UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_148860

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

This book is presented

by

The Government of the United States

as an expression of

Friendship and Goodwill

of the

People of the United States

towards

The People of India

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. Accession No.

Author

Title

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

SOCIOLOGY

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

By

THOMAS CARSON McCORMICK

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

THE RONALD PRESS COMPANY / NEW YORK

Copyright, 1950, by
THE RONALD PRESS COMPANY

All Rights Reserved

The text of this publication or any part thereof may not be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without permission in writing from the publisher.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To My Daughters

Virginia, Mary, and Lillie

PREFACE

This introductory textbook narrows the subject matter of sociology somewhat more than is usually done to a study of the structure and dynamics of the more important social relationships, especially in our society. Such a definition of the field of sociology has the advantage of distinguishing it more clearly from the fields of related social sciences. The assumption here has been that the function of an introductory text is not to exhaust any topic, but rather to guide the discussion, to stimulate it, and to give the student some confidence in his grasp of the main ideas involved.

Every effort has been made to simplify an abstract and sometimes confusing body of material, and to limit the text to those topics which have some significance for beginning students in giving them added insights into themselves and the society in which they live. This author heartily subscribes to the educational dictum that no subject can have much meaning for a student unless it is related to his present knowledge and experience. He has, therefore, not hesitated to turn the discussion toward current issues. The assimilation of minority groups, crime, the role of government, differential fertility, war, and economic opportunity are used to illustrate sociological concepts, and the author has tried to give familiar examples of all important concepts.

One noticeable feature of this text is its relatively free use of quotations for presenting a point or for illustrating or supporting an exposition. By this means the student is brought into direct contact with a representative body of source materials. It is believed that they will help to relieve the style of the textbook writer and to give him support in a field which is not yet an entirely impersonal system of knowledge.

This book has a definitely sociopsychological point of view. Social acts are regarded as having both covert and overt aspects,

neither of which is understandable without taking the other into account. The process of communication-interaction is considered as basic to all human relations, their formation, development, and continuation. Attitudes, values, and prejudices are regarded as being among the most important of sociological phenomena, without which no group can be adequately described. The social process consists of cooperative, competitive, and conflicting behavior. It also includes the development of patterns of relationship or social structures. In this cultural framework the individual becomes a social personality and exhibits the consequences of social learning as it acts upon a biological organism. Although the generally accepted ideas about the importance of the group are given their usual emphasis, nevertheless the individual here remains the ultimate dynamic unit in the social process, however much he may be influenced by others in his group, past and present. Thus the deviant personality and group are accounted for without introducing any new concepts.

As is well known, much basic sociology still rests only upon shrewd observations and penetrating or profound insights. It is this general sociological viewpoint, however, which has deeply influenced modern thought and is constantly being validated in many formal and informal ways. The student will here find a number of empirical studies which help to establish or illustrate the topics of the text. He will not find any attempt at rigorous or systematic statistical treatment, simply because the author does not believe that the field of sociology is ready for quantitative presentation.

At the end of each chapter is a list of questions on the text, and a brief bibliography of further readings, for the convenience of those teachers who may not prefer their own.

The author is indebted to many writers for their direct, as well as indirect, contributions to this text. Each quotation is used with the generous permission of the authors and their publishers, and an attempt has been made to give full acknowledgment in every case.

Madison, Wisconsin
March, 1950

THOMAS C. MCCORMICK

CONTENTS

PART I

The Social Conditioning of Personality

CHAPTER		PAGE
1	ORIGINS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR	3
2	THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY	18

PART II

Social Organization

3	THE PAIR RELATION	45
4	RELATIONS WITHIN A GROUP	66
5	RELATIONS BETWEEN GROUPS	91
6	SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND DISORGANIZATION	105

PART III

Social Stratification

7	SOCIAL CLASSES	135
8	CLASS ORIGINS, PERPETUATION, AND TRENDS	154
9	SOCIAL MOBILITY AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE	176

PART IV

Social Segregation and Deviation

10	BIRACIAL STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED STATES	201
11	EXTRALEGAL PATTERNS	231

PART V

Culture

CHAPTER PAGE
12 HUMAN RELATIONS IN DIFFERENT SOCIETIES . . . 255
13 CAUSES OF VARIATION IN PATTERNS OF RELATIONSHIP . 269
14 CULTURE PATTERNS AND CULTURE AREAS . . . 284
15 CULTURE CONTACTS AND ASSIMILATION . . . 299

PART VI

Some Major Social Institutions

16 THE FAMILY 325
17 THE FAMILY (*Continued*) 347
18 THE NEIGHBORHOOD AND THE COMMUNITY . . . 367
19 THE COMMUNITY (*Continued*) 382
20 RELIGION 404
21 EDUCATION AND COMMUNICATION 426
22 WAR: CAUSES AND PREVENTION 451
23 WAR: SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 470

PART VII

Social Change

24 SOCIAL CHANGE 497
25 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 514
26 LEADERSHIP 531
INDEX OF NAMES 553
INDEX OF SUBJECTS 557

ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE		PAGE
1.	Diagram of organization for a state department of public welfare	83
2.	Proportion of the population of the United States in various age groups	128
3.	Children born per 100 wives under 45 years of age, according to usual occupation of husband	159
4.	Educational status in relation to birth rates in 1935 among wives 15-44 years of age, by nativity and color	161
5.	Family income and birth rates in 1935 among wives 15-44 years of age	162
6.	Estimated net reproduction rates for broad occupational classes	165
7.	Shifts in occupations, 1870-1930	171
8.	Number of persons in family and number of pair relationships between them	339
9.	This shows the Cottage Grove surveyed area	387
10.	Chart showing blood relationships of one church of the Cottage Grove area	389
11.	Chart showing blood relationships of families (of various and no-church) who are next-door neighbors to the families of Figure 10	391
12.	Teter's conception of the generalized city pattern	397
13.	Monthly variation in marriages in large American cities, 1940-1948	474
14.	Number of scientific discoveries and inventions, 1400 to 1900, by twenty-year periods	502
15.	Real income per head of occupied population, five Euro-American countries	503
16.	Rise of the sensate wave in Europe	506

TABLES

TABLE		PAGE
1.	Health of husbands before marriage and their marital adjustment: percentages	11
2.	Estimated population per square mile and daily per-capita income for several nations	100
3.	Class composition of religious bodies, 1945-1946	149
4.	Children under five per 1,000 native white women, aged 20-44 years for cities of different sizes, United States, 1940	158
5.	Standardized fertility rates, 1929-1932, for white urban families classified by occupational status and employment	160
6.	Number of children under 5 years old per 1,000 men 20 to 59 years old, standardized for age of man by marital and employment status and occupation group of man: United States, 1947	168
7.	Number of children under 5 years old per 1,000 women 15 to 49 years old, standardized for age of women, by years of school completed and marital status of women: United States, 1947	169
8.	Number of employees per million of population, United States, 1850 and 1930	172
9.	Comparative occupational "inheritance" in various urban occupational strata	178
10.	Occupational origins of a sample of today's urban labor force	179
11.	Actual and preferred occupations of 5,143 employed youths in Maryland	181
12.	Migrants who moved from one county to another, United States, 1935 to 1940, by age	189
13.	Occupations of employed Negro and white males, 1940	206
14.	Arrests by race, 1947, per 100,000 population	235
15.	Crude marriage rate per 1,000 population, United States, 1910-1946	331
16.	Males per 100 females for the United States, urban and rural: 1940	331
17.	Males per 100 females for the United States, by race and nativity: 1940	332

TABLE PAGE
18. Crude birth rates, United States, 1920-1941 337
19. Percentage of families with no children under 18, by age of male head, married, wife present, United States, 1940 . . 340
20. Net reproduction rates by color for the United States, urban and rural, at different dates 349
21. Marital status of females 14 years old and over in the labor force, 1940 355
22. Per cent of married women (husband present) eighteen to forty-four years old in the labor force by number of children under ten years old: 1940 356
23. Per cent of married women in the labor force in 1940, by husband's wage or salary income in 1939 and number of children under ten years old 356
24. Estimated divorce rate, United States, 1890-1945 . . . 358
25. Estimated divorce rates per 1,000 population, by states: 1947 359
26. Table for predicting adjustment in marriage, from duration of acquaintance before marriage: method of Burgess and Cottrell 362
27. Number of neighboring acquaintances and associates of fifty-four residents of a single square block 369
28. Organization and membership by sex 393
29. Percentage school attendance, by age, for the United States: 1940 431
30. Percentage of persons 25 years old and over, by years of school completed, for the United States: 1940 432
31. Employment status of the population by sex, for the United States: 1940 440
32. Proportion preferring radio as source of news at times of crisis and normal times 446
33. Birth rate per 1,000 population, in the United States and certain other countries, 1937 to 1946 475
34. Sorokin's estimates of war casualties from the twelfth to the twentieth century, World War I, inclusive 477
35. Mortality data for selected countries of Europe, 1943 to 1947, compared with prewar years 480
36. Civilian crude death rates per 1,000 inhabitants, 1937-1946 . 481
37. Regions of the United States, by rank in population density and in proportion of *Who's Who* notables: 1920-1930 . . 509
38. The social origin distribution of men and women in the sample by activity choices 544

PART I

THE SOCIAL CONDITIONING OF PERSONALITY

CHAPTER 1

ORIGINS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

Sociology is interested in social behavior, especially the systems of responses which are customary between members of a society. These systems are commonly referred to in sociological literature as "patterns of interaction." They may also be thought of as types of relationships between individuals and groups of individuals. Examples would be the usual or customary relationships between husbands and wives, fathers and sons, officers and privates, governors and governed, etc., as they occur among, say, an Indian tribe, among the Germans, or among ourselves. Underlying all attempts to understand and predict behavior of this kind are a few basic assumptions and principles, most of them drawn from psychology, which should be familiar to the student. For this reason, we shall begin our study of sociology with a summary of these fundamental ideas, so that they will be available from the first, and will not have to be repeated in the various contexts where they will be needed later.

The Human Organism.—Man is a form of animal life with definite biological characteristics and endowments. In his organic structure lie the fundamental motives of all his behavior, his ultimate abilities, and his limitations. Because of his upright posture and his hand development, he is able to handle objects in a way that few other animals can. His chief distinction, however, lies in his highly developed nervous system.

Soon after birth, and thenceforth, the life processes of every animal require food and water, elimination of waste products, maintenance of a fairly high body temperature, and a certain amount of sleep. As maturity approaches another organic need appears in the form of a pressure for sexual activity. Through

his nervous system an animal is equipped with powers of sensation that indicate each of these physiological needs to him, and, according to whether the body tones are agreeable or disagreeable, inform him whether or not the needs are being met. But the higher animals, and especially man, differ from the lower animals in the nervous mechanisms by means of which they are able to supply their bodily requirements. Some birds, for instance, are born with a number of ready-made patterns of behavior which enable them, when adults, to build nests, sing songs, etc., just as their ancestors did. These complex, unlearned behavior patterns are called *instincts.* In advanced animals like the anthropoid apes, on the other hand, it appears that even such a basic organic process as sex activity does not become defined merely as a result of *maturation,* but requires also *learning.*

What is true of the anthropoid apes, man's closest relatives, is still truer of man himself. Students of the human infant find merely a living system of organic pressures (e.g., intestinal, kidney), sensations (e.g., hunger, pain), release of energy into various types of mass activities (e.g., squirming, rolling of head, kicking), and specific activities (e.g., batting the eyelids, crying, sucking). As a child gets older, the maturing of his physical and nervous structures, supplemented in varying degrees by practice or learning, enable him at the proper time to walk, talk, and perform many new acts with his hands, head, legs. It is chiefly through repetitive trial learning that he acquires the finer, more detailed, and specific skills and patterns, or habits of thought and behavior that characterize an adult. In its ability to learn, the human organism far surpasses all other animals.[1] The extent of learning in man, however, depends not only upon his biological equipment, which is determined by heredity, but also upon the opportunity which the environment gives the individual organism to develop its powers.

Heredity and Environment.—The relative amount of influence which heredity and learning, or environment, each exerts

[1] W. N. and L. A. Kellogg, *The Ape and the Child* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.), 1933.

upon the formation of the specific behavior patterns of human beings in general is not known. Even the meaning of such a distinction, as usually drawn, is not clear:

> What answer can be given to the question so frequently asked—Which is more important, heredity or environment, for the mind and behavior of man? This question can be given a rational meaning . . . only by converting it into a statistical question—Are more of the present differences in mentality and behavior the result of original diversities in genes, or of diversities in environment: diversities in education, social status, cultural state of the society in which men live, tradition, custom and the like? No one can give numerical answers to this question.[2]

Biology completely determines race and sex, and is primarily responsible for physical characteristics like eye color, nose shape, mouth form, and stature. The basic quality of any human brain also depends upon heredity:

> . . . alteration of a single gene may produce feeblemindedness . . . there is strong evidence that proneness to certain types of insanity depends upon certain genes borne by the individuals of particular families, since such insanity "runs in" these families. . . . We know further that such matters as dullness, stupidity, and their opposites, various diversities of temperament, and the like, depend on the genes. For they are known to depend on the nature, quality and quantity of certain of the internal secretions or hormones; and these latter in turn depend on the genes. . . .[3]

Such sciences as zoology, psychology, and medicine concern themselves wholly or partly with the physiological aspects of human behavior. Sociology studies human relationships primarily as they are influenced by accumulative experience or learning, although it necessarily takes some note of the influence of the biological factors of race, sex, age, individual heredity, and the bodily sensations of pain and pleasure. Since learning bears the burden of sociological analysis, it is important to have a good idea of the process whereby a human infant is changed from a purely biological phenomenon into a social being, with

[2] Reprinted from *The Biological Basis of Human Nature*, p. 180, by H. S. Jennings, by permission of W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. Copyright 1930 by the publishers.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 156.

all of the complex acquired characteristics peculiar to the members of a society.

The Principles of Learning.—The known principles of learning are reducible to a few essential ideas. The infant organism is stimulated by a sensation from within or from without by means of some kind of impact upon its nervous tissue. The stimulation may typically result from gas in the intestine, the chemical action of digesting food, the pressure of the bladder, the touch of the mother's hand, sudden contact with cold air, the striking of light waves against the eye, or the prick of a pin. The sensation caused by the *stimulus,* whatever it may be, is carried by the receiving nerves to the central nervous system, i.e., the brain or spinal cord. In the brain or spine, the sensation is noted and/or an impulse is reflected back to the muscles, liberating energy and transforming it into action. In early infancy the responses are gross body movements, waving of arms or legs, crying, urination, etc.

Some of these responses, like urination or crying, represent reflexes. These are simple unlearned, automatic behavior mechanisms that are set off by appropriate stimuli. Even the jerkings of the limbs are not entirely random or unrelated to the nature of the sensations experienced by the infant organism, although there is certainly a good deal of the hit-or-miss about them. If a toe is pinched, the foot is instantly jerked away. But if pain is applied to any part, and is not relieved by squirming or kicking, the continued unpleasant stimulation will finally cause crying. When the stimulation is due to hunger, crying may be the immediate response. Thus from the first the baby modifies its behavior if the latter does not relieve the tension. When a certain response, such as crying because of hunger, is followed by satisfying results (feeding), the spasmodic action of the organism subsides.

The nervous tissue of the infant's body records, or remembers, its experiences, and associates one part of the experience with other parts that accompanied it. In this way the baby gradually connects exciting sensations with certain responses that did or did not change them into quieting sensations. It

selects the satisfying responses for repetition and the unsuccessful responses for avoidance. In the course of time, by virtue of endless experimenting and testing of newly discovered relationships, the child is able to develop detailed, well coordinated, and effective patterns of behavior for satisfying its physiological needs.

Derived Needs and Values.—It is not long before needs that seem to be more psychological than physiological make their appearance. The child begins to cry for his mother when he is not hungry. How does the mere presence or absence of his mother come to have a value for him? The answer is usually given in terms of associative learning. The object, "mother," becomes connected in the child's mind with various satisfactions, notably those of feeding, relief of muscular fatigue through change of body position, and so on. The image of the mother therefore acquires agreeable emotional tones which make it pleasant and desirable in itself. In fact, the recall of pleasant experiences often seems to us more satisfying than the original experiences themselves, because the latter were usually accompanied by some pain that is later submerged in memory. If the presence of the mother continues to be associated with acts that have agreeable consequences for the child, the emotion of "love" for the mother will be built up, until the safety and welfare of the mother may become a matter of the greatest concern to the child. This is an "acquired" value, one that has evolved from the simple sensations of the infant organism, but which is on a different level from them—the psychological level instead of the merely physiological. The child has now added a new need of a different sort to his original and elementary needs for food, warmth, relief from pain, etc. This is the acquired need to protect and care for his mother.

Although acquired needs and values in great numbers are created in the unfolding of every human experience, no particular acquired value is inevitable. In some cases children do not learn to love their mothers because they may never have known them, or because their mothers neglected or abused them. Where love for the mother is lacking it may be because she is associated

with unpleasant experiences. Thus, the acquired values that people happen to have depend entirely upon their experiences. Consequently, acquired values differ widely from one society to another, between social classes, between the sexes, and to a lesser extent, between individuals of the same sex and class in the same society.

Queerly enough, even the elementary physiological needs and appetites of the human organism are directed and profoundly modified, sometimes frustrated and denied, by acquired values. Although the appetite of hunger and the digestive apparatus are the same in American Indians as in Americans of European descent, the latter are sickened at the idea of eating the flesh of dogs, which is often served at certain tribal feasts. The very desire to maintain life itself is overcome by the custom of harakiri among the Japanese, who painfully destroy themselves by twisting a knife in the belly, for the sake of what they consider propriety and honor. Thousands of men and women of our own society for centuries have voluntarily denied the impulse of sex throughout their lives, because of religious teachings which led them to become priests and nuns.

Naturally, to create psychological values which conflict with original nature, stronger rewards and punishments (*sanctions*) are required than are necessary to create values which are in accord with it. It is easier to teach children to enjoy games and sports that release their pent-up physical energies than it is to teach them to enjoy the bodily restraint and mental effort of Greek grammar or algebra, but the latter has been accomplished by imposing effective social sanctions. Learning how to satisfy bodily needs is motivated by automatic sanctions in the form of agreeable or disagreeable physical sensations that result from successful and unsuccessful attempts. The same sanctions, physical pain or satisfaction, are basic to all learning in very early life, and necessarily tend to limit the behavior of the organism. After infancy the role of acquired values as sanctions becomes more and more important. People come to be influenced in what they do chiefly by the praise and acclaim of their fellows on the one hand, by the dread of blame, contempt, and ostracism on the other.

Praise and reproof soon become substitutes for corporal reward and punishment with human beings; and experimental checking of the effect of encouraging and discouraging comments on school pupils' work tends to verify the commonly practised notion—both praise and reproof were of value in facilitating the learning.[4]

Many acquired values become needs as real as the need for food or sleep. Such is the need to save the life of one's child. Since every act is automatically or consciously undertaken to satisfy a need, it is not surprising that there should be a general impulse or "set" to finish any act once started. "Every continued activity arouses in the organism a tendency to persist in the same general type of activity, and a difficulty in changing over to different activities." [5] Evidence that such a tendency exists is not far to seek in the irritation that usually results from being interrupted in the midst of, say, writing a letter, or playing a game.

Imitative Learning.—The fact about learning which is of most interest to students of social behavior is that young children do not long limit themselves to trial-and-error learning, but soon begin to imitate the behavior of the people around them. By following a ready-made model they are saved the great amount of time and effort that would be required to work out a satisfactory pattern of action for themselves. No more striking illustration of imitative learning can be found than the acquisition of spoken language by children. Not only do they come to utter the same word sounds as their elders, but they also duplicate with such fidelity the peculiar nuances of enunciation, inflection, and emphasis that characterize the speech of the adults with whom they are in contact that in later life it is easy to recognize the general locality in which any person was reared, as the South, the Middle West, New England, or Old England.

Children obviously learn to speak, write, eat with a fork, tie their shoelaces, play the piano, etc., by imitation of their elders; but that is not all. They also take from the society

[4] J. F. Dashiell, *Fundamentals of General Psychology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1937), p. 413.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 317.

most of their acquired values and needs, without having developed them out of their own experiences. Children in the United States believe in the democratic, individualistic way of life of their country, those in Hitler's Germany absorbed the totalitarian ideology of the Nazis. Nor is imitative or social learning confined to children. Adults exposed to a new social environment commonly take over some of it, although they are much less pliable than children.

It would be a serious mistake, however, to suppose that automatically following a copy is all that takes place in imitative or social learning. To be sure, much of it is unconscious or "unwitting," [6] like speech inflections. But all conscious trial-and-error learning is not eliminated, although it is greatly reduced, by imitation. Inaccuracies creep into most of the social behavior that is copied. The ideas and values received from others must be to some extent integrated into the previous ideology of the imitator by many mental comparisons. This partly accounts for the innumerable questions which young boys and girls are famous for asking. They cannot be satisfied until they think they see what the new ideas mean in relation to those they already have. This process represents a blending of individual and social processes, since the individual has to rework what he receives from society with reference to his own personal experiences. The latter are always to some extent unique, and the vast range of associations or combinations of images and ideas which occur in each mind as the result of social contacts cannot be exactly duplicated in any other mind, hence the individual variations in values, beliefs, and overt behavior which are to be observed even in the same society.

A great deal also depends upon the prestige which the persons imitated enjoy with the imitator. Many ideas and methods are accepted because of faith in their source, even when their meaning and usefulness is not clear to the borrower. But in the end, borrowed traits are subjected to the same pragmatic tests that are applied in trial-and-error learning. If they prove to be clearly unsatisfactory or inferior to rival traits which might

[6] Ellsworth Faris, "The Concept of Imitation," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXII, No. 3 (1926), 367-78.

be imitated or discovered, they tend to be forgotten or rejected. Yet, in spite of all these opportunities for individual variation, the suggestive weight of a relatively simple and uniform society or class of society, and the normally vigorous application of social sanctions upon the individual member, are so continuous and heavy at crucial points that the amount of conformity to common patterns of ideas and behavior is very impressive in practically all societies.

Prediction of Social Behavior.—Like every other science, the final purpose of sociology is to understand social behavior well enough to be able to predict and control it under a given set of circumstances. Since the number of factors which determine social behavior is very great, including both those within the individual organism (physiological and psychological) and those that enter into the environmental situation to which the individual reacts, the problem is obviously not a simple one. A classification of the most important situations which recur in a society, and of the different social groups or classes which compose it, together with a proportional (actuarial) count of the responses which are usually made to each situation by the members of each group, comprise one scientific method for predicting human behavior. An example is given in Table 1, where the

TABLE 1.

HEALTH OF HUSBANDS BEFORE MARRIAGE AND THEIR MARITAL ADJUSTMENT: PERCENTAGES *

Marital Adjustment	Health Before Marriage		
	Sickly	Average	Healthy
Good	18	38	46
Fair	9	31	28
Poor	73	31	26
Total	100	100	100

*(Adapted from E. W. Burgess and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* [New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939], p. 389.)

success in marriage of husbands is predicted from their health before marriage. If a husband is "sickly," it is ventured that his chances of making a "good" marital adjustment are only 18 in 100, because out of a sample of "sickly" men who married, 18 per cent of them made a "good" adjustment. A "healthy" man is seen to be a much better marital risk, other things being equal, than a "sickly" man.

The above method is essentially the same as that used by life insurance actuaries for predicting a person's chances of dying within a given year of age. Premium rates are based on these empirically determined chances of death. The rates determine the financial security of insurance companies.

A great deal of variation, however, occurs among the individual members within the same group in an advanced society like our own, so prediction can evidently be improved by a further study of the individuals in a group. In general terms, the reaction of an individual to any situation depends upon how he sees it, what responses then occur to him, and which of these seem to him to be the most satisfactory or satisfying at the time. Although it might appear to be an impossibly complex task to make a prediction under such conditions, it is encouraging to discover that, as a rule, the theoretically innumerable possible combinations and permutations of behavior resolve themselves into a few major patterns, each with a potential actuarial probability. The responses of individuals to any common social situation will generally stay within the framework of what is customary.

The above ideas apply strictly only to a situation which in its essentials has happened before, preferably many times. But the problem often has to be faced, How will people behave in a partly new situation? If the situation were entirely new, the psychologists tell us that responses to it would be wholly random. Fortunately, few or no social situations are entirely new. They are, however, very often made up of unusual combinations of familiar elements, and may contain some new elements relative to the persons concerned. In cases of this kind the response will hinge upon recognition of the familiar elements, their suggestion of the responses previously associated with them, an

effort to reconcile these responses with one another, and the final choice of a trial response which appears to the subject to be the most promising and appropriate. Although a simple, ready-prepared actuarial probability is not possible under these conditions, it is sometimes worth while to predict that the probability of a certain response to a given situation will be about the same as the response to a familiar situation most like the new situation.

Another conceivable basis of social prediction is to confront a sample of persons, as similar as possible to those for whom the prediction is to be made, with the anticipated situation as an experiment, and note their behavior. If the situation cannot actually be objectively set up, it may be possible to present its essential elements to the imaginations of the experimental subjects and get their subjective reactions.

If even this last approach cannot be used—and it often cannot—then the "experts" must undertake, from their general knowledge of the persons and the elements of the situation at issue, to deduce as best as they can what the behavior will probably be. This is the method now commonly used. Crude as it is, it is capable of considerable success if enough foresight, information, and intensive study are employed.

All such procedures as the above evidently require that the situation for which predictions are wanted must be anticipated or foreseen. This becomes more feasible if attempts at prediction are confined to situations which have already taken shape sufficiently to indicate what their essential elements are likely to be. Thus, the closer to the day of an election the final prediction of the voting results is made, the more accurate the prediction should be.

A great deal of improvement in the prediction of social behavior may be attained by beginning experimentally with familiar situations, and introducing new elements gradually. It would seem that intelligent and orderly societies would prefer this method of progress over more abrupt and less predictable—as well as less controlled—methods.

The application of a single principle to the prediction of social behavior has often been tried, notably by the economists. The

latter set up an imaginary "economic man," and assumed that he would always act in the way that was economically most favorable to himself. That is, where economic behavior was involved, it was simply predicted that each person or group would do whatever was most profitable to themselves, as measured in dollars and cents. While this formula is often useful, it has been found quite incomplete and inadequate, even within the field of economics. This becomes evident when we recall the broader statement of principle made earlier in this chapter: The reaction of an individual to any situation depends upon how he sees it, what responses occur to him, and which of these seem to him to be the most satisfactory or satisfying at the time.

The "economic man" may be regarded as one of many *ideal types* (i.e., arbitrarily simplified or closed causal systems). Thus, in the case of the economic man, all of the motives of behavior except the economic are disregarded. We may also think of our previous suggestion to discover and classify all important recurrent social situations and groups in our society and the customary responses made to each situation by each group, as being merely an effort to establish more complex "types," or "closed systems," with which actual situations may be compared and behavior predicted. It is more accurate, however, to refer to the types obtained in this latter way as *modal,* rather than as ideal, since the latter term is now used by some sociologists in a different sense.

Finally, mention should be made of a statistical method of predicting social behavior, known as the multiple regression equation. It is best used to supplement the modal-type just discussed. In this method, what seem to be the most important causes (factors) in a situation are selected and measured, and an algebraic equation between them and a specified kind of social behavior is worked out by the methods of mathematical statistics. By substituting numerical values for the factors in the equation, the most probable behavior may be calculated. It is also possible to estimate the range within which the behavior will fall with a given probability. Below is a linear multiple regression equation used to predict the grade-point average

that will most probably be made by a freshman student entering the University of Wisconsin:

$$X_1 = .00804X_2 + .01409X_3 + .00798X_4 - 1.64418$$

where X_1 represents the predicted grade point average; X_2 is the total score on the Wisconsin Achievement battery; X_3 is the rank in secondary school graduating class; and X_4 is the total score on the 1938 edition of the American Council Psychological Examination.[7]

To illustrate the use of this prediction equation, suppose that a certain freshman made a total score of $X_2 = 94$ on the Wisconsin Achievement battery, had a percentile rank of $X_3 = 86$ in his high school graduating class, and earned a score of $X_4 = 98$ on the American Council Psychological Examination. What grade point average will he most probably make in his first semester's work at the University of Wisconsin? Substituting the given values in the formula, we get:

$$X_1 = .00804(94) + .01409(86) + .00798(98) - 1.64418$$
$$X_1 = .756 + 1.212 + .782 - 1.644$$
$$X_1 = 1.1$$

That is, the freshman in question will most probably earn a letter grade of C (= 1 grade-point per credit) in the University. Moreover, it is estimated that the chances are 95 in 100 that he will actually make a grade point average somewhere between 0 and 2.3, i.e., between a D and a B. This is, unfortunately, a very large prediction error, and it would be desirable to narrow it, if possible, by using more or better factors in the multiple regression equation.

It is evident that such relatively exact methods as that of the multiple regression equation are limited to those sociological situations where the factors have been subjected to some form of measurement, or at least to quantitative expression. Quantification is still exceptional in sociology, but it is being slowly extended.

[7] Gustav J. F. Froelich, "The Prediction of Academic Success at the University of Wisconsin, 1909-1941," Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, Serial No. 2574, October, 1941, p. 34.

As yet, systematic efforts of any kind to develop scientific bases for the prediction of social behavior in general have not reached a practical stage. Sociology, together with the other social sciences, is, however, persistently formulating theoretical and tentative approaches to this major problem, which is basic to the welfare and further progress of civilization. Some of these approaches will be outlined in the following chapters.

QUESTIONS

1. In what kind of "systems" is sociology interested?
2. In what three broad ways does the biological organism of man affect his behavior?
3. What are the basic needs of the human organism?
4. What largely takes the place of instincts in man?
5. How does Jennings deal with the question of the relative importance of heredity and environment?
6. What psychological process "bears the burden of sociological analysis," and why?
7. What are the "basic principles of learning"? Give an illustration of each principle.
8. What is a "derived" need or value?
9. How are derived needs related to the basic organic needs?
10. How is a derived need acquired?
11. What, if any, derived need with which you are acquainted is inevitable?
12. Does a derived need ever have right-of-way over an organic need? Can the capacity of learning sometimes betray the organism?
13. What part do sanctions play in the development of acquired values?
14. How may an acquired value become a sanction?
15. Name two major types of learning, and discuss their importance in child development.
16. How do you explain individual differences, on the one hand, and uniformities, on the other hand, in acquired needs and values?
17. What is the final purpose of sociology?

18. Illustrate and explain the "actuarial" method of predicting social behavior.
19. How may behavior be predicted in a partly new situation?
20. Are the results of gradual or radical social change more predictable?
21. Illustrate the use of the "ideal type" in predicting behavior.
22. Explain the prediction of social behavior by means of the multiple regression equation.

REFERENCES

DEWEY, JOHN. *Human Nature and Conduct.* New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1922.

DUNLAP, KNIGHT. *Habits: Their Making and Unmaking.* New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1932.

HULL, C. L. *Principles of Behavior.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1943.

JENNINGS, H. S. *The Biological Basis of Human Nature.* New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1930, chap. vi.

KRETCH, DAVID, and CRUTCHFIELD, RICHARD S. *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1948, chaps. ii, iii, iv.

LA PIERE, RICHARD T., and FARNSWORTH, PAUL R. *Social Psychology* (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1949, chaps. ii, iii.

SHERIF, MUZAFER. *Outline of Social Psychology.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1948, chap. ii.

YOUNG, KIMBALL. *Social Psychology* (2nd ed.). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1944, chaps. iv, v.

CHAPTER 2

THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY

Personality Defined.—We shall define personality as an individual's habitual behavior, covert and overt, toward other persons. As Burgess says, it is "the sum and integration of those traits which characterize the typical reactions of one person toward other persons." [1] Although personality as a term is not usually limited in this way, it is felt that this definition more accurately expresses the core of its meaning. Thus, the personality includes the established attitudes of an individual and the customary external behavior which is associated with them, in so far as these are social in nature. In this sense, even a lack of consistency may be a characteristic of some personalities.

Physical Bases of Personality.—Like any other pattern of social behavior, the personality is a product of two broad classes of factors, the innate and the environmental. The quality of his nervous system unquestionably enters into the responses which a person makes to any situation, and may be expected to introduce an element into his behavior which distinguishes it from the behavior of other persons. Just what these innate elements are has not been determined, but they may contribute to such traits as speed and intensity of reaction, power of discrimination, persistence, aggressiveness, etc. In the words of MacKinnon, "No longer can there be any doubt that there is both specificity and generality of behavior. Both personal consistency and inconsistency must be recognized." [2]

[1] E. W. Burgess in C. R. Shaw (ed.), *The Jack Roller* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 193.

[2] Donald W. MacKinnon, "The Structure of Personality," in J. McV. Hunt (ed.), *Personality and the Behavior Disorders* (New York, The Ronald Press Co., 1944), Vol. I, p. 43.

Several attempts have been made to correlate personality types with biological factors such as body build. Probably the best known proponent of this idea is Kretschmer, who connected the "pyknik" or rounded body form with the "cyclothyme" (genial) personality, and the "asthenic" and "athletic," i.e., weak or thin and well-developed builds, respectively, with the "schizothyme" (unsociable) personality.[3] More recently, Sheldon, Stevens, and Tucker [4] have separated out three physiological personality types which may be vulgarly paraphrased as the "gut," the "muscle," and the "brain." Some other studies have given partial support to Kretschmer's theories, but in the opinion of most students of personality their soundness has not been demonstrated.

Related to the body-build hypothesis is the belief that differences in the functioning of the endocrine or ductless glands have important effects upon the personality. These glands include the thymus, the pituitary, the adrenal, the thyroid, the parathyroid, and the gonad. As yet, however, no research has shown any clear relationship between the ductless glands and personality traits.[5]

In the popular mind, many bodily characteristics are thought to be connected with mental traits. Thus, a square jaw or jutting chin is supposed to indicate a strong will, a high forehead to be a sign of intelligence, bony ridges over the eyes to betray a criminal temperament. All these folk beliefs have now been thoroughly discredited by a number of careful statistical studies.[6]

Personality and the Group.—Applying some of the principles developed in the previous chapter, for all practical purposes it may be said that every human being is born into a social group, most immediately into a small family group composed of parents

[3] E. Kretschmer, *Physique and Character* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1925).

[4] *The Varieties of Human Physique* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1940).

[5] L. Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality* (rev. ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928).

[6] Karl Pearson, "Relationship of Intelligence to Size and Shape of the Head and Other Mental and Physical Characters," *Biometrika*, V (1943), pp. 370-96; G. U. Cleeton and F. B. Knight, "Validity of Character Judgments Based on External Criteria," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, VIII (1924), pp. 215-29; C. Goring, *The English Convict: A Statistical Study* (London: Darling & Son, 1913).

and siblings, less immediately into a larger family of relatives, a class, and a society. These groups are dominated by adults who have a set of values, beliefs, skills, and other behavior patterns already functioning in the conduct of their various life activities. The folkways and mores of one family, class, and society differ from those of another, often quite sharply, and it is evident that the infant is exposed only to those which are peculiar to the group into which he happens to fall by the accident of birth. As the child develops, he of course learns the ways and the opinions of those about him, chiefly by imitation, because that is the most economical and efficient procedure open to him, and much of this imitation is unconscious on the child's part. But, as we know, that is not all. The society of which he is a member is concerned that he should be properly trained and equipped to play a part in it, and from the beginning sees to it that he is rewarded for conforming with, and punished for deviating from, its approved ways.

Nevertheless, we have seen that it is also inevitable that each child should have a somewhat unique combination of experiences and contacts, even in the same family. In any case, a child must interpret these experiences and contacts and integrate them into a system of values, attitudes, and behavior patterns that are more or less his own, even though in the essentials they do conform to the cultural rigidities of the society. The variations seen in individuals are also, it will be recalled, partly due to the inability of anyone to copy complex ideas, emotional tones, and conduct without some inaccuracies and modifications. Another familiar reason is the constitutional differences between individuals.

The structure of a child's personality is formed by the habits of thought, feeling, and acting toward other persons that he learns from the group to which he belongs, with the above individual differences. Some personality elements are widespread in the group, resulting in various degrees of likeness among the personalities in the same family, class, or society. These are due to the impress of common folkways and institutions, and to experience with many similar situations. They form what

Abram Kardiner calls the "basic personality structure" of a society, which differs from one society to another.

Herodotus and Caesar, says Kardiner, recognized "that the various peoples they described not only had unique customs and practices but were also unique in temperament, disposition, and character... there are different basic personality structures for different societies" because "certain culturally established techniques of child treatment [have] the effect of shaping basic attitudes.... Certain practices are significant for the individual during his period of growth and the constellations thus formed remain as a continuity in the personality . . ."

In Tanala . . . the important lesson was the demonstration of the confusion created by social changes when the basic personality remained intact. The old Tanala society had as its economic basis the cultivation of dry rice. This technique permitted a certain type of social organization, based on communal ownership of land, in which produce was divided under the extremely authoritarian rule of the father. The basic needs of the individual (that is, particularly of the younger sons upon whose labor the economy chiefly depended) were completely satisfied, notwithstanding what we should call in our society submission to despotic rule. Passive adaptation to a father was perfectly satisfactory as long as the basic needs of the individual were met. When the wet method of rice cultivation was introduced, communal ownership of land had to be abandoned. The individual suddenly became important, and his rights were threatened by the competitive needs of other individuals for the same means of subsistence. In other words, private property was introduced. The mad scramble for the favored valleys led to the disruption of the whole family organization. This resulted in a great increase in crime, homosexuality, magic, and hysterical illnesses. These social phenomena indicated quite clearly that when the personality, as shaped by the customs suited to the old method of economy, encountered, in the new economy, psychological tasks it was in no way prepared to meet, the result was an enormous outbreak of anxiety with various manifestations.[7]

Fundamental resemblances between personality types have also been observed even between different societies, including advanced and primitive societies. Anthropologists have often

[7] Abram Kardiner, "The Concept of Basic Personality Structure as an Operational Tool in the Social Sciences," in Ralph Linton (ed.), *The Science of Man in the World Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 110-13.

reported that when they become well acquainted with the individuals of another society, say an American Indian or African tribe, they find them strikingly like the people they have known "at home." These personality universals are sometimes referred to as "human nature" common to all mankind, and are ascribed by Charles H. Cooley to the influence of universal primary groups:

> By human nature, I suppose, we may understand those sentiments and impulses that . . . belong to mankind at large, and not to any particular race or time. There is no better proof of this generic likeness of human nature than in the ease and joy with which the modern man makes himself at home in literature depicting the most remote and varied phases of life—in Homer, in the Nibelung tales, in the Hebrew Scriptures, in the legends of the American Indians, in stories of frontier life, of soldiers and sailors, of criminals and tramps, and so on. The more penetratingly any phase of human life is studied the more an essential likeness to ourselves is revealed . . .
>
> . . . the view here maintained is that human nature is not something existing separately in the individual, but a *group-nature*. . . . It is something more, on the one hand, than the mere instinct that is born in us—though that enters into it—and something less, on the other, than the more elaborate development of ideas and sentiments that make up institutions. It is the nature which is developed and expressed in those simple, face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies; groups of the family, the playground, and the neighborhood. In the essential similarity of these is to be found the basis, in experience, for similar ideas and sentiments in the human mind. In these, everywhere, human nature comes into existence. Man does not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship, and it decays in isolation.[8]

Rise of the Self.—It is generally believed that a young infant does not distinguish between himself and others. If this is true, then the idea of a self must be acquired. This is apparently accomplished in the process of the infant's interaction with the persons about him. The idea that he gets of himself will depend a great deal upon how others regard him and react to him. This has been phrased by Cooley in terms of the "looking-glass" self:

[8] Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), pp. 28-30.

In a very large and interesting class of cases the social reference takes the form of a somewhat definite imagination of how one's self—that is any idea he appropriates—appears in a particular mind, and the kind of self-feeling one has is determined by the attitude toward this attributed to that other mind. A social self of this sort might be called the reflected or looking-glass self:

> Each to each a looking-glass
> Reflects the other that doth pass.

As we see our face, figure, and dress in the glass, and are interested in them because they are ours, and pleased or otherwise with them according as they do or do not answer to what we should like them to be; so in imagination we perceive in another's mind some thought of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously affected by it.

A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance; and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification. The comparison with a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgment, which is quite essential. The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another's mind. This is evident from the fact that the character and weight of that other, in whose mind we see ourselves, makes all the difference with our feeling. We are ashamed to seem evasive in the presence of a straightforward man, cowardly in the presence of a brave one, gross in the eyes of a refined one, and so on. We always imagine, and in imagining share, the judgments of the other mind.[9]

A more elaborate theory of how the self develops is offered by George H. Mead:

> The self arises in conduct, when the individual becomes a social object in experience to himself. This takes place when the individual assumes the attitude or uses the gesture which another individual would use and responds to it himself or tends to so respond. . . . The child gradually becomes a social being in his own experience, and he acts toward himself in a manner analogous to that in which he acts towards others.[10]

[9] Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), pp. 183-85.

[10] George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 160.

In other words, the child reacts toward himself as he thinks the other person would. As Young says, "out of a wide range of specific roles of 'others' which he has played, there emerges in time a generalized and more or less integrated pattern of the total role of the child. This becomes a part of the integrated self which grows up in everyday interaction with hundreds of specific persons whose attitudes and habits get woven into the child's own." [11] Mead called this integrated role the role of "the generalized other."

In contrast to the "me," that conventional part of the self which is a product of the taking of the roles of others, Mead assumes an original and dynamic element in the self, the "I," which reflects the tensions and needs of the organism, and represents the unique aspects of the individual. These three terms of Mead, the *generalized other,* the *me,* and the *I,* suggest the three concepts of the psychoanalyst, the *super-ego,* the *ego,* and the *id.* The *id* (impulse, instinct) corresponds roughly to Mead's "I," the *super-ego* (social conscience exerting a suppressive influence on the *id*) to his "generalized other," and the *ego* (reason) to his "me."

It is perhaps closer to reality, however, and simpler, merely to say that a normal infant soon becomes conscious of the pleasant and unpleasant sensations in himself. Accordingly, he will sense his body as separate from other objects and, since it furnishes all his sensations, will recognize that it is the thing of first importance to himself. Gardner Murphy states,

> . . . there is an organism, which among its many functions includes the functions of observing and knowing. Among the things which it observes and knows are its visible surfaces, its vocal cadences, its muscular strains. Being a more or less integrated system of responses, the organism appropriately orders these diverse impressions into an integrated whole and agrees to call it by the name which others have given it, just as it accepts the names that are current for other distinguishable wholes. In the same way, it begins to cogitate on the nature of this totality, paying more and more heed to those aspects of it which others fail to note; the inner world becomes important. From the diverse knowing and thinking processes a conceptual unity is deduced. The

[11] Kimball Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1940), p. 171.

self is a thing perceived, and it is also a thing conceived; in both senses it is constantly responded to.[12]

Combining these three points of view somewhat, we may say that a child's ideas of himself will grow out of his elementary sensations and their obvious implications for his well-being. These ideas will be powerfully affected by what he comes to believe other persons think of him and what he does, and by how he rates himself in terms of the standards that he has learned from his society, with some modifications of his own. The roles, or "parts," played by different persons do not carry equal prestige in the eyes of the society, but each role carries its own status. The general is more highly regarded than the colonel, the colonel than the private. This is well known to the persons concerned, so that each comes to expect the status that belongs to his role, and his self-regard is largely determined by these social evaluations of his role.[13]

To the extent that an agreeable state of body and mind is a criterion of successful adjustment, and a good opinion of one's self is related to a sense of security and emotional satisfaction, it is to be expected that each individual will entertain an opinion of himself as favorable as he can justify to his inner consciousness in the light of the opinions that he thinks others have of him and of his private opinion of himself.

Competition and Personality.—It has already been noticed that the system of attitudes and habits of overt behavior that makes a personality is not merely drawn in various permutations from the prevailing culture, created by socially imposed roles, or fashioned from the arbitrary opinions of others. For one thing, many traits of the personality, such as self-confidence or the lack of it, are the result of competition with one's fellows. In every society there is constant competition for prestige and status, for material possessions, for those roles which are considered more desirable than others, for affection, and so on. This competition takes place within the limitations of the particular culture and in accordance with its prescriptions, to be sure, but it is a process

[12] Gardner Murphy, *Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), p. 479.
[13] Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-81.

that is distinct in itself. Many of the roles which an individual assumes in life are not assigned to him by the society gratuitously, but are taken on because of his superior or inferior aptitudes. Only a few of the young women who go to Hollywood succeed in becoming "movie" stars, and many of the young men who aspire to the college football team finally abandon their attempts to become gridiron heroes.

The same principle of competition applies in a vast number of subtle and unnoticed ways which are nonetheless important in the formation of personality. Thus whether one plays the part of a merry fellow or of a sober one depends a great deal on how well one succeeds in the one character or the other. Every person compares himself with others, and is concerned about how others rate him in this way and that. Everyone constantly tries to maintain the status of his ego at as high a level as he can in accordance with his particular system of values (e.g., success, service, etc.), and tends to do those things that best accomplish this purpose. As a consequence, a person both selects out, and has imposed on him those roles and patterns of behavior in which he is most successful in competition with others, and so is considerably guided by competition in the development of his personality.

Conflict and Personality.—A personality may also represent lasting accommodations or adjustments to the results of conflicts in which it has been engaged. As in competition, these accommodations often determine the role that one person habitually plays in relation to another, or to a group of persons. Dominant and submissive behavior in children is often traceable to success or failure in fighting, wrestling, or other forms of physical struggle. Sometimes ascendancy that originated in this way is transferred to nonphysical and nonconflict situations, as when the captain of the football team in college is elected president of his class. In this way a generalized "success" pattern and attitudes of self-confidence and superiority may be developed as prominent components of the personality.

Cooperation and Personality.—Since participation in group and institutional activities is essentially a process of cooperation,

and is required in a variety of forms of every member of a society from childhood to old age, it is obvious that all individuals get abundant training in attitudes and habits of cooperation, and that these cooperative traits must therefore become basic and universal elements of personality structure. That these traits are painfully acquired by learning can readily be seen by watching the constant difficulties of getting agreement or common behavior among any group of very young children at play, and then comparing such a play-group of youngsters with a smooth-running college football team. Yet it is also to be expected that different personalities will vary in the degree of development of cooperative traits, because of innate and environmental inequalities, and that a small proportion of the members of a large society may be notably lacking in cooperativeness.

Occupational Roles.—Regardless of how a person comes to play a particular role, it is important to realize how much the assumption of roles affects the personality. Perhaps the clearest illustration is the case of the well-defined roles found in certain occupations. A man who spends most of the hours of his active day as a clergyman, a teacher, a shopkeeper, a physician, a factory foreman, a politician, or a bank president, necessarily follows somewhat the same set of motives and values as others in the same calling, and does many of the same things. Like any other attitudes or kinds of behavior, these occupational habits become incorporated into his personality, and give him some of the familiar characteristics that men of his vocation are often observed to have in common.

Personality as a Collection of Group Roles.—It is evident, however, that no man plays only one role, such as that of a judge or a priest. The judge is probably also a husband and a father, a church member, a Mason, a poker player, a fisherman, and so on, and all these are reflected as aspects or angles of his personality. In each of these different group situations he acts a somewhat different part, even though a certain core of his personality is common to all of them. It is therefore possible to think roughly of any personality as a sort of collection of many different group roles, compartmentalized and integrated to some

extent to form the total personality. Some of the roles or aspects of a given personality may be in surprising contrast to others, as when a clergyman is disposed to take liberties with the susceptible women in his congregation. In trying to understand or predict the behavior of any individual, therefore, it is well first to define the situation or group in which he will act, and then to anticipate that he will play the role which he is accustomed to play under those particular circumstances, rather than some other role for which he may be better known.

It should be pointed out, on the other hand, that no personality is merely a composite of a variety of group roles. The matter is not as simple as that. Many other factors which enter into the personality complex have already been mentioned, and should be recalled.

Relation of Intelligence, Health, Beauty, etc., to Personality.—It is to be expected that, other things being equal, a person with superior intelligence will develop successful ways of reacting to other persons, and that this success will tend to give him more confidence and self-esteem. Because of his intelligence, however, he should also learn to avoid any displays of egotism which are offensive to others. In short, it seems reasonable that a person with superior intelligence will tend to develop a more effective personality. The difficulty with this broad principle is, of course, not that it is false, but that many other things besides intelligence affect the personality. One of these is the direction of interest, or system of values. A person of high intelligence may be a scholarly recluse, and, through lack of social contacts and indifference about them, may be inhibited and unpopular with other persons. Or, an intelligent person may have emotional characteristics, such as lack of sympathy, which interfere with his relations with others and in that sense damage his personality. Indeed, the very possession of unusual intelligence may sometimes bring on him jealousy and dislike. Thus, it is evident that less intelligent persons will often have "better" personalities than more intelligent persons, simply because they have other compensating qualities, or because they are more socially inclined.

Vigorous health or invalidism places its unmistakable stamp on personality. This is because both influence the emotions, the roles that can be assumed, the status that can be won, and the concept of the self that can be attained. For example, the sickly and the invalid are likely to compare themselves unfavorably with other persons, becoming supersensitive and bitter and withdrawing into themselves. Or they may exaggerate their ailments to gain attention and special benefits. Such attitudes often become a part of the invalid personality.

Another common influence on the development of the personality is appearance. A person who feels that he is regarded by others as homely or clumsy smarts under his natural inferiority. The psychological effects of his appearance gradually eat into his personality like an ingrowing canker, unless he succeeds in compensating for them, and so reducing their importance. On the other hand, an individual who is constantly admired and sought after for his beauty is pleased by it and is tempted to build his whole personality around this satisfying conception of himself. Thus, on the pleasure-pain principle, the homely person is likely to look to qualities other than physical appearance for his success, whereas the attractive person naturally develops in the direction of the easy rewards that his attractiveness offers him, usually at the hands of the opposite sex, and neglects other qualities in which he does not excel. Because of existing social values, the factor of personal appearance operates much more directly in the case of women, but it is by no means unimportant in the case of men.

The Pragmatic Determination of Personality.—In the above paragraphs on competition and personality, as well as elsewhere, it has been indicated or implied that the attitudes and behavior eventually incorporated into the personality are subject to the acid test of results. Hence, a normal personality tends to represent an integration of patterns that for the most part have been screened for their usefulness and effectiveness. Since behavior has to be repeated many times before it becomes an habitual and enduring part of the personality, the personality patterns should be fairly well proved. In this way, the personality de-

velops as a function of the social environment and of the sensitivities of the human organism, so that it meets as well as may be the requirements of both. The method of personality development is thus again seen to be simply the learning process.

Although most of the responses of an individual to his fellows are no doubt learned through imitation, some of them are largely hit-or-miss. Even when the response is imitated it is often tried in a partially new situation. In any case, the success of the response can be judged only by its consequences. A teacher may first try a friendly approach to Johnny, but if this does not work he will usually try something else. The same applies to the friendly approach in general. If a child begins life that way, but is rebuffed or mistreated in return, he may decide that it is not a good method, and may resort to something different, such as aggressiveness or exploitation.

In the confusion of everyday living it is not always easy to see just what the effects of a certain response are; consequently many mistakes of judgment are made. It is also a fact that the interpretation of consequences depends upon emotional values as well as upon accurate observation, the same results being regarded as satisfactory by one person and unsatisfactory by another. All these items represent complications but they do not change the principle that personalities tend to be shaped by pragmatic considerations.

Personality Types.—The psychoanalyst Jung classified personalities into the two familiar types, *extrovert* and *introvert.* The extrovert is an outgoing person, self-assured, sociable; the introvert tends to live within himself. Jung also set up four subtypes under each of these two major types, namely, the thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition subtypes. It is now generally admitted that the extrovert and introvert types are extremes, with most persons falling somewhere in between (*ambiverts*). Objective definition of the extrovert and the introvert has not proved easy, and there is little agreement whether these types are the result of constitutional factors, of social experience, or of both.[14] Six personality types were proposed by

[14] C. G. Jung, *Psychological Types, or the Psychology of Individuals* (New York: International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method, 1923).

Spranger: (1) the theoretical (truth seeker); (2) the economic (practical man), (3) the aesthetic (artist); (4) the social (sympathetic person); (5) the political (power seeker); (6) the religious (value seeker).[15]

Sociologists have also indulged in personality type-making. Thomas and Znaniecki set up three types: (1) the Philistine (practical man), (2) the Bohemian (pleasure seeker), and (3) the creative man.[16] Other types favored by Burgess are: (1) the objective or direct, (2) the introspective or indirect, (3) the psychopathic or perverse, (4) the social types: the practical, the liberal, and the idealistic or religious. Burgess draws a distinction between what he calls the basic personality pattern and the social type, attributing the former to constitutional factors and early training, the latter to the taking on of social roles. The social type is more subject to change than is the fundamental personality structure.[17] This raises the important question of the adaptability of different constitutional patterns to various social roles, a question which has been little investigated.

Two personality types often emphasized in studies of children are the dominant and the submissive. Here again we are evidently presented with extremes, since aggressiveness and submissiveness occur in all degrees. Although the parts played by innate factors and experience have not been clearly separated in the development of the traits of dominance and submission, any more than elsewhere, research has shown that experience is often decisive. It appears that repeated success in conflict or competition with other children makes for a dominating personality, while continued failure leads to habitual submission. Because most persons have a reasonable share of both success and failure, extremely dominant and submissive types are not common.

Closely allied to dominance and submission are the concepts of superiority and inferiority, which characterize corresponding

[15] E. Spranger, *Types of Men: The Psychology and Ethics of Personality* (New York: G. E. Stechert & Co., 1928).

[16] W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1927), Vol. II, pp. 1854 ff.

[17] E. W. Burgess, "The Delinquent as a Person," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVIII, No. 6 (1923), 665 ff.

personality types. The psychoanalyst Adler made a great deal of these two types, and regarded much of the display of superiority commonly met with as compensation for feelings of inferiority. More will be said on this subject below, under the topic of the disorganized personality.

The value of any scheme of personality typing depends upon its usefulness for a purpose. The chief reason for creating types is apparently to classify an individual as belonging to this type or that, and, as a consequence, to be able to understand or predict his behavior better than otherwise could be done. None of the personality types mentioned above, apparently, is more valuable for this purpose than may be claimed for any number of stereotypes of non-scientific origin.

Personality Traits.—Some of the personality types just described evidently take their names from a single conspicuous trait, such as "submissiveness." A personality, however, always consists of more than one trait. Indeed, an individual may have any number of traits, such as good humor, honesty, determination, industry, thrift, and so on.

By "trait" is meant an area of relatively permanent, general, and consistent behavior, which is not dependent upon any particular object as is the attitude, and which may lack the favorable-unfavorable tone of the attitude. A trait includes both subjective and objective aspects, the former being a point of view, and the latter the overt behavior associated with it. It is evident that a trait, such as determination, is a variety of patterns that have some attribute in common, rather than a single pattern of behavior. This common quality is the essence of the trait, and is usually described by a noun or adjective in popular use. For example, a dictionary definition of the adjective "honest" runs: "acting or disposed to act justly and honorably, especially in business transactions or in relation to the rights of property; fair and candid in dealing with others; unwilling to commit or countenance fraud; upright. . . . Characterized by openness, genuineness, or sincerity; frank, undisguised; sincere. . . ." Although this definition is innocent of scientific exactness, such terms are still indispensable for providing a

description of a personality. The number of trait names in use is great, Allport and Odbert listing 17,593 of them.[18]

Personality Values.—The term "value" has been used throughout this chapter with rather obvious meaning. We can no longer avoid giving it special attention, however, because it is perhaps the most fundamental concept that can be applied in the analysis of personality. A *value,* as we use the term, implies a fixed preference or emotional bias for or against certain objects, ideas, or behavior, expressible by the adjectives "good" and "bad." Values are thus roughly the objects, ideas, etc., to which attitudes are attached. Although the value is also closely related to the trait, in particular a character trait such as integrity or morality, it is usually thought of as being more specific in reference than a trait. Thus a person may abhor direct stealing, which involves one kind of value, but be addicted to sharp business practices, which involve a somewhat different value or values, so that there is some question about his general integrity (trait).

It is evident that what a person does is largely governed by the set of values he possesses. These are acquired by imitation from the surrounding society, or by some other method of learning through pain-pleasure experience. The concept of *character* may be described as the ethical value system and the habitual behavior to which it leads. Of course, established values can be modified in the same way that they are established in the first place, i.e., by additional experience and learning under pressure of sanctions, leading to re-examination, mental conflict, and re-accommodation.

A person's reaction to the individuals about him depends a good deal on the values he has. It matters not only how they behave toward him, but also how he interprets their behavior. He tends to expect them to have the same motives that he has. It is also his own attitudes that decide whether he will like or dislike whatever he thinks their behavior means. Two members of the upper class are more apt to find one another congenial than are a member of the upper class and a member of the lower

[18] G. W. Allport and H. S. Odbert, Trait-names: a Psycho-Lexical Study," *Psychological Monographs* XLVII, No. 211, 1936.

class, because their values are more likely to be the same. It needs to be noticed that values always operate in a situational setting, and that in most social situations several values may be involved, often leading to some mental conflict and enforced choice.

Identification and Sympathy.—The most significant of all social attributes is the ability to imagine one's self in the place and role of another (*identification*), and to understand how the other person thinks and feels, or to *sympathize* with him and his problems. Out of such sympathy grows good will, friendship, affection, and cooperation. Lack of sympathy in turn produces indifference, aloofness, exploitation, and conflict. These are all familiar traits that lead to definite social and asocial personality types. Sympathy itself seems to depend upon the power of the imagination, upon a certain amount of similarity and understandableness, and upon common experiences. It may also be cultivated or neglected as a habit, and is obviously affected by social encouragement or discouragement in certain groups.

Organization of the Personality.—As we have seen, the personality is a complex of attitudes and patterns of behavior, and some of these will certainly conflict with others if they are not subject to some kind of coordination. They are in fact accommodated to one another by means of a hierarchy of values which determines their respective importance and priorities. Thus, if a person wishes to get married, but also feels obligated to support a widowed mother and her younger children, and cannot afford to do both, he will not marry if his scheme of values decisively places duty before pleasure. Thus, to the extent that values affect social behavior, they enter into the personality. A personality whose elements are in a state of effective accommodation or adjustment to one another and to the social situations to which it customarily responds may be called an organized personality. At any given time, these elements will be found to be oriented around dominant patterns, such as certain attitudes and habits of behavior within the family, at the office, or on the golf course. The effectiveness of the adjustment to each situation and in the total is indicated by the sense

of adequacy on the part of the individual and by the approval of the society.

It is perfectly possible for the dominant pattern of a personality to be changed whenever the change seems desirable or necessary. A woman who has reached a certain age may abandon the idea of marriage and substitute that of a career, with the result that her habitual behavior toward men may be modified. This may require a considerable revision of her life values, which will also affect her attitudes toward and relations with her own family and with other persons. It can then be said that a change has occurred in her personality.

When an individual confronts a new area of social behavior, as when a German civilian of Berlin comes in contact for the first time with conquering Russian soldiers, the personality may be said to be unorganized with respect to the new area. Various possibilities must be thought of and compared in the imagination with respect to their probable effects on the values of the individual, and certain patterns finally selected and integrated into the personality. The process is not complete until the responses have been tried out and repeated often enough to stand the pragmatic test of success and so become habits. Thus the continuous process of organizing the personality is always relative to the needs of particular social situations.

Personality Disorganization.—When a personality loses the balance and accommodation which it once had between its values, attitudes, or behavior patterns, or loses its former ability to make effective and acceptable adjustments to accustomed social situations, it is said to be *disorganized* to the extent that such disorder prevails. Personality disorganization is thus a matter of degree, and may vary from a mental conflict regarding honesty as the best policy to the loss of interest in life, or even complete insanity. The cause of such disorganization is usually new experience or changes in the social environment, but the reason is sometimes found in damages to the nervous system by accident, disease, or old age. In either case, competition may then become more difficult, with failure occurring more and more often, until self-confidence is undermined. Disorganization with

reference to a situation may sometimes be avoided if withdrawal from the situation is feasible, as by retirement from an occupation at an advanced age.

New situations to which an individual has not yet worked out satisfactory adjustments do not imply personality disorganization. But disorganization does occur if new situations cause discouragement or shifts of interest which lead to failure in persistent old situations that were once adequately dealt with. If a person's discovery that he has an incurable cancer destroys his interest in social affairs, or prevents him from giving wholehearted attention to his business, some disorganization may be said to exist. Indeed, disorganization can occur only through the demoralizing influence of a new situation on an old one, of new ideas or emotions on old, or else by physiological injury which impairs habitual behavior. This is obvious, because the adjustment between an organized habit and its situation can be disrupted only (1) if the situation is changed—in which case, by definition, we have a new situation and a degree of unorganization rather than disorganization—or (2) if an organized habit is more or less disintegrated, which can occur only in case the human organism loses some of or all its ability to repeat a response already learned.

Most of the failure of individuals to meet social situations adequately is apparently due merely to unorganization, that is, to the circumstance that the person is dealing with new elements in a situation to which he has not yet had time or lacks capacity to work out an effective adjustment. Severe emotional disturbance may also interfere with learning in new situations, and so prevent further effective organization of the personality from developing. These conditions should be distinguished from the decline or loss of efficiency, once possessed, in responding to customary situations.

Functional Neuroses, Psychoses, and Psychopathic Personalities.—The major types of pathological mental conditions are usually included under the terms "psychoneurosis," "psychosis," and "psychopathic personality." A psychoneurosis, or neurosis, it is often said, is distinguished from a psychosis in that (1) the former affects only a part of the personality and is

not completely incapacitating, (2) the neurosis involves no deterioration of the intellect, as does the psychosis, and (3) the neurosis generally includes some purely functional (i.e., nonorganic) bodily disturbance, accompanied by the emotions of anxiety and fear.[19] There is some overlapping, inaccuracy, and vagueness in these distinctions, however, and Cameron feels that "We only multiply our problems needlessly when we segregate psychotic from neurotic patients in our thinking." [20] The psychopathic personality is placed neither in the class of the neurosis nor the psychosis, but in common-sense language is thought of as being characterized by a perverted "moral sense." The psychoses also include organic cases such as paresis resulting from syphilis, but we omit them here.

Some neurotics complain about only imaginary physical ailments. In any case, the neurotic person is fearful and anxious and may have obsessions or compulsions. He is extremely dependent upon the approval and affection of others, but feels and shows little consideration or affection himself. He has a strong sense of inferiority and incompetence, and is held in check by many inhibitions. He easily feels dominated and humiliated, but he is also apt to become aggressive, domineering, and faultfinding.

The functional psychoses are usually grouped under three chief classes: dementia praecox (schizophrenia), paranoia, and manic-depressive psychosis.[21] The advanced schizophrenic patient is inattentive and indifferent to the world outside himself, incoherent, and mentally deteriorated. "The schizophrenic, facing unbearable circumstances in his environment, escapes from reality into a fanciful world of his own." The paranoid is well known for his conceit, suspicions, and ideas of persecution. The manic-depressive is in a state either of overexcitement or of depression.[22]

[19] Roy M. Dorcus and G. Wilson Shaffer, *Textbook of Abnormal Psychology* (Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Co. 1945), pp. 354-55.

[20] Norman Cameron, *The Psychology of Behavior Disorders: A Biosocial Interpretation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947), p. 11.

[21] Dorcus and Shaffer, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

[22] Lawson G. Lowrey, *Psychiatry for Social Workers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 225; Dorcus and Shaffer, *op. cit.*, p. 355; Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1937), pp. 35-39; Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 715-17.

Treatment of Functional Personality Disorders.—Predisposing temperamental or constitutional factors on the one hand and precipitating experiences on the other are generally held responsible for functional mental disorders, whether neurosis or psychosis.[23] Special emphasis has been placed on the role of psychogenic factors, i.e., the experiences of early childhood. "According to observations of the behavior of children, rejection by adults (or its semblance) is probably the most important single factor in the production of the withdrawal and rebellious reactions in childhood. Once established, the behavior may be carried over into adulthood." [24] Among the precipitating experiences may be frustration, emotional shock, "conflict, disappointment, fantasy, physiopathology, trauma in interpersonal relationships, social, economic, and other environmental circumstances . . ." [25]

According to the psychoanalysts, a rejected drive or wish is forced down to the level of the unconscious, where it continues to create tension or stress, the causes of which the subject does not understand. In any case, if long continued, the emotional strain is translated into persistent feelings of anxiety. Sometimes intolerable discredit to the ego is involved. The result may be resentment and aggression toward those considered responsible for a real or imaginary wrong, or the aggression may be transferred to an innocent scapegoat. In place of this there may be an acceptance and even exaggeration of self-blame, or an attempt at rationalization and avoidance of self-blame. Some escape from anxiety through fantasy or daydreaming is normal, but too much of it is pathological. A safer device is sublimation, i.e., substitution of an expression more socially acceptable for the one denied, such as the use of satire instead of physical violence. Another normal type of behavior is compensation—an attempt to make amends for failure by succeeding in some substitute activity, as when a student who cannot make the football team becomes the student business manager of athletics.

All of the above responses may be regarded as different forms of adaptation to a difficult or trying situation. In none of the

[23] No rational explanation of the psychopathic personality has been given.
[24] Lowrey, *op. cit.*, p. 152.
[25] Dorcus and Shaffer, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

instances, however, is true personality disorganization present until the frustration has led to some breakdown in the habit mechanisms of the individual in the face of customary social situations. Anxieties or hostilities may prevent the victim from learning to respond satisfactorily to ordinary new situations or problems that arise. Such disorganization or disability is generally only temporary, disappearing with recovery of emotional balance; but it can be persistent or relatively permanent, and is then regarded as a neurosis or psychosis.

No satisfactory methods of treating psychopaths are known. With neurotics and functional psychotics there are two directions of effort: toward the environment, and toward the subject himself. If the person cannot make a good adjustment in one social situation (for example, his parental family), that social situation may be altered by re-education of his family, or he may have to be removed to another situation wherein he can have better success. Manipulation of the environment, however, works most effectively before the individual has developed any mental abnormality.

After a neurosis or psychosis has occurred, the subject of course carries it with him wherever he goes. Something must then be done to correct his mental and emotional habits. The procedure is essentially one of re-education, and follows the principles of education in general. He must be helped back to normal ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving, especially to self-respect, status, and security through his own achievements. The method includes timely discussion, and the pointing out of actual results of his behavior which the disorganized person can see and compare for himself. There must be continual effort at repression of the abnormal and expression of the normal, aided by the sanctions of emotional satisfaction and dissatisfaction. In this connection, suitable occupational and recreational programs have been found extremely useful. A subject who reacts pathologically to a certain experience which cannot be removed from his future life must be desensitized gradually by repeated exposure to it. Throughout all this the subject must recognize his own abnormality, but be encouraged to believe that he can recover if he will cooperate. He needs to be told

constantly of his progress, and helped to maintain a hopeful attitude.[26]

The method of psychoanalysis is often applied to neurotics. "The patient reclines on a couch and is made as comfortable as possible. The analyst usually sits behind him out of direct vision and asks the patient to relax, allow his thoughts to wander and to relate whatever comes into his mind, no matter how irrelevant it may seem or how objectionable it may be."[27] Dreams are expected to reveal the content of the patient's unconscious, and it is hoped that eventually he will arrive at a better understanding of his symptoms, as a result of which they will disappear. Imaginary ills of the neurotic have been cured by make-believe treatments of an unpleasant nature, accompanied by the physician's assurance that the treatment would stop the trouble. Another approved practice is to allow a person who is disturbed by worries to get relief by talking freely about them to the psychiatrist. After all, however, by far the most hopeful attack on the problem of personality disorder is by means of prevention, or at least by recognition and treatment at the very beginning.[28]

QUESTIONS

1. Discuss the usefulness of the definition of personality given in this chapter, compared with other definitions.
2. How valid are the attempts of Kretschmer, Sheldon, and others to correlate types of personality with body build?
3. How successful is the gland theory in explaining personality traits?
4. Does a square jaw mean determination? What is the scientific evidence?
5. How are personality likenesses in persons of the same class and society to be explained?
6. To what does Cooley attribute the similarities in personality traits noted between members of widely separated societies?

[26] Dorcus and Shaffer, *op. cit.*, chap. xiv.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 480-81.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 493.

7. Are the theories of Kardiner and of Cooley necessarily in conflict? Explain.
8. How are personality differences between members of the same family to be accounted for?
9. Describe the rise of the "self," combining the theories of Cooley, Mead, and Murphy, as far as you can.
10. Explain the part that competition and conflict play in the development of the personality.
11. Why are older children more cooperative than younger children?
12. What are some of the obvious imprints of occupation upon the personalities of school teachers, farmers, preachers, judges, salesmen?
13. Is it more accurate to describe a personality as a "collection" or as a "composite" of group roles?
14. Illustrate from observation some of the influences of physical handicaps on personality.
15. What is the relation of intelligence to personality adjustment?
16. What is meant by the "pragmatic" determination of personality?
17. What personality "types" appeal to you as the most realistic, and why?
18. Give an illustration of a personality "trait," and discuss the precision of the term.
19. What useful distinctions can be made between the three terms *value, attitude,* and *trait?*
20. Distinguish between *personality* and *character.* Is one a part of the other?
21. Why are "values" so important for the study of human behavior?
22. Define *sympathy,* and explain its part in social adjustment.
23. What is meant by an "organized" personality? A "disorganized" personality?
24. Is it possible to change the dominant pattern of a personality after childhood? Illustrate.
25. What are some of the principles which must be followed in the treatment of functional personality disorganization at any level?

REFERENCES

ALLPORT, GORDON W. *Personality, A Psychological Interpretation.* New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1937.

CAMERON, NORMAN. *The Psychology of Behavior Disorders, A Biosocial Interpretation.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947.

DORCUS, ROY M., and SHAFFER, G. WILSON. *Textbook in Abnormal Psychology* (3d ed.). Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Co., 1945.

HORNEY, KAREN. *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1937.

LINTON, RALPH. *The Cultural Background of Personality.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1945.

MURPHY, GARDNER. *Personality, A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947.

MURRAY, HENRY A. *Explorations in Personality.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1938.

LA PIERE, RICHARD T., and FARNSWORTH, PAUL R. *Social Psychology* (3d ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1949. Parts III and IV.

YOUNG, KIMBALL. *Personality and Problems of Adjustment.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1940.

PART II

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

CHAPTER 3

THE PAIR RELATION

The simplest type of social relationship is that existing between two persons. There are evidently many kinds of pair relationships, even in a primitive society. It is usual in sociology to divide all pair relationships into two broad categories, *primary* and *secondary*.

Primary Relations.—A primary relationship is perhaps best defined by saying that each member of a pair has a specific emotional value for the other, so that another person cannot be substituted without emotional disturbance. The relationship between a mother and her child cannot be preserved if the child is replaced by another. If the first child were removed by death, the mother might build up an attachment for a second child, and be much comforted. The two relationships would then be alike in kind, but the mother cannot exchange one child for the other with indifference. Theoretically, she might have been indifferent if the two children had been identical in every respect that she cared about, and her emotional experience had been the same with the two children. These similarities are greater at some times than at others, but in practice they will seldom or never go so far that a mother can accept one child as the complete equivalent of another. She may well have preferences, but her relationship with each child will still be unique and non-interchangeable.

If a child were old enough, he would be equally unable to accept one parent indifferently in place of another, even though he should like the second parent better than the first after he had developed emotional ties with him.

The usual primary relationships found in our society are those that occur between relatives, between husbands and wives,

between friends, and between personal enemies. Nor does it make any difference in the definition whether the emotional values that hold two people within a certain pattern of interaction are positive or negative, provided the pattern depends upon the emotional values with which they regard one another. There are sayings to the effect that there is no hatred so bitter as that between brothers, that love is closely akin to hate, etc. However that may be, for our purposes we may regard hate as just as much a criterion of primary relationship as love.

Secondary Relations.—The emotional value, whether favorable or unfavorable, which one person has for another may vary from very strong to very weak. Thus primary relationships may differ in degree with respect to the quality that makes them primary. At the point where the substitution of one person for another in a pair relationship causes a negligible emotional response, irrespective of purely service or utility considerations, the relationship may be called *secondary* rather than primary. In a grocery store, the customer is usually indifferent whether one clerk or another waits on him, provided the clerks are equally efficient, although he may indeed be disturbed if he gets a poor clerk. In this case the factor on which the relationship depends is the service rendered by the clerk, and not an emotional interest which the customer has in the clerk as a person. A good "automat" might do as well. As soon as a personal interest appears in noticeable degree, the relationship becomes primary.

Stereotype Relations.—Some common relations do not fit so obviously into the simple dichotomous classification of primary and secondary. One of these is that between host and guest, when the latter is a stranger. In many societies hospitality under such circumstances is cordial and unfailing. There has been no prior interaction between host and guest such as is necessary to create personal emotional ties, yet the host is anxious to please the guest as a person. Unlike the relationship of customer and clerk, that between host and guest would, of course, at once become absurd and meaningless if the guest were replaced by a mechanical man. On the other hand, sub-

stituting one acceptable guest for another would not change the essential pattern of hospitality.

It would seem that in the host-guest relationship, emotional attitudes of a primary sort have been developed by the host toward a *generalized* guest or stranger in need of hospitality, rather than toward a particular stranger, and that the guest entertains similar attitudes toward a generalized host. These patterns have been generated in agreement with the values of the society in which each has lived, and function so long as a specific guest or host and his behavior conform reasonably well with the common notion or stereotype. Our test of substitution seems to apply best as between a particular guest and the stereotype. For example, if an ante bellum southern plantation owner, a member of a class noted for its hospitality, had been called on to entertain a Negro artist from New York City, he would have refused to play the role.

There are many familiar relationships of the stereotyped sort. Indeed, most pair relations probably begin in this way. Two friends are usually first thrown together in some stereotyped relationship for which each has emotional attitudes to some extent already prepared. Examples are classmates or fraternity brothers in college, fellow soldiers in Company A, members of a debating team, minister and parishioners, physician and patient, teacher and pupil.

Many relationships, such as those between whites and Negroes in the United States, always function largely at the stereotype level. The traditional relationship between a southern white woman and her Negro "Mammy" is especially interesting because it is apt to exhibit a struggle between a stereotyped pattern and personal patterns developed out of the interaction of actual personalities. We find in such a relationship queer inconsistencies, for demonstrations of personal devotion often go beyond the limits of the socially approved stereotype.

Further Classification of Pair Relations.—It is possible to classify pair relationships in innumerable ways. The most natural, if not the most scientific, is simply to list those which are most conspicuous in our society, such as those between parent

and child, husband and wife, employer and employee, friend and friend. A more abstract approach is to classify them according to their chief functions or motives. Thus the central motive of a pair relationship may seem to be exploitation, service, or emotional or other utility. Dichotomous groupings of these as associative or dissociative, as having utility or disutility, etc., may be made, although the question of degree will enter sooner or later. Sociologists most commonly classify relationships according to certain types of interaction that characterize them, namely, cooperation, competition, rivalry, and conflict. Another frequent category is domination-submission. Many other terms, like contraventive, scapegoat, symbiotic, etc., are also met with. These terminologies involve a great deal of overlapping, are often subjective and hazy in meaning, and are open to other logical difficulties. Most pair relationships probably involve a number of motives and a variety of forms of interaction. The student of sociology should also realize that any given classification is arbitrary, and that others may be more useful for certain purposes. Nevertheless, it is necessary to try to break down, as much as possible, a complex and variable phenomenon like pair relationships into their simpler elements, and to convert them into recurrent types. For this purpose most of the categories mentioned above have proved to be useful, and so meet one test. They will be defined and discussed as they are used below.

The Beginning of Pair Relations.—Any pair relationship begins with some form of perceptual *contact* between the two individuals. How this contact comes about is not important here. The present point is simply that one member or both members of the pair must become aware of the other. The sense of awareness is synonymous with some degree of interest. The interest may be in the person himself or in the person merely as a means to an end. Development of the relationship will then depend upon whether or not the interest is *effective*. An effective interest is one which leads to further responsiveness with reference to the object of the interest.

An effective interest felt by person A in person B occurs when A is for some reason *ready to react overtly* to B. The sex

impulse, for example, is responsible for a more or less perennial interest in persons of the opposite sex, and becomes effective when the particular stimulus has the power, acquired through associative learning or "conditioning," to arouse or release the interest in some form of overt behavior, in the absence of any successfully inhibiting impulses.

Other impulses or interests operate in the same general way. If a person on a railroad train feels inclined to talk or play a game of cards with someone, he looks about at the other passengers and selects one who promises to satisfy his whim. Or, if he is approached by someone with such a proposal, whether or not he accepts it will likewise be decided by his mental and physical "set" or disposition at the moment.

Once contact between two persons has occurred and an effective interest has been aroused in one or both, however casual it may be, the next step is normally some form of communication between the interested parties. This may be through an exchange of looks, facial expression, gesture, act, or speech. Only when the two persons are finally in *communication* with one another, each acting and reacting to the other in attempts to convey and interpret meanings, are they said to be in *social interaction.*

Social interaction is necessarily always psychic in part. For that reason, the term is sometimes extended to include fanciful communication with a person who is absent, the principal imagining not only what he himself would do or say, but also how the other would respond. Actually, most persons indulge in a great deal of purely subjective social interaction. Man has always communicated with his gods in this way. It has the peculiar attraction that the principal can control the responses of the imaginary party as he wishes.

What Determines the Pattern of a Pair Relation?—The form which a pair relationship will take is determined (1) by the impulses that started it, (2) by what is needed to satisfy these impulses, and (3) by the accumulative and modifying effects of the interaction which takes place between the two persons, all under the general control of the *folkways* and the

mores of the society in which it occurs. This general statement needs to be expanded.

The impulse or impulses in the members of a pair that caused them to be interested in one another furnish the initial motive or function of their relationship. In general, the purpose of a pair relation is to promote the psychic or physical well-being of its members. It is a fundamental principle that every relationship has for its *raison d'être* the satisfaction of certain needs or impulses of one or both of the participants. The technique of pair interaction is somewhat suggestive of a chess game: the action of each member is intended to elicit a certain response from the other, and is determined both by the general purposes of the relationship and by the responses of the other.

The specific relation between physician and patient, for example, grows out of needs which may be more obvious or important than those that characterize some other relations, but the difference is one only of degree. The physician behaves to the patient and the patient to the physician in ways which have been developed in their society as the most successful for meeting the particular needs involved, with a certain amount of individual selection and modification. Both play a mixture of stereotyped and individual roles. The doctor takes, the patient gives the case history; the doctor listens with the stethoscope, the patient breathes or articulates as he is directed; the doctor prescribes, the patient takes the medicine; the doctor submits a bill, the patient pays it. The behavior of both, i.e., their pattern of interaction, is chosen to meet the needs because of which the relation was formed—the relief of illness on the one hand, the earning of a fee and social approval on the other. In essentially the same way, the parties to any other pair relation adjust their behavior to serve the needs or impulses which prompted it.

It has already been pointed out that the way in which one person reacts to another depends partly on the group from which each comes. There are general reaction patterns in our society toward females, elderly people, five-star generals, Negroes, priests, and former convicts. These are, again, stereotyped attitudes, which are expressed to some extent in any pair rela-

tion. We have seen above that practically everyone at first reacts to everyone else in terms of group stereotypes. Thus a young sailor does not, at sight, ordinarily behave toward a Navy chaplain as he does toward another sailor like himself.

Although the patterning of behavior in a pair association is directed by needs and usually follows the customs and stereotypes of the society, it is also influenced by the personal adjustments each member makes to the more or less unique combination of qualities in the other. These adjustments, in turn, depend upon the relative force or energy of the two temperaments, the values or philosophy which they bring to the situation, the support they have from third parties or groups, and their abilities or lack of abilities bearing on their common problems. The adjustments of attitudes and behavior which two persons make to one another as the result of the give-and-take in a functioning pair relationship affect their opinions of themselves, and tend to become permanently integrated into their personalities.

As a pair relation continues, the interaction between the parties tends to become channelized or habitual. A pattern of behavior develops which characterizes the particular relation and distinguishes it from all others in which its members engage. By virtue of the ties developed between the pair, each expects and receives from the other certain differential treatment which no other person or stranger would either claim or get. When the ordinary person visits his childhood home he is welcomed and entertained by old friends, not by those who never knew him. To be sure, a distinguished individual may be greeted and banqueted by the mayor to whom he is a stranger. But in this case, also, a prior relation exists, although it is not between the mayor and the visitor as specific individuals. It is a long-established relation between stereotypes, a city official and a visitor of public importance, which leads to expectations of behavior appropriate between the two.

It is clear that in a pair relation the two members may have very different needs, and that they may also play very different roles. What each does depends not only on the demands he

makes of the other, but also on the demands which the other makes of him. It is a crucial fact that what a member of a pair does is not always a matter of his own choice. He may prefer to act in one way, but be forced to act differently in response to the behavior of the other. A businessman who continually tries to push an associate aside or damage him in order to advance himself may force the associate into self-protective or retaliatory behavior, however much the latter might prefer a different kind of relationship with his fellow worker. It then becomes a problem of the dissatisfied associate to break the relationship, to compete with the other as best he can, or to discover how to change the behavior of the other into a pattern more to his liking.

Relations may exist for which only one of the parties feels a need. This member will then play a positive or aggressive role, the other a negative or submissive one. There are also in almost every situation inherent conditions of supply and demand, of abundance and scarcity, that lead to such generalized types of relationship as cooperation, competition, and conflict, already mentioned. The doctor-patient relation is an example of cooperation, the business associates of competition or conflict. These kinds of interaction are so universal and important that they will be treated more at length later.

The Duration of Pair Relations.—Just as the form of a pair relation is mainly decided by the needs it serves, so is its length of life. If the relation fails to provide the benefits for which it was formed, it will be terminated, unless it is considered worth continuing for the sake of other satisfactions. In the latter case, the roles will be modified accordingly. The treatment pattern of the original relationship between physician and patient, mentioned above, is of course dropped after the patient is cured, and the two will often not see one another again. Yet the relationship created attitudes between them which remain in the mind. If the patient becomes ill again he is likely to renew the relation. More than this, attitudes of gratitude and responsibility, or of personal congeniality, may lead to friendship that will last through life. It is very common for a relation which was created

for one purpose to come to serve other purposes or to provide other satisfactions.

It is natural that the needs and interests of any two people should change in time, and that these changes should affect their pair relation. New experience is often welcome for its own sake. Crises in other parts of one's life may occur at any time and divert attention elsewhere. As people grow older, they develop different points of view and different tastes. Two young men who take great pleasure in one another's company because of their zeal for long-distance swimming may discover in middle life that they have little in common. Differences in education, in social opportunity, in income, pull people apart and reduce the satisfactions they once found in one another. The formation of new pair relations may compete with or replace older ones, as when a girl turns from friends of her own sex to courtship and marriage.

With some relations, the original underlying needs may continue but diminish in intensity, with the result that interaction is slowed down, and the ties are weakened. A familiar example of this is marriage as advancing age reduces the sex drive. The marital relationship usually serves enough other interests and benefits to preserve it for life, and on that account may be stronger at the end than in the beginning. But this is not always true, and many marriages that were saved by sex while the couple was young, grow stale in later life.

The great majority of pair relations in our society are casual. Two persons are thrown together without intention or interest on their part by some larger purpose or circumstance, and find it desirable or necessary to cooperate, compete, exploit, engage in conflict, or merely communicate in a conventional way with one another. Employees in the same office, travelers in the same coach seat, two members of a choir, insurance salesman and prospect, etc., suggest some of the innumerable commonplace associations. Most of these contacts, even some of promise, are soon terminated as minor incidents, or are swept away by the currents of social change, and never rise above the incidental level. Those that do happen to persist, however, tend after a while to acquire some of the quality of the primary

relation.[1] The extent to which this occurs in any case depends upon the benefits and satisfactions the members find in one another. If they are considerable, the association is apt to lead to real and lasting friendship and affection; if they are slight, they of course affect the emotions less.

Disruption of Pair Relations.—All pair relations, however important and valued they may be, are, of course, eventually broken by some form of enforced separation, including death. Their disruption is accompanied by an emotional disturbance that is roughly proportional to the strength and benefits of the particular ties. Probably the most generally catastrophic separation is that of parent from child or husband from wife. The shock from such a loss by death is known as bereavement, but the emotions which result from a long or permanent separation due to any other cause differ only in degree. The reason for the severity of the shock in, say, the loss of a parent or spouse, obviously lies in the extreme importance of the needs and satisfactions which he or she served. The death of an elderly parent ordinarily causes less grief than that of one in the prime of life. His children are grown up and no longer need his protection, or he may have become a burden to them. Another reason is that the children have had time to prepare themselves for the inevitable. A member of a vital pair relation of long standing has adjusted his habits of thought and behavior to the other member, and is accustomed to looking to him for certain services and satisfactions. When such a relationship is suddenly broken, his life organization is thrown out of balance, making it very difficult, and often impossible, to reorient himself satisfactorily. Thus the members of an intimate primary relation become in a sense a part of one another's personality, and either may be seriously damaged by the loss of the other. It is interesting that even bereavement is found to be socially conditioned, so that the behavior and, to a lesser extent, the feelings that accompany it vary quite noticeably from one society to another, and often between social classes.[2]

[1] See definition, p. 45.

[2] The student may find illustrations of this and report them to the class.

Jealousy, Anger, and Hate.—Sociologists are accustomed to refer to all of those kinds of attitudes and behaviors which bring and hold people in pair (or group) relations as *associative,* and to those which prevent or break up such relations as *dissociative.* The frustration of the wishes of one member of a pair by the other may lead to emotions of jealousy, anger, hate, etc. They tend to be expressed in behavior designed to lessen or remove the irritation which caused them. What form the reaction will take probably depends chiefly on the desires thwarted, the temperament of the individual, the opportunities presented, and the customs of his society. The jealous person usually wants intensely to preserve the pair relation, but just what he does is decided by what seems to him the best solution under the circumstances. A few generations back he might have challenged his rival to a duel; today, if he sees no way out and his passions are strong, his confusion and frenzy may increase to the point where even fear of the law will not restrain him from committing a crime of violence to remove the third person, or if that is not possible, to destroy the object of his own affections, and often himself as well, in order that no one else may possess what he cannot have. Such an extreme method defeats his own wishes, however, and he will avoid it if possible. He is much more likely to try to change the attitudes and behavior of the desired party in his favor. He may make extra efforts to please, or to show that he is better than his rival. He may promise, argue, quarrel, or threaten. In any case, his real desire is to preserve and strengthen the pair relation, not to end it.

While anger often goes with jealousy, it may also spring from very different causes. In general, anger may be regarded as a dissociative force, making for the dissolution of pair relations not designed for the expression of hostility. Anger may be an indication that the expectations of the relationship are not being realized, that its satisfactions are thwarted. Whether or not these expectations are reasonable is another matter. The perception of inadequacies in a relationship, and expressions of dissatisfaction serve the function of guiding trial-and-error efforts in the development of relationships. There is a point, however, beyond which dissatisfaction cannot go without

threatening the relation itself. The frequent occurrence of anger between a pair may usually be regarded as a symptom that the toleration point is being exceeded.

Hate is an attitude, rather than an impulse like anger. It grows out of what is considered serious injury to a person or his values by another. It is, as a rule, obviously dissociative in its effects, releasing behavior aimed at destroying a nonhostile pair relation.

Nevertheless, anger, hate, and like emotions often become the motive for a certain kind of interaction between two people. This is because such feelings engender a demand for antagonistic behavior, which relieves them. They may therefore serve to hold the parties in contact, for the purpose of venting their ill will upon one another. It is even possible for two persons to cherish a feud for a lifetime, through perpetuating a pair relationship which is characterized by purely hostile roles. When hostile relations develop out of and replace nonhostile relations between the same pair, the antagonistic attitudes responsible may be thought of as *dissociative* with reference to the original nonhostile relation, and as *associative* with reference to the hostile relation!

Definition of Cooperation, Competition, Conflict, and Accommodation in Pair Relations.—Four terms which occur very frequently in sociological literature are cooperation, competition, conflict, and accommodation. They are intended to distinguish between certain kinds of interaction which seem to be carried on universally, and are terms which were in common use long before they were adopted by sociologists. In fact, the meanings which sociologists impute to them closely follow the original popular meanings. *Cooperation* carries the idea of mutual aid, and is thought of as associative in nature. From the point of view of a pair relation, *competition* implies an effort to get something that another person is also striving for. Injury to the competitor as a person is not a motive nor an intended part of the technique of competition, although, to be sure, either party may suffer severely enough if he is unsuccessful. Whenever two individuals attempt to do personal harm to one another, either as an end or a means, they should be regarded as

engaged in *conflict.* Both competition and conflict are superficially thought of as dissociative, even though they may be the basis of countless working adjustments, relationships, and institutions of lasting duration. *Accommodation* is the modification or adjustment of the attitudes and behavior patterns of a pair which results from their interaction.

These rough definitions enable us to recognize and classify most cases, but questions sometimes arise. For example, should the sport of boxing be regarded as a case of competition or conflict? A sparring exhibition may readily be called competition; but when the "K.O." is attempted on an opponent as the climax of a match, the behavior clearly falls under our definition of conflict. Indeed, exactly the same overt behavior might occur in a fist fight. It has been insisted that boxing is competition, like football or any other sport, because there is no ill will, but this point of view seems to create more difficulties than it removes. If ill feeling were made a necessary part of our definitions, it should then be lacking, or relatively lacking, in competition and present in conflict, as defined above. But the proprietors of two cut-rate drug stores trying to put one another out of business are by no means always free from attitudes of resentment and dislike. On the other hand, soldiers of opposing armies have often shot at one another by day and fraternized by night, apparently without any feeling of personal animus. Yet probably few people, including sociologists, would want to say that the druggists were in conflict, the soldiers only in competition. Because of such considerations, we shall prefer the definitions of competition and conflict first suggested above.

It has been proposed to distinguish between cooperation, competition, conflict, etc., in terms of degrees of decreasing communication,[3] from the associative to the dissociative end of the scale. This emphasizes the role of communication in all forms of interaction, but a definition of this kind cannot actually be fully achieved until (1) communication has been subjected to some kind of measurement, (2) at least the approximate form of the relationship between communication and coopera-

[3] G. A. Lundberg, *Foundations of Sociology* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939), pp. 275 ff.

tion, competition, conflict, and accommodation has been determined, and (3) the lines of separation between cooperation, competition, etc., on the scale have been drawn. Moreover, it appears that such a definition, if it were possible, would bear little relation to the present concepts, because, for example, as we now use the terms, there is often no more communication in competition than in conflict.

Cooperative Pair Relations.—We shall think of a pair relation as being cooperative in type when cooperation is the motive or adhesive force responsible for interaction between the two members. The test is to remove the motive for cooperation through the attainment of the goals or otherwise; the pair relation then ceases to exist.

In cooperation, the two members may assist one another in doing the same task, as in turning a heavy wheel. They may perform different parts of a common task, as when one provides the food and the other cooks it. Each may find in the other the gratification of some impulse, such as sex. One may furnish the brains and another the brawn in a business partnership. One may be the buyer, the other the seller. In every case, however, the members are of mutual service or utility to one another, and it is for this reason that the relation occurs. In every case, also, some form of mentally observed interaction (action and reaction) must occur between the two members, and they must be conscious of one another. The Hindu who weaves a rug in India and the American who buys it in a shop in New York do not form a cooperative, or any other kind, of pair relationship, as we have defined the terms. They are, rather, members of an economic organization. If a cooperative pair relation continues for any length of time, the members tend to develop definite accommodations or attitudes and roles with reference to one another. These attitudes may evidently be either primary or secondary.

It is not necessary that cooperation be the exclusive type of interaction which occurs between a pair in a cooperative relation. We have just seen that accommodation is also invariably present. But accommodation is not a parallel or mutually exclusive

category with cooperation, being rather a consequence of it, or of some other form of interaction. The presence of accommodation, therefore, does not create a problem. It is, however, also permissible for competition or conflict to occur between a pair whose relationship is termed cooperative, provided the competition is incidental rather than the essential process holding the pair together. This is subject to determination by the test mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In case either cooperation or (say) competition is found to be capable of sustaining a given pair relation following the removal of the other, then the relation should properly be called cooperative-competitive.

A concept which is more or less synonymous with cooperation is that of *mutual service*. It may be a more accurate term for the description of pair relations wherein the emphasis is not upon assistance in the performance of a particular task or in the attainment of a particular goal, but rather upon some interchange of benefits, as between a landlord and a roomer who gets his rent by tending the furnace.

When the need arises in the study of pair relations for a broader term than either cooperation or mutual service, the word *utility* often seems appropriate. It seems especially applicable when tangible mutual aid or mutual service is replaced by intangible or psychological satisfactions in the case of at least one member of the pair. A familiar illustration is the relationship between a father and his young child. The child may render no objective aid or service to the father; on the contrary, he may exact from the father much expense and sacrifice. Yet when children are kidnapped, fathers show themselves eager to pay any ransom within their power to get them back. Evidently, as a rule, a child has high psychological utility for the father. The father receives emotional satisfactions of a profound sort from the possession and well-being of the child, and these emotions bind him to his offspring.

Some of the types of behavior just cited imply more asymmetry of interaction between the members of a pair relation than do others. In other words, the members in some cases do not respond in terms of even the same general type of interaction. For example, in a competitive relation both members

engage in competitive behavior toward one another, but in a utility relation one may render objective services while the other merely possesses psychological utility. A still more marked instance of asymmetry in pair interaction is seen in the *exploitative* relation. The master-slave relation is an obvious case where one member profits more than the other. The exploitative type of pair relation is quite widespread, often being found where it might be least expected, as among members of a family. However, even the master-slave relation is so complicated with other types of interaction that it is probably never purely exploitative. Moreover, there is a general tendency for the parties in any pair relation to form judgments about the value of the contributions of the other, and to feel that the latter should be reasonably equal to their own. Just as an underpaid worker is apt to do no more than he thinks he is paid for, so a social relation has some of the elements of an exchange, which must seem to be reasonable to those who voluntarily engage in it. A chief difference is that in a noneconomic relation much of the value may be of the psychological or intangible sort.

Competitive Pair Relations.—In competition attention is often focused on a desired object, such as business success, and action is directed toward it or toward third parties (say buyers), with no knowledge of or communication between the individual competitors. It has already been said that under such conditions no pair relationships occur, competitive or otherwise. It should also be noticed that even when a competitive pair relation does exist, it is characterized by less interaction between the two members themselves than is the case with cooperation or conflict. Although two competitors may be painfully conscious of one another, and may develop marked attitudes and well-defined behavior patterns toward one another, their chief attention and behavior will still be directed toward the object for which they are both striving, or toward the people who have the power to decide the issue in favor of one or the other of them. Another trait of a competitive pair relationship grows out of the fact that each member stands as an obstacle to the attainment of the other's wishes, and if either or both

are obviously dissatisfied with the results of the competitive process, they may easily and naturally turn to conflict.

For these reasons, the fundamentally competitive pair relation is likely to be relatively infrequent, impersonal, and unstable. When it does occur, it tends to disintegrate either into the primary relationship of conflict, or into accommodations that lead to cooperation. Thus the competitive type of interaction is usually secondary in pair relations, in which the basic pattern tends to take the form of cooperation.

When competition occurs in a pair relation, the particular form it will take is determined, as usual, both by the folkways and by the individual personalities involved. The behavior will generally stay within the framework of the customary including any "rules of the game" which the society has set up to prevent what it regards as unfair or "wrong." If these are violated, the society may interfere, perhaps punish the offenders. For example, if it were discovered that one of two opposing lawyers had introduced false witnesses to win his case, he would be fined by the court, or prevented from the further practice of his profession. Nevertheless, a great variety of behavior is possible in most competitive situations.

Conflict Pair Relations.—The motive for conflict between two persons is a supposed clash of interests or values. This clash usually generates antagonistic attitudes and emotions, so that the relationship is primary in nature. As we have defined conflict, however, it may occasionally occur on an impersonal, or secondary, basis. As in the case of competition, a conflict pair relation is based on forces which tend to its own termination. In conflict, the essential motive is to subdue, incapacitate, injure, or destroy the body or personality of the opponent. It is attack and counterattack, directed at the other physically or emotionally, personally or impersonally, which sets conflict apart from competition.

Society not only defines many situations as conflict situations, but often provides ready-made patterns of conflict behavior appropriate to each. Most people know what is supposed to be an insult or personal attack and whether one is expected

to respond with sharp language, with avoidance, with legal measures, with overpowering but undamaging physical force, with a blow to the jaw, or with knife-play or gunfire to the death.

Elements of conflict are common in actual pair relations of innumerable kinds; but, because of its nature, conflict is seldom for long the factor primarily responsible for maintaining the relation. Conflict is usually settled in favor of one member of a pair, whereupon the relation ceases in so far as it is based on conflict. In some cases, however, it happens that neither opponent is able to overcome the other, so that the underlying reasons for conflict may then persist, and the conflict relation may endure for a long time.

Accommodation in Pair Relations.—All forms of social interaction between two persons, especially competition and conflict, but also cooperation, normally lead to modifications in the attitudes and behavior, or roles, of each person with reference to the other. In a cooperative pair relation some competition, and perhaps even conflict, are inevitably present, and necessary to indicate the respective parts for which each member is best fitted. In many cases the proper roles are obvious, and were indeed the original motive for forming the partnership. In a business partnership, the member who was trained in bookkeeping keeps the books, the member who has had successful salesmanship experience looks after the sales. But even in such cases there are invariably points at which competition will enter and affect what each does. In the case of the business partnership, as the partners consider their policies, it may become apparent that one has better judgment than the other, and in the interest of both the shrewder may increasingly take the lead. If the partnership continues, numerous other competitive trials will occur and cause the two members to readjust to one another in various ways. These adjustments will tend to become habitual or customary, and to harden into routine and ritual.

Where accommodation is the result of competition or conflict, it always takes the basic form of domination-and-submission.

One member of the pair yields to the superiority, the will, or the force of the other in respect to a particular matter. Thereafter, or at least for a time, each accepts the adjustment, and is governed by it. Of course, each member may dominate the other in some ways, so that in the total any degree, including a balance, of dominance-submission may occur between them.

It is not correct, however, to suppose that all accommodations are the product of competition or conflict, at least in so far as the interaction between members of a particular pair is concerned. The wife of a plumber may have no desire to exchange her housekeeping for pipe-fitting, and their present separate roles are not the result of any competition between them. This is not to deny that their accepted division of labor may have grown out of competition and conflict between the sexes over the centuries, causing men to regard certain occupations, and women others, as their "natural" right. But at this point we are interested only in the relation between a given pair of people.

It is also entirely possible for one person to adjust to another out of a desire to please or gratify. This is seen everywhere in the case of parents who accommodate themselves to their children's behavior and desires because of their fondness for them, rather than because they have been defeated in competition or conflict with them—although there is no denying that some parental behavior is traceable to this last source, also!

Like any other choice, an accommodation or adjustment is made because it appears to the individual to be the most satisfactory thing he can do under the circumstances, or because he seems unable to help himself. Competition or conflict is replaced by accommodation at just that psychological point where the latter seems clearly more agreeable than a further continuation of the struggle. The exact location of this point in time will depend upon what the consequences of yielding are believed to be and how undesirable they appear, on the one hand, and on the degree of fatigue, pain, and hopelessness which have resulted from the conflict, on the other. Any attempt to predict in a specific case must of course be based upon detailed knowledge of the particular conditions and attitudes. Some individu-

als are, no doubt, temporarily more stubborn than others. Theoretically, it is always possible to hasten accommodation by increasing the punishment inflicted by the contest, by decreasing the penalties of submission, or by both.

QUESTIONS

1. Define and illustrate a *primary* pair relation; a *secondary* pair relation.
2. Distinguish a *stereotype* pair relation from a primary or secondary pair relation.
3. Name some other methods of classifying pair relations, and discuss their utility.
4. Describe the psychological and social conditions under which pair relations are initiated, and their developmental process. Test and illustrate these principles from your own experience.
5. What determines the *pattern* that a pair relation will take? Can you illustrate from your own observation?
6. Must each member in a pair relation have the same needs or motives, or play the same role as the other?
7. May a pair relation exist for which only one member feels a need?
8. What are some of the factors which decide the duration of a pair relation?
9. Does the motive of a pair relation sometimes change? If so, will the pattern of the relationship remain the same? Illustrate.
10. Does the *intensity* of a pair relation always remain constant during its life? Discuss with reference to a specific case.
11. What determines the amount of emotional disturbance at the disruption of a pair relation?
12. Define the terms *associative* and *dissociative.*
13. Can hostility provide motivation for a pair relation? Explain.
14. Define and illustrate the four important terms, *cooperation, competition, conflict,* and *accommodation.* Is ill feeling an essential part of the definition of conflict?
15. Describe, illustrate, and compare cooperative, competitive, and conflict pair relations as you have observed them.

16. Distinguish between cooperation and *utility* as bases for pair relations.
17. Cite cases of *asymmetry* in pair relations.
18. What are the bonds which hold together an *exploitative* pair relation?
19. Why is the competitive pair relation relatively uncommon?
20. Why is the conflict pair relation usually of short duration?
21. Is all *accommodation* in a pair relation the outcome of competition or conflict? Illustrate.

REFERENCES

COOLEY, CHARLES H. *Social Organization.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922, chap. iii.

HILLER, E. T. *Social Relations and Structures.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, Part III.

LUNDBERG, G. A. *Foundations of Sociology.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939, pp. 268-79.

PARK, ROBERT E., and BURGESS, ERNEST W. *An Introduction to the Science of Sociology.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921, chaps. 5, 6, 8, 10.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *Society, Culture, and Personality.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947. Part VI.

VON WIESE, LEOPOLD, and BECKER, HOWARD. *Systematic Sociology.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1932, chap. xxxix.

CHAPTER 4

RELATIONS WITHIN A GROUP

Group Defined.—A group is distinguished from a pair by the fact that it involves three or more persons. While the life span of some groups may be brief, the groups most studied by sociologists are those which are of common occurrence in a society and which persist for a period of time. Each member of a group must to some extent be in interaction with every other member, even though the interaction is not face to face. It is not necessary for this intermember interaction to be continuous, but only for it to be recurrent during the life of the group.

An important difference between a pair and a group is that whereas a pair relation is completely terminated by the removal of either member, this need not be true of a group. The dropping or replacement of some members may only modify a group in some degree. Evidently, the effect of such changes is generally felt less in large groups than in small ones.

Nature of Within-Group Behavior.—All interactions found between the members of a group are reducible to pair relations, more or less modified by coordinating behavior. A family consisting of father, mother, and two children is merely a group of individuals, each reacting to the other. In this case there are six pair relations:[1] father and mother, father and child A, father and child B, mother and child A, mother and child B, and the children A and B. The pattern of interaction between them is revealed by their speech habits. One member usually addresses another singly. Sometimes a member may address two or more others simultaneously, as when the mother gives

[1] Found by the algebraic formula for the number of combinations of n things taken r at a time: $nCr = \frac{n!}{r!\ (n-r)!} = \frac{4 \times 3 \times 2}{2 \times (4-2)} = 6$.

the two children instructions about waiting their turn at table. This latter kind of behavior merely represents economy of effort, since the same instruction applies to both children. But the mother will also often speak to child A in the presence of child B or of the father in a manner differing from that when she and child A are alone. In such instances, the pair relation between the mother and child A is modified by the family-group relation, or, in more technical language, within-group behavior. Moreover, much of what the mother tells the child at any time will have to do with the needs, cooperation, sentiments, and ideologies which hold the members of the family together as a functional group: "Brothers mustn't quarrel"; "Don't bother your father, he is tired after working hard all day for us"; "If you misbehave at school, the teacher will think that you don't have the right kind of father and mother." We may therefore generalize: To the extent that the interaction between a pair is influenced by the circumstance that the two persons are also members of the same group (such as a family), such interaction becomes within-group behavior.

Evidently, a great deal of the interaction within pairs is within-group in nature and is not easy to separate out. The most obvious method of separation is to observe how the interaction, say within brother-pairs, differs from that within male nonbrother pairs, the two sets being as alike in other respects as possible. The interaction peculiar to brother-pairs reveals family influences. If similar "subtractions" could be made for all the groups to which both members of any pair belonged, the residual or "purely pair" behavior left would no doubt be relatively slight and meaningless, so powerfully do group influences penetrate into the social relationships between pairs of individuals. For purposes of understanding group behavior, which is the chief concern of sociology, it is essential to be able to identify and extract for study the patterns of behavior which are peculiar to various important types of relationships. Nevertheless, a pair relation may most conveniently be regarded, in accordance with our earlier definition, as the total interaction that goes on between its two members, regardless of what group and individual elements it may be composed.

Primary and Secondary Groups.—If the interaction which characterizes pair relations within a particular group is for the most part primary in nature, the group is called a primary group. If the interaction is secondary, the group is regarded as secondary. These terms are only broadly descriptive, and are not intended to conceal the fact that the primary or secondary quality of most groups is a matter of degree. If, then, it is possible to recognize and classify the pair relations within a given group as mainly primary or secondary, it ought to be possible to decide whether or not the intragroup relationship as a whole falls mainly in one or the other of these categories, and roughly to what extent, if that information is wanted.

Among the group types in our society which are commonly classified as primary are family, play, neighborhood, and college fraternity. Secondary groups are business firms, government bureaus, a ship's crew. It is obvious, however, that some primary pair relations may exist in these so-called secondary groups.

Beginning of Within-Group Relations.—Within-group relations arise in fundamentally the same ways as pair relations. Individuals are born into some groups, like a family, and often find themselves, without choice, members of other groups. Children in neighborhoods or soldiers in a drafted army are both examples of the latter. Children are introduced to the groups to which their parents belong, such as a church of a particular denomination, and ordinarily become members themselves. Later, they may join or organize groups more on their own initiative, as a Masonic lodge or a law firm.

The group, like the pair, is basically a device for serving the physical or psychological needs of its members. Each group, therefore, has its purposes of functions, and is created or voluntarily joined by those who feel a need for its particular benefits. These benefits come from the acting of people together, rather than separately. Groups are therefore organized around needs which are best satisfied by collective action. As a matter of fact, most human needs seem to come under this category, so that the number and variety of groups in an advanced

society like ours is almost incredibly great. It is not easy to think of any need or wish which does not have a group or groups formed to serve it. Perhaps the chief exception is the desire of most persons for some opportunity to be alone for complete relaxation, reflection, and self-contemplation.

Groups are thus formed, through the development of a web of pair and coordinating relations, for the purpose of meeting certain needs or wishes. If membership is voluntary, each person must feel a desire for the benefits which the group is intended to provide, and must believe that they warrant his taking part in the group effort. Some persons who do not see this for themselves are won over by explanation or persuasion, or in some cases are compelled to participate by social pressure or even by physical force, as in the case of a drafted army.

Within-Group Relations and Group Roles.—When pair relations within a group are examined, they invariably reveal a rather distinct set of patterns, which may be called group roles. We have already referred to the husband role, the wife role, the father role, the mother role, the grandfather role, etc., in the family group. Many others come to mind, such as the roles played by doctors, nurses, and patients in the hospital group; by officers and privates in the army group; by teachers and pupils in the school group; by ministers and parishioners in the church group. These roles have often been hammered out over generations by innumerable experiences in pair relations and given shape by the functions of the groups concerned. In time, these intragroup roles become fixed by custom, and are readily impressed upon new members according to their duties by group pressures and imitative learning.

