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THE FAMILY

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THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN MARRIAGE

Translated by I. C. WIGGLESWORTH

"This study of sex relations from primitive times to the present day embodies considerable learning, so arranged and presented as to throw light on contemporary problems. It is obviously of great importance."—*Times Literary Supplement.*

THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Translated by E. COOTE LAKE and H. A. LAKE, B.Sc.

Introduction by PROFESSORS L. T. HOBHOUSE and E. J. URWICK

Second Impression

"A monument of human patience and erudition . . . certainly the result of such labour is to prove beyond contradiction that man's most fascinating study is the study of himself."—*Education.*

THE FAMILY

by

DR. MÜLLER-LYER

TRANSLATED BY

F. W. STELLA BROWNE

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TO MY DEAR FRIEND

Dr. HEINRICH BOHLEN

I DEDICATE THIS WORK

PREFATORY NOTE

THE position of this book in the series "Stages of Human Evolution" will be clear to those who examine the "General Plan and Sequence of Volumes" at the end of this book. They will observe that Books III to IX of my Sociology form a closely related group, dealing with the sociology of reproduction or generation, which we term *Geneonomy*. The third volume introduces the subject, and reference to it will make this fourth volume more easily comprehensible. Nevertheless I trust that *The Family* is also complete and coherent in itself, and that I have not failed in my promise to make each volume an independent unit.

F. MÜLLER-LYER

MUNICH, 1911

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THE FAMILY

CHAPTER I

SURVEY OF THE GENERAL SEQUENCE OF GENEONOMIC PHASES

If Sociology is not to be a mere hobby or game it must investigate the Past of the human social organism in order to understand the present and to illuminate the future; for all genuine science admits the validity of Comte's axiom: "Know in order to foresee, foresee in order to forewarn."

A method of research which seems to me appropriate for this purpose is the "phaseological method". I have explained this method in detail in the previous books of this series.[1] To recapitulate briefly: this method divides the history of human culture and civilization into periods or *phases*. On comparing these distinct phases one with another, the investigator perceives *lines of evolution*, i.e. trends which persist throughout each phase, and which reveal to us the direction of culture and progress. And from the study of these *lines of direction* we may deduce the *laws of human evolution* or *social development*.

The scientific aim and purpose of my "Phases of Culture" is the introduction and adaptation of this great "phaseological method"—known and proved in biological sciences—into the domain of Sociology. It is, of course, far beyond any individual capacity to apply the scheme in detail to all the manifestations of culture. But when an adequate group of capable and enthusiastic workers have mastered this Hammer of Thor, then, indeed, "to think in lines of evolution" will become as important sociologically as the theory of heredity has become biologically. More—this type of mental approach will become one of the most valuable ingredients of social consciousness and a test-quality of the truly "civilized person".[2] For the line of direction, the "evolutionary trend" is the clue

[1] See *Stages of Social Development*, *passim*, and *Sinn des Lebens*, p. 142 *et seq.*

[2] Cf. *History of Social Development*, pp. 304–15.

that leads us out of the jungle-growths of historical material into the light of sociological science, and enables us to plan and make the road into the future.

Hitherto, we must admit, the phaseological method has been little understood, although its main idea is so clear and simple. It has even been misinterpreted in the sense of assuming that the division of history into *phases* was its chief characteristic. I would therefore emphasize once more that the division is only means to an end (just as the specimen in bacteriology is taken in order to make a "culture"!). The precise advantage of this method is not, of course, the division of human history into sections (this has long been practised), but the *discovery and emphasis of the lines of direction in evolution.* Therefore this method might just as well be called "the method of direction or of evolutionary trend". Division of history into sections or phases, without any coherent trend or line of direction, may be of use to the political historian: an example of such a division is the commonplace "Antiquity, Middle Ages, and Modern Times". But sociologically such a classification is a dead thing, meaningless and useless.[1] For where *Narrative History* ceases and knows no more what to tell us, there the territory of Sociology begins.

In this book and the next of the series the phaseological method will be applied to the rich and various material we term *Geneonomy.* Under the term Geneonomy[2] *we group the sum of all those sociological manifestations which directly or indirectly concern human reproduction and the problems of generation,* just as economics treats of the sum of human and social manifestations concerned with material possessions and production. Geneonomy includes, therefore, the sociology of love, marriage,[3] the ceremonial attending marriage, whether barter, capture, or consent, separation or divorce, the social position of women, the structure of the family, education, inheritance, sexual selection, the position accorded to old age,

[1] Cf. *Sinn des Lebens*, chap. xxvi. [2] See *op. cit.*, pp. 144 and 306–09.
[3] See *Evolution of Modern Marriage*, pp. 9–11.

the concept of relationship, the tribe and all special prohibitions or sanctions concerning marriage, etc.[1] We shall now attempt to trace the evolution of all these manifestations from the earliest times to our own day, and to sketch their most significant phases. Let us begin by taking the widest possible view of the mighty stream of human evolution, without allowing our attention to be confused or distracted by details.

From this bird's-eye view of Time we observe that the course of geneonomic development falls into three main epochs, namely:

I. The Tribal Age. (Otherwise the Kinship Age.)
II. The Familial Age.
III. The Personal Age.

And these may be differentiated as follows:

I. The Tribal Age

I. In the Tribal Age human society is based upon the idea of common descent, of blood relationship. The most important geneonomic manifestation of the Tribal Age is the *Clan* or *Sept*.

II. In the Familial Age the Sept, formerly the basis of the Community, disintegrates, and is succeeded by the State, and especially by the Family, which then attains its zenith.

III. In the Personal or Social-Individualistic Age, whose dawn we have just begun to know, the Family follows the Clan into a certain obsolescence. As its successors there emerge the community, organized on an ever more extensive and elaborate scale, and the highly developed human unit or personality.

This division into phases must not be understood to imply that only one type of organization existed in each successive epoch! On the contrary, the Family, the Clan, and the Personality or Individual in the Community have, of course,

[1] *Op. cit.*, chap. ii.

existed in each of these three Ages. But in the first Age the Tribal Principle was dominant, in the second the Familial, and in the third the Personal will be. (Hegemony, therefore, successively of Sept, Family, Personality.)

These three main epochs fall into various phases.

The Tribal Age has four recognizable phases.

(1) The earliest and most primitive "Dawn of Man", in which speech and tools were first discovered or invented, and which lasted till the discovery of fire.[1] In this remote, mysterious Age, which has no living representative among human races to-day, it is probable that geneonomic manifestations were wholly animal in character.

(2) In the Early Tribal phase, represented to-day by the most primitive peoples we know of, the Clan is already developed to a certain degree of complexity.

(3) In the Full Tribal phase, on the lowest rung of the ladder of social stability—namely, *Agriculture*, the Clan reaches its zenith of power.

(4) In the Late Tribal phase the Clan disintegrates, the bonds of kindred slacken, disappear, and the community passes through an immense change which leads into the *Age of the Family*. (Familial epoch.)

II. The Familial Age

In the course of this transformation the clan dissolves into its constituent households or families; the families assume the economic functions of the clan, and its political functions are taken over by the community organized as a *State*, which appears for the first time in history, and assumes ever new powers and forms.

(5) The Early Familial phase is the true time of transition, and shows hybrid institutions, half civic and half tribal.

(6) In the Full Familial phase, at the beginning of civiliza-
on (in its exact sense), the family attains its greatest power,

[1] See *History of Social Development*, pp. 56–57.

synchronizing with the zenith of aristocracy and the State as an instrument of war.

(7) In the Late Familial phase, which coincides with the development of capitalist organization, the family begins to disintegrate, the community is elaborately organized, politically and materially, and captures one key position after the other.

III. The Personal Age

This process of geneonomic development continues steadily. The former *Warrior State*, based on an original relationship of lords and exploited serfs, transforms itself into a *Labour State*. Geneonomic considerations yield more and more to social, and the trend appears to be towards a remote goal where tribe and family will have handed over all but the narrowest geneonomic functions to the flexible and powerful community. Of this Age we know only the first, i.e.

(8) *Early Personal phase*, which is characterized by the differentiation of women's work.[1]

Thus the general sequence of geneonomic development does not present an utter chaos, as has hitherto seemed to be the case, but a coherent and clearly marked trend, carrying majestically all human manifestations from the Natural to the Cultural, from the Organic to the Intellectual, from the Geneonomic to the Social, and from the Tribal to the Personal.

In this wonderful process we may trace a clear direction of evolution—a geneonomic trend which is, as will be evident at the conclusion of our inquiry, only the special geneonomic aspect of the law of cultural development.

There are two ways of proving this law of geneonomic trend. We can either trace every geneonomic manifestation (love, marriage, position of women, structure of the family,

[1] Dr. Müller-Lyer has elsewhere divided human history into these four stages: I. Savagery: Natural Sources of Food. II. Barbarism: Artificial Sources of Food. III. Civilization: Differentiation of Men's Work. IV. Socialization: Differentiation of Women's Work. (Translator's Note.)

etc.) *separately* or we can broadly outline their general evolution. In this latter case we have the advantage of preserving continuity, but we lose grip of the various threads of our texture, of the changes in each special aspect. In the first case the advantages and disadvantages are precisely the reverse.[1]

Having regard to the novelty of my standpoint in sociology, and the strong resistance it must necessarily provoke and encounter, thus necessitating immense and overwhelming evidential material; having regard also to the extreme importance of my subject, I have decided to take both lines of argument. In the present book I propose to outline the general course of geneonomic development, dealing consecutively with its most important manifestations, and in the succeeding volumes (*History of Marriage* and *The Conquest of the Fates*) the synthesis will be analysed into its components, and the "phaseological method" tested on each subdivision of its territory.

In this book, therefore, we attempt to trace the entire sequence of geneonomic development, from the dawn of humanity to our own times, throughout all phases of culture.

[1] Cf. what is said on horizontal and perpendicular subdivisions and historical sections, pp. 62, 63, in *History of Social Development*.

CHAPTER II

PREHISTORY: THE EARLIEST TIMES[1]

> The forces operative in Society are incontestably psychological in origin.
> —HERBART

THE CONCEPT OF PREHISTORY

THIS term is very often wrongly used, even in scientific works; it is applied more as a poetical or literary phrase than with strict accuracy, e.g. "in the grey mists of the most ancient times". In popular language, prehistory generally means the Diluvial or Glacial Ages. But the men of the Ice Age, who were on the same level culturally *as certain primitive hunting tribes of to-day*, had long passed the prehistoric stage; they were greatly superior in knowledge and powers to the really prehistoric men, and they had discovered the use of fire, with which momentous innovation, as we have elsewhere pointed out, the *prehistoric* stage[2] came to an end. Certain historians are still more liberal with the phrase "prehistory"; they use it to cover almost everything on the other side of *recorded history*! And even specialists in prehistory sometimes fall victims to this picturesque exaggeration, although they, above all men, should fully realize that *both Neolithic and Palaeolithic stages of development were subsequent to prehistory, just as the Modern Machine Age has succeeded the Middle Ages, and Industrial Civilization succeeded Barbarism* (whether Agricultural or Nomadic). Such a lax usage of the important concept, prehistory, has, of course, caused much confusion, and many needless controversies might have been avoided if the protagonists had entered the lists armed, not with misty visions, but with mental weapons, sound and sharp as steel.

If the terms *prehistory* and *prehistoric* are to retain an

[1] Cf. *History of Social Development*, pp. 38–59.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 56 and 57

exactitude which makes them sociologically presentable, they can only be used with reference to the far distant period *in which all and any progress and culture first arose.*

In short, the primeval Dawn in which *our forefathers became distinctively human,* used the first implements and the first articulate speech, and finally discovered how to kindle and use fire; which Promethean achievement really brings prehistory to a close.[1]

How long a division of time did prehistory occupy? As our knowledge of this subject has extended and clarified we have been compelled to ascribe it to a past excessively remote. It cost a long and bitter fight (between Cuvier and Boucher de Perthes) before science would admit the *diluvial*[2] existence of Man! We now know that prehistory stretches far into the Tertiary Geological Age, and probably lasted much longer than the sum-total of all subsequent stages of culture.

This relative duration of the various periods of human evolution may be visualized by taking a *yard measure* as the sum of the existence of humanity till now: the first seven-tenths ($\frac{7}{10}$), or about 25 inches out of the 36, would represent prehistory; $\frac{2}{10}$, or a little over 6 inches, the Ages of Savagery, subsequent to the discovery of fire; and of the remaining 5 inches, 4 would have to be proportionately allotted to barbarism and *scarcely* 1 *to civilization.*[3]

Prehistory excels all subsequent cultural stages, not only in duration, but also in importance. It is indeed a stupendous achievement that anthropoids should invent and employ articulate speech, construct tools, kindle fire, and gradually become human. But when once speech, tools, and fire had been systematically and successfully used, then indeed the road had been opened to all future progress: the hardest task of all had been accomplished.

[1] Cf. *History of Social Development, passim.*

[2] The term Diluvial is used as a synonym for *Glacial* epoch—the Ice Age. (Translator's Note.)

[3] Cf. *History of Social Development,* pp. 332–39.

PREHISTORIC PROBLEMS

What do we know of prehistoric life? We must emphasize that Anthropology [1] gives us *no* information about prehistoric Man: such peoples exist no longer on earth. Till now, not one primitive savage race has been discovered, however low in the stage of evolution, that did not know how to kindle fire, that had not some tools and some vocabulary. Truly prehistoric human beings are extinct in this stage of the world's history. Palaeontology holds the clue which enables us to read part of the riddle of prehistoric humanity.[2] Until recently the opponents of Darwin and Lamarck could "take cover" behind the fact that no "Missing Link" had been discovered. Since then palaeanthropology, archaeology—"the science of the spade"—has brought several limbs of the "Missing Link" to the light of day, although we have not yet the complete and perfect sequence of development; and there are several such specimens, so we do not need to rely on an isolated discovery. The series of human fossil remains may be classified as follows:

I. The most primitive group comprises skeletons, or rather portions of skeletons, of extinct races resembling the anthropoid apes more closely than Man. These have been generally termed Pre-human, or *Pro-anthropoi*. These include the fossil remains discovered at Trinil in Java—the *Pithecanthropus erectus* of Dubois—which are, however, considered as collaterals rather than direct ancestors of *Homo Sapiens*. Also the remains discovered at Monte Hermoso and Buenos Ayres in the Argentine Republic. And the jawbone found at Mauren, near Heidelberg, may also, in all probability, be reckoned as belonging to this group. The upper portion of this jaw exactly

[1] Cf. *History of Social Development*, pp. 42–57.

[2] As an introduction to the subject I recommend the manual by Ludwig Wilser: *Leben und Heimat des Urmenschen*, Leipzig, 1910. This contains illustrations and references to the latest authorities. See further Hörnes, *Die Urgeschichte der Menschheit*, Vienna, 1892; Pohlig, *Eiszeit und Urgeschichte des Menschen*, Leipzig, 1907; Ferrer, *Urgeschichte des Europäers*, Leipzig, 1907; Ludwig Reinhardt, *Der Mensch zur Eiszeit in Europa*, Munich, 1906; Klaatsch, "Die Aurignacrasse, und ihre Stellung in der Menschheit", *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, 1911, etc. See also *Stages of Social Development*, pp. 42–57.

resembles that of the *gibbon*, while the chin has greater affinity to the *gorilla*. The teeth alone are human in type. This fossil is almost Tertiary, and its age was reckoned as about half a million years (500,000).[1]

II. A more recent group of remains bears much closer resemblance to *Homo Sapiens*, but has many simian features, e.g. receding chin and forehead, high-set *foramen magnum*, immensely heavy brow-ridges, broad flat nasal bones. This group is known as *Neanderthal-Spy* man. While we only possessed the famous Neanderthal skull in this series of fossils, its significance was often overlooked by anthropologists and even contested by Virchow. But since then the discoveries of this particular fossil type have been so numerous and widespread (e.g. at Krapina in Croatia, Spy in Belgium, Podbaba, near Prague, Tilbury, near London, Gibraltar, Le Moustier, La Chapelle-aux-Saints, and other sites) that it is beyond dispute that these are remains of an early human race, which spread over what is now Europe in the Early Glacial Age. It is equally certain that Neanderthal man used rudely wrought flint implements. In the Cave of Krapina were found the remains of at least *ten* skeletons, and traces of fires and burnt bones, including human bones, from which we may deduce that these predecessors of ours *understood the uses of fire*, and that, incidentally, they practised cannibalism.

III. A third group of human remains from the glacial deposits reveals a physical type differing very slightly, if at all, from extant races.

This group includes:

(1) The Aurignacians, of whom remains have been found at Engis, Predmost, Clichy, Grenelle, Montferrand, Höchst, Cannstadt, Brünn, Ofnet, Brüx, and Olmo.

(2) The Cro-Magnards, whose physical type is still traceable among the Berbers of North Africa, and whose remains

[1] *Sinanthropus Pekinensis*, the fossil remains discovered in 1927 in Northern China, belong probably to this group. (Translator's Note.)

have been found at Cro-Magnon, Bruniquel, Solutré, Laugeri-Basse, and Lausch.

(3) The Grimaldi race, whose remains have been found at Mentone and show strikingly negroid characteristics.

The remains of the *Mauren* pre-man date from the transition age between Tertiary and Quarternary. All the others are Quarternary, i.e. glacial. Tertiary human remains, so far, are only *eoliths* or the most primitive flint tools, such as were found at Puy, Courny, Brest, and in many places in Kent; but no skeletons or parts thereof.

From these discoveries we conclude that as the Neanderthalers already knew how to kindle fire and used flint tools, they must have advanced beyond the *preliminary truly prehistoric* stage; and this is increasingly true of subsequent human races. Sociologically, therefore, the Neanderthalers cannot be described as *prehistoric*. The prehistory of humanity must be relegated to the immensely remote ages of the *Tertiary Geological epoch*.

Prehistoric times are Tertiary, i.e. pre-Ice Age times, even though in certain parts of the globe *pre-men* (*Pro-anthropoi*) survived into the Ice Age. Neither ethnology nor as yet archaeology, can throw light on the institutions of *prehistoric times*, and we are unable to base assumptions about the earliest *geneonomic* (i.e. sexual and family) institutions on any fruits of these sciences to date.

SUMMARY OF THEORIES

It is comprehensible that the views of scientists have differed so widely on these manifestations when we reflect that neither historic records, nor contemporary ethnology, nor any other sources of information were available. The first theory of human origins ascribed the descent of mankind to a single pair, created miraculously by Divine agency. This idea appealed easily to the primitive mind, as it met the very strong *trend to simplification*: if one man and woman were

able to populate the earth with their descendants, it was obviously appropriate to suppose *they had done so*. This idea is incorporated in the Creation Myths of primitive peoples. But the deepest thinkers of classic times had already grasped the concept of the social origin and nature of Man. And as Man was essentially *politikon Zoön*, he could be truly human *only and in so far as he was member of a community*. In the profound aphorism of Aristotle: "Thus the State is in its essence to be conceived as existing before the family or any individual." [1]

But after the fall of classical culture with the Roman Empire, the ancient myth of human descent from a single human pair [2] revived and was accepted for centuries. The Biblical myth is so crudely naïve that it ascribes to Adam the power of speech before he had any human companion to converse with! Even Schiller was so dominated by this primitive concept that he drew the following conclusion (in his Essay on "The First Human Community"): "As Man is descended from one forefather and foremother, who must necessarily have been monogamous, the example of the archetypal pair must have become a sacred law for their successors."

It is the immortal achievement of Darwin in biology and of Morgan and Bachofen in the strictly sociological field, that they maintained the social (or tribal or communal) nature of the earliest human institutions, and sought to prove it by many astounding discoveries. They were joined in this view by many of the foremost sociologists, e.g. McLennan, Lubbock, Lippert, Wilken, Kohler, Post, Hellwald, Bernhöft, Spencer, Ratzel, Achelis, Lamprecht, Wundt, Wilutzky, Fr. Oppenheimer, Von Reitzenstein, Paul Barth, Frazer, Hörnes, Hartland, and others. These savants not only developed and worked out the theory of Man's tribal origin, but many of them also deduced that the prehistoric and/or pre-human hordes must have lived, not in separate marital and family relations, but in *sexual promiscuity*, in the so-called "*communal possession of women*".

[1] *Politics*, i, p. 2. [2] Genesis.

The many incidental errors and hasty conclusions founded on this belief led then to a reaction, represented, e.g., by Andrew Lang and Northcote W. Thomas. Many subsequent scholars, especially Westermarck and his disciples Forel and Kuhlenbeck, reverted to the view that human beings originally lived in couples. The embittered controversies which arose on this topic have borne excellent fruit of knowledge, for all the main protagonists on either side cited a profusion of facts which they had gleaned in the course of their researches. Thus we have at our disposal a mass of material which is at least *relevant* to the geneonomy of our earliest ancestors, and we shall now outline its trends and draw our conclusions.

CARDINAL POINTS IN DISPUTE

As will be understood from our previous outlines, the cardinal points in dispute are:

I. Whether human beings were originally tribal or familial in their customs? Did they live in separate couples and families, or like many of the higher animals (elephants, deer, wolves) in herds or packs?

II. Assuming the existence of the prehistoric human herd, pack, or horde—were the sexual relationships and the parental relationships within the horde *monogamous* or *promiscuous*?

The replies to these riddles are obviously fundamentally important to our quest, for they will determine whether we set out into the realms of geneonomy with correct assumptions or such as are deeply erroneous. Even if we can give no final and explicit answers, it will be of advantage to discuss these fundamentals, for they should clear our minds from prejudice; and it is better to *know that we do not know* than to believe what is not true. And in the course of our inquiry into pros and cons we shall have the opportunity of realizing various facts of the greatest significance for geneonomy, and indeed for sociology in general.

I. ARE HUMAN BEINGS ORIGINALLY SOCIAL OR TRIBAL CREATURES?

A. Arguments Against This Theory

Leaving theological and mythological legends entirely out of our inquiry we may thus summarize the case for Man's *solitary* origin:

1. Man's nearest animal kindred, the great apes—chimpanzee, gorilla, and orang-utan—are not tribal, but live in separate families or solitarily.

2. The most primitive existing human races known to us, e.g. Bushmen and Tierra del Fuegians, also do not live in tribes, but in separate families.

3. As human beings are descended from the anthropoid apes we must assume that at the beginnings of human existence, when the great apes became primitive men, the same conditions prevailed, and that we are essentially non-tribal but domestic, i.e. monogamous in origin and instincts.

But this bridge over the Gulf of Unknown Ages has *two extremely rotten supports.*

For first of all no modern naturalist of competence will admit that *Genus Homo* is *descended* from the gorilla, or any other of the still surviving species of anthropoid apes. The differentiation between man and his *arboreal* kindred must have taken place in mid-Tertiary times at least, and in the aeons between then and now, all the simian species have changed and developed so variously that we must accept a *common origin* as scientifically proved (modern serology confirms the blood relationship between us!)—but not by any means a *direct descent.* Moreover, most species of apes—excepting the great anthropoids—live in herds, often comprising hundreds of members, and show great solidarity. The stronger individuals protect females and young, help wounded members to escape, act as rearguards in case of flight from danger, etc. They also seek their food together; several will unite their efforts to roll

away heavy stones and pull out worms, slugs, and insects from their hiding-places.

Among these *smaller social species* (monkeys rather than apes) we find customs and traits which are strikingly similar *to those of the most primitive savages known to us.* Secondly, it is not the case that human beings have ever been found in solitary families wholly without external aid or co-operation. Ethnology knows no such cases. Human beings live in larger aggregates, which comprise smaller family units; and even in the worst climatic conditions, where hunger and thirst drive individuals into the wilderness to find food or death, these dispersals are temporary and periodic, and the scattered remnant (whom famine, plague, or wild beasts have not destroyed) comes together again and lives as before. We shall give further particulars about such primitive races as the Bushmen, Tierra del Fuegians, and Andamanese in our next chapter.

B. Arguments in Support of Human Social Origins

Firstly. The comparison of the majority of simian species (as contrasted with the gorilla and other great apes) with the most primitive living savages is favourable to the *social, tribal,* or *gregarious theory.*

Prehistoric material, although as yet extremely scanty, is also favourable. For instance, in the case of the skeleton discovered at Le Moustier, there were traces of elaborate burial, although the skull was very animal and must have formed the bony framework of a physiognomy resembling a snout much more than a modern human face.

Secondly. The process of becoming human began, in all probability, by the descent of our ancestors from their haunts in the trees to the ground; by ceasing to be arboreal they evolved, by adaptation, the upright posture, walked on their hind-limbs, and freed their fore-limbs.[1]

[1] Cf. *History of Social Development,* pp. 43–45.

But as a naked, upright wanderer on the earth man must have been in a peculiarly helpless position before he had constructed tools and weapons, and could not have survived without the solidarity and mutual help and protection of that "many-headed monster" the pack or horde. A single weaponless family could scarcely face one of the larger carnivores, and the women and children would have had no chance at all, especially as the period of infancy is comparatively long in human beings, and —at least among extant primitive savages—the children are suckled for years at the breast.

Thirdly. The social and gregarious instincts are innate in human beings. The behaviour of children proves this. Their vanity and love of approbation awaken early, and with them the imitative faculty on which the capacity for receiving instruction and for learning to speak largely depend. Children copy (or "ape"!) everything and everybody, but this imitativeness is essentially a gregarious trait. Furthermore, they possess a highly complex brain-centre governing the faculty of speech, and *as speech implies beings to speak with*, the gregariousness of children must be inherited and innate.

Fourthly. The most primitive and ferocious savages have obviously gregarious instincts. The members of the horde hold together and follow the commands and customs of the horde, which dominates their whole lives. Among savage men especially there is often very little *family* affection, but we find even in the lowest stages of development a high degree of mutual help, i.e. practical altruism, *between members of the same horde or tribe.*[1]

Fifthly. For all normal human beings, continuous solitude is painful, and the inclination to seek the company of their fellows belongs to the fundamental instinctual equipment of our species. Among primitive peoples this inclination is much stronger than where the spoken word can be replaced by print or other means of communication. The urge to communicate

[1] Cf. A. Vierkandt: "Die primitive Sittlichkeit der Naturvölker", *Globus*, vol. 76 (1899), p. 149. Also Felix Somlo, "Der wirtschaftliche Urzustand", *Monatsschrift für Soziologie*, March 1909.

something is among savages almost irrational and quite elemental: compare the ceaseless, meaningless chatter of certain negroes with the screams and grimaces of monkeys and the yells of parrots.

Sixthly. The general course of sociology shows that human culture and civilization are essentially the result of co-operation and interaction among human beings, and could only have been constructed by gregarious creatures. For man's superiority over other animals is certainly not due to his individual prowess, but to his solidarity with others of his own species, to the co-operation that has made him lord of this planet.[1]

Finally, we come to a circumstance which in itself alone proves the gregarious origin of mankind, and this is the complex phenomenon of *speech*. Speech is essentially expression and *communication*, and thus among solitary or non-gregarious creatures is only present in rudimentary form and has never developed any complexities. Among monogamous animals and birds, where the young leave their parents' protection as soon as they become mature, the chief requisite for the growth of articulate speech is lacking—namely, *continuity of association*. But as the pre-human races only humanized themselves with and by means of articulate speech,[2] therefore both pre-men and prehistoric true men must have been gregarious. *The growth and the very existence of articulate speech is in itself a proof of man's gregariousness*.

Even, however, when we grant this fundamental gregariousness we have not proved the impossibility of monogamous unions and separate families within the prehistoric horde, for *gregariousness* is not the same as *promiscuity*. In this form the question is unanswerable. The controversies of recent decades have proved that the views of sociologists on this "primitive promiscuity" change almost as rapidly as fashions, and are much influenced by the subjective attitudes of leading authorities "for" or "against".

As it is one of the secrets of science, rightly interpreted,

[1] Cf. *History of Social Development*, pp. 57–58. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 49–54.

to give a correct form and direction to questions framed so as to be unanswerable, let us ask our second leading question in the following terms:

II. ARE HUMAN BEINGS BY NATURAL INCLINATION (INSTINCT) MONOGAMOUS OR POLYGAMOUS?

Here the answer is plain and clear, "beyond a peradventure". And as the typical human mental and physical qualities have been fixed and evolved throughout aeons of struggle and selection, the answer to this question to-day will afford a clue to the answer in prehistoric times.

For indeed we all know—all adult human beings know—that the sexual impulse in human beings is polygamous or rather *varietist*, i.e. that it is attracted by novelty and change. It is so well known, so obvious, that custom and "good taste" combine to ignore it in conventional conversation. But science has *no* forbidden territories: nothing is prohibited to her researches except deliberate untruth, and nothing but truth is sacred to her. And science has also the *duty of doubt*, where doubt is intellectually possible and permissible. Certain modern authorities have followed this duty of doubt by stating that humanity is by nature monogamous, and have based their theory on the following grounds:

A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF MONOGAMOUS THEORY

Firstly. The argument brought forward is the general numerical equality of male and female adults in human communities, as showing that "Nature's Plan" indicated monogamy. But apart from the fact that this numerical equality is not found among *all* races and countries, such equality, even if absolute, could only suggest that *systematic* polyandry or polygyny [1]

[1] Polyandry, cohabitation of one woman with several men; polygyny, cohabitation of one man with several women. Polygamy may refer to either, but is generally used (incorrectly) for Polygyny. (Translator's Note.)

was unnatural; but not that monogamy was instinctive. For evidently ten men and ten women might just as easily live in group marriage or total promiscuity as in ten separate monogamous marriages.

Secondly. The advocates of the monogamous theory point out *that no existent race has been found to practise absolutely indiscriminate sexual promiscuity.* Even the most primitive hunting and nomadic savages now existent live in separate families and know the institution of marriage. Therefore, they conclude, we must believe the same to be true of prehistoric man.

This argument is erroneous in its premises through lack of true sociological perspective. It is just as mistaken as would be the argument that as concubinage is not legally recognized by the chief nations of Europe to-day, *therefore* it was not legally recognized in the Early Middle Ages. For the most primitive nomadic hunters on earth to-day have advanced quite as far beyond prehistoric conditions as industrial civilization beyond barbarism. They all know and use fire. Is it legitimate to conclude that human beings in prehistoric times, and "in the beginning", knew and used fire? The fundamental error here consists in the frequent, and indeed almost constant, confusion in people's minds *between human prehistory and the conditions and achievements of the lowest grade of hunting nomads known to us*, who have all attained the early tribal stage.

Thirdly. It may be inquired, if humanity is naturally polygamous, why do primitive peoples to-day, including the most primitive, live, not in promiscuity, but in separate families?

The answer to this query will be given in greatest detail in the chapter on "Changes in Motives for Marriage" in *The Evolution of Modern Marriage.*[1] Primitive man does not *marry* —as our naïve "transference" of civilized concepts and sentiments would imply—because he feels passionate emotion

[1] Pp. 112–15.

for any particular woman, but because he wants the woman as an economic asset, a slave, a "beast of burden". He wants to appropriate her working-power, and he knows well that no man or woman can serve two masters! But his need for sexual novelty and variety is met by periodic licence in the tribal orgies, by the loan or exchange of wives between host and guest, by a frequent change of wife—and not confined within the narrow bonds of the *economic institution of marriage*. Hence the promiscuity among adolescents.[1] In his youth he willingly shares a girl with his comrades, for the woman outside the primitive marriage tie is useless to him as a domestic slave; but as soon as he has founded a family and is master of a household, however poor and small, he maintains his power over his domestic *factotum* with relentless vigilance, although he does not scruple to "lend" her occasionally to his friends and guests. Not *monogamous instinct, and not, indeed, any motive of a sexual kind, but economic need and economic convenience have founded the marriage tie of primitive man.*

Fourthly. It has been stated that the immense majority of contemporary primitive peoples live in "monogamy". But a monogamy, not of inclination, but of necessity. As we have already pointed out, the most frequent type of marriage among primitives is polygynous: one man possesses and copulates with several women. But as only the richer, more prosperous members of these tribes have the means to either purchase or support several women, the poorer majority must perforce do with one wife apiece. Then our savants declare: "See, most of them have only one wife, so man must be instinctively monogamous!" Curious methods of reasoning! It would be quite as logical and legitimate to conclude from the fact that most inhabitants of Europe to-day have no independent incomes, that the European races have an innate repugnance to wealth and an almost insuperable love of poverty and hunger! We are in the presence of a "transference"—a confusion between the preferential monogamy of *some* civilized

[1] Cf. *Evolution of Modern Marriage*, chap. iv, pp. 131–60.

individuals and the primitive syndyasmy which we have already had occasion to correct.[1]

Fifthly. Stress has been laid on the natural *jealousy* of mankind, which must, so it is assumed, *have made indiscriminate sexual relations wholly impossible.* Even Darwin accepted this view, but it cannot be substantiated. In our next study of the sociology of sex relationships we shall be able to bring decisive material to prove that here again *confusion* has prevailed: confusion *between possessive or proprietary jealousy and distinctively sexual jealousy or rivalry.* Specific sexual jealousy is alien to primitive mentalities; primitive man seeks a physical sensation of pleasure in his sexual relations, and knows nought of such civilized refinements, such secondary "irradiations" of primordial instinct, as e.g. sexual modesty, sexual disgust, and that highly individualized emotion *romantic love.* The first stages of the individual differentiation of sexual emotion were sexual jealousy and the urge to exclusive possession, i.e. monogamy. And we may observe that among the higher mammals it is just the monogamous "permanent pairing" species who reject all the solidarity of the herd; for as Espinas rightly remarks, the savage jealousy of the adult males prevents all association with others of their sex and kind. (In many of the great anthropoid apes this jealousy leads to polygyny with the Old Man or Head Ape of the group as Patriarch and Possessor.)

Thus we cannot admit that sexual jealousy disproves the instinctively polygamous nature of human beings, or the existence of a very early phase of indiscriminate intercourse. The probability is, in fact, in the opposite direction.

Sixthly. The final objection has been based on the physiology of reproduction. It has been declared that women who habitually copulated with several different men lost the power to conceive, i.e. became sterile. This assertion—somewhat ill-supported by evidence, like so many assertions in the domain of sexual physiology—is based on the sterility of professional

[1] *Evolution of Modern Marriage, passim.*

prostitutes. It is easily understood that in the case of a special class of women who permit indiscriminate genital connection for hire there must exist a state of morbid congestion and irritation which can hardly favour natural reproduction.[1] But these conditions do not obtain in a horde of savages, where a certain number of men engage in marital intercourse with a certain number of women. For the frequency of intercourse will remain fairly even and comparatively moderate, whether the participants are "paired" or "grouped". To admit the "sterility" argument would be to grant that *not only continuous and morbid local irritation*, but also merely moderate intercourse with more than one man injures women's fertility. Even this has been argued. But it is physiologically improbable, and also contrary to the experience of certain races who have lived in either polyandrous or group marriage since remote ages yet are neither numerically diminished nor physically degenerate. Thus Marshall has furnished exact statistics of natality among the Todas [2] of Southern India, and it was shown that 36 women had 167 children among them, and certain mothers had eight, nine, or ten.[3] And Jagor says of the Naïrs who practise group marriage:[4] "The women of the Naïrs in India retain their fertility till they are forty or even forty-five years of age. Mothers of ten children are not rare. A Naïr woman in Calicut is said to have borne sixteen, and another as many as twenty." Thus the Naïr woman is favourably distinguished from the majority of her Hindu sisters, whose childbearing capacity is diminished and whose maturity is brief and soon over. Moreover, the general physique of the Naïrs has not suffered any impairment, apparently. Ploss[5] says: "Free group marriage, which has prevailed for centuries

[1] The frequency with which intercourse takes place in the case of public prostitutes is often incredible. Cf. *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, year xi, 1908, p. 644. In one day a girl received 20 clients, and sometimes over 50. Cf. also the statistics in A. Londres' *Road to Buenos Ayres*.

[2] Cf. *Evolution of Modern Marriage*, chap. iv, "Phases of Marriage", pp. 137–54.

[3] Cf. Ploss-Bartels, *Das Weib in der Natur und Völkerkunde*, 5th ed., i, p. 71.

[4] Reference Ploss-Bartels, as above.

[5] *Das Weib*, i, p. 72.

among the Naïr tribes, has had a prolonged selective influence which seems far from deleterious. Jagor describes the Naïr women as extremely dainty, strictly cleanly in their habits and persons, of very graceful and attractive appearance, and in spite of the intense heat of the climate in which they live their skin is much whiter than that of most Indians. Jagor points out that in Sparta there was a eugenic selection in procreation which produced a stock superior in masculine vigour and courage and feminine beauty to all other Greek peoples." [1] And the Todas are described as big, powerful, muscular people, and of more attractive appearance than any other Dravidian [2] races.

Thus we find that the arguments habitually put forward in favour of the instinctively monogamous nature of humanity *fail* before careful scrutiny. Let us now consider the grounds for believing that human nature is originally polygamous.

B. Arguments in Favour of Polygamous or Varietist Theory

Firstly. Various authorities have attempted to prove that, like most other mammalian species, primitive or prehistoric mankind had a special mating season (so-called time of rut or heat in the animal world), and that therefore in the earliest times, sexual congress can only have occurred at certain definite times of the year.[3] Even to-day there are some savage tribes, it is said, among whom a mating season is as unmistakable as among the red deer and other animals. Even among civilized races births do not occur regularly and evenly all through the year, but statistics show a distinct increase in February and March, proving that the sexual impulse and/or liability to conception is highest in May and June. And these

[1] See Jagor, *Reisen in die Philippinen*, Berlin, 1873.

[2] Dravidians are the aboriginal pre-Hindu natives of India; they mostly inhabit the Deccan. (Translator's Note.)

[3] Cf. M. Kulischer, "Die geschlechtliche Zuchtwahl bei den Menschen in der Urzeit", *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, 1876, p. 142, and Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, chap. ii.

maxima of births and conceptions are probably nothing but the remains of the primitive pairing season of our ancestors, at least this is the most obvious explanation. But in any kind of gregarious creature, permanent monogamous mating is hardly compatible with any special intensive sexual activity in recurrent seasons, as during the quiescent intervals the sexual motive does not operate. We may thus deduce that prehistoric and primitive mankind is unlikely to have lived in permanent monogamy.

Secondly. This first very dubious analogical argument is re-enforced by the observed fact that permanent *monogamous unions are very rare among mammalian species as a whole.* Espinas [1] says, "Among the most highly organized as among the most rudimentary, from the apes to the marsupials, monogamy is rare. Many kinds of birds mate for life, with one partner . . . but among mammals exclusive mutual preferences are rare and generally do not survive a year." And among the really gregarious or social mammals *no species has till now been found to practise exclusively monogamous pairing and parental responsibility within the herd.*

Thirdly. And this is logical, for there is a fundamental *divergence of interests* between the family unit and the herd which would greatly increase the rigours of the *struggle for existence.* It has been pointed out that the most primitive hunters known to us to-day practise individual marriage, and have survived. But this reasoning cannot be applied to the half-human hordes of *really prehistoric times.* While the technical equipment of mankind was in its earliest stages, and weapons and tools very few and inadequate, the solidarity of the horde was a much greater protective agent than in any subsequent epoch. The prehistoric woman, with children at her breast, and the children themselves, could not find any individual adult male protector so vigilant and effective as the numerous horde who acted together in defence or offence. But when the man tipped his rough stick with a sharp head

[1] In *Animal Communities.*

of flint, when he used it as a sword or a battle-axe, then indeed came the crucial moment when budding individualism began to stretch the fetters of the horde, and man began to appropriate the weaker and younger members of the horde for himself without terminating the uses of collective action.

A direct proof of original human gregariousness and promiscuity has been found in the so-called *Classification by Age or by Generations*—according to some scientists. As this method of reckoning relationship is one of the most ancient human institutions, it merits a fuller description herewith.

The degree of relationship or blood kindred between persons is, of course, indicated by special terms: father, mother, uncle, aunt, cousin,[1] niece, nephew, brother-in-law, etc. The general sum of such terms and concepts is described sociologically as *a system of relationships*. As the social organization of all primitive peoples is based on kindred or blood relationship, these systems of relationship have great importance sociologically. They are not only of value psychologically, as affording glimpses into primitive human mentalities, they are also survivals, *sometimes of prehistoric and pre-human ages*; their exact significance presents many puzzles and has led to much controversy among savants.

The primitive peoples reckon kindred in a wholly different manner from ourselves, and this strange system indicates that their institutions must have been originally very different from the family as we know it. For civilized persons, for instance, it is obvious that every individual must have had one male and one female parent: father and mother to us are *unique relationships*. In the ancient systems of relationship there were several fathers and several mothers, and while we differentiate clearly between brothers and sisters, and the children of brothers and sisters, many savage peoples have only one term which includes brothers and sisters and first cousins equally; but this is sometimes applied only to the paternal side, sometimes to the maternal, and sometimes to all equally, i.e. kindred

[1] In French and German there are special names for boy or girl cousin.

may be reckoned as consanguineous, or uterine, or both. Such nomenclature is at first beyond our comprehension. But Morgan has given us a clue in his great work *Systems of Consanguinity* in which, working on the comparative method, he analyses complex institutions into their rudiments, as is the case with Lubbock's [1] work and his own *Primitive Society*. Finally, we reach the most primitive form of reckoning relationships now used anywhere on earth, and we conclude that all other "systems of consanguinity" have developed from this. It is the so-called Hawaiian System, or classification by seniority (Age Group) System, and is found in operation in Hawaii, the Marquesas Islands, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tahiti, and among the Maoris of New Zealand.[2]

This method of reckoning relationship divides the community into three classes according to age.

Namely:

I. The Grandfathers and Grandmothers.
II. The Fathers and Mothers.
III. The Children.

The System does not extend beyond these three generation groups, at least among the Australasians and Polynesians. Great-grandparents and great-grandchildren have no separate existence, as such, in this grouping.

The terms defining relationships are here extremely simple. All members of the oldest Group I call *all* members of Group II their children, and *all* members of Group III their grandchildren; the adult Group II call *all* members of the ancient Group I their parents, and of Group III their children; and the youthful Group III call all members of Group II their parents, and all the Ancients of Group I their ancestors or grandparents.[3]

[1] Cf. Lubbock's *Origin of Civilization*, chap. iv.
[2] Morgan, *Primitive Society*, p. 342; Giraud-Teulon, *Les Origines de la Famille*, p. 55; Lubbock, *Origins of Civilization*, chap. iv. (Cf. also Malinowski's recent book on the Trobriand Islands. Translator's Note.)
[3] Cf. the metabiological Future foreshadowed by G. B. Shaw in *Back to Methuselah*. (Translator's Note.)

The members of each of these three Age Groups among themselves call each other "brother" or "sister". But there is here a marked distinction based on seniority; the "brother" or "sister" is always ceremonially "older" or "younger"; indeed there are some tribes in which there is no general term for "brothers" or "sisters", but several special terms for "older (or big) brother", "younger (or little) brother", "older (or big) sister", "younger (or little) sister", respectively. In fact, this vocabulary corresponds to the French language in the terms "*mon aîné*" and "*mon cadet*", but has nothing equivalent to "*mon frère*". Missionaries wishing to address such communities with the Biblical "Brethren" have often been quite nonplussed!

Moreover, this insistence on seniority prevails throughout each separate group, so that, for instance, if we take all the males of such a community and divide them according to Age Group, distinguishing the Ancients by the letter G for Grandfathers, the Adults by F for Fathers, and the Youths by S for Sons, we get the following "Table of Precedence" in the social order:

I. G 1, G 2, G 3, G 4, G 5, G 6, etc.
II. F 1, F 2, F 3, F 4, F 5, F 6, etc.
III. S 1, S 2, S 3, S 4, S 5, S 6, etc.

G 1 is the oldest member of all this kindred community, and S 6 the latest born and youngest, and between this Alpha and Omega the position of each individual member of and in the kindred community is as rigidly defined by seniority as in the late Prussian Army List! Up to a certain point every individual in such a kindred group is the master or superior of the younger members, but the subject or inferior of those older than himself.

What is the precise origin and significance of this strange wholesale kindred grouping which differs so widely from the complex individual classifications of civilized "kindred and affinity"? Morgan's reply is that this system is a proof of Group Marriage. This is the adequate explanation. All these

wholesale applications of terms and concepts of blood relationship become perfectly obvious if we assume that *all the men and women in each Age Group were either married to one another in actual fact or assumed to be so in virtual theory*. Thus the whole community formed one great *tribal kindred* or *family*. Every member had several parents, because his father and mother *have mated or "married", not exclusively*, but as members of their group.[1]

Morgan's explanation has been hotly contested. The weightiest objections adduced against it are as follows:

Firstly. It was denied that any sociological conclusions could be drawn from the facts he mentioned, as the *terms of kindred and relationship were elaborate ceremonial expressions, methods of address* as vague and meaningless as the convention that speaks of "The Brotherhood of Man". This objection cannot stand for a moment. The terms and concepts they denote are very real and important to those who use them; they denote stringent duties and enviable rights.[2] Among the Australian Blacks the privileges of the Ancient Group (I) are so great that they may eat as much of the available food-supply as they please, while the youths and children must make shift with very restricted nourishment. For there is among these tribes an elaborate ritual code of prohibitions and sanctions about food hallowed by immemorial tradition; even empty and hunger-racked stomachs submit to the claims of the Ancients among the blood kindred.[3] That the terms of kindred are here no empty phrases is proved by the logic and detail with which many primitive peoples have elaborated their range of accepted degrees of consanguinity. Morgan points out that both the systems in use among the Tamils of Southern India and Ceylon, and the Seneca Iroquois in New York State, *recognize 200 degrees of kindred and affinity each with its special term*; he rightly comments that this shows a

[1] For further particulars, see Morgan, *Primitive Society*, p. 342 *et seq.*
[2] Cf. "Phases of Marriage", chap. iv, in *Evolution of Modern Marriage*, pp. 143–45.
[3] See Heinrich Cunow, *Australneger*, pp. 31, 33, 35.

degree of mental concentration and causality on this subject that can scarcely be excelled among human intellectual achievements.

Secondly. The opponents of Morgan then brought forward another objection: they said that the wholesale age grouping was due to *poverty of language*. But primitive peoples have a wealth of terms for matters that interest or affect them. Thus, for instance, certain Bantu races have one term for the green hue of the grass and the blue of the sky; not, of course, because these colours are indistinguishable by them, but because they are matters of indifference to their daily lives. But as pastoral people and indefatigable stockbreeders, they are in constant contact with cattle of various shades of brown, and they have over a dozen words covering a whole scale of colour in browns.

So we may conclude that when the primitive human beings who first conceived and used the Age Group system of relationships omitted all terms referring to individual paternity and the separate family, they did so because they dispensed with the individual family. We, with all our wealth of ideas and terminology, lump different kinds of relationships together indiscriminately when we attach no special meaning to their differences. Thus we address both our father's brother and our mother's brother as "Uncle"; and the term "Cousins" is applied to the children of our father's brothers and of his sisters, as well as those of our mother's brothers and of her sisters, as well as to remoter relatives, "second and third cousins" alike; while some primitive peoples have special terms for all these degrees, both paternal and maternal.

Thirdly. A more cogent objection to the theory of group marriage than those mentioned above seems to me the fact that, while the precise paternity of any member of one of these Age Groups may be uncertain, the motherhood of any individual woman is known as regards her children, both to herself and to others; and naturally so. Morgan met this comment by maintaining that there was no difference or preference shown in the treatment of children and step-

children; we ourselves, in ordinary speech, call our stepmother "mother", our stepson "son". But in my opinion, this classification by Age Groups indicates that paternity and descent through the male parent are not recognized in these communities. And we become convinced that such is the case when we take into consideration another peculiarity of this system of consanguinity, relative to the *promotion* from one Age-stratum to another in order of seniority.

Among the Australian Blacks, when a certain number of young people of the lowest Age Group attain puberty, they are admitted into the Middle Group (of Adults or Parents) with solemn ritual festivities. And on this "promotion" they change their degree of relationship to other members of the horde or tribe. Their former companions of the Youth Group are no longer addressed by them as "little brother" or "little sister", but as "son" or "daughter"; the members of the Adult Group, formerly addressed as "fathers" and "mothers", are now "big brothers" and "big sisters"; and their former "grandparents" become their "fathers" and "mothers".

Fison, in describing these changes, declares that they reduced him to hopeless confusion.[1] But to us, on the contrary, they supply the key to comprehension of a whole way of life and thought. If one and the same young man is to-day the "son" of another man, and to-morrow his "brother", there can be no longer any doubt that this system of consanguinity *ignores all individual parentage*, and that it only concerns itself with the *position of the individual man or woman within the community, reckoned according to age*. Grandparents, parents, children, mean about as much as, and not more than, our expressions aged persons, adults, youths, girls, babies. Indeed, in the Hawaiian tongue *makua kana* and *makua wahina* mean either "father" and "mother" or "old man" and "old woman" interchangeably.

Thus the Age Group system of consanguinity only knows, only expresses the communal, tribal, or gregarious position of

[1] See Heinrich Cunow's book *Australneger*, pp. 47 and 135.

its members, not the individual descent and relationship between parents and children. And this reveals to us the *tribal* nature of this primeval code of customs and ethics. *Solidarity* and *discipline* distinguish it. Evidently prehistoric man, when he first left the sheltering branches of the forest for the perilous terra firma,[1] had to face a hideously severe selective struggle for existence. Naked and weaponless at first, save for fragile sticks and clumsy stones, they were obliged to rely on the solidarity of, and subordination to, the horde, on combination and co-operation of individuals.[1] On the perfection and speed of their communal attacks and retreats, alone depended their survival against the attacks of wild animals or neighbouring tribes, and their success in the *hunting* which was their food supply. Tribes which excelled in discipline and co-operation must have been victorious over those in which individualism raised a proud and premature head! The system of Age Groups must therefore be considered as a highly valuable documentary and historic survival from a far-off alien world, in which the horde was All and the individual Nothing; in which all labours, all dangers, all goods and gear, and even, probably, all the women of the tribe were regarded and possessed "in common".

Thus we reach a similar conclusion to Morgan, though by a different route. It is wholly improbable that the system he describes could develop in any community consisting of separate families. Just as our present social system depends on the family as a basis, and adapts itself to the family as an institution, so—and to an equal degree—is it demonstrable that the system of Age Groups could hardly have been conceived or invented by a community of separate families. And the absolute ignoring of the facts of individual parentage makes it most probable that the separate family did not exist, but that the whole horde formed one great household in which separate families and exclusive pairing were unknown, when the Age Group system arose.

[1] Cf. *History of Social Development*, pp. 54–56.

This obvious conclusion must be accepted by all unbiased persons. Morgan's final deductions correspond to the description given by Nicholas Damascenus centuries ago of the Galaktophagi who "have all property and women in common; *therefore* they all call the Elders among them Fathers, the young men Sons, and those of their own age, Brothers". And it is specially interesting that Plato, who abolished separate marriage as an institution from his Republic, and who cannot have been acquainted with the Hawaiian Islands, came to the same conclusions, and recommended the same customs. He prescribed to the citizens of his Republic a communal or communist way of life, without private property or exclusive possession of women. They should be as one family. The Elders should be fathers and mothers of the younger folk, who should honour them as their children. All of the same age should regard each other as brothers and sisters, and, on reaching adolescence, they should copulate freely with their contemporaries as husbands or wives. (Book V, *Republic*.) It is the primeval Age Group or *classificatory* system exactly.

Fourthly. It has been objected that, in the cases of most of such primitive races as still use the age classificatory system of consanguinity, absolute sexual promiscuity has been replaced by various forms of more or less permanent marriage and separate families. But we cannot conclude that such separate families existed when the *classificatory* system first arose! In these cases the classificatory system is a "survival" which has survived, even though it was alien to the new family institutions preserved by the conservative instinct of mankind. It is a peculiarity of titles and terms of address denoting expert and superior power (of the person addressed) that they have a very tough persistence, long after their actual validity has departed. European society still knows the titles Duke, Earl, Baron, etc., although the offices and duties associated with these titles in the Middle Ages have long become extinct. But it is even more significant that among the races using the Age Group system (or variants thereof) at the present day, i.e. among

the Polynesians, Australasians, Dravidians, and certain North American Indians, investigators have discovered either actual —though obsolescent—group-marriages or else relics of such a system and the cognate fraternal-polyandry or sororal-polygyny. (Kohler.)

The system of consanguinity has been more persistent in its longevity than the family; it halts behind the progress of Evolution, but has not fallen out of the march, and has thus become so significant a witness of conditions in prehistoric times.

Fifthly. Many peoples believe that monogamous marriage, i.e. the appropriation by one man of the person of one woman, is an unnatural and illicit innovation, offensive to the other interests of the tribe, and that in contracting such a marriage the man sins against the tribe by depriving it of its rights over the girl.[1]

According to Seidlitz,[2] exclusive union between a man and woman seemed to the Chevsoors of the Caucasus illicit and disgraceful. The same is reported of certain Southern Slavs[3] and of the Cyprians.[4] Australian Blacks sometimes practise general promiscuity for a season in the hope of averting plague or disaster,[5] just as in classic times the Locrian women prostituted themselves in the Temple of Aphrodite in times of national emergency.[6] Among the Kurmis every bridegroom before his wedding performs a symbolic ceremony with a tree, in order to transfer to it the curse pronounced on marriage.[7] Among other tribes and races the tradition prevails that the marriage ceremony makes the girl available, not for the bridegroom alone, but for his whole tribe. They all have certain rights with regard to her. Among the natives of Australia the woman stolen from another *gens* or tribe becomes and remains

[1] Cf. Post, *Ethnologische Jurisprudenz*, i, pp. 18, 26.
[2] Seidlitz, *Ausland*, 1891. No. 17, p. 334. [3] Post, *Studien*, p. 342.
[4] Bernhöft, *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft*, vol. viii, pp. 173, 175.
[5] Waitz Gerland, *Anthropol.* vi, p. 774; Kohler, "Über das Recht der Australneger", *Zeitschrift für vergleichends Rechtswissenschaft*, vii, p. 327.
[6] M. Juniani Justini, *Epitomie Histor Philippio* (Rühl). Lib. xxi, iii.
[7] Kohler, *op. cit.*, ix, p. 331.

common property of the robbers.[1] In the ancient laws of Hinduism the view that a bride belonged to all her husband's male relatives in common is expressly repudiated, and it is stated that she is *his* wife only.[2] But according to Wilken the polyandrous view prevails in parts of the Malay Archipelago, where the bride is received into the tribe rather than into her husband's household.[3]

This ancient code and custom is preserved in the rites whereby, among some peoples, the bride must give herself to all men of her husband's tribe indiscriminately, before she can be regarded as his wife only. Sometimes the priest or chief acts as the representative of the rest of the tribesmen (*jus primae noctis*), and sometimes the wedding-feast closes with general promiscuous intercourse between all those present.

Monrad gives the following account of the customs of the Fantees, of the Coast of New Guinea; he was himself an eye-witness of what occurred. "The bride repairs to the water's edge, accompanied by a crowd of other women. Several youths of the tribe follow the women, drag both the bride's companions and any female passers-by into the water, duck them under water, and take the most indecent liberties, which are aimed especially at the bride."[4] Similar customs or ceremonies prevailed among the Nasomantes, Galaktophagi, Garamantes of Greco-Roman antiquity, and among Australasian, Malagasy, and some Bantu natives to-day.[5] And the custom of exchanging wives or lending them to guests, which is widely prevalent among primitive peoples, has been attributed by scholars to the same origin; the guest is given the full rights of the tribal members.[6] Legends point to the stage of development at which individual marriage was unknown, by ascribing this innovation to various teachers, leaders, and

[1] Kohler, *op. cit.*, vii, p. 326. [2] Kohler, *op. cit.*, vi, p. 404.
[3] Cf. also Giraud-Teulon, *Les Origines du Mariage*, pp. 71, 72.
[4] H. C. Monrad, *Gemälde der Küste von New Guinea*, 1805–1809. Translated from the Danish into German by H. E. Wolf, Weimar, 1824, p. 51.
[5] Post, *Grundlagen des Rechts*, p. 188 *et seq.*
[6] A summary of literature on the custom of lending wives to guests has been made by Lubbock, *Origins of Civilization*, p. 126.

lawgivers. The Egyptians attributed this institution to Menes, the Chinese to Fohi, the Greeks to Cecrops.

Sixthly. The same trend of ideas and habits gave the prostitute, the courtesan, a specially honoured position among many peoples, especially in Antiquity. In the famous city of Vesali, in Ancient Hindustan, marriage was forbidden, and the chief courtesan of the city, who was at the head of a great house, was treated with honour and respect. When the holy Buddha (Sakyamuni) visited Vesali at an advanced age, he was allotted a dwelling in a garden belonging to the Chief of the Courtesans. He received a ceremonial visit from her; she came in a magnificent chariot, surrounded by her retinue. She approached him and bent low in reverence, then sat beside him and listened to his teaching of Dharma. . . . When she returned to the town she met the Prince of Vesali, who went forth with much pomp and many attendants. *But all these chariots and elephants stood aside to let her pass*. They begged her to permit them to have the honour of entertaining Sakyamuni; but she refused, and when the rulers of the city approached the Holy Man himself, he also would not resign the friendship and hospitality of this lady.[1] This is, of course, the story on which Goethe's *The God and the Bajadere* was founded.

Seventhly. As another result of group marriage we must perhaps reckon an allied manifestation: the *religious prostitution* of Antiquity. In ancient India, Asia Minor, and Greece, a sort of ritual prostitution or promiscuity was generally part of the worship of the Goddess of Love (whether she was known as Venus, Aphrodite, Astarte, Ishtar, Ashera, Mylitta, or Baali). In Babylonia, according to the famous passage of Herodotus,[2] every woman, even of the highest rank, had once in her life to take her seat before the sanctuary of Mylitta and to have intercourse with the first strange man who threw a coin to her and demanded it. In many famous temples of the great Goddess there were special priestesses, *hierodulae*, who

[1] Cf. Mrs. Spier's *Life in Ancient India*, p. 281; Lubbock, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
[2] Book I, p. 199.

performed these special services in honour of the Goddess. The ancient Hebrews called these consecrated temple-girls "Kedeshoth"; in Hindustan, where they had many privileges and were addressed as "Begum", i.e. "noble lady", they were called *devadasis*.

In the great temple of Aphrodite at Corinth there were over a thousand *hierodulae*, and many wealthy citizens of Corinth made a point of dedicating their prettiest slave-girls to this shrine. There were similar temples and priestesses at Athens (founded by Solon), on Mount Eryx in Sicily, in Cyprus (Paphos or Amathos), and at Samos. At Abydos, one shrine bore the name of Aphrodite Porne (or the harlot), and at Ephesos another was dedicated to Aphrodite Hetaïra, etc.[1]

As religious beliefs and practices tend to survive persistently over long periods of time, and hence from remote ages, many investigators have attributed great importance to religious prostitution as evidence of even earlier conditions. We must, however, also emphasize the fact that the exact origin and meaning of religious rituals is often very uncertain and easily interpreted according to individual fancy. It is therefore possible that religious prostitution has not much value as a "survival" for our study of prehistoric times. But no one can deny the evidential value of the *Eighth* argument —the argument based on *periodic festivals* or *ritual orgies*.

Many peoples celebrate recurrent festivals during which complete sexual licence and promiscuous intercourse prevail. We have already given a fuller account of this so-called

[1] Literature and references on this and similar manifestations may be found in Lubbock's *Origins of Civilization*, pp. 105–26; Lippert, *Geschichte der Familie*, p. 168 *et seq.*; Ploss, *Das Weib*, 5th ed., vol. i, p. 454; Post, *Die Geschlechtsgenossenschaft der Urzeit*, p. 31 *et seq.*; McLennan, *Studies in Ancient History*, p. 423 *et seq.*; Westermarck, *History of Marriage*; J. Muller, *Das sexuelle Leben der Naturvölker*, p. 46; Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, vol. i, Leipzig, 1884–90, Col. 390 *et seq.*; A. Hirt, *Über die Hierodulen*, Berlin, 1816; F. von Hellwald, *Die menschliche Familie*, p. 357; Bernhöft, *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft*, vol. viii, pp. 170, 173; Bernhard Stade, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, Berlin, 1887, p. 479 *et seq.*; Schurtz, *Altersklassen und Männerbunde*, p. 198; and much other material.

festival or ritual promiscuity in "Phases of Marriage",[1] and are of the opinion that they may have originally corresponded to a time of "heat" or "rut", i.e. a mating season like that of the mammals and birds, and have found their latest faint reflection in the Carnival of to-day.

These ritual orgies or orgiastic festivals are celebrated by peoples at very varying stages of development, and are of importance, not only sociologically, but for another, psychological, reason. In his sports and games and feasts Man reveals his true nature! The usage made by anyone of his or her leisure hours, when they are free to please themselves, *free to play*, is specially characteristic of their most intimate personality. In sport and play human nature appears free from fear and hunger, and shows itself without a mask. The ritual orgies of whole tribes, an ancient form of recreation and play, prove the inherently polygamous or sexually varietist nature of humanity. This inherent nature has since then been partly hidden by the accretions of cultural development. But as soon as custom and convention cease to operate, the primitive instinct, polygamous or promiscuous, appears naked and unmistakable.

Ninthly. This conclusion is re-enforced by another train of reasoning and observation. The fundamental biogenetic law formulated by Haeckel declares that every individual creature, in the course of his or her existence, passes through various stages corresponding to the stages of development of the species to which he or she belongs. The qualities generally shown by children and young people in their "teens" are to a great extent typical of the psychic processes of our race in prehistoric and even pre-human times. In youth, natural instincts express themselves more clearly and quickly than in later years; and we have elsewhere[2] expressed our agreement with Groos[3] in believing that the games of children unveil the instinctive actions of generations of our remote forefathers.

[1] Chap. iv of *The Evolution of Modern Marriage*.
[2] *History of Social Development*, pp. 86–87.
[3] Groos, *Spiele der Tiere* (1898).

And as we argued, in discussing the promiscuous customs among unmarried youths and girls in some primitive tribes,[1] and the meaning of the "Men's Houses" or "Bachelors' Houses", polygamy or sexual variety is generally characteristic of young men. *Wherever free intercourse with girls of their own age is suppressed and penalized by religion or law, prostitution appears forthwith as part of the social organism.*[2]

So we must deduce from these facts that the original instincts of human beings were not monogamous, but polygamous.

Tenthly. The extent to which primitive peoples to-day practise pair-marriage (or *syndyasmy*, which must be distinguished from the selective and permanent monogamy of *civilized* ideals) does not disprove our case. The primitive pair-marriage is not brought about by *monogamous inclinations*, but by *economic pressure*. Later in the evolution of human Labour and Property, pair-marriage became consolidated, also on economic grounds; thus marriage by purchase or barter tended to permanence as, if the man repudiated his bargain, he had to return her purchase-price. (See Chapter V, *infra*.) When culture and progress made a more prolonged and elaborate nurture of children and their instruction in inherited knowledge and codes of conduct necessary as part of the social tradition, monogamy, as the form of marriage best suited for this purpose, was further re-enforced.

The State, which came into existence very gradually in the final stage of the *Barbarous Ages*, had a particular interest in surrounding sexual matters with sanctions and restrictions, and gave its special favour to monogamous marriage. The Church, the State's companion, ratified the laws of man with the voice of God.

Finally, with the awakening and differentiation of individuality, and of respect for individuality, the primitive physical urge became transfigured into the romantic love of the sensitive and imaginative civilized person, who tends to prefer one and one alone above all other objects of attraction: monogamy

[1] *Evolution of Modern Marriage*, chap. iv. [2] Schurtz, *Altersklassen*, p. 191.

became more and more a partnership of equals, approximated more and more to free mutual choice, with the growth of delicacy of perception and sentiment. But in spite of all favourable factors; in spite of economic, political, dogmatic, and ethical considerations; in spite of the profound changes in human psychology since primitive times—the Neophily, the inherent Varietism, the roving of the sexual impulse, has never been wholly suppressed, much less eradicated. In all the primitive mythologies, among the deities and heroes in whom man has so candidly portrayed himself as he would like to be—in Zeus, Heracles, Theseus, Odin, etc., until the brilliant society of eighteenth-century courtiers and critics—the urge of nature has fought silently, stubbornly, ceaselessly against social rules and individual inhibitions. Our modern fiction is as full of adultery as the daily life it mirrors. For Mantegazza may well ask: "How many men have possessed no woman save their wives, and how many women have never desired or caressed any man save their husbands?" [1] Among women the polygamous tendency and love of sexual variety for its own sake seem to be less pronounced than among men. But appearances may here be deceptive, for women have been subjected to much greater repressions and educated from childhood to restrain, or at least conceal, sexual emotions. It is at least suggestive that, just as where man is complete lord and master socially, polygamy is openly practised and legalized, so where women have obtained a position of equality or of some

[1] Mantegazza, *Anthropologische Kulturhistorische Studien*, p. 303. And many other pronouncements by men of the most serious characters and finest intellects. Thus Goethe, who considered the ideal of the sanctity of marriage an invaluable achievement of civilization, added: "although marriage is really *unnatural*". La Rochefoucauld said: "Il y a de bons mariages, mais il n'y a point de délicieux" (131 Maxime), and so forth. Cf. also Franz Helbing, *Geschichte der weiblichen Untreue*, Berlin (no date); Dufour, *Histoire de la Prostitution*, Paris, 1851; Harriet, *Geschichte der Prostitution aller Zeiten und aller Völker*; Bernhard Stade, *Geschichte der öffentlichen Sittlichkeit in Russland*, Berlin, 1907; *Medizin, Aberglaube, und Geschlechtsleben in der Türkei*; Rüdeck, *Geschichte der öffentlichen Sittlichkeit in Deutschland*, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1903; F. S. Krauss, *Anthropophyteia*; *Liebesleben der Japaner*, Leipzig, 1907; Richard Schmidt, *Beiträge zur indischen Erotik*, Leipzig, 1902 (976 pp.!), and so forth.

advantage, as e.g. among the Iroquois, on the Marquesas Islands, among the negroes of Loango, polyandrous relations are practised and permitted.[1]

The *eleventh* reason for believing variety in sexual matters to be man's natural inclination, and monogamy a slow achievement of evolution, is furnished by the force and universality with which the primitive love of novelty and promiscuity breaks forth, as soon as the pressure of circumstances and public opinion is relaxed. There have been many and recurrent periods of such "moral decadence" among civilized peoples. "If we expel nature with a pitchfork—back it comes at a gallop."

We may quote Edmond and Jules de Goncourt on the sexual standards and practices during and just after the French Revolution, as follows:

"What was marriage to them? Just a bargain. Neither a civic duty nor a religious sacrament, but a natural act. 'C'est la nature en action', says Cambacérès in his Draft of the new legal Code. The child born outside legal and religious sanctions, the bastard, is admitted to equality of inheritance with the lawful heirs.

"This connivance in licence of institutions and actual customs, this encouragement of libertinism and misconduct—what a spectacle it makes of family life! No more scandals! Adultery has become a Sacrament, infidelity a formula. If a couple please, they mate legally. If they cease to please each other, they divorce, just as legally. Wives pass from husband to husband, in pursuit of pleasure, but unworthy of true happiness; her girdle is constantly loosened, tied again, and then again untied. She circulates among men, like a dainty *objet-de-luxe*. She is a wife when it does not bore her too much, a mother when and while it pleases her. The husband . . . of course, roams from one strange embrace to another. Marriage —what has it become? An arrangement, renewable from week to week, from one night to another. A dance.

"Couples divorce one another for an absence of six months,

[1] Cf. *Evolution of Modern Marriage, passim.* (Cf. also the Russian Empresses, the French ladies of the *salons*, and all women of genius or talent who have achieved economic independence. Translator's Note.)

for incompatibility of temper, for anything or nothing. People marry in order to be divorced, dissolve their bonds in order to assume new ones; the man has no retrospective jealousy, the woman no regretful shame. . . .

"In the fashionable streets, those who yesterday were husband and wife meet and pass on; they are united by other ties to other mates. They have forgotten the past so completely that they bow and smile in greeting. All classes, the highest and the lowest, are tainted by this plague of divorce. It is a fashion among the rich, a habit with the poor.

"Countesses divorce their husbands and are married by their former menservants. At Nancy and Metz, whenever the soldiers of France take up their winter quarters, they 'marry' on the understanding that the arrangement ceases when the regiment is transferred. . . . France had become one great house of prostitution." [1]

Johannes Scherr, *Geschichte deutscher Kultur und Sitte*, p. 539, gives a very similar but cruder account of morals and manners in the contemporary Prussia of Frederick William II.

In short, the love of sexual novelty and variety is innately human, and has not been eradicated by force or fear, or even by the moral and intellectual developments of culture and progress.

Here we must take a farther view and arrive at a conclusion of extreme importance for geneonomy, namely, that human beings are not only instinctively *polygamous*, but also *exogamous*, i.e. they seek their mates outside the circle of their families and immediate associates. These two tendencies are closely allied; *polygamy* helps *exogamy*.

III. THE EXOGAMOUS NATURE OF THE HUMAN SEX IMPULSE

As we pointed out in "Phases of Marriage",[2] Exogamy means, strictly speaking, that marriage is forbidden between members

[1] Cf. E. and J. Goncourt, *Histoire de la Société Française pendant le Directoire*, p. 176.
(The masculine and traditional point of view of the Goncourts is very noticeable here. They are horrified that *women* should change partners and keep any social position. Translator's Note.)

[2] *Evolution of Modern Marriage*, chap. iv, pp. 145–53.

of the same family, kindred group, or even tribe. This custom, which exists among many races and is strictly observed, even at very low levels of social evolution, has given rise to numerous theories of its origin and explanations which we shall discuss presently. In our opinion the strongest motive here is the fundamental nature of the human sexual impulse, which seeks something comparatively *remote* and *different*, i.e. is (psychologically) exogamous.

This view has tremendous psychological and social importance, but has unfortunately as yet not met full recognition in all its implications. It was, so far as I am aware, first enunciated by Hellwald [1] and then specially applied by Westermarck to the consideration of primitive exogamy. Indeed, it may easily be recognized, and is generally known, that sexual desire *in itself* is instinctively "exogamous". To quote Hellwald: "The habit of continuous presence and companionship, as human experience teaches us, blunts and diminishes specifically sexual attraction. What has been familiar to us, daily and hourly, from early childhood, is not vehemently desired.

"This habit of daily companionship . . . is always and everywhere the most powerful 'safety-valve' against both imaginative and bodily excitement. As a rule it completely prevents the emergence of any sexual feelings between brothers and sisters, and when this does happen it is only when all other opportunities for gratifying or expressing sexual feelings are repressed. Only that which is new, and strange, and remote, inflames imagination and desire for possession." And Westermarck expresses himself in just the same sense. He states his agreement with Huth in denying any instinctive innate repugnance to marriage or union between near relatives. (The so-called "voice of the blood" that played so great a part in old-fashioned fiction.) But he maintains that there is an innate repugnance to sexual relationship between persons who have lived together from early childhood, and that as such persons

[1] *Die Menschliche Familie*, Leipzig, 1889, p. 179.

are generally nearly akin, this repugnance manifests as disapproval of, and aversion to, the sexual intercourse of near kin.

The best reason for this familiar manifestation is the extreme rarity of incest. If there were not an innate repugnance here, in the propinquity of near relatives of different sexes, and considering the violence with which the sexual emotion develops at puberty, no law and no tradition could prevent frequent acts of incest.[1] Plato of old made the same observation:[2] "An unwritten law prevents, 'so effectively as is humanly possible', sexual intimacies between fathers and daughters, and protects the sisters from their brothers; and not even the inclination towards such acts enters the minds of men." Indeed, as Westermarck points out, it seems otherwise impossible to explain why the special type of feeling developed in daily intercourse between parents and children, brothers and sisters, should be so neutral, so emotionally colourless, without the profound unrest and urge of sexual attraction. Indeed, as we all know, the dulling and levelling influence of permanent companionship operates in much wider circles than those of the immediate family. Everyone knows that novelty has a spell over our sexual nature, almost greater than in any other respect, that, speaking generally, the stranger women appeal more than the well known, and equally well do we know that in married life the inborn exogamy, i.e. varietist nature, pulls continually at sexual desire and often deflects it.

From this explanation we may deduce that instinctive sexual indifference towards persons who have been familiar to us from childhood, and instinctive desire for new and unknown sexual partners, are typical and normal in humanity.

And if we take a wider field of vision we shall see that this psychological factor is *a law of the whole organic world*. Through the operation of this law, conjugation and reproduction among both plants and animals attain to a wealth of possibilities and diversities far exceeding a merely standardized sexual pairing.

[1] Cf., however, the psycho-analytic theories! (Translator's Note.)
[2] Nomoi, Book viii, chap. 6.

Through *phanerogamous* plants, which are generally to some degree hermaphrodites, Nature ensures cross-fertilization in the most ingenious and intricate ways. In many species of flowering plants the pollen acts as poison on the same flower or has no effect. And as plants are sessile and cannot rove in search of partners, cross-fertilization is performed by insects. Modern botany has built up a special biology of flowers, which explains how the strangest shapes of blossoms may be explained and evolved by adaptation to the insect guests who are lured by their fragrant nectar and bear pollen on their wings.[1]

The same exogamous urge (which drives forth in search of a mate) can be observed among animals. The most interesting examples are the *ants*. Each separate colony or community of these insects is normally isolated from the other colonies by mortal enmity. Any individual insect which wanders among an alien crowd of its own kind is pitilessly torn to pieces. And this antipathy prevails, not only between different species, but between colonies of the same species. Their internecine warfare is ferocious.[2] But in their recurrent [illegible] they seem possessed by another irresistible force. Both male and female ants ascend into the air on a great wedding-journey—the so-called "nuptial flight". They meet and mix with *swarms* from other colonies on the same errand. Escherich[3] says that these swarms are sometimes incredibly numerous, and darken the sky by their density. "The instinctive hatred between races and species melts away in the ecstasy which possesses all: the children of the communities which carry on such ruthless feuds on the earth below unite in love in the infinite spaces of the sky and in its glorious sunshine; there they give and take the keenest joys that living creatures know. The air is radiant with love—there is no room for hate and killing." . . . It may be conjectured that the wings of ants, which grow at the swarming season, have only one and the same purpose

[1] Cf. Paul Knuth, *Handbuch der Blütenbiologie*, and the Manual *Bau und Leben der Blüte*, by Oskar Metze, Berlin, 1906.

[2] Cf. Escherich, *Die Ameise*, Brunswick, 1906, p. 131. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

as the forms and colours and scents of many flowers: the attraction of the wanderer in love, i.e. *Exogamy*.

Among gregarious mammals, too, at the mating season, the exogamous urge overcomes all tribal or generic antipathy. Thus, according to Brehm,[1] "all domesticated canine varieties live normally in deadly feud with the dingoes, the native wild-dogs of Australia: they mutually tear to pieces any stray from the enemy's camp that they can run down or surround".

But in the mating season "a dingo bitch has been known to join the domesticated dogs, the household pets, and live with them on the best of terms". Sokolovsky[2] has recently made observations on different types of social apes, e.g. baboons, macaques, and marmosets, which indicate habits of an exogamous kind. When two strangers among these creatures meet and desire to make friends "they turn their hindquarters towards one another as an invitation to their particular method of sex-union, *a tergo*". However grotesque this gesture may appear to us, it is obviously the most business-like manner of proffering both friendship and—exogamy! Sokolovsky repeatedly noticed that the monkeys made "these singular overtures" to the human beings who were in charge of them and treated them kindly.

The Deeper Significance of Sexual Neophily (or Varietism)

We have thus demonstrated that the human sex impulse is, in its nature, both *polygamous* (i.e. drawn to many partners rather than concentrated on one) and exogamous (i.e. drawn to those outside its immediate family and associates). These two tendencies may be summed up as *Sexual Neophily*. (One might also express it as *Varietism*.)

As culture developed into further stages this inherent

[1] *Tierleben*, vol. ii, p. 82.

[2] Cf. Dr. Alexander Sokolovsky, *Verständigungsmittel in der höheren Tierwelt*, Medizinischer Klinik, Berlin, 1911, No. 23, p. 892 *et seq.*

Neophily or Varietism hindered the welfare of the community and was gradually, to some degree, combated and repressed. But in the earliest ages of our race this Varietism must obviously have been of some advantage in preserving and improving the species, otherwise it would hardly be so general or so deeply ingrained. What precisely was this advantage? Why is this roving mischief-maker so ineradicable in our secure and stable "monogamous" social order?

