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DIVINE IMAGINING

AN ESSAY ON THE

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY

BEING A CONTINUATION OF THE EXPERIMENT
WHICH TOOK SHAPE FIRST IN
"THE WORLD AS IMAGINATION"
(No. 2 OF THE "WORLD AS IMAGINATION" SERIES)

BY

DOUGLAS FAWCETT

"We may rest assured that many of the most general laws of Nature are as yet entirely unthought of; and that many others, destined hereafter to assume the same character, are known, if at all, only as laws or properties of some limited class of phenomena; just as electricity, now recognised as one of the most universal of natural agencies, was once known only as a curious property which certain substances acquired by friction, of first attracting and then repelling light bodies."—JOHN STUART MILL.

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TO HIS OLD FRIEND

BERTRAM KEIGHTLEY, M.A.

FIRST AMONG BRITISH THINKERS TO ACCEPT THE IMAGINAL HYPOTHESIS, THIS ESSAY, WRITTEN AT HIS PROMPTING AND PROFITING BY HIS TIMELY SUGGESTIONS, IS DEDICATED AFFECTIONATELY BY THE WRITER

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FOREWORD

" My dear young friend, grey is all theory,
The golden tree of life is green."

MEPHISTOPHELES TO THE STUDENT
(A. G. Latham's translation of *Faust*).

" J'étais le carrefour où tout se rencontrait ;
Le sol, le roc, le feu, la nuit et la forêt
Semblaient les substances mêmes de ma pensée . . .
. . . . je me transformais
Moi-même et je me confondais avec un être immense
Qui ne voit plus quand tout finit, quand tout commence."

VERHAEREN, *Le Mont.*

§ 1. THE truth—if truth it be—which is championed in these pages is the most important, the most utterly enthralling, which can interest the man of culture. It concerns, indeed, a topic beside which our human fortunes and misfortunes, national and international vicissitudes, nay, the entire history of this planet, seem incidents of trifling account. Considered in this reference even the familiar great religions of mankind sink into insignificance. In the stellar and unseen worlds are " many mansions " ; and the religions of their denizens, unaware for the most part of the existence of mankind, may be past counting. Each of these innumerable creeds serves its purpose. They endure as long as their faithful need them, sometimes only for centuries, sometimes, again, for some thousands of years, episodes all in the life of that Power :

Whose secret Presence, through Creation's veins
Running Quicksilver-like eludes your pains ;
Taking all shapes from Máh to Máhi ; and
They change and perish all—but He remains.

Our concern is not with specific faiths, but with the character of this all-embracing protean Power. And, perhaps, we shall find It less elusive than It seemed to Omar Khayyám and seems still to his agnostic and sceptical successors of to-day.

§ 2. We are resenting the aftermath of a war which has fouled two continents. Millions of men had been throwing bits of metal at one another, while their nations, drunk with malice, tasked themselves at an intolerable cost to supply the bits. The worst of the orgy is over. But very many of the survivors have become critical, and bitter reflections are at work sapping traditional beliefs. On all sides it is asked whether a world which comprises the Great War is worth our trust and serious striving? Schopenhauer's blind Will or Bergson's *Élan Vital* might be credited, so think the doubters, with the orgy; less obviously so a World-Power in which reasonable persons could take joy. Truth to tell, this world has always been a hard place for most of those who live in it. It is apt to disgust even men who are outwardly prosperous. The war has brought this disgust into the reflections of multitudes aforetime too careless to think. Hence, in these days of exhaustion and disappointment, pessimism, mistrust of th world-order, an inclination also to rend and destroy, obsess the workers. The earthly paradise, always astonishingly remote, is now more or less lost to their sight. Faith used to provide consolations for these disinherited, but, faith failing them, it is desired now to appeal to philosophy. And what is the reply of an important section of the philosophers? Bertrand Russell warns us that no compensations are to be expected beyond the grave. He decides " . . . that no fire, no he no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an ·- ·· ıua life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the débris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet

so nearly certain that no philosophy that rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built." This creed of despair will hardly lighten our burdens. Would it not be wiser to "yield" rather than "build" with a view to displaying, not without some vanity, a Stoic resignation? If we must abandon hope, why seek to impose a useless struggle on ourselves and others? A birth-strike on the great scale would seem timely; there is no call to prolong the human tragedy. *Que tout crève!*

§ 3. Modern Spiritism cannot hope, as some think, to shatter this creed of despair. Its facts are inadequate. Interpreted in the most favourable way they show that human individuals persist for a certain time, at any rate, after physical death. Only this and nothing more. The riddle as to the remote prospects of these individuals, the general problem of the standing of the individual in the universe; in short, the issues of chief philosophical and practical importance, remain to vex us. The mere continuance of individuals is sometimes regarded as a boon. In an evil world-order, such as pessimists have described, it would be a disaster; prolongation of a tragedy of which the worst acts, for all that we can tell, are to come. We can hardly congratulate ourselves on continuance, much less on "immortality," until we have plunged deeply into metaphysics and learnt thereby to have trust in the character of ultimate reality—of the universe. If this trust fails us, if we find that ultimate reality is such as Schopenhauer or Leopardi or Von Hartmann or even Hegel taught, then we are undone; and it were better, perhaps, that we had never been born. There would exist no guarantee that final and irretrievable disaster will not overtake individuals, whether these endure only for some hundreds, thousands, or millions of years, or again, for ever. If, however, ultimate reality is such as we supposed it to be in the *World as Imagination*, we can afford to weather all trials with our confidence

unabated and unimpaired. For the nature of Divine or Cosmic Imagining is such that every great world-adventure must infallibly be crowned with success. Failure and discord can at worst only prolong the travail of creative evolution; compelling further changes ere harmonious perfection, the "complete making," of a world-system is attained. Individuals, in so far at any rate as they are *values*, cannot disappear; they belong in some manner, which we shall consider in a forthcoming work, as well to the supreme consummation as to the process which conducts to it.

Thus in criticising the creed of despair we are driven, in the first place, to metaphysics, meaning by this term an inquiry into the general character of reality. This indispensable condition fulfilled, we need, further, a special discussion of the individual, assimilating such relevant empirical facts as our limited human experience can furnish. If spiritism, neo-theosophy, or what is called vaguely psychical research, can provide some of these facts, they will be welcome. But their facts must be above suspicion and will be at best of subordinate interest.

§ 4. In the present work we are to be concerned with the first of these two requisites, with the metaphysics. And here let me anticipate a question. What is the relation of this work to the *World as Imagination*? Has not the metaphysics been dealt with already? And, if so, why are we not discussing the individual without further ado? The reply runs as follows:

The *World as Imagination* is concerned with the imaginal hypothesis, that is to say, with the experimental suggestion that ultimate reality, the Power manifest in phenomena, resembles that phase of human experience which we term imagining. What Plotinus called "the One" and treated as "ineffable," what Hegel called the *Idea* and treated as logical Reason, what Schopenhauer called Will and treated as alogical and blind, what Spencer called the Unknowable and left indefinite, what Bradley calls the Absolute and treats as beyond rational thought and will, this is the Power which we

discussed under different names as the imaginal World-Ground, imaginal IDEA, Cosmic Imagination, and best, no doubt, as the Divine IDEA or All-conscious DIVINE IMAGINING. Originality builds on indebtedness ; creation in the intellectual sphere as elsewhere always presupposes the conservation or " imitation " of pre-existing elements. Observes Professor Aliotta, " He who desires something new desires something old, only he desires it in a different way." The artistic, ethical, religious, etc., innovator " does but gather in himself the incitations to will which he feels from a thousand sides ; the only thing in him which is really new is the original synthesis." [1] The imaginal hypothesis finds place for innumerable aspects of systems, ancient and modern, once believed to conflict hopelessly, but this lavish hospitality reveals clearly its conservative, borrowed, or " imitative " side. On the other hand, viewed as an original synthesis, it is creative or transformative to a high degree. It aims at nothing less than providing a basis for the reconstruction of modern philosophical thought. It illustrates also in this regard what has been called the " simplicity of divine things "—any one can grasp the main contention and, having grasped it, is apt to wonder why it was never exploited resolutely before. Imagining is what Professor Mackenzie (who himself regards the world as an " imaginative construction ") has called it so admirably : the Cinderella of philosophy. It was our task to escort this maiden from her mean garret in psychology to the throne of metaphysics where the universe itself is in view.

But if the contention makes quick appeal to many, its verification in the heart of the world-order raises difficulties. Opposed by many rival views and confronted by a mass of problems to which it must bring novel solutions, the hypothesis has to be stated and defended at length. Repetitions even are necessary to accustom the reader to seeming paradox. Hence the *World as Imagination* is too long and too controversial for the ordinary reader, who may be indifferent to

[1] *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*, pp. 225-6, Eng. transl.

what he terms side-issues and interested only in the exposition of the hypothesis itself.

The original work is recommended to all who are thoroughly in earnest with the inquiry; in fact, even as regards exposition, Part III. of it has, in the main, the character desired. Responding, however, to requests, I am writing the present essay in order to restate the hypothesis as succinctly, and with as little indulgence in controversy, as possible. Cross-references to competing opinions, however, being illuminative, are retained. And if we have to confine ourselves in part to suggestion of solutions, we cannot afford to be quite indifferent to the needs of proof.

§ 5. With the appearance of the *World as Imagination* my previous works on philosophy, experiments which had ended in failure, lost their interest for me and others. Some thirty years of reflection had been needed to direct me, unwillingly at first, toward the new world-view, which was indicated in a paper read before the Oxford Philosophical Society in 1910 and stated at length in 1916. Some further developments of that statement await us in these pages, but the original presentation stands, in the main, intact. An important reservation concerns the solution of the truth-problem, now definitely reached. Certain observations about truth in the Glossary of the *World as Imagination* require modification, as will be seen later. Other and minor alterations the reader will discover for himself.

Some friendly critics have credited Imaginism with "preserving" in a new context the idea of creative evolution as championed by Bergson. I ought to say, accordingly, that I have simply "preserved" an idea which I originated for myself when writing the *Riddle of the Universe*: pioneer work of a young man published as far back as 1893. Thus it was urged (p. 321) that the so-called "stable" elements are always being transformed in fact; that "Nature . . . is a *continuous creation*; the march from firemist to organisms is a revelation with something wholly new at every stage of the journey."

I did not appreciate the full worth of the *aperçu* at the time. But in the setting of the *World as Imagination* this vision of Nature acquires its true interest and value. For the power at work is no vaguely defined "vital impulse" but imaginal activity bodied forth in a realistic time-process which accepts the old and the novel alike.

§ 6. It is one of the merits of Imaginism that it not only acquiesces in, but confirms positively, the common-sense belief in a real creative process in time. A world-system reduced to the show of an immobile Absolute—one of the bad bequests inherited from Greek, Indian, and German thought—becomes at once inexplicable. Imaginism rids us of this great historical error for good.

§ 7. Reinstating a real time-process, Imaginism allows us, further, to deal effectively with the problem of the soul. If time-process is merely an unreal show, the story of the individual hardly lends itself to metaphysical interpretation at all. Happily the nature of this mistake admits at last of being stated clearly. Time-process is real, being a Form of ultimate activity, Creative Imagining Itself. We shall find, as Plotinus, most enlightened of ancient philosophers, also found, that the individual does not belong wholly to that tract of the time-process where it seems to begin. Conservation and creation concur in this field of the world-order as elsewhere. It remains to add that the solution of the riddle of the individual will not be, what so many have desired, a simple one.

§ 8. A review in the *Oxford Magazine* criticised the statement that imagin*ation*, as indicated by the title of my last work, is the World-Ground. I accept and endorse the contention. As Leibnitz urged, *quod non agit, non existit*: both aspects, the conservative and the creative, of the World-Ground are emphatically active. Imagin*ing*, not imagin*ation*,—which might suggest to some a sort of fixed precipitate—is the Ground. I must urge in mitigation of sentence that a pioneer book dares not take more liberties with its public

than it must. And a picturesque title, which does not really mislead, has its charm.

§ 9. It may be asked: What is the bearing of views, such as are expressed by the eminent mathematician Dr. Whitehead in his *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, on the account of the evolution of Nature which Imaginism is able to give? Let us say at once that Imaginism possesses nothing like a complete, ready-made philosophy of Nature; that our very general account of Nature's genesis and evolution leaves room for the filling in of voids in "natural knowledge" to any extent of which men of science are capable. Imaginism insists, however, (1) that the voids shall be filled, not with "analytical concepts," which are "outside the range of human understanding" [1]—mathematical inventions not defined in any terms with which we are acquainted and justifiable only because useful—but with genuine "natural knowledge" of cosmic fact; with ideas, that is to say, which correspond to actual imagining as it obtains in Nature; and (2) that the standing of total Nature within Divine Imagining must not be ignored, save provisionally and for some specific purpose or purposes. An abstract way of considering Nature, "the object of perceptual knowledge," apart from its support and wider setting, is, for many purposes of science and even common sense, convenient, but it cannot be justified by a philosophy which aims at truth. Men may be interested for the while, like Dr. Whitehead, solely in the "coherence of the known," but this "known" in Nature is the mere surface-show of the world-principle in one of its phases. There exists, and can exist, nothing outside Divine Imagining. This is the supreme fact which penetrates and influences every other fact, however humble ("extends over" them, as Dr. Whitehead would put it), and to ignore it is to court certain blindness as to the essential character and meaning of Nature. For the rest Dr. Whitehead argues for very much that, in a different context, we have argued for ourselves. Thus he rejects

[1] Cf. Chap. VII. § 6 on the procedure of the relativity-physicists.

absolute space and time and the "disconnexion" that discredits so much crude "physical explanation." And he too emphasises the "creative advance" of Nature and finds perception "always at the utmost point of creation." It is to the efforts of such distinguished allies in the spheres of philosophical physics, chemistry, biology, etc., that we metaphysicians must look, if the hope of constructing little by little a tolerably full Nature-philosophy is to be entertained. We are sure, on the one hand, that no attempts, which ignore the "minor sentients," masked by natural processes, or the phases, conservative and creative, of Divine Imagining, will achieve a Nature-philosophy remotely worthy of the name. Such expositions of the "coherence of the known" would suffer from an abstraction too violent, too monstrous to be borne. On the other hand, we are ready to greet as much of the "known," relevant to our world-view, as the enlightened philosophical physicist, chemist, biologist, etc., can disclose. And why not? We are not dictators whose wishes determine all the real; we have to accept, not to balk at, verifiable laws and facts.

§ 10. Certain new words have been coined in connexion with the imaginal hypothesis. Such are "Grand Imaginal," "imaginals," "nuclear," "attraction-complex," etc. They are necessary and their meanings are stated clearly in the exposition. The most important of these linguistic innovations is "consciring," which meets a need of the first importance; a need so insistent that we were impelled at first to use the abominable "consciousing" to fill the gap. This invention is justified in full. Divine Consciring is Fichte's "infinite activity" regarded as also aware of its contents; the "*conscious energy of the universe*, that which at once conserves, creates, and grasps together all contents"; the active aspect, in short, of Divine Imagining. Consciring in finite human sentients is what certain psychologists have preferred to call "attention," [1] instead of "consciousness."

[1] In its (at least) "two degrees" as noted by Ward, *Psychological Principles*,

"*Con*sciring" accents the *awareness* and *continuity* of experiencing; and rids us of the view that what is aware is an "*inert diaphaneity*," as James put it.

The term "sentient" is used as meaning "experient," "conscious centre," or "area of consciring," not, of course, with any suggestion to the effect that sensationalism is sound philosophy. It is a convenient word of the requisite wide denotation.

Activity, as writers, mathematical and other, seem conspiring once again to declare, is basic. The revolution will be complete when this activity is identified with consciring, of which the sentients, as it were, are rays.

The Appendix contains matter which would have cumbered the exposition. Its three first sections further the attempt to solve the riddles of Truth and Continuity. The section "Instinct and Imagining" belongs properly to the next essay in this series. But the world dances, like a ball, on the jets of creative imagining. And it was well, perhaps, to glance at these jets from another and picturesque point of view without too fastidious a regard for method.

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pp. 62-3. "The first of these degrees is what we in everyday life distinguish as attention, the second is what we contrast with it as inattention." Attention, in the first sense, is focal consciring. The concept of "attention" unfortunately is built on metaphor and is apt to persuade us that we have disposed of a problem which is, perhaps, ignored.

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE IMAGINAL HYPOTHESIS OR (AS SOME CALL IT) IMAGINISM

> "And, like the baseless fabric of this vision,
> The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
> The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
> Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
> And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
> Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
> As dreams are made of. . . ."
>
> SHAKESPEARE, *The Tempest.*

"Science writes of the world as if with the cold finger of a starfish; it is all true, but what is it when compared to the reality of which it discourses?" —R. L. STEVENSON, "Pan's Pipes," *Virginibus Puerisque.*

"Quod non agit, non existit."—LEIBNITZ.

§ 1. IMAGINING has been well called by Professor Mackenzie the Cinderella of philosophy. It has a garret somewhere in psychology; is described airily by writers such as Nordau as a "special case of the general psychological law of association": a case in which "attention" presides less strictly than in the sphere of scientific observation and judgment.[1] But popular associationism, its units and its unions, are, as we shall see later, unsatisfactory. Further, we are concerned

[1] Nordau might have noted that Kant regarded imagination much more respectfully. Cf. the passage cited by Professor Norman Kemp Smith in his *Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 474. We shall be commenting on Kant's attitude shortly. It is eminently worth the attention, belated though this be, of modern thinkers.

here, not with psychical process, however originated, in human individuals, but with the character of reality at large. And, having this wider interest, we are to regard Imagining as the Rosetta-stone which enables us to interpret all appearances, "natural and spiritual." The attempt to point out how Divine Imagining reveals itself in Nature was the task undertaken in the *World as Imagination*. Verification of Imaginism, that ruthless testing emphasised so properly by Mill and the modern pragmatists, has to be sought, it is true, in the narrow field alone open to human experience. But we sample enough, perhaps, of reality or the universe [1] to enable us to grasp accurately its *general* character. "As above, so below." It is unnecessary to know about the ethnology of Mars, the temperature of the Dog-star, the mathematics of Uranus, or the denizens of, perhaps, innumerable unseen worlds ere suggesting a new solution of the basic problem which stirred Plotinus and Hegel.

§ 2. We want, like Faust, to conceive the "power which acts at the heart of the world, the ultimate solution of all riddles." What is our fundamental hypothesis in this regard? Simply this. Ultimate reality is best viewed as imaginal; as conscious activity [2] which, as embodied in content, resembles most nearly that human experience which we call imagining, conservative and creative, reproductive and productive (or constructive). It is not urged that the other aspects of our experience are "unreal" or "illusive"; it is contended that the imaginal aspect suggests the divine world-principle more directly than do those others; *shows it to us less transformed*

[1] Bertrand Russell (*Mysticism and Logic*, p. 110) disputes the view that philosophy is concerned with the universe as a whole, maintaining that "there is no such thing as the 'universe.'" But who is prepared to maintain that the "universe" is a "thing"? The "universe," more reasonably interpreted, remains with us, notwithstanding protests. Thus the "multiverse" of some pluralistic writers is just a kind of "universe" with a variety of irreducible facts in it. And Russell himself in his statement (p. 195) replacing a current view of causation has to make use of the term "universe" no less than three times in six lines of a formula which aims at precision.

[2] The "consciring" of the Foreword, § 10, and of later chapters.

by the creations which take place during the time-process. "Reason," which many have set up as the Absolute, is an instance of a secondary creation such as subserves the living, and the living well, of finite sentients, but which has no standing in reality at large such as could be called cosmic. The hour is such as to invite experiment. "All over Europe before the War," writes Dr. Schiller, "academic lecture-rooms only re-echoed, in all essentials and with minor or minimal variations, four great substantive voices of antiquity, two of them Greek, Plato and Aristotle, two of them German, Kant and Hegel, and philosophy, instead of advancing with the steady sureness of a science, rehearsed only the old problems and the old debates. Nor was the situation materially different in America."[1] Bergson, it is true, had stirred thought with *Creative Evolution*. He has done admirable work, but he has failed to reach the heart of the world. Bergsonism over-accents the "flux" or changeful side of reality and is likened, indeed, by Professor Aliotta to a "shoreless river whose source and mouth are alike unknown." And it discusses vaguely in terms of "life" an activity which we can indicate quite clearly, intuiting it as we do intimately, directly, and from the inside. All things considered, there is a call for a new initiative. Current available hypotheses about the world-ground proving unsatisfactory, some one has to take a risk and launch another. After all, metaphysics has to progress by its votaries *imagining* novel solutions and applying them tentatively to the field of experience. "What is now proved was once only imagined," urges the poet Blake. The imaginal dynamic, moving in all quarters through conflict towards harmony, is illustrated here in the pursuit of speculative truth. Our hypothesis may be regarded as the last resource of an inquirer for whom conflict, too obvious to be overlooked, had wrecked previous tentative solutions. An advance has been made in a direction already suggested, darkly and incidentally for the most part and in no case with the required

[1] *Mind*, Oct. 1917.

completeness of grasp, by writers of such different types as Shakespeare, Shelley, Blake, and the philosophers Kant, Frohschammer, and Fichte. I have dealt elsewhere with such historical antecedents of Imaginism as I have been able to trace.[1] The "new synthesis," which like all adventures of thought, combines both creation *and* conservation of pre-existing ideas, has at least pragmatic worth in enabling you to think conveniently and effectively about reality. But it seeks also to establish its claim to be true; to justify you in regarding it as sufficiently like reality to serve as a substitute for this reality in your thinking. Your purpose being to acquire merely general knowledge, you want the substitute to represent, as satisfactorily as may be, certain limited, but pervasive, features which reality possesses in fact. And, not asking for too much, you will probably have your wish gratified.

§ 3. For philosophy, the primary concern of which is truth, the imaginal hypothesis is an intellectual venture, a tentative effort in the direction of harmonising current conflicts of thought. But aesthetic and ethical interests of vital significance are involved. "All the world's a stage" in literal fact. Matter, energy, force, and the like are fictions of the study; evolution is not a mechanistic process, but an amazing *romance*. In this romance the most humble natural agent, say an "electron" or "sub-electron," is, what Professor Larkin has called it, a "mentoid" or mindlet, a centre in the psychical dynamic. And our titanic world-system is just a complex of contents and sentients, psychical throughout, which exists, along with many other such systems, in Divine Imagining. For us humans, moving out of the level of "mentoids" into that of "mens," life reveals itself as at once an adventure and a discipline. Our way is often hard; sometimes across the burning marl of hell. But, grim as are some episodes in our fortunes, we are to be sure that all will be well with the cosmic romance, of which we are phases, and developing phases too,

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 152-63. A fuller notice of Kant's attitude is required.

that tend to endure. The idling that waits on despair is sane enough; if the world is what Bertrand Russell believes it to be, the sooner we renounce effort and end the human tragedy the better. On the other hand, a creator's interest sustains the man who toils with the certitude of a satisfactory future in view. The higher ethical ideals become worth while; achievement will not perish with the collapse of a mad world into the unconscious.

CHAPTER II

NEGATIVE VINDICATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS—COMPETING SOLUTIONS OF THE WORLD-RIDDLE HAVE PROVED UNSATISFACTORY

§ 1. We have cited already Blake's words "what is now proved was once only imagined." But Blake regards things with the genial glance of a poet, so we may do well at this point to refer the inquirer to John Stuart Mill. This sober logician observes similarly that nearly everything which is now accepted theory was once hypothesis and that "an hypothesis being a mere supposition, there are no other limits to hypotheses than those of the human imagination." [1] The Democritan atoms, the vortices of Descartes, the matter of the materialists, the energy of believers in energetics, the electron and like imperceptibles, the doctrine of natural selection, the inventions of mathematicians, speculation about earthquakes or atoll-making, nay, even such creations as the "One" of Parmenides or the Idea of Hegel, arise for us in this way. Hypotheses are born in our creative imagining; are a sort of fancies woven, not for the joy of day-dreaming, but for the purpose of manipulating or understanding appearances. Some of the fancies, on being tested, are found to be true, some merely probably or possibly true. These survive in a new form. But very many, which are neither useful nor true, remain idle fancies till, being of no prospective value,

[1] *Logic*, Bk. III. ch. xiv. § 4. For some observations on hypothesis, cf. is *rld as Imagination*, pp. 25-35.

they cease to hold our interest and drop out of the realm of thought. Obviously this private imagining or fancying, while indispensable to the progress of science, entails a risk. A fancy may be entertained and defended just for its effectiveness in bringing joy into grey lives. Cherished warmly, because we want to remould things according to our desires, it may pass later into open conflict with reality. Thus *private* imagining may collide with that *cosmic* imagining bodied forth in the structure of Nature, as when a geologist, enamoured of a dream, affirms some belief, regardless of the testimony of the rocks ; or an impatient writer, who has imagined the world once and for all just as he wants it to be, rejects the facts of an embarrassing "psychical research." There are millions of men who add private worlds of fancy to their experience and more millions still who accept such worlds ready-made from their religious teachers. They are, to this extent, isolated artificially within the universe. But philosophers and men of science, in seeking truth, place their private imagining, when needful, at the mercy of that larger imagining within which they live, move, and have their being. They ingest this larger imagining in their own way, but without trying to substitute for it fictions, however agreeable, which exist merely for themselves.

§ 2. The "intellectual intuition" of Schelling, a typical case, serves admirably to warn us to check the vagaries of private imagining. Intuition, he said, resembles the direct process of artistic production, immersing the sage in creative reality, so that he can intuite or "*look at*," nay, become, the very world-activity itself. Such was the claim, but what were the actual achievements of this gifted seer ? Schelling's successive systems, to which none do reverence to-day, suggest, in large part, the play of private and isolated imagining, out of touch with the realities which he claims to know. We have dealt with intuition, its pitfalls and its possibilities, elsewhere,[1] and will append only a few useful observations

[1] *World as Imagination*, Introduction, pp. 10-13, "Intuition and Hypothesis."

here. Intuition so called may yield nothing but fancies, devoid of truth-value, if the imagining concerned is private to ourselves. Take account of the pitfalls that gape for men of faith and those intuitionists, so disliked by logicians and men of science. "Intuitions have proved false in all the sciences, even in mathematics." [1] Among mystics and saints convictions of no value have been advanced as intuitive truths. We look and we pass on. But when alleged intuitions transcend private imagining, their reports on occasion may be illuminative. Thus intuitions, transcending our privacy, occur even in ordinary perception—of sun, trees, grass, and mountains—acquainting us directly with reality independent of our awareness of it. In such perception the *imagining* bodied forth in Nature meets, and fuses with, our private imagining; with the apperceptive setting which invests new presentation. "*It is by imagination that we see* and this is the natural aspect of the miracle, but we see true things," writes the mystic "Eliphas Levi." The Imaginal Hypothesis enables us to understand this surprising *aperçu*. So far, so good. But there may be intuitions on higher levels than that of sun, grass, trees, and what is common to them; the intuitions, so much discussed, which make appeal to Bergson and kindred writers. They occur whenever our imagining mirrors, or is penetrated by, higher regions of world-imagining, which do not ask our leave to exist and persist. A field of vast interest is opened up by this view. Philosophy, however, cannot tolerate a method of intuition which does not provide safeguards against abuse. The difficulty will be to distinguish the genuinely "illuministic" intuition from the intuition (so-called) which is merely the play of private fancy. And, in default of a criterion satisfactory to critics, you will be invited to discard the intuitions as such and to treat them, in most cases, as hypotheses. A verification process is called for. But why complain? If your original intuitions were of worth, you will be sure to find the hypotheses verified in the course of the deductions which

[1] F. C. S. Schiller, *Formal Logic*, p. 237.

exploit them. In the cases of intuitions of historic moment this verification will be long-drawn-out and will take shape inevitably in a new direction of philosophy or science. The hypothesis cannot be kept detached from your stores of knowledge, but ought to fall into its place in the context of a comprehensive system. Being men and not gods, we require a truth-system, that is to say, a whole of knowledge ordered according to a plan; an "appercipient" system which has a welcome for all relevant new facts of experience as they arise. Unable to be conscious of this world in the way in which Plato's Demiurge, say, might be conscious of it, we resort to the best available makeshift; and this is found in the artificial and abstract, but, withal, highly synoptic, arrangement known as the philosophical truth-system.[1]

These genuine intuitions (which we are to treat as hypotheses) belong to that immediacy of imagining that lies beyond, and is higher than, truth. But with this remark we near a vital issue which is to concern us later.

§ 3. What now of our own hypothesis, whether this issued from an original intuition or not? How are we going to make it prevail over its many rivals?

We shall commence by urging that rival solutions of the riddle of the universe have failed. This is the negative vindication. It is not conclusive because Imaginism, the only important alternative in view, may not be the only one possible. An unsuspected, but preferable, solution, some one will suggest, might yet emerge from the womb of time. Consequently a positive vindication is compulsory and will, in fact, begin to occupy us in the course of the next chapter. We have to state the hypothesis more fully and, further, to indicate that it is probably verifiable throughout the processes of Nature and beyond. Having said, with the brevity of a mere phra-

[1] Cp. the view of Proclus. "The decisive word can only be spo' that which is common; and this for the soul . . . is movement fro to point within a demonstrative system connecting principles with ar and applications again with principles" (*The Neo-Platonists*, T. 2nd ed., p. 282).