If a pair relation depends entirely upon the requirements of a single group, as does the relation between an army officer and a private, the role tends to be one peculiar to the group. The army officer gives orders appropriate to the military situation, the private executes them. If, however, the members of a pair belong to a second group in common, they will sometimes also assume roles characteristic of that group in their behavior toward one another. Thus, the army officer and the private

may be brothers. The question then arises, How will the two sets of group roles be coordinated within the same pair relation? If the pair moves from one group situation to another, their roles may change accordingly. While both are on duty, the officer and private may react to one another, at least outwardly, like any other officer and private, but when they are off duty they may become nothing but brothers. On the other hand, it often happens that different group roles cause confusion in pair relations, with the result that the functioning of the pair as members of one or both groups is interfered with. The officer may avoid calling on his brother for dangerous assignments, and bring upon himself the resentment of the other men, thus damaging his military leadership and lowering the morale of the company. Or the private may be jealous of the rank of his brother and come to dislike and avoid him. Skilful group organization seeks to avoid the mixing of different group roles, so that in our illustration the brothers would not be assigned to the same military company.

Persons who enter a going group find awaiting them (a) an ideology and set of values which rationalize the group purposes, and (b) a pattern of interperson relations, or an assortment of fairly well-defined roles. Those who develop a new group have the task of evolving these essentials, which may be referred to as the elements of *group structure*. The structure and functioning of a typical group may be briefly illustrated with any group chosen at random, say a college sorority. Many young women students, usually from fairly well-to-do families, have felt the need of a relatively small group of girls, chosen for congeniality, who might live together while away at college, and thus provide some of the intimacy and loyalty of the family relationship (sorority "sisters"). To this felt need were added the possibilities of better social opportunities, including the meeting of desirable young men, more comforts and luxuries of living than could be had in the usual college dormitories, and the prestige given by membership in an exclusive social club. These things have been obvious enough to occur to many girls in many colleges, as they sought out the kinds of associates they desired and cooperated to carry out their purposes. Then followed the

granting of charters, the founding of chapters, the organization of the sorority on a national scale, and the evolution of rituals of "bidding," "rushing," "pledging," and "initiating," which had to be approved and supervised by college authorities.

Within this framework the girls in any particular sorority developed pair relations based on mutual interests and congeniality, officers were elected, a "house-mother" was installed. Sorority pins, crests, mottoes, songs, and legends followed in course, roles appeared among the members—the financial secretary, the president, the student, the pledge, the initiate, the song leader, the popular "dater," the winner of campus beauty contests, the "prom" queen, the member with dazzling family wealth or position. All these roles are now established and played out again and again in pair relations among the procession of members, and give these relations the distinctive "sorority" coloring. Certain qualities essential for membership are generally assumed, and new members are carefully screened in accordance with them through the device of "rushing" week. It is obvious that the patterns of interaction occurring between members of a sorority are still determined by the social and prestige purposes for which the group was originally formed, and for which it continues to exist.

In pair relations which have a group setting, as in any others, there are initial attractions and repulsions, and the usual development of personal attitudes and roles toward one another as the result of association, guided by group patterns. The eagerness with which, say, two new sorority sisters, who think they see in each other the promise of a pleasant and worth-while friendship, explore one another's backgrounds and opinions is part of the testing and selecting process which may lead to lasting ties of a primary sort. It therefore takes time for persons to build up the ties and patterns of association which are the substance of group structure and behavior. In the course of this experience some individuals must be rejected and others accepted. Those who are regarded as suitable for the purposes and functions of the particular group must learn the ideology and value system, and acquire the relations, roles, and skills peculiar to the group.

Within-Group Relations Are Basically Cooperative.—Since groups are formed because certain purposes can be better achieved by several persons acting together than by a single individual, it follows that the basic type of any within-group relationship must be cooperation. The first problem of a group, then, is to attain effective cooperation for its purposes. The test of the quality of the cooperation is how successfully the group objectives are accomplished. This is usually judged, not by concrete measurements, but by the feelings and emotions of the members of the group. A hunting club will continue if the members are pleased with the recreation, sport, and companionship they get out of the club, even if they often kill no deer. It is a function of the leaders of a group always to be sensitive to the attitudes of the members toward the group experience, and to be guided by them in defining the group purposes and in devising more effective patterns of cooperation for realizing them.

Cooperative relations between the members of a group, as already explained in the case of pair relations in general, may shade off into relations which are better called service, utility, or exploitation. It has been seen that within a family group some of the strongest ties are those of emotional utility, rather than obvious purposeful cooperation. The same is true of a college sorority, while in a hospital group the term "service relation" is more descriptive.

It is of considerable importance to note that some members of a group may feel exploited by others. This might be true of the slaves in an ante bellum southern home, of a member of a family, of underpaid employees in a business firm, or of shanghaied sailors in a ship's crew. Members who feel that they are exploited by definition do not have a cooperative attitude toward the group and must be constantly impelled to cooperation by punishments and special prodding by the other members. The consciously exploitative relationship is essentially one of conflict, with strongly disorganizing tendencies.

Competition Within the Group.—From what has already been said about group formation and functioning, it is clear that

competition between individuals enters immediately in the selection of members. In each pair relation within the group, the two members may not only compete with one another, but they also stand in competition with other members for the place they hold within the pair. Thus they are always subject to displacement. Within the group, competition is keenest for the roles, like that of president of a sorority, which are most coveted because of their prestige or material rewards. Competition likewise tends to decide who shall play the various other roles within the group, such as that of song leader in the sorority.

A *group* role is one which is peculiar to the group, its relationships, and its purposes. In so far as the song leader in a sorority acts as a song leader in dealing with other members of the sorority, she is playing a group role. It is not necessary, on the other hand, that her role of song leader should be the basis of all the pair relations which she forms within the sorority, although it is likely to enter into all of them, and it may even form her only relationship with some of the girls.

It is the nature of competition that its decisions may be made in the minds of third parties, the competitors themselves often being unconscious of the selective process which affects them. Of course, competition in this form may occur between individuals who are not themselves in a pair or group relation (as applicants for a job).

Although a member may play more than one role in the same group, those members who are assigned the most competitive generalized or coordinating group roles, usually called "officers" or "leaders," are apt to be more restricted in the range of their roles within the group than are other members. The "president" of a group finds it harder to lay aside the presidential role than does, say, the "secretary" or even the "vice president;" if the president would descend from his pedestal and be like other members, the latter may not accept him, because they find it hard to dissociate him from his office.

Competition not only largely decides what individuals play what roles and share in what pair relations within a group, but also helps to determine and define what roles will be played at all within a particular group. In some universities, the deans of

colleges are displaced by deans of such divisions as the social sciences, the natural sciences, and the humanities. In most churches, lay leaders have yielded to full-time salaried ministers. The choice between competing roles within a group should theoretically be decided by the effects on the successful functioning of the group; in practice, it is often settled by manipulation and "log-rolling" between the particular personalities involved.

In brief, then, competition is indispensable as well as inevitable in intragroup relations. Through it individuals strive for or obtain membership, favors, status, prestige, and power in the group. It tends to assign group members to the roles for which they are best fitted. It also operates to select those roles and procedures which are most effective for obtaining group objectives, and may even result in modifying the objectives themselves. Indeed, competition goes one step farther. It operates between groups as well as within them. That aspect of the subject will be discussed later.

Conflict Within the Group.—Conflict may occur between the members of a group just as in any other pair relation. Resort may be had to conflict to settle certain issues between the members of a group which cannot be disposed of by competition. The leadership of a criminal gang may be decided by gunplay between the two chief aspirants, because they are unwilling to leave the choice to their followers, or because their followers insist on violent methods. "An important element of the American value-system is the belief that individuals have an obligation to accept the results of fair competition, i.e., to be a 'good loser.' Hence competition tends to turn into conflict whenever doubts are raised concerning the fairness of the competition or the validity of the rules of the game." [2]

The propriety of conflict may vary somewhat with the issue. In a debate regarding the shape of the earth, personal invectives and blows can contribute nothing to a clarification of the question, although they may very well end the argument between the particular persons concerned, and even lead to the popular acceptance of one point of view or another for a time. On the

[2] Robin M. Williams, "The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions," Social Science Research Council, *Bulletin* 57, 1947, p. 60.

other hand, where the group itself lives by conflict, as the crew of a pirate ship, the duel may not be an altogether inept device for deciding the captaincy. Conflict may also be the only feasible way of removing blockages in some within-group relations where it is not clear that one party is more correct, "right," or able than another and neither will give way, or where some member or members refuse to submit to competitive methods. In general, however, the presence of such situations within a group indicates disorganization. Group objectives are promoted if questions and differences between its members are settled by competition rather than by conflict, for the obvious reason that most problems of policy cannot be solved effectively by attacking the person or character of an opponent. Conflict within a group, then, ordinarily interferes with the functioning of the group and tends to disrupt and destroy it.

Accommodation Within the Group.—In within-group relations we are especially interested in the roles which characterize the group in question, how they came about, and how they are changed. For example, in a store we notice such roles as proprietor, floorwalker, buyer, decorator, advertiser, bookkeeper, stenographer, sales clerk, office boy. Inquiry has shown that each of these roles grew out of the necessities and practices of merchandising over a long time, and that the employees of any given store usually shape their specific roles partly by imitation of similar roles in general and to some extent by the special requirements of their particular situation. We have seen that competition tends to select those individuals who will and can best play each of these roles, and then compels them to perform them in a reasonably effective manner. Each member of the group necessarily makes many adjustments or accommodations to other members, accepts his place and part, at least for the time, and his relations within the group tend to become largely habitual and routine. These routinized relations, varying by time and place, in turn are absorbed into the folkways of the society.

Some groups, however, are the result of temporary circumstances and are relatively short lived. A sudden blizzard halts

two automobiles on the highway, and their occupants take refuge for a day and night in a cheese factory in rural Wisconsin. What each person does, the part he plays—jokester, cook, amateur doctor, card player—is wrought out of the skills, attitudes, and temperaments of the particular individuals in the face of the needs and contacts of the moment. The situation is new to all members of the marooned group and does not last long enough to lead to any formal patterns of relationship. Nevertheless, the typical processes of cooperation, competition, and, more rarely, conflict immediately begin to operate to adjust the behavior of the several persons to one another within the brief setting of their common problems and interests.

Groups may differ widely with respect to the stage which accommodation has reached, and in the sharpness with which roles are defined. It is essential in the definition of the group, however, that the interaction between all possible pairs of its members should to some extent take the form of group roles, that is, behavior intended to realize the purposes for which the group exists. These roles must be sufficiently clear to be recognized by competent observers. The extent to which roles will be differentiated between the several members or classes of members will vary from group to group. In most groups, such as the family, some differentiation or specialization of roles is obvious. In some others, such as a bridge club, each member plays much the same role, either continuously or in rotation (as host), although here, too, differences can be made out.

When the role played by a member, or class of members, is not agreeable to the rest of the group, or is not considered by them as being beneficial to the group, it may be said that there is some lack of accommodation within the group. A certain degree of accommodation and adjustment among its members is, in general, essential to the effective working of any group. Nevertheless, accommodation does not always or necessarily mean that the group is either efficient or successful in achieving its purposes. A football team, on which every member plays his position without friction with the other players or coach, may fall far short of winning the championship. This may be due to the nature of the opposition (other teams being

stronger), or to mistaken ideas on the part of the group regarding the most effective patterns of behavior (the coach and players using a type of game that is inferior).

Accommodation is also related to group reform. As some members of a group become convinced that the values held by the group or the methods employed to attain them are not all they should be, lack of coordination may appear, leading perhaps to a reform of group purposes or procedures. Thus, the members of a criminal gang may differ with the leader about the division of the loot. Other members of the gang may side with the leader, resulting in a crisis situation which brings about a change of tactics by the present leader or even his replacement. The type of rivalry or conflict which splits a group from within can be regarded as refusal to accommodate. The same is true of individualistic behavior in general, whether due to personal ambition or what not, which pits the will of an individual member against the functioning of the group.

Sanctions Within the Group.—Because the success of a group endeavor, whatever it may be, is of some importance to its members, it may be expected that they will ordinarily make an effort to obtain effective cooperation among themselves. When the stakes become very great, as in the case of a labor union on strike, the demand for complete loyalty and coordination within the membership becomes more uncompromising. In any case, the members of a group, and particularly its leaders, tend to set up sanctions of various kinds to induce the kind and amount of cooperation needed. These sanctions are both positive and negative. Positive sanctions may consist of salaries, profits, or other material rewards, or they may be limited to immaterial benefits like praise, prestige, or status. Group sanctions are, of course, both material and immaterial, since each can be used to strengthen the other, and it would be a blunder on the part of the group to overlook either. Groups do, however, differ in their emphasis on these two types of rewards.

Negative sanctions, as well as positive ones, are invariably provided, and are used when sufficient rewards are not available, when the latter are not effective enough, or when rewards are

more difficult or less satisfying to administer. Negative sanctions, also, are both material and psychological: money fines, confiscation of estates, physical pain, and scolding, cursing, gossip, avoidance, demotion, and disgrace. In army groups, for example, all of these sanctions have been employed.

The application of any sanctions may, in a sense, be called persuasion. But persuasion in its more usual meaning is also freely used within groups, and includes argument, whether based upon fact or fiction, and propaganda of every kind. Sanctions are employed to induce individuals to form or enter a group, to cause them to play this role or that within the group, to incite them to improve their efforts, and to prevent them from leaving the group.

It should be noticed that the kinds of sanctions mentioned above are sometimes in addition to those which grow out of the purposes of the group itself; at other times they merely maximize or minimize the attainment of those purposes. The purposes of a bank include various economic services to the public, for which profits, often very large, are obtained. The primary incentive of the officials and employees of the bank is the salaries, dividends, and bonuses they receive, but most responsible officials and other employees are also concerned with the satisfactions of sharing in the work of a useful and highly respectable institution, with their own reputation for integrity and efficiency, and with their status both in the bank and in the larger society. They are rewarded or punished by recognition of their efforts, or the reverse, on the part of the higher officers of the bank, and especially by promotions and salary raises. Even in this kind of group, where money is the reason for participation, other sanctions are also at work to stimulate and maintain morale.

Sanctions may be further illustrated in the case of the family. The purposes of such a group are many, and have been frequently mentioned. Companionship, affection, security, sex satisfaction, children, and mutual services are usually listed as the *raisons d'être* of the family. There is a general principle to the effect that those responsible members of any group, including the family, who play their expected roles most effectively, in fact and in the opinion of the other members (as a "good"

father), receive most fully the benefits for which the group exists. The members of the group who fail (as a "worthless" father) get less or none of those benefits. To this extent, the attainment of the purposes of a group is identical with the sanctions which operate to activate and control its members. But this statement does not give full insight into the forces of family life or other group behavior. By their manners, their verbal expressions, and their acts, each member of a family is constantly informing other members of approval or disapproval of their behavior, and attempting to influence them by means of persuasion, praise or blame, warmth or coolness, favors or refusals, attention or avoidance. In the case of children, in addition to such sanctions, physical force and bodily pain are commonly resorted to, if they seem to be necessary to obtain what is considered to be proper behavior for children. It is by such means, as well as by cultural imitation, purposeful cooperation, competition, and conflict, that the members of a family are brought to play the expected roles found by accumulated human experience to be most effective in that particular group situation.

Sanctions from Without the Group.—Not all the pressures which are brought to bear upon the members of a group, and which influence the roles they play and how well they play them, come from within the group itself. The larger society never fails to exert some supervisory control over all important groups, such as the family or a bank, in whose success it is vitally concerned. Everyone is familiar with the readiness with which the neighbors gossip about friction in the Smith family, about any philandering on the part of Mr. Smith or about his failure to provide, about the poor housekeeping of Mrs. Smith, or about the bad manners of the Smith children. In a more formal fashion, the officers of the law are prepared to protect Mrs. Smith and her children from the abuses of a drunken husband and father, to arrest him for desertion, or even to grant Mrs. Smith a divorce. The juvenile court will also take a hand in the control of one of the young Smiths who gets out of hand in the family and is guilty of delinquencies in the community. Where the father of a family is dead or is not able to support it at a

minimum level of living, the state usually provides a small pension for the mother and her dependent children. In other cases of great family need, public or private relief agencies may step in with other financial aids.

One of the most powerful influences on the internal organization and behavior of a group is the presence of an outside competitive or antagonistic group. In the ensuing competition or conflict between the groups, increased efficiency in each group becomes of paramount importance, hence loyalty within the group is intensified, and effort is increased. This continues until the pain (or sacrifice) of the effort seems too great to be justified by the expected benefits of victory, or until the hope of success weakens.

Outside groups, however, do not have to be either competitive or antagonistic to affect the conduct of the members of an in-group. It has already been pointed out that membership in a second group, such as a family, may interfere with or color the appropriate pattern of relationship between two members of a first group, such as a military company or business firm. In the same way, the members of any group bring with them the points of view they have acquired in various other groups, and cannot fail to be influenced by them. This can be seen on every hand, as in the reaction of college students to the teaching of evolution in biology classes because of their early membership in religious groups. Evidently, also, membership in one group may take precedence over membership in another, so that a member of group A may be indifferent about his role for the reason that his first interest is in group B, or in groups B, C, and D. A college sophomore may be such an active member of social groups that he neglects his role as a student in the college. Indeed, we are all acquainted with persons who are members of so many groups that they cannot do justice to any. In a complex society like ours, the extent of group participation varies widely from that of the rural housewife who has almost no contacts outside the family circle to that of the cosmopolitan clubman or clubwoman who belongs to many groups of many kinds.

Coordination Within the Group.—In so far as the activities of any group of people have a common purpose or purposes, these activities must obviously be correlated. It is necessary that the purposes be clear to those who are responsible for the correlation, that the role of each member be appropriate and effectively related to the central motive, and that the various roles be coordinated with one another so as to produce the most effective total effort or behavior. There are two general ways by which coordination of roles may be attained: by agreement among the members at every point in the process, or by direction at the hands of a member or class of members whose particular responsibility or role within the group is coordination of the group effort. In a few small groups, such as a student disciplinary committee of three, it may be possible for the functions of the group to be performed by the undirected initiative of the individual members in face-to-face interaction, say, the discussion of a disciplinary case. In groups of any size, however, and in small groups where the members are not all of equal ability or information, or are not all in constant and direct interaction, it becomes essential that a certain member or members be assigned the special task of directing and integrating the activities of the rest. An illustration of this principle is the conductor of an orchestra.

The presence of a coordinator or coordinators is also evident in almost any other group which may be mentioned, for example, we note the chairman of a congressional committee, the sergeant of a military squad, the coach of a football team, the parents in a family, the editor of a small newspaper, or the judge of a court. In general, the more critical the function or situation of the group, the more thoroughgoing will be its coordination, although this will vary somewhat with the nature of the group function. In a conflict group, where life or death may be at stake, regimentation tends to a maximum. Even here, however, no single leader or class of leaders is capable of making all the decisions in a complex and changing situation, so that in commando raids in World War II men were chosen for their individual initiative, judgment, and daring. Commandos were given intensive training to prepare them to deal with any emer-

gency when no officer was present. The type and amount of coordination needed by any group is always a question to be answered by a study of its personnel, particular purposes, and roles, and any conclusions should then be subject to experimental testing.

Group and Organization.—There are many examples of *plurels,* i.e., collectivities of persons, which meet all the points in our definition of the group, except that each of their members may never be in one-to-one interaction with every other member. Incomplete social contact may occur in a crowd or in various other plurels. In a university, for example, the range of acquaintance of any one student usually falls considerably short of including the whole student body. Person A may include B and C in pair relations, B may include D, and D may include C, but there may be no contact between A and D. If student A received instructions from Dean D indirectly through the latter's assistant, who in turn reported A's reactions to Dean D; or if A and D corresponded in writing, a social contact and interaction at second hand would exist between them. In some situations, however, even this secondhand contact is lacking, and yet we clearly have to deal with a functional plurel or collectivity. Any purposeful or functional plurel, whether or not each of its members has pair contacts with every other member, we shall call an *organization.* An organization, then, is a plurel similar in every respect to a group, except that all its members need not be in communication. Organization is thus a more inclusive term than group, so that all groups are organizations, but all organizations are not groups, in the technical sense. Most organizations which are not groups fail to conform to the group pattern because their membership is too large to make complete contact feasible. The function of an organization also affects the number of member contacts, as when students in a class are concerned directly with the instructor, but only incidentally with one another. Organizations evidently play a very important part in our present-day society.

Some attention needs to be given to the methods by which organizations are able to function in spite of the fact that in-

teraction may not occur between all their members. The key to this problem is found in the role of the coordinator, which we have just discussed in the group. Within the organization the coordinator furnishes the contacts and interaction needed for its functioning which are not provided through pair relations. The exact pattern followed by coordination within an organization is variable. In perhaps the most common form, the major questions of policy are settled by the chief coordinator and his aides, and their decisions are passed by some kind of communication to subcoordinators, who in turn inform the rank-and-file members. In this way, each member of the organization is under common and unifying direction, although he may never know all his fellow members or himself be known to the chief coordinators. Here coordination takes the form of chan-



FIG. 1.—Diagram of organization for a state department of public welfare. (From State of Indiana, Dept. of Public Welfare, *Public Welfare in Indiana*, March, 1944.)

neled pair interactions across and within the various subgroups which compose an organization, and makes unnecessary interaction between all possible pairs of individuals. An illustration of such organizational coordination is any large business firm, with its board of directors and top executives, its departmental

chiefs, and its departmental employees. Similar patterns of coordination are equally obvious in an army or navy, in a college, and in innumerable other organizations.

In one type of coordination there is an attempt to eliminate or reduce the role of a top executive or executives, and allow the individual members of an organization more influence in policy making. This implies less specialization of roles. A familiar example is the election of representatives by labor unions to bargain with company officials for higher wages, shorter hours, or better working conditions, and sometimes to discuss other company policies with them. In some colleges the basic decisions are made by faculty committees. The professors who serve on such committees then assume the role of administrator as well as of teacher and investigator.

A case of coordination of special interest and importance is furnished by democratic governments, say that of the United States. Here the people, as members of the organization, elect most of the important government officials by ballot and the latter then appoint others. The duties and powers of these officials are defined and limited by written law, but within these limits the people are subject to their acts. The roles of the people as members of the government are coordinated by various minor officials, such as the tax collector, the policeman, and the judge of the local court. Even between the local government officials and the average law-abiding citizen, however, the direct contacts are few and slight.

Most governmental relationships are of a mutual service nature, such as those between a citizen and the city street department, the citizen paying taxes which go toward the wages of the street-sweeping gang, and give him, in return, clean streets. In government, as well as in other organizations, the members must be concerned with the efficiency with which the various institutional or official roles are played. Hence, they must be concerned with the patterns of coordination by which efficiency is effected. The great number, heterogeneity, and widespread distribution of its members creates special difficulties in the case of the government. Citizens are occupied with other interests and activities which, in normal times at least, seem

more directly related to their individual welfare. The aggressive role of the average citizen in the government is limited to occasional voting, and his single vote among the millions of others may appear to him to be insignificant. This attitude is strengthened because the typical citizen is not well enough informed about issues or candidates to make him confident that he is accomplishing anything when he does vote. As a consequence, private individuals usually take little initiative in government affairs. Those who do tend to form special-interest or pressure organizations for the purpose of diverting the government from general service to special favors. This is a case of the spontaneous formation of groups or organizations within an organization, some of which may be at cross-purposes with the central function of the organization itself. The chief hope of effective democratic government is for citizens generally to feel enough desire for it to band themselves together to promote good government and eliminate incompetent and dishonest officials. The League of Women Voters is an example of an organization of this kind. Many citizens do not now feel the necessary incentive, but growing public menaces such as unemployment and atomic war, which threaten the welfare and life of every person, may at any time reverse this situation, at least while the crisis lasts.

Institution.—The word *institution* refers to any group or organization whose basic roles and relationships are considered by most sociologists to be clearly defined and well established by norms (values, rules, laws) of the group or organization itself or of the larger society. A public school, a church, a family are among our most familiar types of institutions. An institutional system is a number of similar institutional units functionally bound together, such as the public school system, the Methodist Episcopal Church of America, or the Masonic Order.

According to the definition employed here, an institution is a set of human relationships. Since an institution is merely a well-routinized group or organization, its structure is necessarily the same as that of the latter which we have already dis-

cussed. Certain material objects may be used by an institution which are so closely associated with it that they symbolize the institution in the public mind. They may even condition and influence institutional behavior, but they should not be regarded as a part of the institution. Most prominent among such objects are the buildings that house the institution—the church building, the city hall, the state capitol, the school building. Each of these is fashioned to serve the needs of a special institution, and since these needs vary from one institution to another, the buildings of different institutions are usually of different design and architecture. It is this circumstance which has caused a certain style of building to become symbolic of a particular institution, and has led people to identify the building with the institution.

Objects other than buildings may also be peculiar to an institution. Examples are the cross of the Christian church, the flag of a nation, the coat of arms of a family, the totem pole of an Indian tribe. These are purely symbolic, and serve not only to suggest the name of the institution, but also to call to mind the central value for which it stands. Such symbols have the important psychological power of arousing and maintaining enthusiasm, loyalty, and cohesion among the members of an institution.

Special attention should be called to institutional documents, such as the Bible, the Constitution of the United States, the "books" of a bank. They include a variety of forms: a written statement of values and ideals, history, bylaws, rules of procedure or ritual, records of transactions, and lists of members. These documents are of great aid in regularizing institutional practices over space and time, and in spreading and fixing institutional ideas. In certain cases, an institution may base its authority upon some major document, as the Christian Church on a set of ancient Hebrew writings, or the United States Government on the Constitution.

Although we have found it necessary above to differentiate somewhat between the group, the organization, and the institution, we shall follow common sociological practice in using the

familiar word "group" in the loose general sense, and will indicate when a distinction is intended.

Group Morale.—The attitudes of the members of a group toward its purposes and methods, and toward one another as fellow-members, may be called the morale of the group. Morale is closely related to the efficiency and persistency with which group roles are carried out. Consciousness of purpose, confidence and enthusiasm, belief in fellow-members, priority of the group purpose over conflicting activities, and determination make for high morale, whereas doubt, mistrust, and discouragement make for low morale. Morale is at a maximum when every member of the group himself desires the group objectives keenly enough to put forth his best efforts to attain them. However, the incentive may sometimes be derived from other sources, such as special sanctions, the wish to please a group leader, or the wish to be esteemed by other members of the group or by the public. A member's behavior may even be controlled mainly by his own conscience, or what he thinks is right.

For instance, in an army suddenly created by conscription, the problem of building morale arises. Many of the draftees do not know why the war is necessary, nor what they are fighting for. The reasons given them can only appeal to their imaginations, because they personally have not even seen the enemy. They can appreciate a recital of the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese as a cause for war more easily than they can understand why Japanese imperialism in the Pacific was a violation of democratic principles which should move them to drop everything and expose their bodies to destruction. A great deal of reliance evidently has to be placed upon more immediate sanctions than these. Chief among them are prompt military promotion or demotion on a strictly merit basis; the force of public opinion, especially through letters from home; and, when necessary, compulsion. Stereotypes of the military hero may be set up in the draftees' minds. Dislike and resentment for the enemy may be developed by atrocity stories and moving pictures, if the impression of propaganda is avoided. The choice of well-trained and competent officers, effective equipment, skilful sani-

tary and medical provisions, and good food will increase confidence in the army organization. The soldiers' time may be fully occupied by well-defined tasks at which they can succeed, with opportunity for necessary relaxation and recreation. Prompt delivery of mail to and from home and provision for the security of the soldier's dependents will help. Martial music, the flag, military decorations and uniforms, and finally a sense of the vast size and power of the national military effort will arouse emotion and pride in the individuals who feel themselves to be members of it. Of the greatest importance is enough success in battle with the enemy to establish confidence in victory. Finally, a sense of identification and comradeship with and loyalty to one's "buddies," and a determination not to let them down in time of danger, will tend to develop out of sheer necessity and human feeling. After victory is achieved many new sanctions will be needed to keep up the morale of an army of occupation. Sometimes the attitudes posed by the situation itself, such as the deep-seated yearning of the soldiers to return home, may be so powerful that it is difficult or impossible to create the desired level of morale by the help of any sanctions that can be applied, although much can be accomplished by skill, reasonableness, and decision.

QUESTIONS

1. What happens if a member is removed from a pair? From a group?
2. Can the relations between the members of a group be reduced to a number of pair relations?
3. In what ways, if any, does the interaction between a pair of members within a group differ from the interaction between the members of a pair not within the group? How can this be tested?
4. What is meant by a *group role? Group structure?* Give familiar illustrations.
5. How are group roles initially worked out? Give specific illustrations.
6. Once fixed, how are group roles acquired by new members?

7. Just what is the function of the leaders of a group?
8. To what extent must the relations between the members of a group be cooperative, in order that the group may continue to exist?
9. What is the meaning for the group of members who feel exploited?
10. What functions does competition perform in determining group structure?
11. Why is the president of a group usually more isolated than other members from informal personal relationships?
12. To what extent, if any, is conflict appropriate within the group?
13. Is group structure anything more than the product of many individual accommodations?
14. Cite (*a*) a group in which the roles of members vary widely; (*b*) a group in which the roles of all members are identical or very similar.
15. Under what conditions may it be said that there is a lack of accommodation within a group?
16. Is the degree of accommodation within the group synonymous with group efficiency? Explain.
17. What is the relation between the demand for cooperation within the group and the seriousness of the group situation?
18. What devices does a group employ to insure the cooperation of its members?
19. What is the relation of group sanctions to group objectives?
20. What are the two chief types of positive sanctions employed within groups?
21. Do all the pressures brought to bear on members to play their roles come from within the group itself? Explain.
22. What is the effect of competition or conflict with an *out-group* upon the intensity of cooperation and effort within the group?
23. How may membership in one group affect a person's attitudes and roles in other groups? Illustrate.
24. What is meant by *coordination* within the group, and how may it be attained?
25. What determines the proper degree of coordination within a group?
26. Do all groups meet the definition of an *organization?* Explain.

27. How is an organization able to function in the absence of contact between all of its members?
28. Compare the centralized and the decentralized patterns of *coordination* in two different organizations familiar to you.
29. What is meant by an *institution?* An *institutional system?* Give examples.
30. What is the relation of a community church building to the institutional system of the Presbyterian Church in the United States?
31. Just what is meant by group *morale?*
32. By what devices can group morale be developed and maintained? Discuss with reference to a familiar group situation, as the family, the sociology class, or the football team.

REFERENCES

FINER, HERMAN. "Organization," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932. Vol. XI, pp. 480-84.

GRINKER, ROY R., and SPIEGEL, JOHN P. *Men Under Stress.* Philadelphia: The Blakiston Co., 1945.

HAMILTON, WALTON H. "Institution," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. VIII, pp. 84-89.

HERTZLER, JOYCE O. *Social Institutions.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1929, chaps. i-iii, vi, viii, x.

KRECH, DAVID, and CRUTCHFIELD, RICHARD S. *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1948, chaps. x, xi.

LA PIERE, RICHARD T. *Collective Behavior.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1938, chap. iv.

MOORE, WILBERT E. *Industrial Relations and the Social Order.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946, Part III.

PARK, ROBERT E., and BURGESS, ERNEST W. *Introduction to the Science of Sociology.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921, chap. iii.

SAPIR, EDWIN. "Group," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. VII, pp. 178-82.

SHERIF, MUZAFER. *An Outline of Social Psychology.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1948, chaps. v-vii.

STOUFFER, SAMUEL A., *et. al. The American Soldier.* Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1949, Vols. I, II.

VON WIESE, LEOPOLD, and BECKER, HOWARD. *Systematic Sociology.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1932, chaps. xxxviii, xl, xli, xlii.

CHAPTER 5

RELATIONS BETWEEN GROUPS

Relation Between Groups Defined.—Strictly speaking, relations between groups are relations between their members. There are many groups in a complex society, and interaction occurs between their members, just as between individuals within a group, and for the same reasons. Interaction between groups may be said to take place when their members react to one another as representatives of their respective groups, that is, in accordance with group purposes and points of view. Thus it appears that any pair of persons may interact as individuals, as members of the same group, or as representatives of different groups. In other words, the attitudes and behavior between Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones may be individual and unique, they may be those appropriate, say, to the president and teller of a bank, or they may be those which result from contacts between a "New Dealer" and a Republican. It is the last kind of relationship with which we are now concerned.

An individual can react to a group, such as a jury, as well as to another individual. In doing so, he reacts to a group concept. Whether the group to which he reacts is merely a subgroup within a larger group to which the subject belongs, say the Bible class in his church, or whether it is entirely an outside group, with reference to the subject (perhaps a fraternity of which he is not a member), the general principles are the same.

Basis of Relations Between Groups.—Pair relationships may be influenced by some of the groups to which their members belong, but not by others. Two college students who are roommates may not even know that they are, respectively, Baptist and Presbyterian. On the other hand, if one of the two is an ardent member of the campus Young Communist League

and the other a leader in the Student Republican Club, their behavior toward one another is very likely to be colored by these facts. This is because the difference in religious denominations is not considered important, and denominational motives do not require any particular kind of behavior between their representatives when they happen to be in contact. But the case is different between political groups as divergent as Communists and conservative Republicans. They represent such irreconcilable views on live issues that two earnest members would certainly feel called upon to challenge one another. Thus, in general, persons react to one another as representatives of groups when, and only when, group motives or functions make it seem desirable or necessary.

Ethnocentrism and Some of its Consequences.—Individuals are born into groups and gain their values and points of view, their satisfactions and security, chiefly from them. The individual thinks of himself largely in group terms, since the ideas he has of himself tend to be reflections of his position or role in his group, the "in-group." The society constantly associates him with the groups to which he belongs, ascribes to him the characteristics of those groups, and rates him accordingly. A person's group ordinarily contains those to whom he is emotionally attached, with whom he develops a "we-feeling" or consciousness of kind, and to whom he owes everything he values most, including his own status and opportunities in life. The members of another or out-group are likely, because of their different backgrounds and experiences, to be more or less unlike the members of the in-group. The further apart the origins of two groups, the greater are the differences between the attitudes and personalities of their members. This may be noted between the rich and the poor, between Jews and Gentiles, between whites and Negroes. Differences of this kind usually raise serious questions about the relative values of the life ways of the out-group. Since each group has its own set of values by which it fashions and rationalizes its life ways, there is a necessary harmony between its ways and its values which does not exist between its values and the ways of other

groups. For this reason, and because of obvious self-interest, the members of an in-group almost inevitably regard themselves and their ways as "right" or "better" than the members and the ways of out-groups which differ from them. The greater the difference or opposition between the two groups, the stronger is the conviction on the part of each that the other is wrong, inferior, or evil. Such attitudes of an in-group toward itself and toward an out-group are called "ethnocentrism."

The Indian . . . believes himself to be the result of a special creation by a partial deity, and holds that his is the one favored race. The names by which the different tribes distinguish themselves indicate their belief that as their race is the one favored race, so each tribe of the race is a little ahead of all the others. "Men of men" is the literal meaning of one name; "the only men" of another. A Canadian Mohawk offers as the etymology of the term Iroquois, "I am the real man." The Plains Indians have "the conscious feeling of the tribe as a unit or body"; the Mohave feel "that all members of the tribe are inherently and psychically different from all persons of other tribes." There is also "a sense of racial rather than of tribal separateness." It is said of the Turks that "they have an inborn contempt for all that does not belong to their nation." "Of the geography of our country these Chinamen (in Formosa) knew absolutely nothing. We were barbarians. We came from some poor village of our particular tribe outside civilization, civilization being solely within the dominion of the Celestial Emperor. All the rest of the world—if there were any poor remainder—was benighted, and but the home of 'barbarians,' not 'men.'" This sense of superiority is exemplified by all "chosen people" and has been noticeable in the case of the modern Germans. "We Germans," quoth Bismarck, "fear God and nobody else."

Correlative to such self-satisfaction is hostility to outsiders. In Australia, "strangers invariably look on each other as deadly enemies. Now-a-days, when accidentally brought together, they usually feign friendship; but, before the Whites interfered with native manners, no Black ever neglected to assassinate a stranger at the moment that he could do so without risk to himself." [1]

Although it seems that any group tends to exaggerate its own virtues and to underrate the qualities of groups which are different from or opposed to it, in cases where inferiority is

[1] Excerpts from several sources quoted in W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927). Vol. I, pp. 358 ff.

quite conspicuous some members of the inferior group may recognize the fact and act accordingly. Indeed, it is known that occasional groups do consider themselves inferior, as Negro slaves to their white owners in the ante bellum South. But acceptance of inferiority by any group apparently disappears as soon as any rationale whatever can be developed to disprove it.

To emphasize the weaknesses and imperfections of an out-group may be of practical utility to the in-group. It raises the morale of the latter. It may also enable the in-group, with good conscience, to exclude the members of the out-group from the rules of ethics which are enforced in the in-group. American soldiers, fighting in the African campaign against the Germans in World War II, found it a shock to their emotions to shoot Germans "who looked like their brothers back home" and often wanted to be transferred to the Pacific theatre, where they would feel no compunctions about "knocking those Jap monkeys out of the palm trees." A similar feeling in World War I made it necessary to change the prevalent stereotype of the kindly, thrifty German into that of a brutal "Hun" or "Blond Beast," because it is all right to kill dangerous beasts even if they go about in human form. In World War II, again, the sight and reports of the atrocities committed by both the Germans and the Japanese finally caused many American soldiers to regard them as subhuman by nature and kill them with indifference or even satisfaction.

On the other hand, the disposition of in-groups to regard out-groups as inferior can sometimes have unfortunate consequences for the in-group. In World War II wise leaders frequently considered it necessary to warn both the public and the military against the danger of underrating the ability and courage of the enemy and thereby give him an advantage. It is claimed that Hitler had much propaganda released which was designed to cause the Allies to make just such a mistake. The nearly disastrous Battle of the Bulge was apparently a result of contempt for the Germans on the part of the American command.

Less spectacular but not less important are the peacetime relations and inequalities which develop between in-groups and

out-groups. Members of minority out-groups may be denied the opportunity of education and positions of responsibility, with the result that part of the society is maintained at such a low level that its members cannot make their full contribution to production or progress, and the total society is thereby penalized, sometimes to a serious degree. That this situation is occasionally realized even by members of the in-group is shown by the following excerpt from the Greenwood, Mississippi, *Commonwealth* of December 12, 1945:

To William E. Mallett, Foreman of a Hinds county grand jury, and the jury itself, our congratulations for the deserved criticism levelled at the city of Jackson "for failing to provide a square foot of parks or playgrounds for Jackson's large Negro population."

Mr. Mallett made this telling observation in his comment which cited the rise of Negro juvenile delinquency:

"In the case of the Negro youths, this [delinquency] is easily understandable as both parents frequently work and have little surveillance over their children during the greater part of the day. In view of this circumstance it appears to us that better recreational facilities should be provided by the city of Jackson.

"For, as it stands now, the city has not so much as a square foot of parks or playgrounds set aside for Negroes, and we hardly see how a greatly different result can be anticipated when the only places left for them to find their activities and outlets are on the streets and alleys of the city.

". . . The people who protest Federal interference with our customs might ponder the fact together with those who also consider themselves Christian or humane or even intelligent. One half of Mississippi's population receives in general less consideration than a smart planter gives to a mule. Negro ill health means nothing to many Mississippians who seemingly don't connect cases of tuberculosis among white people with the Negro woman coughing out her life over a tubful of white folk's washing. They don't link up a seeming lack of talent with the lack of vocational and educational facilities, or of personal cleanliness with the hovels to which most Negroes are consigned, or of civic irresponsibility with civic neglect. They don't see the inevitable relationship between the juvenile Negro lawbreaker and the rotten back streets which are his playgrounds."

Out-Group Stereotypes.—A stereotype is simply a generalized concept or syllogism. Such generalizations are unavoid-

able and indispensable for human thinking. Beefsteaks are good to eat, this is a beefsteak, therefore this beefsteak is good to eat; this person is old, old people are antiquated in their ideas, therefore this person's mentality is out of date. By means of the stereotype, an unknown individual may be classified as a member of a familiar group, and reacted to according to the pattern which has been established as usually appropriate for members of that group.

The stereotype which members of an in-group build up respecting the members of an out-group reflects the experiences which the in-group has had with the out-group, and the interpretations of those experiences in terms of the motives, interests, and egotism of the in-group. Stereotypes thus represent various blends of the factual, the purposeful, and the emotional. They are accordingly modified by changes in the factual situation, motives, or interpretations. Even the factual does not usually produce a stereotype which can be called an accurate or balanced picture, however, since "facts" are subject to distortion due to extreme cases, recency, or too few cases.

The chief social test of a stereotype is its utility to the in-group in its dealings with the out-group. This is one reason why a stereotype often persists after attention has been called to its factual errors and misinterpretations. Changes in a stereotype come from recognition of its failures or shortcomings as a purposeful instrument in the hands of the in-group. They may also, of course, result from the dissolution of one of the groups concerned.

A typical stereotype is that held by whites of the Negro in our society. The term "Negro" to most whites in the United States suggests a person with black skin, kinky hair, flat nose, thick lips, low social status, an easy-going carefree disposition, little education, poverty, and criminal tendencies. The elements of this stereotype are derived in part from experience, but their interpretations are obviously colored by the ethnocentrism and self-interest of the whites. The latter consider a black skin inferior to a white skin, thick lips inferior to thin lips, kinky hair inferior to straight or wavy hair, and a flat nose inferior to a pointed nose. They regard these features as evidence of the

biological inferiority of the Negro race, but without knowing why or how they are inferior. It appears that Negroid physical traits have come to be considered inferior simply because they differ from those of the whites and are associated with a people who have occupied a low social and economic position in the society. Thus, the idea of inferiority has spread from the social status of Negroes to their physical traits, and then this inferred physical inferiority is used to explain their inferior social status. This last interpretation serves to justify on biological grounds the wish of the whites to "keep the Negro in his place," by putting the responsibility for the backwardness of the Negro upon an irreversible act of nature. The stereotype of the Negro is thus, in these natural and largely unwitting ways, brought into conformity with the motives and self-esteem of the whites.

Nevertheless, the stereotype of the Negro is capable of change. As many Negroes attain middle-class status, and more of them achieve distinction in roles which lie outside the Negro stereotype, the factual basis of the latter is altered, questions are raised, and doubts appear in the minds of the whites about the correctness of their earlier opinions. The growth of an urban and industrial civilization also brings the two races into contact in new situations for which the old stereotype proves inconvenient. The stereotype must therefore be amended. For example, shall white workers accept Negroes in their labor unions, or weaken their bargaining position with employers by refusing to admit them? This suggests that certain features of the existing stereotype work to the disadvantage of the whites as well as of the Negroes, and as the whites discover this, they will make certain modifications.

Between-Group Roles.—The roles played by the members of one group with reference to the members of another group are determined (*a*) by the purposes of the two groups, and how they affect each other, and (*b*) by customary attitudes and behavior between the groups. Between-group roles may be primary or secondary; and between-group relations may be cooperative, competitive, or conflicting in type.

Candidates of the Democratic and Republican parties compete for public office, with appeals to the voters as referees.

Some of the rival candidates may have no contacts with one another, but may confine their efforts to the public. They behave in any case as the respective parties expect their candidates to behave, although of course with personal variations. That is, they play the roles which have been established for party candidates. The role of the politician has been shaped by party experience, and tends to take the pattern which has proved most successful. Evidently, these roles would be altered if one or other of the parties did not exist, as can be seen in parts of the South where the Republican party is of no importance. In presenting his case to the public, a candidate may, to be sure, point both to his own record and policies, if he has any, and to those of the party he represents, contrasting them with the record and policies of the opposing candidate and party. It is only as the candidates reflect and stand for the ideologies and programs of their respective parties in opposition to one another, however, that one can speak of party behavior.

Whether the between-group relation in the above illustrative situation is primary or secondary depends on whether the two political parties regard one another as made up of unique human personalities, or merely as impersonal "machines." It is well known that political contests are not always limited to competition regulated by election laws and honest ballot counting. Even intimidation and violence against opposing candidates or voters may be resorted to. Party competition then becomes party conflict. In an earlier day in this country, political rivals have been known to kill one another in pistol or sword duels, and today in gang murders. In Latin America bloodshed at elections is common. As a rule, this kind of behavior has not been a part of our own party policy, and should be regarded as a regression to conflict interaction or to social roles of another kind. Under unusual circumstances, the interaction between two political parties may take the pattern of cooperation. This sometimes occurs during national crises, such as a world war. A Democratic President may then invite prominent Republicans to serve in his cabinet in order to obtain more support for the emergency policies of the government. Moreover, Democratic and Republican representatives constantly have to work together

in Congress. It should be noticed, however, that political parties are designed for the purpose of competing for control of the government, rather than for cooperating in the conduct of the government. This major purpose is clearly reflected in the roles politicians commonly play. It may even be said that party behavior is out of place in government officials. Once elected, they are expected to play roles appropriate to members of the government. This is another case where the role in one group (the party) is likely to be carried over into another group (the government), to the confusion of the latter.

The Reference Group.—It has several times been noted that a person may carry with him into one group attitudes and behavior patterns which he acquired in a different group, like the two men who were both brothers and private and captain, respectively, in a military company. Muzafer Sherif and others have emphasized this idea to the point of coining the terms *membership group* and *reference group.* A person who belongs to some group, say the faculty of a southern college (membership group), may hold opinions about race equality, etc., which are held by his family and friends in a northern state where he formerly lived (reference group), and with which he still identifies himself. It is not even necessary that an individual should ever have been a member of a reference group to accept some of its values. A Catholic priest may secretly subscribe to the unorthodox views of the school of philosophers represented by David Hume, because he has had contact with it through his private reading.

As we have seen, inability to keep one's behavior in a membership group from being influenced by the ideas or attitudes which one has absorbed from this or that reference group is a frequent cause of maladjustment in the membership group situation, which may lead to failure in the latter or eventually to changes in its ideology and structure.[2]

Population Pressure and Group Relations.—In general, people who form part of a dense population develop more sec-

[2] Muzafer Sherif, *An Outline of Social Psychology* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948), p. 124.

ondary contacts than do those who form part of a sparse population. Competition occurring in a dense population is then more ruthless because it is less tempered with primary sentiments. The same is true of exploitation. It is in the thickly populated slum areas of a metropolis, or among the crowded millions of overpopulated countries like India or China, that human life is held the cheapest. Desperate people inevitably form themselves into groups for mutual protection and power, and the minimum of sympathy or the maximum of hostility is likely to develop between such groups, of which the castes of India, although due also in part to historical and other causes, are a well-known illustration.

The above statements apply most accurately to cases where the population presses so hard upon the sources of subsistence that extreme poverty is unavoidable for most of the people. Table 2 shows estimates of the population per square mile and of the daily per capita income in several important nations of

TABLE 2

ESTIMATED POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE AND DAILY PER-CAPITA INCOME FOR SEVERAL NATIONS

Country	Density	Per Capita Income per Day
Australia	2.2	$1.38
Canada	2.8	$1.65
United States	44.2	$2.05
India	194.6	$0.05
France	196.9	$0.53
Italy	349.1	$0.33
Germany	360.7	$0.76
Great Britain	395.0	$1.13
Japan	433.3	$0.24

the world. It should be evident that the critical factor is not so much the number of people per square mile as it is the per-capita income, or the relationship between population numbers and the means of livelihood. Under the stress of hunger human relations, and social organization, become something different from what they might be under more favorable conditions.

Accommodation and Coordination Between Groups.—When two groups engage in competition or conflict, one or both may come to feel that the contest is hopeless or not worth while, or that some other course would be better, therefore making certain concessions or accommodations to the other. Thus, one business firm may sell out to another, or two firms may agree to combine and change from a competitive to a cooperative basis. The cooperative reorganization may be a federation, in which each group retains its existence and authority, but agrees to some over-all coordination. Or it may be a surrender, in which one group dominates the other; or a union, in which both groups lose their identity and control passes to a joint body. Naturally, any combination of these possibilities may occur with varying degrees of centralized control, depending upon the needs and possibilities of the particular situation. When, for example, two nations have been at war, the army or people of one of them, having reached a mental state where they prefer even the role of the conquered to the sufferings of further war, may bargain with their enemy in the hope that the latter also will be ready to accept something less than unconditional surrender, in order to be relieved of the war. Terms of armistice and peace may be agreed upon, whereupon each nation makes certain adjustments to the other as a consequence of the conflict and the way in which it ended.

In general, whenever two groups, large or small, cease competition or conflict and become accommodated to one another, they tend to combine into a cooperative unit and to develop the coordination necessary for the functioning of a new organization. This can be seen in the cooperation between the classes in any society. To some extent it is already apparent between the Americans and the Japanese in conquered Japan, or between the Allies and the Germans in Western Germany. Many of the functions of government in both Japan and Germany are performed with the aid of native officials appointed and controlled by the Armies of Occupation or allied civilian government. Gradually the Japanese and German peoples will be organized to cooperate with the allied governments in the conduct of their own national affairs.

It should be noticed, however, that it is perfectly possible for a conquered group to enter a cooperative relation merely as an act of strategy, with the intention of biding its time until a more favorable opportunity occurs to renew the conflict. It is natural for a group which has been beaten to retain a desire to throw off the control of the conquerors and get revenge at some future time. This is especially likely to happen when the memories of the struggle and its suffering die out with the generation that experienced it, and the younger generation knows only the bitter taste of present inferiority. But such a result is not inevitable. There has been, for example, no renewal of the war between our Northern and Southern states. The deciding factor lies in the conditions recognized by the defeated group at the moment when it thinks of resuming the conflict. Everything depends upon whether a fresh struggle then appears more or less desirable than a continuation of the existing order. This, again, is determined by how much reason the defeated group has to be satisfied with its present condition and prospects, and by the feasibility of staging a successful revolt. Both of these factors are largely under the control of the dominant group, which has the power to treat the defeated peoples justly, while at the same time it makes sure that they can have no reasonable hope of winning a new war.

Duration of a Group.—The life span of a group depends on a number of factors, of which the most fundamental are its purposes. If these are achieved by the efforts of the group, and its motives are satisfied, the group may dissolve. Or, the group may repeatedly fail to achieve its objectives, become discouraged, and disintegrate. The old objectives or interests may be replaced by new objectives or interests, giving the group a fresh lease on life. Or a group's purposes may be persistent or self-renewing, causing it to continue in existence more or less permanently.

It has already been stated that a group does not cease to exist when some of its members are dropped or added; its membership is simply changed in degree. The particular individuals who compose a group have their pair relations within the group,

and if these relations are primary in nature, by definition they cannot be removed or replaced with indifference to the other members. On the other hand, the essential roles which characterize a group and develop out of its purposes may remain more or less unaffected by individual changes in membership, so that the functional structure of the group stays about the same. This is most likely to occur in the case of secondary groups, like a bank, but may also be true in some degree of primary groups, even the family. Some groups may then persist with much the same purpose and structural organization even after their original membership has been wholly replaced. Certain banks, stores, and colleges have gone on for generations with so little apparent change that they appear to be the same, although their founders have long been dead.

When a group undergoes changes, especially gradual changes, both in membership and in structure, it is not easy to say at just what point it should be regarded as a different group. As a matter of precision, perhaps the requirements should be a complete turnover in membership and a complete change in purposes and structure, however that might be determined. In practice, where the question is not entirely academic, the answer should perhaps depend largely on the feelings of the asker. A former member may be overcome by a sense of strangeness in the group because certain personalities are no longer there, because some of the values for which it once stood have been abandoned, or even because it is housed in a strange building. As a result, he may have a deep feeling that the old group is gone and a new one has taken its place. In the same case, an outsider may see little change in the group over the years, and insist confidently that it is the same as ever.

QUESTIONS

1. When may interaction between groups be said to occur?
2. Under what general circumstances do people react to one another as representatives of groups?
3. Illustrate and explain what is meant by *ethnocentrism*, using groups with which you are personally acquainted.

It should be noticed, however, that it is perfectly possible for a conquered group to enter a cooperative relation merely as an act of strategy, with the intention of biding its time until a more favorable opportunity occurs to renew the conflict. It is natural for a group which has been beaten to retain a desire to throw off the control of the conquerors and get revenge at some future time. This is especially likely to happen when the memories of the struggle and its suffering die out with the generation that experienced it, and the younger generation knows only the bitter taste of present inferiority. But such a result is not inevitable. There has been, for example, no renewal of the war between our Northern and Southern states. The deciding factor lies in the conditions recognized by the defeated group at the moment when it thinks of resuming the conflict. Everything depends upon whether a fresh struggle then appears more or less desirable than a continuation of the existing order. This, again, is determined by how much reason the defeated group has to be satisfied with its present condition and prospects, and by the feasibility of staging a successful revolt. Both of these factors are largely under the control of the dominant group, which has the power to treat the defeated peoples justly, while at the same time it makes sure that they can have no reasonable hope of winning a new war.

Duration of a Group.—The life span of a group depends on a number of factors, of which the most fundamental are its purposes. If these are achieved by the efforts of the group, and its motives are satisfied, the group may dissolve. Or, the group may repeatedly fail to achieve its objectives, become discouraged, and disintegrate. The old objectives or interests may be replaced by new objectives or interests, giving the group a fresh lease on life. Or a group's purposes may be persistent or self-renewing, causing it to continue in existence more or less permanently.

It has already been stated that a group does not cease to exist when some of its members are dropped or added; its membership is simply changed in degree. The particular individuals who compose a group have their pair relations within the group,

and if these relations are primary in nature, by definition they cannot be removed or replaced with indifference to the other members. On the other hand, the essential roles which characterize a group and develop out of its purposes may remain more or less unaffected by individual changes in membership, so that the functional structure of the group stays about the same. This is most likely to occur in the case of secondary groups, like a bank, but may also be true in some degree of primary groups, even the family. Some groups may then persist with much the same purpose and structural organization even after their original membership has been wholly replaced. Certain banks, stores, and colleges have gone on for generations with so little apparent change that they appear to be the same, although their founders have long been dead.

When a group undergoes changes, especially gradual changes, both in membership and in structure, it is not easy to say at just what point it should be regarded as a different group. As a matter of precision, perhaps the requirements should be a complete turnover in membership and a complete change in purposes and structure, however that might be determined. In practice, where the question is not entirely academic, the answer should perhaps depend largely on the feelings of the asker. A former member may be overcome by a sense of strangeness in the group because certain personalities are no longer there, because some of the values for which it once stood have been abandoned, or even because it is housed in a strange building. As a result, he may have a deep feeling that the old group is gone and a new one has taken its place. In the same case, an outsider may see little change in the group over the years, and insist confidently that it is the same as ever.

QUESTIONS

1. When may interaction between groups be said to occur?
2. Under what general circumstances do people react to one another as representatives of groups?
3. Illustrate and explain what is meant by *ethnocentrism*, using groups with which you are personally acquainted.

4. Do the members of any in-group ever feel inferior to those of an out-group? If so, under what conditions?
5. What are the utilities and the disutilities of ethnocentrism for a group?
6. What is the logical function of the stereotype?
7. What factors, psychological and otherwise, enter into the development of a stereotype?
8. Why does a stereotype often persist after attention has been called to its errors of fact and interpretation?
9. Under what conditions may a stereotype be changed?
10. What factors determine the roles played by the members of one group with reference to the members of another group?
11. What is the usual effect of a dense population upon primary and secondary contacts? Upon the intensity of competition? What other factor needs to be considered in this connection?
12. What kinds of organization are possible when two groups cease competition or conflict, and make an accommodation to one another?
13. Under what conditions is a defeated group likely to stage a new conflict?
14. Is it likely that the normal process of competition will eventually be resumed between victor and vanquished? Explain.
15. What factors determine the life-span of a group?
16. In what sense can a group be said to "continue" after its original membership has been completely changed?

REFERENCES

HILLER, E. T. *Social Relations and Structures.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, Part V.

LA PIERE, RICHARD T. *Sociology.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1946, chap. xvi.

MOORE, WILBERT E. *Industrial Relations and the Social Order.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946, Parts III, IV, V.

PARK, ROBERT E., and BURGESS, ERNEST W. *Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921, chap. x.

ROSE, ARNOLD, and ROSE, CAROLINE. *America Divided, Minority Group Relations in the United States.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948, chaps. iii, iv, v, vi, viii.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *Society, Culture, and Personality.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, Part VI.

CHAPTER 6

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND DISORGANIZATION

Organization is always relative to specific persons and purposes. Individuals or groups which have met certain needs by developing a pattern of cooperation with other individuals or groups may be said to be *organized* with reference to those needs. The members of a family or the departments of a city government are examples. Persons or groups which have never developed any cooperative relationships for satisfying particular needs are *unorganized* with reference to those needs. The lack of proper medical care among certain classes is a case in point.

The Foundations of Social Organization.—If we broadly define social organization as cooperation for any and all purposes, it is synonymous with the relations of those established pair, within-group, and between-group organizations and institutions which function in every society. The habitual patterns of interaction between husbands and wives, parents and children, employers and employees, experts and laymen, governors and governed, sellers and buyers, foremen and workers, church and state, high school and college, the department of public health and the hospital constitute some of the organizational bases of our society.

In so far as competition advances the cooperative process by selecting those persons and groups best fitted for performing certain services to others, and by eliminating them if they become inefficient, the forms which competition takes should be regarded as a part of the organization of a society. Competition is so important that our own society is quite conscious of it and tries to protect it, as in the case of our laws against monopolistic price controls. Competition not only operates

unceasingly everywhere at an informal level, but many institutions also find it necessary or helpful to set up systematic competitive devices, such as prizes for the best salesman, the examinations of our public schools and colleges, the aptitude tests administered by the personnel departments of large business establishments, and the civil service examinations given at regular intervals by state and federal governments.

Conflict, by definition, is aimed at the damage or destruction of opposing individuals or groups, and so prevents cooperation for any productive purposes between the conflicting parties, whether these be individuals, groups, or institutions. The Jews and Arabs in Palestine were not working together to improve the welfare of the total population of that country, because both were devoting most of their energies toward destroying or driving out the other.

As we have seen, the critical situations created by serious conflict furnish an extraordinary motive for effective organization within each of the conflicting groups. Two nations at war face the alternative of organizing to win or paying the often heavy penalties which are exacted from a disorganized loser. Organization of a group for purposes of conflict with another group, however, diverts attention and effort from productive enterprises within the group, and so reduces or prevents organization for the satisfaction of other needs than that of victory over the enemy. Thus conflict, so long as it lasts, interferes with organization for ends other than conflict itself, both within and among the conflicting groups. Yet conflicts often leave powerful imprints on social organization, since they usually end in some sort of adjustment, accommodation, or compromise which influences, for a time, the roles which individuals or groups assume in further cooperation with one another. The victors and vanquished in a war serve as example.

The fundamental organization of any society, then, consists of the network of relationships represented by the *cooperative* folkways, mores, and institutions which have resulted from the long experience of a people in dealing with one another and with their mutual problems. This organization grows out of the trial-and-error learning of innumerable attempts to cooperate,

and is modified, but not primarily determined, by the effects of competition and conflict. It is powered by the multiplicity of motives for which it was created, and is tested and guided in its continuous development by the results it achieves in its various parts and in their relations with one another. A high school is judged by the success of its pupils in college and in life, a church by its good works in the community, a hospital by the treatment of its patients. Efforts at improvement in all of these are likely to be focused at those points where failure is most conspicuous.

Society Defined.—We have used the word *society* several times in this and preceding chapters, and it should now be defined. Perhaps it will prove most useful to regard a society as a population whose members share in essentially the same culture, the same government, economy, religion, etc. Thus, the people of Sweden form a society, and the bulk of the people of the United States of America proper do the same.

It is often convenient to group societies of the same type together and speak of them in broad terms as if they were a single society, such as "Western" society. Even if all the nations of the world should unite under a common government, some nations would have cultures distinctly different from those of other nations, so that they still could not all properly be counted in the same society. Similarly, if a single nation is made up of two or more peoples which differ widely in culture, as the Eskimos of Alaska differ from Americans of European descent, the culturally divergent groups cannot be lumped together in the same society. It is thus evident that *nation* and *society* are not identical terms.

Naturally, no two populations have exactly identical cultures. Their resemblance in this respect is a matter of degree, and the decision as to when two cultures are sufficiently unlike to be called different cultures must be somewhat arbitrary. The United States and Canada, although two different nations, i.e., populations under separate governments, obviously belong to the same general *type* of society. One would be more hesitant to classify together the United States of America and the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics, because of major differences in their forms of economy and government. Yet the United States and Soviet Russia are more alike than the United States and India or China. The United States of America and Great Britain, despite the latter's present socialist Labor Government, are societies of the same type because of their essential likenesses in democratic values and in their total culture and institutions.

Social Coordination.—A society ordinarily includes a great number and variety of groups, each with its own special interests to serve. Without some over-all perspective and centralized planning and control, duplication, disagreement, and interference are certain to occur. A need will be felt for a coordinating and refereeing agency with power to enforce its decisions, even by the use of coercion if necessary. Such an agency, by virtue of its function, has the essential nature of what is usually referred to as *government.* The society through its government defines and passes upon group motives, and regulates group relations. This responsibility is an important one, because it has the effect of handicapping some groups, aiding others, and affecting the welfare of the whole society.

Yet, while a certain amount of centralized coordination through the agency of government is essential to the functioning of a society, the government is not and cannot be responsible for all the orderliness that exists in the relations of individuals, groups, and institutions to one another. Most of the synchronizing and cooperative working together of the innumerable parts of a complex society is due to the existence of adjustments worked out in the generally accepted folkways, or customs, and the mores, or values. The government can have neither knowledge of nor contact with the vast mass of individual and group transactions which occur in a nation every minute of every day. These must, of course, be left to the persons and groups concerned and their sense of what is reasonable and proper.

Ordinary infringements of the folkways are settled by the usual sanctions of social pressure, and clashes of interest by normal competition. Most of us live up to our agreements reasonably well, principally because we have been so taught as we grew up. Another reason for conforming is that when we

experiment with not doing so, the condemnation and avoidance we suffer from our associates are punishment enough, without any aid from the law, to impress upon us the wisdom of conforming. Only when these conventional processes fail, or someone violates the customary code of behavior in a way which has been defined as illegal, must the government intervene.

The Criterion of Coordination.—In its role of coordinator, the government must be guided by some values or principles. Thus, it can undertake to act in the interest of the whole society, or in the interest of certain individuals or groups. Lincoln's idea of government for the people and Hitler's government for the members of the Nazi party represent two opposite conceptions.

The actual choice of a ruling principle or criterion seems to turn upon the outcome of struggles for control of the government. History is full of accounts of such struggles: between the barons and the king, then between the people and the barons in early England; between the Czarists and the communists and other dissidents in Russia; between the agrarian South and the industrial North in the Civil War era. The stakes are so high and the contest so desperate that among many peoples a satisfactory settlement has been and still is thought to require the death or imprisonment of the leaders of the losing side. The results of repeated bloody civil wars, however, have led many societies to substitute other methods, such as elections and the party system. The struggle to dominate the government, of course, exists in our own times and country, but at the competitive rather than the conflict level. The passing of the centuries in the so-called Western countries has witnessed a gradual trend toward the control of government by the masses of the people.

The Central Task of Government in the General Interest.—Theoretically, what any government in the general interest is called on to do is to favor one form of social interaction over another. More concretely, its purpose is to encourage cooperation and free competition, and to discourage conflict and exploitation. By free competition is meant the liberty of anyone to employ what ability he has in any way that will make for the

general welfare. The word "free" is then subject to a restriction: a person is only free to act in what is regarded as the public interest. Nothing else is logically valid in a system where the over-all criterion is the general welfare.

From these definitions, the inference is that if it can be shown that numerous small business units in a certain field of production serve the public better than a few large corporations or a single great corporation, it is the function of a government in the general interest to protect the former from elimination. On the other hand, if large business units can provide given goods or services more economically than small units, it is equally the function of a government to permit the former to prevail over the latter. In the absence of proof in favor of one or the other, the practical role of the government in such cases is to see that both large- and small-scale business units are permitted to compete decisively with one another without resort to conflict methods of any kind. That is, the struggle must be confined to a contest of skill in performing the particular service in question, and attempts to hamper the exercise of such skills by either party must be prevented. The outcome should then be decided on the public merits of the case and will ordinarily lead to the reduction or elimination of the less effective units by the action of economic forces alone.

In some instances the nature of a service may require that, in the public interest, it be performed by the government itself. Such a conclusion must be based on the results of free competition. Services like the handling of the mail and education in our society seem by general consent to belong to the government rather than to private enterprise. The case of the railroads is at present a marginal one. If public ownership is clearly indicated, the government should logically enter this field, otherwise not. The same argument would apply to any other kind of activity. Whatever the development may be in business, it is a fundamental principle in the over-all organization of society for the general welfare that no business or other organization can be allowed to become so powerful that it can influence, control, or defy the government contrary to the public interest. This reason may sometimes, unfortunately, make it

necessary for the government to suppress such an organization, in spite of its superior efficiency in a purely economic sense.

Relation of the People to the Government.—The over-all organization of a society, in so far as it is represented by government in the general interest, should be judged solely by its effectiveness in promoting and protecting the values of the whole society. The accumulated experiences of mankind seem to have established at least one clear principle of government, namely, that government tends to serve the interests of those who control it. If the organization is to be in the interest of the whole society, rather than of certain parts of it, then control must be invested in the whole society. The democratic idea, as it has now evolved in some societies, requires that the decisions of the government shall be based as far as possible on the value judgments of all the people.

The meaning of the phrase "in the general interest" is complicated by the fact that the people sometimes regard themselves as divided in their interests, and are not always in agreement. In our society these differences are reflected at the polls, and the simple expedient is to let a majority of votes decide the issue. The chief threat to this democratic development is the temptation for groups to form for the purpose of controlling the government in one special interest or another. Those who take the lead in this are usually men, including office seekers, who are in a position to make or lose a great deal by government action. We have already seen that the average citizen in normal times has his energies too much occupied with making a living and raising a family to give much thought to the government. First among the organizations which grow up in relation to government in modern societies are political parties, of which the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States are prime examples. These parties are specifically designed to obtain control of the government. Each party acts as a critic of the other while the latter is in office, and makes a periodic competitive appeal for the votes of the public. The people largely identify themselves with whichever party seems more nearly to represent their interests or tastes, and give their votes to the candidates for office nominated by that party.

It is evident that even under such a system, although one vote counts no more than another, individuals may not have equal weight in the control of government. The difference comes through skill in vote-getting, and in bringing pressure and persuasion to bear upon government representatives and officials. Lobbying, or the practice on the part of special-interest groups of trying to obtain desired legislation by personal pressure upon the legislators while law-making bodies are in session and at other times, has become such a routine procedure that many states seek to bring it into the open by requiring all lobbyists and their employers to be registered, and the amount paid for their services made a matter of public record. The sending of letters and telegrams by individual citizens and interest-groups to legislators, and the threat of defeat at the next election is one way in which the public tries to control the behavior of their representatives in the government. Another device is the newspaper editorial. People seem more likely to read a paper whose editorials please them than to reflect upon editorials which take the other side of the case. But the editorials of a newspaper with a large or significant circulation may have some effect on public men.

The public opinion poll is a relatively new device for informing government officials how the people feel on important public questions. This potential use of the poll no doubt overshadows its more spectacular role as a predictor of the outcome of elections. The polling agencies attempt to interview a representative sample of the total population, and to word the questions so that their meaning will be clearly understood. The summation of a typical poll is reproduced below.[1] It is not known to what extent legislators are affected by the findings of such polls, although conceivably the latter may show the distribution of public sentiment more accurately than elections:

THE UNITED STATES AND A WORLD AFTER THE WAR. In an attempt to ascertain whether Americans favor joining a union of nations, this question was presented:

[1] *A Nation-Wide Survey of Post-War and Current Problems*, Report No. 5 (Denver, Col.: National Opinion Research Center, University of Denver, August, 1942), pp. 9-10, 11-12, 21-22.

After the war, if a union of nations that would try to solve world problems were formed, do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea for the United States to join it?

Good Idea	72%
Qualified Answer	2
Bad Idea	15
No Opinion	11
	100%

Significance. Only 15% of the people out of every hundred are against the United States joining a union of nations at this time.

The two out of every hundred who qualified their answers, said that it should depend upon such things as the leadership of such a union, on which nations are members, and upon the "workability" of the union.

People under 40 years old and those on the higher economic and educational levels, are more in favor of this idea than are older people and those with less money and fewer educational advantages.

Comparison. Five months ago the Center asked: "If Germany, Italy, and Japan are defeated, do you think the United States should try to form some kind of a union of the Allied countries to help keep peace and order in the world?" At that time 85% answered "Yes" and 9% "No."

The different wording of the two questions may easily account for the differences in the findings. The earlier question asked if the U.S. "should try to form some kind of a union" compared with "if a union . . . were formed." The March question suggested our leading, not merely joining such a union. Finally, "to help keep peace and order in the world" is capable of stimulating more thoughtful speculation than the wording of the question in this later survey. . . .

FEEDING STARVING PEOPLES AFTER THE WAR. An identical question was used both in this survey, and in the one on which the March Report was based. This question reads:

If, after the war, people in some of the countries in the world are starving, do you think the United States should help feed the people in these countries?

	March Report		This Report	
Yes	80%	91%	74%	93%
Qualified Answer	11		19	
No	7		5	
No Opinion	2		2	
	100%		100%	

Comparison. The main difference is in the qualified answers. A majority of those who modified their opinions in both surveys said in effect, "Yes, if we feed our own first." (March 11%; August 12%). However, a new category becomes significant in the later survey—5% saying: "But don't feed the people who are responsible for the war—the Axis countries."

This second question was asked of those who answered "Yes" or who qualified their answers:

"How do you think this food should be paid for"?

	March Report	This Report
1. By loans to the countries getting the food? *	41%	32%
2. By the people of the U.S. through taxes?	5	6
3. By the people of the U.S. giving money—like through the Red Cross or	31	34
4. Some other way?	8	14
No Opinion	6	7
Of total cross-section	91%	93%

* In the order of presentation in the March Report "Taxes" preceded "loans."

Comparison. The most significant difference is the shift in opinion from "Loans to the countries getting the food," to "Some other way." In both surveys a majority of those who made some suggestion of their own offered a combination of "Loans and Charity," "Taxes and Charity," or "Loans and Taxes." Four out of every hundred in this more recent survey, however, mentioned trade agreements, the barter system, or according to the provisions of the Lease-Lend Bill. . . .

Breakdowns. Question:

"After the war, if a union of nations that would try to solve world problems were formed, do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea for the United States to join it?"

	Good Idea	Qualified Answer	Bad Idea	No Opinion
TOTAL	72%	2%	15%	11%
By Age				
Under 40	75	1	15	9
Over 40	68	3	16	13
By Economic Level				
Upper	79	3	12	6
Middle	72	2	17	9
Lower	63	2	17	18

	Good Idea	Qualified Answer	Bad Idea	No Opinion
By Education				
Some or Completed College	86	2	9	3
Some or Completed High School ..	75	2	15	8
Grammar-School Graduate or Less.	60	3	20	17

Breakdowns. Question:

"If after the war people in some of the countries in the world are starving, do you think the United States should help to feed the people in these countries?"

	Yes	Qualified Answer	No	No Opinion
TOTAL	74%	5%	19%	2%
By Economic Level				
Upper	81	3	16	Less than 1%
Middle	75	5	19	1
Lower	66	8	22	4
By Education				
Some or Completed College	86	3	11	Less than 1%
Some or Completed High School ...	73	6	20	1
Grammar-School Graduate or Less..	69	7	21	3

Public Opinion.—What the poll tries to reflect is public opinion. The latter can always best be thought of with reference to a particular issue, such as public opinion regarding the present international policy of the United States. The polls supply further evidence that a large public, like that in this country, is seldom or never in complete agreement on any issue. Public opinion consists of the attitudes of countless individuals, but gauging it is greatly simplified if individuals with similar points of view are grouped together in some useful way, such as by income, region, race, or occupation. Individuals may form their attitudes as a result of their situations or experiences, or they may take them largely ready-made from others. Members of a family usually have much the same political views both because they have similar interests and experiences and because they have absorbed ideas from one another. The same thing occurs among the members of larger groups, such as coal miners. People usually form opinions only about something which they think concerns them, or in which they are interested. The question of price control in 1946 is a good example. If people are

not clear about a matter of interest, or do not agree with others, they discuss the matter, they read what the papers say, or they listen to speeches. All of this tends to affect their attitudes. A complete poll of the attitudes on a particular question held by a population, showing the proportion and kinds of people who claim each attitude, and preferably giving some indication of the strength with which they hold it, may be said to measure public opinion in the most objective and exact way now possible.

Those in charge of the government may seek to influence public opinion, either to their own advantage or in the general interest. This is especially likely to happen in times of crisis, as during a war. Certain parts of the news from the diplomatic or battle fronts may be withheld temporarily or permanently; the news may be colored to fit government purposes; atrocity stories may be invented about the enemy; or the President may address the people in a nationwide radio broadcast in an attempt to gain their support for his policies. When facts are deliberately concealed or modified with the purpose of bringing about a desired attitude, the method is spoken of as *propaganda.* It is not always easy to draw a line between fact and propaganda because a certain amount of selection or emphasis is inevitable in any report or argument. In extreme cases, however, propaganda is readily recognized.

Governments at times may also try to suppress the formation of public opinion, and hence public action, by forbidding free speech and communication among the people. Orators and editors who speak or write against the government may be jailed or thrown into concentration camps, and "dangerous" books may be burned. The Nazi control of Germany just before and during World War II was perhaps one of the most thoroughgoing and systematic attempts ever made by any government to control public opinion by the use of propaganda, youth movements, control of the schools, denial of free speech, and intimidation. By such means the group in power was able to prevent the development of effective resistance to its policies within Germany to the final day of the capture of Berlin.

Propaganda and suppressive methods may be employed either to win possession of the government or to retain posses-

sion after it has been won. Violence has long been more or less effectively outlawed and freedom of speech, up to a certain point, has come to be protected by law in some democratic countries.

The Organization of Government.—To carry out the functions of government, however they may be defined in a particular society, some kind of organization is unavoidable, just as it is in the case of any other collective purpose or enterprise. We have mentioned a progressive tendency in Western society for the general interest to set the motive and determine the form of the governmental institution. Under this concept, government is clearly distinguished in theory from other groups and organizations within the society because of its purpose to serve the interests of the whole society rather than the interests of any one group or limited number of groups, and because of its exclusive right to use physical force if necessary. Otherwise, the government institution is exactly the same kind of mechanism as other institutions, and develops and changes in the same way. That is, the government consists of purposeful pair relations and group relations coordinated into an institutional pattern.

The central problem in the organization of government is the same as that of other institutions, namely, how the various pair and group roles and their interrelationships are to be defined and developed so as to perform most effectively the functions for which the organization exists. There is more than the usual danger that the relation between the individuals or groups within the government and individuals or groups outside will be affected by personal and group interests contrary to the technical purposes and roles of the government in the general interest, as defined by the law and the oath of office. Thus the most pressing problem relative to government is how to form the official government personnel into an efficient organization devoted solely to the public service. It is the problem of attracting to the government, by means of maximum salary and superior prestige, men and women from the most talented groups in the society. They must have the ideals of service and the training or experience needed for the offices they are

to fill, and their performance must be controlled by prompt and adequate rewards for success and by prompt removal for failure.

Probably the nearest approach to effective democratic government organization which has yet been made is the city manager system, a generally successful experiment in municipal government. Nevertheless, the city manager system has failed often enough to show that the goal has not yet been fully achieved. The chief difficulty is still to keep the government functioning for the general welfare, when the public for the most part lacks the interest and time to control it completely themselves. It would seem that some agency which could keep the people impartially informed about government matters and the government impartially informed of public opinion, is the next logical requirement for more effective democratic government.

Distribution of Wealth and Prestige.—One of the most important things that a modern society has to do is to decide the principle or principles which shall regulate the distribution of wealth or income and prestige among its members, and then set up the means of enforcing those principles. The latter function, of course, where other methods prove inadequate, properly belongs to the government.

An interest group might conceivably be allowed to get all it can, without giving anything in return. In the extreme or crudest form this is not often tolerated among groups of the same society or among the numbers of an in-group. But it has been freely practiced by one society or one group upon another, as by Europeans who have taken colonial lands from primitive peoples and perhaps exterminated the latter in the process. Groups in possession of the government have also sometimes followed a similar practice at home, as when the Cromwellians in England stripped Royalists of their lands and conferred them on Roundhead soldiers. Many of the great landed aristocracies of the world have been largely based upon violent seizure.

Closely related to the above, but less extreme and more common, is exploitation. The exploiting group gives something in return, but always takes more than it gives. A white master did not require everything from his Negro slave and give him nothing; the conditions of life itself and the laws

of the country forbade that. The master had to feed, clothe, house, and otherwise care for the slave, but he was not required by any law, natural or enacted, to give his slave as much as he exacted from him.

A third possible basis for the distribution of benefits within a nation is in proportion to the value of the services rendered or contributions made. Those individuals and groups whose services are regarded by the society as having the most utility receive the largest rewards, monetary and psychic, in return. The usual criterion here has been the familiar law of supply and demand of economics. A skilled surgeon gets a high fee and enjoys a high status because he saves life and because his skill is relatively rare. A motion picture star may earn more money and fame than any surgeon, because of the enormous audience to whose pleasure he ministers. No one movie-goer would pay as much to see the star in a picture as he would pay a surgeon for a dangerous operation, but the total salary the star receives is greater than the total income of the surgeon, and the star is more widely known.

It should be noticed that if the principle of ability to serve were followed exclusively, subject to the law of supply and demand, those groups in a nation which were solely a liability to others, like the chronically invalided or the feebleminded, would receive nothing. In other words, they would be allowed to perish. To avoid this, it is necessary to admit the element of need, or ability to use, as a supplementary principle. This has been done in varying degrees by many societies, including our own, which provides some public aid in such cases.

If the distribution of rewards is governed primarily by the value of the service rendered, then the factors determining the kind and amount of service which different individuals or groups are able to perform become matters of the greatest importance and interest to everyone. Everybody cannot be a great surgeon, a great inventor, or a great artist. Abilities at this level are not common. Such abilities depend upon inborn capacities, motivation, training, and opportunity. The amount of innate talent possessed by any person is the result of such complex forces of heredity that it may well be called a matter

of chance. It is also a chance over which men have as yet developed, and are likely to develop, very little social control. Society, however, does determine motivation and opportunities for developing and using the abilities dealt out by heredity. Even in our own country at the present time the social motivation and opportunity enjoyed by an individual are by no means always proportional to the amount of ability he possesses. There is a complete absence of motivation for certain talents in many social groups. A Negro boy with a gift for abstract mathematics born into a share-cropper family in Mississippi is unlikely ever to know of his talent. It appears that an artistic or poetic child is not only not encouraged, but is actually frowned upon in most peasant families throughout the world. Scientific studies indicate that there are as many brilliant girls as boys, but distinguished achievement is much rarer among women than among men. The influence of social motivation is seen in another striking way in the frequency of great musical composers among those nations which value music and cherish a musical tradition, like the Germans and Italians, and in their relative absence among nations which put emphasis on other things. Lack of schools and other training facilities effectively prevents many young people in the rural areas of our society from realizing their special abilities, and insufficient family income to support a long period of training eliminates great numbers in the cities where schools are available.

A final social differential occurs in the matter of employment. First is the bald fact that several million able-bodied men and women are unemployed in this country more or less normally. They do not have the opportunity to earn what they are competent to earn for themselves. While this group undoubtedly falls below the national average in ability, it is not lacking in some ability. Therefore, in not employing this group society fails to utilize all its members in proportion to the ability they have. It is also a fact that our society does not grant equal opportunity of employment to many individuals and groups in those special fields of service for which they are equipped by nature and training, or for which they would become equipped if they could expect employment. This situation is the result

of various kinds of in-group prejudices, and applies especially to the members of so-called minorities such as Jews, Mexicans, Negroes, Japanese, Chinese, and, to a less extent, even to Catholics. Women, also, are familiar victims of discrimination of this kind.

While it is utopian to expect any society, or form of society, to avoid all inequalities in the development and utilization of the abilities of its members, it is possible to go much farther in this direction than we have yet done. A good start has been made in our country and some others by providing widespread elementary education, so that an increasing number of children attend high school, vocational school, or college. The next step is a thorough testing and vocational guidance program in the public schools—which is already beginning to appear—combined with the higher education at public expense of more talented young people, without reference to their family or group connections.

A society which fully practiced such a program as the above might be described as a democracy of natural ability. In this kind of democracy the rewards, in money and prestige, that any individual received would depend on the worth of his services. In turn, apart from some unavoidable irregularities, the worth of his services would depend on the values held by the society and on his native abilities. Because it utilized individual abilities to the maximum, one would expect such a society to attain to the highest level of average welfare.

International Organization.—The need for centralized coordination and over-all control of individuals and groups is, of course, not confined to the individuals and groups within a single nation. Rather, it applies equally to any set of individuals and groups who are in constant interaction with one another, including those in different nations and the various nations or national groups themselves. The relations between Americans and Britons or Turks, like those between Americans at home, are carried on in a setting of custom and common sense. But such relations are even more subject than are domestic relations to confusion, waste, special privilege, and

conflict methods which violate the conditions of effective cooperative and competitive enterprise. The greater element of danger in international relations is due to the unfavorable attitudes which have naturally developed among nations toward one another because of differences in geographic location, history, culture, race, past conflicts, and general national ethos. The same factors explain the failure of a successful international organization to appear as early as effective governments have arisen within national boundaries.

The principles of international organization are the same as those of national organization. It must be underlaid by a master-value such as equal opportunity for every individual regardless of nationality, and must be able to define and enforce proper relations between different nationalities. The international government alone can have the right and equipment to employ force against a nation, under certain defined conditions, in the interest of the common welfare.

Social Disorganization.—Groups which were once organized to meet a need or purpose, but whose cooperative efforts have for any reason diminished or stopped, although the need or purpose continues, are said to be partly or completely *disorganized* with respect to that need or purpose. Thus, a family may be broken by divorce or death, or a church may be without a minister.

Disorganization may affect an individual, a group, a cluster of groups, or the over-all organization of a society. Group disorganization is due to the failure of some or all its members to play their appropriate group roles. Their failure may or may not imply personal disorganization of the members. Disorganization can come from difficulties and discouragement, from the incapacity or death of the individual, or from the distracting influence of other groups, demands, or desires. The disorganization of a group is a matter of degree, becoming complete only when all its members have entirely ceased to make any cooperative effort for the accomplishment of the group purpose. For example, if a military company has been defeated in battle, and some of its members have retreated in good order or according to some strategy, the company cannot be spoken of as entirely

disorganized. But if all the members of the same company became terror-stricken and fled from the field, each man for himself, the company must be regarded as completely disorganized, at least temporarily.

Relation of Service to Served.—In our modern society most needs are met by groups or organizations to which the individuals served do not belong. For example, the reader is not a member of the staff of the newspaper he reads, nor is he an employee of the grocery store from which he buys. Nevertheless, the newspaper and the store could not exist without readers or customers, and the latter are a necessary part of the particular enterprise. In this sense, the individual or group served is always a part of the organizational system which has developed around given needs. If buyers fall away, the cooperative system disintegrates and the service organization itself, which usually exists primarily for the profit of its members, fails to fulfill that function and disorganization occurs within it. Customers, however, may merely shift their patronage to a second store, and while they thereby bring about the disorganization of one store, they may aid another and their own needs may not suffer. Customers tend to patronize the store that best serves them, thus allowing the selective forces of competition to act upon the economy of the society.

If the service organization is a hospital whose staff of physicians is so depleted by the demands of war that the hospital can no longer protect the health of the community, the remaining staff members may enjoy more prosperity than usual, but the health organization of the community is disrupted. Here the customers, rather than the personnel of the organization, are the victims of the disorganization. It is also possible, of course, for both those served and the organization that serves them to suffer from disorganization, as in this country in the summer of 1946 when very imperfect cooperation existed between the Office of Price Administration and many producers of goods, with injury to producers and consumers alike.

The case is less complicated where an organization, such as a family, serves only its own members. But even here it does not follow that all members are damaged, or damaged equally,

by disorganization. A widowed mother, her daughter and her son may find their way of life interrupted by the decision of the son and chief breadwinner to marry, but only the mother and daughter are likely to suffer from the change. The son merely exchanges one family organization for another to improve his situation in accordance with his wishes. An organization may be terminated because the need for it has ended, as when a regiment is disbanded after the war. This is called de-organization, and should be distinguished from disorganization.

Reorganization.—In many cases an organization does not become completely disorganized before readjustments and modifications are made to improve or restore its efficiency, i.e., *reorganization* occurs. If a rural school loses its teacher, the board of education replaces the teacher as soon as possible; if a hospital finds itself too small to accommodate the patients which come to it, it may add to its facilities and staff. Even when an organization is so thoroughly disrupted that disorganization is complete, disorganization is rarely permanent, if the need persists. A new organization soon appears, differing in various degrees from the old. For instance, a woman recently widowed may remarry or go to live in the home of a daughter.

In fact, it has often been observed that most institutions affected with the symptoms of disorganization make desperate efforts at readjustment, and are likely to assume somewhat modified functions in the hope of serving their constituents better and keeping their support. Thus, a church which is losing members may start a summer camp for the children of the congregation, search for less doctrinal issues to stimulate interest in the sermons, or place new emphasis on the quality of the choir. In this respect, an institution seems to resemble an individual in wishing to preserve its own life, often beyond the point where it has any usefulness. This is due largely to the personal and vested interests which some individuals usually have in the continuance of institutions with which are bound up their own emotional satisfaction and careers. A minister often makes a determined fight to save his church from closing its doors. He will fight, not only because he may still believe in the mission

of the church, but also because he does not want a record of apparent failure placed against him, and thus find it difficult to get another pastorate.

Ramified Effects of Changes in an Organization.—If a one-room rural school gives way to an enlarged consolidated school, some disorganization may occur because of the complex functions performed by the displaced school. We know that when a rural school is removed from the open country some temporary maladjustment often results, because the farm neighborhood loses its social center as well as its school. After a time new ways of meeting the social needs are likely to develop: the neighborhood life may find a new focus in the local church or Sunday school, or it may be shifted to the village, with no permanent sense of loss. On the other hand, some of the farm people may never be as well satisfied with the new arrangement as with the old. Group behavior seldom has the same consequences for every member of a group.

Social Organization and Change.—Undoubtedly, change is the main cause of social de-organization and disorganization, and so of reorganization. The development of individuals from childhood to maturity, and then to old age, a universal and continuous process, is disruptive of many specific social organizations. But if the age ratios remain the same, it generally does not disturb social organization in any important way. This is because individuals pass into other organizational patterns waiting at the next age level, and the patterns which they vacate are in turn taken over by a younger group.

Both social de-organization and disorganization come from changing material conditions and ideologies. In the case of de-organization, a need or interest either disappears or is succeeded by a new one. The old organization loses its motive or *raison d'être* and is then discontinued because it is no longer wanted, or is modified to serve the new interest. As science develops, many people become indifferent about religion, and some religious organizations disintegrate or become purely humanistic in form. There is no feeling of injury at the collapse of an institution which served a need that no longer exists. When the

old need is replaced by a new need, however, the latter is seldom well served immediately. A period of transition occurs, during which a new organizational structure is being created, and some confusion and dissatisfaction exist. This condition is more accurately thought of as *incomplete organization* with reference to the new need, rather than as disorganization with reference to the old need, although the two are often not differentiated.

Disorganization with respect to a given need or interest of a particular group, in so far as it results from change, may be brought about by ideological or personal changes within the group itself, by such changes in other groups, or by changes in material conditions. As a result of these changes, the organization fails to fulfill its purpose, although the need continues. When this happens *disorganization* in the true sense sets in. Thus the death of the breadwinner in a family may lead to the family's breakdown and force it to ask for public relief before effective reorganization can occur. Or, several successive dry seasons in the Dakotas may result in the abandonment of many wheat farms and the disintegration of agriculture in the dust bowl of the Northwest.

Logically speaking, after a satisfactory organization has once been created to serve a need, it is obvious that it will remain satisfactory until some change occurs in the causal system within which it operates. In this sense, it may be said that change is the sole cause of social de-organization, disorganization, and reorganization. Such a statement is so broad, however, that it may be of little practical value. We need to know what changes are responsible in a particular case, or at least what kinds of changes are usually responsible. These questions are taken up in Chapter 24.

What has just been said implies that a new discovery, invention, or organization may react upon older elements of the social structure, displacing or modifying them, or interfering with their functioning. For example, the city brings new needs and values in place of the older rural interests, and compels changes in rural institutions like the family and many occupations. This conflict between the new and the old is due to the interdependence of many parts of the social structure; change in

one part may necessitate alterations in others. In this connection, it has often been pointed out that some of our customs and institutions change faster than others, thereby causing dislocations and confusion, followed by de-organization, disorganization and reorganization. This phenomenon has been called *social lag*. In our own society, the evidence is that material science and invention have forged ahead much more rapidly than have our social and economic organizations, or human relationships. Thus we have recently been supplied by the natural sciences with an implement of fantastic destructive force, the atom bomb, before we have been able to develop an organization of societies on a world scale which is capable of preventing the misuse of such physical power.

Although social lag becomes a problem when it involves changes in one part of a culture which also affect other parts, it need not be limited to changes that have such consequences. We may also speak of social lag where one part of a culture develops more rapidly than another, or where one of two cultures advances faster than the other. The term applies even if the greater progress in the one causes no noticeable disturbance in the other—a not uncommon situation. The great advances in communication—the telephone, the telegraph, the cable, the radio—have neither imposed any great strains upon our educational institutions, nor brought any de-organization or disorganization upon them. Indeed, improvements in one field may sometimes at once be an aid to more effective organization in another, without any intervening confusion. Educational institutions became better able to perform their functions when they obtained the telephone and telegraph. It appears that unequal rates of progress in different parts of a culture may have any one of three effects upon the backward part: (1) de-organization or disorganization, (2) no effect, and (3) improved organization. Even in the first case, disorganization is normally followed by reorganization, which may mean an advance in the backward part. From this point of view, achievement in one field may often be regarded as a cause of progress (immediate or delayed) in another. Since every cause precedes its effect, and most causes of social change are

themselves social changes, we are even led to the idea that social lag is a normal part of the general process of cultural advance.

The key to the effect of social lag upon social organization seems to be the amount and kind of change per unit of time. If radical changes occur suddenly or very rapidly in one area of culture, more or less serious disorganization is likely to result in other areas correlated with it. But if the changes are relatively gradual, the correlated parts may be able to adjust to them without any clear symptoms of disorganization. Some kinds of change can, of course, be absorbed much more readily than others. Great strides in medicine have not proven very disruptive anywhere in our society, but one new discovery in explosives, the atom or hydrogen bomb, may easily lead to the almost complete disorganization of the whole of civilization before satisfactory adjustments can be made.

Vital Statistics and Social Organization.—Another kind of change that affects social organization is illustrated by shifts in the age ratios or age distribution of a population. The consequences of a decline in both the birth and the death rate are a smaller proportion of children and a larger proportion of old people in the national population. These changing ratios for the United States, over the period 1850-1980, can be seen in Figure 2. The percentage of persons 60 years of age and over more



FIG. 2.—Proportion of the population of the United States in various age groups, 1850-1930, and Thompson and Whelpton's "low" estimate, 1940-80. (U.S. Department of Agriculture, BAE.)

than doubled between 1850 and 1940, from less than five per cent to over ten per cent, and in 1948 the percentage had risen to about 11.5 per cent. It is evident that the interests and values, and hence the social organization, of our population must be undergoing some modification because of this shifting age composition. One result, already familiar, is the growing political pressure for pensions for the aged, of which the Townsend Movement is an example. The belief is also often expressed that a population weighted with old people will tend to be more conservative and less enterprising than one dominated by the young, but no adequate studies have as yet been made of such differences, however important they may be. A new field of social research, known as geriatrics, or the science of senescence, is just now opening up, which may include inquiries of this kind.

Survey of Social Organization.—For practical purposes, the degree and effectiveness of organization of a society or unit of society at any time may first be judged in terms of its own felt needs and its capacity to satisfy them. Outside points of view and criteria may be injected later, if desired, but the two should not be confused. A thorough inquiry will also include a knowledge of the changes in felt needs and organization over an appropriate period of years. Such a perspective is necessary to differentiate between the roles of unorganization, incomplete organization, de-organization, disorganization, and reorganization, which is important for understanding the state of social organization at any given time. It has been common to survey only one type of community need or organization, such as the public school system, or unemployment in an American city. More inclusive surveys, which cover a number of activities however, should be made to give a better picture of the community.

It should be noticed that a society may have adequate and inadequate organizations of the same type existing in different places, or even side by side. The police force of one city may be on a higher plane of efficiency than that in another city, or one bank may be better run than another in the same block. The state of organization for the whole society with respect to any given purpose or institution can be represented only by an

average level of effectiveness, supplemented either by a statement of the range from the least to the most efficient individual organizations, or better, by a complete frequency distribution of the existing institutions arranged along some type of efficiency scale.

QUESTIONS

1. How is the definition of the term "organized" related to that of "organization" in the preceding chapter?
2. Are cooperative structures alone properly considered a part of social organization? What of competition? Conflict?
3. Define a "society," and give fresh illustrations.
4. What is the essential role of government in a society?
5. How far can the government be held responsible for the orderliness of a society? Why?
6. What decides the criterion or principle that guides the government in its function as coordinator of a society? Illustrate.
7. What is the central task of a government in the general interest?
8. Is a government in the general interest ever justified in suppressing a business organization which has been successful in fair competition? Explain.
9. What clear principle of government has been established by experience, according to the text?
10. Just what does the phrase, government "in the general interest," mean? What is "in the general interest" in cases where the public seems to split into parts with different or conflicting interests?
11. What is the value, if any, of public opinion polls for government in the general interest?
12. Distinguish between education and propaganda.
13. Is the use of propaganda ever consistent with government in the general interest?
14. What is meant by "freedom of speech," and what is its relation to government in the general interest?
15. In what ways, if any, does organization for government in the general interest differ in theory from organization for any other purpose?

16. What principle of distribution of wealth and position is most consistent with the idea of government in the general interest?
17. What is meant by a "democracy of natural ability"?
18. In what respects, if any, does international organization differ in principle from national organization? What inferences may be drawn from this regarding the essential features of an international organization?
19. Define and illustrate what is meant by group disorganization.
20. Does the disorganization of a group always imply the personal disorganization of some or all of its members? Give an illustration.
21. Should customers be considered a part of the organization which has grown up to serve their needs? Why?
22. Need all members of a group be equally damaged, or damaged at all, by its disorganization?
23. Distinguish by examples between disorganization and de-organization.
24. Give an illustration of disorganization in a group, followed by reorganization.
25. Cite a case of unexpected consequences of changes in a social organization or institution.
26. What is the usual cause of group, or social, de-organization and disorganization?
27. Distinguish between advances in age and changes in the age composition of a society, with reference to their effects on social organization.
28. Just what is meant by the theory of social lag?
29. Does social lag always cause de-organization or disorganization in other parts of the culture?
30. Discuss the idea that social lag is a normal part of the general process of cultural advance.
31. Illustrate what is meant by the "key to the concept of social lag."
32. What special points are made relative to practical surveys of actual community organization?

REFERENCES

ADOLFSON, LORENTZ H. "Local Government and Modern Democracy," in THOMAS C. MCCORMICK (ed.), *Problems of the Postwar World.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945.

CANTRIL, HADLEY. *Gauging Public Opinion.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.

FARIS, ROBERT E. L. *Social Disorganization.* New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1948, chaps. i, ii, iii, xiv.

FELLMAN, DAVID. "Postwar American Federalism," in THOMAS C. MCCORMICK (ed.), *Problems of the Postwar World.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945.

GAUS, JOHN H. "The Planning Process in Government," in THOMAS C. MCCORMICK (ed.), *Problems of the Postwar World.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945.

LA PIERE, RICHARD T. *Sociology.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1946, chaps. xiv, xix.

OGBURN, WILLIAM FIELDING. *Social Change.* New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1927, Part IV.

PANUNZIO, F. CONSTANTINE. *Major Social Institutions.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939, chaps. xxi, xxii.

PARSONS, TALCOTT. "Society," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. XIV, pp. 225-31.

POTTER, PITMAN B. "The League, a League or What?" in THOMAS C. MCCORMICK (ed.), *Problems of the Postwar World.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945.

SHEPARD, W. J. "Government; History and Theory," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. VII, pp. 8-15.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *Society, Culture and Personality.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, chap. xxx; pp. 203-11 ff.

STOKE, HAROLD W. "The New Nationalism," in THOMAS C. MCCORMICK (ed.), *Problems of the Postwar World.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945.

PART III

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

CHAPTER 7

SOCIAL CLASSES

Social Strata, and Upper Stratum Attitudes.—The population of a society tends to be arranged into more or less distinct layers, or strata, which form a hierarchy of wealth and status. If the upper and lower strata of a society are very far apart in culture, power, property, race, appearance, etc., it is likely that the members of the lower stratum will be regarded as innately inferior to those of the upper. This feeling may become so strong that intermarriage between the two appears to members of the upper stratum to be a contamination, and is viewed with such abhorrence that it is banned by custom or law or both. Cultural and educational differences alone may be sufficient to create an antipathy in persons of the upper stratum toward any social contact, as equals, with those of the lower stratum.

This state of mind is further augmented by the resistance of the upper stratum to any changes in the social order which seem to threaten its position. For such reasons, the upper stratum may strive to keep the members of the lower stratum in their "place," not only by refusing them social equality and intermarriage, but also by denying them equal political, educational, and economic opportunities. There is a fear that if the members of the lower stratum were allowed to compete freely with the members of the upper stratum in business, politics, science, and the arts, many of them might achieve distinction and power, thereby displacing some of the upper stratum. It would also then become increasingly impossible to avoid social equality and intermarriage.

The opposition which those in the upper stratum usually have to granting equal opportunities to others may seem inconsistent with their feeling that the lower stratum is biologically inferior. However, the two attitudes are not necessarily incompatible.

For example, the inferiority may be thought to relate especially to innate character. The Devil has never been regarded as incompetent, but that circumstance has not disposed many of the religiously orthodox to welcome him to their homes. There may also be the belief among the upper stratum that if the members of the lower stratum lack native capacity or character, any attempt to provide equal schooling and other opportunities for them would be a foolish waste of resources and would only put false ideas in their heads which would unfit them for their proper usefulness.

The Caste.—When an extreme state of affairs, such as that just sketched, prevails in a society, and is accompanied by practically no interchange of members between the upper and lower strata, and by a strict segregation by occupation, place of residence, etc., a caste system may be said to exist. The most thoroughgoing example of this is furnished by India, where over 2,500 distinct castes and subcastes, each with its own peculiar vocation, customs, religious practices, and often differences of speech, have for centuries been maintained by religious dictate. But it is obvious that some suggestion of caste conditions may also be found in the case of Negroes and whites in the United States, in South Africa, and elsewhere, although these show important deviations from the "ideal" caste type of India.

One aspect of caste is the possibility of an out-caste group as found in India, or of the "marginal man" type, as seen in the United States. A person who belongs to any recognized caste, high or low, has a place in society, with certain well-defined rights and opportunities, however limited they may be. A person who belongs to no caste at all, however, has no status and fits in nowhere. In India such out-castes subsist if they can on the fringes of the society, but the Indian society considers that it owes them nothing and makes no provision for them. In the United States mulattoes and Nisei, or American-born Japanese, have, especially at an earlier period, sometimes found themselves members of no group, because they were rejected by the whites. The mulattoes were unwilling to identify them-

selves with the Negro group and the Nisei were unwilling to identify themselves with the foreign-born Japanese.

Another curious trait of caste relations is the willingness of many members of the upper caste to have illicit sex relations with those of the lower caste, while at the same time they maintain a strict ban on legal intermarriage with them. This would seem to indicate merely that caste distinctions do not always create sexual antipathies. Hence, the upper class may add sexual exploitation to its other forms of exploitation, without any intent on its part to destroy its racial purity by admitting "mongrel" offspring to high-caste membership. If race is not an issue, such sexual exploitation does not mean any lessening by the upper class of its sharp insistence on caste distinctions.

The Order or Estate.—A second type of social stratum is the *order* or *estate,* which differs from the caste in being less closed, and in being controlled by state law. Examples are the serfs, freemen, bourgeoisie, clergy, and nobility of the Middle Ages. A freeman could become a slave and vice versa, or a commoner might receive a patent of nobility.

The Class in Modern Western Society.—Unlike either caste or order, such social strata as the classes in our own modern society are not the result either of religious mandate or secular law. They are not legally closed, although passage from one class to another may be more or less difficult. Birth is still the usual mode of entrance, but there is always more or less penetration of a class by members of the class or classes below and above it. The members of any class tend to be somewhat alike in wealth, education, occupation, attitudes, and patterns of behavior, and are conscious of the differences between themselves and other classes. According to Sorokin, "one can easily distinguish the following major classes in the Western society of the past two or three centuries: (a) the industrial-labor, or proletarian, class; (b) the peasant-farmer class; (c) the dwindling class of large landowners, (d) the capitalist class, now being transformed into the managerial class. Each of these powerful classes is divided into several subclasses." [1] Other

[1] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Society, Culture and Personality, Their Structure and Dynamics* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), p. 273.

recent writers use the terms upper, middle, and lower classes, or break them down into finer subdivisions.[2]

Is There an Unstratified Society?—A society of any age, magnitude, and complexity which is entirely without castes, orders, or classes is unknown. As Hiller states, "Stratification is an indication of society's organization, as far as this refers to its scheme of superordination and subordination." [3] Although attempts have been made to abolish all classes and social distinctions, none has ever been successful. Soviet Russia may be cited as a recent example:

> The composition of Soviet Russian society . . . is very far from one characterized by a dead level of homogeneity. Differentiation of function and interests has increased, rather than the reverse, during the years of Soviet control. . . .
>
> Aside from the relatively small classes of landlords, industrialists, intellectuals, and *kulak* farmers, the masses of Russian workers and peasants, before the Revolution, were close to a primitive homogeneity, only a little removed from serfdom. With the development of industry and collectivized agriculture, the introduction of new techniques and the rise of new specializations, the homogeneity of the masses has changed markedly. In its place one finds unskilled and skilled workers in a wide variety of agricultural and industrial enterprises, one finds technicians, engineers, scientists, and artists in steadily rising numbers; one finds, in addition, the mounting array of administrators that is characteristic of industrial management and government among all industrialized peoples today. . . .
>
> Practically all income of Russian citizens today is work income. That fact, however, does not indicate any more dead level of life and culture, today, than is the case among other industrialized peoples, but perhaps, for the many, rather less. Wages and salaries were never equal in Soviet Russia. . . . Since 1931, with the introduction of "the New Russian [Economics] Policy" advocated by Stalin to increase payment by results, differentiation in earnings was mounting, at least until the present war. According to a recent estimate, the average monthly earnings of engineers and technicians were something like four times those of unskilled workers, in 1935. . . . Certain perquisites, such as

[2] Oliver C. Cox, "Estates, Social Classes, and Political Classes," *American Sociological Review*, X, No. 4 (1945), 464-69.

[3] E. T. Hiller, *Social Relations and Structures* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), p. 601.

a motor car, special vacation arrangements and special housing, might augment the upper grade salaries, but the differences would still be less between the income of top management and that of unskilled workers than in this country. Government officials are on a scale with other administrators, with perquisites mounting as authority and responsibility increase. The highest remunerations, or so it would seem, are allowed to artists, actors and writers of first rank." [4]

Class, Status, and Privilege.—Status and class are closely associated, but they are by no means identical concepts. There is a wide range of status levels within a single class, and considerable overlapping in status levels between members of different classes. A worthless and dissipated member of an upper-class family may be less highly regarded in his community than some upstanding and useful citizen who is nevertheless recognized as belonging to a lower class. Nevertheless, class membership is one of the chief factors that contribute to an individual's status, as the results of a recent study of friendships among American school children illustrate:

. . . the lower the social class of the subject, the fewer times he is mentioned as a "best friend," the lower the social class of the subject, the more times he is mentioned as "don't want for a friend.". . .

With the exception of the group of lowest status, children tend to select as friends, first, children of higher status than their own and, second, children of their own status level. . . .

The child from a family of upper status occupies an enviable position—many of his classmates consider him their friend or would choose him for a friend or mention him as their parent's choice. Very few of his classmates mention him as a person they would not want for a friend.

The child from a family of lower status faces the opposite situation. He is seldom mentioned as a friend [and then only by children of the same social position as his own], but he is often mentioned as a person his classmates do not like and whom parents do not want their children to play with. . . .

Data on reputation follow the same pattern as data on friendship.

The lower-class child in the elementary school in Hometown has the reputation of being poorly dressed, not good looking, unpopular, aggressive; of not liking school; of being dirty and bad mannered; of

[4] Mildred Fairchild, "Social-Economic Classes in Soviet Russia," *American Sociological Review*, IX, No. 3 (1944), 236-41.

never having a good time; and of not playing fair. These opinions of him are shared even by members of his own class group. The child of a family of upper status, on the other hand, enjoys a reputation almost exactly opposite—he is considered well dressed, good looking, popular, a leader; as liking school; as being clean and well mannered; as always having a good time; and as playing fair. . . .

At the high-school level, upper status is a sure indication that the adolescent will at least be the center of attention in his group, whether his reputation is favorable or unfavorable. As the lower-class child grows older, he drops out of school, or by taking on the behavior and values of middle-class association, he tends to lose his distinguishing lower-class features. . . .

Perhaps one of the reasons that the child of lower class is so often a "behavior problem" in school is that he finds himself rejected by his classmates and enjoys such an unenviable reputation. This may also be one of the reasons why lower-class children often find school unpleasant and unrewarding and why the child of lower class so often welcomes the first opportunity to leave school altogether. . . .

While there is no systematic research on the topic, anecdotes and observations suggest that teachers' behavior toward children of lower-class is different from their behavior toward those of middle or upper class and that this discrimination follows the differences in reputation among the social groups.[5]

Persons who have high status in one respect are likely to have high status in other respects:

. . . there exists a real tendency for the different types of status to reach a common level, i.e., for a man's position in the economic hierarchy to match his position in the political hierarchy and for the latter to accord with his position in the hierarchy of prestige, etc. This tendency may conveniently be called "status equilibrium" . . . and a social situation in which a high degree of correlation obtains between the different forms of status, an "equilibrium status structure." [6]

Membership in a social class affects not only a person's status rating, but also the privileges and power he enjoys or possesses. The children of unskilled laborers are seldom found among the students in colleges and universities, even in a democratic coun-

[5] Bernice L. Neugarten, "Social Class and Friendship Among School Children," *American Journal of Sociology*, LI, No. 4 (1946), 305-13.