We must put aside all anthropocentric superstition, and in order to answer this question we must take a view embracing the whole of what is termed *Nature*, i.e. *organic life*.

Why is humanity bisexual? Why could not one sex have sufficed and multiplied, as do the infusoria, by *fission*? Immanuel Kant put this crucial question. But even his great mind was perplexed and could not give the answer. Darwin found the clue, and by a process of reasoning which we will briefly outline herewith.

The most rudimentary living creatures we know of are one-sexed. They multiply by "splitting" or "budding off", i.e. by *fission*. Thus one amoeba becomes two, then four, then eight, etc. A higher form of reproductive process is *conjugation*. Two separate life cells meet, touch, merge into one, and then develop and multiply. What are the advantages of this type of activity? In creatures which multiply by *fission* there is great likeness, though not absolute identity, between the parent and its progeny. *But in conjugation two different structures, two different elements, unite, and in their mutual interaction they affect the lives that result much more variously*. Conjugation as a *method of reproduction enormously increases differentiation, variety, individuation*. But the more variable the organisms, the more apt they are to survive in different conditions: *thus variation helps adaptation to environment; adaptation helps survival and variation and survival ensures an increase of modifications and differentiations, i.e. greater potentialities, some harmful, some excellent. The same result ensues from the action of sexual selection;* all this results from the mechanism by

which the *ovum*, or *egg-cell of the female, is fertilized* by the *spermatozoön* or *seed of the male.*

Thus we perceive that the sexual impulse is not solely an urge to *reproduce and multiply; it directly serves the development and the diversity of all bisexual organic life.* In the remorseless *struggle for existence* the countless kinds of creatures produced by *conjugation* are weeded out by *natural selection*, and eventually (after aeons) finer and stronger types emerge; the amoeba survives, but there arise also mammals and men.

This, then, is the *raison d'être* of the insatiably varietist human sex impulse. *It increases differentiation; it individualizes the race.* If ten women mated with ten men in permanently monogamous pairs, the resultant offspring would obviously be much less varied and diverse than if they all "crossed" and bred with one another. *And so we understand why the human creature, as the most highly organized and varied of all, is also the most polygamous.* He could not have developed his potentialities by sexual selection without a specially active and versatile sex impulse.

And secondly, the ancestral horde could never have survived if the social and gregarious nature of man had not been reenforced by sexual exchanges between members of the same horde. If humanity had been monogamous by instinct, the earliest human or pre-human hordes would have disintegrated into tiny groups and never achieved any social solidarity.[1] Thirdly, exogamy finally led to the intermarriage of different hordes, to larger aggregates, to all increase in human amenities and powers. Fourthly, the primitive hordes would have become enfeebled and degenerate through excessive inbreeding if exogamy had not introduced fresh blood.

In the later stages of social evolution, however, the conditions changed. With an increasing body of traditions and technique *the education of the young in these traditions and techniques became a stronger weapon in the struggle for existence*

[1] Or, we may add, survival in the battles with cold, hunger, and cave-bears! (Translator's Note.)

than racial improvement by heredity.[1] Progress became mainly cultural and psychological rather than *organic*. The race itself became organically fixed or standardized. The human physique, for instance, has been essentially the same since the last Ice Age. The body of *available and necessary knowledge* to be taught the young became larger, the task of imparting it more difficult, and *it was essential that family life should become consolidated, for much of this instruction could only be imparted by and in the family*. And therefore monogamy became more frequent and met with definite approval, and unrestrained varietism in sex relations began to appear harmful, exceptional, and disreputable.[2]

But in the primeval ages when human faculties evolved, sexual neophily and indiscriminate breeding were essential to diversify and improve the human stock and thus to lay the foundations of future achievements, i.e. they had supreme *eugenic value*.

We have now learned to regard the roving sexual inclinations of humanity and the constant tendency to revert to earlier habits with "larger, other eyes". Let us at last cease to "moralize" our primeval ancestors by attributing to them inhibitions and aspirations which have only developed through thousands of years of culture. We can only bring these primeval beings into our comprehension by *mis*understanding them. In the earliest stages of human culture and progress we dimly descry a world so alien to ours that we can only realize its existence with difficulty. If we are to grasp its essentials *we must obliterate all that psychological tradition which culture has built, stone by stone, in our minds and nerves*.

The Geneonomy of Primeval Times

Our psychological and biological knowledge must now be applied to the consideration of the earliest human sexual and

[1] Cf. *Sinn des Lebens und der Wissenschaft* (Prologue to series of Sociological Monographs), by F. Müller-Lyer, pp. 75–80.

[2] Further details in *Evolution of Modern Marriage*, chap. iii. Also *Die Zähmung der Nornen*, p. 22 *et seq.*

family customs. The greatest caution is indicated here in drawing conclusions.

I. Gregarious Origins

But we have attained to *one certainty*. The earliest human and pre-human beings *were gregarious not solitary*. They lived in hordes. The existence and development of articulate speech, by which our forefathers first became distinctively human, proves this irrefutably. The basis of human survival and progress is human gregariousness. This is certain: our other conclusions on this subject can only be hypotheses based on probabilities and analogies.

II. Primeval Endogamy

It is probable that each separate human horde in primeval times avoided the others or was actively hostile to them. For as we descend the human ladder, mentally and culturally, human groups become smaller, sparser, and more isolated, and regard each other with greater suspicion and enmity. Philology teaches us that in ancient language the terms for a stranger and an enemy were originally the same. The same attitude is shown by all gregarious creatures to those outside the horde: by one colony of ants to another, by packs of wild dogs, herds of elephants and monkeys. Thus peace cannot have reigned among primeval human hordes; but war, the fight for life, and especially for the available food-supplies. And the stronger hordes (in numbers or quality) drove away or killed out the weaker, and used the territory and food-supply which they had won.

This separation and suspicion between the rival hordes forced the members of each horde to mate among themselves, i.e. in modern phraseology to commit *incest*, in scientific language to practise *endogamy* like the children of Adam and Eve in Genesis. But would they not necessarily degenerate through such constant inbreeding?

It would take too much of our time and space if we plunged into the protracted scientific controversy on *Endogamy* and

Eugenics.[1] We may recapitulate the most important conclusions thus: Under certain conditions close inbreeding does not appear to have the disastrous effects usually ascribed to it. The professional stockbreeder agrees with the student of anthropology and medicine (Pouchet, Stieda, Orth, Ruppin, Huth, etc.) *that consanguineous parents who are thoroughly healthy will produce healthy offspring; but if the parents suffer from the same constitutional defect it will be inherited by their offspring in an intensified form.* "Among horse-breeders it is axiomatic that a blood stallion of high lineage is mated with his own descendants, and of recent years inbreeding has won more and more advocates in stock-raising circles", says one expert. Reibmayer even goes so far as to say that "in *healthy* stock, consanguineous marriages are favourable, rather than the reverse, to the production of certain qualities".[2] Ribot, Quatrefages, and Ammon agree. Osterlen [3] comments that at present we can more safely recommend marriages of healthy relatives than such between strangers who do not know one another or each other's hygienic or eugenic characteristics. We know that among many ancient and some modern peoples marriages have taken place between brothers and sisters, and even between parents and children, without apparent deterioration of the stock. We may cite the Assyrians, Egyptians, Athenians, Persians, many peoples of Indo-China, both before and after the introduction of Buddhism, the Druses, the Caucasian Mingrelians, and the Royal race of the Sandwich Islands. Thus the Inca of Peru married his eldest sister in order to preserve the purity of her descent from the Sun itself, and among the Mountain Veddahs of Ceylon the younger sister is the chosen. On the other side, stockbreeders maintain that systematic and constant close inbreeding finally exhausts

[1] Cf. especially Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, vol. i, p. 203; Huth, *The Marriage of Near Kin*, London, 1875; Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, chap. xv; Artur Ruppin, *Darwinismus und Sozielwissenschaft*, Jena, 1903, etc.

[2] *Inzucht und Vermischung beim Menschen*, Leipzig, 1897, p. 249.

[3] *Handbuch der medizinischen Statistik*, 1865.

and sterilizes the race, but that the infusion of even only a drop of fresh unrelated blood suffices to neutralize the bad effects of long-continued close inbreeding (Huth).

Thus, *under two essential conditions*, inbreeding seems to lose its perils: firstly, the mating relatives must be "thoroughly healthy"; secondly, there must be, from time to time, an infusion of new blood. The first condition, i.e. physical "fitness" and toughness, is promoted by natural selection in all primitive peoples. The life of savages makes such high and constant demands on muscular activity, sensory keenness, and general endurance, that sickly or sensitive children die before puberty or are killed purposely. Savages have no substantial roof shelter, they sleep on the hard ground or in cold and damp caves, they go about naked or slightly clothed, exposed to the elements, constantly endangered in war or the chase. In our modern civilization, on the contrary, children of defective constitution are reared by the help of medical and hygienic knowledge, and with all the more care the greater their delicacy and defects. They reach puberty, mate, reproduce their own deficiencies in an increasing number of degenerate and defective offspring. Thus savages, who are physically "weeded out" by natural selection, can stand the effects of prolonged and close *endogamy* far better than "civilized" town-dwellers, in whom such stigmata as blindness, deaf-mutism, etc., are not infrequent results of close inbreeding. The artificial checks on the "Survival of the Fittest" have had the result of making "thoroughly healthy", i.e. "fit", people increasingly rare.[1]

III. Primitive Exogamy

But Nature took care *that even primitive and primeval human endogamy* was not wholly without its saving "drops of new blood"; for Nature gave the sexual urge of mankind the *trend towards the unfamiliar and the new.*

[1] Cf. *Zähmung der Nornen*, vol. i, and chap. xi, "Regulation of Population and Selection", in the present work.

To return to our primeval human horde: this instinct towards the new and unfamiliar must have strongly impelled primitive men towards the women of other hordes, when any occasion offered. The *exogamous impulse* must often have conquered the *herd enmities*, just as it does in other gregarious creatures at mating-times. However intense the hatred of horde to horde, the sexual urge at its strongest overwhelms that mutual hatred.

In the lives of neighbouring savage tribes there are sufficient opportunities for such meetings and matings as occurred among the dingoes and the pet dogs of the settlers in Australia. When the men went forth on the chase, or the women to gather roots and wild berries, roving individuals of opposite sexes must have sometimes met, by accident or design, in the depths of ancient forests. The woman yielded freely or was overpowered, and brought into her horde the strain of fresh blood which made her child "different"; stronger, perhaps, or more cunning. These savage love-episodes were perhaps the preliminaries of systematic exogamy: marriage by capture, marriage as an institution, the family, and all the subsequent developments as we must study them.

IV. The Family and Its Origins

As we have pointed out, our answer to the question whether our earliest ancestors were promiscuous or had separate marriage ties and families within the horde can only deal with probabilities, not with certainties. *The hypothesis of monogamy is very unlikely.* How could *the varietist tendency have become so ingrained if the origins of humanity had been monogamous?* And we can hardly doubt that the sexually polygamous tendency must have manifested itself in those ancient times with extreme violence and crudity.

Even to-day the conscientious and consistent practice of monogamy (constancy, exclusive sexual fidelity) demands a very high degree of individual self-control, in spite of all the supporting economic, civic, religious, and ethical sanctions which were undreamt of of yore! Such high and constant

self-control was impossible to really primeval man! Anthropology shows us that human beings follow their primitive instincts the more readily as they are the more rudimentary intellectually and ethically. Biology and psychology support the theory that primeval times knew *human hordes* but no *human homes*. Man was gregarious long before he became domesticated.

We do not need to assume complete promiscuity; there are other modifications and possibilities. Thus Brehm [1] says of the gregarious monkeys in general: "The strongest, oldest, or most cunning male of the herd becomes the leader or 'Old Man'. But not through peaceful election and democratic ballots! Only after obstinate and prolonged quarrels and combat with other candidates for mastery, i.e. with all the other mature males of the herd, does he win sovereignty. The longest teeth and the hardest muscles win. He who refuses to submit is bitten and mauled till he yields obedience. The 'Old Man' exacts complete submission in all respects and from *all* his subjects. He knows no chivalry towards his female companions, he is as violent and dominant as any robber chief. No female member of the herd dares to form intimate relations with a younger male; his eyes are keen and his rule iron. Not only his rivals, but his errant mates, are torn and battered till they learn discretion, and the younger and weaker males are often killed by this brutal sultan if they invade his harem. If his herd attains to great dimensions, some of its members separate and form a new herd under the leadership of another powerful adult male, and the struggle for the mastery over males and females alike of this new herd is begun at once and carried on as before."

We should hardly have imagined this situation deductively; but of course the polygyny of the strongest and cunningest male of the herd must be considered an important factor in improving the stock and producing vigorous and cunning offspring.

[1] *Tierleben*, edit. iii, Leipzig, 1899, vol. i, p. 47.

V. Stages of Development during Primeval and Prehistoric Times

Whatever were the geneonomic conditions in the aeons during which our forefathers changed from simian to human, we cannot logically assume that the original state of things persisted indefinitely and then suddenly leapt the chasm which separated them from the achievements and traditions of even the most rudimentary savages now existent. There must have been prehistoric progress, primeval development; those hundreds of thousands of years—they can hardly have been less!—cannot have been wholly stagnant and similar. For otherwise we should never have progressed beyond their dawn! Just as, with incredible slowness, tools and weapons became more numerous and effective, knowledge and reasoning-power developed, so sociologically changes must have taken place. From the undifferentiated horde there must have evolved some type of organization, i.e. differentiation between the members of the horde.

We must logically assume that the *bases of these first differentiations were wholly organic or "natural"*. There are three main types of organic difference between human beings, i.e.:

I. Differences of Age.
II. Differences of Sex.
III. Differences of Individual Capacity or Faculty, both physical and mental.

The greatest of these dissimilarities is that based on *Age*. Between a child and an adult the differences are greater than between two adults of different sexes. Again, the individual differences between adult man and man or woman and woman in a closely inbred primitive horde must have been much less than between any man and any woman.

We may deduce, then, that the *first differentiation was*:

I. *According to Ages.*—As we shall discuss in our next chapter, the rulers among the most primitive savages we know of are always the old, the experienced, the custodians of tradi-

tion, i.e. of the only Unwritten Law of these tribes. They are, in short, the Elder Statesmen! And the manifestation of this rule by the Ancients (this Gerontocracy) *is the classification by Age Groups*, as described above.

II. When through countless centuries tools and weapons became increasingly effective, and the *battle-axe* or *mace* and *flint-tipped spear* were constructed and perfected, the natural differences between man and woman became emphasized in a very one-sided manner. A woman is at an enormous disadvantage compared to an armed man. And so there began *another differentiation, on mainly sexual lines*, which led to sex-distinctions in work and occupation, to primitive marriage, and the separate family. With these developments we propose to deal after we have summarized the geneonomy of the most primitive living savages.

III. The third differentiation is *that of Occupation or Profession*. This developed much later than the other two, in the early stages of the Familial phase or epoch. (See Chapter VI.)

Thus we may assume three great stages of evolution in prehistoric times:

I. A period of unorganized gregarious life, on the lines of the animal hunting-pack.

II. A period of gregarious or horde life, with classification according to *age*.

III. A period of classification and differentiation according to sex, in which the institutions of marriage and the family were initiated.

Of course these theories are *theories*, not *dogmas*. They aim at replacing the extremely confused and shallow assumptions, which have hitherto prevailed on these problems, by *conclusions which are at least probable in our present degree of knowledge*. For it is some progress to replace inferior hypotheses by those more logical and likely.[1]

[1] By an hypothesis I understand, not an apparent explanation, not an arbitrary attribution or misinterpretation, but in Comte's sense an inductive conclusion, which cannot yet be definitely proved. Hypotheses differ from proved theories by their lesser degree of certainty and serve to make the road clear for scientific theories. The scientific hypothesis would be more appropriately named "Protothesis", as Ostwald suggested.

Summary of Main Points to be Noted Concerning Prehistoric Times

1. Prehistory is the time in which progress and culture originated, in which our ancestors became human. Prehistory achieved articulate speech, tools, the first religious ideas, some abstract concepts, and social organization in Ages and Sex Classifications. It ended with the *Discovery of Fire.*

2. The main portion of prehistory must have lain in the Tertiary Geological Epoch, and probably lasted over several hundred thousand years.

3. Anthropology knows no existent "prehistoric" race. All representatives of prehistoric cultures have long since become extinct.

4. Palaeontology, too, can up till the present give us no information about prehistoric geneonomic conditions.

5. We may assume as definitely proved the *originally gregarious or social nature of mankind*, and that prehistoric men and pre-men lived in hordes or herds, if only because otherwise they could not have invented articulate speech and because progress and tradition could only arise and survive *collectively.*

6. It is equally certain that the human sex impulse is originally and inherently *polygamous*, i.e. drawn to many, and *exogamous*, i.e. drawn to what is unfamiliar—not *monogamous* or drawn only to one.

7. All other problems of primeval and prehistoric geneonomy are as yet unanswerable.

It is as unreliable to assert *definitely* that promiscuity reigned completely within the horde as to assume the existence of separate pair-marriage and separate families within the horde.

8. The tremendous isolation of primitive communities makes it probable that the primeval hordes were *endogamous*, i.e. practised inbreeding (and what we call *incest*). But the naturally exogamous tendency of mankind would modify inbreeding by occasional *exogamy*, i.e. mating with strangers.

9. It is probable that the primeval horde, even in prehistoric ages, became classified according to Age, and then Sex. Prehistory must have had its achievements in culture and progress, otherwise subsequent achievements would have been impossible. These millenniums cannot, therefore, have been entirely similar and stagnant.

CHAPTER III

THE EARLY TRIBAL PHASE

DEFINITION. REPRESENTATIVES. CRITIQUE

PREHISTORIC and primeval times were succeeded by the Early Tribal phase of human development. *This lasted from the discovery of fire till the invention and utilization of artificial sources of food.* Therefore those primitive hunters who are still ignorant of stockbreeding and agriculture, but live on the products of the chase and on such edible plants as grow wild, are in this stage. We call this phase of development Early Tribal or Early Kinship, because it includes the rise and earlier forms of social organization by systems of Consanguinity. In the next phase, synchronizing with the introduction of agriculture, the Kinship phase reaches its highest expansion.

While the geneonomy of really prehistoric times is enveloped in mystery and corresponds to the prenatal and foetal stages of human life, the Early Tribal or Kinship phase is at least illumined by a certain faint glimmer. For we have with us now on earth several remnants of tribes who are still in the Stone Age and the Kinship phase. They are, alas! only small and scattered remnants, whose message to us from the past is full of lacunae and gaps. Those now surviving include the Australian Natives,[1] the South African Bushmen, the Central African Pygmies, the Hill Veddahs in Ceylon, the Mincopies on the Andaman Islands, the Aeta on the Philippines, the Tierra del Fuegians, etc. They are the peoples on the *borderline*, the edge of subsistence; they live in deserts and primeval forests, in remote islands, and in the rigours of Arctic and Antarctic regions, and represent the last survivors of a period now nearly past, but once—to judge by the witness of archaeology—spread all over the earth and probably millenniums in duration.

Can we use these surviving remnants to form a complete

[1] The Tasmanians became extinct in the nineteenth century. (Translator's Note.)

and accurate picture of the Early Kinship phase in past aeons? Not without much hesitation and reservation.

For, primarily, all these surviving peoples are now in much worse material conditions, more barren and severe climates, than must once have housed them. We cannot suppose that their remote predecessors lived by choice in the droughty wildernesses of Central Australia or the Kalahari, or among eternal snow and ice! Not by choice, nor by necessity, for humanity could only have begun its long ascent in a warm climate and among fertile soils, where temperature and vegetation were favourable to the nakedness and weapons of our forefathers. So our present-day primitive hunting-tribes have "come down in the world", so far as luck goes. They have "seen better days". And this influence of severe material privation may have altered their social—and especially their geneonomic—customs.

The barren soil and lack of food break up the community and drive it apart. And bad and barren hunting-grounds can only shelter comparatively *small hordes*. Warmth and fruitful lands, on the contrary, often make large aggregates possible. Thus many species of apes, e.g. baboons, form troupes of several hundred members in Tropical Africa to-day.

Secondly, we must logically ask: *Why*, in the struggle for the spoils of the earth, should just *these particular tribes have come off so badly*? They can hardly have gone willingly into such exile; they most probably were driven forth by strong victorious enemies. And it is very likely that they were the weaker, and the vanquished, because *the gregarious and social instincts*, the most powerful weapons in the primitive struggles for existence, were less developed among them than among their more fortunate conquerors and supplanters.[1]

[1] I cannot accept as correct the frequent explanation that our racial ancestors must have been of superior stuff to the present-day savages, because the savages have remained at the same level of culture since untold ages, whereas our ancestors have evolved rapidly. Anyone who knows the hide-bound conservatism of the European peasantry must hesitate before accepting this explanation. I think, moreover, that the wish to progress, *to innovate*, is lacking among real primitive individuals, and that culture and progress have resulted from the contact and interaction of groups. See *History of Social Development*, pp. 98–129.

Many sociologists have considered these primitive survivors as degenerates, and claimed that the earliest geneonomic institutions were to be sought, not among the primitive hunters, but among the primitive . ˙. ˙ ˙ ˙ i.e. among the aborigines of America and India (the Dravidians), the Oceanians, and at the most among the Australian aborigines. Thus while some savants, with total lack of critical balance or acumen, declared the surviving savage tribes to be the exact copies of our earliest ancestors, other sociologists thought themselves intellectually justified in treating these remnants of an early cultural achievement with neglect and contempt, as "degenerate" and "worthless".

But criticism may be carried too far, and contemptuous scepticism is as fruitless and unreliable as indiscriminate credulity. If we keep to the "Golden Mean" and carefully examine the more primitive hunters, we shall conclude that they offer sociological material of the greatest value.

For they are, first of all, on the lowest rung of the ladder, so far as our knowledge extends. Man's original and earliest occupation and livelihood was by *hunting*. We may thus expect to find among the hunters, geneonomically, as well as otherwise, more primitive conditions and institutions than among the primitive agriculturists, among whom agriculture has led to more or less fixed domiciles, and thus to far greater dissimilarity to the roving nomads of primeval times.

Secondly, *we have no scientific proof at all of the racial degeneracy of these savages*. Their institutions and habits are so entirely in harmony with their means of subsistence, i.e. the chase, that we must conclude that they are very ancient survivals. But even if they had degenerated they are sociologically important; for in degenerating they must have adapted themselves to a lower grade of activity, and have rejected all the concepts and material achievements which were unsuited to, or unpracticable on, that lower grade of culture.

Finally, comparative study of the hunters will teach us how very little we really *know* about the origins of marriage, the family, Exogamy, Totemism, Patriarchate, Matriarchate, and

how cautious we must be in avoiding those *premature syntheses* which formerly played so prominent a rôle in sociology. In many cases they have shed light, for they were inspiring and ingenious errors. We shall be able to find much that is illuminating and suggestive in an indirect sense. Even if we must avoid the assumption that these hunting savages are the exact replicas of our earliest human ancestors, they will fit into an indispensable niche in the series of cultural phases and supply us with a picture—however dim and faded—of the chief processes in the *Early Tribal or Kinship phase.*

They must not be cast aside with contempt, but studied for sociological enlightenment.

A. Tribal Institutions of the Early Kinship Phase

The various types of Kinship group are bewilderingly numerous and diverse; this in itself shows how important the Kinship phase has been in human development, and what aeons of time its evolution must have occupied.

We may divide these tribal and kinship groupings into two grades:

I. The horde;
II. The confederation of hordes.

The horde, pure and simple, is the lowest rung of the ladder of human social organization, and is found among the Tasmanians,[1] Bushmen, Tierra del Fuegians, Veddahs, Botocudos of Brazil, Eskimos, and other contemporary Stone Age hunters. These races live in small hordes, like troupes of monkeys, or wolf-packs; they are wanderers, without fixed abodes; they have no permanent chiefs and no differences of comparative riches and abject poverty. They inhabit forests or deserts, and are in all respects the most primitive human beings of whom we know.[2]

[1] Now all extinct. (Translator's Note.)
[2] Cf. *History of Social Development*, pp. 68–101.

These hordes are composed of single consanguineous groups, who "hold together" normally, but disperse sometimes in search of food. For the chase is a stern master, the woodlands are easily denuded, and the hunters scatter to seek their prey. The land which is their hunting-ground is common property to all the men of the horde. In some cases the booty of the chase is divided according to families: e.g. among the Botocudos and the Eskimos. And in certain parts of the Australian mainland there is still a good deal of indigenous communalism.[1]

According to the anthropologist Tschudi, the Botocudo hordes number between 80 and 100 individuals. According to Martius, 10 to 60 adult males, and Keane says from 10 to 20 "families". Blumentritt and Schadenberg say that the Filipino Aetas go in hordes of 20 to 30 men. Lichtenstein says the Bushmen are only met with in sparse and small hordes, and even then often disperse under stress of hunger. Burchell, however, reckons the number of *families* in the horde as between 20 and 30, and Baines says 25 families is the average. Among the Fuegians in Patagonia, one wigwam is used in common by up to five families, but generally by only two. Bridges says they live in kinship "Septs", which they call *Ukuhr* or House. King and Fitzroy report that hunger and lack of food prevent any larger aggregate of persons from remaining together for more than a few days in Tierra del Fuego. Among the Veddahs of Ceylon, Sarrasin states that a number of related families form a consanguineous horde or sept, called *Warga*. These families consist *of more than two generations*, and search for food separately during most of the year, but unite their forces in the rainy season. And among the Eskimo the hordes generally do not exceed five to six families, also comprising two adult generations as well as children, for parents and children remain together while they live, even after the marriage of the latter.[2] I quote these details in order to demonstrate that however small these communities

[1] *History of Social Development*, pp. 155–57.
[2] *For* material, see Cunow and Westermarck, *passim*.

may be they are *hordes, not single family units*: man is gregarious, even on the lowest rungs.

And the dividing-lines between horde and horde are not only *spatial* and *local*: to regard them as such is superficial. The hordes are each and all *geneonomical groups*: assemblages of persons related by blood to one another, i.e. Kinship groups. Their isolation makes this inevitable; they grow by natural, i.e. biological, increase. Just as in remote mountain villages to-day, in certain countries, all the villagers are interrelated, and marriages with "strangers" are very rare. But these most primitive hordes have as yet no kinship organization. They have neither *Sept-names* nor *Totems*. For *Sept-name* and *Totem* are simply means of distinguishing between kinships, and can only develop when, *after customary exogamy*, the Kinship groups have intermixed and become self-conscious. Thus the isolated horde is a primitive sept or kinship, without name or totem, a group of blood relations.

The isolation of these hordes makes them endogamous by necessity. Ethnology confirms this.[1]

Thus among the Veddahs of Ceylon (according to Bailey, *Transactions of Ethnological Society*, New Series, vol. ii, p. 294) marriage between a man and his younger sister was regarded as normal and proper, whereas with the elder sister such union would inspire horror, just as it would among us to-day. Barrow [2] relates that among the Bushmen there were no prohibited degrees, except between brothers and sisters and parents and children. The Eskimos permit marriage between first cousins, but there is a rule that a man may not marry his wife's sister.[3] Among the Andamanese Mincopies and the Fuegians exogamy has not been—apparently—systematized. Tschudi [4] says of the Botocudos: "Only rarely do they seek wives outside their own

[1] A compendium of sources and literature on endogamous marriages exists in Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*, vol. ii, p. 281 *et seq.*

[2] *Travels into the Interior of South Africa*, London, 1801, p. 276.

[3] Captain Lyon, *Private Journal of Discovery under Captain Parry*, London, 1924, p. 353.

[4] *Reisen durch Süd Amerika*, Leipzig, 1866, p. 283.

horde, whose members are closely interrelated." Isolation leads to incest, even in more advanced culture grades. According to R. P. du Tertre,[1] the idea of crime in these matters was so foreign to the Caribs that fathers married their daughters, and even (though more rarely) mothers their sons. And often a man would marry two sisters, or a mother and her young daughter.

Capture of Women (Primitive Exogamy)

Even in the isolated horde endogamy has its exceptions. It is reported of all savages *that whenever opportunity offers, they steal women from other tribes and carry them off by force.* Among some tribes *marriage by capture* seems more frequent than endogamous marriage within the tribe.

It was recounted of the Tasmanians by Bishop Nixon "that though the numerous tribes of which the population of the island consisted were constantly at war with one another . . . it was rarely the custom amongst them to select wives from their own tribes, but rather to take them, furtively or by open force, from the neighbouring clans".[2]

Thus Nansen says of Greenland that in the early days marriage was a very unceremonious affair. If an Eskimo desired a girl he went to her family tent (or *igloo*) and dragged her off by the hair to his own abode. Sometimes he asked trusty friends to secure the maiden for him, but this friendly aid always took the form of a sudden assault and capture.

King and Fitzroy report that among the Fuegians marriage by capture is often purely ceremonial. In Australia, marriage by capture has been largely superseded by the peaceable forms of exogamy, but survived among the wilder and poorer tribes. David Collins [3] gives an account of the violence of these savage abductions: "The poor wretch is stolen upon in the absence

[1] *Histoire Générale des Antilles*, Paris, 1667, p. 377.
[2] R. Nixon, Bishop of Tasmania, *The Cruise of the Beacon*, London, 1857, pp. 26–29.
[3] *An Account of the English Colony in N.S.W.*, London, 1804, p. 368.

of her protectors. Being first stupefied with blows, inflicted with clubs or wooden swords, on the head, back, and shoulders, every one of which is followed by a stream of blood, she is then dragged through the woods by one arm, with a perseverance and violence that, it might be supposed, would displace it from its socket. The lover, or rather the ravisher, is regardless of the stones or broken pieces of trees which may lie in his route, being anxious only to convey his prize in safety to his own party, where a scene ensues too shocking to relate. This outrage is not resented by the relations of the female, who only retaliate by a similar outrage when they have the opportunity. This is so constantly the practice among them that even the children make it a play-game or exercise."

The abducted women become the mates of their captors, and remain incorporated into the horde to which they have been handed over.

Among the Greenland Eskimos, marriages with near relatives were considered less suitable than with strangers; the latter secured stronger offspring.[1] Petroff says of the Alaskan Togiagemuts[2] that they often change their hordes, joining or even forming new ones. As soon as a youth is able to build a kayak (boat) and man it, he leaves the circle of his family and wanders off whither his fancy takes him to seek a wife.

To recapitulate the essential qualities of the *isolated horde* we may say that (*a*) it is the simplest social structure of which we have any knowledge; (*b*) that it has no connection with other hordes, but lives mostly at war with them; (*c*) that it is a Kinship group, i.e. its members are blood relations; (*d*) that it is endogamous, i.e. *inbred*, but occasionally the necessary "new blood" is provided by the capture of women from other hordes and "primitive exogamy". Most of these distinguishing features recall exactly the herd life of gregarious animals, so we must assume their existence among the prehistoric and primeval hordes.

[1] F. Nansen, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

[2] *Report on the Population, Industries, and Resources of Alaska*, p. 135.

But the small number of members and the existence of *any* separate family units—as in extant savage hordes—must not be attributed to such in primeval times.

Horde-Groupings

(We might also term them *Interlocking Hordes*)

When exogamy has interrelated *separate hordes* they form another stage in the long road from the primeval horde to the Great State.

In order to study these institutions—which attained considerable development even in the Early Kinship phase—we must turn to the great source of information on that phase—to Australia, where kinship concepts and habits have been standardized for millenniums. At the time of its discovery by Europeans this Island Continent was (thinly) inhabited by a race of Negroid type, living in Stone Age conditions, and now rapidly dying out. This source of information is therefore the more valuable because it is precarious. Systematic research is only beginning, but while we cannot give *final* conclusions we may classify some of the many different types of Kinship groups and then endeavour to suggest how they arose.

The Kinship Group of the Australian Aborigines

We note, firstly, great variety and complexity of grouping, which may be classified under three main headings: [1]

1. The first type is called the *Kurnai* type. The hordes here are patriarchal (i.e. led by man) and patrilineal—that is, they reckon descent through the father. But they have no totems.

[1] For material on this topic, see J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, 4 vols. London, 1910, vol. i, pp. 173–579; Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, London, 1899; Northcote W. Thomas, *Kinship Organisations and Group Marriage in Australia*, Cambridge, 1906; Andrew Lang, *The Secret of the Totem*, London, 1905; H. Cunow, *Die Verwandschafts-organisationen der Australneger*; Grosse, *Die Formen der Familie*, chap. iv; Cunow, *Die ökonomischen Grundlagen der Mutterherrschaft*, *Neue Zeit*, vol. 1, p. 108 *et seq.*

2. The second type is also patriarchal and patrilineal, but has totems. It may be distinguished as the *Narrinyeri* type.

3. In the third type we find the patriarchate, but descent is reckoned through the mother; and there are totems. (Matriarchal hordes and groups are not found among hunting peoples until the invention of agriculture and the development of the Kinship group to its full phase.) The typical tribe of the last organization are the *Kamilaroi*.

I. *Patriarchate. Male Descent. No Totems*

The *Kurnai* (or "Men") inhabit the southern part of Victoria and are divided into five major *local* groups, which are named after their districts: (1) Kroatungolung; (2) Brabrolung; (3) Tatungolung; (4) Braiakolung; (5) Bratanolung. *Lung* means Father, or "Old Comrade", "Big Brother".

These local groups each comprise a number of single hordes. Thus the Kroatungolung may belong to the Ben, Dura, Wurmungatti, or Brt-britta. These are quite autonomous, and from *thirty* to *fifty* members strong. All members of a horde consider themselves to be blood relations. They call each other fathers, sons, brothers, and sisters. They show considerable solidarity, and exercise feuds and vendettas. But they have no totems, and thus form no *exclusive* blood groups. The duty of avenging death (blood-feud, vendetta) may also devolve on a member of another horde.

There are no permanent and exclusive chieftains. The boldest and most skilful of the adult men takes over the leadership as occasion offers. But *age* is highly honoured. The Ancients are the arbiters of custom. Often the medicine-man or magician leads the horde.

The marriage sanctions and prohibitions are as follows:

A. The Kurnai may only mate in his own Age class.

B. He may not mate with a cousin nearer than the fifth degree. Thus a couple whose (say) great-grandfather and great-grandmother were brother and sister may not marry. This

rule extends, of course, into many of the neighbouring hordes. A woman when she marries enters her husband's horde, and her children are reckoned as his. If he dies first, she remains in his horde, and becomes the wife of his younger brother.

The tribe appeared to have no definite institutions of a "political" type, and was quite isolated.

II. *Patriarchate. Patrilineal Descent. Totemism*

The *Narrinyeri*[1] on the lower Murray River, and along the coast to Lacepede Bay, are composed of eighteen hordes, named after their districts. *Inyeri* means "belong to". Each horde is independent. The Old Men consider and decide the affairs of the horde, but their decisions must be confirmed by the younger men. Quarrels between the hordes are settled by the Old Men. Here, too, there is no Constitution, no fixed Law: matters are dealt with as they arise. Chieftainship is temporary and occasional, and is in the hands of the "fittest" to grasp and hold it.

Members of each horde are considered as relatives, and the horde itself is a Kinship group or a Sept.[2] And each Sept has its symbolic animal or plant, its *Totem*. The Pankinyeri have the flying-fish, the Kondarlinyeri the whale, the Mungulinyeri the dingo, others have the ant, swallow, and crossbill. But the Totem animal or plant is not shown any special honour or consideration. It is hunted and devoured, but care is taken that no "foreign" medicine-man shall get hold of its remains —bones or feathers, etc.

The Narrinyeri are stringently exogamous. None may marry into their own horde. *And the Narrinyeri are also forbidden to marry the nearest relatives of their mothers.* The children belong to the father's horde. Marriage is by barter or exchange: a sister of the bridegroom-to-be is often offered the stranger horde as the price of one of their own women. If he has no

[1] Cf. Rev. George Taplin, *The Narrinyeri*, Cunow, p. 79.

[2] *Sept* is a cognate of *sib* or *kin*. It means related by blood, without the special connotations of the patriarchal family. The scientific term for cousins, brothers and sisters is *siblings*. (Translator's Note.)

sister he serves one of the powerful Elders of the horde, and asks as a reward that the Elder shall give his daughter as an exchange for the bride.

III. *Patriarchal Horde with Matrilineal Descent and Totems*

The *Kamilaroi* are divided into two Phratries, the *Duli* and the *Kupathin*. Members of each Phratry consider themselves related, i.e. *as descendants of the same ancestress*. Each Phratry has three component Septs, and in these Septs descent is also reckoned by the mother. The Septs practise Totemism.

The Duli Phratry includes:	The Kupathin Phratry includes:
1. The Lizards	4. The Emus
2. The Pandys	5. The Bandicoots
3. The Opossums	6. The Black Snakes

But these Septs are in no sense *local* or *regional*. There is a systematic *cross-division both by district and by descent*. The regional groups are the hordes, which are composed of members of various Septs and both Phratries. Thus a horde of twenty persons might consist of eight members of the Lizard Sept, two Opossums, six Emus, and four Snakes.

There is a further system of classification as well as the Totems and Septs which is elaborate enough to have *four* headings: there are special names for men and women in each marriage group.

	Men	*Women*
I Class	Ippai	Ippata
II Class	Murri	Mata
III Class	Kumbo	Buta
IV Class	Kubbi	Kubbota

The rules are as follows:

An Ippai may only marry a Kubbota (Class I and Class IV). A Murri may only marry a Buta (Classes II and III). A Kumbo only a Mata, and a Kubbi only an Ippata.

The children of these marriages ***belong to the Mother's Sept, but not to her marriage group***. These ***groups change with each generation;*** and

The children of an Ippata	are Kumbo and Buta
The children of a Mata	are Kubbi and Kubbota
The children of a Buta	are Ippai and Ippata
The children of a Kubbota	are Murri and Mata

The class of the Father is ignored.

The children have the name and membership of the other Class or Marriage Group in their Mother's Sept. For Murri and Mata, Kubbi and Kubbota belong to the three Septs of the Duli Phratry; Kumbo and Buta, Ippai and Ippata to the Kupathin Phratry.

Through this elaborate series of classifications no Kamilaroi may marry into his own Phratry or Sept; and he can only make a restricted choice among the Sept members of the other Phratry.

Among the Dieri tribe there are two marriage groups or classes; and among the Arunta as many as eight. The tribes with double or fourfold classification may reckon descent through either the father or the mother. The Arunta, i.e. *eightfold* classification, is said to accompany male descent as a rule.

Theories of the Origin of the Australian Kinship Organizations

Any theory about the development of the Early Kinship phase has to answer fundamental questions; it has to account for exogamy, for patriarchal and/or matriarchal predominance, for totemism, and for the first organization within the hordes. Unfortunately, at the present time, investigators have not arrived at a unanimous explanation of the origin of the Australian Kinship groups. Their hypotheses differ very widely.

According to one hypothesis the primeval horde produced, firstly, the patriarchal horde with male descent, and then the patriarchal horde with descent reckoned through the mother.

If we refer to our conclusions on primeval times (Chapter II), we may suggest a fairly clear succession of developments, as follows:

1. Endogamous original horde, with very occasional exogamy. No systematic capture of women.

2. Individual hordes with marriage by capture. The captured women become members of their captor's horde.

3. Exogamous hordes with exchange-marriage; barter of women, and

4. As a result, the patriarchal horde with male descent.

According to this hypothesis, occasional exogamous matings developed into the ferocious capture of women which is still practised among the lowest Australian aborigines as the first stage in amalgamating separate hordes.

But the capture of women had certain grave disadvantages even for the captors. It could only occasionally be successful; the invader was often struck down by his victim's tribesmen; and success was followed by persistent feuds and attempts at retaliation in kind. The women of the aggressor's horde were in constant jeopardy of similar treatment. These disadvantages could be met by a peaceable *exchange of women* between the different hordes. And this solution had been practised already, no doubt, in the purely material and economic field. Originally, no doubt, any superfluity of goods, e.g. flint implements, in one tribe was promptly appropriated, by stealth or force, by other tribesmen.

In order to obviate feuds and losses men learned to offer goods in exchange, and inaugurated the system of barter.[1]

As in the *economic sphere*, so also *geneonomically*; if the neighbour was too strong to defy, i.e. strong enough to placate, a woman was offered in exchange for one of his tribe or horde.

There began a continuous fusion of blood by intermarriages between the hordes adjacent to one another, and there arose from this fusion larger horde aggregates, i.e. an enormous sociological advance.

Women were the material and the symbol of this new peace and alliance between formerly hostile hordes. These

[1] See *History of Social Development*, pp. 269–71.

aggregates became not only larger, but more differentiated. They became allies in war, and where they competed with isolated hordes for hunting-grounds, the latter were bound to lose the struggle.

Thus exogamy had proved its *survival value*. And it spread for another—psychological—reason. The more vigorous stocks are distinctly more exogamous, more adventurous, than the apathetic and anaemic. Thus exogamy was bound to supersede endogamy in the social struggle for life.

And as soon as exogamy had become customary and preferred, it became "right"; it was sanctioned by religion and tradition. Endogamy was despised, and finally utterly condemned as what we associate with degeneracy and crime: incest!

The evolutional process would thus be: isolated horde; patriarchal horde with exogamy and capture of women; exchange of women; intermarriage and association of hordes.

Patriarchate with Totemism

As soon as the primitive hordes formed closer relations it was felt necessary to distinguish one from another by means of special names. Thus arose Totemism: the names and symbols among hunting-tribes naturally were animals or plants. Thus the most primitive type was probably that of the *Kurnai*: the *Narrinyeri* is a trifle more elaborate, less crude. *But how did the Kamilaroi type arise, with its Matrilineal descent?*

There are three theories: the first, that matriarchy arose out of patriarchal conditions; the second, that it developed independently; the third, that it preceded the patriarchate. Cunow sponsors the first hypothesis, Graebner the second.

According to Cunow, the process was roughly as follows: In the patriarchal horde communities, where descent and horde membership were reckoned in the male line, there arose a demand to emphasize the need for exogamy and the interrelations of members by forbidding marriage with maternal

kindred, as among the Kurnai. This prohibition was expressed by giving the children the names of their mother's Kin or Sept: thus totemism denotes maternal descent. There followed a much closer interlocking of the single regional hordes. *The maternal Septs interdigitate throughout the fabric of the patriarchal hordes, and keep them together* (Kamilaroi type). If one of the Dieri tribe visits another horde, and his totem is not known, the first question is "Minna murdu?" ("Of what Sept art thou?"). "If there are men of the same totem in the horde they give the stranger hospitality and protection, and if required they supply him with one of their women for the time of his sojourn", says Cunow.[1]

The theory just stated is supported by the general superiority of Australian tribes with matrilineal totemism over those wholly patriarchal, and also by the greater solidarity and chance of survival and complexity of this double kinship.

But according to other experts, Fritz Graebner especially, the two ways of reckoning descent and kinship arose independently. Graebner reasons from the fact that male descent predominates among the aborigines of West Australia, and female descent in the Eastern half. He makes very precise and valuable researches, and concludes that both systems are original, and that they have subsequently mixed and modified one another considerably.

A third view was formerly generally accepted, but is now the least favoured. It derives the patrilineal reckoning of descent from the matrilineal. It was supported by Lang, who regarded the horde with patriarchal organization as the summit of evolution, as being most consolidated and integrated.

Which of these three hypotheses is correct, research cannot yet decide.

Nor are anthropologists agreed on the origin of the *marriage groups* (e.g. the Kamilaroi system).

Cunow and Morgan make the illuminating suggestion that these are simply a modified survival of the Age-classification

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 111

system, designed to prevent unions between relatives in ascending or descending degrees of kindred. In the double class grouping the older generation may not marry into the next; so the first and third, second and fourth, have the same names. The fourfold and eightfold (Arunta) groupings evolved from the double by the association or division of hordes, according to Wundt and others. This explanation is supported by the fact that the names often have an age connotation: thus *Kubbi* is said to mean young, and *Kumbo* big.

General Observations on the Origins of Exogamy, Matriarchy, Patriarchy, and Totemism

Thus it will be understood that we have no *certain* knowledge of how the Early Kinship phase developed. Formerly the tendency was to *simplify* too much; to indulge in speculations and theories which have largely proved fanciful and premature. But we now realize how wide a field there is for intense and *inductive* research, and that no one detailed explanation seems adequate. We can only make general observations. For example, on

1. *The Origin of Exogamy*

The Kinship group (or Sept) has obviously been the parent of all associations of hordes and blood relationships. The Sept was the original horde; not the Sept in its more elaborate totemized, patriarchal or matriarchal forms, but the *group of blood relations*. And these hordes and groups were associated by means of exogamy, i.e. by intermarriage, by the extension of kinship to members of other hordes.

But how is exogamy to be explained? Opinions differ greatly.[1] According to the oldest explanation, primitive man had leisure to observe the ill-effects of continued inbreeding and sought fresh blood. We shall deal more fully with this in a later treatise, *The Taming of the Fates*. Let it suffice to say that, as an explanation, it ignores primitive mentality. It ascribes

[1] They are summarized by Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. iv.

a biological knowledge of much later growth. It is obvious that sexual antipathy between parents and children, brothers and sisters, is inherent, and has naught to do with eugenics. Other authorities say that the older men appropriated the women of the tribe so that the youths were forced to seek mates among strangers and enemies. But among primitive peoples the older men do not seem to possess harems as a rule, and there are generally prohibitions of marriage between the various Age Classes. Schurtz says that the tendency of the men to form groups and brotherhoods led to the women's institution of matriarchy. It can hardly be maintained that these concepts and institutions were within the scope of tribes in the Early Kinship phase—or their comprehension.

According to McLennan and Wundt, exogamy arose out of the capture of women, and marriage by capture evolved into marriage by barter or exchange. But this theory gives no explanation of *why* women should be bartered for and exchanged, when they were already available in the barterers' own camp and tribe.

Our view is that exogamy is the expression of that *inherent need for sexual variety*, which not only survives to the present day, but may also be observed as a general rule of organic life. This "desire for strange women" led first to primitive occasional exogamy, then to marriage by capture, then to peaceable marriage by exchange or barter, then to the reprobation of marriage with near kin, and then, through the interlocking of hordes by intermarriage, to the strange "tables of forbidden degrees" which we have sketched in the preceding pages.

2. *Origins of Patriarchate and Matriarchate*

The earlier anthropologists believed the Matriarchate to be the original institution, and the Patriarchate a subsequent form. They reasoned that the relation between mother and child was obvious and unmistakable, but that paternity must always be a matter of faith and probability, and that the

primitive savage does not always realize the connection between pregnancy and the sexual act. *Mater certa, pater incertus!* It is also indisputable that in a much more advanced stage of development, in the higher phases of Barbarism, i.e. in the Agricultural Ages, the Matriarchate existed and changed into strictly patriarchal institutions in the Early City stage (e.g. Greco-Roman civilizations). *But that does not rule out the possibility that the phases before Agricultural Matriarchate were Patriarchal.*

We now recognize that the original isolated hordes *cannot have known either form of parental predominance.* As father and mother belong to one or the same horde or sept, i.e. Kinship group, the question as to which sept the child belongs to has no meaning. And among no primitive savages [1] living in isolated hordes have we yet found any matriarchal customs. The Matriarchate is evidently *not an original institution, whatever place it may take in later development.* It could only arise *after* exogamy had led to the intermarriage between hordes or septs.

But which is first in time: matriarchate or patriarchate?

Separate hordes may have been connected in two ways: *either through the association of previously alien and hostile hordes or through the division of one horde into two or more as a result of natural increase.* In the first case, when *two hordes unite*, the exogamy that causes them to unite is the result of marriage by capture, and in this case descent will be reckoned through the male, and the children will belong to his horde. In the second case, when a large horde separates, and the two hordes remain on a friendly footing, and at not too great a distance, exogamy can be the result not only of *marriage by capture*, but also of *marriage by service.* (Cf. the Biblical story of Jacob serving seven years for Rachel.) In the cases of service-marriage, matriarchate may result from exogamy. Thus associated hordes *may be* based either on male or female

[1] The term *savages* in Dr. Müller-Lyer's classification means tribes in the stage of development in which artificial sources of food are unknown, i.e. essentially *hunters.* (Translator's Note.)

descent. But we are not yet in a position to say which form of evolution predominated.

3. *Origin of Totemism*

Here, too, we have hypotheses, but no definite proof. Many savants derive Totem terms from old legends and myths. Wundt maintains that Totemism arose from the belief in reincarnation of the soul in animals. I think we must start our speculations from the fact that among savages in isolated hordes Totemism has not been found. *The Totem accompanies interrelations, i.e. intermarriages of hordes.* For them and them only is there the need and urge *to mark differences* by special names. For hunters the most obvious and distinctive names are animal: "the hawks", "the bears", etc. Children repeat these personifications in their games. When the usage of an animal name for a horde had taken firm root in custom, the animal so honoured became a centre of legend and story (the same happens to-day in the case of many family names, especially in the hereditary governing classes). Then the totem animal is accepted as the tribal forefather, and accorded some measure of consideration and even reverence.

We will herewith leave the subject of *kinship* or tribalism, and consider the closer and narrower geneonomical structure, the *Family* and *Family Life* in the Early Kinship phase.

B. Marriage and the Family in the Early Kinship Phase

Ethnology knows as yet of no existing savages who do not know how to kindle fire, or who have not some kind of primitive "religious" or magic cult. And equally it knows of no contemporary savages among whom Marriage and the Family are wholly absent. Even on the lowest rung of the cultural ladder known to us among primitive hunters, man and woman are associated in a more or less rigid marriage bond, and the hordes are divided into separate families of parents and children.

Obviously, however, at this stage marriage is cruel, unequal, and coarse.[1] The man, as a rule, is absolute lord and master of his wife. He can illtreat her, beat or mutilate her in the most painful manner, hire her to other men, i.e. in our sense of the term, prostitute her; he can sell her outright for goods or exchange her for a woman he fancies more; he can drive her away when she is old or ill; but he may not kill her, for this would expose him to the vengeance of her blood kindred.

The division of labour between the sexes exemplifies this rough tyranny, for almost all arduous and unpleasant tasks fall to the woman's lot.[2] The man is essentially a hunter and a warrior. He provides the *animal* food of the tribe. He constructs the weapons and tools necessary for the chase and warfare. He also teaches the boys of the tribe how to fight and hunt, when they have reached a certain age. Almost everything else is woman's work. She has to search out and bring the *vegetable* food—berries, roots, buds, etc.—from the forest. She must "hew wood and draw water". She must tend the indispensable fire and see it does not die. She must set up the tent or hut and dismantle it again, dress the skins of beasts, make them into some sort of clothing, row the canoes. And, of course, she must feed and tend the children from birth; and the period of lactation is very long among savages. Above all she is the burden-bearer, the carrier of all goods and chattels on the tribe's constant wanderings from place to place. Tents and poles and food are piled on her back as well as babies and children, while the men lounge alongside erect and unburdened.

Even the spoils of the chase must sometimes be dragged home by the women, as soon as they are struck down. Eskimos and many North American "braves" would consider it beneath their dignity to pull the dead seal out of the water, or carry the dead deer to the camp. A Chippeway chieftain told the

[1] Cf. Grosse, *Formen der Familie*, chap. iv.
[2] See *History of Social Development*, pp. 205–09.

traveller Hearne, that women were made to work and labour. One of them could carry or drag as much as two men (!). They were needed to put up tents, make clothing, keep it in repair, and provide warmth at night. In short, they were indispensable on a long or hard march. Yet they cost little. For, as they had to do all the cooking, they could subsist by licking the fat off their fingers in time of scarcity![1] Women must keep away from all the special circle of men's activities: these are strictly taboo. Custom, tradition, "morality", in short, are relentless here. And equally men are forbidden to do "women's work", or help with it, even if she faints under the load. Man's work is lordly; hers is almost as much despised as slave work at a later stage of history.

The custom of separating the sexes at their meal-times is typical of the utter subjugation of women; it is practised among many hunting-tribes, and even others. Primitive savages, as a rule, do not think women and little children fit to eat with the head of the family. Their turn only comes, after the men have slaked their hunger.

Their methods of obtaining a wife are equally significant. She is acquired, like any other useful or desirable object, *by robbery, exchange and barter, or as a reward for services rendered.* The most primitive and congenial method, marriage by capture (or simply rape), can only be practised occasionally between hostile tribes, and is regulated and restrained by *customary exogamy*. Among exogamous tribes a favourite method is to offer a sister or daughter in exchange, and among some peoples this leads to the betrothal of immature children. In this stage of development *service-marriage* also occurs. If the Australian "black fellow" has no sister to offer in exchange for a bride, he shares the wives of his brothers, or he has intercourse with other women by stealth, or he serves for a wife, like Jacob. Among the Bushmen the period of service sometimes lasts for years, during which the bridegroom supplies his father-in-

[1] See Samuel Hearne, *Journey to the Northern Ocean*, pp. 70–90. (Dated 1797.)

law's family with game.[1] If the husband dies first, the widow passes to his brother or next of kin, like a piece of property.

The marriage ceremony is generally very crude and simple. Captain C. F. Hall [2] says the Eskimos have no special ritual. Among the African Bushmen a marriage took place if and when man and woman agreed in performing the act of intercourse.[3]

The form of marriage at this stage of culture is optional or "permissive" polygamy. Every man takes as many wives as he is able to *obtain and feed.* But the limited nature of the savage food-supplies, the risk and toil of getting the food, and the limited number of available women, reduce possibilities for most men to "monogamy by necessity". The marriages are what we term *syndyasmic*: loose and not very stable pairings. Men's arbitrary caprices are restrained by the usefulness of their slave-wives: *if they repudiate them, they lose their labour.* Marital fidelity is a very "uncertain quantity"; but if the man discovers his wife's adultery, he punishes it cruelly if he has not commanded or permitted it. For he often lends his wife to guests, or exchanges her for their wives; he hires her for payment in goods, or exchanges her for another permanently. The "double standard" is in full force already. Greffrath [4] says of the Australian aborigines of the Northern territory: "Marriage is not binding on the man. If his wife is too old or ceases to please otherwise, he sells or exchanges her. But if a woman runs away from her husband and is recaptured, the penalty is death. Polygamy seems general, at least cases have been verified among all their tribes."

Although this particular grade of evolution puts women in a peculiarly defenceless and dependent position as regards men, there are great differences in the treatment they receive, both ethnically and individually. What natural power and accepted

[1] Chapman, *Travels*, vol. i.
[2] Hall, *Life with the Esquimaux*, London, vol. ii, p. 312.
[3] Sparrman, *Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope*, London, vol. i, p. 357.
[4] "Zur Ethnologie Australiens," "Ausland," *Wochenschrift für Länder und Völkerkunde*, 1882, pp. 430–33.

custom alike refuse is often granted by male caprice. Among the Singalese Veddahs and the unwarlike Eskimos the women are often treated with some consideration, and among more cruel and martial tribes there are cases of individual friendliness and co-operation between husband and wife. The subjugated and exploited women are not consciously and generally unhappy; they know no other conditions, they are trained to them from childhood, and accept inferiority as a matter of course, as their sisters in later phases accept other customary uses—and abuses.

Causes of the Inferior Status of Savage Women

Among hunting-tribes these are apparent and easily understood. They are rooted in the technique of the chase, the sexual division of labour, the inherent laziness and roughness of human beings in savagery.

As has already been remarked, every *division of labour* has as its first result the oppression and exploitation of the weaker partner. Among the hunters, man has the advantage in every sense. He is physically more active and powerful; he provides the main food; he is, as hunter, the maker and owner of weapons and expert in their use—an incalculable factor in his mastery. He is therefore also a warrior, and the women of the tribe depend on his protection in the incessant wars and feuds between tribes.[1]

Economically, too, he has the advantage. He not only provides the stable food, but also many most useful by-products for tools and clothing, e.g. horns, skins, bones, sinews, intestines. The herbs, gathered laboriously by the women, are comparatively unimportant.

The children make the position of savage women even less independent. Pregnancy and lactation take their alternate heavy toll. For lactation among savages is a matter, not of months, but years. The children are generally suckled till they

[1] Grosse, chap. iv.

are four years old, and even six: even twelve-year-olds have been seen at the mother's breast.[1] And the maternal instinct binds the woman to her babies, and through them to their begetter. She cannot desert them and escape from thraldom, as a male captive would certainly do.

Men, in the hunting phase, are sufficiently callous and calculating to use these feminine disadvantages, physiological, technical, and emotional, to the uttermost. Women become slaves. This male callousness is the result of lack of imagination, of very limited sympathy, and of the education in violence and cruelty which the chase and the foray provide, *and indeed necessitate as survival qualities*. Finally, of the constant hunger and material privation in which these savages exist, and which make concentration on bare existence necessary in order to escape starvation. We must also add, as a contributory factor, the extreme *laziness* which characterizes primitive men and makes them avoid any *sustained* effort or force it on others.

Marriage by capture and exogamy also depressed women's status, by separating them from their own blood kindred and stranding them in a strange tribe, whose men are interrelated —that is, allied.

Another final male advantage was the habit of *acting together*, which men learned in the chase and savage warfare. They learned co-operation, and the beginnings of *esprit de corps*. The women were cooped in the family confines; their activity and attention were concentrated there. *Men, in short, were organized, women were not*. The family separates the women from one another, while the hunters and warriors combine to suppress all efforts to flee or resist and attain mastery with the utmost ease in the primeval horde and the later State.

The Family

As man is the owner of his wife among savages, he is also naturally and equally the owner of the children she bears. The

[1] Waitz, vol. i, pp. 171, 180.

father is lord and master of his whole family. But when the children grow up they marry and form families of their own. Thus among savages the family units rarely comprise more than two generations. Among the Veddahs and Eskimos, however, adult offspring remain with their parents even after marriage, and when they are themselves parents. We shall revert later to the relationship between parent and child.

As a rule, among hunters, the rôle of the family is the more important, compared with the horde, in proportion as food is harder to get and the land more barren. The hordes are dispersed by the quest for food, as we have seen in the case of the Veddahs, Bushmen, and Fuegians. The weaker and more unstable the horde, the stronger the family. At this early stage we meet *the essential antagonism between the smaller family unit and the larger tribal or social unit which runs through all geneconomic phases like a scarlet streak.*[1]

The Key to Marriage and the Family

Differentiation of Labour

As origins here are mysterious, we are driven to hypotheses, of which we here select and outline the most probable.

In the previous chapter we pointed out that prehistoric times cannot have been quite static and stagnant, but must have had great evolutionary changes and achievements in phases.

The first primeval phase must have been as devoid of *labour*, in the sense of *continuous purposive activity*, as animal life. There could thus have been no *product of labour*. Like animals, our earliest forefathers took their food straight from Nature, were it animal or vegetable. What each man found in the way of herbs and roots he devoured forthwith. If the food-supply was great, all fell on it, and each took all that he or she could. Any economic dependence of women on men will have been as unlikely at this stage as the economic dependence of the hind on the hart, or the she-wolf on her mate.

[1] For the economic aspects of this antagonism, see *History of Social Development*, pp. 199–203.

But when once tools and weapons had reached a certain stage of elaboration and efficiency, and when fire could be kindled and kept alight at will, some *division or differentiation of labour* became imperative. And, bearing in mind sexual differences, it was equally unavoidable that this division should be on sexual lines. The man, muscularly more powerful and active, and exempt from childbearing, became the warrior and hunter; he alone had the right to bear arms, the duty to use them. The woman, muscularly weaker, and handicapped by pregnancy and lactation, took over the care of the young children, the collection of vegetable food, the vigilant tending of the fire—which could only be lighted again with infinite trouble—and the cooking of the meat brought home by the man, which alone demanded much time and effort.

As a result of this division of economic function, which we find among the lowest savages to-day, *the two sexes became economically dependent on one another; and this mutual dependence was transformed into a male dominance, for in the whole animal kingdom no female creature is at such disadvantage in comparison to its male partner as a human woman, without weapons (even if she be neither pregnant nor nursing), before an armed man.* And as every situation of inequality tends to become one of mastery and servitude, so here. The first differentiation of work became the first form of slavery. Individualism emerged, cruel and arrogant, in its primeval setting, and man enslaved his unarmed mate and founded *the family: his domain, his property.*

Influence of Marriage by Capture

It is doubtful whether he could have succeeded in this so thoroughly with his "sister", a sibling of the same tribe, a sharer in the tribal rights; but another factor helped him. The woman's unarmed state and increased dependence on the food-supply he brought home gave further scope to his urge

for novelty, for the stranger as a mate. Formerly his roving instinct could only be gratified by occasional perilous meetings and matings among forest thickets, whether by force or mutual inclination. But his weapons now enabled him to strike down the hostile tribesmen, stun the woman, and drag her to his tribe's camp. These abducted women were strangers in their captor's horde, they had no share in the blood ties and privileges of the Kinship group, neither father nor brother stood by them. The captor could treat them as booty; without breaking horde and tribal customs he could make them his slaves; and *famulus* means slave! When once the pleasures of uncontrolled power over these creatures, so useful and so helpless, had been realized by such a lazy and merciless being as primitive man, he extended his sway over the women of his own blood and tribe. Marriage and the Family became the "fundamental institutions".

This is hypothesis, however probable. But we *know* certainly that marriage did not arise in the faëry realm of "romantic love", of which primitive man knows nothing, but from iron economic needs. It was the social expression of division of labour between the sexes. Rape, cruelty, and lazy apathy were the three fates who stood around its cradle. And the lowest primitive hunters to-day prove that primitive marriage is simply the ownership and enslavement of woman, and the primitive family its offspring. If woman has become man's private property, the fruit of her body is his too. He becomes the patriarch, i.e. the absolute lord and owner of her and her children; they are *his* family, *his* property.

Thus the later aeons of prehistoric times must have witnessed an enormous change in human communities. The first differentiation according to age was followed by a differentiation according to sex: the hordes were divided into a dominant and a subject sex. From this inequality arose Marriage and the Family.

At least, this is the most likely hypothesis that has been advanced so far.

SUMMARY OF THE CHIEF POINTS OF THE EARLY KINSHIP PHASE

1. The Early Kinship phase begins with the kindling of fire and ends with the use of artificial sources of food-supply, i.e. agriculture and stockbreeding.

2. The existent representatives of this phase are the most primitive hunting-savages we know: Australian Aborigines, Eskimos, Hill-Veddahs, Bushmen, Andamanese, Fuegians, Tasmanians.

3. These survivors can only be used very cautiously as material for reconstruction and definite conclusions.

4. The Early Kinship phase must have extended at one time over all continents.

5. The elaborate and complex systems of consanguinity among some Early Kinship peoples lead us to conclude that this phase must have lasted for millennia.

6. All Early Kinship peoples live in hordes or tribes; none in isolated family units.

7. These hordes are groups of blood relatives.

8. Thus all social organization in this phase is based on blood relationship.

9. The simplest social form is the "isolated horde".

10. The isolated hordes became interrelated and consolidated through exogamy, i.e. intermarriage.

11. Exogamy thus led to horde or tribal groups.

12. The Matriarchate is not an original custom of the single horde, but can only have evolved after and through exogamy.

13. Paternal or Maternal descent may have been reckoned independently at the same time. We cannot decide which was the earlier form.

14. There is also, till now, no unanimity among scientists about the relation of exogamy to totemism.

15. All Early Kinship tribes we know of practise marriage and recognize separate families.

16. Woman, among these tribes, is the property of her husband; his factotum and beast of burden. The father is almost sovereign lord of wife and children.

17. These tribes have rigid division of labour between the sexes; men are the dominant class, women the subject.

18. We do not know at what period marriage and the family first evolved.

19. But we do know that the marriage of primitive savages is, above all, an economic convenience, an exploitation of labour.

CHAPTER IV

THE FULL TRIBAL OR HIGH KINSHIP PHASE

ORIGIN

WHEN mankind acquires fixed habitations, or what means the same practically, when *agriculture* is first practised,[1] geneonomy begins a fresh phase. Agriculture is the parent of all higher culture and progress. Its epoch-making significance depends on the following factors:

Agriculture binds man to the soil he tills. The incessant changeless change, the uncertainty and monotony of the hunter's life become more stable, and later more diverse. Mankind and Earth begin to interact. Human groups acquire a "native soil" and a firm organic basis from which all higher amenities and powers develop. As seed-time and harvest are separated by many months, mankind, which had hitherto lived from hand to mouth, and from day to day, learned laboriously to take thought for the morrow, to envisage and plan the future. They had to lay aside their animal immediacy and fecklessness, and to form mental concepts of Time, Cause, and Effect. Agriculture through thousands of years has changed the impulsive child of the present moment to the civilized man of adult mind, who "looks before and after".

Agriculture also favoured larger groupings. The more hunters, the fewer head of game.[2] The more tillers of the soil (in a primitive stage especially), the more grain and fruit. The amount of new food enabled mankind to concentrate more closely, and in larger numbers, than before.

And to preserve their new achievement, the communities which tilled the soil had to make more complete preparations for *defence* than the nomad hunters. The latter could evade

[1] But see the remarks on Fishing peoples in Chapter V.

[2] Savages' hunting is as wasteful as it is cruel. Cf. the extermination of buffalo in North America and zebras in Africa. (Translator's Note.)

a stronger foe by exodus, by seeking new forests as game lands. But the food-grower had to defend the soil with his life-blood. Escape was difficult. This must have increased the intensity of inter-tribal and inter-racial strife, and the need for consolidation and co-operation if the new way of living were to survive.

By its very nature, agriculture favours collaboration. The hunters follow their quarry separate and disperse easily. But when the first agriculturists faced the forest which they meant to clear and till, the individual was helpless. The work of many men was needed to clear and till a small area. This in itself compelled men to work together and live together.

The first tilling of the soil is the dawn of a new economic era. Such a vast material change necessarily had equally great geneonomic effects. *Geneonomically, indeed, there can hardly be a greater difference than exists between the hunters and even the most primitive growers of food, in fact, as well as theory.*

At the beginning of the Agricultural epoch the *Kinship phase* becomes more elaborate, and extends wider than ever before or since. Mankind has become more numerous and is packed more closely than before. The double ties of blood kindred and local proximity unite them, but as yet no tie between man and man has been imagined save the ancient tie of blood kindred. We therefore *term this phase the Full Kinship or Tribal.*

LOCAL EXTENSION

But as soon as culture and progress become much augmented through the new food-supplies, and a greater amount of material possessions makes *Trade* and *Barter* possible, we have also *navigation*, and a greater variety of *separate technical Trades and Professions*. The Kinship phase melts away under the acid of individual adventure and new wealth and power of locomotion. Thus we *only find Kinship or the Tribe at its zenith, at the beginning of the Sessile stage*; and therefore not among all food-growing primitive folk, *but only in the begin-*

nings of agriculture, with the exception of the fish-eating tribes of North-Western America and North-Eastern Asia, of whom later.

As we have pointed out in the *History of Social Development*, primitive food-growers may be divided into higher and lower according to their technique and other progress. Counting from lower to higher they are:

Certain North American Indians.
Malays, Micronesians, Melanesians, Polynesians } Oceanians of the Pacific.
African negroes.

On the whole the American aborigines, who both hunt game and grow their food, and the Malays are on the lower stages. The Oceanians and Africans are more advanced, but this rule is not invariable.

For the tribes in each of these ethnic groups are on various grades of general evolution. And accordingly we find the *Full Tribal or Kinship phase* specially prevalent among Malays and American Indians who grow maize.

Among the Pacific Islanders it appears sporadically, and in Africa only as an obsolescent and incomplete survival.

We shall observe, in the course of our studies, that the Full Tribal phase is superseded by the Late Tribal and then by the Early Familial phases. All three exist among primitive food-growers. We will now consider the Sept or Clan organization at the zenith of the Tribal phase.

A. The Sept or Clan in the Full Tribal Phase[1]

The Sept is a more closely united Community in this phase of culture than in any other. Its members share the soil they

[1] Cf. especially Grosse, *Die Formen der Familie*, chap. vii, and Cunow, "Die ökonomischen Grundlagen der Mutterherrschaft", *Neue Zeit*, vol. i, p. 106 *et seq.*

cultivate in common; the produce is divided among the families of the tribe, "each according to their need". Often they dwell together in large buildings [1] or halls. Each individual has a right to the food grown by the Sept, and helps to grow it. In almost every case when food is first grown, and among almost all races in the early stages of agriculture, *Communism* —common duties of work, common rights in the harvest—is the basic economic system.

The Sept is not only an economic and regional entity, it has its own laws, politics, and social customs. It involves the duty of the blood feud or vendetta; its members "stand surety" for one another as hostages, defend their common property together, and administer all their affairs in common. Thus the outlook of the lower agriculturists is absorbed—and their technical advance often hindered—by the close and narrow solidarity of the Sept.

Another characteristic feature of the Sept at its zenith is the full development of the Matriarchate.

In the Early Tribal phase we saw the advance of the Kinship group to the horde of patriarchal families, with descent reckoned through the mother (e.g. Australian Kamilaroi). But in even the most advanced tribes of Australian aborigines the woman enters her husband's horde and is reckoned as belonging to him, so that the *women* change their tribe; while the agriculturist, even in the lower stages, often has the custom that the *men* change their local habitation and name. The man joins his wife's sept, or they each live apart economically in their own maternal sept. Thus the matrilineal sept, which had formerly been a scattered handful bound together by name and totem only, solidifies into a sturdy concrete entity, territorial, economic, social, and political. For the food-growers who live and work together are all blood relatives on the maternal side.

These customs in their purest form are only found at the zenith of Tribalism. Kindred is then reckoned exclusively on the distaff side, the paternal descent being ignored. The father

[1] Like the Iroquois "Long House". (Translator's Note.)

is not regarded as related to his children at all! The maternal uncle, brother of the mother, takes his place. (This is called Avunculacy.) All duties and privileges, blood feuds, position in the tribe, etc., go by maternal descent, and are inherited through the mother. So is a share in the soil and dwellings, personal property, too, perhaps. The leader is generally the oldest man in each group of maternal relatives.

Origins of the Maternal Sept

How did this happen? How could the fact and the claims of maternity become so important and honoured among savages?

The causes of this remarkable, and at first almost incredible, process may be considered in the following light:

I. Women ceased to be *nomadic* and became *sessile*, i.e. attached to a definite place and locality, long before men. While men roamed afar in the chase and the foray, often for weeks—and longer—and kept up the customs of the hunting epochs, the women remained as custodians of the fire, the dwelling, and increasingly of the small piece of tilled soil. As dwelling and soil became more important, the position of the woman rose with them; she became more important economically, and therefore also in the minds of men. The care and needs of children must have been of great weight in inclining and/or compelling women to keep in one place long before men did so.

II. The first food-growers were, almost certainly, women. Even in the hunting stage some vegetable food was eaten, and the sexual division of labour was roughly the provision of animal food by the men, of vegetable by the women.[1] This division of labour was at first strictly preserved, even after the discovery that edible food could be grown. The former plant-picker and root-digger became the first tiller of the soil. The men took for a long time comparatively little part in the growth of plant food, which became by custom women's work. But the produce of this work was found to be much more

[1] See *infra*, Chapter VII.

steadily reliable, a much less uncertain quantity, than the game, which, we must conclude, began through centuries of destruction to become less abundant.[1] All this gave women a prestige hitherto undreamed of. They became the economic central sun, the fixed source of supplies; and men became comparatively accessory.

III. *Service-marriage* helped here as well. As women were "bound to the soil" while men were still nomads, a man who wanted the advantage of a woman's labour and the produce thereof, i.e. marriage, had to go to his wife's home, not bear her away to his. As women were food-growers they had an economic value higher than that of the precarious hunter, and the sept did not part with them so willingly. If the man insisted on asking for the girl from her kindred, he had to indemnify them. He had to buy her with goods or with service. At that stage of evolution goods were few and paltry; therefore service was preferred. But purchase by service *meant service to and in her kindred group*. The woman's kindred were thus able (as in the famous story of Laban and Jacob) to screw up the bride-price, i.e. the time of service, sometimes indefinitely. In other cases, man and woman remain each in their own sept, and the man becomes an adjunct to the family group.

Thus the economics of the early stages of agriculture provide an explanation of the rise of Matriarchy in this phase of culture. They also explain the high position of the woman in family life, of which we shall have more to say.[2]

THE RACE

Another great sociological advance of this phase was the amalgamation of tribes and hordes into a Race, a People.

[1] In Europe, at least, important climatic changes must have helped in these processes. (Translator's Note.)

[2] Cf. in Greek myths the association of agriculture with the Great Mother, *Demeter*. Also many Mediterranean Nature Goddesses, Medea and Circe, the Princesses and Compounders of herbs and philtres. The medieval witches were compounders of magic draughts. (Translator's Note.)

Among the aboriginal Australians, political organization had reached the point of association between hordes and tribes, but even so the bond was very loose and feuds between allied hordes and alliances with strangers were not rare.[1] The Agricultural Tribal phase is very different. The Sept or Clan is closely knit, proud of itself, and facing the world as one. Among some peoples of this phase the Septs have become Associations of Septs, and political organization has widened towards the Nation.

EXAMPLES

If we consider the fully Tribal peoples in detail, the most primitive—in the order of progress we have indicated—are (or were) the American Indians, who combined hunting with the beginnings of agriculture. The men have remained faithful to their oldest occupation—the chase; the women have begun to till the soil. They show the classic form of the Full Kinship phase.

The study of their customs has great evolutionary importance. These Redskins have evolved directly out of the Higher Hunting stage. We may thus here find and follow the line of development from Lower to Higher Hunting, and then to Food-growing, which we traced in considering the Australian Blacks. Here, too, there is much to support our hypothesis that the *Matriarchate is an intermediate stage*, preceded and then followed again by Patriarchal rule.

If we take the surviving and recently extinct Red Indian tribes in the order of their evolution, beginning with the lowest, the hunters of the Western Plains—Apaches, Comanches, Shoshones, Blackfeet, etc.—up to the maize- and tobacco-growers of the Eastern watershed—Creeks, Cherokees, Algonquins, Iroquois, Hurons, etc.—we find indisputably that the hunters are, or were, patriarchal, the hunter food-growers matriarchal.[2]

[1] See Cunow's *Study*, p. 121.

[2] Cf. Cunow, *Neue Zeit*, vol. i, p. 209, and *Australneger*, p. 139; Kohler, *Urgeschichte der Erde*, p. 242 *et seq.* Also the accounts of the Virginian Indians in the time of Raleigh and Smith. The story of Pocahontas, etc.

From the standpoint of those who believe Matriarchal institutions to be original and prior to all others, this circumstance is inexplicable: even Morgan found it "surprising", as he confessed in his *Primitive Society* (p. 133). But it accords with and confirms our suggested line of evolution: i.e. that Patriarchate first arose and was followed by matriarchal tendencies in the Early Kinship phase, and by definite Matriarchate in the Full Kinship phase. The erroneous view arose because it is certain that in the later Kinship phase—at the very beginnings of written history—the Patriarchate again became dominant. As scholars—of Greco-Roman antiquity especially —only knew of this last change, they prematurely concluded that the Matriarchate prevailed originally. It is, however, extremely probable that it was a transient stage, followed and preceded by male descent and male domination.

On this sociological curve we find all possible kinds of transitional and hybrid forms, combining both patriarchal and matriarchal features. It is, of course, difficult in some of these cases to exactly determine whether the Matriarchate is emerging or dissolving.

The zenith of this phase, its "classic" example, was found among the hunting and food-growing Red Indian tribes in what are now the Eastern United States of America. The most famous of these were the *Iroquois or Five Nations*, famous in warfare and in sociology through the investigations of Morgan, who lived for years among them and was adopted into their community. These investigations supplied the clue to the ancient Roman *Gens* and *Gentile* organization, which had hitherto been a book with seven seals to the comparative historian.

The Iroquois Sept or Clan [1] was a community of relatives on the maternal side. The father was always member of another Sept, for they practised strict exogamy. He was not reckoned as his children's kinsman; they had their mother's Totem and lived with her Sept. The Septs had large common

[1] See Morgan, *Primitive Society*, *passim*.

dwellings (the famous "Long House"), which were roomy enough to hold up to twenty families and were on a communal basis.

