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(and other Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta)

Vol. I

Doctrine of Srikantha and other Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta

BY

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BLESSINGS

I have very great pleasure in writing a few words of appreciation of this wonderful production of Dr. Roma Chaudhuri, the efficient and popular Principal of the best Women's College of West Bengal viz. Lady Brabourne College, Govt. of West Bengal, Calcutta.

Dr. Chaudhuri really needs no introduction from me at this late stage ; for she has already made a name in India and outside as a Brahmavādinī, as one of the very few Ladies who have devoted their whole lives for the spread of Vedantic Learning. What is more—she is one of those still fewer ones who are living the life of a real Vedāntist. She is well-versed in both Eastern and Western Philosophy and her Works on the Vedānta Philosophy, Nimbarka-Vedanta, Sufisim and Vedanta, Comparative study of Indo-Islamic Philosophy, etc. are well-known.

The present work, Doctrine of Srikantha and other Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta, is a unique one from many points of view. As she has rightly remarked, it is rather difficult to justify logically monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta in many cases. Accordingly, she has discussed in great details the seven main objections against the monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta and has, not only given a clear and full account of the Vedānta refutation of the same, but what is more, given detailed original accounts of her own, regarding these difficult monotheistic problems and solved the same in a manner at once logical and charming. Really, such detailed original discussions regarding these fundamental and difficult problems of all philosophical systems of the world are rarely found.

Specially, her detailed original discussions regarding the Law of Karma, the very foundation of Indian Philosophy in general, are highly scholarly. Her deep grasp of the subject, great critical acumen, expert logical method of discussion and charming expression have all combined to make the work an outstanding contribution to philosophical thought. As a matter of fact, such a big volume on the single topic of Brahman, by far the most fundamental topic of Indian Philosophy in general, is unique indeed from every point of view.

Nalanda Reserch Institute,
Bihar.
10th July, 1962.

Satkari Mookherji

PREFACE

I have great pleasure in presenting the first volume of "Doctrine of Srikantha & other Monotheistic Schools" by Dr. Roma Chaudhuri, Principal, Govt. Lady Brabourne College, Calcutta, to the lovers of Indian Philosophy & Religion.

The Volume has been long overdue, but owing to printing difficuities, it could not unfortunately be brought out earlier. We received a large number of enquiries regarding it and we thank all our well-wishers for the same.

This Volume contains a detailed account of the central topic of the Vedānta Philosophy of India, viz. Brahmnn. All the different aspects of this fundamental topic have been exhaustively dealt with. Many sections have been devoted to discussing the seven objections against the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta. Further, detailed discussious regarding the Law of Karma, the fundamental Principle of Indian Philosophy in general, have been included. Such philosophically difficult topics like the Motive of Creation, Process of Creation, and the like have been fully dealt with.

So, we humbly hope that because of these special features, the work will prove interesting and helpful to all.

We are very grateful to the Govt. of India for bearing half the cost of Publication of this work.

We are also very grateful to Dr. Satkari Mookherji, the noted Sanskrit Scholar and Philosopher of India, formerly, Head of the Dept. and Ashutosh Professor of Sanskrit, and now, Director, Nalanda Research Institute, Bihar, for giving his blessings to us.

Pracya Vani
3, Federation Street,
Calcutta-9
Julv. 1962

Jatindra Bimal Chaudhuri

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Doctrine of Srikantha

CHAPTER I

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The greatest heritage that we are very fortunate to get from our hoary ancestors is the immense treasure-trove of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics. Doubts have been raised as to whether, from this point of view, we are equally fortunate in other respects as well, such as, Science, Economics, Politics, Mechanical Arts and the like. In our considered opinion, in these respects, no less, the invaluable contributions of our ancient scholars can very well, stand on their own, side by side with any system of the West, if not surpass these. However, even if there be some scope for doubts or differences of opinion regarding these points, there cannot, legitimately, be any doubts or differences of opinion regarding the point that so for as Philosophy, Religion and Ethics go, it is the proud privilege of India to stand in the foremost, preceding all. For has not India produced the earliest Philosophical Treatise in the whole world, at the very dawn of human civilisation, viz the incomparable Rg.-Veda which, for the matter of that, is also the earliest literature in the whole world ?

Hence the very soul of India, the very life-blood of her age-old Culture and Civilisation, the very heart-beat of her never-dying spirit, is found not in Palace-Courts, but in Forest-Hermitages, not in Politics, but in Philosophy and Philosophy alone. So, to know India is to know of her Philosophy. Religion and Ethics ; to know how from the very beginning, at the first dawn of Reason in Man, the holy sages of India sought for something Eternal amongst the evanescent, Full amongst the incomplete, Perfect amongst the imperfect, Blissful amongst the miserable. And as a result, as a reward of this incessant search after truth even at the cost of life, we have got a large number of systems of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics, propounded by Indian Seers, which may legitimately be said to be unique in the history of the whole world.

Of these, besides quite a few less known systems, the six Āstika or Orthdox Schools viz. Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, and three Nāstika or Heterodox Schools viz. Cārvāka, Jainaism, Buddhism, are celebrated all over the world. Of these, again, the Vedānta System is by far the most important and well-known one, marking, as it does, the highest culmination of the Philosophical Insight, Religious Fervour and Ethical Striving of India Herself. Of these, again, the

Advaita-Vedānta School of Śaṃkara is by far, the most profound and celebrated one, marking, as it does, the culmination of all Vedāntic Insight and Inspiration of all ages.

Although the ever-springing arguments as to who is the earliest amongst the Vedāntists will, perhaps, never cease—for, who does not know that in India the reverence for age being almost sacramental, every follower, big or small, of a System, naturally strives to prove that to be the oldest—yet, it can safely be said that Śaṃkara's Advaita-Vedānta is the first developed and complete Vedānta-System of thought. Later Vedānta Systems developed more or less as counter-systems trying to disprove Saṃkara's Pure Monism by different kinds of Qualified Monism or Dualistic Non-Dualism. As a result, we have got the celebrated Five Schools of the Vedānta (Pañca-Vedānta-Sampradāya), viz. Śaṃkara's Kevalādvaita-Vāda, Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita-Vāda, Nimbārka's Svābhāvika-Dvaitādvaita-Vāda, Madhva's Bhedābheda-vāda and Vallabha's Śuddhādvaita-Vāda To these, five more may be added, making a total of Ten Schools of the Vedānta (Daśa-Vedānta-Saṃpradāya), viz. Bhāskara's Aupādhika-bhedābheda-Vāda, Viṣṇu Svāmin's Śuddhādvaita-Vāda, Śrīkaṇṭha's Viśiṣṭa-Śivādvaita-Vāda, Srīpati's Viśeṣādvaita-Vāda, and Baladeva's Acintya-bhedābheda-Vāda.

Of these Ten Schools of the Vedānta, the Pure Monism of Śaṃkara naturally, does not belong to any Sect, there being no place for Religion, in the ordinary sense of the term, in Śaṃkara's System from the Pāramārthika or transcendental and philosophical standpoints. From these standpoints, there is only one Reality, viz. "Brahman", there being, no distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped, God and the soul. From the Vyavahārika or empirical and practical stand-points, of course. Śaṃkara is a monotheist ; but he is, by no means, a sectarian theologian, and never identifies "Iśvara" with any Sectarian Deity, like Viṣṇu, Kṛṣṇā, Śiva and the like.

In his actual practices and religious writings also, like hymns, Śaṃkara manifested a commendable spirit of universality and broad-mindedness, though, according to Tradition, he, was born a Śaiva or a Śākta. Thus, he founded four Maṭhas or Monasteries, dedicated to four different deities, viz.—Vadri-Nārāyaṇa at Jyotirmaṭha (Yośī-Maṭha) at Viṣṇuprayāga in Vadri-nārāyaṇa in the north, Sāradā Āmmā from Kasmir, at Śṛṅgerī-Maṭha at Śṛṅgerī in Mysore in the south, Govardhana at Govardhana-Maṭha in Puri in the east, and Sāradā at Sarada-Maṭha in Dvarakā in the west. The hymns too, ordinarily taken to be written by him, are to different deities, like, Śiva, Viṣṇu, Śakti, Gaṅgā, Sūṛya etc. But the other Schools of the above Ten Schools are Sectarian ones, except

that of Bhāskara, who has also, never identified 'Brahman' with any Sectarian Deity. Thus, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva, Vallabha, Viṣṇu-Svāmin, and Baladeva are Vaiṣṇava Vedāntists; while Śrīkaṇṭha and Śrīpati are Śaiva ones. But Śrīkaṇṭha is by far the most celebrated of all the Śaiva Vedāntists and his Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya is taken to be the most authoritative Vedānta-Bhāṣya of the Śaivas.

Hence, though not included amongst the most celebrated "Five Schools of the Vedānta", Śrīkaṇṭha's System, too, is an important System of the Vedānta that should be carefully studied by all those who want to have a full picture of the inner virility and vitality of the Vedānta System of thought, fostering so many different Schools, unknown in other Systems.

Life, Works and Date.

(1) Life

It is very common in India, unfortunately, that lives of great men of olden days are either wholly unknown or, so much inter-mixed with Tradition as to be practically unknown. The same is found to be the case with Śrīkaṇṭha, no less. Nothing is known for certain regarding his date, birth-place, parentage, family, education, works etc.—in short,—life as a whole. And, we do not propose here to enter into controversies and start a discussion regarding these, as the present work humbly aims at giving a detailed account of Śrīkaṇṭha's Philosophical Doctrines only, and is, as such, not at all historical in nature.

(2) Works

The only known work of Śrīkaṇṭha is his celebrated Commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras. In this Commentary, Śrīkaṇṭha has very ably explained the Vedāntā Doctrines from the standpoint of Śaivaism Hence, in the beginning of his Commentary, he bows down to Śiva, the Supreme Brahman, thus :—

"नमोऽहं-पदार्थाय लोकानां सिद्धि-हेतवे ।
सच्चिदानन्द-रूपाय शिवाय परमात्मने ॥१॥
निज-शक्ति-भित्ति-निर्मित-निखिल-जगज्जाल-चित्र-निकुरुम्बः ।
स जयति शिवः परात्मा निखिलागम-सार-सर्वस्वम्" ॥२॥

[For English Translation, see in loco].

Here, Śiva is taken to be the Supreme Self, Existence, Consciousness-and Bliss in Essence, the Essence of all Scriptures, the sole Creator,

Sustainer and Destroyer of the Universe, as well the sole Cause of Salvation.

All these, as a matter of fact, constitute the nature and qualities of the "Brahman" of the Vedānta. But the special merit of Śrīkaṇṭha, from the Sectarian standpoint, is that he, very cleverly, proves these to be the nature and qualities of Śiva alone. Hence, this Commentary is, naturally, held in very high esteem by all Śaivas. Quite conscious of the service done by him to his Sect., Śrīkaṇṭha himself says :—

"श्रीमतां व्यास-सूत्राणां श्रीकण्ठीयः प्रकाशते ।
मधुरो भाष्य-सन्दर्भो महार्थो नाति-विस्तरः ॥६॥
सर्व-वेदान्त-सारस्य सौरभास्वाद-मोदिनाम् ।
आर्याणां शिव-निष्ठानां भाष्यमेतन्महानिधिः" ॥७॥

[For English Translation see, in loco].

Here, Śrīkaṇṭha takes his Bhāṣya or Commentary as a "Great Treasure" of all "noble persons, devoted to Śiva." He, also, states boldly, three main characteristics of his Bhāṣya, viz. that :—

(1) It is, "Madhura" or Sweet in Language ; (2) "Mahārtha" or Profound in meaning ; and (3) "Nāti-Vistara" or Not very lengthy in Exposition.

Appaya Dīkṣita in his commentary on the Śrīkaṇṭha-Bhāṣya, explains these as follows :—

(1) Its words are "Rasavat", "Lalita" and "Ramaṇīya" like those of a Kāvya. Or, its language is juicy, soft and beautiful like that of a Poem. (2) But it does not deal with a soft, dreamy, flimsy subject-matter, like that of a Poem, being very deep, profound and difficult in meaning. (3) Yet, though dealing with such a difficult Philosophical topic (like Brahman), it is not unduly lengthy.

Really, these three are the essential marks of all high class treatises ; and according to that criterion, none can have any hesitation in taking Śrikaṇṭha-Bhāṣya as a high-class treatise.

From this Commentary, we come to know that Śvetācārya was the Guru of Śrīkaṇṭha. In the Introductory Parnegyric, Śrikaṇṭha says :—

"नमश् श्वेताभिधानाय नानागम-विधायिने ।
कैवल्य-कल्प-तरवे कल्याण-गुरवे नमः" ॥४॥

[For English Translation see, in loco].

Here, Śrīkaṇṭha mentions three marks of his Guru or Spiritual Preceptor viz. (1) He has propounded many Scriptures. (2) He shows the Path to Salvation to all. (3) He is supremely auspicious in nature.

Appaya Dīkṣita in his Commentary on the Śrīkaṇṭha-Bhāṣya, explains the above as follows :—

(1) He removes all apparent inconsistencies amongst the different Scriptures, and interpretes these correctly. (2) He, without any discrimination, teaches all how to attain Salvation. (3) Not only that, he also makes for the worldly and Heavenly happiness of all.

As really, these are essential qualities of all great Gurus, we come to know for certain that the Guru of this great man was equally great.

(3) Date

As regards the date of Śrīkaṇṭha, as usual, many claims and counter-claims have been made, —from the claim that he was the earliest of all the Bhāṣya-Kāras, preceding even Śaṃkara, to the counter-claim that he was later than Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Madhva. However, this much is certain from his Bhāṣya that he flourished after Śaṃkara, as he refers to and briefly criticises some of the Advaita-Vedānta Doctrines. Compare the following :—

" न वयं धर्म-ब्रह्म-विचार-रूपयोश् शास्त्रयोरत्यन्त-भेद-वादिनः, किं त्वेकत्ववादिनः ।"
(१-१-१)

This refutes the view of Śaṃkara that Pūrva-Mīnāṃsā (Karma-Mīmāṃsā), dealing with "Dharma", and "Uttara-Mīmāmsā" (Vedānta), dealing with "Brahman" are two different treatises, so that the former need not be studied before the study of the latter.

"यतोऽधीत-वेदेन धर्मो विचारितोऽतस्तदनुष्ठान-सम्पन्न-चित्त-शुद्धिना तत्काल-सम्पन्न-विवेकादि-गुण-सहकृत-परम-भक्ति-संभावितेनानेन ब्रह्मापि निरतिशयनिःश्रेयस्करं विचारणीय-मिति ।" (१-१-१)

Here, according to Śivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā (Appaya Dīkṣita), **"विवेकादि-गुण"** means the famous **साधन-चतुष्टय**, taken by Śaṃkara in his Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya, as constituting the meaning of the term "Atha" in the Sūtra, viz

"नित्यानित्य-वस्तु-विवेकः, शम-दमादि-साधन-सम्पत् , इहामुत्रार्थ भोग-विरागः, मुमुक्षुत्वञ्च ।"

According to Śaṃkara, the study of Dharma is not essential for that of Brahman, but the above **साधन-चतुष्टय** entitles one to the study of Brahman directly. Śrīkaṇṭha rejects this view here by pointing out that the **साधन-चतुष्टय** itself depends on proper knowledge and performance of Dharma.

"चिदचित्-प्रपञ्च-रूप-शक्ति-विशिष्टत्वं स्वाभाविकमेव ब्रह्मणः कदाचिदपि न निर्विशेषत्व-मित्यनेन सिद्धम् ।" (१-१-२)

This refutes the view of Śaṃkara that Brahman is "Nirviśeṣa" or devoid of all differences.

"एवं सति पूर्वपक्षः, जीवस्य स्वाभाविकं ज्ञान-धर्मित्वं नास्तीति। "ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वौ" इति जीवस्याज्ञत्वमेव हि श्रूयते। तस्मादज्ञ एवासौ चैतन्यमात्र-रूपः, किं तु माया-शक्त्यवच्छेदादवाप्त-शरीर-करणादिरयं घटोऽयं पटोऽयं मनुष्योऽयं दैवोऽहमिति कल्पिताहङ्कारबद्धः संसरतीति। संसार-दशायां ज्ञानात् जीवस्य स्वतो ज्ञातृत्वं नास्त्येव, अन्यथास्य कुतो मुक्तिरिति।" एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः ज्ञातैवायमात्मा।····· यदुक्तं मायाशक्ति-सम्बन्धात् संसार-दशायां ज्ञातृत्वमस्येति, तत् सत्यम्। (२-३-१६)"

This refers to the view of Śaṃkara that Jñāna-svarūpa Ātman appears to be a Jñāta through the Upādhi of Māyā or Ajñāna. According to Śrīkaṇṭha, "Māyā" means the real "Icchā-Śakti" of Śiva.

"इति संशये परमेश्वर इति पूर्वः पक्षः। परमेश्वर एव बहुविधोपाधि-वशाज्जीवभावमुपगतो दृश्यते, यथैकमाकाशं घटाद्युपाधिवशान्नानाकारं दृश्यते परिच्छन्नं च।" तथा हि श्रुतिः—"अयमात्मा ब्रह्म" इति वदति। तस्मादीश्वर एवाज्ञानाज्जीवभावमुपगत इति। सिद्धान्तस्तु···ब्रह्मण एवाज्ञानाज्जीवभाव-कल्पने बहु-श्रुति-विरोधादि-दोष-प्रसक्तिदुर्वारा।"
(२-३-४२)

This refers to Śaṃkara's famous Upādhi-Vāda.

"अज्ञानोपाधिभ्यां ब्रह्मैव संबध्यत इति यदुक्तं, तत्र न व्यवस्थेत्याह।" (२-३-४८)

This and following four Sūtras also refer to and refute Śaṃkara's Upādhi-Vāda.

Again referring to the state of Salvation, Śrīkaṇṭha says :—

"अतो निर्विशेषमेव ब्रह्म मुक्तप्राप्यं नान्यदिति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—पूर्वोक्तं सविशेषमेव ब्रह्मस्वरूपं मुक्तप्राप्यम्।···अतः सगुणमेव ब्रह्मस्वरूपं मुक्तप्राप्यं फलमिति।" (३-३-४०)

Here it is said that Brahman is not Nirviśeṣa, but Saviśeṣa ; not Nirguṇa, but Saguṇa ; and so, the Mukta also, who attains Brahman, attains such a Saviśeṣa and Saguṇa Brahman.

"केचिन्निरन्वयोपासकानामामिह शरीरपात एव मुक्तिरित्यचिरादिगतिमनियतामाहुः।"
(४-२-१३)

That is, some hold that those who worship Nirguṇa Brahman or know him through Śravaṇa-Manana-Nididhyāsana (cf. Sivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā of Appaya Dīkṣita), attain Salvation here and now, immediately after death ; so it is not necessary for them to go through the Path beginning with Light for attaining Brahman.

This seems to refer to Saṃkara's Jivan-Mukti-Vāda.

"निरन्वयोपासकानां नार्चिरादिति केचित्।" (४-३-१)

This means the same as above.

Thus, there can be no doubt that Śrīkaṇṭha flourished after Śaṃkara.

In a general way also, Śrīkaṇṭha refers to Śaṃkara in his 'Panegyric Verses'

"व्यास-सूत्रमिदं नेत्रं विदुषां ब्रह्मदर्शने।
पूर्वाचार्यैः कलुषितं श्रीकण्ठेन प्रसाद्यते ॥५॥

(For English Translation, see in loco)

Here by "पूर्वाचार्य" Śrīkaṇṭha means 'Śaṃkara'. The Śivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā also asserts this.

According to some, (e.g. Appaya Dīkṣita himself), Śrīkaṇṭha flourished between Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja. Whatever be other grounds for this assertion, on grounds of inner, logical development, Rāmānuja's system seems to be the first developed Counter-System to stand up against the vastly glorious Śamkarite System. That is why, as natural, he spends most of his time and energy in criticising Advaita View, so that it was not necessary for Nimbārka and Śrīkaṇṭha to do so again on a larger scale later on.

Sivarka-Mani-Dipika of Appaya Diksita.

The only extant sub-commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha-Bhāṣya is "Śivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā" by Appaya Dikṣita, the celebrated Philosopher, Grammarian and Rhetorician (16th—17th Century). This is an elaborate treatise, very scholarly and helpful in interpreting Śrīkaṇṭha's view properly. In the Introductory Verse of this work, he says :—

"नारायणी-सहचराय नमश् शिवाय"—

"Obeisance to Śiva, the Consort of Nārāyaṇī".

This explicit and purposive mention of "Nārāyaṇī" with "Śiva" here shows that Appaya Dīkṣita, true to his universal outlook and spirit of accommodation, made no distinction between Śiva and Viṣṇu as Sectarian Deities.

In the beginning, Appaya Dīkṣita also bows down to the great teachers of the Śaiva Sect, thus :—

"महा-पाशुपत-ज्ञान-सम्प्रदाय-प्रवर्तकान्।
अंशावतारानीशस्य योगाचार्यानुपास्महे ॥३॥"

"I worship the Yogācaryas, who promulgated the Sect that aims at

the knowledge of the Great Paśupati (Śiva), and who are the Partial Incarnations of the Lord."

He also enumerates these Ācāryas as twenty-eight, led by Śvetācārya, the Guru of Śrīkaṇṭha, thus :—

"अनेन श्लोकेन शिव-शास्त्र-प्रचारणार्थं शिवावतार-रूपानामष्टाविंशतेर्योगाचार्याणा-माद्यस्य-श्वेताचार्यस्यापि नमस्कारः क्रियते ।" (१-१-१)

"In this verse, he (Śrīkaṇṭha) bows down to Śvetācārya too, who was the first amongst the twenty-eight Yogācāryas, the Incarnations of Śiva, who came for the propagation of the Śaiva Scriptures."

Of course, it is difficult to identify this Śvetācārya and there is scope for differences of opinion regarding this important point.

Probably, one amongst these holy Teachers of the Śaiva Sect, Śrīkaṇṭha was held in very high esteem by Appaya Dīkṣita who, as revealed in this work, was quite conscious of his own high parentage. Thus, in the Introduction of his Sub-commentary, he asserts the following regarding his perentage :—

"आसेतुबन्ध-तटमा च तुषार-शैलादाचार्य-दीक्षित इति प्रथिताभिधानम् ।
अद्वैत-चित्-सुख-महाम्बुधि-मग्न-भावमस्मत्पितामहमशेष-गुरुं प्रपद्ये ॥४॥
यं ब्रह्म निश्चित-धियः प्रवदन्ति साक्षात्तद्दर्शनादखिल-दर्शन-पारभाजः ।
तं सर्व-वेद-सम-शेष-वुधाधिराजं श्रीरङ्गराजमखिलं पितरं नतोऽस्मि ॥५॥

"I take refuge in my grand-father Acārya Dīkṣita, the Supreme Guru, whose fame has spread from the Himalayas to the Cape Comorin, and who is constantly merged in the great ocean of the Advaita Doctrine of Cit-Sūkhācārya (or of Cit and Sukha, Conciousness and Bliss).

"I bow down to my father Raṅga-Rāja-Makhi whom those possessing certain knowledge and the highest vision of Brahman declare to be "Brahman", and who is well-versed in all the Vedas and the best amongst all the scholars".

But even though belonging to such a celebrated scholarly family, and himself a great scholar and writer, Appaya Dīkṣita humbly says regarding the Śrīkaṇṭha-Bhāṣya :—

"श्रीकण्ठाचार्यकृतं भाष्यं यद् ब्रह्म-सूत्राणाम् ।
प्रतिपदमतिगम्भीरं न शक्यते मादृशैर्बोद्धुम् ॥११॥"

"Every of word of the Commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras by Śrīkaṇṭhācārya is very profound and is not intelligible to persons like me".

'Still, Appaya Dīkṣita undertook to write the above Sub-commentary on it at the command of King Cinna Bomma, and also because of a dream

he dreamt the previous night, as he himself says at the beginning of the work. The dream was to the effect that the Lord, in His Ardha-Nārīśvara Form, but in the disguise of the King Cinna Bomma, appeared to Appaya Dīkṣita and commanded him to explain and expound the faultless commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha (Śloka 12). Thus, Appaya Dīkṣita says:—

"अस्य क्षितीशितुरपार-गुणाम्बुराशेरष्टासु दिक्षु विततोर्जित-शासनस्य ।
अन्तस्सदैव वसता बिभुना नियुक्तो भाष्यं यथामतिबलं विशदीकरोमि ॥१४॥
यावन्तो निविशन्ते विदुषां व्याख्यान-भारती-गुम्भाः ।
सर्वेषामपि तेषां ददाति पुष्पकमिवैतदवकाशम् ॥१५॥
तस्मादत्र यथामति कियदाशय-वर्णनं मया क्रियते ।
तुष्यन्तु ततो विबुधाः कतिपय-रत्न-ग्रहादिवाम्बुनिधेः ॥१६॥

"Directed by the Lord who always dwells inside this King—an ocean of infinite good qualities and a Ruler of eight quarters in an exalted and extensive way,—I shall explain the Commentary, according to my own intellect and power.

"So far as the words of my Explanation go, these will give relief to the wise, like an aerial car. (That is, this Explanation will relieve others scholars from the trouble of explāining the Śrīkaṇṭha-Bhāṣya).

"Here, I, through my own intellect, am explaining to some extent, the intended meaning of the Author. Let the wise be satisfied with that much alone, as a few gems, collected from the ocean, are enough to satisfy all".

This spontaneous and unstinted testimony from one of the greatest minds of those days clearly demonstrates the great value of Śrīkaṇṭha's unique Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya as the foundation of a new School of the Vedānta System of thought.

The Colophons to Śivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā, containing a great deal of information regarding Appaya Dīkṣita, run as follows :—

"इति श्रीशिवातिवादि - मूर्धन्य - शिवदर्शन - स्थापन - धुरन्धर-सकल-देव-भूदेवन् प्रतिष्ठापक - श्रीमत् - चिन्नवोम्म - भूपाल-हृदय-कमल-कुहर-विहरमाण-श्रीसाम्बशिव- प्रेरितस्य श्रीमद्-भरद्वाजकुल-जलधि-कौस्तुभ-श्रीविश्वजिद्-याजि-श्रीरङ्गराजाध्वरि-वरसूनोः अप्पय-दीक्षितस्य कृतौ श्रीकण्ठाचार्य्य-विरचित-ब्रह्म-मीमांसा-भाष्य-व्याख्यायां शिवार्क-मणि-दीपिकाख्यायां द्वितीयस्य अध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।"

"Here ends the Fourth Quarter of the Second Chapter of the Explanation of Śrīkaṇṭhācārya's Brahma-Mīmāṃsā-Bhāṣya, the Explanation called, 'Śivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā', composed by Appaya Dīkṣita

who is the son of Sri Raṅga-Rājādhvarīn, the best performer of the Viśvajit Sacrifice, the brightest jewel of the Bharadvāja Clan, and who has been directed in this respect by Śrī Sāmba-Śiva, abiding inside the heart-lotus of King Srīmat Cinna Bomma, the crown of those who immensely praise Śiva, expert in upholding the Doctrine of Śiva, founder of Temples of gods and patrons of Brāhmaṇas.

In the beginning of his Sub-commentary, Appaya Dīkṣita describes Śrikaṇṭha as specially attracted to the Dahara-Vīdyā or Meditation of the Lord as the Ether inside the heart-lotus (Cidambaram or Cidākāśa). Thus he says.

"दहरविद्यानिष्ठोऽयमाचार्यः। अतएव तस्यां रूप-समर्थकं 'ऋतं सत्यं परं ब्रह्मेति' मन्त्रमिह भाष्ये पुनः पुनरादरातिशयाद् व्याख्यास्यति। कामाद्यधिकरणे च स्वयं दहरविद्या-प्रियत्वात् सर्वासु परविद्यासु दहरविद्योत्कृष्टेति रक्षति।"

"This Ācārya (Śrīkaṇṭha) is devoted to the Dahara-Vidyā. That is why, he has in his Commentary explained the Mantra 'Brahman is Righteousness, Truth and Supreme', (Mahānārayaṇa Upaniṣad 12. 1.) repeated with great care. In the Section on 'Desire and the Like (Br. Sū. 3. 3. 38) he himself will say that amongst all the Para-Vidyās, the Dahara-Vidyā is the best, it being dearest to him". (See in loco).

The whole Mantra is :—

"ऋतं सत्यं परं ब्रह्म पुरुषं कृष्णपिङ्गलम्। ऊर्ध्वरेतं विरूपाक्षं विश्वरूपाय वै नमः॥"

(महानारायणोपनिषद् १२-१)

This has been quoted in Br. Sū. 1. 1. 2. ; 1. 1. 4 etc. (See in loco)

As well-known, Appaya Dīkṣīta was himself an Advaita-Vedāntist. The most celebrated Sub-commentary on Śaṃkara's Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāsya is "Bhāmatī" by Vācaspati Miśra. On Bhāmatī, there is another well-known Sub-commentary "Vedānta-Kalpataru" by Amalānanda. On this "Vedānta-Kalpataru", again, Appaya Dīkṣita wrote a Sub-commentary entitled "Vedānta-Parimala", which is taken to be an important treatise of the Advaita-Vedānta School. But still, Appaya Dīksīta, with a supreme catholic spirit, composed treatises on the Schools of Rāmānuja ("Naya-Mayūkhā-Mālikā"), Madhva ("Nyāya-Muktāvalī) and Śrīkaṇṭha ("Śivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā"), no less. In the present work, he, with a commendable spirit of impartiality, establishes, after Śrīkaṇṭha, a Doctrine of Viśiṣṭa-Śivādvaita-Vāda and criticises Advaita Doctrines. Thus in the Introductory verse he says :—

"यद्यप्यद्वैत एव श्रुति-शिखर-गिरामागमानां च निष्ठा
साकं सर्वैः पुराण-स्मृति-निकर-महाभारतादि-प्रवन्धैः ।
तत्रैव ब्रह्मसूत्राण्यपि च विमृशतां भान्ति विभ्रान्तिमन्ति
प्रत्नैराचार्यरत्नैरपि परिजगृहे शङ्कराद्यैस्तदेव ॥ ६ ॥
तथाप्यनुग्रहादेव तरुणेन्दु-शिखामणेः ।
अद्वैत-वासना पुंसामाविर्भवति नान्यथा ॥ ७ ॥

"Although all the best Scriptures, and Āgamas, as well as all the Purāṇas, Smṛtis, Mahābhārata and the rest advocote Advaita Doctrine ; and although the Brahma-Sūtras, causing confusion even to discerning persons, have taken to be propounding Advaita-Vāda by ancient teachers, like Śaṃkara and the rest ; yet through the grace of Śiva alone, can there arise in men a keen desire for such an Advaita-Knowledge, and not otherwise".

In this way, Appaya Dīkṣita here tries to effect a compromise between Advaita-Vāda and Śivāgama by pointing out that Śiva Himself, and none else, is responsible for all knowledge, including Advaita-Knowledge, equally, although Advaita-Vāda is not the Doctrine of Śaivas of Śrīkaṇṭha School.

So, in accordance with Śrīkaṇṭha's Doctrine, Appaya Dīkṣita concludes :—

"तदिदं ब्रह्मसूत्राणां तात्पय सगुणे शिवे ।
प्रकटीकतु माचार्यः प्रणिन्ये भाष्यमुत्तमम् ॥१०॥

"The Brahma-Sūtras all propound Śiva as possessed of infinite good qualities. To make this clear, Ācarya (Śrīkaṇṭha) has composed this excellent Bhāṣya".

Concluding Remarks

However meagre our knowledge regarding Śrīkaṇṭha may be from the historical and chronological points of view, fortunately, what is far more important, viz. our knowledge regarding his philosophical views, is fairly complete, thanks to his above excellent work, Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya. Although not very extensive, it yet affords us a full picture of his philosophical position in the scheme of the Vedāntic System of Thought, and of his invaluable contributions to Indian Philosophy, as such. That also is gain enough, as, after all, "where and when and what" of a man pale off before his productions, transcending space, time and lineage.

That is why, instead of undertaking a fruitless and unending research into the birth-place ("where"), date ("when") and life ("what") of Śrīkaṇṭha, we have thought it better to present, to the Public, in our humble way, his incomparable production : Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya through this easy, but literal, English Translation (Vol. II) and a detailed account of his Philosophical Doctrines (Vol. I).

CHAPTER II

I Brahman

Brahman is the central conception of the Vedānta Philosophy. The eternal quest of human mind for the Immortal, Eternal, Full, Perfect and Blissful has ended in the Vedānta Philosophy' in one great and grand conception, viz. that of "Brahman", etymologically meaning "One possessing greatness."

(1) Brahman is the Highest Reality

Śrīkaṇṭha, too, takes Brahman to be the Highest Reality, the Supreme Self.

It goes without saying that that there is nothing higher than Brahman, if 'Brahman' means the Greatest Being. As a matter of fact, 'Brahman' cannot be legitimately called 'Brahman' at all if He be not the Highest· Reality, the Greatest Being. Still, as in Philosophy, nothing should be taken for granted, but everything should be proved, Śrīkaṇṭha, with his usual brevity, but clearness, deals with the problem in several places of his Commentary.

For example, in "Parādhikaraṇa" or the Section dealing with the Highest Being (3.2.30—34), he discusses the topic on grounds of Authority as well as Reasoning. Here the question is as to whether there is anything higher than the Supreme Brahman. The Prima Facie View is that on grounds of Authority, it has to be held that there is something higher than Brahman. For, in some Scriptural passages, Brahman has been designated as a "Setu" or a "Bridge", meaning two things, viz. (1) As a bridge keeps two countries or places apart, being a dividing line between these and being itself thus limited, so is the Lord. (2) As a bridge leads to a desired for place, so the Lord too, does the same thing, leading to a Higher Goal than Himself.

Śrīkaṇṭha replies to the above Prima Facie view both on grounds of Authority and Reasoning. There are numerous Scriptural texts, proving Brahman or God to be "Viśvādhika" or more and higher than the Universe. So, there cannot evidently be any object in the universe which is more and higher than He. Also, the designation of Brahman as a "Setu" or a "Bridge" is only metaphorical, indicating only that, firstly, He keeps all the worlds apart, preventing their inter-mixture ; secondly, that He Himself leads the aspirers after salvation to Himself.

On grounds of Reasoning, too, Brahman has to be taken to be the Highest Reality. This reasoning is the age-old and time-honoured reasoning, common to all Philosophers all over the world., viz. that based on an apprehension of an Infinite Regress. The concept of an Infinite Regress is something that is inexorably opposed to that of stable Truth and Final Goal. But Philosophy always aims at Stability and Finality. That is why, in Philosophy, we always strive to avoid such an Infinite Regress. In the very same manner, Śrīkaṇṭha, too, points out that Brahman being proved to be the Highest Being on other grounds viz. because He is the Cause of all and more than the world, as well as the Object to be attained by all—if something still higher be posited, that will inevitably lead to an Infinite Regress. For, now there being no further characterising mark for the Highest Reality, higher and higher Realities have to be posited ad infinitum. In fact, if once such marks as "Sarva-Kāraṇatva," "Viśvādhikatva" and "Sarva-prāpyatva" or the qualities of "being the cause of all, being more and higher than the universe' and 'being an object to be attained by all' be not considered sufficient to make one the highest, then what will ? Hence, Śrīkaṇṭha concludes :—

"अन्यथा परम-प्राप्याद् विश्वाधिकात् परमकारणादुपरि वस्तु-सद्भावे तदुपर्यपि वस्तु सद्भाव-प्रसङ्गेनानवस्था वेदान्त-वाक्यानां भवेत्। अतः, सर्वातीतः परम-शिवः इति सर्वोत्कृष्टत्वं ब्रह्मण एव। (३-२-३१)

"अतः परमेश्वरान्नास्ति परमिति सिद्धम्"। (३-२-२४)

Thus, Brahman is "Para" and "Sarvotkṛṣṭa", the Highest Being and the Best among all.

Hence, He is to be bowed down by all :—

"पर-ब्रह्मण उत्कृष्टतयैव नमस्कारविषयत्वं लक्षणमुक्तम्।" (४-१-५)

(2) Brahman is the Supreme Self.

Another common description of Brahman in the Vedānta is that He is the Supreme Self, "Paramātman" or "Parātman". This implies that "Brahman" or the Greatest Reality, "Para" or the Highest Object, is not a material reality, not a physical object, but a Spiritual Reality, the Soul or the Self, the very Ātman itself. Hence, the materiality and grossness of Brahman have to be controverted in the very beginning ; and this has been done most enthusiastically by all the Vedāntists by their fundamental concept of Brahman as Jñāna-svarūpa or Consciousness in Essence. Śrīkaṇṭha, too, says in the same strain in the very beginning of his Commentary :—

"नमोऽहं-पदार्थाय लोकानां सिद्धिहेतवे।
सच्चिदानन्द-रूपाय शिवाय परमात्मने ॥१॥

The very first word, indicating Brahman, in his Commentary, is, thus, a very significant one—viz. "Aham Padārtha". That Brahman is Ātman, Paramātman, is admitted by all the Vedāntists in unison. But whether Brahman is a Personal God or an Impersonal Absolute, is the bone of contention between the Monists and the Monotheists of Vedānta Schools. As opposed to the Monistic School of the Vedānta, Śrīkaṇṭha, in common with the Monotheistic Vedāntists, holds that Brahman is not only "Ātman", or Self, but also "Aham" or "I", or a Personal Being. This will be discussed more fully later on.

Again, he says in his Introductory Panegyric twice, thus :—

"स जयति शिवः परात्मा निखिलागम-सारसर्वस्वम् ।" (२) ॥
"भवतु स भवतां सिद्धैय परमात्मा सर्वमङ्गलोपेतः ॥" (३) ॥

These repetitions of the term "Paramātman" in the very beginning of his treatise, enable one to catch fully the real spirit of his Philosophical System, viz. a spirit of Spiritualism, Sublimity, Self-realisation, Sacrifice, and Surrender.

(3) Brahman is Siva

Now, it being established that Brahman is the Highest Reality and the Supreme Self, the next question that naturally arises is: Who is this Brahman ? Can anything more special be known regarding Him ? Or, are we to remain satisfied with a knowledge of His nature and qualities in a general manner only ? Śaṃkara and Bhāskara have advocated strict neutrality regarding the nature of Brahman ; and pointed out that it is sacrilegious on our part to try to identify Brahman, the most Universal Being, with a limited Sectarian Deity. But other Vedāntists being Monotheists and devotional by nature, have, according to their own family-tradition, and inclinations, identified Brahman with a Sectarian God, like Viṣṇu, Kṛṣṇa etc. Śrīkaṇṭha, too, propounds his central Doctrine that Brahman is Śiva, the All-Auspicious One. Thus, the name Śiva occurs many times in his Bhāṣya. Compare the above quoted Introductory Panegyric (Verses 2—3).

In the above quoted first hymn, Paramātman has been designated as "Śiva". Then also in the second hymn, also quoted above, "Parātmā" is called "Śiva".

"तदेतादृश-महत्वाद् ब्रह्मेत्युच्यते । तदेव शिव-शब्द-वाच्यमानन्दातिधर्माश्रयतया सिद्धम् ।" (१-१-२)

The term "Brahman", as stated above, means infinite greatness, while the term "Śiva" implies infinite bliss and the like.

But the Highest Reality, the Supreme Self, is not only Great, but also Good. Hence, the identification of "Brahman" and "Śiva" shows the full nature of the Highest Reality, the Supreme Self, as both Great and Soft. This will be discussed fully later on.

"ब्रह्मणः परम-शिवस्य समन्वय-सिद्धं जगत्-कारणत्वादिकं लक्षणं प्रधान-जीवयोर्न व्यभिचरतीति स्थापितम्।" (१-१-१७)

"Brahman" or "Parama-Śiva" is here said to be the Creator etc. of the Universe".

"मुक्त-प्राप्यं परं ज्योतिरिह परम-शिवाभिधानं परं ब्रह्म।" (१-३-४१)

Here, the Supreme Light, the Object to be attained by the freed, is said to be "Parama-Śiva".

"एवं सकल-दोष-कलङ्क-रहित-शब्द-प्रमाणैक-सिद्ध-सर्व-शक्ति-संपद्-विलासे परमेश्वरे शिवे परब्रह्मणि सम्भावनाऽसद्भावना-विचारः सर्वेऽपि निरवकाश एव।" (२-१-३१)

Here, "Parameśvara Śiva", the Supreme Lord Śiva, is said to be free from all faults whatsoever, omnipotent, knowable through Scriptures alone, and finally, to be "Para-Brahman" or Supreme Brahman, who is above all ordinary categories of possibility and impossibility.

"शिव-शब्द-वाच्यं ब्रह्मोभय-लिङ्गमिति।" (३-२-१७)

"Śiva" or "Brahman" has two marks—freedom from all bad qualities, and possession of all good ones.

"शिव-शब्देन परं ब्रह्मोच्यते।" (३-३-१७)

"Śiva" denotes "Para-Brahman".

In such numerous passages, Śrīkaṇṭha explicitly and with great devotion and reverence, identifies "Brahman" with "Śiva", attributing to the latter all the usual qualities and activities of a Monotheistic God.

II Nature of Siva or Brahman

Now that we know that "Brahman" is "Śiva", the next question that naturally arises is: Who is Śiva? The whole devotional farvour and spiritualistic energy of the great scholar and devotee Śrīkaṇṭha have been spent for answering this fundamental question, a question which saints and sages throughout the ages have tried their utomost to answer, but which, surely, will never be answered to the fullest satisfaction of all Who is Śiva, who is the Lord, what is He like, what does He possess, how does He act'—the eternal, spiritual Quest of Man springs from these eternal,

spiritual Questions. And, Śrīkaṇṭha has indeed, supplied us with very good answers, with his clear vision, in a clearer language, easily intelligible to all,

(1) Siva's Names

Śiva, the Supreme Brahman, the Supreme Self, has numerous Holy Names, of which Eight are most important, as these enable us specially to know something regarding the Holy Nature of the Named, the Lord Śiva Himself. These are as follows :—

"अष्टाभिधानाधिकरणमिति भव-शर्वेशान-पशुपति-रुद्रोग्र-भीम-महादेवाभिधानाष्ट-कस्याधिकरणं वाच्यं परं ब्रह्म।" (१-१-२)

That is, these Eight Names of Śiva are :—

Bhava, Śarva, Iśāna, Paśupati, Rudra, Ugra, Bhīma, and Mahādeva.

These are explained by Śrīkaṇṭha, thus :—

"सर्वत्र-सदा भवतीति भव शब्द-वाच्यं ब्रह्म। शर्व-शब्देन सकल-संहृत् ब्रह्म प्रतिपाद्यते। निरुपाधिक-परैश्वर्य-विशिष्टत्वात् ईशान-शब्द-वाच्यं ब्रह्म। ईश्वरस्येशित-व्यापेक्षतया पशुपति-शब्द-वाच्यं ब्रह्म। संसार-रुग्द्रावकत्वात् रुद्र-शब्द-वाच्यं ब्रह्म। पर-तेजोभिरनभिभवनीयत्वात् उग्र-शब्द-वाच्यत्वं ब्रह्मणः। नियामकत्वेन निखिल-चेतन-भय-हेतुतया भीम-शब्दाभिधेयं ब्रह्म। महत्त्वेन दीप्यमानतया महादेव इत्युच्यते शिवः।" (१-१-२)

Thus, these Eight Holy Names all stand for Eight Holy Attributes or Marks of Śiva. Thus, the first Name "Bhava" means that He exists always and at all places. That is, He is Eternal, and Omnipresent. The second Name" "Śarva" means that He is the Destroyer of all. That is, He is responsible for the Creation, Sustenance and Destruction of the whole Universe. The third Name "Iśāna" means that He possesses limitless and supreme glory and grandeur. That is, He is Fullest and the Most Perfect Being. The fourth Name "Paśupati" means that He is the Ruler of all. That is, He is the Controller of the Universe, as well as 'Antaryāmin or Inner Controller of the Jīvas The fifth Name "Rudra" means that He is the Remover of all earthly afflictions. That is, He is the Giver of Salvation according to the spiritual strivings of the aspirers after salvation. The sixth Name "Ugra" means that is Unsurpassable by all. That is, He is Omniscient and Omnipotent. The seventh Name "Bhīma" means that as the Director of the soul, He is an Object of Fear to all. That is, He is a stern Judge and a strictly Moral Being. The eighth Name "Mahādeva" means that He is a Great Deity. That is, He is the Greatest and the Highest Being.

The above Eight Names enable us to know all the fundamental qualities of the Lord—of His Eternity and Indestructibility, of His Creatorship and Director-hood of the Universe, of His Omniscience, Omnipotence and Omnipresence, of His Might and Majesty, on the one hand, and Sweetness and Softness, on the other ; and, finally, summing up all, of His Infinite Greatness, "Mahādeva," the last Name, being also the Highest of all the Names comprising of all the Names and marking their consummation and perfection.

(2) Siva's Attributes

The above clearly shows that Śiva or Brahman is essentially Saguṇa, or possessed of attributes, and by no means, Nirguṇa, or devoid of attributes as held by Advaita-Vāda. This "Saguṇatva" of Brahman has two sides, one positive and the other negative. On the positive side, Brahman is a substratum of all good and auspicious attributes ; on the negative side, He lacks all bad, inauspicious qualities. That is why, says Śrīkaṇṭha, in the Brahma-Sūtras (3-2-11—17,) He has been designated as "Ubhaya-liṅgam" or possessed of a double mark. So says Śrīkaṇṭha, in the "Ubhaya-liṅgādhikaraṇa" or Section concerned with a two-fold mark :—

"सर्वत्र श्रुतिषु चास्य निरस्त-दोष-कलङ्कत्वं निरतिशय-मङ्गलाकरत्वं चेत्युभय-लिङ्गं हि प्रसिद्धम् ।" (३-२-११)

"निरवद्यं कल्याण-गुणास्पदं च ब्रह्म इत्युभय-लिङ्गमेव ।" (३-२-१५)

"हेय-गुण-राहित्येन कल्याण-गुण-साहित्येन चोभय-लिङ्गं ब्रह्म दर्शयति सर्वत्र श्रुतिरेव भगवती ।···सत्य-ज्ञान-रूपं सर्वज्ञं निरतिशयात्मानन्द-शक्ति-विलासं निरस्त-समस्त-दोषं परं ब्रह्मेत्युभय-लिङ्गमिति दर्शयति । ···स्मर्यते च शिवशब्द-वाच्यं ब्रह्मोभय-लिङ्गमिति ।" (३-२-१७)

That is, in all the Śrutis and in all the Smṛtis, Brahman, or Śiva has been repeatedly said to be 'free from all faults' 'devoid of all rejectible, base, lowly qualities' 'unimpeachable', on the one hand ; and 'full of unsurpassable goodness,' 'possessed of innumerable high, noble and good qualities', 'infinitely praiseworthy', on the other.

Equally repeatedly does Śrīkaṇṭha, too, paint the glorious picture of an All-great, All-good, All-auspicious God, whose very name "Śiva" implies 'Maṅgala', eternal and infinite auspiciousness. This 'Maṅgala', really, constitutes the very 'Svarūpa' or essence of the Lord. Thus, Śrīkaṇṭha, with his unshakable faith in the Lord, makes bold to define "Brahmatva" or "Śivatva" repeatedly in his Bhāṣya :—

"निरस्त - समस्तोपप्लव - कलङ्क-निरतिशय ज्ञानानन्दादिशक्ति-महिमातिशय-वत्त्वं ब्रह्मत्वम् ।" (१-१-१)

"निरस्त-समस्त दोष-कलङ्क-निरतिशयमङ्गलाधारत्वं हि शिवत्वम् ।" (१-१-४)

"निरस्त-समस्त-संसार कलङ्कतया निखिल मङ्गलाधारतया शिव-तत्त्वं यदवगम्यते तदुक्तस्वभावतया सकल-जगज्जन्मादिकारणं भवति ।" (१-१ २)

" परम-विशुद्धि-मङ्गल गुण-वाचकेन शिवशब्देन निरस्त-समस्त-दोष कलङ्कं निरतिशयपुरुषार्थं गुणपरिपूर्णं ब्रह्माभिधीयते ।" (३-२-१७)

"निरस्त-समस्त-कलङ्कतया निखिल-मङ्गलभाजनतया च शिवशब्देन परं ब्रह्मोच्यते ।" (३।३।१७)

"निरस्त-समस्त-दोष-कलङ्क-शङ्का-निरतिशय-मङ्गलास्तदं हि शिवत्वम् । परं ब्रह्म च तादृगेव ।" (४-३-१)

These sweet passages will go to show clearly the sweet vision of our Seer-Philosopher Śrīkaṇṭha of the All-sweet Being, who, on the one hand, is eternally free from all "Kalaṅka" or blemishes, and, on the other, eternally full of all "Maṅgala" or excellences.

Here, the term "Nirasta" has been repeatedly used, and with purpose. The term "Varjita" also might have very well been used, but it would have carried a different meaning. "Nirasta" means "Stopped", "Varjita" means "devoid of". If it were only said that Brahman or Śiva is "devoid" of all worldly faults, it might have been thought that He has absolutely no connection with the world and is wholly transcendent. But when it is said that all worldly faults have "stopped" or "turned away" from Him, it clearly indicates, that the Lord is immanent in the world, the world is nothing but His external manifestation, yet the sins and sorrows, faults and failings due to the Sakāma-Karmas of the Jīvas, endowed with freedom of will, do not touch Him or are transmuted in Him.

Thus, we have the exhilarating picture of a Sweet and Benign Being, who is in the world, yet not of it ; who as 'Nīlakaṇṭha' swallows all poison. yet does not drink it ; who holds in Himself all defects, yet is unstained by these.

Of these numerous auspicious qualities, the following Six Holy Attributes are the most important :—

"यत् सर्वज्ञत्वादिविशिष्टमष्टाभिधानाधिकरणं शिव-तत्त्वं तदेव जगत्-कारणं ब्रह्मेत्युच्यते । सर्वज्ञत्वं नित्यतृप्तत्वमनादिबोधत्वं स्वतन्त्रत्वमलुप्तशक्तिमत्त्वमनन्तशक्तिमत्त्वं चैत्येतानि सर्वज्ञत्वादीनि ।" (१-१-२) ।

Thus, these Six Holy Attributes are—"Sarvajñatvam", "Nitya-tṛptatvam", "Anādi-bodhatvam", "Svatantratvam", "Alupta-Śaktimattvam" and "Ananta-Śaktimattvam".

These are again, explained by Śrīkaṇṭha, as follows :—

"नित्यापरोक्षानपेक्षित-बाह्य - करण - निष्कलङ्कानुभव - विषय - निखिल-वस्तुत्वमिह सर्वज्ञत्वम्"।

"निरस्त-समस्तोपप्लव-कलङ्क-निरतिशयानन्द-परिपूर्णत्वमिह नित्यतृप्तत्वम्।"

"स्वतस्सिद्ध-निरतिशय-ज्ञान-स्वत्त्वमनादि-बोधत्वम्।"

"अन्य-प्रेष्यता-कार्पण्य-रहितत्वेन स्ववशीकृत-खेतर-सकल-वस्तुत्वं स्वातन्त्र्यम्।"

"स्वाभाविक - शक्तिमत्त्वमलुप्तशक्तिमत्त्वम्।" "अपरिच्छिन्न - शक्ति - विशिष्टत्व-मनन्तशक्तिमत्त्वम्।"

Thus, the first Attribute "Sarvajñatvam", or "the quality of being omniscient" means that the Lord's Knowledge is eternal, direct, independent of external sense-organs, faultless and comprising of all objects. The second Attribute "Nitya-tṛptatvam" or "the quality of being ever-satisfied" means that He is eternally free from all the blemishes of sins and eternally full of unsurpassable bliss. The third Attribute "Anādi-bodhatvam" or "the quality of having eternal comprehension", means that He possesses self-proved, unsurpassable knowledge. The fourth Attribute "Svatantratvam" or "the quality of being independent", means that on the one hand, He has no controller, and on the other, He Himself is the Controller of all. The fifth Attribute "Alupta-Śaktimattvam" or 'the quality of having non-hidden powers" means that all His powers are natural, following from His very nature. The sixth Attribute "Ananta-Śaktimattvam" or 'the quality of having innumerable powers", means that He possesses limitless powers.

Amongst these Six Attributes, we find that two refer to the Lord's Knowledge, two to His Powers, one to His Independence, and one to His Sinlessness and Blissfulness. Here, apparently the Lord's majestic aspect has been stressed more than His sweet one. But, this, too, has been done with a purpose. For, the final aim of all alike, God or men, is to be "Tṛpta", satisfied, with all the heart's desires fulfilled. All Knowledge, all Power, all Independence aim at this, only at this – to be satisfied, to be happy, to be calm, That is why, the main causes of "Nitya-tṛptatva", viz. full knowledge, full power and full independence, have been emphasised there vigorously.

In this way, the attributes of Brahman may, very well, be classed under two heads : Bhīṣaṇa and Madhura, Majestic and Sweet. From the

former point of view, He is a far-off Deity, an object of reverence and fear to us, an omnipotent Creator, transcendent and beyond our reach, an omniscient Controller, Judge and Dispenser of Justice to all, according to their respective Karmas. Vast is His Knowledge ; profound is His Power ; unfathomable is His Glory or Grandeur. From the second point of view, however, He is nearest and dearest to us all, an object of love and comradeship, immanent in the world and our Inner Controller, infinite bliss and peace. As pointed out above, this soft and sweet aspect of Auspiciousness ('Maṅgala'), constitutes the very Core of Brahman's Nature. Hence, it will be discussed again separately later on.

In common with other Bhāṣya-Kāras, Śrīkaṇṭha, too, interprets a large number of Scriptural texts to show that all those refer to Brahman and the qualities mentioned therein, all belong to Brahman alone. (See below).

Thus, although Śrīkaṇṭha, true to his usual reticence, never attempts any critcism of the Advaita Doctrine that Brahman as 'Nirguṇa', yet he firmly establishes his own Doctrine of the Saguṇatva of Brahman, not by means of elaborate argumentations, but by the simple and straightforward statement of what he thinks to be His essential qualities. Then he concludes, simply, yet forcefully :—

"अतः सगुणमेव ब्रह्मस्वरूपं मुक्तप्राप्यं फलमिति ।" (७-७-४०)

Brahman, as the sole goal to be reached, as the sole object to be attained, is Saguṇa-Brahman. Hence, the ultimate nature of Brahman or Śiva is that He is fully and absolutely Saguṇa.

(3) Siva's Acts.

Just as Śiva has Eight Holy Names (Aṣṭa-Nāma) and Six Holy Attributes (Saḍ-Guṇa), so He has also Five Holy Acts (Pañca-Kṛtya). These are Sṛṣṭi, Sthiti, Pralaya, Tirobhāva and Anugraha. The last two correspond to Bandha and Mukti.

"जन्मादिकं जन्म-स्थिति-प्रलय-तिरोभावानुग्रहरूपं कृत्यमस्य चेतनाचेतन-सम्मेलन-समरसीभूतस्य प्रपञ्च-विलासस्य यतो यस्माद् ब्रह्मेति शेषः ।" (१-१-२)

These will be discussed later on :

III Other characteristics of Siva or Brahman

Besides the above Eight Names, Six Attributes and Five Acts, which enable us to have an inkling into the nature and essence of the Lord, He also possesses numerous other characteristics and it is absolutely

impossible for us to know these even infinitesimally. However, a few more, following from the above, may be mentiond here, separately, those, too, being fundanemtal to an understanding of His essential Nature.

(1) Brahman as 'Saccidananda.'

By common consent, 'Saccidānanda' has been taken to be the best description of Brahman, by all the Schools of the Vedānta That is why, in the very first verse in his Commentary, Śrīkaṇṭha, too, makes obeisance to "सच्चिदानन्दरूपाय शिवाय" to Śiva who is of the form of Sat, Cit, Ananda : Existence, Consciousness, Bliss. A little thought will show as to how great and grand is this Vedantic Conception of सच्चिदानन्द-स्वरूप, how easiest for us to understand, yet how profound and sublime in significance.

(i) Brahman as "Sat".

The first fact we are conscious of is 'existence'—existence of our own selves. 'I exist'—this is the most incontrovertible fact of life. Whatever be the nature of this "I", however true or false it may be, the undeniable fact remains that something exists whoever or whatever he, she or it may be. Thus, as existence is such a fundamental fact of life, it is the first characteristic which we have to posit of God or the Absolute as well—otherwise, we cannot even think of Him. Hence God is "Sat" or Existence, but not only "Sat", also "Nitya Sat" or Eternal Existence. An existence that is not eternal amounts to little, having but a limited, short, temporary life in between Prāgabhāva and Dhaṃsābhāva : origination and destruction.

Again, Brahman is not only "Sat", but also "Sattāvān", not only "Existence", but "Existent". That is, 'Existence' is both His essence or Svarūpa, and attribute or Guṇa. This point is insisted on by all the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta, as against the Monistic School, simply because of the fact that if Brahman be Saguṇa, then His Svarūpa and Guṇa must tally with each other. So, if God is 'Existence' by nature, then He must be 'Existent' by attributes as well. Thns, Brahman is without beginning without end, without growth without, decay—an Ever-Full, Ever-Perfect, Ever-stable Being.

(i) Brahman as "Cit."

But existence may be material or non-material. An atom might exist, and eternally do so. But who would say that it is a full, perfect, fruitful existence ? So, perfect existence necessarily implies non-material or conscious existence ; or, in other words, "Sat" necessarily implies "Cit"—"Existence" necessarily involves "Consciousness". Hence, Brahman is not only "Sat", but, at the same time, "Cit."

Here, too, Brahman is not only "Jñāna-Svarūpa", but also" Jñāna-Guṇaka or Jñatā" That is, Conseiousness is both His essence and attribute. In Sūtra 3.2.16, Śrīkaṇṭha proves this point by means of an attractive illustration :—

" 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' इति श्रुतिरनवच्छिन्न-ज्ञानरूपतामात्रं ब्रह्मण, आह नान्यं निवारयति, विशेषाभावादविरोधाच्च। यथा स्वर्णरूपं किरीटमित्येतत् स्वर्णरूपता-मात्र-कथनपरं, न तत्खचितरत्नादिनिषेधपरं तद्वदिति।" (३।२।१६)

That is, in some Scriptural passages, Brahman, no doubt, has been described as Pure Consciousness (Tait 2.1.1.); but that by no means implies that He is not something else, viz a Conscious Knower. E.G., When a gem-studded, golden crown is simply described as gold is essence, it is not denied that it is also gem-studded.

In the same manner, Brahman is Consciousness in Essence, as well as a Supremely Conscious Being, Sarvajña or Omniscient. This attribute of Omniscience has been included in the above Six Holy Attributes of Brahman. This means that He knows all things at all times, and so He has been called विपश्चित् in the same passage (Tait. 2. 1. 1.), which may be explained as follows :—

"विविधं वस्तुजातं पश्यन्ती विमृश्यन्ती चिद्यस्य स विपश्चित्।" (३।२।१६ श्रीकण्ठभाष्यम्)

Thus, Perfect in Existence, as well as Perfect in Knowledge, Brahman shines forth in His eternal Glory and Grandeur,

(iii) Brahman as Ananda.

But Glory and Grandeur need consummation, as pointed out above, and that is found in His 'Ānanda'. As mentioned above, 'Maṅgala' and 'Ānanda', 'Auspiciousness' and 'Bliss' constitute the very essence of Śiva, etymologically meaning "The Auspicious One." Hence, as we have seen, Śrīkaṇṭha repeatedly and vigourously emphasises this blissfulness of Brahman. As a matter of fact, Perfect Existence and Perfect Consciousness necessarily imply Perfect Bliss, no less. For, to exist is to be happy. For, who has even been found to be desiring to be non-existent ? But if existence were not bliss, why should all desire to exist ? Specially, in the case of Brahman, existence is not obligatory existence, but a purely voluntary one, So, why, should He voluntarily exist unless His Existence also means Bliss to Him ? Further, it is not limited and short-living existence, but is absolutely unlimited and eternal. So, this Bliss also is absolutely unlimited and eternal.

In the same manner, Perfect Consciousness or Knowledge also is

Perfect Bliss. For, to know is to be happy ; to know perfectly and in an unobstructed way, is to be happy in exactly the same manner. Hence, "Sat", "Cit" and "Ānanda" are inextricably connected, one necessarily leading to the other.

The celebrated "Ānandamayādhi-Karaṇa" (1. 1. 13—16.) makes it clear that Ānanda, in the truest sense of the term, can belong only to the Lord, who alone, thus, is both "Ānanda" and "Ānanda-maya". The worldly soul can never be such an "Ānandamaya"—But **नित्य-सम्पन्न-शिव:** or **"ब्रह्म"** alone can be such an **"आनन्दमय"** (1. 1. 13.). For who else but a Nitya, an Eternal, Ever-existent Being, be really blissful ? How can limetless Ānanda be possible, except in the case of a Limitless Being ? So Śrikaṇṭha concludes :—

"ब्रह्मानन्दनिरतिशयशिरष्कत्वेनाभ्यस्यते । तस्मादानन्दमय: परमेश्वर एव ।"

(१।१।१३)

"आनन्दमयोऽप्यानन्दप्रचुर: परमेश्वर: ।" (१।१।१४)

"अत: आनन्दमय: शिव एक एवानुसंधेयमिति ।" (३।१।१७)

The 'Ānandamaya' is the Supreme Lord, possessing an infinite abundance of bliss.

"ब्रह्मणो मनसैव महानन्दानुभवो, न वाह्यकरणद्वारा ।" (१।१।२)

Brahman enjoys His great bliss through His mind only, and not through external sense-organs.

The essential nature of Fulness is that it over-flows and touches others. So, Brahman, the All-blissful Being, is also "Ānanda-Dātā, a Gracious Giver of Bliss to all. Unless one oneself possesses a thing, one cannnot, evidently, give the same to others. Hence, as Brahman gives an abundance of bliss to others, He, too, must Himself possess an abundance of bliss.

"स्वयं प्रचुरानन्दो हि परानानन्दयति । अत: परमेश्वर एवानन्दमय: ।"

(श्रीकण्ठभाष्य १।१।१५)

In this way, the Bliss of Brahman finds expression in the apparently sorrow-suffocated world and makes it blissful. True indeed, is that bliss-pouring text of the Taittirīya-Upaniṣad :—

"All these beings, verily, are born from Bliss (Ānanda) ; being born, are sustained in Bliss ; return and enter into Bliss." (Tait. 3. 6.)

(2) Brahman is All-merciful.

From the above, it will follow that the All-blissful Lord, must, also, be All-Merciful. For Bliss and Cruelty are self-contradictory. One Who

is himself happy, cannot destroy the happiness of others. So, the Lord is, at the same time, a supremely Merciful Being.

The perfect proof of this is that He is an incessant Giver, 'Nitya-Dātā'. Hence, He has been described to be Phala- Dātā, the Giver of the 'fruits' of Karmas, done by the Jīvas. Of course, it goes without saying that according to the fundamental Karma-Vāda, the "Phalas" or appropriate results, good or bad, follow automatically from those Karmes themselves. Still Brahman, and none else, is spoken of as the Phala-Dātā, as Karmas being non- intelligent, essentially need a Director to connect these with their respective souls. So, as non-intelligent things, like Karmas, cannot be called "Dātās" or bestowers of anything, God alone can be so. So says Śrīkaṇṭha :—

"परमेश्वरादेवाराधित्वात् सर्वेषां कर्मफलसिद्धिः ।···न हि अचेतनस्य कर्मणाऽपूर्वस्य वा तारतम्येन प्रतिनियतं फलं ज्ञातुं दातुं सामर्थ्यमस्ति ।···तस्मात् कर्मभिराराधितः परमेश्वरः फलदाता, न कर्मेति निर्णयः ।" (३।२।३७)

But by far the best of all the Phalas, all the desired for objects, all the goals to be reached, is undoubtedly Mokṣa, or Salvation. And, Phla-Dātā All-merciful Lord, must give this most Coveted Phala also to the deserving.

Hence, in the very opening Verse, Śrīkaṇṭha bows down to the Lord thus :—

"नमोऽहं पदार्थाय लोकानां सिद्धिहेतवे ।"

He is the Cause of "सिद्धि" of all the worlds.

Hence, He is described as मुक्ति-साधक by Śrīkaṇṭha thus :—

"एवं श्रुतिरेव सकल-प्रमाण-शेखर-स्थानीया सत्य-ज्ञानानन्दमपरिच्छिन्न-स्वरूपं सर्वज्ञं नित्यतृप्तं स्वतन्त्रं अनादिप्रकाशं अनन्तालुप्तशक्तिकं आत्मारामं अन्तरानुभवैक-विषय-परमानन्दं उपशान्तं अमृतं नीलकण्ठं विरूपाक्षं उमासहितं परं ब्रह्म सर्वात्मकं मुक्तिसाधकमिति सर्वत्र घोषयन्ती केन निवार्यते ।" (३।३।३१)

Not only do all the Scriptures declare this, but, as shown above, Reason, too, leads to the very same conclusion. For, if Brahman be taken to be Phala-Dātā, then all Phalas He Himself must produce, including Mokṣa-Phala.

That is why, Brahman is "Mukta-Prāpya" the Supreme Object to be attained by the freed souls, This has been repeatedly emphasised by Śrīkaṇṭha in common with all the Vedantists. For example, he says : —

"पुण्यापुण्य-प्रवृत्त-नामरूप-विनिर्मुक्तानां मुक्तानां प्राप्यतया व्यपदेशाच्चायं परमेश्वर एव ।" (१-३-२)

That is, one of the main marks of Brahman is that He is "Mukta-Prāpya". So, whenever that mark is found to be applied to any object or being, that must be taken to be Brahman and none but Brahman.

As a matter of fact, "Mukti" is the Summum Bonum, the highest end, the most-coveted, the best-beloved object, and who else but the Highest Being can grant it ?

So, Srikantha concludes enthusiastically :—

"ततः परज्योतिस्-स्वरूपं मुक्त-प्राप्यं परशक्त्युमा-सनाथं परं ब्रह्म दहर-पुण्डरीकाकाश-मध्यवर्ति स्वाभाविकापहत-पाप्मत्वादि-गुणकमुपासनीयमिति सिद्धम्।" (१-३-२२)

"मुक्त-प्राप्यं परं ज्योतिरिह परम-शिवाभिधानं परं ब्रह्म, तत्प्राप्तानामेवानावृत्ति-दर्शनात्। परब्रह्मणोऽन्यत् प्राप्तानां कथमनावृत्तिः समुचिता।" (१-३-४१)

That is, the Supreme Brahman, of the form of Supreme Light, alone is the object to be attained by those who aspire after Salvation. For, those who attain Him alone get rid of transmigratory existence.

Hence, Brahman is regarded as "संसार-पाश-विच्छेद-कारणः संसार-भेषजः" (e.g. Sū, 1. 1. 21.), as well as "परमकारुणिकः" (Sū. 1.3.24.), and सर्वानुग्राहकः" (Sū. 2.1.35. etc.), and so on. He is, thus, the Cause of the severance of the noose of transmigratory existence, the Infallible Medicine to the great disease of sinful and painful worldly life, a supremely Merciful Being, and the Favourer of all.

In this way, Softness, Sweetness, Sympathy, Mercy and Beauty constitute the very essence of Brahman.

(3) Brahman as Pure, Perfect and Complete.

Purity constitutes the essential mark of a Being who is Eternal—Eternal Existence, Eternal Consciousness, Eternal Bliss. For, what is impure, what is imperfect, what is incomplete, can never exist or persist for long. The potency that is inherent in all these, cannot stand still and stable; but must inevitably work either for purity, perfection and completeness, thereby destroying themselves ; or for further impurity, imperfection and incompleteness, thereby also destroying themselves. Thus, impurity, imperfection and incompleteness involve a natural, inner, self-contradiction that sooner or later inevitably make for their own destruction—whether integration in a higher state, or disintegration in a lower.

It follows, therefore, that an Eternal Being or one capable of existing eternally, must also be a Pure, Perfect, Complete Being. Hence, Brahman who is "Nitya", must also be "Nitya-Śuddha, Nitya-Niṣkalaṅka, Nitya-Pūrṇa". Hence Śrikaṇṭha repeatedly refers to Brahman as

"नित्य-शुद्धानन्द-स्वरूपः, निरस्त-समस्त-दोष-कलङ्कः, निरतिशय-मङ्गल-स्वभावः" and so on (e.g. Sū. 1.4.27. etc.). This, has also been referred to above. (Pp. 17—18).

(4) Brahman as the Vast or Universal (Bhuman).

It has already been pointed out above that Brahman is the Highest and the Greatest Being, as the very etymological meaning of the term shows. These 'Highness' and 'Greatness' combine to make Him "Bhūman", a Vast and a Universal Being.

In the seventh chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the celebrated Bhūmā Tattva has been propounded exhaustively, in the Nārada-Sanatkumāra-Samvāda. Here, Nārada repeatedly asks Sanatkumāra about higher and higher Realities, and in reply propounds to him the following in a successive higher and higher order :—Nāma (Name), Vāk (Speech), Manas (Mind), Saṃkalpa (Resolution), Citta (Comprehension), Dhyāna (Meditation), Vijñāna (Knowledge), Bala (Power), Anna (Food), Ap (Water), Tejas (Light), Ākāśa (Ether), Smṛti (Memory), Āśā (Hope), Prāṇa (Vital-breath). But the Highest of all is "Satya" (Truth), which has to be known in a full and perfect manner. Such a full and perfect knowledge is "Vijñāna", distinct from the one mentioned above, which means only knowledge through the Vedas, Itihāsa, Purāṇa, Vyākaraṇa etc. (Chānd. 7. 7. 1.). This 'Vijñāna' is a a higher kind of knowledge of the Highest kind of Truth. Such a 'Vijñāna' requires 'Manana' or Deliberation. 'Manana', again, requires "Śradhā" or Reverence. 'Śraddhā', again, requires 'Niṣṭhā' or Devotion. 'Niṣṭhā', again, requires 'Karma' or Work. 'Karma', again, requires 'Sukha' or Pleasure. And finally, 'Sukha' is identical with 'Bhūman' or the Vast and the Universal and the Immortal (Chānd. 7. 23. 1., 7. 24. 1.)

In this way, the Highest Reality and the Greatest Being, viz. Brahman, is at the same time the Vast and the Universal and the Immortal, or Pleasure. This is an eudemonistic conception of 'Sukha' and 'Ānanda': Pleasure and Happiness or Bliss. These two terms have been purposely used in the Upaniṣads. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. we have the conception of 'Sukha', (Pleasure) in connection with that of 'Satya', (Truth) (Chānd. 7. 22—23); while in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, we have the conception of 'Ānanda (Happiness or Bliss) in connection with that of 'Rasa' (Juice) (Tait. 2. 7., 3. 6) So, the term "Sukha" or Pleasure specially implies Pleasure due to Truth or Intellectual Pleasure; while the term "Ānanda" or Happiness or Bliss specially implies Happiness or Bliss due to Juice ('Rasa'—a very difficult term to translate in English), or Emotional Happiness or Bliss. As the term 'Ānanda' is fuller than the term 'Sukha', ordinarily, it is used in connection with Brahman.

However, as mentioned above, in the concept of 'Bhūman', we have the twin concepts of what is the 'Highest' and what is the 'Greatest', combining into a grand concept of what is the 'Universal', which is but a synonym for 'Pleasure'. And, who else but Brahman can be such a 'Bhūman' or 'Universal Pleasure'?

Hence, Śrīkaṇṭha also concludes in the 'Bhūmādhikaraṇa' (Sū. 1. 3. 7—8)

"परमेश्वर एव भूम-शब्द-निर्दिष्टः। (१-३-७)

"ततः परमेश्वरो भूमा नापर इति सिद्धम्। (१-३-८)

The Supreme Lord, alone, is designated by the word "Bhūman", He alone is the "Bhūman".

(5) Brahman as the Tranquil (Santa)

The Highest Being, the Greatest Being, the Pure, Perfect and Complete Being, the Universal Being and the Blissful Being, is necessarily a Tranquil Being. He has nothing to desire, nothing to attain, nothing to do compulsorily, and so, He is naturally above all excitement, all turbulation, all frustration of any kind whatsoever. That is why, He has been very simply, yet very profoundly, described in the Upaniṣads as :—

"शान्तं शिवमद्वैतम्" (माण्डूक्य ७)

"Tranquil, Auspicious, Non-dual"

One who is himself auspicious, cannot cause harm to any one and need not run after any further gains—so he is tranquil. One who is non-dual, cannot fear or hate any one, need not pine for any one to complete his happiness—so he is tranquil. Thus, tranquillity results from this fullness of Being, this vastness of Existence, this depth of Nature. Hence, it is but natural that the Ever-full, Ever-vast, Ever-deep Being or Brahman should be Tranquil or 'Śānta' in the truest sense of the term.

Hence, Śrīkaṇṭha also points out that the very nature of Śiva is that He is rich with tranquillity and peace, and the Upaniṣadic phrase 'Śānti-Samṛddham' (Tait. 1-6) means 'Śivatā-sampannam' (Sū 1. 1. 2).

(6) Brahman as "Akasa-sarira" and the rest.

In describing the nature of Brahman, Śrīkaṇṭha, like others, often quotes from the Vedic Saṃhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads, Smṛtis, Purāṇas etc. But, in connection with Brahman, his two most favourite texts seem to be one from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (1. 6.) and the other from the Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad (1. 2. 1.) [See (7) just below]. These have been repeatedly quoted by him.

The text from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad is as follows :—

"एतस्मतो भवति । आकाश-शरीरं ब्रह्म । सत्यात्म प्राणाराम मनः आनन्दम् । शान्तिसमृद्धममृतम् । इति प्राचीणयोग्योपास्व । (तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद् १-६)

This has been quoted by Śrikaṇṭha in many places. (e. g. 1. 1. 2., 1. 1. 4., 1. 3. 8., 3. 2. 17., 4. 4. 11., 4. 4. 14. etc.).

This means :—"He becomes more than that—viz. Brahman whose Body is the Ether, Soul is Truth, Vital-breath is Pleasure, Mind is Bliss ; who is abounding in tranquillity, and immortal. O Prācīnayogya ! Worship such a Brahman !" (See below the Section on "Cidambaram as Cit Śakti or Para-Śakti".)

This passage has been explained in Bhāṣya 1. 1. 2.

Thus, according to Śrikaṇṭha, the following are the six fundamental characteristics of Brahman :—

(i) Brahman's Body ("Śarīra") is the Ether or "Ākāśa". This means that He is the "Cidambaram". (See below under the Section : "Cidambaram as Parā Śakti"). Or, in other words, He is "Cit". in essence. This has been discussed above. (P. 21).

(ii) Braman's Soul ("Ātman") is Truth or "Satya". This means that Brahman is "Sat" in essence. This, too, has been discussed above. (P. 21)

(iii) Brahman's Vital-breath ("Prāṇa") is Pleasure or "Ārāma". This means that Brahman's "Prāṇa" is Śakti (Umā) in whom alone does He find pleasure. This is the fundamental concept of Śiva-Śakti, discussed below. (Section on "Brahman and Śakti").

(iv) Brahman's Mind ("Manas") is Bliss or "Ānanda". This means that He is "Ānanda" in essence. This has been discussed above (P 22).

(v) Brahman abounds in tranquillity or "Śānti". This, too, has been discussed above. (P. 27)

(vi) Brahman is Immortal or "Amṛtam". This is by far the most fundamental characteristic of Brahman, comprising within itself all other characteristics in one great and grand fold. For, what does it not imply ? It implies eternal existence that is eternal bliss, and bliss, as we have seen, consists of all other great and good characteristics of Brahman. (See above P. 22)

Thus, by repeatedly quoting the above beautiful Tattirīya text (1. 6.), Śrikaṇṭha only desires to emphasise the fact that Brahman is "Saccidānanda" and "Śakti-samanvita".

(7) Brahman as "Rta" and the rest.

Śrīkaṇṭha's second favourite text from the Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad, is as follows:—

"ऋतं सत्यं परं ब्रह्म पुरुषं कृष्णपिङ्गलम्। ऊर्ध्वरेतं विरूपाक्षं विश्वरूपाय वै नमः।" (महानारायणोपनिषद् १२—१)

This, too, has been quoted by Śrikaṇṭha in many places (e. g. 1. 1. 2., 1. 1. 4., 1. 2. 8. etc). (See P. 10).

This means:—

"Obeisance to Brahman—who is Law, Truth, Supreme, a Person, black and tawny, abstemious, possessing three eyes and having the Universe as His form". (Mahānār. 12. 1.)

This, evidently, refers to a Sectarian Deity, viz. Śiva, with whom Śrīkaṇṭha identifies Brahman. (See above P. 14). Thus, according to him, Śiva or Brahman possesses the following eight fundamental characteristics:—

(i) Brahman is Law or "Rta". This implies that there is no inner contradiction in Brahman, He is one integrated, organic Whole, a perfect System. Otherwise, He cannot exist eternally as a Perfect Being. Existence implies integration, for a thing that is not integrated cannot exist at all. Again, perfection, too, implies integration, for, desintegration or inner contradiction is the greatest of all imperfections. Hence, as Brahman is Eternal and Perfect Existence (See above P. 21), He is Perfect Law, System, Harmony.

That is why, the whole universe too, is a Cosmos and not a Chaos, Thus, Law is the rule of the universe, in the physical, mental and moral spheres equally.

(ii) Brahman is Truth or "Satya". That is, He is "Sat" or Existence in essence. (See above P. 21)

(iii) Brahman is Supreme or "Para". (See above P. 12)

(iv) Brahman is a Person or "Puruṣa". This is the monotheistic conception of a Personal God. (See above P. 14)

(v) Brahman is black and tawny or "Kṛṣṇa-piṅgala. This is a Sectarian Mark.

(vi) Brahman is abstemious or "Ūrdhva-retaḥ". This, too, is a Sectarian Mark.

(vii) Brahman possesses three eyes or is "Virūpākṣa". This, too, is a Sectarian Mark.

(viii) Brahman has the whole universe as His form, or is "Viśvarūpa". This implies another fundamental monotheistic conception, viz. that of Pariṇāma or transformation of Brahman, the Cause, into the

universe, the effect. (See the Section on "Brahman as the Material Cause of the Universe.")

In this way, too, Śrīkaṇṭha quotes the above so many times just to emphasise some of the main characteristics of Brahman or Śiva.

(8) Brahman as Transcendent and Immanent.

Brahman is Omnipresent, the Vast and the Universal. Hence, there is nothing outside Him. Also, Brahman is the Cause, actually and literally manifested in the universe, the effect. (See below the Section on "Brahman as the Material Cause of the Universe".). For these two reasons, Brahman is immanent in the world. There is nothing in the world that is not Brahman, as there is nothing in the clay-jar that is not clay. Hence, Śrīkaṇṭha describes Brahman in many places as "Sarvagata" and "Sarvādhāra" (e. g. Sū. 1. 1. 21)—in all and containing all. Thus, on the one hand, He is "Visvātman", the Soul of the universe, and as such, immanent in its every part and particle, every nook and corner, every grain of dust, every drop of water, every blade of grass. And, on the other, He is the "Antaryāmin", the Inner Controller and as such, immanent in the very souls of Jīvas, permeating, and pulsating with, their every heart-beat, every breath, every life-throb. So says Śrikaṇṭha :—

" भगवत्-सवितृ-मण्डले साक्षादुपास्यतया निर्दिष्टस्य परमेश्वरस्य तस्मिन्नधिकरणे (अर्थात् १-१-२१) विश्वात्मकत्वमुक्तम् ।" (१-१-२६)

"अतश्च सकलात्मा परमेश्वर एवात्राक्षरपदाभिधेयः ।" (१-२-२४) ।

"अतस्तस्मात् सर्वोत्तराच्छिवात् परमस्तीति वादो न युक्तः, श्रुतिमिस्तस्य विश्वाधिकत्वसिद्धेः । अतः सर्वातीतः परमशिव इति सर्वोत्कृष्टत्वं ब्रह्मण एव ।" (३-२-३१)

But although, thus, immanent in the entire universe, evidently the Infinite Being cannot be fully exhausted in a small world like this. So, Brahman is also transcendent. He has infinite qualities and powers, of which only two, viz. Cit and Acit, are manifested in the present world of souls and matter. So, Brahman infinitely exceeds the present world. His glory and grandeur illumine every infinitesimal portion of the present world, yet go beyond the entire nniverse in an infinite manner. That is why, in Monotheistic Systems, the world is God, but God is not the world. Hence, Śrīkaṇṭha, in his characteristic succint, yet simple, way asserts, with due solemnity, this double characteristics of Brahman, viz. that He is immanent yet transcendent, "Viśva-līna" yet "Viśvādhika". Compare the following :—

"तदात्मकत्वेन तदधिकत्वं तदुपास्यत्वं च परमेश्वरस्य ।" (१-२-४)

"विश्वाधिकत्वं परमेश्वरस्य श्रूयते तथा विश्वरूपत्वमपि ।" (१-२-१६)

"सर्वाधिकः सर्वात्मा च शिवः परमेश्वरः इति युक्तमेव ।" (१-२-१६)

" 'नेति नेति' इति पूर्वसिद्धं ब्रह्मणः प्रपञ्चरूपत्वं न निषिध्यते। किन्तु प्रकृत्यैतावन्मात्रं ब्रह्म न भवतीति प्रकृतेयत्तामेव 'नेति नेति' प्रतिषेध्यतीति युक्तम् ।"

(३-२-२१)

Thus, Brahman is at the same time beyond the world (Viśvādhika), yet of the form of the world (Viśva-rūpa); beyond everything (Śarvādhika), yet the soul of everything (Śarvātman).

(9) Brahman as Pure, though Immanent.

A very legitimate question may be asked here. It has been said above that the essential mark of Brahman is that He is Ever-Pure. (P. 25.) But if Brahman be, at the same time, said to be immanent in the universe, as its Soul, as well as immanent in the soul (Jīva) as its Inner Controller, then how can He remain All-Pure, coming as He does in the closest contact with the impure Matter and Souls ?

This Śrikaṇṭha clearly explains, by means of the twin examples of 'Ether and Pot' 'Sun and Water, as mentioned in Brahma-Sūtra 3. 2. 18.

Here, the first example of the 'Ether and Pot' shows that though One and Universal, Brahman is actually present in all objects of the Universe separately, just as, though one and universal, the ether is actually present in all objects like pots etc.

The second example of the 'Sun and Water' shows that Brahman is not at all touched by the faults and failings of those objects, just as the sun, reflected on different water-receptacles, is not touched by their defects (like, muddiness, shallowness etc).

So, these two examples, favourite ones of the Advaita School and repeatedly used by Advaita-Vedāntists for establishing their Upādhi-Vāda, have been used by Śrikaṇṭha here for an absolutely different purpose, viz, for showing, on the one hand, that Brahman actually abides, or is immanent, in the whole world ; and on the other, that, still then, He is totally unaffected by its sins and sorrows.

Hence, he concludes :—

"यतः पृथिव्यादिषु सर्वत्र स्थितस्यापि परमेश्वरस्य निर्दोषत्वं कल्याण-गुणाकरत्वं च अत एव शास्त्रेषु जल-सूर्यकादिवादित्यस्योपमा क्रियते। .....तथा पृथिव्यादिषु वस्तुतः स्थितस्यापि परमेश्वरस्य न तद् विकारादि दोष-स्पर्श इति सर्वान्तर्यामिनः परमेश्वरस्य निर्दोषत्वं स्वरूपगुणाहानिश्चेति सूर्योपमानम् ।" (३-२-१८)

In the same manner, it may be thought that as Cit and Acit, the Souls and Matter, have been said to be constituting the 'Sarira' or Body of Brahman, so, He can no longer be called an Abode of all auspicious attributes (See above Pp. 17—18). To this objection also, Srikantha replies that the possession of Cit and Acit as the body never proves that He is not an All-Pure and All-Auspicious Being. For, as shown above, He is not at all affected by the states and qualities of the Universe of Souls and Matter, although He is transformed into it, although He is immanent in it, although He possesses it as His Body. So, he says :—

"चिदचिदात्मत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणस्तद्धर्मप्रतिषेधाच्च चिदचिद्विशिष्टमपि ब्रह्मानिर्दोषं निखिल-मङ्गल-गुणास्पदं च। एतदुक्तं भवति—चिदचितोः कारणत्वेऽपि तद्विशिष्टत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणः शिवस्य विकाराज्ञत्वाद्यपुरुषार्थ—धर्मरहितत्वं सर्वज्ञत्व-नित्यतृप्तत्वानादिबोधत्व-स्वतन्त्रत्वालुप्तशक्तित्वानन्तशक्तित्वादि परमपुरुषार्थ-धर्मवत्त्वं च नित्यसिद्धमेवेति।"

(३-२-२६)

Brahman has naturally a very close connection with the Universe, for, He as the sole Cause is transformed into it as the effect, He abides in it as its Soul, He possesses it as His Body. All these show that Brahman has the closest possible connection with the Universe. Still, the base qualities of the Universe do not contaminate Brahman at all, and He eternally possesses the Six Holy Atributes, mentioned above (Pp. 17ff.), not possessed by the Universe.

In the very same manner, it may be thought that as Brahman resides inside the individual souls (Jivas) as their Inner Controller, He is similarly contaminated by their impurities and imperfections. Here, also, the same thing can be said :—

"पृथिव्याद्यन्तर्यामितया श्रूयमाणः परमेश्वर एव, सर्वान्तरत्वादितद्धर्म व्यपदेशात्। .....सर्वविकारानुप्रवेशेऽपि तद् विकार-स्पर्श-लेशोऽपि नास्तीति खलु प्रतिपर्यायामृत-शब्द-प्रयोगः। .....तत्रापि-सकल-चिदचित्तत्वानुप्रवेशादस्या पुरुषार्थ संबन्धो भवेदिति शङ्कायां प्रतिपर्यायमैश्वर्यादि-मङ्गल-गुण-संवद्धाभिधायि-भगवच्छब्द-प्रयोगः कृतः।"

(१-२-१६)

Brahman Himself is the Inner Controller of all, Brahman Himself has entered into all the created effects, viz. all objects of the world. Yet in the Scriptures, He has been repeatedly called "Amrta" "Bhagavat", the Imnortal Being, the All-glorious Being etc., specially to show that He is absolutely above all worldly qualities.

Thus, Śrīkaṇṭha concludes on Scriptural Authority :—

"नेति सिद्धान्तः। सर्वावस्थासु सर्वान्तर्यामितया स्थितिमतोपि परमेश्वरस्य न कश्चिद्दोष-कलङ्क-प्रसङ्गः। कुतः ? सर्वत्र श्रुतिषु चास्य निरस्त-दोष-कलङ्कत्वं निरतिशय-मङ्गलाकारत्वं चेत्युभय-लिङ्गं हि प्रसिद्धम्।" (३-२-११)

All the Scriptures in unison declare that Brahman possesses the two-fold marks of being free from all defects and possessing all auspiciousness, as already stated (P. 17). Hence, His other marks of being immanent in the world etc. cannot set at naught this fundamental mark of Purity, Perfection and Completeness, as mentioned above. (P. 25).

Śrīkaṇṭha has, of course, proved the above on Scriptural grounds only. But this may be proved also on grounds of reason, no less. As a matter of fact, Scriptural Texts themselves contain within them profound reasoning, for, real Intuition cannot be opposed to Reason. This reason is that, according to the fundamental Doctrine of the Vedānta, Mukti or Mokṣa means removal of the veil of ignorance (Ajñāna or Avidyā), and realising the real, hidden nature of the universe, and of one's own self or soul. And what is there inside the universe and the individual soul but Brahman ? What else but Brahman do we see when the veil of ignorance is lifted through long and strenuous Sādhanas, spiritual enterprise and discipline ? This is the aim of all Indian Sādhanas,—to see Brahman alone, to see Brahman in everything, to see everything in Brahman, here or hereafter. But if, in the meantime, Brahman Himself comes to be contaminated by the sins and sorrows of the universe inside which He abides, what will there be left for us to see ? For, who will strive to see a sinful, sorrowful, impure Brahman, who is not really Brahman at all ?