[6] Emile Benoit-Smullyan, "Status Interrelations," *American Sociological Review*, IX, No. 2 (1944), 151-61.

try like the United States of America. Many studies in this country have shown that here, as elsewhere, sons of professional and business fathers have a much higher probability of attaining to positions of wealth and distinction than have the sons of fathers who work with their hands. Power goes with wealth and high executive position, financial or political. In societies where stable social classes exist, wealth and important positions tend to be concentrated in the hands of men in the upper class. Moreover, men who achieve great possessions and power rise to the upper class if they were not already at that level. Hence money and authority pile up at the top and are then naturally passed on to the children of the owners, if they are in anywise capable of meeting the responsibilities. In any case, the way is smoothed for young people of the favored classes to come into control of the resources and places of power in a stratified society. In proportion to the tightness of the class system, they will do so.

General Criteria of Class.—According to Lucio Mendieta y Nuñez, "even though the economic factor has great importance for determining the social class, the decisive factor is in reality the cultural one." He divides social classes into higher, middle, and lower, and describes what he regards as the general characteristics of each. The distinctive features of the higher class are:

(1) possession of wealth, worldly possessions, capital, power; (2) a refined form of material and moral living permitting satisfaction of the human needs, individual and collective, by means of the enjoyment of the best things; (3) a feeling of safety and of pride of class; (4) an organic reflection, in the physical aspect, in manners, of the above mentioned characteristics until constituting selective types differentiated as a result of "social culture"; (5) conduct dominated by social conventions rigorously observed, i.e., a life of frequent intercourse within limited circles; (6) constant preoccupation about keeping up appearances; (7) a reactionary and conservative spirit. . . .

Mendieta finds it more difficult to describe the middle class:

We think of the middle class, like the other classes, as made up of different sectors, each presenting peculiar features; these sectors, how-

ever, having certain common aspects that impress a special mark on the aggregate. . . .

In our opinion we may lay down as specific characteristics of the middle class the following:

1. It copies the ways of living of the higher class, which in this purely formal aspect, seems to be its constant ideal: dress, furniture, living quarters, taking into account the middle class in its great mass, is to be found solely in the quality of things, in the fullness of the satisfactions.

2. It bestows great importance on culture, the sciences, technics, the professions, as means for the attainment of economic well-being and moral satisfaction.

3. It possesses a high ethical and religious sense.

4. Its ambitions are limited to obtaining well-being and moral satisfaction mainly by means of work. It doesn't make a point of accumulating riches.

5. It loves and respects private ownership on account of having acquired it by way of patient efforts and privations or because it hopes to acquire it, and naturally feels fearful and indignant at the very idea of being dispossessed of what it justly holds to be the product of its work. The justification of its right to the small property it owns, leads it to justify every right to ownership without taking into account the fact that the enormous properties of the higher class do not have the same foundations.

It is due to this very special psychological circumstance that the middle class is taken to be a factor of moderation, of equilibrium, in the social struggle. The higher class owes much to the middle class, for without the latter, the former would be soon destroyed by the proletariat. The proletariat, in its turn, holds the middle class responsible for delaying the triumph of its cause on account of being conformist, pusillanimous, counter-revolutionary.

Nevertheless, the culture and the high ethic and religious sense of the middle class leads many of its members to a critical analysis of human societies. It is thus that from the middle class have issued, in all epochs, great revolutionaries, great reformers, the apostles of social justice.

6. It exhibits a deep-rooted tendency towards keeping up appearances, towards observing social forms even at the cost of the greater sacrifices.

7. It possesses an economic foundation, a certain minimum economic well-being derived from rent on small property, or revenue from limited capital, from personal work, or from both constituents. Such welfare

nears unencumbered comfort, a certain luxury in some sectors of the middle class; but without reaching the lavish and ostentatious luxury of the higher class.

8. Its line of business . . . is mainly of a technical nature. In civilized countries it consists of the bureaucracy, the small proprietors, the small industrialists, and artisans, the small rural and urban owners, the professionals, the employees of private enterprises. In all these cases the middle class performs intellectual and material labors requiring a certain amount of culture and, in most instances, scientific and technical knowledge, abilities for management and judgment, for organization and execution. . . .

Looking for the distinctive features of universal extent, of the lower class, we find the following:

(a) Rudimentary instruction; in some countries, large sectors of this class are illiterate; in any case, however, its knowledge is circumscribed to that imparted at schools on the elementary level.

(b) It is devoted to manual labor demanding mainly the use of material force or of personal physical action.

(c) Its ways of living are inferior to those of the middle class. The quality of its garments . . . , of its living quarters, foods, is always of scant value; it occupies the cheapest places at public amusements, and the services it requires . . . are always of low cost.

(d) Its manners of speech and of conduct are coarse.

(e) It is very religious, without comprehending the principles of its religion.

(f) It lacks foresight.

(g) Notwithstanding the power of its numbers, which would allow it to carry out, at a given moment, a total social subversion relative to the existing social order, it is the most solid support of the division into classes and of the great legal structure maintaining social inequalities . . . in countries where military service is not compulsory, and even where it is, [the army is] made up to an overwhelming extent by the lower class. . . .

The lower class is by itself incapable of organizing into ideological movements. In spite of its economic situation it accepts the existing state of things, reacting and rebelling only when guided and given a program and a banner by individuals from the other social classes, especially from the middle class. To these characteristics we must add . . . (1) lack of the most recent psychological stratification . . . ; (2) lack of development of moral sensibility; (3) absence of decorousness or its manifestation in a rather primitive form; (4) poor and primitive mental conceptions; (5) intellectual development rendered

stationary; (6) incapacity for rising to abstract ideas; (7) an automatic, not a constructive, mentality; (8) defective organization of the centers for inhibition with a consequent impulsiveness.[7]

Hollingshead identified five classes in a Middle Western community of about 10,000 population in the United States, and found mainly that each of them had a distinct subculture. Their members possessed distinctive traits and the members of each class participated differently in community activities. His Class I corresponds to the "higher" class, Classes II and III to the "middle" class, and Classes IV and V to the "lower" class of Mendieta, and although Hollingshead's description of them is similar, he points out some further interesting traits. Only members of Classes I and II donate a part of their time to community affairs. Four out of five families in Class II are of old American stock, compared with three out of five families in Class V.

According to Hollingshead, intermarriage seldom descends farther than the class immediately below. Marriage occurs a year younger in Class III than in Class II, and more children per women are born in each class than in the class above. No families higher than Class IV were on relief during the depression of the 1930's. Broken families become common in Class IV and excessively so in Class V. Church ties are much fewer in Class IV, and almost nonexistent in Class V, and the same is true of participation in other community activities. Sex immorality and other crimes are common in Class V. These classes are occupational in nature. The men in Class II follow major professions, own and operate larger businesses or farms, or are salaried executives in enterprises owned by Class I families. Those in Class III own and manage small businesses, medium-sized farms, engage in the lesser professions, are skilled craftsmen or foremen, or clerical workers. Those in Class IV and V are wage workers in industry and on farms, and many of their wives are gainfully employed outside the home at poorly rated work including domestic service.[8]

[7] Lucio Mendieta y Nuñez, "The Social Classes," *American Sociological Review*, XI, No. 2 (1946), 166 ff.

[8] August B. Hollingshead, "Selected Characteristics of Classes in a Middle Western Community," *American Sociological Review*, XII, No. 4 (1947), 385-95.

Class Variations in Child-Rearing Practices.—A recent study made in the city of Chicago calls special attention to variations in child-rearing practices, one of the many cultural differences that exist between the social classes:

Middle-class families are more rigorous than lower class families in their training of children for feeding and cleanliness habits. They generally begin training earlier. Furthermore, middle-class families place more emphasis on the early assumption of responsibility for the self and on individual achievement. Finally, middle-class families are less permissive than lower-class families in their regimen. They require their children to take naps at a later age, to be in the house at night earlier, and, in general, permit less free play of the impulses of their children.

Generalizing from the evidence presented . . . we would say that middle-class children are subjected earlier and more consistently to the influences which make a child an orderly, conscientious, responsible, and tame person. . . .[9]

Upper-Class Ritual.—The manners and bearing of a person not only vary from one class to another, but are more stressed at the higher social levels. The conventions and ritual of the upper class in Chicago of twenty years ago are intimately reported by Zorbaugh:

About the social game has grown up a vast amount of ritual, conventional ways of doing things, that serves to set off the aristocracy from "the common.". . . To the "climber," to the person who is not sure of his position, the social ritual is the Ten Commandments. . . . A great deal . . . of the ritual may be ignored, however, by the few whose social position is unquestioned—if those few possess that indefinable something, that indispensable combination of assurance and discrimination known as *savoir faire.*

A society woman writes half humorously, half-seriously, of this ritual:

"Unless you have a sound social position, do not live north of North Avenue or west of North State Street, and be careful of your choice of blocks. If you must live at a hotel live at the Drake, the Blackstone, the Lake Shore Drive, the Ambassador, or the Pearson. Variations from this list are not unusual, but demand discretion. A disapproved neighborhood or hotel goes to prove that you are undesirable.

[9] Allison Davis and Robert J. Havighurst, "Social Class and Color Differences in Child-Rearing," *American Sociological Review*, XI, No. 6 (1946), 698-710.

"It is proper, now, for young people to entertain without servants. But if there are servants, certain forms are absolutely required. The maid is neat and noiseless, and after five is in black. The face of man or maid is quite expressionless. A servant must open the door when guests or callers arrive. The table must be properly set. The cloth is unpopular; a center light is *de trop;* candlelight, without shades, is required. The maid must know the service-plate game; it would be unpardonable if one's maid removed more than one plate at a time.

" 'Well-groomed' is the summing up of an unbreakable commandment. The perfectly coiffed or barbered hair, dustless and spotless clothes, exquisite slipper or speckless spat ('bankers always wear spats'). Women's nails *must* be polished; men's *may* be. One bath a day (or two) is in the ritual. . . .

"Clothes must be in the prevailing exclusive mode, but not the extreme of popular fashion. 'Of course one doesn't wear green slippers or shoes in the daytime, as they do up around Wilson Avenue.' When the shopgirl moves up to the new style, that style is abandoned. 'It is almost impossible, these days, to have exclusive clothes. The mob, from New York to Kansas, copies everything so quickly!' The woman of *l'haute société* does not wear evening slippers on the street, nor evening cut neck, sleeves, or material in the daytime. Style in the smart set must be followed from tip to toe. The wrong gloves, the wrong line, the wrong slipper spoils the impression one strives to create. 'She does not know how really to be smart.' Useless to try to list the up-to-date—change is too rapid. 'Where did you get your mink coat, my dear? You should move up to Wilson Avenue; you look like a kept woman.' Exhibitionism in clothes seems more prevalent on 'Boule Miche' than on the 'Gold Coast.' This, however, may be accounted for by the difference in the group one seeks to impress. The 'Boule Miche' seeks to impress the world at large; the 'Gold Coast' wishes to impress the followers of a more exclusive and fastidious mode.

"Personal cards and notepaper, invitations, are matters which demand absolute conformity to the approved styles. Never make a call; if you do call, it proves that you came from Spikesville, Kansas, or any other place which is running a quarter of a century behind the times. Never go out after the first act at the opera; wait until after the second act. It is unsafe to carry a package or an umbrella. An artist was invited to an afternoon musicale at one of the exclusive 'Gold Coast' homes. It was raining, and she arrived with a wet umbrella. She passed the man at the awning entry, ascended the carpeted stairs, and came to the family servant who guarded the door. She held out her wet umbrella.

He looked at her unresponsively, but made no move to take it. A person who would carry an umbrella could not have been invited.

"It is unfortunate to go to functions via the street car or the Yellow Cab. Some garages advertise cars which look exactly like private cars, and which may be used on social occasions. Most of the people you know could not be taken to the opera in a Yellow Cab. It is superfluous to state that you could not take anybody anywhere on a street car, not even in the daytime.

"Apologies, hand-shakings, introductions, should be used with great caution. You may apologize if you are late, but not if the fish is burned, or the maid's hair awry, or you have worn gloves when you should not have done so. If you are young or go in the younger set, you can occasionally say 'damn,' or 'hell,' or 'Oh, my God!' 'Shut your damned face!' has been known to pass. But 'I'm pleased to meet you' would be practically fatal. *Nil admirari,* unless surprise, admiration, or comment is expected. If you must notice the details or special features of a room or costume, do it without the possibility of being detected. Curiosity is the height of bad breeding.

"You may stand on your head in the drawing-room at a small or a large party, if you do it in the right way, at the right moment; you may crawl along the floor on your hands and knees; you may put your elbows on the table. If you are young enough, you may have a nine-year-old tussle with a perfectly strange young man who looks the apotheosis of the Y.M.C.A., and he may wind a handkerchief around your neck, and drag you about, and kiss you. All this may happen at the smartest of parties, and if your *savoir faire* is perfect, you will not be criticized. But if you hold your spoon or fork wrong, you will never have another invitation to that house. Strangely enough, a person who could use a toothpick has never had even a first invitation. There is something about a person who could use a toothpick which you can tell, even though you have never had a moment of table intercourse.

"If you make a mistake, it is quite plain that you have done so, and explanation or deceit is unsafe. The best way out is to take the attitude that it is of no concern—rather amusing; right, or altogether negligible, because *you* did it. 'Whatever I do is *right* because *I* did it,' was the repeated admonition of a well-known social leader to her young daughter. 'I came over on the street car,' you state, with a little laugh, or with an air of complete composure, giving the impression that you are the sort of person who can do what she likes—that you are above criticism. A friend of mine was visiting at one of the most exclusive of summer colonies. After an afternoon at a polo match she returned to the house with two young men before her hostess' return. A stiff serving man

brought in a splendid and elegantly appointed tea table, and other tables, announcing that the hostess had 'phoned that she would not return to tea. My friend had never had tea this way; she was perfectly certain she would not serve it properly, and for a moment was frozen. This was absolutely unforgivable—she would disgrace herself and her hostess. She turned to the butler. 'Will you serve the tea, Houghton?' Then she laughed. 'Or won't you serve it, Mr. C.? Tea is something I never play with. Somehow it has never interested me, and I should be sure to make a wrong move. Horribly unfeminine, I admit.' Then she proceeded with the conversation, holding her air of complete confidence.

"The manner habitual must be self-possessed; there must be an air of well-being and success. Graciousness in readily adjusted degrees, which at one degree warms and at another cools the recipient, is indispensable. An air of complete self-confidence, of easy assurance, with an occasional glint of *hauteur,* is requisite to social success." [10]

Evidently, many of the attitudes, values, and prejudices of the members of a stratified society are distinctive of the class to which they belong. The importance attached to social amenities, to education and refinement, to good family and wealth, to physical endurance and courage, to sexual morality, and so on, varies so much among the classes that members of one class often feel lost and uncomfortable when in the presence of persons of another class exclusively. Many things which a person takes for granted are not accepted outside of his own class, leaving him confused and baffled for lack of a basis of understanding. Each class forms a more or less separate universe of discourse, whose members speak, as it were, their own language.

Income and Class.—One of the criteria of class that was emphasized above was wealth or income. How much one social class differs from another in this respect depends on the particular society, the times, the number of strata recognized, and where the lines of separation between them are drawn. For example, in a Middle Western city of 60,000 population in 1945, C. Wright Mills found five strata between each of which there seemed to be a "natural" break in average weekly family

[10] Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 57-61.

incomes, as follows: Big business and executives, $137; small business and free professionals, $102; higher white-collar, $83; lower white-collar, $72; wage workers, $59. These figures omit agriculture, and would probably not be representative of classes in the rural southern states, in larger metropolitan cities of the northeastern states, or in a variety of European countries. They have little relation indeed to the differentials that exist in Asiatic countries. Yet in the relatively open classes of the Middle West, these data show that a family in the top class has on the average over twice as much income as a family in the bottom class. Even if we agree with Mendieta that cultural differences may be the decisive ones between classes, it is obvious that many of these cultural differences could not long exist if there were not also wide differences in material possessions and income.

TABLE 3

CLASS COMPOSITION OF RELIGIOUS BODIES, 1945-46*

Body	Per Cent Distribution			
	Upper Class	Middle Class	Lower Class	Total
Entire Sample	13	31	56	100
Catholic	9	25	66	100
Jewish	22	32	46	100
Methodist	13	35	52	100
Baptist	8	24	68	100
Presbyterian	22	40	38	100
Lutheran	11	36	53	100
Episcopalian	24	34	42	100
Congregational	24	43	33	100

* From Liston Pope, *op. cit.* Derived from a breakdown of four polls covering about 12,000 cases, 1945-46, American Institute of Public Opinion.

Class and Church.—Class lines in the United States are reflected in religious behavior and affiliation. In the words of Liston Pope:

Individual Protestant churches tend to be "class churches," with members drawn principally from one class group. . . . Such denomina-

tions as the Congregational, Episcopal, and Presbyterian are generally associated in local communities with the middle and upper classes; the Methodist, Baptist, and Disciples of Christ denominations are more typically associated with the middle classes. . . .

Though all of the major denominations have adherents from the lower classes, the religious expression of the latter has increasingly taken place in the last quarter-century through the new Pentecostal and holiness sects. . . .[11]

Class and Ability.—The disproportionately large contributions of the upper and middle classes to leadership and distinguished achievement are well established. After a careful review of the data, Lorimer and Osborn reached the following tentative conclusion:

> There is evidence that the lowest social groups in a typical American or English urban population are significantly below the large middle classes in *average* hereditary capacity for intellectual development. It is also indicated that the professional and upper commercial groups differ from the large middle classes in the frequency of genetic factors favorable to superior and very superior intelligence.[12]

The Committee on Population Problems of the National Resources Committee took the same general position, but stated it more fully: "The meager evidence at hand indicates that a large part of the differences in average scholastic ability found between children in the same community classified with reference to the socio-economic status of their parents may be due to genetic factors, the remainder being attributable to differences in environmental opportunity. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that hereditary ability varies widely among individuals in all social groups, ranging from low mentality to genius in all groups and that these individual variations are far more important in most respects than the smaller average differences between groups."[13]

Average innate ability, in so far as it can be isolated at all,

[11] Liston Pope, "Religion and Class Structure," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLVI, (1948), 84-91.

[12] From Frank Lorimer and Frederick Osborn, *Dynamics of Population*, p. 252. Copyright 1934 by The Macmillan Co. and used with their permission.

[13] *The Problems of a Changing Population* (Washington, D. C.: National Resources Committee, U. S. Government Printing Office, May, 1938), p. 162.

seems to increase with class status. But because of the much larger proportion of the population in the lower and middle classes, the latter undoubtedly furnish a greater reservoir of the potentially able and very able people in our society than do the relatively small upper and higher-middle classes.

With regard to correlation between class and the rather vague term *character,* there is a lack of objective data. However, Sorokin infers that "except during the period of decay, the upper classes are richer with strong, ambitious, bold and adventurous characters; with hard, severe and non-sentimental natures; with insincere and cynical men. In the period of decay, this difference disappears. The upper classes become soft, sincere, humanitarian, timid and cowardly. Such aristocracy is usually put down and superseded by newcomers of usual type of character." [14]

Class and Physical Traits.—Investigations of the physical characteristics of the social classes are briefly summarized by Sorokin:

1. The upper classes are taller, have greater weight, greater cranial capacity, greater handsomeness and less serious and less numerous anomalies and defects than the lower classes. This phenomenon is more or less permanent and universal.
2. The correlation is, however, not perfect and shows a great deal of overlapping.[15]

Significant recent changes in bodily form and size among immigrant stocks in the United States, as well as other data, suggest that nutrition and living conditions are responsible for a large part of the usual physiological variations between the social classes.[16] This is supported by many observations, including the Garden City experiment where "under good conditions the children of workingmen, who used to be less tall and heavy than the children of well-to-do classes, became rather taller and heavier than the children of the wealthy class." [17]

[14] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1927), p. 312.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 250, 251.
[16] Lorimer and Osborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-5.
[17] Sorokin, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

QUESTIONS

1. How is one social stratum distinguished from another?
2. Describe and explain the attitudes that tend to exist in the upper stratum toward the lower stratum of a society, when they are widely separated by cultural or biological differences. Illustrate.
3. Distinguish between class, caste, and order, and give historical examples of each.
4. Can you cite an authentic case of a completely unstratified society?
5. Does the same degree of stratification exist in all societies? If not, compare the most and the least stratified society that you can learn of.
6. Discuss and illustrate the relations between class and status and class and privilege, in our society. If any exist, to what may they be attributed?
7. Why do members of the upper classes usually have the greatest wealth and power?
8. How many classes can you identify in your own community, using the criteria of Mendieta y Nuñez, or others?
9. Why is class ritual and symbolism so much emphasized by members of the upper class? Mention some instances with which you are familiar.
10. Discuss and illustrate the relation of class to achievement and native ability, keeping the latter two factors separate, as far as possible.
11. What differences in physical traits, if any, can be established between the classes in our own society? If any exist, to what may they be attributed?

REFERENCES

LEDERER, E. *State of the Masses, the Threat of the Classless Society.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1940.

LUNDBERG, G. A. "The Measurement of Socioeconomic Status," *American Sociological Review,* V, No. 1, pp. 29-39.

MOMBERT, PAUL. "Class," and Ginsberg, Morris. "Class Consciousness," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 3, pp. 531-38.

MOORE, W. E. and WILLIAMS, R. M. "Stratification in the Antebellum South," *American Sociological Review,* VII, No. 3, pp. 343-51.

O'MALLEY, L. S. S. *Indian Caste Customs.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1932.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *Society, Culture, and Personality.* New York: Harper & Bros. 1947, Part IV.

CHAPTER 8

CLASS ORIGINS, PERPETUATION, AND TRENDS

Class Origins.—How do the social classes, which so powerfully affect the personalities, opportunities, and satisfactions of a population, come into being, and how are they maintained? The processes underlying the class structure of a society are cooperation, conflict, competition, and accommodation. Of the four, the two latter are the most important.

When one people achieves a military conquest over another, as the Normans did over the Anglo-Saxons in early England, the conquerors usually seize control of the land or other resources, establish themselves as an upper class or propertied aristocracy and treat the losers as inferiors. They monopolize the honorable and profitable posts and occupations and relegate to the vanquished the more menial and poorly paid work. Any attempt on the part of the conquered to usurp the privileges of the conquerors is regarded as improper and dangerous, and is punished. If the process is carried out ruthlessly to the end, a caste system develops (such as that found among the natives of India), or the victors reduce the vanquished to a state of slavery. Such extremes are most likely where the two peoples are very different in race and appearance, as well as in culture, so that the defeated cannot in time lose themselves among their conquerors. As the younger generations succeed the older, those of each class or caste acquire the attitudes, roles, and functions appropriate to their respective positions. They thus become fitted for their stations and work in the society, in a way which then seems to be dictated by the nature of things. The unequal property rights of the classes or castes, first brought about by violent seizure, come to be safeguarded by law.

The religious institutions approve and sanction the *status quo;* the upper and lower classes or castes become incorporated into the social structure of the nation and become interrelated and interdependent in countless ways by which the life and existence of the society are carried on. The accommodation of the two original conflict groups is then complete and the status distinctions so established usually persist for a considerable period of time, often for centuries.

Similar in some respects to military conquest is a revolution which results in the forcible displacement of part of the upper class by the more aggressive and ambitious elements from the classes below. Those who gain and those who lose by such a social upheaval may find themselves and their families more or less permanently allocated to a different stratum from the one to which they would otherwise have belonged.

If the society is organized along class rather than caste lines, it is inevitable that after either conquest or revolution competition will eventually come again into play. Members of the upper class who lack ability or industry, or who happen to undergo unusual misfortunes, will begin to lose their property and become no longer able to maintain the style of life required by their station. On the other hand, those individuals and families in the lower class who possess unusual talents, thrift, and determination, or on whom the accidents of fortune smile, will increase their resources or gradually rise to posts of importance and power in spite of all the class discriminations and legal obstacles that encumber their way.

In countries or historical times well removed from military conquest and violence, the composition of the socioeconomic classes is mainly attributable to individual differences in values, ability, industry, and good fortune, particularly among the men who were originally responsible through their successful or unsuccessful efforts for placing their families in one stratum or another. Such substantial advantages are enjoyed by persons who are born in the upper classes that many more of them are able to remain in this class during their lifetime than could do so if competition were completely free. In the long run, however, the sifting process tends to be mechanical and ruthless, so

that sometimes no amount of effort by family or friends can prevent an individual from sinking in the scale. Two or three generations of incompetence or misfortune are usually enough to remove a family from the upper stratum, even to shift it from a "gold coast" to a slum.

The class or caste, then, is largely a deposit of customary accommodations that have accumulated among groups and individuals as a result of past competition or conflict. The qualification should be noted, however, that all accommodations do not grow out of some form of struggle. Much of the customary class behavior that we see about us represents merely habits derived originally from various kinds of cooperation. Everybody does not want the same thing, and some prefer to be simple while others wish to be great.

People are born into a caste or class, and their basic forms of accommodation are acquired by imitative learning. This fact greatly reduces conflict and competition within a society. Members of every class, even the lowest, tend to insist that their children shall subscribe and conform to the values, occupations, level of living, religion, speech, and customary behavior of their own class, and are disposed to frown upon the assumption of the ideas and manners of classes below or above them. To do the latter has the appearance of desertion or rejection, and is not relished, although exceptions occur. These exceptions are found chiefly in the middle classes of democratic societies where vertical mobility itself is a part of the folkways, and they apply to short movements into the class above. At the same time, it is to be expected, and it is generally true, that a higher value is placed upon membership in an upper or privileged class than in a lower or hardship class.

Race, Class, and Caste.—Throughout the modern world, wherever Europeans have settled with their dominant culture among peoples of the darker races, the class structure shows a darkening of color from the top to the bottom. In the United States, the white and Negro races have been socially and economically so sharply segregated, and passage from the black group to the white has been so thoroughly *tabu* that the resulting racial organization is often referred to as a caste system.

Close analysis, however, indicates that the term "caste" does not accurately describe the situation. Among others, Cox has pointed out that caste represents a stable social equilibrium, whereas race domination in America is essentially an unstable situation: "A stable social adjustment," he says, "may be thought of as one in which the beliefs of a people are in harmony with their practices and in which the social system itself never comes up for critical public discussion." Furthermore, in the United States, "not only are the races not identified with any particular occupation, but there is also no accepted plan for the sharing of occupations" as there is in a true caste system. "Racial antagonism tends to divide the society vertically; the caste system tends to stratify it into a status hierarchy. . . . Negroes and whites in the United States stand toward each other in the relationship of subordination and superordination—a relationship implying suspended conflict. Conversely, castes stand toward each other in the relationship of superiority and inferiority, a relationship implying *natural,* socially accepted, peaceful status-ordering of the society." The caste theory applied to America "serves almost invariably to obfuscate the most significant aspects of race relations." [1]

Differential Fertility.—The socioeconomic classes in Western society differ in their birth rates and other vital indexes. Those families that live in cities, and those that have the most income, the most education, and the highest occupational status tend to bear the fewest children. This seems to be due to the influences of city life and economy, to personal ambition, to standards of living and personal gratification, and to a knowledge of contraceptive methods. The differences in the birth rate between farm and city people, and upper, middle, and lower socioeconomic classes are narrowing, however, as the attitudes of the bourgeoisie toward birth control, better sanitary facilities, and contraceptive information become more and more widely diffused in our society.

Reporting on a survey of fertility in Indianapolis in 1941, Whelpton and Kiser state that:

[1] O. C. Cox, "Race and Caste: A Distinction," *American Journal of Sociology,* L, No. 5 (1945), 360-68.

In general the traditional inverse relation of fertility to socio-economic status is found. . . .

For both Catholic and Protestant unions in the upper rental and educational classes, the fertility rates of wives 40-44 are below replacement requirements but the deficits are generally greater for the Protestants than for the Catholics. Among all Protestant couples in which the wife was 40-44 and in which both the husband and wife had completed at least one year of high school, the fertility rate is approximately 40-48 per cent below that required for permanent replacement of the group by births.[2]

Lorimer and Osborn found that "differentials in fertility among social classes in various parts of the United States, and in communities of different sizes are surprisingly similar. . . ." To them, "It seems very likely that differentials in fertility among social groups in the United States may become narrower in the course of the next fifty years. However, . . . the present writers consider it improbable that these differentials will be levelled off or reversed in this country in the visible future." [3]

TABLE 4

CHILDREN UNDER FIVE PER 1,000 NATIVE WHITE WOMEN AGED 20-44 YEARS FOR CITIES OF DIFFERENT SIZES, UNITED STATES, 1940*

Size of City	Number of Children Per 1,000 Women 20-44
250,000 and over	200
25,000-250,000	221
2,500-25,000	260

* Adapted from *Population: Differential Fertility, 1940 and 1910: Women by Number of Children Under 5 Years Old*, Bureau of the Census, 1945, p. 11.

Statistics for the United States indicate that the number of children relative to the number of women of childbearing age gets smaller as the size of the city gets larger (Table 4). In contemporary Western societies, the lowest birth rates are found

[2] P. H. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser, "Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility: 1. Differential Fertility among 41,498 Native White Couples in Indianapolis," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XXI, No. 3 (1943), 221-80.

[3] From Frank Lorimer and Frederick Osborn, *Dynamics of Population*, pp. 95, 96. Copyright, 1934, by The Macmillan Co. and used with their permission.



FIG. 3.—Children born per 100 wives under 45 years of age, according to usual occupation of husband. The rates have been standardized for age; data relate to unbroken unions in which the husbands and wives were native born. The "poor areas" in five cities are the sections covered by the "Health and Depression Survey" in Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Syracuse. National Resources Committee, *Problems of a Changing Population*, p. 140.

in cities, the highest in farming areas. As an illustration, in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, which is 93 per cent urban, the birth rate in 1935 was 14.7, while in Adams County, which is all rural, it was 19.2, on the basis of births allocated to place of residence.

The birth rate within a city varies with the occupation of the husband, being lowest in the professional group and highest in the unskilled labor group. Data demonstrating this correlation appear in Table 5 and Figure 3. We thus see that most of the reproduction that occurs in cities is supplied by the lower occupational classes, and by the unemployed in each occupational class. This creates some significant problems of education and of relief for the city community.

TABLE 5

STANDARDIZED FERTILITY RATES, 1929-1932, FOR WHITE URBAN FAMILIES CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS AND EMPLOYMENT *

Occupational and Employment Status	Standardized Birth Rate For 1,000 Married Women Aged 15-44 Years
Total	152
Unskilled labor	182
No employed workers	234
Part-time workers	166
Full-time workers	169
Skilled labor	150
No employed workers	188
Part-time workers	152
Full-time workers	134
Salaried workers	134
No employed workers	167
Part-time workers	153
Full-time workers	120

* Adapted from Lorimer and Osborn, *op. cit.*, p. 64, Table 23. By permission.

There is a striking negative association between the amount of education and the birth rate. According to a large urban sample, in the case of native whites, the difference is most marked between persons who attended only a grade school and those who attended high school or college; and in the case of

foreign whites and Negroes, the greatest contrast is between those who attended college and those who did not. (Figure 4).



FIG. 4.—Educational status in relation to birth rates in 1935 among wives 15-44 years of age, by nativity and color. Rates standardized for age and surveyed cities combined. From Clyde V. Kiser, "Birth Rates and Socio-Economic Attributes in 1935," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XVII, No. 2 (1939), 142.

The birth rate, urban or rural, also increases as family income declines, especially between families with annual incomes below and above $1,000. (Urban, Figure 5).

Reproduction of the Socioeconomic Classes.—The natural perpetuation of any group or class in a society depends upon

both the birth rate and the death rate. The enormous expansion of the white race which accompanied the agricultural and industrial revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a consequence of a reduction in the death rate rather than of a rise in the birth rate. Actually, the birth rate soon began to



FIG. 5.—Family income and birth rates in 1935 among wives 15-44 years of age, by nativity and color of the wife. Rates standardized for age and surveyed cities combined. From Clyde V. Kiser, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

fall. In the United States, the death rate dropped from 17.2 per 1,000 population in 1900 to 10.6 in 1945 and to 10.1 in 1947. The prospect for the future, however, is that the death rate will be higher, rather than lower, than either of these last two figures. This is because in a stable population (one in which the age distribution has become stabilized under a constant birth and death rate) the average age at death must be about 94 years in order to realize a death rate as low as 10.6. There is no likelihood that such an advanced mean age will be attained. The low death rate in 1945 and in recent decades is due in part to

the improvement in health conditions, and in part to a temporary overproportion of young people in our population. If the birth and death rates of 1945 should continue for a sufficient time, the excess in the younger age groups would disappear, and the death rate would stand at about 14.7 per 1,000, with a mean age at death of 68 years.

Just as the birth rate varies from one group to another in a society, so does the death rate. In this country, rural areas have a lower death rate than cities (standardized for age), professional and businessmen than skilled and unskilled workers, white than nonwhites, females than males.

To judge which groups or classes in a society are failing to reproduce themselves and which are expanding their numbers, we need some index that shows the excess of births over deaths. Such an index is the so-called *net reproduction rate.* According to the Bureau of the Census of the United States, in the five-year period 1935-40 the net reproduction rate for the nation as a whole was 97.8, for the urban population 72.6, for the rural-nonfarm population 115.0, and for the rural-farm population 166.1. The general rate of 97.8, for example, means that if 100 newly born girl babies passed through the childbearing period subject to the birth and death rates prevailing in 1935-40 at each year of age, they would be succeeded in the next generation by only 97 or 98 daughters. Since 100 daughters are required for replacement, these figures would indicate a declining population, if the observed vital rates should persist until the age distribution became stabilized. As a matter of fact, however, the national population did not actually decline in 1935-40 because its age distribution had not been stabilized and it happened to contain an overproportion of women of childbearing age. Although the birth rate per woman was low, the large number of young women produced a sufficient number of babies to cause some increase in the total national population during the five-year period.

Referring to the four net reproduction rates quoted above, we can see that if our city population were long subjected to the birth and death rates obtaining between 1935 and 1940, it would decline by about 27 per cent per generation, whereas

the village population would increase by 15 per cent and the farm population would increase by 66 per cent. This evidently means that most of the future population of this country would be drawn from rural and farm communities, just as it has been in the past. The rural excess to which we are accustomed will gradually be reduced as an increasingly larger proportion of the population of the nation comes to live in cities, as the practice of birth control continues to spread among rural people, and as the death rate of the city approaches that of the country. But it is doubtful if the differential will ever entirely disappear. The cities of the nation are likely to continue, indefinitely, to be fed by a stream of rural immigrants, coming chiefly from the South and West, who must be assimilated to the folkways and mores of an urban economy and an urban way of life.

It should be noticed that the low net reproduction rate of the total population of the United States reported by the Bureau of the Census for the years 1935-40 was a phenomenon of the severe business depression of the 1930's. The second World War and a boom in industry caused the rate again to rise above the 100 mark. Thus from 1942 to 1947 the net reproduction rate for the total population was 129.2, and the corresponding rates for the urban, rural-nonfarm, and rural-farm categories were 108.5, 146.5, and 185.9, respectively.[4] Few students of population problems, however, expect these rates to remain long at such high levels.

Looking now at the replacement rates of the socioeconomic classes in the registration area of this country, we quote briefly from Landis, the data under discussion being for the year 1928:

> The . . . chart [Figure 6] shows the approximate net reproduction rates per generation of broad occupational classes with reference to the estimated rates necessary for replacement. It will be seen that the professional and the business and clerical groups have rates considerably below the necessary replacement rates. The professional groups produce only three fourths of enough offspring for replacement. Rates of skilled and semiskilled groups barely exceed replacement rates, most of the excess coming from the laboring classes so far as urban groups are concerned. The total of all nonagricultural groups combined barely

[4] Bureau of the Census, "Fertility: April, 1947," *Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 18, p. 5.

reproduces itself. The agricultural class reproduces at a rate 32 per cent above that necessary for replacement.[5]

In addition to the several factors mentioned above, differential reproduction rates are affected by religious denomination. Catholics have larger families than Protestants, even when



FIG. 6.—Estimated net reproduction rates for broad occupational classes, U. S. Registration Area, 1928. (From Paul H. Landis, *Population Problems* [New York: American Book Co., 1943], p. 146. Data from Lorimer and Osborn, *op. cit.* By permission.)

age, occupational class, race, nativity, and residence factors are the same between the two groups.[6] Mormonism has undoubtedly served to keep the birth rate of Utah above that of the neighboring states.

Commenting further on the social consequences of the differential net reproduction rate as practiced by American families, the Committee on Population of the National Resources Committee wrote in 1938:

[5] Paul H. Landis, *Population Problems* (New York: American Book Co., 1943), pp. 146-47.

[6] Frank W. Notestein, "Class Differences in Fertility," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CLXXXVIII (1936); 32-33; Samuel A. Stouffer, "Trends in the Fertility of Catholics and Non-Catholics," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLI, No. 2, (1936), 145-46.

It is evident that, at present, families in the occupational groups characterized by superior education and enlarged opportunities have on the average fewer children than families handicapped by meager education and limited economic and cultural resources. This contrast is characteristic of most communities today, though it is not found in the oldest surviving patriarchal societies. A negative relationship between level of cultural-intellectual development and reproduction may operate as an imperceptible drag on cultural advance. This drag can be offset by ameliorative social action, extensive provisions for public education, and the stimulating impact of technological advance. But no civilization can be stable or progressive over a long period unless it is able to establish a positive relation between reproduction and health, culture, and social ideals. . . .

There is absolutely no doubt about the existence generally at present of a negative relationship in the United States between fertility and social or economic status. There is, for example, a pronounced tendency toward net reproductive loss among the families of urban workers in occupations that usually require high-school training or its equivalent, causing a net decrease of 10 to 35 per cent per generation among these groups. Furthermore, it is well established that families on relief are on the average more fertile than nonrelief families in the same community, although there is no evidence that relief status as such has any influence on this differential. This is a striking illustration of the general finding that families on the margin of decent subsistence or actually submerged in poverty are often characterized by high fertility. It is hardly necessary to argue the fact that poverty means handicapped child development. Present differential birth rates subject a disproportionately large number of children in each succeeding generation to the blighting effects of poverty. Furthermore, the larger average number of children born to poor parents places an unequal share of the economic burden of replacing the nation's population on the very families that are least able to bear this special responsibility.[7]

In many countries, and particularly in the United States, we have seen that there has long been a heavy migration from the farms and villages to the cities. Data were given which indicated that the rural persons who had the most education and the highest intelligence quotients were the ones most likely to seek their fortunes in the metropolitan centers. This combination of factors has alarmed many writers, who have seen in

[7] *Problems of a Changing Population* (Washington, D. C.: National Resources Committee, 1938), pp. 11-12.

the pull of the city and in the phenomenon of vertical mobility, i.e., the movement from one class to another, two processes that combine to select the ablest elements from the population and place them under urban and upper class influences which in effect render them relatively sterile. This, they feel, may eventuate in a serious decline of the biological quality of a society, as well as of its level of culture. For example, Sorokin writes:

> At the end of the eighteenth century the aristocracy of the Middle Ages was almost burned out. What remained was exterminated during the wave of revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century. After that time, the upper strata, with very few exceptions, began to be filled by new people; by new rural immigrants, and by the offspring of previous rural migrants.
>
> Into the place of the previous aristocracy of birth came the aristocracy of wealth, and talent, and political ability. But that has been burned out with an even greater rapidity than the upper classes before it. . . .
>
> Does the wasting of the best human material lead to a final dilution of the population of mobile society? The answer depends on whether the waste of the upper classes is or is not greater than the production of talents within the lower classes. If the production is not less than the waste, and it may be continued indefinitely, then apparently a mobile society is not doomed to a final depletion of its best stock. If the production is less than the waste and the sources of the lower classes in regard to a fortunate combination of genes are limited, then evidently the permanent waste leads to an exhaustion of the best human material, and to racial depletion. Theoretically, both hypotheses are possible. And at the present moment we cannot decide the question certainly in either way. Nevertheless, in a hypothetical way, the supposition of exhaustion seems to be more probable.[8]

Much the same conclusion is reached by Lorimer and Osborn:

> In so far as group differences in genetic capacity for intelligence may be established, our consideration of genetic principles indicates that differential reproduction among these groups would affect the distribution of genetic capacities in the whole population. A relatively slight increase in the reproduction rate of the groups with the higher average capacity for intelligence and a relatively slight decrease in the

[8] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1927), pp. 495-98.

reproduction rate of the groups with the lower average capacity for intelligence would very largely increase the number of individuals of high capacity, and very largely decrease the number of feeble-minded. Present trends are producing the opposite result.[9]

Sociologists, however, are primarily concerned with the cultural wastefulness of the differential birth rate, rather than with any possible effects on the biological quality of the population. Their general position on the cultural aspect of the problem was given above, in the quotation from the Committee on Population of the National Resources Committee.

Since the beginning of World War II, the pattern of differential fertility in this country has undergone some changes

TABLE 6

NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS OLD PER 1,000 MEN 20 TO 59 YEARS OLD, STANDARDIZED FOR AGE OF MAN BY MARITAL AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND OCCUPATION GROUP OF MAN: UNITED STATES, 1947*

Employment Status and Occupation of Man	All Marital Classes Children under 5 years old per 1,000 men	Married, Wife Present Children under 5 years old per 1,000 men
Total, 20 to 59 years	335	458
In labor force	349	460
Employed	355	462
Unemployed	230	441
Not in labor force	101	359
Employed	355	462
Prof. and semi-prof. workers	355	465
Farmers and farm managers	462	549
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm	353	412
Clerical and kindred workers	276	389
Salesmen	311	395
Craftsmen, foremen, etc.	378	454
Operatives, etc.	360	469
Service workers	271	406
Farm laborers and foremen	329	634
Laborers, except farm and mine	341	502

* Adapted from Bureau of the Census, "Fertility: April, 1947," *Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 18, p. 20, Table 19.

[9] Lorimer and Osborn, *op. cit.*, p. 252. By permission.

which should be noted, although it is likely that they will be temporary. Of special interest is the relative rise of reproduction in the professional and proprietor classes, which, partly because of their access to contraceptive methods, are most responsive to the ups and downs in the economic and psychological climates. Table 6 shows the situation in the various occupational groups for 1947. Whether or not a group was then replacing itself can be judged by comparing the rates in the table with the figure 257, which the Bureau of the Census in 1946 gave as the approximate number of children under 5 required for replacement.[10]

Another census table of the same date, however, adapted below as Table 7, indicates that differential fertility of the accustomed type still prevailed among women of different educational levels.

TABLE 7

NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS OLD PER 1,000 WOMEN 15 TO 49 YEARS OLD, STANDARDIZED FOR AGE OF WOMEN, BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED AND MARITAL STATUS OF WOMEN: UNITED STATES, 1947*

Years of School Completed	All Marital Classes Children under 5 years old per 1,000 women	Married, Husband Present Children under 5 years old per 1,000 women
Total	367	526
Grade school:		
Less than 5 years	508	718
5 and 6 years	477	661
7 and 8 years	422	572
High School		
1 to 3 years	396	535
4 years	323	465
College:		
1 to 3 years	306	482
4 years or more	271	446

* Adapted from Bureau of the Census, "Fertility: April, 1947," *Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 18, p. 6, Table 5.

10 Bureau of the Census, "Differential Fertility: June, 1946," *Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 8, p. 8.

If the upper classes in the Western world resume the below-replacement rate of net reproduction customary before World War II, further vertical mobility will evidently be inevitable if the upper classes are to continue to exist. Moreover, as we have already pointed out, the factors of individual competence and competition necessarily tend to stimulate some exchange of members among classes. The highest degree of efficiency in the organization and functioning of any society requires that competition be free enough to assign individuals to the tasks for which they are best fitted, regardless of their class origins. In view of these facts and principles, it is valid to regard vertical mobility as an essential part of normal social dynamics, and to seek to develop more effective and democratic institutions for the selection and preparation of young people for the roles they should play. At the same time, the rule of efficiency requires that the net reproduction rate should never favor either the biologically or the socially less fit, but always the reverse. This requires the development of more refined and objective standards for judging biological quality, which is now accepted as clearly inferior only in such extreme cases as the feeble-minded. It also calls for a major and sustained effort on the part of a society to revise its economy in such a way that, in so far as possible, all of its children will have proper physical care and nutrition and equal opportunities for cultural and occupational training in its educational institutions. Devices are needed to induce and enable families that are regarded as inferior in heredity, culture, or earning capacity to produce less than their quota of children, and families regarded as superior to bear more than their quota. European governments have tried several methods to increase the birth rate of the middle and upper classes without much success, perhaps because the benefits allowed per child were too low.

Occupational Changes in the United States.—We have seen that one of the most important determiners of the role and status of an individual in a society is the occupation he follows. For this reason, the changes in the occupational patterns of the population of the United States that have been taking place

over the last hundred years is of the greatest interest and significance (Figure 7). The proportion of males sixteen years of age and over gainfully employed fluctuated around 90 per cent between 1870 and 1930, but for the same age group of females the corresponding percentage increased from 14.8 in 1870 to 20.6 in 1930. In 1940, the Bureau of the Census changed the category from "gainfully employed" to "in the labor force," which is not comparable. In 1940, some 82.6 per cent of all males and 26.6 per cent of all females 16 years old



FIG. 7.—Shifts in occupations, 1870-1930. Percentage of all persons over 16 years of age engaged in each major group of occupations. (U.S. Department of Agriculture, B.A.E.)

and over were counted in the labor force. In 1948, the labor force included some 22 per cent of all females 14 years old and over who were married and living with their husbands, as compared with about 15 per cent in 1940.[11] Obviously, more single and married women are now working for wages outside the home than formerly. Another major trend appears in the proportion of children between ten and fifteen years of age gainfully occupied, the figure having dropped from 18.1 per cent in 1890 to 4.7 per cent in 1930. These children have, of course, been shifted as a group from the ranks of labor to the school.

[11] Bureau of the Census, "*Marital and Family Characteristics of the Labor Force in the United States: April, 1948*," *Population Reports*, Series P-50, No. 11, p. 9, Table 1.

With reference to the chief occupations it appears that, between 1820 and 1930,[12] the number employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing declined from 72 to 21 per cent of all gainful workers 10 years of age and over; those engaged in industry rose from 12 to 31 per cent; those in commerce from 2 or 3 to 21 per cent; those in clerical service from less than 1 per cent to 8 per cent; those in professional service from 2.8 to 6.5 per cent; and those in public service from practically nothing to 1.4 per cent. At the same time, those in domestic and personal service remained almost stationary at 10 to 11 per cent.[13] Within these broad categories, Table 8 shows some of the more specific changes that have occurred since 1850:

TABLE 8

NUMBERS OF EMPLOYEES PER MILLION OF POPULATION, UNITED STATES, 1850 AND 1930*

	1850	1930
Bakers	615	1,147
Blacksmiths	4,308	1,013
Harness and saddle workers	982	62
Iron and steel workers	528	6,731
Machinists	1,039	5,215
Plumbers	81	1,937
Textile workers	1,925	7,796
Chauffeurs		7,920
Locomotive engineers and firemen	202	9,110
Clergymen	1,157	1,212
Dentists	126	579
Lawyers, etc.	1,032	1,308
Physicians and surgeons	1,757	1,253
Chemists, etc.	20	302
Barbers, Hairdressers, etc.	259	3,049

* From "Occupational Changes since 1850, as Shown by Census Reports," *Monthly Labor Review*, XXXVII, No. 5 (1933), 1017-27.

During the century under review, the status rank-order of the major occupational groups probably has not been altered. Nevertheless, the social distance between some of the categories has apparently diminished, particularly between skilled laborers,

12 No comprehensive comparable data are available for a later date.
13 Landis, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

business proprietors, and professionals. The economic position of women, although still clearly subordinate to that of men, has become much more independent, so that the average woman is no longer obliged to marry for support. The rise of great manufacturing and commercial corporations, each employing thousands of workers of many skills and grades, has ushered in an age of labor unions, strikes, and group bargaining, wherein the old relationship of employer and employee has been fundamentally altered in favor of the latter. Moreover, within these labor unions, important new alignments of interests are taking place which are helping to reconcile the animosities of racial and other minority groups because they join in the common cause of labor against capital and management. Altogether, therefore, the deep-seated trends that have been occurring in the economic order of Western society have included significant changes in many of the social roles, values, and class relationships that formerly existed within the society.

Class Trends in the United States.—Some sociologists believe that vertical mobility is gradually diminishing in the United States. For example, Hiller writes, "It appears that these stratifications are becoming more rigorous, insofar as there is less rising from the ranks than there was a generation ago, because the handicaps are too great in competition with those who inherit fortunes. To this extent class lines are becoming more rigid and ascent is more restricted."[14] In the opinion of the present writer, however, no adequate measurement of the trend in vertical mobility has been made, so that statements like the above are largely impressionistic.

QUESTIONS

1. How do some people come to be in one class, some in another? Give actual examples, if you can.
2. Does the American Indian fall within the class system of the larger population of the United States? If so, how is he distributed with reference to it?

[14] E. T. Hiller, *Social Relations and Structures* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), pp. 618-19.

3. With what socioeconomic factors is the differential birth rate chiefly associated in Western society?
4. What are the present trends in the differential birth rate in the United States, and how far are they expected to go?
5. Does the natural perpetuation of a socioeconomic class depend solely on its birth rate? Explain.
6. Discuss and illustrate the meaning of the net reproduction rate. Why does a population not always actually decline when the net reproduction rate falls below one hundred?
7. Compare the net reproduction rates of the several broad occupational classes in the United States.
8. Discuss some of the probable biological, social, and economic consequences of the existing net reproduction rates. Which of these do you consider proven?
9. What, if anything, can be done by a government to alter the differential net reproduction rate? By what criteria or principles should such efforts be guided?
10. What changes, if any, have occurred in the proportion of the population gainfully employed, by age and sex, since 1870?
11. Describe the chief occupational shifts in the United States since 1820.
12. What, if anything, has happened to the relative status of the major occupations over the same period?
13. Is there any class trend in this country? Illustrate.

REFERENCES

Cox, Oliver C. *Caste, Class and Race.* New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1948.

Edwards, Alba M. *Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940.* Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, 1943.

Hiller, E. T. *Social Relations and Structures.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, chaps. xxx-xxxvii.

Kroeber, A. L. "Caste," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 111, pp. 254-56.

Landis, Paul H. *Population Problems.* New York: American Book Co., 1943, chaps. vii-x.

Lorimer, Frank, and Osborn, Frederick. *Dynamics of Population,* Part I, chap. viii; Parts III and IV. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934.

McConnell, John W. *The Evolution of Social Classes.* Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *Social Mobility.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1927, chaps. i, ii, vi, and xiv, and Part III.

———. *Society, Culture, and Personality.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, chaps. xv, xxi, xxvii.

CHAPTER 9

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE

Vertical Mobility.—Very few societies have had completely closed classes, wherein no movement between classes, called *vertical mobility,* could take place. So fundamental is vertical mobility that Sorokin, a leading student of the subject, sees the church, school, family, and vocations not only as agencies for education, but also very definitely as agencies for selecting and distributing the members of a society into socioeconomic strata. This winnowing and sifting process is important, because it assigns people to those positions in life for which they are best fitted.

Present Western societies are distinguishd by a great amount of vertical mobility. This is especially true in the United States, where brothers are often scattered among very different occupations. Sorokin found that of the notables listed in *Who's Who in America* in 1922-23, nearly one-fourth were sons of farmers, 6 per cent sons of skilled laborers, and less than one-half of one per cent sons of unskilled laborers. These figures indicate considerable vertical mobility, but they also show that relatively few individuals move from the bottom to the top, even in this country. Rising or falling in the class structure is most frequent in times of crisis or rapid change, as in war and revolution, whether social, political, or economic. "In spite of the above-shown dispersion among different occupations, the 'hereditary' transmission of occupation still exists, and, on the average, it is still high enough. It is likely also that the father's occupation is still entered by children in greater proportion than any other." [1]

[1] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (New York, Harper & Bros., 1927 ed.), p. 438; See also pp. 207-8, 438, 440, 441, 466, 472. Sorokin's italics have been disregarded.

Although Sorokin wrote his book on vertical mobility a generation ago, it is still an excellent summary with reference to the contemporary United States and most of Europe. The broad principles he formulated have been supported by recent factual studies. One of the latest of these studies, by Richard Centers, deals with the urban occupations in this country and may be cited as an illustration. Center's findings

> . . . tend to lend reality to the claim that America is a land where extensive upward mobility can and does occur, since somewhat over a third of urban fathers beget sons who achieve higher occupational status than they themselves enjoy, but . . . it is equally correct . . . to say that nearly two-thirds of white American males have sons whose occupational status is either the same as or no better than their own. . . .
>
> Table [9] shows that sons of fathers in a given occupational stratum may be distributed over the entire occupational range, and this is, in fact, typically the case. There is an orderliness in the distribution, however, and typically fewer and fewer fathers of a given stratum have sons going into occupations other than their own as occupations recede in the occupational order from their own. Taking the occupation of the father as the point of reference in each case, it is typical for the son not to have differed in occupational placement very far in either direction . . . when the third line of Table [10] is examined, it is shown that . . . even though only about a third of the last generation's small business owners and managers had sons who were also small businessmen, these constitute over half of today's small businessmen. Somewhat the reverse situation obtains with respect to professional men. Whereas by Table [9] it is shown that 32 per cent of professional fathers had professional sons, Table [10] indicates that only 23 per cent of today's professional men were drawn from professional fathers.
>
> Table [10] indicates also that sons in a given occupational stratum tend to be drawn most heavily from fathers in the same or a closely contiguous stratum . . . but that sons are also characteristically drawn more heavily from certain strata than others. For example, whereas substantial proportions of sons in nearly every stratum had fathers whose occupation was skilled labor, comparatively small percentages of sons in other than the unskilled stratum had fathers who were unskilled,

TABLE 9

COMPARATIVE OCCUPATIONAL "INHERITANCE" IN VARIOUS URBAN OCCUPATIONAL STRATA

Occupational Stratum of Father	N	Per Cent Whose Sons Are of Various Occupational Strata								
		Large Business	Professional	Small Business	White Collar	Farm Owners or Mgrs.	Skilled Manual	Semi-skilled Manual	Farm Ten't or Laborer	Unskilled Manual
Large Business Owners & Mgrs.	16	*50*	19	6	25	—	—	—	—	—
Professional	41	15	*32*	17	10	5	12	5	2	2
Small Business Owners & Mgrs.	145	10	11	*32*	*24*	3	8	10	1	1
White Collar	77	8	9	10	*45*	6	9	7	1	5
Skilled Manual	190	6	6	8	17	4	*31*	20	1	7
Semiskilled	127	1	2	6	11	4	22	*43*	1	10
Unskilled	41	—	6	5	10	4	17	20	1	*37*

TABLE 10

OCCUPATIONAL ORIGINS OF A SAMPLE OF TODAY'S URBAN LABOR FORCE

Occupational Stratum of Son	N	Percentages Whose Fathers Are of Various Occupational Strata						
		Large Business	Profes-sional	Small Business	White Collar	Skilled Manual	Semi-Skilled Manual	Unskilled Manual
Large Business Owners & Mgrs.	46	*18*	13	30	13	*24*	1	—
Professional	57	5	*23*	28	13	21	5	5
Small Business Owners & Mgrs.	87	2	8	*53*	9	18	8	2
White Collar	129	3	3	27	*27*	*26*	11	3
Skilled Manual	116	—	4	10	6	*50*	24	6
Semiskilled	122	—	2	11	4	31	*45*	7
Unskilled	48	—	2	2	8	29	28	*31*

and likewise few sons in any stratum had fathers in either the large business, the professional or the white collar strata.[2]

The chief avenues of social ascent in the United States are a college education and the winning of wealth. In 1940, nearly 16 per cent of the population 18 to 21 years of age was enrolled in colleges and universities, compared with only 4 per cent in 1900. The number of boys in the typical American community who indicate a desire to enter the higher professions is considerably in excess of the need. Many students who spend some time in obtaining the educational training required for such a profession as the law fail to achieve their ambition and are later found working in a variety of occupations carrying less social prestige. The white-collar occupations in general, including the lower clerical jobs, have been overcrowded in recent decades, compared with low status occupations like farm labor, domestic service, and the like. This trend has gone so far that the demand for workers in the manual trades, together with the increasingly effective organization of labor in the boom period following the second World War, has resulted in striking boosts in wage rates of manual workers. Table 11, based on Maryland data, furnishes some evidence that many youths now favor skilled trades over clerical work.

The Social Climber.—Members of a given class are recognizable to one another and to other classes by their conformity to the customs and symbols of their class. These may include dress, material possessions, preferred occupations, manners, language, enunciation, education, place of residence, religion, size of family, knowledge of fine wines, and so on. Since membership in a class goes far to determine life opportunities of every kind, a person who belongs to a favored class cannot afford to have the fact doubted and suffer denial of the benefits that go with it. People who are born into a class and have moved in it all of their lives usually have to worry only about maintaining enough income to stay in it. Those families who

[2] Richard Centers, "Occupational Mobility of Urban Occupational Strata," *American Sociological Review*, XIII, No. 2 (1948), 197-203. See also P. E. Davidson and H. D. Anderson, *Occupational Mobility in an American Community* (Stanford University, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1937), J. W. Taussig and C. S. Joslyn, *American Business Leaders* (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1932).

TABLE 11

ACTUAL AND PREFERRED OCCUPATIONS OF 5,143 EMPLOYED YOUTHS IN MARYLAND.*

Occupational Field	Percentage of Youths	
	Desiring Specific Field	Employed in Specific Field
Professional-technical	38.3	7.5
Managerial	9.1	4.1
Office-sales	18.5	27.1
Skilled	18.2	4.3
Semiskilled	6.3	24.9
Unskilled	2.5	14.6
Domestic-personal	6.9	11.4
Relief project	0.2	5.9
Other		0.2
Youths reporting	100.0	100.0

* Howard M. Bell, *Youth Tell Their Story* (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1938), p. 132, Table 8.

are trying to gain admission to an upper class, however, are seldom able to acquire all of the characteristics and peculiarities of the class above them. They are likely to be more anxious about such matters than are the old upper-class families who, in their security, may become rather careless. Indeed, poverty may even become a badge of aristocracy, as happened in the South after the Civil War when the large planters and slave-owning landed gentry were universally ruined, and the newly prosperous families usually came from the merchant, small farm, and artisan classes.

In many societies, the highest social status is accorded to persons with an ancestor, preferably a remote ancestor who generations and perhaps centuries ago lifted himself, his family, and his descendants into the top class. Contemporary individuals who possess the ability or have the good fortune to achieve high social position may be grudgingly accepted as upstarts, or at best be regarded as somewhat contaminated by their humble origin. This can be explained in terms of the usual in- and out-

group attitudes, since a person who enters one class from another cannot be separated entirely from the prejudices felt by the class which he has joined against the class from which he has come. This prejudice is increased by the natural resistance of an upper class to invasion from below, which is felt as a threat to the security and monopoly of privilege enjoyed by its members.

Since birth and family are the surest claim to upper-class status, it is easy to understand why in most aristocracies so much emphasis has been placed upon family. With this inevitably goes the upper-class ideology that "blood" counts for everything, and that the members of the upper classes are biologically superior to the members of the lower classes and hold their position and benefits by virtue of the laws of nature itself.

A person who is intent on rising from a lower class to a higher because of social ambition and desire for status is often referred to as a "social climber." Some of the tactics used by "climbers" who aspire to break into the "Four Hundred" in Chicago are described by Zorbaugh:

> Without the exclusive citadels of the Four Hundred is always a throng seeking to push its way in. The "social game" has created a new social type, the "climber." The wiles of the "climber" are many and obvious. The most obvious step up is a brilliant marriage; but this route is open only to men. The majority of climbers seek to buy their way into society not openly, to be sure, but tactfully and insidiously, in the name of charity. Many "climb," too, by clever stage management taking up a titled foreign *emigré*, the writer of a best seller, or the latest sensation at the opera and making him the rage for a season. The ability to contrive a brilliant *salon*, with a celebrity or two, and a few of "just the right people" as drawing cards has accomplished more than one social triumph. Finally, there are occasional knights errant of "society," like the celebrated Ward McAllister of a generation ago, who achieve success by sheer force of personality. Whatever route the climber elects to travel, a long and carefully planned campaign is required.
>
> For example, Mrs. John Jones has social ambitions. She is the wife of a man who has made his fortune in the Northwest in lumber. She moves her family to Chicago. By applying, can she get her name in the *Social Register*? No one in the family is employed. The family name is above reproach—after all, a certain romance attaches to lumber.

But no—she first has to be accepted socially. She must, as it is vulgarly put, "climb"! Now there are, of the six thousand who have their names in the *Social Register,* some two hundred, or perhaps three hundred, who form the "top layer"; and of these three hundred there are a dozen who are the "elite." Mrs. Jones's problem is to secure an invitation to dinner in one or more of the homes of the "top layer" surely; of the "elite" if possible. But Mrs. Jones cannot accomplish this by inviting them first to her home; her invitation would go pointedly unanswered.

One Mrs. Jones, from an eastern manufacturing city, took apartments at one of the fashionable drive hotels. Her little girl got acquainted about the hotel with the little girls of mothers whose names appear in the *Social Register.* Then she gave her little girl a birthday party to which these other little girls were invited. Their mothers then felt under obligation to her. She was invited to a tea, to a dance, and finally to a dinner. Then she had arrived. An invitation to a political meeting or a wedding means nothing but opportunities. An invitation to tea is a first step. Then follow a dance, a luncheon, and finally a dinner, which is equivalent to a certificate of social acceptance and the smaller the dinner, the more enviable the certificate.

More commonly, however, the ambitious climb by the "pet charity" route. For each of the socially prominent has her "pet" charity, or her "pet" political or social movement. Mrs. Van Derfelt has at her home an afternoon meeting of the Democratic Women's Committee. Mrs. Jones is at the meeting. Afterward she goes up to Mrs. Van Derfelt; "Oh, Mrs. Van Derfelt, I've just heard about your interest in the Home for Crippled Children, and what a wonderful work it is doing. May I not contribute a little something?" Mrs. Van Derfelt then feels more or less obliged to invite Mrs. Jones to tea. The game goes on. And if Mrs. Jones plays her cards well, next year her name will be seen in the *Social Register.*

Still another wile of the climber is that of sending her children to a fashionable school, where they get acquainted with the children of the Four Hundred. Through the children the parents meet, and the first step is taken.

The successful "climber" is an artist in self-advertisement, in getting and keeping her name in the society columns, in associating herself with just the "right" people and just the "right" things.

The "social game," whether that of getting in, or of staying in, requires a continual planning, maneuvering, reciprocation of invitations, effort to keep in the swim. . . .[3]

[3] Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 51-53.

Horizontal Mobility.—The relationships and organization of any society are considerably affected by the amount of movement from one place to another, or *horizontal mobility,* which occurs within it. The major purpose of migration is to improve the economic and social condition of the migrants; it is therefore one means of shifting from one class level to another. In other words, horizontal mobility is, in part, an aspect of vertical mobility and as such often has an important bearing on class origins. In the United States, a large proportion of the families of wealth and position were founded by men who only two or three generations ago left the farm to make their fortune in the city. If they had remained in the rural hinterland they could not have achieved such an improvement in status.

The most spectacular migrations of early history were armed invasions, in which one people settled by force in the country of another people of equal or superior culture, e.g., the Goths in Rome, the Franks in Gaul, the Normans in England. A second important historical type of migration is colonization, as of parts of North America by the British. In all of these cases, the natives for the most part were violently dispossessed of their land by the newcomers, who represented a more advanced culture.

Recent long-range migration, however, has been a peaceful movement of people of one nationality into the territory of another nationality. Immigrants of many nationalities have come into the United States as individuals or families, rather than as tribes or peoples. This long-continued immigration has had some far-reaching effects on vertical mobility, and on many other forms of social relationships in our country.

Immigration to the United States.—About 35 million immigrants are estimated to have come to the United States between 1820 and 1925. The volume of arrivals increased from about 8,000 in 1820 to 1,285,000 in 1907, declined sharply during World War I, and was rapidly increasing again in 1924, when rigorous restrictive quotas were established. Prior to 1890, the mass of immigrants came from northern and western Europe. By 1890, however, nearly a third of all immigrants were from southern and eastern Europe, especially Italy, Austria-Hungary,

and Russia. In 1910, the immigrants from northern and western Europe were outnumbered 5 to 1 by those from southern and eastern Europe.

Until about 1830 immigrants were encouraged and welcomed by the Americans, because of the need for a larger population to exploit the natural resources of the young republic. As the volume of immigrants continued to swell, however, problems of poverty, city slums, and crime became more and more serious. After 1825, "Nativist" agitation and movements appeared in New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and elsewhere. By 1852 there were 25,000 Chinese on the Pacific Coast, and thirty years later a temporary act was passed by Congress to exclude Chinese laborers, an act which was made permanent in 1904. The Japanese appeared on the West Coast in large numbers after 1900, but the influx was checked by a "Gentleman's Agreement" with Japan.

The time finally came when it was generally believed that the population of the United States had caught up with its natural resources. The era of free land had passed, and a sense of crowding was beginning to be felt. In spite of this situation, the volume of immigration, chiefly from southern and eastern Europe, again expanded to enormous proportions in the early 1920's. Congress then conceived the idea of a percentage quota for limiting immigration, and after 1927 only 150,000 admissions a year from Europe were permitted, apportioned according to the national origins of the total population in the 1920 census. This limited immigration was intended to favor northern Europeans, as the following quotation shows:

> . . . according to the estimates which were made for the purpose of determining the immigration quotas from different . . . countries . . . 45 per cent of the total white stock in the United States is derived from Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 11 per cent from that part of Ireland now constituting the Irish Free State, and 17 per cent from Germany as at present constituted [1936], making a total of 68.9 per cent from these three countries. No other country has contributed as much as 5 per cent to the total.[4]

[4] Joseph A. Hill, "Composition of the American Population by Race and Country of Origin," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CLXXXVIII (1936), 183-84.

In response to strong pressure from the Pacific Coast, where the Japanese were acquiring land holdings and were reproducing rapidly, the Immigration Act of 1924 also excluded all aliens "ineligible to citizenship in the United States," a clause designed to put a complete and permanent end to Japanese immigration.

During the business depression of the early 1930's, there was actually a net immigration from the United States. Since 1936 there has been a small annual excess of admissions over departures, averaging about 30,000 a year until 1946, when the figure rose to 90,578.

Some Consequences of Immigration.—Although immigration hastened the growth of population in the United States, experts believe that it will have little effect on the level at which the population may tend to become stabilized.

A vast majority of our foreign immigrants have been unskilled laborers. They did much of the heavy physical work of a fast developing nation. The immigrants depressed the average efficiency of labor for a considerable period, and perhaps delayed the invention and development of labor-saving machinery. The effect of immigration was apparently to lower wages, or at least to prevent them from rising as much as they otherwise might have done. Unrestricted immigration was never a significant cause of business depressions, although it probably served somewhat to aggravate them. That immigration was long a serious obstacle to the organization of labor, however, is generally conceded.

According to a report of the Immigration Commission, made in 1908-11 and later reaffirmed, "no satisfactory evidence has yet been produced to show that immigration has resulted in an increase in crime disproportionate to the increase in adult population. Such comparable statistics of crime and population as it has been possible to obtain indicate that the immigrants are less prone to commit crimes than are native Americans." Similarly, the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement found in 1931 that "there is insufficient information available to warrant any deductions as to criminal activity

among the native born of foreign parentage as compared with those of native parentage." [5]

At least a third of the immigrants from southeastern Europe have been illiterate. In this country, however, this handicap was quickly overcome by their children, who apparently reduced the ratio of illiteracy below that prevailing among the children of native white parentage.

The enormous inpouring of impoverished peoples undoubtedly increased the proportion of the poor, but it also tended to increase vertical mobility among the native whites, as many of the latter rose to higher economic and social levels on the backs of the foreigners. In the same way, the new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe displaced the older immigrants of "Nordic" stock at the bottom of the social scale, and many of the former, after a few generations, found their way out of the slums and became more or less merged with the Americans of colonial British origins. The slum-dwelling foreigners, however, although proportionately reduced, still form the lowest stratum of white American society. The religious and other differences between some of the immigrant groups and the native white Americans have magnified the size and importance of white minority groups like the Jews, which are segregated at varying degrees of social distance from the rest of the society.

Internal Migration.—It is well known that from colonial times to World War I there was a flow of population toward the new lands of the West. Before 1880 much of the population of rural New England had been drained off by this movement. After the settlement of Oklahoma was complete in 1910, and the rush to the ranges to grow wheat following the first World War was halted by declining prices and drought, the westward push was greatly reduced. Migration, especially with reference to southern Negroes, tended to be toward the great industrial cities of the Northeast and Middle West. But there has still remained a considerable migrational drift from the Middle West and elsewhere to the Pacific Coast, especially after

[5] Arthur Evans Wood and John Barker Waite, *Crime and Its Treatment* (New York: American Book Co., 1941), pp. 240-46; Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1947*, p. 106.

1940. By 1940, nearly a fourth of the population was living outside its native state.

The chief origin of these internal migrants has been the rural areas of the nation, especially the rural areas of the southern states. So great was the movement away from farms between 1920 and 1930 that in two of every three states the rural-farm population actually declined. The depression of the 1930's caused a shrinkage in the tide flowing from farm to city, and there was a short-lived trek by many of the unemployed from the city to the farm, followed by a tendency to seek the suburbs of cities:

> The population in the territory adjacent to the central cities of the metropolitan areas increased twice as rapidly as that in the central cities themselves." In 1933 over a million homeless transients, unattached young men and family groups, the latter dubbed "Okies" and "Arkies" from their southwest origin, were drifting from place to place in search of employment. Between 1935 and 1940, 12 per cent of the population changed residence from one county to another, and about 5 per cent crossed state boundaries. From April, 1940 to January, 1946, the total farm population again decreased by about 15 per cent. "It is safe to say that, with the exception of a few southern cities, a large share of the population of all large cities (ranging from 30 to 80 per cent for the individual cities) was born elsewhere. . . ." [6]

The effects of the endless stream of rural migrants upon the folkways of the cities, and upon urban class turnover, must be very great, although it has not been much studied.

Selective Migration.—Many more women than men are involved in the farm-to-city migration, and there is also a selection by age. A disproportionate percentage of farm boys and girls 10 to 20 years old leave the farm, so that our farm population has more children and fewer adults under 50 years of age than the urban population. A much smaller proportion of those 20 to 50 years of age migrate to the city. Among older people, especially elderly women, however, the rate of migration from farms again rises sharply.[7] Another striking fact is that those

[6] National Resources Committee, *The Problems of a Changing Population* (Washington, D. C.: 1938), Chap. iii.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

who seek a career in the cities have more schooling than those who remain in agriculture. This undoubtedly has more serious social consequences than any possible deterioration of the biological stock in the rural areas which may result from this selective urban migration.[8]

TABLE 12

MIGRANTS WHO MOVED FROM ONE COUNTY TO ANOTHER, UNITED STATES, 1935 TO 1940, BY AGE *

Age	Per Cent
5 to 13 years	12.4
14 to 17 years	10.4
18 to 19 years	13.4
20 to 24 years	18.1
25 to 29 years	19.8
30 to 34 years	17.8
35 to 44 years	13.5
45 to 54 years	9.7
55 to 64 years	8.0
65 years and over	6.9

* Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940: *Population, Internal Migration 1935 to 1940: Age of Migrants*, p. 24.

An interesting study of one aspect of the selective nature of rural-urban migration was made by Gist and Clark. Standard intelligence tests had been given to high school students in rural communities scattered over the state of Kansas in 1922-23. "In 1935, approximately thirteen years after the tests were given, steps were taken to secure further information on as many as possible of the individuals originally tested, the chief purpose being to ascertain which of them had migrated to cities and which had remained in rural communities. . . ." Of those who were still living in rural areas in 1935 the mean I.Q. was 94.78 ± 0.19, while of those who were living in urban communities it was 98.26 ± 0.25. The difference here could not be due to chance. Within the rural group, the nonfarm group had an I.Q. of 96.14, the farm group of 93.38. Within the city group, the mean I.Q. of the individuals living in the largest cities was 99.31, in the second largest cities 98.16, and in the

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

smallest cities 97.02. "The foregoing data show a tendency for the intelligence quotients to be graduated upward as the size of the community increases . . . if the country is losing to the city a disproportionate number of those from the upper I.Q. range, as appears from this study to be the case, such selection does not necessarily have any genetic significance. . . . On the other hand, it is entirely possible that the traditional conservatism of the country, the lack of effective rural organization in many areas, and the shortage of qualified leaders may be in part the consequence of selective migrations." [9]

Causes of Migration.—Broadly speaking, the reason for almost all voluntary migration is the simple fact that the "place to" seems more attractive than the "place from." Sometimes escape from restraint, persecution, or ways of life and government that are not congenial is sought. To some extent, it is the lure of adventure and the unknown. But the main cause of migration is economic. Usually, people believe that a new locale offers an opportunity for economic betterment. Stouffer has formulated a theory to the effect that "the number of persons going a given distance is directly proportional to the number of opportunities at that distance and inversely proportional to the number of intervening opportunities." [10] The *Report of the Committee on Population Problems to the National Resources Committee* in 1938 said, "During the 'twenties migrants for the most part were finding their way to places of greater economic opportunity. With some exceptions, the less favorable lands lost population to the more favorable; the least prosperous communities, chiefly agricultural, lost persons to the most prosperous communities, largely urban and industrial. . . ." [11]

Internal Migration and Rural Areas.—From the point of view of the farm people and of the nation, migration from the farm to the city is, of course, necessary to prevent population congestion and economic depression in rural areas. Neverthe-

[9] Noel P. Gist and Carroll D. Clark, "Intelligence as a Selective Factor in Rural-Urban Migrations," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV, No. 1 (1938), 38, 50, 57, 58.

[10] S. A. Stouffer, "Intervening Opportunities: A Theory Relating Mobility and Distance," *American Sociological Review*, V, No. 6 (1940), 846.

[11] National Resources Committee, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

less, it is also evident that the constant process of rearing and exporting half or more of its young people places a very severe burden upon the rural community.[12] Baker estimated what the loss of this manpower meant to rural areas for the decade 1920-30:

> The cost of the contribution which the farming people have made to the productivity and prosperity of the cities, suburbs, and villages is greater than is commonly recognized. If it costs $2000 to $2500 . . . to rear and educate the average child on American farms to the age of 15, when he may be assumed to be self-supporting,—and $150 a year does not seem an excessive estimate of the cost of food, clothing, medical services, education, and all the incidental expenses—then the 6,300,000 net migration from the farms during the decade 1920-1930 represents a contribution of about $14,000,000,000. This contribution is almost equal to the value of the wheat crops plus half that of the cotton crops during these years.
>
> Nor is this all. When the farmer and his wife grow old and die, the estate is divided among the children. During the decade 1920-1930, about one-fifth of the farmers and their wives died, and their estates were distributed among the children. One-third or more of the children had moved to town, and many of those children who remained on the farm had to mortgage it in many cases to pay the brothers and sisters who lived in the cities their share of the estate. A rough estimate indicates that between $3,000,000,000 and $4,000,000,000 was drained from the farms to the cities and villages during the decade 1920-1930 incident to the settlement of estates.[13]

Although the latest available figures show that the net farm emigration from 1940 through 1947 was only 3,200,000, compared with 6,300,000 for 1920-30, the earlier dollar values need some upping, and revised estimates would be impressive for the later periods also.

Mobility and the Stranger.—The presence of the stranger in a community is, of course, a consequence of migration. He has been regarded as both an interesting and important person, and has been considerably discussed by sociological writers

[12] Paul H. Landis, *Population Problems* (New York, American Book Co., 1943), p. 437.

[13] O. E. Baker, "The Outlook for Rural Youth," *U. S. Department of Agriculture Extension Service Circular 223* (Washington, D. C.: 1935).

like George Simmel and Werner Sombart. From their point of view, the chief peculiarity of the stranger is his relative freedom from many of the conventions of the community, and the foreign ideas that he brings with him from the outside. Some mystery is therefore often attached to him. When he does not intend to become a permanent settler, his relationships with the community are detached and impersonal.

The itinerant peddler or trader, especially if he is of a different nationality, most nearly fits the above conception of the stranger. Members of segregated and minority groups, like the gypsy or the foreign-born Jew, also approximate it. Indeed, clearly marked native-born minorities like some Jews and Asiatics, may, to a less extent, be included under the category of the sociological stranger. Such people are not expected to understand or abide by all of the local folkways and mores, and so they are able to do things that would not be tolerated in a native. For this reason they can perform economic services which require ruthlessly impersonal methods contrary to the mores of the community, like the lending of money at very high interest rates. Since such kinds of strangers have no class status in the community anyway, they stand to lose none by engaging in occupations that are regarded as completely disreputable, such as rag-picking and junk-buying. In this way, they are able to gain a livelihood in the community. If they are successful in making money, they can later build themselves or their children up to the point where they have some recognized standing and acceptance in the society, should they choose to remain and become a part of it.[14]

The above ideas may seem more applicable to smaller communities, where relations are largely primary. In great cities, secondary or impersonal attitudes are so much the rule toward everyone outside one's own social circle that most members of the majority group itself have no primary sentiments toward one another. Actually, however, each class in the city has its standards and criteria of conduct and respectability. At the top level, even the wealthy meat packer is looked on with less favor than

[14] Floyd N. House, *The Range of Social Theory* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1929), pp. 180-81.

say the manufacturer of Pullman coaches, and no one above the lowest level could conduct a pawnshop without serious loss of status in his own class. So even in the city there are roles, often profitable ones, that are largely left to the stranger, in the sociological sense as a class.

The Class Struggle.—We have now discussed both social stratification and its opposite, social mobility, with emphasis on the processes and forces associated with the movement of persons from one social and economic level to another. We cannot properly leave the subject of social classes, however, without giving some attention to what has been called the *class struggle.* This term has been dramatized through the writings of Karl Marx and many of his followers as a basic conflict between the upper and the lower classes of capitalistic society, tending to a bloody world proletarian revolution. The great social upheavals of history, such as in France and especially in Russia, have helped to give the words a sinister and foreboding meaning to the average American.

As a matter of fact, the Marxists themselves have never offered a definition of the class struggle objective enough to enable a careful social scientist to know whether such a phenomenon is present or absent in any particular society. As a result, in a recent attempt to examine the concept of class struggle in several different societies, Moore found it necessary to begin with a definition of his own:

> In order to give the Marxists the benefit of any doubt concerning the existence of a class struggle, a society is considered to manifest such a struggle when the data report the existence of hostility, expressed in actual behavior including at least occasional violence and not mere verbal symbols. . . .[15]

Since the class struggle, so defined, clearly is not characteristic of all stratified societies, Moore tried to discover the conditions under which it does occur. Examination of ten literate and ten preliterate societies, chosen as roughly representative of stratified societies throughout the world, seemed to show

[15] B. Moore, Jr., "A Comparative Analysis of the Class Struggle," *American Sociological Review,* X, No. 1 (1945), 31-37.

that the class struggle was absent from the societies which had a stable economy, i.e., where there was little change in the distribution of economic goods and in methods of production for a generation or more. Also a class struggle was rarely observed outside of literate societies. Finally, there appeared to be little correlation between the amount of vertical mobility that existed between strata and the presence of class struggle. Moore said further:

> While the preceding conclusions are highly tentative, it may not be out of place to mention some of their applications to modern society. It is clear that some form of struggle between the various strata of society is widespread and likely to continue so long as fluctuations occur in the economic structure. Since it is highly unlikely that the impact of new technological inventions has run its course throughout the world, especially in the Orient, it is safe to estimate that these fluctuations will continue for some time to come. . . .
>
> This will necessitate on the part of Western society a continued and rapid evolution of those institutions which resolve the internal tensions resulting from the struggle between social strata. We have already seen from the case of Indian society one way in which other cultural factors may modify the struggle between social strata. However, it is unlikely that Western society will develop along these lines. It is more likely that there will be a growth of mores and institutions governing the relations between social strata and between economic pressure groups such as industrial labor, agricultural workers, and entrepreneurs —to mention only a few—that will keep the antagonisms within the bounds of cooperation . . .[16]

Moore's failure to apply any statistical tests to his results justifies his warning that his "conclusions are highly tentative." They appear, however, to be consistent with the principle that conflict tends to occur between the classes whenever the lower class, for any reason, believes that it is getting less than its proper share of the comforts and privileges of life, and that the upper class or its institutions are to blame. Furthermore, the lower class must feel that successful resistance is possible and that it is right and desirable to resort to violence to correct matters. Poverty alone, therefore, without discontent, hope, and directed hostility, does not lead to class conflict. But if

[16] *Ibid.*

some change in the economy of a society results in a lower (absolute or relative) level of living for the proletariat, the latter is likely to feel that its rights have been violated, to become dissatisfied, and to look for reasons. If the real explanation is complex, as it usually is, the upper class, whether responsible or not, easily becomes the object of suspicion and resentment.

It may seem surprising that Moore found little relationship between class conflict and the presence or absence of vertical mobility in a society. This is no doubt because individual initiative results merely in some members rising out of the proletarian class, but has no effect on the condition of the masses who remain behind.

Both our discussion and the factual study cited lead to the inference drawn by Moore, that the prevention of class conflict lies in institutions for avoiding or settling the disputes that arise between the classes before resort to force or revolution seems necessary. These devices have, of course, already appeared in the form of labor unions and employers' associations to represent the two classes in discussions, with the government itself as final judge and arbiter, the latter in theory acting impartially in the interest of justice to both sides and to the public at large.

Inasmuch as the organization of a society for economic purposes, like organization for any other purpose, is fundamentally a cooperative and competitive process, it follows that society's economic disorders can be cured only by more or better cooperation and competition. To introduce conflict is to change the nature or purpose of the organization, and hence to disrupt or dissolve it. If conflict is resorted to, it must by definition damage one group or another, or both groups, which contribute toward the working of the organization. In doing so, it further damages the organization which was in need of improvement. If conflict enters, there must be a return to cooperation, first to restore the damage done, and then to correct the original trouble. The use of conflict between classes can therefore be helpful only when one class or both classes refuse to cooperate effectively until the argument of force or violence is applied.

This is evidently an unintelligent argument for at least one of the classes under any conditions. It is especially so if the class that is in the wrong happens also to be the stronger, when conflict may lead to the imposition of worse conditions and less efficiency than before. It is a function of the over-all organization of any society to try to provide against the occurrence of conflict between its classes through government refereeship and enforcement of official rulings in disputes that cannot be peacefully settled otherwise.

QUESTIONS

1. How important is a screening process to select people for high places?
2. What part do institutions like the family, school, and occupation play in relation to social mobility?
3. Discuss and illustrate at some length the frequency and range of vertical mobility in the United States, according to Centers.
4. Give examples of how war, revolution, and great inventions increase vertical mobility.
5. From 4, above, would you expect a more stable class structure in a peaceful primitive society, or in the England of the Industrial Revolution?
6. What are the two chief methods by which social status may be improved in the United States?
7. Does the social distance between the white collar occupations and skilled labor seem to be increasing or decreasing? Explain.
8. What is meant by upper class ritual, and why is it so much stressed?
9. Why are persons who have the ability and ambition to lift themselves into the upper class often looked at askance by the established aristocrats?
10. How is horizontal mobility related to vertical mobility? Explain and illustrate.
11. Sketch the history of immigration to the United States since 1820.
12. Summarize some of the economic and social consequences of immigration on the life and development of this country.

13. Describe the chief currents of internal migration in the United States.
14. In what ways is our rural-urban migration selective?
15. Describe some of the effects of rural-urban migration on rural areas and on cities.
16. What is the fundamental cause of migration? What are supplementary causes?
17. Discuss the stranger and his supposed role in the community.
18. What, broadly speaking, is the Marxian concept of the class struggle?
19. How does Moore define the class struggle in order to test its presence or absence in a society?
20. What are the two chief hypotheses that Moore tries to test, and what are his findings and conclusions regarding them?
21. What is meant by "stability of the economic structure" in our society?
22. Can you cite specific evidence of a class struggle in this country now?
23. Why did Moore find little relationship between the class struggle and social mobility in the societies he studied?
24. What important applications to modern society did Moore draw from his study?
25. What relation is there between misery and class struggle? Can you account for this?
26. What logical case can be made for introducing conflict into a cooperative organization?
27. Under what conditions, if any, is conflict necessary or justifiable within a society?

REFERENCES

ANDERSON, H. D., and DAVIDSON, P. E. *Ballots and the Democratic Class Struggle.* Stanford University, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1943.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. *International Migration, 1935 to 1940: Economic Characteristics of Migrants, 1946; Social Characteristics of Migrants, 1946; Age of Migrants, 1946; Color and Sex of Migrants, 1943.*

DAVIDSON, P. E., and ANDERSON, H. D. *Occupational Mobility in an American Community.* Stanford University, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1937

GIST, NOEL P., PIHLBLAD, C. T., and GREGORY, CECIL L. *Selective Factors in Migration and Occupation.* Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri, 1943.

GOODRICH, CARTER, ALLIN, BUSHROD W., and HAYES, MARION. *Migration and Planes of Living,* 1920-1934. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1935.

HALL, FORD P. *Government and Business* (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939.

JENKS, JEREMIAH W., and LAUCK, W. JETT. *The Immigration Problem.* New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1912.

JEROME, HARRY. *Migrations and Business Cycles.* New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1926.

LANDIS, PAUL L. *Population Problems.* New York: American Book Co., 1943, Parts IV and V.

LIVELY, C. E., and TAEUBER, CONRAD, *Rural Migration in the United States.* Washington, D.C.: Works Progress Administration, Research Monograph XIX, 1939.

MOORE, WILBERT E. *Industrial Relations and the Social Order,* Parts V and VI. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946.

NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE. *The Problems of a Changing Population.* Washington, D.C.: 1938, Parts II and III.

PATTERSON, S. HOWARD. *Social Aspects of Industry.* (3rd. ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1943.

SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1942.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *Social Mobility.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1927.

SUMNER, WILLIAM GRAHAM. *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934.

TAUSSIG, J. W., and JOSLYN, C. S. *American Business Leaders.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932.

THORNTHWAITE, C. WARREN. *Internal Migration in the United States.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1934.

PART IV

SOCIAL SEGREGATION AND DEVIATION

CHAPTER 10

BIRACIAL STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED STATES [1]

The whole social and economic organization of a society may be influenced by the presence within it of two distinct racial groups, one of which, the "majority," occupies a position of relative advantage over the other, the "minority." This has been the case in the United States. There is no minority problem unless we describe a minority as a disadvantaged group that is regarded as "different," that is held in lesser esteem or dislike, that is not admitted to free and equal participation in the life and opportunities of the larger society about it, and because of this feels mistreated. The answer to the question of injustice which always arises in connection with this kind of relationship depends upon the extent to which the attitude of the majority toward the minority is colored with prejudice, and the extent to which discrimination is practiced against it. By prejudice is meant an attitude based on emotions that stem from irrelevant differences, misinformation, misinterpretation, or special interest. Discrimination is simply the overt expression of prejudice.

The broad principles underlying majority-minority relations were developed in Chapters 4 and 5. We shall therefore devote the present chapter to a more specific and detailed discussion of the changing social structure which exists between the white and the Negro, who is the outstanding example of a racial minority in the United States.

The General Situation.—It is well-known that Negroes in the United States, both in the North and in the South, have

[1] Adapted, by permission, from "The Negro," by T. C. McCormick, in *Problems of the Postwar World*, by T. C. McCormick (ed.), copyrighted, 1945. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.

long been growing more resentful of racial discrimination. The entrance of this country into two world wars within a generation as a defender of the democratic way of life caused Negro leaders to increase their demands for immediate equality with whites in economic employment, and the outlawing of other traditional inequalities.

Because of large migrations of colored people to northern cities in recent decades, the Negro is no longer confined to the South. It is certain that, even if the federal government were so inclined, any thoroughgoing attempt on its part to enforce equality for the Negro would meet with the opposition of the southern states, and it is not likely that Negro-white equality would have the political support of the rest of the nation. The inconsistencies and the difficulties of the situation are obvious. To give a better understanding of it, we shall survey the present position of the Negro, sketch the chief developments that have taken place, and consider some of the explanations and interpretations of this complex problem.

Numerical Importance of the Negro.[2]—In 1940, Negroes totaled nearly 13 millions, so that, if the nation's population were evenly distributed, about one person in every ten would be a Negro. In many counties of the southern states, however, three-fourths of the population are Negro, and occasional counties show a ratio of four Negroes to one white.

Negroes do not immigrate in appreciable numbers to this country, and therefore increase only by excess of births over deaths. Nevertheless, between the last two decennial censuses they added nearly one million to their numbers, a growth of a little more than 8 per cent. According to sample estimates by the United States Bureau of the Census, over the 5-year interval of 1935-40 whites had slightly higher net reproduction rates than nonwhites in cities (73.1 and 70.2 respectively); but the reproduction rates for nonwhites exceeded those for whites in villages and especially on farms (rural-farm: nonwhites 205.8, whites 157.2). Moreover, 33 per cent of nonwhites but only 22 per cent of whites lived on farms or in rural-farm territory.

[2] The statistics given in this section are drawn from the Sixteenth Census of the United States and from earlier censuses.

The result was to give all classes of nonwhites a mean net reproduction rate of 113.7 and all classes of whites a mean net reproduction rate of 95.7.

These figures mean that if the birth and death rates of 1935-40 and the present residential distribution of whites and nonwhites should continue as they now are, the time would come when each 100 girl babies in one generation of whites would be replaced by only 95.7 girl babies born in the next generation; whereas each 100 girl babies in one generation of nonwhites would be replaced by 113.7 in the next generation. Thus the whites would gradually decline in number and the nonwhites would increase. As a matter of record, however, the percentage of Negroes in the total population has fallen from 19 in 1810 to 9.8 in 1940. This shrinkage in the proportion of Negroes was, of course, due to the enormous immigration of whites over the period, and it was chiefly because there was no net immigration between 1930 and 1940 that the percentage of Negroes was able to rise slightly from 9.7 to 9.8. In the decades just ahead, it is probable that a larger part of the Negro population will live in cities, and that white immigration will continue on a restricted basis. On the other hand, a larger proportion of nonwhites than of whites will remain in the lower economic and rural classes that furnish more than their quota of births. After balancing all these factors, it appears that the present ratio between the numbers of whites and Negroes will continue without much change.

Present Status of the Negro.—One of the most important indexes of the status of a minority people is its level of living and the economic inequalities that exist between it and the majority. An extensive survey, the Consumer Purchases Study,[3] found that in the South generally the median income of Negro families in both rural and urban areas in 1935-36 was about one-half that of white families in the same types of areas, while in the northern cities of New York, Chicago, and Columbus Negro families had a median income about two-thirds that

[3] Richard Sterner, *The Negro's Share* (New York, Harper & Bros., 1943), pp. 60, 327 ff.

of whites.[4] Because of sampling defects it cannot be claimed that these estimates are exact, but they do support the results of all other investigations and common observation in finding that Negroes on the average exist at a sharply lower level of living than do whites.

The Consumer Purchases Study also suggests that the reputation of Negroes for thriftlessness is exaggerated. When Negro and white families in the same income class were compared, a somewhat smaller percentage of Negroes than of whites was found to end the year with a deficit. This finding cannot be taken literally because here, too, the sampling of whites and Negroes in the study cited was biased. But it does demonstrate that many Negro families are careful and thrifty in the management of their affairs.

Extensive housing surveys show that the masses of Negroes everywhere occupy the least desirable and the most inadequate dwellings located in the poorest areas of both city and open country.

In the South, Negroes are customarily paid lower wages than whites for the same kind of work, although no strictly accurate comparison has ever been made in terms of amount and quality of work performed. For additional reasons, or because Negroes are easier to control, colored labor is usually employed in preference to white on plantations, in domestic service, and in some other low-grade occupations in the South. Negroes have long been numerous in the labor force of the iron industry in the Birmingham district; but few of them are found in textile mills and in most other southern industries. In the North, discrimination against the employment of Negroes in industry has been more general. This attitude was dramatically revealed during World War II by the slow and scattered acceptance of Negroes in the suddenly expanded war industries of the nation in the face of an acute manpower shortage. Even in 1937 and 1940 the proportion of Negro males fourteen years of age and over employed in urban areas was only three fourths to nine tenths

[4] The northern and southern figures are not comparable, (1) because many small cities were included in the southern estimate and (2) because a much larger proportion of Negro families was on relief in northern cities than in southern cities, and these were omitted from the estimates.

that of the corresponding class of whites. In the southern and border states, with some exceptions (North Carolina, for one), Negroes were barred from war emergency training courses for workers and, although this was not true in the North, schooling there seldom led to jobs. This situation aroused much resentment among Negroes in every section.

Negro workers are excluded from membership in many of the unions of the American Federation of Labor and from almost all the affiliated and unaffiliated railroad brotherhoods. They are generally accepted by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), although there has been discrimination in reference to promotion seniority; but the CIO has not been important in the industries that employ large numbers of Negroes. In the past, labor unions generally have offered organized opposition to the admission of Negro workers in urban industry. Also, many Negro leaders have been traditionally opposed to the affiliation of Negro workers with the unions and have preferred to appeal directly to the employers.

The markedly inferior economic position of the great majority of the Negro race, compared with most of the white race in the United States, is clear from all the formal data that have been collected as well as from common knowledge. A comparison of the 1940 occupational distribution of employed Negro males with that of whites is shown in Table 13. As would be expected, few Negroes are listed as business proprietors, managers, and officials. There were nearly three Negroes to one white among unskilled industrial and farm laborers. Ninety-five per cent of all employed Negro males are engaged in manual labor, in contrast to 70 per cent of whites. It is not surprising that such occupations as Pullman porter, postal clerk, and mail carrier have high prestige among Negroes.

Another very significant index of the status of Negroes today is the amount of formal education they have. In 1940, for the entire nation, Negroes 25 years old and over had completed a median of 5.7 school years, compared with 8.8 school years completed by native whites and 7.3 school years by foreign-born whites. Ten per cent of these Negroes had finished no school years at all, the corresponding figures for native whites

TABLE 13

OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED NEGRO AND WHITE MALES, 1940 *

Occupation Class	Percentage of Total				Negro as Percentage of White	
	White		Negro			
Total	99.27		99.46		100	
White-collar	30.35		5.08		17	
Professional and semiprofessional		5.88		1.82		31
Proprietors, managers, and officials		10.59		1.27		12
Clerical, sales, etc.		13.88		1.99		14
Skilled industrial craftsmen, foremen, etc.	15.56		4.42		28	
Semiskilled industrial operatives, etc.	18.82		12.53		67	
Unskilled industrial laborers	7.53		21.24		282	
Domestic and personal service	6.01		15.25		254	
Domestic service		0.16		2.91		1,820
Protective service		2.13		0.54		25
Other service		3.72		11.80		317
Agriculture	21.00		40.94		191	
Farmers		14.03		21.13		151
Farm laborers		6.97		19.81		285

* Adapted from Bureau of the Census, *The Labor Force*, Vol. III, Part I, p. 97.

and foreign-born whites being 1.3 and 12.2 per cent, respectively. That the quality of the schooling received by southern Negro children is much poorer than that received by southern white children is evident from the fact that in the southern states where Negroes attend separate schools the average expenditure in 1945 was about $32 per Negro child and $74 per white child. Moreover, the schooling of the two races is by no means on an equal footing in the cities of the North. The Negro race as a whole, therefore, evidently stands on an educational level much below that of the whites.

Related to the poverty, lack of education, and low status of the Negro masses is their record of legal arrests. The Negro arrest rate has increased absolutely, probably because of more accurate statistics, and has remained about three times that of whites over the decade or so for which official figures are available. The number of arrests of Negroes per 100,000 of the Negro population fifteen years of age and over in 1940 was 1,708, while the corresponding rate for native whites was 620 and for foreign-born whites 202. For criminal homicide the Negro arrest rate was about seven times that of native whites; for robbery it was four times as great; and for assault it was eight times as great. As Myrdal says,

> In the South the number of Negro male felony prisoners is only between two and two and a half times as great (in proportion to population) as the number of native white male felony prisoners. In the North, however, the Negro rate is almost five times as large as the white rate. This would seem to be due mainly to the fact that Northern Negroes are concentrated in cities, where social disorganization is greater and law enforcement is more efficient.[5]

It is well-known that Negroes have "high visibility" to the police and are arrested much more readily than whites. Yet, however these striking differences in arrest rates may be interpreted, the fact that Negroes find themselves in trouble with the law so much more often than whites must be regarded as another indication of an abnormal relationship between them and the dominant white society in which they live. This seems especially

[5] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944), Vol. II, p. 971.

true when it is observed that the Negro middle class maintains standards of conduct little different from those of the same class of whites.

In a typical year, 1944, the Bureau of the Census reported 166 illegitimate nonwhite births per 1,000 total live births, in contrast to a white rate of under 20. The difference in extramarital sex behavior must be something less than such statistics suggest, because the whites are known to make more use of contraceptive devices. However, these rates of illegitimacy vary little from South to North, and have shown no clear tendency to decline over a period of more than 20 years. They vividly reflect the low class status of the Negroes, and reveal a marked and persistent deviation on their part from the family mores and organization of the white population.

Disease and death usually prey more freely upon a disadvantaged people. The death rate per 1,000 Negroes in 1940 was 13.9, while per 1,000 whites it was 10.4. At the death rates prevailing in 1945, the average nonwhite male in his twenty-fifth year could expect to live about 38 years longer, while the average white male of the same age could look forward to 44 years. Surveys have shown that sickness is over 40 per cent more frequent among Negroes than among whites. In cities tuberculosis kills about five times as many Negroes as whites, and the death rate of Negro women at childbirth is three times that of white women.[6]

In most of the southern states, Negroes participate only to a very limited extent in voting at local and state elections. Negroes are not often allowed to vote in the southern Democratic primary, which is usually equivalent to the election in a section where the Democratic party has no serious opposition. Furthermore, large numbers of Negroes, and also many whites, do not pay the poll tax that is commonly imposed in the South, and are thereby disqualified from voting. Although Negroes are not prevented from voting in the cities of the North, it is a very exceptional occurrence when one of them is elected to even a minor public office.

[6] J. H. Lewis, *The Biology of the Negro* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).

A final test of the position of a minority people is the willingness of the majority to live, associate, and intermarry with them. In the South, Negroes are sent to separate schools, they attend separate churches, they belong to separate lodges, they are not generally allowed to sit with whites in public conveyances, and they do not exchange social visits with them.[7] In cities everywhere, but more rigidly in the North than in the South, Negroes live apart in black belts and Harlems. In the World War II Army Negro privates were placed in segregated units and were commonly assigned to manual labor rather than to combat duty. Negro officers of high rank were rare and were looked at askance. Until the end of the war the Navy accepted Negroes only as messmen and for other menial work. Intermarriage between Negroes and whites is forbidden by law in all of the southern states and in more than a dozen states of the West and North.

Changes in the Status of the Negro Since Emancipation.— The brief appraisal above of the present position of the Negro in the United States, over three-quarters of a century after his emancipation from slavery, shows that his status is obviously still markedly inferior to that of the whites in every respect. It is important, however, to know what progress the Negro has made since he was set free.

Statistics are lacking by which to measure the change in the extent to which Negroes are socially segregated by whites, but a variety of indications may be noticed. Whereas in 1917 Negro Army officers were trained in a single school at Des Moines, Iowa, in the Second World War they were interspersed among the whites in many camps in the South and elsewhere, and the Navy for the first time accepted a limited number of Negro volunteers as "reservists" and admitted a few Negro ensigns. Negro workers have been mixed with white workers in several industries. We have already seen that Negro children in increasingly large numbers are found with white children in northern public schools.

[7] Charles S. Johnson, *Patterns of Negro Segregation* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1943).

As the result of rulings by circuit courts (e.g., Maryland, 1936) and the Supreme Court of the United States (1938), every state must now either admit Negroes to state supported schools or provide equal separate educational facilities for them. Under this decision, practically every southern state is paying the tuition of some Negro students in northern colleges, and over 2,500 Negroes, it is reported, are receiving these aids. Texas and Oklahoma, in particular, where test cases have occurred, have tried to solve the problem by setting up separate law schools. But this has not been acceptable to the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) and the pressure continues. Another southern state, Arkansas, has announced that Negroes may go to white schools, provided they study and attend classes separately. Delaware has opened college doors to Negro graduate students, and Washington University in St. Louis has accepted Negroes in the schools of medicine and social work. In Virginia, the contest has centered upon admission of Negro pupils to white elementary and secondary schools, with the courts insisting upon literal compliance with the ruling of equal facilities. There are about one hundred Negro teachers in white colleges in the North and West. The postwar years, however, have also seen some explosions of white resentment against Negroes in high schools in Indiana, Illinois, New York, and California.

Legal attacks have been made upon "Jim Crow" practices on busses and other common carriers in the South. In the case of *Morgan* v. *Virginia,* the United States Supreme Court held in 1946 that interstate bus passengers were not subject to the racial segregation laws of any state, and in Kentucky in 1947 a railroad company was made to pay damages for placing two Negro interstate passengers behind a curtain in a dining car. One of the most recent (May, 1948) Supreme Court opinions bearing on racial segregation is that zoning and other agreements prohibiting the rental or sale of residence or business property to Negroes are legal but are not enforceable. The 1948 sessions of the Southern Medical Association in Baltimore were opened to Negro physicians and surgeons for the first time, although Negroes are barred from membership in the South-

ern Medical Association. The American Medical Association admitted Negroes to membership in 1949. A Negro player appeared in major league baseball in 1947 for the first time since 1884, and at the end of that year a mixed team from a northern university played in a Cotton Bowl football game in Dallas, Texas. In 1948, forty southern cities had added Negroes to their police forces. No increase in social visiting or in intermarriage between the two races, however, is known to have occurred.

The only available data that are capable of showing a trend in the economic condition of Negroes are those relating to farm ownership, home ownership, and occupational distribution. In the year 1910, 219,000 Negro families had risen from a condition in which they were chattel property themselves to partial or complete ownership of 12,850,000 acres of farm land valued at over 600 million dollars.[8] Twenty years later, there had been some decline in Negro farm ownership, Negroes owning in 1930 about 182,000 farms, totaling 11.7 million acres. This loss occurred chiefly in the four southern states of Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, and Tennessee, each with a high concentration of Negroes, and was due largely to such factors as soil erosion, the boll weevil, and the westward shift of cotton production. The number of Negro farm owners declined further by 1940 to 174,000, but over one-fourth of all farms operated by Negroes were then owned by their operators, a higher percentage of ownership than was reported in any of the three preceding decennial censuses. Although in the South the number of Negro farmers has been decreasing relative to white farmers, the proportion of Negroes remaining in agriculture in that section is still considerably greater than the proportion of whites. This situation has been summarized by Rupert B. Vance:

> Negro farmers lost their proportional representation during this period but markedly improved their agricultural position. Though their status upon emancipation was purely that of laborers, by 1930 only 29 per cent of Negro males in agriculture were laborers. Fifty-eight

[8] Abram L. Harris and Sterling D. Spero, "Negro Problem," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. II, p. 341.

per cent had become tenants, and 13 per cent were owners. But among the white farm operators the rise of a tenantry has meant a great decrease in the proportion of ownership.

Thus the result of competition for the land presents a picture not altogether unfavorable to the Negro farmer. Present Negro owners and tenants are all the descendants of slave laborers, while the white tenants and laborers are children and grandchildren, in the main, of landowners. For the Negro, tenancy . . . is a step in advance of the previous generation; for the whites, it is a step backward.[9]

Coincident with the development of unfavorable conditions in southern agriculture, the growing demands of war industry in 1916 to 1919 and the curbing of foreign immigration in 1924 drew more and more Negroes into the flow of population from the farms to the cities, including the industrial cities of the North. As a result, Negroes, like whites (but more slowly) have steadily become less dependent upon agriculture for a livelihood, until now only one-third of them live on farms.[10]

The percentage of Negro male gainful workers ten years old and over in manufacturing and mechanical industries and transportation and communication, inclusive, rose from 16.7 in 1910 to 18.7 in 1930. The corresponding percentage for 1940 was 22.4 (white, 32.9), but the figures of the occupation census of 1940 are not fully comparable with those of earlier censuses. Although Negroes are mainly employed as unskilled laborers, the proportion of Negro male workers who were unskilled dropped from about 74 in 1910 to 69 in 1930 and to 57 (white, 20) in 1940. There are few Negroes in public service, but the percentages (males) were 0.7 in 1910, 0.9 in 1930, and 1.5 (white, 4.1) in 1940. Within the segregated black belts of the cities Negroes have also been able to develop in modest but significant numbers their own shopkeepers, realtors, bankers, clericals, and professionals such as lawyers, physicians, journalists, scholars, writers, and artists.[11] Negro weekly newspapers now have a

[9] Rupert B. Vance, "Racial Competition for the Land," in *Race Relations and the Race Problem*, Edgar T. Thompson (ed.), (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1939), p. 113.

[10] Sterner, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[11] Bureau of the Census, *Population*, Vol. V, *General Report on Occupations*, 1930, p. 74; Vol. III, *The Labor Force*, 1943, Part I, p. 188; *Population, Comparative Occupational Statistics for the United States 1870-1940*, p. 189.
Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-89.

circulation of about 1.5 millions. As an indication of their progress in some kinds of business, in 1940 Negroes owned and operated 21 legal reserve life insurance and assessment companies with a combined premium income of over 16 million dollars.

In the summer of 1941, the president of the United States, moved by the threat of a protest march by Negroes on Washington, issued Executive Order 8802, declaring that "all contracting agencies of the Government of the United States shall include in all defense contracts hereafter negotiated by them a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any workers." To see that it was obeyed, he created a Committee on Fair Employment Practices. A survey in the spring of 1942 showed that many firms had begun to hire Negroes for the first time, but that this employment often represented little more than token compliance with the government order. Between July, 1942, and July, 1943, however, the percentage of Negroes in establishments reporting to the United States Employment Service increased from 5.8 to 6.7 per cent. Although Negroes were still not employed in war industry in numbers commensurate with their proportion in the general labor force, a reliable Negro publication reported that "in spite of the frequency of employment difficulties and interracial conflicts in industry, the major problem of simple Negro employment has been overcome." Simultaneously, Negro leaders, while pointing out that the potential skills of Negroes were still being inadequately utilized, admitted significant advances for the Negro in the field of labor organization, in upgrading to semi-skilled and skilled jobs, and in employment in automobile plants, in the iron and steel industry, in aircraft factories, in ordnance works, and in shipbuilding yards throughout the country.[12] These Negro gains evidently resulted from the accumulating pressure of an acute manpower shortage in war industry rather than from government fiat, from Negro agitation, or from any basic change in white sentiment. For the year 1946, the National Urban League reported the entrance of Negroes into

[12] Robert C. Weaver, "The Negro Comes of Age in Industry," *Atlantic Monthly*, September, 1943.

more new job fields, with telephone companies, department stores, and insurance companies.[18] No large-scale lay-off of Negro workers had occurred to January 1, 1949, in the boom years of full employment following the war.

The percentage of nonfarm Negro-occupied dwellings owned by their occupants rose from 17.0 in 1900 to 23.6 in 1940, a gain of 39 per cent. For whites there was a corresponding increase from 36.7 to 42.7 per cent, a gain of 16 per cent. Thus, while the proportion of ownership of nonfarm homes by Negroes remained much less than in the case of whites, the difference had decreased.