The members of these Septs or Clans had the following rights and duties:

1. They chose their chieftains in peace (the Sachems) and war.
2. They could depose them.
3. They might not marry within their own clan.
4. They inherited the personal property of members of their clan.
5. They were mutually sworn to help and defence in war and to exact retribution in life or goods (blood feud).
6. They had the right of giving names to their members.
7. They could adopt strangers.

Finally, they shared

8. A huge common burial-place, and
9. The right of assembly.

All adults could attend the Tribal Council, and the women had an equal right of voting and speaking with the men.

This Council was the political authority among the Iroquois. Their Sachems dealt with current affairs as they arose, but everything which affected the whole community was settled in the Council after full discussion. The Clansmen and Clanswomen chose and deposed their chiefs, decided on blood feuds, adopted strangers, even "Palefaces". Rousseau's ideal of democratic Government by Consent appeared fully realized to the Republicans who studied the Iroquois!

As Morgan points out, the bond of blood in these Clans or Totem Septs gave the individual that protection and support which nothing else in the Red Man's world could afford. In "Civilization" the State protects person and property; in the "Gentile" or Kinship group, the Clan or Sept. And these Septs were large enough numerically to be effective units. Within their membership they were strong for help or enmity: an injury to one was an injury to all, and to help a friend was

to help his Totem Sept. The Iroquois clansmen had much individual freedom and absolute equality, for neither Sachems nor War Chiefs had any *possessive* power. They were a true blood brotherhood proved in peace and war. Freedom, equality, brotherhood, though not proclaimed, were practised. And this explains the inflexible independence and the personal dignity of the Red Man of tradition.[1]

The clans numbered between 400 and 1,000 persons each. They were nine in all, and bore the names and totems of the Wolf, Bear, Turtle, Beaver, Red-deer, Quail, Heron, Eel (Watersnake), and Hawk.

The Totem Septs were not identical with the tribes, who formed another organization, crossing and strengthening the Totem Septs. There were *five* tribes among the Iroquois: the *Five Nations*, famous among French and English in Colonial times. These were the Mohawks, Onondagas, Cayugas, Oneidas, and Senecas; later, in the eighteenth century, the Tuscaroras joined, and the Five Nations became the Six. Each tribe contained members of various Totems, but not all Totems were represented in each tribe. Thus the Senecas had representatives of eight Totems, so also the Onondagas and Cayugas; the Mohawks and Oneidas had only three Totem Septs apiece.

Another custom shows how greatly the *concept of alliance at this stage of culture is a concept of blood relationship*. According to Charlevoix, the Mohawk Tribe was termed the eldest brother of the Five (i.e. the Uncle, cf. Avunculacy). The Oneida people were the eldest sons, the Senecas the youngest sons.[2]

Conquered tribes outside the Fivefold Confederacy were often incorporated *by adoption on terms of full equality*, but the number of the *Five Nations* was not increased.

The Iroquois Confederacy was remarkable in many ways, especially as the largest and most efficient example known to

[1] Cf. Morgan, Catlin, *Letters and Notes on the Manners, Customs, and Conditions of the North American Indians*, 2 vols.; Schoolcraft, *Notes on the Iroquois* (1846); Algic Researches (1839), and Onéota, etc.

[2] Cf. Waitz, vol. iii, p. 121. Also the German, John Heckewelder, a Moravian missionary, "Account of the Indian Tribes formerly inhabiting Pennsylvania" in *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society.*

us, of a society founded on blood kinship. But many other Indian hunters and maize-growers had similar kinship institutions, e.g. the Wyandottes (the survivors of the once mighty *Huron* tribes), Mandans, Minnitaries, Creeks, Crows, Cherokees, Delawares, Mohicans, and Choctaws. Others again, the Omahas, Winnebagoes, and Ojibways were Patriarchal. But was this a subsequent or a previous stage? [1]

We now turn to the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago. In spite of the geographical distances and differences in surroundings and race we find striking resemblances to the elaborate kinship organization of the Iroquois in its main features. For the *Law of Phaseological Sequence* appears valid in all climes and races.

The most conspicuous example among the Malays is found at Menangkabau on the island of Sumatra, and described by the Dutch anthropologist G. A. Wilken.

The territorial or regional unit among these Malays is the *Negari* or District, which is divided into a series of villages or *Kotas*. In each *Kota* dwell several Septs or Clans; they are termed *Suku* and are matrilineal, i.e. their members are descended from the same mother or ancestress. The members of each *Suku* dwell together in their own part of the village; such kinship dwellings are called *Kumpulan Rumah*. They stand by each other in all things. The Malay says of his sept: "They that dwell in the same Kumpulan Rumah are of one blood; they have one root and stem; one right and one duty; one honour and one shame." The *Sukus* are therefore locally divided, *but united by common descent on the distaff side.*

None may marry into their own *Suku*. Husband and wife, though married, are of different *Sukus*, and the woman remains in her own *Kumpulan Rumah*. The man also stays with his mother's people, so marriage does not involve a joint household.

Thus the Family is subordinated to the Sept; it does not include the husband and father, but the mother and children.

[1] Cf. Morgan, *Primitive Society, passim.*

The head of this maternal family is the eldest brother of the mother, the *mamaq*, who has authority over, and duties towards, his nephews and nieces.

The biological father of children has no authority over the children he has himself begotten; but if he is an elder brother he can become the *mamaq* of his sister's children. (Avunculacy.)

In these joint households dwell many relatives: young children with their mothers, uncles, aunts, grandmothers, great-aunts, who are descended from a common ancestress, or in the Malay phrase *sabnah parui*.[1] Their head is the oldest uncle. When a girl marries, an annex is added to the Communal dwelling. When the *suku* becomes unmanageable in size, it splits into two groups who inhabit two *Kumpulan Rumahs* and form a *Kampong*.

The wife's inheritance goes to her children. If she has none, her brothers and sisters share it. The man's heirs are not his children but his nearest—maternal—relatives. Goods, name, and position are all inherited through the mother only.

All *Sukus* have equal rights. An Assembly of headmen decides the common business of the village.

Similar arrangements are found among other inhabitants of the islands of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.[2]

They have been carefully studied and documented by Grosse in his valuable *Formen der Familie* and by Cunow, *Mutterherrschaft*. Unfortunately the accounts of travellers are often fragmentary and confused. We therefore refer specially to

[1] Literally "from the same belly" or womb.

[2] "These stretch from Madagascar to Easter Island and are divided into two main groups. The first group is known as Indonesia, and consists of the Islands of the Malay Archipelago, the Moluccas, Philippines, and Sunda Islands, which include Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and Celebes. The second group is Oceania, which is subdivided under three heads: firstly, *Melanesia*, consisting of New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, New Hebrides, Fiji, and New Caledonia; secondly, *Polynesia*, consisting of Hawaii, New Zealand, Tonga Islands, Samoa, Rotamah, Marquesas Islands, Society Islands, and Easter Island; and thirdly, *Micronesia*, consisting of the Marianes or Ladroni Islands, the Caroline, Marshall, and Gilbert Islands. The Indonesians and Polynesians are Malayan, the Melanesians are Papuan, while the Micronesians are a hybrid from both races."—*History of Social Development*, p. 74, note.

Grosse and Cunow,[1] and would specially cite among Malay peoples the Dyaks [2] of Borneo; among Indo-Chinese the Garos [3] of Assam; among the Micronesians the Pelaw,[4] Mortlock,[5] and Marianne [6] Islanders.

Among the Melanesians the Sept is in dissolution to a greater extent than in Micronesia, and the same is true of Polynesia, where the Early Familial phase has already begun. But the Polynesian Maori of New Zealand, whom Schurtz estimates to number 44,000 persons, have stood by the Matriarchate and the Kinship group. Their Septs are called *hapu*—that is, *womb*.[7]

Finally, we have in Africa the predominating *Early Familial phase*. *Kinship organizations* are relatively rare among African tribes, but we find many cases where descent is reckoned through the mother, and several survivals indicating that in primitive agricultural stages (hoe-culture) the Full Kinship phase coincided and extended widely on that continent.[8]

B. Family Life in the Full Kinship Phase

The Family is almost obliterated by the power of the Sept or Clan in this phase of geneonomical development. Grosse remarks that "the primitive agriculturist feels and acts, in essential things, not as member of a family, but of a Kinship Group". In many cases the *family is disintegrated* by the Sept. Husband and wife each remain in their own group, the husband is a mere accessory to the maternal Sept, an "outsider" whose

[1] Cf. also G. A. Wilken, *Over de verwantschap en het huwelijks en enfrecht bij de volken van het Malaishe ras*, pp. 24–30; Achelis, *Modern Völkerkunde*, p. 297; Cunow, *Matriarchat*, p. 209; Starcke, *Primitive Families*, p. 84; Grosse, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

[2] Wilken, p. 81; Grosse, p. 143.

[3] Mahári, *Mutterschaften*; Grosse, p. 143.

[4] Cunow, p. 206; Kubary.

[5] Grosse, p. 147; Cunow, p. 206.

[6] Grosse, p. 162.

[7] Thomson, *The Story of New Zealand*, vol. i, p. 88 *et seq.*; Cunow, *Matriarchat*, pp. 204, 205.

[8] Further material on this in Chapter VI.

work is to beget the next generation. This comparative weakness of family ties is not only typical of the particular phase we are studying, it is also of general sociological interest. For the second time we find the *antagonism between family ties and social ties, between communal and domestic life, and the struggle between these two types of human institution*, which extends throughout historical geneonomy. In the next book of our Sociological Series a chapter will be devoted to this phenomenon.

The superiority of the wider social organism over the family is connected with another characteristic feature of the Full Kinship phase—namely, the *fortunate and honoured status of woman.*

When the institution of marriage first arose there began that secular struggle between Man and Woman which is still carried on in millions of households all over the world, and probably still will be so until we attain a real justice and equal rights between the sexes. In this tragic struggle the woman has throughout the ages almost always been vanquished. But in the Full Kinship phase the slave and domestic utensil of the savage hunters attained to a position which she has never recaptured in the course of all subsequent evolution.

Among some races she dominated the men. In this early phase of evolution women were the heads of families, an institution we term the *Matriarchate*; and in certain rare cases this dominance extended into political life; we find instances of *Gynaecocracy* or Government by Women.

Examples

In order to form an idea of this remarkable development we must examine the family life of the peoples we have cited as practising Kinship institutions.

Among the Iroquois the women only tilled the soil (by primitive hoe-culture). They thus had control of the food they grew. The men only helped agriculturally with the clearing

of absolutely new ground; their main occupations were hunting, fishing, the building of canoes, the war-trail, and the making of weapons and hunting-tackle. The women not only tilled the fields but also cooked the food, tended the children, and made the clothing of the tribe.

The marriages [1] were generally arranged by the mothers of the pair and the chieftainesses of the lodges. The husband did not move into the "Long House" of his wife's family, but remained in his mother's dwelling, and only visited his wife occasionally.[2] He had to bring his wife regularly some of the game he had killed; [3] if he failed in this he could be divorced. For it was the right of married couples to part whenever they wished to do so,[4] though, on the whole, such proceedings were not approved, especially when there were children. The children belonged to their mother's totem and family, the father had no right over them, nor over his wife's goods and chattels. His personal belongings reverted to his mother's clan; in the families, the daughters inherited their mother's belongings, while the sons could only claim a share in house and food.[5]

Morgan quotes Wright to the effect that the women shared in the tribal Assembly, and had power in the clans and everywhere else too.[6] Lafitau [7] says: "All real authority among these people is vested in the women. The fields and their produce are in their hands. They are the soul of the Council meetings; they decide on war or peace; they guard the treasure of the tribe. Into their hands the prisoners are delivered; they arrange the marriages, they rule and rear the children, and their blood decides name and inheritance."

Among the *Wyandots* the women were dominant politically. Powell [8] says that in every Totem Group there were four female

[1] Cf. as sources: Lafitau, *Mœurs des sauvages Ameriquains*, vol. i, p. 72; De la Potherie, *Histoire de l'Amérique Septentrionale*, Paris, 1772, vol. iii; Morgan, *Primitive Society*, p. 385; Cunow, *Mutterherrschaft*, p. 238; Waitz, vol. iii, p. 101.

[2] Lafitau, vol. i, p. 72. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 579. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 581.

[5] *Ibid.*, *op. cit.* [6] *Primitive Society*, p. 385. [7] *Op. cit.*, i, p. 71.

[8] J. W. Powell, *Wyandot Government*; Cunow, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

elders of the *Sept* or *Gens*, chosen by the eldest women or house-mothers of the various lodges. These four women chose the Sachem (peace-chieftain), and together with him administered the Totem Group's affairs. The Tribe of Wyandots consisted of eleven Totem Clans, and the Council of the Tribe of the eleven Totem leaders, i.e. of forty-four women and eleven men, so that the *women had always a substantial majority*, and the Sachems had to follow their behests.

Among other Indian tribes the women held a favoured position.[1] Thus among the Ojibways they took part in warfare, as well as in the Council, and there were several famous prophetesses and "wise-women" of this tribe.[2]

Among the Narragansetts, Winnibegs, Creeks, and Potawattamis women might fill the office of chieftain.

Among the Matriarchal Malays, as among the Iroquois, the family has almost vanished in favour of the Clan or Sept, and the position of women is correspondingly high. Their customs are saturated with the Matriarchal spirit.

In *Menangkabau* in Sumatra, as we have mentioned, husband and wife remain each in their separate maternal households. Wilken says: "Marriage, therefore, does not involve cohabitation. Married life takes the form of visits which the man pays the woman in her clan home. Daily he comes to help her in the rice-fields and share the midday meal. At least, this is the rule at first. Later on these daily visits become rarer, and the man only makes an appearance in the evening, and if he is a faithful, attentive husband stays the night in his wife's dwelling. This marriage is called *Sumandò*; there is no separate family. The husband belongs to his *Suku*, the wife and the children to hers. *Samandei* are those "having one mother"—i.e. members of one clan.[3]

[1] Waitz, vol. iii, p. 100.

[2] J. G. Kohl, *Kitschi-Gami oder Erzählungen vom Obern.* See *Ein Beitrag zur Charakteristik der Amerikanischen Indianer*, Bremen, 1859, vol. i, p. 176.

[3] Wilken, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

The Dyaks of Borneo are also organized in Matriarchal clans, and the sexes are on a very equal footing. Schwaner even thinks "they give too much power to their women; for these often rule in the home and over whole tribes with virile force, and encourage them to warfare, themselves leading the fighting-men. In many of the Council Assemblies the votes of the women are decisive, and so is their influence, but they may not address the assembly as orators." [1]

Brooke of Sarawak attributes many fine and even charming qualities to the Dyak women.[2] He declares that in many cases they proved politically wiser and more dexterous than the men, and their advice was often followed in the most important affairs. At the head of the Lingga tribes he found two distinguished elderly women, who had governed them for many years.

Among the Marianne Islanders the wife joins her husband's clan, but "if the man fails in respect towards her, if he misbehaved or visited his ill-temper on her, she could strike him with impunity or leave him and return to her former free estate. In the Assemblies for Council and Judgment the women exercised so much influence—without having official authority—that they really controlled all public affairs. As they ruled unquestioned in their households, nothing was done without taking their opinion and securing their consent." [3]

According to Kubary, the Pelew Islanders lived in exogamous matriarchal clans, with a headman (*Rupak*) and a headwoman (*Rupak eldil*). The women were highly honoured and called "Mothers of the Land". Their public influence is dominant and decisive. *The woman is the exclusive tiller and owner of the taro plantations.* Insults to her are severely punished, and

[1] Dr. C. L. M. Schwaner, *Borneo, Beschruving van het Stroomgebied van den Barito*, Amsterdam, part i, p. 161.

[2] Charles Brooke, *Ten Years in Sarawak*, London, 1866, pp. 70, 130–31 (Cf. also the position of the Burmese women at the present day. Translator's Note.)

[3] M. Louis de Freycinet, *Voyage autour du monde*, Paris, vol. ii, part i, book iii, p. 475.

the birth of a girl is more welcomed than that of a boy. Kubary reports also great "freedom of morals".[1]

Among some races of Indo-China the Matriarchate has been found in operation. Dalton [2] says of the *Garos* in Assam:

"The clans are divided into different houses called *mahâris*, which may be translated, *motherhoods*. . . . Children, as with the Kasias, belong to the *mahâri* of the mother. From the paternal parent they derive nothing, and it would certainly appear, from the social customs of the *Garos*, that their great lawgiver must have been a female. The men do much of the heavy work, and all the fighting, and are so far not deprived of their natural obligations as the stronger animal, but in other respects they are dependent on the females" (p. 63).

According to Dr. G. Le Bon,[3] "A woman formerly exercised supreme authority in each Sept. Now a man, the *laskar*, is head, and he is chosen from among the richest slave-owners, but the women always ratify this choice, and he remains subject to their discretion and their advice." The Pani-Kooch have similar customs. "When a woman dies the family property is divided among her daughters; and when a man marries he goes to live with his wife's mother, and obeys her orders and those of his wife." [4]

The Matriarchate among primitive races is certainly one of the strangest manifestations in all anthropology. But its emergence becomes comprehensible when we consider the economic conditions prevailing among the lower agriculturists, which differ widely both from the lowest stages of human evolution and from those more advanced, with which we are familiar. Woman attaches herself to the soil earlier than man does; she first grows and produces grain and root crops. These become the staple foods; she is the source of supplies

[1] Sources: S. S. Kubary, *Ethnologische Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Karolinischen Inselgruppe*, Heft I; *Die Sozialen Einrichtungen der Palauer*, Berlin, 1885, pp. 34, 35, 73, 81, 82: Kubary, *Ethnographische Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Karolinischen Archipels*, p. 159; Semper, *Die Palau-Inseln*, p. 74; Bastian, *Inselgruppen in Oceanien*, p. 107.

[2] *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, p. 63.

[3] *Les Civilisations de l'Inde*, p. 101.

[4] Dalton, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

and the owner of the food she grows, therefore she is in a favoured position generally. The women become organized in Kinship groups, and the men are outside their organizations. The head of the clan is a man, but kin to, or chosen by, the women. The women are a "close corporation", the men are not.

Simultaneously the Matriarchal clan dissolves marriage in its earliest form—that is, the rigid domestic slavery of women to men. Man loses his absolute power. Women achieve some measure of freedom and even of authority.

Thus we can trace the course of evolution in this phase, from the Patriarchate to the Matriarchate, which reaches its highest point among certain North American Indians and Malays; and then the Matriarchate changes into Patriarchal dominion. It is therefore often impossible, in isolated instances, to decide whether peoples in this phase are achieving or leaving the zenith of Matriarchate. And of course the same is true of the later Kinship phase; no sharp line can be drawn between them. These historical transitions are always fluid and gradual.

Finally, we must emphasize the fact of our uncertainty *whether in all cases of tribes and peoples who have passed through the Full Kinship phase, there was complete Matriarchate.* It is quite possible that the patriarchal tribal organization persisted even during the Full Kinship phase with some peoples. As yet there is no proof that the Matriarchate has been a *universal historical* phenomenon; that all peoples who entered the later Kinship (and Early Familial) phase were formerly Matriarchal. But we do certainly know that during the later Kinship phase, in many countries, Matriarchs were displaced by Patriarchs, and that among those Oceanian and African races who are in the early stages of *the Familial phase* there are still matriarchal survivals, and that there are also many indications that those Aryan (European) peoples who now lead the world had once, before their written history began, a kinship organization, with matriarchal descent and privileges.

Characteristic Features of the Full Kinship or Tribal Phase

We may summarize as follows:

1. This phase is the zenith and fullest expansion of the kindred group, sept, or clan. In no other epoch known to us is this blood relationship group so active and closely knit.

2. The community has become an organized entity, a *race*; the race is an extension of the oldest basis of organization, i.e. blood kindred.

3. At the beginning of this phase evolution tends towards the Matriarchate; at its conclusion the Patriarchate predominates.

4. At the summit of kinship Matriarchate prevails. The clans are matriarchal: people belong to their mother's tribe and family, and

5. The position of women, which sometimes amounts to political authority or official rule (gynecocracy), is better than in any other stage of culture.

6. Marriage and the family are insignificant compared to the *Tribe*. In some cases they have been superseded. In these cases the man is an accessory to the woman's tribe, and must win her from them by service. The children are *hers, not his.*

7. This Full Kinship organization is very common at the beginnings of fixed domicile, i.e. among the lower food-growers (hoe-culturists), and, as we shall see, among some *fisher* peoples.

8. We do not know whether Full Kinship organization was *always* accompanied by Matriarchate—in other words, whether all peoples of higher culture must necessarily have once been matriarchal—but we do know that the Matriarchate was once very prevalent, but was followed by the Patriarchate, and that among some peoples this happened at the beginnings of recorded history.

CHAPTER V

THE LATE KINSHIP PHASE

ORIGIN

THE change from Nomadic to Sessile is only favourable to the Kinship phase in its early stages. As soon as agriculture develops and communities increase and trades differentiate themselves, the Clan or Sept begins to melt away before the growing framework of the *State*. This slow but all-important change began in the later Kinship phase. The causes were, of course, primarily economic. The forests have been largely cleared, the fields are full of corn, people have enough food and to spare: they "wax fat and kick". It is not any longer necessary to devote all time and energy to bringing a bare sufficiency to sustain life from the soil. There is a great fund of *surplus energy* and of surplus goods. *Material wealth* appears among mankind and begins to act on the human mind and motives. It summons the *individual* out of the slumbers of tribal ages, and leads him forth out of the familiar circle, out of the idyllic peace and plenty of a prosperous commune. For *wealth* means *power*, and the *first* feelings and strivings that raise the individual out of and above his kind are inspired by this *power*.

This individualism appears first among some of the men. After a certain stage of skill in agriculture has been attained, and a considerable area brought under cultivation, the superiority of this new Way of Life as a *source of food* to hunting and fishing becomes evident. Men begin to take a more active part in tilling the soil, the chase becomes more of a diversion—a "sport". Male slaves—captives in warfare—tilled the land from an early date. With the increase of the food-supply and the release of much masculine energy of mind and body from the chase, *trade, travel, and navigation appear* and develop the available resources of humanity, mental and material. In order to facilitate primitive trade or barter the first money, i.e.

natural money or *medium of exchange*, was invented and agreed; preserved food, clothing, ornaments, tools, cowry shells, cattle.[1]

And this wealth, this *means of exchange*, is concentrated in the hands of men. Man's power and importance rise. They not only can help with agriculture and supply meat: the goods of the most varied kind, from ornaments to slaves, that he either makes or gets by barter or by warfare and piracy are *his*; he does not share them with the sedentary community at home.[2]

Thus again the scales dip deep and unequally between man and woman. The man *who owns any appreciable wealth* does not serve for his wife in her mother's home. He *buys* her from her relatives, and she must leave home and kin and enter *his* house and dwell therein. *Sumandò-marriage* and *Service-marriage* are superseded by *Marriage by barter. This is the distinctive difference between the zenith of Kinship and its decline.* At first the rich men, the rulers and chiefs, begin to buy their wives from the maternal clan, and to lead them home; the poorer majority serve for their wives in the ancient way. But gradually the innovation spreads among the common people: the wife follows her husband's clan, shares his home and name, and the Matriarchate becomes a thing of the past. And as the woman has been "bought and paid for", she becomes her husband's property. She loses her old freedom in the fertile fields, and is more and more confined to the house, over whose threshold is written, "And he shall rule over thee".

Matriarchate falls before the patriarchal aggression. Woman has lost her command of food-supplies, her power over her children, her voice in the Councils; she is once more in strict subjection, and her fate is sealed for some thousands of years. The renewed dominance of Man revives the smaller Family group in which he was primarily lord and master in pre-matriarchal days. The Family, which under the Matriarchate was so unimportant that it approached dissolution, now begins a victorious career at the cost of the Kinship clan.

[1] See *History of Social Development*, pp. 236–42.
[2] Cf. Homer's *Iliad*. (Translator's Note.)

For the old Clan solidarity irks men more and more as they gain more of the reality of power. Man's command of material wealth and its opportunities develops self-reliance and forethought, but also calculation and avarice. He objects to "share and share alike" with all his kin; the old communal life and help of the Clan becomes a fetter and an outworn thing which he instinctively tries to cast aside in every department.

Thus he aims (consciously or not) at re-consolidating the "small family" (the two generations family, not, of course, the "two-child family") at the cost of the Kinship group, and at making this domain more and more completely *his*. And especially he is impelled to take *the soil and the land* which formerly belonged to the tribe and the clan and to make it his private property, "*for him and* HIS *heirs forever*".

The old form of inheritance, by which on a man's death his goods and share of soil reverted to his kin, is incompatible with the supremacy of the *Family* as the unit. Why should not the wealth, acquired with such labour and peril, now go to his own children? So the clansmen lose and the children gain.

The communal property becomes family property, "real estate". Clan inheritance becomes inheritance "of heirs *male*". So the later Kinship phase comprises an incalculable change, not only geneonomically, but throughout the sociological sphere. The Clan dissolves; the Family, its natural antagonist, is aggrandized and conquers, step by step, in a secular battle, property, descent, inheritance, etc.—a process which reaches its summit in historic times in the *High Family phase*.

The main stages of this process are:

1. The increase of *wealth*, in amount and variety.
2. The consolidation of such wealth in men's hands.
3. Resultant *marriage by purchase*, the man paying for the woman.
4. As his purchase, she becomes *subject* to him once more.
5. *Descent* is reckoned through the father: Matriarchate becomes Patriarchate; first in the form of *Clans with male descent*,

6. Then the man separates the Family, i.e. himself, *his* wife and *his* children, from the Clan or Kinship group.

7. *Inheritance* tends increasingly to be in the Family.

8. The Kinship group dissolves. The Family wins.

EXTENT. EXAMPLES

The later Kinship phase is found among agricultural peoples who have not yet reached the stage we term "*civilization*", i.e. they have become habitually *sedentary*, but are organized in clans, and not on political or "State" lines. As we have recounted, these include tribes of American Indians, Malays, and Melanesians: further, certain Africans and also certain Polynesians.[1] Among these peoples we find innumerable transitional forms and varieties of custom. We shall enumerate some of the most significant, and in the order most adapted to show the process of change from Matriarchate to Patriarchate. We repeat that we do *not maintain that* ALL *the peoples cited have passed through all possible previous changes*, but we may reasonably assume the *cases we cite to be typical of the general human phaseology*.

We shall trace the evolution from Full Kinship peoples to peoples in the Early Family phase, and shall take as one extreme of our series of cases the highly tribal Septs and Sumandò-marriage of the Malays of *Menangkabau* (See previous chapter.) There are among the Sumatrans other kinds of marriage as well.[2] Whereas the *Sumandò partners* have no joint household, but stay each with their own kin, the *Ambilanak-marriage* incorporates the husband into his wife's Sept or Clan; there he takes a position midway between a son and a servant. This marriage is therefore highly matriarchal, like *Sumandò*. *Ambilanak* means literally "accepting the child".

In the third kind of marriage in Sumatra, *Djudjur*, which is

[1] Bp. Codrington says in *The Melanesians*, p. 102: "The line which separates Melanesian from Polynesian falls between Fiji and Tonga." (Translator's Note.)

[2] Marsden, *History of Sumatra*, p. 262.

mainly practised by the rich, the husband buys his wife, takes her to his home, and thenceforth regards and treats her as belonging to him.[1]

A similar marriage form is found among the New Zealand Maoris, whose mainly matriarchal Kinship groups we have already mentioned. There, too, it is first practised by the wealthier classes. Taylor [2] says that a prospective father-in-law often simply invites the young man to come and live as his daughter's husband. He is then regarded as a member of her clan, and sometimes forced to side against his own kinsfolk in warfare! This custom of adopting the wife's domicile was so usual that young men who refused to follow it were often deserted by their wives. Taylor heard of several instances in which men had tried to break away, but lost their wives in consequence.

But the chiefs and wealthy Maoris do not join their wife's *hapu* on *marriage, but she follows them to their roof*; and it is permitted to the rich man to have several legal wives.[3] And in the Mortlock Islands the common people serve for their wives, but the nobles and leaders have their own households in which their wives dwell.[4]

This *Djudjur*-marriage is the first step towards Patriarchate, i.e. male descent and dominance. The chieftains and leaders go first and are followed by the less fortunate classes. Even in the fully tribal clans there is the beginning of the end. Let us see the process develop.

Among the South Sumatran *Lampongs* and *Passamah*, Djudjur is so prevalent that the Septs are no longer Matriarchal! Even the law of Exogamy has fallen into disuse.

Among the *Alfures*, a hybrid race between Papuan and Malay, of *Buru* and *Ceram*, the clans are patriarchal and the clansmen pay the bride-price. The same is the case in Timor.[5]

[1] Marsden, *History of Sumatra*, p. 262.
[2] *The Ika a Maui or New Zealand and Its Habitants*, London, p. 164.
[3] A. S. Thomson, *The Story of New Zealand*, London, vol. i, p. 179.
[4] Kubary, *Bewohner der Mortlock Inseln*, Hamburg, part iii, pp. 260–61.
[5] For the Lampongs, see Wilken, *op. cit.*, p. 58, and the Alfures, *ibid.*, pp. 49–50.

Among the Sumatran Battaks, Wilken[1] says that descent was formerly reckoned through the mother. Now they live in patriarchal clans called *Warga*. Sometimes—though rarely—a man who cannot pay the bride-price settles in his wife's clan-dwelling: the children are then reckoned as of *her* Kinship group. This matriarchal marriage form is called *Manding-ding*. But as a rule woman is bought and is treated as bought property. "She is a piece of saleable property, both in the eyes of the parents who sell her and of her husband and his brother and other kinsmen who inherit her on his death"—the so-called *Levirate*. The husband controls all her property, even what she earns. In New Britain, as in Melanesia generally, Exogamous septs, with maternal descent,[2] prevail, but wives are bought for sums reckoned in cowry-currency, and often at five or six years of age. If the man cannot pay, he borrows from a chief or uncle, and *serves* in repayment. In some places he serves his wife's parents for her. She is so much his property that he can sell her again. The women are harshly treated and sometimes beaten.[3]

Similar conditions are found in the New Hebrides and Solomons, but as the bride-price is very high the wife is better treated.[4]

Among the Fijians, whose *technical* culture and progress are the highest in Melanesia, the women are excluded from agriculture and confined in the houses, and their treatment is severe and rough, often positively cruel. There are relics of Matriarchal institutions here, too, e.g. a girl child belongs to her mother's totem; but the purchase money paid for the wife seals her as *property*; she is treated with contempt; all work of a heavy or unpleasant kind is allotted to her. In her youth, says Williams, she is sacrificed to man's desires and in

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 38, 41.

[2] R. H. Codrington, D.D., *The Melanesians: Studies in their Anthropology and Folklore*, p. 34.

[3] Rev. B. Danks, "Marriage Customs of the New Britain Group", *Journ. Anthrop. Inst.*, vol. xviii, 1888–89, p. 388; Codrington, *loc. cit.*; Powell, pp. 81–83; Cunow, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

[4] H. B. Guppy, *The Solomon Islands and their Natives*, p. 46.

her old age to his cruelty.[1] She is excluded from Temple service; many foods are taboo to her; she may only eat after her husband, and not leave him without his consent. "His rule is absolute over her; he can with impunity illtreat, kill, and—devour her." If she can neither endure her lot nor escape to another man, she kills herself. Suicides of women are not rare. When a man dies, one of his wives is strangled to serve him beyond the grave.[2]

These instances show the stages of this geneonomical transition. Synchronizing with the enslavement of women, the *Kinship group* was deprived of the common soil in favour of the family. Family inheritance is the distinctive mark of the death of the Kinship phase.

Thus in Florida in Melanesia the old common land, "the *Matanga* property", says Codrington, "is never absolutely in the individual, but in the *Kema*, being looked upon as having been cleared originally by the *Kema*. Portions are occupied in hereditary succession by families within the *Kema*, by an original agreement which now has come to a right."[3] The succession is not from father to son, but generally to the sister's children.

In Tonga there is inheritance in the male line: the Early Family phase has begun. Although the relationships are reckoned through the mother, her whole property goes to her husband and children if she dies first.[4] Her kindred do not even recover the tiny strip of land that was her dowry.[5]

Among those Red Indian tribes whose kinship organization was the most elaborate and pronounced known to us, this change of custom was initiated under the very eyes, so to speak, of European observers. Thus Morgan says that among the more prosperous Indians an aversion to the inheritance of their property by their fellow-clansmen was already operative.

[1] *Fiji and the Fijians*, i, p. 169.

[2] References: Cunow, *op. cit.*, p. 181; Grosse, pp. 145, 180; Waitz Gerland, vi, pp. 627–28; Westermarck, p. 561.

[3] Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 62.

[4] William Marner, *Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, London, vol. ii, p. 91.

[5] Lewis Morgan, *Systems of Consanguinity*, Washington, p. 581.

In some instances the ancient way was simply ignored and the man's children made his heirs. All manner of tricks were used by men of the Iroquois, Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, Menomenees, Crows, and Ojibways to secure their children the inheritance. One Choctaw expressed to Dr. Byington the wish to become an American citizen, solely because then his property would go to his children, but if he remained a member of his tribe his clansmen would inherit. Moreover, among Indian tribes in which there was considerable individual property in domestic animals, buildings, and real estate, it became customary to distribute these to the children by gifts *inter vivos*, and thus evade the customary reversion! With the increase of wealth and goods the disinheriting of the children of their owners caused resentment and opposition, and among some tribes in the eighteen-eighties the system of inheritance, as in Europe, was introduced and the old custom abolished.[1]

Further, when a man had reclaimed a piece of land from the wilderness by his own efforts, this land was increasingly considered his property. Morgan says of the Pueblo Indians of the South-West, whose clans were matrilineal, that their land was common property, but that ground cleared and tilled by any individual could be sold by him to anyone in the same tribe. But when he died the land reverted to his wife or daughters, and if he had none to the family of his father.

Thus we can trace the disintegration of the kinship property, both in goods and estate, in favour of the (patriarchal) family. Its doom is sealed—and the same forces and processes were at work among the classical peoples of the Mediterranean and among the Teutons, when they passed from myth and legend into history, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter.

We find the Later Kinship phase among two other occupational groups of races besides the Middle Agriculturists[2]—

[1] See Morgan, *Systems of Consanguinity*, p. 581, and Morgan, *Primitive Society, passim.*

[2] Dr. Müller-Lyer classifies Agricultural technique as follows: (1) Hoe-culture—the most primitive and always combined with hunting or fishing. (2) Agriculture, i.e. Plough culture. (3) Horticulture. (Translator's Note.)

namely, among several peoples living by fishing and among cattle-breeders. We shall now consider these two groups briefly.

THE VARIOUS KINSHIP PHASES AMONG FISHER PEOPLES[1]

We have the opportunity of a bird's-eye view of Clan and Sept institutions in their various phases, compressed into a narrow geographical area, among the *fishing tribes* who live on the coasts of North-west North America, and North-eastern Asia. Grosse terms these the "Higher Hunters". If we classify and compare them in the order of their economic development, we shall see the sequence of Kinship phases succeed one another like the three Acts of a great drama, just as we beheld them in our progress from the Hunters to the Hoe-culturists and then to the more advanced tillers of the soil. For fishing, under favourable conditions, has a precisely similar influence, sociologically, to agriculture. The salmon swarm on those Pacific coasts in such abundance that the food-supply is certainly equal to that of primitive hoe-tillage. And there are also herrings, trout, cod, and other fish in plenty. Moreover, shores and forests contain deer, reindeer, fur seals, otters, mountain sheep, which are not only used for food, but in the fur-trade also.

This is an essential factor, for *food-supply is the foundation of all progress*, whether rice, fish, or maize matters not: the *available amount* is all-important.

So we find all the results previously registered—results which would have been out of the question without *deliberate and artificial production of food.*

The first manifestation is the sedentary way of life. As the salmon ascend the rivers in their season, the streams become rivers of abundance—almost like the Nile to Egypt. The inhabitants are massed together on banks and estuaries. Here,

[1] Material summarized by Waitz, iii, pp. 310–46; Grosse, chap. v, pp. 65–88; and Cunow, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–41.

too, women took the initiative. For the men are absent from home, hunting or trading, for long stretches at a time.

Immediately the economic value of women rises. Women are much more adapted physically and mentally to fishing than to hunting. They take a fully equal share in the catching, landing, and drying of the salmon. And as the whole household is also run by their work, they are valuable assets, and the fathers of daughters are not willing to lose their services or dispose of them cheaply. Hence a tendency to *service-marriage*, to *Ambilanak*, and to the maternal clan—that is, to the Matriarchate.

Later, however, we find the historical reactions of abundant food-supply, and as *the population grows in numbers without exceeding the food-supply* there is released energy, expressed in trade and travel, accumulation of goods, differentiation of labour, i.e. wealth, and the people are divided into economic grades or classes.

This wealth falls into the hands of the trader and the skilled craftsman, i.e. of certain men of the tribes. They are no longer content to *serve* for their wives, but obtain them by purchase, from their kindred, and bring them to the "conjugal domicile", i.e. into the conjugal sphere of power. The service-marriage becomes a purchase, Patriarchate follows Matriarchate, and the Full Kinship phase passes into its decline.

Strictly speaking, these fisher-folk belong to the stage of savagery, as they have only *Natural* sources of food-supply. But the geneonomic phases they undergo are strictly parallel to those of the agriculturists.

I. Early Kinship Phase

The lowest grade is occupied by the *Californian Indians*.[1] These have two divisions: the wilder inland tribes, Wintuns, Mishinami, Miwoks, etc., who are hunters mainly.[2] According to Powers they buy their wives for shell-necklaces and furs and treat them contemptuously and often cruelly. Geneonomi-

[1] Waitz, iii, p. 325.

[2] Cunow, *op. cit.*, pp. 134, 135.

cally they resemble the other Hunters of the Early Kinship phase, e.g. such typical hunters as the Apaches, Shoshones, and Blackfeet.

But even here there is a matriarchal *trend*, which becomes conspicuous if we turn to the second group of Californian aborigines, the *Yuroks*, *Paroks*, and *Pomos*. These tribes dwell on the coast and live on fish. The father-in-law, finding his daughter's work of value, is less inclined to part with her. He only gives her to a wooer who can pay a good price; but after the price is paid the woman goes to her husband's house and becomes his property.[1] A poor man joins his wife's household and contributes his work to their subsistence.

II. Full Kinship Phase

Among the more progressive and prosperous fisher-folk *service-marriage* increases; it becomes customary for a man to join his wife's kindred; there are numerous shades and grades of transition to Matriarchy, and a very distinctive and full-blown example in which this type reaches its zenith. We may cite the graphic account by G. W. Steller of the Itelmens, a now extinct tribe of Kamskatkan aborigines.[2]

"The Itelmens live in Ostrogs, which at the time of the first occupation of the territory by the Cossacks contained clans of from 200 to 300 persons; they were so numerous because the men on marriage join their wives' clans." "If a man will wed among their people, he can in no wise do so but by serving for his wife"—and from one to four years. If the girl does not like him, all his labour is lost. If he marries, "he must forsake his parents and dwell with hers, as a servant, if he wants to wed the girl" (p. 210). "In this manner of marriage the foundation is laid of the power of women and the servitude of men; for the men must ever flatter their brides and speak them fair, live but to please them, and kneel at their

[1] Cunow, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
[2] Georg Wilhelm Steller, *Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamskatka*, Frankfurt, 1774.

feet" (p. 345). "They love their womenfolk so inordinately that they are their most humble servants. The woman disposes of all matters and is treasurer of any property they value; he is cook and man-of-all work before her. If he does aught amiss, she cuts off his tobacco ration! And it costs him great store of prayers, compliments, and endearments to obtain the same. But the men are not jealous, and console themselves secretly with many strange women and damsels, of whom they are ardent lovers. They must be secret about it, though, because of the great jealousy and suspicion of their wives, who themselves claim freedom in all things, seek the love of strange men, are insatiable in these matters, and therewith so boastful and vain that she amongst them is held happiest that can tell over the most paramours" (pp. 287–89). "In catching the fish, man and woman row together in boats; the men catch the fish, the women thereupon cut and slice it, clean it of offal, hang up the slices to dry them, and when dried, collect it together with the roes—the old folk and children helping them the while. . . . And this food-store they hold, thereafter, in their continual keeping and at their disposal" (p. 316). In addition to the nurture and teaching of the children, "the women perform such diverse tasks that one must look to find more intelligence amongst them than amongst the men, as is so in very deed" (p. 316). But at the head of each Ostrog, Steller found, not a woman, but the oldest man of the maternal clan (p. 210).

III. Later Kinship Phase

Among the wealthier fisher-folk, such as the Nootka, Thlinkit, and Haidah, we find proofs of a condition in many ways superior to that of the primitive food-growers or hoe-culturists.[1] They are sedentary and have attained a comparative density of population.

According to Veniaminoff, the Thlinkits (called the Koloshy by the Russians) of Alaska numbered formerly between twenty

[1] Cunow, *op. cit.*, p. 136; Waitz, iii, p. 325 *et seq.*

and twenty-five thousand souls.[1] Langsdorff[2] estimates the inhabitants of one of their strongholds at between 13,000 and 14,000 persons, and Krause says that in one village he found 50 houses and 1,200 inmates.

These tribes carry on a lively trade among themselves and by means not only of simple barter, but of a standard of value *in kind*. The mediums of exchange are chains of shells, white deerskins, and woollen blankets, and these afford a scale by which other commodities are estimated.[3] There is already some differentiation in the occupations of the men. There are woodcarvers (of great skill), silversmiths, blacksmiths; there are special women weavers. Before Cook's voyages, these races were acquainted with copper, bronze, and even with iron, probably through their Asiatic trade. They have a marked division of classes, a cleavage between rich and poor. The rich men had formerly slaves or servants whom they bought or captured in war. Within each clan certain families formed a privileged section, whose privileges were, however, based upon riches rather than descent. There was a *plutocracy*, for only a rich man with many goods and slaves could aspire to the dignity of chief.

This economic prosperity begins the transformation of matriarchal into patriarchal institutions, and all the typical changes from the *zenith* of kinship to its decline. Matrilineal descent is generally preserved even when marriage by purchase prevails among them, and such marriage by purchase is very common. The poorer men serve for their wives and join the households of their fathers-in-law. But as a rule the men have enough money to purchase a wife or more than one, and to keep them in their own homes, i.e. under their control. And by the process we have already indicated, the wives so purchased become servants, if not slaves. All the stages of this subjugation

[1] Heinrich Johann Holmberg, *Skizzen über die Völker des russischen Amerika*, Teil I, "Die Thlinkiten", *Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennicae*, Tom. IV, p. 289.

[2] Dr. Aurel Krause, *Die Thlinkit-Indianer*, pp. 52, 107.

[3] As cattle and sheep in old Rome. *Pecunia* = money, derives from *pecus*. (Translator's Note.)

may be observed. For instance, among the *Thlinkits*, of whom we have the fullest information, the women are best placed. The bride is not bought, but won through *presents* from her wooer to her father, who gives his daughter a *dowry* which often exceeds the value of the gifts. After marriage the husband can remain in his father-in-law's household, if he so prefers, or go to his own.[1] Descent is reckoned through the mother. Nephews inherit from maternal uncles,[2] who also partly educate them (Avunculacy). The women are treated with respect, and often have great influence. Old age and ugliness do not prevent certain women from exercising power as reputed witches.[3] If a man is absent for long stretches from his home his younger brother is often permitted to cohabit with the wife, but must contribute to the upkeep of the household—the so-called fraternal polyandry.[4] In general, the Thlinkits are monogamous; only chiefs have many wives. One leader of the *Nass* tribe is said to have appropriated forty! If a marriage is dissolved,[5] the children remain with their mother.

The *Nootkas* also reckon descent through the mother. But the wife is bought by her husband and goes to his home;[6] and rank and goods can be inherited from the father.[7] Although the wives are well-treated there is an active trade in young girls.[8] The women are excluded from the tribal feasts and must do much heavy work.[9] According to Scouter,[10] the *Queen Charlotte Islanders* are the most energetic and intelligent of the whole North-west coast, and are distinguished by their craftsmanship in both metal and wood. They were formerly the richest tribe on that coast. Purchase-marriage is general among them, and although rank and name are matrilineal the men have no hesitation in prostituting their wives—to white men or others—for gain.[11]

[1] Aurel Krause, *op. cit.*, p. 219. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 231.
[3] Bancroft, *loc. cit.*, i, pp. 109–10. [4] Krause, p. 221. [5] Krause, p. 221.
[6] R. C. Mayne, *Four Years in British Columbia*, p. 276.
[7] Bancroft, p. 196. [8] Waitz, iii, p. 333. [9] Bancroft, p. 196.
[10] *Journ. Roy. Geog. Soc.*, London, vol. xi, p. 218. [11] Bancroft, p. 167.

SYNOPSIS

Although the fisher-folk or higher hunters have not attained to the production of artificial food, and therefore appear to the cursory survey less advanced than the hoe-culturists, they nevertheless control a form of subsistence equal to that of the more advanced agriculturists. The same economic causes have the same geneonomic results. And the exact sociological importance of these fishers consists in *the clear and unbroken succession of transitional forms* which they reveal, and which *confirm our conclusions on the rise, zenith, and decline of kinship institutions.*

THE LATE KINSHIP PHASE AMONG STOCK-BREEDING OR PASTORAL PEOPLES

There is a third occupational group of primitive peoples, among whom we can trace the later phases of kinship. These are the stockbreeders or pastoral nomads of the Asiatic and African desert lands. The best known are in Asia, the Mongolian and Turco-Tartar tribes, Kalmucks, Khirgiz, Turcomans, the Tibetans, and, farther North, the reindeer nomads, Samoyedes, Tungeses, and others. In Africa, the Bedouins, Dinkas, Gallas, Somali, Ovahereros; and in the extreme north of Europe the Lapps. In the past, the Aryans, Scythians, and Parthians were pastoral peoples.[1]

The exact *phaseological position* of these nomadic stock-breeders is not quite certain. Formerly it was believed that the pastoral phases represented a *general transitional stage from hunting to tilling the soil.* But this view is untenable, for pastoral nomads appear only in the Eastern Hemisphere, and the so-called "Old World". In Oceania and in the Americas this stage was simply "dropped out" and agriculture followed the hunting stage.[2]

Even as regards the Old World, Eduard Hahn has adduced

[1] Cf. *History of Social Development*, pp. 88–91.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 88–91.

important reasons for believing that, *far from being a prelude to agriculture, stockbreeding among some peoples has succeeded tillage.*[1]

It is impossible now to prove that most of these peoples had a Full Kinship phase with Matriarchate. We only find maternal clans among stockbreeders, in the case of the Hereros, who call these clans *Eanda*. But among the Aryans there are traces and numerous survivals in language and custom, indicating that the ruling races of to-day were once matriarchal. (See *infra*.) The geneonomy of pastoral peoples is emphatically of Late Kinship type. The reasons are, of course, mainly economic.[2]

Stockbreeding arose from, and is related to, hunting, as tillage is to root and herb-picking. Thus it is a characteristic *male* occupation, and an *exclusive* privilege or duty of man. The care and tending of the flocks and herds becomes a "reserved occupation" and women are stringently forbidden to take part therein, just as it is considered contemptible for a man to do "women's work": pick herbs, tend babies, or pitch and strike tents, etc. The flocks and herds are the private property of the men, and, therefore, having command of the main food-supply, men have an enormous advantage. The herds, on a low grade of pastoralism, are not only food but material wealth, the standard medium of exchange. They increase and multiply, and are the key to all other goods. Thus man owns not only food, but the means of attaining all other goods. Pastoral peoples proverbially dislike any hard sustained toil, but are keen and inveterate hagglers and traders. Here, too, the advantage is man's. And pastoral nomads are warlike

[1] According to Forrer's *Urgeschichte des Europäers*, p. 132, the first traces of stockbreeding can be found in the transneolithic ages—between the Old and New Stone Ages. The first animals kept by man were the dog, the so-called peat-hog, a species allied to the domestic swine, and then, soon afterwards, the latter, and the goat. For these primeval peoples the course of development appears to have been from hunting directly to stockbreeding. See *History of Social Development, loc. cit.*

[2] A full account in Grosse's work (*op. cit.*), chap. vi: *Die Familie der Viehzüchter*. I refer students for details to this authority.

and aggressive; their greed for more cattle and their expansive way of life that requires "pastures new" constantly lead to chronic, petty, or more serious warfare. But war is sociologically women's worst enemy, and brings them completely into men's power and at men's mercy.[1]

The manifold dominance of the man as food provider, owner of the food-supply and means of exchange, as trader, and finally as warrior and freebooter, corresponds to the disadvantage and often the disrespectful treatment of women. The women are won by purchase or capture, sometimes by sheer rape. At the present time, opportunities for this are limited. But the survival of wedding ceremonies in which *a capture is acted or simulated* proves how much more congenial this method is to the nomad soul. The more common method, however, is purchase: the wife is bought for so much livestock, sheep or cattle. The price is decided by the respective families. This bargain stamps the woman as *goods* —as the man's property, over which he has full rights and privileges.

Fritzsch says that among the cattle-rearing Kaffirs of South Africa "a wife represents to her husband a capital investment, and he intends to 'get his money's worth' through the work she does and the children she bears. If the woman grows old, falls sick, or is childless, he often sends her back to her father and demands the return of his cattle." [2] She must do all the heavy work, besides her domestic duties. As a Kaffir once said to the traveller Shooter,[3] "she is her husband's ox"; arguing that she must work, being bought at a price. When Shooter told him how Europeans treated their women quite differently, he would not admit that the cases were parallel, *because the white men did not buy their wives!*

In order to acquire the largest possible number of servants the pastoral nomad buys as many wives as his means will allow.

[1] Further particulars in *Evolution of Modern Marriage.*
[2] Fritzsch, *Die Eingeborenen Süd Afrikas*, p. 141.
[3] Joseph Shooter, *The Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country*, pp. 79–80.

The wife is entirely at the man's mercy; he can seek satisfaction[1] elsewhere with complete impunity; he can repudiate his wife and drive her away; he can lend her to his guests—whilst any adultery of the woman on her own initiative is mercilessly punished.

The difference in the status of husband and wife is often observed in the behaviour of their children! Vambéry remarks that however pleasant and appropriate the customs may appear that decree that the son may not be seated, or smoke, or speak loudly without his father's permission, this feeling is neutralized (in the European observer) by the indignation and repugnance inspired by the same son's treatment of his mother —at least officially and in public.[2] And the wives of the Bantu chiefs and "kings" might only move to and fro on their knees in the presence of their lord.[3]

It is quite in accordance with this point of view that the widow has no part in her husband's property at his death, but is herself inherited by his lawful heirs.

There are certain pastoral peoples among whom women had or have a better position. For instance, according to Jakobowsky,[4] the Hottentots treat their women comparatively well; the men may not drink a mouthful of milk (their staple food) without the women's permission. Enemies are cursed by the "womb of the mother", etc.—perhaps those are echoes of an earlier Matriarchate. According to Isaaks,[5] among the Kaffirs the little girls—whose marriages will eventually bring substantial profit—are better treated and less often punished in childhood than their brothers. And the position of women among the East African Galla[6] and the Bedouins[7] is also praised by some investigators. These are, however, exceptions. In general, the social position of women among pastoral

[1] See the stories of Abraham and Hagar and of Judah and Tamar in the Old Testament. (Translator's Note.)
[2] Hermann Vambéry, *Das Türkenvolk*, p. 227.
[3] Ratzel, vol. ii, p. 116.
[4] *Globus*, vol. 70.
[5] Isaaks, *Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa*, vol. ii, p. 293.
[6] Ratzel, vol. ii, p. 169.
[7] J. L. Burckhardt, *Bemerkungen über die Beduinen und Wahaby*, p. 284.

nomads is low, and they are considered totally inferior. The same hard arrogance is shown in the relationship of the father to his children.

The Family Among Pastoral Peoples

The herdsmen live, characteristically, in family groups of more than two generations. The father and grandfather is patriarch in the true sense: lord and master of all his descendants. He is the proprietor of wife or wives, children and children's children, just as of the flocks and herds and the goods for which he trades them. He feels his position, not as begetter or as partner, but as *owner*. His male descendants are servants, his female descendants are saleable goods, whom he disposes of to the highest bidder. Among some herdsmen this patriarchal power lasts as long as life itself. Among others the aged and weakened tyrant meets bitter retribution. Among the Somali the old father is often driven out to starve, after having been utilized in labour till his remaining strength is exhausted.[1] Among the Bedouins Burckhardt[2] saw "old men reduced to subsisting on the charity of the encampment, although their sons lived in prosperity and could have kept their fathers".

The Sept or Clan Among Herdsmen

The three-generations family is typical, geneonomically, of the herdsmen. These are fairly independent of one another, for the herdsman's life tends in all ways to expansion and restlessness. The Clan or Kinship group is therefore less prominent; it is often only a loose association for mutual defence and joint aggression. Where warlike neighbours do not make some solidarity necessary, as, for instance, among the Lapps and reindeer nomads of Northern Asia, the Kinship group is of little importance compared to the family. But generally a small number of three-generation families form a

[1] Dr. Philipp Paulitschke, *Ethnographie Nord Ost-Afrikas*, p. 205.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 284.

sort of clan, and, of course, a patriarchal clan, in which descent and relationship are counted in the male line exclusively, whilst the maternal relatives do not count.[1] Exogamy is in existence among many of these peoples—Turcomans and Mongols (Ratzel), and the African Wakamba, Somali, Bantu peoples. Some, on the other hand, are endogamous, like the Hottentots, who only marry in their own kraals.

The Tribe Among Herdsmen

The association of clans into tribes is also loose and casual, especially in time of peace, when the various families scatter easily and willingly. But when fear compels joint defence, as the herdsman's property is easily stolen, the clans coalesce, either through exogamy or through an organization of military type, which can be so strict that petty princes and leaders of tribes emerge as powerful despots, as among the Kalmucks and Kara Kirghiz, and in the historic case of the Huns.[2]

We shall immediately recognize that the Late Kinship phase is the geneonomic stage of herdsmen when we recapitulate the features of that phase herewith.

Characteristics of Late Kinship Phase

1. The social organization is still based on blood relationship, but the Clan Sept (or *Gens*) is in dissolution. Where it exists, it is patriarchal.

2. The Family, which was almost obliterated by the Clan at the zenith of Kinship, evolves rapidly and takes on more functions. It becomes the domain of *man*.

3. Clan property, even in land and food, becomes more and more family property.

4. Woman sinks from her position of highest importance and authority to become the servant of her husband. The Matriarchate, where it existed, becomes the Patriarchate. Female descent is not reckoned.

[1] Grosse, *op. cit.*, p. 112 [2] Details given by Grosse, *op. cit.*, chap. vi.

5. The most important contributory factor here is increased wealth, which has been concentrated in the hands of men. Men buy their wives, who thus become property; and this practice becomes general. The demiurge of the whole process is the *individualism* of man, awakened and stimulated by *wealth*.

6. The Later Kinship phase, in countless hybrid blends and transitional forms, exists among those primitive peoples who are beginning to experience economic prosperity, i.e. the *Middle* soil tillers (who use the plough as well as the hoe)—the more advanced fisher-folk and the herdsmen. Among the last named we find the transition to the Early Family phase (the predominance of the father and the unimportance of the clan). For the transition between Late Kinship and Early Family is as fluid as between the phases within the Kinship epoch.

To sum up the characteristics of the rise, zenith, and decline of Kinship we may say that:

The Early Kinship phase was dominated by hunting.
The Full Kinship phase by the beginning of fixed dwellings.
The Late Kinship phase by the beginning of wealth.

CHAPTER VI

THE EARLY FAMILY PHASE

DECLINE AND FALL OF THE KINSHIP GROUP

In the Early Family phase the Kinship group *has become obsolete as a political and economic structure*. Human society is no longer built up on a basis of blood relationship. The *State* has begun its existence, and this means one of the greatest changes in human history. Time has sung the requiem of the Kinship group; it has gone down before the process of evolution, which eternally discards simpler forms, both organic and institutional, in favour of more complex with great variety and potentialities. The days of primitive, naïve equality and fraternity, of which Rousseau lamented that they ought never to have ceased, have vanished, for the ancient sacred tie of recognized blood kinship that held human beings together for thousands of years and enabled them to achieve comparatively great cultural progress is dissolved, and humanity has lost the gentle and bountiful foster-mother who fed its childhood. A harsh and rough master will now drive his pupils up steep and stony ways with a rod of iron. *Kinship* is followed by *lordship*; solidarity and mutual help by *servitude* lasting for millennia. And the magician who has wrought this change is *wealth*: the *force of property and the wish for property* have transformed primitive peoples and made them "civilized", i.e. *capable of hard sustained work of various kinds in urban communities*.

The hard fetter that binds the community together is *political. The State* is born, not as an abstract principle, but in the very concrete shape of a ruler or a ruling class. And for one ruler there are ten or more subjects, for one lord ten or more servants. Servitude, therefore, is the lot of the overwhelming majority of mankind. *Thus geneonomy has finally relinquished the task of politically organizing the community*.

The Family as Ascendant

Of course the ancient blood tie was not extinct psychologically, and relationship might still mean much in emotional life and indirectly. But the clan or sept has ceased to function as an economic (productive) or political entity. Its heir in the *political* sphere is the *State*, and *economically* the *Family*, which rises and unfolds as the clan or sept decays.

The Family, therefore, shares now with the State the *basic* position, and we realize that "the foundations of social order", far from being unalterable and eternal, have already sustained great changes. In its early stages, among the governing classes, the Family was numerically large; it included not only plentiful offspring, but also three generations and their wives, and was further strengthened by domestic servants on the slave basis. And in this expansion the Family was capable of considerable productive output. It was often a little world of its own.

Flocks and herds and "real estate" supplied animal and vegetable food and raw materials for clothing, and these were made into finished products in the family domain and dwelling. Spinning, weaving, basket-work, sewing, cooking, the cutting-out and making of clothes became women's constant occupations, for they were largely confined to the house, and the fields were cultivated by slaves.

In those early times it was true—if ever—to speak of the self-feeding, productive, self-contained family units. But not *exactly* so, for the Early Familial is also the Early Industrial phase—that is, there is already some *differentiation among men in their trades and pursuits*, and *money* has been already adopted as a social necessity, though at first only "natural money", e.g. cattle.

The head of the household is the husband and father, whose rights and privileges are—at one period—almost unlimited. The woman's position is strictly subordinate, although there are still certain far-off echoes of matriarchal times. Marriage by purchase has become general and typical, and has stamped the wife as a commodity: the property of her purchaser, bound

to serve and obey; and he tends to extract as much work, attention, and comfort as possible. Therefore men strive, by purpose as well as instinct, to keep as many wives as their means allow. The Early Familial Age is the Golden Age of Polygamy *par excellence.*

Causes of the Decline and Fall of Kinship Institutions

What are the real causes of this change? What finally induced men to leave the Kinship group—tested through centuries and with the prestige of tradition—and to build up their lives afresh on a new basis?

I. Division into Rich and Poor

We have already pointed out that *material wealth* was the main acid that dissolved the clan. The increase of wealth, in itself, divides those who have it from those who have it not. And this contrast disintegrates the clan, *whose essence is the equality of all its members.* When certain families in a clan or sept acquire wealth, they separate from the rest and join the rich men of other septs in a plutocracy. The rich "Beaver" and the rich "Hawk" have far more in common with one another than with the poorer members of their own respective totem groups. The individual instincts and consciousness of the strong and cunning man who has acquired wealth in primitive conditions despises and rejects the ancient communism of blood kinship, which demands solidarity and "share alike" with the poor stay-at-homes.

Another factor intervenes: men not only *become* rich, but are *born into* wealth. For goods and gear are inheritable from fathers to sons. The rich man's son has a double chance of wealth, a double advantage over the poor; and thus as the rich man's wealth and power increases, so the poor man becomes comparatively ever poorer and ever more defenceless.

Of course the ruling class is not entirely composed of the

Fittest in the Darwinian sense, as is often wrongly assumed; not a select *corps* of strong minds and bodies, but a succession of men well entrenched in economic security and advantage, by the goods inherited through family and descent. And these privileged people look with contempt on those who have remained poor, and who respond with envy or servility or both! And thus there is at once economic division, the rich marrying among themselves and standing together; *a class cleavage like a mortal wound throughout the former kinship fabric.*

II. Division into Masters and Servants

The development of agriculture made it possible to extend the subjugation, which was formerly the lot of women only, to a certain number of the male population. The tiller of the soil is of necessity more or less bound to the soil: he cannot take to the woods like the huntsmen, and *therefore field work is safe work for slave-owners to give to slaves.* Sooner or later it must necessarily have occurred to man that it would be more profitable not to kill, torture, or devour the captives taken in warfare, but to enslave them and work them to the last ounce. But as soon as there were wars, and victories and slaves enough, and the captured slaves were incorporated as a sort of livestock into their conquerors' possessions, the people of the most victorious State would fall into two classes, *freemen and slaves.* Strangers are brought into the community *who cannot be dealt with by adoption*, which was the method used in the Kinship groups of old.

Another possibility or facility for servitude is given by agriculture through warfare. A neighbouring tribe may invade a territory, maintain their footing as conquerors, and make the natives their subjects. Or they may subjugate less advanced races by raids and campaigns and exact tribute, but govern the conquered from their own country by means of officials and soldiers (e.g. Ancient Rome). Or again, there may develop within one racial body a warlike aristocracy of rich men, who keep for themselves all the advantages of martial efficiency

and are organized as an army. In any of these cases there is a division of the community into rulers (or warriors) and ruled (agriculturists and artisans); or into those who fight and those who feed the fighters.

The *principle* expressed in this form of society is new and aggressive and fertile in fresh developments. The Family phase is based, not on blood relationship, but on *relative power*: lordship on one side, on the other servitude.

War. The Military State

The *immediate* cause of lordship and the master class is War, which assumes a new aspect under the new economy. Before peoples became sedentary, wars, or rather feuds and forays, were sporadic and occasional. With the State and Family Organizations wars become continuous, and a part of the system. For population has immensely increased, and peoples are packed more closely on the fertile soil and means of subsistence. So each race or nation must be ready to defend itself; it must be *forearmed*. Leadership in war thus acquires a new and great importance. The leader or war chief of the Kinship groups was chosen *ad hoc* and anew each time; when peace came he returned to the ranks, and his power was limited. But the leader of a standing army must be an expert and always "on the job". He has many facilities and inducements to become ruler of his whole community, and an *absolute ruler*.

And warfare becomes profitable. There is wealth in the world, and it is profitable to conquer and rob that wealth. All the goods prepared and produced through years of hard skilled work may be appropriated in a few days of successful aggression by a bold and strong raider—and he can also obtain the services of his enemies as captives.

So warfare becomes the most profitable and honoured of activities, and the victorious warrior the human ideal. Without dull labour and humiliating servitude he lives at others' expense, and tastes life to the full. The State, then, in its origin is organized war, organized pillage. It is a system

whereby the ruling minority rides the ruled majority with reins and spurs, and exploits them—cunningly or violently.

Economic Differentiations in Trades

A third division among classes is associated with the cleavage between rich and poor, lords and servants. This is the *industrial differentiation* into trades and occupations.

Those members of the community whose share of the soil has been seized by the rich find themselves forced to do other work or starve. *They work with their hands (carvers of wood or stone, or metal-workers), or they become merchants.* On their "broad lands" the heads of the great noble families keep a retinue of slaves and specialists, who all contribute to the output and needs of the great household. They become "expert", some at agriculture, others as fishers, boat-builders, wood-carvers, stonemasons, smiths.[1] And men become more and more diverse in their occupations and interests, and the trades become stereotyped into castes. (As in Hindustan.) These trade groups have nothing to do with the old clan membership and help to disintegrate the Kinship group.

We have now, in the place of the undifferentiated clansmen, a triple inequality in status and occupation: Industrial, in different trades; Social, between rich and poor; and Political, between masters and servants.

As these various categories have quite different and often mutually opposed interests, discord arises within the race organized into a State to which more primitive peoples have nothing analogous. Among such peoples there is equality of status and identity of occupation, there are no "parties" or classes or class war! In the very pertinent words of Lafitau in describing the Iroquois:[2]

"If affairs arise in which the whole nation is concerned, they assemble in a General Council, attended by delegates from each village. And in this Council they show such zeal for the common good and mutual forbearance that *therefrom arise*

[1] *History of Social Development*, Book iii, chap. i, pp. 163–76.

[2] *Mœurs des Sauvages Amériquains*, tome ii, p. 464.

an admirable unanimity and solidarity that saves their nation, and can in no wise be broken."

The dawning Class-State is very different. In order to control warring interests and keep the unstable system alive there is need of a new power in human affairs. This power is the State, the organized supreme central authority, and its first form *is the forcible government of an inchoate majority by a compact few*. The aforesaid causes led to an enormous change in human institutions. The process of change, in many cases, took place by the following methods:

Certain families, whether partly the leaders of clans by descent or (more probably) in possession of superior wealth, form a noble class or caste, which seeks in every way to differentiate itself from the less prosperous, and more especially by means of *class endogamy*. This process is helped by the *hereditary chieftainships* observable in the Late Kinship phase; thus certain families had already attained a privileged position. The former *war chief* becomes the *permanent* leader; his power grows with the number of wars waged and victories won.

As a result we have:

I. Instead of the clan, *the State*, which is at first composed of villages and tribes. At its head is

II. The *King* or *Chieftain*, whose powers are at first those of a patriarch. He is generally limited in his activities by

III. The *Nobles*, who supply the lesser chieftains of the *Council*, which helps the King to rule.

The rest of the population are either

IV. *Poor freemen*, who do the work of tillage, handicrafts, and trade; and lower still

V. The *Slaves*, to whom are relegated all the heaviest and least pleasant tasks.

Extension of the Early Family Phase
Examples

This phase includes those comparatively advanced primitive peoples among whom the *differentiation of men* (by trade and

occupation) has already begun, among whom blood relationship is no longer the basis of social institutions; but there is, rather, the rudiment of *political* organization. This means that they have advanced to the threshold of *civilization* by our definition; they are semi-civilized, or in the higher stages of barbarism.

These peoples include many of the American Indians, and of the Malays, the majority of the Polynesians, and most of the African agricultural tribes. They are also exemplified in classical antiquity by instances which we shall deal with in the following chapter.

We find countless transitional forms which show the process of change from Late Kinship to Early Family institutions in a very graphic manner, and we also find a variety of modifications of the—very plastic—fully evolved type. We will first consider the transitional forms among the Malays.

As we have already recorded, the more primitive Malayan tribes are organized on a kinship basis. The tribe consists of clans or septs, each with a chief at its head. The tribe is managed by the assembly of these chiefs, whose dignity has already, as a rule, become hereditary. Where there is appreciable wealth with warlike tendencies, we find, as, for instance, at *Sulu* in Achin (Samba), that the headmen of the clans and their families have become an *hereditary nobility*—the Dattos.[1] These are large landowners, who also control the administration. They elect the ruler, who is Commander-in-Chief in war, but in practice simply their nominee. They possess all power, and frequently abuse their position by levying toll and by extortion. Their less fortunate fellow-clansmen have been degraded to servitude, and captives taken in warfare are absolute slaves. Slavery is also the penalty of "free" poor men who get into difficulties with the law. The treatment of slaves is, as a rule, fairly good. We have thus before us here an *authoritarian*, political, and social organization in the process of being born. There are three classes, the Dattos, who supply

[1] Ratzel; i, p. 407.

the ruler, the free common people, and the slaves, and all three have differentiated themselves out of the clansmen of the old Kinship group.

Let us take a further step. When the ruler is ambitious and vigorous, and has had good fortune in warfare, he makes himself absolute (autocrat) and degrades the nobles to a caste of hereditary courtiers who are only privileged to hold certain high offices. This was the case at Pontianak in Sekadau. The autocrat soon exploits his power financially; thus the Sultan of Kutei levies taxes to the amount of a million gulden per annum. In Tobah, the Sultan has appropriated the office of High Priest as well, and is indeed the State incarnate! The members of the Malay aristocracy are mere officials in comparison with him. Thus in the narrow ethnic framework of the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago we find the whole sequence of stages, from the Matriarchate of the Full Kinship phase to Despotism and the Early Patriarchal Family.

The same developments may be followed among the most advanced Red Indians;[1] in Old Virginia, Florida, and North Carolina, among the Lagunos,[2] the Polynesians, and Africans. The results of this process are the "three estates" of King, Lords, and Commons—for the Slaves "do not count". The King always aims at autocracy, the nobles try to exploit the people and degrade their status, the common folk themselves become ever weaker and less capable of organized resistance. The threefold struggle between these classes leads to the most diverse forms of organization: we find little States with a pronounced democratic tinge; then patriarchally constitutional little kingdoms; oligarchies where the nobles rule; theocracies where the priests rule; and, finally, despotisms where the King wields absolute power over his subjects.[3] And strange memories and survivals of the Clan and Matriarchate appear sporadically still in this new social order.

In the Polynesian Islands (with few exceptions) lordship

[1] Waitz, iii, p. 126. [2] Morgan, *op. cit.*
[3] For further details, see *infra, The State.*

had replaced communal kinship [1] in the native societies. There were chiefs or nobles, common folk and slaves. But this form of social organization was not carried out with uniform harshness through all the Islands. The more democratic were Samoa and Paumotu; the more aristocratic Tonga, Tahiti, Raratonga, and Hawaii. As illustrative cases we will take respectively Samoa and Tonga.

In Samoa the constitution contained both kinship (clan) and feudal or authoritarian elements.[2] Every chief's family formed a clan of about fifty persons and chose a headman. The clan headmen living in one village chose the village headman; and these again elected the ten head chiefs or district chiefs, who had authority in the Island. They were highly honoured, but had to work like other people.[3] Their power was limited by the other chiefs and by the Council, which comprised both those chiefs and the second estate—those who owned and tilled a piece of soil.[4]

In Tonga, lordship is more pronounced, for a race of conquering invaders rules over a vanquished stock of older inhabitants.[5] The head of the State was the King or *Tuitonga*; he was considered sacred, and ruled autocratically in both worldly and religious matters. The people were classified as follows:

I. The nobles or *Egi*, who had two subdivisions: (*a*) the chieftains, who appropriated all State offices; and (*b*) the lesser nobles, who were all in any way related to the chieftains.

II. The intergrades from nobility to common people were two:

(*a*) The *Matabule*, who formed the retinue of the chieftains, and in common with the *Muas* formed a sort of artistic and intellectual caste.

[1] Horatio Hale, *Ethnography and Philology in Wilkes' U.S.A. Exploring Expedition*, vol. vi, p. 28.

[2] See Rev. George Turner, *Nineteen Years in Polynesia*, London, 1861, chap. 29; Waitz, *op. cit.*, vi, p. 166.

[3] Waitz, vi, p. 166.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] W. Mariner, *Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands.*

(*b*) The *Muas*, were some of them priests, and they also educated children of noble blood and practised skilled trades, such as canoe-building, tattooing, and the carving of walrus ivory, etc.

III. The common people or *Tua* were peasants and artisans in the less skilled crafts, of which the most despised was that of *cooking*.

IV. Finally, the slaves, mostly captives in war and forays.

In spite of this elaborate aristocratic classification inheritance was still partly matriarchal, or rather *matrilineal*. Goods passed from father to son, *but rank, office, and lineage were inherited through the mother*. On the other hand, the servile spirit and the class cleavage were so developed—both in Tonga and other Polynesian Islands—that only great men and chiefs were credited with personal immortality. The common people believed themselves to be soulless. Another peculiarity was the estimation of a son of noble lineage as of higher rank than his father, because the son had one ancestor the more! So the father *nominally* resigned in his favour. The same logic regarded a girl of chieftain's family as more aristocratic than her mother. In Tonga, the daughter of the King and Queen was of such high rank that no Tongan was fit to be her husband. But this did not hinder her from taking as many lovers as she pleased. If she bore a girl child (as rank was matrilineal), the baby was of even higher descent than the Princess, and received supreme honours as *Tamaha*.[1]

Among the agricultural peoples of Africa the most usual constitutional form is monarchy, strictly limited by chieftains or nobles. Among the smaller tribes the patriarchal tendency is conspicuous, the Royal House have the same position as regards the people as the patriarch to his family.[2] Among these smaller tribes the royal power was not great. In Bambuk the King could be deposed by his subjects, and his tribute was fixed by them.[3] In Ashanti,[4] on the other hand, there was a

[1] Waitz Gerland, vi, p. 177.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 127.
[3] Waitz Gerland, p. 134.
[4] Waitz, p. 145.

regular oligarchy, arrogant and suspicious, which ruled King and people; and among the Congolese the King's power was absolute; his greatest vassals could be sold as slaves at his pleasure.[1] In Dahomey, the interaction of war and kingship was extraordinary: "War is not only the sport of kings, but of all Dahomeyans; in their greed for war, plunder and slaves they demand as their right, that the year shall be divided between fighting and feasting. Women took part in warfare. The female bodyguard of the King were five thousand in number, and the whole army twenty-four thousand strong. All Dahomeyans were regarded as the King's slaves, and all property was his by right. He inherited men's goods, he could confiscate property or have anyone put to death; even his nearest relatives might be slain at his pleasure or sold as slaves. He had also supreme rights over all the women of Dahomey." [2]

Kinship and Matriarchal Survivals in Africa

In spite of the marked patriarchal and early familial character of most institutions among the native food-growers of Africa, there are survivals which clearly indicate former kinship and matriarchal customs. The widespread *cults* of sacred animals are evidence of earlier totemism.[3] And totemism survives in some tribal rites. Thus the Bechuanas, a Bantu people, dwelling between the Orange River and the Zambesi, and living both pastorally and by tilling the soil, are divided into groups which have totem names: Ba-Kuena are the Crocodile folk, Ba-Alapi the Fish folk, Ba-Chueneng the Monkey folk, and Ba-Nare the Buffalo folk. Each group has its own songs and dances in honour of the totem. In order to ascertain to which totem a Bechuana belongs, one asks him: "What do you dance?" [4]

Matriarchal survivals in Africa are quite frequently found,

[1] Waitz Gerland, p. 152. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

[3] Cf. J. Weiszenborn, *Tierkult in Afrika*, Leipzig.

[4] Frazer, vol. ii, p. 369. A detailed collection of material on totems in South, Central, and West Africa may be found in Frazer's great book, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910.

among West African peoples especially. Royal or chieftain's rank, for instance, is generally inherited by the sister's son; and among the common people the same is true of material goods.[1] In Loango, chieftainships and noble rank are inherited through the mother, never paternally. The children of a prince are only themselves princes too, if their mother is of royal rank. But the children of the princesses of Loango are always princes, although these royal women could choose their husbands quite freely, and even force any man to matrimony, and then at will repudiate him again. The ceremony was simple: she simply whistled or called to him.[2] In Lunda the chief persons were the *Muata-Jamvo*, or King, and a woman, the *Lukokesha*. She was not married, but had a male slave as lover; and he was dressed as a woman and covered with ornaments.[3]

The Lukokesha was forbidden to become a mother, for she was the symbolic ancestress of the royal race. If she nevertheless became pregnant, her children were killed at birth. In Accra, Angola, there were even queens regnant.[4] In Loango "The King chose out a grave, sedate, experienced matron, whom he called his mother, and honoured more than his mother by the flesh. She was entitled *Makonda*, and had great authority. The King had to consult her in all important matters. She might even slay him if he failed in respect, or refused what she asked. She might choose a husband as she pleased, and her children were reckoned of the Royal House. If her lovers take other women, they must die." This is a contemporary account of a traveller in the year 1749. In Ashanti, as the King was headman, his sister was head-woman.[5]

Among the Zambesi peoples the women had much influence, and before any trading was done they were consulted.[6]

[1] Cf. Material in Dargun's *Mutterrecht und Raubehe*, p. 5; Livingstone; Waitz, *op. cit.*

[2] L. Degrandpré, *Voyage de la Côte Occidentale*, 1786 à 1787, Paris, 1801, pp. 109, 110, 112.

[3] Pogge, *Im Reiche des Muata-Jamvo*, p. 156.

[4] Cavazzi, *Historische Beschreibung der drei Königreichen, Congo, Matamba & Angola*. German version by Jäcklin, Munich, 1694, p. 285.

[5] Ploss-Bartels, *Das Weib*, 8th ed., p. 652. [6] Livingstone, *passim*.