Further, an Eternal Being like Brahman cannot in this way go on changing His nature and essence. Hence, the very conception of Brahman's mutability and impurity is absurd. He is, of course, inside the universe, but He is always there in all His glory and grandeur, which no one can ever destroy. Even a small lamp inside a clay-jar, though not seen, yet retains its light, all the time, and when the covering of the jar is shattered, is seen at once in its original form. So, why can this be not possible in the case of Brahman too, the All-Powerful and All-Glorious One ? And, there are even worldly examples to show that one thing can remain inside another thing, yet be untouched by it. E. G. the lotus-leaf inside water is not wetted by it. So, why can this be not possible in the case of Brahman, the All-Powerful and All-Glorious One ? (See below Chap. III under the

Section on "The Second Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda and its Refutation".)

In fact, the Immutability and the Purity of Brahman are the very grounds of the Vedānta Philosophy. If these are lost, the Vedānta, the very Doctrine of Brahman is lost. This is also pure reason, as shown above. (P. 25). And, the Scriptures only express this incontrovertible reason in the form of inspired Mantras, embodying the superb wisdom and sublime insight of the master-minds of old. So, reliance on Scriptures is really nothing but reliance on a higher category of reasoning than our own. Hence, the common Vedānta Doctrine that Brahman is Immanent in the impure universe, yet is Himself Pure, does, indeed, stand to reason.

(10) Brahman as Cidacid-Visista

The above has shown that Brahman possesses Cit and Acit: Individual Souls and Matter, as His Attributes and Body. This is a fundamental concept of Śrīkaṇṭha-Vedānta, and repeatedly emphasised by him in many places of his Bhāṣya. Compare the following, amongst others :—

"भवतु स भवतां सिद्धैव परमात्मा सर्वमङ्गलोपेतः।
चिदचिन्मयः प्रपञ्चः शेषोऽशेषोऽपि यस्यैषः॥—(३)

" चिदचिद्रूपं ब्रह्म खलु इति शान्त उपासीत ब्रह्म इति।" (१-२-१)

" सर्व-चिदचित्-प्रपञ्च-शरीर-विशिष्टं ब्रह्म-सर्वशब्द-वाच्यम्।" (१-२-१)

" तदिह सकल-चिदचिदाकार-परम-शक्ति-विलास-समरसात्मनः सर्वदोष वासना-कलङ्क-रहितात् सर्वज्ञतादि-सकल-मङ्गल-गुण-रत्नाकरात् परब्रह्मणो विरूपात्त्वाच्छ्ववादे-तस्मात् परं किञ्चिदपि वस्त्वन्तरं नास्तीति।" (३-२-३०)

This will be discussed later on under the heads of "Creation" and "Relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat" (Chap. III and VI).

(11) (i) Brahman as All-Powerful.

The All-Merciful Brahman is at the same time All-Powerful. As pointed out above (P.19—20), Brahman has two sides, Bhīṣṇa and Madhura : Terrible and Sweet. It is true, that Brahman's second aspect of Ānanda, Maṅgala and Karuṇā : Bliss, Auspiciousness and Mercy, constitutes His very core, as alredy stated. (P. 19—20). But really, His first aspect is nothing contradictory to it, as there cannot, evidently, be anything contradictory in Brahman's Nature. So, Brahman's Sternness and Justness are nothing but the other sides of His Softness and Mercy. And, this Sternness is nothing unjust, but a necessary corollary of His supreme nature as Justice and Morality in essence. Thus, the All-Powerful Brahman strictly

controls the whole universe according to the canons of Justice. He creates all Jīvas according to their own, respective Karmas, enables them to reap the results thereof (See below Chap. III under the Section on "Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda"). Just as a kind, loving father also controls, guides and punishes his sons, as necessary, according to their behaviour and demeanour, so does the Lord. (See below under the Section : "Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda).

(12) Brahman is Jnata, Karta and Bhokta : A Person.

These have already been mentioned separately as well, as these constitute a main point of difference between the Monistic and Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta. As well known, according to the Monistic or Advaita School of the Vedānta, Brahman is only Saccidānanda-Svarūpa (P. 21). Existence, Consciousness and Bliss in nature or essence, but not a Jantā, Kartā and Bhoktā : a Knower, a Doer and an Enjoyer. But according to the Monotheistic Schools, Brahman is Jñāna-svarūpa and Jañtā, Kartā and Bhoktā. The first means that He is consciousness or knowledge through and through, and has been very appropriately described in the celebrated Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad as follows :—

"स यथा सैन्धव-घनोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नो रसघन एववं वा अरेऽयमात्माऽनन्तरो-बाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन एव ।" (बृहदारण्यक ४-५-१३)

"Just as a lump of salt is without inside, without outside, but only salty through and through, so this Soul also is without inside, without outside, but only knowledge through and through."

But at the same time Brahman is Jñātā or Sarvajña, All-knowing and Ever-knowing. This also has been referred to above. (P. 32)

"न हि परमेश्वरादन्यस्मिन् सर्वज्ञत्वादिकं संभवति ।" (१-२-२२)

Brahman is the only Omniscient Being. For, Omniscience means perfection of the cognitive side of Brahman's nature—which is accompanied by an equal perfection on the emotive side in the form of His All-and-Ever-Blissfulness ; and equal perfection on the conative side in the form of Omnipotence. But who else but Brahman can be Omniscient, All-and-Ever-Blissful and Omnipotent ?

That Brahman is a Kartā, having Pañca-Kṛtyā, has also been referred to above (P. 20), and will be done so below again. (See below P. 56 under the Section on "Activities of Brahman.")

That Brahman is a Bhoktā has also been referred to above (P. 23).

These Jñatṛtva, Katṛtva and Bhoktṛva also prove another important Doctrine of the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta, viz. that of Brahman's Personality. He is the Highest Person, Puruṣottama, in a literal sense, and not in a seatarian one (meaning Viṣṇu). As a matter of fact, the concept of God is not the denial of the concept of Man, but rather a consummation of it. God and Man, no doubt, differ qualitatively, from the phenomenal standpoint. But from the noumenal standpoint, although Man is not merged in God, like a grain of salt in the ocean, and retains his full personality and individuality (See P. 41, 43. See also Chap. VI—the Section on "The Relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat".), yet he does not differ from God qualitatively in that sense, as he himself is divine,—though not identical with God, yet similar to Him. Thus, God and Man, being similar to each other, each is a Person, with full developments of all the sides and all the phases of Personality as we can conceive of viz. cognitive, emotive and conative sides with different phases and different manifestations on different occasions.

This concept of Personality is a fundamental, theological concept, and the System of Śrīkaṇṭha being also a theological one, he naturally takes this as a central tenet of his Vedānta Doctrine. Thus, here God is reverentially and lovingly pictured as a Supreme Monarch, and Controller, with universal, eternal, unobstructed authority over all :—

"विश्वपतिः परब्रह्मभूतो जीवान्तर्यामित्वेनोपास्य इति ।" (१-२-३)

But this 'all' is not something absolutely different from Him—the subjects are the parts and parcels of the Sovereign, His very essence, His very manifestations. Such is the exhilarating conception of a Divine Realm of Persons, where the Supreme Person sees Himself reflected in all other persons, in love and tenderness, in bliss and peace, in truth and reality. (See below Chap. VI—the Section on "The Relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat").

(13) Brahman as One (EKa)

In the very beginning of the present Chapter on Brahman, it has been stated that the first characteristic of Brahman is that He is the highest Reality (P. 12). Now, the term "highest," being superlative, is necessarily a relative one, implying, as it does, some other realities that are less high, or lower. So, from this single term, we come to know that according to the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta, there are other 'realities' besides Brahman, viz Cit and Acit : Jīva and Jagat. Thus, here, three realities have to be admitted, viz. Brahman, Cit and Acit : Īśvara, Jīva and Jagat. Hence, if in this way, the Doctrine of a plurality of realities is accepted, then that seems to imply a kind of Pluralism, with all its

inherent defects and inner contradictions. But, surely, the Vedānta, in all its forms, is a Doctrine of Unity, and not of Multiplicity Therefore, the question is as to how to reconcile the oneness of Brahman with the reality of Jīva-Jagat.

(ii) Three kinds of Bhedas.

Now, when we speak of more than one reality, that means that there is a difference or 'Bheda' between the same. For, if we speak of two realities A and B, A must be different from B, otherwise, why count them as two ? Of course, Differences themselves may be of different kinds. Accordingly, in Indian Philosophy, three kinds of 'Bhedas' or 'Differences' have been spoken of :—'Sajātīya', 'Vijātīya' and 'Svagata'. 'Sajātīya-Bheda' means the difference between two (or more) objects of the same class, for example, that between one tree and another. 'Vijātīya-Bheda' means the difference between two (or more) objects of two (or more) different classes, as for example, that between a tree and a stone. 'Svagata-Bheda' means the difference between two (or more) parts of the same whole, as for example, that between one leaf and another, between a leaf and a flower, and so on, of the very same tree. Evidently, here the difference between one leaf and another of the same tree, may, also be called 'Sajātīya-Bheda' in one sense ; while that between a leaf and a flower of the same tree, may be called 'Vijātīya-Bheda,' in that sense. But, to prevent this kind of confusion, 'Sajātīya' and 'Vijātīya' 'Bhedas' are taken here to be referring to differences between things, taken as wholes ; while 'Svagata-Bheda', between parts of those wholes.

Thus, here, it is evident that the first two kinds of 'Bheda', viz. 'Sajātīya' and 'Vijātīya', really imply separate realities, like trees, stones, and the like. But a question may legitimately be asked here as to how 'Svagata-Bheda', too, can imply the same, for, how can mere 'parts' be taken to be 'realities' themselves ? If the whole be real, then necessarily, its parts, too, must be so; but, simply for that reason, a part cannot be taken to be a 'reality' by itself

This, of course, is wholly correct. For, it goes without saying that the 'reality' by itself is only the whole, as the whole only is an 'object' or a 'thing.' Still, the mutual differences amongst the 'parts' of one 'whole' is also an undeniable fact, as, real 'wholes' are 'organic wholes', or wholes of mutually different, yet intrinsically united, parts. Thus, an 'organic whole' is essentially 'a unity-in-difference', neither a mere unity nor a bare difference, but a wonderful combination of both 'Unity' and 'Difference.' It is in such a combination, alone, in such a unity amongst differences only, that lies the very essence of an "Organic Whole". In fact, if all the parts were identical with one another, then, there would have been really no question of a "whole" at all; for then, there would have been

only a "one", and not a "whole". "Whole", really is a relative term, implying essentially, its "parts"; and "parts", in the plural, imply essentially their mutual differences. That is why, "Brahman" of the Advaita School is not really a "Whole" or a "Unity", but only a "One"—although to distinguish It from "Brahman", of the Monotheistic Schools, It is often called an "Abstract Whole". Thus, it is absolutely essential for the Monotheistic Schools to admit "Svagata-Bhedas" of Brahman. (See below under the Section on "Relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat").

In fact, by this conception of an "Organic or a Concrete Whole", the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta try to reconcile the oneness of Brahman with the multiplicity of Realities. Thus, according to them, Reality is, indeed, not one; yet, at the same time, Brahman is One Reality. This apparently self-contradictory conception is, according to them, quite possible on the abave grounds, that is, if Brahman be taken to be an "Organic Whole."

Thus, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, as well, Brahman's essential nature is that He is One, 'Ekamevādvitīyam" (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6. 2. 1.). All other characteristics of Brahman follow necessarily from this first and fundamental characteristic of "Oneness." For, if Brahman be not One, what else can He be as 'Brahman'? Evidently, if there be some other Realities to destroy His 'oneness', then He can no longer be All-pervasive, All-powerful, All-knowing, and the rest. Hence it does not require much argumentation, as pointed out above, that Brahman has no 'Sajatīya and Vijātīya Bheda', or no reality outside Him, on a par with Him. Further, His 'Svagata Bhedas' too, do not destroy His 'Oneness'; and to make this doubly clear, the second term "Advitīya" has been purposely attached to the first term "Eka" in the above celebrated Chāndogya Upaniṣad text. (Chānd. 6. 2. 1.).

(14) (i) Brahman as Unique (Advitiya)

The question may, legitimately, be asked as to why both the terms "Eka" and "Advitīya" have been thought necessary here. This seems to be nothing but a kind of useless repetition, for, "Eka" or "One" and "Advitīya" or "Without a second" are only positive and negative ways, respecctively, of indicating the very same fact. But how can we, really, conceive of Scriptures as indulging in anything superflous? However, leaving that aside, we can, on the grounds of reason, no less, show that the term "Advitīya", too, is essentially needed here, over and above the term "Eka."

(1) First, according to all logical canons, a conclusion arrived at on positive grounds is confirmed and, thereby, very much strengthened on negative grounds. Mill's celebrated Inductive Methods, viz. Method of

Agreement, Method of Difference, and Joint Method of Agreement and Difference amply illustrate this. These Methods are as follows :—

Method of Agreement :—

A B C	a b c	
A D E	a d e	
A F G	a f g	etc. etc.

∴ A is the cause of a.

Here, the conclusion is arrived at on the grounds of a large number of positive instances only. So, it is rather precarious.

Method of Difference :—

A B C	a b c	
B C	b c	

∴ A is the cause of a.

Here, the conclusion is arrived on the grounds of one positive and one negative instances.

Joint Method of Agreement and Difference :—

A B C	a b c	
A D E	a d e	
A F G	a f g	etc. etc.

Again :—

B C D	b c d	
E F G	e f g	
H I J	h i j	etc. etc.

∴ A is the cause of a.

Here, the conclusion is arrived at on the grounds of a large number of positive and negative instances.

In Indian Logic, similarly, we have the same kinds of Method. For example, in the Nyāya System, we have the Methods of "Anvayā" or Agreement in Presence ; "Vyatireka" or Agreement in Absence, and" "Vyabhicārāgraha" or Absence of Contradictory Instances.

Thus :—

Whenever A is present, a is present.

(Anvaya)

Whenever A is absent, a is absent

(Vyatirekaha)

No instance is found of A being present, yet a being absent,

and

No instance is found of A being absent, yet a being present.

(Vyabhicārāgraha)

∴ A is the cause of a.

Now, all the above cases clearly show the great logical value of

negative instances in confirming the results arrived at on the grounds of positive instances.

The same is the case here, too. Here, the first positive term "EKa" or "One" is beautifully confirmed by the second negative term "Advitīya" or "Without a Second", and so, this is by, no means, useless.

(2) Secondly, however, the term "Advitīya" has a deeper significance, as, it not only confirms the fact of Brahman's Oneness, but over and above, itself brings to light an additional characteristic of Brahman, viz. His Uniqueness. Thus, Brahman is not only "One", but also "Unique", —this is the real implication here.

But a question still remains. Are these two really different, necessitating such a different mention, for, if Brahman be "One", is He not, at the same time, "Unique" ?

Not necessarily,—replies a Mono.heistic Vedāntist. For, the term "One" is an absolute one, while the term "Unique", relative; and it is this latter implication that is specially needed here. Why ? Simply because of the above fundamental Monotheistic conception of Brahman as an "Organic Whole". According to this conception, as we have seen, (P. 37) Brahman is not the only Reality, as His parts Jīva and Jagat are also equally real. So, the question naturally arises as to the exact position of Brahman, the Real, in relation to other reals, like Jīva and Jagat. The term "One" does not involve this question, as, by itself, it simply means that Brahman is One Reality, without necessarily raising the further question regarding His position in a Hierarchy of Reals. But the term "Advitīya" specially does so. Hence, this second term, too, is essentially necessary.

Thus, what does this term "Advitīya" really imply ? It implies that in the Hierarchy of Reals, Brahman has an absolutely Unique position, as, amongst all the Reals, He alone is the "Whole", and none else. In fact, all other "Reals" are only "parts", and "parts" of the "Whole". That is why, naturally, "the Whole" or Brahman is a Unique Reality.

A question, again may be asked here as to why, then, the Advaita Vedānta Schools, too, base their Absolute Monism on the very same celebrated Chāndogya Upaniṣad Text Chānd. Up. 6.2.1.) ? Why do they, also, require the second term "Advitīya" here ?

The reply is that they do so to show that Brahman is the Sole Reality and there is no other reality besides Him. Here also, the first term "One" by itself, being absolute in nature, does not involve any reference to any thing else. But, the question always remains for all, Monists or Monotheists, as to whether there is any other reality besides Brahman; and if so, what is the position of Brahman in relation to the same. That is why, both the Monists and the Monotheists have to face the very same problem

in the beginning, although, as well-known, their solutions of the same are quite different. Thus, according to the Monistic Schools of the Vedānta, Brahman is "Advitīya" or Unique, because He is the Sole Reality, Jīva-Jagat being "Mithyā" or False. But according to the Monotheistic Schools, Brahman is "Advitīya" or Unique because He is the only "Whole" amongst other realities, like—Jīva-Jagat. In this way, the stress on "Advitīyatva" or Uniqueness of Brahman, over and above His "Ekatva" or Oneness, is needed equally by all Schools of the Vedānta.

With reference to the Monotheistic Doctrine of the Uniqueness of Brahman, a further question still remains, viz. In what way is He Unique —qualitatively, or quantitatively, or both qualitatively and quantitatively ?

Evidently, there cannot be any qualitative uniqueness, here, on the part of Brahman; as, according to the Monotheistic Doctrine of "Pariṇāmavāda" or Real Transformation (See below Chap. III under the Section on "Brahman as the Material Cause or Pariṇāmavāda". Also the Section on "The Refutation of the First Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇavāda") Brahman is Himself transformed into the forms of Jīva-Jagat, so that Jīva-Jagat themselves are, too, Brahman in essence or nature. That is why, the Chāndogya Upaniṣad has declared gloriously :—

"सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म ।" (छान्दोग्योपनिषद् ३-१४)

Thus, qualitatively, Brahman, Jīva and Jagat are of the same nature.

But quantitatively, there is, indeed a vast difference, like that between a whole and its parts. Thus, quantitatively Brahman is "Bhūmā," or Vast; Jīva, "Aṇu" or infinitesimal, being only one part amongst an infinite number of parts; Brahman is Omnipotent; Jīva, not so, falling short of that only by one power, viz. that of Creation-Maintenance-Destruction (Sṛṣṭi-Sthiti-Pralaya). (See P. 43) In this way, though qualitatively identical with Brahman, both Jīva and Jagat, yet retain their own 'individuality' under all circumstances whatsoever (P. 36); and in that sense, are only quantitatively different from Brahman. (See below Chap. VI under the Section on "The Relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat.")

In this way, Brahman of the Monotheistic Schools of Vedānta is quantitatively Unique, i. e. a Whole, immanent in its parts, yet transcending these infinitely (See P. 30-31 below. Also Chap. III the Section on "The Refutation of the Fifth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-vāda"). Thus, so far as He is immanent in His parts, He is qualitatively the same as the parts; but in so far as He is transcendent over the parts, He is quantitatively different from and more than the same.

In this way, such an Uniqueness of Brahman, makes for the supreme glory and grandeur of Brahman and Jīva-Jagat, at the same time. The glory and grandeur of Brahman lie in this, that, though not the only

reality, He is, yet, the Highest and the Vastest Reality. If there be only one Reality, then, surely, the Supreme glory and grandeur of that sole, one Reality is easily established. But if there be many realities, qualitatively of the very same nature, then, naturally it is far more difficult to prove the Supreme glory and grandeur of one only, amongst the rest. That is why, this conception of Brahman's quantitative uniqueness, specially makes for His Supreme glory and grandeur.

In the very same manner, this conception of Brahman's quantitative uniqueness also makes for the supreme glory and grandeur of Jīva-Jagat, no less. For, is it not an absolutely grand and glorious thing that quantitatively infinitely small Jīva is yet qualitatively the same as Brahman ?

Here, finally, a word of warning is needed. The relation between Brahman, on the one hand, and Jīva-Jagat, on the other, has been described above as that between an Organic Whole and its parts. But really speaking, Brahman can have no parts, like a physical object ; and is not a divisible entity at all. The fact is that all these empirical terms are absolutely inadequate for describing the real nature of Brahman, yet we have to have recourse to these, there being no other alternative here. So, what is meant here is simply this : In Brahman, the All-pervasive Being, there is an infinite number of realities, each retaining its own individuality eternally, as His Guṇa-Śakti, attributes and powers. (See below Chap. III the Section on "The Refutation of the Second Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇavāda").

Incidentally, this fundamental Vedānta Conception of Brahman's Uniqueness also shows that the distinction between the Monistic and the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta is, after all, only a quantitative, and not at all a qualitative one. For, according to both, Brahman and Jīva-Jagat are qualitatively the same, i.e. all are Brahman. But, while according to the Monistic Schools, they are also quantatively the same, according to the Monotheistic Schools, they are quantitatively different. Thus, according to the Monistic Schools, as Brahman and Jīva-Jagat are qualitatively as well as quantitatively the same, there is really, only One Reality, viz. Brahman and there does not, as a matter of fact, arise any question of a relation between Brahman and any thing else. According to the Monotheistic Schools, Jīva-Jagat are quantitatively different from Brahman, as such, always retain their individuality or separate existence from Brahman. In this way, as the fundamental "Brahmatva" or "Brahman-hood" of all is equally admitted by all the Schools of the Vedānta, these are, surely, qualitatively the same, i.e. the very same kind of Doctrine of Brahman or "Brahma-Vāda." It is quantitatively only that

we count 'one' in the former, 'three' in the latter. Does that, really, imply a very great difference ?

(ii) The Concept of Individuality.

A further question still remains. It has been said above (P. 36, 41, that Brahman, on the one hand, and Jīva-Jagat, on the other, are only quantitatively different, and not qualitatively, still they are different and still Jīva-Jagat retain fully their own respective individualities (P. 36). But is that ever possible ? For, if, Jīva-Jagat be not qualitatively different from Brahman, i.e. not different from Brahman by nature, how can they be called separate individual realities ? Evidently, 'individuality' implies uniqueness in nature and qualities ; and mere quantitative "more-ness" or "less-ness", "greatness" or "smallness," "highness" or "lowness" cannot really constitute such an Uniqueness. For example, is one drop of sea-water really and actually different from the sea, really and actually a separate individual entity, really and actually a unique reality ?

A Monotheistic Vedāntist would reply by simply pointing out that differences in attributes and powers do constitute a real kind of difference, and if that be so, the differing things are each a separate individual entity, a unique reality. A drop of sea-water is, indeed, a separate entity, a unique reality in the sense that, what it is, no one, nothing else is in exactly the same way.

This, in fact, is, the inexplicable mystery, as well as the infinite glory of an 'Individual'—What it is, it is, it is alone, and no one, nothing else is exactly that. Take two grains of salt, two particles of dust, two drops of water, two blades of grass, two petals of flower, two leaves of a tree, or any such pair. In each case, each one of the pair is an 'individual' entity, a unique reality, a separate existence, although apparently indistinguishable from the other.

In exactly the same sense is Brahman an Individual, Jīva an Individual, Jagat an Individual. Such is the great and grand Conception of Individuality of the Monotheistic Schools. (See Chap. VI under the Section on "The Relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat. ') Whether logically acceptable or not, whether philosophically justifiable or not, it has, indeed, a sublime majesty of its own that has never failed to capture the imagination of seers, saints and sages, all throughout the ages. Though infinitely small in quantity, the Jīva, yet dares to call itself a separate individual, a unique reality besides Brahman, the Almighty, All-Majestic, All-Glorious, All-Powerful, All-Pervasive Being—on a par with Him, as regards nature or essence, and claiming equality with Him in every respect, except two—one in size, the other in power, Brahman being Bhūmā or All-Pervasive, Jīva, Aṇu or

atomic in size; Brahman being Omnipotent, Jīva, lacking only the powers of creation maintenance and destruction (Sṛṣṭi-Sthiti-Pralaya). (See P. 41) Herein lies, fundamentally, the beauty of this Monotheistic Conception of Individuality.

However, drawing this long discussion to a close, we might point out at the end that the Vedānta Concepts of Oneness and Uniqueness of Brahman,—from whatever standpoint these might be considered, Monistic or Monotheistic,—are indeed, unparalleted in the world for their sublimity of vision, profundity of understanding and magnanimity of outlook. These, at the same time, strike a death-blow to the absolutely wrong, yet still today dogmatically clung, belief that Monotheism and Monism were unknown to India and later on imported to it from over the deserts and across the seas.

IV Brahman and Sakti

(1) Para-Prakrti as Siva's Para-Sakti.

Brahman, as we have seen, is Ananta-Sakti, possessed of Infinite Powers (P. 19). But when there are more than one, when there are many, there is naturally a question of the 'best' amongst the many. Here also, the same question can be raised: What is the Para-Śakti the Supreme Power of Brahman ?

According to Śrīkaṇṭha, this Supreme Power or Para-Śakti, is Para-Prakṛti. This is, of course, not the Acit or the physical power of Brahman, responsible for the physical world, which is also called "Prakṛti". Hence, to distinguish the Supreme Power from this physical Prakṛti, the term "Para-Prakṛti" has been used here. This Para-Prakṛti is above the universe of souls and matter, and its Mahā-Vibhūti", or Great Glory and Grandeur ; of the form of Supreme Knowledge and Bliss ; above all limits of space, time and the like ; and natural. In fact, this Para-Prakṛti constitutes the very essence as well as attributes, Svarūpa and Guṇa, of the Supreme Brahman or Para-Brahman. Hence, without this Para-Prakṛti the above states : Eight Holy Names (P. 16) and Six Holy Attributes (P. 17) are not at all possible on the part of Brahman. Thus, Para-Brahman without His Para-Śakti is absolutely powerless. In the colloquial language—Śiva without Śakti is Śava or a corpse. In fact, Śiva is what He is, does what He does, through Śakti alone. Such is the glorious conception of Śakti in Śrīkaṇṭha-Vedānta.

Hence, Śrīkaṇṭha beautifully explains the nature of Para-Prakṛti thus :—

'किं बहुना। श्रुति-स्मृतीतिहास-पुराणाभियुक्त-सूक्ति-प्रामाण्यात् सकल-चिदचित्-प्रपञ्च-महाविभूति-रूपा महासंविदानन्द-सत्ता देश-कालादि-परिच्छेद-शून्या, स्वाभाविकी परम-शक्तिः पर-ब्रह्मणः शिवस्य स्वरूपं च गुणश्च भवति। तद्व्यतिरेकेण पर-ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञत्व-सर्वशक्तित्व-सर्वकारणत्व-सर्वनियन्तृत्व-सर्वोपास्यत्व-सर्वानुग्राहकत्व-सर्वपुरुषार्थहेतुत्वादिकं सर्वगतत्वं च न संभवति। किंच महेश्वर-शिव-महादेव-रुद्रादि-परमाख्यानामभिधेयत्वं च न संभवति।" (१-२-१)

Such is the Glory of Para-Prakṛti Para-Prakṛti is identical with Para-Brahman, and makes His very existence possible and fruitful. Thus, the essential characteristic of Brahman is that He is Omniscient, Omnipotent, Cause of all, Controller of all, an Object to be worshipped by all, the Favourer of all, the Cause of Mokṣa, Omnipresent, and the like. And His essential Names, manifesting His Nature and Attributes are Śiva, Maheśvara, Mahādeva, Rudra and the like. All these Divine Characteristics and all these Divine Names depend wholly on the Para-Prakṛti and cannot belong to Para-Brahman without Para-Prakṛti, as stated above.

Such is the Sublime Conception of Para-Śakti, in Śrīkaṇṭha-Vedānta.

(2) Cidambaram or Cit Sakti as Para-Sakti.

The question here naturally arises as to what really is this Para-Prakṛti ? Here Śrīkaṇṭha, according to his sectarian leaning, identifies the Para-Śakti with Cidambaram or the Ether inside the Heart-lotus. This Conception of Cidambaram is a central one in the Śaiva System of Śrīkaṇṭha, and has been repeatedly emphasised by him in his Bhāṣya. This is also called "Daharākāśam", the Small Ether, and that Śrīkaṇṭha was specially attached to the Dahara-Vidyā has already been stated, (P. 10).

Compare the following :—

"निखिल-जगदण्ड-पण्ड-बुद्बुद-निकुरम्ब-जलधि-स्थानीया पर-प्रकृतिरूपा परम-शक्तिर्हि चिदम्बरमुच्यते। तत्स्वरूपं ब्रह्म आकाश-शरीरम्। पर-प्रकृतित्वं चिदाकाशस्य 'सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतानि आकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते' इत्यादि श्रुति-सिद्धम्। सत्यात्मसत्ता-रूपम्। प्राणारामं प्राणास्सकलाधारभूता चिदम्बर-प्रकृतिरुच्यते। स्वरूप-भूतायां तस्यामारामो यस्य तत् प्राणारामम्। मन आनन्दं मनस्येवानन्दो यस्य न

वाह्यकरणे तत् मन आनन्दम्। अत्राप्यानन्द इति चिदम्बर-प्रकृतिरुच्यते। अत्र सच्चिदानन्दरूप-परमाकाशरूपं ब्रह्मस्वरूपानन्दं मनसैवानुभवति वाह्य-करण-निरपेक्षमिति सिद्धम्।" (१-१-२)

In the Scriptures, Brahman is described as "Ākāśa-śarīra", "Satyātma", "Prāṇārāma", "Mana Ānanda" and like (Tait. 1. 6). (See P. 27) In explaining this, Śrīkaṇṭha here develops his fundamental conception of Cidambaram.

First, Brahman is called "Ākāśa-śarīra", or One who has the Ether for His Body. Here, "Ākāśa" means "Cidambaram" or "Para-Prakṛti". The Śivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā explains the term "Cidambaram", thus—

"सकल-प्रपञ्च-परिणामिनी परमेश्वरस्य चिच्छक्तिश्चिदम्बरमुच्यत इत्यर्थः।"

Thus 'Cidambaram' is nothing but the 'Cit-Śakti of the Supreme Lord,

"चिच्छक्तिः परमेश्वरस्य जगद्व्यापारे छेदने कुठारवत् करणभूतैव केवलं, न तु प्रपञ्च-प्रकृतिरिति केचिदाहुः। तन्निरासार्थमाह—परम-प्रकृतित्वमिति।"

(शिवार्क-मणि-दीपिका पृः १२३)

This Cit-Śakti is not a mere instrument of Brahman in His act of creation, just as an axe is the instrument for cutting woods. But it is also His material for creation.

In other words, Brahman creates the world out of Himself,—thus being its Material Cause (Upādāna-Kāraṇa)—by means of Himself, thus being its Instrumental Cause also (Nimitta-Kāraṇa) (See below Chap. III the Section on "Brahman as Material and Efficient Causes"). But as stated above, Para-Prakṛti is identical with Para-Brahman. So, Para-Prakṛti is both the Material and Instrumental Causes of the world. And, Para-Prakṛti is nothing but Cidambaram, and Cidambaram is nothing, but Cit-Śakti. Accordingly, the Cit-Śakti of Brahman is both the Material and Instrumental Causes of the world. So, it is neither Cit alone, manifested in the Jīvas, nor Acit alone manifested in material objects ; but a combination of both, constituting the very Nature of Brahman. That is why, in the above passage in Śrīkaṇṭha-Bhāṣya, "Parama-Prakṛti-rūpā Parama-Sakti, called Cidambaram" is described as an Infinite Ocean, on which numerous worlds appear and disappear like bubbles.

This Cidambara is Sat or Existence in essence.

"सर्वत्र प्रपञ्चे सदसदित्यनुगत-प्रत्यय-विषयतया स्फुरन्ती सर्व-प्रकृतिभूता सैव चिच्छक्तिस्सत्ता।" (शिवार्क-मणि दीपिका पृः १२३)

In the world, everything is found to 'exist', when we perceive them thus : 'This is this, this is that' etc. Now, this common quality of Existence is nothing but the Existence of the Cit-Śakti, shining in all.

Again, the Cit-Śakti is Ānanda or Bliss in essence.

Thus, the Cit-Śakti is Sat, Cit and Ānanda in essence, like Brahman. (See P. 21ff).

It is, thus, the Prāṇa, the basis and the support of all.

"परमाकाशस्य पर-प्रकृति-रूपस्य सर्व-भूत-कारणत्व-सद्भावात् सप्रयोजनम् ।"

(१-१-२३)

The Supreme Ether or Para-Prakṛti is the Cause of all.

As in the case of Brahman, so in the case of the Para-Śakti, too,—which is Para-Prakṛti or the Cidambaram, identical with Him—it is, Ānanda or Bliss that constitutes the core. Hence, Śrīkaṇṭha refers to the blissfulness of Para-Śakti often, thus :

"ततो ब्रह्म-धर्म-स्वभावः प्रकृत्यात्मा परमाकाशरूपा परमशक्तिः आनन्दमय इत्युच्यते ।"

(१-१-१६)

Para-Śakti, Para-Prakṛti or Parākāśa is of the same nature as Brahman. Hence, Para-Śakti has been referred to as "Ānanda-Maya" in the Scriptures.

That the Para-Śakti is Daharākāśam is also repeatedly mentioned by the Dahara-Pūjaka Śrīkaṇṭha :—

"परमेश्वर एव दहराकाशः ।" (१-३-१३)

"तस्मादीश्वर एव दहराकाशोऽपहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणक इति ।" (१-३-१३)

"अतोऽपि दहराकाशः परमेश्वरः ।" (१-३-१५)

"तत्रापि दहराकाश-मध्यवर्ती न परमेश्वर उपास्यः, किं तु दहराकाशो परमेश्वर-धर्माणाम-पहत-पाप्मत्वादीनां संबन्ध-प्रतीतेः, दहराकाशत्वमप्यस्य चिदम्बररूपतयेति न विरोधः ।"

(१-३-१६)

The Supreme Lord is the Daharākāśam, as it alone possesses all the qualities of Brahman, like 'freedom from sins, etc. So, the Lord is not inside the Daharākāśam, but is Himself Daharākāśam which is but Cidambaram.

(3) Umā or Maya as Para-Sakti.

We have seen that, Para-Śakti is Para-Prakṛti, Para-Prakṛti is Cidambaram or Cit-Śakti, Cidambaram is Daharākāśam. Now, we reach the consummation of this Concept of Śakti in that Supreme Concept of Umā, as Para-Śakti of Para-Brahman, as Para-Prakṛti, as Cit-Śakti, as Cidambaram, as Daharākāśam.

As shown above, this Para-Prakṛti Umā or Māyā is the very essence of Para-Brahman and identical with Him. Without Her, He is absolutely powerless ; without Him, She, too, is equally powerless. Thus, there is a close relationship of reciprocity between the two. Creation is possible only through the co operation of both, and not otherwise. Referring to this fundamental Cosmological Theory of his Vedānta-System, Śrīkaṇṭha says :—

"मायायाः सकल-प्रकृतित्वं तद्विशिष्टत्वं महेश्वरस्य·····अवगम्यते। यथा केवलाच्छरीराल्लोम-नख्यादुद्यत्पत्तिर्न संभवति आत्मनश्च तथा न केवलं मायाया जगदुत्पत्तिः महेश्वराच्च किं तु मर्त्यच्छरीरिणः केश-नखादुद्यत्पत्तिवत् मायिनः परमेश्वरात् सकल-चेतनाचेतन-प्रकृतिः पुरुषोऽभिव्यक्तो भवति।" (१-४-२७)

Māyā is Prakṛti, or the root Material Cause of all, and Brahman possesses Māyā as His Śakti, Guṇa, Śarīra etc. From Māyā alone the world cannot result, nor from Brahman alone, but from Brahman, the Māyina, together with His Power of Māyā. Just as nails, hair etc. cannot spring from the body alone or from the soul alone, but from the body together with the soul, so is the case here. (See below Chap. III under the Section on "Refutation of the First Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda").

So, when we conceive of Brahman, we have to conceive of Him not alone, but together with Māyā or Umā. That is why, Śrīkaṇṭha repeatedly refers to Brahman as "Umāpati", "Umānātha" and the like, thus :—

"पूर्वं निखिल-भुवन-नाकस्य निरस्त-समस्त-दोष-वासना-कलङ्कस्य निरतिशय-माङ्गल्य-रत्नाकरस्य उमापतेः परब्रह्मणः आदित्य-मण्डलमास्पदमिति निरूपितम्।" (१-१-२५)

Para-Brahman, the Lord of Umā, is the Lord of the whole universe, free from all blemishes due to faults and worldly desires.

"परमेश्वरस्य उमासखस्य दहर-पुण्डरीक-मध्यवर्तित्वेनोपास्यत्वं प्रसिद्धम्।" (१-३-१६)

Parameśvara, the Companion of Umā, is to be worshipped inside the Small Heart-Lotus.

"ततः परज्योतिस्स्वरूपं मुक्तप्राप्यं परशक्त्युमा-सनाथं परं ब्रह्म दहर-पुण्डरीकाश-मध्यवर्ति-स्वाभाविकापहतपाप्मत्वादि-गुणकमुपासनीयमिति सिद्धम्।" (१-३-२२)

The Supreme Light, Supreme Brahman, accompanied by Umā, is to be worshipped inside the Small Ether in the Heart-Lotus.

"....परमशक्तिरूपोमा-शबलितस्य विरूपाक्षस्य परब्रह्मणः साक्षात्कारः सकल-संसार-निवृत्ति-पूर्वकं तत्प्राप्तये तदुपासकानां तद्वाचकप्रणवपराणां भवतीति निरूपितम्।" (१-३-१३)

The direct vision of the Supreme Brahman, variegated with the Paramā Śakti Umā, leads to His attainment.

"समस्त-साक्षिणः सर्वज्ञस्य तमसः परस्य विश्वोत्तीर्णस्य परम-शक्त्या उमया सहितस्य विशिष्टस्य परमेश्वरस्यैव भूतयोनित्वं भूतप्रकृतित्वं च गीयते।" (१-४-२८)

The Supreme Lord, who is the Witness of all, Omniscient, Beyond darkness, Transcendent over the world, is said to be the Source of all and the Material Cause of all, as accompanied by and endowed with Parama-Śakti Umā.

"परशक्त्या प्रणव-वर्ण-व्यत्यासरूपोमा-शब्द-वाच्यया शबलाकारत्वेन कृष्ण-पिङ्गलं परं सर्वातिशायि ब्रह्म।" (१-३-१२)

Here, by a clever device, "Umā" has been shown to be the same as the famous "Praṇava" or Om, with a slight variation in its order. Thus Praṇava or Om means A + U + Ma. In the case of 'Umā', however, we have U + Ma + A.

"परमशक्त्योमया शबलितरूपं निर्विकारं त्रिलोचनं परं ब्रह्म सर्वोत्तरमिति निरूपितम्।" (४-३-१४)

The Changeless Supreme Brahman, variegated by Umā, is the Highest of all.

Para-Śakti Umā is, indeed, identical with Para-Brahman. Yet it is repeatedly said that Para-Brahman is "Śabalita-Rūpa" or "Śabalīkṛta" or made variegated in colour by Umā. This is meant for showing that Brahman is not Nirviśeṣa or devoid of all differences, whatsoever, as held by the Advaita School. Brahman has no Sajātīya-Bheda or difference from some one or some thing belonging to the same class ; and "Vijātīya-Bheda" or difference from some one or something belonging to another class. Yet He has Svagata-Bheda or internal differences (See P. 37). His attributes and powers constitute His Svagata-Bheda. From this standpoint, Umā being Brahman's power, constitutes His Svagata-Bheda. That is why, it has been said in Śaivāgama, or Śaiva Holy Works, that the Lord is Black and Tawny because of Umā, His Supreme Power (Para-Pṛkṛti). In this way, His Para-Śakti Umā lends Variety, Colour, Beauty, Glory and Grandeur to Śiva's Form, and is the very Core of His Being, the very Essence of His Nature, the very Basis of His Existence.

Such is the strangely wonderful Conception of Śiva-Śakti in Śaiva Philosophy. Śakti is identical with Śiva, yet different from Him ; Śakti is Siva's part, yet necessary to complete and fructify Him ; Śakti is wholly dependent on Śiva as His Power and Attribute, yet Śiva is wholly dependent on Her for being what He is and doing what He does. Such a Superb Paradox is, indeed, unique in the History of Philosophical Speculation. But is it really an Inexplicable Mystery, a matter of Pure Mysticism, beyond the range of all reasoning and comprehension ?

(4) Real Implications of the Concept of Siva-Sakti.

But we make bold to assert that really there is no Paradox, no Mystery, no Mysticism in any Concept of Indian Philosophy. It is, of course, asserted by all Indian Sage-Philosophers with very appropriate modesty that—

"अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावाः न तान् तर्केण योजयेत्—

"The ideas that are beyond ordinary thought should not be made subjects of argumentation."

Still, while admitting that deep, profound philosophical ideas cannot be proved by ordinary means of proof or sources of knowledge, they never say that these are to be accepted merely on trust, as matters of blind faith and unquestioning acceptance. For, there are such things as higher means of Proof, higher sources of Knowledge or higher kinds of Perception and Inference which lead to a full comprehension here. And, our revered Indian sages have given clear evidences for such higher categories of knowledge in their inspired utterances and writings all throughout.

So, the Paradox of this fundamental concept of Śiva-Śakti has been beautifully resolved by them. This, has been done by the celebrated Indian Doctrines of Prema, Māyā and Līlā.

(i) The Concept of Prema

The absolutely unquenchable thirst of Indian Philosophers for Unity and Universality has led them inevitably to the basic Concept of the One—One Supreme Self: Paramātman, One Supreme God: Parameśvara, One Supreme Absolute: Para-Brahman. This Supreme Self, Supreme God, Supreme Absolute is Eternal and Unchanging, Full and Perfect, eternally and fully Consummated, eternally and fully Satisfied, eternally and fully Pure. So, He has no need for anything,—knowledge, happiness, perfection, purity, fulness. Hence, He has also no need for any activity at all. Thus, we have the conception of a Static Deity, or Reality, who, from all eternity simply "Is"—One and Alone. without a second, without any companion, without any communion with any one, without any activity or transformation of any kind whatsoever. From the strictly Philosophical standpoint, such a Great and Grand conception has, indeed, a majestic beauty of its own, that has never failed to capture the imagination of Great Minds. Hence, in the History of Philosophy, we meet with many an attempt to reach such a One and Universal Being, and rest there.

But the lure of the perceptible world, with all its beauty and ugliness, pleasures and pains, virtues and vices, is, indeed, very great. After all, the philosopher himself springs from the soil of the earth, and

the earth cannot be ignored. It has to be faced, it has to be tackled, it has to be explained. Hence, even strict Monists, like Śaṃkara, have to bring in Māyā to explain the phenomenal and ultimately false world.

But to the Monotheists, this idea of an eternally static or inactive, eternally alone, eternally satisfied Absolute has no charm. The idea of a Personal God is a rich, warm, sweet one, where all the elements of a humanly imaginable perfect personality are taken to reach their highest perfection in one Grand, Full, Perfect Whole. Whether this procedure is epistemologically correct or not, mataphysically real or not, ethically useful or not—is not the point at issue here. The point is that the inner impluse, the eternal cravings of man for communion with God are not satisfied unless and until the Being towards whom these are inevitably directed is realised as a Personal Being, whom he can revere and love and who also can love him and feel for him. Unless we can believe this firmly, there cannot be any Religion for us at all.

Thus, Religion essentially means a Personal Conception of God. And, such a Personal Conception cannot, evidently, be the Conception of a Cold, Neutral, Deity, devoid of all feelings. Hence, we conceive of God as essentially a Loving God (Prema-maya). But Love (Prema or Prīti) is a relative term—it essentially means a relation between one who loves and one who is loved. However, God being Omnipresent, there cannot be any one outside Him to love ; so He loves Himself, loves the Jīvas that are within Himself. Here, the Jīvas are only His parts, and if His love be exhausted in the Jīvas only, then it will remain only partial. Undoubtedly, according to those Monotheistic Schools that believe in a God of Love, God's fullest love is given unstintingly to His each and every devotee, who is His Other Self. Still here, His fullest love is given, after all, to a minuetest (Aṇu) Jīva—and this conception fails to satisfy the eternal cravings of the Jīva itself for the fullest manifestation of God's love. That manifestation can only be in His Own Self, and for that, a duality, so to speak, between God and His Own Self has to be conceived of. Here God loves His Own Self, the loving nature of God finds the fullest consummation of His fullest love in His own fullest Self. It is this Self that is Umā, Śiva's Para-Śakti.

(ii) The Concept of Maya

Thus, Umā is the very Self (Svarūpa) of God, so identical with Him, yet for making the concept of Love plausible, is taken also to be different from Him. In this way, Umā makes Śiva's Love possible, and thereby other attributes and functions, on His part. She is also taken to be the

Attribute (Guṇa) and Power (Śakti) of the Lord. For, Nature (Svarūpa), Attribute (Guṇa) and Power (Śakti) are nothing separate—Nature is manifested in Attributes and Powers, Attributes and Powers make up Nature. No doubt, Attributes and Powers are parts of Nature and are Svagata-bhedas of the Whole. So Umā has been purposely called an Attribute and a Power of Śiva, to show Her identify-in-difference also from Him. This Attribute, this Power is not a partial one, as in other cases, but it is a Supreme Attribute (Para-Guṇa), a Supreme Power (Para-Śakti), identical with Him.

In this way, Umā is the Svarūpa of Śiva, so identical with Him ; Para-Guṇa and Para-Śakti of Śiva, so identical, yet different from Him. She is one with Him, yet completes Him ; depends on Him, yet makes Him possible (See above P. 51). Because of all these apparently paradoxical relationships between the two, Umā is called Māyā, a Mystic and a Magic something ; not only that, a wonderful and an enchanting something. She is, of course, Śuddha-Māyā, as distinguished from Aśudha-Māyā or Prakṛti (Sū. 4-4-22 ŚM.D. 2-2-36). The conception of One, Full, Static God is quite clear to the discerning mind. But the conception of One, apparently becoming Dual, yet remaining One in Essence, is not so clear. That is why, this is a conception of Māyā. This conception has never failed to capture the imagination and enthral the hearts of the Monotheistic thinkers of Mādhurya-Bhakti School, or, the School according to which the relation between God and Souls is a sweet, intimate, Personal one. For, what sweeter vision can there be than that of Śiva, playing lovingly with Himself, making Himself dependent on Himself, bifurcating Himself, again, drawing that part to Himself in one Great and Grand Circle ? Like a Māyāvin, Magician, the Lord plays with His own Māyā, manifesting His loving, playful, joyous Nature to the fullest in that way.

(iii) The Concept of Lila

Thus, this Concept of Māyā makes inevitably for that of Līlā. The God of Religion is a loving, playful, joyous God, playing with Himself, with His Jīvas, His parts ; and also with His Entire Self or Śakti. The whole relation between Śiva and Śakti is, thus, nothing but one of Līlā, or Supreme Divine Sport on the part of God. Not out of any necessity, but, on the contray, because He has no needs to get rid of, no ends to attain, no desires to fulfill—the Lord engages Himself in this ethereal sport with Himself in love and joy, bliss and beauty, fulness and perfection. Through this Divine process of Dividing and Uniting, Giving away and Taking Back, Enjoying and being Enjoyed, the Ever-Complete God completes Himself anew, so to speak, and

manifests His combined, complete Nature or Bliss in the form of the Universe. That is why, the creation of the world has been described as a mere "Līlā" or Sport and Frolic on His part. (See below Chap. III the Section on "Refutation of the Sixth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda").

Thus, the Concept of Śiva-Śakti, is nothing paradoxical or self-contradictory. Metaphysically, as pointed out above, an absolutely Abstract Absolute cannot create, cannot manifest Itself,– only a Concrete God can do so, and Śakti supplies this concreteness to the Creator God. Theologically, also, such an Abstract Absolute is totally unsatisfactory, and Śakti supplies life, beauty and bliss to the God of love and prayer. In this way, the Concept of Śakti is logically necessary to Monotheistic Schools. This Śakti is Māyā—the most hidden, most mysterious, most wonderful aspect of God ; Śakti is Umā (to Śaivas), or Rādhā (to Vaiṣṇavas)—the most beautiful, most blissful, most enchanting aspect of God. Thus, God is One and Indivisible, no doubt, yet He is Richest in contents, and has, accordingly, numerous aspects. The combination of all these aspects is Para-Śakti Umā or Rādhā, as the case may be.

As a matter of fact, a Concrete, Full, Rich, Warm, Dynamic Personality is best expressed through the relation between two. So, even the great and age-old Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, which propounds a most sublime form of Monism, asserts unequivocally :—

"स वै नैव रेमे तस्मादेकाकी न रमते, स द्वितीयमैच्छत्।"

(बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद् १-४ ३)

"He did not feel pleasure. Hence, none can feel pleasure alone. He desired for a second."

This desire for a second is not a sign of any want, defect or imperfection on the part of God—it is but essential to His fundamental sweet, loving, playful Nature, finding expression within Himself in a sweet, loving frolic with Himself, as both the One and the Other, as both the Lover and the Beloved, as both the Player and the Object of Play, as both the Enjoyer and the Object to be enjoyed. [See below Chap. III (II 6 ii) under the Section on : "Refutation of the Sixth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-vāda."] From the standpoint of God, this is the logical justification and philosophical necessity for Para-Śakti. For, God cannot, evidently, be taken to be Līlā-Mayā, Ānanda-Mayā, Prema-Mayā, Full of Frolic, Bliss and Love, unless He thus sports with, enjoys and loves Himself in the form of 'Another.'

From the standpoint of Men, as already stated, the Concept of Śakti is necessary both from the philosophical and religious points of view.

Thus, from all points of view, this Supreme and Sublime Concept of Śiva-Śakti is an eminently reasonable one.

(5) Real Implications of Sakti as Cidambaram or Daharakasam

As we have seen, Para-Śakti is identified in Srīkaṇṭha's System as the "Cidambaram" or "Daharākāśam". As a matter of fact, Parameśvara Himself is identical with the same. So, naturally a question may be raised as to why the Bhūmā Mahān, the Great and the High Lord or His Para-Śakti, identical with Him, has been identified with something so infinitely small as the "Cidambaram" or the "Daharākāśam". This means the Ākāśa or the Ether inside the heart-lotus of the Jīva who is Aṇu or atomic in size Hence the Ether within the atomic heart-lotus must itself be still smaller. So, how can the All-pervasive Lord and His Para-Śakti be identical with this Smallest Ether within the heart ?

First, this identification of the Supreme God with this "Small Ether" has a deep meaning, both from the philosophical and religious standpoints. Philosophically, the Jīva is Aṇu, or atomic or infinitely small, no doubt. But still it is similar to Brahman, the Vibhu, the Infinitely Vast. Hence, although Aṇu, it has within itself the Vibhu Parameśvara.

The heart of the Jīva is conceived to be like a Lotus (Hṛadaya-Puṇḍarika), with its thousand petals spread on thousand sides. Many are the mystic interpretations given by different thinkers of this Heart-Lotus and its Petals. But leaving all these aside and considering the matter from a simple, direct, non-technical standpoint, it might very well be said that this beautiful conception of the Heart-Lotus with its spreading petals, implies the gradual spreading, core by core, of the inner essence, the inherent glory and the infinite grandeur of human nature.

(i) The Concept of Panca-Kosa

According to the celebrated "Doctrine of Five-fold Sheaths" (Pañca-Koṣa), as propounded in the Taittirīya Upāniṣad (Tait. 2.), the Jīva consists of five sheaths (Koṣa), viz. Anna (Food or Body nourished by Food), Prāṇa (Vital-breath), Manas (Mind), Vijñāna Philosophical Knowledge) and Ānanda (Bliss). But its real and final nature is Ānanda or Bliss. So the outer sheaths are to be gradually pealed off till the innermost Core is reached. That is why, in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, we have higher and higher conceptions of the Self as Anna, Prāṇa, Manas, Vijñāna and Ānanda. In this way, mere Physical Personality (Annamaya Ātman), is elevated to a Living Personality (Prāṇamaya Ātman), that to a Rational Personality (Manomaya Ātman), that to a Discerning Personality (Vijñānmaya Ātman), and that, finally, to a Blissful Personality (Ānandamaya Ātman).

Thus, the Jīva at first realises itself to be a Physical Being or

identifies its own Self, Ātman, with the Anna, or Food or the Physical Body, sustained by Food ; then it realises itself to be a Living Being, an Animal, distinct from inanimate, material, objects and identifies its own Self, Ātman with Prāṇa, or the Vital-breath, the animating Principle of Physical Life or Life in the Physical world ; then it realises itself to be a Thinking Being, a Rational Animal, distinct from all other animals, and identifies its own Self with Manas, or Mind, the instrument of empirical knowledge ; then it realises itself to be a Discerning Being, a knower, distinct from all other rational animals, and identifies its own Self with Vijñāna or Philosophical Knowledge, the real means to Salvation (Mokṣa) ; then it realises itself to be a Blissful Being, distinct from all other knowers, and identifies itself with Ānanda, or Bliss, the essence of the Self, as it really is.

In this way, the more does the Jīva realise its true nature, the more does the petals of its Heart-Lotus expand, and the more does Ānanda manifest itself as permeating its innermost being and filling its life with peace and bliss.

Now, the Cidambaram or the Daharākāśa is the vast expansion within this quantitatively small, yet qualitatively great Heart-Lotus. When the Jīva comes to realise itself as Ānanda, its Heart-Lotus is fragrant with that Ānanda, with all the petals expanded fully in Ānanda.

Then, the Ether within the Heart-Lotus too, is Ānanda, through and through. In fact, in that state, the innermost core of the Heart-Lotus is manifested as Ānanda in essence and hence the Ether within it is also so. In that state, this Ether is nothing but the Ānanda-maya God, and the Ānandamoyī Śakti. Thus, from the metaphysical standpoint, the identification of the Cidambaram or the Daharākāśam with God and Śakti is quite justifiable. It simply shows that the very essence, core or nature of Jīva is identical with that of Brahman. For, the Cidambaram or the Daharākāśam represents the innermost being, the real essence, the basic core of the Jīva ; and in this regard, here, the Jīva is absolutely identical with Brahman. According to Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta, Jīva and Brahman are identical in essence, but different in qualities and powers, so that the Jīva is neither absolutely identical, nor absolutely different from Brahman, but similar to Him, being both identical with and different from Him. (See below Chap. VI under the Section on : "The Relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat".) The Doctrine of Cidambaram or Daharākāśam represents this identity of essence between Jīva and Brahman in a beautiful, enchanting manner. This is the metaphysical justification of the identity of the Cidambaram or Daharākāśam with the Para-Śakti, for the matter of that, with Parameśvara Himself, as found in the system of Śrīkaṇṭha.

From the standpoint of Religion, no less, the above Doctrine is quite justifiable. From this standpoint, different kinds of Worship or Meditation have been enjoined in the Scriptures. But amongst all these, naturally, that on God as the Innermost Self, as identical with the self of the worshipper, is by far the best. And, Dahara-Vidyā or the Meditation of God inside the Daharākāśam represents this Supreme Identity. That is why, it has been taken to be the best form of Meditation by Śrīkaṇṭha. (See P. 10).

Thus, it may be safely concluded that the Supreme and Sublime Doctrine of Cidambaram or Daharākāśam is nothing absurd or impossible from any standpoint whatsoever.

V Activities of Brahman

The Pañca-kṛtya or the Five-fold Activities of Brahman have been referred to above, (See P 2-). The main of these is the first one, viz Creation, the rest following from it.

(a) Brahman as Creator, Sustainer and Destroyer of the Universe

One of the fundamental Problems of Philosophy is that of Creation. In fact, all philosophical strivings arise from the basic cosmological question : "What exactly is the self, the 'I'. What exactly is the world, the 'Not-I' ; How did they come and where will they go ?" Hence, in any System of Philosophy, these questions have to be tackled first.

Hence, in the Brahma-Sūtras also, after the preliminary Sūtra "Athato Brahma-Jijñāsa" "Then, therefore, there is a desire to know Brahman" (Br-Sū. 1. 1. 1.), the second one, beginning the topic, is "Janmādasyā Yataḥ", "From whom arise the origination and the rest of the world" (Br. Sū. 1. 1. 2.). Thus, the primary, fundamental mark of Brahman has been taken to be Creatorship and the rest of the Universe. (See P. 20. Also P. 35).

But the question may be asked : Why should Brahman alone be taken to be the Single and Supreme Cause of the entire Universe of souls and matter ? For, there are many other possible alternatives, such as, material atoms (Paramāṇu) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Systems, Prakṛti (Primary Material Cause) of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga Systems, the Jiva (Individual Soul), Hiraṇyagarbha (Collection of Individual Souls), Viṣṇu or some other Deity, and so on. In common with all other Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta. Śrīkaṇṭha, too, holds that none of the above can ever be taken to be the cause of the world. For example,

the material atoms, being unconscious and non-intelligent, can never fashion this vast and variegated universe, showing clear signs of intelligence. The Parāmaṇu-Kāraṇa-Vāda or Atomic Theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System has been criticised by Śrīkaṇṭha in the Tarka-Pāda, the Section concerned with the criticism of rival theories (Br. Sū. 2.2. 10–16). The unconscious Prakṛti or Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga Systems, too, has to be rejected on the same grounds. This Pradhāna-Kāraṇa-Vāda or Doctrine of the Causality of Pradhāna, too, has been repeatedly criticised by Śrīkaṇṭha all throughout, and also separately in the above Tarka-Pāda (Br. Sū. 2.2. 1-9). (See below under the Section on : "Refutation of Rival Theories".) To hold that the Jīva is the creator of the Universe is simply absurd. (e. g. Br. Sū 1. 1. 16). Equally absurd is to hold that Hiraṇyagarbha, the aggregate of the Jīvas (Jīva-Samaṣti-rūpa), (e. g. Br. Sū. I. 1. 17—20) can be the cause of the Universe. All these, the Jīva, Hiraṇyagarbha, Viṣṇu and the like are themselves created by Brahman. So, how can they be taken to be the First Cause ? Now, all these really do not require much argumentation, and the only conclusion that can be accepted is that :—

"निरस्त-समस्त-संसार-कलङ्कतया निखिल-मङ्गलाधारतया शिव-तत्त्वं यदवगम्यते तदुक्त-स्वभावतया सकल-जगज्जन्मादिकारणं भवति।" (१-१-२)

Śiva, Mahādeva, the Great God alone, can be the Cause of the creation, maintenance and destruction of the Universe. [See below Chap. III the Section on : "Brahman as Creator".]

(2) Brahman as Material and Efficient Causes.

Now, a cause may be of two kinds, material cause or Upādāna-Kāraṇa and instrumental or efficient cause, or Nimitta-Kāraṇa. We may here take an ordinary example. A potter takes a lump of clay, and then by means of certain instruments, like wheels, rods etc., produces a clay-jar etc. Here, this lump of clay is the material cause; while the potter himself, with his instruments and the like, is the efficient cause. The material cause is actually transformed into the form of the effect; and for that reason, ordinarily by the term "Cause," the material cause is understood. But the efficient cause, though not actually transformed into the form of the effect, is yet necessary for the final production of the effect. In the example cited above, the lump of clay cannot by itself become the clay-jar etc.—for that, the thought, desire, energy etc. of the potter and his actual work, as well as the power of wheels etc. are also equally necessary. Thus, for the production of the effect, the co-operation or combination of the material cause and the efficient cause is essential.

In the world, it is found that the material and efficient causes are

mutually different. In the above example, the efficient cause, viz. potter with his instruments, is quite different from the material cause, viz. the lump of clay. The efficient cause here is an intelligent agent who knows how to handle and make use of certain special kinds of instruments etc. for getting a particular kind of object; while the material cause is a physical object outside him. So, when we say that Brahman is the Cause of the world, the question naturally arises as to whether He is only the Material Cause, or only the Efficient Cause, or both.

First, it is absurd to hold that Brahman is only the material cause. For, then, who is there to fashion Brahman into the form of the universe? So, what efficient cause, capable of handling such a supremely vast Being as Brahman as material, can there ever be outside Brahman? Secondly, for the same reason, Brahman cannot be only the Efficient Cause, for, there cannot be any material object outside the Omnipresent Brahman. There are Schools, of course, which have propounded this strange theory. But these inevitably make Brahman limited, i.e. non-omnipresent and non-omnipotent.

Accordingly, the only possible conclusion here is that Brahman is both the Material and Efficient Causes of the Universe. Hence, He is called repeatedly "Ubhaya-Kāraṇa": Twofold Cause, by Śrīkaṇṭha in his Bhāṣya. Compare the following amongst others :—

"तत्र तादृशः महिम्नि जगदुभय-कारणत्व-सम्भवात्। तदेतादृश-महत्वाद् ब्रह्मेत्युच्यते।" (१-१-२)

The Great and Glorious Brahman alone can possibly be both the Material and Efficient Causes of the Universe. It is because He holds such a power that He is called Brahman

"तदितः पूर्वाधिकरण-न्यायैः सर्वज्ञं नित्यतृप्तमनादिबोधं स्वतन्त्रमलुप्तशक्तिकमनन्तशक्तिकं सकल जगदुभय-कारणं समस्तोपनिषत्तन्त्र-समन्वयैक-प्रतिपाद्यं स्वप्रकाश-निखिल-प्रपञ्च-विशिष्टाद्वितीय-स्वभावं सच्चिदानन्दरूपं संसार-पाश-विच्छेद-कारणं चिदचिदर्थान्तरं शिव-तत्त्वं परं ब्रह्मेति सिद्धम्।" (१-१-२१)

In this passage, all the main characteristics of Brahman have been clearly set forth. Thus, He is possessed of the Six Holy Attributes, mentioned above (P. 17); is both the Material and Efficient Causes of the world, established by all the Scriptures; possesses the Universe, His own manifestation, as His body and attribute, and thus, is One only, without a second, of the form of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, the Cause of the breaking asunder of the noose of mundane existence, and different from the Cit and the Acit.

"कथं सर्वज्ञत्व-सर्वशक्तित्व-विशेषमन्तरेण जगदुभयकारणत्वं ब्रह्मणो भवति।" (१-१-५)

The question may be asked as to how it is possible for the same Brahman to be both the Material and Efficient Causes at one and the same time? The clear Scriptural proof of this is the following. celebrated passage from the Tattirīya Upaniṣad.

'तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत। तस्मात् तत् सुकृतमुच्यत इति।" (२-७-१)

"He Himself transformed His own Self. Hence He is called a Well-Doer."

Here, when it is said: "He Himself", that implies that He is the Efficient Cause; and when it is said: "His own Self", that implies that He is the Material Cause.

In fact, as pointed out above, Brahman being All-pervasive, there can be nothing outside Him that can be the material cause or the efficient cause here. So, Brahman alone has to be both. Here, Śrīkaṇṭha propounds the common, Monotheistic Doctriue of Pariṇāma. "Pariṇāma" means "actual transformation". Here, the material cause is actually transformed into the form of the effect. E. G. the lump of clay is actually transformed into the form of a clay-jar etc. This Pariṇāma-Vāda follows from Sat-Kārya-Vāda, or the Doctrine that the cause contains the effect from the very beginning in a potential form, and is, then, transformed into the effect through the instrumentality of the efficient cause. E. G. milk is transformed into butter, through the precess of charning.

In the very same manner, Brahman is actually transformed into the form of the Universe of souls and matter, and so far He is the Material Cause. But, He Himself effects this transformation, and so far He is the Efficient Cause.

(3) Brahman as the Material Cause of the World or Parinama-Vada

Now, let us consider, first, as to how Brahman can be taken to be the Material Cause of the world.

(i) First Objection against Parinama-Vada

Two very legitimate objections may be raised here. These have been met by Śrīkaṇṭha ingeniously in Sūtra-Bhāṣya 1. 4. 27, for example. The first objection may be set forth as follows :—

"नन्वज्ञान-विकारास्पद-हेय-प्रपञ्च-रूपेण प्रकृति-भावेन कथं वर्तते निरस्त-समस्त-दोष-लव-कलङ्को निस्सीम-मङ्गल-गुण-रत्नाकरो निरङ्कुश-नित्यसिद्ध-वैभवः प्रपञ्चातीतः परमशिव इति।" (१-४-२७)

That is, the cause and the effect must be similar in nature, for, it is the cause itself that is transformed into the form of the effect. Thus, a lump of clay is transformed into the form of a clay-jar; a lump of gold is transformed into a gold ornament, and so on. But, a lump of clay cannot become transformed into a gold ornament; or a lump of

gold cannot become transformed into a clay-jar. But, here Brahman is absolutely pure, faultless and an ocean of limitless, auspicious attributes; while the Universe is an abode of ignorance, impurity, and all bad qualities. Hence, how can Brahman be transformed into the form of the world? So, at best, Brahman can be taken to be only the Nimitta-Kāraṇa or Efficient Cause of the Universe, and never its Material Cause. (See below Chap. III the Section on: "First Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda".)

(ii) Second Objection against Parinama-Vada

The second objection is as follows :—

"हन्त कारण-विकाररूपो हि परिणामः पूर्वरूप-परित्यागेण रूपान्तरापत्तिः परिणाम इति। कथं परमेश्वरोऽनवधेधर्मात् परिभूयत इति चेत्। (१-४-२७)

That is, "Pariṇāma" or transformation means changes on the part of the object transformed. That is, it means that the object transformed gives up its former form and assumes a new one. But how can such a change of form be ever possible on the part of an Immutable, Ever-Pure Being? For, all changes mean either changes for the better, or changes for the worse. Now, no change for the better is possible on the part of a Being who is the Best Being from the very beginning, from all eternity. And, it goes without saying that no change for the worse is possible on His part. So how can such an Ever-Perfect Being ever change or be transformed into the form of the universe?

(iii) Refutation of the Objections against Parinama-Vada

Śrīkaṇṭha replies to both the objections in Sūtra-Bhāṣya 1-4-27 thus :—

During Pralaya or Dissolution, there is no manifested universe, no distinctions of Cit and Acit, souls and matter, no names and forms; but there is only Brahman, One only without a second. Then, the Cit and the Acit which are Śaktis or Powers of Brahman, remain merged in Him, in a potential, unmanifested form. This is the Causal State of Brahman, and is called "Darkness." Then, there issues forth from Him, the Light of Supreme Intelligence or Parmā Prajñā or Jñāna-Śakti, due to which He desires: "May I be many, may I procreate". (Tait. 2-6). That, is, Brahman with unseparated, subtle Cit and Acit as His Body, desires to have the separated. gross Acit and Cit as His Body. Or, in other words, He desires to manifest out of Himself the Cit and the Acit in the form of the universe of souls and matter. Then He separates, so to speak, the Cit and Acit out of Himself, and then, again, enters into the same. This is the Effected State of Brahman

This account closely follows that given in the celebrated Tattiriya Upanisad :—

"सोऽकामयत। बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति। स तपोऽतप्यत। स तपस्तप्त्वा इदं सर्वमसृजत। यदिदं किञ्च। तत् सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्। तदनुप्रविश्य। सच्च त्यच्चाभवत् निरुक्तानिरुक्तञ्च। निलयानिलयञ्च। विज्ञानाविज्ञानञ्च। सत्यञ्चानृतञ्च। सत्यमभवत्। यदिदं किञ्च। तत् सत्यमित्याचक्षते। (तैत्ति २-६)।

"He desired : 'May I be many, may I procreate. He meditated. After meditation, He created all these—whatever there is. Having created these, He entered into these. Having entered into these, He became the actual and the other, the expressible and the inexpressible, the based and the non-based, the conscious and the unconscious, the real and the false—whatever there is. Hence, He is called "Satya", the Real".

In the same manner, Śrīkaṇṭha also says that Creation implies that Brahman alone is the Cause, Brahman alone is the Effect. That is, Brahman with the Cit and the Acit unmanifest is the Cause ; Brahman with the Cit and Acit manifest is the Effect. So, he concludes in the above Sūtra-Bhāṣya.

"सदसत्-प्रपञ्चरूपेण बहुधा परिणतोऽभवदिति पुरुषस्य बालत्व-युवत्वादिवत् ब्रह्मणो जगच्छरीरिणः कारणत्वं कार्यत्वं। (१-४-२७)

Just as the same person has different states like childhood, youth and the rest, so Brahman, too, has the Causal State, as well as the Effected State.

The real implications of this Monotheistic Pariṇāma-Vāda will be discussed below. [Section (10) on "Further Reflections" etc.]

(4) Twofold State of Brahman : Causal and Effected

Śrīkaṇṭha repeatedly refers to this twofold state of Brahman, His Causal State and His Effected State, thus, for example :—

"स्थूल-सूक्ष्म-चिदचित्-प्रपञ्च-रूप-शक्ति-विशिष्टः परमेश्वरः एव कार्य-कारण-स्वरूपं सत्-पद-विषय इति निर्णयः।" (१-१-५)

The Supreme Lord alone is the Cause as well as the Effect, as possessing, respectively, subtle and gross Cit and Acit Śaktis as His Body. So He is called the "Existent."

"कार्य-कारणोभयावस्थं ब्रह्मात्र समुपास्यम्।" (१-३-३२)

Brahman is to be worshipped in both His Causal and Effected States.

'ततः समुचितं चिदचिद्विशिष्टः परमेश्वरः कारणं कार्यं च तत्तदवस्था-विशेषादिति।" (१-४-२७)

Hence, it stands to reason, that the Supreme Lord, with Cit and Acit as His Attributes, is both the Cause and the Effect.

The real implications of this Monotheistic Doctrine of Brahman's twofold state : Causal and Effected, will be discussed later on. [Section (10) on "Further Reflections" etc.]

(5) Processes of Creation and Dissolution

In Sūtra-Bhāṣya 1. 2. 9., also Śrīkaṇṭha refers to the above processes of Creation and Dissolution, in greater details.

(i) State of Dissolution

Thus, here he says :—

During the period of Pralaya or Dissolution, Brahman draws back into Himself the manifested universe of souls and matter. Naturally, then there are no distinctions of names and forms, days and nights, summers and winters and the rest. Hence, such a state is called "Darkness," or a state when every thing remains merged in the Lord ; only He, in His eternal light, remains as the eternal substratum of all. This state is called "Darkness", because :—

"नाम-रूप-शून्यतया ग्रहणायोग्येषु विषयेषु विहत-करण-शरीर-शक्तीनां जीवानां प्रपञ्च-ग्रहणं नास्ति, मल-तिरोहित-स्वज्ञान-करणतया शिवस्य स्वप्रकाश-रूपस्यापि पूर्वमिव दर्शनं नास्ति । तस्मात् निरस्त-समस्त-कार्य-विशेष-ज्ञाना परम-सुषुप्तिमयी महावस्था तम इत्युच्यते ।"
(१-२-९)

This state of Darkness does not, of course, affect the Self-Manifest Lord, the Witness of every thing. It only implies want of knowledge on the part of Jīva, there being no world of objects to perceive, as well as, no organs etc. through which to perceive. There cannot also be, then, any perception on its part, of Brahman as well, who is no doubt, present then as Self-manifest, yet cannot be perceived by the Jīva, devoid of all organs of knowledge. Hence such a state of absence of knowledge, a state of profound sleep or stupour is called "Darkness".

At this stage, the Lord remains as the Absolute or "Kevala", because :—

"नाम-रूप-विभागानर्ह-सूक्ष्म-चिदचित्-प्रपञ्च-शक्ति-विशिष्टतया शिवः केवल इत्युच्यते ।"
(१-२-९)

When Brahman is called the "Absolute" or "Kevala", it does not imply that He is a "Nirviśeṣa" or distinction-less Being, in the Advaita Sense of the term. But it simply means that He possesses Cit and Acit in a subtle form, without any distinctions of names and forms as in the case of their gross forms.

This is the state of Pralaya or Dissolution.

(ii) State of Creation

Now, the state of Sṛṣṭi or Creation.

At this stage, the Lord manifests out of Himself the subtle Cit and

Acit endowed with names and forms, as before, and thereby creates the universe anew according to the past Karmas of the Jīvas [See below under the Section on "Refutation of the First Objection against the Law of Karma" (4), included under "Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda".] Here, He does not take any external material for creation—that being impossible—as a potter takes a lump of clay from outside, to create clay-jar. But, His own Subtle Self or Māyā is transformed into the form of the universe.

"मायापुरुषयोरूपादानत्वं श्रूयते। कथं निरुपादनत्वमिति चेत्—सत्यम्, यथा घट-निष्पत्तौ कुलालस्य स्व-शरीर-पृथक्त्वेन मृत्पिण्डोपादानं दृश्यते, तथा न परमेश्वरात् पृथक्सिद्धं मायादुपादानं, मायादिरूपात् परमेश्वराज्जगदुत्पत्तेः, अतो न विरोधः। ततः स्वरूपापृथगवस्थान-सूक्ष्म-मायापुरुषः परमेश्वर एव स्वयमुपादानमपीत्युच्यते।" (१-२-९)

The Supreme Lord is the Upādāna-Kāraṇa, of the form of the Māyā-Puruṣa, (Acit-Cit) which is nothing but the subtle form of the Supreme Lord Himself. (Para-Prakṛti)

So far Brahman is the Upādāna-Kāraṇa or Material Cause of the universe. (P. 46)

(6) Brahman as the Efficient Cause

Now, let us consider as to how Brahman is the Efficient Cause of Universe. (P. 46,

First, He desires to be many, desires to manifest out of Himself the Unmanifest Universe of souls and matter, as stated in Scripture : "He desired : 'May I be many' " (Tait. 2- 6-). This He does through His "Māyā-lakṣṇānā Icchā-rūpā Śakti", through His Icchā-Śakti, of the form of Māyā, or Power of Desiring. "Then He meditated" (Tait. 2. 6). Then, He ponders over the new bodies etc to be created according to the past Karmas of Jīvas. This He does through "Tapas-rūpikā Jūñānā-Śakti or Power of Knowledge. "He created all this" (Tait. 2. 6). Then, He manifests out of Himself the new universe. This He does through His "Saṃkalpita-Sakala-Karaṇa-Vidagdhā Kriyā-Śakti," through His Kriyā Śakti or Power of Doing. "Having created this, He enters into it" (Tait 2-6) That is, He enters into the whole universe as well as into Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Rudra, who are directly responsible for Creation, Maintenance, and Destruction.

Thus, Śrīkaṇṭha concludes with a note of simple faith :—

"तदिह सर्वशक्तेः सर्वज्ञस्य शिवस्य महिमा केन विज्ञायते।" (१ २-९)

Who can grasp the glory of such a Omnipotent, Omniscient Śiva ?

(7) Narayana and Hiranyagarbha

In some passages, Nārāyaṇa and Hiraṇyagarbha have been referred to as creators. But really speaking, Brahman alone can be the Creator, Sustainer and Destroyer of the entire Universe of souls and matter.

In fact, Nārāyaṇa is the Upādāṇa-Śakti of Brahman and, as such, dependent on Brahman (Br. Sū. 1. 2. 3 ; 4. 3. 15). Yet as, Śaktimān and Śakti are identical, and as in this case there is no distinction between the Efficient and Material Causes, so Brahman, the Śaktimān and the Efficient Cause, and Viṣṇu, the Śakti and the Material Cause are identical.

"यतो विष्णु-शिवयोरूपादान-निमित्तयोरवस्था-भेदमन्तरेण स्वरूप-भेदो नास्ति ।"
(१-३-१२)

As the Upādāna Śakti or Upādāna-Rūpa of Brahman, Viṣṇu, too, is "Niratiśaya-Ānanda-Svabhāva" or infinite bliss in essence. (Br. Sū 1.3.12).

Hiraṇyagarbha, on the other hand, is "Jīva-Samaṣṭi" or collection of all individnal souls. (Br-Sū 1. 3. 12. etc.), or "Sakala-Kārya-Samaṣṭi-Rūpa", collection of all effects. (Br. Sū. 4. 3. 14.). Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu is the Upādāna of Hiraṇyagarbha and so higher than he.

"सकल-कार्य-समष्टिरूपाद् हिरण्यगर्भात् परो नारायणस्तदुपादानत्वात्, ततोऽपि परं शिवाख्यं निमित्तं विरूपाक्षं परं ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिकं नित्यतृप्तं स्वतन्त्रं स्वप्रकाशमिति ।"
(४-३-१४)

Thus, Brahman or Śiva, together with His Para-Śakti Umā, (P. 47) first assumes the form of Nārāyaṇa, as the Upādāna-Kāraṇa ; then from Nārāyaṇa, the first effect Hiraṇyagarbha is produced ; from that, the rest of the world. In this sense, at best, Hiraṇyagarbha can be said to be the cause of intermediate effects. or, here too, the Lord is the real Creator (Br Sū. 1. 1. 19.).

Thus, Śrīkaṇṭha concludes :—

"सर्वज्ञया मनोवाग्-विपर्यास-रहितं स्व-शक्ति-मरीचिभिः सकल-जगत्-पूरकं स्वाविभक्तया परम-प्रकृति-रूपया परमानन्द-चिदेक-रस-परमाकाश-लक्षणया स्वावस्था-भेद-परम-चेतन-नारायणारब्ध-हिरण्यगर्भादि-सकल-कार्य-प्रपञ्चया परशक्त्योमया शबलित रूपं निर्विकारं त्रिलोचनं परं ब्रह्म सर्वोत्तरमिति निरूपितम् ।" (४-३-१४)

Brahman alone is Omniscient and, as such, free from all defects of speech and mind. He alone has filled up the entire Universe by the rays of His own powers. He alone has a variegated form through His Para-Śakti Umā (P. 47), who is His inner distinction, who is the Para-Prakṛti, who is the Parama-Ākāśa, one mass of supreme bliss

and consciousness, who is the entire Universe, consisting of effects, led by Hiraṇyagarbha, created by Nārāyaṇa, His Upādāna form.

In this way, Brahman and Brahman alone is the Creator, both the Material and Efficient Causes of the entire Universe ; and none else.

(8) Brahman is not only the fficient Cause.

There are some Schools of Philosophy (e. g. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) that hold that Brahman is only the Efficient Cause of the world and not also its Material Cause. But the general Vedānta View is that He is both the Material and Efficient Causes. So, Śrīkaṇṭha, too, takes special pains to refute the view that Brahman is only the Efficient, and not also the Material Cause. E. g. in "Prakṛti Adhikaraṇa" or Section Concerning the Material Cause (Sū. 1. 4. 23 — I. 4. 28.) he establishes that Brahman is the Material Cause, thus : —

(i) Objections against the Doctrine that Brahman is the Material Cause

It may be thought here that Brahman is only the Efficient, and not also the Material Cause, for the following two reasons :—

First, so far as our experience goes, we always find that the Material and the Efficient Causes are mutually different. E. g. the potter, the efficient cause, is different from the lump of clay, the material cause ; the weaver, the efficient cause, is different from the threads, the material causes and so on. So, in the case of Brahman, too, this is the case, and we cannot, all on a sudden, imagine a case where the two are identical.

Secondly, as a matter of fact, such an imagining is also absolutely useless. As in other cases, effects are easily produced by an efficient cause with the help of a material cause outside it, so why not here ?

(ii) Refutation of the Doctrine that Brahman is not the Material Cause

This view, Śrīkaṇṭha controverts on the following grounds :—

(a) On Scriptural Grounds

First, it has been definitely asserted in Scriptures, that through the knowledge of the material cause, all the effects produced out of it, can be known. (Chānd. 6 1. 4.). Here, three examples have been given : viz. of a lump of clay, a lump of gold, and a lump of iron. When these are known respectively, all the objects made of clay, gold and iron are known respectively So, according to this view, to know Brahman is to know the world. But unless Brahman be the material cause of the world, this is not possible, for, to know an efficient cause is never to know the effects.

Secondly, Brahman Himself desires to be many, to procreate

(Tait. 2. 6.). This definitely proves that He is both the Efficient and Material Causes.

Thirdly, Brahman is both of the form of the Universe (Jagadākāra) and Lord of the Universe (Jagat-Pati). The first proves that He is the Material Cause, the second that He is the Efficient Cause.

Fourthly, He is actually transformed into the form of the Universe of souls and matter, and this may be proved both on the grounds of Scripture and reason. [For the real meaning of 'Transformation' see below Pp. 71 ff].

Fifthly, He alone is called the "Source" of all beings in Scriptures. That means that He is the sole Material Cause.

So, Śrīkaṇṭha concludes—

"ततश्चोपादानमपि निमित्तं परं ब्रह्मैव ।" (१-४-२८)

The Supreme Brahman is both the Material and Efficient Causes.

(iii) On Grounds of Reason

This may be proved, as a matter of fact, not only on Scriptural grounds, as pointed out here by Śrīkaṇṭha, but also on grounds of reason, no less, though not mentioned by him.

For, as pointed out above, there being nothing outside the Omnipresent Brahman, how can there be any material cause outside Him ? Further, Brahman is the only Being which contains the elements of both Cit and Acit, which are transformed into the forms of individual souls and material objects [For the real meaning of 'Transformation' see below Pp. 71 ff]. Otherwise, we have to conceive of two separate material causes one for the individual souls, and one for the material objects. But if there be two such absolutely independent, unconnected and mutually opposed material causes, these are sure to come into conflict with each other, making the smooth running of the Universe, which is a Cosmos and not a Chaos, impossible.

If it be said that the Omnipotent Lord is there to bring both into harmony with each other for the production of one, whole integrated Universe,—the reply is that in that case, no less, the relation amongst the different elements will be artificial and external. Also, if Brahman be only the Efficient Cause, He cannot be the Inner Controller, for the matter of that, any kind of Controller of the Universe of Souls and Matter, produced out of two material causes, outside Him (in whatever way that be possible). For, once the clay-jars etc. have been produced, what control can the potter have over the same ? In fact, not only the Omnipresence, but all other special qualities of Brahman will become impossible on His part, if there be such an external world of souls and matter, produced out of external material causes.

(iii) Refutation of the Saiva View that Brahman is not the Material Cause

In this connection, Śrīkaṇṭha takes special pains also to refute the views of those Śaiva Schools, which hold that Śiva is only the Efficient Cause of the world and not its Material Cause, in "Pāśupata Adhikaraṇa" or Section called "Pāśupata" (Br. Sū. 2. 2.35—38). He refers to the Schools, thus—

"पत्युः परमेश्वरस्य श्रुति-सिद्ध-जगदुभय-कारणत्वस्यापि तदागमनिष्ठास्तन्मताभिप्रायानभिज्ञा एकदेशिनस्तान्त्रिकाः केवल-निमित्तत्वं वदन्ति। तदुक्तं न वेति संदेहः।" (२-२-३५)

Although in the Scriptures, the Supreme Lord is definitely stated to be both the Material and Efficient Causes of the world, yet some Schools of the Tāntrikas, having failed to grasp properly the real meaning of the same, have declared Him to be the Efficient Cause merely.

Here, evidently he means those Śaiva Schools which take Śiva to be only the Material Cause.

This Śrīkaṇṭha says is opposed both to Scripture and Reason.

The opposing party may say here :—By using wheels, rods etc., a potter, who is not the Material Cause, becomes a "Kartā", an Agent or an Efficient Cause. In the same manner, the Lord is only the Efficient Cause, while Māyā (Prakṛti) is the Material Cause, and Śakti is the instrument (like wheels, rods etc.). Otherwise, if the Lord be the Material Cause as well, He will become inevitably subject to changes etc.

To this, Śrīkaṇṭha replies as follows :—

The Lord has no physical body, but an efficient cause has a physical body. So, the illustration of the potter is not to the point. For, the potter can control the lump of clay through his physical organs etc. But how can God, devoid of physical organs, control Prakṛti, the primary material cause ? If it be said that God does not control Prakṛti, then that will practically amount to the acceptance of the Sāṃkhya view.

If it be said that, it is by no means essential that a controller should possess a body—for, the soul, though not possessing a body, yet controls the sense-organs—the reply is that, in that case, the Lord would become subject to the states and processes of Pradhāna, the material cause ; for the soul, while controlling the sense-organs, is subject to their states and processes.

If it be said that, just as the potter controls the lump of clay, different from and outside him, so is the case with the Lord, no less—the reply is that, in that case, He becomes limited, non-omniscient etc.

That is, as pointed out above, the very concept of a Pradhāna or Primal Matter, outside Brahman, involves self-contradiction (P. 66) Hence, Śrīkaṇṭha concludes :

"सर्वथा न केवलमीश्वरो निमित्तमित्यस्माकं सिद्धान्तः।" (२-२-३८)

Our conclusion is that the Lord is not only the Efficient Cause, but also the Material Cause.

(9) Real Implications of the Cosmic Parinama-Vada

Above (P. 59–61), two main objections have been raised against the Pariṇāma-Vāda or the Doctrine that Brahman as the Material Cause is actually transformed into the form of the universe of souls and matter. It has also been shown as to how Śrīkaṇṭha tackles the problem. The real implication of the famous Monotheistic Vedānta Doctrine of Pariṇāma, is as follow :—

(i) Parinama-Vada or the Doctrine of Actual Transformation

"Pariṇāma" means 'actual transformation'. This is ordinarily taken to be opposed to "Vivarta", meaning 'apparent transformation'. "Pariṇāma-Vāda" is the doctrine of the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta, while "Vivarta-Vāda" is that of the Monistic Schools of the Vedānta. According to the first view, the cause is actually transformed into the form of the effect, as a lump of clay into a clay-jar. Here, the cause and the effect are equally real. According to the second view, the cause appears to be transformed into the form of the effect, but is not actually so, as, during the rope-snake illusion, the rope appears to be a snake, but is never actually the snake for a single moment. Here the so-called cause, (it is not at all a cause, as it does not actually produce any thing or an effect at all) alone is real, not the effect.

(ii) Sat-Karya-Vada or the Doctrine of the Prior Existence of the Effect in the Cause

Now, both the above Doctrines are forms of the famous Indian Doctrine of Causation, viz. Sat-Kārya-Vada, according to which, as against the rival Doctrine of Asat-Kārya-Vāda, the effect is potentially contained in the cause from the very beginning. Here, we are directly interested in the Pariṇāma-Vāda. According to this Doctrine, the cause first, potentially contains the effect in it as its Śakti, in an unmanifest way, Then, through the instrumentality of the efficient cause, that potential, latent, unmanifest effect is made actual, patent and manifest. Thus, milk contains butter in it in a potential form ; later on, through the further process of charning, that potential butter is manifested in an actual way. Then we say that

milk has actually become transformed into the form of the butter. So, here creation does not mean a new beginning, an actual new production, but only the manifestation of what was already present in an unmanifest form.

(iii) Difficulties of Parinama-Vada

Now, how this Parināma-Vāda may be applied in the case of Brahman, the Cause, and the Universe, the effect, has been explained above (P. 59). The question here is as to whether this Cosmic Parināma-Vāda is logically justifiable, or not. The two main difficulties in this connection have been referred to above, (P. 59). But really, these can easily be got rid of, if the real implications of this Cosmic Parināma-Vāda be properly understood.

(iv) Solution of the First Difficulty : The Universe is not Impure and Non-sentient

As has been stated above (P. 59), here, Brahman Himself is the Cause and Himself is the Effect. So, here there is no question of the transformation of the Ever-Pure Brahman into the form of a different something, viz. the impure world. The objection was raised as to how a lump of gold can become transformed into a clay-jar (P. 59). For, the effect being nothing but a transformation of the cause, must be of the same nature as the cause. So, how can an impure and imperfect world, the effect, arise from Pure and Perfect God, the Cause ?

