since one object of reforming our electoral system is to reduce the uncertainty of the results, it is usually thought worth while to eliminate even this element of chance. This is done by examining all the 201 papers received by O'Higgins in the previous count (if he had had 7,674 first preferences, the whole of these would have had to be re-examined);[2] the equivalent process in an open election would be a consultation among those voters to decide who should move on. If, for example, a candidate needing only 100 supporters had 200, and if, out of those 200 supporters, 120 wanted to move to candidate A, 60 to candidate B and 20 to candidate C, then it would be fair to let half of each of these groups go,[3] so that of the 100 surplus votes A would get 60, B 30, and C 10.

The Returning Officer therefore sorts the 201 papers according to which of the eleven 'continuing candidates' is marked as the voter's next available preference, and from each of those piles he adds to that candidate's total the correct proportion of papers. If, for example, there are found to be 15 papers marked 1—Allen, 2—O'Higgins, 3—Anthony, the reasoning is as follows: out of 201 papers, O'Higgins can spare 194, keeping the

[1] Contrast the points system, p. 82, and the block vote, p. 42.

[2] Although this is the procedure almost universally followed, Professor Hermens (*Democracy or Anarchy?*, p. 49), says it 'would be so complicated that it is not done'.

[3] Which half? See p. 103; and Appendices iv, p. 254, and v, p. 276.

other 7 to make up his quota; therefore out of the 15 indicating a desire to help Anthony next, he can let $\frac{194}{201} \times 15$ go. This works out to $14\ \frac{96}{201}$ and fractions are eliminated by counting the largest of these as equal to one and neglecting the smallest;[1] Anthony will therefore receive 14 extra votes.

These transfers of surplus votes and of the votes of defeated candidates are continued until, in the fourteenth count, we find that four candidates have reached the quota—one with a surplus of 11—and the only other two remaining have 6,853 and 5,537 votes respectively. It is unnecessary to transfer Sheehan's surplus of 11, since it is too small to raise Anthony above last place even if it all went to him. The only possible further step would be to eliminate Anthony, and this need not be done because it could have no other result than the election of Hickey as the fifth member. Hickey is therefore declared elected without having reached the quota.

It will be noticed that the five candidates elected are the five who were leading (and in the same order) on the first count. This is not a rare occurrence (in 1948 it happened in eight of Eire's forty constituencies), but even if it were usual it would not entitle us to decide the election on the first count only. One reason has already been given;[2] it is necessary not only that justice should be done but that justice should be seen to be done, and in a case like this the effect of the subsequent counts is to demonstrate beyond dispute that the candidates leading on the first count are in fact the five most desired by the voters. In other cases the effect is to demonstrate that this is not correct, or only partially correct; 17 Irish constituencies returned the leading candidates but in a different order, while in the remaining 15 constituencies one candidate was elected who would not have been successful on the figures of the first count. An example is the three-member constituency of Wicklow, (see next page). As no candidate had a quota on the first count, it is natural that Brennan should be the first elected, since two of his party colleagues are eliminated and their votes transferred. Cogan, the Independent, secures the third seat in preference to Sweetman (Fine Gael), runner-up, because he is more acceptable to the bulk of those voters who have not elected a candidate of their own party.

[1] See Regulation 9 (*b*), (*c*), pg. 253. For a still more accurate method, which does not neglect these fractions, see p. 122, and Appendix v, p. 276.

[2] See p. 104.

		First Count	
Everett	(National Labour)	4,834	Elected second
Brennan	(Fianna Fail)	4,142	Elected first
Sweetman	(Fine Gael)	3,941	
Cogan	(Independent)	3,618	Elected third
Byrne	(Fianna Fail)	3,414	
McCrae	(Labour)	2,072	
Clarke	(Clann na Poblachta)	1,824	
O'Reilly	(Fianna Fail)	1,760	
Hyland	(Clann na Poblachta)	844	
		26,449	Quota—6,613

The second reason why it is not sufficient to stop at the first count is that if the voters knew this was to be done, the first count itself might be very different. It might, for instance, very well be argued that Sheehan, the Independent, having to cover the constituency with no party organization to back him, had no chance. Should a little more than one-quarter of his supporters be deterred by this consideration from 'wasting their votes' on him, he would lose his place among the first five. The transferability of the vote is a guarantee that it will be cast according to the voter's real wishes.

The actual rules used by Returning Officers are printed as appendix iv (p. 247). They are very detailed, because they have to provide for any contingency, however remote (e.g. a tie between two candidates) and specify exactly how each paper shall be dealt with, to avoid any suspicion of bias on the part of the Returning Officer; they do not however depart at all from the principle as exemplified in the election in Rowland Hill's school, and are simple to put into effect.

THE VOTERS IN ACTION

It will now be profitable to examine in detail the conduct of the voters in this Irish election. In the first transfer of votes (elimination of O'Dubgaill) it will be seen that *every* other candidate gets some support, but that the degree of this support varies very greatly. The majority of O'Dubgaill's supporters (58 per cent) wish their votes to be transferred to the other candidate of the same party. They have chosen to give a straightforward party vote, while at the same time showing quite plainly that, of the party's two candidates, they prefer O'Dubgaill to Hickey.

Of the votes going to the other 14 candidates, Lynch (Fianna Fail) secures the largest number (13) though his party gets a total of only 31 transferred votes against 78 for the other (anti-de Valera) parties. All through the election there are signs of Lynch's personal popularity, and he (the youngest of the Fianna Fail candidates) was the first of them to be elected, while one of the party's sitting members (Furlong) lost his seat. The same tendencies are evident in the third count, where the preference of Fine Gael voters for O'Higgins as compared with the party's other candidates is confirmed, and indeed in every other count.

In sharp contrast to block vote elections, the voting figures show quite clearly which individual candidates the voters prefer. It might be thought that this is accounted for by a tendency of the Irish to vote on personal rather than on party lines, but examination shows that the amount of party voting is approximately the same in Eire as in Britain. Analysis of the Cork result sheet shows that the total of 18,449 transfers carried out in the whole 14 counts is divided as follows:

(*a*) from one candidate to another of the same party—10,324 = 56 per cent.

(*b*) from one anti-de Valera candidate to another anti-de Valera candidate of another party—5,496 = 30 per cent.

(*c*) from Fianna Fail to an anti-de Valera candidate or vice versa—2,629 = 14 per cent.

That there was a strong tendency to vote on party lines is also shown by the fact that of the non-transferable votes (3,050) 90 per cent (2,747) became non-transferable when no candidate of the same party remained.

We can now see how the single transferable vote results in the proportional representation of (*a*) parties and (*b*) groups of more or less closely related parties. The National Labour Party, for instance, nominated two candidates (although it could hardly have hoped to win two seats), its votes being initially divided between the two. That 'splitting of the vote' made no difference whatever to the party's chances (nor would it have done if Hickey and O'Dubgaill had shared the votes much more equally), for when the less popular candidate was eliminated the whole of the purely party vote went to the more popular; all those who would have voted for Hickey if he had been the only National Labour candidate transferred their votes to him from O'Dubgaill. Similarly, the splitting of the anti-de Valera vote

among four parties and an Independent did nothing to reduce the prospect of defeating the government. Those whose main concern was to 'get de Valera out' made sure of exerting their full influence by recording a preference for each of the non-Fianna Fail candidates.

The result, from the party point of view, was as follows:

	First Pref.		*First Pref.*	
	Votes	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*
Fianna Fail			17,034	2
Fine Gael	10,167	1		
Independent	4,898	1		
National Labour	4,767	1	27,841	3
Clann na Poblachta	4,334	0		
Labour	3,675	0		

Fianna Fail has two quotas on its own account and Fine Gael one; the Independent and National Labour candidates are elected with the help of other parties too small to obtain separate representation.

The proportional representation of the pro- and anti-de Valera groups is clearly the result of the transfer of votes from one candidate to another within each group. The contrast in this respect between the single transferable vote and party list systems is discussed below.[1]

ACCURACY OF REPRESENTATION

The political effects of this and other proportional systems will be discussed further in chapters viii, ix, and x; for the present it is necessary to return to the mechanics of the single transferable vote. It will be remembered that the object of the method was to make every citizen's vote effective. How far is that object attained? It is of course out of the question to expect 100 per cent perfection in this respect. The crux of the matter is whether the results of the method show a reasonably close approach to its aim.

Inspection of the Cork result sheet shows that the proportion of ineffective votes there is at any rate much lower than the British average.[2] Of the 44,875 votes cast, 27,442 (61 per cent) contributed to the election of their first-preference candidate,

[1] P. 115. ff
[2] See p. 99.

and a total of 36,273 (81 per cent) to the election of a candidate for whom those voters are known to have expressed some preference. The only votes not actually contributing to the election of one of the three members are the 5,537 for the runner-up, the 3,054 non-transferable, and the surplus of 11 which it was not necessary to transfer from Sheehan, a total of 8,602 or 19 per cent. Moreover, among the 3,054 people whose votes are non-transferable a large proportion will be satisfied with one or other of the five elected candidates. For example the 425 who showed no further preference when the last continuing Fine Gael candidate was eliminated are almost certainly happy to regard O'Higgins as their member), and probably (though not certainly) examination of Anthony's papers would show that most of these bore a preference for at least one of the elected candidates.

This 19 per cent of ineffective votes is close to the figure that would be expected on theoretical grounds. Since each quota of votes must, if eventually accumulated on the same candidate, secure his election, it is evident that the largest single group of people whose votes can be ineffective is one fewer than the quota, i.e. $\frac{\text{total votes}}{\text{total seats} + 1}$. In the example of Cork, with five seats to fill, we should therefore expect 16·7 per cent of the votes to remain unused. The slightly higher percentage is due to the non-transferable papers. The method depends on the transfer of votes, and if any large number of voters refuse to let them be transferred, its object will to that extent be defeated. If the anti-de Valera parties each behaved as an entirely separate unit, whose members would in no circumstances associate with any other, then a large proportion of their votes would be ineffective and those parties might no longer get their proper representation—we should be back at the single non-transferable vote discussed on p. 78. Since, however, most voters do avail themselves of this insurance against wasting their vote, in practice the number of ineffective votes does usually approximate to the figure of one less than the quota. This number depends on the number of seats to be filled, and decreases as the seats increase; even for a five-member constituency the wastage is much less than in a British general election. The rate of decrease is at first very rapid and later becomes slow.[1] The advantage of enlarging Parliamentary constituencies beyond the size

[1] See graph on p. 115.

that returns between five and ten members is small and more than counterbalanced by the disadvantages.

There are, however, no 'technical difficulties in the way of the application of the single transferable vote in large constituencies' which need limit it to the election of five members.[1] It is true that the count becomes lengthy when the method is applied to very large numbers of candidates, but no other technical difficulties arise. If the candidates are well known to the electors, no upper limit to the number of seats need be set. Cork votes as a single unit to elect all its 21 City Councillors, and by the end of the 54 counts involved in its 1950 election only 11 per cent of the papers had become non-transferable. For Parliamentary purposes, the British Proportional Representation Society recommends constituencies returning from three members each in country districts to seven members each in large towns.


No personal preference can operate, of course, unless the voters have some knowledge of each individual candidate and his views. This would be impracticable (except for a few people of national reputation) in a constituency covering an entire country. To some extent this requirement must conflict with the desire to make party representation as accurately proportional as possible—an object that is achieved by making the constituencies as large as possible. This conflict is, however, less serious than may at first appear, because with each increase in the number of members per constituency, the gain in accuracy obtained by adding yet another becomes less. While a change from single-member to three-member constituencies will increase the accuracy of party representation enormously, a change from 21 to 23 seats per constituency will make little difference. An approximate measure of the accuracy[2] will be the smallness of the group that will fail to obtain representation using the Droop quota of $\frac{\text{total votes}}{\text{seats} + 1} + 1$;[3] the maximum size of that group is $\frac{\text{total votes}}{\text{seats} + 1}$. Obviously, the larger the constituency the greater will be the possibility of accurate representation, but with each enlargement the practical disadvantages become greater. The following graph, however, shows that the advantage of extra members falls

[1] Hermens, *Europe Between Democracy and Anarchy*, p. 9. Compare p. 15, *Democracy or Anarchy?*: 'Prominent supporters of P.R. will usually admit that the number should not be less than five.'

[2] The accuracy of party representation will depend also on the number of parties competing and on the method of calculation used.

[3] See pp. 105, 129.

off very rapidly after the first few, and must soon be overtaken by the drawback of growing impersonality and consequent lower accuracy of representation of groups other than the parties. Constituencies each returning about five members would seem likely to give satisfaction in both respects.[1]



From the examples in Appendix ii (p. 240) it will be seen that the single transferable vote and the various party list systems of proportional representation all give very similar results as regards the representation of individual parties. The representation of a party is proportional to its votes within a limit which depends primarily on the number of representatives returned by each constituency, and only to a minor extent on the particular system used.

FLEXIBILITY

One fundamental advantage of the single transferable vote is that it makes possible the fair representation of opinions which do not coincide with party divisions. In any proportional

[1] See Appendix ii, p. 240. Constituencies of this size will give no scope for the election of mere "cranks" to Parliament. A deposit to discourage 'frivolous' candidatures may be retained, as it is in Eire, but, since such candidatures can no longer affect the chances of more serious contestants, this seems an unnecessary interference with a citizen's right to stand for election.

system the accuracy with which they will be represented will depend on the degree of freedom allowed for voting on other than party lines. In a closed party list system such freedom is strictly limited. In the Belgian general election of 1950 the one party united in support of King Leopold was over-represented as compared with the three parties which were all wholly or partly anti-Leopold. If the Belgian system had been applied to the Irish constituencies in the circumstances of 1948, it is clear that the pro-de Valera Fianna Fail party would similarly have been over-represented as compared with the anti-de Valera parties. In Cork, for instance, if supporters of the defeated anti-de Valera candidates had not been able to transfer their votes, and had not shown their solidarity by choosing in the main to transfer them to other anti-de Valera candidates, Fianna Fail could have got three seats to its more numerous opponents' two; under the d'Hondt rule it would have done so.[1] The method of the largest remainder (which favours small parties)[2] would indeed have given three seats to the non-Fianna Fail parties (one each to the three largest of them), but so it would even if those parties had nothing in common. Thus, if the two smallest of them were on de Valera's side the balance of opinion would again be misrepresented. In either case, fair representation of the two groups would be ensured by *apparentement*,[3] i.e. by allowing one party to declare that it wished its unused votes to be utilized for the benefit of another. But although such an arrangement among the anti-de Valera parties would very likely be acceptable to *many* of their voters, it clearly would not be acceptable to *all*. It could be imposed only against the indignant protest of, for instance, those 186 Fine Gael supporters who, on the ninth count, having no other candidate of their own party to support, preferred even a Fianna Fail candidate to one of those regarded as their party's allies. Under the single transferable vote there is no need for any such arrangements between parties or any of the consequent disputes. Those voters who wish to treat any of

[1] Professor Hermens (*Europe between Democracy and Anarchy*, p. 9) objects that under the single transferable vote, we 'exclude all utilization of surpluses' (meaning by 'surpluses' the votes that cannot be utilized within a single constituency returning about five members). This objection ignores the corresponding drawback of party list systems—that the supporters of a small party are unable to prevent the waste of their votes by directing that they shall be transferred to another party.

[2] See p. 86.

[3] See p. 89.

the parties as an alliance are free to do so, and if (as in Cork in 1948) such voters are very numerous, the group of parties thus linked will get its due representation.

CORK CITY, 1948

	Fianna Fail	*Fine Gael*	*Labour*	*National Labour*	*Clann na Poblachta*	*Independent*
Actual result:						
Votes	17,034	10,167	3,675	4,767	4,334	4,898
Seats	2	1	0	1	0	1
d'Hondt rule:						
(1) no *apparentement:*	*17,034*	*10,167*	3,675	4,767	4,334	4,898
	8,517	*5,083*				
	5,678					
(2) Alliance of Labour and National Labour	*17,034*	*10,167*	*8,442*		4,334	4,898
	8,517	5,083	4,221			
	5,678					
(3) Alliance of Labour, National Labour and Clann na Poblachta	*17,034*	*10,167*	*12,776*			4,898
	8,517	5,083	*6,386*			
	5,678					

The Swiss system, with its freedom for *panachage*, and the Finnish, with its combinations of lists, will give results approximating to the Irish rather than the Belgian, but when it is a question of division within a party rather than agreement between different parties, they will again give a less perfect reflection of the popular will than does the single transferable vote. The reason is that under *any* list system a vote, however personal, is counted also towards the total of the list on which that candidate appears, and therefore may help to elect a candidate who, on the particular question the voter thinks important, takes a view opposite to that of the candidate supported. That can never happen under the single transferable vote, because, for instance, a vote cast in the first instance for O'Dubgaill in Cork will in no circumstances be transferred to his party colleague Hickey unless the voter so directs.

The importance of this factor (which will be discussed further in the section dealing with the political effects of voting systems)[1] may be imagined if we consider the circumstances of

[1] See p. 150.

Great Britain in 1938. Had the Munich agreement been followed by a general election (as many expected), the division for or against the policy of appeasement would have been far more important than the usual party lines, and public opinion could not have been properly reflected by any system under which a vote cast for Churchill as a leading opponent of appeasement could have been counted as a vote for the party led by Chamberlain.

A real example of somewhat similar division and combination across the party lines is the Irish election of 1922[1] in which the dominant question was whether or not the Treaty with Britain should be accepted. The result of the election was (so far as that question was concerned):

Candidates	*Votes*	*Seats*	*Seats in proportion to votes*
pro-Treaty	491,592	68	67·6
anti-Treaty	134,165	18	18·4

(37 other seats were uncontested.)

Party representation within the pro-Treaty group also was proportional; e.g. the Labour party, in the constituencies it fought, polled 25 per cent of the votes and won 23 per cent of the seats.

NON-POLITICAL ELECTIONS

Examples of the spontaneous combination of voters into groups of various kinds, and their reflection in the elected body, are found in elections where political parties either do not appear or exist side by side with other groupings of comparable importance. The Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society makes public not only the results of its elections but fairly full details of the candidates. Those details make no reference to political party but include the candidate's name and address, age and previous service on the Society's committees. It is therefore possible to group the candidates in at least three ways—according to sex, age or place of residence—any or all of which groupings might be reflected in the result. If, for example, some members try to get as many women as possible on to committees (therefore voting '1' for a woman candidate, '2' for another woman and so on) while others have an equally decided preference for

[1] See also p. 223.

men, the numbers of men and women elected should be proportional to the votes given in the first instance to candidates of the two sexes. Similarly, if the membership is divided between those who put their trust in older, experienced representatives and those who demand new blood, the committees will be a proportional mixture of old and young. There is likely also to be a tendency to support candidates from one's own neighbourhood (if only because they are usually better known to the voter). Examination of the figures shows that all three groupings do exist and do secure proportional representation on the committees.

ROYAL ARSENAL CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY

General Committee—7 Members

Proportional Representation of Groups other than Parties.

		Candidates	*First Pref. votes*	*Members elected*
1946.	*Geographical Divisions:*			
	District No. 1	7	1,660	3
	„ No. 2	5	1,139	2
	„ No. 3	3	773	1
	„ No. 4	6	555	1
	Division According to Sex:			
	Men	17	3,154	5
	Women	4	968	2
	Division According to Age:			
	Over 40	16	3,032	5
	Under 40	5	1,090	2
1948.	*Geographical Divisions:*			
	District No. 1	15	3,021	4
	„ No. 2	11	2,168	2
	„ No. 3	5	858	1
	Division According to Sex:			
	Men	26	5,112	6
	Women	5	935	1
	Division According to Age:			
	Over 40	23	5,017	6
	Under 40	8	1,030	1

To a large extent, therefore, the use of the single transferable vote renders unnecessary the rules frequently laid down by societies that, for instance, the members living in a certain district or joining in a certain year shall have a stated number of representatives. If the people in that category are numerous enough to justify that number of representatives, and if they have a sufficiently strong common interest to vote as a group, they will get that representation automatically.

In certain cases, however, it is felt desirable to ensure the representation of some special group of people which may be too small to poll a quota of votes. The rules can quite easily be modified for this purpose. The Building Societies Institute considers it necessary that its committee should always contain at least a few women, and therefore has a rule that out of the 11 or 12 committee members elected annually (one-third of the whole committee) at least one must be a woman. This entails only one modification of the method: that, if at any stage of the election there is only one woman left among the continuing candidates and she is bottom of the poll, she shall not be eliminated but shall be declared elected, the remainder of the election proceeding normally.

OVERLAPPING INTERESTS

The possibility of obtaining proportional representation for groups of several different kinds simultaneously is a feature of the single transferable vote which is particularly important in plural societies.

In a country populated by more than one race, or by antagonistic religious groups, difficulties are raised by the demand of the racial or religious minority for representation. Under a majority system, such minority representation can be assured only by holding separate elections, such as the election by Maoris of their four representatives in the New Zealand Parliament, or by reserving certain seats for candidates of a specified race or religion, as in India. Under a party list proportional system, the minority could elect its representatives without such special provisions, but could make sure of doing so only by nominating a list standing expressly in the interests of that minority. In either case, attention is drawn to a division which, in the cause of national unity, it is desirable to minimize; considerations are introduced which may be irrelevant to politics, and the normal development of political parties is hampered.

Under the single transferable vote form of P.R., however, any substantial and cohesive minority is automatically assured of its representation without any special provisions and without necessarily appearing as a contestant in the election. Imagine a country populated by white and coloured people (in not too unequal proportions) and having an election contested by two

political parties. Each party will naturally choose its candidates so as to make the greatest possible appeal to both races. Then a white voter will probably vote first for whatever white candidates there may be of his own political party. He may stop there, or he may go on to give later preferences either to whites of different political views or to coloured candidates with whose politics he agrees. A coloured voter will probably do the reverse. In this way, the voters divide themselves into four groups (white of the first party, white of the second party, coloured of the first party and coloured of the second), each of which (if it is large enough) will get its fair representation.[1] Every voter is encouraged to consider the merits of every candidate, whether of his own race or not, and no race is driven to form itself into a party in order to obtain representation.

In the English-speaking countries, racial and religious divisions play a relatively small part in elections under P.R. New York, for example, has important racial groups (Negroes, Irish, Italians, etc.) but none of these ever produced its own list of candidates[2] and in every election far fewer people voted on racial than on party lines.[3] For example, in the first four P.R. elections in New York, 80 per cent of the votes transferred from Democratic candidates went to other Democrats, but an analysis, made in 1947, of the Italian vote in New York's five P.R. elections showed that of votes transferred from Italian candidates an average of only 36 per cent went to other Italian candidates. This, moreover, includes transfers to Italians of the same political party; the purely racial vote must, therefore, have been less than 36 per cent.

Within our own country it is well known that women find it much more difficult than men to become candidates for constituencies where they have a hope of winning. This does not necessarily mean that the constituency selection committees themselves have a prejudice against women in Parliament; it may only mean that they think the voters have.[4] It is the duty

[1] If a minority is too small to win a seat by its own strength, but is nevertheless considered entitled to representation, it can be assured of this by the method used in the Building Societies Institute—see above, p. 120.

[2] Contrary to what is stated by Erika Jacobs, *Mitteilungen* of the German *Wahlergesellschaft*, June 1948.

[3] See Belle Zeller and Hugh A. Bone, *American Political Science Review*, December 1948, p. 1140, and authorities quoted therein.

[4] See *Women and Parliamentary Elections*, J. F. S. Ross, *British Journal of Sociology*, March 1953, p. 14.

of any selection committee to recommend the candidate who appears most likely to win votes and least likely to lose them; if it is believed that a woman, or indeed anyone, will alienate the sympathies of any substantial number of voters, then that candidate must not be recommended. The position would be quite different if, instead of being limited to the selection of one candidate, the local party organization had to find candidates for a constituency returning several members. It would then have to select at least as many candidates as it could hope to elect, and common sense would suggest the selection of these candidates so as to appeal to as many different kinds of electors as possible. In these circumstances, a selection committee would be very likely to include a woman among its recommended candidates. If it did not do so, the women (or any other group within the party that felt itself to have been overlooked) could themselves nominate an additional candidate without fear of harming their party's chances by splitting its vote. The electors would have a free choice among the candidates, and would choose a man or a woman as they preferred.

The problem of the simultaneous representation of groups of different kinds arises also in international organizations. All such bodies recognize the desirability of having on their governing committees representatives from each of the different regions of the world they cover, but it is also desirable that the various opinions within the organization should be represented. Both in the League of Nations and in the United Nations, great difficulty has been experienced in meeting these requirements. Elections have often been very protracted, and the results have been determined at least as much by bargaining between delegations as by the actual voting. It must be expected that the number and importance of international elections will increase, and it is therefore desirable that more consideration should be given to the best method of conducting them. The single transferable vote would enable both regions and opinions to be represented fairly, without restricting freedom of voting.

ELIMINATING CHANCE

An important variation of the single transferable vote method is that commonly known as the Senatorial Rules, on account of its application to the election of the Senates of the Republic

of Ireland, Northern Ireland and South Africa. It is also called the Gregory method, having been first suggested by J. B. Gregory of Melbourne in 1880.[1]

In describing the fundamental mechanism of the single transferable vote, it was pointed out[2] that a certain arithmetical operation is necessary to eliminate the element of chance in transferring a surplus; a series of proportion sums ensures that the actual papers transferred shall be a fair sample of the whole. It may, however, be objected with justice that the element of chance has not thereby been eliminated completely: of the surplus papers transferred in the 12th count of the Cork election,[3] 109 go to McCartan who is eliminated on the 14th count, and these 109 papers therefore have to be passed on again, to the voter's next available preference. The number of papers received by Lynch on the 11th count and bearing a next available preference for McCartan must have been 164 ($\frac{1443}{2170}$ of which is 109) and it is possible that, out of these 164, 109 might bear a next preference for Anthony and the other 55 for Hickey. It is further conceivable that precisely those 109 papers might be the ones selected for transfer. In that case, the scales would be tipped unfairly in favour of Anthony, and if the election were a little closer than in fact it was, this would result in his election instead of Hickey's. It should be evident that in an election with over 40,000 voters the chance that the result will really be affected in this way is remote. A grossly unrepresentative selection from well mixed papers is itself improbable, and so is a very close vote between two candidates; the improbability of both occurring together is very much greater—so great that in elections of Parliamentary dimensions the risk can safely be ignored.[4] It will be significant in such elections only if they are so close as to be vitally affected by other factors, such as weather, over which we have no control.

When, however, the number of voters is small (where it is counted in tens rather than thousands) the chance that the wrong allocation of a single vote may affect the result becomes large enough to be worth eliminating. This is achieved quite simply by eliminating the selection of papers for transfer: if, for

[1] For details, see Appendix v, p. 276.
[2] P. 108.
[3] P. 107.
[4] See p. 205.

example, a successful candidate polls twice the quota, instead of transferring to other candidates half of his papers, we transfer all of them, giving each paper the value of one-half. An example of the use of this method is given below.

Obviously, the new value of each paper will not usually be a convenient fraction like one-half; it is therefore the practice to simplify the working by a decimal system, all fractions less than 0·01 being left unused (though their total is recorded). The decimal point is also avoided by giving each paper the original value of 100 instead of 1.

A typical example is the election of five Yorkshire representatives to the Liberal Party Council in 1949, (see opposite page). In this election no group voting is discoverable; the effect here of the single transferable vote is to give full weight to the voters' views regarding the candidates' personal qualities. For example, the great popularity of Ronald Walker comes out clearly and is not masked (as it would be if the vote were not transferable) by any hesitation about giving a vote to a candidate who is regarded as certain to be elected without it.

It will be seen that in the above example the 'loss due to disregard of fractions' is much too small to have any effect on the result; the degree of accuracy is therefore clearly sufficient for the purpose. There is, however, nothing to prevent this degree of accuracy from being raised to any limit desired, by giving the papers an initial value of 1,000 (as is in fact done for the Irish Senate) or even more.

The assignment to a paper of a value other than 1 may be made also for a quite different reason. In various organizations, for example trade unions, votes are cast on behalf of branches of the organization, and it is often desired to give a large branch more voting power than a small one. This is done in either of two ways: by issuing to each branch one, two or more ballot papers according to its membership, or by giving each branch only one ballot paper but marking that paper so as to indicate that it has a value of one, two or more as the case may be. The effect of the latter procedure on the Returning Officer's task is similar to that of the Senatorial Rules: it demands of him a greater degree of care. The Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union has used this method since 1913.

When comparing the accuracy of different voting methods, it may at first appear that the simpler the method, the less

YORKSHIRE AREA LIBERAL FEDERATION—1949—ELECTION OF FIVE MEMBERS TO LIBERAL PARTY COUNCIL

Number of valid votes—122
Value of valid votes—12,200

$$\text{Quota} = \frac{12{,}200}{6} + 1 = 2{,}034$$

	Count 1	*Count 2*		*Count 3*		*Count 4*		*Count 5*		*Count 6*	
	Value of votes polled	*Trans. of Walker's surplus*	*Result*	*Trans. of Hindley's surplus*	*Result*	*Trans. of W-Town's surplus*	*Result*	*Trans. of Moore's surplus*	*Result*	*Trans. of Laycock's votes*	*Result*
Hindley, Mrs.	1,900	+1,428	*3,328*	−1,294	*2,034*		*2,034*		*2,034*		*2,034* (2)
Laycock, Mrs.	300	+ 136	436	+ 305	741	+ 74	815	+ 44	859	−859	—
Moore	1,000	+ 952	1,952	+ 305	*2,257*		*2,257*	−223	*2,034*		*2,034* (4)
Wilson-Town	1,700	+ 748	*2,448*		*2,448*	−414	*2,034*		*2,034*		*2,034* (3)
Walker	*6,500*	−4,466	*2,034*		*2,034*		*2,034*		*2,034*		*2,034* (1)
Watson	400	+ 680	1,080	+ 183	1,263	+ 74	1,337	+ 44	1,381	+159	1,540
Wilson	400	+ 476	876	+ 488	1,364	+259	1,623	+132	1,755	+558	*2,313* (5)
Loss due to disregard of fractions		+ 46	46	+ 13	59	+ 7	66	+ 3	69		69
Non-transferable votes										+142	142
	12,200		12,200		12,200		12,200		12,200		12,200

cope it will give for errors on the part of the Returning Officer or his assistants. Up to a point this is true, but we must remember that the only mistake that matters is a mistake that is not discovered. The error, if detected before the declaration of the poll, involves nothing more serious than loss of time. From this point of view the methods using X's come out badly: given the same vigilance on the part of the officials and the candidates' agents, a mistake is less likely to be noticed than it is under the single transferable vote. This is because, in the first place, once the papers have been sorted and counted they are never looked at again unless a recount is demanded, while under the single transferable vote a large proportion of the papers (one-third in the Cork election) are re-examined for purposes of transfer—many of them several times. In addition, an automatic check on the calculations, and on the counting of papers in the second and subsequent counts, is provided by the fact that the figures must always add up to the same total.

Another factor tells in favour of any method depending on the sorting and counting of actual ballot papers as against any method in which votes recorded on the ballot papers are transcribed on to another sheet of paper—as is commonly done, for example, in block vote elections. If a paper for Jones, John has accidentally been sorted into the pile for Jones, Henry, it is comparatively easy for a counting agent to notice this and challenge it in time. Should the mistake be noticed at any later stage it can be corrected, but if a pencil mark has allegedly been put in the wrong column it may be that neither the counting official nor his challenger can be sure of this, even one moment after the mark has been made.

VALUES OF PREFERENCES

Some critics of the single transferable vote suggest that it is wrong for an *n*th preference to have the same value as a first preference; they consider that a vote on being transferred from one candidate to another ought to be reduced in value.

This proposal is clearly inconsistent with the principle illustrated on p. 101. A person who first stands beside candidate A and then moves to candidate B is no less a whole person than if he had gone to B in the first place. It also involves certain practical difficulties such as deciding what value each

preference ought to have. More important, however, is the fact that such a modification would destroy the effectiveness of the system.

The object of making the vote transferable is to ensure that as nearly as possible every vote cast shall be effective—as effective as any other vote. But, if the vote is to be reduced in value on transfer, some votes will necessarily have much less effect than others. If an elector happens to vote in the first place for a candidate eventually elected with the help of transferred votes, that elector's vote will have its full effect. If, on the other hand, he votes first for a candidate who receives little support, or for one so popular as to have a surplus, that vote will have to be transferred at least once and the voter will therefore have less effect on the result. To reduce the value of the vote on transfer is to give the voter a reason for wishing to avoid transfers as far as possible; we are, therefore, immediately involved again in the estimations of chances which cause so many votes to be cast for something other than the voter's real preference.[1]

We are also involved in the party manipulations already shown to be possible under other systems.[2] For example, a party polling just enough votes to elect two candidates if its votes are divided equally between them can easily fail to elect more than one if one candidate has initially far more votes than the other. It becomes a positive handicap for a party to include among its candidates one of outstanding merit, and it is asking for defeat to nominate more candidates than can be elected. All the evils of the 'split vote' return. For this reason we must not assign a smaller value to a second or later preference.

Late preferences do not always have the same importance as early ones, for though (say) the sixth preference has, *if it is used*, exactly the same effect as a first preference, it is very much less likely to be used. It has already been mentioned (p. 112) that in the Cork election 61 per cent of the votes cast contributed to the election of their first-preference candidate. In the Irish constituencies as a whole, the percentage of votes effective for their first preference varied in that election from 46 in Mayo South to 71 in Waterford and Wexford. That is to say, the first preferences

[1] See pp. 65, 110.
[2] See pp. 77, 79, 81, 82, 130.

alone usually have a greater—often a much greater—effect on the result than all other preferences put together. The official report on the Tasmanian election of 1916 shows that, in the first three P.R. elections in that country, an average of 80·55% of votes cast had become effective for their first preference and only 4·65% for a fourth or later preference.

There is, moreover, no need for the Tasmanian rule that a ballot paper, to be valid, must bear at least three preferences. The results of the elections could hardly have been different if no voter had gone beyond a second preference, and would have been at least broadly similar even if everyone had 'plumped' for his first preference only. Seeing that only a few voters are likely in fact to behave thus, there would seem to be no justification for interfering with a citizen's right to indicate that he considers only one of the candidates to be worth voting for. Still less is there any need for the rule adopted for the Australian Senate, that the elector must mark a preference against *every* candidate. Not only are there strong objections to forcing a voter to express opinions about candidates of whom he may have no opinion at all, or all of whom he may dislike equally, but it only increases the number of invalid papers. An example of its futility is the 1949 election of Senators for New South Wales (where the invalid papers were 12·1 per cent): there were (for the 7 seats) 23 candidates, all of whom had to be numbered, and one of these candidates, being, as such, present at the count and having the curiosity to examine to what extent the rule was justified, reported that every ballot paper became effective for its fourth preference if not before.

The above must not be taken as suggesting that 'plumping' is in any way desirable—it is not—nor that the transferability of the vote is of small importance. Although it not infrequently happens (as in Cork) that the transfers make no actual difference to the result, in other cases they have a very great effect, particularly where there are many parties or where one good candidate is overshadowed by the exceptional popularity of one of his party colleagues. For instance, in Leix-Offaly in the 1948 election a Labour candidate who was seventh in the first count was finally elected fourth, over the heads of three Fianna Fail candidates, with the aid of second or later preferences from anti-de Valera voters.

WHICH QUOTA?

Before leaving this subject of accuracy, it will be well to return to the Droop quota and the reason for its adoption in preference to the Hare quota.[1] The two quotas are respectively:

$$\textit{Hare quota:}\ \frac{\text{total votes}}{\text{total seats}}$$

$$\textit{Droop quota:}\ \frac{\text{total votes}}{\text{total seats} + 1} + 1$$

It may at first appear that the Hare quota is preferable as using (in ideal conditions) every vote cast, while the Droop quota obviously leaves a substantial number unused. If, however, we take simple figures for an imaginary election we soon see that this appearance is deceptive. Suppose that 700 votes have been cast to fill 7 vacancies, and that there are no non-transferable papers. The Hare quota is $\frac{700}{7} = 100$, so the election will end with 7 candidates having 100 votes each and no votes left over. The Droop quota is $\frac{700}{8} + 1 = 88$, so the election will then end with 7 candidates having 88 votes each and 84 votes left over. It is, however, not true that in the former case there are no votes unused. The illusion arises from the fact that each of the successful candidates has among his votes some that are of no use to him: each of those candidates would have been among the seven people elected if he had had only 88 votes, because it is impossible for any eighth candidate to reach that number. Hence, each of the seven has 12 votes which have not in reality contributed to his election, and as $7 \times 12 = 84$, the total number of ineffective votes is the same in both cases.

That being so, does it matter which quota is used? Yes—because with the larger quota the votes are withdrawn from active participation in the election *at an earlier stage*. With the Droop quota, the twelve votes not needed by the first selected candidate will be transferred to other candidates and may save one or more of them from elimination. Suppose the 700 votes are shared among two parties in the proportion of 360 for the

[1] H. R. Droop, *Papers of the Juridical Society*, 1869, vol iii, part xii, p. 469. See also C. L. Dodgson, *The Principles of Parliamentary Representation*, p. 28.

one and 340 for the other and that these parties have each 4 candidates, whose votes on the first count are as follows:

Party I		*Party II*	
A	110	W	90
B	104	X	86
C	100	Y	84
D	46	Z	80
	360		340

Since, if we use the Hare quota, Party I has only 14 surplus votes to be transferred, nothing can save D from being the first candidate to be eliminated; hence, Party I, although the larger, can get only 3 seats out of the 7. The Droop quota, on the contrary, leaves Party I with 50 surplus votes to be used, and if these (or even only 35 of them) go to D they must save him from elimination—candidate Z will go out first and thus it is the smaller party that will get only 3 seats to its opponents' 4.