Schweinfürth records of the Monbuttu, "The women showed a very self-reliant and independent spirit towards their husbands. This relationship was clearly shown when I asked the men to sell me some curiosity; for they replied invariably, 'Ask my wife; it is hers.' [1] And the Monbuttu attached very little importance to conjugal fidelity," Schweinfürth adds, "as he frequently observed, from day to day, in the Nubian camp." Forbes says of Dahomey, that the famous celibate women warriors of the King's bodyguard were treated as men, and rivalled them in courage and ferocity.[2] Among the Southern Senegalese the women had political rights, according to Bertrand-Bocandé; [3] they took part in public assemblies, and "on their will depends peace or war". In Jami the women not only took part in law-making, but they were the judges in disputes brought before the Tribunal. And in Cabou they could become rulers, and were "much respected".[4]

Position of Women. Polygyny

But these are exceptions. In general, during the Early Family phase, women's position is very unfavourable and depressed. *Marriage by Purchase* is general, making the wife "bought goods", and as such her husband's property and his labour-slave especially. People in this stage, therefore, try to get as many wives to work for them as their means allow. The enormous inequality between the possessors of wealth and power and the bulk of the people leads to monstrous excesses. Thus, according to Spillmann,[5] the King of Loango had thirty-two wives, but wished to increase the number to fifty. The *Muata Cazembe*, chief King of Lunda, had no less than six hundred, who acted as servants to his four Queens.[6]

[1] Schweinfürth, *Im Herzen von Afrika*, Leipzig, 1874, vol. ii, p. 96.
[2] Waitz, vol. ii, p. 159.
[3] *Bulletin de la Société de la Géographie*, tome xi, Paris, 1849, p. 267: "Notes sur la Guinée portugaise ou Sénégambie méridionale", p. 267.
[4] As above, *Bulletin de la Société de la Géographie*, tome xi, Paris, 1849.
[5] *Vom Cap zum Zambesi*, Freiburg i.B., 1882, p. 190.
[6] "Der Muata Cazembe, und die Völkerstamme von Süd Afrika," *Zeitschrift für allgemeine Erdkunde*, vol. 6, Berlin, 1856, p. 399.

W. Peters relates that "if the *Muata* saw a woman whom he desired, or heard of one who might please him, he summoned her to his presence. As soon as she arrived, she was strictly questioned, and, if necessary, tortured, in order that she might give the names of any men who had had connection with her carnally." These unfortunates were then seized and slain, and their goods confiscated, while the women were secluded in the royal harem. Among the *Maraves*, according to Peters, a wife has to crouch on her knees at some distance while her husband is eating.[1] According to Stanley, King Mtesa, who was once the mightiest ruler in all the eastern half of Equatorial Africa, had five thousand wives, but only five hundred of these were his actual mates.[2] And Felkin estimated Mtesa's wealth of wives at seven thousand.[3] The husband himself was not certain on this point; he was lavish to a degree, and once offered the traveller a present of eighteen picked beauties. The King of Dahomey regarded all his female subjects as his personal property; he could give them as presents, or sell them as slaves, or otherwise use them as he chose.[4] Of Kasanga, the ruler of Urua, Cameron [5] reported that when the King slept at home in his palace his bedstead and royal couch were formed by the women of his harem. Some of them, on their hands and knees, made a sofa of their backs, and the others lay flat on the ground before it, as a soft carpet for his feet.

Characteristic Features of the Early Familial Phase

A new world and a new social order appear. We are in the outer courts of the Temple of *Civilization*, at the border-line between primitive and civilized peoples, between prehistoric and historic times.

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 282–83. [2] A. M. Stanley, *Through the Dark Continent*, vol. i.
[3] *Uganda Reise in "Ausland"*, vol. 55, Stuttgart, 1882, p. 169.
[4] Wilson, *Western Africa, Its History, Condition and Prospects*, London, p. 202 *et seq.*
[5] Cameron, *Across Africa*, German ed., vol. ii, p. 61.

Geneonomy has finally resigned its former function of determining social organization. *Social and Political* (Demonomic) progress become distinct from *Organic or Biological* processes, and become artificial, more or less conscious and "super-organic".

The Familial epoch corresponds in *economics* to the epoch of *differentiation among men* according to trade and occupation. Politically it is *authoritarian*. It is a time of *servitude*, which lasted thousands of years, till mankind slowly evolved new ideas and forms of culture.

The first Familial phase may be characterized as follows:

1. The Clan, Sept, or Kinship group has gone down before the new needs and material resources, for which it was inadequate. There has been a threefold differentiation:

(*a*) Economic, into trades and occupations.
(*b*) Social, into rich and poor.
(*c*) Political, into governing and subject classes.

The community changes its basis and must adapt itself in all ways to the change.

2. Politically, the Kinship group has been succeeded by the State, a precarious balance of unstable elements in which conflicting interests are "harmonized" by force. In the State, which at first appears in insignificant or undeveloped forms, three powers—ruler, nobles, and commoners—rule a slave-class without rights or share in the State. This triangular struggle results in the most various Constitutions, from the aristocratic republic to absolute despotism.

3. On the economic side the clan or sept is replaced by the family, which approaches its zenith, and is the chief geneonomic institution. It conquers the *soil* even of the common lands, and develops into the "joint" (or three generations) family; it commands the services of numerous slaves. It often forms an economic unit, producing for its own consumption. It is *strictly patriarchal*.

4. The position of *women* has fallen. They are dependent on,

and subject to, men. Marriage by purchase is general. The bought wife is a piece of property and a domestic servant to her husband. In this phase polygyny often attains its greatest extremes.

5. Nevertheless we often find incongruous institutions and customs, which we must regard as survivals from the Kinship and Matriarchal Age into the alien atmosphere of the Early Family.

Here we conclude our synopsis of the institutions of primitive or Nature-peoples; we have endeavoured in this survey to clarify our ideas of social developments. Of course the picture has many huge lacunae and is a rough outline. We have tried to keep to the main lines or main *evolutionary trends*; there are, of course, many deviations, and much remains for future investigation to tackle. What we sorely miss, in the course of such investigation, is a really "Descriptive Sociology" in Herbert Spencer's sense of the term—that is, an Anthropology that would logically collect, and clearly present, all the material on social customs and institutions which travellers have, up to date, recorded. Until such an encyclopedic work of reference is available, synthetic investigators must laboriously dig up their data out of countless books of travel and monographs, and lose years, even decades, of their lives which should have been devoted to sociological syntheses and philosophy—and could be so devoted were the materials easily available.

We now turn to the *Culture* folk, the "Civilized", i.e. those nations who mostly possess recorded histories, and whose course of development is comparatively clear, not dim and conjectural.[1] We are now, therefore, on historical, more or less documented ground, after groping and guessing in the twilight.

EPILOGUE

I may refer, in this connection, to the "Law of the Expansion of Consciousness".

[1] Cf. *History of Social Development*, pp. 324–25.

I. In a primary stage, which is, however, not conterminous with the Kinship epoch, but extends into the Early Family phase, there was *no history*: only sagas and myths. To this stage, roughly, belong the times *before recorded history*.

II. In the Familial epoch the alphabet was invented and historic records first kept. Chronologies of events, statements of concrete facts, began—this is conterminous with *history*. But the concept of expanding development has hitherto been unrealized.

III. With the dawning *personal* epoch, *both individual and social*, human consciousness was invaded by the idea of *cultural development*. *History* is succeeded by *sociology*. And the human mind seeks the clue to future changes in order to comprehend their nature and control them by knowledge and purpose.

Thus we might also differentiate:

I. Prehistoric phases.
II. Historic phases.
III. Sociological phases.[1]

[1] Cf. *Sinn des Lebens*, chaps. xv, xvi, xxvi, and p. 262.

CHAPTER VII

THE FULL FAMILIAL PHASE

(IN ANTIQUITY)

IN this phase all the tendencies we have just traced attain their zenith. State and Family have become the "foundations of society", the village, parish, and race-communities consolidate and expand into the National State; and political life is so active and conspicuous that the new stage of human culture takes its name therefrom, and is known as *Civilization*. The Family is dominant in the geneonomic sphere of parental and sexual relationships.

All the peoples on the lower rungs of this stage have elaborate and stringent *familial* laws and customs. We may cite as examples the Chinese of the days before the Great War—and to some extent still; the Japanese up till the nineteenth century; the Peruvians and Mexicans at the Spanish Conquest; the Assyro-Babylonians, Indians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans at the prime of their glory and prosperity, and the Latin and Central European peoples during the Middle Ages.

FORMER KINSHIP ORGANIZATIONS AMONG THESE PEOPLES

Nevertheless it is possible to *prove* that most of these peoples had a Kinship phase in their remote past; and this phase is established as a certainty in the earlier evolution of that race which has the most brilliant record in human culture. The last echoes of the Kinship group resound into the historic times of classical antiquity. And the great writers of Antiquity have made us fully acquainted with the transition from Early to Full Familial institutions.

According to tradition there were originally four tribes in Attica, and each of these fell again into three phratries, and each phratry into thirty septs or clans. The twelve phratries

are even said to have formed twelve independent town settlements.

According to Grote, "the gens was a clan, sept, or enlarged, and partly factitious, brotherhood, bound together by (1) common religious ceremonies and exclusive privilege of priesthood in honour of the same God, supposed to be the primitive ancestor and characterized by a special surname; (2) by a common burial-place; (3) by mutual rights of succession to property; (4) by reciprocal obligations of help, defence, and redress of injuries; (5) by mutual right and obligation to intermarry in certain determinate cases, especially when there was an orphan daughter or heiress; (6) by possession, in some cases at least, of common property, an archon and a treasurer of their own." [1]

This was the oldest constitution of Attica, and of other Greek States as well.

The Hellenes depicted by Homer were already completely familial in their organization. They fought in phratries. An ancient Attic saga tells us of the change from Late Kinship to Early Familial times in the following terms: Theseus united the aforesaid twelve towns of Attica into one people, and their capital was Athens—formerly, perhaps, the residence of the *Basileus*, or chief captain in warfare. Moreover, *regardless and independent of the old clans*, Theseus is credited with the division of the people into the three classes of *eupatridae* (nobles), *geomoroi* (peasants), and *demiurgoi* (workers or artisans). The rich *patricians* were thus separated and released from obligations to their fellow-clansmen. They formed a close corporation with a *legal right* to all higher offices of the State. It is undoubted that in the pre-Solonic times these eupatrids faced the rest of the people, entrenched in privileges and cunning in the use of every advantage. First, they deposed the King and abolished monarchy—the last King of Attica was traditionally Kodrus—in order to get a free hand and to acquire more of the common lands, as well as to practise *usury*,

[1] George Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. ii, p. 428.

by which they obtained a tenacious hold on the poorer citizens. This oligarchy was at its height at the time of the Draconic laws. On every peasant's bit of land stood the small columns of stone which indicated the amount the toiler owed to this or that noble usurer. Peisistratos, the "Tyrant", put himself at the head of a popular movement and drove out the eupatridae. The laws of Solon brought definite victory to the citizens, and Athens started on its career as an authoritarian republic (a minority of freemen, employing slave labour).

The course of history was very similar in the Early Roman Republic.[1] Here also old traditions describe a union of three tribes with a joint number of 300 clans or septs (*Gentes*).

The rights and duties of the clansmen were substantially the same as those we have found among the Early Atticans and the Iroquois. (See Chapter IV.)

The constitution comprised:

1. A Council of Headmen of Clans or Elders—*Senatus Romanus.*
2. An Assembly of the people—*Comitia Curiata.*
3. A military leader or king—*Rex.*

The Senate had a hundred members, and their offspring and descendants were *patricians* (cf. Greek eupatridae)—a clear proof of the importance attached to male descent.

The Roman patricians, like the eupatridae, drove out their kings and formed "a Republic" which was an oligarchy. And they concentrated their efforts on getting the *Common Land* into their possession.

The leading authorities on Rome are of the opinion that the soil of Latium was originally the common property of the *Gentes*. But when Rome first appears in history, as distinct from tribal legend, we find there was a difference between the private estates of its citizens (*agri privati*) and the extensive fields and vineyards which were national property (*ager publicus*,

[1] Morgan, *Primitive Society*; Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, 4th ed., vol. i, p. 37; Grosse, *Formen der Wirtschaft*, p. 199; Laveleye-Bücher, *Das Ureigentum*, p. 345.

ager populi). The private estates were small, each including only the area necessary for house-room, a courtyard, and garden: the so-called *bina jugera*. These little estates passed from father to son (*heredium*); but the *ager publicus* was the people's, and unalienable.

The *heredium* was regarded as necessary for the maintenance of each family, and till the end of the Roman Republic it was considered disgraceful to sell it. It was not, however, fully sufficient for nourishment, and the possessors of these tiny estates had not only to cultivate strips of the public cornfields, but to pasture their cattle, sheep, goats, and swine on the public pasture. This typical arrangement resembled that of pre-war Russia and of Germany before the Roman invasions and settlements. *But we have no tradition of any Roman custom analogous to the periodical subdivisions of the Common Land among Teutons and Slavs.*

The *ager publicus* could be freely occupied by any patrician, so long as he did not transgress the customs and rules in dealing with the piece of land he occupied. He acquired a right, *not of possession*, but of *occupation and use, which in theory might be at any moment rescinded*, and however long it lasted could never become full right of possession. But law and practice sometimes differ, and the patricians held tight to the right of usage of the portions of the *ager publicus* occupied by them, *just because there was no fixed date by which such land reverted to the Commonwealth.* And these occupied portions became so extensive that the occupiers would leave bits of them to their clients as *alms* (*precarium*)—on *request*, and for *a portion of the produce.* Later on, when fortune in war had brought many slaves to Rome, the patricians had the land they occupied cultivated by these slaves. They also made full use of the right to graze their cattle on the common pasture, but were in no great hurry to pay the dues levied for this privilege to the State.

The Plebeians, like the *Hintersassen* of the German borderlands (Markland), had no right of occupation in the

ager publicus. But from time to time they received grants or lots, whose area appears to have been usually *seven "jugera"*. These lots were larger than the *heredia* of the patricians, because they had to serve for the subsistence of a whole family —and the *bina jugera* contained the courtyard and garden. As agriculture is the only source of wealth in secluded and primitive communities, every free man must have the opportunity of a livelihood.

But failing the periodic redivisions and distributions of Slavonic and Teutonic custom, it was necessary for the Romans to constantly cut into the Common Land, as the Plebeians had no permanent security in their holdings.

The Roman *Gentes* kept a tradition and habits of solidarity for centuries in certain respects. In quite late times the fellow-"Gentiles" supported and helped one another in need, stood security for debts, bought off captive slaves, and paid fines. And when the kinship spirit had otherwise evaporated, the *Gentes* met in the celebration of religious rites.[1]

The ancient Hindus had strictly patriarchal septs—*Sapinda*: it is still forbidden to Brahmins to marry women of the same clan-name as themselves.[2] The Kelts in Scotland and Ireland kept Kinship groups (clans and septs) till very late in history. The clans were politically active in the Scottish Highlands till the middle of the eighteenth century, and had to be dissolved as independent organizations by Government decree. The lineage was, however, since centuries, patriarchal.[3] We shall deal in a later chapter with Teutonic kinship institutions. Among the Slavs, Kinship groups survived an astonishingly long time. We have mentioned the *Zadruga* of the Southern Slavs in a previous work;[4] and Laveleye says of pre-war Russia: "In all Great Russia, i.e. throughout the immense area beyond the Dnieper . . . the land, or that part of it which is

[1] Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique*, 13th ed., p. 114; Grosse, *loc. cit.*, p. 200.

[2] Hellwald, *Menschliche Familie*, p. 469; Morgan, *passim*.

[3] Cf. Solomon Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, Paris, 1905, pp. 9, 30, for totemism among Greeks and Kelts.

[4] Cf. Krauss, *Süd Slaven*, p. 72; Hellwald, p. 505.

not Crown property or Nobles' Estate, is the indivisible property of the peasants. . . . Every adult male has a right to an equal portion in the land whose owner is the Commune or *Mir*." Formerly the Mir tilled its land communally; then the land was divided up and distributed, either every sixth year or in some districts every twelfth or fifteenth, but most frequently every ninth year, and by casting lots. The Mir is a real Kinship group, and its members claim descent from a common ancestor. When one of the members dies, the heir is not his nearest relative, but the adult membership of the Mir; the children are excluded.[1]

Among non-Aryan peoples we find the Hebrews divided into twelve kindred tribes, claiming descent from the twelve sons of Jacob. According to Morgan (p. 311) the tribe of Levi had eight *clans* and three *phratries*—Gerson, Kohath, and Merari. In China[2] the septs and clans had vanished by historically recorded times, but there is sufficient evidence that Kinship groups were active and recognized there also in the remote past, as follows:

Firstly, it is beyond dispute that the soil was once the common property of groups larger than the family.

Secondly, there are still about a hundred clan-names or *gens*-names (according to other savants, quite 400), one of which is borne by every Chinaman, and marriage with a woman of the same *gens*-name is forbidden.

Thirdly, the glyph for *gens* is *sin*, and this is composed of two symbols, one of which denotes a woman and the other birth. We may conclude that these clans were originally matrilineal.

Fourthly, the bearers of the same clan-name still assemble for religious ceremonies at the tombs of their common ancestors, and even now, according to Möllendorff,[3] "a gens or clan" is formed where some hundreds of individuals of the same "family name" dwell near one another. He adds: "Officials leave clan affairs almost entirely alone." Among the Japanese, at the beginning of their history the people consisted of several

[1] Laveleye-Bücher, *Ureigentum*, p. 7 *et seq.*
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 466, 467.
[3] *Das Chinesische Familienrecht*, pp. 41–42.

Gentes or Kinship groups or clans, called *Uji*. They were based on blood relationship.[1] According to a communication from Professor Osawa in Tokio to Professor Grosse, there are still exogamous clans in the southern province of Higo, and these villages are not administered by a Daimio,[2] i.e. are relatively free and communal societies. In Old Egypt the people were first an assemblage of small local tribes, called *Nomens*, which consolidated later into the ancient kingdom. These local *Nomens* were administered, or rather presided over, by hereditary headmen, and the form of inheritance was "from the father to his daughter's eldest son".[3] And the quaint animal heads and masks of the Egyptian deities suggest very strongly that they were originally the *totems* of special tribes or clans, i.e. that the most ancient, pre-dynastic Egyptians practised totemism.

The Peruvians, at the time of the Spanish Conquest, were completely organized on an authoritarian basis with a bureaucracy, but it is probable that their previous development had corresponded to the stages of Mexican history so well elucidated by Morgan,[4] who has proved the original existence of Kinship groups in the land of "Anahuac".

Matriarchal Survivals

The ancient Matriarchate left perceptible traces among the early civilizations as well as the Kinship group. Bachofen—in his great work *Das Mutterrecht*—and subsequent investigators have collected much evidence on this point.[5]

[1] O. Nachod, "Japan", in *Hartungs Weltgeschichte*, p. 583.

[2] Grosse, *op. cit.*, p. 194. [3] Brugsch, *Geschichte Egyptens*, p. 19.

[4] *Primitive Society*. See also "On the 'Calpulli' of the Central American peoples", Alonzo de Zurita, *Rapport sur les différentes classes de chefs de la nouvelle Espagne*, Paris, 1840, p. 51. In *Voyages, relations et mémoires originaux pour servir à l'Histoire de la découverte de l'Amérique*, publiés par H. Fernaux-Compans.

[5] Literature and sources have been enumerated by Post, *Ethnologische Jurisprudenz*, i, p. 71; Giraud-Teulon, *Les Origines de la Famille*, p. 14 *et seq.*; L. Dargun, *Mutterrecht und Raubehe*, Breslau, 1883; F. V. Reitzenstein, *Liebe und Ehe im Alten Orient*, Stuttgart, 1909; M. Hörnes, *Urgeschichte der bildenden Kunst*, Vienna, 1908. Vol. ii deals with Matriarchy and Maternity cults among Chaldees, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Early Teutons, and Slavs, pp. 88–104.

For instance, when the Athenians first appear in history they were divided into *patriarchal* clans. But there is linguistic proof that these were formerly matriarchal. Fellow-clansmen were termed *homogalaktes*, i.e. "nursed on the same milk"; and *adelphos*, i.e. fraternal or sororal, means "sprung from the same womb", for *delphys* is one of the terms for the womb.[1] Most graphically is the transition dramatized in the tale of Orestes, and we may term the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus the tragedy of Maternity and Matriarchy *par excellence*. Orestes had slain his mother, Clytemnestra, in order to avenge Agamemnon, his father, whom she had slain. According to matriarchal codes he is a murderer, for he is only related to his mother and not to his father. By patriarchal standards he has done justice and right, as the strictly patriarchal point of view only recognizes male descent and male authority. In the saga, the avenging Furies (Erinnyes) are the spokeswomen of Matriarchy, Apollo and Pallas Athene of the new Patriarchate. The Erinnyes pursue Orestes and torment him with remorse and terrors, and in a dialogue between Orestes and one of these avenging spirits he demands:

Orestes: Why, then, didst thou not her—while yet she lived—pursue?
Erinnyes: *She was not kin by blood to him she put to death.*
Orestes: But I, thou tellest me, am of one blood with *her*?
Erinnyes: Did she not carry thee, Murderer, beneath her heart?
Dost thou forswear, dost thou deny, thy Mother's blood?

The patriarchal view is put as fiercely and partially by Apollo as the matriarchal by the Erinnyes:

Appollo: The mother does not give its life unto her child,
Life-giver is the sire; she but preserves the gift.

And as an example he brings forward Pallas Athene, divine but motherless, borne from the head of Father Zeus. The Erinnyes reply:

[1] Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 3rd ed., 1907, p. 307.

Erinnyes: Thou dost cast down and slay the Mighty of Old Time.

The Judges appear. Pallas Athene seizes the decisive stone and flings it into the Urn for Orestes' acquittal.

She, the motherless, the Mind-born, accepts patriarchal supremacy.[1] The despairing Erinnyes chant:

Erinnyes: Oh ye *New Gods*! Oh Laws well-tried, *Most Ancient Right*!
Ye cast them down, ye tear them from the Avenging Hands!

Another matriarchal survival under alien conditions in Athens was the prohibition of marriage between brother and uterine half-sister, while marriage with the consanguineous half-sister (father's daughter) was permitted. Similarly, among the ancient Hebrews, Sara was Abraham's wife and also his half-sister, "the daughter of his father, but not of his mother", and therefore, according to the matriarchal view, not his blood relation at all.

Giraud-Teulon is of opinion that the Roman Patricians derived their name from *Patres*, and were "their Father's sons", i.e. patriarchal in organization at a time when the Plebeians were still matriarchal. To this day, among the Touaregs of North-West Africa, those who are Moslems, and, of course, strictly patriarchal in their institutions, call themselves their "Father's sons"; the unconverted and more primitive Touaregs, on the contrary, are "Mother's sons".[2]

According to Bernhöft,[3] the Ancient Roman Concubinate is simply and solely the old "pair-marriage" according to matriarchal customs and ideas, like the *Gandharva*-marriage in Hindustan, while the Patrician marriage was fully patriarchal. Even the term *Matrimonium* recalls the *Matriarchate*; in German the terms *Brautschaft* and *Bräutigam* (English, bridal and bridegroom) have a matriarchal flavour, and the word for children of the same parents emphasizes *sisters* instead of

[1] See Bachofen, *op. cit.*, vol. xxv. [2] Giraud-Teulon, *Origines*, p. 82.
[3] *Zur Geschichte des europäischen Familienrechtes*, p. 194.

brothers (*Geschwister*). As we shall see, when considering our Teutonic forefathers, Tacitus found the *Avunculate* in force among them; that is, there was a particularly close tie and responsibility between a *man* and his *sister's son*: a characteristic feature of the old Matriarchate. (In spite of this significant linguistic evidence, many savants have denied that the Aryans were ever fully matriarchal, and this mainly on linguistic grounds! See below, Chapter IX.) In ancient Egypt we constantly find matriarchal survivals; Herodotus says that the women went forth to the markets to buy and sell, while the men remained at home; and the duty of supporting the parents in old age devolved on the daughters and not the sons. Diodorus Siculus even says that the bridegroom vowed obedience to his future wife in all things in the marriage contract.[1] Even in China it is probable that the Matriarchate once prevailed. We have already mentioned that the Chinese clans or septs were formerly maternal in their descent. And the oldest Chinese chronicle relates that in the most remote past the people knew their mothers, but not their fathers, and that decent separation of the sexes was as unknown as the rule of lords and princes among them. In Chinese *to marry* is *hun-yin*, i.e. *to take a husband*: cf. the Ambilanak-marriage among the Malays! And it is also otherwise inexplicable that at wedding-feasts the bride's relatives take the best places, while the bridegroom's family must put up with the inferior seats.[3] Moreover, one of the original Chinese tribes is (or was still before the war) ruled by a woman, whom her subjects treat with great respect. The succession is limited to the female members of a certain dynasty, and the other Chinese call this tribe *Nue-kue*, i.e. ruled by a woman, and treat them with utter contempt.[4]

[1] Herodotus, 2, 35; Diodorus, 1, 27; Bernhöft, p. 166. Cf. Döllinger on the Gynecocracy in Meroë, *Heidentum und Judentum*, p. 40, sec. 87.
[2] A. Conrady, "China" in Von Pflugk Hartung's *Weltgeschichte*, Berlin, 1910, vol. i, p. 483.
[3] Grube, "Zur Pekinger Volkskunde", *Proceedings of Berlin Ethnographical Museum*, Berlin, 1901, p. 45.
[4] Katscher Gray, *Bilder aus dem Chinesischen Leben*, p. 320.

History, therefore, is fairly explicit in confirming our supposition that all peoples who have attained what we defined as *Civilization* were organized in Kinship groups before recorded history began. Both our forefathers by blood and our cultural ancestors in the spirit, the Greeks and Romans, *on their entry into recorded history* were in the process of transition, from the Late Kinship to the Early Family phases, as we have indicated, and form absolutely classical and typical examples of what this transition implies.

This transitional period was followed, in both Greece and Rome, by the Full Familial phase, whose characteristics we must now define. We may sum them up as twofold:

(*a*) The authority of the State.
(*b*) The integral unit of the household or family.

The State of this phase is no elastic tribal entity, but a consolidation of numerous small tribes, and each victorious war leads to larger and more powerful political organizations. There are leagues for mutual defence (and aggression), for defeat in war means the subjugation of the defeated. *Vae Victis! The Full Kinship phase is also the high noontide of wars of conquest.*

And war surrounds the young State, not only without, but also within its gates. The interests of its members diverge economically, socially, and politically. It is therefore the age *par excellence* of *Class Wars*. Patricians and Plebeians, Exploiters and Exploited, Kings, Nobles, and People, strive furiously together. But these events are outside the sphere of geneonomy, and we must now consider the Family life of this Iron Age in more detail.

THE FAMILY

When the Kinship group disintegrated it did not dissolve into separate individuals, but into its larger components—families; and into the form which is almost invariably dominant in the older civilizations—the patriarchal joint family (in which *three* generations are represented). In order to form a concept of

this joint family life, let us take two fully evolved, though geographically widely separated, examples: the ancient Roman and the recent or contemporary Chinese.

At the head of the Chinese joint family—concerning which we have already had something to say [1]—stands the Paterfamilias, whose authority is so great as to be almost absolute. He is the administrator of the family capital and income, and wife, children, and children's children are subject to his commands and caprices.

He may not only chastise his children, but sell them, hire them, and, under some circumstances, kill them. Sometimes boys sell themselves as slaves in order to raise the funds for their parents' obsequies. It is considered the height of virtue, in traditional Chinese morality, for young people to commit suicide if they are unable to exact reparation for any slight or insult to their parents. Manners, morals, and religion in China "demand complete resignation and submission to the father's will, and absolute denial of all individuality and independence". Children are told to rise at cock-crow, carefully wash and dress themselves, and appear before their parents, with a respectful inquiry as to their commands for the day. A son never enters the room in which his father is present without the invitation to do so; he never leaves it without paternal permission; he never speaks until he is spoken to. These customs have become so much a part of the Chinaman's nerves and blood that adult men receive blows from their fathers without a word of complaint or protest. A son who insults his father is liable to the death-penalty. A father who beats his child to death gets off with one hundred strokes from a bamboo cane—not a heavy penalty, as Chinese punishments go. A father who is struck by his son has the right to kill him.[2]

[1] Cf. *History of Social Development*, pp. 78–84, and *Evolution of Modern Marriage*, chap. iv.

[2] But, in fact, Chinese fathers make little use of these gross and cruel customary rights of chastisement. As in the majority of countries which have remained four centuries in the Full Familial phase, human nature has partly triumphed over human institutions, and violence in education is avoided. Japan has been termed the "Children's Paradise" in contrast to Europe.

Sons and daughters alike are married and given in marriage at their father's will. Their own desires play hardly any part in choosing their partners; bridal couples meet for the first time on their wedding-day. The father has also the supreme power of disposing of his son's estate, and the latter may not leave the place where his father dwells without permission, even in adult manhood; or he may only betake himself to a specially designated place within easy reach. This power lasts as long as the father lives; but it ceases in case the son enters the official class, as the tradition is that the Emperor himself is father of his officials. Nevertheless if either of the parents of an official should die, he must leave his office for a mourning-time of twenty-seven months. The girl child and maiden is in her father's control till she passes into her husband's. A wife's duty to her husband is absolute obedience; without his permission she must not leave the house. If she breaks this rule her husband may sell her to another man as a concubine, but he is not permitted to dispose of her to the houses of prostitution. He may, however, chastise and physically maltreat her, so long as she is not "badly injured". But if she lifts her hand against him she receives one hundred strokes; and if she strikes either of his parents or grandparents, or her own, the penalty is death. Widows who find life without their husbands intolerable are held in signal honour. They dress themselves in red robes and hang themselves, either in their departed husband's home or publicly in the presence of an applauding crowd. *In practice* the wife and mother generally receives courteous and respectful treatment from her husband, and is honoured by her children—though in the second place. After the father's death the mother has authority over their children.[1]

Among these Eastern Asiatics, anger and force towards children are regarded with horror. Perhaps one reason is the prolonged peace which Japan enjoyed from A.D. 1603 to 1868.

[1] Cf. Leopold Katscher Gray, *Bilder aus dem Chinesischen Leben*, Leipzig, 1881, pp. 222, 238, 253, 254; P. G. von Möllendorff, *Das chinesische Familienrecht*, Shanghai, 1895, pp. 21, 29, 31, 41, 46, 47; Ruhstrat, Ratzel, Hellwald, *Die menschliche Familie*, p. 378. (Note.—This applies mainly to the China before the Great War. Translator's Note.)

The Roman joint family was very similar in structure and customs. There, too, the Paterfamilias was the owner of the whole family estate, and the absolute lord of his wife's body and spirit, of his children and their children, and of his servants and slaves, who owed him implicit obedience. His rights over them included: (1) the right of chastisement; (2) the right of life and death; (3) the right to sell or send as hostage against debts; (4) the right to betroth, give in marriage, and divorce; (5) the right to dispose at will, not only of the family wealth, but also of any money the sons obtained independently. Thus, did he so choose, he could flog, kill, sell as slaves or hire in payment for debts, his nearest fellow-mortals, "his own flesh and blood". The position of the children was in one respect worse than that of slaves. A son whom his father had sold as a slave and who was freed by his master *then reverted to the paternal yoke*, and three times! Only after the third release were they their own masters, whereas the slave who was set free was free at once and for good. The father betrothed and married off his children as he chose. He could demand the return of a daughter from her husband and the dissolution of a marriage, however happy and fruitful.[1] The Roman maiden became a wife when she reached her twelfth or thirteenth year, and was betrothed at even tenderer age.[2] Even though a law might stipulate that her consent was necessary, any virtual freedom in the matter was out of the question, because of her youth and ignorance, and—because of the dreaded *Patria Potestas*. This power, with all its hideous and demoralizing possibilities, lasted throughout the lives of father and children. However great the son's achievements, and however high his office in the State, his father had the power to deprive him of all material fruit of his labours, sell him as a slave, or kill him; censors, consuls, and praetors were as subject to this law as

[1] Cf. several instances in the history of the late Republic and Early Empire among leading families of Rome. Augustus married his daughter Julia to his stepson Tiberius, compelling him to divorce Vipsania, to whom he was deeply attached, etc. (Translator's Note.)

[2] Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte Roms*, 8th ed., vol. i, p. 467. Cf. also Lecky.

any trembling child. And the Roman *Patres Familiarum* reaped the result; they were generally beyond measure feared, and often hated even more than feared. They were tyrants and oppressors from whom escape was impossible, and their deaths would be a stroke of beneficent fortune for all their adult children. As Lecky remarks, there are hardly any examples of filial love throughout Roman history. In the Civil Wars, fathers were habitually betrayed to death by their sons.[1] Slaves were more loyal and dependable, for their lord's death did not liberate them! Mommsen, the great authority on the political history of Rome, says: "The unlimited and wholly irresponsible power of the male head of the family was indestructible and unchangeable while his life lasted. Neither senility, nor madness, nor his own free will and desire could divest himself of these privileges. . . . As against the Paterfamilias, all the members of the *familia* had *no* rights: his wife and children no more than his slaves and his kine."[2] The family was indeed a tomb-like dungeon to individual hope and happiness. And religion lent its power to the might of law and custom. In all old Civilizations, Ancestorship forms a considerable part of religious ritual. The departed forbears are honoured as semi-divine, and domestic worship is offered them by their descendants. The High Priest of this domestic cult is the husband and father, and his religious functions invest him with a certain measure of sanctity.

Thus the ancient Roman *Familia* was a common slavery, sanctioned by religion, law, and morals, of all members to the head: Paterfamilias. And the term *Family* had in its original sense a far wider significance than now, and may be more correctly translated by *Household*. Its essence was not *Consanguinity or Common Ancestry, but a relationship of servitude to an authority founded on power and property*. According to Paulus Diaconus, *famel* meant originally the equivalent of *slave*, and *familia meant property in and over persons*,

[1] *Velleius Paterculus*, ii, p. 67. [2] *Römische Geschichte*, vol. i, 1st ed., p. 50.

whether related biologically, or hired for service, or bought or captured in war as slaves. And *Pater* did not originally express the *organic* relationship as *begetter* that is denoted by the term *genitor*. It was a synonym for *rex*, or *basileus*, and its original sense was *Ruler, Master*. Paterfamilias was first and foremost *the lord of his household*, his *famuli*, his slaves.

In historic times the Roman Joint Family attained a monstrous and excessive development. The Romans conquered and plundered the world as known to them, and the tribute of the conquered countries became the personal property of a comparatively small Patrician and "Knightly" (see below) caste. And the great households of the Patricians—the authoritarian Joint household, or *Oikos* [1]—began to include thousands of skilled and specialized slaves. The great country estates, the *Latifundia*, became principalities in extent; the palaces were little towns, and each domain an *imperium in imperio*. The army of slaves owned by each noble house was so great that they were divided into sections, each under its special overseer. Such slaves included: field-workers, herdsmen, weavers, spinners, tailors, smiths, valets and house-slaves, treasurers, book-keepers or accountants, even painters, surgeons, doctors, teachers, librarians, philosophers, and rhetors [2] (orators or elocutionists).

This hypertrophy of the "family" was more or less peculiar to ancient Rome and the Patricians; but the general patriarchal structure is common to all ancient Civilizations; Assyrians, Babylonians, Mexican Aztecs, Peruvian Incas, Hebrews.[3] Whether the typical conditions are alleviated and made more humane, as apparently was the case in Egypt and among the Hellenes, or even more merciless and entangled in superstition as in old Japan, or, in many cases, present-day India, the characteristic of the Full Familial epoch and institution is the concentration of absolute power over

[1] *History of Social Development*, pp. 171, 175–76.

[2] Epictetus! (Translator's Note.)

[3] Jephthah's daughter; Abraham and Isaac. (Translator's Note.)

the household in the hands of one man: i.e. the *Patria Potestas*.[1]

The position of *women* under this system is obviously unfavourable. But there are striking differences among different peoples in this respect.

In some cases matriarchal traditions and survivals seem to have secured for women a position of comparative freedom and dignity; life was certainly better for them among the Egyptians than among the Hebrews, among the Spartans than in Athens. In other environments, while the Law was only masculine in its bias, public opinion and custom were more tolerant. The Roman matron, under the Republic, had a sternly circumscribed life, but within "her sphere" she received honour, both privately and from the State. Perhaps the most extreme cases of the subjection of women were in Old Japan and Brahminic India.

But even in the most alleviated circumstances women's lot was hard and degraded. All important, interesting, and honoured avocations were appropriated by men. First and foremost, of course, warfare and leadership in battle; all the upper ranks of the priesthood; political activities, trade, seafaring, manufactures of various kinds, large-scale agriculture, and stock-raising. Men, therefore, have economic resources, and can move freely about the world. Women are secluded in the home, and the palace becomes more of a prison than ever was the hut or tent of the age before cities were built. "Women's work" is paltry and deadening—all the most wearisome and repugnant household routine is hers.

Men regard marriage, first and foremost, as a device for securing heirs of unquestionable legitimacy for their goods and wealth. Their wives are their personal property, the bearers and wet-nurses of *their* sons and heirs. A wife and mother is legally a child who must be under guardianship and "pro-

[1] Joseph Unger, *Die Ehe in ihrer Welthistorische Entwickelung*, Vienna, 1850. (*The Jewish Family*, pp. 32–36.) For the *Patria Potestas* in Gaul, see Caesar *De bello Gallico*, vi, p. 19. S. Mayer, *Die Rechte der Israeliten, Athener, und Römer*, vol. ii, p. 416.

tection" all her days. As a maiden she is subject to her father, as a wife to her husband, as a widow—at least among the Hellenes—to her eldest son.[1] The "unlimited and irresponsible" paternal power had occasionally strange developments. In the Old Russian patriarchal family it occasionally happened that the dreaded household tyrant broke down the resistance of his young daughters-in-law,[2] and such excesses were comparatively frequent in the palmy days of Rome.[3]

Among many nations we find evidence of a freer and finer position of women *before* the development of the City State which stands sponsor to the era of *Civilization*. Thus among the Greeks of the Heroic Age, as expressed in their myths, women were far more active and important[4] than in the historic ages. Compare Arete, the Phaeacian Queen, to the Athenian wife of Perikles' time, a prisoner in the gyneceum! In India, before Brahminism, women had a fairly good position and various privileges, the right of free movement, and some social equality with men. The laws of Manu changed all that. Woman was denounced as "the cause of all shame and dishonour, the cause of all dissension", etc., and the Brahmins introduced and established *Suttee*—the final expression of female subjection. In Old Arabia, before Mohammed, the position of women was greatly superior to what it subsequently became. Robertson Smith[5] states that the Arabs were originally matriarchal, and even in Mohammed's time *Mota*-marriage was a relic of comparative freedom and equality. With Islam came the inferiority which has claimed women in the Near East till our own time. The change from Matriarchate to Patriarchate was accompanied, just as in Hellas, by the worship

[1] Cf. Telemachus and Penelope in the *Odyssey*. (Translator's Note.)

[2] Melnikoff, *In den Wäldern*, i, p. 108. According to Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 3rd ed., p. 361.

[3] Schrader, *Schwiegermutter und Hagestolz*, p. 104.

[4] The list of examples might be much longer. For instance, the great Agricultural Matriarch, Demeter, and her daughter Persephone; Medea—although she was a Barbarian princess; Hecuba, Andromache, Clytemnestra, Helen; and the Queens of Crete, not to mention Hippolyta and Penthesilea. (Translator's Note.)

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 179.

of "New Gods". In the most ancient Arabia, Al-Lât [1] was the mother of the Gods; but in Mohammed's time female divinities were regarded as the daughters of the supreme male. We have indicated elsewhere that the Full Familial epoch coincides with a tendency to *permanent monogamy*. The rulers of the State realize the importance of an *orderly and regular family life for the State's survival and supremacy*. The younger generation no longer appeal to clansfolk, or take refuge with them. They must sink or swim with the paternal power. And in that early stage of civilization numerous and vigorous offspring are necessary. Thus Laws, Religion, and "Morals" —which represent *the theory of current custom*—must all maintain and buttress the power of the family. Polygamy and temporary mating scatter energy and interest. Therefore it is characteristic of the utilitarian and political Roman mind that the High Priest, the *Flamen*, was the official representative of the strictest and most permanent monogamy. He *must* marry, and his marriage ceremonies were of the most solemn description. Only death could sever the bond, and if his wife died he had to resign his high office.[2]

Causes and Factors Contributing to the Full Family Phase

The causes which led to the rise of the family continue throughout its zenith, but become accentuated and, as it were, accumulated through the passage of time.

As we concluded, war and victory in war were the ironsmiths that forged the earliest political entities; *that made tribes into States*. But it depends on material resources and geographical position and configuration *whether* and/or *when* population can become sufficiently *numerous* and *dense* for political organization to become possible. The scattered islands

[1] Cf. the *Lilith* of the Hebrews, the nocturnal demon. She was, according to legend, *Adam's first wife, and rebelled against him.*

[2] Cf. Lecky, *History of European Morals, passim,* and Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae,* X, p. 15.

of Oceania, the relaxing heat of Equatorial Africa, with the peculiar "lay" of its rivers and forests, were not favourable to the settlement of large numbers. But the fertile river-banks of the Yangtse-kiang and Hoang-ho, of Mesopotamia, of the Nile delta, of the indented coasts and islands of the Caribbean Sea, the Peruvian plateau which commanded rivers and forest lands, and perhaps, above all, the Mediterranean Sea, were as though destined and predestined for the framework of empires. *War and Conquest were supported by geography*; larger and ever larger States arose. Therefore these regions were the homes of the first States and of political life and political theory; i.e. here the first rungs on the ladder of *Civilization* were mounted by mankind.

The *National State* is distinguished from the *Tribal*, not only by the number of its inhabitants, but by their higher differentiation. The gulf between rich and poor, rulers and subjects, widens, and the number of occupations and trades increases *pari passu* with the size of the population under one and the same political authority. Thus on the *political* side the State, having taken over the functions of the ancient Kinship group, discharged those functions with conspicuous success, and developed them to a high degree of efficiency in many directions.

But the task of continuing and expanding the *Economic* functions of the clan or sept was too difficult for the *Infant State*. So this task fell to the *Family*, which "took on" a variety of jobs, from the production of food and much handling of raw material (e.g. clothing) up to the education of children and a considerable proportion of religious ritual. And the family grew and flourished and became increasingly autonomous; it began to command the services of many slaves; it appropriated fresh portions of the old Common Land for its use; riches from conquered foreign lands were privately appropriated, *and the basic problem of the distribution of wealth was settled out of hand by the institution of slavery and the monopoly of inheritance.*

The absolute mastery of the man in this patriarchal family was based on war. For war is inimical to women, and the stringent military discipline necessary to survival in a conquering and plundering State infects the whole of that State's internal and domestic relationships. And man is also the owner of wealth won by his activities as warrior, merchant, craftsman, usurer, or farmer. Women are excluded from these occupations and must be content to be their husbands' housekeepers and the bearers of legitimate heirs. The sept, formerly a refuge and support in cases of marital tyranny or incompatibility, had long since become obsolete. Moreover, in a State founded on and administered for war, women have no place in the Councils or the Assembly. Men make the laws, and with a certain amount of deliberation and purpose, and the result is that law and custom, equity and "morality" all favour the man as against his partner. And as "men portray themselves in the gods they worship", the old matriarchal divinities are succeeded by "new Gods"—Athene, who was born without a mother, and Apollo, who proclaimed that the father was the real engenderer, the mother only a vessel. And the Ancestor Cult had the special services of the father as family high priest.

So economics of production, custom, i.e. "morals", legislation, political organization, religion—all contributed to enhancing the man's power and prestige and subjugating the woman. And all contributed to give the rigid despotic trend so characteristic of the Familial phase in Early City States—the most deeply and habitually blood-stained of all human evolutionary phases.

Summary of Characteristics of the Full Family Phase

The zenith of the Family phase continues and completes its early stage.

The *State*, framed for conquest and plunder, has developed into a national or multi-national Empire, on a basis of strict

authority and discipline. The community is divided into classes or—in extreme instances—castes, with mutually incompatible interests; they are held together outside by the iron bond of the State, but they are in perpetual ferment and discord. Thus beyond its borders the *State* means war, conquest, and defeat; and within its domain exploitation, slavery, and servitude. A small minority, strong in wealth and the tradition of family inheritance, rules with a rod of iron an inchoate unorganized majority—the *people*. The ancient *Clan* has either wholly vanished as an institution or survives only piecemeal and in trivial things.

The *Family* has taken over the productive and nutritive work of the Clan and attains the apex of power and honour. It is largely self-supporting in food and clothing, producing what its members consume. In form it tends to the three generation "Joint" family, at whose head stands the Pater-familias, whom law and religion invest with autocratic power. In the ruling class of Rome, the Familia or Joint Patriarchal Household hypertrophied to monstrous dimensions; wide areas were cultivated by slave labour in the private interests of one patrician stock.

Woman's position is unfavourable. She is treated as a grown-up child, as her husband's domestic servant, and as the bearer and nurse of *his* lawful sons and heirs. All political power and economic wealth are concentrated in male hands, whether in the army, the priesthood, the law, political life, administration, trade, industry, finance, or the possession and cultivation of real estate.

Marriage shows a tendency to become stereotyped as permanent monogamy. The general ethics of this phase are excessively warlike, violent, despotic, and often cruel.

This phase is generally prevalent among nations which have achieved City States (Civilization)—and are passing through the beginning of large-scale administration.

CHAPTER VIII

THE LATE FAMILY PHASE

(IN ANTIQUITY)

NOTHING stands still. No social institution is eternal. In the later Kinship phase the Clan disintegrated; in the later Family phase the institution which sponsored it crumbled.

The agents here are, of course, mainly economic; the concentration of the means of production and multiplication of products; the extremes of wealth and poverty, which overthrew the Clan, pursue their inevitable work on the family in its turn.

(1) ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION

The decline of the Familial epoch is the dawn of capitalism.[1] Capitalist organization among ancient peoples first appeared on the shores and in the neighbourhood of that Mediterranean Sea which is rather a pathway of nations than a sundering gulf. The peoples of the Mediterranean Littoral and Western Asia, the Assyrio-Babylonians, Persians, Phoenicians, Jews, Egyptians, Carthaginians, Greeks, and Italiotes, were representatives both of three different continents and three different linguistic stocks; and they were also on different cultural levels and inhabited countries with a variety of products, so that they *offered every inducement to trade* (by barter or in its later stages). Their sea was a great highway of commerce, bearing its freights of merchandise, like a gigantic slave, in any direction, North, South, East, or West. The wide and intricate international intercourse that developed rapidly in such favourable conditions, and reached its expression politically in the Roman Empire, was the decisive factor in this new economic manifestation. The enormous increase in trade and commerce led to the invention of a common standard of values and medium

[1] See *History of Social Development*, pp. 173–76.

of exchange: of *money*.[1] Trade by exchange of goods became trade in goods for money; *industrialism* became *capitalism*. Money became capital, and we may suggest that the stages of the process were as follows:

The excess of money was first of all exchanged—in the conquering States—for more or less solid and permanent material objects, sources of pleasure, and monuments of power. Magnificent palaces were built; statues of world-wide fame, golden wrought-armour, silver vessels, chains, ornaments, household furniture of the greatest artistic merit and considerable technical skill—all these were made and demanded with zeal and taste, and the first epochs of the monetary dispensation brought a glory of plastic and decorative art which has never since been equalled. Later, the greed of gold, the demand for *returns* on investment, beat down inspiration and joy in living like an iron flail.

There were other ways besides artistic creation and collection—and ways more congenial to the nature of capitalism, be it added—of turning accumulated wealth into goods, of making it bring forth new wealth. The owner of *land*, who makes other people, e.g. slaves, cultivate that land for him, owns a permanent source of wealth; his capital bears fruit, and he can enjoy it without either spending it all or himself doing the heavy work of tillage. And so, in classical antiquity, so-called "free" peasants were already driven in crowds from the soil and their homes by land-hungry wealthy men.

And a third method of using great accumulations of wealth was in *business enterprise and trade*. Ships were built and equipped, and the crews were hired, or, to save time and trouble, the money for these preliminary steps was advanced to an *entrepreneur*, who had to refund it out of the profits he made by selling goods. Thus side by side with industry and retail trading, large-scale trade and commerce—capital commerce—began. It is historically and theoretically significant

[1] *History of Social Development*, pp. 275–76.

that the first form in which capitalism was made manifest was, everywhere, *foreign trade.*

But this type of enterprise, though profitable, was risky. Apart from storms and shipwrecks the Mediterranean swarmed with pirates up till a late date in history. The purchase and cultivation of larger and larger tracts of land was a more dependable form of investment. Workshops and huts were built, an adequate number of slaves was purchased, a foreman or overseer installed in command, and the fortunate owner, free from petty cares, simply pocketed his returns.

In threefold manner, in the ancient world, capitalism had tackled its survival problem *of making money by money*, not by hard work or by happy violence. *The medium of exchange had become itself productive, money was transfigured into capital.*

And simultaneously new possibilities of material production and economic organization revealed themselves; labour, fertilized like Danae by the golden stream, far surpassed the output of retail trade and individual craftsmanship. A new economic epoch had begun.

(2) The Warrior State becomes a Labour State

Accordingly the citizens turned their efforts into these profitable channels: "peaceful" and lawful acquisition, foreign commerce and usury. A passion for profit and speculation is characteristic of the late Roman Republic and Empire. War became a less conspicuous occupation and preoccupation. The fierce warrior became increasingly the calculating merchant, who took care not to imitate Curtius or Horatius. The military aristocracy became commercialized. The free peasant of the cornfields and vineyards of Latium, who had fought and conquered for Rome, was "sold up" and vanished. The paid soldier takes his place. The basis of the State becomes financial.

(3) Amelioration of Customs. Ethical Progress

Concurrently there was a slow and deep change, a development in human feelings and ideas. In the Warrior State, war

and plunder, conquest and forcible subjugation of the conquered were the most honoured avocations of the free man. This form of activity intensified his natural bent towards prompt violence and callousness to his fellow-mortals' suffering. The States founded on trade and commerce depend on the peaceful and amicable agreement between the trading persons or interests, and on a certain balance of mutual advantage. Certainly the mercantile type of character has grave defects as well as qualities; calculation, dishonesty, and avarice are stimulated as keenly as the faculty of perceiving and recognizing other points of view. But violence, oppression, *destruction, per se*, is discouraged. We do not claim for the merchant a finer moral fibre, for the ancient cruelty and arrogance were often accompanied by fearless courage and endurance. But the general standard of manners becomes more tolerant and intelligent. The Paterfamilias develops a certain reluctance to hand his maiden daughter over to the brutal despotism of a possible son-in-law, as helpless and rightless as a bale of rugs or a myrrhine vase. He gives her a *dowry*, which immensely enhances her claim to consideration; she even inherits a share of his wealth when he dies. The fact that a woman has a personality of her own dawns dimly and uncertainly, but this realization is expressed in Late Roman centuries. She rises from her slave status and stands beside her husband as an equal and helpful partner.

(4) The Household and Capitalism

This emancipation is helped, or rather made possible, by the reactions of large-scale foreign trade and industry (typical of capitalism) on the joint and patriarchal household. As we have pointed out, the family at its zenith was largely self-supporting. The numerous incidental needs and objects the household did not itself meet or manufacture were supplied by retail trade and skilled artisans. But with the wholesale manufacture or necessities and luxuries, furnished by commercial capitalism, no household could compete, and the cheap, numerous wares

won. Thus important economic functions were withdrawn from the family, which was, however, first and foremost a geneonomic entity, *a form of organizing production*. The family was thus materially weakened and ethically depreciated, though not in any way to the same degree as it is to-day.

(5) The Law of Integration

The stronger and more fortunate the external position of the State, the wider became its activities at home. In old Roman days only the Paterfamilias was recognized as existing politically, or having rights and interests. In later Roman times there was an immense improvement in the conditions of women, children, and slaves. Their happiness and dignity were recognized as of some importance.

The Roman Patriarchal Family in Dissolution

From all sides the facts and tendencies of the Early Capitalist era acted as dissolvent acids on the patriarchal family structure. Let us survey facts and trace the stages of this "disintegration", in Spencer's phrase; for Roman history gives extremely clear evidence of one of the most important sociological phenomena.

The Roman *familia* of ancient Republican times was a mighty, impressive, and fundamental institution. Its head, the Paterfamilias, was the master of his wife, as wholly as of children and slaves. And Imperial Rome saw the crumbling of this prison; the Paterfamilias lost his rights and privileges, the Roman lady became free *sui juris*. In this emancipation of women the following phases are unmistakable and significant:

I. The original form of marriage in Rome was the so-called *Manus*, in which the husband had full power over his wife. She passed from her father's *hand* to her husband's. The oldest recognizable records show marriage by purchase.[1]

[1] Cf. Lecky, *History of European Morals*, vol. ii; Rossbach, *Untersuchungen über die römische Ehe*; Laband, "Die rechtliche Stellung der Frau", *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie*, vol. iii, p. 176; J. Denis, *Histoire des théories et des idées morales, dans l'antiquité*.

II. Purchase-marriage was abolished, at first only among the Patricians, then generally. But all marriages were *Manus*, i.e. expressed male guardianship and supremacy.

III. A widespread tendency manifests itself towards evading this guardianship and supremacy, and this first crystallizes in the *Usus* or "Custom"-marriage. This was celebrated by *mutual consent* (*Consens*) and certain ritual *ceremonies, but did not involve wardship*: the relation of guardianship, as in *Manus*-marriage, only followed after a year of uninterrupted possession, and the wife could nullify it by availing herself of the so-called *Trinoctium*, i.e. spending three nights in the year outside her husband's house. If she managed to do this she remained *free*, i.e. not in her husband's *tutelage*.

These free marriages implied a certain power of the husband over the wife, but only in so far as was necessary biologically and for purposes of family unity and direction. In other matters the woman remained a member of her father's household or under the tutelage of her *Agnates*. She could obtain a divorce *against her husband's will* if her relatives stood by her. Her property remained her own, subject to her father's discretion, with the exception of the *dowry*, which, however, was generally returned in cases of widowhood or divorce.

This form of marriage was achieved early in Roman history. The *Trinoctium* are mentioned in the *Twelve Tables*. But the *Manus*-marriage was much more prevalent at that date.

IV. Free (*Trinoctium*) marriage became more common, but the former *Manus* and *Usus* types continued, so that there were three possible legal varieties of status and contract.

V. And by the time of Cicero and Caesar—the end of the Roman Republic—the "free" marriage had superseded the *Manus*. The Customary (*Usus*) three nights were dispensed with, and the liberty of the married woman was accepted without this formula.

VI. And in the final stage the Free Marriage is the only marriage. This form has superseded all the rest.

So in the struggle lasting over many centuries the Roman

women liberated themselves step by step from the tutelage of men, and won a position which no subsequent century or civilization has accorded them.[1] Christianity brought NO improvement in this respect, but a *retrogression*; for, as cannot be too *clearly understood, the attitude of Christian dogma and ethics to sexual and geneonomic matters is not that of the declining Familial phase, but of that phase at its zenith.*

The process of emancipation may be easily followed in Roman Law.[2] In the days of the Roman kings it had been forbidden for a husband to sell his wife as a slave under the penalty of *Sacratio capitis.*

The *Lex Julia* and *Lex Papia Poppaea* deprived a husband of the right to kill a wife taken in the act of adultery, and vested this right in the public courts and the woman's father. Constantine abolished the death-penalty for female adultery. In early times divorce had been the exclusive privilege of the husband at his good will and pleasure. But even before Augustus, attempts were made to alter this by a special procedure, and fines inflicted on the guilty partner. By the *Lex Julia* women who were mothers of several children were emancipated from the tutelage of their male relatives, and this was termed the *jus liberorum.* The Emperor Claudius abolished this tutelage of uncles and male collaterals—the so-called *agnates*—and it is probable that from A.D. 200 there was not any question of tutelage or compulsory dependence for women who were not slaves, and who had completed their twenty-fifth year.[3] The woman of the non-slave class was *sui juris*, she had personal independence and was treated directly and as a responsible individual by the administration. They could fully dispose of money they earned or obtained from investment, as well as of the portion they inherited on their father's death.[4] In this manner an appreciable proportion of Roman

[1] It must be remembered that Dr. Müller-Lyer's book was written before the Great War and the Russian Soviet Republic. (Translator's Note.)
[2] Rossbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–62. See also Lecky, *passim.*
[3] Durny, *History of the Roman Empire*, iii.
[4] Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte Roms*, i, p. 273.

wealth came into the hands of women, who thus in many cases obtained the "whip hand".

Lecky points out that in the course of Roman recorded history the whole basis of the family had been changed from the absolute authority of the husband to the virtual equality of the wife, and that legal equality coincided with a high degree of social influence and amenity.[1]

The emancipation of the *child* from the absolutism of the *Patria Potestas* was parallel to the liberation of woman in the Roman Empire and late Republic.[2] The *State*, which had taken over the duty of avenging kindred blood from the *Gentes*, proceeded very gradually to deprive the Paterfamilias of his domestic jurisdiction, and to make judicial functions the exclusive right of the State.

Here, too, we can trace the inherent antagonism between the power of the family and of the wider social aggregate; the development of the Roman State implied limitation of the *Patria Potestas*. The Twelve Tables ordained that while the bachelor son might only be sold as a slave three times by his father, the married man might never be so sold. A father who slew his son without judicial sanction or recognized cause might be indicted and punished. With the Empire came —also gradually—the piecemeal abolition of the *Patria Potestas*, leaving only what was essential to protection and security. Trajan attempted to liberate from paternal authority a son whom his father had physically ill-treated, but his humanity was premature. But Hadrian punished a father who had killed his guilty son in an unworthy and degrading manner as guilty of the crime of parricide. Alexander Severus compelled a father, who intended to exceed his very elastic powers of

[1] For a detailed discussion of the position of women in the later Roman Empire and the effects of Christianity in limiting and degrading that position, see Lecky, *History of European Morals*, vol. ii, p. 316 *et seq.* Also Havelock Ellis, vol. vi, *Sex in Relation to Society*, chaps. ix and x. (On "Sexual Morality" and "Marriage".) The ignorant and prejudiced denunciations of Christian zealots have obscured these facts in the past. (Translator's Note.)

[2] Cf. H. Wallon, *Histoire de l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquité*, Paris, vol. iii, p. 471 *et seq.* Also our English Lecky, *op. cit.*

chastisement, to report to the President of his province, and after Constantine the murder of a son by his father was treated as a form of parricide. Caracalla stigmatized the right of selling a son into slavery as *res illicita et dishonesta*—wrongful and disgraceful, and it was rescinded by Diocletian.[1] Augustus ordained that even during his father's lifetime a son should be able to use and dispose of the money he had earned as a soldier,[2] and Constantine gave the same privilege to Civil Servants.

The third subject class, the *slaves*, were also benefited, though help came to them very slowly and imperfectly. In the "good old days" of Republican virtue and patriotic tradition, the slave was simply a piece of property: death and any form of torture or indignity were his—or hers—at their master's will. The Empire limited this iniquity. Till the time of Claudius the cowardly cruelty of killing or simply exposing ill or exhausted or crippled slaves was habitual. If not turned helpless into the streets or woods they were rowed out on to the island dedicated to Aesculapius, the God of Healing, and left there to the mercy of the Divinity. Claudius made the highly significant decree that the exposure of a slave should involve his instant release from slavery, and that a master who preferred to kill a slave in such a case, rather than lose his services, was guilty of murder.[3] Hadrian took from the Paterfamilias the *jus vitae necisque*, the right not only *to kill*, but *to condemn* his slaves, and gave this right to the judges. Antonins Pius made wilful killing of a slave, i.e. killing without cause recognized by law, equivalent to the murder of a slave by a man not his master, and liable to the same penalty as that serious invasion of property rights. If a master was convicted of serious ill-treatment, he had to sell his slave. And in the time of the great jurisconsult Ulpian (born A.D. 170) it became accepted in principle that slaves living in the marriage relationship, termed in their case *contubernium*, might

[1] Rossbach, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 48. See also Lecky, *passim*, and Dill, *Roman Society*.
[3] Suetonius, Claudius, 25, and Diodorus, lx, p. 29.

not be separated and sold into different households or to different dealers. Formerly this was legal and quite common. Ulpian, whose views on the position of women were extraordinarily fair and enlightened, also championed the slaves. He declared that by the laws of nature all men, free or slaves, were alike. The principle and ideal had thus been enunciated.[1]

The Significance of the Concentration of Power in the State

What is the sociological explanation of the assumption of rights, formerly vested in the household, by the State?

In the transitional stage between the zenith of the Kinship group and the establishment of the authoritarian State (with many wars and migrations, etc.), the social fabric of the agricultural and trading communities was considerably loosened, and much that had formerly been done communally had to be undertaken by the vigorous and experienced men who were heads of households. Hence, in the Early Family epoch, the household is a little world of its own, and interference by the Central authority would have been equally unpopular and impracticable. But with the extension and elaboration of the State's activities, and the development of industry and commerce, the social and economic functions which the household has appropriated came naturally into the purview of public discussion and legislation. For, as we have pointed out, there is a significant inherent antagonism between the smaller and the larger social groups. When the family is powerful, the community is weak, and *vice versa*. And as the State gradually deprived the Paterfamilias of all *judicial* functions, it broke the inhuman relationship of absolute irresponsible power towards helplessness and servitude incorporated in the old patriarchal household. The family, as an institution, was weakened thereby; but culture, ethics, human dignity, and happiness were, beyond question, served.

We cannot ignore another aspect of the disintegration of

[1] *Digesta*, 15, 17, 32.

the family; the contempt for any standards of conduct, public or private, the excesses of luxury, and the decrease of the most educated and privileged classes by voluntary celibacy and childlessness, which was a constant source of denunciations and laments.

By a natural reaction from the former conditions the number of divorces in the final Republican and the Imperial Ages was very great. Seneca expressed himself in obviously exaggerated terms:[1] "Who among women still blushed at the thought of divorce; for many nobles and famous ladies reckoned the years, not by the Consuls, but by the number of their divorced husbands, wedding in order to divorce, and then divorcing in order to again wed. . . . Why should shame attach to adultery when women have lured those who are now their husbands by adultery? Chastity is held proof of ugliness, of deformity—they are fools and obsolete who know not now that marriage is a long adultery"—and so forth, through pages of denunciation.[2] Even Denis says that the frequency of divorce placed marriage on a par with legalized prostitution, that adultery was a fashion and considered a proof of good taste, and that there was a widespread diminution of the size of families, and much abortion.[3] There were certain conspicuous cases, undoubtedly, in the Early Empire especially; thus Julius Caesar was legally married successively to Cossutia, Cornelia, Pompeia, and Calpurnia, and was known to be the lover of Posthumia, Lellia, Tertulla, Mucia, Servilia and her daughter Tertia, Eunoë Queen of Numidia, and the famous Cleopatra, who bore him a son, Caesarion. His adventures with married women became a by-word. His soldiers, who adored him, called him in rough jest "*moechus calvus*", "bald adulterer". His enemies made more extreme accusations. Curio termed him "Every woman's husband and every man's wife". And his colleague in the Consulate, Marcus

[1] *De beneficiis*, Annales, lib. iii, cap. 16.
[2] *De beneficiis*, lib. iii, cap. 16.
[3] J. Denis, *Histoire des idées morales dans l'antiquité*, tome ii, p. 100.

Calpurnius Bibulus, gave him the nickname "the Bithynian Queen".[1]

It was, of course, among the wealthy and ruling classes of Old Rome that opportunity was matched with inclination. Thus, in his famous Sixth Satire, Juvenal sneers grudgingly at the poorer citizens' wives and bourgeoises of his time:

> Yea, these do condescend to bear the perils of childbirth,
> Even to suffer, if needs must be, the woes of the wet nurse;
> —*She who sleeps on a gilded couch has not much risk of children.*[2]

Celibacy and sterility became so frequent that fears were entertained of the extinction of the Roman race and State, even in the Late Republic. Caesar had to stimulate men to found families by premiums and prizes, and Augustus enacted rigorous laws against the barren and the bachelor. And when the *Equites* class—comprehensibly—murmured against this interference, they were summoned to the Forum and addressed by the Emperor in person and in the strongest terms. Among other extravagances he accused them of "committing murder, by denying life to those they might engender. They were guilty of blasphemy against their fathers by letting their line become extinct—and treason to Rome, left sterile and empty. . . . Would those who counted among their forefathers the glorious Quinctii, Valerii, Julii—would they let these glories perish? Some might think that without the cares for a wife and children they could wander whithersoever they would and live freely, but how was such freedom better than that of robbers, outlaws, and wild beasts?" [3]

The severe laws and the official encouragement of large families were of no avail. Custom was stronger than laws. Tacitus [4] observed that "marriages and children born there-

[1] Jacoby, *Études sur la selection chez l'homme*, pp. 10, 11.

[2] Prevention of conception was unknown to the Romans, but both infanticide and abortion were prevalent. (Translator's Note.)

[3] Dion Cassius, xvi, chaps. 4–8.

[4] *Annals*, iii, p. 25.

from were none the more numerous for all this legislating, but rather *Orbitas*[1] became more prevalent", and he adds a remark of considerable significance, that these laws had the bad result "of putting all families in jeopardy of ruin, through the tale-bearing and false witness of *delators*". The measures taken were both punitive and approbative; together with penalties on bachelors and childless marriages, the childless man was excluded from his father's inheritance, and women who had not become mothers at the age of twenty were also liable to fines. Fathers of numerous families were recipients of special honours, had the preference in obtaining official promotions, and the best seats at the public games; but even the last inducement failed: *Orbitas* conquered Rome's "blood and State".[2]

The same processes were recorded not only in Rome, but among the Greeks in Sparta as well as Athens. In the year 431 B.C., Athens had 27,000 armed male citizens. This number remained stable throughout the incessant wars of that generation, but according to Seeck in his work on *The Decline of the Antique World*,[3] in the following generation there were only 20,000, and this number remained constant till about 306 B.C., i.e. for a century. Polybius[4] relates that in his time (204–122 B.C.) "All Greece suffered from decline of population, the cities became empty and the fields were not tilled, although we had not been severely smitten either in wars or by plague. . . . For men became so addicted to pride, avarice, and show that they would not any longer marry, or if they did so would only raise one, or at the most two, children, so that these might live in wealth and comfort after them. Thus the evil grew apace, for when there were only two children they might easily die untimely, and thus the homes were left empty and

[1] A term meaning both celibacy and childlessness. (Translator's Note.)

[2] Friedländer, i, p. 64; Döllinger, p. 704; Lecky, vol ii; Dill, *Roman Society*; Brooks Adams, p. 67, etc. (Cf. also the very similar and equally ineffective measures taken in post-war France since the law of July 31, 1920. Translator's Note.)

[3] *Geschichte des Unterganges der alten Welt*, i, p. 318.

[4] Book 37, chap. 4, or (in another ed.) chap. 9.

the cities became depopulated and deserted, like hives when the bees have swarmed." [1]

The Real Causes of Moral Degeneracy in the Antique World

This subject has been thoroughly misinterpreted, for as the disintegration of the ancient patriarchal household and the *Patria Potestas* synchronized in the Late Republic and the Empire with the collapse of ancient moral standards, many historians and professional moralists have concluded that disintegration was the cause of degeneracy, or at least a main factor. The Roman moralists and satirists took this view, and it became a dogma in the Christian era, and has been affirmed in serious histories as though it were the incontrovertible result of the most careful study and research.[2]

This view is gravely and mischievously erroneous, but the reasons for its error must be analysed when we consider the sociology of the *State*. However, as the error is crucial in distorting our vision of geneonomic evolution, by introducing outworn views and standards and side-tracking our efforts, we must summarize briefly our view of the *real* factors in the decline and fall of the Classical Civilizations.

Like all ancient City States, Rome was based on conquest and plunder; its methods were those of a band of brigands of exceptional vigour and ability, as is shown by its long continuance, its scale of effort and organization, and the amazing financial ingenuity it displayed. And when the main preoccupation became trade rather than war, the exploiting ten-

[1] The Greek method of infanticide was to expose the new-born child in a jar. It could be saved and adopted if anyone cared to do so. More girls than boys were thus left to die of cold and hunger. The depopulation of Greece in the third and second centuries B.C. has been attributed to a prevalent and pernicious form of malaria by medical historians. (Translator's Note.)

[2] Havelock Ellis remarks: "On the strength of the statements of two satirical writers, Juvenal and Tacitus, it has been supposed by many that Roman women of the late period were given up to licence. It is, however, idle to seek in satirists any balanced picture of a great civilization." (*Sex in Society*, p. 396). (The Christians have, of course, encouraged this misconstruction. Translator's Note.)

dencies and habits of the Romans changed their form, but not their nature. Force was succeeded by wealth. The incessant wars in which the Romans engaged were wars of conquest, annexation, i.e. exploitation. Their numerous victories had subjugated the peoples of Southern, Western and Central Europe, Western Asia, and Northern Africa. The *Provinces* —literally the conquered or beaten lands!—were subjected to a merciless and systematic form of exploitation. They had to pay tribute, which was assessed at an enormous sum, and were drained of money and all valuable works of art, etc. Then Praetors and Proconsuls, Tax-collectors, and *Equites* were sent in hungry swarms to gather what remained.

The Romans knew no truce in financial matters, even after victory. When the provincials *could pay no more, the conquerors advanced them money at incredible rates of interest.* Brutus lent to the Senate of Salamis, for instance, at 48 per cent.! And there was a final, profitable expedient of seizing the "natives" and selling them as slaves.[1] As an example of efficient Roman finance in the provinces, let us take the case of Julius Caesar. As aedile, he had treated the people to such gorgeously expensive public games at his expense that his debts amounted to the equivalent of £1,560,000. He was made Pontiff and Praetor, and Proconsul of Spain. After a year's absence he returned to Rome, *having by vigorous and successful provincial administration obtained the money to clear all his debts!* [2] And he had done nothing offensive to the current standards and practice of Roman Patricians.

When Verres, a member of the financial class (*Equites*), was tried publicly for his infamous administration of Sicily, and condemned after an impassioned oration by Cicero to a fine of 40,000,000 sestertia (over £500,000), the leading Romans took Verres' part.

The conquered peoples were only reconciled to this exploitation by the compelling presence of the Roman

[1] H. Wallon, *Histoire de l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquité*, vol. ii, p. 41.
[2] Schlosser, iii, pp. 219, 226.

legionaries and the use of "exemplary methods". Especially in Late Republican days there were constant revolts, crimes, executions. When Mithridates reconquered Asia Minor, he was received with rapture as a deliverer. And when he issued a proclamation from Ephesus calling on the cities of Asia Minor to fall upon and slay the Romans dwelling among them, his command was so welcome that in one day of massacre the number of Roman victims is estimated up to 150,000 persons.

Thus it was in the provinces, *Vae Victis!* What of the Conquerors at home?

Colossal sums flowed in a ceaseless and ever increasing stream Romewards from the conquered lands and towns; tribute, compensation for war damages, sheer booty of war, slaves, works of art, etc. Did the "Roman people" live in comfort and luxury after so much bloodshed and so much glory? Far from it. The Roman people were poor and in humiliating poverty. The spoils of the known world were concentrated in the hands of a comparatively small number of aristocratic families. We have already traced by what means the Patricians had brought the old Common Lands into their private possession. They added another activity to their land-grabbing in the form of usury, which they practised on the largest scale and at shameless and incredible rates of interest. The Law of Debt, made and administered by the class with money to lend, took care that the *poor* debtor himself, nor his immediate offspring, nor his descendants, escaped from the creditor's clutches. The debtor was imprisoned, and in the *private dungeon of his creditor*. He and his became slaves, or he had to work the little farm he had formerly owned as a freeman for his creditor's profit and as his serf.

Niebuhr gives an impressive example, as follows: "In the Consulate of Appius Claudius and P. Servilius in the year 259 B.C., a sudden spark kindled the accumulated injustice to flame. An old man who had managed to escape from the debtors' dungeon cried in agonized terror for the help of the Quirites. He was clothed in foul rags, pale and emaciated from

hunger, with matted hair and beard. He showed the crowd who collected at his shouts that he bore the bleeding scars of torture, and told his tale. He had fought in eight-and-twenty battles for Rome. In the wars his house and farm had been destroyed, and the Etruscan famines had forced him to realize all the poor valuables he had. He had borrowed, and the interest charges had multiplied his original debt. Then the creditors had obtained a verdict enabling them to secure his person and those of his two sons, and had put them in chains. Many citizens recognized a captain known widely as a brave man, in the distorted features of the fugitive. Sympathy and wrath ran in tumult through the streets of Rome; those who were in bondage and those who feared to become so joined forces, and furiously demanded redress from this common wrong." [1]

After centuries of feuds between Patricians and Plebeians, the latter obtained political equality, and the rich descendants of Plebeian ancestors joined the Patricians in a new governing class, in which the *Nobiles* and *Equites*, the so-called *Optimates*, had all real power. The ancient patrician Oligarchy was succeeded by a regular plutocracy. The main representatives and agents of this plutocracy were the *Equites*, skilled financiers on a large scale—in fact, *bank directors*. They lent conquered princes and cities the moneys levied as tribute to Rome—at usurious interest; they farmed the taxes in the provinces, and they had a hand in any unsavoury speculation that promised large returns. In order to entrench themselves against possible legal consequences, they were organized into societies and fraternities, and the resources of these associations carried the day in any struggle.

No, not the Roman people, but the *Optimates* were the real masters of the world. The vanquished thousands abroad, and their "friends, Romans, countrymen" at home paid toll to them. Cicero bitterly lamented, *Ad paucos homines omnes*

[1] Niebuhr, *Römische Geschichte*, one vol. ed., pp. 319, 320, 324, 334. See also a good account by Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

omnium nationum pecuniam parvenisse. This was when he indicted the infamous Verres,[1] but he was in practice—as distinct from theory—the well-paid advocate of the *Optimates*, as Adams has shown.[2] But in this case he was speaking sober truth, as is proved by the estimate of Lucius Marcus Philippus, who in the year 90 B.C. judged the number of wealthy families *at not more than* 2,000![3]

And Pliny tells us that in the middle of the first century A.D., half the province of Africa was in the possession of six ground landlords, whom Nero simply had executed.[4] Under Honorius several great families enjoyed a yearly income equivalent to over 2,000,000 francs, says the French scholar M. Dureau de la Malle.[5]

The private fortunes of the governing class became monstrous and senseless in their excess. Crassus, the proverbial rich man of Antiquity, would only admit a man was rich if he could keep an army at his own expense.[6]

The vast accumulations of wealth in private hands resulted in enormous extravagance and luxury. Let us admit that at the same time science and the arts flourished, as is always the case when there is leisure and abundance of material; but concurrently with this technical progress there developed an insane type of expenditure, both puerile and brutal.[7] Thus at one banquet "Heliogabalus had six hundred ostrich brains served to his guests"! "A myrrhine vase was bought by Nero at 300 talents" (over £45,000). "Flocks of sheep were dyed in purple." "Hortensius watered his trees with wine." "Apicius set before his guests dishes of small birds which had cost him about £6,000; the high price was due to the fact that only birds which had been taught to sing or speak (!) were used."

[1] *Verres*, Act ii, 5, 48. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 37.
[3] Cicero, *De officiis*, lib. ii, C. 21.
[4] C. Plinii, *Secundi Naturalis historia.* The words are "sex domini semissem Africa possidebant cum interfeci teos Nero princeps". Detlefsen edit., xviii, 6.
[5] *Économie politique des Romains*, p. 221.
[6] Seneca, *De beneficiis*, ii, p. 27; Tacitus, *Annals*, xii, p. 53; xiii, p. 42; xiv, p. 55; Dio Cassius, lxiii, p. 2 *et seq.*
[7] Roscher, *Ansichten der Volkswirtschaft*, i, p. 156.

Horace declares that the household of Arrius fed on nightingales' tongues. There is also the well-known story that Cleopatra—and Caligula—melted pearls in wine to make the vintage rarer, etc.

