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MORALITY IN THE MAKING



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TORONTO

MORALITY IN THE MAKING

BY
ROY E. WHITNEY

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1929

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DEDICATION

TO THOSE WHO HAVE MADE MY HOMES, PAST AND PRESENT; FOR IT IS CHIEFLY THEY WHO, THROUGH THE USE OF THE MORAL FORCES IN THEIR CONTROL, HAVE LITERALLY MADE ME WHAT I AM AND THEREFORE MADE THIS BOOK WHAT IT IS.

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PREFACE

It is sometimes suggested that we have made greater progress in the last century in the physical sciences than in our knowledge of moral phenomena. And no one will doubt that there is room for progress in the moral field. Nor does it seem to be merely the courts, or parents, educators, and social workers, who need to become better posted in regard to moral processes but also the thousands who in their work-day life draw their salaries on the basis of their success or failure in stimulating moral action in those who work for them. The task of the business manager is the stimulating of accuracy and alertness in his stenographers; thoroughness and neatness in his bookkeepers; courtesy and tact in his salesmen and telephone operators; critical discernment in his buyers and sellers and honesty in his whole force. Every department head in the thousands of business enterprises of every land has daily to cope with the problems of stimulating these and many other moral acts. Every parent knows that his wrestling with the daily moral problem is never closed until the last youngster is tucked under the covers and soundly asleep.

The need and use of this better knowledge of moral processes lies about us on every hand. What follows, "Morality in the Making," is merely an effort

to understand a little more fully the forces at work in ever present problems like those already named; to learn a little more of the natural causes of our mental reactions in which our morality arises, to lay a foundation for a technique by which we can make changes in our own and others' moral reactions.

INTRODUCTION

John is evidently sure that his action last evening was right, but Tom is convinced that it was wrong. How, mentally, did John get his conclusion and Tom his? And Ralph believes that John and Tom are both wrong. How does Ralph's mind work to bring him out at his conclusion? And especially how can he, after seeing that Tom and John are both sure they are right, be so sure that they are wrong and he is without a doubt right? How do we reach our moral positions anyway?

Under what conditions do we become convinced that we are wrong? And what happens in our minds? We feel differently then, but why and how? For we are no more wrong after we find it out than we were an hour before. What is the mental difference between being right and being wrong? How can we feel right again when we find we have done wrong? What is the right way to treat an adult who is wrong and knows it? Or a child? And, too, what is the right way to treat a man who knows he is right, especially if you know he is wrong?

And why should we care whether we are right or wrong? Why not do "just as we please" without regard to whether we are moral or not? It is often expensive to tell the truth; why should we do it? Why do we do it? Who will pay us what we lose by being moral? Why will a selfish man lose money

for the sake of his conscience? Why do we not lie, steal, and cheat freely and efficiently? What keeps us from it? Does it pay to be moral? If not, are we moral only when it pays and immoral at other times?

Why is it that we are very willing to tell the truth when it hurts others? Why do we sometimes tell the truth when it hurts us? What happens when we have told the "truth" which hurt another and later we find that it was not the truth but merely what we thought to be true? The facts have not changed, but we have. How? Why? What has happened within our minds? When is it right to obey? To disobey? What is different in us when we are sure obedience is right and when we are sure it is wrong?

What is conscience? Conscientiousness? Moral certainty? And who is morally deficient? Morally defective?

What is our will? Do we by willing really push the ball past the goal when it would otherwise fail to reach that goal? Is there power in will power? If so, what is it? Its origin, its strength, its freedom, and the limits of its force? Is our will free? What is it free to do and not free to do?

What is influence? Just what may a friend do for another? Just how may he direct his influence to accomplish exactly what he wants? Should we ever disapprove or oppose our friends? Or praise them? When and how long and how much? What is the effect of our approval or disapproval on another? What are the roots of the power in approval and disapproval? Why do some have influence while others have practically none?

Such questions as these and many more are raised frequently, but definite and thoughtful answers seldom appear in terms of the mental reactions involved. The psychology of our moral ways is a mine in which but little prospecting has been done. What is the meaning and function of our moral life in modern society? Many codes of behavior are changing; many talk as though we were less moral today than in previous generations. We hear of crime waves and of various modern "causes of immorality." But, when we seek to find what is considered to be the cause, we find something very vague, such as cheap motion pictures, the prevalence of short skirts, or the World War. But how can we hope to know the causes of immorality when we have never asked that prior question: what are the causes of morality? What causes us to be moral at all? When and how did morality appear in human behavior? Under what conditions does it persist, increase or decrease?

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MORALITY IN THE MAKING

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CHAPTER I

WHAT DO WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY THINGS ARE GOOD OR BAD?

Obviously, we use these words good and bad in many connections and with various import.

We refer to inanimate objects as good and bad with no moral quality implied. Some boys on a farm were hunting eggs for their mother. All the fresh, eatable ones they were to take to the house, but all the rotten ones were theirs to throw at a mark back in the woods. The boys were more interested in the rotten ones and hunted harder for them. High up in the hay one boy shouted: "Here is a *good* nest—fourteen eggs that are dandy—every one of them slops when you shake it." Another boy shouted: "I have four good ones already"; by which he meant *good* to throw at the mark. The third boy reported, "All I have found are *good* ones and that is the trouble with them, for Mother will want them all, so they are no *good* for me."

By dozens of illustrations we can see that we use good or bad in reference to the purpose we have in mind at a given time. We call a thing good whenever it is useful for the purpose we are then con-

sidering. A suit of clothes may be good for a masquerade and most inappropriate for a wedding. A wind may be good for the boy who is flying his kite but bad for the man who is painting a flag pole near by. The rain may be good for the farmer but bad for the lady who is entertaining on her lawn. To-day a dog may be good, but if to-morrow he goes mad, he is good-for-nothing at the dog show.

So far then, that thing or event is good which we approve for the purpose we now hold in mind. Whatever is contrary to our purpose we call bad. That is another way of saying we call that good which brings us what we want, and whatever interferes, delays or reduces the satisfaction of our desires is commonly referred to as bad. One man goes into ecstasies of praise over a certain liquor. He calls it "good liquor." It is for him an economic good with power to draw money from his pocket. But the same liquor on another man's lips is vehemently pronounced bad, even though it has been prescribed by his doctor. For him it is negative as a desire satisfied. He would pay no money for it. But suppose this man went into the drug business in which the sale of liquor by prescription brought profits. It might soon become for him an item in his list of goods to be bought—an economic good with power to draw money from his purse. When thinking of his profits, he would also call it good liquor; when thinking of its chemical purity he would call it good liquor; but when thinking of its taste in his throat it is bad.

In summary to this point, we see that all that we call good is considered a satisfier of some desire. There may be great difference of opinion as to

whether a given object will or will not satisfy a certain desire. On a cold, winter day, two men are preparing for a long hike. John has laid out the heavy clothing which he expects to wear. Tom looks at it and exclaims, "That sweater is no good. It will not keep you warm, for the wind will go through it easily." John insists: "That sweater is good for it is closely knit and will not let the wind come through." John's opinion is contrary to Tom's. The real facts are unknown, for that sweater has never been worn. It is the opinions that determine whether the sweater is considered good or bad and its economic value differed because of the difference in their opinions. Tom would pay less for it than John, for he sees less of desire-satisfaction in it. The desire to keep warm was not in question, but the sweater as a means to its satisfaction is debatable. "Good" is our stamp of approval upon that which we choose as a means of satisfying our desires. The basic factor without which we call nothing good is our approval of it as such a means. What we approve as a means to our satisfactions we call good, and what we disapprove is, for us, bad. We debate endlessly as to the goodness or badness of college educations, styles of dress, diets, radios or automobiles. Back of our differences we note three factors: (1) the variations in our knowledge of the facts about colleges, diets or motors; (2) the differences in our desires for which they may be a means of satisfaction; and (3) differences in what we approve and disapprove as means of getting those satisfactions. Only if we approve in this last matter, do we declare the college or the diet to be surely good.

So far we have discussed the use of these

words only in their non-moral applications. But each of them is used frequently to point to a moral quality of behavior. It is obvious that we cannot find any act of man which all will agree under all circumstances to call either good or bad. Killing of one's brother, fratricide, is commonly considered bad, but, in the tangled circumstances which modify cases, it has sometimes been considered good.

But, if we can lay aside the quest for objective standards, we may come nearer to understanding moral reactions by asking merely what is going on in men's minds when they "feel" that they are doing right or doing wrong? What is the mental factor which distinguishes between being right and being wrong?

CHAPTER II

WHAT IS THE MENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "DOING RIGHT" AND "DOING WRONG" AND DOING THAT WHICH IS "NEITHER RIGHT NOR WRONG"?

More technically, the question is what is the psychological difference between acts which are moral, immoral and non-moral?

Some say this is right and that is wrong, while others say neither act involves any moral question at all. What one man calls right is very wrong in the eyes of his neighbor and to the friend across the way it is "no one's business but his own, for there is nothing right nor wrong about it." What underlies these differences in that which we consider moral?

There have been many ways of answering this question. The moralist has argued point by point why this is moral and that is immoral or non-moral. The professor of ethics has responded with a long discussion of customs, beliefs and practices. The religionist had pointed to his codes and canons, whether from Mount Sinai or some other shrine or prophet. The philosopher has discussed the origin and relativity of knowledge. The practical man of action has said, "Do as you think best, for you will die before they will answer it." Many have con-

cluded that, since no two agree, the practical rule is, "Let your conscience be your guide."

But even so, how does a conscience work? When you "feel it is right," what is happening in your mind that is like the events in other men's minds when they feel they are right? By what processes of mind do men come to feel that an act is right or wrong? Under what conditions does the thought of rightness or wrongness arise?

If the boy scout accepts a dime for carrying a basket for an old lady, he feels that he has done wrong, but the barber's porter does not feel so when he is helping you to put on your overcoat. Why the difference? If you drop a dime in the tambourine of the Salvation Army lass, she says "Thank you," but if you drop it in the fare box on the street car, no one says "Thank you," or thinks it. Why the difference? A coal miner went into a mine following an explosion, risked his life for hours, and rescued three men. For this service he would accept no pay. Two weeks later he quit his job at the mine because, he declared, they failed to pay him for three tons at fifty cents per ton, causing him a loss of one dollar and a half. Strangely inconsistent, is it not? We call the hired soldier mercenary, but we do not think so of the hired chauffeur or mechanic. Surely there is some basis for this apparent inconsistency which runs through every day's events. What is it?

The boy scout's rules require him to do "a good turn" daily and *disapprove* his taking money for it. On the other hand his code *approves* getting a job and earning money. Evidently the scout is expected to get his money by certain approved means and not by others which are disapproved. When the mer-

chant hands us our groceries in exchange for our dollars there is no question of approval or disapproval, for it is assumed to be a fair economic exchange of value for value. So also is paying the conductor or the paper boy as long as the agreed price is paid. But whenever the grocer charges us a price which we disapprove, the moral question enters and we say: it is not right that he charges so much. If we fail to pay the conductor, he will immediately disapprove. Failure to pay raises the moral question in that it raises the question of approval or disapproval. As long as the miner receives the agreed wage, he sees no moral element in the transaction. As he puts it, "I do the work, they pay the money, and that is all there is to it." But failure to pay even a small sum raises a question of approval and brings in the moral factor.

We note that in each of the above illustrations, the non-moral act involves no question of approval or disapproval, but the moral act always involves this question.

Why does the conductor not thank you for your dime in the fare box? Because it is not a transaction involving approvals, therefore he expresses none. Failure to pay raises the question of approvals and he immediately reacts by disapproving. Why does the Salvation Army lass thank you for your dime? Because the transaction is moral—it involves approvals, therefore it is essential that approvals be expressed. You gave her your dime, not for any goods to be delivered, but because you may think, "She represents a good cause" or "The Salvation Army did good work during the war" or "Every one else is giving, I'd feel cheap not to give anything"

or "I hated to refuse her." Note that the motive in each of these rests on a question of approval, either by yourself or others. You gave because you approved, or because you could not approve yourself if you did not give, or you did not want to face her (implied) disapproval. Since it was a transaction based, not on exchange of economic goods, but on approval, she expressed her approval in her "Thank you."

If, after the boy scout had carried the basket for the old lady, she had expressed no approval, the boy would feel that he had been cheated. The scout master may try to console the boy and thus make up for the loss of approval by lavishing on the scout his approval in some such form as this: "Well, Scout, you can have the satisfaction of knowing that you did your part well, even if the lady did not thank you." Thus the boy gets the approval of his scout master and his own self-approval. The importance of this self-approval we shall see later.

The following paragraph appeared recently in the papers:

Frank Bennett, 14, and Charles Miller, 12, are boy scouts, pledged to do "a good turn daily." So when they found a package containing \$140, they took it to a police station.

The boys refused a reward, explaining it was their good turn for the day. Incidentally they got their pictures in the newspapers.

Note that they could not approve accepting "pay" but they accepted newspaper publicity which brought public approval and confirmed their self-approval.

We may now state a tentative answer to the question with which this chapter began, namely, What is the mental difference between "doing right" and "doing wrong" and doing that which is "neither right nor wrong"? The difference seems to lie in the fact that the non-moral acts never involve the weighing of any approval or disapproval in the mind of the actor. But the moral acts always involve the weighing by the actor of some one's approval or disapproval, either his own or that of some one else. And the immoral act involves doing that which the actor disapproves. Whether this is true or false as a distinction on which to base a definition of morality, we shall have ample opportunity to judge later.

By taking definite cases of moral action, we may analyze the mental factors in relation to this element of approval.

Case 1

Mr. Adams and a companion, Mr. Brooks, went to enjoy the rugged scenery of the mountains. They traveled far from the usual haunts of men into a remote highland. One day, while standing on a mountain ledge, overlooking miles of uninhabited country, a small stone, loosened from a near-by cliff by nature's ceaseless process of erosion, went tumbling down the mountain, gaining greater and greater velocity as it went. The thought occurred to them to loosen a massive boulder which stood at the brink of the cliff, then to watch it go tumbling hundreds of feet down the mountainside. With enthusiasm they bent their backs to the task and soon sent it falling, bouncing, plunging over the rocks and among

the trees. "See it go!" shouted Mr. Adams with care-free abandon.

Scarcely had he said it, when his face turned white for far below he saw a party of hunters appear in the path of that plunging stone. The whole scene was changed by the thoughts that now arose in his mind. "Will that stone never stop? Will it go over them, by them, or must it fall with the force of hurtling death upon them? What a terrible thing we have done!" That moment of suspense seemed an hour. The boulder veered to one side. One hunting dog was crushed, but no man was injured.

Adams and Brooks, much relieved, immediately started down to meet the hunters. As they went, Adams said, "It never entered my mind out in this wild country that there might be any danger to anybody. When the little stone fell, I thought merely how interesting it would be to see a big rock go down like that. I would never have pushed it off, if I had thought of the danger involved." (When Adams rolled the stone, no element of approval or disapproval had entered his mind. He did it merely because it interested him. But after the hunters appeared, he instantly passed a new judgment in which he disapproved his act, while inwardly defending himself by the partially expressed excuse, "A man cannot be blamed for that of which he never even thought." Thus he achieved self-approval.)

Brooks answered: "As we worked to loosen the boulder, I thought to myself, 'There is not a soul within a hundred miles of us. We haven't seen a person since we left the train four days ago.' I thought of the possibilities, but decided that it was perfectly safe." (Thus we see that Brooks rolled the

stone after approving it. His act was moral and he accepted the responsibility which Adams had not felt.) Then he added: "This could not happen again in a million years; it is just a coincidence." Thus Brooks defended his act and held his self-approval.

When they reached the hunters, all were willing to consider it just an accident of the wilds, except the owner of the dog that was killed. He was an experienced mountaineer and complained that any one ought to know the undebated code of all mountain climbers that it is unsafe to loosen anything which might fall. On the assumption of a code of morals which he had been taught from childhood, he disapproved the act and considered it shockingly immoral. Mr. Brook's only answer was, "It was lucky for you that you were not here five minutes earlier when the mountain sent down the first stone. You would have decided that it is safer to stay far from mountains where things may fall at any time." Thus Brooks defended his self-approval by suggesting that the mountains drop stones any time and these hunters were there at their own risk.

In summary, we see the act of loosening the boulder was done (1) by Adams without moral consciousness, (2) by Brooks with moral consciousness, and (3) observed by the dog's owner with a disapproving judgment which made that act immoral in his eyes. Their judgment of the act as non-moral, moral and immoral is in direct variation with the approval-attitudes of each. The act was non-moral to one in whose mind no thought of approval or disapproval was weighed. The moral question entered just the moment the thought of approval or disapproval arose in consciousness. It was immoral

in the eyes of one who disapproved it from his first thought about it.

Case 2

Mrs. Carlton was dying. A few hours before the end came, she requested her husband not to marry again for at least three years. The thought of re-marriage had not entered his mind. It seemed to him very remote and almost out of the question. His reply was frank and sincere: "If you prefer that I should not, I shall never re-marry." Mrs. Carlton then replied, "It is well that you marry again if love comes, but promise that you will not marry for three years." "I promise," he said. No one was present to hear this promise. Mrs. Carlton died.

Mr. Carlton is now the only person who knows of the promise. Four children constitute his family. After two experiments with housekeepers, an excellent woman was secured, by name, Mrs. Dale. In character and personality she fitted the need exactly. She was a widow with a child of seven who also fitted into the family very happily. Now, eighteen months after Mrs. Carlton's death, a fine comradeship prevails. The children draw no distinction between the families and often forget that she is not their mother or that he is not the father of them all. Even the neighbors find it hard to remember that she is not Mrs. Carlton. Moreover, a spontaneous affection has sprung up between this man and woman as they have tried to work out together the problems of this home. The continuance of the housekeeper-and-employer relation is becoming unnatural.

Question: Could marriage at this time be moral?

For her, who has no ties and knows nothing of the promise to Mrs. Carlton? For the children, who all seem to approve in their various childish ways? For him? No moral question is involved as far as he is concerned except his promise to Mrs. Carlton, which is known only to himself. And why should that prevent his marriage? What is there to keep him from ignoring it? Let us analyze this which we call "moral scruple" and "sense of duty." It is his sense of duty only that stands between him and the marriage he now desires. Only this moral scruple is to be dealt with before he can act. What is it? What will he do to meet this, which is his moral problem?

What he will do depends upon his habits of mind and action. We may consider several possibilities.

If he is seldom self-conscious—the kind of man who but momentarily turns his thought inward on his own reactions, he may have almost forgotten his promise. When he does think of it, he may lightly dismiss it by saying, "Oh well, if she but knew how matters stand, she would approve remarriage now." Such men often attain their self-approval easily. He may add, "I promised not to remarry because then it seemed reasonable and best, but any one can see that, under present circumstances, it is unreasonable and no one would ever expect me to wait a year and a half longer." If this is his mental process, the moral restraint is immediately gone. His self-approval is immediately established in favor of marrying at once.

If he is a man of normal introspectiveness, several factors may enter to make easy or difficult his path toward self-approval. If he is a man of action, who is habitually impatient with obstacles which hinder

his progress, he may simply assert that his promise is a small matter compared with the practical and more pressing issues involved in the daily care of his children. By such attention to his immediate tasks, he may distract his attention completely from his promise, and thus attain his own approval for immediate marriage. If, however, some experience in his past has resulted in a conviction that promises are never, never to be broken, he will find it impossible to attain self-approval until his promise is completely carried out. Suppose, moreover, that he has a clear visual memory in which he constantly sees his wife as she looked when she asked him to promise not to marry for three years. Such a memory might make her eyes seem now to be accusing him of infidelity. Whenever he seems on the verge of attaining self-approval by any process of rationalization, those accusing eyes may upset all hopes of a stable decision. Suppose, however, he begins to think that Mrs. Carlton was a woman of jealous disposition, whose wishes should be discounted anyway. He may decide that she was merely fearful of another woman, and therefore unreasonable in her request. Thus he may discount the request she has made and attain his own approval for re-marriage now. Again, passionate love for Mrs. Dale may so fill his mind that Mrs. Carlton recedes from his attention and with her go the self-questionings which arise. But, until by some process or other, he has attained his self-approval for the marriage he desires, the moral question will persist.

If he is extremely self-conscious, tending to turn his thought inward constantly, weighing and reweighing his approval-data, questions such as these

will crowd into his attention: "What would Mrs. Carlton say if she knew I even thought of breaking my promise? Wouldn't she turn in her grave at the thought of it? I can see her eyes looking at me now. And the children—could they ever respect me again, if they knew how weak I am? What would the neighbors think? Maybe Mrs. Carlton told one of them to watch to see whether I kept that promise! And if Mrs. Dale knew of it, she would not want to marry me for fear that a man who breaks his promise to one wife would do the same for the second. What would the minister say? Maybe he knows that I promised her! God must see what a degenerate I am to thus consider breaking my promises!" Innumerable questions may arise in such a man to prevent his attaining self-approval. For him the third year is likely to pass before he can reach any stable judgment in either direction. To such a man we may well apply the term conscience-stricken.