But this doubt or objection is based on a mis-conception. For, here, the effect, itself, the world itself is nothing but Brahman Himself. Nay, it is even sweeter, more beautiful, more blissful than that—it is Ānanda-rūpiṇī Umā Herself, embodying all the beauty and bliss, glory and grandeur of Brahman (Br. Sū. Bhāṣya 4-3 14) (P. 52) So who dares say that the world is in essence impure and imperfect ? Of course, from the merely worldly point of view, it appears to be so ; but really, it is Brahman and His Para-Śakti in essence. From this real point of view alone, can the celebrated Scriptural statement : "From Bliss, verily, all these beings arise ; in Bliss, when born, are they sustained. to Bliss do they return" (Tait 3-6) be taken to be true. So, the world is not a new effect from God, so that the question might arise as to how God can produce a new effect that is totally different from Himself. (See under the Section on "Refutation of the First and Third Objections against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda).

It has been said above that Brahman holds all defects in Him, yet Himself remains Pure (P. 18) ; again, that Brahman remains Pure,

though Immanent in the impure Jīva-Jagat (P. 31—32). Now, all these statements are true only from the 'empirical', and not from the 'transcendental' standpoint (P. 72. See below the Section on "Concluding Remarks : Līlā and Karma"—'empirical' standpoint is not false, as held by the Advaitins, but only incomplete, being a standpoint of Jīvas. But from the transcendental standpoint or standpoint of Brahman—the Universe, as shown above, is neither defective, nor impure. (P. 69)

(v) Solution of the Second Difficulty : Brahman has Transformation, but no Change

From this standpoint, the second objection, too, aganist this Cosmic Pariṇāma-Vāda can be easily refuted. It is the question as to how Brahman, the Immutable, the Ever-Perfect, Ever-Satisfied, Ever-Full Being can ever be subject to changes as the above "Pariṇāma-Vāda" essentially implies. But here, too, it may be pointed out, as before, that here there is no change of one thing to a new, different some thing ; but the same Brahman is transformed into Himself. So, it cannot involve any change on His part. If one changes into himself, that is not really any 'change', for the self or the essence remains just the same always. One may manifest one's powers or keep these unmanifest, but that does not mean any change in one's own nature or essence. A mechanic may weild or manifest his power and produce a particular kind of machine ; or may not actually do so. But that never means that his whole nature changes. In this case, the material cause of the machine lies outside the mechanic, the efficient cause, and the effect produced, too, is a thing totally outside the agent. Still, it does not involve any change on his part. But, in the case of Brahman's Causality, the Material Cause is Brahman Himself, the effect produced is Brahman Himself, not outside (which is impossible, He being omnipresent), but inside Himself.

Thus within His Universal Bosom, Brahman engages Himself in this Cosmic Play with Himself, with His Para-Śakti (P. 52) (See also the Section on "Refutation of the Sixth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda). So, what question can there of mutability on the part of Brahman ? When manhood is unmanifest, a person is a child ; when it is manifest, he is a youth, but he does not change to become two different persons for this reason. (P. 61) In the same manner, Brahman with unmanifest Cit and Acit is the Cause ; with manifest Cit and Acit is the effect—the very same Brahman remaining one and the same all throughout.

The real implications of this will be discussed below. [Pp. 71 ff]

Other objections in this connection, will be dealt with below. (See under the Section : "Refutation of Objections against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda).

(10) Further Reflections on the 'Parinamitva' and 'Nirvikaratva' of Brahman.

As pointed out above (P. 60), one of the most formidable difficulties that Monotheistic Systems of the Vedānta have to face is regarding the Doctrine—essential to their theory that the Universe is real and an effect of Brahman—that Brahman, as the Cause, is actually, and not only apparently, transformed into the form of the Universe of souls and matter, yet Himself remains untransformed or unchanged. Thus, Brahman is 'Pariṇāmī' or transformable, yet 'Nirvikāra' or unchangeable.

(i) The Problem of Reconciling 'Transformation' with 'Unchangeableness'.

Now, Transformation or Pariṇāma, and 'Change' or 'Vikāra' are practically synonyms. Or, rather, 'Pariṇāma' is a kind of 'Vikāra', and as such 'Pariṇāma' essentially involves changes For example, when a lump of clay, the cause, is transformed into the form of a clay-jar, an effect, then the lump of clay essentially and unavoidably changes. That is, for example, it gives up its former, original black colour, round form and soft state, and becomes red in colour, oblong in shape and hard, due to being burnt in the furnace and the like. Further, its functions also change. As a mere lump, it cannot function as a water-jug ; but as a jar it can.

Of course, here the Advaita or Monistic Schools of the Vedānta would say that such changes of colour, shape, state, function and so on do not at all constitute real changes—as here the substance 'clay' does not change. It is the same clay that is present in the lump or the cause ; it is the same clay that is present in the jar or the effect—so, what change is there ? Hence, the so-called changes of colour, form, state, function and the like are not real changes at all.

These are mere matters of words, as stated by Scriptures themselves : —

"वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ।"

(छान्दोग्योपनिषद् ६-१-४)

"The effects are mere names, due to words—the clay alone is real."

This, in fact, is Vivarta-Vāda or Doctrine of Apparent or Illusory transformation of the Advaita Vedānta Schools. The Advaita-Vādis, in fact, have no difficulty in this connection, as according to them, there is really no problem of creation at all, Brahman being no Creator at all. So, here there is no question as to how Brahman can be 'Pariṇamī' and 'Nirvikāra': subject to transformation, yet unchangeable, at the same time.

But according to the Monotheistic Schools, as we have seen, creation is a real, a very real act on the part of Brahman (Pp. 20, 56). So, the Monotheistic Vedāntists have to solve here the apparently insoluble problem as to how Brahman can be 'Pariṇāmī', yet 'Nirvikāra ;—subject to transformation, yet unchangeable, at one and the same time.

(ii) Worldly Analogies for the Same.

Very ingenious, indeed, are the analogies given by Scriptures :—

"यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्णते च
यथा पृथिव्यामोषधयः सम्भवन्ति।
यथा सतः पुरुषात् केशलोमानि
तथाऽक्षरात् सम्भवतीह विश्वम्।"

(मुण्डकोपनिषद् १-१-७)

Here three analogies have been given :—

(i) Analogy of a spider. A spider weaves, the web out of itself—the web being its effect—yet itself remains unchanged.

(ii) The earth produces herbs out of itself, yet itself remains unchanged.

(iii) A living person produces hair and nails out of himself, yet himself remains unchanged.

In all these cases, we find that the cause in question produces an effect, yet itself remains unchanged and untransformed. And it is asserted by the Monotheistic Vedāntists that all these Scriptural instances clearly and definitely prove the possibility of "Pariṇāma" or transformation without 'Vikāra' or change on the part of the 'Pariṇāmi' or the cause.

The analogy given by Śrīkaṇṭha is, as stated (P. 61, 67), of a person, in whom 'manhood' is inherent from the very beginning, but when he is a child, it remains unmanifest or potential in him ; again, when he grows to be a youth, it is manifested fully in him ; yet he does not change, but remains the very same person, all throughout.

In the very same manner, it is held by the Monotheistic Vedāntists, that Brahman is transformed into the Universe of souls and matter, yet Himself remains unchanged. In the very same manner, Brahman has Jīva-Jagat in Him in an unmanifest, potential form, during Pralaya or Dissolution ; again, manifests the same in an actual form during Sṛṣṭi or Creation. Yet He remains the very same Brahman all throughout.

(iii) Transcendental and Empirical Standpoints.

Now, all the above analogies are quite plausible from the Empirical standpoint i.e. from the standpoint of the world. But these do not fit

in, really, in the case of Brahman from the Transcendental standpoint.

Why, and what, exactly, is the distinction, in the Monotheistic Systems of the Vedānta, between the 'Empirical' and the 'Transcendental' ? (See the Section on "Creation from Two Standpoints", included under the Section on "Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda".) The empirical standpoint is the standpoint from the side of the effect : the universe of souls and matter. The transcendental standpoint is the standpoint from the side of the cause : Brahman. The empirical standpoint is not totally false, as held by the Advaita School, but only partial or incomplete. (See under the Section on "Concluding Remarks : Lilāvāda and Karmavāda" under the general heading "Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda".)

Now, from the empirical standpoint, the above examples may serve their purpose. For, from this standpoint, the main question is as to whether the same Brahman is always there or not, under all circumstances, during Creation as well Dissolution, and not as to whether, Brahman is subject to any change of states, or not.

From this standpoint, alone has Brahman been said to have transformation (Pp. 29, 30, 32) and manifestation (P. 18, 36) above.

In fact, if you come to think of it, all the above examples do indicate changes of forms and functions, though not of the essence. Thus, a spider before weaving out threads and after it, must, of necessity, be of two forms, though itself, untransformed and unchanged. In the same manner, the sprouting out of the herbs does effect a change in the broad bosom of Mother Earth. In the very same manner, the sprung up hairs and nails, undoubtedly, change the form of that person to that extent— for, who can fail to note the distinction between a head full of flowing curly locks, and a bald head—though this cannot change his nature ?

(iv) Differences of Forms and Functions Constitute Real Differences.

And, here, the same question again arises : Are distinctions of forms and functions real distinctions ? As we have seen (P. 71), according to the Advaita or Monistic Schools, the answer is in the negative ; while according to the Monotheistic Schools, it is in the affirmative. In fact, according to the Monotheistic Schools, Brahman, on the one hand, and Jīva-Jagat, on the other, differ only in forms and functions, and not in essence—yet they are finally different so far. (See below the Section on "The Relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat." Also the Section on the "Concept of Individuality" P. 43.)

Hence, it is that in the above analogies there being distinctions of forms and functions, there are real distinctions between the prior and the later states. Thus, the spider changes its form and function, though not nature, when it weaves a web out of itself. The earth also, does so when its herbs spring forth on it. A person also does so, when his hair and nails issue forth in him. Again, there is, undoubtedly, a difference, as regards forms and functions, between the prior hairless and 'nail-less' form of the individual, and the later form, full of hair and nails. Finally, who can deny that the five year old Rāma is vastly different in forms and functions, from the twenty-five year old Rāma?

Thus, in all the above examples, we find that the object in question changes its forms and functions, though not nature or essence.

Now, on the ground of the above analogies, we have to say that Brahman in His Casual State, is different from Brahman in His Effected State.

(v) 'State' Implies 'Change'

In fact, the very term 'State' ordinarily implies a kind of difference, a kind of change from previous existence. For example, we speak of 'unripe' state and 'ripe' state in the case of a fruit. This implies that the fruit changes from being unripe to being ripe. Here, although the fruit is the same, yet the change from unripeness to ripeness is a real change on its part according to the interpretation of the Monotheistic Vedāntists themselves. Again, we speak of a man being in a 'healthy' state and in an 'unhealthy' state; in an 'angry' state, in a state of 'fear' and so on. Here the physical states of 'health', 'disease' and the rest, as well as the mental states of 'anger', 'fear' and the rest all equally imply physical or mental changes on the part of the person concerned, although, naturally, he himself remains the same person all throughout- the same Rāma being now healthy, now unhealthy, now angry, now afraid and so on. Thus, it does not require much argumentation to prove that the very conception of a 'state' is a conception of 'change.'

Now, we have spoken of Brahman as having two 'states'. Thus, first in His Causal State, He contracts His Cit and Acit Śaktis within Himself, and Cit and Acit, then, remain in Him as His potential, unmanifest Śaktis or Guṇas. This is called the 'Unmanifest State' of Brahman. Then, secondly, in His Effected State, He expands His Cit and Acit Śaktis out of Himself; and Cit and Acit, then, are manifested as Jīvas and Jagat. This is called the 'Manifest State' of Brahman.

(vi) Brahman can have 'States' only Empirically.

But all these are, and can be, true only from the empirical standpoint,

from the standpoint of the Jīvas, from a partial or incomplete standpoint. Thus, if we, as imperfect Jīvas, try to conceive of God as a Creator, we naturally do so on the basis of Analogy. And, on this very common basis, we conceive of Him as shown above, as contracting and expanding His Guṇas and Śaktis, non-manifesting and manifesting the same, non-transforming and transforming Himself into the form of the Universe of Souls and Matter and so on. In this way, we apply all these empirical terms to Him in our honest and loving efforts to grasp Him from our standpoint.

And, the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta have given due importance and value to such honest and loving attempts on our part to conceive of God as our Creator. That is why, in all the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta, the two states of Brahman, His Causal and Unmanifest, and His Effected or Manifest States are repeatedly spoken of (P. 61).

(vii) Brahman can have no States Transcendentally.

However, can we really take the Monotheistic Vedāntists to be so short-sighted, so lacking in comprehension, so worldly-minded as not to realise that Brahman cannot, from the transcendental stand-point, have any 'states' or 'changes' at all ? Do they not themselves insist on Brahman being absolutely 'Nirvikāra' or 'Unchangeable' ? So, how can such a Brahman be now unmanifest and now manifest; now contracted, now expanded ; now latent, now patent ; now potential, now actual, now destroying, now creating ?

Here the Monotheistic Vedāntists have to say either that these states of manifestation and non-manifestation are not states of change ; or, that these states of manifestation and non-manifestation are states of change. But if they accept the first alternative, then, their own fundamental Doctrine—that Brahman and Jīva-Jagat, like any cause and effect, are identical in essence, yet different in forms, qualities, powers and functions will fall to the ground. Thus, as shown above (P. 73), it is absolutely essential for the Monotheistic Vedāntists to hold that the difference in forms, qualities, powers and functions do constitute a real kind of difference. Otherwise, their Theories will be just the same as the Advaita Theories —for according to both the Monistic (Advaita) and Monotheistic Schools, Brahman and Jīva-Jagat are identical in Svarūpa or essence ; though different in forms, qualities, powers, and functions. But while the Monistic Schools hold that differences in forms, qualities, powers and functions are only apparent, and, by no means, real kinds of differences, so that there is really no difference or 'Bheda' at all between Brahman and Jīva-Jagat ; the Monotheistic Schools hold that these do constitute real

kinds of differences, so that there is a real kind of difference or 'Bheda', no less, between Brahman and Jīva-Jagat (P. 43). In this way, the Monotheistic Vedāntists cannot accept the first of the above two alternatives that differences of states, are not real differences or states of change.

In the same manner, they cannot, also, accept the second of the two alternatives, menticned above,—for, if they accept the states of manifestation and non-manifestation as states of change, they cannot, according, to their own Theories of the 'Nirvikāratva' of Brahman, take these to be belonging to Brahman actually, or, from the transcendental standpoint.

In fact, as shown above (P. 75) and also as referred to below, Brahman cannot have any change of states at all. (See below under the Section on "Paradox of 'Fully' and 'Wholly'," included under the General Section on "Refutation of the Fifth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda" ; also the Sections on "How can a Whole play with its Parts ?" and "How can Līlā be reconciled with Jīva-Karmas ?" included under the General Section on : "Refutation of the Sixth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda".)

(viii) Brahman's Activity or Lila

Even if He be taken to be an Active Being or 'Sakriya' (Pp. 2, 56), His Activity cannot involve any change on His part. So, He can have only that kind of Activity which involves no change on His part at all. And, there is only one such kind of Activity, which, as distinct from all other kinds of Activity, does not spring from a motive or feeling of want, does not aim at an end or unattained object, does not involve any means or efforts to do something, does not imply any change or passing from the state of non-having to that of having, and so on. And, this one, unique, wonderful kind of Activity is 'Līlā'. That is why, all the Schools of the Vedāntists—also the Monistic or Advaita Schools from the 'Vyavahārika' or empirical standpoint—take the Creative Act of Brahman as a Divine Sport or 'Līlā'. (P. 52-53. See below under the Section on "Refutation of the Sixth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda ")

This Divine Līlā has no 'beginning', no 'end', no 'now', no 'then', no 'this', no 'that' ; no change of states, no efforts, no activities of any kind whatsoever. So, why call it an 'Activity' at all—it is 'Essence', it is 'Existence', it is 'Eternity', that simply "is", and never 'Becomes.' (See below the Section on "Real Implications of the Doctrine that Brahman is 'Nirvikāra or without changes, yet transformed into the form of the World", under the Section on "The Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kārana-Vāda.")

Thus, from the transcendental standpoint, from the standpoint of Brahman Himself, from a full or complete standpoint—Creation and Dissolution on the part of Brahman do not involve any distinction between the prior Causal or Unmanifest State and the later Effected or Manifest State at all.

(h) Brahman is absolutely Unchangeable.

The question may legitimately be asked here as to why, then, do Monotheistic Vedāntists not say that straight, instead of repeatedly harping on the Causal and Effected States of Brahman. The answer is that, as pointed out above (P. 73), this they do so from the standpoint of the Jīvas themselves. Otherwise, why should they emphasise repeatedly the 'Nirvikāratva' of Brahman ? Otherwise, why should they repeatedly refer to the Authority of Scriptures ? (P. 65) This very requisition of the Scriptural Authority shows that they were fully conscious that the 'Pariṇāmitva' of Brahman cannot really be rationally reconciled with His 'Nirvikāratva'—one has to be given up. Which one ? Evidently the 'Pariṇāmitva' of Brahman. However much one may argue, one can never really prove that Brahman is transformed into the form of the world, yet remains untransformed ; Brahman is changed as having Causal and Effected States, yet remains unchanged. If we do not take Brahman to be 'Acintya' or beyond all thinking and comprehension, as actually done by the 'Acintya-Bhedābheda-Vāda ; if we hope to have an inkling into the real nature of Brahman, 'Acintya' or incomprehensible to us, but not, surely to Saints and Seers ; if we firmly believe that, there being an underlying harmony between ourselves and Brahman, Brahman is amenable to higher comprehension or Upalabdhi, the end of all our 'Sādhanas' or Spiritual strivings—then, we have no other alternative but to hold that Brahman's Act of Creation can never entail Him to any change of states, like unmanifest and manifest, potential and actual, contracted and expanded.

(vii) Real Nature of Brahman's Activities.

On the one hand, the Concept of Activity is rather inconsistent with that of an Eternal, Unchangeable Being or Reality, like Brahman. For, 'Activity' implies means and ends, efforts and changes, quite impossible on the part of an Unchangeable, Ever-satisfied, Ever-full Being. (For fuller details, see under the Section on "The Refutation of the Sixth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda"). On the other hand, however, one of the main differences between the Monistic and Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta is with regard to the question as to whether Brahman is 'Niṣkriya' or without activities, or 'Sakriya' or essentially Active.

(a Two Main Activities of Brahman : Creation and Emancipation.

As we have seen (P. 20), according to the Monotheistic Schools, the two main Activities of Brahman are 'Sṛṣṭi' and 'Mukti' : Creation and Emancipation. It is asserted here, that 'Sṛṣṭi' is due to the past Sakāma-Karmas of the 'Bubhukṣu-Jīvas themselves while 'Mukti' is due to the past and present 'Sādhanas' of the Mumukṣu Jīvas (P. 25). But in that case, both Creation and Emancipation become 'purposive' activities. That is, then, we have to say that Brahman creates the universe for enabling the Jīvas to undergo the results of their past 'Sakāma-Karmas, so that they may finally attain Emancipation. (See below under the Section on "The Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda.")

(b) The Unique Nature of Divine Activity

But really speaking, God's activities cannot be purposive. For, 'purpose' implies a desire for the attainment of something not yet attained; and that, evidently, is impossible in the case of an Ever-Satisfied, Ever-Perfect, Ever-Full being like Brahman. So, it cannot be said that Brahman creates 'for the sake' of something or some one else ; just as it cannot be said that He creates 'for the sake' of His own Self. That is why, it has been said above that God's Activity is a 'Līlā' or a 'Sport', the only kind of non-purposive activity, which is not a mere mechanical one.

Now, what exactly is the nature of such a Divine Activity ? It is evidently not a result of any reflection or exertion on His part, like jumping or running, on ours. It, thus, has no separate desire behind it, no separate effort accompanying it. That is why, it has been said above to be Nature itself (P. 76). Take the act of 'shining' by the sun. It is not preceded by thoughts, not succeeded by efforts, but is the very nature of the sun. This will be discussed in details under the Section on Lilāvāda (See under the Section on "The Refutation of the Sixth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-vāda").

But the point to note here specially is the following :—

It has been said above that whatever be our imperfect reading of the situation from our or the empirical stand-point of the situation, Brahman cannot, from His own, or transcendental stand-point, be really transformed into the form of the Universe of Souls and Matter (P. 75). Now, the question here is : Does that really mean that there is no real transformation at all, no real activity at all, on the part of Brahman, and the Advaita or Monistic Vedānta Doctrine of Vivarta or Illusory Transformation is the only correct one, instead of the Monotheistic Vedānta Doctrine of Pariṇāma or Actual Transformation ?

(c) The Monistic and Monotheistic Schools Differ Quantitatively

Surely not. As pointed out above, the whole distinction between the Monistic and Monotheistic Schools is really a quantitative one (P. 42). That is, the whole distinction between the two Schools is that according to the Monistic Schools, Brahman is an Abstract Being with no internal distinctions or 'Svagata-Bhedas' of Guṇas and Śaktis : Attributes and Powers ; while according to the Monotheistic Schools, Brahman is a Concrete Being, an Organic Whole with Jīva-Jagat as His Guṇa-Śaktis or internal differences or 'Svagata-Bhedas' (P. 37). Thus, according to the Monotheistic view, Jīva-Jagat are eternally real in Brahman and as Brahman ; yet because of retaining their respective 'individualities', are not totally identical with Brahmans, as held by the Monotheistic Schools —but also different. In this way, Jīva-Jagat are real, as real as Brahman, yet separate realities (see below under the Section on "The Relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat").

So far well and good. But still, then, the original question remains unanswered : Is 'Transformation or Pariṇāma' or 'Creation' or Sṛṣṭi' real on the part of Brahman ? If not, how can He be 'Pariṇāmī' and 'Jagat-Srastṛ and Mukti-Dātṛ and 'Sakriya'—subject to transformation, the Sole Creator and Emancipator of the Universe of Souls and Matter, and capable of activities as held by the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta ?

(d) The Concept of 'Divine Transformation.'

Now, let us first take 'Pariṇāma' or the question of 'Transformation'. Evidently, from the transcendental stand point or from the standpoint of Brahman Himself, there is no question of any new transformation, for two reasons. Firstly, there is no question of 'time' in the case of Brahman; so that there cannot be any new transformation into a new thing on the part of Brahman, like, the new transformation of a lump of clay into a new clay-jar, here and now. Secondly, Brahman is in Jīva-Jagat, His 'Svagata-Bhedas' eternally, just as He is ; Jīva-Jagat are in Brahman eternally, just as they are ; so that Brahman cannot be transformed into Jīva-Jagat anew and assume a new form, like a lump of clay, transformed into a clay-jar anew and assuming a new form thereby.

So, what does 'transformation' mean here really ? It means that Brahman is eternally present in Jīva-Jagat, as a substance is eternally present in its qualities and powers, a whole in its parts, a cause in its effects. Yet Jīva-Jagat, Cit-Acit are only two amongst His numerous 'Svagata-Bheda's and are, thus, quantitatively different from Brahman (Pp. 36, 41). Brahman is, thus, "fully" present in each of His infinite number of 'Svagata-Bhedas'—but not "wholly" exhausted in any one of these. (See below under the Section "Real Implications of the Doctrine

that Brahman is Nirvikāra or without changes, yet transformed into the form of the Universe", under the Section on "Refutation of the Fifth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vīda).

To show this clearly, it has been said that these 'Svagata-Bhedas' or Guṇas and Śaktis are different 'transformations' or 'manifestations' or 'aspects', or 'effects', or 'parts' of Brahman. All these terms are meant for showing that all these 'Svagata-Bhedas' of Brahman, including Jīva-Jagat are individually and mutually different from one another (P. 43), though all are equally 'Svagata-Bhedas' of Brahman, and as such, Brahman Himself qualitatively. Otherwise, it might have been thought that all being equally 'Svagata Bhedas', are absolutely identical. Just as the different transformations or manifestations of a lump of clay, viz. a clay-jar, a clay-glass, a clay-plate and so on are mutually different, though all are clay in essence – here the terms 'transformation and manifestation' bear ordinary meanings of actual change of states—so the different transformations and manifestations of Brahman, viz. Jīva, Jagat and so on, are mutually different, though all are Brahman in essence—here, the terms 'transformation and manifestation' do not bear ordinary meanings of actual change of states at all.

In this way, the Monotheistic Vedānta Doctrine of 'Pariṇāma' has a real value and validity from the dualistic-nondualistic standpoint of Monotheistic Vedānta.

(e) The Concept of Divine Activity

But, then, what meaning can 'Creation' and 'Destruction' have here ? For, if Jīve-Jagat be eternally in Brahman as His 'Svagata-Bhedas' or Guṇas and Śaktis, they cannot be created or destroyed. Also, if Brahman has no change of states, no expansion or manifestation and contraction or non-manifestation, then Creation and Dissolution cannot be taken to be expansion or manifestation of His Guṇas and Śaktis ; and contraction or non-manifestation of the same. So, what exactly are 'Sṛṣṭi-Pralaya', 'Creation-Dissolution' according to the Monotheistic Schools ?

In the same manner, how can Brahman be conceived to be creating Jīva according to their past Sakāma-Karmas ; again, emancipating them according to their 'Sādhanas' or spiritual efforts ? The Jīvas, being in Brahman cannot be veiled by Ajñāna or Ignorance. So, how is 'Bandha' or Bondage at all possible in their cases ?

These are nothing but Sport or Līlā on the part of God as explained above (Pp. 52-53). Līlāvāda will also be explained and in details below (See the Section on "The Refutation of the Sixth objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda").

Now, what is this Divine Sport ? It is an expression of Prema and Ānanda : Love and Bliss. So, it is a kind of loving, blissful Play (Pp. 50-52). But what is a Play ? It is something opposed to the stern realities and the stark facts of life. In love and bliss, it soars high up the hard crust of the earth, and makes up a dream-world of its own. That is why, make-belief constitutes the very Core of a 'Play.' But such a make-belief does not make the Play false by any means—that being its very nature. E. G. when a boy plays with soldiers, when a girl plays with dolls, when a grown-up plays chess—all such plays involve make-belief. Even games like foot-ball and the like, involve make-belief in the sense that the players are in a special world of their own, for the time being, above their every-day, ordinary humdrum existence. Otherwise, there is no play at all.

So, the Divine Play also involves make-belief, in a thousand times sweeter, more wonderful, more enchanting way. Here, God plays with His own Self—with His 'Svagata-Bhedas', with His entire Self or Umā (P. 47). So, here, He separates, as if, certain Jīvas from Himself ; again, unites them with Himself. These 'separating' and 'uniting', are, of course, not actual acts on His part. For, how can He actually separate the Jīvas, ever-united with Him ? How can He actually re-unite the Jīvas, never separated from Him even momentarily ? Hence, here, He lovingly and joyfully plays hide and seek, so to speak, with Himself— as if separating the Jīvas from Himself, as if re-uniting them with Himself (P. 52). In the ordinary philosophical language, this is called 'Creation', this is called 'Dissolution' ; this is called 'Bondge', this is called 'Salvation'. All these are make-belief plays on Brahman's part, and such a make-belief, as pointed out above, being the very essence of a play, such plays on the part of Brahman are real, very real, constituting, as they do, the very nature of Brahman Himself.

In this way, really, from the transcendental standpoint, Jīva-Jagat are never created, never destroyed, never manifested, never unmanifested, never bound, never freed - they being always there, always in Brahman, as His 'Svagata-Bhedas'. Still, Brahman is always playing with Himself, playing with His Para-Śakti Umā, playing with His Svagata-Bhedas', playing with the Jīvas (Pp. 52: 53). But what does He play, how does He play ? He plays here the sweetest of all plays – He plays hide-and-seek, with Himself – this is the 'what' of His Play. He seemingly separates and re-unites Himself with Himself—this is the 'how' of His Play. In this way, although here there are no actual separation and re-union, creation and dissolution, bondage and emancipation—yet all these seemingly happen in the process of His Play, and, though 'seeming', are,

as such, real, as real as the Play itself, constituting, as they do, the Play itself.

That is why, let us repeat, 'Divine Play' is the only possible explanation as to how an Unchangeable Being can be Creator and Emancipator, or responsible for 'Sṛṣṭi and Mukti', generally supposed to be the two fundamental activities of Brahman.

(f) 'Sakriyatva' of Brahman, or the Doctrine that Brahman is an Active Agent.

It has been said above that the acts of creating and destroying, binding and emancipating on the part of Brahman are not acts in the ordinary senses of the terms, being only a 'Līlā' or a Sport on His part (P. 81). It has also been said that even this Sport or Play is not an activity in the ordinary sense of the term, but Nature itself (P. 76). So, the question, naturally arises: How, then, can Brahman be called 'Sakriya' or an Active Agent? This 'Sakriyatva' of Brahman is another fundamental point of distinction between the Monistic and Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta.

As pointed out above (P. 76), if any activity be at all possible on the part of Brahman, it is 'Lilā and only 'Līlā'—'Play,' and' only 'Play.' But the question here is: If this 'Līla' or 'Play' be the very Nature of Brahman, then why call it 'Activity' at all?

This is necessary, from the Monotheistic standpoint. For, according to this standpoint, Creation and Dissolution are real, and not illusory, as held by the Monistic Schools. Now, Creation requires a Creator, and Creator is, ordinarily, conceived to be an active agent. Hence, to show that Creation is real, it has to be shown that this Creator, too, is so. So, if it be said that Brahman is 'Niṣkriya' or without activities, it might be thought that He is not a Creator and so Creation is not a fact. Hence it is insisted on here that Brahman is an active Creator; or, from the transcendental standpoint, He is a Player, and Creation is His Play.

Now, this Play is, of course, His Nature itself. But it might, as well, be called His Activity, to make it clear that He is the Actual Creator of the Universe of Souls and Matter. For example, is 'shining' the nature or an activity of the sun? Is 'blowing' the nature or an activity of the wind? Is 'flowing' the nature or an activity of a river? Is 'blooming' the nature or an activity of a flower? (See under the Section on the "Refutation of the Sixth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda", and "The Nature of Niṣkāma-Karmas" under the Section on "Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda")

As a matter of fact, in all such cases, there does not seem to be any difference between 'Nature' and 'Activity'. Still, it cannot be denied that here there does exist a reference to an activity of some kind, as distinct from other cases. For example, when Brahman is called, Saccidānanda, (P 21), or 'Ekamevādvitīya" (Pp. 36—38), these characteristics of being 'Existence, Consciousness and Bliss', 'One only, without a second," have no reference to any activity of any kind whatsoever. But when Brahman is called "Sraṣṭṛ-Pātṛ-Hārtṛ-Mokṣadātṛ"—Creator-Maintainer-Destroyer-Emancipator—these characteristics do have a reference to activities of some kind. Thus, as distinct from the first kind of 'Static Characteristics', the second kind of 'Dynamic' Characteristics', may be termed as 'Activities.'

In this sense, alone, is Brahman 'Sakriya' : but not in the sense of, doing something anew, assuming a new state, changing or being transformed into something else, creating a new effect, aiming at an unattained end, resorting to selected means, and exerting Himself.

Thus, the Vedāntic Brahman is simply 'Being' and never 'Becoming.' If this be properly understood, then it does not matter at all as to what particular characteristics we want Him to possess or what particular functions we want Him to perform. It does not also matter at all as to how, finally, we conceive of Him—in a Monistic or in a Monotheistic Way—for, as both the Schools equally agree as regards the above fundamental characteristic of Brahman, their differences are not so irresolvable, as ordinarily thought.

VI Brahman's Body

(1) Non-physical Bodies and Worlds.

The concept of Body is ordinarily associated with a lower, physical stage of existence ; and the state of Mokṣa is taken to be a bodiless one, when the Ātman, freed from the shackles of a physical body and a physical world, is manifested fully in its real nature or essence. But in Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta, a distinction is drawn between physical and non-physical bodies. It is wrong to hold, it is pointed out here, that bodies and worlds are necessarily physical. Of course, during the stage of Bondage, the soul, due to its past Sakāma-Karmas or selfish works, comes to be associated, so to speak, with a physical body and be born in a physical world. But there are such things as bodies of the freed

souls, and the world of Brahman which they attain. These cannot, evidently, be physical. So, non-physical bodies and worlds have to be admitted.

Hence, Brahman, too, is conceived as possessing a divine, non-physical Body and residing in a divine. non-physical World.

(.) Objection against the Doctrine of Divine Body : Anthropomorphism

The question may be asked, here, as to the legitimacy and desirability of this conception of a non-physical body. It may be thought that this conception is much too Anthropomorphic, and unwarrantably makes the states of Bondage and Release similar in nature, differing only in quantity, and not in quality. But really speaking, it may be legitimately thought, that Ātman or the Self is without any body and without any connection with the physical world. So, why should a Body and a World be suddenly tagged on even to the Supreme Self, who is described in the Scriptures as one infinite mass of knowledge, totally non-physical, non-gross, non-limited ?

(ii) Refutation of the Charge of Anthropomorphism

In reply, it may be pointed out that the concept of Anthromorphism is the common concept of not only Religion, but also more or less of all human studies. For, human studies are necessarily studies through human minds, the results of which are expressed in human terms. So, how can we ever go beyond human conception and human concepts ? In the case of Religion, specially, that being mainly an emotional study, our hearts have to be satisfied. That is why, a sublime kind of Anthropomorphism is essential to it. The God of Religion is conceived as a God of Infinite, Beauty, Grace, Charm, Serenity, Sublimity- But all these we cannot think of without the idea of Personality, nay, Anthropomorphism. We cannot ordinarily conceive of God from the strictly Monotheistic standpoint without, at the same time, thinking of Him e. g. as a Golden Person, Vast and and High, infinitely Bright, shining like a thousand suns, spreading around Infinite Beauty, Bliss and Glory. Hence, it is but natural for the devotees to ascribe an absolutely non-physical body to the Lord. Also, though God is really Omnipresent, yet for the reasons stated above, He is conceived to be residing in Brahma-loka, the World of Brahman. Thus, the ascription of a Body and a Residence to the Supreme Lord from the human standpoint seems necessary for the clearest conception and fullest satisfaction of the worshippers. Just as we cannot conceive of a Loving, Amorous, Playful, Blissful God as all alone, but has to think also of His Companion

(See above P. 47), so also we cannot conceive of a Beautiful, Bright, God as without a Body and an Abode.

(iii) Theism Itself is Anthropomorphic

The charge of Anthropomorphism is a common charge against Theistic Systems. In fact, in one sense, Theism itself is anthropomorphic through and through, as when we ascribe all good qualities, powers and activities to God, these are "good" according to our human standards only. So, as pointed out above, we have tried to catch God, so to speak, in the small net of our human ideas and human words, with what success and what truth, God only knows. This has led some pessimists to assert that our Theology is wholly a subjective creation, a mere figment of imagination, with no objective truth or basis behind. Hence, they assert, as God has created man in His own image, so man, too, has taken revenge on God by creating God in his own image.

(iv) Indian View : Objective Anthropomorphism or that of the Wise and the Pure.

But Indian Theologists are never so pessimistic. To them, Religion is not subjective, but fully objective. The fact that all knowledge is knowledge through human ideas and all expressions of the same are expressions through human words—has nothing to do here. For, to think of that is to make all knowledge eternally doomed to sheer subjectivism ; as, then, no real, absolute knowledge will be at all possible and even all scientific knowledge will be merely subjective. So, Indian Philosophers boldly hold that human necessity and Divine Necessity exactly tally with each other. That is, if from the human standpoint, it is necessary for us to endow God with certain characteristics, from the Divine standpoint, God is actually endowed with the very same characteristics. Why ? For, has not God created man in His own image ? That is why, when man, too, in his turn, creates God in his own image, that is not a groundless, empty, subjective image, but nothing but the objective Image of God Himself.

Of course, it goes without saying that this human conception must be "human" in the truest sense of the term ; that is, the conception of one whose mind is pure, intellect sharp, emotion deep, insight profound ; in a word, the conception of a Sādhaka, of a Ṛṣi, of a Draṣṭā, of a Seer, of a Saint, of a Sage. That is why, in Bhāratīya-Sādhanā, Citta-Śuddhi or purification of the mind has been given so much importance as the very first step in the Great Spiritual Sojourn without which there cannot any light of Knowledge or Devotion at

all in the mind of the Mumukṣu, or the aspirer after Salvation. Just as the real beauty and glory of the sun cannot be duly reflected on a dirty mirror, so the real nature of Brahman, too, cannot be truly reflected on an impure mind. But what is known by real Sādhakas by their pure minds and sincere hearts does, indeed, represent the objective nature of Brahman, at least partially, at least negatively, indicating what He is not, if not fully, what He is.

(v) Necessity for such a Concept of Divine Body

Hence, according to the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta, the ascription of a Body and an Abode to Brahman is not only a subjective necessity from the human standpoint, but also an objective necessity from the Divine one. That is, it is not only necessary from the standpoint of Religion, as shown above, but also true from the standpoint of Metaphysics. Metaphysically, the conception of a Theistic God is that of a Concrete Being, an Organic Whole of an infinite number of attributes, and powers. All these naturally require a Substratum, and that is the Body of God. In this case, of course, the Self and the Body are identical; yet Body has to be separately taken for showing His Concrete Nature, viz. that within His own Self, He has internal differences or Svagata-Bhedas, which, without jeopardising His unity and universality, yet prove that He is not an Abstract Whole, (Nirviśeṣa) but a Concrete Whole (Saviśeṣa), with the fullest and richest content of numerous Guṇas, Śaktis, Aṃśas : Attributes, Powers, Parts.

The conception of the Abode of Brahman : Brahma-loka, also, implies the same thing. Ordinarily, an abode is wider than and outside the person residing in it. But evidently this is impossible in the case of Brahman, for, there cannot be any thing wider than and outside the Omnipresent Brahman. So, here too, the Brahma-loka is identical with Brahman Himself. Still for the reasons stated just above, Brahman has to be taken as residing in a place befitting His Nature.

In fact, all the theistic conceptions that seem rather strange, self-contradictory or anthropomorphic, viz. the conception of 'Para-Śakti (P. 44), of Body and Abode and the like, are necessary to the very theistic conception of God as a Concrete Whole, a Being that is Full and Perfect, Coherent and Harmonious, not by denying differences, but by transmuting the same.

(2) Divine Body.

The possession of a body ordinarily implies the experiencing of pleasures and pains on the part of the soul connected with it. So, the doubt may be raised here as to whether the Body of Brahman or Śiva also

involves such a "Bhoga" or experiencing of pleasures and pains on the part of Brahman, no less.

Of what kind is the Body of Śiva ? What is the form of Śiva, the Supreme Brahman ? According to his sectarian view, Śrīkaṇṭha propounds Brahman or Śivā to be of a supremely auspicious form, with three eyes (Trilocana), black and tawny (Kṛṣṇa Piṅgala), and the like. (P. 29)

(i Divine Body involves no Bhoga

But such a Body or a Form does not involve any "Bhoga" on His part. For, "Bhoga" is the result of Sakāma-Karmas or selfish acts done with a desire for the results thereof. According to the fundamental Law of Karma, such Karmas have Karma-Phalas or appropriate results, which lead inevitably to Karma-Phala-Bhoga or which have to be experienced. But where there is no Sakāma-Karma, there is naturally no Bhoga. Here, evidently, there cannot be any Sakāma-Karma in the case of Brahman ; so, here the Body of Brahman is something that is not due to Karmas, as in the case of the Jīvas or individual souls who are born anew each time, according to their past Sakāma-Karmas. But He voluntarily assumes such a Body, and so, His case is quite different. (See below under the Section : "Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda").

"अतोऽस्य त्रिलोचनत्वादि-लक्षण शरीर-संबन्धात् शरीर-गत-सुख-दुःखादि-संभोग-प्राप्तिरिति चेत् न, वैशेष्यात्। सुख-दुःख-भोग-हेतुभ्यो जीव-शरीरेभ्यो ब्रह्मरूपस्यास्ति हि वैशेष्यम् इच्छा-गृहीतत्वादस्य, तेषां कर्म-मूलत्वाच्च"। (१-२८)

(ii) Objection against the Doctrine of Divine Body

Here an objection may be raised as follows :—

"स्वेच्छा-गृहीतोऽपि देहः संसारिणामिव परमेश्वरस्यापि दुःखमुत्पादयेदेव। स्वेच्छा-संबद्धेऽपि पावकस्य दाहकत्वं हि स्वभावः।" (१ १-२१)

It may be objected that even if the Lord assumes a Body voluntarily, yet He cannot escape the consequences of possessing a body. E. G. whether one touches fire voluntarily or non-voluntarily, one cannot escape from burning.

(iii) Refutation

As usual, Śrikaṇṭha refutes this objection on grounds of both Authority and Reason, thus :—

"शरीर-संबन्धादस्मदादिवदीश्वरस्य न संसारदोषापत्तिः। श्रुतिरेव भगवती ह्यस्य-

शरीर-संबन्धं सर्व-पाप-राहित्यं च प्रतिपादयति। वयं हि श्रुति-प्रामाण्य-शरणा न युक्तिं बहु मन्महे। पावकोऽपि संबन्धात् न शक्तिमतां दाहकः।" (१-१-२१)।

First, Scripture declares that the Lord possesses a body, yet is never subject to any faults. Secondly, the reason is that the possession of a body simply cannot by itself lead to the experiencing of pleasures and pains. E. G. a piece of paper comes into contact with fire, and the fire at once burns it; but if water comes into contact with fire, the fire cannot burn it. So, the mere coming into contact with fire cannot by itself lead to burning, which, really, depends on the nature of the object concerned. So, here also Jīva possesses a body, Brahman also does so, yet as Jīva and Brahman are different, and the Jīva alone as subject to Bhoga, not Brahman.

As a matter of fact, the Body of Brahman is also quite different from that of the Jīva.

"अत एवाप्राकृतानि पाप-जरा-मरण शोकादि-रहितानि स्वेच्छा-संपादितानि लीला-मङ्गलरूपाणि परमेश्वरस्य स्थिराणि नित्यानि विजायन्ते। अतः परब्रह्मणः परमेश्वरस्य जीवाद्वैशेष्यान्न तच्छरीरादि गत दोषापत्तिः।" (१-२-८)

The Body of God is non-material, free from sins, old age, death, sorrows and the like, assumed voluntarily, sportive and auspicious in form and eternal. These marks are not found in the body of the Jīva.

This Śrīkaṇṭha exphasises again and again in his Bhāṣya :—

"त्रिलोचनत्वादि-लक्षण-शरीर विशिष्टे परब्रह्मणि प्रसक्तानां शरीर-धर्माणां पाप-जरा-मरण-क्षुत्तृडसत्यकामासत्यसंकल्पानां निषेधाय हि अपहत-पाप्मत्वादयः प्रतिपादिताः। त्रिलोचनादि-लक्षण-शरीरकमपि परं ब्रह्मापहत-पाप्मकं जरा-रहितमशोकमविजिघत्सम-पिपासं सत्यकामं सत्य-संकल्पं चिदानन्दरूपं भवतीति न विरोधः।" (३-३-३८)

The body of the Jīva is subject to sins, old age, death, hunger, thirst, and lacks the power of fulfilling desires and translate resolves into action. But Brahman, though possessed of a body, is yet eternally and absolutely free from all sins, old age, sorrows, hunger, thirst, and possesses the powers of fulfilling all desires and translating all resolves into action, (Chānd. 8. 1. 5.) and is also Supreme Consciousness and Bliss in form.

In this way, the Body of the Lord is Sat, Cit, Ānanda—Supreme Existence, Consciousness and Bliss in essence; purely non-physical, and totally devoid of all mundane states and characteristics. In fact, it is the very self of Brahman, as pointed out above, and thus, possesses all His Supreme Glory and Grandeur. Finally, it is His Para-Śakti Umā, the emblem of Infinite Beauty, Bliss, Brightness (P. 47).

(3) Brahman's assumption of Forms for the sake of Devotees

Besides His own Eternal Form, Brahman, for favouring His devotees, also assumes various Forms on various occasions. The following may be cited as a few examples :—

सर्वाधारस्य सर्वगतस्य आदित्यान्तर्वर्तित्वं न संभवतीति यदुक्तं तत्र न विरोधः, सर्वाधारः सर्वगतः परमेश्वरः साधकानुग्रहाय हिरण्मयं किमपि रूपं समास्थाय सवितृ-मण्डलमधिवसति।" (१-१-२१)

In Chāndogya Upaniṣad (1. 6.), there is a Mantra regarding "a Golden Person inside the sun." Now, according to the Vedāntists, this Golden Person is none but Brahman Himself.

But, here an objection may be raised as to how an Unlimited Being, like Brahman can reside inside a limited object like the sun. To this, Śrīkaṇṭha replies by saying that although the Supreme Lord is the Substratum of all and Immanent in all, yet He can reside very well inside the disc of the sun, for, He assumes such a form for favouring His devotees.

"अपरिच्छिन्नस्यापि परमेश्वरस्याङ्गुष्ठमात्रत्वमुपासक-हृदयापेक्षया, मनुष्याधिकारत्वा-दुपासना-शास्त्रविधेः। मनुष्याणां हृदयं यावत्प्रमाणं तदवच्छिन्नं रूपं परमेश्वरः परम-कारुणिकः परिगृह्णाति तदुपासनासिद्धये।" (१-३-२४)

In Kaṭhopaniṣad (4. 12—13), there is a reference to the "Aṅguṣṭha-Mātra-Puruṣa", or a Person of the size of a thumb. This, too, is taken by the Vedāntists to stand for none else but the Lord. Now, here, too, a question naturally arises as to how the Vast and the Great God can ever be of the size of a thumb merely. And, the solution offered, too, is just the same, viz. that the Supremely Merciful Lord resides inside the hearts of men, and hence has to assume a very small form for pleasing His devotees and enabling them to worship Him in a convenient, easy way.

(i) Reciprocity of God and Man : The Concept of Grace

In Monotheistic Doctrines, this Concept of Grace does, indeed, occupy a central position. According to this theory, just as the devotee is incomplete without God, so God, too, is incomplete without the devotees. As the devotees call God to them, so God, too, calls the devotees incessantly to Him. So, for pleasing and helping His devotees, the All-Merciful God lovingly assumes various forms to suit their tastes and capacities. These Forms, arising out of the Infinite Ocean of bliss and beauty, may come and go, but are not, for that reason, empty bubbles, transitory and elusive. On the contrary, they represent the cream of God's Essence of Love and Mercy. Love seeks to please others ; Mercy,

save others. These pleasing and saving are, as pointed out above (P. 23), essential characteristics of Brahman, whose very nature, as a Concrete Whole, is to be connected by an unbreakable bond of sweet intimacy and loving communion with another,—for, a Theistic God cannot be conceived to be Alone, in His lonely Majesty, Sublime Self-completeness and Cold Indifference. Hence the assumption of such Forms for pleasing and saving His devotee—His other self—is quite justifiable from the theistic standpoint,

VI Sources of the Knowledge of Brahman

(1) Three Sources of Knowledge

Ordinarily, both in Eastern and Western Systems of Philosophy, three sources of valid knowledge have been recognised, viz. Perception, Inference and Authority.

Perception is regarded as Immediate Knowledge, or knowledge that we gain immediately or directly through our sense-organs or mind. Accordingly, there are two kinds of Perception: External and Internal. External Perception is Perception, by our sense-organs, of the attributes and the like, of external objects. Thus, there are, five kinds of External Perception through the five kinds of sense-organs, viz., Visual, Auditory, Tactual, Olfactory and Gustatory, through the eye, the ear, the skin, the nose and the tongue respectively. These reveal the characteristics of the objects, viz. colour, sound, touch, smell and taste, respectively. Again, there is a kind of Internal Perception by the mind, called Introspection in Western Psychology, revealing the mental states and processes of thinking, feeling and willing.

Inference is Mediate Knowledge where we take a leap from the known to the unknown, from premises to conclusions. E. G. from the known fact of smoke, we infer about the unknown fact of fire.

Authority or Testimony is knowledge through reliable works or persons, and so, this, too is Mediate Knowledge.

Now, whenever there is a question of valid knowledge, there is naturally a question of the sources of the same. So, in the case of this fundamental knowledge of Brahman, the question is: How can we come to know of Brahman? Can He be known through the above three ordinary sources of Knowledge? Or, are there some special means of knowing Him? The Vedānta View is that Brahman can be known

through Scriptures or Śāstras and all the Vedāntists take special pains to establish this point in details.

(2) Scripture as the Means of Knowing Brahman

In the third Sūtra of the First Chapter, Brahman has been described as "Śāstra-Yoni"—"Śāstra-Yonitvāt" (Br. Sū. 1-1-3). This means that Scripture is the "Source" of Brahman, or the only means of knowing Brahman, amongst the above three ordinary ones.

(i) Perception, not a Means of Knowing Brahman

Thus, first, it needs no proof that Brahman is totally beyond the range of ordinary sense-perception.

"ब्रह्मस्वरूपं प्रत्यक्षादिना प्रमाणान्तरेण नाभिव्यज्यते। 'न संदृशे तिष्ठति रूपमस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चनैनम्, हृदाम्' इत्यादिना यतः श्रुतिराह अतः प्रत्यक्षादिना सिद्धा सत्ता न ब्रह्मेति।" (३-२-२२)

As usual, here, too, Śrīkaṇṭha mainly refers to Scriptural proof, by quoting a text from the Upaniṣads. But, Reason also shows that from the very nature of the case, Brahman can never be an objeet of ordinary sense-perception. For, it, first, requires sense-object-contact which is impossible here. Secondly, the perceivable object is limited in nature, which Brahman is definitely not.

(ii) Inference, not a Means of Knowing Brahman

However, it is quite easy to prove that Brahman is not an object of ordinary sense-perception, about which there can be and has been really no controversy at all. But, attempts have been made at all times and in all Systems of Philosophy to prove God's existence by means of Inference. Specially, it is very difficult not to succumb to the temptation of having recourse to the common, easy Casual Argument, which strives to prove God, the Cause, from the world, the effect, on the basis of the universal and necessary Law of Causation thus :—

All effects are due to causes, like the pots etc., due to the potter etc.

The world is an effect.

Therefore, the world is due to a Cause, (viz God).

But the whole argument has been rejected by Śrīkaṇṭha in toto (Bhāṣya 1.1.3.). He points out that the very principle of this argument is wholly inapplicable to the case of Brahman. For, the fundamental principle of Inference is Analogy, thus :—

All men are mortal, like Shyam, Hari etc.

Ram is a man.

∴ Ram is mortal.

Here, the argument is based on a Double Analogy. First, the Minor Term "Ram" indicates a person who is analogous to other similar persons or "men", indicated by the Middle term, the examples being Shyam, Hari etc. That is why, it may be argued safely that what is true in the case of all other men (viz mortality), is equally true in the case of Ram, no less. Secondly, the Major Term "mortal" indicates that Ram's mortality is analogous to the mortality possessed by all other men, viz. Shyam, Hari etc. Thus, as a matter of fact, the whole argument implies that Ram, who is similar to other men like Shyam, Hari etc , possesses mortality, which is similar to the mortality possessed by all other men, viz. Shyam, Hari etc.

Now, let us try to apply the same principle of Double Analogy to the case of God.

Here, first, when it is said in the Minor Premise that—"the world is an effect", the sense in which it is an effect is quite different from that in which a pot is an effect, as stated in the Udāharaṇa or example. For, pots etc, are effects within the world, and what is within and what contains that as its infinitesimal part, cannot evidently be similar. So, if the world be an effect, it is, indeed, a unique kind of effect, one and only. For, no other effect is so vast and variegated, so complex and unintelligible, as the world. The world and the pot might differ quantitatively only, and not qualitatively. Yet they do differ so vastly that any similarity between the two, for all practical purposes, is ruled out. For example, a drop of sea-water and the sea may be quantitatively the same, yet the sea is unfathomable, not the drop ; the drop can be easily wiped out, not the sea. So, who would, from the practical, empirical stand-point, dare to call the two similar ?

Secondly, the Major Term "Cause" also is quite different in the case of God and in those of others, such as, potters etc. Here, in fact, God and other wordly causes differ not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively, from the practical, empirical, standpoint. So, what similarity can there be between the same ?

Thus, by Inference here, we can only arrive at the conclusion that a limited effect, viz, the world, similar to a pot, is produced by a limited cause, similar to a potter. But this is not the conclusion that we want here. If that were so, then we would have to say that the effect viz. the world, on its part, is easily breakable like a pot etc, and the cause viz. God, on His, is subject to all the faults and failings of a human person, suject inevitably to the fruits or consequences of actions or Karma-Phalas. Also, as the potter etc are only efficient causes, while the lump of clay etc. are only material causes, so on the grounds of Udāharaṇa here, we can never by Inference arrive at a world-cause, who is simultaneously both the material and the efficient causes of the universe. (See, 1. 1. 3.)

In this way, Inference, which is an important source of knowledge in other cases, is absolutely, from its very nature, unsuitable in the case of Brahman. As Brahman is entirely unique and has nothing similar to Him in the world from the empirical point of view, so Empirical Inference which, as pointed out above, is based on Analogy, is totally impossible in His case.

(3) Scriptures prove Brahman alone.

Accordingly, the conclusion is that Brahman cannot be known either through Perception or through Inference, but only through Scriptural Authority. Hence, Śrīkaṇṭha concludes :—

"ततो वेदान्त-शास्त्रैकगम्यं तत्प्रमाणकं ब्रह्मेति सिद्धम्।" (१-१-३)

Hence, Brahman can be known and proved only through the Vedānta-Śāstras.

But if it be said that Brahman can be known and proved only through the Scriptures, then the question naturally arises as to whether all the different Scriptures prove Brahman alone, and none but Brahman. If they deal with something else, some other topic, then, of course, we have to face the unpleasant situation that Brahman cannot be known at all by us. Hence all the Vedāntists have devoted the whole of their energies in proving that all the Scriptures unanimously prove Brahman alone. In fact, a large part of the Brahma-Sūtras discusses different Scriptural texts, referring apparently to objects other than Brahman, and tries to show that all these really refer to Brahman alone. A few examples are given below, just to demonstrate the mode of argument here.

(1) In the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (2. 5.), there is a reference to "Ānanda-maya" or the Self consisting of Bliss. The question naturally is: Who is this "Ānanda-Maya"—Jīva or Brahman ? Here it is shown that He is Brahman, and none but Brahman (See. 1.1,13—20)

(2) In Chāndogya Upaniṣad (1.6.6—7), there is a reference to a "Hiraṇmaya Puruṣa" or a Golden Person inside the sun. Here, also it is proved that He is not the Sun-god, but Brahman, (Sū. 1.1.21—22.)

3) In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (1.9.1.), there is a reference to "Ākāśa" or Ether. Here it is proved that the Ether is not the elemental ether, but Brahman (Sū. 1.1. 23—24)

(4) In Chāndogya Upaniṣad (1.11.5), there is a reference to "Prāṇa" or Vital-breath. Here it is proved that this is not ordinary vital-breath, but Brahman (Sū. 1.1. 23—24)

(5) In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (3. 13. 7.), there is a reference to "Jyoti" or Light. Here it is proved that this is not the fire within the belly, but Brahman. (Sū 1. 1. 25—28)

(6) In the Kauṣitakī Upaniṣad (3. 2.), Indra refers to "Prāṇa" or the Vital-breath, as identical with himself. Here, it is proved that, this is neither Indra, nor the ordinary Vital-breath, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 1. 29–32)

(7) In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (3. 14. 2.), there is a reference to "Manomaya", one who consists of the mind, and so on. Here, it is proved that this is not the individual soul, but Brahman. (Sū. 1.2.I–2).

(8) In the Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad (11. 3), there is a reference to "Nārāyaṇa", Here it is proved that this is not the god Nārāyaṇa, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 2. 3—8)

(9) In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, (2.25.) there is a reference to "One to whom Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas are food". Here, it is proved that this Eater is not some one else, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 2. 9—10)

(10) In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, (3. 1), there is a reference to "Guhāṃ Praviṣṭau" or two entered in a cave. Here, it is proved that these are not Buddhi and the individual soul, but the individual soul and Brahman (Sū. 1. 2. 11—12).

(11) In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (4. 15. 1), there is a reference to the "Person inside the eye." Here, it is proved that this is neither the individual soul nor the person reflected on the eye, but Brahman (Sū. 1. 2. 13—17).

(12) In the Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad (16. 3), there is a reference to a "Aṅguṣṭha-mātra-Puruṣa", or a Person of the size of a thumb only. Here, it is proved that this is not the Vital-breath, but Brahman (Sū. 1. 2. 18.)

(13) In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (3. 7. 3.), there is a reference to the "Antaryāmin" or Inner Controller. Here it is proved that this is neither the individual soul nor the Virāt, Puruṣa, nor Pradhāna, but Brahman (Sū. 1. 2. 19—21).

(13) In Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (1.1.5.), there is a reference to the "Akṣara", the Imperishable. Here, it is proved that this is neither Pradhāna nor the individual soul, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 2. 22—24).

(14) In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (5. 18. 1.), there is a reference to "Vaiśvānara". Here, it is proved that this is neither the gastric fire nor the elemental fire, nor the Fire-god, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 2. 25—33.)

(15) In the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (2. 2. 5.), there is a reference to "the Support of the Heaven and the earth". Here, it is proved that this is not the air, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 3. 1—6).

(16) In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (7. 23. 1.), there is a reference to the "Bhūman", the Plenty. Here, it is proved that this is not the vital-breath, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 3. 7.—8.)

(17) In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. (3. 8. 8.), there is a reference to the "Akṣara", the Imperishable. Here, it is proved that this is neither Praṇava nor the individual soul, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 3. 9—11).

(18) In the Praśna Upaniṣad. (5. 5.), there is a reference to a "Person lying in the city". Here, it is proved that this is neither Hiranyagarbha, nor Nārāyana, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 3. 12)

(19) In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, (8. 1. 1), there is a reference to "Daharākaśa" or the Small Ether. Here, it is proved that this is neither the elemental ether, nor the individual soul, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 3. 13—22).

(20) In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. (4. 12.) there is a reference to "Aṅgustha-Mātra-Puruṣa" or a Person of the size of a thumb only. Here it is proved that this is not the individual soul, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 3. 23—24).

(21) In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (6. 2.), there is a reference to "the trembling of the whole world". Here, it is proved that the cause of this trembling is not the thunderbolt, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 3. 40).

(22) In the Chāndogya Upanisad (8. 12. 3,), there is a reference to "Para-Jyoti" or the Highest Light. Here, it is proved that this is not Nārāyaṇa, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 3. 41.)

(23) In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (8. 14. 1.), there is a reference to "Akāśa" or the Ether. Here, it is proved that this is neither the sky, nor the individual soul, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 3. 42—44)

(24) In the Kauṣitakī-Upaniṣad (Chap. 4.), there is a reference to the "Object to be known". Here, it is proved that this is not the individual soul, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 4. 16—18).

25) In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (2. 4. 5.), there is a reference to the "Ātman", the soul. Here, it is proved that this is not the individual soul, but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 4. 19—22).

(26) In the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (2. 1. 1.), there is a reference to "Ātman", the soul, as the originator of everything. Here it is proved that this, Brahman, and none else, and Brahman is both the material and the efficient causes. (Sū. 1. 4. 23—28)

(27) In the Śatarudrīya, there is a reference to "Anger" as belonging to Rudra. Here, it is proved that this Anger is none else but Brahman. (Sū. 1. 4. 29.)

In this way, practically the whole of the First Chapter has been devoted to proving that the different Upaniṣadic Texts all refer to Brahman and Brahman alone. The following are the only exceptions :—

(1) Sū. 1. 1. 5—12—Here, it is proved that the Sāṃkhya Pradhāna is not the cause of the world.

(2) Sū. 1. 3. 25.—32. Here, it is proved that the gods are entitled to worship Brahman.

(3) Sū. 1. 3. 33—39. Here it is proved that the Śūdras are not entitled to the study the Vedas.

(4) Sū. 1. 4. 1.—7. Here it is proved that the term "Avyakta", as found in the Kaṭha Upaniṣads (3. 11.), is not the Sāṃkhya Pradhāna, but the body.

(5) Sū. 1. 4. 8—10. Here, it is proved that the term "Ajā", as found in the Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad (4. 5.), does not mean the Sāṃkhya Prakṛti, but Para-Prakṛti.

(6) Sū. 1. 4. 11—15. Here it is proved that the term "Pañca-Pañca-Jana", as found in the Bṛhadaraṇyaka Upaniṣad (4. 4. 10), does not mean the twenty-five Sāṃkhya principles, but five 'Pañca-Jana', a special kind of beings.

Such a detailed discussion of the different Scriptural texts in the very First Chapter of the Brahma-Sūtras has been undertaken with the sole purpose of confirming the Fourth Sutra :—

"Tattu Samanvayāt", (Sū. 1. 1. 4.)

"All the Scriptural texts are in concordance with regard to that, viz Brahman".

Thus, all the numerous Scriptural texts unanimously prove one and the same being, viz Brahman, and none else but Brahman—this is the unanimous view of all the Schools of the Vedānta.

(4) Scriptures are not concerned with Karmas.

Besides proving that all the Scriptural texts, though apparently dealing with a variety of topics, like the ether, the vital-breath, the fire etc., really unanimously refer to Brahman, and Brahman alone, all the Vedāntists also try to prove that the Scriptures all deal with Brahman, and not with Karmas. This is discussed at length in the last of the famous "Catus-sūtrī" or the first four of the Brahma-Sūtras. This has been quoted above.

If it be said that the Scriptures are concerned with Brahman, that means that they are concerned with an object which is already there and which it is not necessary for any one to produce by means of action or Karmas. Thus, the Scriptures have nothing to do with Karmas.

(i) First Objection and Refutation

Here, a three-fold objection may be raised :—

First, it may objected that—as we know from our own, direct experiences words all refer to actions. E. G., we have such sentences

as :—"Bring a cow" "Tie a cow", and all these call forth actions on our part. Hence, all words stand for and denote certain Karmas or actions.

To this, Śrīkaṇṭha replies as follows :—

First, words do not, by any means, refer to Karmas or actions always. Just as there are Injunctive sentences of the form : "Bring a cow", "Tie a cow" etc., so there are numerous Indicative sentences, also, like "A son has been born to you", "This rose is red", and so on.

Further, what is more important, even in the case of an Injunctive sentence, the idea that one gets from it, is about an object, and not about an action. Thus, in the above Injunctive sentence : "Bring a cow," the person enjoined, first, gets an idea regarding an object, viz, a cow ; then, he has an idea regarding an action with reference to it, viz. bringing ; and then, alone, can he act with regard to it, viz. bring it. In this way, every action is preceded by two kinds of knowledge—one about the object with regard to which the action is done, and one about the action which is done. In fact, knowledge always precedes action. So, it is totally wrong to hold that words denote only action, and never objects.

(ii) Second Objection and Refutation

Secondly, it may be objected that, as Brahman can very well be proved by Inference, Scriptures are not at all necessary here. For, Scriptures enable us to know what cannot be otherwise known.

To this Śrīkaṇṭha replies by pointing out that Brahman can never be proved by Inference. This has been stated above. (See Pp. 91ff).

(ii) Third Objection and Refutation

Thirdly, it may be objected that, as all the Vedānta texts are concerned only with injunctions regarding the worship of Brahman, these cannot, again, be taken to be concerned with Brahman as well. For, the same text cannot have two different kinds of meaning.

To this Śrīkaṇṭha replies as follows :—

If we consider the meaning of the Vedānta texts carefully, we find that all of them do refer to Brahman. In fact, there are certain definite marks through which we can correctly interpret or understand the real meaning of a text. These are the seven marks of an intelligible text, viz. Beginning, End, Repetition, Novelty, Result, Explanation, Fitness

(Upakrama, Upasaṃhāra, Abhyāsa, Apūrvatā, Phala, Arthavāda, Upapatti. cf. Śri. Bh. 1. 1. 4.)

All these marks are found in the case of Scriptural texts proving Brahman. Thus all the Vedānta-texts begin with Brahman and end with Brahman ; repeatedly refer to Brahman ; prove Brahman as a novel object which cannot be proved by other sources of knowledge ; result in the knowledge of Brahman alone ; explain the nature and attributes of

Brahman ; and all together establish Brahman in a way absolutely free from inconsistency. Thus, there can be no doubt that the Vedānta-texts do establish Brahman.

So, Śrīkaṇṭha concludes :—

"युक्तमिति सिद्धान्तः। वेदान्त-वाक्यानां तात्पर्य-लिङ्ग-समन्वयेन ब्रह्मबोधन-समर्थत्वात्।"……

"ततो वेदान्त-वाक्यानां ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यम्।"……

"एतैर्लिङ्गैर्ब्रह्मणि तात्पर्यमवगन्तव्यं वेदान्तवाक्यानाम्।" (१-१-४)

From all the marks, stated above, it is clear that the Vedānta-Texts all prove Brahman, and do not deal with Karmas.

(5) Two-fold Purport of Scriptures or Vedanta-Texts.

But here one thing has to be noted carefully, viz. that the Vedānta-Texts are concerned not only with Brahman, but also with Injunctions (Vidhis) regarding the knowledge and meditation of Brahman.

(i) Vedanta-Texts are both Indicative and Injunctive

It may be asked here as to how the very same Vedānta-texts can mean two things—viz. Brahman Himself, as well as Injunctions regarding His knowledge and meditation.

The reply is that, after all, Indicative Vedānta-Texts, concerned with Brahman Himself, and Injunctive Vedānta-Texts, concerned with Injunctions about the knowledge and meditation of Brahman refer to the same topic, viz. Brahman and none else but Brahman. So, of course, one and the same text is not concerned with Brahman and Injunctions, regarding His knowledge and meditation—some, the Indicative ones, refer to Brahman ; others, the Injunctive ones, refer to Injunctions regarding Him. But still, it can be safely said that all the Scriptures deal with Brahman and Brahman alone.

(ii) Injunctive Vedanta Texts are distinct from Purva-Mimamsa Injunctions.

The fact that the Scriptures contain Injunctions do not, by any means, prove that they are concerned with Karmas, like the Pūrvā-Mīmaṃsā. For, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Injunctions are those concerning Sakāma-Karmas, like, Sacrifices, rites and rituals and the rest, and produce worldly or Heavenly results, leading constantly to births and re-births or transmigratory existence. Thus, from their very nature, such ordinary Injunctions refer to non-eternal objects or results. But Vedānta-Injunctions regarding the knowledge and meditation of Brahman, are, by nature, entirely different, as Brahman is not something

non-eternal (See below), and as the results of the knowledge and meditation enjoined are not Saṃsāra, but Mokṣa, not transmigratory existence, but Salvation. Thus, the Vedānta-Texts are not concerned with ordinary injunctions regarding Sakāma-Karmas, but only with those regarding the knowledge and meditation of Brahman.

(iii) Four Kinds of Injunctions in the case of Vedanta-Texts.

There are, in fact, four kinds of Injunction (Vidhi), viz., Utpatti-Vidhi, Viniyoga-Vidhi, Adhikāra-Vidhi and Prayoga-Vidhi. All these are possible in the case of Vedānta-texts.

Thus, first, we have Utpatti-Vidhi, e. g., in the text : "O ! the Self should be seen". (Bṛh. 2. 4 5.). This kind of Injunction is one regarding the means to the main act enjoined. So, the above Vedāntic Injunction means that the Self is to be seen by means of the Vedāntas, or through a study of the Vedāntas.

Secondly, we have Viniyoga-Vidhi, e. g., in the text : "Therefore, having this knowledge, having become calm, subdued, quiet, enduring and collected, one should see the Self in the Self itself (Bṛh. 4. 4. 23). This kind of Injunction is one regarding the auxiliary means to the act enjoined. Here, Calmness, etc, have been, enjoined as auxiliary means to 'Seeing', the main act enjoined.

Thirdly, we have Adhikāra-Vidhi, e.g., in the text : "Knowing the Lord, one becomes free from all bonds" (Śvet. 1. 8.). This kind of Injunction is one regarding the Adhikārin to the knowledge of Brahman, or it indicates one who is entitled to know Brahman. Here, it is said that one desirous of knowing Brahman is entitled to the study of the Vedānta.

Fourthly, we have Prayoga-Vidhi, e. g., in the text : "One who deserves salvation from bondage and is endowed with the qualities of 'Calmness', etc,, should strive to attain the knowledge of Brahman." This kind of Vidhi is one regarding the main act enjoined. Here, the main act enjoined in 'knowing Brahman'.

Thus, says Śrīkaṇṭha, all the four kinds of Vidhi or Injunction are found in the Vedānta texts regarding the knowledge and worship of Brahman, (Śri. Bh. Br. Sū 1. 1. 4.)

(iv) Objection and Refutation.

A natural objection may be raised here, viz., that a Vidhi or an Injunction refers to a future action, and an action refers to something to be produced, transformed, attained, reformed : Thus, Utpatti (origination), Vikāra (transformation), Prāpti (attainment) and Saṃskāra (reformation) —these are the four results of action. And, in every case, the object concerned is non-eternal. So, action, from its very nature, is possible

with regard to non-eternal objects only. But how can Brahman be ever conceived to be non-eternal ? Hence, there cannot be any action with regard to Brahman, and that is why, no injunction is possible with regard to Him.

To this Śrīkaṇṭha replies as follows :—

It goes without saying that Brahman is not non-eternal and so is not an object of Injunction and Action. But here the injunction is regarding knowledge of Brahman and not Brahman Himself. There is no harm in saying that knowledge of Brahman is something to be produced. For, a man may not care about, knowing Brahman at first, i. e., may not be aware of his own eternal Self. And this Injunction regarding knowledge and meditation of Brahman is meant for' inspiring him to know and meditate on Brahman. Even in the case of those who, as serious students of Philosophy, by themselves, without any injunctions, strive to know Brahman, such Injunctions are meant for preventing them from attempting to know Brahman through any other means,—like Inference and the like,-other than Scriptures. Thus, such Injunctions regarding the knowledge and meditation of Brahman are, of course, necessary. And, as, here, the Injunctions are all psychological ones, referring to the knowledge and meditation of the Jīva, and not metaphysical ones referring to the existence or otherwise of Brahman, there is no question at all that such Injunctions, will make Brahman a created object or non-eternal in any way.

According to Śrīkaṇṭha, such Injunctions regarding the knowledge and meditation of Brahman are necessary over and above the indicative Vedānta-texts regarding Brahman and His attributes like : "Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Infinite" (Tait. 2. 1.). For, such texts give us only an indirect second-hand knowledge regarding Brahman. This is only the stage of "Śravaṇa" or indirect, mediate learning on grounds of Authority only. But for direct realisation, and intuition of Brahman, further injunctions regarding "Nididhyāsana" or meditation are necessary. Hence, the Vedānta-Injunctions, undoubtedly, serve a very useful purpose.

So, Śrīkaṇṭha concludes :—

"न केवलं ब्रह्मपरा वेदान्ताः किं तु 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्य' इत्यादिषु तद् ज्ञान-विधिपरा अपि ज्ञायन्ते ।" (१-१-४)

"अतस्तात्पर्य-लिङ्ग-समन्वयेन ब्रह्मपरा वेदान्तास्तदुपासनापराश्चेत्यविरोधः ।"

(१-१-४)

The Vedāntas or Scriptures deal not only with Brahman, but equally with Injunctions regarding the Jnāna and Upāsanā, Knowledge and Meditation of Brahman.

(6) All Words Denote Brahman.

(i) All Scriptural and Non-Scriptural Words Designate Brahman

It has been shown above that all the Scriptural-Texts refer to Brahman and Brahman alone. Or, in other words, all the Scriptural words unanimously denote Brahman, and none else but Brahman. As a matter of fact, however, all words, whatsoever, Scriptural or non-Scriptural, denote Brahman alone. For, as shown above (P. 30), Brahman is immanent in the world, as its material cause, just as a lump of clay is immanent in all the effects, like clay-jar, clay-plate, etc., as their material causes. Hence, all the objects in the world are Brahman in essence, just as clay-jar, clay plate and the like are all clay in essence. That is, the name : 'Brahman' may the equally applied to all objects of the world, just as the name 'clay' is equally applicable to all clay-jars, clay-plates, etc. In this way, all words denoting different objects of the world also denote Brahman, their Soul, Substance, Material Cause. (P. 57).

"तथा च सर्व-चिदचित्-प्रपञ्च-शरीर-विशिष्टं ब्रह्म सर्व-पद-वाच्यम्।" (१-२-१)

The whole world, consisting of souls and matter, constitute the Body of Brahman. Hence, all words denote Brahman.

"तथा सर्व-श्रुति-सामरस्य-विचारे सर्वेषां चिदचिद्-वस्तूनामन्तर्यामितया अनुप्रविष्टः सर्वशरीरः सर्व-शब्द-वाच्यः परमेश्वरः शिव इति विज्ञायते।" (१-४-२२)

Thus, all the Scriptures unanimously prove that the Supreme Lord is none else but Śiva, who has entered into all the sentient beings and non-sentient objects as their Soul ; who has, thus, the whole universe as His Body ; and who is, accordingly', denoted by all words.

"चराचर-वस्तु-संबन्धो तद्व्यपदेश-शब्दो ब्रह्मणि न भाक्तः. किं तु मुख्य एव। .....सवस्य वस्तुनो नाम-रूप-विभागाय तत्तदात्मतया ब्रह्मणोऽनुप्रवेशः भाव-भावित्वात्। ..... इहात्मतया प्रपञ्चानुप्रवेशाद् ब्रह्मणस्तच्छब्द-वाच्यत्वं मुख्यमेव यथाऽत्मनो ब्राह्मणादि-शरीरानुप्रविष्टस्य ब्राह्मणादि-शब्द-वाच्यत्वं मुख्यम्। ..... तस्मात् सकल-चराचर-वस्तु-शरीर-प्रविष्टस्य ब्रह्मणस्तच्छब्द-वाच्यत्वं मुख्यमेव।" (२-३-१७)

(ii) All Scriptural and Non-Scriptural Words Designate Brahman in a Literal Way.

The problem is discussed here in this way :—

It has been shown above (Pp. 27—29), that all the Scriptural words like 'Ākāśa' and the like really' denote Brahman. Now, the question may be asked as to whether other ordinary words, too, denoting different sentient beings and non-sentient objects denote Brahman as well, in a primary and literal sense. It may be thought here that,

according to general usage, a word standing for one particular object, cannot, at the same time, stand for another different object in a primary and literal sense; but only, at best, in a secondary and metaphorical or figurative sense. Thus, when it is said: "The sun is the sacrificial stake", the word "sun" can denote a sacrificial stake only secondarily and figuratively, and never directly and literally. So, if it be said that the words denoting worldly objects also denote Brahman, just as the Scriptural words like 'Ākāśa', etc., do, then, that is possible only indirectly and figuratively.

To this, Śrīkaṇṭha replies by pointing out that, just as in the case of the Scriptural words, so equally in that of non-Scriptural ones, Brahman alone is directly and literally denoted. The reason for this is that Brahman alone has entered into all as their Souls and Essences. Just as the soul entered into the body of a Brahmin, is called 'a Brahmin', so exactly is the case here. Thus, Brahman alone is primarily, directly and literally denoted by all words whatsoever, Scriptural or non-Scriptural

All the Monotheistic Vedantists take special pains to show that Brahman is directly denoted by all words whatsoever, for this simple reason that according to them (except the Dualist Madhva), Brahman being the One, Supreme, Material Cause, (P. 57), all souls and material objects are identical with Him in essence, though different from Him in forms, attributes and functions. Although such Schools admit of both difference and non-difference between. Brahman, on the one hand, and Jīva-Jagat, on the other, yet the great importance of identity of essence has been always specially emphasised by them all.

(7) The Place of Reasoning in the Vedanta.

(i) The Vedanta is not Dogmatic.

As in the Vedānta, Brahman is said to be entirely "Śāstra-Yoni" or knowable through the Scriptures alone, so the charge of Dogmatism may easily be brought against it, for the matter of that, against all the Systems of Indian Philosophy, more or less. But a little reflection will show that this charge of Dogmatism or blind, uncritical faith in Scriptures, is wholly unjustifiable. (See below under "Refutation of the First Objection against Brahman Kāraṇa-Vāda).

The Vedas, i.e., the Jnāna-Kāṇḍa or the Upaniṣads form the very ground of the Vedānta. But, for that reason, it is wrong to characterise the Vedānta Philosophy as wholly Dogmatic. For, what is found in a germinal form in the Upaniṣads, is developed in the form of a big tree in the Vedānta Systems. Thus, in the Upaniṣads, we find soul-stirring, inspired Mantras which indicate, of course, heights of philosophical

perfection and contain within themselves supreme and sublime thoughts, representing the highest kind of philosophical insight. But still, in such inspired products, we cannot expect detailed logical proofs or philosophical argumentations in support of the theories stated. Hence, in the Upaniṣads, there are mere statements of facts, but not proofs of the same on logical and philosophical grounds. It was left to the Vedānta Systems of Philosophy to supply the proofs on grounds of reason and build up a logically consistent system on the basis of the Mantras of the Upaniṣads.

Thus, the Vedānta System of thought is really based on solid grounds of Reason. In the System of Vedānta Philosophy, of course, there are profuse quotations from the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, and in some, also from Smṛtis, Purāṇas and other celebrated works. Instances are also not lacking where in support of a particular contention, Scriptural texts have been quoted. Still, in all the Systems of the Vedānta, there are numerous independent arguments by means of which the Upaniṣadic Doctrines have been fully expounded and supported, and rival Doctrines disposed of. All these are, indeed, of a high order and definitely prove the great critical capacities of the Vedānta-thinkers.

(ii) Sravana-Manana-Nididhyasana.

It may be thought here that as all these reasonings and argumentations are within the scope of the Scriptures only, these cannot, by any means, prove the capacity for independent thinking and critical reflection of the Vedānta Philosophers But the reply to it is that the acceptance of Scriptural Authority constitutes only the first stage in the Philosophical Method of India. This first stage is called "Śravaṇa" or Hearing. As the name implies, this is the stage of Authority. the stage of learning from others, and accepting uncritically, for the time being, what we known from the Scriptures or from our Gurus, Spiritual Preceptors. If this were the end, then surely, the charge of Dogmatism conld have been brought easily. But this is not the end, only the beginning.

The second stage is called "Manana," or Thinking. As the name implies, this is the stage of Independent Reasoning, the stage of reflecting over what has been learnt at the first stage on grounds of Authority alone, and accepting or rejecting the truths accepted before uncritically.

Then, the third or the final stage is called "Nididhyāsana" or Meditation. As the name implies, this is the stage of Direct Realisation, the stage of constant reflection on the Truth, first accepted on trust from others, at the stage of "Śravaṇa" and then on grounds of one's own reasons at the stage of "Manana." Through this kind of reflection or meditation.

there is a Direct Insight into or Perception of Truth, for attaining which there is such a constant striving on the part of the seeker after Truth.

This Philosophical Method shows that no Indian Philosopher can ever remain Dogmatic in his search for Truth. That is, he can never stop at the stage of Śravaṇa or Authority. For, this indirect, second-hand knowledge is never counted as real, final knowledge in Indian Philosophy. All knowledge, worth the name, must be perceptual, immediate, direct. So, until and unless the preliminary knowledge, due to Authority, is, finally, elevated into "Darśana" or Direct Seeing, it is useless and cannot bring about Salvation.

That is why the term for "Philosophy" in India is "Darśana" — a supremely appropriate term, which definitely shows that Philosophical Knowledge must be a direct, immediate. perceptual knowledge—any other kind of knowledge, any indirect, mediate knowledge cannot be called 'Philosophical Knowledge'. Hence, neither knowledge through Authority, nor knowledge through Inference can be called Philosophical Knowledge. Of course, Philosophy involves all these—here we start with Authority, then proceed to Inference—, but we have to end finally in Direct Perception, Intuition Insight, in "Darśana" or Seeing. Hence, in India, a Philosopher or a wise nan is called a "Draṣṭā" i.e a Seer, one who directly and immediately "sees" the Truth, as clearly as, or even more clearly than, we see ordinary objects.

(iii) Purvapaksa-handana-Siddhanta

There, is another kind of Philosophical Method, besides these "Tri-Sādhanā" or three-fold spiritual means: Śravaṇa, Manana and Nidhidhyāsana, mentioned above. This is the Method of Pūrva-pakṣa, Khaṇḍana and Uttara-pakṣa or Siddhānta. This, really, falls, under 'Manana'. According to this Method, before proving his own theory, a Philosopher has to state carefully and impartially the theories of his opponents. These constitute the "Pūrva-pakṣa" or Opponents' Views. Then, he has to criticise these and prove the same to be false on logical and philosophical grounds. This is called "Khaṇḍana" or cutting. Then he has to prove his own theory on logical and philosophical grounds. This is called "Uttara-Pakṣa" or "Siddhānta" or Philosopher's own view. This compulsory Method also inevitably prevents an Indian Philosopher from being dogmatic, or obstinately sticking to his own view, without even caring to know about other possible views. A Philosopher who, thus, starts at the beginning to prove his own theory, will not be listened to. For, how can one start to build a house until the existing one is demolished ? So, first other existing views have to be taken notice of (Pūrva-pakṣa)

and demolished (Khaṇḍana); and then only can the edifice of a new view be raised (Uttara-pakṣa or Siddhānta).

(iv) Two kinds of Dogmatism.

Thus, "Dogmatism" may mean two things : First, blind faith in Authority or uncritical acceptance of Truth ; secondly, blind faith in one's own self, or uncritical sticking to one's own opinion. The first Philosophical Method of "Śravaṇa, Manana and Nididhyāsana" prevents against the first kind of Dogmatism ; the second Philosophical Method of "Pūrvpakṣa, Khaṇḍana and Uttara-pakṣa or Siddhānta", against the second.

(v) Three "R's" of Indian Philosophy : Revelation, Reasoning, Realisation.

Thus, it is altogether wrong to suppose that simply because, the Indian Systems start with Vedic Authority, they are all dogmatic through and through and there is no place for Reasoning in Indian Philosophy. But the Indian Philosophical Method, as we have seen, is one whole of Authority, Reason and Parception or Insight or Intuition. In Western Philosophy, Reason and Revelation are ordinarily taken to be opposed to each other. But in Indian Philosophy, the two are taken to be complementary to each other—"Śravaṇa" leading to "Manana", "Manana" to Nididhyāsana—Authority or Revelation leading to Reasoning, and Reasoning to Realisation. Thus, these are the supreme three "R's" of Indian Philosophy :—Revelation, Reasoning, Realisation.

Indicating the organic relation between these three, Śaṃkara has beautifully said :—

"नानेन मिषेण शुष्क-तर्कस्यात्मलाभः सम्भवति । श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव ह्यत्र तर्कोऽनुभवाङ्गत्वेनाश्रीयते ।" (ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य २-१-६) ।

Mere, dry Reasoning is of no use here. But Resoning, which is in conformity with Scripture, alone has to be resorted to as auxiliary to Realisation.

Śrīkaṇṭha also asserts in the very same strain :—

"अतो नानुमानगम्यं ब्रह्म भवति । किं च श्रुत्यानुगुण्यादनुमानमपि ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणं भवतु नाम । (१-१-४) ।

Brahman cannot be known through Inference. Yet, Inference that conforms to Scripture, may very well be a proof with regard to Brahman.

(vi) The Value of Inference.

Now, here a very legitimate question may be asked, as follows :—
Here, only that kind of Inference has been accepted as a proof which

conforms to Scriptures. That practically means that Inference is not an independent source of knowledge, but is concerned only with elucidating and confirming what has already been stated. In that case, what is the value of such a satellite Pramāṇa ?

The reply to this is as follows :

Simply because here Inference has been said to be conforming to Scripture, it cannot be said that there is no scope for any independence on its part. As a matter of fact, when there are so many different interpretations of the very same Vedas, how can it ever be said that there is no scope for independent thinking here ? In the very same Vedānta System alone, there are as many as Ten Schools ; and each and every of these claims to have been based on the Veda-Upaniṣads directly. Thus,here each founder of a Sect or a School first interprets the Vedas-Upaniṣadas by means of his own thinking, reasoning, logical argumentation and philosophical reflection, and then, forms a new Sect or founds a new School on the basis of the same.

In this way, Inference conformig to Scripture or "Manana" after Śravaṇa has two main functions :— (i) Immediately after "Śravaṇa," definitely determining the meaning of the Vedas in accordance with its own logical and philosophical canons ; (2) proving the same and disproving rival views in details on strict logical and philosophical grounds.

(vii) The Necessity of Authority in Inference

Thus, here Scripture simply forms the starting point of Inference, and nothing more. We know that according to logical rules, Inference is the process of passing from the Premise to the Conclusion. Here, the Vedas constitute only the Premise of this kind of "Śrutyānugṛhita-Tarka" or Inference conforming to Scripture.

According to Indian Tradition, the Vedas are "Apauruṣeya," or not composed by any ordinary, ignorant or little-knowing individuals or human beings. But the Vedas are "Divine Words." That is, the Vedas are the immortal instructions issued forth from the mouths of extra-ordinary individuals or saints and seers who are but the messengers of God on earth. Ordinary, ignorant, little-knowing individuals, like us, can have the first inkling into, supra-mundane, fundamental, profound Philosophical Truths through such Scriptures only. For, we lack intelligence and power to grasp such deep matters without any help from others, through our own independent efforts only. In ordinary spheres also, we find that in the beginning we have to depend on our parents, teachers, elders, and other persons, for

learning, for a long time. So, naturally, in the very difficult spiritual or philosophic sphere, such a kind of preliminary help is necessary for us a thousand times more.

(viii) Sastra-Yonitva and Guru-Vada

That is why, "Śravaṇa" or "Śraddhā" i. e. reverence for Scriptures and Gurus (Spritual Preceptors), has been taken to be the very first step in the Path of Philosophical Knowledge or Spiritual Striving. This is the real import of the much-maligned "Śāstra-Yonitva" of Brahman and the Indian-"Guru-Vāda." Ignorant persons, puffed up with pride for their so-called abilities, think that they can easily know Brahman through ordinary sources of knowledge, like Perception and Inference. It is for teaching such foolish persons that the Vedānta-System has described Brahman as "Śāstra-Yoni." The warnings by the Upaiṇsads also have this purpose in view :—

'From whom Speech with Mind turn back, not getting" (Tait 2. 4)

"He who thinks that he does not know Brahman, really knows Him. But he who thinks that he knows Brahman, really does not know Him." (Kena 2. 3)

(ix) Gradations in Knowledge.

As a matter of fact, as there are Degrees and Gradations every where, so there are Degrees and Gradations in the sphere of knowledge, no less. Hence, here, there must be differences as regards the sources of knowledge also. That is, what is a proof in the case of ordinary knowledge, is not, naturally, so in that of philosophic knowledge.

Thus, ordinary Perception regarding worldly objects is a proof in the case of ordinary knowledge, but not in that of philosophic knowledge. Here, the Perception of Truth, of Brahman, of Ātman (Soul) is not sense-parception, but entirely of a different kind. In the same manner, ordinary Inference, from Premises arrived at previously by ordinary individuals regarding ordinary objects, is a proof in the case of ordinary knowledge ; but not in that of philosophic knowledge. Here, the Inference must start with the Scripture as a Premise. Similarly, ordinary Authority of worldly books and teachers regarding worldly objects and events is a proof in the case of ordinary knowledge, but not in that of philosophic knowledge. Here, the Authority is Scriptural Authority. That is why, we have special names, viz, "Śravaṇa" for Authority, "Manana" for Inference, "Nididhyāsana" for Perception, as sources of valid knowledge (Pramā) or methods of Philosophical Realisation.

In this way, it is clear that though apparently "Śruti" or Scripture

is the be-all and end-all of Indian Philosophy, yet, really, as we have seen. Reasoning and Perception, too, are considered absolutely necessary here.