Obviously such standards and habits must have injured the domestic life and character of the *Optimates* who practised these excesses. The majority of that class were, while still young, habituated to gormandizing, drunkenness, and sexual excesses of all kinds; and they refused the obligations of marriage or avoided large families in order to keep their fortunes for their own pleasures. The richest families died out. At the beginning of the Empire under Augustus it was reckoned that of the ancient Patrician families only fifty survived![1]

Another effect of this accumulation of wealth and economic inequality was a widespread corruption and venality. He who would not accept ten thousand was amenable to hundreds of thousands, and to the plutocrats such amounts were trivial. *Equites*, Senators, the highest officials—all were accessible to these methods. Consuls sent against the foe were bought over, e.g. the Consul Memmius by Jugurtha, the Numidian King. It was Jugurtha who uttered the famous branding epigram *urbem venalem, si emptorem invenerit*—that the whole of Rome was buyable if a buyer could give enough. This corruption affected the administration of the Law, its police and its judges. Cicero, in his first great oration against Verres, declared that there was a rooted conviction in Rome and the provinces that a man of wealth, no matter of what crimes he might be guilty, was safe from conviction by the Courts of Rome.[2]

The wealth that ruled and decided everything was not won by skilled, unremitting honest work: it was the fruit of speculation, extortion, usury, or, at the best, the monopoly of inheritance. Under these conditions the general slogan became "Eat or be eaten", and sheer self-preservation became avari-

[1] Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 68. (The three hundred years of external and civil war before Augustus had surely exterminated many! Translator's Note.)
[2] *Verres*, Act i, 1.

cious and callous beyond belief. Pliny lamented that "men's one aim now is to acquire wealth, and as much of it as possible; all honours, the Senate, the highest offices depend on gold. All higher things are neglected and rotted away; the same with the arts, of which Rome knows but one: the art of getting rich." [1]

Life for the dispossessed was one long struggle. The enormous concentration of wealth left hundreds starving where one man benefited. The free peasants who had furnished such matchless troops in Rome's early campaigns were driven from house and home, or bought up or imprisoned for debt. The gigantic estates of the nobles were worked by hundreds of slaves, always branded, sometimes in chains. Where there had been villages and gardens, there were the hideous *ergastula*—the dens or great kennels of the slaves.[2] The Romans were lords of the world, but Roman citizens had hardly a strip of their homeland left to them. Pliny summed it up, *Latifundia perdidere Italiam.* The more spirited and vigorous members of the exploited and dispossessed people became brigands or pirates (who swarmed in the Mediterranean); the rest gravitated to the towns and formed a lazy and mischievous mob, which was kept amused and amenable by the distribution of grain, and by the shows in the arena. *Panem et Circenses.*[3]

The class that had tilled the soil was ruined, and the army in which the Italian peasants had fought so successfully was a tool in the hands of organized wealth.[4]

Of course this process of displacement and exploitation met with long resistance, and it sowed deep hatred. How could it be otherwise when some had all the benefits and others all the burdens? The later Republican centuries are full of civil war between *Optimates* and people. Thrice the dispossessed

[1] C. Plinius Secundus, *Nat. Hist.*, xiv. 1. [2] Döllinger, *op. cit.*, p. 714.
[3] See Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte Roms*, 8th ed., vol. i, p. 373, and especially the excellent description by Dureau de la Malle of "the concentration of wealth in a few privileged families", *op. cit.*, p. 219 *et seq.*
[4] Adams, p. 66. Dureau de la Malle, p. 222. Before Caesar's time, 320,000 "Citizens" (with their families, over a million persons) were fed with corn at the public cost.

majority tried to storm the citadel of wealth and privileges—under the Gracchi, under Marius, and under Caesar himself—but in vain, and the third party who profited by the mutual exhaustion was—Imperialism. Absolute power, concentrated in one man's hands, curbed a community that had forgotten unity and justice. Instead of the Oligarchy called Republic, Rome and the world had emperors. The Empire was a milder and more tolerable régime for the common people, but the system of exploitation in principle was the same.

Weary of the struggle, the Roman proletariat had learned that this life was not for them, but for the rich and powerful. But Christianity promised them a new life and a new world after death, into which their oppressors could no more enter than "a camel through a needle's eye": a world where they should have all the happiness they had missed on earth. This was indeed "glad tidings", and the tinder was ready for the spark. Hence the amazing enthusiasm and impetus with which the new doctrine spread among slaves and poor. These flocked to the preachers—and these almost only. They despised the cares of the present world, they repudiated citizenship, and took no part in civic or public life. They had set all their hope on a kingdom of righteousness and happiness beyond the darkness of Death.

The mighty drama of Roman History closed with the despair of any *human* solution of its problems and redemption of its wrongs, and with the hope of justice and peace beyond the grave. This hope turned men's minds from constructive social effort, and the fruits of such effort were postponed for centuries. Peace reigned for four hundred years—the *Pax Romana*; the Empire was great and glorious—but an incurable disease gnawed its vitals, and its fate was sealed.

To recapitulate: it was *not* the disintegration of the ancient patriarchal family that caused the fall of Rome or of the other empires of antiquity. It was the *Concentration of Wealth in the hands of a few*. The too rich minority degenerated in irresponsibility and excess. The too poor and immense majority

in misery and servility. That ancient society was like an organism smitten by some strange disease that drove all the life-blood to one organ, congesting and putrefying it, while all other parts and functions atrophied in anaemia and lethargy.

So when the Teutonic peoples, rough barbarians but full of primitive vitality, fell upon the provinces and swarmed in hundreds of thousands across the frontiers, the Empire collapsed like a rotten tree at a few sharp strokes of the axe. *The dissolution of the family itself was no symptom of decay; on the contrary it registered an advance which, as we shall demonstrate in Chapters X and XI, was entirely in harmony with the trends of evolution.* In what, may we ask, did this much lamented "disintegration" consist? In the emancipation of women and children from the irresponsible—and often malignant—power of the heads of households; in the amelioration of the conditions of slavery; in the supersession of a barbarous situation of absolute authority and absolute subjection by a more truly humane and parental relationship. But while Roman geneonomic and social conditions improved, the *cancer of economic unbalance and injustice* grew and spread. This was the fatal factor that broke the power of Rome and sapped its vitality and that of the whole antique world. Progressive ideals and institutions *did nothing but good* in evolving something nobler and tenderer out of the ancient Roman Patriarchate.

Characteristics of the Late Familial Epoch in Classical Antiquity

The dominant geneonomic feature of the Late Familial phase is the "liquidation", or rather the disintegration, of the family as it had hitherto existed. The Paterfamilias or Patriarch, who had ruled the Ancient Household absolutely, lost this autocratic power gradually and piecemeal. His wife and children were released from servitude, and even his slaves received certain rights and amenities. The equality of the sexes, legal

and social, reached a point in Late Imperial Rome which was unparalleled in history till the twentieth century. The family assumed the best character it bears to-day—the natural relation of parenthood and parental authority, tempered by responsibility and duty.

The main factor in this transformation is, of course, the economic and industrial change into large-scale capitalism, which means that war was superseded by industry and trade. Peace and prosperity were inimical to harshness and despotism in the home. Feelings became more sensitive, imaginations more active, a human personality was discovered in women, children, and even slaves. The central authority preoccupied itself more and more with the activities of peace, and appropriated the juridical rights which had formerly belonged to the Paterfamilias. At the same time large-scale commerce and credit took over most of the economic functions of the family, which in its earlier phases had been largely self-supporting.

There were undoubtedly some symptoms of repulsive degeneracy in Roman society and the classic world during the Late Familial phase; but these excesses were not caused by the evolution of the family, but by the concentration of money, land, and goods in the hands of a few families, by the contrast between luxury and misery.

This pitiless concentration of capital is full of lessons for our time too! We must presently investigate its primary cause. We shall find that this cause was also the primary cause of the fall of Classic Civilization. *Not the liberation and emancipation of subject classes and the subject sex, but the obstinate greed that clung to one ancient institution: the absolute right of inheritance.*

CHAPTER IX

THE SEQUENCE OF GENEONOMIC PHASES AMONG TEUTONIC PEOPLES

INTRODUCTORY

A WIDESPREAD and erroneous impression still prevails among our contemporaries to the effect that the Middle Ages were the organic sequence of Classical Civilization, and that under the influence of organized Christianity a level of culture and ethics was attained far superior to the finest moral achievements of Antiquity.[1]

This is entirely incorrect. After the fall of Rome, new races, largely of Teutonic blood, became prominent, and these were still in the stage of barbarism and had far to go before they attained the ethical cultural level of the antique world at its best. It took about a millennium and a half before any real advance was achieved, and higher human manifestations than those of the apex of classical civilizations can be recorded. On the technical and industrial side especially, Classical Antiquity was not *excelled* until about the end of the eighteenth century.[2]

It is—or should be—a truism that no moral code or religious dogma, however sublime, could possibly raise vigorous barbarians to the level of an ancient, evolved, and refined culture. To-day the Christian religion transplanted into the minds and emotions of African negroes becomes a negro religion, a new kind of fetishism. And among the overwhelming majority of the Teutonic invaders, Christianity was "subdued to what it worked in" for many long centuries. The profound poetry and pity and insight of the teachings of Jesus was buried under strata of the rankest superstition. For the masses throughout the Middle Ages the Christian faith was a confused

[1] See *Sinn des Lebens*, p. 306 *et seq.*, and *History of Social Development*, pp. 173–78.
[2] See *History of Social Development, passim.*

polytheism of Saints who could work miracles for their worshippers—a polytheism ruled and managed by a priesthood endowed with magic powers. The Christian Church claimed to teach the Brotherhood of man and the Fatherhood of God: "Little children, love one another." But its position was hardly consolidated and secured before the persecution of heretics and of witches began. Thousands of men and women, no worse than their fellows, died in torment, in the torture-chamber or at the stake. Only in our own day has Christianity begun to lay aside the barbarous armour in which it suffocated for centuries. Slowly it begins to approach the profundity and sublimity of the days of the Stoa, of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. . . .

These views are largely individual and may be disputed; but whatever our religious opinions may be it is indisputable that the Teutonic and Latin races, after the fall of the Roman Empire, had to climb again all the weary way that Classical Antiquity had traversed centuries before them, to attain our present moral and intellectual outlook.

The Teutons described for us by Caesar were in the later stages of the Kinship epoch. In the Early Middle Ages they traversed the Early Familial phase, and in the "Ages of Chivalry" the Full Familial zenith. About the end of the eighteenth century the decline of the family began.

Of course Teutonic history was not a mere *repetition*; they had some differences from Classical—and other—races and cultures. Certain entomological specimens all go through the stages of egg, larva, pupa, and adult butterfly. But all pupae and all butterflies are not exactly like one another! And thus also the phases of cultural development *are not precisely the same in all peoples*, whatever their climate and ethnical stock and geographical setting. They may vary in the same phase as widely as two butterflies of different species. But let us look below the surface, at "the Constant Pole amid the Flood of Time". If we do not allow details to distract our vision, but keep to the *main trends*, we shall recognize the *sequence*

of geneonomic phases outlined in our first chapter as a universal evolutionary law: a law from which the Teutons *could not be exempt*, in spite of the echoes of Antique culture and the influence of Christianity. We are extremely well-informed about the exact processes through which the Teutonic races passed in those two thousand years, from the primitive conditions, described with such admirable clarity and vigour by Caesar and Tacitus, to our own days. We must now pass in review a *well-authenticated historical course of development from the angle of geneonomy*—a valuable opportunity of testing our axioms and conclusions. We begin with the earliest traceable and recorded conditions before the Migration of Peoples.

I. Earliest Recorded Conditions Among Teutons

When the Teutonic peoples first appear in recorded history, they were in the later stages of the Kinship phase organized into patriarchal clans or septs, i.e. descent was reckoned through the male, and he was the master. But sagas and survivals in custom and language indicate that the Germans and Scandinavians, like other peoples, were *matriarchal* in the remoter past. We have referred to this in Chapter VII, and must now add a few observations.[1]

Among the ancient Greeks, the tale of Orestes symbolizes and describes in imaginative and personal terms the change from maternal descent and dominance to the Patriarchate. The same conflict and change are expressed in the great national epic of the German people, the *Nibelungenlied*, in a slightly different situation, but also in connection with the duty and right of blood feud. In the contradiction between the tie of sisterhood to her brothers, and as a wife to her husband, the glorious Siegfried, Kriemhild slays her brothers to avenge Siegfried's death. How shall this deed be judged?

[1] Cf. L. Dargun, *Mutterrecht und Raubehe* (in the series "Untersuchungen zur Deutschen". *Staats und Rechtsgeschichte*, Gierke, Breslau, pp. 21–77). Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, 3rd ed., vol. i, book 2, chap. i, p. 85 *et seq.*; M. Hörnes, *Urgeschichte der bildenden Kunst in Europa*, pp. 88–104.

According to ancient matriarchal ideas it was her duty to prefer her brothers' lives and rights to the husband who was not "of one blood with her". The patriarchal view made the husband's claim higher than any other. According to the older version of the great epic, she is condemned; she is the "she-devil" on whom Hildebrand executes just retribution by striking her down in the moment of triumph. In the later poem, the *Lament*, she is "innocent before God", for she kept faith with her husband. And most strangely significant of all, the most ancient known version of the saga does not mention Kriemhild's vengeance at all.

Gods as well as heroes followed the changes of social development. Lamprecht[1] says, "Even after the Teutonic peoples had adapted their sagas to the patriarchal point of view, and even after the tribal groups of Ingve, Istve, and Hermund traced their lineage to forefathers and not any longer to matriarchs—the Earth-mother, Herchta, was still reverenced as the original ancestress of all these tribes; a victorious relic of the ancient custom." If, as Tacitus recorded in a famous and much-quoted passage, the Teutons attributed something sacred and weird to Woman,[2] and never lightly refused her counsel or denied her wishes, we may surely see there a matriarchal element. More precise evidence is furnished by the Avunculate. "The eldest brother of a family, so soon as he attained man's estate, was the guardian and protector of all his sisters; before maturity he and they alike were—*with their mother—under the protection of her eldest brother, not of their father*." Tacitus records a later survival of these conditions: "Nephews regard their maternal uncles with equal honour to their father; some indeed hold the kindred of a man and his mother's brother closer and more sacred than fatherhood."[3] Moreover, children were called after their mother. Even in the *Nibelungenlied* the three Burgundian kings are repeatedly called *die Uotenkinder*, i.e. children of

[1] *Op. cit.*, i, p. 102.
[2] *Germania*, chap. viii, p. 5.
[3] *Germania*, chap. xx.

Uote or Uta, the Queen Mother; and in historic times famous royal houses, like the Lombard line, traced their descent from an ancestress, not an ancestor.[1] The great North German legal Codex of the thirteenth century, the Sachsenspiegel, declared *that no child was illegitimate as regards its mother*, and *this means that* even under full ecclesiastical supremacy, *so far as the unmarried were concerned, the mother's position and name went to her children.*[2] In Early Merovingian times it was axiomatic that children—whether lawfully or "base born"—followed the rank and status of their mothers. The generation described for us by Tacitus was accustomed to reckon descent through the mother. Many passages of the various tribal codes, especially the oldest extant code of the Salic Franks (*Lex Salica*, § 59), expressly state that inheritance could only go *through the mother.*[3] The term for children of the same parents, even of both sexes, in the German language is *Geschwister*, which means a couple of sisters, and is equivalent to the Latin *consobrini* (*consosrini*).[4] And the term *Gelichter*, like the English *litter*, applied to animals only, means *uterine* brothers or sisters, and derives from the Old High German *lehtar* or *gilehtar*—the womb.[5] There is, indeed, a considerable amount of evidence, linguistic and mythological, that the Teutonic and Nordic peoples had matriarchal institutions in the days before recorded history. This evidence is surprising in its amount and relevance when we consider that the Aryans were herdsmen, and that pastoralism is profoundly unfavourable to women's position and consideration.[6] It must be admitted that authorities like Schrader, Bernhöft,[7] and Ihering dispute this theory, and maintain that these matriarchal terms and customs were bequeathed to later Aryans by the indigenous non-Aryan

[1] Lamprecht, p. 107. [2] *Idem.*, p. 101.

[3] Heusler, *Institutionen des deutschen Privatrechtes*, vol. ii, p. 272. (*Though the woman herself could not inherit.* Translator's Note.)

[4] Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 3rd ed., p. 307.

[5] Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, 2nd ed., p. 111, note.

[6] The mythological material is well summarized as regards the Egyptians, Semites, and Aryans by Hörnes in his book on *Primitive Art*, already cited, pp. 88–104.

[7] Cf. Chapter V.

population whom the invaders conquered, and with whom they intermixed.[1] This view is based wholly on philology.[2] It cannot yet be said that the question has been settled.

There are relics of an even remoter epoch than the Matriarchal Kindred phase. For instance the historian Lamprecht [3] points out that in Iceland, colonized by Scandinavians in the ninth century, "the term *brother* had a wider meaning than that which we associate with it, even well into historical times". Moreover, the Teutonic and Scandinavian gods, like the deities of ancient Greece, mated and intermixed in a manner which is possibly the faraway echo of the facts of life in a primeval endogamous human horde. Niordr-Nerthus and Fro-Frouwa were brother and sister, and at the same time husband and wife: so were Zeus and Hera. Among another ancient people of Aryan tongue, the Persians, the kings and nobles practised brother and sister marriages into quite late historic times.[4] In the Ynglinga Saga it is told that Niord took his sister to wife, "For this was lawful in Vanaland" (Scandinavia).[5]

Our forefathers were much inclined to marriage by capture. It was considered a noble and creditable act, and according to Stiernböck far preferred among the ancient Goths and Swedes to tamer methods. To tear away an enemy's wife, bride, sister, or daughter by force from his side, and then to wed her oneself, was the height of heroism and joy—for the captors. And it was quite approved that a daughter should marry her father's victorious slayer. The old Skalds constantly sang of such killing, such abduction.[6]

[1] "Zur Geschichte des Europäischen Familienrechts", *Zeitschrift für Vergl. Rechtswissenschaft*, vol. viii, p. 10.

[2] Schrader, *op. cit.*, 3rd ed., p. 366 *et seq.* Richard Schröder gives a synopsis of literature on Aryan Matriarchy, *Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*, 5th ed., p. 64. Cf. also Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iv, p. 151.

[3] *Op. cit.*, i, p. 100. [4] Lamprecht, p. 101.

[5] S. Laing, *Heimskringla*, or *Chronicle of the Kings of Norway*. See also Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 94, note 12.

[6] Dargun, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–40; *Die Raubehe und ihre Reste bei den Germanen*; Lamprecht, *op. cit.*, i, p. 111; Rudeck, *Geschichte der öffentlichen Sittlichkeit in Deutschland*, 2nd ed., p. 230.

Such abductions constituted perfectly reputable and valid marriages; they were both troth-plight and wedding-feast[1] among the Norsemen of Scandinavia. Among the Langobards, Franks, and Alemanni, the capture of a woman invalidated not only a previous betrothal, but even a consummated marriage.[2] For the woman was considered a piece of property, more or less desirable or useful, to be acquired as other property by force or for gold and goods. Even under King Lothar I, the widows who had proved their fertility in marriage, and so might be expected to produce heirs,[3] pleaded for special protection from abductors.

Up to our own day, over the German country-side there are *wedding customs* which surely derive from these ancient rapes.

In Salzburg province the bridegroom's friends come to the house of the bride's father with their guns and swords to fetch her for him—or as a "Guard of Honour".[4]

In Swabian Hartfeld in the south-west the bride is carried off in triumphal procession by his friends to his house.[5] And in Mecklenburg on the Baltic coast the young men of the village, when a peasant girl is betrothed, carry out a mimic siege of her father's house, ending with a "clear-out" or general shindy *de rigueur*, which only comes to an end when the bridegroom has chased and caught the bride.[6]

II. The Late Kinship Phase Among Teutons

In the time of Caesar and Tacitus the Germans had Kinship groups, though these were already patriarchal. Before the Migration of Peoples, which ended in the break-up of the Roman Empire, the clansmen dwelt in their own villages, i.e. groups of houses. Caesar calls these village communities

[1] Dargun, pp. 118–19. [2] Lamprecht, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
[3] Very significant of the patriarchal and feudal points of view. (Translator's Note.)
[4] Cf. the picturesque customs at military and naval weddings in this country. (Translator's Note.)
[5] Dargun, p. 128. [6] *Ibid.*

cognationes et gentes. Like the Roman *gentes*, they honoured a common ancestor and fought side by side in battle.[1] In war and peace they stood together, each for all and all for each.[2] They were groups of families with a common *Garth*, or Courtyard or Village Square, patriarchally organized like the Jugoslav *Zadruga*. The kindred groups together formed the political Unit,[3] and the ancient communism was still conspicuous. *No private ownership was recognized in the soil, only a right of usage*. Each year the land was divided by throwing lots, and this meant also an annual "house-moving".[4]

A chieftain of the Suevi explained to Caesar that this constant redistribution was intended to prevent discontent and ensure against unfair advantage; it was the ancient communal custom. After the disintegration of the Kinship groups the old land tenure remained for centuries among the *Markgenossenschaften* (Associations of Marchers on the borderlands to the East).[5]

But by the time of Tacitus the ideal of communal equality was often disregarded. Certain families among the clansmen enjoyed higher status and owned more goods, and they also received larger grants of land.[6] These hereditary chieftains formed the oldest German royal and princely classes. There were no occupational subdivisions among Tacitean Germans, but there was the great cleavage between freemen and slaves. The number of slaves increased enormously in the course of the Migration of Peoples. Slaves were only numerous at first in the houses and on the estates of the chiefs.[7] The men considered war and hunting, the care of cattle and horses, and the building of log-houses and stockades the only occupations worthy of the free and noble in spirit. Agriculture, according to Tacitus, they relegated to "women, old men, and weaklings".[8] The

[1] Tacitus, *Germania*, chap. 7.
[2] *Ibid.*, chap 21. Further details in Grimm, *Rechtsaltertümer*, p. 642.
[3] Grimm, *op. cit.*, p. 642 *et seq.*; Laveleye-Bücher, *Ureigentum*; Grosse, *Formen der Familie*, p. 202; Schrader, *op. cit.*, p. 379.
[4] Caesar, *Bello Gallico*, vi, p. 22.
[5] Cf. Laveleye-Bücher, *op. cit.*
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 424.
[7] F. Dahn, *Urgeschichte der germanischen und romanischen Völker*, vol. i, p. 209.
[8] Tacitus, *Germania*, 15.

Kinship groups were largely self-supporting. Cattle was the medium of exchange, except with the Romans, who used—and demanded—money. We may summarize these facts as follows: *Before the Migration of Peoples the Teutons were organized on Kinship lines, but by the time of Tacitus the transition to the Early Familial phase had begun.*

The Position of Women Among the Teutons

This geneonomic phase is certainly not harmonious or consonant with the glowing account of the status of German women recorded by Tacitus. But we must realize that in spite of its value and interest the *Germania* is *a one-sided moral tale* intended to put to shame and improve his Roman countrymen. It can only be used as *moral* evidence with the utmost caution.[1]

For as a matter of hard fact the *Patria Potestas* was as mighty and often as merciless in the ancient German legal code as on the Seven Hills. *The man buys his wife and she thereby becomes his property.* This purchase of the bride is found among all Teutons, Goths, Norsemen, Danes, Saxons, Anglo-Saxons, down to the High Germans of the South, Franks, Burgundians, and Lombards.[2] Grimm and other jurists and historians have supplied a mass of evidence that marriage among our forefathers was a real business transaction, and the bride was the purchased goods. In the ancient Icelandic and Norse documents a marriage contract is *brudkaup*, in Swedish *brudköp*.[3] The Anglo-Saxon codes have similar terms, and in the German Early Middle Ages "the purchase of the woman" is flatly mentioned in various legal judgments and documents. The wedding-ring of those times had a very different meaning from that attributed and cherished by romantic idealism to-day. The earliest form of minted money was ring-shaped, and these

[1] Cf. Grimm, *op. cit.*, pp. 455 and 617 *et seq.*; Rossbach, *op. cit.*, p. 229 *et seq.*; Riese, *Idealisierung der Naturvölker des Mordens in der griechischen und römischen Literatur*; Labaud, "Rechtliche Stellung der Frau", in *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie*, iii, p. 169 *et seq.*

[2] Rossbach, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

[3] Bride-buying. *Kaup* (German *Kauf*) is preserved in its English cognates *Cheapside, Chipping* Campden, *Chipping* Norton, Cheap! (Translator's Note.)

were for convenience strung together on ropes. (*Reipus* or *Reif.*) The *Reipus* of the Salic and Lombard Codes was the sale price which the bridegroom placed on his wife's finger. So the oldest wedding-ring was [1] the *price* of the woman's body, of her fruitful womb and her busy hands.

(And just as the wedding-ring, the magic circle of gold, was a *sale price*, that other romanticized symbol, the bridal veil, derived from the other form of marriage: capture and rape. The Slavonic peoples muffled the head of the captured woman in cloaks and veils *so that she might not find her way home again*. In ancient Gothic *quen lingan*, "to veil or shroud a woman", means to marry her.[2])

The purchased bride passed from her father's power to her husband's. Her husband could beat her—and his children and his slaves—could give her to another man, or could in certain circumstances kill her.[3] According to the strict legalism of our ancestors a woman could never be independent; she never was legally "of age",[4] but always under tutelage to father, husband, her husband's male relatives, or her own eldest surviving son when he came of age.[5]

The relationship of paternal authority and control over the children was designated *Mundium*, from the German *Munt* or hand, and thus corresponds, linguistically and legally, with the Latin *Manus*. This *Mund* over the woman passes from her father to her husband on marriage, after which her legal relationship to her husband is one of strict subjection, like that of an immature girl child to her father. The legal and judicial attitude towards women is the same among the *Earliest* Romans and the Teutons of the Migration of Peoples, and the same term *Mund* is used to describe it. The husband has the right and obligation of representing his wife before the Courts, putting forward her claims to property, etc., avenging insult or robbery committed against her, defending her in battle and civil disturbance, acting in an advisory capacity in

[1] Schrader, *Linguistisch-historische Forschungen*, vol. i, p. 132.
[2] Dargun, *op. cit.*
[3] Grimm, p. 621; Rossbach, p. 229.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 617–18.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 623.

matters of property and finance, deciding her domicile, and, in short, he is to the fullest extent in the later medieval phrase "the woman's lord and master".[1]

The father and husband could in certain circumstances sell his wife and children. Thus the ancient Frisians gave their women and children to the Romans as goods in payment of the tribute levied on them.[2] Even in the Middle Ages the sale of wife and children was permitted under special emergencies, such as famine. We cannot definitely point to a date when this ancient right of taking the woman's life or disposing of her person became invalid. According to Grimm, as late as 1828, among the common people in England, wives were brought to open market and sold by their husbands.

It is true that adultery was visited with severe punishments among all the ancient Teutonic tribes. But *not from the ethical and pseudo-idealistic standpoint as a crime against morality or the sanctity of marriage. Adultery was an invasion of certain valuable rights appertaining to the husband.* His wife was part of his property. Therefore, according to ancient Teutonic legal and moral concepts, *only the wife could commit adultery*; the husband's actions were on a wholly different plane. The offended husband was judge and accuser in his own case; a convicted (or suspected) adulteress was publicly exposed, stripped naked, and with her long hair shorn off then driven forth into the wilderness.[3]

So it is evident that the legal position of women among the Early Teutons was exactly the same, and no better than is generally the case during the Later Tribal and Early Family epochs throughout history.

III. Early Familial Phase (Early Middle Ages)

During and immediately after the Migration of Peoples there took place among the Teutons that enormous upheaval and

[1] Labaud, *op. cit.*, p. 171. [2] Grimm, *op. cit.*, p. 635.
[3] Rudeck, *Geschichte der öffentlichen Sittlichkeit in Deutschland*, 2nd ed., p. 219.

transformation which leads out of Tribalism into the Patriarchal Family. The ancient communal septs disintegrate, and their place is taken by the organized State. There is a profound social differentiation between the ruling class of warriors and the subject class who till the soil. The professional soldiers, who were originally the bondsmen of the chieftains and leaders, become an hereditary ruling and fighting aristocracy; they appropriate the ancient property of the clan, the common land, and reduce its former "free and equal" communal cultivators to serfage and dependence—*adscripti glebae*—"bound to the soil".

This privileged class takes over the *political functions* of the Kinship group; economically, the inheritor of the Kinship group is the family or household, which becomes predominant both industrially and geneonomically.

Just as in Rome, the patriarchal family widens to include slaves and serfs. Its characteristically medieval structure among the governing class is the *Manor*[1] (German, *Fronhof*). The Manor, or in medieval Latin the *Villa*, is our friend the *patriarchal and authoritarian joint household*, which is so typical of the Early and Full Familial phases; the main difference in the Middle Ages being simply this, that the slaves of ancient Rome have been mainly replaced by *villeins and serfs* "bound to the soil". Every great lord, whether secular or "spiritual", the latter including the religious houses, possessed one or more manors. These manors were country estates, consisting of the lord's dwelling- or great-house, and the barns, stables, store-rooms, gardens, fields, vineyards, orchards, etc., appertaining thereto; these manors often reached the dimensions of a large village, and were worked by serfs or *villani*. The serfs and tenants were bound to service on the estate, and in addition had to pay "dues" in raw materials and kind to the lord. These "dues" included fodder for horses and cattle, linen cloths, wool, beer and ale, casks, kettles, cauldrons, knives, shoes, etc., so that the manor largely fed and clothed itself.

[1] Cf. Von Maurer, *Geschichte der Fronhöfe, passim.*

In Frankish or Salic times, i.e. from 1024–1125 (contemporary with the Norman Conquest of England), this transformation was mainly accomplished. The manors covered what is now Southern and Western Germany, and according to Maurer, contemporary documents mention a village (*vicus* in distinction to *villa* or manor) quite seldom.[1]

The Family and Christianity

Let us now consider the family life of the Early Middle Ages. It was based in theory on the doctrines of organized Christianity, which spread rapidly among Latins and Teutons during and after the Migrations of Peoples. But the decisive factors in its development were phaseological and mainly economic. The dogmas of the Christian Church were simply a manifestation of the particular concept and attitude towards women and parenthood which dominates during the Early and Mid-Familial epochs in any and every ethnic setting. The household during these epochs is both industrially and geneonomically "a foundation of society". It is eminently in the interests of the social order to buttress the household in every way, to make it economically productive and fertile in children, firmly entrenched and exalted in public estimation. The world was still thinly populated, and it was still a necessity for any vigorous and vital stock to increase and multiply; customary polygamy deprives many men capable of fatherhood of their natural partners, and the most permanent form of social and economic partnership in a stable community is monogamy. The Church made monogamy indissoluble. Economically the household became a lifelong partnership in production and reproduction; indissoluble marriage promoted these objects, economic and geneonomic, quite irrespective of the personal feelings and intimate relationships of the marriage partners.

The Church's dogmas and codes met the phaseological conditions of the Early Middle Ages with complete success,

[1] See *History of Social Development*, pp. 171–81.

by prohibiting alike polygamy and divorce, and making life-long monogamy the only officially recognized and morally respected form of marriage.

It has often been maintained that the standardization of monogamy, together with other ecclesiastical laws, placed women for the first time in a position of dignity, and did them justice and reverence. Let us not deny that a certain idealism among certain Christians benefited women. The prohibition of polygamy gave the legal wife a definite status, and the cult of the Virgin Mother had irradiating influences. Moreover, the Jesus of the Gospels demanded fidelity from the husband as well as from the wife, and Christianity maintained that women had immortal souls, and were thus of equal value with men—though only in spiritual and eternal matters—in the sight of God, with whom there was "neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female".

But in the essentials of life, organized Christianity took special care that women should be kept in the subjection typical of the dawn and zenith of family hegemony. Marriage was indissoluble, and it was not easy for a man to turn out or repudiate his wife, though this sometimes occurred. But the wife was bound irrevocably to her lord and master. Any equality of immortal souls was a matter for eternity only, not for this temporal world. The New Testament is quite explicit: "Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection, But I suffer not a woman to teach nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence. For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman, being deceived, was in the transgression. Nevertheless she shall be saved in childbearing if they continue in faith and charity and holiness with sobriety." (I Tim. iii. 9–15.) "As in all the Churches of the saints, let your women keep silence in the Churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but they are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law. And if they will learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home, for it is a shame for women to speak in the Church."

(I Cor. xiv. 34, 35.) And "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the Church" (Eph. v. 22), and so forth.

The Church had incorporated in its doctrine that patriarchal Semitic myth which attributed the Fall of Man and the exile from paradisaical bliss, to the actions of woman. "The woman was in the transgression."

And the Canon Law was perfectly logical: it decreed that woman was not created in God's image. Adam was tempted by Eve, not Eve by Adam. Therefore it was righteous that man should be woman's lord and master, so that she should not again tempt him to sin. The law ordained that she should be subject to man, and almost his handmaiden.[1] St. Thomas Aquinas attributed the inferiority of woman to some prenatal deficiency.[2] At the Synod of Mâcon in A.D. 585, the assembled bishops debated with much earnestness whether women were human beings, and finally concluded that they were.[3] The myth of Eden played the same rôle in Christian mythology as the myth of the motherless birth of Athene from the brain of Zeus in Greek history (Chapter VII). In both cases male supremacy had clothed itself in the garments of religion.

Another main contributory factor in the low status of women was the *asceticism* prominent in Christian dogma and theory. Christianity arose among the slaves and poorer freemen of the Roman Empire, who were accustomed to exploitation and privation in all forms. They naturally felt bitter jealousy and resentment at all the joys of which their masters deprived them. Joy and pleasure became suspect; even the civic and economic sides of life were needless "vanity" and unrighteous; earthly life was but a brief preparation for the next.[4] And the keenest of life's pleasures became the special object of Christian

[1] Canon Law, *Causa* xxxiii; Louis Frank, *Essai sur la Condition politique de la femme*, pp. 42–43.

[2] *Summa Theologica*, i, q. 92, art. i, ad. 1.

[3] Henne am-Rhyn, *Kulturgeschichte des deutschen Volkes*, i, p. 93.

[4] Dill, *Roman Society*, p. 11, calls this "a renunciation, not only of citizenship, but of all the hard-won fruits of civilization and social life".

suspicion and hatred. Erotic love, love in its physical aspects, was outlawed; celibacy was represented as the bridal of the human soul with God. Paul of Tarsus said (I Cor. vii. 1): "It is good for a man not to touch a woman." Sexual relationships, even where emotion was mutual, were considered unclean and sinful; marriage was a concession, but a degradation, "to avoid fornication".

Any religious doctrine that terms sexual love unclean must also degrade and condemn women. And the Early Christian Fathers vied with one another in gross and ingenious obscenities in their reprobation of the sexual side of life and of the special personality of women.[1] Lecky maintains that "The services [2] rendered by the ascetics in imprinting on the minds of men a profound and enduring conviction of the importance of chastity, though extremely great, were largely counterbalanced by their noxious influence upon marriage. Two or three beautiful descriptions of this institution have been culled out of the immense mass of the patristic writings, but in general it would be difficult to conceive anything more coarse or more repulsive than the manner in which they regarded it."

Tertullian [3] carried his fanaticism to the point of perversity: woman, he wrote, was the gate of hell, the mother of all ills. She should blush with shame at the thought of her womanhood, and live in perpetual penance for the sin of Eve. Her clothing was the mightiest engine of the tempter. For a virgin of virtuous habits, every public appearance with unveiled face was equivalent to suffering rape, was another illuminating pronouncement of Tertullian. The feasts and privileges of Christianity were denied to married couples who had had intercourse together on the eve of the great festivals, and Gregory the Great tells of a young wife who became "possessed of a devil" because she had taken part in a procession in honour of St. Sebastian without having refused her husband on the eve of the feast.[4]

[1] E.g. St. Bernard (*Meditationes*). Odo of Cluny, St. Augustine, Tertullian.
[2] Vol. ii, *European Morals*, p. 321.
[3] *De virginibus velandis*.
[4] St. Gregorius, *Dialog*, i, p. 10; Lecky, vol. ii.

Paul of Tarsus would only admit marriage for the avoidance of fornication (see the well-known passage in Corinthians): "It is good for them if they abide even as I. But if they cannot contain, let them marry; for it is better to marry than to burn." (I Cor. vii. 8, 9.) (See also texts cited above.)

Origen took the Gospels literally, and castrated himself in obedience to Matthew,[1] "there be eunuchs which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake. He that is able to receive it, let him receive it."

St. Ambrose [2] praised such devotion highly. And this profound morbid impurity of thought and feeling was accompanied by downright material *dirt*. St. Jerome considered that bathing injured a maiden's modesty, for she should not see her own naked body. He was also an opponent of bathing and washing on general principles, and not only as a sexphobiac; he admitted that the epidermis became coarse and hard, and even sore if it were never washed, but those who had once bathed "in Christ" did not need to trouble about such matters.[3]

Let us leave this repulsive mixture of dirt and ignorance and morbid instinct. *Only let us clearly realize that woman had fallen very low in comparison to her position at the end of the Family epoch in the later Roman Empire.* Among all peoples in the Early and Middle phases of this epoch her position is thoroughly inferior, and Christianity has little weight against Phaseological Evolution. The Early Christian Church preached to barbarians an appropriate and barbarous form of family structure and sexual ethics, and in so doing made its doctrines historically acceptable and victorious.[4]

[1] Matt. xix. 12.

[2] Selected writings of St. Ambrosius. Schulte's translation into German, p. 157.

[3] F. Krauss, *Realencyclopaedie der christlichen Altertümer*, vol. i, p. 10; S. Hieronymi, *Opera omnia*, tom. i, xiv Epist. Col. 354; cvii Epist. Col. 876; *Patrologiae cursus completus*, tom. xxii. See also Lecky, vol. ii, pp. 106–131.

[4] As an example of the absolute inaccuracy of historians and "moralists" who are unacquainted with geneonomic evolution, let us cite a passage from Édouard Laboulaye, *Recherches sur la condition civile et publique des femmes, depuis les Romains*, p. 159. "In the twelfth century the victory was won, and

THE MID-FAMILY PHASE

IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND TILL THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

The full zenith of this epoch continues and systematizes the tendencies of its dawn.

War and Conquest weld together the lesser civic entities of the earlier phase into National States.[1] *War* is man's most important and respected occupation. The Middle Ages, throughout all their centuries, echo and re-echo with the clang and clamour of war between peoples, between lesser principalities, between feudal lords, between all these and kings, and between kings and kingdoms; long years of murderous devastation, comparable to the Early and Full Familial epochs of Antiquity. And these wars had a definite political and administrative achievement; from them arose National States, the kingdoms of France, of England, and the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation.

Class differentiation was systematized and elaborated in medieval times. The feudal aristocracy, which also supplies most of the great ecclesiastics, possesses almost all the soil of their respective countries, and with the soil the means of livelihood and of exchange. Its pyramidal structure is well entrenched. The unorganized, inchoate subject class consists of peasants and serfs, whose energies and resources are drained to the marrow by their lords. The soldier, the priest, and the serf are the typical human products of this phase, and its authoritarian structure.

But gradually there appears besides these three types a fourth figure to whom the future belongs; a figure who is destined to overcome and replace that feudal hierarchy: the citizen, the burgher.

the laws of the Church had become generally accepted in questions of marriage. Women are more deeply indebted to the Canon Law than to any other legal code, for the noble position they hold to-day; we must not forget this"!

[1] E.g. the Heptarchy in England. (Translator's Note.)

Medieval towns originated as fortresses—little asylums to which the country-folk could flee for safety in the constant plundering forays and feuds. But in spite of their armour of bulwarks, bastions, and towers, the medieval towns from the beginning breathed a freer air than those of Greece and Rome. The Roman patricians and *optimates* lived by preference in the towns; they only sojourned on their country estates in the oppressive heat of summer. But the Teutonic princes and nobles disliked to be "cooped up" in the towns; they preferred to dwell in their manors, in their castles and fortresses on land that was theirs, and gave them room to move about. And so, in contrast to the distinctive developments in Greece and Rome, the medieval city provided an atmosphere in which *free burghers*, *freemen*, *citizens*, could exist and maintain their existence, and ultimately throw off the feudal yoke and inaugurate a new age and system in which violent oppression and stereotyped authority were to be replaced by peaceful labour and production, and by some measure of freedom. In Germany the twelfth century was the great age of the foundation of cities, but both the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries saw much similar activity. And the more numerous the towns became, and the more evident their power and their distinction—they would neither tolerate oppression like the serfs, nor seek to exercise it like the lords; and the more the available leisure and craftsmanship of the burghers—in the same proportion did their activity turn *from self-defence in warfare*, to *trade and commerce*. This possibility of leisure, safety, material, and a market, made the medieval towns more and more centres of skilled specialism in various trades and crafts, and the dispossessed of the country-side flocked into the free towns to earn their bread in a skilled trade. Often they had learned their trade on a manorial estate. Soon the free craftsmen of the guilds formed one of the chief elements in the town life and population. The guild organization is said to have begun in the twelfth century. The guilds were originally designed for mutual protection and the preservation of

trade secrets, but in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries especially they attained political power and a share in civic administration.[1]

Another new economic tendency developed in the *medieval towns*; *handicrafts were accompanied by capitalistic trading enterprises*. And, as in Antiquity, these enterprises took the form of *foreign trade*, especially with the East. In the Italian towns trade had assumed a capitalist tendency in the fourteenth century, and in the fifteenth century large-scale foreign trade was well established in the South German towns (Ulm, Augsburg, Nürnberg, Frankfurt, etc.).[2]

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, capitalist ventures *were extended from foreign trade to manufacture*. But for some centuries the factories were very sparse and few, and the largest part of the invested capital was put into "Home Industry", in which the workers produce the goods in their own homes.

Thus the medieval township produces a new distinctive type of outlook and activity—the *economic type*, and this is destined to change *the State organized for war into the State as an industrial organization*. But in the Full Family phase the new class and its concepts had not sufficient power yet for its historic task. The feudal aristocracy was buttressed by the priesthood, whose power over ignorant and superstitious minds was practically absolute.

THE FAMILY

Here, too, we perceive that *tendency* has become *system* under the fostering efforts of the Church, which has become a power economically established, and ceaselessly occupied with political and social matters. From the beginning the Church aimed at entire domination in sexual and family affairs. In the year 1075 Hildebrand, Pope Gregory the Great, abolished marriage among

[1] See *History of Social Development*, pp. 180–189. The same is equally true of England, especially London. (Translator's Note.)

[2] Sombart, *Der moderne Kapitalismus, passim.*

the clergy: thus celibacy became the official ideal, marriage an official second best.[1] Divorce had always been sinful in the Christian view; there was some little variety of opinion among the Fathers as to the rights of the "innocent" partner when adultery had been committed. But in the twelfth century the Canon Law imposed itself on the Customary Law, and marriage became indissoluble.[2]

The Church was equally opposed to concubinage, but here the fight was very long and hard. In 1530 and 1577 concubinage was forbidden by Civil Law as immoral and injurious to public welfare. And in the Council of Trent (1563) every marriage without priestly sanction and blessing was declared null and void. Thenceforward a free marriage by mutual consent was deemed concubinage, and as such, a crime.

Thus we see that the position of women under Canon Law and feudal Christianity had immeasurably declined since the later Roman Empire.[3] Lecky says: "In addition to the personal restrictions which grew necessarily out of the Catholic doctrines concerning divorce and concerning the subordination of the weaker sex, we find numerous and stringent enactments which rendered it impossible for women to succeed to any considerable amount of property, and which almost reduced them to the alternative of marriage or a nunnery. The complete inferiority of the sex was continually maintained by the law; and that generous public opinion, which in Rome had frequently revolted against the injustice done to girls in depriving them of the greater part of the inheritance of their fathers, totally disappeared. Wherever the Canon Law has been the basis of legislation, we find laws of succession sacrificing the interests of daughters and of wives, and a state of public opinion which has been formed and regulated by these laws; nor was any

[1] Hans Prutz, *Staatengeschichte des Abendlandes in Mittelalter*, vol. i, p. 354.
[2] Cf. Havelock Ellis, vol. vi, *Sex and Society*, pp. 433–34; "The slow and subtle triumph of Christian Priests over the private affairs of men and women", Lecky, vol. ii, *passim*; Laboulaye, *op. cit.*, pp. 152–58.
[3] Cf. Lecky, vol. ii, *passim*; Legouvé, *Histoire morale des femmes*, pp. 29–30, 148; Finck, *Romantische Liebe*, i, p. 191; Hellwald, *Human Family*, p. 564; Donaldson and Ellis.

serious attempt made to abolish them till the close of the last century." [1]

But one step in advance had been made since the patriarchate of antiquity: the family was not exclusively founded on Agnatio or male descent and the relatives on the paternal side; the mother's kin, the *Cognationes*, received recognition and responsibility. But economically the women were in a web of restrictions and prohibitions. They could not independently perform business transactions even in the petty sphere to which they were relegated. The housewife could only spend a strictly limited and proscribed sum of money on food for the household without her lord's sanction. *Mulier taceat in ecclesia* was valid in the Law Courts too. Early papal decrees made a woman's witness invalid because "Undependable".[2] By the customs of the town of Ulm, a man, married or single, who had intercourse with a virgin was only compelled by law to give her a pair of shoes (!), and if she became pregnant, two gulden before her confinement. *But he had to take charge of the child.*[3] The English Common Law made the married woman, or *feme couverte*, almost a nullity. All her rights devolved on her husband. She could not make a will, or be party to a contract, or appear in Court. The crimes or torts she committed in her husband's presence were ascribed to him, to his authority and compulsion. Her personal property and earnings were his. Even after separation or divorce, no account could be demanded from him. Any "real estate" of his wife's could not be alienated or sold without her consent, but the power of use and administration was vested in the husband.[4]

Neither the romantic "service" (*Minnedienst*) of the knight to his lady in certain phases of chivalry, nor the *culte* of the

[1] Lecky, *European Morals*, vol. ii, p. 339. (See also the very deliberate and cautious judgment of Sir Henry Maine, *Ancient Law*, pp. 154–59. Translator's Note.)

[2] Röslin, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[3] *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 35. (A gulden was the smallest current coin of medieval Germany.)

[4] Pollock and Maitland, *History of English Law*, vol. ii; Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, vol. i, p. 224 *et seq.*; Ellis, *Sex in Society*, p. 401 *et seq.*

Virgin Mother, nor the many learned ladies and remarkable feminine personalities of the Renaissance helped women out of their lamentable legal and civil status. And if the ancient Teutons venerated "something sacred, weird, and supernatural in women", the medieval inquisitors and legalists saw only the uncanny, the degraded, and the malignant aspects of the beings whose ancestress and archetype, Eve, had "brought sin into the world"; they saw only the chosen and appropriate instrument of Satan. The number of women burned to death as witches in Germany alone is estimated by the social historian, Johann Scherr, as not less than one hundred thousand.[1]

Even after most of the concepts and customs of the Middle Ages had been profoundly changed by economic forces, the domain of the family was still largely in the shadow of the Canon Law, e.g. in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. We may cite a few examples from different centuries and countries. Thomas Wright remarks of the fifteenth century in England [2] that young ladies, even of the noblest families, were not only strictly, but tyranically brought up. Their mothers kept them hard at work, and exacted a servile obedience. They even speculated with the fruits of their children's work.

Craik says that until the seventeenth century English children might only stand in trembling anticipation or kneel in their parents' presence: to be seated without permission was unheard of.[3] Gabriel Compayré describes the position of the majority of French women in the seventeenth century as subordinate to their husbands, in the lower classes a beast of burden, and among the wealthy a toy and ornament. Intellectual knowledge or interests were viewed with suspicion, and education was directed towards adapting girls for a life of submission or of seclusion from the world.[4]

[1] Scherr, *Geschichte der deutschen Frauenwelt, passim.*

[2] Wright, T. A., *History of Domestic Manners and Sentiments in England during the Middle Ages*, London, pp. 381–82. Cf. also Spencer's *Sociology*, vol. ii.

[3] Craik, *Pictorial History of England*, ii, pp. 884–85.

[4] Compayré, *History of Pedagogy*, translated by Payne, chap. x, pp. 230–31.

Even so advanced, and in some ways free, a mind as Montaigne's felt that knowledge and instruction impaired a woman's natural charm, and that they should therefore be kept from her.[1] Chateaubriand declared that his mother, his sisters, and himself were frozen into statues in his father's presence, and only recovered animation when that presence was removed.[2] The inhuman harshness and severity, and even wanton cruelty, practised in the family of Frederick William I of Prussia, father of Frederick the Great, was not very exceptional for that age, the early and mid-eighteenth century; it was typical of domestic theory accepted, if not always so vigorously practised. Stephan, a leading authority on the eighteenth century in Germany, says: "The main aim of domestic discipline and child nurture, according to our ancestors, was to break the child's unruly spirit and accustom him or her to instant and complete obedience. This was the aim, not only of special punishment, but of the whole of the domestic arrangements." As G. H. von Schubert [3] says, the household was a monarchy in miniature, the husband and father its autocrat. The wife and mother was his subordinate rather than his coadjutor. The head of the household was as a rule excessively jealous of his dignity and prerogatives. He expected his "nearest and dearest" to give him the same treatment that he was accustomed to exact from the peasants on his estates, the soldiers in his regiment, the subordinates in his office, or the apprentices in his business.

When his children spoke or replied to him, they had to use the special ceremonial plural (*Sie*, the French *vous*), and in their letters they addressed him as *Herr Vater* or *Monsieur mon père*. "The children were to be incessantly reminded of his power and authority, so that it might never occur to them to pit themselves against him" (p. 127). Caspar Schiller always used the form of address prescribed towards servants and subordinates to his illustrious son, even after the poet had achieved fame; for the father was excessively self-important.

[1] *History of Pedagogy*, chap. x, pp. 230–31.
[2] *Mémoires*, i, pp. 17, 28, 130. [3] In his *Autobiography*, published in 1854.

Prussian militarism heightened this domestic discipline; the methods of the barrack-room and parade-ground were used in the nursery. And how heavy was the father's hand! Thus Fr. von Klöden, a Prussian aristocrat and intellectual, relates that his maternal grandfather, the Court Surgeon of the Prussian Royal family, Dr. Willmanns, used to beat his children unmercifully for the most trivial negligences. He also varied his punitive measures with considerable ingenuity, and once uttered the maxim that children could never be corrected or chastised sufficiently! The families of Von Klöden's friends were similarly treated. David Zeller once callously remarked to one of his sons who had received a double dose of flagellation, "I only wonder that thou hast still any hind-quarters left!" The greatest Germans of that era—the philosopher J. G. Fichte, the philologist Lachmann, the poets Tieck and Kerner, the musicians Gluck and Beethoven, the educational reformer Basedow—were reared in this manner. Beethoven's abnormal suspicion, taciturnity, and shyness are attributed to the inhuman educational methods of his father.[1] "If the paternal grandfather of the Von Klödens were out of humour for any reason, he "put the fear of God into his boy", i.e. he beat him like a carpet. "But praise and encouragement were very sparingly administered." Thus, according to their type of physique and temperament, the children under this régime developed either semi-imbecility, systematic dissimulation and deceit, or a repressed fury of resentment. "They feared their fathers far oftener than they felt any affection for them. They may have revered them, but love them they could not. All contemporaries admit this unreservedly." "The children fly into the attics and cellars, cupboards and corners when their father comes home, and tremble at the sound of his loud, menacing voice."[2]

[1] Stephan, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

[2] One of the best German pictures of this strange and almost incredible domestic epoch is the first chapter of Willibald Alexis' *Cabanis*. Cf. also chap. iv and vol. vii of our Sociological Series, *Die Zähmung der Nornen*, part ii, "Die Erziehung".

In short, wherever the family phase has reached its zenith, whether in Ancient Babylon, Japan, or Rome, or in Medieval Christendom, up to the time of the French Revolution, its educational insignia have been the rod and the cane.

And of course "the womenfolk" or "the females", as they were termed, were kept in the strictest subjection and the narrowest sphere. Johanna Schopenhauer gives this description of her youthful environment: "No respectable woman of high or moderate social position would have thought of crossing the street unless accompanied by a servant, or at least by her own lady's-maid. They did not even make necessary purchases at the shops: tradesmen were instructed to send a selection of goods to the private houses for inspection and choice. It was considered improper and immodest to appear at the theatre, the promenades, or anywhere in public without male escort. But as men were as busy then as now, and brothers and cousins not always available, this rule meant virtual seclusion for many women. At balls and dances there was a network of etiquette and thou-shalt-nots. I hardly think any of the graceful young ladies and ardent dancers of to-day would have suffered the clumsy boorish boredom of one of those dances for an hour at most." [1] According to Taine, on the very eve of the French Revolution, domestic discipline was extremely strict, and paternal authority supreme and often merciless among the upper classes and the people.[2] Then came an incalculable change. After the Revolution the Vicomte de Ségur [3] wrote: "Among our worthy grandparents, a man of thirty was more completely subject to his father than a youth of eighteen is to-day." *Tutoyage* between parents and children became the fashion after the Revolution, and was considered indecently disrespectful by professional censors! [4] But a new era had dawned, as once before two thousand years, previously. The later phase of the Familial epoch had begun.

[1] *Jugendleben und Wanderbilder*, chap. 24.
[2] *L'ancien régime*, pp. 174–75.
[3] *Les femmes, leur condition et leur influence*, i, p. 376.
[4] Stephan, *op. cit.*, p. 137, note.

Synopsis

We have endeavoured to give only the necessary outlines of Latin and Teutonic geneonomic development in order to avoid repetition and retain the due proportion of this volume of our series. But it is clearly indicated that those European nations who now lead the world, have passed through the same phases as more primitive peoples, in the last two thousand years.

There are, of course, some distinctive features. The Middle Ages were freer in some degree than classical antiquity. The slaves were replaced by *villeins*, and the cities were the nurseries of independent citizenship. Also we must remember that the Middle Ages perpetually derived from, and referred to Classical ideas and institutions, and it was part of the historic mission of the Church to confer some of the treasures and achievements of antiquity on the young barbarian peoples.

But the main evolutionary trends are unmistakable. Before recorded history, both Mediterranean and Teutonic peoples were probably *matriarchal*. During historic times they passed through the Late Kinship, the Early Family, and the Full Family phases. We shall now present evidence that in recent times these have been succeeded by the characteristic manifestations of the family's decline.

CHAPTER X

THE LATE FAMILY PHASE IN MODERN TIMES (NINETEENTH CENTURY)

CAPITALISM AND THE FAMILY

IN our study of the family of classical antiquity we observed disintegration began with large-scale commerce and capitalism, and with the transformation of the State primarily organized for war, into the State primarily organized for industry. In proportion as more and more functions devolve upon the *community*, both economic and administrative, the family must become weaker and less significant as a sociological factor. It is therefore clear that our modern large-scale capitalism has synchronized with a similar decline of the family as an institution.

The origins and early stages of capitalism, medieval and modern, were of very slow growth.[1] Its rudiments may be traced back to the Crusades. Capitalism, in antiquity, arose from and worked through foreign trade. But throughout the Middle Ages foreign trade was only a small department of economy and revenue. It is characteristic of the slight and poor development of foreign trade, that so late as the year 1825 the whole mercantile tonnage of the Hansa town of Bremen weighed less than the great steamship *Kaiser Wilhelm II* in 1913! Capitalism (i.e. investment on long-term credit) took over the mines, and factories were founded, but until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these were few and on a small scale. Then came "out-work", which, however, was comparatively unimportant compared with handicrafts and the self-feeding and clothing household for several generations.

Thus capitalist development proceeded at a languid and leisurely pace. Suddenly came a colossal spurt of energy, accelerating progress after a millennium and a half of apathy

[1] *History of Social Development*, pp. 178–83.

and producing the greatest change and expansion of industry and economic life known to history. This epoch-making event was the *invention of great labour-saving machines*. With the introduction of *steam power* into industry, capitalism began a rapid advance all along the line, and a new economic epoch of *intense and extensive activity began*.

This meant a fundamental change in cultural manifestations, especially in the *geneonomic* sphere. In the Early and Mid-Family epochs household production was the most important economic factor; the household fed and clothed itself and supplied goods outside its own circle. It is true that, after the rise of the cities, an increasing amount of work was taken over by the increased amount and differentiation of skilled craftsmanship. But even the medieval townsmen generally owned a garden or a little field which they cultivated, or they kept pigs or poultry. Many artisans could only afford to live by such incidental occupations.

It was large-scale capitalism based on machine production that gave the *coup de grâce* to the ancient *Oikos*—the household as a productive unit. With economic co-operation and high-power machinery, capitalism was master of such enormously efficient methods that the puny produce of the household was ruled out of the race. A new principle is established in this era of new scope and methods, a principle opposed to that of "self-help" and production by and for the consumers' own needs. The producers, the manufacturers of any given articles, were to be those persons best qualified and equipped for the particular job in question. Soon hardly anyone produced for their own individual consumption, *but consumed foods produced by experts for exchange*.

The household lost ground all along the line to the factory; one branch after another was successfully attempted and appropriated. And the economic rôle of the household, which had dominated industry for so many centuries, came to an end.

Inevitably domestic activities and duties became far less in number and urgency. They also became depreciated in public

esteem—they "lost caste", as it were. Formerly these duties and activities were necessary, arduous, and varied, including the grinding of corn or other cereals in stone hand-mills; the "combing" of flax or wool, spinning, weaving, washing, and bleaching; the brewing of ale or beer or mead; the boiling of soap and dipping of candles; the preparation and distilling of all manner of cordials and herbal remedies—also, incidentally, of cosmetics—the preserving and bottling of fruit; the storage of provisions over long periods of time; the cutting out and making of garments; the baking of bread; the sinking of wells and provision of water; and generally some forms of horticulture, dairy-work, pig- and poultry-keeping [1] as well.

Three-quarters of this work have been taken over by agencies outside the family and the home. Even in the most isolated rural districts hardly any household does its own butchering and baking, weaving and laundry-work. The gasworks or the electrical company have taken charge of the light supply; central heating often provides the necessary warmth. *Everything can be bought more cheaply than it can be made outside the factories.* The work of the housewife and housekeeper has ceased to be *industrially productive* and has become a matter of *buying goods* as profitably as possible.

A. The Modern Disintegration of the Family

Thus, at first slowly and gradually, through the development of skilled handicrafts and then rapidly and thoroughly through organized capitalism, the industrial functions of the household were cut down to a minimum and the family declined in prestige and began to disintegrate, to "liquidate" itself, as in

[1] Under the Salic Emperors (in 1024 to 1125) the housewife was expected not only to prepare meals and manage her staff, but also, together with the maids, to comb wool, weave cloth, prepare and spin flax, sew and wash. There was generally a special room for weaving. The woman also made her husband's clothes. She also made artistic embroideries, tapestries, and coverlets worked with gold. Cf. J. Kunze, *Deutsches Privatleben in der Zeit der salischen Kaiser.*

the corresponding phase of classical antiquity. We must now trace this dissolvent process in some detail.[1]

1. The first victim was the most conspicuous development of the family, the authoritarian large-scale household, the manor and estate. The towns had already undermined its prosperity and prestige.[2] So many *villeins* fled from their lord's tyranny to the towns, that even in the Middle Ages an amelioration of conditions was unavoidable, to prevent wholesale attempts to escape. Serfdom was abolished in Austria in 1781 under Joseph II, in 1783 in Baden, in 1789 in France, and from 1807 to 1811 in Prussia under Stein. This was the doom of the great household and the territorial magnates' economic power. The small and decadent survivors of this institution are the entailed estates of the lesser nobility and landed gentry, and these produce raw materials and dairy produce, and corn, no longer for their own consumption, but for the open market.[3]

2. The middle-class family followed the same trend. It first became a family of two generations, parents and children, instead of the old patriarchal joint family of three. *Thus it became the smallest possible geneonomic group yet known.*

3. And this group became yet smaller and "beautifully less". The number of children born to each pair has diminished enormously. The housewife of the Middle Ages was surrounded by children of all ages and stages, from the adolescent to the babe unborn. Under the foully unwholesome conditions of medieval life and the constant chronic and epidemic diseases, many of the children born died as infants or before puberty.[4] The strenuous reproductive life of the medieval woman was occupied incessantly with pregnancies, confinements, and lactations, and with the care of broods of children. But to-day enormous families are realized as an intolerable

[1] Cf. the arguments of Professor Dr. von Wieses on the "Influence of Social Evolution on the Family" at the first Conference of the Philanthropic Centre at Dortmund, May 26, 1913.

[2] Cf. Von Maurer, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 481.

[3] *History of Social Development*, pp. 184–203.

[4] Cf. any available family records or parish registers in this country as well. (Translator's Note.)

and unnecessary burden. The demands of hygiene and education have become immeasurably greater and demand both a larger income and more time and specialization than the average father of a family can provide, without severe privation or disastrous strain. Among the wealthy and privileged also small families are desired in order to avoid the dispersal of the inherited income. Moreover, the area of the more advanced national States has become fully populated and an unmanageable influx of new lives is neither felt as a benefit to the family nor to the community. The small, deliberately limited family (often the two-child family) has become increasingly prevalent, first among the more prosperous and educated classes, and often among the masses, as the knowledge of *scientific prevention of conception*, which *makes parenthood optional, without abolishing the physical side of love between the sexes, becomes more accessible and more efficacious.*

4. On the one hand, fewer children are brought into the world. On the other, the duty of educating such children and preparing them for adult life has been largely taken over by the State, i.e. the organized community. The individual family can no longer fully meet the educational requirements of modern life. Thus *Schools* have been founded in which instruction is given by specially trained teachers. And compulsory attendance ensures that the children shall spend a certain amount of their time under this instruction and supervision rather than at home.

5. Thus the children only belong for part of their time to the family circle, in which, formerly, their lives were wholly confined. And among the dispossessed classes of our civilization (i.e. the majority) they become economically self-supporting at a much earlier age than was the case in the Mid-Family phase, and tend to leave the parental roof for good. In the Middle Ages the son, or at least the eldest, succeeded his father almost automatically in his father's trade; especially among peasants and artisans, house, "plant", "goodwill", and tools passed to the new peasant or craftsman. The same was

even more often the case among the prosperous merchants and the privileged nobility. Thus solid and continuous family traditions were built up. But now inherited status and occupation are increasingly replaced by chosen professions or trades. Far more often than formerly, for instance, does the baker's son become a doctor or a minor official, or the peasant's daughter marry a townsman. Rigid demarcations between trades and classes are melting, and the process has gone so far that in the German University world "men whose fathers have enjoyed the same academic culture or social privileges as themselves are hardly a quarter in number of the whole student class".[1] This process disintegrates the family by carrying its members into different environments and subjecting them to different influences.

6. In the Mid-Family phase, the guildsmen, assistants, and apprentices to the family's trade or business ate at the master's table and were treated as members of his household: the business employees and domestic servants "lived in". The relationship was responsible, intimate, often quite patriarchal. It has now passed, almost entirely, from *status to contract.* Employees take their wages in money rather than kind, and tend more and more to "live out". Nor does the old home of the family any longer afford a roof to elderly aunts, invalid cousins, and other "poor relations"—at least, not to anything like the extent usual two generations ago. For the family can no longer give them any useful or necessary work within its four walls, and urban homes have grown very small and urban rents very high. Spacious courtyards and shady gardens, corridors and airy, sunny rooms are rare, and there is neither space nor cash for much except necessities.

7. The same factors have diminished the number of persons employed in domestic service. When the family was a productive institution it needed a considerable staff. But now the proletarian girls prefer the liberty of their leisure hours and work as shop assistants or factory hands rather than among

[1] Paalzow in *Berliner Akademischer Wochenschrift*, 1907, No. 27.

strangers and restrictions as domestic servants. Hence the rising tide of lamentation about the "servant problem". Statistical investigation in the Berlin of 1907 found only 87 applicants for every 100 places, and in the province of Brandenburg only 65 applicants for every 100 places. Similar complaints came from the Prussian towns and suburbs, Frankfort an der Oder, Charlottenburg, Potsdam; from the Rhineland, Westphalia, and Baden. A newspaper advertisement shows that girls were occasionally promised the use of the family's seasonal subscription tickets for theatres and concerts, and either a week's or a fortnight's holiday with full pay and a free afternoon a week as well as the obligatory Sundays. (We have gone far forward since the right of chastisement in the good old times of the family's zenith!) In spite of entreaties and inducements the number of domestic servants in Germany fell from 1,339,000 to 1,265,000—that is by about 75,000—between the years 1895 and 1907, although in the same period the population of the German Empire increased by nearly 8,000,000, the number of households by 50,000, and the general material prosperity in proportion![1] According to Maria Heller's calculations only every *eighth* household in Berlin had a domestic servant. The "servant problem" in the United States of America has led to permanent residential quarters in hotels or to "apartment houses".[2] Simultaneously the relationship between domestic employers and employed is changing its character from that of *fixed status* to *free contract between essential equals*. It has become already largely democratized. The trend of modern institutions and ideas is not to absorb the domestic servant into the employer's family, but to treat her as an independent worker with definite hours and conditions. The domestic servant is liberated from the family discipline,[3] and the charwoman or daily help, who comes to her

[1] *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, 2nd year, p. 907.

[2] Cf. an article on the "Apartment House with Communal Kitchen and Restaurant" in the *Vossische Zeitung* of February 1, 1914. Post-war tendencies have, of course, intensified these conditions. (Translator's Note.)

[3] Cf. Paulsen, *System der Ethik*, vol. ii, p. 312.

employer's house or flat for certain definite hours, but is in no way accountable to that employer outside those definite hours, is typical of the present and—even more—of the future.

8. The family lost another bulwark by the decline of dogmatic theology. At the zenith of the family's significance and activities, every household was a religious community in miniature. In antiquity the father of the family was *ipso facto* the high priest of the ancestral cult, and surrounded by priestly sanctity. To-day, in remote country districts, the head of the household still has the privilege of conducting family prayers, but among town-dwellers these have become almost obsolete or are limited to grace before meals, said by one of the children. The family has lost the generally accepted religious sanctions and associations which were "living waters" to its former authority and vitality.

9. Also the domestic circle is no longer the centre of social life and social entertainment. At the zenith of the Family epoch, the members of each family and their immediate neighbours received and exchanged hospitality in their respective homes. The medieval inns and hostelries were not originally intended for habitual local use, but for strangers and wayfarers. In the Nürnberg of the fifteenth century the burghers were forbidden by law to take their meals regularly at inns![1] In our times the small families who reside in the tenements or flats or mansions of big towns are strangers to their nearest neighbours, and often find themselves in a position of unparalleled isolation and consequent social irresponsibility. And the dwellings themselves have not the space or equipment for large social gatherings. So the increased urban need for conversation and companionship, and especially the growing taste for some form of mental or aesthetic pleasure, has led men and women to seek "the bread of life of the spirit" outside their homes. In all large towns many lectures, public meetings, theatrical and musical events take place every evening. Thus we find that the

[1] Stahl, *Das deutsche Handwerk*, vol. i, p. 275.

inns, public-houses, and restaurants are more patronized than ever before—at the beginning of the nineteenth century this was quite the exception among tradesmen and the middle classes —and clubs and societies of all grades and kinds multiply enormously.[1] And in the large towns women freely visit and use restaurants and tea-rooms instead of meeting their friends "at home". Even such families as still have both means and wish to "entertain", tend to stereotype entertaining to a dull ceremonial round of visits and invitations.

10. Hotels and restaurants have helped to undermine the old-fashioned type of hospitality. In the small and highly rented dwellings of our towns the "guests' room" is more and more conspicuous by its absence. Hotels and pensions are more comfortable for both parties, there are fewer obligations and less trouble and expense. Moreover, the amount of travel and the mobility of modern well-to-do people makes the entertainment of all and any possible visitors impossible for all but the largest means.

11. The displacement of small separate houses by large tenements or blocks of dwellings has been decisive in much of the disintegration we observe. Formerly every family of reputation and position possessed a home of its own, inherited from generation to generation, however small and plain, the citadel of the family's forces, the temple of its honour. These houses had a very distinctive poetry of their own, an atmosphere which continually inspired and fed the sense of domestic unity and duty. As the poet and novelist Theodore Storm writes: "In the shadowy corners and on the furrowed floors brooded the memories of the past. Something remained

[1] In the 9th volume of the *Neue Generation*, 1913, 4th no., p. 216, Bernard Shaw wrote that there was hardly any family life in England left. Men spend two-thirds of their lives out of their homes at their work, or on the way to their work or from it, or at their clubs or "pubs". Most of the remaining eight hours they generally spent asleep or at their meals. The children were at school, running errands, or knocking about the streets. Domestic affection was considered a duty, other affection was a pleasure. Even allowing for Shavian exaggeration we may see that in England, the country of home life *par excellence*, impending changes are already on the way.

of all the lives that had dwelt and died in those rooms. We, who were of their flesh and blood, met this something, this *Aura*, face to face in our home, and we felt that we were members of a goodly company, over which death could not prevail." But as the clan had lost the common land, so now the family lost the home and therewith its economic basis and social *raison d'être*.

The ancient home of the family hardly survives, except in country places, and the family traditions and standards have largely vanished with the inherited place and house. One of the first writers to perceive the extent of this loss was Riehl;[1] he was the first to sing the swan's song of the old-fashioned family, although in the vain hope of reviving it. He saw "the most important reason for the divergence between the manners and morals of the country-side and the towns is that to peasants the ownership and occupation of their own houses is something necessary and fundamental: to the townsman it is incidental".[2]

The concentration of population in the towns has led to an enormous rise in rents and the price of land for building purposes: the available space is utilized to the last square inch, and the long rows of tenement houses and workmen's flats tower above the narrow streets and alleys. In the tiny rooms of these barrack-like dwellings the small urban families of to-day lead a restless, uncertain, and almost nomadic existence, for they are at the mercy of constantly rising rents. In Breslau,[3] with 400,000 inhabitants, no less than 194,602 moved from one dwelling to another in the course of the year 1899, and in Hamburg, in the same year, 212,783 persons "moved house".

12. The de-territorialization or, perhaps more accurately, de-localization of the family has another contributory cause.

[1] *Die Familie*, p. 272.

[2] In Munich in 1907, among 512,902 inhabitants the owner-occupiers were 14,673. To every owner-occupier there were 35 inhabitants, and in the poorer quarters as many as 100.

[3] Sombart, *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, ii, p. 329.

Modern methods of production—and traffic facilities—mix and mingle individuals from all provinces and even countries, in the towns and the big factories and businesses. In former years, even in the towns, almost everyone had their family circle, or at least some relatives; their origin and to some extent their affairs were known. Most of them stayed in the place where their forbears had lived and died; as in remote country places to-day, where almost all the inmates of one village are related to one another. But to-day we live under the sign of travel and mobility, and there are hardly any families whose members are not scattered far and wide, while in the same tenements people from the most distant and different places, provinces, and countries live side by side.

13. The weakening and deracination of the family have made it unpracticable as a *refuge* in time of need.[1] At the zenith of its power the family—like the clan—offered support and asylum to its members, in illness, privation, misfortune, or even crime. For the duties and rights of the family were reckoned as more sacred than the claims of the commonweal. The family was a mutual protective association against life's difficulties and dangers. But nowadays the head of a household who has had bad luck in business cannot by any means always rely on his relatives for help, and many families are quite unable to care for their aged and infirm members, for invalids and orphans. The community takes an ever larger and more active part in social salvage. The State and local authorities build and supervise schools and institutions for the care of children, orphanages, hospitals, almshouses, convalescent homes, etc. Children whose parents cannot care for them properly are fed. The State does not permit parents to physically illtreat their children or neglect them in certain ways. At the other end of life the aged and infirm are given some provision, and the national

[1] The disintegration of the family in small towns is depicted in a masterly way in Ottomar Enke's novel *Patriarch Mauke*.

care of infancy, illness, and old age expands in all leading countries.

14. Public health work has taken over the care of the sick from the members of the family. Even apart from infectious diseases, well-to-do persons who are seriously ill go to a sanatorium or a nursing-home, and poor people to a hospital. Even in gynecology and obstetrics we see a slow but gigantic movement in progress, from domestic to public care and responsibility.[1] For in the medical sphere large-scale organization is taking over many functions formerly relegated to private practice, as "pooled" resources are in *some* cases more efficient and have special facilities.

15. Finally, the increased activity of the modern State in geneonomic matters is exemplified and completed by *National Insurance.* The family has been obliged to appeal to the community, organized on a capitalist basis, to temper the wind of uncertainty and privation, and the ever-gnawing anxiety for the future. A sudden misfortune which would wholly ruin an isolated family, forsaken by remoter kindred and neighbours alike, becomes tolerable and to some extent remediable when the State helps in shouldering the burden: a load that would crush one man can be borne by a crowd. This idea of either Company or State Insurance developed concurrently with the Late Family phase, and has attained an expansion in recent decades which makes insurance one of the most conspicuous and characteristic features of our times.[2]

Thus function after function is lost to the family and taken over by the community. This socialization of functions proceeds apace, and the power and prestige of the family diminishes. *The organized community, and the individual personalities of its members, emerge as the important factors of modern life and touch at an increasing number of points of contact.*

[1] Cf. the recent suggestions of the Ministry of Health Committees, at the urgent representations of organized women in Great Britain, for adequate maternity service, 1929–30. (Translator's Note.)

[2] Cf. *History of Social Development*, pp. 299–300.

B. The Rise of Women's Status in the Late Family Phase

> Thou shalt desire men's culture,
> art, knowledge and honour.—
> F. Schleiermacher
> (Die zehn Gebote.)

An immense change has taken place in the relations between men and women, synchronizing with the decline of the old-fashioned family, and mutually interacting with and influenced by that decline. Just as in a corresponding phase of classical antiquity women were slowly liberated from the *patria potestas*, so in our time there is an *emancipation* of the most definite and detailed kind. The causes of this supremely important process may perhaps be defined as follows:

(*a*) The transition from militarism to industrialism.

We have pointed out that in classical antiquity the State organized for war became the State organized for trade and industry. We may apply almost the same terms to the transformation of our times.

Tacitus tells us that the ancient Teutons "deemed it sloth, nay, even cowardice, to win goods or advantage by the sweat of labour, when they might win them by bloodshed". This might be the motto of the Middle Ages. War was *the* honourable and virile occupation *par excellence*. But the methods of large-scale capitalist production bring new institutions and ideas. The burghers of the free towns turn more and more from war to industry, work, and trade. Violence is less profitable than the power of wealth; the fierce warrior than the cunning trader. It is significant that the heads and executive representatives of the most advanced modern States—Britain, France, and the United States of America—appear officially in civilian attire.

But as we have repeatedly emphasized, *war is inimical to women*. The spirit of violent recklessness and despotic discipline is carried over from the State to the household. Man alone counts in war-time; in the militarist State he makes

laws and administers them. Women are servants, accessories, victims. But a State founded on peace and orderly activity is not essentially unfavourable to women. Trade and industry are generally within women's powers, and the activities of the sexes tend to become more alike, and therefore their status becomes more equal.

(*b*) Ethical sentiments are developed by these altered conditions, primitive impulses become more complex, deeper, and more delicate. The primordial predatory cruelty and wanton destructiveness of the archetypal hunter and warrior become modified by a new range of concepts and sensations. Pity, altruism, a power of imagining and suffering the pain and injustice inflicted on others, develop very slowly, but they enrich and deeply alter men's emotional life. Finally, man begins to discover the personality, the independent, equivalent human being in woman; he no longer treats her as a mere instrument of his sexual pleasure and material comfort, but as a comrade and friend, on an equal footing with himself.

(*c*) A further specific factor in the modern emancipation of women, and a most important phenomenon sociologically, is the beginning of *the occupational and professional differentiation among women*. We have alluded to the number and variety of economic functions taken over from the household by the large-scale industrialization of the community. The domestic activities of women have become sharply circumscribed and limited, they cannot suffice to employ a healthy human being's whole time and thoughts. Women are driven by need, or seek through their own inclination, to earn their livelihood in industry and clerical employment. To-day [1] one-third of all women over fourteen years of age earn in industry or some definite occupation; and the occupational differentiation of women must be regarded as a sociological and cultural law.[2] This differentiation and increase of economic opportunity helps women to self-determination, in spite of difficulties and

[1] This book was written in 1911. (Translator's Note.)
[2] *History of Social Development*, pp. 218–30.

set-backs. It gives women a perfectly new and more dignified relationship to men. They are no longer dependent on the good will of individual men. But one of the strongest ties of the social fabric in the past has been finally severed.

We may trace the consequences in religion, ethics, and law.