But in such men two factors need to be clearly distinguished, the outward evidences of which are not easily discernible in a given act, namely moral sensitivity and indecisiveness. The latter may be present without the former, and men may be sensitive to approval or disapproval and yet be decisive. Decisiveness can be studied separately by observing other acts in which no moral question is involved. Sensitivity can be studied when no pressure for a decision is present in a moral question. When both indecision and moral sensitivity are present in one person, we see them vacillating in miserable uncertainty, unable to summarize their data into a moral judgment.

Do we now see that the moral problem which

stood between Mr. Carlton and re-marriage was really the problem of gaining his own approval? What he lacked was self-approval and he could not "settle the question" until he could attain by some process or other that approval of himself. His moral problem disappears as soon as he can establish a course of action for which he can hold a stable self-approval, whether it is a decision to marry or not to marry. His sense of duty is his feeling of the urge to self-approval. We speak of that which we must do to gain our self-approval as our "duty."

Case 3

Mark Twain presents a picture in Huckleberry Finn, which, although it may be fiction, is true to the working of a human mind in a moral problem. When Huck Finn, with the runaway slave, Jim, was floating by raft under cover of darkness down the Mississippi, they were on the lookout for Cairo, Illinois, where Jim hoped they could bring the raft to shore and he would escape into the non-slave states, a free man. Huck Finn says:

There warn't nothing to do now but to look out sharp for [the lights of] the town, and not pass it without seeing it. He [Jim] said he'd be mighty sure to see it . . . but if he missed it he'd be in a slave country again and no more show for freedom. Every little while he jumps up and says:

"Dah she is?"

But it warn't. It was Jack-o'-lanterns, or lightning-bugs; so he set down again, and went to watching, same as before. Jim said it made him all over trembly and feverish to be so close to freedom. Well, I can tell you it made me all over trembly and feverish, too, to hear him,

because I begun to get it through my head that he *was* most free—and who was to blame for it? Why, *me*. I couldn't get that out of my conscience, no how nor no way. It got to troubling me so I couldn't rest.

Here has entered a thought involving Huck's disapproval. The moral question is thus raised. If something had happened which would have threatened to take from them the next day's food supply, it would scarcely have stimulated as intense mental activity as this challenge to his desire for approval awakened. His conscience bothered him. He could not rest.

I couldn't stay still in one place. It hadn't ever come home to me before, what this thing was that I was doing. But now it did; and it stayed with me, and scorched me more and more.

Note that the facts had not changed, but merely approval issues had entered for the first time. See how, contrary to his comfort, various elements which add to his disapproval come trooping into his mind.

I tried to make out to myself that *I* warn't to blame, because *I* didn't run Jim off from his rightful owner; but it warn't no use, conscience up and says, every time, "But you knowed he was running for his freedom, and you could 'a' paddled ashore and told somebody." That was so—I couldn't get around that no way. That was where it pinched. Conscience says to me, "What had poor Miss Watson (Jim's rightful owner) done to you that you could see her nigger go off right under your eyes and never say one single word? What did that poor old woman do to you that you could treat her so mean? Why, she tried to learn you your book, she tried to learn you your manners, she tried to be good to you every way she knowed how. *That's* what she done."

Miss Watson who had befriended Huck was the loser. Each memory of her kindness increased his disapproval of himself. His moral problem centers, not in another's disapproval of him, but in his own. Observe, too, the element of self-consciousness as typical of the struggle for self-approval. "Conscience says to me," and, below, "abusing myself to myself" and "talking to myself."

I got to feeling so mean and so miserable I most wished I was dead. I fidged up and down the raft, abusing myself to myself, and Jim was fidgiting up and down past me. We neither of us could keep still. Every time he danced around and says, "Dah's Cairo!" it went through me like a shot, and I thought if it *was* Cairo I reckoned I would die of miserableness.

Every prospect of Jim's success is to Huck a threat of defeat to his hope for self-approval. If we are inclined to doubt the strength of the desire for approval, see how uncomfortable the loss of self-approval makes Huck. The desire for food is recognized as one of the strongest in man, but Huck could have postponed its satisfaction with less discomfort than he felt from his hunger for self-approval.

Jim talked out loud all the time while I was talking to myself. He was saying how the first thing he would do when he got to a free state he would go to saving up money and never spend a single cent, and when he got enough he would buy his wife, which was owned on a farm close to where Miss Watson lived; and then they would both work to buy the two children, and if their master wouldn't sell them, they'd get an Ab'litionist to go and steal them.

It most froze me to hear such talk. He wouldn't ever

dared to talk such talk in his life before. Just see what a difference it made in him the minute he judged he was about free. It was according to the old saying: "Give a nigger an inch and he'll take an ell." Thinks I, this is what comes of my not thinking. Here was this nigger, which I had as good as helped to run away, coming right out flat-footed and saying he would steal his children—children that belonged to a man I didn't even know; a man that hadn't ever done me no harm. I was sorry to hear Jim say that, it was such a lowering of him.

To us who have an anti-slavery code of approvals, Huck's reasoning seems humorous. We see how his data could have been used to Jim's favor. But Huck had his own codes of approval and he had to make peace with them. What felt "lowering of Jim" to Huck, felt elevating to Jim.

My conscience got to stirring me up hotter than ever, [says Huck] until at last I says to it, "Let up on me—it ain't too late yet—I'll paddle ashore at the first light and tell." I felt easy and happy and light as a feather right off. All my troubles was gone.

Note the instant relief when he gains self-approval. The load was gone. Happiness returns; he begins singing.

I went to looking out sharp for a light, and sort of singing to myself. By and by one showed. Jim sings out:

"We's safe, Huck, we's safe! Jump up and crack yo' heels! Dat's de good old Cairo at las', I jis knows it!"

I says:

"I'll take the canoe and go and see, Jim. It mightn't be, you know."

He jumped and got the canoe ready, and put his old coat in the bottom for me to set on, and give me the paddle; and as I shoved off, he says:

"Pooty soon I'll be a-shout'n' for joy, en I'll say, It's all on accounts o' Huck; I's a free man, en I couldn't ever ben free ef it hadn' ben for Huck; Huck done it. Jim won't ever forgit you, Huck; you's de bes' fren' Jim's ever had; en you's de *only* fren' old Jim's got now."

I was paddling off, all in a sweat to tell on him; but when he says this, it seemed to kind of take the tuck all out of me. I went along slow then, and I warn't right down certain whether I was glad I started or whether I warn't.

Consider the effect of Jim's approval on Huck's supposed loyalty. It started a new problem for Huck, for the entrance of a new question of approval, as we have seen, marks the arrival of a new moral issue. Can Huck approve himself if he turns his back on Jim's need and friendship? Huck had not weighed that matter yet. The loss of his satisfied, self-approving state of mind is immediate. Huck is distressed again. Jim's gratitude to him makes the solution harder to find.

When I was fifty yards off, Jim says:

"Dah you goes, de ole true Huck; de on'y white gen-t'leman dat ever kep' his promise to ole Jim."

Well, I just felt sick. But I says, I *got* to do it—I can't get *out* of it. Right then along comes a skiff with two men in it with guns, and they stopped and I stopped.

[Parley with these men interrupts Huck's plan to go ashore and tell on Jim. They are looking for "run-away niggers" and it is a practical chance for Huck to tell on Jim, but, in the face of an emergency which threatens him, he acts in Jim's favor without settling the moral questions involved. His mind is filled with the necessity for action. However a few minutes later when he is back on the raft and free to think, the whole question of approval or disapproval thrusts itself in again.]

I got aboard the raft, feeling bad and low, because I knowed very well I had done wrong, and I see it warn't no use for me to try to learn to do right; a body that don't get *started* right when he's little ain't got no show—when the pinch comes there ain't nothing to back him up and keep him to his work, and so he gets beat. Then I thought a minute, and says to myself, hold on; s'pose you'd 'a' done right and give Jim up, would you felt better than what you do now? No, says I, I'd feel bad—I'd feel just the same way I do now. Well, then, says I, what's the use you learning to do right when it's troublesome to do right and ain't no trouble to do wrong, and the wages is just the same? I was stuck. I couldn't answer that. So I reckoned I wouldn't bother no more about it, but after this always do whichever come handiest at the time.

As usual with us humans, he does not press the logic of his data and draw a conclusion therefrom. That is the way we suppose we think. We would like to believe that we have thus attained a sort of objective validity for our conclusions. But we really do just what Huck did. We flounder over the moral field, seeking to find our lost sense of self-approval. We cannot stop until we find it, even though we have to resort to compromise, or rationalizing, or distraction as Huck did. When he found his self-approval he became comfortable and happy.

CHAPTER III

HOW DO WE DECIDE A MORAL QUESTION?

How do we get our reasons for our decisions and why do we defend the truth? Is a moral question ever settled?

At the close of the last chapter we noted the way in which Huck Finn floundered over the moral field, hunting for his lost self-approval. He hunted just as one who has lost a purse in his home—here, there, everywhere, overturning his recent experiences, looking under details that usually pass unnoticed, searching with anxious look until at last it is found. Then what a sense of comfort! What a relief to him! A few minutes before he had been driven and goaded by a “duty” to tell on Jim and simultaneously pulled back by a loyalty to Jim. He could do neither with any satisfaction, nor could he decide not to do either of them. Finally he decided. But what did he decide? To an outsider it seems that he decided nothing in particular. And that is probably true. He merely found a little clew which led him to his lost self-approval. But now all the urge to send Jim back to Miss Watson was gone. He “had decided” not to do it and could “state his reasons.”

We commonly say: Because I have decided the moral problem, **this is what I approve.** Logical as

that may sound, the psychological fact is that we puzzle and weigh our problem to find a way to our self-approval. When we find it, the mental tension is relieved and we then say, "We have decided." When pressed to state what we have decided, we formulate the point of view in which we found self-approval, and we give that as "our reasons," although to the outsider it is often not at all apparent that there is any reason in it. We do not approve what our logic leads us to decide is right. Logic never leads us anyway. Our desires lead us. In moral matters it is our desire for approval that is leading. We find our self-approval and pronounce the concurrent point of view to be "right."

A case which is probably parallel to many of our experiences will reveal the elements of these decisions.

Mr. Eden is a member of the X club which is to have an important meeting to-night. If he fails to attend, all the club members will disapprove and he will have to explain to twenty of them during the next week. Moreover, the president will disapprove because Eden's committee is expected to report. The treasurer also will disapprove because Mr. Eden's dues should be paid to-night. And Mr. Eden would really like to attend for thus he will see an old friend, the speaker of the evening, who is visiting from out of town. Perhaps he will be invited to sit on the platform with the speaker. In all, Mr. Eden's desire for approval will get considerable satisfaction if he attends the club to-night.

But his wife is not very well and she would heartily approve if he spent the evening at home. His mother, who lives with them, always disapproves

that club anyway. If Mr. Eden attends under these circumstances, his mother will emphatically disapprove. Moreover, if he pays his club dues to-night, he discovers that he will not have quite enough money to buy the medicine he is supposed to take home to his wife. The druggist is an old friend but he has an outspoken dislike for credit sales.

The question before Mr. Eden is: To go or not to go? The following is the way in which Mr. Eden's mind actually works out the answer.

"Mother's prejudice against the X club is entirely unreasonable. Since she is so prejudiced about it, I don't mind white-lying to her a bit just to keep peace in the family. She likes my boss, Jones, and everything will be satisfactory to her, if I tell her 'with regret,' of course, that Jones wants me to do something for him this evening. (Jones is a member of the club and wants me to attend with him. A fellow must do a little something to please his boss, you know.) And if I do go to the club, my old friend, the speaker, will be glad to see me. I ought to go out of courtesy to him, and to get my committee's report in, too. By going, I'll see some of the boys who won't mind advancing to me a little cash for that medicine. I've made up my mind: I'll call up wife to see how she is, and tell her about Jones' request that I do something for him to-night, and when I get home I'll explain to her how it all really came about. She is a good sport and won't complain, for she knows I enjoy the club meetings."

Thus Mr. Eden has attained self-approval and goes to the club in high spirits. Near the close of the evening, word comes to him that his wife is not so well and wants him to come home. After paying

his respects "to the boys," he goes down the street. He now begins to think of the telephone call to go home and of his wife's condition. She must be worse. How did they know he was at the club? They must have 'phoned the office. Smith was working late; he must have told them where to find him. His wife must be seriously sick if they 'phoned in that way. His self-approval was gone. He begins to think how badly she looked when he left her that morning. Maybe she is critically ill! He wishes he had not gone to the club. To himself he says: What is a club meeting when a man's wife really needs him? I should have told the boys I could not attend and gone home.

At home he finds a real turn for the worse. A doctor and nurse are already there. He says to the doctor, "I did not expect anything like this." The doctor is silent. (If the doctor had spoken his thoughts, he would have said, "Neither did I.") In the doctor's silence, Mr. Eden infers disapproval because his own mind is filled with it. He says to himself, "If she dies, I can never forgive myself for failing her when she needed me."

But she did not die. Mr. Eden learned later from the doctor that no one could have foreseen such an illness. In this Mr. Eden found great comfort and often said later, "No one could expect me to know this which a doctor could not foresee."

We may here state the principle involved. Mr. Eden wanted to go to the club, but he also wanted self-approval. He found a way to get both. When he attained the self-approval, he formulated the steps by which he attained it, and called them, "My reasons for going to the club." On his way home, he

reviewed the data. The club desire had been satisfied and therefore had lost its power. The situation at home had evidently changed. He now rejudged his act and disapproved and felt that others must disapprove—his wife, his mother and, when they learned of it, the neighbors. "If she dies," he thought, "I can never forgive myself." But when he found that the doctor could not have foreseen the illness, he grasped the thought eagerly, as the drowning man grasps a rope, to rescue himself from disapproval. Whenever, even weeks later, some one referred to the events of that night, he comforted himself by remarking, "Even the doctor couldn't foresee that turn for the worse." He is sensitive where disapproval cut so deeply that night and without understanding why he does it, he defends himself.

The process by which we attain self-approval and avoid others' disapproval we review, sometimes with leisure to modify and restate many steps of it, and sometimes hastily and almost without any critical revamping. And that amended process of attaining self-approval we give to the world as "our reasons," or our moral judgment. We judge that to be right by which we have attained self-approval; then we fight for and defend it in proportion to its value to us as a means of maintaining self-approval.

Herein lies the motivation of our fighting to defend the truth. It is verily a fight of self-defense, for it is a struggle to maintain our valued approval. If we lose it, we shall be miserable until we regain it. He who attacks our truth is attempting to take from us a valued possession which we have struggled to get. He who would take from me that which can satisfy my desire for self-approval can expect no

less resistance than if he took that which can satisfy my desire for food and shelter. We fight for "our truth" just as we fight for other desire-satisfiers. Martyrs are those who prefer death to the loss of self-approval. We think of Socrates, of Huss, or of Jesus, and there are thousands whose names we never knew. But most of us find some way of retaining both life and self-approval, even though, to others, we seem to have resorted to compromise and sophistry. For Galileo all the values of life were on the side of recanting, except his self-approval. Did he, by some mental process not revealed in his words, hold his self-approval despite his recanting? Perhaps the story, whose authenticity has been doubted, that he added under his breath, "Nevertheless it moves," is supposed to suggest a means of retaining his self-approval.

But some one will complain: Then there is nothing to prevent men from thinking that almost anything is right, if in whatever one finds self-approval he inevitably sees the right. Let us admit that actually men have, at one time or another in human history, thought almost any or every act we can mention to be right while at some other time or place they have thought the same act to be wrong. The wide divergence that we note in human approvals and disapprovals seems to support our theory that "right" is what we approve. The limits are set only by the nature of man, and within those limits we may expect great diversity of moral reaction.

Many have desired some infallible code in which each act is defined as either right or wrong. Some have sought a magic touchstone, but when they have sought it most diligently it has proven as elusive

as the bags of gold at the end of the rainbow. The progress of knowledge has constantly moved from some supposed absolute toward a new definition in terms of relationships. Our ancestors "knew" that the earth was the center of the universe, but to-day we "know" its location only in relation to other bodies in the universe. Frank recognition of relationships as our best means of definition has not resulted in chaotic thinking. Open recognition of the process by which we make our moral judgments will not spoil our morality. Clear understanding of its imperfections and dangers will but prompt us to make allowance more wisely for our human frailty. But the great hope is that by understanding it, we may shape and use it for human good.

It would seem, then, that a moral question is never finished or settled with any assurance of permanency, for some change of circumstance or experience may open the question once more. We know this is true almost daily. That which we once approved we now disapprove and that which we formerly disapproved we now approve. The facts do not change but our experience with them changes. Therefore, as long as a man lives out in the thick of human activities, where new experience is sure to come to him, that man is subject to changes of his moral positions, for his approval will shift in his adjustment to his experience. If one will close a cloister door behind him and give himself daily to the same tasks and the same thoughts, he will decrease the probability of moral change in himself for he thus limits the probability of new experiences which may disturb his self-approval. But by this same process moral stagnation is brought about.

We may say that, for any of us, a moral question is settled whenever and as long as we hold an unquestioning self-approval. If any turn of events raises anew the question "Am I right?" our period of moral certainty is gone until we again achieve undoubting self-approval.

Is it not interesting as we grow older that, especially in the things we disapprove, we voluntarily limit our experience so that there is little likelihood that our moral positions in regard to them will change? On the other hand we keep closer fellowship with that which we approve and we change our moral views while our old disapprovals remain unchanged. This often results in our holding moral tenets quite inconsistent with each other. Thus a man who formed a strong disapproval of every form of activity which was known as "breaking the Sabbath" twenty-five years ago may violently disapprove many "innocent" practices; yet in business this same man may have "shady practices" far more serious in another's eyes than playing jazz on Sunday. Thus the Pharisee is made, by the retention of a fixed code of disapprovals during a marked change of his codes of approvals.

The Puritans are known for what they disapproved, which became fixed and the story of it outlived them. But we know little of what they approved in daily experience, such as bartering with the trader, swapping hides or horses, or despotism in their family life.

Does it not now seem that our *conscience is synonymous with our approval and disapproval judgments*? To some that will seem so self-evident that it is but playing with words which are synonymous.

To others it may seem like the cruel vivisection of a friend. In the next chapter, we shall discuss how we satisfy our conscience, but we shall not use the word conscience, for we can see it functioning more clearly in terms of its elemental parts. A layman in the mechanical field may stand in a service garage beside an engine and watch "the engine run." To him it is simply an engine, a unit, a whole functioning. But to the engine mechanic, it is parts—pistons, tappets, valves, pumps, generator, coils, distributor, etc., etc. So with observing our conscience in action, let us see how its parts interact, its approval and disapproval judgments rise and fall, under the push and pull of desire. We cannot do so under the name which refers to the whole, but we may understand it in terms of its parts.

Before closing this chapter, it is well that we examine briefly this word "approval" which we have already used very often and must use many times again.

Any basic experience, desire or emotion in our human affairs is of such importance that in our language many words develop to convey the various tints and shades of meaning which the speaker wishes to designate. Thus a basic emotion which we most often call fear is expressed by many different words, each carrying its various emphasis on some phase of that psychological fact of fear. We may mention a few of these fear-expressing words, such as: fright, alarm, surprise, anxiety, worry, timidity, shyness, diffidence, faint-heartedness, consternation, etc. Yet in some form, the emotion of fear is present as a sort of common denominator in each of these.

And so it is with this word approval. We are seeking to point to a deep-seated experience of the race. What word is used matters little. This experience has its tints and shades also, for which we have many words, such as: appreciation, recognition, favorable comment, regard, public acclaim, love, understanding by others, praise, commendation, etc.

It may seem arbitrary to choose the word approval to represent these experiences, but repeated analysis points to it as the term best fitted to point to that basic factor which runs through them all. But the word is not so important, for it is but the arrow pointing to the psychological factor common to a myriad of human experiences, rather than a definition of that factor.

Since it is this factor, and not its various forms of expression that we are here seeking to understand, it seems best that, even at the cost of tedium and repetition, this one word be used constantly wherever that factor is discussed.

CHAPTER IV

HOW DO WE ATTAIN SELF-APPROVAL? HOW DO WE SATISFY OUR CONSCIENCE?

Without attempting to characterize all the ways to self-approval, there are four routes commonly used, which we **may** call:

- (1) Getting the disapprover out of the way
- (2) Getting ourselves away from the disapprover
- (3) Discounting our disapprovers, and
- (4) Prejudging our acts so that we do only that which we may approve. Thus we face the facts and forecast our approval of ourselves.

The fourth way has its difficulties and may seem to be full of compromise and "rationalizing" (as in the case in the previous chapter, in which Mr. Eden decided to attend his club meeting), but it is essentially the fact-facing way to self-approval. Each of the other ways is an evasive expedient, and in the long run we see that they can bring us but a temporary sense of self-approval. And because they merely evade or postpone the moral issue, a person who has developed moral efficiency will see through them and discard them as devices of primitive morality. By illustrating their use in moral cases, we may be able to see their true relation to the fourth method of gaining self-approval.

Just because the first three are temporarily easier than the fourth, we need not be surprised to find them in common use among primitive peoples, among children, and in fact with all of us, especially when we are under heavy pressure and uncritical of our moral acts.