(x) Place of Reasoning in Indian Philosophy

So, it would be manifestly wrong to hold that Reasoning has no place in Indian Philosophy. Just as an ordinary Inference is not possible without a Premise to start with, and the conclusion of the Inference has to conform to that Premise or follow from it, so in Philosophical Inference, too, the conclusion has to conform to the Scripture, the Premise. ("Śrutyanugṛhīta-Tarka")

In the case of ordinary Inference, the Premise is obtained through Observation, Experiment and the Inductive Method of causal connection and uniformity of Nature. And it has to be taken for granted by the reasoner, on the basis of the results of scientific investigation by celebrated scientists. In the same manner, in the case of Philosophical Inference, the Scriptures are to be taken for granted on the basis of the results of direct realisation by celebrated seers and saints. In the case of ordinary Reasoning, the scientific results or formulae may be interpreted entirely differently by different scientists, though not by ordinary persons, and conclusions drawn therefrom. In the same manner, in the case of Philosophical Inference, the same Scriptural texts may be interpreted entirely differently by inspired saints, and seers, though not by ordinary persons, and conclusions drawn therefrom. So, what difference is there between ordinary Inference and Philosophical Inference? If the former be not taken to be dogmatic, why should the latter?

In fact, it is undeniable that Inference, the very prop of Critical Method as against Dogmatism, itself contains an unavoidable element of Dogmatism in so far as it blindly accepts the premises on the basis of the work done by others. So, where the premises are blindly accepted, Dogmatism inevitably results, whether in ordinary or in Philosophical Inference, as the conclusions are drawn from the Premises and there is not much scope for really independent thinking here. But where the premises are first interpreted in the light of the reasoner's own independent thought and then the conclusions drawn—there is no Dogmatism, whether in ordinary or in Philosophical Inference.

In the case of Philosophical Inference—in India, we have seen, great saints and scholars interpret the Scriptural Premises in the light of their own independent thinking first, and thereby found many different Schools on its basis. These Schools, again, have Sub-Schools, and so on. This

peculiarity of the Indian Philosophical Method is a proof against Dogmatism.

(xi) Doctrine of Last Prophet unacceptable to Indian Philosophy.

Another definite proof that there is no Dogmatism in Indian Philosophy is its fundamental aversion to the Doctrine of Last Prophet, accepted by not a few Religious Systems as their central dogma. According to this Doctrine, a particular "Prophet" or Founder of a Sect is the last one to interpret the Message of God on earth, and after him, there cannot be any new interpretation of the Scriptures, no new Sects, no new thinking.

But according to the Indian View, as Truth is infinite, so the ways of interpreting and representing it are also so. Hence, each and every one is at perfect liberty to interpret the Scriptures according to his own judgment and comprehension and found new Sects. 'Let no one be so foolish as to claim that his is the only or the last interpretation of the Scriptures'—this is the eternal warning as well as the inspiring Message of Hope of Indian Philosophy. So, in what else has the glory or grandeur of Reasoning been manifested in such glowing colours ?

"युक्तिहीन-विचारे तु धर्महानिः प्रजायते"—

"Dharma itself is jeopardised, if there be acceptance of any thing without reasoning".

This superb Maxim of the Smṛtis, forms, indeed, the very basis of Indian Philosophical Thinking.

(xii) Tarka and Upalabdhi : Reasoning and Realisation

In fact, in Indian Philosophy, the term "Thinking" has a unique and a wonderful meaning, not found elsewhere. The equivalent term for "Thinking" is "Tarka", literally. But in India "Tarka" is only ordinary, empirical phenomenal, thinking, concerned with worldly things and events—it is, by no means, extra-ordinary, philosophical, noumenal thinking, The Indan term for this latter kind of thinking is Jñāna in the beginning and "Upalabdhi" or "Anubhūti" in the end. "Jñāna" or knowledge belongs to a higher plane than "Tarka" or Reasoning ; "Upalabdhi" or Realisation belongs to a higher plane than "Jñāna" or knowledge, in the same sense as union is higher than division, comprehension than union. Reasoning, as pointed out above, divides, being analytic in nature ; Knowledge unites, being synthetic in nature ; but Realisation comprehends, being universal in nature.

(xiii) Tarka, Janana, Upalabhi : Analysis, Synthetis, Comprehension

Thus Analysis, Synthesis, Comprehension—this is the natural

order of thought. But the thing, the object we strive to know is one and one only, from the very beginning to the end— the "Vastu", "Dravya," "Tattva" or "Satya", call it by any name, is one and one only, it does not and cannot change, it is there from all eternity in its entirety, whether known or not, or in whatever way known. That is why, our ways of knowing may be analytic or discursive ; it may proceed step by step, part by part—but the final knowledge must invariably be of the Whole. And the Whole can be reflected in the Whole alone, and so. the final knowledge of the "Vastu", "Dravya", "Tattva" or "Satya" must of necessity be a Whole Knowledge, a Total Realisation.

(xiv) Real Relation between Reasonning and Realisation,

For this reason alone, Reasoning is said to be inadequate for philosophical comprehension—and not for anything else. For "Reasoning" is one thing, "Vision" quite another. Are they opposed ? In one sense they are ; in another, not. They are opposed in the sense 'Two' is opposed to 'One' ; 'Division' to 'Union'. They are not opposed in the sense 'Two' is transcended in 'One,' Division in 'Union'. It is in this latter sense alone that Reasoning has been taken in Indian Philosophy. Just as in other sphères, so here, too, the Lower is not exactly negated, but really consummated in the Higher. In this sense, Reasoning, too, has its just and honourable place in the scheme of things in India.

(8) Utility of Quotations

A very common feature of Indian Philosophical Work is abundance of quotations from Scriptures and other celebrated treatises. Here, a question may, naturally, be asked as to whether such quotations serve any useful purpose, or not. In fact, the prejudice against such quotations in modern times is as strong as was the love for the same in ancient. However, such quotations did serve a very useful purpose in those days.

First, the weight of Anthority is not something to be derided of lightly. Especially, in Philosophical Works, dealing with very profound problems of life, the additional confirmation by superior individuals is, undoubtedly, very welcome. This habit of quoting from well-known authorities has been, ordinarily, interpreted as a tendency towards Dogmatism, or blind faith or uncritical acceptance of Authority. But really, it indicates the characteristic humility of Indian thinkers, and nothing more. It is, really, against Indian Tradition to claim to be the Founder of a Sect or a School of thought, or to have propounded a new Theory. So, every new thinker seeks for support in ancient lores, and takes special pains to quote from as many sources as possible in support of his own theories. This does not, as pointed out above, imply

any lack of original thinking on the part of Indian thinkers or their inability to stand on their own without the help of others. For, then, how can the fact that the very same texts have been quoted joyously by different Schools, be explained ? This definitely proves that original thinking precedes quoting from Authority, and, not vice versa, viz not that theories are propounded according to quotations.

Secondly, such well-known quotations do, indeed, serve to represent facts in a clear, sweet, yet forceful manner. Nothing can be compared with the inspired utterances of those mighty minds of old. But facts are facts, they do not change with ages or places. So, when the same facts are revealed anew to later thinkers, naturally, the same beautiful expressions cannot also recur. For this reason, too, quotations should not be looked down upon as something to be advoided like poison.

The over-diffident tendency to lean wholly on others is, indeed, regrettable. But equally regrettable is also the over-confident tendency to ignore totally the contributions of others. The Indian custom to quote from others in support of one's own theories is really an antidote to both the above extreme kinds of tendencies ; and as such, it is, indeed, a very beneficial and salutary one.

CHAPTER III

I Creation (Srsti)

(1) One and Many

The Problem of Creation is, indeed, the second fundamental Problem of Philosophy. For, metaphysically, if we start with the "One," the very next question that naturally arises is: How does the "Many" arise from the "One"? Epistemologically, if we start with the "Many," then also the same question remains: How does the "Many" arise from the "One"? In one sense, really, it might also be said that the "Many" is the more real of the two; for the "Many" has never been absolutely and permanently negated, like the "One". Every one, in fact, has to start with the "Many", to begin with. So, for the time being, it has to be taken to be real, whatever its ultimate fate may be at the hands of different thinkers. Thus, a kind of temporary and relative existence has been attributed to the "Many" by all. But the Materialists, e. g., have not conceded even this much to the "One," which has been eternally and absolutely denied by them.

In this way, the "Many", indeed, poses an important and an unavoidable problem for the Monists, for the Monotheists, for the Pluralists—for all, equally. For the Monists, the problem, briefly, is: How to deny the "Many", and keep only "One"; for the Monotheists: How to adjust and keep the "Many," with the "One"; for the Pluralists: How to make the "Many" appear as one whole, with or without the "One". So, let us, now, proceed with this fundamental problem, and try to see what solution has our great and good friend Śrīkaṇṭha to offer in this important respect.

Hence, let us once more, pose the essential philosophical questions:—

(1) How does the world arise from God?
(2) Does it arise at all?
(3) If not, what is its explanation?

(2) Brahman as Creator

Śrīkaṇṭha is a simple and straight Monotheist. So, he does not even pause, for a moment, to reflect as to whether the world is real, or only apparent; but at once, straightway, takes it to be a real, very real effect, springing out of that real, very real Cause: Brahman. That is why, in his Commentary on the celebrated Second Sūtra—

"जन्मादस्य यतः" (ब्रह्मसूत्र १-१-२)

"From whom arise birth and the rest of this" (Br. Sū. 1. 1 2.). he asserts in his usual direct manner :—

"जन्मादिकं जन्म-स्थिति-प्रलय-तिरोभावानुग्रहरूपं कृत्यमस्य"
"चेतनाचेतन-सम्मेलन-समरसीभूतस्य प्रपञ्च-
विलासस्य यतो यस्मात्तद् ब्रह्मेति शेषः ।" (१-१-२)

"He alone is Brahman from whom arise the origination, preservation, destruction, bondage and salvation of all sentient beings and non-sentient objects.

"यत् सर्वज्ञत्वादि-विशिष्टमष्टाभिधानाधिकरणं शिव-तत्त्वं, तदेव जगत्कारणं ब्रह्मेत्युच्यते ।" (१-१-२)

"He alone who possesses six qualities, like omniscience and the rest, and eight names (See P. 16 –19 ,—is Śiva ; and He alone is, again, said to be Brahman, the Cause of the world."

All these have been set forth in details (See Pp. 56ff) above', and so need not be repeated here. The meaning of Brahman's Creatorship has also been discussed. (See Pp. 77ff).

(3) The Order of Creation

Some Schools of the Vedānta take the Order of Creation to be somewhat similar to the Sāṃkhya Order with, of course, the very fundamental difference viz that Sāṃkhya Prakṛti is an independent, physical reality, which the Vedānta Prakṛti is not. The Vedānta Prakṛti is nothing but the Acit Śakti of Iśvara, the Śakti or Power through which He manifests out of Himself, the physical world.

(i) Samkhya Order of Creation

The Sāmkhya Order of Creation, as well-known, is as follows :—

In the beginning of Creation, there is "Saṃyoga", or contact, so to speak, between Puruṣa (Soul) and Prakṛti (Primal Matter). Due to this, the "Triguṇātmikā Prakṛti" or the Primal Material Energy, consisting of the three constituents : Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, manifests out of herself the entire Universe, step by step, Thus, the first product of Prakṛti is Mahat (Cosmologically) or Buddhi (Psychologically). The 'Mahat' is the germ of the whole Physical Universe ; Buddhi, of the Psychical The second product is Ahamkāra, having three forms : Sāttvika, Rājasika, Tāmasika, due to the proponderance respectively, of the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas Guṇas. From the first arise the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, and mind ; from the second, according to some, nothing directly, it only helping the other two to produce their respective effects ; from the third, the five Tanmātras or subtle, pure, unmixed essences of Earth,

Water, Fire, Air, Ether. Finally, from the five Tanmātras, arise the five Mahābhūtas or gross, mixed elements of Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether. These gross, mixed elements arise out of the subtle, pure, unmixed elements according to the process of Pañcīkaraṇa or Quintuplation, as follows :—

1 Gross Earth = $\frac{1}{2}$ Subtle Earth + $\frac{1}{8}$ Subtle Water + $\frac{1}{8}$ Subtle Fire $\frac{1}{2}$ Subtle Air + $\frac{1}{8}$ Subtle Ether, and the same for the rest.

(ii) Vedanta Order of Creation

Of course, the Vedānta Views in this respect, are quite divergent, some similar to the Sāmkhya View, as stated above, some not.

For example, we may take, at random, one example, each, from the Monistic and Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta.

(a) Monistic Vedanta View

The first is given in the celebrated Advaita-Vedānta treatise "Vedānta-Paribhāṣā" of Dharmarājādhvarīndra (7th Chapter). It may be, conveniently, represented in a chart form, thus :—



(3) Tāmasa Tanmātras

Five Gross Elements (According to the Process of Pañcīkaraṇa)

Earth Water Fire Air Ether.

Thus, we find that this Advaita Order is quite distinct from the Sāṃkhya one.

(b) Monotheistic Vedanta View

Then, secondly, we may take the Chart given by Puruṣottamācārya of the Monotheistic School of Nimbārka. in his famous "Vedānta-ratna-Manjūśa" a copious commentary on Nimbārka's "Daśa-ślokī" :—



Thus, this Scheme is very similar to the Sāmkhya one, with the vital difference, as mentioned above, viz that the Vedānta Prakṛtī is not an independent physical principle, but the 'Acit-Śakti' of Iśvara.

The Vedānta-Sūtras, however, refer not to 'Pañcīkaraṇa", as done by the Sāṃkhya System, but to 'Trivṛt-Karaṇa or the Process of Tripartition (Br. Sū. 2. 4. 20 – 22. Śaṃkara-Bhāṣya). This is taken from the Chāndogya Upaniṣadic account of Creation (Chānd. Up. 6. 2.). Here, it is said that, in the beginning, there was only the "Sat", the Existent. Then, He desired to be many, and created "Tejas" or Fire. That Fire desired to

be many, and created "Ap" or Water. That "Water" desired to be many and created "Anna" or Earth.

Śrīkaṇṭha, also, in his Bhāṣya accepts this Doctrine of Trivṛtkaraṇa (Sū. 2 4. 17–19). In this Section, he points out that the Process of Tripartition is due to Brahman, alone ; and not to Brahmā. For, here, from the tri-partitioned Fire, Water and Earth, first the 'Brahmāṇḍa' or the Universe arises, and then Brahmā ; and then the Jīva or the Individual Soul. (Sū. 2. 4. 17.)

In this connection, Śrīkaṇṭha, from his Sectarian Viewpoint, takes special pains to refute the views that not Brahman or Śiva, but Nārāyaṇa, Brahmā etc, are the Creators of the Universe. [See under the Section on "Refutation of the Fifth Objection against the Law of Karma" included under the general Section : "Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda"].

(4) Brahman, the Sole Creator.

The Doctrine that Brahman is not only the Creator, but also the Sole Creator of the universe, is a fundamental Cosmological Doctrine of the Vedānta. For the Monistic Vedāntists, like Śaṃkara, this question does not really arise at all from the transcendental point of view. From the phenomenal point of view, also, as he always keeps Theology out of Philosophy, his problem is only to show that only Iśvara is the Creator—if we have to speak of Creation at all—and not Prakṛti or Primal Matter of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga Schools, Pramāṇus or Primal Atoms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Schools, and so on. But the problem for him is not to prove one sectarian Deity like Śiva or Viṣṇu as the Creator, to the exclusion of others. However, this very problem poses itself largely before Sectarian Monotheists, like Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva ones ; and not a few pages of their otherwise deeply philosophical works are devoted to such sectarian matters. So, the question may, legitimately, be asked as to the philosophical value, if any, of such discourses and discussions in philosophical works.

(5) The Sectarian Interpretation of Brahman.

(i) Necessity for Sects.

This inevitably leads to a fundamental question, viz. Why should there be Sects at all ? All of these, we find, strive to prove their own respective Deities as the very same as Brahman, as possessing the very same nature, attributes and activities, as standing in a more or less same relation to the Universe of Souls and Mattter. But the fact is that human mind, by nature, hankers after varieties—variegated are its thoughts and feelings and desires, apparently contradictory, yet really harmonious. For,

really, contradictory things cannot exist in the very same substratum. So, unity-in-plurality is the order of the psychical world—the mind is one, having a unity and a continuity of its own, as its most fundamental characteristic, and combining all the different mental states and processes into a total, organised, systematised, harmonious, well balanced mental life If the Mind fails to do so, then it really ceases to be a Mind at all, but disintegrates itself into a number of chaotic processes, which we call abnormal states. In the very same manner, the physical world, too, is a cosmos, and not a chaos, Here, atoms cling forth to atoms to make up a part, parts attach themselves to parts to compose a whole; wholes co-exist with wholes to fashion the world. Yet, the world is not full of useless repetitions and exact replicas of the very same things. and if there be something different from repetitions and replicas, there is bound to be not only differences, but also apparent contradictions. Yet, the world is one whole. So, who could deny that it is a unity-in-diversity ?

Thus, this unity-in-diversity or diversity-in-unity is the very pattern of things on earth. So, it is naturally the pattern of those Philosophical Systems that take things to be real and try to interpret their real nature. That is why, we find that the Monotheistic Schools mostly conceive of the relation of God to the universe of souls and matter as one of unity-in-difference. In the very same manner, this fundamental tendency of those Monotheistic Philosophers is reflected in their attempts to conceive of God. God is One, the Absolute is One—Iśvara is One, Brahman is One. Not only that, as stated above, God's nature, attributes and activities are all one. Yet, His Names are different, and all dissensions refer only to these names.

(ii) The Value of Names,

But are Names, really, mere empty symbols, mere meaningless words, mere out-pourings of a uncontrolled fancy ? The Indian View definitely negates all these. According to Indian Philosophy, as well known, Śabda or a Sound, or a spoken word has an intrinsic connection with its object, So, naturally, if words be different, the corresponding objects are also so.

But in that case, what about Synonyms ? When synonyms are derivative in nature or by themselves carry different meanings, though referring to the very same objects, these naturally emphasise different aspects of the very same thing. Compare the synonyms of 'Father', viz ; "Janaka" and "Pitā", having different derivations, and, thereby, emphasising that the father "procreates" (Root—Jan = to create.), as well as "protects" (Root—Pā = to protect). Or, compare the different names of Durgā, referring to Her different attributes: "Gaurī and Kālī",

the first meaning Her fair form ; the second, dark. Or, "Jagaddhātrī and Cāmuṇḍā", the first meaning Her protective form ; the second, destructive.

But what about the synonyms that do not come under any of the two categories, mentioned above,' like "Kanaka" and "Hiraṇa" or "Kusuma" and "Puṣpa". ? These are mere poetic utterances by different Poet-Seers—who knows when, who knows why, who knows how ?

Thus, names may be both descriptive and non-descriptive ; synonyms, too, just the same. Now, the names of Iśvara are all descriptive in nature, like Viṣṇu, Kṛṣṇa, Harī, Śiva etc. So, these are meant to emphasise different aspects, attributes, powers, functions of the very same Iśvara or Brahman, although His total nature, attributes and functions are just the same.

(iii) The Value of Divine Names.

Thus, although the Names of God have ever been a bone of contention amongst different Religious Systems of the world, yet when one comes to reflect over the whole matter, one finds that every Name has an intrinsic merit of its own—none is to be rejected, none is to be given undue importance, none is to be taken to be of a greater or a lesser value—for, if there be God and if He be gracious enough to listen to the supplications of men, how can He be partial to one, like one, favour one, to the exclusion of all the rest ? That is why, the numerous Names of God, arising out of the numerous ideas, feelings and desires of numerous individuals, are really all one, whether descriptive, onomatopoetic, or ordinary.

This, in fact, is the real, philosophical and theological explanation of 'synonyms', whatever be their technical, grammatical or philological explanations. In this case, there is a beautiful combination of three things—the apprehended object, the apprehending mind, and the name by which the latter denotes the former. By whom have the names been coined ? Leaving aside the deep philological implications of this fundamental question, it may be said, safely, from the straight, philosophical standpoint that even if we accept the Nyāya view that the Śakti or potency of each word to denote an object is fixed by Iśvara or God Himself, and is, as such, unalterable, still there is nothing wrong in the view that these words or names represent to us the many-sided human nature, rich in content, wide in extent, full and flowing.

It is this human self that has for ever, striven to raise its eyes to the Divine, to see Its Light, to hear Its Voice, to express its Glory. That is why, the presence of Sects is not condemnable by itself—what is condemnable is their bigotry. When the white dazzling sunlight is

broken in the prism in the enchanting form of "Vibgyor" or seven lovely colours, like violet, indigo, blue, green, yellow, orange and red, from one point of view, it becomes, so to speak, more beautiful, easier to be perceived, softer and sweeter. In the very same manner, when the Divine Light is reflected on the prism of the soul, what lovely colours it produces, how glorious and numerous, how heart-capturing and soul-stirring! The various Sects are nothing but the various colours of the All-coloured All-beautiful, All-luminous God. So, like their sources, these, too, are really things of beauty and joy.

That is why, in India, Religious Sects have never been looked down upon On the contrary, it has always been freely and gladly admitted that the existence and emergence of these Sects are welcome signs, being signs of ever-fresh hearts and ever enthusiastic minds, of expanding lives and exhilarating strifes, of newer and newer vision and fewer and fewer delusion.

(iv) Sectarian Names for Brahman.

For this reason, the Vedānta attempts to identify Brahman with Sectarian Deities do not, in any way, go aganist its fundamental spirit viz., that of unity and universality. Brahman is One, Brahman is All-pervading; and what does it matter if we call Him by a Sectarian name, when we know very well and admit fully that He is the epitome of all our religious inspirations and philosophical realisations, the end of all our logical apprehensions and ethical attainments, the be-all and the end-all, the blood and the bone, the heart-beat and the pulse-throb of our very essence and existence. In fact, when there is the rise of such a Beatific Vision, there are no names, no forms, no sects, but all are reduced to one great and grand and glorious Name, Form, Sect—that of Brahman and Brahman alone

This is the real implication of an Indian religious Sect. Hence, when the Holy Founder of a Sect visualises only one name amidst numerous others as the Name of God, does he not visualise also the fact that, that Name contains all other names, that From conglomerates all other forms, that Sect combines all other Sects? This is clear from the attempts of the Vaiṣṇavas, e. g., to prove that all the texts regarding Viṣṇu really mean Śiva, and none but Śiva. The same is found in all other cases.

In this way, the sectarian interpretations of Brahman do, indeed, show the intense virility and vitality, the inherent value and validity of the Vedānta. This, indeed, is no small gain.

II. Refutation of Objections against Brahma-Karana-Vada or the Doctrine of the Causality of Brahman

Although a truth is a matter of realisation only, yet a Theory requires proof. Proofs may be of two kinds—positive and negative. Positively, that particular Theory or Doctrine has to be shown to be grounded on solid facts; negatively, other Theories or Doctrines have to be shown to be wrong.

Here the process may be from Truth to Theory; or from Theory to Truth. The first is found in the case of inspired saints; and the second, in that of infused scholars and scientists. Thus, the divinely inspired saints and seers first realise the Truth in an inspired moment in the twinkling of an eye, and, then, try as best as they can, to explain this philosophical Truth in the form of a logical Theory to others. On the other hand, scholars and scientists, infused with external knowledge, justify their Theories, first, by a chain of arguments; and then, may, in a few cases, be blessed with a Divine Realisation, bringing forth before their views the Truth in all of its Glory and Grandeur.

As a Philosopher, Śrikaṇṭha, too, in common with other Vedāntists, starts with the Truth in the First Chapter. Then, in the Second Chapter, he, again in common with other Vedāntists, takes up, in right earnest, the necessary, though, surely, the less pleasant, task of building up a Theory of the Causality of Brahman, or, Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda. The Positive proofs are given in the First Quarter (Pāda) of the Second Chapter, where he refutes several possible objections against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda and thereby adduces his own reasons for the same. The Negative proofs are given in the Second Quarter of the Second Chapter, where he himself raises several objections against other Theories and thereby tries to bring to light their inherent defects and fallacies The first will be considered in this Section; the second, in the next.

The possible objections against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda may be classed under seven heads as follows :—

(1) (i) First Objection against Brahma-Karana-Vada (2.1.4—2.1.13)

The first objection that may be raised against the Doctrine of the Causality of Brahman is based on a fundamental question, viz. **What exactly is the relation between the Cause and the Effect ?**

That is, is it a relation of absolute identity (Abheda); or, one of absolute difference (Bheda); or, finally, one of identity-in-difference (Bhedābheda)? Every one of these alternatives seems to be something impossible. For, first, if the Cause and the Effect be absolutely identical, then, why should there be two names and two forms, as found in the world? Again, secondly, if the two be absolutely different, then, how can the Effect arise from a totally different Cause? Finally, if the two be identical as well as different, then,is that not asserting something self-contradictory?

Each and every of these questions raises a very profound philosophical problem which need not and cannot be discussed under the present Section. Here, only the second alternative need be taken as embodying the First Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda, as visualised by Śrīkaṇṭha and other Vedāntists in this connection.

Thus, the First Objection is as follows :—

The Cause is the creator or producer; and the Effect, the created product. Now, here how does the Cause create or produce its Effect? The process of creation is not that, the Cause produces a totally different, Effect, which, when you come to think of it, is impossible. For, how, can a thing create or produce out of itself something else that is totally different from itself? So, here the process is the transformation of the Cause into the form of the Effect. And, if the Cause itself be transformed into the Effect. then, surely, the Cause and the Effect must be similar in nature.

Take a simple and an ordinary example. A potter, as an efficient cause (Nimitta Kāraṇa), takes a lump of clay as the material cause (Upādāna-Kāraṇa) and produces a clay-jar from it. Here, as the jar has been fashioned out of clay, it itself is, naturally and inevitably, clay and nothing but clay. In this way, the very process of Causation essentially implies a simlarity between the Cause and the Effect.

Now, let us come to the point at issue here. According to the Doctrine of the Causality of Brahman, Brahman is the Cause and Universe is His Effect. So, it is expected that Brahman and the Universe will be similar in nature But are they actually so? Definitely not. For, who does not know that Brahman is sentient, the world non-sentient; Brahman is Ever-pure, the world impure through and through; Brahman is eternal, the world changeable; Brahman is Knowledge in essence, the world ignorant. Brahman is Bliss in nature, the world sorrowful, and so on indefinitely? Hence, how can there ever be any Cause-effect relation between the two? This, in short, is the First Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda, summed up by Śrīkaṇṭha himself thus :—

"कथमनयोर्गो-महिषयोरिव कार्य्य-कारणभावः सम्भवति ?" (२-१-४)

"How can there be any Cause-Effect relation between these two (viz. Brahman and the world), as between a cow and a buffalo ?"

(ii) Refutation of the First Objection against Brahman-Karana-Vada. (See above Pp. 59 ff).

Śrīkaṇṭha, in common with other Vedāntists, brings in counter-arguments here, as follows :—

(a) The Cause and the Effect are not always similar in appearance.

First, he points out that there is no absolute rule that the Cause and the Effect must be similar to each other Examples of this are not lacking. We find, as a matter of fact, that sentient scorpions etc. arise from non-sentient cow-dung ; again, non-sentient hair and nails arise from sentient persons. So, on the same analogy, why cannot the non-sentient world arise out of the Brahman ? (2. 1. 6.)

So, he says :—

"सिद्धान्त उच्यते—विलक्षणयोरपि ब्रह्म-प्रपञ्चयोः कार्य-कारण-भावः सम्भवति। अचेतनाद् गोमयात् चेतन-वृश्चिकोत्पत्ति-दर्शनात्, चेतनात् पुरुषात् अचेतन-केशादुद्भूतपत्ति-दर्शनाच्च।" (२-१-६)

Of course, this argument may appear to be a laughable one to many, for the simple reason that the examples given here are both faulty. For, who does not know of the simple, yet fundamental biological principle viz. 'Life comes out of life alone' ? Hence, sentient scorpions are not really produced by the non-sentient cow-dung, but by the sentient parent scorpions ; non-sentient hair and nails are not really produced by the sentient person, but are parts of the living body. So, why have these examples been given by all the Vedāntists in unison, led by Śaṃkara himself ? Were they really so ignorant as to be wholly unware of the above fundamental principles ? This, evidently, cannot be admitted. Śrīkaṇṭha himself refers to the same examples in Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya or Commentary on Brahma-Sūtra 1. 4. 27, and clearly says that hair and nails cannot arise from the body alone or from the soul alone, but from the body and soul together (See P. 48). So, what did these wise scholars and deep thinkers really have in their minds ? What did they really mean here ?

What they really meant is that the cause and the effect are not always similar in forms. From a particular cause, there may arise an effect that has no similarity in form at all with its cause. What similarity, e. g., is there between the small seed and the huge tree with roots, trunk,

branches, leaves, flowers and fruits that ultimately springs out of it ? What similarity is there between the hard seeds and the flowing oil we get from the same ? What similarity is there between the liquid milk and the solid caisin produced out of it ? If we leave aside these cases of single causes, and proceed to consider those of a combination of causes, the matter becomes more evident. For, who does not know, e g. of the vagaries and surprising conduct of the chemical elements ? Hence, it is that such compounds seem to bear no resemblance at all to their constituent elements. What resemblance has water, to cite a simple well-known example, to H_2O, Oxygen and Hydrogen separately. In this way, although a clay-jar is seen to be similar to the lump of clay, its cause, and a gold-bangle to the lump of gold, its cause—yet there are many causes as shown above, where nothing of the kind, no similarity between the cause and the effect can be seen at all.

But, then, how do we know that the two are casually related ? We know this, first, on the ground of Authority, or, if possible, on that of Inference ; and, then, on that of Perception. Thus, we are told here, first that a particular, element will produce a result quite different from it : or, that a particular combination of elements will bring forth a product totally dissimilar to it. Again, if we have advanced farther, we may also ourselves infer about the same. Then, when the knowledge we have gathered is put to a practical test, we ourselves see the results with our own eyes.

The case of Brahman and the world falls under this category of dissimilar causes and effects. For, here, too, no similarity between Brahman, the Cause, and the world, the effect, is seen. The main of these dissimilarities, as pointed out above, is that, while Brahman is a Supreme, Sentient Being, the world is not sentient at all. So, here, too, the very same question may be asked, as to how, then, do we come to know that there is really a cause-effect relation between Brahman and the world ? Perception, evidently, is out of the question here. For, who can claim to be able to see the production of the world, when that will happen again at the end of Pralaya (Universal Destruction) and beginning of Sṛṣṭi (Creation) ? Hence Inference, equally, is impossible here, as Inference, depends on prior perception. (See P. 91 above). Suppose, here we argue thus :—

All cases of Pralaya are followed by Sṛṣṭi.

This is a case of Pralaya.

Therefore, this is followed by Sṛṣṭi

Here, the Vyāpti or the universal and necessary relation between the major and the middle terms in the Universal Major Premise, may be established, only if there be, first, uncontradicted experiences of

Pralaya being followed by Sṛṣṭi. But how can that be ever possible? In the same manner, the Minor Premise, too, need be observed, which also is impossible. Hence, no Inference is possible here at all.

Thus, Śrīkaṇṭha comes to his second counter-argument in this regard, viz. that the hypothesis that the world has been produced out of Brahman has to be accepted on the ground of Scriptural Authority.

(b) The causality of Brahman is proved on the Grounds of Scripture: No Dogmatism.

This, indeed, is a hypothesis which, though inexplicable, is, yet, equally unquestionable. So, Śrīkaṇṭha is not ashmed to assert with full confidence :—

"अतः शुष्कतर्को न बाधकः श्रुति-समन्वयस्येति निर्णयः।" (२.१-६)

"So, it is established that mere dry reasoning can never set at naught what has been proved on the ground of unanimous Scriptural Authority".

But this, indeed, is not Dogmatism, not a kind of blind faith or irrational belief. As we have seen above, the creation of the world is an established, inevitable, unchangeable fact (with, of course, apologies to Śaṃkara!) And, such a fact, which we have to face and explain, being beyond both Perception and Inference, can be known through Authority and Authority alone.

Indeed, that is not Dogmatism at all; that is an inevitable and also an indubitable fact that has to be recognised, willy nilly—this being a fact known by all, known at all times, known everywhere—how can it be denied? It can be done so only on the ground of an equally strong, equally unanimous, equally universal authority of wiser persons. E. G. that the sun is moving round the earth is a kind of cosmic illusion, known by all, known at all times, known everywhere. So, it has been set at naught by a very strong unanimous, universal authority of scientists, and we have to admit that it is the earth that is going round the sun, and not vice versa. This is done purely on the grounds of Authority; and here, we have to accept Authority even though it goes against our own clear, unanimous, universal perception. If that be so, if Authority can set at naught even direct, clear, universal, perception, why cannot it confirm such a perception?

According to Śrīkaṇṭha, in the case in hand, this is exactly what happens. The world is there, with all its beauty and glory, with all its vastness and variety, with all its conglomeration and complexity. But however beautiful and glorious, however vast and various, however conglomerated and complex it, still, manifests no sign of being a cause. For, a cause is eternal, which the world does not appear to be. Lo

is not everything transitory in Nature ? Does not the dancing brook dry up, showing nakedly the rough pebbles underneath ? Does not the lovely flower dry up, scattering its petals all around ? Does not the sweet baby grow up to be a sour grand-father, to die soon and be wiped away from the face of the earth ?

So, the receptacles of all these, viz. the world, cannot by itself be taken to be eternal from an absolute point of view, though it may be so from a relative one only. Specially, according to the Indian View, it is the past Sakāma Karmas or selfish acts of the Jīvas or individuals, that is responsible for every new creation (See P. 35, also the Section on "Refutation of the Sixth and Seventh Objections against Brahma Kāraṇa-Vāda"). So, the universe is not a cause, but an effect.

In this way, we know the objects of the world to be non-eternal, the events of the world to be so—in fact, any and every thing in the world to be so. And our knowledge, our perception is confirmed by Authority. So far well and good. But then the question is asked ; 'So, who or what, then, is the cause of the world ? Here, neither Perception, nor Inference being of any avail, the only source of knowledge or 'Pramāṇa we have, finally, to fall back again is Authority, Scriptural Authority, as the last resort.

But though last, it is by no means, the least, for according to the Indian View, incomplete, imperfect, fallible Perception and Inference of incomplete, imperfect, fallible human beings are far less valuable, far less reliable, far less acceptable than the complete, perfect, infallible testimony of complete, perfect, infallible saints, sages and seers, who, though possessing incomplete, imperfect, fallible human bodies, have within them the light of the complete, perfect, infallible souls, which light is nothing but the Divine Light, which souls are none else but the Divine Soul.

So, where is Dogmatism here ? (Pp. 102 ff) When we fail to attain something through our own independent efforts, we have to take the help of others—this is but a very natural law of life. Life would, surely, have been impossible if we had to, or, for the matter of that, tried to, live by our own independent efforts alone, without relying on any one else, without taking the help of any one else, without having faith in any one else.

Take the ordinary, worldly life of a child. Physically and mentally, how much does he depend on others, at every step ! In fact, the extent to which he has to depend on others far exceeds that to which he can depend on himself Take his physical development. For so many years, he has to rely, in this respect, wholly on others, on his

loving parents, well-wishing relatives and friends —who tell him what to take and what not, what to do and what not, at every step. It is only many years later, when he grows up to be an intelligent adult, that he is able to take a proper care of himself. But still, even then, can he wholly rely on his own indepeudent judgment alone, on his own independent efforts alone, on his own independent resources alone ? No, never. Then, again, take his mental development. In this sphere no less, or rather more so, his dependence on others far exceeds, both in extent and importance, that on his own self. For, learning never ceases for any one at any time. Thus, for so many years, all throughout his school and college career, he learns so many things from so many persons in so many ways ; and even when he is a mature adult, he has to learn, or accept on trust, so many things from others, all throughout his life. In this way, Authority has to be admitted to be one of the main sources, really speaking, the main source of our knowledge even in ordinary spheres, even in this age of reason and individual freedom.

So, why cannot Authority be so in a still more difficult sphere, viz. the spiritual, where reason, naturally, cannot have so much sway ? of course, it goes without saying that independent realisation or direct perception is the goal. But still, before this supreme goal is reached, we have to start actually on the way to it, for which, as we have seen, we have to depend on others.

Thus, it goes without saying that external Authority has to be elevated to a state of internal perception ; dependance on others, to that of independence of the self ; mere apprehension, to that of realisation. That is why, we have the very appropriate name for Philosophy in India, viz. "Darśana" or Vision. It is a direct, complete, perfect vision of Truth that we aim at, and not a second-hand indirect knowledge. But still, as we have seen before (P. 103), we require essentially, first, Śravaṇa or Authority, then Manana or inferences, and then only can we, finally, be blessed with Darśana or Perception or Vision of Truth through Nididhyāsana or Meditation on the Truth we have accepted on the above two grounds.

In this way, Śrīkaṇṭha, in common with other Vedāntists, does not decry Authority as smacking of Dogmatism, as totally rejectible and condemnable. On the contrary, he accepts Authority gladly and thankfully when Perception and Inference fail to offer any legitimate explanation for an actually present, existent, undeniable fact.

(c) The Cause and the Effect are Similar in Nature

But, ultimately, being a Seer himself, blessed with the beatific vision of Truth, he does not really stop here ; but goes on to offer himself the real and the final solution of the apparently baffling problem as to how an altogether different effect can arise from an altogether different cause.

"अतः कार्य-कारणयोः जगद् ब्रह्मणोः वस्त्वेकता न हीयते ।" (२-१-७)

In his celebrated "Śivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā-Ṭīkā" Appaya Dīkṣita explains the phrase.

"वस्त्वेकता" as "एकद्रव्यत्वम्" ।

So he says :—

This means that the Cause and the Effect are one and the same "Vastu" or "Dravya" or, one and the same thing, object or substance. Whatever be their differences in other respects, like forms and functions, their identity in essence cannot be denied in any way whatsoever. For example, a mere lump of clay and a well-finished clay-jar are, no doubt, different in forms and functions, yet both are clay in essence, and nothing but clay. So, even in those cases, where the effect appears to be absolutely distinct from the cause, really and actually speaking, the effect is the same as the cause in essence.

In this way, if Brahman be taken to be the cause of the world, then it has also to be admitted, at the same time, that the world, the effect, is Brahman in essence. If that be so, what does it really matter if the world be "acetana" or non-sentient ? For, if 'Cetanatva' be the essence of Brahman, the Cause, and not only a quality, thereof, then the very same 'Cetanatva' is also the essence of the world, the effect, no less. And in that case, 'acetanatva' is only a form or a quality or external appearance of the world, and nothing more.

(d) The Universe is not really Impure and non-sentient.

Thus, it is only apparently that the world is different from Brahman ; but really, it is itself 'Brahma-svarūpa, nothing less. It is because, of this that the Ṛṣis, or seers, saints and sages, declared with firm faith "Śarvaṃ Khalvidaṃ Brahma" "All this, verily, is Brahman (Chāndogya Up. 3. 14. 1). So, how can there ever be any doubt that the world is Brahman is essence, Brahman through and through, nothing but Brahman and Brahman alone. Hence, it is only by form, only by external appearance, is the world, the effect, non-sentient or 'Jaḍa', impure or 'Aśuddha' imperfect or 'Apurṇa', etc. But by essence, by reality, it is sentient or 'Ajaḍa', pure or 'Śuddha', perfect or Purṇa', like Brahman Himself (See Page 69, also below under the Section ; "Refutation of the Third Objection.") ; — being the very same "Vastu",

the very same 'Dravya'—the very same object, the very same substance as Brahman Himself (See Page 41).

This, in fact, is the real implication of the Vedānta Conception of the world as 'Jaḍa and Aśuddha'.

(f) reation out of 'Asat' or Non-Existence

It may be asked here as to why in reply to the above First Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda, the Brahma-Sūtras do not say this straight, (See below) instead of trying to justify the production of an entirely different kind of effect from an entirely different kind of cause, by means of two faulty examples (cf. Brahma-Sūtra 2. 1. 6.)

This has been done purposely, as stated above, for emphasising the fact that the cause and the effect need not necessarily be very similar in form or appearance. Hence, says Śrīkaṇṭha, in the Scriptures, no less, sometimes, the world is said to spring out of 'Asat' or the Non-existent. Compare the following from the Upaniṣads :—

"असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्तत् सदासीत्।" (छान्दोग्य ३-१९-१)

"This was Asat or Non-existent, in the beginning. Then, it became Sat or Existent".

"असद् वा इदमग्र आसीत्। ततो वै सदजायत।" (तैत्तिरीय २-७)

"This was Asat or Non-existent, in the beginning. Then, the Sat or the Existent arose out of it".

"असदेवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तस्मादसतः सज्जायत"

(छान्दोग्य ६-२-१)

"This was Asat or Non-existent in the beginning, One only, without a second. Hence, from the Asat or the Non-existent, the Sat or the Existent arose."

But here the same question arises :—How can 'Sat' arise out of 'Asat'? How can the world arise out of Non-entity, or Non-existence? The purpose of this, says Śrīkaṇṭha, is only to show that there is no fixed rule that the cause and the effect must always be very similar to each other. So, he says in his Commentary :—

"नैवं वाच्यम्। सालक्षण्य-नियम-प्रतिषेध-मात्रपरत्वाच्छ्रुतेः।"

(२-१-७)

So, very appropriately, Śrīkaṇṭha states three reasons :— the first, from the empirical standpoint ; the second, from the epistemological ; the third, from the philosophical.

Thus, from the empirical standpoint, it can be said that the Cause and Effect need not necessarily be similar in form. Then, again, from the epistemological standpoint, it has to be admitted,—however impossible or unintelligible that may appear to be—that Brahman, and none but Brahman, is the sole, Cause of the world. Finally, from the philosophical standpoint, there is really no difference of essence between Brahman and the world, and the world is Brahma-svarūpa or Brahman in essence.

In this way, logically, yet beautifully, indeed, does Śrīkaṇṭha dispose of the First Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda (See above the Section on 'Brahman as Pure, though Immanent' P. 31).

(2) (i) Second Objection against Brahma-Karana-Vada. (Su 2. 1. 14—2. 1. 20).

The Second Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda follows logically from the Refutation of the First.

(a) Brahman cannot be Impure-like the World.

Thus, it has been just said that Brahman and the world are identical in essence or "Eka-Vastu", "Eka-Dravya". (P. 127). So, in that case, the two are really identical. In that case, again, all the faults and failings of the world are sure to pertain to Brahman Himself, no less.

It has been said above that Brahman and the world are identical in essence (P. 127), and this may mean two things, viz (1) either, Brahman is like the world, possessing, as it does, its essence or nature ; (2) or the world is like Brahman, possessing, as it does, His essence or nature.

Now, the second alternative is an impossible one, for, who, in his senses, would assert our gross, physical, impure world to be the imperceptible, finest of the fine, non-physical, pure Brahman ? So, the only alternative is to take Brahman to be identical with the world, possessing, as such, all its ignoble qualities like mutability, materiality, impurity, and so on. In that case, also, does not our Beautiful God, Immutable, Non-material and Pure, disappear immediately like a vanishing mirage, like a deluding illusion, like an empty dream ? (See P 25, 31ff).

(b) Brahman cannot experience pleasure-pains, like the Individual Soul.

Here, the Objection has been raised specially in connection with the Jīva or the individual soul. Thus, it is said that if Brahman and the individual soul be identical, or if the individual soul be the body of Brahman, then Brahman, too, will become subject to Bhoga, or He, too, like the individual soul, must experience pleasures and pains.

But our theological idea regarding One God is, fundamentally, different. The very first characteristic of God of Religion is purity, perfection and contentment, full and eternal. He is, thus, Nitya-śuddha, Nitya-buddha, Nitya tṛpta, Nitya-mukta—eternally Pure, eternally Knowing, eternally Contented, eternally Free. How can such a Supreme Being ever become subject to worldly experiencing of pleasures and pains—which are the results of Sakāma-Karmas or selfish activities—of any kind whatsoever ?

(ii). Refutation of the Second Objection against Brahma-Karana-Vada.

Śrīkaṇṭha refutes this Objection in two ways.

(a) Brahman and Jiva-Jagat are not totally Identical

Firstly, Brahman and the world are not absolutely identical, as held by the Advaita Vedānta School ; but there is also a difference between them. (Pp. 42ff,). The main fact to note here is that the relation between Brahman and the world is a peculiar one, because of which, Brahman and the world are (i) one in essence, yet not identical ; (ii) not identical, yet not wholly different. This will be discussed below under the Section on "The Relation between Brahman, Jīva and Jagat."

(b) Brahman and Jiva-Jagat are Non-different in Essence : Jiva is Nitya-Mukta.

(2) Secondly, Brahman, the Cause, and Jīva-Jagat, the Effects, are "Ananya" or non-different. This, in fact, is the real crux of the whole matter. Brahman and Jīva-Jagat are the very same object, the very same substance (Vastu, Dravya) (Pp. 127), and so Jīva-Jagat are, by nature, pure, perfect, full. (See P. 127). During the state of Bondage, or 'Baddhāvastha', Jīva Jagat may appear to be impure, imperfect, incomplete and so on. But, as pointed out above (P. 127), how can the universe of souls and matter be impure, imperfect and incomplete, when their Cause, their Essence, their Soul, viz. Brahman, is Himself Pure Perfect and Full ?

Also, Bhoga (experiencing of the results of Sakāma-Karmas) of Jīvas, and the results thereof : Sukha-Duḥkha (worldly pleasures and pains), are all worldly things ; so are the mutability, materiality and mortality of the world. These do not represent the real nature of either the Jīva or the Jagat, being only passing phases during the temporary state of Bondage. Now, Brahman cannot have any real connection with anything that is not lasting, not to speak of being affected by the same in any way. Hence, the states of the Baddha Jīva-Jagat cannot affect Brahman and make Him impure, mutable, mortal. Thus, here the question, of

Brahman being contaminated by such worldly states, does not arise at all (See above Pp. 31 ff).

It has been stated above that Brahman contains all defects in Him, yet is Himself Pure and Perfect (P. 18); also, that He is immanent in the impure Jīva-Jagat, yet remains uncontaminated. (Pp. 31-32.). But all these are true, as pointed out above, (P. 127)., only from the worldly or empirical point of view, and not from the absolute or transcendental.

In fact, the state of Bondage or Boddhāvasthā, according to all the Schools of the Vedānta, is not an actual state, for according to all, Jīva is Nitya-Mukta or eternally free. It is not that the Jīva, in its empirical state or state of Bondage, ceases to be free, loses its real nature and actually becomes some one else for the time being. Really, no such changing of one's own nature or Svarūpa is ever possible. So, during the state of Release, as during the state of Bondage, the Jīva remains what it really is ; only, during the latter state, it fails to realise or recognise its real nature due to the veil of ignorance or Ajñāna.

If this be so, then we have to admit that the Jīva is never, for a single moment, really impure or imperfect or incomplete. It only appears to be so to itself and to others, so long as it itself and others fail to realise its real nature due to Ajñāna or ignorance. Thus, if the Jīva's impurity, imperfection, incompleteness, mutability, mortality—in short, mundaneness, be not only passing phases, but also mere appearances, then what question is there of such ultimately false appearances affecting and contaminating Brahman, the Real, the Eternal, the Pure, the Perfect, the Full, the Immutable, the Supra-mundane ?

The same applies to the case of the world, no less.

(c) Brahman is never Contaminated by His Connection with Jīva-Jagat.

Thus, Brahman is, indeed, eternally connected with the Universe of Souls and Matter, as His very own Body, as His very own Attributes and Powers, as His very own Parts and Parcels, as His very own Effects and Manifestations. So, how can there be any question of any foreign, baser, lesser elements or characteristics entering into Him and polluting Him, through such a connection ? This connection is an essential one, a natural one, a fundamental one—it being the very nature of Brahman to be connected with Jīva-Jagat, as it is the very nature of a soul to be connected with its body ; of a whole, with its parts ; of a substance, with its attributes and powers ; of a cause, with its effects. Thus, what is natural and essential to Brahman, what pertains to His very nature and flows from His very essence—can never go against His own nature or destroy His own essence.

If we realise this great truth once, then all the seemingly difficult theological problems of how from a conscious, non-material Brahman, an uncouscious, material world can arise ; how the All-Pure and All-perfect Brahman can retain His own purity and perfection in spite of the infinite impurities and imperfections of the Universe of Souls and Matter with which He is connected, and the like, are solved at once, in a way at once interesting, ingenious, and illuminating.

The question may, again, be asked, as done before (Pp. 122, 128) as to why the Vedānta does not say this straight, instead of bringing forward other extraneous arguments unnecessarily ? The reply is that the Vedānta reserves this fundamental argument to the last for the discerning, for wiser scholars and purer saints, and, very wisely and very sympathetically starts with such arguments as would be more intelligible to ordinary persons, not yet far advanced in the long and difficult Path of Spiritual Realisation.

The Truth is eternally there to be known, to be realised ; but, naturally, it takes time and requires gradual approach. And, the Vedāntic Seers, flowing with the milk of human kindness and knowing well human frailities, faults and failings, have only made provisions for these, and nothing more. All these prove clearly the fundamental catholic spirit of the Vedānta—its inner sense of universal sympathy, and its inborn feeling of love for all.

(3) (i) Third Objection against Brahma-Karana-Vada. (Sutrs 2. 1. 21—2. 1. 23.)

The Third Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda follows logically from the Refutation of the Second It has been said there, finally, that the Cause and the Effect being "Ananya" or non-different, Brahman, the Cause, is non-different from, or identical in essence with, the universe of Souls and Matter, the effect. Now, if that be so, the question may, naturally, be asked as to why should the Omniscient, Omnipotent Brahman create a world, so full of pains and sufferings, sins and errors, impurities and imperfections, and Himself suffer there infinitely in the form of the Jīvas ? No rational being in his senses ever desires to subject himself to sins and sufferings unnecessarily, when he himself possesses the power to prevent the same.

So, the creative act of Brahman must be considered to be a very foolish one, and, in that case, He cannot be taken to be an All-wise Being, knowing and acting intelligently, as befitting an All-knowing and All-powerful Being.

(ii) Refutation of the Third Objection against Brahma-Karana-Vada.

(a) Brahman and Jiva-Jagat are not totally Identical.

As the above Objections are similar in nature, the ways of disposing of them are also, naturally, so. Hence Śrīkaṇṭha refutes this Objection in a way, very similar to the other two, discussed above,

Thus, he points out, first, that though Brahman and Jīva-Jagat are non different in essence, yet there is a difference, also between them, as Brahman is "Adhika" or transcendent, far exceeding Jīva-Jagat in might and majesty, purity and perfection, beauty and bliss. In this way, Brahman is "Sarvajña," or Omniscient ; Jīva "Ajna" or ignorant ; Brahman in "Cetana" or Sentient ; Jāgat is "Acetana" or non-sentient. So, are they not very different ? Hence, how can the impurities and imperfections, sins and sufferings, faults and failings of Jiva-Jagat affect Brahman, at all ?

Now, this is the explanation offered by Śrīkaṇṭha from the worldly standpoint. As we have already seen, from the worldly standpoint, the Universe of Souls and Matter, is quite distinct from Brahman. Of course, their Essence, their Substance, their Soul, their Whole, their Cause, viz. Brahman, is always there, and is always identical with them in 'Svarūpa' or nature. Yet, from the worldly standpoint, this identity of nature is not discerned ; rather, it is the difference of forms and attributes only that is seen.

In this way, from the empirical standpoint, when the world is taken to be distinct from Brahman and impure, imperfect, sinful, sorrowing—naturally, Brahman Himself is not all these. So, no charge of acting foolishly and subjecting Himself to impurities and imperfections, sins and sorrows, by creating the Jagat and living there as the Jīvas—can be brought against the All-wise, All-powerful Brahman.

(b) Jīva-Jagat, are, however, as Pure as Brahman.

But from the real transcendental point of view, as we have seen, (P 127), the Universe, as a part, an attribute, a power, an effect and the body of Brahman, can never be impure, imperfect, incomplete, sinful and sorrowful. From that standpoint, the Universe is Umā, the Para-Śakti of Śiva Himself (P. 47—48). So, from this point of view, the question of foolishly doing harm to one's own self (Hitākaraṇa) does not arise at all. From this standpoint, Śiva plays with Himself, with His Para-Śakti Umā, and hence is the creation of the world. (See the Section on "Umā or Māya as Para-Śakti" Pp. 47—49). Thus, the Universe of Souls and Matter is nothing but an embodied form of the joy or the frolic of Brahman. (See below under "Refutation of the Sixth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-

Vāda"). Hence, how can the created universe be impure and imperfect, sinful and sorrowful at all ?

In this way, it has to be admitted that though Śrīkaṇṭha tries to refute the above Objection apparently on the ground that the impurities and imperfections of the created universe cannot touch the Creator Brahman, the Creator being different from, other and more than, the created object (Pp. 30—32), yet, the real ground is that the created world is as pure and perfect as the Creator Himself, being the manifestation of His pure and perfect nature, which is nothing but pure and perfect Bliss.

(c) "Bheda" and "Abheda" between Brahman and Jiva-Jagat.

Thus, really speaking, all the above Objections against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda are, evidently, based on a wrong conception regarding the "Bheda" or difference between Brahman, on the one hand, and Jīva-Jagat, on the other. The Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta all emphasise this "Bheda" also, side by side with "Abheda", or non-difference between Brahman and Jīva-Jagat. But what do these two really imply, and how can these be reconciled ? These are, indeed, difficult questions for the Monotheistic Vedāntists, who do not, on the one hand, accept Śaṃkara's Doctrine of pure "Abheda", and on the other, Madhva's Doctrine of pure "Bheda" between Brahman and Jīva-Jagat. This will be considered in details below. (See below the Section on "Relation between Brahman and Jīva-Jagat.").

But one thing is clear here. It is this, that whatever be the precise and peculiar nature of this relation, from the real and ultimate standpoint, Jīva-Jagat can never be impure and imperfect, sinful and sorrowing, mutable and mortal, when their Cause, Brahman – of whom they are manifestations, according to the Monotheist Vedānta Doctrine of Pariṇāma (See above Pp. 59ff)—is Himself eternally and essentially Pure and Perfect, Sinless and Blissful, Immutable and Immortal. (See above under, Section "The Universe is not really Impure and Non-sentient P. 127).

(d) The Difficult Monotheistic Concept of "Bheda."

To think that the Monotheistic Vedānta Doctrines involve this kind of inner contradiction, is, surely, absolutely absurd. Hence, their concept of "Bheda", which has to be admitted, is really a difficult one for them, and has to be interpreted and understood in a very careful manner. (See under the Section "The Concept of Individuality." P. 43) For here, the question naturally arises as to what "Bheda "can there still be left between Brahman and Jīva-Jagat, if they have to be admitted to be all equally pure and perfect, sinless and blissful, immutable and immortal, as shown above ? (P. 127.

However, leaving aside all these difficult problems for later discussion (See below the Section on "Relation between Brahman, and Jīva-Jagat"), let us, here, proceed on the basis of the undeniable fact that the Universe of Souls and Matter is really as true and perfect, as sinless and blissful, as immutable and immortal as Brahman Himself.

4. (i) Fourth Objection agai st Brahma-Karana-Vada. (Sutras 2. 1. 24—2. 1. 25).

The Fourth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda seems to be rather a childish one, based, as it is, on a false analogy between Brahman, the Universal Creator, and other worldly creators, like, potters, carpenters, chariot-makers, and the like.

Thus, the Objection is as follows :—

The world is a vast and variegated one ; and ultimately, it is due to the Five Great Elements, or Pañca-Mahā-Bhūtas, like Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether (Kṣit, Ap, Tejas, Marut, Vyoma). Thus, this "Vicitra-Jagat" or Variegated World cannot be due to one and the same Cause, like Brahman. In the world, it is found that even in the case of a single effect, many causes combine together to produce it finally :—

"दृश्यते हि रथादि-कार्येषु बहुकारकोपसंहारः ।" (२-१-२४)

Thus, if a person wants to make a chariot, he has to take the help of so many other things. E g., he has, first to, take a suitable material, like a log of wood. Then, secondly, he has to get hold of certain instruments etc., like swords, saws and the like ; and certain implements, like wedges, nails, and the like. In this way, through the help of so many other things alone, can he, finally, make that chariot ; and never by himself alone.

Now, if this be so in the case of a simple and single effect like a chariot, then, surely, how many more accessory causes will be necessary in the case of this vast and complex world can well be imagined.

Further, the question also remains as to how so many different effects can be produced out of the very same Cause Brahman. In the world, we find that different causes produce different effects. So, how can the same Cause Brahman produce so numerous and variegated effects by Himself alone ?

Thus, the above Objection can be split up under two heads :—

(i) Brahman cannot produce a single effect by Himself alone.

(ii) Brahman cannot produce many effects by Himself alone.

(ii) Refutation of the Fourth Objection against Brahma-Karana-Vada

(a) A seemingly Childish Objection.

As pointed out above, this Objection seems to be rather a childish and a frivolous one. For, is it not very childish or foolish to expect any analogy between the Cause of the world and causes within that world? Good analogy requires essential similarity; and similarity requires equality. But what equality can there ever be (from the worldly point of view, of course) between the worldly causes which are themselves effects of Brahman, and Brahman Himself? In fact, what analogy is really there between the whole world as an effect and the smaller effects within it, that we can expect here an analogy between Brahman, the Cause, on this side, and other worldly causes, on that? The matter appears to be too evident to require any further argumentation or discussion.

(b) Yet, not meaningless: The Value of Analogy.

So, the question may, naturally, be asked as to why should the Brahma-Sūtras, compiled by the wise saint Bādarāyaṇa, contain such an obviously foolish and meaningless Objection?

The answer is that, at the first stage of spiritual realisation, analogies do play an important part. Understanding unknown facts on the analogy of known ones is, indeed, a common intellectual process, and has to be resorted to by all. Indian sages, who always manifest a deep sympathy for the ignorant masses, and, accordingly, always take special pains to illustrate their abstruse discussions by means of well-known, concrete examples.

That is why, as well-known, "Udāharaṇa", or concrete illustrations have always been taken to be so very essential in Indian Philosophical Discourses. Hence, it is thought here, that ordinary persons, who are trying to know something about the World-Cause through the Brahma-Sūtras, will, naturally, at the first stage, try to understand the whole matter in the light of their ordinary, every-day experieuces. That is why, in the Brahma-Sūtras, as well as in other Indian Philosophical treaties, such obvious, easily disposable, and apparently foolish Objections are sometimes found, as well as, answers of the some calibre.

(c) The Charge of Childishness against Indian Philosophy is Unjustified

But the supreme beauty of the whole thing lies in this that, everything is taken very seriously, and no sign of any neglect or haphazardness is ever shown, even though all these are meant for ordinary persons, like you and I.

In fact, if you come to think of it, it is for the enlightenment of the ignorant masses mainly that philosophical works have to be composed. For, those who have advanced a little, do not very much require any such external help or exposition, but can proceed further by their own inner light and spiritual vision. Hence, the charges, sometimes brought against Indian Philosophy even by Indian scholars, viz. that Indian Philosophy is rather childish or frivolous in nature, is wholly unjustified. Indeed, if it be childish to provide for those who are but mere children in the lore of the Ātman, and help them to be grown-up adults in the same, then Indian Philosophy is undoubtedly 'childish.' But, if it be veteran-like to ignore no one, however weak and meek, then, surely, Indian Philosophy is a very wise, veteran one.

(d) Brahman alone can produce Single Effects and Many Effects.

However, nothing daunted, Śrīkaṇṭha, tries to refute the above Objection on the ground of Analogy, or by means of concrete examples from everyday life.

Thus, in reply to the first part of the Objection viz. (i) Brahman cannot produce a single effect by Himself alone,—he points out that, that is, of course, possible—

"एकस्यापि कार्य्यरूपेण परिणामः सम्भवति, यथा, क्षीरस्यैकस्यैव दधिभावेन।
(२-१-२४)

Even in the world, we find that a single cause can be transformed into an effect, that is, produce it by itself alone. For example, milk is by itself transformed into the form of curd. So, why cannot Brahman by Himself be transformed into the form of the universe?

In the same manner, in reply to the second part of the Objection, viz. (ii) Brahman cannot produce many effects by Himself alone,—Śrīkaṇṭha cites another familiar instance from our everyday life--

"चेकनादेकस्मात् पुरुषात् केश-नखादि विचित्र-कार्य-निष्पत्ति-दर्शनात्।"
(२-१-२४)

Even in the world, we find that many effects follow from a single cause. For example, hair, nails and the like arise out of the very same man. (See above Pp 48, 122 for the appropriateness of this example.) So, why cannot the same thing happen in the case of Brahman, too?

In this way, very cleverly, indeed does Śrīkaṇṭha tackle the problem by defeating his opponent in his own game through citing counter-instances of the very same type.

(e) Brahman is Omniscient

But really speaking, Śrīkaṇṭha fully knows that mere worldly analogies are of no real avail here. For, from the merely worldly or

empirical point of view, there cannot be, really, any analogy between Brahman and the Universe. Hence, finally, be resorts to, as before, to Scriptural Authority (Pp. 124 ff,. Also, see under "Refutation of the Fifth Objection.")

"अतः शास्त्रावगतशक्तेः परमेश्वरस्य सर्वममुपपद्यते। इति परमेश्वरस्य अनन्त-शक्तिमत्त्वं श्रुयते। तस्य किमसाध्यम्।" (२-१-२५)

That is, from the Scriptures, we come to know that Brahman is Omnipotent. (P. 34). So, nothing is impossible on His part.

In fact, this Omnipotence of Brahman, to which repeated refereuces are made in the Vedānta, can be proved very well on the grounds of reason, no less. Really speaking, here resort to Scriptural Authority is not at all needed. For, Brahman cannot be Brahman at all, if. He be not Omnipotent at the same time. Brahman is One, Brahman is without "Sajātīya and Vijātīya Bhedas" (See above P. 37). So, what rivals can He ever have to flout His authority, to impede His powers, to obstruct His will? (See above Pp. 19, 20, 34).

In fact, the Omnipotence of Brahman follows necessarily from His Oneness, discussed above (P. 36). This Oneness, as we have seen, constitutes the fundameutal nature of Brahman. And if, Brahman be One, He is also, at the same time, Omnipotent, as shown above. (Pp. 19, 20, 34).

(f) Brahman is Omnipresent

Now, although here, on the grounds of Omnipotence, it may be said that Brahman can do any and everything He likes, yet in order that this may not be taken as a kind forced silencing of opponents, some other reasons may be advanced here, as follows:—

(i) Brahman is Omnipresent. So, there being nothing outside Him, there is no question at all of His requiring any external or additional help, like material implements, and the rest. In the language of Logic, all these—e.g. in the case of the production of a chariot, the carpenter, the log of wood, the nails, wedges, swords, saws etc.—are not really "causes", but only "conditions"; and all these and other various "conditions", positive and negative, constitute one whole "cause". But in the case of Brahman, who is Omnipresent, there is no other alternative but to take Him as the "Cause", containing within Himself whatever is necessary for the production of the Universe of Souls and Matter.

(ii) Further, here the effect: the Universe of Souls and Matter, too, cannot be outside Brahman, as the effect, Chariot, is outside the carpenter. Creation, in fact, is nothing but a play of Brahman with Himself (See above P. 80. Also see below the Section on "Refutation of the Sixth Objection against Brahma-Kāraua-Vāda".) Hence, all the above

questions as to how Brahman can create the Universe without some external help, and the like cannot arise here at all.

Still, accustomed, as we are, to taking things on the basis of Analogy, good or bad, all Objections have to be tackled and satisfactorily disposed of. That is why, as pointed out above (P, 136) all these Objections against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda have been taken so seriously by our wise philosophers throughout the ages.

5. (i Fifth Objection against Brahma-Karana-Vada. (Sutras 2. 1. 26—2. 1. 31.)

The Fifth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda seems to be a rather serious one, as follows :—

It has been established above that Brahman, the Cause, is transformed into the Universe of Souls and Matter, the effect (Pp. 59ff, 122). In that case, we are, inevitably on the horns of a dilemma, as follows :—

If Brahman be without parts (Aṃśa or Avayava), then the whole of Brahman will be transformed into the Universe ; and if Brahman be possessed of parts, then Scriptures will be contradicted.

Either, Brahman is without parts, or He is possessed of parts.

∴ either the whole of Brahman will be transformed into the Universe, or Scriptures will be contradicted.

Now, as in the case of a Dilemma, neither of the above two alternatives can be accepted.

For, firstly, if the whole of Brahman be transformed into the form of the universe, then, Brahman will be wholly immanent in the universe. But the Vedānta View is that Brahman is neither wholly immanent, nor wholly transcendent, but both (P. 30),

Again, secondly, if Scriptures be the only sources through which Brahman can be known, (then) how can a view regarding Brahman that contradicts Scriptures be accepted ?

So, the only conclusion we have to accept here, willy-nilly, is—

"तस्माद् ब्रह्मणः परिणामो न युक्तः ।" (२-१-२६)

"No transformation of Brahman is, thus, ever possible."

Hence, Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda or Pariṇāma-Vāda is a totally unacceptable Doctrine. (See Pp. 59ff)

(ii) Refutation of the Fifth Objection against Brahma-Karana-Vada

(a) Scriptures prove Brahman to be both Transcendent and Immanent.

(1) Here, as usual, Śrīkaṇṭha, in common with other Vedāntists starts with "Śruti-Pramāṇa" or Scriptural Evidence. (Pp. 91, 124, 134,).

"ब्रह्मणो जगत्-परिणामो युक्त एव, तच्छ्रुतेः। श्रुतिरेवात्र प्रमाणम्, न प्रमाणान्तरम्।" (२-१-२७)

"The Doctrine that Brahman is transformed into the form of Universe, does, indeed, stand to reason, there being Scriptural texts to that effect. Here Scripture, alone, is the proof, and not anything else."

The Value and Validity of Scriptures in proving Brahman are, indeed, great, as shown above. (Pp. 91ff).

(b) Worldly Analogies prove Brahman to be both Transcendent and Immanent.

(2) But, again, as usual, Śrīkaṇṭha, in common with other Vedāntists, does not stop here, but also puts forward other arguments, no less. Thus, here, too (P. 136), Analogy is a fruitful proof. For, in the world, too, similar examples are found.

For example, "Jāti" or the Universal or the Generic Essence, is present through and through in each and every of the infinite number of individuals. But "Jāti" has no parts; and so, if it be fully present in one individual, then it becomes wholly immanent in it alone, and cannot, then, be fully present in an infinite number of other individuals of the very same class. However, that is not the case. On the contrary, "Jāti," though not possessed of parts, is yet present, through and through, in an infinite number of individuals, being immanent in each, yet transcendent. So exactly is the case with Brahman. He is, of course, without parts, yet He can be immanent, through and through, yet remain transcendent. (Pp. 30-31).

(c) Brahman is Omnipotent.

(3) But, again, as usual, Śrīkaṇṭha, in common with other Vedāntists, discards Analogy for a higher kind of proof. For, Good Analogy implies that the object with which comparison is made and the object compared belong to the same category,– rather, the first is somewhat superior to the second. For example, it is asserted that animals, being similar to men in possessing physical bodies must be subject to similar kinds of physical pleasures and pains. But here, Brahman is infinitely higher than the world, and so, what real Analogy can there be between the two, from the empirical standpoint?

That is why, the third proof given by Śrīkaṇṭha, here, is based on another fundamental characteristic of Brahman, already referred to above (Pp, 34, 138) viz. His Omnipotence. No Analogy is needed here, rather the uniquely Omnipotent Brahman is said to be capable of any and every thing.

(A) Brahman's Omnipotence proved on the grounds of Scripture.

Vehemently, indeed, does Śirkaṇṭha assert this repeatedly, with full faith and vigour :—

"तस्य सकलेतर-प्रमाणावगत-वस्तु-विजातीयत्वेन तत्राददृष्ट-शक्तियोगेन विरोध-भावात्। अतः परिपूर्णस्य तस्यैव कार्यत्वं कारणत्वं च सम्भवति।" (२-१-२७)

"अतो ब्रह्मापि शब्दैकप्रमाणकं विचित्रानन्त शक्तिकमिति ततः सर्वाविरोधः।" (२-१-२८)

".....इत्यादि दर्शनात् सर्वोऽपि शक्तिर्ब्रह्माश्रितेति विज्ञायते। अतः सर्वशक्तिमतः तस्य किं न संभवति।" (२-१-३०)

"एवं सकल-दोष-कलङ्क-रहित-शब्द-प्रमाणैक-सिद्ध-सर्व-शक्ति संपदविलासे परमेश्वरे शिवे परब्रह्मणि सम्भावनाऽसम्भावना विचारः सर्वोऽपि निरवकाश एव।" (२-१-३१)

"He is quite different from all other objects, known from other sources, and possesses unseen Powers. Hence, no contradiction is involved here. That is why, He, the Full, can be both the Cause and the Effect at the same time"

"From Scriptural passages, it is known that He is the Substratum of all Powers. So, what is impossible on the part of such an Omnipotent Brahman!"

"Thus, no question of possibility or impossibility can be raised in the case of Śiva, the Supreme Lord, the Supreme Brahman who is free from all stains of faults, who can be known through Scriptures alone, and who possesses, by nature, all pelf and powers"

(B) Brahman's Omnipotence proved on the grounds of Authority.

This Omnipotence, as pointed out above (Pp. 138 ff.), is a fundamental characteristic of Brahman. (P. 34.) and is proved not only on the grounds of Scriptural Authority, but also on that of Reasoning. In this connection, Śrīkaṇṭha brings forward another reason as to why Brahman has to be admitted to be Omnipotent. This is as follows (Br. Sū. Bhāṣya 2. 1. 28.)

Jīva and Jagat possess manifold powers. These powers of the Jīvas are not found in Jagat, and vice-versa. Again, different Jīvas possess different kinds of powers; different material elements like Fire, Water and the rest also do the same. Thus, the existence of "Bahu" and "Vicitra", numerous and "various, powers in souls and physical objects is a fact of Nature. Now, Brahman is the Substratum of Jīva-Jagat, and as such, much Higher, much more Powerful than the same, (Pp. 30, 31, 41). So, it stands to reason that Brahman must possess infinitely more numerous,

infinitely more varied powers, in fact, all powers. For, how can the Substratum be ever less powerful than the things that inhere in it ?

(d) Examples from Other Systems

Here, Śrīkaṇṭha also resorts to the common device, of taking 'Attack as the best form of Defence'. So, he points out succintly :—

'कृत्स्न-प्रसक्त्यादिदोषा निरवयवेऽचित्-सजातीये प्रधानादौ, न ब्रह्मणि शास्त्र-प्रमाणके ।" (२·१-२६)

"The faults, like entire transformation etc., pertain really to the non-sentient Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhya System, not possessing any parts; and never to Brahman, established by Scriptures".

That is, Pradhāna of the Sāmkhya System is conceived to be the root cause of the physical world, which is nothing but its 'Pariṇāma' or transformation. But Pradhāna has no parts. So, the very same difficulty arises here, no less, viz. that the whole of Pradhāna must be transformed into, and immanent in each and every of the numerous physical objects —which is impossible. For, if Pradhāna be wholly transformed into and immanent in one physical object, then, it will be fiully exhausted in that single object alone ; and cannot, again, be transformed into any other object besides it. Thus, on this view, Pradhāna can produce, at best, only a single physical object of the world. That is against the Sāmkhya View itself. And, really, is that not an absolutely absurd view ?

(e) Brahman Creates without Organs.

Incidentally, Śrīkaṇṭha disposes of another Objection in this connection viz. that Brahman, having no organs, cannot be the Cause of the Universe

Here, as before,he has recourse to Scriptural Authority, and concludes with firm faith :—

"विचित्रानन्त-शक्ति-सबल-माया परम-शक्ति-विशिष्टः परमेश्वरः स्वशक्ति-सवलेन प्रपञ्चाकारं स्वतः प्रपञ्चातीतश्च भवति ।" (२·१-३१)

"श्रुतिरेव भगवती प्रमाणम् ।" (२-१-३१)

"The Supreme Lord, variegated through possessing infinite and variegated powers, and possessed of the Supreme Power Māyā. (P. 51.) voluntarily assumes the form of the Universe, yet is beyond it (P. 30)."

"Here, the Holy Scripture alone is the Proof." (Pp. 93, 124).

(f) Real Implications of the Doctrine that Brahman is Nirvikāra or without changes, yet transformed into the form of the Universe, and that He is without arts, yet not wholly Immanent in the Universe : Concept of Śakti or Energy.

Now, after referring to Śrīkaṇṭha's, refutation of the above Objection, let us now pause a little to consider the real implications of the same.

For, as pointed out above (P. 139), this Objection appears to be a rather serious one.

From the rational standpoint, the argument contained under Section (b) above (P. 140) is the best.

This is nothing but the celebrated Modern Concept of Śakti or Energy.

Take the case of Sāmkhya Pradhāna (P. 140). Pradhāna, the root material cause of the material universe is, evidently, not itself a material object, but rather a kind of eternal, ultimate, fundamental Physical Energy, not having any parts, like a material object. So, the question that may be raised in connection with an ordinary material object, having parts, viz., as to whether it, as a cause, is wholly or partly transformed into its effects — cannot be raised here at all.

In this way, this eternal, ultimate fundamental Physical Energy manifests itself and takes form in each and every physical object of the Universe; yet is not exhausted in any of them.

The same, and more so, is the case here. (See P. 145). In the Vedānta System, Creation (Sṛṣṭi) has been described as "Sva-Śākti-Vikṣepa", or expansion of the Cit and Acit Śaktis of Brahman Himself; and Destruction (Pralaya), as contraction of the same.

The real implications of this Pariṇāmavāda have been discussed above. (Pp. 70, 79).

Thus, Brahman is, surely, devoid of parts: Niraṃśa or Niravayava, although He is taken to be an Organic Whole. (P. 36 ff). Hence, Cit and Acit are not His parts, as a leg is a part of a table, or, finally, an atom is a part of a physical whole. These constitute only His Guṇas and Śaktis: Attributes and Powers, which are, by no means, His physical parts, in the ordinary sense.

(g) Relation between Brahman and His Guna-Śaktis.

Then, what are these Guṇas and Śaktis: Attributes and Powers?

That raises a fundamental question of the real relation between Substance, on the one hand, and its Attributes and Powers, on the other.

According to the Monistic Schools of the Vedānta, the relation is one of absolute identity; or rather, there is no question of any relation at all, as the substance has only "Svarūpa" or a nature or an essence of its own, and no attributes or powers at all. This seems very plausible, as what necessity, nay possibility, is there for Attributes and Powers, over and above Nature or Essence?

Thus here, too, we seem to be on the Horns of a Dilemma, as follows:—

If Attributes and Powers are identical with the Substance, then, these are superfluous; and if Attributes and Powers are different from the Substance. then these are impossible.

Either, Attributes and Powers are identical with the Substance, or these are different,

Therefore, either Attributes and Powers are superflous, or these are impossible.

Thus, here, as natural in a Dilemma, there are two equally unpleasant, alternatives, and these imply the following :—

Firstly, if Attributes and Powers are identical with the Substance, then their very existence is wholly unnecessary—for, what is the use of positing again a multitude of Attributes and Powers, when these have the very same nature, the very same essence as the Substance itself.

Secondly, if Attributes and Powers be different from the Substance, then is it ever possible that there should be contradictory Attributes and Powers in a Substance, of an entirely different nature ?

But the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta have, necessarily, to face and resolve this Dilemma, because of their fundamental Conception of Brahman, as referred to above, as an Organic Whole (See P. 36).

And, how they have solved the problem by their Concept of Individuality has also been shown there. (P. 43.)

(A) Attributes and Powers are different manifestations of the same Substance.

In fact, Attributes and Powers are but different sides or aspects of the very same Substance. The Substance is, indeed one, yet it has different manifestations.

The river is, indeed, one; yet flows forth in endless ripples and eddies. The lotus is, indeed, one; yet blossoms forth in numerous petals and seed-vessels. The sun is, indeed, one; yet shines forth in countless rays and shafts. The cuckoo is, indeed, one; yet sings forth in manifold tunes and melodies.

In the very same manner, and more so, Brahman is, indeed One; yet, manifests Himself in infinite Attributes and Powers (See P. 17).

As the white light of the sun is broken forth in a prism in seven enchanting hues, so the Nature or Svarūpa of Brahman is broken forth, so to speak, in Attributes and Powers, the former implying more static aspects, the latter, more dynamic.

Thus, Attributes and Powers differ from the substance, not qualitatively, but only quantitatively (See Pp. 36, 41 ff,) So, these are 'Bhedas', or differences, or separate realities in Brahman—but not any

parts. For, the term 'part' ordinarily, implies a divisible and a divided portion of the whole, which these are, definitely, not.

In this way, according to the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta, to keep Brahman's richness of content, His Svagata-Bhedas have to be admitted, without, however, implying any divisible 'parts'. (P. 42).

Thus, the 'Niraṃśa-Brahman. or Brahman devoid of parts, is by no means 'Nirviśeṣa' and 'Nirguṇa, or an Abstract Reality, but essentially 'Saviśeṣa' and Saguṇa', or a Concrete Unity, an Organic Whole.

(h) The Question of Total or Partial Transformation from the Transcendental Standpoint.

In the case of Brahman, specially, the above question of total or partial transformation cannot be raised at all. For, does not Creation finally imply that the Loving God the Playful God, the Blissful God is playing with Himself, with His Para-Śakti-Umā ? (See P. 47ff). This, really, applies to all the Objections against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda.

(i) The Vedanta Conception of Divine Energy.

Still, if we persist in considering the matter from the ordinary standpoint, an easy, yet scientific solution can be found, as shown above, (P. 143) in the celebrated Modern Concept of Energy.

Due to this Concept, as we have seen, the whole idea of Causation has been revolutionised, and the age-old whole-part conception has been appropriately revised. It is held now that it is not really and ultimately a divisible material object that is transformed into the form of an effect; but it is only the Energy inherent in it that is done so. Thus, it is the Energy inherent in the Seed that gradually blossoms forth into a beautiful, majestic, full-grown, huge tree,—through every part of the tree, this Energy is manifested, yet it is not fully exhausted in any one of the same. In the same manner, it is the Energy inherent in the Milk or Milk-particles that takes form in butter or curd. This Energy is eternal, it is never exhausted, never dies. Such is the great and grand conception of Energy, even from the empirical standpoint.

So, how much greater and grander is this Vedānta Concept of Divine Energy ! The Vedānta Concept of Brahman is, of course, a static one. (Pp. 70ff) That is, here Brahman is conceived to be eternally full, eternally perfect, eternally blissful, eternally satisfied. So, He eternally 'Is', and never 'Becomes' (P, 83. Also see below "The Concepts of Līlā and Māyā" and "Static and Dynamic Conceptions of Brahman" under the "Refutation of the Sixth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda". "How can Līlā be reconciled with Jiva-Karmas ? " under the Section : "Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda".)

Stll He being All-powerful, is an Eternal Storehouse of Energy; and it is this Energy, pulsating throughout His own Self, permeating His own Self, vitalising and vivifying His own Self, that works in His every Attribute, every Power—in Cit and Acit, variously called His "Guṇa" or Attributes, and "Śakti" or Powers

The Cit and the Acit are also taken to be constituting the Body of Brahman; He being its Soul. Now, when the Soul vitalises the Body, who would raise the question of the Soul being wholly or partly immanent in every part of the Body? The Soul, indeed, has no parts; yet it is not wholly exhausted in any of the parts of its body; yet it is fully present in each of the same.

(j) The Paradox of "Fully" and "Wholly".

Thus, from whatever standpoint, is the matter discussed, the same conclusion is arrived at, viz. that the Paradox of Energy is the Paradox of Brahman, the Paradox of Life is the Paradox of Brahman, the Paradox of Soul is the Paradox of Brahman. Thus, e g, the partless, indivisible Life is "fully" present in the smallest particle of the living body; yet not "wholly" exhausted and immanent in it.

It is this Paradox between "fully" and "not wholly" that constitutes the real crux of the matter here. Very beautifully, indeed, does the wise Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad refer to this Paradox thus :—

'ॐ पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात् पूर्णमुदच्यते। पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते।" (५-१-१)

"Om. That (Unmanifest. Brahman is Full. This (Manifest) Brahman is Full. From the Full, the Full emerges. If the Full be taken away from the Full, then, too, the Full remains."

Thus, as pointed out above, Brahman is "fully" present in the world; yet He is not "wholly" exhausted therein That is why, Brahman, in His Unmanifest, Casual State is Full; and Brahman in His Manifest, Effected State, or as present in the universe of Souls and Matter, is Full; and even when He is fully transformed in the same, He remains Full for ever, as before.

The real meaning of such a 'Transformation, has been shown above (Pp. 68ff.)

Thus, in every particle of dust, Brahman is fully present; every particle of dust is Brahman Full Pure and Perfect; still when millions of such particles are combined together, the very same Full, Pure and Perfect Brahman remains. This is the wonderful Mathematics of the Vedānta :—If from 100, 100 be subtracted, still then 100 remain! Again, if to 100, 100 be added, still then 100 remain! How? For the mere

reason that here there is really no 'subtraction', no 'addition' at all, there being only One, All-pervasive Reality, having no outside and inside. So, nothing can be subtracted from and taken out from It; and nothing can be added to and taken in in It. In this way, the Full is Full, at every place, every moment, every time, through and through.

(k) Eternal, Unchangeable Brahman

In fact, this is the only kind of Existence that an Eternal, Unchangeable Being can have, if He has to exist at all. (P. 70 ff). For, Eternity and Unchangeability necessarily imply that there is no change at all from the existing state, either qualitatively or quantitatively. So, just as the Eternal, Unchangeable Brahman cannot become otherwise qualitatively by being something else; so also, He cannot become otherwise quantitatively by becoming 'more' or 'less', in any way. Hence, whenever He is, He is what He is eternally; wherever He is, He is what He is eternally; whatever He is, He is what He is eternally. In this way, transcending all conditions of Space, Time and Circumstances, He Is, only Is. (P. 70 ff). Accordingly, when He is the universe, He simply is as He is, what He is. (Manifest, Effected State), just like, when He is not the universe (Unmanifest, Causal State). (See above 82 ff).

(l) Real Implications of the Vedanta Doctrine of Creation. (Pp 68 ff.)

This is the sublime Vedānta-Doctrine of Creation—Creation is not a happening in time, not a change of states, not a result of needs—yet it is a new something, yet it is a real transformation, yet it is a necessary activity. What s sweet and sublime Paradox is this! But is not life itself a Paradox, and more so, its interpretation, viz. Philosophy?

But after all, why "new"? Why "actually transformed"? Why a a "necessary action"?

"New" because Brahman is eternally New as He is eternally existent, yet never grows, never changes, never becomes old. So, everything within Brahman is eternally new.

"Actually transformed" because the world is as real as Brahman Himself, containing Brahman "fully" (P. 146 ff.)

"A Necessary Action" because Creation is Nature itself (P. 78 ff), and Nature is Necessity.

Very strange, yet very sweet is this Monothesistic Vedānta Conception of Creation.

"Strange", because it is not easily amenable to ordinary reason; "Sweet", because it brings to light a sweet play between Brahman and Jīvas, a sweet vision as to how the All-Sweet God, with His Ambrosia of Love and Bliss, is eternally sweetening the lives of the so-called suffering and sorrowing souls.

(6) (i) Sixth Objection against Brahma-Karana-Vada (Sutras 2. 1. 32 —2. 1. 33)

The Sixth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda is a still more formidable one, arising, as it does, from a fundamental question, viz. that of the Purpose of Creation. This, as well-known, is a main problem of Philosophical Cosmology. It may be put thus :—

(a) The Nature of a Voluntary Action.

If we carefully analyse the nature of a Voluntary Action, we find the following characteristics and steps in it :—

Firstly, the agent or the Kartā lacks something, for example, water in his system.

Secondly, due to lacking this, he has a feeling of want in him. This is called the "Spring of Action."

Thirdly, this feeling of want, naturally, makes him think of an object which will enable him to get rid of it. This object which he chooses after due deliberation, as he thinks it will enable him to get rid of this painful feeling of want, is called the "End.", and the idea of the End, is called the "Motive".

Fourthly, when he has an idea of the End, naturally, he has a strong desire for it.

Fifthly, he thiks of the Means to that End, and chooses certain means which he thinks will enable him to attain that End. The idea of the choosen End and Means together is called "Intention".

Sixthly, and finally, he actually begins to act, that is, follow the Means to attain the End. Here, thus, he takes certain materials, uses certain implements, and thereby tries to attain the End as best as he can.

In this way, a Voluntary Action necessarily implies, first, some want or defect on the part of the agent. For, as shown above, if he does not lack a thing, he cannot have any desire to get that thing and act accordingly.

Secondly, a Voluntary Action necessarily implies also numerous changes on the part of both the agent himself and the materials and the like with which he is working.

(b) Five Kinds of Causes.

In the terminology of Indian Logic, here we have the combination of five kinds of Causes viz. Samavāyi-Kāraṇa. i.e. the threads, in the case of the production of a piece of red cloth; Asamavāyi-Kāraṇa, i. e. the red colour of the threads; Nimitta-Kāraṇa. i.e., the instruments and implements, like spindle, weaving-machine, wheels, etc.; Prayojaka or the agent, i. e. the weaver himself; Bhoktā or the buyer of that piece of red cloth.

Here, Samavāyi-Kāraṇa and Asamavāyi-Kāraṇa, i. e. the red threads, constitute the Upādāna-Kāraṇa or Material Cause of the effect, viz. the piece of red cloth ; Nimitta-Kāraṇa and Proyojaka or Directive Cause, its Nimitta-Kāraṇa or Instrumental or Efficient Cause.

(c) The Ever-Satisfied Brahman cannot be a Creator.

First, let us apply these marks to the case of Brahman Himself, the Cause, the Creator of the world.

Now, Creation must be a voluntary action on the part of Brahman. So, it also must spring out of a feeling of want or defect on His part. Or, it must also imply an unattained end or an unfulfilled desire on the part of Brahman. But the fundamental nature of Brahman is that He is 'Āpta-Kāma' : 'Nitya-Tṛpta', 'Nitya-Śuddha', 'Nitya-Buddha,' 'Nitya-Mukta'—Eternally Satisfied, Eternally Pure, Eternally Knowing, Eternally Free, with all ends eternally attained, all goals eternally reached, all desires eternally gratified. So, how can such a Full, Pure, Perfect Brahman have any want or defect. any unattained end or any ungratified desire at all ?

In this way, the Purpose of Divine Creation cannot be explained at all. All rational, free, acts require Motives. That is, each and every one of such acts must have a reason or a purpose behind it. But what motive, reason or purpose can be attributed to Brahman, the All-perfect, All-pure, All-full, All-blissful Being ? He does not need the world for His own perfection, development, completion, fulfilment, as He is fully Perfect, fully Developed, fully Complete fully Fulfilled from all eternity, through all eternity, to all eternity.

Thus, He cannot create the world for His own sake. Again, to take the only other alternative, He cannot create the world for the sake of Jīvas or individual souls for, then, how can He be called an All-merciful Being, if He, in this way, subjects the Jīvas to infinite, mundane miseries ?

Thus, Brahman can have no purpose at all for creating the Universe of Souls and Matter. And, to act without a purpose is to act like an immature child incapable of reasoning ; or a madman, devoid of reasoning.

But how can Brahman, the Omnescient Being, behave childishly or foolishly in this way ?

(d) The Unchangeable Brahman cannot be a Creator.

Secondly, Creation will also imply numerous changes on the part of Brahman, the Creator. As we have seen (P. 60,) Creation implies numerous changes on the part all the five Causes which combine together to produce an Effect Or, more briefly, all the three Causes here, viz. Upādāna or Material Cause, Nimitta or Efficient Cause and Bhoktā or Final Cause, undergo numerous changes.

Take the above example of a weaver, weaving a piece of cloth for a prospective buyer. Here, the Efficient Cause weaver, together with his instruments and implements, naturally undergoes many physical and mental changes, due to different movements, gestures, postures, utterances and the like, as well as, different thoughts, feelings, desires and the like Then, the Material Causes, the red threads too, are subject to constant changes of shape, size and the like. Again, the Final Cause, the buyer, too, changes in the sense that at first he did not possess that piece of cloth, but now does so.