The preceding facts show beyond question that the range of economic opportunities for Negroes in the highly organized and competitive American system of free enterprise has been gradually expanding and that the ownership of property among them has been slowly increasing, in the two or three generations that have passed since their release from slavery.

It is somewhat simpler to measure the progress that Negroes have made in education. Whereas, in 1865, 95 per cent of the Negroes in the United States could not read, today the figures are practically reversed, and over 90 in 100 can read. In 17 southern states in 1940, 87 per cent of Negro children six to fourteen years old, inclusive, were attending school, compared with 58 per cent in 1915. In 1940, the Federal Census reported 80,000 Negroes who had completed four or more years of college training.

North Carolina is a good illustration of the change in attitude of Southern states toward Negro education. In 1835 that state passed a law forbidding the teaching of the race and specifically stating that its public-school system should never extend any of its benefits to any descendant of Negro ancestors even to the fourth generation. Just a century later, North Carolina is leading the nation in its provision of public instruction for Negroes, with 2,141 public schools, 168 of them at high school level, 5 state-supported colleges, and $7,000,000 annual expenditure from the state treasury for Negro education.[14]

[18] *Events and Trends in Race Relations*, IV, No. 7 (1947), 199.

[14] Edwin R. Embree, *American Negroes: A Handbook* (New York: The John Day Co., 1942), pp. 36, 37.

When it is further noted that about one-fifth of all Negroes now live in northern cities, where they often attend the same public schools with the whites, the vast improvement that has taken place in the educational situation of the race can be appreciated. Indeed, it is a matter of complaint that Negroes are now being educated beyond the opportunities granted them to participate in the economic and social life of the nation.

There has been a striking decline in the number of Negro lynchings in the South, from an average of 84 per year between 1889 and 1910 to 4 or 5 per year in 1940 and 1941, one in 1945, 6 in 1946, and one in 1947. In spite of emphasis upon reports of intimidation, beating, and shooting of Negroes by the Associated Negro Press, it appears that the period of interracial confusion, readjustment, and violence that followed the Civil War is giving way to one of more regularized and legal relations. A downward trend in lynching, however, does not yet imply the equality of the Negro before the courts. Also, as the Negro has moved northward, interracial clashes and violence have become more frequent in other parts of the country.

Negro health, as reflected in the lowered Negro death rate, shows impressive progress. The rate has been cut in half since 1900, due not only to the general advance of sanitation and medicine but also probably to improvement in the economic and educational level of the race.

The political position of the Negro has not remained completely stationary in the southern states with the passing of time. According to Luther P. Jackson, writing in the annual report of the Virginia (Negro) Voters League for 1942, "in all things pertaining to the suffrage Virginia has made steady advancement in recent years toward a relationship of racial equality. Whereas formerly most registrars refused registration to Negroes, today the overwhelming majority of them draw no color line." As a result of federal court decisions and some change in white sentiment, during the decade of the forties Negroes were able to vote in the primary elections of the southern and border states to a greater extent than at any time since Reconstruction. There were in 1944 two Negro members of Congress, something that had not occurred for 70 years.

In northern cities the growing colored population has the same suffrage rights as whites. There Negroes have for the most part been voting with the political party that seemed most favorable toward their race, and their vote promises to acquire some importance in the balance of power in city politics.

Forces Tending to Reduce Discrimination.—The ongoing changes that have just been described in the status of the Negro are being brought about by a number of influences, the most important of which will be briefly noticed. It is generally recognized that, with growing urbanization and education among Negroes, the latter have become much more conscious of their rights as citizens of a democratic commonwealth.[15]

The second war in a quarter of a century "to make the world safe for democracy" focused the attention of Negroes more sharply on the discriminations practiced against them. During 1943, as in 1918 and 1919, race riots in Texas, Michigan, California, New York, and elsewhere gave clear evidence of the tension beneath the surface. In the case of the Detroit riot, over 200 editors of daily papers in 29 scattered states considered traditional race prejudice to be the fundamental cause, with subversive activities, crowded housing and poor recreational facilities, juvenile delinquents, and war tensions following in order of importance. A report to the Governor of Michigan by the acting supervisor of the State Bureau of Child Welfare on interviews with 340 men held by the Detroit police for participating in the riots, stated that these men were not recent migrants to Detroit. Twenty-three of the 26 whites arrested were of northern origin, and most of them were steadily employed at good wages. This riot was apparently a reaction of Detroit whites to increasing Negro pressure, economic and otherwise.

From a sociological viewpoint, the question of whether discriminatory behavior toward any group such as the Negro is unjust can find an answer only in the mores of the people. In the United States, the mores vary to some extent by region

[15] T. J. Woofter, Jr., *Races and Ethnic Groups in American Life* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1933), p. 200; Hortense Powdermaker, "The Channeling of Negro Aggression by the Cultural Process," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVIII, No. 6 (1943), 129 ff.

and by race. To most southern whites, the differential treatment of the Negro appears necessary and proper. By the Negroes themselves it is now regarded as both unnecessary and unjust. Also, the attitudes of the whites in the North deviate from those in the South to such an extent that much of the treatment of the Negro which is conventional in the South is thought to be wrong in the North, despite the fact that the North itself is by no means free of discrimination. Finally, the nation as a whole subscribes to certain idealistic democratic and Christian values which are often inconsistent with racial practices, both in the South and in the North.

Assuming a "strain toward consistency" in the mores of a society, as Sumner [16] termed it, the sharpest of these differences in American racial opinion and behavior are gradually being worn down. For that reason alone, some forms of discrimination against the Negro will probably be relaxed or dropped. One of the numerous indications that such a process is under way is the evolution in the South of a vigorous liberal bi-racial organization, now called the Southern Regional Council, with a full-time, paid staff. The Council's primary purposes are "to attain through research and action programs the ideals and practices of equal opportunity for all people in the region; to reduce race tension, the basis of racial tension, racial misunderstanding, and racial distrust. . . ." Other evidence of the same kind is occasional editorials in southern newspapers pointing out that "it would be far better to do away with this [poll] tax by state action than by having other states continually yawping at the state."

Although white employers in industry are often prejudiced against Negroes, their interest sometimes causes them to hire Negro laborers because they will work for lower wages. Accordingly, to strengthen their bargaining position, white workers in such cases may find it to their advantage to accept Negroes into their unions.

Discrimination against the employment of Negroes becomes more awkward during certain crises, such as business depressions and wars, when the federal government is directly or indirectly

[16] William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906), p. 5.

involved as an employer and much public money is being spent. It is difficult for a government that formally recognizes all citizens as equal, or that makes war in defense of democracy, to permit gross racial inequalities in the dispensation of relief, jobs, or wage rates. It is evident that the Negro race has been greatly aided by two world wars within a generation. Mainly because of the critical manpower shortages that were thereby created and of threats to wartime morale, each war allowed Negroes to make gains of every kind more abruptly than would ordinarily have been possible. Every step ahead that Negroes have taken has constituted a reality to which the attitudes of the whites have slowly tended to become adjusted.

As Negroes have gone to northern cities, they have organized to protect their "rights," and it has been seen that they have begun to take advantage of the legal machinery of the nation by retaining lawyers in the defense of Negroes involved in test cases of discrimination, whether in the South or in the North.

The inclination of white politicians of every party in northern cities to cater to the Negro vote, the zeal of white liberals, and the increasing strength of militant Negro organizations in the North are among the social forces that are leading to a strengthening of federal laws in an effort to compel the South to enfranchise her Negro masses, to admit Negroes to white schools, and to abolish "Jim Crow" practices. The socialist and communist parties have long declared themselves in favor of Negro equality. The Communists actively took the Negro's part in the spectacular Scottsboro case, and have even gone so far as to propose that a large part of the South should become, for all practical purposes, a Negro state. Similarly, the Trotskyist Socialist Workers party promised, "What the federal government of the 1930's began and then abandoned, the Workers' and Farmers' Government will carry through to completion." Yet, so far, Negroes have shown little disposition to vote either the Socialist or the Communist ticket.

Improvements in Negro education, and the growth of a Negro middle class with rising standards and achievements, have lessened somewhat the average cultural distance between Ne-

groes and whites. It does not follow, of course, that discrimination against Negroes would stop if they should eventually attain the cultural level of the whites. Caste attitudes are not necessarily forgotten when the situations in which they developed have changed. The treatment of the Negro would then depend on how the whites interpreted the new Negro in relation to white values and interests. In the early stages of any such development, it is likely that the advance of the Negro would appear to the whites to be even more threatening than before, with reference to economic competition and race mixture. Nevertheless, one would expect the removal of many of the reasons for the present aversion toward the Negro eventually to result in some weakening of the emotional foundations of that aversion, which now makes a Negro competitor more resented than a white competitor, and creates opposition to any kind of equality with him.

The scientific study of racial differences is causing the popular belief that Negroes are on the average mentally or temperamentally inferior to whites to be brought more and more into question. Sociologists and anthropologists generally consider that the explanation of the Negro's commonly poorer performance on mental tests, and of his lesser achievement in the building of a civilization, probably lies wholly in his present economic and social disadvantages, on the one hand, and in his ancient geographic isolation and other historical accidents, on the other. As these more sophisticated ideas spread among educated whites and Negroes, they are likely to help toward the development of a public opinion that will be more favorable to the improvement of the status of the Negro.

A very fundamental consideration in the whole psychological situation that we have been discussing is the welfare of the white group. Do the whites penalize themselves when they keep the Negroes in their "place"? If so, will this come to be more clearly recognized? The high crime rates, the high rates of disease and death, and the low general efficiency of southern communities that have a large proportion of Negroes are well known. The burden of such a people upon the relief resources,

upon governmental administration, and upon the psychology of living in the South has long been heavy.[17]

From the white point of view, the Negro problem would not exist at all if there were no Negroes, and it is generally assumed that race feeling increases as the proportion of Negroes in the population rises. The reduction of this proportion by one-half since 1810 has without doubt helped the situation much more than is generally realized. It has been seen, however, that because of the restriction of white immigration, no further significant reduction in the ratio of Negroes is probable.

There is a possibility that the most decisive force acting upon the Negro problem will prove to be the illicit crossing of the races which has already resulted in an extensive population of mixed bloods. High-grade mulattoes are often indistinguishable from whites in physical appearance. It is common knowledge that each year many of them "cross the line," i.e., succeed in passing as whites. In this way, an unknown amount of Negro blood is slowly being diffused among the white population. If the process should continue until most whites can no longer claim racial purity, a social hierarchy might develop based not on purity of race but on skin color, similar to that now found in Brazil or the West Indies. Although statistics on the subject are lacking, at present a variety of evidence suggests that irregular sex contacts between whites and Negroes are on the decline.

The Bases of Discrimination Against the Negro.—The almost caste-like distinction between white and black in the United States has been accounted for in a variety of ways. The members of practically all groups are wishfully inclined, where they are conscious of no overwhelming evidence to the contrary, to regard their own traits as the best, and those that differ from them as inferior. Although they have not been accurately analyzed, there are no doubt some deep-seated psychological reasons for this tendency (e.g., self-esteem is related to confidence, and confidence to success). It is an historical fact that "old" Americans of British stock always considered them-

[17] Gardner Murphy, Lois Barclay Murphy, and Theodore M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1937), pp. 54 ff.

selves as both different from and better than Indians, Spaniards, Orientals, south European immigrants, and even later comers from northern and western Europe. Also, these prejudices have been roughly proportional to the biological and cultural differences that have existed between the old Americans and the various minority groups.

When a strange people is introduced into a society, the attitudes toward them are also influenced by the ideas and beliefs with which they are specifically associated. Historically, within the memory of a few people still living, the Negroes were slaves and, moreover, "savages taken from the jungles of Darkest Africa." As such, they occupied the lowest possible rung on the social ladder and often were not even regarded as human beings possessed of "souls." The Negro has since been kept in his "place" in part because the folkways and institutions of this early society felt no need of any other place for him and bequeathed none to posterity.

In countries like Brazil and Cuba, Negroes are not segregated as they are in the United States, even though the blacks everywhere form the bottom classes of the social pyramid with the color scheme paling off to white at the top.[18] This difference in development is often explained by pointing out that emancipation of Negroes in these countries occurred as a natural process, whereas in the United States it was the forced result of a civil war followed by a bitter aftermath during which the northern army attempted to maintain recently liberated slaves in political positions of authority over their former masters. This caused southern whites to identify the advancement of the Negro with the purpose of the northern enemy and to make resistance to it a matter of loyalty to the Southland and its culture based on white supremacy. Moreover, in the words of another writer, ". . . the Negro . . . was . . . unfitted for the freedom . . . suddenly thrust upon him . . . [and] was forced to enter a competitive economic system when he knew not the meaning of such a condition. . . . Because of this lack

[18] Eric Williams, "Crossways of the Caribbean," and Dante De Laytano, "Brazil's Pattern of Democracy," *Survey Graphic*, November, 1942.

of adequate training the history of the Negro from 1865 to the present has been inevitable." [19]

A further explanation is that the Latin-American republic of Brazil and the Caribbean islands were largely colonized by single males who freely intermarried with Indian and Negro women and whose sole descendants were of mixed blood, whereas the United States was occupied by white men with their wives and families when the black slaves were introduced. Hence, the offspring of miscegenation between the races carried the additional stigma of illegitimacy and were regarded as Negro instead of being accepted into the dominant race.

Although it is often charged with being only a rationalization to cover economic motives, the sentiment that Negroes should be segregated and assigned a humbler role because they are biologically inferior to the whites is probably the most general and fundamental of all white attitudes toward Negroes in the United States. It has been commonly believed that Negroes are at a lower level of biological evolution than whites because of their distinctive body odor when unwashed, their supposedly more pronounced sexuality, their higher crime rates, their poorer school performance, their lower average I.Q.'s received in mental tests, and their comparative lack of historical achievement. If it has occurred to many whites that these shortcomings may be due to the low social and economic status of the Negroes, such realization has not lessened their distaste for them. This opinion of Negroes has naturally given support to the sentiment that the white race would be degraded by intermarriage with them, although illicit sexual relations may occur. Even the few whites who disclaim aversion to intermarriage with Negroes usually admit that they find it difficult to identify themselves with Negroid descendants. It has therefore happened that the whites have developed extraordinarily rigid mores for the purpose of preserving the purity of their race, including a tabu against intermarriage with Negroes, and the exclusion from the white race of all children of mixed blood, illegitimate or otherwise.

[19] Roy F. Nichols, "The Progress of the American Negro in Slavery," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CXL, November, 1928, p. 121.

It is believed by many students that the antagonism of a numerous class of poor whites in the South has formed the chief barrier to the advancement of the Negro freedmen. Faced with direct competition from the blacks, these people are supposed to have enforced the code of white supremacy because it gave them an economic advantage. Resentment by lower-class whites against Negroes as competitors for jobs is even regarded by some economic determinists as the sole reason for race discrimination throughout the nation. In support of this theory, they claim that middle- and upper-class whites take a more liberal attitude toward Negroes than do poor whites, although careful observers do not agree on this point, and they cite the well-known attempts of white laborers in the North to bar Negroes from employment in industry.

It has been said that minority groups like the Jews in Germany and the Negroes in the United States furnish the majority of the population with the psychological satisfaction of a scapegoat on which feelings of frustration may safely and usefully be vented in times of individual or national stress. One writer believes that it is emotionally more agreeable to treat a minority aggressively and tyrannically than it is to treat it with kindness, justice, and equality. There is, no doubt, some truth in all these theories, but those which are usually considered most important have to do with economic competition and intermarriage.

Two Alleged White Fears Examined.—It is not likely that reason will have much more to do with the course of race relations in the future than it has in the past. Nevertheless, it is interesting to analyze more closely what are usually said to be the two chief causes of the white's differential treatment of the Negro. The first, it is claimed, is a fear of the Negro as a competitor for jobs, and the second is an aversion to intermarriage with him.

If the Negro were resented only because he was an economic competitor of the white, there could be no resentment against him because he was a Negro. He would then be treated no differently than a white competitor, unless he were a more formidable one. Apparently, Negroes would be more formidable

competitors than whites if Negro job seekers were more numerous than white job seekers, if Negroes were better workmen, or if they would take a lower wage. Since whites seeking work, even at the unskilled level in industry, greatly outnumber Negroes except in parts of the South, the first possibility does not generally apply as a reality. It has never been claimed that Negroes were better workmen than whites. Negroes will often accept a lower wage than whites, but one way to prevent this is to take them into the white labor organizations. Since they have only in part and generally with reluctance been admitted to white labor unions, the third reason cannot be the controlling one.

The actual reason for discrimination against Negroes as competitors for industrial jobs must, then, be either that they are members of a different race, or that their weak position in our society makes it easier to block them out of competition. In the first case, the cause of the discrimination is race prejudice, and in the second, the differential treatment is made possible by race prejudice. Moreover, many classes of whites against whom Negroes do not compete are known to be strongly prejudiced against them, even if less so than the classes exposed to their competition. This logic does not support the theory that competition is the cause of race prejudice. Rather, it indicates the contrary: that race prejudice, i.e., racial aversion or dislike, is directly or indirectly responsible for the discrimination that is now practiced against the Negro in industry.

In the southern states intermarriage between whites and Negroes is illegal and unknown. In those northern states where there are no laws against it, it has very rarely occurred. Many observers are convinced that among southern whites the feeling against marrying Negroes is so strong that it is the underlying reason for denying them equal civil rights and economic opportunities.

If Negroes were freely allowed to advance themselves, for a very considerable time the tabu against intermarriage would probably be little changed. This opinion is due to the observation that in the cities of the North, where racial attitudes are supposed to be less strong than in the South, intermarriage be-

tween the two races has shown no tendency to increase with the growth of a successful Negro middle class. Among middle-class Negroes a compensatory resistance to intermarriage with whites now exists and is becoming more rigid. Also, if the tabu were somewhat more often broken under a policy of no other discrimination against Negroes, the violators and their offspring could simply be dropped from the white race, as mulattoes have always been. Nevertheless, if the general principle is accepted that the aversion felt by whites to intermarriage with Negroes is not innate but grows largely out of the extremely low status of the latter race, this antipathy must eventually be expected to diminish as Negroes, and especially mulattoes, gradually advance in education, wealth, and power. The fear of the whites that equal opportunities for Negroes would in the end lead to increasing intermarriage between the two races is therefore by no means without foundation. To be sure, this foundation is only the probability that many of the whites would lose their aversion to intermarriage with Negroes. But this is the one condition necessary for intermarriage because the Negroes are a subordinate race, are already of mixed blood, and have everything to gain from further amalgamation with the whites.

With regard to the specific purpose of preserving the purity of the white race, however, illicit race crossing must of course be considered, as well as intermarriage. The question may then be raised whether a suppressive or a liberal policy toward Negroes would, on the whole, result in a slower infusion of Negro blood into the white race. The sexual exploitation of Negro women by white men is easier when Negroes are poor and degraded. It is not known whether the apparent recent reduction in irregular sex relations between the two races is due more to a general improvement in the position of the Negroes or to a lowering of sex standards among white women. But if we can assume an increasing use of contraceptive devices, we must again reach the conclusion that any accelerated absorption of Negro blood into the white race in the future can result only from the removal of the stigma of biological and social inferiority from the Negro. If this is true, it is necessary to regard

the unwillingness of whites to grant general equality to Negroes as due in part to a direct clash between the two values of white racial superiority and democratic equality, both of which are characteristic of our society, rather than to a mistaken analysis of probabilities.

Some Issues of Policy.—Both the whites and the Negroes have always shown a lack of unity regarding racial policies. The idea of setting up a separate Negro state in Africa has been thoroughly discredited among Negroes since the debacle of Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican Negro who, about 1914, organized a "back-to-Africa" movement of large dimensions and collected a huge sum of money from Negroes which was used for the purchase of unseaworthy ships. A comparatively few Negroes feel that the case of the Negro and other depressed minorities is hopeless under the present social and economic order and demand a revolution, usually some form of Marxian communism, to be brought about by any means that may be necessary. In contrast, there are undoubtedly some Negro leaders whose prominence and prosperity grow out of the inferior condition of their race, and who accordingly may strive to preserve the status quo.

From the Negro viewpoint, some of the fundamental issues of racial policy were early defined in the now rather outmoded division of opinion which arose between Booker T. Washington, pioneer Negro educator in the South, and W. E. B. DuBois, a founder of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, in New York City. Washington held that Negroes should make the most of whatever opportunities they had, in order that the race might slowly but surely rise by virtue of hard work, efficiency, and thrift. He looked for aid to the white employer and philanthropist and avoided ties with labor. On the contrary, DuBois, in the earlier spirit of Frederick Douglass, advocated the immediate removal of all distinctions between blacks and whites. Negroes now increasingly resent the "Uncle Tom" type of "good Negro" which many of them believe was approved by Washington, and the DuBois point of view has been gaining rapidly in every section of the country,

although not all Negro leaders accept it without reservations.

Nothing that has happened, however, has caused the rejection of Booker Washington's belief that the competence and reliability of the colored masses must be raised, and that the responsibility for improving the personal qualities and skills of the Negro rests primarily upon Negro leaders. The assistance of whites is essential, however, because Negro leaders alone do not command enough resources for any kind of program, and because the program must be acceptable to whites.

With the passing of the years, Negroes now no longer look primarily to northern philanthropists for the support of their schools, but have increasing access to the public treasury in many states. Pleased with the economic and other gains which Negroes made during the last war, colored leaders nevertheless continue to cry out against the great inequalities that remain, in the hope of getting more concessions for their race. With their migration to northern cities, Negroes have discovered that while "in the South discrimination is more spectacular, in the North it is almost as effective." With their expectations and ambitions fired by progress, but still far short of equality with whites, the critical problem as impatient Negro leaders see it is how to put an immediate stop to white discrimination against Negroes. Searching desperately for policies and methods, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in 1947 petitioned the United Nations in an "earnest appeal to all the world for elemental justice against the treatment which the United States has visited upon us for three centuries." Shortly afterwards, a prominent Negro, testifying before a Senate committee, threatened "mass disobedience" by Negroes in case of a military draft if the policy of segregation in the armed forces was not changed. Most leaders of the race, however, seem now to pin their hopes upon the passage of federal anti-discrimination laws and federal court rulings, i.e., legal fiat.

If, however, legal and political methods should be employed by pro-Negro organizations to win rights for Negroes much faster than the dominant white sentiment of any great section of the country approved, the probable result would be to arouse the organized opposition of the whites. This would strengthen

rather than weaken the biracial structure of society which already exists. An example of such a result was the political revolt of the southern "Dixiecrats" against President Truman in the election of 1948, as a protest against his Civil Rights program aimed at outlawing social segregation and discrimination throughout the nation.

Our whole inquiry has suggested that discrimination against the Negro at present is derived chiefly from the fact that he has always been and still is the member of an easily recognized race of low historical status.[20] What part can education and propaganda, through the schools, moving pictures, etc., play in changing attitudes of this kind? The purpose of any such education would be to promote Negro equality. Since public education in the United States is a prerogative of the individual states and communities, this purpose would have to meet with the approval of the local people. Any attempt to spread pro-Negro propaganda in the South would be quickly detected and stopped. It is also unlikely that emotional attitudes can be much affected by the teaching of facts in schools, so that educators could do little to redirect racial attitudes in the South, if they should wish to. Altogether, it would seem that public education and propaganda methods in race relations in this country may at the most be used to lead slightly and to reinforce changes already occurring in popular opinion, but not suddenly and radically to alter the sentiment of a section or the nation.

The Prospect.—Whether or not the Negro problem in the United States is being, or ever will be, "solved" depends on the definition of the word. If the test of solution is the decline or disappearance of the consciousness of differences between Negroes and whites, the problem is more acute than it was a generation ago, because as Negroes have made progress they have become more aware of the inequalities that remain. What we have found is that a variety of complex social changes, forces, and pressures has been causing the whites to yield increasing opportunities and "rights" to Negroes. The first and most obvious advances have been in education, the second in

[20] Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb, *op. cit.*, pp. 240 ff.

the urban professions and industrial employment. General political enfranchisement seems to be just appearing on the horizon. No direct progress toward social equality and intermarriage has been observed. A fact of significance, however, is that one kind of gain naturally leads to another. Educated Negroes cannot be kept at manual labor or prevented from voting as easily as illiterate Negroes, and white supremacy loses much of its meaning when Negroes are economically as well off as whites. Further progress of the Negro race is to be expected, in spite of any setbacks that may occur. The trend seems to be gaining in momentum. Yet progress is not arrival. The realities which we have examined do not point to the disappearance of racial antipathies in the decades that lie ahead.

QUESTIONS

1. What is the definition of a minority group? Give examples.
2. Just what is meant by prejudice? By discrimination?
3. Summarize in a sentence the present critical situation with regard to the Negro in the United States.
4. Discuss briefly the growth and size of the Negro population in the United States, and its relation to the so-called Negro problem.
5. In comparison with the white, what are the main points regarding, (*a*) The present economic situation of the American Negro? (*b*) His educational opportunities and achievements? (*c*) His criminal record? (*d*) His illegitimate birth rate? (*e*) His health and mortality? (*f*) His political status? (*g*) His social segregation?
6. How do you account for the facts given under 5*c* and 5*d*?
7. What changes, if any, have occurred since the Civil War in (*a*) the social segregation of Negroes? (*b*) Their economic position? (*c*) Their education? (*d*) Their ability to vote and hold office? (*e*) Their death rate?
8. What is the trend in the number of lynchings in the South?
9. What are the chief forces and developments which tend to reduce racial discrimination in the United States?
10. Discuss the eventual probable bearing of illicit race crossing on the Negro problem.

11. How is the strong belief in the innate inferiority of Negroes in the United States to be accounted for?
12. Discuss and evaluate other important bases of discrimination against the American Negro.
13. What is the argument against the theory that the Negro is resented only because he is an economic competitor of the white? How valid do you consider it?
14. If the whites should grant the Negroes complete equality of opportunity to advance themselves, what would be the probable effect on intermarriage between the two races?
15. Compare critically the philosophies of Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. DuBois for the advancement of the Negro race.
16. What, at present, seems to be the main objective of most Negro leaders in the United States?
17. In what policies and methods do these Negro leaders appear to put most reliance?
18. Discuss the probable consequences of attempts to eliminate discrimination against Negroes in the South by the enactment and enforcement of federal laws.
19. To what extent does it appear that the public schools might be used to combat racial discrimination in the South?
20. Will the major inequalities of the Negro in the United States probably be removed within the next few decades?

REFERENCES

DRAKE, ST. CLAIR, and CAYTON, HORACE R. *Black Metropolis.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1945.

FRANKLIN, JOHN HOPE. *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of American Negroes.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Inc., 1947.

HERSKOVITS, MELVILLE J. *The Myth of the Negro Past.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1941.

JOHNSON, CHARLES S. *Patterns of Negro Segregation.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1943.

KLINEBERG, OTTO (ed.). *Characteristics of the American Negro.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1944.

MYRDAL, GUNNAR. *An American Dilemma.* New York: Harper & Bros., 2 vols., 1944.

ROSE, ARNOLD and CAROLINE. *America Divided.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948.

STERNER, RICHARD. *The Negro's Share.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1943.

CHAPTER 11

EXTRALEGAL PATTERNS

The members of a society are brought up in its customs and beliefs, and follow them with a conformity that is surprising and impressive. Nevertheless, deviations from the ruling norms and values occur in many forms and degrees. Most of these variations are considered as mere crudities, bad manners, vulgarities, oddities, stupidities, clevernesses, or liberties, and are discouraged by the pressures of social disapproval and other informal methods of control. Deviations frequently occur, however, which are regarded as more serious threats to the well-being of the society. Against these the society seeks to protect itself by declaring them to be violations of its formal laws and prescribing penalties for them. Such extralegal deviations are termed delinquencies or crimes, and have been the subject of considerable attention by a specialized branch of sociology known as criminology.

Crime Defined.—In arriving at a definition of the term "crime," we can probably do no better than compare the definitions offered by three contemporary criminologists. In the words of Gillin, "crime is an act that has been shown to be actually harmful to society, or that is *believed* to be socially harmful by a group of people that has the power to enforce its beliefs and that places such act under the ban of positive penalties." [1] From much the same point of view, Sutherland writes: "Crime may be considered to involve three elements: a value which is appreciated by a group or a part of a group which is politically important; isolation of another part of this group so that its members do not appreciate the value or appreciate it

[1] John L. Gillin, *Criminology and Penology* (3rd ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1945), p. 9.

less highly and consequently tend to endanger it; and a pugnacious resort to coercion decently applied by those who appreciate the value to those who disregard the value." [2] And finally, according to Von Hentig: "Crime to the criminologist is something clear-cut: a violation or neglect of legal duty for which the law, either common or statutory, has provided legal discipline." [3]

The first two of these definitions are quite broad, and stress the social nature of crime, i.e., the idea that crime is a violation of certain values held by that part of a society which is able to apply coercion to violators. The third definition is more specific in limiting crime to behavior for which the law provides penalties. The last applies particularly to our own society, and definitely recognizes the formal element of the law. The three definitions reinforce one another, and together give a better idea of the meaning of crime than does any one of them alone. As Sutherland remarks about his own definition, however, no present definition of crime should be regarded as very fundamental or exact.

When the concept of illegal behavior is extended to children the word *delinquent* is preferred, if the act of violation is not too serious. A delinquent is described in the statutes of New York as follows:

> The word "delinquent" shall include any child over seven and under sixteen years of age (a) who violates any law of this state or of the United States or any municipal ordinance or who commits any act which if committed by an adult would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment; (b) who is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the control of his parents, guardian, or other lawful authority; (c) who is habitually truant; (d) who, without the consent of his parent, guardian or other custodian, deserts his home or place of abode; (e) who engages in any occupation which is in violation of law; (f) who begs or solicits alms or money in public places under any pretense; (g) who associates with immoral or vicious persons; (h) who frequents any place the existence of which is in violation of law; (i) who habitually uses obscene or profane language;

[2] Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1934), p. 11.

[3] By permission from *Crime: Causes and Conditions*, pp. 5-6, by Hans von Hentig, Copyrighted, 1947. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York.

or (j) who so deports himself as wilfully to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others.[4]

This paragraph contains many words and phrases that evidently need interpretation by the courts. But it is a typical legal definition of a "juvenile delinquent."

Causes of Crime.—A criminal is often thought of as a victim of heredity, i.e., as afflicted with an inborn weakness of mind or character, or possessed of some kind of vicious tendency. In 1876 the Italian criminologist, Cesare Lombroso, held that a criminal could be told from the abnormalities of his features and physique, such as a flat nose, heavy jaw, or misshapen forehead. The idea of a physical criminal type, however, was successfully refuted in 1913 by an English prison physician, Dr. Charles Goring. After studying three thousand prisoners, Goring found that "both with regard to measurements and the presence of physical anomalies in criminals, our statistics present a startling conformity with similar statistics of the law-abiding class. Our inevitable conclusion must be that there is no such thing as a criminal type." [5]

In a similar way, many studies have failed to show that feeble-mindedness plays more than a relatively small part as a general cause of crime,[6] and psychiatric examinations of great numbers of prisoners indicate that the percentage of psychotics among them is negligible.[7] A loosely defined "psychopathic personality" has attracted some attention recently, and prison psychiatrists have reported widely varying proportions of newly admitted prisoners as falling in this category:

> In general, the term "psychopathic state" refers to one who is poorly equipped to meet the demands of his environment. The deficiency, however, appears not in the intellect but in matters of decency, honesty, or consideration for others. Individuals of this type cannot be depended upon, and seem to be unable to function in any permanent position. They are noted for their poor judgment in matters involving the emotions, frequently acting upon impulse. The tendency to refer to

[4] Paul W. Tappan, *Delinquent Girls in Court: A Study of the Wayward Minor Court of New York* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), p. 233.
[5] Charles Goring, *The English Convict* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1913), p. 173.
[6] Sutherland, *op. cit.*, chap. xv.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 97, 98.

them as being constitutionally inferior is unsatisfactory, since, though their behavior cannot be traced to any definite organic cause, it is equally true that it cannot be demonstrated to be constitutional. It is much wiser, in view of our present knowledge, or lack of knowledge, to appreciate the possibility that in some instances the disorders are the outgrowth of poor or unfortunate environmental circumstances. These people are, nevertheless, abnormal in spite of the fact that their abnormalities may not have reached the extent of a mental disorder. . . . Their delinquency, vagrancy, and ready susceptibility to drug and alcoholic addiction and sex irregularities, as well as their criminal behavior, make them important social problems.[8]

It seems that no diagnosis of the "psychopathic state" is very clear, and that its causes are not known. Thus, any prisoner who comes in with a persistently bad behavior record can apparently qualify as a psychopath, so that relatively little confidence can be felt in such a classification and little information can be gained from it until the condition, if it exists, is more carefully specified and better understood.

Sutherland concludes that only a small proportion of serious crimes results directly either from intoxication or from the use of drugs, but that the indirect effects of the excessive use of alcohol are much more important. These latter commonly include the nonsupport of families and a general deterioration of family life.[9]

Table 14 compares the arrest rates of white and Negro males fifteen years old and over in the United States for the period 1936-40. There can be no question that the rates for Negroes are far in excess of those for whites. It cannot be said with any confidence, however, that the higher rate is due to race until all other relevant factors are equated between the two groups, and such a complete equation is out of the question. The greater poverty and ignorance, the lower occupational status of the Negro, and race prejudice may be responsible for all of the difference. The urban Negro lives in slum areas, and it is well known that slums furnish high crime rates regardless of the color or nationality of their inhabitants. Indians are like Negroes in their frequency of arrest and commitment, and the explanation

[8] Roy M. Dorcus and G. Wilson Shaffer, *Textbook of Abnormal Psychology* (3rd ed., Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Co., 1945), p. 421.
[9] Sutherland, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

TABLE 14

ARRESTS BY RACE, 1947, PER 100,000 POPULATION *

Offense charged	White	Negro
Criminal homicide	2.7	20.4
Assault	24.5	178.0
Robbery	9.8	58.8
Burglary	20.3	79.1
Larceny	32.9	144.4
Auto theft	11.4	22.1
Embezzlement-fraud	11.5	15.5
Forgery and counterfeiting	5.4	8.3
Rape	5.2	20.1
Total	412.0	1297.6

* Adapted from Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports*, XVIII, No. 2, p. 122.

again is obviously a sociological one, especially the great differences between the culture of the Indian and that of the white man who makes the law and enforces it.

In accordance with the principle that mobility tends to increase crime, immigrants to the United States show higher crime rates than the population of their home lands. When, however, proper corrections for age, sex, etc., are made, their rates are found to be lower than those prevailing for other groups in this country. The children of the foreign-born, on the contrary, appear to be more criminal than the native-born whites, because of the disorganizing effects of the new environment, usually the city slums. On the whole, the evidence fails to establish any scientific basis for the popular belief that biological differences due to race and nationality play a significant part in the commitment of crime. Rather, the evidence points to environmental circumstances as the important factor.

Of eight types of crime reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for 1947, all except murder showed higher rates in cities than in rural areas.[10] This is no doubt in part because of the incompleteness of rural crime statistics, in part be-

[10] *Uniform Crime Reports*, XIX, No. 1, pp. 5, 18. See also Walter A. Lunden, *Statistics on Crime and Criminals* (Pittsburgh: Stevenson & Foster Co. 1942), pp. 73-74.

cause of the weakening of the primary social controls of family and neighborhood in urban life. In a series of studies made in Chicago, Shaw, McKay, and others have found the highest delinquency and crime rates in the slums or so-called "areas of disorganization" near the center of the city. The same results have been obtained in a number of other large American cities, but do not apply to all smaller cities or to some foreign cities. These findings and other evidence point to the neighborhood and community environment as the major precipitating causes of delinquency. In some Chicago slums it appears that stealing and other forms of delinquency are not only associated with poverty and general deterioration, but also that they have become established as regular ways of life which the children acquire just as in other neighborhoods they learn to play marbles or baseball:

In our block we shot craps for money. Some of the kids would steal from the newsstands on the corner and others would steal from their mother's pocketbook and from their sisters and brothers. Some of the kids bought candy with the money they stole, and some would buy cigarettes, chewing gum, tobacco, and snuff. . . .

Times were always poor in the neighborhood and I and the other children had to steal coal off the tracks of the railroad and sometimes break seals on the box car to get fruit or whatever the car contained.

The children are broken in on stealing by many of the parents. It usually starts out by the parents sending them out to pick coal on the railroad tracks. . . . There are so many picking coal off the tracks that it soon is gathered up . . . so they first steal off the coal cars; later they steal out of the coal yards themselves. As they get a little older and bolder they begin to look on coal stealing as a piker's racket. . . . They next turn to stealing off peddlers. . . . By this time they have a mob, because in numbers they are safer. They roll drunks, rob storekeepers, bread boxes and pie wagons.[11]

The slum areas are infested with boys' gangs which follow certain delinquent practices and transmit them and the skill required to do them from one generation of boys to another. Thus the crime rate of such an area changes little over a long

[11] Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, "Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency," *The Causes of Crime*, Vol. II, No. 13, National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, June 26, 1931), pp. 120, 125, 130.

period of years, regardless of changes in the composition of the local population, say, from German and Irish to Italian and Jewish or Mexican and Negro:

> The boys' gang is an adjustment that results from the failure of the family and community to meet the boy's problems. This failure is especially characteristic of the foreign family and community, which economic necessity has segregated in the slum. Hence it is that the slum, particularly the foreign slum, is gangland. For gangland is but the result of the boy's creation of a social world in which he can live and find satisfaction for his wishes.
>
> The characteristic habitat of Chicago's numerous gangs is that broad twilight zone of railroads and factories, of deteriorating neighborhoods and shifting populations, which borders the city's central district on the north, on the west, and on the south. They constitute a sort of medieval empire in a modern city. This empire is divided into three great domains: the North Side Jungles, which lie north and east of the north branch of the Chicago River; the West Side Wilderness, which lies west of the Loop and the river; and the South Side Badlands, which extend south of the Loop and east of the South Branch of the river. The realm of the gang also extends into the better residential areas along railroads and business streets which reach into these communities like tentacles of the slum. In addition to these chief regions of gangland, there are certain appended areas attached to industrial and other suburbs and satellites which include slum-like districts and foreign communities of the poorer type. The haunts of the gang, however, are chiefly to be found in the so-called "poverty belt" about the Loop.
>
> The beginnings of the gang can best be discerned in one of those crowded sections of the city that comprise its characteristic habitat. On a warm summer evening, for example, the formation of gangs may be easily observed in the twilight life of the slum. Groups of children at play are everywhere. They readily meet in their social environment, hostile forces which knit them together and give them solidarity. The embryo gangs often have their beginnings in the fighting that takes place between rival streets. While many of them are ephemeral, others develop considerable social self-consciousness. They often get a name from their own street or of their own choosing. In this way the embryo gang becomes solidified and permanent and acquires considerable stability. Boys may hang together in this manner throughout the whole period of adolescence, and when they arrive at manhood they represent a well-integrated group. After the gang has developed for a period, it is likely to become conventionalized, taking on some traditional form

like a club, or following some social pattern in the community. The dominant social pattern for the gang in Chicago is the athletic club, a type of organization which is the dream of every street gang. In the conventional stage, however, the formal acquirements are largely external and the group still retains many of its old gang characteristics. Out of these gangs of boys and young men the criminal gangs develop, and often these dangerous associations masquerade under the name of clubs. The crime commission of Chicago estimates that there are 10,000 professional criminals in the city. It is more than likely that their training was in such gangs, which, usually unsupervised, are veritable cradles of crime.

Besides creating juvenile delinquency and training criminals, the gang acts always as a source of disorder in the community. It is a problem for school, for park, for playground, and for settlement. It thrives on conflict. When there are riots, the gang takes a leading part in them; and it easily becomes a nucleus for the mob. In its more mature forms, in unscrupulous hands, it becomes the instrument for evil. It may be used in labor slugging, in strike breaking, or in violent competition. In Chicago, as in other cities, it has become a favorite tool of political bosses, who subsidize it and protect it in its delinquency in return for strong-arm work and votes.

Yet it would be erroneous to suppose that the gang is inherently evil. It is simply a spontaneous expression of human nature without social direction. It is a product of neglect and repression. It flourishes like weeds in the formal garden of society.[12]

More recently, the Chicago Area Project has reported that only one out of five delinquents charged with stealing were lone offenders, on the one hand, or had more than three companions in theft, on the other. This suggests the importance of companions, whether connected with an organized gang or not, in setting the pattern for delinquency.[13]

The broken home, i.e., the home from which one parent has been removed by divorce, desertion, or death, is commonly regarded as the chief of all sources of delinquency. The careful investigations by Shaw and McKay, however, found it to be of minor importance in Chicago.[14] According to the Gluecks,

[12] Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 154-56.

[13] *Juvenile Deliquency*, A monograph prepared by the Chicago Area Project, Mimeo (1946), p. 11.

[14] Shaw and McKay, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-84.

delinquents are more likely to come from families which have a parent or older sibling with a criminal record.[15]

At the end of a study of 486 adult inmates of the Wisconsin State Prison, in which he compared them in some detail with their law-abiding brothers, Gillin drew the following conclusions regarding the conditions that had contributed to their criminality or lack of criminality:

> The conditions that seem to create a [crime] hazard are low income of the parents; inferior intelligence, mental deficiency, queerness, and insanity; and drunkenness and disharmony in the parental home. The following conditions are hazardous when they are not offset by countervailing influences: early termination of school and departure from the home; conflict, between the culture of the home and that of the community; frustration of the child's fundamental wishes in the home and in the community with resulting emotional conflict; consciousness of inferiority; loss of self-esteem from whatever cause (loss of status, low intelligence, emotional instability, lack of security, economic and emotional); and anti-social companions. Among the circumstances most likely to precipitate anti-social behavior are threats to emotional security, usually in filial, familial, or sexual relations, and suggestions by clever and unscrupulous individuals.
>
> Among the circumstances that appear to have a steadying effect are stability of occupation, economic security, an occupation suited to the individual's tastes and talents, satisfying domestic relationships, satisfactory status in the community, and personal integration.[16]

Although Gillin names poverty as the first cause of criminal behavior, so complex and varied are the effects of the environment on the personality that wealth and opportunity may also furnish the setting which generates crime. Let us listen to Clarence Darrow defend Richard Loeb, who was born and raised a rich boy:

> Dickie Loeb was a child of wealth and opportunity. Over and over in this court Your Honor has been asked, and other courts have been asked to consider boys who have no chance; they have been asked to consider the poor, whose home had been the street, with no education

[15] Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor T. Glueck, *Five Hundred Criminal Careers* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1930).

[16] John L. Gillin, *The Wisconsin Prisoner: Studies in Crimogenesis* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1946), pp. 190-91.

and no opportunity in life, and they have done it and they have done it rightfully.

But, Your Honor, it is just as often a great misfortune to be the child of the rich as it is to be the child of the poor. Wealth has its misfortunes. Too much, too great opportunity and advantage given to a child has its misfortunes, and I am asking Your Honor to consider the rich as well as the poor. . . .

Darrow's biographer, Irving Stone, wrote of Leopold:

His father had taught him and demonstrated to him that wealth controls the world, that anything he desired could be bought. When he wanted to hunt birds in the park and it was out of season his father's wealth had secured him a special permit; when he was caught fishing out of season his father not only paid the fines but replaced the equipment that had been taken from Leopold and his friends. . . . Young Leopold grew up with the idea that he was beyond responsibility because he was beyond the need to earn money; that all his life he could do precisely what he wished because he would always have the money with which to buy that wish.[17]

Just as crime is no single or uniform act, so it must have many causes. If we assume that all behavior has some motive or purpose, however vague, then criminal behavior must be behavior that attempts to attain its purpose by the use of methods legally defined as criminal. The crucial question is then why the criminal solves his problem in an asocial, rather than in a socially approved manner. There are, of course, several answers. The American Indian who takes blood revenge is following an approved Indian pattern, but is violating the criminal code of the white man, who regards his behavior as murder. The blood feud of the Kentucky mountaineer is in the same general class. In fact, there exist in our complex society many groups with developed values and practices which not only differ from those of the larger society, but which are also more or less in conflict with the latter. This is true of certain business corporations, labor unions, boys' gangs, and rural moonshiner's communities. The conflicts may result from different cultural evolution (as in the case of the Indians and whites); or they may

[17] By permission from *Crime: Causes and Conditions*, p. 205, by Hans von Hentig, Copyrighted, 1947. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.

be attributable to special group interests which are opposed to the interests of the larger society, as illustrated by the crimes of big business, bootlegging, gambling, and vice. In some cases, it is easier to achieve a purpose by means of a criminal act than by socially approved methods, an illustration being easy theft vs. hard labor. Indeed, crime may sometimes offer the only way out short of severe suffering or death, as when a man who cannot get employment or relief is driven to steal food for himself and his family. For certain personalities, the excitement of a life of crime—gambling, prostitution, robbery—is emotionally so much more attractive than the routine of the workaday world that they cannot resist its lure. In those groups or gangs where crime is an accepted career, it is the road to approval, status, and power, as among racketeers of the underworld. Men who engage in shady enterprises of this sort are drawn into them in much the same way as other men enter legitimate business and professional life, i.e., by exposure to opportunities of that particular kind in the company of associates who approve of them. Crimes like rape and murder, on the other hand, are usually committed on the spur of the moment, to relieve overpowering emotional tensions created by the passions of lust, anger, hate, jealousy, and the like.

Mere chance often plays a decisive part in the commitment of crime. Von Hentig has gone so far as to estimate that it is a contributing factor in 20 to 30 per cent of all prison cases, although it must be admitted that there seems to be no clear basis for such a calculation. But Von Hentig calls attention to the fact that the late Clarence Darrow, in the course of a long and outstanding career as a criminal lawyer, was impressed with the importance of accidental circumstances in both the violation of the law and the conviction of the violator.[18]

From what has been said, it can be seen that three kinds of factors are always concerned in criminal behavior, as well as in behavior in general, namely, personalities, situations, and cultures. Personalities introduce attitudes, values, knowledge, emotional tendencies, and abilities. Situations set special problems and specific conditions under which they must be solved.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 352-54.

Culture imposes certain general opportunities and restrictions on the method of solution, and with these occasional group values may be in conflict. A situation may thus create demands and tensions of any degree of difficulty which some personalities can solve within the approved channels of the law-making culture and others cannot, or which conceivably no personalities can solve without either violating the criminal code or giving up their purpose.

Most people are able to satisfy their essential needs and to adjust their demands upon life to the point where they can be met by following the accepted customs and approved behavior patterns of their society. If the average citizen cuts corners a little here and there he is careful that his deviations are not serious enough to put the stamp of criminality upon him. He lives by an occupation that is considered to be of some use to the society and worthy of a certain economic reward and social esteem.

In a society as vast and complex as ours, however, everybody is not so fortunately situated. There are many isolated pockets where a peculiar combination of circumstances suggests contrary ways of life, and where there are few satisfying opportunities to enter the normal channels of the workaday world. This type of dislocation occurs most conspicuously in the slums of great cities, in depressed and backward rural areas, and among certain types of neighborhoods, families, and individuals everywhere.

In all cases, the background associations, the situations in which they find themselves, and the temperament and capacity of the individuals are the factors that decide a career. Even when they are similarly situated, people differ in their ability to steer their courses among the alternatives and problems that bear upon them without breaking the prescribed rules of the game. It is because of this fact that some criminologists have made a distinction between the "good evildoer" and the "genuine criminal." The former is seen as a victim of unusual environmental pressures, the latter as unable because of something within himself to make a law-abiding adjustment even under ordinary circumstances. Von Hentig says:

Most of our criminals are milieu-made. They are law-abiding while the sun shines, economic life goes on undisturbed, and their ability of adjustment is not taxed excessively. When social storms are brewing, depressions set in, prices tumble, and the army of unemployed swells, the average law-abiding individual yields to extreme pressure and becomes a lawbreaker.[19]

Such a distinction between the "good evildoer" and the "genuine criminal," however, depends upon another distinction, namely, that between ordinary and extraordinary circumstances, for which no definition is suggested.

With further reference to the relation of social organization to crime rates, it has been pointed out that immigrant and other minority groups which are able to maintain strong family ties, religious loyalties, and definite mores (in other words, groups that have not lost their social and cultural integration) have lower incidence of crime than have those groups which have become disrupted by internal cultural conflicts, as is often the case with second-generation immigrant neighborhoods in American cities.[20] The importance of the essential integration of all parts of a society with the whole may be underscored in the words of Sutherland: "Crime is a symptom of social disorganization and probably can be reduced appreciably only by changes in the social organization." [21]

Criminologists realistically point out, however, that at any level of efficiency in social organization likely to be achieved in practice under any kind of actual social or economic system whatever, there will always be some deviant personalities and groups that will be unable or unwilling to conform to the prevailing mores and legal code of the society. While it can be confidently asserted that a more thoroughgoing and effective organization of society, designed to meet the essential needs of all members of the population, would reduce the crime rate to a greater degree than any other method, it cannot be expected that even the most drastic procedure of this sort would ever eliminate the problem of crime.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[20] Arthur Wood, "Minority-Group Criminality and Cultural Integration," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XXXVII, No. 6 (1947), 509-10.
[21] Sutherland, *op. cit.*, 1934, p. 22.

Crime as Social and Personal Disorganization.—Returning to Sutherland's statement quoted above that crime is a symptom of social disorganization, it appears that his term, "disorganization," does not quite fit the definitions of social organization and disorganization as given in this book. Most crimes seem to be committed because our total social organization is inadequate, and has never been adequate, to meet the complex conditions of modern life. For example, we have not yet been able to achieve an economic system which will provide opportunities of full and continuous employment for all of our population which is able and willing to work. This is, strictly speaking, *incomplete organization,* rather than disorganization, which implies that an effective organization once existed but no longer does.

We have already seen that criminals are not necessarily disorganized persons. The individual, like the group, may be simply unorganized or untrained to meet a particular situation in a socially approved manner. Or, because of his membership in a deviant group, he may be organized or prepared to meet it in a way that is regarded as antisocial by the larger society. Even a person who once responded to a situation as a law-abiding citizen, and later reacts to it in a criminal manner, may not be personally disorganized, but merely reorganized to achieve his ends in a different way. Indeed, a disorganized personality can commit only an impulsive or blundering crime, because of his mental confusion. Many crimes are of this type, but others are the result of careful design and effort.

Between the members of a criminal gang itself, it is well known that there is often very effective cooperation and efficient organization. From the point of view of its relations with other individuals and groups in the society, however, its behavior is exploitative and illegal. A state of conflict exists between the criminal group and the rest of society, which is obliged to support a domestic armed force, the police, to combat crime and protect its law-abiding citizens. The activities of the criminal elements are therefore opposed to the productive organization of society, and reduce its efficiency. An example is the successful racket which exacts substantial payments from the moving

picture theaters in Chicago on the threat of destroying their business by dropping stench bombs among the audiences. This is, of course, pure loot, in return for which no useful service is performed, and the men who obtain it live as parasites upon the rest of the society. Thus crime within a society lowers the general level of living by the amount that it exacts, plus most of the enormous cost of maintaining the police and criminal courts.

Social Control of Crime.—The position of modern criminology on the treatment of criminals is in sharp contrast to the traditional point of view and practice of the law. In early times the law apparently borrowed from religion the assumption that a person is the sole determiner of his own behavior, and therefore is to be held responsible, i.e., blameable, for whatever he does. This point of view, of course, involves the disputed doctrine of the freedom of the will, and leads logically to punishment as the natural treatment of crime. Criminologists, on the contrary, believe that human behavior, like any other natural phenomenon, is largely the result of external causes. For example, an Indian from Calcutta and a white man from Stockholm behave differently because they were brought up in different cultures—a circumstance for which neither can be held responsible.

Criminologists search for the causes of crime, in the hope of lessening it through obtaining control over the conditions that produce it. In this scientific process they find little use for the ideas of blame and punishment. Instead, their emphasis is placed upon two concepts, namely, prevention and reform. Criminology must thus be primarily interested in all theories and attempts concerned with the improvement of social organization, whether they are aimed at changes in the economic system, or at increasing the effectiveness of the family, educational, religious, and government institutions in meeting the needs of their members. The Chicago Area Project, for example, tries to motivate neighborhoods and communities which have a delinquency problem to remove it from within, through the efforts of their own leaders and institutions—the school,

the church, the club, the play group.[22] It is in a continuous public effort to remove the more demoralizing aspects of poverty and the more glaring inequalities of opportunity for a satisfactory law-abiding life that the criminologist sees the chief hope of reducing crime rates. Full employment, a living wage, good housing, wholesome neighborhoods, and the absence of discrimination against minority groups, are among the factors that first receive his attention.

The second great concern of criminology is for the proper development of the individual personality, especially in those liability groups that are on the margins of law-abiding society. It must look to the schools, the churches, the police, and the social welfare agencies, especially in areas of poverty and social disorganization, continuously to search out those children who are in the way of acquiring shiftless or antisocial attitudes and behavior, and focus their skills upon them in a determined effort, by whatever means and changes may be necessary, psychological or material, to redirect their interests and values into socially approved channels. The role of the psychiatric social worker is becoming increasingly indispensable in this vast undertaking, particularly when she works in conjunction with the local school.

The modern juvenile court differs from the ordinary court of law in that its procedure is informal, and by virtue of its guardianship rights and powers of supervision or probation over delinquent children, it undertakes to investigate the reasons for their misbehavior and to bring about their reform by any method which seems best suited to the particular case. The achievement of these children's courts is still not impressive, but most criminologists feel that they are superior for their purpose to the criminal court, and are an important step in the right direction. The juvenile court is particularly designed to carry out the third great objective of scientific criminology: reform, at the earliest possible age, of those antisocial personalities which have developed in spite of all organized efforts at their prevention.

[22] Chicago Area Project Monograph, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

As experience accumulates, constructive criticisms of the procedures and practices of the juvenile courts are appearing. For example, Tappan points out the confusion that prevails in the present transitional stage of passing from antiquated to modern methods of dealing with the problem of delinquency. He reports a strong tendency for social workers to involve the Wayward Minor Court of New York City primarily in the function of preventing delinquency, rather than in reformation of delinquents. While he does not question the importance of prevention, he believes that this can be done better by agencies other than the court. He does not regard the court as properly equipped to deal with prevention, and he feels that the stigma of court interference should not be placed on young people who have not yet committed any offense. He also charges the juvenile court with retaining too much of the old attitude toward young offenders:

> It is the author's contention that a great part, if not the vast majority, of the cases which today are dealt with in some fashion by the Wayward Minor Court could be serviced more exactly and appropriately by other agencies of the city, leaving to that tribunal and its probation staff the sufficiently challenging task of dealing reformatively with truly delinquent adolescents. Selective referrals could be made most advantageously by coordinating councils rather than in the fashion of unplanned, spasmodic, fortuitous happenstance which now prevails. . . .
>
> Our strongly primitive heritage in dealing with offenders against the criminal law has found continuing, if somewhat diminished, expression in the methods of administering treatment to the adolescent as well as to the adult. . . .
>
> It is probably true that, toward the individual case, the dominant attitude of the majority of those into whose hands the wayward minor is placed during processing and treatment is still retributive and punitive.
>
> Side by side, but in substantial conflict with the punitive approach, proceeds a clinical emphasis upon rehabilitation, expressed in the effort to remove the girl, if it is believed necessary, from her risk-creating environment, to find her legitimate employment, to take care of her more obvious physical ailments, and to encourage the development of higher ideals as such. The more constructive purpose and methods of treatment are likely to be applied when contact with a girl on probation has developed the worker's insight and sympathy; especially, therefore,

when the girl's conduct has not been too morally offensive to the particular worker, when the girl has conducted herself with docility, or when she is attractive and engaging . . .

Often entering into this conflicting intermixture of purpose is the added desire to prevent the sex offender, especially when she has become venereally diseased, from spreading her charm or infection further, and so to incapacitate her for a time. In such instances one finds a struggle among philosophies of moralistic judgment and punitive treatment against a violator of the social mores, of a nonmoralistic and clinical effort to cure disease and protect society, and of a reformative attempt to produce a better adjustment to the community and its standards. Court, probation, and institutions, all in varying degrees display the confusion of purposes, emphasizing now one, now another.[23]

The theory of reform which distinguishes the children's court is recommended by criminologists for the adult criminal court as well, although the difficulties there are obviously greater because of the more advanced age of the offenders. The proposal is essentially that, after everything possible has been done by society for the prevention of crime, every newly convicted adult criminal shall be studied intensively to determine the most promising method of treatment which might be applied in his case. The court would then be free to prescribe as it saw fit in an attempt to achieve his rehabilitation and restoration to society. This might involve immediate and unconditional release; discharge on parole under supervision; commitment to a hospital for medical or psychiatric care; placement in a training school; or other form of treatment. In a certain proportion of extreme cases, of course, the offender would be incapable of reform. For the protection of society, he would have to be sentenced to permanent confinement in prison or in an asylum for the criminally insane. Institutions of public correction would be more specialized in type, designed for definite purposes and types of cases, rather than as catch-alls for men of every age and criminal condition, as is now the common practice. In these institutions, and in the outside supervision of men on parole, the technical knowledge of medicine, psychology, sociology, and case practice would be more fully utilized in the work

[23] Tappan, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-39, 87-88, 211-12.

of rehabilitating the adult criminal as well as the juvenile delinquent.

Criminology stresses prevention and rehabilitation rather than punishment, but this does not mean that it advocates no use whatever of punishment, nor that it rejects all idea of individual responsibility. On the contrary, it takes the point of view that it would be as much a mistake to assume that an individual has nothing to do with his own conduct as to suppose that all of the causes of his behavior lie within himself. The principles of the psychology of learning clearly recognize the need for motivation through means of rewards and punishments, and no program of rehabilitation could possibly succeed without utilizing these fundamental methods to some extent. In so far as feasible, it must be seen to that the consequences of crime to the criminal shall not be pleasant or profitable, and that law-abiding behavior shall be the more rewarding.

Evidently no scheme of sanctions can be effective if it is limited to the formal punishment of convicted criminals, because many persons who are guilty of criminal behavior are never convicted, and positive rewards for good behavior are as essential for the control of crime as are negative punishments. It therefore appears that any adequate theory of punishment implies a closely knit and effective organization of society, which is capable of more clearly defining and controlling the rewards and punishments of legal vs. illegal behavior. Since punishment follows the criminal act, it can only serve two purposes: (1) social revenge or retribution, or (2) deterrence of further misconduct by the same person or others. Penological experience of many centuries has proven that even the most severe forms of punishment fail to prevent the repetition of criminal behavior. This is also in accord with expectation—most of the many causes of crime are in no way modified by punishment. Punishment may, of course, have a deterring effect on misconduct; but it is practically never sufficient in itself.

Finally, punishment may have a variety of emotional consequences on the person punished, some of which are quite different from what the law intended. It often produces anger and a desire to retaliate against society after release. Punishment

by imprisonment commonly leads to acquaintance with other criminals and the reinforcement of antisocial attitudes through fellow-feeling, the sharing of experiences, and the desire for increased status in the eyes of fellow-criminals. It is well known that young law-breakers look with envy and admiration upon the hardened, "big-time" criminals whom they encounter in prison, learn eagerly from them, and attempt to emulate them after serving their sentences. It is for this reason that prisons have been called "schools of crime."

Social Science and the Law.—If the above discussion of the point of view of social science toward the problem of crime gives the impression that our legal institutions and practices are entirely archaic and misdirected, such a result is not intended. Lawyers and judges can argue strongly in favor of present court procedures as practical necessities and safeguards of personal rights. In this connection, it is interesting to notice that when a sociologist is also trained in the law, he is apt to consider that each of these two approaches is in need of correction by the other. We again quote Tappan:

> Social scientific thinking has been especially relevant to the analysis of processes, methods, and philosophy of disposition of cases (so inadequately guided by the law): pointing up the need for improved individualization and classification in treatment; the dangers of unnecessary incarceration, of the invidious disparities in treatment which are possible and actual under the statutes; and the effects of gross variations among the personnel, especially the differences among judges and among probation officers.
>
> Juristic thinking, on the other hand, points up numerous errors which have arisen in the adjudicative process due to the attempted over-all "liberalization" of the Court into a surrogate for social agencies. It reveals the dangers and injustice in depriving defendants of the trial protections generally assured under Anglo-American legal tradition, the error which may result from basing court adjudication on vague hearsay social data, the need for statutory substantive norms of conduct as a pre-condition of trial justice. Specifically, the ideas of preadjudication investigation and course-of-conduct adjudication have been attacked as unjustifiable products of loose thinking in applied sociology, incompatible with sound legal theory.[24]

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 227, 229.

QUESTIONS

1. *a*) Define the terms "delinquency" and "crime."
   b) How is it that "no present definition of crime can be regarded as very fundamental or exact"?
2. Contrast the theory of Lombroso with the findings of Goring.
3. Discuss and evaluate the following as significant causes of delinquency and crime:
   a) Mental deficiency
   b) Mental disorder
   c) "Psychopathic personality"
   d) Alcoholism
   e) Drug addiction
   f) Race
   g) Nativity
4. Compare the crime rates of cities and rural areas and try to explain the differences.
5. What is the ecological pattern of crime in great American cities? How do you account for it?
6. How is the boys' gang related to delinquency?
7. What is the evidence regarding companions in crime, and what is its bearing on the gang theory of delinquency?
8. What did Gillin find to be the chief conditions making for and against adult crime in Wisconsin?
9. Is the idea that great wealth may dispose a boy to crime a valid one? On how much evidence does it rest?
10. Illustrate crimes due to conflicts between the values or interests of a particular group and those of the larger society in which it is situated.
11. What are some of the similarities and dissimilarities between a criminal "racket" and a legitimate business organization?
12. Just what is meant by saying that "chance" often plays a part in the commitment of crime?
13. What three kinds of factors are always concerned in criminal behavior, and how?
14. Discuss the "social pressure—disposition" theory of criminal behavior, with reference to the "good evildoer" and the "genuine criminal." What is one of its weaknesses?

15. Are closely knit immigrant groups, or those partly Americanized, likely to have higher crime rates? Why?
16. Discuss the possibility of devising a social or economic system in which there would be no crime.
17. How is crime related to social organization? To group organization? To personal organization?
18. What are some of the chief differences between the points of view of criminology and of the traditional law?
19. Briefly describe the functions and methods of the present-day juvenile court, and evaluate them.
20. Discuss the idea of punishment in dealing with violations of the law.

REFERENCES

CAVAN, RUSH SHOULE. *Criminology.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1948.

GILLIN, JOHN LEWIS. *The Wisconsin Prisoner.* Madison, Wis.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1946.

SHAW, CLIFFORD R. (ed.). *Brothers in Crime.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

SHAW, CLIFFORD R., with MOORE, MAURICE E. *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931.

SUTHERLAND, EDWIN H. *Principles of Criminology* (4th ed.). Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1948.

TAFT, DONALD R. *Criminology.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945.

WHYTE, WILLIAM FOOTE. *Street Corner Society, the Social Structure of an Italian Slum.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943.

PART V

CULTURE

CHAPTER 12

HUMAN RELATIONS IN DIFFERENT SOCIETIES

The term *culture* refers to the customary behavior and manners, the knowledge and skills, the prevalent ideas and beliefs, the institutions, and all the fabricated objects (clothing, architecture, tools, weapons, machines, books, works of art) of a people. A culture includes the established patterns of human relationship and social organization that exist within a society, which are of chief interest to sociology.

Wherever two societies have developed independently, i.e., with little or no communication between them, as did, say, the English and the Aztecs, their cultures are always unlike. The reasons for this will be brought out in the next chapter. In the meanwhile, to give some idea of the wide variations in even the most commonplace human relationships which occur from one society to another, several examples of intrafamily relations, together with a few other relations, quoted from anthropological reports of societies in many parts of the world and at different historical periods, are collected below.

Family Relations as a Cultural Variable

Young Chinese Married Couple.—Yang presents a description of the traditional relations of a newly wed Chinese couple:

Since marriage in an old-fashioned Chinese family is arranged by the parents, and since the two young people do not know each other before the wedding, the problem of adjustment for the newly married couple is a difficult one. They do not have their own home, but live with the husband's family. Although the couple often achieve a genuine affection for each other after a brief period of living together, they must not let their love be apparent and the husband, if he is to be considered

a filial son and a good brother, must maintain closer relations with his family than with his wife. A young husband must not mention his wife too often; he must not praise her in family gatherings or to the villagers; if she passes by when he is with other persons, he must not speak to her unless either one or the other has an urgent message. When a husband returns from a trip he must greet his parents and his brothers and sisters before he greets his wife. Only after several hours have elapsed may he excuse himself and join his wife in their room, and that only on the pretext that he must clean up and change his clothes. Although he may be most anxious to be with his beloved one, and his family (especially his mother and sisters) understand this perfectly, he must none the less affect indifference.

A young wife must also keep from showing that she loves her husband. The general attitude is that a decent wife should love her husband, but must not let her love spoil his career or make him neglect his duty to his family. A good wife stays at her work with her mother-in-law or sisters-in-law during the day, and at night she must wait until all the family members have retired before she can go to her room and be with her husband. She should avoid sitting with her husband at social gatherings and should act as if she does not know him. She, too, must avoid referring frequently to him, or if it is necessary for her to do so, she should not use his name nor say "my husband," but instead use the pronoun "he." In speaking to her younger brother-in-law, or younger sister-in-law, she may refer to her husband as "your number X brother." When her husband returns from a prolonged trip, she does not greet him. Instead she prepares hot water and a meal for him, according to her mother-in-law's order. However, every member in the family knows that, after his mother, she is the one who is happiest at his return. The younger sister-in-law may tease her and this she will secretly enjoy.[1]

Marriage Among the Aztecs.—The marriage relation in the relatively advanced civilization of the Aztecs, although developed in more or less complete isolation from any contact with white culture, shows some interesting resemblances, as well as differences, when compared with our own modern society. Vaillant reports that

A youth was ready for marriage at twenty, and a girl was deemed mature at about sixteen. The parents arranged the marriage with the consent of the boy and girl. A priest was consulted to decide whether or not the fates of the couple were harmonious. Incest laws like our

[1] Martin C. Yang, *A Chinese Village: Taiton, Shantung Province* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 54-55.

own prevailed with the further restriction that marriage must be outside the clan. Having satisfied these conventions, the father of the boy sent two elderly clanswomen with gifts to the girl's father who, following custom, rejected the suit. The old ladies returned again to consult in earnest with the parents of the prospective bride. Such a discussion was necessarily intricate, since it involved the amount of the bride's dowry, which was to be balanced by the gifts of her suitor.

On the evening of the wedding one of the matchmakers carried the bride on her back over the threshold of the husband's house. Elaborate speeches were made by everyone, following which the mantles of the bride and groom were tied together, symbolizing the union. The old men and women gave tongue again in the form of long-winded homilies, and at last a feast, liberally lubricated with pulque, took place. The bride and the groom, after this merciless treatment, retired for four days of penance and fasting, and not until that period elapsed did they consummate their marriage.

As is often the case in a warrior nation which suffers from reduced man power, polygamy was prevalent. Yet the first wife took precedence over the others, and her children alone had the right to inherit. Concubines were permitted and there was, likewise, prostitution. Desertion was frowned upon, but a court would grant a decree of divorce under certain conditions. A man could obtain the right to cast out his wife if she were sterile, were subject to prolonged ill temper, or neglected the household duty. The wife could be freed from a husband who failed to support her or educate the children or who ill-treated her in the physical sense, for the Aztecs had not invented mental cruelty. A divorced woman could remarry as she chose, but a widow had to marry a brother of her deceased husband or one of his clansmen.

Women had definite rights, but they were inferior to those of men. They could hold property, enter into contracts, and go to courts to obtain justice. In matters of sexual morality girls had to be chaste and wives faithful to their husbands. A man transgressed the rules of propriety only when his illicit relations involved a married woman. Otherwise his wife could not formally demand his fidelity.[2]

Marriage System of the Australian Aborigines.—Primitive Australians are unusual for the intricate scheme of restrictions which they have developed around marriage. To quote from Thomas,

2 George C. Vaillant, *Aztecs of Mexico* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1941), pp. 111-12.

[In the Urabunna tribe we can] distinguish women of three different levels of generation; the *Nowillie* belong to that of the father and to still older generations; the *Biaka* to the younger one and the *Apilla* and *Nupa* to the same generation as the individual concerned. A man can only marry women who stand to him in the relationship of *Nupa,* that is, are the children of his mother's elder brothers, blood or tribal, or, what is the same thing, of his father's elder sisters. The mother of a man's *Nupa* is *Nowillie* to him, and any woman of that relationship is *Mura* to him and he to her, and they must not speak to one another. In connection with this it must be remembered that it is not necessary for the woman actually to have a daughter for her to be *Nowillie* and so *Mura* to the man; the very fact that she was born a sister of his father places her in this relationship. In the same way *Nupa,* the term applied to a woman with whom it is lawful for a man to have marital relations, and which is thus the term applied to a wife, cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded as at all the equivalent of the latter term. It is applied indiscriminately by a dingo man to each and every member of a group of water-hen women with one or more of whom he may perhaps actually have marital relations, but with any one of whom it is lawful and possible for him to do so. When we say possible for him to have such marital relations, we mean that any one of these women might be assigned to him, as they all, in fact, stand to him in the relationship of potential wives. . . .

While this is so, it must be remembered that in actual practice each individual man has one or perhaps two of these *Nupa* women who are specially attached to himself and live with him in his own camp. In addition to them, however, each man has certain *Nupa* women, beyond the limited number just referred to, with whom he stands in the relationship of *Piraungaru.* To women who are the *Piraungaru* of a man (the term is a reciprocal one), the latter has access under certain conditions, so that they may be considered as accessory wives. . . .

There is no such thing as one man having the exclusive right to one woman; the elder brothers, or *Nuthie,* of the latter, in whose hands the matter lies, will give one man a preferential right, but at the same time they will give other men of the same group a secondary right to her. Individual marriage does not exist either in name or in practice in the Urabunna tribe. . . .

A man may always lend his wife, that is, the woman to whom he has the first right, to another man, provided always he be her *Nupa,* without the relationship of *Piraungaru* existing between the two, but unless this relationship exists, no man has any right of access to a woman. Occasionally, but rarely, it happens that a man attempts to prevent his wife's

Piraungaru from having access to her, but this leads to a fight and the husband is looked upon as churlish. When visiting distant groups where, in all likelihood, the husband has no *Piraungaru*, it is customary for other men of his own class to offer him the loan of one or more of their *Nupa* women, and a man, besides lending a woman over whom he has the first right, will also lend his *Piraungaru*. . . .

It will thus be seen that in the Urabunna tribe we have apparently an organization closely similar to that described by Mr. Howitt as occurring in the Dieri tribe with which it is associated locally. It will also be evident that in both these tribes there is what can only be described as a modified form of group-marriage, the important features of which may be summarized as follows. We have:—

(1) A group of men all of whom belong to one moiety of the tribe who are regarded as the *Nupas* or possible husbands of a group of women who belong to the other moiety of the tribe.

(2) One or more women specially allotted to one particular man, each standing in the relationship of *Nupa* to the other, but no man having exclusive right to any one woman, only a preferential right.

(3) A group of men who stand in the relationship of *Piraungaru* to a group of women selected from amongst those to whom they are *Nupa*. In other words, a group of women of a certain designation are actually the wives of a group of men of another designation.

A curious feature in the social organization of the Urabunna tribe is the restriction in accordance with which a man's wife must belong to what we may call the senior side of the tribe so far as he himself is concerned. He is only *Nupa* to the female children of the elder brothers of his mother, or what is exactly the same thing, to those of the elder sisters of his father. It follows from this that a woman is only *Nupa* to men on the junior side of the tribe so far as she is concerned. This marked distinction between elder and younger brothers and sisters is a striking feature, not only in tribes such as the Urabunna, in which descent is counted in the female line, but also in tribes such as the Arunta in which descent is counted in the male line. . . .[3]

Absentia Marriage of Kulin Brahmans.—In India, certain historic events, combined with the caste system, produced the following marginal marriage practice of the Kulin Brahmans:

The interest of upper-class men in the legality of polygamy, which they could economically afford, continued to exist, even after the acute

[3] W. I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins* (Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1909), pp. 468-71.

shortage of women among the invading warriors was terminated. Such shortages have everywhere compelled conquerors to marry girls of subject populations. The result in India was, however, that the lower-caste girls had a large marriage market, and the lower the caste stood the larger was their marriage market; whereas the marriage market for girls of the highest castes was restricted to their own caste.

Among the upper castes, however, the sale of girls to a bridegroom of rank was difficult, and the more difficult it became, the more was failure to marry considered a disgrace for both the girl and her parents. The bridegroom had to be bought by the parents with incredibly high dowries, and his enlistment (through professional matchmakers) became the parents' most important worry. Even during the infancy of the girl it was a sorrow for the parents. Finally it was considered an outright "sin" for a girl to reach puberty without being married. This has led to grotesque results: for example, the marriage practice of the Kulin Brahmans, which enjoys a certain fame. The Kulin Brahmans are highly demanded as bridegrooms; they have made a business of contractually marrying girls in absentia upon request and for money, girls who thus escape the ignominy of maidenhood. The girls, however, remain with their families and happen to see the bridegroom only if business or other reasons accidentally bring him to a place where he has one (or several) such "wives" in residence. Then he shows his marriage contract to the father-in-law and uses the father's house as a "cheap hotel." In addition, without any costs, he has the enjoyment of the girl, for she is considered his "legitimate" wife.[4]

Zuñi Matriarchy.—Among the Zuñi Indians of New Mexico, The household is the economic unit, and is, in all economic activities, cooperatively organized. It is a group of variable composition: a mother, her husband, her daughters with their husbands and children, to which may be added a fluctuating group of males, divorced, widowed, temporarily estranged, or unmarried sons. All occupy a single house with from two to six rooms, including a large general living room in which the entire household works, eats, and sleeps, and where guests are entertained. A number of rooms serve to store food and the sacred paraphernalia. In this crowded atmosphere, children playing underfoot, women working, people chatting, the individual lacks that privacy which we seek in our civilization.

Within the household, relations are for the most part informal. Individual authority and responsibility are almost entirely lacking. Ordi-

[4] From *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, pp. 406-07, translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. Copyright, 1946 by Oxford University Press, New York, Inc.

narily the female contingent of blood relatives presents a united front. A man finding himself out of harmony with the group will withdraw quietly whenever he chooses and ally himself with another group. With his departure obligations cease, and his successor fathers his children.

In the things that count most in Zuñi life, in matters of ritual, the man is an outsider in the house of his wife. His most permanent ties are with the house of his sister, with whom he is united in the care of the sacred fetishes. On every occasion of moment he returns to her house. If she is in need or if her children are in need he will bring them food and gifts. If male labor is needed in the fields, a brother can be called on to assist. Similarly a woman is obligated to help her brother and her brother's children in a ceremonial and economic way. The woman, of course, as an owner of the house, is united with her own blood kin in the care of the sacred fetishes that are kept within it.

When a man marries, the ties of the blood group cut directly across the new set of obligations that are imposed on the man by marriage. He leaves his mother's house to live with his wife and mother-in-law. Here he cooperates in the economic labor of tilling fields that belong for the most part to his wife's household, with a group of males, his wife's sisters' husbands, who are more or less strangers to him. He lives with a group that cannot accept him completely, in which he is regarded as an outsider. Furthermore, the very stability of his marriage depends largely upon the whims of his wife, who may with little ado place his small bundle of belongings on the threshold of the home as a sign that he is no longer desired. It is not until a good many years have passed that he begins to achieve some sort of status in his wife's household, but for the most part he is regarded with suspicion as one who may, upon the dissolution of the marriage, spread slanderous bits of gossip about the household.[5]

Polygamy in British Guiana.—Polygamy was the common practice throughout the Guianas. A man had as many wives as he liked or could get. The frequency with which wives were sisters suggests that the husband had some marital claims upon his first wife's sisters, if he chose to assert them. The following is a picture of life in a polygamous household on the Orinoco:

As might be expected, quarrels are not wanting among the wives, although they do not live together in one house, but each one has her

[5] By permission from *Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples*, pp. 322-23, by Margaret Mead (ed.). Copyright, 1937. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.

separate habitation together with her children and her separate hearth. The fish which the husband gets is divided proportionately among all of them according to the children which each one has. When mealtime arrives they stretch the mat, which is his table, on the ground and each wife, after placing in front of him his plate of meat, his cassava cake, or caiza of maize, retires. Whether he eats or not, no one speaks to him. After the lapse of a sufficient time, each wife brings a drink of beer (chicha), which she places in front of him, and, this done, then retires to her hut to eat and drink with her children; and so strife is avoided. In the field a similar separation is arranged for. The husband divides the land, which he and his friends have cut into as many portions as he has wives, each woman sowing, cultivating, and looking after her own portion without meddling with the others. . . .

There is reason to believe that the first, generally the oldest of the wives was specially intrusted with the performance of certain duties, the exercise of certain privileges and powers. On the upper Rio Negro she is never turned away, but remains the mistress of the house. Similarly, among the Wapishana, etc., though the other wives may be young enough to be her daughters, and comparably far more attractive, the old hag will retain her position as head of the household. . . .

Arawak widows have their hair cut on their husband's death and can not marry again until it has reached a definite length. When this time has arrived, the husband's nearest relative (his brother) claims first right over her. If someone else wants her he must buy her from the first claimant, either with a gun, a corial, or some other object.[6]

Slave Matings in the Ante Bellum South.—The mating relation among Negro slaves on the plantations of the southern United States before the Civil War may seem as strange to many American readers as the customs of another land.

The violation of a slave woman was not a breach of the law but a mere trespass upon her master's property. She and her man could not legally marry. Marriage was a contract concerned mostly with the bequeathing of property; and slaves could hold no property and could make no contract. Some of the matings no doubt were dictated and were not always the worse for that. A few men were permitted to take wives on other plantations—"abroad wives," for short. Children in such a case were considered as their mothers' offspring, the property of her master. The father and his master had no duties toward them

[6] Walter Edmund Roth, "An Introductory Study of the Arts, Crafts, and Customs of the Guiana Indians," *Thirty-Eighth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1916-1917*, 1924, pp. 684-89.

or claims upon them. Some planters were quite averse to this practice, since it meant a traveler Saturday night, an absentee Sunday, a weary workman Monday and an unmated buck the rest of the week. A plantation had no bachelor bunk house; a large pickaninny crop was a necessity if the laborers were to be properly replaced through the years to come. In the main sex relations were normally peaceful.[7]

The Negro Family After Emancipation.—Following the Civil War, confusion reigned among the newly freed Negroes, their family life continued to be highly unstable, and with most of them promiscuous sex relations were the rule. As a random illustration, Frazier mentions the case of a freedman, Kit, and his wife, Nina: "Nina's first husband, who had been sold away from her 'in the old secesh times,' had come back and claimed her. Nina had been brought up on another plantation to which husband number one had now returned. But Kit had belonged to the Smith estate. So the wife went from one place to the other, spending a few weeks alternately with each husband. She had no children, so had nothing to bind her more to one than the other. . . . Marriage as a formal and legal relation was not a part of the mores of the freedman." [8]

The persistence of ante bellum habits was still strongly reflected in the statistics of Negro and white families in 1940. Only 71 per cent of all Negro families had a male head, compared with 83 per cent of white families,[9] and the number of illegitimate births per 1,000 live births in 1943 for the nation as a whole was 165.2 for nonwhites, compared with 16.3 for whites.[10] These figures furnish a rough measure of the extent to which Negroes still do not conform to the marriage mores of the whites among whom they live. "Emancipation," says Frazier, "destroyed the *modus vivendi* which had become established between the two races during slavery. In their relative isolation [the Negroes] developed a folk culture with its

[7] Ulrich B. Phillips, "Slavery: United States," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. XIV, p. 88. Copyright, 1934 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

[8] E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), pp. 97,98.

[9] Bureau of the Census, *Population: Families, Types of Families*, Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, p. 6.

[10] Federal Security Agency, "Illegitimate Live Births by Race—United States, 1943," *Vital Statistics, Special Reports*, Vol. XXI, No. 15, 1945.

peculiar social organization and social evaluations. Within the world of the black folk . . . the maternal family organization, a heritage from slavery, has continued on a fairly large scale. But the maternal family organization has also been tied up with the widespread illegitimacy which one still finds in these rural communities. Illegitimacy among these folk . . . involves no violation of the mores." [11]

Other Customs

In the above paragraphs we have seen some of the wide variations in attitudes and behavior patterns which have occurred in a single relationship, the relationship between husband and wife, or in the relationship between other members of the family, in a number of different societies. We shall now notice briefly a few other customs, for the most part extremely unlike our own, that are or have been practiced by one people or another throughout the world.

The Vendetta in New Guinea.—Supernatural beliefs, such as a belief in sorcery, can strongly affect human relationships. Mead writes the following about the vendetta in New Guinea:

A disappointed hunter or fisherman turns over in his mind how to discover who would be likely to have bewitched his nets. He perhaps raises his eyes and sees a member of a neighboring friendly village on his way to pay a visit. It at once occurs to him that this man is the sorcerer, and watching an opportunity, he suddenly attacks and kills him. This man's life has the value of another man's life, and unless full compensation is made in the shape of boars' tusks, shell armlets, etc., his friends take the first opportunity of squaring the account by killing a man, or as many as they can. Thus a vendetta is established that lasts years and years, until one day it strikes some chief that it is time this state of affairs is ended, and he sends a message to his enemies by a friendly native, suggesting a squaring up. A place is appointed; the number of lives taken on each side is estimated, and the value of the balance of lives taken by the stronger tribe is paid for.[12]

[11] Frazier, *op. cit.*, p. 483.
[12] Mead, *op. cit.*, pp. 244, 258, 259. By permission.

Iroquois Nomenclature.—Among the Iroquois of New York, extraordinary emphasis was placed on a status-conferring system of nomenclature:

Long before a child was old enough to show much personal interest in his career, he was assigned to a lifelong series of names which in themselves determined his ultimate status and political function. The most venerable of names, those which entitled the bearer to a seat in the Grand Council at Onondaga, as well as lesser ceremonial and tribal titles were thus predetermined. . . . Though common names did not remain within the confines of the family with any degree of precision, all important titles such as sachemships, tribal chief names, and names of ceremonial officials were carefully guarded within the maternal line. Coming to a unanimous agreement, the women of the maternal line chose the child successors to series of names which might culminate in high administrative titles of community or nation. An important name was never bestowed upon an outsider so long as there were suitable candidates within the family. Thus pride in ownership of names was an important cohesive factor.[18]

Infanticide.—Infanticide, a practice thoroughly abhorrent to our own society, has been widespread among peoples whose circumstances of life were very different from ours. As Sumner says,

The [primitive] Australians practiced infanticide almost universally. A woman could not carry two children. Therefore, if she had one who could not yet march, and bore another, the latter was killed. . . . Australian life was full of privations on account of limited supplies of food and water. The same conditions made wandering a necessity. . . . Sickly and imperfect children were killed because they would require very great care. . . . In British New Guinea there is more or less infanticide, the father strangling the infant at birth to avoid care and trouble. . . . On Nukuoro the civil ruler decides long before a birth whether the child is to be allowed to live or not. . . . On the Murray Islands in Torres Straits all children beyond a prescribed number are put to death, "lest the food supply should become insufficient." "If the children were all of one sex, some were destroyed from shame, it being held proper to have an equal number of boys and girls. . . ." Throughout

[18] William Graham Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), Vol. I, p. 366.

Polynesia infanticide was prevalent for social selection, all of mixed blood or caste being put to death. Only two boys in a family were allowed to live, but any number of girls. In Tahiti they killed girls, who were of no use for war, service of the god, fishing, or navigation. The Malagassans on Madagascar kill all children who are born on unlucky days.[14]

Killing the Aged.—Similarly, the practice of killing the old, the defective, and the sick, including one's own parents or grandparents, has occurred among nomadic peoples especially. Compelled to be constantly on the move to maintain a meager existence, the weak and infirm members of the tribe could not keep up, and it was seldom feasible to transport them. The situation of these unfortunates was even more hopeless when the enemy was on their heels:

All this enters into the life conditions so primarily that the custom is a part of the life policy; it is so understood and acquiesced in. . . . Catlin describes his leave-taking of an old Povea chief who was being deserted by the tribe with a little food and water, a trifling fire, and a few sticks. The tribe were driven on by hunger. The old chief said: "My children, our nation is poor, and it is necessary that you should all go to the country where you can get meat. My eyes are dimmed and my strength is no more. . . . I am a burden to my children. I cannot go. Keep your hearts stout and think not of me. I am no longer good for anything." This is the fullest statement we can quote, attributed to one of the abandoned old men, of the view of the proceeding which could make him acquiesce in it. The victims do not always take this view of the matter. This custom was common to all the tribes which roamed the prairies. Every one who lived to decrepitude knew that he must expect it. . . . The Hudson's Bay Eskimo strangle the old who are dependent on others for their food, or leave them to perish when the camp is moved. They move in order to get rid of burdensome old people without executing them. The central Eskimo kill the old because all who die by violence go to the happy land. An old woman of the Murray River people, Australia, broke her hip. She was left to die, "as the tribe did not want to be bothered with her." The helpless and infirm are customarily so treated.[15]

[14] Adapted from William Graham Sumner, *The Folkways* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1906), pp. 316-17.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 324-25.

Comments

The anthropological accounts quoted in this chapter, describing the customs of peoples in various parts of the world, have to do with subjects that have always been of keen interest to travelers and readers of stories about strange lands. Most of us are aware of the existence of foreigners and primitive peoples in other countries, and of the presence of small numbers of them in our own midst, usually on Indian reservations and in the slums of our great cities. We are all conscious of the fact that primitives and foreigners are more or less unlike ourselves in appearance, speech, and other ways of life. After reading the more formal materials above, the student may ask what further significance, apart from common knowledge and interest, such accounts have. The answer is that the study of foreign cultures from the objective and impartial point of view of anthropological science effectively takes a person outside his own culture, and enables him to look back upon it with a new relativity of perspective and understanding that he could not gain in any other way.

Merely descriptive accounts of cultural differences like those given here, however, are not enough in themselves to develop a scientific attitude toward foreign customs. It is necessary also to understand the underlying resemblances which exist between all human cultures, to see each culture as a coordinated and working system of the life-ways of a people, and to understand why any culture, including our own, has come to be what it is. These questions are taken up in succeeding chapters. From a normative point of view, it is to be expected that an acquaintance, made in the scientific spirit, with some of the striking differences in the customs of various societies, plus some knowledge of the reasons that lie behind them, will make for a better understanding and for less intolerance between peoples.

QUESTIONS

1. Define and illustrate the term *culture,* as used in sociology and anthropology.

2. Mention the traits that you consider most like and most unlike our own culture in the marriage or other family relationships among (*a*) the Chinese, (*b*) the Aztecs, (*c*) the Australian aborigines, (*d*) the Kulin Brahmans, (*e*) the Zuñi of New Mexico, (*f*) the Orinocos of British Guiana, (*g*) slaves in our ante bellum southern states, and (*h*) American Negroes after emancipation.
3. Briefly describe the following customs, and compare them with our own practices; (*a*) the vendetta in New Guinea, (*b*) the system of status-conferring nomenclature among the Iroquois, (*c*) infanticide among primitive Australians and others, and (*d*) killing the old and the defectives by the Povea and the Eskimo.
4. What is to be gained by the student of sociology from the study of the customs of primitive and foreign peoples?

REFERENCES

BREASTED, JAMES H. *The Conquest of Civilization.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1926.

FRAZIER, E. FRANKLIN. *The Negro Family in the United States.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939.

HERSKOVITS, MELVILLE J. *The Myth of the Negro Past.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1941.

KLUCKHOHN, CLYDE, and KELLY, WILLIAM H., "The Concept of Culture," and MURDOCK, GEORGE PETER, "The Common Denominator of Cultures," in Ralph Linton (ed.)., *The Science of Man in the World Crisis.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.

MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW. "Culture," and KROEBER, A. L., "Culture Area," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. IV, 1931.

MURDOCK, GEORGE PETER. *Our Primitive Contemporaries.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938.

ROTH, WALTER EDMUND. "An Introductory Study of the Arts, Crafts, and Customs of the Guiana Indians." *Thirty-eighth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1916-1917,* 1924, pp. 25 ff.

SUMNER, WILLIAM GRAHAM. *Folkways.* Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906.

———, and KELLER, ALBERT GALLOWAY. *The Science of Society.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927, Vol. I.

VAILLANT, GEORGE C. *Aztecs of Mexico.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1941, pp. 621-47.

CHAPTER 13

CAUSES OF VARIATION IN PATTERNS OF RELATIONSHIP

In the foregoing chapter it was suggested that the wide differences between the customary relationships of various primitive and other societies were the necessary result of the circumstance that the cultures developed independently of one another. We shall now consider some of the underlying reasons for this.

Chance.—It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that men everywhere, in trying to satisfy their organic and derived needs and desires, have had to rely upon the learning process. We saw that learning begins with trial-and-error methods, and is at first guided by the physiological satisfaction or dissatisfaction that results, and, later, by whatever values are associated with the accompanying emotions. The point that is of most interest to us here is that trial-and-error, when applied to any complex situation, invariably leads to a variety of solutions. Men acting independently at different times or places will almost certainly hit upon more or less different initial approaches to a common problem. For instance, in the mating relationship some societies may experiment with the method of taking a woman by capture, some may happen upon the idea of buying a bride from her male kinsmen, in others the husband may go to live with the wife's family, and so on.

Channelization.—Once a form of relationship has been hit upon that seems to produce reasonably satisfactory consequences, it becomes the basis for further development, modification, and elaboration. Continuing experience may bring new observations, ideas, and practices, but they all tend to grow out

of the original form of relationship and to be directed, or "channelized," by it.

An interesting example of channelization is claimed by Robert Briffault. According to his theory, the husband originally resided in the parental abode of the wife, under the eye of her family. In later times, apparently irked by this arrangement, the husband, with the aid of his kinsmen and friends, tried to take the bride to his own home, but met with the forcible resistance of her male relatives. Out of this armed conflict finally came a compromise whereby the husband paid the wife's family to agree to her removal. But, to save face, her clansmen continued to make a pretense of opposition. This, says Briffault, was the origin of the widespread and age-old ritual of capturing or seizing the bride at marriage ceremonies, found in Australia, in Melanesia, in New Guinea, in Polynesia, in Indonesia, in India, in Africa, and among the country people in every part of Europe:

> Thus, for example, among the Wataita and Wadshaga, after the financial arrangements for the acquisition of the woman have been completed, the bride is seized and brought away by her husband and a party of four friends, who carry her by the legs and arms, squirming and shrieking, while a jeering crowd of girls follows the procession.[1]

The Containing Culture.—A third factor in the shaping of any custom is the total culture, or larger cultural pattern, of which the custom is a part and to which it must be accommodated. No human relationships known to us today originated in a cultural vacuum. On the contrary, such relationships have invariably been influenced by other customs or circumstances in the company of which they happened to develop. Examples readily come to mind. A respectable woman in the early agricultural society of America had great difficulty in avoiding matrimony, if she wished to do so, because the opportunities to follow an independent career were extremely limited under an economic system in which the vast majority of all paid occupations outside the home were designed for and customarily

[1] From Robert Briffault, *The Mothers*, p. 232. Copyright, 1931, by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

filled by men. The relation of a mother to her children in our contemporary society is affected to a considerable extent by the existence of public schools. It is also generally realized that the enormous expansion of the urban way of life in modern times has profoundly altered the whole structure of family relations between husband and wife, between parents and children, between parents and grandparents and other kin. As Folsom says,

> Urbanization and mobility have broken up the large family group of our older rural society. Grandparents, uncles, and aunts less frequently live with the family. Adolescent sons and daughters leave the home community to find work. A new cultural attitude has arisen that it is actually undesirable for a young married couple to live with a parental family. Have we only recently discovered the disadvantages of living with our in-laws, or have we only recently found it possible to get away from them? More probably, we have been *forced* away from them by economic changes, and have hence re-evaluated the difficulties of the large household, calling them now a *danger to be avoided* rather than a *duty to be cheerfully performed.* While gaining certain values in the marital relation, we have lost other values of the old-time household where grandfather or aunt often times had a personality which held the group together in a rich and beautiful social life.[2]

Natural Environment.—The effects of the natural environment—climate, flora and fauna, mineral resources—upon human culture is a subject that has proved more complex than was realized a quarter of a century ago, when a school of geographers led by Friedrich Ratzel, Ellsworth Huntington, and Ellen Semple advocated a theory of environmental determinism.

A less extreme point of view is now held by most social scientists, including geographers. They regard nature as one, but only one, of the factors affecting culture. They also recognize that culture in turn affects the natural environment. The latter is seen as a limiting factor within which culture may take a variety of forms, any one of which is possible under the given physical conditions. Which of the many possible forms the culture will take—for instance, the industrial civilization of the white man or the savage culture of the American Indian—will

[2] Reproduced by permission from *The Family and Democratic Society*, p. 186, by Joseph K. Folsom, published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1943.

depend on the historical antecedents of the people living there, i.e., the culture they brought to the place, the foreign cultures with which they have had contact, and so on.

The claim of Huntington and others that some physical environments offer greater material resources or more stimulating and advantageous climates than others need not be denied, provided it does not imply that the natural environment is the only factor, or the most important factor, operating in the situation to determine the form culture will take there. Similarly, the opponents of the environmental school are on sound ground so long as they do not insist that all natural environments are capable of supporting any pattern or type of culture indifferently.[3]

Race.—The three chief races of mankind—Caucasoid, Mongoloid, Negroid—evidently at one time formed groups somewhat isolated from one another, and so necessarily evolved different systems or patterns of culture.[4] The variations in these patterns may well have been the result of social segregation alone, or the purely social factor may have been augmented by dissimilarities in racial physiology and psychology. Popular belief has generally attributed most, if not all, of the cultural divergencies and inequalities observed between these races to biological differences. On the contrary, the trend among anthropologists and sociologists has been to disclaim the importance of innate race characters, and to explain the differences entirely, or almost entirely, in terms of social isolation and the natural environment. The latter position is clearly stated by the anthropologist Boas:

A survey of our globe shows the continents inhabited by a great diversity of peoples different in appearance, different in language and in cultural life. The Europeans and their descendants on other continents are united by similarity of bodily build, and their civilization

[3] See, for example, Ellsworth Huntington, "The New Science of Geography," *Yale Review*, II (1912), 90-96; H. L. Shapiro, "Society and Biological Man," in *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, Ralph Linton (ed.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 34-36; Robert S. Platt, "Environmentalism versus Geography," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LIII, No. 5 (1948), 351-54.

[4] W. W. Howells, "Physical Determination of Race," in H. E. Barnes, Howard Becker, and Frances B. Becker (eds.), *Contemporary Social Theory* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1940), p. 266.

sets them off sharply against all the people of different appearance. The Chinese, the native New Zealander, the African Negro, the American Indian present not only distinctive bodily features, but each possesses also his own peculiar mode of life. Each human type seems to have its own inventions, its own customs and beliefs, and it is very generally assumed that race and culture must be intimately associated, that racial descent determines cultural life. . . .

We are accustomed to speak both of primitive races and primitive cultures as though the two were necessarily related. We believe not only in a close association between race and culture; we are also ready to claim superiority of our own race over all others. The sources of this attitude spring from our everyday experiences. Bodily form has an aesthetic value. The dark color, the flat and wide nose, the thick lips and prominent mouth of the Negro; the slanting eye and prominent cheekbones of the East Asiatic do not conform to those ideals of human beauty to which we of West European traditions are accustomed. Furthermore such strange types as are members of our society occupy, very generally, inferior positions and do not mingle to any great extent with members of our own race. In their native land their cultural life is not as rich in intellectual achievement as our own. Hence the inference that strangeness of type and low intelligence go hand in hand. In this way our attitude becomes intelligible, but we also recognize that it is not based on scientific insight but on simple emotional reactions and social conditions. Our aversions and judgments are not, by any means, primarily rational in character.

Nevertheless, we like to support our emotional attitude toward the so-called inferior races by reasoning. The superiority of our inventions, the extent of our scientific knowledge, the complexity of our social institutions, our attempts to promote the welfare of all members of the social body, create the impression that we, the civilized people, have advanced far beyond the stages on which other groups linger, and the assumption has arisen of an innate superiority of the European nations and of their descendants. The basis of our reasoning is obvious: the higher a civilization, the higher must be the aptitude for civilization; and as aptitude presumably depends upon the perfection of the mechanism of the body and mind, we infer that the White race represents the highest type. The tacit assumption is made that achievement depends solely, or at least primarily, upon innate racial ability. Since the intellectual development of the White race is the highest, it is assumed that its intellectuality is supreme and that its mind has the most subtle organization. . . .

. . . Why did the White race alone develop a civilization which is sweeping the whole world, and compared with which all other civilizations appear as feeble beginnings cut short in early childhood, or arrested and petrified at an early stage of development? . . .

A brief consideration of the general outlines of the history of civilization will give us an answer to these questions. Let our minds go back a few thousand years until we reach the time when the civilizations of eastern and western Asia were in their infancy. The first great advances appear. The art of writing is invented. As time passes, the bloom of civilization bursts forth now here, now there. A people that at one time represented the highest type of culture sinks back into obscurity, while others take its place. At the dawn of history we see civilization cling to certain districts, taken up now by one people, now by another. Often, in the numerous conflicts of these times the more civilized people are vanquished. The conqueror learns the arts of life from the conquered and carries on their work. Thus the centers of civilization are shifting to and fro over a limited area, and progress is slow and halting. At this period the ancestors of the races that are today among the most highly civilized were in no way superior to primitive man as we find him now in regions that have not come into contact with modern civilization. . . .

We may now ask, did no other races develop a culture of equal value? It would seem that the civilizations of ancient Peru and of Central America may well be compared with the ancient civilizations of the Old World. In both we find a high stage of political organization, division of labor and an elaborate ecclesiastical hierarchy. Great architectural works were undertaken, requiring the cooperation of many individuals. Plants were cultivated and animals domesticated; the art of writing had been invented. The inventions and knowledge of the peoples of the Old World seem to have been somewhat more numerous and extended than those of the races of the New World, but there can be no doubt that the general status of their civilization measured by their inventions and knowledge was nearly equally high. . . .

If the achievements of a people were a measure of their aptitude, this method of estimating innate ability would hold good not only for our time but would be applicable under all conditions. The Egyptians of 2,000 or 3,000 B. C. might have applied the argument in their judgment of the people of northwestern Europe who lived in the Stone Age, had no architecture and a very primitive agriculture. They were "backward" people like so-called primitive people of our time. These were our ancestors, and the judgment of the ancient Egyptians would now

have to be reversed. Precisely in the same way must the customary estimate of the Japanese of one hundred years ago be reversed on account of their adoption of the economic, industrial and scientific methods of the western world.[5]

The position taken by anthropology on this subject is supported by the psychological argument put forward by Klineberg, who points out that there seems to be no scientific reason to expect a relationship between intelligence or personality traits and the amount of melanin or other pigment in the skin, since the latter is merely an incident of selection with reference to the effects of the actinic rays of the sun.[6]

Even anthropologists and psychologists are influenced by democratic idealism, however, so it is well to include a note of scientific caution. Although he would apparently agree in general with the preceding, at least one anthropologist, Shapiro, regards the disposition to discard the race factor entirely as premature:

. . . while all the arguments for racial correlations with innate capacity may be explained away, a tantalizing but elusive conviction that races or peoples are in some degree differentiated by their inherited abilities lingers on. My own inclination is to regard the extreme, all or nothing, hypothesis as eventually unsatisfactory in clarifying the relationship of race, capacity, and civilization. Just as the racist explanation of every minutia of culture behavior and capacity is obviously maleficent and untenable before the facts, so the tendency to interpret all aspects of civilization and society as based on factors outside and beyond the genes seems only a partial explanation of an extraordinarily complex interrelationship. . . .

The admittedly inadequate evidence on racial physiology as far as it goes offers no clear-cut case of differentiation along strictly racial lines. Physiological distinctions seem more a matter of local adaptation than a concomitant of anatomical differentiation. It is, however, hazardous to be dogmatic on this point since the entire field of racial physiology is practically untouched. Especially is it necessary to remain open-minded on this score when one realizes the great question mark

[5] Adapted from Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, pp. 3-10, 15-17. Copyright, 1938 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

[6] Otto Klineberg, "Racial Psychology," in Ralph Linton (ed.), *The Science of Man in the World Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 67-68.

that the functioning of the endocrine system represents in explaining the diversities of mankind.[7]

Population Density.—In Chapter 5 it was indicated that frequency and quality of social contacts in any society are affected by the size and density of its population. The goat-herd who tends his animals in the mountains of New Mexico and only occasionally sees another human being evidently lacks the variety of social relationships that are normal, say, to a dweller in a European peasant village. Everyone also senses the very different flavor of life in a village and in a great city.

For one thing, it has often been remarked that any unattached persons who come to the city, although they are surrounded by a sea of humanity, are very conscious of the absence of intimate or primary social contacts. This so-called phenomenon of "crowd isolation" seems to reach a high point in the urban rooming-house districts, where the sense of loneliness that prevails has been realistically caught by Zorbaugh in the life history of a working girl who was drawn to Chicago from a small middle-western town. The rooming-house, says Zorbaugh, has no dining room, no parlor, no common meeting place:

> One gets to know few people in a rooming-house. All told, in the year and a half I lived there, I didn't come to know over twenty well enough to speak to them. And there must have been nearly three hundred people in and out in that time—for there are constant comings and goings; someone is always moving out; there is always an ad in the paper, and a sign in the window. But rooms are never vacant more than a few hours. There seems always to be someone walking the streets looking for a room, and someone is always moving in. People change so fast, and one is in so little—being at work all day, and out every evening as likely as not—that there is little chance to get acquainted if one wished. But one doesn't wish—there is a universal barrier of distrust in this rooming-house world. At first I couldn't comprehend it; but later I was to come to. . . .
>
> I had occasion to inquire for a man living in a rooming-house. He had roomed there about a week. There was no 'phone in the place, so I had to call at his address. I went there about 7:30. After I had rung the bell for some time, a woman about forty-five answered the door.

[7] H. L. Shapiro, "Society and Biological Man," in Linton, *op. cit.*, pp. 30, 34. By permission.

She wore a house apron, and was evidently the landlady. I asked for Mr. X. She said "Who?" I repeated the name. I looked at the address in my notebook, to see if I had the address correct. I told her that this was the address he had given, and went on to describe him. She knew of two men in the house who might answer to his description. I then told her that he did a lot of work on the typewriter in his room. Then she knew whom I meant. She told me to go to the third floor and see if he was there. He was not in. I knocked at several other rooms, but no one knew anything about him. When I got downstairs the lady had disappeared, and I could not leave a message.

I came back a week later, and the same woman came to the door. I asked if Mr. X was in. She said he had moved yesterday. I asked if she knew where he went, but she did not know. She said that he left when his week was up. He had left a note for her, saying he had to leave. I asked her if he might not have left a forwarding address for his mail. She said that he did not, that he never got any mail. . . .

There were two girls in a room across the hall who worked as shop-girls in the Loop. They came from some town in southern Illinois. They weren't good looking—and, besides, like myself, they had had good homes, so they were lonesome. They used to go often to the movies, and sometimes to a dance, but the celluloid heroes proved more satisfying to these plain but heart-hungry children than did the neglect of the dance hall "sheiks." Other evenings they spent reading *True Romance, Experience, True Story Magazine,* and other such magazines devoted to stories of the adventures of girls in the city. One of them kept an intermittent diary, filled with stories—fictitious, I always was sure—of street flirtations and adventure. We used to spend evenings writing letter to Doris Blake, asking what a young girl should do if a man she liked but didn't love tried to kiss her. It was all a make-believe, a peopling our workaday world with adventure and heroes.

Upstairs was an old maid, who was somebody's secretary, who still wore nipped-in corsets, and a curl hanging at the side of her head. She had a picture of a handsome man on her dresser, in a big frame, before which she used to powder and primp. She told a different story about him to everybody in the house who would listen. She was the only talkative person I ever found in the house.[8]

Population size and congestion, however, are not always associated with social isolation. It is known that social relations in many city slums, notably in the crowded Italian tene-

[8] Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 73-75, 84.

ments, are the intimate relations of closely-attached families and neighborhood groups. This may be clearly seen, for example, in Firey's description of the Italian North End in Boston.[9] The North End has a family structure that reaches out to include kindred of all degrees, and even especially adopted friends, called *compari* and *commari.* Families are rated by their hospitality in inviting friends to the Sunday meal. There are many *paesani* groups consisting of immigrants who came from the same provinces in Italy, and a wealth of other clubs, political organizations, lodges, churches, and benefit societies. Reciprocal services and visiting abound. The *paesani* hold *festas* in honor of their patron saints with parades, special masses, costumes, oratory, and family reunions. Yet it is reported that many Italians of the second generation have broken away from the transplanted Old World folkways of their parents.

In contrasting the close personal relations in an Italian slum with the barrenness of social life in a rooming-house area, the most obvious explanation of the difference is that the rural Italians brought their culture and their social relations, i.e., their kindred and friends, with them to the city. The immigrant Italians were as much isolated from the rest of the city as were the Americans in the rooming-houses. It is also claimed that the Italian peasant culture brought to America has a warmer quality, while it lasts, than the North European culture which most Americans have inherited. That this culture may not be able to survive in the city beyond the life span of the immigrants themselves, however, is indicated by the fact that the social relations among the Italians in the North End of Boston have begun in the second generation to run into some conflict and confusion. Altogether, it can hardly be said that the apparent exception of the immigrant Italian slum colony refutes the general hypothesis that secondary relationships tend to be typical of large and dense populations.

This question should not be considered with reference only to immigrants to the city, foreign-born or native-born, or to the lower socioeconomic levels of urban society. If we turn to

[9] Walter Firey, *Land Use in Central Boston* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), pp. 183-92.

the middle-class sections of metropolitan cities, we find that there is usually little or no intimate relationship with the people next door or in the same block, but that middle-class urban families usually do have friends or acquaintances scattered about somewhere in the city.

The problem of the correlation between population size and density and the number and patterns of social interaction present is evidently rather complex because so many variables, cultural and psychological, are involved. In some of our remote and thinly settled mountain communities, especially those that are engaged in the illicit manufacture of "moonshine" liquor, strangers often encounter far more suspicion and resistance than they do in the rooming-house sections of our big cities. It cannot be claimed, however, that they meet with as much indifference, which is the real issue. Observation has connected the spirit of hospitality and friendliness with rural peoples much more often than with urban peoples. The reason seems to be that in the city the very numbers render other human beings commonplace, and make it impossible for anyone to be acquainted with more than a relatively few persons, so that the great majority are strangers who regard one another with indifference or with distrust. But as yet this important problem has had almost no direct scientific study, so that we can reach no conclusions about it here.