Often when primitive man found a disapprover standing in his way to the satisfactions of his desire, he did just what his pre-human ancestors had always done: he killed the disapprover or died in the attempt. Because of a growing disapproval of murder, the race has sought to limit this method of solving a moral problem. Yet this oldest law in the statute books does not eliminate murder from the experience of civilized society. If the cave man found a woman he desired and her mate disapproved, the getting of the disapprover out of the way was the complete solution of the problem from the standpoint of the interloper. In fact how far down into human history does this kind of morality extend? If a Roman soldier in Gaul saw a woman he desired, did he not get the disapproving mate out of the way, and did not the soldier feel that he had solved his problem? One would hunt far to find evidence that his conscience bothered him or that he even raised a question regarding his act. The moral problem for him disappeared because the disapprover disappeared. Dead men raise no questions. The behavior of the Roman soldier, we sometimes say, was due to his philosophy that "might makes right." Probably the truth is better stated if we say that by might he got rid of the irritating question of right. When the disapprover was gone, the only one whose presence raised the moral question was eliminated. Our

modern codes of ethics against killing personal enemies had not occurred to the soldier. No moral question arose in his mind after he had the woman. He knew that "the spoils belong to the victor." That was an approved and respected code of his day. To get rid of those who interfere, by annihilation, was a rule of the race long before the slogan, "Swat the fly" was invented. Swat the enemy—annihilate him—is an older and more widely applied code.

Only slowly are we finding methods which are better than these older ones in dealing with many of our problems. The classic Greek race, whom history has called the genius of its time, found one of its best thinkers a disapprover of common practices. It seems to us that Socrates was a moral stimulator for them, but the powers that ruled decided to be rid of the disapprover and they brought to him the poisoned hemlock. Four centuries later and in a country not far distant, a religious pioneer who saw deeply into the follies of his day, expressed his disapproval and they led him out of the city to a cross on the hill. Thus they were rid of this disapprover. But in the process they so stirred the moral judgments of many that through the centuries there has persisted a noble line of morally sensitive persons as a small germ of life in the mass who have claimed the name of Christian. Many of them have raised voices of disapproval, with the result that not a few have been given to the lions, the fire, the sword, and voluntary and involuntary exile. Note the names by which they have been known, "Dissenters," "Protestants," "Puritans," "Abolitionists," "Prohibitionists"—each name bearing the suggestion of the disapproving character of the movement. Every genera-

tion has killed its prophets (along with its criminals, enemies, etc.) because they stood in the way of the attainment of complaisant self-approval.

It is to Lincoln's moral credit that he refused to get rid of two disapprovers in his cabinet, Chase and Seward, whose financial and state-advisor functions he was able to appreciate despite their opposition. A man of less moral insight than Lincoln would have discharged them as "obstructionists" or "agitators." It is a man far above the average in moral attainment who can learn from his accusers and profit thereby.

In every office, factory or store where men try to work out the ordinary problems of manufacturing, distributing or merchandising, the disapprover can be found. He sees or thinks he sees fault in the policies of the house. He is a non-coöperator at some point, and likely to be called an obstructionist, or agitator, or just a pest. Sometimes his ideas are clearly impracticable; sometimes they are merely not convenient or fitting; sometimes they are as foolish as Westinghouse's air brake and similarly rejected for a time and then ardently praised. When he is just a nuisance, it is probably well for the common good that the usual methods of demotion or discharge be used. But there is a different case: suppose this disapprover points to real inefficiency, waste, or corrupt practices and thus interferes with his boss getting full approval. When the boss finds this out, he faces a fork in the road. How can he attain approval—his own and others'? He can face the facts as they now stand revealed, or he can "fire" the disapprover and thus remove from his presence the one who raises the problem. Undoubtedly hun-

dreds have been discharged as a means for their executives to gain an unstable and tottering approval.

Not infrequently we read of the murder of a husband or wife by the other. It seems shockingly impossible at a distance. As we get into the intimate details, we find the murderer saying, "I made a foolish deal in business and lost heavily," or "I came from a poor family which was looked down upon and disapproved by her folks. She kept bringing this up before my friends and taunted me until I couldn't stand it. I was very angry and saw red and killed her." Back of it lies this simple fact: she stood in the way of his attainment of self-approval until he momentarily cast aside all scruples in a dash to attain it. He removed the disapprover. To us who are outside the scene, the fact that he came from a poor family or lost money seems too trivial to cause murder. It was. It would not cause murder except as it became the obstacle across the path of a mighty desire for self-approval. Not a few murders of persons otherwise loved have been for the seemingly simple causes described as nagging, accusing, taunting, scolding, etc.

And what is divorce where such conditions exist? It is the legal recognition of the separation of the disapproved from the disapprover. And this legal device, with all its attendant ills, is a safety valve to many an overheated domestic boiler. Perhaps we shall learn how to draw the fires before the pressure becomes dangerous! Do we doubt that better moral development of boys and girls would improve the moral relations of marriage?

By a strange turn of fates, the disapprover and

the disapproved may be so bound up in one personality that a man cannot live happily with himself because he has accepted some ideal or ambition for himself which is so remote that he comes to look upon it as unattainable and yet he cannot approve its abandonment. Thus he accuses himself of being a failure or good-for-nothing. He goes over and over the fateful circle of ambition and defeat. He struggles for self-approval and then in desperation he makes his dash for liberty through suicide. He cannot approve himself in life, perhaps he can in death. It momentarily looks preferable to life, and the deed is done. Thus he combines the first and second methods as we have stated them: he gets rid of the disapprover by getting away from his own disapproving self. It is one of the strange turns of self-consciousness.

Children seldom practice the first method—getting the disapprover out of the way—because they are usually too weak and ineffective. But throwing stones, fighting, and dire threats of annihilation show clearly how they tend to use this method of escaping from the depressing mood of being “too little” or “mere children” into the much desired mood of full self-approval as “big,” “strong,” and “grown up.”

But children, especially in their 'teens, often use the second method, getting away from the disapprover. Boys and girls leave home. We sometimes say they get the “wanderlust.” Without attempting to make a complete study of the causes, it is easy to note a large number of cases in which the child has shown no tendency to wander. Another motivation appears in the fact that they leave directly after

some marked disapproval at home, or some humiliation before schoolmates, or some "scrape" which will be strongly disapproved when it becomes known, or following a low grade or "failure" in classes. For them to stay at home or at school means facing others' disapproval for their "failure." By leaving, they get away from the disapprover or that person or persons who arouse their own disapproval of self. Adolescents are sensitive to shames and disgraces which are minor in adult codes but are keenly felt in their codes. But if self-approval is lost—no matter how it is lost—the child will go to great length to regain it. It is not surprising, therefore, that they often try the age-old method of escape from the disapprovers and all that awakens such mental associations.

A curious illustration of this method is seen in those who evade the "Community Fund Solicitor" or the "neglected relations who come to visit" or the minister who calls because he has observed their absence from church. They feel an obligation when in the presence of such persons, and yet, if they can avoid meeting them, the battle with a disapproving conscience seems to be easier for them. It is a method of keeping the obligation from getting a hearing in the court of self-disapproval.

The same thing is accomplished by distracting the attention of others who might disapprove, from the facts surrounding our guilt. The prisoner at the bar tends to inject irrelevant testimony to get the disapprover away from the uncomfortable topic. The "alibi" is often a method in court and outside of it by which the disapprover is sent chasing far away in order to relieve the pressure on the accused.

It is again illustrated in our reaction to the high-pressure salesman who asserts that his device will save us money and asks, "Don't you want to save money?" or "Don't you want to make money?" We cannot approve ourselves if we lose an opportunity to make money, so we buy to gain our own approval and his; but often we find it hard to justify the purchase when we have to explain it later.

The whole state of mind of nations at war with each other and of neighbors or households engaged in private warfare, seems to involve much of this method of attaining self-approval through keeping at a distance from the enemy lest we see something in him which will disturb our self-approval. We grasp at lies about the enemy which calm thought would show us to be absurd, and we find a sort of self-exultation in disapproving him. There is an effort to depreciate him in order to make our comparative rank seem higher. As a method of attaining self-approval, it seems base enough when we approach it from that side, yet it is so frequently practiced by all of us, that it must be named as a common method of assisting ourselves to self-approval. Out of thousands of men discharged from industry for gross incompetence, destruction or waste of material, fighting, stealing, cheating, or any other cause, it is doubtful whether any of them have gone home to their families without some story which saved their own self-approval, frequently at the expense of some fellow workman or executive. And perhaps it is well that self-approval finds so many ways of protecting itself. If we felt as good-for-nothing as the executive who discharged us thinks we are, suicide would be more common. It is

interesting to observe men under circumstances of severe disapproval. Seldom does the disapproved man hang his head as the disapprover thinks he should hang it. Self-approval is maintained against tremendous odds, and often by discounting the opposing data, circumstances, statements, and personalities on which the others have built their disapproval. Wardens of penitentiaries should be able to give very valuable data on the processes by which self-approval is attained and maintained. A man who has spent many years as a teacher in prisons says that he never met a man there who seemed to seriously disapprove of himself. In fact, whoever met a man anywhere who did not rather quickly reestablish his self-approval? No man can continue to disapprove himself, as some of his associates may disapprove him, without suicide.

As stated before, the first three methods, namely, (1) getting the disapprover out of the way, (2) getting away from the disapprover, (3) discounting the disapprover, are essentially evasive methods. In each there is an element of slipping away from or around the facts. But facts are like our shadows; we can turn our backs on them and forget them, we can go in dark places and not discern them, we can strike at them and pronounce them vanquished, but sometime, somewhere we find ourselves walking in the light with our eyes open and we see the shadow is still with us.

Our greatest difficulty with our disapprovers, however, arises not in them but in ourselves, when we have to agree with our accusers. Another's disapproval is hard, but we can face it and bear it pretty well until we find that we must agree with

him. When he expresses a reproach which we know to be true, he strikes the body blow which we fear. As long as we are sure that his accusation is false, we are brave, hopeful and self-controlled, but when we feel the justice of his reproach, our mood is no longer confident and strong. Our self-approval is at stake. We must do one of two things: either (1) stand at bay and fight for our self-approval or (2) yield, admit we are wrong and gain a new self-approval by making right whatever was wrong. Which shall we do? The second course seems direct and reasonable, but the first is the more common reaction. To yield our present comfort in the interest of a fuller self-approval in the future requires foresight and self-restraint. We tend to act for the immediate comfort. It takes moral quality to pass by present values in the interest of future goods, even though they are greater. Probably that accounts for the frequency of our choice of the first course, namely, to stand at bay and fight for our self-approval. So we deny the accusation against us, we revile the accuser, we argue, we grow hot and red in our anger, we bluff, we lie to defend our honor and reputation. If we calmly review our action later, we can see how faulty it was. We may be compelled to admit that we were wrong. But this makes us start over at the point where we so recently fought for our honor. And it is doubly hard to admit that we fought on the wrong side yesterday. So we usually fight again and again to maintain our weak position. It is because of our lack of moral foresight that we fought in the first place. If we had been stronger morally we would have yielded yesterday and so stood strong in our new self-approval to-day.

This brings us to that which we called the fourth method of attaining self-approval, namely: by frankly meeting the moral problem by doing only that which we ourselves approve and will approve. This is solving the moral problem by moral action.

This requires that before we act in a moral issue, we forecast the various possibilities and then act in a manner we can approve. This means prejudging our acts and forecasting our approval and disapproval. A very simple and primitive person will evaluate his completed acts. If he disapproves, he will promise "never to do it again." But a higher morality is needed in which, by prejudging our contemplated acts, we learn to act by moral foresight in ways we shall approve.

In the mental evolution of our race, cannot our degree of mental efficiency be judged at each stage by our ability at that point to face facts and adapt our behavior to them? This is the meaning of mental adaptation to environment. Our mental efficiency is our ability to observe facts and adapt ourselves accordingly. As we dig into the ruins of a Pompeii or a Carthage, we judge their mental attainments by the way in which they met the facts of gravity in building their structures, the facts of wind and wave in building their ships, the facts of struggle in constructing their weapons and walls of defense. We study their utensils, pottery, fireplaces, coins, and writing as evidences of their mental capacity to face the facts of their environment and adapt themselves to them.

And, in parallel, do we not judge their moral attainments by the way in which they faced the facts within their society and made adaptation to them?

How did they deal with the facts of sickness, old age, helpless infancy, youth's need of education, poverty, wealth, sex, division of labor, group competition and failure? With what codes of honor or dishonor did they treat the rich, the poor, the producers, the non-producers, the wise and the foolish, the babes and the aged, the demagogues and the searchers for truth? How clearly did they see the moral facts and how frankly did they face them and how effectively did they make adaptation to them—these are the tests of the races that were and of the races that are. Our moral progress depends upon our capacity for moral fact-facing, fact-interpreting adaptations.

As the years lengthen into centuries and some one shall look back upon our little day upon the earth to evaluate its achievements, it is possible that he will write down in his book something like this: About this time there awakened in the races of the earth, through the development of the physical sciences, a new appreciation of the value of fact-facing. By observing the facts of nature's processes and learning her ways, so many great possibilities of the sciences were opened that a truly new appreciation of the fact-facing methods of science spread throughout the civilized world.

Thus some future historian may characterize the mental adaptation of our day. Is it possible that he will find data to support a similar assertion regarding our moral adaptation? Will he note that this generation saw a clearly defined movement toward new understanding of the facts of our moral relations? Will he say that during this period, when rapid progress in the material sciences had pro-

duced great strides in invention, research, and discovery in their fields, there was a similar movement in research, discovery and invention in the moral relations of mankind? Repeatedly the comment has been made of late that we have progressed further and faster in the material phases of life than in the moral. Is it possibly because we have been slower to apply in this field the painstaking, fact-facing, fact-interpreting methods of science which alone have made possible the material progress of recent years? Surely the entrance of the scientific spirit into the moral field is urgently needed.

Any method of attaining self-approval except the fact-facing fourth way, whether relied upon by individuals or by the race, must prove less than satisfactory.

CHAPTER V

WHY DO WE NOT DISCARD MORALITY? WHY ARE WE MORAL AT ALL?

Why do we not go about the satisfactions of our desires more directly and without all these moral rules of the game? We desire food; the farmers have it; it is in the commission and wholesale houses and in the retail stores. Why not take it? Men desire sex satisfactions and women are not all strong enough to resist, so why not rape? Money is a great means of purchasing satisfiers. Why is not money grasped and snatched and stolen whenever it is within reach? Why are we moral? Instead of wondering over the number of immoral acts recorded in the daily papers, is it not a greater wonder that any morality exists? We could satisfy many desires directly, but instead we have a thousand rules of the game of life that prescribe how we shall get our satisfactions. For example, in regard to our food, regulations define how it shall be measured, sold, cleaned, bottled, pasteurized, or served in public eating places. There are many rules as to how we shall get shelter, clothing, mates, comforts, etc. We call these approved methods by such names as contracts, sales, deeds, payments, exchange of values, equities, divisions of labor, rights, privileges, marriage contracts, monogamy, child-labor laws, provisions for depend-

ents and many other terms which mark lines not only of legal responsibility but of courtesy and etiquette and even styles and precedents. And strangely enough, more than ninety-five out of every one hundred persons live through their whole lives without any serious breaking over the rules of this great game.

Do we never wonder why anybody cares to play according to the rules? Why do we not break over them freely and often? Why, especially, do we feel badly when we do break over them and why does our conscience bother us? What is remorse and shame and pride and moral enthusiasm? Why do we insist on setting up our moral scales and weighing almost everything that we do or that any one else does or even proposes to do? The weights and balances we use are admittedly various and changing. Why then do we insist upon using ours and upon others using theirs? And is it not strange, too, that we quarrel because their scales do not agree with ours? Why do we have such scales at all? Why not simply discard them and be non-moral?

If it takes powerful desires to drive men out of bed and to hard work, what desire is powerful enough to account for this vast effort put into weighing, approving and disapproving our own and others' acts, this insisting on patience, perseverance, honesty, faithfulness, reliability, monogamy, keeping of promises, paying of debts, politeness, courtesy, kindness, charity, cleanliness, neatness, thoroughness, accuracy, obedience to the rules in traffic, in property, in business and social ethics, and so forth. Nothing less than a powerful desire can account for this great expenditure of effort by which we keep

ourselves in the approved ways of society. Is there a strong enough desire for this approval to explain this phenomenon?

Evidences of a desire to be approved are all about us. Children play but a few minutes without showing it. How often we hear:

"Mother, watch me build my blocks."

"See me skate."

"Mother, isn't this pretty that I made? Look, Mother, look."

"I'm helping you, ain't I?"

"Mother, what would you do without your little helper?"

"Mother, I can do this all alone."

And after each such remark there is a pause for approval. An older child says:

"See how big I'm getting; feel my muscle."

"Jim was afraid, but I wasn't."

"You can't do this, can you?"

"I knew that before he told me."

Parents and teachers know how children respond to approval. The teacher says:

"That is fine. You did well."

"John has spelled every word correctly." (See John respond.)

"I was proud of this class when the principal visited the room."

The child hides his hands at the table, for their dinginess may not be approved; the wife changes her apron before answering the door-bell, for the soiled one may not be approved by the person at the door. She hurries to get the meal on time because the hus-

band will approve or because he may disapprove if it is late. The husband wears his overshoes or his "Christmas" necktie because his wife approves. The office boy runs to be on time at the office, not because he is sold to the idea that punctuality is a virtue, but because he wants the boss's approval or dislikes his disapproval. When a person is detected in a crime or a serious fault, the desire for approval is strong enough frequently to dominate the tense emotions of such an hour, and it breaks forth in such comments as "What will my wife think?" "Must this be known?" "Don't let this get into the papers!" "If this must be known, give me a chance to break the news to father myself" (a more favorable setting can be given and less disapproval result), or "It is well that my mother did not live to see this day" or "This is awful. I can never bear the shame of it"—the crime did not make him feel so badly, but others' knowledge of it creates a disapproval [shame]. He cries: "How can I face my family now?" or "I would rather die than to go through a public trial."

But it is not the approval of others only that we prize, for it is one of the achievements of self-consciousness that we have come to think of ourselves as one of our most valued friends. We care for our own approval of our acts. Herein lies the possibility of conscience. We deceive another and although he may never discover it, we feel as badly as though our friend had turned against us. And it is true, for we have lost the respect of our closest companion, our self. We cannot be content until we have reestablished that esteem. Any one of us can testify to the greatness of the relief we feel when we again

get our own approval. The clouds have fled and the sun shines again.

Livingstone could not approve of himself in the comforts and honors of England if he left undone the task he had set for himself in Africa. His desire for self-approval drove him back into the jungle against the protests of his friends. Lincoln could not approve of himself as he sat in the courtroom, if in memory he still heard the squeals of the pig floundering in the mud from which he could have released him. The men who rode with Lincoln felt no such code of honor. They easily gained their own approval by commenting, "It is no business of ours." When the *Titanic* was sinking at sea, men stood aside for the women to fill the lifeboats, for they desired approval more than safety, than life itself. The widow of India climbed upon the funeral pyre of her husband to be cremated because she could not otherwise keep the respect of her community or of herself. The desire for life is secondary, at times, to the desire for approval. In chapter four we have already seen how men fight like creatures at bay to defend their self-approval; such is the powerful grip of this desire.

If any reader doubts whether or not he has in himself this desire, let him try any one of the following: Go to church with his wife's hat on, as was suggested by Lincoln to the man who said he did not believe in styles. Laugh aloud in church. Tell your hostess that the refreshments are very poor. Let your garter drag while you dance twice around the room at a formal party. Not one of these things is essentially harmful to any one but they are decidedly disapproved.

We may now partially answer the question with which this chapter began, namely: Why do we not discard morality? Why are we moral at all? It is because we have this deep-seated and apparently inescapable desire for approval. We are moral because we have to be to satisfy ourselves. In a broad sense we are moral because we want to be.

But why do we have this desire? Whence did it come into our experience? May we not escape it?

Our ancestors had abundant experience to make them sensitive to approval. Crude, primitive man learned nature's rough treasures were free. Sticks and stones, fruits and berries were his to take freely from nature's lap. But if he took them from the lap of his neighbor who had found them and carried them home, that neighbor objected with scowls and sometimes with anger and blows. With neither words nor wits to define what he felt, he found that there were two ways of getting things, one approved and the other disapproved. The rule "finders are keepers" was practical and approved long before the dawn of history. Keeping sheep was approved and stealing them disapproved long before the alphabet was invented.

He who could not win the approval of his group became an outsider at the fireside and the feast. He might even be an outlaw, hunted and pursued by his fellows. Disapproval preceded attack then as now. He who did not sense disapproval was less prepared than the man who did. Thus sensitivity had a survival value. To be disapproved has always meant ostracism, injury, less food, less shelter, less of all the satisfiers of our desires. On the other hand, ap-

proval of others has always resulted in gifts and opportunities in food, shelter, sex and society.

As a race, we have acquired our desire for approval because we have found it not only valuable but sometimes a survival necessity. Thus this desire has become characteristic of the strong, surviving races.

And as individuals, what do we experience that gives us this strong desire? As children we laid plans without thinking about adult disapproval, and with what result? We were happy in our mud-pie making when mother appeared and jolted us with a positive disapproval of such pies made on the front porch. We investigated with the curiosity of scientific pioneers the possibilities of matches, and nearly set ourselves and the house on fire. We waded with glee in the puddle and ruined our new shoes and stockings. Each of these was great fun until we found that we had omitted to consider adult disapproval. Sometimes, like a wind storm on a summer day, this disapproval broke with a suddenness which left us dazed and wondering what it was all about. But thus we learned what would "go" and what would not at "our house."