The possibility of the smaller party's over-representation in the former case depends on the very even distribution of its votes among its four candidates and the much more uneven distribution of the larger party's votes. The single transferable vote with the Hare quota thus offers some scope for the party manœuvres already shown to be possible under some other systems.[1] In certain limited conditions, it is possible for a highly disciplined party, by dividing its votes suitably among the right number of candidates, to win more seats than a rather larger party which allows its followers to distribute their preferences among its candidates as they please.

Such possibilities, however, do not appear to exist with the Droop quota; at any rate, no party has yet discovered them, and that is not for want of trying.

Parties sometimes believe that they can win more seats for the same number of votes by persuading their supporters to vote for the party's candidates in a particular order. This mistaken idea has been followed in the Australian Senate elections and by one party in the Zionist Federation, but without affecting the numbers of seats won. In Tasmania, with far longer experience of P.R. than the other Australian states, the electors are accustomed to making their own

[1] See p. 127.

selections among candidates and no attempt has been made to influence their freedom of choice. The Senate results are just as proportional in Tasmania as elsewhere.

ESSENTIAL FEATURES

Proportional representation requires that each elector should have one vote, which is made effective by being passed on, as may be necessary, from the candidate he has marked '1' to the candidate he has marked '2' and so on, the method being applied not in single-member constituencies (as with the alternative vote) but in constituencies returning at least three members. Each successful candidate is elected, not by a majority, but by a quota, that quota being one vote more than the number obtained by dividing the total number of valid votes by one more than the number of seats to be filled. 'P.R.' in this sense differs from all list systems (even the most flexible) in two ways.

Firstly, it allows the voter full freedom to express his preferences for individual candidates, either with or without regard to those candidates' party affiliations. Secondly, it ensures that no vote shall assist in the return of any candidate or any party unless the voter has expressly indicated that he wishes it to do so.

Examination of the effects of the system in practice shows that it possesses at least the following advantages:—(1) the elected body reflects, within limits of a few per cent, the strength of political parties or other groups of opinion among the voters; (2) any party or other group having a majority of votes will have a majority of seats; (3) the element of the gamble is eliminated; (4) the elector is enabled to choose between candidates on personal as well as party grounds.

CHAPTER VII

Some Technical Aspects of P.R.

'As Bismarck once blurted out, when you say that you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice.'—HENRY HIGGS, *National Economy*.

Some of those who agree that proportional representation is theoretically desirable see certain practical objections to its adoption. These are discussed in the following pages.

PERSONAL CONTACT

It has been said that the British M.P. 'is in many ways almost the father and mother of his constituents.'[1] Opponents of P.R. fear that the larger constituencies required by the system would impair this happy relationship; it would prevent a candidate from making himself known and, if elected, keeping in close touch with political opinion in his constituency. Furthermore, the fact that the member would be only one of several to whom the constituents might look for help in personal matters would loosen the sense of obligation felt by the member in existing conditions to all his constituents, whatever their politics.

The difficulty of the larger geographical constituency is, of course, a real one, but much less so than would have been the case fifty years ago. A constituency returning five members might contain 200,000 electors, scattered perhaps over some 500 square miles. With modern methods of transport this would not be unmanageable. If the difficulties of campaigning over a large constituency are serious, we should expect to find them felt most by the Independent or the lone candidate of a small party, and least by the candidate of a large party, who works as one of a team with an organisation which in any case covers the whole area. In fact, however, Independents fare

[1] Major Vivian Henderson, House of Commons, 8 April 1921.

much better in P.R. elections,[1] showing that any difficulties involved in the large constituency are outweighed by factors tending to help the candidate who is appealing to the electors on the ground of his own personal merits.

Similar considerations apply to the elected member's relations with his constituents. Under P.R. he will have a larger area to cover, but the number of his electors will be no greater; five M.P.'s for a five-member constituency will divide the representation among them, whilst under the present system each represents a single geographical area. The original proposals of Thomas Hare[2] envisaged the purely geographical constituency being replaced by voluntary associations of like-minded voters. Whilst P.R. in its modern form does not abolish the geographical constituency, its effect is that an M.P. is returned by a quota of supporters in a constituency returning several members instead of by a bare majority, perhaps even a minority, in a single-member constituency. In fact, the close personal relationship supposed to exist under the present system between a member and his constituents, and claimed to be a justification of the single-member constituency, is often largely a myth. A Gallup poll in 1948 showed that one person in three did not know the name of his M.P., and one in five did not know his party. In a multi-member constituency almost all the voters will be able to look to a representative whom they will have directly helped to elect and with whose political opinions they will be in sympathy. The personal link is therefore likely to be much closer.

With regard to a constituent's private problems as distinct from politics, it is true that the representative of a single-member constituency feels himself under an obligation to serve equally all his constituents irrespective of party, and indeed generally does so; and it may be suggested that a member for a multi-member constituency might be tempted to consider that his first responsibility lay with the quota which had voted for him. On the other hand, the member elected by P.R. may have a greater interest in his constituents and a greater ability to serve them, because he is more likely to be a local man and to represent the same constituency for a long period. The candidate of a political minority in the district

[1] See pp. 203–4, 208, 224, 229.
[2] See Appendix iii, p. 245.

where he lives cannot hope to represent that district under a majority system;[1] under a proportional system (even the impersonal party list) he may do so. And a member will not have to leave his constituency merely because his party loses its majority there.

NOT TOO DIFFICULT

Is the single transferable vote, or any other proportional system, too difficult for the voter or for those who have to count the votes?

There now exists a great deal of experience of proportional voting systems used by various electorates. In no instance known to the authors has the difficulty been such as to cause the abandonment of the system. If difficulties of a less serious nature have been encountered one would expect to find them reflected in public complaints, in an excessive number of spoilt papers, or in low polls. Of these tests, the first is likely to be the least reliable (so far as the voters are concerned) because those most affected by the alleged difficulty (the unintelligent or the ill-educated) would be the least prone to express their resentment in print or in organized protest. Their complaint would more probably take the form of abstention from voting, or of mistakes which would invalidate their ballot papers. The numbers of abstentions and mistakes in voting can of course be measured, but it must be remembered that they have many causes other than the voting system; one can hardly, for example, draw any conclusion about the relative difficulty of two countries' systems simply by comparing these figures for a highly educated and politically conscious country with those for a backward one.

The British first-past-the-post majority system in single-member constituencies requires of the voter only one very simple action (and is often defended on the ground of this simplicity), but an appreciable, though small, number of voters fail to perform even this simple action correctly. It is often argued that, if some electors cannot understand how to put a X against the name of one candidate out of two or three, a much larger number will be unable to cope with a more complicated method, involving for instance the numbering in order of preference of ten candi-

[1] Only about half the members of the 1951 Parliament could be identified from their published descriptions as living in or having any close connection with their constituencies.

dates. That objection, of course, does not hold for the simplest party list forms of proportional representation, which make no greater demands on the voter than does the British system, and we need consider it only with reference to one or two systems which confront the voter with a relatively complex operation. Is there in those cases any evidence that an appreciable proportion of electors find the task beyond them?

Perhaps the most complicated system, from the voter's point of view, is the Swiss. The elector may have anything up to 33 votes (in Berne). He may give one vote to each of up to 33 candidates (who may appear on the same or on different lists), he may give two votes (but not more) to one candidate, and he may even alter the lists by writing in names of candidates. If all these possibilities bewilder the voter, one would expect to find that the number of spoilt or blank papers is much higher in the large cantons which return many members than in the smallest ones which return only one each. Examination of Swiss figures, however, suggests the opposite: if we arrange the cantons in ascending order of their electorates, we find that the highest figures of blank and invalid papers occur in the single-member cantons, and that there is no tendency for those figures to rise with increasing complexity of the ballot paper. (See next page.)

Statistics also show that the Swiss voter understands his electoral system sufficiently to make substantial and increasing use of the freedom of choice that it allows him. In 1930,[1] 82 to 87 per cent of the voters supported a party list unchanged, but by 1947 that figure had fallen to 67 per cent, varying from 98·7 per cent in Zug to as low as 37·3 per cent in Valais, where just over half the voters made alterations in the party lists. *Panachage* (i.e. supporting candidates of two or more different parties) varied in 1947 from 1·0 per cent in Zug (2 seats) to 17·0 per cent in Zürich (31 seats).

The objection of difficulty for the voter is raised most often against the single transferable vote. There is now a great deal of evidence readily available on this system from the English-speaking countries. In Ireland, the newspapers immediately after the first P.R. election contained many references to the smoothness with which the election was carried out, but few complaints of difficulty. Such complaints as there were

[1] Professor R. C. Brooks, *Civic Training in Switzerland* (University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 109.

SWISS NATIONAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS

Percentage Polls, and Blank and Invalid Papers, in the Cantons.

(Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz, 1949, p. 474)

Number of members	*Canton*	*Percentage voting*		*Percentage blank and invalid*		*Voting compulsory*
		1943	*1947*	*1943*	*1947*	
1	Appenzell I. Rh.	50·3	47·2	8·2	8 9	no
1	Nidwalden	70·2	64·0	1·3	2·3	no
1	Obwalden	68·6	36·3	0·8	8·2	no
1	Uri	45·3	66·3	19·8	6·7	no
2	Appenzell A. Rh.		uncontested			
2	Glarus	76·5	78·1	2·7	2·9	no
2	Zug	67 2	75·2	4·9	4·4	no
2	Schaffhausen	90 0	88·5	4·5	3·3	yes
3	Schwyz	70·4	73·4	2·4	3·0	no
4	Basel-Land	62·9	67·5	1·3	0·7	no
5	Neuchatel	57·0	58·0	2·3	2·2	no
6	Graubünden	73·9	75·3	2·5	1·8	no
6	Thurgau	76 3	78 4	2 5	2·6	yes
7	Valais	76·1	73·8	1 2	1·4	no
7	Fribourg	69·5	68·2	0·9	1·1	no
7	Ticino	72·7	69 6	3 1	1·3	no
7	Solothurn	82·0	86·5	2·5	1·9	no
8	Genève	35·9	53 3	5·1	0·4	no
8	Basel-Stadt	65·8	67·5	1·7	0·4	no
9	Luzern	81·1	81·2	1 3	1·2	no
12	Aargau	86·5	87 5	3·7	3 6	yes
13	St. Gallen	80·1	81·4	4·8	4·8	yes
16	Vaud	54·5	67·1	2·8	3·1	no
31	Zurich	71·9	75·5	1·3	0·8	semi-
33	Berne	68·8	66 8	1·0	1·0	no
194	Switzerland	70·0	72·4	2 3	1·9	

usually referred to the Returning Officer's task rather than to the voter's. Complaints of this kind do not come from people actually engaged on the count; on the contrary, we find them saying: 'The English press correspondents sympathize with us in having to work so complicated a system as P.R. It is wasted sympathy, for the system is simple to understand and easy to carry out.'[1]

Is there a silent protest in the form of spoilt papers or abstentions? The Republic of Ireland, unfortunately, publishes no total of invalid papers for the whole country, but a figure is given for individual constituencies, and is usually about 1 per cent or lower. This is certainly higher than for an English constituency, but it does not appear excessive. We have no means of determining whether the higher figure in Ireland is due to the difficulty of the voting system or to some other difference in the political conditions of the two countries. A more reliable comparison would be between two elections in the same electorate at the same time but by different systems. Such examples are rare, but we have one in the Yonkers (New York) elections of 1947[2] and another in Tasmania. The blank and invalid papers in the P.R. election of Yonkers City Councillors amounted to 4·56 per cent (3·24 per cent invalid), which is high by English standards but low compared with the figures for three non-proportional elections carried out at the same time with the aid of voting machines, namely those for:

Children's Court Judge	7·7%
Supreme Court Justice	8·1%
County Sheriff	11·1%

In Tasmania, we can compare invalid papers under different systems during the period (1909–17) when the people of Tasmania were voting with X's in Commonwealth elections and 1, 2, 3 . . . in the election of this State's House of Assembly. The percentages of invalid votes are shown overleaf. If the differences can be regarded as significant at all, they indicate that the voters find the single transferable vote somewhat more difficult than marking one X but less so than several X's; quite certainly there is no large increase in invalid votes attributable to the voter's having to write 1, 2, 3. . . . This is the more

[1] *Irish Press*, 24 January 1933.
[2] See the *National Municipal Review* (New York), February 1948, p. 107.

remarkable because, under the Tasmanian law, at least three preferences have to be marked: all papers bearing only one or two preferences are included among the invalid.

	Commonwealth			*State*
	One ×	*Three* ×'*s*	*Six* ×'*s*	*1, 2, 3, . . .*
1909	—	—	—	2·86
1910	2·51	3·29	—	—
1911	1·16*	—	—	—
1912	—	—	—	2·85
1913	3·07	6 13	—	2·87
1914	2·38	—	4·71	—
1916	—	—	—	5·51
1917	3 07	3·72	—	—
Average	2·44%	4·38%	4·71%	3·52%

* Referendum.

That invalid papers were very few in all the P.R. elections for University M.P.s may prove nothing; highly educated people might be expected to be able to write 1, 2, 3 . . . correctly. They are also few in the miners' and the railwaymen's elections, in which the alternative vote, like P.R., requires the voter to mark preferences for as many candidates as he wishes. The number of candidates is often very large (much larger than would be expected in a Parliamentary election by P.R.), but the number of papers spoiled by reason of a mistake due to the 1, 2, 3 . . . system is small—much smaller than the number spoiled for other reasons, as the following figures show.

NATIONAL UNION OF RAILWAYMEN

Election of Executive, 1949

Total of ballot papers returned	45,927	
Invalid: wrong method of voting	34	= 0·07%
paper unsigned	56	= 0·12%
paper signed but not voted on	231	= 0·51%
	321	= 0·70%

Moreover, the percentage of papers spoiled by reason of the method is no greater than in a comparable trade union, the Tailors and Garment Workers, voting by marking one X. Three

consecutive elections in this union gave the following figures of ballot papers rendered invalid by bearing more than one X:

NATIONAL UNION OF TAILORS AND GARMENT WORKERS
Election of Executive Board Delegates

Total of ballot papers		Two or more X's		
1949	69,683	124	=	0·18%
1951	60,594	81	=	0·13%
1953	68,300	41	=	0·06%

Other trade union elections show similar results.

Mr. Cosgrave, then Prime Minister of the Irish Free State, speaking in America in 1925, complained that many voters showed a lack of understanding of the system in as much as they failed to record more than one preference, or perhaps two, and that consequently some sections of the electorate failed to get proper representation. It is true that the number of non-transferable votes is sometimes high enough to be capable of affecting the election of the last member for that constituency—e.g. the 1,703 people in Cork whose votes failed to affect the result because they could not be transferred from McCartan could have elected Anthony in place of Hickey.[1] It is, however, obvious from the closeness with which results for Eire as a whole approximate to proportionality that the effect of this is not serious. Indeed, it could not be expected to be, for even if every voter recorded only one preference, this would only reduce the system to the single non-transferable vote, which, as we have seen,[2] does give a reflection of the voters' wishes much more faithful than that given by any majority system. It will be noticed that in the Cork election the number of non-transferable papers becomes substantial only when voters whose candidate is being eliminated have no other candidate left of the same party to whom they can transfer their votes. These electors have used their preferences intelligently at any rate in so far as their own party is concerned.

It is most certainly desirable that each voter should go on marking preferences until there remain only candidates about whose relative merits he is indifferent. For instance, in County Louth in 1948 the anti-de Valera forces, divided as they were among three parties, would not have won two seats to Fianna

[1] See p. 107.
[2] P. 78.

Fail's one if it had not been for the readiness of Fine Gael supporters to transfer their votes on the last count to a Labour candidate in preference to a Fianna Fail candidate.

Fianna Fail		13,696 votes (1 seat)
Fine Gael	11,105	
Labour	3,767	17,034 ,, (2 seats)
Clann na Poblachta	2,162	

On the other hand, the effects of ignoring this advice are unlikely to be disastrous, for the reason that most votes become effective for their first, or a very early, preference.[1]

Failure to understand the voting system may show itself in mistakes which do not invalidate the ballot paper. Among these is alphabetical voting: instead of selecting the candidates he prefers, the elector marks the first on the ballot paper. It is certain that some people do this, but they do it also when they have to vote with a X. When only one member is being elected, we have no means of detecting that fact. Of the 16,142 people who voted for Mrs. Ganley in S. Battersea in the 1950 general election it is impossible to tell how many, if any, did so because her name appeared above those of Partridge and Tyers. When, however, we find that out of 34 party lists in the various wards in the Battersea Borough Council election of 1949 no less than 14 have their three or more candidates in completely alphabetical order in the result, we must have at least a strong suspicion that alphabetical voting occurs. The extent of it, however, may be very small; as already pointed out,[2] a very few people voting in this way will suffice to produce the alphabetical effect.

The same small number voting alphabetically in a P.R election could have little, if any, effect on the result. We find in fact that in the Irish constituencies the initial letter of a candidate's surname has, under P.R., only a trifling effect on his chance of election—certainly a much smaller effect than under the block vote. If we compare the Irish general election of 1948 with the London Borough Council elections of 1949 in wards where representation was divided between two parties (there is no object in including one-party wards, because in those the party quite eclipses all other factors), we find that the

[1] See below, pp. 127–8.
[2] See p. 31.

proportions of elected members to candidates in the two halves of the alphabet are as follows:

	Republic of Ireland	*London*
A to M	110/288 = 38%	37/67 = 55%
N to Z	37/110 = 34%	8/23 = 35%

Thus, the indications are that, in a P.R. election, the position of a candidate's name on the ballot paper is immaterial. If, however, the electors are unconvinced of this, there is no reason why their concern should not be allayed by the use of a rotating ballot. This means that, at regular intervals throughout the printing of the ballot papers, the order of the names is changed; if there are ten candidates, each of them appears first on one-tenth of the papers. This device was used in New York City.

AN IMPROMPTU ELECTION

That elections under proportional representation by the single transferable vote do not require exceptional intelligence in either the voters or the Returning Officers is illustrated by one carried out in occupied Italy in July 1944. Atri, a town of 22,000 inhabitants on the Adriatic coast, was in charge of an American A.M.G. officer, Major Garrigan, from Cincinnati. Wishing to have an elected council to help him in administering the town, and being himself used to voting by P.R. (but not to acting as Returning Officer), he applied the method to Atri and got a council which he described as excellent.[1]

The holding of a really free election at all was a rather daring experiment, for nothing of the kind had happened in Italy for twenty-three years, and Major Garrigan was doubtful of his own authority to order it. The women had never voted, and considerable tact was needed to obtain agreement that they should do so. The town, though generally enlightened, was 20 per cent illiterate and not politically minded. Most of the people of influence welcomed the proposed election and co-operated willingly in the method Major Garrigan proposed. The proclamation of the election was posted eight days before polling day, and included an explanation of how to vote and of the principle of the count. The preliminaries (nomination and so forth) were infor-

[1] For a full account, see the *National Municipal Review* (New York), June 1946.

mal, but the ballot itself was conducted in the usual strict conditions of secrecy, with the aid of the secretary of the commune, who produced the old ballot-boxes. There was plenty of discussion of the election, but no disturbance at any stage. The voters numbered 1,172, which was considered satisfactory, seeing that the harvest was in full swing and that there were no organized political parties. About one-third of the voters were women. A novel feature was that the count took place in the open air, in the town square. It passed off smoothly in three and a half hours, although neither Major Garrigan nor any of his three British assistants had more than an elementary knowledge of Italian. Out of the 1,172 ballot papers, only 22 were spoiled, and 80 per cent of the papers contributed to the election of one or other of the seven successful candidates.

Major Garrigan's verdict on the experiment was as follows: 'The election proved several things. One was that the Hare system is not too complicated for any group of people, regardless of their general training or literacy; second, that the Hare system is an ideal mechanism for Military Government. It enables Military Government to secure the most complete information possible about the political thinking of the community, and to gain the co-operation and support of the people. It also gives Military Government confidence that it knows what the people think of the civilians it uses for government positions.'

FEWER ABSTAINERS

While opponents of P.R. argue that the greater difficulty of marking the ballot paper will cause many to abstain from voting, its supporters believe that polls will be higher under P.R. because many who do not trouble to vote when the result is a foregone conclusion will do so when they have the assurance that their vote is very likely to affect the result.

It is comparatively seldom that this matter can be put to the test by comparing elections under different systems but in the same electorate and under otherwise similar conditions. However, such evidence as there is tends to show that all proportional voting systems reduce the number of abstentions.

In the Swiss elections already referred to,[1] it will be seen that

[1] P. 136.

n nearly all the cantons using proportional representation the polls are much higher than in the single-member cantons. Tingsten[1] points out that before the adoption of proportional representation in 1919 Swiss polls were low, but that in 1919 they rose sharply, to a level maintained ever since. Before 1919 polls in those cantons where voting was voluntary were 25 to 30 per cent lower than in cantons with compulsory voting. Since 1919, the voluntary poll has always been within 10 per cent of the compulsory. Moreover, the valid votes have increased from 1919 onwards in those cantons where attendance at the poll is compulsory.

For elections under the single transferable vote, it is possible to compare the four British University constituencies voting by that method with the three under the single-member system, but this leads to no reliable conclusions because the variation in the poll within any one of those constituencies was much greater than the average difference between one constituency and another. In one instance, Queen's University, Belfast, we can compare the behaviour of the same electorate under the two systems. In electing their one representative to Westminster in 1945, only 51 per cent of the graduates voted, compared with an average poll of 65 per cent for the rest of Northern Ireland; but in the P.R. election for their four representatives in the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1949, 76 per cent voted—only 1 per cent below the average for all constituencies. That is, P.R. appears to have stimulated voting sufficiently to offset the depression of the poll by postal voting.

In Eire, polls are slightly lower than in Britain for Parliamentary elections, but substantially higher for local government elections.

HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE?

A difficulty raised by objectors to P.R. is that an inordinate amount of time must be occupied by the count. This objection does not apply to simple list systems. In France, for instance, the count was completed the same night. Complicated systems like the Finnish require longer, and it may well be expected by anyone seeing the Cork result sheet that its fourteen counts must

[1] *Political Behaviour*, p. 195.

have taken a very long time. The time is certainly longer than for a first-past-the-post election, but can hardly be regarded as excessive, especially if we compare it with the amount of trouble that would be taken in making five appointments of comparable responsibility in any other walk of life. The Cork count (one of the longest in that election) occupied 750 man-hours including meals, the Returning Officer and 24 assistants working from 9 a.m. to midnight on two days. Polling in the 1948 general election in Eire took place on Wednesday, 4 February, and the count began on the following morning. The *Irish Press* of Friday, 6 February, published results up to 4 a.m. covering 95 out of the 141 seats involved. The count was then complete in 19 out of the 39 constituencies voting (Carlow-Kilkenny polled a week later). The *Dublin Evening Herald* of the same day gave a total of 112 seats, with 26 constituencies completed, and the last results came out in the course of the same night—i.e. rather more than forty-eight hours after the close of the poll.

It may be noted in passing that if the same ballot papers used in such a P.R. election were counted by the alternative vote method, as used by the Miners and Railwaymen and formerly for the Australian Senate, the count would take several times longer. In Cork City, this alternative vote procedure would have amounted to five separate elections, each involving the whole 44,875 ballot papers and each requiring the elimination one by one of from ten to fourteen candidates.

No proportional system seems to have given rise to any appreciable amount of discontent on account of the time taken, except perhaps in the Australian Senate elections. There, the normal time is greatly lengthened[1] by conducting the count partly in the separate polling districts and partly in several larger districts, instead of wholly at a central point. The general feeling appears to be that extra time consumed in the count is no unreasonable price to pay for a true reflection of the voters' wishes.

WHAT DOES IT COST?

In so far as the time taken over the counting of votes will be longer the cost of staff will be greater, but again it may be thought well worth while. The cost to public funds of the Cork

[1] But not in comparison with the previous alternative vote method.

City election in 1948 was £1,608 or about 6d. per elector. Just before the British general election of 1951, Manchester estimated that its expenditure would be £12,500 or 5½d. per elector.[1]

Expenditure by candidates might be expected to be greater under a proportional system—the larger the constituency, the more money might be spent to cover it. This consideration, however, would not affect the candidates of a major party contesting every seat: it would not cost more for five candidates to fight a five-member constituency as a team than to fight each of five divisions separately. Almost certainly, indeed, it would be cheaper, for they could divide the work in any way most convenient to themselves, employ only one agent, instead of five, issue (if they wished) a joint election address. The evidence on this point is, unfortunately, meagre: Eire issues no returns of expenses comparable with the British, and it is difficult to get reliable figures. However, those that are available are not high by British standards. In the four divisions of County Cork (each with an electorate about equal to that of the smallest English constituencies), no candidate in the 1951 general election returned as his expenses more than half what would have been the legal limit under British law; most of the returns were much lower still. If the difficulties (financial or other) of contesting the larger constituency are really serious, they should be felt most by the Independent, who has no other candidate with whom to share the task of covering the constituency, and no party organization to help him.[2] Far from finding the handicap too great, however, Independents fare much better under proportional representation by the single transferable vote than in single-member constituencies; not only do they contest elections, but in far larger proportion they win them.

BY-ELECTIONS

There are several possible methods of filling a single seat. These fall into two categories, one or other of which will be favoured according to the importance attached to by-elections as a new test of public opinion.

[1] *Manchester Evening Chronicle*, 20 September 1951.
[2] See also pp. 132, 208, 224, 229.

SOME TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF P.R.

I. Methods affording a new test of public opinion

(a) *A new election over the whole constituency.* An election for a single vacancy is carried out over the whole multi-member constituency, still using the single transferable vote so that the new member elected will have the support of a majority of those voting. This method is used in the Republic of Ireland.

Its drawback is that the new member will necessarily represent the majority party; if the deceased or retired member belonged to a small party, that party will lose its representation.

(b) *A new election over part of the constituency.* The constituency is divided, for by-election purposes only, into single-member districts, and the members choose (in the order of their election) with which one of those districts they will be associated. If one member dies, a by-election is held over his district only.

Since a member will naturally choose to associate himself with that part of the constituency in which he has most support, this does give some chance for a minority to retain its seat (if it is concentrated in a particular district), but this is by no means a certainty.

II. Methods designed to preserve the representation of opinion as expressed at the general election

(c) *Co-option of the runner-up.* The highest unsuccessful candidate is deemed to be elected to the vacancy. This method has the advantage of simplicity, and is often used by societies for filling casual vacancies on their committees.

For Parliamentary elections, or others in which party or similar divisions are involved, the method is unsatisfactory, since it may, for example, replace the only Labour member for a constituency by a Conservative or vice versa. An improvement would be:

(d) *Co-option of the next highest candidate of the same party as the deceased or retired member.*

(e) *Re-counting of the deceased or retired member's votes.* The original ballot papers are preserved, and in the event of a casual vacancy those which contributed to the election of the member concerned are used to elect one member from among those who were unsuccessful in that constituency at the general election. As this enables those who have lost their representative to replace him, it would appear to be the fairest method, provided (*i*) that the original unsuccessful candidates are still available

for election, and (*ii*) that they include at least one candidate who is acceptable to the party (or other group) which has lost its representative. The method is used in Tasmania and Malta and by some societies in this country.

Condition (*ii*) is provided for by the rule that no candidate can be elected unless he has the votes of a clear majority of the deceased or retired member's supporters. If no candidate polls this required number of votes, or if the original candidates are no longer available, the vacancy is filled by:

(f) *Co-option* (as for local Councillors in Britain during the war), the new member being chosen from among the same party or other group as the member he is replacing.

ILLITERACY

Illiteracy presents a serious problem only if it is widespread. Elsewhere it is dealt with by a procedure similar to that adopted in our own country for people who, for one reason or another, including blindness, are unable to mark their own ballot papers. The Irish Electoral Act of 1923 lays down careful regulations for the use of Returning Officers when assisting illiterate voters. A similar method has been found satisfactory in Malta, where the number of illiterates in the first P.R. election averaged 41·5 per cent of those voting, and in some places exceeded 90 per cent.

The single transferable vote has not so far been used by electorates with a still higher percentage of illiteracy, such as exists among the main body of Indian citizens. It has, however, been used in India for indirect elections by relatively small and educated electorates. The Simon Commission[1] reported that 'a system of proportional representation has been constantly employed in the Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Councils for the selection of Committees. No difficulty has been found in its practical operation and the members fully understand it and appreciate its advantages.' The Government of India Act, 1935, provided that the members of Provincial Legislative Assemblies should elect by P.R. members of the Federal House of Assembly. The war prevented this from coming into operation, but the same machinery was used in the

[1] *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission* (1930), Vol. ii, p. 118.

election of India's Constituent Assembly, on her attainment of independence.

The manifest advantages of the single transferable vote in the conditions of a plural society[1] are not necessarily to be dismissed as unattainable if that society is also illiterate; the recognized methods of providing for voters unable to read can be adapted to various voting systems, including the single transferable vote. Where the bulk of the electorate is illiterate, it is already common to print on the ballot paper, in addition to the name of each candidate, a pictorial symbol (some familiar object such as a cow, a cock or a plough) chosen by the candidate, or allotted to him, to represent himself. The voter is then required to indicate by some simple means, such as by making a cross beside the appropriate symbol, which one of the candidates he supports. This would make it quite easy to apply the semi-proportional method of the single non-transferable vote.[2] Clearly, it would also be possible to employ in this way a simple party list system, using each symbol to represent (like the familiar hammer and sickle) not a person but a party; symbols have in fact been used in this way in Italy.

It may be considered that one or other of these simple methods will suffice for an electorate of low educational standards, but if the political intelligence (as distinct from the literacy) of the electors seems to warrant it, there would appear to be no insuperable objection to using a single transferable vote ballot paper of the same kind. Candidates of similar views might be encouraged to choose symbols having something in common (animals for one party, birds for another, and so forth), and electors at that stage of mental development should not find it difficult to mark their preferences with, for example, X for the first, XX for the second, and so on. The single non-transferable vote might be used first and later modified in this way. If the bulk of the voters use simply one X, while those who are able to do so mark further preferences, the effect will be to give some advantage to the latter. The more highly developed electors will have a greater certainty that their votes will be effective.

[1] See p. 120.
[2] See p. 78.

CHAPTER VIII

Some Political Aspects of P.R.

'Government is a trust, and the officers of the government are trustees; and both the trust and the trustees are created for the benefit of the people.'—HENRY CLAY, speech at Ashland, Kentucky, 1829.

Proportional methods of election are, it is generally agreed, better adapted than is any majority method to producing an 'image of the feelings of the nation', the first of our aims which an electoral system should fulfil. But their adoption is often opposed on grounds other than the technical objections discussed in the previous chapter. Proportional systems, it is asserted, increase unduly the number of parties securing representation, thus preventing any one party from obtaining a working majority; therefore, government has to be based on a coalition or on a single party which depends for its majority on the support of allies. This results in greater likelihood of unstable government.

In the first place, however, opponents of proportional representation exaggerate its tendency to facilitate an increase in the number of parties, and ignore the fact that a multiplicity of parties may arise from many causes and often exists under majority systems. It would be more correct to say, not that proportional representation creates parties, but that when those parties have been called into being by other causes it secures their reflection in Parliament. In Tasmania,[1] the voters find their needs met by only two parties and Independents, and half a century of P.R. has not changed this position. On the other hand, the French voters tend, for a variety of reasons, to divide among many parties, and the use of a majority system has never checked this tendency.

The following table shows the number of parties represented

[1] See p. 208.

in the Lower House in various European countries just before the outbreak of the 1914–18 war:[1]

First-past-the-post		*Second ballot*		*Proportional systems*	
Denmark	4	Germany	21	Finland	6
		France	12	Belgium	4
		Italy	10	Sweden	3
		Netherlands	10		
		Switzerland	5		
		Norway	3		

It is evident from this table that the number of parties in a country has little relation to its voting system, and in particular that the salient examples of the multiplication of parties cannot have arisen from proportional representation. All the countries in the above table which were then using majority systems later adopted proportional representation. Their experience under the new system is discussed in the next chapter. In no case was the change followed by any marked increase in the number of parties, and in some instances there was a decrease. The indications are, therefore, that proportional representation does not encourage the formation of parties but only reflects in the Parliament whatever tendencies towards fusion or division may exist in the country at the time of the election.

While that general conclusion follows from experience of all proportional systems in actual use, it should be pointed out that in this respect the single transferable vote is likely to differ materially from party list systems. Where votes have to be cast for a party list, any dissident element within a party can seek representation only by submitting a separate list. This forces the voter into a choice between the one group and the other; moreover, it entails the creation of some sort of organization, which may tend to make the splinter group a permanent party, remaining after the occasion of the split has disappeared. If, however, the voter has a free choice among different candidates of the same party, and especially if he can, in addition, indicate his agreement with certain of the candidates in other parties, the dissident group will probably be able to secure its due representation without constituting itself a separate party. Those conditions are fulfilled most completely under the single transferable vote.

[1] All figures are from official returns, Braunias' *Das Parlamentarische Wahlrecht* or contemporary newspapers.

Moreover, if a split does occur, the single transferable vote enables it to be more easily healed when the circumstances producing it have changed. This is illustrated by an incident in the history of the Irish Labour Party. In 1944, the National Labour Party split off from the Labour Party owing to a dispute over alleged Communist influence in Irish branches of British trade unions. This split, however, had no serious effect on the Labour movement's electoral fortunes, as it would have had under other voting systems, for supporters of the one section were free to give their later preferences to candidates of the other, and a sufficient number did so to enable the two together to secure nearly their proportional share of the seats.[1] Thus, the bitterness that would have arisen if the two parties had spoiled one another's chances was avoided, all Labour voters were encouraged to remember that their two parties still had much in common, and they were re-united before the election of 1951.

It is often objected that if three (or more) parties obtain representation, the third party may, by holding the balance of power, be able to exact from one of the larger parties concessions in return for its own support. In other words, a certain amount of minority legislation might be possible through party bargaining. But the fear of this is exaggerated, for both partners in any such bargain will be aware that it may lose them many votes at the next general election, and possibly at a by-election. Any attempt by a smaller party to abuse its balancing position, or acquiescence in this by a larger party, will be dangerous to the party itself.

But even if the danger associated with a balancing party in Parliament is real, it is less serious than the risk of control by a very small group of voters. The Parliamentary party has to vote openly, and can be called to account at the next election; the electors vote by secret ballot and are accountable to nobody. A balancing party in the House of Commons representing probably two or three million voters may decide this or that action of the government; a few thousand voters, by changing sides, may decide which government takes office.

It is indeed this very power of the "floating voter" which supporters of the two-party system give as a reason for thinking two parties sufficient. Each of those parties, they say, in its

[1] See Appendix ii, p. 224.

anxiety to win over people not firmly attached to either of them, adopts policies that will appeal to those people, so that "simple majority voting produces a certain moderation in the government".[1] But the result may not be moderation; one or both parties may be wooing extreme groups and the government may therefore find itself committed to extreme policies certainly not desired by the bulk of the voters. The "floating voters" may be thoughtful people of moderate views, or thoughtless people easily swayed by trivialities, or organised pressure groups offering their votes to whichever party will pledge its support to their particular interests.

Moreover, the influence of the minority, whether moderate or extreme, must, under a majority system, be very uncertain. In a constituency where the result is expected to be close, a tiny pressure group can exercise influence out of all proportion to its importance; where there exists a large permanent majority for one party, the legitimate claims of a far larger body of voters can be ignored with impunity. Under a proportional system, on the contrary, the influence of such a group cannot be either much greater or much less than its size warrants.

Proportional representation may indeed lead such a group to seek and obtain representation as a separate party, but to deny it the right to do so is to deny it any remedy if the major parties ignore its claims. Opinions of minorities expressed merely at the polls can never be the equivalent to that represented in the House of Commons. As John Stuart Mill said,[2] 'in the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked; and, when looked at, is seen with very different eyes from those of the persons whom it directly concerns'. A similar opinion was expressed by John Morley[3]—'the best guarantee of justice in public dealings is the participation in their own government of the people most likely to suffer from injustice'.

A further danger of the two-party system is rule by a minority; rule, that is to say, by a minority of the nation which happens to have a majority in the government party. In nineteenth-century Britain that danger was not so great as it is

[1] Prof. W. A. Robson, *International Social Science Bulletin*, Summer 1951, pp. 362–3.

[2] *Representative Government* (Everyman Edition), p. 209.

[3] *On Compromise* (MacMillan, 1886), p. 326.

to-day. The parties were then comparatively loose associations, on the one hand of people generally disposed to experiment and improve, and on the other hand of people preferring the existing order and averse to change. An M.P. was committed to an attitude rather than to a programme. Nowadays, however, to vote for a party is to commit oneself to a series of proposals which a candidate is expected to support completely. Some of those proposals may have been accepted by only a small majority of the party, and may be unacceptable to all or most of its opponents—that is to say, in total, to a majority of the voters—but if that party becomes the government those proposals will nevertheless be put into effect along with the rest of its programme. The country may thus be involved against its will in a course of action from which there is no retreat.[1]

The risk of such minority legislation is reduced if there are more than two parties. The programmes of those parties are sure to overlap to a greater or less extent, giving the voters the possibility of choice between different combinations of the same policies, and this effect will be increased if the voters can be given, within each party, a choice between candidates of different shades of opinion. Moreover, if there are three or more parties, it becomes much less likely that any one of them will have such a Parliamentary majority as will enable it to act, regardless of criticism from outside or even from within its own ranks.