In this way, Causation, meaning a kind of Creative Activity, necessarily and naturally involve numerous changes on the part of all the Causes present here.

Now, in the case of Brahman, He Himself has to be taken to be both the Material Cause and the Efficient Cause simultaneously. (See P. 57 ff.) As such, He has to undergo infinite kinds of changes, doubly, as a Material Cause. as well as an Efficient One. But Brahman is essentially an Unchangeable Being, Nirvikāra, as all Vikāras or changes necessarily imply imperfection. For, as pointed out above (P. 60,), all changes are either changes for the better, or for the worse. Now. changes for the better imply a prior state of imperfection which now changes to become more perfect. Again, changes for the worse is still worse, implying a later state of imperfection which now results from a better prior state. In this way, no change or transformation is possible on the part of Brahman (See P. 60).

Hence, it is said, finally, that the very analysis of a rational and free, i. e. a voluntary activity, reveals clearly that Creation cannot be a voluntary activity on the part of Brahman. But, how can it ever be conceived to be an activity of any other kind ?

(e) Five kinds of Mechanical Acts.

Thus, besides Voluntary or Purposive Activities, there are Non-Voluntary or Non-Purposive Activities of five main kinds, viz. Spontaneous or Random, Reflex or Sensory-Motor, Instinctive, Habitual and Ideo-Motor. Of these, again, the first three are original ; the last two, acquired. Thus, the random movements of new-born chicks etc., or running, jumping etc. by children. and the like, are. Spotaneous or Random Acts. The automatic and immediate removal of the hand, when it accidentally comes into contact with a burning stove, and the like, are Reflex or Sensory-Motor Acts. Here, the mere sensation of heat automatically leads to the act of removing it immediately. Next, building of nests by birds and the like, are Instinctive Acts. Walking. and the like, are Habitual Acts. The automatic putting into one's pocket of another man's match-box, and the like are Ideo-Motor Acts. Here the mere idea of the match-box,

automatically leads to the associated act of putting it inside the pocket. These last two kinds of Acts were originally Voluntary,but have become Non-Voluntary through constant repetition.

(f) Mechanical Action is also impossible on Brahman's Part.

Now, all the above kinds of Non-voluntary Acts, as evident, are purely mechanical or automatic in nature, without any thought or reflection, without any prior idea of the means and the end, without any choosing of a particular means and end, without any pre-conceived plan of any kind whatsoever. In short, these Acts indicate no mark of intelligence at all. So, how can the supreme, creative activity of All-knowning Brahman be one of this kind ?

Thus, the Divine Activity, cannot be, as pointed out above, a kind of impulsive, irrational or forced one. If He acts, He does so voluntarily, with full knowledge, desire and free will—full knowledge of the End to be attained and the Means thereto, full desire for the End to be attained, full will to attain it.

But a Voluntary Activity is impossible on the part of Brahman, as pointed out above. And, a Non-voluntary Activity is still more imposible on His part, as pointed out just now. Thus, no Activity of any kind is at all possible on the part of Brahman. So, that Creation of the universe of Souls and Matter is impossible. Hence, Brahma-Kārana-Vāda or the Doctrine of the Causality of Brahman is an impossible one.

(ii) Refutation of the Sixth Objection against Brahma-Karana-Vada.

(a) Creation is a Sport : Lilavada.

The above objection has been very aptly and ingeniously refuted in the celebrated and oft-quoted Brahma Sūtra.

"लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम्।" (२-१-३३)

"Only a Play, as found in the world."

This contains the famous Vedānta Doctrine of Līlā.

According to the Vedānta View, Creation is nothing but a "Līlā" or a Play on the part of Brahman. This has been already referred to above (P. 52).

(b) Nature of 'Lila' or 'Play'

Now, what is a "Play ?" A Play is, indeed, a kind of Voluntary Activity, but not a Purposive Activity at all (See below).

It is, in fact, absolutely wrong to identify a 'Voluntary Activity" with a "Purposive One." Ordinarily, of course, voluntary activities are also purposive ones, as shown above. But there is, at least one kind

of Voluntary Activity viz. 'Play', which is not a purposive one, in the sense that it does not arise out of any want or defect or impurity or imperfection,—any unattained end or ungratified desire of any sort whatsoever.

On the contrary, 'Play' implies the absence of all wants and defects, all impurities and imperfections, all unattained ends and ungratified desires. For, when does one, when can one indulge into play? Only when one is fully happy, with no wants or defects or complaints of any kind, at least for the time being.

Thus, 'Play' serves no purpose here, except to give an outer expression to an inner happiness. In this sense, 'Play' does not warrant any want, but rather, the absence of the same.

(c) Worldly Examples.

An ordinary example is given here, viz. of a man, playing balls, happily, not out of any necessity, but simply because he is feeling fully satisfied. In fact, happiness is an emotion, and an emotion has, naturally, a tendency to manifest itself in outer expressions, gestures, activities and the like. This is not a need or a necessity, but nature itself.

For example, the sun shines, the wind blows, a flower blooms, a river flows by nature alone, and not out of any want or defect. (See below under the Section "The Nature of Niṣkāma-Karma" under "The Refutation of the Seventh Objection ")

In exactly, the same manner, does a happy, contented man engage himself in various kinds of sports by nature alone.

So, why cannot Brahman, the All-blissful, All-contented, the All-perfect, All-pure, All-full Being do so ?

Accordingly, in his simple, straightforward manner, Śrīkaṇṭha says :—

"सम्भवत्येव निष्प्रयोजनाऽपि प्रवृत्तिः केवल-लौलामात्रेण परमेश्वरस्य ।"
(२-१-३३)

"This, of course, is possible. The Supreme Lord acts, without any need, but only in sport."

(d) View of Sivarka-Mani-Dipika.

Appaya Dīkṣita in his Commentary "Śivārka-Maṇi-Dipikā" makes the matter clearer. He, thus, discusses the problem from a wider standpoint, and points out that in one sense, even a 'Sport or Play' may serve a purpose. Accordingly, 'Sport' may be classed under two heads thus :—

"सुखितस्य सुखानुभव-प्रयुक्त-चेष्टादि-लीला । सा द्विविधा – तात्कालिकानन्दाद्यार्था प्रयोजन-लौला, तदप्यनुद्दिश्य-केवल-लीला । न द्वितीयायामसम्प्रतिपत्तिः । दुःखो-

द्रे के रोदनवत् सुखोद्रे के हास-गानादेः प्रयोजन-रहितस्य सर्वानुभव-सिद्धत्वात। अतएव हसित-रुदितादिषु कारणमेव पृच्छन्ति, न तु प्रयोजनम्। एवं लोके दृष्ट्वात्तद्वदेव पारमेश्वरी जगतसृष्टिर्नित्य निरतिशयानन्दानुभव-प्रयुक्ता केवल-लीलेति सूत्रार्थः।" ("शिवार्क-मणि-दीपिका।")

(e) Two kinds of Sport : Purposive and Non-purposive.

Here, Appaya Dīkṣita first defines "Līlā" by pointing out that "Līlā", or Sport means the activities, due to the feeling of pleasure, on the part of a happy man.

Sports are of two kinds—those due to some purposes, those not due to these. The former are called "Prayojana-Līlā or "Purposive Sport"; the latter, "Kevala-Līlā" or "Mere Sport".

Thus, in the case of a "Purposive Sport", a purpose is served, viz. it gives pleasure, for the time being, to the person engaged in that kind of sport. That is, sometimes, a person may play or engage himself in sports for the sake of pleasure. Here, he wants to enjoy that kind of pleasure through that kind of sport Hence, this kind of "Prayojana-Līlā" or Purposive Sport", is like an ordinary voluntary activity and springs from the lack of something, viz. pleasure, in that person who engages himself in that kind of sport.

But the second kind of Sport or "Kevala-Līlā or "Mere Sport" does not involve any purpose at all. On the contrary, it is but a natural expression of pleasure or happiness, already present in that person.

For example, when a person is stricken with grief, he expresses his sorrow by means of weeping; when a man is overjoyed, he expresses his joy by means of laughing and singing. In all these cases, only reasons or causes of weeping, laughing, singing etc are asked, and never their purposes. That is, the reasons or causes of weeping and laughing are the corresponding emotions of sorrow and joy, which thus, as pointed out above, naturally manifest or express themselves in these effects or external signs.

Thus, in such cases we do not ask for the Final Cause or the purpose; but only for the Antecedent Cause or the reason. So, we do not enquire here as to for what purpose, or for gaining what end, that person is crying or laughing; but only, why or for what reason he is doing so.

In the very same manner, in the case of Brahman's act of Creation, we should not ask as to for what purpose. He is creating the universe of Souls and Matter; but only, at best, why or for what reason, He is doing so. The reason, as mentioned above, is that He is an All-blissful Being

and, that is why, He is spontaneously, expressing His Supreme Bliss, in the form of this Cosmic Sport or "Līlā" with His own Self (Pp. 76,81).

That is why, Taittirīya Upaniṣad has declared beautifully :—

"आनन्दं ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्। आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति। आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभि संविशन्तीति।" (तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद् ३-६)

"He came to know of Brahman as Bliss. From Bliss, verily, do all these beings arise. Through Bliss, do they live. To Bliss, do they return and enter in."

Thus, this Doctrine of Divine Sport or "Līlāvāda" beautifully brings to light the real nature of the Vedānta Doctrine of Creation, as well as the nature of the created effect or the Universe of Souls and Matter. If this Doctrine, which forms the very core, the very quintessence, of the Monotheist Schools of the Vedānta, be properly understood, then there will be no further possibility of any objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda being raised at all, as done above, such as : How can an impure non-sentient world be produced from a Pure, Sentient Brahman (P. 121) ? Will not the impure universe vitiate the Pure Brahman during Pralaya or Universal Dissolution (P. 129)? Will not Brahman and Jīvā-Jagat be absolutelly identical (P. 129)? Will not Brahman and Jīva-Jagat be absolutely different ? (P. 124) ? Will not the whole of Brahman be transformed into and immnanent in the universe (P. 139) ? and the like.

(f) Creation as a Sport

That is why, Appaya Dīksita in his "Śivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā," points out that the Doctrine of Divine Sport "or" Litāvāda clearly indicates the following :—

(i) The act of Creation on the part of Brahman does not imply any want or defect on His part, (See P. 80), but is only a sport, springing from Infinite Bliss.

(ii) It is only a very natural act on His part, following from His very Nature or Svarūpa. So he says, in continuation of the above quoted passage : —

"अत एवात्र लीला-शब्दः क्रियावाची न तु विलास-रूप-क्रिया-विशेष-वाची। 'लीला क्रिया विलासश्चे' त्युभयत्रापि तस्य शक्तिस्मरणात्। "कैवल्य"-शब्दः पूर्ववत् प्रयोजनोद्देश्य-व्यवच्छेदेन स्वाभाविकत्व-लाभार्थः। तथा च यथा लोके प्राणिनां निमेषादि-व्यापाराः स्वाभाविकाः, यथा च केषाञ्चिद् गान-व्याख्यानादिषु शिरोऽङ्गुलि-चालनादयः स्वाभाविकाः, न तु प्रयोजनार्थाः, तथैव परमेश्वरस्य सृष्ट्यादि-व्यापारा अपि स्वाभाविका एव।

That is, the term 'Līlā" may mean either a kind of Activity, or

a kind of frivolous indulgenee in sense-pleasures. But, here, evidently, it can mean only the first. The term "Kaivalya" or "only" in the above Brahma-Sūtra "लोकवत्तु लीला-कैवल्यम्" (२-१-३३) means, as stated above, that this Divine Sport is not due to any need on the part of Brahman, but only to His own Nature itself. Just as, the act of winking on the part of a person is due to his very nature, and not to any need ; just as, the act. of moving the heads and the fingers on the part of a person, who is singing, or explaining something, respectively, are due to his very nature, and not to any need—so the act of creating the world on the part of Brahman is due to His very nature, and not to any need.

(iii) The act of Creation on the part of Brahman is not due to any effort on His part, but is only a very easy act. So, he says :—

"यद्वा लीला-शब्दोऽत्र अनायास-कर्मपरः। 'लीलामात्रमेतस्य भारत्रय धान्य-वहनमिति' तत्रापि प्रयोग-दर्शनात्। 'कैवल्य'-शब्दः क्रियतोऽप्यायासस्यानपेक्षाद्योतनार्थः। तथा च यथाङ्गुलि-चालनादयः अनायास-साध्याः क्रिया, न प्रयोजनापेक्षा। अतएव तत्र न प्रयोजन-प्रश्नः। ....एवं परमेश्वरस्याऽपि अनायास-साध्याः निश्वसितादि-कल्पतया श्रुताः सृष्ट्यादिक्रिया न प्रयोजनापेक्षा इति तात्पर्यम्।"

(शिवार्क-मणि-दीपिका)।

That is, the third meaning of the term "Līlā" is that, it is a very easy kind of task. For example, it is said, in common use, that. 'It is only a child's play on his part to carry these three loads of rice,' Thus, just as moving the fingers and the like are very easy kinds of task on the part of a man, so is the Creation of the universe of Souls and Matter on the part of Brahman That is why, the Divine Creation has been described in the Scriptures as a kind of 'breathing' on the part of Brahman, without any need at all. (Bṛh. Up. 2 4 10; 4. 5. 11.)

Of course, in a sense, breathing is a very necessary act. Still, when a person is breathing, he does not do so on the thought that it is necessary for him to breathe—but, only, spontaneously. Creation, is such a kind of 'spontaneous' act on the part of Brahman.

Thus, according to Appaya Dīkṣita, the term 'Līlā" in the above Brahma-Sutra (2 1. 33) means three thiugs :—

Viz (1) it is an act due to the feeling of happiness ; (2) it is a natural act, (3) it is an easy act.

"आनन्दानुभव-प्रयुक्तानां, स्वाभाविकानामनायास-साध्यानाञ्च त्रिविधानामप्य-नुद्दिष्ट प्रयोजनानां व्यापाराणां संग्रहिको द्रष्टव्यः।" (शिवार्क-मणि-दीपिका)

Thus, these three characteristics of 'Sport' are present million-fold in this Cosmic Sport which we call "Creation". Hence, Creation is an expression of Brahman's infinite bliss, flows from His very nature, and is infinitely easy on His part.

(g) Processes of Divine Lila

It has been stated above that Divine Līla is absolutely spontaneous, natural and easy, (Pp. 154 155). Now, the next question is : What, exactly, is the Process of such a Divine Līla ? This has already been discussed above, to some exent, (Pp. 52, 75 ff.) Let us now pause a little to reflect over the matter anew.

(A) Nature of a Play

1. Psychology of a Play.

Now, what are the main features of 'Play', as commonly understood ?

(i) First, 'Play', requires a person or an object (one or more) to play with. In this way, it always implies a distinction between the two—the player and the played or the object of play.

This 'play-object' may be external (as usual), or internal (as rare). Thus, a boy, as common, plays with his play-mates or balls etc., existing outside him. Again, a baby plays with his own limbs, fingers and toes and the like, inside his body. Again, an adult plays cards with his friends, or chess alone, existing outside him. But very rarely, if at all, do normal adults play with themselves physically.

Psychologically, however, playing with one's own feelings, thoughts and desires is quite common in the case of both adults and youngsters. This takes the form of 'Day-dreaming', 'Fantasy' etc.

In this way, 'Play' essentially implies an 'Another', and a knowledge, full or otherwise, of that This is the Coguitive Condition of 'Play'.

(ii) Secondly, 'Play' requires the emotions of love and happpiness as its core. Hence, evidently, there cannot be any play with a person or an object with whom or with which one has no relation of amity or friendship. A boy does not play ball with those of his class-mates whom he does not like ; an adult does not play cards with his antagonists or those whom he dislikes.

In ordinary language, we, sometimes, get 'expressions' like : 'Playing with his victims before killing them'. This is not unoften found in the Animal World, like a cat playing with a mouse before killing it outright. But it is clear that such cases are not those of 'Play' at all.

In fact, if there be no feeling of love, there is no 'Play' at all—this is an essential condition of 'Play' in all its forms. Hence, the so-called 'playing' with one's victims, whom one hates, cannot be taken to be 'Play at all It is only an aggressive activity, a vindictive activity, a part of the total activity of killing or destroying which springs entirely from anger and hatred.

Again, 'Play' is essentially an expression of happiness Happiness or bliss, by nature, is effluent, effusive, efforvescent. It has a tendency to sprout forth, flow out, gush over Biologically, Play is taken to be an outlet for surplus energy (Spencer). But, psychologically, it is essentially an outlet for happiness.

What, after all, is happiness ? Leaving aside its higher, philosophical meaning, we may say that happiness implies a fulness of heart which, by nature, overflows into external expression and action.

But why only 'happiness ? Have not all strong emotions the very same tendency ? Does not grief express itself into weeping, striking the forehead and the breast, tearing off the hairs, rolling on the ground ? Does not anger express itself in shouting, cursing, striking, breaking and the like ? Does not fear express itself in trembling, fleeing, crouching, falling and so on ?

True. But in all these cases, ordinarily, only isolated expressions, gestures and activities are found. In the case of 'Happiness', however, over and above the isolated expressions, gestures and activities,—like smiling, laughing, singing, dancing, clapping, jumping and so on—there is one, whole connected act like 'Play', not found in other cases. That is why, it has been said above that 'Happiness', specially, has a natural tendency to express itself outwardly, not only in isolated gestures etc., but also in one whole connected act, viz, 'Play.'

Thus the emotions of Love and Happiness are the Emotional Conditions of 'Play.'

(iii) Thirdly, 'Play' is entirely non-purposive. (P. 153). It is wrong to hold that 'Play' can ever be purposive, aiming at an end, egoistic or altruistic.

So Appaya-Dīkṣita's view in this connection, as referred to above (P. 153), cannot be accepted. Thus, if a man plays card with his opponents for winning some money from them—that is not a 'Play' at all, but a kind of selfish activity, fulfilling none of the above two emotional conditions of 'Play', viz. Love and Happiness, and so, really, designable by other names, such as, 'Money-extracting', 'Cheating' and the like.

In the same manner, playing for winning power and pelf, prizes and medals, honour and succour, are not real plays at all, but only respective activities in connection with those respective ends.

This is the conative condition of a 'Play'.

2. Uniqueness of Play

All these have been referred to above. (P 52,80) But what is worth noting here, again, is that 'Play is, indeed, a unique and a wonderful

something, from all points of view—Physical, Psychological, Logical, Ethical, Metaphysical.

Play from the Physical Stand-point

Thus, from the Physical Standpoint, a 'Play' involves a series of physical activities in a physical setting. Still, it has no actual reference to actual physical events, no actual connection with actual every day life, no actual dealings with actual daily transactions.

Hence, though physical, it is yet, non-physical. How ? Simply because, it, by nature, arises above all those present conditions and physical environments, and regales in a non-physical world of make-belief and imagination (P. 81). For, who would call an act a Play if it refers to actual needs and necessities, like eating and drinking ? Really, a 'Play' is a play because it plays or frolics about in a non-factual world of its own creation.

Take any kind of 'Play'. It is clear that plays by children are mostly imitations of elders, and as such, do not refer to actual facts Thus, a boy plays a soldier ; a girl, a mother; a student, a teacher; a patient, a doctor. Even plays by elders, like cards, chess etc. refer to an imaginary world where Kings and Queens, Horses and Chariots, Cards and Chess-men behave in a way entirely their own.

And, strange though it may sound, even those plays or games that are supposedly very robust and realistic, making the players very robust and realistic, are, as a matter of fact, entirely non-realistic in nature. For, the world they live in during the period of the game is a small, detached world of their own where they are taking parts which they do not or cannot do actually. Ask any player, and he will convince you of the truth of this statement.

So, is not 'Play' really a wonder-inspiring something, that can, thus, without any great or high enterprise of any kind,—on the contrary, because of being absolutely spontaneous and natural and easy (P. 155) —lift all up in a special world of its own ? Thus, is not 'Play' a unique and wonderful kind of physical and actual activity ?

Play from the Psychological Standpoint

From the psychological standpoint, similarly, a 'Pay' is fully emotional, yet wholly selfless ; fully voluntary, yet wholly non-purposive. Is that not, too something unique and wonderful ?

Play from the Logical Standpoint

Again, logically, a Play, is neither a 'Cause or an 'Effect', in the ordinary senses of the terms. It is not the cause of any desire, e.g. for happiness ; it isalso, not the effect of any desire, e.g. for happiness—being

simply a natural and spontaneous outer expression of inner happiness itself, without any desire to that effect also. Is that not, also, something unique and wonderful ?

Play from the Ethical Standpoint

Further, ethically, a 'Play' is voluntary, yet amoral or not subject to any moral judgments of good or bad, not being purposive in nature, not being the effect of any desire at all.

But, suppose, a boy steals a ball to play with, a girl bites her mother to get a doll to play with, a card-player hides a card to cheat his fellow-players, a chess-player willfully moves back a figure to win—what then ? Are these not to be judged as morally bad ? The reply is that—these are not 'Plays' at all, but some other kinds of purposive activities. Plays are spontaneous and natural ; and, what is spontaneous and natural cannot be immoral ; what is purposive can only be so Thus, though voluntary, a 'Play' is, at the same time, non-purposive, spontaneous, natural and amoral. Is that too, something unique and wonderful ?

Play from the Metaphysical Standpoint

Finally, metaphysically; a 'Play' is not a 'fact', yet a 'reality'. Why not a fact ? This has been explained just above (P. 81, 158). It is not a 'fact' because it has no connection with actual facts, but creates a dream world, a sweet fantasy, a lovely imagery of its own. Still, it is a 'reality', and not false or a non-entity, as this make-belief, this imitation, this imagination, constitutes its very nature, very essence, very existence—otherwise what is 'Play ? ' In this way, when a boy plays a soldier, and a girl a mother, then the plays, as expressions of their joy, are very "real", although these do not represent "facts". In this way a "Play" is not a "fact", yet a "reality".

Is that not finally, something unique and wonderful ?

Thus, a 'Play' has rather a narrow of scope, which fact is not ordinarily realised. That is why, many acts which are not really 'Plays', pass off as such, giving rise to a grave misunderstanding as to the real nature of 'Plays'. So the play by a professional is not a play, aiming, he does at money ; the play by an amateur is, also, equally not a play, aiming as he does, at name and fame. In this way, the slightest trace of a desire of any kind destroys the very essence of a 'Play.'

(B) The Nature of Divine Play

It goes without saying that Human Play can, by no means, represent Divine Play at all from any point of view whatsoever, as in other cases. Yet, as shown above (P 84ff), Anthropomorphism is the only way through which we can at all come to know of God. Of course, it is true that worldly categories, like Substance, Attribute, Space, Time, Cause, Power,

Design, and the like, are wholly inadequate to describe God fully to us. Yet, before we reach the state of 'Upalabdhi', the state of Speechless Realisation—such categories are necessary for both instruction, on the part of the Teacher, and understanding, on that of the Students.

So, let us proceed fearlessly in our attempts to probe into the secrets of the Supra-mundane Reality through the Muandane. What better proof, here, can be for Inner Teleology ?

1. Can a Tranquil God Play ?

Now, Divine Play embodies the above exhilarating features of a 'Play' million-fold. Thus, as a Loving and Blissfull-God, He loves His own Self and plays with the same (Pp. 50, 53).

But, after all, what a strange, unintelligible, unimaginable concept is this ! Why should He, thus, love Himself ? Why should He, then, frolic with Himself ? Why cannot He keep still, why cannot He keep tranquil or calm ? Is He not 'Śāntam' ? (Muṇḍūkya Up 7) (P. 27). So, why should He play, like a child, with Himself ?

2. Tranquillity Makes for Playfulness

However, is this Concept of Divine Līlā really so very absurd as to be altogether beyond comprehension ? Why should it be that ? From our human standpoint only, is 'Play' regarded as something rather childish, something that is indulged in by children only, and very seldom by adults. The reason is that 'Play' being an expression of joy, being wholly without any reference to any desire or any end of any kind whatsoever, being essentially a kind of make-belief—cannot, naturally, be indulged in much by grown-up persons, devoid of joy, always running after selfish ends, and in a constant contact with the stark realities of life, hard like a stone itself.

But the God of Religion is essentially suited for 'Play'. For, what is our conception of such a God ? Our conception, imperfect and incomplete as it is, is, yet an exhilarating conception of a Sweet, Innocent, Pure, Joyful, Playful Child-like God—saturated with Sweetness, shining with Innocence, sparkling with Purity, bubbling with Joy, filled with Frolic. All these, by no means, disturb His tranquillity or calmness a bit—for, all these constitute His very nature or essence, just as calmness itself does As a matter of fact, as already, stated (P. 27), He is Śānta or Calm or 'Tranquil', because He has no inner conflicts and contradictions, no efforts or attempts to make, no desires to fulfill and ends to attain—and, really, such a Being alone is Sweet, because He has nothing to irritate or embitter Him ; Innocent, because He has nothing to make Him grow or age ; Pure, because He has nothing to sully or contaminate Him ; Joyful, because, He has nothing to make Him grieve or be grave; and,

finally, Playful, because He has nothiug to obstruct or obliterate is Eternal Essence, Existence, Expression.

In this way, Brahman's 'Playfulness' marks the climax, the maximum completeness and consummation of His whole Nature. The main sides of His Natnre, viz. Snpreme Might and Majesty, as well as His Infinite Softness and Sweetness (Pp. 19,20) combine togethar to make Him a Playful and a Blissful Being.

3. "Blissfulness" Sums up all other Characteristics of Brahman

As a matter of fact, if we have to choose or fix upon only one characteristic of Brahman, amongst His numerous ones (P. 17), which will enable us to have an inkling into His real, fundamental Nature—there is one and only one such fit one from all points of view, according to all Schools of the Vedānta viz. "Ānandā" or "Bliss." This single characteristic sums up within itself, in a wonderful enchanting manner, all other possible, all other plausible, all other imaginable characteristics of the Monotheistic God, of the God of Religion.

Hence it has been taken by the Vedāntists to be the very core of His Being, the very Essence of His Existence, the very Prop of His Nature (P. 22 .

For, what does it not imply ? It implies all—all His Glory and all His Love, all His Strictness and all His Mercifulness—in fact, all His Perfection, full and complete. Really, full 'Ānanda or 'Bliss' necessarily implies full 'Purṇatā or 'Perfection', as, evidently, if there be any imperfection, any incompleteness, any impurity, any incongruity in Him, He cannot have a full 'Bliss' in Him, and be full 'Bliss' in essence. That is why, 'Ānanda' or 'Bliss' inevitably stands for full 'Perfection of Being' ; and full 'Perfection of Being' inevitably stands for a full combination of all other characteristics of Brahman.

In this way, 'Ānanda' or 'Biiss', as stated above, is the one characteristic—and the only one—that can by itself represent fully the infinite other full characteristics of Brahman.

4. "All-Perfection" cannot do so Fully

But why not the characteristic of "All-Perfection ? Does it not, too, as pointed out just above, imply all other possible, full characteristics of Brahman ? So, how can it be said that the characteristic of 'Ānanda' or 'Bliss' alone is fit to stand for other possible, full characteristics of Brahman ?

The reply is that, theoretically, of course, the characteristic of 'All-Perfection, can, and does, include in it all other possible, full and perfect characteristics of Brahman. Yet, it cannot take the place of the characteristic of 'Ānanda', for the simple reason, that it practically or actually is neither so rich in content, nor so sweet in sound as the term 'Ānanda' It has been said above that all words,

Scriptural or non-Scriptural, denote Brahman (P. 101). It has also been said that synonyms are meant, for indicating the different aspects of the same thing (P. 117). So, here also, we have many, names for Brahman for indicating some of His numerous aspects.

Now, of these, the term "Perfection" is, indeed, very wide in Connotation, implying as it does, perfection of all other characteristics : attributes and powers. Still, it cannot be denied that it is rather abstract and colourless in real implication, indicating nothing in particular from the cognitive, emotional or conative standpoints.

But as contrasted with this, the term 'Ānanda' is concrete, colourful, warm and full from every standpoint. From the cognitive standpoint, it implies full perfection of Knowledge and Realisation, or Omniscience,—for, ignorance is a great cause of pains and sorrows ; from the conative standpoint, full perfection of Desire and Effort, or Ever-satisfaction,—for, unsatisfied desires and unrewarded efforts, too, are great causes of pains and sorrows. And, at the centre, as the core, it implies 'Bliss,' full perfection of Emotion, as the result of the above two. In this way, indeed, does the characteristic of 'Ānanda' or 'Bliss' eternally stand for the real nature of Brahman, in all His aspects, fully and wholly.

5. Ananda and Lila

'Ānanda and Līlā' are the same. For, Līlā is the expression of 'Ānanda', as stated above (P. 76,81,152,154), and in this case, the expression and the thing expressed are one and the same, as the expression is the expression of Nature, and not an isolated activity, as in ordinary cases.

6. Lila as Expression of Ananda

Here, too, the term 'expression' is used in two different senses. E G. we say, 'Ram expresses his joy by singing', Here, 'Joy' is a passing emotion of Ram, and is not taken to be his very nature, So, here 'singing' is also taken to be not the expression of the nature of Ram, but only an isolated activity, manifesting it. But suppose we say : 'The sun expresses its light.' Here 'light' constitutes the very nature of the sun, and so, naturally, the expression' 'light' and the object expressed, 'the sun' are one and the same,

The same is the case here wih, 'Ānanda' or 'Bliss,' as 'Ānanda,' as explained above, constitutes the very nature or essence of Brahman, (Pp. 21, 161). Hence here 'Līlā' or 'Play,' being an expression of 'Ānanda,' is the same as the 'Ānanda-Svarūpa' Brahman, or Brahman who is Bliss in Essence.

So, what is strange here if Brahman engages Himself in 'Līla.' ? In fact, as 'Ānanda-Svarūpa-Brahman' is also 'Līlā-svarūpa-Brahman,' Līlā is as natural to Brahman, as light to the sun. So there is nothing strange if He plays. On the contrary, it would have been very strange

if He did not do so—just as, there is nothing strange if the sun emits light ; on the contrary, it would have have very strange, if it did not do so.

And this Līlā does not, by any means, disturb His nature or tranquillity. It involves no excitement, no effort, on His part, as it is His very Nature itself. As the emission of light does not, in any way, involve any disturbance to the sum itself, on the contrary, makes it what it is—so is the case here.

(C) Can God play with Himself. ?

Finally, the question of playing with Himself is not at all anything strange or absurd. Do only children play with themselves ? Do not saints and sages, poets and scholars do just the same ? Of course, instead of playing with their own limbs, or toes, or fingers and the like, as done by children in their innocence, they, in their supreme innocence of non-attachment and non-selfishness, play with their own selves—with their own thoughts and sentiments. For, are they not, essentially, dreamers of dreams and seers of visions ? Thus, they are not interested in external objects and their values. Their own thoughts and sentiments, their own dreams and visions are all that they possess, all that they love, all that they regale in, all that they play with.

In the same manner, are they not also controllers of their own selves and developers of their own souls ? Thus, they control their selves and develop their souls, not like outsiders in a strict, stringent manner, but like insiders in a manner at once loving and joyful. And, this is nothing but 'Play', provided it is strictly neutral and unselfish in nature, not even aiming at Salvation or Beatitude.

In this way, this 'Play', indeed, is a 'childlike', but, by no means, a 'childish' activity. For, as shown above, even hoary-headed, venerable saints and scholars indulge into it unashmedly.

And, Brahman, too, is, undoubtedly 'childlike', but never 'childish'. Being Omnipresent, He has no one or nothing outside Him to play with. Further, as Play' is His very nature, He is always playing within Himself, with Himself. So, this kind of Internal Play or Self-Play, constituting, as it does, the very nature, essence and core of Brahman, is nothing absurd or impossible.

In fact, 'Svagata-Bhedavāda and Līlā-Vāda' the Doctrine that Brahman possesses internal 'Bhedas' or, differences, and the Doctrine that He eternally plays with Himself—are complementary ones. For, then, we have to admit automatically that His very Nature being play in essence, He plays with Himself, or His 'Svagata-Bhedas.'

Just look around—and you will see as to how this is happening every day, everywhere in Nature. The vast corn-field is playing with itself in tossing bunches of corn ; the large river is playing with itself in

dancing ripples; the stately tree is playing with itself in swinging branches and leaves. Thus, who does not play in this world ?

And, so does the Life and the Breath of the world, Brahman, the most Superb Player, play with Himself in a most superb manner, making the whole Universe a superb embodiment of Play, Joy and Love.

Of course, as pointed out above (P. 156), Play is essentially dual in nature, as it requires at least two. But these two need not be external to each other, as shown just above ; but may, very well, be one and the same, or, internally dual.

(D) Two Kinds of Divine Play.

It has been said above (P 52) that Brahman plays with Himself in two ways--He plays with His Para-Śakti Umā ; again, He plays with the Jīvas, His 'Svagata-Bhedas'.

1. Distinction between Uma and Jīvas.

The distinction between Umā and Jivās, is that, though all of them constitute the 'Svagata-Bhedas' or 'Internal Difference (P. 37), yet Umā alone is identical with Brahman, not the Jīvās.

2. How can Uma be both identical with and different from Brahman.

The question as to how Umā can, at the same time, be different from Brahman, yet identical with Him, need not be asked here. (Pp. 45, 49). For, it is the Paradox of all Concrete Unities, Organic Wholes or Substances having Attritutes and Powers

3. Relation between Substance and Attributes.

The question here is as to what exactly is the relation between Substance, on the one hand ; and its Attiributes and Powers, on the other. This has already been discussed above (P. 143).

4. The "Moreness" of the Substance

But the point to note here is that a Concrete Unity or an Organic Whole is not a mere sum-total of its parts ; a Substance is not a mere sum-total of its attributes and powers. – but something more—an inexplicable 'More,' may be, yet an undeniable 'More'.

Or, rather, why inexplicable, as, it is the Law of Life itself, Existence itself, Nature itself ?

5. Worldly Examples

A tree for example, is not a mere sum-total of its internal parts or 'Svagata-Bhedas', like roots, branches, leaves, flowers and fruits, but undeniably something much more. A river is not a

mere sum-total of its internal parts, or, Svagata-Bhedas, like ripples and eddies, but undeniably something much more. A mountain is not a mere sum-total of its internal parts, or Svagata-Bhedas, like stones and grains of dust, but undeniably something much more. A body is not a mere sum-total of its internal parts, or 'Svagata-Bhedas, like limbs and ligaments, but undeniably something much more. A mind is not a mere sum-total of its internal parts, or 'Svagata-Bhedas', like thoughts, sentiments and desires, but undeniably something much more.

In this way, examples may be multiplied to show that a Substance, a total Whole has a peculiar existence of its own that is above all its parts —it is fully immanent in all its parts—or attributes and powers—yet fully transcendent over the same.

It is in this 'Moreness' that lies the Individuality (P. 43) or the 'Substantiality' of the Substance concerned.

6. A Whole and an Aggregate.

Herein, in fact, lies the main distinction between a 'Whole' and an 'Aggregate'. An Aggregate is merely a sum-total of its so-called 'parts'. E. g. a bundle of pencils tied by means of an external piece of string. Here, the 'bundle' is nothing more than a sum-total of a number of pencils ; and the pencils have no real, inner connection with one another, or, with the so-called 'whole' viz. the bundle. In fact, in the case of an 'Aggregate', the terms 'whole' and 'part' are wholly inappropriate. Rather, the terms 'Aggregate' and 'Items' are more suitable.

7. Distinction between Substance and Para-Sakti.

Now, this 'Moreness' or 'Substantiality', in which the 'thinghood' of the substance lies, may be called the 'Para-Śakti' of that Substance itself, to distinguish the former from the latter, from other ordinary isolated Śaktis and Guṇas, Attributes and Powers of Brahman.

This Para-Śakti is the concrete embodiment of all the Guṇa-Śaktis of the Substance, of course, also transcending the same infinitely. Now, such a 'Para-Śakti' is identical with the Substance, as the Substance, too, is the sum-total of its Attributes and Powers, yet something more infinitely. Still, a distinction has to be drawn here between a 'Substance' and its 'Para-Śakti, or Supreme Powers, as the former is more or less abstract, the latter, wholly concrete.

8. The Abstract and the Concrete

Thus, a Substance and its Para-Śakti are identical in so far as both consist of all the other 'Svagata-Bhedas' or Attributes and Powers, yet are 'More' than the same. But a Substance and its Para-Śakti are taken to be different, in so far as the Substance is abstract, the Para-Śakti, concrete—as implied by the very term 'Sakti', retained here purposely.

In fact, every concrete thing can be lookedat from two standpoints—from the standpoint of its bare or mere existence, from the standpoint of its concrete expression in attributes and powers.

A tree e. g. may be thought of simply as a 'tree', without any explicit reference to its internal parts, like, roots, branches, leaves, flowers and fruits—or, as a sum-total and more, i.e., a whole, of these internal parts, like roots, branches, leaves, flowers and fruits.

But can an Organic Whole be ever conceived of without its parts ? And, what is the necessity of such an abstract and artificial conception?

The reply is that, abstract and concrete ways of thinking, implicit and explicit conceptions, are well-known and possible.

And, the necessity lies in this that it clearly brings to light the great necessity and utility of Śakti in a Monotheistic System. How an abstract God is realised to be a Concrete One through His Śaktis—this is the main theme of such a Monotheistic System, Hence, to show that God is a Concrete God, not because of any thing else, but solely and simply because of His Śaktis —such a distinction has to be made, and is necessary, between God and His Para-Śakti. That is why, the Concept of 'Para-Śakti is the Central Concept of Monotheistic Systems of Thought.

9. Brahman and Uma

For the very same reason, Umā, the Para-Śakti or Supreme Power of Brahman or Śiva has been, in Monotheistic Systems, endowed with all paradoxical qualities, as mentioned above and declared to be a 'Māyā' or something seemingly inexplicable (Pp. 51,52) though not really so in the end, as shown above.

However, to resume the discussion started, the Līlā or Play of Brahman may be with His Para-Śakti Umā, or with his Jīvas or Individval Śaktis.

(E) Brahman's Play with His Para-Sakti

As stated above (P. 46), the Para-Śakti, as identical with Brahman, consists of both Cit and Acit-Śaktis and is both the Material and Instrumental Causes of the Universe of Souls and Matter. This is, of course, only from the point of view of the universe as known to us. But Brahman really possesses an infinite number of attributes and powers, beyond ordinary human comprehension (P 17), and, Umā as His very Self, as identical with Him, as making all His attributes and powers possible for Him, must consist of all these infinite attributes and powers, and still go beyond the same.

In this way, when Brahman plays with Umā, surely, an infinite number of infinitely blissful and beautiful universes, infintely beyond human comprehension must be there, of which, our own universe of Souls and Matter is just a tiny bit. So this Para-Śakti or Cidambara or Umā has been very appropriately described as an ocean where numerous universes appear and disappear, like mere bubbles. (P. 45).

"निखिल-जगदण्ड षण्ड-बुद्बुद्-निकुरम्ब-जलधि-स्थानीया परम-प्रकृतिरूपा परम-शक्तिर्हि चिदम्बरमुच्यते।" (१-१-२)

The Parama-Śakti, of the form of Parama-Prakṛti, is like an Ocean where arise numerous bubbles of numerous worlds.

(F) The Concept of Organic Play

1. What is Organic Play ?

Now, when a tiny bubble of our present universe arises, so to speak (Pp. 51, 80 ff), out of this Cosmic Play of Brahman with Umā, the Cit or the individual souls. as well as the Acit or the material world, are manifested, so to speak (Pp. 51, 80ff). So playing with Umā means simultaneously playing with the Svagata-Bhedas of Brahman, like Cit and the Acit, and so also of Umā, identical with Him.

In this way, Brahman's Play with Himself or Umā is a rich, warm, sweet, concrete kind of Play, consisting of numerous Plays with numerous Jīvas individually. Thus, the Divine, Cosmic Play is itself an Organic Unity, a Concrete Whole, having numerous plays each organically connected with, yet each different from, all the rest.

In fact, such a conception of "Organic Play" is essential to Monotheistic Vedānta. For, according to Monotheistic Vedānta, here, Brahman plays with His own Self, or Umā. Now, His own Self or Umā is a Concrete Reality, not an Abstract One, as repeatedly pointed out above (P. 37). A Concrete Reality means a Reality of mutually different 'individuals' (P. 43), each 'individual, being, definitely, a fully separate reality, though wholly dependent on Brahman, as natural.

Hence, if there be a Play with such a Concrete Reality, it cannot be an abstract play or only one play ; but it must, of necessity be a concrete play, or, a combination of a multitude of plays referring to the multitude of the 'parts'—the term is used for want of a better one (P. 139, 140, 143ff). —constituting it. That is why, Brahman's Play with His own entire Self or Umā means also His plays with all His 'Svagata-Bhedas', at the same time, and also something more P. (165).

2. Wordly Examples of Organic Play

Thus, what an absolutely enchanting picture is this !

Just try to imagine it, only a tiny bit ! Just glance around to see examples of it, only a tiny bit !

Thus, if you just touch a well-tuned harp, all the various strings will vibrate and sing forth, in harmony. If you just press a single, well-organised switch, all the variegated lights will blaze up in numerous colours. If you just shake a sprightly tree, all its branches, leaves, flowers and fruits will move gaily in rhythm in unison. If the wind touches the surface of the river, millions of ripples will dance and clap together in joy. If a gust passess over a field, hundreds of corn-bunches will toss and bow their heads together, in awe.

3. "One-Many" and "Many-One" Play

Thus, everywhere, you will see the same enchanting picture—how through 'One' alone, 'All' also are stimulated,

This is a Law of Nature and a Law of Life; this is a Law of Love and a Law of Joy. In this way, Nature is one in many—as in this vast world, natural characteristics are present in all physical objects; Life is many in one—as in the same person, vitality is manifested in manifold ways; Love is one, yet universal—as it always transcends itself; Joy is one, yet catching—as it always overflows itself.

Similarly, although analogies are imperfect (P. 136), yet through these we can at least get an inkling into the Process of Divine Play of Śiva-Umā.

Thus, this is, at the same time, a 'One-Many', and a 'Many-One' Play.

It is 'One-Many', because though it is a Play with One Para-Śakti, Para-Prakṛti Umā, yet at the same time, it is also a Play with many Svagata-Bhedas or Guṇa-Śaktis of Brahman.

Again, it is 'Many-One', because though it is a Play with many Śvagata-Bhedas or Guṇa-Śaktis of Brahman, yet, finally it is, over and above, also a Play with One Para-Śakti, Para-Prakṛti Umā, who as pointed out above (P. 165), is not a mere sum-total of all the Svagata-Bhedas or Guṇa-Śaktis alone, but something over and above.

In a similar manner, this Divine Śiva-Umā Play is, a manifold Play, no doubt, yet, after all, it is One, Unique Play of Brahman Himself with Himself.

4. Organic Play—Most Wonderful of all

What a Wonderful Play is this !

All the varieties, all the beauties, all the colours, all the music, all the fragrances, all the sweetness, all the softness of myriads of worlds are there in their fullest glories and grandeur Yet the total Play infinitely transcends all these So, One is One always, from whatever standpoint is the matter looked at

(G) Brahman's Play with Jivas

As we have seen above, Brahman's Play with His Para-Śakti Umā means, at the same, His play with all His 'Svagata-Bhedas' or 'Guṇa-Śaktis'. The 'Cit' or Jīvas, or the individual souls, as found in the present universe, are just a few, amongst the above.

1. Brahman's Plays with Jivas—Mutually Different

As each Jīva is a separate 'individual', not reducible to any one or anything else (P. 43), Brahman's play with each Jīva also is individually different from His play with every other—each is an absolutely new, unique, unparalleled kind of Play.

Thus, Brahman's Plays with the Jīvas are, at once, orderly in nature, and various in kinds. It is orderly, because Brahman cannot play with the Jīvas arbitrarily or just as He likes; but has to take into account the distinct individualities of the Jīvas, in a systematic way. Again, as already stated, the Jīvas being different. Brahman's Plays with them are also so, so that the Plays are variegated in nature.

2. Order and Varieties of the Same

These Order and Variety, springing inevitably from the irreducible individualities of the Jīvas themselves, make room for Karma-Vāda and reconcile it with Līlā-Vāda. All these will be discussed later on (See the Section on: 'Concluding Remarks'. Līlā-Vāda and Karma-Vāda; included under the Section on "The Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda").

3. How can a Whole Play with its Parts?

But here let us pause only just a minute to consider as to how a whole can ever play with its parts Can we ever conceive that a vast ocean is playing with a single wave; a huge tree is playing with a tiny leaf; a wide meadow is playing with a humble blade of grass?

But do we not see here that even a single wave reflects the vigour of the vast ocean; even a tiny leaf emits forth the beauty of the huge tree; even a humble blade of grass embodies the softness of the wide meadow? If a part can, thus, mirror the life of the whole, then that is nothing but the whole playing with and in that part.

4. Real Meaning of 'Play'

Specially, in the case of an Organic Whole, each and every part, big or small, is essentially connected with the whole; and the whole, in its turn, with each and every part. And 'Play' simply stands for this inner, intimate, indissoluble relation between the whole, on the one hands, and the parts, on the other.

The greatest and the best play, in fact, is such a play of the 'Essence' of one in the very 'Existence' of the other in an absolutely natural and spontaneous manner, just like the flow of the vital-juice from the root to every part of a tree. If this vital relation, this natural relation, this spontaneous relation, be not one of 'Play', then what is ?

So, it has to be admitted that the term 'Play' or 'Līlā' is very appropriate in indicating that relation between an Organic Whole and its parts. The essential characteristics of 'Līlā', as we have seen, are non-purposiveness, spontaniety, naturalness, easiness, blissfulness etc. (P, 155-156 . And the relation between an organic whole and its parts, do manifest all these characteristics prominently.

Thus, it is not a purposive kind of relation. When the pencils are tied up together by means of an external piece of string, to form a bundle that is due to a purpose, for the bundle was not there in the beginning, but is, later on brought into existence artificially for the sake of some end. So, such a 'bundle' can be neither natural, nor spontaneous, nor easy, nor blissful, being due to some efforts on the part of some external agency.

But an Organic Whole is there from the beginning, being, thus, natural, spontaneous, easy, and blissful.—with no external efforts and strain, no inner disharmony or disturbance—and hence, blissful or calm. Also, the Organic Whole itself may serve a purpose, a very good purpose ; but the relation between itself and its parts, cannot be purposive at all, as it is due to the very nature of that Organic Whole'.

Thus, there is nothing absurd that the Whole should 'Play' with each of its parts

5. Everything is 'Play', yet 'Real'

In the case under hand, the Whole, viz. Brahman, is 'Līlā' by nature. So, His whole Self is playing eternally and so, His every internal 'part'—we use the term for want of a better one (P. 39, 140, 143, 167)—is playing eternally, at the same time.

In this way, everything is a Play - God is a Play, the World is a Play ; yet every thing is real, very real—God is real, very real ; the world is real, very real.

Such a sublime, yet sweet, Doctrine of Creation is, indeed, un-paralleled in the History of Human Thought. For, to show that the Creator God is a real Creator, yet this involves no imperfection on the part of the Creator ; that the created world is a real world, yet this involves no transformation or change on the part of the Creator; that Creation is a real act, yet this involves no purpose and effort on the part of the Creator—is surely, not, a natter of joke. But the Vedāntists have, indeed, been able

to make this a matter of joke and joy by their joyous and frolicsome Doctrine of 'Lila' or Divine Play.

(H) The Concepts of Ananda, Lila and Maya : Mahamaya.

Some references have already been made to, the Concepts of Prema, Māyā and Lilā above (P 50, 53), Now, before we conclnde this Section on Lilāvāda or Doctrine of 'Play', let us reflect on it, once more, to probe into its innermost core or meaning.

1. Mahamaya : The Universal Mother

A very common name for the Para-Śakti or Supreme Power of Brahman is Mahāmāyā. Of course, this is specially, a Saiva name, being a synonym for Dūrga or Umā Still, it is a common, generic name, accepted by all the Monotheistic Systems to indicate the Paramā Janinī, or the Supreme Mother, who, as the Para-Śakti of Brahman and as such identical with Him, is taken to be the Cause of the Universe of Souls and Matter.

The question here, is ; Why should the Mother of the world, the Procreatress of universe, be called 'Mahāmāyā or one who possesses 'Great Māyā ?

2. What is Maya ?

Now, what exactly do we mean by the term 'Māyā', in this connection ?

As well known, the Concept of Māyā is a fundamental Concept of the Advaita-Vedānta Doctrine. And, so, in the Advaita Vedānta, we meet with many definitions and explanations of the term "Māyā". Now, leaving all these technicalities and formalities aside, we may safely say that from the ordinary standpoint, Māyā is a kind of Guṇa or Śakti, attribute or power that deludes all and makes them take a false thing to be real, and a real thisng to be false,

For example, an expert magician, through his magical powers, seems to produce a person walking in the sky, by means of certain materials, like ropes. bamboo poles etc. Here, it appears as if the person is a real one and that he is really walking in the sky. But as the magician himself knows very well, as those clever persons in the audience also know very well, that there is no real person here at all, and so no one is walking in the sky at all It is only a kind of 'magic' that by nature, makes non-existent things appear as existent for the time being.

If we accept this ordinary meaning of the term 'Māyā', the question naturally arises as to why should the Mother of the Universe : Mahāmāyā, who is Truth in Essence, resort to this kind of 'Māyā', or magical devices, to delude all ?

3. Māya necessary from two standpoints.

The reply is that, this is absolutely necessary both from the cosmological and ethical standpoints.

4. Necessity from the Cosmological Standpoint.

From the Cosmological Standpoint, as we have seen repeatedly above (Pp. 52–53, 80 ff, 151 ff), the only possible explanation of Creation is 'Līlāvāda'. The Universal Mother is 'Ānanda-Svarūpa' or 'Bliss in Essence'. Bliss, by nature, is self-manifesting ; and, so, by nature, expresses itself in 'Līlā' or 'Play'. 'Līla', again requires at least two, there can be no play alone, although these 'two' may be external or internal (P. 156)

Through such a 'Līlā' or 'Play', the player sees his own bliss, light, beauty, sweetness and glory reflected in his companion for play ; and these five attributes are reflected back, again, in him, fifty-fold, from his play-companion. Through this kind of give-and-take, reflection-and-counter-reflection, this already full Ānanda or Joy, appears to be fuller, deeper, sweeter.

In exactly the same manner, as pointed out above, 'Parama-Līlā-Mayī Jagajjananī, 'the Blissful, Playful, Universal Mother, making Herself apparently dual, is eternally playing with Herself. So, Creation is only Mahāmāya's Līlā or Play.

5. Nature of Mahamaya's Lila.

Now what is the nature of this Play of the Universal Mother ?

Such a 'Play' has two sides : separation and re-union, disappearance and re-appearance, non-manifestation, and re-manifestation, If both be identical with each other, then how can there be any sweet play between the two ? The very sweetness of a play essentially lies in this :—from one side,—the player jokingly hides himself at first, and then, lovingly lets his companion seek him out and catch him. The very sweetness of a play essentially lies in this : - from another side—the companion of the player seeks her beloved frantically, at first ; and then, gratefully gets him. This is the real essence of 'Līlā' or a Play on the part of the Universal Mother-Herself.

6. Lila involves Maya

For this reason,—'Līlā essentially involves 'Māyā'. For, through the help of such a 'Māyā', as if, this Frolicsome Universal Mother hides Herself away from Her Companions:—the Jīvas; as if, appears to be something else, viz the world. But this is only a 'Māyā', on Her part, not a real something. For, She is not really leaving Her Play-Companions ; not really becoming something else, viz. the world. Her Play-Companions, too, caught in this net of Māyā, seem to lose Her for the time being ; and then, tearing off this net of Māyā, seem to get Her, again.

Such, indeed, is the Eternal Play—hiding and manifesting, losing and getting.

Just glance at Nature Herself—is She, too, not constantly playing the same sweet game ?

Look, the sun hides itself, off and on, under the cover of the clouds ; again emits its golden beams on the surface of the earth, the next moment. Look, the waves recede away from the shore, every minute ; again, jump back on it, the next moment. Look, the honey-loving bees fly away from the full-blown flowers, now and then ; again come back, humming, with renewed vigour, the next moment. Thus, if you just glance around, you will see the same sweet, loving, joyful play everywhere, every moment in the universe.

7. Necessity of Play from the Ethical Standpoint.

In the same manner, the Divine Play-Ground of Mahāmāyā, the Para-Śakti, the Para-Prakṛti is this physical world, is this human heart. Filled with Her own infinite Bliss, She playfully, jokingly, joyfully, hides Herself, as it were, in every smallest part and particle of the world, in every smallest petal and pollen of the heart-lotus.

Such is Her great and unfathomable 'Māyā' ; and, that is why, She is 'Mahāmāyā'. Because of the deluding power of Her 'Māyā', the Jagat appears to be what it is not,—appears to be non-sentient and impure ; the Jīva appears to be what it is not—appears to be small and subject to sins and sorrows. Such an appearance, such an apprehension, is, in fact, 'Māyā'—the appearance, the apprehension of the real as false, and the false as real.

But this, too, is the Mahālīlā of Mahāmāya—the Great Play of the Universal Mother. For, if She be, not thus, away and hidden from the Jīvas, then, how can any Sādhanā or Spiritual Striving be ever possible on their part ?

Thus, from the spiritual or ethical standpoint, the Jīvas have to tear off the cloak of Māyā, and seek Her out here, in the so-called non-sentient and impure world ; in the so called small and sinful-sorrowful Jīvas. Thus, they have to see that the world is not world, as such, but Brahman Himself ; that the Jīva is not Jīva, as such, but Brahman Himself —"All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. Up 3, 4, 1), "I am Brahman" (Brh. Up. 3.4.10.)

Such a Seeking alone is 'Sādhanā' or Spiritual Striving ; such a Seeing alone, is 'Siddhi' oa Salvation. It is only, because of the 'Mahatī Māyā' or Great Māyā of 'Mahamaya' that this kind of 'Sadhana-Siddhi', or in one word, Spiritual Life, is possible on the part of the Jīvas. For, what is eternally there, needs no Sādhanā ; what is eternally not there, makes Sādhanā futile, as it were. But what is eternally there, yet

temporarily not there, needs intense Sādhanā. That is why, for making a life of constant Sādhāna possible on the part of the Jīvas, the Universal Mother, through Her inscrutable Māyā, seems to veil Herself up from the Jīvas in this way, joyfully, playfully.

8. Intrinsic Connection between Ananda, Lila and Maya : Three Aspects of the Universal Mother.

Hence, the Ānanda or Bliss of the Mother is expressed inevitably in Līlā or Play ; and 'Līlā' or Play, again is expressed inevitably in Māyā or obliterating Power.

Thus, Ānanda, Līlā and Māyā are the three main aspects of Her wounderful, enchanting Nature.

In this way, first, when the Jīva-Jagat are one with Her, when She alone is there—that is Her 'Ānanda-rūpa' or Bliss-Aspect.

Secondly, when She playfully separates Jīva-Jagat, so to speak, from Her own Self, when both She and the Jīva-Jagat are there—that is Her 'Līlā-rūpa' or 'Play-Aspect'.

Thirdly, when She hides Herself, so to speak, inside Jīva-Jagat, when Jīva-Jagat alone are there—that is Her 'Māyā-rūpa' or 'Obliterating-Aspect'.

Of course, as pointed out above, all these processes of hiding and manifesting, losing and attaining etc. imply no changes on Her part, and are not real from the transcendental standpoint (Pp. 70ff)

9. Para-Sakti as the Creatress of the Universe.

Thus, although it has been said above (P. 56) that Brahman is the Creator, and the rest, of the Universe of Souls and Matter, yet in Monotheistic Systems, Para-Śakti is the real Creatress. That is why, She has been designated as the Material and Efficient Cause of the Universe. (P. 46). The fact is that, only a Concrete. Brahman can be the Creator, and this is nothing but Para Śakti (P 53). Hence, very rightly, the universe has been called a form of Umā Herself (P. 48).

This Conception of the Para-Śakti as the Direct Cause of the Universe is at once, a sublime and a soul-stirring one. Who would not say, at least an Indian, that the conception of a Mother is much more sublime and soul-stirring than that of a Father ! In fact, Mother is an Epitome of the sweetest essence of the Father. And, the scholar and the devotee alike naturally desire to see the world ultimately as, a sweet one, a joyous one, a lovely one. The aim of all their learned speculations and fervent prayers is the same—to be able to penetrate the hard crust of the earth and reach to the life-giving water beneath ; to remove the dark veil of mist and see the clear sky above ; to break through the dense forest and reach the 'Eldorado' in the middle. Now, when such a hard crust is

penetrated, such a dark veil is removed, such a dense forest is broken through, what do we expect to see there (P. 33) ? All the unalloyed glory and gaiety, all the sweetness and softness all the love and loveliness of Brahman, the Immanent One—and this is nothing but the Para-Śakti of Brahman.

What, after all, is the Beauty of a thing ? It is its Fulness, it is its Harmony, it is its Warmth. And, Para-Śakti stands for the 'Beauty' of Para-Brahman ; and the ultimate beautiful nature of the universe is due to this,--only to this.

(I) The Static and Dynamic Conceptions of Brahman.

A very int resting question may be raised here in connection with this Problem of Creation.

1. 'Staticism' and 'Dynamism' in Philosophy.

As mentioned above, there are two main Conceptions of God in Philosophy :—Static and Dymanic. According to the first, as we have seen (P. 71ff.), God is eternally Full, Complete, Pure, Perfect, Satisfied, and as such, an absolutely Unchangeable Being. So, it is rather difficult, as pointed out above, to explain Creation—which is an act and as such implies changes,—on the part of God (Pp. 60, 68 ff.)

But according to the Dynamic Conception of God, Change or Transformation is the very Nature or Essence of God ; and, as such God, is being naturally transformed into the form of the world. And, such a change or transformation does not, by any means, imply any imperfection or defect or want on the part of God. For example, a seed, containing the tree within it potentially, naturally changes and grows or is transformed into a tree in course of time.

Now, this change or transformation is, surely, not a sign of any defect or want on the part of the tree. On the contrary, if the seed is not changed or transformed into a tree, if it remains a mere seed just as it is now, then that would be the greatest defect on its part as a seed, and such a barren, useless seed will very soon become dry and disappear from the face of the earth. That is why, it is wrong to say, as ordinarily done by the protangonists of the Static View of the Deity, that all changes necessarily imply wants or defects. For, changes that are due to the very nature of the object do not, at all, imply the above,—but just the contrary,—as its real consummation or fulfilment lies only in such a change or transformation.

2. 'Dynamism' in Indian 'Staticism'

In Western Philosophy, we have got a celebrated example of this Dynamic view of Reality in the Absolute Idealism of Hegel. In Indian Philosophy, as pointed out above, we have the Static View of Reality.

(P. 71 ff.) So here, as pointed out above (Pp 52–53, 80 ff, 152 ff), Līlāvāda or Doctrine of Līlā is the only solution.

Still, the interesting point to note here is that even this Static View of God does, indeed, involve the Dynamic One, no less. For, this 'Līlā' or 'Play' on the part of the Divine Being, Brahman or Iśvara, is taken to be due to the very "Svabhāva" or Nature of Brahman or Iśvara Himself So, from this very term "Svabhāva" we come to know that Brahman cannot but, by nature, engage Himself in this Cosmic Sport and thereby produce the Universe of Souls and Matter.

3. View of Samkara

In Śaṃkāra-Bhāṣya, for example, we find a direct mention of the term "Svabhāva" or Nature. Compare the following :—

"यथा चोच्छ्वास-प्रश्वासादयोऽनभिसन्धाय बाह्यं किञ्चित् प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव भवन्ति, एवमीश्वरस्याप्यनपेक्ष्य किञ्चित् प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव केवलं लीलारूपा प्रवृत्ति र्भविष्यति। न हीश्वरस्य प्रयोजनान्तरं निरूप्यमाणं न्यायतः श्रुतितो वा सम्भवति। न च स्वभावः पर्यनुयोक्तुं शक्यते।" (२-१-३३)

That is, Iśvara or God acts without any need what-so-ever, but only by nature.

Here, a beautiful example is given, viz, of the act of breathing. The acts of inhaling and exhaling, in fact, are not due to any felt need and effort on the part of any one. It is not that here, we feel a need , then, desire to remove it ; then, think of and choose an object, taken by us to be capable of removing it ; then, think of and choose an object ; taken by us to be capable of leading to the attainment of that object and then, begin to act, or inhale and exhale. On the contrary, the whole process of breathing, or the whole act of inhaling-exhaling is absolutely natural on our part, absolutely sprightly and spontaneous.

Here, Śaṃkara uses the term "Svabhāva" thrice in his Commentary on the above celebrated Brahma-Sutra –

'लोकवत्तु-लीला-कैवल्यम्।" (२-१ ३३)

And, says definitely that one can never go against ones own nature at any time.

He, also, emphasises the fact that even 'Līlā' or 'Sports' may be of two kinds—viz. those that are due to – and those that are not due to ·

'किञ्चित् सूक्ष्मं प्रयोजनम्।'

That is, in the case of the first kind of 'Sports', there may be a question of some needs and also that of satisfying the same. For example, some sports may be due to our desire for pleasure and aim at this end of attaining pleasure, or giving pleasure to others. But in the

case of the second kind of 'Sports', not a trace of any desire of any kind, implying some wants or defects remains. The reason for this is that such Sports are due to "Svabhāva" and not "Abhāva"—to "Nature", and not to "Need.'

This clearly shows as to how the Problem of Creation has been tackled seriously even by the Monistic Schools of the Vedānta which do not take the universe and its creation to be real at all. So, from the empirical point of view, the Advaita-Vedānta School does supply a plausible solution of this difficult question of Creation.

4 View of Bhaskara

In Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya (2. 1. 33) Bhāskara of the "Aupādhika-Bhedābheda-Vāda" School of the Vedānta, also repeats Śamkara's contention, thus :—

"न च स्वभावः पर्यनुयोक्तुं शक्यते।" (२-१-३३)

"One cannot go against one's own nature at any time"

In this way, according to Bhāskara, as well, Creation is nothing but a Sport on the part of God, due to his very nature.

View of Bhamati

Vācaspati Miśra, in his celebrated Sub commentary "Bhāmatī" on Śamkara's Commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, mentions three alternative causes of creation, viz Icchā, Svabhāva or Līlā.—

"तस्मादुपपन्नं यदृच्छया, स्वभावाद्वा, लीलया वा जगत्सर्जनं भगवतो महेश्वरस्येति।" (२-१-३३)

"So, it stands to reason, that the Lord creates the universe just as He likes, or by nature, or in sport.

Thus, here, the first alternative means that God, being an eternally Omnipotent Being, can do just as He likes or desires. The act of Creation is, similarly, due to His spontaneous wish without any need at all on His part.

The second alternative means that He creates due to His very Nature.

The third alternatives means that He creates in sport.

So, all the three alternatives unanimously imply one thing, viz. that there is no question of any need here, on the part of God.

So, why have the three alternatives mentioned separately ? This, we think, is simply due to the desire of the famous author to bring to light the profound fact that from whichever aspect of God does the Creation of the universe arise—the central fact remains that it does not imply any want or defect on His part.

Thus, here "Iccha" or Desire implies His conative aspect; "Svabhāva" or Nature, His cognitive aspect; "Līlā" or Sport, His emotive aspect.

In the Commentaries of Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Śrīkaṇṭha, however, there is no actual mention of the term 'Svabhāva" or Nature and no direct reference to two kinds of 'Līlā', as shown above. But it is clear that they, too, really meant that God's Act of Creation flows from His very "Svabhāva" or "Svarūpa"—Nature or Essence.

Lilavada: Reconcilation of Static and Dynamic Conceptions

Now, how are we to characterise this beautiful Vedānta Doctrine of 'Līlā'—this 'Līlāvāda', made so much of in the later Schools of the Vaiṣṇava-Vedānta ?

Is it a Doctrine of Static Reality, or a Doctrine of Dynamic Reality ?

Really speaking, these terms themselves are rather ambiguous and do not bear the very same shades of meaning in Eastern and Western Systems of Philosophy.

For example, the Vedāntic Brahman is ordinarily characterised as 'Static', as shown above (P. 70, 77, 147, 149), because it is not necessary for Him to create the Universe for His own perfection, and the act of Creation is totally unnecessary on His part. But the Hegelian Absolute is ordinarily characterised as 'Dynamic', as it is absolutely necessary for Him to create the universe.

Still, as pointed out above, if the Vedāntic Brahman acts, not due to any necessity, yet due to His Nature as a Loving, Sporting Being—is that not a kind of Dynamism ? Again, if the Hegelian Absolute acts out of the necessity of Its Nature, yet is Full and Perfect from all eternity, is that not a kind of Staticism ?

Necessity of Nature and Necessity of Wants

In fact, it is the 'Necessity of Nature' and not the 'Necessity of Wants' that is the crux of the whole thing here; (See P.152) and this alone supplies the connecting-link and affords the meeting-ground of the Static and Dynamic Conceptions of Reality. For, so far as God or the Absolute does not grow, does not need anything, does not act for attaining any end —He is Static. (Pp. 70ff, 77, 147, 149). Again, so far as God or the Absolute is essentially transformed into the universe, creates it by nature, and has it as His 'Other' always—He is Dynamic.

Such is the superb Static-Dynamic Doctrine of Līlā of the Vedāntists. And being, at the same time, a sweet Doctrine of Bliss, it is unique in the world. For, at best, the world has been taken to be an expression of Divine Thought (Hegelian School), but who has ever ventured to rise higher and see in it the manifestation of Divine Bliss ?

(7) (i) Seventh Objection against Brahma-Karana-Vada (Sutras 2. 1. 34—2. 1. 35.)

(a) How can Brahman be at once All-Powerful and All-Merciful ?

The Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda, too, is a rather formidable, one, representing, as it does, another difficult problem of Theology. It is as follows :—

It has been stated above that Brahman creates in Sport. But what is a mere 'Sport' to Him is, surely, just the opposite to the created Jīvas or the individual souls For, who would like to be born in a world which, by common consent, is an abode of infinite sorrows and sufferings ?

(b) Theological Dilemma.

In fact, here we are inevitably on the Horns of a Dilemma—that celebrated Theological Dilemma, which has caused so much headche to so many thinkers, in so many ages, all throughout the world. It is as follows :—

If God cannot prevent pains and evils, then He is not All-Powerful ; and if He can, but does not, then He is not All-Merciful.

Either, He cannot prevent pains and evils ; or He can, but does not.

Therefore, either, He is not All-Powerful; or, He is not All-Merciful?

How can Brahman be All-Merciful ?

But the theological Conceptionof God is that He is, at the same time, both All-Powerful and All-Merciful. So how can we solve this problem ?

Western Soluion of the Problem

In Western Philosophy, we find many attempts reconcilating Gods' Omnipotence with His All-mercifulness. But, all of them are based on a common fundamental argument, viz. that the above Dilemma can be taken by one horn. This means, that in the above Dilemma, the first half of the major premise, or the first hypothetical proposition is, indeed, materially or actually correct, as, there the consequent does, as a matter of fact, follow from its antecedent. But the second half of the major premise, or the second hypothetical proposition, is materially or actually false, as, here, the consequent does not, as a matter of fact, follow from its antecedent.

Physical Pains and Moral Evils are beneficial for the Souls

Thus, simply because God can, yet does not, prevent pains and evils. He cannot be at once stigmatised as a Cruel Being. On the contrary, He, as a Supremely Merciful Being, purposely, i.e with the express purpose of

benefitting the Jīvas or the individual souls, subjects them to all these worldly pains and evils. These are, in fact, absolutely necessary and beneficial for them.

In this way, Western Theologicians attempt to show in details as to how Physical Pains are necessary for the protection and development of wordly souls, and how these make for the good of the souls concerned.

In the very same manner, Moral Evils are also proved to be necessary for making Morality possible. The fact is that, Morality requires essentially Freedom of Will or the possibility of choosing between alternatives, morally good or bad, so that both virtues and vices must be present in the world. In fact, it is pointed out, in this connection, that moral character can be developed, moral life can be led, moral goodness can be attained, only by conquering temptations, only by choosing the right in the midst of the wrong, only by controlling the lower, animal self by the higher, spiritual one.

In this way, the presence of pains and evils has been sought to be justified by Western Philosophers. Hence, it has been said here that the All-merciful God, in His infinite Mercy and Grace, wishing to make the souls partake of a Moral Life and thereby become His own moral partners, creates pains and evils in the world. So, this is not at all a sign of cruelty or callouness, on this part, towards the souls.

(c) How can Brahman be Impartial ?

But a still more formidable difficulty remains. The question here is as to why should there be so many differences amongst the individual souls themselves ? Just glance a bit around—will you not see that some are rich, some not ; some are wise, some not ; some are healthy, some not—and so on, eternally, infinitely, inexplicably ? Do not all these individual differences make God liable to the charge of partiality ?

Western Solution of the Problem

In fact, Western Philosophers do not seem to have any satisfactory explanation of the above mystery. To put it at the door of Human Freedom of Will and its natural consequences, does not seem to be enough. For, different individuals do not seem to be directly responsible for many of their present states.

For example, according to the Principle of Heredity, the original characteristics, physical or mental, with which an individual is born, cannot be changed, later on. But the individual, evidently, is not responsible for the same. Again, according to the Principle of Sociology, the family and society in which the individual is born, also play a very important part all throughout. But how can the individual himself be responsible for these ? In this way, such individual differences, which

are, indeed, undeniable facts of experience, are very difficult to be satisfactorily explained on the grounds of the above.

(d) Indian View.

Now, let us turn to the Indian attempts at solving these difficult theological questions. The difficulties are stated here, as follows, in a way, very similar to the above :—

God cannot be taken to be the Creator of the Universe, for, then He will become liable to two great charges, viz. of Vaiṣamya or Partiality and Nairghṛṇya or Cruelty. All these have been stated above.

Charge of Partiality against Brahman

Thus, the Charge of Partiality arises from the fact that the different individuals are found to have different lots in the world. In fact, physically, mentally, socially, economically, morally—from every point of view imaginable—there are so many and so important differences amongst all the individuals that it seems but very natural to take God to be a Partial Being, specially favouring some with His choicest gifts, like, heath, wealth, honour, intelligence, capacity and the rest, while specially depriving others of the same. But Partiality is, indeed, a great sin. So, how can the All-Pure, All-Perfect God be ever conceived to be a Partial Monarch ?

Charge of Cruelty against Brahman

Secondly, the world. by common consent, is an abode of intense and infinite pains and sufferings. And, so, naturally, the Jīvas or the individual souls who are created in such a terrible world, are, thereby, made to undergo unending and unbearable hardships for no faults of their own. Does that not prove God to be also a very Cruel Being ? But how can, again, an All-Benign and All-Merciful God be ever conceived to be a Cruel Demogorgon ?

Thus, either God is not the Creator of the Universe, or, He is not God at all.

Thus, the Objection has been stated by Śrīkaṇṭha, thus :—

"लीलयाऽपि परमेश्वरस्य सृष्टिर्न सम्भवति। परपूर्णतया राग-द्वेषादि-विहीनत्वात्। सकल-साम्येन मध्यस्थ एव हि परमेश्वरः। तस्य केषाञ्चित् सुखमयं देवादि-शरीरं केषाञ्चिद् दुःखोत्तरं मनुष्यादि-शरीरं सृज्यते। वैषम्यं दुर्वारम्। किञ्च, सृष्टेः संहारपूर्वकत्वात् सकलं युगपत् संहरतः परमेश्वरस्य नैर्घृण्यं च भवेत्। तदेवम-पुरुषार्थ-सम्बन्धापादिन्या जगत्सृष्ट्या किं परमेश्वरस्य ?" (२-१-३४)

That is, it is objected that no creation is possible on the part of the Divine Being, even in sport, as contented in the previous Sūtra (2. 1. 33), For, God being a Perfect Being, is absolutely free from all

worldly impulses like, attachment and aversion. So, He must be a totally Impartial Being. Hence, if He be conceived to be creating some as all-happy gods, and some as all-miserable men, then it is very difficult to prevent the charge of Partiality being brought against Him. Again, He not only creates the Universe, but also destroys it (P. 56). So, it is equally difficult to prevent the charge of Cruelty being raised against Him. Thus, if God be taken to be the Creator of the universe, He inevitably comes to be vitiated by the twin faults of Partiality and Cruelty.

(ii) Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Karana Veda (Sutras 2. 1. 34—2. 1, 36)

(a) Karma-Vada : The Law of Karma

The solution, offered by Śrīkaṇṭha, in common with other Vedāntists, is, indeed, a very ingenious and interesting one. It is based on the celebrated 'Karma-Vāda" or Law of Karma, which may, legitimately, taken to be the very basis of Indian Philosophy.

Let us just pause a little to consider this Law of Karma, which has been discussed so much by Indian and non-Indian Scholars, and so much misunderstood, throughout the ages. (See Pp. 34—35)

Law of Causation

The Law of Causation is a Universal Law, equally accepted and equally respected, by all the Systems of Philosophy, all throughout the ages. For, the very first attempt, on the part of men, to formulate a reasonable view of the universe, to work out a cosmos out of an apparent chaos all around, to rest on a secure basis a of Law and Justice, is inevitably an attempt to discover the 'Reason' for the existence and continuation of each and every thing, each and every being of this vast and variegated universe of ours.

Man, in fact, is not a mere physical being, not even a mere animal, but also a rational being, and this inherent rationality in him naturally makes him seek for rationality everywhere. For, whoever or whatever be his Creator—material atoms, physical energy, individual souls, Deities, or God,—how can he, as a rational being, ever conceive that he has been created as a rational being in a wholly irrational world, and, as such, his own rationality would not find any counter-part outside,—also, over and above, be set at naught or contradicted at every step there ?

A rational man, thus, rationally refuses to believe that this great, inner instrument of 'Reason' is an entirely useless one,—in fact, nothing but an illusion, a chimera, an empty bubble, with no inner core, or reality

or foundation of its own. For, if he possesses 'Reason' inside, yet cannot apply it to the external world, then he is forced to conclude, willy-nilly, that the so called 'Reasoning Faculty' in him is not at all a real one.

In the History of Philosphy, of course, cases, though very few, are not lacking of an Absolute Intellectual Pessimism, amounting to a total denial of any rationality anywhere in the universe. But, fortunately, for all, such Pessimism, as pointed out above, is very rare; and in most cases, philosophical speculations are marked by a robust optimism, based on a firm faith that man, as a rational being, can find out a rational explanation of the world in which he lives. And, this has led him to believe firmly in a Universal Law of Causation, as the regulating principle of the Universe.

Two kinds of Causes: Initial and Final.

Now, 'Cause', as we have seen (P. 148), may be of two main kinds – 'Initial', or, 'Cause Preceding', and "Final" or, 'Cause Leading.'

The 'Initial Cause' or the 'Cause Preceding' accounts , for the actual existence of a Thing, and thus, consists of the Material (Upādāna) as well as the Instrumental (Nimitta) Causes (See P. 148 above). Thus, the lump of clay, as well as the potter, with his instuments and the like 'constitute such a' 'Initial Cause, or Cause Preceding.'

Again, the 'Cause Leading' stands for the purpose which it serves. Thus, the customer who buys the pot and uses it for drinking puroses, constitutes such a 'Cause Leading.'

Now, there are philosophers who are interested only in the first; while there are others who are so in both. The first results in a purely mechanical view of the universe; the second, teleological.

Indian Law of Causaation.

The Law of Causation of Indian Philosophy is a Law of both the 'Cause Preceding' and the 'Cause Leading.' Its firm faith in both constitues (P. 182), indeed, its very foundation.

Now, what is such a Law of Causation, in both these aspects ?

Right from the Rg-Veda, the earliest known Literature in the whole world, we get clear indications that our Indian Seers discovered a Universal Order working in all things in the world. This is nothing but the famous "Rta" of Vedic Literature, because of which it is held that the whole course of Nature, the rising and the setting of the sun and the moon, the advent and ending of days and nights, the creation and destruction of things and beings – is running smoothly in an orderly manner. Thus, this is nothing but an application of the Law of Causation in the physical sphere, according to which, every effect must have an antecedent cause, every cause must have a consequent effect ; and, thus, all things are connected with all things, in a necessary way, and all things, though apparently

unconnected, and even opposed, in some cases, really form one organic whole, which we call the Cosmos.

Karma-Vada or Law of Causation applied to the Physical Sphere.

Now, the application of the very same Law of Causation to the psysical sphere gives rise to the celebrated "Karma-Vāda" of Indian Philosophy. Just as in the physical sphere, we say, that every cause must produce an effect, and every effect must be produced by a cause, so in the psysical sphere, too, we have to say the very same thing. But what is the Cause and what is the Effect here? The Cause is "Karma", and the Effect is "Karma-Phala."

(b) Nature of Karma : Voluntary Action and Karma-Phala

Then, the question is : What is a "Karma" ? "Karma" here means a kind of Voluntary Action. That is, it is a free and a rational action, undertaken by a "Kartā" or an agent voluntarily, after due deliberation and final choice of the end and the means, (See P. 148).

Now, if an action be done, thus, freely and rationally by an agent, naturally, he himself alone is fully responsible for it. Hence, it is but just and proper that he himself alone should reap the consequences thereof. Thus, every "Karma" must have a "Phala" or a consequence intended or not, and here "Karma" is the cause, and ; "Phala,"—intended or not —its effect.

Thus, here the "Kartā" or the agent should, according to all canons of Justice, experience the results or 'Phala" of his own voluntary acts or "Karma," or have Bhoga of the same. If one person does something, good or bad ; and is allowed to get away or escape from its appropriate results ; or, if another person has to undergo or experience the same, then will that not be the height of Injustice ? That is why, the Indian Law of Karma or Karma-Vāda is very insistent that the Karma-phala, or the appropriate consequence of each and every voluntary action has to be undergone by the agent of that act. Thus : Karma—Karma-Phala—Karma-Phala-Bhoga—this is the inexorable Law of Karma.

Here, the question is : What, exactly, is the appropriate result or 'Phala, of a Voluntary Action or 'Karma ?'

Ethically, Voluntary Acts are of two kinds—good or bad (Puṇya and Pāpa), Now, what other consequence can a good act have than pleasure, success and fulness ; and what other consequence can a bad act have than pain, failure and void ? Thus, if a man acts wisely, unselfishly, virtuously, naturally, we expect him to be very happy, successful honoured, healthy, wealthy, in a word, a fully-developed and fully satisfied individual. On

the other hand. if a man acts unwisely, selfishly, viciously, naturally, we expect him to be unhappy, unsuccessful, dishonoured, unhealthy and poor—in a word, a non-full, non-satisfied individual.

But the question of questions is: "Is he really so? Is he really so?"—in both the cases. With great reluctance, but with absolute frankness, we have to reply: "It is not so, mostly. It is not so, mostly"—in both the cases. For, who can deny that often virtuous man suffer and sinful men prosper in this world of ours?

Two Great Ethical Problems

Thus, arises the great ethical problem: How to explain properly the present lots or states of different individuals in the world? Here, we have to face two problems, as pointed out above:—

(i) Why should virtuous persons suffer and sinful persons prosper?

(ii) Why should individuals have different states and destinies in the world—some being happy and prosperous, others not?

If no proper explanation can be given of (i) above, then the world-order cannot be taken to be a moral or just one, or the product of an All-Moral, All-Just Being or God.

Again, if no proper explanation can be given of (ii) above, then God cannot be taken to be an Impartial Being.

(c) The Doctrine of Births and Rebirths: Janma-Janmantara-Vad

So, to explain the above two fundamental problems properly, Indian sages have formulated a further fundamental Doctrine of Births and Rebirths or Janma-Janmāntara-Vāda, as a necessary corollary of, or supplement to the above fundamental Doctrine of Karma or Karma-Vāda.

Thus, according to the Doctrine of Karma, every "Karma" or Voluntary Act must produce a "Phala," and every Phala must have "Bhoga" or be experienced by the 'Kartā" or the free and rational agent concerned.

But the difficulty here is that in course of one life, on earth, a person performs numerous Karmas, the results of all of which cannot be experienced by him in course of that very same life, Still, Justice demands, the Law of Karma insists on, that no person should be allowed to escape the appropriate consequences of his own acts—if he does something, he must inevitably suffer or enjoy for it, as the case may be.

Hence, if such logically expected, philosophically sound, and ethically just results do not, or cannot, follow in the present life, these must, of necessity, do so in the next life or birth—otherwise Justice is violated; Truth, set at naught; Morality, reduced to a chimera.

In this way, for experiencing properly the just consequences of ones own Karmas or Voluntary acts, one has to be born again on earth.

But in this new life, a person not only experiences the just consequences of his own past acts, but, naturally, as he cannot remain idle or inactive in his new birth, he performs numerous new Karmas or voluntary acts there. These, latter, too, as shown above, cannot all produce their appropriate results in that life; and, according to the procedure, shown above, that particular person or individual has to be born again; and so on and on, infinitely.

In this way, there results an infinite series thus :—

Janma—Karma—Janma Karma—and so on, ad infinitum.

Here, two very important questions arise :—

(i) Is this Series really endless ?

(ii) Which precedes which—Janma precedes Karma, or vice versa ?

(d) Samsara-Cakra : The Wheel of Worldly Life : Initial Pessimism of Indian Philosophy.

The difficulty, here, in the first case, is obvious, as explained above.

A Jīva is born again to undergo the just results of its own past Karmas; and in that new birth, it performs many new Karmas, and has to be born again to undergo the just results of those new Karmas; in that new birth, it performs many new Karmas, and has to be born again for the very same purpose—and so on.

This apparently endlessly rotating Series is called "Saṃsāra-Cakra" or the Great Wheel of Worldly Life. Like a ceaselessly rotating wheel, this Worldly Life, this Empirical Existence, this state of Bondage, grips individuals in its iron clasp and revolves them mercilessly on and on, tossing them again and again, birth after birth, life, after life, into the mire of ignorance and indolence, with no possibility of escape.

But, where, then, is the hope for "Mokṣa or Mukti", Salvation or Emancipation from this impure and imperfect, sorrowing and suffering world ? Is it, then, Pessimism, pure and simple, that we have to accept as the Message of Indian Philosophy ? But this kind of Pessimism is, indeed, very harmful to life. For, it inevitably disheartens us and dampens our courage, making all submit meekly to the ordains of Fate. Naturally, if we are all inevitably and inexorably subject to this painful worldly life, with no hope, no possibility, no way for escape at all, why should, we then, strive, in vain, for anything higher, for a purer and happier life—for 'Mokṣa or Mukti', in short ?

Final Optimism of Indian Philosophy

But, really, Indian Philosophy is only initially Pessimistic and not finally—finally, it is Optimistic. For, according to it, although the world is full of sorrows and sufferings, and we have no other alternative but to begin, thus, with this Fact of Suffering—yet, we have never to end with that very same Fact of Suffering, as it has been declared unequivocally by Indian Philosophy that Salvation from Sufferings is possible on the part of all, through the 'Sādhanas' or Spiritual Means.

The crux of the whole matter lies in this :—

It has been said above, in a general manner, that each and every 'Karma' or 'Voluntary Action' must, according to Karma-Vāda or Canons of Justice, must produce "Karma-Phala", here or hereafter ; and 'Karma-phala' must, inevitably, lead to 'Karma-phala-bhoga. or experiencing of the results thereof ; and that, finally, to Samsāra-Cakra, as explained above.

Thus, if the Baddha-Jīva be in, this way, endlessly revolved on this wheel of life ; if it be, in this way, endlessly subjected to births and re-births ; if it be, in this way, endlessly, compelled to experience infinite pains and privations - then how can it be ever blessed with "Mokṣa", the Summum Bonum of life ?

(e) Sakama and Niskama Karmas : Selfish and nselfish Acts.

The Indian solution of the problem is as follows :—

'Karmas' or Voluntary Acts are of two kinds—'Sakāma' and Niṣkāma'.

'Sakāma-Karmas', as the name implies, are selfish acts, or acts done with a selfish end in view. Here, the 'Kartā' or the agent, according to the procedure explained above (See P. 148), feels the want of something, desires for that thing for his own selfish pleasure, and then strives to attain it. Thus, in this case, the whole procedure, from the beginning to the end, is a selfish one

Now, according to the Indian View, the Karmas that come under the jurisdiction of the Law of Karma, as explained above (See P. 184), are only such 'Sakāma-Karmas.'

For, what, after all, is the real meaning of this Law of Karma ? It simply means, as stated above (See P. 184), that agents themselves are fully responsible for their own voluntary acts which they perform freely and deliberately for attaining some results themselves. So here, it is rightly considered just and proper that the appropriate results, (and not always the intended ones), of those acts should be experienced by them, here or hereafter. Or, in other words, the 'Phalas'

or results of their own 'Sakāma-Karmas' must, of necessity, be experienced by them, here or hereafter; and hence, it is these 'Sakāma-Karmas' alone that lead to births and re-births, endlessly, as explained above.

(f) The Nature of Niṣkama-Karmas.

But are these the only kinds of Karmas or Voluntary Acts? No, surely not. There is a higher kind of act, viz. the 'Niṣkāma-Karmas.' As the name implies, these 'Niṣkāma-Karmas' are wholly unselfish in nature, and are not done with any selfish end in view. So, though, a Voluntary Act, a Niṣkarma-Karma, yet does not possess the characteristics of an ordinary voluntary act, as shown above. (See P. 148).

Niṣkama Karma does not spring from a Want

First, it does it spring from a feeling of want, as in other cases. So what does it spring from? It springs from a sense of pure duty, from a maxim of 'Duty for duty's sake alone. Or, rather, there is no such sense even, for, such a sense implies, after all, a distinction, a gulf between the prior stage of resolution, of whatever nature it is, and the later stage of performance. But a 'Niṣkama-Karma' is entirely natural and spontaneous, issuing forth from the the very existence or Sattā and very nature or Svarūpa of the person concerned.

Worldly Examples

Take the examples of the sun or the wind, or a flower or a river (P. 152) 'Shining or emitting rays' is an act on the part of the sun; 'blowing or gushing out,' on the part of the moon; 'blooming or blossoming forth' on the part of a flower; 'flowing or rushing on', on the part of a river. But all such acts are purely natural and spontaneous. and so require no prior deliberation and resolution, no later effort.

In exactly the same manner, a 'Niskāma-Karma' requires no prior sense of want of anything as its spring of action; no later resolution, no final endeavour of any kind whatsoever.

Niskama-Karma has no End in view : Unconscious Teleogy

Secondly, a 'Niṣkāma-Karma' has no reference to an end, at all.

For example, when the sun shines, the wind blows, a flower blooms, a river flows—the earth may be illuminated, cooled, beautified, fertilised. But who would say that the sun shines, the wind blows, a flower blooms, a river flows for those purposes, for achieving those ends? For does not the sun shine, the wind blow, a flower bloom, a river flows absolutely spotaneously, with no question of any end here at all (P. 152)?

This, in the language of Philosophy, may be called 'Unconscious Teleology.' This means that according to the Universal Law of Causation, every event, every occurrence, everything that exists is

connected essentially with two more things, one preceding, the other following. The thing preceding is called as we have seen, the 'Initial Cause,' or the 'Cause Preceeding'; and the thing following, 'the Final Cause', or the 'Cause Leading' (See P. 148, 182). Thus, the sun, for example, is due to a prior 'Cause', and serves a later 'Purpose', even if it is not conscious of the fact. In exactly the same manner, a 'Niṣkāma-Karma', of course, benefits mankind, but the agent here has not even that end in view

Thus, as the agent of a 'Niskāma-Karma' has himself no end in view at all, he cannot be held responsible for the result thereof.

For example, the sun simply shines because it is its nature to do so; and hence, it cannot be held responsible, in the ordinary sense of the term, for the result, good or bad, of that act of shining.