But our experiences were not all those of disapproval. Our toddling, baby feet fetched mother's spool which had rolled away and we were warmed by her approval. A hundred little errands we did, and found the pleasure of action doubled by the appreciation which followed the achievement. Doing things for adults was made jolly fun because these adults knew how to gladden us with appreciation, sometimes in such superlative forms as candy or toys.

If primitive or modern man wants the desire-satisfiers which only companionship in work and recreation can offer, he must sense others' approval and disapproval and adapt himself to it. Much more surely is this true in gaining the satisfiers for the finer desires of cultured persons, for without a fine sense of others' feeling, no friend can give to another the satisfactions of art, music, inspiration and friendship. The "fine art of living together" is the moral art of adaptation to the approvals within a morally sensitive group.

In summary, as a race and as individuals, we have been moral because experience has created in us this powerful desire which makes us moral. Through experience we have learned to forecast the approval of others and of ourselves because we have found it important and valuable. We are moral, then, because we have this strong desire and we have this desire because it has been the means of increased adaptation to our fellow men and sometimes a trait essential to individual and race survival. This is our conscience, and this is the way we have come by it. In these last two chapters we have seen the methods by which we satisfy our conscience (gain our self-approval) and why our conscience holds us with a grip we cannot escape. Our conscience is an inevitable part of us, an element in our evolution as surely ours as our nervous system and our mentality.

CHAPTER VI

HOW DO WE GET OUR DESIRES?

Can desires be created or prevented or developed? Can parents and educators control what desires shall take root and grow in the mental life of their children? If so, to what extent and how?

Following the subject matter of the last chapter, we should be well on our way to discover the causes of desires. Many have thought of desires as a possession at birth, an inexplicable gift or curse of the gods, akin to the innate ideas which some folks still suppose we have.

This evening thousands of men will sit in their homes, comfortably settled after the evening meal. What will each one do next? It depends upon the desire which will move them next to action. One desires some tobacco to smoke and will reach for it unless some other desire moves him in another direction. Another desires music from his radio and tobacco does not appeal to him. Another is not interested in either, but rejoices in a two-dollar ticket to the theater, and soon he will be on his way to use it. Another wishes to dance while another would flee from a dance but desires a Greek classic. His neighbor reaches expectantly for the story in the new magazine at his elbow, but the next neighbor wants ardently the chance just to go to bed.

How did they get these desires? We may fall behind the old saying, "There is no accounting for tastes," and insist that our desires are beyond understanding. Or we can see that our desires have a history and by studying it, we may learn of the forces out of which they spring.

We may see at least that some of our desires develop as a reaction to experience. Surely the desire for cigarettes has not been latent in all women through historic ages and suddenly become noticeable to women in this generation. Before Columbus discovered America and tobacco, did men desire tobacco although they had never known of the plant? Did the boy desire tobacco the first time he tried to smoke? Or did he desire to be big and do as the big fellows do, and therefore smoke because they did? Or was it the desire to avoid some one who called him "sissy" because he did not smoke. Or was it a desire to experiment and see what it was like? But whatever desire it was, it was not the craving for tobacco which he found when he "swore off" after years of smoking.

If the first time John tried to smoke he had accidentally set fire to the garage and been whipped for it; and the second time he had been laughed at by those for whom he cared most; and the third time he had become terribly sick and the fourth time a hot spark had blown in his eye and made it so sore it spoiled a swimming trip; and, if for all of the first ten times he tried, some unpleasant experience had arisen out of it, there would be few Johns who smoke. Without pleasurable experience desire does not develop.

How does the desire to gamble arise? Under what

circumstances may it arise? What tends to increase it or decrease it? Why does the farmer, who, by the nature of his task, is constantly face to face with the uncertainties of weather, flood, or drought or a hundred other enemies of his crops, seldom become a gambler, although his business is often characterized as the greatest of gambles? On the other hand, why do the sons of wealth, who never felt the uncertainties of fortune or the stings of serious losses, not infrequently gamble and develop a desire for gambling?

A man now in middle life gave the following description of his experience with this desire. When he was a boy, he was given fifty cents, the biggest sum of money he had ever had, to go to the country fair and make it a great day. In that time fifty cents bought much. Early in the day he saw a gambling wheel, at which some men were winning two and three times the amount they had staked. Naturally his desire for many things had been awakened and he wished ardently that he had more than fifty cents to spend. In this wheel he saw the possibility of satisfying this desire, if he "played" a quarter and doubled it as the men had doubled their money. He played and lost in that one brief moment, not only the hope of more money and the things it could buy, but one half of all the things he might have bought with the money his parents had given to him. The sun shone hotly, but for him the whole day was under a heavy cloud. Everywhere he went he saw things he could not have because he had gambled.

Through his youth and manhood he had been frequently associated with gambling and has often been invited to participate, but it has been without inter-

est or power to lay hold of him. He has had no desire for it, even when tempting prospects of great gain for small stake have been offered. Why? Suppose the experiences of the first day at the country fair had been reversed. Suppose that he had won fifty cents more and had doubled his purchasing power and also been the envy of every money-hungry boy he met that day. If he had found keen pleasure, the law of our organism which tends to repeat each pleasurable experience would have acted in him. Desire is but the reaction of our organisms to pleasurable experience. Desire is but the biological mechanism to assist our organism to find again that which brought pleasure. Just as the mechanisms of the eye and the ear have developed through their utility to the organism, so this mental mechanism has evolved in response or as an adaptation to experience.

We may see the process in relation to an experience in which the factors are easily isolated. We who wear glasses and are so dependent upon them that there is but very limited pleasure in any activity without them have a definite and unmistakable urge to get them. Like men who desire drugs, we find ourselves restless and driven by an unceasing urge until we have found them. Some one may rightly insist that it is scarcely the desire for glasses which we feel, but a desire for the comfort and relief associated with them. But, note equally that men do not feel a desire for drugs (e.g. morphine, opium, alcohol) but for the satisfactions that result from their use. Nor is it bread or meat we desire but the satisfactions which are associated with food. But in the same sense as men desire food or drugs, so we desire our glasses.

But what is the history of this desire for glasses? There was a day when we had no such desire. Parents, teachers and oculists combined their forces to get those glasses on our noses and keep them there. We were outspoken and truthful in saying repeatedly, "We do not want them." But, lo, to-day we want them and if they are mislaid we hunt for them as for a treasure. Forced to wear them, we found comfort, increased vision, freedom from headache and eye-strain. We had pleasurable experience with them—nothing more. And unbidden, there sprang up in our psychic field this phenomenon we call desire. As the steel rises when the magnet passes over it; as the sea rises when the moon moves above it; so, at the coming of pleasurable experience, desire arose where there had been no desire. Does the magnet move the steel? Does the moon cause the tide? Then pleasurable experience makes desire.

We have heard of the carefully conducted experiments in which fish in an aquarium were associated with other smaller fish which they ate with promptness and dispatch. But, one day, into the aquarium was put a glass partition which divided the larger fish from their food. For a time they dashed themselves against the glass, ready to grasp the food which swam on the other side. But it was not long before they ceased to show any interest in the little fishes with which there was no experience of food-satisfaction. Desire diminished and disappeared by the same psychic law that it had appeared, just as the tide fell when its relation to the moon had changed. Satisfactions stimulated desires. Without satisfactions desire waned. They varied in direct proportion.

Since we have found that desire is the biological response to pleasurable experience, what use can we parents and other moral educators make of this law? We can control the making of the desires of children and adults to just the extent that we control their discovery of pleasurable experience.

For example, if their early experiences with candy are in having a nickel to run to the store and get an all-day sucker for themselves, there springs a desire to do it again. Their desire for candy comes to be a desire for money to run to the store. If on the contrary, their major experience with candy is with home-made candies which mother makes or has early taught them to make, their desire for candy is likely to call for home-made varieties and the associated social joys found in making and sharing it. The character of the desire is determined by the pleasurable experiences out of which it grew.

If children have found pleasure in jazz and it is typical of their pleasurable contact with music, the desire for it will follow as surely as the night follows sunset. Much of the pleasure in it came through the activities associated with it, such as the singing, jesting and reading in the warm contentment of the home, around the musical instruments, and the comradeship of children with parents in which the younger ones expand their thoughts and emotions to meet the adults. As the years lengthen, the desire to repeat this pleasure associated with jazz will appear.

If, however, without changing the scene, the music of that home is not jazz, but *Il Trovatore*, *Poet and Peasant* or *Humoresque*, the desire will be for such music if the other elements are unchanged. If new children come into the community, who give new

pleasurable experience to our children, we must expect new desires to arise.

If the pleasures of childhood have been associated with going from home to places of amusement (such as theaters, pleasure resorts, parks, dances) desire for repetition will inevitably follow. If on the other hand those pleasures have never come, but instead many happy associations with impromptu parties and games in which individual initiative was a large element (as contrasted with the passivity of the picture-show spectator), the desires which arise will tend to repetition of that kind of pleasure.

Home-loving children are not an accident but the product of a process. Nor are those children who treat home as a filling-station and a parking-space likely to develop in a home which is awake to the children's interests. Why do the delinquent children of every community come in such high percentage from broken or irregular homes? Is it not because in the maladjustments, therein, the anticipating and developing of the normal desires of the child have been neglected? Unbalanced desire-structures are built by unbalanced pleasure-experiences.

CHAPTER VII

DOES MORALITY INTERFERE WITH OUR GETTING WHAT WE WANT?

If from the long list of human desires we choose a very few which are common and fundamental in the experience of the race, we may see clearly the relation of our morality to our struggle to satisfy these desires. Three desires we may choose which are surely common and fundamental, for without them the race could scarcely exist. We may call them (1) the desire for food, (2) the desire for skin comfort, and (3) the desire for sex satisfactions. Perhaps the second needs further definition, for it is so inclusive that no one word explains it. By skin comfort we refer to those sense satisfactions without which we are greatly distressed, as when we are too cold, too hot, bruised, burned, scratched, cut, pricked, or irritated. All of these are related to the one desire we have called skin comfort. The three desires named have been chosen for another reason, beside their basic importance and their commonness, for they are directly dependent upon the experience of a definite set of nerve ends. They are localized and their satisfaction is rather easily distinguished from other experiences. To study the relation of these desires to our morality, we must place along with them a fourth desire, namely, the desire for approval, out of which our

morality springs. We may then see what part the satisfaction of the desire for approval plays.

These relations may be observed more quickly in a diagram than in description. The chart which follows aims to suggest relations rather than to catalog them.

It is well that we note in our diagram that which never would have appeared in our lives if the desire for approval had not developed. With bold strokes, we would cross off every item that lies to the right of or below the heavy black line. It may seem at first that some of them could remain, but on further study each will be seen to be dependent on that desire, either in ourselves or in others whose approval we seek. If the desire to be approved dropped out of our human motivation, would we not get our food in any and every way our physical and mental capacity made possible or practicable? The bear in Yellowstone Park gets his food from the berry bushes, the hotel steps, the exposed lunch of the tourist or the forage of his fellow bear—if he “can get away with it.” He satisfies his sex desires by any means within his physical and mental capacity, without weighing any questions of monogamy or adultery, rape or frightening, or killing of competitors, or the presence or absence of spectators. If he has any desire for approval, it is rudimentary only.

We see then, that our morality limits and prescribes the methods by which we satisfy our wants. For each desire there are approved ways of getting satisfactions and ways which are considered improper. If we examine the disapproved ways, we find that each interferes seriously with the satisfactions some one else desires. My desire for warmth does not

THE RELATION OF MORALITY TO DESIRE-SATISFACTIONS

Desires	Satisfiers	MAN'S MEANS OF GETTING THESE SATISFIERS		
		Physical-Mental Non-moral	Moral Approved	Immoral Disapproved
Food	Plants fruits berries grains seeds roots juices saps	His body, to hunt fish climb plant cultivate	courage thrift foresight perseverance	seizure theft murder terrorizing
	Animals milk butter cheese meats oils	His mind, to devise coördinate construct his tools weapons implements machines	patience endurance judgment	cheating gambling deception
SKIN- COMFORT	warmth protection clothing bedding shelter medicines ointments	(same as above)	(same as above)	(same as above)

SEX	Mates	Primary brawn beauty caresses Secondary property gifts ornaments	courage generosity forethought tenderness coöperation attentiveness	rape adultery promiscuity prostitution murder divorce?
APPROVAL	Associates in travel family business school recreation	Physique— Approval through skill prowess grace Mind— Approval through knowledge judgment strategy invention	charity courtesy generosity honesty dependability tact courage patriotism piety helpfulness cheerfulness cleanliness	boasting bragging deception pretenses evasion disparagement

warrant that I burn your house and you for the heat I might thus receive. Society has approved the satisfaction of the sex desire in the circumstances which fairly consider the desires of others involved; for example, the mate, the children present or to be, the state which must care for them if others fail, possible spectators, and others.

Our morality, then, evaluates both (1) our desires, and (2) the means we have for satisfying them. But it does more. This evaluating process might be cold calculating of values without regard for our feelings, if this evaluating were not itself motivated by a warm desire—the desire for approval. Thus our morality is not a mere intellectualist who gives us abstract appraisal of values. Instead, it is an interested friend who will lose or gain by each decision we make. When we debate with this partner within us, we feel the meaning of Huck Finn's saying: "I tried to make out to myself that I wasn't to blame" but "my conscience got to stirring me up hotter than ever" and I began "abusing myself to myself." In business we hear our economic self saying to us, "If I force that sale, I'll make money," but our moral self responds, "Yes, but your neighbors will look the other way when you meet them, and you'll go to bed with a guilty conscience."

As the clerk at the counter hears the noon signal, food desire whispers, "Cut that customer short, and come, eat." Approval Desire responds, "Food Desire, you must wait for you can't elbow me out so easily. The profits of this sale will buy many lunches and if we finish this sale, the customer will approve, and so will the big boss up in the front office." So the clerk listens to Approval Desire and goes to lunch a little

later, but with a satisfied conscience, for the clerk is self-approved, customer-approved, and boss approved.

Does morality interfere with that clerk's getting what he wants? Yes and no! It retarded the satisfaction of one desire but rewarded a desire whose satisfaction he more strongly craved.

We do not explain why this condition exists, but we observe the fact that human life on this planet has developed thus. Driven by desires so strong that we prefer to endure much rather than fail to satisfy them, a large portion of the race has chosen to satisfy each desire morally. And how has it come to pass? The desire for approval has developed in us as unbidden as any other desire, but as long as we have it, we feel it insisting that it get its share of satisfactions as it competes for its place among our desires.

We are not justified in considering this racial ascent of the moral mountain as a trifling achievement. Mr. Owen D. Young, who gave the address of dedication of the new buildings of the Harvard School of Business, is quoted in the following passage which pictures the efforts of primitive men to enter into those relations, new at that time, but now considered essential in the codes of business.

One of the world's most ancient records says, "In the western sea there is a market where an agreement exists between the buyer and the seller that, if one comes, the other goes. The seller first spreads out his goods; afterwards the purchaser spreads out the equivalent, which must lie at the side of the articles for sale until taken by the seller, when the objects purchased may be carried off." What a fascinating picture of the early dawn of trade the representatives of the two tribes, each with their own

products, advancing slowly, carefully, suspiciously even, not for the purposes of war but for the peaceful exchange of goods. The more daring adventurer walks out into the open area between the lines, deposits an article there and slowly returns. Watchfully, with anticipation, he awaits the advance of some one from the other side. At last one emerges, bringing his article and places it beside the first and retires. A seller and a buyer have come out of the darkness of barbarism into the advancing light of civilization. The seller must now elect which article he will take. If it be not his own, a trade has been made and the advance of human relations has begun. Trust has been substituted for suspicion; self-restraint has taken the place of uncontrolled acquisitiveness; a code of morals and of law will emerge; and at last sportsmanship, recognizing with a sense of honor the rules of the game, will come into being.¹

By voluntary submission to these moral codes of law and of trade have we got more or less of the values we desired?

Without it, the handicraft of others could not be ours, the arts and trades of others could not have reached us, the herbs and spices and medicines which others had discovered would have been unknown to us, the knowledge and morals of neighboring peoples would have been hidden secrets. Through trade the numerals of the Arabs spread over the earth. Through trade the silks of China, the spices of India, the rubber of Africa, the potato and corn of America have become international possessions.

But a prerequisite upon which that trade is based is an ever-expanding morality—self-restraint, foresight, reliability, sportsmanship, honor, trust, credit,

¹ Harvard Alumni Bulletin, 1927, p. 1026.

honesty, patience, persistence, coöperation. If we would have the benefits of trade, we must develop and extend the virtues which underlie all production and exchange of goods.

Failure to make such moral adjustments is failure to make fundamental adaptations to our environment. Nature has presented to man as the great alternative of life—unspoken but operative in every law of nature: Make moral adaptation or remain where you are. If you would be more and have more, then strive more, reach higher, persist longer, think harder. Build out of your falls, ladders and bridges; out of your chills, clothing and shelters; out of your hunger, gardens and storehouses; out of your thirst, wells and cisterns. From your fatigue, devise tools and mechanisms; from your wants, learn to conserve wealth; from your mistakes, develop foresight; from your thoughtlessness, develop attention; from your pangs of loneliness, make friendship; from your losses and the horrors of war, learn the meaning and value of coöperation and mutual understanding.

The races of to-day are those who responded to the challenge of nature and learned—to the incomplete extent we now practice them—the great virtues which underlie human achievement.

And how shall we answer the question with which this chapter began, namely: Does morality interfere with our getting what we want? It does limit or prevent our getting part of what we want, in the interests of getting more that we want. It evaluates and trades the lesser for the greater satisfactions. This is the function of conscience and therein we see both the way of its evolution and the natural forces which give it power in human activity.

CHAPTER VIII

IS MORALITY NATURAL? HAS IT NATURAL LAWS, WHICH, IF KNOWN, WOULD CONSTITUTE A SCIENCE OF MORALITY?

We have outlined the mechanical process by which we have become moral. We have seen that

- (1) without our desire for approval—by others or ourselves—we would never have tried to be moral;
- (2) that our desire for approval has sprung out of pleasurable experience with approval and painful experience with disapproval;
- (3) that our approval judgment is an appraiser who gives precedence to the desire-satisfiers considered at the moment most important or valuable.

If we seek to press back further into the causes of our mental life, it would be next in order that we ask how it has come about that we have the mental capacity to make judgments at all. If we were to study that, we would find that intelligence and all the capacities of the central nervous system developed as mechanisms assisting us to attain fuller satisfactions. There can be little doubt that mentality is an integrating mechanism which has developed as an adaptation of our organism to our environment. The

story of life apparently has been one of progressive adaptation or coördination with the natural laws of environment.

Yet there are many who vaguely think that man must struggle against nature for attainment. Even scientists talk of "man's conquest over nature," thus suggesting that nature is a protesting opponent to be overcome. The influence of that ancient philosophy which considered that man is by nature bad is still felt. In fact, its phrases even yet carry their old meaning to many. For example, we hear of the "natural" man in contrast with the "spiritual" man. How common it is to think that nature is apart from morality, that it is natural to do wrong, and that he who does right, does so by overcoming his natural tendencies.

And, if we see only the surface, life surely shows much to justify this assumption. The innocent child eats the poisonous berries and dies. The aspect of nature is unchanged as the funeral procession winds down through the valley. Nature has no tears to mingle with the parents' grief—an indifferent spectator, we say. Nature is no respecter of persons; "the rain falls on the just and the unjust"; the tornado treats the saint and the sinner without discrimination. Sometimes nature seems perversely even to favor the less moral. The best man in town falls on the icy corner and is fatally injured, while the ne'er-do-well town drunkard merely sprains his ankle on the same ice. The good die young and some not-so-good live to an over-ripe old age.

It is not strange that man has drawn the conclusion from his many experiences that nature is indifferent to his vital interests. On many issues, if

she votes at all, she votes contrary to our immediate hopes and wishes. Such are the data that suggest that nature is at least indifferent, if not hostile, to our moral achievements.

It is well that we ask ourselves seriously whether morality is natural. If we really live in a world hostile to moral achievement, we should know it and face our problem frankly. If nature is so set up and organized that moral achievement is unnatural and contrary to the natural impulses of man, then all effort to increase and develop moral action should be plainly seen as contrary to natural law. The work of the moralist should then be plainly styled, "bucking the Universe."

Let us choose certain definite moral qualities apparent in the race and check their relation to our experience.

Possibly we can agree that the following are real moral qualities:

PERSISTENCE, that attainment which marks the man who will wipe off the perspiration and keep on going, long after rest would be sweet, in the interest of values deemed greater than the comfort he is exchanging for them!

FORESIGHT, that attainment of man by which the more distant goods and ills are visualized and realized so that they may be weighed in judgment just as if they were actually at hand beside the present values!

PATIENCE, that attainment by which a man holds in check present impulses in the interests of future values yet out of grasp!

SYMPATHY, by which man identifies his fortunes with those of certain others so fully that he

can forget to note the effect of events on his personal goods if only he can see a good achieved for them!