It is true that the absence of an assured Parliamentary majority for the whole of one party's programme would involve some departure from established British practice. It would be necessary for the largest party to accept the fact that, while it was entitled to the leadership of the House and could expect to achieve much of what it desired, it might on occasion have to give way and consent to practise some form of co-operation with members of other parties. It is also true that politicians have not shown much readiness to accept such a change. There are frequent complaints that both the major parties show more inclination to make party capital out of the problems of the day than to co-operate in solving them. Only rarely is the nation's course of action in any matter agreed upon by both; much more often it is safe to assume that any-

[1] Cf. Wertheimer, *Portrait of the Labour Party*, p. 207.

thing proposed by the Government will be resisted by the Opposition, and safer still to assume that, if the matter comes to a division, every member will go into the lobby with his own party and against the other. The parties are often made to appear more sharply divided and more completely opposed to one another than in reality they are. The belief that the two-party system is the only practicable method of governing will, it is hoped, be shown to be erroneous in our later examination of electoral experience in other countries.

STABLE AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT

The wish to limit the number of parties to two is connected with the belief that government can be carried on effectively only by a single party. One party, it is said, must have unhampered power for the time being to carry out its programme; if the electors are dissatisfied with its conduct of affairs, their remedy is to replace it with another party at the next general election. An opposition party is held to be necessary for this purpose and also to supply criticism of the government. The desirability of such criticism is acknowledged by advocates of "strong" one-party government; for example, Professor Hermens admits that a government majority can be too large and suggests electoral devices to "secure for the opposition a number of seats large enough to make it possible for it to oppose the majority vigorously in Parliament"[1].

It is assumed, firstly, that the functions of government and opposition are separate, to be carried out by two different bodies of people, and, secondly, that a sufficient guarantee against the danger that a government will ignore criticism is provided by the prospect that the "swing of the pendulum" will bring the critics into power. The Parliamentary minority is regarded as the potential government but, for the time being, is excluded from the responsibilities of administration. The system has 'the incurable weakness that it tends to make the "out" party always a destructive party'.[1]

However, in some advanced democracies generally regarded

[1] *Europe between Democracy and Anarchy*, p. 96. Professor Hermens does not, however, suggest any criterion of what is "large enough"; he only refuses to accept the proposition that the opposition should be as large in proportion as the number of its supporters among the electorate.

[2] Alistair Cooke in his *Letter from America*, B.B.C. Home Service, 3 November 1950.

as particularly well-governed—notably in Switzerland and in Scandinavia—the conditions so widely regarded in Britain as essential are seldom or never fulfilled. There is no one party with power to carry out its whole programme, no other party whose function is to oppose the government now and replace it in the future. Government is usually carried on either by two or more parties in coalition or by one party that must obtain some support from outside its own ranks for the passage of any given measure. That support does not necessarily always come from the same quarter; a critic of the government on one issue may be a supporter of it on another. Moreover, a government defeated on a particular question, not a vote of confidence, does not necessarily feel called upon to resign; it continues to govern but, on that question, submits to the majority will of Parliament.

In those countries, a general election is usually followed, not by the formation of a completely new government, but by a modification of the old one—a larger share of ministerial posts for one party, a smaller for another; the replacement of one minister by another. This introduces an element of stability which is lacking in countries depending on the "swing of the pendulum"—there is much greater continuity in policy. A measure that has required the assent of several parties, backed by a genuine majority of the voters, is unlikely to be reversed. On the other hand, modifications found desirable in the light of experience may be accepted more readily when the parties are accustomed to the idea of compromise.

In Britain, the introduction of a proportional system would tend to promote a spirit of compromise by removing an incentive for an opposition party to seize upon any opportunity to overthrow the government. Under a majority system, such a party may gamble on the knowledge that quite a small movement of public opinion may give it many more seats; there is a strong temptation to force an election. But under a proportional system no large change in the composition of Parliament can take place without a comparable change in the country. There is no object in forcing an election if no considerable change is likely. The parties therefore have to adapt themselves to the existing situation. Though to some extent they must do this under any form of proportional representation, they will cooperate more easily if the form used is one that puts less emphasis on the divisions between parties and more on what they

hold in common. The single transferable vote meets these requirements most fully, because it allows the voter to support candidates acceptable to him, whether they all belong to one party or not.

Coalitions are not here advocated for their own sake. Single-party government, provided it represents the country's wishes, has decided advantages and it may well result from proportional representation. But even if it does not, a coalition backed by a majority of the voters is preferable to a single-party government supported only by a minority. Under the single transferable vote, moreover, coalition is free from the most serious objections raised against it in Britain, for no election pacts would be involved in the constituencies; any number of candidates can seek the support of the electors without "splitting the vote", and parties can therefore co-operate on one question without sacrificing their right to differ on others.

Stability and continuity require, of course, a sense of balance and toleration on the part of both the nation and its representatives. To deny that such an ability exists amongst the British electorate and parties would be absurd. Government without an assured parliamentary majority is no new thing in British politics. It existed, and worked well, during three periods—from 1846 to 1852, from 1886 to 1892, and from 1910 to 1915. In all three periods the minority government was able to survive for a longer period than the average, and to carry difficult and controversial measures. In 1924 and 1929 it was attempted more half-heartedly, and without success. Coalition governments also have proved successful, though it has needed times of crisis to call them into being. In normal times single-party government, with a real or fictitious majority, is considered the only choice. But if a more democratic and a more mature conception of government can be approached through the agency of a fairer and more scientific voting system, it is surely preferable to a two-party system which, as Sir Winston Churchill said,[1] places us 'in the strange position that although four-fifths of each of the great parties agree about four-fifths of the things that ought to be done at home and abroad, and although if the worst happened we should all sink or swim together, we seem to be getting ever more bitterly divided as partisans'.

[1] B.B.C. Home Service, 3 May 1952.

CHAPTER IX

Experience Under Proportional Representation—I

List Systems

Some indication of the relative merits of majority and proportional voting systems can be found in the experience of certain countries under both methods. Ever since the latter part of the last century, there has been a strong tendency for the countries of Continental Europe to discard a majority system in favour of a proportional one. With a single exception, these proportional systems have all been based on the party list, while on the contrary every English-speaking country that has adopted proportional representation has chosen the single transferable vote form.[1] Experience under list systems will be dealt with here, leaving the next chapter for a discussion of the system with which English-speaking readers are more closely concerned. Some countries have later modified the system of proportional representation originally adopted, or have extended its application to organs of their national or local government not at first affected. In only a few instances has a proportional system been abandoned once it has been adopted.

The following pages deal briefly with the history of electoral changes and their effects in European countries where democratic government still exists. It has not been thought necessary to include those countries now behind the Iron Curtain whose

[1] In the countries of Continental Europe, political parties were given legal recognition long before the adoption of proportional representation, and parties are often required to register as such in order to obtain the right to nominate candidates. In the United Kingdom, on the contrary, parties, as such, have no official existence in electoral law, none of the official machinery of nomination or election depends on them, and a candidate's party is never mentioned on the official documents required for those purposes.

electoral experiments have been quite overshadowed by other factors in their turbulent history. The mechanics of the voting systems used have been explained elsewhere; in these chapters the emphasis is on the motives that inspired a change in electoral methods and on the influence this change itself exerted on administration and on party structure.

Two major criticisms of proportional representation have been discussed in the previous chapter: that it results (*a*) in an excessive multiplication of parties and consequently (*b*) in a lack of effective government. The facts show the fear of these consequences to be exaggerated, while on the other hand there is evidence that in many cases proportional representation has produced political harmony. This is especially true of countries with a more mature experience in self-government, where there has grown up a truer understanding of democracy and an increased sentiment of national unity.

SCANDINAVIA

By 1921, the Scandinavian countries had each adopted some system of proportional representation for the election of all or many of their national and local political assemblies. These systems differed one from another. It is noteworthy that none of them has been discarded, even for a brief period. In some cases, experience revealed defects in the system as first adopted, but this led to improvements which, far from altering the basic principle of proportionality, strengthened its application.

Denmark. The first national elections embodying the principle of proportional representation took place in Denmark in 1856. The particular method employed was a form of the single transferable vote devised by the Danish statesman, Carl Andrae.[1] Its application, however, was limited to the election of 55 out of the 80 members of the single-chamber Rigsraad. In 1866, under a later constitution which established a second chamber (abolished again in 1953), the system was restricted to the indirect election of the Landsting or Upper House, by electoral colleges which after 1915 were themselves chosen by a party list form of

[1] A year after Andrae's system was introduced, Thomas Hare in England independently put forward very similar proposals. These are described in Appendix iii, p. 245. The successful working of Andrae's system, and its similarity to Hare's proposals, are discussed in a report from the Secretary of the British Legation in Copenhagen, 1 July 1863.

proportional representation. Andrae's system, like Hare's, was later improved by the adoption of the smaller (Droop) quota[1] and the utilization of unsuccessful candidates' votes as well as of surpluses. However, its full effects in producing free and equitable representation could not be seen in elections where the voters were confined to small electoral colleges composed of disciplined party representatives.

Until 1915, the Lower House (Folketing)[2] was elected by the British system. During the preceding years, political power had been shared chiefly by the Conservatives and Liberals, but two parties of the Left (Radicals and Social Democrats) were developing in strength because of an extension of the franchise. In the earlier years of the present century, neither of the two older parties could obtain a working majority, despite the operation of the majority system. In order to achieve some political stability, the practice grew up of concluding pacts between the parties. It was seldom that all four contested one seat. Conservatives and Liberals on the one hand, and Radicals and Social Democrats on the other, usually preferred to come to an understanding. There was therefore in practice a tendency towards an uneasy party dualism, with the Liberals threatening to absorb the Conservatives and the Radicals and Social Democrats becoming an opportunist fusion. These artificial alliances of parties naturally opposed to one another were an increasingly unsatisfactory factor in the life of the nation.

In an attempt to eliminate unrest caused by these alliances, and give fairer representation to the Left, an element of proportional representation was superimposed on the single-member majority elections by a law of 1915, which operated in the general election of 1918. Following public protests against the inadequacy of this reform, the whole system was put on a proportional basis in 1920, and later modifications have increased the accuracy with which the parties' votes are reflected in the House.[3] Within the party list system, the order of election of individual candidates is determined by a form of transferable vote, but the voter is limited to the expression of his *first* preference, transfers being carried out according to the order of the candidates' names on the ballot paper. This method is very similar to the Belgian[4] but tends to give a more local character

[1] See pp. 105 and 129.
[2] The Folketing consists of 150 members, elected for a period of four years.
[3] See Appendix vi, p. 281. [4] See p. 92.

to the representation, because, in each district within the constituency, the candidate nominated by residents of that district appears on the ballot paper as the first of his party's list.

Under proportional representation in Denmark, there has been some tendency for the number of parties to increase. The four chief parties, however, have continued to dominate the Folketing as under the majority system, with two to four minor ones (including the Communists) securing only an ineffective share.[1] The following table shows the party representation from the last majority election onwards:

ELECTIONS TO THE FOLKETING, 1913–53*

	Conservative	*Liberal*	*Radical*	*Social Democrat*	*Communist*	*Others*	*Number of parties*
1913	7	44	31	32	—	—	4
1918	22	46	31	39	—	2	5
April 1920	28	49	17	42	—	4	5
July 1920	26	52	16	42	—	4	5
Sept. 1920	27	52	18	48	—	4	6
1924	28	45	20	55	—	1	4
1926	30	47	16	53	—	3	5
1929	24	44	16	61	—	4	5
1932	27	39	14	62	2	5	6
1935	26	29	14	68	2	10	7
1939	26	30	13	64	3	10	9
1943	31	28	13	66	—	11	8
1945	26	38	11	48	18	7	7
1947	17	49	10	57	9	6	6
1950	27	32	12	59	7	12	6
1953	26	33	13	61	7	9	6

* In this and similar tables, 'others' may include several parties and Independents; Independents are not counted as a party. It should be noted that a party continuing under the same name may change its nature radically in the course of years. The table omits a mainly uncontested election in 1915. The elections of July and September 1920 were occasioned by the incorporation of Schleswig into Denmark.

It will be seen that none of the four chief parties has been able to secure a clear majority in any one election. Therefore, administrations have been based on a coalition, or on government by a single party, dependent for its majority in any division on support from some part of the 'Opposition', though it

[1] The Communist representation rose to 18 in 1945 and has since declined to 7. The Justice Party (Georgeist) has lately increased rapidly in strength and in 1950 equalled the Radicals.

should be realized that in Denmark the term 'Opposition' has no such connotation as it has in Britain. The table below shows that the life of these governments has been relatively long.

DANISH ADMINISTRATIONS, 1913–52

Type	*Duration*
Radical Liberal with Social Democrat support	June 1913–March 1920
Non-party	March–April 1920
	April–May 1920
Moderate Liberal	May 1920–October 1922
	October 1922–April 1924
Social Democrat	April 1924–December 1926
Moderate Liberal	December 1926–April 1929
Social Democrat and Radical Liberal	April 1929–November 1935
	November 1935–April 1940
During the occupation, coalitions of all the major parties and Independents. No Danish Government between August 1943 and the liberation	April–July 1940
	July 1940–May 1942
	May–November 1942
	November 1942–August 1943
	May–November 1945
Moderate Liberal	November 1945–November 1947
Social Democrat	November 1947–October 1950
Moderate Liberal and Conservative	October 1950–

The reasons for the stable and satisfactory nature of such administrations are common to all the Scandinavian countries and are dealt with in succeeding pages.

Norway. The Norwegian Parliament (Storting)[1] is elected for four years and consists of 50 members from the towns and 150 from the country districts.[2] These are now chosen by a proportional system in 11 urban and 18 rural constituencies returning from 3 to 7 members each. Before 1921, they were elected by the second ballot in single-member constituencies. Representation was shared among three parties (Conservative, Liberal and Socialist), the first two of which contained divisions which did not always collaborate and on two occasions split off to

[1] The Storting elects 38 of its members to form a separate House, the Lagting, the remainder constituting the Odelsting. Legislation must be considered by each House separately; the Lagting can only approve or reject it. If there is disagreement between the Houses, a two-thirds majority at a joint sitting is required for a decision.

[2] This division (which favoured the country districts) was abolished in 1952.

form separate parties. There existed the practice of political alliances usually associated with the second ballot. The Conservatives and Liberals generally combined against the Socialists, thus placing the Left under a permanent electoral disadvantage. The introduction of a proportional system was designed to remedy this.

Under the new system, the number of parties contesting elections increased from five in 1921 to nine in 1933, and in 1949 was six. Not all, however, were successful in winning seats, and the effective Parliamentary strength remained concentrated in the hands of Conservatives, Agrarians, Liberals, and Socialists. The Socialists' progress received a set-back in 1923, when, after the repudiation of Moscow by the moderate element, the left wing broke away to form the Communist Party. This had some success, especially in 1945, but by 1949 its support had fallen again below the level necessary to secure a seat even in a seven-member constituency. In the 'thirties, the Socialists, while not attaining an absolute majority in the Storting, won sufficient seats to enable them to form a minority government, which, by a modification of the more extreme points in its programme, was able to command the required majority. The following table shows the changes in party strengths in the Storting between 1915 and 1952:

ELECTIONS TO THE STORTING, 1915–52

	Conservative	*Agrarian*	*Liberal**	*Socialist*	*Communist*	*Others*	*Number of parties*
1915	21	—	78	24	—	—	3
1918	50	3	54	18	—	1	4
1921	57	17	39	29	—	8	5
1924	54	22	36	24	6	8	6
1927	31	26	31	59	3	—	5
1930	44	25	34	47	—	—	4
1933	31	24	25	69	—	2	6
1936	36	18	23	70	—	3	6
1945	25	10	20	76	11	8	6
1949	23	12	21	85	—	8	5

* Braunias (*Das Parlamentarische Wahlrecht*, p. 394) lists separately from the Liberals a small Radical group appearing in 1918 with three members and decreasing to one in 1930.

In the first years following the introduction of proportional representation there was an alternation of minority or coalition

administrations, whose nucleus was usually the Liberals and against which the Socialists formed the Opposition. In 1933, however, the Socialists emerged as the most powerful single element, strong enough to form a minority government. And since 1945 they have governed alone, with a clear majority.

NORWEGIAN ADMINISTRATIONS, 1913–52

Type	*Duration*
Liberal	Jan. 1913–June 1920
Conservative	June 1920–June 1921
Liberal	June 1921–Mar. 1923
Conservative–Independent Liberal	Mar. 1923–May 1923
Conservative–Independent Liberal	May 1923–July 1924
Liberal	July 1924–Feb. 1926
Conservative–Indpendent Liberal	Feb. 1926–Jan. 1928
Labour	Jan. 1928–Feb. 1928
Liberal	Feb. 1928–May 1931
Agrarian	May 1931–Mar. 1932
Agrarian	Mar. 1932–Mar. 1933
Liberal	Mar. 1933–Mar. 1935
Labour	Mar. 1935–June 1945
Labour–Conservative–Liberal	June 1945–Nov. 1945
Labour	Nov. 1945–Nov. 1951
Labour	Nov. 1951–

Sweden. Sweden formerly used the British system, except for Stockholm which formed one constituency returning 22 members by the block vote. Representation was seriously distorted, especially under the block vote,[1] and agitation for a change began as early as 1867, at the time of the first introduction of proportional representation into Denmark. Along with this movement went a demand for the reform of the franchise, which rested on property qualifications. A law passed in 1907 established manhood suffrage and proportional representation under the system described in Appendix vi (p. 280). It was applied first to the election by local Councils of representatives in the Upper House, and in the following year to the election of Stockholm Town Council and all the provincial Councils; the first general election to the Lower House of Parliament under this system was in 1911.

[1] In 1887, the Liberals had a majority of 20 in the Riksdag, but the following year this was reduced to a minority of 2, because one of the Stockholm members was found to be 13s. 0d. in arrear on his taxes for 1881–2. This invalidated his election and all the 6,700 ballot papers on which votes were cast for him; a recount then resulted in the defeat of all the 22 Liberal members for Stockholm and the election of 22 Conservatives. (See R. Dickinson, *Summary of the Constitution and Procedure of Foreign Parliaments*, 2nd edition, 1890, p. 151.)

Before 1911, Sweden had three parties—Conservative, Liberal and Social Democrat. This pattern has persisted without major change. Only one large new party has grown up, the Agrarian Party, which split off from the Conservatives. Though remaining in sympathy with them it has lately turned more towards social reform. The Liberals split on the prohibition question into two groups (elections of 1924, 1928 and 1932) which later re-united to form what is now known as the People's Party. The Communists have had some success but are now declining; a Swedish Nazi Party never succeeded in winning a seat.

The following table shows the party strengths from 1911 to 1952.

ELECTIONS TO THE SWEDISH LOWER HOUSE, 1911–52

	Conservative	*Agrarian*	*Liberal*	*Independent People's*	*Social Democrat*	*Communist*	*Others*	*Number of parties*
1911	65	—	101	—	64	—	—	3
Spring 1914*	86	—	71	—	73	—	—	3
Autumn 1914*	86	—	57	—	87	—	—	3
1917	59	12	62	—	86	—	11	5
1920	70	30	48	—	75	—	7	5
1921	62	21	41	—	93	7	6	6
1924	65	23	5	28	104	5	—	6
1928	73	27	4	28	90	8	—	6
1932	58	36	4	20	104	2	6	7
1936	44	36	27	—	112	5	6	6
1940	42	28	23	—	134	3	—	5
1944	39	35	26	—	115	15	—	5
1948	23	30	57	—	112	8	—	5
1952	30	27	59	—	109	5	—	5

* The second election in 1914 was due to a constitutional crisis precipitated by a speech by the King.

The variations from one election to the next are larger than in most countries using proportional systems, but small compared with those in British elections.

During the 1920's, administrations were usually based on one party, which had no clear majority but relied for support on allied groups within the Chamber. In the early 'thirties, the Social Democrats secured an ascendancy which has endured until the present day, and in 1940 they won a clear majority of the seats. When lacking a clear majority, they either have followed the same plan of relying on Parliamentary support

from other parties or have formed a coalition with the Agrarians. It will be seen from the following table that these administrations have varied in duration from three months to over six years and have tended to become more and more long-lived. In the last eighteen years there have been only four governments, and each of these has contained some of the same elements as its predecessor; there has thus been continuity of policy.

SWEDISH ADMINISTRATIONS, 1917–52

Type	*Duration*
Liberal–Social Democrat	Oct. 1917–March 1920
Social Democrat	March 1920–Oct. 1920
'Administrative'	Oct. 1920–Feb. 1921
'Administrative'	Feb. 1921–Oct. 1921
Social Democrat	Oct. 1921–April 1923
Conservative	April 1923–Oct. 1924
Social Democrat	Oct. 1924–June 1926
Liberal	June 1926–Oct. 1928
Conservative	Oct. 1928–June 1930
Liberal	June 1930–Sept. 1932
Social Democrat	Sept. 1932–June 1936
Agrarian	June 1936–Sept. 1936
Social Democrat–Agrarian	Sept. 1936–Dec. 1939
National Coalition	Dec. 1939–July 1945
Social Democrat	July 1945–Oct. 1951
Social Democrat–Agrarian	Oct. 1951–

Finland first adopted a proportional system in 1906, while she was still a Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire, exercising home rule through a Diet consisting of four Houses (Nobility, Clergy, Burghers, Peasantry). Following a *coup d'état* in 1899, the country remained for some time in a turbulent state, and it became increasingly clear that a radical reconstruction was necessary to place Finnish democracy on a firm foundation. To this end, the constitution of 1906 was drawn up, which is remarkable for the original and democratic nature of its provisions. These included the introduction of universal suffrage at the age of 24, and the establishment of a single-chamber legislature.

The electoral system, which was devised at the same time was essential to the success, and indeed to the acceptance, of this constitution. As a contemporary Finnish pamphlet[1] point

[1] *The Finnish Reform Bill of 1906* (Helsinki, 1906).

out, the four estates of the realm (i.e. the Nobility, Clergy, Burghers, and Peasantry) would certainly not have surrendered their respective powers and privileges to a single-chamber assembly, if they had not been assured that each of them would receive a fair deal, and that there would exist no possibility of the assembly's being dominated by an extremist minority. An important factor behind their acceptance lay in the check placed on the power of the assembly by a standing provision that certain important Bills could not become law until after the next general election. This provision was similar in intention to the power of delay possessed by the British House of Lords, but was made more effective because Finland's electoral system allows the voter a greater opportunity to express any conclusions that he may have formed during the period of delay. In Britain, delay until after a general election cannot be relied upon to reveal the electors' will regarding the measure in question, because a vote can express only general approval of a whole political programme. The Finnish electoral system, on the other hand, does make possible an expression of public opinion regarding particular items in such a programme, for (besides giving each party its proportional share of the seats) it permits the voter, within each party, a large degree of choice among different candidates, who may hold various views on the delayed measure.[1]

The new constitution was accepted unanimously by three of the four Houses, and by a majority of 100 to 8 in the House of Nobility. Its initial success has been maintained in such a degree that no substantial changes have been thought necessary. Moreover, under it there has existed that strong government which alone could have maintained the independence of Finland in the face of grave and repeated threats. This strength certainly does not rest on a large Parliamentary majority for one party, for such a thing has never existed since Finland attained independence in 1917. It is not associated either with stability in the sense that the government continues unchanged for long periods; on the contrary, Finland has a new Prime Minister on an average about every eighteen months. The government's strength springs rather from a broad popular consent. Cabinets are usually coalitions of three or four parties, and their complexion has changed gradually with

[1] For details of the system, see Appendix vii, p. 282.

developments in public opinion, preserving continuity and avoiding abrupt reversals of policy.[1] J. Hampden Jackson,[2] writing on the situation of Finland after the second world war, said that it called for 'a patience, a degree of tact, a mixture of solidarity and subtlety on the part of the Finns which would be an unparalleled test of democratic character'. He went on to show that this test had been well met: 'It is no accident', he observes, 'that Finland is the only surviving democracy in the Russian sphere of influence'. Such a survival has been largely due to strongly developed democratic qualities, with a machinery of government that has permitted the effective expression of such qualities.

Scandinavian Experience. In most of these countries there has been a tendency for the number of parties to increase after the adoption of P.R., but in all of them Parliamentary representation has been shared predominantly by four major parties. One or other of these has usually been in a position, if not to form a majority government by itself, at least to provide the nucleus of a stable administration in collaboration with a second party with a programme not too dissimilar from its own. The Scandinavian peoples are often credited with a stronger grasp of democratic principles, and greater ability to translate them into political action than have many countries, not excluding Great Britain. Their success in solving the problems of minority government, when this has been necessary, may be attributed to this natural or acquired capacity. But a considerable contribution has also undoubtedly been made by the political machinery they have adopted; both their electoral systems and the great use made of Parliamentary committees have helped to render co-operation between parties and the spirit of compromise acceptable and normal. Whereas in Great Britain recent attempts (in 1923 and 1929) to carry on the government of the country without a single-party majority were short-lived and disappointing and ended in bitterness and recriminations, minority governments in Scandinavia have functioned successfully and for long periods. As a French observer says of Sweden,[3]

[1] See the *Finland Year Book*, 1947, p. 68.

[2] *International Affairs*, October 1948, p. 506. For further discussion of recent Finnish history, see this article and the P.R. Society pamphlets No. 95 (p. 24) and No 96 (p. 22).

[3] Marc Ullmann, *Le Monde*, 6–7 June 1954.

the nation is remarkably united on essentials. The processes of compromise in committee lead to virtually unanimous reports and hence to Bills backed by all parties; unanimous votes in the Parliament itself are not unusual. Few countries in the world can point to such general stability of government or to what may be even more important, such continuity of government policy in both home and external affairs.

SWITZERLAND

In examining the electoral experience of Switzerland, it is necessary to remember the political and racial structure of the country. Switzerland is a federation of cantons which can broadly be divided as regards race into German, French, and Italian, the people of German stock far outnumbering the rest. Within certain cantons themselves there are racial and religious minorities, and conflict has often in the past been serious. Although Switzerland is today a well-integrated federation, the Swiss still thinks first and foremost in terms of his canton, and the cantons retain, and jealously guard, a considerable degree of autonomy. The Swiss system of government is indeed based on a still smaller unit, the commune, where an active democracy expresses itself through meetings of all the adult males.[1] Swiss parties were for long organized on a cantonal basis, and became national bodies only in the later years of the last century. Cantonal elections therefore have more significance than the local elections of most other countries.

Discussion on the suitability of electoral systems began in Switzerland during the first half of the nineteenth century. A system for the election of a Constituent Assembly for Geneva was suggested by Victor Considérant in 1842 and elaborated by him in 1846. This influenced the *Association Réformiste*, founded in 1865, which was partly responsible for the first step taken to revise the Swiss electoral laws. The demand for this revision arose out of the bitterness of political divisions exacerbated by a majority system of election in circumstances where racial and religious differences themselves put a strain upon national unity. In 1847, the predominantly Roman Catholic cantons attempted

[1] In some of the smaller cantons (Appenzell, Glarus, Unterwalden), the legislative power of the canton is exercised directly by all male adult citizens meeting in a public assembly called the Landesgemeinde.

to secede from the Federation, but their revolt was suppressed by the superior strength of the Protestants in the Sonderbund war. At later dates, several elections gave rise to disturbances involving loss of life.

One such incident occurred in the canton of Ticino in 1889.[1] The election of that year gave the Conservatives 77 seats for 12,783 votes, while the Liberals, with almost as many votes (12,166), got only 35 seats. The resulting dissensions were ended by the intervention of the Federal Council, which recommended a proportional system. This was used first for the election of a constituent assembly, and was incorporated into the cantonal constitution in 1891, for the election of the Cantonal Council, constituent assemblies and Municipal Councils. The law was approved by referendum the following year and has remained in force ever since.[2] The object of pacifying the canton was attained, and the success of proportional representation in Ticino encouraged its adoption for other Swiss elections.

In the canton of Geneva, the Protestants and Catholics were nearly equal in numbers but the operation of the block vote resulted in domination of the council by the former. This led to great friction, particularly where legislation connected with religious matters was concerned. In 1892, Geneva followed the example of Ticino by introducing a proportional system. The effect was to reduce considerably the disturbances caused by unfair representation. The influence of the two systems can be seen in the cantonal elections of November 1892 compared with the elections for the National Council in the same canton the following October. While the cantonal elections passed off calmly and were followed by no disturbances, in the Federal elections (still under a majority system) political antagonism gave rise to rioting.

Such were the diametrically opposite influences of the majority and the proportional systems in a country where racial and religious differences were potential threats to national unity and local harmony. As will be seen later, this situation was approximately repeated in the case of Belgium.

[1] For the full story, see *La Démocratie Tessinoise et la Représentation Proportionnelle* by Professor J. J. Galland, Grenoble, 1909.

[2] Its application was extended in 1892, 1895 and 1898 to the election of the Executive Council, jurors and Communal Councils. In 1904, however, the Liberal majority on the Executive Council secured a change in its method of election to the limited vote. This system was less favourable to the minority, and gave the Liberals four seats out of five instead of three out of five.

The use of proportional representation gradually extended, so that by 1909 it was in force for some or all local elections in ten more cantons. The cantons' experience in turn influenced public opinion with regard to Federal elections, an effect that is clearly seen in three successive initiatives. Advocates of proportional representation for the election of the National Council[1] first secured a popular vote on the subject in 1900, when the change was rejected by a three-to-two majority of the citizens voting and by 11½ cantons to 10½. Ten years later, the number voting for the change had increased by half, the number of opponents remaining nearly stationary and constituting only a bare majority, and 12 cantons voted in favour to 10 against. By 1918, the supporters of proportional representation had increased by a further 25 per cent while its opponents had fallen by nearly one-half; the proposition was carried by 299,550 votes to 149,035 and 19½ cantons to 2½, and became law in time for the election of 1919. The system then introduced[2] has remained in force ever since, without important change.

Under the majority system before 1919, the Radical Party controlled the Council most of the time. For example, the first Council elected under the new Constitution of 1848 consisted of over a hundred Radicals (who, broadly speaking, were Protestants) compared with some eight Conservatives (Catholics), although the latter represented about half the population. In some cantons the Radicals invariably secured all the seats, with a bare majority of the votes cast. Towards the end of the last century, the Radicals, under the impact of newer political doctrines, began to lose their cohesion, despite the operation of the electoral law. Their apprehension of the threat to their dominance was shown by their opposition to the efforts made in 1900 and 1910 to introduce an element of proportionality into Federal elections. Despite the continuance of majority voting, however, the Radicals began to lose ground to the Catholics and to newer parties; by 1917, the Social Democrats had secured 19 seats in a Council of 182. Thus, the majority system did not prevent the rise of new parties. Had the system continued,

[1] The Federal Parliament consists of the Council of States, whose members are elected by the cantons, and the National Council, which is the more important body and is elected directly by the male citizens. Each canton has one National Council member per 24,000 of its population. The executive body, the Federal Council, is elected by the Federal Parliament for a period of four years.

[2] See p. 95.

it is probable that the Social Democrats in their turn would have dominated the Council and the Radicals would have becomes the victims of unfair representation, just as the British Liberals did.

The effect of the change in the voting system in 1919 was to reduce Radical representation sharply from 102 seats to 58 (31 per cent of the seats for 29 per cent of the votes), near which level it has remained ever since. Part of the seats lost by the Radicals went to the new Peasant Party, which already existed in embryo as a section of the Radical Party, and nearly all the rest to the Social Democrats, who more than doubled their representation. A number of splinter parties did present candidates, but they never won more than a very few seats and most of them disappeared again very quickly. 'The proportional system has not in the least caused or favoured . . . a multiplication of little parties. On the contrary, if there is any conclusion to be drawn from the four proportional elections so far held, it is that there is a tendency for the voters to concentrate in the great historic parties.'[1]

The following table shows the development of the Swiss political parties under a proportional system since 1917:

ELECTIONS TO THE NATIONAL COUNCIL, 1917–52

	Radicals	*Conservative*	*Social Democrat*	*Liberal Democrat*	*Peasants*	*Communists*	*Others*	*Number of parties*
1917	102	42	19	12	—	—	7	6
1919	58	41	41	9	31	—	9	9
1922	58	44	43	10	35	2	6	8
1925	59	42	49	7	31	3	7	9
1928	58	46	50	6	31	2	5	9
1931	52	44	49	6	30	3	3	8
1935	48	42	50	6	21	2	18	10
1939	50	43	45	7	22	—	10	8
1943	47	43	54	8	22	—	20	8
1947	52	44	48	7	21	7	15	9
1951	51	48	49	5	23	5	15	8

In considering the effects of the voting system in Switzerland, other characteristics of that country's political structure must be borne in mind. The Swiss citizen shares in his own govern-

[1] *Statistik der Nationalratswahlen*, 1919–28, p. 31.

ment much more directly than most. He is expected to take part in a large number of elections and local assemblies, and (together with a specified minimum number of his fellows) may challenge Federal or cantonal legislation or even initiate legislation: the law in question is confirmed or vetoed by a popular referendum. The Federal Council is not, like the British Cabinet, a body of Ministers chosen by the leader of the largest party; it is elected by the Federal Parliament and is chosen so as to include representatives of all the main parties and of the different types of cantons. That is to say, the proportional principle is extended beyond the election of the Parliament to the formation of its Executive. It has also become a tradition that the maximum legal duration of the Federal Council of four years shall not be terminated prematurely, even if any of its proposals are rejected either by the Parliament or by the country on referendum.

Switzerland has long been of interest to constitution-makers, and in many parts of the world today a federal form of government is being considered. In Africa it seems probable that several large areas, on the verge of attaining self-government and containing differing races, cultures and languages, will find federation suited to their problems. The experience of Switzerland with regard to electoral methods in a multi-racial population would seem to be apposite.

BELGIUM

The political experience of Belgium under both a majority and a proportional system of election has, in one respect at least, been similar to that of Switzerland. The disputes of the two racial sections of the population (Flemings and Walloons), which menaced the unity of the nation during the last century, have been to a large extent resolved by the substitution of a proportional for a majority system.

The majority system, employed until 1899,[1] resulted in Flanders returning Catholics and Wallonia, except for certain rural areas, returning Liberals or, between 1894 and 1899,

[1] Election was by the second ballot, in constituencies most of which returned from 2 to 4 members each; there were 9 single-member constituencies, and one (Brussels) returning 18 members. The restricted electorate was increased tenfold by the law of 1894. This law also introduced the plural vote for certain family, property and educational qualifications; this was abolished in 1919.

chiefly Socialists.[1] Within each region there were minorities which, deprived of any hope of representation in national, or even in local, politics, formed enclaves of discontent.

In the national legislature,[2] until 1894, two solid blocks each represented exclusively the majority in its respective half of the country. They differed irreconcilably on the question of whether Belgium should be a secular State, and on problems created by the privileged position that French (the language of Wallonia) held, to the detriment of most Flemings, in administration, law and education. Both Catholics and Liberals tended to concentrate upon, and magnify, these issues at the expense of broader and more constructive policies, which would have been beneficial to the nation as a whole,[3] for they allowed little room for non-sectarian opinion within their ranks. Such a state of affairs was, it should be remembered, found in local as well as in national politics.

But the introduction in 1899 of a proportional system for Parliamentary elections[4] enabled the votes of Belgian minorities to become effective, and the representatives of the three main parties, Catholics, Liberals and Socialists, instead of being concentrated within one or other racial area, to be distributed more evenly over the country.[5] Thus, there were returned to the national legislature members whose sectarian views were qualified by other considerations which exercised a moderating influence; when some Catholics represented industrial cities and some Liberals rural areas, it became easier for them to find some measure of common ground than when their representation was confined respectively to opposite types of constituency. Furthermore, within the constituencies proportional representation contributed to making all parties less insistent on sectarian policies and encouraged them to assume the character of national

[1] See p. 63.

[2] The Belgian legislature is composed of two Chambers: the Senate, one half of which is elected directly, the rest being elected indirectly or co-opted; and the Chamber of Representatives (the more important), which now numbers 212 Deputies and is elected for four years by universal adult suffrage.

[3] Differences between the Catholics and Socialists centred at first on social, industrial, and franchise problems. The rise of a Catholic left wing forced the more traditional Catholic elements to compromise. Nevertheless, strong feeling over religious and racial differences persisted for some years.

[4] As in Switzerland, a trial had been made of proportional representation in municipal elections; it had proved successful in improving civic spirit and administration.

[5] The extension of the suffrage also contributed to this effect.

movements, for no party could any longer be assured, as it was under the former system, that an appeal to the majority alone would secure all the seats. The general effect on the nation as a whole was to integrate the different racial and social elements.

The experience of Belgium under proportional representation contradicts the repeated assertion that this system promotes such a large number of parties that any effective government is rendered virtually impossible. The system from the outset assisted the revival of the Liberal Party, which previously appeared to be in process of being eliminated.[1] The only new party to gain representation before 1914 was a minor and short-lived one, the Dansistes. In later years, three additional parties did return members, but the majority of seats was shared by the three older parties, though the incidence of their representation varied. Of the new groups, the Communists alone still retain (1953) any representation. Since 1945 the number of parties in the Chamber has remained stable at four. The table of the various parties in the Belgian Lower House since 1898 (page 175) shows that the number of parties winning seats since the introduction of proportional representation has not been excessive.

In Belgium, administrations have been more numerous under proportional representation than they were before 1899, but the duration of administrations, or the existence of a government able to ride roughshod over the rights of minorities, is not the sole criterion of good government. In Belgium, the effects of more frequent changes of government have caused less disturbance to the national welfare than the long periods of uninterrupted and arbitrary rule by purely Catholic or purely Liberal administrations.