In exactly the same manner, the agent of a 'Niskāma-Karma' is not responsible, in the ordinary sense of the term, for his action. If that be so, then, surely, no question arises here of his experiencing any results of his 'Niskāma-Karmas' at all.

(g) Niskama-Karmas : Without Phals or Results to be experienced: Final Optimism of Indian Philosophy.

And, herein lies the solution of the entire difficult problem.

Suppose, an individual performs numerous 'Sakāma-Karmas', as natural, in the present life. According to the Law of Karma, he has to undergo the 'Phalas' or appropriate results of his 'Sakāma-Karmas' or Selfish Voluntary Acts. But as it is not possible for him to experience the appropriate results of so many 'Sakāma-Karmas' in course of the same life, he has to be born again to do the same.

Now, in this new life, if he performs new 'Sakāma Karmas', then the just results of these, not capable of being fully experienced and thereby exhausted in the same life, will lead to a further birth, and so on, as fully shown above many times (See P. 185-6). But if he wisely performs the new Karmas in this new life, not in a 'Sakāma' way at all, but wholly in a 'Niskāma' one, then, evidently, it will not be necessary for him to experience the results of the same. In that case, it will not also be necessary for him to be born again to experience the results of his past, 'Sakāma-Karmas', not experienced before.

Thus, in the present life, he will have to experience the results of his past, 'Sakāma-Karmas', not experienced before; but after that, no further results of 'Sakāma Karmas' will remain for him to be experienced, all his new Karmas being purely 'Niskāma'. In this way, he will get rid of further births and re-births, and through appropriate 'Sādhanas' or Spiritual Means, be able to realise the 'Summum Bonum' of Life, viz. 'Moksa' or Salvation..

Samsara-Cakra : Anadi, but not Ananta

Thus, according to the Indian View, the 'Samsāra-Cakra' is, indeed, 'Anādi' or without a beginning, but, by no means, 'Ananta' or without an end for separate individuals themselves. From the standpoint of the whole, of course, it is 'Ananta' or without an end,—as there is no end to the existence of Brahman, so there is also no end to His Cosmic Sport with Himself (see Pp. 52-53 Also, P. 151ff), and so no end of the 'Saṃsāra' or the world. But from the standpoint of the individuals separately, each one can get rid of this painful cycle of births and rebirths and be blessed with the nectar-taste of 'Mokṣa'.

Final Optimism of Indian Philosophy

This is the final Optimism of Indian Philosophy, as referred to above. The fact of pains and privations cannot be denied—it is an actual fact of direct experience ; and even if ultimately explained away as purely illusory on Philosophical grounds—for the time being, this fact of sins and sorrows cannot simply be ignored. On the contrary, it is to be admitted, taken note of and explained. That is why, Indian Philosophy is initially pessimistic, as stated above (P. 186). But finally, it is fully optimistic. For, it never asserts that the 'Jīvas' or the individual souls are eternally and absolutely subject to this impure and imperfect, sinful and sorrowful earthly existence, which is called the 'State of Bondage' or 'Baddhāvastha'.

For, as shown above, it is possible for each and every one to get rid of such an worldly state and realise his own nature or 'Ātman' as eternally free from all impurities and imperfections, sins and sorrows.

In fact, 'Bandha' or 'Mokṣa', Bondage or Liberation, depends solely on the individual himself, and on none else. (See below the Section on "Sādhanas"). Through his own 'Ajñāna' and 'Sakāma-Karmas' : Ignorance and Selfish Acts, due to it—he is repeatedly subject to the worldly state. Again, through his 'Jñāna' and 'Niṣkāma-Karmas' ; Spiritual-Knowledge, and Unselfish Acts, as well as other 'Sādhanas' or Spiritual Means—he is able to realise what he really is : Brahman in essence—and this is Mokṣa.

Thus, as Indian Philosophy freely admits the possibility of 'Mokṣa' on the part of each and every 'Baddha-Jīva', it is ultimately supremely Optimistic ; and inevitably spurs individuals to higher, spiritual efforts leading to a higher, spiritual goal.

Thus, Indian Philosophy is essentially a Philosophy of New Hope and Good Cheer, of Self-reliance and Self-realisation ; of Law and Justice.

(h) Niskama Karmas : Higher kinds of Voluntary Action.

Before we conclude this discussion regarding 'Niṣkāma-Karmas', one more question remains to be answered. This is as follows :—

It has been said above (See P. 188, that a 'Niṣkāma' Karma is a natural, spontaneous one, without any prior want and imperfection. later deliberation and resolution, and final effort and activity.

Now, it may be thought here, then, that a 'Niṣkāma Karma' is, as such, not a voluntary action, at all', but a purely involuntary, automatic or mechanical one. But such an automatic action is, evidently, a lower kind of action than a voluntary one, not manifesting any marks of intelligence and free will (See P. 150). And, how can a 'Niṣkāma-Karma, an involuntary one, be lower in status and glory than a 'Sakāma-Karma', a voluntary one ?

The answer is that all spontaneous acts are not, necessarily, involuntary, automatic or mechanical ones. The classification of Involuntary and Voluntary Acts, as given above (See 148, 150) is only an empirical one, or true only from the worldly standpoint. But, as everywhere, so here, too, there is a lower classification, and a higher. From this lattter point of view, acts are spontaneous and natural, yet voluntary; voluntary, yet without any prior and later stages, like feeling of want. deliberation, choice, action. An example of such a higher kind of voluntary act has also been given above viz. the act of Cosmic Play on the part of Brahman, (See P. 52, 151).

Characteristics of Niskama-Karma

Let us, now, pause a little to consider the nature of such a higher kind of Voluntary Action or a Niṣkāma Karma.

Niskamas-Karmas are Spontaneous and Natural

(i) Firstly, as stated above (P.188), it is spontaneous and natural. What do these two adjectives really mean ?

The first adjective "Spontaneous" means that it is not due to any want or defect of any sort whatsoever, and so it does not require any deliberation and final choice regarding the object likely to remove it; and the means likely to lead to the attainment of that object; as well as any effort to follow those means to attain that end. Thus, the fundamental marks of an ordinary voluntary action are totally absent from this kind of extra-ordinary voluntary action.

Again, the second adjective "Natural" follows logically from the first one. If such an act is not undertaken for the attainment of an end through some means then it is not a forced or a super-imposed one.

Sakama Karmas : Ordinary Voluntary Acts are not fully Free Ones

As a matter of fact, an ordinary voluntary act, though characterised as a free one, is not really fully so. For, though here, there is no external compulsion, there is a great internal one viz. that of an unfulfilled desire. This unfilled desire, so to speak, internally compels the person concerned to act for the attainment of that object which he thinks will enable him to get rid of the painful feeling of want and attain his heart's desire.

For example, to take the case referred to above (See P. 148). Here, an individual lacks water in his system, and for that reason, feels thirsty, Now, this sensation of thirst, which is a very painful one, compels him to think of an object which will enable him to get rid of it,—viz. Water—and search for the same. In this way, although no one is forcing him to search for water from outside, yet his own strong desire for water is doing so from inside.

Niskama-Karmas are Fully Free

But the above kind of higher voluntary action, not being due to any desire for any end at all, is free in the truest sense of the term. That is why, it is called "Natural", or flowing from the very nature, of the agent—from the full, perfect nature,- and not from any want or defect in it.

Niskama-Karmas are Full / Conscious

(ii) Secondly, the higher kind of voluntary action is voluntary in the truest sense of the term. That is, it is not an unconscious act, like an automatic or a mechanical one, but a fully conscious one. Thus, here there is a complete vision of the 'end' and the 'means'- to use ordinary terms—, or an immediate, complete, re-action to the situation, but in an entirely selfless way.

Niskama-Karmas are fully Knowing

(iii) Thirdly, the higher kind of voluntary act is based on a higher kind of knowledge, viz., that regarding the non-performance of all wordly objects. In the later and higher kind of Niṣkāma-Karma, there is also a knowlege that wordly objects are not really wordly objects, pure and simple, but Brahman in essence.

The Unique Nature of Niskama-Karmas

In this way, a 'Niṣkāma-Karma' is, indeed, a most unique, a most wonderful, a most exhilarating kind of Karma.

Thus it involves no deliberation regarding means and ends, yet is the wisest, the most intelligent of all acts It involves no great effort or strain of any sort, yet is the smoothest, the most perfect of all acts. It involves no desire for any pleasure, yet is the most tranquil, the most blissful of all acts.

Thus, a 'Niṣkāma-Karma' is, indeed, a most unintelligible kind of Karma to ordinary persons. It is also a most difficult kind of Karma, at the same time. Only those who have risen to a higher status, are capable of performing such 'Niṣkāma-Karmas'. For, according to a fundamental psychological law, cognition, emotion and conation—thinking feeling and willing—are organically, most intimately connected. Hence, naturally, when there is a higher kind of Knowledge and Devotion —Jñāna and Bhakti—there must also be a higher kind of Action—Karma ; and this is nothing but 'Niṣkāma-Karma'.

In fact, an automatic or a mechanical action, as the name implies, follows automatically, or mechanically from the automaton or the machine: viz. body. But, a 'Niṣkāma-Karma' follows spontaneously and naturally from the Soul, endowed with all the beauties and all the glories of the All-beautiful and All-glorious Soul. So, is it not a manifestly absurd, false Analogy to hold that a 'Niṣkāma-Karma' is an Automatic Action, because of involving no prior deliberation and later effort, as in the latter—just as it is entirely laughable to say that a diamond is a piece of broken glass, because of glittering like the latter.

The Glory of Niskama-Karmas.

Indian Philosophy, as well-known, consists of a large number of Systems, six Āstika or Orthodox Systems, three Nāstika or the so-called Heterodox Systems, as well as many other Systems, some minor, some important, besides the nine main Systems, like the Śāmkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāmsā, Vedānta, Cārvaka, Bauddha and Jaina. Naturally, all these various Systems differ from one another in many points from the philosophical standpoint ; and because of this, we have perhaps, all the known philosophical theories in Indian Philosophy, from Monism to Pluralism, Atheism to Absolutism, Māterialism to Idealism.

But in spite of such differences, there are some fundamental points of similarities, some innermost bonds of unity amongst these Systems which, in the final analysis, enable one easily to identify all these Systems as springing from the very same soil, as being nurtured by the very same light and air, as blooming forth, finally, as symbols of the very same spiritual beauty and fragrance of the very same age-old Culture and Civilisation. One of such universal and eternal Concepts in Indian Philosophy is that of Niṣkāma-Karma.

This Concept has at once a simplicity and a grandeur that have never failed to capture the imagination of our saints and sages, seers and devotees, all throughout the ages. To those wise minds and pure hearts, this simple and ever-green truth flashed forth in its pristine purity

that to work for selfish ends was to live the life of a brute ; while to work for the sake of duty, for the sake of others, with no selfish end in view, is the least one can do to live the life of a Man. On one side, this is indeed, a very simple Concept ; Work unselfishly, do not think of the self at all. But on the other hand, it is also the grandest, vastest conception, one that is the very foundation, the very life-blood of all Philosophy and all Ethics.

(i) Philosophical Concepts of Unity and Universality

Now, Philosophy, by nature, aims at Unity and Universality.

The former means that there is one fundamental Truth, or Law, or Principle—call it by any name—which alone affords a full and a satisfactory explanation of all other truths, or laws, or principles. In fact, there cannot be, from the standpoint of Philosophy, Religion, Ethics or Science—really, from any standpoint whatsoever—more than one Truth or Law or Principle. For, from no conceivable standpoint whatsoever can a self-contradictory system exist So, if many truths, many laws, many principles co-exist, then either they are mutually inconsistent as being really and absolutely different from one another; or they are only apparently different from one another, but really nothing but various manifestations of the very same fundamental Truth, or Law, or Principle.

However, as the very idea of a self-contradictory system existing for any length of time is wholly fantastic, it has been admitted, from all standpoints that this vast and vāriegated Universe of ours is really the manifestation of the very same, universal Truth, or Law, or Principle.

In this sense, Unity and Universality, indeed, constitute the very ground of Philosophy and Ethics.

"Unity" is applicable from the side or standpoint of the Universe or Multiplicity, implying that all the multifarious things unitedly proceed, finally, from the One.

' Universality" is applicable from the side or standpoint of the Truth or the One, implying that the One is present universally in all things.

In this sense, the Concept of Unity and Universality, taken together, is the grandest and vastest of all concepts, comprising, as it does, the entire expanse of the Heaven and the Earth.

(j) Niskama-Karma involves Unity and Universality

The Concept of Niskāma-Karmas, too, is nothing in essence but this Concept of Unity and Universality.

For here, to work for one is to work for all ; to think the of self is to think of the the world.

Really, however, in Niskāma-Karmas, there is no place, for one, no place for self—either one's own self, or that of another. It is, by nature, entirely and eternally selfless, without any desire whatsoever for any gain—either for one's own self or for that of another.

(A) Punya-Karmas, too, are Sakama.

Accordingly, even the ordinary Puṇya-Karmas (P. 199) or benevolent, pious acts, wholly meant for the good of others, are regarded as Sakāma-Karmas, and as such, detrimental to Mokṣa or Salvation, in Indian Philosophy.

Undoubtedly, from the worldly point of view, these are infinitely better and more laudable than Pāpa Karmas or selfish, sinful acts ; and that is why, while Puṇya-Karmas entitle one to Svārga or Heaven, Pāpa-Karmas only to Naraka or Hell.

But, as according to Indian Conception, even Svarga or Heaven means nothing, as compared with Mokṣa or Final Beatitude, in the eternal flight of the soul towards Infinite Expansion, Infinite Perfection, Infinite Realisation, even Puṇya-Karmas, so very useful and essential from the worldly point of view, have to be discarded from the spiritual point of view by the aspirers after Mokṣa or Salvation.

It is this entirely impersonal nature of Niskāma-Karmas, that makes for its inherent grandness and vastness, referred to above. For what is impersonal or not confined to a person, is, naturally universal or embracer of all persons. In this sense, the very simple conception of Niskāma-Karma is at once, as mentioned before, the grandest of all conceptions.

(B) Niskama-Karmas are Impersonal, yet not Cold

A question may legitimately be asked here : If Niskāma-Karmas are so very impersonal in nature, are they not also the coldest, most colourless, most meaningless kinds of Karmas ever imaginable ? For, if a thing be not done out of the depth of one's heart, if it lacks the warmth of fellow-feeling and the tinge of benevolent desires, if it does not aim at any end whatsoever—then, how can it lead one to that state which implies the fullest expansion, manifestation, development and perfection of all the sides of one's being ?

(k) The Concept of 'Development.'

This raises a fundamental question in Indian Philosophy, viz whether 'Development' means negation of the undeveloped state and emergence of a new one ; or, only its fuller manifestation ; or, in other words, whether the developed and undeveloped states differ in kind, or only in degree.

Thus, the point at issue here is as to whether the ideas and feelings and desires of the state of Bondage are purified, and perfected, expanded and developed during the state of Salvation ; or, are simply annihilated to give way to some new states and processes.

The solution offered by our holy saints and sages for this intriguing problem is, indeed, an ingenious one.

According to this, the very concept of 'Development' has no place in Indian Philosophy from the ultimate or transcendental standpoint. (For "The Concept of Empirical Development, see under the Section on "Refutation of the Second Objection against the Law of Karma).

One of the fundamental tenets of Indian Philosophy", is that 'Satya' is 'Nitya' ; or 'Truth' and 'Eternity' are identical. That is, what is true is eternally true—it cannot change its nature, either for the better or for the worse. In this sense, the Self, the Eternal Truth, cannot be developed, but can only be manifested. That is, it cannot be asserted here that at first, in the state of Bondage, the Self was in an undeveloped state; and, then, in the state of Salvation, it comes to be or becomes developed. For, this will go against the Universal Indian Conception of Self as ever-perfect.

Hence, according to this view, the ever-perfect, ever-full, ever-glorious Self only remains hidden in our veil of ignorance during the state of Bondage ; and is only manifested in its pristine purity, perfection, fulness and glory in the state of salvation when that veil is removed. Hence, really, there is no question of a higher and a lower, a developed and an undeveloped state here. The so-called lower and undeveloped state is not a real state of the Self at all ; it is only a passing phase, a mere screen to veil the ever-real, ever-perfect, eve-peresent Self. In this sense, the ideas, feelings and desires of our empirical existence, however full, however sublime, however noble have no place during the state of Mokṣa, or Self-manifestation, and Self-realisation.

(l Niskama-Karma, not a Developed form of Sakama-Punya Karma.

In this sense, Niskāma-Karmas are not more perfect forms of Sakāma-Puṇya-Karmas. That is, they are Karmas without any trace, whatsoever, of even any lofty feeling and benevolent desire. But that does not make such Karmas cold or callous or colourless or purposeless or valuless.

(m) Two kinds of Niskama-Karmas : Preceding Moksa and Succeeding Moksa.

There are two kinds of Niskāma-Karmas, viz. those that precede Mokṣa and those that follow it.

(A) First kind of Niskama-Karma, preceding Moksa.

The first kind of Niskāma-Karmas constitute the preliminary steps to the Sādhanas, like Jnāna and Bhakti, which actually lead to Mokṣa. For, so long as the mind is swayed by Rāga-Dveṣa,—wordly passions, like attachment and aversion, it cannot, evidently devote itself to anything higher and nobler. Hence, when through the performance of Niṣkāma-Karmas, Sakāma-Karmas together with their springs : selfish desires, are totally suppressed, the mind is purified of all lower, animal, base, worldly tendencies and in such a pure mind alone can there ever be the rise of knowledge and Devotion which finally bring about Salvation.

(B) Second kind of Niskama-Karma, succeeding Moksa.

The second kind of Niskāma-Karmas, on the other hand, are those done by the Free Soul, the Jivanmukta, after Mokṣa or Salvation. The Jīvanmukta, has indeed, no duties to perform, no ends to attain, no obligation at all to any one, in the ordinary senses of the terms. Still, he does not, by any means, lead a lazy, inactive, purposeless life. On the contrary, as he stands as a living example to all, showing them the Path to Salvation, he has to act constantly for teaching others.

Thus, the Niskāma-Karmas of the Mumukṣu or aspirer after Salvation purify his mind and make him fit for undertaking Sādhanas or adopting direct spiritual means to Salvation. The Niskāma-Karmas of the Mukta or Free Soul, help the other Mumukṣus in the Path to Salvation.

(C) Is Niskama-Karma purely Impersonal ?

Of these two kinds of Niskāma Karmas, the first, evidently, is not so full, and perfect and spontaneous, as the second.

Niskama-Karmas, preceding Moksa, not so perfect as those Succeeding it

Thus, in the first case, the aspirer after Salvation is still a novice, a traveller who has just taken the first step in his long, and difficult and hazardous journey to an altogether new realm. As such, his Niṣkāma-Karmas may, excusably, be something more or less forced, and all his feelings and desires may have to be suppressed more or less, with effort, leaving his mind in a more or less blank state.

Thus, he may perform his duties only for the sake of Duty itself ; and all the ordinary charges against that well-known and Sublime Ethical Doctrine of "Duty for the sake of Duty" (cf. Kant) maybe brought against such Niskāma-Karmas, at the most.

For, the Mumukṣu or the aspirer after Salvation is yet a Baddha-Jīva, a Soul in Bondage; and, as such, his actions are susceptible to ordinary criticism and evaluation according to the ordinary standards of ethical judgement. According to such a standard, of course, Sakāma-Puṇya-Karmas, flowing with the milk of human kindness, proceeding from the warm feelings of love and sympathy, sublime and benevolent desires for helping others, may appear to be far better than such strictly neutral Niskāma-Karmas, devoid of all these.

(D) Ordinary Altruistic Acts are really Selfish

But here also the question remains as to whether any kind of feeling and desire and satisfaction, even entirely for others, that is, any kind of personal elements, even entirely with regard to others, is desirable at all or not. In fact, when we do something out of selfish motives for our own good, we aim at our own personal pleasure. But even when we do something out of those so-called unselfish motives for the good of others, then, too, in exactly the same manner, we aim at our personal pleasure—as here, too, the good of others will give us intense pleasure. In this sense, even the benevolent acts are not really unselfish, and that is why, in Indian Philosophy, even the Puṇya-Karmas have been branded as "Sakāma" or selfish, and rightly so.

(E) Niskama-Karmas are entirely Altruistic

Herein lies the crux of the whole problem, as well as its solution. If a Karma or an act, though springing out lofty feeling of love for others and sublime desire for the good of others, is undertaken for the personal pleasure of the Kartā or agent, it is really a Sakāma or selfish act. But if a Karma or an act, springing from the above causes, is undertaken only for the good of others and not for any personal pleasure that this good will yield to the Kartā or the agent, then only is it really Niṣkāma or unselfish, selfless act. In this sense, in the case of Niṣkāma-Karmas of the first kind, viz. of a Mumukṣu or aspirer after Salvation, lofty feelings of universal love and sublime desires for universal service are indeed, present; but no desire for personal pleasure at all. So, this first kind of Niṣkāma-Karmas are neither cold, nor callous, nor colourless nor purposeless, nor valueless, in any sense whatsoever.

(F) Niskama-Karmas, succeeding Moksa, cannot be due to Emotions at all

But, in the case of Niṣkāma-Karmas of the second kind, viz. of a Mukta or a free soul, the above questions do not arise at all. In this case, the Jīvan-Mukta is, indeed, not an ordinary Jīva subject to ordinary

feelings and desires and so his actions, too, cannot be judged by ordinary standards. Hence, really here there can be no questions at all of even sublime feelings of love and benevolent desires to serve.

For, the Jīvan-Mukta realises all beings as Brahman, or what is the same thing, as Ātman, and so can no longer have any feelings of love, sympathy, mercy, pity, and the like for them. He only tries to help them to remove their evils of ignorance and thereby make them realise their own real nature or Self in its pristine purity. Thus, the Niṣkāma-Karmas of a Jīvan-Mukta or the Full and Perfect Soul, though not proceeding, from the mundane standpoint, from what is called lofty feelings and desires, are essentially fuller, and more perfect than even the most loving and most benevolent actions of Puṇya-Karmins or virtuous men.

(ب) Niskama-Karmas, Higher than Punya-Karmas

This brief survey will, however, be enough to show that this Indian Concept of Niṣkāma-Karmas is, indeed, unique in the history of human thought. For, in Western and Islamic Systems of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics, ordinary Puṇya-Karmas or virtuous deeds are taken to be Niṣkāma or unselfish ; and the Pāpa-Karmas; Sakāma or selfish. Here, the Puṇya-Karmas are regarded as the highest possible kind of Karmas performable ; Svarga or Heaven, the highest possible kind of goal attainable. In Indian Philosophy alone, Karmas, higher even than the Puṇya-Karmas; a Goal, higher even than Svarga, are conceived and recommended as the Summum Bonum of life. Here alone we have that supreme and sublime concept of 'Ānanda' or Bliss, infinitely superior to and essentially different from 'Sukha' or Pleasure, which other Systems aim at. (P. 195)

(n) Two kinds of Niskama-Karmas, from another Standpoint : Egoistic and Altruistic.

Niṣkāma-Karmas have been classified above as (i) those of a Mumukṣu, (ii) those of a Mukta.

Niṣkāma-karmas may, also, be classified as (ii) those referring to self, (ii) those referring to others.

In fact, any Karma may be classified like this, according to the most common process of classification. A Karma, from its very nature, refers to some thing else—and that 'something' may be either one's own self, or 'egoistic' ; or that of another or 'altruistic'. For example, eating, drinking, resting, reading, writing, laughing, crying—and so on, and so on—far too numerous to be even attempted to be mentioned, belong to the first class. Feeding, serving, teaching, scolding, consoling, pushing,

holding—and so on, and so on—far too numerous to be even attempted to be mentioned, belong to the second class. Of course, all these are ordinary 'Sakāma-Karmas'.

(A) Niṣkama Egoistic Acts

But Niṣkāma-Karmas of a Mumukṣu or aspirer after salvation, and a Mukta or free soul—also are of the very same kinds. For, a Niṣkāma-Karmi or a performer of Niṣkāma-Karmas also performs daily the above two kinds of Niṣkāma-Karmas. He also eats and drinks, reads and writes, laughs and cries. Again, he also feeds and serves others, scolds and consoles them, pushes and holds them. So, what kinds of acts are these, in the case of Niṣkāma-Karmis or those who perform Niṣkāma-Karmas? For, how can there be Niṣkāma eating and drinking, and all the rest?

But, if we accept the Doctrine of Niṣkāma-Karmas, we have also to admit that Niṣkāma eating and drinking, and all the rest, are possible Sakāma eating and drinking and all the rest, serving as they do, biological purposes, spring from the fundamental selfish Instincts of Self-preservation and Race-preservation. But Niṣkāma eating and drinking and all the rest, although serving biological purposes, willy-nilly, do not spring from the Instinct of Self-preservation and Race-preservation, at all. For, these instincts are purely animal instincts, shared alike by all living beings. But a Niṣkāma-Karmi has risen above the animal side of his nature and is, accordingly, no longer guided and driven by animal, physical, selfish instincts. As he has a physical body, he, naturally requires physical things, like food and drink, for its maintenance. But he has no desire for the same, as an ordinary man has; and his acts of eating and drinking follow spontaneously, naturally from his very nature. as explained above (see P. 152).

(B) Niskama Egoistic Acts passible

Of course, such a selfless, effortless biological act is very difficult to be conceived of. But is it very easy to conceive of a 'Jivan-Mukta—one who is in the world, but not of it? (See below the Chapter on "Salvation"). Is it, even, very easy to conceive of a 'Mumukṣu'—one who is in the world, but gradually rising above it?

( ) Jivn-Muktas and Mumuksus are exmples of the same

Who can, really, conceive of such a person, one amongst a million, who looks just like an ordinary man?

With hands and feet, with hunger and thirst, with likes and dislikes, with joys and sorrows, yet far above these, and not subject to any biological, psychological, physical, empirical conditions—such a

conception, inevitably, is. such a person, a humanly divine, or a divinely human person, does exist. For otherwise, who would have brought forth with him a Divine Message—the Message of an All-beautiful, All-bountiful God to emancipate Mankind ?

In fact, the very existence of Religion and Morality on earth shows that Man is not all Mud, but really Gold within. When this Gold gradually shines above the Mud, gradually does the divine in the human reveal itself. And, this is possible.

But not only that , this must happen, for how can a lower thing obliterate, for ever, a higher one ? Clouds cannot, forever, obliterate the shining sun ; nor can the boulders, obstruct, for ever, the dancing stream ; nor can the dark layers of earth prevent, forever, the tiny seed inside, from springing up into a lovely sprout. In this way, the full manifestation of the Divine in the human is, undoubtedly, possible.

If this be so, then, undoubtedly, purely Niṣkāma or selfless, biological acts are possible on the part of such a biologically existent, yet biologically unconditioned Muṇukṣu or Jivanmukta.

(C) Niskama Altruistic Acts

In exactly the same manner, his Niṣkāma-Karmas, referring to others are, also, entirely selfless. He loves and serves others, not because he feels pleasure, not because he hopes for some ultimate gain, not because of some earthly consideration, not even out of a sense of duty,—but only and solely because it is his nature to do so This has been fully explained. above (Pp. 152, 188ff).

In this way, all the so-called egoistic and altruistic acts of a Niṣkāma-Karmī are, really, neither egoistic, nor altruistic, as both of these refer to a 'self'—of one's own or of others. But who is seeing (i.e a Mumukṣu), or has seen (i.e. Jivan-Mukta), the Universal Soul in everything, in all has nothing further to desire for, for, 'desire' requires a distinction betweenthe 'desirer' and 'the object of desire.' But if all be One Self—who will desire for whom ?

(D) Two kinds of Niskama-Karmas : Punya and Papa.

Sakāma-Karmas, too, have been classified under two heads :—

(i) Puṇya or virtuous deeds (ii) Pāpa or vicious deeds.

(A) Even Punya-Karmas are Sakama.

That 'Pāpa-Karmas' or vicious deeds are 'Sakāma-Karmas' or thoroughly selfish ones, no one can doubt. But the que tion may, legitimately be asked as to why even 'Puṇya-Karmas' or virtuous deeds have been here stigmatised as 'Sakāma-Karmas'. The answer has already been given above. Such virtuous deeds are, of course, infinitely better than vicious ones Still when carefully analysed, these, too,

are found to be selfish in nature. What does, really, a 'Selfish" action imply? It simply implies an action that has reference to a "self"—one's own or of another. That is why, according to this criterion, egoistic acts, referring to one's own self; as well as altruistic ones, referring to other selves, are equally "selfish" in nature.

As a matter of fact, so long as one's own self, as well as other selves are not realised as One Universal Self, any reference to any kind of "self" at all is bound to produce something "selfish".

Take an ordinary "Puṇya-Karma" or virtuous deed, like establishing a school in a village. Here, the philanthropic agent desires for the good of the poor villagers, and not apparently for his own pleasure. Still, how can it be denied that the good of the poor villagers brings intense pleasure to that person himself, no less? Take also the case of Mother-Love, in praise of which, poets have sung lustily. But is it really and ultimately unselfish? By no means. For, the well-being of the child brings a very great pleasure to the mother herself. So, how can her love for her child be described as "purely unselfish"?

It may, of course, be said here that the mother does not herself aim at such a pleasure; what she aims at is only the good of the child; and the pleasure that she feels is not the intended result, but only an incidental, unintended one. But the whole point here is that ordinary love, referring to certain beloved persons to the exclusion of others, is itself, when you come to think of it, a selfish one. This is true of all emotions. Ordinary emotions attach themselves to certain selected objects; and are, as such, very narrow in extent and selfish in content.

The Peculiarity of Indian Ethics: Real Distinction beetween Egoistic and Altruistic Acts.

Undoubtedly, there is a distinction between love for one's own self alone, and love for others. The former, we call, 'egoistic'; (Svārthapara) the latter, 'altruistic' (Parārthapara). But, really, the two do not differ in kind, but only in degree—not qualitatively, but only quantitatively. For, in both, a 'Desire' is present—egoistic or altruistic, for one's own self or for others—still a 'Desire', qualitatively the same kind of 'Desire', although quantitatively it is different, referring to one only, or to more. Thus, egoistic love refers to one only; altruistic, more than one.

1. From the Psychological Standpoint.

It may be objected here that, egoistic love and altruistic love are by no means of the same kind qualitatively—egoistic love alone is selfish, impure, not altruistic. The reply to this is that, psychologically, the feeling of love and the consequent desire for the well-being of the

beloved object, as well as the activities that follow from the same, are exactly the same in all cases, whatever be the objects to which these are attached and directed.

Take two simple cases. A 'selfish' father loves himself; an 'unselfish' mother loves her son. Here, the first kind of love is characterised as 'egoistic'; the second, 'altruistic'.

But do these really differ in any way, psychologically? Evidently not. Psychologically, a mental process does not change when its object changes. For example, whether we perceive an elephant or an ant, psychologically, the process of perception is exactly the same. Similarly, whether we love Ram or Sam, psychologically, the process of loving is exactly the same. In the very same manner, whether we desire for sugar or salt, psychologically, the process of desiring is exactly the same. Here also, the love of the selfish father for his own self, and the love of the unselfish mother for her son are, psychologically, exactly the same. Again, the desire of the selfish father for his own well-being, and the desire of the unselfish mother for her son's well-being are, psychologically, exactly the same. Finally, the activities of the selfish father to keep himself well, and the activities of the unselfish mother to keep her son well are, psychologicaly, exactly the same. In this way, psychologiclly, the so-calied 'egoistic' and the so-called 'altruistic' acts are exactly of the same kind.

2. From the Metaphysical Standpoint.

Now, do these differ from any other standpoint—metaphysical or ethical? Now, metaphysically, from the standpoint of the 'Noumenon,' the Ultimate Reality, all empirical objects are of the same status, and the same is the case here, no less.

3. From the Ethical Standpoint.

Ethically, also, can any real distinction be drawn between the two? This seems to contradict flatly the ordinary view, which makes so much of the distinction between an 'egoistic' and an 'altruistic' act, taking the former to be entirely vicious and the latter, virtuous. But this is an undeniable fact. If by an 'egoistic' act we mean an act, referring to one's own self—then that is not necessarily vicious; and if by an 'altruistic' act we mean an act, referring to others,—then that, too, is not necessarily virtuous. Here, really, everything depends on the actual behaviour of the person conerned.

Suppose a starving father steals some food to feed himself, and suppose a poor mother steals some food, exactly in the same manner, to feed her starving son—are not both the same kind of stealing, and ethically condemnable in exactly the same way? Again,

suppose a father arranges for the murder of his business rival to get rich himself; and suppose a mother arranges for the murder of her son's buiness rival to make her son rich—are not both exactly the same kind of murder and ethically condemnable in exactly the same way? In the same manner, if the 'selfish' father looks after his own interests as a moral, law-abiding citizen, demanding only what he is socially and morally entitled to and trying to get only what is necessary for his own proper maintenance; and if the 'unselfish' mother does the same for her son—are not both these acts equally right, ethically?

In this way, the common distinction between **'egoistic'** and **'altruistic'** acts, as vicious and virtuous, respectively, does not really stand to reason. As a matter of fact, both are equally 'selfish,' and whether one is vicious and the other virtuous depends on something else—as shown above—viz. on the actual activities of the persons concerned.

(C) Uniqueness of Indian Ethics

This is the view of **Indian Ethics**, and in this respect, this is absolutely unique and unparalleled in the History of Ethics For, in all other ethical systems of the world, the final criterion of Morality is 'virtue-vice' and 'virtuous acts are taken to be the highest, purest, and most perfect kinds of acts, tending to the Summum Bonum or the Highest End of Life. But in Indian Ethics, both the vrituous acts or Puṇya-Karmas and the vicious ones or Pāpa-Karmas, are, as shown above (P), equally 'Sakāma-Karmas' or 'selfish acts.' Hence, these can never lead to the 'Summun Bonum' of Life, i e. 'Mokṣa or Mukti- or Salvation. On the contrary, as shown above the Puṇya-Karmas and the Papā-Karmas equally lead to 'Samsāra' or worldly existence repeatedly; and, the first condition for Mokṣa is the complete cessation of such 'Sakāma-Karmas'—Puṇya and Pāpa.

From the strictly narrow empirical point of view, of course, a distinction has to be drawn between 'Puṇya-Karmas' and Pāpa-Karmas,'—otherwise, ordinary, everyday, practical life will be impossible. That is why, as stated above from the standpoint of this Empirical Ethics, it is said here that 'Puṇya-Karmas' lead to 'Svarga' or 'Heaven', while 'Pāpa-Karmas' to 'Naraka' or Hell; But 'Svarga' is by no means 'Mokṣa,' which also is a unique point in Indian 'Mokṣa-Tattva' or Doctrine of Salvation. (See below the Section on "Salvation)

(D) Egoistic and Altruistic, Selfish and Unselfish Acts.

To recapitulate, let us once again, in the end, refer to the real distiction between, (i) 'Egoistic' or 'Svārthpapara' and 'Altruistic' or 'Parārthapara' Acts, or 'Karmas'. (ii) 'Virtuous' or 'Puṇya' aud 'Vicious,'

or 'Papa' Acts or 'Karmas.' (iii) 'Selfish' or 'Sakāma' and 'Unselfish' or 'Niskāma' Acts or 'Karmas.' (P. 293, 302

As we have seen, the Classification or Division of Acts, as under (i) and (ii), involve the logical fallacy of Cross Division. This means that an Egoistic Act may be both virtuous and vicious; so also an 'altruistic' one.

Again, 'egoistic' and 'altruistic' acts do not differ qualititatively, both being equally 'Sakāma-Karmas', but may do so only quantitatively. (P. 302). An 'egoistic' act necessarily refers to one, while an 'altruistic' act may refer to one or more. When it refers to more than one, it differs from an 'egoistic' act quantitatively; and not otherwise

Again, 'virtuous' and 'vicious' acts also do not differ qualitatively, both being equally 'Sakāma-Karmas' But from the standpoint of Empirical Ethics, these differ in their results, viz. Heaven and Hell (P. 306).

Again, 'Sakāma-Karmas' and 'Niṣkāma-Karmas' differ qualitatively. (P. 293). For, even when an altruistic act, which is at the same time a virtuous one, embraces the whole world, aiming at the good of the entire mankind, it remains a 'Sakāma-Karma', involving, as it does, a 'desire' for the well-being of all. Thus, the real distinction between 'Sakāma-Karmas' and 'Niṣkāma-Karmas' is due to the presence or absence of 'desire'—and not to number.

(M) Niskama-Karmas: Supra-Moral.

We have above referred to the 'Empirical Ethics' (P. 306) of Indian Systems. From the standpoint of 'Empirical Ethics', Heaven is the Highest End and 'Virtue is the Highest Means'. But from the standpoint of 'Supra-Empirical Ethics', Salvation is the Highest End, and Niṣkāma-Karmas, leading to Jñāna and/or Bhakti, are the Highest Means. Such 'Niṣkāma-Karmas' are supra-moral. As the agent here is not responsible for his acts, in the ordinary sense of the term, (P. 283—4) he cannot, also, be judged as morally good or bad for his acts. Just as the 'shining' by the sun, the blowing' by the wind, the 'flowing' by the river, the 'blooming' by the flower (See P. 281) are neither morally good, nor morally bad, so the Niṣkāma-Karmas of a Mumukṣu and a Mukta, also are neither morally good, nor morally bad—but above such ordinary ethical judgments. (See below the Section of "Salvation").

(N) Mutuality of Cause and Effect
Jnana and Karma: Births and Selfish Acts.

In connection with the Law of Karma, two difficult questions were raised above (See P. 185. Again, in connection with the first question,—viz. What, if any, is the way out of the 'Samsāra-Cakra' or

seemingly endless series of Births and Re-births ? —, the nature of Niṣkāma-Karmas, the only way out, has been discussed above. (P. 187)

Now, the second, still more difficult question remains to be disposed of. (See P. 277).

(A) Mutual Relation between Jnana and Karma

The difficulty, here, may be stated as follows :—

According to the Law of Karma, 'Sakāma-Karmas' lead to a new birth, so that its 'Phalas' or appropriate results may be experienced there, as required by the canons of Justice. But in this new birth, new Sakāma-Karmas, are performed, leading to a further new birth and so on. (See P. 185)

Now, here we find that 'Karmas' require 'Janma', for, 'Karmas' or acts can be performed only in a particular birth. But, again, 'Janma' requires 'Karmas', for the Jiva is born for experiencing the results of its past 'Karmas'. In this way, unless there be 'Janmas', there cannot be any 'Karmas' ; again, unless there be 'Karmas', there cannot be any 'Janmas'. So, which precedes which ? Is 'Janma' first, or 'Karma' ? How to explain the very beginning of Creation ?

(B) Mutuality of Cause and Effect.

In Western Logic, we have a similar instance in what is ordinarily called 'Mutuality of Cause and Effect'. Take the ordinary example of a hen and an egg. Here, also, the very same question may be asked : 'Which precedes which ?' From a hen, we get an egg , from an egg, we get a hen, and so on, continuously. So, which do we have in the very beginning : a hen or an egg ? Hence, the concept of Mutuality of Cause and Effect has been brought in to solve the problem. It is said here, that each of the terms, viz. 'hen and egg' in the two-term series, is a cause and an effect, in rotation. Thus, when a 'hen' produces an 'egg', she is the cause of the effect 'egg' ; but when an 'egg' produces a 'hen', it is the cause of the effect 'hen'. In this way, a 'hen' is both the cause and the effect ; so is an 'egg'.

(C) Bijankura-Nyaya.

In Indian Philosophy, we have, the famous Maxim 'Bijāṅkura-Nyāya' ; or the 'Logical Maxim of Seed and Sprout'. As in the case of the hen-egg mutuality, so in this case, no less, there is a relation of 'Mutuality of Cause and Effect' or Inter-dependence between a seed and a sprout. Thus, from a seed, we get a sprout ; again, from a sprout, we get a seed, and so on.

So, according to this Logical Maxim of 'Mutuality of Cause and Effect' or Inter-dependence, it has to be admitted, willy-nilly, that the very first beginning here cannot be logically explained. In fact,

it is not possible for us to say definitely as to whether at the very beginning, there was a hen or an egg, a seed or a sprout, and so on.

( ) Samsara is Anadi.

According to Indian Philosophy, also, it is not logically possible for us to explain the very first world-creation. Hence, the above "Samsāra-Cakra" or wheel of Earthly Existence has been taken to be "Anādi", or without a beginning, but not 'Ananta' or without an end, for separate individuals, (See P. 190). As in a wheel or a circle, there is no beginning—every point may be the beginning and the end at the same time, so in this 'Wheel of Earthly Existence' or 'Samsāra-Cakra', also, there is no beginning. Hence, it is not possible for us to say definitely as to whether 'Janma' precedes 'Karma' or 'Karma' precedes 'Janma'.

But is this not an admission of ignorance regarding a fundamental philosophical fact, viz. that of creation? If the very beginning of creation cannot be logically explained, then what philosophical system, worth the name, can ever hope to stand on its own? For, is not 'Creation' a fundamental Philosophical Problem? (See P.).

(E) Solution of the Problem from the Temporal Standpoint.

The answer to this very legitimate query is as follows (See below):—

From the temporal standpoint, such an ignorance is but natural. If we speak in terms of the ordinary cause-effect relation, involving an antecedent and a consequent: a thing preceding and a thing succeeding, then we have also to admit that as time cannot stand still, what is 'preceding' is also 'succeeding' simultaneously. Thus, there is no absolute point in Time, to be characterised as the 'first' or the 'last'. In fact, the very conception of Time implies ceaseless flow or changes, and all changes are relative, and what is relative, can have no absolute, existence.

Thus, although, from the worldly standpoint, we separate the 'cause' from the 'effect', as two absolute existences, that is really something artificial. So, as the very concept of Time is not applicable to God, the Timeless, Never-changing Being, it cannot also be applied to His acts of Creation. Hence, if we try to explain creation in terms of Time, it naturally becomes unintelligible to us. That is why, the world has been taken to be 'Anādi', or something the first beginning which cannot be logically or intelligibly explained.

(F) Solution of the Problem from the Divine Standpoint.

But from the Divine stand point, it is 'Anādi' in a quite different sense. (P. 284). From this standpoint, creation is but a **'sport' or**

a 'Līlā', on the part of Brahman. (P. 52–53, P. 246), and follows from His very nature as a Loving Blissful, Playful God. Hence, as such a Loving, Blissful, Playful God is eternal, having no beginning and no end, His Cosmic Play with Himself, viz. the Universe of Souls and Matter, is also eternal, having no beginning and no end. So, from this standpoint, there arises no question as to which 'precedes' which, and which 'succeeds' which. (P. 370).

Thus, here, we are on the Horns of a Dilemmā :—

If Creation be a Creation in Time, then no Beginning is conceivable ; and if Creation be a Creation not in Time then no Beginning is possible.

Either, Creation is a Creation in Time ; or Creation is a Creation not in Time.

Therefore, either, no Beginning is conceivable, or, no Beginning is possible.

But as unusual with Dilemmas, the above Dilemma is both formally and materially valid.

In this way, the 'Anāditva" or the state of being 'beginningless' quite fits in on the part of the Universe.

This, in fact, simply shows the inadequecy of ordinary categories of Substance, Cause, Space, Time, Change etc, in the case of transcendental realities. Thus, Brahman, or the Transcendent Being does not exist as a Substance that becomes, does not produce as a cause an effect outside Himself, does not occupy space, there being no space, nothing outside Him ; does not occur in Time, does not change. Such a unique Brahman is Brahman of the Vedanta, One only without a second, without comparison, without parallel or analogy of any kind whatsoever.

(G) First objection against the law of Karma : Self-completeness of Life.

As has been said above, Karma-Vada, or the Law of Karma is a fundamental prop of Indian Philosophy. P.). But it is, indeed, a unique Doctrine, not found in any other Philosophical system of the world. Hence, naturally it has been deeply misunderstood and vastly villified by quite a few foreigners.

Thus, three main objections may be raised against the Law of Karma.

The first objection is as follows : —

According to the Law of Karma, past actions produce results in a future life. But, this surely, is very unjust. Why should events of life be dragged on to a different life—if, of course, there is actually such

a life! One life is one complete whole—from birth to death. Even if there be more than one life for an individual, then each life should be taken to be self-sufficient and self-complete. Death is an absolute break, If there be anything beyond it, let that be a new something,—a new beginning, a new life, a new birth. Life is an absolute beginning. If there he anything prior to it, let that be taken to be past and gone, dead and buried with no overhanging shadows, with no extending hands, with no penetrating gripe.

(A) Refutation of the First Objection against the Law of Karma.

If we pause a little to grasp the real implication of the Law of Karma, then we shall see that, as mentioned above (P. 184), it is not at all an unjust Law, but, on the contrary, a supremely just one.

(A) Law of Karma is a Law of Justice.

First, what is 'Justice' and, what, 'Injustice?' 'Justice' means that one gets what is one's due. Due as what? Due as a human being, in the proper sense of the term. And, the main content of Justice is that the individual gets proper results for that for which he is responsible. This 'responsibility' is a fundamental ethical concept. If we are free, we are responsible; if we are responsible, we have to face the results. Suppose, we cannot do so due to some other extraneous causes. But will that wipe away our responsibilities? Evidently not. For example, a murderer who flees to another country may temporarily escape punishment; but will any one say that it is just? In the same manner, Death also, cannot put a sudden end to all our responsibilities and liabilities, at all. Is this something very absurd, vere impossible, very unintelligible?

Now, what, after all, is the simple implication of the Law of Karma? Ethically, as we have seen, it is, indeed, a Law of Justice. And metaphysically, it is nothing but a law of Continuity.

(B) Law of Karma is a Law of Continuity.

It simply implies that Life is one continuous whole; and every part of Life is organically and indissolubly connected with every other, Hence, what is past, is not really 'passed'—dead and gone, and over and finished. But it re-lives in the present, which. again, flows on into the future. In this way, Past, Present and Future form one continuous, unbreakable whole.

Now, according to our Indian View, Life is not confined to the present birth in the present world only. For, 'Life' is that which, from the beginning to the end, is directed towards a single end. As a matter of fact, in the present birth, no less it is continuity of purpose that binds all the variegated and even apparently contradictory interests and events

together in course of the very same birth. According to the same criterion, Life, say the Indian Sages, is not confined to the present birth only. For, the end or the purpose remains the same all throughout, viz. Mokṣa or Mukti. Till this purpose is not fulfilled, Worldly Life is not ended, and continues birth after birth, till, there is 'Mokṣa. That is why, births and deaths are not given so much importance in India,- for, birth, after birth, the very same individual continues,—naturally being affected by his previous births, naturally affecting his future births—in one continuous series.

Hence, it is held by Indian Philosophers that, just as a prior moment necessarily affects a later one ; just as Monday affects Tuesday ; just as 1959 affects 1960—so exactly. does one life affect another, inevitably, indubitably, invariably,

Is that not very appropriate from the Metaphysical standpoint ? For, Metaphysics cannot tolerate any gap or interruption in the world-system, at all. Really, the special task of Metaphysics is to bridge over all apparent gulfs, to heal up all apparent breaches, to bind together all apparent breakages, thereby, bringing to light the inherent unity and continuity of life and the world.

If we take such a panoramic view of life, then why should not the Sakāma-Karmas of one life produce effects in another ?

Now, let us see as to whether any justification can be found of the Law of Karma in other spheres of knowledge.

(C) Sphere of Biology : The Law of Heredity.

Biology, by common consent, is a very important science. And, do we not find the Law of Continity here, too ? A fundamental Law of Biology is the Law of Heredity. And, according to this Law, physical and mental characteristics are transmitted through the 'genes', generation, after generation, from parents to children, from forefathers to progeny, from ancestors to descendants.

This is a clear evidence that Science admits the Law of Continuity, As a matter of fact, whatever may be asserted by the Environmentalists, it is an accepted fact that after all, Heredity is much more important than Environment. A proper kind of Environment is, of course, necessary for the development of a characteristic. But still, if a characteristic be not already present, how can it, then, be developed ? If the seed be bad, how can excellent soil, light water, air produce a good plant ? Thus, what the individual inherits at the very beginning of his existence. determines the whole of his life to a very large extent.

1. First Difficulty with regard to the Law of Heredity.

But if you come to think of it, is not this Law of Heredity a very

unjust one? We know that certain heinous diseases are hereditary, and "Sins of fathers are visited on their children." But why should the poor children suffer for the sins of their fathers? Why should they be born blind, cripple, feeble-minded and the like for no faults of their own? Is that not very unjust?

Is not, the Law of Heredity, as a matter of fact, far more unjust than the Law of Karma—stigmatised as unjust, by many? For, according to the Law of Karma, one's own voluntary acts produce their appropriate results in the next birth. But according to the Law of Heredity, others' acts produce their appropriate results, generations later, in the lives of innocent victims, or otherwise. Is it not far more unjust that an individual should experience the results of others' acts than that he should experience the results of his own? In fact, as shown above, there is really nothing unjust if one undergoes the results of one's own voluntary acts. But if this Law of Karma be not admitted, then the Law of Heredity, ordaining that an individual has to undergo the results of others' voluntary acts, and others' constitution—physical and mental—and so on—becomes necessarily a supremely unjust Law.

2. Second Difficulty with regard to the Law of Heredity.

There is also another difficulty in the Law of Heredity. According to this fundamental, biological Law, the fertilized ovum, the first beginning of an individual's life, contains all the elements of Heredity, and is responsible for the whole future life of the individual. Now, this fertilized ovum contains half the characteristics of the father, and half of the mother. Here, naturally, many combinations are possible. For example, suppose, the father possesses A, B, C, D; the mother, P, Q, R: S; then the combinations may be ABPQ, ABRS, CDPQ, CDRS, ABPS, ABQS, and so on. Now which combination a particular child will inherit is entirely accidental—Biology can afford no explanation at all for it. Yet the whole life of the child depends on that combination.

Take an ordinary example. Suppose, the father is physically ugly, but mentally brilliant; while the mother is physically beautiful, but mentally deficient. Now, suppose, the first child Ram inherits the mental brilliancy of the father and the physical beauty of the mother; while, the second child Sam inherits the physical ugliness of the father and the mental deficiency of the mother. Thus, Ram grows up to be a handsome, intelligent boy; Sam, an ugly, foolish boy. Now, why should there be this kind of difference between Ram and Sam? Why should Ram be favoured with all the choicest gifts of God, and not poor Sam? Biology or any other science, cannot reply. The different combinations which different individuals inherit are, thus, taken by science to be purely accidental, for which no reason can be assigned.

Here, the Indian Law of Karma is the only possible explanation. Ram and Sam, inherit different combinations according to their own past Karmas. In this way, the present distinctions between Ram and Sam —physical, mental, social, economical and so on—are due to their own past Karmas which were not able to produce their appropriate results before.

In this way, either the Law of Heredity—which is essentially a Law of Continuity—is absolutely unintelligible, haphazard and unjust. Or, it is also an application of the more fundamental Law of Karma. Is there any way out ?

(D) Sphere of Psychology : The aw of Relativity.

As in Biology, dealing with Life, so in Psychology, dealing with Mind, continuity is a fundamental Law. The very description of Mind as "a stream consciousness" shows that in the mental sphere no less, the past essentially influences the present ; the present, the future.

Take any Psychological Law, e.g. the Law of Contrast, or the General Law of Relativity. In all these cases, the prior influences the later in such a way, as even to change the later's very nature. Take half of an orange peel, tasted before tasting sweets, and half, tasted after. Are not the sensations quite different,—one sweet, the other sour ? Is this not continuity ?

Take, again, Laws of Educational Psychology. All of these hold that lessons learnt in very early life, maxims practised then, habits formed during that period—continue to affect the whole of the later life.

Take, again, Freud's Depth Psychology. According to this, the very early desires of a child vitally affect the whole of his future life. For example, the celebrated theory of 'Œdipus Complex' of the Freudian School implies that the first, fundamental sex- impulse of a child, called the 'Œdipus Complex', though repressed very early, continues to influence materially the whole of the child's future life.

Examples may be multiplied to show that in all sciences, the Law of Continuity is a fundamental Law.

All these, of course, refer to the same Life, But the principle is just the same, if another life can be conceived of. And, why cannot such a life be conceived of ? In fact, as shown above, also to be shown below (P. 185), 'Janma Janmāntara-Vāda' or the Doctrine of Births and Re-births, has to be accepted for explaining many otherwise inexplicable facts.

(E) Sphere of Logic : The Law of Causation.

Logic, as a science, takes the Law of Causation as its very

foundation. But this Law of Causation, too, as we have seen, is a Law of Continuity. 'A' as the cause, continues into 'B' as the effect. If this be so in the present life, why cannot the causes continue into their effects in the next? Otherwise we have to say that some causes produce their effects, some do not. But why? No legitimate answer can be given. It cannot be put at the door of natural phenomena, for, occurrences in Nature can afford no explanation at all, being purely mechanical in nature. It cannot be attributed to individual efforts, for, often individual efforts do not bear appropriate fruits, here and now; while effortless results may follow (See below).

What can explain all these, except the Law of Karma? In fact, if we confine ourselves to the present life only, our outlook becomes so narrow that many facts, requiring explanation, escape our notice; or defy our attempts at comprehension and explanation, and we happily substitute the Law of Chance and the Law of Indeterminism for the Law of Order and Harmony. Is that not a retrogade step?

(F) Sphere of Ethics: The Law of Necessary Relation between Virtue and Happiness.

Ethics, as the Science of Conduct, makes a fundamental distinction between 'Right' and 'Wrong', 'Virtue' and Vice'. Also, according to Ethical Maxims, only those responsible for their own acts, are liable to be judged as 'good' or 'bad', 'virtuous' or 'vicious' for the same. And, also, according to Ethical Maxims there should be an essential relation between 'Virtue' and 'Happiness' 'Vice' and 'Unhappiness'.

All these fundamental Ethical Maxims imply two main things: —

(i) An agent is fully responsible for his Voluntary Acts, and has to be judged as morally good or bad for the same.

(ii) A morally good act should bring its own rewards, a morally bad act, its own punishment.

How is a Voluntary Action Judged?

Now, let us take these two, one by one.

(i) Here, the fundamental question is: By what part of a Voluntary Action is the action to be judged? (See P. 184). By 'Motive' or intended end alone? By 'Intention' or intended end and intended means alone? By 'Work' or the actual result alone?

According to Western Ethics, Intended Results are to be morally Judged.

The Western View is that a Voluntary Action has to be morally judged as 'good' or 'bad', not by 'Motive' or End, as the end does not

justify the means; not by 'Work' or the actual result, as actual results do not always tally with the intended ones; but by 'Intention' or Intended End and Intended Means, taken together.

Now, what is the Indian view? The Indian View, as referred to above (P. 184), clearly states that every 'Karma' (meaning, of course, Voluntary Action) must produce a 'Karma-Phala; (or appropriate result); and every 'Karma-Phala' must produce 'Karma-Phala-Bhoga; (or experiencing of the results), or be experienced by the Karma-Kartā; (or free and rational agent). Hence, according to the Indian View, the agent here, must experience the actual result, and not the intended one.

Here, what exactly is the distinction between 'actual result' and 'intended result'? When the actual result tallies with the intended result, there is, of course, no distinction. When the actual result does not tally with the intended result, then, there is, indeed, a distinction; and that may be due to many causes, as the case may be. Many of these causes or circumstances are due to the individual concerned himself. E. G., when a student slips and falls, thereby dislocating his wrist, and fails in the examination, as a result that slipping on his part is called an 'accident'—but in the universe which is a 'Cosmos', there can be no 'accidents' accidents are only causes unknown So, this 'slipping' must be due to causes —and who knows it may be due to the student's own carelessness. In that case, naturally, he himself is fully responsible for it, and so fully responsible for the actual result, though it does not correspond to the intended one.

But cases may occur where the causes or circumstances, that make the actual result quite different from, even opposed to, the intended one, have nothing to do with the individual concerned himself. Eg., here, the student might have been pushed suddenly by a mad man, and hence slipped. So, how can he be, then, held responsible for this 'slipping', and, for that, the actual results, quite distinct from the intended ones?

The answer is that, this very circumstance of being suddenly pushed by a mad man occurred to him alone, and not to his friends, Why? If this cannot be explained by his present Karmas, the only explanation is that this was due to his own past Karmas. In this way, willy-nilly, knowingly or unknowingly, because of his present action, or because of past, he himself is responsible for the causes or circumstances which produce the actual result, as distinct from the intended one.

The fact is that, as will be shown later on (Section on 'The Refutation of the Second Objection against the Law of Karma', included

under the Section. "The Refutation of the Seventh Objection agrinst the Law of Karma"), an individual is born with certain hereditary characteristics and environmental circumstances, according to his own past Karmas, but for the rest, he is free. So, if the actual results do not tally with the intended ones, then the circumstances responsible for the same must be due to his past or present Karmas. So, he has to be held fully responsible here, no less.

In the above example, the fact of being suddenly pushed is taken to be merely 'accidental' or something 'inevitable' over which one has no cotrol at all. But how can Science really recognise something that is purely 'accidental' or 'inevitable'? So, according to the Law of Karma, the so-called accidents or inevitable occurrences are due to the past or present Karmas of those particular individuals themselves.

According to Indian Ethics, Actual Results are to be morally Judged.

Thus, according to the Indian View, Karma means 'Voluntary Action', (P. 184), 'Karma-Phala' means 'Actual Result, iuteuded or not'; 'Karma-Phala-Bhoga' means experiencing the consequences of the above actual results. As here the individual is—willy-nilly, knowingly or unknowingly, because of his present action or because of past—responsible for the actual results, whether interded or not, it is but just and proper that he should experience joys or sorrows and the like, as the appropriate consequences thereof.

This has been fully explained above (P. 184).

It has also been shown adequately as to how this is a Law of Justice (P. 184).

The Place of Death in Indian Philosophy.

So far, Western Ethics fully agrees with Indian Ethics. But according to the Indian Standard, Western Ethics does not proceed to the end, but stops in the middle, For, Western Ethics does not admit 'Janma-Janmāntara-Vāda' or the Doctine of Births and Re-births. But says Indian Ethics: Can Death obliterate everything, stifling the voice of Justice? Can an individual escape the just consequences of his own voluntary acts, simply because Death spreads its ominous pall over him? Is Death such a great blessing as to make him enjoy all the pleasures of all his numerous good deeds? Is Death such a great curse as to make him suffer all the pains of all his numerous bad deeds, the results of which have not yet been experienced?

N), according to the Indian View. Who knows—to a virtuous man, Death may prove to be a curse ; to a vicious man, a blessing ?

Hence, the Indian tendency is not to give so much importance to Death, as such. It is simply the Door to a new life—which may prove to be really a 'new' life, with further 'Sakāma-Karmas,' all given up, and Niskāma-Karmas performed ; or, which may prove to be only a new repetition of the old life of ordinary cravings and failings.

That is why, to give a full scope to the Law of Karma to the end, Indian Philosophers have unhesitatingly formulated the further Law of Births and Re-births, 'Janma-Janmāntara-Vāda,' as noted above. This simply implies, that under no circumstances whatsoever should the individual be allowed to evade his moral responsibilities and the just consequences of his own voluntary acts.

In this way, from the sphere of Ethics also, we get, a full justification of our Law of Karma. Can a more just Law be conceived of ?

1. Relation between Virtue and Happiness.

(ii) Now, let us consider the second fundamental implication of Ethical Maxims, referred to above. (P. 185).

If an act be morally good, then it is expected, according to all canons of Justice, that it will bring happiness, name, fame, health, wealth, success and the like to the agent. On the contrary, if an act be morally bad, it is excepted that it will bring unhappiness, condemntion, poverty, failure and the like to the agent. But does this realy happen ? Seldom. For, is not the world full of of instances of virtuous men suffering, and vicious men prospering ?

Difficulties in Western Solutions :

Western Ethics seems to have no solution of this very difficult problem.

One common solution may be that—what is apparently suffering in the eyes of the world, is really not so in the eyes of the virtuous man. In the very same manner, it may be said that, what is apparently happiness in the eyes of the world, is really not so in the eyes of a vicious man. Thus, even in the midst of all poverty, diseases, infamy, failure and the like, a virtuous man remains unaffected and unperturbed, calm and peaceful, satisfied and and blissful, in the firm conviction that he is doing his own duties, that he himself is really untouched by all these worldly sins. In a similar, way, in the midst of all wealth, name, success, a vicious man really suffers immensely due to the constant prickings of his own conscience.

But this solution does not seem to be logically tenable. After all, here we are dealing with ordinary men ordinary 'Sakāma-Karmis'. ordinary individuals, aiming at pleasure and striving to avoid pain. In such a case, it is not to be expected that even a virtuous man should rise to such a height as to be unaffected by worldly pains and sufferings. After all, the pangs of hunger, the torture of diseases, the pains of bereavement, poverty, infamy etc. cannot be dismissed off simply as non-entities. These are bound to affect even a good, virtuous man and make his life totally miserable Similarly, it cannot, legitimately, be expected that a vicious man should possess a conscience. Thus, we have to admit that virtuous men do suffer and vicious men enjoy in the world often.

Merits of Indian Solution.

So, what is the way out ? The way out, as usual, is this celebrated Law of Karma. According to this Law, as we have seen, acts, if not capable of producing their appropriate results in the present life, have to do so in a future one. Hence, if we find in the world that a virtuous man is suffering sorrows, we have to explain this by his past Karmas. Also His present good deeds are not bearing their appropriate 'fruits,' and are being accumulated for a future-occasion. The same is the case with a vicious man.

Law of Karma is the best possible Solution.

Is there any better explanation ? Pause and think. It will be very difficult to find any. The ordinary reasons advanced,—viz. that the proper formation of character requires trials and tribulations, i. e., the capacity to suffer for the sake of righteousness and come out victorious in this moral struggle—do not seem to be of any use here. For, although it is true that the real moral worth of an individual comes out more clearly in the midst of sins and sorrows, failures and frustrations, degradations and diappointments, yet the question may legitimately be asked as to why the ultimate victory, with all its rewards, should not result here—before the eyes of all, to show the rewards of virtues, and the punishment of vices. Why should these be left for a future occasion—Heaven or Hell, as the case may be ? Are we to take it, then, that virtue will bring sorrows here, only with the hope of joys in Heaven ; Vice will bring joys here only with the apprehension of sorrows in Hell ? But why ? If a voluntary action is destined to produce an appropriate result in the world, it should do so here in the world—why should everything be left for a future world ?

Some Legitimate Questions Replied.

The Crux of the whole thing here is this :—

First Question.

If we take an ordinary worldly action, good or bad, it is meant for producing an appropriate result. In the language of Indian Ethics, it is a 'Sakāma Karma', aiming at a definite 'Phala' or result. In the language of Western Ethics, it is a 'Voluntary Action', having a definite end. So, according to all criteria, its most essential part is the result that will follow from it ; and so, there is an organic, necessary relation between the act and its result ; and an act is an 'act' because it leads to a result ; while an act is a mere 'movement', if it does not. If there be such an essential, indissoluble relation between an act and its result, then it is expected that the two should be always together. In that case, only one definite and particular kind of result can follow from only one definite and particular kind of act. As a matter of fact, there is a necessary relation between a cause and its effect ; and one particular cause produces one particular effect ; and one particular effect follows from one particular cause.

Here, a voluntary action, that is, a virtuous or a vicious deed, has an appropriate result viz., pleasure in the case of the former ; and pain, in that of the latter, according to all canons of Justice and Morality So, if we admit a necessary relation between a cause and its effect, then we have also to say that the cause must produce that definite effect, one day or other, —it must of necessity. Hence, a virtuous act must produce pleasure or happiness in the world, one day or other.

Now, suppose, a virtuous deed fails to produce its appropriate result : pleasure or happiness, in this world. What, will, then, happen to its appropriate result : pleasure or happiness ? According to the Western View, it will be produced in Heaven. But is that logical or just ? No, for, logically, if an effect is scheduled to be an earthly one, it cannot be logically a Heavenly one. And, morally, an earthly result should be experienced on earth, and not elsewhere.

Reply to First Question.

However, let us consider the Indian View in this respect. According to this View, there are two kinds of Puṇya and Pāpa-Karmas, virtuous and vicious deeds, viz those leading to results on earth ; and those leading to results in Heaven or Hell, as the case may be. The first kind of virtuous and vicious deeds are expected to produce their appropriate results here on earth. But these may fail to do so due to many circumstances, viz., other connected events or circumstances, and the like.

E.g., a patriotic person helps a fighter for the country's freedom, during a foreign rule and is severely punished for it. Here, due to other connected circumstances, his virtuous deed of helping a patriot cannot now produce its appropriate results, viz. honour and happiness; and pain results due to a previous vicious deed, the result of which could not be experienced before, due to similar causes. So, this virtuous deed should produce its appropriate result, pleasure or happiness, later on in the same life; and if that be not possible, in another life. But it has to follow in an earthly life, not in Heaven. Again, a patriotic person who helps a patriot in a free country may be honoured immediately and thus, this similar virtuous deed may lead to the appropriate result, pleasure or happiness, here and now; as the connected circumstances are different.

In this way, according to the Indian View, the appropriate results of the first kind of virtuous or vicious deeds must be produced either in this life or birth, or in a next—and not in Heaven or Hell, as the case may be. Logically and morally, this seems to be the only way out.

Of course, logically and morally, it would have been best, if the above first kind of virtuous or vicious deeds were able to produce their appropriate results actually here and now, in the present birth or life on earth. Logically, it would have been best, as the cause would have, then, produced its effect immediately. Morally, it would have been best, as the demands of Justice would have, then, been fulfilled immediately, serving as perceivable examples of the fundamental Ethical Maxim: Virtue brings its own rewards; Vice, its own punishment.

But as this is, unfortunately, not possible, three alternatives are left:—

(i) The appropriate results never follow.

(ii) These follow in Heaven or Hell.

(iii) These follow in a next birth or life, as the case may be.

(i) This, evidently, is not acceptable at all, according to the Law of Karma.

(ii) This is the Western View, not acceptable to Indian Philosophers, as shown above (P. 218).

(iii) This is the Indian View, and under the circumstances, the only possible solution.

Second Question

A question still remains. It has been said above that if on a particular occasion, a virtuous deed, e. g, fails to produce its appropriate result pleasure or happiness, then the actual result produced then, viz.

pain or sorrow, is the appropriate result of a prior vicious deed. But is that not itself rather unjust ?

Reply to Second Question

The reply is : It has already been pointed out above that it would have been best if all virtuous or vicious acts, scheduled to produce their appropriate results on earth, did so here and now. But unfortunately, as we have seen, that is not always, rather, often, possible. The world is so vast and complex, and there are so many complex 'Karmas' of so many complex individuals, that simple, straightforward results cannot always follow. Under the circumstances, it would have been far more unjust to allow a virtuous or a vicious deed to remain, totally unexperienced, with its appropriate result, than to have it experienced on a different occasion, later on.

Third Question

A further qustion remains. If this be so, then, what, after all, will be the moral value of such acts ? For, if a virtuous man suffers immensely for his good deeds, then even if these be the appropriate results of his prior bad deeds, still, then will not the individual himself think that virtue leads to sorrows and sufferings, and be discouraged from following the Path of Virtue ? Again, if a vicious man prospers greatly for his bad deeds, then, even if these be the appropriate results of his prior good deeds, still, then, will not the individual himself think that vice leads to joys and pleasures, and be encouraged to follow the Path of Sin ?

Reply to Third Question

The reply is : It is true that in individual cases, this might happen. But what is the alternative ? This is, indeed, a fundamental difficulty of the Ethical Systems of all countries, throughout the ages. That virtue should bring its own rewards immediately, and vice its own punishment—is a fundamental Maxim of Ethics ; that these do not—is an equally fundamental Fact of Experience. So, the problem of problems here is : How to reconcile the two ? Philosophers after Philosophers, Ethicists after Ethicists have tried to solve the problem in different ways, but in vain.

You may say :

(i) External pleasure or pain, success or faiure do not realy count here. What counts alone is internal peace or happiness. Hence, virtuous men, who externally suffer, are, however, internally happy ; while, vicious men who externally prosper, are, however, internally unhappy.

But this has been replied to before (See P. 216).

(ii) Virtuous men do not act or care for rewards.

This, too, has been replied to above (See P. 217). As even a virtuous men is a 'Sakāma Karmi', he aims at an end ; and as to whether he expects, or not, a reward, is not the main point here, the main point is as to whether he should get a reward according to the Canons of Morality : and if he should, why he does not. So, the very same difficulty remains.

And, what about a vicious man, under this head :

(iii) The present world is not a perfect one, but still in the process of evolution. So here there is no necessary relation between 'Virtue' and 'Happiness', 'Vice' and 'Unhappiness', as demanded by Justice and Morality. That is why, at present, only in a few cases, is Virtue actually followed by its appropriate result viz. happiness ; for the rest, it takes place in a perfect place, viz. Heaven. But in a future, more perfect world, we may expect that virtue will bring its own rewards immediately, and sin its own punishment.

But this is not the Indian View. This kind of Doctrine of Evolution is not accepted by Indian Philosophers. (See below under the Section on The Acit : Jagat'). According to the Indian View, the world is what it is from the very beginning, and it has been shown many times above, that the world is not 'World' as such, but Brahman or His Śakti (See P. 69, 127, 135). And, it depends on you how you take it—but that will not change the nature of the world itself.

Doctrine of Evolution of no help here.

As a matter of fact, the Western Doctrine of Evolution, applied to the sphere of Ethics, does not seem to be of much help here in solving the above problem. For, the question of questions here is : What would be the form of the finally evolved, perfect world ? Will there be, can there be sins and sorrows at all in such a perfect world ? If so, how can it be called 'perfect', and what distinction would, then, there be between a perfect and an 'imperfect' world. If not so, will not that perfect world be 'supra-moral', outside the pale of ordinary moral Judgements ? In that case, really, the above question does not arise at all. This, in fact, is nothing but the sphere of Niskāma Karmas', as explained above (P. 187). Here, as we have seen (P. 189), there is no question of any 'Karma-Phala' and 'Karma-Phala-Bhoga'. So, the above question as to why a virtuous or a vicious act does not lead to its appropriate result here and now, does not arise at all. In a perfect world too, if and when existent, there cannot be any distinction between 'Virtues' and 'Vices', and so, there is really, no ethical problem at all. The problem has to be faced really in an imperfect world, like ours ; and solved there.

From this standpoint, from the standpoint of the present world, from the standpoint of 'Sakāma Karmas' performed here, the Law of Karma appears to be the only possible and plausible solution. In this way, in the sphere of Ethics, no less, the Law of Karma stands fully justified.

(G) Sphere of Theology : The Law of God's All-mercifulness and Impartiality.

The questions that may be raised in the sphere of Theology has already been referred to in the very beginning of the Section, under the heading : "Seventh Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa Vāda". (P. 179).

As has been stated above, two grave charges may be brought against God, the Creator of the universe, from the Theological Standpoint, viz. (a) that of Cruelty or "Nairghṛṇaya", (b) that of Partiality or Vaiṣamya.

(H) Refutation of the charge of Cruelty against Brahman.

As has been mentioned above repeatedly, if the Law of Karma be admitted, then the otherwise insoluble ethical and theological problems become easy to be solved. (P. 186)

As we have seen, Indian Philosophy is initially pessimistic, as it starts with the undeniable fact of pains and sorrows as found in the world. It has also been explained there that all these sins and sorrows are due the 'Sakāma-Karmas' of the 'Baddha-Jīvas' themselves (P. 186). For, naturally, most of the Karmas of the Baddha-Jīvas or souls in bondage, are vicious acts, leading to sorrows and sufferings as their appropriate results. Not only that, even the virtuous acts of the Baddha-Jīvas, though leading to joys and pleasures as their appropriate results, cannot bring about real happiness or bliss. For, as explained above, (P. 184, 204)., even these virtuous deeds are entirely 'Sakāma' or 'selfish' in nature aiming at transitory, earthly joys and pleasures. Now what is transitory, cannot really be worth while or worthy in nature Hence even the earthly joys and pleasures cannot bring us real and permanent happiness. That is why, worldly existence has been rightly characterised as full of intense sins and sorrows, pains and sufferings, impurities and imperfections. And "Mokṣa" or "Mukti" has been characterised as "Salvation" or "Emancipation" from such a painful, empirical existence.

Now, the question naturally arises from the Theologial standpoint, as to why should God voluntarily create such a painful world and make Jīvas be born there ? Is He not, then, a very cruel, a very callous Being ?

Sins and Sorrows are due to the Sakama Karmas

As we have seen (P.190), this charge of cruelty against God may be easily refuted if the Law of Karma be admitted. All these

earthly sins and sorrows are not due to God, but to the individuals themselves. These individuals are subject to constant births and re-births or 'Sāmsāra-cakra' according to their own 'Sakāma-Karmas.' So Brahman cannot, evidently, be held responsible for the sins and sorrows, as found in the world. So how can He be called a cruel or a callous Being ?

Ethical Necessity for Creation.

Further, although the world is full of impurities and imperfections, sins and sorrows, although it is finally rejectible and "Mokṣa" or "Mukti" means getting rid of this painful wordly existence, still, it too, has a purpose and a value. For, nothing can be purely useless or valueless in this beautifully ordered, intelligently systematised Cosmos of ours— so how can the Cosmos itself be so ? Now what is that purpose ? The final purpose in Indian philosophy is only one—viz, "Mokṣa" or 'Mukti". The world, too, serves that purpose.

But when it has been said that "Mokṣa" or "Mukti" means getting rid of 'Saṃsāra' or the world, is it not rather contradictory to assert, in the same breath, that the very same 'Saṃsāra' or world serves the purpose of 'Mokṣa' or 'Mukti' ? No, it is not so in the sense that though ultimately rejectible, the world is, indeed, a stepping-stone to 'Mokṣa' or 'Mukti' How ? In this way : The Law of Karma essentially implies that unless and until the results of our 'Sakāma-Karmas' are fully experienced, births and re births will continue for the Jīva, and 'Mokṣa' or 'Mukti' become impossible, Now, where can such Karma-Phalas or results of 'Sakāma-Karmas' be experienced ? In the world only.

Thus, the world, too, has to be teleogically and never mechanically, explained. This is the, 'Cause leading' of the world, as mentioned above (P 184). Thus the 'Cause preceeding' of the world is the 'Sakāma-Karma of a Jīva ; while the 'Cause leading' is 'Mokṣa' or 'Mukti'.

Necessity for Niskama-Karmas

Of course, as pointed out above, the world, or the present life or birth of the individual may lead to new births, if new 'Sakāma-Karma are performed unwisely (P. 185). But if 'Niṣkāma-Karmas' are performed, then the results of the old and accumulated 'Sakāma-Karmas' will be experienced and thereby exhausted, opening the way to "Mokṣa" or "Mukti". In any case, the world, the present birth or life of the individual is the only sphere where the Karma-Phalas may be experienced and exhausted, So, from the moral standpoint, from the standpoint of Salvation—the world, indeed, is essential - although it solely depends upon the Jīvas themselves as to whether the same world will lead to the tearing off of their bondage, or to further bondage.

Hence, Brahman has to create the world according to the past Sakāma Karmas of the Jīvas, leaving to the Jīvas themselves as to whether this will be beneficial or harmful to them. So, He cannot be accused of cruelty at all.

In Western Ethics, all these worldly sorrows and sufferings are taken to be essential for the formation and development of character, as stated above (P. 217). This might be so, but this view fails to explain as to why such sorrows and sufferings accrue more to some, less to others, and here the distinction, evidently, cannot be explained except on the grounds of the Law of Karma.

2. Refutation of the Charge of Partiality against Brahman.

The second grave theological charge against Brahman, as we have seen (P. 185), is that of Partiality. That is, here in the world, individuals vary widely, and so it has to be said that Brahman is partial to some, to the exclusion of others.

Individual Differences are due to Sakama-Karmas of Jivas.

But here, too, the same solution is the only possible solution. As already pointed out (P. 211), the main causes of individual differences are the genes in the fertilized ova, or the hereditary characteristics inherited by the Jīvas at the very beginning of their individual existences. Now, these as we have seen, are entirely due to the past Karmas of the Jīvas themselves (P. 212). Again, individual differences may, also, be due to environmental differences, which, too, are due to the past Karmas of the Jīvas themselves.

Failure of Modern Science in this respect.

Thus, Modern Science attributes individual differences to two main causes: Heredity and Environment. So, the parentage of an individual, as well as the circumstances under which he is brought up, and the like, make all the differences between individual and individual. But science cannot explain as to why this child will have this parentage and that environment; and that child that parentage and this environment. (P. 211). This can be explained by the Law of Karma alone.

Hence, all the individual difference are due to the individuals themselves, and Brahman cannot be held responsible for the same. Thus, Brahaman cannot be accused of partiality at all, as He creates the world according to the past Karmas of the Jīvas' themselves.

Hence, in common with other Vedantist Śrīkaṇṭha, too, asserts repeatedly :—

"इति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—सर्वथा जगत् सृजतः परमेश्वरस्य वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न भवतः। कर्मसापेक्षत्वात् सृष्टिर्वैषम्यस्य"। (२-१-३४)।

"ततः कर्ममूलमेव सृष्टिर्वैषम्यम्।" (२-१-३५)

In refutation of the charges of Impartiality and Cruelty (Vaiṣamaya and Nairghṛṇya) against Brahman, it may be said, says Śrīkaṇṭha, that these are entirely unfounded. For, all the differences, as found in the universe, are due to the Karmas of the Jīvas themselves. So, Brahman cannot be held responsible for the same.

Objections against the Doctrines of God's All-Mercifulness and Impartiality

In this connection, Śrīkaṇṭha in his Commentary refutes five possible objections against the above Doctrine that Brahman is not responsible for the different lots of individuals, as found in the world—but only the respective Karmas of those individuals themselves.

(i) First Objection and its Refutation

Objection

It has been said above (P. 185-86) that the world is created according to the past Karmas of the Jīvas themselves. But Karmas must be done by the Jīvas, and cannot remain hanging in the air. However, at the beginning of creation, there are no Jīvas, so how can, there be Karmas, and Creation according to Karmas?

Reply

As has been pointed out above (P. 190-207), the 'Saṃsāra-Cakra', or the Series of Karma—Janma—Karma—Janma—and so on, is taken to be 'Anādi' or beginningless. Hence just as the Jīvas are Anādi, so are their Karmas.

"यथा जीवानादित्वं तथा तत्कर्मणयप्यनादित्वं दृश्यते हि। कर्मप्रवाह-सिद्धोऽयं संसारः।" (२-१-३५)

Creation is according to the Sakarma-Karmas of Jīvas

In fact, as has been repeatedly explained above (P. 185-186), if a Jīva is born on earth again, that only because its past Karmas have not been fully exhausted or experienced. Due to the moral force, latent in such 'Karmas', the 'Phalas' or appropriate results of which have not as yet been experienced, the Jīva has to be born again for experiencing the due results of such Karmas. So, if there be no Karmas, there can be no 'Sṛṣṭi' or Creation at all. Here, Creation being due solely to the Karmas of the Jīvas themselves, Karmas must be there at the beginning of each Creation

Sakarma-Karma-Vijas reside in the Subtle Body

But where do these reside? These reside in the Soul, or rather in the

'Sukṣma-Sarīra' of the Jīva, or the subtle-body of the individual soul. This subtle body accompanies the Jīva till it gets rid of 'Saṃsāra-Cakra' or this cycle of births and re-births, and is blessed with 'Mokṣa' or 'Mukti', though the 'Sthula-Śarīra' of the Jīva is destroyed at the time of death at the end of each birth (See below under the Section of 'Cit : Jīva). These are called 'Karma-Saṃskāra' or impressions left by the past 'Karmas' the results of which have not yet been experienced Thus, at the beginning of each Creation, Brahman, the Creator, makes each Jīva or individual soul be born again on earth by associating it with a new physical body and assigning it to a particular family, and so on, strictly according to its 'Karma-Saṃskāras' or past Karmas, the results of which have not yet been experienced. The process according to which He does so exactly, will be discussed later on.

In this way, the above Objection viz. that at the time of Creation, there are no Jīvas, so there are no Karmas of Jīvas – appears to be rather a childish one. As mentioned above (P. 34), the Jīvas are eternal as the Cit-Śakti of Brahman. So Pralaya or Dissolution does not imply a total destruction of the Jīva-Jagat ; nor, Sṛṣṭi, a new creation of the same. Really, Creation means the manifestation of the Cit-Acit-Śaktis of Brahman ; Dissolution means non-manifestation. So, the Jīvas are always there, in a manifested or in an unmanifested form. The real implications of such a manifestation and non-manifestation have been discussed above (P. 68, 79).

Hence, the Baddhas-Jīvas, with their Karma-Saṃskāras are ready there at the time of Creation for Brahman to take note of and create each accordingly.

Says Śrīkaṇṭha in his Commentary :—

"परमेश्वरो हि जीवानां विचित्रं कर्म सर्वज्ञतयावलोक्य स्वशक्त्या तत्तदनुगुणमेव भोगायतनं देवादिशरीरं सृजति।" (२-१-३५)

Being Ommiscient, the Lord knows all the numerous and various Karmas of all the Jīvas, and according to the same, creates the various bodies and the like of those Jīvas, so that they may experience the results of their past Karmas, in the new world.

Appaya Dīkṣita's View

Here, Appaya Dīkṣita in his Subcommentry, "Śivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā, gives a nice example :—

"एवं च यथा नरपतिः प्रजानां व्यवहारदर्शने तदीय-युक्तायुक्त-वचनानुसारेणानुग्रह-निग्रहविशेषं कुर्वन् पक्षपातित्व-लक्षणं वैषम्यं न प्रतिपद्यते, एवमीश्वरोऽपि तदीय-कर्म-विशेषानुसारेण विषम-सृष्टिं कुर्वन् न तत् प्रतिपद्यते, प्रत्युत-विषमकर्मणामेकरूप-सृष्ट्यामेव

युक्तायुक्तवादिनामेकरूपानुग्रहे व्यवहारद्रष्टुरिव परमेश्वरस्य वैषम्यमापद्येतेति भावः। एवं कर्मापेक्षया वैषम्यपरिहारेणैव नैर्घृण्य-परिहारोऽपि लब्धः।"

(शिवार्क-मणि-दीपिका, २-६-३५)।

An impartial Monarch cannot, evidently, favour some subjects and prosecute others arbitrarily. On the contrary, he has to take into account their conduct, and also consider whether their pleadings are reasonable or not. Then alone can He, as an Impartial Judge, reward or punish them, according to their actual acts. In the very same manner, the Lord, too, rewards or punishes the Jīvas, or creates them as having different lots in the world. This is the least that an Impartial Judge can do. Otherwise, if He created all alike, in spite of their past Karmas being different, then that would have made Him a totally Partial Lord. Thus, creating Jīvas as different is not at all unjust or partial. On the contrary, creating all Jīvas alike would have been supremely unjust and partial on His part.

(ii) Second Objection and its Refutation.

Objection

The creation of the world may be taken to be due to the respective past Karmas of the Jīvas themselves, as shown above (P, 185-86) and this may exonerate Him of the charge of partiality. But is not the very creation of the world a very cruel act, as shown above (P. 222)? For no one can deny that the world is full of pains and sufferings, sins and errors, impurities and imperfections. It is no use being unduly and unjustly optimistic and saying: "God's in Heaven and all's well with the world." God may be in Heaven or anywhere else; but, at least, this much is certain that all is not well with the world. Just consider the course of the world impartially, unemotionally, dispassionately—what will you see? You will see but an unending series of: Birth—Growth—Decay—Death; or more properly, in the technical language of Philosophy—the 'Śaḍvikāras' or six kinds of mutations :—

Janma, - Sthitī—Vṛddhi - Vikāra or Pariṇāma—Jarā or Kṣaya—Maraṇa.

Or Birth—Subsistence—Growth—Change or Transformation—Old age or Decay—Death.

Thus, from the beginning to the end, the life of a worldly soul, is subject to constant changes, and is, thus, essentially transitory or non-eternal. So, how can permanent or eternal perfection and happiness be ever possible here? That is why, it is a well-known fact that in the world, there might be a few pleasures, but pains are far more numerous; there might be a few virtues, but vices are far more

numerous ; there might be a few fulfilments, but frustrations are far more numerous. In fact, it is also questionable as to whether any thing can be really called 'pleasure', 'virtue' or 'fulfilment in the world at all. So, it does not need much argument to prove that the world is an intensely sinful and sorrowful one.

And, God in His supreme might and majesty, out of His own sweet will and inclination, creates such a world, non-chalantly and unconcernedly. So, what kind of a God is He except a supremely Cruel One, absolutely indifferent to the interests of the Jīvas, absolutely unmoved at the sorrows of the Jīvas, absolutely untouched by the pleadings of the Jīvas. So, the charge of cruelty has to be brought against Brahman, inevitably.

Śrīkaṇṭha puts the Objection thus :—

"ननु जोवानां शरोर-सृष्टौ अचेतनस्य कर्मणश्चेतनानधिष्ठितस्यासामर्थ्यात् चेतनत्वेन परमेश्वर एव प्रयोजक इति वक्तव्यम्। कथमसौ सृष्टेः प्राक् संहृत भोग साधनतया संसार-क्लेशरहितान् सुखिनो जोवान् पुनरपि संसारहेतुना शरीरेण योजयति परम-कारुणिकोऽपि सन्निति चेत्।" (२-१-३५)

Non-sentient Karmas cannot, at the beginning of Creation, create the bodies and the rest of the Jīvas. So the sentient Lord alone is the Creator of all these. But how can He ever, being an All-merciful Being, associate the Jīvas. once again, with bodies and the rest and cause them to be reborn, when prior to creation, they are quite happy as not being subject to any worldly experiences and pains ?

Reply

The above Objection has already been refuted above. (P. 186, 222)

Creation is necessary for Salvation

As Śrīkaṇṭha and Appaya Dikṣita point out here, the act of Creation does not, by any means, prove that Brahman is a supremely Cruel Being. On the contrary, it proves that He is a supremely Merciful Being and the favourer of all—"Sarvānugrāhaka". And, in what does His Favour "Anugraha" consist really ?

"अनुग्रहः बन्ध-निवर्तनेन स्व-साम्यप्रापणरूपः।"

(शिवार्क-मणि-दीपिका २-१-३५)

Favour means enabling the Jīvas to attain 'Mokṣa' or similarity with Himself, after destroying their state of Bondage.

That is, God really favours Jīvas, when He, according to their Sādhanas, leads them to 'Mokṣa' or 'Mukti'.

Now, this Mokṣa cannot be attained unless and until all Sakāma-Karmas are fully experienced and thereby exhausted. And for that, the

Jīvas have to be born on earth. This is the great necessity of "Saṃsāra". So, though ultimately rejectable, it is necessary in the beginning to enable Jīvas to get rid of their Sakāma-Karmas. Thus, though paradoxical, it has to be admitted that 'Saṃsāra' is the door to 'Mokṣa' (P. 223). So says Śrīkaṇṭha :—

"एवं क्रमाद् भोगेन पक्वे स्वकर्मणि शुद्धान्तःकरणानां जीवानां स्वविषयं ज्ञानमुत्पाद्य निरतिशयानन्दरूपां मोक्षलक्ष्मीं प्रकाशयति।" (२-१-३५).

In this way, when the 'Karmas' are exhausted through 'Bhoga' or experiencing, Brahman produces knowledge regarding Himself in those purified Jīvas and thereby leads them to Mokṣa.

Appaya Diksita's View

Appaya Dīkṣita, with his usual sense of humour, here refers to the case of 'Vraṇa and vaidya' in his Śivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā'. Now, when a patient is suffering from a boil or 'Vraṇa', the physician or 'Vaidya' applies medicine to it to make it suppurated or 'Pakva', so that it may burst forth, emitting the pus out, leading to relief and cure. But prior to that, when the physician through the application of medicine and the like, tries to make the boil suppurate, that gives intense pain to the patient for the time being ; still that cannot be helped and is meant for the greater benefit of the patient himself. In the same manner, the physician applies different kinds of suppurating medicine to different patients, suffering from different kinds of boils. Here, the physician is never accused of cruelty and partiality. On the contrary, he is praised as a very kind and helpful doctor trying to help his patients to attain their ends, viz. cure of the disease.