"Imagining is the source of all appearances," we have to refer inquirers to these appearances and to ask whether they promote our mere truth-claim to the rank of truth. There is nothing gained by assenting to abstract contentions; Imaginism can acquire full meaning and value only by being applied to all available levels of experience and being found, in a general way, adequate to them. The positive vindication ought to be complete. In practice it is a far-off goal toward which we have to travel as far as possible, on penalty of being deemed not fully in earnest with our work.

The queen-bee has been described as visiting the cells of immature queens and destroying potential rivals, being able to reign thenceforth undisturbed. The *World as Imagination* provides a case of similar tactics. We selected a number of representative types of thought directed toward the solving of the world-riddle and pointed out their fatal defects. Having stung these rivals, it was hoped, to death, Imaginism was able to pass into the foreground and claim exclusive attention. We are inclined to tolerate this queen because we require one and there is only this one survivor left in view. But she must justify her pretensions later.

§ 4. The first of the rival hypotheses to be demolished was extreme Materialism: the view that ultimate reality (or realities) consists of *matter* in movement; absolute space and time being sometimes mentioned, sometimes very oddly taken for granted.[1] We can reveal the heart of this fallacy at once. Natural objects are what we perceive when we point to the external world. But matter, which is not a natural object, is never perceived or perceivable. It is just an imaginal creation;

[1] Popularly interpreted, Materialism means often no more than the denial
[illegible] a "future life." Many idealists, agnostics, and others, however, are of
[illegible]ion that, when the brains are out, the man dies. Materialism, again,
[illegible]ned above in the precise philosophical sense of the term, is not incon-
[illegible]vith belief in human survival. For it might allow that a subtle
[illegible]ody, quitting the physical body at death, preserves consciousness
[illegible]tion." There are, indeed, materialists who have said as much;
[illegible]ages and votaries of the séance room hold similar views.

a mere concept which serves as a thought-instrument facilitating our practical relations with man and Nature. Bertrand Russell calls it a "logical construction"; [1] and, if he means here by "logical" an abbreviative device which subserves the purposes of certain reasonings, we can assent readily. This *stable* or, if you will, "logical" construction is substituted in our thinking for perceived things whenever our interests dictate. Thus the concept or substitute-fact helps us greatly in practical communication with our fellows and in much of science. But its invasion of metaphysics (and Materialism, of course, is a sort of metaphysics) is intolerable. Matter means something merely spatial and resisting—something possessing, as the phrase runs, the attributes of extension and inertia; resistance being specially accented, as when Mill terms matter the "element of *resistance* in the sensible world." "The conception of Matter reduced to its simplest shape," wrote Spencer in *First Principles*, "is that of co-existent positions that offer resistance." Resistance is also what makes appeal to Dr. Johnson and common sense. A concept or substitute-fact imagined selectively in this fashion, an abstraction clad in mere rags of quality, cannot stand for a world-principle. It ignores most of that fragment of Nature and sentient life of which you, for instance, are aware at this moment. To state this inadequacy is to discredit the hypothesis. A walk in the country, a glimpse of the wealth displayed in the privacy of your psychical being, damn Materialism at once as mythology.

"Matter" belongs to that sub-species of concept which we have called the command-concept, the distinction in question being of importance. The command-proposition, of which it is a term, summons, or rather tries to summon, into being a reality which the concept is to represent. There is a command or decree that, at the uttering of the concept, the reality, which answers to it, shall flash somehow into existence. And, though no such reality shows in our experience, our attitude is that it has appeared somehow and can be discussed as an

[1] *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 137.

existent on this basis.[1] Treated thus as if it were a fact, and the theme, perhaps, of bulky volumes, the "reality" lives only in outline, as an aborted intention, within the private imaginings of mankind. There is a call to the vasty deep, but nothing occurs there. *Parturiunt mentes*, but the existent, which the concept is "about," is never cradled. Science makes great use of these command-concepts. Prominent instances besides "matter" are "force" and "energy," the persistent particles of mathematical physics, and the infinitely numerous infinite numbers of the new mathematics. In the framing of command-concepts we are creators,[2] but we cannot complete the being of that which we imagine.

This explaining of "matter," a veritable Frankenstein's monster, ought to free Frankenstein from obsession by it. But mental habit is strong. Thus even Russell, in a materialistic vein, finds that "blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way."[3] We have to express our disappointment on noting this orgy. Such conduct seems unworthy of a "logical construction,"[4] but it is, perhaps, never too late to mend.

Mach went so far as to denounce "mechanical mythology," the superstition of too many men of science. Let us allow, as we must, that mechanistic categories have proved of enormous value in such thinking as subserves practice. But let us note as well that, ignoring too much, these categories leave us ill-equipped for discovering the solution of the world-riddle. We have to add that the case against "mechanical mythology" holds equally good against what has been called "sub-mechanics," namely, the mass of contradictory thinking about the ether and its local modifications. This ether-lore is often suggestive as symbolism, to be interpreted anew in the light of philosophy. But ether, as it figures in sub-mechanical

[1] Cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 33-4 and elsewhere.

[2] Thus the view that all concepts are copied from experience is once more shown to be absurd.

[3] *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 56. [4] *Ibid.* p. 137.

mythology, is merely the concept of ordinary "matter," re-imagined somewhat for new uses. It was invented, as Poincaré tells us, to avoid the break-down of the laws of general mechanics. It is a command-concept justified by its value in use. Philosophically regarded, material ether is an "ambitious attempt to give a complete explanation of the physical universe by making an elephant stand on a tortoise. Scientifically it has a perfectly adequate use by veiling the extremely abstract character of scientific generalisation under a myth, which enables our imaginations to work more freely." [1] We have discussed elsewhere the mechanical categories, their excellences and their defects. Man was forced to *imagine* his world as a mechanism by the demands of practice.[2]

Physical explanation which supposes absolute space and time, and a matter existing disconnectedly in bits, the changes in whose behaviour are imposed on them by other bits *external to* them, was too crude to stand. Absolute space and time were condemned by competent philosophy long before the relativity theorists came to be. And matter (whose content = *the extended that resists*), once exposed, is unavailable henceforth for world-building. It is unavailable even for those subtler theories which discourse of tiny particles or "mobile strains" in the ether: the ether in which we see too often matter resurrected to attend its own funeral.[3] But material ether, riddled with contradictions, has lost much of its popularity. It has had to be re-imagined to serve new purposes.[4] And it will continue to be re-imagined in ways that will lead at last

[1] Dr. A. N. Whitehead, F.R.S., in *The Organisation of Thought*, p. 225.

[2] Cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 35-48 and 293-327.

[3] Cf. *ibid.* pp. 320-25.

[4] "What we have called the World" [the aggregate of point-events conceived as four-dimensional], writes Professor Eddington, F.R.S., in an article on the theory of relativity, "might perhaps have been legitimately called the aether; at least it is the universal substratum of things which the relativity theory has given us in place of the aether. But the aether in physical theories has been gradually changing its character as science has developed, and perhaps this latest change from a three-dimensional to a four-dimensional aggregate is sufficiently fundamental to justify a new name" (*Mind*, April 1920).

out of the desert of physical abstractions into psychics. Until then our experience of unstable and inevitably defective mechanical explanations promises to be extensive. There is an unlimited number of such possible explanations, urges Poincaré.[1] And the worst of it is that they are all certain to be unsatisfactory.

The collapse of mechanical explanations, after a delay of non-committal in the nebulous sphere of "point-events" and the like, will drive inquirers to psychics. And already the language imposed on men of science shows the pressure at work. Thus Professor Soddy writes of matter's "disinclination to move when at rest and its disinclination to stop moving after it has been started."[2] Observe, however, that concrete *natural objects*, not "matter," the mere concept, behave in these ways. Observe further that this resistance to being moved and to being stopped when moving constitutes the so-called "attribute of inertia" in its two aspects. "Mass," again, was originally this same "inertia" regarded, apart from the relations actually implied, as the passive, inherent quality of a body.[3] Search for the implied somewhat that resists will be found to conduct us inevitably to psychics. And the "disinclination" of this somewhat will refer us in last resort to that conservation, or comparatively stable psychical activity, which underlies all natural happenings said to exemplify "laws."

There is another philosophical use of the term "matter" to which I must refer briefly. "Matter," if we accept the terminology of the commentators, plays an important part in the speculations of Plotinus, not to mention those of Aristotle and Plato. This Plotinic "matter," however, has nothing in common with the "matter" which concerns science or materialistic metaphysics. It is an indeterminate principle

[1] Cf. *Science and Hypothesis*, Eng. trans., pp. 167-8.

[2] *Matter and Energy*, p. 171. Cf. Professor Carveth Read. "Inertia does not mean want of vigour, but the exact contrary; and may be metaphorically described as the inexpugnable resolve of everything to have its own way" (*Logic, Deductive and Inductive*, p. 175).

[3] "Mass" as "function of velocity" is novel and promising.

able to receive, but not to generate, forms. It lies somehow within an all-embracing ineffable One; is not proffered, like the "matter" of Buchner or Moleschott, as self-complete. And, devoid of proper being, formless in itself, it cannot be said to possess even extension.

The Plotinic view of "matter" marked a defective idealism which, confronted with a cult of abstract forms, had to invent a field of some sort in which the said forms could show. But an indeterminate field, *i.e.* one which has neither this nor that nor any discoverable positive character, is nothing. In verity an indeterminate "matter" is merely a command-concept, whose decree we are unable to realise in full. What is "informed" is always "transformed," has shown one form or manner of being before showing another. The forms themselves, again, hardly suggest the presence of a hierarchy of unchanging Platonic archetypes at the "back of beyont." Novelty and a real creative evolution must be allowed for. The world-principle, if we accept the thesis which dominates this essay, has assuredly unchanging aspects, but it displays a basic formative spontaneity as well. Imagining, of course, *conserves*, but must not such a principle be *creative* as well? The question would seem to provide its own answer.

§ 5. Extreme materialism being bankrupt, efforts have been made to couple matter with force, nay, to promote force alone to the dignity of a world-principle. Discredited mass-particles became the meeting-points of forces; even the concept of "mental force" has been floated to complete the scheme. The concept or substitute-fact used is too empty. Indeed, force being a mathematical fiction, not a specific physical existent, we find that, on substituting it for the world, we possess a void.[1] Force is a conceptual agent, having direction as well as magnitude, which moves or tends to move a body. Thought further, as so often, in terms of muscular effort, force seems fairly concrete. But muscular effort is a trifle beside

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 41-3 and 308. In the familiar expression "vital force" (pp. 555-6) the term "force" is uninstructive.

the contents of a universe! You cannot therefore equate forces with reality at large.

§ 6. Matter can now be tried in harness with energy, or, again, energy, as in energetics, can be raised to the status of the world-principle. In the latter case, the experiment seems worth making, but failure is, nevertheless, complete, as shown decisively elsewhere.[1] The definitions of energy, "capacity for work," "everything which can be produced from work or which can be transformed into it," etc., invite suspicion. They reveal no definitely recognisable world-principle. They fail to indicate the alleged "fundamental reality" manifest within its alleged conservations and transformations. And the reason is not far to seek. Energy is the creation of human imagining; "a magnificent economic schematic device for keeping account of the functional variations of the surface phenomena."[2] This invention is only justified by its practical success. To make use of it in metaphysics, to regard it as the stuff of which actual phenomena are made, is an aberration of confused thinking.[3]

Energy, in short, is a command-concept; it does not exist beyond our imagining in the vasty deep as the Entity which sires the world. But, if we treat energetics as symbolism and, ignoring practical considerations, look for the character of the activity symbolised, we shall secure, perhaps, an illuminative result for our pains. Energy-symbolism "resembles a mist which hangs over an unseen town and represents in some fashion its outline. The mist is not the town itself; on the other hand, it exists in its special shape only because the town is a reality underneath. We can even discuss certain broad features of the town by feigning that it is present to our perception as the mist."[4] Energetics has its eyes on

[1] On energy, cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 43-8, 313-20, 419-28, 457, 487-90, 534-6.

[2] William James.

[3] Cf. particularly *World as Imagination*, pp. 313-18, for the mishaps that attend this venture.

[4] *World as Imagination*, pp. 318-19.

the mist, metaphysics on the town just visible, perhaps, through it.

But note this. Nature lends itself in great measure to the making of energy-symbolism. As soon, however, as the theorist begins to apply the symbolism to the sphere of conscious life, his troubles begin. For the town is now clearly visible, and to describe it any longer in terms of the mist becomes absurd. In other words the contents of conscious experience, of which the energy-theorist is directly aware, contrast too sharply with the symbolism employed. Why speak darkly when the psychical reality itself is showing naked and unashamed? And what if energy, after all, is only a name for psychical activity?

Discard the term "energy" for "activity." What if all activity is at bottom CONSCIRING, *i.e.* the conscious activity which is *aware of, conserves and transforms*, the contents that appear in the world?[1] And these content-transformations, which are of course not mere relations of quantities but qualitative, are they quite devoid of meaning? Do they not belong to an order in whose changes a teleologic nisus toward harmony, constantly being frustrated, is as constantly reasserting itself? In this protean flux there are more or less conservative "equivalencies" between contents that come and contents that go; the disappearing contents giving place to others just as if a vast cosmic balancing process—an immanent design making for "divinity of measure"—were at work. Surely the world-principle cannot be a blind thing which only here and there rises into psychical life? Surely too an active principle is concerned. "What *is* this Infinite of Things itself which we name Universe, but an Action, a sum total of Actions and Activities?" asks Carlyle. Are we to hold, then, that imaginal activity conserves and transforms the world and that to this quarter we must look in quest of the solution symbolised so naïvely by energetics? Assuredly this will be our attitude in the sequel.

[1] Cf., pending explanations, § 10 of the Foreword.

§ 7. Having disposed of matter, force, and energy, we considered next a solution of the world-riddle submitted by "Scholastic Theism." This hypothesis claims that the ground of appearances, the source and sustainer of the worlds and their allied sentients, is an infinite God, perfectly wise, all-powerful, and holy: the infinite personality adored by scholastic and semi-scholastic philosophers as the "sum total of all Reality and Perfection." The case for this solution can be stated clearly and, as it seems, quite exhaustively. It is a poor case,[1] and I need not re-discuss it here. The case for belief in a *finite* God, personal or superpersonal, was not under consideration. But there are fields for the activity of, perhaps, innumerable such Gods; each the highest conscious power of his particular world-system. We may incline to consider our own world-system, which includes as a detail the "starry heavens" of the astronomer, as the one and only system of the sort in the universe. But the ocean of the infinite may contain islands past numbering; each one of these the seat of a world-system or creative experiment originated in isolation from the rest. A stirring vista, no doubt, for those who, like certain German sages, have found in the art, science, religion, and philosophy of poor mankind the supreme achievement of evolved life!

§ 8. Examining the two sorts of Agnosticism, the phenomenalistic form and that associated with the name of Herbert Spencer, we found both unsatisfactory. An agnostic does not avoid metaphysics, though he desires to do so. He too institutes an inquiry into the character of reality. Thus Spencer proffers much information about the Unknowable and its modes. His metaphysics is less enterprising, less successful, let us hope, than our own, but that is all.

§ 9. Pluralistic realism held our attention for a short time only. Its pluralism, like pluralistic idealism, accents data which find ample recognition by the Imaginal Hypothesis as fully stated. Its crusade against "subjectivism" is timely,

[1] Cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 49-61.

but quite compatible with idealism in the form in which we accept it. Our attitude can be called a realistic idealism or an idealistic realism at will. It is more realistic, for instance, than attitudes which deny that "secondary qualities" are present in Nature. And there is a sense, we shall find, in which it is true to say with the realists that the "relation of cognition" does not alter the character of the reality conscired (or "cognised").

§ 10. We passed on to consider the topic of idealism. What do we in particular mean when we use this term? Let us return in the first place an answer which takes what we may call the cosmic point of view.

We need not discuss here the history of the word "idea": an interesting one, but irrelevant. Any system can be called idealistic for which ultimate reality resembles our experiencing.[1] Thus Bradley's well-known essay, building on the Absolute Experience, is idealistic. ". . . To be real is to be indissolubly one thing with sentience. It is to be something which comes as a feature and aspect within one whole of feeling, something which, except as an integral aspect of such sentience, has no meaning at all."[2] To say that nothing is real except in a whole of feeling is to say that this Absolute Experience, though transcending personality, is conscious. A difficulty arises when we consider world-principles such as Schelling's Immemorial Being and Schopenhauer's Will. Are we to allow that the systems based on them are idealistic? The principles, though not completely conscious, manifest as finite experients and supply all that these experients enjoy and confront. In themselves they are "virtual" or "potential" experience; *i.e.* that which, under certain complex limiting conditions, becomes conscious or actual experience. They comprise, moreover, no contents which could not show in conscious experience,

[1] "Resembles" is emphatic. In the case of human experien*cing* the contents experienc*ed* are not wholly sustained and created just when and because we experience them. But Divine Imagining can sustain and create unaided the contents which it experiences or, better, "conscires."

[2] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 146.

were this latter to break its bounds and illuminate them throughout. You may incline, accordingly, to term such principles idealistic. But, after all, the standpoint of a philosophy of the All-conscious contrasts sharply with that of partisans of the Unconscious. And we shall do well not to bury a momentous distinction under a common name.

Idealism, as we hold it, is a philosophy of the All-conscious. It does not regard consciousness as arising only here and there. *It views*, as we shall see, CONSCIRING *as the universal and eternal activity*. Partisans of unconscious world-principles cannot speak properly of cosmic experience. Experience, which is not conscious, is nonsense. Their world-principles—Schopenhauer boldly calls his Will blind—work in utter darkness: a darkness that does not even know that it is dark. And, no more than bankrupt materialism, can they suggest with any plausibility how consciousness, however subordinate they make it, begins. This problem of "consciousness" treated as epiphenomenon, as mere froth on the surface of finite life, degraded into inexplicable product of a power other than itself, proves the ruin of the self-styled idealistic systems discussed.

Thus far touching idealism as regarded from the cosmic point of view. Were my sentient life expanded into Divine Imagining, I should conscire all that is real, contents and sentients alike, in unity with the consciring in an immediacy beyond reason and truth. Question and answer are not on that level divorced. Where nothing is lacking to intuition, *i.e.* to intuitive imagining, nothing need be sought. Ultimate reality at least shines in its own light. Enough. But idealism is often approached from the standpoint of the human individual looking forth, as did Berkeley, at natural objects, trees, land, and sea, at what we refer to popularly as the external material world. And it is asked: how does perception arise for this individual and what precisely does it attest and convey? Well, with "matter," "force," "energy," and the like set aside, and idealism favoured in a general cosmic

regard, we can say something at once; a complete answer awaiting us in the sequel.[1] Clearly we are not nihilists, resolving our experience into a flux of unreal, inexplicable, loose states. And as clearly not psychological idealists, regarding private "minds," with their "states of consciousness," as comprising and possessing all the reality, perceptual and other, which they directly know. These and like forms of subjective idealism make no appeal to us. The tree which I see beyond the balcony is not a mere complex of "my" states of consciousness, whether "I" am viewed as a series of fugitive states, a closed "mind," or a windowless monad. The tree is what we call a fact, and, etymologically, a fact is what has been "made." But what has been "made," in part at my point of reality, may be of one tissue with what has been "made" beyond it. Thus the tree-facts present to percipients A, B, C, and D differ considerably, but at all four points of reality there is *prolonged* a tree-fact present at X. At X is, what may be termed, a common and tentacular fact, *i.e.* a fact aspects of which all the percipients share, which spreads its tentacles, as it were, in every direction. Four of these tentacles, each modified by its medium, are present at the points of view of A, B, C, and D, and differ accordingly. Note that the tentacular fact is genuinely present in these quarters. Is not the sun present everywhere—in grass, cloud, sky, rose, and human brain—where its "influence," *i.e.* "*inflowing*," is traced? The perceptions of A, B, C, and D are fragments of the routes which the travelling prolongations take: fragments which consciousness serves to light. All the percipients alike dwell in the radiations of the *common* reality at X; are not shut up in separate cells but are sharing *the* world.

We have begun, it would seem, to solve the riddle of perception, but how is even this beginning to be justified? Having got rid of matter, energy, etc., we are able to understand.

[1] More especially in the forthcoming work on the individual, of which the discussion of the riddle of External Perception forms a part.

Nature is not a dead mechanistic system, but a psychical continuum. In a psychical continuum no fact is isolated; a mutual commingling or compenetration prevails on the great scale.[1] Thus, to cite an effective illustration, the group of minor sentients (or "mentoids," as they have been called) symbolised as an atom is found to "influence," *i.e.* to flow into, a like group a million or more leagues away. Traditional generalisation fails entirely to reveal to us why such facts are what they are. It stops short at a uniformity asserted of surface phenomena. Its verification depends on the behaviour of the minor sentients; and a time may come when it will be no longer true. In Nature, as well as in the verse of Shelley:

> All things by a law divine
> In one another's being mingle.

A change in the character of this "mingling" was a condition of the very birth of our world-system.[2] And we cannot expect the habitual or conservative actions of sentients during a time process to be rigorously stable.

Allowing, then, for this "mingling" in the psychical continuum, allowing further for the so-called "secondary qualities," colours, sounds, etc., that are present in the "mingling," whether we are aware of them or not, we have grasped something about the imaginal structure of Nature. "In the eyes of the man of imagination Nature is Imagination itself" (Blake). What now of the common tentacular fact which has been "made" at X? It is not that fictitious thing, a material object, a complex of mere extensions and resistances. What, then, is it?

It is of the same stuff as the facts present to A, B, C, and D. It is "made," conserved, and created—evolved, if you prefer the word—in the imaginal structure of Nature. Hegel

[1] This truth is beginning to influence, not only metaphysicians, but the philosophical physicist and mathematician. Cp. Dr. Whitehead, *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 96, on "the field of an electron" as extending through all time and space.

[2] Cf. Chapter IX. §§ 3 and 4.

urges that " the things that we know about are mere phenomena, not for us, but in their own nature and without our interference ; and these things, finite as they are, are appropriately described when we say that their being is established not on themselves, but on the divine and universal Idea." [1] We do not accept Hegel's panlogism, but we agree with him cordially in this respect. Sentients, each apperceiving in its special way, confront the contents of the world-imagining, amid which they have become conscious. The process of confronting, however, has yet to occupy us : the tree as it comes to any one finite sentient is a mere shadow of the tree as it exists for Divine Imagining. Only the general lines of a solution have been indicated.

What we mean by idealism is now becoming clear. It will be clearer still when the positive vindication of Imaginism is complete.

§ 11. Continuing our survey of representative systems, we considered next typical examples of idealism. Deferring to the verdict of so many able interpreters, we have supposed Hegel to hold the view that ultimate reality is experience, *i.e.* that the Idea or Cosmic Reason is conscious. There have been followers of Hegel who interpreted his words differently. It is to be regretted that certain philosophers seem unable or indisposed to return plain answers to questions of vital import.

The monadology of Leibnitz finds ultimate reality in experience, since God, who is supposed to be aware of the " windowless " monads and to influence their contents, rescues the system somehow from the unconscious. The monads themselves become conscious, are never more than in part conscious, and need not, in order to exist, be conscious at all.

The concept of the windowless monad is that of the old-world impenetrable atom excluding from its sphere of existence other atoms, but promoted to the rank of a psychical unit.

[1] Wallace's *Logic of Hegel*, p. 79.

Each of such units, a self-contained centre of experience, actual or potential, is supposed to contain an infinity of contents, but is actually aware only of a few. The complications of a God-monad, *with* windows, and of a pre-established harmony, become necessary when the units are thought as co-operating in order to a world.

The hypothesis of the monads is a fancy which, being unverifiable, remains fancy and not a truth. Before I can believe in many monads, I must believe in my own. And experience reveals no windowless monad, but rather a centre or circle of consciring which is open, and responsive, to an enveloping world-order. The monad disestablished, monadology, of course, loses its value; it retains the interest of an historical attitude and nothing more. Monads marked a pluralistic reaction against the monism of Spinoza which exalted unity at the expense of multiplicity. Later philosophical systems have taken note of this multiplicity very properly, and have discussed "monads," "natural monads," "reals," etc., to great profit, but these psychical existents have now limited contents, windows, and are interrelated. The original monads of Leibnitz, we may predict safely, will never appeal successfully to thinkers again.

§ 12. Turning to another form of idealism, we noted the hypothesis of "mind-stuff": a sham idealism which asserts first that reality is psychical and treats it subsequently just as if it was not. This "mind-stuff," of which the world is made, and which shows regularities analogous to physical laws, is unconscious except when its "bits" are integrated into certain organisms. These "bits" of sentiency and their laws are the material units and mechanical laws of the materialists renamed. Unverifiable, because no one could hope to observe the "bits" of a psychical atomism, and impotent before the riddle of our workaday conscious life, the "mind-stuff" hypothesis calls for little notice.[1] Simplifications of this sort have to overlook too much. There is, indeed, in all quarters

[1] Cf., however, *World as Imagination*, pp. 78-9.

a " mind-stuff," or, better, psychical content, which shows in minor and major sentients, and belongs, in last resort, to the multiform reality of the world-system. But its discussion on the lines of Democritan atomism is absurd.

§ 13. In the Will of Schopenhauer a much more important suggestion claimed our notice. The Will is a psychical reality, *i.e.* it is supposed to be akin to our empirical willing, as its name implies. But the resemblance is astonishingly far to seek. The Will is above time, unconscious, and blind, that is to say, not guided by ideas. In our experience, however, willing *is* the realisation of ideas, with or without conflict, and it occurs, further, in a time-process. Hence Schopenhauer's world-principle is, in fact, an unknown x ; a command-concept, in part verbal, since our imagining cannot construct it to any profit.

Treated as a blind principle and tested by application to experience, the Will fails : a result which prompted Edward von Hartmann to supplement it with a guiding " logical " ultimate which he called the Idea. Will and Idea were then placarded as aspects on an unconscious Absolute and there emerged a new " philosophy of the unconscious." The account of the relations between the Will and the Idea degenerated into a play of private fancy.

The motives, which had power over Schopenhauer, explain much. He had probably read Fichte's later contention to the effect that " Will is in a special sense the essence of reason." And resenting Hegel's panlogism and, very properly, Hegel's failure to account for the miseries of life, he believed that this " Will," completely shorn of reason, would fit the facts admirably. But, in his desire to destroy Hegelianism, he put faith in the barest of abstractions ; lacked, accordingly, that richness of content necessary to a reality which is to explain the world. His revolt against panlogism, his indictment of the ills and abominations that afflict man and animal on this planet, cannot be overlooked. But the riddles which he propounds, riddles which every honest system of philosophy

ought to confront, can be solved in a manner of which he failed altogether to take account.[1]

§ 14. We found in the system of Hegel, which was criticised at some length,[2] a contrast which throws the Imaginal Hypothesis well into relief. We considered the main historical influences contributory to this system: more particularly the cult of conceptual thought, logically co-ordinated, which was inherited from Greece, the story of the categories, and the dialectic. The search for a stable concept of concepts issues in the Absolute Concept—the rational Idea—Absolute of all the perfections and above time. Kant's categories, again, "form really the substance of Hegel." [3] Used first to solve the riddle of human experience, these categories are rescued from Kant's narrow idealism, multiplied, raised to the position of "souls of reality" at large, interconnected and woven at length into the rational thought-system of the Idea. Within this system shows dialectic, the immanent self-movement of the categories; the "universal and irresistible" power, following the Idea into its externalisation as Nature, and lying indeed "at the root of" every natural process; and beyond this, again, penetrating, as compelling dynamic, into the varied regions which concern the "philosophy of mind." It is not to be treated merely as a philosopher's method, but as the very pulse of cosmic life.

Hegel's perilous venture is the identification of ultimate reality with Reason; the logically-articulated truth-system of the Absolute Idea. "The real is the rational and the rational is the real," observes Hegel; God, as he interprets this much-abused term, is complete conscious Reason or Truth. The regions of Nature and Mind have to be viewed as "applied logic"; the logical Reason as "by its own native action

[1] For Schopenhauer cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 80-85. Fichte (p. 80), whose speculations probably gave birth to the Will, said much that modern pragmatists would endorse. We might call pragmatism a continuation of the old British Empiricism, lit by the *aperçus* of Fichte and Schopenhauer.

[2] *World as Imagination*, pp. 86-126.

[3] Dr. Hutchison Stirling, *Secret of Hegel*, ii. 401.

specialised and developed to Nature and Mind." Our task is to detect logical forms in appearances; for appearances are "a particular mode of expression for the forms of pure thought." At last Reason is in view as absolute sovereign of the world! But with the application of this hypothesis to the appearances of "Nature" and "Mind," Hegelianism is undone.

A philosopher ought not to suppose a logical Idea capable of extruding the amazing variety which appears in Nature and finite sentient life. The Idea is, by hypothesis, somewhat empty of content and he is asking too much of it. But, quite unwittingly, he may be helping out the hypothesis by a device. *He may be substituting the thought of an imaginal for that of a logical Idea*, and he may then suppose readily that "forms" are "expressed" in the regions of Nature and Mind, with their implied real succession in time. And having allowed for logical forms, or (shall we say ?) stable *conservative connexions*, he will be able to allow, further, for the many elements of appearances which cannot be called logical at all.