Belgian governments (which have been largely coalitions since 1900) by no means present the chaotic picture which some critics paint. They have had the merit of giving the nation, in many ways so composite, a far more representative government than previously, and one which, as any examination of the reforms introduced will show, has been far from ineffective in its legislative achievements. There have, admittedly, been times of

[1] There is, however, a tendency to draw too sweeping conclusions from too few elections. The graph given by Maurice Duverger (*L'Influence des Systèmes Electoraux sur la Vie Politique*, p. 58) shows a sharp fall in Liberal representation from 1890 to 1898, but does not show that 1890 was a peak year which had been preceded by several other wide fluctuations in the number of Liberal Members.

serious party deadlock. Because these have been resolved either by royal intervention or by government decree, the proportional system has been indicted.[1] But if such a crisis does arise, in which the people's elected representatives are unable to agree on the right course and a more or less arbitrary decision has to be taken, it is surely better that this should be done by

ELECTIONS TO THE CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1898–1952

	Catholic	*Liberal*	*Socialist*	*Communist*	*Flemish Nationalist*	*Rexist*	*Others*
1898	112	13	27	—	—	—	—
1900	86	34	31	—	—	—	1
1902	96	34	34	—	—	—	2
1904	93	42	29	—	—	—	2
1906	89	46	30	—	—	—	1
1908	87	43	35	—	—	—	1
1910	86	44	35	—	—	—	1
1912	101	44	39	—	—	—	2
1914	99	45	40	—	—	—	2
1919*	75	33	69	—	7	—	2
1921	83	31	68	—	3	—	1
1925	78	23	78	2	6	—	—
1929	76	28	70	1	11	—	—
1932	79	24	73	3	8	—	—
1936	63	23	70	9	16	21	—
1939	73	33	64	9	17	4	2
1946	92	17	69	23	—	—	1
1949†	105	29	66	12	—	—	—
1950‡	108	20	77	7	—	—	—

* Adult male suffrage and votes for about 8,000 women (e.g. certain war widows). Remainders were utilized on a Provincial scale.

† Women were enfranchised on the same terms as men, and the number of seats in the Chamber was raised to 212.

‡ Election occasioned by the dispute over King Leopold.

the Crown on behalf of the whole nation, or by a government that has come to power with the backing of a majority of the voters, and has had to listen to all points of view, rather than by a party that holds fortuitous power through an unrepresentative electoral system.

The following table shows the changes in administration since 1918. A large proportion of these were, as will be seen, merely minor reshuffles in the composition of the cabinet, and not the complete substitution of one government for another. In

[1] Hermens, *Democracy or Anarchy?*, pp. 306–7.

other instances, they resulted from a general election, held at the legal four-yearly interval.[1] In many of these changes, the basic composition of the government was preserved (even after an appeal to the country). In this respect, continuity, which undoubtedly has many advantages, has been ensured to a greater degree than in many countries using a majority system.

BELGIAN ADMINISTRATIONS, 1918–52

Delacroix	Nov. 1918–Dec. 1919	Catholic-Liberal-Socialist
*Delacroix	Dec. 1919–Nov. 1920	Catholic-Liberal-Socialist
Carton de Wiart	Nov. 1920–Dec. 1921	Catholic-Liberal-Socialist-Non Party
*Theunis (reconstructed† March 1924)	Dec. 1921–May 1925	Catholic-Liberal-Non Party
*Vande Vyvere	May–June 1925	Catholic-Liberal-Socialist
Poullet	June 1925–May 1926	Catholic-Liberal-Socialist
Jaspar (reconstructed Jan. 1927, Nov. 1927, and in 1928)	May 1926–Oct. 1929	Catholic-Liberal-Socialist. The Socialists left the Administration in Nov. 1927
Jaspar (reconstructed May, 1931)	Oct. 1929–June 1931	Catholic-Liberal-Non Party
Renkin (reconstructed May 1932)	June 1931–Oct. 1932	Catholic-Liberal
de Broqueville (reconstructed Dec. 1932, Jan. 1934)	Oct. 1932–March 1935	Catholic-Liberal-Non Party
Van Zeeland	March 1935–June 1936	Catholic-Liberal-Socialist
*Van Zeeland	June 1936–Nov. 1937	Catholic-Liberal-Socialist
Janson	Nov. 1937–May 1938	Catholic-Liberal-Socialist
Spaak	May, 1938–Jan. 1939	Catholic-Liberal-Socialist
Spaak	Jan.–Feb. 1939	Catholic-Liberal-Socialist
*Pierlot (returned after the General Election of April 1939; reconstructed Sept. 1939 and continued in office in London during the occupation)	Feb. 1939–Sept. 1944	Catholic-Liberal-Socialist-Non Party
Pierlot	Sept. 1944–Feb. 1945	All party, including Communists, who resigned in Nov. 1944
‡Van Acker	Feb. 1945–Jan. 1946	All party, but the Catholics§ resigned in July 1945
*Spaak	March 1946	Socialists and Technicians
‡Van Acker	March–July 1946	Liberal-Socialist-Communist
Huysmans	Aug. 1946–March 1947	Liberal-Socialist-Communist

[1] Up to 1914, elections were biennial, covering half the country on each occasion.

Spaak	March 1947–Aug. 1949	Catholic-Socialist
(resigned in Nov. 1948, but resumed office in that same month)		
Eyskens	Aug. 1949–June 1950	Catholic-Socialist
Duvieusart	June–Aug. 1950	Catholic
Pholien	Aug. 1950–Jan. 1952	Catholic
Van Houtte	Jan. 1952–	Catholic

* Following a General Election.

† Only the major reconstructions are noted.

‡ Van Acker resigned in January 1946 and following the General Election of February 1946 there was a period of political crisis during which several party leaders attempted to form administrations. M. Spaak succeeded in forming one for a few days.

§ Towards the end of 1945, the Catholic Party was renamed the Christian Social Party (*Parti Social Chrétien*).

The advantages that proportional representation can bring to a country are demonstrated in Belgium. The system has succeeded in softening many racial antipathies which hindered the growth of true national unity, and which a majority system was making more acute.

THE NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands first adopted a proportional system in 1917 for elections to the Second Chamber of the States-General[1] and to the various provincial assemblies and local communal councils. Before that year, the Second Chamber was elected by the second ballot in single-member constituencies. For local elections, multi-member constituencies were used. From the granting of the constitution of 1848 this system encouraged a provincial and sectarian conception of politics and prevented the emergence of effective national parties. It cannot be claimed that the change to a proportional system has eradicated these weaknesses from Dutch politics, but it has certainly not accentuated (much less introduced) them. Moreover, it has eliminated one vice of the majority system, namely, that of promoting within the constituencies alliances based rather on the pursuit of immediate electoral advantage than on any real community of principle between the parties, and of distorting the representation of such alliances.

[1] The national legislature, the States-General, comprises two Chambers. The first is chosen by Colleges of the Provincial States; the second (and more important) is directly elected for four years by universal adult suffrage.

LIST SYSTEMS

In the years immediately following 1848, three principal movements competed for the support of a limited electorate: the Liberals, the Calvinists and the Catholics; to these were added a few Conservatives who represented the more aristocratic element.[1] The problem of whether the Netherlands should be a secular State or not (on this, Liberals were opposed to the two denominational movements) and, in addition, a doctrinal issue between the Calvinists and the Catholics, became the preoccupations on which the Dutch parties were to concentrate, often to the exclusion of more important questions. Under the majority system then in force, there was inaccurate representation of the opinions of the electorate, and also weak government. The Liberals could sometimes muster an absolute majority in the Second Chamber; when they failed to command this, the alternative was an ineffective and uneasy coalition of the two confessional groups, supported by the Conservatives.

The religious question which divided the parties was complicated in the later decades of the century by the political demands of the unenfranchised working classes whose interests (see p. 55) none of the traditional groups represented. Under the impact of these demands, the existing parties began to lose their cohesion and to break up into various factions. As early as 1878, the impossibility of constituting a party administration led to the formation of a non-party ministry.

The new constitution of 1887 extended the franchise and increased the number of members in the Chamber, but left the method of election untouched. The religious problem, chiefly in the guise of denominational versus secular education, and the demand for a still wider franchise, remained two of the chief party issues. To safeguard denominational schools, an alliance was forged between the Anti-Revolutionaries (Calvinists) and the Catholics. But the former group, by democratizing its platform, antagonized its right wing, which formed a new party, the Christian Historicals. In 1896, a further electoral law doubled the electorate, which, however, still remained restricted in comparison with that of other democracies. During the following years, the number of parties increased further by the disintegration of the Liberals and the rise of the Socialists and (far

[1] These groups could hardly be called parties in the modern sense of the word until later in the century. In 1878 the Anti-Revolutionary Party (Calvinist) was formed; in 1884, the Liberal Union; in 1889, the Social-Democratic League, and in 1896, the Catholic Party.

ess marked) of the Communists. The insistence of the partie. on a sectarian approach to religious, franchise or economic ssues again necessitated a resort to an extra-Parliamentary and non-party ministry. In a further revision of the constitution in 1917, manhood suffrage at the age of 25[1] was conceded by the parties of the Right in return for equal treatment for religious endowed schools, and proportional representation was introduced.

The majority system employed until 1917 had failed to restrict the number of parties. The introduction of proportional representation at first somewhat accentuated the tendency of Dutch political groups to break up into splinter parties, for there was a continued emphasis by Dutch politicians on doctrinal issues and on academic differences of opinion on social and economic problems. However, for the most part, representation in the legislature continued to be monopolized by the half-dozen existing parties. After 1945, the number of small parties that had succeeded in securing one or two representatives diminished considerably. As has been observed elsewhere, when a group ceases to have an adequate *raison d'être* it is not perpetuated by the proportional system. Thus, in 1918, in the first proportional election, eight small groups obtained representation, but by 1952 the number had dropped to two.[2]

Dutch cabinets since 1918 have all been coalitions. Their lives have on the whole been long, though there have been fairly numerous cabinet reconstructions. In some cases, the formation of an administration has been unduly delayed because of the tendency of groups to haggle over their share of portfolios. Between 1918 and 1940, these coalitions were usually composed of the three denominational parties, which were cemented chiefly by an opposition to the anti-clericalism of the Liberal and Labour groups. The first coalition cabinet formed under the proportional system lasted, with some reconstruction, from 1918 to 1925 (surviving a general election); during this time it

[1] The franchise was extended to women in 1922, and the voting age was lowered to 23 in 1945. Voting is compulsory.

[2] The particular form of proportional representation chosen was one offering great encouragement to very small parties. Although voting takes place in eighteen districts, the lists of candidates nominated in those districts can, and usually do, declare themselves to be part of a national party list, and seats are then allocated on the basis of their national total. The law has undergone minor modifications to the disadvantage of the small parties (see Braunias, *Das Parlamentarische Wahlrecht*, Vol. ii, p. 251).

was twice defeated, but its resignation was refused by the Chamber.[1] Later coalition cabinets had more difficulty in maintaining stability, and, as a solution, there was an increasing tendency to entrust the government to a body of 'experts', drawn from as many parties as possible. This practice has been followed since 1945, when the growing urgency of economic problems has shown more clearly than ever the futility of making academic questions a basis for government. The following table shows the development of the Dutch parties between 1913 and 1952, and the table facing shows the Dutch administrations between 1918 and 1952.

ELECTIONS TO THE SECOND CHAMBER, 1913–52

	Catholics	*Anti-Rev.*	*Christ. Hist.*	*Liberals**	*Lib. Dem.*	*Social Dem.†*	*Comm.*	*Others*	*No. of parties*
1913	24	11	9	32	7	15	2	2	10
1918	30	13	7	10	5	22	2	12	15
1922	32	16	11	10	5	20	2	3	10
1925	30	13	11	9	7	24	1	1	11
1929	30	12	11	8	7	24	2	2	12
1933	28	14	10	7	6	22	4	9	14
1937	31	17	8	4	6	23	3	8	10
1946	32	13	8	6	–	29	10	2	7
1948	32	13	9	8	–	27	8	3	8
1952	30	12	9	9	–	30	6	4	8

* This party included two groups in 1913 and 1918. In 1946, the bulk of the Liberals formed the present People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, while a left-wing section combined with the Social Democrats to form the Labour Party.

† Labour Party—see preceding note.

Whilst proportional representation may not have eliminated from Dutch political life a certain traditional insistence on sectarian issues, it has certainly allayed any bitterness that might have been felt under a majority system by parties deprived of fair representation or made the victims of opportunist electoral pacts. Moreover, though from time to time it has been possible to form an administration only after hard bargaining, an administration once constituted has usually of late had a long and useful life, because it has been the outcome of a genuine attempt to find common ground. Such a practice, despite its disadvantages, is preferable to the precarious existence of

[1] It dissolved finally over the religious issue of diplomatic relations with the Vatican.

a hastily created stop-gap administration. Finally, proportional representation has made its contribution to the introduction into Dutch political life of a more co-operative spirit. Thus, for example, the Social Democrats, while disagreeing with the more conservative confessional groups on some points, have found enough common ground with them to participate in the government. In post-war years, therefore, the Netherlands has presented the picture of a nation facing, with an increasing degree of unity, the many difficulties created by years of war.

DUTCH ADMINISTRATIONS 1918–1952

Ruys de Beerenbrouck	Sept. 1918–Sept. 1922	Catholic, Anti-Rev.
,,	Sept. 1922–Aug. 1925	,, ,,
Colijn	Aug. 1925–Mar. 1926	,, ,,
de Geer	Mar. 1926–Aug. 1929	Extra-Parliamentary, under a Christ. Hist.
Ruys de Beerenbrouck	Aug. 1929–May 1933	Catholic, Anti-Rev.
Colijn	May 1933–May 1935	'National', composed of Cons. groups
,,	July 1935–May 1937	,,
,,	July 1937–July 1939	,,
,,	July 1939–Aug. 1939	,,
de Geer	Aug. 1939–Sept. 1940	Catholic, Anti-Rev., Labour, non-party
Gerbrandy (reconstructed several times whilst in exile in London)	Sept. 1940–June 1945	National
Schermerhorn	June 1945–June 1946	National
Beel	June 1946–July 1948	Catholic, Labour
Drees	July 1948–Jan. 1951*	Labour, Catholic, Christ. Hist., Liberal
,,	March 1951–June 1952	,,
,,	Sept. 1952–	,,

* Dr. Drees resigned, and a crisis lasting some fifty days ensued before he again took office.

ISRAEL

Proportional representation elections took place during the Palestine Mandate, and the same system has been continued in the new State of Israel. It is a rigid party list system in which the whole country is treated as one constituency.

This gives the maximum encouragement to small parties, which in any case are likely to be numerous in a new country

with a large immigrant population drawn from widely differing lands. Nevertheless, the bulk of the votes have been concentrated on only a few parties (five in 1944, four in 1949, three in 1951) and extreme groups have had very little success.[1] The municipal elections of 1950 (under the same form of proportional representation) showed even more markedly a tendency for the voters to ignore splinter groups.

The provisional government of Ben Gurion was confirmed in power by the 1949 election and again in 1951, his party (Mapai or Labour) being consistently much the largest. It has never had a clear majority, and has governed with the help of one or more of the other moderate parties.

There is some dissatisfaction with the impersonal nature of the voting system, though it seems that most Israelis regard the party as by far the most important consideration in an election. There can, however, be no reasonable complaint about the strength or stability of the resulting government. Considering the difficulties with which it has had to cope (particularly the economic ones associated with the policy of unlimited immigration which no Israeli government could at present reverse), it can only be regarded as very successful.

In all the foregoing countries, proportional representation is associated with stable and generally satisfactory government; its alleged evil effects in this respect are completely absent. We now come to four countries—Germany, Italy, Greece, and France—which are likely to be cited as instances of a contrary character.

GERMANY

Representative institutions had existed in Germany for nearly fifty years before 1918, and a party system had been built up, but the real power resided elsewhere. Bismarck bequeathed as his political legacy a nation untrained in self-government, which remained accustomed to having its affairs directed by outstanding statesmen and a strong executive despite the fact that it possessed the semblance of representative institutions. The electorate and their representatives were not allowed the experience of self-government needed to train them in political wisdom.

[1] See Appendix ii, p. 240.

Excluded from any true responsibility, the parties tended to become, not so much national movements, but pressure groups or the rival regional, sectional and confessional elements which were rooted in German history and character. Any union between them was based upon a bargaining (*Kuhhandel*) which ought to attain limited and selfish objectives.

The electoral system of the country abetted this emphasis on narrow sectarian issues. The Reichstag was chosen from single-member constituencies by the second ballot.[1] This gave opportunity for discreditable electoral bargaining, and often increased the disproportion between the votes cast and the seats won. For example, in 1907, the Social Democrats secured 28·9 per cent of the votes cast and were leading in 73 constituencies, or 18·4 per cent of the whole—that is to say, under the first-past-the-post system they would have had 18·4 per cent of the seats. But combinations of other parties against them on the second ballot reduced this already too low proportion of seats by nearly half, to 10·8 per cent.[2]

The same pattern of party politics reappeared after 1918 under the proportional system adopted by the Weimar Republic, and it must be emphasized that this was the old pattern, not a new one called into being by proportional representation.[3] Although the particular form of proportional representation adopted offered the maximum encouragement to small groups,[4] the number of parties in the Reichstag under that system never exceeded the number in 1912, even if we subtract from the latter the purely local parties that disappeared automatically with the provinces Germany lost in 1918[5]. As early as 1896 the Reichstag was 'subdivided to an astonishing degree',[6] containing 15 parties, no one of them with as much as one-quarter of the seats, and by 1912 the number of parties had risen to 21. Those parties were no more co-operative before 1918 than afterwards, and according to

[1] If no one candidate had a clear majority on the first ballot, the second ballot took place between the two leading candidates only.

[2] J. H. Humphreys, *Proportional Representation*, p. 291.

[3] Hermens and others who contend that proportional representation causes a multiplication of parties support this contention by quoting German statistics beginning in 1919. This is misleading if no figures for earlier years are given for comparison.

[4] Any party polling 60,000 votes over the entire country obtained one seat.

[5] By the time Hitler seized power "there was a general tendency for a concentration of parties, and the possibility of only four or even three parties emerging was great". Erich Roll, *Spotlight on Germany* (Faber & Faber, 1933), p. 249.

[6] A. L. Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, Vol. ii, p. 42.

Seats won by German Parties under (*i*) the second ballot (1912), (*ii*) party list P.R. (1919–33), and (*iii*) the mixed system (1949).

	1912	*1919*	*1920*	*May 1924*	*Dec. 1924*	*1928*	*1930*	*July 1932*	*Nov. 1932*	*Mar. 1933*		*Aug. 1949*
Social Democrats	110	163	102	100	131	153	143	133	121	120	Social Democrats	131
Centre	91	91*	64	65	69	61	68	75	70	74	Centre	10
National Liberals	45	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Conservatives	43	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—		
Prog. People's Party	42	19	65	45	51	45	30	—	—	—	Free Democrats	52
Poles	18	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Reich Party	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	German Right	5
Guelphs	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Reform Party	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Reconstruction	12
Farmers' Union	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Christian Social Party	3	—	—	—	—	—	14	3	5	4	Christian Democrats	139
Alsace-Lorrainers	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Alsace-Lorrainers Centre Party	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Economic Union	2	—	—	—*	—*	23	23	2	1	—		
German Social Party	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
German Peasants' League	2	—	—}	10*	17*	8	6	2	3	2	Bavarian Party	17
Bavarian Peasants' League	2	4	4}									
Independent Lorrainers	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	S. Schleswig Party	1
Danes	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Alsatians	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
German Nationalists	—	44	71	95	103	73	41	40	54	52		
Bavarian People's Party	—	—*	21	16	19	17	19	22	20	18		
German Hanoverians	—	1	5	5	4	4	3	—	1	—	German Party	17
German Democrats	—	75	39	28	32	25	—	4	2	5		
Independent Socialists	—	22	84	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Communists	—	—	4	62	45	54	77	89	100	81	Communists	15
National Socialists	—	—	—	32	14	12	107	230	196	288		
Land League	—	—	—	10	8	3	—	—	—	—	Freedom Party	2
Saxon Peasants	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—		
Christian National Peasants	—	—	—	—	—	9	21	—	—	—		
State Party	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	7	11	2		
Others	2	2	—	4	—	2	6	—	—	1	Independents	3
Total seats	397	421	459	472	493	491	577	607	584	647		404
Parties represented	21	10	10	12	12	15	15	11	12	11		11

* Parties in alliance.

The 1912 and 1949 figures are taken from official returns, the 1932 and 1933 figures from *Europa*, and the rest from Braunias' *Das Parlamentarische Wahlrecht*, i, 88.

Lowell[1] 'the worst feature of the existing (1896) condition of politics is the constant diminution of the moderate elements'.

This situation, however, was more dangerous under the Republic than it had been before. The Imperial regime did give Germany acertain unity. The numerous groups pursuing opportunist policies for their own benefit might be ineffectual and often irresponsible, but they were allowed merely the shadow of power; its substance resided in a strong monarchy and efficient executive. With the disappearance of the Kaiser, these politically ill-educated parties were called upon to provide a government. Moreover, they were handicapped by the association of the Republic with defeat, they were faced with acute economic difficulties, and the Weimar regime (unlike that of the Empire) was constantly threatened by the campaign of certain elements whose avowed intention was to destroy it.

Between 1919 and 1932, no coalition of the Right or of the Left could achieve a majority. In such circumstances the Centre held the balance of power. But, owing to the differing and narrow aims (principally economic and social) of its component parts, this Centre group could never formulate a continuous policy nor one that would permit it to ally itself for long with the Right or with the Left. Some homogeneity was, however, introduced by a common religious attitude, and provided a stability which prevented its members from drifting to the Right or to the Left in sufficient numbers to enable either of those groups to form a stable administration. Thus, under Weimar, the Centre was the maker and breaker of cabinets. It was represented in 17 out of the 20 Administrations of the regime, and its erratic policy largely contributed to their downfall.

A further cause of the instability of the Republic's governments was the clash between centralism and federalism. The life of the national government depended not only upon a stable coalition within the Reichstag, but also on the character of the seventeen local assemblies of the Länder (the largest of which represented about 63 per cent of the German population). Party politics within the Länder tended to take on an independent local pattern, which resulted in numerous and sharp disagreements between them and the Reich Government, and often placed the central authority in jeopardy.[2]

[1] Ibid, p. 43.

[2] In theory the law of the Reich was supreme, but the lack of adequate police and other machinery often made its enforcement impossible.

Such were some of the broad factors that led to instability, to the failure of the attempt at democratic government, and consequently to dictatorship. To attribute this dictatorship to the operation of the electoral system is an over-simplification of the facts.[1] The Weimar system proved incapable of solving Germany's numerous difficulties for other reasons, and by 1932 the Reichstag elections showed that a majority of the electorate (that is, Communist and National Socialist voters taken together) desired its overthrow. Those electors, disillusioned by the experiment in democracy, were prepared to turn to any element which seemed to offer economic salvation and national rehabilitation. It is alleged that proportional representation led to the triumph of the Nazi Party by enabling it to win seats while it still represented only a small minority of the electors, but winning of a few seats in its first three elections was not a major factor. By 1930, the German elector was in a mood to follow any party showing ruthless determination to give Germany 'a place in the sun', whether or not that party already had some members in the Reichstag. Once public opinion had turned to the Nazis, an election under a majority system would have resulted in a landslide in their favour.[2] Under proportional representation, the party never won a majority in the Reichstag in a free election.

The impression that splinter parties were created by proportional representation is fairly widespread within Germany itself, and the system has been opposed also on the ground of its impersonality (there was no provision for choice between candidates within the list). Hence, when the country made a fresh start after 1945, the electoral system of the Weimar Republic was changed. Local elections were held while Germany was still being administered by the Occupying Powers. In the American and French Zones, these elections were under the old Weimar system, but in the British Zone a compromise between this and the first-past-the-post system was adopted, under the impression that a large element of personal choice would thereby be introduced.[3] This mixed system, with minor

[1] Under almost exactly the same system, operating over the same period between the wars, Czechoslovakia was the most stable and successful democracy in Eastern Europe.

[2] Goering's evidence in his trial for war crimes was that under the British system the Nazis would have won every seat in the 1933 election.

[3] See p. 96.

modifications, is now used for all elections in Western Germany. It is less accurately proportional than the old one, but has avoided any serious distortion of the voters' wishes; in the 1949 election of the Bundestag there was only a slight over-representation of the two largest parties.[1]

The tendency to many parties remains. Thirteen parties, besides Independents, contested the 1949 election and eleven of them got some representation. On the other hand, most of those parties won very few seats and there are signs of a concentration of votes upon a few major parties, a process that had already begun under the Weimar Republic.[2] The only Government so far has been a coalition of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats headed by Dr. Adenauer (Christian Democrat). It has at least shown itself capable under strong leadership of carrying through successfully a drastic currency reform, and pursuing consistently its policy of co-operation with the Western Powers. The stability of the Adenauer administration confirms the opinion, therefore, that the failure of the Weimar governments was due to causes other than the electoral system.

ITALY

For nearly all the time from her creation as an independent state to 1919, Italy elected her Chamber of Deputies by the second ballot in single-member constituencies. An exception was the period from 1882 to 1891, when the constituencies each elected two to four members by the block vote or five members by the limited vote (four votes for each elector). In 1919, the country adopted party list proportional representation, and, as in the case of Germany, it has been alleged that this contributed to the later rise of a dictatorship. The roots of Fascism, however, existed already, and were nourished by the political circumstances in Italy under the older electoral systems.

Following the establishment of the kingdom of Italy, the parties of the Right enjoyed a period of some fourteen years as the government until 1876. In the last years of the century, power passed to the Left, to a group of politicians possessing little homogeneity or capacity for effective rule and disinterested

[1] See Appendix ii, p. 243.
[2] See Erich Roll, *Spotlight on Germany* (Faber & Faber, 1933), p. 249.

service. This situation persisted up to the first World War. Thus, true Parliamentary government had never become an integral part of the national life; it even acquired discredit in the eyes of the electorate. Parties were to a great extent mere personal factions, and a conservative estimate of their number in 1913 was ten. Italy was ruled by 'coalition Governments with weak and inconsistent programmes propped by the bought support of groups'.[1] The political experience of Italy (like that of Germany) under majority systems of election before 1919 demonstrated that these methods do not necessarily divide Parliamentary representation into two homogeneous bodies of opinion, and certainly do not do so within a country that is still politically immature. In Italy, these majority systems resulted in a tendency to elect a Deputy for his local influence rather than for his political opinions, and the elected Deputy, having no fixed political allegiance, bartered his vote with the administration.

It was in these political circumstances that proportional representation was introduced in 1919. Elections under it were held in 1919 and 1921. There was no substantial increase in the number of parties on the introduction of proportional representation. There was a distinct tendency for the parties to become, instead of personal factions, real political groups with national programmes; far from preventing the emergence of stable groups, the new system promoted them.[2]

The Socialists, who had been gradually gaining in strength, won about one-third of the seats in the new Chamber in 1919, and formed the most effective opposition to the dominant Liberal group; close behind them came a new group, with clerical and peasant associations, the Popular Party. The Catholics for the first time took part in the election as a party. These new elements were not disposed to acquiesce in the manipulations practised by the older political leaders, but, partly owing to their political immaturity, they proved unequal to the task of finding a satisfactory solution to the country's problems. The Socialists refused to collaborate in government, and promoted (with the use of force) industrial unrest which the government did little to check. This, with other factors, inspired the rise of

[1] Bolton King and Thomas Okey, *Italy To-day* (Nisbet, 1901), p. 20.
[2] See the majority and minority reports of the Italian Parliamentary Committee on the electoral law, 1923.

nationalist groups which in their turn resorted to violence.[1] In the 1921 election, these elements, which included Mussolini's Fascists, secured 45 seats, won from the Socialists largely as a reaction from the latter's unconstitutional methods. The formulation of a party programme promising Italy far-reaching reforms was enough in the existing circumstances to set Fascism on the road to success.

The rise of Fascism was assisted by the ineffective policies and dissensions amongst other groups. By 1922, Mussolini was able to form a cabinet, based on a coalition of four parties. He introduced a new electoral law under which the country was divided into fifteen constituencies, and each party submitted national lists of candidates. The party with the largest poll was entitled to two-thirds of the seats (356), while the remaining seats were divided proportionally among the other parties. As it turned out, the 'premium' for the largest party was not needed to secure a Fascist victory; they polled not far short of two-thirds of the votes, and the end of the first experiment in Italian democracy was at hand.

With the restoration of Parliamentary government in Italy after 1945, a proportional system was again adopted, for the election first of a Constituent Assembly and later of the two Chambers that were created.[2] Of the 556 seats in the Constituent Assembly, 426 were shared among the three largest parties (Christian Democrat, Socialist and Communist), and those parties, with the addition of two Republicans and one Liberal, formed the Government under Signor de Gasperi (Christian Democrat) as Prime Minister. This government led a precarious existence in the face of economic difficulties, but de Gasperi remained in power until his resignation as a result of the election in 1953.

Ten parties obtained some representation in the Chamber. Thus, following this second introduction of proportional repre-

[1] Too many Italians, unfortunately, had yet to learn the lesson that 'in a self-governing people, all parties are responsible for the maintenance of government; . . . a party that refuses all share of responsibility for the maintenance of government may render a great disservice to the country. For Parliamentary government implies government as well as loyalty to Parliament. Parliamentary parties who refuse to assist in permitting the wishes of the majority to have effect, are in revolt against Parliamentary government itself; in the resulting chaos Parliamentary government may disappear.' See John H. Humphreys, *Representation*, August 1923, p. 19.

[2] In the Senate, 236 members were elected; 107 others sat of right as ex-Premiers, ex-Presidents of the Chamber, or ex-Deputies who had spent more than five years in prison under Fascism.

sentation, there has again been no increase in the number of parties represented. A fear that the system would breed splinter parties (the usual bogey of opponents of proportional representation) has proved unjustified; on the contrary, there has actually been in the Italian Parliament a consolidation, tending to produce only three main parties. This effect might have been more marked if the new system introduced had been the single transferable vote.

It would have also removed one ground for the demands arising a little later for a departure from proportional representation. One motive for changing the electoral law was the desire that all non-Communist parties should be able to pool their strength; under the single transferable vote they could have done this to any extent that the voters wished. The new law, passed in 1953 in the teeth of most bitter opposition, not only provided for *apparentement* but awarded two-thirds of the total seats to any party or alliance polling, over the whole country, more than half the votes. In the event, this weakened the Government coalition, for public resentment against the electoral law contributed to a fall in the government poll to 0·2 per cent below the required half.

GREECE

Greece has never had settled political conditions at any time since her first constitution was granted in 1843. Geographical factors militate against the unification of the country and impede the growth of great national parties such as we know in Britain. There have been four new or revised constitutions (1863, 1911, 1926, and 1935), the last of which was suspended under the Metaxas dictatorship and restored in 1944. The Crown has frequently been the subject of dispute, and Greece was a republic from 1924 to 1935. The electoral system has been changed many times, but no form of proportional representation was used until 1926; before that date, majority systems were in force, election being generally by the block vote in large constituencies.

The following table records the changes of administration between 1919 and the beginning of the Metaxas dictatorship in 1936.

GREECE

Year	*Election*	*Prime Minister (or dictator)*
1919		Gounaris
1920	majority	,,
1921		,,
1922		*Protopapadakis
1923	majority	Venizelos
1924		Papanastasiou
		Sophoulis
		Michalakopoulos
1925		*Pangalos
1926		*Kondylis
	proportional	Zaimis
1927		,,
1928	majority	Venizelos
1929		,,
1930		,,
1931		,,
1932		Papanastasiou
	proportional	Venizelos
1933	majority	Tsaldaris
1934		,,
1935	majority	,,
		*Demertzis
1936	proportional	,,
		*Metaxas

* Assumed power as the result of a *coup d'état*. Metaxas became Prime-Minister constitutionally on the death of Demertzis, but made himself dictator and dissolved Parliament four months later.

It will be seen from the table that the instability of Greek governments certainly cannot be attributed to proportional representation. Changes in administration, brought about either by constitutional or by unconstitutional action, have been frequent under the majority system.[1] When a government with great strength in Parliament has emerged from an election under a majority system, it has not always been to the advantage of the country; the 1920 election was followed by a disastrous war, which was denounced by the Opposition as well as by Greece's allies and therefore might have been averted if the Opposition had had its just representation of about half the seats. On the other hand, the absence of a Parliamentary majority for any one party has not always meant weak government; the coalition government following the 1926 election instituted reforms which probably no one party could have carried through alone.[2]

[1] See for example Braunias, *Das Parlamentarische Wahlrecht*, Vol. i, p. 194.

[2] See A. W. Gomme, *Greece* (O.U.P., 1945), p. 68, and S. Forster, *A Short History of Modern Greece* (Methuen, 2nd ed., 1946), p. 164.

The great need of Greece is for the development of a much greater capacity for co-operation among her politicians. Proportional representation, by preventing a large Parliamentary majority for one party, did force upon the parties some attempt at co-operation. That attempt would have had a better chance of success if the particular system chosen had been one less dependent on the division of candidates into party lists. With the single transferable vote, some of those parties that appeared as separate entities might have found sufficient expression as wings of one larger party, and the voters could have given expression to the elements of agreement that exist between one party and another.

FRANCE

Contrary to a widespread belief, France has never at any time elected her Parliament by any proportional system except in 1945 and 1946. Confusion on this point arises partly from the repeated use of the second ballot, which many erroneously imagine to be a method of obtaining proportional results,[1] and partly from a system introduced in 1919, by which some of the seats were filled by a proportional method.

Under the Third Republic there was controversy over the merits of single- or multi-member constituencies as such, apart from the voting system applied within them. The single-member constituency (*scrutin d'arrondissement*) is claimed by its supporters to give the elector a greater hold on his representative, establishing a more intimate relationship between the Parliament and the electorate. This is held to provide a bulwark against any possible *coup d'état*, a danger to which the country was particularly exposed in the years immediately following the creation of the Third Republic. Moreover, in the Chamber itself, deputies tended to unite into small groups, a factor that militated against rule by large *blocs* or the exploiting of such *blocs* by an individual. Thus, the fear of Royalism in 1875, and of Boulangism in 1889, inspired the reintroduction of single-member constituencies. On the other hand, the single-member system is alleged to be more corrupt than a system of multi-member constituencies (*scrutin de liste*), inducing in deputies a parish-pump mentality and undue sensitiveness to pressure from local interests, and also tending to produce in-

[1] See for example Hermens, *Democracy or Anarchy?*, p. 143.

stability of government. Supporters of the large constituency hold that it leads a deputy to take a wider view of his responsibilities, and produces combinations of groups with broader interests, stimulates the formulation of national policies and gives the elected body a more national character.

Throughout most of its existence, the French Republic has used one or other of two systems, each with minor variations: (*a*) single-member constituencies with the second ballot;[1] (*b*) a majority system in multi-member constituencies (usually coinciding with Departments), with or without a second ballot. The electoral law alternated between one system and the other no less than eight times from 1831 to 1919, the former system predominating.

During the early years of this century, the Socialists in particular, and the smaller groups of the Right and Centre, began to agitate for proportional representation. Jean Jaurès characterized the majority systems as 'une acte de défiance envers le suffrage universel', and the success of a proportional system in neighbouring Belgium stimulated the movement for its introduction into France. As in many other countries, the post-war atmosphere of 1919 was favourable to a change. However, the advocates of proportional representation, in their readiness to compromise with the advocates of a majority system, made concessions that quite destroyed the proportional character of the system.[2] The most important of these was the provision that if, in any one constituency, any one party or alliance of parties secured an absolute majority of the votes, that party or alliance took all the seats in the constituency, whether any other party had secured a quota or not. This alone would suffice to make a proportional result very unlikely, but in addition the law gave scope for party manœuvres, especially for the combination of party lists in such a way as to make sure that one such combined list would poll at least 51 per cent of the votes. In 1919, the parties of the Right were the most successful in forming such combinations, while in 1924 it was the parties of the Left which profited; hence the 'swing of the pendulum' between those two elections was greatly exaggerated.

[1] There has been no restriction on the number of candidates in the second ballot, and as a rule the leader in this second ballot has been declared elected even if lacking a clear majority. The 1831 law, however, provided that in the latter circumstances a third ballot should be held between the two leading candidates only.

[2] See *Elections Législatives du 16 novembre, 1919*, by Georges Lachapelle, pp. 9ff.

This system was abandoned after the 1924 election, and France reverted to the second ballot in single-member constituencies, which continued to be used up to the war. In October 1945, a real proportional system was applied to the election of the first Constituent Assembly. This was a pure party list system, with no *panachage* or preferential voting; seats were allotted according to the d'Hondt rule.[1] The system was applied without substantial alteration to the election of the second Constituent Assembly in June 1946, and of the National Assembly (formerly the Chamber of Deputies) in the following November. It was criticized in various quarters for several reasons. The impersonality of the voting was widely disliked, and some concession to this dislike was made in the third election, voters being allowed to express a preference for a particular candidate within the party list. In practice, however, this was quite valueless, for such a preference became effective only if expressed by more than half of the voters supporting that party.[2] Very few voters did express a preference. The Socialists wished also to introduce *panachage*, but this was opposed by the Communists and the *Mouvement Républican Populaire* (M.R.P., or Christian Socialists), who saw in it a danger of their 'fringe' voters being seduced, and it was never adopted. A different objection came from the smaller parties, in particular the Radicals, who wanted the unused votes in each constituency to be utilized on a national scale. The d'Hondt rule does slightly favour the larger parties,[3] and it was also true that in a number of constituencies the Radicals fell a little short of the quota, which caused them to win fewer than their proportional share of seats. In the election of June 1946, the average numbers of votes needed to obtain one seat were as follows:

Communists	36,000
M.R.P.	35,000
Socialists	36,000
Parties of the Right	41,000
Radicals	59,000

The differences in these figures are much smaller than those commonly found under majority systems, but the handicap happened to operate against the very party (the Radicals) that,

[1] See p. 87.
[2] An effective choice between candidates was introduced in local elections.
[3] See p. 89.

under the second ballot, had been over-represented owing to the concentration of its strength in certain districts where it was sure of a majority.[1] The Radicals, therefore, failing to secure national utilization of remainders, pressed for a return to the second ballot.