"न हि प्राणिनां व्रण-पाकार्थं तत्तद्व्रणगुणानुसारेण क्षारं निवेश्य तारतम्येन क्षार-निवेशप्रयुक्तं क्लेशमनुभावयतः कारुणिकस्य वैद्यस्य वैषम्य-नैर्घृण्यं प्रसज्यते।"

(शिवार्क-मणि-दीपिका (२-१-३५)

That is, when the doctor applies different quantities of soda to boils according to their nature, and also causes pain to the sufferers thereby, he, as a kind doctor, is never open to the charges of cruelty and partiality.

Similar is the case with Brahman and the Jīvas. Brahman, as the Supreme Physician of the Boil of Mundane Existence, has to subject the mundane Jīvas to the pain of mundane existence and apply the medicine of 'Karma', or make them undergo the results of their past Karmas, so that the boil of Mundane Existence may burst forth and be cured, leading to 'Mokṣa'.

Thus, Brahman cannot be accused of Cruelty and Partiality simply because He creates the world according to the past Karmas of the Jīvas themselves.

(iii) Third Objection and its Refutation

Objection

Brahman is responsible for Pralaya or Universal Dissolution. Does that not prove Him to be a very Cruel Being ? For, destroying so many millions and millions, of Jīvas together, is, undoubtedly, the height of cruelty and injustice (P. 56).

Reply

Destruction is according to the Past Sakama-Karmas of Jivas.

Hence, it may be said, first, that like 'Sṛṣṭi' or 'Creation', 'Pralaya' or Dissolution, too is due to the Karmas of the the Jīvas themselves. The exact process of this will be discussed later on (See the Section on "The Fifth Objection against the Law of Karma").

Utility of Death and Destruction

Further, it is wrong to hold that Pralaya is altogether a curse—for it may also be taken as a a great blessing in disguise. How ?

"संहारश्च जीवानां संसार-व्यापार-परिखिन्नानां सुषुप्तिवद् विश्रान्ति-हेतुतया परमेश्वरस्य न नैर्घृण्यापादकः।" (२-१-३५)

In fact, Death, though so much dreaded and regarded as the greatest of all worldly mishaps, sometimes proves beneficial to the Jivas themselves. For, what a great struggle-life is, according to common consent ! So, although led by our own blind animal instincts, viz. the fundamental instincts of Self-preservation and Race-preservation, we hanker for worldly life, yet it cannot be denied that worldly life is a very strenuous and tiring one ; and a rest and a respite are urgently needed. Death, surely, affords such a rest and a respite to such war-weary, life-weary, pain-weary souls. In fact, according to the Videha-mukti-vādins, or those who hold that "Mokṣa" or 'Mukti" is possible only after death, when all the past Sakāma-Karmas of Baddha-Jīvas being fully experienced are fully exhausted, and the approriate 'Sādhanas' or spritual means fully followed (See the Section on 'Salvation'). Hence, to such Baddha-Jīvas, Death is most welcome. To those also, who are destined to go to Heaven for their Puṇya-Karmas or virtuous deeds after Death, (P. 199), Death is very welcome. But to those alone who are destined to go to Hell after Death for their Pāpa-Karmas or vicious deeds, Death may prove to be a great terror, and justly so. However, generally speaking, Death is not an unmixed evil at all (P. 215-216).

Again, Pralaya or Universal Dissolution, when even Heaven and Hell disappear for the time being, undoubtedly affords a breathing-space to all worldly souls, more or less exhausted after a long spell of hard struggles in the world.

In this way, according to the Laws of Nature, Destruction is also necessary like Creation, for, worldly objects must have a beginning and an end, being essentially non-eternal in nature. Thus, non-eternal objects come and go, to make room for other non eternal objects which will also come and go. This being the Law of Nature, made by Brahman Himself, He, too, has to abide by it, and follow the Law of Creation, Maintenance and Destruction. And for that, He can, by no means, be accused of Cruelty.

(iv) Fourth Objection and its Refutation

Objection

It has been said above (P. 185-186), that Brahman creates the world according to the past Karmas of the Jīvas, or individual souls. Here, a formidable question arises. In that case, who is, really, the Creator here —Karma or Brahman ? Here, we are on the horns of a Dilemma—

If Creation be due to the Karmas of the Jīvas, then Brahman is not the Creator ; and, if Creation be due to Brahman, then Brahman is cruel and partial.

Either, Creation is due to the Karmas of the Jīvas, or Creation is due to Brahman.

Therefore, either, Brahman is not the Creator, or Brahman is cruel and partial.

The Śivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā makes the difficulty clearer :—

"यदि कर्म-वैचित्र्यमूलं जगद्वैचित्र्यं तदा कर्माधीन एवेश्वरो विचित्रं जगन्निर्मातीति तस्य कर्मपारतन्त्र्येण व्यवहर्तृगत-युक्तायुक्त-वचन पारतन्त्र्यस्य व्यवहारद्रष्टुरिव नास्ति निरतिशयस्वातन्त्र्य-लक्षणमीश्वरत्वमिति प्राप्तम्। तथा सति किं तेन ईश्वर इति नाममात्रं बिभ्राणेन वस्तुतोऽनीश्वरेण। जगद्वचित्र्यस्य कर्मवैचित्र्येणैव सिद्धतया तस्यानुपयुक्तत्वात्।' (शिवार्कमणि-दीपिका २·१·३५)।

If the different lots of different individuals, as found in the world, be due to the differences of the Karmas of those individuals themselves, then it has to be admitted that the Lord creates this variegated world, as under the control of those Karmas. Hence just as a Judge cannot act independently, but has to depend on the reasonable or unreasonable arguing by the lawyers—so, Brahman, too, is not an Independent Creator, but depends entirely on the Karmas of the Jīvas. So, how can He be designated as the Lord ?

Reply

What is the way out ?

In his usual succint manner, Śrikaṇṭha tries to solve the problem as follows :—

"कर्मणोऽपि तदधीनत्वात् तस्य न स्वातन्त्र्यहानिः।..... कर्मशक्तीनामनन्तानां संस्थापकमात्रत्वात् परमेश्वरस्य। कर्मणामेव स्वशक्तिवशात् सृष्टि-वैषम्य-हेतुत्वे तद्-व्यवस्थापकमात्रस्य तस्य न वैषम्यम्।" (२-१-३५)

On the one hand, Karmas are under the control of Brahman. So Brahman does not cease to be Independent. On the other hand, Karmas themselves are responsible for the different lots, as found in the world. So Brahman does not become open to the charges of cruelty and partiality.

In fact, theologically, this charge is, really, a formidable one. For if there be any thing that God cannot make otherwise, then God ceases to be Omnipotent. This will be discussed later on. (Also see the Section on "Lilāvāda and Karma-vāda).

(V) Fifth Objection and its Refutation

Objection

If God be Omnipotent and All-merciful, then He can at once, and immediately see to the expiring of the Karmas of the Jīvas and thereby exhaust these all. In that case, salvation would be attained by all immediately and no further births and re-births would be necessary.

Reply

The reply to this has been given many times above (P, 185-186). Creation and Dissolution, Bondage and Salvation—everything depends, as we have seen (P. 185-186, 225, 226, 228) and as will be proved later on (Section on "Salvation".) on the own respective Karmas of the Jivas themselves.

Divine Grace is according to the Karmas of Jivas.

In fact, the grace of God cannot be arbitrary (see P. 224 God is, surely, All-powerful and All-merciful; but all these do not imply that He acts just as He likes according to His own sweet will (See below the section on "Salvation) So, His "Anugraha" or "Grace", which, according to the Monotheistic Schools finally brings about Salvation, is showered on different individuals strictly according to their own Karmas. Hence, evidently, Brahman cannot arbitrarily exhaust all the Karmas of the different individuals to enable them to be free all at once. For that, every individual will have to be born repeatedly till he himself actually experiences each and every Phala' or appropriate result of his each and every Sakāma-Karma'.

Śrīkaṇṭha here solves the problem very ingeniously thus :—

"सत्यं परमेश्वरेण सममेव सर्वेषामनुग्रहे क्रियमाणेऽपि ये पक्वमलास्ते मुच्यन्ते, अपक्वमलाः काल्क्रमादेव। यथा, सावतृकिरण-सन्दोहे सममेव सन्तेऽपि पक्वान्येव पद्मानि विकसन्ति, नापक्वानि।" (२-१-३५)

Here instead of saying that Brahman does not favour all, but only some

deserving persons according to their Sādhanas or spiritual strivings, it is, perhaps, better, from the theological point of view to say that as Brahman is All-merciful, He emits His Supreme Mercy always and for all, it being impossible for Him to change His Nature at any time, just as the sun is all-luminous and emits its rays always and for all. Here although the sun shines for all equally, yet only those lotuses that are mature open up their petals and bloom forth, and not those that are immature. In the same manner, Brahman's Grace is there eternally and for all impartially and equally. Still only those who are fit to be free according to their own Sādhanas' or spiritual strivings, are freed finally through His Supreme Grace, and not others.

Appaya Diksita s View

Appaya Dīkṣita comments in his Sub-commentary "Śivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā" thus :—

"परमेश्वरस्य सर्वत्र करुणा-साम्येऽपि विचित्र-स्वभावानां तदावरण मलशक्तीनां व्रणानामिव पाकस्यानियतकालत्वात् सर्वेषां मुक्तेरयौगपद्यम् ।

(शिवार्क-मणि दीपिका २-१-३५)

Although the Lord is All-merciful and the Favourer of all equally, yet all are not fit to receive His Favour equally and simultaneously, as their Karma blemishes are not removed equally and simultaneously, or their Karma-boils suppurated equally and simultaneously. Hence, there is no possibility of Universal Release simultaneously.

Samkar .'s View

To show the strict neutrality or impartiality of Brahman, Śaṃkara, in his Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya, gives another beautiful illustration, from the Vyavahārika or empirical standpoint, viz. that of "Parjanya" or clouds, thus :—

"अतः सृज्यमान-प्राणिधर्मापेक्षा विषमा सृष्टिरिति नायमीश्वरस्यापराधः । ईश्वरस्तु पजन्यवत् द्रष्टव्यः । यथा हि पर्जन्यो व्रीहि-यवादि-वैषम्ये तु तत्तद्बीजगतान्येवासाधारणानि सामर्थ्यानि कारणानि भवन्ति, एवमीश्वरो देव-मनुष्यादि-सृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति देव-मनुष्यादि-वैषम्ये तु तत्तद् जीवगतान्येवासाधारणानि कर्माणि कारणानि भवन्ति । एवमीश्वरः सापेक्षत्वान्न वैषम्य-नैर्घृण्याभ्यां दूष्यति ।" (शङ्कर वेदान्त-भाष्य २-१-३४)

Take the case of clouds. Clouds impartially shower down rains over an open field in which different seeds have been sown by farmers. Yet, when the seeds sprout forth in plants, these plants are found to be entirely different in nature. So, what is the cause of such mutual differences amongst the plants ? The clouds, evidently, or the rains cannot constitute such causes, as shown above. So, the only explanation is that the seeds of those plants are mutually different from the very beginning, and so

the differences amongst the seeds initially are responsible for the differences amongst the plants ultimately. In this way, the clouds or the rains are only "Sādhāraṇa-Kāraṇa" or Common Causes of the resulting plants; while the potencies inherent in their seeds are the 'Asādhāraṇa-Kāraṇa' or special causes of the resulting plants.

Exactly same is the case here, as repeatedly explained above, (P. 185-186). Iśvara or God is the Sādhāraṇa-Kāraṇa or Common Cause of gods, men and the rest; while the respective Karmas of those individuals are the 'Asādhāraṇa-Kāraṇa' or special causes of those individuals.

4. Concluding Remarks: Lilavada and Karmavada

In this way, from the sphere of Theology, no less, we get a full support of the Law of Karma. In fact, every Theological System of the world has to face three formidable questions; two of which have been already referred to (P. 170, 222), viz.

(i) If God be All-merciful, then how can there be a world full of sins and sufferings?

(ii) If God be All-Impartial, then how can there be a world full of individual differences?

(iii) If God be All-powerful and All-knowing, then how can there be Freedom of Will in the case of individual souls, making Morality possible?

Attempts have already been made to answer the first two questions, on the grounds of the Law of Karma, above (P. 182 ff). Now, an attempt will also be made to answer the third below. (Section on 'Fifth Objection against the Law of Karma' included under the Section on 'Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma-Vāda).

How can Isvara-Lila be reconciled with Jiva-Karmas?

The crux of the whole matter is this.

Under the Section on Lilāvāda (P. 52, 151ff, 207-8), it has been shown as to how the creation of the world is not really a kind of production of an external effect—like the production of a clay-pot out of a lump of clay by a potter; but it is really a kind of 'sport' on the part of Brahman with Himself. It is because of His essential loving, joyful, playful Nature that Brahman engages Himself in a Divine Sport with Himself, seemingly bifurcating Himself into the Universe of Souls and Matter; seemingly separating the Jīvas from Himself, seemingly making them be born in the world, thereby, making them, "Baddha"; seemingly bringing them back to Him making them "Mukta" or "Free". We have here purposely used the term "seemingly" several times to make it clear that all these processes are not 'real' processes, as there cannot be any change of states on

the part of Brahman, like expanding out or manifesting which is "Creation" or Sṛṣṭi, and contracting in or not manifesting which is Dissolution' or 'Pralava' ; separating, which is 'Bondage' or Bandha, and uniting which is 'Mokṣa' or Salvation (Pp. 70 71, 82, 147, 238). Yet, according to the Monotheistic Schools, Creation and Dissolution, Bondage and Salvation, Souls and Matter (Jīva-Jagat) are 'real', not only empirically or phenomenally, as held by the Advaita School—but also transcendentally or noumenally. How is that possible ? This will be discussed later on. (See below the Section on "Salvation"). For the time being, it is quite sufficient for our purpose to accept the Doctrine of Līlā, as established above (P. 52, 151 ff , 207-8).

Now, it has been said under the Section on "The Refutation of the Sixth Objection against Brahma-Kāraṇa Vāda" (Pp. 151ff), that Brahman creates the universe of souls and matter in sport. But under the Section on "The Refutation of the Seventh Objection against Brahma Kāraṇa-Vāda" (P. 182ff , it has, again, been said that Brahman creates the universe of souls and matter according to the Karmas of the Jīvas themselves. Now, how can these two apparently contradictory statements be reconciled ? For, as shown above, there is no necessity in Līlā, except the necessity of Nature, which, however, involves no compulsion of any kind at all (P. 82, 152, 178). Thus, Līlā' or Sport' is due to the loving, joyful, playful Nature of Brahman which essentially or by a necessity of Nature, expresses itself in sports. But here there is no forcing of any kind whatsoever either externally or internally, and that is why, it is purely spontaneous Yet Brahman cannot play' or 'create' in whatever way He likes, as He has to do so according to the Karmas of the Jīvas—so far His act of 'playing' or 'creation' is a controlled kind of act. So, are not these two concepts : the Concept of Līlā and the Concept of Karma—Līlāvāda and Karma-Vāda—the two fundamental Concepts or Theories of all the Schools of the Vedānta, inconsistent with each other ? (P. 169)

Isvara-Lila and Jiva-Karmas are not inconsistent.

Of course not, for how could have Indian Philosophy stood so long and honourably, if its two legs were mutually antagonistic,— can any one stand or walk with a pair of legs moving in two opposite directions ? So, the above two fundamental Indian Doctrines are by no means opposed to each other. On the contrary, these two together make up a great and grand Theory of Creation, unparalleled,—and may we say with all humility—the best, in the world.

Marks of a Sport : Orderliness.

Now, first, creation is of course, a Līlā or a sport on the part of Brahman—an Infinite Sport, expressing His infinite Love and Infinite Bliss (P. 52, 76, 151). But another equally important characteristic

of Brahman is His Orderliness; another equally important characteristic of a sport is its variety. Thus, if a being be not an orderly, systematic being, it cannot be a 'being' at all—for 'existence', implies 'consistency', 'consistency' implies 'order' or 'system'. Thus, what is disorganised is disharmonious, and what is disharmonious is disintegrated soon, even if it has a temporary kind of existence. Hence it is that Brahman has been described as "Rta." (P. 29),

Marks of a Sport : Variety

Again, a sport, to be a sport cannot be monotonous—variety, and novelty constitute its very essence, and make it what it is—an embodiment of love and bliss. Thus, when Brahman engages Himself in His Divine, Cosmic Sport, He naturally does so according to a Supreme System, in an orderly, and not in an haphazard, manner. Again, He plays with His own different 'parts'—this term has to be used for want of a better one (P. 225 ff)—in different ways, making His 'Play' variegated, rich, full. In fact, as the Jīves are mutually different (P. 43), Brahman's plays with them must also be so. (Page 169 ff)

Now, what is the principle of such an Orderly, Variegated Play? According to what particular principle does Brahman—in empirical terms—separate, so to speak, certain Jīvas from Himself, and re-unite, so to speak, certain others with Himself; makes for the "Bandha' or "Bondage" of some. and "Mokṣa" or "Salvation" for others? According to the inherent individualities of the Jīvas themselves (P. 43),—in empirical terms according to the respective Karmas of those Jīvas themselves. (P. 185) These 'individualities', from the transcendental standpoint, and these 'Karmas' from the empirical, make for orderliness on the part of Brahman, and variety in the case of His sport'. As a matter of fact, this kind of Divine, Cosmic Play is the only kind of Activity that we can conceive of on the part of Brahman. For, as we have seen (P. 62, 76, 148ff, 151ff), all other kinds of activity are purposive in nature, involving a kind of want or defect on the part of the agent himself; and so, this Activity must be a fully orderly one. In this way, this Divine, Cosmic Sport is essentially an orderly one, although it is spontaneous and non-purposive.

Freedom and Determinism not Inconsistent

Really speaking, Spontaneity and Regularity, Freedom and Discipline, Bliss and Order, Love and Law are two sides of the same thing. For, what is spontaneous is only so because of a perfect regularity within—if there be internal irregularity, then there will, naturally, be internal conflicts to conquer, internal hurdles to cross, internal obstacles to overcome; and in that case, as naturally, the spontaneous flow of that thing will be inevitably hampered. Can the sun shine spontaneously, if there be irregularities inside its own disc? Can the wind blow spon-

taneously if there be irregularities within its own course? Can the stream flow spontaneously, if there be irregularities within its own bosom? Then, everything will be impossible, or, at least, only forced, halting, artificial.

In the same manner, Freedom essentially means Discipline or self control. As a matter of fact, uncontrolled Freedom is an impossibility or a contradiction in terms. For, the so-called uncontrolled Freedom really amounts to an abject surrender to the rule of Animalism, to our lower passions and impulses, to our physical cravings and strivings. Thus, if we cannot check our lower impulses, if we become slaves to our own blind, irrational desires, if we are led by our animal instincts—then, where, really is our freedom? In this way, Freedom essentially means rule of self, control of self, discipline of self.

Hence, it is said that real Bliss, Joy or Happiness is real Order, System or Harmony. Real Love is Law incarnate. That is why, God of Bliss is also God of Order, God of Love is also God of Law. Accordingly, His Acts of Creation and Emancipation—Sṛṣṭi and Mukti or the two sides of His Supreme Act of Playing, being expressions of His Love and Bliss, are inevitably orderly Acts, according to the Laws of His own Nature. These Law and Order consist in creating, so to speak, the Jīvas according to their own past, 'Sakāma Karmas or selfish acts; and emancipating so to speak, the Jīvas according to their own 'Sādhanas' or 'spiritual strivings'.

In this way, just as we can safely assert, in the same breath, that, the sun shines spontaneously, without any selfish purpose, yet is subject to its own inner laws—so we can also assert safely that Brahman creates the universe of Souls and Matter in sport, yet creates the same according to the past Sakāma-Karmas of the Jīvas themselves. Thus, Līlā-vāda and Karma-Vāda: Doctrine of Creation in Sport and Doctrine of Creation according to Karma's—are fully consistent with each other—rather, supplement each other, instead of being opposed to each other. And, here the second Doctrine is essentially necessary to make clear the first. For, our ordinary conception of 'sport' is that it is something absolutely free, untrammelled, uncontrolled, without any order, system, rule or law. To controvert this, the Doctrine of Karma is necessary, by the side of the Doctrine of Līlā.

Monistic View regarding Creation.

In fact creation according to all the Indian Theories—Monotheistic and Monistic—can be considered from two standpoints—Transcendental and Empirical (P 73 ff). Of course, there is a distinction between Monistic and Monotheistic interpretations of these two standpoints. According to the Monistic Standpoint, the empirical is 'Mithyā' or False;

as such it is ultimately negated, and is qualitatively different from the transcendental. But according to the Monotheistic Standpoint, the empirical is not 'Mithyā' or False, but only 'Apūrṇa' or 'Incomplete', as such, it is never ulimately negated, and is only quantitatively different from the transcendental. Thus, according to the Monistic Standpoint, from the transcendental standpoint, there is no question of Creation at all—there being only one Reality, viz. Brahman, Jīva-Jagat, the Universe of Souls and Matter being 'Mithyā' or False. From the empirical standpoint, however, Creation is a Līlā or Sport of Iśvara, according to the past Sakāma-Karmas of Jīvas themselves.

Monotheistic View regarding Creation.

According to the Monotheistic Schools, however, Creation is real from the transcendental standpoint, no less. From this transcendental standpoint, Creation is a Līlā or a Sport on the part of God, without any reference to Jīvas, without any reference to Karmas without any reference to birth and re-births (P. 52,76,148,152) For all these terms 'Jīvas', 'Karma', Janma-Janmāntara' are empirical in nature. That does not, of course, imply that these are false in nature, for, as shown just above, the empirical is not 'false,' but only 'incomplete'. Hence, it is only due to our incomplete vision, because of the veil of ignorance that we consider ourselves to be Jīvas, independent of Brahman, living in a Jagat, independent of Brahman performing Sakāma-Karmas for selfish gains, being born and re-born, sinning and suffering, going to Heaven and Hell—and doing all such sorts of things. Now, all these, according to the Monotheistic Schools—are not false, but, as pointed out above, only incomplete. Thus Jīva is Jīva, no doubt, but not independently of Brahman, but only as 'Svagata-Bhedas' (P. 37), internal differences of Brahman ; Jagat is Jagat no doubt, but not independently of Brahman, but as only 'Svagata Bheda' of Brahman. Also, these being eternal, cannot really be created ; yet creation is a fact, and not an illusion, in the same sense as a 'Play', though essentially, a kind of make-belief only, is, undoubtedly, a fact. (P. 81,159,170). In the very same manner, the Jīvas being eternally free, cannot really be freed again, yet Salvation is a fact, in the sense explained above.

Difficulties in the Monotheistic View.

This is the only way in which the Monotheistic Systems can reconcile their fundamental Doctrines, viz. that Brahman is not subject to any changes or transformation, and that, the Jīvas are eternal and eternally free, with their equally fundamental Doctrines that Creation and Dissolution, Bondage and Emancipation, Striving and Securing are actual facts (P. 70-71, 82, 147, 235). The general supposition is that it is very difficult, if not totally impossible, to justify logically Monistic Theories (Advaita-

Vāda). But, the above considerations will clearly show that it is far more difficult to justify Monotheistic Theories which, in the same breath, assert that God is unchanging, yet is transformed into the form of the world ; and that the Jīva is eternal, yet an effect of Brahman.

(F) Sphere of Metaphysics : Law of Conservation of Values

Metaphysics, as well known, is a Study of Reality, and in this sense, is the oldest and the most primitive of all studies. For, with the very dawning of rational reflection, the first and the fundamental question that a Rational Man asked was : 'What is Reality' ? Now, in trying to grasp the Real nature of Reality, the Rational Man is confronted with a fundamental, undeniable distinction, viz. that between 'Reality' and 'Appearance'—in the technical language of Philosophy—between 'Noumenon' and Phenomenon'. "Things are not what they seem"—this poetic maxim is, in fact, the very beginning, but by no means the end, of Metaphysics. Thus, this distinction between 'Seeming' and 'Being' is maintained all throughout in Metaphysics, till 'Seeming' is resolved into Being' ; (Absolutism), or 'Being' into 'Seeming' (Scepticism).

1. Existence and Value

However, one thing is clear here viz. that according to all Metaphysical Theories, 'Value' is a fundamental characteristic of 'Existence'. This simply means that what is', or what 'happens' has a value of its own—whatever that be—and that value can never be lost, even though apparently so. Now, there are different views as to whether 'appearances' have any value at all, and if so, what and to which extent. But leaving all these intricate questions aside, we may note here a fundamental Law of Metaphysics, viz. the Law of Conservation of Values. It is as fundamental to Metaphysics as the Law of Conservation of Energy is to Physics.

2. Law of Conservation of Values

This Law of Conservation of Values means that the very existence of an object carries within it an inner potency which must express itself in an appropriate result ; and until and unless it does or can do so, that potency is conserved in it. That effect is called its 'Value'. This Law of Conservation of Values is, however, the same as the Law of Causation, as found in the Science of Logic (P. 182). As a Science, it simply deals with existent facts ; and says that a cause actually produces an effect ; an effect actually proceeds from a cause. But it does not say as to what happens to a cause that does or cannot actually produce an effect. But Metaphysics being a wider study has to consider further this question equally : If a cause, if an existent thing, if an object fails, for the time being, to produce or manifest its value—what happens to that

value? Here, according to the Law of Conservation of Values, that value does not disappear, but is conserved. For what purpose? For the purpose of later manifestation. If there be no such later manifestation, what then? Then the value of that object remains in it in a potential form. For how long? That depends on the nature of the object itself. Thus the value of a seed is in the plant. If the plant cannot be produced, due to some reason or other, then the seed may, for sometime, retain its plant-producing potency, or may dry up.

3. What is Value?

A further question, may be asked as to whether the 'value' of a thing lies in what it "is", or only in what it "does". The answer is simple enough. If a thing be 'static', then its value and its existence are identical; its value, thus lies in what it "is". Again, naturally, in the case of a 'dynamic' thing, its "value" and "behaviour" are identical, and its value lies in what it "does".

In any case, according to this beautiful Metaphysical Doctrine of Conservation of Values, values are as eternal as the valued substances themselves. If the object persists, its value, too, does so.

4. What happens to Unmanifested Values?

But in the case of a dynamic reality, a new difficulty, crops up. It is as follows:—

If the value be not manifested here and now, what happens to it? Western Philosophical Systems, not believing in Re-birth, is at a loss here. The undeniable fact remains that if the value is something to be expressed, something to blossom forth and fructify in something else, something to lead to an appropriate effect—then unless and until that value is expressed, that value is fructified, that value is produced into an effect—that value should be conserved and an appropriate metaphysical theory formulated to make that possible. But, unfortunately, Western Scholars have fought shy of the only metaphysical theory possible and plausible here, viz. the theory of Births and Re-births. So, the whole thing is in a cauldron, in a melting-pot.

5. Indian Solution of the Problem

Here steps in Indian Philosophy with its usual broad outlook and ingenious modes of solution. And what does it offer? It offers, as usual its fundamental Law, viz. the Law of Karma, as the sole solution of the above problem. According to it, Karmas, i.e., Sakāma-Karmas are dynamic realities, and as such, their values lie in their products, or their values lie in producing pleasures or pains, as the case may be. These values must be produced, otherwise, Sakāma-Karmas are not so at all. Hence, if not produced immediately, these values are necessarily conserved. and, are produced later on. According to the Indian View, if

such values have to be produced, as shown just above, then these have to be produced even in next births—for, a Sakāma-Karma without its appropriate result, good or bad, is unthinkable. Thus, the Law of Karma means that there is no loss of the Karmaphalas of Sakāma-Karmas. And, this is nothing but the Metaphysical Doctrine of Conservation of Values.

Thus from the sphere of Metaphysics, no less, we get a full support for the Law of Karma.

(G) Concluding Remarks : Law of Completeness

The Law of Karma has been sought to be justified above on the grounds of different branches of study. Underlying all these, there is a basic Law—the Law of Completeness, and the Law of Karma is nothing but a great and grand illustration of such a Law.

1. Law of Completeness

How, what is this Law of Completeness ? It holds that a 'Complete' thing is only that which, in the empirical sphere, can be taken together with its 'Cause-preceding' and 'Cause leading', (P. 183, 223). For example, a pot is not completely known, until and unless its 'Cause preceding' and 'Cause leading' are done so. Here, its 'Cause preceding' is the potter with the lump clay and other tools and instruments. And its "Cause leading" is the buyer who purchases it and uses it for drinking and other such purposes. Thus, to know the pot completely, we have to know 'what' it really is ; and to know what it really is, we have to know its how' and 'why'—'how' it comes into existence and 'why' it comes into existence. Here, the 'how' is known from the 'cause preceding' ; and the 'why', from the 'cause leading'. In this way, from the empirical or worldly standpoint, a complete thing is essentially connected with other things, being itself produced by something else, itself producing something else ; being itself served by something else, itself serving something else. In this way, a worldly thing, a thing that becomes, is a "thing" only in relation to its antecedents and consequents, only in relation to its causes and purposes—it cannot be taken just as it is and left there,—it has to be traced back and followed up.

2. Law of Karma is a Law of Completeness

And, the Law of Karma is nothing but this processes, of "tracing back" and "following up". It insists on a complete explanation of a thing, "tracing it" to its "cause preceding", and "following it up" to its "cause leading'. And, what is the fundamental thing in the world ? Karma, for, the world is a world of becoming, where activities are, as such, so very important. Hence, such Karmas, viz. Śakāma-Karmas, must be taken to be complete facts, i.e., being produced by appropriate

preceding causes, these must also, lead to appropriate succeeding results or Phalas. But if these are not allowed to do so, then these will, inevitably, remain incomplete, failing to reach their consummation or fulfilment. However, as the world is entirely teleological or purposive in nature, everything in the world must be so; everything in the world must be able to reach its own completion, attain its own consummation, honour its own commitments. The Indian Law of Karma only emphasises this and nothing more. And, as a corollary to this, it has also to assert that if the present life be too small, too full to afford a scope for the fulfilment of the purpose of each and every Karma another life will be needed for that. How can that be taken to be wholly impossible or absurd? Is it not far more impossible or absurd that in a teleological world, in a world created by the Supremely Rational God, purposive acts or Sakāma Karmas should fail to fulfill their purposes or produce their appropriate results?

(h) Second Objection against the Law of Karma : Fatalism.

A second, common objection against the Law of Karma is as follows :—

It has been said above that according to the Law of Karma, the past Karmas of a Jīva determine its present life here and now. Thus, its hereditary characteristics, as well as its environmental conditions are all due to its past Karmas (P. 182ff). Now, the activities of that Jīva in the present life are due to its hereditary and environmental conditions. (P. 210,248) For example, if this Jīva acts intelligently and virtuously, but another Jīva does the opposite, then the difference between the activities of these two Jīvas must be due to Heredity, Environment or both. Thus, Rāma acts intelligently because he has inherited intelligence from his parents or ancestors; and also because his environments have helped him to develop his intelligence. Now, according to the Law of Karma, Rāma's hereditary characteristics and environmental facilities are entirely due to his own past Karmas. Hence, his intelligent activities here are entirely due to his own past Karmas.

1. Law of Karma makes Freedom of Will Impossible.

In this way, if the Law of Karma is admitted, it has also to be admitted, at the same time, that there is no freedom of action in any life or birth at all. But from all eternity, there is a series of pre-determined acts, each pre-determined by a corresponding act in a prior birth, and each, again, determining an act in a later birth.

Thus it is that Freedom of Will is an impossibility; and the main characteristics of a voluntary action, viz., free reflection about different alternatives regarding ends and means, as well as free choice of one

amongst the rest, are, accordingly, all illusory. Hence, the Law of Karma, instead of being a Law of Justice, as asserted, (P. 69), becomes a supreme Law of Injustice. For, why should an individual be allowed to enjoy pleasures or forced to suffer pains—not only here, but also hereafter—for acts which are really not 'voluntary acts' at all, in any proper sense of the term? For, here, as shown above, the so called 'free reflection' is an act inevitably pre-determined by other prior acts; the so-called 'free choice' is, also, an act inevitably pre-determined by other prior acts. Hence, the individual concerned should not be held responsible for his present acts, and compelled to undergo the results thereof.

2. Law of Karma makes Morality and Religion Impossible

In fact, if the Law of Karma be admitted, then moral life itself will become impossible. Morality requires freedom of will, the possibility and capacity to choose freely and rationally amongst alternative courses of action, good or bad. Hence, if there be no freedom of will then, moral responsibility becomes a farce. In this way, the Law of Karma inevitably involves Fatalism; and Fatalism inevitably puts an end to all that we call a human life, as distinguished from a mere 'animal life; and as inevitably makes way for Mechanism, Amoralism, and finally, even Materialism. For, human beings who are simply 'automata' like material objects, and behave like material objects, are really, the same as material objects, differing from the material objects at best in degree only, and not in kind. Also, God who creates such a wholly automaton-like world, is not, really, like the God of Religion; for the God of Religion is a God of Prayer and Worship, having an intimate relation with His own counter-parts, the individual souls. But if the individual souls be purely machines, like material objects, Religion becomes meaningless, and God of Religion also so.

In this way, it may be pointed out that the Indian Law of Karma is a wholly untenable Doctrine.

(r) Refutation of the Second Objection against the Law of Karma.

The above objection, indeed, appears to be a formidable one. But really it is due to a very common misunderstanding of the whole problem of Creation from the Indian point of view.

As pointed out above, Creation can be considered from two standpoints, transcendental and empirical. From the transcendental standpoint, it is 'Iśvara-Līlā'; from the empirical, it is according to Jīva-Karmas (P. 37 ff).

(A) Karmas and Phalas form one Whole

Thus, from the empirical standpoint, the 'Sakāma-Karmas' are

taken to be causes, of which 'pleasure' and 'pain' are taken to be just effects. Now, according to the Law of Causation, a 'cause' (Cause No. 1) is completed, so to speak, as soon as its own appropriate 'effect' (Effect No. 1) is produced. Hence, it is that 'Karmas' and 'Phalas' are taken to be forming one, total whole. So, if the effect, again, in its turn, becomes a cause itself (Cause No. 2 by producing another effect of its own, (Effect No. 2), then the "Cause No. 1." has no direct connection with or control over the "Effect No. 2", the Effect No. 2 being directly produced out of the "Cause No. 2".

Of course, it is true, that "the Cause No. 2" being itself the "Effect No. 1" of the "Cause No. 1", itself carries within it the characteristics or qualities and powers of "the Cause No. 1". But, still, the "Effect No. 2" is not at all a product out of these characteristics or attributes and powers only. For, as pointed out above, the 'potency' or the power of being a Cause' is exhausted in the case of a particular thing, as soon as its own appropriate, direct, immediate effect viz. "Effect No. 1" is produced. But its remote effect, viz. "Effect No. 2" is really due to the new 'potency' or 'new power of being a cause' of Cause No. 2.

(B) Real Meaning of a 'Cause'.

Otherwise, we shall be led, inevitably, to an absurd position, thus: If in a series of Mutual or Reciprocal Causes and Effects, there be a hundred effects, one after another, then all of these must be taken to be due solely and wholly to the Original Cause alone, to the Cause No. 1 alone. In that case, how can the "Cause No. 2", and the rest be called "Causes" at all? Then, these should, more properly, be called mere 'transmitters' only. For, real causes are entities on their own rights, with their own potencies or powers to be causes, and are not mere transmitters by any means.

(C) Worldly Examples.

In fact, to maintain that in a Series of Mutual Causes and Effects, all the effects are due to the Original Cause or the Cause No 1, will be as absurd as to maintain that all the trees in the world, past, present and future being due to one original seed, partake of its characteristics only; all the hens in the world, past, present and future being due to one original egg, partake of its characteristics only; all the human beings in the world, past. present, and future, being due to the same parents, partake of their characteristics only; this will automatically mean that all the trees, all the hens, all the human beings in the world, past, present and future, are exactly identical in nature. The same is the case with every species.

Thus, according to the above view, we are landed on a very strange conclusion. Let us take a symbolical example once again. Suppose we say that A as a cause, produces B as an effect; again, B as a cause, produces C as an effect, and so on. Now, here, suppose we say that 'X' constitutes the nature of 'A'. So, 'B', as the effect of 'A', is also 'X' in nature Hence, when, again, from 'B' as a cause, 'C' arises as an effect, 'C', too, must be 'X' in nature, and so on and on. In this way, 'A', 'B' 'C' and all the rest in the series must be all 'X' in nature and so be exactly identical in nature.

If that be so, then all the members, past, present and future, of all the species in the world must, always and inevitably, be exactly the same, or identical in nature.

But is that ever found ?

(D) The Cause is an Independent Power

Hence, we have to conclude that as in single cases, so in the case of a series, a particular cause and its effect form one complete whole, i.e., the cause 'A' and its effect 'B' complete the matter for the time being. After that if 'B' again becomes a cause of another effect 'C', then B', though partly determined by 'A', its own cause, is also partly, independent, as itself a cause of 'C'.

In fact, it is this characteristic of 'part dependence', and 'part independence' that constitutes the very core or essence of a 'Cause'. Thus, a cause, as itself an effect, is determined by its previous causes—so far, it is determined and dependent. But, again, it, as itself a cause, itself determines its later effect—so far, it is non-determined and independent

Take a common example. A seed springs out of a plant—so far it is determined and dependent on that plant. But when it itself produces another plant, it does so by its own inner potency or power, which is its own; its environments may be different; or, even, in the same soil, under the same circumstances, its reaction may be quite different, producing a plant different from the original.

Or, take a better example, more to the point. A child is born of particular parents, in a particular family, under particular circumstances. So far, he is, surely, determined by his hereditary and environmental peculiarities. But can it be ever said that the child is entirely determined by the same? Evidently, not. Even 'identical twins', having the very same hereditary characteristics, and brought up in very similar environments, are by no means, identical. And, it would also be very hazardous to assert that, if, like hereditary characteristics, environmental circumstances, too, were exactly identical here, then the 'identical twins' would have been

exactly identical, proving thereby that an individual is wholly determined by his or her hereditary charact ristics and environmental circumstances. For, the individuality of an individual is an undeniable fact of experience, as shown above (P. 43).

(E) The Cause is an Individual.

And a Cause is essentially an Individual.

Now, what exactly, is an Individual ? As pointed out above (P. 43), an Individual is a unique something—what it is, it alone is, and no one else is And, such a 'uniqueness' implies, essentially, that, the Individual necessarily possesses the power of rising above its circumstances, going beyond its own causes. For, if it were determined solely by its own circumstances, by its previous causes, then it would have been the same as many other individuals under the very same circumstances ; then, it would have been the same as its previous causes But it is not, definitely not. So, this proves definitely that the individual is unique because it has the power to rise above its own circumstances, to go beyond its own causes.

And, it is in this that lies the potency or power of the Cause.

(F) A Cause or an Individual is Self-determined.

In this way, a Cause or an Individual is essentially self-determined. This implies that there is something in it. an incomprehensible residue, an inexplicable 'more', that, in the midst of all its surroundings influencing it, still, makes it free and independent, not, of course, in the sense of being absolutely wild and uncontrolled—but, only in the sense of being controlled by its own 'individual self', and not by any external circumstances.

(G) 'Other-determination' and 'Self-determination'.

It has been said above (P. 245) that a Cause is partly determined and partly not. Now, what does this exactly imply ? It simply implies that the 'other-determination' itself is, finally, self-determination. This is by no means, paradoxical. For, an individual is partly determined by his hereditary characteristics and environmental circumstances ; yet, ultimately, he himself determines as to how these will mould his life and shape his destiny. Thus, Rama may, by heredity, possess a good power of painting ; and also, his environmental conditions may be favourable, in this regard. Again, Syama may not possess a good faculty of painting, and, also his environmental conditions may not be very favourable, in this regard. Yet, who knows, Rama may not actually turn out to be a good painter ; while, Syāma may prove to be quite a good one. Why ? Because, it lies within the power of an individual to deal with his hereditary and environmental conditions according to his own inclinations and capacities. (P. 248)

Undoubtedly, it is true that such powers are not unlimited in extent. For, Syāma, inspite of his best efforts, can not become a good painter as he, from the beginning, by heredity, lacks the power of painting. Still, he, can at least, wipe away the Zero' (0) and transform it into 'One' (1). This much lies within his power. More so, Rāma can wipe away 'Hundred' (100) and reduce it to a mere Zero (0). Is this not freedom or independence enough ?

And, this is self-determination, pure and simple.

(H) Law of Karma : A Law of Self-determination.

Now, let us return to the original problem posed for here.

It is true that the present life of an individual, here and now, on this earth is due to his past Karmas, as shown above (P. 182ff)—otherwise, no just explanation can be given of individual differences Still, as also shown above (P. 245-246), the individual, by no means, is wholly determined by his hereditary characteristics and environmental circumstances ; but himself determines as to how these will, ultimately affect his life and produce actual results therein. In other words, the individual is, essentially, a self-determined being, as a metaphysician would say.

(I) Law of Karma does not imply Fatalism.

Hence it is wrong to assert that the Law of Karma necessarily implies a pernicious kind of Fatalism, and, is, on that ground, absolutely untenable.

Really, there is no scope for Fatalism here, at all. Apart from any thing else, who starts the whole series, the whole course of Births and Re-births ? The self itself, the individual himself, and no one else. It is his own 'Sakāma-Karmas' that start the whole series, the whole course of Births and Re-births. So, leaving aside all these questions as to 'which precedes which, Janma or Karma', which, however, have been fully discussed above (P. 206—7)—it may be safely said here that the Law of Karma, being essentially a Law of the Sakāma-Karmas, or selfish voluntary acts of individuals, can never imply any kind of Automatism or Fatalism, at all. For, even if, for the sake of argument, it is assumed here that the later Karmas of an individual are entirely determined by his prior Karmas—that is not Automatism or Fatalism, by any stretch of imagination. Automatism or Fatalism implies pre-determination by external circumstances, beyond one's own control. But here the acts of an individual are determined by his own free acts, his own past acts, of course, now beyond his control. But what does that matter, really ? After all, these are his own acts, his own voluntary acts, and if the once-done voluntary acts continue to produce their effects birth after birth—that would, really, be nothing more than self-determination,—may be,

rather an unduly long drawn self-determination, yet, self determination undoubtedly and inevitably. So, here, even if it be accepted that some previous acts can produce a long series of later acts, even extending to different births still such later acts cannot, by any means, be called Automatic or Mechanical Acts, like Random Acts, and the rest (P. 180); also 'Forced Acts', like the act of building a road, at the point of a bayonet, by a prisoner of war.

In any case, as we have seen above, this is not taken to be the real implication of the Law of Karma. For, the Law of Karma is, essentially, a Law of Causation, 'Karma' being the Cause, and 'Karma-Phala', the effect. And, a cause, as we have seen, directly produces its own immediate effect only, and ends there. If it is supposed to start a series, then also, each intermediate cause in it is a separate individual, with separate potencies of its own.

1. Case of the Same Birth.

Now, here, suppose, in course of the same birth or life, a particular individual performs a particular 'Sakāma Karma' or selfish voluntary action. Then it produces its appropriate result, accompanied by pleasure. And, for the time being, the matter ends there. For example, a student studies hard and passes the examination, getting intense pleasure for the same. Here the original act and its appropriate result are taken to be one complete whole, as pointed out above. Then, of course, this reult or consequence of 'passing the examination' may lead to other results, such as 'joining a college' or 'getting a job' and the like. But here, that student exercises his free will over again, and chooses a particular course of action. In this way, the Law of Karma leads to no special difficulties in the case of the voluntary acts, done in the course of the same birth and producing their appropriate results, then and there. For, the Indian case is nothing peculiar. According to all protagonists of Free Will, human actions are done voluntarily and produce their appropriate results, here and now, unless otherwise prevented from doing so.

2. The Individual and Heredity and Environment

The very pertinent question, as to whether the voluntary desires and efforts of an individual are the only deciding factors here, may, very well, be raised here. This has already been referred to above (P. 210-11, 242, 245-46).

The question is an all-important, all-time question as to whether an individual does, really, possess the power of rising above his hereditary characteristics and environmental circumstances. It has been said above (P. 210), that the hereditary characteristics and the environmental circumstances are responsible for individual differences, as

found in the world ; and, so in order that God may not be accused of partiality, these hereditary characteristics and environmental circumstances are taken to be due to the past Karmas of those individuals themselves, and not to the sweet will of God.

3. Objection

Voluntary Acts are not really free.

Now, here, the question, naturally, arises as to whether the so-called 'free and voluntary' acts of an individual are really and truly so, considering the fact that it is the hereditary characteristics and environmental circumstances that make that individual act in those particular ways, rather than in others.

To take the above example (P. 246), a student Rāma due to his past Karmas, (according to the Law of Karma), inherits intellectual abilities, love of knowledge, desire for a higher, scholastic life, powers of sustained studies and the attributes of determination, persistence courage optimism and so on. Further, due to his past Karmas (according to the Law of Karma), he is, also, born in a cultured, helpful, kind family. And, all these factors combine together to make him study hard for his examination, and thereby, attain success and pleasure. Here his very act of 'studying hard' is not, really, an independent kind of action, but is, essentially, determined by the prior factors, mentioned above. (See P. 242). Again, take the case of a second student, Syāma. He is an unfortunate one. His hereditary characteristics and environmental circumstances are not at all intellectually stimulating. Hence, his act of 'not studying hard' and failing, as a consequence, experiencing intense pain for the same, is not, really, an independent one, but determined by these prior factors. Again, take the case of a third student Yadu. He has inherited high intellectual abilities, but is not fortunate enough to have good intellectual opportunities. However, here the hereditary factors being stronger than the environmental ones, his act of 'studying hard' follows naturally. Again, take the case of a fourth student Madhu. He has not, unfortunately been born with high scholastic powers ; but is fortunate enough to have stimulating and sustaining environmental circumstances. However, here the environmental factors being stronger, his 'act of studying' follows on his part quite naturally.

Here, the above acts, it is asserted, are due to hereditary and environmental factors, combined together, positively or negatively—positively, as in the first two cases where both are of the same nature and supplement each other ; or, negatively, as in the last two cases, where the two are of an opposing nature and counter-act each other, the stronger one being the deciding factor.

Thus, it is asserted here that, as in the case of other Physical Sciences, dealing with the behaviour of unconscious physical objects in the case of which there is no question of 'Free Will and Voluntary Action', so here, too, in the case of Human Psychology, dealing with the action of conscious, rational, free human beings, exact mathematical calculation and prediction are quite possible.

4. Refutation : Human Freedom is an Undeniable Fact.

But is that really a fact ? Is it really a fact that human beings are just like physical objects, and behave wholly automatically like the same ? Of course not. Otherwise, amongst the numerous very strange, absurd, unacceptable, undesirable consequences that will follow, perhaps the worst would be that there will really remain no distinction between the Cit and the Acit, souls and material objects. For, then, the so-called 'consciousness',—generally supposed to be the 'Differentia' in the technical language of Logic, or the distinguishing mark, in ordinary language, of the Soul—will be different from 'materiality' not in kind, but only in degree.

However, leaving this fundamental Philosophical problem aside—the proper consideration of which will take lots of time and space—the point to note here is this :—

This is not a special problem for the protagonists of the Indian Philosophical Doctrine of Karma, alone, but for all philosophers, all over the world, all throughout the ages always. For, the hereditary and environmental factors are always and already there—Law of Karma or no Law of Karma. An individual is never born absolutely blank, with nothing in him as hereditary factors, and nothing around him as environmental ones. This is a hard, actual, absolutely undeniable fact, which has, of necessity, to be faced and dealt with. The Indian Philosophical Law of Karma only steps in to offer a plausible solution of this great and grave problem as to why different individuals should be born with different hereditary and environmental factors—which the Sciences of Biology, Psychology and Sociology apparently fail to do. But the hereditary and environmental factors are always and already there—whatever explanation may different Philosophers offer of the same. That is why, it has been said above that this is not a special difficulty of the Indian Philosophical Doctrine of Karma ; but a very general difficulty of all Doctrines of Human Freedom.

5. Solution of the Problem

But is there no solution ? Undoubtedly there is.

Take the above four cases, again (P. 249). In the first case, it has been said that Rāma studies hard because of intellectual hereditary traits and environmental circumstances. But it may also be found that his brother

Lakṣmaṇa, having very similar traits and circumstances, neglects his studies and fails in examinations. Even Rāma himself may act differently on different occasions, now studying hard and passing; now neglecting his studies and failing. It cannot be said here that his circumstances are changing, and, that is why, his acts. too, are doing so. For, if you come to think of it, his behaviour may change every moment —and how can his environments also change so much every moment to make so much differences in his behaviour? Thus, here, visibly, there is no change at all except the tick of a clock; very visibly, there is a vast change on the side of the behaviour of that individual. So, it would be mere Dogmatism to assert that all changes in the behaviour of a person are due to some unknown and unintelligible changes in his environments.

In the second case, again Syāma's brother Vyoma may study hard inspite of adverse hereditary and environmental conditions, and get some kind of success. Or, as shown above, Syāma himself may behave differently every moment, or on different occasions.

The third and fourth cases are also of the same kind.

Examples need not be multiplied to show that human freedom is a fact and a reality.

In fact, in the world, which a world of Space and Time, a world of existence and occurrence, everything exists in Space and occurs in Time, and so everything has a past, a present, and a future. The peculiarity of an empirical or worldly existence being essentially this, it follows from this that every empirical or worldly individual or Jīva is a complex being, determined by his past, yet determining his present and future. It is in this part determination and part freedom that lies the total 'individuality' of the individual, as shown above. (P. 246). Thus, an individual has surely the power to rise above his hereditary and environmental circumstances. As a matter of fact, an individual cannot be called an 'individual' at all if he lacks this power. For, his very 'individuality' consists in his 'more-ness' over his determining circumstances. He is, thus, due to his own determining circumstances.—which are, according to the Indian Philosophical Doctrine of Karma, due to or determined by himself—, yet always remains something 'more'. (P. 246-47).

6. The Concept of Empirical Development.

It has been stated above (P. 195-96), that from the ultimate or philosophical standpoint the concept of Development has no place in Indian Philosphy. This, as shown, and as will be shown (in the Section on "Salvation"), is perfectly true. But, from the empirical, worldly, standpoint, Development is a fact and has to be admitted. And, this 'Development' is really, a peculiar, wonderful process, being a combination of 'old' and 'new', 'determination' and 'freedom', 'past' and 'future. Thus,

at every stage, the developing object, develops out of a previous stage, emerges out as a new stage, and not merely as a repetition or duplication of the old, and develops into a future stage which also will emerge out as a new stage, and not as a mere repetition or duplication of it. This, in fact, is the only meaning of 'Development'. The very term 'Development' makes this abundantly clear. If there were no new something at every stage, then the original thing cannot be called 'developed', but only 'repeated', only 'duplicated', only 'multiplied'. But who would dare to say that Nature is a series of 'multiplication' only? Do not the infinite varieties in Nature definitely prove this to be a case of 'addition'—additions that make up for the colour and music, fragrance and sweetness, beauty and gaiety—in one word, richness and fulness of Nature Herself?

In this way, Emergent Evolution is the order of Nature. Like a chemical compound, emerging as something new out of the combination of separate, old elements, worldly effects, too, emerge out of their causes as something new.

That is why, the eternally continued world never grows old. Its novelty is as much a Law of its nature as its continuity.

So, the 'Karmas' of the Jīvas are, also novel ones. And, hence, there is no Necessitarianism here, at all.

7. 'Inevitableness' is the Law of Nature.

As a matter of fact, the main objection against the Law of Karma is that it makes inevitably, for a kind of 'inevitableness' in human actions which does not, all all, tally with the voluntary or free 'nature' of the same. But really speaking, is not 'inevitableness' itself the Law of Nature? For, if we consider the matter dispassionately, for a moment, then we shall see that many of our acts seem to be inexplicable, and, so, inevitable.

For example, a passenger, at the last moment, without any rhyme and reason, cancels his booking for an air flight; and another passenger, all on a sudden decides to avail himself of that vacancy. Then, there is an air-crash, and, every one says that it is 'fate' that saved the first gentleman and killed the second. Again, take the case of a Lottery. This is taken to be, purely, 'fate' or 'chance'. And, from the scientific standpoint, it, has to be admitted that this is nothing but 'fate', 'destiny', 'luck', chance', 'accident'—for, though there is, really, no scope or room for chances' and 'accidents' in Science, yet has any Science been able to explain these cases rationally?

In this way, if we carefully analyse the life of a particular individual, we shall inevitably find that there are many circumstances in his

life which are altogether beyond his control, yet which inevitably influence and determine his life to no mean extent. Yet, neither Science nor Philosophy can offer any satisfactory explanation of the same, without, accepting, the Indian Philosophical Doctrine of Karma. So, the Law of Karma only tries to explain what has been left unexplained by Science and Philosophy alike. Hence, it would be very unjust to charge it with formulating a kind of Fatalism, on that account. In fact, as stated above (P. 247, if, in other cases, Freedom of Will is not jeopardised because of the inevitableness and pre determination, as found everywhere, then why should it be so in the case of the Law of Karma the only fault of which is to explain the same as due to the self itself, and not to any external causes at all ?

8. The 'More-ness' or 'Uniqueness' of the Individual

It has been said above that the very 'individuality' of the individual consists in being something 'more' than his pre determining causes and circumstances. Now what exactly is this moreness' and how do the individuals come to have different kinds of 'more-ness', which, finally, make for their individual differences ?

Now, according to the Mechanical or Materialistic view, as everything in the world is accidental, so is the creation of different individuals on earth So, according to these theories, somehow or other, the physical elements are accidentally combined together to produce different conglomerations of individuals.

But the ordinary theistic views as we have seen (P 238), face great difficulties here. For here, God is inevitably made a Partial Being, endowing different individuals with different kinds of 'individuality' or 'more-ness' or uniqueness'.

Now, what is the Indian view in this respect ? As we have seen, (P 185) according to this view, an individual is partly determined by his herditary characteristics and environmental circumstances—and all these are due to his own past Karmas, and not to God or Brahman. But the 'more-less' or 'uniqueness' of an individual is something his very own, something which is independent of his hereditary and environmental factors, something which is self-determined and self-controlled. What, exactly, then is this 'something' !

9. Brahman an Organic Whole

From the transcendental standpoint, this simply implies that Brahman is an Organic Whole'. What is an Organic Whole' ? As pointed out above (P 37) it is a whole of naturally different parts. Now, Brahman, too, is taken to be essentially an 'Organic Whole'. So, the Jivas, the parts—(the term is used for want of a better one. See P 144-145,—of Brahman, are from

the very beginning, naturally different from one another. So, here, each is an individual, different from every other individual (P. 43). In this way, the mutual differences amongst the Jīvas, as the 'Svagata-Bhedas' or 'internal differences' of Brahman, have to be recognised by all Monotheistic Systems of thought, of the type of the Monotheistic Vedānta.

In fact as we have seen, from this transcendental standpoint, there is no question of Creation, at all (P. 237-38). So, the above question, viz., how different individuals come to have different individualities, does not arise here at all.

10. The Jiva : An Individual Self

The term "Jīva" is, ordinarily, translated as "Individual Soul", Now, as we know, English Terms are, often very inadequate to designate the different shades of meaning carried by the corresponding Sanskrit ones. In this case, however the adjective 'Individual', as well as the noun 'Soul' are quite appropriate. For, as we have seen (P. 4), the Jīva is a 'Soul' or a 'Self'— Ātman', being the 'Svagata-Bhedas' of the Supreme Soul of Self —the 'Paramātman'. Yet, each is a unique individual. (P. 48). In this 'Individual selfhood' lies the solution of the above difficult problem.

11. Objection : Differences in the Individualities, imply partiality on Brahman's part.

The problem is the same as posed many times above (P. 179ff., viz. that unless Brahman creates (from the empirical standpoint) the Jīvas according to their own, respective, past Karmas He has to be charged with partiality and cruelty. Now, as has been showu above (P. 210-12), the hereditary characteristics and environmental circumstances, which partly determine the individuals, are due to their own respective past Karmas of those individuals themselves. But the remaining part, the residue, the 'more-ness', 'the uniqueness' are not due to the hereditary and environmental factors, and so not due to the past Karmaa of the Jīvas. So, does not Brahman become inevitably open to the very same charge of 'Partiality', as He endows different Jīvas with different kinds of 'individualities' or 'uniqueness' or 'more ness' ? How to get rid of this formidable difficulty ?

12. Reply : Individualities are due to Freedom of Will.

But, though this difficulty is a formidable one, yet, it is, by no means, insoluble. For, it is the individual self itself that is the 'unique' something here, the 'more' something here that can rise above all hereditary and environmental circumstances. This 'individual self' is not an arbitrary creation of God Himself—but a rational creation of the individual self itself out of the freedom of will, the free Gift of God, given equally to all. Because of this 'rationality', and this free will', the Jīva, in the truest sense

of the terms, is a maker of itself, an architect of its own 'fate', working out its own destiny, freely and rationally.

In fact, man has been defined as a rational animal. But 'rationality' essentially implies freedom'. For, what is the use of rationally thinking out of this course of action, or that, unless one is free to follow this course or that ?

Thus, as we have seen (Pp 246-47), from the empirical or worldly standpoint, from the standpoint of the Jīva, 'freedom of will' is a fact. And, if that be so, every, normal, rational, adult individual is at perfect liberty to work just as he likes, forming his own life just as he thinks fit.

To take, once again, the above examples (P. 246). Rāma, as befitting his hereditary and environmental circumstances, studies hard and passes the examination ; while, his brother Laksmaṇa, as not befitting his hereditary and environmental circumstances, does not study hard and fails. So here Rama and Lakṣmaṇa behave differently out of their own free will and in that way build up their lives differently.

This is the 'residue', this is the 'more' something, this is the 'unique' person, this is the 'individual self', the rational self, the free self.

13. The Self and Freedom : which precedes which ?

It has been said above that God makes a free gift of 'Freedom of Will' to all. So, the question may be asked as to: Which precedes which here ? Does Freedom precede Self ; or Self precede Freedom ? Not the first, for, then, where will Freedom itself inhere ? Not the second, for' as has been said above (P. 251, 254), it is 'Freedom of Will' that forms the Self ; also, here, God Himself, too, becomes open to the charge of partiality. So, what is the way out ?

14. Solution of the Problem

The way out is not very difficult. For, what has been said above (P. 251, 254), viz. that 'Freedom Will' forms the Self, is perfectly correct, and that 'Freedom of Will' itself needs a substratum, too, is equally correct. Hence, the only thing that can be asserted and accepted here is that God, in His infinite goodness and wisdom, endows all alike with 'Free Selves', Selves with Freedom of Will, as their only characteristics. Here, the Selves are not made distinct arbitrarily from the beginning, and hence, God cannot, by any means be charged with partiality. But only God's own Nature, own Essence is poured in all in equal drops, endowing all equally with divine, free, rational Selves or Souls.

And it is entirely left to the Jīvas themselves to mould themselves out their free will ; i. e. to manifest the divine essence even in the midst of

all their pre-determined hereditary and environmental circumstances– this is 'Mukti' or Salvation or, to have the same obliterated by the veil of Ignorance and selfish Desires—this is 'Baudha' or Boudage.

In this way, the Jīvas are different in so far as their hereditary and environmental circumstances are so. And, these being due to their own, respective past Karmas, no fault of 'partiality' attaches to God, at all. Again, the Jīvas are the same, in so far as they are all equally free and rational or God in essence—above all their hereditary and environmental circumstances. And, the Divine Essence being the same in all, here, too, no fault of 'Partiality' attaches to God at all. And 'forming the self itself', 'moulding life' 'working out one's destiny' and similar expressions all, really, mean that the Divine Essence in all has to be manifested progressively, as best as one can do so.

II The Case of a Different Birth

As we have seen, (P 185), if the 'Sakāma Karmas' or Selfish Voluntary acts of a particular individual fails to produce its 'Phalas' or appropriate results here and now or, in course of the same life or birth, then these have to do so in the next life or birth.

How do these non-experienced and so accumulated 'Karmas' produce their appropriate 'Phalas' in the next life or birth ? These do so by making the individual get a particular kind of heredity and environment (P. 2 1 12), and are exhausted thereby. For, the rest, the individual is, undoubtedly, free to act, just as he likes (P. 247 . And, so the question of Fatal sin does not arise here, too at all (P. 247)

1. Past Karmas and their Appropriate Results.

It has been said just above that past 'Sakāma-Karmas' produce hereditary and environmental circumstances for different individuals in the next birth or life. The question here is : Are these the only appropriate effects of the past Karmas ? Or, do these past Karmas also produce some later effects, by directly influencing the new 'Sakāma-Karmas' of that particular individual in that new birth ?

The answer in general, has been given above (P. 244-45). There, it has been said that each cause and its appropriate effect together form one complete whole ; and as soon as that particular effect is produced, the cause-effect series is completed then and there. The same is the case here, too. Here, the past Karmas, as causes, produce hereditary characteristics and environmental effects in the present birth, as their appropriate effects ; and then and there, the Cause-effect series is completed. Then begins the new free life of that individual under the setting of his pre-determined or past Karma-determined hereditary and environ-

mental factors and circumstances ; and how this new life will be shaped depends on him and his own new Karmas and no further on his past Karmas of a previous life.

In this way just as the first part of the Doctrine of Karma, viz. that the Sakāma Karmas of this life must of necessity produce their appropriate 'Phalas', does not imply any Fatalism ; so the second part of the Doctrine of Karma, viz. that the past, non-experienced 'Sakāma Karmas' must produce their appropriate 'Phalas' in another life, does not involve any Fatalism, at all.

2. Past Karmas and Next Life

A further question still remains here. This is as follows :—

Do the past Karmas produce their appropriate 'Phalas' only in this birth, or even in some later births ?

The answer is that, this is rather uncertain. Ordinarily and as expected, the past Karmas produce their results in the immediately following birth. But in some special cases, where the past Karmas are inevitably prevented from producing their 'phalas' or appropriate results even in the next birth, according to the fundamental tenet of the Law of Karma that every Karma must, necessarily, produce its 'Phala' or appropriate result, some day or other, these past Karmas, too, must produce their 'Phalas' or appropriate results in some other birth, later on.

It must be remembered, however, that such a dragging of the past Karmas throughout more births than one, is not at all, a desirable thing. The best thing, it goes without saying, is that the 'Sakāma-Karmas' should all produce their own, respective appropriate results in the present birth, so that the individuals concerned may know of the results thereof, immediately. This is desirable for more reasons than one. (See below P.258). However, if that be not possible, due to unavoidable circumstances, then we have to admit, willy-nilly, that the unexhausted past 'Sakāma-Karmas' continue to be there, with their full vigour or potency, till, in a later birth, next or still later, these produce their 'Phalas' or appropriate results.

3. Past Karmas, Phalas and their Obstructions.

A further question still remains—another fundamental question, viz. why should some 'Sakāma-Karmas' produce their 'Phalas' or appropriate results here and now. in the same birth ; while others not ? What is the discriminating mark between these two kinds of 'Sakāma-Karmas' ?

The answer is that these depend on both internal and external conditions. The internal conditions are the inner potencies of those Karmas themselves. The external conditions are other external circumstances, like other stronger Karmas, pushing for fulfilment by producing their 'Phalas' or appropriate results, and the like.

4. Worldly Examples

Take the case of a blossoming cherry-tree. Here there are numerous buds, but all of these do nomot blossom forth together at the same time. Why? First, because the buds themselves are internally different, having different kinds of potency or fertility. Secondly, because their external conditions are different, some being more exposed to light and air, and more drenched by water; others less. Thirdly, because some larger or stronger buds over-shadow other smaller or weaker ones.

The same is the case here too. Not being really mechanical or automatic but fully voluntary only, these 'Sakāma-Karmas' are, naturally different, with different characteristics, powers, tendencies and the like. Their opportunities for producing their appropriate results, too, differ widely. These are also stronger or weaker, simpler or more complicated and so on, in nature. That is why, naturally, all the Karmas do not behave alike in producing their own, respective, appropriate results.

We may, here conveniently take some ordinary instances.

A professional swindler, in a high position, avoids arrest and prosecution, all throughout his life, because of strong backing by his influential, dishonest friends. Here, under the present circumtances of his Society and State, 'backing by influential friends' is, at least for the time being a stronger kind of action than 'swindling.' Again, later on, if the moral conditions of his Society and State improve, then the 'backing by influential friends' will not be of much help to him; and then 'Swindling' will, automatically become the stronger one, producing its' appropriate results, viz. arrest, prosecution, conviction, degradation, sorrow, here and now.

Again, a studious boy writes the answers to the Final Questions, well; but at the last moment, is seized with a sudden strong temptation, copies the last answer from his neighbouring candidate's book, is caught and, finally, expelled Here, the 'act of honestly answering the questions' is weaker, under the present circumstances, than 'the act of copying from others'. And, so, the stronger one prevents the weaker one from producing its appropriate results.

These illustrate as to how stronger acts may prevent the weaker ones from producing their own, respective, appropriate results immedately, even in course of the same life or birth.

The example given is that of a stronger cow, eating grass forcibly by driving away many weaker ones.

Further, adverse or complicated external circumstances may delay the results. For example, a poor but honest boy tries hard for an honest job; but due to very stringent conditions, fails to do so. Here 'honest

trying' fails to produce its appropriate result 'getting the job' here and now, due to other external circumstances.

Again, a student studies very hard for his examination and he is quite confident of passing the same. Yet, he is given a seat in a dark, hot corner, cannot write his answers well, and fails, ultimately. Here, also, due to other external circumstances, his act of 'studying hard' fails to produce its appropriate result 'passing'.

These illustrate as to how opposing external circumstances prevent acts from producing their appropriate results immediately, even in course of the same birth or life.

Further, the Karmas, themselves, may be of different kinds, having different kinds of potencies. E g. take two unconnected voluntary acts of a boy, viz. 'practising tennis' for winning a championship, and 'doing physical exercises' for improving health. Now, here, suppose, the former is done with vigour, regularity and precision, and so produces its appropriate results soon. But, suppose, the latter is done in a rather careless, irregular manner, and naturally, the appropriate result does not follow so soon.

Again, two sisters Rani and Vani are interested in music, and take daily music lessons. Rani's practising produces the appropriate results, such as, getting music prizes; while Vāṇi's practising does not'. Here, apart from the question of inner, inherent or hereditary powers, the acts themselves may differ, one being fuller and more perfect than the other. Hence, the less full and less perfect act fails to produce its own, appropriate result soon.

These illustrate as to how due to their own nature, some acts may produce their appropriate results immediately or soon; some may not do so, even in course of the same birth or life.

Thus, the above are some main causes which prevent Karmas or voluntary acts from producing their own, respective, appropriate results, here and now.

We find from the above that in some cases, such delays in the production of the appropriate results or effects are due to the Karmas themselves—on their potencies intensities, complexities, regularities, completeness, perfection, and the like; and nothing more remains to be said in this connection. However in some other cases again, such delays are due to external causes, like other stronger acts or other adverse circumstances. But, is it not wholly unjust that an individual should enjoy or suffer, as the case may be, for these external circumstances, over which he himself has no control at all, and for which he himself is not responsible at all?

The reply to this has been given many times above (P.211-12). The external circumstances over which the individual has no control and, for which he is not responsible, are, however, his own creation. For, these are either due to his hereditary and environmental conditions-which, again are due to his own past Karmas (P.211-12)—or, to his new free and rational acts (P. 247) i. e. to his present Karmas (P. 214, 250). So, here there is nothing objectionable from the standpoint of the Law of Karma.

Law of Karma and Non-Voluntary Actions and Non-Moral Actions : Peculiarity of Indian Ethics.

It has been stated above that the Law of Karma is a Law of Voluntary Activities only (P 184). But there are quite a few kinds of Non-Voluntary Activities, like Random Activities, Senseri-Motor Activities, and the rest (P. 150 . These are, naturally, taken to be non-moral, or beyond the scope of moral judgment, like 'good' or bad'. Further, besides these, acts which lack the two essential characteristics of a voluntary action, viz. rationality and freedom, are, also taken to be 'non-moral" in the above sense. Thus, the acts of a mad man or a child, devoid of reason, are not morally judged as 'good' or 'bad'. In the very same manner, the forced acts of convicts or prisoners of war are not morally judged.

In this way, Western Ethics excludes a larger part of human activity from its own scope or from that of moral judgment as 'good' or 'bad', and totally, exonerates the individuals concerned from any responsibility for the same

But Indian Ethics is a peculiar one, as we have already seen in connection with the very common ethical distinction between 'egoistic" and 'altruistic' acts, (P. 201 3) Its peculiarity is due to the fact that, as in other cases, so here, too, it is, ultimately, taken to be a subsidiary part of that great and grand field of study, viz. Mokṣa-Sastra or Deliberation and Discourse on Salvation, its Summum Bonum of life, to use an ethical expression, but philosophically, Life itself. (See below the Section on 'Salvation')

However, leaving that aside, we may, here, note another peculiarity of Indian Ethics, in connection with the above question of Non-Voluntary and Non-moral Acts.

Now, according to Indian Philosophy, Teleology is the core and the essence of the whole world ; and the whole world has been created by God (in the sense as explained above P. 241-42) solely according to the past 'Sakāma-Karmas' of the Jīvas, or the individual souls. Thus, the world has a great moral purpose behind it, viz. the purpose of serving as an arena where one undergoes the results of one's own non-experienced and unexhausted, past, 'Sakāma Karmas', and prepares one's self for Mokṣa or Salvation, through the Sādhanas' or spiritual strivings. (P. 187,. In this

way. in the world, the individuals or Jīvas are responsible for each and every thing that exists in space and occurs in time, as in the world, each and every thing that exists in space and occurs in time is the result of either the past 'Sakāma-Karmas' of the Jīvas, or their present 'Sakāma-Karmas'.

1. Two Kinds of 'Responsibility'

Now, this responsibility is of two kinds, according to the nature of the things and events concerned

1. First, we have 'responsibility' in the ordinary, Western ethical sense of the term ; or 'responsibility' of a free rational agent for his own voluntary activities. These are called 'moral actions', to be judged morally as 'good' or 'bad'.

2. Secondly, we have 'responsibility' in a special sense in the Indian Ethical sense, viz. that we are responsible for any and everything here, on earth. In this sense, we are not only responsible for our free and rational voluntary acts, but also for all kinds of acts, even non-voluntary, including non-rational and non-free ones, as mentioned above. (P. 150). In what sense ? In the sense that even such non-voluntary acts are due, ultimately, to the past or present Karmas of the individuals concerned. How ?

2. Worldly Examples

Take an ordinary example. An individual is captured as a prisoner of war, and then is forced, totally against his will, at the point of a bayonet, to construct a road or an aerodrome, that will go against the interests of his own, beloved Mother-country. Here, his 'act of building', being a forced one, is non-moral, i. e. not open to moral judgment as 'right' or 'wrong'. Yet, how can he himself shirk the responsibility of being captured and placed in such a situation of being forced by others to do something ? Thus, such a capture may be due to his own carelessness ; or to the treachery of his so called friends whom he trusted foolishly ; or to some circumstances totally beyond his own control ; or, to what is, ordinarily, called 'accident'. But whatever be the circumstances that lead to his capture and torture—those circumstances themselves need explanation. And, according to the Indian Law of Karma, the only possible explanation is that these are due to the Karmas of the individuals concerned—Karmas, past and present.

All other activities have to be explained in the very same way, for the general maxim of the Law of Karma, viz. 'Nothing without a cause, nothing, nothing,' has to be applied to each and every case, each and every !

And, what is the harm ? If Science, though professedly devoted to explanation by means of causes, yet has to leave many things, to

'chances' and speak glibly of 'accidents, off and on—' then, what harm is there if something else steps in to try a hand? Is there any better explanation?

3. Peculiar kind of Responsibility

In this way, in Indian Ethics, we have two kinds of 'responsibility'—one involving the question of immediate moral judgments as 'good' or 'bad'; the other, not. In the first case, as accepted by ordinary Ethics, the individual concerned is responsible for his own voluntary acts, which are morally judged as 'good' or 'bad'. In the second case, however, he is held responsible for his non-voluntary acts, in the sense, shown above but his acts are not morally judged as 'good' or 'bad'. For, these are not the direct but only indirect results of his voluntary acts. That is, these are the past Karmas, responsible for his hereditary and environmental circumstances, and leading to such a situation through a chain.

Thus, in Indian Ethics, we have the peculiar conception of 'responsibility' without 'moral praiseworthiness or blameableness'.

(III) Law of Karma and 'Accidents'.

The above has shown clearly that in the vast, hoary field of Indian, Philosophy there is not even an inch of space for 'accidents' of any kind whatsoever. According to the scientific definition, an 'accident' or a 'chance' is a 'cause unknown'. And, by its own admission, it cannot explain these unknown factors, and so, delegates the same to mere 'accidents' or 'chances' as last resorts. In this way, Science is, after all, self-inconsistent. For, whatever be the modern interpretation of the age-old concept of causality, i. e. as a continuum without any element of Time, the fact remains that, here as something leads to something else, like one wave leading to another, and so on, there should not be any unknown link in the series.

Now, whatever be the verdict of Physics in this respect, the verdict of human life is quite clear—viz. that all the links here are not known; and that is why, many circumstances in it have to be taken to be due to more 'chances or accidents' (P 252). From the very beginning of his individual life to the very end—such inexplicable circumstances are numerous. For example, the very combination of hereditary qualities, which he gets at the very beginning of his individual existence, as well as the environments under which he is born, are inexplicable to the Science of Biology. (P 210-11).

But the Indian Law of Karma, though dubbed as wholly irrational and unjust—is the only attempted full explanation that is both rational and just But it is not a mechanical system, nor 'a closed continuum' of Physics—but essentially a system of self-determination alone (P. 247).

(W) Law of Karma and 'Adrsta'.

'Adṛṣṭa' or Fate or Destiny is a very common concept of our daily lives. We often use such expressions.—

'Alas! this is but fate'! 'My fate saved me from this great disaster'! 'My fate has brought me this great fortune' and so on.

Thus, if we carefully analyse the above expressions and exclamations, we shall find that in every case there is an unknown element. According to the Law of Karma, 'Adṛṣṭa', or the unknown principle, is nothing but the accumulated stock of the past non-experienced and unexhausted 'Sakāma-Karmas' of the Jīvas themselves. So, in the most literal sense: 'All are architects of Fate'.

(V) Concluding Remarks: Daiva and Purusakāra.

A long discussion has been undertaken above regarding the real implications of the Law of Karma. The charge of Fatalism, in fact, is a very common charge against the Law of Karma. That is why, so much time has been taken by us to refute it, as best as we could, in our humble ways.

Let us conclude here with very common, but telling, examples:—

In a game of cards, the cards are shuffled and then distributed to different players. In this way, which particular cards will a particular individual get, does not depend on him at all. But, how he will play the cards depend on him alone. Thus, a dull player, though having a good hand, fails to play well. On the contrary, an intelligent player, though having a bad hand, plays quite well as far as possible.

Similarly, in this Great Game of Life, we are given our cards according to our own past Karmas, in the shape of our hereditary characteristics and environmental circumstances. This we call, 'Daiva', or 'Destiny'; or 'Adṛṣṭa' or the Unseen Principle. But for the rest, we are free to play, just we like. This is called 'Puruṣakāra or Human Endeavour.

Thus in this Mysterious 'Bhava-Līlā'. or Play of Life, we are, of course, given the implements of play to begin with; but, play, we must, through our own independent judgments and efforts.

Again, fishermen are given different kinds of boats by their leaders; but how best they will row depends entirely on themselves alone An inexpert rower, though given a very good boat, has every chance of being drowned; while an expert rower can reach his destination in spite of getting an old, rickety boat.

Similarly, in this Great Ocean of Life, we are given our boats according to our own past Karmas, in the shape of our hereditary characteristics and environmental circumstances. But for the rest, we are free to row, just as we like.

Thus, in this boundless 'Bhava-Sāgara' or Ocean of Life, we are, of course, given the boats to begin with ; but, row, we must, through our own independent judgments and efforts

Again, travellers are given different kinds of lamps by forest-officers to cross a forest ; but how best they will see their way through, depends entirely on themselves alone. A nervous and incautious traveller, though given a good, bright lamp, has every chance of having it extinguished very soon ; while a self-confident and courageous traveller, though given a small dim lamp, can come out of the forest very well.

Similarly, in this Great Forest of Life, we are given our lamps, according to our own past Karmas, in the shape of our hereditary characteristics and environmental circumstances. But, for the rest, we are free to travel, just as we like.

Thus, in this Dense 'Bhavāraṇya' or 'Forest of Life' we are, of course, given the lamps to begin with ; but travel, we must, through our own independent judgements and efforts.

In this way, whether we play, or row or travel, we never begin with an absolute scratch, but always with certain implements, equipments, instruments. For, no one is an absolute point, with an absolute beginning in the ceaseless flow of Time ; but every one is a continuity, a continuous, concrete whole of 'Past-Present-Future'.

1. Mutual Relation of 'Daiva' and 'Puruṣakara'

In Western Psychology, the question is always raised as to whether 'Heredity' is stronger than 'Environment' or vice versa. But, in Indian Philosophy, we have to face the broader question as to whether 'Puruṣakāra' or human efforts are more potent than 'Daiva' or the original hereditary and environmental factors, or vice versa.

It cannot be denied that Daiva' is a very potent factor in the life of an individual. During the first formative periods of life, when the child is not yet in a position to do anything much independently, the formation of his life, psychologically, is practically over ; and, his later life is, more or less, but an unfolding of the same.

But those who believe in Human Free Will cannot accept this Totalitarian or Mechanical Conception of human life, or development. The verdict of Psychology or Sociology need not be controverted here. But, according to the Doctrine of Free Will, the free will of the individual concerned is always, and at every step, a third factor, to be reckoned with, over and above the first and the second factors of Heredity' and 'Environment', respectively. In fact, do we not, at every step, find clear signs of such a 'Free Will', in every human being—not excepting a child ? As in other cases, here, too, there may be more or less developed states of the case.

So, if there be free will at every step, that free will must produce results at every step, great or small.

This is the Indian View of 'Puruṣakāra'. According to this View, 'Puruṣakāra' can always control, rise above, and even, change 'Daiva'. In this connection, the famous saying of Karṇa in the Mahābhārata may be recalled—

"दैवायत्तं कुले जन्म, ममायत्तं च पौरुषम्।"

"Birth in a particular family is due to 'Daiva, but 'Puruṣakāra' is wholly dependent on me".

2. Can 'Purusakara' Change 'Daiva'?

This, in fact, is a very crucial question.

According to the Indian View, 'Daiva' consists of both the original hereditary and environmental factors of the individual concerned. Now, here, environmental circumstances can be changed by the individual, of course, sometimes later. Thus, he may totally give up his parents, relatives, friends, associates and the like, constituting his 'social environments'; leave his country or home-place and the like, constituting his 'physical environments'; change his present position, occupation, and the like, constituting his 'economical' environments', and so on. In this way, he can begin his life anew under new environmental conditions, better or worse.

But the question of questions here is: Can 'Environments' change 'Heredity'? Even more, can 'Puruṣakāra' or independent efforts really change 'Heredity'?

Western Psychology seems as yet undecided on the point, The two opposing camps of Hereditarians and Environmentalists are still raging a ceaseless war in this regard. Here, one thing is clear, viz. that even if a characteristic, i.e. a quality or a power, be present in some one from the very beginning through 'Heredity', it may remain totally unmanifest through adverse environmental conditions. E. G. even if the seed be an excellent one, it may not produce any flowering plant for want of good soil, light, air and the like. In this way, 'Environments' can easily kill practically an existent hereditary power. In the case of human beings, it may be said that adverse 'Environments' or rather, the lack or deficiency of independent efforts to rise above the same, may, to all intents and purposes, make an existent hereditary attribute or power non-existent,

But the real difficulty is regarding the converse. Can Environments' or 'Independent Efforts' create an attribute or a power when it is, by heredity, non-existent in an individual?

As pointed out above, Western Sciences, like Psychology, Sociology and Biology, are very much divided on the point. But the consensus

of opinion seems to be that 'Environments' or 'Independent Efforts' cannot create new attributes or powers; but can only manifest and develop already existing ones. That is why, we have proverbs like: "You cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear"; or, the corresponding Bengali proverb, "You cannot beat a donkey into a horse".

3. This Wonderful Free Self

However, the verdict of Indian Philosophy in this respect is clear. According to it, the powers of the Free-Self are, indeed, great. And, it is not known what the Self can do and what the Self will do. Indeed, wonderful is this Free-Self. Restricted as it is by its hereditary and environmental conditions, as well as, bodily inabilities and mental inefficiencies—it can, yet, soar to wonderful heights, and manifest wonderful potencies. Thus, do we not find cases of sudden conversion, sudden manifestation of new powers, sudden emergence of literary or scientific geniuses?

The Hereditarians will, surely, say here that all these are nothing but cases of hitherto unmanifested, and so, unknown hereditary powers. But, when you come to think of this, what proof is there that all the manifested abilities are hereditary abilities, and nothing else? What hereditary characteristics exactly does the individual concerned actually get just at the moment when the two parental cells combine together to produce a new living organism.—Science has no means of ascertaining. The only proof of this is the actual manifestation of certain abilities in the individual concerned later on. But, as stated above, who would say here definitely as to which of these abilities are hereditary, and which, acquired?

So, let us, give the Indian Doctrine of Free Will, at least, the benefit of doubt, and gladly accept its contention that, at least in a few cases, the possibility of 'acquired abilities' has to be admitted, willy-nilly.

And, with justice! For, what meaning is there in 'Free Will', if it is not 'free' to rise above its present conditions, and add to its stock of inheritance. What kind of Sovereign is he who only wears the Jewelled Crown, but is not free to enrich it by a single gem?

4. Doctrine of 'Super-Freedom of Will'.

We started with the apprehension that the Law of Karma might involve a kind of Fatalism, that would prove to be a death-blow to 'Moral Life', itself and exercise a very pernicious influence on all, paving the way for Pessimism and Inactivism.

But, lo! what do we actually find in the end? We find, to our great gratification, that the age-old Law of Karma, the very life-blood, the very heart-beat, the very vital-breath of Indian Philosophy, is after

all, not only a Law of Fatalism ; but, on the contrary, a Law of 'Super-Freedom of Will'. In what sense ?

In the sense of going far beyond even the ordinary Doctrines of Freedom of Will. For, as we have seen, such Doctrines also of Freedom of Will involve a kind of Fatalism or Necessitarianism, as according to these, ordinarily, the freedom of the Self is, rather, a limited kind of freedom, as the Self does not seem to have any control regarding the hereditary characteristics, except in manifesting the same,—but having no power to add or increase.

But, the Law of Karma, leaving the Free Self just as it is, even allows it the freedom to add and increase its hereditary characteristics, not to speak of the environmental circumstances.

Further, according to it, everything, each and every thing in the life of an individual, is due solely and wholly to his own Karmas—may be past, may be present, may be great, may be small, may be good, may be bad—but entirely and eternally to his—and no one else's, not even God's—Karmas. Such a Doctrine of pure and simple self-reliance, self-endeavour, self-development is, indeed, rare in the world ; and it is to the eternal glory of our revered Rişis or Seers of old, that they have visualised such a superb Doctrine, even at the dawn of Human Civilisation itself.

(s) Third Objection against the Law of Karma : God ceases to be Omniscient and Omnipotent

A third common Objection against the Law of Karma may be stated as follows :—

It has been said above that Brahman creates the universe according to the own, respective, past Karmas of the individual souls or Jīvas, (P. 182ff). It has also been explained above as to how, otherwise, Brahman becomes inevitably open to the charges of Cruelty and Partiality (P. 179). Well and good ! But does not the above Doctrine of Creation according to the past Karmas of the Jīvas themselves involve other difficulties from other points of view ? What are these ? These are difficulties regarding Gods Omnipotence and Omniscience. As a matter of fact, just as God cannot be taken to be Cruel and Partial, in any way, so He cannot, also, be equally taken to be Non-omnipotent and Non-omniscient. But, here, unfortunately, to avoid one kind of difficulty, we are inevitably landed on another ? How ?

In this way :—If God has to create according to the past 'Sakāma-Karmas of the Jīvas only, then how can He be called a 'Free Agent ?' A free agent, really, is one who is not guided or controlled by any external circumstances, and compelled to act in a particular way, according to the same. That is, he has alternative courses of action open to him and can rationally and freely choose from amongst the same.

In fact, as well-known, these two—viz 'rational thinking' and 'free choice', constitute the two fundamental marks of a voluntary action (P. 148). And, all Jīvas, all normal adults have full opportunities for doing such voluntary acts, which, from the empirical or worldly standpoint, are the best kinds of acts.

But look at poor Brahman. He, in His infinite wisdom and goodness, has allowed the Jīvas to what He Himself cannot do—viz. perform voluntary acts. Why ? Because, in His great and good act of creation—a fundamental act on His part—He Himself—All-wise and All-powerful, as He is—has no scope for any rational deliberation and free choice amongst alternatives. So, how can His act of creation be called a 'Voluntary Act' ?

Consider the matter, once more, fully, Firstly, he has no scope for rational deliberation in His Creative Act, for the simple reason that here there is nothing at all for Him to think or reflect upon or deliberate about. For, here only one course of action, is open to Him, viz to act or create according to the past Karmas of the Jīvas themselves. These Karmas are eternally there, creation after creation ; and, the only task of Brahman here is to connect the different Jīvas with their own respective Karmas, and the rest follows accordingly.

That is why, here it is not necessary for Brahman to think of or decide about anything else, except to know simply of the already existent Karmas of the Jīvas. These Karmas are done by the Jīvas independently and freely, as Brahman has endowed them all with free will. So, the only function of Brahman here is to take note of those independent, free acts of the Jīvas, and act, willy nilly, accordingly.

Secondly, for the same reason, He has no scope for free action here. He cannot, according to the Law of Karma, change the Karmas of the Jīvas even an iota ; or create new Karmas and destroy old ones. or assign the Karmas of one to another , by any means. So, He is more or less an Automaton here, guided and compelled by external circumstances, viz the Sakāma-Karmas of Jīvas, acting according to their own sweet will.

A Difficult Theological Dilemma

Thus, if Creation be admitted to be according to the past Karmas of the Jīvas themselves, then that will inevitably jeopardise Brahman's Omnipotence. For, then, He being powerless against the Jīva-Karmas, cannot be called 'Omnipotent' or' 'All-powerful,' and the Jīva-Karmas will become more powerful than He. So here, we are on the horns of another difficult theological Dilemma :

If Brahman creates the universe according to the past Sakāma-Karmas of Jīvas, then He is not All-powerful ; and, if He does not create the universe acccording to the past 'Sakāma-Karmas of the Jīvas, then He is not All-Impartial.

Either, He creates the universe according to the past 'Sakāma Karmas' of the Jīvas ; or, He does not.

∴ either, He is not All-powerful or He is not All-Impartial.

What is the way out ?

This is from the empirical standpoint or from the standpoint of the Jīvas.

The same question has already been raised and discussed from the transcendental standpoint or from the standpoint of Brahman (Section on Līlā and Karma P. 52,76,151).

(t) Refutation of the Third Objection against the Law of Karma.

Now, the same objection from the transcendental standpoint, has been disposed of above. (P. 225ff). The disposal of the Objection from the empirical standpoint, is also very similar.

(A) The Monotheistic Conception of Saguna-Brahman

Now, according to the Monotheistic Vedānta View, Brahman is essentially 'Saguṇa' or possessed of an infinite number of excellent, auspicious attributes (P. 17). So, Brahman is taken to be an Organic Whole of these attributes, His 'Svagata-Bhedas'. Hence, these attributes, being the Svagata-Bhedas' or internal differences' of Brahman Himself, must be harmonious with one another, though sometimes apparently inconsistent. For, evidently, there can never be any contradiction in the nature of Brahman.