The sensible content of Nature, which philosophers are apt to overlook, has to be provided, but how ? Are you to extract it from logical categories ? Again, Nature seems often alogical: the alleged "applied logic," in fact, fails very frequently to appear. Hegel's charge is "that Nature is too weak to exhibit reason everywhere, that much is accidental and wholly without meaning." [1] In the *Philosophy of History* he finds Nature more satisfactory.[2] But his petulance elsewhere is not surprising. There is very much, as well in Nature as in the lives of finite sentients, that suggests cosmic unreason and anarchy. No explanation, drawn from his system, is found adequate to the facts.

Dialectic, viewed as a "universal and irresistible" power, is moribund, if not already interred. Thinkers will continue

[1] Erdmann, *Hist. of Modern Philosophy*, Eng. transl., p. 689.

[2] He seeks to show that "what was intended by eternal wisdom, is actually accomplished in the domain of existent, active spirit, as well as in that of mere Nature" (*Phil. of History*, Sibree's transl., p. 16).

to busy themselves with the method of finding and harmonising oppositions, as well they may, but dialectic as operative in a dust-storm or a waterfall interests them no longer. The dynamic manifest in such quarters has to be viewed, then, by idealists in a new light: a light which will illuminate impartially all spheres of the known cosmos. "Whenever there is anything being carried into effect in the actual world," to cite Hegel's words on the scope of dialectic, illustrations of the new dynamic must be sought.

§ 15. Hegel, in championing Reason—the Logical Idea—as "sovereign of the world," shows us at the same time how Reason's ambitions can soar too high. By exhausting the possibilities of Reason he rids us of, perhaps, the greatest error in the history of philosophy and thus prepares the way for a new solution of the world-riddle. The revolt against his hypothesis was led by Schopenhauer and Schelling, who exposed well the strategy of its champion: to wit the substitution of logical concepts "divested of empirical elements" for the living, concrete reality which experience reveals. The divisions within the ranks of Hegel's followers showed, further, how little rest their master had brought to thought. Among modern British neo-Hegelians and others inspired in part by Hegel, there is no pretence of maintaining his views intact. All have abandoned the dialectic, so indispensable to his position, and most speak of Reason and the rational in ways that mark a retreat. Thus the Reason that for Hegel is "exclusively its own basis of existence," the "energy," and "sovereign" of the world, has dwindled for Dr. Bosanquet to the dimensions of a "nisus to unity." [1] Bradley, again, who has been influenced notably by Hegel, denies, withal, that truth, as merely rational, can be ultimate reality and asserts Absolute Experience in which all appearances, rational thought included, fuse harmoniously.

[1] Cf. my paper "Observations on Cosmic Imagining and Reason," *Mind*, vol. xxvii. (N.S.) No. 106, p. 154. Dr. Bosanquet's *Logic* deals with the "mental construction of reality."

This doctrine of the Absolute Experience, which is no thinker confronted by an "other," but enjoys immediacy of feeling, marks an advance on the Hegelian view that equated the Absolute Idea with truth. It has been assailed as "mystical intuitionism," but to merit such a description is to incur no reproach at all. Ultimate reality, however we finite sentients come to know about it, must shine in its own light and, thus shining, is beyond the level dominated by discursive thought. Absolute Experience, freed from its traditional immobility and interpreted anew as Divine Imagining, will form the basis of the researches that are to task us in the following chapters.

§ 16. The bearing of Bergson's philosophy on Imaginism was discussed in the *World as Imagination* to great profit.[1] Bergson, if Imaginism be conceived rightly, over-accents change: what we term the conservative aspect of the world-principle occupies his attention little, if at all. His *Élan Vital*, described as an imperious impulse to create, is a symbolic concept, not a vision of the heart of the world. In the sphere of evolution we descry the creative aspect of the world-imagining.[2] We are interested in no mere veil, but in Isis herself. Further, we cannot follow Bergson when he contrasts the creative "Life" with an inert, automatic, obstructive, "Matter"; an opposition of "two complementary inverse aspects" of reality which builds on popular dualism too seriously.

The opposition and co-operation are pronounced. "Inert Matter," which provides "Life" with a field for creation, serves also to divide it into distinct sentients. For sentients are the "rills" which "Life," the great river, feeds. "Consciousness is distinct from the organism it animates, although it must undergo its vicissitudes";[3] it lies dormant, however,

[1] In connexion with the history of Imaginism (pp. 157-63), with consciousness (p. 170), with "detension" and the genesis of the natural order (pp. 453-8), with biology (pp. 543-5), with instinct (pp. 560-65), and other issues.

[2] Creative evolution (Foreword, § 5) was my theme as far back as 1893, but not originally in connexion with Imaginism.

[3] *Creative Evolution*, Eng. transl., p. 284.

when "Life" is "condemned to automatism," awakening when a choice has to be made.[1] "Life," then, is not always a conscious principle. But it comprises myriads of "tendencies" and "potentialities"; is always very rich in content. When not conscious, it is just a pemmican of content related somehow to another stratum of content—the "Matter." How is it awakened to consciousness when there arises the possibility of a choice? We can hardly suppose that this awakening. is effected by "Matter," the inert and automatic. On the other hand "Life" can hardly awaken itself. For it would have to be awake already in order to know that the moment for awakening had come.

Consciring, cosmic and other, assuredly sustains even stable or "automatic" natural systems. And, as regards the opposition, may we suggest this? ". . . There is no theoretical call to suppose that Nature is so fundamentally different from ourselves that an 'inverse aspect' of reality confronts 'Life.' Nature is aglow with psychical life in every quarter and cranny. It is of one tissue with the psychical reality noticed in ourselves. There is no dualistic opposition of 'Life' and 'Nature.' There are only the conflicts of centres of psychical activity, major and minor, within the bosom of the Imaginal IDEA."[2]

Interesting further relations between Bergsonism and the Imaginal Hypothesis will manifest themselves during the course of this inquiry. The main contention has been stated already. The "*Élan Vital*" is no more than a symbolic concept; that which is symbolised being certain creative phases of an imaginal world-system.

[1] *Creative Evolution*, Eng. transl., p. 275.

[2] *World as Imagination*, p. 162, closing a discussion of the alleged inverse aspects. Cf. also p. 170.

CHAPTER III

POSITIVE VINDICATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS

"I have felt
A Presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns
And the rour l ocean and the living air
And the blue sky and in the mind of man;
A motion, and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things."

WORDSWORTH.

"You cannot squeeze Nature out of the desiccated abstract notions of logic. But belief in a truly *concrete Idea* whose imagining takes form as Nature . . . *that* is easily grasped and understandable by all. Again, you cannot squeeze *art*, however you try, out of a sterile logical Ground. You cannot get this kind of imagination, or indeed any novelty of imagination, out of conceptual 'reason.' On the other hand, you can make an, at any rate, very plausible attempt to show how imagination becomes transformed in the time-order into reason."—*World as Imagination*, p. 131.

§ 1. THE object of philosophy for Hegel is the IDEA: the Absolute Experience regarded as rational, as the conscious Reason.[1] To comprehend this IDEA is, not to say Lord! Lord! but to re-read patiently its manifestations throughout the varied strata of Nature and sentient life. For this "god-

[1] The word "idea" has accumulated many meanings. The more important are (1) seen form; (2) form; (3) concept, universal or idea as framed by an individual thinker; (4) concept, universal or idea treated as an independent cosmic reality (*e.g.* as a Platonic idea); (5) any content present to a conscious centre, and lastly (6) the Absolute Experience itself, the concept of concepts, as for Hegel.

intoxicated " thinker life's great interest is the contemplation of the rational IDEA. For us also the entire field of knowledge is glorified in the light of a cult. Our object, withal, is no longer the rational but the imaginal IDEA, that is to say Cosmic Experience interpreted as resembling our imagining, conservative and creative, rather than our reasoning. And wide as is the abyss which parts the IDEA from finite sentients such as we, there is sufficient resemblance, we may contend, to render feasible the project of this essay. As above, so below. The private imagining of this and that sentient displays certain features which seem to mark the Cosmic Experience as well. When we say that the world-principle is imagining, we do not mean that it is on a level with the petty conditioned activity so named which shows in ourselves ; we refer to it as the perfect prototype of this petty activity ; as the sun whose rays, grievously diminished as is their light, remain light still and thus reveal unambiguously the nature of their source. The ocean of the infinite is not a *totum simul* for our direct vision ; nevertheless in every ripple and wave we are able to descry its main character. The Whole lives in all its members ; and by interrogating these latter, we propose to discover much at any rate of the Great Secret.

The term " Imaginal IDEA " has not found, was not likely to find, general favour. It serves to indicate effectively the respect in which our world-principle contrasts with that of Hegel, but with this its usefulness ends. The term IDEA is too reminiscent of the concept of concepts—of the " Notion," as it has been called. Nor, again, are the alternatives " Cosmic Imagination " or " Imagining," so often used in the last work, quite satisfactory. They suggest to some that the world-principle is too " objective," impersonal, or even subpersonal ; a disastrous distortion of our meaning. Accordingly we shall substitute for them as a rule the expression " Divine Imagining." The world-principle is beyond, not below, the defective level of personality. It conscires the content of a universe. It comprises in that content splendours of imagining such as

no finite experient, even the God of a world-system, could enumerate, much less possess. It is no Neutrum, to be painted grey in grey, but enjoys a radiant affective life.[1] Being indefinitely superior to what theists adore as a personal God, its experience is properly called divine.

§ 2. Imagining, in the narrower psychological meaning of the term, refers us to a portion only of private human experience; the portion in which the world-principle comes to us, as we contend, *least transformed*. It has been regarded often as illustrating the "association of ideas," as the field of processes of no great depth, explicable, perhaps, by some future insight into the physics and chemistry of the brain. There is, however, no region in Nature, the brain included, which is not psychical through and through. And association is just one of those convenient explanations which give men a sense of power, but which mutilate the reality of which they treat. The units and unions, the very retentiveness (conservation) and novelty (creation), which are presupposed, drive us to metaphysics for a fuller statement of the truth. In respect of imagining associationist psychology failed to convince even Hume, for whom—and let his admirers note well the fact—the "magical faculty" of imagination was inexplicable by understanding.[2] It will remain so unless regarded as continuing a wider kindred activity in which all phases of human experience, known to the psychologist, take their rise. This wider tract of activity, again, connects with yet wider tracts such as sustain and create the world. Imagining has thrown off, and maintained stably, so much novelty in the time-process that, when it takes form in us sentients, it seems almost concealed from itself; a *creator* half buried under the

[1] Cf. Chap. V. § 2, on Divine Imagining as Delight, Love, and Beauty.

[2] Hume calls Imagination "a kind of magical faculty in the soul which, though it be always most perfect in the greatest geniuses, and is properly what we call genius, is, however, inexplicable by the greatest efforts of human understanding" (Treatise I. § 7). Note that Hume clings to imagination even when assailing the Ego and productive causation.

wealth of its creations, under the "magically" initiated developments which it *conserves*.

In its comparatively untransformed portion—the imagining which interests most plain men and which psychologists contrast with other complementary phases of our private lives —the original activity continues itself clearly enough. But even elsewhere it penetrates and pervades fastnesses from which its prior deeds might seem to have excluded it. Thus reasoning on its simpler levels is barely discernible from imagining and, even on its higher levels, cannot move without it. Ordinary perception, again, is rich with what Professor Stout has called "relative suggestion" or "constructive reproduction." [1] There is confluence of content from Nature (every presentation, motor or sensory, conveys something to us from the imaginal structure of Nature) with the private apperceptive imagining which makes the presented specially "ours." Thus, while clad in part in the novelties into which it has changed, the plastic mother-reality overlaps all its forms. The differentiation of the "psychological individual" does not concern the present essay. But it will furnish a fascinating study for those who are prepared to reconsider it in a new light.

§ 3. Understanding and fancy derive alike from the overlapping mother-reality. We are glad to cite an opinion of Kant's in this regard. "In several passages," writes Professor Norman Kemp Smith in his admirable Commentary,[2] "the understanding is spoken of as simply imagination which has attained to consciousness of its activities. Elsewhere he states that they are distinct and separate. From this second point of view Kant regards imagination as mediating between sense and understanding, and, though reducible to neither, akin to both." On one point he is clear, ". . . it is to productive imagination that the generation of unified experience is primarily due. In it something of the fruitful and inexhaustible

[1] See the chapter on "Relative Suggestion" in vol. ii. of his *Analytical Psychology*.

[2] *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 265.

character of noumenal reality is traceable. . . . To its noumenal character we may also trace its capacity of combining those facts of sense and understanding which in the realm of appearance remain persistently opposed. Imagination differs from the understanding chiefly in that it is at once more comprehensive and also more truly creative."

Imagining, with a "noumenal character" and furnishing the connective tissue of Kant's system, gives pause. This imagining reappears in the philosophy of Fichte as the pre-empirical activity that produces perceived objects.[1] The following passage, cited by Professor Kemp Smith, is also highly suggestive: " . . . in the human mind we have sensation, consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, power of discrimination, pleasure, desire, etc. Now to begin with a logical maxim requires that we should reduce, so far as may be possible, this seeming diversity, by comparing these with one another and detecting their hidden identity. We have to inquire whether imagination combined with consciousness may not be the same thing as memory, wit, power of discrimination, and perhaps even identical with understanding and Reason. Though logic is not capable of deciding whether a fundamental power actually exists, the idea of such a power is the problem involved in a systematic representation of such a multiplicity of powers." [2] The "fundamental power" mooted is akin to our plastic mother-reality: the trunk from which shoot the branches of human experience. Considered merely as the power manifest in that experience, it may fail to interest all students. Considered, further, in the light of Imaginism, as a power radiating from a universal power of the same general character, it commands instant respect. And we are asking whether the time has not come when Kant's tentative suggestion may not prove of vital importance to philosophy.

If pure imagining, with its fecundity, plasticity, and tolerance, is the "fundamental power" noted above, its

[1] Cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 152-3. Fichte brings us near to Imaginism.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 474.

presence even in the penetralia of severe Reason would be expected. And, as we observed before, this Reason, an admirably efficient creation, cannot, in fact, move without it. Thus when Hegel opens his dialectic with "Being," the most empty and abstract of the categories ("underived indeterminateness"), he has to imagine it in the form of a command-concept. Experience had given him nothing of the kind. And the subsequent transitions of the dialectic reveal, not the "self-movement" of the categories, but rather harmonising imaginal solutions *imported into* their conflicts. Professor Santayana argues explicitly for a rational imagination "which prompts us not to regard our ideas as filling of a dream, but rather to build on them the conception of permanent objects and overruling principles, such as Nature, society, and the other ideals of reason. A full-grown imagination deals with all these things. . . ."[1] Thus imagining, transformed stably into Reason, is allied closely with imagining not thus transformed. "The material universe is largely a concept of the imagination which rests on a slender basis of direct sense-presentation. But none the less it is a fact, for it is a fact that actually we imagine it," observes Dr. Whitehead.[2] Fancy sires hypotheses: Karl Pearson calls laws of science "products of creative imagination." H. W. B. Joseph writes of the "logician's imagination"; Bertrand Russell insists that this "logical imagination"—or shall we say the imagining which conserves and creates in logic and mathematics?—is essential. Psychologists write sometimes as if imagining creates, always in a concretely synthetic way but, as these citations show, there is highly selective imagining such as issues in very general concepts and command-concepts: *e.g.* that "abstract imagination" which Russell would rescue from the tyranny of phenomena and allow to work freely in pure mathematics.

[1] *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, p. 213.

[2] *The Organisation of Thought*, p. 155. Dr. Whitehead is referring, of course, to the human imagination. The "slender basis of direct sense-presentation," let us add, connects us with the world-imagining.

"Here, as elsewhere, we build up our ideals out of the fragments to be found in the world; and in the end it is hard to say whether the result is a creation or a discovery."[1] It is a creation, we may suggest, when it belongs solely to the imagining of human sentients; it is a discovery if it acquaints us with imaginal connexions that obtain, independently of us, in the world at large. For the "direct philosophic vision"—genius—the "*new effort of logical imagination*," which Russell deems necessary when mere method fails,[2] is in fact that very intuitive imagining of which we have written before: imagining, which is not merely private, but which taps a fontal imagining in the wider cosmic order itself. Genius is intuitive imagining of highly creative types, and it is important to note that it may create simply within the sphere of our human fancies, as in the cases, say, of a decadent symbolist and teller of wondrous tales; or soar with poet, mathematician, man of science and philosopher into the heights of Divine Imagining. And the great genius is almost always a creator, who can soar beyond himself in this direction at need.

Clearly imagining and imaging are not convertible terms.

The pervasiveness of imagining in mathematics is seldom sufficiently accented. "Even in abstract calculation mathematical thought is essentially inventive and constructive, and every analysis presupposes the synthesis completed in the act of definition."[3] "Algebra, the poem of order," observes J. H. Fabre, that glorious naturalist, "has magnificent flights." Metageometry, though the imagining here concerns bare figures, and not a varied sense-world, is brilliantly inventive.[4] Even the Euclidean figures exist for us primarily by our decree; they are not faithful copies of anything that perception supplies. They are created as command-concepts when they are defined. "The same may be said of space in

[1] *Mysticism and Logic*, pp. 69-70.
[2] *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 241.
[3] Aliotta, *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*, p. 333.
[4] "I have created another wholly new world," writes Bolyai.

general: perfect continuity, unlimited divisibility, absolute homogeneity, the number of dimensions, the degree of curvature, etc., are conceptual determinations which may be formed on the occasion of an experience or the image of one, but were not given therein as such." [1] "Imaginary," similarly, for Bergson [2] is the "homogeneous and impersonal duration, the same for everything and for every one, which flows onward indifferent and void, external to all that endures." The concepts which cluster round the new mathematical infinite are surprising examples of what the creative "logical imagination" can achieve. Rare as is the atmosphere of this domain, inapplicable as assertions about it may be to the sensible world, the domain is real in so far as we treat it as built by fancy. The worst that can be said is that the building has been decreed, but not fully accomplished: that fancy cannot contrive to spin all the wonderful fabrics she has planned. But there we have the defect of the command-concept; creative humans have sometimes to feign that things are done which in fact cannot be done at all. A transfinite number, having parts "similar" to itself, is conceived and the concept is product of that pure imagining which is the "fundamental power." Agreed. But the imagining seems at best inchoate. Numbers, which are not finite numbers, which are too abstract to be embodied even in dots, exist in the intentions of their creators, not as the "collections" or "aggregates" of which Cantor and others are pleased to write. Recipes for their creation are furnished, but who is to carry them through? "The essence of number is to construct a finite whole out of homogeneous units," observes Dr. Bosanquet.[3] And you

[1] Aliotta, *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*, p. 283.

[2] *Matter and Memory*, Eng. transl., p. 274.

[3] For some trenchant criticism cf. his *Logic*, 2nd ed., i. pp. 163 ff. Dr. Bosanquet regards the idea of infinite number as based on "the notion of counting without having anything particular to count," corresponding to the idea of parts without a whole. We are "merely saying 'one, two, three,' and it is for this reason that we need never stop" (p. 166). Professor Ray Dotterer's paper, "The Definition of Infinity" (*Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, vol. xv. No 11, May 1918), will repay study.

cannot construct even a finite "aggregate" out of units that do not exist.

It is noteworthy that the mathematician, while creating with the freed "logical imagination," is, nevertheless, forced to take note of the conservative or unyielding side of the ideal objects created. "Once created, this world, in its own eternal and dignified way, is as stubborn as the rebellious spirits that a magician might have called out of the deep." [1] "Within limits, you create as you will, but the limits once found are absolute. Unsubstantial in one way, as fairyland, the creations of the pure mathematician's ideality still may require of their maker as rigid, and often as baffling, a search for a given kind or case of mathematical existence, as if he were an astronomer testing the existence of the fifth satellite of Jupiter, or of the variables of a telescopic star-cluster." [2] Let us hasten, however, to add that there is nothing in this peculiar to mathematics. Thus some man invented the game of chess. In doing so he was free to create at will. But, having once created, he had to confront the conservative aspects of his creation. He and later chess-players were to make innumerable discoveries, controlled by what the limiting conditions of the chess-domain permit and dictate. And some of these discoveries, not anticipated in any way at the outset, have been remarkably fine. The chess-domain provides, observe, a field for the making of "universal and necessary" propositions—valid so long as it endures. Thus one case of 1. $\frac{\text{P—KB3}}{\text{P—Q4}}$, 2. $\frac{\text{P—KKt4}}{\text{Q mates}}$ is every other possible case; even if chess is played for ever, the Q must mate. The truth of $2+2=4$ is not more stable. It too would lapse were countable units to disappear; the proposition being then meaningless.[3]

Having descried the "fundamental power" at the roots of the individual, we return with profit to a consideration of this power as manifest in the world-order at large.

[1] Royce, *World and the Individual*, 1st Series, p. 214.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 215. [3] Cf. Chap. V. § 4, and § 3, Appendix.

§ 4. Our hypothesis submits that both the imagining that astonished Hume and imagining treated as the "fundamental power" at the roots of the individual resemble in important ways the universal power manifest in the worlds. This is to contend, in the first place, that the power is no Eastern, German, or neo-Hegelian Absolute, complete, finished, and altogether above time. Divine Imagining comprises conservative or stable connexions, but also, in virtue of its eternal character, *creative* process. Nature becomes part of what Professor Mackenzie has termed an "imaginative construction." Recognising a real time-succession, we shall accept and interpret Evolution with a whole-heartedness to which believers in static Absolutes cannot aspire. And, in interpreting it, we shall, perhaps, near that much-discussed, much-desired "constant"; a basic conceptual system which can be applied, substantially unaltered, to all future items of experience as they arise. Have no fear that the progress of metaphysics towards this system will be without end. The labours of the centuries, failures so-called as well as successes, are even now bearing their fruit; a final effort on the part of us, who have profited so vastly by them, may bring the reward. Does the present hypothesis strengthen, in some degree, this hope? If it be a romance, it is at least, as Dr. Schiller allows, a consistent one. It remains, however, to determine whether, while consistent internally with itself, it is consistent, further, with the cosmic reality for which it professes to stand.

A preliminary statement of its claims follows. If this account compels attention, a positive verification can be sought in the only tolerable way. The inquirer will not be content with genial glances such as suffice for makers of phrases and poets. He will test the suggestions throughout all available strata of fact, "natural and spiritual." He will be aided by what we have to say, but, in the main, he must do the testing himself. He will recall Dr. Schiller's remark, continuing the better side of the old British empiricism, "every thought, when actually thought, is an experiment,

every inquiry is a question." For, if we judge aright, philosophical truth-claims rest on private imagining, embodied in concepts, in so far as this agrees, or promises to agree, with imagining on the wider or cosmic scale. Dogmatism on issues of cosmic range is out of place ; no one, be he philosopher, man of science, religionist, or even uninstructed person in a hurry, can be quite sure that his first imaginings are correct.

§ 5. Claim 1. The first claim is that our idealism has room for all facts to which pluralists of any school can point. We repeat " for facts," as contrasted with mere command-concepts that pretend to be more than they are. Thus mathematicians, who take up philosophy, require careful watching. Pure mathematics is not supposed to dictate to " actual existence," [1] but is this wise reticence always observed ? It is not. Hence Poincaré's notification to all concerned that mathematics can be sometimes " a nuisance, and even a danger," tempting us to assert more than we know.

We observed that " any system can be called idealistic for which ultimate reality resembles our experiencing," [2] or, let us say, conscíring. But the word " resembles " is emphatic. The conscíring in finite centres can never wholly sustain or create the contents conscíred. The sun, *e.g.*, is present to " my " conscíring but does not depend on it for existence. Were, however, Divine Conscíring to cease, all the contents of all the world-systems would dissolve and leave " not a rack " behind. Even the finite sentients, which arise with Its *partial abdication* in a world-process and which realise in their turn big possibilities of freedom, presuppose It throughout in the background. They are not self-complete monads ; they continue the fontal power; their being is their activity, but it expresses *also* the activity of the world-principle. Thus when we speak of Divine Experiencing or Conscíring, we must do so with the reservation that It is not merely aware of, but sustains and creates, the contents and sentients present to It.

[1] Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 69
[2] Chap. II. § 10.

Outside Divine Imagining and the myriads of sentients, ranging from so-called "mentoids" to gods, that live, move, and have their being within It, there is not, and there cannot be, any existent of any kind. An alleged existent of this sort is merely a command-concept: a figment of human imagining which is mistaken for something more.

A world, independent of *our* perceptions, which includes a real spatial order and real successive stages, and which is sufficiently "loose" to provide for the relations of more or less independent plural agents, has room for all the facts cited by pluralists.

§ 6. Claim 2. Our hypothesis, like all others, is imagined first and then verified—*i.e.* shown to be, not merely a fancy, but a fancy that is sufficiently like its object to serve our theoretic interests. It is to stand, in our thinking, as a fancy-born substitute-fact for that ultimate reality which we cannot conscire integrally. It is a makeshift of discursive thought, but sentients in our position can compass nothing better.

Now, viewed in this light, the hypothesis has an advantage over others. Private *imagining* or fancy is building a substitute-fact representing a universal *imagining* akin in character to itself. "All the other metaphysical explanations," as Dr. Schiller observes, "involve and presuppose" that private imagining which we stress. But in the case of our hypothesis the universal reality meant is also imagining and in the other cases something else.

§ 7. Claim 3. It has been said that all attempts to conceive ultimate reality are misleading. We accent *selected* features of our experience and, since in selecting we have to reject, we cannot hope to conceive ultimate reality impartially. Why select imagining and drop the other features of our adult experience? The answer is given when we recur to the suggestion that imagining, in a wider sense of the term, is the "fundamental power" in the individual: the magician who transforms himself into the differentiated subordinate powers. A similar overlapping presence may be said to belong to

cosmic imagining. Hence Dr. Schiller is of opinion that Divine or Cosmic Imagining "can really afford to be what other metaphysical principles falsely claim to be, viz. all-embracing. It can be represented as including not only all reality, but all 'unreality.' . . . Its elasticity and tolerance contrast very favourably with the proud and narrow-minded exclusiveness of the ordinary Absolutes, which always in the end ignore the reals of low degree, though they usually begin with a perfunctory parade of their inflexible resolve to absorb all finite things."

In Keats' *Hyperion*, Asia, "daughter of enormous Caf," a Titan of the female persuasion, has a vision :

> And in her wide imagination stood
> Palm-shaded temples, and high rival fanes,
> By Oxus or in Ganges' sacred isles.

So stood and stand this and other world-systems in Divine Imagining with their aspects, which we discuss as sentients, things, qualities, quantities, and relations, all comprised. The Imagining overlaps and pervades every phase of the systems. It can hold or create all manner of variety of being—even "potential worlds" indefinitely numerous [1]—but we feel at once, when we put the contrast thus, that nothing which we label "Reason" could be regarded as adequate to the facts. Indeed "Reason," even in the higher reaches of science and philosophy, is vitiated by abstractness ; a feature which Hegel, for whom the rational was the real, recognised but misinterpreted as an excellence. For Hegel avers that rational thought "under the aspect of feeling, perception, and imagination" is not in its "own proper form." It "renounces the field of the external and internal sense" in the search for *notions*. Notions, let us object, may be comprehensive : they can never be adequate, because bloodless. This is to say that the "abstract imagination," which feeds and pervades rational thought, is a

[1] Since "potential" indicates here an inchoate but existing fact : an imaginal field only in part realised.

makeshift, necessary indeed for the living of sentients such as we, but severing its users from the concrete imagining in the world. There is the flaw, which, once pointed out, cannot be overlooked.

While Imagining is the overlapping presence which includes reasoning, it is also the same power which, in certain manifestations yet to be described, displays the "alogical" happenings, the unreason, which were noticed by Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, the meaninglessness that even Hegel descried in much of Nature, the abominations that disgust so many rebels with the story of life. These phenomena, so often ignored or minimised ignobly by academic philosophy, interested us elsewhere; their place in an imaginal world being assigned readily.[1] We saw that "intelligible connexions," to make use of a stock university phrase, are very frequently not "intelligent" ones. Panlogism and allied types of thought are out of court.

On the other hand, there are *stable* or conservative connexions, sometimes called "logical" (with no obvious justification for this use of the term), sometimes just "eternal connexions of content," said to be superior to time. The Divine Idea has room for indefinitely rich systems of *stable* connexions and values. But it would be better to say that these *endure* without change than to label them "eternal" in the sense of being timeless. Whatever lasts unchanged has a time-quality. And to assert that it will last indefinitely is to assert, in very many cases at any rate, more than we know. We shall return to the topic. For the moment we repeat that Imagining has its stable aspect and therewith stable ("logical") or conservative connexions. It is tolerant, indeed, of anything of which you can think.

§ 8. Claim 4. Attempts have been made to regard the Absolute as *thinking* on the great scale. But thinking, after all, is only, what Royce calls it in *The World and the Individual*, a "name for the process by which we define or describe objects

[1] *World as Imagination*, Part III. ch. ix. pp. 566-604.

viewed as beyond, or other than, the process whereby they are defined or described." The Divine Experience is not a truth-system—eternally accomplishing itself and eternally accomplished—"about" an Other. It is not truth but Reality, *i.e. unmediated imagining* which is its own object. The so-called "mystical intuitionism" of Bradley, for whom also the Absolute Experience, possessing the "immediacy of feeling," transcends truth, marks, as we saw, an advance on Hegelism. Getting rid in our way of the static character of this Absolute, rescuing it thus from the realm of the unknown, we shall confront soon—Divine Imagining! But one further step is needful. We are not to suppose that this Experience is a unity which smothers the distinctions and relations which we treat abstractly in conceptual thought.[1] It is not on that level of confusedness which, for us finite sentients, precedes the evolution of "self" and "not-self." It is that highest immediacy for which all aspects of content, qualitative, relational, etc., are conscired together but with perfect clarity. An alleged Divine Experience, which smothered distinctions, even those of the finite sentients, would be overlooking what ought—if It be really all-embracing—to be present to It. It would not be adequate to reality. And the Experience, let us recall, is not a whole inertly enclosing timelessly fixed parts. It is actively conservative and creative. There is no valid "philosophy of the unconscious" to which we can make appeal. *Consciring is itself the "energy" of the universe. Every difference subsists in virtue of the tireless conservation and creation thus assured.* Of this more anon.