A further objection was that the new system did not permit two parties to combine forces against a third, as they used to do on the second ballot. As the time approached for the election of the second National Assembly in 1951, the moderate parties who formed the government became more and more anxious that they should be able to combine against their opponents, and, moreover, that those opponents' representation should be reduced as far as possible. There was fear of, on the one hand, the Communists, and, on the other, General de Gaulle's *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (R.P.F.), which had taken shape as a party since the previous election. A prolonged dispute followed, which from the first was unlikely to end in any reasonable solution because each party seemed mainly concerned with devising an electoral system that would give it as many seats as possible and its opponents as few as possible. After several abortive attempts, there was finally adopted, just in time to permit elections in June 1951, an electoral law bearing a strong resemblance to that of 1919. Parties presenting separate lists of candidates were allowed to declare that they wished the votes cast for those lists to be pooled (in any one constituency) for purposes of calculating the allotment of seats. In addition to this, the method of voting over the greater part of the country was changed. In the Seine and Seine-et-Oise (where there are some districts with strong Communist majorities), proportional representation was retained, but with the method of the largest remainder,[2] which favours small parties rather than large ones. In the rest of Metropolitan France (where the Government parties were almost everywhere in a majority), if no one party or alliance of parties obtained a clear majority of the votes, the seats were to be divided proportionally (but using the d'Hondt rule, which favours the largest parties[3]), but if any one party or alliance did get a clear majority, however small, it would take all the seats in that constituency.

[1] Compare p. 26.
[2] See p. 86.
[3] See p. 89.

This system certainly served its purpose in giving the parties then forming the government an advantage over their Communist and Gaullist opponents.

The advantage of the government parties would have been still greater if they had made fuller use of the provisions for *apparentement*. As it was, with alliances in 83 out of the 95 constituencies to which this system applied,[1] they gained an absolute majority, and therefore swept the board, in 41 constituencies, each returning from two to ten members. Even where an absolute majority was not obtained, and the seats were shared on a proportional basis, the result was sometimes unfair because a party forming part of an alliance could win more seats than a party obtaining more votes but outside the alliance.[2] That might be justified if the parties forming the alliance had a real unity, but this was not necessarily the case; their combinations depended rather on considerations of electoral tactics, and varied from one constituency to another. The general effect of the system was that the two largest parties (amounting to nearly half the electorate) were deprived of all representation in 35 constituencies, covering approximately one-third of the country. This, however, did not enable the other parties to carry on government with any more success than before. No cabinet that could survive a vote in the Assembly was formed until eight weeks after the election of June 1951, and five Prime Ministers held office between that election and the end of 1953.

The period during which France used proportional representation was too short to afford reliable evidence as to the effects of that system on the political life of the country. There was, however, no increase in the already existing tendency to splinter parties and to unstable governments; indeed the number of parties represented in the Assembly was lower than before. The existence of numerous parties and the instability of administrations cannot be put down to proportional representation, for they have been common features in French politics for many generations. Under the Third Republic, that is to say for over seventy years during which she used two types

[1] The R.P.F. (Gaullists) formed alliances in twelve constituencies, the Communists in none. In five constituencies, government parties figured in two rival alliances. See Peter Campbell, *Revue Française de Science Politique*, October-December 1951, p. 498.

[2] For example, in the Marne the M.R.P. secured 36,509 votes out of a 'coalition' total of 75,595 and received two seats, whereas the Communists and R.P.F. each polled about 10,000 votes more but obtained only one seat apiece.

of a majority system, France had more than 90 cabinets, compared with 20 in Great Britain. Long before 1939, the broad divisions of the Right, Centre, and Left were split into numerous sections, and acted merely as loosely allied and opportunist cartels.

The causes of this multiplicity of parties and instability of governments are too various and fundamental to be cured by a change in the electoral system alone.[1] Unlike Great Britain, France has no long tradition of parties organized on a national scale with strong central and local executives. Political organizations in the constituencies still often owe but a loose allegiance to the national party. Deputies, while nominally returned with a party label, have been, and to a large extent still are, more susceptible to public opinion within their constituencies than responsive to the policy of their party chiefs. Moreover, though elections might be fought by candidates under the aegis of the various parties, it has always been the case that Parliamentary groups representing shades of opinion within the national parties were formed in the Chamber after the elections. Candidates who climbed on the band-wagon of a party in an election did not consider themselves necessarily pledged to support that party if they were successful.

This inevitably affected the stability of administrations. They were composed of representatives (not always the leaders) of various groups, and sometimes were headed by politicians less influential in one way or another than many of their colleagues. Such administrations were liable to disintegrate rapidly because of the independence of individual deputies, the criticism of other groups, and the friction within their own ranks.

Moreover, for Parliamentary reasons the power of the Chamber was great enough to exert a disruptive influence upon the executive. The Parliamentary groups formed the Committees of the Chamber, and it was these Committees (cabinets in minature) that were largely responsible for the fate of legislation, government or private, in the House. The order of business in the Chamber was decided, not by the government, but by the leaders of the groups; deputies had wide powers through interpellations to raise questions of policy, and they had great latitude in promoting or impeding legislation.

Another important fact to be considered is that the defeat of a

[1] See Dorothy M. Pickles, *The French Political Scene* (Nelson, 1938), pp. 39 ff.

French Government is not normally followed by a dissolution. A group or combination of deputies can, therefore, bring about the fall of a government without involving themselves in the expense of a new election or the risk of losing their seats. It is true that, under the Constitution of the Third Republic, a limited power of dissolution was possessed by the Administration. The President of the Republic could dissolve the Chamber on the advice of his Ministers and with the consent of the Senate. This right, however, was exercised but once, in 1877, in circumstances that created a prejudice against dissolutions.[1] Under the Fourth Republic, the Council of Ministers can dissolve the Assembly when defeated on a motion of confidence or of censure, but only if two cabinets have been thus defeated within a period of eighteen months (excluding the first eighteen months of the Assembly's life.)

EXPERIENCE UNDER PARTY LIST SYSTEMS

In considering the several countries using the list system, it has been seen that proportional representation does not lead to an inordinate multiplicity of parties or to unstable government. In no country previously free from them have these disadvantages developed through changing to a proportional system. Countries that have used proportional representation continuously over long periods include the most stable democracies of Europe—Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries and Finland (also Czechoslovakia during her independence). In those countries, the system did indeed encourage the rise of one or two additional parties, but these represented emerging sections of public opinion. They took their place in the Parliamentary sphere, and often as elements of the administration, to the general advantage of the nation.

In certain other countries, such as Italy and France, it has been shown that the introduction of proportional representation was not responsible for the large number of parties and political instability; these conditions had already existed under the discarded majority system. As a corollary to a denial that proportional representation leads to numerous parties and unstable governments, it is clear that a majority system fails to prevent

[1] This dissolution appeared to the public as a move to override their elected representatives and seize power for President MacMahon and the Monarchists.

them either; it does not always crystallize public opinion within a few national parties, one of which is sufficiently powerful to support for any length of time a strong administration. This is amply illustrated by an examination of the political history of France and Holland in particular.

Proportional representation has removed from the political life of certain nations disadvantages which a majority system was imposing, to the detriment of their well-being. In Switzerland and Belgium especially, it has been shown that the suppression of minority representation was creating serious internal dissension; those countries are certainly more united as a consequence of having adopted proportional systems.

Two of the most successful democracies (Switzerland and Finland) have gone further than others in modifying the party list system so as to give the voter, rather than the party, power to elect the individual he wishes to act as his representative. This is an advantage, for a body elected under a proportional system of voting (whether the party list or the more elastic single transferable vote) may call for a degree of toleration between groups which may not be demanded by a majority system. The more the voters are allowed to show that there are gradations of opinion within each party, and that people in one party have affinities with people in others, the less sharp and bitter are likely to be the divisions within the nation, and the better are the prospects for co-operation of its component elements, for the give and take which is required if no one party is in a position to dictate. Moreover, the greater the degree of choice among candidates of any one party, the less need there is to form a new party for the promotion of a particular point of view.

The single transferable vote gives more freedom to the voter to choose his representative than is possible under any list system. The next chapter is devoted to an examination of experience in countries using this method.

CHAPTER X

Experience under Proportional Representation—II

The Single Transferable Vote

'The King is to be advised . . . by his Parliament, in whom—as much as man is capable of—he hears all his people, as it were, at once advising him.'—FAIRFAX, 1645.

When the Royal Commission appointed in December 1908 met to consider possible changes in the British electoral system, only a small part of the electoral experience discussed in the last chapter existed for its guidance. Regarding the single transferable vote (with which, much more than with list systems, the Commission was concerned), evidence was still more meagre—in fact almost non-existent. Although the pros and cons of the system had been discussed ever since the pioneer work of Hare, Hill and others half a century before, the theoretical arguments advanced had not then been put to the actual test of use by a wide electorate until the year following the Commission's appointment. The Danish Upper House had indeed been elected indirectly by the single transferable vote since 1855, but the only direct elections whose results were available to the Commission were a few for municipal Councils and one Parliamentary election—the first for the Tasmanian House of Assembly.

A few years later the Speaker's Conference, which led to the Representation of the People Bill of 1917, had little more evidence available to it, and its unanimous recommendation of P.R.[1] in Boroughs with three or more members—as against the Commission's support for the alternative vote—was presumably

[1] Throughout this chapter, the term 'P.R.' will be used as synonymous with 'proportional representation by the single transferable vote'.

still based on theoretical arguments. The first vote on P.R. during the passage of the Representation of the People Bill, 1917, was on an amendment instructing the Boundary Commissioners to act on the supposition that P.R. would not be introduced. The voting was:

	For P.R.	*Against P.R.*
Liberals	76	53
Conservatives	38	84
Labour	13	10
Irish Nationalists	14	1
	141	148*

* *Hansard* records "Ayes 149", but lists only 148 names.

All that remained of the Speaker's Conference recommendation for P.R. was its use for the election of University members. Before considering this limited test of the system it may be interesting to note the apparent inconsistency of the British Parliament in agreeing to its use in Ireland, Malta, Gibraltar and other territories under its control while refusing its use in local and Parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom.

One reason has no doubt been a natural reluctance to experiment with a comparatively untried system. Experience of its practical effects was, however, becoming available and little attention was paid to this. It may be significant that when in 1918 the proposal was only narrowly defeated in the House of Commons it was on a free vote, whilst in 1948, when the Liberal Party divided the House on the second reading of the Representation Bill on the same issue, they were supported by two Independent members only. The Party whips were on, and members voted to order.

The truth seems to be that opinion on the issue had hardened during this period on purely party lines, and that political opportunism had obscured a subject which calls for disinterested thought and discussion. When the question of electoral reform has been discussed in Parliament, particularly from 1918 onwards, accusations have constantly been made of 'deals' between the parties.[1] The Liberal Party has always shown the greatest interest in the subject, and in more recent years this concern on grounds of principle has been reinforced by obvious motives of advantage. The two larger parties, on the other hand, have

[1] Cf. D. E. Butler, *The Electoral System of Britain*, p. 83.

both in turn profited from the gamble of the existing system. This motive of self-interest, added to a belief that the two-party system is best for the country as a whole, has led them to oppose any change in the method of voting. Party discipline has been invoked for this purpose, and there has been official discouragement of any serious discussion, resulting in widespread ignorance of even the most elementary facts.

THE UNIVERSITY MEMBERS

Whilst the countries of Continental Europe have nearly all adopted the party list system of Proportional Representation, English-speaking countries, when they have made any change, have invariably preferred the more flexible single transferable vote. The first trial of the system in Britain which we shall notice is that for some of the University members from 1918 to 1945. The Representation of the People Act 1918 applied the single transferable vote to University constituencies returning more than one member, viz.:—

Oxford	2 Members	Combined English	2 Members
Cambridge	2 „	Scottish	3 „
Dublin	2 „	(in 1918 election only)	

It will be apparent that no sufficient test of the system was provided by its application to these few constituencies, which differed in their electorate and their electioneering conditions from most constituencies, and which were moreover too small to provide fair representation of the political parties. In a two-member constituency contested by two parties, one of which is approximately twice as strong as the other, the result must be either that they obtain equal representation (if the smaller party polls just over half the votes of the larger) or that the larger party wins both seats (if the smaller polls just under the half of its votes). Any third party is, of course, excluded. Thus, we find, for instance, that the substantial Labour minorities in the Universities never obtained a seat, and that, of the two parties that contested all four constituencies in 1929, the Conservatives got 7 seats with 39,766 first preference votes and the Liberals only one seat for 15,305 votes—because they fell a little short of one-third of the total votes in each of the two-member constituencies. This, however, by no means implies

that the introduction of P.R. in 1918 was of little consequence to the representation of the Universities. Its effects can best be judged by comparing conditions before and after 1918 in the two constituencies that, already existing at that date, merely had their voting systems changed.[1] The following is a summary of general election results in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge since 1885:

	Oxford		*Cambridge*	
1885	uncontested	2 Cons.	uncontested	2 Cons.
1886				
1892				
1895				
1900				
1906			1 seat contested	2 Cons.
1910 (Jan.)			uncontested	2 Cons.
1910 (Dec.)				
1918	contested	2 Cons.	contested	2 Cons.
1922				1 Cons., 1 Ind.
1923				2 Cons.
1924				
1929				
1931	uncontested	2 Cons.	uncontested	2 Cons.
1935	contested	1 Cons., 1 Ind.	contested	2 Cons.
1945		2 Ind.		1 Cons., 1 Ind.

One major change is obvious—that with the introduction of P.R. it became the rule, instead of the exception, for elections to be contested. Evidently the non-Conservative elements, though still greatly in the minority, no longer felt their position so hopeless that it was not worth while to fight.[2]

It will also be seen that Independent candidates have secured election, particularly towards the end of the P.R. period. It may be argued that this was due, at least in part, to an increasing feeling that a University M.P. ought to be a non-party man or woman. But such a feeling would not have sufficed to secure the

[1] Besides the introduction of P.R. (and the enfranchisement of women over 30, which applied to all constituencies), there were changes in the regulations governing the registration of graduates as Parliamentary electors. These changes, however, had very little immediate effect on the composition of the university electorates.

[2] It should be noted that the only contest in the period before 1918 was among three Conservative candidates. We thus have no means of telling whether the proportion of non-Conservatives did or did not increase after the 1914–18 war.

election of Independents if the old voting system had been retained. The figures for the election of the first Independent were:

Cambridge University, 1922

Rawlinson	(Cons.)	4,192	
Butler	(Ind.)	3,453	
Sorley	(Cons.)	1,018	
Total		8,663	Quota 2,888

Only one count was necessary, as Rawlinson and Butler each had over one quota of first preferences. The total Conservative vote was 5,210. Therefore, if each elector had had two votes, as before 1918, Rawlinson and Sorley must each have got about 5,000 votes (plus some from supporters of the Independent who chose to use their second vote for one of the Conservatives), and must both have been elected. Butler, though still having exactly the same 3,453 supporters, would have failed. Similarly, A. P. Herbert, Oxford's first Independent member, would have failed in 1935 under the old system.[1]

The Independents elected for University seats between 1918 and 1945 would almost certainly never have been elected at all for any other constituency, unless they had been prepared to abandon that very independence for which, very largely, they were valued. Of the nine members elected by the four P.R. constituencies in 1945, six were Independents.[2] Among these, Eleanor Rathbone had previously stood for a division of Liverpool (of which she was a distinguished citizen) and failed, though polling almost exactly the same proportion of the total votes as that which secured her election for the Combined English Universities in 1929. It does therefore appear that the use of P.R. in the University elections did promote a readiness on the part of distinguished men and women to contest elections although not committed to the dominant party, and also the return of members of the type that defenders of the University franchise consider it ought to return.

THE SCOTTISH EDUCATION AUTHORITIES

The only other public election to which P.R. has been applied in Great Britain is that of the Scottish Education Authorities

[1] See *The Ayes Have It*, ch. ii.

[2] Sir Arthur Salter, Sir Alan Herbert, H. Wilson Harris, Eleanor Rathbone, Kenneth Lindsay, and Sir John Boyd Orr.

from 1919 to 1928, after which they ceased to be elected separately. In these elections, the divisions were mainly on religious rather than party questions, and the various bodies of religious opinion did obtain fair representation, as these typical results show:

EDINBURGH EDUCATION AUTHORITY, 1925

Party	*Votes*	*Seats obtained*	*Seats in proportion to votes*
Church Joint Committee	28,028	22	21·1
Roman Catholics	6,272	6	4·7
Labour	4,680	2	3·5
Independent	4,338	3	3·3
Protestant League	1,929	1	1·4
Total	45,247	34	34·0

GLASGOW EDUCATION AUTHORITY, 1928

Moderate	146,784	30	29·5
Roman Catholic	52,551	11	10·5
Labour	23,751	4	4·8
Communist	1,137	0	0·2
Total	224,223	45	45·0

It will surely be agreed that, for example, it is both just and, in the long run, conducive to harmony, that both Protestants and Roman Catholics should be fairly represented on a body exercising control over their own schools. Under a majority system it can be regarded as certain that the Roman Catholic minority would have had no representative in Edinburgh, and in Glasgow only such few members as might have been elected from any district having a Roman Catholic majority.

The Returning Officer at Glasgow gave a decided affirmative answer to each of four questions addressed to him by John H. Humphreys. The official regulations, he found, gave quite sufficient guidance to those conducting the election, and left practically no room for chance in the determination of the result. Fair representation was obtained, and this had a favourable influence on the working of the Education Authority, which he described as 'well-balanced, and showing by its actions that it had in view the interests of the whole electorate'. This returning officer had no experience of counting for Parlia-

mentary elections, but saw no reason to expect that any difficulty would arise in applying the same regulations on that scale.

THE CHURCH ASSEMBLY

Reflection of different shades of religious opinion is apparent also in the elections of the Church Assembly, in which P.R. has been used since 1920 for electing members of the House of Laity, and since 1921 also for the election, by the clergy of each diocese, of the Proctors of the Lower Houses of Convocation of Canterbury and York.

Experience of these elections over the first nine years was summarized[1] by Prebendary E. D. Merritt, who had been present at the counting of the votes on six out of the seven[2] occasions. He considered the elections to have been most satisfactory, giving fair representation to every school of thought in proportion to its voting strength. The London clergy could be classified in four groups, and in that diocese the five proctorial elections had given the following results:

	1921		*1922*		*1924*		*1925*		*1929*	
	votes	*seats*	*votes*	*seats*	*votes*	*seats*	*votes*	*seats*	*votes*	*seats*
Anglo-Catholic	473	7	399	6	379	5	366	6	359	5
Central	284	2	176	3	210	3	172	3	210	3
Evangelical	151	2	214	3	251	4	233	3	186	2
Independent	50	1	96	1	82	1	95	1	144	2
Totals	958	12	885	13	922	13	866	13	899	12

For the first three groups, ignoring the Independents, the numbers of first preferences per seat won were as follows:

	1921	*1922*	*1924*	*1925*	*1929*
Anglo-Catholic	68	67	76	61	72
Central	142	59	70	57	70
Evangelical	76	71	63	78	93

[1] In a letter to the *Guardian*, 1929.

[2] Five general elections of the House of Clergy (proctors) and two of the House of Laity. A proctorial election takes place after every Parliamentary general election.

In the first election, voting did not follow party lines so strictly as it usually has done since.

Twenty years later, Prebendary Merritt said:[1] 'I do not know who it was who secured the insertion of this system in the constitution, but I always think his statue should stand in Dean's Yard and be inscribed "The saviour of the Church of England".'

Naturally enough this opinion is not universally shared—there have been from time to time complaints that either voters or returning officers fail to understand the system[2]—but the general attitude can be gauged from a debate of the Assembly on the 11 February 1926, when a proposal to substitute the block vote was withdrawn in the face of overwhelming opposition. In February 1953, a proposal to elect the House of Laity by a modified form of the block vote (allowing cumulation of two votes on one candidate) was heavily defeated.

TASMANIA

In 1896, the Tasmanian Attorney-General, A. I. Clark[3] secured the use by the two Tasmanian towns of Hobart and Launceston of proportional representation by the single transferable vote for electing their town councils and also their representatives to the Lower House of the Tasmanian Parliament. This lasted only a few years, owing to dissatisfaction, not with P.R. itself, but with the use of two different systems in town and country at the same time. It was followed in 1907 by a new Electoral Act under which all the members of the House of Assembly were elected by P.R. in five constituencies, each returning six members. This has remained in force ever since, two attempts to replace it having been defeated (the first largely through the evidence given by John H. Humphreys before a

[1] *Church Times*, 19 August 1949.

[2] Another objection (raised by Major Birchell in the Church Assembly debates of 1926) has been that it is wrong for a very small quota of people to be able to elect a representative. But if, for example, 88 people elect a committee of 10, it is an inescapable arithmetical fact that their representation is at the rate of one member for every 9 electors; this cannot be changed except by altering the size of the committee. What is achieved by P.R., with its quota of 9 in this instance, is that *every* 9 voters elect one representative and only one; under a majority system, one group of 9 would probably elect several representatives and another group none.

[3] The inventor of the now standard method of distributing a surplus—see p. 108.

Select Committee of the Tasmanian Parliament). In 1914, the Select Committee and the House rejected a government proposal to substitute a party list system, and the attempt of a later government (1932) to return to single-member constituencies was also defeated.

Of late years, the party in office has complained against the return of an even number of members from each constituency, which (where there are only two parties besides Independents) tends to make the balance of parties in the House even closer than it is in the country. Tasmanian governments are not free from the desire to have things made easy for them by a large majority, and their attempts to escape from what they find an inconvenient division of opinion among the electors have sometimes led them into unnecessary general elections.

This even balance of parties is the result of a development opposite to that which opponents of P.R. predict: the consolidation of a large number of small groups into only two parties. Professor Nanson, writing just after the first P.R. election,[1] spoke of the new system as a complete success although it had 'stood a severe test, for never before in the history of Tasmania had there been so many parties and factions. Yet the result of the election is the rejection of all candidates save Labour men and anti-Socialists'—the latter being a cohesive party within which various shades of opinion were represented. The same division has endured to this day, variations of opinion finding sufficient satisfaction in voters' freedom to discriminate among candidates of the same party and in the return of an occasional Independent. A noteworthy instance of the latter is R. C. Townley, who resigned from the Labour Party a few months before the 1946 election, stood again as an Independent and was elected on the first count with 8,247 votes—over twice the quota and 2,445 votes more than any other candidate in the State. This is a clear case of the voters' being enabled by the single transferable vote to make their wishes prevail over those of a party machine. It also shows that a strong personality is not prevented from making itself felt by the size of the constituency—the average area of a Tasmanian constituency is equal to that of the two English counties of Devon and Somerset together.

[1] The Melbourne *Age*, 8 May 1909.

Results of the Tasmanian elections are given in appendi
and other aspects of them were referred to on pages 138, 1
Further details are readily obtainable from the excellent rep
on General Elections issued periodically by the Tasman
government.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA: THE SENATE

Australia as a whole has been much inclined to elect
experiments, and as early as 1862 a Bill for proportional re
sentation on the lines proposed by Hare passed both Ho
of the New South Wales Parliament but failed to become
owing to the resignation of the government. Agitation for I
bore no more fruit in legislation until 1918; the Bill then pa
included the compulsory recording of a preference for e
candidate, with the result that the election of 1920 sho
excessive numbers of spoilt papers, abstentions and obv
cases of alphabetical voting. The Labour Party, which led
opposition to P.R. after the 1920 election, repealed the Ac
soon as it won a clear majority (1925). P.R. has, however, c
tinued to be used for the indirect election of the New Sc
Wales Senate since 1933.

In 1949, an increase in the size of the Australian Senate
made the occasion for altering its system of election from
alternative vote in multi-member constituencies to P.R.
rather sudden change of front on the part of the governm
which might be accounted for by the virtual certainty that ur
the old system the government party would have failed to
one seat. Under P.R., while losing some votes as expe
(dropping from 52 per cent to 45 per cent), it retained just
its fair share of Senate seats then being filled. In the Hous
Representatives, however, still elected by the alternative
in single-member constituencies, Labour lost heavily.

The result was that the Liberal-Country Party coalition
a large majority in the lower House, though it was in a minc
in the Senate because eighteen Senators were not due for
election and of these (elected under the old system) fifteen
Labour. This led the Prime Minister to ask for a double
solution, and the election for a complete new Parliament g
him a majority in both Houses.

[1] P. 244.

Although the Australian Senate now reflects faithfully the support of the various parties among the electorate, it does not yet reflect the voters' opinions of the individual candidates—except in Tasmania. The parties have urged their voters to number their candidates in a particular order, and, outside Tasmania, this injunction has so far been obeyed. In Tasmania, however, no attempt has been made to impose such restriction on their freedom.

	Senate (P.R.)		*House of Representatives (A.V.)*	
	% *votes*	*Seats*	% *votes*	*Seats*
1949				
Liberal-Country Party	50·5	21	50·3	74
Labour	45·0	21	46·0	47
Others	4·5	0	3·7	0
1951				
Liberal-Country Party	49·7	32	50·3	69
Labour	45·9	28	47·6	52
Communists	2·1	0	1·0	0
Independents	2·3	0	1·1	0

It is unfortunate that Australia has again adopted, for her Senate elections, the superfluous rule that every candidate must be numbered.[1] This serves no useful purpose and merely tends to discredit the system, owing to the excessive number of invalid papers it produces. In 1951, the number of spoilt papers was 7 per cent of the total poll—a figure about six times as high as in Eire.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The first large-scale application of P.R. in Tasmania began, as several others have done, with local government elections. Much can be said in favour of such a beginning, for the two objections that (rightly or wrongly) carry most weight against P.R. for Parliamentary elections have little or no relevance to municipal elections. First, there is usually no occasion to enlarge the constituency, for in the United Kingdom nearly every ward already elects at least three councillors. Secondly, instead of there being a prejudice in favour of 'strong' government by one party with a large majority, there is often a reaction against party in

[1] See p. 128.

local government and in favour of having as councillors the most suitable men and women regardless of party.

In other British Dominions (New Zealand, Canada, South Africa and at the end of 1953 in New South Wales, Australia) and in the United States of America, P.R. has been adopted for a number of local government elections.[1] Among the more interesting of these applications to local government are some in Canada—Edmonton for Provincial elections, and Calgary and Winnipeg for Provincial and City Council elections. It has already been pointed out[2] that, in the country constituencies of Alberta, the alternative vote gave every seat in the 1948 election to the party polling not much over half the votes.[3] Ten seats in its Provincial Parliament are, however, filled by P.R. in the two five-member constituencies formed by the towns of Calgary and Edmonton, and there is a great contrast between the results under the two systems.

ALBERTA, 1948

	Social Credit	*C.C.F.*	*Liberal*	*Others*	
Country constituencies (alternative vote):					
Votes	122,665	43,127	39,046	6,891	
Seats	46	0	0	1	(Ind. Soc. Cred.)
Calgary and Edmonton (P.R.):					
Votes	41,527	13,260	16,695	13,769	
Seats	5	2	2	1	

But for P.R., Alberta's 1948 Parliament would probably have been entirely without an Opposition.

As in some of the European countries discussed earlier, the demand for proportional representation in Winnipeg arose out of dangerous antagonisms between different sections of the population. According to the account given by Hoag and Hallett,[4] a general strike in 1919 left much bitterness. The first municipal election after the strike resulted in a deadlock between the forces of labour and their opponents organized in a Citizens' Association. There was general agreement that the ward boundaries were unsatisfactory, but no agreement on their revision seemed possible until it was suggested that single-

[1] See Appendix i, pp. 238–9.
[2] P. 59.
[3] Results of other Alberta elections have differed from this only in degree.
[4] *Proportional Representation*, p. 229.

member districts should be abolished and P.R. used to ensure fair treatment to both sides. By a majority of two, the Winnipeg City Council voted to divide the city into three wards, each electing three members annually by P.R. Those who voted against this measure wanted a still fairer plan making the whole city one constituency.

In the spring of 1920, the Provincial Legislature, also anxious to reduce class antagonism, passed without a dissenting voice a Bill providing that Winnipeg's ten members of the Legislature should be elected from the city at large by P.R. The first election under the Act was held in June 1920. It resulted in the return of four Labour members, four Liberals and two Conservatives. Prominent leaders of all three parties expressed their satisfaction and the electors appear to have remained satisfied with their electoral system.

A recent Provincial election in Winnipeg (1948) has been analysed in great detail by the Secretary of the Proportional Representation Society, John Fitzgerald, with results similar to those found for the Cork election.[1] There being ten seats (for which 20 candidates competed), the accuracy of party representation was high:

	Candidates	*1st pref. votes*	*Seats obtained*	*Seats in proportion to votes*
C.C.F. (Labour)	6	29,872	4	3·8
Coalition Liberal	5	23,216	3	2·9
Coalition Cons.	4	10,226	1	1·3
Independent	1	8,309	1	1·0
Communist	2	6,953	1	0·9
Social Credit	1	635	0	0·075
Socialist	1	222	0	0·025
Total	20	79,433	10	10·0

Within each party, the degree of discrimination exercised by the voters between candidates was also marked (and bore no relation to alphabetical order), the variation in the case of the largest party being from 11,237 first preferences for its most popular candidate down to 1,796 for its least popular. The elected candidates of each party were those thus shown to be preferred by the voters.

[1] See pp. 110–11 ff.

Analysis of all the transfers shows that about 90 per cent of the voters voted on party lines. There were also many transfers between Coalition Liberal and Coalition Conservative candidates, illustrating again how the single transferable vote enables voters of different parties who have some affinity to support a common cause without sacrificing their parties' identity.

There is, however, a curious and significant exception. When one of the two Communist candidates was eliminated, only 61 per cent of his votes went to the other Communist; well over one-quarter of his supporters preferred Labour candidates to his party colleague. This behaviour on the part of the voters illustrates clearly how the single transferable vote renders it difficult for a party—even one with so high a reputation for discipline as the Communist Party—to impose its will rigidly on its sympathizers in the electorate.

In Australia, the use of P.R. for local government elections was long confined to the town of Armidale[1], but in 1953 it was made general in New South Wales for all local elections involving more than two seats (the alternative vote) applying to the rest). This reform came suddenly and appears to have been due to some particularly unrepresentative results under the old system, coupled with allegations of corruption in the Sydney City Council and elsewhere. Unfortunately, the common Australian rule requiring the compulsory marking of a large number of preferences was again adopted, giving rise to an unnecessarily large number of invalid papers.

In the U.S.A. there have been a number of instances of P.R. having been given up after some years of trial in municipal elections. This does not necessarily imply its failure in practice; it may indeed have succeeded too well. Many Americans will admit that local government in their country has too often fallen into the hands of a corrupt clique. In some states party organization is very highly developed, and the party boss has acquired a power unknown in Britain. Changes in a town's electoral system are effected by referendum, and P.R. has in many cases been adopted by popular vote with the declared purpose of cleaning up corruption. In these circumstances, it is

[1] Under an Act of 1919, a poll on changing the voting system could be taken on the petition of one-fifth of the voters. This number of signatures was obtained in Armidale before the widening of the franchise made the task impracticable.

not surprising that those whose vested interests have been attacked in this way have taken the first opportunity to condemn and throw out a voting system which gives such freedom to the ordinary elector. So we find that of the twenty or so American municipalities which have adopted P.R., about half have since reverted to majority systems. In the successful campaign for the repeal of P.R. in New York (after unsuccessful attempts in 1938 and 1940), advocates of repeal had on their side Tammany Hall (which spent $35,000 on the campaign against the Keep Proportional Representation Committee's $4,000) and the bulk of the press.[1] Another very important factor operated in favour of repeal in 1947—the presence on the City Council of two Communists. Undoubtedly, so small a minority (the Communists polled 7 per cent of first preferences and won 7 per cent of the seats) would have had no chance under a majority system, and in the violently anti-Communist atmosphere of 1947 it was easy to represent P.R. as a dangerous device promoted in the interests of the party which by that time was so much feared. This same anti-Communist feeling, however, makes it probable that no Communist would have been re-elected to the council had the next election still been held under P.R. It must be remembered that the previous election was in November 1945, when feelings on that subject were very different. In fact, in the first election after repeal (November 1949[2]) the Communists ran only one candidate, whose votes amounted to only about one-quarter of what would have been needed to return him under P.R. Whilst the votes cast for the other parties differed little from those of previous years, the Communist vote fell to a negligible figure. These circumstances indicate that a popular vote for repeal, in New York or in any other city with similar conditions, is *by itself* no proof that P.R. failed to satisfy the citizens' requirements. To probe such a question, a great deal more evidence would be necessary.[3]

[1] On the other hand, opponents of P.R. maintain that previous popular votes in its favour were due simply to inadequate presentation of the case against it *Democracy or Anarchy?*, p. 396.

[2] Elections were held every second year until 1945, every fourth year after that.

[3] Such evidence for P.R. is to be found mainly in the *National Municipal Review*: in the article *The Repeal of P.R. in New York City—Ten Years in Retrospect* (Zeller and Bone, *American Political Science Review*, December 1948, p. 1127); and in *The Government of Cincinnati, 1924–1944* (Report to the Wilder Foundation by T. H. and D. D Reed). On the other side we have Professor Hermens, *Democracy or Anarchy?*, pp 359–419.

It is impossible to deny that all the city councils elected b P.R. have reflected the party opinions of the voters much more faithfully than those elected by majority systems. The immediate effect of the return to majority election in New York was to restore the near-monopoly by the Democrats, that party winning 24 out of the 25 seats for 52·6 per cent of the votes cast.

Professor Hermens does not attempt to deny that New York City was much better governed by the time P.R. was repealed in 1947 than it had been under the majority system ten years earlier, nor that the same is true of every other city using P.R. What he does argue is that the improvement occurred not because of P.R. but in spite of it—that the improvement was due to the adoption at the same time of other reforms, especially of the 'manager system' which places responsibility for day-to-day administration in the hands of a permanent official analogous to an English Town Clerk.[1] New York had the added advantages of a Mayor and a District Attorney (La Guardia and Dewey) bringing exceptional determination and ability to the task of 'cleaning up' the city. Obviously those factors must count, and it will be difficult to disentangle their several effects.

The extent to which P.R. may have improved American local government must therefore still be a matter for argument; what is certain is that not even so determined an opponent as Professor Hermens has been able to find any instance in which the alleged evil effects of P.R. have outweighed the advantages of the manager system, or any instance in which its repeal has enabled the manager system to work better. In the absence of such instances, it is difficult to see on what grounds of public interest it is possible to prefer to P.R. a system that excludes from a share in their community's government men and women who do not happen to belong to the largest party.

BRITISH DEPENDENCIES

As already mentioned, British governments disinclined to reform of the electoral system at home have nevertheless accepted the principles of P.R. for overseas territories under their control. The reasons for so doing have been particularly strong where racial or religious minorities needed to be protected; hence the recommendation by the Simon Commission

[1] See for instance *Democracy or Anarchy?* p. 376.

that P.R. should be used in India and Burma. The system is especially valuable in such circumstances because it enables political parties to develop across the racial or religious divisions, not confining anyone to voting within his own community and encouraging the voter to notice that there are people of similar opinions in other communities. The difficulties associated with illiteracy have, however, caused the system to be limited in India and Burma to indirect elections.[1]

In Malta, on the other hand, the constitution of 1921 prescribed the single transferable vote for an electorate containing many illiterates. For the Senate (elected by two constituencies returning respectively four and three members), only those able to read and write could vote, but for the Legislative Assembly (eight four-member constituencies) electors had to satisfy either a literacy or a property qualification. As already mentioned,[2] the mechanics of the election presented no difficulty, and the political results appear to have been equally satisfactory. It may be argued that the suspension of the Constitution between 1930 and 1932, and from 1933 until after the war, implies the contrary, but such was not the opinion of those responsible. The reasons given for the suspensions were excessive clerical and Italian influence. When, during the period of Malta's reversion to Crown Colony status, elections were restored for ten members of the Council of Government, those elections were by the single transferable vote in two five-member constituencies. A Royal Commission appointed in 1931 reported that there were no proposals for a change in the voting system but that the system was 'fully understood by the voters and much appreciated by them'. Leading members of different political parties testified to the same effect, the leader of the Constitutional Party (Lord Strickland) describing P.R. as 'excellent' and 'the only system possible', and the leader of the Labour Party (Dr. Boffa) demanding that it should be a reserved subject in the Constitution. It was embodied in the new Constitution of 1947, the single Chamber being elected in eight five-member divisions. for a three-year term. Four elections have been held under this constitution, in 1947, 1950, 1951 and 1953. Voting is overwhelmingly on party lines (with marked discrimination between candidates within the parties), but party politics are

[1] See p. 147.
[2] P. 147.

more fluid than in most countries. Dominating the situation are the economic difficulties resulting, in part at least, from the war. The 1947 election gave Labour a clear majority, but in 1950 the party failed to agree on the need for a policy of reduced expenditure and split into two parts, the larger of which became the main opposition party while the smaller, the Workers' Party, has shown a disposition to co-operate with the Nationalists. The Nationalist Party formed a minority government after the 1950 election, and its policy, as opposed to that of the Labour Party, was in effect confirmed by the election of 1951, following which three members of the Workers' Party were included in the government. In 1953, both the largest parties gained at the expense of the small ones, Labour taking the lead again with 19 seats to the Nationalists' 18 and the Workers' Party being reduced to three seats. The coalition was maintained, with an increased proportion of Nationalist ministers. That the main division is between the Labour Party alone and the other parties in combination is shown by the result of the 1951 election, in which Labour, though polling a few votes more than the Nationalists (40,164 against 39,946), secured one seat fewer; it nevertheless won a number of seats corresponding exactly to its percentage poll. The explanation is that, while Labour was fighting in isolation, the Nationalists received support from outside their own ranks; Labour lost 177 votes by transfers to candidates of other parties, while the Nationalists made a net gain of 922 votes transferred from candidates of other parties. If the election could be regarded as a contest between the Labour Party and the rest, the result was exactly proportional. Further, the two wings of the Labour movement taken together obtained their proportional representation.[1]

In Gibraltar, adoption of P.R. for electing five members of the Legislative Council set up in 1950 was due to dissatisfaction with the working of the limited vote in the election of City Councillors. In filling the seven elective places on the City Council, each elector could exercise only four votes; nevertheless, in 1945, the largest party (the Association for the Advance-

[1] Some concern is expressed regarding the relatively high proportion of papers that become non-transferable (8·9 per cent in 1951). Although this could be sufficient to affect the last seat in each constituency, it has not so far given rise to any serious anomaly in the results.

ment of Civil Rights, or A.A.C.R.), by organizing a fairly even distribution of its votes among its seven candidates, secured all seven seats. Subsequent elections under the limited vote have aroused little interest; that of 1947 was uncontested.