Other virtues which we need merely to name are such as CAUTION, COURAGE, HONESTY, FORTITUDE, DISCRETION, TOLERANCE!

If we can agree that such are moral qualities, then let us press seriously the question: How are these developed? Is it apart from nature, or do they arise out of some intimate interaction with nature?

In what school did man learn patience, foresight, fortitude and the like? Consider the experience of a primitive hunter in the dawn of human experience. He could hunt for fruit and nuts and berries without patience, foresight, or fortitude. But, if he grasped the berries without foresight, the thorns scratched and pricked. If he climbed the tree for fruit, without foresight, limbs broke under his weight or snakes lurked to his harm, or the poison spider surprised him amid the fruit. If this primitive hunter lacked patience, he found less food than his patient brother. When winter came, he lacked the stores of food, firewood, and skins, as compared with the well-provisioned shelter of his morally advanced neighbor who had attained foresight, patience, and fortitude.

Do we not see how, for each virtue learned, nature presented some new reward of comfort, food, shelter, or happiness which warmed the heart of man, as the approval of a friend? And how does it happen that man did not overdevelop these virtues?

If man developed patience to the extent that it became sloth, or foresight into unlimited speculation, who tutored him to understand his error? Certain orderly processes of nature brought the slothful man

and his speculative brother face to face with want, hunger, or cold, which felt to man like the disapproval of his best friend, nature. Want and pain and death have trod at the heels of man, like the hard troops at the rear of Napoleon's army, who pricked and prodded until marching was preferable to desertion. Perhaps we do not like nature's method of adult education, but it seems to be a definite pedagogy, which, like others, must be judged by its results. But is it not clear that much of the moral quality which man has is due to this interaction with the natural order?

And to the moral qualities previously noted, we should add those attainments of skill and knowledge which represent moral effect in the acquirement, even though the motivation is often economic. Note the skill and knowledge represented in the arts, crafts, and trades. Consider the achievement of the musician, poet, dramatist, architect, physician, banker, lawyer, manufacturer, chemist, physicist, astronomer, goldsmith, dentist, jewel-cutter, carpenter, plumber, and many others. In each of these the achievement requires an unmistakable moral element for its attainment. No one of these is acquired without the investment of patience, perseverance, controlled and directed imagination, and modified acquisitiveness. Whether it is knowledge or skill of the fingers, the acquirement involves a moral process.

But is this moral process apart from and independent of the natural order?

If I would master some phase of music, it is because I see in that music satisfactions for my desires. Perhaps I desire tone and harmony; perhaps

it is public applause or the comradeship of other musicians! But how may I get these satisfactions? May I get them quite apart from and independent of the natural order, or has nature definite plans and specifications according to which I must build my structure? The first tone I strike on the violin or piano depends for its quality on the coöperation of nature; for example, the physics of a vibrating string, predetermined and long established, must be recognized. If I want less or more of overtone, nature will give them to me, *if* I learn her ways and fit myself to them. When I want the tone louder or softer, sweeter or firmer, nature will give them to me—*if* I intelligently coöperate with her. But nature's "if" is positive. She will not come to my ways; I must go to her. If I will fit myself to her ways, I may have almost unlimited variety of range and tone combinations to suit my taste.

But how may I learn nature's ways? By persistence, self-control, postponement of present pleasures in the interest of future values, etc. The only way in which I can get what I want is that moral way. But I rebel. I say: There must be some other and easier way to what I want. But nature pays no heed to my rebellion. (How unparental she is—she does not plead or coax or even act shocked.) She gives me all the freedom any moralist could desire. I need not practice my music, try my scales, or even touch my instrument. I may give up all of it and go without the satisfactions of my musical desires, or I may take the moral road to get them. She gives me an alternative as inescapable as fate: Be moral or go without the satisfaction of that desire.

Does morality seem to be something apart from

nature? Or is morality woven with the laws of nature as the warp with the woof in a carpet? If in some moral laboratory, under our microscopes, we had seen unfolding the phenomena just described in which a man is struggling for mastery of music, should we consider it the struggle of a moral creature in the grip of a ruthless environment which is unfitted to his moral quality? Or if we saw under our microscopes the medical student burning the midnight oil over the problems of cellular structure, neurones, and bacteria, while on the wall of his room there hung the picture of the bearded physician bringing to a suffering child the relief born of knowledge and skill, would we say: It is not right that nature has thus prescribed that this student must first attain by moral processes that knowledge and skill before he can have the power for human weal or woe which its possession gives him? Is it not more likely that we should say: It is a merciful and moral provision of nature that the power of knowledge and skill cannot come into hands undisciplined by moral training!

Shall we consider it a coincidental relation between man and his environment, or is it a moral law woven into the very order of the universe that character (developed through patience, foresight, self-restraint, etc.) is a prerequisite of every achievement and in proportion to that achievement?

Does the chemist, who sees in every clod and stone and tree and man the phenomena of his science, pronounce chemistry to be unnatural? Does the biologist, who sees swarming through the air, sea and over the land a myriad forms of life, declare that life is unnatural? Should the moralist, who finds

in nearly two billions of human beings who now populate the earth, the phenomena of moral action, let pass unchallenged the statement that morality is not natural? Is there any evidence that it is not subject to natural laws or that it is developed apart from and without interaction with the natural order? Is it less subject to study and research and mastery than any other natural phenomenon? There is no evidence that morality is other than natural.

But there is another approach to this question which we should not neglect. When we hear men speak of our human triumph over a morally hostile universe, or of its being natural to do wrong and unnatural to do right, we may ask them to suggest some changes, which, if incorporated into the ways of nature, would make morality more natural or nature better fitted to morality. Now, that seems to be a fair and simple request, in view of the numerous complaints we hear against nature's treatment of us. If nature is not fitted to our moral activity, it should be simple to point out ways in which her behavior might (at least theoretically) be made more morals-producing, or less damaging to our morals.

For example, in those cases already cited, in which nature seems indifferent to our grief and suffering, what changes would we recommend? Would we consider nature to be moral if the poison were taken out of all berries, the slippery element out of all ice, the heat out of the fire that burns us and the chill out of the blizzard, so that the world might be safe for babes and fools? Would any morality at all develop in such a fool-proof world? The old saying: "If ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise" would be

so literally true that none would seek either skill or wisdom. Would the natural order be better fitted to our moral purposes if rain fell only on the fields of the just and left the unjust the option of becoming good or irrigating from pools controlled by the righteous recipients of the rain? Would our situation be made more moral if none but ne'er-do-wells and knaves fell and broke their bones, while gravity suspended action when nice folks were indiscreet? Or perhaps we would consider it a more moral world if for each of our little children nature provided a guardian angel along the banks of the brook or in the city's traffic to guide the little feet! Would some one suggest that nature is immoral because she seems to have laid upon us parents that task, even though our children suffer because we are inefficient guardians? Yet every one of these suggestions is impracticable and injurious to ultimate morality if it were made effective in nature.

Does it not seem a bit strange that, if we are really superior morally to so-called non-moral nature, that suggestions do not flock to mind for many practical improvements of the natural order? If this Universe is not moral, why are we unable to make suggestions to make it so? If we can make no such suggestions, are we not compelled to recognize in nature-as-it-is, in reaction to which we have developed the only morality we know, not only its life-producing but its morality-producing character? If rocks are natural formations, if animal life is natural, then morality is equally natural.

The evolution of morality may be traced from the dawning of this desire for approval. Little by little, the desire has grown out of experience, in-

creasingly asserting itself among the primary desires of man, insisting that other desires yield or postpone their satisfactions so that it may get its fair share. We are moral as naturally as we are physical or mental or social. To live and satisfy our ever-increasing wants we have developed in the direction of mental and moral achievements. The world in which we live is so set up that this was the way and the only way to get the further satisfactions we have craved.

If the foregoing is true, we are ready in summary to state:

(1) Nature is so set up that the fullest satisfaction of many desires is impossible except through moral action. To get these satisfactions we have become moral.

(2) Since certain satisfactions cannot be attained without moral development, and since satisfactions are the basis of new desires, the morally underdeveloped cannot desire nor enjoy what may be called the higher levels of satisfactions.

(3) Nature's formula, in response to which we have developed our morality, seems to be the continual conditioning of the fuller satisfactions of our desires upon further and further moral attainments. The natural law of moral growth is that we may have increasing satisfactions if and only if we increase our moral attainments.

CHAPTER IX

ARE WE MORAL BECAUSE IT PAYS? WHAT
ARE MORAL VALUES? WHAT ARE ECO-
NOMIC VALUES? SHOULD WE PAY FOR
A MORAL ACT? INCENTIVES?

The values we accept as pay for a service we render we evaluate in terms of the satisfactions they bring to our desires. Only desire-satisfiers have value and we classify the values we get in terms of the desires they satisfy.

An artistic value lies in that which will be accepted as satisfaction for a desire for beauty. If the landscape picture you paint can satisfy a strong desire in many persons, that picture has great artistic values. But it has no value to the grazing cow which looked over your shoulder while you painted that landscape. It satisfies none of her desires.

If your home can satisfy the desire of many people, so that they would want it for their home, it has proportionate economic value, that is, value in the open market for which money is the common denominator.

If your service to your country during the World War won great approval from the thankful thousands, it had great moral value, but your salary may list you with the "dollar-a-year" patriots.

Values are classified according to the desires they

satisfy. Moral values seem to be no exception. We have found the desire for approval lies at the center of each moral action. We ought not to be surprised therefore to find that the desire for approval is the basis of all moral values. In practical experience, we find men attaching moral value to any act, or memory, or judgment, or possession which can satisfy that desire. Men who shrink from war go to battle to satisfy their own and others' approval codes, and we consider them moral heroes. A man will face the perils of shipwreck, or robbers, of beatings, of persecutions, of hunger, and cold, as St. Paul boasts in his Letter to the Corinthians, all to satisfy his own desire for approval by himself and others. His conscience required those acts and through telling others he adds to his satisfaction. A mother went into her burning house and brought an imprisoned child through the flames only to say, "I could never have looked myself in the face again, if I had stood safely on the pavement below." The boy scout who carried the lady's basket was not satisfied, for she failed to thank him. But he was satisfied, when his scout master had praised his "good turn." The miner who saved his entombed companions merely said, "No self-respecting miner could refuse when volunteers are needed." Self-approval would be lost by doing less, by the miner, the scout, the mother, St. Paul, and every other who renders a service of moral value. A man went through bankruptcy and admitted himself unable to pay his creditors. As the days went on, some of them cursed, some forgave, some forgot; but his desire for approval (self and other) drove him through years of labor and saving and privation

until every cent was paid with interest. Nothing compelled him. The law and the court had excused him from the whole obligation. Nothing compelled—except his desire for approval. Without a satisfaction for it he could not rest. We say that such a man has a sense of moral values and his act is appraised as a moral achievement, and his example is proclaimed by the moralist that others may see and do likewise. His deed has moral value to the community as an example and an influence.

Do we now see that every act is motivated by an exchange of values; that each service has its compensation in the form of some desire-satisfier? Our sense of equity demands it. Whenever we find a service rendered for which there is no economic value exchanged, there must be some other value given or an injustice has been done. The miner digs the coal and the operator pays the wage; the miner rescues his friends and they "cannot forget the service he did for them." The lady cannot pay the scout, but she can thank him. A moral act which is unrewarded is an injustice as truly as work done without wages. The charities worker accepts as part of his pay this moral coinage of approval, along with the priest, the preacher, the teacher, the parent, and every other person of moral value to the community. Lincoln received as President of the United States a salary much smaller than the annual alimony of some of our rich divorcees. However, to Lincoln not only do Americans but millions the world around acknowledge a debt of gratitude and appreciation (a moral debt), and history may never write on his ledgers "Paid in full." Are there any who would not choose the heritage of Abraham Lincoln

or Louis Pasteur rather than the estate of a millionaire's son? If we would doubt the value placed by men on the moral returns from investment, we may recall the men and women who have given comforts, health, economic dreams and careers in exchange for a clear conscience (self-approval) earned through care of aged parents, the sick, the young, the defenseless. Desire for wealth has motivated great achievements, but the desire for approval has made civilization possible. Without it, competition would be as the fighting of bears for the carcass, ambition would be as the pushing of pigs to reach the trough, alertness would be as the soaring of the hawk over its prey, success would be more sordid than Nero and Louis XV. Desire for approval has made the masters of nations.

But we should not forget that even this desire has been prostituted to low and mean uses. For the applause of the crowd, little men have sold their souls, as puppets for low demagogues, or have spent their last coin for style and show, for tinsel and baubles to decorate a single night of gaudy gayety. The best we have may be basely used, and pearls cast under the feet of swine may yet be pearls.

We may now define *moral values* as those values arising out of the satisfaction of the desire for approval by ourselves and others. We might similarly define artistic values for the lover of beauty; historic values for the historian; scientific values for the scientist; health values for the sick; and economic values for all of us, each in terms of the desire satisfied.

The answer to the question with which the chapter began is probably now clear, "Are we moral because

it pays?" Historically, the race would have developed no morality except for the satisfactions which arose out of it. Nor would the race continue it, if our common experience did not show us that it pays. We are moral in just the ways we are, because we conserve, or believe we conserve for ourselves, the greatest values thereby.

Why, then, do men rob gas stations and steal from store counters? The answer is to be found in the experience of the person who steals. Learn of his home, present and past, or his experiences through the years. In his individual career, we will find that he has found values by other ways than moral achievement. Deception or fraud or theft has shown values somewhere in his experience, even perhaps in his vicarious experience in the story or the picture show. If he is normal mentally (and we are here considering only such persons), he is reacting normally to his experience. If he is not caught, his mind is likely to be found saying, "I thought I could get away with it and I did." A few successes with the profitable side of robbery and moral certainty that robbery pays may be established. Add to that the thrills of approval he gets by reading of his "job" in the newspapers. Add to that the new standing he gets in his gang. Normal desires, although basely used against the common good, are satisfied. He is reacting to a natural law of morality.

But, it should be asked, "Did he not get disapproval too?" The words of a young, lone robber, who was frequently in the headlines recently, may give the answer. He said after his capture and on his death bed, "Dad and Mother used to kick on my being out nights, but I thought they was old-fash-

ioned." He discounted his disapprovers—"old-fashioned" and "kicking."

If his experience had been entirely unfavorable the first ten times, as was that of the boy in chapter six who tried to learn to smoke, he would have never become a robber. It is well that we note how valuable and satisfying has been the experience of gunmen and bootleggers of late. The natural law of moral reactions will increase the number if the satisfactions run high. How soon shall we find ways to reverse that experience?

But, by and large, the great body of the race has learned through experience with nature and their fellow men to say: "Honesty pays," "Honesty is the best policy," "You work for what you get in this world," "Hard work ultimately produces results," "Perseverance is rewarded," "Murder will out," "Truth crushed to earth will rise again," "Think before you leap," "A clear conscience is better than a gold mine," and many other "truths." But individual experience runs far outside the lines of racial averages. Many children have learned early that dishonesty pays, that lies and deceptions are useful tools, that their perseverance is not rewarded, and that you can get things in this world without working for them. Having learned these "truths" in their experience, their morality is normal if they seek their values in the places they have learned to find them.

In employment offices dozens of men lie and misrepresent themselves daily to get jobs. Why do they lie? Because, in their experience, they have found truth in the misquoted scripture, "A lie is a very present help in time of trouble." If lies had never

worked, few would grow to adult years so addicted to the practice.

Should we then pay for a moral act? If morality is to be preserved, we must reward morality. But how? In cash? In economic goods? Sometimes! But especially we must consider the incentives of man, which arise out of approval—by others affecting his standing at the club, the factory, the church, among neighbors; by himself in his sense of rank, achievement, position, satisfied conscience, and approval by his deity. Industry used to know only economic values (pay), but slowly it is learning of the incentives that lie in moral values.

What then is the task of the moral educator? Is it not to so guide the experience of those he would train that desirable behavior brings abundant satisfactions and undesirable behavior runs low in satisfactions?

CHAPTER X

WHAT IS OUR WILL?

What do we mean when we say in defeat, "I lacked will power," or in success, "I forced myself to do it"? What happens when we will to get up in the morning or to go to work despite our headache, or we will to refrain from laughing out loud in church or we will to stop smoking or scolding?

There is the age-old problem, What is our will and is it free? It seems useless to debate about freedom of the will unless we are sure just what it is that we want to be free. Realizing that it is easy to ask this question but very difficult to give an answer which will mean anything to other persons, we venture to try once more to analyze this mental trait in the hope that, as the coral reef is built by tiny additions, we may deposit our bit of experience toward a fuller understanding of this element of personality. At least it is in order that we ask: What are the obvious mental phenomena which are present in consciousness when we *will* to do anything? What is going on mentally when we look at the time-piece early in the winter morning, feel the cozy comfort under the covers, note the coldness of the air of the room, feel ourselves dozing again, then arouse ourselves to action and force ourselves to get up?

One fact is clearly observable. There is a conflict

of desires, such as the desire for comfort and the desire to get to work on time and the desire to catch the proper car or train and the desire to be self-approved and boss-approved. And out of all these possible competing desires there arises but little conflict as we lie warm in bed, for the desire for comfort is, just now, an easygoing giant whose attackers are Lilliputians. With a gesture of impatience, this powerful desire for comfort waves away his attackers with, "Don't bother me now." But they whisper to me, "You'll be late and miss your car." I push my foot out of the warm area into the unwarmed sheets. Desire for comfort says: "Pull it back; I told you you'd be sorry if you did it; see how cold it is!" How obviously true his arguments are! How cozy that foot is now, back in the warm place! I softly sink into that haze of consciousness akin to a fog in which nothing is clearly discernible. But there my desire for comfort lost the battle, for, unseen, under cover of the mist, that competing desire for self-approval has slipped up to my ear and has shouted loudly enough to wake the dead: "Look out! You'll be late!" In fright, I jump out of bed. I am in the middle of the floor like a fireman. It seems to have taken no effort, no act of will. I just did it. When there was no desire active in me (for my desire for comfort had dozed to sleep with me), that desire for self-approval had jumped in and driven me to action, before any other desire could protest. I was adequately motivated. Desire released all the energy needed and no inhibiting desire was quick enough to put on the brakes. That happened on Monday morning.

But on Tuesday morning it was not that way. I

had stayed up a bit late the night before and it was colder too. (See how I get my self-approval.) The desire for peace and skin comfort combined their efforts and brought with them a third fellow who argued that I really needed more sleep if I were to work so hard. He said that in justice to myself and my job I ought to take a day off and sleep late. I don't know how he knew it, but he stated the fact that there wasn't as much need for me at the office that day as usual. With all that holding me in bed, how could I be expected to rise? I would have gone to sleep in three winks if it had not been for an argument raised before me like the headlines of a newspaper, thrust up by some one who hid behind that paper. It said, "Remember how silly Jones looked yesterday when he came in an hour late and tried his weak alibi about oversleeping and then admitted he had heard the alarm?" I remember; he did look silly and the boss didn't like it either. (Hiding behind that suggestion and pushing it up before me was really my desire for approval, self-approval and boss-approval, but I was not conscious of it.) I lay there thinking about Jones and the office and how cold it was and how comfortable it was in bed. I was conscious, but not self-conscious when my eye fell on the clock. Here I suddenly became self-conscious, blinked and looked myself over, "Shame on me, I'm no better than silly Jones. I know it is time to get up. A minute more and I'll be asleep. I must get up and not lie here." Thus, slowly summoning *my will*, I put my feet out on the cold floor. Did I use my will? Did I make an effort to get up? Let me testify that I *know* I did! I *forced* myself to get up!

What is this sense of effort? This will power that

we exercise and know we have exercised it because it feels tired after it has been used? When we have willed to get up, against sleepiness and the cold, and have succeeded, what has happened mentally?

On Monday when I rose without that sense of effort or willing, we see that at the moment but one desire was motivating me and with a minimum or none of self-consciousness, I was out of bed. There was no conflict of desires at the moment of action, although there was such a conflict just a moment before I began to doze.

But on Tuesday morning there was, throughout the whole process of contemplating and arising, a conflict of desires. One urge, then another, played its rôle upon my mental stage like Launcelot Gobbo's conscience and the fiend saying budge and budge not, but neither was decisively effective.

Then there came into play that complex mechanism of our human mentality, self-consciousness. Myself awakened to look objectively at this lazy man in bed and saw the whole performance, as a mother looking at a child who should be up and ready to start to school. This self-conscious self passed judgment on what it saw and said, "Shame! No better than tardy Jones! Nearly asleep again!" That sudden discovery of myself on the verge of a disapproved act (going to sleep again) released the energy of a desire (for approval). This energy was the little balance of power thrown in favor of the approved course. My feet swung out of bed to the cold floor.

It took energy to accomplish that and it had taken energy the day before when it had not seemed half so hard. But on Tuesday I was painfully aware of

this expenditure. And why? On Tuesday there had entered self-consciousness and while self-consciousness was right on my mental stage observing the actors, a new disapproval had appeared and this was the new weight which had tipped the balance in favor of rising. Self-consciousness saw and felt that weight go into the scales. That is the reason it was so markedly sensed.