Let us state the contention about "unmediated imagining" once more but in another way. Consider then your private imagining. Note that it can be concerned solely with itself. Note, on the other hand, that your conceptual thinking is process which concerns reality *other than* the process itself. You can imagine a new world, a heaven, or a skating-rink,

[1] Bradley supposes that in the Absolute "all distinctions are fused and all relations disappear."

and live awhile immersed in your very imagining. But you have to think of or "about" free trade, socialism, and the old red sandstone. This contrast is instructive. For ultimate reality, you now surmise, resembles in this respect your direct imagining. It does not concern a reality other than itself. It is self-sufficient; has no frontiers. Its object is just the content which it conceives. But were it of the character of conceptual thinking, it would be reaching forward eternally to a somewhat other than, and contrasted with, itself.

This outlook on the unmediated imagining secures the solution of the riddle of truth. There is no truth which can be identified with reality at large and called the Idea or God. The "*self-verifying*" truth of Hegel, for which the strictly true content is "one mediated by itself, where mediation and immediate reference to self coincide," disappears with panlogism and its dialectic. And we have to ask where this dethroned truth, no longer equated with divinity, is to abide. The attitude of the pragmatists, it may be, arrests us. "The pragmatic attitude," writes Dr. Schiller, "is essentially that which is not satisfied with "ideas," speculations, systems, beliefs, but insists on bringing them to the test of things (*πράγματα*) they lead to, if taken as true and acted on, viz. their "consequences." But the *testing* is more important than the "consequences." Hence the distinction between "truth-claims" and validated "truths" discriminated from errors is vital. As every claim has to be further tested, the pragmatic attitude is essentially experimental." [1] Stated in these terms, pragmatism is a continuation of the better side of the old British empiricism. And so far, so good. The main contentions of this essay are offered as experiments to be tested by application in the quarters to which they refer. Truth is not regarded as a system, pre-existing *sub specie aeternitatis* to our contemplation of it. It arises piece-meal with the adventures of men and their like; as collections of true propositions arranged according to plans. So far no single collection exists.

[1] Letter to the writer, cited *World as Imagination*, p. 619.

But the " true " proposition, of course, raises a further problem. All knowledge, however " theoretic " it be, is of some practical value in satisfying a need ; and all arrangements, or " systematising," of truths satisfy promptings in part emotional. Hence, as far back as Schopenhauer and Fichte, we note a tendency to subordinate the " theoretic " to the " practical " ; a tendency which is reasserting itself in the pragmatism of to-day. " The whole system of our ideas depends upon our impulses and our will," urged Fichte.[1] An extreme development of this tendency regards truth as a form of goodness or utility. The true proposition is useful—though not always on the lower practical levels of adaptation to life-conditions—but it is also something more.

There is no difficulty in citing ideas of value to science and workaday practice, ideas markedly " useful " and " opportune," which ought not to be called true. Thus the mythology of blind " energy," so widely employed, is very useful, but to say that the world consists of such " energy," which is being conserved and transformed, would be untrue. Ideas, then, treated as " instruments " of a high order, may be true or untrue. If they are true, what is the end which their appearance to us fulfils ? Surely that of representing, more or less faithfully, that for which they stand ? Even the formula $pv = \frac{1}{3}mnc^2$ has a double value ; it serves my purpose on a lower practical level and tells me, also, something " interesting " about the real world. And similarly, but more obviously, the truths of geology and metaphysics are valuable, not only as helping to guide conduct, but as revealing, in some measure, to private imagining, embodied in concepts, the character of the larger imagining in which we live. The end fulfilled in metaphysics is dominantly " theoretic " ; the value of the ideal constructions depending on their likeness to the reality of primary interest. It is, accordingly, at this point that I reach what has been called " representational pragmatism." Truth arises in us, but is controlled by the reality which it concerns,

[1] Cf. *World as Imagination*, p. 80.

and for which it stands as substitute-fact, often most shadowy, in our thinking. Such a substitute-fact is decidedly an "instrument," but its value depends on its likeness to what it claims to represent. Thus the tradition of the "city of Minos" seemed for long mere private imagining; it was called true and acquired value when excavations showed that it resembled a fact. The truth of my ideas of Caesar is useful just because it realises my end of imagining, with some measure of success, "what Caesar was like."

A reality as such, be it Divine Imagining or a tree, is neither true nor false. Only judgments about it can be labelled in this way. A dualism of "idea" and "reality" is presupposed. When seeking truth about Divine Imagining, I must be content with some constructed ideas which represent It. If I want to get completely beyond truth and its implied dualism, I must become the reality, must reach the level whereat Divine Imagining and my imagining coincide. An expansion on this scale, we may suggest, is beyond the dreams even of a finite God. And claims of "union" with the divine, such as have been put forward by merely human mystics and their champions, can be dismissed outright. All of us exist within Divine Imagining. But there are many grades of expansion, and the higher are not within our ken. I ought to add that no illumination, remotely worthy of the alleged "union," has found a place in the annals of mysticism or philosophy.

Shining in its own light, Divine Imagining is not truth and is beyond truth. But, seeing that it comprises finite sentients of all kinds, It includes *as fact* all the truths and errors which arise with them. Thus, Itself above truth and error, It conscires in these sentients exactly what truth and error are. The "transmutation" of these last into some unknown harmony unlike either, as in Bradley's Absolute, is a stroke of private fancy.

"Representational pragmatism" blends with the correspondence-theory of truth, as re-thought on the lines of this

essay. Ideas are instruments, which, to be true, have to agree more or less with reality. If reality were found to comprise contradictions, truth would have to comprise them too. "Coherence" has a secondary importance; there is no basic truth-criterion save this agreement as ascertained by testing.[1] Particular statements may hold good regardless of "coherence"; and their verifying facts are not to be considered "unreal" just because innumerable influences beyond themselves conspire to their making.[2] On the other hand, alleged truths, never to be tested by application to cases, are spurious. Even $2 + 4 = 6$ would not survive the vanishing of distinguishable units: it would lose meaning, cease to be one of those stable conservative (so-called "logical") connexions which were noticed recently.

The ideas said to correspond with reality are themselves real facts. They "mean," however, the reality *of primary interest* for which they are substituted in our thinking. Correspondence may be taken as likeness, not as implying necessarily a "point to point relationship of elements in two systems" exemplifying the same purpose. "While two things may resemble one another . . . because they show the same purpose, they equally well do it on account of an identity of character other than teleological, and this is all that the 'correspondence theory' requires."[3] The likeness is relevant to our purposes, whether we are responding to a physical surround or ascertaining the character of the universe.

The great stumbling-block of the correspondence-theory is said to be the reality that corresponds. Can we be sure that it corresponds, since, by definition, it is often placed outside the circle of the "mind"? Belief in a closed "mind," knowing nothing save in and through its own modifications, invites this criticism. But we are not so aloof from reality after all. Very many truths concern facts of the presented

[1] The *maxim* of contradiction cannot dictate to the real. Cf. Chap. VI. § 1.
[2] *World as Imagination*, pp. 288-9.
[3] Professor A. K. Rogers, *Mind*, Jan. 1919.

objective world. And in all these cases the dualism of truth and truth-object lies within experience. Very many truths, again, concern my private life and the lives of other sentients. While the last-named realities are not directly present to me, "ejects," representing them and believed in as completely as are a sound or pain, are treated as facts. And why not? Even realities, supposed popularly to transcend our experience, may be penetrating it. Things, as Shelley sung, "in one another's being mingle"; a reality, which, on the evidence of certain marks, is called remote may be revealed, on the evidence of others, as present wherever its influence shows. An "electron," present in a flower, has its field of influence also in my brain. Hence, as we saw, the *tentacular fact* (Chap. II. § 10) is at once within and independent of my perception. Hence the lover is present to the beloved, though their conscious centres as such lie apart. Conscious centres are not divided, like the hypothetical monads, from the rest of reality. They might be compared to the travelling sparks which wander across a piece of burnt paper. As they travel they are conscious of all the "mingled" reality lit up in their paths. The path of one spark does not cover the whole paper, but, owing to the "mingling" just noted, anything existing focally anywhere on the paper may show in it. The sparks are centres of consciousness, or consciring; the paper is the psychical continuum in which no content is sheerly divided from others.

Realities, to which we are often said to be related across a void, may thus be with us. Nature-contents enter our sense-perception, not as mere modifications of the "mind," but rather, in geological parlance, as *intrusive sheets* which are modified where they penetrate. Divine Imagining, again, is present at every point of minor realities, and, incidentally, to the "mentoid" and black-beetle as well as to Hegel. Nothing squats spider-like on an utterly private web of properties or "states."

A reality that has been evolved within an experient centre

—*e.g.* the permanent imaginal background against which its passing perceptions show, the private "world" of rags and patches which abides, while this and that colour, sound, etc., comes and goes—is none the less a truth-object other than the proposition which affirms it. But command-propositions raise a difficulty. In this case the reality asserted does not exist, but is ordered, according to some formula, to exist. The assertion, therefore, concerns inchoate or aborted imagining, which is treated as more, as realised in fact. An "infinite number of infinite numbers" is a case in point. The assertion of an "impossible object" such as a round square is another. We can discuss this command-concept; make it the subject of propositions. There is no truth-object, but we can feign that there is. And, feigning persistently, we might use the concept as an element in the constructions of the "abstract imagination," as Russell calls it.

The notion that the world, for each of us, "exists in the medium of our mind" as a "sort of building, of which the materials are our ideas and perceptions,"[1] is too subjective and leads inevitably to a theory of judgment whereby contents have to be extradited or "referred" somehow beyond the said "mind" to reality. In strict accuracy it seems better to say that the world "for each of us" is not built in the "mind," but in the *centre of consciring*, some only of whose contents constitute later what we call features and possessions of "mind." And the *centre of consciring*, open to influx as it is, ingests literally the same connected system of things that feeds other centres. There seems no call to "refer" mental modifications *to* reality. There is rather awareness of elements *within* reality, as the foundation on which our experience, the outward and inward present, begins. This realistic view of perception belongs to that wider idealism which we have indicated already.[2]

[1] Dr. Bosanquet, *Essentials of Logic*, p. 5.

[2] The subject of external perception belongs to the forthcoming work on the individual.

There are perceptions before there are judgments, true or false, about perceptions, and it is important not to confound the two. There is no consciousness of "correspondence" in the having of the primary perceptions themselves; this relation supervenes when we have an interest (as in reflective thought and in communications to others) in framing propositions for which truth-ideas and truth-objects lie apart. In perceiving a snowy pine I am not aware primarily of any ideas which, being like the object perceived, may stand for it conveniently in my thinking; I am sunk, so to say, in the contents of the object itself. The dualistic truth-attitude, relevant to some purpose, commences later. The presented pine, with which elements, private to my centre of experience, fuse, nears the level of that *pure imagining* which we called, after Kant, the "fundamental power" at the root of the individual.

The presentation-continuum, in which such primary perceptions stand out, is close to the imagining of Nature which feeds it. It is influx from regions beyond our conscious centres, though, as our next essay will show, influx very considerably modified in the quarters into which it penetrates. Nature, as content in Divine Imagining, is far richer, in respect of sensible variety, quantified qualities, and relations, than the Nature we perceive, and, of course, immeasurably superior to the phantom-world of physics; a creation of our human "abstract imagination."

At the other extreme where judgments about perceptions have passed into science, the truth-ideas become at last so inadequate to truth-objects as to rob knowledge of its charm. "Scientific knowledge," observes Aliotta, "gains economically, but loses objectively as its schemes become more generic and more abstract. Here we have the weak point of science, which is forced to impoverish concrete reality, to look at it from a one-sided point of view, and to reduce it to a mere frame-work of abstract formulae in order to fulfil practical requirements. Our intelligence endeavours in this way to

make up for the natural limitations of memory." [1] In the interests of practical life and of our limited attention, unable, like Divine Conscíring, to sustain all co: tent impartially at once, this transition to abstractness is needful. But the price paid is a heavy one. The would-be contemplative, who wants to grasp reality in its fulness, is guest at a Barmecide's feast and prone to rebel. Knowing very much in the form of sciences which subserve practice, he knows too little that he can value for its own sake. And at this stage the voice of the mystic is to be heard, proclaiming loudly the need of an apprehension superior to that of intellect with its arid science. Now what does the mystic desire, often so confusedly and vaguely? Just this. *A return from the dualism of the truth-idea and the truth-object to that undivided concrete imagining which stands for nothing else, but is reality itself.* A glorious return indeed, if each content, previously apprehended abstractly, continued to be apprehended along with its concrete setting. But the mere enthusiast, unable to live the intellectual life, cannot expect to conscire clearly beyond it. Intellect must transfer its values to direct apprehension or we may find ourselves, alas, like some historic mystics, perilously near the confused mentality of the cod. Further reflections on this theme are to follow. The desire of the mystic is an ideal, never fully attainable by sentients of the human type.

A concluding word on "belief" and our solution of the truth-problem has been stated. Belief, too often confounded with what is believed, with the import of the judgment or proposition, seems an emotion. It has degrees of intensity rising to the "feeling" of certainty, and appears when contents occupy or tend to occupy attention stably. A patch of colour or stab of pain—the simplest percepts that stand out in the presentation-continuum—are believed in when noticed. Any content, that is directly conscired, is believed in; only inferences built on it can be doubtful. Similarly in the realm of ideas there obtains a "primitive credulity." And any

[1] *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*, p. 64.

circumstance that strengthens the hold of ideas on attention strengthens belief. Mere iteration of a statement often produces complete conviction ; instances of " indissoluble association " are instances of highly stubborn beliefs. James Mill's principle of the *fixity* of ideas does not cover all cases of belief (which includes percepts), and does not, indeed, of itself ever " constitute " belief, but it provides a field for the emotion. And the emotion, swollen by other coalescing emotions and organic sensation, may become formidably strong, stabilising yet further the ideal content which it pervades. A religionist's faith, *i.e.* his private imagining as operative in religion, owes much to this accessory emotional support. Hence a philosopher, whose business is to state truth, is more reliable and honest when he has no particular religion to save. Such emotions are not flung away at a call.

§ 9. Claim 5. The next claim for the Imaginal Hypothesis is that it solves the riddle as to the standing of consciousness in the universe. This solution will enable us to assign a tolerable meaning to " activity " and later to the symbolism of blind " energy " which has bulked so largely in science. Hegel in his *Philosophy of History* writes of the IDEA : " While it is exclusively its own basis of existence and absolute final aim, it is also the energising power realising this aim, developing it not only in the phenomena of the Natural, but also of the Spiritual Universe—the History of the World." What is this " energising power " or " spiritual energy " ? In a universe, which is Divine Imagining and its modes, the only available power is surely consciousness. Owing, however, to our habit of regarding consciousness as, in the main, a mere mirror or " inert diaphaneity," we lack at first a term to express it when conceived as active, as ultimate activity—as the Fichtean " infinite activity " itself. The consciousness, or rather conscious-ing, in question is not merely awareness that shines idly in its own light ; it is also the *active continuum* that *sustains* and *creates* all the minor sentients and all the contents of which it is aware. To express this activity, which is bodied

forth in the conservative and creative aspects of the world, I propose to make use of the word CONSCIRING. To say that Divine Imagining conscires is thus to say that It is at once conscious, as aware of the contents of a universe, and also the "energising power," which conserves and creates all that therein is.[1] Consciousness (con-scire) is the continuity of the contents of a spiritual universe: continuity, failing which there would be no universe, no wholeness of being; not even that plurality of unrelated ultimates which has been called a "multiverse."[2] Since such ultimates, if quite unrelated, would not constitute a collection or system, however loose, it is not clear how they could be termed many. Nay, not being conscired, hence not being actively conserved and created, they would not exist at all.

Consciring is thus the ultimate ground of relations: the continuity wherein all contents and sentients are grasped *together*, closely or loosely connected, as members of Divine Experience. It manifests too as that conservation and creation failing which every content and every sentient would vanish and leave "not a rack" behind. The solid-seeming earth, the wonders of the starry heavens and of their allied "unseen" worlds, depend for their being on a ceaseless two-sided imagining of contents that endure without change and of contents that change. And, finite sentients, while enjoying truly free creative initiative, and being, accordingly, relatively independent, presuppose, nevertheless, the Universal Consciring as their source. The eddies exist, we may say, not by and of themselves, but within the ocean of the infinite.

"There is free infinite activity, as Fichte urged, but this activity does not 'condition' the universal consciousness—it is this consciousness itself. Activity is *whole* just because it is this *con*sciousness—the cosmic *con*sciousness which

[1] We have to allow, however, later for the fact that the finite sentients, in whose favour Divine Imagining *abdicates* in part, also sustain and create in their limited ways. With the imaginal spontaneity of these sentients arises the sphere of chance and individual freedom.

[2] For Continuity cf. § 2, Appendix.

*com*prises its content, not passively, but as self-identical power." [1]

Developments of this thesis await us.

§ 10. Claim 6. In regarding the world — the connected system of things and sentients—as conservative and creative imagining, we are able to suggest also the nature of the imaginal dynamic which operates in change. This suggestion may be substituted for the Hegelian dialectic viewed as "universal and irresistible" power manifest in the processes of Nature and sentient life. The problems of Cause (William James called cause "an altar to an unknown god, an empty pedestal marking the place of a hoped-for statue") and Chance become less formidable.

§ 11. Claim 7. We are able to understand, *pace* Bradley, why and how experience "should take place in finite centres, and should wear the form of finite 'thisness.'"

§ 12. Claim 8. We glimpse in the Imaginals the realities incorrectly, but most suggestively, conceived in the Platonic theory of the Ideas.

§ 13. Claim 9. We retain belief in a finite conscious God; not marred by the defect of being a mere "person," whose rank in the universe seems assigned by chance. God is not Divine Imagining, but rather an exalted society of experients constituting the highest conscious power of a particular world-system.[2] There may be innumerable such Gods allied with world-systems unknown to us. They are mere points in the infinite. The supreme affective life is not to be found in such a society or societies, but in Divine Imagining Itself. The frequently implied view that ultimate reality is a grey neutrum need not dismay us. It would be truer to say that in Divine Imagining perfectly satisfying Love, Delight, and Beauty coincide.

§ 14. Claim 10. We are enabled to understand fully why Evil exists; and why so much that is odious, hideous, and sometimes barely mentionable, defiles the world.

[1] *World as Imagination*, p. 187.

[2] But cf. Chap. X., "God and the gods," § 5. We must go warily.

§ 15. Claim 11. We become aware of the standing of time in its aspects of duration, simultaneity, and succession. Even time-succession yields its secret. Professor A. E. Taylor (and others) balk at " the perhaps insoluble problem why succession in time should be a feature of experience." [1] Unintelligible for Absolutism, succession reveals to us its mystery. An eternally *fixed* Imagining were, indeed, absurd. The changing side of this Imagining is just " creative evolution " itself; or, otherwise put, time-succession, being the form of creation, is equally real with that complete Imagining of which it is a mode. This view rescues succession from the sphere of illusive appearance to which so many philosophers, Western and Indian, had condemned it. Idealistic realism is, again, in evidence. When I write Imagining, I repeat that it is conscious imagining—conscring—that I have in view. This conscring, in its conservative and creative embodiments, resembles, at a distance, the imagining of our acquaintance and is, therefore, similarly named.

Time-succession is one of the inventions of creative evolution. So also is that order of contents as co-existent called space. Space, as referred to here, is a real order which belongs to the manifestation of Divine Imagining in a world. The spatial order in Nature is continued into animal and human experience. But it is not a " form " of the Kantian sort, having no reality save for finite percipients. Idealistic realism again!

We need not, of course, discuss such topics as " beginning " and " end " in connexion with the entire content conscired by Divine Imagining. But we can assuredly conclude to the beginning and end—so far as a stretch of creative time-process is concerned—of a particular world-romance, such as that of which the physical part is descried in our starry heavens. We agreed to shelve the debate, based on unverifiable human fancies, as to whether there are universal Cosmic " Days " followed by " Nights " when evolutionary, *i.e.* creative pro-

[1] *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 164.

cesses, wholly cease.[1] There are occasions when an agnostic attitude is imposed. Suffice it to urge that the "Day" of Divine Imagining has no twilight and that notions of the emergence of worlds from an intermittently active principle belong to mythology. But, in respect of our own particular world-system, the evidence, were it drawn only from the facts underlying the symbolism of "energy," seems decisive.[2] This world-system is passing through a phase of creative evolution, and will attain relative perfection in a stable harmony of rest. Whether it has passed through former like creative phases, and whether, in the dim future, it will pass through others, only experience, not to be simulated by vague human fancies, can show. A wisely pragmatic hint is to moot no fancies that cannot be "tested" in part.

The point of moment to human philosophers is just this. The creative evolution of our existing world-system began—it will end. Whether further creation will follow a period of stable conservation and harmony we need not and cannot say. The probabilities are against belief in a permanently stable state. Waiving, however, this issue, we are able, it would seem, to imagine approximately the manner in which evolution began and to descry certain influences which determine, in a general way, how long it is to last.

The rethinking of Causation is vital to the task in hand. And if Imaginism is true and if time-succession, accordingly, is real, is not a solution, closely akin to that which we have suggested, compulsory ? [3]

§ 16. Claim 12. Imaginism provides further for a most important consideration—that relative to the scouring or scavenging of reality. If, by hypothesis, there must be novelty in an imaginal universe, there must also be destruction, and probably on a great scale, of all novel contents

[1] Cf. *World as Imagination*, "Nature (or the Natures) began," Part III. ch. ii.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 419-25, on "time-limitations and energy."

[3] Cf. *ibid.* pp. 343-76, 470-73; also Chap. VI. of this work.

which are sheerly bad or even not permanent positive values. It was a grave defect of the Hegelian and neo-Hegelian idealism that it had to foul the Absolute Experience, or Absolute Idea as Hegel styles It, with every fragment of evil of this and other worlds. Turn your eyes from academic prosing to the facts and realise fully what this treatment of the Absolute means. The neo-Hegelian has to suppose that the Absolute Experience (in which nothing happens, since time-succession is said by him to be unreal) conserves all the evils in a fixity above change. For "transmutation" of them, as the phrase runs, implies a real time-process and cannot, therefore, be entertained. And, if it be supposed that the evils are eternally something different from what they are to us, then our experiences, hanging in a void, remain unintelligibly external to the Absolute. The men eaten alive by ants, done to death slowly by some hideous and degrading disease, or just disgusted by the normal squalor and meanness of human life, furnish an instructive problem. And for myself I am content to state the difficulty and leave it to ferment in the reader's mind. The Absolute, if it treasured hospital wards, cholera districts, torture chambers, and war-areas, would hardly be a home even for the mystic.

Divine Imagining, encountering the evils of a world-adventure, in which finite sentients, major and minor, continue the free creation of their source, tolerates, but at need can destroy. There are two main lines of treatment of evils. Some are sheerly bad and must be destroyed, even for memory. Others subserve values of a permanent sort and become transmuted in the process. This transmutation implies a real time-succession.

§ 17. Claim 13. The standing of things, qualities, quantities, and relations becomes clear. Things include more or less stable content-complexes in the imaginal, but "loose," structure of Nature, *e.g.* a planet, a bit of platinum, or a diamond. Such things do not ask our leave to exist and persist. Other things, which we isolate in our practical

interests, do not exist as divisions of Nature except for us. Thus the Matterhorn is carved by us out of its natural setting: there are no Matterhorn, Rothorn, Gabelhorn, Little Matterhorn, etc., when the interested spectator ceases to isolate them in his percepts. These are forms only of a rock-world which our needs compel us to divide. The rock-world, of course, belongs not merely to our experience, but to the world-imagining.

Qualities refer us to the Imaginals.[1] And all qualities, of course, are quantitative—quantity, extensive, intensive, and protensive, being a name for the manners in which qualities *occupy* the field of content of divine consciring. And since all contents are conservative and creative embodiments of consciring, and since every quality must show, as we say, a certain quantity or measure, we seem to be within hail of a vital generalisation. Quantity and this consciring activity can be brought together in thought. *Quantity is a function, we suggest, of consciring.* It now becomes possible to surmise how qualities, which would infect the universe, are destroyed. The consciring that maintains them ceases, they wither quantitatively and perish. The working of human "attention" or consciring is not uninstructive in this regard. But our limitations leave the secret of consciring in part undisclosed. We are insufficiently conscious. Even when we create, as in fancy, we do not apprehend fully how we do so. We create in a twilight. Note that, in discussing any kind of creation, care must be taken not to accent too confidently mere "synthesis" or combination. The puzzle is to discover why "synthesis" so often involves radical transformation of the "synthesised." The putting together of elements supplies no adequate explanation of why the elements should be altered. The analogy of chemical "synthesis" avails nothing. The same problem afflicts the intelligent chemist as troubled Mill.[2]

Relations presuppose consciring: cosmic or other.[3] Differ-

[1] Cf. Chap. VIII. § 3. [2] Cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 357-60.
[3] Cf. Chap. IV. § 8.

ences are only different in so far as they are together or compresent to consciring—to the *con*scious activity that is the continuity of the contents thus related. A relation "is that aspect of a content-whole along with which aspects felt as different [terms] are felt also together. This view can be tested conveniently by the relation of co-existence. There is a total experience—in this experience two or more *different* terms, A, B, stand out 'substantivally'; the relation is the aspect of the experience along with which they are felt also as together, as *co*-existent." [1] ("Felt" here, as so often in philosophical writing, = "conscired.") They are conscired and are thus together; and the manner of the togetherness is the relation. Hence relations, also, can become terms in their turn when they are conscired in a new form of togetherness. Thereupon a new relation, or manner of being together, begins. A prolonged relating of relations is a play of the "abstract imagination" which has, possibly, been carried too far by intellectuals in certain spheres.

§ 18. Claim 14. If Nature is what Blake called it, and what our hypothesis implies, viz. "Imagination itself"—a product, which even empiricists can observe, of Divine Imagining—we might expect to enjoy illuminative views of "inorganic" and "organic" evolution. We are not disappointed. The resurrected *Élan Vital*, freed from its shroud of metaphor, has been descried.

§ 19. Claim 15. Imaginism supplies the intellectual basis of mysticism, while checking its vagaries. "There is a mysticism," as Professor M'Taggart tells us, "which starts from the standpoint of the understanding, and only departs from it in so far as that standpoint shows itself not to be ultimate, but to postulate something beyond itself." Promise of a sane and orderly development is secured in this way. The danger of mistaking the lower immediacy for the higher is lessened. We avoid the pitfall of "reverting to the lower form of immediacy upon which intellectual reflexion has not done its

[1] *World as Imagination*, p. 341.

work, instead of pressing on to the higher in which the effect of that work is preserved, though its form is transcended." [1] All the values of intellect ought to be preserved in a higher experience. But the devotional mystic, striving to rise beyond differences, is apt, as one indeed admits, to lose himself and the object of his devotion alike in the "*cloud of unknowing*": he falls in fact towards the level of an emotional cod. A child, staring at a Turner or sunset, has much, in truth, present to it, but how much of this can it assimilate and make its own? The devotional mystic, becoming aware of a great tract of the world-imagining, would fail to "apperceive" it, would be on a lower level than the child, and, returning to ordinary human experience, would babble confusedly as he usually does. The mystics of history, if we exclude the case of Plotinus, who started from the standpoint of the understanding and fared correspondingly well, have left us no illumination of moment. And the tree of their mysticism must, perforce, be judged by its fruits. Let us make no mistake in this matter. Actual solutions of philosophical difficulties, expressed clearly and precisely, are to be sought from all sages who claim that they enjoy superior insight. If certain ordinary philosophers enjoy intuitions and succeed, for the sake of others, in embodying these in lucid statements, it is not too much to ask the mystic, who takes up the pen, to be intelligible at times. And the mystic, who had profited by a full intellectual development, would assent readily.

How far towards "union" with the world-principle can the human mystic expect to rise? We are all "united" with this principle at a point. But to rise to the level of coincidence with it—and this, I suppose, is what is meant by the "union" of devotional mystics—is, for us humans at any rate, a stirring ideal rather than a realisable end. *Festina lente*; and mistake not some relatively humble level of supernormal experience for the universal power in which swim the worlds. Or, if you insist on the "union," show us some proof

[1] Professor A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, pp. 152-3.

that you are wiser than other men. You, who have soared so high, have surely brought back *some* treasures at the worst? Tell us, who are plain men, something about reality that will give our intellectuals pause.