The first P.R. election for the Legislative Council in 1950 gave the following result:

	No. of candidates	*1st pref. votes*	*Seats won*
A.A.C.R.	4	3,250	3
Independents of the Right	2	2,589	2
Independent Left of Centre	1	671	0
Labour	2	540	0

The poll was 53 per cent, compared with 71 per cent in the City Council election of 1945 and 35 per cent in that of 1950. Papers spoiled for reasons connected with the voting method went up from about 0·5 per cent in the City Council elections to 1·5 per cent, which, however, cannot be regarded as high in the first election by a new method, with about half the voters (the women) voting for the first time. There was very marked discrimination between one candidate and another of the same party. The returning officer and staff carried out the election without difficulty.

IRELAND

> 'It had to be this kind of a world before the Irish could drop out of sight as the most peaceful nation in it.'—Canadian newspaper, quoted by *Reader's Digest*, July 1951.

The most important applications of proportional representation by the single transferable vote have been in Ireland. That country's experience of the system illustrates very well how P.R. works—its effects on the party system, on the stability of governments, on the quality of M.P.s and on the influence exerted by the voters—and it is therefore worth detailed consideration.

The use of P.R. began in Ireland (as it did in Australia) with a local government election. The town of Sligo, under a very one-sided council on which the most heavily rated section of the citizens had never been able to obtain representation, ran into increasing financial difficulties and finally went bankrupt.

As a result there sprang into existence a vigorous Ratepayers' Association in which many members of the hitherto unrepresented minority took a prominent part. After much discussion, this Association and the Corporation agreed upon a Bill, the Sligo Corporation Bill, 1918, giving the Corporation unlimited powers on three conditions: (1) that there should be an early election, (2) that this election should be held under the proportional system, and (3) that the Irish Local Government Board should have power to intervene in the event of any failure in the administration. The Bill was duly promoted and became law without opposition, and Sligo became the first town in the United Kingdom to elect its council by P.R.

The election aroused unprecedented interest and there was a 73 per cent poll. In each of the three eight-member wards there were 16 candidates—Ratepayers' Association, Sinn Fein, Labour and Independents. The method of voting was explained at a town's meeting addressed by John H. Humphreys and by means of instructions on cinema screens and in the press; the proportion of papers spoiled through failure to understand the system was 1 per cent. For the most part, voters recorded a sufficient number of preferences (non-transferable papers in the West ward numbered 33 out of 940), and the parties made no attempt to impose on their supporters a particular order of preference. In every ward, representation was shared among the three parties and (in the two wards they contested) Independents, and in the West ward a member of both a religious and a political minority, the Protestant Unionist candidate, was elected on the first count with nearly twice as many votes as any other candidate.

SLIGO MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS (all wards)
Analysis of Party Results

Party	*First preferences*	*Seats in proportion to first preferences*	*Seats actually obtained*
Ratepayers' Association	823	8·94	8
Sinn Fein	674	7·33	7
Labour	432	4·70	5
Independents	279	3·03	4
Totals	2,208	24·00	24

A typical press comment was that of the *Sligo Champion* of the 18 January 1919:

'The system has justified its adoption. We saw it work; we saw its simplicity; we saw its unerring honesty to the voter all through; we saw the result in the final count; and we join in the general expression of those who followed it with an intelligent interest—it is as easy as the old way; it is a big improvement and it is absolutely fair.'

The press and various local authorities advocated the extension of the system to all local government elections; the government agreed, and the Local Government (Ireland) Act of 1919 followed. Elections under this Act took place in 1920.

DUBLIN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, 1920
(Representation in British Parliament: 7 Sinn Fein, no others)

Ward	*Unionist or Reform.*	*Ind.*	*Nationalist*	*Labour*	*Sinn Fein*	*Total*
Arran Quay	—	—	1	3	5	9
Clontarf	4	—	—	—	4	8
Fitzwilliam	3	—	—	1	5	9
Inns Quay	—	1	1	2	6	10
Merchants Quay	1	—	1	1	4	7
Mountjoy	—	1	2	—	4	7
New Kilmainham	1	—	1	2	5	9
North City	1	—	2	2	3	8
Wood Quay	—	—	1	2	3	6
Trinity	2	—	—	2	3	7
Totals	12	2	9	15	42	80

BELFAST MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, 1920
(Representation in British Parliament: 8 Unionists, 1 Nationalist)

Ward	*Official Unionist*	*Ind. (U. or Lab.)*	*Nationalist*	*Labour*	*Sinn Fein*	*Total*
Cromac	5	—	1	1	—	7
Duncairn	4	1 (*U.*)	1	1	—	7
Falls	1	—	2	1	2	6
Ormeau	4	—	—	2	—	6
Pottinger	4	—	—	1	1	6
St. Anne's	4	1 (*Lab.*)	—	1	—	6
Shankill	4	1 (*U.*)	—	2	1	8
Victoria	4	—	1	1	1	7
Woodvale	5	—	—	2	—	7
Totals	35	3	5	12	5	60

On these elections many contradictory opinions were expressed. The Unionists in the north were bitterly opposed to the system, and their expressed intention of abolishing it at the first opportunity led the British government to include in the Home Rule Bill a provision that no change was to be made for three years. Certain facts, however, are undeniable; one of these is that what are now the capital cities of the two parts of Ireland, Dublin and Belfast, were not made to appear, as they well might have done under a majority system, to be completely opposed. On the contrary, the results showed clearly that in each city, and in nearly every one of their wards, opinion on the question of union or independence was divided.

Encouraged by the local election results, the British government included in the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, a provision that the two Irish Parliaments set up under it should be elected by that same system, and specified constituencies that were to return from 3 to 8 members each. This was accepted by the Southern Irish, who later, of their own free will, incorporated P.R. in their own Constitution, but it was resisted by the Ulster Unionists, who secured a reversion to the British system of election at the earliest moment permitted by the Act.[1] In local government, Northern Ireland abolished P.R. in time for the 1924 elections; for the Northern Ireland House of Commons the majority system was used for the first time in 1929. The four members for Queen's University, Belfast, continued to be elected by P.R.

Since then, there has been endless controversy about the effect of this change and about the Unionists' motives in making it.[2] The Government's own defence of its action is singularly weak. All that it amounts to is an assertion that the abolition of P.R. has made no difference to the representation of the anti-Unionist minority, and the alleged proof of this thesis is usually confined to quoting figures for members in the successive Parliaments.

[1] Under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, no Bill to change the electoral system could be tabled until three years after the establishment of the Northern Ireland Parliament, i.e. in June 1924.

[2] The reader who wishes to form an opinion on the merits of the case should refer to the publications of the two sides, e.g. *Ulster is British* (Ulster Unionist Council, March 1949) and *One Vote Equals Two* (All-Party Anti-Partition Conference, 1949).

		Unionists	*Anti-Unionists*	*Others*	*Uncontested Seats*
P.R.	1921	40	12	–	0
	1925	37	12	3	8
Majority system	1929	40	12	–	22
	1933	40	12	–	33
	1938	41	11	–	21
	1945	37	13	2	20
	1949	40	12	–	20

These figures, however, are insufficient proof, because, for all the table shows to the contrary, the twelve anti-Unionist members may represent twice as many voters as did the twelve in 1925; it is most unusual for political opinion in any country to remain as static as these election results suggest. We can, of course, obtain totals of votes cast for the parties, and these also, admittedly, show no great change since 1925. But the number of uncontested seats has increased very greatly; hence the real strength of opinion on each side can only be estimated. No answer is given to the question: why does the Government refuse an electoral system under which the strength of majority and minority would be known with certainty and would be reflected with certainty in the Parliament? Whether the abolition of P.R. has or has not made any difference to the actual composition of the Parliament (or of local councils), it has certainly tended to embitter relations between Unionists and Nationalists.

In the South developments have been very different. Of this State, born in civil war, Canon Luce of Dublin was able to say eighteen years later,[1] 'P.R. has been a healing force in our midst. Old political feuds are dying; public spirit is replacing faction. . . . The voice of reason is heard and the gun is silent. . . . P.R. has been a unifying force, and unity is strength.'

These effects began to show themselves from the beginning, when, as already mentioned,[2] P.R. made it possible for the Irish people to express their opinion for or against acceptance of the Treaty with Britain. This first election took place in June 1922, in accordance with a provision in the Treaty that an election should be held as soon as possible after the signature, in

[1] *Irish Times*, 23 June 1938.
[2] P. 118.

order to give the Irish electors an opportunity of confirming the settlement. The leaders of the pro- and anti-Treaty elements, however, came to an agreement to avoid contests and nominated an agreed panel of candidates. Their Pact admitted the right of others to contest the election, but when considerable numbers of other candidates were in fact nominated, the signatories of the Pact, Michael Collins and de Valera, issued a manifesto against them. Under the old single-member system, this combination of the strength of the two main parties would have deterred most others from standing and would have ensured the defeat of any who did stand. As it turned out, 47 candidates outside the agreed panel were nominated, thus forcing a contest, not for 47 seats only, but in 47 constituencies covering three-quarters of the country. Once a contest was secured, the voters found themselves, not limited (as they would have been in a single-member constituency) to electing one Panel candidate, who might be pro- or anti-Treaty, but invited to select among several Panel candidates of varying opinions on the Treaty, in addition to non-Panel candidates. The very decided success of the pro-Treaty candidates (who got 68 per cent both of the votes and of the contested seats) made the wishes of the people clear beyond dispute.

Subsequent elections[1] have followed the more familiar party pattern, and have indeed disappointed the expectation of those who thought P.R. would make impossible party government on the British model.[2] It is true that no one party has ever had a large majority—sometimes no party has had any clear majority—and that party leaders have often been impatient of their position and inclined to resort too readily to a fresh election in an attempt to escape from it. Even so, there were only eight general elections from 1922 till the second world war, compared with Britain's six, and only one change of Prime Minister compared with six in Britain. No 'landslide' occurred in any election and no defeat of valued personalities; when Cosgrave's party lost the election in 1932, he and all his ministers kept their seats, and the same applied to de Valera and his colleagues on their party's defeat in 1948.

An illustration of the influence of a candidate's personal merits under the single transferable vote is found in the return

[1] See Appendix ii, p. 243–4.

[2] See Dr. Nicholas Mansergh, *The Irish Free State, its Government and Politics* (Allen & Unwin, 1934), p. 329.

of Independents already mentioned.[1] One of these was James Dillon, Minister of Agriculture in Costello's Government, one of the three members for Monaghan. He could hardly have hoped for election if Monaghan had been divided into three single-member constituencies. Had he secured the same proportion of the votes (which is unlikely, owing to people's fear of 'wasting their vote' on a candidate they believe to have little chance of winning), that could not have given him a majority over the Fianna Fail candidate. Fianna Fail (the largest party) polled 11,730 first preferences to Dillon's 6,621, which, if the votes were evenly spread, would have given Fianna Fail the victory by about 4,000 to 2,000 in any one of the three divisions. Even if the Independent's support had been largely concentrated in one district, his chance of overcoming this nearly two-to-one handicap would have been slender. He won because he had to obtain, not a *majority* of 4,000 or so in one-third of the county, but a *quota* of 7,154 in the whole county. This advantage more than makes up for any difficulty that a lone candidate may have in making himself known over the larger area.[2]

While leaders of all parties in Eire have repeatedly expressed their attachment to the electoral system, de Valera has from time to time shown signs of resenting the limitations placed on his power and envying the position of Baldwin in 1935 or Attlee in 1945. In 1934, his Government was responsible for an Act reducing the number of members per constituency to a maximum of five—thus reducing the chances of the smaller parties and increasing the margin by which the largest party's seats may exceed the strictly proportional number. Even so, the amount by which the results diverge from strict proportionality is very small compared with the anomalies of any majority system, and in no single instance has an election for even so few as three seats resulted in one party's capturing the whole representation.[3]

In the early stages of the 1948 election, de Valera threw out several hints that, if returned again, he would seek to abolish P.R.; nothing, however, was said about this in his later speeches,

[1] See p. 132.

[2] See also the re-election of Dr. Noel Browne in 1951, p. 129.

[3] There was in the 1948 Dail one constituency, Galway South, whose three Deputies all belonged to the Fianna Fail party. There, however, the contest was, in fact, for only two seats, the third being that of the Speaker, who, by law, is returned unopposed.

and one must infer that the proposal was not popular.[1] A theme consistently reiterated by him from beginning to end of the campaign was that the country must give his party a clear majority, otherwise chaos would ensue. As de Valera himself would not contemplate sharing power with anyone else, the only alternative to a Fianna Fail government was a coalition of the other parties. Those parties, he said, having nothing in common but dislike of him, could not combine to form a government, or, if they did succeed in the attempt, would not be able to maintain their collaboration for more than a few weeks. On the 9th February, when the result of the election was known except for the postponed contest in Carlow-Kilkenny, de Valera said in that constituency, 'a coalition Government, formed from five or six parties with their divergent views and conflicting programmes, and with a combined strength only equal to that of Fianna Fail, obviously could not last. Such a Government, if it should ever get down to serious work, would fly apart and we should be forced into another general election within a few months.'[2]

However, the next day the Labour and Clann na Poblachta leaders announced their readiness to join Fine Gael in an inter-party government. When the Dail met on the 19th February, John A. Costello was elected Taoiseach (Prime Minister) by 75 votes against 68 for de Valera, and he was immediately able to announce his Cabinet, including five Fine Gael Ministers, two Labour, one National Labour, two Clann na Poblachta, one Farmers' Party and one Independent. It should be noted that Costello was not the leader of Fine Gael at the time of the election. It seems at least probable that one reason for his selection for the difficult task of leading Ireland's first inter-party government was his evident popularity with the electors—he was the only Fine Gael candidate elected on the first count. Thus, thanks to a voting system that gives them a choice between personalities, the Irish people themselves appear to have had a hand in choosing their own Prime Minister.

The inter-party government remained in office for three and one-quarter years (just over the average life of a British Parliament in peacetime since 1918) without any change until

[1] Since that election, de Valera has expressly advocated P.R. as the means of electing a Parliament of all Ireland.

[2] *Irish Times*, 9 February 1948.

there was a minor reshuffle of three posts in March 1951. Not only was there no 'general election within a few months'; three years passed with no hint of one, no resignations, no crises—in short, Eire's lack of a majority for any one party placed her in less difficulty during those three years than the British government's small majority occasioned in as many weeks.

While opinions necessarily differ about the merits of any government, this Irish government appears for most of its life to have given unusual satisfaction to the majority of its people. The British government of 1945–50 boasted, with good reason, of its record in holding seats in by-elections; but the Irish government actually increased its poll in the Donegal West by-election.

This increase in popular support seems to be sufficient answer to the only substantial charge brought against the inter-party government—that of undue influence exerted by the small Clann na Poblachta. That party's leader, Sean MacBride, in supporting Costello's nomination as Taoiseach, said: 'Clann na Poblachta could not claim to have received a mandate from the people to repeal the External Relations Act. This would therefore remain in abeyance . . . on other matters he was prepared to co-operate with other parties in giving effect to those portions of their policy on which there was common agreement.'[1] The government did, however, repeal the External Relations Act in December 1948, and this has naturally been said to be a case of pressure exerted by a small party in a balancing position. Those concerned have, however, denied that any such pressure was exerted, and declare that the decision was taken freely by the Government as a whole. While no one outside the Cabinet can have absolute proof that this denial is true, there seems every reason for believing it—for if MacBride had been using his party's position to blackmail his Cabinet colleagues into a course they disliked, it is unlikely that he would have succeeded without some threats of resignation, some signs of dissension becoming known to the public. It is clear that the repeal was not resented by the electorate; if it had been they would not have turned out in increased numbers to vote in a by-election for the government responsible; some candidate

[1] *Irish Times*, 19 Feb. 1948.

with an anti-repeal programme would have appeared and would have polled well.[1]

The contrast between Eire and the United Kingdom when faced with similar Parliamentary situations is exactly what would be expected on theoretical grounds by advocates of the single transferable vote and opponents of a majority system. In Britain, after the close result of 1950, both Government and Opposition devoted more attention to the possibilities of a new election than to governing in accordance with the verdict of the last one. The Government Whips, in order to maintain their precarious majority, insisted on the attendance of every supporter. The Opposition watched for a chance for a snap division. Both were waiting for some small change in public opinion which might give a substantial majority to either, and were ready to gamble on this when the time came.

No such conditions existed in the Irish Dail. There also the government's majority was small, and, since it depended on several parties, one might expect it to have been even more precarious. Yet there was no feeling of recurrent anxiety. The factors already discussed on p. 155 (the certainty of election results and the improved opportunities for co-operation between parties) produced an atmosphere in which stable government could be carried on.

One important factor in assisting the formation and maintenance of this inter-party government is illustrated by the Donegal West by-election. The single transferable vote (even when used to fill a single vacancy) made unnecessary any arrangements between the parties and allowed two coalition candidates to stand without any danger of "splitting the vote". Had the vote not been transferable, the Fianna Fail candidate would have been elected on a minority vote. To avoid that, one of the Government candidates would have had to stand down in favour of the other, with all the attendant heartburning in the parties and restriction of the voters' choice. No such arrangements were necessary in Donegal: the Clann na Poblachta candidate could seek the voters' support for his

[1] It is true that in the Donegal West by-election the Clann na Poblachta lost votes as compared with the general election. Unfortunately there is no means of telling whether this was an expression of dissatisfaction with that party or a positive vote for the principle of coalition—the gain of votes having been made by the first man to stand avowedly as an inter-party candidate. In the general election of 1951, the Clann na Poblachta lost heavily; this appears to have been due mainly to a feeling that the party had served its purpose and was no longer needed.

particular point of view without in any way weakening the support which his party was giving to the government; the voters endorsed the coalition while at the same time indicating quite freely which of its components they preferred.

Far from creating the 'weak Executive and instability of government' which many authorities expected,[1] P.R. is making possible a new type of government. Senator J. G. Douglas[2] points out that 'considerably more responsibility must fall on Parliament under an inter-party system than under the party system of government, when most decisions are made outside the House and the main function of the Opposition is to criticize and oppose without any expectation that its action will affect the result in any but minor details', the latter position approaching that in totalitarian states, where Parliament is 'simply a machine for registering decisions made by the party that has succeeded in obtaining dictatorial powers'.

The success of an inter-party government will depend on the extent to which Parliament rises to this increased responsibility. In this respect there is a marked difference between Fianna Fail (the Opposition in that Dail) on the one hand and the remaining Irish parties on the other. De Valera has consistently stood for one-party government and refused to consider any sharing of power, and his party criticized the inter-party Government for not acting as though it were formed from one party only. The Government realized that an inter-party system of government could not succeed unless Deputies were allowed a considerable degree of freedom to make their own decisions on the merits of each proposal. Free votes became increasingly common. The difference in attitude was illustrated during the debate on an amendment to the Government's Transport Bill. While Government supporters spoke and voted according to their varied opinions of the amendment, the Opposition first sought to find out whether the Government favoured the amendment or not, and eventually voted as a party against it. There was no question of the Government's resignation; it simply accepted the decision of a majority of the Dail that its Bill would not be improved by the amendment. If the unco-operative attitude of the Opposition on that occasion were the general

[1] Mansergh, *The Irish Free State, its Government and Politics* (Allen & Unwin, 1934), p. 329.
[2] *Irish Times*, 22, 24 and 25 July, 1950.

attitude of all parties, then inter-party government would fail. Senator Douglas points out that a responsibility falls on the electors to choose those men and women who are prepared to co-operate. The Irish electors seem to have done this.

By the end of its third year, the inter-party government lost the support of some Independents. The main occasion of its seeking a dissolution was a dispute over the policy of the Minister of Health, Dr. Browne, who had taken steps that incurred the disapproval of the Roman Catholic Church. The Prime Minister took the side of the Church, and Dr. Browne resigned both from the Cabinet and from his own party, the Clann na Poblachta. It has already been pointed out that in a British general election it is impossible for the electors to express their opinion on such a matter except by treating it as the one question that determines their votes. It is also easy to imagine what would be the fate of a member of the British Cabinet (no matter how popular) who had quarrelled with his Prime Minister and left his party. The Irish election of 1951 offers a striking contrast on both these points. The movement of opinion as regards the parties was small[1] except in the case of the Clann na Poblachta, which lost votes heavily. The Opposition gained slightly in votes and won one more seat. The votes given to certain individuals, however, were strikingly different. In Dublin South West, Sean MacBride, leader of the Clann na Poblachta, dropped from 8,648 first preferences to 2,853. While in 1948 he topped the poll with a substantial surplus, in 1951 he only just secured re-election for the fifth seat with the help of votes transferred mainly from a Fine Gael candidate. In Dublin South East, on the other hand, Dr. Browne, now standing as an Independent, polled half as many votes again as his former party had polled there in 1948, and ran the retiring Prime Minister a close second (all three seats there were filled on the first count). The first three candidates in those two elections were as follows (a second Clann na Poblachta candidate in 1948 had 559 first preferences):

DUBLIN SOUTH EAST (FIRST COUNT)

		1948		*1951*
Costello	(Fine Gael)	8,473		9,222
MacEntee	(Fianna Fail)	7,371		8,334
Browne	(Clann na Poblachta)	4,917	(Ind.)	8,473
Quota		7,407		7,336

[1] See Appendix ii, p. 244.

Members who had supported Dr. Browne in the Dail also increased their polls. It seems perfectly clear that the weight of public opinion was on Dr. Browne's side.

It seems likely that there will be further developments in Eire in the nature of a realignment of parties, for Fianna Fail and Fine Gael differ little in policy and the distinction between them has become a little unreal. The flexibility of the single transferable vote should facilitate a development such as, for instance, the drawing together of the right wing of one party and the left wing of the other. The reunion of the Labour movement into one party took place in the 1951 election, which was not contested separately by National Labour.[1]

In Ireland, as in the Scandinavian countries, P.R. has developed a new attitude to government. When, as frequently happens, no one party or group of parties is in a position to put through the whole of its programme, Parliament may accept the government's guidance on some matters and reject it on others. The government will not feel it necessary to resign if the larger body fails to agree with them on every point. In Switzerland, constitutional conventions permit the citizens to reject legislative proposals by referendum without involving the Government's resignation.[2] When the constitution of the Irish Free State was being drafted, consideration was given to this feature of the Swiss Constitution,[3] and when for the first time the balance of parties necessitated a coalition the subject was revived. The success of proportional representation in Eire has inspired the suggestion by William Norton, leader of the Labour Party and a former Deputy Prime Minister, and Eamonn O'Neill, Fine Gael and ex-Deputy Speaker, that the Dail should elect the Cabinet itself by this method. This suggestion, whether it is ever adopted or not, shows how far P.R. has changed the temper of Irish political life.

[1] See p. 151.
[2] *Civic Training in Switzerland*, p. 115.
[3] See Nicholas Mansergh's *The Irish Free State, its Government and Politics*, p. 160.

CHAPTER XI

Conclusion

In our search for a voting system which will meet the requirements of a modern democracy, we have examined the mechanics of various electoral methods and the influence these have had upon the character of parliamentary institutions and of the government of the countries using them. We have seen that, if the nation is to exercise to the full its democratic right of choosing its rulers, the instrument, that is the electoral system, by which this choice is made, is of immense importance. Unfortunately there is a disposition among some politicians, often based it must be admitted on prejudice and ignorance, to rest satisfied with their institutions merely because they have acquired the sanctity of tradition, and to assume that they have reached a more or less final shape. Any modifications which are thought necessary are minor refinements designed to meet some need of the moment, and framed only too often by party politicians for their own advantage. But because universal suffrage has been attained in a particular country, it is not to be assumed that the electoral ideal has been achieved, or that the improvement of voting methods is a matter of merely academic interest. It would, of course, be rash to imply that the quality of statesmanship, the standard of debate and legislation, the political integrity of the legislature or the degree of public spirit shown by the electorate can be solely influenced by any particular voting method employed. But in any study of parliamentary democracy the effect of voting systems should certainly be taken into consideration and the question posed as to whether their influence is shaping institutions to the desired end.

There is of course no such thing as finality in political development, and the evolution of democratic government is still at an early stage. In recent years a wealth of experience has become available of the working of political institutions and the

influence of voting systems upon them. As a consequence there is a growing realization that the subject of electoral reform requires fundamental re-examination such as could best be given in Great Britain by a Royal Commission. We have endeavoured to show how certain cruder systems of voting, one of which is the British method for parliamentary elections, fail to secure the four commonly accepted chief aims of democratic government. In particular, representation of important minorities may be eliminated; there is no certainty even that the majority will rule; the voter's choice of representative is narrowly limited, and, finally, stability and continuity in government is in no way assured. Actual experience has shown that the first three of the accepted aims can be obtained by a well-designed proportional system. The fourth, effective and stable government, which many will think the most essential, cannot be guaranteed by any voting system alone, though its attainment may well be helped or hindered. It may be frustrated, even under the best planned institutions, by human frailty, by the short-sightedness of politicians or by the circumstances of the hour.

But the sound health of the body politic can itself contribute to the effectiveness, stability and continuity of government. A voting system known to be just to all sections of the community, as free as possible from the element of chance, and offering the electors a more direct share in the choice of representatives would remove the existing sense of frustration, and would promote this sound health by making the citizen a responsible and conscious partner in government. It would still remain, some would urge, for politicians to modify their accepted role of partisans insisting on the complete substance of a party programme. The single transferable vote would, we suggest, assist in this change of attitude for it would give the representative greater independence, and would free the electorate from the tyranny of party by offering a wider choice of candidates. If parties were imbued with an over-riding sense of responsibility towards the nation as a whole, and were prepared to collaborate to this end, then the lack of a single-party majority need offer no very serious problem. A more mature conception of political behaviour would be evolved in which freedom of discussion and a spirit of compromise would replace the inevitable enactment of party measures and the rigidity

of party policy. Parliaments would become more of a Council of State, more of the 'grand inquest of the nation', and less the battlefields of opposing armies. Democracy would become recognized as more truly government 'of all the people, by all the people, for all the people', and thus be more readily accepted and more stable.

In Britain itself the need for reform has been obscured by excessive complacency about the virtues of national institutions, natural perhaps to a country which has been called the 'Mother of Parliaments'. To refuse to consider an alternative method of election because it might involve also a revision of our attitude to parties and offer greater freedom and responsibility to the ordinary citizen, is to deny the belief for which there is ample evidence, that the British people have shown a special aptitude for parliamentary self-government. It is to reject our faith in democratic principles. We prefer to believe that the British people are entitled to, and are capable of putting to their advantage, a more representative government than they are able to obtain at present. The method of choice of such a government should be as scientifically framed and as efficiently adapted to its purpose as experience and political wisdom can make it. If a belief that the principles of democracy are desirable and attainable is founded on any true conviction, it is not sufficient for every citizen to have the vote; he should also be assured of the greatest possible freedom and effectiveness in its use. A parliament thus elected will possess a solid authority and an enhanced prestige, and will become in truth the authentic expression of the national will.

APPENDIX I

Applications of Various Electoral Systems*

1. MAJORITY SYSTEMS

A. Relative Majority (First-past-the-post System)

(i) *Single-member Constituencies*

United Kingdom.
- House of Commons: all members since 1950; most members from 1885 to 1945.
- Provincial County Councils.
- Other local Councils in Wards that elect only one Councillor annually.

U.S.A.
- House of Representatives (most members).
- Senate.
- Some local authorities.

Canada.
- House of Commons.
- Provincial Parliaments except Alberta, New Brunswick and (1952–54) British Columbia.

South Africa.
- House of Assembly.

New Zealand.
- House of Representatives.

(ii) *Multi-member Constituencies* (*Block Vote*)

United Kingdom.
- House of Commons—constituencies returning two Members, 1885–1945.
- London County Council.
  (3 members per constituency; formerly 2.)
- London Borough Councils.
  (2 to 9 Councillors per Ward.)

* This list does not claim to be complete, but includes all the most important examples.

Provincial Boroughs in some Wards.
Urban and Rural Districts not divided into Wards; some Wards of Districts.

U.S.A.
Some local authorities.

Canada.
Provincial Parliament of New Brunswick.

Greece.
Chamber of Deputies at various periods.

Turkey.
National Assembly.

Switzerland.
National Council before 1919.

Many unofficial committees in various countries.

B. ABSOLUTE MAJORITY

(i) *Single-member Constituencies*

(a) *Second Ballot (or Exhaustive Ballot)*

France.
Chamber of Deputies, 1928–45 and at intervals before this.
Overseas members of present Assembly.

Germany.
Reichstag, 1871–1918.

Some Trade Unions.

(b) *Alternative Vote*

Canada.
Provincial Parliament of Alberta (country constituencies) and of British Columbia, 1952–54.

Australia.
House of Representatives.
Legislative Assemblies of Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia.

Some Trade Unions.

(ii) *Multi-member Constituencies*

(a) *Second Ballot*

France.
Some local authorities.

Belgium.
Chamber of Representatives before 1900.

(b) *Alternative Vote*

Australia.

Senate, 1919–49.

National Union of Mineworkers.

National Union of Railwaymen.

2. SEMI-PROPORTIONAL SYSTEMS

A. Limited Vote

United Kingdom.

40 M.P.s in 13 constituencies, 1868–80.

Gibraltar.

City Council.

Formerly, various local Councils in many countries.

B. Single Non-transferable Vote

Japan.

House of Representatives, since 1900.

C. Cumulative Vote

United Kingdom.

School Boards, 1870–1902 (Scotland until 1918).

U.S.A.

Illinois State House of Representatives.

3. PROPORTIONAL SYSTEMS

A. Party List

(i) *No Choice between Candidates*

Germany.

Reichstag, 1919–33.

Many local authorities.

Czechoslovakia, 1919–38 and 1945–48.

Chamber of Deputies and Senate.

France.

National Assembly, 1945 and 1946.[1]

Seine and Seine-et-Oise constituencies in 1951.

Social security committees.

Israel.

Knesset.

[1] The 1946 system did provide for some choice between candidates, but this was ineffective. See p. 194.

(ii) *Choice allowed of one candidate within a list*

Belgium.
Chamber of Representatives, since 1899.
Part of Senate, since 1899.
Provincial Councils, since 1920.
Denmark.
Folketing and local Councils since 1920.
Netherlands.
Second Chamber and local Councils since 1917.
France.
Councils of large towns.

(iii) *Larger freedom of choice, extending to more than one candidate within a list*

Italy.
Chamber of Deputies, 1946–52
Norway.
Storting and local Councils since 1920.
Sweden.
Both Houses of Parliament and local Councils since 1909.
Netherlands.
First Chamber, since 1923.
Greece.
Chamber of Deputies, 1946–52, and at intervals before this.

(iv) *Large freedom of choice, not confined to candidates of one list (panachage)*

Finland.
Parliament (single chamber) since 1906.
Switzerland.
National Council, since 1919.
Most Cantonal Councils, from 1891 onwards.
Luxembourg.
Chamber of Deputies, since 1919.

B. MIXED SYSTEM. (First-past-the-post corrected by party list. No choice between candidates.)

Germany.
Bundestag and Landtage since 1946.
Denmark.
Folketing, 1915–20.

APPENDIX I

C. Single Transferable Vote

Republic of Ireland.
- Both Houses of Parliament since 1922.
- Sligo Town Council under an Act of 1918; all local Councils since 1919.

Northern Ireland.
- Senate and University M.P.s since 1921.
- Lower House, 1921–5.
- Local Councils, 1919–22.

United Kingdom.
- Nine University M.P.s, 1918–45.
- Scottish Education Authorities, 1918–28.
- Church Assembly
  - House of Laity, since 1920.
  - Proctors of the Lower Houses of Convocation of Canterbury and York, since 1921.
- Committees of unofficial bodies, including:
  - Liberal Party,
  - Young Conservatives (Midland Counties Federation),
  - Common Wealth Party,
  - Congregational Union,
  - Crusade for World Government,
  - Zionist Federation,
  - Board of Deputies of British Jews,
  - Building Societies Institute,
  - Dental Board,
  - National Union of Teachers,
  - Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union,
  - Woolwich Equitable Staff Association,
  - John Lewis Partnership,
  - Johnson and Phillips,
  - Cotton and Rayon Merchants' Association,
  - Institution of Naval Architects,
  - Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society,
  - Manchester and Salford Co-operative Society,
  - Reading University Students' Union,
  - Bedford College Students' Union,
  - Institute of Education Students' Union.

APPENDIX I

Canada.
  Alberta: Members for Calgary and Edmonton in the Provincial Parliament.
  Manitoba: Winnipeg, for Provincial and City Council elections.
Australia.
  Commonwealth Senate, since 1949.
  New South Wales: Upper House, since 1932. Armidale Town Council; other Town Councils since 1953.
  Tasmania: Lower House, since 1907.
South Africa.
  Senate, since 1909.
Malta.
  Senate and Legislative Assembly, since 1921.
Gibraltar.
  Legislative Council, since 1950.
U.S.A.
  City Councils of Cincinnati and eight other towns.
  Student Councils of Ohio and Vermont Universities and of Elizabethtown College, Pennsylvania.
Some World Federalist Organizations.

APPENDIX II

Examples of Elections under Proportional Systems

A. LIST SYSTEMS

1. *No choice between candidates*

FRANCE

National Assembly (2- to 10-member constituencies)

	Oct. 1945		*June 1946*		*Nov. 1946*	
	Votes	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*
Communists	26%	145 = 26½%	26%	146 = 26½%	28%	169 = 30%
M.R.P.	24%	143 = 26%	28%	167 = 30½%	26%	164 = 29%
Socialists	23%	134 = 24½%	21%	129 = 23½%	18%	101 = 18%
Radical Socialists	6%	20 = 4%	8%	32 = 6%	10%	43 = 8%
Parties of Right	15%	35 = 6%	13%	35 = 6½%	12%	38 = 7%
Others	6%	71 = 13%	4%	39 = 7%	6%	47 = 8%

ISRAEL

(One constituency, covering the whole country)

	Constituent Assembly, 1949 (d'Hondt Rule)		*Knesset, 1951 (largest remainder)*	
	Votes	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*
Mapai (Labour)	35%	46 = 38%	37%	45 = 37½%
Mapam (Left-wing Labour)	15%	19 = 16%	13%	15 = 12½%
Religious Bloc	12%	16 = 13%	7%	8 = 7%
Herut (Right)	11½%	14 = 12%	7%	8 = 7%
General Zionists	5%	7 = 6%	16%	20 = 16½%
Progressives	4%	5 = 4%	3%	4 = 3%
Communists	3½%	4 = 3%	7%	5 = 4%
Others	14%	9 = 8%	10%	15 = 12½%

NOTE: Owing to large-scale immigration, the population nearly doubled between these two elections.

APPENDIX II

2. *Choice of one candidate within the list*

Belgium

Chamber of Representatives (2- to 32-member constituencies)

	1946		*1949*		*1950*	
	Votes	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*
Chrisitan Soc.	43%	92 = 45½%	44%	105 = 49½%	47%	108 = 51%
Socialists	33%	69 = 34½%	30%	66 = 31%	36%	77 = 36½%
Liberals	9½%	17 = 8½%	15%	29 = 14%	12%	20 = 9½%
Communists	13%	23 = 11%	7%	12 = 5½%	5%	7 = 3%
Others	½%	1 = ½%	5%	0 —	—	— —
		202		212		212

3. *Choice of more than one candidate within the list*

Italy

1946

Constituent Assembly

	Votes	*Seats*
Christian Democrats	35%	207 = 37%
Socialists	21%	115 = 21%
Communists	19%	104 = 19%
Democratic Union	7%	41 = 7½%
Uomo Qualunque	5%	30 = 5%
Others	13%	59 = 10½%
		556

1948

Chamber of Deputies (5- to 36-member constituencies)

	Votes	*Seats*
Christian Democrats	49%	307 = 52%
Popular Front (Comm. and Nenni Socialists)	31%	182 = 32%
Socialist Unity (Saragat)	7%	33 = 6%
National Bloc	4%	18 = 3%
Monarchists	3%	14 = 3%
Republicans	2%	9 = 2%
Italian Social Movement	2%	6 = 1%
Others	2%	5 = 1%
		574

APPENDIX II

GREECE

Chamber of Deputies

	1950		1951	
	Votes	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*
Populist	18·3%	58=23·2%	6·7%	2= 0·8%
Liberal	16·9%	54=21·6%	19·1%	57=22·4%
Centre Union	17·7%	49=19·6%	23·5%	74=28·8%
Democratic Socialist	10·6%	34=13·6%	2·2%	0
Democratic Front	10·3%	22= 8·8%	10·5%	10= 3·6%
Independent Coalition	7·6%	16= 6·4%	—	—
Nat. Regeneration Front	5·0%	9= 3·6%	—	—
National Party	3·4%	4= 1·6%	—	—
New Party	2·5%	2= 0·8%	—	—
Farmers	1·6%	2= 0·8%	1·4%	1= 0·4%
Greek Rally	—	—	36·6%	114=44·0%
Others (16 parties)	6·1%	0	—	—

NOTE: In addition to the seats won in the constituencies, others were distributed on a national basis. In 1950, all parties were eligible to share in these additional seats; in 1951, only parties polling at least 17 per cent of the votes.