Family Size.—The decline in the size of the urban family in the United States and elsewhere has led to changes in the relations between parents and children, and between siblings. Where there are only one, two, or three children each one is likely to receive from the parents a quality of attention and comradeship different from that where the number of children runs to seven or eight, or, in older days, to ten or fifteen. The presence of each additional brother or sister, whether older or younger, will make a change in the life of any child. Thus, according to Folsom, females preceded or followed by females tend to be rejected by both parents, the younger of two males is less apt to meet with the mother's favor, and a younger child following a male is usually preferred by the father. Or, in

more general terms, the "value of a child to his parents appears to be in inverse proportion to the number of children of the same sex," and a younger child often attracts affection away from an older sibling.[10]

Age Distribution.—It was seen in Chapter 6 that the proportion of the total population of the United States 60 years of age or over rose from less than five per cent in 1850 to 11.5 per cent in 1948, and that demographers have estimated that in 1980 the figure will be about 20 per cent. Evidently, a society with a heavy proportion of old people will not have the same structure of relationships as a society with relatively few old people. For example, a society weighted with old people will, of course, have more widows and widowers, grandparents, and caretakers of the aged. Even though all the forms of relationship that occur in a society with a normal age distribution may be found in a society weighted with old people, in the latter case the old will enter into more relationships, which will in itself make a significant difference in the life and folkways of the two societies. If an old person is taken into the family of a married son or daughter, his presence there colors the relationships between members of the younger family. Likewise, if he is not accepted into the family of any of his children, the problem of how to provide for him makes itself felt in the family circle and affects the attitudes and behavior of its members toward one another. Regarding this growing problem Parsons observes:

> By comparison with other societies the United States assumes an extreme position in the isolation of old age from participation in the most important social structures and interests. Structurally speaking, there seem to be two primary bases of this situation. In the first place, the most important single distinctive feature of our family structure is the isolation of the individual conjugal family. It is impossible to say that with us it is "natural" for any other group than husband and wife and their dependent children to maintain a common household. Hence, when the children of a couple have become independent through marriage and occupational status, the parental couple is left without attachment to any continuous kinship group. It is, of course, common for

[10] Folsom, *op. cit.*, pp. 331-32.

other relatives to share a household with the conjugal family but this scarcely ever occurs without some important elements of strain. For independence is certainly the preferred pattern for an elderly couple, particularly from the point of view of the children.

The second basis of the situation lies in the occupational structure. In such fields as farming and the maintenance of small independent enterprises there is frequently no such thing as abrupt "retirement," rather a gradual relinquishment of the main responsibilities and functions with advancing age. So far, however, as an individual's occupational status centers in a specific "job," he either holds the job or does not, and the tendency is to maintain the full level of functions up to a given point and then abruptly to retire. In view of the very great significance of occupational status and its psychological correlates, retirement leaves the older man in a peculiarly functionless situation, cut off from participation in the most important interests and activities of the society. There is a further important aspect of this situation. Not only status in the community but actual place of residence is to a very high degree a function of the specific job held. Retirement not only cuts the ties to the job itself but also greatly loosens those to the community of residence. Perhaps in no other society is there observable a phenomenon corresponding to the accumulation of retired elderly people in such areas as Florida and Southern California in the winter. It may be surmised that this structural isolation from kinship, occupational, and community ties is the fundamental basis of the recent political agitation for help to the old. It is suggested that it is far less the financial hardship of the position of elderly people than their social isolation which makes old age a "problem." As in other connections we are here very prone to rationalize generalized insecurity in financial and economic terms. The problem is obviously of particularly great significance in view of the changing age distribution of the population with the prospect of a far greater proportion in the older age groups than in previous generations. It may also be suggested that through well-known psychosomatic mechanisms, the increased incidence of the disabilities of older people, such as heart disease, cancer, etc., may be at least in part attributed to this structural situation.[11]

[11] Talcott Parsons, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. VII, No. 5 (1942), 615-16.

QUESTIONS

1. What is meant by the statement that many of the differences between cultures are due to chance? Can you give probable examples?
2. Describe and illustrate the process of channelization in the development of our own culture, and of some other culture.
3. Distinguish between the influence of channelization and the influence of the surrounding culture on the development of a particular pattern of social relationship.
4. From the writings of Ellen Semple, Ellsworth Huntington, or others of their school, give an example of extreme environmental determinism.
5. What arguments do most contemporary social scientists offer against this point of view?
6. On what grounds may even mild forms of environmentalism be misleading?
7. Just what influence, if any, may the natural environment have upon culture?
8. What is meant by saying that "human life and environment are intimately interwoven in every aspect of their being, biologically and culturally, from the beginning of life on earth?"
9. What part do the environmentalists believe climate plays in cultural achievement?
10. Try to summarize the relationship of the natural environment to human culture in your own words.
11. Which of the races of mankind has developed the most advanced culture? What is the correct explanation of this, in the opinion of most anthropologists today?
12. What psychological argument does Klineberg use in support of the position of the anthropologists?
13. Evaluate Shapiro's qualification of the point of view given in answer to Question 12.
14. How may the so-called "crowd isolation" of the great city be accounted for?
15. Point out some specific ways in which it has been shown that the size of a family may affect the relationship between its members.

16. How is the structure of social relationships in our society being affected by a steadily increasing proportion of older people?

REFERENCES

BREASTED, JAMES H. *The Conquest of Civilization.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1926.

HOWELLS, WILLIAM. *Mankind So Far.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1944. Part III.

HUNTINGTON, ELLSWORTH. *Climate and Civilization.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915.

KLINEBERG, OTTO. "Racial Psychology," in Ralph Linton (ed.), *The Science of Man in the World Crisis.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.

KROEBER, A. L. *Anthropology* (rev. ed.). New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1948, chaps. ix, xvi.

MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW. "Culture," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. IV, pp. 621-45.

PARSONS, TALCOTT. "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States," *American Sociological Review,* VII, No. 5, pp. 615-16.

POLLAK, OTTO. *Social Adjustment in Old Age.* New York: Social Science Research Council, 1948.

SEMPLE, ELLEN C. *Influences of Geographic Environment.* New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1911.

SHAPIRO, H. L. "Society and Biological Man," in Ralph Linton (ed.), *The Science of Man in the World Crisis.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *Society, Culture, and Personality.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, Part VII.

CHAPTER 14

CULTURE PATTERNS AND CULTURE AREAS

In previous chapters we have seen examples of how family relationships, such as those between husband and wife, or parents and children, differ in widely separated societies, and even in parts of the same society. We also learned some of the reasons why such differences occur. It is obvious that similar variations may be expected in the case of every other kind of social relationship, such as that between ruler and ruled, captor and captive, lender and borrower, employer and employee, doctor and patient, teacher and pupil, and so on.

Sociologists are interested in a particular relationship (like that between father and son among the Australian aborigines or among ourselves) not primarily for its own sake, but because its analysis contributes to an understanding of the principles of association. It is instructive both in itself and as a part of the total web of relationships within a society. Each such total web of relationships can be regarded as forming a distinct system, and efforts may be made to compare it with corresponding systems of relations, and to draw generalizations from those comparisons.

The Dominant Role in a Society.—Anthropologists have drawn the generalization that every culture is built around certain "focal points of interest," one of which may often dominate the entire culture. As an example of this, Linton has called attention to the dominant role of the warrior in Comanche society:

> Most of the activities and interests of Comanche society revolved about the men of fighting age, who took precedence over all the other groupings. Boyhood was a mere preliminary to warrior status, and old age a not-too-welcome aftermath. Women of the warriors' age group

dominated the other feminine age groupings in somewhat the same way, but even they derived their importance primarily from the interest which the warriors took in them. Attitudes toward the boy as a potential warrior influenced his entire training, and especially the attitudes of father toward son. The father constantly honored his son and worked for the boy's interests in preference to his own. The Comanche explained this on a double basis. The father expected his son to be killed during early manhood and lived in constant anticipation of the grief that this would cause him. In particular, he did not wish to be tormented with regrets for things which he might have done for him. Second, if the son did survive by a sort of miracle, the father would have to look to him for care and protection in his old age. His gratitude for such potential favors should therefore be expressed at once. It is an interesting commentary on the way in which the society's interest was focused on the warriors that the old regarded any help which they might receive from sons of fighting age as a favor and not a right.

Throughout most of their history the wars of the Comanche were mainly offensive ones, and there can be no question that they were waged primarily to enable warriors to gain prestige. . . .

We may summarize the orientation of Comanche culture by saying that it was organized about the warrior and was so arranged as to give full play to his individualistic and competitive tendencies.[1]

Every person among the Comanches was thus rated by the kind of relation in which he stood to the warriors, because the development of a dominant warrior role necessarily implied not only that it would be the criterion of status in the society, but also that adjustments to it must be made by all members of the tribe. It should be noticed that not only did the warrior role affect every relationship into which a warrior entered, but it affected other relationships that did not include a warrior. Thus, warriors had a prior claim to the young women of the tribe, and this had important effects upon the relations of these women with the men in the tribe who were not warriors. It is by virtue of the dominance of certain roles and of accommodations to them of a number of other relationships that a total pattern of social organization peculiar to a given society is developed.

[1] Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1936), pp. 443-53.

In a society as complex as ours, the patterns of dominance are much less obvious than among the Comanche Indians, but the same general principles apply. Incidentally, something similar to the importance of the Comanche warrior was the prestige enjoyed by the soldiers, sailors, and marines who served in World War II compared with other young men at the time; or in the special favors shown on the campus to members of an American college football team. Generally, however, it cannot be said that the warrior type now plays a controlling role in our society. It did not do so among all the Indian tribes. Some of them put emphasis on one role, some on another, depending on the values and ways of life that happened to be stressed in the particular culture. An illustration of the dominance of a very different type of relationship may be cited from another part of the world, the Tanala tribe of Madagascar. The central institution among the Tanala was the "joint family":

Membership in this group was determined by descent in the male line. Since marriages within the village were the rule, even daughters, who of necessity married out of the joint family group, remained in close touch with it throughout life. The family was conceived of as a continuum with a definite, historic beginning but no end. This concept was no doubt linked with the keen interest which the Tanala took in past events. Every family kept genealogies of its heads from the time of the founding and had a wealth of traditions which appear to be fairly authentic. . . .

As a continuum, the family was divided into the living and the dead, both groups being equally real to the native mind. The dead division had its village, where its members lived exactly as they did when alive, even marrying and bearing children. Death was regarded as little more than a change of residence, and the most important feature of the funeral ceremony was the introduction of the newly dead individual to his ancestors, with a request that they receive him and treat him well. Conversely, the dead man was informed of his new status and advised that he now belonged with the ancestors and should behave accordingly. . . .

Although the living and the dead division of the family each had its regular residence, there was a good deal of what might be termed visiting back and forth. The dead were formally invited to be present at all ceremonies given by the living. They received their share of the feasts given at such times and were asked to take home a portion for

any of the ancestors who had been prevented from attending by illness or pressing business. Individual ancestors might visit the living at any time, appearing to them in dreams if they had something they wished to communicate, or simply observing their activities. Conversely, the souls of the living might visit the ancestral village, where they were sure of a welcome. If the soul remained away too long, the person sickened and died. . . .

This focusing of interest upon the family was reflected in a unusually complete submergence of the individual in the group. The ideal member of Tanala society, whether man or woman, was a rather timid, retiring person keenly susceptible to public opinion and quick to espouse the side of the majority. Young people were expected to be respectful to all their elders and completely obedient to their fathers and the family head. A son could not sit in his father's presence without special permission or even sleep in a bed as long as his father lived, although in some clans he might purchase the right to use a bed at the time of his marriage. Children began to work for the family at an early age and, until marriage, were expected to turn over all their earnings to it. The boy's only consolation lay in the knowledge that, in due course of time, he could demand similar service and obedience from his own sons. Apparently the abstract justice of this arrangement was never questioned and any failure was punished by the anger of the ancestral spirits.

. . . Whatever social importance they [the heads of families] possessed they derived not from their individual qualities but from the size and wealth of the families which they represented. They were symbols rather than persons. At public ceremonies the attention of the group was centered upon them and the whole family contributed toward helping them make a good showing. They were richly dressed even if the rest of the family went in rags, and they had to maintain their dignity at all costs. Within the family, the position of the head was mainly an executive one. Although his authority was absolute in theory, he never tried to exercise it unless he had founded the family himself. A hereditary family head would be extremely cautious about taking any step without consulting the other male members and making sure that he had the solid backing of the group.

Open quarrels of any sort were frowned upon, and violence within the group was so rare that most informants had never seen a fight between adults. Families, as units, openly competed with each other in a mild way, each family trying to make as good a showing as possible at weddings, funerals, and other ceremonies, but there was little display of wealth and no ostentatious waste. Competition between individuals

was so thoroughly discouraged that there were no recognized patterns for it.[2]

In this sketch of parts of the culture of the Tanala, it appears that the family relationship colored all others, and was so greatly elaborated that it was extended even to include and reactivate the dead. Here we may notice other partial parallels with Western society. In pre-Revolutionary France, and at the same period in any other European country, a person's whole pattern of life was ordinarily determined by the status of the family into which he chanced to be born. A man of "high degree" was separated sharply in every respect from one of "low degree." In early Scotland, for example, competition, rivalry, and conflict were largely on a family or clan basis—the MacDonalds against the Campbells, the MacFarlanes against the MacGregors. In the pre-Civil War southern states, family connections received considerable emphasis, and in most parts of the United States and Europe today the family to which a person belongs is still a matter of importance in influencing all the other relationships and roles of life—social, religious, educational, and vocational.

The idea of the dominant role or institution offers a key to the analysis of the complex organization of relationships within a society. As already implied, a considerable amount of this social structure develops as adaptations to the dominant roles, which may be regarded as the axes around which the culture revolves. Many relations may best be understood by the ways in which they are attached to and depend upon these controlling institutions, for example, social rating to economic level in America. On the other hand, in any culture there are almost always some forms of relationship which are relatively independent of the dominant institutions, and many other relationships that differ in the closeness of their correlation with the dominant institutions. Thus the church to which a person belongs is not as closely geared to what he does for a living as is the special-interest group with which he identifies himself, such as a trade union, a manufacturers' association, or a medical society.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 453-61.

It is of great theoretical and practical value to be able to break down the social system of a society into a number of subsystems, some of which are interdependent and others not. This concept will be found especially useful in the chapters dealing with the subjects of social change and social lag.

The Culture Area.—If two cultures show clearly different patterns of relationship and social organization, the regions where they occur are spoken of as separate and distinct *culture areas.* The best examples of culture areas are found among primitive people who have a minimum of communication with the outside world. In the case of the American Indians, ten well-defined areas have been described: the Plains, the Southwest, the North Pacific Coast, the Mackenzie-Yukon, the Arctic, the Plateau, California, the Northeast, the Southeast, and Mexico.[3] We shall give brief sketches of two of these, the Plains and the Northwest Coast, from the point of view of their social organization, including the family, the community, and the "state."

Among the Plains Indians the independent governing unit, a tribe, was made up of a number of bands, each headed by a chief. One of the most picturesque traits of this culture area was the form of the organized camp, which was distinguished by an invariable circular arrangement of the tipis, with the council tipi standing alone in the center.

Marriage was exogamic with respect to the band, meaning that wives had to be chosen from outside the band of the husband. The children in some cases were regarded as members of the band of the father, in others of the band of the mother. Polygamy was customary, but a man seldom had more than three wives. Wherever possible, the wives were sisters, because it was thought that this would make for more peaceful family relations. The position of the first wife was superior to that of the others. A plurality of wives in the more important families is said to have been a natural development because of the lack of servants and slaves in this area.

[3] A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923), pp. 336-40.

The political organization in the Plains tended to be informal and democratic. Each band had its head men, and one or more representatives in the tribal council. There were intertribal alliances, but no confederacy such as the important League of the Iroquois in the Eastern Woodland area. Men's military and ceremonial societies were common. Among some tribes the men passed from one of these societies to another in regular sequence, so that the societies represented age groupings. In a few tribes there were corresponding women's societies. The latter generally had to do with magical or mythical ceremonies centering about the buffalo. These societies, male and female, rank with the camp circle as among the most typical social characteristics of the Plains culture. They originated apparently as the inventions of one or two tribes.

Other distinctive traits of the Plains Indians were some of their devices for the winning of social applause and prestige. While individual ownership of land was unknown, there was private property in food, utensils, horses, and so on. Families accumulated a surplus of such property only to give it away later in a lavish and magnificent ceremony which excited admiration and greatly increased their social distinction. At other gatherings and feasts it was customary for men to come forward and recount or announce their deeds, especially in war. This led to the heraldic recording of a warrior's feats in picture writing on his buffalo robe or tipi, to certain ways of wearing eagle feathers in his hair, and to decorations on his clothing and his horse.[4]

In the culture area of the Northwest Coast, the basic social units were usually clusters of villages which might be associated with subtribes, tribes, and larger linguistic groups. The outstanding trait in this area was an hereditary aristocracy. Each village was dominated by a few families of aristocratic lineage and wealth. These intermarried with other families of the same status both in their own village and throughout the tribe, so that they formed a distinct upper class. Just below them were families whose social rank depended upon the degree of their

[4] Clark Wissler, *North American Indians of the Plains*, Handbook Series No. 1 (3d ed.; New York: The American Museum of Natural History, 1941), pp. 90-105.

relationship to the top families or chiefs. Next was a sort of middle class, whose members could rise somewhat in the social scale by first accumulating wealth and then marrying into a family of higher rank. At the bottom of the social hierarchy were slaves recruited from captives of war and their descendants. Among most American Indians war captives were adopted into the tribe, but on the Northwest Coast the values of aristocracy and wealth were so highly developed that captives and their descendants remained slaves and, like other property, were used chiefly to increase the prestige of their owners, sometimes being killed for that purpose.

Wealth was valued less for its own sake than as evidence of the greatness of a family, and for this purpose ceremonial occasions were provided at which it was given away or destroyed in impressive amounts. The chiefs themselves were graded according to their worth and parentage, in which the rank of the mother as well as of the father was important. But inherited names and honors could be maintained only by the continued display of wealth. In such a situation competition between the chiefs was intense. Their rivalry took the main forms of the ceremonial distribution of property mentioned above, and the breaking of coppers, which were highly valued shield-shaped metal designs. If one chief broke a copper and presented the pieces to his rival, the latter had to destroy a copper of equal or greater value, or yield prestige. In these contests the chief represented his family group, which furnished most of the property, and whose prestige rose or fell with his own.

Feasts were required for a large variety of social events, such as the naming of a child, the puberty ceremonies of girls, tatooing, burials, and the erection of a house. Only those could give them who had the right to certain names and honors, inherited or acquired, that could be publicly displayed. In certain tribes the method of acquiring honors was through marriage, which thus became a main enterprise of the ambitious. The ultimate sources of wealth were hunting, fishing, the building of canoes, and slaves. In addition to wealth and dignities, public duties were inherited, like the public listing of property, the teaching

of songs to initiates, and the enforcing of tabus and rules regarding the use of the river.

In some tribes, a man could not marry within his own clan or mother-group. There were always two groups, for example, the Ravens and the Eagles. If a husband were a Raven his wife and children must be Eagles. Since in many tribes it was required that a man's rights and property must remain in his own group, his heir could not be his own son, but must be his sister's son, who was accordingly reared by his uncle. If a quarrel occurred between the two marriage-groups, the group allegiance of husband and wife being different, they found themselves on opposite sides.

Marriage was generally limited to equals in rank, and this, together with other marriage restrictions, often reduced to two or three the number of potential mates for a member of the top aristocracy. Wide inequalities of age between spouses were favored. The wife always resided in the husband's village. A gift of property by the wife's father to her husband, however, gave her the freedom to return to her own village if she wished. Among some tribes the initial advances were made by the boy's family, among others by the girl's family.

War was carried on for purposes of revenge or the taking of slaves. Revenge was visited upon any member of the guilty person's group. In such cases both men and women were killed. Victims of rank or worth equal to that of the persons killed were demanded, whether they were the guilty parties or not. Thus retaliation was directed against the group to which the offender belonged, rather than against the offender himself.[5]

It appears that the culture area of the Plains was clearly marked off from that of the Northwest Coast by such traits as the circular camp vs. the village; a relatively democratic social order vs. a blooded aristocracy; polygamy vs. monogamy; adoption of war captives into the tribe vs. their reduction to permanent slavery; and separate soldiers' and women's societies vs. secret societies including both sexes.

[5] Pliny Earle Goddard, *Indians of the Northwest Coast*, Handbook Series No. 10, 2d ed. (New York, The American Museum of Natural History, 1941), pp. 88-109.

In differentiating one culture area from another, as we have just done for the American Indians of the Plains and the Northwest Coast, sociologists are interested primarily in differences in patterns of social organization. While anthropologists in dealing with primitive peoples have included descriptions of social organization, they have tended to place major emphasis upon material culture traits, such as totem poles, houses, wearing apparel, weapons, canoes, and the like. In treating social organization, moreover, they have centered attention on the more spectacular features, like sun dances, puberty initiation ceremonies, potlatch feasts, and cannibalistic rites. They have also been concerned about formal organizational structures such as the mode of government, and especially about the complexities of exogamous regulations and groupings.

Partly because anthropologists have been strangers among the people they studied, they have not found it easy to describe the less formal, more intimate and commonplace social roles, relationships, and attitudes that exist between family members, friends, the upper and lower classes. Such case studies are especially scanty in anthropological descriptions of the culture areas of the American Indians.

The Common Denominator of Cultures.—All the efforts of science are motivated by the fundamental belief that like produces like, or, in other words, that like causes produce like effects. This means that to the extent that common factors are present in different human societies, their cultures will be alike. Some effort has been made to discover not only similarities between certain selected cultures like those of Europe and China, but also any universals or traits common to all human cultures. Anthropologists have long entertained the belief that there are underlying, as well as superficial, resemblances between cultures. This theory grows largely out of the observation that the human organism and its basic needs are everywhere about the same, so that cultures, however remote they may be from one another, must reflect these common elements and forces. The similarities are, to be sure, hidden under many differences, like those we have already described, but they are nonetheless present.

The argument which we have previously laid down, that different cultures more or less by chance usually hit upon unlike solutions of the same problem, cannot be carried too far. Indeed, contrary tendencies have also been observed. One of these is known as the principle of *limited possibilities.* This means that, although there may be more than one way of doing something, the number of feasible alternatives may be rather small. A great deal depends on the nature of the case. For example, the number of sounds, or phonetic combinations, that may be used to represent the relationship between a child and the kinship groups in a society is practically infinite. But the number of ways in which a child may be related to kinship groups through systems of descent is apparently no more than six or eight: (1) through the father (patrilineal), (2) through the mother (matrilineal), (3) through both (bilateral), and (4) a few combinations of these, such as optional, alternating, or double descent.[6] Moreover, some of these patterns, as the first three, are certainly more obvious or convenient than the rest. This latter point should be formulated as a third principle, the principle of *emphasis.*

If, under the principle of limited possibilities, there are only a few possible patterns that a certain relationship may take, while at the same time there are numerous societies in which this relationship must occur in one form or another, it is plain that several societies will necessarily have the same pattern, even if they arrive at it quite independently. It also appears, from the principle of emphasis, that the possible patterns will not be distributed equally among the societies, but that some will be much more common than others. Both of these principles, then, in addition to the basic sameness of the human organism and its requirements, operate to produce certain uniformities in the cultures of man everywhere, especially in those cultures at the same level of advancement.

One of the most striking illustrations of these principles may be seen in the general pattern of family organization. In a previous chapter we cited anthropological accounts which em-

[6] George Peter Murdock, "The Common Denominator of Cultures," in *The Science of Man in the World Crisis,* Ralph Linton (ed.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 139.

phasized the differences that exist in family relationships from one society to another. We may now quote a further account which points out the underlying structural resemblances in the family institution the world around:

Complex family forms, such as polygynous and extended families, are variable, but all known societies have the same fundamental form, the nuclear family of father, mother, and children. This may stand alone, as in our society; it may be complicated in particular cases by the inclusion of other relatives; or it may exist as a distinguishable unit within a more complex social grouping. Extended families, for example, normally consist of a number of nuclear families united by a common line of descent, and polygynous families typically include several nuclear families in which the same man plays the role of father in each. In contrast to many lower animals, the father is always a member of the human family—presumably because education is one of the family's universal functions and only a man is capable of training a male child in masculine cultural skills.

In all societies the nuclear family is established by marriage, and the relationship between its adult members is characterized by a division of labor according to sex. Sexual intercourse is always permitted between father and mother, but invariably prohibited as incestuous between father and daughter, mother and son, brother and sister. Seeming exceptions, such as dynastic incest, pertain only to small groups of peculiar status, never to an entire society. The nuclear family is always an economic unit, and it is universally charged with the functions of child rearing, socialization, and early education. The family may gather to itself other functions in particular societies, but throughout history and ethnography it is invariably the focus of the sexual, economic, reproductive, and educational relationships indicated above. This coincidence of behavior is truly remarkable in view of the diversity of responses in other departments of culture.

The explanation is not far to seek. The sex drive accounts for cohabitation, and indirectly for reproduction. Its satisfaction tends to give at least some permanence to sexual association, during which the advantages inherent in a division of labor have an opportunity to manifest themselves. Primary sex differences channelize economic pursuits, and economic rewards fortify the sexual association. Children make their appearance in this context, and are bound to the mother through lactation. Their care and training are more naturally assigned to the mother and her sexual and economic partner than to anyone else.[7]

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 140-41.

There are still further reasons why different cultures may be alike in certain respects. These may be grouped under the terms of *parallelism, convergence,* and *diffusion.* Each of them will be briefly defined and illustrated.

Although two societies acting independently usually stumble upon quite different ways of defining and meeting the same need, this is not always true. It is well established that they occasionally arrive at what is essentially the same result by parallel development. Linton cites as an example the invention of the blowgun in South America and Malaysia. The concept of zero is another case in point: it was worked out by two far separated peoples, one in India and the other in Central America. Such similarities may be due to chance, or, overlapping somewhat the principle of limited possibilities, to *like natural habitats and available materials.* Or they may be due to the principle of *logical association,* whereby an idea or device once attained leads with more or less probability to corresponding improvements and developments along the same line. This matter is discussed at more length later, under the general subject of social change.

The theory of convergence implies that sometimes a genetic study of an apparently identical or closely similar trait found in cultures that could not possibly have borrowed from one another, clearly shows them to be the end-products of quite different lines of development or evolution, which nevertheless came out at about the same place. The striking custom of pyramid building that occurred in ancient Egypt and again in Mexico derived in the one case from a tomb and in the other from the foundation of a temple or altar. Another example is the sex gender in certain languages both of the Old World and of the New World.[8]

Finally, it is obvious enough that wherever two societies have ever been in direct or indirect communication with one another, one of them may borrow from the other a material or immaterial culture trait. The borrowing of traits between cultures, or diffusion, is usually the correct explanation of the specific identities or resemblances found among them. The sur-

[8] Linton, *op. cit.,* pp. 368-69; Kroeber, *op. cit.,* pp. 119-20.

prising extent to which our own culture has borrowed from other cultures is shown in a subsequent chapter.

Some idea of the large number and diversity of traits that anthropologists have found to be common to all known cultures can be gathered from a partial list given by Murdock. It includes age grading, athletic sports, training in cleanliness, community organization, cooperative labor, education, courtship, dancing, division of labor, ethics, etiquette, funeral rites, games, gestures, gift giving, government, greetings, hospitality, incest tabus, rules of inheritance, joking, kin-groups, kinship nomenclature, law, marriage, modesty concerning natural functions, mourning, penal sanctions, personal names, population policy, pregnancy usages, property rights, propitiation of supernatural beings, puberty customs, religious rituals, sexual restrictions, ideas of a soul, status differences, trade, visiting, weaning. Moreover,

> Cross-cultural similarities appear even more far-reaching when individual items are subjected to further analysis. For example, . . . funeral rites always include expressions of grief, a means of disposing of the corpse, rituals designed to protect the participants from supernatural harm, and the like. When thus analyzed in detail, the resemblances between the cultures are found to be exceedingly numerous.[9]

QUESTIONS

1. Does every kind of social relationship differ more or less in patterning from one society to another? Give a few illustrations.
2. Why is the sociologist interested in any particular form of social relationship in a given society, like that between employer and employee?
3. Define and give fresh examples of dominant roles in primitive and advanced cultures.
4. Show how the dominant role affects other relationships in the society, and how it is geared into the rest of the social structure.
5. Are some relationships in a society relatively independent of the dominant social role? Can you quote examples?
6. Just what is meant by a culture area? From your reference reading, describe the traits of a selected culture area other than

[9] Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

one of those discussed in the text. To what extent is it possible to limit the distinguishing traits to social organization?

7. How do you reconcile the theory of the underlying similarities of all human cultures with the wide variations in specific culture traits that anthropologists have reported?
8. Define and illustrate the principles of (*a*) limited possibilities, and (*b*) of emphasis, in the development of cultures.
9. Define and illustrate the principles of (*a*) parallelism, (*b*) convergence, and (*c*) diffusion.
10. Can you add from reference reading further universal culture traits to the list that Murdock gives?
11. Why does Murdock say that further analysis of culture traits will increase the number of universal traits?

REFERENCES

KROEBER, A. L. *Anthropology.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923, chaps. viii-xiii.

———. "Culture Area," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. IV, pp. 646-47.

———. *Cultural and Natural Areas of Native North America.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1939.

———. "A Study of History," *Life,* February 23, 1948, pp. 119-33.

LINTON, RALPH. *The Study of Man.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1936, chaps. xv-xxv.

MURDOCK, GEORGE PETER. "The Common Denominator of Cultures," in Ralph Linton (ed.), *The Science of Man in the World Crisis.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.

WISSLER, CLARK. *The American Indian* (2d ed.). New York: Oxford, University Press, 1922, chaps. xiv, xx.

CHAPTER 15

CULTURE CONTACTS AND ASSIMILATION

Contact of Cultures.—Historically, few if any culture areas have been completely isolated from all others, although some culture areas have been exposed to many more contacts than others. Frequent contacts are to be expected when two culture areas are close together, as the Indians of the plains and those of the southern plateau.

Some contacts may, however, come about by occasional communication over long distances, as, say between Egypt and early Europe. Distant contacts have usually been due to the energy of traders, who have played an important part in the carrying of bits of one culture to another. Referring to Europe in the late Stone Age, Breasted writes:

> The occasional visits of the traders from the coast settlements along the Mediterranean were welcome events. Such a trader's wares were eagerly inspected. Some bargained with him for a few decorated jars of pottery, while others preferred glittering blue-glazed beads. Great was the interest, too, when the trader exhibited a few shining beads or neck rings of a strange, heavy, gleaming, reddish substance (copper or bronze), so beautiful that the villagers trafficked eagerly for them. Most desired of all, however, was the dagger or ax head made of the same unknown substance. Such ax heads, though they were much thinner, did not break like stone axes, and they could be ground to a better edge than the ground stone ax ever gained.
>
> To the communities of inner Europe that trader brought also vague rumors of the lands from which his wares had come, of great peoples who dwelt beyond the wide waters of the Mediterranean Sea. Whereupon some of the Late Stone Age villagers of Europe perhaps recalled a dim tradition of their fathers that grain and flax, and even cattle and sheep, first came to them from the same wonderlands of the Far East.
>
> With rapt attention and awe-struck faces they listened to the trader's tales of huge ships which made the rude European dugouts look like

tiny chips. They had many oarsmen on each side, and mighty fir trunks were mounted upright in the craft, carrying huge sheets of linen to catch the favoring wind, which thus drove them swiftly from land to land. They came out of the mouths of the vast river of Egypt, greater than any other river in the world, said the trader, and they bore heavy cargoes across the Mediterranean to the islands and coasts of southeastern Europe or neighboring Asia. Thus at the dawn of history barbarian Europe looked across the Mediterranean to the great civilization of the Nile, as our own North American Indians fixed their wondering eyes on the first Europeans who landed in America, and listened to like strange tales of great and distant peoples.[1]

Invasion and conquest of one people by another have for ages been a powerful means of bringing one culture into the presence of another. The whole of two folkways has thus been abruptly thrown together, something which trade could not accomplish. Breasted describes with vivid imagination how, not long after 2000 B.C., the barbarous Greek herdsmen, driving their cattle before them, and carrying their women and children in crude horsecarts, appeared from the North and overran the flourishing towns of the Aegean Sea. Wave after wave of Greeks followed, and over a long period of some eight hundred years they took possession of Crete, and spread out over all the islands of the Aegean. By 1200 B.C., the barbarism of the invaders had almost smothered the advanced Aegean civilization, but not entirely. The latter gradually began to leaven the rude customs of the Greeks, until eventually there arose from the impact of the two peoples the most magnificent culture of antiquity, that of the Athenian Greeks.[2]

The old customs of bringing back captives of war, and of procuring slaves from slave traders or tribal chieftains, have unintentionally exposed a native culture to outside influences:

There are only three hereditary social classes in Buganda: royalty, freemen, and slaves. The slave class is recruited in the main from war captives, although Ganda children are sometimes sold or pawned by their parents. Masters have the power to sell and even kill their slaves, but as a rule they treat them almost as members of the family. A slave

[1] James Henry Breasted, *The Conquest of Civilization* (New York, Harper & Bros., 1926), pp. 238-39.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 269-71, 274, 281.

woman commonly enters the harem of her master, and she acquires a free status if she bears him a child.[3]

Less spectacular than the mixture of cultures by conquest or slavery has been the filtering into one culture area of scattered individuals and relatively small groups from other areas, by peaceful migration. The intermingling of migrants of many cultures in the cities of the Orient and Europe, like Singapore and Paris, and, on an enormous scale, in American immigration, has been a striking characteristic of modern times. The population of the United States in 1940 included nearly 9 per cent of foreign-born persons. Most of these foreign born were of white European origin, but there were also among them appreciable numbers of Mexicans, Negroes, Japanese, and Chinese. The proportion of foreign born in the population varies in different parts of the country from over 20 per cent in New York to less than one per cent in some of the Southern states.[4]

The traveler is another means by which culture traits are carried from one area to another. Travelers' tales, oral and printed, and souvenirs of strange lands have been a source of interest and wonder from antiquity to the present, and have done something to lessen the isolation of provincial societies everywhere. In modern times travel has been enormously increased and extended by the railroad, the ocean liner, and the airplane, so that it is no longer only the unusual individual who has seen beyond the limits of his native community or state.

In recent decades, the epoch-making achievements of science and technology in the field of communication, the rapid world-wide distribution of mail, the cable, the telegraph, the telephone, and finally the radio, aided by the world press services, promise to break down the cultural isolation of even the most remote parts of the globe.

Borrowing of Culture Traits.—Once two cultures are brought into some degree of contact by any of the means just men-

[3] From George Peter Murdock, *Our Primitive Contemporaries*, pp. 521-22. Copyright, 1934 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

[4] Joseph A. Hill, "Composition of the American Population by Race and Country of Origin," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CLXXXVIII (1936), 180-81; Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, *Population*, II, p. 9.

tioned, competition or conflict inevitably occurs between them. Sometimes only the addition of an important trait to a culture is at issue, such as the introduction of gunpowder into Europe from China. At other times, it is a question of how far one culture will be displaced by another, e.g., the American Indian cultures by the white. Again, the emphasis may be on the mutual accommodation of two cultures to one another, as in the case of the European and Oriental cultures in Singapore.

With reference to material culture traits in particular, the extent of our own borrowings is described by Linton:

> Because we live in a period of rapid invention we are apt to think of our own culture as largely self-created, but the role which diffusion has played in its growth may be brought home to us if we consider the beginning of the average man's day. . . . Our solid American citizen awakens in a bed built on a pattern which originated in the Near East but which was modified in Northern Europe before it was transmitted to America. He throws back covers made from cotton, domesticated in India, or linen, domesticated in the Near East, or wool from sheep, also domesticated in the Near East, or silk, the use of which was discovered in China. All of these materials have been spun and woven by processes invented in the Near East. He slips into his moccasins, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands, and goes to the bathroom, whose fixtures are a mixture of European and American inventions, both of recent date. He takes off his pajamas, a garment invented in India, and washes with soap invented by the ancient Gauls. He then shaves, a masochistic rite which seems to have been derived from Sumer or ancient Egypt.
>
> Returning to the bedroom, he removes his clothes from a chair of southern European type and proceeds to dress. He puts on garments whose form originally derived from the skin clothing of the Nomads of the Asiatic steppes, puts on shoes made from skins tanned by a process invented in ancient Egypt and cut to a pattern derived from the classical civilizations of the Mediterranean, and ties around his neck a strip of bright-colored cloth which is a vestigial survival of the shoulder shawls worn by the seventeenth-century Croatians. Before going out for breakfast he glances through the window, made of glass invented in Egypt, and if it is raining puts on overshoes made of rubber discovered by the Central American Indians and takes an umbrella, invented in southeastern Asia. Upon his head he puts a hat made of felt, a material invented in the Asiatic steppes.

On his way to breakfast he stops to buy a paper, paying for it with coins, an ancient Lydian invention. At the restaurant a whole new series of borrowed elements confronts him. His plate is made of a form of pottery invented in China. His knife is of steel, an alloy first made in southern India, his fork a medieval Italian invention, and his spoon a derivative of a Roman original. He begins breakfast with an orange from the eastern Mediterranean, a cantaloupe from Persia, or perhaps a piece of African watermelon. With this he has coffee, an Abyssinian plant, with cream and sugar. Both the domestication of cows and the idea of milking them originated in the Near East, while sugar was first made in India. After his fruit and first coffee he goes on to waffles, cakes made by a Scandinavian technique from wheat domesticated in Asia Minor. Over these he pours maple syrup, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands. As a side dish he may have the egg of a bird domesticated in Indo-China, or thin strips of the flesh of an animal mesticated in Eastern Asia which have been salted and smoked by a process developed in Northern Europe.

When our friend has finished eating he settles back to smoke, an American Indian habit, consuming a plant domesticated in Brazil in either a pipe, derived from the Indians of Virginia, or a cigarette, derived from Mexico. If he is hardy enough he may even attempt a cigar, transmitted to us from the Antilles by way of Spain. While smoking he reads the news of the day, imprinted in characters invented by the ancient Semites upon a material invented in China by a process invented in Germany. As he absorbs the accounts of foreign troubles he will, if he is a good conservative citizen, thank a Hebrew deity in an Indo-European language that he is 100 per cent American.[5]

Yet it is important to notice that the borrowing of new culture traits is by no means a simple matter. A sufficient reminder of this point is the slowness with which the American Indian has adopted the culture of the white man. After three centuries many Indians are still thoroughly alien to and bewildered by the complex urban, industrial, and scientific society by which they have been surrounded. Their situation recalls the point that the long development and specialization of a culture in one direction makes it difficult to gear parts of it into a different system. The buffalo-hunting Plains Indians, for example, could readily accept from the whites such

[5] Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1936), pp. 325-27.

additions as the horse and the rifle, because those things had utility for them and fitted into and supported their own culture, making it more effective. The case was quite different, however, when it came to adopting certain other traits of the white man's civilization. Work in a factory and life in a city could not be grafted upon the Indian culture at any point, for it demanded the almost complete and abrupt displacement of the latter by an alien and unknown way of life which made no appeal to Indian values, and for which the Indian had no understanding or skills. Before this adaptation could happen, the personality formed in the Indian culture would have to be disintegrated, and a value structure similar to that of the white culture, with its individualistic labor economy, developed in its place.

Those who have observed the difficulties that are met with in every attempt to bring about a radical change in persons of our own culture, such as efforts to reform juvenile delinquents, will appreciate the much greater obstacles that stand in the way of the adoption of European civilization by a person brought up in a primitive Indian tribe. So long as Indian children are not taken from their parents at birth, these changes can come about only after many generations.

When one society borrows a trait from another, the trait is modified to adapt it to the receiving culture. Furthermore, the borrowed trait may vary from the original because of failure to copy it exactly, or because of difficulties in communicating it. The patterns of relationship between a Catholic missionary and his African parishioners are by no means identical with those that exist between a Catholic priest and his American or European parishioners. Such a new relationship must be built out of the attitudes and folkways that are already present among the natives, and must be interpreted to them in terms of ideas and values that are familiar and acceptable. The result of all this often seems bizarre in the extreme, but the process is unavoidable:

> As soon as we pass from such simple culture elements as techniques and their material products, we encounter increasing difficulties in

communication. Although it is quite possible to describe such an element of culture as the ideal pattern for marriage and even to express it in non-verbal behavior, this expression is much less complete than that which is possible with regard to such a culture element as basket-making. The most thorough verbalization has difficulty in conveying the series of associations and conditioned emotional responses which are attached to this pattern and which give it meaning and vitality within our own culture configuration. . . . This is even more true of those concepts which, while a part of culture, find no direct expression in behavior aside from verbalizations. There is a story of an educated Japanese who was trying to understand the nature of the Trinity and after a long discussion with a European friend burst out with: "Oh, I see now. It is a committee." Such a remark gives a shock to any good Christian. The Trinity certainly is not a committee, but it may bring the point home to the reader if he pictures himself as trying to explain to this Japanese student just how and why he was in error.[6]

Experience shows, however, that even the nonmaterial traits of an alien culture, such as family relationships, machine politics, or gangster activities, may be effectively acquired by living in close association with them under certain conditions for a sufficient period of time. Many of the descendants of the foreign-born immigrants who occupy the slums of New York City become fairly well Americanized within two or three generations, and successive nationalities often go through much the same stages of gangsterism, political bossism, labor organization, and final economic and social assimilation.

In the last analysis, the fate of an alien culture trait, whether material or immaterial, depends upon the attitudes which the potential borrowers have toward it. To compensate for the trouble of changing habits, the trait must seem very desirable to those who take it over. It may appeal to the appetite, save labor, confer prestige, it may be thought to have magical properties, give power, possess artistic value, or what not. If the new trait does not replace a native one and does not offend the receiving value system, it may meet with little resistance, as, for example, the introduction of tobacco in England.

But where a new trait competes with an old one, it can displace the latter only by virtue of some supposed advantage or

[6] *Ibid.*, 338-39.

else by coercion. To an Italian father in Chicago, the discovery that his children cannot stay at home and help him with his fruit stand during school hours comes as a real frustration. He can be expected to accept it voluntarily only if he can be brought to feel that the education of his children is more desirable than their help with the family business; or that the penalties he will suffer from the hard hand of the law are too much to be withstood. The process of his acquiring the typical American attitude toward public education will require time, and will grow only out of his continued experiences and observations. If his Italian friends agree with him in resenting this particular requirement of American life, they may band together to circumvent it by fair means or foul, and cause much trouble for the truant officer. In this case, the assimilation of the group to the ways of the New World may be hindered by mutual support and organized opposition.

It is well known that the style of clothing, hair cut, and other easily seen and imitated traits of American culture are usually the first to be taken over by the foreign born. If there is much delay in acquiring these things, it is because even a change in styles of clothing arouses a sense of disloyalty to the past, or causes a negative reaction somewhere in the immigrant group, especially if there are attempts at compulsion. Their value system must then undergo a change as a result of further experiences with the rewards and penalties of the new life, just as in the case of school attendance mentioned above. The more intangible aspects of Yankee culture, such as the relationship of parents and children, or the independence and freedom of young women, are acquired more slowly and only through persistent participation in the life of the American city.

Intermarriage.—The more subtle culture patterns, subjective and objective, of the native American population cannot become incorporated into the culture of people of recent immigration until they have been allowed to share in them for two or three generations through intermarriage. Admission into American homes as servants may contribute toward that end, but is not enough. Only with intermarriage can an immigrant group become Americanized in the full sense. Ex-

pressed in more technical terms, cultural assimilation is never complete until intermarriage freely occurs.

A distinction should be made between intermarriage and amalgamation or biological fusion. The latter may take place outside of marriage, and may not be accompanied by transfer of the family mores of the majority group, as witness the extramarital mixing of blood between whites and Negroes in the United States and the deviations from the white family pattern among the Negro masses, already described. Amalgamation itself, therefore, is not a guaranty of cultural assimilation.

As fundamental as intermarriage is for cultural assimilation, however, it is only one aspect of a broader principle. Theoretically, the only thoroughgoing method for assuring complete assimilation, if such were desired, would be to *rear the infants of all minority groups wholly within the majority culture.* Expressed more reasonably, this means simply that any group whose assimilation is to be fully accomplished must finally come to participate in the American culture in *every* respect like native white Americans of the same class. This would mean the same family life, the same schooling, the same housing, the same occupations, the same income, the same medical care, the same religion, the same newspapers, and so on. This, in turn, would require that the alien and native groups be thoroughly mixed and participate in all activities without distinction, rather than in separate or segregated groups.

Majority and Minority.—There is a great difference, however, between a scientific principle and an actual social process. The latter may make use of some scientific knowledge, but it is guided at bottom by the values of the society. If it is contrary to the folkways for native white Americans to attend the same schools and churches with Negroes, to work beside them in the office and shop, to intermarry with them, or otherwise to treat them as equals, this will be weighed against the desire, if any, to have them acquire the white culture in a complete sense, including its standards of reliability, honesty, industry, morality, literacy, and health. Everyone knows that the actual choice has so far been to limit the cultural assimilation of the Negro. The native American value system operates in a similar but

milder way to retard the assimilation of foreign-born whites, especially those of south European and Jewish ancestry, into the American life.

By a minority people, as we have already said, is meant a cultural or racial group within a larger society which is regarded as "different," "inferior," or not completely "belonging" to the society. All of the obstacles to a scientific program of assimilation for the various minority peoples in the United States, however, do not stem from the value system of the native white majority, even if that is the major source of difficulty. The minorities in the mass are themselves not prepared to participate and mingle freely with the native white population. The ordinary motives and bases for the development of personal and group relationships between aliens and native white Americans will for the most part be weaker than the tendency to form relationships within their own groups. It has been seen in earlier chapters that personal relationships develop out of common values and interests, so that the older members of minority and majority groups are apt to find little in common and much to hold them apart.

The first real opportunity for association comes when the children of the immigrants attend the same schools as the children of the natives. Even there antagonistic gangs and cliques are apt to be formed between the foreign and native children. Nevertheless, personal relationships will begin to form about such points as individual fighting ability, cooperation on athletic teams, or sex attraction. The parents of one group may then become acquainted with some of the children of the other, as the youngsters talk about and visit one another. If any intermarriages occur when the second generation grows up, some of the old folks on different sides of the nativity line will get to know one another in that way. It is evidently among the children, however, that the conditions necessary for the development of personal and group relationships will be more nearly satisfied, and among whom assimilation will chiefly occur.

The direction of change among the children of immigrants will be away from the minority patterns and toward those of the majority, to the extent that the latter seem to offer more

in the way of status and other rewards. In fact, the high rates of delinquency and crime which exist among the children of the foreign born in the slums of our cities have seemed to many to indicate that these young people have abandoned the culture of their parents faster than they have been able to substitute that of the New World. They are inclined to reject the ways and authority of their parents as something foreign and inferior. It is also clear that the second generation often learns criminal behavior as a consequence of its residence in the slum and its contact with other groups:

The excess criminality of the second generation of immigrants has been generally recognized, although the statistical demonstration of the excess is perhaps not conclusive. Special studies have indicated that the delinquency rates of the second generation are comparatively low when an immigrant group first settles in a community and increases as contacts with the surrounding culture multiply. The rate remains low in those foreign colonies which are comparatively isolated from the surrounding culture. The rate is low in the heart of the colony but increases on the borderlines where the group comes into contact with other groups. Moreover, the rates are comparatively low in the immigrant groups which have moved away from the areas of deterioration into the better residential neighborhoods. The statistics indicate, also, that the rates are comparatively high for the children in families in which the parents are not of the same nativity. These things point to a conclusion that the high rate of the second generation of immigrants is due to the contacts with delinquency in America and to the conflict of standards.

The second generation appears to approach the native-born of native parentage in regard to the kinds of crimes committed. In 1910 the Immigration Commission stated its findings on this point as follows:

"The movement of the second generation crime is away from the crimes peculiar to immigrants and toward those of the American of native parentage." [7]

Other things being equal, the less self-sufficient a minority group is, the sooner will it be forced by the demand for survival to adopt the culture of the majority. Similarly, the rate of assimilation tends to increase as the size of the minority group diminishes, relative to the majority. Finally, assimilation is

[7] Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1934), pp. 115-16.

much easier when the culture of the minority is like that of the majority. Aliens from England, Scotland, or Ireland need little time to become Americanized, and Scandinavians, Germans, and other northern and western Europeans find the process simpler than do the peoples from southern and eastern Europe.

Race differences complicate the situation. North American Negroes have no foreign culture to hinder them, and yet they have made less progress in acquiring the native white culture than most alien white minorities which have been in this country for a much shorter time. Negroes find complete participation far harder because of the strong prejudice against their race. The same is true in less degree of the Japanese and Chinese. These racial prejudices form an obstruction that may persist as long as a colored race retains its physical characteristics. The children and grandchildren of foreign-born whites, on the contrary, tend to lose all of the noticeable differences that stamped their ancestors as aliens (except some Jewish types), and so meet with steadily diminishing social resistance.

There is a widespread disposition to attribute important cultural differences to a difference in ancestry or biological nature. Even the Catholicism of the Irish and the Protestantism of the English are often spoken of as something that runs in the blood or "temperament" of the two nationalities. And there are superficial reasons for the popularity of this kind of notion. Biological causation has something of the supernatural and final associated with it, because it is regarded as the work of the Creator. If an undesirable trait is racial, the only remedy is to subjugate or destroy the race, an idea that seems to have more primitive emotional appeal than the technical alternative of education or social reform. It has recently been seen in action on a grand scale in the "liquidation" of thousands of Jews and Poles by the Germans. The biological interpretation is also simpler, i.e., easier to understand, than the sociological, and so is more popular.

Culture Conflict.—Two cultures or culture traits may be said to be in conflict when one or both are so resented by the carriers of the other that antagonistic emotions are aroused and acts of violence occur between the two groups. An illustration

is the long-standing feud between the North and South Irish, the former being predominantly Protestant and the latter almost solidly Catholic. Why some cultural differences should arouse antipathy or antagonism and others not is a fundamental problem of social psychology. The broad answer is that those traits of an out-group which have come to be associated with disagreeable, unpleasant, disgusting, or hateful ideas are emotionally resented. The South Irish, who happened to be Catholics, have suffered long and intensely from the oppression of their bigger and more powerful neighbors, the English, who happened to be Protestants. These abuses were bitterly resented, and were accompanied by centuries of bloodshed and violence in Ireland. When the English forcibly ejected the Irish and planted a colony in northern Ireland, the attitudes of hatred that had been developed in the Irish toward the English were immediately transferred to the colonists, who in turn had no love for the Irish. As time wore on, the chief distinction between the people of northern Ireland and those of southern Ireland, who were of essentially the same race, came to be their religions, which served as a symbol against which the long-felt antipathies of each could be expressed.

A Homogeneous vs. a Heterogeneous Society.—The length of time a minority culture can persist in the midst of a majority culture, and the social consequences of its persistence, are questions which are often raised in the United States and other parts of the world where mixed cultural groups are found. Under conditions that make for hostility or aversion, and hence result in enforced segregation, history and sociology both suggest that a minority culture may apparently continue indefinitely. The story of the Jews in the ghettos of Europe is the classical case. Where a minority group is given the opportunity to lose itself in the majority, the problem would seem to depend on the social values of the minority. The minority will then tend to adopt first those traits of the majority that appeal to it for reasons of convenience, status, or security in living among and dealing with the majority. The adopted traits will usually include language, clothing, and occupations. The traits which a minority will retain longest are those that are thought to reflect credit

upon the origins and achievements of the group or that are peculiarly associated with its history, and yet that do not seriously injure its relations with the majority by which it is surrounded. Norwegian-Americans have their patriotic orders like the Sons of Norway, hold picnics at which they eat lutefisk, and attend Lutheran churches, at least until their descendants have intermarried sufficiently with native or other nationality groups to lose their Norwegian identification. Native Americans of colonial stock may not prefer Norwegian characteristics, but neither are they particularly offended by them, and are inclined to dismiss them with a shrug or a joke. This mild prejudice may even stimulate the assimilation of Norwegians, and no serious problems exist in such a case.

With a people like the Jews, the situation is quite different. The antagonistic attitudes that have existed toward them for centuries in the Old World were brought by the colonists and immigrants from Europe to this country, and persist here without great change. Jews have not been welcomed into Gentile social life in America, and many of those who have tried to mix with the general population have been rebuffed and turned back into the Jewish group. Moreover, the Jews themselves have long-standing defensive attitudes, behavior patterns, and techniques that have seriously interfered with their assimilation. They revere their forefathers and value their religion and its associated traits such as food habits, festivals, and holidays so highly that they hold to them in spite of any inconveniences or difficulties in their contacts with the Gentile world. At the same time, the Jews enter into the economic and professional life of the larger society about them and compete vigorously for its monetary and honorific rewards. The Jews have been city dwellers and traders from medieval times, partly by virtue of Gentile laws that forbade them to own land; and they naturally carry on in these traditions when they come to America. It is chiefly with reference to the Jews that the question of the possibility and the value of permanent heterogeneous culture elements within the same society has been raised.

By birth and rearing, the American Jews find themselves in one group, the Gentiles in another. However, every individual

Jew (or Gentile) is also a member of a number of subgroups. These subgroups include the family, the neighborhood, the church (synagogue), the school, the church school, the business, and so on. The membership of the Jewish family and the synagogue is usually exclusively Jewish; but in the public school, the neighborhood, and business the Jew has constant contact with Gentiles.

A field of business is characterized by competition in rendering secondary services. Because of the traditional identification of the Jews as a people apart, when they enter business they are regarded as Jews competing against Gentiles, rather than as individuals competing against individuals. The latent attitudes of dislike that one group holds toward the other, i.e., the current stereotypes, then at once come into play. This situation contains the germs of group conflict and violence, but has seldom gone so far in this country, although it has often done so in Europe. On the other hand, since the Jewish merchants serve the Gentile public and need to understand Gentile wants and values, they cannot fail to compare Gentile values with their own. This is a first step toward their assimilation.

In school and neighborhood the immigrant Jews and their children will have further contacts with the Gentile society into which they have come. The resulting social interaction may take the forms of rivalries, feuds, friendships, romances. Here, too, Jews and Gentiles will first see each other as members of different groups. With time they—and certainly their children—will become more and more conscious of individual personalities each in the other. Adjustments and accommodations will emerge from these associations which will not only constitute working relationships between the Jews and the Gentiles but will also tend to change both somewhat, but particularly the minority group.

As the Jewish children grow up in the larger society, they will inevitably need to seek some status in it as well as in their own group. To gain this status they will have to accept many of its mores and folkways. The folkways which are most easily accepted will, as already said, be those that least disturb the patterns they have learned from their parents, rabbis, and other

Jewish adults. Some of the things that the Gentiles do and value, however, will interfere or conflict with Jewish beliefs or practices, and the issue between them must be settled by their relative utility to the younger Jews, as they themselves see it. For example, there is the case of a Jewish youth who played on the basketball team of a large city high school, and was kept practicing in the gymnasium until late each day. This caused him to be tardy every Friday for the evening meal at his home, which his family regarded as a religious ritual as well. The father felt that such conduct was disrespectful of Jewish traditions, and demanded that his son be on time. When he continued to be late, the father, as the patriarch of the household, undertook to discipline the son, with the result that there was a quarrel and fight in which the older man was severely beaten and the boy was brought into a juvenile court. There the son indicated that he thought being a prominent athlete in high school was more important than the Old World customs of his parents.

Those in favor of preserving Jewish differences have contended that many members of the Jewish group have made important contributions to the advancement of civilization in this and other nations. They have urged that the assimilation of Jews would be a loss for the total society. For this argument to have force, however, it is necessary to show that the contributions made by Jews have either represented Jewish culture traits, or that they could not have been made in the absence of such traits. The notable achievements of modern Jews in the sciences, arts, business, and government have nothing that is characteristically Jewish about them except, perhaps, Jewish ambition and family solidarity which supports it. The fact that the achievements are abundantly duplicated by Gentiles indicates that the Jewish factor is either of minor importance or irrelevant. The circumstance that the Gentiles owe their religion chiefly to the early Hebrews is not a reason why the modern Jews who have come to the United States should not be assimilated, any more than the modern Greeks, Germans, and others whose remote ancestors also contributed in important ways to the Christian religion.

It appears that there are no adequate reasons for expecting that the culture of America will be enriched by encouraging Jewish differences. On the contrary, the basic principle of cultural growth would indicate that the Jews, like any other group, will contribute to American civilization in proportion to the completeness of their participation in it, i.e., in proportion to the completeness of their assimilation and the absence of discrimination. This principle is seen more clearly in the case of the Negro, whose extreme social segregation has clearly prevented him from making his quota of contributions to American culture.

Accommodation vs. Assimilation.—A society such as ours is, of course, composed of numerous groups that differ from one another in various ways. We have only to look about us to see contrasting groups like scientists and Christian Scientists, northerners and southerners, employers' associations and labor unions, urbanites and farmers, the fashionables of the Gold Coast and the foreign born of the slums. In so far as the differences of these groups grow out of the economic and social functions that they perform for the larger society, they are the products of division of labor and specialization, and are necessary to maintain our advanced culture. Such differences underlie the very organization and cooperative functioning of society. Functional groups are like the parts of a machine: each part is differently shaped, as shaft and gear, but its form is dictated by the role it has to play in the total mechanism. The folkways and mores vary from one functional group to another, and these, taken together with regional variations, form the complex American pattern of life.

Although functional differences contribute to the cooperative working and organization of a society, they also often tend to segregate one functional group from another, and to generate different interests and points of view that may make understanding difficult and lead to clashes of interest between some groups, as farmers and industrial laborers. Many functional groups in our society thus develop some of the characteristic attitudes of in-groups toward out-groups. The total society also holds stereotyped ideas about each functional group which often

partake of the nature of prejudice or exaggerated attitudes of superiority or antipathy. This is especially pronounced toward the "lower" functional groups like domestic servants and unskilled laborers, and certain "higher" groups like "Wall Street bankers." Once functional groups are well established in the folkways, there is some difficulty in movement from one group to another, so that even in the United States it is the unusual individual who changes from a low to a high group, from cook to Congress, or vice versa.

We thus find widespread prejudices and segregation of varying degrees between many of the indigenous functional groups that form our society. The basic processes and the practical consequences are much the same as in the case of foreign groups that have entered the society but have not yet been assimilated or accepted by it. The frictions and barriers to complete participation in the activities of the society, which exist among our native groups and inhere in our native social organization, are due to incomplete adjustment or accommodation to social change, or to the very nature of specialization within the framework of a complex social organization.

In spite of resemblances, however, it is important to distinguish clearly between the incomplete accommodations, imperfections, and prejudices that exist within the organization of any advanced society, on the one hand, and the incomplete assimilation of foreign groups to the folkways of another society, on the other hand. While a native group develops differences in the process of adjusting itself to the structure of the larger society, so that the differences themselves are accommodations to that society, the foreign group imports differences that do not fit into the patterns of the receiving society. The differences developed by the native group may lead to certain difficulties, but in general they enable the group to function usefully in the social structure, and so have a net worth for the society. The differences of the foreign group can be expected, *a priori,* to have no such utility, but rather the disutility of maladjustment, in proportion to the degree to which the group is foreign. So, if it is desired to preserve the latter differences, they must be justified on other grounds.

An element that may seem to complicate any analysis of the problem of assimilation in the United States is the circumstance that most of our institutions and culture patterns were originally imported from other countries. The backgrounds of our civilization were fundamentally British, Irish, and northwest European, and were already relatively homogeneous and unified, whatever their remote origins may have been. During a period of between two and three centuries our culture has undergone many internal adjustments and developments which have given it a character distinctively its own. Nevertheless, there are groups of long standing in our society that are still so conspicuous as objects of prejudice that they may not seem clearly to be indigenous.

Illustrative of these is a minority religious group like the Catholics. The Catholic church as an institution was brought here by our European forebears just as were the various Protestant denominations. What we seem to have is merely a continuation of the struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism that has long gone on in Europe. These antagonistic attitudes, like the institutions themselves, were transplanted to American soil, and so became a part of our cultural heritage. A necessary step in the analysis of assimilation is therefore a definition of what is foreign. Since the Catholic church is an old institution of Western culture, since it has existed in this country from the beginning of the white man's occupancy, and since the conflict between Catholicism and Protestantism is part of the European cultural background of the great majority of American citizens, the attitudes cannot very well be classified as foreign to our society. From this it follows that the persistence of two distinctly Western religious institutions in this country which divide the population into prejudice groups should be defined as a failure of both groups to make the accommodations necessary for mutual tolerance and cooperation, rather than as a failure of either to become assimilated to American culture.

Definite prejudices also exist between the people of one section of our country and another, as the Northeast and the Middle West, or the North and the South, and between people in cities and on farms. It is obvious that such differences may be

labeled "native," in much the same sense as the Catholic-Protestant antithesis above. They are developments which have occurred specifically in our own society.

Jews have formed a part of the population of the United States since colonial times, and it may be asked whether we should speak of their assimilation or their accommodation. The question has further point because many Jews who have come to America previously lived for centuries in European countries, like Germany. The answer seems to be that Jewish traits, in so far as they stem from the Hebrew religion, must be regarded as foreign. The Asiatic religious complex of the Jews has been preserved by them over a very long period, regardless of the country in which they have lived. Their religious institutions have always been segregated, both in Europe and America; the synagogue is almost as strange to Americans today as it was to their European ancestors. It does not much matter to the argument whether the Jews whose lives and personalities are affected by this complex are of native or foreign birth.

The Jews are, of course, only one of many groups that bring alien culture elements to the United States. Practically all foreign-born immigrants of every nationality are the carriers of some foreign traits, however closely they may resemble native Americans in their basic European culture patterns. Even the immigrant from England has some obvious "peculiarities" in points of view, speech, and customs.

Jews and Dunkards.—The question is often raised, why the Jews should have to give up their religion and its associated folkways in order to escape from a minority group status, any more than, say, the Dunkards. In the public mind the differences between Jews and Dunkards, whether they are of foreign or native origin, are largely differences of degree. Status in each case is determined by the number of differences between the minority and the majority, and by how serious or objectionable these differences appear to the majority, for reasons which are historical or otherwise. Evidently, the Dunkards also are, and will continue to be, looked upon with prejudice, the amount of the prejudice being roughly in proportion to the extent to

which they are thought to deviate from the norms of behavior and ideology of the larger society.

Odds Favor Ultimate Jewish Assimilation.—In the competition and conflict that go on between Jewish and Gentile culture traits in the United States, the odds are heavily against the Jewish traits because of the relatively small number of Jews (about 3 per cent of the population) and their inferior status. If American culture should be modified to any extent by the adoption of Jewish patterns, the differences between Jews and Gentiles would be diminished just as effectively as if the Jews themselves had changed, and this would also weaken the probability of maintaining the Jewish distinction. As a matter of fact, however, little or no tendency to adopt traits from the Jewish complex has been noted in this country. Actually, the assimilation of the Jews to the patterns of the majority is proceeding rather rapidly, and many Jews now favor it as vigorously as others oppose it. There is, for example, a clear statistical tendency for Jews to approach nearer to the occupational distribution of the Gentiles, the longer they live in this country. This may be taken as some index of the progress of assimilation in many other areas of life, in spite of emotional resistance to it by both majority and minority.

Conclusion.—We have seen that the present culture of North America, and the culture of the British Isles and northwestern Europe from which it is derived, have borrowed freely but selectively from other cultures in all parts of the world. A distinction should be made, however, between the adoption of traits from a foreign culture and the contributions to American culture made by minority groups living in the United States. In the first case the traits were originated independently in distant places over long periods of time by a people working within the framework of their own culture. History furnishes many examples of the quickening of one culture by contact with another. The American people adopt some of the culture traits brought here by alien groups who have come as immigrants, if the traits appeal to them. But there are reasons for questioning the idea that an alien group will make more contributions to

American civilization by permanently retaining some of their alien differences than by being absorbed into the American culture within a reasonable period of time. If any of the traits of an alien minority are adopted by the larger society, the minority will then no longer be different because of them. But a minority which clings to alien traits that are not taken up by the general population will remain different in those respects; the consequences will then depend upon the nature of the differences and the attitude of the public toward them. If the differences are regarded as of no consequence, the public will either be indifferent to them or will take them as a joke, usually the latter. If the differences are distasteful to or resented by the larger society because they clash with its own culture traits for any reasons, the group that holds them will be resented, accorded a minority status, and treated with discrimination. This discrimination, which is nothing more nor less than the application of social sanctions to discourage behavior that is not approved by the larger society, tends to bar the members of the minority from full participation in the activities of the larger society according to their abilities, and limits them to inferior functions. It accordingly appears that any determined effort by an alien group permanently to resist assimilation in any respect may reasonably be expected to lead at best to mild ridicule and at worst to serious social and economic handicaps. It is not likely that either of these results will place the members of the minority in a position to make a greater contribution to the culture of the society.

QUESTIONS

1. Name and give examples of several methods by which contacts between cultures are brought about.
2. How does cultural contact through conquest differ from that due to trade? Illustrate.
3. About what proportion of the population of the United States in 1940 was foreign born? Were they evenly distributed throughout the nation?
4. Define and give examples of cultural competition.

5. To what conclusion does cultural competition finally lead?
6. What useful functions does this process serve?
7. How many of the items which Linton says we have borrowed from other cultures can you name? Can you add anything to the list from other references?
8. Why is the borrowing of new culture traits not a simple matter? Elaborate the case of the American Indian, by way of illustration.
9. Under what conditions does one society borrow a culture trait from another?
10. Just what happens to a culture trait when it is borrowed by one society from another? Why? Give examples.
11. What kinds of traits are especially difficult to borrow, and for what reasons?
12. Are there any culture traits which cannot eventually be acquired from another culture, under close and continuous contact, if these traits appear desirable to the borrower and the society of origin offers no intentional obstacles?
13. How necessary is intermarriage in the process of cultural assimilation, and why?
14. Can biological amalgamation be substituted for intermarriage without changing your answer to the preceding question? Explain.
15. What is the basic formula by which alone complete cultural assimilation can be achieved?
16. How does an attitude of discrimination toward a minority group affect its assimilation? Discuss and illustrate.
17. How is the assimilation of a minority people affected by its own attitudes and practices? Illustrate.
18. Analyze carefully the usual processes and steps by which an immigrant group is advanced toward cultural assimilation in the New World. Support your analysis with historical cases.
19. Define and illustrate conflict of cultures. To what extent is it a conflict of the bearers of the cultures?
20. Why do some cultural differences arouse resentment, while others do not? Can you give examples?
21. Define and give cases of the questionable use of the principle of biological determinism.

22. How long may a minority culture group persist within a majority culture? Under what conditions may such a group continue indefinitely? Give actual instances.
23. What traits of the majority does a minority people tend to take over first, and why? What traits are taken last and why? Give examples.
24. Discuss thoroughly the case of the assimilation of the Jews in the United States, with special reference to their persistence as a minority group, and to their contributions to American culture.
25. Show how groups like employers' associations, labor unions, etc., differ from true minority groups. Do such group differences create problems of social conflict? Should these differences all be removed?
26. What is the difference between the case of the Jew and that of the Dunkard?

REFERENCES

BREASTED, JAMES HENRY. *The Conquest of Civilization.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1926, chaps. ix, x.

HALLOWELL, A. IRVING. "Sociopsychological Aspects of Acculturation," in RALPH LINTON (ed.). *The Science of Man in the World Crisis.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. 171-200.

LOCKE, ALAIN, and STERN, BERNHARD J. (eds.). *When Peoples Meet: A Study in Race and Culture Contacts.* New York: Progressive Education Assoc., 1942.

LUNDBERG, GEORGE A. *Foundations of Sociology.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939, chap. viii.

PARK, ROBERT E. "Social Assimilation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* I, pp. 281-83.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *Society, Culture, and Personality.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, chaps. xxii-xxiv, xxxviii.

STEWARD, JULIAN H. "The Changing American Indian," in RALPH LINTON (ed.). *The Science of Man in the World Crisis.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. 282-305.

PART VI

SOME MAJOR SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

CHAPTER 16

THE FAMILY

Primacy of the Family.—The small family, consisting of father, mother, and children, is considered by sociologists to be the most basic of all social institutions.[1] This implies a number of things. The family is the group in which conventionally the individual is placed by birth, and through which he gets his physical features, his sex and race, and also his nationality, his community, his social class or status, and the name by which he is known. The family provides the fundamental learning situation where he acquires his speech and speech inflections, and absorbs his first ideas, beliefs, life values or ideals, and religion, which inevitably exert a powerful influence on the whole of his later life. For the child, the family is the source of food, shelter, affection, protection, and general security, and it opens up for him his first opportunities in the world. For the parents the institution of the family likewise furnishes affection, social approval for the satisfaction of the deep-seated sex impulse, children of their blood and name, and a convenient division of labor between the sexes that provides each with a number of services.

Because of its primacy and universality, the concepts and roles of the family tend to be carried over into other social institutions, such as religion and government. "It is interesting to note," says Kirkpatrick, "how often in religions other than the Christian, God is referred to as the father. The frequent worship of an earthmother and of various fertility goddesses, constitutes a further extension of the parental idea. Family patterns are often projected into the heavens and the gods assembled in family groups." [2] And similarly, "The outstanding

[1] Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), p. 26.

[2] Reproduced by permission from *Religion in Human Affairs*, p. 87, by Clifford Kirkpatrick, published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1929.

feature of state development is the decline of the blood bond in favor of the territorial bond; it has been seen that, although the family and clan tended to disappear in the tribe, the consanguineal tie has long persisted, at least in name. The term 'nation,' from the Latin verb 'to be born,' is evidence of this, and the terms of family-relationships are used loosely to cover political connections; many a scion of stock but recently transplanted to this country refers to his American 'forefathers.'" [3]

The World-Wide Family Pattern.—We have already seen from a number of examples of family relationships in pre-literate societies that the structure of the family differs a great deal in widely separated and divergent societies (Chapter 12). It is not necessary to supplement these illustrations here. But, by way of summary, it is interesting to notice that every possible form of marriage relationship between the sexes has actually been tried by various peoples at different times and places. We find (1) universally, monogamy, or marriage between one man and one woman; (2) among a wealthy few, polygyny, or marriage between one man and two or more women; (3) occasionally, polyandry, or marriage between several men (usually brothers) and one woman; and (4) rarely, group marriage, or marriage between a group of men and a group of women, generally on some kinship or village basis. Likewise, almost every conceivable way of obtaining a wife has been practiced somewhere at some time, e.g., wife capture, wife sharing, inheritance of a brother's widow or a wife's sister, wife purchase, parental selection, individual choice, group tabus. The same variety holds for types of relationship between husband and wife, parents and children, the small family, and the kinship group. For example, the authority of the husband and father is absolute among some peoples, negligible among others where the wife's brother takes over in his stead. The family name, kinship ties, and inheritance of property descend through the father in one case, through the mother in another, and sometimes bilaterally. Divorce may be at the beck of personal whim or forbidden entirely.

[3] William Graham Sumner and Albert G. Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), Vol. I, p. 96.

Nevertheless, it has also been shown (Chapter 14) that basic social institutions like the family are alike in many fundamental ways throughout the world. As Folsom has concisely stated:

A survey of the world's cultures seems to indicate certain things to be true of all societies and of most people in them. *First,* the principal sexual behavior is heterosexual. *Second,* there is some continuity of the sex and love relationship; persons become conditioned to particular sex partners and do not shift indifferently from one partner to another. There may be some "promiscuity," but it never applies to most of the people most of the time. *Third,* there are always certain sex avoidances. There are aim taboos (sexual approaches must not be made to certain persons). *Fourth,* there is always an incest taboo which is enforced through unusually great horror and repulsion. *Fifth,* males always are the more active competitors for sexual satisfaction and their competition is always regulated by some scheme of organization and rules. The incest taboo performs this function within the household group and sometimes as regards a whole sib or society, but some additional code, such as that of possessive marriage, seems always to be felt necessary to prevent sexual desire from becoming a source of such frequent competition or conflict that it disrupts other social relations and wastes untold energy. *Sixth,* mothers practically always nurse or care for their own babies and there is a prolonged attachment between mother and child. *Seventh,* some male, or males, always are responsible for looking after the mother and her child, however well or badly this function may be performed, and even though sometimes the male in question is not the biological father.

Thus there emerges in dim outline a kind of subcultural, socio-natural pattern of the family. . . .[4]

Sexual intercourse before or outside of marriage is not regarded in the same way by all societies. Among some peoples virginity before marriage is approved and expected, among others the reverse is true. In Western society, premarital chastity is the ideal, although marriage is usually delayed for several years after puberty. This places a strain upon the mores that is one of the problems of our times. No society, advanced or primitive, however, treats the relations between the sexes with indifference, or fails to try to regulate them according to

[4] Reproduced by permission from *The Family and Democratic Society,* p. 82, by J. K. Folsom, published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1943.

its ideas of what is best for the social welfare. Among some peoples who permit premarital relations, marriage must follow the birth of a child, and infidelity after marriage is severely punished. The chief concern of every society seems to be to safeguard the child, and to provide for his support and upbringing by his own parents.

Courtship.—The family begins in mate selection. Who may marry whom is made clear by the folkways of every society. The chief marriage tabus are based on ideas of kinship and are often complicated (see Chapter 12). The origins of the tabu against marriage between persons standing in certain blood relationships to one another, i.e., the universal incest tabu, are unknown, although many guesses have been made about them. Among the individuals who are available for mates under the rules of relationship, choice is further influenced by the prevailing standards and customs of the group, which may include considerations of race, religion, wealth or property, family status, and personal qualities. Among some peoples the mate is picked by the parents, among others by the contracting parties themselves. In America in modern times, romantic attraction comes first.

Romantic love has been familiar to American society from its beginning, but the so-called "romantic complex" has come to dominate the ideas of courtship and mate selection to a much greater extent in recent times than formerly. The term romantic complex includes several things. First is popular approval of the idea that before marriage the two young people should, above all, be romantically infatuated with one another, and that every other consideration, even health, should be secondary. Obvious concern about wealth or family connections is frowned upon as mercenary and rather contemptible, in a country that is itself regarded throughout the world as the most mercenary of all contemporary societies. Infatuation evidently depends more upon sexual attraction, especially in the woman, than upon practical considerations such as ability to cook and sew, intelligence, or strength of character. Indeed, American girls carefully hide any evidence of unusual intelligence

because they think it will make them less attractive to men. There is also general resentment against parental advice or interference in the choice of a mate by a son or daughter, because, it is said, it is not the parents' happiness that is at stake.

This preoccupation with the emotional aspects of courtship seems to be associated just now with somewhat looser moral standards among reputable young women, and by their resort to every artifice to increase their glamour and sex appeal. The whole development is in line with the present-day pleasure philosophy which has appeared, it is said, as a revolt against the over-rigid and duty-ridden folkways of our Puritan forebears.[5]

It is not to be expected that if such emphasis is placed upon romantic thrill in courtship, it will be promptly dropped after marriage; and that it is never quite forgotten is witnessed by the efforts which married women make, even in old age, to preserve their physical attractiveness. It is very obvious, however, from our tremendous divorce rate, either that the romance of courtship soon fades out in many marriages, or that other things besides romance are necessary for an enduring marriage.

As a matter of fact, however, while what has been said above about the stress that is laid upon romantic emotions as a prelude to American marriage is perfectly true in a broad way, and is undoubtedly one of the peculiarities of our time, some detailed studies indicate that by no means all young people emphasize it to the same extent. Young women, apparently, often show a more practical viewpoint toward mate selection than young men. A good deal, of course, depends on the class, or group, concerned. In a study at the University of Wisconsin, for example, college women indicated that they valued in a prospective mate those qualities that make for success in life in our present day economy—ambition, intelligence, education—more than they did good looks, sex appeal, or physical prowess.[6] It is also clear, from a look at the men and women who have married, as well as from other evidence, that glamour quite frequently is not the only consideration in the choice of a life partner. The real fact seems to be that, although emotional and

[5] Folsom, *op. cit.*, pp. 544-45.

[6] T. C. McCormick and B. E. Macrory, "Group Values in Mate Selection in a Sample of College Girls," *Social Forces*, XXII, No. 3 (1944), 315-17.

romantic elements are unusually prominent in American courtship, are highly dramatized in our moving pictures, magazines, and novels, and are probably the sole consideration in many marriages, a substantial majority of the marriageable population want some of the cardinal qualities in a mate as well, and are not much inclined to let themselves "fall in love" if they think such qualities are lacking.

Marriage.—The act of taking a mate is everywhere regularized by some kind of marriage ceremony or ritual, which serves to symbolize the formal approval of the union by the society. With us, marriage has become a legal status under the jurisdiction of the state, but the strong influence of the church is still seen in the custom of having the marriage service performed by a minister of the gospel. It has already been noticed, however, that among the lower-class Negroes in the United States cohabitation without legal marriage is common, and excites little comment or protest from the rest of our society.

The number of marriages per 1,000 of the population during a calendar year is known as the crude marriage rate. Table 15 shows the crude marriage rate for the United States over the period 1910-48. The fluctuations are evidently associated chiefly with changes in business conditions, as in the 1930's, and with war in 1918 and in the 1940's.

The Sex Ratio.—Another basic factor that influences the marriage rate is the relative numbers of the sexes in the various endogamous groups within a society. The many disturbances in normal human relationships which accompany a serious unbalance in numbers between the sexes have often been witnessed in times of war and among immigrant groups consisting largely of males. The degree of balance or unbalance between the sexes can be conveniently told from a figure known as the sex ratio, which is the number of males per 100 females in a population.[7] The sex ratios in the total United States population, the urban and rural populations, among whites and Negroes, etc., in 1940 can be seen in Tables 16 and 17. It appears that for the nation

[7] Found by dividing the total number of males by the total number of females, and multiplying the quotient by 100.

TABLE 15

CRUDE MARRIAGE RATE PER 1,000 POPULATION, UNITED STATES, 1910-46 *

Year	Rate	Year	Rate
1948	12.4 †	1927	10.2
1947	13.9 †	1926	10.3
1946	16.4	1925	10.3
1945	12.3	1924	10.5
1944	11.0	1923	11.0
1943	11.8	1922	10.3
1942	13.2	1921	10.8
1941	12.7	1920	12.0
1940	12.1	1919	11.0
1939	10.7	1918	9.7
1938	10.3	1917	11.2
1937	11.3	1916	10.7
1936	10.7	1915	10.1
1935	10.4	1914	10.5
1934	10.3	1913	10.6
1933	8.7	1912	10.6
1932	7.9	1911	10.2
1931	8.6	1910	10.3
1930	9.1		
1929	10.1		
1928	9.9		

* Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, "Postwar Marriage Trends," *Statistical Bulletin*, XXVIII, No. 6 (June, 1947), 2; Federal Security Agency, "Marriage and Divorce Statistics, United States: 1887-1937," *Vital Statistics—Special Reports*, IX, No. 60 (June, 1940), 822.

† Provisional.

TABLE 16

MALES PER 100 FEMALES FOR THE UNITED STATES, URBAN AND RURAL: 1940 *

Urban-Rural Residence	Males per 100 Females
Total Population	100.7
Urban population	95.5
Rural population	107.8
Rural-nonfarm	103.7
Rural-farm	111.7

* Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census of the United States, *Population* II, Part I (1940), 9.

as a whole the sexes were then almost exactly equal in number, but that there was some excess of females in cities and of males in rural areas. The latter was due to the circumstance that a larger proportion of young women than of young men leave the farms for the cities, drawn by the better opportunity for employment in urban industry than in farming. The foreign born, and especially "other races," such as the Japanese and Chinese, show a great excess of males. In the case of the Chinese, the men leave their wives in China and return to them after acquiring what they consider a competency in this country. The shortage of Negro males indicated by a sex ratio of 95.0 may be due to under-enumeration of Negro males by the census takers, as a result of the unsettled location of many Negro men.

TABLE 17

MALES PER 100 FEMALES FOR THE UNITED STATES, BY RACE AND NATIVITY: 1940*

Race and Nativity	Males per 100 Females
White	101.2
Native	100.1
Foreign born	111.1
Negro	95.0
Other races	140.5

* Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census of the United States, *Population*, Vol. II, Part I (1940), 9.

In 1948, the sex ratio for the total United States population had declined to 99.1. This was due chiefly to the higher death rate of males, and to diminishing numbers of the foreign born. In the age group 45 years old and over there were only about 97 men to 100 women, in contrast to 104 males to 100 females under 20 years old. The latter ratio reflects the larger number of boys born. Since these tendencies may be expected to continue, an increasing excess of women in the upper age classes can be anticipated in the future, if immigration continues to be held at its present low level.[8]

[8] Bureau of the Census, "Estimates of the Population of Continental United States, by Age, Color, and Sex: 1946 to 1948," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 21 (May 27, 1949), 2, 3.

As illustrative of some of the effects of the sex ratio on marriage, Ogburn found that (1) cities with high sex ratios had larger percentages of females married, but smaller percentages of males married, than cities with low sex ratios; (2) the sex ratio influenced the percentage of females married twice as much as it did the percentage of males married, because, he thought, men were less dependent than women on the local supply of the other sex in marrying. By way of example, he compared the two cities of Detroit and Cambridge: "In Detroit the supply of males is greater than the supply of females, there being 127 males over 15 years of age to 100 females, while in Cambridge the supply of females is greater than the supply of males, there being only 88 males to 100 females. The percentage of males married in the two cities is very nearly the same, 56.6 and 55.5, respectively, while there is quite a difference in the percentages of women married in the two cities, 65.4 per cent in Detroit and 48.6 per cent in Cambridge." Ogburn also saw in this the reason why relatively more women than men were married in rural areas than in cities (see Table 17); and (3) the largest percentage of both sexes married was found not where the sexes were equal in number, but where there was an excess of males.[9]

So few young males survived in Germany after World War I that nearly a fourth of the females of that generation had no opportunity to marry. Although the distortion of the normal sex ratio placed a severe strain upon the customary psychology and monogamic structure of German society, the mores of the established family were strong enough to withstand the pressure, and the surplus women were shunted off into industry and other forms of self-supporting employment.

Groups in which there is a marked shortage of women are often marked by a roughness that is supposed to be a peculiarly male characteristic. This may be seen, for example, in early American frontier life, or in the Colorado or California "Gold Rushes." Von Hentig says of the latter:

[9] Ernest R. Groves and William F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York, Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1928), pp. 193, 194, 197, 198, 204, 213.

Perrigo mentions the reporter of the *Rocky Mountain Times* writing in 1861 after the first territorial election that "Central has passed her first election and nobody is killed. Central has seen two hundred and seventeen fist fights, ninety-seven revolver fights, eleven bowie-knife fights and one dog fight. . . .

As so often happens, the crime wave was attributed to foreigners or to out-of-state intruders. The same thing had occurred ten years before in California. The real reason, however, was the pathological structure of this boom society. It created the same tensions and solutions which may be found in the all-male prison population.[10]

It may, however, also be argued that the lack of established local sentiment, weak law enforcement, and the type of males attracted by the adventure, as well as the absence of women, had something to do with the disorder referred to.

It is in the all-male (or all-female) population of the prison that the disruption of the relations between the sexes is most complete. Competent observers of prison life have considered this the most critical of all problems that plague the inmates and officials behind stone walls: "Much of the chaos, the upset, the querulousness, the electric-charged atmosphere of any prison is due to this denial. Most of the psychiatric casualties of prison life can be traced to acute panic episodes resulting from conflict about homoerotism." [11] As Lindner also points out, the already extreme tension is further aggravated by the constant and stimulative reference to the sex theme in our culture, which bombards the prisoners through magazines, advertisements, "movies," etc.

Although all of the vagaries and complexities of the sex problem certainly cannot be laid to unbalanced sex ratios, which after all occur only here and there among us, the effects of unbalanced sex ratios upon social relationships and social institutions in our complex Western society seem to be more ramified and important than is generally recognized.

In the case of primitive societies, it is natural to suppose that the sex ratio has a great deal to do with the prevailing forms of marriage. As Folsom says, "Polyandry [two or more hus-

[10] By permission from *Crime: Causes and Conditions*, pp. 123-25, by Hans von Hentig, copyrighted, 1947. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.

[11] Robert M. Lindner, *Stone Walls and Men* (New York: The Odyssey Press, Inc., 1946), p. 460.

bands sharing one wife] *would be naturally favored* by a high sex ratio and polygyny [one husband having two or more wives] by a low sex ratio, if all other forces were eliminated." It happens, however, that the last-named condition is never satisfied, so that considerable variation and irregularity is actually found to exist. Among the Todas, a well-known polyandrous people that practiced female infanticide, there were from 127 to 259 men for every 100 women, depending upon the group studied. Later, under white influence, the sex ratio dropped from 140.6 in 1871 to 127.4 in 1901. Polyandry also occurs among the Tibetans, who

> do not practice female infanticide, except where they have been influenced by the nearby Chinese. Yet these Chinese who practice female infanticide are never polyandrous but have a certain amount of polygyny. The expected correlation does not hold in these cases. . . . If the sex ratio were the main *cause* of the numerical pattern of mating, then a change in the sex ratio should produce an appropriate change in that pattern. What happened, then, when the Toda sex ratio dropped as a result of their discontinuing the killing of girl babies? We might expect there would be less polyandry and more monogamy [one husband, one wife] as the sexes became more equal. *Some* change had to take place. The one that did take place was this: where formerly three brothers shared one wife, now the three brothers tend to share two wives! Instead of adopting more monogamy they have taken to a form of *group marriage* in which the multiple-husband pattern still prevails. This pattern had evidently been a *value,* as monogamy is a value with us, and as such persisted long after the external conditions favoring it had changed. . . . Thus it is reasonable to suppose that polyandry is often the *cause* of female infanticide and a high sex ratio, rather than a result. [The case is similar with polygyny, which] "may be the cause or the result of a low sex ratio, or it may be carried on *in spite* of a high sex ratio as a result of other causes." [12]

The Size of the Family.—It is well known that the family in the United States is much smaller today than it was a few decades ago, when a larger part of the population was rural. Even in the last census decade of record, the median size of the family declined from 3.40 persons in 1930 to 3.15 persons in

[12] Folsom, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-60. By permission.

1940. Surprisingly enough, also, the dramatic rise in the birth rate after World War II will probably cause little, if any, increase in the average size of family. This is because the great bulk of the new births represent first and second children of newly formed families, which apparently will not grow much larger. However, the present high birth rate has reduced somewhat the speed of the long-time decline in family size.[13]

For any given natural resources and state of the arts, it seems reasonable to assume that a population may be too small for maximum utilization of the resources available, or too large to realize the greatest mean share of income per capita. There must, then, be a certain size of population that is capable of attaining the greatest mean share per capita, which we may call the economic *optimum* population for the time, the place, and the circumstances. In the same way, we may speak of a population of optimum size for reasons other than economic; for example, for conviviality or social satisfaction. This will, of course, depend upon the prevailing folkways and acquired values, as witness at one extreme the disposition of the early American pioneer to feel "crowded" if he could see in the distance the smoke from the cabin of another settler, and, at the other extreme, the apparent contentment of the Italian with life in the populous tenements of the city slum. As a matter of fact, it is evident that a number of considerations enter into the popular thinking about the optimum population, although the most important single criterion is apparently the economic one.

Not only do the members of every society probably entertain some ideas of an optimum population, but in many societies, including modern Western civilization, they also attempt with some success to do something to achieve it. The method employed among ourselves is simple and direct, and consists in the decision of each married couple about how many children they want, followed by the practice of certain methods of birth control to realize their wishes. The accumulation of these innumerable effective family judgments regarding the optimum size of family for their particular conditions results in a total

[13] Federal Security Agency, "Is Family Size Increasing?," Selected Studies, *Vital Statistics—Special Reports*, XXIII, No. 16 (August 29), 1947.

optimum population for the nation. Into these family decisions go such considerations as the desire to give each child a good diet, adequate medical care, wholesome home and neighborhood surroundings, and a proper education; to keep the family small enough to allow it to "get ahead" in the world; to prevent overburdening the mother with childbearing and child care; and to conform to the prevailing sentiment of a particular social class regarding what is a proper size of family. It is evident that the motives for such family limitation reflect the judgments of whole social classes respecting desired levels of living, ideals of affection and comradeship, and other factors. Consequently, they may well be regarded as a sort of class concensus.

TABLE 18

CRUDE BIRTH RATES, UNITED STATES, 1920-41

Year	Birth Rate	Year	Birth Rate
1920	23.7	1931	18.0
1921	24.2	1932	17.4
1922	22.3	1933	16.6
1923	22.2	1934	17.1
1924	22.4	1935	17.0
1925	21.5	1936	16.8
1926	20.7	1937	17.1
1927	20.6	1938	17.6
1928	19.8	1939	17.3
1929	18.9	1940	17.9
1930	18.9	1941	18.9

Bureau of the Census, *Vital Statistics Rates in the United States, 1900-1940* (Washington, D. C., 1943), pp. 666-67.

The weight of considerations of income and security upon family limitation can readily be observed in the behavior of the marriage and birth rates during periods of business prosperity and depression. Table 18 is an exhibit of the number of babies born per 1,000 population in the registration area of the United States over the years 1920 to 1941, inclusive. The approximate mean birth rate for the prosperous 1920's is 21.6, for the lean 1930's is 17.4, and for the upswing years 1940 and 1941 is 18.4. The lowest birth rate on record occurred at the depth of the depression, 16.6 in 1933.

Even in the twenty-two year interval represented in Table 18, a long-time downward trend of the birth rate can be detected. The same thing is shown, for example, in Sweden, where reasonably good vital statistics are available for nearly 200 years. The Swedish crude birth rate steadily declined from 34 in 1750 to 15.2 during the four years 1928-32, and the same general trend occurred in practically all Western countries. On the contrary, in Russia and the Orient there has been little reduction in human fertility, the Russian birth rate standing at 43.8 in 1928-32, and that of India, for example, at 35.9 over the same period.

The influence of the sheer number of members on the patterns of relationship and personality development in the family is an important question which has not been much studied. Bossard has recently formulated a "law of family interaction" that connects the size of the family with the number of personal relationships among its members. He states it as follows:

With the addition of each person to a family or primary group, the number of persons increases in the simplest arithmetical progression in whole numbers, while the number of personal interrelationships within the group increases in the order of triangular numbers. The mathematical formula involved may be set forth as follows:

$x =$ the number of personal interrelationships
$y =$ the number of persons

$$x = \frac{y^2 - y}{2}$$

The basic meaning of this law is that every increase in the number of members of a primary group results in more than a corresponding increase in the number of sets of personal interrelationships and that, the larger the group becomes, the more disproportionate the increase becomes. . . .

. . . what happens with the addition of each new member of the family group may be set forth in the following two sets of numbers:

Number of persons	2	3	4	6	7	8
Number of personal relationships	1	3	6	15	21	28

1. Applying this law to family relationships, one is impressed with the actual complexity of life within families of even moderate size, especially for the young child. Consider, for example, a family of five, consisting of father, mother, and three children. A total of ten sets of personal relationships prevail within this family [Figure 8]; and, because of the close proximity and intimate nature of family life, there is a continuing awareness of each of them by all members of the family group. . . .



FIG. 8.—Number of persons (dots) in family, and number of pair relationships (lines) between them.

2. On the other hand, the proposed law clarifies what the loss of one member may mean to the interactive process of a family. Just as the addition of one member increases the number of relationships in exact keeping with the number of members already in the group, so similarly does the withdrawal of one member decrease the range and complexity of the interactive process. This becomes particularly significant in a small family. In a family of three, the loss of one member reduces the number of relationships by two-thirds of their former number; in the case of a family of four, the reduction amounts to two-fifths.[14]

Another study seems to show that jealousy between siblings decreases with the number of children in the family above two.[15]

The Age-Cycle.—The family normally undergoes many changes from the date of its beginning to its final dissolution by the death of one or both of its founders. The time before the birth of the first child may be called the companionate period, when the couple are occupied almost solely with their romantic attachment and the development of habits of adjustment to one another. With the arrival of children the first

[14] James H. S. Bossard, "The Law of Family Interaction," *The American Journal of Sociology*, L, No. 4 (January, 1945), 292-94.

[15] M. Sewall, "Some Chances of Jealousy in Young Children," *Smith College Studies in Social Work* (1930), pp. 6-22.

pattern of relationship between the young married pair has to undergo a number of modifications, and much of the attention that they had bestowed on one another is now necessarily redirected to the children in learning to care for them, control them, and live with them. As the children grow up, the problems of providing and planning for them become the central concern of the parents, and the presence of the children enters constantly into their relations with one another. The members of the family may then even be divided into congeniality groups, with the father and mother in different groups. Finally, when all of the children have married and left home, the man and wife return to the companionate basis from which they started, except that romance is now replaced by an established comradeship. (See Table 19.)

TABLE 19

PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES WITH NO CHILDREN UNDER 18, BY AGE OF MALE HEAD, MARRIED, WIFE PRESENT, UNITED STATES, 1940*

Age of Male Head	Per Cent of Families with No Children Under 18
Under 25	46.5
25-29	34.3
30-34	25.3
35-44	23.0
45-54	39.8
55-64	64.4
65 and over	81.9

* Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census of the United States, *Population; Families: Types of Families*, 1940, p. 72.

The Family as a Social Institution.—The family is as much a product of human culture as the school or the church, and has the same general characteristics as other social institutions. It consists, originally, of a pair relation between a man and a woman who have bound themselves together for the purpose of serving mutual needs, physiological and acquired. In their efforts to achieve the institutional ends for which the family group exists, the members of countless families have worked out, over long periods of time, generalized patterns of relation-

ship with one another. These patterns are family roles—the role of the husband and father, of the wife and mother, the oldest child, the youngest child, the only child. The younger generation learns these roles from growing up in the parental family, and repeats them later in its own families.

The motives of the family institution become elevated to the position of family ideals and values, and are transmitted to the young along with the other ideology of the supporting society. Like all social institutions, each family tends to become a value and end in itself, accumulates its own traditions, myths, and heirlooms, develops family loyalty and pride, and in the upper classes at least may acquire a variety of family symbolisms clustered about the surname, such as the family crest, arms, motto, tartan, and the like. In many countries, of which ancient Scotland is a conspicuous example, the idea of family and clan has played a central part in the life of the nation. The Scottish population formerly consisted of a number of clans, each headed by its own chieftain of the name, and giving little or no allegiance to any other authority.

Competition and Conflict in the Family.—In spite of the fact that each member of a family plays a special cooperative role assigned to him by the folkways, a certain amount of competition and conflict for status and privilege goes on in the family among its members. Custom still places the chief responsibility and authority upon the male head, but in the actual give-and-take of daily living the wife may show the stronger personality or the better judgment, and this cannot fail to affect the relative positions of the two in the family. The children compete for the attention and affection of the parents, and because of temperamental differences, the parents may find equal treatment of the children difficult or impossible. Conflicts of opinion and interest are certain to occur between the spouses, among the children, and between the parents and children, many of which can be settled only through a long-drawn contest of personalities. Such personality clashes tend to bring about within the family circle, as elsewhere, a variety of accommodations, which eventually become a part of the particular family

pattern, and help to decide the place, rights, and privileges of each member, within the broad limits fixed by the folkways for each sex and age. It is chiefly variation in competitive types of behavior such as these which makes one family different from another.

In the competitive interaction that goes on within a family, individuals develop a number of techniques by means of which they seek to defend or promote their own ego and personal interests. Common among these are habits of "kidding," arguing, nagging, "apple polishing," satire, spells of silence, weeping, illness, absence from home, drinking, threats of suicide, and temper tantrums. Since such methods are little more than a hit-or-miss procedure, they may have unintended and unwanted consequences. And yet, after any habit once becomes habitual, it is hard to stop. Conflict within the family may destroy the family as an institution by interfering with the performance of the cooperative functions for which it exists.

The Sources of Family Attitudes.—Psychoanalysts see universal conflicts between parents and children growing out of the sex impulse. The following is a typical statement:

> . . . in normal psychosexual development the identification of the boy with the father engenders in the child a feeling of competition for the love of the mother, and that love for the mother has its counterpart in hostility toward the father. In like manner, identifying herself with the mother, the girl recognizes her as a competitor for the love of the father and maintains a hostility toward her. The term "Oedipus complex" has been given to this configuration of love and aggression because mythologically Oedipus married his mother and slew his father. For the female the term "Electra complex" is similarly used.[16]

Such hypotheses, the same writer admits, are still so entirely theoretical that to many clinicians they are "too far-fetched and unsubstantiated to be plausible." Nevertheless, he feels that "psychoanalytic hypotheses are often startlingly illustrated in case studies of unusual forms of adjustment." Experimental social psychologists, however, have found that the development

[16] By permission from *Modern Clinical Psychology*, p. 83, by T. W. Richards, copyrighted, 1946. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.

of emotional attitudes of like and dislike among members of a family is much too complex to be comprehended by the single-factor (sex) approach of the psychoanalysts:

Affection between individuals probably depends partly upon identification, partly upon the tele, or sense of attraction to the distinct individuality of another person, and partly upon emotional responses which the Freudians have referred to as an aspect of sexuality, using the term very broadly indeed (Plato's "eros"). Apart from the Freudian outline (first, polymorphous sexuality; second, the auto-erotic period; third, the latency period during which repression of overt sexuality causes responses to be directed primarily to members of one's own sex; and fourth, the heterosexual period), there are few hypotheses which offer cues to the student of the development of affection and love. Following De Sanctis' analysis, we have already suggested the confusion and inadequacy of explaining the deeper and more persistent fixations or canalizations in terms of single discrete drives. In a study of adolescent friendships, Horney makes a pioneer effort to break through the pseudo-scientific convention that love is almost entirely sexual in origin, re-asserting the distinction between tender mother love and sexual love, and showing the extreme complexity of the canalizations of each child's love for his teddy-bear, for his baby sister (until she gets big enough to get in the way), for his teacher, for the members of his gang, or for his Scout leader; for each child there are many rich and complex experiences important for his own personal development. It is hard to believe that a mother cat's eager licking of her kittens is intimately associated with the experience of mating; nor is there any good reason for believing that it is sound to think of normal parental love and care as having much in common with sexual love. It is probably more sound to think of affection of all sorts as derived in large part from a general reservoir of warm feeling which may be canalized now into friendship, now into parental love, now into sexual love.[17]

As a matter of fact, the attitudes which develop between the members of a family depend upon the same psychological principles as the attitudes formed between any other persons. Whether they are attitudes of affection or attitudes of dislike depends upon how the behavior of one member of the family seems to another member to affect the latter's own interests and welfare, and upon the acquired values that become asso-

[17] Gardner Murphy, Lois Barclay Murphy, and Theodore M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1937), pp. 514-15.

ciated with the image of one member in the mind of another. A brother may dislike a sister because she, rather than he, is the favorite of the family, or because she is unkind to their mother, or because he disapproves of her conduct with men. In a study of aged-parent-child relations in fifty Minnesota families, Dinkel found that the conflict in those families varied from apparently none to complete estrangement between parents and children. He concluded that the conflict present was basically a clash between the rural culture of the older generation and the increasing urbanization which affected the attitudes and conduct of the younger generation.[18] While situations differ, accumulating experience indicates that the explanation of family conflict will usually be of the kind described by Dinkel, rather than the sex-complex theory of the psychoanalyst.

QUESTIONS

1. For what reasons is the family usually regarded by sociologists as the major institution of society?
2. To what extent are other social institutions in our society influenced by the family? Give illustrations.
3. What sets the limit to the number of forms that marriage is found to take in different societies throughout the world?
4. In spite of the great variation that anthropologists have observed in the structure of the family, what basic elements are everywhere common to the family institution?
5. (*a*) Make a careful list of the chief considerations that determine the choice of a mate among us, according to your own observation. (*b*) Can you arrange them in order of priority? (*c*) Do they differ between men and women? Why? (*d*) Between socioeconomic classes? (*e*) Between rural and urban areas? (*f*) Are they mainly utilitarian or emotional?
6. (*a*) Just what is meant by the term "romantic complex"? (*b*) To what extent does it dominate other considerations in serious courtship among your acquaintances? (*c*) Is it emphasized equally by everyone?

[18] Robert M. Dinkel, "Parent-Child Conflict in Minnesota Families," *American Sociological Review*, VIII, No. 4 (1943), 412-19.

7. Can you cite any society, primitive or advanced, which does not regulate, in one way or another, the relations between the sexes, with the welfare of the child in view?
8. What do you conceive to be the social purpose of the marriage ceremony or ritual which in some form is universal among mankind?
9. How was our marriage rate affected by the depression of the 1930's? By the recent war?
10. Summarize the effects of the sex ratio upon the proportion of married men and women.
11. (*a*) What were the consequences for the monogamous family in Germany of the heavy depletion of young males in World War I? (*b*) How do you explain this?
12. Cite some characteristics of an all-male society, as observed in prisons and elsewhere.
13. How much did female infanticide have to do with the forms of marriage found among the Todas, the Tibetans, and the neighboring Chinese? Why was this?
14. (*a*) In what way, if any, does the family differ in principle from the general pattern of a social institution? (*b*) What are some implications as to the origins and form of the family?
15. Do cooperation, competition, and conflict all have some useful part in family adjustment? Explain.
16. How adequate is Freudian psychology to account for the positive and negative attitudes that develop among the members of an average American family?
17. (*a*) How does the age cycle affect the structure and functions of the family? (*b*) What, if any, distinct stages can you make out?
18. (*a*) In what ways, obvious and subtle, do the number, age, and sex of the members of a family affect the relationships between them? (*b*) In view of this discussion, what size of family do you consider most desirable?

REFERENCES

BECKER, HOWARD, and HILL, REUBEN (eds.). *Family, Marriage and Parenthood.* Boston: Heath & Co., 1948.

BRIFFAULT, ROBERT. *The Mothers: The Matriarchal Theory of Social Origins.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931.

BURGESS, ERNEST W., and COTTRELL, LEONARD S., JR. *Predicting Success in Marriage.* New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939.

FOLSOM, JOSEPH KIRK. *The Family and Democratic Society.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1934.

GOODSELL, WILLYSTINE. *A History of Marriage and the Family* (rev. ed.). New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934.

HART, HORNELL, and HART, ELLA B. *Personality and the Family.* Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1935.

MOWRER, ERNEST R. *Family Disorganization.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927.

MURDOCK, GEORGE PETER. *Social Structure.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949.

TERMAN, L. M., *et al. Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1938.

WALLER, WILLARD. *The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation.* New York: The Cordon Co., 1938.

WESTERMARCK, EDWARD. *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilization.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936.

CHAPTER 17

THE FAMILY (CONTINUED)

The Changing Family.—Like other institutions, the family in any society undergoes modifications and changes. The important changes that have occurred in the modern family, mainly as a result of urbanization, may be briefly summed up as follows: (1) In the United States there has been a trend toward earlier marriage and a larger percentage of people married; (2) husband, wife, and children work together less, but play together more; (3) the average housewife still has to give full time to homework, but this has changed from manufacturing to service; (4) the style of dwelling is moving toward the large apartment and the single-family home, and away from the "flat," with increasing home ownership in cities; (5) greater mobility causes more emotional upset among children taken to new neighborhoods; (6) there is less social prejudice toward unmarried persons, and less restraint upon widows; (7) premarital sex relations are experienced by a larger proportion of women, but prostitution plays a lesser role in sex relations outside marriage, and illegitimacy and its penalties have decreased; (8) young people are freer from parental control in mate selection; (9) the influence of kin, community, church, and custom upon family behavior has weakened; (10) genealogy and pride in family are less emphasized; (11) women have greatly increased their independence, and to a less extent their social and political power; (12) although women are more differentiated among themselves, they do not seem to be getting more like men; (13) the care and education of children, both by the family and by other agencies, have been tremendously elaborated; (14) the family tends to be child-dominated, "psychology" takes the place of physical discipline, and parent-child relations are on a more "democratic" level; (15) child labor, once com-

mon, has decreased nearly to the vanishing point; (16) the activities of children have become more separated from those of adults; (17) there is no trend toward removal of the responsibilities of marriage and parenthood; (18) the aged and the childless are more separated from normal family groups; (19) planned parenthood, contraceptive practices, and lower birth rates are replacing *laissez faire* procreation; (20) companionship and affection between the sexes are much freer, and sex, once a concession to "the flesh," is becoming a positive social value; (21) in the secondary relationship of cities, it is increasingly the function of the family to meet the need for intimacy and close affection. All other services of the family but this can be performed by other institutions; (22) these changes represent a readjustment to modern life, in the functions, values, and structure of the family.[1]

Different Family Patterns in Our Society.—Differences in the value systems and structure of the family occur not only over time, but also from one part to another of the same society. Most of the changes mentioned above have gone much farther in the city family than in the rural family. This is because the farm or village family of today continues to exist under conditions more like those which a century or more ago formed the milieu of the family generally.

Some of the traits which have resisted change in the rural family more than in the city family include (1) the birth rate and family size; (2) association with the larger kinship group consisting of grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins; (3) clannishness; (4) the frequent presence in the home of dependent aged and unmarried relatives; (5) more participation by all members in a common occupation; and (6) the patriarchal form of family control.

For the period 1942 to 1947, inclusive, the gross reproduction rate[2] was 1177 in cities, 1586 in villages and other rural-

[1] Folsom, *The Family and Democratic Family* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1943), pp. 169-92.

[2] "The average number of daughters that would be born to each [1000 women] among a cohort of females who start life together, on the assumption that all females will live through the complete childbearing span and that their fertility at successive ages will conform to age-specific fertility rates existing at the present time. . . . The

nonfarm areas, and 2029 on farms in the United States.[3] At the time of the last published census, in 1940, the net reproduction rate (the gross rate corrected for deaths) was declining (Table 20). At present, the trend has been temporarily reversed, with the greatest gains in the cities.

TABLE 20

NET REPRODUCTION RATES BY COLOR FOR THE UNITED STATES, URBAN AND RURAL, AT DIFFERENT DATES *

Net Reproduction Rate	White			Nonwhite		
	1935-40	1930-35	1905-10	1935-40	1930-35	1905-10
United States	957	972	1339	1137	1074	1329
Urban	731	756	977	702	684	558
Rural-nonfarm	1146	1150	1516	1210	1193	1402
Rural-farm	1572	1566	2007	2058	1916	2084

* Adapted from Bureau of the Census, "Gross and Net Reproduction Rates for the United States by Regions: 1935 to 1940, 1930 to 1935 and 1905 to 1910," *Population, Special Reports*, November 11, 1943, Series P-1943, No. 5, p. 2.

In the year 1947, the median number of related persons per household was 2.95 for the urban population, 3.09 for the rural-nonfarm (chiefly village) population, and 3.50 for the rural-farm population.[4] The influence of the mere size of the family on the relationships among its members has already been touched upon. It is further obvious that where there are several children in the family, often fairly close together in age, and other children are not easily accessible, as on the farm, there will be more association between the siblings, and greater dependence and self-sufficiency within the family for companionship.

---

rate is computed by adding existing age-specific fertility rates for women of given groups, regardless of marital status, and expressing the sum on the basis of number of *daughters per [1000 women]*." Bernard D. Karpinos and Clyde V. Kiser, "The Differential Fertility and Potential Rates of Growth of Various Income and Educational Classes of Urban Populations in the United States," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XVII, No. 4 (1939), 371.

[3] Bureau of the Census, "Fertility: April, 1947," *Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 18 (1948), 5.