Our position in short is this. The quest of the mystic is Divine Imagining. But, if you would expand towards this, do not, as Professor Santayana would say, "sink into mysticism," but "rise into imagination." The devotional mystic, of the type of crotomaniacal saints and religious enthusiasts whose biographies are known to us, will sink. The inquirer of the type of Plotinus will rise. Further, ridding ourselves of the traditions of sectarian religions, Eastern and Western, let us remember this. We are all members of Divine Imagining. But between conscíring at a mere point within It and conscíring as Divinity Itself lies an abyss: not to be bridged, perhaps, even when a million world-processes, like the present, shall have run their course. Expand into Divine Experience, but entertain only reasonable hopes. And do not suppose that, by ignoring the differences which we note abstractly as intellectuals, you are thereby, in meritorious fashion, nearing your goal. The fool, after all, is not an ectype of the divine. The Power which gives birth to the variety of the world, which takes shape in the wealth of relations studied by logician, mathematician, psychologist, and other votaries of science, possesses, in fact, the features that you strive to ignore. Intuition is intuitive imagining; your intuitive imagining may close with some higher and concrete imagining. Agreed. But take heed, man in a hurry, lest you seek to go too fast and, evading the novitiate of intellect, reach a light at once darkness for you and "ineffable" for us of the outer court, the profane.

§ 20. Claim 16. We are able to bring invaluable suggestions to that study of the individual which is to occupy us in a special work. The conservation and creation manifest on the lower levels of the real are manifest also on the higher. Such further testing of the hypothesis is indispensable. But the

outlook, in respect of some time-honoured problems of philosophy—*e.g.* the relations of conceiving and body, the evolution of "faculty," freedom *v.* determinism, birth, death, and continuance, the plurality of lives, the goal of the world-process and so forth—is at least novel and of high promise. We are entitled to expect much from a hypothesis as fecund as Imaginism has shown itself already to be.

These claims serve to indicate important quarters in which Imaginism can be tested with profit. Shall we say that the adventure is worth while and even enthralling?

CHAPTER IV

DIVINE IMAGINING

"An intuitive imagination enjoys that supreme mode of understanding reality for which mystics crave. It 'stands under' things; a reasoned system only 'stands for' them."—*World as Imagination*, p. 205.

"Our logical thoughts dominate experience only as the parallels and meridians make a checker-board of the sea. They guide our voyage without controlling the waves."—Professor G. SANTAYANA, *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, p. 261.

§ 1. ASSIGNING, with Lotze, a "modest position" to man's mentality, we regard thinking as a pale substitute for concrete imagining. There is nothing surprising in the defects of this substitute. Man's early career required nothing more than psychical processes which could guide action in the rude practical struggle of life. Hence the insistence of Schopenhauer and others on the domination of the "intellect" by the "will" as expressed in the organism. We need not adopt Schopenhauer's mythological terminology, but we can note with profit that thinking's first business, during primitive mental evolution, was to inform and direct action in a narrowly practical domain. And, while serving admirably in this domain, it was not to prove equally satisfactory when it became an end in itself. Thinking, in fact, viewed in a theoretic regard, is a makeshift, a tedious and fallible one, hardly possible, moreover, without language.[1] And logic is an

[1] "Such an analysis of a particular object as is required for its description would be impossible without language. It presupposes a serial succession of conceptual attitudes, each bringing out different aspects of the thing

instrument or means for facilitating the march of this thinking to truth, though it possesses, of course, a certain theoretic interest as well.[1] Thinking and logic belong to the levels of finite sentient life; are not, save as they characterise these levels, features of that all-embracing principle which transcends truth. For this principle, being fully present to Itself, has no need to think, as Plotinus also could say. Divine Imagining is present to Itself immediately in the very sentients and contents which, grasping, conserving, and creating, It is said to conscire. It is, as we saw, not knowledge "about," but reality.

Henceforth, then, we relegate discussion of "rational thinking," "reasoning," and "reason" to its place in works on the finite individual. But, in respect of the word "reason," some observations are timely even now. We have to suggest that this sonorous word has so many potential meanings that a definition ought to precede the use of it. Thus for Kant reason just contrasts with understanding; for Hegel, again, it means the complete, logically organised, system of cosmic thought, for Wundt the "tendency to unity," for Bosanquet the "nisus to unity," for Royce the "search for truth as such,"[2] for J. H. Tuckwell "the activity in us and in all things of the one all-inclusive, all-pervading Reality." Munsterberg seems to regard reason as a system of valuations; Bertrand Russell refers to it as a "harmonising, controlling force," aided by the philosophic vision. Definition is thus requisite. We ourselves mean by "reasoning" the empirical processes, fallible and tentative, which conspire to the making

considered, and all combining with each other into a unity. This implies a distinct and orderly sequence of different apperceptive processes without mutual interference or distraction arising from competition" (Professor Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, vol. ii. p. 178).

[1] Logic viewed as the "mental construction of reality" (Bosanquet, *Essentials of Logic*, p. 4) raises an issue which belongs properly, it would seem, to provinces of metaphysics and psychology, to the inquiry as to how the world comes to exist for you and me. This inquiry falls within a work on the individual, not within one dealing with reality at large. On the domain of logic cf. § 1, Appendix.

[2] *World and the Individual*, 1st series, p. 155.

of truths of inference, and by "reason" the ordered arrangements of propositions in which the approved results of reasoning are stabilised. These last arrangements constitute a quest of harmony in the sphere of intellect. And, in so far as they express co-ordination according to a dominant, pervasive plan, they mark also a "nisus to unity." But they are essentially human makeshifts; truth-ideas and systems which may bear scant resemblance to their objects. The world at large is not conserved and evolved by a reasoning process—*οὐ κατὰ λογισμόν*, as Proclus would say—nor can it be duplicated in a pemmican of arid classifications, generalisations, and deductions such as convenience mankind. Thus the rock-history of the planet, as present, along with all else, to Divine Imagining, differs much from our imitative, but still highly abstract and artificial, geology.

Plotinus, reminiscent of Plato's reticence about the "Idea of the Good," used to urge that ultimate reality, "the One," is, but that reasoning cannot tell us *what* it is. But truth-ideas agree more satisfactorily with the great truth-object than this agnosticism allows. And we have reached in fact a determination of the "what"; have been able to moot a recognisable and veritably all-embracing principle. It remains to press our advantage further, and we propose to do so at once. Let us consider then in what respects the concept of Divine Imagining can be made more precise.

Imagining and Sensible Variety.

Imagining and Will.

§ 2. Divine Imagining includes, or may pass into, all possible modes of experience. To repeat Dr. Schiller's significant remark, It "can really afford to be what other metaphysical principles falsely claim to be, viz. all-embracing." Thus It takes form in any phase of thought, sense, will, feeling, and fancy.[1] We are using the only concept applicable

[1] Bradley (previous to the publication of the *World as Imagination*) had suggested that "what is, I presume, wanted is something which is at once

to cosmic Total Experience. Thus even what is discussed as sense, or "sensible variety," and has puzzled the followers of the logical tradition from Plato to Hegel, is native to Divine Imagining, but by hypothesis, not to a logico-rational *prius*. Will might seem to present a difficulty, but this is not so. What is sometimes called cosmic Will is just Divine Imagining active in the spheres of conservation (sustentation) or creation (evolution), or both. We can say with Hegel, and with far more plausibility, that the Idea is not so powerless as to be unable to realise Itself. It conscires; and on this conscíring float appearances. Will, when treated as bare—"empty" in von Hartmann's language—volition and regarded as a cosmic ultimate, real in its own right, is mythological. This fiction, withal, lies at the foundations of at least two systems of German philosophy.

Will, as noted in connexion with human sentients, is defined by Bradley as the "self-realisation of an idea." "It is will when an idea produces its existence." More accurately, we may speak of the "realisation of an imaginal field." We must not suppose, however, that the realisation lies always on a level different from that where the imagining begins. I may realise merely the idea of making my day-dream more luminous, as when I create private fancies of aeroplane travel. On the other hand, my dreams, issuing in action in our common world of fact, may help to produce amazing results. The political future is nothing but the "realised ideal" of the people (Carlyle). We are not to suppose, again, that all willing, even in the case of human sentients, is concerned with change. The lingering kiss, the smile that defies adversity, the accomplishment of *the* task of a lifetime, mark a sustentative, and not merely a creative or changeful, effort. How often is this conservative side of willing, this obstinate maintenance of the imaginal field, overlooked.

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thought, and sense, and will, and feeling, and fancy," and had questioned the claim of imagination to cover the ground. He had, doubtless, in view imagination in the narrower psychological sense of the term.

It is when we are lost in pure imagining which stands for no "other," is of interest for its own sake, and develops its own immanent end, that our "willing" recalls best the "willing" of Divine Imagining. When I enjoy an aeroplane trip in my private world of dreams, I "will" merely to realise an end on the level where my imagining begins. There is no expansion or realisation of the imaginal field, so that it alters existence in a sphere beyond itself. Observe, by the way, that, while realising a plan which was present at the outset, this imaginal activity improvises also largely as it goes, thus uniting conservative and creative features which concur, indeed, in every event.

To "fulfil" a plan is to "fill full" or complete the original inchoate imaginal field whether on the level where it begins or on another level which is transformed to this end. I may enjoy a day-dream pure and simple or transform industry, an empire, or history therewith. In the case of choice, after deliberation, inchoate fields are in conflict; there is the human experience of having to select one of exclusive, opposite, or incompatible alternatives or lines of expansion. The problem of freedom, mooted in this regard, will find its solution in the work on the individual. For the present we may suggest that choice of this description belongs only to the sentients of the time-process, so fraught with conflict in all respects. Divine Experience, however thwarted toward evil by free initiatives of the sentients born within It, overrules obstacles and is realised, without weighing of alternatives, in the most direct way imaginable. We shall discuss this when dealing with causation, on the great scale, hereafter.

Divine Imagining as identical in differences.

§ 3. Any instance of pure "awareness" is indistinguishable from any other. And this fundamental identity of the instances indicates their source: Divine Imagining, Whose *continuity* is essentially its sameness of *con*scious grasp. Identity marks the conscious or consciring side of the Imagining. On

the side of contents there are resemblances or likenesses, but hardly the "identities" on which many philosophers have laid such stress.

Conscíring and Content.

§ 4. We have emphasised repeatedly the importance of the distinction between conscíring and content conscíred. But even Plato and Aristotle had "no perfectly general term for the consciousness with which we follow any mental process whatever, as distinguished from the process itself"; [1] and this conscíring is ignored all too readily by philosophers even to-day. Further, conscíring being thus ignored, the contents, of which it is the continuity, are discussed sometimes in veritably surprising fashion. Thus the bolder materialists have *identified* them with nerve-matter in movement. Now "matter," we agreed, is a concept made and used by thinking man; impossibly, therefore, a condition of the origin of its maker. But if, *per impossibile*, "matter" were something more, to wit an existent in its own right, it would be far too poor to support the materialist theory. For, by definition, it is compact of extension and inertia, "bits" of it doing no more than move in very varied ways. Well, the contents of my crowded experience cannot be equated with a collection of such moving "bits." We pass on.

But another sort of materialist may arise and cry. "Yes: that view is idle. But what of the statement that conscíring and contents alike are *results* of movements of matter; results quite unlike the causes that give them birth?" And, perhaps, a believer in energetics will suggest that the results are so much transformed blind energy. The reply available is decisive. The "matter" and the "energy" are alike fictions,

[1] Cf. the view of Professor Siebeck as cited by T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*, p. 52, 2nd ed. Plotinus, however, refers ordinarily to "an accompaniment" (παρακολούθησις) of its own mental activities by the soul. "Self-consciousness," in its distinctive meaning, is expressed by "accompanying oneself" (παρακολουθεῖν ἑαυτῷ). With these terms are joined expressions for mental "synthesis" . . . as a unitary activity of the soul in reference to its contents."

and remarkably thin ones at that. And the term "results" (effects), which men invoke too lightly, itself raises a problem —that of causation. The solution destroys the materialistic and allied hypotheses outright.

But the overlooking or minimising of the riddle of consciousness is not confined to naïve hypotheses such as those noted above. The view of James that consciousness is a "relation" is an instance in point. He supposes a "*particular sort* of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter"—such pure experience in itself being "neither consciousness nor what consciousness is of." He is thus mooting a pure experience which, not being conscious, is not intelligibly experience at all. And as we agreed, consciring is not itself a relation, but the ground of relations. Dr. Bosanquet, again, an idealist, evades the riddle by regarding consciousness as the "meaning of externality"; as content, but for whom or what? Bradley, by his use of words such as "sentience," "felt mass," "feeling," "felt totality," "self-feeling," "sentient experience," etc., conveys the impression that he has dealt with the difficulty when he has really left it ignored. He agrees with Bosanquet's view that "the connexion of *contents*, I suppose, is the same thing as the unity of consciousness."[1] Finite sentients, however, are not mere content-complexes, nor, again, is reality at large merely the totality of contents somehow connected. To accept such a view is to ignore the heart of idealistic realism—the universal consciring.

Professor Alexander minimises the riddle by supposing consciousness to exist in space as a function of the higher nerve-centres. We suggest alternatively that consciring, the conscious energy of the universe, is basic and that the spatial order is a passing feature only of certain contents which it conserves and creates. The "higher nerve-centres," this planet, and the Milky Way are but bubbles on the ocean which this consciring ensouls.

[1] Bosanquet's view as expressed in *Life and Finite Individuality*, p. 191. Italics mine.

The truth about consciring.

§ 5. The truth would seem statable thus. The spiritual continuum or cosmic "wholeness," in which contents show, is nothing passive: it is Fichte's "infinite activity," the deepest root of being. But for Fichte the activity is not itself conscious; is rather the presupposition of consciousness, which arises at a certain remove from it. Limit is set up within infinite activity, whereupon this latter becomes aware of itself.[1] For us, on the contrary, the activity, which embodies itself in all contents and sentients, is not blind, but emphatically that which *con*scires the contents and sentients, providing thus the *con*tinuity characterising a universe. "*Failing an ultimate continuity, there is no common ultimate reality to be 'active' at all.* There is no *con*scious togetherness—only a 'multiverse,' the elements of which lie hopelessly apart."[2] The continuity thus indicated is not, of course, the mathematical one; nor even that which has been defined by James; it is the same as that continuity which shows in our own lives,[3] in the limited consciring which shines for us in its own light. Bradley and Bosanquet try to bury consciring in the welter of "connected contents," but, were there no consciring, divine and finite, there would be no connexions at all. The "*felt* mass" of Bradley, for instance, is just the presentational continuum as conscired.

Leibnitz urged that that which does not act does not exist. "In the beginning was activity," exclaims Faust. But the Fichtean activity fails. A non-conscious principle cannot act on teleological lines. And the "wholeness" of the world, which allows for so much looseness in the detail, is left unexplained. Hence we have to reinterpret this activity as

[1] The limit is the "non-ego" decreed to exist within the infinite activity (*World as Imagination*, pp. 179-80). This is the primary "opposition." The trouble is that this activity, which is not conscious, has to realise a plan which presupposes consciousness.

[2] *World as Imagination*, pp. 186-7.

[3] On continuity, which we assert of contents as well as consciring, cf. § 2, Appendix.

consciring (con-scire), *i.e.* as what conserves, creates, and is aware of, the contents of the universe. The *unity* in these contents reflects, indeed, the *identity* of the consciring. Considered along with its contents, this consciring is no other, of course, than Divine Imagining Itself.

Divine Imagining is not a person.

§ 6. It may be asked again — is Divine Imagining personal? Assuredly not. That which is manifest in all contents and all finite sentients is not to be conceived as *a* person, as *a* finite sentient Itself. We are not in quest of a successor to Zeus, Jupiter, Jahveh, Ormuzd, Allah, and the rest. Nor are we occupied now with the problem as to whether there exist subordinate finite gods. There may exist innumerable such powers within the ocean of the infinite; we are considering the ocean.

Personality, in fine, could not be a divine excellence. It presupposes a certain insulation and a special and very restricted content, is incurably one-sided and agape with defect. But at this stage a difficulty, which perhaps haunts the reader, can be laid. We are not suggesting to the unwary something insentient and, to this extent, inferior to finite conscious life. Philosophies of the unconscious have been demolished. In denying that Divine Imagining is a person, we are asserting also that It is conscious in the supremely eminent sense. It is aware of all that It conserves and creates. The dependent finite sentient, god, man, or beast, opposing an intermittent, petty, "self"-content to a fragmentary "not-self," invaded by innumerable influences not of its making, and acting freely on a very minor scale, is only in process of becoming fully conscious. It resembles a dully-gleaming crystal in the wall of a cave. Sometimes the crystal shines with a faint borrowed light, sometimes it lacks even this and is lost to sight in the gloom. And all the time in the great world or macrocosm without, the sun is blazing in the sky: symbol of

Divine Imagining that is lord of light. Are you to adore the dull gleam in the cave and to dub "atheist" me who prefer the sun? Well, you may label me as you will, but I shall not burn incense the more within the cave.

Divine Imagining is not a barely monistic principle after the Indian model. It manifests in the eternally real many.[1] And It cannot oblige theologians by vanishing into a single experient. Will you bid the ocean pass wholly into a cup? It lives, no doubt, in this or that exalted single experient who could be called a god, nay, peradventure, in innumerable such gods. But It lives, further, we may suggest, on levels too high for insulated experients and It supports always, not merely this or that sentient or level, but the entire expanse of being.

Consciring is at the root of qualities.

§ 7. Consciring, as the conscious energy of the universe, that which at once conserves, creates, and grasps together all contents, lies at the root of qualities. We need not anticipate discussion of the Imaginals (Chap. VIII. § 3) concerned. We can get to the essential at once.

Kant's Principle of the Anticipations of Perception states that "in all phenomena the real, which is the object of sensation, has intensive magnitude." Getting rid of his subjective idealism, we may put the matter thus. *All quantity, in all quarters of reality, intensive, extensive, and protensive alike, is a function of consciring.* And were a quality to lose its intensity, it would cease forthwith to exist not only for us, but for the particular world-system, in the main independent of us, in which it appears. Whether it would cease to exist for Divine Imagining also raises a further problem about which I venture no statement. There may obtain limbos in which qualities

[1] Proclus urged that the many have always existed somehow and could never be finally absorbed. But we have to add that, while the many are eternal, creation and destruction may obtain on a great scale in their midst.

(or rather their Imaginals) can survive somehow in Divine Imagining, as " potentialities " not too intolerably vague to allow for. But sufficient for us is the lapse from our particular world-system. To perish there is to be no longer conscired there by Divine Imagining, by the sentients which continue It, or by both. Quality, at zero point of intensity, vanishes.

What is Quantity ? The manner of occupation by qualities of the field of Divine Imagining and of subordinate continuing fields. All forms of real quantity involving space, time, degree, etc., are embraced by this definition which answers incidentally Mill's question in the *Logic* (Bk. I. chap. iii. § 12) as to what the mysterious attribute may be. " Everybody knows, and nobody can tell," he says, of the respect in which things are said to differ quantitatively. Nobody can tell, we agree, until the frontiers of a too narrow empiricism are passed and metaphysics comes into its own. The answer then presents itself quite naturally.

An important reflection. If quantity is a function of consciring, if quality owes thus its manner of occupation of the content-field to consciring, we reach a further significant result. We have urged, indeed, already that an imaginal world-theory, in contrast to the cult of an immobile Absolute, must allow for creation and destruction. These last are inseparable from the active side of imagining : the consciring. And they are alike indispensable. The Power of infinite potency is not limited to mere conservation of the old. The Power, in Whose worlds emerge hideous evils, is not compelled to conserve all that minor levels of creation contain of the new.

Quantity being the " manner of occupation " in question, to say that two things are of the " same " quantity is to say that their manners of occupation of the content-field agree. In other words, there are two things with two exactly resembling, but numerically different, manners. A and B, for instance, may be equal in length, but their length-aspects are not, strictly speaking, the " same." The sole indisputable " sameness " in the universe is the consciring which, present

to itself, has all else present to it. Qualities and quantities simply resemble one another.

Consciring as the ground of relations.

§ 8. Consciring, itself above relations, is the ground of relations. The consciousness of two like ideas is not the like ideas themselves, nor, again, is it, according to a cunning verbal device, the ideas *plus* a "feeling" of their likeness. For "feeling" here seems used in such a way as to suggest that the consciring is in truth just a *sensation*: a content, in short, and nothing more.

Were there no universal consciring, there would be neither terms nor relations. The view of certain writers that "relations" connect the "parts" of objects into wholes overlooks the fact that relations are not agents which create wholeness, but are themselves possible only because of wholeness. They are abstractions: ways or manners of that togetherness which presupposes the continuity of consciring, divine and finite.

Despite customary warnings, we ventured to submit a definition of relations (Chap. III. § 17), and we saw, further, that relations conscired in new forms of togetherness may themselves become terms. Such as they are, moreover, they penetrate their terms—"all things by a law divine in one another's being mingle"; external relations occur only in mathematics and the often too abstract thinking that grows out of it.[1] Cosmically speaking, relations endure conservatively or arise creatively as aspects of the imaginal field of Divine Experience. They have been well called "universal phenomena";[2] a phrase which breaks down the Chinese wall

[1] "Relations are external only in abstract mathematics, in which the terms can be ranged side by side, and united by a sign which symbolises their relation, without in any way modifying them. The number 8, for instance, will always remain the same number in all the relations in which it can be placed to other numbers" (Aliotta, *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*, p. 337, Eng. transl.).

[2] The phrase is that of Renouvier.

once raised between them and other phenomena of a supposed inferior grade. Many relations, inseparable from what they are said to relate, take their rise in the throes of creative evolution. They bear no special hall-mark of divinity; are on the level of the terms which they pervade and with which they are solid. The Kantian fiction of relation-forms, which are imposed on sense-content, did much to perpetuate the cult of the relation, but with the coming of objective or realistic idealism the need for his artificial scheme disappears. Nature does not rise "like an exhalation" merely within the perceptions of finite sentients. Nature, a phase of Divine Imagining, pre-exists to its appearance to these sentients: comprises vast webs of relations which come to the sentients and which they have simply to accept. On the other hand, each sentient accepts its fragments of Nature in its own way and, in the process of altering them, continues the work of creation.

How the wider consciring attests itself in my petty life. Every noticeable aspect of the perceived world implies it.

§ 9. In the region of a finite sentient consciring is conditioned in all sorts of ways: what is conserved, created, and grasped there is subject to content-influences innumerable which express consciring beyond it. What is known as "attention"[1]—the selective noticing of this or that content in preference to others—marks the focus of consciring, the "growing-point" of the mind. And, as Dr. Ward writes, "attention on the side of the subject implies intensity on the side of the object: we might almost call intensity the matter of a presentation without which it is a nonentity." Exactly; and we now see how the interpretation is to run. I attend to a green copse. The consciring, which is called mine, has its degree; and it encounters presentations that come to it already intense. What is behind the native intensity of the

[1] Or rather what Dr. Ward calls the first of its two degrees.

presentations ? Proximately the consciring of innumerable minor sentients : sentients which many writers, but not we, have described as monads ; sentients which are masked by the externally perceived facts of Nature. Ultimately the consciring of the great powers that pervade Nature, nay Divine Imagining Itself, is involved. To be is to be active or express activity ; and the intensive, extensive, or protensive quantity with which qualities exist for us expresses consciring. Thus each noticeable aspect, even of the perceived world, is evidence of cosmic consciring ; as strong to sustain " atomic " and " sub-electronic " systems as to support us, our organisms, and the general welter of content-complexes or real " things." Anything, of which we become aware, *e.g.* a pin-prick, a taste, a sound, has its intensity and thus illustrates the imaginal activity that lies at the heart of the worlds. Do you desire to observe the " hypothetical " Divine Imagining at work ? Consider the sunlight or merely your organic sensations. These sample the very actions which your wholesome empiricism asks us to produce. Similarly the grain of sand, the rustling curtain, the smile of your friend, the hardness of the table, the mere blot on the MSS. : all these proclaim the consciring with whose lapse the world would vanish, leaving behind " not a rack," not even the fabled void.

Consciring is not fully present to itself in finite sentients.

§ 10. It has been said that " attention " is not presented. Our view is that consciring is present to itself in human experience and becomes, for this reason, a topic of discussion. Idle, however, to assert that it is this or that content merely in order to minimise its essential uniqueness. Examples of this error were cited in § 4. Propositions such as affirm that x is the same with, or like, y, *i.e.* that x is or resembles something else, fail us utterly here. But, while intuited directly, consciring is not intuited in full. Alike on the sides of consciring and content we humans move in the twilight,

being candidates for conscious life, properly so-called, rather than adequate examples of it.

Divine Imagining and the concept of the "unconscious."

§ 11. Were we, with Goethe, to regard colours as intermediate between white and black, we might say that white stands for Divine Imagining, which, in point of infinity of content and complete presence to Itself, contrasts with any possible finite experient, from "sub-electronic" sentients or mentoids up to the gods. Black symbolises the "unconscious," *i.e.* content which, while existing for the divine (and perhaps other) consciring, has no existence as a sentient area *for itself*. Nothing exists which is not present to consciring, but there is very much content that lacks a "centrality and unity" of its own, and very much that possesses these features at one time only to lose them at another. I am conscious of the ink-marks existing on this paper, but I do not suppose that these marks constitute also a special experience within mine: therefore I regard them as merely contents, not conscious in their own right but present, nevertheless, to the inclusive consciring which I call mine. In this way I acquire a positive concept of the unconscious, being aware of contents which exist, indeed, for me, but enjoy no consciring proper to themselves. A world-system present to Divine Experience consists of such contents and of sentients that are aware of contents.

On the levels of conscious life.

§ 12. The intermediate colours themselves can be taken as representing the various levels of conscious and "scious" life,[1] from the lowliest minor sentient or "mentoid" of sub-electronic grade up to the exalted "mens" of the highest finite god: a society of interpenetrative sentients rather than

[1] "Scious" denotes a very low level of conscious life. When the contents grasped are relatively very simple, we may speak conveniently of sciousness and sciring rather than of *con*sciousness and *con*sciring.

a single experient. The violet, indigo, and blue of the spectrum symbolise the more "spiritual" levels; *i.e.* those nearest in character to Divine Imagining. The red stands for forms of sentient life such as belong primarily to levels of crudity, division, and conflict, of which later.

In noting these levels of conscious life, we dispense with the terms "supra" or "superconscious." There is no form of being aware which is above the conscious. It is not clear why the superconscious is held sometimes to excel the conscious; a mere animal percipient would be superior, *qua* sentient, to a world-principle such as Schopenhauer's Will, Schelling's Immemorial Being, or the Unconscious of von Hartmann.

"Subconscious" is another term which requires notice. We must avoid supposing a sort of consciring which can be discussed at need *as if* it were unconscious: a monstrous conception not unfamiliar to modern students. Consciring that does not conscire is simply verbiage. In so far, again, as "subconscious" refers us to co-conscious or scious agents, the "sub" cannot be justified. It might be urged that even we human folk could be called "subconscious," seeing that we are immeasurably below the level of that experience which has all contents and sentients present to It. But, however low our position in the universe, we are at least centres of consciring. Similarly the sentient life of a "mentoid" or minor natural agent, chemical or sub-chemical, is very far below mine. But, though devoid of anything like my explicit memory, expectation, reasoning processes, rich affective moods, etc., it is, nevertheless, a centre of consciring in its own right: not mere content present along with other content to some inclusive centre. We shall suggest later how these and the innumerable other consciring centres arose. This inquiry, indeed, will be forced on us in its place as we apply the general theory of Imaginism to concrete fact.

For us, perhaps, the best use for the term "subconscious" would be to replace "unconscious" in respect of contents

such as were symbolised by black. We are committed to idealistic realism. We are sure that all contents of the universe are psychical in character, of one tissue with familiar mental contents which are labelled thus. The world of my private fancy is made of the same stuff as the larger world beyond and including it. This larger world depends on the divine consciring which is continued into subordinate consciring areas, in part only free. Any content whatever is sustained by consciring. *And were it conscired intensely enough, it would become itself a consciring area, a sentient, an individuated unit which has awakened to life.* Meanwhile as content it presupposes the *same* supporting power which manifests elsewhere as sentients. The very distance of its being from zero—its intensity—shows the power at work. Hence idealists may well prefer to call the content "subconscious" rather than "unconscious." For content is not devoid of that intensity which attests consciring: it is merely without that individuated sentience which an intenser degree of consciring might produce. The principle of individuation seems to be that a wider consciring raises a part of its *content* to the intensity whereat a lesser consciring, a *new sentient*, with its measure of freedom, begins. This, as we shall see later, is a suggestion of great importance in the explanation of reality.

In connexion with human psychology, we often speak of consciousness as having its "threshold" below which lie regions of the "subconscious." The contents of these regions are called subliminal; they have influence, but do not appear themselves in the field where I am conscious clearly or dimly. It is needful, however, to bear in mind that innumerable minor *co-conscious and co-scious* centres may obtain in these subliminal tracts. The so-called subconscious consists, to this extent, of minor conscious agents of which we are not aware. And, if so, the subconscious proper is simply that residual content which does not possess a "threshold" and a consciring area of its own. Let us agree that to lie beyond our fields of consciring is not necessarily to be subconscious;

and further that there may obtain sentients whose "thresholds" pass contents of far too low intensity to appear to us.

What ought we to mean by "self-consciousness"?