4. *Large freedom of choice, not confined to one list*

FINLAND

Single chamber, 1948 (constituencies average 13 members)

	Votes	*Seats*
S.K.D.L. (Communist alliance)	20%	38=19%
Agrarian Party	24%	56=28%
Social Democrats	26%	54=27%
Conservatives	17%	33=16½%
Swedish People's Party	8%	14= 7%
Liberals	4%	5= 2½%
Independents	1%	0
		200

SWITZERLAND

National Council, 1947 (Four 1-member constituencies; others 2- to 33-members)

	Votes	*Seats*
Conservatives	21%	44=22½%
Freisinnige (Radicals)	23%	52=27%
Liberals	3%	7= 3½%
Peasants' Party	12%	21=11%
Socialists	26½%	48=25%
Democrats	3%	5= 2½%
Independents	4½%	8= 4%
Communists	5%	7= 3½%
Others	2%	2= 1%
		194

APPENDIX II

Sweden

Lower House (2- to 12-member constituencies)

	1948		*1952*	
	Votes	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*
Social Democrats	46·5%	112 = 48·7%	46·4%	109 = 47·4%
Liberals	22·5%	57 = 24·8%	24·4%	59 = 25·7%
Agrarians	12·6%	30 = 13·0%	10·9%	27 = 11·7%
Conservatives	11·8%	23 = 10·0%	13·8%	30 = 13·0%
Communists	6·6%	8 = 3·5%	4·5%	5 = 2·2%
		230		230

B. MIXED SYSTEM

Germany

	Local Elections 1946		*W. German Parliament 1949*	
	Votes	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*
Social Democrats	37%	2,847 = 36%	29%	131 = 32·5%
Christian Democrats	37%	3,586 = 45·5%	31%	139 = 34·5%
Communists	8%	147 = 2%	6%	15 = 4%
Free Democratic Party	7%	320 = 4%	12%	52 = 13%
Lower Saxony Country Party	5%	642 = 8%	—	—
Centre	4%	211 = 3%	3%	10 = 2·5%
Bavarian Party	—	—	4%	17 = 4%
German Party	—	—	4%	17 = 4%
German Right	0·2%	3	2%	5 = 1%
Reconstruction Party	—	—	3%	12 = 3%
Independents	0·7%	20 = 0·3%	5%	3 = 0·75%
Others	1·1%	75 = 1%	1%	3 = 0·75%

C. SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE

Ireland

The Dail, 1933 (3- to 8-member constituences)

	Votes	*Seats*
Fianna Fail	49½%	77 = 50½%
Clann na Gaedheal	30½%	48 = 31½%
Centre	9%	11 = 7%
Labour	6%	8 = 5%
Independents	5%	9 = 6%
		153

APPENDIX II

(3- to 5-member constituencies)

	1948		*1951*	
	Votes	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*
Fianna Fail	42%	68 = 46%	46%	69 = 47½%
Fine Gael	20%	31 = 21%	25½%	40 = 26½%
Clann na Poblachta	13%	10 = 7%	4%	2 = 1½%
Labour	9%	14 = 9½%	11½%	16 = 11%
National Labour	2½%	5 = 3½%	—	—
Farmers	5%	5 = 3½%	3%	6 = 4%
Independents	8½%	14 = 9½%	10%	14 = 9½%
		147		147

TASMANIA

House of Assembly (6-member constituencies)

	1909 (*first P.R. election*)		*1950*	
	Votes	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*
Labour Party	39%	12 = 40%	48½%	15 = 50%
Non-Socialists	61%	18 = 60%	—	—
Liberal Party	—	—	47½%	14 = 47%
Independents	—	—	4%	1 = 3%
		30		30

MALTA

Legislative Assembly

	1921 (*first P.R. election*) (*4-member constituencies*)		*1950* (*5-member constituencies*)	
	Votes	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*
Constitutional Party	25%	7 = 22%	10%	4 = 10%
Labour Party	23%	7 = 22%	28½%	11 = 27½%
Nationalist Party	12%	4 = 12½%	29½%	12 = 30%
Unione Maltese	39½%	14 = 43½%	—	—
Boffa Labour Party	—	—	23%	11 = 27½%
Democratic Action	—	—	6%	1 = 2½%
Jones Party (Gozo)	—	—	1%	0
Independents	½%	0	2%	1 = 2½%
		32		40

APPENDIX III

Thomas Hare's Proposals

The principle of proportional representation by the single transferable vote was first suggested by Thomas Wright Hill in 1821. A form adaptable to the secret ballot was put forward by Andrae in 1855, and by Thomas Hare soon after the 1857 general election in a pamphlet entitled 'The Machinery of Representation'; it was elaborated in Hare's treatise on 'The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal', published in 1859. These original proposals underwent various modifications, an account of which can be found in the fourth edition, 1873 (page numbers quoted below refer to that edition).

Although Hare certainly recognized that his system would give representation to minorities, he disliked having it described as a scheme merely for that object (Hare, p. xix); he wished it to be considered as a means of 'making the exercise of the suffrage a step in the elevation of the individual character, whether it be found in a majority or in a minority', and laid great stress on its quality of 'personal representation'. Hare wished to liberate the voter from all unnecessary restraints (Hare, p. vii) and to give him the maximum both of freedom and of responsibility in his choice of a representative; to give expression to natural community of interest, without confining the voter within boundaries, geographical or other.

Each voter was to be allowed to support any candidate, anywhere in the Kingdom, and to guarantee the efficacy of his vote by providing for its transfer, if necessary, to other candidates in the order of his preference. A candidate was to be declared elected on attaining the quota found by dividing the total votes in the country by the number of seats in the House of Commons; the votes cast for a candidate in his own locality were to be counted for him first, those from more distant places only if required to make up the quota (Hare, p. 164). Something of

the same idea is found in the Danish electoral system—see this volume, p. 160. It seems curious that in some versions of the scheme votes were utilized by transfer only from a successful candidate with a surplus, not from one at the bottom of the poll;[1] in the fourth edition, however, Hare does describe both processes and cites (Hare, p. 351) a model election by W. R. Ware in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, whose procedure is nearly identical with standard modern practice. (The two differences are the use of the Hare instead of the Droop quota—see this volume, pp. 104, 129—and of the least accurate method of selecting surplus papers for transfer—see this volume, p. 108.) If votes cast for defeated candidates were not actually utilized by transfer, they were, however, allocated to whichever of the elected candidates the voter had placed highest on his paper, so that very few voters would be left without some person whom they could regard as 'their' M.P. (Hare, p. 173). It was intended that ballot papers should be signed and that a voter should be able to inspect his own paper and see to which candidate it had finally been credited (Hare, p. 9).

It will be seen that the main difference between the Hare plan and its later developments is that Hare intended votes to be utilizable anywhere in the country, not only within one constituency of five or so members. It is unfortunate that the scheme has never been tried in this form, for it is difficult to estimate how much difference it would make to the actual results, how much extra labour it would involve, and whether the advantages were sufficiently substantial to be worth this extra labour. There are certainly attractions in the more complete freedom given to the voter by Hare's scheme, but the general opinion now is that the smaller constituency gives good enough results; the main beneficiaries of transfers of votes from one constituency to another would presumably be nationally-known candidates, who are already sure of election in the smaller P.R. constituencies, and candidates of very small parties. The small parties would certainly benefit; the question is whether this advantage would be great enough to justify the labour involved in applying Hare's method to an electorate of thirty millions (the electorate in 1857 was 1,227,274).

[1] See also C. L. Dodgson, *The Principles of Parliamentary Representation*, p. 32.

APPENDIX IV

Standard Regulations for Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote

These regulations are substantially those contained in the Education Authorities Election Order (Scotland), 1928 (Statutory Rules and Orders, 1927, No. 1138/S.58), authorized under the Education (Scotland) Acts, and in the University Elections (Single Transferable Vote) Regulations, 1918 (Statutory Rules and Orders, 1918, No. 1348). Material divergences are indicated in the notes.

Definitions.

1. In these regulations:

(1) the expression 'continuing candidate' means any candidate not elected or not excluded from the poll at any given time;

(2) the expression 'first preference' means the figure '1' standing alone opposite the name of a candidate; 'second preference' means the figure '2' standing alone opposite the name of a candidate in succession to the figure '1'; 'third preference' means the figure '3' standing alone opposite the name of a candidate in succession to the figures '1' and '2'; and so on;

(3) the expression 'next available preference' means a second or subsequent preference recorded in consecutive numerical order for a continuing candidate, the preferences next in order on the ballot paper for candidates already elected or excluded from the poll being ignored;

(4) the expression 'transferable paper' means a ballot paper on which, following a first preference, a second or subsequent preference is recorded in consecutive numerical order for a continuing candidate;

(5) the expression 'non-transferable paper' means a ballot paper on which no second or subsequent preference is recorded for a continuing candidate:

Provided that a paper shall be deemed to have become a non-transferable paper whenever [see Note 1]:

(*a*) the names of two or more candidates (whether continuing or not) are marked with the same number and are next in order of preference; or

(*b*) the name of the candidate next in order of preference (whether continuing or not) is marked:

(*i*) by a number not following consecutively after some other number on the ballot paper; or

(*ii*) by two or more numbers; or

(*c*) for any other reason it cannot be determined for which of the continuing candidates the next available preference of the voter is recorded;

NOTE 1—The most common irregularities covered by this proviso occur under (*a*), e.g. a ballot paper marked 1 for candidate A, 2 for B, 3 for C, 3 for D, 4 for E; and under (*b*) (*i*), e.g. a ballot paper marked 1 for A, 2 for B, 4 for C, 5 for D, 6 for E. Both these ballot papers are valid and transferable up to and including the second preference. Thereupon the vote becomes non-transferable through the break in the sequence of figures.

(6) the expression 'original vote' in regard to any candidate means a vote derived from a ballot paper on which a first preference is recorded for that candidate;

(7) the expression 'transferred vote' in regard to any candidate means a vote derived from a ballot paper on which a second or subsequent preference is recorded for that candidate;

(8) the expression 'surplus' means the number of votes by which the total number of the votes, original and transferred, credited to any candidate, exceeds the quota;

(9) the expression 'count' means:

(*a*) all the operations involved in the counting of the first preferences recorded for candidates; or

(*b*) all the operations involved in the transfer of the surplus of an elected candidate; or

(*c*) all the operations involved in the transfer of votes of an excluded candidate or of two or more candidates excluded together.

2. (1) Each voter shall have one transferable vote [see Note 2]. Vote of electors.

(2) A voter in recording his vote: Method of voting.

(*a*) shall place on his ballot paper the figure 1 opposite the name of the candidate for whom he votes; and

(*b*) may in addition indicate the order of his choice or preference for as many other candidates as he pleases by placing against their respective names the figures 2, 3, 4, 5, and so *on* in consecutive numerical order.

NOTE 2—This provision has reference to the value of the vote recorded on each ballot paper. Each ballot paper counts for one vote and one only, whatever the number of preferences expressed upon it. The provision does not preclude an elector who possesses the necessary qualifications from exercising more than one vote by means of separate ballot papers.

In certain organizations, sub-divisions of the whole, e.g. the branches of a trade union, exercise their voting power *en bloc*. In such cases the ballot paper has a value corresponding to the number of qualified members in the voting unit. The vote, though multiple in value, may be a transferable vote, and the principle of proportional representation can be applied under appropriate regulations.

3. A ballot paper shall be invalid on which [see Note 3]: Invalid ballot papers

(*a*) the figure 1 standing alone indicating a first preference for some one candidate is not placed; or

(*b*) the figure 1 standing alone indicating a first preference is placed opposite the name of more than one candidate; or

(*c*) the figure 1 standing alone indicating a first preference and some other figure are placed opposite the name of the same candidate; or

(*d*) it cannot be determined for which candidate the first preference of the voter is recorded; or

(*e*) any mark is placed by the voter by which he may afterwards be identified.

NOTE 3—(i) *Spoilt ballot papers*. If an elector before placing his ballot paper in the ballot box, or otherwise delivering it to the proper authority, becomes aware that he has voted irregularly, he should return the spoilt paper and apply for a fresh one. The Representation of

the People Act 1949, Second Schedule, *Parliamentary Elections Rules*, Rule 42, provides:

A voter who has inadvertently dealt with his ballot paper in such a manner that it cannot be conveniently used as a ballot paper, may, on delivering it to the presiding officer, and proving to his satisfaction the fact of the inadvertence, obtain another ballot paper in the place of the ballot paper so delivered . . . and the spoilt ballot paper shall be immediately cancelled.

(ii) *Vote given by a cross.* Under judgments given by the Courts in election petitions having reference to elections in which the vote is given by marking a cross or crosses, the returning officer appears to be allowed considerable discretion in admitting ballot appers which are not marked strictly in accordance with the prescribed method. The provisions as to marking the ballot papers 'are directory merely. It is sufficient if they be obeyed substantially' (Parker's *Election Agent and Returning Officer*, 5th edition, p. 197).

In a quoted case it was held that a ballot paper so marked as to show for whom the voter intended to vote ought to be counted, however much the directions contained in the Ballot Act were contravened.

In the elections of private organizations, the returning officer is usually free to admit as good all ballot papers which clearly indicate the intention of the voter. The most important case is that of voters who give their vote by a cross instead of a figure or figures. If a ballot paper is marked with one cross against the name of one candidate and is otherwise unmarked, it can reasonably be held to give a clear indication of the intention of the voter.

(iii) *Marks of identification.* The provision contained in sub-clause (*e*) does not generally apply except in the election of public bodies. In many elections, and particularly in elections in which the voting papers are delivered to the returning officer by post, the voter is required to sign his voting paper as a means of identification. Even with a signed voting paper the secrecy of the ballot can be substantially preserved if the space for signature is on the back of the voting paper.

The Representation of the People Act, 1949, Second Schedule, *Parliamentary Elections Rules*, Rule 46 (4), provides: 'The returning officer, while . . . counting the votes, shall keep the ballot papers with their faces upwards, and

take all proper precautions for preventing any person from seeing the numbers printed on the backs of the papers' (or, say, the signatures of the voters, if written thereon).

4. The form of ballot paper to be used, and the form of directions for the guidance of voters in voting [see Note 4] shall be those set out [in the Second Schedule annexed to these regulations]. Form of ballot paper.

NOTE 4—(i) The general arrangement of the ballot paper follows Rule 19 of the Second Schedule to the Representation of the People Act, 1949, the effect of which is that every ballot paper shall contain a list of the candidates described as in their respective nomination papers, and arranged alphabetically in the order of their surnames, and (if there are two or more candidates with the same surname) of their other names.

(ii) In the ballot paper as illustrated in the Second Schedule, some particulars given in the corresponding Schedule of the Statutory Order, not concerned with the application of P.R., have been omitted. The form of directions for the guidance of voters in voting, namely, the directions to be placarded outside every polling station and in every voting compartment, has also been omitted, but the essential directions are contained in the instructions as to voting in part 2 of the Second Schedule.

5. After the ballot papers for an electoral division have been counted [see Note 5] and mixed in accordance with Rule 46 of the Second Schedule to the Representation of the People Act, 1949, the returning officer shall examine the ballot papers and shall sort them into parcels according to the first preferences recorded for each candidate, rejecting any that are invalid. Sorting papers.

NOTE 5—The counting of the papers prescribed in this regulation has reference to the checking of the number of papers in each ballot box which is required in public elections.

6. The returning officer shall then count the number of papers in each parcel and shall credit each candidate with a number of votes equal to the number of valid papers on which a first preference has been recorded for such candidate, and he shall ascertain the total number of valid papers. Counting papers

7. The returning officer shall then divide the total number The Quota.

of valid papers by a number exceeding by one the number of vacancies to be filled. The result increased by one (any fractional remainder being disregarded) shall be the number of votes sufficient to secure the election of a candidate. This number is herein called the 'quota'.

Candidate with quota elected.

8. If at the end of any count the number of votes credited to a candidate is equal to or greater than the quota, that candidate shall thereupon be elected.

Transfer of surplus. Surplus to be transferred.

9. (1) If at the end of any count the number of votes credited to a candidate is greater than the quota, the surplus shall be transferred, as in this regulation provided, to the continuing candidates for whom the next available preferences have been recorded on the ballot papers in the parcel or sub-parcel last received by the elected candidate.

Priority of surplus.

(2) (*a*) If more than one candidate has a surplus, the largest surplus shall be dealt with first.

(*b*) If two or more candidates have each an equal surplus, the surplus of the candidate with the greatest number of votes at the earliest count at which the candidates in question have an unequal number of votes shall be dealt with first. When the numbers of votes credited to such candidates are equal at all counts, the returning officer shall determine which surplus he will deal with first.

Transfer of surplus optional.

(3) The returning officer need not transfer a surplus when that surplus, together with any other surpluses not transferred, is less than the difference:

(*a*) between the votes of the candidate lowest on the poll and the votes of the candidate next above; or

(*b*) between the total of votes of the two or more candidates lowest on the poll and the votes of the candidate next above, provided that the exclusion from the poll of the aforesaid two or more candidates lowest on the poll shall not reduce the number of continuing candidates below the number of vacancies remaining to be filled.

Surplus from original votes.

(4) (*a*) If the votes credited to an elected candidate consist of original votes only, the returning officer shall examine all the papers contained in the parcel of the elected candidate whose surplus is to be transferred.

Surplus from transferred votes.

(*b*) If the votes credited to an elected candidate consist of original and transferred votes, or of transferred votes

only, the returning officer shall examine the papers contained in the sub-parcel last received by the elected candidate whose surplus is to be transferred.

Papers sorted to next available preference.

(*c*) In either case, the returning officer shall sort the transferable papers into sub-parcels according to the next available preferences recorded thereon, shall make a separate sub-parcel of the non-transferable papers and shall ascertain the number of papers in each sub-parcel of transferable papers and in the sub-parcel of non-transferable papers.

If transferable pape equal to or less tha

(5) If the total number of papers in the sub-parcels of [redacted]

tude, the fractional part shall be deemed to be the largest which arises from the largest sub-parcel, and if the sub-parcels in question are equal in size, the fractional part credited to the candidate with the greatest number of votes at the earliest count at which the candidates in question have an unequal number of votes shall be deemed to be the largest. When the numbers of votes credited to such candidates are equal at all counts, the returning officer shall determine which fractional part shall be deemed to be the largest.

Papers transferred from sub-parcels.

(*e*) The particular papers transferred from each sub-parcel shall be those last filed in the sub-parcel, and each paper so transferred shall be marked in such a manner as to indicate the count at which the transfer took place.

Exclusion of candidates.

10. (1) If at the end of any count no candidate has a surplus, or if any existing surplus need not be and is not transferred, and one or more vacancies remain to be filled:

One candidate excluded.

(*a*) The returning officer shall exclude from the poll the candidate lowest on the poll; but

Two or more excluded.

(*b*) If the total of the votes of the two or more candidates lowest on the poll together with any surplus votes not transferred is less than the number of votes credited to the candidate next above these, the returning officer may at the same count exclude the aforesaid two or more candidates lowest on the poll, provided that the exclusion of these candidates shall not reduce the number of continuing candidates below the number of vacancies remaining to be filled.

Selection of candidates for exclusion.

(2) If, when a candidate has to be excluded, two or more candidates have each the same number of votes and are lowest on the poll, the candidate with the lowest number of votes at the earliest count at which the candidates in question have an unequal number of votes shall be excluded, and, when the numbers of votes credited to those candidates are equal at all counts, the returning officer shall determine which shall be excluded.

Transfer of votes of excluded candidates.

(3) Upon the exclusion of any candidate, the returning officer, save as hereinafter provided, shall examine all the papers credited to that candidate; shall sort the transferable papers into sub-parcels according to the next available

preferences recorded thereon for continuing candidates; shall transfer each sub-parcel to the candidate for whom that preference is recorded; and shall set aside as a separate sub-parcel the non-transferable papers.

Last vacancies.

11. (1) If at the end of any count the number of elected candidates is equal to the number of vacancies to be filled, no further transfer of votes shall be made.

(2) If, on the exclusion of a candidate or candidates, the number of the then continuing candidates is equal to the number of vacancies unfilled, the continuing candidates shall thereupon be elected, and no further transfer of votes shall be made.

Priority of election.

12. The order of priority of election of elected members shall be the order in which they are severally elected. If at the end of any count two or more candidates are elected, the order of priority shall be the order of magnitude of the numbers of votes credited to such candidates, beginning with the greatest.

Procedure in transferring votes. Papers transferred.

13. (1) Whenever any transfer is made, each sub-parcel of papers transferred shall be placed on the top of the parcel, if any, of papers of the candidate to whom the transfer is made and that candidate shall be credited with a number of votes equal to the number of papers transferred to him.

Non-transferable papers set aside.

(2) Non-transferable papers (except such as in the transfer of a surplus may be required for the quota of the elected candidate) shall be set aside as a separate sub-parcel together with any parcel of non-transferable papers already set aside.

Papers retained for the quota.

(3) On the transfer of the surplus of an elected candidate, all papers not transferred to continuing candidates and not set aside as provided in the preceding paragraph, shall be placed together in one parcel as the quota of the elected candidate and the parcel shall be marked with the name of the elected candidate.

Partial recounts.

14. Any candidate or his agent may, at the end of any count, request the returning officer to re-examine and recount all or any of the papers dealt with during that count, and the returning officer shall forthwith re-examine and recount accordingly the papers indicated without making any alteration in the arrangement of the papers in the various parcels, save where such alteration may be neces-

sary in consequence of any error discovered in the recount; the returning officer may also at his discretion recount papers either once or more often in any case in which he is not satisfied as to the accuracy of any previous counting of the votes: Provided that nothing herein shall make it obligatory on the returning officer to recount the same papers more than once.

Determination of questions arising out of decisions by returning officers.

15. If any question shall arise in relation to the exclusion from the poll of any candidate, or to any transfer of votes, the decision of the returning officer, whether expressed or implied by his acts, shall be final unless objection is made in writing by any candidate or his agent before the declaration of the poll, and in that event the decision of the returning officer may be reversed upon an election petition.

Election petitions.

16. (1) If upon an election petition:

(i) any ballot papers counted by the returning officer are rejected as invalid; or

(ii) any rejected ballot papers are declared valid,

the Court may direct the whole or any part of the ballot papers to be recounted and the result of the election ascertained in accordance with these regulations.

(2) If upon an election petition the decision of the returning officer upon any operation is reversed, the operation in question and all operations subsequent thereto shall be void and the Court shall direct what operation is to be made in place of the operation in question, and shall cause the subsequent operations to be carried out and the result of the election to be ascertained in accordance with these regulations.

(3) On any recount, subject to such modifications as may be necessary by reason of any Order of the Court, each paper shall take the same course as in the original counting of the votes.

Notice of result of poll.

17. The counting of the votes having been completed in accordance with these regulations, the operation of which is illustrated in the First Schedule annexed hereto, the returning officer shall publish a notice of the result of the poll and of the names of the persons elected. Such notice shall include a record of any transfer of votes made under these regulations and of the total number of votes credited to

each candidate after any such transfer, and shall be in the form given in the Third Schedule annexed to these regulations, or in a form to the like effect [see Note 6].

NOTE 6—This provision does not appear in the Statutory Orders among the regulations for the application of proportional representation. In Order 1,138 (of 1927) a similar provision forms part of more general regulations prescribing certain duties of the returning officer.

FIRST SCHEDULE

Example of the method of counting the votes at an election conducted on the Single Transferable Vote system of Proportional Representation set out above.

Let it be assumed that there are six members to be elected, and that there are eleven candidates, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L.

First Count

Sorting and counting the ballot papers. (Reg. 5, 6.)

The ballot papers having been mixed and examined, the invalid papers being rejected, the valid papers are sorted into separate parcels under the names of the candidates marked with the figure 1. Each separate parcel is counted, and each candidate is credited with a number of votes equal to the number of papers on which a first preference has been recorded for him.

State of poll at end of first count.

The result of the count is, say, as follows:

Candidates	*Votes*
B	140
F	62
H	50
C	25
L	24
G	14
J	13
D	10
A	5
E	5
K	0
Total	348

Ascertainment quota. (Reg. 7.)

It is found that the total number of valid votes is 348. This total is divided by seven (i.e. the number which

exceeds by one the number of vacancies to be filled), and 50 (i.e. the quotient 49 increased by 1, the fractional remainder being disregarded) is the 'quota' or the number of votes sufficient to secure the election of a member.

Candidates with quota elected. (Reg. 8.)

The votes obtained by B, F, and H exceed or equal the quota, and these candidates are thereupon elected.

Second Count

Transfer of surplus. (Reg. 9 (1), (2) (*a*).)

B has 90 surplus votes (i.e. B's total 140, less the quota 50), and it is necessary to transfer this surplus first as being the largest.

Surplus from original votes. (Reg. 9 (4) (*a*).)

All B's 140 papers are examined and sorted into separate sub-parcels according to the next available preferences recorded thereon.

In general the next available preference will be the second preference. But any paper on which the second preference is given to either F or H, both already elected, passes to the next available preference after such candidates. A paper marked with 1 for B, 2 for H, 3 for F, 4 for J is placed in the sub-parcel for J.

Reg. 9 (4) (*c*).)

A separate sub-parcel is also formed of those papers on which no further available preference, i.e. no further preference for any continuing candidate, is shown and which are therefore not transferable.

The result is found to be as follows:

A next available preference is shown for D on	.....	80 papers
A next available preference is shown for E on	.....	2 papers
A next available preference is shown for J on	.....	25 papers
A next available preference is shown for K on	.....	29 papers
Total number of *transferable papers*	.....	136
Number of *non-transferable papers*	.....	4
Total of B's papers		140

Proportion of papers to be transferred. (Reg. 9 (6) (*a*).)

Since the total number of transferable papers (136) exceeds the surplus (90), only a portion of each sub-parcel can be transferred, and the number of papers to be transferred from each sub-parcel must bear to the total number of papers in the sub-parcel the same proportion as that which the surplus bears to the total number of transferable papers.

Numbers to be transferred ascertained. (Reg. 9 (6) (*b*).)

The number of papers to be transferred from each sub-parcel is ascertained accordingly by multiplying the number of papers in the sub-parcel by 90 (the surplus) and dividing the result by 136 (the total number of transferable papers). In practice the calculation may be simplified by reducing the fraction 90/136 to the equivalent fraction 45/68.

The process is as follows:

D's sub-parcel contains 80 papers, and his share of the surplus is, therefore ..... $80 \times \frac{45}{68}$ or $52\frac{64}{68}$

E's sub-parcel contains 2 papers, and his share of the surplus is, therefore ..... $2 \times \frac{45}{68}$ or $1\frac{22}{68}$

J's sub-parcel contains 25 papers, and his share of the surplus is, therefore ..... $25 \times \frac{45}{68}$ or $16\frac{37}{68}$

K's sub-parcel contains 29 papers, and his share of the surplus is, therefore ..... $29 \times \frac{45}{68}$ or $19\frac{13}{68}$

Total $88\frac{136}{68}$

The numbers of papers to be transferred as thus determined contain fractions, and, since only whole papers can be transferred, so many of the largest of these fractions, taken in order of their magnitude, as will make the total number of papers to be transferred equal to the surplus are reckoned as of the value of unity.

Treatment of fractions. (Reg. 9 (6) (*c*).)

Thus as the *whole* numbers determined above amount to only 88, viz.: (52+1+16+19), or two short of the surplus, 90, the two largest fractions, $\frac{64}{68}$ and $\frac{37}{68}$ are reckoned as unity, and the numbers of papers actually transferred are as follows:

To D ..... 53 papers
To E ..... 1 paper
To J ..... 17 papers
To K ..... 19 papers

Total, being B's surplus, 90 papers

Selection and marking of papers transferred. (Reg. 9 (6) (*e*).)

The particular papers to be transferred to D, E, J and K are those last filed in their respective sub-parcels, and,

therefore, at the top of the sub-parcels. The papers transferred are clearly marked with the number of the count at which the transfer is made. This indication can conveniently be given by writing or stamping the number of the count on each paper transferred.

Disposal of papers on transfer. (Reg. 13 (1).)

These papers are added in separate sub-parcels to the parcels of D, E, J and K. (Note: K has no parcel of original votes.)

The totals of the votes credited to these candidates then become:

D ..... 10+53=63
E ..... 5+ 1= 6
J ..... 13+17=30
K ..... 0+19=19

Quota of elected candidate set aside. (Reg. 13 (3).)

The remainders of the papers in the sub-parcels (i.e. the papers not transferred), together with the papers on which no further available preferences are marked, are collected together and formed into one parcel, representing B's quota of votes (50), which is marked with B's name.

The parcel is made up as follows:

The remainder of D's sub-parcel	80 less 53=27
The remainder of E's sub-parcel	2 less 1= 1
The remainder of J's sub-parcel	25 less 17= 8
The remainder of K's sub-parcel	29 less 19=10
The non-transferable papers	4
Total, being B's quota	50

The operations involved in this transfer are summarized in the following 'Transfer of Surplus Sheet' [see Note 7].

NOTE 7—The Transfer of Surplus Sheet is one of the two essential working forms in an election of this kind. The other essential form is the Result Sheet, an example of which is shown on p. 270. In counting the votes in a large election, it is useful to have also, for each candidate, a Vote Record Sheet on which are entered the votes received by that candidate in each count.

APPENDIX IV

Count No. 2

TRANSFER of B 's SURPLUS

Surplus – – – – – 90

Number of transferable papers – – 136

$$\textit{Proportion to be transferred} = \frac{\text{Surplus}}{\text{Number of transferable papers}} = \frac{90}{136} = \frac{45}{68}$$

Names of Candidates marked as the next available preference after elected candidate	*Papers of elected candidate (last parcel received) re-sorted to next available preference*	*Calculation of number of papers to be transferred as surplus—*		*Papers of elected candidate divided proportionally—*	
		Whole numbers	*Fractional parts*	*Number of papers transferred (largest fractions treated as whole numbers)*	*Number of papers retained for Quota of B (elected candidate)*
A					
C					
D	80	52	64/68	53	27
E	2	1	22/68	1	1
G					
J	25	16	37/68	17	8
K	29	19	13/68	19	10
L					
Total number of *transferable* papers	136	88	136/68	90	46
Number of *non-transferable* papers	4			†	4
Totals	* 140 (Total)			* 90 (Surplus)	* 50 (ForQuota)

NOTES FOR RETURNING OFFICERS

* It will be found convenient to begin filling in the transfer sheet by inserting the totals in the spaces marked with an asterisk. These totals are known before the count is commenced.

† *When the number of transferable papers is less than the surplus*, the difference is inserted in the space marked with a dagger, and a corresponding number of the non-transferable papers are stamped and set aside, as a separate sub-parcel, with the parcel, if any, of non-transferable papers. The number of papers so set aside is recorded in the appropriate space on the Result Sheet.

State of poll at end of second count.

The state of the poll at the end of this count is as follows:

Candidates	*Votes*
B	50 (elected)
F	62 (elected)
H	50 (elected)
D	63 (elected)
J	30
C	25
L	24
K	19
G	14
E	6
A	5
Total	348

Election of candidate. (Reg. 8.)

D now has 63 votes, a number which is more than the quota. He is accordingly elected.

Third Count

Priority of surplus. (Reg. 9 (2) (*a*).)

There are now two surpluses, that of F (12) and that of D (13). Both exceed the difference (1) between E and A, the candidates lowest on the poll. D's surplus, being the larger, is dealt with first.

Surplus arising from transferred votes. (Reg. 9 (4) (*b*).)

To distribute D's surplus, only the sub-parcel last transferred, containing 53 papers, is considered. These 53 papers are examined and sorted into sub-parcels, according to the next available preferences, with the following results:

A next available preference is shown for A on	2 papers
A next available preference is shown for E on	2 papers
A next available preference is shown for J on	43 papers
A next available preference is shown for K on	5 papers
Total number of transferable papers	52
No further preference is shown on	1 paper
Total	53

(Reg. 9 (6) (*b*).)

The number of papers to be transferred from each sub-parcel is ascertained by multiplying the number of papers in the sub-parcel by 13 (the surplus) and dividing the result by 52 (the total number of transferable papers). The fraction 13/52 is equal to the fraction $\frac{1}{4}$; therefore:

A's share of the surplus is	$2 \times \frac{1}{4} = \frac{1}{2}$
E's share of the surplus is	$2 \times \frac{1}{4} = \frac{1}{2}$
J's share of the surplus is	$43 \times \frac{1}{4} = 10\frac{3}{4}$
K's share of the surplus is	$5 \times \frac{1}{4} = 1\frac{1}{4}$

Equality of fractional parts. (Reg. 9 (6) (*d*).)

The whole numbers determined above amount to 11, or two short of the surplus, 13. Therefore, the two largest fractions are reckoned as unity. The largest fraction is $\frac{3}{4}$, and this is accordingly reckoned as unity. Two fractions, of value $\frac{1}{2}$, are equal and next largest. When the fractional parts are equal, that which arises from the largest sub-parcel is deemed to be the largest. When, as in this case, the sub-parcels as well as the fractional parts are equal, the fractional part credited to the candidate with the greatest number of votes at the earliest count in which the candidates in question had an unequal number of vote is deemed to be the largest. Candidates A and E were equal at the first count, but E had the greater number of votes at the second count. E's share of the surplus is, therefore, 1 vote, and A's share is *nil*. J's share is 11 votes, and K's share is 1 vote.

The operations involved in this transfer are summarized in the simplified transfer sheet on page 264:

(Reg. 9 (6) (*e*), Reg. 13.)

Sub-parcels of 1 paper, 11 papers and 1 paper, clearly marked so as to indicate the count at which the transfer took place, are added to the parcels of E, J, and K respectivcly, and the remainders (2+1+32+4), together with the 1 non-transferable paper and the 10 papers received by D on the first count, making 50 papers altogether, are formed into one parcel, making D's quota of votes. This parcel is marked with D's name.

The state of the poll on the conclusion of this count is as follows:

Candidates	*Votes*
B	50 (elected)
F	62 (elected)
H	50 (elected)
D	50 (elected)
J	41
C	25
L	24
K	20
G	14
E	7
A	5
Total	348

APPENDIX IV

Count No. 3

TRANSFER of D 's SURPLUS

Surplus – – – – – 13

Number of transferable papers – – 52

Proportion to be transferred = $\frac{\text{Surplus}}{\text{Number of transferable papers}} = \frac{13}{52} = \frac{1}{4}$

Names of Candidates marked as the next available preference after elected candidate	*Papers of elected candidate (last parcel received) re-sorted to next available preference*	*Papers of elected candidate divided proportionally—*	
		Number of papers transferred (largest fractions treated as whole numbers)	*Number of papers retained for Quota of D (elected candidate)*
A	2	$(\frac{1}{2})$ —	2
E	2	$(\frac{1}{2})$ 1	1
J	43	$(10\frac{3}{4})$ 11	32
K	5	$(1\frac{1}{4})$ 1	4
Total number of *transferable* papers	52	(13) 13	39
Number of *non-transferable* papers	1	—	1
Totals	53 (Total)	13 (Surplus)	40 (For Quota)

APPENDIX IV

Fourth Count

Transfer of surplus. (Reg. 9 (1).)

F's surplus (12) must now be distributed, as it exceeds the difference (2) between E and A, the candidates lowest on the poll. F's surplus is distributed proportionately among the next available preferences on F's original 62 papers in exactly the same manner as in the case of B, with the result that 9 papers are transferred to L, 2 to C, and 1 to A.

Quota of elected candidate set aside. (Reg. 13 (3).)

The papers forming F's quota are placed together in one parcel, which is marked with F's name.

The papers forming the quota of H (who obtained an exact quota on the first count) are likewise placed together in one parcel, which is marked with H's name.

State of poll at end of fourth count.

The state of the poll on the conclusion of this count is as follows:

Candidates	*Votes*
B	50 (elected)
F	50 (elected)
H	50 (elected)
D	50 (elected)
J	41
L	33
C	27
K	20
G	14
E	7
A	6
Total	348

Fifth Count

Exclusion of candidate. (Reg. 10.)

There being now no surplus requiring to be dealt with, the returning officer proceeds to transfer the votes of the candidate with the smallest total of votes.

Exclusion of two lowest candidates together. (Reg. 10 (1) (*b*).)

The candidate lowest on the poll is A, with 6 votes, but since the combined totals of A and E (6+7=13) are less than 14, the total of G, the next lowest candidate, the returning officer decides to transfer the papers of both A and E at the same count.

The papers in the parcels of A and E (total 13) are examined and it is found that:

G is marked next available preference on	7	papers
J is marked next available preference on	3	papers
K is marked next available preference on	1	paper
No further preference is shown on	2	papers
Total	13	

(Reg. 13 (1), (2).)