[4] Bureau of the Census, "Household Composition and Characteristics in 1947, for Urban and Rural Areas and Regions," *Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 11 (1948), 8.

Two reasons may be given for the persistently higher birth rate of farm families. The first of these is the economic consideration that children are useful and even necessary assets in family farming, while at the same time they are less difficult and expensive to provide for in respect to the essential items of space and food. The second reason is the comparative lack of knowledge and practice of contraception among farm people. If either of these conditions should later be very much changed, as through the industrialization and mechanization of agriculture, or the spread of facilities and attitudes for birth control, the farm family would be expected to become smaller, as has the urban family.

The kinship circle forms the most natural and primary in-group for safeguarding and advancing the welfare and position of its members, extending what is done by the individual parents for their children. It often happens that there is one strong or successful member of a kinship group—an aunt, a grandfather, or even a cousin—who is the mainstay of his or her relatives, helping the widowed and the unfortunate with money, and aiding the young to get an education and a start in life. The importance of this wider kinship structure that still exists in a diminished form in our midst does not seem to be clearly recognized in the present-day stress upon individualism.

Somewhat less contact with the larger kinship group is to be expected in cities than in farming communities. Family loyalties and mutual aid are found in urban as well as in rural communities, and are by no means always entirely extinguished by the prevalent scattering of family members and their separation in space. It is, however, apparently true that kinship ties tend to be strongest in farm communities where they are least disturbed.

When a family unit consisting of man, wife, and children live in the same community with some or all the grandparents and a number of other near relatives, they have certain privileges and prerogatives of affection and assistance which they could not otherwise expect. In turn, they also have obligations that go with these intimate ties, and must give as well as take. As a consequence of their kinship bonds, they are subjected to

an additional amount of informal social control. This comes about because of the expectations which the larger family has regarding them and the influence which these expectations have upon their behavior. Under the eyes of their kin, a young couple is less likely to depart from the folkways and mores of their childhood.

Some modern young couples purposely leave their home communities to avoid what they regard as the repression, supervision, or "meddling" of their relatives. Other young couples remain because they feel that their lives are enriched and made more secure by having their kin around them. No doubt the attitude in each case is traceable to the particular traits of the relatives and of the young people involved.

As a part of the pattern of familism in rural areas, and related to the less drastic problems of space and to the nature of the farming enterprise, the head of a farm household and his wife are somewhat more likely to make their home a refuge for their old parents, their grandchildren, and their maiden aunts or bachelor uncles, than is the urban married couple. The actual difference, however, is not so great as is usually assumed. According to the 1940 census, in every one hundred households there were found, in addition to their own children, thirty-one other relatives of the husband and wife, as compared with about twenty-seven in the urban case.[5] Moreover, some of this small difference between the farm and the city household may be due to the circumstance that the median age of the heads of the farm households was about 48.3 years, whereas that of the heads of the urban households was two years younger. Without regard to place of residence, about half of all households where the husband was forty-five or older contained one or more adult relatives, including sons and daughters. Out of each forty of these relatives, twenty-four were single sons or daughters, five were married, widowed, or divorced sons or daughters and their spouses, and about three were mothers and one the father of the husband or his wife.[6]

[5] Bureau of the Census, *Population*, IV, *Characteristics by Age*, Part I, M. S. Summary. 1940. Table 10, pp. 26, 27, and Table 11, pp. 31, 36.

[6] Paul C. Glick, "The Family Cycle," *American Sociological Review*, XII, No. 2 (1947), 171.

More than most urban occupations, farming on the average American farm is a business in which all members of the family who are physically able cooperate to some extent. Most of the heavy work in the fields and barns is done by the father and his older sons. The mother and daughters not only cook the meals for them and any hired help they may have, but also usually care for the poultry and the family garden, and often help feed the hogs, milk the cows, separate the milk, and wash the utensils. In 1948, women made up over 25 per cent of the total farm labor force proper. With the mechanization of agriculture this percentage seems to have permanently increased. Farm children are taught to do chores at an early age, and their labor contribution rapidly increases as they grow older.[7]

A common opinion of rural sociologists regarding some of the effects of farm life on the family is expressed by Sims:

> The conditions of its existence have fostered an unusual degree of interdependence among the members of the farm family. In no other sphere of society do we find the sexes quite as indispensable for each other's well-being as they prove to be in the country. The spheres of labor allotted by custom to men and women can be interchanged less easily under agricultural conditions than under urban. There is rare mutuality of interest. One farmer's wife has declared: "An important advantage is that farm life makes it easier for the wife's and husband's interests to be the same. Everything is to be cared for and planned together and at home instead of outside the home. This I think makes for greater companionship between them. . . .
>
> This state of interdependence, coupled with relative isolation, the influence of primary group traditions, property interests, and numerous children, tends to make the marital relation more stable and lasting in the country than it is in the city. . . .

But it seems that there may also be a disadvantage. As Sims admits:

> This family, however, often tends to be patriarchal in type, i.e., it is under the father's domination. It is altogether natural if not altogether good, that it should be so, for much in the farming situation fosters such relationships. The management and direction of the enterprise, the necessity for someone to assume responsibility, the pressure for

[7] Lowry Nelson, *Rural Sociology* (New York: American Book Co., 1948), p. 286.

husbanding resources, and the lack of countervailing influences all operate to perpetuate and to establish the father's lordship. Above all, the patriarchal relation prevails in a more intensified degree in the farm family on account of the greater isolation of the household in the country.

Where patriarchal authority has gone to extremes, as indeed it sometimes has, family unity has often been destroyed. The boys and girls have often fled from it at the first opportunity and, if the wife and mother has remained to endure it, force of habit or lack of other alternative has prevailed over counter motives. The husband's control of the pocketbook has been one of the evidences of patriarchal authority as well as a frequent occasion of family rebellion. A niggardly attitude toward the wife and children has often resulted, and led to serious dissatisfaction. Nowadays, however, the greater freedom, wider knowledge of the world, and the more abundant opportunities for self-support that are within reach of all, including country women, are undermining the old-time arbitrary lordship of the countryman over his family.[8]

Some of the foregoing quotation seems to reflect a bit of nostalgia for our rural past and some of the prejudices usually associated with it. This should not, however, prevent the recognition of a certain amount of truth in Sims's description of the farm family, and the traits that do undoubtedly differentiate it more or less from the urban family at the present time. Competent observers agree that the father's control in the farm family is becoming less pronounced, and that in this and a number of other respects the rapid social and economic changes of the times are carrying the farm family along in the same general direction as that already taken by the urban family.

In Chicago, Mowrer distinguished four types of families according to the area in the city where they lived. These types were the emancipated, the paternal, the equalitarian, and the maternal. The emancipated families occurred in the rooming house, kitchenette-apartment, and residence-hotel sections. There were no children, and the wife, as well as the husband, was usually employed outside the home. The father-dominated families, generally of foreign origin, were located in the slums, had many children, and the activities of the wife were confined

[8] Condensed from N. L. Sims, *Elements of Rural Sociology* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1934), pp. 432, 434.

to the home. In middle-class residential neighborhoods among the business and professional classes, there were also children, but not nearly so many. There was a minimum of subordination of the wife in relation to the husband, and the wife participated in interests outside the home, often leaving the children in care of a nursemaid. On the edge of the city, in the commuter zones, the absence of the husband all day tended to place more responsibility upon the wife, especially with relation to the neighborhood.[9]

Family Disorganization.—Divorce, desertion, and separation are the usual ways by which a marriage is voluntarily terminated by one or both of the parties. They result from maladjustment in the marriage relationship or other disruptive influences. A family which has lost one parent from any cause is spoken of as a "broken" family, and a broken family must be regarded as in some degree a disorganized family, as we use the term.

Disorganization in the family, as in any other social institution, simply means that the functions customarily expected of the family by its members and by society are no longer being adequately performed because of the failure or loss of members, or because of other factors. The essential functions of the family fall upon the parents rather than upon the children, so that the amount of disorganization in a family is ordinarily much greater because of the failure of a parent to play the role expected of him than because of the corresponding failure of a child. This is reflected in the fact that a family is not said to be "broken" if one of the children is missing. In the "broken" family, the performance of the function of the absent parent has lapsed, sometimes gradually and sometimes suddenly, and to this extent disorganization occurs. It will be reduced if the family readjusts itself, the remaining parent or other member taking over the functions of the missing parent, as far as possible. If the lost parent once fully performed his role in the family, however, his place cannot be completely filled, even by remarriage. His removal, therefore, leaves some amount of

[9] Ernest R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927), pp. 110-12.

persistent disorganization in the family. This is true although the surviving parent and the children continue to play their roles effectively and without loss of morale. On the other hand, where the absent parent was of little worth when present, the family may on the whole be better organized and adjusted without him than with him. In some cases of divorce or death, the payment of alimony or the inheritance of an estate makes the economic readjustment of the family easier; in other cases, relatives or society must step in with financial aid. It may also happen that a family broken by the removal of one parent is too demoralized to recover. Its disorganization increases until it disintegrates into unattached individuals.

The chief ties that hold the members of a modern family together are the affectional bonds and sex relationships between the spouses, the affectional bonds between the parents and children, economic support by the male head, and the performance of housekeeping duties and child care by the wife and mother. This normal functioning of the family implies a certain customary division of labor between husband and wife. But, though natural and usual, the pattern familiar to us is not always inevitable or essential to the continuance of the family. In a considerable number of families in our country the wife works outside the home and helps support the family. (See Tables 21, 22, 23, below.) Sometimes, the wife permanently maintains a husband who is unable to work.

TABLE 21

MARITAL STATUS OF FEMALES 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER IN THE LABOR FORCE, 1940 *

	Per Cent Distribution
Females 14 years old and over in the labor force	100.0
Single	49.4
Married	35.5
Husband present	29.6
Husband absent	5.9
Widowed and divorced	15.1

* Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, Population. Vol. III, *Labor Force*, Part I, p. 26.

TABLE 22

PER CENT OF MARRIED WOMEN (HUSBAND PRESENT) EIGHTEEN TO FORTY-FOUR YEARS OLD IN THE LABOR FORCE BY NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER TEN YEARS OLD: 1940*

Age	Women with No Children Under 10	Women with 1 Child Under 10	Women with 2 or More Children Under 10
18-24	27.2	7.2	4.3
25-29	36.1	11.5	7.4
30-34	31.1	11.9	8.2
35-39	23.3	10.0	7.2
40-44	16.9	8.2	6.5

* John Durand, "Married Women in the Labor Force," *American Journal of Sociology*, LII, No. 3, p. 218.

Occasionally, families live on inherited wealth, with no contribution from the husband and father. Or it may happen that the older children, by their labor, keep the parents and the younger siblings together. In the same way, in wealthier families or where the wife works out, the latter may be largely or

TABLE 23

PER CENT OF MARRIED WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 1940, BY HUSBAND'S WAGE OR SALARY INCOME IN 1939 AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER TEN YEARS OLD*

Wage or Salary Income of Husband	Per Cent in Labor Force	
	Women with No Children Under 10	Women with 1 or More Children Under 10
$1 ..... $199	33.1	16.6
$200 ..... $399	28.5	13.9
$400 ..... $599	26.9	12.3
$600 ..... $999	24.8	12.1
$1,000 ..... $1,499	21.5	8.9
$1,500 ..... $1,999	14.0	5.6
$2,000 ..... $2,999	12.1	3.3
$3,000 and over	8.5	2.8

* *Ibid.*, p. 222.

entirely relieved of the tasks of housekeeping and child care by servants, and yet the family may be in no sense disorganized. In other words, in order that the family shall be considered satisfactorily organized, it is not necessary that the structure of all families shall be identical, or that a family shall conform precisely with the model family pattern in the society. On the contrary, a certain amount of variability or flexibility in family roles is necessary for the successful adjustment of the family under the many different circumstances that occur. It has even been possible for the family to exist where the spouses have little satisfaction in one another's companionship. This was not an uncommon situation with the European family in the past, when marriage rested on practical rather than on romantic considerations, and affairs of the heart were cultivated outside the marriage institution. In our contemporary society, where people marry with the idea of romantic happiness uppermost in mind, many marriages survive considerable disappointment in this regard because of other substantial benefits from the arrangement, especially the interest of the parents in their children.

In comparing a family which has always provided fewer benefits and less affection with a family which provides more, it is better to refer to the former as being less organized, rather than more disorganized, than the latter. But if a wife and mother decides to take a job and make an independent career for herself at the cost of being unable to render the family services which she has been accustomed to perform, and if she does this against the objections of the husband, the family may properly be regarded as relatively disorganized until it readjusts to the new situation, supplies the mother's services satisfactorily in some other way, and the husband's resentment does not cause him to neglect or abandon his own role in the family.

The spectacular rise in the divorce rate in the United States in the last half century cannot be regarded as an accurate index of the amount of increase in family disorganization over the period (Table 24). The expanding divorce rate reflects, mainly, a change in the folkways and laws regarding divorce. It is now considered preferable, for a couple whose marriage is regarded

by one or both of them as unsatisfactory, legally to dissolve their partnership rather than to continue to live together, as was formerly done. The divorce rate has also been increased by such alterations in the social climate as a general decline in religion, the shrinking size of the family, and the general opportunity for women to be self-supporting.

TABLE 24

ESTIMATED DIVORCE RATE, UNITED STATES, 1890-1945*

Year	Rate per 1,000 of the Population
1945	3.6
1940	2.0
1933	1.3
1930	1.6
1910	0.9
1890	0.5

* U. S. Public Health Service, "Marriage and Divorce In The United States, 1937 to 1945," *Vital Statistics—Special Reports: Selected Studies*, XXIII, No. 9, pp. 218-19.

It is significant that nearly two thirds of all divorced couples have no children. As Folsom expresses it, "the majority of divorces are really broken 'companionates' rather than broken families." [10] This means that childless marriages are much more often broken by divorce than are marriages with children. The chief reason for this seems to be that the child is a strong tie, holding the parents together in spite of the fact that some of the affection and attention of both parents, and especially of the mother, is usually diverted from the other spouse to the child.

The divorce rate increases, on the average, from farm to city, and with the size of city. It also varies widely from one part of a city to another, from state to state (see Table 25), with the occupation of the husband, from Catholic to Protestant to no-church, with the amount of education, and with many other factors. Although there are no accurate figures on the

[10] Folsom, *op. cit.*, chap. xv. See also, Ernest R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), chap. v; Ernest R. Mowrer, *The Family* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), chap. ix.

subject, it is believed that at least as many families are broken by desertion and separation as by divorce. Desertion has been called "the poor man's divorce."

TABLE 25

ESTIMATED DIVORCE RATES PER 1,000 POPULATION, BY STATES: 1947 *

Division and State	Divorce Rate	Division and State	Divorce Rate
United States	3.3	District of Columbia	2.5
New England	2.2	Virginia	2.3
Maine	3.2	West Virginia	...
New Hampshire	2.6	North Carolina	1.8
Vermont	2.1	South Carolina	...
Massachusetts	2.1	Georgia	...
Rhode Island	2.0	Florida	8.9
Connecticut	1.7	East South Central	...
Middle Atlantic	...	Kentucky	...
New York	...	Tennessee	3.0
New Jersey	2.1	Alabama	3.7
Pennsylvania	1.6	Mississippi	3.4
East North Central	...	West South Central	...
Ohio	3.8	Arkansas	5.0
Indiana	...	Louisiana	...
Illinois	...	Oklahoma	...
Michigan	3.5	Texas	6.2
Wisconsin	1.8	Mountain	...
West North Central	3.1	Montana	5.0
Minnesota	2.0	Idaho	7.0
Iowa	2.6	Wyoming	5.4
Missouri	4.5	Colorado	...
North Dakota	1.5	New Mexico	5.8
South Dakota	2.2	Arizona	3.7
Nebraska	2.5	Utah	4.0
Kansas	3.6	Nevada	99.3
South Atlantic	...	Pacific	...
Delaware	2.8	Washington	4.6
Maryland	3.1	Oregon	4.4
		California	...

* U. S. Public Health Service, "Provisional Marriage and Divorce Statistics, United States, 1947," *Vital Statistics—Special Reports*, XXIX, No. 4 (September 9, 1948), 51.

Crises like business depressions and wars compel the institution of the family to make sudden and often difficult readjustments to decreased income, unemployment, change of residence,

and extended separations. Both the business cycle and war cause violent fluctuations in marriage, birth, and divorce rates. The leaving of fathers for war and the employment of mothers in war industries aggravate juvenile delinquency. The divorce rate falls in hard times and rises in good times. It was greatly exaggerated by World Wars I and II because of the haste of war marriages, the enforced absence of husbands overseas, and the greatly increased mixing of men and women in industry.[11] Such major social disturbances as wars and depressions also affect various other aspects of family life, some of which are intangible and not easy to measure.[12] Among the more obvious consequences of the last war Burgess sees "intensification of the trend toward the companionship type of family; a further rise in the status of women; further losses of family function, with the increasing use of nursery schools . . . and the extension of governmental provision for family security; further liberation of the code of sexual morality." [13]

It is well known that the only child lacks the opportunity to develop his personality in interaction with other children in the family. But it is not so often noticed that the only child creates a three-cornered family relationship which is very different from that created where two or more children are present. The sex of the children also makes a distinct difference in family relationships, so that a family of all daughters or all sons each poses peculiar conditions of its own, both for the children and for their parents. A small sibling family is more likely to be single-sexed than a large one. For example, by the theory of probability, we would expect about half of all two-sibling families to be single-sexed, but only about one in thirty-two six-sibling families to be single-sexed. The situation of an only sister in a family of brothers, or of an only brother in a family of sisters, is also familiar. In each case, there are believed to

[11] J. O. Reinemann, "Extra-Marital Relations with Fellow Employees in War Industry as a Factor in Disruption of Family Life," *American Sociological Review*, X, No. 3 (1945), 399-404.

[12] Robert C. Angell, *The Family Encounters the Depression* (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1936); Samuel A. Stouffer and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Research Memorandum on the Family in the Depression* (New York: Social Science Research Council Bulletin No. 29, 1937).

[13] Ernest W. Burgess, "The Effect of War on the American Family," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIII, No. 3 (November, 1942), 343-52.

be definite effects upon the structure of the family. More research into the correlations between size of family and personal interrelations within the family, as well as those outside the family, may show other associations of practical importance.

Our divorce statistics are so impressive that it is not often noticed that nearly five times as many families are broken by death as by all other causes combined. In a large majority of cases, the initial break in the family is caused by the death of the husband and father.

Predicting Success in Marriage.—A more specific search for factors that influence marriage adjustment has been made by writers who have tried to predict success or failure in marriage. For example, Burgess and Cottrell, in Chicago, found, among other things, that young men were poor risks as husbands who (1) were only children, (2) lived in a roominghouse or hotel area, (3) finished high school only, (4) were irregularly employed, (5) earned under $150 a month, (6) had no savings, (7) belonged to no social organizations, (8) grew up in a city, (9) had gone with six or more women before marriage, (10) had almost no men friends, (11) had divorced or separated parents, or (12) had a record of almost continuous conflict with their father.

The way by which Burgess and Cottrell arrived at their predictions is shown in Table 26. In this Table, 526 married couples were classified (*a*) according to the length of time man and wife had known each other before marriage and (*b*) according to their own rating of their marital adjustment as "poor," "fair," or "good."

It may be seen from the Table that the percentage of couples who rated their marriage adjustment as "good" increased from 22.4 to 53.3 as the period of acquaintance lengthened from less than six months to five years or more. This was taken as an indication that marital adjustment was related in some way to length of acquaintance before marriage; and Burgess and Cottrell somewhat arbitrarily assigned an adjustment "score" to each acquaintance-period, ranging from 0 for "under six months" to 25 for "five years and more." The same method was applied to a large number of other factors believed to be

associated with marital success, such as education, occupation, income, family background, and marital status of parents. The assigned scores were then used to predict the marital adjustment of other young people contemplating marriage, those couples getting the highest score being considered the best risks.[14]

TABLE 26

TABLE FOR PREDICTING ADJUSTMENT IN MARRIAGE, FROM DURATION OF ACQUAINTANCE BEFORE MARRIAGE: METHOD OF BURGESS AND COTTRELL *

Period of Acquaintance Before Marriage	Marital Adjustment			No. of Cases	Score Value Assigned
	Poor	Fair	Good		
	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent		
Under Six Months.....	47.0	30.6	22.4	49	0
Six to 23 Months.....	37.7	24.6	37.7	122	10
Two to Four Years.....	27.8	28.4	43.8	194	20
Five Years and More...	14.7	32.0	53.3	150	25
No Reply				11	
Total	28.5	28.3	43.2	526	

* Adapted from Burgess and Cottrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 282, 406.

Most emphasis is usually placed by students of the family upon like-mindedness of husband and wife as a condition for successful marriage. By this they mean that the couple should have about the same convictions and philosophy, at least about what they consider the more important things of life. There are two principal sources from which their similarity in point of view can come: (*a*) the previous social environments of the two young people, and (*b*) their assimilation to one another in courtship and in marriage. It is generally believed that the outlook is more favorable if man and wife belong to the same general socioeconomic class, share the same religious beliefs, were both reared in the city or on the farm, are not too far apart

[14] E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939), pp. 275-79. See also L. M. Terman *et al.*, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1938), especially chaps. v and xiv.

in amount and kind of education, and so on. It is also commonly thought that the most crucial single background factor is the families in which they spent their respective childhoods, and the often subtle but deep-seated value systems which they acquired from early family experiences. For this reason, Burgess and Cottrell tested the relationship between success in marriage and a rather crude index of similarity in family backgrounds, and found that as the index rose by 10 points the percentage of couples with "good" marital adjustment increased from 31 to 57.[15] They also expressed the opinion that the difference would have been greater if their index could have included the more subtle and imponderable factors in the family environments.

Harriet R. Mowrer seems to regard the parental family and the social background factors as less important for determining a successful marriage than the process of mutual adjustment or accommodation which takes place between a couple, first in courtship and then in marriage, whereby they become increasingly alike psychologically, or "assimilated" to one another.[16] It is well established, however, that similarity in social background is very significant for marital success, if only because identification in marriage is made easier by it. It is also evident that while the degree of accommodation achieved in courtship may be used for predicting success in marriage, adjustment in marriage itself is the result to be predicted.

Sorokin makes it very explicit that it is necessary for the married pair to think alike only about those things which one or both of them regard as important. Whether or not they are in agreement on other matters is inconsequential. For this reason, he points out, no list of things about which all married people should agree—religion, fidelity, or what not—can be made that will be generally valid. As an example, Sorokin gives a difference in political party preference between an average man and wife in the United States and between a couple in Nazi Germany: in the first case it would have practically no effect on

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

[16] Harriet R. Mowrer, "Getting Along in Marriage" in Howard Becker and Reuben Hill (eds.), *Family, Marriage, and Parenthood* (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1948), pp. 341-65.

the future of the marriage, but in the second it might make continuance of the marriage impossible.[17]

QUESTIONS

1. Can you summarize the list of changes that have occurred in the institution of the modern family in our society, as given by Folsom, in one generalized statement?
2. Do you agree with item (21) in Folsom's list?
3. In what ways has the rural family changed less than the urban family? What is the general explanation?
4. Compare the effects of close versus remote contact with the larger kinship group upon the behavior and adjustment of a young married couple.
5. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages in modern life of the traits of family pride and clannishness. Why are they declining?
6. To what extent does the 1940 Census support the common opinion that old people are found in the homes of their children on the farm more often than in the city? How do you account for any real difference?
7. What consequences does the occupation of farming have on family relationship and structure, according to Sims?
8. Is the urban or the farm family more "democratic"? Explain just what is meant by this term here. What are the reasons?
9. Does the pattern of family life vary from one class of the urban population to another? Mention some of your own observations on this point. What is the explanation?
10. What are the possible ways in which a marriage may be voluntarily terminated?
11. What is meant by a "broken" family?
12. Is a "broken" family a "disorganized" family? Explain.
13. Illustrate different degrees of disorganization in the family.
14. What are the chief ties that hold together the members of a modern family?

[17] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Society, Culture, and Personality* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), pp. 138-41.

15. May any of the customary roles in our modern family be absent or changed without necessarily breaking or dissolving the family? Is some flexibility of roles desirable? Explain.
16. When may a family be spoken of as weakly organized, rather than as disorganized?
17. Why cannot the rapid rise in the divorce rate in the United States over the last 50 years be taken as an accurate index of the amount of increase in family disorganization?
18. How do you explain the fact that childless marriages are much more often broken by divorce than are marriages with children?
19. How do desertion and separation compare with divorce in frequency? Is there a class difference in this respect?
20. Compare divorce rates in the United States by states and regions, and try to account for some of the differences. (See Table 25.)
21. What were some of the most obvious effects on the family in the United States (*a*) of the depression of the 1930's? (Consult the references mentioned in footnote 12); (*b*) of World War II? (See the reference in footnote 13.)
22. How does death compare with divorce and desertion as a cause of broken families in our society?
23. Pass judgment upon the argument that the acquired adjustment of a couple to one another in courtship and marriage, rather than similarity of values derived from their social backgrounds, is important for successful marriage.
24. Why does a difference, say in religious belief, disrupt one marriage but not another?
25. Briefly explain the method used by Burgess and Cottrell, or by Terman *et al.*, to predict success in marriage.

REFERENCES

AYSCOUGH, FLORENCE. *Chinese Women.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1937.

BARRON, MILTON L. *People Who Intermarry.* Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1946.

BROMLEY, DOROTHY D., and BRITTEN, F. H. *Youth and Sex: A Study of 1300 College Students.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1938.

BURGESS, E. W., and LOCKE, H. J. *The Family: From Institution to Companionship.* New York: American Book Co., 1945.

BUTTERFIELD, OLIVER M. *Sex Life in Marriage.* New York: Emerson Books, 1937.

CALHOUN, ARTHUR. *A Social History of the American Family.* Cleveland: A. H. Clark Co., 1913.

COHN, DAVID L. *Love in America.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1943.

DAS, SARAGADHAR. *Purdah: The Status of Indian Women.* New York: Vanguard Press, 1932.

DUVALL, EVELYN M., and HILL, REUBEN. *When You Marry.* Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1945.

FRAZIER, E. FRANKLIN. *The Negro Family in the United States.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939.

GLASS, DAVID V. *Population Policies and Movements in Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940.

KOOS, EARL L. *Families in Trouble.* New York: Kings Crown Press, 1946.

MEAD, MARGARET. *Sex and Temperament.* New York: William Morrow & Co., 1935.

MOWRER, HARRIET R. *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord.* New York: American Book Co., 1935.

MYRDAL, ALVA. *Nation and Family: The Swedish Experiment in Democratic Family and Population Policy,* New York: Harper & Bros., 1941.

DE ROUGEMONT, DENIS. *Love in the Western World,* New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1940.

THOMAS, W. I., and THOMAS, DOROTHY S. *The Child in America.* New York: Alfred Knopf, 1928.

CHAPTER 18

THE NEIGHBORHOOD AND THE COMMUNITY

Significance of the Neighborhood.—Next to the family, that part of our society with which a child usually has the most intimate and frequent contact, and from which he acquires the largest share of his folkways and mores, consists of the children of the other families that live nearby, or in the same *neighborhood.* He finds these other children as soon as he goes outside his own door: in village or city, he ordinarily plays with them in his and their homes and yards, on the streets, and in nearby playgrounds or parks; on the farms he meets them whenever he ventures out on the road. He generally encounters some of these same neighborhood children when his parents take him to Sunday school and church, and he is likely to be constantly and closely thrown with most of them when he goes to school. Even in great cities, most children are absorbed into the play groups or the gangs that they find in their block or on their street. It is now known that the influence of these playmates of their own age often has more to do with shaping of the personality traits and character of children than the influence of their parents.

The influence of the play group alone is enough to make the neighborhood important in any systematic study of human relations. But that is not all. Although the neighborhood is generally of more concern to children than to adults, the latter also frequently know their neighbors, or something about them, discuss them, like or dislike them, are interested in what they and their children do, borrow from them, exchange with them an occasional cake or pie, "visit" or otherwise associate with them from time to time, join with them in various organized social

activities, and give them their sympathy and help in misfortune, illness, or death. As a form of primary group association, the neighborhood often means much to the people who compose it. The neighborhood makes a difference too in the attractiveness or unattractiveness of the physical surroundings and of the people one sees, in transportation and other utilities, in noise or quiet, in cleanliness, odor, and sanitation, even in the extremes of heat to which one is exposed in summer. Finally, the social status or rating of a family is largely judged by the neighborhood in which it lives; in fact, neighboring families tend to belong to the same general socioeconomic class. All these considerations are clearly enough reflected in the emphasis that most families, especially those with children, still place upon selecting the "right" kind of neighborhood in which to live.

The central idea of a neighborhood, as the term is commonly used, seems to be that of a group of persons living near one another and bearing to one another primary relations something like those just described. It usually applies to a collection of families in a city or village block or on contiguous farms. There are deviations, of course: families who own summer cottages may have two sets of neighbors, one in the city and the other on the lake. The word "neighbor" is sometimes applied to men or firms whose offices are in the same building or on the same floor.

The distance between neighbors varies from farm to city, and from one part of the city to another, so that the limits of a neighborhood cannot be determined by distance alone. The simplest method of locating the boundaries of a neighborhood is probably to ask the individuals in what neighborhood they think they live, whom in it they or other members of their family know, and just what are their social and other relationships with them. If the sociologist wishes to show the neighborhood on a map, he can dot in the various families mentioned by his informants as belonging to their neighborhood, and let these dots reveal at once the general consensus and the irregularities of opinion. Or he may indicate separately the lines of the neighborhood as given by the children, by the men, and by the women, because they are not necessarily the same.

In Bloomington, Indiana, with a population of about 21,000, Sweetser asked 54 individuals (in contrast to families) living in a single block about their acquaintances and social relations within the block and immediately across the street. The locale was a lower middle-class residential area, with single detached family houses. Separate lists were made of "acquaintances" and of "associates," with the results shown in Table 27. Ac-

TABLE 27

NUMBER OF NEIGHBORING ACQUAINTANCES AND ASSOCIATES OF FIFTY-FOUR RESIDENTS OF A SINGLE SQUARE BLOCK *

Number of Acquaintances or Associates	Number of Informants With Specified Numbers of	
	Acquaintances	Associates
1-15	3	22
16-30	3	15
31-45	6	9
46-60	6	5
61-75	9	1
76-90	10	1
91-105	6	1
106-120	8	—
121-135	3	—
Total	54	54
Median	75	23

* From Sweetser, *op. cit.*, p. 527.

cording to this Table, none of the persons interviewed was acquainted with all his neighbors, as defined. The number of acquaintances per person interviewed varied from 13 to 131, out of a possible 140, while the median number of acquaintances was 75 and of associates 23. Sweetser accordingly set up the generalization that *"individual residents of urbanized areas [including members of the same family] are differentiated from each other with respect to the neighbors with whom they are acquainted and with whom they associate."* This in turn led him to the important inference:

Since, therefore, individuals are markedly differentiated with respect to interpersonal relations among their neighbors in urbanized residential

areas, it is clear that insofar as they are influenced by a local culture they may be in contact with very different patterns, in spite of the propinquity (or even identity) of their residences. To illustrate concretely, the simultaneous existence in delinquency areas of delinquent and law-abiding traditions may be thought of as reciprocally related to the differential acquaintance and association of individual neighbors. That some residents of such areas become delinquent, while others become law-abiding would then be expected: differential association with delinquents producing delinquency, and differential association with law-abiders producing law-abiding behavior.[1]

In this survey, Sweetser arbitrarily defined the area of the neighborhood as a block and the houses adjacent to it on all four sides, rather than making its boundaries depend upon the relationships which he discovered. But he illustrates one way in which a study of the social structure of a neighborhood may be made. Following his general procedure, it is possible, if desired, to make "sociometric" diagrams, showing by arrows which children play together, which wives visit together, and other relations of special interest, whether of an individual or family nature.

The Life Cycle of an Urban Neighborhood.—When people who grew up in a neighborhood return to it in later life, they usually find it very much changed, often almost beyond recognition. This is because neighborhoods, like many other things, pass through a life cycle. Queen and Thomas have described what they consider the typical life history of an urban neighborhood:

(a) The first stage is the occupying of a district by homeseekers who wish pleasant, healthy, and otherwise acceptable surroundings in which to rear a family. They want congenial nigh dwellers who will become neighbors in the sense of people who visit back and forth, go shopping together, care for each other's children, and engage in the other practices associated with neighboring. (b) As time passes, the number of residents increases and personal acquaintance declines. The neighborhood is surrounded by various sorts of people and perhaps by business houses. It may be divided by a new thoroughfare. Some of the earlier settlers

[1] Frank L. Sweetser, Jr., "A New Emphasis for Neighborhood Research," *American Sociological Review*, VII, No. 4 (1942), 525-33.

die or move away. Some of the newcomers are tenants instead of owners. Neighboring and neighborliness decline. (c) In a third stage, there may be invasion of the neighborhood area itself by business or by strange ethnic groups. As single dwellings give way to converted tenements, apartments, and rooming houses, occupied increasingly by racial or other groups regarded as inferior, neighborhood pride and loyalty decline still further. (d) Finally personal contacts practically disappear, neighboring ceases, and the district loses its identity in the general life of the city. It may continue as part of a respectable residential section; it may be taken over by business or industry; or it may deteriorate slowly while vice and crime get a foothold. In any case the life cycle of a neighborhood has been completed.

Now these events do not occur in identical sequence. Some of them may be absent from particular cases. But in general the shifts follow the approximate order that we have indicated: from residential home ownership to tenancy, to business, to heterogeneity of inhabitants, sometimes to disorder, and to the final displacement of residents by other uses of the land.[2]

Queen and Thomas have painted the usual life history of a city neighborhood, but the pattern is rather more variable than they have indicated. For example, it sometimes happens in the changes of urban development that a former business or industrial street is converted into a block of tenements or apartment buildings, or an old rooming-house section makes way for a new and prosperous residential development. It is actually possible for the life of a neighborhood to begin or stop at any place on the cycle, the essential point being the certainty of eventual change in the quality of the neighborhood, or in the use to which the land and buildings are put.

The Vanishing City Neighborhood.—People who live in metropolitan areas are often scarcely acquainted with the families that live around them, but may have their friends and intimates and the social groups to which they belong scattered over the city. The story of a couple that was inspecting an apartment in a large apartment hotel illustrates this, perhaps

[2] By permission from *The City: A Study of Urbanism in the United States* pp. 307-08, by Stuart A. Queen and L. F. Thomas, Copyrighted, 1939. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.

with some exaggeration. Well pleased after seeing the apartment, on their way out the wife recognized a woman who got off the elevator. Turning sharply to the rental agent, the lady said, "We won't take the apartment; I don't care to be in a hotel where I know someone." Because of the highly impersonal attitudes that prevail among the residents in many city blocks, sociologists are inclined to question the existence of anything like the neighborhood in a great city. The fact seems to be, however, that, according to our method of locating it, the neighborhood may actually be present in any degree down to the vanishing point. Some parts of a city, including perhaps the central slum areas, undoubtedly have neighborhoods to a greater extent than others. At just what point to draw the line and say there is no neighborhood at all, is an arbitrary decision. But it should be recognized that there is probably some "neighboring" going on in most blocks where people have their dwellings, if not among families, then among individuals here and there, or among the children.

It would be possible to modify the idea of the neighborhood sufficiently to allow the dotting in on a map of the friends, acquaintances, and organizations of the people in a city block wherever they may fall over the city, and then be able to accept the resulting pattern as the spatial distribution of the "neighboring" and organized activities of the families in that block. A "neighboring" or "social" map of this kind for any city would be of much sociological interest, even though the dispersed groupings were not called neighborhoods. This proposal might be of special use to those city planners who feel that the lack of local neighborhoods is a serious loss to satisfactory urban living, and wish somehow to restore it. In this way they might either get some practical ideas on how to bring closer together in space the scattered friends, or else be led to the conclusion that with modern methods of transportation the common spatial separation of friends in a city is not very objectionable, and so shift their concern to those people who do not participate at all in "neighboring" or in social organizations, either in their own block or elsewhere in the city. That a very considerable proportion of urban people actually do not participate in any or-

ganized social life is indicated by a survey of New York City which will be mentioned in the following chapter.

The Community.—We speak of the school community, the church community, the trade community, the hospital community, etc., and of the total community as a sort of composite of all these. Thus a community may be defined as a population living in a common area which is served by the same institution or group of institutions. A large city may include a number of rather clearly marked composite communities, whose populations seldom go beyond their respective boundaries to satisfy their institutional and other needs. A particular institutional community such as a trade community can be shown on a map by dots marking the location of all families that trade at a given center, village, or shopping district.

Another way of diagraming a community is to draw lines connecting, say, a church with the families that attend it, etc. (See Chapter 19). A graph of this kind shows the constellations of service relationships within a community and, if it does not become too complex, may be useful for studying local social organizations with the community welfare in mind.

Sacred and Secular Communities.—Rural communities differ from urban communities chiefly in their dependence on the occupation of agriculture, in the comparative sparseness of their population, and in greater social homogeneity.[3] In its psychology and folkways the rural community clearly comes under the more generalized type of what has been termed the "sacred" society, and the urban community under the contrasting type of the "secular" society. An interesting abstraction of these two types has been made by Howard Becker.[4] The chief characteristic of the sacred community of the folk society variety is resistance to change. It is traditional, customary, conservative, old-fashioned, rural, backward, and physically isolated. It is also socially isolated, hindered in communication with other

[3] Carle C. Zimmerman, "Rural Society," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, XIII, 469.

[4] Taken from Howard Becker, *Interpreting Social Life in Context*, mimeographed pamphlet prepared for class use at the University of Wisconsin, pp. 37-41, 56-60. See also Howard Becker and Reuben Hill (eds.), *Family, Marriage and Parenthood* (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1948), pp. 19-39.

groups by differences in accent, dress, and gesture. The sacred society is therefore marked by mental isolation. Its members are suspicious and hostile toward all outsiders or "furriners," and are unacquainted with any beliefs or ideas other than their own. If their language was originally like that of the next peoples, it has often gradually accumulated differences until it seems to be unrelated to any other. The uniqueness of its language then ensnares the society in a peculiarity of logic which further prevents it from passing beyond its own borders. The cake of custom becomes still thicker and harder if most of the people cannot read or write. One of the commonplaces of the folk society is the importance of kinship ties, and the great pains taken in the reckoning of kin. "Some dwellers in folk societies have as many as three hundred ways of labeling their various relatives, whereas in this modern day, with its small family units as over against the mammoth kinship clusters of earlier periods, we think that we are doing well when we can identify a few second cousins." Another mark of this isolated group is the comparative absence of highly specialized vocations. Even the people who claim a particular trade are usually jacks at many, and can do most of the things that need to be done in the community. Any departure from the customary ways of getting a living meets with resistance.

At the opposite pole from the sacred or folk community is the secular community. Here resistance to change in general is at a minimum, and many kinds of change are eagerly sought after. The most extreme examples of the secular society are the great cosmopolitan cities located on the highways of commerce and communication. Their first characteristic is accessibility. People of every kind from everywhere are found there, rubbing shoulders and ideas. The symbols of such a society are the telegraph, the telephone, the newspaper, the wireless. Therefore, the secular community is open-minded, often to the point of ostentatious flouting of things once held sacred. "Anything for a thrill" expresses the spirit of the crowd.

In the metropolis the kinship circle reduces almost to the married pair and its scanty offspring, and there is a corresponding dwindling of the social control formerly exercised by the

kindred. As Becker says, "Instead of the reverent imitation of elders, ancestors, or other traditional models, there is the prairie-fire spread of style among contemporaries. 'Shirt-tail out' changes to 'shirt-tail in' almost overnight, the switch from skirt to blue jeans and back overrides parental protest, and the Tubular Torso yields to the New Look." Stepped-up competition and minute subdivision of occupation are the rule, with multiplied specialists each contributing his expert bit.

The strange, and the exotic generally, are attractive to many. Anything novel or "different" has prestige value. "Change of scene, dress, friends, and marital partners becomes virtually compulsive among that small proportion of a secular society which pays the costs—or if one prefers, reaps the advantages—of ultra-rapid secularization." Everyone is, indeed, in some sense a stranger. Slang replaces the proverb. The old is despised, the new esteemed. Supernaturalism there may be, but it is not of the traditionally religious variety. The prestige of science is so great that scientific quacks abound.

It is evident from the above conceptions of the sacred and the secular types of society that one extreme has been purposely set against another, for the sake of the emphasis in contrast. Elsewhere Becker points out that there can be no completely secular society, since such a society would lack the common purposes and values which are necessary to hold any community together. Nevertheless, it is easy to recognize in these two antithetical types many of the essentially contrasting traits that are familiar to us in rural areas, on the one hand, and in our great urban centers, on the other.

Empirical Findings Regarding the Size of Community and Sociological Traits.—Empirical comparisons of rural and urban communities sometimes give rather inconsistent and confusing results, if clean-cut differences like those pictured by the sacred and secular typology are expected. For example, in an Oklahoma survey, W. H. Sewell and E. Amend found little difference between college students who lived on farms, in villages, in towns, and in cities relative to their attitudes toward the family, the law, economic conservation, and education, and relative to such

traits as morale, inferiority feelings, and general adjustment. According to other studies, city children had fewer superstitious beliefs than small-town children; northern children in large towns and cities showed considerably more prejudice against Negroes than did children in small towns; and so on.[5]

Psychological tests still yield higher average scores for city children than for rural. This may be partly a matter of class distribution and lumped averages; but it probably also reflects the somewhat different kinds of mental experience and outlook of city and country children. School performance and cultural achievements which are valued by the society as a whole all favor the city.[6] In spite of the Sewell-Amend study, farming as an occupation usually receives a significantly low rating in Western society. For instance, when 100 occupations were grouped into 26 categories and rated by 345 Kansas high-school and college students, the farmer fell in 25th place, close to the bottom.[7] This attitude toward farming, the basic occupation of rural life, is largely shared by rural people themselves, and clearly indicates the superior prestige of urban life. There are many other readily observable symptoms of the same state of mind, such as the tendency to refer with pride to residence in a great city, but to be reticent about living in a village or on a farm.

Turning to more objective data, we may recall rather pronounced differences in certain rural and urban vital statistics, already given. Sanderson investigated the relation between the size of community and marital status in the United States, and found that the proportion of persons fifteen years of age or over who are married, or have ever been married, tends to decrease as the size of the community increases, while the proportion of persons who are single or who have never married increases with the size of the community. Except for males on farms and in suburban cities of 25,000 to 50,000 population,

[5] William H. Sewell and Eleanor E. Amend, "The Influence of Size of Home Community on Attitudes and Personality Traits," *American Sociological Review*, VIII, No. 2, 180-84; Gardner Murphy, Lois Barclay Murphy, and Theodore M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology* (Rev. ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1937), p. 1019.

[6] Carle C. Zimmerman, "Selective Rural-Urban Migration," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, XXIII (1928), 109-13.

[7] Mapheus Smith, "An Empirical Scale of Prestige Status of Occupations," *American Sociological Review*, VIII, No. 2, pp. 185-92.

white persons marry at a little older age in large places than in small. The proportion of homes broken by divorce or death increases with the size of the community. In an earlier report, Sanderson showed that larger communities have smaller families, proportionately more childless marriages, more native white mothers gainfully employed outside the home, more family mobility, and more illegitimate births.

Another discovery was that incorporated villages resemble small cities in the matter of marital status much more than they do the farm or rural-nonfarm population. For this reason, Sanderson points out, in contrasting family data for rural and for urban populations it is important to separate the incorporated villages from the rural farm and rural-nonfarm populations in order to obtain a correct picture of the rural family.[8]

It is evident that a great many general and special conditions must enter into the determination of the outlook and patterns of behavior which characterize any particular modern community, large or small; and therefore that these characteristics should not be expected to be entirely consistent if any simple mechanistic criterion like size of place is taken as the independent variable. Nevertheless, most sociological surveys have little difficulty in finding certain significant average differences between small, rural communities and large, industrial or commercial cities, as well as those communities that lie in between—differences of a nature which are spot lighted in the sharply contrasted dichotomy of sacred and secular, described above.

Identification with the Village Community.—Whatever cultural differences there may be between one community and another, rural and urban, small city and great city, an intimate and controlling relationship often exists between an individual and his community. This has been observed in many places; for example, in a recent interesting study of a village in Lebanon. On the rugged slopes of the high Lebanon mountains of Syria are scattered several hundred villages. They are all very much alike in cultural background, but each one of them, in the minds

[8] Dwight Sanderson, *Relation of Size of Community to Marital Status*, Memoir 200, Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station (1937), p. 36.

of its inhabitants, is clearly set off from the rest. This is no doubt partly because there are no dwellings or farmsteads between the villages. Most of the villagers are farmers, but they all live in the villages. The boundaries of the territory that belongs to each village are clearly defined. The study was made in the one village community of Bishmizzeen, by Afif Tannous, a native of the village who, in his own words, "was brought up in the image of its culture." Tannous writes:

The boundary lines between village and village begin to show themselves in the case of intervillage marriage . . . the choice of a mate from outside the village is tolerated, but not encouraged. Other family groups see in it an implied insult to their girls. Also, they see in the chosen woman a stranger who does not belong. They are not certain of her behavior and status among them. Her advent into the village tends to make them conscious of their entity, as the "Bishmizzeen group," for example.

Also, in situations of conflict or competition village identity is clearly demonstrated. When quarrels take place between individuals from Bishmizzeen and a neighboring village, usually such quarrels do not end with the individuals concerned. They tend to implicate the two village groups, as the Bishmizzeen group versus the Amyoon group.

When a villager, say a Bishmizzeenian, goes to a village where he is not known, he is soon asked, "Where do you come from? To what family do you belong?"

When the young men of one village participate in a religious festival in a neighboring village, they do so as the young men of Bishmizzeen. They try to outdo other village groups (the young men of Amyoon or Afsdikor Kaferha zir) in group dancing, horse racing, singing, or ringing the church bell.

The Bishmizzeen people are conscious of their entity as the "Bishmizzeen group" in respect to learning. They have always been proud of their good village school and the relatively high proportion among them who have had college education. They refer to their village as the village of Ilm ("learning"). Amyoon is conscious of itself as being "strong," "dominating," and the "stronghold of the church." Kafer-Akka is proud of the fact that its farmers are the most industrious and successful. Similarly, other villages have consciously developed such distinctive identifications.

When a misdemeanor or a minor crime is committed in the village, one hears such remarks as the following: "This is not the custom of

our people!" "By your behavior, you have spoiled the name of your village." "Are we going down to the level of other villages?" etc.

Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that pride in every distinctive and valued character of any individual, family group, the church, occupation, the natural resources, including air (literally!) is emphasized in this intensive community consciousness.[9]

The power of the culture and values of the community of Bishmizzeen on its members is reflected in the language of Tannous, the writer and native son who felt them within himself. The emphasis on pride in one's village and competition between villages, so prominent in his account, is not altogether inappropriate in our country, where there is often considerable rivalry between high school basketball teams, bands, and debating teams, even in the case of relatively small communities having consolidated high schools. This rivalry precipitates the familiar psychology of the in-group, out-group situation, with all of its effectiveness in developing prejudices, ego-involvements, and identifications with one's own group.

Of course, the influence of the community on its inhabitants does not grow entirely out of intercommunity rivalry. It exists abundantly where the latter is unknown. As we have already seen, it has many sources—the neighbors, the church, the school, the corner drug store, the newspaper, the doctor, the postman—and is the mental and emotional residue of long and frequent contacts. Not to be excluded from the list, either, are the physical aspects of the community, the streets, the trees, the houses and yards, the business section, the climate. As Becker puts it: "Men grow their way into landscapes, so to speak, and a severe wrench is felt when the native place is left behind."

QUESTIONS

1. Why do sociologists attach importance to the neighborhood and its social relationships?
2. How may a neighborhood in which you have lived be defined?

[9] Afif I. Tannous, "Group Behavior in the Village Community of Lebanon," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVIII, No. 2 (1942), 231, 238-39.

3. How may the boundaries of this neighborhood be shown on a map?
4. Show how to diagram the social relationships of the same neighborhood.
5. Describe Sweetser's study of neighborhood relationships in Bloomington, Indiana, and the main inference he drew from it. Is the latter valid for the neighborhood defined in Question 2?
6. Trace the life cycle of some old neighborhood in a city of your acquaintance, and compare it with the typical pattern drawn by Queen and Thomas.
7. Consider carefully the extent to which neighborhoods are still to be found in some large city you know.
8. Do you believe that attempts should be made to strengthen or restore the neighborhood in the great city? If so, explain why, and by what methods it might be accomplished.
9. What is the distinction between neighborhood and community?
10. Is the large city referred to in Question 7 one community, or several? Explain.
11. How can the trade or school community be determined and plotted on a map? Has such a map been made for your city?
12. What are the chief contrasts between the sacred and secular types of community, according to Becker?
13. How realistic is the sacred and the secular dichotomy? Of what value is it in application to rural and urban communities familiar to you?
14. To what extent do empirical comparisons of rural and urban communities support the sacred and secular typology? Explain.
15. What relationships did Sanderson find between marital status and community size?
16. According to Sanderson's study, should incorporated villages be grouped with rural or with urban places in studying the rural family? Why?
17. To what extent do you and people of your acquaintance seem to identify with the childhood community? Can the results of such identifications be objectively noted in personalities from rural and urban backgrounds?

18. Are people from our southern cities more like the rural people around them, or like the people from cities of similar size in the North?
19. What is the bearing of Question 18 upon the sociological importance of the community?
20. What would happen to such intersectional resemblances if the type of neighborhood (upper class, middle class, lower class) were also the same in each case?
21. Compare village rivalries as you have witnessed them in this country with those described in the study by Tannous.

REFERENCES

BURGESS, ERNEST W. (ed.). *The Urban Community.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926.

CARPENTER, NILES. "Neighborhood," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. XI, pp. 356-57.

FIREY, WALTER. *Land Use in Central Boston.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947.

GIST, NOEL P., and HALBERT, L. A. *Urban Society.* (3rd ed.) New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1948.

KINNEMAN, JOHN A. *The Community in American Society.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1947.

LINDEMAN, E. C. "Community," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. IV, pp. 102-05.

MORGAN, ARTHUR E. *The Small Community.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1942.

MUNTZ, EARL E. *Urban Sociology.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938.

Our Cities. Report of the Urbanism Committee to the National Resources Committee. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937.

PARK, ROBERT E., BURGESS, ERNEST W., and MCKENZIE, RODERICK D. *The City.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925.

QUEEN, STUART A., and THOMAS, LEWIS F. *The City.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939.

SAARINEN, ELIEL. *The City.* New York: Reinhold Publishing Corp., 1943.

STEINER, JESSE F. "Community Centers," and "Community Organization," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. IV, pp. 105-08.

CHAPTER 19

THE COMMUNITY (CONTINUED)

The Community as an Aggregate of Institutions.—A community can be analyzed into a relatively stable set of relationship patterns. In turn, these can be broken down into many roles and norms of behavior, all cooperatively or competitively geared together for the performance of a variety of services and satisfactions. In other words, the members of a typical community, whether rural or urban, are members of families, churches, schools, business establishments, professions and other occupations, all of which render mutual services to the others in a process of economic and social exchange. Most of these functional groups within the community are themselves institutions by definition, so that the community is actually a local aggregation of institutions and other groups. Moreover, these local institutions are more or less integrated and bound together in ways so crystallized and well established in custom and law that the community itself seems entitled to be called an institutional system. It then becomes possible to apply the concepts of an institutional system to the community, as an aid in studying (1) the needs the community serves, (2) the roles that are essential to its functioning, (3) the relations between groups and institutions within the community, (4) the integrating agencies, such as the community government (itself an institution directly representing the community), clearing houses, chamber of commerce, etc., (5) the relations between the community and outside institutions, such as the county, state and federal governments, other communities, regional or national organizations and directorates of churches, banks, public schools, welfare agencies, wholesale firms, newspapers, radio chains.

One of the chief questions in community organization has to do with the functions that can better be rendered within the

community and those that can more efficiently be done from without. This tends to determine the extent to which any community is self-sufficient. Of course, no community, even the greatest city, in modern Western society is completely self-providing. Most communities, whether urban or rural, import the bulk of their material consumption goods. This can readily be seen by checking the articles found in any home or office, including many foods. It is, of course, a result of our elaborately developed system of regional economic specialization and exchange. The case is somewhat different, however, with professional and personal services. Because of their contact nature, most of these must be and are performed by specialists within every community, or else must be available from a relatively short distance. Doctors, dentists, lawyers, certain courts of law, hospitals, schools, welfare agencies, churches, are essentially on a local basis, although small rural communities find it necessary to combine with others nearby in order to be able to support efficient professional services, or their inhabitants must travel to a neighboring city for them. In fact, it is well known that communities of different sizes are not equally well served in any of these respects. For example, many rural areas now suffer from a serious shortage of doctors, psychiatrists, trained nurses, dentists, and hospital facilities. Problems such as these have led naturally to systematic attention by sociologists, social workers, and others to the subject of community organization, including appraisal surveys, followed by attempts to set up action programs for the purpose of remedying the situation, i.e., creating within the community the specialized roles required to satisfy neglected local needs, or arranging with surrounding communities to supply them.

If a certain degree of self-sufficiency is taken as the criterion of a community, where the lower limits should be set is rather arbitrary, as it is in all such definitions. But in our society, it may perhaps be required that the community shall have some separate if subordinate unit of government, a residence section beyond the scope of the neighborhood, its own basic institutions like schools and churches, some sort of business center, and the presence of, or need for, representatives of the essential profes-

sions of medicine, dentistry, and the law. If something less than this seems to be more than a neighborhood, it may possibly be thought of as two or three neighborhoods, but not as a community.

Community Roles in Attitude and Personality Formation.—In the Bennington (Vermont) College community, Newcomb reported that the assimilation of newcomers into the community involved the newcomers taking on more liberal attitudes, and that the channeling of diverse personalities into a limited number of patterns was the result of the small number of roles which prevailed in the community.[1] The simple, recurrent types of personality met with in out-of-the-way rural communities are partly to be accounted for in this way. Similarly, the variety of personality types in large cities is associated with the great number of heterogeneous roles that characterize urban life.

Prestige in a Rural Community.—Although the matter of prestige or social rank is of great importance in many social groupings, it has been most studied in the kinds of relationship that occur in the community. The chief factors which tend to decide prestige or status levels in a rural community in our own country are brought out in a recent investigation by Kaufman.

The place was a community in New York State. About half of the 1,235 persons lived in a village, the other half in the surrounding open country. All of these individuals were ranked by some fifteen judges as to their standing or prestige in the community. It was found that status depended upon a number of different activities and social characteristics, and represented a sort of net balance between assets and liabilities of every kind which the community considered relevant. There appeared to be at least ten different varieties of status which entered into the determination of the standing of a member of the community in prestige. They were:

1. Economic status. This was indicated by level of living and apparent income. Four categories were made explicit—well-to-do, moderate means, limited means and indigent.

[1] Theodore M. Newcomb, "Community Roles in Attitude Formation," *American Sociological Review*, VII, No. 5 (1942), 621-30.

2. Occupational status. This status was sometimes not differentiated from economic position. The statuses of teacher in the central school, minister, physician, and operators of the larger businesses and farms had high rank. Educational attainment, when apparent, was closely related in the minds of the judges to occupational status.
3. Ethnic status. There were two categories, Yankee and Oldland,[2] with the latter being of lower rank.
4. Status gained from reputed beliefs on political and economic questions. Some members of the Oldland Merchandising Association were regarded to hold highly deviant political and economic views. There were two categories—those who held these views and those who did not. The former suffered a decided loss in prestige.
5. Organizational status. Individuals gained prestige from unusually active participation in the organized life of the community and from holding certain offices and membership in certain organizations.
6. Family statuses. Persons who were known for their marital infidelity, "common-law" marriages, or neglect of children suffered serious loss in prestige. Thus, there were two categories—those who conformed and those who broke the family mores.
7. Statuses gained from using, or not using, alcoholic liquors to an excess and addiction to drugs. "Drinkers" were severely condemned by many members of the community.
8. Statuses acquired from the possession of certain personality characteristics as retiring, unfriendly or hostile on the one hand, and open, friendly or helpful on the other. Some persons were ranked definitely lower than they would have been otherwise because they were hard to get along with or trouble makers. Also, in a very similar classification were the just queer persons of low mentality and those with pronounced psychoses. On the other hand, a few individuals were noted for their extreme friendliness and helpfulness.
9. Clique status. An individual's prestige rank was sometimes influenced by whether or not he had friends of extremely high or low prestige.
10. Kinship status. This is gained from the reputation of one's kinship group, e.g., being a member of a leading family or of a no-account family.

[2] Old country, e.g., Germany.

"It is likely," says Kaufman, "that at least one-sixth of the 418 family heads had a decidedly lower prestige rank than their economic, occupational and ethnic statuses warranted. This was the case because these persons possessed such statuses as holder of radical political beliefs, 'drinker,' 'trouble maker' and other low prestige statuses described above. There were also individuals who had decidedly higher prestige rank than their economic and occupational statuses merited. . . . Much more was frequently implied, for example, in the term 'good farmer' than proficiency in one's occupation. A configuration of statuses seems to have been designated by such a term. A man who was 'a good farmer' was expected to conform to the mores and the laws, to participate to some extent in the organized life of the community and 'to get along with his neighbors.'"

If a man had been convicted of law violations, he suffered a definite loss of prestige. Altogether, it appeared that the regard in which the community held a person was determined more by his own personality, behavior, and achievements than by his family and kinship connections.[8]

A Village Church Survey.—The part that an institution like the church may play in the social structure of a community is graphically illustrated in a church survey which was made in the Cottage Grove rural community, located about ten miles from Madison, Wisconsin. (Figure 9.) The study included a village with 97 families, plus the surrounding territory to a distance of four miles out with 246 other families. The inhabitants of the village consisted of active or retired farmers, workers generally employed in Madison, and local business and professional people. Outside the village practically all families were engaged in farming. The population was stable, most of the family heads having lived there for many years. Nearly three-fourths of the people were of Norwegian and German stock, the rest British.

The small population of the area was divided between as many as forty different churches, only four of which were in the

[8] Harold F. Kaufman, *Defining Prestige in a Rural Community*, Sociometry Monographs, No. 10 (New York: Beacon House, Inc., 1946), pp. 4, 6-8, 9, 11.



FIG. 9.—This shows the Cottage Grove surveyed area. The rectangle in upper center is the village of Cottage Grove. Each small square represents a house. (The village has 60 houses. These are not indicated.) The three small circles in the village represent churches. . . . Lines connect the houses with the church attended by the family. (Lines running off the map converge where the different churches would be if mapped.) Scale: Two inches equals 1 mile. ═══ indicates main highways. This map shows the complexity of the church-going pattern in this community.

village. For example, the Lutherans, who made up about half of the total families, attended more than twenty churches belonging to five separate Lutheran denominations. Many of the churches were in the open country, some were in Madison. The distance traveled to church averaged five miles.

With regard to the sociological effects of so many churches in the small community, the author of the survey, Louis Bultena, who was at one time a minister of the largest church in Cottage Grove, made these comments:

A superficial observer, seeing a church in the open country and attending some of its services, might easily conclude that the church was a center of integration for the neighborhood area in much the same way as a rural school. Yet this inference would be far from accurate in the Cottage Grove area. For it is clear that the rural church, like the city church, selects and draws its members, primarily on the bases of class, nationality backgrounds, family relationships, and other cultural factors.

Between the churches of this rural community there is often real, though covert, conflict and competition. . . . In reality each church is struggling against others for status and competing with them for members. . . .

In view of this situation, it seems reasonable to assume that the churches in the area represent a divisive influence and offer obstacles to total rural community integration.

On the other hand it is interesting to discover evidence that the rural church in the Cottage Grove area serves as an effective force for drawing together certain small groups that are quite homogeneous in social, economic, and nationality characteristics. Thus four-fifths of the families in Church No. 1 were home-owners, whereas the 70 no-church families were equally divided between owners and renters. . . . Families at almost the same economic level, as indicated by the assessed values of their homes tended, as would be expected, to go to the same churches. The home valuations of those who attended church in Madison were the highest, while those of the village Lutheran group were the lowest.

While churches show a fairly balanced mixture of the several nationalities in the community several are highly selective with regard to nationality. In Church No. 2, for example, 24 of the 30 family heads are of German antecedents, and in Church No. 4, 25 of the 29 family heads are of Norwegian extraction.



FIG. 10.—Chart showing blood relationships of one church of the Cottage Grove area.

In the entire surveyed area only ten families showed a division in church membership. Six of these were Protestant-Catholic, four were inter-Protestant splits. Family integration on religious matters in this community is high.

Figure [10] shows the blood relationships of the families of the Presbyterian Church of the village of Cottage Grove. In this chart are included only close relationships such as brother, sister, parent, first cousin, and uncle and aunt. Five of the families showing no relationships have moved into the community within the past five years. By comparing this chart with Figure [11] one can see that this church is largely "a family affair." Figure [11] shows the amount of relationship among the neighbor families living next door to those of Figure [10]. In this control group, which attends a variety of churches or none at all, few blood relationships are evident.

The outsider may wonder why two struggling churches across the road from each other—practically alike in creed—do not unite and thus form one stronger church with a better choir, better equipment and so on. He does not realize the strength of the bond created by common interests and long participation together in many services of worship, church socials and special occasions such as funerals, baptisms, and weddings. The church is the place where strong emotional experiences occur. Even the building in time acquires a peculiar sanctity for its members. In the Cottage Grove area there are practically no organizations that compete with the churches. Except for the "Royal Neighbors" there are no local lodge or commercial club groups. Except for a small bridge club in the village, social groups are shifting, nebulous, and without formal organization. It is probable that the rural church commands a more primary allegiance from its members than any other group except the family.

During the past few decades several denominations have combined or federated. But, in general, the combinations seem to be only formal, with unification mostly at "the top," while the local church units continue to remain separate and to compete. Many other studies of rural churches in America show that they seldom unite except from sheer economic necessity. Rural churches usually seem to prefer extinction to union.

By way of summary one may say that in the area studied rural churches serve to integrate groups or classes rather than localities or communities.[4]

[4] Louis Bultena, "Rural Churches and Community Integration," *Rural Sociology*, IX, No. 3 (1944), 257-64.



FIG. 11.—Chart showing blood relationships of families (of various and no-church) who are next-door neighbors to the families of Figure [10].

Social Organizations in Cities.—It is generally known that in villages and rural areas of this country the church is the most frequent type of organization, other than the family. It may be surprising to learn from recent studies that the religious interest is also the commonest motive for the organized groups that occur in a small city, and apparently even in a metropolitan city.

In Boulder, Colorado, Bushee [5] found a larger number of churches and religious societies than any other of a kind, as may be seen from Table 28. In interpreting this Table, he concluded that, next to religion, one of the strongest incentives for the formation of groups was the desire for self-improvement, which led to a variety of educational and cultural groups and to many programs of noneducational organizations. Another strong incentive was the wish for social relationships. The search for prestige accounted for some of the groups, and the purpose of community improvement was responsible for others.

The importance of the church as a social institution in Boulder was increased by the circumstance that about half of the adult population either did not belong to any organized group or belonged to a church only. Twenty-nine per cent of the adults in Boulder belonged to no organization, over half belonged to only one organization, nearly three-fourths belonged to no more than two. According to Bushee, about 3,000 adults took no part in community activities even as members of churches, and probably most of them lacked "adequate social life." Most of the people who belonged to few or no organized groups were members of the lower economic classes, while those who belonged to many groups were members of the middle or upper class.

Table 28 shows a preponderance of women in every type of organized groups except the fraternal, economic, and recreational, as defined. About 62 per cent of all the organizations were for women only, 26 per cent were for both sexes, and 13 per cent were for men. These proportions were much the same as those given in the Lynds' *Middletown.* Since many of the

[5] Frederick A. Bushee, "Social Organizations in a Small City," *American Journal of Sociology,* LI, No. 3 (1945), 217-23.

women's clubs were quite small, however, they contained only 47 per cent of the total membership, about 30 per cent falling to mixed groups, and 23 per cent to men's groups. The largest excess of women occurred in the social, educational, cultural, and religious organizations. The greater number of women than men in organized groups may be peculiar to Boulder, since surveys of some other places have shown more men than women.

TABLE 28

ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP BY SEX *

Type of Organization	Total Number	Total Adult Membership	Males	Females	Per Cent Females
Churches	23	5,372	2,046	3,326	61.9
Other religious	46	2,330	572	1,767	75.5
Fraternal	21	2,298	1,264	1,034	45.0
Educational	41	2,005	293	1,712	85.4
Social	41	1,350	180	1,170	86.6
Economic	21	1,337	1,077	260	19.4
Recreational	36	890	508	382	42.8
Social service	16	779	245	534	68.5
Patriotic	9	572	235	337	58.8
Cultural	14	382	79	303	79.3
Total	268	17,324	6,499	10,825	62.4
Total less churches	245	11,952	4,453	7,409	62.7
Total less all religious	199	9,603	3,881	5,732	50.6

* From Bushee, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

In terms of the ratio of organizations to inhabitants, there were more organizations in the small city of Boulder than in "Middletown," or than in the 140 American villages reported in *Rural Social Trends* by E. de S. Brunner and J. H. Kolb. This evidence suggests that cities have more organizations in proportion to their inhabitants than villages. The reason may be that cities have a more heterogeneous population with a greater variety of needs to be served by organized groups.

A study in New York City similarly differentiated between the social classes and emphasized the large proportion of urban dwellers that had no connection with any organized group, except, perhaps, the church. The explanation seemed to be that, while the neighborhood and larger kinship group have declined in that city, their places have not been taken by special interest groups to the extent commonly supposed. Well over half of the working and lower paid white-collar classes belonged to no organized group, if churches were omitted. In all occupational classes except the professional where the income was less than $3,000 a majority of the people of both sexes was unaffiliated; it was only in the business class earning as much as this and in the professional class that a majority were members of any group.

In regard to the sexes, women in the lowest economic classes participated much less than men, but the two sexes participated about equally in the upper classes, as the following percentages show: unskilled labor, women 9 and men 32; skilled labor, women 25 and men 44; professional, women 82 and men 79.

The author of this survey, however, properly raised a question regarding the interpretation of these figures:

> That the majority of citizens remain completely outside the stream of organized social life is significant but its implications, also, require a more refined study. The frequent assumption that the non-participants are necessarily isolated, rootless, barred from complete realization of personality needs to be examined. Indeed it may be supposed that many social and recreational organizations in the city recruit their membership largely from those who are, in fact, isolated and lonely and who seek satisfactions which other segments of the population find more fully in unorganized social relations of a neighborhood, a gang, or a strong family unit. Similarly, we cannot assume that members of cultural associations are necessarily better informed or more interested in self-cultivation. Some interests may be pursued singly through individual utilization of cultural resources of a community. Non-membership in other associations, however, no doubt implies that sections of our population are cut off from channels of power, information, growth, and a sense of participation in purposive social action.[6]

[6] Mirra Komarovsky, "The Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers," *American Sociological Review*, XI, No. 6 (1946), 686-98.

Urban Ecology.—The life of any large city falls into a complex network of zones, natural areas, and communities. As Zorbaugh says:

> There is no phenomenon more characteristic of city life, as contrasted with the life of the rural community or the village, than that of segregation. The village is relatively undifferentiated; its population is relatively of one economic and social class; the business area is the general store; the characteristic areas within the village are confined to a few shacks along the railroad, or to a "darky town." But the sharp contrasts of the city, emphasized as they are by segregation over given areas, are familiar to everyone: the great central business district, with its towering buildings and thronged streets; the railroads lined with smoking industries; slums and foreign colonies; the "bright light area" and the "red light district"; bleak areas of deteriorated dwellings, small businesses and "furnished rooms"; mile after mile of apartment houses; outlying districts of single homes and dormitory suburbs. Nor is this segregation accidental. It is the result of competition and the economic processes which fix the utility and value of the land, determine the rent the land will derive, and consequently prescribe more or less rigorously the usage to which the land will be put. . . .
>
> Through this process of segregation each natural area in the city takes on a color which sets it off from adjoining areas, and the city becomes a mosaic of neighborhoods, communities, and little cultural worlds. But these areas are not distributed throughout the city at random. The striking contrasts and the heterogeneity which these numerous segregated areas of the city present, resolve, upon analysis, into more generalized zones.[7]

What is the nature of the "more generalized zones," or geometric patterns, into which, by a complex of economic and social forces, the life of a city is regimented? Some twenty-five years ago, Burgess offered the hypothesis that the basic pattern was a series of concentric circles, representing the natural growth of the city around a center, the business district. The character of each circular zone was largely dictated by its distance from the center, and by the extent of encroachment of the business district upon it. He accordingly described, as an ideal construct, some five concentric zones, (1) the downtown area, (2) an

[7] Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 232-34.

area in transition, which is being invaded by business and light manufacture, (3) the workers' zone, (4) the area of high class apartments and single family dwellings, and (5) the commuters' zone.[8]

Another pattern was suggested some years later by Homer Hoyt, known as the sector theory, which he thought fitted many cities. It is essentially the idea of a pie cut into slices. A sector is a wedge of territory widening out from the center of the city, and having economic and social characteristics which make it different from other parts of the city. With special reference to rentals, in which he was chiefly interested, Hoyt concluded that high, intermediate, and low rental areas definitely took the form of sectors extending from the center to the periphery of the city.[9]

In one of the most recent contributions to the theory of urban ecology, Teter found that in Madison, Wisconsin, the geometric zonal pattern was best described by a combination of the theories of Burgess and Hoyt. Several series of data, such as percentage of dwelling units built before 1900, average number of dwelling units per structure, and percentage of dwelling units owner-occupied, were adequately represented by concentric circles. A variety of other data, however, including occupational distribution, per family assessed valuation of dwelling units, and rental areas, clearly fell into the sector pattern. Since a zone and a sector each indicated a different set of population characteristics, the segments or cells which resulted from the intersection of zone and sector marked off a natural area. An ideal construct of these segments (S II 3, S VI 1, etc.) is shown in Figure 12.[10]

Whatever tendencies there may be toward this or that geometric design in the areas of a city, it is evident that people of the same general economic and social traits tend to collect in the

[8] Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project," in Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, *The City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925), p. 50.

[9] Homer Hoyt, *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Housing Administration, 1939), pp. 75-76.

[10] John W. Teter, "The Ecology of Residential Areas in the Madison Community" (Doctor's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1947), p. 97.

same parts of the city. This fact supports the idea of the neighborhood in the city, since if people who are alike in income and social background are thrown together, they may be expected to possess all of the requisites which make for neighborly relationships.



FIG. 12.—Teter's conception of the generalized city pattern.

There is one circumstance in urban ecology, however, which interferes somewhat with the development of the neighborhood. There is usually more than one natural area of a kind in the city, i.e., clusters of people of the same socioeconomic class are found here and there over the city, rather than all of them congregated in one spot. A family may make its friendships among the group with which the head of the family is associated in his occupation, or among the acquaintances made in college, in the army, in the country club, on a trip abroad, or in the former

home town. These friends may happen to live in separated, if similar, parts of the city. Thus any family living in one area may have its friends and intimates in another area (or in several other areas) of the same general sort, at some distance apart in the city. With telephones and modern transportation, the family may continue to cultivate these friends, rather than those persons dwelling in their immediate neighborhood. Nevertheless there should still be a disposition to develop, by chance and otherwise, acquaintances with near neighbors, which must lead to some neighborly relations in most, if not in all, of the natural areas of a city.

Of first importance in relation to the ecology of the city is the operation of the principle of segregation. Segregation separates—almost with mechanical precision—the masses of the population into more or less homogeneous groups and places each group within its own natural area, more or less marked off from the rest. It has already been indicated that the forces which bring this about are economic competition and, within the limits so set, social choice. These forces act not only upon such obvious differences as those of race, native and foreign-born, and rich and poor, but also upon the subtler psychological values and attitudes, sifting and sorting people so that the city becomes a mosaic of different races, nationalities, incomes, customs, religions, political opinions, and other forms of like-mindedness, each capable of being located and enclosed on the map.

The Community and Crime.—In a study of seven communities in Wisconsin, Arthur Wood found definite correlations between the frequency of crime and certain community characteristics. Crime rates were most highly correlated (1) with the proportion of the population engaged in business and the professions ($r = -.91$) [11]; (2) with the proportion of the population on WPA (public relief or public works) in 1939

11 The coefficient of correlation, $r = -.91$, means that 91 per cent of the variation in crime rates from one community to another, as measured by the standard deviation, is negatively associated with differences between the communities in the proportion of the population engaged in business and the professions. The standard deviation is the square root of the mean of the squared deviations of the crime rates from their own mean. See, for example, T. C. McCormick, *Elementary Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1941), chap. x.

($r = .86$); and (3) with per capita recommended assessed property values in 1938 ($r = -.75$). From this it would appear that the more prosperous communities, and those with a large proportion of middle-class and upper-class people, have less crime than others. This is in general agreement with the studies of the incidence of crime (as usually defined) in urban neighborhoods.

The conditions that prevailed in a poor and backward rural community of a few decades ago in New York State, a type which is still familiar as a breeding ground of delinquency in many parts of the country, have been described by Claghorn:

> The township of A, nestled among the hills, is completely rural in character. . . . A, the only village, straggles on an open flat, from which the hills roll up on all sides. About 200 persons live in the 50 houses, which, with one or two stores and churches, a blacksmith shop, a hall, and the schoolhouse, form the social, religious, and trading units of the town.
>
> At any time of the day you can find a few of the idle old and the incompetent young gathered at the store. The counters on both sides are lined with loungers, most of them young men in the prime of life. The older men play checkers sometimes, but mostly they just sit and smoke, and chew and spit—and gossip. . . .
>
> Both the churches hold many lively entertainments, the most interesting events of the countryside. These are held in the hall or at private houses, and everyone comes for a good time. But the poverty in initiative and in the range of amusements illustrates the fact that people do not by instinct know how to play. . . .
>
> There are 11 schools in the sparsely populated township, and they are failing signally to meet the needs of the youngsters. The eagerness with which the children leave school as soon as there is a possibility of escape proves that both parents and children feel this. Even in the village school, where older boys have always been accustomed to attend, only two boys over 14—the age at which they can get work certificates—were found. . . . Nearly one-fifth of the children enrolled are retarded. . . . Seven teachers are young girls with little or no experience and little judgment, and they are always having trouble with the older boys. . . .
>
> The village school has been difficult for any teacher to handle. One, a young man, tried to win the scholars by kindness. He went swimming with the boys, taught them to dive, and played ball with them; but they

treated him so badly that he had to give up the school. Another young man of fine character finished out the term. He told the Sunday-school superintendent that he was never in a school where such low moral standards prevailed. Even the girls would write vile things in the closets.[12]

There is no evidence to support the belief that crime is a constant of human nature, which occurs more or less by quota everywhere. All investigations indicate that crime is a product of provocative economic and social conditions which exist in some families, in some neighborhoods, and in some communities much more than in others.

The Company Town.—A town which is planned and built by a company for its employees near the factory or mine where they work, and whose ownership remains in the hands of the company, is a special type of community which has characteristics of its own. A company town would seem to lend itself to planning more completely than any other type of community, except perhaps the villages constructed and leased by the government, e.g., Greenbelt, Maryland. For this reason, one might expect a number of engineering and civic improvements, and in some instances the company town, like Hershey, Pennsylvania, does appear to be a model of design with respect to both efficiency and beauty. In many other cases, however, as in the mining and factory communities common in this country, the result is row upon row of unsanitary, boxlike houses, and a drab, unwholesome community existence. The whole outcome depends upon the philosophy and will of the company officials, working within the limitations of the funds at their disposal. It is claimed, however, that there are always limitations upon the freedom of the occupants in local political matters, in labor union activity, and in the whole range of so-called "civil liberties."[13]

[12] Kate H. Claghorn, "Juvenile Delinquency in Rural New York," Federal Security Agency, Children's Bureau, *Bulletin* No. 32 (1918), pp. 76-80.

[13] See Wilbert E. Moore, *Industrial Relations and the Social Order* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946), pp. 468-70.

QUESTIONS

1. May a large city include more than one community? If so, how can each be identified and shown on a map?
2. How do you explain the fewness and the simplicity of the personality types which are met with in isolated rural communities?
3. How many different factors can you recall which affected status in Kaufman's New York study?
4. In your experience, is status within a community determined more by individual merit or by family connections? How might this be more carefully measured?
5. About how many churches served the Cottage Grove rural community? How do you account for this?
6. On what characteristics did those churches select their members?
7. Did its churches serve to integrate the Cottage Grove community? Explain.
8. With what relative frequency was religion the motive for organized groups in Boulder, Colorado?
9. What were some of the other chief motives for the formation of voluntary organizations in Boulder?
10. What proportion of the population of Boulder did not belong to any organized group, except perhaps a church? How many did not even belong to a church? From what socioeconomic class were these nonparticipating people drawn?
11. From what socioeconomic classes did the persons with many group affiliations come? Have you any explanation?
12. Compare the relative participation of Boulder men and women in organized activities.
13. How did the small city of Boulder compare with the 150 villages reported by Brunner and Kolb in the ratio of number of organizations to inhabitants?
14. What were the chief findings of Komarovsky's survey of social participation in New York City?
15. How serious did Komarovsky regard the nonparticipation of large numbers of people in New York City?
16. What is meant by urban ecology?

17. What are the forces by which the population of a city is divided into "natural areas"? To what extent does choice decide?
18. What is the geometric pattern, if any, which the natural areas of a city tend to take? Can you give concrete illustrations with which you are acquainted?
19. What is meant by saying that the natural areas represent a psychological map of the city?
20. What evidence is there that the economic and social structure of the community is an important factor in delinquency and crime?
21. Discuss the sociological characteristics of the company town, compared with other towns of similar size and economic background.

REFERENCES

BOWERS, RAYMOND V. "Ecological Patterning of Rochester, New York," *American Sociological Review,* IV, No. 2 (1939), 180-89.

CRESSEY, PAUL F. "Population Succession in Chicago: 1898-1930," *American Journal of Sociology,* XLIV, No. 1 (1938), 59-69.

DAVIE, MAURICE R. "The Sociological Basis of Future City Planning," in PAUL ZUCKER (ed.). *New Architecture and City Planning.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1944, pp. 343-52.

DOUGLASS, H. PAUL. "Suburbs," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. XIV, pp. 433-35.

GILFILLAN, LAUREN. *I Went to Pit College.* New York: The Literary Guild, 1934.

GILMORE, H. W. "The Old New Orleans and New—a Case for Ecology," *American Sociological Review,* IX, No. 4 (1944), 385-94.

HAGOOD, MARGARET JARMAN. "Statistical Methods for Delineation of Regions Applied to Data on Agriculture and Population," *Social Forces,* XXI, March, 1943, pp. 287-97.

HATT, PAUL. "The Concept of the Natural Area," *American Sociological Review,* XI, No. 4 (1946), 423-27.

KLUGMAN, MIRIAM. "Human Ecology and the City Planning Movement," *Social Forces,* XXIV, October, 1945, pp. 89-95.

MACDONALD, LOIS. *Labor Problems and the American Scene.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1938, chaps. v, vi.

———. *Southern Mill Hills.* New York: Alex L. Hillman, 1928.

MITCHELL, ROBERT B. (ed.). "Building the Future City," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* CCXLII, November, 1945.

MUMFORD, LEWIS. *City Development; Studies in Disintegration and Renewal.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1945.

REED, THOMAS H. "Metropolitan Areas," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. X, pp. 396-401.

BREASTED, JAMES HENRY. *The Conquest of Civilization.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1926.

HOWELLS, WILLIAM. *The Heathens: Primitive Man and His Religions.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1948.

KENT, CHARLES FOSTER. *The Social Teaching of the Prophets and Jesus.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923.

KIRKPATRICK, CLIFFORD. *Religion in Human Affairs.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1929.

LUNDBERG, GEORGE A. *Can Science Save Us?* New York: Longmans, Green and Co., Inc., 1947.

MATHEWS, SHAILER. *Contributions of Science to Religion.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1926.

RANDALL, JOHN HERMAN. *The Making of the Modern Mind.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *Society, Culture, and Personality.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, pp. 225-29.

SUMNER, WILLIAM GRAHAM. *Folkways.* Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906.

CHAPTER 21

EDUCATION AND COMMUNICATION

Education, in a broad sense, occurs in all societies and among all kinds of persons.[1] Everywhere younger people learn from older people, individuals with skills show the way to those who lack the know-how, people of prestige and position are imitated by those below them—whenever the learners feel, or can be made to feel, that the learning is worth while for them. On the other hand, the older also learn from the younger, the superior from the inferior, so that teacher and learner frequently exchange places in the ordinary give-and-take of life.

In our society, education usually has a more formal meaning than the above, and has particular reference to the teaching that occurs in special educational institutions or schools that have developed among us. It is in these educational institutions, and in the educational practices, ceremonies, or customs of more primitive societies that we are more directly interested here.

Education in Preliterate Societies.—Invariably, primitive and savage societies have certain folkways whose special motive is the more or less systematic training of the young in certain skills which are considered important by the tribe, or their indoctrination in beliefs or ideas which are thought desirable by the elders. Thus, the adult hunters may carefully school the young men over a long period in the techniques of hunting and stalking game; the girls may be instructed by the women in weaving and pottery making. Elaborate initiation ceremonies at puberty, designed largely for their psychological effect on the youthful initiates, are prominent among many primitive peoples. The

[1] See, for example, Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1945), p. 24.

educational practices, including ritualistic initiations, of the now extinct Tasmanians are described as follows:

During the years of childhood the young Tasmanian absorbed the culture of his tribe through conscious inculcation and unconscious imitation. In this way, for example, he acquired the language. He also learned to count as high as five—the Tasmanians possessed no higher numerals. A major part of his education consisted in becoming familiar with the economic functions and duties of adult life. The girls learned that woman's work was to collect vegetable foods, dive for shellfish, climb trees for opossums, serve as pack animals, make the baskets and boats, build the huts, care for the children and tend the sick. Boys learned that the chief duties of the men were to hunt, fight, and make weapons. They were taught by their elders the use and manufacture of weapons and the art of tracking men and animals, and they also acquired a knowledge of local geography.

When a boy reached the age of puberty, he underwent a ceremony of initiation into manhood, in which he was scarified on the shoulders, thighs, and breast, was given a secret name, and was presented with a fetish stone, which he kept carefully concealed from the women. There seems to have been no corresponding ceremony for girls. A system of age-grades apparently prevailed among the Tasmanians. Promotion from one grade to the next was determined by age and merits recognized by the tribe. Secret ceremonies accompanied initiation into each, but an unusual degree of mystery centered about admission to the third and highest grade, the members of which possessed certain regulatory powers.[2]

Probably the nearest approach made by simpler peoples to education as it is known in the modern world has to do with the training of medicine men, shamans, and priests, the last usually at the relatively higher cultural levels. The secrets and tricks of the medicine man were taught the novitiate by an older shaman, the office often being handed down from generation to generation in the same family.[3] In ancient Mexico, there was an elaborate educational program for the priests. Quoting again from Murdock:

[2] From George Peter Murdock, *Our Primitive Contemporaries*, pp. 8-9. Copyright, 1938 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 258.

The cults of these various deities of the Aztecs of Mexico were tended by a class of priests, recruited for the most part from the younger sons of the nobility. The novices received their education in the *calmecac* or priestly seminary along with their brothers, but remained after the latter had left for war or public life. Living under the strictest discipline, they began with menial tasks in the service of the gods and gradually advanced to more important duties, receiving instruction meanwhile in the sacred writings, calendrical lore, ritual, chants, and ascetic practices. The priests of inferior rank lived with the novices in the *calmecac* and performed subordinate sacerdotal functions. Those of superior grade bore distinctive titles and specialized in the service of individual gods or in particular activities such as divination, sacrifice, music, or ceremonial. At the apex of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, elected for their merits from the ranks of the superior clergy, stood two high priests, of whom one served Uitzilopochtli and the other Tlaloc, although both bore the honorary title of Quetzalcoatl. They advised the king and council on matters of war and public policy. Priestesses received a similar education, but could not aspire to high station. Priests wore black cotton mantles, painted their bodies black, and never cut their hair, which hung long, loose, and frequently matted with blood. Four times a day and thrice each night they drew blood and offered incense to the sun. They underwent various prescribed fasts, vigils, and forms of self-torture. Although sometimes married, they commonly took vows of chastity. For the slightest infraction of their ascetic regulations they performed severe penitential rites. In other respects, however, they lived in ease and often in luxury, supported by large landed estates, rich contributions of tribute, and a continuous stream of sacrificial donations. The social services which they rendered in return included, besides their strictly religious functions, the education of the young and the cultivation of the sciences and fine arts, in which they enjoyed a complete monopoly.[4]

The Aztec priests were thus the scholars and teachers of their nation, and the young received some systematic education at their hands.

It is interesting to find that among primitive peoples approximately the same results were often achieved by widely different methods of training the young. For example,

The Manus of Admiralty Island give definite early training in the respect for property; Samoans neglect to give any such specific instruc-

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 390-91. By permission.

tion to their children, yet adult Samoans like adult Manus habitually respect property and property rights. Etiquette may be taught very early, as among the Omaha Indians and the Samoans, or the children may be given unbridled license for years, as among the Manus, yet in all three societies the adults observe the customary rules of etiquette.[5]

The Development of Education in Western Society.—Western education in the modern sense traces its origins chiefly to the ancient Greeks. As early as the Homeric period there were private schools in Athens where music and poetry, and later oratory, science, drama, history, and reading and writing were taught. Gymnastics were featured in separate schools known as *palaestrae*. As time passed, literary studies increased relative to athletics; in the age of the sophists, emphasis was on the arts of persuasion and oratory. Some of the basic ideas of modern education were advanced by Greek philosophers—training to think, by Socrates; education by the state, by Plato; and the inductive method which underlies present-day science, by Aristotle. Higher education in Greece began very simply with a philosopher and his students or followers. These men established rhetorical and philosophical schools, some of which eventually developed into famous universities, as at Athens and Alexandria.

With the founding of the Roman Empire, elementary schools developed and furnished preparation for public-supported grammar schools whose curricula included history, science, and literature, and later dialectics, music, and mathematics. Above the grammar school was the rhetorical school, which also taught philosophy, geometry, and astronomy. The University of Rome, which grew out of a library founded by Vespasian, offered among other things training in the professions of law, medicine, and architecture.

Between 300 and 600 A.D., the spread of Christianity and the growth of the power of the Christian church led to the gradual taking over by the church of the schools and the function of education throughout the Roman Empire. Education

[5] From Margaret Mead, "Education, Primitive," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. V, p. 400. Copyright, 1931 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

then became limited primarily to the training of the clergy, and little of the old Greek and Roman system of education survived the onset of the Middle Ages except the monastic schools preparing novices for the priesthood.

The first revival of intellectualism appeared in the form of scholasticism, which centered upon disputes of church doctrine. The first universities of Europe, including the University of Paris (1180), were founded by the "schoolmen" connected with this movement. Private grammar or Latin schools appeared to prepare the ruling classes for the universities, which gave courses in the arts, theology, law, and medicine. In the cities a few guild and merchants' schools provided instruction in the elements of reading, writing, and arithmetic for the children of the masses.

The Renaissance brought a brilliant revival of the old Greek ideas of a liberal education, but the central aims of education later degenerated into mental discipline and formal drill in the classical languages. The fifteenth century saw the rise of the German type of secondary school known as the *Gymnasium,* and of such famous English upper class public schools as Winchester, Eton, and St. Paul's. In the American colonies, a grammar school was opened in Boston as early as 1635, and later all towns of any size in Massachusetts were required to have "reading" schools. The Protestant Reformation, which was associated with the Renaissance, championed universal literacy in order that everyone might read the Bible. It also strengthened the control of the church over the schools. A little earlier, the growth of printing had been an event of the greatest significance for the future of education.

In modern times, the school has rapidly become one of the three or four major institutions of Western society. After the sixteenth century the rise of great nations overshadowed the church, and the schools everywhere became increasingly secularized. The triumph of the state in education occurred first in the centralized school system of Prussia about 1800, then in the localized systems of England and the United States about a half century later. Instead of pietism and religious doctrine, the schools now began to stress the virtues of patriotism and the

superiority of the national culture. The democratic ideas that prevailed in the West led to efforts to equalize educational opportunity for all, and attendance at school became generally compulsory between the ages of six and fourteen years. Thus the old system of differential education for the classes and the masses slowly gave way. A "common" high school that opened in Boston in 1821 was imitated in other parts of the United States, and a striking development of state-supported universities occurred in the Middle West, setting the pattern for the rest of the nation and for other countries. The curricula of school and college have since expanded enormously to cover both a wide range of the humanities and of practical subjects like agriculture, commerce, engineering, and home economics. Nursery schools and kindergartens and adult education now include in the formal educational system a still larger part of the total population, and there has been a vast increase in attendance not only in the grade school, but also in high school and college.[6] (Tables 29 and 30.)

TABLE 29

PERCENTAGE SCHOOL ATTENDANCE, BY AGE, FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1940 *

	Per Cent Attendance
Total, 5 to 24 years	57.7
5 years	18.0
6 years	69.1
7 to 9 years	94.3
10 to 13 years	95.5
14 years	92.5
15 years	87.6
16 and 17 years	68.7
18 and 19 years	28.9
20 years	12.5
21 to 24 years	5.1

* Adapted from Bureau of the Census, 1940: *Population,* Vol. II, *Characteristics of the Population,* Part I, p. 33.

[6] See George S. Counts, "Education: History," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. V, pp. 403-14; Charles S. Judd, "Education," in *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1933), chap. viii.

TABLE 30

PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS 25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED, FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1940 *

	Per Cent Distribution		
	Total	Male	Female
No school years completed	3.7	3.9	3.6
Grade school: 1 to 4 years	9.8	10.9	8.6
5 and 6 years	11.4	11.7	11.0
7 and 8 years	34.6	35.3	33.9
High school: 1 to 3 years	15.0	14.2	15.7
4 years	14.1	12.0	16.2
College: 1 to 3 years	5.4	4.9	6.0
4 years or more	4.6	5.4	3.7
Not reported	1.4	1.6	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

* *Ibid.*, p. 40.

The Relation of Education to the Total Culture.—Educational practices and institutions, like those of religion, grow out of the culture in which they occur, and are part and parcel of it. This generalization is readily tested by noticing the forms which education takes in various cultures or subcultures. We have just seen how obviously education among the ancient Greeks reflected the flavor and peculiarities of the Greek civilization, with its emphasis upon oratory and philosophy. We have also seen how the schools in cultures dominated by religious ideas and institutions adapted their curricula and their teaching to the doctrines of the church, whereas schools in societies where the state was the central value took a secular and national point of view. In countries with a distinct ruling class and an aristocratic tradition, we have found that the system of education consisted almost exclusively of schools for the upper class or of sharply differentiated schools for the leaders and for the masses. In democratic countries there has been an enthusiastic attempt, at public expense, to equalize educational opportunities for all. No more striking demonstration of the intimate connection between education and

governmental institutions in modern states is needed than the way in which the Nazis immediately took over the schools of Germany, replacing old textbooks with new, and making radical changes in the teaching personnel and in the ideologies taught. This, however, was overshadowed by the work of the Hitler child and youth organizations, which had profound effects on German youth, effectively converting them *en masse* into the most fanatical of Nazis, eager to die for the swastika, the party, and the fatherland.[7]

The question may well be raised whether the schools merely express the culture and sentiments of the people concerned, or whether they modify them. The answer seems to be that the educational system of a nation teaches what the group in power wishes it to teach—whether that be a certain brand of religion, of democracy, of Fascism, or of Communism. The effectiveness with which the schools execute the will of the controlling group or groups in a nation depends largely upon the degree of control exercised by the group, and upon its skill. In the case of a modern democracy like the United States, no one group is able to dictate educational policy, but whatever ideas and values are common to the society find expression in the schoolroom, just as clearly as in the case of Communist Russia or Nazi Germany. The schools in a democracy cannot teach ideas which are too greatly at variance from those that are current, but if they wish to modify public opinion in any particular (say, reduce race prejudice in the southern United States), they can apparently go little beyond the accepted beliefs without arousing serious public resistance.

The Functions of Education.—The primary purpose of education, both informal and formal, is usually said to be to aid in transmitting the culture of a society, whatever it may be, from one generation to another. Since children are born without any knowledge, skills, values, or other elements of culture whatever, they must learn all these things largely from their elders, and this is an educational process. When a civilization becomes

[7] See Kimball Young, *Sociology* (New York: American Book Co., 1942), pp. 449-53; Howard Becker, *German Youth: Bond or Free* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

very complex, and a great part of it is embodied in written or other symbolic materials, as is the case with any modern advanced culture, systematic training along many lines becomes necessary and inevitable, and formal educational institutions must be developed to perform the task.

What is actually taught by the schools is a vast mass of facts, ideas, skills, and values which is considered important by the society and outside the scope of other agencies, plus many other things that are not intended. Recent attempts to rationalize the goals of general education have led to such expressions as the following: "The complete development of man as a rational creature"; "a sound mind in a sound body"; "the harmonious development of all the faculties"; "cooperative and mutually helpful living." These are evidently not realistic descriptions of the complex of purposes that lies behind education in our society.

At the present time, the primary business of the schools in the United States is to teach the contents and skills of certain recognized fields of knowledge or practice which may be broadly classified in familiar terms as the humanities, the natural sciences, the social sciences, the applied sciences, and the practical arts. School work consists for the most part in learning from books. Some educators claim that the main purpose in the teaching of any subject is to train for thinking, while others deny the possibility of such generalized training and instead stress factual information, although they admit that few facts are remembered. Education in the arts and sciences is termed cultural, in contrast to vocational or professional training. Cultural education is especially valued for the social prestige it confers. Higher education is regarded as the principal ladder for raising the social and economic level of oneself and one's children in American life. This is true even in the case of the Negro, who is anxious to go to college even though after graduation he often fails to get employment suited to his training. An educational system of this kind is obviously the product of a society with an equalitarian philosophy, open classes, and a high degree of vertical mobility.

It is often claimed that higher education is weakened by being made available to everybody. It can also be argued, however, that education increases natural differences in ability, and that opening the competition to everyone increases the number of able students. If standards can be maintained, the abler individuals will go on, while the less able will drop out at lower academic levels. It has been emphasized by Sorokin that one of the chief functions of our schools is to select and distribute the members of the population into the several social strata, from the lowest to the highest. The amount of formal schooling an individual can claim is generally quite decisive in closing or opening occupational opportunities to him, and in locating him on the social scale.[8]

Quite apart from learning, the school system relieves parents of much of the care for their children, promotes useful acquaintances among the young people, and provides them and the community with recreation and amusement through organized athletic sports and other extracurricular activities. Coeducation brings together thousands of selected young men and women and furnishes them special opportunities for romance and marriage. The luxurious social and fraternity life of some colleges has been compared to country clubs, which are attended by many chiefly for the pleasures and thrills that are to be had there.

In western countries the science taught in the colleges tends to change and to replace older points of view. It is also true that the teaching of social science and philosophy may be expected slowly to modify popular opinion. Scientific research, or the scientific quest for more physical or social knowledge, is one of the functions of the graduate schools of large universities. It leads to new discoveries and inventions that compel and speed up cultural changes, both ideological and concrete. Yet, if a population is passed through a common educational system, the experience should make its members more alike in point of view, if not in ability. Thus, it may be said that modern education serves both to introduce changes into the existing culture, and

[8] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Society, Culture, and Personality* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), pp. 441-42.

to spread the culture in a more homogeneous fashion throughout the population. It does not follow, however, that all formal education makes only for change or progress. That it may have a contrary effect is perhaps most clearly shown in the case of the old Chinese educational system, which consisted chiefly of memorizing the Chinese sacred literature, and allowed no deviations therefrom. Conformity, rather than initiative, was taught as the supreme virtue, with the result that Chinese education served powerfully to prevent rather than to stimulate social change.

Not only does education pass on the cultural heritage of a particular society from generation to generation, but it also aids in the assimilation of outsiders, and especially of their children, to that culture. There are questions as to what educational methods and policies are the most effective for this purpose, including the question of the extent to which assimilation should be forced. Experience suggests that the change from one culture or subculture to another should be somewhat gradual and voluntary, rather than compulsive. Otherwise, resistance, confusion, and general disorganization may result.

Much direct attention is naturally given in the United States to the idea that the public schools should train for citizenship in a democracy. Courses in American history are offered in the grade schools. The secondary schools teach more history, plus civics, economics, and occasionally sociology. Emphasis is commonly placed on the teaching of the democratic form of government, the responsibilities of the voter, and patriotism, the latter being a reflection of the nationalistic sentiment of the times.

Recent years have seen the development of a service of vocational guidance and counseling in some of the larger high schools and universities. Interest and aptitude tests and knowledge of employment opportunities are used as a basis for the advice given. As yet, little effort has been made to test the effectiveness of this type of service against later success or failure on the job.

Religion seldom appears among the subjects in the curricula of state-supported public schools. This is in conformity with

the current democratic principle that the state and the church should be kept separate. Religious denominations are free, however, to establish schools of their own, and have often done so. In these church schools the doctrines of the denomination are usually taught along with the standard academic subjects. This again reveals the invariable adaptation of education to the values of the group which operates it.

Many denominational colleges, however, eventually drop their affiliation with the church, and become privately endowed secular institutions. They thereby usually improve their position in a society in which secular education enjoys more prestige. Some of the major American universities have had such a history. There are some private schools and colleges which cater especially to the wealthy, and so reflect whatever class differentials there are among us. Endowed universities are not dependent upon legislative support and are therefore freer from political pressure. But they are more sensitive to the influence of the religious group or wealthy class to which they owe their endowment. It appears likely, in view of American culture, that state-supported universities will become increasingly important relative to private universities, much as public high schools have done relative to private preparatory schools.

The universities of Europe are on more of a professional basis than is true of American colleges and universities. Typically, most of our college students enroll in the so-called college of arts and sciences, where the emphasis is on general or cultural subjects rather than on courses of a professional or practical nature. Only a small minority of American college students pass on into professional schools like law or medicine.

Almost no attention has been given to measuring the success of the schools and colleges in attaining their declared objectives. Some correlation has been found between the amount of formal schooling an individual has had and his income and position in our society. But to what extent this is due to schooling is not clear, because education is selective of the people who take it.

Some Socioeducational Problems.—It is a generally accepted idea in the United States that every child should have an equal

opportunity to receive at least an elementary school education, and better, a high school education as well. This has led to compulsory school attendance laws in the various states, usually extending through age sixteen, and to the giving of financial aids by a state to the poorer counties and school districts. Nevertheless, children in cities and towns still enjoy much better schools than those in the country, and the former also spend more years in school. The cost of schooling per pupil in sparsely settled rural areas is so high that even with consolidated schools and bus transportation, facilities equal to those in the city cannot be provided. It is of interest to notice that our population is distributed over the land according to opportunities in industry and agriculture, which is apparently not the optimum distribution for all purposes, such as the educational.

Since only a fraction of the young continue their education through the secondary school or college, the question arises as to who should properly receive a higher education. Even in the United States at the present time the colleges draw their students principally from the middle class, and only rarely from the lowest class of unskilled labor. Thus in this country, although less than in most of Europe, family status and income sharply reduce the population from which college students come. This is contrary to the democratic ideal of equality of educational opportunity for the children of all the people. Here again the values and structural organization of our society show inconsistency and lack of adjustment, with economic values fundamentally setting a pattern which does not permit some noneconomic values to be realized. If pushed to its logical conclusion, equality of educational opportunity would mean that every child with the native capacity and the desire to take a higher education would be able to do so. To make this possible, without state or other aid, it would be necessary for the parents of every such child to be able to meet the costs of a higher education. Even with free tuition in state colleges, these expenses are now well beyond the means of a large part of the American population.

To achieve this educational goal, the state would either have to defray all or most of these costs, or the efficiency of our

economic system would have to be so stepped up that practically all American parents would earn incomes equivalent to the present income of the average middle-class family. The first alternative now seems more plausible than the second, but the expenses on the government would be so heavy that it probably would not be workable. No doubt the best that can be expected is that the government should try to make it possible for all young people, regardless of their family situation, to compete for public scholarships which will enable as many of the competent to attend college as the public feels it can support. Inferior students who went to college might then be required to pay a larger part of the cost of their education than they do now. This would eliminate many of the latter, and would put a premium on scholarship which does not now exist.

One of the sources of confusion in secondary and higher education relates to the training of women. In earlier days it was solved by providing little or no advanced schooling for them. Today, more girls than boys complete high school, and for every 145 boys who finish college there are 100 girls who do so (see Table 30, page 432). There is a persistent difficulty, however, in deciding what kind of education women should have. Apparently about 91 per cent of American women get married sooner or later, and commonly give up independent working careers to become housewives. This greatly reduces the motivation of women to prepare themselves seriously for a vocation or profession outside the home. And yet a considerable number of women, married as well as single, now find it necessary or preferable to work outside the home for many years, or throughout their entire lives. (See Table 31, below, and Tables 21, 22, 23, pages 355-56.) Every woman faces this possibility, and it is largely responsible for the educational problem. Some of them specialize in home economics and child care, so that they will be prepared for either marriage or a professional career. For the most part, however, college women take the conventional academic or cultural courses. The preferred female professions are teaching, nursing, and social work, with library work, journalism, personnel work, and even law, medicine, and engineering attracting small numbers. In the

majority of cases, married women do not feel the call to work outside the home again until they have lost their husbands or have reached middle age and their children have grown up. At that late date they usually have little competence left in their original vocation or profession, and have difficulty in finding employment. Only a very few college women consistently follow a professional career after marriage. The educational dilemma of women reflects another confusion or lack of adjustment in our rapidly changing modern culture.

TABLE 31

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE POPULATION BY SEX, FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1940*

Employment Status	Per Cent Distribution	
	Male	Female
Persons 14 and over	100.0	100.0
In labor force	79.0	25.4
Not in labor force	21.0	74.6
Engaged in own home housework	0.5	56.7
In school	9.1	8.7
Unable to work	5.9	4.6
In institutions	1.5	0.8
Other and not reported	4.0	3.8

* Census, 1940: *Population*, Vol. III, *The Labor Force*, Part I, United States Summary, p. 3.

Another central issue in higher education today is to reconcile the teaching of general culture with the need for specialization. The increasingly complex technology of our civilization has compelled the individual who would compete successfully to concentrate his training and efforts within a relatively narrow field, such as chemical engineering, heart surgery, or banking. In many occupations, as engineering, there has been a tendency to force more and more professional courses into the college curriculum, leaving little opportunity for attention to other subjects. As a result, the professional student is in danger of becoming just a technician, and is otherwise typically lacking in general knowledge and culture. This causes the specialist to

have a faulty grasp of many of the situations and problems that confront him, even in his own profession, as when the physician has no insight into the sociological factors that affect the health of his patients, the sociologist overlooks the physiological factors in the causation of crime, or the engineer is not much above the level of the savage in superstitious beliefs.

Moreover, the absence of a common core of knowledge and values in a society of specialists tends to prevent them from cooperating effectively with one another in achieving common objectives. In the words of Linton, ". . . in spite of the differences in behavior entailed by different roles, all members of the society must share a long series of culture patterns, especially covert patterns, and recognize a common value system. It is the transmission of this completely shared nucleus of culture which provides the members of the society with common understandings. . . ." [9] The leading universities and colleges of the United States are now trying to reorganize their curricula so that many more students will receive both a liberal education and some specialized training, even within the four-year period of undergraduate study, which is all that most students get. The result in many colleges has been to require that the first two years be devoted to large "blocks" of courses, often of the "survey" type, in the major fields of human knowledge: the humanities, the social sciences and the natural sciences, and mathematics. The last two years of college are devoted to specialization in some single field such as chemistry or economics, premedical or prelaw courses. Fields like engineering, however, have been but little affected by the emphasis on liberalization.

The Teacher-Pupil Relation.—Like any other pair relation, the pattern of the teacher-pupil relation is shaped by its purpose. In the first place, one member of the pair is selected because he is supposed to be capable of teaching and willing to teach, the other because he is in need of being taught. Notice, however, that the young pupil in our educational system is not ordinarily self-chosen, but is impressed into the role by his parents or by

[9] Linton, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

society. In this respect, the relation between pupil and teacher is fundamentally different from that between, say, doctor and patient, where each usually seeks the relationship on his own initiative.

The simple circumstance that the pupil does not volunteer to play his part leads to complications in the teacher-pupil relationship. It means that the teacher must be held responsible, not only for a knowledge of what he is to teach and for the ability to present it clearly, but also for providing the pupil with the motivation that the latter himself lacks. This original weakness in the teacher-pupil relationship is a chronic threat to the success of the teacher-pupil relation everywhere. It compels the teacher to spend a large part of his energies in trying to arouse an interest in learning. Where he does not fully succeed in this, he is obliged to impose and maintain discipline largely by negative methods. This tends to create a situation where the teacher is pitted against the pupil and, since the teacher deals with a number of pupils at once, he must control a group rather than a single individual, which, of course, is more difficult. As pupils become older they reach a maximum of resistance, apparently in the first year or two of high school, and then become increasingly self-motivated as they reach college age. In spite of the one-sided nature of the average teacher-pupil relation, however, in some cases the relationship proves to be one of the most satisfactory and most valued in our society.

No adequate proposals for the general overhauling and improvement of the present defective teacher-pupil relation have yet been made, either by educators or by sociologists, although it would seem to offer a real challenge to inventive social minds. The most promising idea so far advanced by progressive educational thinkers is no doubt to begin with the child's own interests, whatever they may be, and develop further interests out of them.

The Teacher and the Community.—In the United States, a large majority of the teachers in the elementary schools and high schools are women. Most of them are young and relatively inexperienced, and do not expect to continue long in the

profession. These young women accept salaries that are too low to attract competent men; accordingly, they underbid and keep the latter out of the schools. Because most teachers are young women who view their work as temporary, and because teachers in general are a low-paid group, they do not enjoy a high status in the average American community, compared with lawyers, doctors, and prominent businessmen. At the same time, since teachers are so intimately associated with the development of the community's children, they are required to maintain high standards of conduct, and are subjected to close observation and criticism if they do not conform strictly to all of the local mores—if they do not attend church regularly, if they "date" a great deal, if they are out late at night, if they dance, or if they drink or smoke.

The combination of difficult teacher-pupil relations, poor pay, inferior status, and rigid supervision of teachers' lives has made the occupation of school teacher increasingly unpopular. Recently, the nation was faced with a serious dearth of teachers. This situation brought about some increase in teachers' salaries, but the basic difficulties remain.

The Press.—The newspaper and the magazine are commonplaces in almost every American home. Probably a majority of the adults in our society, especially those who live in urban communities, read a daily paper almost as regularly as they eat their morning or evening meal. Through these papers they quickly learn of every important event that happens in their home community and around the world. In addition, they read editorial opinions on the issues of the day—local, national, and international. Finally, the press exposes them to the advertisements of a great variety of available goods and services.

An institution as important as the press cannot be ignored by any society of which it is a part. In a democratic nation, one of the major concerns is a free and efficient press. An appraisal of the condition of the press in the United States was recently made by a commission which spent three years and $215,000 on its investigation.