The Christian Churches, in their creeds and dogmas, crystallized the patriarchal morality of the Early and Full Familial phases; this point of view was represented as eternal and immutable, divinely ordained for ever. Woman was born to be subject to man: she was the great criminal of the human race. Eve, in Eden, had brought sin and sorrow into the world, and sexual love was inherently impure and degrading. The marriage bond was indissoluble. The Catholic Church boasts that her essential doctrines are unalterable. But human conditions alter and human knowledge grows. The power of the organized Church was forced to give way in all the more progressive countries; modern thought and the modern State have begun to mould marriage and domestic institutions in a larger and finer spirit. A new social code is being worked out in the sexual sphere as well as civically and industrially.

Modern civilized ethics consider women, not as men's predestined inferiors and instruments, but as independent and fully adult persons, with the same human rights as men. Sexual love is not dirt or sin; it is the summit and flower of human life, it preserves and ennobles the human race.

Logically, therefore, the marriage laws can no longer be left to the medieval mercies of the Church. The French Republican Constitution of September 3, 1791, declared that "the law regarded marriage as a Civil Contract only". Since then, almost all the chief National States have accepted the Civil Contract as the legal essential.

The French Revolution also decreed equality of inheritance, as between sons and daughters.

In the heyday of family morality, the husband and father was legally entitled to beat his wife, as well as his children and servants. To-day, physical ill-usage is legal ground for divorce, or, in less advanced countries, for separation.

Finally, the State admits the *dissolubility of marriage* in certain circumstances. Wives have some legal chance of escape from intolerable marital conditions. In almost all countries the husband who is proved at fault has to contribute to the wife's support, and she is thus protected, in theory at least, against destitution.[1]

The compulsory lifelong monogamy aimed at by the Church has only been fully enforced for a few centuries. Women are now to some degree emancipated from the *patria potestas*, and we have already seen that such emancipation is a signal characteristic of the decline of the family as an institution. The altered relationship between men and women is clearly mirrored in the laws, but these laws are still eminently unfair in certain respects. Women are still put at a disadvantage, and in the same category as the immature and the insane. For instance, in Germany, if a married couple live together on a basis of joint economic resources, and if any earnings the woman may acquire by outside work have not been specifically exempted in the marriage contract, the man may appropriate such earnings and waste them on drink or betting.

The notorious Prussian Law of Assembly forbade "Women, schoolchildren, and apprentices to take part in political Associations". And women are still excluded from political and electoral rights: a most fundamental disadvantage, giving men a free hand legislatively.

But law always limps behind the onward march of thought and custom: law is the petrifaction of the past.

The living organism cannot be standardized in clauses and paragraphs; its activities exceed the letter of the law and point the way to the future. It is obviously merely a matter of time for women to attain full political rights. But this belongs

[1] The facts are, of course, much less satisfactory. (Translator's Note.)

to the dawn of free individuality, which we must consider in our next chapter.[1]

C. The Relationship between Parents and Children

The change here has been equal to—if not greater—than in the relations between men and women. The father, in the zenith of the Family phase, was the severe and absolute ruler of his household. Now he tends more and more to become the friend and companion of his children. In the past, *parental rights and filial duties* were exclusively stressed. Now we recognize the duties and obligations of parents to the lives for which they are responsible, as much more important. Children have now become the objects of sympathy, attentive altruism, and profound consciousness of responsibility. The child has rights as well as the parent. This change of mental climate took place in the nineteenth century, which has been termed, and with justification, "the century of the child". According to modern views the duties of parents begin before the new life is engendered or conceived. They who, in the satisfaction of their instincts, have given to another human being the enigmatic gift of life—that two-edged sword—are bound in honour and humanity to see that their gift does not become a doom and a curse.

Any sufferer from inheritable infectious disease commits a cruelly immoral action in becoming a parent. Equally cruel and immoral is the man who begets children to whom he cannot or will not give the education and environment worthy of twentieth-century human beings.

Formerly children were brought up under a system of stern repression, often with violence, at their parents' caprice: they were slapped, caned, birched. The theory of education was

[1] It is to be noted that this was written in the years before the Great War. Since then there have been so many changes everywhere that the younger generation of women is in danger of taking their rights too much for granted. Nevertheless in England, notably as regards the marriage laws, we have still much medieval lumber to discard (Translator's Note.)

unknown. But now much of the parental authority and responsibility devolves on the trained teacher, and beating and whipping are regarded as confessions of incompetence on the part of those who use them. The tone of daily intercourse between parents and children is more spontaneous and more human. The ideal is to educate the child to full maturity and to respect its intimate personality, instead of preserving an artificial tutelage on into adolescence. In this sphere of ethics the United States of America and Great Britain lead the way. The choice of a marriage partner is no longer the business of the family, but is the most imprescriptible right of the young people themselves, and of the daughters as well as the sons.

Here, too, law reflects ethical and cultural progress. Fathers may still chastise their children, in moderation, but not neglect them or injure them physically. They may not totally disinherit them, but must leave them a certain obligatory share in inheritance. Nor may children any longer be made legally liable for their parents' debts.

At the zenith of the family as an institution, trade, profession, social position and environment tended to be strictly hereditary. The same was the case with religious membership and political party. But in this fluid and electric age young people frequently—if not generally!—have different opinions from their parents and another attitude to life. And so "fathers and sons" are set at variance and often become acutely hostile; and there is a great cleavage or a permanent alienation between the members of the household.

D. Symptoms of Degeneration

The decline of family rigidity, the weakening of paternal authority, the emancipation of women, the increased independence and consideration of children—all are strongly reminiscent of the Late Familial phase, as described to us in classical antiquity. But beside the finer vital symptoms and amelioration of habits and standards there is a "seamy side"

which cannot be described otherwise than as degenerate. We have no intention of stressing the faults of an age so dynamically significant as our own in an unhelpful and prejudiced spirit of pessimism. But it will suffice to let the very grave facts speak for themselves.

Increasing Frequency of Divorce

The social phenomenon of divorce has increased with rather noticeable rapidity. In the German Empire, in the year

1894	there were	7,502 divorces
1899	there were	9,433 divorces
1902	there were	9,074 divorces
1903	there were	9,932 divorces
1904	there were	10,882 divorces

Or we may consider the proportion of divorces to marriages.

In the year 1900, to every 10,000 marriages there were 8·1
In the year 1902, to every 10,000 marriages there were 9·3
In the year 1903, to every 10,000 marriages there were 10·1
In the year 1904, to every 10,000 marriages there were 11·1

In certain other countries the ratio is much higher.

In some of the United States of America the proportion is one in ten marriages, in others even one in five.[1] The increase of individual development and individual claims increases the difficulty of harmonious married life, and we must therefore logically expect that in future divorce will become more frequent instead of less.

Celibacy or Agamy

A further significant symptom is the amount of celibacy or agamy.[2]

Among primitive peoples, just as in the animal world, celibacy is very exceptional. As soon as puberty is reached sexual

[1] Dr. Ernst Schultze Grossborstel, *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, 11th year, p. 220.

[2] Von Öttingen, *Moralstatistik*, p. 180; Haushofer, *Lehr und Handbuch der Statistik*, pp. 404–06; Wappäus, *Allgemeine Bevölkerungsstatistik*, vol. ii, p. 267.

satisfaction is sought. Voluntary abstinence is almost unknown. Adults who are not married are regarded with contempt as "unnatural"—or incomplete. Aged bachelors and maids are unknown and marriage takes place at a very early age.[1] According to Nansen, the Greenland Eskimos marry, i.e. form a joint household, before they are able to become parents, and the same is true of other primitive races. In ancient Rome, as we have already mentioned, maidens were married at ten or twelve years of age, and the same customs prevailed among the Hebrews, Chinese, Hindus, and Greeks.

How different is the modern European! In 1875, according to Von Öttingen, more than a third of the total inhabitants, male and female, over fifteen years old were unmarried.[2]

According to the census of 1890, persons over twenty years of age in the German Empire were classified as follows:

	Married.	Unmarried, Widowed, or Divorced.
Men	8,300,000	4,700,000
Women	8,500,000	5,700,000

Thus 8 men out of every 13 and 8 women out of every 14 were married.

In the year 1900 there were 17,000,000 persons between twenty and forty years of age, i.e. sexually mature. Of these, 56 per cent. were married, and the number of celibates, 44 per cent., was not far from half! Let us take the age of effective sexual power and desirable reproduction as from eighteen years; reckoning this period of full maturity till fifty in men, and till forty in women, we find that 12,000,000 of German citizens were thus excluded from legally recognized and socially respected sexual life, and only able to exercise this side of their natures outside the law, if at all.[3] The marriage prospects of women are worse than those of men, because women are in a majority in all Western Europe; in Germany this majority amounts to nearly 1,000,000. According to the German census

[1] Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, chap. vii. [2] *Op. cit.*
[3] Adele Schreiber, *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, i, p. 820; Gnauck-Kühne, *Die deutsche Frau a. d. Jahrhundertwende*, pp. 73–79.

of December 1, 1900, there were 27,713,247 male persons and 28,629,931 female.

It is, however, erroneous to maintain (as is often done) *that the actual number* of marriages has appreciably diminished.

The figures for Germany per thousand inhabitants are:

In the period	1872–1876	9·49 marriages
In the period	1877–1881	7·62 marriages
In the period	1897–1901	8·41 marriages
In the period	1903	7·91 marriages
In the period	1904	8·03 marriages
In the period	1905	8·07 marriages
In the period	1906	8·16 marriages

In other European countries there is a marked decrease. Thus in Norway, between 1890 and 1900, the ratio of marriage frequency per thousand of population fell from 8·48 to 5·94.[1] In France the rate is 7·8 per thousand, in Sweden, 6·54 per thousand.[1]

Nadobnik [2] points out that in Germany, at least, the average age of marriage has not increased on the whole; rather the contrary. Eduard Bernstein attributes this to the fact that the German workmen marry young, and a larger number of them marry than of the commercial and professional classes. In the Kingdom of Prussia, for instance, the average age of the tradesman at marriage is 30·5 and of the official 32·5, whereas the factory worker is generally married at 27·7, and elderly single men of the working class are quite rare.[3]

Thus the recent and current improvement in the marriage statistics is the result (according to Bernstein) of the increased prosperity and more bourgeois habits of the industrial workers. And this is due to the concessions and advantages obtained by systematic proletarian organization and agitation. At the other end of the social scale the marital age for men rises steadily, and "for the last half-century the number of marriages among the well-to-do has fallen".[4]

[1] *Archiv für Rassen und Gesellschaftsbiologie*, iv, 1907, p. 123.
[2] *Politisch-anthropologische Revue*, 1908.
[3] Max Marcuse, *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, 1910, p. 336.
[4] Professor Adolf Mayer, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, 1909, 12th year, no. 1.

But the habits and standards of the prosperous and leisured tend to spread downwards. So if the present factors continue in operation we must expect a general rise of the age of marriage and an increased refusal to marry at all. And already between one-third and one-half of the people in their sexual prime are not living in legal marriage. What are the reasons for this extremely important development?

Causes of Celibacy

1. One of the chief causes is undoubtedly economic. It is the growing difficulty of earning enough to keep a family. This is evident, as the number of marriages follows the cycles of good or bad trade.

Among primitive peoples, wives and children are useful economic assets; they are almost material necessities and sources of property and power. But to-day the economic value of the most efficient housewife has fallen, because of the altered methods and resources of capitalist production. Among the rural population and the industrial workers of the towns the wife "does her bit" staunchly, and we seldom find bachelor peasants or artisans.

But among the well-to-do the wife is often a positive liability—that is, when she is not herself an heiress, or of exceptional earning capacity. There are thus three distinct types of women on the economic basis alone.[1]

I. The heiress, who almost always marries, but who is married, only too often, as a profitable speculation. Her existence is generally not conspicuously useful, and her demands, economic and otherwise, are large. She is the rarest of the three classes, for only a sixth part of the German population has an income exceeding 6,000 marks (£300).

II. The old-fashioned housewife. If we consider her from the purely economic and industrial point of view we must admit that most of her busy activities could be carried out as

[1] Cf. Edward Carpenter's division of the women of the past into the lady, the domestic drudge, and the prostitute in *Love's Coming of Age*.

efficiently and less extravagantly by a paid housekeeper. Too many housewives are, in fact, costly luxuries.[1]

III. The economically independent woman with a special differentiated occupation would be able to "double man's joys and share his burdens" if custom and domestic cares did not exert double pressure on her to give up her work on marriage. And of course to some extent she competes with men and thus makes marriage more difficult. This result will continue until society is organized adequately for the needs, and on the efforts of, two equivalent and economically independent sexes. We shall refer again to this requisite.

2. One of the chief traditional incentives to marriage has been the wish to leave as large a progeny as possible. Nowadays this desire has slackened. Among primitive peoples children need no elaborate training; they mature early and can be set to work. As adults, they live with their parents and contribute to the parental power and prosperity. The same conditions obtain in early civilizations. In ancient Egypt the expense of rearing a boy till puberty was reckoned at 20 drachmae (about ten shillings)![2] But to-day education is a long and expensive and necessary process, and when the children can earn they leave their parents, and often for good. Thus the economic advantages of a large family have been not only extinguished but almost reversed.

3. The long period of preparation and apprenticeship at the Universities and in the learned professions makes marriage impossible for many "intellectuals" till middle life. By the time that the man of the professional and administrative classes can "found a family" without imprudence or inconvenience, he is often *blasé*, or has become thoroughly habituated to casual sexual affairs, and refuses to accept legal obligations.

[1] Perhaps this is why so many educated Germans marry servants. In 1886 in Munich, in the "occupational group", officials, academic persons, and artists, only 82 married among their own group, 102 into the group of "independent merchants and manufacturers", and 100 into the "servant" group. (G. Hansen, *Die drei Bevölkerungstufen*, p. 226.)

[2] Honegger, *Kulturgeschichte*, ii, p. 47.

Or, in the matter of virility, his day is over. As Kant said: "While I still had need of a woman, I could not support her. Now that I could support her, I can no longer enjoy her."

4. In the lower grades of human evolution the pleasures of life are almost entirely confined to physical and instinctive actions; this is still true for the majority of earth's human inhabitants. But an awakened and instructed *mind* has a whole range of other joys and distractions; the pursuit of art and science, even if only as an *amateur*, the exchange of ideas, their expression in print, etc. All these can be enjoyed as well, or better, in celibacy, as in marriage. For marriage yokes the mental energies to the task of making a living. Often they are swamped in the day-to-day routine of "the job", in the cares of the household, and the responsibility for new lives.

Vierkandt[1] says: "We can see this most clearly . . . in the change which takes place . . . as a rule in the adolescent, when he ceases to 'study' and accepts family responsibilities. This metamorphosis generally implies a decline of mental activity and versatility of mental joy and elasticity. Intellectual things are dominated by material and the conventional 'Philistine' results." But this adequate reason for avoiding marriage, in the case of rarer human types, with creative intellectual aptitudes, is, of course, *highly dysgenic*.

In fact, every higher form and stage of culture involves this particular peril for marriage and family life.

5. The sexual urge of primitive peoples drives them directly to reproduction. But more evolved types "look before and after" and balance consequences. Vital processes become more and more influenced and interpenetrated by reason, foresight, intelligence.

Instinct "says yea unto life"; intelligence is sometimes inclined to ask: "Is it worth living?" And as the most highly cultured human beings marry late, they have learned that the ardent passion which urged most powerfully to union is a

[1] *Natur—und Kulturvölker*, p. 475.

rhythmic and not a static emotion; a variant and not a constant condition.

Men consider and calculate the lifelong responsibilities of marriage, they wonder whether they will beget children for happiness or misery; they reflect on their chances of life, on their investments, on the embargo on much mental and physical pleasure. Even if he recognizes that celibacy can never give him anything so great as the happiness of a really harmonious and successful marriage, he also knows that it can never inflict the misery and anxiety and acute suffering of unhappiness in marriage.

6. The decision in favour of marriage is not made easier by existing marriage laws.

To be legally valid and socially recognized, marriage implies the signing of a contract which is very like personal slavery. The partners have to undertake lifelong responsibilities of the most intimate and difficult kind. One becomes bound to another person, one's happiness and even honour depend on that person's good will, judgment, affection. Individual liberty is over. Even if dissensions or an embittered mutual hate develops between the partners they are compelled, under penalty of economic ruin, to remain in the home which has become a hell.

If a man cannot prove, by acceptable evidence, that a child conceived by his wife in adultery and treachery is not his, he is obliged to rear it and [illegible] it, even though he knows it is not his. And when finally a married couple are driven to part, they cannot be free of one another until they have exposed their most private affairs to coarse ridicule or censorious blame. They have to leave the decision as to "guilt" or "innocence" in their marriage to a stranger, who judges according to witnesses' evidence or personal principles or prejudices, but who is himself mortal and liable to error, and cannot know the real intimate history of their lives together. This judge may even condemn the injured partner to support the injurer for life.

It is evident to all thoughtful persons that the existent marriage laws are a major cause of the modern refusal to marry.

Modern potentialities and views of freedom make possible causes of conflict in marriage innumerable and any prophecy of the future of any individual marriage partnership, highly risky. An adequate and appropriate law would, above all things, respect the right of human individuality, which can never be "vowed" away.

7. As a further aggravating circumstance in the modern marriage situation, we must remember that for primitive persons almost anyone of the opposite sex who has youth and health is a possible mate. Evolved individuals are more selective, more "difficult". This has been made more painful and a graver hindrance by absurd obsolete rules of etiquette and restricted and artificial opportunities of meeting, at balls, dances, etc.

It is possible to decry modern individualism as old egotism. But sexual love has always been the most profoundly personal, i.e. egotistic, of passions. People marry (when not compelled to do so), or rather *mate*, not out of altruistic motives, but to get what they believe priceless and essential to happiness. And if marriage were ever to be based wholly—or even mainly—on so-called altruistic (e.g. nationalistic) motives, its last hour would have struck in this phase of evolution.

Sexual Abstinence

Another painful problem emerges. The prevalence of celibacy condemns a great number of sexually mature and normal men and women to an unnatural sexual deprivation. Views of experts [1] on the results of such repression differ very widely.

There are two opposing schools of thought, of which one maintains that abstinence from sexual activity is a trivial loss and has no serious effects: some even claim that the sexually abstinent are healthier on the whole than the normally active.

[1] Cf. Hegar, *Der Geschlechtstrieb*, p. 13. Also Havelock Ellis, *Sex in Relation to Society*, vol. vi of "Studies", chapter on Sexual Abstinence.

According to other authorities, rigid and prolonged abstinence causes all manner of morbid results, neuroses, neurasthenia, psychoses, etc. The truth is probably somewhere midway between these extreme views. Persons with a sound and even somewhat blunt nervous system need probably not fear any added risk of "mortality or morbidity"—at least, no such risk is statistically demonstrable.[1] But Erb points out that persons of specially unstable or excitable nervous sensibilities have been, and are, harmed by sexual abstinence.

And the most "normal" adult cannot live permanently in an entirely non-natural condition without ill-effects of some kind, direct or indirect.[2] He does not become "ill", in a certain sense, any more than anyone who has an arm or leg encased in plaster of Paris for life. But like every and any bodily organ which is never used, the genital organs slowly atrophy, wither, and cease to be able to perform their natural office. Moreover, if a man of strong physique and sanguine constitution lives in prolonged sexual abstinence, he develops various weakening and disturbing symptoms, e.g. sleeplessness, frequent and profuse involuntary seminal losses (pollutions), fits of melancholy which he is perhaps quite unable to trace to their real cause, and extreme irritability. The normal sexual desires which he will not or cannot gratify in a normal manner, distract his mind with tormenting and humiliating distortions of normal acts in his sleeping and waking visions. If he has not a balanced judgment, great strength of will, and some knowledge of psychology, this enormous repressed urge will manifest itself either in prudery or in perversity, both of which may

[1] *Op cit.*

[2] See Erb, "Über die Folgen der sexuellen Abstinenz", *Journal of the German League for the Prevention of Venereal Disease*, October 1903. The Russian doctor, Tarnovsky, says: "Healthy human normality must include the complete and regular satisfaction of *all* human needs, and this is the aim of hygiene; this, and *not* the compulsory suppression of so important an organic function as that of sex. To recommend the extirpation of any function for the sake of an abstraction or an ideal is the attitude of sectarian fanaticism and not of medicine and hygiene." Bertha von Suttner says that love is "an intensification of living". And when a friend of Goethe once asked him how he was, he replied: "I am not well, for I am not in love with anyone, and no one is in love with me."

have the gravest social consequences. For Nature is not mocked, and the instinct implanted in all creatures more strongly and deeply than any other, excepting only the instinct of self-preservation, cannot be permanently starved without incurring painful and cruel results; results indeed often more tragic in their nature than any punishments inflicted by conventional laws or customs. And as woman is more extensively and essentially sexual in body and mind than her male partner, therefore she suffers more gravely than he does through compulsory abstinence, though both "morality", as hitherto interpreted, and her own instincts of modesty have contributed to hide this suffering or even to deny it. We all know cases of women whom law and custom and their own education and environment have successfully cheated of all physical experience of sexual love; who without a murmur or a quiver live down the life within their veins, while their bodily attractions slowly fade and vanish and the thwarted instinct twists and deforms their mental outlook and emotional life, till its ferment has made them into the permanently plaintive, prudish, affected, wilfully aggressive and eccentric or blindly bigoted "old maids" of traditional caricature. A brave and brilliant woman has expressed the feelings hidden by this crippled existence. She says: "On the one side: the legal bargain of the marriage market; a bargain that gives no guarantee of love, of health, of fidelity; a bargain existing concurrently with prostitution, venereal diseases, abnormalities, and self-abuse. On the other side: pale-lipped hunger, a perpetual *malaise*, sleepless nights, and by day a heavy listlessness, an absolute inability to concentrate the mind on any work; and weeping—the bitter weeping of the woman who is ripe for love but has never known it, at each recurrent summit of bodily function—all this drives many women to self-inflicted death. Is this sexual health? Is it tolerable? . . ." [1] And it is still the fate of thousands.

[1] Ruth Bré, *Staatskinder oder Mutterrecht?* p. 108. Cf. also Gabriele Reuter's novel, *Aus guter Familie.* (We may hope that this systematic deprivation and oppression has become less since the war, though there is still much to amend. Translator's Note.)

Some Aspects of Unlegalized Sexual Activity

As abstinence is so intolerably difficult for many persons that, if persevered in, it destroys mental and physical health, it is obvious that what cannot be obtained with the approval of society will be obtained illegally and often in perverted ways. Hence the enormous prevalence of every kind and degree of "irregular" sexual gratification and arrangement, from more or less permanent but unlegalized and therefore handicapped unions, to concubinage, prostitution, and all manner of positive and negative perversions. This great torrent of human pain and longing has been the theme of poets, novelists, psychologists, and sociologists on countless occasions, and often in the most impressive terms. The "sexual problem", " sexual suffering," "sexual maladjustment"—these are the refrains that sound like the cries of the condemned in the medieval hell, through the clamour of the age we live in. Let us give a few statistics which justify that bitter chorus.

Let us first consider prostitution. Though admittedly imperfect, statistics show its ominous prevalence and increase.[1] In Berlin in the year 1845 there were 600 registered professional prostitutes. In 1875 there were 2,241, i.e. in thirty years the number had more than trebled. Between 1875 and 1896 prostitution in Berlin increased almost twice as rapidly as the general number of inhabitants! In 1896, 5,098 prostitutes were registered; since then the number has decreased officially, but only because the police have grown less ready to arrest and register. Doctors compute the number of professional prostitutes in the German metropolis at 50,000.[2] And there exists also the "occasional" and clandestine prostitution of thousands

[1] P. Hirsch, *Prostitution und Verbrechen*, p. 10.

[2] Hirsch, as above. (Before the war the system of Police registration and supervision existed in many German towns. It has now been abolished in favour of *compulsory notification*, but *free treatment* of venereal disease. In Germany, as elsewhere, professional prostitution is being superseded by a large amount of amateur and experimental sex relations on a more equal and comradely basis. Translator's Note.)

of women who cannot earn enough to keep themselves without this supplementary source of income. In the large towns certain streets have become most unpleasant and almost impossible for respectable and refined women after quite an early hour in the evenings.

The number of illegitimate births is also significant.

In 1904 in Munich 12,877 children were born in wedlock and 4,445 outside—that is, 25·7 per cent. births were illegitimate. The number of such births per every thousand inhabitants is 4·2 in Berlin, 8·5 in Munich, and 9·5 in Vienna![1] In the German Empire the average yearly number of illegitimate births is not less than 180,000—about one in every ten births. The fact that this ratio has persisted ever since statistics were systematically kept, does not make the injustice and suffering it implies any less grave.

In Germany the *percentage* of illegitimacy to births is 9·23; in Austria, 14·67; in Hungary, 8·61; in Switzerland, 4·63; in France, 8·41; in England, 4·52; in Denmark, 9·43; in Norway, 10·23. And among German towns and provinces: in Berlin, 14·73; in Prussia, 7·67 and in Bavaria, 13·77.

According to an approximate estimate of the waste of life among illegitimate children, 66 per cent. of the children born in wedlock attain their twentieth year, 18·2 of the "bastards"![2]

The Incidence of Venereal Disease

As we know, professional prostitution is an ineradicable and inevitable accompaniment of the institutions and ideas of the Familial epoch. But it has assumed an especially repulsive and tragic aspect through the plague of venereal disease. The great specialist, Blaschko, explored the records of one of Germany's leading insurance bureaux, with a predominating commercial clientèle, throughout the country. His other investigations, military and civilian, prove that these diseases are much

[1] *Mutterschutz*, i, p. 459.

[2] Prinzing, *Handbuch der medizinischen Statistik*, pp. 72–77. (The German Republic has done something to protect these children. Translator's Note.)

commoner among the "University" educated and higher commercial classes, than among the artisans who marry young.

Some of the results are appalling in their implications. For instance, Blaschko found that of his material, among the men who married when they were over thirty years of age, every one, on the average, had had two attacks of gonorrhea, and every fourth or fifth was syphilitic.[1] Erb, and other specialists, obtained similar results. The Prussian Government made a special investigation on April 30, 1900, for the whole Kingdom of Prussia. On that day 41,000 treatments were recorded for venereal diseases; 11,000 of these were for initial syphilis. The figures are too low to be accurate, as only 63 per cent. of the doctors who were circularized by the Department replied to the questionnaire. But on the figures recorded it was found that for every 10,000 men there were on the selected date 142 in Berlin, in the other towns 50, and in the whole area 28, under treatment for venereal disease.

Kirchner calculated that over 100,000 persons were infected or suffered daily from the results of infection, and he estimates the national monetary loss therefrom at 90,000,000 marks per annum (£4,500,000). The chief focus of infection was prostitution. According to Blaschko, 395 out of 487 male syphilitics had been infected by professional prostitutes (81·1 per cent.).[2] According to Professor Kopp, it was statistically proved that 773,000 venereal cases were under medical treatment daily in Prussia, and the number of venereal cases in all Germany kept at a steady level of between two and three million.[3]

There is also an elaboration and diffusion of abnormal practices and abnormal emotional tendencies in sexual matters. It is unnecessary to enumerate them, but the number and variety of these "psychopathies" is so great that medical

[1] Iwan Bloch, *Das Sexualleben unserer Zeit*, p. 438 of original. English version by Eden Paul, M.D.

[2] An ironical comment on the efficacy of "regulation"! (Translator's Note.)

[3] References: *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*, 1910, no. 137, p. 3; Robert Hessen, *Die Prostitution in Deutschland, passim*; and Dr. Eugen Müller, *Die Prostitution*, 2nd ed., 1898.

science has constructed a system of classification in which they appear under their distinctive genera and species, like Linnaeus' plants or the fossils in a geological collection. It is, of course, impossible to *begin* to get statistical evidence in these matters, and we have to refer to the—often almost incredible—estimates of medical and psychological experts. According to such leading authorities as Kertbeny, Magnus Hirschfeld, and Von Römer, the percentage of male homosexuality in Germany was 2·2 in 1900; the number of adult inverted men would therefore not be less than half a million.[1]

The Falling Birth-rate

This is a most significant fact which is occupying the attention of students of biology and politics in all the countries of Western civilization. Between the years 1881–1908 the average number of births per thousand of population fell as follows:

	1881		1908
In England from	33·9	to	26·5
In Germany and Austria	37·0	to	32·3
In the Netherlands	35·0	to	25·7
In Belgium	38·8	to	25·3
In Italy	38·0	to	32·4
In France	24·9	to	20·2[2]

We can only register an increased birth-rate in Russia and Japan. But the actual number of population rises steadily because modern science and hygiene preserve the lives that are born, much more effectively than was ever the case before.

A limited birth-rate is therefore *in itself*, and *up to a certain point*, entirely beneficial, for quite half the misery among the masses in various countries is due—as daily experience teaches us—to the reckless propagation of children, for whom the world, as at present constituted, has no room and no opportunities. But when parental prudence exceeds a certain measure,

[1] Bloch, *op. cit.*, p. 553.

[2] See the statistics of live births per thousand, from 1846–70, in K. Kautsky's *Vermehrung und Entwicklung in Natur und Gesellschaft*, pp. 2, 3.

the continuance of the race must be imperilled.[1] The most widely known instance is perhaps that of France.

In 1789 the *average* number of children in the French family was 4·2; in 1891 it had fallen to 2·1, and since 1900 the numbers of births and deaths almost balance each other.[2] The race does not multiply, but remains stationary. And the wealthiest districts—i.e. the rich departments of the Centre and the South—have the lowest number of births, while poor districts like the predominantly Keltiberian and devoutly Catholic Finisterre, Landes, Morbihan, Savoie, and Cantal still produce a large number of children.

As an explanation of this disparity it has been maintained that population cannot increase indefinitely within any given area, and that the increase of culture and knowledge must sooner or later bring a stage when the available area is stocked to capacity and increase must cease in favour of stability. Moreover, the undoubted fact that the death-rate falls with the birth-rate, i.e. that limited increase gives longer life and better health to the population in general, is an enormous argument in favour of the falling birth-rate as a truly progressive and beneficent phenomenon. But the further equally undoubted fact that the poorest classes increase everywhere more rapidly than the well-to-do must be a warning against too complacent and indiscriminate approval of present tendencies—and this complacency is further undermined when we realize that in the British Empire and the United States of America, which have room enough to spare in all their dominions and territories, the same processes are steadily at work.

Statistics[3] have been compiled which prove that in the

[1] In the territory of the German Empire in 1808 there were 20,000,000 inhabitants, and by 1905 as many as 60,000,000. Obviously population growth cannot continue at this rate indefinitely. Further details of the law of population will be discussed in Vol. VI of our "Stages of Development" series, *The Taming of the Fates* (*Zähmung der Nornen*), part i, "Sociology of Selection and Population".

[2] Levasseur, *La Population française*, iii, p. 150.

[3] See Kuczynski's article, *Politisch-anthropologische Revue*, year 1, p. 835; Ratzel, *Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika*, ii, p. 176; L. Quessel, "Rassenselbstmord i. d. Vereinigten Staaten", *Sozialist. Monatshefte*, 1911, p. 453.

oldest parts of the Eastern United States, Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the increase among the Anglo-American stock is even less than in France, so that the population would fall sharply were it not for foreign influx. The general increase in the newer States is larger, but mainly through the disproportionate natality of the negroes and coloured people. Is this a symptom of the same slow atrophy that destroyed classical civilization repeating itself in the young giant of the West? When we read the exhortations and reproaches which President Roosevelt has seen fit to address to the women of America, we catch the very accents of Augustus Caesar thundering against the *optimates* of Rome.[1] Roosevelt said, "No quality in a race atones for the failure to produce a number of healthy children."[2] Again he praises "ability to breed well and fight well . . . these and similar rather humdrum qualities go to make up the sum of social efficiency. The race that has them is sure to overturn the race whose members have brilliant intellects, but who are cold and selfish and timid, who do not breed well or fight well, and who are not capable of disinterested love of the community".[3] And he denounces the fact that American women do not regard marriage and home-making as sufficient occupation and duty to fill out a lifetime, but presume to criticize these institutions! He complains of feminine independence, both in the wealthy business and professional classes and among the "highly paid" industrial employees, who enjoy so much liberty(!) that they are disinclined to regard marriage otherwise than as "any port in a storm". The Principal of Harvard College, Dr. Elliot, also lamented the small families and late marriages of educated and prosperous Americans in a public address. According to the latest statistics, the average number of children per American family is between two and three, and twenty years ago it was between four and five. In many of the oldest historical

[1] See above, Chapter VIII.

[2] *American Ideals*, p. 349 (1899).

[3] *American Ideals*, Review of Brooks Adams's *Law of Civilization and Decay*.

"Colonial" towns the British American stock is diminishing, while in the slums of New York and Chicago children of immigrants from all over the world swarm in thousands. Women who have once tasted the fruit of knowledge, and of even the precarious and limited independence of the "business girl" or factory hand, have no inclination to give it up for "home-duties", even if and when they marry.[1]

In much the same sense as President Roosevelt, an English prelate bemoaned the falling birth-rate in the British House of Lords. The Bishop of Ripon declared that the natural increase of the British people would be entirely at an end and population wholly stationary (if not falling) within eighteen years if present tendencies continued. There were already 1,100,000 children less than might have been anticipated on the basis of former percentages. London alone, he concluded, had 25,000 fewer children in the year 1902.

Germany still has a yearly excess of births over deaths of about 800,000; and in the circumstances of modern economics and laws this rate of increase must be unequivocally condemned as harmful both to individuals and to the community. But here, too, the birth-rate is falling; in the year

1876 there were, per 1,000 adults, 41·0 births
1900 there were, per 1,000 adults, 35·5 births
1906 there were, per 1,000 adults, 34·08 births

In the south of Germany, where we have an older and more urbanized culture than in the north, the decrease is most marked. And there can hardly be any doubt that, as in countries where capitalist production and organization are more developed, the future will see a further decrease. Berlin and Hamburg have already almost as low a birth-rate as Paris. Neo-Malthusianism in practice always originates among the prosperous and leisured, and percolates downwards. German demographical processes in the twentieth century repeat French demographical processes in the nineteenth century.

[1] Cf. *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*, February 19, 1903.

And anyone who knows at all how the poor live knows also that their large families are mainly due to their ignorance and inability to prevent them. The difficulties of rearing children are so enormous that as soon as the poorer classes have effective access to the means of prevention there can be no doubt that they will follow the example of the rich.[1]

Increase of Crime

A further symptom of contemporary maladjustment and distress is an increase of criminality, as in the Late Familial phase of Antiquity.

The German Criminal Statistics Report for 1901 gave a synopsis of the figures for twenty years, from 1882 to 1901. They are startling and do not include military offences and breaches of discipline.

The German Courts condemned an increasing proportion of the population for crime and minor offences throughout these two decades.

Year.	Number of Persons Sentenced.	Rate per 100,000 Civilians.
1882	315,849	996
1887	336,189	1,020
1892	403,592	1,149
1897	447,925	1,204
1901	484,262	1,223

[1] The author has dealt fully with population problems in Vol. VI, *Die Zähmung der Nornen*, part i, pp. 215–367. The title "Taming of the Norns", or Nordic Fates, was chosen as appropriate to the three great factors of selection, education, and inheritance, which mould the lives and natures of mankind. (Although written before the Great War, subsequent events have justified Dr. Müller-Lyer's prophecy throughout Western and Central Europe. This is due, not only to post-war economic conditions, but also to the growing independence and citizenship of women, and the tendency persists even in Italy and France, despite fevered political and social propaganda. The difficulties of adequate family limitation and family life in general among the poor in England are well shown by Mrs. Lella Secor Florence in *Birth Control on Trial* (Allen & Unwin, 1930). Translator's Note.)

It is specially significant that the number of youthful offenders increases very rapidly.[1] For every 100,000 persons committed for trial in the periods specified below, the proportions were as follows:

Periods.	Sentences on Young People between 12 and 18.	Sentences on Adults.
1882–1886	564	1,097
1887–1891	618	1,150
1892–1896	707	1,221
1897–1901	733	1,298

Thus from 1887 to 1901, as compared with 1882–1886, there was an increase in adult criminality of about 18 per cent., but among young people at puberty the increase was about 30 per cent.! And the earliest "teens", from twelve to fourteen, are conspicuous in their share of delinquency, "rowdiness", or positive crime. This is so alarming a factor, both in its probable causes and certain effects, that it has been termed "*the* problem of youth" *par excellence* by Franz Oppenheimer. The main cause is obviously a disintegration of family authority and resources which gives these children neither shelter nor control.

Loss of Dogmatic Religion

Many scholars associate increased criminality with loss of belief in dogmatic Christianity and "simple faith", just as in Imperial Rome crime was associated with the loss of faith in the Old Gods. We shall discuss this explanation later. But there is no doubt that among other symptoms of the Late Familial epoch we find the crumbling of set creeds and dogmas, that the foundations of organized religion are undermined by criticism and scepticism, and that in matters of ultimate faith, as everywhere else, authority is at a discount and individual independence and preferences the determinant factors.

[1] Paul Hirsch, *Prostitution und Verbrechen*, p. 7 *et seq.*

Accumulation and Concentration of Property. Mammonism

It would therefore be useless to deny the existence of many disquieting and degenerative symptoms in our own day, just as in the corresponding classical epoch. But we came to the conclusion that in Antiquity the fundamental cause of these symptoms was the excessive concentration of property and power in the hands of a privileged minority.

This inequality exists also to-day, and it is perhaps the gravest symptom of them all.

We shall find that this one-sided distribution and concentration of wealth has its *geneonomic* as well as its financial aspect, and is so important that an examination of its causes and effects becomes necessary to our argument.

The inequality of material property, with all its results, has already reached a degree which causes disquiet to all thinking persons, of all schools of thought.

Let us take Soetbeer's statistics first. According to this authority,[1] of the approximately 10,000,000 industrial workers in Germany, 41·46 per cent. have a yearly income which reaches 914 marks and 94·4 per cent. an income reaching 420 marks.[2] In the Kingdom of Saxony, according to the "Statistical Handbook" for 1888, 42 per cent. of the persons registered under the census had an income of 500 marks per annum. According to the Ober Regierungs Rat Georg Evert,[3] a leading Government official, only one-fifth of the whole German people has over 6,000 marks: four-fifths are therefore practically without independent means. Werner Sombart[4] calculates on the basis of the exhaustive trade and occupational statistics of 1895 that there are 35,100,000 persons on

[1] Volkseinkommen im preussischen Staat, 1876 & 1888, *Hildebrand & Conrads Jahrbuch für National Ökonomie, & Statistik*, n. series, vols. 18 and 19.

[2] According to pre-war English money about £45 14s. and £21 respectively. (Translator's Note.)

[3] "Sozialstatistische Streifzüge" in the *Journal of the Prussian Statistical Bureau*, year 1901.

[4] *Das Proletariat*, pub. Frankfurt am Main.

the proletarian or "proletaroid" economic grades in Germany—that is, 67·5 per cent. or over two-thirds of the total population. In the year 1910, in Munich, the cost of maintaining and providing for indigent persons and paupers was 3,238,711 marks, i.e. 27 per cent. of the total municipal expenditure.[1] The statistics of the wealth accumulated in the hands of *individuals* in the Kingdom of Prussia are extremely significant. Almost one-fourth part of the total wealth in the hands of private persons is owned by millionaires, and another quarter by persons whose capital amounts to between 200,000 and 1,000,000 marks. "In the year 1899 those liable to income tax, as drawing incomes of over 900 marks per annum—with their dependents—numbered only 31·43 per cent. of the total, and those with over 3,000 marks income only 4·01 per cent."[2] Evert calculates the total sum of Prussian private capital at 90 milliards. In Hungary the disproportion between the property of the landed aristocracy and the rest of the nation is monstrous. The great house of Esterhazy alone has 516,000 "catastral" acres, and "0·09 per cent. of the Hungarian landowners possess 31·19 per cent. of the cultivated soil of Hungary".

These Hungarian conditions are becoming aggravated, not improved. Between 1870 and 1900 the entails grew from *463,000 to 2,400,000 acres*, and at the same time the farms and effects of 180,000 peasants were "sold up".[3] In England the soil is largely appropriated by a privileged class, drawing a rent of 4,000,000,000 marks (£200,000,000) into between 14,000 and 15,000 pockets. The London conditions are particularly flagrant. Seven peers own over 1,672 acres and draw over £14,000,000 a year in rent—the Dukes of Westminster, Norfolk, and Bedford, Lord Howard de Walden, and Lords Portman, Northampton, and Cadogan[4]—and 30·7 per cent. of Londoners are paupers. In the United States of America

[1] *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*, no. 450, October 1, 1910.
[2] Councillor Evert, *op. cit.*
[3] Dr. Oskar Jászi, *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, November 1910, p. 766.
[4] These figures relate to pre-war conditions, but have never been disproved. (Translator's Note.) See Charles Booth, *Labour and Life of the People*, 1891, vol. ii, part i, chap. 11.

the national income was estimated at $6,500,000,000 in 1890. Seventy-one per cent. of this amount was concentrated in the possession of 9 per cent. of American families! and one-fifth of this 71 per cent. belongs to 0·3 per cent. of these families! Not less than 10,000,000 persons were "poor", and 4,000,000 of these were paupers, dependent on public charity. Fifty-two per cent. of the farmers were bankrupt or in debt.

These statistics prove an inequality of virtual status and opportunity which permits a small class to live in luxury without any equivalent return to society; whilst a huge majority is deprived of all effective share in the higher pleasures and achievements of the many-sided culture and technique of our times.

The details of daily life at both ends of the social scale show strong resemblances to the life, under corresponding extreme conditions, in the declining Roman Empire. The Press proclaims—from day to day—the consumption of veritable feasts of Lucullus; a single strawberry, out of season, is charged five shillings; the cost of the floral decorations runs into four figures, that of the table service into three! The luxury hotels in London—the Piccadilly, Savoy, etc.—are flagrant excesses in this direction; the building of the Piccadilly alone was estimated to have cost over £3,000,000. There is an equal extravagance and luxury in dress among the parasitic class. H. F. Urban estimates that about 6,000 New York "ladies" spend 160,000,000 marks (40,000,000 dollars, £8,000,000) yearly on dress and cosmetics. This expenditure and consequent appropriation of human time and effort does not go towards the creation of works of art and the eternal service of beauty, but feeds the meanest forms of rivalry and competition and the instinct to boast and "show off". Thousands of skilled workers must slave "overtime" (and pinch in "off-seasons") to deck arrogance and idleness.[1]

[1] A graphic picture of this type of feminine parasitism and its emotional quality has been given by the Danish authoress, Karin Michaelis, in *The Dangerous Age*. Only the title is incorrect. The misery and degeneracy depicted are *not* the inevitable results of the climacteric, but of "idleness and fullness of bread"; the pathology of the female parasites.

And side by side with senseless waste we have disease, hunger, the physical and mental horrors of overcrowding and bad housing.

It has been calculated that the *monetary* cost of *tuberculosis* in the United States of America alone is $330,000,000 a year.[1] In Chicago 5,000 schoolchildren come to school unfed, and a further 10,000 enjoy educational facilities in a state of *under*-feeding. The privation in Brooklyn was particularly bad in 1909. In December 1907, in Berlin, 11,900 children were found to be attending 245 municipal elementary schools without a midday meal, and most of them had had no breakfast either.[2]

In Berlin "The Housing conditions are atrocious. 1,900,000 out of the 2,100,000 inhabitants are cooped and crammed into one- or two-room dwellings, and the lower their incomes, the higher, proportionately, are their rents."[3] Leopold Katscher calculates "that in Vienna there are 750,000 persons who are packed together at the density of between *3* and *11* per room".[3] And according to Dr. Alfred Mayer the Viennese census of 1900 revealed that over one-third of the dwellings in Vienna had only *one* room, but housed "43 per cent. of the Viennese people".[4]

The Modern Class-State

Between the two extremes of rich and poor there is an intermediate grade, the so-called middle classes. Modern States consist typically of these three subdivisions, each a world in itself, with its distinctive habits and standards.

I. The lowest class, the *Proletariat*, includes about two-

[1] Cf. *Sinn des Lebens*, pp. 303–04; F. Engels, *On the Position of the English Working Class*, 2nd ed.; Villermé, *Tableau de l'état physique et morale des ouvriers employés dans les manufactures de coton, de laine et de soie*; Talon, *La vie morale des ouvriers*; Deutsch, *Die Kinderarbeit und ihre Bekämpfung*; Pashitneff, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klassen in Russland* (German trans.); Broda und Deutsch, *Das moderne Proletariat*; Robert Hunter, *Das Elend der neuen Welt* (German trans. by Südekum); Werner Sombart, *Das Proletariat*, etc.

[2] *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, ii, p. 53.

[3] *Ibid.*, iii (1910), p. 615.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 458.

thirds of the total population, does all the heaviest and most distasteful work, and is virtually excluded from all the highest achievements and influences of human culture.

II. The middle class is in a fairly healthy condition economically, as its production and consumption almost balance. Unfortunately, however, numerically the middle classes are less than one-third of the total.

III. The upper class or plutocracy lives on inherited wealth, and most of its individual members consume far more than they produce. We must elaborate this point further, for in the later stages of the Familial epoch there is a typical evolutionary process at work, by which the old military aristocracy of conquest and territorial possessions merges into a capitalist plutocracy, just as the State changes its basis from war to industry.[1] Thus in Antiquity the Roman *patrician* was superseded by the *optimate*. We may study the same process to-day in detail in many and varied national environments. In those countries where industrial development has been earliest and most rapid, i.e. in the United States of America, France, and Britain (whose nomenclature still remains feudal, but which has become thoroughly industrialized), the transition from military aristocracy to financial plutocracy has been completed. In Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Russia the governing class is still agrarian, i.e. territorial, but the financier is permeating them.

These two governing groups are different in many of their qualities and traditions,[2] but they are based on the same principle, namely, the inheritance of excessive and superfluous wealth, either in the shape of the soil or of credit and control of raw materials. Individual capacity, mind, and character and achievement do not decide social privilege and power, but the accident of birth. These economic grades are not grades of human efficiency, but are at once stereotyped and accidental. The rulers are not a sifted and selected aristocracy of personal

[1] See *History of Social Development*, pp. 278–303. Also pp. 184–92, and *Sinn des Lebens*, p. 211 *et seq.*

[2] See *History of Social Development*, pp. 278–88.

achievement, but are mixed inextricably with average or sub-average—mentally and physically inferior—elements. We might even term the agrarian and capitalist plutocracy of our times a *geneocracy*, as it depends on the accident of birth and descent, but as this phrase is unusual and might cause confusion, it is better to keep to the term plutocracy, whose meaning we have fully explained.

In the countries of civilization the small plutocratic class is the ruling power. Its members have appropriated a lion's share of the soil; they have a controlling interest in mines and factories, i.e. over the main sources of production, they run the banks and the whole machinery of credit; they dispose of the accumulated energy and industry of millions. The great landowners raise the price of the people's daily bread [1] by means of taxes on imported wheat; the great capitalists form trusts and combines governing supplies and prices of other necessaries of life. They decree alternately "booms" or "slumps" in corn, copper, coal, steel, etc.—but they always "make" on the markets. They manipulate the foreign exchanges and can cause panics on the stock exchanges and international complications at will. For the plutocracy does not only govern the lives of producers and consumers, but the world of politics and international relations as well.

All modern States, great and small, are engaged in increased activities in various directions. This involves greater expenses. The modern State needs money or credit, and more and more of both. Thus, according to the economist, Riedel, the Brandenburg Prussian State Budget, at the time of the Great Elector, amounted to 400,000 thalers; at the end of the reign of Frederick the Great (II) to 16,500,000 thalers, of which three-quarters were devoted to the Army; and in 1904 the State spent 2,800,000,000 marks (£140,000,000).[2] According to

[1] This was written of the Prussian and Austro-Hungarian landowners before the war, but has its warning for Britain to-day! (Translator's Note.)

[2] A thaler was 3 marks—about 2s. 6d. The Great Elector was contemporary with Louis XIV and our later Stuarts, Frederick II with George II and early years of George III. (Translator's Note.)

Gerstfeld the State budget was as follows per head of population:

	In 1878.	In 1906.
	Marks.	Marks
In Germany	32	118
In Austria-Hungary	26	66
In France	57	75
In Russia	24	44
In Great Britain	47	98

The Imperial German Budget [1] recently amounted to three milliards of marks, of which 53,000,000 went to Social Services, 1,500,000,000 for military. All this, of course, means huge national debts. Germany's annual payments of interest on debts are 146,000,000 marks (£7,300,000); England's 550,000,000 marks (£27,500,000); France's 750,000,000 marks (£37,500,000); and countries like Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Portugal can no longer meet their debts.[2] The national debts of modern Europe are no *chance* misfortune, but the result of tendencies inherent in our present condition; and they must increase still further. Thus Governments become subject to plutocrats, and multi-millionaire financiers and financial "rings" are enabled to dictate policies, choose officials, etc., and yet remain *politically irresponsible*, even when they will—war. And war is a very profitable business for a chosen few, as war requires—money without end.

The plutocracy and great financial interests acquire a hold over the mental resources of modern societies; their books, music, pictures, theatrical and sporting activities. Above all, over the Press, especially the daily Press, which becomes an agent to stultify and mislead the peoples. The great newspapers are owned or controlled by men of enormous wealth, who

[1] Fr. Zahn, *Die Finanzen der Grossmächte*, p. 14.

[2] Novikoff, *Gaspillages des Sociétés Modernes*, p. 254. (The equivalents of these sums are, of course, reckoned on the *pre*-war basis. Post-war burdens make these earlier symptoms appear trivial! Translator's Note.)

can swamp all proclamation of inconvenient facts, manufacture public opinions like soap or "dope", and incite the nations against one another by slander or suggestion in order to distract attention from the real offenders.[1] Thus the plutocracy acquires ever more and more political power, and uses it with impunity, *secretly* and *irresponsibly*, so that this fatal influence is not observed or even recognized by the average citizen of any country. The official statesmen and politicians take the centre of the stage in the full limelight and act the drama of the Constitution to the bewildered and credulous crowd. But behind the scenes stands the man with the money, and statesmen and diplomatists, senators and tribunes are simply his marionettes. For so long as plutocracy rules, democratic forms of government, however "humane" and "enlightened", are only a farce, a series of empty phrases, to deceive the exploited and disinherited of the earth.

This plutocratic power is entrenched in and armed with the whole modern State apparatus of Navy, Army, and Police. Violent revolution has become almost a counsel of despair before the linked fetters of steel and gold. Where the governing class is least checked by other sociological factors, for instance, in Tzarist Russia and Republican America, there is a *systematic and profound venality*. Henry Clay said, "every man has his price"—and there are few prices that the plutocrat cannot pay. American "politics" are proverbial, from the smallest municipal contest to the presidential elections.[2] In Lincoln Steffens's brave book, *The Shame of the Cities*, the inner workings of the American Constitution are revealed; theft and bribery on the most extravagant scale.[3]

Creative and decorative *Art* is already largely infected by irresponsible wealth, even when not directly subservient. The modern millionaire has no time to study the technique or

[1] Cf. Norman Angell's Studies of War and the Press. (This prophecy is strikingly correct: it was made in 1911. Translator's Note.)

[2] *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1892, p. 779.

[3] Similar post-war developments include the Teapot Dome Scandals, and the peculiar history of the Harding Administration, not to speak of the bootlegging industry in all its ramifications. (Translator's Note.)

absorb the atmosphere of a work of art. His aesthetic instincts are at once coarse and shallow, and as he pays the piper he calls the tune. Show and sensation parade as Art. In literature, especially in fiction, rubbish saturated with unreality and false standards corrupts public taste and distorts judgment. The stage is becoming more and more a variety entertainment, with lavish "properties" and appeals to the tired business man. The people are losing touch with the theatre and it is becoming more and more the exclusive amusement of the rich. Music is also losing its artistic and psychological content and becoming a matter of noise, gigantic orchestration, and nervous titillation. Very few families care now to cultivate music as their joint offering to beauty, but the sound of the piano, manipulated without taste or purpose, does not cease in the land. In painting there is a curious *contraction* of interest. The great imaginative subject, the "composition", is almost extinct: either landscapes or portraits predominate. There is a widespread fevered snatching at "effect"; often at the cost of technique as well as idea and vision. Formerly private wealth contributed to build splendid temples and cathedrals, monuments and public works, but now it tends to pay the price of palaces and country houses and Riviera hotels, and the great pictures and masterpieces of decorative art (in furniture, porcelain, tapestry, goldsmiths' work, etc.) which have been collected by private connoisseurs are increasingly in private hands, and only too often lost to general appreciation. Any genuine artist in any medium, line, form, colour, music, prose, verse, meets an appalling competition of third- or fifth-rate but *subsidized* productions, *with unlimited* facilities for advertisement. The market is overcrowded and the genuine article lost in the shoddy flood. The art of *living* with dignity, grace, and enjoyment—not to mention common honesty—is not furthered. A society composed mainly of exploited or exploiters has the motto:

> In the battle of life, it is beat or be beaten,
> At the banquet of life, it is eat or be eaten

Thence the need for money, and the greed for money, and the view of life which counts time as money, and acquisition as the only worth-while occupation. This view of life is termed "Americanism", but it has many European protagonists. Success—financial success—becomes the current test of human worth. Idealism and enthusiasm in any other directions are distrusted and derided. There is a profound unrest, an unbalance and perpetual nerve-strain, often leading to invalidism, insanity, suicide. Pessimism, the philosophy of social disease, the weary distaste for the world and for one's self, is typical of the Late Familial phase, in history and to-day.

The disease of our epoch continues with a steady accumulation of virulence by the operation of a natural law. The concentration of wealth is a *positive* and progressive evil; the greater a fortune is, the greater are its powers of growth. The United States and Great Britain lead here, but other modern States follow them. And in Germany statistics show that "*There is a numerical increase, not of the moderately 'well-to-do', but of the richest class of citizens, and of the total national wealth in their lands.*" [1]

Let us take persons liable to income tax in Prussia from 1895 to 1899. The means of those persons whose incomes do not exceed 3,000 marks (£150) a year have not increased appreciably. The figures are:

IN MILLIARDS

1895.	1896.	1897.	1899.
21·32	21·36	21·39	21·60

But the fortunes of the "*really wealthy*" have increased by six milliards of marks in the same actuarial period.[2] According to Rudolf Martin, two of the largest private fortunes in Central Europe may be taken as examples. Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck was worth 62,000,000 marks (£3,100,000) in 1896, 120,000,000 marks (£6,000,000) in 1905, and 177,000,000

[1] According to Evert, *op. cit.* See the table on p. 234 of his book
[2] Evert, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

marks (£8,850,000) in 1908. The Duke of Uzès (Ujest) was "worth" 54,000,000 marks (£2,700,000) in 1899 and 151,000,000 marks (£7,550,000) in 1908, etc.[1]

Concurrently with these immense accumulations of wealth the number of persons of *independent means* falls, relative to the total population, as big business obliterates the smaller competitors. Careful occupational statistics were compiled in the census of both 1882 and 1895 in Germany. The number of financially "independent" persons increased by 7 per cent., the number of economically "dependent" by 22 per cent., i.e. by more than three times as much![2] Between 1895 and 1907 the number of persons of independent means engaged in agriculture and manufactures fell, but showed a slight increase in trade and commerce. The statistics are:

	1895.	1907.
In agriculture	2,568,725	2,500,974
In manufactures	2,061,764	1,977,122
In trade and commerce	843,557	1,012,192

Now look at the increase of persons "in employment", i.e. dependent on often risky outside factors.

	1895.	1907.
In agriculture	96,173	98,812
In manufactures	263,745	686,007
In trade and commerce	1,233,647	1,959,525[3]

The Class War

It is certainly untrue that the income of the proletarian class is growing less; it has risen slightly during the last two decades. But this is due to the *organizations* of the workers, which defend the standard of working-class life—a factor with which we shall deal in the next chapter of this study. The poor may grow slowly less poor, but it is even more indisputable—as President Roosevelt himself was constrained to admit—that the rich

[1] *Unter dem Scheinwerfer*, Berlin, 1910, p. 193 *et seq.*
[2] Ferdinand Goldstein, *Die Übervölkerung Deutschlands und ihre Bekämpfung*, p. 7.
[3] Margarethe von Gottberg, *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, ii, p. 528.

are growing richer. But wealth and poverty are, after all, relative conditions, comparative terms. So the more rapid and intense accumulation of wealth makes poverty harder to bear, for its contrasts are more psychologically evident and impressive.

And indeed there is a steady increase of resentment, bitterness, and ill-will among those disinherited of the earth who form, after all, the great majority in all States. The prospects of the child born in a family of the poorer grades of wage-earners are generally hopeless. He or she is condemned to spend life in an uncongenial treadmill of monotony and drudgery—and to think of the "lucky folks", whom the Press depicts, who "need not work", yet reap the fruits of his labours. Formerly many persons consoled themselves with the reflection that plutocratic expenditure "was good for trade", and "made employment"—"it brought money into circulation",[1] etc. But since then the proletariat has begun to grasp the rudiments of economics. They realize that the plutocracy does not secrete gold or extract it, bee-fashion, from flowers, but receives it as a tribute from the productive work of the masses. They are beginning to understand that everyone who consumes more than he produces is a social parasite and harmful to the community, however great his inherited advantages, and that the under-consumption of goods and services by the majority is directly caused by the unjust and disastrous *inequality of distribution*.

Thus the State appears as an engine of oppression, and mutual confidence and co-operation fail before resentment and envy. For the modern Class-State is not founded on justice and fair distribution of the fruits of labour, but on an obsolete system of distribution which has long outlived its value and significance, that rests on the bayonet's point and is not "broad based upon the people's will", but ultimately on force and nothing but force.

[1] Tönnies in *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, i, p. 1085, sums up the situation thus: "The great majority have no private means, and no hope of acquiring any."

Theory of the Concentration of Wealth

We have argued [1] that in the Later Familial epoch of Antiquity a severe social disease manifested itself, and that all the States of ancient civilization fell victims to the ravages of this disease. And the name of this endemic scourge was—and is—the *concentration of wealth*; the accumulation of available national and international resources in the hands of a small number of families.

In the Later Familial epoch of modern times this disease of the body politic has reappeared, and its complications are so serious that many sociologists despair of the future of modern civilizations.

Let us probe for the *cause* of this great sickness of humanity and leave on one side, for the present, the question as to whether it is inevitable or—curable.

The simplest and most reassuring explanation of the tragic economic inequality among individuals would be that it was the reflex of their innate inequalities, mental, ethical, and physical. Some—so runs the glib platitude—are industrious, thrifty, vigorous, intelligent; and others are lazy, stupid, self-indulgent; and so the former category are rich, the others poor. A magnificent vindication of the economic order and—so simple! Only this theory, though widely spread, is not true. As an explanation of social conditions it is quite inadequate. Daily experience teaches us that many extremely industrious, conscientious, and thrifty people spend their lives in hideous poverty and die of its effects, and that many rich people rot their lives away in idleness and extravagance, and have never worked for the money they waste, but inherited it.

And we have hit on the cause of the concentration of wealth. It is the accumulation of fortunes through inheritance within one family, or a limited number of such families. It is the fact that there is no maximum limit of inheritable wealth, but that it multiplies automatically.

[1] See Chapter VIII.

As soon as any community possesses appreciable monetary wealth, there will arise a *certain inequality* in the possession and distribution of such wealth. According to ability, or opportunity, some individuals will get more of this available wealth than others. But the concentration of the means of production and exchange is not the inevitable result of what is earned by individual effort, but of the accumulation and inheritance of property or money by family descent, without check or limit on the amount.

For this fact of inherited wealth endows the few and disinherits the majority. The battle of life is fought with pitilessly, absurdly unfair equipment. Some enter the lists in armour of triple steel and gold, throned in the saddle, with sword and lance; the rest are naked and their hands empty. For each successive generation that this war is waged its conditions become more intolerable, more outrageous. It is admitted by all business men that the first £10,000 of any fortune in any trade are far harder to get together than the next £100,000. For by the essential nature of capitalism, money breeds money.[1] The man born into wealth has so great an advantage over the man born into poverty that the latter can hardly ever be his successful competitor; economic conditions will generally enforce servitude and exploitation. And thus fortunes accumulate in certain families to incredible proportions; and the members of such families to-day have few children and "marry money" on principle. Unlimited inheritance in the family has the effect of a great dam across a stream, which deflects the water to one meadow, while other fields lie droughty and barren. The obvious effect, after some time, is the transformation of good grassland into a swamp on the one hand and a desert on the other. To complete the simile, let us add that the dam of inheritance automatically rises in height with each generation. Therefore we must conclude that unrestricted family inheritance provides a mechanism for making the rich richer, and the poor poorer—if this mechanism is not counter-

[1] See *History of Social Development*, pp. 173–92.

acted by vigorous and continuous efforts at redressing this unbalance. Natural human differences and inequalities between individuals are *not* the causes of the inequalities of distribution and possession; such causes are to be sought in the artificial exaggeration and perpetuation of economic inequalities through family inheritance. Such inheritance is therefore the cause of the concentration of property and the underlying cause of the degeneration which has hitherto attacked all civilized peoples, in exact proportion as they permitted such unrestricted inheritance.

We have found a key. Will it fit the locks? Let us recapitulate the stages of human development from this point of view.

There could be no concentration of property during the Kinship epoch. The most perilous and easily multiplying form of property—that is, money—had not been invented, and the communism of the Kinship groups prevented the accumulation of such wealth as was then available, within certain families. Now, at last, we can fully appreciate the deep human wisdom of that chieftain of the Suevi, who explained to the great Julius that the common lands were annually redistributed, "in order that the common people should not grow discontented". (See above, Chapter IX.)

The danger of excessive concentration is not great during the early stages of the Familial epoch. For in spite of the institution of the family and inheritance by male descent there was not enough available material wealth for any formidable accumulations. In fact, unrestricted family inheritance was quite just and appropriate under certain economic conditions; for instance, when this inheritance consisted in dwelling-house, field and orchard, tools and household gear, i.e. in necessities of livelihood. An example of the innocuous nature of *family inheritance as distinct and apart from large capital accumulations* is the case of China,[1] where family inheritance is universal, but capitalism unknown. The Chinese social and

[1] Pre-war China! (Translator's Note.)

political structure has existed for thousands of years and shows no signs of decline.

Nevertheless the beginning of the Familial epoch *makes possible* a certain form of concentration of property. This is the appropriation of large areas of soil and the land, which represent wealth in the early stages of culture. As soon as the Kinship group is superseded by unrestricted family inheritance, and portions of the land are appropriated by certain families, there arises a parasitic class. These conditions led to the serfdom of the formerly free tillers of the soil in feudal Europe; they have been observed outside Europe as well. Hale describes the results of a similar system in the Sandwich Islands as producing chiefs and lords of amazing arrogance and impudence, corpulent with overfeeding, bold and haughty; and common people who were emaciated, unhealthy, cowardly and servile, degenerate physically and mentally. Both contrasting types had, however, in common the qualities of laziness and cruelty. The rich would sacrifice anyone to defend the sanctity of some taboo or simply for their own amusement. The poor killed their own children to avoid the added burden of feeding and tending them, or in order that they might not share misery and slavery.[1]

With the invention of money, and later of credit, the wealth in the hands of private families swelled into a devastating social torrent.

The great lawgivers of the ancient world were more akin to the customs and concepts of the tribe, and the nature of limitless private wealth was evident to them. Accordingly we find that Lycurgus simply eliminated the use of money in his City State (Sparta) and Solon instituted the Athenian *Seisachtheia*, the cancellation or repudiation of debts, which "opened the veins" of the gorged plutocracy. The aims of Lycurgus and Solon were identical; they wished to prevent or to restrict within limits the concentration and accumulation of private property. And their respective States attained their

[1] Waitz Gerland, vi, p. 203.

summits of glory and prosperity following on this legislation. But when the laws of Lycurgus and Solon became inoperative, private property accumulated and Grecian degeneracy began. A great authority on the history of classical civilization, Böckh, says that the struggle between rich and poor brought about the ruin of Hellas.[1] And Aristotle knew that the inequality of means was the source of all revolutions.[2]

Early in their history the Romans sanctioned the form of property associated with the *Quirites*: *personal, exclusive, quantitatively unlimited and inheritable.* And with the growth of wealth in the community came the results characterized by Laveleye in his famous monograph. "This form of property was hardly systematized before it began to threaten the existence of democratic institutions and of the Republic itself by its gravitational force. Attempts to limit and control this force were vain. *The larger mass of property absorbed the smaller.* Fundamentally the whole economic history of Rome is nothing but the struggle against the growth and the aggressions of the Quiritarian form of property." Laveleye adds[3] that "The philosophers and legislators of Antiquity were well aware, by experience, that political freedom and equality can only survive if they are founded on equal economic conditions." Aristotle enumerated the methods by which the Greeks sought to ensure such conditions, as follows:

1. Sometimes the area of land which any citizen might own was definitely prescribed.

2. Sometimes land was declared inalienable in order to prevent its appropriation by a few individuals.

3. Finally, the rigours of unjust distribution were mitigated by the institution of common public meals. Lécrivain[4] reminds us: "We must not forget that the aristocracy owned almost all the soil, and were exclusive controllers of capital and credit. As the number of these families constantly diminished, and marriages could only be solemnized within the same class,

[1] Böckh, *Staatshaushalt der Athener*, i, p. 201.
[2] *Pol.*, v, p. 1.
[3] Laveleye (Bücher), *Ureigentum*, p. 344.
[4] *Le Sénat romain depuis Dioclétien*, p. 82.

these immense fortunes *could not* be redivided and distributed, but they grew automatically in the hands of a steadily decreasing circle of persons." "Finally," [1] concluded Laveleye, "the inequality which destroyed first the Republic and then the whole of Roman civilization was a progressive and cumulative inequality."

The opinion that excessive concentration of property was the cause of the fall of classical civilization is therefore no new suggestion, but is held by eminent authorities on Ancient History.

Classical civilization perished, but the same process of hypertrophied private property repeated itself among later peoples, like some inevitable doom. Even in Old Babylonia, according to cuneiform inscriptions, the peasant was "sold up" by the rich man.[2] The same was the case in Attica, then in Rome, and then, at a certain stage of development, in all subsequent nations. It is the peculiar achievement of the American writer, Brooks Adams, to have traced and demonstrated the process of decline in detail, as it affected Romans and Byzantines, Britons and Spaniards, Hindus and modern Europeans, but he did not recognize its primary cause.[3] We shall therefore not repeat his demonstration, but rather attempt to apply the theory of concentration of property *deductively*, having formulated it by *induction*. Let us show that the principal symptoms of degeneration which appear concurrently with the concentration of property are logical consequences of unrestricted family inheritance.

Deductive Examination of the Theory of Concentration of Property

1. The unrestricted inheritance of property, and especially of *capital*, in certain families necessarily divides nations into two economic classes: the heirs and the disinherited. They

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 345.
[2] Cf. Friedrich Delitzsch, *Handel und Wandel in Alt Babylonien.*
[3] In the book frequently quoted above.

are equipped for the struggle of life on totally unequal terms.

2. The increased production of goods leads to increased accumulation, i.e. concentration among the rich, and to the pauperization of the majority. Thus family inheritance contributes to form the Class-State, with its three grades: plutocracy, middle class, and masses.

3. As the plutocracy takes a disproportionate share of the national output (in goods and services) for its use, the consuming power of the majority is unfairly and artificially hampered. This unbalance of consuming power reacts on *production*. For the small purchasing power of the majority of citizens leaves many goods on their manufacturers'—or retailers'—hands. Hence the feverish quest for "foreign markets", "a place in the sun", while at home thousands of poor men have not a serviceable shirt or a whole pair of shoes! If the masses could buy what they need for health and comfort there would be an immense new demand for food, clothes, household furniture, etc., and production would rise to meet this demand, and ensure all industrious and honest people a share in the *technical* and *material* progress of the twentieth century.

4. Under present circumstances the majority in all civilized States has no share in any of the finest cultural achievements of mankind. Art and science are only accessible, in their fullness, to the fortunate. Our cultural heritage is closed to the masses, whose existence is in many respects more wretched and more saturated with bitter resentment than that of most primitive peoples. Thus the very small consuming and purchasing power of the majority is an ethical, intellectual, scientific, and artistic handicap as well as a grave material disadvantage. All talk of progress is empty mockery, unless and until progress reaches the overwhelming majority of modern mankind.

5. Inheritance makes the distribution of property essentially unjust. Justice demands that each individual should be

rewarded according to merit and effort, i.e. for services performed. But the inheritance of capital legalizes *gain without effort*. This senseless system makes excessive riches or abject penury the result, not of an individual's own work or conduct, *but*, as a rule, of the habits and the *good or bad luck* of parents or great-grandparents. In some circumstances prosperity may be granted or withheld for life, according to whether an uncle or an aunt dies first! The men who do the most difficult, distasteful, and necessary work are not rewarded with wealth, or even with security; those who inherit enough, are. For under organized capitalism, invested money earns much more than any individual effort can earn.

6. The heirs of wealth, however idle, can command all the pleasures and amenities which the poor can never hope to attain by the toil of a lifetime.

Hence work in itself is despised.

7. The heir to wealth does not really live on the accumulated possessions of his forbears, but on the work of his contemporaries; too often he does not attempt to repay this by his own efforts, but exploits it as an incontestable privilege.

8. The plutocrats tend to deteriorate physically and mentally by excessive luxury and self-indulgence owing to their opportunities and the resources at their command. The proletariat, at the other extreme, deteriorates equally, through constant privation, underfeeding, overcrowding, uncleanliness.

Let us avoid misunderstanding.

Among the wealthiest families there are efficient and tireless workers, men of distinguished intellectual gifts and powers of leadership, initiative, and administration. But the most brilliant of these do not draw the major part of their incomes as the reward for their personal efforts, but as returns on invested capital, dividends, or rents. Very fine personalities do not justify a system which is inherently wrong.

9. The financial resources of the family decide the careers of its members. Thus the most responsible offices and profes-

sions are filled, not by the most capable, but by the wealthiest or most influential candidates.[1]

10. As, under capitalism, money makes money far quicker and in larger amounts—by speculation—than human effort in trade or profession, a type of acquisitiveness has developed that can never have enough. We term it pleonexy. If wealth can only be won through personal effort, Nature itself puts a limit to wealth. But if wealth can be won without abnegation or perceptible exertion, there is no psychological or organic check to the greed for possession, and it develops to monstrous proportions.

11. With pleonexy and its motives and urge to acquire—without effort and without limit—comes financial *corruption*. And this is all the more inevitable because of the vast power at the command of individuals and groups. Wealth sets the pace; the artist does not paint or sing in the service of his vision, the doctor does not "battle with ignorance, prejudice, disease"—they are competing tradesmen, out to make money and "sell their goods".

12. Pleonexy has as its offspring the servile hunt for bequests, for dowries, for marriages founded on money only. A great heiress can always command suitors, even when she is a congenital imbecile or invalid. But much feminine beauty and vitality has been lost to the race because of lack of means. Thus family inheritance has a most deleterious effect on sexual selection and eugenics.

13. The increase of national debts is indirectly due to family inheritance.

We have seen that the community, organized into the State, has taken over many functions once discharged by and in the family (e.g. the care of the sick, the aged and infirm, the orphans, etc.). But while the family loses one office after another and the State assumes responsibilities, the family as

[1] As regards the post-war situation in Great Britain there are interesting statistics in two recent pamphlets of the Fabian Society, by Professor H. J. Laski and Mr. R. T. Nightingale, on the composition of British Cabinets and the British Foreign Office and Diplomatic Services. (Translator's Note.)

an institution does not improve the State with the means to do these services, but keeps a tight hand on capital through the operation of inheritance. The enormous budgets of modern States mean loans from the wealthiest families and groups. Thus the State becomes debtor and servant of those whose master and creditor it should be.

14. Thus plutocracy masters and dominates modern States, and decides not only quality and quantity of production and consumption, but peace and war; and the latter is enormously lucrative to a small wealthy oligarchy. Therefore the masses all the world over are incited against one another and the inception of *international institutions* is hampered. Anarchy and competition in armaments persist.

15. Thus influence and example spread an attitude towards life that has only one standard: the making of money. "The bad man is he who—does not do good business." Delicacy of honour and integrity of personality, truth, and justice, all ideal elements in human nature, become "absurd", irrelevant, obsolete. The general moral tone reveals itself in a striking increase of criminality.

16. Parallel with the disease of plutocracy runs the discontent and despair and bitter resentment of the exploited. There are class wars, civil wars, revolutions, and when these symptoms supervene we know that there are three *possible* solutions:

I. A solution of failure and vital exhaustion. A general decline in the population—among the rich because they wish to preserve inherited property intact in the family; among the poor partly as a result of underfeeding and premature death, partly because they refuse to have children doomed to servitude and hunger. The race, stricken by a mortal disease, wilts and perishes.

II. A decisive victory for the plutocracy, leading to despotism, on a military basis; only a victorious general and his praetorians can hold a millionaire oligarchy in check. And following the establishment of despotic order, an incurable stagnation,

economic and civic. The four hundred years of the *Pax Romana* repeated! All the world and the glory thereof belong to a small chosen circle, who inherit but do not work for them, i.e. they are closed to labour and effort.

The accident of birth decides conditions and generally the whole character of a lifetime. The rich man remains rich and fills important offices without overmuch exertion. The man born poor generally remains poor, in spite of all his efforts and privations. Intellectual activity declines, and ideal aims become senseless in the face of this inequity. Talent and mental creation atrophy. Money has eaten up mankind. But the discontent of the frustrated masses gnaws at the foundations of the State, e.g. the battle of Christianity against Roman citizenship; and to-day—the new religion of the disinherited: Communism! And the first vigorous external attack smashes the edifice into fragments.

III. There is a third possibility. The people might triumph, after long and hard struggles, and survive to plan and make all things new, and deliver the future from economic disease.

The Results of Abolition of Inheritance

The chief cause of the death of nations in the Familial epoch is the concentration of property, and this is the logical and legal result of unrestricted family inheritance.

Let us envisage a commonwealth in which family inheritance had been abolished or very strictly limited.

Of course, individuals of eminent mental gifts and physical vigour would still succeed in acquiring large fortunes, even immense wealth, through thrift or happy chance. But on the death of the original accumulator of such wealth, it would revert either wholly, or for the most part, to the community or be divided into small portions among numerous heirs and legatees. Excessive wealth would be a fluid, not a solid entity, and perpetual accumulation and accretion would be

effectively prevented. Moreover, we know that the acquisition of enormous wealth by and in one generation of any family is exceptional, as huge fortunes are usually the result of generations of hereditary capital, thrift, and good fortune in speculation.[1]

In these circumstances there would be no *automatically* aristocratic class, but an aristocracy of *merit, service, and natural ability*. There would be no human mass stratification, no systematic exploitation, large-scale venality or mammonism. Labour itself would distribute what it produced. All the main sources of production and raw materials, landed estates, mines, oil wells, great factories and industrial "plant", would gradually be taken over by the Commonwealth. And the Class War would be superseded by proud, honourable, and level *individual* competition in achievement. Nowadays the majority of citizens enter the lists of life deprived of hope and inspiration, but under a just economic system all would have "a fair field and no favour", and the number of competitors in constructive civilization would multiply tenfold, and the rewards of effort an hundredfold; for most of the national income is at present appropriated and disposed of by family inheritance. Under such inspired and improved conditions all human energy would receive a tremendous impetus. There would be a general *simplification of life* when the plutocracy could no longer monopolize consumption and degrade production by vulgar show. And the system of distribution would become both simple and entirely equitable. For the heaviest, most distasteful and necessary tasks would then have the smallest number of applicants, the easiest and most agreeable the largest. And the more difficult and unpleasant the kind of work the higher should be the pay attached to its proper performance. Thus the division of labour would regulate itself as the price of goods does at present, on the basis of supply

[1] In a recent detailed and balanced study of *The Economics of Inheritance*, Mr. Josiah Wedgwood makes a convincing case for limiting the growth of large fortunes and emphasizes the hereditary nature of most of such accumulations. (Translator's Note.)

and demand, and this would partially solve the social problem [1] without abolishing free competition and individual effort, but rather by really liberating and enhancing them.