If we were to resolve this mental reaction into a formula as the physicist does, it might be worked out as follows: The desire for comfort (not self-conscious) is urging toward arising. The formula is:

URGE TO RISE
is less than
URGE TO STAY

But, unfortunately, on this Tuesday morning under discussion, the desire for approval has released into my nervous system too little urge to overcome the desire for comfort. If I am to "do my duty" more urge toward the approved action must come from somewhere. (If my wife had spoken just then and disapproved me, my desire for approval would have released more urge—perhaps enough to have broken the deadlock and to have thrown the equation in favor of rising. So also, if the telephone had rung, throwing a little new urge into the equation. But the wife did not speak and the phone did not ring.) I was still "confined to my bed" by my desires, because

URGE FOR COMFORT
was greater than
URGE FOR APPROVAL

Fortunately something happened to change the balance of power. At last, during the conflict of desires self-consciousness arrived to play its part. When it saw what was happening it disapproved of me and this self-disapproval was the new force in the balance, so the equation now reads:

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{URGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS TOWARD} \\ \text{APPROVAL} \\ \text{plus} \\ \text{URGE OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS TOWARD} \\ \text{APPROVAL} \\ \text{is greater than} \\ \text{URGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS TOWARD} \\ \text{COMFORT} \end{array}$$

Thus self-consciousness caused effort to be released. And because effort expended just then, under the eye of self-consciousness, was inevitably conspicuous, it is natural that "I felt it." I knew I forced myself to get up. That sense of effort was my feeling of "willing to get up." Whatever happens in such a moment of self-observation is felt to be especially our own act as contrasted with the interplay of desires to which self-consciousness is not attending.

It is interesting to observe this difference in our attitude toward energy expended without self-consciousness and with self-consciousness.

For example, we sit at the lecture and find ourselves growing drowsy. We are comfortable, and nothing stands in the way of a good nap except our self-respect. We know others will notice it and we have often disapproved others who went to sleep under similar circumstances. Therefore we "fight

sleep." Every one has tried it and we all know it is hard work. Looked at objectively we know that such a sleeper is really not expending any great amount of nervous energy but to the sleeper it "feels" like harder work than walking or running. In terms of any unit by which energy can be measured (ergs, calories, ohms, watts) the energy output of such a sleeper would be very slight. The psychological fact we need to note here is that whatever energy he expends is at such a moment expended before the eye of self-consciousness and therefore fully appreciated. Thus a little energy output in the presence of self-consciousness receives as much or more attention than a far greater output in the normal activities of the day when we are not self-conscious.

If we are playing the piano or typewriting without self-consciousness and suddenly that factor enters, the sense of effort increases greatly. If we walk down the street swinging our arms in natural movement there is no sense of effort, but if we become self-conscious the sense of effort is often great. Spontaneous dancing seems effortless, but if some critic whose approval we desire looks at our feet, the *work* of dancing is likely to be felt.

Whatever effort is expended in that mental act we call "willing" is always self-consciously observed, and therefore keenly appreciated. This should help us to understand the comparative strength or energy of our wills in relation to the rest of our energy output. A man with rheumatism climbs the steps to high seats in the theater for the sake of seeing the entertainment he desires. His attention is on the anticipated events, the crowds, the building, and it is not on himself. But, if he were to climb one-fourth

the steps to do an unpleasant "duty" his effort would be self-conscious and would register mentally as much greater effort. If a child can wipe the dishes in a moment of anticipation of the coming of much-desired visitors, the sense of effort is as nothing compared with a moment's work done as a discipline.

In the interest of clearness, another element should be noted. We do not use our wills unless other motivation is lacking. Our willing is done only when we see that the approved interests are in danger of failing. If that which we approve is clearly being done and not in danger of neglect, we act just as freely (without sense of effort) as ever. Motivation arising in the desire for approval may be just as strong and free as any motivation arising from the desire for food, rest, or pleasure. Confusion on this point has caused much of the misconception of morality and especially of the moral values in discipline both of children and adults.

Some have thought that little could be considered moral unless it was done with this sense of effort which is characteristic of willing. Many have thought that doing that which is unpleasant to us has some special moral value, because it "strengthened the will." Others have cursed themselves for lacking "will power" because they were unable to "force themselves" to do a certain unpleasant task which some of their neighbors think they ought to do and for which the actor was inadequately motivated. Failing to see that will power lies in adequate motivation, they have tried to develop their "will" by exercise, as if it were a muscular organ. By counting upon a chain of causation which did not

exist, they have expected great results which did not follow.

Are all of our moral acts "willed"? That is, do we have to will to do everything which we do morally? Very fortunately we do not have to *will* in all our moral acts. We *will* only when the approved course of action would fail to get adequate motivation without willing. Most of the days moral activity is fully motivated by the obvious values to be gained by each act. We buy and sell, go and come, answer the telephone and make calls to others, and do hundreds of approved acts just because we "feel like doing them." As soon as we decide to do such an act, the end for which we decided to act furnishes sufficient motivation. But, if the telephone call to be made involves an unpleasant duty only and if we positively approve the doing of that duty, we become self-conscious and say, "I ought to make that call." The energy released by the desire for approval is released and without it the call would not be made. We felt the expenditure of that energy and we say, "It took will power to get that done." The intensity of the disapproval we would feel if we failed to do that duty is the measure of the strength of the will power available to move us to make the call. The power in our will-power is as great as and no greater than the energy released by the desire for approval at that time. If we fail to act then, our desire for that approval may increase or it may wane or never get our attention again. It is our self-conscious appreciation of approval-values at stake which releases the "power" in will-power.

Have we freedom of the will? Can we do whatever we want to do? Or will to do? How surely

foolish it is to answer arbitrarily either yes or no without definition of the limitations within which all our acts are confined. It is obvious that we cannot do whatever we wish to do, without regard for physical and mental conditions. I cannot will to sing like Caruso and straightway do so. If my larynx, my chest, my ears and the nasal cavities of my face are like his, I may be able by years of practice to sing as acceptably as he did. But there are many ifs, and the gambling chances are thousands to one that, no matter how hard I will, it will never come to pass. May I will to invent as much and as valuably as Thomas Edison? My age, my training, interests, mental limitations, knowledge and family obligations are as surely determining factors as my will. May I will to drive my automobile anywhere and as fast or slow as I will to go? Most assuredly no; for that car has limitations other than my will. It does not speed like a racer; it will not go over rough roads at high speeds and stay out of the ditch (as a heavier and better car might); it will not make a sharp turn at sixty miles per hour and stay right side up. Merely *willing* to drive that car is but one factor in a long chain of causation, every link of which is essential to the result I may will to accomplish.

But, having accepted these conditions or limitations, the question of freedom of the will as it relates to the man of the street is: If I plan to-day to be in Chicago next week, but to-morrow change my mind and plan to go to Buffalo, have I the freedom to do so? No one will doubt that, if this be freedom of the will, we have it, for we make such decisions daily. It is one of the common experiences of life.

For the theological theorist the problem of freedom of the will centers in his assumption that "some one not ourselves" creates our thought by fiat, that "foreordination, election, and predestination" play a determining part in our behavior. There is no value in discussing the problem with him, for the difficulty lies in his assumptions rather than in the psychological phenomena of the will.

But there is yet another approach, for the question may be put in this way: "Am I free to do that which I will to do, within the limits of my own personality?" Am I free (able) to stay my own hand from murder which I clearly disapprove, when my desire for revenge and my fear of revelations which I may bury with my victim push me to strike? Therein lies the problem of moral responsibility and justice as seen by the judge at the bar, and therein lies our problem of the "free moral agent."

The law assumes that a man knows the consequences of his own acts. Perhaps the truth would be more nearly stated if we say: The law holds a man responsible for the consequences of his own acts. Not only does the law of the courts do this, but the very laws of the universe have done this with man ever since there was a man.

If a man has climbed a tree, nature held no fireman's net under him to protect him from the consequences of his own acts. If man has gone out on the thin ice, nature has provided no sky-hooks to grasp when the ice broke. If the innocent child walked to the river's brink, nature provided neither a rail nor a guardian angel to prevent his falling to death. Ignorance of the law, whether of gravity, of ice breakage, or of the strength of the branches of

trees, or even the codes of the state has not lifted from man the responsibility for the consequences of his own acts. As we have noted before, no universe could be fitted to the moral nature of man if it were ignorance-proof or fool-proof.

But to return to the impulse of murder as described above! Is the individual responsible if his combined desires to defend his reputation, to get revenge and to destroy the accuser prove greater than his desire for self-approval which, at the critical moment described, is the last restraining factor? Let us frankly admit that this psychological force which we have found to be our will is just as weak when seen on the street and in the court as it is in psychological descriptions of it. This bit of motivation which arises out of self-conscious approval or disapproval is often a tiny weight in the scales, when, on the other side, are heaped several of our basic desires. A sudden turn of events may throw hate, fear, hunger, and love into one side of the scales of motivation, while in the other, self-conscious approval alone weighs against them. It is not surprising then that acts are committed contrary to the conscience (approval-judgment) of the actor.

But it is possible to overemphasize that side of our experience, seemingly justifying immoral acts. We must not forget that we have already seen that each desire has been built up by a succession of pleasurable experiences, in which self-approval or disapproval was forceful enough to have swung the balances. We have seen how desire-building is a moral process, and a man is responsible at forty for the desires he has built into himself, to the extent that he has approved or disapproved the ex-

periences through which these desires have been made. Our desires and our approvals are the result of a cumulative process. If a child has first taken from the family purse, then from the lockers at school, then from the gas station, then from the bank, and then, in self-defense, in a moment of fright, he has shot the officer who seeks to arrest him, the moral balance against him is undoubtedly such that the last act is an inevitable consequence of that which has gone before. But he is not thereby exonerated. Parents, teachers, society in many ways may have contributed to his delinquency, but the law of nature and society must still stand—he is responsible for the consequences of his own acts. It is possible that, at each step of the way, this robber has used every ohm of resistance which his desire for approval released, but it is entirely improbable. If sometimes an injustice is done under this assumption of individual responsibility, it is nevertheless the nearest approximation to justice that we have yet invented.

Based upon the average experience of the race, we judge that, by and large, a man can do that which is approximately moral if he uses the energy released by his desire for approval. To that, whether we like it or not, society holds us in its judgments. That energy released by self-consciousness when it touches the springs of approval may seem weak and it is weak. But it is our will and by our use of it the babe is made into the builder of the race or into a bloodsucking parasite which created nothing and lives upon the constructive energies of others.

CHAPTER XI

ARE SOME MORE MORAL THAN OTHERS? DO WE NEED MORE MORALITY OR A BETTER MORALITY?

No one will doubt that there are variations in behavior. **We may try** definitely to seek their causes and evaluate their importance.

In the last chapter we noted that, by a combination of circumstances, any one of us may find ourselves in a moral predicament in which the force of nearly all our strongest desires is combined in favor of an action which we cannot approve. A lonesome girl, far from home for the first time in her life, received a letter from her mother from which, because a page was accidentally omitted, she was led to believe that she would receive no financial or moral support from home for a long time. Seeking employment, she was asked to coöperate in a scheme which seemed to her of doubtful honesty but which offered pay she could hardly forego. Through a chain of circumstances, she found herself facing a decision in which, on the one side stood only her home training with its wholesome codes of approval and disapproval and her desire for self-approval, while on the other balance of her scale were heaped desires for companionship and friendship, for money and the security it would bring, for excitement and ad-

venture to break the drab monotony of her days and for music and beauty which she craved. We could scarcely be surprised if it took all the energy that her self-disapproval and approval could release by every turn of her imagination and reason to keep the moral scales balanced. And if they became over-balanced against the course she approved we would feel that she was more to be pitied than censured.

• Undoubtedly not a few moral shipwrecks, like some wrecks at sea, have been due to no fault of the shipbuilders or the captain on the bridge. Exceptional combinations of wind and rain, fogs and ice, or tides and currents, or perhaps nearly all of them at one time—forces beyond human control—have sent sailors to Davy Jones' locker. Men and women have broken each item of the Decalogue despite their best efforts of will to avoid the act they disapproved. And, looking at the other side of the picture, thousands have tried to steal, kill, commit adultery and bear false witness and have been thwarted by circumstances beyond their control.

We are free, but not wholly free to do what we approve or to avoid that which we disapprove. We exonerate the prisoner of war who was compelled at the point of the bayonet to give service to the enemy; and likewise the driver of the automobile which killed the child who ran from behind the parked machine to certain death.

These factors are recognized increasingly in law and in the moral codes of people. We treat the sane murderer differently from the insane—unless sometimes a weak jury loses its moral discernment in the presence of oratory and legal technicality.

Thus we may now name as the *first variable ele-*

ment which affects moral reactions, the *external forces which affect behavior*.

A *second variable* is found in our *different degrees of sensitivity to the approval or disapproval of others*. As we have already seen, if it were not for this trait of sensitiveness to approval, it is doubtful whether we would have developed moral scales at all. It is for the purpose of making adjustments to others' approvals that we get out our scales and weigh each proposed act, seeking to predetermine the approval-values (moral values) which lie in it.

Some people have such intense desire for approval that even the most trivial question must be weighed against every possible whim of approval. Some are habitually so involved in weighing minute values that if a really great moral issue comes to them, it is days before they can separate and weigh each detail which makes the whole. The parts congest their little scale-room; they are conscience-stricken and overwhelmed by the complexity of their task, as the small merchant who tried to weigh out an order of a thousand sacks upon a scale of one-sack capacity.

But others have only big scales fitted to weigh by the hundredweight and the ton. Such men are often developed in executive positions of the rough-and-ready sort. Such men handle equitably decisions involving big stakes. But one of them is utterly at a loss when he comes home at night to find that Jack has torn Jill's paper doll. Often he grows impatient and contemptuous at others' smaller problems. He is a giant at the jeweler's task, unfitted to do that work, but very useful if hitched to a task proportionate to his moral training.

And while we are speaking in figures, we may mention another type. The "man with the hoe" has no modern scales at all, but with some ancient balance, crude and inaccurate both in large and small matters, he blunders through his moral issues. Back of such weighing is the poor mental mechanism of his lowly development. In his own eyes he is as virtuous as any. He is but a prehistoric man who is unfortunate enough to be born contemporaneously with his civilized brothers. His mental tools are as out of date as the stone hatchet and the bone needle and his morality, while not bad in his time, is as primitive as his tools. He represents a low degree of sensitivity to the approval of others, due to his low mental and nervous development—his incapacity to sense distinctions which are out of his range of appreciation. We should not be surprised when one of these primitive contemporaries appears in some particularly brutal crime.

The man who is supersensitive, always weighing and worrying over each moral detail, is quite the opposite in nervous organization. He is a highstrung, energetic, complex organism. He is hypercritical of every moral move or decision, both in himself and in others. He is so busy weighing moral details that he cannot act effectively. Like Mr. Carlton, in chapter two, as described in this mood, debating, weighing, imagining others' approvals and disapprovals, he is unable to arrive at any stable decision.

While we may be critical of some phases of the conscience of the man we have described as the executive whose scales are fitted to weighing large moral problems, he does represent pretty fairly a person who is neither too sensitive or insensitive to

approvals. His moral judgments are stable, firm, practicable and broadly equitable.

These three types suggest the effects of variations in the degrees of sensitivity to approval. By discussing one more example of the lack of sensitiveness, we may not only become clearer as to its effects, but may understand the processes by which this variation is developed. Suppose that we have to deal with a youth whom we will call Harold, who has had the following history.

Harold's parents are wealthy. They have many social and business interests which keep their time and attention very fully occupied. Both are normal persons and healthy-minded, but much preoccupied by their adult interests. Throughout Harold's babyhood and boyhood, up to thirteen years, he was almost entirely in the hands of servants, tutors, and governesses. Whenever he was disciplined by one of them, he quickly made his way to his parents who accepted at its face value a story of unjust treatment, neglect, or abuse, and promptly dismissed that servant. Thus, before he was six years old, he was master of all the adults who had much to do with him. His parents he easily managed too, for he found that his mother would respond quickly if he acted sorry, and very quickly if he cried under his discipline. His father would walk away if he cried and, even if his father grew very angry and threatened dire punishments, nothing serious resulted. Thus, no disapproval ever hurt him, or caused him to reconsider his ways. If a servant scolded, he did not listen. If a tutor chided, he looked out of the window and waited for the tutor to finish his remarks. If a governess threatened with force, ac-

according to his mood, he yielded as the line of least resistance or he defied her and she yielded. Disapproval of others never touched a vital spot in his experience.

At thirteen, he was sent to a private school in which he quickly became a hero among his mates. He seemed so brave, for he did as he pleased in the face of rules and instructions. As we say in slang, "He got away with it." He was not a bad boy at heart, and often did just what his teachers wanted him to do, if it fitted his desires. The headmaster knew that such boys could be handled (we do not say, educated) by strategic yielding and tactful side-stepping. Therefore Harold's desires were recognized and he was never seriously crossed.

At eighteen, Harold went to a great State University, in which a student could do much as he wished as far as personal discipline was concerned. He was quick to learn and by selection of his courses and hours, hiring tutors when emergency suggested it, and a little study, he avoided embarrassment. At the University, as at home, many recognized his ability and saw his independence, so they followed the line of least resistance, said little soft and flattering things to keep his good humor.

Thus, he had felt the glow of others' approval, but he had never found the necessity of winning that approval by earning it. He never had to get that approval as a means to satisfying any important desires. So we may safely say that neither approval nor disapproval had been a serious factor in his experience.

At twenty-one, Harold finds himself in a serious trouble. He has taken liberties with another's prop-

erty. A child who saw him in the act may tell and thus cause him arrest and also a difficulty with "his girl." Has his experience trained him to raise the moral question and to seek only the moral way out of his dilemma? Will he search primarily for the approved (right) way out? Will he think first of what will be approved or of what will get his desire-satisfiers which he now sees slipping from him? Might he dash through a scheme to attain his satisfaction with little thought of approval or disapproval? Is a sequel, in your morning paper, a surprise to you, if it reads as follows: University youth kills child and hides body; keeps brazen front when quizzed by police; shows neither fear nor shame; considered an emotional defective; motive not known. Are we surprised when we know that to him the child appeared to be the one obstacle between him and that escape he greatly desired? Shall we say that his reactions are not true to his experience? Are not normal? Has he ever experienced a discipline which needed to be feared, or has he developed a self-disapproval which could result in "shame"? He is not brazen, but simply insensible to that which others feel under such circumstances. Others call him brazen, for they would have to be brazen to act as he does, but he is reacting normally to his experience.

An otherwise normal person may be so developed by his experience that he lacks average sensitivity to approval and disapproval. He may thus come to do things which many will say that no normal person could do. He has had a subnormal moral training, and, if the elements of morality are not recognized, he may seem **only a spoiled child**, which may be but

a soft word for a serious moral fault. If circumstances combine to throw the strain upon this weak factor in a person no different from hundreds all about him, he may be suddenly a terrible criminal. The public is surprised, his family is shocked, his relatives disown him, but none are more surprised than this man himself. A characteristic of the lack of sensitivity which lies at the foundation of moral deficiencies is that it does not sense its deficiencies. The color blind do not appreciate the colors they do not sense, nor do the morally blind appreciate the distinctions they cannot feel.

At the other extreme from Harold is the man whom we have described as supersensitive and never able to complete the weighing and reweighing of his moral data. The non-sensitive man is socially maladjusted, but so also is the supersensitive man whose elaborate morality cannot function in practical situations. The wholesome, useful moral life lies near a happy mean. The physician of morality will seek to treat correctively either of these extremes. He will seek a balanced development of the sense of moral dependence and of moral independence. In Harold's case, little sense of need of others' moral judgments had been developed. He could go against the protests of all his family-servant-teacher world. He may have been misinterpreted to seem morally independent, but he was merely morally insensible. Moral independence is seen in such as Lincoln, who feel keenly the disapproval of others, yet, in final judgment and action, rely upon their own self-approval.

This leads to the *third great variable* which affects moral behavior, namely: *Variations in our moral*

self-reliance as against our reliance on other's approval.

When at the age of fifty-five years, Sir Walter Scott found his publishers insolvent and accepted as his own the debts amounting to over seven hundred thousand dollars, his friends and admirers advised against it and offered gifts and loans. Their approval and his approval differed. He relied on his own judgment. Another would have said: they know more than I about such matters and if they do not think me responsible, it is foolish for me to shoulder the burden. He felt the responsibility and he was self-reliant in moral matters. Some men in business dare not close a deal or make a major decision without consulting many advisors. Some persons cannot act upon even small matters, such as what to wear to the theater, without consulting every one they can reach. Life for them is a succession of "Shall I or shall I not?" Others go to the far extreme. They never ask advice, for they have never learned the value of moral consultation.

Up to this point, we have seen three major variables which modify moral behavior:

(1) Difference in the forces which play upon us at times of moral decision;

(2) Differences in our sensitivity to approval or disapproval. These are reflections of the variations in our desires for approval;

(3) Differences in our moral self-reliance as contrasted with reliance on others' approval.

We need now only to name two other chief variables, for they have been sufficiently discussed, namely:

(4) *Differences in the objects of our desires—the satisfactions we crave; and*

(5) *Differences in what we approve—our moral codes.*

When we consider that a locksmith can make hundreds of different keys from but five variable factors, we may appreciate how these five variables, each divisible into several distinct shades of motivation, may result in a multitude of moral possibilities.