"These agencies," said the Commission, referring to the newspapers, the radio, and the movies, "can facilitate thought and discussion. They can stifle it. . . . They can debase and vulgarize mankind. They can endanger the peace of the world; they can do so accidentally, in a fit of absence of mind. They can play up or down the news and its significance, foster and feed emotions, create complacent fictions and blind spots, misuse the great words, and uphold empty slogans. [They] . . . can spread lies faster and farther than our forefathers dreamed. . . . They can, and they do."

The conclusion of the Commission was that the freedom and efficiency of the press are endangered, but that at present the danger lies within the press itself, rather than outside it. The Commission felt that it is not enough to secure the press against government censorship. Rather, the special need of the press is to be protected against concentration of ownership. More rigorous antitrust and other laws are required to maintain proper competition in the communications field, and to regulate in the public interest any monopolies that seem necessary. The Commission even went so far as to warn the "giants of communication" that if they do not put their houses in order, the Government may one day be asked to do it for them! At this point the Commission must have been painfully aware of the need for a less simple theory of democracy than the ideology of the past, in order that the basic democratic values might be preserved in an increasingly complex social order!

It is further of interest to notice the standards which the Commission set up for the American press. The press, it thought, should provide:

(1) a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning; (2) a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism; (3) a means of projecting the opinions and attitude of the groups in the society to one another; (4) a method of presenting and clarifying the goals and values of the society; (5) a way of reaching every [citizen] by the currents of information, thought and feeling which the press supplies.[10]

[10] *Time*, XLIX, No. 13 (March 31, 1947), 67-68. Courtesy of *Time*, copyright Time, Inc., 1947.

In striking contrast to the position of the American press is the situation in a country like Russia, where the press has been completely nationalized. There the disadvantages of commercialism are exchanged for government management and rigid political control at all times. Evidently, we have here another example of the effect of the total culture and organization of a society on the form of a particular institution, the latter being compelled to adjust to the former.

The Radio.—The radio accomplishes through the ear exactly what the newspaper and magazine do through the eye. In addition, it furnishes musical entertainment that is beyond the power of the press. The radio has the further unique feature that it can relate events while they are occurring and their outcome is still in suspense. The press cannot compete with the radio in speed or ease of transmission. Although the radio is not as ubiquitous as the newspaper, a large proportion of American families in both city and country now own or have access to a set, and it has evidently become a major factor in American life, as it has in the lives of the people of other western countries.

The radio offers greatest competition to the newspaper in times of crisis, according to studies made by Lazarsfeld:

> The way in which a crisis increases radio's importance is indeed impressive. During the week of October 17, 1938, the American Institute of Public Opinion asked a representative sample of American people the following question: "In the European crisis, were you more interested in the radio reports or the newspaper reports?" Table [32] compares the answers to this question with the answers to a question asked the preceding year: "For news, do you depend upon the radio more or less or about the same as you depend on your newspaper?"
>
> The data reported in this table are for northern states only. They show that in all economic classes, rural and urban alike, there was a decided tendency for people to state that they were more interested in the radio reports during the European crisis than in the newspaper reports. In the preceding year more people depended on the newspaper for their news than depended upon the radio, especially in the urban regions. The economic difference which affects radio preferences of urban people in 1937 disappears during the crisis. The profound

significance of radio in a period of tension is made clear by these figures.[11]

The near-panic caused throughout the United States in October, 1938, by a realistic Orson Welles broadcast describing an imaginary invasion of the earth by an army from the planet Mars bears witness to the powerful effects that may be produced by the method of instantaneous mass communication made possible by the radio.[12] In this connection, it is significant that the less educated listen to the radio more than the better educated.[13]

TABLE 32

PROPORTION PREFERRING RADIO AS SOURCE OF NEWS AT TIMES OF CRISIS AND NORMAL TIMES *

(On different cultural levels in rural and urban populations)

	Rural Population			Urban Population		
	Low	Middle	High	Low	Middle	High
Prefer radio	(Per Cent)			(Per Cent)		
1937	46.5	48.3	34.0	33.8	28.8	18.6
Crisis, 1938	67.4	76.9	70.4	74.9	79.6	71.9

* Among those who have a choice.

Five areas of contention have been pointed out in current discussions of the radio: advertising, education, freedom of the air, artistic standards, and social significance. With respect to each of them except the last we will only say that there are conflicting interests and points of view which need not be discussed here.[14] Commenting on the possible social consequences of the radio, Lazarsfeld writes:

. . . radio might help in some cases to tip the balance in favor of one of the many alternatives which society faces today. Radio could make people more willing to move away from metropolitan centers, because it relays some advantages of those centers to the rest of the country.

[11] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page*, pp. 259-60. Reprinted by permission of the Publishers, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc. Copyright, 1940 by Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc.

[12] Hadley Cantril, Hazel Gaudet, and Herta Hertzog, *The Invasion from Mars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940).

[13] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *The People Look at Radio* (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), p. 84.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

Radio will probably make it easier for a party in power to keep itself at the helm of the state, and so could function as a potentially anti-democratic instrument or at least slow up the cycle of ascendancy and decline characteristic of political parties. Radio can, for better or for worse, facilitate many tendencies toward centralization, standardization, and mass formation which seem prevalent now in our society. But of the many alternative developments that can be visualized now, very few will occur "by a tip of the balance." They will be the result of powerful social forces which during coming decades will affect radio broadcasting much more than they will be influenced by it.

Technological innovations have, it is true, a tendency of their own to engender social change. But so far as radio is concerned all signs point to the unlikelihood of its having, in its own right, profound social consequences in the near future. Broadcasting is done in America today to sell merchandise; and most of the other possible effects of radio become submerged in a strange kind of social mechanism which brings the commercial effect to its strongest expression. There are no sinister tendencies operative in radio; it works all by itself. A program must be entertaining and so it avoids anything depressing enough to call for social criticism; it must not alienate listeners, and hence caters to the prejudices of the audience; it avoids specialization, so that as large an audience as possible will be assured; in order to please everyone it tries to steer clear of controversial issues. Add to this the nightmare of all broadcasters, that the listener is free to tune in on competing stations whenever he pleases, and you have the picture of radio as a stupendous technical advance with a strongly conservative tendency in all social matters.

If in 1500 A.D. a study of the social fruits of the printing press had been made, it could hardly have foreseen all the changes which we attribute today to its invention. In the frame of the social conditions of those days, not even the most exhaustive analysis of the new medium of communication could have led to useful prediction. The importance that print has acquired is due largely to the Reformation and the big Western revolutions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the same sense we cannot know what radio will mean in centuries to come, because we do not foresee what major social developments are impending. We can be fairly sure only that radio will not of itself mold the future. What we, the people of today and tomorrow, make of our social system: this will define the place of radio in history.[15]

[15] Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page*, pp. 331-33. Reprinted by permission of the Publishers, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc. Copyright, 1940, by Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc.

QUESTIONS

1. Define education, informal and formal, and give illustrations from a preliterate society.
2. How do you explain the fact that primitive peoples have obtained about the same results by very different methods of child training?
3. What relation, if any, can you find between magic or religion and formal education in primitive society?
4. What part did religion play in the development of education in the Western world?
5. Review what seem to be the most essential points in the evolution of our own present educational institutions.
6. Give illustrations of some of the ways in which educational systems reflect the cultures of which they are a part.
7. Do schools merely reflect the culture to which they belong, or can they also change it? Cite as pointed evidence as you can.
8. What, apparently, are the major functions that formal education performs for our society?
9. What are some of the minor functions of our schools and colleges?
10. What do you infer from the circumstance that it now appears quite impossible for the officials of a majority of our colleges and universities to abolish intercollegiate football, if they should wish to do so?
11. Would you want to go to college, even if you knew that it would not increase your earning power? If your answer is yes, what would be your reasons?
12. Consider carefully some of the probable consequences of making collegiate scholarships available to large numbers of qualified high school graduates.
13. Can you cite any ways in which higher education clearly affects the later thinking, beliefs, values, and behavior of those exposed to it?
14. Is the influence of higher education limited to those who have been to college? Explain.

15. In world history, has the system of education ever proved to be an obstacle to material progress? Under what conditions could this happen?
16. What are the present relations of religion to education in this country?
17. Why have many of our denominational colleges dropped their religious affiliation?
18. Discuss some of the apparent social consequences of specialization in our colleges, and what the latter are doing about it.
19. Discuss how, and to what extent, private and public schools, respectively, are accommodated to our contemporary culture.
20. About what proportion of the children who enter grade schools in the United States ever graduate from college? Compare the figure with those for England, France, etc., obtained from other references. How do you explain the differences?
21. Discuss the problem of equal educational opportunity for children in our sparsely settled rural areas.
22. According to the democratic philosophy, who should receive a college education, if everyone cannot? What would be required to put such an ideal into effect?
23. What causes the present difficulties in the higher education of women? Can you propose any solution, in terms of current social values?
24. How does the teacher-pupil relation at compulsory attendance levels often differ from the typical professional-client relation, and what are some of the consequences?
25. Analyze the causes of the post-war shortage in grade school teachers in this country. From other references, learn what remedies were proposed.
26. By what criteria should the press in a democratic country be judged?
27. In the light of such criteria, what criticisms may currently be made of the press in this country?
28. Compare the organization of the press in the United States and in Russia.
29. Why does a crisis increase the importance of the radio relative to the newspaper as a news dispensing agency?

30. What are the five chief areas of contention in current discussions of the radio?
31. Look up the incident of the "Invasion from Mars," and report on it in some detail.
32. Why do the less educated listen to the radio more than the better educated, and what is the significance of the fact?
33. Summarize Lazarsfeld's opinions regarding the possible social consequences of the radio in the United States. Do you agree with them?

REFERENCES

CANTRIL, HADLEY, GAUDET, HAZEL, and HERTZOG, HERTA. *The Invasion from Mars.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940.

DEWEY, JOHN. *Democracy and Education.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923.

GILLIN, JOHN LEWIS, and GILLIN, JOHN PHILIP. *Cultural Sociology.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948, chap. xvii.

JOHNSON, CHARLES S. (ed.). *Education and the Cultural Process,* reprinted from *The American Journal of Sociology,* XLVIII, No. 6, May, 1943.

JUDD, CHARLES H. "Education," in Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent Social Trends in the United States.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1933, chap. vii.

KEEZER, D. M. "Press," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. XII, pp. 325-43.

LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. *The People Look at Radio.* Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1946.

———. *Radio and the Printed Page.* New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc., 1940.

LEE, A. M. *The Daily Newspaper in America.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937.

SARGENT, S. STANSFELD. "Stereotypes and the Newspapers," *Sociometry,* II (1939), 69-75.

WAPLES, DOUGLAS (ed.). *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.

ZIEMER, M. *Education for Death: the Making of the Nazi.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1941.

CHAPTER 22

WAR: CAUSES AND PREVENTION

War may be simply defined as armed conflict between or among sovereign states.[1] It is, accordingly, a characteristic in-group, out-group relationship of the crisis type.

War and Human Nature.—There is an old belief that war is a necessary expression of the fighting instinct in man. When human beings are blocked in the pursuit of their wishes, it is said, anxieties, anger, and hostilities are aroused. These find inevitable release in attempts to destroy the object of resentment, or in projection upon substitute objects. With the increase of scientific knowledge in psychology, sociology, and anthropology, however, this point of view has been found to be a misleading oversimplification.

Human societies, both civilized and savage, it appears, differ widely in their warlike tendencies. Some societies fight constantly with their neighbors, some are belligerent and peaceful by turns, others rarely or never depart from the ways of peace. The Scandinavian nations of modern times, once constant pillagers of Europe and now existing in the midst of war-torn countries, have nevertheless succeeded in avoiding war for a very long period. Among many examples of peaceful primitive peoples may be mentioned the Semang Negritos of the Malay Peninsula, of whom it is authoritatively reported:

> The various bands live at peace with one another. They roam with perfect freedom over the territories of other groups in the same tribe—always, of course, respecting their fruit trees. War, or any other form of hostility, is absolutely unknown, not only between the different bands and tribes of the Semang themselves, but also with the Sakai, and even with the Malays, by whom they are not infrequently harassed. They

[1] Alvin Johnson, "War," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. XV, p. 331.

never react to ill-treatment with treachery, much less with open violence. They merely withdraw and avoid their oppressors.[2]

As a consequence of the steadily decreased emphasis by psychologists upon the importance of instincts in human behavior, the conviction has grown among social scientists that war is primarily a consequence, not of the biological nature of man, but of the structure of some societies, i.e., their institutions, customs, and traditions.[3] Ninety-nine per cent of the members of the American Psychological Association in 1944 signed the following statement of their technical opinion on this subject:

1. War Can Be Avoided: War Is Not Born in Men; It is Built into Men. No race, nation, or social group is inevitably warlike. The frustrations and conflicting interests which lie at the root of aggressive wars can be reduced and redirected by social engineering. Men can realize their ambitions within the framework of human cooperation and can direct their aggressions against those natural objects that thwart them in the attainment of their goals. . . .[4]

This official position of the psychologists is supported by the anthropologists and sociologists. As an anthropologist has expressed it,

. . . perhaps the greatest lesson which anthropology can teach is that of the boundless plasticity of what we too glibly call "human nature." Every culture is a traditionally transmitted set of solutions to highly similar problems which every human group has faced. The exuberant variety of solutions which have been devised to the same problem (say "sex" or "property") is truly amazing and makes one eternally skeptical of any argument couched in the form, "That would never work—it is contrary to human nature!"[5]

War as Culture.—War is to be regarded simply as one kind of learned response to certain types of situations on the part of

[2] From George Peter Murdock, *Our Primitive Contemporaries*, pp. 94-95. Copyright, 1938 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

[3] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (2 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), Vol. II, p. 1199.

[4] "The Psychologists' Manifesto," in Theodore M. Newcomb, Eugene T. Hartley, et al. (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1947), p. 656.

[5] Clyde Kluckhohn, "Anthropological Research and World Peace," in L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver (eds.), *Approaches to World Peace: a Symposium* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1943).

a tribe or nation. It involves attitudes and beliefs, a great variety of skills, and a large amount of social organization. For example, the American people held certain opinions about the Nazis—they thought of them as a gang of sex perverts and criminals that had obtained control over the German nation, whose ideas of right and wrong outraged the mores of this country, and who sought to conquer the world and rule it as a master race. The possibility of living in a world dominated by such people seemed intolerable, and this soon led to American aid to the countries the Germans had already attacked. To render this aid effective required an enormous amount of financial and industrial reorganization, carried out under the direction of the best-trained minds in those fields in the nation. In anticipation of entering the war itself, the young men were drafted into the armed forces, and at once placed under military instruction headed by professional military commanders.

Evidently, all of the attitudes of the American people and the behavior they followed in the face of the German and Japanese threats represented culture patterns, including many traditions of long standing. Furthermore, the functioning of governmental, fiscal, industrial, and military institutions were parts of our modern western culture. Thus the war that followed grew out of and involved many elements and aspects of Euro-American culture, was a highly complex and in many ways technical matter, and as such was peculiarly a product of western civilization and technology. The emotions that lay beneath it were aroused by the violation of a set of values clustered about an elaborate ideology known as democracy, itself a cultural product which could not be ascribed in any sense to original human nature, since it is peculiar to ourselves and certain other peoples, and is not common to all human societies. Thus even the anger and indignation of the American people that served in part as the motivation for the war were culturally determined, and might never have been aroused in a culture that was very unlike our own. Moreover, the expression of this indignation might have taken many forms other than those it did take, if our traditions, institutions, and situations had been different from what they were. Notice the diverse response

of nations like Sweden and Ireland, which were dictated by their own peculiar history and location. On close examination, therefore, the origin and prosecution of World War II in the United States is seen to be culturally determined to such an extent that the contribution of unlearned instinctive elements, if any at all, appears to be slight and unimportant.

War as Conflict of Values and Interests.—War is an example of the familiar social process of conflict, which was discussed in earlier chapters, when carried on among great numbers of individuals aligned against one another as members of opposing tribes or nations. Like all conflict, war is an attempt to attain an end or to dissolve an unacceptable situation by injuring or destroying opposing individuals or groups whose injury or destruction, it is believed, will accomplish the desired purpose. Thus in the definition of conflict lies the assumption of the presence of antagonistic values or interests.

Students of war have often pointed this out. In his extensive analysis, *A Study of War,* Wright places ideals first among the causes of war. In addition, he says, people may be moved to go to war (1) to escape undesirable conditions; (2) as a means for carrying out a foreign policy; or (3) because of intertribal or international incidents to which war is regarded by the jural standards of the time to be the proper reaction.[6] All of these causes, however, imply conflicting ideas, interests, or policies. Similarly, Johnson has declared that the main forces making for war are conflicts of interests, whether material or ideal.[7] Sorokin considers that most wars are fought for the sake of several values, although some one value may be more basic than the others.[8]

Examples of conflicts of national or sectional values and interests are abundant and well known. The clash between the totalitarian ideology and value system of the Nazi policy as expressed by Hitler in *Mein Kampf* and the principles and ethics of British and American democracy has already been mentioned

[6] Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 726-27.
[7] "War," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. XV, p. 341.
[8] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Society, Culture, and Personality: Their Structure and Dynamics* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), pp. 507, 508.

as an extreme and uncompromising case. In the United States, deep-seated differences between the values and interests of the North and the South culminated in the American Civil War, in connection with the struggle for economic and political dominance and the institution of slavery.

Inevitability of Conflicts of Values and Interests.—If wars are the result of conflicting values or interests, as they undoubtedly are, it can hardly be argued that a practical way of abolishing them is to eliminate all ideological and interest differences among nations. It appears that such differences must always occur among groups that function as separate units and under different traditions and situations of life. This has been recognized by recent writers like Wright, who believes that all nations should share in a public opinion formed in constant contact and communication with one another.[9] It is important to notice, however, that differences of opinion and interest are likely to arise even if the groups are in more or less social contact, but are still subject to somewhat different conditions and historical influences. Emphasis has been given to this point by the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association, which clearly realizes that any Declaration of Human Rights must recognize the validity of many different ways of life and cannot be dominated by the ideals of any single people:

> As a result of the accidents of history, every people not only has a sentiment structure which is to some degree unique but also a more or less coherent body of characteristic presuppositions about the world. This last is really a borderland between reason and feeling. Perhaps in a certain sense the "logic" of all nations is the same. But their premises are certainly different. And the trouble is that the most critical premises are so often misstated—even by the intellectuals of the group. The very morphology of the various languages inevitably begs far-reaching questions of metaphysics and of value. . . . What we notice, what we talk about, what we feel as important is in some part a function of our linguistic habits. Because these linguistic habits tend to remain as unquestioned "background phenomena," each people tends to take its fundamental categories, its unstated basic premises for granted. It is assumed that others will "think the same way," for "it's only human

[9] Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 1088.

nature." When others face the same body of data but come to different conclusions, it is seldom thought that they might be proceeding from different premises. Rather it is inferred that they are "stupid" or "illogical" or "obstinate."

And so not only the external facts about a nation [its population density, birth rate, water-power potential, and the like]—important though these are—must be taken into account. Their sentiments and the unconscious assumptions which they characteristically make about the world, are also data which must be discovered and respected.[10]

War and Contact.—Because any two societies which have not been much in contact will have different points of view and values, and unfavorable stereotypes of one another, it has often been supposed that if they should become better acquainted, they would develop more understanding and sympathy. But when contact is made or increased between such societies, the first result is actually some form of competition or conflict. The extent of the tension depends both upon the degree and kind of value differences that exist between them, and upon the conditions under which the contact takes place. If the differences do not arouse intense resentment, or if contact can be kept to a point of tolerance, the societies may gradually make peaceful adjustments and accommodations to one another. Each may then accept some of the other's traits that fit into its own customs, especially those traits that seem superior to some of its own. In this way, they may not only become accustomed or accommodated to one another, but also more alike. In case the clash of values is severe, however, and there is no diminution of contact, the tension may become so intolerable that the nations will resort to war to settle more speedily whose interests and values shall dominate.

The problem of international contacts has always been a central one in the foreign policy of the United States. Until about 1940, the dominant belief was that the best way to avoid trouble abroad was not to "meddle" in foreign affairs.[11] Our own decision to remain outside the League of Nations after World War I had to be revised after World War II had shown the

[10] "Statement on Human Rights," *American Anthropologist*, XLIX, No. 4 (1947), 542-43.

[11] Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 1115.

impossibility of isolation in the modern world of rapid and widespread communication and transportation and international trade.

War and Social Change.—Sorokin has called attention to the fact that a conflict of values may also arise among parts of the same society or among different nations because of changes of values that occur in one group but not in the other. He cites as examples Ikhnaton's religious revolution in ancient Egypt, the Buddhist transformation in India, the Protestant Reformation in Europe, etc., from each of which came civil or international wars. Periods of rapid social change of any kind, material as well as ideological, such as the 20th century, are usually marked by many wars.[12]

It appears that too little change also may be productive of tensions that may lead to violent release. Overtight stratifications within a society may foster abuses until the underprivileged become desperate and stage a bloody revolt. Or the tradition-encrusted and self-satisfied nation of long standing may refuse to make the accommodations necessary to adjust to another nation, and thereby become involved in difficulties that must be resolved by war.[13]

War as a Shortcut or Last Recourse.—Attention is directed to two frequent reasons for war, namely, (1) its supposed economy over other methods of persuasion, in the matter of time required to effect a desired change,[14] and (2) the utility of force as a measure of last resort to accomplish what it is believed other methods cannot accomplish.

The validity of the first point is weakened by the circumstance that many conflicts which war seems to settle do not stay settled. They reappear later and cause further wars, civil or international, or are finally disposed of by more peaceful processes of competition and social change in the later course of history. In some instances, conflicts may have been dissolved more quickly by war than they could have been otherwise, e.g., in the American Civil War. But the question remains, Was

[12] Sorokin, *op. cit.*, p. 510.
[13] Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 1108, 1109.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 1041, 1236.

the time saved worth the destruction of human life and the heavy material costs of war, in the final judgment of the societies concerned?

The broad truth of the second point, i.e., the frequent success of force as a reserve measure when every other method has failed, cannot be disputed. Again, however, the real issues are why better methods cannot be used, and whether or not in any given case the societies involved feel that violent means are justified by the end. History has often judged that they were not.

The use of force is still regarded within a society as necessary for maintaining law and order, in the interest of the society as a whole. It is likely to be equally necessary for the same purpose within any larger international organization of societies that may conceivably be set up.[15] The use of force by a total society when required to preserve that society against destructive elements, however, is quite a different thing from the use of force by one society against another for the advancement of its own interests at the expense of the other. The practical answer to the problem of force at the present time, therefore, seems to be not to deny its occasional necessity or usefulness, but to sublimate it by limiting its use to the society as a whole, national and international, for the purpose of keeping law and order among its parts, when no other method is effective.

War and the Scapegoat.—It has often happened that the political party in control of a national government has found itself confronted by a serious crisis of discontent among its people, which threatened to overthrow the party, or even to lead to a general civil insurrection against the form of government itself. In such cases it is a familiar recourse of politicians to attempt to divert the antagonisms of the populace from their own government to an outside enemy, or even to some unfortunate element among themselves, such as the Jews in old Russia or modern Germany. That this has been the chief cause of many wars and Jewish persecutions or pogroms can hardly be questioned.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 1091, 1093.

War is sometimes an outlet for internal tensions, so that anything that tends to raise tension within a nation may be an influence for war. This is evidently a generalization of considerable scope, and implies that war may be made less probable by a general policy of keeping the people of a nation satisfied and contented. Good government, justice in the courts, economic opportunity not too much restricted to favored class and majority groups, business prosperity, reasonable expectations and philosophy of life, all contribute to keeping internal tensions at a safer level, where they are less apt to be externalized against an outside enemy. Dissatisfied minorities and exploited classes, such as the peasants of China, the Indian masses of Central and South American countries, and the Negroes in the United States and Africa, are familiar sources of tensions which potentially may lead to accumulative violence and war.[16]

War Profiteering.—The popular idea that special-interest groups, like munitions and armament makers and international bankers and investors, are largely responsible for maneuvering nations into war for their own profit is another theory that is no longer taken very seriously. It is true that evidence collected by the League of Nations and other investigators shows that such charges are not without some foundation. But when they are carefully weighed, they are not found to be a major explanation of war. And, apparently, the oft-made proposal that the state should take over the manufacture of arms and the like would not decrease the likelihood of war.[17]

War and Psychological Factors.—In recent analyses of the factors and causes of war, little emphasis has been placed upon the "natural" antipathy felt by one people for another. Dislike is seen as the result of clashes of interests and values, which must therefore be looked to as more realistic sources of war.

Reference is sometimes made to another type of tension, namely *ennui,* or simple boredom. A long period of peace in an industrial society may be marred by a dull, mechanistic form of life for the masses, which leads them to welcome the new ex-

[16] See Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 336-37.
[17] Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 1174-75.

hilaration and excitement of an anticipated war with its tense situations and its heroic symbolisms. No competent student, however, now attaches much importance to this.

Dread of war by a society tends to cause that society to avoid war. On the contrary, public confidence in an easy victory over another nation is favorable to the declaration of war. Apprehensions about the warlike motives and power of other nations, whether they are based on fact or fiction, are likely to lead to secret or open preparations for war, including the armament races so familiar in recent times. The competing countries blow up their budgets and debts with the astronomical costs of constructing the vast machinery of war. The taxes levied for this purpose sometimes equal or exceed those for all other functions of government combined. For safety's sake, no nation can afford to be outstripped in this grim competition by a potential enemy, so that the logical limit of effort is the point of national exhaustion. Armament races have often continued from a quarter to half a century, and have stopped only with war itself. The folly of such a procedure as an international policy, however compulsive it may be for a nation caught in the system, is so obvious that many attempts have been made to negotiate disarmament treaties, especially following disastrous wars. But in a world of many self-centered and independent nationalistic states, some state has always broken away from the pact and started the race anew. At the moment this is written, we are in the midst of the most colossal and expensive armament building contest of all time.[18]

If the people and their leaders believe that, practically speaking, war cannot be eliminated, that at some time, for one reason or another, war is inevitable, then discreet nations will obviously include a consideration of war in their long-time policy. This will affect and color all of their relationships and economy, both internal and external. This is equivalent to saying that nations will make military preparations at home and will seek out advantageous alliances and balance-of-power blocs abroad, all of which will lead to involvements and situations favorable to actual war.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 690.

If we accept the judgment of all impartial investigators of war, that modern war brings far more injury than benefit to everyone concerned, it then appears that a decision to make war must always be based on a misunderstanding or miscalculation on the part of one or more of the belligerents. Such considerations led Wright to place particular emphasis on the part played by psychological factors in the etiology of war:

In international relations the sources of opinion have been only remotely related to the conditions about which opinions are held. Apprehensions of the tendency of conditions have, therefore, had little relation to the actual tendency of those conditions, yet it is from the apprehensions that wars develop. The economist may analyze actual conditions of trade, prices, and technology and may make accurate predictions of their tendency, but through such activity he has been able to contribute little toward estimating the probability of war. The journalist, the politician, or the psychologist, ignoring such conditions and analyzing the apprehensions and opinions which are actually held, however irrational they may be, has been able to judge far better of the probability of war. In this sense it would seem that psychological rather than economic factors have been responsible for war. The economist, keeping within his field, cannot explain war. He may do much to prevent war in the future by enlightening opinion so that apprehensions, opinions, and ideologies will conform more closely to the actual tendency of events and conditions. If people only fought when they would actually better their conditions by doing so, there would not be much war in the modern world. In modern civilization war springs from "emotions devoid of ideas and desires devoid of appraisals." To prevent war, the emotion-charged symbols which control opinion must everywhere be kept in closer contact with the conditions which people think they describe. Symbols must everywhere refer to conditions, not to myths, stereotypes, or fictions. . . .

. . . Unnecessary public alarm will usually endanger the peace, but public complacency when external conditions actually threaten war may be equally dangerous. Unless confidence in peace is rational, far from promoting peace such confidence may encourage aggression. If most of the wolves turn into sheep, it will be an opportunity for the wolves that remain.

The attitude conducive to peace is neither that properly attributed to the ostrich, which denies the possibility of war, nor that of the cynic, who considers war inevitable, but that of the rational man, who appraises

the opinions and conditions tending to war and the direction of human effort which at a given point in history might prevent it. In the present age planetary comprehensiveness of vision and the utmost foresight are essentials of such rationality. These imply guidance by a central investigatory organization with capacity, free from possible impairment by national states, to communicate with individuals throughout the world. So long as control of education and communication is a monopoly of national states, it is not to be expected that attitudes conducive to war can be prevented from developing in certain areas, and the virus once developed in one section of the human population, like a cancer in the human body, will under present conditions spread to other sections and involve the whole in war.[19]

War and Nationalism.—By definition, international war is dependent upon the existence of nations. It has been seen that the fundamental cause of such wars is national differences in interests and values. Individuals identify themselves with their own nation, and tend to regard it with emotions of affection, loyalty, and pride—sentiments which are commonly known as patriotism. Toward the people of other nations they generally entertain attitudes of difference, superiority, exploitation, rivalry, potential conflict, apprehension, often a desire for their defeat and removal. In keeping with these self-centered attitudes, each nation acts primarily in its own interest, for its own advancement, its own security, and its own glory. In so doing, it necessarily interacts with other nations, always at the level of potential conflict.

Nations are merely one kind of social aggregate, analogous to cities, corporations, families, and the like, and a social aggregate itself is analogous to an individual. The essential difference is that the nation is the only type of group or individual which at present still retains complete self-determination, or freedom from control and regulation by any higher group or organization which acts in the interest of society as a whole. The basic effective cause of modern international war, by general agreement, lies in the spirit of nationalism, which is due to the existence of sovereign nations.[20]

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 1116, 1117, 1224.
[20] *Ibid.*, chap. xxvii.

A World Order.—There is no likelihood that nations or similar groups will ever cease to exist, any more than that all of the component states, provinces, or counties of the United States, Russia, England, Germany, or other nations will cease to exist. The fact that national groups have everywhere been firmly established for a very long time suggests that they are natural forms of social organization that serve useful purposes. Neither does it appear that the cause of peace demands the elimination of the nations of the world, even if such a thing were possible.

The sociology of human relations clearly indicates that what is required to abolish war among nations is not to eliminate nations, but, rather, to bring them under the control of a larger and more inclusive type of world organization. Genetically, this is the next step to be expected in the evolution of human society. Individuals, families, clans, cities, and substates have organized under an authority superior to themselves which has allowed them to continue to survive as units, but which denies them the right to employ violence against one another, and serves as a judge in any disputes that may occur among them. As a rule, both persons and groups have willingly submitted themselves to a higher authority, or acted voluntarily to create such an authority. The purpose, of course, was to enjoy the benefits of law and order which could not otherwise be obtained. The same reasons are now compelling the nations of the earth to join together under some kind of super-organization, with sufficient powers to assure them of the peace and security they want, just as each nation itself now has the powers to assure its own citizens of general security from internal violence and crime.

In order to have an effective world power for the abolition of war, it is evident that all powerful nations must be included. It is also essential that each individual nation completely surrender its rights and ability to make war on other nations, and, in general, submit itself to the impartial verdict and control of the world organization in all matters that affect its relations with other nations.

About the general principles outlined above there is almost complete agreement among scientific students of war and the social order. The difficulties in the way of realizing a successful world organization lie in the nationalistic attitudes and customs that now prevail everywhere, which must be abandoned in favor of an attitude of world citizenship. Evidently, all important nations must agree simultaneously to the fundamental changes that are required, and there must be found a way to assure them that the transition can be made without too great risk to themselves. This is a colossal task, but the ominous threat of the atomic bomb in the background would seem to be motivation enough to overcome all hesitation and eventually to bring about an effective united nations authority, with coercive powers sufficiently strong to prevent any attempts by unruly individual nations to violate the peace.[21]

War and Form of Government.—There is some difference of opinion among students with regard to the relation between the form of government and the tendency of a nation to make war. This may be shown, for example, by comparing the views of two of the more important contemporary writers on the subject, Sorokin and Wright. According to Sorokin's interpretation of history, democracies and republics have not been more peaceful than have autocracies and monarchies; and increases in literacy and education have not reduced war.[22] Wright also finds that external pressures caused by the political and economic activities of other nations have been more important than the form of government in involving nations in war, but he believes that a democratic government is more favorable to peace than is an absolutist government. In support of this, he offers the following reasons: The masses of the people do not want war, and where they control the state, they will agree to war only if it is forced upon them by nondemocratic governments. The political structure of democracy is less adapted to the successful use of threats and violence than is the structure of autocracy. An autocracy is more likely to resort to war to divert attention

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 1350, chaps. xxviii, xxix. xl.
[22] Sorokin, *op. cit.*, p. 498.

from internal dissatisfactions, because the tensions cannot be relieved by merely changing the political party in office. And finally, "Autocrats, especially those who have achieved their own position, tend to be aggressive types of personality, to consider themselves above the law, to regard universal ideals as useful only for propaganda, to value military preparation and the institution of war as instruments of both internal and external policy, and to value power above welfare. Democracies, on the other hand, tend to give leadership to personalities of a conciliatory type, to attach importance to respect for law, to oppose military preparation for war, and to value liberty, humanity, and welfare above power." [23]

Yet Wright admits that democracies have not in the past cooperated effectively for world organization. Unable to achieve a lasting balance of power, they have failed to act rationally to preserve the peace, and have repeatedly blundered into war.[24]

War and the Economy.—Two nations may resort to war to settle the conflict between their economic systems and ideologies. The occasion for war in this case, however, is the difference between the two economies, rather than the form of either. Is capitalism, as a system, more or less conducive to war than is state socialism, communism, or other types of economy?

If we accept Wright's belief that centralized or totalitarian governments represent a type of political organization which is best adapted and most disposed to war, and if centralized governments are less characteristic of capitalistic societies than of socialistic or communistic societies, then apparently it should follow that capitalistic societies are less warlike than socialistic or communistic societies. There is some difficulty, however, in the specific application of this reasoning because the contrasted terms, like "centralized" versus "uncentralized," "capitalism" versus "socialism," are matters of degree. Furthermore, it is not quantitatively established to what extent socialism and totalitarian, or highly centralized governments, necessarily go together. The case of England, for example, raises some im-

[23] Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 847.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 824, 836, 837, 840, 841, 842.

portant questions regarding these points. Nevertheless, the consensus of competent authority is that there is an observed tendency and a logical necessity for socialistic or communistic economies and centralized governments to be associated.[25]

War and Population Pressure.—The wish for economic gains and improved material conditions of life is generally conceded to have often been the decisive factor in driving nations into war. To the extent that a population exceeds the capacity of its territory and the state of its arts to support it at a desired level, population pressure may be regarded as a secondary cause of war. Population pressure alone, however, is not an effective cause of war. A people may be too starved and weak to undertake a conquest. They must have enough energy to make the necessary effort and they must also have some hope of success. For these reasons, absolute population pressure is not closely correlated with the making of war. The half-starving nation of India is notably peaceful, while the Germans, with one of the highest per capita incomes in Europe, have a long record of attacking their neighbors, in order to increase their *Lebensraum.*[26]

War and Social Science.—"Scientific investigators," according to Wright, "have tended to attribute war to immaturities in social knowledge and control, as one might attribute epidemics to insufficient medical knowledge."[27] Since the responsibility for developing social knowledge falls upon the social sciences, i.e., social psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, economics, and history, a serious lag is usually considered to exist between the progress of these disciplines and the so-called natural sciences, physics, chemistry, biology, geology, and astronomy. Physics is able to produce a bomb capable of destroying civilization, but it is not certain that sociology is capable of organizing society well enough to prevent the disastrous misuse of such a dangerous invention. Governments are continuing to invest vast sums of money in experiments of

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 1111, 1162-64, 1166, 1168, 1172, 1184, 1185, 1196, 1197, etc.
[26] Warren S. Thompson, *Plenty of People* (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1948).
[27] Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 733.

the atomic or hydrogen bomb type, and very little in scientific studies of how to maintain the peace.

It does not follow, however, that if the social sciences possessed all of the knowledge necessary to organize the world effectively against war, such knowledge would be put to the proper use. It is the function of science to provide knowledge, but society, rather than science, determines what, if any, use shall be made of it. Indeed, the social sciences already know much more than is being applied by the statesmen in the United Nations. To the extent that the delegates representing Great Britain, the United States, France, Russia, etc., have conflicting interests and purposes which they refuse to compromise, they cannot agree in the building of a world order, regardless of how much knowledge of the workings of human society may be possessed by their staffs of experts. Nevertheless, a more convincing knowledge of the relationships between the various forms of government, economy, world organization, war, and human welfare and contentment, plus a clearer understanding of the historical and social-psychological reasons for the wide differences in points of view and values that exist between some of the great nations of the world, would no doubt be of help in clarifying the atmosphere of some of the conferences.

QUESTIONS

1. How may war be defined? Does the American Civil War satisfy this definition?
2. To what extent is war the result of a fighting instinct in man? Discuss the evidence.
3. Just what is meant by saying that war is a culture pattern or patterns?
4. Is conflict of interests or values always present where there is war? If so, why discuss further "causes"?
5. Are conflicting values and interests among nations inevitable?
6. If your answer to Question 5 is "yes," can there be any real hope of avoiding war? On what grounds?
7. Discuss the idea that if peoples become better acquainted

through contact, they will like one another, and there will be peace between them.

8. Compare the belief in isolation as a method of staying out of war with the contact theory in Question 7.
9. Analyze carefully the relationship between social change and the occurrence of war.
10. What argument, if any, can be offered against war as a short-cut method for obtaining national objectives? As a measure of last resort?
11. Explain and evaluate the scapegoat theory of war.
12. If governments took over the manufacture of all arms, would the probability of war be lessened?
13. How important as an incentive for war is the dislike or antipathy which one nation "naturally" feels for another?
14. What is the psychological background of modern armament races?
15. What are the usual consequences of armament races?
16. How successful have disarmament pacts been?
17. If no one can benefit from modern total war, how are nations led into it?
18. What specific psychological conditions, if any, need to be prevented or changed in order to reduce the likelihood of war?
19. Do wars arise from actual conditions, or from the opinions held about them?
20. What, according to Quincy Wright, is the attitude conducive to peace?
21. Is nationalism the chief cause of war? Explain.
22. What is the argument for a world organization to prevent war?
23. What requirements must be met if a world organization is to be effective in outlawing war?
24. What practical difficulties beset the creation of a successful world order?
25. Is there any relationship between the form of government and the disposition to make war? How convincing is it?
26. Is there a relationship between the type of economy and war? What is the evidence or the argument?
27. Analyze the contention that the prevention of war depends upon the development of the social sciences.

REFERENCES

BERNARD, L. L. *The Causes of War.* New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1944.

CLARKSON, J. D., and COCHRAN, I. C. (eds.). *War as an Institution.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1941.

CROWELL, B., and WILSON, R. F. *How America Went to War.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921.

DAVIE, M. R. *The Evolution of War.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929.

FALLS, C. *The Nature of Modern Warfare.* London: Oxford University Press, 1941.

FULLER, J. F. C. *War and Western Civilization, 1832-1932.* London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1932

HERRING, P. *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy Under Arms.* New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1941.

NICOLAI, G. F. *The Biology of War.* Translated by C. A. GRANDE and J. GRANDE. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1919

PHILLIPS, T. R. *The New Warfare.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1942.

PRATT, F. *America and Total War.* New York: Smith & Durrell, 1941.

———. *What the Citizen Should Know About Modern War.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1942.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *Society, Culture, and Personality.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, pp. 503-22.

SPEIER, H., and KÄHLER, A. (eds.). *War in Our Time.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1941.

CHAPTER 23

WAR: SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

Social Intensification, Regimentation, and Emotionalism in War.—War typically brings a heightened emotional tension, more rigorous governmental control, tighter social integration, and greatly increased cooperative effort within the warring societies.[1] Public interest runs high, radios are overworked, newspapers are eagerly scanned, everyone is intent upon the one colossal event, the war. Boredom is gone; in its place is anxiety. Open war greatly intensifies the fears, prejudices, and antipathies which ordinarily mark the attitudes of the members of one group toward the members of another group which is regarded as different and unfriendly.

Divisions and disputes within the in-group tend to be minimized or laid aside, while the animosity is directed toward the common enemy. In the United States, amidst the serious hazards of World War II, a Democratic President won the support of Republican party leaders by appointing them to critical posts in the government and the war effort. In spite of misleading newspaper headlines, the forces of labor and capital declared a truce for the duration, in order that the production of vital war materiel might not be delayed. In the Axis countries, including Japan, and in Russia, totalitarian governments rigorously regimented the entire population for the all-out struggle. Democratic America and England immediately drafted most of their young males into the military services, and assumed control over all vital resources by strictly enforced rationing. Intense flare-ups of suspicion and antipathy toward the Japanese in continental United States appeared, and almost the whole of that "enemy" group was quickly placed behind the barbed wires of concentration camps or "relocation centers" scattered through

[1] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), Vol. II, p. 698.

the western states. In Germany the Jews became a symbol of animosity and scapegoatism, and millions of them, including women and children, were gassed to death in the horror chambers of Buchenwald and other "liquidation" centers. In the Philippines the Japanese conducted ruthless "death marches" of captured American soldiers, and gave free vent to their sadism upon white military and civilian prisoners.

In contrast and contradiction to the regimentation of a society in time of war, but not inconsistent with the emotional stresses that naturally prevail at such a time, are the disruptive effects of war upon social values and conduct, vital statistics, health, and economic conditions. The image of war soon penetrates into every aspect of life, and sets its stamp upon it.

Crime.—With regard to some of the effects of war on crime, the conclusions are fairly clear. From such data as are available for the Civil War period in the United States, it appears that there was (1) a marked and general decrease in the number of male criminals in prisons during the war years, (2) an increase in the number of female prisoners in many places during the same time, (3) an increase in the number of children in prison in some states and probably rather generally, and (4) a marked increase in the number of commitments of men to prison during the years following the war. Much the same pattern was observed in the Franco-Prussian War, and has occurred in every major war since. During World War I, official English criminal statistics showed a decline in crimes committed by adults, while juvenile offenses rose; in the United States, there was a decrease in the prison population. Again, with the advent of World War II, there was a sharp decline in the prison populations of Great Britain, Canada, and the United States.[2]

The broad explanation of these facts seems to be that the severe social disorganization caused by war leads to an increase in illegal behavior, as evidenced by the rise in the female and juvenile offense rates,[3] but the bulk of young adult males is in

[2] Marshall B. Clinard, "Wartime Trends in the Prison Population," *Proceedings of the 1942 Congress of the American Prison Association*, pp. 357-59.

[3] There was also no doubt more rigorous legal action against juvenile offenses during World War II than normally in this country. See Paul W. Tappan, *Juvenile Delinquency* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1949), p. 157.

military service where they are under rigorous discipline and enforced employment, and where violations of the military regulations are dealt with by the military authorities, thus enormously lightening the normal burden on the civil courts.

Further evidence on wartime crime in the United States during the second World War has to do with the breaking of OPA (Office of Price Administration) regulations, sometimes referred to as "white-collar" crime. Fifty-seven per cent of the business concerns investigated were found in violation, although this figure may be somewhat too high because of selective sampling. Relatively few of the businessmen offenders had previous criminal records.[4]

Wars are invariably followed by a marked upsurge in civilian crime, which appears as soon as the armies are disbanded. The post bellum period usually has an offense rate that is clearly above that of the ante bellum period and probably exceeds that of the war period itself. This is commonly attributed to the extensive psychological and social maladjustments which are brought about by war and its aftermath.

Sex Morality.—In times of war sex standards are among the first to be lowered. The problem of venereal disease is always a major one in the army, and medical measures rather than sexual restraints are relied on to deal with it. Moreover,

> Increase in sexual promiscuity in war times is not confined to soldiers at the front. It increases everywhere. It has been held that street-walking in London was ten times higher after the war than it was earlier. The sex license of the soldier cannot help disturbing sex standards in general. "Respectable" people are also affected. . . . Every war yields its toll of illegitimacy on the one hand and sexual frustration on the other.[5]

Most of the increase in female delinquency noted above takes place in the area of sex offenses. Juvenile court statistics indicate that in the case of adolescent girls the sex offense rate during and following World War II rose from 10 to 30 per cent above that of peace times. On late adolescent males the

[4] Marshall B. Clinard, "Criminological Theories of Wartime Regulation," *American Sociological Review*, XI, No. 3 (1946), 258-70.

[5] Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization* (rev. ed., New York: Harper and Bros., 1941), pp. 1,032-33, 1,037.

effect was much the same. Among a sample of 221 such boys in the United States who were exposed to the conditions that existed in World War II, 78 per cent had had heterosexual experiences before they were sixteen years old.[6]

Marriage, Birth, and Divorce.—War has a terrific impact upon marriage rates, birth rates, and divorce rates. Marriages usually increase just before the onset of a war, decline in the midst of the conflict while the armies are occupied in fighting, rise to a record peak following the return of the soldiers to civilian life, and then subside to a normal level (Figure 13).

Many ill-considered marriages occur in the new contacts, confusion, and emotionality of war. These, together with the long separations during the war and the difficulties of later readjustment, cause a spectacular surge in the divorce rate when the postwar period arrives. For example, the number of divorces granted in this country in 1946 is estimated to have increased by one-half over the number granted in 1942, which "means that the increase in the number of divorces in the four years between 1942 and 1946 nearly equaled the increase from the beginning of our history until 1942."[7] Reference has already been made to the distortion of the sex ratio because of the destruction of great numbers of young males, and its adverse effects upon the marital prospects and general moral tone of many women of the war-shattered generation.

Closely following the violent fluctuations in the marriage rate in time of war are changes in the birth rate. The *Statistical Bulletin* notes that:

> Despite the many postwar difficulties besetting large areas of the world—serious food shortages, lack of housing, widespread economic and political problems—the birth rates in many countries have increased since the end of the war, and are now at higher levels than during the immediate prewar period. Evidence of the postwar resurgence in the birth rate is presented in [Table 33], which shows annual rates for twenty-six countries for the decade 1937-1946.[8]

[6] George E. Gardner, "Sex Behavior of Adolescents in Wartime," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXXXVI (November, 1944), 64.

[7] Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, XXVIII, No. 7 (July, 1947), 7.

[8] *Ibid.*, "Divorce and Wartime Marriage," XXIX, No. 3, p. 1.



FIG. 13.—Monthly variation in marriages in large American cities,* 1940-1948 (daily average number in each month as per cent of daily average for 1941). (Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., *Statistical Bulletin,* XXVII, No. 12 (December, 1946), 2.

There are no figures for Russia, but the evidence we have suggests that the birth rate in that country has also increased

TABLE 33

BIRTH RATE PER 1,000 POPULATION, IN THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES, 1937 TO 1946

Country	Birth Rate per 1,000 Population										Percent Change from 1945 to 1946
	1946	1945	1944	1943	1942	1941	1940	1939	1938	1937	
Netherlands ..	30.2	22.7	24.0	23.0	21.0	20.3	20.8	20.6	20.5	19.8	+33.0
France	20.6	16.2	16.4	15.9	14.8	13.3	14.0	14.9	14.9	15.0	+27.2
Italy	22.6	18.3	19.2	19.9	20.4	20.8	23.4	23.5	23.7	22.9	+23.5
Roumania	23.8	19.6	21.7	23.4	24.4	25.7	26.5	28.3	29.6	30.8	+21.4
Scotland	20.3	16.9	18.5	18.4	17.6	17.5	17.1	17.4	17.7	17.6	+20.1
Norway	22.5	18.8	19.6	19.1	17.9	15.5	16.3	15.9	15.6	15.1	+19.7
United States .	23.3	19.6	20.2	21.5	20.9	18.9	17.9	17.3	17.6	17.1	+18.9
England and Wales	19.1	16.1	17.5	16.2	15.6	14.1	14.5	14.9	15.1	14.9	+18.6
Belgium	18.1	15.5	15.1	14.8	13.1	12.1	13.4	15.3	15.8	15.3	+16.8
Japan	26.5	23.4	29.4	29.6	29.7	30.7	28.9	26.1	26.7	30.6	+13.2
Canada	26.6	23.8	23.8	24.0	23.4	22.2	21.5	20.4	20.6	20.0	+11.8
Austria	15.9	14.5	*	*	*	20.2	21.8	20.7	13.9	12.8	+ 9.7
Australia	23.7	21.8	21.0	20.7	19.1	18.9	18.0	17.7	17.5	17.4	+ 8.7
New Zealand .	25.2	23.2	21.6	19.7	21.7	22.8	21.2	18.7	17.9	17.3	+ 8.6
(Excluding the Maories)											
Finland	27.0	25.1	21.1	20.3	16.5	24.1	17.7	21.1	20.9	19.9	+ 7.6
South Africa ..	27.7	25.8	26.6	25.9	25.2	24.9	25.3	25.3	25.0	24.9	+ 7.4
(European population)											
Bulgaria	25.7	24.1	21.9	21.6	22.9	22.0	*	*	*	*	+ 6.6
Venezuela	38.5	36.8	35.9	36.3	35.7	34.9	36.0	36.9	34.5	33.9	+ 4.6
Northern Ireland	22.6	22.0	23.5	24.2	22.9	20.9	19.6	19.5	20.0	19.8	+ 2.7
Irish Free State	22.9	22.5	22.2	21.9	22.3	19.0	19.1	19.1	19.4	19.2	+ 1.8
Denmark	23.4	23.5	22.6	21.4	20.4	18.5	18.3	17.8	18.1	18.0	− 0.4
Switzerland ...	20.0	20.1	19.6	19.2	18.4	16.9	15.2	15.2	15.2	14.9	− 0.5
Sweden	19.6	20.2	20.3	19.3	17.7	15.6	15.1	15.4	14.9	14.4	− 3.0
Chile	32.1	33.1	32.9	32.9	33.0	32.4	33.2	35.0	33.4	33.4	− 3.0
Portugal	24.7	25.7	25.0	24.9	23.8	23.7	24.3	26.2	26.6	26.7	− 3.9
Mexico	42.5	44.9	44.2	45.5	45.5	43.5	44.3	44.6	43.5	44.1	− 5.3

* Data not available.

NOTE:—In a few countries the rates are not strictly comparable over the decade. For details see the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics of the United Nations.

[Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. *Statistical Bulletin*, XXVIII, No. 9 (September, 1947), 2.]

since the end of the war. The *Statistical Bulletin* attributes the rise in our own national birth rate to war-induced prosperity and the special psychological factors attending the induction and release of men from the armed forces:

> Concurrently with the rapid demobilization of our army and navy soon after V-J Day, the number of births increased rapidly up through 1946, resulting in an all-time record of 3,440,000 babies in that year. This represented a gain of approximately 1,000,000 babies in 1946, as compared with the experience of 1933, the excess being not far from one-half year's crop of new infants in the prewar period.[9]

It is interesting to notice that the young married people who are chiefly responsible for the present record number of babies are themselves the product of another peak in the birth rate that occurred on the heels of World War I, so that the current wave-crest of births is accentuated by an earlier one of the same sort. It is believed that the high birth rates of the postwar period in the Western world are temporary, and that after a time they will fall closer to their prewar level, and perhaps again resume their long-time downward trend.

Death.—Death has always been the most obvious result of war. Among others, Sorokin has shown that the casualties of war have greatly increased in recent times. By broad estimation, he places the casualties of war from the 12th to the 19th century, inclusive, at some 14 millions, those of World War I at 20 millions, and those of World War II at over 50 millions. In Table 34 are shown these casualties for each century in terms of percentages of the number of men under arms.

The vast increase in the casualties of war is attributed to the invention of more and more destructive devices, especially gunpowder, to the increase in the continuity of fighting, and to the larger proportions of the populations engaged. The estimates in Table 34 do not extend to the period of World War II.[10]

Because of the recent invention of the atomic bomb, of the less spectacular but sinister possibilities of bacteriological war-

[9] *Ibid.*, XXVIII, No. 5, pp. 6, 7.

[10] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Society, Culture, and Personality: Their Structure and Dynamics* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947), p. 497.

TABLE 34

SOROKIN'S ESTIMATES OF WAR CASUALTIES FROM THE TWELFTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, WORLD WAR I, INCLUSIVE

Century	Casualties as Percentages of Army Enrolment
XII	2.5
XIII	2.9
XIV	4.6
XV	5.7
XVI	5.9
XVII	15.7
XVIII	14.6
XIX	16.3
XX	38.9

fare, and of the recognized fact that modern war is total war based upon the mobilization of all of the resources of a nation, any future wars may be expected to be more destructive of human life and property than the last war, which was itself the most destructive in human history. Some of the possibilities can be gathered from the following statement by Henry D. Smyth, a prominent physicist and member of the Atomic Energy Commission:

since Hiroshima, we have gradually learned the full significance of the atomic bomb. We know that a few thousand of these bombs could destroy in one night all the cities and industrial centers of this country, with their civilian populations. We know that any country which sets out to make atomic bombs will be able to do so within a few years since the fundamental principles were well known in 1939, and the only so-called secrets are technical tricks of manufacture and final assembly of the bomb. Any industrial nation can learn these tricks for itself and indeed improve upon them. We know that future atomic bombs can be cheaper and more destructive than the ones used to end this war, and that they can almost certainly be sent as rockets or planted secretly ahead of time and detonated without warning. Once an atomic bomb is made it lasts for a long time and can be stored or hidden with slight possibility of detection. We know that plants devoted to peaceful uses of atomic energy could in a short time be converted to bomb plants.

We know that if all the atoms in one pound of Uranium-235 could be made to undergo fission, the explosion resulting from that one pound would be equal to the explosion of sixteen million pounds of TNT. We know that in all probability no adequate military defense can be developed against atomic weapons.[11]

Another new and potentially revolutionary type of warfare is biological or "germ" warfare:

Biological warfare may be defined as the use of bacteria, fungi, viruses, rickettsias, and toxic agents derived from living organisms (as distinguished from synthetic chemicals used as gases or poisons) to produce death or disease in men, animals, or plants. It may be directed against military or naval forces, civilian populations, livestock, or crops. Employed against personnel, it may cause fatalities, or only incapacitate; the duration of illness may be brief or protracted; the causative agents used may be persistent or non-persistent; they may spread readily from infected to healthy persons, or they may be of a type which produces non-contagious disease. . . .

It is important to note that, unlike the development of the atomic bomb and certain other secret weapons during the war, the development of agents for biological warfare is possible in many countries, large and small, without vast expenditures of money or the construction of huge production facilities. It is clear that the development of biological warfare could very well proceed in many countries, perhaps under the guise of legitimate medical or bacteriological research. Many plants designed and ostensibly built for industrial fermentation processes could be used for the mass production of pathogenic microorganisms or their poisonous products. . . .

In whatever deliberations that take place concerning the implementation of a lasting peace in the world, the potentialities of biological warfare cannot safely be ignored.[12]

Summarizing the military point of view regarding the totality of new lethal weapons, Rear Admiral Zacharias has this to say:

What all of these modern weapons (including rocket guns), developed in the various countries, have in common are the following. . . .

[11] Henry D. Smyth, "We Face a New Age," *Changing World*, February, 1946, p. 3.
[12] Department of State: *The International Control of Atomic Energy: Scientific Information Transmitted to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946–October 14, 1946.* Publication 2661, 1946, pp. 65-71.

First, they show but slight similarity to conventional armaments of the past; second, they permit the waging of inter-continental war from long distances, the "push-button" war; third, they are designed to destroy enormous areas with all the life and property existing within them. . . .

The full extent of the revolutionary change that has come about in the concept of warfare is not generally recognized. In the light of these developments, our most cherished conventional armaments—aircraft carriers, long-range bombers, lava-spouting incendiary bombs and automatically-fed heavy guns—represent an era of warfare which will never again return. . . .

Yet we are still in the earliest stages of this revolutionary era. The weapons of this epoch, however formidable they may appear, are still at a primitive stage, capable of far greater development. . . .

There is no defense against absolute war, except to make war itself obsolete. There is much glib talk about sinking our industries below the surface of the earth and moving our factories into caves. It is estimated that it would take twenty-five years and require an expenditure of three hundred billion dollars to move the essential war industries alone below ground. Untold billions more would be needed to disperse our cities and eliminate the concentrations of humanity which are the actual centers of our civilization.

Even then this incredible expenditure would be wasted since such defensive measures would be entirely useless against the other modern weapons at which we have hinted.[13]

Public Health.—The effect of World War II on the public health in belligerent countries was varied. In the United States and England health was better than usual;[14] in France, the war brought a great epidemic of typhoid fever. The chief problem in occupied France, however, was not infectious diseases, but deficiency diseases, due to undernourishment and actual starvation. In a country like Germany, the picture was much worse. Both scarlet fever and typhoid cases practically doubled in the war year 1944. For other diseases the story was similar.[15] In Germany, Poland, and other war-ravaged countries,

[13] Ellis M. Zacharias, "Absolute Weapons More Deadly than the Atom," *United Nations World*, November, 1947, pp. 13-15.

[14] *United Nations World Health Organization*, Interim Commission, December 12 and December 19, 1946.

[15] *War Medicine*, VIII, No. 5 (1945), 283, 287, 288.

TABLE 35

Mortality Data for Selected Countries of Europe, 1943 to 1947, Compared with Prewar Years

Year	Austria	Belgium	Bulgaria	Czechoslovakia	England & Wales	Finland	France	Germany	Hungary	Italy	Netherlands	Roumania
	Death Rate from All Causes per 1,000 Inhabitants											
1937-1939	14.2	13.4	13.6	13.2	12.0	13.6	15.6	11.9	14.1	13.9	8.6	19.0
1943	13.8	13.6	13.0	14.1	13.0	13.4	16.6	12.1	13.5	15.2	10.0	18.1
1944	16.0	15.9	13.7	*	12.7	18.1	19.8	*	15.4	15.9	11.8	19.6
1945	25.6	14.8	14.9	17.6	12.6	13.1	16.6	*	*	13.8	15.3	20.0
1946	13.4	13.6	13.7	13.7	11.5	11.7	13.3	12.4 †	14.7	11.9	8.5	18.0
1947	12.5	13.1	*	11.9	12.0	9.0	13.0	*	12.3	11.4	8.0	*
	Infant Mortality per 1,000 Live Births											
1937-1939	82	82	144	108	54	69	65	61	129	104	36	179
1943	79	75	130	109	49	49	75	*	116	113	40	172
1944	88	83	121	*	45	69	78	*	*	102	46	162
1945	162	100	145	138	46	63	108	*	*	99	80	188
1946	81	75	124	109	43	56	73	105 †	114	84	39	164
1947	76	75	*	*	41	59	66	*	111	82	34	*

* Not available. † British Zone.

Chief Sources: Publications of Statistical Office of the United Nations, the Epidemiological Information Service of the World Health Organization, and the United States Federal Security Agency.

Condensed from a table in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, XXIX, No. 5 (1948), 2.

there was a widespread incidence of tuberculosis and other major infectious diseases. Tables 35 and 36 clearly indicate the effect of World War II on mortality rates.[16]

TABLE 36

CIVILIAN CRUDE DEATH RATES PER 1,000 INHABITANTS, 1937-46*

	Austria	Belgium	France	Italy	United Kingdom	United States
1937	13.3	13.2	15.3	14.2	12.6	11.3
1938	14.0	13.2	15.8	14.1	11.8	10.6
1939	15.3	13.9	15.6	13.4	12.2	10.6
1940	14.8	16.2	19.2	13.6	14.6	10.7
1941	14.0	14.8	17.4	13.8	14.0	10.5
1942	..	14.8	17.1	14.2	12.7	10.4
1943	..	13.6	16.6	15.2	13.4	10.9
1944	..	15.9	19.8	15.9	13.1	10.6
1945	24.8	14.7	16.2	13.8	12.9	10.6
1946	13.4	13.4	13.3	12.0	12.1	10.1

* *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, Statistical Office of the United Nations, October, 1947, pp. 8-10.

Mental Disorders.—Probably the best opportunity to test the effects of drastic war experiences on the mental health of the population was furnished by England in World War II. A pointed summary of the consequences in that country was given by Stokes in 1945:

In respect to those florid mental upsets of psychotic nature which require treatment in a mental hospital, there has been no increase. Admissions to the London observation wards after a period of heavy bombing were not significantly raised in numbers.

Figures on the incidence of neurotic mental upset are more suspect. A careful study has, however, appeared, surveying a large middle-class general practice in London. In this practice in a typical pre-war year 30 per cent of attendances were for nervous symptoms. In the blitz month of 1940 the proportion increased to 41 per cent, although a large number of those predisposed to neurosis or in whom neurosis was aggravated had been evacuated. During six months of higher raids the proportion returned to the usual figure. . . .

[16] See the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's *Statistical Bulletin*, January, 1946, for a discussion of wartime health in the United States.

. . . the amount of neurosis is increased in . . . heavy raids but the increase is not great. Furthermore, those affected are chiefly people who were previously neurotically ill or people whose age or domestic difficulties were against them.[17]

The complexity of the whole problem of mental disturbance is suggested by the following comment growing out of American observations: "Studies of individual cases show that the war enters in to produce variations in life which in some cases strengthen the personality organization and in other cases weaken it. . . . The experience of such battlegrounds as Guadalcanal show how very drastic can be the conditions under which apparently healthy people can survive without breakdown and how some break down under these conditions who have withstood the worst that civilian life has to offer. The study of individual cases shows that worry and adversity cannot be identified in any general terms, but only in relation to the peculiar personality that experiences them. . . ." [18]

It has been authoritatively reported that psychoneurosis constituted at least one-third of the total casualties in the armed forces of the United States.[19]

On the whole, the evidence indicates that the shocks and suffering of the war brought about definite increases in the number of neurotics, but not in the number of psychotics in the civilian population and armed forces of the nations affected. The distinction between a neurosis (or psychoneurosis) and psychosis is that the latter is the more serious and deep-seated.[20]

Population Shifts and Dislocations.—That a major war inevitably causes profound disturbances in the distribution and mobility of the population of the belligerent nations can be strikingly seen in the United States, even though our nation was not subjected to bombing or to occupation by enemy armies.

[17] A. B. Stokes, "War Strains and Mental Health," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, CI, No. 3 (1945), 215 ff.

[18] George S. Stevenson, "Civilian Mental Health in Wartime," *The Proceedings of the Institute of Medicine in Chicago*, XV, No. 10 (1945), 209.

[19] Edwin G. Zabriskie, "Nervous Disorders in the Armed Forces," *op. cit.*, p. 222.

[20] See R. M. Dorcus and G. W. Shaeffer, *Textbook of Abnormal Psychology* (Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Co., 1945), p. 354; L. G. Lowrey, *Psychiatry for Social Workers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 226.

Between 1940 and 1947, the time of preparation for war, war itself, and demobilization, there was an enormous amount of internal migration. During those seven years, the Census Bureau estimates that some 25 million civilians, or about one-fifth of the total population of the country, changed their county of residence, and that another 44 millions moved a lesser distance.[21] In the first three years of the period, thirty states underwent a net loss in population, through the interchange of migrants, of over 3 million, which was far in excess of usual.[22] In the single year following the end of the war, over 6 million people fourteen years old and over changed their county of residence as civilians. Prominent among these were persons twenty to twenty-four years old, veterans, and married persons living apart.[23]

In addition to endless troop movements, significant shifts of population occurred to the localities of war plants and industries. The confusion, overcrowding, and maladjustment that resulted from the sudden piling-up of working people in the great centers of war industry is well illustrated by the Detroit race riot of June 21, 1943, which has been attributed to the jostling of the white and black races under conditions of inadequate housing and recreational facilities, and to irritation and emotional tension.

However violently internal migration in the United States was churned up by the war, the situation was obviously mild in contrast to that in certain European countries like Poland, Germany, Russia, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. "Flights, evacuations, transfers, and forced migrations have been interrelated aspects of a movement affecting every country invaded or dominated by Germany. Numerically, the largest movement has been that of the Soviet population from the occupied to the unoccupied area and such related migrations as the deportation of the Volga Germans to Asiatic Russia. However, the most

[21] Bureau of the Census, "Internal Migration in the United States: April, 1940 to April, 1947." *Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 5, October 31, 1947.

[22] *Ibid.*, "Interstate Migration and Other Population Changes, 1940 to 1943," *Population—Special Reports*, Series P-44, No. 17, August 28, 1944, p. 1.

[23] *Ibid.*, "Employment of Wartime Migrants, March, 1945," *Population*, Series P-S, No. 8, February 13, 1946, p. 1; "Migration in the United States: August, 1945 to August, 1946," No. 24, June 6, 1947, p. 1.

tragic consequences for the individuals concerned and the most difficult problems for the future come from the movements of exiled peoples," especially the Jews.[24]

A very considerable displacement was due to the mobilization of foreign labor by Germany. At least 30 million people were transplanted or removed from their homes from the beginning of the War to the spring of 1943. In Germany, it is estimated that there were 140 dislocated persons per 1,000 of the prewar population, which was a higher ratio than in any other country except Poland. Other countries with high ratios were Czechoslovakia, Belgium, France and the Netherlands.

When it is considered that the above figures refer only to the period between the beginning of the war and the spring of 1943, and do not take into account the vast flights of uncounted Germans from the countries despoiled by Germany and the other unrecorded homeward treks of uprooted peoples everywhere over Europe, some impression of the true size of this war-induced population upheaval can be gained. It should also be realized that similar massive population dislocations occurred in China, Manchuria, and elsewhere in the Asiatic and Pacific areas as a result of the war with Japan.[25]

Destruction of Property.—As a result of the free use of the bombing plane dropping high explosives and incendiary bombs on enemy cities, the loss of material property in modern warfare has mounted to enormous proportions. Great cities like Warsaw and Berlin were almost reduced to rubble, and in many areas of London only ghost walls remained after constant and ruthless raiding. The homes of countless families were destroyed and many structures of high artistic or architectural value were damaged or obliterated. Factories and manufacturing plants were the special targets of bombing missions. Like the Chicago fire, which cleared the way for the building of a greater and modern Chicago, the drastic damage of war may sometimes be followed by new and better planned cities. But, for the most part, the result is a disastrous loss of property

[24] *Population Index*, IX, No. 4 (1943), pp. 233-34. See also pp. 235-36.
[25] See Eugene M. Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population in Europe* (Montreal: International Labour Office, 1943).

which brings about lower levels of living and greater impoverishment of long duration for most of the people of all the nations concerned, victors as well as vanquished.

The outright destruction of property by the machines of war, however, although the most spectacular, is perhaps the least important source of material loss that is brought about by present-day war. There is also an enormously accelerated consumption in war of natural resources, such as the metals and oil, which can never be replaced. The crucial needs of the armies and navies must be met, and quickly, without time or spirit for economy, so that extravagance and waste on a grand scale occur and attract little attention. Indeed, a war is now more an endurance contest in vital materiel than in manpower, and that nation whose physical resources are first burned out is beaten. Military needs are necessarily given priority over civilian needs, and plants which produce one article of peacetime consumption after another are converted to the manufacture of the implements of destruction. Raw materials that ordinarily go into the production of consumption goods are diverted for war purposes, as nitrates from fertilizer to gunpowder. Consumers' goods like food, shoes, gasoline, tires, houses, etc., become so scarce that it is necessary to place them under restrictive rationing. Prices of these scarce items of great demand necessarily rise rapidly, and this is aggravated by full employment of the population in war industry at high wages. Price control then has to be introduced as the companion of rationing.

The result of these critical economic developments is, of course, a steady deterioration in the average level of living of the populations of the belligerent nations. "A workman who earned $7.20 a week before the war [World War I] would have earned $9.60 in 1918, but the goods on his budget which would have cost $7.17 in 1914 had risen to $25.63 in 1918." [26] The people must tighten their belts to any limit required to prosecute the war; and their morale is measured by the amount of their compliance. To pay for the colossal costs of a major war, the tax rate is drastically raised until a larger and larger share of

[26] Willard Waller, *The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation*, p. 28, The Dryden Press, 1938, reprinted by permission of The Dryden Press, Inc.

an individual's income is taken by the government. But this is far from enough; government debts of astronomical magnitude are incurred, so great that they cannot be paid. After World War I, countries like Great Britain and France were obliged to default on their national debt to the United States.

Such a sudden and desperate conversion of the economy from a peacetime to a wartime basis as occurred in World Wars I and II cannot be made without profound dislocations and disturbances in the industrial and business structures of the warring nations, and through them of the entire world. World War I was followed by a period of shortage, inflation, and booming business, which suddenly collapsed into the severe and prolonged depression of the 1930's, when millions of unemployed went on government relief. The first stage of this earlier history is being repeated after the second World War, the English and French economies have already undergone serious crises, and the world is at this writing teetering dangerously in a desperate effort to escape the same fate from the backwash of the economic orgies of the war.

Weakening of the Mores.—The disintegrating influences of war on the mores of a people are described by Waller:

> Ordinarily . . . the mores change slowly, but in wartime they change rapidly. Many of the characteristics of the mentality of the war and postwar periods derive from the impact of war upon the mores.
>
> All of the mores, naturally, change in somewhat different ways in wartime, but it seems accurate enough to say that they are, in general, weakened. If one attempted to describe wartime changes in the mores in a single formula, the formula might perhaps run about as follows: In war the mores in general decay, and are replaced by hedonistic life adjustments on a short-term basis. The mores of patriotism constitute an apparent exception, and there are other moral changes, such as the accentuation of in-group humanitarianism and the improvement in the status of minority groups, which do not fit the formula, but the formula seems to cover a wide range of other cases. . . .
>
> A number of causes cooperate to change the mores during a war. A most important cause of change is that the basic conditions of life are changed; since the mores are always an adaptation to the basic conditions of life, they must be altered correspondingly. Some notable

changes in the basic conditions of life are the following: Millions of families are broken up by conscription, evacuation, or death. Many millions of persons change their occupations; women and children must often work outside the home. The standard of living tumbles. Communities are on the boil. New situations arise which call for new folkways, and, ultimately for new moral codes. Blackouts have already . . . greatly altered the folkways in European capitals. . . .

A further cause of moral change in wartime is the interruption of all settled habits of living. One may argue that the mores owe their very existence to the interweaving of individual habits, and whatever we may say of the origin of the mores, it is certainly true that the strength ot their hold at any given moment is explicable in some such way. Habits formed in the setting furnished by the habits of others, habits which in themselves constitute long-term adjustments, moralities which take the long view of life, storing up the credit and sometimes sacrificing cash—these are truly the enormous flywheel of society, and in times of peace they function to keep life moving in its accustomed manner. When war begins, the habits of some millions of persons are broken; nearly everyone must stop doing what he has been doing and start doing something else. The result is that in thousands of new situations the old habits exert no control over behavior, and many adjustments are made entirely outside the mores.

Closely associated with the above is the emancipation of people from the small primary groups and the communities in which they ordinarily live. Such primary groups as the family, the work group, and the religious groups ordinarily function as the watchdogs of morality, and if any of them is derelict in his duty, there are other agencies of the community ready to step in. Gossips narrowly observe their neighbors' behavior, and the strong voice of Mrs. Grundy keeps people more or less in line. War takes large sections of the population away from their homes and their local communities; it stirs up populations as one stirs soup; people are thrown together who have never seen one another before and will never see one another again; regions, culture groups, religious groups, and classes are all mixed as they are at no other period in life. At the same time, people are unable to satisfy their primal needs in the usual way. Millions of men are pulled out of the family and compelled to live with other men; millions of women are similarly taken out of their customary places; there could be no other result than unconventional behavior.[27]

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 12-14.

Disorganization in a War-Wrecked Area.—People who have never had their own country subjected to the destructive forces of modern warfare and overrun by alien armies of occupation can hardly be expected to realize the extent of the physical and social wreckage that may occur, or how restoration is gradually brought about. Probably one of the most vivid and realistic pictures available of such a situation is the description of what happened in Bavaria in the second World War given by Arthur W. Bromage:

> What happens when war sweeps over an area and public administration is gone with the wind? I have in mind, partly, Bavaria in the spring and summer of 1945. If the area has had a highly centralized system of public administration with authority issuing down from the top, a number of things happen. Let us assume an area with four levels of administration: central; state; administrative district; and local including city and county with subordinate townships within the county. Communications are shattered; postal services, telegraph, and telephones are out; railroads and motor transport are immobilized. Central governmental control is highly dependent on this postal, wire, road, and railroad net. Orders cannot circulate out to the periphery without communication lines, and personnel cannot move back and forth without transport. One cannot do much on a bicycle. Correspondingly, the outlying communities are powerless to report back, to apprise central authorities of local conditions, to request instructions, to obtain any over-all estimate of the disaster. Functioning in the dark, the individual community has to meet and solve whatever it encounters on the spot. It is first aid in public administration.
>
> Beyond the physical disruption, the national ideological conflict causes top administrators in the higher echelons of government to take it on the run, to disappear, to melt away. The top-level political official knows that his day is done and that he must choose his own way out from among a variety of methods: death, flight, or loss of identity. Whatever he does, he is not at his administrative post. Subordinate officjals take their cue from him. Political and administrative disintegration spreads down into the routineers.
>
> Nor is this disintegration confined to any one layer of government. It appears in the state, the administrative district, and to a lesser degree, in the local community. Policemen, firemen, public utility engineers, finance officers, clerical and subordinate personnel may stand fast either out of an overpowering sense of public duty to the community or out

of a lesser involvement in the ideological implications. The higher the administrative headquarters in the chain of public administration, the more chaos and confusion will prevail. Conversely, the lower the level of public administration, the greater retention of administrative structure and personnel there will be.

I have seen an area—the State of Bavaria—including five administrative districts and some 160 cities and counties in which administration was reduced temporarily to what the local governments could do for approximately ten million people—subject, of course, to military control. This is not to say that all evidences of centralized administration were obliterated. Tag ends of the former central system were available. For example, officials and employees of a railway division or of a central financial district for the collection of taxes remained on duty. Such administrative outposts of the central government had to be restored gradually, sometimes under state supervision.

How does the community, urban or rural, react under these circumstances? Assume a city of some 750,000 population. What do we expect to find when the bombings have ceased? The heart of the city is destroyed. There may be buildings or walls of buildings standing here and there, but near the railroad terminals, factory areas, and in downtown sections, rubble is all that is left of once busy lanes of traffic, producing industries, loading docks, tracks, and shopping marts. Trams are not running. The local gas works are either flattened or not operating for lack of coal. Electric current may be nonexistent, sporadic, or fairly stable—it all depends. Water supply may still be available, but breaks in the mains will have necessitated cutting off areas to avoid great wastage. Sewer lines have hundreds of major breaks. Telephones are out, either by act of war or by order. There is no postal service. Street cleaning and garbage service have become unknown luxuries.

No traffic police are around except the military. Few civil police are on duty and they wear civilian clothes with arm bands furnished by the occupying authorities; but they carry no arms. Even while they work, they are being screened by ideological standards which exclude those who were members of the Nazi party or its organizations. The fire department may have equipment still intact, but its personnel must also be examined on political adherences.

The populace, if it still has food reserves, cooks over ranges or open fires, or not at all. There are long queues before the food shops and whatever supplies there are fall under ration tickets and price control. The banks are closed and for once no one is worried about the payment of taxes, except the newly appointed municipal administrators. Public

health and public welfare are crippled by lack of personnel and finance. Education has come to a dead stop. Buildings are destroyed, damaged, or otherwise occupied; children and teachers are dispersed to the country; textbooks have become politically archaic. It takes a long time to reconstruct a school system once it is disordered. There are more problems than those concerned with the ideologies held by teachers and expressed in books. Obstacles as to structures, fuel, and transportation must also be surmounted. . . .

The first reaction on the part of the civilian is apt to be one approaching anarchy. The norms of authority and the usual restraints having disappeared, this is the moment for one to save what he can. This response may take the form of looting for food and valuables, moving in on someone else's premises where they stand vacant, seizing elementary forms of transport such as bicycles or carts. Nothing matters any more. The whole sense of the ordered, integrated community has been lost. This is especially true in areas where centralized authority and control have had long arms down into local life, where everything has been ordered and regimented. Unless one has seen local administration stop and flounder until life is breathed into it again, he cannot realize how pervasive municipal administration is to life and daily being.

Shortly, the old awe of authority is transferred from the washed-out central civilian authorities to the new military units who have a physical embodiment in the local military government headquarters and who, it is soon discovered, mean business about curfew violations, ideological intransigence, and disorder generally.

This is where the resilience of localism manifests itself. The sense of the community is intensified rather than diminished. People straggle back to a bombed-out town, putter around in the ruins, build a hovel close to or on the site of old home-rubble, set up makeshift shops, dig for buried treasures, and look to emergency administrators to bring a gleam of hope and some semblance of order out of local chaos. Wherever a town is suddenly destroyed, people try to rebuild on the ruins. Given half a chance, they will go back and begin all over again.

The people are so dazed at first that they do not even make minor repairs to their own damaged buildings or "scrounge" wood from bombed-out areas. But this phase passes and is succeeded by an urge to individual and group survival. The state of bewilderment disappears and slowly the process of repair in a crazy-quilt manner begins. The struggle for food is primary. Long hours must be spent in queue lines, or resort may be taken to black-market deals. Search for shelter and

warmth are close seconds. Usually enough clothes have been saved to provide some kind of protection for the body. . . .

. . . the military government is in command and mobilizes local action. Under the control of the military, the community must pull itself up by its own bootstraps. . . .

Gradually even after local services are set in motion, it becomes apparent that the community is still not a community. One really does not have a community in modern administration until there are banks, taxes, pay rolls, postal service, telephone, and telegraph. Intercommunication with other cities by post, telephone, railroad, and motor transport must be re-established. Much of this comes slowly. . . .

Generally speaking, the rural county, village, and township come off better in modern war than the congested urban area. . . . The villages and the countryside are more likely to escape. Their administrative problems are less acute. Food supply is closer at hand. Shelter is proportionately less damaged. Less intricate administrative machinery is less susceptible to injury. Security problems are less intense, except where outside elements infiltrate and bands commit depredations. Sanitation is a less complicated problem.

If we cannot assure ourselves positively and permanently that there will be no more war, it follows that American communities will—in this atomic era—lie within the danger zone. One obvious consideration seems to be the decentralization of public administration.

For emergency purposes, a plan for an appropriate number of Federal authority centers is needed, each center to be endowed with a bureaucratic complement to carry on Federal civil functions in a given regional area. Each one of these regional areas will require a single administrator, responsible for carrying on administratively in his area even though completely cut off from all other Federal-authority centers and from Washington . . . in total war the best chance for survival lies in a strong system of local self-help.[28]

QUESTIONS

1. Illustrate what is meant by the social intensification that is caused by war.
2. How far did regimentation go in the United States in World War II? Was it necessary?

[28] Arthur W. Bromage, "Total War and the Preservation of Democracy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXLIX (January, 1947), 66-74.

3. Give additional examples of hysteria in this country as we entered the last war against the Axis powers.
4. What pattern do crime rates usually follow in wartime? Why is this?
5. What happens to the established sex mores under the impact of war? Have you any explanation?
6. Describe the behavior of marriage, birth, and divorce rates in the United States prior to, during, and following World War II. What were some of the factors involved?
7. What occurred in other countries in the matter of these vital statistics?
8. Outline Sorokin's theory of the increasing destructiveness of war. Check the reliability of his estimates by referring to his publications.
9. What are the peculiar advantages and dangers of biological warfare? How far has it been developed?
10. What, if any, defenses are feasible against atomic warfare? Against "germ" warfare?
11. Discuss the effects of the last war on public health in some of the major countries involved.
12. Review the experience in World War II with incidence of neuroses and psychoses.
13. Describe the shifts of population in this country and in Europe due to the late war, and evaluate some of the consequences.
14. How seriously do the demands of modern warfare deplete natural resources? Investigate this topic further in the conservation literature.
15. Discuss the relative extent to which the outcome of a war depends on manpower and on materiel.
16. What is the effect of war on the levels of living in the belligerent countries? Are the victors an exception? Is this inevitable?
17. Consider how far and why war changes the mores. Give examples to support your claims.
18. After reviewing Bromage's description of war-wrecked Bavaria, give a careful analysis of just how social organization disintegrates under such circumstances, and what must be done to restore it.

19. What measures does Bromage recommend to reduce the social disorganization which might result from the intensive bombing of this country if there were another world war?

REFERENCES

CHALKLEY, L. *Technology and Economics of Total War.* Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943.

DUNHAM, H. WARREN. "War and Personality Disorganization," *American Journal of Sociology,* XLVIII, No. 3 (1942), 387-97.

ELLIOTT, MABEL A., and MERRILL, FRANCIS E. *Social Disorganization* (rev. ed.). New York: Harper & Bros., 1941.

FRAZIER, E. FRANKLIN. "Ethnic and Minority Groups in Wartime, with Special Reference to the Negro," *American Journal of Sociology,* XLVIII, No. 3 (1942), 369-77.

GRINKER, ROY R., and SPIEGEL, JOHN P. *Men Under Stress.* Philadelphia: The Blakiston Co., 1945.

HUGHES, EVERETT C. "The Impact of War on American Institutions," *American Journal of Sociology,* XLVIII, No. 3 (1942), 398-403.

KULISCHER, EUGENE M. *The Displacement of Population in Europe.* Montreal: International Labour Office, 1943.

OGBURN, W. F. "Sociology and the Atom," *American Journal of Sociology,* LI, No. 4 (1946), 267-75.

——— (ed.). *American Society in Wartime.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943.

RECKLESS, W. C. "The Impact of War on Crime, Delinquency, and Prostitution," *American Journal of Sociology,* XLVIII, No. 3 (1942), 378-86.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *Social and Cultural Dynamics: Fluctuations of Social Relationships, War, and Revolution.* New York: American Book Co., 1937, Vol. III.

WALLER, WILLARD. *War and the Family.* New York: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1940.

——— (ed.). *War in the Twentieth Century.* New York: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1940.

WRIGHT, QUINCY. *A Study of War.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.

PART VII

SOCIAL CHANGE

CHAPTER 24

SOCIAL CHANGE

The Principle of Inherent Social Change.—The social relationships that exist in every society are continually being formed, modified, broken, and reformed, under the force of varying motives, personnel, and situational factors. For example, new couples, each with individual differences of many kinds, constantly come together to form marriage partnerships, sometimes on the farm, sometimes in the village, sometimes in the city. Many of them are poor, some are wealthy, some are neither rich nor poor. They range over every conceivable combination of circumstances in respect to health and disease, occupation, type of living quarters, presence and absence of relatives and friends. The difference in age between the spouses may be narrow or wide, and the same is true of intelligence and strength of character. These dissimilarities lead to adjustments and patterns of conjugal life which deviate more or less from the common societal mold in every conceivable dimension.

Into most of these companionates children are later introduced, whose number, sex, temperaments, and personalities further differentiate one family from another. Playing upon these natural groupings may be such major influences as the business cycle with spiraling prices and drastic shortages of goods and housing, or unemployment and despair; war with the drafting of young husbands and fathers into the military services; revolutions in industry or agriculture that suddenly rechannel the course of men's lives. The invention of the wheat harvester or the cotton picker may force countless families from their farm homes to wander or find work in factories and other urban industries. It is the play and counterplay of such myriad and complex forces as these that impose a variety of adjustments

upon family and other relationships in any modern society, and that inevitably make for social change.

Probably the most complete theory of social change so far proposed is that of Sorokin. The general and omnipresent process of variability in social relationships described above he calls the "principle of imminent change":

> Change is an inherent property of all functioning systems. . . . Whether the system is scientific or religious, aesthetic or philosophical, whether it is represented by a family, a business firm, an occupational union, or a state, it bears within itself the seeds of incessant change. . . .
>
> . . . An additional reason for the change of a sociocultural system is its milieu, which is made up mainly of a multitude of other changing systems and forces. The total constellation of interacting systems necessarily intensifies the process of change inherent within each member system.[1]

Types of Social Change.—At least three major types of social change can be made out from what has been said. One of these is the differences which appear in the same class of social relationship as we go from one instance to another, e.g., family relationships change somewhat from rural to urban family, from kitchenette to duplex or single dwelling family, or even from one apartment-house family to another. A second form of change refers to the modifications that the same identical social unit undergoes during its existence. Thus a family begins as bride and groom, acquires one, two, or more children, the children grow up, they finally leave the home, and the parents are again alone as an aged couple. A third form of social change is the spectacular sort more often spoken of, occurring in a social institution over time and following a definite trend. Thus, we have the transition from the large, paternalistic farm family of colonial America to the small equalitarian urban family of the present, with all of the behavior and psychological differences familiar to everyone.

All of the preceding kinds of change may be regarded merely as variations or modifications within the same subsystems or systems. A very different kind of change is the replacement

[1] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Society, Culture, and Personality* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), pp. 696-97.

or substitution of one system for another. This may occur in either of two ways. The old system is gradually transformed into the new system, as courtship into marriage. Or the old system is abruptly displaced by the new system, which has an entirely different origin, e.g., the German government by an army of occupation. The first process is the usual one, the second being much less frequent.[2]

The Time-Sequence of Social Change.—Regarding the time order of social change, Sorokin derives several "principles," which are approximately as follows. In any system, such as an institution like a religion or the law, the ideology changes first, and the behavior and material aspects change later. Thus, a revision of the law has to be conceived in the minds of the law-makers before it can be written down and enforced upon the public. The outward parts of a system may resist modification for some time, because of the inertia of custom or vested interests. For instance, the same church buildings, sacred books, and certain religious ceremonies may continue in use long after important changes have been made in a doctrine or belief. If the external structure is too rigid, it may finally explode under the accumulating psychological pressure. "All this," says Sorokin, "means that thought is the most dynamic form of reality . . . it is never static and always contains in itself tensions that . . . produce continual change and new creation."[3]

Everyday recognition of the priority of thought and feeling over action is seen in the amount of effort that reformers expend in the use of argument and propaganda. All such persuasion is for the purpose of changing the opinions or thought-ways of the people whose behavior it is wanted to redirect. Some sense of the importance of first controlling the thought-ways of people in order to control their overt behavior can be gained by noting the number and prominence within our own society of those individuals who make persuasion their sole occupation. There are many professionals who spend all of their time in talking or writing aimed at influencing the thinking of the public, and so

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 655.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 660.

inducing it to this or that kind of action. Ministers, educators, lawyers, journalists, politicians, and advertisers all seek to obtain the behavior they desire by manipulating thought symbols or language.

Something needs to be added to Sorokin's first "principle" of social change, however, to explain why the persuasion mentioned above is necessary. The reason is that the changes in ideology which he stresses are introduced by only a part of the population, and must then be explained and "sold" to the rest, which must react to them. This also accounts for the resistance with which new ideas meet.

Also, it may be pointed out here, people are often exposed, not only to new ideas which are not their own, but also to material objects or institutions with the presence of which they themselves have had nothing to do—as a new machine, the city, the "dust bowl," or state fascism—but to which they must accommodate their thinking and their lives. This evidently introduces another principle, which is the reverse of Sorokin's first principle above, namely, that it is frequently necessary for people to make mental and physical accommodations to changes both in the thought and in the material world about them, for which they themselves are not responsible. This means that in the actual processes of social change, either ideas or material conditions may change first, from the point of view of some of the elements of a society.

The second principle put forward by Sorokin is that in a great system composed of several subsystems, change appears first in one of the small subsystems, and then may or may not spread to the larger subsystems, and finally to the system as a whole. It thus appears that superficial changes are more frequent and rapid than profound changes. This applies to basic ideas and supporting or secondary meanings:

> A change in this or that prayer, ritual, or material vehicle of a religion is more frequent than changes in basic credos and dogmas. Small Christian denominations change, appear, and disappear within every year or decade. The larger religious systems like the Catholic, the Protestant, the Eastern Christianity, Hinduism, Taoism, endure

for centuries changing basically as a whole only rarely, once in a century or in several centuries.)

The third and last of Sorokin's principles having to do with time sequence states that no one type of subsystem always leads or lags in the processes of social change. As an illustration, he refutes the claim of Auguste Comte that the order of development of the sciences was mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology. Many great scientific discoveries were made in remote antiquity, like the kindling of fire, the domestication of animals, and the principles of the lever and the wheel. In all countries and during all centuries there was a variety of orders, and a frequently simultaneous rising and falling of all the physical and social sciences. "Other theories of a uniform time-sequence in the change of subsystems in a cultural system," says Sorokin, "will stand the test of fact and logic no better, and we may dismiss the notion that any such uniformity exists." [4]

The Direction of Social Change.—Some writers have believed that social change always moves in a straight line, as from simple to complex; others have thought that history repeats itself, i.e., the course of change is circular, as from simple to complex to simple; still others have noticed nonidentical rhythms or oscillations. Actually, all of these forms and many others (spiral, branching, etc.) occur, but not alone or permanently, since a given course of events may change from one form to another, or terminate completely.

Sorokin has set up a broad formula for the prediction of social change. It states that if a system is changing in a given direction, all of its subsystems will change in the same direction. As an illustration of large-scale prediction of the trend or sweep of a whole system of culture in accordance with this formula, he cites the case of Vico:

When in the seventeenth century Vico stated that European culture was passing from the phase of heroes to that of men, he correctly diagnosed the direction in which religion and ethics, political and

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 666. See also pp. 659-65.

economic institutions, science and arts, language and mores were changing, the forms toward which they were moving, which traits they were losing and acquiring. Unappreciated during his lifetime, the predictions of Vico have subsequently proven to be valid in major essentials. His predictions constitute one of the best examples of a roughly accurate diagnosis of the direction of the change of most of the systems and subsystems of European culture, much more valid than many narrower and more precise appearing predictions of specialists in economics and politics, in prices and wages.[5]

It should be noticed that Sorokin's prediction formula above may be extended to include correlated subsystems, as well as supersystems. It will often be easier to judge how an institution is likely to change by observing how another related institution, or related culture elements, are changing, than by trying to observe the behavior of the total culture. This is especially true where one institution or type of behavior is rather definitely integrated with another. Thus it might be predicted that if social security laws are passed in a given country, a movement toward socialized medicine is likely to follow.

The Rate of Social Change.—It is usually believed that cultural change in modern Western countries is occurring at a constantly faster rate. This belief is supported by the generally



FIG. 14.—Number of scientific discoveries and inventions, 1400 to 1900, by twenty-year periods. (Adapted from Sorokin, *op. cit.*, p. 609.)

accepted opinion that there have been more discoveries and inventions during the last century than perhaps during all previous centuries.[6] Ogburn compares the modern acceleration in the rate of inventions superficially to the compound interest law, and

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 689. See also pp. 675, 680-81, 688-90.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 694-95.

explains it on the principle that new inventions always grow out of preceding ones.[7]

Somewhat more particular in his choice of mathematical curves, Hornell Hart prefers the S-shaped logistic to describe the growth of culture. He and others have applied this curve, for example, to the accumulation of inventions and discoveries,



FIG. 15.—Real income per head of occupied population, five Euro-American countries. (Adapted from Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 342.)

to the growth of national populations, to the rising real wages index, to the increasing expectation of life, and they have often found that it fitted remarkably well (Figure 15).[8]

No careful student of the subject now accepts the unqualified theory of an ever-rising rate of cultural growth. Ogburn

[7] William F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1927), p. 105.

[8] Hornell Hart, "Logistic Social Trends," *American Journal of Sociology*, L, No. 5 (1945), 337-52.

points out that, on closer inspection, the compound interest law is not an accurate description because actual developments occur by jumps: "There will be a period of stability or of relatively slight change. Then occurs a fundamental invention of great significance which precipitates many changes, modifications and other inventions which follow with relative rapidity for a time. These rapid changes are then followed by another period of relative stability—unless another fundamental discovery be made." [9] He also suggests that the rate of innovation may be retarded by social hostility toward the new, by the incapacity of human nature to assimilate too complex a culture, and by the limitations of natural resources.

It will be noticed also that the logistic curve, unlike the curve of compound interest, does not imply an ever-increasing rate of cultural growth. Rather, it assumes that after a time a decrease in the rate will set in and will continue until finally the growth will come practically to a standstill.[10] Elsewhere, Hart found that when logistic series of social data encountered the great depression of the 1930's, some of them "broke into ripples" or "exploded," while others exhibited successive "logistic surges" of growth. From this he concluded, like Ogburn and others, that "Human culture develops through a series of growth surges," but he further insists that "at a given time [it] tends to be a constant mathematical function (usually logistic . . .) of the condition at the immediately preceding time." [11]

The Principle of Limits.—It is well known to statisticians that a given relationship, say that of a straight line, between any two variables usually holds true only within limits. For example, the birth rate declines as income increases between certain lower and upper levels of income, but below and above those levels it may decline as income declines, rise as income rises, or remain about the same.

A principle of limits should also be recognized in the theory of social change, as Sorokin has pointed out. A system can as-

[9] Ogburn, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-8.

[10] Raymond Pearl, *Introduction to Medical Biometry and Statistics* (2d ed.; Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1930), p. 419.

[11] Hornell Hart, "Depression, War, and Logistic Trends," *American Journal of Sociology*, LII, No. 2 (1946), 112-22.

sume only a limited number of forms, and these are often surprisingly few. It is therefore possible to predict that the system will change only in one or another of a few possible directions. For example, modern governments can drift only toward or away from centralization, and toward totalitarianism or democracy, with their minor variations. If the pattern in a given country is now decentralized and democratic, it need merely be considered to what extent, if any, it appears to be moving in the directions of centralization and totalitarianism. This is still difficult enough, even with the aid of the formulas previously mentioned which call attention to the course of change in the cultural supersystem of which the government is a part, and in correlated institutions like the national economy. But the task is made more possible by the principle of limits.[12]

Sensate and Ideational Cultures.—The idea of predicting social change on a grand scale mentioned above is applied in rather a dramatic way by Sorokin to predict a shift which he believes is going to take place in the values that underlie the whole culture of the Western world. The major premise on which is built the vast structure of western culture, he says, has to do with the ultimate nature of reality, and what is most worth while. Is the supreme integrating value sensory, or supersensory, or partly both? For some cultures the only true reality is what can be perceived by the sense organs, and their ultimate values are therefore sensory. Such cultures Sorokin calls sensate. Other cultures mortify the flesh, and pin their faith to the supersensory and superrational, i.e., to the world of pure spirit and mysticism. These are termed *ideational.* In the second group are mentioned Taoist China, Brahmanistic and Buddhistic India, Christian medieval Europe, the Zuñi or Hopi Indians of America. It is impossible to understand or interpret the institutions, folkways, and mores of any of these peoples without knowing the major premise that underlies their culture. It is Sorokin's opinion that the Western world is now approaching the end of a long era of an intensely sensate culture, which is already "shot through by a multitude of irreconcilable

12 Sorokin, *op. cit.*, pp. 699-701.

clashes of values," and is preparing to enter a period of idealistic civilization:

The contemporary sensate system, in its virile stages, contributed markedly to the values of science and technology, the fine arts, and, in lesser degree, philosophy and ethics. But it is clearly approaching the end of its career, it is rapidly crumbling under our very eyes. In its present decadence phase, characterized by increasing wars and revolutions, by the perversion of science in the interest of ever more lethal weapons of destruction, by progressive sensualism and the like, it has begun to menace the further existence of humanity. If civilization is not to perish, our moribund sensate supersystem must be replaced by a new ideational or idealistic supersystem. Sooner or later such a supersystem will emerge, destined to continue the creative role of the super-organic on this planet.[13]



FIG. 16.—Rise of the sensate wave in Europe. (Adapted from Sorokin, *op. cit.*, p. 601.)

Other writers also think that they see signs of a dawning revival of religion in the United States and Western Europe. Whether this is correct, and if so, whether a fundamental reversal in our system of values is getting under way, as Sorokin anticipates, most sociologists would probably feel that the evidence is not yet sufficient to support any scientific judgment.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 706; see also pp. 319-20, 514-22.

Social Change and Invention.—A great part of social change is undoubtedly brought about by human invention. An invention is usually defined as a new combination of existing elements of knowledge, arrived at after investigation, thought, and experimentation; a discovery is said to be an innovation, hit upon by chance. This distinction may sometimes be useful, but chance also enters into every invention to some extent, so that it is hard to separate discovery from invention, and many chance discoveries have no doubt passed for inventions. The difference is also lessened by the emphasis which modern scholars have placed upon the slow evolution of inventions at the hands of countless unknown contributors over long periods of time. The circumstance that every step in advance grows naturally out of the steps already taken, and that the completion of an invention consists merely in taking the last step in point of time, which may be no more difficult or significant than many of the steps that preceded it, further detracts from the theory of the great inventor, and from the halo that surrounds him in the popular mind. As Ogburn expresses it, "the existing culture is the mother of inventions," and the state of the culture very much overshadows individual genius in importance. Unless the elements that enter into an invention are present in a culture, no amount of genius can supply them. But if the elements are present, the great frequency of duplicate inventions that have been made independently in every part of the world suggests that the achievement of the invention is rather inevitable, and if not made by one inventor will be made by another. Ogburn lists 148 cases of independent multiple inventions, usually appearing at about the same time in the same or related cultures.[14] To mention only one of them, the application of the principle of the steam engine to the steamboat was made independently by Fulton, Jouffroy, Rumsey, Stevens, and Symmington in the first decade of the 19th century.

Since the advance of knowledge and skill depends upon the accumulation of innumerable items of culture, other things being equal, a great society should make more rapid progress than a small one, because the former has many more contributors.

[14] Ogburn, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-102.

Expressing the same truism from a slightly different viewpoint, many social contacts are more productive of new ideas and ways than are a few. Furthermore, however much important discoveries and inventions may depend upon the cultural base from which they come, they are usually made by the exceptional individual, and the probability that the necessary exceptional individuals will appear becomes greater as the population gets larger.

Another advantage of the large society is the opportunity it affords for the development of specialized occupations and social roles, i.e., division of labor, which greatly increases social efficiency. In circumscribed communities few people can be spared from the essential industry of agriculture, and there is a lack of the skills and clientele on which to build an elaborate structure of diversified manufacturing, trade, learned professions, and fine arts.

An example of the influence of population density on cultural achievement appears in Table 37, where the number of notable men and women listed in *Who's Who in America* per million of population in each region of the United States increases directly with the population density of the region.[15] To measure the closeness of association between population density and the proportion of citizens listed in *Who's Who,* the value of the rank correlation coefficient was found to be $\rho = .91$. If there were perfect agreement, ρ would be unity ($\rho = 1.00$), so the amount of correlation in this case is high. It should not be inferred, however, that population density alone is the cause of the ranking of a region in *Who's Who* notables. High population density means urbanization, and the occupations which are most likely to bring distinction in our society are found in cities. Also, the outstanding leaders in trade, commerce, industry, and the professions are drawn to the large cities.

A variety of other specific factors which affect invention have often been pointed out. Among the most important is the direction of interest. Great achievements in music are not likely to occur in a nation where concern is centered upon the

[15] See, for example, Stephen S. Visher, "The Comparative Rank of the American States," *American Journal of Sociology,* XXXVI, No. 5 (1931), 735-57.

development of material wealth and little encouragement is given to the fine arts. A society must be willing to make use of an invention, in order to make it significant. The Western world was not ready to accept the League of Nations after World War I, and the failure of the League prevented any general recognition of it as an important social invention. Resistance to change varies among societies, and from one period to another in the same society. This resistance is less in new societies like the United States, and during crises such as wars

TABLE 37

REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, BY RANK IN POPULATION DENSITY AND IN PROPORTION OF *Who's Who* NOTABLES: 1920-30 *

Region	Rank, Population Density	Rank, *Who's Who* Notables, per mil.
Mid-Atlantic	1	2
New England	2	1
E. N. Central	3	3
Lower South	4	7
Southwest	5	8
W. N. Central	6	4
Upper South	7	6
West †	7	5

† Without California.
* Data in second column from Visher, *op. cit.*, pp. 738-39.

and business depressions. Under the impact of beginning life in a new world, or under the stresses and exigencies of a desperate situation or threatened catastrophe, people are compelled to accept almost anything that promises to save them, whether it is in accord with convention or not.[16] Some of the opposition to social change comes from those persons and classes who fear that their self-interests and security may be injured thereby. A more general resistance on the part of the people arises out of the inertia of habit and the disinclination to substitute something new and untried for the well-worn paths of life. But the poor and discontented classes are often willing to exchange their

[16] Horace M. Kallen, "Innovation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. VIII, pp. 58-61.

present unsatisfactory situation for anything that holds out a promise of betterment.

It was suggested in Chapter 12 that a large proportion of the traits in most cultures, including our own, did not originate within the containing culture itself. Rather, many of the traits were introduced from outside. The conditions which influence the acceptance or rejection of an alien trait are much the same as those which determine the success or failure of an invention or social change that originates within the culture. In brief, some or all of the members of the society must recognize in the new element enough advantages to compensate for the inconveniences and uncertainties involved in its adoption. This recognition may come only gradually, as the new is tried here and there and the results are noted.

Changing vs. Static Societies.—Social relationships are considerably affected by the rate of change in a society. It is often stated that societies which have remained relatively static for a long time are usually societies in which there has been opportunity to work out the most satisfactory adjustments by repeated trial-and-error methods. In such a milieu the social roles of every individual are definite and sharply defined in accordance with age, sex, class, and occupation. There is, for example, no uncertainty about the position of women in the family and in the life of the society, and little deviation occurs from the accepted patterns of female behavior. Confusion and a sense of insecurity are at a minimum, since there is a niche for everyone and unquestioning acceptance of the part each one is assigned to play. A stable society of this kind tends to conform rather closely to the type called *sacred* in Chapter 10.

In contrast to stable societies are those in which rapid change is the order of the day, such as the great metropolitan populations of the United States. Modern urban dwellers have to make quick accommodations to new social situations, which often change again before there has been time to work out the most satisfactory adjustment to them. One may cite the restlessness and indecision among American women, whose long-established role in the rural family is breaking down in the

apartment life of the city, and is being disrupted by the employment of women for wages in factory and office. In our fast-moving culture there is a trend toward secondary relationships, and materialism is stressed more than moral and ethical values. This suggests both the sensate culture of Sorokin and the secular society discussed in Chapter 10. Ogburn and others have raised the crucial question whether a culture may not sometimes expand so rapidly or become so complex that it is impossible for human nature to make a satisfactory adaptation to it. If this were the case in the urban America of today, the stresses and strains of increasing maladjustment apparently should be reflected in rising rates of admissions of patients to mental hospitals. The most careful studies have so far failed to verify this expectation. On the other hand, it may be plausibly argued that, if new cultural elements are adopted because they seem to serve human wants better than previous or competing traits, a changing and complex culture should be more completely adjusted to human wants than a more static or simple culture. This is another question to which sociology does not as yet have a confident answer.

QUESTIONS

1. Explain and illustrate the principle of inherent social change.
2. What three forms of social change may occur within the same system? Can you cite instances of each?
3. Give an example of the displacement of one system by another; of the transformation of an old system into a new one.
4. Discuss Sorokin's claim that ideology always changes before behavior and material culture. Does his claim need any qualification?
5. Can you find any exceptions to the "principle" that change always begins on the periphery, and never at the heart, of a system?
6. Do you agree with Sorokin's refutation of Comte's hierarchical order in the development of the sciences? Can you test his "principle" further?

7. Is Sorokin right in rejecting the idea that social change always moves in a straight line? Illustrate several patterns in which it actually moves.
8. (*a*) What is Sorokin's formula for predicting the direction of social change? (*b*) How can it be made more complete? (*c*) Does he use it correctly in predicting the shift to an ideational type of culture in the Western world? (*d*) How exact are his definitions of terms? (*e*) How does your last answer affect the value of the formula for prediction?
9. To what, if any, mathematical law does the rate of cultural growth conform? Discuss especially the logistic curve.
10. Is there any agreement about the behavior of the rate of cultural change?
11. How does the "principle of limits" apply to social change? Give examples.
12. How sharply can you distinguish between invention and discovery?
13. Just how accurate is the "great man" theory of invention?
14. Consider the relative extent to which social change is due to invention and to other forces, such as change of location and climate, growth of population, etc.
15. Why are population mass and density a factor in cultural progress?
16. How do you explain the outstanding development of art and music in Italy, and of industrial organization and efficiency in the United States?
17. (*a*) Can you give an example of the rejection by a society of a useful invention? (*b*) Why was it rejected?
18. What factors determine whether a society will accept a culture trait which originated outside itself? Illustrate.
19. How convincing is the evidence or argument which you can find to support Ogburn's claim that a culture may develop so rapidly, or may become so complex, that human nature cannot make a satisfactory adjustment to it?

REFERENCES

BARNES, HARRY ELMER. *Society in Transition.* New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939.

CHAPIN, F. STUART. *Cultural Change.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1928.

MACIVER, ROBERT M. *Social Causation.* Boston: Ginn & Co., 1942.

MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW. *The Dynamics of Culture Change: An Inquiry into Race Relations in Africa.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945.

MEAD, MARGARET. *The Changing Culture of an Indian Tribe.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1932.

OGBURN, WILLIAM F. *Social Change.* New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1927.

PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL TRENDS. *Recent Social Trends.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1933.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* 4 vols. New York: American Book Co., 1937-43, (especially Vol. IV).

———. *Society, Culture, and Personality.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, chaps. xlvi and xlvii.

SPENGLER, OSWALD. *The Decline of The West.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1926.

CHAPTER 25

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The Action Crowd.—An action crowd is a group of people which collects to participate in a groping, mass effort at cooperation. The occasion arises out of a maladjustment that affects a number of people. Food shortages in occupied Germany are a case in point. The people involved have a sense of deprivation or injury, plus an urge to do something for relief or revenge. The first outward signs of the crowd situation are unrest and a tendency for people to gather and mill about. Restlessness and tension become so great that they must be released in some kind of purposive action. This mental state in the individual is accentuated by contact with the crowd.

Gustave Le Bon, a French writer of half a century ago, gave a striking description of the psychological influence which a crowd exerts upon its members. According to Le Bon, an individual who finds himself in an action crowd acquires from the press of numbers about him a feeling of invincible power. Because of the absorption of his identity in the throng, he loses all sense of responsibility. His susceptibility to suggestion is so exaggerated that every sentiment and act of the crowd is contagious. The unconscious personality takes over, and the feelings and ideas of the crowd are immediately translated into acts.[1] It is evident that Le Bon draws a picture of extreme mob excitement, whereas identification with a crowd may actually occur in varying degrees, depending upon the individual and the occasion. Nevertheless, he directed attention to the psychology of crowds in a stimulating way.

Among the first things that the so-called action crowd does is to try to define the situation, i.e., to clarify and verbalize the

[1] Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922), pp. 33-36.

issues that caused it to come together. This is accomplished by individual remarks, addresses or harangues, or by gestures and shouts of approval or disapproval. Relationships and roles, chiefly of the leader-follower type, however temporary or spontaneous they may be, rapidly take form among the members of the crowd. When there is finally a consensus as to what the trouble is or where the blame belongs, attention is focused on the question of what should be done. The answer is arrived at by the same crude process as before. Both the definition of the situation and the action that follows are necessarily drawn from the culture or thought-ways of the society to which the crowd belongs. The response to the shooting of a white man by a Negro in many parts of our southern states, for example, has in the past customarily been an attempt to lynch the Negro.

After the crowd has completed its purpose, it scatters and does not assemble again. But, if a crowd cannot finish its business quickly, it may continue to gather for several days or even a longer period. In our illustration above, this may occur when the Negro to be lynched is barricaded in jail for protection by the sheriff, and two or three days are required for the crowd to capture the building.