This reform and liberation might be begun almost imperceptibly by a progressively increasing tax on the larger inherited incomes. No one should be deprived of his possessions, but unearned endowment of heirs should be curtailed by this justest and most righteous of imposts.

Of course there are grave objections against the reform of inheritance. These we shall endeavour to state and answer in a special study (Vol. VIII of this series, Part III). We must conclude that the entire abolition of family inheritance within our lifetime would be quite impracticable, but that the disadvantages of a *legally enforced maximum limit of* inherited income are negligible, compared to the benefits which would accrue from such legislation—if effectually enforced.

Objections to this Theory. Theories other than Hypertrophy of Inheritance as Causes of National Decay

We have now traced and established our lines of argument: the immediate cause of national decay is unrestricted family inheritance of property. All further degenerative symptoms arise from this factor and follow it "as the night the day". But this simple and adequate explanation is very far from general acceptance. The phenomena of national decay have been accounted for by many other theories widely promulgated, and which we must therefore now summarize.

1. Many savants have sought and found consolation in the words "death is the end of all things"; "everything must end

[1] Note, *partially*. And we may repeat that this study only treats of the *geneonomic* aspects of social problems. We hope to discuss the whole problem of administration in the tenth volume of this sociological inquiry, and to demonstrate that this giant task *cannot be achieved by any one measure or from any one angle*, nor by any catastrophic event but step by step, through evolution, and carefully designed and executed constructive effort in *all* departments of sociology, in harmony with the trends of evolution.

some day". They use the analogy of plant life. Trees, flowers, grass, seed, take root, sprout, grow, and bloom, then wither and decay. The statement that "everything must end some day" is indisputable, but so vague and general that it must be characterized as a mere phrase or platitude. Let us imagine that pathology had never attempted to investigate and combat the *causes* of disease; that the doctors' only available warning or advice to the sufferer had been: "My friend, you must die, because, of course, all things must die. Look at plants, etc., etc."! Moreover, we cannot stress the *very vague and slight parallelism between organisms, whether vegetable or animal, and human social institutions*, without falling into countless errors and ending in a cul-de-sac. A related view of human institutions which has also been widely promulgated has as its slogan the refrain "Over-civilization": peoples reach a certain material and cultural level and then automatically perish. Thus even so eminent a sociologist as Gumplowicz holds that "The decline in the birth-rate is the necessary consequence of rising culture and civilization, which separate the human mind and will from the primordial urges and make mankind rebel against Nature." [1] Certainly the increase of culture constantly makes the instinctive actions of humanity into deliberate, discriminative, purposive actions, or rather it saturates instinct with conscious purpose.[2] But the consequent "individualism" of mind and will is not by any means always opposed to natural necessities, but only under certain conditions. The belief that all peoples who have attained a certain cultural level *inevitably* recede and die out is a most harmful error. The kernel of truth it contains should rather be thus expressed: *Peoples who have reached the Late Familial phase of development do not survive that epoch, unless they are able to achieve the Early Personal phase:* i.e. the *phase of social-individualism*. A further modification of this theory considers that high intellectual ability and/or strenuous brain-work necessarily diminish sexual

[1] *Monatschrift für Soziologie*, 1st year, p. 791.
[2] Cf. *Sinn des Lebens*, p. 262.

activity, and that the sexual impulse or "racial instinct",[1] as they prefer to call it, fades and flickers out in the white light of pure intellect. This arbitrary assertion is based on the fact that many of the greatest poets, philosophers, discoverers, artists, and inventors have had very few children or none. But the deduction is false. For, firstly, such a high degree of intellectual power and activity has never been, and probably will never be, diffused throughout any nation or race. And, secondly, the diminished offspring of certain eminently gifted men are not the result of their vital or genital deficiency, but of the incompatibility of large families—or sometimes of any family life at all—with the very stormy or very secluded lives of most men of genius.

2. *Over-population* has been declared the root cause of all human ills. And over-population is indubitably a scourge that causes infinite suffering and misery, but it is not the cause *par excellence* of national decay. In ancient Greece, and in Italy under the Roman Republic and Empire, whole provinces were sparsely populated or deserted at the summit of the classical concentration of property. In the United States of America, with its vast unoccupied spaces and natural resources, the symptoms of national decay are even more pronounced, in some respects, than in densely peopled old Europe. And finally, China, which has been a stable social and political entity for thousands of years, and is very thickly populated, shows no "decay".

3. Some moralists preach that wealth in itself brings about decay. Wealth, so they argue, undermines "morals", destroys simple habits and high standards of conduct, creates luxury, laxity of fibre, sterilizing and suicidal vices. But the great masses of the people in all past and present national States are not and never have been wealthy. On the contrary, they were, and many now are, abjectly poor, and they suffered and decayed, not in luxury, but in misery.

[1] The term *instinct* is, strictly speaking, not correct as applied to anything so protean in its manifestations and so intermingled with mental imagery and suggestion as the sexual emotions of humanity in general. (Translator's Note.)

4. In a public address in the Great Hall of the University of Berlin in 1910, President Roosevelt, as guest of the town and University, maintained that Roman civilization fell mainly because the *Civis Romanus* lost his fighting spirit.[1] But Herbert Spencer has proved that the replacement of militarism and the military spirit, by the industrial type of character and activity is an indispensable condition of progress to higher human types. Moreover, classical history proves that corruption was engrained and widespread long before the Empire brought the *Pax Romana*.

5. Some adherents of the *ancien régime* have explained the decline and fall of Rome as due to the extinction of the ancient patrician stocks. But there is no basis whatever for regarding the Plebeians as racially, i.e. *genetically*, poorer stuff than their foes. The initial advantage of the Patricians was not that they were mental and physical giants, but that they emphatically were *beati possidentes*; they were landowners and merchants, with hereditary succession to property and an organization which enabled them to use these advantages as against the Plebeians. And the argument is two-edged, for the Plebeians, after centuries of struggle, attained an equal status, and also they produced equally able consuls, generals, administrators, orators, philosophers, and poets. Where is the genetic inferiority there? It is, of course, obvious that centuries of civil war destroyed many able and vigorous men and their possible contribution of offspring. But we must also admit that normally healthy nations "make good" losses in war with amazing rapidity.[2] The extermination of a privileged class, debilitated by centuries of inbreeding, might be very serviceable to the general racial vitality.

6. A hypothesis which has attained great popularity in recent years explains that the ancient peoples flourished so

[1] Even old Pliny knew better than that! (See also Norman Angell's *Great Illusion*. See also some of the consequences of the Great War! Translator's Note.)

[2] Otto Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt*, i, chap. 3; *Die Ausrottung der Besten.*

long as they "kept their blood pure and free from inferior strains". But as soon as their stock became mixed it became tainted, and physical and mental degeneracy ensued.

The kernel of truth here is probably administrative and sociological. A State composed of a number of races of the most diverse ethnic origin and cultural grade (e.g. Tzarist Russia!) is obviously much harder to administer than a national entity whose elements are on approximately the same level, and with similar standards and traditions. But this significant fact is quite distorted and missed by the ultra-racialists, who claim that the cause of confusion and disharmony is not co-partnership of peoples of different grades in the same State, but biological mixture, which destroys the "purity" and the vitality of some specially sacred stock.

We cannot deal with genetics in detail here, but would point out some objections to the racialist explanation.

Firstly, let us take the great historical example of Rome. Decay began in the Roman State and at its headquarters, long before there was any racial intermixture and "crossing" of the ruling stock.[1] We find serious social and ethical symptoms in the third and second centuries B.C., and especially among the aristocracy, which was closely inbred and laid great stress on purity of descent. Complaints of *Orbitas*, i.e. voluntary and persistent refusal to marry legally or to procreate, date from 234 B.C., and there were amazing aberrations and crimes among members of the oldest and proudest families. Cato the Elder bewailed that "those who stole from the Roman citizen died in chains and dungeons, but those whose thefts were from the Roman State, robed in the Purple and Gold". In 184 B.C., Cato the Censor laid a heavy tax on boy prostitutes, etc. And in Imperial times the most depraved and abnormal of the Caesars were pure-blooded Romans of immensely ancient lineage, Julii and Claudii, Tiberius, Caius Caligula, Nero. The Spartans laid great stress on racial purity and forbade strangers to sojourn in their city for any length of time; or to

[1] Cf. Fred. Hertz, *Moderne Rassenprobleme*, p. 213 *et seq.*

wed Spartans. But with wealth came corruption, in Lacedaemon as elsewhere. Some racialists have therefore attributed the fall of classical civilization, not to cross-breeding, but to its exact contrary—too prolonged and close inbreeding![1]

In the second place, peoples of unmixed race are found almost entirely on the lower grades of culture, and seclusion has meant not only "purity of blood", but also inbreeding and backwardness in general progress. The increase of traffic between races diminishes their purity of blood, but increases their progress and culture. Thus the peoples who now lead the world intellectually and materially are of very mixed ethnical composition, e.g. the British, French, Germans. Let us consider the German people, ethnically. They are composed of Teutonic or Nordic, Latin or Iberian, Keltic, Slavonic, and Hunnish or Mongolian elements. Ammon declares that there are only about 10 per cent. pure-blooded Teutons left in Germany, and they are being submerged by the brunette type. Röse's view is even more extreme; he says there are no unmixed Teutons in Germany.[2] It is highly improbable, in fact inconceivable, that the racial admixture in Republican Rome can have reached anything like this confusion and complexity. A third important consideration is based on the experience of stockbreeders, eugenists, and geneticists. They concur that "crossing" between races of such different mental and physical type as, e.g., Northern Europeans and negroes, probably has not very favourable results.[3] But that races which are allied by origin, yet distinctive, often produce the best brains and physique. Thus the great statesman and man of action, Bismarck, had several strains of both German and Slavonic

[1] Reibmayr, *Inzucht und Vermischung*, p. 255.

[2] In 1905 there were 1,029,000 non-Germans, i.e. citizens of other States resident in Germany; one foreigner to every 59 Germans. In France there were 1,037,000 foreign residents, in England only 287,000.

[3] But note that there is hardly any European society in which such persons (mulattoes, quadroons, etc.) do not meet artificial handicaps and prejudice, except perhaps in France, and there have been brilliant artists and writers with a streak of African; see also the modern stage! (Translator's Note.)

blood.[1] Havelock Ellis, in his great *Study of British Genius*, makes out a strong case for believing that *crosses* between the blond and the dark physical types tend to produce people of more than average faculties; among the subjects of his study he found such mixed types more frequent, among both sexes, than either the very fair or the very dark in colouring.[2] Schallmeyer says that crossings between allied but distinctive races produce in many instances even better offspring than the permanent inbreeding of even very fine stock;[3] and according to Reibmayr,[4] "crosses between allied stocks are generally highly successful, both in physical and mental qualities; and this favourable result is increased when thorough crossing is followed by a period of inbreeding". The animal breeders are of the same opinion, and Westermarck [5] quotes Andrew Knight as inclined to believe that the greatest intellects of humanity are the children of parents of widely different hereditary constitution . . . and as certain of having observed unfortunate results of the union of two persons who resemble one another closely in character and colouring.

We hope that these few quotations will suggest that the questionable hypothesis that race mixture means degeneracy, though it has wide popular support,[6] has very little scientific basis.[7] The racial problem is as yet unsolved; *Anthroposociology* is in its infancy, and suffering from many infantile ailments. Hitherto this most obscure subject has been dealt with according to inclination rather than reason; emotionally rather than logically. But emotional values, however important, are not objective, and Chauvinism is a bad sociologist. Again, the distinction between heredity and environment, racial stock and grade of culture, has constantly been confused or mis-

[1] Cf. Dr. G. Lomer, *Bismarck im Lichte der Naturwissenschaft.*
[2] See also O. Ammon, *Archiv für Rassen und Gesellschaftsbiologie*, year v, p. 130. (The organ of the German eugenists and racial hygienists.)
[3] *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, xi (1908), p. 272.
[4] *Inzucht und Vermischung*, p. 59.
[5] Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage.*
[6] Cf. Schultz, *Race or Mongrel?*
[7] F. Hertz, *Moderne Rassentheorien*, pp. 212, 237.

interpreted. If these errors are avoided, there is here a huge, and possibly fruitful, field for study and research.[1]

7. According to another view, which has distinguished and enthusiastic exponents in British politics and letters, and has been championed in Germany by Franz Oppenheimer,[2] the *private monopoly of land* is the root of all economic evil. We may summarize the case for this view as follows: The free settlement and cultivation of the soil by individuals is prevented by the ownership of large estates. The landworkers on these estates are paid a minimum wage. And even with increased density of population and facilities for co-operation, which cause a rising demand for the produce of agriculture, these wages remain stationary; for the rise in prices benefits *the landlord alone*, the agricultural worker or tenant farmer remains on a fixed wage or income. There results "the flight into the towns". The countrymen wander into the towns, and as they have nothing but the strength of their muscles to sell in the labour market, they are forced to hire themselves to employers, who give them only a fraction of the values they produce in exchange. These urban wages are kept down by the continual influx of landless workers into the towns, where they compete against and undercut one another. Thus arise unearned increment, excessive profits on capital, and the gigantic fortunes which contrast so flagrantly with the average workmen's wages. And the primary cause of this hypertrophied capitalism is the land monopoly.

If this monopoly were abolished, wide areas which are now largely uncultivated and uninhabited, or "held up" for purchase

[1] As references we may cite Gobineau, *L'inégalité des races humaines*; William D. Babington, *Fallacies of Race Theories*; Keane, *Man, Past and Present*; William Ripley, *The Races of Europe* (with excellent bibliography); A. Reibmayr, *Inzucht und Vermischung*; Nyström, "Formenveränderungen des menschlichen Schädels", *Archiv für Anthropologie*, 1902; von Török, "Neue Untersuchungen über Dolichocephalie", *Zeitschrift für Morphologie und Anthropologie*, 1905; Friedrich Hertz, *Moderne Rassentheorien*; Beddoes, *Races of Britain*, etc.

[2] Author of several books on the land question. Cf. also Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*, and the publications of the English League for the taxation of Land Values. (Translator's Note.)

at speculative prices, would be free and available for settlement and development. No worker would be compelled any longer to hire himself at a starvation wage, for, as Turgot said, "where all have access to the land, no one will want to work for another's profit". Capitalist employers and *entrepreneurs* would then find men to work for them for an adequate wage, and only for an adequate wage. Interest on capital, rent, and all unearned incomes would shrivel to a minimum and cease to exert any evil influence in the determination of class cleavage. And labour would be once more the source of wealth. But the free competition of all individuals would guarantee the recompense of honest work and the just distribution of wealth, were the tyranny of land monopoly once broken for ever.

This economic theory has been further worked out by Oppenheimer, on the sociological side. He argues that wealth, i.e. goods, possessions, and values, may be won in two ways: by work or "economic means" and by force, robbery, or conquest, i.e. "political means". Large landed estates were acquired by force in the past; thus landed property is forcible appropriation, and as such, a fatal anachronism in our times. And industrial capital he describes as a secondary form of forcible appropriation, as it has arisen only because land monopoly forced the expropriated workers to accept the capitalists' terms. Therefore the supersession of land monopoly would be only an act of equalitarian justice; it might be carried out by State purchase and division among independent peasant owners.[1]

The weak spot in this hypothesis may be described as the neglect of a third means of acquiring wealth, in addition to the "economic" and the "political"; i.e. the hereditary or *geneonomic* method. And it is just this institution of inheritance which at

[1] Oppenheimer admits that this theory can only be valid until such time as the soil is entirely in the possession of small owners. He believes this to be in the remote future; other economists anticipate it far sooner. (Cf. Wilhelm Lexis, *Allgemeine Volkswirtschaftslehre* (1910), p. 237 *et seq.*; Hanshofer, *Bevölkerungslehre* (1904), p. 106.) The theory certainly does not furnish a *final* solution of social problems.

present gives most wealth to few individual persons and secures *income without service.*

If we give due weight to this omission we may conclude that land monopoly is indubitably the most destructive form of plutocracy, and agrarian plutocracy constitutes a more dangerous privilege than industrial or financial.

This has been proved by Oppenheimer and others. But this means that agrarian plutocracy or monopoly is simply a species of the genus geneocracy, or inherited wealth and power. The *Latifundia*, the great estates of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, are the accumulations of inheritance in the past. The introduction of a legal limit to hereditary property would automatically reform land tenure to a considerable degree; for accumulated property in the land is one facet and aspect of concentration of property in general, and therefore preserved by unrestricted inheritance.

8. The objection will be raised that most rich families die out in a few generations, and that this must necessarily break up the inherited estates and funds. But the general statement is incorrect. Experience and knowledge of history prove that many great families have been members of the ruling and privileged classes in Europe for centuries, and that even where historic names have become extinct the stock died out *in the male line only*; its daughters married in their teens or early twenties, and carried blood and wealth on into further generations. The young men of the governing class are apt to enjoy themselves very freely in adolescence, and the result sometimes injures their procreative powers in marriage. They have far more opportunities of ruining themselves financially by debts, etc., than their carefully guarded sisters. And, finally, only a few generations suffice to accumulate wealth and achieve a definite class cleavage.

9. The decline and disappearance of religious belief has been arraigned as the cause of degeneracy in ancient Rome and to-day. This has certainly been a contributory factor, but it is unworthy of serious discussion as the *mainspring* of the

phenomena we are considering. To give only one instance: the Byzantine Empire was born into and grew with a rising new religion of immense psychological vitality, i.e. Christianity. Nevertheless monopoly and concentration of wealth and the resultant degeneracy were the same in the Eastern Empire as elsewhere, and ran the same course. The facts of economics have an infinitely stronger and wider effect than the concepts of religion.

A more plausible objection is to point out that inheritance has "worked" in Europe for centuries, and yet the middle class has not wholly disappeared from amongst us. This is perfectly true; but when the State as organized for war passed into the industrial State, there was a great *Seisachtheia*—a virtual cancellation and repudiation of debts. The aristocracy of the Middle Ages, secular and ecclesiastical, monopolized *two-thirds* of the soil. Of course the religious bodies inherited as Corporations and not as successive generations of a family, but this point is irrelevant: both families and religious Corporations were examples of concentration of property through inheritance. After the French Revolution there was a redistribution of property on a gigantic scale: hundreds of peasant proprietors replaced one marquis or one monastery as owners of certain areas of soil. And great urban expansion accompanied the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century. The prices of town sites, whether for houses, shops, or offices, were incredibly inflated, and are so still. Within recent decades the value of the land (especially in the towns, but not by any means exclusively so) has risen by tens of millions,[1] and these enormous ground-tents are often pocketed by people whose social services are small indeed! A number of members of the working class who happened to own a cottage or meadow in the neighbourhood of one of the new towns were able to sell at a profit or "hold for a rise" and make their fortunes in this manner; and they joined the "prosperous middle class" as a great influx of new

[1] The post-war development of motor-traffic and "ribbon" building has brought a new factor into play here. See the publications of the English League for the Taxation of Land Values. (Translator's Note.)

recruits. This redistribution of wealth *held up* concentration for a while; but for *how long?* That is another matter.

It is, however, perfectly obvious and indisputable that unrestricted inheritance is in itself a mechanism leading to monopoly of wealth and consequent social and vital decline, but that other and constructive social forces may be brought against such monopoly and decline. And we shall endeavour to prove that such progressive and constructive agents are accessible in "our day and generation", here and now.

Characteristic Features of the Late Familial Phase in Modern Times (Nineteenth Century)

Large-scale capitalist organization withdraws one economic function after another from the sphere of the household. The productive capacity of a family and its dependents can no longer compete with machine production. Thus the family begins to dissolve or disintegrate. Most of its former functions pass into the hands of the State, which enormously increases in the scope of its activities and the complexity of its organization.

The power of the paterfamilias is gradually limited by law, custom, and opinion. Women and children attain a certain degree of freedom and consideration. This improvement in women's status is based ultimately on *industrial and professional differentiation among women*, which begins and develops during this phase.

Military activity is largely transmuted into industrial energy, rule by violence into more profitable rule by wealth, and the State as warrior into the State as trader. The oligarchy based on conquest and landed property is slowly superseded and absorbed by a capitalist plutocracy, which becomes the ruling section of the nations.

A typical feature of the Late Familial phase is the excessive concentration of property in the hands of a small number of

persons and their families. This virtual monopoly of surplus wealth and power is due to inheritance, i.e. to an essentially *geneonomic* factor. Its social results are the symptoms of degeneracy—mammonism or money-worship, venality, striking increase of criminality—which repeat those of the corresponding phase of Antiquity. The resemblances here are so numerous and close that it would be mere repetition to stress them further.

But with the twentieth century we begin to emerge from the Late Familial phase and into a momentous transition—the dawn of social-individualism or of the *Personal epoch*. Its main lines of development are already discernible.

CHAPTER XI

THE EARLY INDIVIDUAL OR PERSONAL PHASE (TWENTIETH CENTURY)

ONE sociological phase passes into another gradually and without sharply-cut demarcations or ultimate catastrophes. We cannot say of any period in history, "here, at such and such a date, one phase ended and another dawned". The processes of change are almost imperceptible, the whole evolution fluid and with intervals both of stagnation and reaction, comparable to the day-by-day changes of weather within the greater cycle of the seasons. Certain manifestations are degenerate, but from them and beside them there arise influences and institutions full of the spirit and purpose of the New Age.

Thus at the present time we see new ways of thought and life burgeoning out of the debris of the Late Familial phase. These new ways we term personal or socially individual, because of their main trend.

The next volumes in this study of the sociological evolution of mankind will deal with the manifold new features of the Early Personal phase; the various subdivisions of geneonomy will be passed in review. Volume V, *Phasen der Liebe*,[1] examines the trend towards freedom and respect for individuality within a highly organized social framework, as manifested in love, in the motives for and conditions of marriage, the status of women, and the structure of the family. Volume VI, the first part of *Die Zähmung der Nornen* (*Taming the Fates*), deals with these trends in genetic selection and the problem of population; the second part of this section (Volume VII) is a study of education; and the third part of the trilogy (Volume VIII) deals with inheritance, economic and eugenic. Finally, Volume IX envisages the social position of old age in the past and present of human evolution, and its prospects in the future.

[1] Translated by Isabella C. Wigglesworth (G. Allen & Unwin), *The Evolution of Modern Marriage*.

Here we are taking a general view of the field of geneonomy, and must answer these questions: (*a*) Are geneonomic institutions and customs really undergoing *evolution*? (*b*) Or must we anticipate static or retrograde conditions? (*c*) What is the *direction* of the *total geneonomy of contemporary life?*

Savants and sociologists differ widely in their answers to these questions. Some anticipate retrogression—a general material and psychical *ebb*; some believe that decay and collapse are unavoidable; others, again, consider the Late Familial phase as a bridge to social institutions of greater scope and finer purpose.

Among the sociologists who believe that development must ebb backward to earlier conditions to survive the excess of recent tendencies, one of the greatest was Herbert Spencer—a name for ever honourable, and one of the founders of sociology. In the second volume of his *Principles of Sociology* he points out that among the more advanced nations the process of dissolution of the greater family aggregates (tribes and *gentes*) has been completed, and that now a disintegration of the smaller family unit (*the* family in our sense of the term) has begun. Step by step with the changes which are making the *individual* answerable to the community for crimes and torts of all kinds, rather than holding the family responsible for the orderly behaviour of its adult members, we find another series of changes which have rescinded family responsibility in other ways as well. When the law provides for the maintenance of children whose parents starve or underfeed or otherwise neglect them, it has taken over a distinctive function of the family. The same is the case when the State takes a certain degree of responsibility for elderly and infirm parents, whom their children cannot or will not support. The most recent legislation has further loosened family ties by depriving parents of the obligation of feeding and exercising the *minds* of their children. Education by the parents or under their supervision has been replaced by education under Government auspices. When the educational authorities find it necessary to provide

boots, etc., for the poorest children before they can attend school, and to keep a check on school attendance by special inspectors, they are making the nation responsible instead of the family in an even wider sense. This recognition of the individual instead of the family as the unit of society has gone so far that many persons take the parental duties of the State for granted, even towards criminals. Do these final disintegrative symptoms represent the normal development of the family? Spencer asks this question and answers it in the negative. He believes in a pending revulsion of sentiment and reaction of law, i.e. that compulsory education will be rescinded, that the education of children will once more be exclusively entrusted to their parents, and that the family will recover the ground lost to the State and to voluntary communal action.

This is an extreme view on one side. Many authorities hold that the liquidation of the rigid family structure is leading to higher types of activity and organization. Most of the socialist thinkers belong to this group, from Plato himself to Owen, Fourier, and the present Marxists. Some of them have pictured the geneonomic future with a wealth of fancy rather than logic. Up to a certain point the reformers who concentrate on the problem of inheritance are in agreement with the socialists, e.g. B. Schäffle,[1] Benjamin Kidd.[2] But they would leave social problems to the arbitrament of free competition, after having abolished monopoly and concentration of property by family inheritance.

The most widely accepted and indeed popular view is that evolution will suddenly and for ever halt before the sacred threshold of the home and the family, and that the family will continue in its present structure and status till the end of time. We shall recognize that this inertia in the midst of the tremendous dynamics of our cultural change would mean dislocation and decline. Let us consider the possibility of such dislocation and decline.

[1] Schäffle, *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers*, 2nd ed., vol. ii, pp. 85–88.
[2] Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution*.

One of the most distinguished spokesmen of this view is the American, Brooks Adams, to whose work we have already referred. Adams believed he had discovered and formulated a law, the "Law of Civilization and Decay", according to which the emergence of capitalism was fatal to the martial and the "imaginative" types (represented by the soldier and the priest, respectively), who were necessarily superseded by a new *trading* type, the *mercantile*. This mercantile man, i.e. the capitalist plutocracy, appropriated the lion's share of wealth, the masses degenerated in hunger and misery, the family lost its fertility, woman her charm, and all art and intellectual activity became instruments of corruption. When society has reached such a condition its ruin is necessary and inevitable.

This pessimism is based on the parallels between our present age and the decline of classical civilization. Such parallels exist, but temperamental pessimism is a bad guide and distorts vision and judgment as thoroughly as its converse, invincible optimism, or any other extreme degree of emotion. Adams had an acute and precise perception of the resemblances between the nineteenth century and the decline of Antiquity, but his blindness to their enormous *differences* is as extraordinary as his insight in other directions.[1]

Differences between the Late Familial Phase of Antiquity and the Present Time

1. The first essential difference is *economic*. Here there is no comparison. The Roman Empire at its zenith remained in the early stage of capitalism. But since the last half of the eighteenth century—mainly as a result of the invention of large-scale machinery—the modern world has reached the

[1] An interesting companion volume to Brooks Adams's book is Georg Hansen's work, *Die drei Bevölkerungsstufen. Ein Versuch die Ursachen für das Blühen und Altern der Völker nachzuweisen* (*The Three Grades of Population. An Attempt to Discover the Causes of National Vitality and Decay*). This book appeared in 1889, some years before Adams's, and Hansen does not share the American's pessimism. President Roosevelt has a vigorous review of Adams's book in his *American Ideals*.

zenith of capitalism and this has been followed by its later phase.[1] Thus our industrial institutions and resources are two full stages ahead of Imperial Rome; and such a much more extensive and elaborate organization of production can afford to "carry" a much freer and more varied type of family. Indeed, it requires such a freer type. The individualism of later Antiquity was premature and foredoomed, lacking an adebuate economic foundation. Modern individualism is based not only on justice and sentiment, but on a firm and complex economic structure, which does not need to depend on the unit of the family.

2. A further striking difference concerns the proletariat in Antiquity and to-day.

The slaves and proletarians of the Roman Empire resigned themselves to despair of this world far too soon. They fell victims to other-worldly, anti-human, anti-vital Christianity. They hoped to enjoy supreme bliss beyond the grave in a heaven closed for ever to their rulers and the rich. Thus they became politically emasculated, and their hopeless inertia was utilized by a governing class which had no such beliefs. Monopoly and privilege went on "from strength to strength" and with impunity, owing to the cowed inertia of the masses and the atrophy of their political sense. Certain documents from the latest period of the Roman Empire express perfect sense of security and self-confidence on the part of the ruling class, which saw no writing on the wall, but believed that all was well with the world![2]

[1] See *Stages of Social Development*, pp. 184–92, and also pp. 278–303.

[2] Gaston Boissier writes (*La Fin du Paganisme*, vol. ii, pp. 224–25): "One would think the members of that generation, which was to be the *last generation of Imperial Rome*, must have had some conception of the dangers that threatened them. . . . The Letters of Symmachus, a man of position, who filled high offices, and was a widely read author, prove the contrary; they prove that statesmen, politicians, leaders of thought, did not dream the end was at hand. On the very eve of the catastrophe all the routine of life, public and private, went on as before. Symmachus exclaims: 'We live in a virtuous and meritorious age, when men of ability can only blame themselves if they do not attain worthy aims'! And it seemed to him quite impossible that so enlightened and refined a society could fall before the barbarians."

How different is the spirit and the attitude of the masses and of many educated individuals to-day! In every modern State members of the working class have formed huge associations and unions with the sole purpose of winning and enforcing better wages and conditions in this transitory world! They own a new weapon in the shape of the *Press*—unknown to Antiquity; and for the scattered individuals of the proletariat, their Labour and Socialist Press is a bond of union and a great organizing force. The State, formerly frankly an instrument of exploitation, is forced more and more to give heed to their case and mitigate the hardships of their lives. The results of "resolute class struggle" are already substantial enough to have broken the so-called "iron law of wages", so that the incomes of the common people are rising, though slowly and by small degrees.

According to Richard Calwer, between 1895 and 1906 the wages of German industrial workers rose at a rate of slightly over 37 per cent., and the purchasing power of money fell by only 22 per cent.[1] The General Commission of German Trade Unions has calculated that co-ordinated trade union action in the year 1906 won the following concessions, partly by "strikes" and partly by "peaceful negotiations". (1) Increase of wages amounting to 48,780,000 marks (over £2,439,000)[2] for 652,471 persons for that year; and (2) shorter hours, amounting to 48,876,000 hours for 322,542 persons.[3] And the deposits in the Savings Banks of Germany amounted in 1912 to twelve milliards of marks.[4] The industrial workers are not decaying, they are slowly rising with infinite effort. Politically or electorally the masses have been emancipated; socially their emancipation is beginning. Two-thirds of our fellow-citizens in Germany, who have hitherto lived in proletarian or proletaroid (semi-proletarian) conditions, are becoming educated,

[1] Cf. Epstein, *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, i, no. 6, p. 572.
[2] On pre-war rates, of course. (Translator's Note.)
[3] See Bernstein, *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, i, p. 528.
[4] According to Hübner's *Geographisch-Statistische Tabellen*, published by Juraschek, Frankfurt-am-Main.

active, conscious citizens and full members of a modern cultural community.[1]

The Trade Unions are faced by the great employers' organizations. But the typical great employer of to-day is not the landowner, but the financier (even more than the manufacturer). Slavery is abolished in Western civilization, nor are men legally "bound to the soil"; and the relationship between the ruling class and the masses has become greatly mitigated compared with classical civilization. A spirit of good will, of sympathy, and sense of public duty is diffused among the finer elements of the governing class. In the United States of America especially, portions of enormous private incomes are devoted to philanthropic, civic, and scientific purposes, to help and beautify cities and universities. A spirit of altruism, a sense of obligation and shame in great possessions while so many starve, are manifested increasingly, but were alien to classical civilization.

3. Modern times have welcomed a cultural force of the first order and of incalculable possibilities in *science*, that brings light and help and widens the mental horizon of types of humanity whom Antiquity would have left in the darkest ignorance. Sociology, which is one aspect of science as applied to humanity, has made us realize culture and progress as an evolutionary sequence, and put new aims and purposes before us of which the Antique world knew naught.[2] Sociology not only illuminates the future, it analyses the past, it reveals the causes of things, and suggests the best means of liberation and development. It enables us to master those dark primordial forces to which the masses fell ignorant and helpless victims in the ancient world: into our own hands it puts the keys of Fate. For the immense epoch of human history, which included classical and medieval times, was *passive*; but we are at the

[1] Cf., as regards Britain and France, Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution*, pp. 207–74. Cf. also *Fabian Tracts*. These statistics are, of course, pre-war. The post-war situation is much more complex and unequal as between various trades. Unemployment! (Translator's Note.)

[2] See *Sinn des Lebens* (Introductory volume of our series, chap. xv).

beginning of an *active and creative culture of humanity* which can remould the world through our *conscious realization of evolution.*[1]

4. Geneonomic and scientific factors both contribute to, and are re-enforced by, another tendency, the modern attitude to ethics, or rather the revolutionary change taking place in public opinion on all human relationships and human conduct. Morality, like everything else, is not a rigid thing, fixed and defined for ever, but is continually changing and growing, including new categories and new situations, as is obvious with the increasing scope and complexity of modern life. In ancient tribal days the Kinship group was the great social and moral centre; communal solidarity in war and peace, community of goods, the blood feud, etc., were ethical, i.e. approved and essential to the survival of the race. In the next stage the family was the fundamental institution—a world in itself. Merit or guilt were shared by all members of a family. To-day in China parents and children are punished for each other's offences, and the family is jointly responsible for its members. But among us this type of ethical code is passing into the individualist, or rather social-individualist, code of the future. Each individual human being is responsible and fully responsible for his or her own actions and cannot be arraigned or punished for others' offences. In the family's zenith it was obvious that the sins of the fathers should be visited upon the children unto the third and fourth generation. But our sense of what is humanly decent and tolerable revolts against this barbarism and repudiates it as a social maxim. And if we consider it unjustified to punish anyone for another's fault, directly or indirectly, we can also no longer admit that an unrestricted number of descendant generations should be rewarded and privileged at their fellow-citizens' expense in recompense for ancestral services of a sometimes questionable character. If guilt cannot be inherited and vicarious, neither can merit; both are matters of personal choice and individual

[1] Cf. *Sinn des Lebens, passim.* Also *History of Social Development*, pp. 333–57.

conduct. Formerly it was considered specially honourable to live through the exertions of others, on inherited income and rent; some vulgar and prejudiced minds still consider this means of livelihood a distinction, but the person who lives in idleness and luxury on inherited means is considered a social parasite by healthy opinion. Even those who have "independent" inherited means should engage in some definite work, and many do so, for it is becoming clear to all that those who do not work are kept by those who do.

An increased responsibility and refinement of moral sentiment is shown in other directions than the primary economic duty of work. In classical civilization the infliction of pain and death deliberately and intentionally on men and animals was the most keenly relished form of public amusement, whether in gladiatorial shows or wild-beast fights or Nero's "gardens lit with live torches". Much remains to be done and improved, but pity as a moral force is increasingly respected. The Romans regarded their slaves with contempt, as an inferior race, but to-day there is a growing sense of sympathy and responsibility towards all helpless and crippled lives, which would be more frequently and forcibly manifested were it not often drowned by *fear*.[1]

5. A final consideration reminds us that the nations of classical civilization did not "decay" in a "peaceful and natural" manner, but were conquered and their institutions destroyed by barbarian races. We can hardly anticipate such an end. The Mediterranean and Western Asiatic "world" was encircled by "Barbarians" on North, East, and South, and the greater part of the globe was inhabited by utterly primitive races. But in the early twentieth century peoples of more or less advanced culture—*civilized* peoples acquainted with urban life and artificial sources of food—composed six-sevenths of all humanity. Our grade of cultural and technical progress is so broad-based that we need hardly fear a collapse comparable

[1] Cf. Lecky, *History of European Morals*, for a very full discussion of the problem of cruelty and attitude towards human and animal suffering. (Translator's Note.)

to the Fall of Rome. And modern culture is not stagnant, but moves with even unmanageable rapidity on the material and technical side.

Phaseological Notes

The analogy between our age and Imperial Rome, which has been so often cited, is therefore essentially incomplete. The main difference consists in our enormous superiority in industry and technique, with all its implications, in politics, science, ethics, and geneonomy. *We are emerging from that Later Familial phase which no nations have ever survived in the past. We have a potential future which is a wholly unprecedented phase in human history.* History, i.e. past experiences, past achievements, can teach us nothing of service here. But where history falls silent and speculative analogy deceives, the empire of sociology begins.

For sociologically, human culture is a process of development in which one phase merges into and is followed by another. Certainly no two links in this many-stranded chain are exactly alike. But the current of human evolution sweeps onward, following the law of its own being and moving in a definite and ascertainable direction. This *direction* of human culture may be recognized by the comparison of its various phases, and by the observation of their distinctive trends. The comparative study of these trends and tendencies will give us the law of phaseology in evolution, for the sum of human achievement.[1]

The phaseological method acts as a *measure* or *standard of valuation* for the intrinsic character of the different stages of human development and the institutions which emerge therein. We shall now apply it to the most significant *geneonomic* factors, while reserving the detailed statement of the trend of geneonomic evolution for Volume IX of our series.[2]

[1] See *Sinn des Lebens* and *History of Social Development* for elaboration of this theory.

[2] Cf. also *History of Social Development*, pp. 218–32.

I. Evolutionary Trends affecting the Institution of the Family

We have argued that the family as a social institution is dissolving or disintegrating, and that this disintegration is due to an atrophy of function, as the State and the Capitalist system of large-scale production have taken and are taking over all the work once performed in and by domestic households. Since the introduction of large-scale machinery and the widening of trade to an international scope, the whole basis of modern culture has changed. But historical experience teaches us, as a general truth, that every great achievement or advance in the material and economic sphere (as, for instance, the discovery of *agriculture*) has concomitant and consequent changes in all other spheres of culture, in civics or politics, religion, ethics, and art; and necessarily so. All cultural manifestations must adapt themselves to the material basis of life; its "daily bread"; and geneonomic, i.e. sexual and parental relationships, can be no exception. The facts we have cited prove conclusively how strongly the family has already been affected by these great transformations and revaluations.

Are they at an end so far as the family is concerned? Can it be that the family as it exists to-day, diminished in numbers, functions, and prestige, is something immutable and final?

To answer this question we must clearly understand which functions are still exercised—more or less exclusively—by the family: their significance and the manner in which they are fulfilled.

Such functions are neither few nor trivial, they include:

1. Household duties, i.e. the purchase of food and raw materials of clothing, cooking, some dressmaking, and much mending, sewing, washing, cleaning of dwelling-houses and furniture.

2. The reproduction, rearing, and some degree of education of children.

3. The regulation of the number of such children, and hence of the population.

4. The regulation of sexual selection.

5. The mental and emotional "daily bread" of human intercourse.

6. Some amount of care for the sick and disabled, and provision for the aged.

7. The possession and administration of a considerable amount of property, including credit, invested capital, and the means of production.

And finally,

8. The decision as to trade or profession of the younger generation.

These matters are still partly, and in some cases mainly, decided and managed by and in the family circle. And they are of such vital importance, both practically and in principle, that we must still regard the family as the corner-stone of society. It is indisputable that the lives of most citizens are dominated and even absorbed by family considerations. . . . But it appears to us, at least, equally indisputable that almost all these functions and duties must diminish, as a result of greater activity and complexity of social administration and of State control (if the trend of evolution is not to retrogress to lower standards of life and culture).

Let us consider in detail:

1. The Household Duties as performed by and in the Family

These are still often heavy—but only a poor residue of former activities when the family produced what it consumed. And even cooking, laundry-work, mending, scrubbing, and retail buying have not been kept in the hands of the household out of necessity, nor because they are most appropriately and efficiently attended to in the household, but by the might of old custom and human mental laziness. For the household "economy" is production and consumption on a dwarf scale, which is at the same time disproportionately expensive. It is (like the hand-weaver's loom, fated to be replaced by the

great factory of textiles) sooner or later, at least among a large section of the people, destined to give place to the large-scale joint dwelling or communal household, with an enormous saving of time and money and liberation of energy for other occupations than the material routine of existence.

Behold at the present time in any large town, in the lower middle-class or poorer quarters, sixty little houses, each with its kitchen range agape for fuel. The food consumed at the meals of *sixty* households is prepared in approximately two hundred or three hundred pots and saucepans, which are then devoutly washed up "by hand"—or not, as the case may be. Sixty housewives go marketing, basket on arm, and buy tiny portions of meat, a cabbage here, a lettuce there—and a small purchase means high prices and often very third-rate articles!—or a pailful of dusty or stony coal, etc. The whole dwelling reeks with the odours of cooking, but the smell of sacrifice is often unsavoury to its lord. Clothes must often be mended or shoes cleaned with one eye on the stove, that tyrant of the human race, for there is no room and no time to attend to them otherwise. In short, this trivial (yet incessant and often heavy and disagreeable) round wastes time, money, and energy, for machinery can hardly be used in such little space and on so small a scale. An adequate joint household organization need only employ one woman in ten, and could work more cheaply and efficiently and at less cost to human nerves and digestions. Instead of the sixty households each struggling round its Moloch stove, it would be possible to have a large central kitchen, presided over by a trained cook, a specialist in that profession, and to supply more nutritious, varied, and pleasant food at about half the price! Each family dwelling would have its lift, which would bring the meals ordered, promptly and "piping hot", to the table. Many most ingenious labour-saving devices have already been invented and patented, but are pitifully rare in use, because of their incompatibility with the traditional kitchen and its furniture. The great joint kitchen could and would use them all: the rinser would cleanse and

dry hundreds of pots and dishes, the vacuum-cleaner would make the rooms clean and wholesome, a shoe-cleaning and polishing machine would help lighten "this misery of boots". Instead of the recurrent struggles with stoves and grates, with storms of ashes and smoke-polluted atmosphere and the equally unnecessary inconveniences of the weekly washing-day, the joint household would provide central heating, a laundry, hot and cold water laid on, and electric lighting; and the slave of the stove, sink, and wash-tub, the housewife and mother of a family, would be relieved of her most monotonous and unpleasant household tasks, while, at the same time, there would be a great saving of the nation's money and prevention of duplication. Moreover, the housewife could give herself the necessary rest and care when "below par" in health; now, among the poor and only too often in the middle class as well, she keeps on at her job till she has injured herself seriously; for without her the whole miniature machine—or rather miniature chaos!—would be frozen still and dead. The joint household could offer many occupations and amenities to its members: telephone services, both within the building and outside; dark rooms for photography; workrooms of various kinds. There would be proper bathrooms and washing facilities, and, consequently, a great improvement aesthetic and hygienic; there might be special visitors' rooms or suites of rooms; clothes and household linen could be stored in warm, dry, moth-proof cupboards; there would be music-rooms with sound-proof walls and double doors; libraries and reading-rooms; and great airy halls, courts, and gardens, where the children could run, shout, and play without disturbance to, or interference by, busy and tired adults. Individual liberty could be admirably served by the capably equipped and managed joint household, and with such liberty would come greater power and variety of personality. For the joint households need not be stereotyped to one pattern, either structurally or in their administration. They might belong to many and diverse types; they might be familial joint households, where

each family group would have its own separate and special dwelling or claustral, forming fellowships of common life and thought; or they might have a certain amount of joint social activity on club or *pension* lines for particularly gregarious persons; or, finally, they might be *phalanstères* in Fourier's sense of the word: *producing* as well as *consuming* goods or services, e.g. carrying on some form of industry or handicrafts in the winter and working on the land in the summer.[1]

The joint household would solve an ancient problem, which has become the nightmare of housewives and an eternal refrain in all their conversation—the problem of domestic service. The present difficulty of obtaining or keeping domestic servants is notorious. In the United States of America many families have adopted hotel or boarding-house life permanently in consequence. When Upton Sinclair wrote on these difficulties and demanded joint households he received countless letters of enthusiastic agreement, for too often at the present time, in the words of the Prophet Micah, "a man's enemies are they of his own household" (Mic. vii. 6).[2]

This difficulty is common to all countries of industrial civilization and grows apace. The status of the domestic servant, formerly the last survival of feudal serfdom, is totally changing and becoming a *contractual*, strictly defined relationship on an equal footing. We may anticipate that the great joint households of the future will have some resemblance to the better kind of hotels and restaurants of to-day, inasmuch as the "cogs in their machines" will not be *personal attendants*, but skilled and trained employees, capable of cooking meals or tending children. Or the energy and enthusiastic wish to "do something", to be grown-up and important, which actuates children at certain periods of growth, might be employed by giving them some regular household tasks suited to their capacities. Or else other members of the joint household with a certain degree of practicality and tact might undertake certain

[1] Cf. Kropotkin, *Fields, Factories, and Workshops.*

[2] Cf. also the work of Charlotte Perkins Gilman (or Stetson).

services and add thereby to their incomes. One thing is certain: the traditional relationship of master or mistress and servant, *when there is neither responsibility, efficiency, nor regard on either side*, is doomed and cannot too quickly disappear.

Fourier's fantastic but inspired vision is being realized, on somewhat different lines, in many countries. In Frankfurt-am-Main there are already "Homes", i.e. associations of both widowed and single women, with communal kitchens, and a public-spirited company has been founded for the construction of small dwellings "with annexes", and demonstrates in a model manner that even under unfavourable conditions much may be done to solve the housing and service problems. The "annexes" include amenities and services within each block of buildings, for the use of each household or of the whole block; they consist of crèches, gardens, playgrounds, reading-rooms, lecture-halls, and a club-house.[1] In America joint dwellings for working-class families have existed for some time, and an organization for building and equipping large joint households is in existence in New Jersey, under the direction of Upton Sinclair. In Vienna dwellings with communal kitchens have been built for single women engaged in industry or the professions, and in England a start has also been made. In Wiesbaden an association for the emancipation and education of women (*Frauenbildung—Frauen Studium*) has done much. And in Reichenberg (Bohemia) there is a model joint dwelling where a meal for two people only costs 6½d.! (54 pfennigs).[2] The Berlin "communal kitchen" experiment was a regrettable fiasco, which did the cause no good, but is to be ascribed rather to lack of initial capital than to any error in principle. The foundations of Director Fick in Copenhagen have survived successfully; they are described as

[1] Cf. Henriette Fürth, *Jubiläumsbericht der Aktienbaugesellschaft für kleine Wohnungen in Frankfurt-am-Main.*

[2] Maria Lischnevska in *Mutterschutz*, ii, p. 228; *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, ii, pp. 738–39; *1st Supplement to the Rheinische Kurier*, no. 60, November 2, 1908; *Praktischer Wegweiser*, October 3, 1908. (German post-war architecture and town-planning are splendid achievements under great difficulties. Translator's Note.)

excellent specimens of their kind and certainly inspire others to follow their example.[1]

But it would be foolish to anticipate that these experiments should become popular or general at the present time. The joint multiple household would be impracticable for the whole of our rural population. Moreover, many persons and families prefer as their ideal habitation their own homestead in a garden city. (But we must remember that the joint household and the garden city are not by any means mutually exclusive arrangements!) But the joint household would be a most important and beneficent innovation for

1. Married women active in some trade or profession.

2. For young people of both sexes, as enabling them to marry early and live together without great expenses, social parade, or a whole caravan of furniture and fittings, and to enjoy and love one another with the sanction of law and custom and in the vigour and freshness of youth. And if these habits became general among adolescents, the sexual problem and much of the social tangle of our times would be on the way to solution. The celibacy of about 50 per cent. of persons at the age best suited for parenthood; secret aberrations, prostitution, venereal diseases—would diminish to a notable extent. The right of youth to the mystery and ecstasy of physical love would be recognized, as it was in ancient rituals and is now among many primitive peoples.

3. The joint household would also obviously help and benefit the *working classes*, whose lack of initiative in launching such enterprises, though doubtless partly due to lack of the necessary preliminary capital, is difficult to understand.

4. It would also be of great service to trade unions in *productive* branches of industry, and

5. To widows or widowers, especially with young children.

But there will be the most deeply rooted and embittered opposition to such institutions for some appreciable time, and its elements will be mainly vanity, mental laziness, and

[1] Rosika Schwimmer, *Frankfurter Generalanzeiger*, September 28, 1907.

dislike of new and wider ways of life. Their chief adversaries will be housewives of the old-fashioned type—undifferentiated women, clinging to the stereotyped burdens which justify their existence; the anti-social education of the Familial phase, with its lack of stress on public spirit; the self-importance of countless family circles who regard themselves as the salt of the earth, though producing neither achievements nor personalities to leaven humanity; and, above all, *custom* and *habit*, which are so particularly strong in geneonomic matters. Nevertheless the advantages of joint households with communal kitchens and other domestic services must finally become obvious, even to these refractory reactionaries, owing to the lack of servants and to the sheer expense of the tiny separate household. Not, of course, that the small separate household will be wholly abolished (for those who honestly prefer it), any more than all motor-buses will vanish in favour of railway trains! But in many cases they will be superseded in favour of large-scale joint households.

The significance, or rather necessity, of the large-scale joint household has not yet been adequately recognized. Their advantages would not only be economic and material, but would contain other potentialities of leisure and the use of leisure in ways which would mean improvement mentally and ethically, and a higher level of knowledge and conduct generally, as we hope to show in detail.

2. The Rearing and Education of Children

Education has to hand on to the rising generation the cultural achievements in knowledge and standards of conduct of the race—their "traditional values". The teacher is, so to speak, the mental executor and legatee of all previous history; he moulds the raw material of human impulses into the *civilized personality*. All we know, and all we can do, all refinements of sensibility and powers of control, all the intellectual aptitudes and faculties which have blossomed in humanity through

millennia, must be made accessible by *education*, through the adult generation, to the new-comers on earth who carry on the torch. Therefore the higher our stage of culture and progress, the more exacting is the task of education. On previous grades of evolution the primitive educational theory and practice of the domestic circle sufficed. But the domestic circle alone is quite inadequate as a preparation for modern life. Pedagogy, i.e. trained and specialized professional educators become necessary, and they must have an aptitude for the work.

Thus among all peoples on a certain level of progress we see a new human institution: the *School*, which thenceforth shares the educative function with the family.

The School is the first step on a mighty process of development, during which *familial* instruction and education is increasingly replaced by *professional and social* instruction and education.

At present we have reached the stage at which the *instruction* proper, i.e. the mental and intellectual training, is almost entirely in the hands of the schools. The even more important formation of *character* by personal habits and emotional influences—*essential* "education"—is still in the sphere of the family.

But the family is no longer capable of educating its younger members for the modern world. Why?

Because first of all most parents have not the available leisure to devote to their children. In the proletarian class the mother must often earn outside the home, as well as the father, in order to get enough food or pay the rent. An education worthy of modern citizens cannot be imparted in such conditions! Among the rich the children are too often entrusted to nursemaids and servants, and the results in habits and character are sometimes serious and lifelong.

Secondly, even parents who have the leisure and the best intentions are not necessarily qualified by knowledge or temperament to undertake the most difficult art and science of all—the equipment and cultivation of new human individuali-

ties; and experience has frequently shown that those parents who are most firmly convinced of their own abilities as educators have not the least idea of the intricacies of the great task they have so confidently undertaken![1]

Thirdly, in many families educational methods carry on the ancient habits of bodily compulsion and violence and unrestrained explosions of temper. No one who has not himself been adequately *educated* can educate another. Much "family education" is retrogression pure and simple. Modern pedagogy must break this tradition.

Fourthly, children are *social* beings and their training must recognize and allow due weight to this fact. Human beings learn mutual understanding and co-operation in the company of their kind; mind and "character" or physical and emotional habits are formed in association with others in early years. In the ages of large families, when children had many brothers and sisters, this essential element was provided in the domestic circle. But the two-child system tended to isolate children in their most formative years. Many modern children live surrounded by adults till they are six years old; they are often profoundly bored and lonely, have no suitable occupation (for developing muscular and nervous co-ordination), and acquire the peevish, exacting, self-centred character which ruins their personal happiness and that of their neighbours, and makes much of modern life so ugly and so empty.[2]

Finally, life in a big modern town is injurious to children, mentally and physically. We may quote from the *Politisch-anthropologische Revue* a most disquieting diagnosis of the ravages of urban life:

[1] "The people who want to bear children and the people who actually do bear children are not always the people who are best fitted to rear children.

"Many people who do not want to bear children, or who are ill-fitted to bear children, are eminently suited to rear children." *Chronos; or the Future of the Family*, by Eden Paul, M.D. (Kegan Paul), p. 27.

"Many of us remember a nurse with a genius for motherhood, to whom we owed more than to our mother by blood!" *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[2] There is another side to this. Human beings grow in solitude—if they have any depth or force—as well as in society of others. Do we not know the types who can never bear to be alone? (Translator's Note.)

"THE GREAT CITY AS THE GRAVE OF THE RACE

"The reports on the health of schoolchildren in Schöneberg,[1] 1907–1908, are seriously significant of the damage which is going on. At the entrance medical examination of 1,790 schoolchildren:

83 were found to be mentally defective.
202 were found to be physically under-developed.
416 suffered from rickets.
541 suffered from scrofula.
3 suffered from tuberculosis.
145 had defective eyesight.
127 had defective hearing.
92 had defective articulation.
80 had had heart disease.
79 had ruptures in the lower abdomen.
137 had spinal curvature.
566 were found to need protracted medical treatment.

"There were 1,961 children under normal health in the other age classes, so that the School Medical Officers had to deal with 2,527 cases in the year covered by the Report under discussion, quite apart from the obligatory revisions and general inspections. The mentally deficient required and received special care, and their instruction in special supplementary classes had encouraging results. Even though only a small fraction of these defectives could pass on into the normal schools, the majority reached the standard of the next higher supplementary class. But a full *sixth* of the total number of children remain permanently on the lowest grade of deficiency. They are not idiots, but to give them any chance of a tolerable existence or usefulness will mean building and equipping special institutions, which the Report recommends accordingly. Thus we have it on the authority of *the School Medical Officers that there are hardly any really and completely healthy children in Schöneberg!* And these conditions obtain in one of the more 'select' suburbs, with good hygienic facilities, and newly 'arisen' from village status to form part of a great city! What a glaring instance of the doom attached to 'The

[1] A suburb of Berlin.

Flight from the Land' and to the much belauded industrialization of the people!"

Let us give due weight to these abuses and remember the numerous cases where the parents are on definitely bad terms with one another, or where the children are illegitimate (and close on 200,000 of these are born in Germany every year), or where either the father dies prematurely or the mother is lost to them—and her loss, according to available evidence, is much the more serious of the two.[1] Then we may *begin* to understand why a human being educated and thinking and behaving in terms of modern culture and worthy of modern standards, is so rare. We shall also comprehend other matters, e.g. the uncanny increase in brutal crimes, and the large share of adolescent and pubescent youth in such crimes. For the higher the demands of culture and progress on the education of modern citizens, and the greater the concurrent disintegration of the family, the less can these requirements be met. In order to make human beings adequate to modern knowledge and powers we need finer discrimination and fuller resources; we need to apply these to social and civic organization. And we must have trained experts in the diagnosis and training of *character* as well. Thus the trend of evolution in education must be from the domestic to the specialized or pedagogic. Already much has been done in this direction.

The *States* and the *Municipalities* have intervened to preserve the human material of the future. Thus in the City of Posen poor schoolchildren receive a warm breakfast and a warm midday meal. In 1908, 733 children were thus fed.[2] In Milan all the schoolchildren of the town receive one meal at the school daily, and all concerned are satisfied with this arrangement.[3] The French Government provides school equipment, coats and shoes and baths and a warm breakfast for hungry children, and even in some cases a warm midday meal as well.[4] And in all the great German towns there are soup-kitchens,

[1] Cf. Adele Schreiber, "Witwerkinder", *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, 1910, p. 643.
[2] *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, 1910, ii, p. 86.
[3] *Ibid.*, iii, p. 37.
[4] *Ibid.*, ii, p. 675.

crèches open all day, orphanages and kindergartens or nursery schools, where "toddlers" below school age may be safe and well cared for.

The State invades the domain of the *patria potestas* at home as well. The German Civil Code (§§ 1666 and 1838) deprives parents of the custody of their children if they neglect to have them educated. In Britain and the United States social and administrative care for Child Welfare has reached a high degree of efficiency. In April 1909 a new Law intervened to protect children from the atmosphere and company of public-houses, and introduced reformatory schools and special institutions (Borstal) instead of the depraving adult prisons for youthful offenders. We have other proofs of the superiority of specialized education. In 1910 William George founded a pioneer school, on new lines, at Freville in the State of New York. It was based on the principle of self-determination and self-administration; a "*free children's Republic*", making its own rules, holding their own disciplinary courts, and earning by garden work and otherwise. The most intractable cases accepted the opportunities offered them, helped to work the system, and enthusiastically made it a success. In the great school at Redhill deserted and derelict children have been educated by high-minded and highly qualified teachers with magnificent results. "Hardly *one per cent.* of the pupils came into conflict with the laws after leaving the school, and 92 per cent. 'made good' in life among their fellow-citizens. This is a far more favourable percentage than that given by the average elementary school." This means that *derelict and delinquent children, under specialized and systematic education, turned out better citizens than "normal" children educated mainly at home.*[1]

And many parents begin to perceive that small households in big towns are really not adapted for the rearing of children, and that they cannot do their children a greater service than

[1] Cf. the post-war results of the work of the U.S.A. Juvenile Courts. (Translator's Note.)

to send them to good schools *in the country*. Hence the striking number of all manner of schools and educational ventures in rural surroundings, which give special attention to the development of character and bodily health as well as to *instruction*.[1]

The most successful of the new school ventures in Germany is the "Free School Community", instituted by the genius and enthusiasm of Dr. Gustav Wyneken at Wickersdorf—the most important achievement in education since Rochow's days.[2] If all citizens could enjoy such understanding and advantages the really civilized State would be an actual fact in a few generations; but it must remain a Utopia for the present, for these special schools are extremely expensive, and hence closed in practice to all except the rich.

We must avoid the opposite extreme to traditional methods, which would suppress all parental share and influence in education. Really deep parental love has a value and influence which no institution can replace, and we must aim at combining parental devotion, equipped with modern science, and the specialized skill of the trained teacher.

The multiple joint household would offer special facilities for the alliance of parental and pedagogic care in the case of younger children. Here they could dwell securely under the eyes of their parents, and at the same time guided and instructed perhaps by a woman of eminent gifts and educational experience. They need not moon about and get into mischief, they could learn unconsciously in their playtime and become useful and accustomed to sustained attention and self-help. Above all, they could be *with other children*, and they would learn "to give and take"—fair play, humour, comradeship—instead of the sullen selfishness and self-importance too often developed by "familial" environment, to their own harm and the harm of all.

The nation which first made such education generally accessible would grow in moral and mental stature, for the

[1] These tendencies have been accentuated since the war. (Translator's Note.)

[2] Dr. Wyneken and A. Halm published a *Journal of the Wickersdorf School Community*. (Diederichs, Jena.)

character of a people or an individual is formed in the nursery (i.e. up to five years of age) in its main lines.

We may even characterize *exclusively* domestic education as a positive *hindrance to progress* at the present time. The last half-century has not only opened new worlds in pure and applied science, industry, and technology, but it has also worked out the beginnings of a temple of philosophy, ethics, and art, worthy of its economic and scientific foundation. And the ethical and emotional culture, the formation of *character* which falls to the lot of most modern industrial proletarians, rural workers, and even "average" middle-class bourgeois, is hardly better—nay, even poorer in some respects —than that of a Bantu or an Eskimo. But the cause of this lamentable deficiency is primarily their familial and domestic education, which is based on a tradition now obsolete. We can only expect the stupidity and insensibility of the bulk of our "civilized" populations to be cured if and when adequate specialized education is available for all. Then and then only can the things of the mind and spirit show anything like the activity and efflorescence of our contemporary material and technical achievements.

3. Regulation of Population and 4. Sexual Selection

One of the chief problems of geneonomy is the regulation of population. Neither too many nor too few children should be born into the world. If there are too many we have *over-population*, with its disastrous results, scarcity, famine, chronic underfeeding, epidemics, wars, etc. If there are too few, then human races, each with its special virtues and values, dwindle towards extinction.

The regulation of population has hitherto been decided entirely by the family and in a primitive and highly unsatisfactory manner. As soon as economic conditions show some improvement, however precarious, there is an increase of

marriages and births; in bad times the marriage-rate slackens appreciably and misery and poverty mow down the infant lives engendered in brief prosperity.

This method of regulating natural increase has serious dangers. The rearing and education of children become more costly and complicated with every advance in knowledge and standards of living. Many married couples avoid burdens which they find intolerable, by using methods of birth control. The birth-rate falls accordingly. In Germany there is still too great an excess of births over deaths, but even the German birth-rate per thousand is steadily dropping. This falling birth-rate will become more conspicuous as soon as contraceptives become more widely known among the majority of the people, and this is merely a matter of time.[1]

Selection.—Under the present dispensation the family settles, not only quantity, but quality of the national increase, and does it so inadequately that many biologists are already convinced of the degeneration of the white race. In the governing circles of most countries the *mariage de convenance* is customary; and this necessarily deteriorates stocks which practise it through generations. Among the poor there is often not enough food available to nourish the children properly, and they are physically irretrievably injured. (See the Report cited above of the health of schoolchildren in a Berlin suburb—pre-war.)[2] And proletarian birth-rates are

[1] Post-war developments in Germany—as elsewhere—have justified Dr. Müller-Lyer's prophecy. Perhaps, however, he hardly gives due weight to the greater number of *survivals* per 1,000 of the modern birth-rates. (Translator's Note.)

[2] We may cite from the Press an example of housing. The municipal teacher, H. Weisskopf Fürth, has a contribution in the latest number of the Annual in *Bodenreform*—organ of the Land Taxers. He investigates the housing and sleeping arrangements of the children under his charge, and the results are appalling. Trained eyes and minds can discern such realities under the numerals of official statistics, but for everyday folks it is very different to face them in flesh and blood. Herewith a quotation:

"Of the 60 boys, only 14 have a bed to themselves; 9 out of these 14 are in an orphanage! Must children become orphans under public care in order to enjoy the elementary decency of a bed for themselves? The Matron in charge of the orphanage tells me that new arrivals sometimes cry violently,

always the highest, while the wealthy and well-to-do incline to the two-child family, owing mainly to our peculiar system of inheritance.

Population and Selection and the rearing of children are the most essential and obvious joint functions of the family; the sociological and biological kernel and *raison d'être* of this institution being *reproduction*. But it is now evident that the State and the Community must once more intervene to supervise and supplement the family's deficiencies. There is a deep menace here to the whole white race, and it becomes a necessity of survival for modern States to meet and overcome it. And as no modern adults can be exactly compelled to procreate children,[1] the only method will be for the State to contribute to the cost of rearing the citizens its future requires. Public health authorities would then be able to refuse to subsidize persons with inheritable diseases, and to give premiums to specially vigorous and suitable parents, and this might counteract the dysgenic influences which have already impaired our stock.

We may observe the first small beginnings of such an arrangement in France. The Municipal Council of Paris spends 100,000 francs yearly in support of expectant mothers, according to Adele Schreiber. The contributions are paid in cash, and no distinction is made between legal wives and unmarried mothers; and there are many institutions and maternity homes. The *Asyle Michelet*, for instance, gives security to all its inmates, there is no scandal and no interference from the world outside. No formalities are demanded, no proofs of identity; anonymity is confidential and complete, and foreigners of all nationalities are received as well as French women. The *Assistance publique* takes charge of any children

but that in most cases sobs and tears give way to beaming smiles if they are taken into the big, bright dormitory and shown the little bed: 'Look! This bed belongs to you now, always, and to you only!' A marvellous and incredible prospect to these children. . . ."

[1] Except indirectly by carefully preserved ignorance and bad housing! (Translator's Note.)

entrusted to it, but the child so entrusted is lost to its mother for life.[1] In the year 1909 Professor Richet, of the French Academy of Medicine, suggested that for every second child there should be a premium of 400 francs, for every third of 800 francs, to be raised by 50 per cent. death duties on all inheritance to collaterals. Leroy Beaulieu suggested that candidates for official posts who were fathers of three children or more should have preference, and that bachelor officials should lose 20 per cent. off their salaries.

These are very trivial attempts which will probably remain ineffective. But when—as may be anticipated at some future date—"race-suicide" threatens to destroy civilized nations, we shall at last realize that the pregnant woman and nursing mother is fulfilling a "social function" just as necessary as the soldier's! And that this social function must be respected and alleviated as much as possible by any civilization worthy of that name.

5. Everyday Social Contact. The Satisfaction of the Gregarious Instinct

The dissolution and retrogression of family life among the most progressive peoples is beyond dispute. Among the governing classes of France and the United States of America the family bonds have been considerably loosened; and even conservative Britain, the land of "Home" *par excellence*, turns more and more to clubs and hotels. Social intercourse within the family (including distant relatives and "in-laws") flourishes most among the numerous class of the smaller bourgeois—not the most intellectually active of the community! And too often there is an iron wall, an icy barricade, between such families as are not related by blood or connected by mar-

[1] For a less rosy account, see Victor Margueritte's trilogy of novels, especially *Ton Corps est à Toi*. Post-war France has elaborate and stringent laws against birth control since 1920. So far the chief effects have been an increase in infanticide, "illegal operations", and maternal deaths in childbed. (Translator's Note.)

riage. The isolation and stagnation of many such small lower middle-class households has become monstrous and poisonous to minds and characters. Within the magic circle prevail asphyxiating boredom, prejudice, and the rankest personal gossip; there are endless "duty calls", often wasting much time, or paid at hours when the visited relative is known to be "not at home"; and there are equally dull "duty meals" where all real exchange of ideas or emotional interest is unthinkable. Hence, by a natural reaction, the profusion of clubs and societies of all kinds, in England, France, and Germany; the public-house life of men, and the tendency of women to meet their friends for tea and gossip on the neutral territory of some restaurant or café.

Multiple joint households would bring many new possibilities and amenities in social intercourse. Members of the household could meet their friends in the reading-rooms, libraries, gardens, and refreshment-rooms; there would be a far wider range of human mental contacts in a sympathetic atmosphere which might herald a revival of comradeship and co-operation, as in the Kinship epoch. The mental and general culture of the people would improve, and the social intercourse of congenial spirits, which is one of the most permanent and delicate of human pleasures, would be liberated from the empty formulas and oppressive traditions of the Family phase. Conversation between fairly educated and interested persons spreads knowledge and helps to develop culture, even if they are amateurs, mainly preoccupied in earning their livelihood. Literature, art, music, all the finest and least perishable pleasures would become known to, accessible to, and appreciated by millions outside the small privileged circles which can taste them to-day. The *initial inspiration*, the *electric spark*, is needed, but the latent material is there in human hearts and brians. For all human culture is the expression of human relationships, and the more versatile and intense these relationships become the finer is the efflorescence of human culture in

any nation.[1] We therefore maintain that the multiple joint household would be the appropriate environment for rearing a generation of cultured, balanced, intellectually vital, and comradely men and women, capable of being pioneers to a finer future.

But the traditional structure of the family under present conditions is positively hostile to progress and culture.

6. Care of the Sick, Infirm, and Aged

A further important office which traditionally devolves on the family is the care of sick persons and the support of old age. We have discussed the care of the sick in a previous chapter, and seen it gradually removed into the sphere of communal organization. And the weakened and truncated family of to-day can no longer offer a fit resting-place for weary old age. Aged parents are only too often an unbearable burden to adult children, struggling to earn a livelihood, and the relationship between parents and children in such enforced dependence at close quarters, becomes unspeakably bitter and degrading to both parties. Unmarried women are apt to bear the brunt here, for the sons leave their parents' roof as early as possible; but how many devoted daughters have sacrificed their youth and their whole life to parental claims! And how many aged men and women, after honourable and hard-working lives, are left in need and loneliness, deserted by children and kinsmen, in the shadow of death! And this pitiful fate may lie in store for any of us. State and voluntary communal organizations have therefore begun to *socialize* the ancient family provision and protection for old age and illness by means of *Insurance*. But we are only at the beginning of possible development on these lines. Every honest man and woman who can

[1] Paul Natorp says in *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität*: "Culture is essentially a co-operative achievement and depends on the force and depth of communal life entirely." And Herder (*Ideen*, v, chap. 6) says: "Sociability, friendship, genuine sympathy: these are almost *the aim and purpose of humanity*, the goal of human history."

work and is willing to work must be guaranteed an old age of peace of mind and human comfort and dignity. For old age, and old age *alone, has the right to live, to rest in peace awhile, without labour.*

The doom of Genesis, "In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou labour", is silent here; but in a just and enlightened State all adults should realize that "he that will not work, neither shall he eat".

Old age must again become sacred to us; in the Later Familial phase it was derided and despised. Let the State guarantee an adequate fixed provision for the needs of the natural counsellors and leaders of the people. Let them be released from care and anxiety, let them look backward and forward and at the world around them in quiet sunset hours. Such a certainty would help all workers with pluck and "grit" through their most difficult hours, blunt fortune's slings and arrows, and be a more far-reaching alleviation than the promise of an unknown hereafter.

7. The Distribution of Property through Unrestricted Inheritance

The family clings tightly to its privilege of *inheritance*, which still decides the distribution of national income in spite of the profound economic changes in modern times.

In the previous chapter we sought to prove that the *limitation of this privilege of inheritance* has become an urgent necessity of State, and to demonstrate that unrestricted inheritance is the main agent of national degeneracy.

And the modern State is beginning to lay its hand on the inherited incomes of its privileged citizens by means of death duties and taxes on unearned incomes. The imperative need of more money will force Governments farther on this road, even if sociological insight be lacking. The most desirable method of taxing inherited income has not yet been adopted. Small and moderate sums should be left untouched. A definite

inheritable maximum should be established by progressively rising taxation spread over several years. Such a reform of inheritance would be of great benefit to the overwhelming majority of citizens, and would only deprive the possessors of unjust and excessive wealth, which harms those who dispose of it. It would be to distrust the human mind and achievements if we doubted that such an abolition of unjust inheritance, through taxation, must not become a reality sooner or later. For, as Bishop Kopp pertinently observed in the Prussian Upper House in 1908, "Rights of private property cease where necessity of State begins."

An increasing number of business concerns have passed and are passing from the possession and control of families and becoming shareholding companies with limited liability. The business is no longer directed by members of the originally owning family, but by a salaried managing-director, who is the intermediary link between family ownership and socialization. There is also an enormous development of trusts, combines, rings, and syndicates, aiming at the elimination of "free competition" and the allocation of market areas and fixing of output and prices. But a business or industry ripe for monopoly is on the road to nationalization or socialization; this is a question of *time* alone. We must also not omit to mention the voluntary bequests and gifts of colossal fortunes to public works and philanthropic or intellectual purposes, made famous by certain American millionaires. This is also a form of the socialization of what would otherwise be inherited.

These processes are all examples of a particular *evolutionary trend*, as was recognized by Schäffle. He expresses himself in this sense: "As the family was the first owner of capital, so the management and direction of large business concerns is initially in the hands of the family. But past history has shown that all main social functions become gradually released from family control and the family circle: the administration, education, religious ritual, traffic, defence, jurisdiction, etc." And already Socialism is stating the case for "the real functions

of the social circulation and metamorphoses of matter—the metabolism of institutions—production and exchange, set free from private ownership by corporate control, just as the really social part of education (primary and secondary), research, philanthropy, and intellectual creation in art and science have been liberated from the fetters of ancient tribal and familial custom". Capitalism, on the other hand, "endeavours to limit social metabolism to family property and inheritance for ever", which Schäffle [1] considers as impracticable as communism. For in earlier cultural stages offices and dignities, titles and social position were strictly hereditary, as well as property. The ancient castes and closed corporations in which inheritance became social petrifaction are obsolete; they survive only in hereditary monarchy and capitalist privileges. And among the leading cultural peoples the hereditary monarch is superseded by an elected president, and hereditary capitalism finds increasing opposition among those capable of independent thought. . . .

We thus find socialization of functions previously exercised by and in the family to be a law of cultural development, and economic conditions in the past and present lead us to conclude that the socialization of surplus wealth is only a matter of *time* and of the *pace* of *progress*.

8. Choice of Trade or Profession for the Younger Generation by the Family

A cognate function to inheritance of property is the share taken by parents and relatives in selecting or deciding the *occupations* of the younger generation. This is sometimes considerable, though much less so than at the familial zenith. The decision as to a child's profession or means of livelihood rests in the majority of cases, not with his or her own aptitudes and inclinations, but with the family exchequer. This sometime settles, not only what can be chosen, but what *must* be!

[1] *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers*, vol. ii, p. 298.

The results are far-reaching in both individual lives and social institutions.

I. Many talents are lost and wasted. Some—and perhaps several—cases of genius are suffocated, or at least maimed and crippled for life.

II. The chief offices in Government administration, in the judiciary, in literature, art, medicine, tend to be appropriated by very mediocre capacity; and

III. The intimate personal happiness of thousands is destroyed by such compulsion. Men who would be excellent and enthusiastic workers at some handicraft have a bitter and unsuccessful struggle as third-rate lawyers or doctors. A youth with the urge and the imaginative power of a sculptor of genius must lead the miserable and humiliating existence of an incompetent waiter or barber's assistant, etc.

Thus in this immeasurably significant matter of occupation and profession, the way of progress is to socialize the family's power of choice and determination. Education should be directed to discover talents and aptitudes at an early age; and the State would do itself much service by instituting a carefully managed scholarship and bursary system for the encouragement of talent, as is already the case, for instance, in the highly progressive Dominion of New Zealand and in Würtemberg, which has produced a very large proportion of famous Germans.

Synopsis

The most essential activities of society are still in the hands of the family. Family affairs and interests are still the overwhelming preoccupation of most of our fellow-citizens. The family will be very powerful for a long while to come, but it is equally indisputable that in its present form it is undergoing a radical transformation.

It may be helpful to compare this transformation with the changes undergone, ages ago, by the family's "Big Sister", the Kinship group, sept, or clan.

At an early cultural epoch the Kinship group was the geneonomic centre of human activities through thousands of years. But as culture and material progress advanced, the Kinship group proved inadequate; it became a hindrance rather than a support and help, and had to be "scrapped". The sociological struggle was long and cruel, lasting through two full phases of evolution—the Late Tribal and Early Familial—before this primordial institution, which had meant so much, finally became obsolete.

The successors of the Kinship group, as the main human institutions, were the State and the (patriarchal) family. Now began a second geneonomic epoch in which the family was the focus; it became as powerful as the sept had been, and formed the basis of society. But with further progress, especially material and technical, the family also is being outgrown, and in its present truncated form and with its present enormous surviving powers and sphere of influence it too has become a fetter and hindrance, economic, intellectual, and ethical; for owing to the tenaciously preserved and upheld institution of inheritance, the family has become the bulwark of social parasitism and at the same time of the most flagrantly unjust system of distribution.[1] This system deprives the people of their natural leaders—that is, of those persons who possess eminent gifts in that direction—in favour of a plutocracy or "geneocracy" of a set of enormously rich families, for whom colonial conquest and war are lucrative, and who thus have a direct interest in opposing international peace, understanding, and co-operation. Family inheritance of capital and the means of production likewise deprives the State of funds greatly needed for constructive purposes. And it favours, and indeed

[1] Cf. G. Bernard Shaw: "Unequal distribution of purchasing power upsets the proper order of economic production, causing luxuries to be produced on an extravagant scale whilst the primitive vital needs of the people are left unsatisfied; its effect on marriage, by limiting and corrupting sexual selection, is highly dysgenic; it reduces religion, legislation, education, and the administration of justice to absurdity as between rich and poor; and it creates an idolatry of riches and idleness which inverts all sane social morality." Fabian Tract, no. 233, p. 10, *Socialism and Fabianism.*

almost necessitates, marriage for money, deteriorates the racial stock, and accumulates surplus property which is the soil in which men decay.

The education imparted in the family grows more and more inadequate to modern life, and reactionary. It makes young people into commonplace philistines, incapable of the outlook and standards of modern culture.

Social and mental intercourse between human beings can be the finest refreshment and the mother of great achievement. If limited to the family circle it becomes an empty form, banal and petty.

Compulsory and permanent monogamy prevents millions from attaining happiness in love and life. Honourable old age is given no sort of security and consideration; the sick and infirm are at the mercy of public institutions or perish miserably and alone.

On the purely material side millions of money are wasted by the "dwarfish" economy of the small separate household, and an incalculable amount of time and energy and health as well.

Thus the family—formerly, in its appropriate stage of evolution the mainstay of morals, the corner-stone of the State, and an inspiring and regulating agency of the greatest value—has become, in its present *transitional form*, a *hindrance to progress*. The good it still achieves is often the enemy of a possible best. The family must evolve and change, and it is changing—and radically.