Are some more moral than others? A simple yes or no is an inadequate answer. All of us who have capacity for self-conscious judgment have the mechanisms of morality. But the apparent universality of this mechanism among persons of normal mentality does not insure a uniform morality. The experiences to which we have reacted have resulted in wide variations in our sensitivity, our self-reliance, our desires and our codes.

The moral problem of the race is not, Have we men who possess the mechanisms of morality? but, How and to what ends are they being used? Just as the traffic problem of our cities lies not primarily in whether autoists can drive, but how they do drive and to what purposes and with what results. Is the auto being used to give the family recreation and fresh air, pleasure and comradeship, or to rob gas stations and to kidnap children? The same machine may be used for either or both. So, also, if our mental and moral mechanisms are capable of building civilization, but are being used to rob and plunder and fleece, the fault is not necessarily in the mechanisms but in their use.

It seems quite likely that our youths are reacting

quite normally to the moral training we give them. If a child has learned that lying helps him out of many troubles with his parents, teachers, and companions, we can believe he is morally normal when he lies to his employer. If a youth has found several easy ways of getting money without working, such as teasing mother by day, and slipping it from father's pocket at night, and shooting craps, is he not morally normal when he continues the quest of money without production? If by example and comment we suggest that many are getting money by luck, clever manipulation, and shady deals, we advance his moral training in the same direction. If at home and in school we teach our children that it is better to wear "white collars" than to earn with the hands, are they not morally normal if they treat skilled mechanics as low and petty clerks as folks worth while? If we prize "dash" and "pep" as the great virtues and seldom given mental efficiency, painstaking accuracy, or hard-earned foresight honorable mention, will it be their deficiency when they accept our codes?

The question we need to ask is not, Have some people more morality than others? but, Have some folks better morality than others? The answer is emphatically, "Yes!"

What we need is not merely morality, but a better morality—*better desires* which motivate useful and productive activity: *better codes of approval*, which honor physical and mental achievement that is worth while rather than mere cleverness; *constructive methods* of dealing with those who go wrong and destroy human values; *thoughtful selection and placement of our approval and disapproval* with all

its moral effect on young and old about us; *tolerance* born of the realization of the forces that make and break men, but not indifference and laxness. We need *moral-scientists* who with patience and exactness develop for us the formulas of our moral forces, and *moral physicians* who, with technique born of mastery, can direct corrective and restorative treatment of our ills.

But how shall we get this which we need?

If we understand the laws of chemical reaction, we can do wonderful things with chemicals. We can make synthetically the silk which the worm has long made in his little workshop; and we can make (if not now, some day) the milk which the cow has been furnishing since civilization began.

If we understand the laws of moral reaction, we may be able some day, soon, if not now, to make synthetically the bandit and the honest cashier he robs. We are now producing both. What we need is to understand the process by observation and experiment. Perhaps some day a man of wealth will see that the annual loss in the United States by theft, embezzlement and kindred moral failure which now amounts to about thirty-six dollars per capita, might be greatly lessened by the expenditure of a small fraction of such wealth in men capable of moral research work in laboratories fitted to the task. And the annual loss by moral deficiencies is a thousand times greater than this criminal loss, if we compute the inefficiencies, waste, and spoilage due to moral malformation. Scientific study in electricity, chemistry, and dynamics has paid for itself untold times. Similar research in the moral field will

yield its millions and its billions in cash and happiness and in misery avoided.

Already we hear of beginnings in such research, such as those at Columbia University and at Yale, conducted usually as a side line by men otherwise charged with heavy responsibilities. Such men, because of their personal interest, are voluntarily adding research to their already overloaded schedules. Their pioneering courage and insight will some day find appreciation.

CHAPTER XII

WHAT IS INFLUENCE AND WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF ITS POWER?

Influence is not a new device for changing men's ways of thinking, acting or living. Since the dawn of human society, one man has influenced or changed the thoughts, desires, hopes and ambitions of another, so that he has lived differently, and affected in turn the habits, desires and behavior of others.

If one were to fly by aeroplane from Boston to New York in this year, would he see the same face of nature which lay under that course in the year when the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth? Man has changed the face of Mother Earth by piling the stones of New England into fences and by cutting down the trees and out of their lumber building houses and factories, and by converting rugged hill-sides into meadows. Had not man come there, the landscape would not be so to-day. Nothing unnatural has happened, but we see the face of nature as she has reacted to the acts of man. We observe what man has done and we think it is the measure of his achievements, but we should also note what nature has done. Man cut down the tree and left the stump, nature rotted the stump and the mound is nature's reaction to man's act. Man cleared away the forest

and nature in a short time spread her seeds and decomposed her mold and made a meadow. Even when man plants the seed, what a futile act it would be if nature did not react in her wonderful, typical way by the germination, absorption, extension and other phenomena we call growth! Man did something but nature also did something. Man acted, nature reacted. We misunderstand the whole phenomena of influence if we fail to appreciate both of these factors. Man's acts are what he did; nature's reactions to his acts are the measure of his influence upon nature.

On Thursday I spoke two words out in my back yard. That is what I did. The words were: Good Morning! They were my act and they were not my influence. On that morning my neighbor was in his back yard and he reacted—that was my influence. His reaction to my act is the kind of phenomena we are here studying.

On Friday morning, I said two words in my back yard. The neighbor's dog was in our flower bed. I said meanfully, "Get out!" That was my act. But my neighbor heard and he is sensitive to my disapproval of his dog. He reacted; that is my influence. My influence lies not in what I do, but in what my neighbor does as an adaptation or modification of his activity following my act.

Influence, as we have said, is not something new. It seems to have been a part of man's capacity from very primitive times. Without this factor in human history, the world would be quite different to-day. It is Man's reaction to Man. And what is it? How does it work? Why does man react at all? Under what circumstances does he and does he not react?

What seems to determine the force or strength of his reactions? What is the force which makes a peaceful man react to a sentence quietly spoken, perhaps with but a turn of the head, or perhaps with violent anger and a display of frantic energy? And how is it released from its source?

The source of man's energy we may leave to the physicist, the biologist and others to define, but of one thing we are sure, it is released only through the desires of man. A desireless man is a corpse. He is a locomotive in the round house with no steam in its boilers. Reduce desires to the vanishing point and all evidences of activity, interest or intelligence vanish also. Western religions have pictured man's ultimate hope as a heaven of complete satisfaction of every desire, while the Hindu has sought as his goal, escape from all desire. He pictures a perfect state to be sought by all, which he calls Nirvana. And what is it? It is as that night in which you slept a dreamless sleep, untroubled by any desire, a perfect, unmotivated unconsciousness. The only reason the Hindu seeks desireless Nirvana is his desire for it. It is a fatal circle. Death provides his escape to desireless inaction. The Western religion desires more satisfiers which in turn are but food upon which more desires grow. It too is a fatal circle. Death provides his escape to desireless exhaustion. Whether we seek the fountain of perpetual youth, or heaven with every wish daily satisfied, or Nirvana with no wishes at all, desire is the releaser of each energy that moves us toward our goal—or from it.

We have discussed the origin of desires in chapter six. We know that they are the biological response

of our organisms to pleasurable experience. We do not try to explain them; we merely observe that, like gravity, they exist and some of their characteristics are known to us:

- (1) Desires release energy;
- (2) Desires are born of pleasurable experience;
- (3) They release energy into the channels (sometimes called neurone patterns) favorable to the repetition of the pleasurable experiences out of which they grew;
- (4) Sources from which we have felt desire-creating pleasure are thereafter considered satisfiers and become the objects of our desires;
- (5) The presence in consciousness (actual or projected by imagination) of possible satisfiers is the condition under which desires release their energy, (that is, desires are felt or effective);
- (6) The satisfiers may be present but if unnoted or unheeded by consciousness, they are not effective or felt;
- (7) The amount of energy released by a given desire seems to be conditioned mainly by (a) our resources of energy available at the moment—health, fatigue, relaxation, etc., determine this—and (b) the intensity of the pleasurable experience anticipated from that satisfier;
- (8) We control the desire-building process in another whenever we control the pleasure-yielding experiences which come to them;
- (9) We influence the activity of another by bringing to his consciousness possible satisfiers to which he will react;
- (10) Another's reaction to the desire-satisfiers

which we have brought to his attention is the behavior we have influenced and the extent of his reaction is the measure of our influence.

Therefore, if A would influence B, he will present to B's consciousness certain desire-satisfiers. *If B then does something as his reaction to these satisfiers, that is what A has influenced him to do.*

A boy is reading the comics when his mother calls, "Dinner is on the table." Whatever behavior follows in response to the desire-satisfiers she has presented to his consciousness measures her influence upon him at that moment. If the dinner is known to him to be made up of spinach, prunes and other insignificant satisfiers of his desire, or if it is his favorite dish with many satisfiers, it will condition his reaction. If the "funny paper" contains desire-satisfiers more effectively presented to his consciousness, his behavior will be thereby conditioned. If thought of strong maternal disapproval of tardiness at meals arises in his consciousness, his desire for approval will play its part in motivating his response. But his reaction to the desire-satisfiers presented to consciousness by her call is the measure of her influence on him at the time.

A man is sitting in his doctor's office, shrinking from the surgery the doctor prescribes. Will he decide to submit to the operation without which the doctor knows his chance of life is very slight? The surgeon presents to his patient's attention satisfactions such as health, activity for himself, continued earning-power with which his family is to be supported, and also suggests the loss of self-approval if he neglects his health and finds himself eventually too weak-

ened to endure the operation or withstand the disease. The doctor appeals to another desire, when he says: "If I were you, I would not put off for another day this entering the hospital, for I consider it cowardice in any man to neglect his future health and his family's good just because he shrinks from temporary discomfort. I know you are not that kind of a man!" Thus the doctor suggests to the patient that he cannot get satisfaction for his desire for approval without going to the hospital. The doctor will disapprove him as a coward. The influence of the physician is measured by the reactions which arise out of his presentation of desire-satisfiers to the attention of his patient.

The testimony in a recent divorce case brought out the fact that the wife, in her own words, had "No influence in his life any more." The testimony revealed further that she no longer ministered to his personal comfort in any way—servants prepared his meals and cared for his personal wants. She no longer paid any attention to his business affairs or went in his social circles for she had her own which kept her very busy. For months she had not been the person who satisfied any desire of his—social, intellectual, conjugal, financial or for personal comfort. She had given up, one by one, every relationship in which she controlled a desire-satisfier, and then was surprised that she no longer influenced him. The psychological fact had not dawned upon her that *we influence those whose desire-satisfiers we control and we influence them only in so far as we control those satisfiers*. Even her approval or disapproval no longer counted with him for he had ceased to desire it any more than that of strangers. She could

no longer motivate him, although he was not bitter toward her.

We say: "They had grown apart." But the reverse process is also interesting. What happens when folks "grow together"? A characteristic of courtship is the tendency of each to try to become almost the sole satisfier of all of the other's desires. There seems to be an intuitive appreciation of the fact that, if a third party satisfies any of the wants of the courted one, that third party has influence and may become a rival. And in case the courter (whether man or woman) realizes that the courted one is independent (not dependent), there is felt a concomitant weakening of the courter's influence.

In marriage, the mutual control of the normal means of satisfaction for each other increases, and with it that sense of interdependence and mutual reliance. Perhaps they say: "Wife knows how to cook the meals just right," or, "Hubby is such a comfortable companion when I am tired and helpful when the children are sick," or, "He never knows where to find his clothes when I am gone," or, "She always knows just what to do when the children quarrel," or, "We always talk over the day's problems together." These and many other homely, mutual satisfactions lie back of the influence of mates upon each other. Probably not a few homes would disintegrate if it were not for the mutual satisfactions in the sex relations. No doubt many women stay with men whom they would otherwise desert, if they knew how to satisfy their financial requirements independently. Is there a relation between the increasing independence of women in financial matters and the increasing per cent of divorces? One man said, "I would

have left my wife years ago if I had thought I could hire a housekeeper to care well for the children." These mates held together despite a divided house on the questions of religion and of race, for each of them held important satisfiers for the other.

We have seen then the source of the power of influence. We are now ready to ask: To whom is this power available and how is it made effective?

CHAPTER XIII

INFLUENCE—WHO MAY USE IT?

Who may be the builder of morality? By whose hands shall this important tool for good or ill be used?

Since we now see that influence is conditioned upon the desires which a man has and then upon the effective presentation to his attention of possible satisfiers, we should see clearly who may be influential:

(1) Any one who can control what new pleasurable experiences come or do not come to another, for thus is determined what desires are built in him. Likewise the control of one's displeasing experience becomes a factor.

(2) Any one who can control what desire-satisfiers are effectively presented to the attention of another. But this is in turn made up of two elements: (a) control of the desire satisfiers and (b) ability to effectively present them so that they get another's attention as satisfiers. This effectiveness in presenting satisfiers is none less than that complex of qualities which make up good salesmanship, by which competing desire-satisfiers get into the background and those to be "sold" get the spotlight on the stage of consciousness.

It is not for us to discuss here that great factor of salesmanship in presenting satisfiers, for it would

lead us far afield from the mechanisms of morality. However, he who would be morally effective must master that technique. Separate treatment of this is found in many books, as those on the psychology of salesmanship, of pedagogy, of public speaking, of foremanship, of parenthood, and of many other forms of leadership. That there is a technique of presentation of satisfiers to the attention of others none will doubt who have tried to "sell," whether in the realm of goods, or art, or invention, or ideas. The satisfier may be at hand, and yet never be sold, because the presentation is ineffective. Each must study that in his own field of interests, whether he is teacher, orator, lawyer, doctor, merchant, parent, foreman, salesman, or any other person who seeks consciously to influence others.

But our purpose here is rather to point out those to whom, in society as it is, this opportunity of influence is naturally given. How well they use it must be left to them.

We have seen already how influence is natural to the relations of husband and wife, in the illustrations of the last chapter. Because each holds so many of the satisfiers for the other, and because each has surrendered freely to the other the keys of entry into the inner life, mutual influence is a basic quality of that relationship. Therefore, we name as the first class of persons to whom circumstances have given the tools of influence, the home-building mates.

And closely associated with them, often involving the same persons, is the second class: the members of a family—parents, children, and intimate relatives.

The child finds the satisfaction of all desires dependent at first upon his parents. Food, shelter, cloth-

ing, toys, approval—all are in their control. Nature or human nature or God, if you prefer, has placed the moral tools of influence in the hands of parents. At least they are there and stay there if they are used. The control of the desire-building process, which starts with the babe's first day, is the parents' whether they want it or not. What they do has influence, is effective, shapes another life inevitably. And as the child grows older, he finds greatly increased desires and possibilities of their satisfaction depend upon coöperation with his parents; for example, education, nice clothes, social funds, home parties, skates, costumes, advice in trouble, protection from undesirable persons and situations, a home base during school vacations and when out of employment. But how well the parents use these tools which the institution of parenthood has placed in their hands, depends on (1) the moral qualities to which the parents have attained, (2) the skill or tact or technique with which they use their opportunity.

And that children have an influence on parents, no one who has lived in a home can doubt, for they hold the keys to many of the satisfactions for which men and women will strive and labor and offer even health or life itself as a price not too great to exchange.

Parents can be moral architects of the first rank or the builders of houses without the necessary frames to withstand the wind, rain and chill of the varied seasons of a lifetime. Some build in their children little frail moral bric-a-brac, which, if no severe stress or strain comes to them, may endure respectably to old age. Some build fairly well but unusual

strain befalls their handicraft and moral disaster follows.

Parents, more often by act than by word, usually unconsciously, may teach their children that: evasion is easier than obedience; it will come out all right no matter what you do; law and order are not for the clever; do as you please to-day and see what happens to-morrow; a bluff is as useful as knowledge; tease and you will get it, but work and you won't; effort pays less than deception; try anything once. Such parents, and their name is Legion, should pay the taxes which support our schools for delinquents, our police who hunt them, our courts who try them, our jails which board them and briefly restrain them. How much of the billions lost by theft annually in the United States is the normal result of such home training? Not a little; perhaps most of it.

Next to the parents, the school holds control over many of the satisfiers of children. In the school the child first steps out of the shelter of home to win approval in competition with his peers. Allowances for "he's so little" and "mother's pet" are not made at school. He learns bluntly what the other fellows think of him. If he is "stingy" or "piggy" or "smarty" or "tattle-tale," they will tell him. Again, in the school the child finds work in a form seldom given to him at home—the daily, regular, inescapable task. He takes to it as the proverbial duck to water for he finds all the others are doing it. Almost before he is tired of it, he has accepted it as inevitable and necessary and he seldom revolts.

And in the third place, the school brings him that new experience, the teacher. She, too, insists on clean hands, obedience, promptness, accuracy, coöperation

—just what mother required, only a little more so perhaps. This is a great step toward universalizing his notion of what is right and wrong.

And in the fourth place, he finds that not only mother but all the teachers and all the other children's parents insist on the same general code of behavior. And back of the teacher is (undefined but a big something) the school with authority to prescribe acts. This is the pressure of society with its "thou shalt" and "thou shalt not" in the child's life. Here his sense of law and order as bigger than himself or even than his parents or even than the policeman enters his experience.

Thus, in summary we find four large factors in the school's power to shape his moral development. There he finds his happiness (desire-satisfiers) dependent on:

(1) *Adaptation to his peers;*

(2) *Achievement in his task* if he is to gain approval of his peers, his adult partners (parents, teachers and others he meets) or of himself. This is the great producer of patience, perseverance, determination, self-confidence, the will to triumph, self-restraint, etc., etc. Our task is our greatest educator;

(3) *Accomplishment in behavior*, for the same reasons;

(4) *Adaptation to institutions* if he is to avoid the many penalties and disapprovals of all his world of folks.

The above is not intended as an inventory of the moral mechanisms of the school, but merely as sufficient analysis to point out their importance in the moral training of children. The place of the teacher

in these is to see that all this moral mechanism impinges on each child according to his needs. Her influence is determined by her manipulation of these desire-satisfiers by which she induces him to strive and attain.

What is here suggested as true of the public school may suggest the possibilities in the field of moral training in higher education. And with the mates, the parents and the schools there should be named a fourth factor in moral education, namely, the job by which we earn our bread and butter.

Jobs and moral undernourishment go together no better than jobs and physical undernourishment. Note that (1) the morally underdeveloped tend to avoid regular work; (2) the morally underdeveloped prove unfitted for good production; (3) production, with its attendant disciplines, is a part in the experience and training of all of the world's moral leaders; (4) productive men and women are seldom found among the morally deficient.

Fundamentally, this is but another way of saying that the same formula underlies the building of our business morality as that which we found in nature's process of moral stimulation. Nature seemed to say to man, "You may have better shelter, if you will gather thatch and weave it (produce it); you may have foods the year around in abundance, if you will plant, cultivate, harvest and store them (produce them). And to do these things, one by one, as he saw in them a way to get the fuller satisfaction he craved, man learned by patience and persistence the arts and crafts and trades by which increasing production of his desire-satisfiers was possible. Moral growth and productive labor are so fundamentally associated

that one may see in them the moral law of nature: Work for it by moral achievement and it shall be yours. Those who will not work, may eat, but limitedly; may rest, but on a hard bed; may be clothed, but in tattered garments.

The fact that our task is a mighty factor in our moral development can scarcely be overstated, and yet it is seldom mentioned as important in moral training. Nature has given us but incomplete satisfiers. We must work over from its raw state everything nature gives us, and that is the meaning of cooking, weaving, sorting, smelting, mining, mixing, assembling, manufacturing, and all our labor upon raw materials.

Because, in modern civilization, we are so interdependent, all who produce must do so for some one else. We all work for somebody to whose wishes and will we must adapt ourselves. They are our employers, whether we call them so or not. What they are shapes and determines our daily task and in turn shapes us. Without a task, what would we be in one generation, and without specific, clear-cut tasks, which require intelligence, application, patience, persistence, enthusiasm, foresight, courage and caution, what would we be at all? To fail in them means poverty, shame, and a multitude of unsatisfied wants. But, thus motivated, we do not fail. Our task and our employers have influenced us. We have responded to them and our reaction is the measure of their influence.

And a fifth person of influence, we may name, is ourselves, our self-conscious critics of ourselves. Because we hold the great desire-satisfier by which all our moral energy is released, our self-approval, it be-

hooves us to guard it as a precious human birthright. He who plays with his self-respect, who tries to convince himself that a little is good enough, is belittling his own influence with himself. If he wishes to build up that desire for self-approval, it will be done by winning his own approval by meritorious action. His pleasurable experience with his self-approval will increase his desire for it and thereby his moral energy will also increase.

And to the five already mentioned, our mates, the home, the school, the job or employer, and ourselves, we may add a sixth major factor in moral education, namely the publicist. We tend to accept as true that which our associates say they have found to be true, although we have never experienced it for ourselves.

He who reports to us what our associates found true is a great builder of our moral codes which reach beyond our personal experience. Is the world round? What proportion of those who believe it could prove it? Is Bolshevism a great blessing or a terrible curse? What have you heard from those associates whom you trust? Was the great World War fought for human liberty or human greed? Maybe it was for both, but your position on this moral matter will reflect what you have heard from the associates you trust, whether your friend or the soap-box orator or the great public speaker or your favorite magazine.