Now, as mentioned in the above Theological Dilemma, two of the fundamental attributes of Brahman are 'All-Powerfulness and 'All-Impartiality'. Also, He is an All-Just' and All-Moral Being, an 'All-Merciful' and 'All-Loving' Being. Hence, if He has to create the universe, He will have to do so in such a way that none of His attributes is set at naught in any way.

(B) Moral Nature of the Universe.

In fact, what does the Universe of Souls and Matter, as created by God, imply, as a created effect of Brahman ? It implies that from the empirical standpoint, from the standpoint of the Jīva, it is nothing but an arena of moral development. As we have seen (P. 52, 76, 151,), from the transcendental standpoint, from the standpoint of Brahman Himself, there is no question of any purpose in the Līlā or Play of Brahman, which we call 'Creation'. But from the empirical standpoint, from the standpoint of the Jīvas themselves, it has a deep, moral purpose behind it viz., that it affords opportunities to the 'Baddha-Jīvas' to undergo the 'Karma-Phalas' or the appropriate results of their past Sakāma-Karmas' so that, by getting rid of their 'Sakāma-Karmas', they may ultimately, be blessed with 'Mokṣa' or Salvation. All these have been explained above in details. (P. 185 ff).

In this way, from the empirical standpoint, or standpoint of the Jīvas themselves, Creation is entirely a Teleological process, a process of upholding the great Moral Ideal of 'Niṣkāma-Karmas', and leading to the great spiritual end of 'Mokṣa' or Salvation.

If that be so, then the Universe of Jīva-Jagat has to be created in such a way as to make this kind of Moral Life, this kind of Spiritual Life possible on the part of the Jīvas. Let us have this clear first. If there be any question of creation at all—and we know, there is, from the empirical standpoint, or the standpoint of the Jīvas themselves—then, the created world, according to the Indian Views—is not a mechanical something, not an accidental or purposeless something, but is essentially a teleological or purposive something, and that purpose is one and only one—the one and only one purpose of the whole of Indian Philosophy, viz 'Mokṣa' or 'Mukti', or 'Salvation'.

(c) Free Nature of the Jivas.

Hence, Brahman, the Creator, creates both Jīva and Jagat for the very same spiritual purpose, viz. 'Salvation'. That is, the 'Jīvas' 'attain' 'Salvation' through the help of the 'Jagat'; and the 'Jagat' affords opportunities to the Jīvas to do so. That is, it is essential that the Jīvas must be free agents. No moral endeavour, no spiritual striving, is at all possible on the part of one who has no freedom of will. Thus as we have seen, worldly Jīvas may perform three kinds of action—Sakāma-Puṇya-Karmas' 'Sakāma,-Pāpa-Karmas' and 'Niṣkāma-Karmas' (P. 195). The first two come under 'Morality'; the last under 'Spirituality'. But in every case, free will is the first condition. Hence as Brahman creates the Jīvas as 'moral' and 'spritual' beings, so He, must, of necessity, create them also as 'free' beings. For, how can the All-wise Brahman do something that is totally absurd and impossible? And, it is, undoubtedly, totally absurd and impossible to conceive of any moral life and spiritual life without a 'free life', at the same time.

Thus, Brahman has to create the Jīvas as free beings, in whatever way that be possible (See just below). And, if that be once admitted, then there is no way out of the conclusion that God creates according to the past Karmas of the Jīvas themselves. For this, as we have seen (P. 181ff) is the fundamental demand of Justice itself. And, an All-Just Brahman cannot jeopardise the just claims of Justice.

(D) Creation according to Jiva-Karmas does not jeopardise Divine Omnipotence.

In this way, if all the conditions of Creation be properly understood here, there arises no question at all of jeopardising the Omnipotence of Brahman. Let the conditions be re-capitulated :—

(i) Brahman creates the universe for the sake of the 'Mokṣa' or

'Salvation' of the 'Jīvas'. So, He has to create the Jīvas as free agents; otherwise, it will be very unwise on His part.

(ii) Brahman creates the Jīvas as mutually different. So, He has to create the Jīvas according to their past Karmas; otherwise, it will be very unjust on His part.

In this way, Brahman, out of His own All-spiritual Nature, endows the Jīvas with freedom of will; and then, when, as free agents, they perform 'Sakāma Karmas' or Voluntary action, Brahman out of His own All-Just Nature, creates them according to their own past, non-experienced, and so, unexhausted Karmas. In this way, if one does something out of his own nature, that can never be set at naught by another aspect of his own nature, for, Nature is one, not dual or multiple.

(E) Worldly Examples

For example, a Sovereign declares several prizes for sports-competition amongst his soldiers. Then, he distributes the prizes strictly according to the merits and performances of the soldiers themselves. Here, then a Sovereign, though possessing absolute powers over his own soldiers, though supplying the funds for the prizes himself alone, though himself the only and the final judge of the contest—yet, restricts his own freedom or power in such a way as not to upset the other equally fundamental aspect of his nature as a Sovereign, viz his strict impartiality and justness. But, here who would say that the Sovereign is a powerless, weak one, as he observes certain rules and regulations, and restricts his own power?

Or, take the case of a Judge or an Examiner. A Judge has been given an absolute power of judging and passing sentences. But can he ever act arbitrārily, ignoring the evidences placed before him? No, for, then, he will cease to be a Judge; and the very nature or quality of being a 'Judge' implies that he judges cases impartially, strictly according to the evidences and other connected circumstances alone; and the moment he fails to do so, he ceases to be a Judge.

In exactly the same manner, an Examiner has an absolute power of evaluating answer scripts and allotting marks. But can he ever act arbitrarily, ignoring the merit or otherwise of the answer-papers, submitted to him? Surely not. For, here, too, the very nature or quality of being an 'Examiner' implies that he exmines papers impartially, strictly according to the quality or value of the answers given by the candidates concerned; and not according to any other consideration, And, the moment he fails to do so, he ceases to be an 'Examiner'.

Or, take the case of a Doctor. He, too, has an absolute power to prescribe medicines or lines of treatment. But can, he, too, act arbitrarily with regard to his patients? Most emphatically not.

Here, too, the very nature or quality of being a 'Doctor' necessarily implies that he doctors his patients, not arbitrarily, but only strictly according to the symptoms of their diseases And, the moment he fails to do so, he ceases to be a 'Doctor'.

Examples need not be multiplied here. The fact to note here is that any and every person, weilding powers over others, must do so according to some fixed rules and principles. For, the very conception of 'Power' necessarily implies that of 'Justice'; the very conception of "Freedom" implies that of 'Rule'; the very conception of Self-dependence implies that of Self-control. That is why, if anyone weilds power, without justice, in an unjust manner, he is not called a 'powerful' man, bnt only a 'tyrant'; if any one exercises freedom, without rules in an unruly manner, he is not called 'a free, man', but only a 'libertine'; if any one shows 'self-dependence or independence without 'self-control', in an uncontrolled manner, he is not called a 'self-dependent' or 'independent man, but only 'undisciplined'.

And, so in every case, there is a kind of 'limitation': 'Power' is not uncontrolled, but limited by Justice; 'Freedom' by 'Rule'; 'Self-dependence' by 'Self-control'. But, here such self-limitations are not, really limitations, in the ordinary sense of the term; as these constitute the very nature or essence of those things concerned. For, as pointed out just above, 'Power' is not 'Power' at all, if not limited or guided by 'Justice'; 'Freedom' is not 'Freedom' at all, if not limited or guided by 'Rule'; 'Self-dependence' is not 'Self-dependence', at all if not limited or guided by Self-control'.

This is the general rule regarding 'Power', 'Freedom', Self-dependence',

Brahman's Power, Freedom and 'Self-dependence'

Brahman, too, is 'Sarva-Śakti-Svādhina-Svatantra'—Omnipotent, Eternally Free, Absolutely Self-dependent.' Yet, for making a spiritual life possible for the Jīvas, He allows it freedom; for upholding the claims of Justice, He creates the universe according to the past 'Sakāma-Karmas of the Jīvas. So, why should these imply any limitations on Him? As a Powerful as well as a Just being, He cannot but weild His power according to the canons of Justice. As a Free, as well as an Orderly Being, He cannot but exercise His freedom, according to rules. As a Self-dependent, as well as a Self-disciplined Being, He cannot but manifest His self-dependence according to the processes of self-control.

Hence, the above Objection—that if Brahman has to create the Universe according to the past 'Sakāma-Karmas' of the Jīvas, His Omnipotence and Freedom will be jeopardised,—is wholly untenable. This will be, as shown above, as absurd as to hold that a Sovereign is not powerful and

free, simply, because he rewards and punishes his subjects according to their good and bad deeds, and not arbitrarily.

(G) The Concept of Self-limitation

In Western Theology, which does not believe in the Law of Karma, the problem is presented in a slightly different way, viz., as to why God should allow freedom of will to human beings, thereby limiting His own absolute freedom ? The solution offered is, ordinarily, that this is a case of Voluntary, Divine Self-limitation. And, the counter-argument also, is, ordinarily, that any kind of limitation, even self-limitation, is, after all, a limitation, and so inappropriate on the part of an Unlimited and Illimitable Being like God.

Now, there may be differences of opinion regarding the above question. That is why, here the Indian Concept is not a concept of 'Self-Limitation', but, rather one of 'Self-Characteristic'. In fact, the term 'limitation' is rather a misnomer here, as shown above. (P272). Really speaking, it is no 'limitation' at all on the power and freedom of a Sovereign if he rewards or punishes his subjects according to their good or bad deeds and not arbitrarily ; because this is the only way in which he can ever do it, or be a Sovereign,

It is this real apprehension of the meaning of 'Self-limitation' that will enable us to see that there is no contradiction, in the nature of God. So 'limitation' or 'restriction' of any kind is not necessary in His case, at all. Everything in Him is spontaneous and sprightly—and this is the Essence of God. (P. 270-72)

(u) The Fourth Objection against the Law of Karma.

The Fourth common Objection against the Law of Karma is a still more formidable one.

Under the "Refutation of the Third Objection against the Law of Karma", it has been shown as to how Brahman allows freedom of will to the Jīvas, and creates the universe according to their past, 'Sakāma-Karmas, without His Omnipotence and Freedom being jeopardised or curtailed in any way (P. 267 ff . But, even if His Omnipotence is saved in this way somehow, alas ! His Omniscience cannot be done so at all. Why ? Because of the following reasons :—

Brahman is, essentially, Omniscient or All-Knowing, This means, that He knows all events or things always. Accordingly, not only the past and the present, but also all the future acts of the Jīvas, what it will do year after year, birth after birth, as well as the results thereof, are known to Him from all eternity. In that case, the so-called freedom of will of the Jīvas is a farce and an illusion. For, if all its acts, together with their actual results be known to Brahman always, these are, really, pre-determined by Him always, and cannot be made otherwise by the Jīva

through its so-called independent efforts. Thus the Jīva's moral and spiritual life will become impossible, on this count.

Another Difficult Theological Dilemma

If to avoid this, it be said that, Brahman does not know all the acts, with their results, of the Jīvas—then He will become non-omniscient. Thus, here, again, we are on the horns of another Theological Dilemma:—

If God knows all the acts of the Jīvas, then the Jīvas are not free; and if God does not know all the acts of the Jīvas, then He is not Omniscient.

Either, God knows all the acts of the Jīvas, or He does not.

Either, the Jīvas are not free, or God is not Omniscient.

What is the way out?

(v) Refutation of the Fourth Objection against the Law of Karma.

This, indeed, is a very difficult, philosophical problem for all Theological Systems of the world, all throughout the ages.

It is, indeed, more difficult than the problem as to how individuals can rise above their hereditary and environmental circumstances, discussed above (Pp 263-64). Hence, a Western scholar has remarked tensely. "Theology has more perils for human freedom than Cosmology." (Seth's Study of Ethical Principles P. 401.18th Ed.)

(A) Western Solution.

In Western Theology, the problem is, generally, attempted to be tackled on the basis of Divine Timelessness. Thus, it is said here that Divine Knowledge is not at all a temporal one, but is immediate and intuitive. So, it does not 'happen' in time, as a 'process', like human knowledge. But human voluntary acts happen in time, as a 'process'. Hence, it is asserted here that there can be no relation of contradiction or opposition between these two entirely different kinds of things viz. Essentially Timeless Divine Knowledge, and Human Freedom, essentially subject to temporal conditions, Thus, it is concluded, in this connection that Divine Omniscience does not jeopardise Human Freedom, the two being on two different planes. If, of course, these were on the same temporal plane, then the question could have arisen. But it does not now.

As a matter of fact, Divine Omniscience is quite different from worldly pre-determination. Worldly pre determination is a process in time, and hence, it is, naturally, opposed to Human Freedom, also a process in time. That is why, we have to discuss seriously, in this connection, only as to whether the pre determination—as held by the

Necessitarians, by hereditary and environmental factors really set at naught Human Freedom. But there is no difficultywith regard to the present case, as explained above.

(B) Difficulties of Western Solution.

But, if we come to think of it, the above Western Solution, is not at all satisfactory. That God is Timeless, is a well-known metaphysical and theological fact, But, how can that afford any relief here? For, whether God knows in a timeless manner, or not, that makes no difference to the question at issue here. The main thing is that God does know—in whatever way that be possible, consistently with His own nature and characteristics, And, if God does know, there the difficulty remains exactly the same, viz—if God does know eternally all human acts and their results, there is really no meaning, at all in human freedom.

So, what is the way out?

(C) Only Solution of the Problem

The only way out is to tackle the problem straight and face the consequences.

And, what are the consequences? The consequences are not that God is not Omniscient or Man is not Free—God is Omniscient and Man is Free - both these, viz both. Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom, have to be kept. But the only logical conclusion is that God is Omniscient, no doubt, not in the sense that He does actually know all things, but only in the sense, that He can know all things, but does not. Why? Because, as stated above, and as well-known, there is no contradiction in God's Nature.

1. God allows Human Freedom and Makes it Possible.

Now, it has been explained above, that it is God's Nature to allow freedom of will to the Jivas (P. 270). If that be so, then it is also God's Nature to allow them the conditions of that freedom. For, how can God act here, in a contradictory,—we might even say with all apologies to God,—in a deceptive manner, by allowing men freedom by one hand, and withdrawing the same by the other, so speak, through knowing and thereby pre-determining all their acts from all eternity? This is impossible on the part of God.

So, here we have to say that either God does not allow freedom to men at all; or He does so, gladly and actually. No other third alternative can be conceived of here—like, He allows freedom to men only apparently, and not really, and so on. Now, here, the first alternative is wholly untenable. For, as we have seen, from the empirical standpoint, God creates the universe with a moral purpose, i. e. for enabling the Jivas

to attain salvation through it finally, by exhausting their 'Sakāma-Karmas', performing 'Niṣkāma-Karmas', and practising the 'Sādhanas' (P. 186-87). If that be so, as we have seen already, it is absolutely necessary for God to give freedom of will to men—otherwise, the very purpose of His creation will be totally defeated (P. 270).

Thus, God cannot behave in a haphazard manner, like a mad man, now starting something, now doing something contradictory to it. But being a supremely rational, supremely systematic, supremely able Being, He finishes all His acts in a rational, systematic, and able way.

Hence, the only question here to be decided about is: First, whether God actually gives 'freedom of will' to men, or not. Once this question is decided, the rest is easy.

So, as we have seen (P. 270), God actually does give freedom of will to men. That is final.

2. God can, but does not, pre-know.

Accordingly, His act of giving freedom of will to men must be a full and consistent one. He cannot, from the Monotheistic standpoint, deceive men by apparently giving them freedom of will, but really not, He cannot play a practical joke on them by actually giving them freedom of will, yet making the exercise of such a freedom wholly impossible by other circumstances. So, when He gives freedom of will to men, He must also see to it, at the same time, that there is nothing to prevent the full exercise of such a Freedom i. e. arrange for the circumstances that will enable them to exercise such freedom actually. What are such circumstances? Such circumstances are these: He himself must not predetermine the voluntary acts of the Jīvas; so. He must not pre-know the same. So God does not do so.

This is a simple solution, but fully logical.

Let us have it clear.

(i) God gives freedom to men.

(ii) God does not pre-know their acts.

Here (i) and (ii) are positive and negative ways of the very same thing. So, there cannot be (i) at all without (ii), for, if (i) be true, (ii), too, must be so—there is no other alternative.

(D) The Indian view: Saksi-Caitanya.

The Indian Conception of 'Sāksi-Caitanya or Witnessing Consciousness', may, profitably, be noted here. This is really an Advaita-Vedānta term, used, generally for showing that the real 'Caitanya' or Consciousness of the 'Ātman' or Self is unaffected by the empirical states and processes of the 'Manas' or Mind, itself a product of 'Ajnāna' or

'Avidyā'. But, in the Monotheistic Schools, it may be taken as Iśvara or God, not directly interfering with human activities, though immanent in the hearts of men as, 'Antaryāmin' or Inner Controller. Hence, He is a silent 'Witness', so to speak, of everything, but not a direct participator in any thing.

This is the Monothestic picture of an Omnipotent, Omniscient Omnipresent God, possessing all powers, all knowledge, and pervading all ; yet leaving the sphere of human lives free for free endeavour and free realisation.

So, what contradiction is involved here ?

(E) Wordly Analogies.

To make the matter clear, we quote here certain wordly analogies.

A benevolent Sovereign, desiring to make a gift of a piece of land to a subject, makes all necessary arrangements for the same, so that the individual concerned may enjoy the ownership of the land unrestrictedly. So, the Sovereign voluntarily restricts his own authority over the land, removes his own properties from there, demolishes his own buildings on it, orders his own guards to vacate, and, in this way, does any and everything that is necessary for enabling the beneficiary to enjoy the gift without any restriction whatsoever. If the Sovereign does not do all these, yet makes a gift of the land to the subject concerned, his act will be either a foolish or a knavish one. But it is inconceivable that a Sovereign Monarch should act in such a strange and absurd way.

Or, take the case of a democratic King, delegating some of his powers to the Legislative Assembly. Here, also, he takes proper steps to see that the Assembly has a full authority over the subjects delegated to it. And, if he be strictly democratic, he will not, also, reserve any special powers for him in those respects.

Or, take the case of a fond father, dividing his properties amongst his sons even before death. Here, also, he takes all proper steps to give an absolute authority to his sons over his properties.

Now, in all these cases, men in authority voluntarily make a gift of something to some other persons and at the same time, do everything that is necessary for making the gifts absolute.

But does that imply any restriction of authority on their part ? Surely not. This follows simply from their very nature as 'Giver's. One who gives, does so in such a way as to make the 'giving, actually

effective. Hence, whatever is necessary, for that, is, by no means, any 'limitation' or 'restriction' on the 'giver's power, authority or freedom—but simply his nature as a 'giver'.

So, what contradiction is there ?

(F) Divine Omniscience is not inconsistent with Human Freedom; No Limitation or Even self-limitation here.

In exactly the same manner, God, as a Giver of Freedom of Will to men, does not voluntarily know their acts and the results thereof, to make such a freedom possible for them—that, by no means, implies any self-limitation, self-restriction on His part or any jeopardising of His Omniscience For, this voluntary non-knowing of human acts and their results implies no limitation on His Ommiscience by anything external, —it is not even self-limitation—but only His nature itself as a 'Giver'. In fact, just as God cannot be a Just Creator, unless He creates according to the past, 'Sakāma-Karmas of the Jīvas (P. 184-85, 270-71), so, here too, He cannot be a Giver of Freedom, to the Jīvas, unless He refrains from pre-knowing the acts of the Jīvas, together with their results.

So, as everywhere, so here, too, there is no limitation, no restriction, no curtailment, no jeopardising of any power or attribute of God, at any time, under any circumstances whatsoever. There is only the eternal manifestation of His Nature—His harmonious, consistent, smooth, serene, beautiful Nature (Pp. 272-73). So, if this Nature of God be understood, even a bit—'realization' is a big thing, leave that apart—still then, all these apparently insoluble Theological problems will at once vanish, like a mirage before a discerning eye.

(G) Is Brahman actually Omnipotent and Omniscient, or only potentially so ?

1. Objection

Two questions have been discussed above—two very difficult problems for the Theologians of all ages and all countries, viz.

(i) How Brahman or God can be taken to be Omnipotent, when He has to give Freedom of Will to the Jīvas, and so, create the universe of Souls and Matter, only according to the past, 'Sakāma-Karmas' of the individual souls or Jīvas

(ii) How Brahman or God can be taken to be Omniscient, when He has to give Freedom of Will to the Jīvas, and so, refrain from knowing their acts and the results thereof.

The answers suggested were that :—

(i) Brahman or God being a Just Being by nature, by nature creates the universe of Souls and Matter according to the inviolable

principles of Justice, and so, according to the past Karmas of the Jīvas themselves. So, this is no limitation of God's Omnipotence, but His very Nature. Itself.

(ii) Brahman or God being a Free Giver of freeedom to the Jīvas by nature, by nature refrains from knowing the acts of the Jīvas, in order to make this freedom possible for them.

Well and good, and accepted. But, reflect just for a moment, over the real implications of the above.

If the above views be accepted, then we have to say that, willy-nilly, it does not matter if it is by nature—even then, God has to restrict His Power and Knowledge, voluntarily, refraining from doing and knowing whatever He likes, for the sake of the Jīvas, or for the sake of allowing them freedom of will. Now, this may be very natural to God ; this may be very beneficial to the individual souls—all these may be fully and gladly admitted. But still, the hard, undeniable fact remains that, if these be so, Brahman can, no longer, be called actually Omnipotent and Omniscient ; but, at best, only potentially so. For, then, we have to say that, Brahman can create in whatever way He likes, but does not do so actually. So, actually, He is not Omnipotent, but only potentially. In the very same manner, we have also to say that, Brahman can know whatever He likes, but does not do so actually. So, here also, actually, He is not Omniscient, but only potentially.

Worlly Examples

Take the examples given above.

If a just Sovereign rewards and punishes his subjects according to their merits and demerits, then as a Just Monarch, he becomes restricted in power or authority to that extent. Again, if a Liberal Sovreign gives a gift to a subject and does whatever is necessary for making the subject an absolute owner of the same, then also, as a free giver, he becomes restricted in power or authority to that extent.

In the very same manner, Human Freedom does actually restrict Divine Omnipotence and Omniscience, and so, here only the potential Omnipotence and Omniscience of God can be saved, nothing more. Bu when Brahman is called 'Sarva-sākti' and 'Sarvajna'. He is taken to be actually Omnipotent and Omniscient. and not only potentialy.

So what is the way out ?

2. Reply

If God is to be theologically conceived, then, undoubtedly, His actual, and not only, potential, Omnipotence and Omniscience have to be kept, at any cost. Again, if Man is to be theologically conceived, then,

undoubtedly, his actual, and not only apparent, freedom has to be kept, at any cost. For, as well-known, from the theological standpoint, or from the standpoint of Religion, God is actually Omnipotent and Omniscient; White, Man is actually free, and freely, spiritually strives to attain God.

And, if both have to be kept, then, as pointed out above (P. 276) the above are the only solutions possible. However, we repeat, if properly understood, these solutions never jeopardise the 'actual', as opposed to 'potential', Omnipotence and Omniscience of God, or the 'actual', as opposed to 'apparent' freedom of Man.

Now, it has been said above, repeatedly, (P. 270) that the just God's act of creation according to the past, 'Sakâma-Karmas' of the Jîvas is not any kind of 'limitation' on His freedom of action or powers—not even 'self-limitation'. So, how can the question of any kind of 'limitation' arise here at all? It is 'nature', we repeat again, and, where there is the question of 'nature', there cannot be any question of 'limitation' of any kind whatsoever.

3. God cannot go against His own Nature

Thus, a Just God, by nature acts justly, and not otherwise, Here, the phrase: 'and not otherwise', however, does not imply any defect, weakness or limitation on His part, but, just the contrary. In fact, the Omnipotence of God includes this fundamental power of always acting according to His own nature. The power to act arbitrarily, even against one's own nature, cannot be called 'power' at all—as it is nothing more than a 'revolt' against nature. And, the main task of 'powers' is to quell such regrettable 'revolts' within nature. For, one's own 'nature' must be, at all costs, harmonious, consistent, organised, peaceful (P. 278).

Of course, there maybe cases of sudden 'reformation', when there is a sudden revolt against one's own nature. But, really, here the force that leads the person concerned to 'revolt' or 'rise against' his own nature, must become a real 'power' to be ultimately effective. And, the attempts to go against one's own nature that cannot become such 'powers', have naturally, to be suppressed for the sake of maintaining Life's integration, the 'sine qua non' or the essential, minimum condition of life itself.

In fact, not to go against nature, and to organise the thousand and one opposing tendencies, feeling, ideas into one harmonious whole—is not an easy task. So, the real and the greatest power of any man lies in this, and in this alone.

4. Real Meaning of God's Omnipotence.

And, in God's case, too, His Omnipotence is not an empty abstract theoretical something—meaning any and everything in an abstract

theoretical manner. But it is a full concrete, practical something—meaning His power to act according to His own Nature In human cases, such a power is limited in nature, as it is, often, hampered by internal 'revolts' and external opposition. But in God's case, naturally, such a power is absolute, eternal, unhampered. And, this is His Omnipotence. Thus His act of Creation according to the principles of Justice or the past Sakāma-Karmas of the Jīvas, being an act according to His own Just Nature, implies His full powers to act according to His own Nature—and this is nothing but 'Omnipotence', instead of being any defect or deficiency or lack of powers or Omnipotence on His part.

5. Real Meaning of Divine Omniscience.

In the very same manner, Gods 'Omniscience', too, is not something empty, abstract or theoretical. But it, too, is something full, concrete or practical, implying His power to know all according to His own Nature. Thus, His act of not knowing the acts of the Jīvas, being an act according to His own Nature as a Free Giver of freedom to men, implies His full powers to act according to His own Nature—and this is nothing but 'Omniscience', instead of being any defect or deficiency or lack of knowledge on His part.

In this way, as pointed out above (P. 278—280), in God's case, also in all cases, the only thing to be considered is 'Svarūpa', or Nature, and nothing else. All His attributes, all this powers, all His activities are manifestations of this, and only this, and nothing else but this. (P. 144).

Thus, although the ordinary limits of possibility and impossibility are not applicable in the case of God, yet there is one limit, viz. that **even God cannot go against His own Nature** - this is impossible even on the part of God. If this fundamental concept can be grasped, all problems regarding God can be solved easily and joyfully.

6. God is actually, and not only potentially, Omnipotent and Omniscient

Hence, God is **actually,** and not only **potentially,** Omnipotent and Omniscient.

Ordinarily, speaking of nature, we speak of its three main sides—cognitive, emotive and conative, from the standpoints, respectively, of thinking, feeling and willing. If we apply the same categories to God also—we might, briefly, say that He is All-knowing from the cognitive side, All-Merciful from the emotive, All Powerful from the conative. Hence, according to the above maxim—a fundamental, theological maxim—God knows according to His own Nature loves according to His own Nature, acts accoding to His own Nature. And all these: His Omniscience, All-Mercifulness and Omnipotence, are **actual,** and not only **potential,** even though, according to His fundamental Just Nature, He does not know

all things, does not favour all beings, does not do all things—as shown above For, what follows from Nature Itself, is always **actual**, and never only **potential**.

(H) Concluding Remarks

We have spent a lot of time, and devoted a lot of space for the above two fundamental theological questions. For, the whole structure of a Monotheistic System depends on the same. Cases are not infrequent when philosophers and theologians—both Western and Eastern—have given up the problems as insoluble and referred to the 'Ananta-Acintya Śakti'—the infinite, inscrutable powers of God, because of which He is capable of any and every thing, though incomprehensible to us. But such theories make God unknowable, on the one hand ; and, autocratic, on the other—both of which, in our opinion, a Monotheistic God should never be.

That is why, in our humble ways, we have attempted to offer a solution, based on the fundamental Indian Concept of. 'Svarūpa' or 'Nature', which perhaps is the only way out, under the circumstances, Who knows ?

(w) The Fifth Objection against the Law of Karma.

A fifth, rather an ingenious Objection may be raised here, as follows :—

It has been said above (P. 1 2ff) that the universe is created according to the past, Sakāma-Karmas' of the Jīvas themselves. But all the Jīvas are, by no means, born together ; nor do they die together. On the contrary, they are born and die separately ; the 'Jagat' or the material world is already there even before they are born ; and continue to be there even after they die So, how can it be said here that the 'Jagat is created according to the past, 'Sakāma-Karmas' of the Jīvas themselves ? For, over and above the fact that all the Jīvas are not born simultaneously, the Karmas of all of them are, by no means, identical. On the contrary, if it be held that each Jīva is a separate and a unique 'individual' (P. 43) then its Karmas, too, must be absolutely separate and unique. So, how can such separate and unique past Sakāma-Karmas of so many different individuals, born, over and above, separately at many different times, combine together to produce one, total, identical world, just at the beginning of Creation ? Again, when so many different individuals die separately at many different times, what will happen to the world, supposed to be created according to their respective, past, Sakāma-Karmas ?

In this way, it is asserted, the creation of the Jīvas, according to their own, respective, past Sakāma-Karmas is, undoubtedly, tenable.

But the creation of the Jagat according to the same Law of Karma is wholly untenable, as shown above. So, what is its explanation ?

(X) Refutation of the Fifth Objection against the Law of Karma.

But the above Objection is, really, based on a mis-conception regarding the Law of Karma. It is not the contention of the Law of Karma that the whole physical universe, with its sun and moon, seas and mountains, towns and villages is created anew with the birth of each Jīva. This, evidently, is absurd and impossible, For the universe is there long before particular individuals are born, and will continue long after they die.

So, how has it been created ?

(A) Creation of the Universe according to the Karmas of All Conjointly.

Now, according to the Indian View of Creation, the present universe is created at the time of Sṛṣṭi or Creation, and will continue till the time of Pralaya or Dissolution. And, according to the Law of Karma, a definite number of Jīvas, whose past, Sakāma-Karmas have not yet been exhausted, have to be re-born in this universe.

Here, the Omniscient and Omnipotent Brahman takes note of all the past, Sakāma-Karmas of all those Jīvas, and creates the physical universe out of His 'Acit-Śakti', according to all these conjointly, in anticipation. That is, He creates, in anticipation, an infinite number of small individual universes, so to speak, suited to an infinite number of Jīvas, according to their own, respective, past 'Sakāma-Karmas', so that, they may, in their own times, be born in those 'individual universes' or in simple language, under those environmental circumstances.

1. Objection

The question may legitimately be asked as to how so many different past Karmas of so many different Jīvas combine together to produce only one universe which is a Cosmos, and not a Chaos. For, such numerous variegated, Karmas are sure to be mutually contradictory, and, so, how can these conjointly produce a universe that is one, consistent, organic whole ?

2. Reply

The reply is that, it is quite within the power of Omnipotent and Omniscient God to fit in all these numerous, variegated, and even, contradictory Karmas into one consistent whole or 'Cosmos'.

It is, of course, true, that according to our own conception of a Just and Orderly God, we cannot conceive of God as combining contradictory elements together by a super-natural, magical, mystical feat of will. But the fact is that, what is contradictory in a small setting, may not be so under a wider perspective. For example, one small leg and

another big one are naturally inconsistent and inconvenient in the case of a small teapoy, having only two legs and one pattern But in the case of a big table, having many legs and patterns, placed on different slopes and heights, these two legs of different heights may be quite suitable, at different points.

In a similar manner, in this vast and variegated universe, nothing is so very contradictory as to be incapable of being fitted in the total pattern of the whole. Also, all these Jīvas were living together in the same world, performing their Karmas under similar conditions. So, how can these be so very contradictory ?

In fact, in the universe there are not a few contradictory elements, like day and night, summer and winter, land and water, and what not — still the world is a Cosmos, still the course of Nature is smooth, still the life of Man is harmonious.

So, it is nothing impossible on the part of Brahman, even consistently with His Just and Harmonious Nature, to produce a harmonious universe, according to the conjoint past Karmas of all the Jīvas, entitled to be born there. The blocks are there, but the setting in, the putting together, the pattern, are entirely His own. So, like an expert toy-maker, fitting the apparently chaotic toy-blocks into a beautiful picture, Brahman, too, fits in the past Sakāma-Karmas of the Jīvas into the form of this beautiful universe.

So, what contradiction is there ?

(B) The 'Individual Universes' : Five Kinds of Environment.

And, in this big universe, the small 'individual universes' await the birth of their respective masters. These are the environmental circumstances under which the Jīvas, with their respective hereditary characteristics, are re-born. Such environments are physical, physiological, psychological, social and economical ; and these differ according to the respective, past Karmas of the Jīvas.

Thus, if you come to think of it, even the physical environments, viz. the common sun and the moon, light and air, land and water, differ according to the past, Sakāma-Karmas of the Jīvas themselves. For, climatic and geographical differences do make for important differences in the lives of different individuals, as the Anthropologists will show. Thus, one born in a hot country and, one in a cold one ; one born in a fertile land, and one in a desert ; one born in a town and, one in a city, and so on, do differ in nature and abilities, quite a lot.

And, that the physiological, psychological, social and economical environments of the Jīvas differ, is well-known.

Thus, according to the Law of Karma, the big universe, as well as the small 'individual' ones are created in accordance with the past,

'Sakāma-Karmas' of the Jīvas themselves; in such arenas. the Baddha-Jīvas are re-born, with their physiological and psychological inheritance to undergo the appropriate results of the their own, past, non-experienced, unexhausted Karmas.

Thus, physiologically, the Jīvas are born with different kinds of bodies, sense organs, motor-organs, and the like.

Psychologically, the Jīvas are born with different kinds of minds and mental powers and the like.

Socially, the Jīvas are born in different families, societies, regions, as different races, nationals, castes, with different creeds, traditions, histories, and the like.

Economically, the Jīvas are born as rich or poor, highly or lowly placed and so on.

(C) Creation is due to Jiva-Karmas.

In this way, there is no real inconsistency here, at all. Sṛṣṭi or Creation is, thus, due to the Jīva-Karmas, and the Law of Karma is not set at naught in any way.

(D) Creation is due to Jiva-Karmas.

Thus, the actual process of Creation of Jīva-Jagat is as follows :— (P. 176).

First, as we have seen (P. 182 ff , the Jagat or the physical world is produced from all the past Karmas of the Jīvas, taken by Brahman conjointly. Here, all those Jīvas whose Karma-Bījas are ripe, so to speak, are born gradually, at their scheduled times. Thus, on the first day, those whose Karma-Bījas are fully ripe are born, together ; and then, others, day by day, hour by hour minute by minute, just when their Karma-Bījas are fully ripe and ready to produce their appropriate fruits or results. In this way, the Jīvas are born ceaselessly during the whole period of 'Sṛṣṭi' according to their own, respective past, 'Sakāma-Karmas'.

(E) Dissolution is due to Jiva-Karmas

In the very same way, 'Pralaya' or Dissolution, too, is due to the Jīva-Karmas (P. 230). According to the Vedānta 'Pariṇāma-Vāda'or the Doctrine of Real Transformation, 'Sṛṣṭi' or 'Creation' means that the Karmas are active or awake, so to speak ; while 'Pralaya' or 'Dissolution' means that the Karmas are inactive or sleeping, so to speak. Hence, when the time is ripe for the Karmas of those Jīvas, who are entitled to be born, to be active and awake, there is 'Creation' , when, the time is ripe for the same to be inactive and sleeping, there is 'Dissolution'. Thus, 'Dissolution' is not 'Salvation', for, even then the Karma-Bījas continue—Karma-Bījas which are to fructify in a new birth. So, it is only a kind of temporary suspension of actual worldly life, though the conditions for the same are there.

(F) Difficulties in these Conceptions of Creation and Dissolution

The difficulty in connection with 'Creation' has already been explained (P. 28. The same difficulty is felt more in the case of 'Dissolution'. For, the question here is as to how all the Karmas of all the Jīvas can become inactive and dormant simultaneously, to cause 'Pralaya'. In the case of 'Creation', of course, to solve the difficulty, it may be said that the Omniscient God takes note of all the Karmas of all the Jīvas and creates the world. accordingly, in anticipation, though all the Jīvas are not born together at the very same time, but do so gradually, according as their Karmas actually ripen (P. 283-84). But the same explanation, in terms of 'anticipation', evidently, cannot be effective in the case of 'Dissolution'. So, we ask again, what is the way out?

(G) Solution of the above.

In this connection, in the beginning, we may refer to the view of Appaya Dīkṣita in his 'Sivārka-Maṇi-Dīpikā –

"यद्यपि सृष्टि-क्रम वैषम्य-कारणं कर्म-क्रम-वैषम्यमिव संहार-यौगपद्य-साम्य-कारणं कर्म-यौगपद्य-साम्यं न सम्भवति, तथापि प्राणिनां निशास्विव भोग-विशेष-प्रापणार्थं तत्तच्छरीर-स्थापकानां कर्मणां काल-विशेषे युगपत् स्वापस् सम्भवत्येव। कर्मणां स्वापो नाम प्राणिनां प्रवृत्त्यनाभिमुख्यमिव कार्यानाभिमुख्यम् तत् सर्वसम्प्रतिपन्नम्। अनादि-भव-सञ्चितानामनन्तानां कर्मणां युगपत् कार्यारम्भकत्वादर्शनात्। तत्र च कर्मणः स्वापे फलानामपाक इव कालविशेषः कारणमिति ऋतु-विशेषे जम्बु फलादि-पाक-यौगपद्यवत् कालविशषे कर्मणां स्वाप-यौगपद्यं नानुपपन्नम्॥" (२-१ ३५)

Here, Appaya Dikṣita very cleverly brings to light two main differences between 'Creation' and 'Dissolution'. Hence, he purposely uses the terms 'Krama' (Order) and 'Vaiṣamya' (Difference) in connection with former, but the terms 'Yaugapadya' (Simultaneousness, and 'Sāmya' (Sameness) in connection with the latter. Thus, he says here that 'Creation' is a gradual process, it takes place in Kramas' or stage by stage. Again, these 'Kramas' or stages are mutually different; or the Kramas of the Jīvas are different, and so, they are also gradually born as different. But 'Dissolution' is not a gradual process, and takes place at the same time. So, here all the Karmas of the Jīvas should be the same. But is that not wholly inconceivable?

Still, he quotes an analogical example. During nights, all the different Jīvas go to sleep. Similarly, a particular time may come when all the Karmas of all the Jīvas go to sleep, causing 'Pralaya' or 'Dissolution'. Or, to take another analogical example: During a particular season, all the berries may ripe simultaneously,—so here, too. Hence, Time' is the cause of such a simultaneous ripening.

(ग) Death, Dissolution and Salvation : Marana, Pralaya and Mukti Not the same.

Now, let us pause a little to consider the matter a bit.

During 'Pralaya', all Karmas cease to operate. So, this is not the same as ordinary 'death'. Ordinary 'death' does not mean the cessation of all Karmas. It means only the cessation of those Karmas that are scheduled to bear fruits here and now, in the world. But there is another kind of Karmas, viz. those that are scheduled to bear fruits hereafter, in Heaven or Hell, as the case may be. After the exhaustion of this latter kind of Karmas, the Jīvas concerned return to or are re-born in the world, and the whole series starts against (P. 185). But 'Pralaya' is the only period when all Karmas, scheduled to bear fruits here or hereafter, cease to function for the time being.

Thus, 'Pralaya' is something peculiar. It is not 'Mukti' or Salvation, when all Karmas are totally and eternally destroyed. It is not ordinary death, when Karmas to be experienced hereafter, viz. in Heaven and Hell only, remain. But it is a state when Karmas are not destroyed, only do not function at all. At this stage, the Universe of Souls and Matter is withdrawn by Brahman within Himself, and remains in Him in a subtle form.

1. Creation and Dissolution are Gradual Processes

Now, whatever be the analogies given by Appaya Dīkṣita, really speaking, all the Jīvas and the Material World are not withdrawn by Brahman within Himself, simultaneously. As during 'Creation', all the Jīvas are not manifested or created out of God at the very same time, but only gradually; so during 'Dissolution', too, all the Jīvas are not withdrawn or destroyed in God at the very same time, but only gradually.

Thus, daily Jīvas die. Some of them go to Heaven or Hell to experience the results of their past Karmas the results of which are to be produced there; and then to be re-born in the very same world. Others, whose Karmas become inoperative, are withdrawn in Brahman to await re-birth in a new world. This goes on and on. Then, a time arrives when only the last batch remains. So, these are all destroyed together and withdrawn in Him; after that, or simultaneously, the physical world, as well.

Thus, no contradiction is involved here. Evidently, the world cannot be created every time a Jīva is born; also cannot be destroyed every time a Jīva dies. But, the world is there even before the individual souls are actually born and even after they die. And, every thing is according to the past 'Sakāma-Karmas' of the Jīvas themselves. Also, there is nothing wrong or unintelligible if the world exists, even before the Jīvas appear, and continue, even after they disappear.

Thus, when the question of Creation arises from the empirical standpoint, the Cit and the Acit, the two Śaktis of the Creator God, are in perfect accord with each other. From this standpoint, the 'Cit' is the higher principle, and the world is really created for the sake of the Cit, as explained above. (P. 128 ff . Hence, the Jīva is taken to be the 'Bhoktā' or Experiencer, the Jagat its 'Bhogya' or object of Experience.

Thus, if the whole Creation be according to the past Karmas of the Jīvas, then the physical world, too, must be created according to the same. This fundamental principle has to be admitted here, first and foremost, and everything else has, inevitably to be, adjusted to it, whateren be the difficulties. And, the difficulties as shown above (P 283). are easily removable, if we understand the fact that, even without jeopardising the scope of this great and good Law of Karma in any way, God can create the physical world even before the individual Jīvas are born separately and maintain it even after individual Jīvas die separately and gradually.

2, The Production of the Physical World is something Peculiar

The simple reason is that the case of the production of the physical world according to the past, 'Sākama-Karmas' of the Jīvas, is not exactly analogous to those of other Karmas-Phalas or 'fruits or results thereof. In these latter cases, those Karma Phalas are to be experienced directly and separately by those respective Jīvas themselves. But such, evidently, is not the case with the world as a 'Karma-Phala. It is an arena where all the Jīvas, in part simultaneously, and in part successively, experience their Karma-Phalas. So, here there cannot be numerous, separate worlds for numerous, separate Jīvas. And, if there be only one world for all, it must be there for all, irrespectively of individual births and deaths, as it does not, as a whole, depend on, the individuals separately, as their separate Karma-Phalas do. And here there is, also, no inter-mixture or hybridization of Karmas. For although the whole world has been created according to the Karmas of all, yet as we have seen (P 254), here each Jīva is born in its own small individual worlds, according to its own special past Karmas.

In this way, Indian Cosmology, from the Metaphysical and Theological standpoints, is quite consistent with the ordinary view that in order of creation, the world both preecedes and outlasts the living beings, as natural.

(x) Concluding Remarks on the Law of Karma

We have taken quite a long time over the Law of Karma, and we think, justly so. For, the Law of Karma, as pointed out repeatedly above, forms the very foundation of Indian Philosophy as a whole.

Just pause for a moment, pause and reflect—what a magnanimous

conception is this ! What does this really imply ? That is simple enough, for. what is sublime, is, also, necessarily simple. In fact, complexity is a sign of incompleteness—the more a thing becomes complete and perfect, the more it becomes simple, with all its external obstacles overcome, internal conflicts resolved, inherent defects destroyed, insoluble difficulties ironed off. In the same manner, the Law of Karma is, at the same time, a sublime and a simple one ; a fundamental and a fine one; a basic and a beauteous one.

1. Sublimity of the Law of Karma.

In what does its sublimity, its fundamentalness, its basicity, consist ? And, in what, its simplicity, fineness and beauty ?

Its sublimity is that it takes an absolutely panoramic view of the world. In fact, by common consent, living from moment to moment is not really living at all. For, Life is not a point, but a line ; not a drop, but a wave ; not a grain, but a block. So, why cannot this line stretch, this wave flow, this block spread beyond death ?

According to our Rişis—saints and sages, prophets and incarnations, scholars and devotees, these can, and do so,—definitely can, and definitely do so.

(A) Life is Purposive

The main qnestion here is : What, exactly, is Life ? Is it something accidental, or is it something teleological ; is it something mechanical, or is it something spontaneous ; is it something material, or is it something spiritual ? Indian Philosophy firmly asserts, without hesitating for a single moment, that everything, everything, everything on earth has a definite purpose behind it—not even a leaf moves, not even a drop falls, not even a sparrow flies, without a definite purpose. But, at the same time, can such a purpose be fulfilled completely in course of the same life ? That depends. If the purpose be something ordinary, something small, something easily attainable, then, of course, that is a different matter. But, if it be not—what then ? Will it, then, remain unfructified ? No, that cannot be. For, purpose and fulfilment are relative terms ; and the former without the latter is, really, impossible.

(B) The Summum Bonum, the Highest Purpose of Life is Mukti

Here, on the one hand, the purpose is something very vast, grand and glorious, viz. realisation of Brahman. On the other, the common obstruction, too, is eqnally fundamental, but more terrible, more widespread, more irremovable, viz. our own "**Ajnana**", our own inherent Ignorance. our own lowly impulses and activities. So, naturally, the

removal of this veil of Ignorance takes time. One life, one short life may not be enough for it; but, removed it must be, and till that is done, Life's purpose is not fulfilled, and so Life cannot be ended, If it be so ended, then it has to be taken to be wholly purposeless, wholly useless, wholly haphazard. But can any one, really, except an incorrigible Pessimist, conceive Life to be such ?

(C) Worldly Examples: 'Existents' and Occurrences'

A lamp must shine, a flower must bloom, a river must merge in the sea, a cuckoo must sing. If a lamp does not shine, but is extinguished; if a flower does not bloom, but is dried up; if a river does not reach the sea, but is lost; if a cuckoo does not sing, but is struck mute—then, what, after all, are they? They are not, then, 'existents', but only 'occurrences', and in a teleological universe, such 'occurrences' are, undoubtedly, entirely misfits.

(D) The Summum Bonum must be Attained

According to our Indian View, human lives, at least, cannot be taken to be such misfits. The Lamp of Life must shine; the Flower of Life must bloom; the River of Life must flow; the cuckoo of Life must sing. Shine as what, bloom as what, flow as what, sing as what? As one thing, and one thing only—shine as Brahman, bloom as Brahman, flow as Brahman, sing as Brahman. What else is it, what else can it be, what else should it be? It is Brahman, and it has to realise this, and till it does so, it cannot end.

(E) One Life not Enough for it

But is one life enough? The question may be asked legitimately—'Why not'? If the soul is already divine by nature, if this divinity be something eternally existent, and, not something to be newly acquired—then, what trouble is there only to realise it, only to manifest it? If the lamp be already there, is it, after all, so very difficult to lift away the veils only, to enable it to manifest its light? If the flower be already there, is it, after all, so very difficult to tear off the coverings of the bud, to enable it to manifest its bloom? If the river be already there, is it, after all, so very difficult to remove the obstructions of the boulders, to enable it to manifest its flow? After all, 'existents' are positive; 'obstructions', only negative. So, how can 'obstructions' obstruct, obliterate 'existents' for long?

Right! They should not, but they do, in most cases do, indubitably do. What is the use of denying this undeniable fact? That most of the worldly individuals do not attain perfection or salvation here; that they

die, leading ordinary selfish, lives ; that they commit sins and escape—are facts of experience. So, how can it ever be said that one life, the present life is quite sufficient for the purpose of Salvation ? In the case of a few only, obstructions are negligible. But what about the rest ?

(F) Western Views of Heaven and Hell Not Acceptable

In this connection, we have, of course, the ordinary conception of Heaven and Hell. But are these at all satisfactory ? Specially, the conception of Hell, that of eternal damnation ? For, according to this view, the individual soul is eternally doomed to the tortures of Hell, after death, as the just consequences of its vices and crimes on earth.

This is just what the Law of Karma controverts vehemently. Give it opportunities, give it opportunities, give it opportunities after opportunities, opportunities after opportunities, till it attains Salvation. Do not confine its life, its attempts in the narrow scope of its present life. Evidently, this present life is not enough for his reformation, for his realisation, for his salvation.

Really speaking, as we know, there is no 'reformation' here, no change, no addition, no new something—but there is only 'realisation' —realisation of what is eternally existent, realisation of the eternal 'Brahmanhood' of the soul. The term has been used here in the ordinary sense only. However that may be, the question is : If the individual soul fails to realise its inner divinity, its eternal glory, its infinite greatness in the present life, and through sheer ignorance, goes on leading a life of brute impulses and selfish acts, then, should it be punished straightway and for ever in Hell ; or should it be given fresh opportunities ? The Western Philosophers accept the first alternative ; Indian Philosophers, the second. Which is preferable ?

(G) Indian View : Unlimited Opportunities For All

We prefer the second, infinitely more than the first. Why ? Because, it is much more sublime, much more sympathetic, much more accommodating. Give the soul infinite opportunities, life after life, birth after birth. Let it not end incomplete, imperfect, inglorious, as a seeming sinner, as if only a small Jīva, and not the great and grand Brahman Himself. Let it complete itself, perfect itself, glorify itself—or, rather, realise its eternal completeness as Brahman, eternal perfection as Brahman, eternal glory as Brahman. Is that an easy task ? As has been said above, in one sense, it is easy, very easy, For, here, it is not necessary to attain any new attribute, acquire any new skill—in short, change and improve nature, but only, to realise nature, realise the Self, realise the real nature of the Self.

True, very true! Yet, in another sense, it is difficult, very difficult. For this "Knowledge of Self", this 'Ātma-Jñāna" is, after all, the most difficult of all kinds of knowledge. It is not due to ordinary perception, inference or authority—it is "Darśana"—Vision. For just a few, as pointed out above, it is easy—they are "Ātma-Sthita", "Sthita-prajña", "Sthita-dhī"—they rest on the Self, on their own selves, rather than on the world, on others. So, the Vision of the Self—"Ātma-Darśana" is, naturally, easy for them. But what about the rest? We again ask: What about the rest? So, think of the majority, and give them chances, more and more chances, more and more—till the goal is reached.

(H) Indian Optimism: Every one must be Free.

And, the goal must be reached—must! This is our Indian view, our eternally optimistic Indian View, our infinitely encouraging Indian View, our incomparably exhilarating Indian View. Every one must realise his own self, his own nature, his own Brahmanhood—every one, of necessity, without exception. But every one evidently, indubitably is not doing so. So, every one must be given chances, an infinite number of chances, as stated above—today or tomorrow, now or then, here or hereaffer—infinitely. And, this—in fact, is the Law of Karma, nothing more, nothing less.

Look at Nature! Do you not see a Great and Grand Purpose everywhere? There is an inner necessity, so to speak, in everything great or small. There is an ineviableness in the growth of everything. The child grows up as an adult, the bud blossoms forth into a flower, the stream flows on as a river. But is it mere physical growth? Apparently it is. But really it is nothing but the manifestation of Life itself—Life that is physical, yet not so, that mysterious, wonderful principle behind all growths of all kinds whatsoever.

What is this Life—this 'Prāṇa'? In the strictly philosophical terminology of the Indian Systems, it is 'Jaḍa'—material. This may seem strange to many—and, with justice? For, how can 'Prāṇa' ever be 'Jaḍa'? The idea behind is that 'Prāṇa' is an empirical principle; it is worldly life, depending solely on Jaḍa Body-Mind, physical, conditions. So, it, too, is itself "Jaḍa or physical". However that be, 'Prāṇa', in the sense of being Life Divine, Life Eternal, Life Beautiful is something essentially 'dynamic'—it must, essentially, manifest itself—no dark clouds can obliterate its light for ever; no closed up petals can stop its bloom for ever; no heavy boulders can check its flow for ever. This is the Law of Nature, this is the Law of Life, this is the Law of Soul. And this is the sublimity of our

magnificent, Indian Law of Karma. Its vision is sublime, superb, soaring beyond the narrow present, looking straight backward and forward, in order "to see Life steadily and see it whole". It is this wholeness of Life that is the real point at issue here, and the Law of Karma is nothing but an admission and an expression of the same.

2. Fundamentalness of the Law of Karma.

And, from its 'Sublimity', inevitably, follows its another fundamental characteristic, viz its own Fundamentalness'. What is a 'Fundamental thing'? What makes for its 'fundamentalness'? That is nothing but its capacity to supply plausible explanations for many things together, otherwise inexplicable by themselves. Take the concept of Energy in Physics, and that of Psyche in Psychology. So many connected problems are solved thereby, so many gaps filled up, so many creases smoothed out, so many knots untied. Hence, a 'fundamental thing' is wide in its scope, yet firm in its hold; accommodating, yet uncompromising; universal, yet individualistic.

(A) No Compromise with Chances.

Such, too, is our Law of Karma. As we have already seen, so many spheres of knowledge require its help (P. 181ff). All these have been discussed above in details. But the point to be emphasised, once more, here, is its refusal to compromise with 'chances', under any circumstances whatsoever. There is no sphere of study in the Modern World that does not give or is not forced to give, some license, to chances, to accidents, to the inexplicable'. to the 'the unexpected', to the unwanted. But the Law of Karma boldly and firmly refuses to do so. In fact, its secret of success is that it goes to the very root of the matter, and removes the difficulties, lock,stock and barrel.

This strictly scientific attitude, this superbly philosophical sagacity this serenely sure conviction, makes it at once, a fundamental doctrine and a forceful one.

In fact, what is fundamental, is also forceful, for, in order to be a basis, it must also be brave, and, have the courage of conviction to face facts, and stand up against all odds.

So, this Law of Karma, too, is such a cool, courageous Law, furnishing the very foundation of Indian Philosophy, as a whole; and boldly offering explanations for all its knotty problems. It is, really, inconceivable, as to what Indian Philosophy would have been. without this fundamental Law of Karma. There is, really, no second instance, we think, in the whole History of Philosophy of such a Law, weilding such vast powers and exercising such deep influences, all throughout. unfailingly.

(B) The Soul is Divine

What does its 'fundamentalness' really imply? It implies the eternal, spiritual force of the Soul or the Self. According to the first characteristic of 'Sublimity', discussed above, infinite opportunities are given to the Soul or the Self to realise the 'Summum Bonum' of its life. But opportunities' necessarily imply persons capable of seizing the same, using the same, fructifying the same. Otherwise, mere empty 'opportunities', with no corresponding 'users' of the same, are absurd and meaningless. Hence, as pointed out just above, infinite opportunities necessarily imply infinite abilities.

It has been said above under the first characteristic of 'Sublimity', that every soul is Brahman in essence, and, must one day or other, realise its eternal divinity. So, from this, it follows that possess it must infinite powers to realise itself as divine. It is Divine, it must know itself to be Divine, it can know itself to be Divine, it does know itself to be Divine—these four assertions mean exactly the same thing. And, the first two come under the first characteristic of 'Sublimity'; the last two, under the second one of 'Fundamentalness'.

Thus, the Law of Karma is a Law of supreme optimism, taking, as it does, its fundamental stand on a concept of Eternal Spiritual Energy. The worldly 'opportunities' are not the 'masters', but the, 'slaves' of the Soul—this is what it fundamentally implies. As a matter of fact, no Doctrine can ever be a fundamental one, in Indian Philosophy, unless it be an inherently spiritual one. And, the fundamentalness of the Law of Karma also, therefore, implies necessarily such a Spirituality, from the beginning to the end.

3. The Basicity of the Law of Karma.

Now, what is the distinction between a "Fundamental Doctrine" and a "Basic one"? The first is externally fundamental; the second, internally. What does this imply? It implies that the second is more fundamental than the first, and forms its basis, as such, if that be possible at all. In many cases, we stop with the "Fundamental", and cannot proceed further to the "Basic".

(A) An Eternal Spiritual Paradox.

But here we do, we have to do. In what way? In a very paradoxical way, as follows :—

The first mark of the Law of Karma, viz. its 'Sublimity, implies that the Soul has to realise its own eternal Brahmanhood; while the second mark of the Law of Karma, viz. its Fundamantalness' implies the corollary, viz. that the Soul does realise its own eternal Brahman-

hood. Now, the third mark of the Law of Karma, viz. its 'Basicity implies that the Soul is not only Brahman, but also its Realisation. At the above two stages, we unconsciously speak from two different standpoints:—Timeless and Temporal. Thus: "The Soul is Brahman"—this is a timeless fact. But "The Soul realises Brahman"—this is a temporal one. Here, the temporal is taken to be leading to the timeless.

Really speaking, this is a great spiritual Paradox. Here: How can the 'Sādhanas' really lead to 'Siddhi'? For, the Sādhanas' are temporal facts, which Sāddhi' is definitely not. And, this Paradox is, inevitably, to be accepted. For, no one has, as yet, offered a solution. How can a fact, which is qualitatively different, as well as lower, lead to a fact, qualitatively different, as well as higher? At what point does the quality which is lower suddenly change, and become transmuted, nay elevated, to something else? That point, too, is a point of time. So, how can elements of time, processes of time, influences of time be avoided? How can the mind, which is Jaḍa, or material and non-spiritual, according to the Indian View, lead its own illumination, which, will, so to speak, end its own existence?

(B) "Die to Live."

But such is Life! At every step, such is Life! "Die to Live"—is the very slogan of Life. Life is a continuous, ceaseless process and the question is: Is it a 'Development' or a 'Manifestation'? If the former, then, Life is a new something at every stage, a novel emergence, an addition and an acquirement. If the latter, then, Life is eternally what it is, with no new addition or acquirement, but with only unfolding of what it is from the very beginning to all eternity. We have many different views regarding the problem, as natural.

But, the difficulty remains just the same, in both cases. For, whether a 'Development' or a 'Manifestation', at every stage, nay, at every step, a lower something leads to a higher something. How to explain that —that is the crux of the whole question. Is there really 'Dying' to Live'? Is it really 'Dying' or 'Living'; is it really 'Destruction' or 'Fulfilment'; is it really 'Ending' or 'Beginning'? This is the eternal question for all Systems of Philosophy, Religion and Morality. throughout the ages.

In any case, if a thing be not an absolutely 'static' one—the above problem has to be faced. So, it has to be faced in the case of each and every worldly object, for, each and every worldly object must have either 'Development' or 'Manifestation'—it cannot remain, as it is, as it just is, but has, inevitably to be either 'developed' or 'manifested'. So, the question, the great question always is: How does it do so?

(C) The Basic Fact of Indian Philosophy : Simple. "Is-ness"

According to our Indian View, from the 'Pāramārthika' standpoint, from the real, fundamental, transcendental standpoint, the Self **is**, simply **is**, with no development, not even manifestation. The dark clouds are blown off, and lo ! the golden sun shines out. The hard buds burst off, and lo ! the serene flower blooms forth. The dry sands are dug out, and lo ! the merry river flows on ! But did the sun ever cease to shine, the flower to bloom, the river to flow ? No. But its shining has to be manifested to some one else, its blooming also, its flowing also, respectively—and not to itself, never for itself.

Thus, 'Manifestation' is, naturally a 'Dual Conception'. And when there is no 'Duality', there is also no manifestation'.

In this way, from the standpoint of the 'Satya', 'Sattā', 'Vastu' itself, of Truth, Existence, Thing itself—there is no such thing at all.

And, the Law of Karma, as a 'basic' Law, implies this, and nothing but this. Really, from the ultimate point of view, a thing simply 'is', and does not 'develop', nor is 'manifested', as pointed out above. This pure and simple 'Is-ness' is the most basic fact of Indian Philosophy. And the Law of Karma proudly stands for this 'basic' fact.

(D) The State of Bondage is False.

What an absolutely sublime conception is this ! And also, it cannot be denied, an absolutely unintelligible one ! Just conceive of the Soul, revolving eternally on the 'Samsāra Cakra', on the Wheel of Earthly Existence, being subject, repeatedly to births and rebirths. But for what purpose ? If it simply 'is', and never 'becomes', and is not even 'manifested', then, for what purpose does it do so ? Purposes may be of two kinds : Either to acquire something new, or to manifest something old. But if neither of these be possible on the part of the eternally existent Soul, what is the meaning of its 'Baddhāvasthā' or the state of Bondage ?

Really and truly, finally and basicly, there is no meaning, no meaning at all. For, the basic conception of Nityatva of Mukti can imply only this, and nothing but this. If Mukti be Nitya, if the state of Salvation be eternal,—as it must be, it being impossible for the Summum Bonum, the highest, nay, rather, the only End of life, to be non-eternal—then Badhāvasnhā must be Mithyā, the state of Bondage must be false or an illusion on our part. Is there any way out ? Is there any way out of this Advaita conclusion ? Indeed, a very difficult question for the Monotheistic Vedāntists. But one seems helpless. However, further reflections on this basic point are postponed for a future occasion. (See the Section on "Mokṣa")

Thus, basically and paradoxically, the Law of Karma carries within itself seeds for its own destruction. But this is the most basic fact of its existence. It, thus, points to a life that is for ever beyond its fold; and that life is the only real one. What a glorious death! And, the basicity of the Law of Karma lies in this, and only in this! It is, undoubtedly, a sublime law, and, also a fundamental one as shown above. But, now we find that basically, it is an empirical law only, as, the eternally existent and eternally manifested Soul is really and transcendentally, not subject to it at all. Such is its supreme Paradox!

4. The Simplicity of the Law ol Karma

The cause-effect relation is, after all, a simple one—whatever the philosophers may say, and whatever form it may assume at their hands! For, something produces something—this is an undeniable, universal fact of experience. And, the Law of Karma is nothing but a statement regarding it. A Karma, an action, produces a Phala, a result—who fails to understand this—for, such a Karma is meant, is undertaken for such a Phala. And, this is the very contention af the Law of Karma, viz that a Sakāma-Karma is by nature "Phala-prasavi", productive of results, and hence must do so, or cease to be a Karma, at all. Hence, in order that its "Karmatva", its very nature may be maintained, it must be given fullest opportunities for producing appropriate results, here or hereafter, life after life, birth after birth. Very simple, indeed, is this thesis. Very simple, indeed, from the cognitive standpoint!

5. The Fineness of the Law of Karma.

And, also, necessarily, a fine one, a very fine one, indeed, from the conative standpoint! In what does the fineness of a thing consist? It consists in hitting on the nail, in grasping the point straight, in reaching to the core direct. So, "Fineness" means absence of all superfluities—a "gross" thing may have superfluities, not a "fine" one.

Thus, from the conative standpoint, the Law of Karma refers to the very core of one's empirical life, viz. action, selfish action. The empirical life is one of constant striving, and action, selfish action, is the embodied form of such a striving. No other system, indeed, has thought of dealing with action, everyday action, ordinary action, in such a direct, straightforward manner!

5. Beauty of the Law of Karma

And, finally, the beauty of the law of Karma, its absolute beauty, from the emotive point of view! In what does the beauty of a thing consist? It consists in its symmetry, in its proportion, in its equillibrium.

And, the law of Karma, if anything, is a perfectly equipoised one. In a chain of causes and effects, the tendency is either to stress the cause more than the effect; or, conversely. Some would think more of the hen, than of the egg; some, just the opposite. But, in the Law of Karma, the cause and the effect are given equal importance. So, the balance is in a state of absolute equillibrium.

And, above all, the beauty of a thing lies in its sweet appeal to the heart; and thence, in its indescribable joy. The heart feels fully at home here, fully at rest here, fully at peace here, fully in concordance with the object in question here. Thus, here, the heart responds to the object, flows out towards it, catches it in its own chamber and fits it in there. It is this "fitting in" that results in joy; for, disharmony is irritating; harmony, soothing.

And, does not the Law of Karma soothe us in this way? What it teaches is nothing but the Divinity of the Soul. And, is not that an absolutely soothing conception? Look around and see! Do you not see a Divine Discontent all around, and that, no other conception can soothe us, like this! Just look at your own heart, and you will at once realise this! This just fits in the empty cavity of the heart, just fills up its empty chamber! What else can?

Thus, from every point of view, the Law of Karma is, indeed, an incomparable one. It may not, of course, be fully acceptable to all. But its glory and grandeur cannot, on that account, be denied.

Conclusion

The Message of the Vedanta

INTRODUCTION

Wonderful, indeed, is this vast and variegated land of ours, this Bhāratvarṣa, this "Land of Light" that has ever served as a beacon-light to the weary and unwary in the dark and dangerous wilderness of life. Always a land of many religions and many languages, a custodian of many cultures and many customs, a repository of many ideas and many ideals, India, has, thus, ever been a great and grand pattern of unity-in-diversity-neither a bare, empty, all-absorbing unity; nor a over-full, flowing, all-separating diversity. What makes for this supreme Unity in the midst of all apparent diversities? What brings all the numerous hearts together in such a superb Union, in love and fraternity? What, in short, is the eternal, indissoluble bond amongst these millions and millions of sons and daughters of Mother India? That is only one—the most elusive, yet the most intimate bond, a bond that binds the souls together in a threadless knot, in a knot of spiritual affinity, —in short, the bond of Philosophy.

What is Philosophy?

What, after all, is Philosophy? It is a **belief** in and an **attitude** towards Life; and naturally, if you have to live a life on earth, the **belief** you have in it and the **attitude** you adopt towards it are, indisputably, the most fundamental things of life. In this sense, Philosophy is the living embodiment of the Culture and Civilisation of a country. For, Culture and Civilisation are nothing but this **belief** in Life and an **attitude** towards it. Thus, the country being the same, its Culture and Civilisation are the same; and this being so, its Philosophy is also the same. In this way, Philosophy is the only living and lasting bond of Unity amongst the multifarious diversities, apparently present every where all around.

From this main root of Philosophy, we have naturally, numerous divisions and branches, leaves and sprouts, flowers and fruits, giving rise to so many different Schools of Indian Philosophy. Amongst these all, the Vedānta is, by common consent, the greatest and the most profound; the greatest and most profound of all the Vedānta Systems being, again, the Advaita-Vedānta. Perhaps, it would not be very wrong to assert that before the superb glory and grandeur of the Advaita Vedānta-System, all other Systems pale off. Still, as stars pale off in morning-

light, but are not without their own beauty and glory, so other systems of the Vedānta, too, have their own just places in the Vedānta System of Thought.

Fundamental Characteristic of Indian Culture :— Unity-in-Diversity.

This, in fact, is the fundamental principle of India herself in all her spheres, throughout the ages. For, India has ever **united**, never destroyed; ever accepted, never derided; ever assimilated, never swallowed.

Thus, many currents of Culture and Civilisation have been **united** in the loving fold of Mother India, without being destroyed, without losing their own individualities, without giving up their own inner beauty, and eternal worth—this is the ever-flowing and ever-filling River Blissful of India. In the same manner, many outsiders, invited or uninvited: invited guests or uninvited visitors, have been **accepted** in the broad bosom of Mother India, without having to forego their own dignity, without having to disown their own loyalties, without having to surrender their fundamental rights—this is the ever-expanding and ever-enriched Field Bountiful of Mother India. In exactly the same manner, many victuals have been **assimilated** in the wide inside of Mother India, without having to sacrifice their respective potencies, without having to relinquish their own specialities, without having to be merged completely in a great and grand whole—this is the ever-growing, ever-pulsating Body Beautiful of Mother India, sweet with blissful rivers, serene with bountiful fields.

Wide Outlook.

This being the pattern of the Indian Way of things, in the sphere of Philosophy, no less, different systems have flourished together, side by side, making up one great and grand "Philosophy of India", yet not clashing with one another, or aiming at mutual destruction. So, it is but fit and proper that the Vedānta Philosophy of India, **the** Philosophy of India, should consist of so many magnificent Systems, each with its invaluable contribution, each with its superb outlook, each with its supreme splendour, ever-lasting loftiness and loveliness. That is why, in spite of there being as many as ten main Schools of the Vedānta, the "Message of the Vedānta" is one indeed, a Message, enriched by all, yet a grand Unity, a wonderful Entirety, a beautiful Whole.

What is a "Message"?

What, after all, is a "**Message**"? Does it not sound very grandiose, very exhilarating, very inspiring? Do we not, with, perhaps, legitimate pride, hear and speak of "the Message of India" to the World at large?

"The Message of India"

But really, there is nothing grandiose, nothing imposing, nothing boastworthy here. For, Message is Life itself. In fact, if we, accept, as we must, a teleological, and not a mechanical, view of life, then any and everything on earth, big or small, high or low, animate or inanimate, has a "message" of its own, which is nothing more and nothing less than an expression, an exposition, an explanation of its very being, i.e. of the purpose of its life.

Look at the sun and the moon—what is their message? Is it not the very simple, yet very profund Truth that, in whatever way and in whatever form it may appear, Light lights up all miseries, lightens down all burdens, enlivens all lethargies?

Look, again, at the serene meadows, the sparkling leaves and the smiling flowers. What is their message? Is it not the never-failing yet ever-felt fact that Beauty springs up at every nook and corner, that Harmony shines everywhere, that Love and Loveliness are orders of the day?

Look, once again, at the rustling wind, dancing brooks, singing birds: What is their Message? Is it not their incomprehensible yet incontrovertible truth that Bliss smiles in every grain of dust, that Fun runs riot in every drop of water, that Frolic plays in every blade of grass?

In exactly the same manner, Light and Beauty and Bliss emerge forth, emanate from every particle of matter, from every living cell, from every thinking mind, from every discerning soul.

The Message of Philosophy

Exactly the same is the case with Philosophy, no less. Its "Message" is not something extraneous to it, but is its own nature. Just as it is the nature of the sun to shine, and the nature of the wind to blow, and the nature of the river to flow, so it is the nature of Philosophy to manifest its nature in the form of **Light** and **Beauty** and **Bliss**—and this is its "Message".

The Message of Indian Philosophy

The Message of Light

The First Message of the "Vedānta" or Indian Philosophy, is that of Light.

Pauranic Accounts of Creation

Now, what is this Message of "**Light**" of Indian Philosophy? It may be said with certainty and without any fear of contradiction that **Light** is the **Life** of Indian Philosophy. What is "**Light**"? Light is what removes Darkness. And what is Darkness? "Darkness" is Death.

Thus, Light removes Death, and is, as such, Life itself. Accordingly, in the Indian Cosmology, in the Indian accounts of Creation, in the Purāṇas, e.g, we find constant references to Light as emerging out of Darkness, dispelling Death,—ever and bringing with it the luminous, ever-luscious, ever-lovely Life itself.

Upanisad c Accounts of Creation

But it is of profound significance that in the Upaniṣads we find no such references.

In the ancient and celebrated Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, it is said that in the beginning, there was only "**Mrityu**" or "Death", and all things were covered up by it. This "**Mrityu**" was of the form of "**Ashaya**" or "Desire" to eat. (Bṛh up 1. 2. 1.) This clearly refers to the famous Indian Doctrine of Karma, or the theory, that Sakāma-Karmas or Selfish Works lead to constant births and re-births or this worldly, empirical existence, which is but "**Mrityu**" or mortal, and, as such, a transitory, painful existence. So, it is but fit and proper that the mortal universe should come out of Mortality or Death. But in the same breath, it is asserted in the same .Upanisad that in the beginning, there was only **Atman**, or the Self (1 4.17 ; 2.1.20) ; "**Purusavidha-Atman**" or the Self of the form of a Person (1. 4. 1) ; "**Brahman**" or the Absolute (1. 4. 10-11).

In the equally celebrated Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, as well, it is asserted, in a similar manner, that in the beginning, there was only "**Sat**", the Existent, "**Ekamevadvitiyam**" one only, without a second. (Chānd Up. 6-2-1.)

So, the question naturally arises, as to how to reconcile the above, and why there is no mention of "Darkness" here, as in other treatises, like the **Puranas** etc.

Myth and Pith

The answer to this question lies in the fundamental distinction between "**Myth**" and "**Pith**". From the standpoint of "**Myth**" or from the lower empirical standpoint, there is, indeed, a very real, very insurmountable distinction between "Life" and "Death" ; "Light" and "Darkness". So here, Life emerges out of Death, defeating it. Light emits forth from Darkness, dispelling it.

But, from the standpoint of "Pith" or from the higher, noumenal standpoint, Death and Darkness are not second realities besides Life and Light. If we have this higher, fuller, truer vision of Brahman as every thing, then how can there, any longer, be any death, any darkness, any delusion, and degradation, any derangement, at all ? That is why, from the traditional, cosmological standpoint, Life and Death, Light and Darkness, Bliss and Sorrow are different from and opposed to each other. But from the real philosophical standpoint, these are not ; for, there is

only the One, **Brahman, Isvara, Atman, Purusa**—call it by any name,—the Absolute, God, Soul, Person.

We call Him, Her or It Light ; we call Him, Her or it Life ; we call Him, Her, or it Bliss—for, what better terms can we think of ? Still, these are not ultimately suitable, being **relative** in nature—**relative** respectively, to Death, Darkness and Sorrow. However, as thoughts require words, as human thoughts and human words, being relative by nature, are both inadequate to apprehend and express the Absolute, in accordance with the celebrated Upaniṣadic Dictum :

"Yato Vāco Nivartante Aprāpya Manasā Saha" (Tattirīya Upaniṣad 2. 2.)—

"From whom speech, with Mind, turn back, not getting Him".

We have, either, not to think, speak and write of the Absolute, at all ; or do all these as best as we can. And human nature being what it is, this second course has been preferred by all, for, the main beauty of human nature is its indomitable spirit of adventure, its incorrigible tendency to hope, its inexhaustible energy to apprehend the Inapprehensible.

Message of Light of Indian Philosophy

So let us not be disheartened, let us proceed with our "**Message of the Vedanta**", whatever be its worth. For, undoubtedly it is far better to give our thoughts to the Absolute, to God, to Soul, to Person, —in short, to any and everything higher, than to give our thoughts entirely to worldly objects and affairs. It is far better to speak and write of God than to speak and write entirely of worldly events and incidents. So let us proceed, and ask the question, again, only with a deeper thought and a fuller consciousness of our own limitedness, : "What is this Message of **Light** of Indian Philosophy ? Of Light that is not relative and opposed to Darkness ? Of Light that is so entirely on its own account ?"

Now, the Message of Light, as relative and opposed to Darkness, is, as we know, is a Message of Good Cheer and New Hope. It implies that there is something in everything which enables everything to be really **some** thing more than apparently what it is. Thus, there is an Inner Light, an Uuquenchable Fire in every thing, and to-day or tomorrow, in this life or another, it is destined to have this Light manifested, this Fire kindled. Of what forms these will be—this manifestation of the Light and this kindling of the Fire—and of what nature that thing will, then, be—these questions have been elaborately discussed and expounded by Indian Philosophers in their celebrated Doctrines of **Moksa** and **Sadhana**, Goal and Means ; and it is not the place to dwell on these.

But it would suffice, if it be only emphasised here that this Message of Light of the Vedānta, for the matter of that, of Indian Philosophy itself, is simply one of "Divine Destiny", the simple yet firm faith that whatever be the present destiny, the present form of a thing, it is inexorably **destined** to be divine, for the simple yet unalterable reason that **"Sarvam Khalvidam Brahman"**—'Everything is Brahman" (Chānd up. 3-14-1), "Brahmedam Sarvam" (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad 2-1-5 etc ; "Brahman is everything". What greater destiny can there be, what sweeter hope, what firmer faith ?

Message of Light from the Absolute Stand-point

And, next, what about the 'Message of Light as Absolute' ? There is no question of Destiny here ; any emergence out of a previous, different state ; any manifestation and kindling, as before. For, this Absolute Light is eternally existent, eternally full, eternally perfect, eternally manifested, eternally kindled.

Hence, the 'Message here is that, any and every one, any and every thing is eternally the Light, the Absolute, Brahman. From the relative, temporal, phenomenal. cosmological, mundane standpoints, a thing may be unmanifested and then manifested ; and that is why, we say that the eternal Divinity of man is **at first** unmanifested or unknown to him ; **later on, it comes to be manifested** or known to him. But from the absolute, supra-temporal, nonmenal, metaphysical, extra-mundane standpoints, what one is, one is ; there cannot even be any temporary obscuration of its real nature.

Take a common example. We say that the clouds hide the sun from **us**. This is the ordinary, worldly standpoint. But if there be no 'us', no observer to see and know of the sun, then clouds or no clouds, the sun is always what it is —a bright and burning object, and there is no obscuration of its light and heat through any thing to any one. Hence, when there is a **question** of **Knowing**, there may be obscuration or **not**, manifestation or not ; and this is the empirical standpoint. But from the standpoint of **Being**, there cannot be any such thing ; and this is the supra-empirical, extra-mundane, absolute, eternal standpoint.

Thus, the Message of the Vedānta simply is —

(1) Brahman are You.
God through and through.
(2) Manifest this Light.
In Life's darkest night.

Here (1) refers to the absolute standpoint ; (2) to the relative.

The Message of Beauty.

In fact, as pointed out above, the Message of Light is nothing but the Message of Life itself—of Existence itself, eternal, perfect, full. After all, Existence is the prime fact, the first truth, the fundamental

reality ; for, if one does not exist, then, what can one be ? So, then, there is the end of everything. That is why, the every first Reality is Life, Existenee, Being : Sattā, Tattva or in short 'I'—**'Aham'** and the very first Realisation is 'I am', **'Aham Asmi'**.

The second message of 'Beauty' is, as evident, of the same nature. Reality is One, Realisation is One ; still as the same sun emits rays all around, so the same Reality, the same Truth emits its messages differently, That is why, we speak of **'Messages'** in the plural, indicating only the different standpoints from which the same Reality, the same Truth can be considered : Thus, the Message of Light and thc Message of Beauty are at bottom one, only two different ways of looking at the very same One.

Life is Beauty

For Life is Beauty, Existence is Beauty, Being is Beauty. For whatever **lives**, whatever exists, whatever is, must, by nature, by necessity be beautiful, as Life, Existence or Being is nothing but Harmony. and Harmony is nothing but Beauty.

In fact, a disharmonious thing is a contradiction in terms, For, disharmony involves disruption ; disruption, derangement ; derangement, dissolution ; dissolution, destruction. Thus, really nothing **ugly** can ever exist.

Of course, from the ordinary worldly, empirical, standpoint, we distinguish between Beauty and Ugliness, jnst we distinguish between Light and Darkness, Life and Death. But from the absolute point of view, as we have seen, there is only and always Light, only and always, Life, only and always Beauty.

In fact, even from the worldly standpoint, all such difficult questions arise, as to whether Beauty is subjective, or objective : i. e., whether to a mother her children are objectively or **really** beautiful, or subjectively or emotionally, so on and so on.

Also, why is a flower called beautiful and not a fly ? Why is dew so enchanting, and not dung ? Why is chirping so soul-strriing, and not barking ? Is it objective Beauty, or Subjective Utility—utility from the standpoints of cognition, feeling and conation, as satisfylng all the three ?

Thus, when a scientist lovingly calls a shapeless root beautiful, when a mother fondly calls her suub-nosed son beautiful, when a milk-man endearingly calls the stinking heap of cow-dung beautiful—do they **actually** with thcir own eyes, see that all these above objects, are really actually, factually, beautiful ; or do they only think these to be beautiful, because they love these things, or find these to be useful, or for any other reason ? Also, is impersonal seeing more accurate than personal feeling ? Or, is Beauty, a matter of cold, neutral apprehension only, or is it a warm full feeling ?

So, let us leave all these difficult questions, which cannot, and need not, be discussed here: and try to grasp the real implication of the Message of Beauty of the Vedānta.

Brhaman is a Person

It is simply this: The Category of Life by itself is only impersonal; that of Beauty is also personal. So, this implies that Brahman, Ātman is a Person, not in the ordinary theistic sense,—which may be objected to by the Absolutists,—but in a supra-theistic sense, acceptable to all.

What is the sense? It is nothing but this, that the full Life, Existence and Being of Brahman, call Him the Absolute or God, as you like, is not a blank, cold, colourless kind of life, existence or being, —not necessarily an Organic Unity, (which is objected to by the Monistic or Absolutist School), not necessarily a Person in the sense of involving a personal relationship with other persons (which, also, is equally objected to by the Monistic or Absolutist School)—yet a soft and sweet and serene Person, a Being that is Beauty, a Life that is Loveliness, an Existence that is Excellence, at the same time.

So, what the Vedānta tells us here from the absolute standpoint, is that all are Brahman, all are Light, and Beauty. And from the temporal standpoint, it simply asks us to see and realise, this Beauty in our own selves, as well as in all things in the world—to see all as Brahman, to see all as Beauty.

(7) Beauty eternal
Is life's Kernel.

(2) Unwarp this core
To advance more and more.

As before,

(1) refers to the absolute standpoint,
(2) to the contingent.

The Message of Bliss

The third Message of Bliss, though the same as the above two, as pointed out above, yet marks the culmination of all the messages of the Vedānta. For, this **"Ananda-Tattva"** or Doctrine of Bliss is the central doctrine of the Vedānta,—for the matter of that, of Indian Phllosophy itself. "A thing of Beauty is a joy for ever". So, Light or Life is Beauty, and Beauty is Bliss.

Hence in our Upaniṣads, Brahman is described not only as **"Satyam, Jnanam, Anantam"** (Taittiriya Upanisad 2. 1.) "Truth, knowledge, Infinite", but also as **"Raso vai Sa"** (Tait, Up, 2.7.) "He verily, is Juice". Indeed "Rasa" as a term, is very difficult to translate in English, But its equivalent **"Ananda"** is translated as "Bliss" which, too, we think, is rather inadequate. However,

it is enough to convey to one a sense of infinite, eternal, absolute happiness,—not selfish pleasure, not transitory gratification, not narrow attainment—but a state of absolute expansion, called "**Bhuman**" in the celebrated Chāndogya Upanisad.

What is "**Bhuman**" ? Very beautifully does, indeed, the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, attempt to define the Undefinable :—

"YO VAI BHUMA TAT SUKHAM, NALPE SUKHAMASTI" (Chand. Up. 7. 23. 1)

"What is **Bhuman** or great is Bliss ; there is no Bliss in Alpa or small".

Next, it is said with equal grace :—

Why is there such a "Bliss" in the **Bhuman**", and not in the "**Alpa**" ? Simply because –

"DVITIYAT VAI BHAYAM BHAVATI" (Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 1. 4. 1.). "Verily, Fear arises from a Second",

Why does Fear arise from a second ? Evidently, because the Second is looked upon, not only as **different from**, but also as opposed to, the First. Hence it is that Oneness, Unity and Universality involve Bliss ; Duality, Disunity and Limitedness do not. Hence it is that the fundamental Vedānta Doctrine of "One" ('**Eka**") is the same as the equally fundamentai Vedānta Doctrine of "Bliss" ("**Ananda**"). This "**One**" may be simply "One", an abstract and partless One, as held by the Monistic Schools of the Vedānta ; or, it may be also a "**Whole**" and a "**Unity**", a Concrete Whole and an Organic Unity of parts, as held by the Monotheistic Schools of the Vedānta. In the first case, there is no question at all of any duality ; but in the second case, there is duality, but no disunity ; as all the parts are real only as inside it, only as parts of the whole, only as identical with it in **Svarupa** or **essence**.

Thus, whatever School we may belong to, the Vedānta Doctrine of One implies simply this, and nothing more :—Every one, every thing is Brahman, Brahman alone, none but Brahman. Tom is **Brahman**, Dick is **Brahman**, Harry is **Brahman** ; Ram **is Brahman**, Sam is **Brahman**, Yadu is **Brahman** ; the earth, water, fire, air, ether all are **Brahman**.

What is Bliss ? Bliss is want of fear and the consequent expansion of life

And, whatever be our special creeds and and convictions, the Vedānta Doctrine of Bliss implies simply this, and nothing more :—Look upon every one, every thing as your own self, the same Atman ; as the same Supreme Self, as the same **Paramatman** ; as the Absolute, as the same **Para-Brahman**. This is the coveted **Bhuma-Drsti**, Atma-Drsti, Brahma-Drsti—a direct Realisation of Brahman as all and all as Brahman—"Sarvam Khalvidam Brahman (Chand. Up. 3. 14. 1.)" "Brahmedam Sarvam" (Brh. Up. 2.5.1.)—the dream of Kavis or Poets, the aim of Prājnas or Scholars or the Vision of Risis or Seers. That is, this is the quintessence of Vedanta Sadhana—to realise the eternal **Brahma-hood** of all, to see the Divine Light

in all, tofeel the Divine Beauty in all to taste the Dlvine Bliss in all—including one's own self, in all cases. If there be only one, there is only Light, only Beauty, only Bliss.

Thus, the Message of Bliss of the Vedanta is this :

(1) Beautiful and deep
Your real keep.

(2) See it in all
Obeying heart's call.

As before, (1) refers to the transcendental standpoint: (2) to the temporal.

The above is. indeed, difficult, but Pessimism is foreign to the very spirit of India, for this simple reason, that—as we tried to emphasise repeatedly above—what **is**, what eternally **is**, can be easily manifested or realised ; what **is not**, cannot be done so, even after the greatest effort. This, in fact, is the Indian view of Progress, Perfection, Procurement. Ordinarily, all these mean the very same thing, viz reaching a new goal, attaining a new and a higher state, obtaining some thing more sublime not obtained before. But according to this Indian view, there can never be the rise of **something** out of **nothing**, fulness out of emptiness, hundred out of zero. Also, **Moksa** or **Mukti** or **Siddhi** or Salvation, being the **Summum Bonum** or the Highest End, or rather, the **only** End, of life, cannot be **Anitya** or non-eternal.—something that is non-existent in the beginning but later on **comes** to be produced through some causes, like the **Sadhanas** or Spiritual Means. Evidently, what itself is **Anitya** or non-eternal cannot be a respository of **Nitya** or eternal Perfection, Fulness, Bliss. Hence, **Moksa** or Salvation being such a state of eternal Perfection, Fulness and Bliss, must essentially be **Nitya**, or eternal.

That is why, it has been said unequivocally and unanimously that Progress does not imply an advance from a less perfect to a more perfect states, or an **attainment** of some new qualities, not possessed before. It only implies the **manifestation** of our own eternal real nature, eternal perfection, eternal fulness, eternal bliss.

So, what we have to do here is only to look inside at our own Selves, at our own Atman, at **Brahman** which we really are. This look, this vision, or this realisation is the only thing we aim at here. But is it, after all, so very difficult ? The incorrigibly optimistic Indian **Risis**, Seers who have themselves seen their own Atman, Brahman inside, assure us that from one point of view, it is undeniably difficult, just as it is difficult to see in dense darkness, breathe in polluted air, break open the locked doors of a dark and stifling dungeon. But from another point of view, it is easy enough, just as it is easy to uncover the cover of burning lamp, remove boulders on the path of a flowing river, clap away the bees on a blooming

flower, open the windows of a closed room ; and get in, at once, the light that is there burning, the water that is there flowing, the flower that is there blooming, the air that is there blowing.

In the very same manner, the Lamp of one's life is ever burning, the River of one's life is ever flowing, the Flower of one's life is ever blooming, the Air of one's life is ever blowing. So, what reason is there to be pessimistic ? It is not that we have to hunt for a new treasure, to cross ocean, or to catch the moon.

So, let us do this simple thing right now, just right now—for is it not the most neglected thing at the same time ? No particular time, no particular place, or no particular method is compulsory here—at any time, day or night, at any place, home or wilderness, through any method or no method at all—can one do it, do it well, do it fully, do it joyfully—i. e. Realise the Eternal Self—the Luminous, the Self Beautiful, the Self Blissful.

This is the Message of the Vedānta—nothing more, nothing less. Can self anything be more inspiring, more exhilarating, more soul-stirring ?

Like the Golden beam of Sun
And the silvery sheen of Moon
Like the gentle touch of Dew
And the smell of Lotus new
Bright, soft, cool, enchanting.
Know thy Atman, everlasting
Where is sorrow, where is sin ?
If this vision once you win.
This, the Risi's, Message old
And our only hope and hold.

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