§ 13. What ought we to mean by the term "self-consciousness" or, better, reflective consciousness? I am said to be conscious when I perceive a tree and to be self-conscious when I am conscious that I perceive the tree. And there are those who have urged that I can be conscious that I am conscious that I perceive the tree, and so on. What solution is available? Full discussion of the problem of "self" awaits us elsewhere, but something not without relevance can be said at once. Consciring the tree does not imply necessarily that a "self" conscires or is conscired along with it.[1] The permanent soul is a content-complex, which at one time is conscious, at another not. It was not primitively, nor does it comprise always in its present stage, an "ego," or "self."[2] The "self" and the "not-self" arise within the field of content when lit and grasped by consciring. We cannot hold, as even Mill puts it, that "something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." But the point of moment is that the consciring, for which the series exists, is wider than the "self," is the activity which renders this "self," intermittent phenomenon as it is, possible. "Self" assuredly does not arise at all on the lower levels of animal and sub-animal consciring, and on the human level it is evolved, but not as a permanent feature of psychical life. It is created and re-created with the varying of the streams of interest. Even during thinking, artistic production and

[1] Writing of the perception of a whitewashed wall, Professor A. E. Taylor observes: "It is only when attention to the content of the perception becomes difficult (as, *e.g.*, through fatigue of the organs of sense, or conflict with some incompatible purpose) that I am normally aware of the perceived object as a not-self opposed to, and restricting, myself. The same is, I think, true of much of our life of conscious purposive action" (*Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 336).

[2] Hence the soul ought never to be discussed as an "Ego."

contemplation, or the mere noting of a stick or stone, the "self" or "ego" may disappear. What does not disappear is consciring; at root a neutral activity, which *may* support "multiple personalities," simultaneous and alternating, and which normally does support the variety of loosely organised "selves," in part antagonistic, which figure in the life of the ordinary man.

Perception of the tree implicates "self" only when interest requires it. Even reflective thought about the tree has no necessary reference to "self"; the interesting tree and its relations may suffice to fill attention. But suppose that a garden is being designed just where the tree cumbers the ground, or even that the psychology of thinking is in question, then the self-phenomenon, as well as the tree-phenomenon, may be relevant, in which case both will be conscired. Prior to the new need the content-background, over against which objects are perceived, excites no interest. Now, however, emerges an idea which is being realised, and which is being obstructed and furthered in the process; a nascent idea encountering what is not itself. Focally and thus preferentially conscired, this idea is identified in a special way with the sentient, *is* the sentient more intimately than the opposing contents which appear to "it," becomes "self"-content over against "not-self" content.[1] Thus too a preferred emotional mood contrasts with another mood which, though equally a part of experience, is repelled as "not really myself." It was not the "real I" that expressed yesterday disgust with life!

Consciring of ideal contents of this sort involves the self *v.* not-self opposition and what we mean by "self"-conscious-

[1] ". . . we say of a man," observes F. H. Bradley, "that his whole self was centred in a certain particular end. This means, to speak psychologically, that the idea is one whole with the inner group which is repressed by the not-self, and that the tension is felt emphatically in the region of the idea. The idea becomes thus the prominent feature in the content of self. And hence its expansion against, or contraction by, the actual group of the not-self is felt as the enlargement or the restraint of myself."

ness. A public speaker is without " self "-consciousness when entirely interested in his audience and his topic : he becomes " self "-conscious if ideas of success, etc., too focally conscired, are opposed to conditions which may further or thwart them. We have to remember in this regard that there are many " selves " in fact, differentiated by the unlike ideal contents specifying them. These " selves," even in the case of the normal human sentient, are as a rule loosely organised and frequently at war among themselves. They characterise defective beings who are little more than candidates for properly *con*scious life.

" Self-conscious thought " is an expression that is often misleading. It has been applied even to the cases of thinkers who are concerned with metaphysics, logic, mathematics, economics, etc. But it is just in such researches that the " self " or the " selves " are most easily dispensed with. Thus when there is examining of Kant's doctrine of categories, consciring may have this topic alone as its focal content. " Self " is then excluded. And this distinction between consciring and " self " helps us in a further regard. The saying " I know that I know that I know," etc., embodies an error. It is not the " I," in the sense of a presented empirical " self," that conscires content. Consequently the hypothetical indefinite regress of " self-conscious reflection," which has puzzled some writers, seems out of court.

The problem of the sentient is a much larger one than that of the " self " or " selves." The " selves " are many and varied—may collide, may even fall apart—and the supposed identical " self " of a lifetime, which is said to embrace them, may be far to seek. Hence it has been said seriously that a man is a series of men. And what if the series began before " he " was a babe, and has lasted in fact through a long plurality of lives ? We have to solve, it would appear, a singularly interesting riddle : that of the individual, of its relation to the divine consciring, of its standing, as an amazing sameness in differences, in the scheme of things. For the

present we have just glanced at one of its aspects and we pass on.

Consciring and activity.

§ 14. The consciring, which is present to itself, is, in respect of content present to it, activity. Some further observations are called for regarding this and allied topics.

The concept of activity has been flouted by certain modern idealists, and notably by those concerned to uphold a static Absolute. Its application to phenomena, supposed to be merely "physical," need not concern us. But we note that it is condemned outright by Bradley as "contradictory," as not furnishing, therefore, a truthful representation of the character of reality. It dissolves utterly, on his showing, in the welter of false appearances.[1]

But the vitality of a concept, which stirred a Leibnitz and a Fichte, need excite no surprise. And in point of fact activity is apt to reassert itself even in philosophical quarters where it is denied. Consider two very interesting instances. In Kant's artificial system activity is a derived pure "judging concept" akin to causality. On the lines of his narrow idealism it is valid within our finite experience—not beyond it. At once there arises a difficulty. Kant's attitude presupposes a "synthetic activity," forming the discrete sense-manifold into our category-shot world. Activity, then, is more than a category valid within our experience; it lies, also, at the root of it! Similarly in the Hegelian system activity is a subordinate category or thought-determination within the organised totality of the Idea. On the other hand, the Idea is discussed, not merely as comprising this category, but as Itself, throughout Its entire extent, active: It is the infinite "energy" of the universe, the "absolutely powerful Essence"; It carries out a divine plan in history. Now to what conclusion does this astonishing feature of Kant and Hegel point? Surely to this. After trying to reduce activity to the level of

[1] On the "law" of contradiction and the misuse of it cf. Chap. VI. § 1.

a *partial category*, philosophy finds inevitably that activity reasserts itself as a *universal reality*.[1] This much, indeed, we shall regard as beyond dispute. But in what shape has the universal fact to be accepted ?

We have endeavoured to answer this question in our treatment of conscíring : that is to say, of the active aspect of Divine Imagining. Conscíring, in respect of content, *is* the " energy " of the universe. And, where conscíring is fully present to itself, the last secret of conservation and creation is revealed. Conscíring is the achieving of something ; an activity not separable from the content achieved. And, disposing of a time-honoured antithesis, we get this. Content is what is conscíred, its " form " is the manner in which it is conscíred. In so far as Its conscíring sustains without change, Divine Imagining comprises conservative content ; content such as makes appeal to believers in a static Absolute. But in so far as Its conscíring involves change, creative content, with its real time-process, is born. Viewed thus as conservative and creative, Divine Imagining will take on ever more concrete forms as we proceed.

" *Consciousness* " *is thus not an abstraction in the ordinary sense of the term.*

§ 15. The word " conscious*ness* " might be supposed to denote an abstraction and is very frequently construed in this way. But, though bodied forth in contents, cosmic conscíring, even when discussed by itself, is not an abstraction in the ordinary sense of the term. It is an active principle not on a level with what exists in, by, and through it. For, after all, it conserves, creates, and destroys : might, indeed, abolish any aspect of its wealth in the making of new. Out of its own limitless spontaneity it completes itself in all directions. Made determinate by what it holds in being, it is also self-

[1] Cf. also the modern appeal to " action " from the side of science, *e.g.* Dr. Whitehead in *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 14.

determining; there being no source of content extraneous to it and to the minor areas of consciring within it.

"*Mental activity and passivity*" *in the human sentient and what is implied.*

§ 16. Finite consciring areas, such as grow human "selves," are determined in part by other finite areas beyond themselves and by the cosmic consciring common to all areas alike. Each area is an island in cosmic activity—each is open to the winds that blow across that ocean. Hence determination from within, real as it is, has to concur with determination from without. But even in these islands "to be awake is to be active, and the more awake we are the more active we are."[1] There is no tract of merely passive experience: "Mental activity and passivity" are not mere ideas of reflective thinking. In Professor Stout's words, "mental activity exists in being felt. It is an immediate experience. The stream of consciousness feels its own current."[2] But his use of the words "felt," "feels," "feeling of activity" (like Bradley's "felt mass"), illustrates a tendency we had reason to regret before: the tendency to assimilate consciring to a kind of sensory content.[3] The upshot may be to focus our interest on contents to the prejudice of inquiry as to what *awareness* of these contents implies.

In urging that "mental activity exists when and so far as process in consciousness is the direct outcome of previous process to consciousness,"[4] Professor Stout raises, further, the question of what "outcome" is, *i.e.* the problem of the manner in which causation is to be understood. Many idealists have regarded the concept of causation as "contradictory"; James as "an empty pedestal marking the place of a hoped-for

[1] Stout, *Analytical Psychology*, vol. i. p. 170.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 160.

[3] James similarly identifies activity with portions only of content; cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 192-4. His theory of consciring, as we saw, is quite unsatisfactory.

[4] *Analytical Psychology*, vol. i. p. 148.

statue." We, on our part, may be sure that Divine Imagining, for which succession and simultaneity are alike real, contains the "statue." It is our business to observe and think obstinately in the hope of finding it.

Consciring and the "energy" of science.

§ 17. We called consciring the energy of the universe. What is the relation of this view to current scientific teaching about "energy"? We have answered in part already. The "blind energy," which interests science, is a command-concept. Its invention was as inevitable as it was useful. It is discussed as if it existed beyond our thought. But we saw that belief in it cannot be verified by perception, even though this "energy" is held to dwell in every object which is perceived! No physicist can say clearly what manner of reality it is. Ostwald reduces all to "energy"; thus mass, weight, chemical qualities, even the phenomena of conscious life, are treated as forms of this ultimate. But what, in the end, has he to say of this ultimate itself? *Nascetur ridiculus mus.* "Energy" is "everything which can be produced from work or which can be transformed into it." Clearly an ultimate described so vaguely has never been experienced. And the reason, we may suggest, stares one in the face. It does not exist to fall within experience at all. Energetics desires to represent facts of all sorts without recourse to hypothesis. But its "energy," neither known nor knowable, which is discussed, nevertheless, as the stuff of which things are made, is hypothesis which ignores verification. Energetics has mistaken symbolism for metaphysics.

Not to repeat prior criticisms, we come to this. We must translate the approved portions of this symbolism into our own language. In the notions of stable equivalencies, of "conservation" which concurs with "transformation," of the direction of "transformation," and so forth, there is a soul of good which seeks embodiment in our own metaphysics. What,

after all, is being conserved and transformed—what is the truth not quite undiscerned even in the shadowland of science ?

We turn from " blind energy " to the Imaginal Hypothesis. The qualitative, as well as the quantitative, features of the problem are now kept in view. Content-activities arise and content-activities cease as the " divinity of measure "—the *nisus* toward harmony—of a balanced world-system dictates. Contents and sentients are being changed in such wise that no excess or defect, frustrating the *nisus*, can obtain permanently. The transformation of " energy " is a surface-symbolism whereby we describe a world-system with quality-changes duly proportioned and related so as to subserve purpose within Divine Imagining. We shall have much to say of this aspect of creative evolution in the sequel.

Are we able to descry the reality for which the " constant quantity," the conservation of the " blind energy," stands ? It would seem so. Have we not urged that quantity, in all its modes, is a function of consciring ? And are not we ourselves in centres of consciring and conversant, therefore, in part, with what obtains there ? What is this limited, but distributable, " attention " of which some psychologists speak ? " We must assume," writes Dr. Ward, " that there is always some degree of continuous attention to the presentation-continuum as a whole. Acts of attention are changes in the distribution of this attention just as presentations are changes in the differentiation of the continuum. As the latter is not completely resolvable into a discrete manifold, so neither is the former wholly resolvable into discrete acts." Attention is activity ; [1] a limited conscious activity, somehow " distributable." Shall we say, then, that consciring, which is limited for all sentients, has to *conserve* and *create* accordingly ? When it glows in one region, it smoulders in another or others, and *vice versa*. " Every concentration of attention in one direction involves, *ipso facto*, an equivalent excentration in another . . . concentration and diffusion of attention are but inverse aspects

[1] Cp. also Stout, *Analytical Psychology*, vol. i. p. 189, " Attention is activity."

of one act." [1] We see at once why a symbolism of the "redistribution of energy" is practicable here, also why it ought not to be pressed too far. A rigid determinism may be advocated by symbolists who run amok.

The drift of the alleged "blind energy" of Nature likewise tells its story. Thus "the symbolism of energy-degradation is a way of regarding a world-system as through a glass—very darkly. Its significance to us consists in its being a hint, from the side of science, that our world-system and its relatively closed sub-systems are of finite duration, having beginnings and ends. Worlds, it is suggested, have careers in which a certain fund of mutability can be spent and no more. They strike the mind as moving, slowly but fatally, towards a day of doom. They are, perhaps, all experiments, and there is a tide in their affairs which may or may not lead to fortune, but which has its inevitable turn. Suggestions for deriving these funds of mutability *indefinitely* from prior sub-systems and systems are not satisfactory. The ultimate origin of the "energies" must be sought, as Bergson himself concludes, in an "*extra-spatial*" source." [2]

Wherever "blind energy" has been inferred, there in fact you have consciring—conscious or scious activity, divine and finite. And the finite areas of consciring, seats of partly self-sustained and even "free" experience as they are, are controlled and overruled in the balanced order of the system to which they belong. Aglow with innumerable sentient centres, major and minor, this system is the reality within which subordinate modes of being have to bend or break. Hence no re-interpretation of "blind energy" can afford to ignore it. The "redistribution of matter and energy"—to employ a phrase of current symbolism—within it is in last resort teleologically explicable, expresses a plan one with the character

[1] *Psychological Principles*, p. 63. Ward prefers the term "attention" to "consciousness." But surely "attention" is incurably metaphorical? "Consciring," again, ushers us into the very heart of things.

[2] *World as Imagination*, "Time-limitations and energy," pp. 423-4.

and creative life-adjustments of a psychical whole. The system, again, despite its possible millions of minor worlds, its amazing range in time and space, its hierarchies of sentients from mentoids to gods, itself belongs, or will yet belong, to some superior whole, of which, however, few of its denizens may have occasion to dream. The " redistribution " within the minor system will, in this case, display features not fully accounted for by consciring within itself.

Interpretations of " energy " symbolism as it bears on various aspects of Nature, inorganic and organic, and sentient beings have been attempted in my last work. Concerned with concrete qualitative change, occurring in stable measures, such ventures are of high interest. They invite us to leave the shadowland of formulae and to gaze on the processes of creative evolution itself.

Infinite and finite.[1]

§ 18. Why does Hegel call the IDEA, *i.e.* reality viewed as the organised system of Reason, infinite ? Because at no point is It limited by Its antithesis or opposite, by something else which It is not, but which sets bounds to It. The IDEA or Divine Reason is " always in its own sphere." In a like way we have to conceive Divine Imagining as not limited or bounded by any reality other than Itself. For the innumerable sentients and the novel contents emergent with these have no frontiers which exclude It outright. They illustrate the variety of Its appearances : are aspects of creative processes in which Its own imaginal spontaneity is expressed. A difficulty is suggested by this view. With the birth of the sentients (or subordinate areas of consciring) there begin happenings ordinarily ascribed to " chance " and " individual freedom." And these happenings include orgies of " self-will " and sheer evil such as subserve no end that could possibly be called " divine." We are well aware of the facts, have no need to evade them. With creative evolution are opened the flood-

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 266-77.

gates of risk. Divine Imagining initiates a development which, despite its basis, becomes in part undivine, an inferno of ill.

Divine Imagining is continued in the sentients to which, as we shall see, It gives rise. But these sentients, no longer Its mere contents, become relatively independent centres of consciring. Each is more or less capable of free initiative, of action determined unforeseeably from within, of inventions, many and often diabolic. Bad as is our world, it contains just what Imaginism prepares us to find. The sentients which continue the Divine Life continue, in their petty ways, Its imaginal spontaneity as well. Hence the torrent of grim "variations," hence, too, let us allow, so much that is splendid and fair. But, in spite of their free initiatives, these sentients and what they create have their being in Divine Imagining and constitute provisional features, at any rate, of Its life. They are not self-dependent ultimates set over against a limited god. Even in what we call their worst phases they illustrate the fecundity of the power common to them all. Limited themselves, they are rooted, withal, in the limitless.

But this notion of the infinite seems defective. We have to endorse the view that the infinite is not limited by an "other," but to do so is not enough. The Hegelian Idea, unlimited in this manner, might still be held limited in another. And, indeed, this static Absolute "complete, perfect, and finished," above time, lacks, it would seem, above all the power to create novelty. Divine Imagining, as we conceive It, accepts no such limit; imagining being conservative and creative alike. It is "infinite in potency" if we understand by this that Its imaginable, *i.e.* creatable, innovations are limited only by Itself. Thus Imaginism enables us to re-interpret a neo-platonic belief to profit.[1] It invests the treacherous term "potency" with meaning. And it makes

[1] "Infinity, in the sense in which it really exists, with Proclus as with Plotinus, means infinite power or potency. That which ever is is infinite in potency; for if its power of being . . . were finite, its being would some time fail. That which ever becomes has an infinite power of becoming. For if the power is finite, it must cease in infinite time; and the power ceasing, the

clear to us that the power manifest in evolutionary process must be unlimited, since otherwise such process would come to an end.

Divine Imagining, then, is infinite. But it creates limits for sentients and contents within Itself and decrees Its own self-limitation or determination therewith. And all the while Its "infinite power of becoming" is manifest in the worlds. If ultimate reality is Imagining, Its eternal character is to evolve or create. But the new cannot be derived from a mere reshuffling of the old. The headwaters of creation must be unlimited, if the stream is to endure for aye.

Divine Imagining determines Itself by limitations imposed within Itself. And one limitation, we may suggest, is the following. All contents that are imaginable are not realised in the worlds, else preposterous infernos would result. And of the contents realised much will have to be destroyed, vanishing as such even from "memory." The only tolerable conservation in the perfect, *i.e.* the "thoroughly-made," world is one of values.[1]

We turn naturally at this stage to the problem of number. Does this limiting prevent us from believing that infinitely numerous differences are present in the contents of Divine Imagining? Well, there is not an infinite number of such differences for reasons previously discussed. An infinite number belongs to a special sphere created by command-concept: to the play of the "logical imagination" of the mathematician. A number, applicable or belonging to "collections" in the ordinary empirical world, is always a finite number. But we might discuss an infinite plurality, if there were any profit in so doing. And in this case we could urge that the plurality, being beyond counting, remains inexhaustible and hence un-

process must cease. The real infinity of that which truly is is neither of multitude nor of magnitude, but of potency alone" (T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*, 2nd ed. p. 170). "Potency" is hardly interpretable save on the lines of Imaginism.

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 270-71.

countable, even though quadrillions of differences are suppressed. Being unable, however, to take stock of a universe, we shall do well to be modestly agnostic. We live in a world-system which, despite its starry heavens and their allied unseen places, is, perhaps, of minor importance. We cannot know whether other world-systems are infinitely many or not. On the other hand, we believe that this system of ours is finite, its space and time aspects included, in all respects.[1] Hence, unless the suggested plurality of finite world-systems is infinite, it will not comprise more than a finite number of differences.

Clearly we are on safe ground if we talk of indefinitely many differences. And what more is wanted ?

The use of the term " infinite " in phrases such as infinite love, infinite wisdom, etc., need not delay us. Love is not a Cantorian group or class whose parts are numerically similar to itself. Nor is it a reality which is not bounded by other realities. " Infinite " here means that love is perfect after its kind, unlimited only by influences such as impair this excellence. Descartes, again, calls God the " positive infinite," as unity of all the perfections, the one perfect reality. Infinite in this sense also need not concern us. The infinite, so far as we have seen at present, may include confusion and conflict and thus fall short seemingly of the perfections which Descartes had in view. Divine Imagining, though always " in its own sphere," takes shape, at least provisionally, in regions of intolerable evil and unrest. The question, then, as to the sense in which It is perfect still awaits an answer.

[1] Dedekind's infinite " self-representative " ideal system is " defined and proved " without explicit reference to the number of its members. But the concept cannot be applied. Reflection in " my thought-world " has limits in fact. As regards space and time, Russell (*Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 140) urges that "we have no reason except prejudice for believing in the infinite extent of space and time, at any rate in the sense in which space and time are physical facts, not mathematical fictions." We shall see later that this "prejudice" appeals in vain to metaphysics.

CHAPTER V

DIVINE IMAGINING (*continued*)

Divine Imagining and perfection.

§ 1. If to be perfect is to be "accomplished," harmoniously complete above change (like the famous Absolutes of philosophy), to be a system frozen hard at the back of beyont, Divine Imagining is not perfect. In the very conserving of Its character It is a well-spring of change, this change being as real as those aspects of It which seem to be fixed. Its worlds, again, fail to mirror those perfections which Descartes and most religions ascribe to the "positive infinite." Very many of their features are intolerably bad. The Absolute of Hegel or Bradley possesses even these features, it is said, in a timelessly glorious form, not to be revealed to mere mortals. We have no like device for disposing of our riddles; cannot appeal thus from hard experience to the back of beyont. We have to accept Divine Imagining as continued in the worlds and as really wearing the robe in which It appears. Complete explanations will often elude us, but we shall at least strive always to respect the facts.

Let us consider a world-system which is being evolved. In this creative process a "fact," whether private to our experience or not, is what the word means literally, viz. that which has been made. The world-system itself is a complex fact which has been made, and is still being made, within Divine Imagining. It includes, as we agreed in Chapter IV.,

free local initiative, of which finite consciring areas or sentients are the seats, and, along with this, much transmutable but, also, much sheer evil.[1] It is imperfect as its changes attest. It will become perfect, *i.e. thoroughly made*, when it cannot be bettered in any *imaginable* way. It will then have reached stability, a harmony alike from a central point of view and from the points of view of its sentients, further changes having no value. The system will have attained restful equilibrium, and the imaginal dynamic will have become, accordingly, just conservative. But this rest-phase will hardly be final, since the system, while now internally stable, may be disturbed once more from without. It may come to interact with like systems, great and small; and a system of these systems, again, may become a unit in a yet higher system, and so on. The rethinking of time and causation, compelled by these statements, is to concern us shortly.

Each world-system, while realising conservatively a plan, is in part also an adventure; local initiatives, which originate with finite sentients, burgeoning into the "unforeseen." Creative imaginal spontaneity shows on each level of consciring within the system; including the realms of "chance" and that "freedom" which determinists deny. We saw that the infinity of Divine Imagining implies both self-sufficiency "within its own sphere" and unlimited creative potency; inability to create novelty and to persist in creating it would be a basic defect. But the interminable adventures of creative evolution imply risks; the sentients that continue Divine Imagining are relatively insulated and yet originative; and, as described in our last work, may "run amok." Events occur alike ruthless and hideous and, in a scheme which is realised through sentients, from the lowest sub-chemical natural agents or "mentoids" up to gods, it must needs be so. But now we grasp a solution of moment. The divine artistry takes form in an epic of creation which includes

[1] Cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 566-604, "First steps toward a solution of the riddle of evil." There must be no evasion of the difficulties cited.

indefinitely many sentients, freedom and chance. It determines Itself, therefore, as impotent to achieve a fully satisfactory world-*process*. What It does achieve is the direction of the adventure, often at a dire cost to the sentients, towards harmony: towards that "thoroughly-made" or perfect consummation which Tennyson glimpsed and termed the "divine event." Success is assured; Divine Imagining vindicates Itself in the *result*. It overrules a process, into which a portion of Itself has changed: and this portion has to bear the burden of all that the overruling entails.

So much for perfection and creative evolution. But what of the conservative spiritual background over against which creation proceeds — what of Divine Imagining in so far as It is not a sphere of processes at all? Well, on a level where imaginal act is fact, to imagine a substitute or filling for unwanted or defective content is to provide it. Divine Imagining, in so far as It is stable, shows Itself thereby to be perfect, that is to say to be enjoying a harmony which no change *imaginable* could "make" more thoroughly. And clearly a perfection of this sort is self-attesting. The faintest note of discord attendant on vague longing is excluded.

We have to consider anon how the creative and conservative content-phases come together within Divine Imagining and whether, strictly speaking, there obtains any completely stable background at all.

Variety is dear to imagining. Belief in the perfecting of a world-system ought not to be interpreted too narrowly. Not every content, experienced as evil on our first acquaintance with it, lacks value. Leibnitz compares his god to the artist who makes ugly colours and sounds conspire to the harmony of his work.[1] And the artistry of an imaginal world-order requires, indeed, very many sorts of contents, tending to conserve such as further beauty. The question of the con-

[1] A. Clutton Brock in *Shelley, the Man and the Poet*, p. 200, refers to "the music of Mozart in which the divine beauty of delight is enhanced by remembrance of pain."

servation of sentients—the problem of "immortality"—belongs to our essay on the individual. But, if, in this sphere, we accent cosmic values, we must recall also that these are not always determined according to human standards. Very many types of sentients, "good" and "bad," are wanted if history is to be fruitful and picturesque. We take our places—and our special risks—in a stirring adventure in which to live interestingly and to create richly are far nobler than to fast and pray.

Progress in the "infinite life" is "simply not needed," declares the absolutist Royce when dealing with the religious aspect of philosophy. The "need" which marks obstructed human striving is, of course, absent. On the other hand, Imaginism implies creative innovation and even destruction, whether these be called justifiably progress or not. Are we to say that novel sentients and contents cannot enrich Divine Imagining, glorious beyond measure as It eternally is? Are these mere phases of love-lit imagining which creates for pure joy in the act? Is not being itself just to be active or express activity? Even so. But in reconsidering our use of terms, we must not forget what we have said already about the infinite. To be always in its own sphere and to be infinite in potency are not the same as to conceive all possible contents and sentients in a determinate, eternally actual, form. Hence, while regarding the term "progress" with suspicion, we have to avoid words that tend to divert attention from the creative aspect of the Divine Life.

Divine Imagining, we urged, is beyond that arrangement of fragmentary knowledge which is named truth. It is also beyond the mode of living which is called "moral."[1] Truth and moral goodness, as we experience them, are, of course, very real forces on the side of harmonisation: of that perfecting or "thorough making" of the world which we have discussed above. Truth implies a measure of agreement or harmony between knowledge and reality. A value in itself, a

[1] The "One" of Plotinus is similarly *ὑπεράγαθος* or supra-moral.

possession of which we approve for its own sake, it subserves also, and obviously, ulterior practical interests. Moral goodness, again (implying time-process and conflict in which experienced evil is overcome), secures harmonious, rich, and full living for myself *or* others, myself *and* others. " Egoism " and " altruism " are alike indispensable and desirable, though to combine them aright may require grave decisions. In making these latter I may have to consider the well-being of the entire social order of which I and the " others " are members. And the ideal of harmonisation may come to include, further, the love of a finite god and, as in the case of the mystic, a burning devotion to Divine Imagining Itself. Moral goodness cannot be restricted to narrow " personal " and " social " ideals, such as were contemplated by agnostic hedonists and utilitarians of old ; it is *a phase of the vast cosmic harmonising process* whereby a now divided, groaning creation is being brought nearer to the " divine event."

We do well to extol such excellences. But if we call truth and moral goodness " eternal values," what ought we to mean ? Surely that they are approved aspects of our lives which are to be treasured indefinitely—so long as we and our descendants remain what we are. But the insulated sentient may not, as such, be immortal. And his values, accordingly, in their present forms may not endure. Truth and moral goodness, needful for the life of a world-system, may pass into something higher in the " divine event."

Divine Imagining as Delight, Love, and Beauty.

§ 2. Divine Imagining, we saw, can be discussed as perfect in that the harmony of Its life cannot be more complete than it is either in respect of what It conserves or of what It creates. It conserves many elements which, as experienced now by us, are odious, but which, from a central point of view, may have value, as Leibnitz suggests, as aspects of a higher harmony. True that It tolerates also provisionally elements that are to

be destroyed. But such elements, doubtless, have a limited range. Each evolving world-system, no matter how vast it be in space and time, is maintained at first, perhaps, apart; unable to infect others and the background of the divine life. It remains insulated or encysted, a thing in the region of "wrath," *i.e.* conflict, unworthy to enter into the full joy of the Lord. The overruling of its myriads of sentients, fecund in novel "variations," is a mark of the Perfect Life as manifest in this quarter. Evolution, conditioned by unforeseeable "variations" which thwart as well as aid, presents hideous features, but is guided, withal, as well as possible to its goal. The nature of the process, which gives birth to relatively free sentients, precludes more.

But this highest imaginable harmony seems to possess something intimate which has not yet been discussed. "Energy," in the words of the poet Blake, "is Eternal Delight." And even Bradley defines the perfection of the Absolute as the "identity of idea and existence attended also by pleasure." We have to contend similarly that Divine Imagining would be defective, had It not an affective aspect, an aspect whose pervading feature is what may be called beauty, love, and delight interfused. The mere "pleasure" or "balance of happiness," with which some credit the Absolute, seems to our thinking a poor thing, the most beggarly of academic concessions. But it is quite worthy of Absolutes such as the Idea of Hegel; a Prussian divinity of the type of Moloch, which, in the words of Chalybaus, "consumes and digests in a selfish manner every self-subsistent within the insatiable unity of the absolute substance." Were ultimate reality of this character, we should be fools, of course, to take life seriously at all.