Those who tell us what others say is true must accept the moral responsibility for the moral effect of their telling. Such is the influence of the publicist, whether he works through word of mouth or words in columns and pages, whether he be writer, cartoonist, preacher, advertiser, or gossip monger.

These six great moral forces (and there are others),

are already at work for good or ill, for peace or war, training us humans either to *make* or *take* what we want. These are six great centers of influence, six classes of persons into whose hands have come the priceless tool by which lives are shaped. They have influence. How do they use it? How can they use it? What can they accomplish by using it?

CHAPTER XIV

WHAT MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE USE OF INFLUENCE?

Long before man became "homo sapiens"; far back of the adaptations of mammals to mammals; so far back that it is useless to guess just when it was, creatures began adapting their behavior to the acts of other creatures. The lion growled and his enemy turned and fled. He acted and his enemy reacted. It is a rudimentary form of influence, limited by the capacities of the creatures involved. Adaptation to environment means modified action to fit environment. This is the basis and possibility of influence. That which lacks this capacity for adaptation cannot be influenced. Human influence is man's reaction to man.

And now we ask: What can be accomplished by the use of influence? Let us first ask: what has been accomplished? We might answer, "Everything," and be not far from the truth. If a man could have lived alone a million years without other men to whom he could react, it is doubtful whether he would have made appreciable progress. He might have donned the pelt of an animal to keep himself warm, but what we call clothing is an adaptation of man to man. He might have used a club, but the lever and the ball bat are adaptations involving coöperation with

other men. Human progress is, like the coral reef, the cumulative achievement of a coöperative group, shaped and modified by the tides and currents of their environment.

At six o'clock in the morning, see the passengers on a street car. Surely there must be some motive, some definite force which has brought them each from their beds so early. Here is an elderly man with a dinner pail, there a slender girl with earnest face, and here a robust youth of twenty years, and there a sallow-faced woman who surely might have profited by another hour of rest. Why is each of these on that car? In the motives of each one, we may gamble, there is another person. The old man with the dinner pail is returning from a watchman's job at a factory, to greet a little woman who has shared for fifty years the bitter and the sweet—all that he does is shaped and colored by his relations with her. And so it is with the others on that car—homes, friends, mates, babies (past, present, or future), employers, employees, business associates, are shaping their behavior. What they are, what they are becoming, where they are going, as well as what they are not doing is shaped by the influence of these other persons. What has been accomplished by influence? Civilization with all it holds of good or ill is the structure man has built in reaction to his fellow man.

The babe cries to be picked up because it got results that way yesterday. The child begs for pennies because a desire has been built up by satisfactions discovered in the past. The boy washes his face because he has found it the only way that he can get along even tolerably with his home-mates. The boy washes the auto because it is made a condition for

satisfactions he wants. He studies his high-school lessons to please his teacher or keep face with his companions or get entrance requirements for college. The bandit plays his game for thrills, money, a girl, the gang, or some other reaction to mankind—all as the result of influence.

Whether our sons shall desire social achievement or athletic laurels or scientific research need not be entirely the result of chance. Whether our daughters care more for beauty of clothes or of character is not in the hands of the "Three Sisters of Fate" half so surely as it is in the hands of three others, by name, mother, teacher, and girl friend. Whether our sons and daughters will care more for the cheers of the crowd than for a clear conscience is determined by their experiences with folks. What desires are we building into them by the experiences we provide for them? What moral attainments are we making prerequisite for the satisfactions we control? Which of their acts are we rewarding with abundant or scanty approval? How judicially are we placing our disapprovals?

And how are we assisting them to select the companions who shall influence them? If we see that it "happens" that the pleasures are numerous and very satisfying when they are with the "right" sort of companions, the desire for these and similar companions will naturally arise. Observe how we use this law of human nature (usually unconsciously), when we entertain those whose friendship we wish to hold. For them we bring out not only our best dishes and manners, but our best music and stories. When the undesirables call, why do we forget to pass the candy and find it hard to think of anything interesting to

do? As the old saying is: "We may not be able to choose our relatives, but we can choose our friends"—and those of our children if we find need of it.

Are we selecting their experiences which shall shape their interests and their recreations? Do they fit their particular minds and bodies? When we see their tantrums, or deceits or falsehoods, or tattlings are we as interested in them as in the evening paper and the radio. How are we shaping our accounts at the table, when we tell of encounters with the bill collector, the careless driver, the sick employee, or the visitor we did not wish to see? What our children will approve is influenced more by what they see us approve or disapprove than by our preachments as to what they ought to approve.

If you would make an executive of your boy, what moral qualities must you see that he develops? (We are not discussing here his fitness in health, or intelligence, etc.) What does the executive who is to manage a business or large department need to be morally? Two traits will illustrate: (1) he must not vacillate in his policies or instructions. Instead he must decide clearly and insist upon the execution of his decisions. He will make mistakes and they will cost him and others heavily, but he will also make good decisions which will be of great value; and (2) he must be ready to face the results of his decisions. If they are good, he will be satisfied and if they are bad he will quickly recognize it and make frank adjustments. He is not an executive if he gives orders, then awaits with trembling to see whether they work out well. In summary of these two qualities it can be briefly stated: he needs decisiveness without fear.

And how may this characteristic of executives be developed? Will it be by checking and rechecking each of his decisions before we let them go into action? Shall we ask him in each youthful endeavor: "Now son, are you sure you are right? Let me see and decide for you! Consult me before you ever do anything important!" Consider the effect of such a policy consistently applied in each of his little and big endeavors.

Or shall we rejoice when we see that boy starting something on his own initiative and say to ourselves: Maybe he will make a mistake, but if he does break his wagon, he will learn what heavy loads it will carry. It is said that one executive used to say to his responsible heads when they made a costly mistake: "That was pretty expensive, John, but that means we expect you soon to make a very valuable decision which will save the company many times that amount." He developed many executives because he built into them those qualities of decisiveness without fear. (If he found his man was in need of the caution which arises out of the bitterness of errors made in haste, we do not doubt that his answer was different.)

And what will happen to your daughter if from babyhood she has been told: "Be careful! Don't try that, for you are not strong enough to do much! Let big brother decide that for you and get some one to help you!" If, on the other hand, you praise her for each little domestic task she does and give her pleasure in keeping things clean, even though the work be useless, will it have no effect? If you wish a domesticated, hot-house plant, it can be developed by the moral temperatures and protection you place about

it. Clinging vine daughters can be produced if the nursery is provided.

Among the Turks until recently practically all approved the harem. Among the Chinese until recent years, they approved foot-binding for women and long queues for men. Among Americans we used to approve only long skirts and long hair for women. In these three widely separated countries the same methods were used to establish and maintain these customs. Any persons who ventured to do otherwise were criticized and openly disapproved. Only those who practiced the approved styles were given approval. Nor was this concerted action in these remote countries the result of any conscious plan. They used the same methods because it is the one way of moral reaction for human beings.

Among the American Indians certain respected leaders disapproved as unmanly any shedding of tears or show of grief. By the same law of moral reaction there has arisen a race who look upon tears as bad and expressions of grief as unmanly. Such is the law of influence the world around.

The character of our children and our friends is like a dike which stands against the invasion of the waters. When a weak spot appears, we may throw in the weight of our approval (or disapproval as the case may be) like extra bags of sand to strengthen the weak spot. It is the beauty of friendship that when bereavement or reverses come, some one, whose strength has not been impaired by our disaster, comes to our side. By what they do, they invoke a reaction in us. Thus they influence us. We say: "They gave us strength."

But still we are puzzled—what shall we try to do

with our influence? If we could do as we wish, still we would not know what to do, for we do not know what kind of children we want ours to be. We hesitate to shape their desires, lest we give them the wrong ones. And well we may, for obviously we know too little to warrant drastic changes. But the great virtues of mankind, on which all achievement has been founded, we may seek to build in those for whom we feel responsibility. We know that every life on which the race has placed an abiding stamp of approval has had a definite blending of the great virtues, such as persistence, patience, tolerance, ambition, initiative, decisiveness, friendliness, fearlessness, caution and many others. Out of such qualities is moral character built, just as all beauty is made of the blends found in one rainbow. The light of human goodness, like the sunlight passing through the prism, breaks up into the virtues with their shades and tints. All pictures are painted from the colors in the light spectrum; so also the beauties of character are found in the virtue-spectrum. But the beauty depends upon the colors chosen and their arrangement. No one picture contains them all and in no two is the arrangement or blending the same.

And so it is in the character of people. The virtues in the beautiful child are not those we note in the good policeman, nor are those of the good bride the same that we find in the good mother who has reared to maturity her family. Virtues are for use and their value is determined by the function they serve. The virtues of the poet are not identical with those of the doctor, nor those of the preacher with those of the manufacturer. There is no universal face which represents every type of loveliness of feature and form,

nor is there one universal character which represents all human virtues.

Each virtue carried to an excess becomes a vice and each vice has its virtuous side. Caution in excess is a vice and so is courage unblended with caution. Foresight may deteriorate into unlimited speculation which prevents useful action. Quickness of action without a blending with foresight spells disaster. A surgeon has qualities which may spoil him for aviation.

If we have learned the laws by which character is shaped, we still are uncertain to what ends we should work. No one will be so bold as to say that we should consciously form each element of another's character if we could. Even if we so desired, the elements are far too complex for our present knowledge. The physician performs a valuable service for the child without undertaking to weigh out each ounce of food with all its chemical and vital elements, and to direct each movement by which the muscles get exercise and to assign each task by which our nervous system builds up its coördinations. He trusts much to the probabilities of average human experience to build a normal body and mind. Where he finds need of regulative diet, or constructive exercise, or corrective activity for the patient, he assigns it.

So, too, the physician of morals must take for granted much of the normal experience of his patients. But as he sees here and there need of regulative, constructive, or corrective guidance, he must have the adequate technique of his profession to do well that task. No one will suggest that his task is easy or lacking in complexity. Moreover it is the most recent of the professional ventures, scarcely yet

having a good name and certainly no professional standing. However, thousands of parents, teachers, doctors, professors, and laymen are experimenting with more or less success. And we must not forget that back of each respected field of knowledge there lie humble beginnings such as these.

If what is written here shall in any way assist another in his quest for knowledge of the laws of moral reactions, it shall have accomplished more than its purpose. In a sense, that which is here set down is aimless, for it has sprung out of no intention to write a book, but merely an effort to answer with some thoroughness the questions with which we began. Pestered by the mental disease we may call "inquiryitis," itching from an incurable curiosity as to the causes of moral action, driven by a tyrannical conscience which steadfastly refused to drink the hemlock or breathe the anesthetic, we have asked and queried and finally sought to put down in order what we have seemed to find.

CHAPTER XV

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES—AN ATTEMPT TO STATE DEFINITELY SOME OF THE NATURAL LAWS OF MORALITY

Recognizing that we are dealing with a field of data as complex and baffling as any among the "exact" sciences, and far less thoroughly studied and analyzed, we may venture to state as working hypotheses some of the main elements we have observed in the moral reactions of men. Knowing that no statement of a natural law is final, for each new truth we observe is a modification, we nevertheless must not forget that we make progress only by stating as precisely as possible that which now seems to us to be true. Therefore, as a summary, interesting primarily to those who seek the philosophy of morality, let us try to state the underlying principles as we now see them. We shall number them merely for convenience in referring to them.

1. Our morality is one of our adaptations to our environment.

2. The Universe seems to be so set up or ordered that, if we would make fuller or more detailed adaptation than the animals, we must develop and use moral reactions.

3. Our desires are a biological response to our pleasurable experience.

4. Variations in pleasurable experience result in variations in (a) the objects of our desires, (b) the strength or intensity of our desires, and (c) the associations which stimulate or arouse our desires.

5. Among other desires, experience seems to have created in all of us a desire to be approved by others and by ourselves. Variations in experience modify this desire also, as noted in four above.

6. In every act to which we apply the term moral, this desire for approval seems always to have a part. In other acts it seems never to have a part. Therefore it seems to be a distinguishing factor in morality.

7. The acts we consider non-moral are those in the contemplation and execution of which no question of approval or disapproval appears in consciousness.

8. Acts which spring out of a consciousness in which a question of approval or disapproval is being weighed are never termed non-moral. To these acts we uniformly attach moral responsibility.

9. Moral consciousness seems to be any mental state in which a question of approval or disapproval is being weighed or judged.

10. We designate as bad or wrong those acts which we disapprove. And we designate persons as good or bad in direct ratio to the intensity of our approval or disapproval of them.

11. We consider ourselves to be doing wrong whenever we act contrary to our own approval. This is immoral action.

12. We judge that to be right by which we attain self-approval.

13. We review the mental process by which we attain self-approval and avoid others' disapproval, sometimes with leisure to modify and restate many

steps of it, and sometimes with haste which prevents critical revamping. This amended process of attaining self-approval is what we give the world as "our reasons" for our decisions.

14. We defend the "truth" because its defeat means the loss of our self-approval. We fight to protect that valued possession.

15. A moral question is settled whenever and as long as we attain and maintain an unquestioning self-approval of our position.

16. Our conscience is synonymous with our approval and disapproval judgments, or we may say, our conscience is our judgments of approval and disapproval.

17. Because of our tendency to separate ourselves from that which we disapprove, so that we have little or no further experience with it, our disapproval codes tend to become fixed. Whoever becomes a moral recluse or "separatist" tends to develop disproportionately his codes of disapproved acts.

18. We seek to attain self-approval by several methods, such as (a) getting the disapprover out of the way, (b) getting ourselves away from the disapprover, (c) discounting the disapprover, and (d) prejudging our acts so that we do as nearly as possible only that which we approve.

19. All methods of attaining self-approval seem temporary and deficient except the latter, which is essentially fact-facing. However the other methods are very commonly used and often appear to be entirely satisfactory to their users. Moral efficiency seems, however, to discard them as devices of primitive morality.

20. Just as our biological efficiency is measured by

our adaptation or lack of adaptation to our environment, so also is our moral efficiency measured. Just as the fact-facing, fact-studying, fact-interpreting processes of science have made possible important new adaptations in our non-personal environment, so similar fact-facing processes in the moral field may be expected to make possible important new adaptations there. Our crimes against life, property, and the pursuit of happiness call clearly for new moral adaptations fitting us to our modern environment.

21. We do not freely overrun or ignore moral distinctions because of the force of our desire for approval. Through it is released all the energy of moral action. Our morality is no stronger or weaker than our desire for approval.

22. As individuals and as a race we have had abundant experience (pleasurable and otherwise) to make this desire powerful. Presence of this desire for approval has not only survival value but great value as a means of increasing our satisfactions.

23. Our morality is natural. It is our reaction to the natural order. Our virtues have been developed as successive adaptations to non-human and to human nature.

24. Nature has yielded to us increasing satisfactions only after and as the result of our increasing moral achievement.

25. We have become moral in the quest of satisfactions which we could obtain only by becoming moral. Morality has paid us, but often in approval-satisfactions rather than economic goods.

26. Moral values, like all other values, arise out of satisfactions to our desires. We credit moral value

to any object, act or memory which yields satisfaction to our desire for approval.

27. We are moral in just the ways we are—that is, we approve in thought and act just what we do approve—because thus we conserve or believe we conserve for ourselves the greatest values (satisfactions).

28. Individual experience runs far outside the lines of racial averages and individuals therefore approve and disapprove many acts contrary to the common judgment.

29. The fact that an individual approves an act which is commonly disapproved is not evidence of moral perversity. He may be reacting normally and morally to his experience.

30. The moral educator may so guide the experience of those he would train that useful and constructive behavior brings them abundant satisfactions, while destructive acts yield but little satisfaction.

31. The phenomenon of “willing” or “using our will power” is always associated (a) with a conflict of desires, (b) with evidences of self-consciousness, and (c) with a feeling of effort. We say, “*I forced myself to do it against my desires.*” Whenever any one of these elements is lacking, we do not “will” to do. We often act conscientiously (approving our act), without the sense of effort; but we never have the sense of moral effort without approving or disapproving our act or without a conflict of desires.

32. The fact that self-consciousness is a part of each occasion of willing makes the expenditure of effort register plainly in self-consciousness, while effort expended during the absence of self-consciousness does not so register.

33. Before we begin to will, two desires are urging us in contrary courses. We may be keenly conscious but are usually not self-conscious at that point. As soon as a question of approval is raised we become self-conscious. Then self-consciousness, like a spectator, observes the conflict. If the course approved by us is adequately motivated, so that the other act is inhibited, we have no sense of effort. We merely say, "I am doing rightly."

34. But, if we become self-conscious of our conflicting desires and have approved one course of action, and if then the approved course is inadequately motivated, so that it is in danger of defeat, we "will" (we make effort in favor of the approved course). We say, "I tried to do right."

35. Consciousness of the immanence of defeat to our approval releases the energy of that desire (for approval), thus increasing the motivation toward the approved course. Self-conscious recognition of this energy released constitutes our "sense of effort" in willing. This additional motivation may or may not carry the day in favor of the action we approve.

36. The "power" in "will-power" is the energy released by our desire for approval when we become self-conscious of the immanence of the loss of approval satisfactions.

37. We influence another to will to do a mutually approved act, if we bring effectively to his attention the immanence of his loss of approval values which would be involved in not acting thus.

38. Should we ever scold, reprimand, or otherwise disapprove another person? There is force in A's expressed disapproval as long as by it B's self-approval is decreasing and thus the force of his desire for ap-

proval increasing. The force of B's desire for approval is the measure of his motivation toward the approved action. If, at the height of B's motivation, A can direct him to some means of attaining approval, all that energy may be brought to bear on the act in question. It is important that A assist B back to self-approval, else B may be motivated only to fight for his self-approval instead of being motivated to do the approved act. Disapproval without opening the pathway to regaining self-approval seems only to motivate defense.

39. Have we freedom of the will? By self-conscious activity we may at any time throw into the scales of our motivation the force of our approval or disapproval. This does not guarantee the success of the action we approve, but we are responsible for the use of this force to its full value only. Small as this force may seem, to it we must credit the moral triumphs of civilization. Our freedom is within the conditions or limitations of our physical and mental nature. It is never beyond or outside these limitations.

40. Variations in moral reactions arise out of variations in the moral factors in individuals, the chief of which are: (a) differences in the forces which play upon us; (b) differences in our sensitivity to the approval or disapproval of others; lack of sensitivity causes moral obtuseness while oversensitivity causes moral pettiness and inefficiencies; (c) differences in the extent to which we rely upon our self-approval or upon other's approval; (d) differences in what we desire—variations in the objects to which our desires draw us; (e) differences in what we approve—our moral codes.

41. Each of the above variables in moral action is

subject to modification by the moral educator, parent or friend. A definite technique is implied in the foregoing chapters.

42. Desires release our energy and upon them we must depend for all moral motivation.

43. Desires are born of pleasurable experience. They release their energy into the channels (sometimes called neurone patterns) favorable to the repetition of the pleasurable experiences out of which they grew.

44. Sources from which we have felt desire-creating pleasure are therefore considered satisfiers and they become the objects of our desires.

45. The presence in consciousness (actual or projected by imagination) of possible satisfiers is the condition under which desires release their energy (that is, desires are then felt or effective).

46. The satisfiers may be present, but if not noted or heeded by consciousness, they are not effective.

47. The amount of energy released by a given desire seems to be conditioned mainly by (a) our resources of energy available at the moment (affected by fatigue, relaxation, health, etc.), and (b) the intensity of the pleasurable experience anticipated from that satisfier.

48. We control the desire-building process in another whenever we control the pleasure-yielding experiences which come to them.

49. We influence another's action when we bring to his consciousness possible satisfiers to which he reacts.

50. Another's reaction to the desire-satisfiers which we have presented to his attention is the behavior we

have influenced and the extent of his reaction is the measure of our influence.

51. Human influence is man's reaction to man, or, we may say, it is our adaptation to the human elements in our environment.

52. But man's adaptation to other men is subject to orderly causes arising out of his desires. Therefore influence may be directed and effectively planned in so far as the factors are fully known. Acts can be planned so that known forces arising out of them can be counted upon to produce known results.

53. Since influence is in the hands of any and all who control the desire-satisfiers of others, they must accept moral responsibility for the way in which they dispense them. Every desire-satisfier which we may yield to another is a moral force for which we are responsible.

54. Since we tend to accept as true that which our associates say they have found to be true, although we have never experienced it for ourselves, those whom we trust influence us to build up our codes of approval or disapproval beyond the reach of our experience.

55. The control of the dispensing of desire-satisfiers lies especially in the hands of (a) mates, (b) parents, (c) schools and those who administer them, (d) employers, (e) publicists, and (f) ourselves, for we must most of all gain our self-approval. Upon these lies especially the responsibility for the moral development of society.

56. The value of a virtue is determined by the function it serves. The moral qualities of an individual are valuable to him only as they are a means of successful adaptation to his fellow men.

57. No single blend of human virtues is equally valuable in all environments.

58. The task of the moral educator for the present must be similar to the work of the physician, (a) in diagnosis of unhealthful morality, and (b) in prescribing regulative, constructive, and corrective treatments.

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