The operation is completed by the transfer of 7 papers to G, 3 papers to J and 1 paper to K, and the 2 non-transferable papers are set aside as a separate parcel.

State of poll at end of fifth count.

The state of the poll is now as follows:

Candidates	*Votes*
B	50 (elected)
F	50 (elected)
H	50 (elected)
D	50 (elected)
J	44
L	33
C	27
G	21
K	21
Non-transferable papers	2
Total	348

Sixth Count

Candidates equal and lowest on poll (Reg. 10 (2).)

No candidate is elected as the result of the fifth count, and the next operation has to be decided upon. Candidates G and K have each the same number of votes (21) and are lowest on the poll. K's papers are distributed, as he obtained fewer votes than G at the first count. From the distribution of K's papers, 4 papers are transferred to C, 15 to J, 1 to L, and 1 is non-transferable. J therefore reaches a total of 59 votes, and is elected.

(Reg. 8.)

State of poll at end of sixth count.

The state of the poll is now as follows:

Candidates	*Votes*
B	50 (elected)
F	50 (elected)
H	50 (elected)
D	50 (elected)
J	59 (elected)
L	34
C	31
G	21
Non-transferable papers	3
Total	348

APPENDIX IV

Seventh Count

Exclusion of candidate. (Reg. 10 (1)(a), Reg. 9 (3).)

J's surplus (59 less 50=9) would now have to be transferred were it not for the provision of Regulation 9 (3). Under this regulation the returning officer need not necessarily transfer a surplus, when that surplus, together with any other surplus not transferred, is less than the difference between the votes of the candidate lowest on the poll and the votes of the next candidate above.

J's surplus (9) is less than the difference between the totals of the two lowest candidates C and G (31 less 21 = 10). The returning officer decides not to transfer J's surplus, and proceeds to transfer the votes of the candidate with the smallest total of votes. G's parcel of 21 papers is therefore examined. It is found to contain 7 papers on which C is the next available preference, 12 on which L is the next available preference, and 2 which are non-transferable. (Reg. 10 (3).)

Therefore 7 papers are transferred to C and 12 to L, and 2 are filed in the parcel of non-transferable papers. (Reg. 13)

The state of the poll is now as follows:

State of poll at end of seventh count.

Candidates	*Votes*
B	50 (elected)
F	50 (elected)
H	50 (elected)
D	50 (elected)
J	59 (elected)
L	46
C	38
Non-transferable papers	5
Total	348

Eighth Count

Surplus arising fro previous transfer. (Reg. 9 (4) (b).)

J's surplus (9) must now be distributed, as it exceeds the difference (46 less 38=8) between the votes of the two candidates lowest on the poll. For this purpose, only the sub-parcel of papers last transferred to J (15 papers) is taken into account. These are examined and arranged in sub-parcels for the continuing candidates, with the following result:

C is marked next available preference on	4 papers
L is marked next available preference on	3 papers
Total number of transferable papers	7
Number of non-transferable papers	8
Total	15

Transferable papers less than surplus. (Reg. 9 (5).)

In this case the total number of transferable papers (7) is less than the surplus (9), therefore the returning officer transfers the whole sub-parcels of transferable papers to the continuing candidates indicated thereon as next available preference. This accounts for 7 votes out of the surplus 9. There is a difference of 2 papers. The sub-parcel of non-transferable papers is therefore divided into two portions, one containing 2 papers, the other containing 6 papers. The (Reg. 13 (2).) portion of 2 papers is set aside with the other parcels of non-transferable papers already set aside, and the portion of 6 papers is retained to make up J's quota (6+44=50).

(Reg. 9 (6) (e).) The papers transferred to the parcels of C, L, and non-transferable are marked so as to indicate the count.

The operations involved in this transfer are summarized in the transfer sheet shown opposite.

State of poll at end of eighth count. The state of the poll after the eighth count is as follows:

Candidates	*Votes*
B	50 (elected)
F	50 (elected)
H	50 (elected)
D	50 (elected)
J	50 (elected)
L	49
C	42
Non-transferable papers	7
Total	348

Last vacancy. (Reg. 11 (2).) Candidate L is now elected without further transfer, as only one vacancy remains to be filled, and L's votes exceed the votes of C, the only other continuing candidate.

(Reg. 12.) The final result is that B, F, H, D, J and L are elected in the order stated.

Notice of result of poll. (Reg. 17.) The 'Result Sheet' shown on page 270, which is part of the Notice of the Result of the Poll, includes, in compliance with Regulation 17, a record of each transfer of votes and of the total number of votes credited to each candidate after each transfer, and of the order of priority of the elected candidates.

APPENDIX IV

Count No. 8

TRANSFER of J 's SURPLUS

Surplus – – – – – 9

Number of transferable papers – – 7

roportion to be transferred = $\frac{\text{Surplus}}{\text{Number of transferable papers}} = \frac{9}{7}$ *taken as* 1

Names of Candidates marked as the next available preference after elected candidate	*Papers of elected candidate (last parcel received) resorted to next available preference*	*Calculation of number of papers to be transferred as surplus—*		*Papers of elected candidate divided proportionally—*	
		Whole numbers	*Fractional parts*	*Number of papers transferred (largest fractions treated as whole numbers)*	*Number of papers retained for Quota of J (elected candidate)*
C	4	4	—	4	—
L	3	3	—	3	—
Total number of *transferable* papers	7	7		7	—
Number of *non-transferable* papers	8			2	6
Totals	15 (Total)			9 (Surplus)	6 (ForQuota)

RESULT SHEET (from Notice of the Result of the Poll)

Number of valid votes—348 Number of members to be elected—6

Quota (number of votes sufficient to secure the election of a candidate) $= \frac{348}{7} + 1 = 50$

Names of candidates	*1st Count*	*2nd Count*		*3rd Count*		*4th Count*		*5th Count*		*6th Count*		*7th Count*		*8th Count*		*Names of elected candidates and order of election*
	Votes polled by each candidate	*Transfer of B's surplus*	*Result*	*Transfer of D's surplus*	*Result*	*Transfer of F's surplus*	*Result*	*Transfer of A's and E's votes*	*Result*	*Transfer of K's votes*	*Result*	*Transfer of G's votes*	*Result*	*Transfer of J's surplus*	*Result*	
A	5		5		5	+ 1	6	− 6	—		—		—		—	
B	140	− 90	50		50		50		50		50		50		50	B (1st)
C	25		25		25	+ 2	27		27	+ 4	31	+ 7	38	+ 4	42	
D	10	+53	63	− 13	50		50		50		50		50		50	D (4th)
E	5	+ 1	6	+ 1	7		7	− 7	—		—		—		—	
F	62		62		62	− 12	50		50		50		50		50	F (2nd)
G	14		14		14		14	+ 7	21		21	− 21	—		—	
H	50		50		50		50		50		50		50		50	H (3rd)
J	13	+17	30	+11	41		41	+ 3	44	+15	59		59	− 9	50	J (5th)
K	—	+19	19	+ 1	20		20	+ 1	21	− 21	—		—		—	
L	24		24		24	+ 9	33		33	+ 1	34	+12	46	+ 3	49	L (6th)
Non-transferable papers	—		—		—		—	+ 2	2	+ 1	3	+ 2	5	+ 2	7	
Total	348		348		348		348		348		348		348		348	

APPENDIX IV

SECOND SCHEDULE

1. Form of Front of Ballot Paper

Election of.....

.....Members to be elected.

BALLOT PAPER

Mark order of preference in spaces below	*Names of Candidates*
	BROWN (John Brown, of 52, George Street, Bristol, Merchant).
	JONES, JOHN (John Jones, of 5, Mary Street, Bristol, Retired Teacher).
	JONES, WILLIAM DAVID (William David Jones, of 10, Charles Street, Bristol, Merchant).
	ROBERTSON (Henry Robertson, of 8, John Street, Bristol, Builder).
	THOMAS (Walter Thomas, of 23, Anne Street, Bristol, Painter).
	WILLIAMS (James Williams, of 5, William Street, Bristol, Labourer).

INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS

VOTE BY PLACING:

the figure 1 in the space provided opposite the name of the candidate who is your first choice; *and further (if you so desire)*

the figure 2 opposite the name of the candidate who is your second choice; *and further (if you so desire)*

the figure 3 opposite the name of the candidate who is your third choice; *and so on as far as you may choose.*

2. Instructions to Voters

The instructions to voters contained in the form of front of the ballot paper on page 271 set out in clear terms the method of recording a vote under the single transferable vote system. It is recommended, however, that further precautionary instructions such as the following should also in some wise be given.

2. It is advisable to go on marking the candidates in the order of your preference until you are indifferent as to the candidates whom you have not marked.

3. Your vote is transferable only if you make it so by indicating a choice or choices (2; or 2 and 3; or 2 and 3 and 4; and so on) in succession to your first choice. If you 'plump' for one candidate, that is, if you mark no further figure of preferences for any other candidate, you do not thereby give your first choice candidate a better chance of being elected. On the other hand, by so voting you make your vote non-transferable, and if the candidate of your first, and only, choice is defeated, your vote will not count for any candidate.

4. Crosses must NOT be used.

Further information of service to voters is contained in the directions for the guidance of the voter in voting and delivering his vote (see Regulation 4) which in public elections are posted in the polling compartments. In the case of electorates for which this form of communication is not available, the directions, or certain of them, may usefully be printed on the ballot paper, for example:

5. If you do not place the figure 1 on your ballot paper, or if you place the figure 1 opposite more than one name, or place the figure 1 (indicating a first preference) and some other figure opposite the same name, your ballot paper will be invalid and will not be counted.

6. If you inadvertently spoil your ballot paper you may return it to the presiding officer at the polling place [*or, in some cases,* to the returning officer], who will, if satisfied of such inadvertence, give you another paper.

In the case of elections where there is a large number of candidates, it is convenient to put the whole of the instructions to voters on the back of the ballot paper, together with a space for signature, if signature is required. In that event,

a notice calling attention to the instructions should be printed in bold type on the front of the ballot paper.

3. Examples of Marked Ballot Papers

A. Validly Marked Ballot Papers

1

	Allen
	Bell
1	Cox
	Dunn
	Ellis
	Ford
	Gilbert
	Holt
	James

2

	Allen
	Bell
	Cox
2	Dunn
	Ellis
1	Ford
	Gilbert
	Holt
	James

3

1	Allen
	Bell
6	Cox
4	Dunn
	Ellis
5	Ford
	Gilbert
3	Holt
2	James

4

	Allen
2	Bell
3	Cox
4	Dunn
5	Ellis
6	Ford
1	Gilbert
7	Holt
8	James

B. Invalidly Marked Ballot Papers

5

1	Allen
	Bell
	Cox
	Dunn
	Ellis
	Ford
	Gilbert
1	Holt
1	James

6

	Allen
	Bell
	Cox
x	Dunn
	Ellis
x	Ford
	Gilbert
	Holt
	James

7

	Allen
	Bell
1	Cox
3	Dunn
1	Ellis
2	Ford
	Gilbert
	Holt
	James

8

	Allen
	Bell
2	Cox
	Dunn
1[5]	Ellis
	Ford
4	Gilbert
3	Holt
	James

APPENDIX IV

C. Ballot Papers Valid up to a Point

9

	Allen
	Bell
	Cox
2	Dunn
1	Ellis
2	Ford
	Gilbert
	Holt
	James

9. Valid for first preference; thereafter non-transferable.

10

6	Allen
2	Bell
4	Cox
	Dunn
3	Ellis
	Ford
1	Gilbert
7	Holt
	James

10. Valid up to fourth preference; thereafter non-transferable.

For the validity of a ballot paper marked with a X against the name of one candidate only, see Regulation 3, note 3 (ii).

APPENDIX IV

THIRD SCHEDULE

Notice of the Result of the Poll

Election of.....

held on the.....day of..... 19.....

I, the undersigned, being the returning officer at the poll for the election of....., do hereby give notice that the result of the poll and of the transfer of votes is as follows:

Number of valid votes .....

Number of members to be elected .....

Quota (number of votes sufficient to secure the election of a candidate .....

Names of Candidates	*First Count*	*Second Count*		*Third Count*		*Fourth Count*				*Names of elected candidates and order of election*
	Votes polled by each candidate	*Transfer of*	*Result*	*Transfer of*	*Result*	*Transfer of*	*Result*			
Non-transferable papers										
Total		—		—		—		—		

And I do hereby declare that.....are duly elected.

Dated this.....day of.....19....

.....

Returning Officer

APPENDIX V

The 'Senatorial Rules'

The regulations under which the element of chance is entirely eliminated from the distribution of a surplus are contained in two documents concerning the election of the Irish Senate—British Statutory Rules and Orders No. 727 of 1921 and Irish Statutory Rules and Orders No. 32 of 1938. Much of what is contained in those regulations is of course covered by the standard regulations printed as Appendix IV; there are reproduced below only those parts of S.R. & O. 727 which lay down the *differences* in procedure.

SCHEDULE

Part I

Arrangement and counting of voting papers.

5. (2) For the purpose of facilitating the processes prescribed by these Rules, each valid voting paper shall be deemed to be of the value of one hundred.

Ascertainment of quota.

6. The returning officer shall add together the values in all the parcels and divide the full total value by a number exceeding by one the number of vacancies to be filled. The result increased by one, any fractional remainder being disregarded, shall be the number sufficient to secure the return of a candidate. This number is herein called the 'quota'.

Candidates with quota deemed elected.

7. If at the end of any count or at the end of the transfer of any parcel or sub-parcel of any excluded candidate, the value credited to a candidate is equal to or greater than the quota, that candidate shall be deemed to be elected.

Transfer of surplus.

8. (3) If the surplus is equal to or greater than the total value of the papers in the sub-parcels of transferable papers, the returning officer shall transfer each sub-parcel of transferable papers to the continuing candidate indicated thereon as the voter's next available preference, each

paper being transferred at the value at which it wa received by the candidate whose surplus is being transferred.

When the surplus is greater than the total value of the sub-parcels of transferable papers, the non-transferable papers shall be set aside as not effective, at a value which is equal to the difference between the surplus and the total value of the sub-parcels of transferable papers.

(4) If the surplus is less than the total value of the transferable papers, the returning officer shall transfer each paper in each sub-parcel of transferable papers to the continuing candidate indicated thereon as the voter's next available preference, and the value at which each paper shall be transferred shall be ascertained by dividing the surplus by the total number of transferable papers, fractional remainders being disregarded, except that the consequential loss of value shall be noted on the Result Sheet.

(5) A surplus which arises on the completion of any count shall be dealt with before a surplus which may arise at a subsequent count.

NOTE 1—There is no provision, as in the standard regulations, No. 9 (3), for omitting the transfer of a surplus too small to affect the next count.

Exclusion of candidates.

9. (2) (*a*) The parcel containing original votes shall first be transferred, the transfer value of each paper being one hundred.

(*b*) The sub-parcels containing transferred votes shall then be transferred in the order in which and at the value at which the excluded candidate obtained them.

(3) In the transfer of each parcel or sub-parcel a separate sub-parcel shall be made of the non-transferable papers, which shall be set aside at the value at which the excluded candidate obtained them.

(4) If, when a candidate has to be excluded under this Rule, two or more candidates are each credited with the same value and are lowest, regard shall be had to the total value of original votes credited to those candidates, and the candidate with the smallest total value shall be excluded, and where the total values are equal, regard shall be had to the total value credited to those candidates at the earliest count at which they had unequal values, and

the candidate with the smallest value at that count shall be excluded.

If two or more candidates are lowest and are each credited with the same value at all counts, the returning officer shall arrange the papers of such candidates according to the next available preferences recorded thereon for continuing candidates, including the candidates in question, and shall exclude that lowest candidate for whom the total values of next available preferences expressed is smallest, and if the total values of next available preferences recorded for two or more of the candidates in question are then equal and smallest, the returning officer shall determine by lot as between the candidates last mentioned which candidate shall be excluded.

> NOTE 2—There is no provision, as in the standard regulations, No. 10 (1) (*b*), for the exclusion of two or more candidates at the same count.

Anyone carrying out an election under these rules should be careful to read Rule 7 in conjunction with Rule 9 (2) (*a*) and (*b*), noting the words in Rule 7 '*or at the end of the transfer of any parcel or sub-parcel of an excluded candidate*'. If, for example, candidate A requires 23 to reach the quota, and among the papers of candidate B being eliminated there is one original paper (value 100) bearing a next available preference for A, that paper *only* is transferred to A; there may be among B's papers transferred papers also bearing a next preference for A, but these are not required to make up A's quota and are therefore transferred not to A but to the next available preference after A. Failure to observe this rule would mean that the returning officer would find himself in difficulties through having to transfer a surplus consisting of papers of different values.

Part II consists of an example of an election carried out by this method, and Part III gives the form of the voting paper and of the result sheet. (For the latter see p. 125.) There is reproduced opposite the form used in the transfer of a surplus.

APPENDIX V

Count No. ...

TRANSFER of 's SURPLUS

Value of each paper when credited to elected candidate.....

Transferable papers..... *Number*..... *Total Value*.....

Value of Surplus – – – – .....

ew value of each paper transferred:

$$\frac{\text{Surplus}}{\text{Number of transferable papers}} = \frac{\quad}{\quad} =$$

Names of Candidates who are next available preferences	*Number of papers transferred*	*Value of papers transferred*
Total		
Non-transferable papers Loss of value due to disregard of fractions	—	**
Totals		(Surplus)

* NOTE: *When the value of transferable papers is less than the surplus* (*a*) each transferable paper shall be transferred at the value at which it was credited to the elected candidate, (*b*) a number which is the difference between the surplus and the total value of the transferable papers shall be entered in the space marked with a double asterisk, and (*c*) all the non-transferable papers shall be set aside at the value of such difference, and this value shall be shown in the appropriate place in the Public Notice of the Result of the Election.

APPENDIX VI

The Swedish System

Sweden has no official ballot papers, though in practice the parties print their own lists of candidates and most voters use these. Any voter is at liberty to alter such a list by striking out names, adding others, or changing the order of the names, or he may write his own ballot paper.

Any ballot paper headed with the name or motto of a party is counted towards the total of votes for that party; any paper without such indication of party is counted only towards the individual totals of candidates named on it, such candidates being placed in a separate 'free group'. The seats won by each party are determined by the d'Hondt rule, and the candidates elected to those seats are determined by two methods. First, if more than half the supporters of the party have placed the same candidate first on their papers, he is elected; if more than two-thirds have placed the same two candidates first, those two have first claim to the party's seats, if more than three-quarters have placed the first three names first, those three have the first, second, and third seats, and so on. If at any time this rule breaks down, seats are filled by the 'reduction rule': the candidate with the highest number of votes is elected, the papers on which his name appears are marked down to a value of one-half, the relative positions of the remaining candidates are determined afresh and the highest of them is elected, and so on.

It will be seen that this system gives the party organization much less power than does, for example, the Belgian; in fact it may be held to give too much power to dissident groups, for it requires only a relatively small number of votes to displace a party's fourth or fifth candidate by another. (The same objection might be thought to apply to the single transferable vote, under which, if a party wins four seats, one-quarter of its voters can elect one of its candidates, but there is an important difference because a candidate favoured only by one-quarter of the

party does not automatically get the benefit of votes cast for the rest of that party's candidates, as he must do under any list system.)

THE DANISH SYSTEM

The greater part of the seats in the Folketing are filled by a system similar to the Belgian, in constituencies returning from two to seven members each; other seats are reserved for allocation to under-represented parties to make the total result as proportional as possible. The numbers of constituency and additional seats are now 105 and 44 respectively.

Details of the system have been modified from time to time, to increase the accuracy of representation and to check certain party manoeuvres. In 1947, one party made use of additional seats to increase instead of to diminish the inaccuracies due to election in small constituencies. The Venstre, being primarily an agricultural party, contested the country districts only, and won there, by direct election, eight seats more than its proportional share of the whole House. All the Copenhagen seats were contested by a nominally separate, but in reality allied party, the 'Liberal Party of the Capital', which won no seats by direct election but polled sufficient votes to secure 3 out of the 31 additional seats. The outcry that followed led to a reform of the system by raising the number of additional seats and by providing that a party winning in the constituencies more seats than it should have in proportion to its total vote should lose the excess seats.

The incident illustrates the difficulties inherent in party list systems, which demand a ruling as to what is and what is not a separate party.

APPENDIX VII

The Finnish System

The effect of the Finnish form of proportional representation is that the elector votes, as in all other party list systems, for a party, but within that party selects three candidates for his particular support, and of those three candidates give the first a whole vote, the second half a vote and the third one-third of a vote. Those three candidates may be entirely of the voter's own choosing—he may write their names on a blank space—and if, as he more often does, he accepts one of the combinations of three already printed for him, he may alter their order. The elector thus has great freedom of choice, although, as indicated below, the system is not proof against party manipulation.

The schedules of three are formed by nomination by not less than fifty electors in any constituency, and these schedules are usually combined in 'compacts' which are the party lists. Any one candidate may, and often does, appear in more than one schedule, which makes the number of candidates appear to be larger than it really is; no compact may contain more names than there are vacancies in that constituency. The schedules are printed as in the specimen compact shown on pages 283–4 and the voter simply marks one of these schedules, changing the order of the names if he wishes. As compared with the single transferable vote, this method gives the party organization more influence, because the voter has a particular order of three names suggested to him, and accepts this order unless he takes special steps to alter it; the voter's influence, however, is very much greater than under any system in which the entire list of a party's candidates is presented to him in a given order. A party has been known to secure the election of a candidate favoured by its organization, by placing him second on a large number of schedules, each of these schedules being made attractive to voters in a certain locality by having as its first name that of a candidate of strong local popularity.

APPENDIX VII

The returning officer first determines the order of the candidates within each party's compact, by adding up the votes each candidate has got from each schedule on which he appears. For instance, if 6,000 people have voted for schedule 1 as it stands, and 5,000 for schedule 35 as its stands, then Schybergson will have 6,000 votes from the first source and 2,500 from the second. In the order thus determined, the first candidate is credited with a number of votes equal to the total of voters who have supported the compact on which he appears, the second with half this number, and so on through the whole list of candidates —a process essentially similar to the Belgian. Thus, within any one constituency, all the candidates of all the parties are placed in a numerical order, and if there are 23 vacancies in that constituency the first 23 candidates in that order will be elected. This, however, is subject to one reservation: this order may be, and sometimes is, changed by the addition to a candidate's total of votes from outside his party. A candidate's name may appear in more than one compact, or in isolated schedules not included in a compact, or on written papers handed in by independent voters.

FINNISH GENERAL ELECTION, 1907
(the first under the existing system)

Part of a ballot paper of the Nyland Division—the Voters' Compact of the Swedish People's Party

1 HELSINGFORS Experienced Members of the Diet:	33 EAST NYLAND-LOUISA Justice and Progress:	34 MID-NYLAND-NICKBY The Welfare of the Rural population:
—Schybergson, E. E. —Neovius, A. W. —Soderholm, K. G.	—Rosenquist, G. G. —Stromberg, J. —Ehrnrooth, L.	—Topelius, G. L. —Alfthan, K. von —Rosenquist, B. T.
35 MID-NYLAND-ESBO The Welfare of the Rural Population:	36 WEST NYLAND-KYRK-SLATT The Welfare of the Rural Population:	37 WEST NYLAND-EKENAS The Welfare of the Rural Population. Law and Justice:
—Wasastjerna, O. —Schybergson, E. —Soderholm, K.	—Nordberg, G. —Ehrnrooth, L. —Oljemark, K. T.	—Oljemark, K. T. —Schybergson, E. —Soderholm, K.

APPENDIX VII

38 BORGA Knowledge and Experience:	39 HELSINGFORS Sound Development of the Community:	40 HELSINGFORS Law and Justice:
—Runeberg, J. W.	—Westermarck, Helena	—Soderholm, K.
—Bjorkenheim, G.	—Rosenquist, B.T.	—Alfthan, K. von
—Rosenquist, G. G.	—Bjorkenheim, G.	—Westermarck, Helena
41 HELSINGFORS Legality and Progress:	42 HELSINGFORS Swedish Culture:	43 HELSINGFORS Friends of Labour and of the People:
—Westermarck, Helena	—Rosenquist, B.T.	—Alfthan, K. von
—Neovius, A.	—Gustafsson, F. prof.	—Gustafsson, F. prof.
—Ehrnrooth, L.	—Soderholm, K.	—Gronroos, F.
44 HELSINGFORS Experience and Practical Knowledge:	45 HELSINGFORS The Labourers' Welfare:	46 HELSINGFORS Commerce and Industry:
—Runeberg, J. W.	—Ahlroos, F.	—Heimburger, W. F.
—Schybergson, E.	—Holmberg, W.	—Bjorkenheim, G.
—Neovius, A.	—Ehrnrooth, L.	—Schybergson, E.

47 THE SKERRIES OF NYLAND: HELSINGFORS Navigation and Fisheries:	48 THE PROVINCE OF NYLAND: HELSINGFORS Temperance, Morality and Popular Education:
—Hjelt, Th.	—Sohlberg, H.
—Reuter, O.	—Ahlroos, F.
—Alfthan, K.	—Rosenquist, G. G.

APPENDIX VIII

Points System

No recorded examples are known of this system in actual use; three theoretical illustrations will show how it may fail to give a fair result. Each of these illustrations uses that form of the method in which the elected candidates are those with the lowest totals of preferences (see page 82).

Example I

Best candidate may be defeated
Two to elect out of five candidates

	Candidates and Preferences				
	A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*
No. 1 Voter	1	2	3	4	5
No. 2 ,,	1	3	2	4	5
No. 3 ,,	1	3	4	2	5
No. 4 ,,	5	1	2	3	4
No. 5 ,,	5	3	1	2	4
Total	13	12	12	15	23

The elected candidates are B and C, with a value of 12 each, but A, who polled three first preferences, could defeat either on a straight fight by three votes to two.

APPENDIX VIII

Example II

No security for fair representation

Four to elect out of five candidates

	Candidates and Preferences				
	A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*
No. 1 Voter	1	2	3	4	5
„ 2 „	1	2	3	4	5
„ 3 „	1	2	3	4	5
„ 4 „	4	1	2	3	5
„ 5 „	4	1	2	3	5
„ 6 „	4	1	2	3	5
„ 7 „	3	4	1	2	5
„ 8 „	3	4	1	2	5
„ 9 „	3	4	1	2	5
„ 10 „	2	3	4	1	5
„ 11 „	2	3	4	1	5
„ 12 „	2	3	4	1	5
„ 13 „	2	3	4	5	1
„ 14 „	2	3	4	5	1
„ 15 „	2	3	4	5	1
„ 16 „	2	3	4	5	1
Total	38	42	46	50	64

E has the support (first preferences) of four voters out of the sixteen. Under a proportional system he is entitled to be elected as one of the four representatives. But party ABCD, by voting according to plan, can ensure E's defeat. In the example, the total value of preferences for A, or B, or C, or D is less than the total value of preferences for E.

Example III

The representation obtained by a party depends on the way its voters distribute their preferences among that party's candidates—a highly disciplined party, which can arrange that approximately equal numbers of first preferences go to each of its candidates while the other party's candidates are marked in roughly the same order, may get more seats than a larger party whose voters follow their own inclinations—especially if this larger party has one outstandingly popular candidate.

APPENDIX VIII

There are three to be elected and each of two parties puts up ree candidates. The party with three voters elects candidates and C; the party with four voters elects only candidate D.

	Candidates and Preferences					
	A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*
No. 1 Voter	1	2	3	4	5	6
,, 2 ,,	2	3	1	4	5	6
,, 3 ,,	3	1	2	4	6	5
,, 4 ,,	4	5	6	1	2	3
,, 5 ,,	4	6	5	1	2	3
,, 6 ,,	6	5	4	1	3	2
,, 7 ,,	5	6	4	1	3	2
Total votes	25	28	25	16	26	27

APPENDIX IX

Election of One Person by a Majority

Though the alternative vote is the commonest method of securing election by a clear majority, it is not the method likely to give the most general satisfaction. For instance, in an election in which first preferences are given as follows:

Black	14
Gray	2
White	15

Gray will be eliminated and the second preferences of his two supporters will decide between Black and White. It may be argued, however, that this is unsatisfactory, since the final result can please only just over half the voters, the other half being very displeased—while if Gray were elected it might be that all the voters would be reasonably satisfied.

There are methods which do not inevitably defeat the candidate who is everyone's second preference; their relative merits are discussed by J. R. Bainbridge (*Public Administration* (Australia), December 1947, p. 418), Duncan Black (*Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, May 1949, p. 158) and J. F. S. Ross (*Parliamentary Affairs*, Summer 1953, p. 277). One such method is that of Borda[1], in which a certain number of points is awarded to a candidate for each first preference he obtains, a smaller number of points for each second preference, and so on, the winner being the candidate with the largest total of points. This method has decided merits, but is still open to one of the objections raised against the points system for filling several vacancies: the result may depend on the relative values assigned to preferences. In the above example, supposing Gray to be the second choice of both Black's and White's supporters, if first, second and third preferences are valued in

[1] Put forward in a paper read to the Académie Royale des Sciences, 16 June 1770, and published in the *Histoire de l'Académie Royale des Sciences* for 1781. This appears to be the first proposal for preferential voting.

arithmetical progression 2, 1 and 0 or 3, 2 and 1 respectivel,, Gray will be elected; if, however, they are valued in geometrical progression 4, 2, and 1, he must lose. (And it may well be argued that the geometrical progression is the more logical, since it makes the ratio between one preference and the next independent of the number of candidates.)

The assigning of values to preferences is avoided in the methods proposed by E. J. Nanson (Royal Society of Victoria, 1882; *Proportional Representation* by Hoag and Hallett, page 491) and by G. H. Hallett, jnr. (ibid, page 494). Those desiring sufficient detail to enable them to use these methods should refer to Hoag and Hallett's book; the principle employed is as follows:—

The first count in the above example shows that the number of voters wanting White most is greater than the number wanting Black or Gray most. If on the second count we eliminate Gray and transfer his supporters' votes, we find out which of the two—Black or White—is preferred by most of the voters when they have no other choice; if both of Gray's votes go to Black, Black will be elected instead of White. But we do not know how many people prefer Black to Gray or Gray to White; to discover this we must also eliminate White and Black in turn. If, then, it happens that all the 'Whites' detest the 'Blacks' and vice versa but each of those groups finds it can get along quite well with the 'Grays', the result of our operations will be:

	First Count	*Eliminate Gray*	*Eliminate White*	*Eliminate Black*
Black	14	16	14	—
Gray	2	—	17	16
White	15	15	—	15

That is, Black is preferred to White but not to Gray, White is not preferred to either, and Gray is preferred to either Black or White. Gray is therefore elected.

The same principle can be applied to the election of more than one person at a time; this possibility is discussed by Bainbridge but he considers it inadvisable. One reason for rejecting it is that the added complication is not worth while: when only one person is being elected, the Nanson method is very likely to give a different result from the alternative vote, but with an increasing number of seats and of candidates the likelihood of this decreases rapidly. In an election for three or more seats, it very seldom

happens that the candidate who is bottom of the poll, and who remains bottom after the distribution of any surpluses, can show any evidence of being widely acceptable to the voters. The other consideration is that the election of a compromise candidate is less desirable when the body being elected includes two or more different opinions. When either Black or White can be elected, but not both, Gray may serve the whole body of voters better than either, but a committee that includes both White and Black will feel less need for Gray. When both White's and Black's supporters are represented by their first choice, there is not the same reason for wishing to have them represented also by their second choice.

APPENDIX X

Proposals in the British Parliament for Reform of the Voting System

1832. Limited Vote for Parliamentary elections (Mackworth Praed). Rejected.

1854. Limited Vote for Parliamentary elections (Lord John Russell). Bill dropped.

1867. Cumulative Vote for Parliamentary elections (Robert Lowe). Rejected.
Limited Vote for Parliamentary elections (Lord Cairns). Adopted.

1870. Cumulative Vote for School Board elections (Lord Frederick Cavendish). Adopted.

1872. Bill for Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote in Parliamentary elections (Walter Morrison). Rejected.

1888. Amendment to Bill setting up County Councils, to introduce Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote (Sir John Lubbock). Rejected.

1907. Municipal Representation Bill (Lord Courtney) for the optional use of Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote in municipal elections. Referred to Select Committee.

1908. Municipal Representation Bill, amended in accordance with Select Committee's recommendations, passed by House of Lords.
Alternative Vote Bills (J. M. Robertson, Dundas White, Dunn). No facilities.

1909. Municipal Representation Bill introduced in House of Commons (James Gibb). No facilities.

1910. Municipal Representation Bill reintroduced (Aneurin Williams). No facilities. Preliminary resolution carried.

Alternative Vote Bill (Crawshay Williams). No facilities.
School Board Elections (Scotland) Bill (W. Phipson Beale), to replace the cumulative vote by the single transferable vote. No facilities.
Royal Commission on Electoral Systems reported that the case for applying Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote to Parliamentary elections had not been proved conclusively but that municipal elections afforded a good field for testing it.

1911. House of Lords Reconstitution Bill (Lord Lansdowne), for partly elected House, using Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote.
Muncipal Representation Bill reintroduced (J. M. Robertson).
Alternative Vote Bill (Crawshay Williams) reintroduced.

1912. Deputation to Government on Irish Home Rule Bill; amendments incorporating Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable vote accepted.
Proportional Representation Bill (R. D. Holt). No facilities.

1913. Proportional Representation Bill reintroduced (L. S. Amery). No facilities.
Municipal Representation Bill reintroduced (H. G. Chancellor) under ten-minute rule. No facilities.
School Board Elections (Scotland) Bill reintroduced (Sir W. Phipson Beale). No facilities.

1914. Municipal Representation Bill reintroduced in House of Lords and passed.
Deputation to President of Local Government Board (Herbert Samuel) on Municipal Representation Bill. Promise of inquiry by Select Committee; stopped by war.

1916. Speaker's Conference on Electoral Reform. Recommended Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote; incorporated in Representation of the People Bill, 1917.

1917. Representation of the People Bill established Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote for the election of nine University M.P.s; application to the election of 211 M.P.s in urban areas defeated by 7 on a free vote.

1918. Scottish Education Act; established Proportional Repre-

sentation by the Single Transferable Vote for the new Education Authorities.

Sligo Corporation Act, prescribing Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote for election of Town Council.

House of Lords committee drew up schedule of P.R. constituencies for experimental use under Representation of the People Act, 1918. Rejected by House of Commons.

1919. Local Elections (P.R.) Bill passed House of Lords.

Local Government (Ireland) Act. Prescribed Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote for all local government elections in Ireland.

1920. Government of Ireland Act. Prescribed Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote for all Irish Parliamentary elections.

Local Elections (P.R.) Bill (Lord Parmoor) passed House of Lords. Starred by Government, but no time given in Commons.

P.R. amendment to Representation of the People Act, 1918. Defeated.

Proportional Representation Bill (A. C. Morrison-Bell). No facilities.

1921. Local Elections (P.R.) Bill reintroduced and passed House of Lords.

Proportional Representation Bill (Sir T. Bramsdon). Defeated.

1922. Proportional Representation Bill (A. C. Morrison-Bell) won a place in private members' ballot but too low for further progress.

Local Elections (P.R.) Bill reintroduced in Commons.

1923. Local Elections (P.R.) Bill reintroduced (Harold Morris) and obtained second reading debate; defeated by 169 to 157.

Local Elections (Alternative Vote) Bill (Dr. Chapple). No facilities.

1924. Bill to amend Representation of the People Act, 1918, by introducing Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote (Athelstan Rendall). Defeated.

1927. Debate on electoral reform in the House of Lords.

1928. Motion for an enquiry (Earl Grey) discussed in House of Lords. No action by Government.

Proposal for reform of House of Lords (Earl of Clarendon), including 150 Peers elected by P.R. or Cumulative Vote. Specific proposal rejected, but principle of fair representation of parties endorsed.

1930. Report of Ullswater Conference. Division on party lines; no agreed recommendation.

1931. Alternative Vote Bill, promoted by Labour Government, with Liberals supporting it as a second best. Passed House of Commons but did not become law owing to fall of Government.

1932. Local Elections (P.R.), Bill reintroduced (Robert Bernays). Talked out.

1933. Bill for reform of House of Lords (Lord Salisbury), including election by Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote.
House of Commons; motion for reform (H. Holdsworth) talked out.

1936. Metropolitan Borough Councils (P.R.) Bill—non-adoptive—applying Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote to the Metropolitan Boroughs (Sir Percy Harris). Application to London only resisted by Government.

1937. Local Elections (P.R.) Bill—non-adoptive—applying Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote to Metropolitan Boroughs, County Boroughs and London County Council (Sir William Wayland).

1938. Second reading counted out.
Local Elections (P.R.) Bill reintroduced (T. E. Harvey). No time available.

1940. Local Government and Register of Electors Bill; T.E. Harvey pressed unsuccessfully for inclusion of P.R.
Motion in House of Lords (Lord Rea) for Speaker's Conference.
London Government Bill; amendment (T. E. Harvey) for P. R. rejected.

1943. Motion for conference on electoral reform (G. W. Rickards).

1944. Speaker's Conference. Division on party lines, both in Conference and in Parliamentary debates. Reform rejected.

1948. Representation of the People Bill. Various amendments

to introduce P.R. for Parliamentary and London County Council elections; none successful.

1950. Following general election, request by Winston Churchill (Leader of the Conservative Opposition) for an inquiry by a Select Committee. Rejected by Labour Government and not supported by Churchill's party.

1954. Representation of the People (St. Albans) Bill, for the use of the alternative vote for an experimental period of ten years. Introduced by John Grimston, M.P. for St. Albans. Counted out.

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