A riddle as to why Divine Experience manifests in finite sentients has vexed Oxford. It arises from the tendency to paint Divinity grey, belittling the affective aspect inseparable from sentient life. The philosophy of the All-conscious—a doctrine that regards consciring as ultimate—ought surely to

be able to solve this riddle.[1] Let us see. Divine Imagining is active in virtue of its eternal character. Its very being is to be active; and to be active in this sphere is to conserve and create. But this "unimpeded" divine activity implies a correspondingly rich aspect of what psychologists and some others call "pleasure," but which we have to regard in this connexion as the supreme affective life: the life beside which even the highest human emotions show dim and dull. Note carefully the sequel. We are not to urge with timid idealists that Divine Experience enjoys probably a balance of "pleasure"; we are to say unhesitatingly that It enjoys the supreme affective life. Now the crown of any exalted affective life must be akin to what we call love. And then? "Thou great star," cries Nietzsche to the sun, ". . . what were all thy happiness, if thou hadst not those for whom thou shinest." When declining to paint reality grey, we must be thorough and learn to use the other and more appropriate colours aright.

The "god-intoxicated" philosophers and mystics are thus justified. Divine Imagining, the infinite activity, enjoys the highest form of affective life. We cannot, of course, reproduce concretely in fancy the glorious fact; how are human emotions, wills-o'-the-wisp flitting at night over mire, to simulate the noontide sun? But we can indicate, at a distance, some very general features of this life. We can urge that, as supreme, it is, at any rate, crowned with *love*; that, allied with harmonious infinite activity, it is *bliss* or *delight* ineffable, *i.e.* delight

[1] "All higher forms of conscious life known to us experience, we are sure, pleasures and pains; we are sure, further, that conscious life, uncoloured by those feelings, would be a thing nothing worth, and that the higher we climb in our survey of conscious life, the fuller and richer we find its emotional side. And when we come to conceive the universal conscious life, which transcends personality, we cannot, with any semblance of probability, deny that it is emotional in an eminent sense. In sober truth, the whole practice of treating the Ground as a sort of chill logical, or other grey sort of, limbo, belongs to superstition. And, in the case of a writer who regards the Ground as alike conscious *and imaginal*, the superstition no longer lends itself to any defence" (*World as Imagination*, p. 148-9).

such as no concepts, used in human thinking, can express. And what of *beauty* which has that immediacy that attests itself ? In seeking beauty, as Mackenzie submits, we seek what, in a sense, is " the highest end of all " ; even truth fails to satisfy " until we can see that it has beauty." The mere thinker, shall we say, finds no rest short of expansion into the very plenitude of the Divine Life : a plenitude which includes somehow this feature of beauty. Stirred no doubt by this same impulse, Ravaisson has told us that the world is the work of an absolute beauty, " qui n'est la cause des choses que par l'amour qu'elle met en elles." But here, of course, in accenting an aspect too often overlooked, he outruns the truth. The world, viewed as " applied beauty," is explained as inadequately as it is by Hegel's " applied logic." Beauty pervades, indeed, ultimate reality. But this aspect is not the same as the fully concrete Divine Imagining Itself.

Anything, which is labelled " beautiful," whatever else it be, pleases ; and nothing can be pleased or be happy except conscious life. We are rid, accordingly, of loose thinking which dwells on " self-existent beauty " or regards beauty as a nondescript " essence " of which, in their degrees, all things called beautiful partake. In discussing its definition, we are concerned with the manner in which pleasant things are conscired. Let us place ourselves first at a cosmic point of view. Let us suggest that, for Divine Imagining, any content, content-complex, or sentient, is beautiful in so far as it is conscired with satisfying delight. Let us suggest further that completely satisfying delight invests nothing short of the universe. Even a nascent world-system, ugly were it conscired by itself, may contribute, as contrasting member, to the delightfulness of a larger whole. For, after all, there are symphonies that transform discords.

The human point of view concerns fragments of the real. Anything is beautiful if I can rest in it, if only momentarily, with a joy felt sufficiently within its limits. This definition is comprehensive, covering *e.g.* attitudes towards a glass of port,

a "glad eye," bursting rocket, falling star, chess-solution, sunset, artistic prose, statue, symphony, poem, picture, character, mathematical construction, crag, fair woman, the solar system, or cosmic order. In experiences of the beautiful there is transition from very crude experiences to the higher with no apparent break. In the crude, as in the case of the port, relatively simple elements suffice; in the higher, as in the cases of a Turner picture, a Helen, a mathematical marvel, or cosmic order, the harmony of complex wholes, to which the elements are contributory aspects, is in view. These elements, noticed separately, are often of no interest or positively unpleasant. If, however, the whole were not positively pleasant, or if, again, it were not present to conciring, it would not be a form of beauty at all.

Most things which men call "beautiful," *e.g.* the human body, are unsatisfactory at best. And what is beautiful for one experient is often, and indisputably, ugly for another.[1] Nature and artistic creation on this level are phases of a nascent world-system. We are blind, too, even to the superior levels of this system, like Plato's folk pent in their gloomy cave. But there are those who, in rare moments, have seen beyond the cave. . . .

The mystic, homing to the world-principle, seeks what is to fulfil his desire completely,[2] that in which he is to be at once active and at rest, the harmony which, in an emotional regard, has been described as the "state of love in love." He hopes often to attain quickly to what aeons of development may refuse. And he is prone to misinterpret, as accounts show, very minor happenings which occur on the way. But the enthusiasm which prompts his quest is surely well founded.

Cosmic Beauty is an aspect of Divine Imagining, in so

[1] *World as Imagination*, p. 232.

[2] The notion, cherished in certain quarters, that the mystic must be "freed from desire" shows confusion of thought. Because he ceases to desire many familiar and unimportant things, he does not cease to desire altogether. He must become a flame of desire. Eastern twaddling misleads.

far as Its included contents and sentients are a completely satisfying delight. Note that this delight is also the mystic's love; the supreme Cosmic Love that crowns the height of feeling. The delightful contents and sentients (individuals and societies of these), or rather the delightful whole of which they are members, constitute the joy-complex whose being is to be loved. We emphasise "whole," just because there are imperfect worlds and sentients which, taken separately, imply discord, but which may contribute none the less to a harmony lying beyond themselves. They are being perfected for a consummation which is to absorb all the novel and precious features that they can bring. We can hardly suppose, nevertheless, that *all* worlds and sentients are conscired in the same way. The divisions of creative evolution are real; all the evolving world-systems do not mingle in one another's being; their intermingling, to be accomplished in due season, is not simply their compresence to Divine Imagining. We have to allow for the *insulated*, nascent systems, too ugly to enter, along with others, into minor and major wholes. Such systems, in theological language, belong to the region of "wrath." But they, too, are contents of the love-lit Imagining. They are theatres, accordingly, of destruction and creation such as transform them, slowly and at a cost, to splendour. They begin as wild adventures illustrating once more the amazing variety in the Divine Life. They mature into what they must needs become alike for their own beauty and for the beauty of the encircling Life.

The term religion may be defined as "devotion to what, we believe, is the most perfect reality experienced."[1] Interpreting its meaning thus, we can say that Divine Imagining, as showing this devotion, has Its religion too. This religion, however, is of a piece with Its harmonious living. Devotion

[1] *World as Imagination*, p. 289. It denotes thus a variety of possible objects of devotion. We hear, in fact, of religions of Humanity, of the State, of Art, etc., as well as of the cults, Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, etc., ordinarily so-called.

to Its contents and sentients is also devotion to Itself. Being all-inclusive, It does not go beyond Itself and yet It finds all that supreme love and beauty imply within Itself. Have you a fear at times that " the world may go wrong " ? I have heard such a fear expressed. Be rid of it. All is not well with the world. And, for aught I can say, worse things, even catastrophes, on the astronomic scale, might occur. But, on the other hand, all *will* be well. For the guarantee lies in the character of the Divine Life Itself. As Imagining It can conserve ; as Imagining It can create. What is wanted can be brought into being, what is intolerable can be, and is being, destroyed. The pressure of the imaginal dynamic is ceaseless. And that pressure in a plastic system works towards the harmony noted above. Things are not frozen hard in an insane, timeless Absolute. There is no situation, however dread, which creative imagining cannot remould to profit. But the way sometimes may be a long one, and the cost to the implicated sentients grave.

It must suffice to indicate such very general affective features of the Divine Life. To attempt more would be idle. There are problems touching which even the gods, if well-advised, are agnostic.

Time

" The world of imagination is the world of eternity."—Blake.

§ 3. The Divine Life is not realising that " moral order of the universe " which Fichte upheld so strangely as an end in itself. Its perfection is supra-moral : the life beautiful, the blissful immediacy towards which the river of moral goodness flows, but in which it is changed. And, as blissful imagining, It is, as Shelley sings, the power :

> Which wields the world with never-wearied love
> Sustains it from beneath and kindles it above.

It " sustains " as conservative. Creatively, It and Its

continuing powers "kindle," are the "plastic stress" which compels:

> All new successions to the forms they wear
> Torturing the unwilling dross that checks its flight,
> To its own likeness, as each man may bear,
> And bursting in its beauty and its might
> From trees and beasts and men into the heaven's light.

Shelley, who, like ourselves, found imagining in "earth and sky," would have welcomed what we have to say about time, conservation, and creation. For these views belong as much to poetry as to philosophy. To poetry, since the spirit of the *Adonais* and of Prospero's intuition lives in them. To philosophy, since they are phases of severe thinking, developed in a theoretic interest and to be applied rigorously before being passed as probably true.

And first as regards our general attitude towards time.[1]

We are concerned with primary time. Absolute homogeneous time, that which "in itself and in its nature without relation to anything external flows equally," Newtonian time, is . . . well, conceived, is a command-concept or imaginal creation of man mathematical quite irrelevant to our present inquiry.[2] This time was invented during the short period covered by the history of Europe. It transforms that primary aspect of time-experience which is denoted by "flowing." We, on the other hand, are to have a *cosmic* outlook: are concerned with an order or orders within which the birth of this secondary homogeneous time has its date. We have also to consider duration and simultaneity as well as the successions of concrete "flowing."

Kantian subjectivism, for which time is a mere form of finite experience, is set aside. We found in consciring, the active side of Divine Imagining, the ground of relations (Chap.

[1] Cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 234-58, 416-25, 460-66, etc., for various points dealt with summarily here.

[2] Philosophical leaders of science assent. ". . . absolute time," observes Dr. Whitehead, *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 8, "is just as much a metaphysical monstrosity as absolute space."

IV. § 8). The time-relations of all contents and of all finite sentients, implicated with these contents, are thus grounded. We have no call to regard anything present to Divine Imagining as "timeless." [1] For that which does not happen—is not an event—*endures* at any rate or is conserved, and endures also *simultaneously* with other differences, in the continuity of conscious grasp. "Timelessness" is a favourite term of philosophers, naming an excellent example of the command-concept. There is a voice in the study, but no answering experience shows in the vasty deep. We are recurring to the theme under "conservation."

Let us make use of previous contentions. Given differences of contents present to *con*sciring, there are relations; and the manners of this togetherness determine the sorts of relations. Time-relations are instances in point. Consciring is the continuity of differences that (1) endure and (2) show simultaneously with one another. In short, *duration* and *simultaneity*, as modes of static time, are explained. This duration, —obverse of the "sustaining" activity,—considered by itself, can be called "timeless," but only in the sense of not including, and not being contrasted with, creative succession.[2] Duration, unmeasured by aught outside itself, is not the same with the absence of duration. This stirless now or non-"specious" present comprises, however, the already noted simultaneous differences. And its duration will show clearly as soon as contrasting successions allow. Duration and succession serve to light one another. An order of changeless simultaneity is to stand out over against an order of change. A caution is needful at this stage. Duration in Bergson's sense of the term, as "that in which each form flows out of previous forms, while adding to them something new," is not what we are considering now. "Flowing"

[1] Unless consciring, considered apart from content, is to be awarded this epithet. On Continuity cf. § 2, Appendix.

[2] Cf., in a psychological regard, Reid, *Intellectual Powers*, Ess. III. ch. v. ". . . we may conclude with certainty that there is a conception [intuition ?] of duration where there is no succession of ideas in the mind."

belongs to the domain, not of conservative, but of creative, imagining.

Time then denotes certain manners in which contents appear together, are conscired, within Divine Imagining. Bare time, being fiction, is ignored.

Decisions as to the standing of time, and more particularly of time-succession, are significant. "If time-succession is not unreal, I admit that our Absolute is a delusion," writes Bradley in discussing "Temporal and Spatial Appearance." Professor A. E. Taylor has stressed the "perhaps insoluble problem why succession in time should be a feature of experience." Professor Mackenzie regards the time-problem as "the most difficult in the whole range of philosophy." But starting from the imaginal hypothesis, we seem able to reach the beginnings, at any rate, of a solution.

Duration and simultaneity presuppose conscíring. Succession likewise, but in a different way. Let us make this clear. Divine Imagining, by hypothesis, is not an eternally [1] *fixed* imagining: the very essence of its character includes the power to change. This changing is just creative evolution. And Divine Imagining, being real, Its mode of creative activity is real as well. This vindication of change or time-succession, as Bradley's avowal concedes, is fatal to the Absolute. Time-succession is described by Royce as the "form of ethically significant process"; [2] it is rather, let us suggest, the wider form of creation, *i.e.* the manner in which Divine Imagining realises Itself in novel reality. Divine Imagining is infinite

[1] Dr. Schiller in his *Formal Logic*, one of the most indispensable books of these days of reform in philosophy, gives five frequently confused—and abused—meanings of "eternal" (ch. xxi. § 7). "Eternally" here means "everlastingly." The Divine Life might conceivably endure without including a single creative process, but It would not always thus endure.

[2] *The World and the Individual*, 1st Series, p. 420. Royce's beginningless and endless succession, a "well-ordered infinite series" present altogether, with a "single Internal Meaning," to Divine Experience brings us back, after all, to the fixed and completed Absolute. This Absolute seems not even a conservative activity; It merely is. We cannot congratulate It on possessing inalienably the abominations that defile Its "time-span."

in potency, we agreed, in this very regard. And It is beyond the level where distinctions of moral good and evil obtain.

It follows that the outgoing from, and ingoing to, the world-principle (*πρόοδος* and *ἐπιστροφή*), which, in neo-platonism and Hegelism, have only a "logical" meaning, are for us actual processes, phases of a real evolution with a real succession, comprising minor successions changing at different rates. Indefinitely many of these outgoings may be taking place: adventures that lapse from, and mature again to, beauty. Again and again the world-systems may re-emerge, returning, aglow with sentient life, to enter into the "joy of the Lord." The variety native to Imagining, the ocean of beautiful life, implies indefinitely many of such systems, insulated in their earlier stages from one another. Our astronomers and other men of science are concerned with a portion, a very minor aspect, of one of these.

Plato's view that philosophy's object is the changeless, is the error that has misled European thought. Even Schopenhauer, despite his hypothesis of the Will, is driven to distort fact. He insists that "while history teaches us that every time something else has been, philosophy tries to assist us to the insight that at all times exactly the same was, is, and shall be";[1] that "all becoming and arising are merely seeming."[2] And, as we know, serried ranks of thinkers have nodded assent. This belief in the unreality of succession involves us in grave intellectual difficulties.[3] Regarded from an ethical, and even aesthetic, point of view, it is disastrous. Why, then, did men go out of their way to misread appearances which proclaim loudly their error? They were victims, like Plato, of the cult of the stable concept, and sought, with an excess of enthusiasm, to interpret the universe as stable throughout. Schopenhauer, nominally an adversary of this cult, was unable to rid himself of it. The view that ultimate reality is Imagining, not a stably conceptual reason, liberates us once and for all. We have no

[1] *World as Will and Idea*, Haldane and Kemp's Translation, iii. 223.
[2] *Ibid.* iii. 225.
[3] *World as Imagination*, 242-5.

need henceforth to tamper with, and distort, fact. We can accept "becoming" in the rough, and refine our knowledge about it at leisure.

The time-content, we must not say time, of any one world-system, or process of creative evolution, is finite in all respects. The particular system begins to change; and these changes end: to recommence, it may be, anon. Mackenzie insists on the difficulty of assigning limits to the series of occurrences in time "owing to the apparent demands of the principle of causation that every event should follow upon an antecedent event and lead on to a subsequent one." [1] But there is no time apart from time-content, and the limits of content are the limits set by Imagining. The principle of causal succession, a postulate not an approved truth, itself has to be re-interpreted. *The marvel, after all, is that events happen and continue to happen.* They do so, not merely because other events have preceded them, but because they are steps in the movement of the world towards perfection and beauty, because they are phases of Creative Imagining in its balanced wholeness. One set of events does not of itself call another set into being. The sequel will explain. Harmony once reached, further process would defeat activity's end. "The causal dynamic is no master—it is only the manner in which imagination presses to its goal, the slow making and perfecting of the world-romance which began and will have its end; an 'end' at once the close of a time-process and the crown of a purpose fulfilled." [2] The causal dynamic, yet to be indicated, restores an equilibrium which has been violated. How, we shall see.

The time-instant (*ἄτομον τοῦ χρόνου*) is finite, comprising no lapse. Content—not a conceptually infinite divisibility—decides. You cannot divide time-content, unless distinguishable quality-aspects permit. The lapseless instant preserves thus momentarily, even amid change, the lapseless character of the conservative duration which we discussed before.

[1] *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, pp. 361-2.
[2] *World as Imagination*, p. 471.

Cases of change, again, show abrupt steps, limited in number.[1] These steps are not "in time": they are a time-succession itself within and beside other successions. They are not severed from one another, terms of a *merely* "discontinuous series" parted by gaps, as philosophers, too interested in abstractions, may suppose.[2] Consciring is the continuity of even the most loose modes of being; is that activity which, in explaining causation, must be sought beyond the related events themselves. Divine consciring and the subordinate myriads of Its continuing consciring areas provide for every possible situation. Futhermore, in all the situations compenetration or intermingling of contents is to be found. This is obvious in those cases of causation where the agents are human sentients active in altering their thoughts, characters, and so forth. And "as above, so below."

The "step" which marks changing on the small scale marked, also, if we suppose aright, the origin of changing at evolution's dawn.[3]

Human sentients enjoy perceptions limited by their practical needs. What for us are indivisible events may for other sentients be "distinguished so minutely as to furnish contents as rich as those which, from our point of view, occupy aeons of the world's history."[4] Our ordinary sensible impressions, colours, sounds, etc., suppress reality, no doubt, on a surprising scale. But the indefinite complexity of time-content is one thing; the alleged infinite divisibility of "time" quite another.

Conservation

§ 4. In considering time-content with the emphasis on time we have the relations—the manners of togetherness of the contents—in view; in considering it with the emphasis on content we pass to conservation and creation as more concretely exemplified in sentients and things.

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 249-52, p. 354 ff. "Step" is used in this sense by William James.

[2] Cf. Chap. VI. § 9 and § 2 Appendix.

[3] Cf. Chap. IX. § 4.

[4] Royce, *The World and the Individual*, 2nd Series, pp. 137-8.

Activity, whose end is sustaining without change, is the basic conservative phase of Divine Imagining. But the end is at one with the activity. In the cases of finite sentients an end is realised in a time-process; desire and aversion presuppose that the end wanted is to follow the want. And even when we *maintain* contents of experience, a kiss, sweetness of temper, a muscular effort, a special direction of thought, we are still immersed in change, and we hold apart, and sway between, an idea and an actually or possibly opposed fact. But the universal conservative Imagining is not conditioned in this way. Here there is no chronological lapse between primal imaginal field and realised end; and indeed no opposition between idea and fact at all. The conservative Imagining is immediate reality whose immanent end coincides with its being. This is the excellence which no finite sentient in a world-process, not even a god, achieves. And failure to achieve subjects it to the unrest of obstructed aversion and desire. A surfeit of this ever-renewed unrest angers a Schopenhauer, being part cause of his belief that life is not worth living; moves the mystic, as we read, to desire to be rid of desire, and sends all mature sentients at last homing back to the greater life whence they fell. The "hound of heaven" bays us forward ceaselessly; victims of defect which cannot be made good save in a domain beyond insulated living.

There is, we agreed, no purely passive experience for the sentient, subjected though it is to invasive influences (*i.e.* "inflowings," penetrations) from every quarter. Even the resting cat is "actively maintaining" its position on the hearth-rug and, so long as it is awake or conscious, it remains active.[1] Its very attention to its comfort and surroundings is activity. And when it sleeps and is not conscious, that is to say when it has ceased to exist as an sentient, its body is conserved actively till it re-exists as a sentient once more. The notion of an existent with no activity native to it or expressed in it is idle. The activity, the *consciring*, of the Divine Life, provides

[1] Stout, *Analytical Psychology*, ii. 304.

the entire field where the nature-objects and the lives allied with them appear. The Divine Life, says Aristotle, is ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας: the activity which involves no "motion," *i.e.* change. Dr. Schiller, in *Riddles of the Sphinx*, has done well indeed to emphasise the value of this phrase for modern thought. At the same time we must recall that this self-sustaining ἐνέργεια is essentially conservative activity. The complementary creative aspect, implying a real cosmic process, is not in view. For such process, occurring within the Divine Life, must alter It in however slight a degree; and the cult of the changeless, inherited by the Stagirite from Plato to the hurt of so much subsequent European thought, would have to be disallowed.

Creation presupposes conservation; and, indeed, islets of pure conservation—of duration without change—appear within creative evolution itself. The minimal changes, for instance, include bits of enduring content, which comprise no succession, along with the "steps" or spurts of novelty (Imagining in evolution *semper facit saltum*). But creation presupposes conservation in a further way. Thus we might conceive Divine Imagining as absorbing its creative episodes, and as enduring indefinitely without others as ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας. But It *will* be expressed, again, in others, for It is not that which can be everlastingly accomplished; a sterile perfection revelling in Its treasures, but impotent to create more. The ocean of the infinite underlies the storms that may stir its surface. And in creation, perhaps, regions are transformed which had their home in the harmonious activity of rest.

As above, so below. Turner when imagining a sunset which he has seen, and when later, in artistic mood, imagining a novel sunset which he has not seen, is conservative and creative in ways which resemble, at a distance of course, conservation and creation in the Divine Life. But a man is, at best, only a very minor factor in the results popularly ascribed to him: his activity is a ripple only within the

general activity which holds him, his organism and the world in being. And critics might object (1) that both of Turner's sunsets were "derived" from perceptions of Nature, and (2) that the Divine Life is not fed thus by perceptions of reality beyond Itself. Let it not be overlooked, however, (1) that Turner's perceptions are not what materialistic theory and crude commonsense may still incline us to believe. *They participate directly, albeit creatively, in that very real imagining which constitutes Nature. To perceive a sunset is to drink of the fulness of the Divine Life.* And Turner's own sunset is not a complex of reshuffled images, as the discredited old association-psychology taught. Unit-sensations and unit-images, combining as chemical units have been supposed to combine, belong surely to fiction. The second sunset is an obvious creation, a novelty, not "derivable" in full from antecedents of any kind. And, further, (2) even the Divine Life, in sustaining content, conserves much that is not primitive, but that has arisen within It as "made" creatively in the remote past. The Infinite Life does not draw on reality beyond It, but this is because, in Hegelian language, It is "always in its own sphere." It retains, however, somehow what we call the past and conserves and creates accordingly.[1]

The phenomena of our world must not be lumped together carelessly by Heracleitans, ancient and modern, as a mere "flux"; their conservative aspects are beyond number. The world (which means, etymologically speaking, that which abides or lasts) seeks to be unstable and stable at once. Its minimal changes, we infer, are "steps" from bits of pure duration. And what I perceive in Nature and call "thing" may be understood in two ways. It may refer me to a relatively independent complex, *e.g.* a piece of platinum or a diamond; to an effort towards durable being amid the flux itself. Or it may refer me to the artificial, to an object, *e.g.* the Matterhorn or a sand-dune, carved out of perception for my convenience; a private effort of my own towards a belief, towards a stable

[1] Cf. Chap. VI. § 14 on the standing of the past.

result which may serve to guide my action. Experience, as I have urged elsewhere, includes " more or less stable phenomena, many of which obstinately resist alteration, and many of which (as in cases of cycles of events, astronomical, climatic, etc.), when altered, protest practically against change by trying to recur. Again, the symbology of the ' conservation of energy,' inadequate as we found it to be, affirms that causal conditions are ' conserved ' somehow in events. ' Energy ' is a symbol which furthers stable quantitative predictions : which predictions are verified because certain modes of changing in Nature are approximately stable. Note, however, by the way that stability in changing is not secured by a rule that the ' same ' conditions are followed regularly by the ' same ' events. There must be provision for the conditions concurring more than once. There is required, in short, a ' uniformity of events,' as Dr. Schiller observes,[1] failing which the rule that the ' same ' conditions issue in the ' same ' events would not rescue the world from chaos or enable us to predict to profit. The relative rates of change in creative evolution must be such that the ' same ' conditions can concur regularly and stably *here*, while novel conditions are concurring *there* : a far-reaching conservatism being as essential to a cosmos as it is to a political state. It is in this co-operation of the conservative and the creative that we can detect one of the most striking expressions of the purposiveness of the world process." [2] Most phenomena, as thus controlled, are, in fact, what Mill found them to be, more or less enduring : they " persevere in their being," as Spinoza used to say. Mill cites as examples the facts called bodies and the positions in space and the movements of bodies. " No object at rest alters its position without the intervention of some conditions extraneous to itself : and when once in motion, no object returns to a state of rest, or alters either its direction or its velocity, unless some new external conditions are super-induced. It, therefore, perpetually happens that a temporary cause gives rise to

[1] *Formal Logic*, p. 300. [2] *World as Imagination*, pp. 385-6.

a permanent effect." [1] The bit of platinum or the nitrogen diatomic molecule, each the region of very numerous inward successions, but each relatively stable as a whole, are hardly good examples of "flowing." Astronomic and geologic stabilities obtain on an impressive scale. In all quarters appear enduring kinds — the *imaginals*. Biologic modification conserves the past in the present. The flux of our psychical processes shows a series of comparative halts and restarts. A train of thought has its enduring topic which the vanishing successions serve. Memory itself is a phase of the wider Conservative Imagining. Creative initiative *and* stability are indispensable to the mature man. In politics, "a disposition to preserve and an ability to improve, taken together," mark Burke's ideal statesman. For States that are too conservative, like revolutions that are too creative, court failure. As to social life as a whole—"First Bagehot, then Tarde, then Royce and Baldwin here, have shown that invention and imitation, taken together, form, one may say, the entire warp and woof of human life, in so far as it is social," is the verdict of James. In an imperfect world this conservation, like creation, holds often of useless, and even sheerly evil, things. "Perseverance in its own being" makes for mischief as well as for good. A "variation," persisting to an extreme, may lead absurdly to the hurt or extinction of an animal species.[2] And hosts of noxious organisms, customs, religions, institutions, governments, and modes of thought cumber the world, persisting with an obstinacy that ignores value. "That not only men, but women in an advanced period of civilisation—men and women who not only professed but very frequently acted upon a high code of morals—should have made the carnage of men their habitual amusement, that all this should have continued for centuries, with scarcely a protest, is one of the most startling facts in moral history." [3] There are political and social

[1] *Logic*, Bk. IV. ch. xv. § 1.
[2] *World as Imagination*, p. 388.
[3] W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals* (Ed. 1913), i. 271.

survivals in our modern European life that are hardly less baneful and vile. They are unjustifiable from the standpoint of morals or beauty—but they persist.

In the concept of "law," of those empirical generalisations which refer us to uniformities or regularities of succession and coexistence, we have conservation again in view. With practical predictions to make, men are prone to overrate the quantitative aspect of these laws; to describe them with Mach as "equations between the measurable elements of phenomena." But, after all, quantities imply qualities, and, predictions apart, the qualitative aspects of life hold our interest.[1] Interpreting laws more adequately we shall assert with Ravaisson that our power to frame them presupposes habits of Nature; that they are "formulae descriptive of the habitual behaviour of a complex system of sentient beings," as A. E. Taylor puts it.[2] The apparent fatality of Nature, according to Ravaisson, is the result of habits formed by the repetition of actions once free: actions which expressed originally a new initiative towards perfection and beauty. The strict determinism, which is supposed by some to obtain in Nature, is thus secondary.

This view is congruous with our idealistic realism; for which perceived Nature masks indefinitely many areas of conseiring, major and minor, in all quarters. Do not suppose that we are indulging in metaphor. Habit, as defined even by Spencer,[3] is "a course of action characterised by constancy, as distinguished from actions that are inconstant"; and, adding that all actions are psychical, we need not demur. But habit, again, itself has to be explained. It is a phase of that wider conservation which is concerning us now. The basic condition of the forming of habits in ourselves is that the psycho-physical processes involved are repeatable; and

[1] Sciences like biology, palaeontology, geology, etc., could not be studied seriously, if laws were interpreted as above.

[2] Cf. also Schiller, *Formal Logic*, p. 314.