Human prejudices in geneonomic matters, i.e. in all that concerns sex and parenthood, are the deepest and most violent of all, with the possible exception of religious prejudices.

If, thousands of years ago, in the later stages of the Kinship group some sociological prophet of the Stone Age or Bronze Age had declared that the Kinship group was passing away, and that its passing was right and necessary—if mankind was to rise to higher things, this reckless heretic would doubtless

have been regarded with wrath and horror and driven forth with sticks and stones, if he did not meet a worse fate. To-day, at the end of the Late Familial phase, we are also entering a new world and a new age. And we may perhaps hope that human progress has brought enough insight into sociological development to avoid hindering its necessary course and to prevent or mitigate some of the sufferings inevitable in every great change. The wider the scope, the more intricate the activities of any State or community, the more must the functions formerly devolving on the family (or sept) be communalized or socialized; this is the way of the greatest activity and utility. The concentration of many and diverse functions in the family was once necessary for survival, but evolution separates, i.e. differentiates, these functions again. The patriarchal joint family and household was a world of itself, industrial and social, educative and religious (or ritual); it decided property and occupation, production and consumption; it had rights of life and death. In fact, in its extended though rudimentary uses it resembled the earliest *flint implement*, the so-called *coup de poing*, which was at once a hammer, chisel, lever, scraper, axe, knife, file, drill, and saw, though only in an awkward and limited manner. And by the same evolutionary trend through which all the aforesaid specialized implements developed out of the primitive archetypal tool, the various functions of that human institution of the *family* have been taken over and specialized and perfected by other instruments and institutions. So that if human evolution continues on wholesome and vital lines the family will retain only one special function which can be perfected: the function assigned by nature of producing and rearing "fit" and beautiful beings.

We have admitted that up to the present age no race known to us has survived the Late Familial phase, and the general stage of evolution associated therewith. *Hitherto all the nations which attained this grade of culture stood still—receded, declined, and sometimes perished.* They seemed stricken by some awful

disease—now we have learned the cause and nature of this mysterious malady.

And this means enormous barriers in the way of progress to a new and higher form of culture. It means not only overcoming and remoulding deep-seated domestic and geneonomic habits, but simultaneously curbing the power of plutocracy. This double giant's task, which will probably take centuries to complete, seems specially allotted to the peoples of Northern and Western Europe—the Nordic and Atlantic races. Will they be equal to the task? Only time can show.

II. Trends of Differentiation. Division of Labour. Differentiation Among Women

We believe that the evolution of the family, far from having been completed and crystallized for ever in its present form, has most significant further stages to undergo.

We shall be confirmed in this view by the study of the modern Woman's Movement, which in its *phaseological* aspect we have termed the Differentiation of Women. We have already touched on its causes and will now endeavour to appraise its connection with other sociological processes, its interrelation with other strands in the great web of the differentiation or division of human occupations and activities.

The modern Woman's Movement is the direct continuation and completion of the evolutionary trend of human progress for thousands of years.

Differentiation is a condition of evolution, not only in mental and cultural matters, but in the sub-human world of organic nature.

Throughout the series of living creatures, from the *infusoria* to the mammal, we find that a plant or an animal is graded in the scale of life according to the number of special organs for special purposes which it possesses. In the amœbæ, all functions are united in one gelatinous cell: sensation, motion,

nutrition, digestion, excretion, and reproduction (by fission); all this is executed by one tiny speck of protoplasm. But the mammal has special organs of sensation, from sight to touch, special organs of locomotion in the muscles, special organs of assimilation (salivary glands, liver, and intestines), special organs of thought (in the cerebral cortex), and special apparatus for reproducing its kind.

And evolution did not cease in creating man. There was social differentiation, as there had been organic differentiation. The primeval horde was almost certainly homogeneous; its members lived, worked, and "thought" alike. In the great modern State, populations numbered by millions are distributed among hundreds of different occupations.

We may distinguish three main stages of development in regard to this differentiation; three epochs, from the primeval horde to the modern State.

I. The first epoch is that of division of labour as between the sexes. The men are hunters *par excellence*, and fighters. They supply the animal food to the community, while the women collect the plant food and attend to all other work connected with the household and the children. Thus on this early grade of evolution—among hunters, herdsmen, and rudimentary agriculturists—the people have an *occupational* cleavage corresponding to sex—that is, all men do one kind of economic work and all women do another kind. There are no specialized professions or trades.

II. In the second epoch there is *occupational differentiation among men*. Formerly all the males of the tribe fought and hunted; in the second epoch they *specialize* in tillage of the soil, fishing, hunting, handicrafts, buying and selling, religious ritual, healing, fighting, leadership. The elaboration of possible activities and increase of food resources leads to corresponding increase in the numbers of different occupations and the knowledge and skill they require. Our present statistics enumerate over ten thousand recognized trades and professions! In the second epoch women as a sex had no share in this

process of specialization. With a very few individual exceptions they were restricted to the undifferentiated activities of the household. Male differentiation in trade and profession synchronizes with *civilization* properly so-called and is its most signal characteristic.[1]

III. The third epoch has already begun; its typical manifestation is the extension to women of the civilized variety of occupation and activity. For division of labour does not halt after having swept the last man into its net. Women cannot be immune from sociological processes. Here are a few statistics showing the speed with which this movement has advanced.

There were in Germany in the year

1882	4,259,103 women earners
1895	5,264,393 women earners
1907	8,243,498 women earners

That is to say, 30·7 per cent. of all earners are women, and one-third of the industrial and professional work of the nation is already done by them. In agriculture and cognate work the number of women employed has risen in twelve years from 2,753,000 to 4,254,488; male agricultural labourers have decreased and sought work in towns. In the winter of 1906–7 only 254 women studied at the German Universities; in the winter of 1909–10 there were 1,856—over *seven* times as many.

The first woman professor at a German University was Dr. the Countess von Linden; her University was Bonn, her subject Zoology.[2] In England the first woman Mayor of a town was Miss Dove, the famous head mistress, who was elected by the Councillors of High Wycombe in Buckinghamshire.

The professional and industrial work of women is specially conspicuous in the United States of America. In the year 1909 one woman out of every five in the United States of America was professionally or industrially an earner (5,007,069).

[1] See *History of Social Development, passim.*

[2] *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, iii, p. 530.

Between 1893 and 1909 in the United States the number of women in certain professions increased as follows:

	Approximately per cent.
Law	500
Architecture	217
Ministry of Religion	197·9
Librarianship	116·7
Typewriting and Secretarial Work	305

while those employed in domestic service decreased relatively to the growth of the American population. The population increased at the rate of 21 per cent., the domestic servants by 6 per cent. Women have also occupied high official and administrative posts in the United States of America. A woman occupies the post of General Inspector to the Bureau of Education and at an adequate salary.

At the beginning of this occupational specialization among women it was conventionally regarded as a temporary evil, an unfortunate episode, caused by the sudden emergence of machine production, and to be combated as thoroughly and ceaselessly as child labour.[1] But this view is obsolete. We recognize the working of a cultural necessity, of an evolutionary trend. A nation in which not only men but women as well do specialized and organized work is *ipso facto* culturally higher than one in which only one-half of humanity has variety of occupation and all this implies.

Drawbacks and Defects

Every advance in knowledge and power is at first surrounded by hostile forces, of which human inertia and ignorance are the chief. The number of arguments and objections which have been raised against any measure of freedom for women is legion. Many of them have had to yield to the merciless logic of the accomplished fact. But we must answer two main

[1] This view is apparently still held in some influential quarters! (Translator's Note.)

lines of controversy which still cause perplexity and distress and confuse the issue for many.

The first objection is that earning her living "unsexes" a woman; makes her "unwomanly". The concept of what is or is not natural and becoming in women has varied widely at different times. Among the most primitive peoples it has been "woman's sphere"—for thousands of years—to carry all heavy loads, leaving the men with only their bows, arrows, and spears or clubs; this strikes primitive races as "natural", necessary, and right. Not so long ago (as time goes!) such an eminent thinker as Michel de Montaigne thought that knowledge diminished a woman's attraction and that she must be as ignorant as possible in order to please men. A few decades ago a woman who bicycled or skated was considered very "mannish", if not "fast"; now we despise women who neither keep their bodies fit through some physical exercise or sport, or their minds fresh and alert at the spring of knowledge. Already there has been a change in the most "average" attitude. At the zenith of the Family phase men found a special charm and relish in the weakness, helplessness, timidity, and semi-imbecility of women, to whom it was easy to play the conquering hero and omniscient sage. The men of to-day are rather easily bored by these virtues, and on the whole prefer a woman who can be to some extent a comrade on an equal footing, who can value and admire their achievements, because she can understand something of what they mean.

But what of the woman driven early into the hard competition for a livelihood? Must she not become a neuter or a virago? Experience has already proved the contrary. On the stage, at the Universities, as artists and writers, normal women to-day can be more attractive to normal men than the timid and mentally limited "parlour plant" who never leaves her four walls and has the outlook of arrested development.

Among the ten thousand different trades and professions listed in statistics there are some obviously more suited to women than to men; and it can hardly be maintained that

women would ask to be policemen or stevedores, or men to be florists and milliners and china-painters. There is already to some degree a certain *natural* division of labour, by which each sex creates the values most suited to its aptitudes.

The second objection is much the more important. The opponents of feminism point out that *motherhood*, the most important function of women, *under present conditions* is not compatible with continuous specialized work. If the mother works systematically in a factory or office she cannot look after her children, consequently the races in which there is occupational specialization of women will degenerate or die out. For women, professional life and married life or motherhood are irreconcilable. The most highly intelligent and skilled woman worker is faced by the dilemma: profession *or* marriage? Either the occupation or profession becomes an unbearable fetter, withering and repressing women's deepest instincts, *or* it must be abandoned. The opponents of feminism (the equal share of women in self-determination and cultural advance) declare that for this reason, if no other, such differentiation must for ever be restricted to a small minority of women, and that the overwhelming majority will continue to devote themselves to the family and the home.

On first sight this objection appears final. It is so important that it has persuaded some eminent scientists, even in our own day, to condemn feminism utterly and to seek its extermination, root and branch.

This is a repetition of the eternal gesture of reaction and pessimism. Every substantial cultural advance brings abuses and maladjustments at first, because it breaks into and dislocates previous conditions. The early railways drove carters out of work. When the first torch was carried into an icy hut the smoke was suffocating. Some concluded that the nature of fire was to function in the open air, i.e. that closed rooms could not be warmed. Some, of more forward-looking mind, made a hole in the roof and later evolved the stove and the chimney. It is no service to humanity if we blindly oppose the

deleterious results of each advance, but *it is constructive service* to think out the situation and to meet the difficulties, if necessary, in new ways. But the necessary consequence of the differentiation among women is joint or co-operative housekeeping. There is no other method of adjustment here.[1]

The essential difficulty is not the industrial or professional employment of women in itself, but the primitive nature of much small-scale housekeeping—a type of organization into which the specialized woman does not fit at all. The large-scale co-operative household will remove the incompatibility between motherhood and professional occupation. While the parents were occupied with earning their livelihood the young children of the joint household would be safe from harm, playing or resting in airy rooms and gardens under the charge of specially trained and selected women with a love of little children and thorough knowledge of educational theory; they would learn good habits and manners betimes from these educators; they would themselves educate one another in human nature and provide one another with occupation, exercise, and amusement.

Let us suppose that co-operative housekeeping is supplemented by a generous system of maternity insurance, enabling both the expectant and nursing mother to take a complete rest from outside work for several weeks; this combination of possible resources would enable the modern woman to experience both work in some regular occupation and marriage with child-bearing. We must remember that gestation and lactation do not necessarily fill all a woman's reproductive maturity. It would be possible for an employed woman to devote much of her leisure hours to her children and to exert quite as powerful an influence for good as is possible now between the claims of stove, sink, and washtub. So long as paid employment, professional or industrial, is incompatible with normal marriage, i.e. marriage with a family, most women

[1] The first to clearly recognize and express this truth was probably Lily Braun (*Frauenarbeit und Hauswirtschaft; in Memoiren einer Sozialistin*, vol. ii, 1911, pp. 363–68).

will regard such employment as an unpleasant interim, a preliminary stage to marriage. So they take little pains to learn or do their work efficiently, show very slight "unionizing" capacity, and are badly paid in consequence. In short, feminism (occupational specialism) among women can only become general and equably adjusted through the co-operative household. A new age demands new measures and new activities.

Results of the Professional Differentiation of Women

The Women's Movement is weighted and hampered by something further—by the immense scope and radical nature of the changes with which it must necessarily be associated. For its advocates and its enemies agree that a thoroughgoing specialization among women means the remoulding of our whole cultural life. This conclusion is justified by contemporary observation and by historical analogy. By the time that the differentiation of employment among men had become established the societies in which it was so established passed through enormous changes; they passed from barbarism to civilization in the exact and technical sense of the term. Civilization is in its essence the epoch of full differentiation of occupation among men. In the transition from agricultural barbarism to civilization the use of metals (bronze and iron) must presumably have been as decisive as the invention of large-scale machinery was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[1]

We may then expect that a differentiation of women's occupations and employments on anything like the same scale will be of incalculable importance economically and throughout human life and thought. We cannot hesitate to greet a new cultural dawn, a new epoch, in the Women's Movement, however tentative and hesitating its initial aims.

1. For this much disputed specialism in occupation among women means their economic independence and therefore

[1] For a summary, see *History of Social Development*, pp. 98–111.

their personal independence and self-determination, i.e. an equal status for women with men and the end of men's complete dominance. While man is the food-getter for the whole family, woman is dependent on him and must obey in all essentials. No one can force the man to provide her with more of any necessity of life than is just enough to keep her alive; he does not need to pay any attention to her individual wishes. This means a dependence on another individual, actual and legal, which is not compatible with any human dignity.[1] Some prominent feminists, e.g. Dr. K. Schirmacher and Marianne Weber, as well as the great authority on sexual reform, Professor August Forel,[2] have suggested a legal provision for the payment of a special percentage from the husband's wages or income, to the wife for her work in the household. But this reform is not in harmony with dominant evolutionary trends, and is inconsistent with the essential spirit of the Women's Movement. It would probably only succeed in terrifying even more men than at present avoid legal marriage.

The basis of any individual's claim to independence must be the power to earn his or her own livelihood. Therefore women's liberation means women's self-support—that is, differentiation in employment. While women are dependent on the good will of their bread-winners, the patriarchal despotism of the past will prevail widely. This despotism has made women petty, sly, and servile, and while it lasts, marriage remains an economic institution instead of a *geneonomic* partnership, as it should be.

2. The economic independence of women must change the whole nature of marriage.

To quote the German League for the Protection of Motherhood, "marriage will become a free contract between two ethically and financially independent beings". The absolute dominance of the man, the traditional patriarchate, must cease. Marriage becomes essentially geneonomic—that is, it

[1] *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, ii, p. 533.
[2] Cf. *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, vol. ii (1905), p. 1072.

also differentiates and specializes itself out of the patriarchal household with its multiplicity of functions. It subserves its real purposes of human love, reproduction, and selection with wholesome results.

3. The basis of sexual selection will be altered, or rather really sexual selection (by mutual inclination) will begin. Marriage for dowries or for board and lodging for life will cease to produce devitalized children. Healthy and attractive women will have the preference over heiresses, who may be sickly and subnormal. Sordid economic considerations would no longer poison the institution of marriage as they do now, to the lasting injury of the race.

4. Girls without inherited means would have the possibility of effective freedom of choice. At present the dowryless girls of the middle classes either become old maids or are almost compelled to accept the first suitor who comes along. A leading feminist has compared these girls to "starved-out garrisons", forced to surrender to any *condottiere*. As a rule, only a girl with a dowry—or inherited income—can really *choose* a husband, and the inherited income or dowry at once makes a further conflict possible.

It torments the girl with the gnawing doubt of the real motives of her suitors: is she wooed for herself or for her money? Is she risking victimization by a hypocrite and "gold-digger"? But a woman earning her own livelihood, "by hand or brain", can pick and choose; she is not dependent on a man's favour for bread and a roof, she can find suitors enough if she is a good worker. Almost all women of the industrial working classes who have some trade or employment outside their homes marry, and marry young, and however hard their lot escape the special humiliation and distresses of the penniless maiden "of good family".[1]

5. Paid employment for women would facilitate marriage in many cases. As we have shown, the present standardized marriage contract and the marriage and divorce laws are a

[1] Cf. Max Marcuse, *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, 1910, p. 334.

very serious obstacle, for the husband must undertake the lifelong support of his wife and is often totally ruined in case of an unhappy marriage and unavoidable separation. This is out of the question in marriage with a self-supporting woman. The present German law abolishes the duty of alimony if the wife can support herself "according to her position in life".

Let us consider an objection which will doubtless be made at this point. There can hardly be any doubt that the monogamous tendency has developed with general human culture, and indeed that real monogamy can only be necessary or possible on a high evolutionary level. Polygamous or polyandrous marriage, not to speak of group marriage, is surely incompatible with modern individual psychology. But the *duration* of marriage is a very different matter, as has been admitted since the legalization of divorce. There is a necessary harmony and interaction here. Since personal love first arose in humanity the tendency to monogamy has grown strong enough to enable the law to dispense with compulsion, but this compulsion still holds many persons together who are hopelessly incompatible.[1]

6. Marriages could be entered on much earlier in life if both partners were self-supporting. The great co-operative households we have envisaged, would enable young people to marry without incurring ruinous debts. A wider choice of possible marriage partners, more humane and reasonable marriage laws, and marriage at the most appropriate age would deprive sexual relationships outside marriage of all justification and excuse.[2] Such relationships would be condemned by public opinion, and prostitution and venereal disease would become much rarer, if not wholly extinct. Youth would once more have its right to the joy of life and there would be no more need to fear "race suicide".

7. Marriage liberated from the cash nexus would develop finer possibilities, and unhappy marriages would be almost

[1] Dr. Müller-Lyer appears to overlook some very important considerations here. (Translator's Note.)

[2] A highly disputable general statement. (Translator's Note.)

unknown. Most thoroughly unhappy marriages only retain the semblance of continuing for the reason that neither man nor woman can *economically afford to part*. The woman has no other means of livelihood, the man cannot pay alimony or run two households. Economic autonomy of both partners would make marriage dependent on mutual feeling and on the children. Moreover, the education of the children could be largely undertaken by the joint household and the nursery school.

8. Marriage reform and the liberation of the family from stereotyped economic functions would make it much easier for the community to tackle that reform of inheritance, which is necessary if the class State of to-day is to become a commonwealth of social justice, a commonwealth whose members live and work without unfair restrictions and advantages; where the rich man's heir is not preferred to the efficient, and where aptitudes and enthusiasm determine the profession of a lifetime. In such a commonwealth neither merit nor guilt would be inherited automatically, but would express individual character and effort, and it would be possible to put into practice the maxim: As the service is, so should be the reward.

9. The differentiation of women in employment would greatly increase the sum-total of economic output, as must be obvious, as it would mean that many more workers were employed. Therefore the *hours* of those employed could be humanely reduced. The greater mortality of men is largely due to their *occupations*, and to overwork through accident or disease. At agricultural employment men's death-rate is no greater than women's. The emancipation of women would indeed liberate and benefit *men* to an even greater degree.[1]

10. The development of women into independent per-

[1] The objection is still raised sometimes that there are no women of genius. This is, first of all, irrelevant. The differentiation of women does not depend on exceptional individuals, but on the systematic work of the majority under adequate social conditions. Very few men have achieved work which stamps them as possessing *genius*, and there have been women of genius (George Sand, George Eliot, Rosa Bonheur, Sophie Kovalevska, Mme Curie) whose work was far above the average human level.

sonalities through the way of self-support will change them from what they are now, namely, the most reactionary members of the community. It will make them full partakers in modern progress, and this must influence the remotest departments of life. Dogmatic theology, which has been specially cherished and handed on by women from one generation to another, must make way for a view of life at once nobler and more rational. Ethics, codes of law, art—all may receive beautiful and tender enrichment through women, for much has remained to reform and construct throughout the ages of men's dominance and monopoly.

We may say, then, that the differentiation in occupation and employment among men led out of barbarism into civilization. The differentiation among women will lead out of this very faulty and barbarous civilization into a new phase, and this transformation may be expected to accomplish itself on purely evolutionary lines, gradually and piecemeal, gathering sweep and force with each generation. Certainly it will take long, very long, to adapt the unwieldy conservatism of law, custom (or morals), and religion to the changed—and still ever-changing—basis of economics. But we are already justified in considering the modern Women's Movement one of the most significant and important of all.

III. Evolutionary Trend of Individualism

There is another evolutionary trend which may be traced throughout geneonomic progress. It is barely perceptible at first, then it emerges and becomes conspicuous *pari passu* with the development of culture, till it constitutes one of the chief dynamic forces; this is *individualism.*

Definition

What does this much used and abused term mean? Let us attach a definite concept to the word.

Each individual being is born with special faculties, urges, or impulses and capacities which are the motives of their actions throughout life.

Modern psychology demonstrates that the impulses of self-preservation, of reproduction or sex, the social or gregarious impulse, the play impulse, and the impulse of curiosity are the bases of human character from which our motives and actions derive. The more intensely and completely these impulses can be gratified, the more harmoniously they can interact—the more fully mankind is realizing its mission and purpose.

But ex-human reality opposes the realization of man's impulses. Nature's tribute can only be wrested from the elements by hard work, and life together with his kind is only possible through a system of inhibitions, compulsions, and concessions. Mankind deals with nature as a community, but the struggle against social obligations and restrictions is waged by each and all of us *alone, as individuals*. We call this ceaseless struggle individualism. Individualism is the effort of human beings to manage their lives according to their own impulses and wishes, to "go their own way", to do things "on their own responsibility", to choose and to refuse what life offers, as they prefer; to "express their individuality", and thus to develop the powers and urges of their own organism to the highest degree. Individualism is the effort to exercise *free will*, the quest for liberty or for happiness.

There is a certain harmony between the interests of the community and those of its members as individuals. But there are also oppositions and incompatibilities. The freedom of one ends where that of another begins. Experience clearly shows that if circumstances make anyone able to exercise or increase his freedom of action at another's expense, the opportunity will generally be taken. The history of the world has instances on every page. Many thinkers have been led to regard individualism and egotism as identical, even to construct "philosophical" systems in which ruthless egotism was glorified as the fine flower of human individuality.

But oppression and exploitation do not help the free expression of individuality. An oppressor postulates oppressed persons as well; and for one despot there must be ten slaves. What one wins, many lose. Even the individual gain is questionable. Oppression and exploitation are essentially parasitic, and biology shows us that degeneration is the fate of the parasite and exhaustion of its host and victim.

Psychologically there is a sharp distinction between egotism and individualism. Human beings are social or gregarious creatures. They have definite impulses to co-operate with, to help, and to please their fellow-men, as well as impulses of self-preservation and sex. These social or altruistic impulses may become so overwhelming that they may extinguish even the fierce primal urge to live and keep on living, as is shown in the stories of Decius Mus, Arnold von Winkelried, and countless others. The social impulse makes solitude difficult or terrifying; vanity (a specially marked characteristic of the social impulse) or the love of approbation and praise make mankind very dependent on the approval of other men; and there are finer ingredients. There is pity, which, lighted by sufficient imagination, shows his own suffering in others' pangs and his own slavery in others' servitude; every normal person has a certain instinctive inclination to go to the help of an ill-treated child or a drowning adult. Without this social or gregarious (or even altruistic) trend in human nature, no human community or human survival would have been possible, nor could human states coalesce and function to-day, in spite of all their apparatus of police force, law, and religious sanctions.

But we have defined individualism as the effort of human beings to express their individuality, to develop the powers and urges of their own organism to the highest degree. The social impulse is a fundamental urge in human beings. If it is not satisfied, human beings will not be happy or functionally complete any more than if sheer hunger for food or thwarted sexual needs torment their imagination and weaken their

bodies. We speak of normal human beings. There are some who are not normal. They suffer either from grave inherent defect—the so-called "moral or emotional imbecility"—or from the effects of an "education" which is simply psychic mutilation; and the altruistic sentiments and habits are beyond their capacity. Egotism, far from representing the quintessence of individualism, is its crudest form, the individual expression of the *ill-bred* or the morally *defective* person.

These somewhat general observations may be illustrated and amplified by a short summary of the history of individualism, which should show its trend.

Historical Development of Individualism

1. The primal human horde probably knew as little individual consciousness as the animal herd or pack. The individual unit is one of the herd or horde. If we observe the habits of *ants* or *bees* we must conclude that each insect is almost as much a *part* of the community as each cell in an animal's body is a part of that animal. A bee stings automatically, though the sting costs her her life. Among mammals, like sheep and cattle, the gregarious impulse absorbs nearly all individual life. The original human communities must have been on almost the same level. Among the most primitive peoples known to us, custom, tradition, the interests and habits of the horde or tribe dominate all individual activities; there is very little personal choice or personal freedom.

Thus we must recognize the oldest—and, of course, instinctive and unconscious—principle, both of human and subhuman communities, as *social*: the social entity dominates.

2. *The Subjugation of Women.*—For thousands of years the masterless, homogeneous human hordes roved and multiplied; then, probably about the time of the discovery and use of fire, individualism appeared in its crudest form, brutal and reckless, beyond our power to imagine. The discovery of fire and the invention of tools and weapons gave men a great

advantage over women. This advantage was used to the uttermost—women became the first slaves. Their forcible capture and abduction led to individual marriage—at least this appears the most probable explanation—and to the separate family, i.e. to the absolute dominance and mastery of the man over his little group of dependents.

In the zenith of the Tribal or Kinship epoch there is a swing of the geneonomic pendulum. The family is subjected to influences which in many cases appear to have abolished it, and the communal principle is victorious, in work and life. But this stage was relatively brief. Surplus energy means surplus goods, i.e. *wealth*, wealth leads to the *purchase of women*. The patriarchal family with male descent and dominance is re-established. Individualism evolves another manifestation.

3. *The Enslavement of Men.*—Women were the first slaves. But with the authoritarian State the human community organized for war and plunder; an organized minority governs and exploits an unorganized majority by force of arms.

This division of humanity into masters and slaves was certainly helpful to culture and progress by making it possible for a leisured class to give time to philosophy, art, and political administration. Moreover, the natural human vice of laziness was "driven out" by the vice of greed for power; human beings began to learn the habit of *sustained* effort and attention, i.e. of hard work. But the finer aspects of individualism were latent. Violence and servitude are the characteristics of this stage of human history.

4. The rule of force was followed by the rule of wealth. Accumulated wealth changes the warrior State into the State organized for trade. The merchant and the creditor or capitalist emerge beside the soldier and the priest. The ruling class becomes a plutocracy, monopolizing the means of subsistence and pauperizing the majority. The State declines and crumbles.

5. Again life emerges from decay. The mass of the people become conscious of their misery; they reason, question, and hope. A new idea dawns, that the egotistic form of individual

action does not bring happiness, but dooms victor and vanquished alike. An incalculable aspiration, vague and indefinite but overwhelming, enters the minds of men in the authoritarian civilizations. Confucius in China, Buddha in India, Christ in the Roman Empire proclaim the equal worth of all, the humanity of the poor and the slave and the outcast, the love of one's neighbour. But the great new vision came before there was the hard material foundation for such a dazzling temple. The healing fountain trickled away into the sand, and the religion of altruism was buried under the mountains of superstition.

6. But progress continued on the economic side. Industry was quickened by natural science into productions of hitherto unimaginable efficiency and scope. Man's power over nature has increased to a point which makes a *tolerable and truly human existence for all* a possibility; and this possibility of individualism without exploitation becomes unmistakably evident—in conjunction with another idea. Human beings begin to recognize that they are *social* beings, and can only live fully and completely on a social basis; that only work justly earns wealth; that a redistribution of socially produced property must be the new principle of social organization; and that all economic acquisition without exertion is to be condemned, as all have an equal right to the reward of what work they do.

Individual egotism, as expressed in authority and servitude, wages a long and bitter struggle with *social individualism*. The perfectibility of its individual members is the *purpose* of the organized State. The community is the means of achieving this purpose—and the only means by which it can be achieved.

The most far-reaching change is economic. Individualism in business methods had reached its zenith during the Full Capitalist phase; a zenith expressed by "unrestricted competition" and Manchesterism.[1] Such an extreme had to have a rapid revulsion. "Unrestricted competition" soon dug its own grave by compelling labour to organize against the employing

[1] Cf. *History of Social Development*, pp. 111, 184–92, 278–303.

class and to fight for living wages and tolerable hours and conditions. In the most prosperous and necessary departments of industry, cartels, syndicates, trusts, and rings were formed, tending to become virtual monopolies and restricting the freedom of their constituent members and organizations. *But as soon as a trade has become ripe for monopoly, its socialization is necessary in the interests of the community.*[1]

The producers lose their individual independence in almost every branch of output and become interdependent with others, other individuals, concerns, and industries. But as individualism is checked in economic *production* it concentrates on *consumption.* For individual human nature will only submit to strict routine and dependence and subjection in productive industry, if it is compensated by a *very large amount of security and freedom in spending.*[2] This change is perhaps most pronounced in Great Britain. The country which produced the Manchester School of Economics in the nineteenth century is now set for collectivism, "full steam ahead". Certain Dominions of the British Empire, such as New Zealand and Australia, are the most advanced countries of the world in their social administration.

SYNOPSIS

The development of individualism passed through three stages:

I. AN EXCLUSIVELY SOCIALISTIC EPOCH

Herd or horde life is the rudimentary form of human association. Individuals have as yet no fully active personal consciousness and they are absorbed in the life of the horde.

II. AN EXCLUSIVELY INDIVIDUALISTIC EPOCH

expressed in egotism and self-aggrandizement at others' expense, in three successive forms:

[1] Cf. *History of Social Development*, pp. 295–99.
[2] Cf. G. D. H. Cole's *The Next Ten Years.*

(*a*) The enslavement of women.
(*b*) The enslavement of men.
(*c*) The rule of wealth.

III. An Epoch of Social Individualism

in which the community is sufficiently well organized to permit free play to the individualities of its members—with limits exacted by the rights and welfare of others. Individuals enjoy more leisure and security through adequate communal organization, and can devote more time to personal achievement and personal happiness.

Trend and Purpose of Individualism.—Advancing culture means increasing individualism. Individual development and variety are the *trend* of culture, the direction in which it is growing. Unawakened among members of the pre-human and earliest human hordes, individualism first arose at a certain important stage of development in the form of oppressive and aggressive selfishness, breaking down the resistance of weaker beings. As the community grows larger, at once more *varied* and more *integrated*, the possibility of "individualism without oppression", i.e. of social individualism, grows with it and can now become the principle of human effort and association.

As individualism is an *emergent* or *evolving* tendency, we may assume that it will *increase* in the future.

To what *purpose* does it tend?

In what ways will it, presumably, be manifest?

The individualism of mankind in the future will, we believe, be directed, not to the oppression of others, but to the liberation of the ego. It will oppose needless restrictions and "dead levels". Just as the ancient individualism freed itself from the tribal communism of the Kinship group, so modern individualism opposes the outworn structure of the family and those geneonomic customs which are *vestigial* from past stages of history.

Human beings who have attained to the finer and more enlightened kind of individualism aim—even unconsciously—at the *fullness and perfection of human experience*. This aim is in certain circumstances opposed to the preservation and reproduction of the race.

So long as reproduction followed automatically on the gratification of the second most important natural impulse there was no need to worry about the continuance of the race, in spite of enormous infant mortality. But reproduction has now been to some extent brought under the calculating and foreseeing action of the human reason. Concurrently with this new knowledge, the responsibilities of rearing and educating children often mean renunciation of personal pleasures, physical and mental, and of any sustained development. If human beings are faced by the dread choice between offering their personal security, comfort, achievement, and pleasure to the claims of children not yet conceived, and—taking certain precautions; we know very well which alternative they will choose. We have discussed this urgent problem of Neo-Malthusianism and celibacy in our tenth chapter. *In certain circumstances* more evolved desires and impulses *deflect* the crude primitive urges, and the continuance of the race is imperilled. And as the knowledge and habits at first monopolized by the governing class are made accessible to the masses, all leading modern States will sooner or later be faced by the dilemma: race suicide or progress into efficient social-individualism?

Thus we can see how critical and crucial is the phase of development into which we have been born. The monopoly of property and means of production by the minority would alone be enough to ruin the future of any nation, but we have another cause of decay at work in the operation of individualism in a *milieu* already poisoned by economic injustice. The danger is imminent; will it be averted in time?

The conventional prescription, administered in countless sermons, speeches, newspaper articles, etc., is the discipline of

sacrifice, patriotism, return to the good old ways of the family's zenith. Again the eternal blindness of reaction that tries to preach away an advance in culture in order to prevent the abuses and defects inseparable from any advance. But the obscurantism does no good, rather harm. *If individualism will no longer tolerate obsolete institutions and customs, then new and appropriate geneonomic forms must be found.* Mankind is not made for institutions, but institutions for mankind; and definite individualities need institutions which respect personal freedom. Thus the trend of evolution is an argument in favour of our conclusion that growing culture will entail wider, freer, and more diverse geneonomic arrangements, i.e. arrangements to meet the needs of sex and of parenthood.

IV. The Evolutionary Trend of Socialization

Hand in hand with the *individuation* of the separate human personality we find the *co-operation*, the *socialization* of mankind. This might be termed the main current of evolution, the spinal column of human culture, the foundation of all progress. It has been dealt with in the second volume of this series, *History of Social Development*,[1] and the thesis there set forth may be summarized as follows: The essential force of humanity and its superiority over other species do not consist in the muscular or mental powers of individuals, but in the capacity for working together, for association and co-operation, by which men become, as it were, cells in a huge super-organism, and an organism which grows steadily in power and capacity, spreading itself over the whole planet by thousands of intricate nerves and muscular channels. All the greatest cultural achievements have been due to more *intensive* and *extensive co-operation*, to progressive *socialization*.

This progressive and cumulative socialization has changed the human race from a peculiarly helpless slave of natural forces, to the master of this planet. And as the power of the

[1] George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 10s. 6d. net. Published 1920, reprinted 1923.

species grows, so also does the power of its individual members, or rather their *potentialities*; and this increased individual variety and capacity is, as it were, a glorious fruit on the great tree of co-operation and socialization. Without the community of mankind there could be no culture; man in *entire* isolation would not be *any personality*, as we understand the term, but a speechless idiot, doomed to swift extinction.

Socialization of resources and functions proceeds to evolve new ways of life, ever more powerful, intricate, and various. The *biological* associations, tribal and familial, relinquish their offices one by one.

Thus we may recognize the *growth of socialization* as the deeper cause of the supersession successively of Kinship group and Family. This is specially marked in economics and industry. The socialization of labour and production has been immensely accelerated in our own age by large-scale capitalism and international trade. Production for the producer's own use has become production for the exchange of the wares produced. And as the evolutionary law of socialization is one of the most important, or rather the most important, of all directional lines of development,[1] we must come to the conclusion, from this angle of vision as well as from others, that the socialization of activities now exercised by the family, such as food-preparation and education of children, will be continued and completed.

V. Evolutionary Trend of the Law of Form,[2] Association, Differentiation, Integration

In the *History of Social Development* a further law of human evolution was enunciated. We termed it the "Law of Form". "The development of labour organization is caused by the continued entry of new elements, and with every new element there arises a new phase. But the new element does not so much supplant the older one as join on to it, so that the organization of labour is continually adding fresh forms to

[1] See *History of Social Development, passim.*

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 255–56.

those it already has, and only later on do the older ones wither away. At every step the element that was first appearing in the last phase will become the main characteristic of the following one."

From the earliest times to the present age *seven* successive types of organization have emerged, and in the following order:

1. The horde, tribe, or Kinship group.
2. The familial household.
3. The trade with foreigners, or external commerce.
4. The authoritarian household (manor) or estate.
5. Free handicrafts.
6. The capitalist enterprise.
7. The socialized service, whether national, parochial, municipal, or co-operative.

Must we assume that the possibilities of social organization have been exhausted? Is not our present age sufficiently complex in activity and tense in energy to evolve its own typical institution? Is it likely that the power of organic growth and adaptation should suddenly fail before the peculiar conditions of our age? To ask these questions is to answer them with No! But what will be the typical institution of our age, the eighth among the great economic institutions of human history?

All the lines of human progress, which we have followed up to the present time, converge and meet in one focus, and this focal point is the *joint co-operative household*, which we must therefore accept as the *eighth type of economic institution*, according to all laws of probability.

We have stated the case for believing the co-operative large-scale joint household to be superior to the small family household, economically, geneonomically, ethically, and in all cultural essentials. As large-scale industry has superseded retail production, so large-scale domestic economy must supersede small.

There are certainly immense obstacles in the way of this

reform. We have admitted them, but we must not lose our historical perspective. In this respect the large-scale co-operative household has no more to contend with than its predecessors. Hardly any of the seven great economic institutions have been definitely desired or deliberately designed by individual human beings, but have rather been evolved and imposed upon mankind through evolutionary processes; through what is traditionally termed "The Power of Destiny".

For mankind only becomes deliberately constructive and progressive at an advanced stage of culture. By nature, human beings are extremely lazy and conservative. If the wishes of the average human being had set the pace there would probably have been no appreciable cultural progress whatever.

We must, however, observe that the "Law of Form" in sociology does not at all imply the total *abolition* of the small familial household. "The new element does not so much supplant the older one as join on to it"; and it is to be anticipated that both the small domestic household and the large joint co-operative household will exist in the Cultural phase which is now dawning, side by side, interacting on each other, and on the other social and economic institutions.

Obviously changes of such scope and intricacy do not occur with lightning velocity! They are not the fruit of one revolutionary gesture, but demand a prolonged and gradually evolutionary process, probably lasting for centuries. For they imply new ways of thinking and feeling, another kind of social "climate" and more evolved, intelligent, and sensitive individuals. But the average of the race changes very slowly and gradually. Imagine, for instance, the disgust and dismay with which our great-great-grandmothers would learn the possibility that the girls of to-day would go into the world to earn their livelihood as men do! Minds with no sociological training or standards of accuracy are *victims* of the most naïve *transference*, i.e. of the inclination to attribute the habits and sentiments of the present time indiscriminately, alike to the remote past and to the future.

VI. The Evolutionary Trend of "Imperative Energy"

Perhaps the most universal in its application of all evolutionary trends is that to which the so-called "theory of energy" applies. Ostwald[1] designated this principle "imperative energy", and Avenarius called it the "minimum expenditure of force". Applied to sociology, it means that the energy of humanity, which is *au fond* a highly developed form of solar energy, takes those forms which are most favourable to happiness and complexity of function as culture advances. It would be easy to point out the close correspondence of this (doubly!) illuminating theory with the course of geneonomic development as outlined above. But philosophical considerations are out of place in sociological argument, and a fuller discussion and application of the theory of cosmic energy must be reserved for the final volume of this sociological series.

Enough of evolutionary trends considered in general. Let us now consider those characteristics of our age in which the current has set full away from the Late Familial and towards the Early Personal phase. First of all art, especially poetry and fiction and modern literature generally.

The Early Literature of Personality

As poetry and fiction (like all art) mirror life and sociological fact, we may expect new elements to be active and a new attitude in evidence. A literary treatise would be out of place here; a few comments should suffice to prove that the spirit of the age is no longer familial, but personal or individual.

Modern literature is preoccupied with sexual problems to a hitherto unexampled degree. The intense preoccupation is its most conspicuous feature. We admit that "Love has always been the soul of poetry" among civilized peoples (not among primitives), but the amount of space and significance attached to geneonomy in modern literature would be incom-

[1] Wilhelm Ostwald, *Die Energie*, chap. xii.

prehensible to the past ages. There are very few dramas and novels now, in which the pangs and burdens of human passion do not supply the dominant note from start to finish. And this intense preoccupation with Eros in all the departments of his kingdom—as well as the popularity of the subject among readers—proves that the love-life of most modern men and women is not entirely wholesome or satisfactory. And indeed the constant refrain is disillusionment, *malaise*, longing for something better, something, at least, *different*.

What is the second noticeable characteristic of such modern literature as has any purpose or value, ethical or artistic? Its strongly individualistic standpoint. The novel of the nineteenth century, ending with the "engagement" or at the altar, has been replaced by the novel of married life. And married life is dealt with almost wholly in a critical and negative spirit. Unhappiness, acute conflicts, the eternal triangle, adultery in all its shades and grades are depicted and "analysed", i.e. made understandable. The enormous questioning and deflation of traditional values here may be illustrated by the comparison between Voss's *Luise* and Maupassant's *Une Vie*. On the one side a serene idyll, ending with a lawful betrothal amid general approval and satisfaction; on the other, the long Calvary of the woman in subjection, of the "wife and mother".

The first flashes of this new light in Germany were Hippel's work *Über die Ehe* (*Concerning Marriage*) and Schlegel's *Lucinde*. Its first conspicuous German manifestation was in the work (and even more in the life) of Goethe. Goethe, the great pioneering individualist, lived his life so variously and intensely that Fate has almost made him the archetype and ideal of modern humanity.[1]

And the more recent "thinkers and makers" breathe a modern atmosphere, even when they treat a subject of the familial world. We may cite one example among many.

[1] Cf. the English Romantics, Godwin, Shelley, Byron, Trelawney, Leigh Hunt, Mary Wollstonecraft, De Quincey. (Translator's Note.)

Theodor Fontane's novel, *Effy Briest,* is a perfect reproduction in fictional form of the standards and conditions of the traditional family. A seventeen-year-old girl of noble family is betrothed by her parents to a country squire in his forties, whom she has never learned to know even as an acquaintance. He has been her mother's suitor in his youth. After the marriage she lives in a small country town beside a coolly respectable and ceremonious husband. She has no adequate duties or interests to fill her time; she is idle and bored, and emotionally starved. An intrigue follows. Years afterwards her husband learns for the first time of his wife's "fall", calls out the seducer and kills him. She is ostracized, deserted by all her relatives and acquaintances, alone and regarded with shame and scorn. She falls into a decline and dies. This novel is *traditional* in its characters, action, and atmosphere. And yet, although the little *chef-d'œuvre* is written with objective clarity and delicate discretion, the author's indignant pity shines through it; one feels in him the new spirit and the condemnation of the traditional standard as wholly barbarous. The same attitude of the modern man to traditional material is much more drastically expressed in Ibsen's work. In his prose epic of the Hamburg merchant classes in the nineteenth century, *Buddenbrooks*, Thomas Mann ridicules the familial point of view of his prosperous plutocrats. And women writers —or women writers who count at all—have generally freed themselves from traditional standards. Neera's *Theresa* depicts the ideal "sweet young girl" of the nineteenth-century home, repressed and restricted, ashamed of love and of her body, helplessly submissive; but Ruth Bré's *Staatskinder oder Mutterrecht* (*Children of the State or Matriarchy?*) voices the awakened woman, who throws down a ringing challenge to all superstitions and compulsions. Indeed, most writers of any merit who express themselves on sexual problems now are individualists.[1] While pseudo-literature, rubbish, "printed

[1] Herewith a selection of representative names, English, German, French, Scandinavian, and American: Theodore Dreiser, Upton Sinclair, Sinclair

matter only", is familial and traditional so far as it has any coherent tendency at all. Of course some of the most famous recent and contemporary poets and novelists are traditional in their standard of values: e.g. Paul Bourget, Marcel Prévost, and Gabriele d'Annunzio,[1] though the subjects they treat by preference are the sex problems of unhappy marriage or emotional incompatibility and disillusion. Finally, Nietzsche, though so versatile in his brilliance that many of his devotees regard him as the greatest of moderns, is thoroughly traditional here. But he has the distinctive note of proclaiming traditional views as the summit of human evolution, and following them out to their extreme logical conclusion.

Legislation

Literature expresses the intimate thoughts and desires of its cultural period and thus often outruns reality. Legislation, as is well known, lags behind life. For laws are solidified customs and habits, just as writing is solidified speech. The inevitable drawback of this process is the tendency of laws to perpetuate outworn things, and thus to hinder and repress new things which are codified tardily and inadequately.

Therefore we will not expect to find the modern spirit incorporated in our legal codes or even in their interpretation. But even these granite walls are being slowly demolished and rebuilt. A very few but crucial instances herewith of the manner in which the Early Individual phase is being made manifest in the laws.

Lewis, Ethel Coburn Mayne, Rose Macaulay, Havelock Ellis, Edward Carpenter, Edith Ellis, Olive Schreiner, Victor Margueritte, V. Sackville West, Virginia Woolf, Naomi Mitchison, J. B. S. Haldane, Eden and Cedar Paul, Else Jerusalem, Rosa Mayreder, Helene Stöcker, J. P. Jacobsen, Maria Janitschek, Lily Braun, Richard Dehmel, Ricarda Huch, Gabriele Reuter, Klara Viebig, Arthur Schnitzler, Frank Wedekind, Radclyffe Hall, Naomi Royde-Smith, Peter Nansen, Gustav Frenssen, Colette Willy, Bertrand Russell, Georg Hirth, Cicely Hamilton, Agnes Hennigsen. And, though now established national institutions, Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells. (Translator's Note.)

[1] To some extent also D. H. Lawrence, though with a new standard of freedom in discussion. (Translator's Note.)

(*a*) *Women's Legal Status and Rights*

John Stuart Mill, in his classic on *The Subjection of Women*, pointed out that by the English law of his time a wife could do nothing without her husband's permission, at least his *tacit* permission, as "silence gives consent". She could acquire no property: at the moment she acquired it, it became *ipso facto* his. The children carried in her womb, born at the risk of her life, were his. He alone was their legal parent, their mother could decide nothing respecting them without his consent and as his representative. Even after his death she could only be her children's legal guardian if her husband provided accordingly in his will. What a change since then in the lives and status of Englishwomen! In the year 1884 the Married Woman's Property Act gave them full rights over property they inherited or money they earned.

In Germany the Civil Code, the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, has also liberated women's earnings from their husbands' disposal. Paragraphs 1365 and 1367 decree that a wife may freely dispose of her "property reserves"—that is, of money or goods earned by her own work. This one paragraph proves how the freedom of women's personality depends on their right to do independent paid work! As soon as occupational specialism among women reached a certain point, the law took cognizance and accepted the logical results. In former ages German women were such perpetual minors that after the husband's death the guardianship of their children fell to male relations rather than to them, but now a widow is her children's legal guardian (since 1900), and even a widow who has been divorced. Compulsory celibacy of women teachers has been abolished almost everywhere except in Germany, though there has been a reaction in Austria.[1] The Lower Austrian Landtag (Provincial Assembly) on November 1, 1905, decided that all women teachers, married or single, should be addressed as

[1] In post-war England the position is still very unsatisfactory. See the publications of the Open Door Council (Open Door International). (Translator's Note.)

"Frau"; and in France every adult woman is addressed as "Madame".

The political and civic rights of women have advanced enormously of recent decades. Many States have accorded them the active franchise, and some the right to be elected to public offices. In New Zealand women have had both rights since 1893; in Australia since 1902. These sociological pioneer States have set an example to Europe which has already been followed in Norway. In 1907 the vote and the right to be elected to the Storthing were accorded to all women of, or over, twenty-five, or paying taxes on a low level of yearly income (about £25), or married to men paying such taxes. This enfranchises 300,000 women. Norwegian women have the same rights in earning as men; they dispose freely of what they have earned; they have full access to the Universities and to all public offices.[1] In Finland also women have the vote, and all probabilities indicate that electoral equality between men and women is only a matter of a few decades' delay.[2]

(*b*) *Marriage Laws*

The civic and political enfranchisement of women is accompanied by an improvement and refinement of the institution of marriage.

Until recent times the Church was omnipotent in marriage, and all possible pressure was applied, first to make then to keep an indissolubly permanent partnership as the only legal form.[3] The first improvement was the introduction of civil marriage during the French Revolution. This gave the signal for the legalized *dissolubility* of marriage, whether by divorce or separation, in almost all modern States. But the grounds

[1] Castberg, "Die demokratische Entwicklung in Norwegen", *Dokumente des Forschritts*, i, p. 530.

[2] This equality now exists in most post-war States: the United States of America, Russia, Germany, Austria, Scandinavian kingdoms, Canada, Irish Free State. Not in France. In Britain the decisive dates were November 1918 (limited franchise, property age limit of 30 years) and 1929 (on the same terms as men). (Translator's Note.)

[3] See Chapter IX. Also the work of Lecky, Havelock Ellis, John Stuart Mill.

for divorce and the facilities for separation vary widely in different countries. In Switzerland, for example, a divorce may be obtained at the petition of one of the partners if supported by motives which seem to the judge to be adequate. But in Belgium both spouses must agree in desiring divorce (so-called Divorce by Consent). In France, on the other hand, divorce is only obtainable (1) if one spouse is condemned to imprisonment or penal servitude; (2) if adultery is proved—and this means any adultery by the wife, but on the husband's part adultery with aggravating circumstances, such as the use of the *domicile conjugale*; (3) in case of grave physical injuries and insults. The French Law shows clearly that very restricted grounds for divorce directly promote sexual relations outside marriage.[1] And in Germany the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch did not facilitate divorce, but restricted it under the Catholic influence of the Centre Party in politics. The former Divorce Law of the Kingdom of Prussia permitted dissolution of a marriage in which one spouse only had so deep and intense an aversion to its continuance that reconciliation was impossible. The Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch no longer recognizes the "unconquerable aversion" of both partners as a ground for divorce.[2]

In another direction Germany is more progressive. Since May 25, 1903, a mother employed in an insurable occupation may claim assistance *during six weeks*, when she gives birth to a child, whether this child is born in wedlock or not; an enormous ethical achievement when we remember the medieval attitude, the exposure of girls and women to public insult, the hounding to child murder. In Norway a marriage may be legally dissolved by mutual consent, and although the Norwegian laws are the most liberal of (pre-war) Europe, Norway has fewer divorces than any other European country![3]

[1] The same might be said of the present divorce law of England, though slightly ameliorated in 1923. (Translator's Note.)

[2] The Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch is at present undergoing revision and redrafting (1930). (Translator's Note.)

[3] *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, 1910, pp. 501–02. The *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* of February 8, 1914, describes a Divorce Supper, celebrated at the house of a prosperous merchant of Christiania (Oslo). Husband and

In Sweden *free* marriage (i.e. what is termed companionate marriage without Civil Contract) is accepted under certain legally specified conditions, and women living in this type of union have the same rights as in the marriage sanctioned by the State.

We may therefore distinguish the following stages of liberation in the history of the institution of marriage since the triumph of Christianity.

I. Exclusively ecclesiastical jurisdiction and ceremony. Absolute indissolubility.
II. Ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction. Divorce possible though strictly limited.
III. Civil Contract without ecclesiastical interference.
IV. Free marriage, i.e. private marriage contracts without State interference. The State only intervenes if and when the parents fail in their duty to their children. For even in Free Marriage, freedom ceases where the rights of third parties are infringed.

Obviously the Marriage Laws can only become freer as mankind grows in sympathy and sense of responsibility. It would be senseless to abolish the present marriage laws so long as sexual habits have not improved.[1] But it is certain that there has been a "Coming of Age" in matters of human love during the Later Familial phase. We *have* juster, more merciful, more decent ideas and sentiments than our medieval ancestors concerning love and marriage, concubinage and prostitution—above all, concerning the personality of women and also of children. In those "ages of chivalry" bishops drew revenue from brothels! Even since the age of Goethe we may thankfully record an appreciable improvement.

wife "had been married for six years, and experienced much happiness together and also much grief. Now that the time had come to part, and each go their own way, they both desired their deep mutual thankfulness for the happiness each had given and received to sound above all other notes in their Farewell!"

[1] Cf. Edward Carpenter, *Love's Coming of Age*, p. 163.

(c) *The Position of Children*

We have already recorded the increased share taken by State, Municipality, and voluntary Associations in the protection of children. Here we may find an admirable example of the trend towards socialization, even though its inception has been somewhat timid and incoherent.[1]

The evolutionary trend of the most modern developments in the marriage laws and the status of children may be formulated as follows: Marriage is more and more regarded and treated as a private matter, but the education and care of children becomes more and more a national responsibility and concern.[2]

Societies for Geneonomic Reforms

This new Woman's Movement and Movement for the Study and Protection of Children have conquered not only Government departments, but voluntary organized effort as well. We may note the "Deutsche Gesellschaft zur Bekämpfung der Geschlechtskrankheiten" (German Society for Combating Venereal Diseases), which has first of all dared to cast aside the fatal secrecy which has smothered sexual enlightenment, and to hold its meetings for discussion in public. At the beginning of the year 1905 the "Bund für Mutterschutz und Reform der sexuellen Ethik" (League for the Protection of Motherhood and Reform of Sexual Ethics) was founded in Germany with the main objects of protecting unmarried mothers and their children, of combating sexual injustice and prejudice, and of promoting a thorough reform of the institution of marriage. It was founded by a group of very able, sincere, and courageous

[1] Cf. The post-war Children's Charter of the League of Nations. (Translator's Note.)

[2] Miss J. H. Clapperton, a pioneer feminist, wrote in 1885: "Legal changes are required in two directions, viz. towards greater freedom as to marriage and greater strictness as to parentage. The marriage union is essentially a private matter in which society has no call and no right to interfere. Childbirth, on the contrary, is a public event. It touches the interests of the whole nation." *Scientific Meliorism*, p. 320. See also Ellen Key's well-known work.

women—Helene Stöcker, Ruth Bré, Maria Lisznevska, Adele Schreiber, Gabriele Reuter, Henriette Fürth—and a number of eminent thinkers have joined it.[1]

A great ethical achievement is the power of co-operation and organization among women who have been considered hopelessly hostile to one another in the past. Now they join forces on many issues and make their influence felt politically and culturally.

The leading women's organizations in Germany, beside the "Bund für Mutterschutz", are the "Bund deutscher Frauenvereine", or League of German Women's Societies, which is predominantly Conservative; the "Verband fortschrittlicher Frauenvereine", or League of Progressive Women's Societies; the International Federation for the Abolition of State Regulation of Prostitution; a Social Democratic Party Women's Organization, whose international conference at Stuttgart in 1907 was attended by fifty-eight delegates from almost all civilized countries; a Union of Women Students' Associations in Germany; a General League of German Women, founded in 1865; a German Society for the Rights of Mother and Child, i.e. for the protection of children born outside wedlock (founded May 28, 1910); and several others.

In the United States of America a Society for Sexual Reform has been founded which aims at *revaluation* of sexual matters and a finer treatment of love.[2] In Holland the Dutch Neo-Malthusian Bund diffuses knowledge of contraception by means of pamphlets, etc. In Great Britain, another such body, the *Neo-Malthusian League*,[3] seeks to combat poverty and prostitution by rational family limitation. And the women's demand for political equality becomes ever more clamant.

[1] This League is now on an International footing. Dr. Helene Stöcker is on the Executive of the World League for Sexual Reform. (Translator's Note.)

[2] See Bloch, *Sexual Life*, p. 302.

[3] The Neo-Malthusian League, founded in 1877 after the Bradlaugh-Besant trials, was the pioneer birth-control society of the world. Its first secretary was Mrs. Annie Besant, and it was supported for nearly fifty years mainly by the devotion and enthusiasm of the Drysdale family. Its organ was the *Malthusian*, now the *New Generation*. (Translator's Note.)

In 1907 a Prussian Committee for Women's Franchise was formed in Berlin in order to encourage the women of Prussia to active interest in political life by lectures and debates. The British movement is most famous and active. On February 9, 1907, occurred the first great feminist procession in London; over 3,000 women (Suffragettes), led by Lady Frances Balfour and Mrs. Fawcett, marched from Hyde Park to Trafalgar Square to demonstrate for this right. And the various Labour parties of Europe, so far as they are Socialist, have included Women's Suffrage and some measure of geneonomic reform in their programmes.

The Problems of Geneonomy

Geneonomy, i.e. all matters relative to sex and parenthood, are passing through an acute crisis among the most advanced nations at the present time—that is, they are undergoing changes at once *rapid* and *profound*. During all transitional periods there is a great gulf fixed between conditions as they are and as they are becoming, or between the *actual* and the *ideal*. In the full zenith of typical epochs in times of adaptation and expansion there is a certain harmony between theory and practice; but transitional stages are characterized by a deep discontent, an incessant criticism of existing conditions, a demand for change, for the *solution of problems*.

The most important *problems* of geneonomy, as we have seen, are:

1. The problem of celibacy.
2. The problem of prostitution or sexual vices.
3. The problem of venereal diseases.
4. The problem of unhappy marriage and marriage reform.
5. The problem of maternity insurance or endowment.
6. The problem of equal rights for men and women.
7. The problem of the illegitimate child.
8. The problem of the education of the younger generation and the youthful criminal.

9. The problem of eugenics or racial selection.
10. The problem of the reform of inheritance.
11. The problem of choice of career.
12. The problem of population.
13. The problem of domestic economy and its reform.

Anyone who gives these problems *serious thought* can hardly remain of the conservative opinion that "things always have been so and always will be". On the contrary, the conviction that there is an intolerable contrast between all these things as they are and as they should be will take possession of his mind and will. And the more evolved individuals will find this contrast so monstrous and ridiculous that it will become translated in their consciousness into a most valuable incentive to progress. But this burning indignation and enthusiasm are blind without insight into sociological processes.

Cultural evolution cannot be arranged according to personal happiness, nor is it a matter of blind chance. It advances "by iron and eternal laws", and only when we have recognized these laws can we successfully solve these problems on a scientific basis. An attempt at synthesis will be made in Volume IX, which treats of "The Sociology of Old Age, of Kinship, and of the Laws of Evolution".

Characterization of the Present Phase

Our forefathers, when they first appear in recorded history, were in process of change from the Late Kinship or Tribal to the Early Familial phase. We too are in a transition of crucial importance. We have not wholly emerged from the decline of the Familial phase, yet in many respects progress has reached the Early Individual epoch.

Since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries industry has attained *expansion* and *combinations of labour* unlike anything hitherto recorded in history. And now we have to *adapt our general culture to the economic framework*; this process of adaptation is already clearly perceptible in geneonomic matters.

The family loses function after function. They are taken over by the State or by voluntary co-operation. In all probability the disintegration of the family will only cease when all social and economic activities have been taken over, and the family can devote and differentiate itself on purely *geneonomic* lines.

Woman takes part in this characteristic differentiation; slowly she becomes *self-supporting*, *self-determining*, and also *politically active*. As the Familial epoch was heralded by differentiation of male employment, so the Individual epoch is ushered in by differentiation of employment among women.

The traditional form of *marriage*, indissoluble, patriarchal, and compulsory monogamy, is felt as obsolete and inadequate. Marriage is viewed and treated more and more as a private individual affair between two free and equal persons. Its trend is towards a really "free union", which would gradually supersede lower forms of sexual association, such as concubinage and prostitution. The education and protection of *children*, on the other hand, becomes increasingly a public responsibility.

Mankind is slowly approaching a new world, which appears before our eyes in outline, however vague and distant.

This world is the home of free individuals in well-constructed and organized communities. But whether or not those nations at present most advanced, have the power and wisdom to steer their ships into the port of this new world and to land, that only the future can reveal.

CHAPTER XII

SOCIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS

CONCLUSION

ALL manifestations of sociology are interrelated; they act and react upon one another incessantly. A certain stage and source of food-production corresponds to a certain structure of the family. Creative art is extremely dependent upon available technique. (One cannot imagine a symphony by Bruckner rendered by the tree drums and whistles of Central African negroes.) A high degree of scientific knowledge and primitive religious beliefs are mutually incompatible. A variety of human occupations and employments is impossible until some order and authority have followed the institution of the State; rich and manifold cultural life must be based on large-scale industry. And as soon as great changes have taken place in one of these departments of human activity, they cannot be permanently evaded in all others as well.

Geneonomy is closely interrelated with industrial and material resources on the one hand, and with social and political institutions on the other—that is, with the two other great spheres of *economy* and *demonomy*. The interrelationships and interactions here are so numerous and rapid that we should make geneonomic evolution incomprehensible by ignoring them. Monographs on "the Family" or "the History of Marriage," which treat of their subject in artificial isolation from its basis and background, are therefore almost useless as sociology. Such specialized monographs can never give an adequate representation of geneonomical facts, but may certainly serve a scientific purpose indirectly as collections of—often precious—material.

For this reason industry, politics, and social administration have bulked so largely in our treatment of geneonomy.

In conclusion, the industrial and political interrelationships and interactions of geneonomy may be briefly reviewed. We will take the industrial first.

Economy and Geneonomy

We have divided geneonomic evolution into three main epochs: I, Tribal; II, Familial; and III, Individual. Following Tylor, Fourier, and Morgan, economic evolution has been classified correspondingly into three cultural grades:

I. Savagery,
II. Barbarism, and
III. Civilization,

which are further subdivided into phases.

I. Savagery

This epoch includes the uncounted ages from the beginning of human progress to the discovery of agriculture and pastoralism (domestication of animals). At this stage human beings feed on wild plants, roots and berries, and on animal food collected by the chase and fishing. They construct weapons and tools out of natural objects, e.g. stones and sticks, manipulated or adapted in a primitive manner.

(*a*) The lowest rung of savagery includes human *origins*. This stage probably began with the *descent of the pre-human anthropoid* from the trees to the ground. Its achievements include the framing of the greatest instrument of human culture—*articulate speech*; the construction of *primitive tools* of stone and wood; and, finally, the discovery of how to kindle and keep alight *fire*. The representatives of this stage, which extends far into Tertiary geological ages, have long ago perished from the earth.

(*b*) The *middle* stage of savagery has, on the other hand, surviving representatives in the sociologically significant races whom we term the *Lower Hunters*. They include Tasmanians,[1] Australian Aborigines, Central African pygmies, Bushmen, Singhalese Veddahs, Andamanese, Tierra del Fuegian Yahgans, and Eskimos. They dwell in remote, inaccessible, or unfavour-

[1] Extinct in the nineteenth century. (Translator's Note.)

able portions of the earth, have remained at their present cultural stage, and are mostly in process of extinction. They are the men of the *borderline* between starvation and survival; they live in small nomadic hordes and are omnivorous, eating everything they can seize and chew, either among plants or animals and insects.

Their tools and weapons are practically those of man in the Glacial Ages, and among all of them *fire* is kindled, fed, and used; primitive religious or supernatural beliefs are held, and there is customary division of labour between the sexes.

Among many of them the chief weapon is already the bow and arrows.[1]

(*c*) The upper stage of savagery is that of the *Higher Hunters*. It cannot be definitely separated from the preceding stage by any sharp dividing line. The cultural and material equipment of the more advanced hunting-races only differ from those of the primitive hunters in *degree*, and their superiority is due to the more favourable territory they inhabit. Their chief representatives are—or were in historically recent times—the North American Indians, Sioux, Apaches, Comanches, Athabascans, South American Araucanians. There is also a subdivision of races who live by *fishing*: the Itelmen, Aleuts, Gilyaks, Haidah, Thlinkits, Chinooks, and the Indians of British Columbia. These races inhabit the Pacific coasts of North America and of North-Eastern Asia—Siberia—and form a special local variation of their type, which must be considered a departure or side-line from the main trend of evolution. They have fixed abodes, and in some ways a higher culture than the most primitive tillers of the soil.

II. Barbarism

begins with the utilization of sources of food which are not *directly* "natural", i.e. with the invention of *tillage* and of

[1] "If the control of fire constitutes the first great step in human progress, the invention of the bow in late Palaeolithic times is little less important as a means, by its range and precision, of securing greater certainty in ensuring the food-supply." E. N. Fallaize, *The Origins of Civilization.*

stockbreeding. At this stage there are two further great inventions: *weaving* and *pottery*. Implements and weapons are much elaborated, polished and bored. This includes the Neolithic Age, which is followed in the later stages of barbarism by the *use of metals*. From the standpoint of economic organization, barbarism has two main grades or phases:

(*a*) On the first grade we find the herdsmen and hoe-culturists.[1] Here there is division of labour as between the sexes, but not otherwise.

(*b*) On the higher grade, division or differentiation of labour among the men begins. The trend towards civilization has started. Agriculture is elaborated, and there is a certain semi-political and administrative organization of a primitive kind. These are the Higher Barbarian peoples or higher agriculturists.

The lower grade is represented by the nomadic herdsmen of the Asiatic and African deserts, the Red Indian hunters and maize-growers (Iroquois till recently), many Papuan and Malayan tribes. The upper grade includes Oceanian and African soil-tillers, the Homeric Greeks, the pre-Republican Romans,[2] the Teutons of the Migration of Peoples, etc.

III. Civilization

in its economic sense, is fundamentally the differentiation among men, i.e. their segregation or rather specialization in various employments or kinds of labour. Only such division of labour which is made possible by agriculture, i.e. extended food-supply, makes possible *some degree of leisure*, and those fruits of leisure which distinguish the "cultural" from the "primitive" peoples. This masculine differentiation is closely related to the foundation of *Cities*—which give civilization its name—and of *States*; to the invention of writing and the alphabet; and the accumulation of knowledge in distinct

[1] See *History of Social Development*, pp. 73–77.

[2] Who already used the plough, e.g. *ager publicus*, etc. (Translator's Note.)

branches of *science*, and to art. *Technically*, civilization is the *age of metals*, especially of iron and gold.

The following subdivisions suggest themselves on the economic basis:

(*a*) *Lower civilizations*, whose economic organization does not go beyond the practice of different trades and handicrafts.

These include the aboriginal American cultures of Mexico and Peru (Incas, Aztecs, Mayas, Chibchas), Assyria and Babylonia, Egypt, Ancient India, and China. The Greeks before Solon, the Romans till the Punic Wars, and the peoples of Medieval Europe.

(*b*) *Middle civilizations* which have begun *capitalist*, i.e. large-scale credit, economic organization.

They are specially represented by the nations under the Roman Empire, and the Latin and Teutonic nations before the eighteenth century.

(*c*) *Higher civilizations* possess a wide and complex capitalist organization. On the topmost rung of civilization the use of *large-scale machinery* begins, and concurrently the differentiation of women's labour.

The European nations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were at this stage.

How are the geneonomic phases related to the economic stages and grades of evolution?

I. In Savagery

1. The first stage, that of human origins, is geneonomically unknown to us. It can only be guessed at by analogy.

2. The second stage, that of the lower hunters, is the phase of the Early Kinship group.

3. The same is true of the *higher hunters*. The *fisher peoples* show all Tribal or Kinship phases, early, middle, and late.

II. Barbarism

1. On the lowest stage are the most primitive tillers of the soil or food-growers. They are in the Full Kinship or Tribal phase.

Here, geneonomically considered, we must include a middle grade leading from the initial stages to the later.

2. This middle stage includes those agricultural peoples who possess *wealth*, i.e. large surplus food-supplies, and the pastoral peoples. The former are in the Later Kinship phase; the latter —the herdsmen—show the beginning of the Familial epoch.

3. The highest grade of barbarism is that on which historical records begin. It synchronizes in part with the change from the Late Kinship to the Early Family phases; in part with pronounced *familial* institutions.

III. Civilization

1. The *lower civilizations* are *pre-capitalistic* and *fully familial.*

2. The *middle civilizations* are *capitalistic*, in some cases elaborately so, and belong to the *Late Familial phase.*

3. The *higher civilizations* are beginning to pass into the *early phase of individualism, and to differentiate the employment among women.*

Geneonomy and Demonomy

The framework of human society has not remained the same throughout the millennia of human culture. It has followed a definite *sequence of phases.* Three distinctive epochs may be recognized, and a fourth is emerging. These epochs we have named, following their *chief* principle of organization, though not, of course, their exclusive principle:

I. The Kinship or Tribal
II. The Authoritarian
III. The Regional or Territorial

and as a probable future epoch

IV. The Communal or Co-operative.

I. During the first epoch, which lasted from the origins of progress to the beginnings of civilization, human beings

associated on the bases of blood kinship and consanguinity. This principle was disintegrated on the topmost grade of barbarism at the beginning of historic times. It was replaced by an entirely different motive and relationship:

II. The Authoritarian, which was personified in the *State*. At this stage an organized minority (the nobles) ruled an unorganized majority of slaves and bondmen. The Authoritarian organization of society ended in Europe with the English revolution in the seventeenth century and the French in the eighteenth. It was followed by

III. The Regional or Territorial, in which the national territory is the chief social factor. Its inhabitants are free and equal in theory, but divided into the Haves and Have Nots in practice.

IV. The type of society which appears now to be in process of formation is composed of *free voluntary associations* largely international in scope. They are held together by the views and interests of the individuals who compose them. These organizations are higher in evolution than the national States, as their membership is not decided by the chance of birth or descent, but by individual choice and conviction, i.e. *by a freely exercised personality*. Each modern person becomes member of a number of associations based on common interests and common opinions which extend throughout the world and form great international systems; the territorial aggregates are not lost or overthrown, but function side by side with the larger syntheses. Local and spatial factors are of course too important to be omitted from *any* set of institutions.

If we compare geneonomic and demonomic sequences we shall find that:

1. The two Tribal epochs synchronize closely in both spheres.

2. The demonomic Authoritarian period is geneonomically divided into the Early and Middle (or Full) Familial phases. The prime of the family is also the age of slavery *par excellence*,

and of the greatest restriction and repression of human personalities in war and conquest.

3. Authority being questioned and modified, the Territorial principle takes its place. The family begins to liquidate as a social institution.

Late Familial Phase

4. In our age the territorial institution is beginning to alter and probably pass into various forms of voluntary co-operation or association. Simultaneously appear the first symptoms of the Early Individual phase.

We may present these interactions on all three planes in tabular form. (See pp. 398, 399.)

It is perhaps necessary to observe that this attempt at tabulation *only refers to those main characteristics of human evolution which are common to all peoples*, however great may be their ethnical differences and differences of environment. We would not dream of denying that such differences exist—and to a marked degree—within the framework of the general cultural epochs or phases. But whereas the first historians[1] were mainy interested in natural and racial *differences*, at a more advanced stage of knowledge and progress, their *resemblances* are more stressed by scientific and philosophical opinion.[2]

Therefore it is the first duty of sociology to trace *the general historical outlines* of cultural evolution. Only when these are understood and established will sociologists be able to describe and to appreciate the *local* variations due to special qualities of race or conditions of environment.[3]

[1] Cf. Herodotus.

[2] This is but one instance of a general trend in social psychology. The primitive human mind is most strongly impressed by what is new, different, extraordinary, and sensational. The evolved and trained mind seeks the "normal" or typical aspects of what is singular, abnormal, and "adventitious". We may formulate this trend of thought as follows: "The evolution of human culture advances from the particular to the general, from the concrete to the abstract." See *Sinn des Lebens*, pp. 261–62.

[3] See *History of Social Development*, pp. 321–22.

	Economic Phases.	Races and States.	Geneonomic Phases.	Demonomic Phases.
I. Epoch of Savagery	*a. Initial Stage* Origins	All extinct	—	—
	b. Middle Stage Lower hunters	Australian Negritoes, Tasmanians, African Pygmies, Veddahs, Andamans, Eskimos, Yahgans. "Ice Age"	I. Tribal Epoch Early Phase	I. Tribal Epoch
	c. Upper Stage Higher hunters Fishers	Apaches, Comanches, Red Indians, Haidah, Aleuts, Thlinkits	Early, Full, and Late	—
Barbarism	*a. Initial Stage* Early soil tillage	Maize-growing Red Indians, many Malays, Micronesians, New Zealand Maoris	Full Tribal and Kinship	—
	b. Middle Stage Plough culture	Many Malays and Melanesians	Late Kinship	—

II. Epoch of	Nomad herdsmen	Tartars, Bantu, Tacitean Teutons	Late Tribal and Kinship, Early Familial	—
	c. Upper Stage	Most Polynesian and African Tribes. Homeric Greeks, Pre-Republican Romans, Medieval Teutons	II. Familial Epoch Early Phase	II. Authoritarian Epoch
		Line of Cleavage between Primitives and Cultured		
III. Epoch of Civilization	*a. Initial Stage* Lower civilizations	Peruvian and Mexican cultures, Babylon, Egypt, China, Greeks till Solon, Romans till Punic Wars, Medieval Europe	Full Familial Phase	—
	b. Middle Civilizations	Greeks after Solon, Romans after Punic Wars, Europe till nineteenth century	Late Familial Phase	III. Territorial Epoch
	c. Upper Stage	Europe in twentieth century	III. Individual Epoch Early Phase	IV. Dawn of Social or Co-operative Epoch?

Conclusion

In the volume herewith concluded we have attempted to perform the first part of our task—namely, to treat the whole course of geneonomic development from the phaseological point of view. In our next projected volumes the following subjects will be considered:

First of all the general geneonomic sphere will be separated and classified into its components: Sexual love, marriage, position of women, the family, education, selection or eugenics, inheritance, status of old age, consanguinity, etc. Each of these vertical sections of sociological *time* stratification will be analysed phaseologically in turn. Comparison between the past and the present will show us in detail those characteristics which we have termed "early individualist".

The Law of Geneonomic Evolution

Secondly, we shall seek the main principle and *meaning* of geneonomic evolution; and to discover the "steadfast pole amid the flight of time". For the formulation of a system of grades or phases is of course no *final aim*, but simply the *means* by which we may scientifically test the *definite trend of evolution* (within such phases and in the epochs they compose).

In the *History of Social Development* the same method was applied to economics, and a trend or law was discerned which rules the economic sphere as does the law of gravitation, the astronomical. We formulated this law or trend as "The Socialization of Labour".

An analogous trend rules in sexual and parental evolution. The synopsis just completed should demonstrate clearly that this evolution does not proceed haphazard, but in a definite direction. And this direction is so evident that thoughtful readers will have realized the dominant trend. It may be most briefly formulated thus:

The trend of culture is from the distinctively geneonomic

(or biological) to the social. The more highly organized a community, the more functions pass from the geneonomic institutions, tribe, sept, and family, into the social administration. Thus we can say:

Geneonomic or biological groups are increasingly replaced by social groups; *or* human relationships between individuals become less geneonomic and more social; *or*, while social groups assume higher and more complex (artificial or cultural) forms, geneonomic groups become smaller and simpler. And as in the course of development mankind acquires more and more power over natural forces, and the mental capacities of the individual increase also (though slowly), a more general statement is justified as follows:

The trend of culture is from the horde to the individual, from the animal to the mental personality.

This again is only an aspect of the general evolutionary trend, formulated as follows:

The evolution of culture passes from the organic to the super-organic.

All super-organic achievements, i.e. those of human culture, must be based on the organic world. Human culture is the continuation of organic evolution in the plants and the animals. But the substances of geneonomy, sex and parentage, are essentially organic. And human communities were at first based on the organic principle of blood relationship—the principle which rules the growth of a coral reef or a clump of fungi growing on a tree-stump or—higher in evolution—of an ant-hill. But with the advance in human knowledge and power, *organic* forms become *artificial*, *super-organic*, *cultural*.

We can only offer proof of this by the analysis of the various geneonomic themes. This analysis will reveal that the most significant manifestations of sex and parentage may be deduced and explained as securely and clearly from this one main trend as economic development from the trend of the socialization of labour.

Therefore, we shall have a geneonomic measure and standard

of values whereby to test the degree of evolution, and to judge which institutions are higher and which more primitive. The geneonomic law may thus be applied to our third task: the solution of the *geneonomic problems* enumerated in the previous chapter.

The author cannot conclude without answering an objection arising from an easy misunderstanding of the geneonomic evolutionary law. An extreme and exclusive meaning may be attributed to this law. It might be supposed that geneonomic forms will all be disintegrated and all relationships of kindred or marriage destroyed. Such a conclusion is quite erroneous. Sociological laws and trends have their limitations. As we have repeatedly emphasized, the phrases "Tribal, Familial, and Individual or Social Individualist epochs" do *not* mean that at first *only* the tribe existed, then *only* the family, and that finally *only* the isolated individual shall exist! All these three entities have existed in all epochs; but at first the Tribe or Kinship group was dominant, then the Family and now the Individual Personality is more conspicuous and more respected. So long as humanity survives, kindred ties of love will also survive; the sympathy of—at least some—kinsfolk, the love of parents and children, as of men and women, are inherent in our nature.

The evolutionary trend from the organic to the super-organic does not mean that the biological basis should be despised or destroyed, which would be equally senseless and cruel, but that this mighty organic basis which we share with all animals shall become ever more enlightened by knowledge, more sensitive, and more noble.

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