Dealing with a Mob.—If we define a mob as an action crowd bent on violence or destruction, how to control a mob in the interest of law and order often becomes an important practical problem. The usual reliance of the police is to prevent all sinister gatherings of people at times of a threatened disturbance. A more fundamental policy is for the government to seek to anticipate and eliminate conditions that might readily lead to trouble, such as the inadequate housing, transportation, and recreational facilities for the masses of whites and Negroes who were crowded together in the city of Detroit as workers in the war industries of that area, just before the outbreak of the race riot in June, 1943. Alarmed by that riot, a number of other cities, including Chicago, which had had a similar riot in 1919, took immediate steps to set up interracial committees and other groups to study and recommend measures for maintaining satisfactory relations between the two races.

Once a mob has been allowed to form, however, the time to stop it is obviously before its emotions have been aroused and its course of action decided upon. An effort may be made to have a person of status in the eyes of the crowd, preferably a powerful personality with skill at persuasion, define the situation for the crowd in such a way that the latter will disperse. This is not an easy task, and calls for a knowledge of the habits of thought of the crowd members in order that a successful appeal may be made to other values, or to other interests, and so divert attention from the cause of excitement. Sometimes a discreet "kidding" of the crowd, or the telling of a few apt jokes, has been successful in creating good humor, and so avoiding the danger of violence. A fully aroused and focused mob is, of course, much more formidable. Calling out mob leaders by name will remove the element of anonymity which protects the members of crowds, and may dampen their ardor. Or they may be arrested and removed if the police are strong enough to take them against the resistance of the crowd. Persuasion may still be possible by the proper persons, but the presence of troops is usually necessary to discourage the advanced mob. In the last resort, the use of force itself against the mob may be unavoidable.

The Mass Movement.—The term *mass movement* should be reserved for an epidemic of public or crowd behavior in a society, where the crowds or publics everywhere throughout the society have much the same definition of the situation. The Women's Christian Temperance Union campaign in the days of Carrie Chapman Catt was of this type. A mass movement is the result of widespread concern or dissatisfaction with some condition or problem which causes an outburst in one place to spread rapidly to other localities.

The Crusades of the Middle Ages are a spectacular example of an historical mass movement on a grand scale. They grew out of the religious excitement and superstition of the times, the spirit of errant knighthood and chivalry then at its height, the practice of making holy pilgrimages, the ambition of the Pope to secure his position as head of world Christianity, and

the desire for plunder and quick status made possible by a holy war.

Beginning with the First Crusade in 1096, the movement swept over the whole of western Europe and persisted for more than a hundred years. The people everywhere were aroused by the exhortations of the clergy. In France, white-bearded Peter the Hermit rode a mule from village to village, urging everyone to fulfill the commands of God by marching to the Holy Land. The people began to look for signs and wonders. At the height of the frenzy, crowds are said to have started for Jerusalem led by a mad woman, a goose, and a goat, which were seen as the agents of the Lord. A bishop, Guilbert of Lisieux, noticing one night that the sky was thick with shooting stars, declared that this prefigured the movement of Christians to the heathen lands. The Jews, as the accursed race which had crucified the Christ, were pillaged and massacred without mercy in various places throughout France. The greedy and the calculating took advantage of the opportunity for wanton rapine and profit, as the pilgrims hastily sold what property they had before they set out on the road. The first ill-prepared expeditions left France early in the spring of 1096, and a concourse led by Walter the Penniless was attacked in Bulgaria and scatteed with much loss of life. But nothing could dampen the ardor or stop the amazing movement which the beliefs and conditions peculiar to the times had started.[2]

The Orgiastic Crowd.—It sometimes happens that an emotional tension which grips people has been brought about by causes which seem beyond human remedy. The anguish and suffering caused by the ravages of the plague called the Black Death in the Middle Ages were more than the people could bear, but it seemed pointless to blame anyone and nothing was known that could be done about it. Under these circumstances, there suddenly broke out in city after city wild orgies of dancing crowds in the streets, a form of expressive relief that apparently lightened somewhat the weight of distress:

[2] T. A. Archer and Charles L. Kingsford, *The Crusades: The Story of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1894), pp. 33-37.

The effects of the *Black Death* had not yet subsided, and the graves of millions of its victims were scarcely closed, when a strange delusion arose in Germany, which took possession of the minds of men, and, in spite of the divinity of our nature, hurried away body and soul into the magic circle of hellish superstition. It was a convulsion which in the most extraordinary manner infuriated the human frame, and excited the astonishment of contemporaries for more than two centuries, since which time it has never reappeared. It was called the dance of St. John or St. Vitus, on account of the Bacchantic leaps by which it was characterized, and which gave to those affected, while performing their wild dance, and screaming and foaming with fury, all the appearance of persons possessed. It did not remain confined to particular locations, but was propagated by the sight of the sufferers, like a demoniacal epidemic, over the whole of Germany and the neighboring countries to the Northwest, which were already prepared for its reception by the prevailing opinions of the times.

So early as the year 1374, assemblages of men and women were seen at Aix-la-Chapelle who had come out of Germany, and who, united by one common delusion, exhibited to the public both in the streets and in the churches the following strange spectacle. They formed circles hand in hand, and appearing to have lost all control over their senses, continued dancing regardless of the by-standers, for hours together in wild delirium, until at length they fell to the ground in a state of exhaustion.[8]

The same kind of expressive behavior is common among religious sects. Among the underprivileged classes of many nations, including our own, apparently the hardness and barrenness of life have long led to gatherings of people in their homes, or in the forests or fields, to share in the excitement or conviction of religious experiences of a highly emotional nature, including "talking in tongues," shaking or "quaking," shouting, dancing, fainting, and convulsions. All of these appear in Davenport's description of an early camp meeting of the Cumberland Presbyterians in Kentucky in the year 1801:

. . . a vast host, estimated . . . to be twenty thousand souls, came together at Cane Ridge Camp. . . . The remembrance of that fateful gathering lingers in Kentucky after the lapse of a century. Nothing was lacking to stir to its profoundest depths the imagination and emotion

[8] J. F. C. Hecker, M.D., *The Black Death, and the Dancing Mania* (London: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1888), pp. 106 ff.

of this great throng of men, women, and children. It was at night that the most terrible scenes were witnessed, when the camp fires blazed in a mighty circle around the vast audience of pioneers bowed in devotion. Beyond was the blackness of the primeval forest, above the night wind and the foliage and the stars. As the darkness deepened, the exhortations of the preachers became more fervent and impassioned, their picturesque prophecies of doom more lurid and alarming, the volume of song burst all bonds of guidance and control, and broke again and again from the throats of the people, while over all, at intervals, there rang out the shout of ecstasy, the sob and the groan. When daylight came, the temper of the assembly was somewhat modified, but there was the same tendency to boisterous emotion. Men and women shouted aloud during the sermon, and shook hands all around at the close in what was termed the "singing ecstasy." There are many suggestible bits of testimony to the highly overwrought state of those susceptible people. One of the most careful observers, the Rev. Mr. Lyle, who kept a diary and journal through this whole period, and passed calm judgment in the midst of the wild excitement, to whom we owe the best account of the extravagances and disorders, has described the crowd at Cane Ridge rushing from preacher to preacher if it were whispered that it was "more lively" at some other point, swarming enthusiastically around a "fallen" brother, laughing, leaping, sobbing, shouting, swooning. If the assembly were languid, he says, a few shrieks and one or two instances of falling would quickly arouse them, and as far in every direction as the people could see or hear, others would be caught in the contagion and would likewise fall. Children were allowed to preach, a little girl of seven being propped up on the shoulders of a man, and exhorting the multitude "till she sank exhausted on her bearer's head . . ."

Next to the "falling" exercise the most notable and characteristic Kentucky phenomenon was the "jerks." The unhappy victim shook in every joint. Sometimes the head was thrown from side to side with great rapidity. Again the feet were affected, and the subject would hop like a frog. Often the body would be thrown violently to the ground, where it would continue to bound from one place to another. Peter Cartwright declares that he had seen more than five hundred persons jerking at once in his congregation. . . .[4]

The Public.—Crowd behavior like that of the Crusades and Dancing Mania of the Middle Ages, or the Kentucky camp

[4] From F. M. Davenport, *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, pp. 75-82. Copyright, 1905, by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

meeting in 1801, is not now as widespread in the Western world as it once was, although something of the same sort still occurs among the poor and illiterate classes in the more isolated rural regions and in some of the city slums in the United States and elsewhere, as witness the snake sects of the Appalachian Mountains, and the fantastic "Hindu" cults of Negroes which have been reported in Detroit and other cities. Today the *public* has become a much more important vehicle of collective behavior than the crowd. This change was clearly recognized a quarter of a century ago by Ross, who attributed it to the printing press. The press was no doubt a chief cause, although of course a number of other factors have also contributed, some at a later date, including the telegraph, the long-distance telephone, the radio (and now television), the moving picture, the advance of public education, the growth of science, urbanization, and the decline of supernaturalism. Ross further pointed out the essential differences between the crowd and the public. By a public is meant all of the people who read the same news or editorial in the press, or who hear the same radio broadcast. Physical contact is, of course, absent. In contrast to the rapid communication by gesture and the contagious emotion which make the typical crowd irrational and explosive, the public is reached through the printed word, picture, or oral communication which is reacted to by individuals singly, or by the members of one family, a few friends, or perhaps a few fellow riders on an interurban train. Moreover, as Ross expressed it,

> One is a member of but one crowd at a time, but by reading a number of newspapers, one can belong to several publics with, perhaps, different planes of vibration. So far as these various unanimities cross and neutralize one another, the suction of the public will be weakened. The crowd may be stampeded into folly or crime by accidental leaders. The public can receive suggestions only through the columns of its journal, the editor of which is like the chairman of a mass-meeting, for no one can be heard without his recognition. For all these reasons . . . the psychology of the public, though similar to that of the crowd, is more normal.[5]

[5] E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923), pp. 63-65.

On the other hand, publics may be vastly larger than any crowd, so that a whole nation can now be alerted almost instantaneously by radio or press, whereas in the days of the crowd the tension proceeded more gradually in wavelike fashion from community to community, so that the entire population was never at the peak of excitement at once. That a widespread public also can have its emotions aroused to a high pitch and, under the right conditions, even be stampeded in panic, has been amply demonstrated by skilful radio appeals for contributions to popular causes, and by incidents like the "invasion from Mars" broadcast mentioned in Chapter 21.

Personal and Group Influences in Public Opinion.—The importance of the newspaper, the magazine, the radio, television, and the speaker's rostrum in the formation of public opinion is evident, but the part played by ordinary personal influence and discussion is not so well recognized. As a result of a study of the social factors that affect the way people vote, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet found that people were more inclined to discuss the election with their families and friends than to listen to radio speeches or read newspaper campaign items and political editorials. Most of those interviewed who were late in making up their minds as to how they would vote attributed their final decision to informal personal influences. The investigators believed that this might be explained in part by the circumstance that as an important election approached it was easier for the indifferent citizen, toward whom most of the campaign oratory was apparently directed, to avoid newspaper stories and radio speeches than it was for him to remain untouched by the political talk which more or less inevitably occurred among the people with whom he usually associated. Thus a waitress in a restaurant was cited as having changed her intention to vote because she overheard customers say the candidate would be no good. The family undoubtedly wielded the most influence. Where both husband and wife stated how they intended to vote, only one pair in twenty-two disagreed; eleven times out of twelve parents and children voted alike; and altogether "Fully three fourths of the respondents with vote

intentions in September followed the political lead of their families." [6] Membership in groups other than the family, such as social clubs and professional societies, it appeared, also definitely influenced voting behavior.

The Audience.—The audience is a special type of public which, except in the case of a radio audience, shares with the crowd the characteristic of being a physical gathering of persons in one place (contact-audience). In fact, a crowd may at any time turn into an audience, at least temporarily, and *vice versa.* The members of an audience, strictly speaking, are always attentive to a speaker, performer, or set of performers, and conform to the quiescent role of listeners or observers. If the members of the audience ask questions or express opinions, the audience is for the time converted into a discussion group, which is something different. The audience and discussion group are among the chief agencies employed by social movements in contemporary Western society, the discussion group occurring especially in democratic countries. When issues become very interesting, important, or critical in the public mind, as a result of newspaper, radio, or other publicity, and some kind of action seems desirable or necessary, the contact-audience and discussion group are needed to pass resolutions, set up committees, and take the other steps required to launch an action program. It is by this process that modern social movements, such as civic reform, public medicine, old age pensions, etc., are inaugurated and set going.

From Movement to Institution.—People who are actively engaged in a social movement have to reassemble time after time, so that patterns of relationship begin to take shape among them, and functional roles appear, including those of leaders and followers. The result is an organization or institution, or a series of them. Thus a mass meeting intended to protest political corruption in a city may lead to the organization of a reform party which will continue to participate in municipal elections. The reform party will acquire officers with

[6] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc., 1944), chap. xv.

established duties, a platform, and all the other marks of a social institution.

Some institutions have in the past grown out of action-crowd situations, the Ku Klux Klan of the Reconstruction Period being one example. Other institutions trace back to the gatherings of ecstatic religious crowds, evolving from sect to denomination, as the present-day Methodists or Baptists. Closer to the orgiastic crowd are contemporary sects like the Holy Rollers and the Snake cult before mentioned, which have not yet become established as conventional religious denominations. In somewhat more detail, but still briefly, we may cite a particular reform movement employing simple organized group action which culminated in the Woman's National Christian Temperance Union. Although many temperance organizations, national and international, like the Independent Order of Good Templars, already existed, the women did not take over until the so-called great "crusade" in the decade after the Civil War. This particular aspect of the movement assumed the dramatic form of saloon visiting by bands of devout women. Mrs. Anne Wittenmyer, a participant, described a typical visit in the following way. In a town called Hillsboro, a company of local wives and mothers entered a saloon kept by a man known as "Bob" Ward:

> "Bob" was a social, jolly sort of fellow, and his saloon was a favorite resort, and there were many women in the company that morning whose hearts were aching in consequence of his wrong-doing. Mrs. Thompson presented the appeal, another lady read a selection in the Bible, and then Mrs. Thompson began to talk to him, and she did it with her heart all stirred up by the memory of the wrongs the man had done to many whose weaknesses he had taken advantage of, dragging them down to disgrace and ruin. Ward was evidently touched. He confessed that it was a "bad business," said if he could only "afford to quit it he would," and then tears began to flow from his eyes. Many of the ladies were weeping, and at length, as if by inspiration, Mrs. Thompson kneeled on the floor of the saloon, all kneeling with her, even the saloonist, and prayed, pleading with indescribable pathos and earnestness for the conversion and salvation of this and all saloon-keepers. When the amen was sobbed rather than spoken, Mrs. Washington Dagget's sweet voice began, "There is a foundation," etc., in which

all joined; the effect was most solemn, and when the hymn was finished the ladies went quietly away, and that was the first saloon prayer-meeting. . . .

Timid women, unused to missionary work, went out as flaming heralds of the Cross, carrying the gospel of the Son of God into the saloons, and down into the slums of vice. And these ministrations were attended with wonderful power and success. Whole towns were cleared of the liquor traffic in a few days; hundreds of men who had been in the trade for years, closed their saloons, and renounced their business forever; thousands signed the pledge.[7]

In order to hold and extend the gains made by the thousands of crusading women calling themselves Daughters of Temperance, the work was organized and put on a permanent basis by the formation of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1874, and by the establishment of branch unions in cities and large towns, and even in many villages, throughout the entire nation. The organization later spread to Canada, Great Britain, India, Africa, and other countries,[8] and in 1883, under the influence of Frances E. Willard, there appeared the World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union. The WCTU is still active and well known in the United States and elsewhere as a persistent pressure group in favor of local and national temperance legislation. In typical institutional fashion, it has never returned to the evangelistic and strong-arm methods of the impassioned popular movement from which it came.

Fashion.—Fashion has been defined as the "custom of changing custom" in various parts of culture, such as dress, architecture, the fine arts, medicine, automobiles. The frequent and rapid shifts of fashion that are familiar in modern Western society are unknown in many other cultures, primitive and advanced, and did not become characteristic of Western society until the Renaissance. There is in fashion enough continuity, authority, and discretion usually to distinguish it from the more

[7] Mrs. Anne Wittenmyer, *History of the Women's Temperance Crusade* (Boston: A. H. Earle, 1882), pp. 40-41.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 795-97.

effervescent *fad* (e.g., the sudden popularity of the ball-bearing fountain pen), and the more bizarre *rage, mania,* or *craze,* which implies almost complete preoccupation for a time with a new activity (like miniature golf, or the Florida land boom of the 1920's). But the differences between fashion, fad, craze, etc., are a matter of degree, and are not always clear.

Some study has been given to the sociology of fashions in dress. The chief conclusions seem to be that the wearing of clothing probably did not in the beginning originate from any purpose of modesty, but from a desire for self-display, looking to class status or personal distinction, or to attracting the attention of the opposite sex. No doubt, clothing was also often adopted by primitive people for protection against cold or against the practice of the "evil eye" and other forms of magical injury. The present shifts in clothing fashions are usually explained broadly in terms of a wish for new experience, and more specifically a striving for prestige and attention, especially on the part of upper-class women who have almost no other socially approved avenues to distinction. According to this theory, in a society where each class strives toward the class just above, and where cheap production and rapid communication and transportation are present, the women of the middle and even lower classes are able soon to adopt the new styles affected by their wealthier sisters. Although they pay less for their clothes, the latter are enough like the more expensive models to be recognized as the same. As soon, then, as the ladies of fashion observe that the style they have affected has been taken up by women in the social classes below them, the prestige value of that style becomes negative, and they look for some fresh innovation which will distinguish them from the crowd.

A questionnaire study of 1,452 high school, normal school, and university students in 1923-28, by Hurlock, however, did not support some of the above inferences. Miss Hurlock found that the students did not seek to make dress a symbol of financial status, or to imitate persons of higher class. On the contrary, most of them chose their clothing with the desire to make themselves inconspicuous. She admits, however, that her study

shows only "the reactions of the more serious types of men and women toward the clothes problem." [9]

It is a common opinion that fashions are dictated by leading designers formerly centered in Paris, now in Hollywood. This is qualified by practically all competent students of the subject. They find that even the highest placed designers of women's garments are limited in what they may devise by the underlying psychology of the public at the time. Experience has taught businessmen the danger of promoting anything which is opposed to the direction in which the tide of fashion happens to be moving at the moment. A new style must evolve out of the present style, and cannot deviate too far either from it or from the prevailing sense of propriety and convention. There is, accordingly, a sort of continuum in styles, a variation around certain trends, dictated by the situation of the moment:

> Under the apparently placid surface there are always powerful psychological drifts of which fashion is quick to catch the direction. In a democratic society, for instance, if there is an unacknowledged drift toward class distinctions fashion will discover endless ways of giving it visible form. Criticism can always be met by the insincere defense that fashion is merely fashion and need not be taken seriously. If in a puritanic society there is a growing impatience with the outward forms of modesty, fashion finds it easy to minister to the demands of sex curiosity, while the old mores can be trusted to defend fashion with an affectation of unawareness of what fashion is driving at. . . . However, fashion never permanently outruns discretion.[10]

The new fashion, according to an American investigator, is not set by some outstanding woman of society, but by a number and variety of rich, well-dressed women in different places. If one wishes to foretell the styles, he must early observe what is being worn by such women who have leisure, courage, intelligence, artistic sense, good taste, and a desire to compete with others of their class for distinction in dress. Wherever such women are to be found—at the seashore, in New York, in Paris,

[9] Elizabeth B. Hurlock, "Motivation in Fashion," *Archives of Psychology*, No. 111 (New York: 1929).

[10] From Edward Sapir, "Fashion," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. VI, pp. 139-44. Copyright, 1931, by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

in London—there is a center from which new fashions may radiate. Each may contribute something, e.g., London fabrics or silhouette, New York length of skirt, Buenos Aires color combinations, and Paris the finishing touches of chic. Incidentally, the preferences of men are said never to dominate the fashions of women's dress.[11]

Evolution vs. Revolution.—All social movements, other than the merely orgiastic, are directed at some kind of social change, improvement, or reform. The motivation which drives them is derived from the irritation or distress caused by unsatisfactory or injurious conditions of life, and from the attractiveness of the relief and pleasure which are anticipated if certain changes can be brought about.

We have seen that a great mass of alterations and betterments take place in the habits and culture of a people without the aid of any conscious social movement, through myriads of small individual readjustments, discoveries, and social inventions, and through occasional major social inventions. It is when these ordinary social processes prove inadequate because of new ideas and wishes introduced from outside or arising within the society that unrest is generated. Such unrest may develop far enough to result in purposive collective behavior.

A social movement is particularly likely to occur when the fault is thought to lie in one or another aspect of social organization—economic, political, or social (e.g., class or caste privilege, religious abuses). It is less likely when the complaint has to do with conditions popularly attributed to fate or supernatural sources. In other words, a social movement is usually directed by one part of a society against another part, and reflects a conflict of group interests. If the methods include force and violence, the movement may be a revolution in the military sense. The word revolution, however, is used here with the broader meaning of a sudden and extreme social movement, whether or not physical violence is employed. The wholesale confiscation of the estates of the landed gentry of a nation is a

[11] Paul H. Nystrom, *Economics of Fashion* (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1928), pp. 32-35, 71-72, 82.

case in point, even though only legislative methods are used and no blood is shed.

The American Civil War, for example, freed overnight hundreds of thousands of slave laborers on the plantations of the southern states. This precipitated a major economic collapse in that area from which the South still has not fully recovered after more than three-quarters of a century. If slavery could have been abolished gradually, and the slave owners compensated for their loss, the disastrous consequences might have been avoided.

Any abrupt or violent social movement creates many dislocations in the structure and working of a society, and causes confusion and maladjustments of various kinds. This is the price paid for any benefits such a movement may bring; the gains and losses must be weighed against one another. There is usually a further account to be balanced, too. This is the gain of one group against the loss of another—sometimes victors versus vanquished, sometimes owners versus labor. From the point of view of society as a whole, these losses and gains may cancel each other, and yield no net improvement. The other possibilities are, of course, that the total gain will be greater than the loss, or that the total loss will be greater than the gain, in the judgment of history. Change by social invention represents substitution of the new for the old by a process of comparison and test, which is some guarantee against serious mistake. The struggle for advantage and the emotional stress of a revolutionary social movement, on the contrary, do not lend themselves to such safeguards.

QUESTIONS

1. Define an action crowd, and describe the behavior of one which you have observed. What conditions were responsible for it?
2. What are the psychological characteristics of a crowd, according to Le Bon? Do they agree with your experience in Question 1?
3. How does a crowd define the situation? What determines its definition? Can you illustrate?

4. What is the usual period of life of the action crowd? Why is this?
5. What may be done to avoid or control mob violence? Cite actual cases where mobs have been successfully or unsuccessfully dealt with.
6. What is a mass movement? Study the history of one such movement in the literature, and report on it.
7. How does the orgiastic crowd differ in purpose and behavior from the action crowd? Describe an orgiastic crowd that you have seen.
8. Do you agree with Ross that this is the era of publics, rather than of crowds? If so, do you think the change is an improvement? Why?
9. Contrast the psychology of the public with that of the crowd, and give reasons for the differences.
10. Discuss the finding of Lazarsfeld et al., that people who are uncertain how to vote are more influenced by family and friends than by campaign speeches and literature.
11. In what ways does an audience resemble and differ from an action crowd? Is a discussion group an audience?
12. Give examples of both action and expressive crowds which have developed into organizations or institutions.
13. What are the steps in the process of institutionalization in such cases?
14. Under what conditions may a social movement become institutionalized, and under what conditions may it fail to do so?
15. Distinguish between fashion, fad, and craze or mania, and give current examples of each.
16. Try to formulate a consistent sociological theory of contemporary fashions in women's dress, using the brief summary in this chapter and further references.
17. State the case of evolution versus revolution as alternate processes for social improvement. Can you support your argument with actual examples?

REFERENCES

ALBIG, WILLIAM. *Public Opinion.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939.

BARR, ESTELLE DEY. "A Psychological Analysis of Fashion Motivation," *Archives of Psychology,* No. 171. 1934.

BRINTON, C. *The Anatomy of Revolution.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1938.

CANTRIL, HADLEY. *The Psychology of Social Movements.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1941.

DEWEY, JOHN. *The Public and Its Problems.* New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1927.

EDWARDS, L. P. *The Natural History of Revolution.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927.

ELLIOT, H. H. *The Process of Group Thinking.* New York: Association Press, 1928.

FLÜGEL, J. C. *The Psychology of Clothes.* London: International Psychoanalytical Library, 1930.

HEWITT, H. *The Jehovah's Witnesses.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.

HOLLINGWORTH, H. L. *Psychology of the Audience.* New York: American Book Co., 1935.

HUGHES, HELEN MACGILL. *News and the Human Interest Story.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940.

HURLOCK, ELIZABETH B. *The Psychology of Dress: An Analysis of Fashion and Its Motive.* New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1929.

LAIDLER, H. W. *Socio-Economic Movements.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1944.

LA PIERE, RICHARD T. *Collective Behavior.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1938, chaps x-xiii.

LIPPMANN, WALTER. *The Phantom Public.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1925.

MCCONNELL, D. W. "Temperance Movements," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. XIV, pp. 567-70. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934.

MERTON, ROBERT K. *Mass Persuasion: The Social Psychology of a War Bond Drive.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1946.

ORLANSKY, H. *The Harlem Riot: A Study in Mass Frustration.* New York: Social Analysis, 1943.

RAPER, ARTHUR F. *The Tragedy of Lynching.* Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1933.

SWEET, W. W. *Revivalism in America: Its Origin, Growth, and Decline.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944.

CHAPTER 26

LEADERSHIP

Leader Defined.—A leader may be defined as one who shows the way which others follow. According to this definition, a person more prominent or successful than his fellows is not necessarily a leader; the test is whether or not he is imitated, followed, or obeyed. In the usual relationship between a physician and his patient, the physician is a leader because he tells the patient what to do and the patient does it. The same is true of the teacher and pupil, the latter copying or obeying the former. The concept of leadership therefore applies in any situation of commanding and obeying, of setting a model that is imitated, of making a suggestion that is accepted, of going first and being followed. A person who merely overpowers another, or compels him physically, but fails to motivate him psychologically, through fear or desire, to act in accordance with his will, cannot be called a leader in the present sense.

The definition of leadership just given means that practically everyone is from time to time both leader and follower. It also implies that leadership is a matter of degree. Most people who participate in normal social interaction with their fellows constantly shift back and forth between leader and follower reactions, but they gain on that account no recognition as leaders. It is only when an individual customarily plays the rather obvious part of a leader in some social relationship, e.g., as an army captain, or when he attracts attention in a leadership role in some situation of particular importance, that he is recognized as a leader.

Specialized and Generalized Leaders.—The great majority of leaders are such only in some specialized relationship. Examples are a minister and his congregation, or a foreman in his

shop. Men in some occupations are more narrowly restricted in their leadership than others, depending upon their contacts with the public and the prestige of their calling. A pharmacist is less likely than a minister to become a general leader. The lawyer, because of his connection with the law, is easily drawn into politics and public affairs, and is apparently more likely than any other professional man to be accepted as a popular leader.

In critical matters, such as illness or war, people ordinarily select their leaders rather carefully with an eye to their competence, and prefer a physician or a military man, rather than a movie actor. It is a familiar fact, however, that very conspicuous and prominent leaders in special fields tend to be thought of as leaders-at-large, and are called into, or assume, leadership roles in a variety of situations which are sometimes rather incongruous. We often have the opinions of movie stars quoted in the newspapers and magazines regarding politics, business, religion, and social philosophy, about which they are not well informed. Some persons are leaders in more situations than others, as appears if something like an inventory is made of the number and kinds of relationships in which a sample of individuals act in a leadership capacity. The more or less generalized dominant or leader type of personality, on the one hand, and the submissive or follower type, on the other, are well known to social psychologists, particularly in the case of children, and have been the subjects of numerous studies.

The Technician and the Executive.—In modern Western society, the major policies of business, educational, and other institutions tend to be controlled by a top executive officer, as a president, subject to a board of directors, with the aid of various assistant executives, e.g., vice presidents, managers, supervisors, deans, department heads, and often technical committees. The characteristic functions of an institution, however, such as research, teaching, selling, designing, building, writing, are performed by technicians: professors, engineers, lawyers, physicians, journalists, artists, and craftsmen, whose training or experience gives them the special skills required.

Sometimes the executive was formerly a technician, sometimes not. In many cases, the chief has none of the training or the skills of the technical men who work under him. Thus, General Dwight Eisenhower, a military commander, was appointed president of Columbia University, although he did not claim to be a scholar or an expert in the field of higher education. The reasons for this situation, in so far as they are valid, grow out of the differences between the roles of the executive and the technician.

The executive is responsible for the competence of his staff of experts and other workers, for their morale, for their proper compensation, for securing the funds necessary for maintaining the institution, for the profits of the business if it is money-making in nature, and for the satisfactory functioning of the institution in the opinion of the public it serves. These duties of the executive are obviously quite different from those performed by the technician, who is not so much concerned with the functioning of the total institution with which he is connected as he is with rendering certain services requiring special knowledge or skills.

If the technician fails in his role, the purpose for which the institution exists is thwarted; it is in the quality of the services he renders that the contribution of the institution must be measured. For example, in an engraving firm, it is the artistry of the engravers that is the real issue; in a university, it is the competence of the instructors and the value of the research done by the faculty members which decide the standing of the school. Thus the main function of the executive is to obtain the services of competent technicians and to provide both a psychological and a physical situation in which they can do effective work. Theoretically, therefore, the executive should relieve the technician of all administrative bother, and enable him to concentrate his energies on the application of his special skill to the appropriate type of service or production.

The executive, as well as the technician, may be thought of as a person of specialized skills. As a rule, however, these skills are not acquired by professional training in a college or university as are technical or professional skills, but by experience.

They are also usually skills which depend more on qualities of personality, or ability to deal with people, than do the skills of many technicians, who are more likely to be concerned with inert matter or physical conditions. But this is not always true, as witness the work of the psychiatrist or the teacher. Moreover, the knowledge of the executive is usually broader than that of a technician, and at the same time less systematic and thorough, since it is not based on any body of established scientific or technical knowledge. For this reason, the executive commonly seems to be more of a personality, and to operate on the basis of practicality or common sense, rather than on the scientific or trained professional level, of the more mechanistic or learned technician. In many cases the executive and the technical roles are combined in varying degrees in the same individual. This is true, for example, of the practicing physician who heads a large clinic, or of a scientist or scholar who is both chancellor and professor in a small college.

Since both executive and technical services are indispensable for the operation of any institution, one is, per se, no more important than the other. The higher pay and status that generally go with executive positions seem to be due to the circumstance that there is only one chief executive in an organization, whereas there may be many technicians. They may also stem from the fact that the executive can "hire and fire" the technicians, and, finally, to the fact that the executive represents the institution before the public. It has never been shown that first-rate executive ability is rarer than first-rate technical ability, or vice versa. Sometimes, the post of chief executive involves more of the element of personal risk than that of skilled technician, as note the insecurity of college presidents compared with the security of professors. The strain of office and responsibility are then apt to be greater for the executive. These elements may contribute further to the higher pay received by executives.

The Charismatic Leader.—Apart from the mere habit of dominating, there is a quality sometimes referred to as "charisma" which characterizes some leaders. Charisma, meaning "the gift of grace," seems to be due chiefly to a popular belief

in the more or less superhuman powers of the leader. Among primitive peoples it explains the prestige enjoyed by the medicine man or shaman. Everywhere, the leader with charisma arouses in his followers a feeling of amazement, awe, reverence, or worship. He does this largely by virtue of accomplishing, appearing to accomplish, or promising to accomplish, the impossible, or feats far above the capacity of ordinary mortals. The great religious and military leaders of history (Christ, Napoleon) offer the most obvious and impressive examples of charisma. They seemed to achieve baffling success, or literally to work miracles. Time adds vastly to their stature through inevitable myth-building, so that in many cases the charisma may be more a consequence of the myths than of the actual accomplishments of the hero or god. Charisma can even creep into science, and shroud its colossal figures like Galileo, Copernicus, Newton, Einstein, in the black robes of magic. As Max Weber and others have pointed out, the ruin of the charismatic leader is failure. He must be constantly ready, when doubted by his followers or his enemies, to satisfy them with a fresh miracle, another victory, or a new discovery.[1]

While extraordinary achievement or reputation is undoubtedly the main explanation of charisma, it is clearly not all that may be involved. Certain traits, such as personal magnetism and charm, which are often acknowledged but still very little understood by social psychology, also contribute to the quality of charisma. Physical appearance and bearing are not without effect. Great orational skill is also often a powerful ingredient in the charismatic leader. A good example was Adolf Hitler, whose dramatic public appearances and fanatical harangues made him the idol of the German masses long before he had won any diplomatic or military victories for the Reich.

Finally, it must be noticed that even such a quality as charisma is not confined to a few world or legendary figures. It can be recognized in various degrees in lesser leaders—statesmen, politicians, ministers, teachers, prize fighters, and others whose

[1] *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans., ed., and with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 52, 245-47.

extraordinary personal qualities and success arouse unusual enthusiasm in their followers.

The Relation of Leader to Follower.—Omitting the case of the dictator for the moment, people ordinarily follow a leader because they think it is to their advantage, or because it is emotionally satisfying, to do so. This means that the follower selects his leader, and uses him for his own ends. The leader is then in a sense the servant of his followers, and remains their leader only so long as he is satisfactory to them. Thus, in the section above, we saw that the charismatic leader had constantly to "prove" himself to his followers.

The leader shows the way which people want to take but cannot find or hold without his aid. The leader is, accordingly, whether he be great or small, recognized or unrecognized, of genuine utility, and socially indispensable. As such, he is worthy of his hire, and is either accorded some sort of recompense which he considers enough to repay him for his efforts and risks, or he will decline to continue to function. His compensation may be material or immaterial, or both. Leaders as a category are probably content with smaller material wages relative to the importance of their services than anyone else, because of the psychological satisfaction they derive from the prestige and status which successful leadership brings them.

Whether a particular person becomes a leader depends not only upon his own qualities and abilities, but also upon the customs, needs, and wishes of his fellows. Napoleon would not have been a military leader if he had been born and had spent his life in a Quaker society, which abhors war. It is a commonplace that many a great potential leader has lived and died unknown because his lot happened to be cast at a time or in a place where there was no demand for his particular kind of genius, and no opportunity for him to develop his special ability. This is why it is often said that the leader is a product of history, and why one century and country have produced a series of great leaders in one area, such as the fine arts, while another country and century have produced leaders in a very different area, such as military conquest.

The case of the dictatorial leader, however, is somewhat different. The essential difference is that the dictator chooses his followers, decides what he wants them to do, and tries to create alternatives and sanctions for them so that they will elect to do what he wishes. It will be noticed that in his situation the initiative is just reversed from that of the nondictatorial leader, where the followers select and decide, at least within the limits of choice created by the supply, inclinations, and skills of their potential leaders. The parallel holds even to the point that in dealing with the nondictatorial leader the followers may, and often do, undertake to coerce the leader by confronting him with socially dictated alternatives in the same way as the dictatorial leader does his followers.

At bottom, the answer to the question of the leader as dictator or as servant hangs upon whether the followers or the leader have more power, or upon whether the will of the followers or the will of the leader is considered to be the more important. In a democratic society, of course, the matter has been decided in favor of the people or followers. The President of the United States, for example, clearly falls into the category of the nondictatorial leader.

Actually, however, there is no mutually exclusive or pure dichotomy such as we have pictured in the dictator and the servant type of leader. The President of the United States may sometimes attempt to coerce Congress, and through them the people, to do his bidding, just as a dictator would, to the limit of his power to control political rewards and punishments. Or a Hitler may here and there find it necessary to adjust his own will to that of his generals or his people. More important still, it often becomes necessary for the nondictator type of leader to play the role of dictator in dealing with some parts of the population he is supposed to represent, in the interests of the population as a whole. In fact, in every democracy this coercive function of the delegated governmental leader or official is formally provided for in the law and law-enforcement agencies of the government. Sanctions are constantly found necessary and are applied to individuals and groups who will not obey the will or law of the majority in the particular society. The crucial

distinction between this situation and that of the true dictator, however, is that in the former the leader is not forcing his own will upon his followers, but is acting merely as an instrument to enforce the will of the majority upon the rest.

The difference between dictator and nondictator becomes more tenuous when the political leader compels obedience as the agent of a party in power which does not represent a majority of the people. There are few or no political dictators who act entirely as individuals; practically all of them represent some interest group, however small it may be, and derive much of their authority and power from it. Thus in practice, both in public and private life, the dictator is likely to be the servant of, or at least allied with, some group, and as such, he forces his and its will upon members of the state, family, or business firm. This was clearly true in the case of Hitler, Napoleon, and probably every other tyrant of history, as well as innumerable petty tyrants of everyday life—for there are many tyrants in small as well as in large affairs. Even in an avowed democracy, it is sometimes not easy to decide whether a government official is always intent upon carrying out the will of the majority, or whether he is seeking to impose on the people the will of a special interest or lobby group with which he is allied. Yet in extreme cases of the dictator and servant types of leadership, the main source and direction of control are clear enough.

Competition for Leadership.—In boys' gangs, according to Whyte, "The leadership is changed not through an uprising of the bottom men but by a shift in the relations between men at the top. . . . When a gang breaks into two parts, the explanation is to be found in a conflict between the leader and one of his former lieutenants." [2]

This is in agreement with expectation. Effective competition for the position of leader in any group will naturally occur among those considered best equipped, which will be those who have shown the most leadership ability and are usually closest in rank to the current leader himself.

[2] William Foote Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), p. 261.

The Responsibilities of Leadership.—A member of the Senate of the United States, in acting for his constituents, has three courses from which to choose: (1) he may simply try to do what the majority of his constituents, or of the people of the nation, want; (2) he may carry out the will of a small group or party; or (3) he may follow his own judgment, if there is a difference of opinion between himself and his constituents or party. In cases (1) and (2) he qualifies as a leader if he shows the way in defining or accomplishing what the people or group wish—which, after all, is the usual function of the servant-leader. But he is not a leader at all, in our sense, if he does only what others dictate in a routine fashion. In case (3), his leadership depends, of course, upon whether or not his decisions are accepted. Among still other possibilities, a congressman may be a parliamentary or strategic leader of a special interest group or party, but not of the people at large.

Although an honestly elected representative of the people in the government, of the stockholders in a business corporation, etc., is a servant-leader by mandate, it is nevertheless sometimes possible for him to coerce the masses through the passage of special-interest legislation, and so become in some degree a dictatorial leader who forces others to conform to his will through the pressure of legal sanctions.

Another special case of interest is the propagandist. He undertakes to persuade people to do what he wants by means of misinformation or emotional appeals which prevent a careful weighing of the pros and cons. Since he is leading the people not in accordance with their wishes, but in accordance with his own purposes, he cannot be called a servant-leader, and is more properly classified with the dictatorial-leader.

The Qualities of a Leader.—In any group, the leader who is voluntarily followed is the individual who is thought to be the ablest and most trustworthy person present with reference to the kind of activity in which the need for leadership is felt. That reliability is one of the chief qualities demanded of a leader is brought out in many studies. For instance, Whyte, in his *Street Corner Society,* says,

Not all the corner boys live up to their obligations equally well, and this factor partly accounts for the differentiation in status among them. The man with a low status may violate his obligation without much change in his position. His fellows know that he has failed to discharge certain obligations in the past, and his position reflects his past performances. On the other hand, the leader is depended upon by all the members to meet his personal obligations. He cannot fail to do so without causing confusion and endangering his position.[3]

This also seems necessary from the definition of a voluntary leader. The greater the number of people who follow a leader and the more vital the stakes involved, the greater will be the disaster if he proves undependable. Consequently, unreliability cannot be tolerated in the leader in a critical situation, and will quickly cause his removal. In contrast, it is much less important whether or not a person who has no following falls short in dependability, because only he himself is concerned. This is illustrated by the captain and the private in a company engaged in battle. The death of many men may result from a lack of courage or constancy on the part of the officer, whereas an individual soldier may fail in his duty with far less serious consequences. For these reasons, leaders are usually chosen for trustworthiness with much more care than are their followers. It is therefore to be expected that, on the average, they will be more reliable than their followers.

Other personal characteristics which have been found to be highly correlated with leadership are intelligence, appearance, fairness, originality, liveliness, and voice. It has also been observed that leaders are more original and creative than the run of their followers. They must be inventors in one way or another in order to carry out their functions of trail-blazing for their fellows, even though they cannot go too far beyond them without losing their influence. Moreover, their inventions and devices must be successful in the eyes of others or they will not be accepted.

Parten has reported that among pre-school children leaders have somewhat higher intelligence than nonleaders.[4] Yet, as

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 257.

[4] B. M. Parten, "Leadership Among Pre-School Children," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXVII (1938), 430-40.

would be expected from the principles of leadership that have been developed above, "children who are *too superior* in . . . abilities are not accepted as leaders. For instance, children with intelligence quotients of 160 are more likely to be leaders in a group of children with intelligence quotients in the neighborhood of 130 to 140 than in a group of children with average intelligence." [5] Although practically all other studies have indicated that leaders score higher on intelligence tests than do their followers, the amount of relationship between leadership and intelligence may be expected to vary somewhat according to the situation. Thus, in his discussion of the allied subject of genius, Gardner Murphy sets up the hypothesis that genius depends on three major factors, namely, sensitiveness, intelligence, and motor ability—the first two being interdependent, but not the third—and cites as evidence Cox's studies of the childhood abilities of men and women who later attained outstanding distinction. Cox found that intellectual precocity of children in school was most closely associated with later achievement in mathematics, philosophy, and science, less closely with adult distinction in fine arts and music, and scarcely at all with military leadership.[6] However, a possible inference from this reference that military officers do not on the average have superior intelligence to privates is not supported by the thousands of intelligence tests administered to the Army in World War I, which showed very considerably higher mean scores for officers than for privates.

Parten further points out that leadership among children implies a greater intensity of social participation, the leader being a child who is more active than the other children in many different situations, even including those in which he was a follower rather than a leader. Leaders, even of the "servant" type, are commonly thought of as dominating, or at least as self-confident, personalities, in the situation where their leadership is exercised. Many studies of leadership have corroborated this opinion.

[5] Gardner Murphy, Lois Barclay Murphy, and Theodore M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1937), p. 525.

[6] Gardner Murphy, *Personality, A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), pp. 456-57.

H. H. Anderson has made an important distinction between "dominative" behavior and what he calls "integrative" behavior. In integrative behavior two persons make mutual accommodations and adjustments, arrive at common purposes, and work together to achieve them. In dominative behavior, by contrast, one person tries to impose his will upon another, without regard to the latter's wishes, and without making any concessions to him. Anderson believes that dominative behavior is a characteristic of insecure persons, and arouses a submissive reaction only in those who cannot offer successful resistance. Otherwise, dominative or integrative behavior is responded to in kind. There is no tendency for the two types of behavior to occur together in the same individual. Both domination and integration are associated with ascendency, but the former somewhat more than the latter. The implication is that in integrative behavior the leader takes the initiative by virtue of mutual adjustment and consent. "Integrative" social behavior, then, is characteristic of the "servant" type of leader, and "dominative" behavior is characteristic of the dictator type of leader.[7]

Physical stature and weight seem to play a part in determining leadership, not only in those areas of behavior which are at the physical level, such as fighting or heavy labor, but in executive and political areas as well. For example, studies have shown that university presidents in the United States are, on the average, taller and heavier than presidents of small colleges, bishops are larger than small-town preachers, city school superintendents are taller than small town principals, and so on.[8]

Sources of Leadership.—If a leader has superior qualities in the area of his leadership, they may be due in varying degrees to innate endowment and to training or environment. In many cases, however, the leader is chosen because of his social status or rank, due to membership in an upper class or a distinguished family. In England, for example, army officers, political leaders, ministers, physicians, scientists, and writers have, until recently, come very largely from the middle and upper classes.

[7] Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb, *op. cit.*, pp. 526-27.
[8] E. B. Gowen, *The Executive and His Control of Men* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915).

Even in the United States the son of a professional man has a far higher probability of becoming a leader himself than has, say, the son of a farmer or laboring man. This may not be due so much to the fact that the middle and upper classes apparently average higher in native talent as it is to the circumstances that they have a relative monopoly in education and opportunity, have a different pattern of ambition and occupational pursuits, and often enjoy superior health because of better food and medical care. With regard to the individual family, however, it is fairly well established that "a brilliant and creative mind is much more likely to appear in the family of a genius than elsewhere, and enormously more likely if both parents are highly gifted." [9]

The importance of class in directing interest toward the attainment of leadership and other forms of eminence in the England of the past is illustrated by Table 38, taken from Joseph Schneider's article, "Class Origin and Fame: Eminent English Women," [10] and based on a study of the *English Dictionary of National Biography* (DNB). In explanation of the table, Schneider says that it "shows the activity-choice range of the individuals in the total DNB sample of 7,449 social origin cases:

. . . The élite show a consistent preference for leadership pursuits. Almost two-thirds of all the individuals born of fathers classified as belonging to the élite became eminent in leadership pursuits. In a descending order of preference, learning comes next and art last. The professions show a similar trend, with learning outstanding, leadership second, and art last. The order of preference is completely reversed for individuals born to artist parents: art comes first, learning second, and leadership last. One may describe the élite and artist groups as situated at the opposite poles of the activity-choice scale, with a maximum of social distance intervening.

The business-crafts-labor class, the most numerous in the population, performs functions which are only rarely so highly valued by the group as to bring eminence to those who perform them. Fame for any member of these classes almost invariably depends upon the possibilities for social climbing. The direction of movement chosen, as (the table) shows,

[9] Murphy, *op. cit.*, p. 458.
[10] *American Sociological Review*, V, No. 5 (1940), 706-07.

TABLE 38

THE SOCIAL ORIGIN DISTRIBUTION OF MEN AND WOMEN IN THE SAMPLE BY ACTIVITY CHOICES

Social Origin	Total		Leadership (Politics, Law, War, Religion, Philanthropy, Reform)	Learning (Scholarship, Science, Medicine, Engineering, Invention)	Art (Letters, Painting, Engraving, Architecture, Histrionics)	Miscellaneous
	Num. (1)	Pct. (2)	Pct. (3)	Pct. (4)	Pct. (5)	Pct. (6)
Elite	4,307	100	62.59	18.65	11.94	6.82
Nobility	1,160	100	78.11	7.24	8.10	6.55
Gentry	773	100	62.60	19.52	11.76	6.12
Politicians	256	100	70.30	8.19	11.32	10.19
Lawyers	445	100	48.52	28.30	18.86	4.32
Soldiers, etc.	516	100	65.09	17.13	12.00	5.78
Divines	1,157	100	50.89	31.52	9.63	7.96
Professionals and Civil Service	903	100	23.64	54.03	17.60	4.73
School Masters	204	100	23.52	50.48	18.13	7.87
Scholars, Scientists	66	100	12.11	74.23	10.60	3.06
Doctors	411	100	22.61	58.86	14.10	4.43
Engineers, Inventors	19	100	21.04	52.61	21.05	5.30
Administrators, Civil Service	203	100	38.90	33.98	24.13	2.99
Men of Letters, Artists	423	100	12.47	15.56	68.34	3.63
Men of Letters	39	100	20.51	23.06	51.27	5.16
Painters, Actors, etc.	384	100	4.42	8.06	85.41	2.11
Commercial, Crafts, Labor	1,532	100	22.82	23.73	35.75	17.70
Publishers, Printers	127	100	12.58	22.81	33.85	30.76
Businessmen, Shopkeepers	850	100	35.27	28.94	22.23	13.56
Craftsmen, Artisans	468	100	23.92	27.12	38.66	10.30
Laborers, Servants	87	100	19.52	16.06	48.27	16.15
Agriculture	284	100	35.55	31.67	22.63	10.15

tends to be toward the arts and not toward leadership. The activity-choice distribution of yeomen and farmers tends in the direction of leadership.

Investigators have reported that the order of birth and number of children in a family affect their disposition for leadership. Thus it is said that oldest children tend to be more submissive than their younger siblings; and that only children are the most aggressive and dominant of all.[11] These differences are largely due to variations in the patterns of

parental example, direction, encouragement, or coercion. The parent provides the atmosphere, the objects to be attended to, the fields with their anchorage points, the experience of watching the work in art or science when it is in the making, and the chance to participate early in the creative process. This may captivate the first-born son's imagination more than that of the others because of the greater enthusiasm and freedom on the part of the father; similarly, after the mother has for some years borne no more children, the last-born may be closer to her and to the father, and both economically and emotionally more richly endowed with those advantages or personal treasures than are the intervening children. This may well be the interpretation of Havelock Ellis' data, which indicate that eminent men in Great Britain tend to be the eldest or the youngest child in proportions surpassing their fair share among all the children considered.[12]

The British custom of primogeniture, however, may account for Ellis' finding regarding the eldest son, which does not seem to agree with Goodenough and Leahy's observations in the United States as mentioned above. Partridge, in his investigation of Boy Scouts (previously cited) found that, while some boys were always chosen and others were apparently never chosen as leaders, most boys fell in between these two extremes.

Males assume general leadership in most societies, including our own at the present time. Men everywhere hold nearly all of the controlling positions in government, the professions, business, and the fine arts, and are even regarded as head of the family and the home. This situation is undoubtedly due in part

[11] F. L. Goodenough and A. M. Leahy, "The Effect of Certain Family Relationships Upon the Development of Personality," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, XXXIV (1927), 45-71; Parten, *op. cit.*, pp. 430-40.

[12] Murphy, *op. cit.*, p. 459.

to the elaboration of beliefs and folkways which exaggerate the powers of the male, so that many posts of priority are occupied by men which could as well be filled by women. Nevertheless, the universality of male dominance is evidence that it is finally attributable to the advantages which the male enjoys in the sex function and in secondary sex characteristics. The female is severely handicapped by childbearing and the inevitably associated task of child care, in competition with the male in other lines of activity. The male also benefits from a larger, stronger physique and a louder and deeper voice, all of which favor him for leadership, not only in primitive societies where the basic patterns of relationship between the sexes are laid down, but also in the more advanced societies, especially those in which agriculture and war are prominent features. Once the role of the woman has been defined within the family it is certain to be framed by a luxuriant growth of cultural values and sanctions, which create in women themselves a desire to conform to what is expected of them and is most admired in them. So far has the dominance of the male been carried that even in our modern society at marriage the very name of the wife is absorbed by that of her husband, she generally becomes dependent upon him for her livelihood, she follows him wherever his occupation may take him, and in most of the other affairs of life she accepts his leadership. This appears, for example, in one of the incidental findings of a study of voting, which was quoted earlier:

> Among husbands and wives, both of whom had decided to vote, only one pair in twenty-two disagreed. . . . The almost perfect agreement between husband and wife comes about as a result of male dominance in political situations. At one point of the study we asked each respondent whether he had discussed politics with someone else in recent weeks. Forty-five of the women stated that they had talked the election over with their husbands; but, for an equal number of randomly selected men, only four reported discussions with their wives. If these family discussions play as important a role for husbands as they do for wives, then we should get approximately the same number of reports on the interchange of political ideas from both sexes. But only the wives are aware of the political opinions of their husbands. Men do not feel that they

are discussing politics with their wives; they feel they are telling them.[13]

Age is another factor which enters into the problem of leadership. Adults naturally assume dominance over children, and older children over younger children. In many societies, direction of the most important affairs is in the hands of the old men. In our own country, the chief executive of the nation is usually a man who has passed the half-century mark, and white heads dominate our most powerful legislative body, the Senate. The men who occupy the top posts in business are also usually in middle life or older. This is because much time is consumed in acquiring advancement.[14] But in some fields, like the sciences, invention, literature, and the fine arts, it can be claimed with reason that, as a rule, men make their major contributions before they reach middle life. The leaders of political revolutions also tend to be young. Like any other trait, the meaning of age for leadership depends largely upon the situation, and the kinds of abilities, dispositions, experiences, and opportunities it calls for. For example, among men who live by their muscles, such as professional athletes, the champions are apt to fall in the age class between twenty-five and thirty-five, and for the most part between twenty-five and thirty.

The Class, Nation, or Race as Leader.—Like individuals, one group may be thought of as leader and another as follower in some aspect of life or culture. For example, the middle and upper classes of Western society were mentioned above as the chief sources of leaders in the past, so they may properly be regarded as the leaders among the classes. Because of certain differences in cultural heritage, including more schooling and material possessions, these two social strata have been the first to conceive new ideas and fashion new devices, many of which, after more or less delay, were finally adopted by the lower strata.[15] That there is nothing fixed or inevitable about this

[13] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc., 1944) p. 141.
[14] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1927), p. 264.
[15] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Society, Culture, and Personality* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), p. 569.

order of things, however, is suggested by the situation in England, where important changes and reforms have been inaugurated by the Labor Party, which primarily represents the working classes.

On a larger scale than class, one nation or cluster of nations may for a time take the van and others march behind them in the progress of civilization. The role of leadership in this respect fell originally to the Asiatic and Mediterranean nations of Egypt, Greece, and Rome, and later passed from them to such countries as France, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. In this division the so-called Caucasoid or white race has appeared in the forefront of cultural advance, the Mongoloid or yellow race has come second, and the Negroid or black race third. The explanation of this is now believed to be the accidental distribution of historical opportunities, largely determined by cultural exposure or isolation, rather than to any inherent biological superiority of one race over another. Although the fact of the unequal roles played by the racial groups in cultural achievement up to the present is clear enough, it is quite possible that the leadership order of these same races may be changed in the millennia that lie ahead.

Leader Worship.—Every society has its heroes, and the same is true of many smaller groups such as families, communities, schools, and religious denominations. In the chapter on religion, it was noticed that popular heroes have often been elevated to the rank of family or national gods. Even where this has not occurred, we have seen that great men have, in the course of time, tended to become wrapped about with myths and legends which have enormously exaggerated their virtues, or even completely changed their character. The story of the boy George Washington and the cherry tree is familiar to every American, and clearly falls in the class of hero myths.

The explanation usually given of this human tendency toward hero worship is twofold. First, the people feel that the greatness of their leaders reflects credit on them and on their race. Second, they can identify themselves imaginatively with their heroes, and through them can perform vicariously splendid

deeds of which they themselves (and, indeed, often their heroes as well) are actually incapable. This fantasy thinking gives common folk ideals and models to imitate and strive toward. It also increases pride and self-esteem, which, however, are easily carried over into ethnocentrism and feelings of superiority over other peoples.

The shapes and images in which a people mold their chief historical and legendary figures are determined by their folkways, especially their values and wishes. Among crude and warlike societies the favorite hero pattern is that of the terrible warrior (the Hebrew Yahweh); among religious groups the ascetic or saintly type is carried to the extreme of supernatural perfection (Christ). It may accordingly be said that the ideals of a people tend to be personified, or clothed with flesh and blood, in the persons of their great men. This process begins with living leaders, who are represented as having the virtues that are most highly valued by the group. It gathers momentum after the death of the hero, and in the cases of the very great, reaches its maximum after a period of generations or even centuries, when there is little information remaining to serve as a check on the truth of the accumulated stories and legends. Finally, in the course of time, vast cultural and historical changes serve to make the ancient heroes obsolete, so that they are gradually replaced by a fresh coterie of heroes.

QUESTIONS

1. What is the definition of a leader? For example, does the definition fit Woodrow Wilson? Does it fit a police officer who forces a striker into a patrol wagon?
2. Is practically everyone sometimes a leader? If so, why is every person not recognized as a leader?
3. Distinguish between specialized and generalized leaders, and give examples of each.
4. What types of persons are likely to become generalized leaders?
5. Compare the roles, importance, and qualifications of technicians and executives in a modern business company, college, or other organization.

6. Why are executives usually given higher status and more salary than technicians in the same organization?
7. To what extent, if any, should technicians serve on committees which have a share in making and administering the major policies of an organization?
8. Define "charisma" and give examples of charismatic leaders who are known to you through history or through personal acquaintance. To what do you attribute the possession of charisma in each case?
9. Describe and illustrate the social functions of the democratic leader.
10. How does a leader typically compare with his followers in ability and dependability? Why? Can you cite actual cases?
11. Why are great leaders said to be products of history? Give examples.
12. How does a dictatorial leader impose his will upon others?
13. Are the roles of democratic and dictatorial leaders always clearly separable? What of the judge who is elected by the people?
14. Describe the competition for leadership which you have observed in some group of your acquaintance. What principles, if any, seem to apply?
15. Do propagandists belong among democratic or dictatorial leaders? Why?
16. What personal traits, besides superior ability and reliability, seem to be associated with the democratic leader?
17. Explain and illustrate the distinction made by Anderson between "dominative" and "integrative" behavior.
18. What are the relationships, if any, between the socioeconomic classes and leadership in Western society? Can you explain?
19. Does birth order affect the probability of becoming a leader? If so, for what reasons?
20. Is the role of leadership universally assumed by men over women due to innate masculine superiority, or to other factors?
21. Discuss some of the interrelations between age and leadership.
22. In what sense may a class, nation, or race be spoken of as leader?

23. To what do you attribute the leadership of the British Empire? Of the white race?
24. Analyze and illustrate the social psychology of hero worship in our own society and generally.

REFERENCES

BAVELAS, A. "Morale and the Training of Leaders," in G. Watson (ed.). *Civilian Morale.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1942.

BELLINGRATH, G. C. *Qualities Associated with Leadership in the Extra-Curricular Activities of High School.* New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1930.

GIBBS, C. A. "The Principles and Traits in Leadership," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* XLII, No. 42 (1947), 267.

GOURIN, E. B. *The Executive and His Control of Men.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915.

LEOPOLD, L. *Prestige.* London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913.

LIPPITT, R. "An Experimental Study of the Effect of Democratic and Authoritarian Group Atmospheres," *University of Iowa Studies,* XVI, No. 3, pp. 43-198.

MILLS, C. W. *The New Men of Power.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1948.

MURPHY, GARDNER, MURPHY, LOIS BARCLAY, and NEWCOMB, THEODORE M. *Experimental Social Psychology* (rev. ed.). New York: Harper & Bros., 1937, pp. 522-28, 830-32.

PIGORS, P. *Leadership or Domination.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935.

SCHMIDT, RICHARD. "Leadership," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. IX, pp. 282-86.

YOUNG, KIMBALL. *Social Psychology* (2d ed.). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1946, chap. x.

INDEX OF NAMES

Adolfson, Lorentz H., 132
Albig, William, 530
Allin, Bushrod W., 198
Allport, G. W., 33, 42
Anderson, H. D., 180, 197
Anderson, H. H., 542
Angell, Robert C., 360
Archer, T. A., 517
Atkins, G. G., 409, 410, 424
Ayscough, Florence, 365

Baker, O. E., 191
Barnes, H. E., 272, 513
Barr, Estelle de Y., 530
Barron, Milton L., 365
Bavelas, A., 551
Becker, Frances, 272
Becker, Howard, 65, 90, 272, 345, 360, 361, 363, 365, 381, 396, 413
Bell, Howard M., 181
Bellingrath, G. C., 551
Beloit-Smullyan, Emile, 140
Berelson, Bernard, 521, 522, 547
Berman, L., 18
Bernard, L. L., 469
Bertholet, Alfred, 408, 417
Beynon, E. D., 424
Boas, Franz, 275
Bossard, James H. S., 338-39
Bowers, Raymond V., 402
Breasted, James H., 268, 283, 299, 300, 322, 425
Briffault, Robert, 270, 345
Brinton, C., 530
Bromage, Arthur W., 488-91
Bromley, Dorothy D., 365
Brunner, E. de S., 393
Bryson, L., 452
Bultena, Louis, 388-91
Burgess, E. W., 11, 18, 31, 90, 345, 360, 361, 362, 363, 365, 381, 396, 413
Bushee, Frederick A., 392-93
Butterfield, Oliver M., 366

Calhoun, Arthur, 366
Cameron, Norman, 37, 42
Cantril, Hadley, 132, 446, 450, 530
Carpenter, Niles, 381
Cavan, Ruth Shonle, 252
Cayton, Horace R., 230
Centers, Richard, 177-80
Chalkley, L., 493
Chapin, F. Stuart, 513
Claghorn, Kate H., 399, 400
Clark, Carroll D., 190
Clarkson, J. D., 469
Cleeton, G. U., 19
Clinard, Marshall B., 471, 472
Cochran, I. C., 469
Cohn, David L., 366
Cooley, Charles H., 22, 23, 65, 325
Cottrell, Leonard S., Jr., 11, 345, 361, 362, 363
Counts, George S., 431
Cox, Oliver C., 138, 157, 174
Cressey, Paul F., 402
Crowell, B., 469
Crutchfield, Richard S., 17, 90

Darrow, Clarence, 239, 240, 241
Das, Saragadhar, 366
Dashiell, J. F., 9
Davenport, F. M., 518-19
Davidson, P. E., 180, 197
Davie, Maurice R., 402, 469
Davis, Allison, 145
De Laytano, Dante, 221
Dewey, John, 17, 450, 530
Dinkel, Robert M., 344
Dorcus, Roy M., 37, 38, 40, 42, 234, 482
Douglass, Frederick, 226
Douglass, H. Paul, 402
Drake, St. Clair, 230
Du Bois, Cora, 407
Du Bois, W. E. B., 226
Dunham, H. Warren, 493
Dunlap, Knight, 17
Duvall, Evelyn M., 366

Edwards, Alba M., 174
Edwards, L. P., 530
Elliot, H. H., 530
Elliott, Mabel A., 472, 493

Embree, Edwin R., 214
Erman, Adolf, 409

Fairchild, Mildred, 159
Falls, C., 469
Faris, Ellsworth, 10
Faris, Robert E. L., 132
Farnsworth, Paul R., 17, 42
Fellman, David, 132
Finer, Herman, 90
Finkelstein, L., 452
Firey, Walter, 278, 381
Flügel, J. C., 530
Folsom, Joseph K., 271, 280, 327, 329, 335, 346, 348, 358
Franklin, John Hope, 230
Frazier, E. Franklin, 263, 264, 268, 366, 493
Froelich, Gustav J. F., 15
Fuller, J. F. C., 469

Gardner, George E., 473
Garvey, Marcus, 226
Gaudet, Hazel, 446, 521, 522, 547
Gaus, John H., 132
Gerth, Hans H., 260, 535
Gibbs, C. A., 551
Gilfillan, Lauren, 402
Gillin, John L., 231, 239, 252, 450
Gilmore, H. W., 402
Gist, Noel P., 190, 198, 381
Glass, David V., 366
Glick, Paul C., 351
Glueck, Sheldon, 238, 239
Goddard, Pliny E., 292
Goodenough, F. L., 545
Goodrich, Carter, 198
Goodsell, Willystine, 346
Goring, Charles, 19, 233
Gourin, E. B., 551
Gowen, E. B., 542
Gregory, Cecil L., 198
Grinker, Roy R., 90, 493
Groves, Ernest R., 333

Hagood, Margaret Jarman, 402
Hall, Ford P., 198
Hallowell, A. Irving, 322
Hamilton, Walton H., 90
Harris, Abram L., 211
Hart, Ella B., 346
Hart, Hornell, 346, 503, 504
Hartley, Eugene T., 452
Hatt, Paul, 402
Havighurst, Robert J., 145
Hayes, Marion, 198
Hecker, J. F. C., 518
Herring, P., 469
Herskovits, Melville J., 230, 268
Hertzler, Joyce O., 90
Hertzog, Herta, 446
Hewitt, H., 530
Hill, Joseph A., 185, 301
Hill, Reuben, 345, 363, 366, 373
Hiller, E. T., 65, 104, 138, 174
Hollingshead, August B., 144
Hollingworth, H. L., 530
Horney, Karen, 37, 42, 343
House, Floyd N., 192
Howells, W. W., 272, 283, 404, 425
Hoyt, Homer, 396
Hughes, Everett C., 493
Hughes, Helen MacGill, 530
Hull, C. L., 17
Hunt, J. McV., 18
Huntington, Ellsworth, 272, 283
Hurlock, Elizabeth B., 525, 526, 530

Jenks, Jeremiah W., 198
Jennings, H. S., 5, 17
Jerome, Harry, 198
Johnson, Alvin, 451, 454, 459
Johnson, Charles S., 209, 212, 230, 450
Joslyn, C. S., 180, 198
Judd, Charles S., 431, 450
Jung, C. G., 30

Kähler, A., 469
Kallen, Horace M., 509
Kardiner, Abram, 21, 407
Karpinos, Bernard D., 349
Kaufman, Harold F., 384-86
Keller, A. G., 265, 268, 326
Kellogg, L. A., 4
Kellogg, W. N., 4
Kelly, William H., 268
Kent, Charles F., 425
Kingsford, Charles L., 517
Kinneman, John A., 381
Kirkpatrick, Clifford, 325, 425
Kiser, Clyde V., 157, 158, 161, 162, 349
Klineberg, Otto, 230, 275, 283
Kluckhohn, Clyde, 268, 452
Klugman, Miriam, 402
Knight, F. B., 19
Kolb, J. H., 393
Komarovsky, Mirra, 394
Koos, Earl L., 366
Kretch, David, 17, 90
Kretschmer, E., 19
Kroeber, A. L., 174, 283, 289, 296, 298, 407
Kulischer, Eugene M., 484, 493

Laidler, H. W., 530
Landis, Paul H., 164, 165, 172, 174, 191, 198
La Piere, Richard T., 17, 42, 90, 104, 132, 530
Lauck, W. Jett, 198
Lazarsfeld, Paul F., 360, 445-47, 450, 521, 522, 547
Leahy, A. M., 545
LeBon, Gustave, 514
Lederer, E., 152, 158
Lee, A. M., 450
Leopold, L., 551
Lewis, J. H., 208
Lindeman, E. C., 381
Lindner, Robert M., 334
Linton, Ralph, 42, 272, 275, 283, 285-89, 296, 298, 302-3, 305, 322, 407, 408, 426, 441
Lippitt, R., 551
Lippmann, Walter, 530
Lively, C. E., 198
Locke, Alain, 322
Locke, H. J., 365
Loeb, Richard, 239
Lombroso, Cesare, 233
Lorimer, Frank, 150, 151, 160, 165, 167, 168, 174
Lowrey, Lawson G., 37, 38, 482
Lundberg, G. A., 57, 65, 152, 322, 425
Lynd, H. M., 392
Lynd, R. S., 392

McConnell, D. W., 530
McConnell, John W., 174
McCormick, Thomas C., 132, 201, 329, 398
MacDonald, Lois, 402
MacIver, R. M., 452, 513
McKay, Henry D., 236, 238
McKenzie, Roderick D., 381
MacKinnon, Donald W., 18
Macrory, Boyd E., 329
Malinowski, Bronislaw, 283, 513
Marx, Karl, 193
Mathews, Shailer, 425
Mead, George H., 23, 24
Mead, Margaret, 261, 264, 366, 429, 513
Mendieta y Nuñez, Lucio, 141, 144
Merrill, Francis E., 472, 493
Merton, Robert K., 530
Miller, E. T., 173
Mills, C. Wright, 148, 260, 535, 551
Mitchell, Robert B., 402
Mombert, Paul, 152
Moore, B., Jr., 193-95
Moore, Maurice E., 252
Moore, Wilbert E., 90, 104, 153, 198, 400
Morgan, Arthur E., 381
Mowrer, Ernest R., 346, 354, 358
Mowrer, Harriet R., 363, 366
Mumford, Lewis, 402
Muntz, Earl E., 381
Murdock, George P., 268, 294, 295, 297, 298, 301, 346, 405, 406, 427-28, 452
Murphy, Gardner, 24-25, 42, 220, 228, 343, 376, 541, 542, 543, 545, 551
Murphy, Lois Barclay, 220, 228, 343, 376, 541, 542, 551
Murray, Henry A., 42
Myrdal, Alva, 366
Myrdal, Gunnar, 207, 230

Nelson, Lowry, 352
Neugarten, Bernice L., 140
Newcomb, Theodore M., 220, 228, 343, 376, 384, 452, 541, 542, 551
Nichols, Roy F., 222
Nicolai, G. F., 469
Notestein, Frank W., 165
Nystrom, Paul H., 527

Odbert, H. S., 33
Ogburn, William F., 132, 333, 493, 502, 503, 504, 507, 511, 513
O'Malley, L. S. S., 153
Orlansky, H., 530
Osborn, Frederick, 150, 151, 158, 160, 165, 167, 168

Panunzio, F. Constantine, 132
Park, Robert E., 65, 90, 104, 322, 381, 396, 413
Parsons, Talcott, 132, 281, 283
Parten, B. M., 540, 541
Patterson, S. Howard, 198
Pearl, Raymond, 504
Pearson, Karl, 19
Phillips, T. R., 469
Phillips, Ulrich B., 263
Pigors, P., 551
Pihlblad, C. T., 198
Platt, Robert S., 272
Pollack, Otto, 283
Pope, Liston, 149, 150
Potter, Pitman B., 132
Powdermaker, Hortense, 216
Pratt, F., 469

Queen, Stuart A., 371, 381

Saarinen, Eliel, 381
Sanders, S. E., 403
Sanderson, Dwight, 377
Sapir, Edwin, 90, 526
Sargent, S. Stansfeld, 450
Schmid, Calvin F., 403
Schmidt, Richard, 551
Schneider, Joseph, 543-45
Schumpeter, Joseph A., 198
Semple, Ellen C., 283
Sewall, M., 339
Shaffer, G. Wilson, 37, 38, 40, 42, 234, 482
Shapiro, H. L., 272, 283
Shaw, Clifford R., 18, 236, 238, 252, 403
Shepard, W. J., 132
Sherif, Muzafer, 17, 90, 99
Simmel, Georg, 192
Sims, N. L., 352-53
Smith, Mapheus, 376
Smyth, Henry D., 477-78
Sombart, Werner, 192
Sorokin, Pitirim A., 65, 104, 132, 151, 153, 167, 175, 176, 177, 198, 283, 322, 419, 420, 425, 435, 454, 457, 464, 469, 476, 493, 498, 499, 500-2, 504, 505, 506, 511, 513, 547
Speier, H., 469
Spengler, Oswald, 513
Spero, Sterling D., 211
Spiegel, John P., 90, 493
Spranger, E., 31
Steiner, Jesse F., 381
Stern, Bernhard J., 322
Sterner, Richard, 203, 212, 230
Stevenson, George S., 482
Steward, Julian H., 322
Stoke, Harold W., 132
Stokes, A. B., 481-82
Stone, Irving, 240
Stouffer, Samuel A., 90, 165, 190, 360
Sumner, William Graham, 198, 217, 265, 266, 268, 326, 425
Sutherland, Edwin H., 232, 233, 234, 243, 244, 252, 309
Sweet, William W., 412, 530
Sweetser, Frank L., 369, 370

Taeuber, Conrad, 198
Taft, Donald R., 252
Tannous, Afif, 378-79
Tappan, Paul W., 233, 247, 248, 250, 471
Taussig, J. W., 180, 198
Terman, L. M., 346, 362
Thomas, Dorothy S., 366
Thomas, L. F., 371, 381
Thomas, W. I., 31, 259, 366
Thompson, Warren S., 466
Thornthwaite, C. Warren, 198

Vaillant, George C., 257, 268
Vance, Rupert B., 212
Visher, Stephen S., 508, 509
Von Hentig, Hans, 232, 240, 241, 242-43, 334
Von Wiese, Leopold, 65, 90, 413

Wach, Joachim, 404, 416
Waite, John B., 187
Waller, Willard, 346, 483, 485, 486-87
Waples, Douglas, 450
Washington, Booker T., 226-27
Watson, G., 551
Weaver, Robert C., 213
Weber, Max, 260, 417, 535
Westermarck, Edward, 346
Whelpton, P. H., 158
Whyte, William F., 252, 538, 539, 540
Williams, Eric, 221
Williams, Robin M., 153
Wilson, R. F., 469
Wirth, Louis, 403
Wissler, Clark, 290, 298
Wittenmyer, Anne, 523-24
Wood, Arthur, 243
Wood, Arthur Evans, 187
Woofter, T. J., 216
Wright, Quincy, 452, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461-62, 464, 465, 466, 470, 493

Yang, Martin C., 256
Young, Kimball, 17, 24, 37, 42, 433, 551

Zabriskie, Edwin G., 482
Zacharias, Ellis M., 479
Ziemer, M., 450
Zimmerman, Carle C., 373, 376
Znaniecki, F., 31
Zorbaugh, Harvey W., 145, 148, 182-83, 237-38, 276-77, 395

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Ability; *see* Natural ability
Ability to serve
  and distribution of wealth and prestige, 119-21
Accommodation
  between groups, 101-2
  defined, 57
  in pair relations, 62-64
  vs. assimilation, 315-18
  within a group, 75-77
Action crowd, 514-15
Age
  and leadership, 546
  and selective migration, 188-89
  distribution, cause of variation in patterns of relationships, 280-81
  in United States, 1850-1980, 128-29
Age cycle of the family, 339-40
Aged
  increase of the, United States, 128-29
  killing of the, among primitive peoples, 266
  maladjustment of the, 281
  presence of the, affects family relations, 280-81
  provision for the, 280-81, 348, 351, 522
  retirement of the, 281
Alcohol and crime, 234
Amalgamation and cultural assimilation, 307
Ambivert, 30
American Federation of Labor (AF of L) and the Negro, 205
Anger, in pair relations, 55-56
Animal worship in primitive religion, 409
Appetites, 8
Areas, culture; *see* Culture areas; Natural area
Areas of disorganization and crime, 236-37
Aristocracy, 181-82
  among Indians of Northwest Coast, 290-92
  and education, 432
  Southern ante-bellum, 181
  see also Upper class
Assimilation
  and crime, 309
  and intermarriage, 306-7
  of minority groups, 307-10
Association, principle of, 296
Associative, 56
Atomic bomb, destructiveness of, 477-78
Attitudes
  community influences in formation of, 384
  rural vs. urban, 375-76
Audience, 522
Autocracy and war, 464-65

Basic personality structure; *see* Personality, basic structure
Beauty and personality, 29
Between-group relations; *see* Relations between groups
Biological explanation of culture, 310
Biological warfare, 478
Biracial structure in the United States, 201-30; *see also* Negroes
Birth control, 336-37, 348, 350
  see also Differential fertility; Illegitimate birth rates
Birth rates
  changes in, 337-38
  differential, 168
  of farm families, 350
  and war, 473-76
Black Death and the Dancing Mania, 517-18
Borrowing of culture traits, 296-97, 301-10
  difficulties in, 304-6
  intermarriage and the, 306-7
Boys' gangs and crime, 236-38
Broadcast from Mars, 446
Broken family
  death as cause of, 361
  defined, 354
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States, 128, 171

Bureau of the Census, United States, 168, 169, 187, 197, 202, 206, 208, 212, 214, 331, 332, 340, 349, 351, 431, 432, 440, 483
Business cycle and vital statistics, 164, 360

Camp meeting, 518-19
Capitalism and war, 465-66
Caste, 136-37, 154-57
Catholicism vs. Protestantism, 317
Chance and variation in relationships, 269
Change
  and social organization, 125-28
  by inventions vs. by mass movements, 528
  direction of social, 501-4
  education and, 435-36
  effects of social, on human nature, 511
  in a social system, 499-501
  in ideology, 499
  in the family, 347-48
  inventions and social, 507-10
  principle of inherent social, 497
  principle of limits in social, 504-5
  rate of social, 502-4
  science and, 435
  size of society and rate of social, 507
  time sequence of social, 499-501
Channelization cause of variation in relationships, 269-70
Charismatic leader, 534-36
Chicago Area Project, 238, 245, 246
Child
  domination by the, 347
  in the family, 327-28
  labor, 347-48
  the only, 360
Child-rearing practices by social classes, 145
Children, increased care of, 347
Christianity
  and development of education, 429-30
  and human relations, 416-17, 422-23
  in rural and urban areas, 418
  outlook for, 422-23
Church
  among urban organizations, 392-93
  and family, 386-91
  survey, in a village, 386-91
  see Religious denominations
Cities
  and internal migration in the United States, 188
  and selective migration, 188-91
  religion in, 373-75, 418-20
  rooming-house areas in, 276-77
  social organizations in, 392-94
  see Urban populations
Class struggle, 193-96
Classes; *see* Social classes
Climber; *see* Social climber
Clique, status from, 385
Common denominator of cultures, 293-97
Communication and culture contacts, 301
Communism and war, 465-66
Community
  an aggregate of institutions, 382-84
  and crime, 398-400
  and the teacher, 442-43
  church survey in a village, 386-91
  competition between communities, 379
  defined, 373
  diagraming the, 373
  identification with the, 377-79
  improvement of the, 392
  prestige in a rural, 384-86
  roles, 384
  rural, 373, 375-77
  sacred, 373-75, 418
  secular, 374-75, 418
  self-sufficiency of, 383
  size of, and social traits, 375-77
  urban, 374, 375-77
  see Rural community
Company town, 400
Competition
  and class struggle, 195
  and personality, 25-26
  and social organization, 105-7
  between communities, 379
  between village churches, 386-91
  defined, 56
  in pair relations, 60-61
  in the family, 341-42
  within a group, 72-74
Conflict
  and class struggle, 195-96
  and personality, 26
  and social organization, 106-7
  defined, 56-57
  in pair relations, 61-62
  in the family, 341-42
  within a group, 74-75

Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the Negro, 205
Conquest and culture contacts, 300
Consistency in mores, 217
Consumer Purchases Study, 204
Convergence, cultural, 296
Cooperation
  and class struggle, 195
  and personality, 26-27
  and social organization, 105-7
  and the action crowd, 514
  defined, 56
  in pair relations, 58-60
  within a group, 72
Coordination
  criterion of, 109
  of relations between groups, 101-2
  of relations within a group, 81-84
  social, 108-9
Coordinator, 83
Courtship, 328-30
Crime
  and chance, 241
  and children of foreign-born, 235, 309
  and disorganized areas, 236-37
  and emotion, 241
  and prisons, 248, 250
  and situation, 241-42
  and social disorganization, 244-45
  and the law, 250
  and weak primary social controls, 236
  causes of, 233-43
  defined, 231-33
  in wartime, 471-72
  prevention of, 249
  social control of, 245-50
Criminal, the
  and alcohol, 234
  and boys' gangs, 236-38
  and broken homes, 238-39
  as career, 241
  and companions, 238
  and drugs, 234
  and foreign birth, 235
  genuine, 242-43
  good evildoer, 242-43
  and group interests, 241
  and mental defects, 233
  and nationality, 234-35
  and personal disorganization, 244-45
  and physical abnormalities, 233
  and poverty, 239
  and psychopathic personality, 233-34
  and wealth, 239-40
  rehabilitation of, 249-50
Criminology
  and the law, 250
  emphasizes causes of crime, 245
  seeks prevention and rehabilitation, 249
Crises
  and the radio, 445
  and social movements, 514-15, 516-19
  effects on family, 359-60
Crowd
  influence of, on members, 514
  action, 514-15
  orgiastic, 517-19
  vs. the public, 520-21
Crusades, the, 516-17
Cult, religious, defined, 413
Culture
  complexity of, and human nature, 511
  contacts, 299
  defined, 255
  influence of the total, on education, 432-33
  patterns, 284 ff.
  principle of emphasis in development of, 294
  principle of limited possibilities in development of, 294, 296
  principle of logical association in development of, 296
  rapid change in, affects social relations, 510
  the containing, causes variations in relationships, 270-71
  traits, borrowing of, 301-10, 510
Culture area
  defined, 289
  of American Indians, 289
  of Northwest Coast Indians, 290-93
  of Plains Indians, 289-90
Cultures
  and modern communication, 301
  common denominator of, 293-97
  conflict of, 310-11
  contacts of, 299
    and conquest, 300
    and migration, 301
    and travelers, 301
  ideational, 505-6
  primitive, 273-75
  sensate, 505-6
  two independent, 255
  see Culture

Dancing Mania and Black Death, 518, 519-20
Death
  as cause of broken families, 361
  rates, 162
    and war, 476-81
    differential, 163
Delinquency areas, differential relations in, 370
Delinquent
  and juvenile court, 246-48
  defined, 232-33
Democracy, 109-21
  and public education, 431, 433
  and war, 464-65
  of natural ability, 121
Democratic leader, 536-38, 540-42
Denomination, religious; *see* Religious denomination
Density, population; *see* Population density
Dictator as leader, 536-38, 542
Differential fertility
  by education, 160-61, 169
  by family income, 161-62
  by husband's occupation, 160, 168
  changes in, since World War II, 168-69
  of different size cities, 158
  of social classes, 157-58
  urban and rural, 158, 160
Diffusion
  cultural, 296-97, 301-7
  difficulties of, 304-10
Direction of interest and invention, 508-9
Discoveries, scientific, 1400-1900, 502
Discrimination
  bases of, against Negro, 220-26
  defined, 201
  forces reducing, against Negro, 216-20
  toward minority groups, 320
Disorganization
  and change, 126
  and war, 488-91
  social, 122-25
Dissociative, 55-56
Distribution of wealth; *see* Wealth
Divorce
  and childlessness, 358
  and family disorganization, 354
  as part of general family pattern, 326
  rates, United States, 1890-1945, 358
    and war, 473
    by residence, 358
    by size of community, 377
Dominant personality, 31
Dominant role in a society, 284-89
  its effects on social structure, 284-85, 288
  in a primitive society, 284-85
  in modern society, 286
Dominative behavior, 542
Drug addiction and crime, 234
Dunkards, as minority group, 318

Ecology; *see* Urban ecology
Economic man, 14
Economy
  disruption of the, by war, 486
  form of, and war, 465-66
Ecstatic religious experience, 410
Education
  and assimilation, 436
  and religion, 430, 436-37
  and scholasticism, 430
  and selective migration, 188-91
  and social change, 435-36
  and specialization, 440-41
  and the democratic idea, 431
  and Protestant Reformation, 430
  and the radio, 446
  and the Renaissance, 430
  and the state, 430-32
  and the total culture, 432-33
  defined, 426
  development of, in Western society, 429-31
  functions of, 433-37
  in Greece, 432
  in preliterate societies, 426-29
  of women, 439-40
  problems of, 437-41
Ego, 24
Egypt, religion of ancient, 408-10
Electra complex, 342
Elite, the
  and vertical mobility, 183
  as source of leaders in England, 542-45, 547-48
Emotionalism in war, 470-71
Employment status of population, by sex, United States, 1940, 440
Environment
  and heredity, 4-5
  natural, as cause of variation in relationships, 271-72
  as factor in parallelism, 296
Ethnocentrism, 92-95
Evolution, social, vs. revolution, 527-28

Executive vs. technician, 532-34
Exploitation
  economic, 118-19
  in pair relations, 60
Extrovert, 30

Fair Employment Practices, Committee on, 213
Family
  adaptability of roles in, 355-57
  affection in, 343, 348, 355
  age-cycle of, 339-40
  and church, 386-91
  and divorce, 326, 357-61
  and larger kinship group, 350-51
  and war, 487
  as social institution, 340-42
  as dominant social institution, 286-88, 325-26, 341
  competition in, 341-42
  conflict in, 341-42
  disorganization of, 354-57
  effects of crises on, 359-60
  father's role in, 327
  four types of urban, 353-54
  gainful employment of women in, 355-56
  limitation of, 336-37
  mother's role in, 327
  status from, 291, 385
  reorganization of, 355
  roles, 340-41
  rural vs. urban, 348-53, 377
  similarity of background, in marital success, 363
  size of
    as cause of variation in relationships, 279-80, 338-39
    changes in, 335-38
  source of attitudes between members of, 342-44
  the changing, 347-48
  the childless, 358
  the unorganized, 357
  ties enumerated, 355
  uniformity in patterns of, 295, 326-28
  variation in patterns of, 255-64, 348-54, 497
  values, 341
  see Broken family
Farm family, 349-53; *see also* Family
Farming, rating of, 376, 386
Fashion
  centers of, 526-27
  changes in, 524-27
  defined, 524
Father's role in family, 327
Federal Security Agency, 263, 331, 336
Female, subordinate role of, 545-46
Fetish, 405
Follower, relation of, to leader, 536-38
Force as reserve measure, 458
Foreign-born
  and crime, 235, 309
  assimilation of, 305, 308-10
Freudian outline, 343
Freudians, 343
Functional groups in community, 382
Functional personality disorders, 36-37
  treatment of, 38-40

Gangs; *see* Boys' gangs
Genealogy, diminishing emphasis on, 347
Generalized other, 24
Germ warfare, possibilities of, 478
Gods, the; *see* Supernatural
Government
  and opinion polls, 112-16
  and public opinion, 115-17
  disorganization of, in war-wrecked areas, 488-91
  form of, and war, 464-65
  in the general interest, 109-10
  organization of, 117-18
  relation of the people to, 111-12
Gross reproduction rates
  defined, 348-49
  for United States, 1942-47, 348-49
Group
  and personality, 19-22
  duration of, 102-3
  functional, in community, 382
  influence of, in public opinion, 521
  morale, 87-88
  primary and secondary, 68
  reference, 99
  roles, 69-71
  vs. institution, 85-87
  vs. organization, 82-85
  see also In-group
  see also Out-group
  see also Relations within a
Groups; *see* Relations between groups
Growth, logistic curve of, 503-4

Habit and invention, 509
Hate in pair relations, 56
Health and personality, 29
Heredity and environment, 4-5

Hero worship, 548-49
Homogeneous vs. heterogeneous society, 311-15, 320
Horizontal mobility, 184
Households, composition of, 351
Human nature
  and cultural complexity, 511
  and primary groups, 22
  and rate of social change, 511
Human organism
  physiological equipment of, 4
  physiological needs of, 3-4, 8
Human relations in different societies, 255-68

I, the, 24
Id, 24
Ideal types, 14
Ideational cultures, 505-6
Identification, 34
Identity, absorption of, in crowd, 514
Ideology, changes in, 499
Ikhnaton and monotheism, 409-10
Illegitimate birth rates of whites and nonwhites, 208
Imitation, 9-10
Imitative learning, 9-10
Immigration to United States, 184-86
  consequences of, 186-87
Incest tabu, 327
Income
  and social class, 148-49
  real, 503
Incomplete organization, 126
India, castes of, 136
Indians, American
  and crime, 234, 240
  and white culture, 303
Inevitability of war, belief in, 460-61
Infanticide
  among primitive peoples, 265-66
  effects of, on form of marriage, 334-35
In-group, 92-95
Instincts, 4
  and war, 452
Institution
  defined, 85
  from mass movement to, 522-24
  vs. group, 85-87
Institutions, community an aggregate of, 382-84
Integrative behavior, 542
Intelligence
  and personality, 28
  of leaders, 540-41
  quotient, and selective migration, 189-90
Intermarriage
  and assimilation, 306-7
  of Negroes and whites, 209, 222-26, 229
Interests, war from conflict of, 454-56
Introvert, 30
Inventions
  and direction of interest, 508-9
  and habit, 509
  and social change, 507-10
  and the cultural base, 508
  vs. mass movements as source of social change, 528
  number of, 1400-1900, 502
  parallel, 296
Irish, the, and Catholicism, 310-11
Iroquois nomenclature, 265

Jealousy in pair relations, 55
Jews
  as scapegoats, 192
  assimilation of, 311-15, 318-20
  as strangers, 192
  discrimination toward, 312, 313, 318
  displacement of, by war, 484
  stereotypes of, 313
Juvenile court, 246-48

Killing of the aged among primitive peoples, 266
Kinship group, the larger, and the family, 350-51

Land, use of, in urban ecology, 395
Languages, morphology of, cause of international misunderstandings, 455-56
Law, the, and criminology, 250
Leader
  and age, 547
  charismatic, 534-36
  creativeness of the, 540
  defined, 531
  democratic, 536-38
  dictator, 536-39
  dominative vs. integrative, 542
  intelligence of the, 540
  physique of the, 542
  propagandist as, 539
  qualities of democratic, 539-42
  relation of, to follower, 536-38
  reliability of the, 539-40
  responsibilities of, 539
  self-confidence of the, 541

social participation of the, 541
specialized vs. generalized, 531-32
technical vs. executive, 532-34
worship of the, 548-49
Leadership
and nation, 548
and birth order, 545
and race, 548
and the élite, 543, 547-48
and the middle class, 542-43, 547-48
competition for, 538
sources of, 542-47
Learning, 4
imitative, 9-10
principles of, 5
trial-and-error, 6-7, 9
Level of living, effects of war on, 485-86
Like-mindedness for successful marriage, 362-64
Limited possibilities, principle of, 294, 296, 504-5
Logistic curve of growth, 503-4
Lower class
criteria of, 143-44
in Middle Western United States, 144

Magic
defined, 404-5
vs. science, 406
Maladjustment
and action crowd, 514
of aged, 281
of personality, 35-37
Male, leadership of the, 545-46
Marital status by size of community, 376-77
Marriage
conditions for successful, 361-64
forms of, 335
groups, 292
possessive, 327
predicting success in, 11-12, 361-64
rates, 330-31
and war, 473-74
effects of sex ratio on, 333
ritual of, 330
trend toward earlier, 347
trend toward more, 347
Marriage relationship, patterns of
American Negro, 262-64
Australian aborigines, 257-59
Aztec, 256-57
British Guianans, 261-62
Chinese, 255-56
Kulin Brahmans, 259-60
Zuñi, 260-61
Married women, gainful employment of, 355-56
Marxists, 193
Mass movement, 516-17
causes of, 527
from, to institution, 522-24
orgiastic, 517-19, 527
vs. invention as source of social change, 528
Mate
desired traits in a, 328-30
parental control over choice of a, 347
Maturation, 4
Me, the, 24
Medicine, public, 522
Mental defects and crime, 233
Mental disorders, 35-37
and war, 481-82
treatment of, 38-40
Middle class
and leadership, 542-45, 547-48
criteria of, 141-43
in Middle Western United States, 144
rise of Negro, 212, 218-19
Migration
and culture contacts, 301
and education, 188-91
causes of, 190
internal, United States, 187-88
selective, 188-91
see Immigration
Minority groups
and equality of opportunity, 120-21
as cause of war, 459
assimilation of, 307-15, 318-20
defined, 308
discrimination toward, 312, 318, 320
Mob
dealing with a, 515-16
excitement, 514
Mobility; *see* Social mobility
Monotheism in an ancient religion, 409-10
Mores, the
consistency in, 217
effects of war on, 486-87
Mormons, rise of, 410-12
Movement; *see* Mass movement
Multiple regression equation, 14-15
Mutual service in pair relations, 59

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 226, 227
National Opinion Research Center, 112
National Resources Committee, 150, 159, 165, 166, 168, 188, 190, 198, 381
Nationalism as basis of war, 462
Nationality and crime, 235
Nativity, sex ratio by, 332
Natural ability, democracy of, 121
and social class, 150-51
see Ability to serve
Natural area in urban ecology, 395-98
Natural environment; *see* Physical environment
Natural resources, consumption of, in war, 485
Needs
derived, 7-8
physiological, 3-4, 8
Negroes
amalgamation of, 220, 225, 307
and Civil Rights program, 228
and crises, 216-18
and Garvey movement, 226
and labor unions, 205, 217
and poor whites in South, 223
and scientific study of racial differences, 219
and Socialists, Communists, etc., 218, 226
and Southern Regional Council, 217
as economic competitors of whites, 223-24
as scapegoats, 223
bases of discrimination against, 220-23
belief in biological inferiority of, 222
burden of, upon the South, 219-20
changes in status of, since emancipation, 209-16
comparative income of, 203-4
economic trend of, 211-14
education of, 205, 207, 209-10, 214-15, 227-28
employment of, 204-5, 213-14, 217-18
forces reducing discrimination against, 216-20
home ownership of, 214
housing of, 204
illegitimate birth rate of (nonwhites), 208
illicit crossing with whites, 220, 225, 307
in Brazil, Cuba, etc., 220-22
intermarriage of, with whites, 209, 222-26, 229
Jim Crow practices against, 210
legal arrests of, 207, 234-35
lynchings of, 215
migration of, to cities, 212, 218, 227
morbidity and death rates of, 208, 215
net reproduction rate of, 202-3
numerical importance of, 202-3
occupations of, 205-6, 209, 212-14, 229
organizations of, 218, 226
political participation of, 208, 215-16
present status of, 203-9
race riots involving, 216, 515
racial policies of, 226-28
reputation for thriftlessness, 204
rise of middle class of, 212, 218-19
sex ratio of, 332
social segregation of, 209-11, 229
status of, in Army and Navy, 209, 227
the outlook for, 228-29
wages of, 204
Neighborhood
and crime, 236-37
associates vs. acquaintances in the, 369
boundaries of the, 368
defined, 368
differential relations in, 369-70
scattered, 397-98
significance of, 367-68
see Urban neighborhood
Net reproduction rate
and business cycle, 164
by color, 349
by occupation, 164-65
by religion, 165
by residence, 348-49
defined, 163, 349
differential, 163-64
of Negro, 202-3
social consequences of differential, 165-70
Neurosis, 36-37
Nomenclature, Iroquois, 265

Occupational roles and personality, 27
Occupations
and retirement, 281
and vertical mobility, 176-81

changes in, United States, 171-73
differential fertility by, 160
net reproduction rates by, 164-65, 168,
status of, 385
Oedipus complex, 342
Only child and family relationships, 360
Optimum population, 336-37
Order of birth
and family roles, 340-41
of leaders, 545
Order or estate, 137
Organization
and social change, 125-28
and coordination, 108-9
and vital statistics, 128
diagram of, in a state department, 83
faults in social, and mass movements, 527
foundations of social, 105-6
incomplete, 126
of personality, 34-35
social, in cities, 392-94
survey of, 129-30
Orgiastic crowd, 517-19
Origins of social behavior, 3-17
Out-group, 94-95
stereotypes of, 95-97

Pair relations
accommodation in, 62-64
beginning of, 48-49
classification of, 47-48
competitive, 60-61
conflict in, 61-62
cooperative, 58-60
disruption of, 54
duration of, 52-54
exploitative, 60
jealousy, anger, and hate in, 55-56
mutual service in, 59
utility in, 59
what determines pattern of, 49-52
Parallelism, cultural, 296
Parenthood
planned, 348
responsibilities of, 348
Patterns of relationship
causes of variation in, 269-83
age distribution, 280-81
chance, 269
channelization, 269-70
family size, 279-80
natural environment, 271-72
population density, 276-79
race, 272-76
the containing culture, 270-71
Per capita income and population density, 100
Personal influences in public opinion, 521-22
Personality
and competition, 25-26
and conflict, 26
and cooperation, 26-27
and the group, 19-22
as aggregate of group roles, 27-28
basic structure of the, 20-21
defined, 18
disorganization, 35-36
dominant, 31
inferior, 31-32
organization, 34-35
physiological bases of, 18-19
psychopathic, 36-37
relation of intelligence, health, beauty, etc., to, 28-29
social development of, 18-42, 384
status and, 385
submissive, 31
superior, 31-32
traits, 32-33
treatment of functional disorders of the, 38-40
types, 19, 30-32
values, 33-34
Physical abnormalities and crime, 233
Physical environment
as cause of cultural parallelism, 296
as cause of variation in social relationships, 271-72
Physical traits and social class, 151
Physique of leaders, 542
Play group and personality, 367
Polls, opinion, and government, 112-16
Polyandry and infanticide, 335
Polygyny and infanticide, 335
Population density
and cultural achievement, 508
and per capita income, 100
and secondary relations, 276-79
as cause of variation in social relationships, 276-79
Population dislocation by war, 482-84
Population Index, 484
Population optimum, 336-37
Population pressure
and group relations, 99-100
and war, 466
Population, size of, and inventions, 508

Praise and reproof, 9
Prediction of social behavior, 11-16
Prejudice
  defined, 201
  toward functional groups, 316
  toward minority groups, 312, 318
President's Committee on Recent Social Trends, 513
Press, the, 443-45
  and its publics, 520-21
  and the radio, 445-46
Prestige, 10
  distribution of, 118
  in a rural community, 384-86
Priesthood, the
  as a profession, 414
  education of, among Aztecs, 428-29
Primary relations
  between two persons, 45-46
  in cities, 276-79
  within a group, 68
Primary social controls and crime, 236
Primogeniture, British practice of, and leadership, 545
Prisons, effect of sex deprivation in, 333-34
Privilege and social class, 139-41
Profiteering and war, 459
Progress
  and specialization, 508
  density of population and, 508
  size of society and, 507
Propaganda and public opinion, 116
Propagandist as leader, 539
Property, destruction of, by war, 484-86
Prostitution diminishing, 347
Psychoanalysis, 342
Psychoanalyst, 24, 342
Psychological factors and war, 459
Psychoneurosis, 36
Psychopathic personality, 36-37
  and crime, 233-34
Psychosis, 36-37
Puberty, initiation ceremonies, 426-27
Public, the, 519-21
Public health in World War II, 479-81
Public Health Service, United States, 358-59
Public medicine, 522
Public opinion
  and government, 115-17
  and group influence, 521
  and personal influence, 521-22
  and propaganda, 116
Punishment
  and crime, 245, 249-50
  of children, 347
Pupil-teacher relation, 441-42

Race, 5
  and assimilation, 307, 310
  and class or caste, 156
  and crime, 235-36
  and culture, 273-76
  as cause of variation in social relationships, 272-76
  as source of leadership, 548
  scientific study of differences, 219
  sex ratio by, 332
  see also Biracial structure in the United States
Radio, 445-47
  and education of listeners, 446
  and the press, 445-46
  and the public, 521
  in times of crisis, 445-46
  social consequences of, 446-47
Rate of social change, 502-4
Real income, 503
Reference group, 99
Reflexes, 6
Reformation, Protestant, and public education, 430
Regimentation in war, 470-71
Relations between groups, 91-104
  accommodative, 101-2
  and population pressure, 99-100
  basis of, 91-92
  coordination of, 101-2
  defined, 91
Relations, social
  affected by rate of cultural change, 510
  influence of religion on, 415-17
  see Pair relations
  see Relations between groups
  see Relations within a group
Relations within a group, 66-90
  accommodative, 75-77
  and group roles, 69-71, 73
  beginning of, 68-69
  competitive, 72-74
  conflicting, 74-75
  cooperative, 72
  coordination of, 81-84
  external sanctions and, 79-80
  institutionalized, 85-87
  morale in, 87-88
  nature of, 66-67
  primary and secondary, 68

Relationship, patterns of; *see* Patterns of relationship
Reliability of leader and follower, 539-40
Religion
  a culture trait, 407
  and aesthetics, 414, 422-23
  and education, 430, 436-37
  and Fundamentalism, 421
  and hero worship, 548-49
  and humanitarianism, 416, 420-23
  and historical method, 421-22
  and orgiastic behavior, 518-19
  and science, 406, 417, 420
  as reflection of the family pattern, 407-10
  as reflection of the state pattern, 408-9
  colored by time and place, 408, 419-20
  defined, 404
  example of an ancient, 408-10
  functions of, 413-14
  influence of, in social relations, 415-17
  in rural and urban areas, 373-75, 418-20
  in urban social organization, 392-94
  modern trends in, 420-23
  monotheism in an ancient, 409-10
  origins of, 406-8
  primitive forms of, 405-6
  universality of, 406-7
Religious denominations
  and differential fertility, 165
  and social class, 149-50
  rise of, 410-13
  survey of, in a village, 386-91
Religious relationship, the, 414-15
Renaissance, the, 430
Reorganization, 124
Repetition, 7
Reproduction
  of the social classes, 161-62
  see Gross reproduction rates
  see Net reproduction rates
Reproof and praise, 8
Retirement of the aged
  and occupation, 281
  and residence, 281
  and status, 281
  and maladjustment, 281
Revenge among Indians of Northwest Coast, 292
Revolution, social, vs. evolution, 527-28
Rivalry; *see* Competition
Role
  between groups, 97-99
  dominant, in a society, 284-89
  group, 69-71, 73
  group, and personality, 27-28
  occupational, 27
Romantic complex, 328-30
Rooming-house areas, secondary relations in, 276-77
Rural areas
  and internal migration, 188
  and selective migration, 188-91
  religion in, 373-75, 418-20
Rural community
  attitudes in, 375-76
  characteristics of, 376-77
  crime in a, 398-400
  prestige in, 384-86
Rural family, 348-53
Rural populations
  differential fertility of, 163-68
  sex ratio of, 331

Sacred community or society, 373-75, 418, 510
Sanctions, 8
  external to group, 79-80
  within group, 77-79
Scapegoat theory of war, 458-59
Scapegoats
  Jews as, 192
  Negroes as, 223
School
  attendance, 431
  years of, completed, 432
Science
  and culture, 435
  and religion, 406, 417, 420
Scientific discoveries, number of, 502
Second generation immigrants and crime, 309
Secondary relations
  between two persons, 45-46
  in cities, 276-79
  within a group, 68
Sect, religious
  defined, 410
  Mormon, 410-13
Sector in urban ecology, 396
Secular community or society, 374-75, 418, 510-11
Segment in urban ecology, 396-97
Segregation
  in urban ecology, 395-98
  see also Negroes

Self, the
looking-glass, 23
rise of, 22-25
Self-confidence; *see* Confidence
Sensate culture, 505-6
Service
and distribution of wealth, 118-21
and prestige, 119-21
in relation to served, 123-24
Sex, 4, 8, 327
and Electra complex, 342
and family relations, 360, 497
and membership in social organizations, 392-94
and Oedipus complex, 342
and race, 225
and selective migration, 188
as family bond, 355
avoidance, 327
employment by, 440
impulse, 342
leadership of male, 545-46
morals, and war, 472-73
tabus, 327, 348
Sex ratio, 330-35
by nativity, 332
by race, 332
by residence, 331
effects of disturbance of, 333-35
effects of, on marriage rates, 333
Sexual intercourse, social control of, 327-28
Sexual morality, 360
Slaves
among Indians of Northwest Coast, 291-92
marriage among Negro, 262
Slums; *see* Areas of disorganization
Social behavior
origins of, 3-17
prediction of, 11-16
Social change; *see* Change
Social classes, 135-98
and ability, 150-51
and denomination, 149-50
and differential fertility, 157-70
and income, 148-49
and physical traits, 151
criteria of, 141-45
in Western society, 137-38
origins of, 154-56
struggle of the, 193-96
trends in the, 173
variations in child-rearing practices of the, 145
see Lower class; Middle class; Upper class
Social climber, 180-83
and education, 434
Social disorganization; *see* Disorganization
Social lag, 127, 501
Social mobility, 176-98; *see also* Horizontal mobility; Vertical mobility
Social movement; *see* Mass movement
Social organization
in cities, 392-94
see Organization
Social participation of child leaders, 541
Social relations; *see* Relations, social
Social science and war, 466-67
Social stratification; *see* Stratification
Social system, changes in a, 499-501
Socialism and war, 465-66
Societies
changing vs. static, 510-11
men's and women's, among Plains Indians, 289-90
sacred and secular, 373-75, 418, 510
secret, among Indians of Northwest Coast, 292
Society
defined, 107-8
size of, and social change, 507
Sociometric diagrams, 370
Soul, the, in primitive religion, 405, 409
Southern Regional Council, 217
Specialization
and education, 440-41
and social efficiency, 508
in leaders, 531-32
Spirits in primitive religion, 404-6, 409
State, the
and public education, 430-33
influence of, on religion, 408-9
see Government
Static societies, 510-11
Statistical Office of the United Nations, 481
Status
and social class, 139-41
and retirement of the aged, 281
equilibrium, 140
in a rural community, 384-86
Stereotype relations, 46-77
Stereotypes
of Jews, 313
out-group, 95-97

Stimulus, 6
Stone Age, Europe in, 299-300
Stranger, the, and mobility, 192-93
Stratification, social, 135-98
  status and privilege, 139-41
  upper class attitudes, 135-36
Submissive personality, 31
Success in marriage, prediction of, 11-12
Super-ego, 24
Superior children as leaders, 541
Supernatural, the, in religion, 404-5, 407, 413, 415, 420, 422, 549
Survey of social organization, 129-30
Sympathy, 34
System; *see* Social system

Teacher and the community, 442-43
Teacher-pupil relation, 441-42
Technician vs. executive, 532-34
Tensions, war from internal, 459
Totemism defined, 406
Traders and culture contacts, 299
Traits, personality, 32-33
  culture; *see* Culture
Trial-and-error learning, 6-7, 9
Types
  ideal, 14
  personality, 19, 30-32

Uniform Crime Reports, 235
Uniformity
  in cultures, 297
  in family patterns, 295
United Nations World Health Organization, 479
Unmarried, the, 347
Unrest, social, and mass movements. 527
Upper class
  and education, 432
  and the social climber, 181-83
  attitudes, 135-36
  criteria of, 141
  in Middle Western United States, 144
  reproduction of, 166-68
  ritual, 145-48
Urban areas, religion in, 373-75, 418-20
Urban ecology, 395-98
Urban family
  four types of, 353-54
  see Family
Urban neighborhood
  differential relations in, 369-70
  life cycle of, 370-71
  scattered, 397-98
  the vanishing, 371-73
Urban populations
  differential fertility of, 158, 160
  sex ratio of, 331
Urbanization and changes in family, 347-48
Utility in pair relations, 59

Values, 7-8
  personality, 33-34
  war from conflict of, 454-56
Variation in family patterns, 255-64
Vendetta, the, in New Guinea, 264
Vertical mobility, 176-80
Village
  and the rural family, 377
  church survey in a, 386-91
  identification with, 377-79

War
  among Indians of Northwest Coast, 292
  and crime, 471-72
  and disease germs, 478
  and dislocation of populations, 482-84
  and form of economy, 465-66
  and form of government, 464-65
  and human nature, 451-52
  and level of living, 485-86
  and minority groups, 459
  and nationalism, 462
  and population pressure, 466
  and sex morals, 472-73
  and social science, 466-67
  and the atomic bomb, 477-78
  and the mores, 486-87
  and the scapegoat, 458-59
  and vital statistics, 473-79
    births, 473-76
    deaths, 476-81
    divorces, 473
    marriages, 473-74
  as culture, 452-54
  as last recourse, 457-58
  as shortcut, 457-58
  defined, 451
  destruction of property by, 484-86
  disorganization in areas wrecked by, 488-91
  effects of, on mental disorders, 481-82
  effects of, on family, 360
  emotionalism in, 470-71

War (*Cont.*)
from belief in inevitability of, 460-61
from conflict of values and interests, 454-56
from contact, 456-57
from internal tensions, 459
from miscalculation, 461-62
from social change, 457
profiteering, 459
psychological factors and, 459-62
regimentation in, 470-71
social intensification in, 470
total, 477, 478-79
world order as solution for, 463-64
War Medicine, 479
Wealth
and ability to serve, 119
and exploitation, 118-19
distribution of, 118-21
rivalry in, 291
Who's Who in America, 176, 508-9
Widows, 347
Women
education of, 439-40
gainful employment of, 355-56
independence of, 347
Women's Christian Temperance Union, origin of, 523-24
World order
as solution for war, 463-64
Worship
in religion, 404
of heroes, 548-49

Zero, concept of, parallel invention of, 296
Zones, in urban ecology, 395-96