[3] Note to the *Study of Sociology*.

this conservative repetition must be supposed to obtain also in Nature. There is consciring, which is conservative, among the minor sentients, and, with that, the uniformity, facility, and obstinacy, characteristic of habit, supervene. But action is, to a certain extent, plastic while habit is being formed. And the formed habit, again, will never be quite stable, since no two instants of the world's history are exactly alike; and the sentients will not behave at the second instant quite as they did at the first.[1] Even the best verified generalisations of science, being dependent on this changeable behaviour, are menaced and may become obsolete with the process of the suns. But the rate of change of the behaviour, in respect of the more important laws, is so slow that it makes no practical difference to human generalisers.

There are those who want their laws to declare "eternal connexions." To what end? "What is the value of an eternal connexion save as a guarantee of particular judgments (applications) and a guide to the prediction of happenings?" asks Dr. Schiller. "The scientific 'law' or universal is no doubt more valuable than a particular observation because it can lead to an indefinite number of such observations. But for all that scientific generalisations are constructed on a basis of particular observations, and must ultimately show themselves relevant to the course of events. If they fail to do this they become unmeaning, and sooner or later, we balk at calling them true."[2] On the lines of our representational pragmatism, truth has to agree with reality. And, reality being changeful, many of the alleged "eternal connexions" may change or lapse. Shall we, then, simply refer to them as *conservative connexions* which endure indefinitely. They are features of an imaginal world, wherein much is experimental and transient:

[1] "The concept of the unvarying character of the laws of Nature, freed at length from its practical motives, became universal, and has inflicted itself as a dogma upon more recent thought. *Yet its origin was social*" (Royce, *World and the Individual*, 2nd Series, p. 197). Italics mine.

[2] *The Import of Propositions.* A Symposium, *Proc. Aristotelian Society*, 1914–15.

and they may have had an origin and may, perchance, come to an end.

But are such connexions "truths"? The answer, for us, is obvious. Divine Imagining, not being truth, does not comprise truths except as the true judgments present, and perhaps for a while only, to finite sentients. It comprises all cosmic connexions, conservative or other, as aspects of Its immediate reality: that reality about which we petty finites assert, or try to assert, our truths. And It comprises these connexions, not "timelessly," but as aspects that endure. What we have now to ask further is this. Are there any conservative aspects about which we can say that probably they will endure and have endured always? The eternal or everlasting character of Divine Imagining Itself is presupposed by any minor features that may show in It. It would not negate Itself by any changes, however vast. That at least is clear. But when we come to consider the minor comprised features, what are we to say? Take the case of $2 + 2 = 4$. Many regard this as an intuitively known truth. We shall suggest that realities only are intuited; truths being stated about these. This truth, however, seems to hold only under favourable conditions. Thus two and two conjugating unicellular organisms may become two. Two raindrops and two others, as they fall, may become five. Hence the alleged truth, applied to certain cases of becoming, will not stand. We must rescue it, therefore, from the becoming and import stability into the groups of units involved. Let us, then, represent the raindrops by dots which are to remain *stably distinguishable*. Let us intuite the dots as  and, again, abolishing the space-interval, as  . The  , named after a similar familiar group, are 2 and 2. The  , named likewise, is four. Two and two, then, it may seem (do not "make"), *are* four. Nothing happens to the dots, and they endure, accordingly, by hypothesis, as what they are. Are they four, then, *before* I count them as well as *after*? If they are, they are also two and two, or one, one, one, and one.

So that even in this domain the man, who counts with an interest, is required. I cannot, by collecting the stable dots, attain any aggregate other than four, but why, after all, is a "collection" or "aggregate" in view? And how, further, are the units, which go to constitute it, obtained? They are carved out of his presentation-continuum by a sentient who pursues ends. That which is a unit for one purpose may become many units for another. The planet is a unit for the astronomer and a collection of units for Lucretius. A regiment is a unit for the General Staff and 1000 men for an A.S.C. supply officer.

Will "2 + 2 = 4" remain a stable verity? There are presupposed stably distinguishable differences which conscious selection can treat as units. So long as reality comprises these differences and sentients able to distinguish them, so long will this truth hold good.

A chess-truth is just as enduring as 2 + 2 = 4 or the truth proved in Euclid's 47th proposition. Any case of it is every other case. The constitutive conditions of chess guarantee its stability. But it is certainly a truth which began to be, and, though now raised above events, as the saying goes, it exists, not timelessly, but endures.

Not to be true is not the same as to be unreal. Pure mathematical creations, *which ignore by intention other realms of reality*, are neither false nor true. They are new forms of reality constituted by command-propositions. As values, often of a high order of beauty, they endure in conservative imagining; and as values which enrich life, they may endure so, other things being equal, for ever.

I will close these observations by suggesting that the old-world cry for *aeternae veritates* was not raised originally with a mere theoretic interest in view: there was also a secret desire to show that even human experience was in touch somehow with the divine. A batch of such approved truths was thought likely to count for something in the fight against the sceptic and materialist. We require no such assistance

to-day. There is no aspect of human experience which does not presuppose a spiritual world-principle. Thus the very "impressions," which were once regarded as a chaotic manifold and almost despised, are now revealed as parts of the presentation-continuum; and this latter, again, as a window giving on to Divine Imagining Itself. This wondrous Imagining pervades, in fact, sentients and Nature. Hence our procedure in this essay is to accent this pervasiveness, not to exploit disputable "universals." Divine Imagining shows in blossom, sky, wave, in our whole cognitive and affective life; does not overlap our experience merely at one or two points which concern logic, mathematics, or ethics.

Note

On numbers and the abstract number-system cf. Appendix, § 3, *Metaphysics and Number*. Appendix, § 1, on the *Domain of Logic*, also bears on the truth-problem involved.

Note on Imagination and the "Laws of Science"

The conservative aspect of framing "laws" or generalising is always blended with creative work of our own. Noteworthy in this regard are the remarks of Professor Karl Pearson in his *Grammar of Science* (3rd edit.)—remarks which, had they been known to me at the time, would have been cited on p. 36 of this work. Pearson (Preface, vi) treats the electron as a construct of the physicist's imagination, which indeed, as a symbol, it is. The laws of science, which simple folk regard as copied from experience, are "products of the creative imagination. They are the mental interpretations—the formulae under which we resume wide ranges of phenomena, the results of observation on the part of ourselves or of our fellow men" (pp. 34-5 ff.). There is an aesthetic side to these constructions. Well may Dr. Whitehead ask in like vein "What are the crude deliverances of sensible experience, apart from that world of imaginative reconstruction *which for each of us has the best claim to be called the real world?*" (*Organisation of Thought*, p. 212). Italics ours.

CHAPTER VI

DIVINE IMAGINING (*continued*)

CREATION AND THE CAUSAL DYNAMIC

§ 1. HE who denies the reality of time-succession denies that of novelty and causation. Nay, "the formation of new reality as a *bona fide* addition to the universe of what was not in it before seems to me," observes Bosanquet, "a contradiction in terms." [1] And causation, a notion of the first importance, an "attempt to account rationally for change," is contradictory as well for him as for an allied thinker, Bradley. Now why do these thinkers adjudge causation contradictory? They refuse to admit, in the cases of this and the other alleged false appearances, that anything can be anything else; [2] a contention said to defy the Law of Contradiction (A cannot be both B and not-B). But rejection of the self-contradictory seems a serious matter. For Hegel urges that every fact in the "natural or spiritual" world includes, not merely different, but contradictory attributes.[3] The contradiction of everything finite is that "it is somewhat as well as something else." Are we, then, to suspect that appearances are an unreal show?

[1] *Logic*, 2nd ed., ii. 249.

[2] Bradley applies this fundamental objection to the case of causation thus: "If the sequence of the effect is different from the cause, how is the ascription of this difference to be rationally defended? If, on the other hand, it is not different, then causation does not exist, and its assertion is a farce. There is no escape from this fundamental dilemma."

[3] Cf. Wallace, *Logic of Hegel*, p. 225.

Or are we to suspect that the Law of Contradiction has been formulated and used amiss ? Let us see.

A wholly yellow flag cannot be also red at the same time, since yellow and red are incompatibles or exclusives. But note that it can be yellow (B) and also the " something else " (not-B) that helps to make, and keep, it a yellow flag. It is, to this extent anyhow, *what it is* and *what it is not.* What comes from beyond it, penetrating its being, is incorporated with it, cannot be severed from it. A " thing is what it is only in and by reason of its limit. We cannot, therefore, regard the limit as only external to the being which is then and there. It rather goes through and through every part," contends Hegel. In this sense the yellow flag *is* its " other " : the constitutive surround. But the " abstract understanding " has only the yellow flag in view.[1]

Now some writers are prone to think of the exclusives, yellow and red ; others of what is meant by Hegel. *This is why Mill derives the Law of Contradiction from experience, while, for Hegel, experienced facts seem to flout the Law.* Here we have a very hot-bed of confusion and muddle. Spencer, also, is cited by Mill as stating that the Law of Excluded Middle " is simply a generalisation of the universal experience that some mental states are directly destructive of other states " ; he too, has the exclusives, yellow and red, in view. He is not urging that yellow, while unambiguously yellow, B, is also the " something else," or not-B, which helps to determine it at this point. But that is what Hegel avers.

Note further that the exclusives are not opposed by decree of a mere Law or generalisation. Experience supplies the oppositions which the generalisation records. And, as James has remarked, empirically-known exclusives may not, in all possible circumstances, collide.[2] Hence the generalisation, which records my experiences, may not record those of denizens of the Dog-Star. Would it not be droll if an

[1] Cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 277-89, on contradiction.
[2] *Principles of Psychology*, pp. 463-4.

arbitrary Law of contradiction forbade Dog-Star folk to conceive as compatible what exist for them compatibly in fact ?

A Law, again, which simply asserts exclusives to be exclusive, would be puerile. What, then, is the so-called Law ? Surely a mere maxim. Since yellow and red are, for us, exclusives, we are to regard them always as such. Never use language which implies that they are compatible, when in fact, as perceptions will assure you, they are not. Let those who think, write, and talk about reality treat them, however symbolised, as what they are. Exclusives exclude or " shut out " one another ; avoid feigning in any way, verbal or other, that they don't.

The Law of Contradiction, about which so much controversy has raged, which is for Bertrand Russell a Law of thoughts and things, and the very foundation of Bradley's sceptical Absolutism, perishes. And, for all that the mere *maxim* can say, one can be also many, x can become v, the discrete can also be continuous, and so forth. If these and like B's and not-B's are exclusive, we have to treat them as such in our statements about reality. But if experience decrees otherwise, then we have to accept its decisions without protest : the *fait accompli* in this case may not be ignored. Furthermore, the fact that an appearance is influenced from beyond itself need not be held, as by Bradley, to imply that it is " unreal." Thus a so-called " self-transcendent " sentient, like the writer, presupposes a determining world-system, but is none the less a centre of experience within it as real, if not as enduring, as Divine Imagining Itself. A more complete knowledge of the " conditions " could not abate this reality a jot. It would prove, on the other hand, instructive. While the " conditions " invade my being, I, on the other hand, am found to penetrate them in my turn. A caprice of mine, the throwing of a stone, stirs Sirius. A thought-creation of mine may alter the history of the planet. And such creations are never wholly determined for me by

an encroaching world. I am posited, in fine, where I appear; in my being invading contents are transformed.

§ 2. We can continue now, with a clear conscience, to discuss novelty and causation, features of Creative Imagining, and hence only in this connexion to be understood adequately.[1] When ultimate reality has been identified with Imagining, all our main difficulties vanish; and the minor, if not all surmountable, are, at any rate, only such as limited human knowledge must expect. We are rid, incidentally, of such nightmares as the Absolute, which holds "timelessly" sick-rooms, torture-chambers, and trenches, or Nietzsche's "circular movement which has already repeated itself an infinite number of times, and which plays its game to all eternity." And we are enjoying the vision of a power, radiant with delight-love-beauty, inexhaustibly fecund, and unhindered, save by the transient, but inevitable, anarchy of some of its worlds, from evolving the most satisfactory systems *imaginable*. We need not burden It with choice, for "the power of choice between opposites belongs to a want of power to persevere in what is best."[2] But we may speak of "design" as immanent in each world-system or system of such systems; of something traced or sketched in outline,[3] of a germinal conservative plan, one with the content which it informs, and to be developed and enriched with the unforeseeable as creation proceeds. Nature, of course, is no "mixture and separation of unchanging elements"—this is a primitive crudity of thought inherited from Greek atomism—but a phase of a divine adventure, a poem of creative evolution. Whatever subsidiary features it displays, such, for instance, as those surface-phenomena which prompt the symbolism of Herbert Spencer, it remains always in essence what Blake and Shelley, and, as Prospero, perhaps Shakespeare, felt it to be. Evolution (which includes the minor dissolutions incidental to every great world-system)

[1] On causation cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 343-76.
[2] Whittaker on Plotinus. *The Neo-Platonists*, p. 60.
[3] "Design" is derived from *dessiner*, to draw.

" is a creative romance within a Power of which the best representation is furnished by our own imagining—conservative (or reproductive) and creative (constructive or productive). It is a romance at once splendid and infernal, an epic uncensored, to its artistic gain, by the narrow moral conventions of mankind. Scientific generalisations about it resemble a bookworm's notes about *Othello*; they deal abstractly with certain features of the play, but they miss the concrete movement of the whole. And they leave us, of course, utterly in the dark as to the productive activity which decreed that the whole should be." [1] In considering novelty and causation we contemplate the dynamic which animates and ever renews this amazing romance.

§ 3. If now each world-system is a romance, a poem of creative evolution (as the writer urged as far back as 1893), there are statements current about causation, about the riddle of the succession of phenomena, which are clearly inadequate; which a very brief examination compels us to reject. The stream of phenomena in the world is of psychical character and constitutes, accordingly, at bottom *a problem in psychics*. And we shall have to penetrate deeply into reality to grasp what occurs. Mill ignores deliberately the riddle as to how events come to pass.[2] Hence his definition of cause as the " antecedent or the concurrence of antecedents on which it [the event] is invariably and unconditionally consequent " fails to content us. We want to know how an event, *e.g.* a fire, begins. It does not begin merely because certain " antecedent " surface-facts belong to the time-series where it appears. Any view which refers us to " functional relations between the elements of experience " is similarly unsatisfactory. It ignores so much that its main value must lie in subserving predictions. Bain's insistence on " transferred energy " as the " final and sufficing explanation of all change," and Carveth Read's teaching that the " trans-

[1] *World as Imagination*, p. 415.

[2] On the use of the word " event " see note at the end of the chapter.

formation of matter and energy " is the essence of causation, fail likewise. " Matter " and "energy," we saw, are not existents that act on one another in an independent external world : they are just our human ways of conceiving aspects of Nature, useful instruments or devices of our thinking. And devices of our thinking cannot be offered as the causes, say, of trees, sunspots, and storms ! Take note, again, that there are very many cases of causation besides those which Bain and Carveth Read seem to have contemplated when forming their views. Events occur not only in Nature, as known from the outside, happenings such as interest astronomers, physicists, chemists, geologists, etc. They occur also in the history of sentients, human, animal, and other. And when, *e.g.*, political economists ask how the exchange value of a commodity is related to the causes of which it is an effect, an explanation, in terms of " matter " and " energy," is no longer even tolerable. A truthful reply cannot be given in such terms. Similarly if we seek to determine the causes of visual space-perception, of the Renaissance, of the conversion of soldiers to bolshevism, of the improvement of some one's character, or of the decision of a friend to visit Switzerland, we must abandon mere symbolism and get at the facts. There is no avoiding psychics in *this* sphere at any rate ; and it may be that, in exploring it, we shall obtain a clue which will guide us through the other as well : through that Nature which we are constrained, as insulated sentients, to perceive from the outside. Causation, as experienced directly in its higher forms, may aid us to surmise what obtains in the depths. In a world of imagining the higher and the lower modes of the creative dynamic cannot lie utterly apart.

We shall have to travel freely where Mill feared to tread. And, incidentally, we shall see what is called the " derived " fact in a new light. Let me explain. Spinoza, continuing the cult of the changeless, declares against novelty ; every experienced fact is to be regarded as deducible from the One Substance, in which it is eternally contained. This attitude

reappears in Spencer's description of evolution as a passage from homogeneity to heterogeneity; which passage takes place during the integration of "matter" and the dissipation of "motion." In the earliest and most crude version of this scheme one of the derived heterogeneous phenomena was supposed to be conscious activity; consciring itself regarded as a transformation of "motion." Perversity could go no further. Now what we have to urge is that all this "heterogeneity," all these facts deduced or derived from the "persistence of force" (itself said to be unrevealed), belong, in fact, to conservative and creative imagining; to a process in which every step has its novelty, and nothing whatever flows solely from content-conditions preceding it in time. There is a ceaseless complicating and transforming activity at work. This holds true of all Nature and sentient life. It is as great a mistake, for instance, to derive, with Berg, music from the love-cries of monkeys, as it would be to suppose the Taj Mahal "latent" somehow in a prehistoric cairn, or Shakespeare's plays hidden in the tales and chronicles of which he made use. The earlier phenomena merely indicate that a history of creative achievement has begun.

Examining the case of the "caused event," called the formation of water, we came to the following conclusion.[1] Chemical combination in this quarter, as Mill suspected, is transformation; a conservative feature being weight. Unchanging elements are out of court. But how does the qualitative transformation come to pass? There are concerned very numerous psychical existents or minor sentients, which the surface-appearances of Nature mask, just as they mask those more generally accredited sentients which we call animals and men. Professor Taylor has written, "What appears to us in sense-perception as physical nature must be a community, or a complex of communities of sentient experiencing beings; behind the appearance the reality must be of the same general type as that which we, for the same reasons, assert to be behind

[1] *World as Imagination*, p. 357 ff. and elsewhere.

the appearances we call the bodies of our fellows." [1] But we must go warily. What, for instance, we speak of as oxygen and hydrogen are *contents of Nature*, not the mythological world of mechanistic science, but the rich psychical Nature within Divine Imagining; contents present to the minor "experiencing beings"; each of the latter aware of a very limited field, but having an extremely wide influence.[2] We are not to regard Nature as consisting of the sentients (as Leibnitz regarded, say, an orange as consisting in itself of monads); on the contrary, it was in connexion with portions of Nature—how we shall suggest anon—that the sentients themselves began to be. These sentients are not monads; they are minor and minimal foci or *centres of conscíring*; but the contents which they conscire fragmentarily are present also to Divine Imagining and might conceivably be so present, even if the sentients ceased to conscire or, what is the same thing, to exist. We can liken Nature to a sheet of black, burnt paper across which tiny sparks are flitting in all directions. This black sheet stands for the complex of contents, not itself conscious, which is present to Divine Imagining. The finite sentients resemble the tiny sparks.[3] They have no being apart from the glowing portions of the black sheet. And, if they cease to show, the sheet is none the less real in their absence. It stands for a portion of the Divine Life—one of innumerable processes of creative evolution—and would not vanish utterly with the subordinate sentients to which it appears.[4] Mâyâ theories therefore are repudiated. This explanation rids us of subjective idealism.

The minor and minimal sentients are very far below the levels at which "memory," "expectation," and "self," as we conceive them, obtain. In these depths the differentiation

[1] *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 209.

[2] An "atom" or "electron" in my pen influences Sirius. Cf. also Whitehead, *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 96.

[3] We are ignoring the large sparks and the circle of white radiance which might be wanted to represent a finite god. The simile may prove, withal, helpful.

[4] "Utterly," cf. § 14.

of " self " and " not-self " has surely not begun : there exist subpersonal immediate experiences, having time-spans, which, within an interval measured by our second, may comprise what would seem interminably long-drawn-out contents. These contents, however, are akin to our presentations, and are coloured by pleasure and pain : by those " vital feelings " which attend furthered and thwarted consciring : the action that shines in its own light. Quadrillions of minor sentients have their areas in my body and brain. They convey such contents to me ; I am in direct touch with them whenever I perceive colours or attend to organic feeling. But, while I can say what the contents of minor sentients, as condensed in my time-span, are *like*, I am quite unable to descend into the depths where the long-drawn-out processes occur. The arcana of Nature escape me. My perceptions are no fuller than my practical living requires them to be. But they report enough to serve my turn during the present discussion.

This necessary digression ended, we return to the " causal event." What takes place when H and O combine to form water ? The minor agents or sentients involved are self-conserving ; " persevere," as Spinoza would say, " in their own being " ; a characteristic which they inherit from the conservative ground, whence Nature, or rather the Natures, bud off. This self-conservation implies conflict with any disturbing contents which invade and oppose their own. Invasive contents are always penetrating others ; many further the contents of the invaded sentient ; many are neutral, perhaps ; many, again, are destructive, that is to say, in the regard of what they penetrate, exclusives or incompatibles. In the intimate mingling of contents in this interpenetration occurs inevitably conflict—the war of the incompatibles. In the case of chemical causation under consideration furtherance counts, no doubt, for much. But there are also opposed contents which are asserted at the same points of space and time. Conflict prevails. This situation is *harmonised*, comparatively speaking, by a creative act or acts ; hence the *new*

qualities of water, which were not present in the antecedent "conditions," regarded separately or collectively, before the act. We have to allow here for the becoming of something out of nothing; for the new qualities which, not being in the prior contents, are gifts of creative consciring.[1] "Hegel is perfectly right in urging that the saying, 'From nothing comes nothing; from something, something,' abolishes becoming, though this view seems fraught with trouble for his own general philosophical attitude. Anyhow, '*Ex nihilo nihil fit*' cannot figure without qualification in an imaginal interpretation of reality."[2] A novelty of real concrete time "sprouting," to use a phrase of James's, is in view.

There are cases of causation in which conservation, cases, again, in which creation, dominates, but there is a leaven of creation in all. The case just noticed belongs to the class of "heteropathic" laws or uniformities of causation discussed by Mill. In this class "most of the uniformities to which the causes conformed when separate cease altogether when they are conjoined"; and the distinction is "one of the most fundamental" in Nature. In the spheres of chemistry and organised bodies the creative or transformative aspect dominates very markedly. We note also what may be called "imaginal leaps" at critical points of creative evolution, examples of prominent "steps" of change.[3] But they are not too revolutionary to imperil the orderly movement of large-scale cosmic events. The heteropathic law, after all, comes to stay: is at once creative and stable. And there is stable compounding of its effects with those of other like laws and also with those of non-heteropathic laws. The red strand of conservation continues to be seen amid change.

§ 4. This distinction between "laws of composition" and "heteropathic laws" directs attention alike to the conflict in causation and to the sort of harmonising imaginal solution

[1] Cf. § 8, however, on the need of allowing for intrusive and easily overlooked conditions which manifest themselves as occasions permit.

[2] *World as Imagination*, pp. 360-61. [3] *Ibid.* p. 364.

which supervenes thereon. All cases of causation, in the light of analysis, are found to involve multiple agents. And, accordingly, to cite Mill's words, there obtain "two different modes of the conjunct action of causes from which arise two modes of conflict, or mutual interference, between laws of nature." [1] In the first of these the conflict finds a dominantly conservative solution since "even when the concurrent causes annihilate each other's effects, each exerts its full efficacy according to its own law—its law as a separate agent." But in the second the harmonising solution is dominantly creative "as in the experiment of two liquids, which, when mixed in certain proportions, instantly become, not a larger amount of liquid, but a solid mass." These two types of *conflict or mutual interference* and the two sorts of accompanying *solutions* tell their own story and must give the most careless reader pause.

§ 5. I will now cite a case of causation on a much higher level. It illustrates effectively the creative stroke. "What is the cause of the production of *Hamlet*?" The "totality of conditions" comprises, besides a poet's education, vicissitudes and thoughts about life, an old story picked up somewhere, a desire to profit by fame, love of art for its own sake, etc. etc., the list being susceptible of additions in a great variety of directions. But tabulate the "conditions" as you will, "Hamlet" will not be present in any one or in all of them. It is of no use to say with Bradley or Taylor that, when conditions *a*, *b*, *c* . . . are complete and present, "Hamlet" is present as well. For you know perfectly well that this is to say that, when the "condition" *of having been imagined* is present, "Hamlet" is present too! But it is just *this* stroke which is entirely new to the universe: the appearing of a creative construction which has never been thought before. The supreme causal *act* (just as in the case of the chemical process) is not the meeting, or interpenetration, in the experience of a poet, of innumerable psychical data.

[1] See Mill, *Logic*, Bk. III. ch. vi., "Of the Composition of Causes," on this "radical" distinction.

It is the *making* of the play that transforms, and brings new harmony into, the data. Seen in this light, the "event" illustrates the truth that something—the distinctive reality of "Hamlet"—can come from nothing. Only if you ignore novelty is it true that something has come from something; to wit, from the data tabulated in the "conditions." [1]

A significant case of creative causation on a high level is the following. It illustrates incidentally what causal explanations have to include. The shorthand of the mere mathematician, writing on causation, the recently noted theories of Bain and Carveth Read, fail us utterly.

The Greeks who played so important a part in history were "product of an intense fusion," of a compenetration of clashing and conflicting elements. "An immemorial civilisation," writes Professor J. L. Myres in his *Dawn of History*, "bred in the fair surroundings of an Ægean world, and gloriously dominant over them, has stooped to conquer . . . a ruder folk who broke in to enjoy its paradise. For a while, these conquerors spoiled more than they were able to enjoy. But like Semitic intruders in Babylonia and Syria, these folk of northern nomad origin and 'Indo-European' ways of thought, brought with them qualities, traditions, and institutions which offered a new standpoint for looking at Ægean Nature, just because in origin they were independent of it." The Minoan world—such was the imaginal solution of this conflict—became Greek. The invaders "brought their language, their social structure, a large part of their religion"; there was evolved a stock of "magnificent mongrels, to clarify and *harmonise* this wealth of *incongruous* gifts." [2] We have here a case of large-scale causation which can be inspected, to some extent, in the open. And the creative harmonisation of conflict cannot be overlooked. Undoubtedly we must allow for the class of "waiting conditions" mentioned in § 8, and undoubtedly we are ignorant of all the conspiring powers concerned,[3] but the creatively imaginal

[1] *World as Imagination*, p. 365.
[2] *Dawn of History*, p. 221. Italics mine.
[3] Cf. Chap. X., "God and the gods."

character of the main "result" leaps to the eye. Observe, too, the seeming ruthlessness with which this fateful innovation was carried through. There is no false sentimentalism in the working of the imaginal dynamic. And the strong man of modern times, rejoicing in such a lesson, will take heed and learn to be "hard" at the call of need, allowing nothing to stand in the way of a well-meditated creative initiative, political, economic, or other, of value to social life. He must needs experiment, but let him do so with the interests of this larger life always in view. It is better even for him that all shall go well with this life than that he, a mere unit, should posture for a little while in purple and fine linen. The reflections suggested by our tenth chapter are conclusive.

A further case. What is the cause of X's picture being sold to the stingy collector Y for £800? X wanted £1500, and Y offered originally £750. Well; if we wish to account fully for the characters and circumstances of X and Y, we shall have to take in the residual world-system in so far as it has contributed to make, and keep, them what they are. Among the other conditions, presupposed by the transaction, is, *e.g.*, the sun; were the sun much hotter than it is, X, Y, and the picture would be glowing gas. But, considering the *causa causans* locally dominant in mediating the particular change in view—the determination of the price—what do we find?

What we find is an area of discord or disturbance, embracing X and Y, which becomes comparatively harmonious once more. In this harmonising process there is an "imaginal solution," the price, supervening on a situation of conflict constituted by the incompatibles, demand and offer. This price is a new thing in its special context, an *invention*; and it serves to provide obviously incongruous tendencies with a reconciling creative issue. In this issue survives a conservative element; Y's disposition to buy cheaply was an imaginal field that is now more or less realised. As in so very many cases, the harmonisation of the area of conflict is imperfect. A peace of Versailles is achieved. Nevertheless, X, though still harried by

discords, goes not empty away. There are situations, of course, where, confronted by giant agencies, X disappears. For the interests of great areas of discord may compel the sacrifice of victims, and who is to forbid such deeds ? But " compel " is emphatic.

§ 6. We discussed elsewhere the cause of socialism, and we found its focal-point in a novel " imaginal solution " or creation which seeks to harmonise conflict ; to re-establish in this way an equilibrium which the march of events has disturbed. Great political and social movements always hinge on imaginal solutions, which are to harmonise a sphere of disturbance or conflict, which are experimental, and very frequently fail. It was from experience of this kind, interpreted amiss, that the idea of a dialectical process drew part of its charm. We may find also instances of this harmonisation in such of our volitions as comprise conflict. When uncertain whether I am to go and live in Switzerland, my very conflicting " motives " so called are imaginal creations ; the future being unborn. And when I decide to go, it is a transformation of pre-existing psychical elements—the thought of an attractive new life—that occupies attention, *i.e.* focal conciring, and issues in further act. I have solved my problem, and the experiment is in the lap of the gods. What is discussed as " freedom of the will " depends in part on these transformative strokes which no mere *vis a tergo*, no mere conservation of pre-existing influences, explain completely. This time-honoured question will be dealt with in a later essay.

Conflict has its indispensable value, on the great and small scale alike, on account of the value of pain as compelling change ; pain colouring every phase of unresolved psychical conflict on all levels of the time-process. Evolutionary achievement is not, of course, *pace* the pessimists, always a theatre of conflict marred by excess of pain. Far from it : there is no appreciable pain in many quarters even of " action's storm," and no need for it. But " pleasure or happiness, the mark of free or furthered psychical activity, tends to the conservation

against change of the experience which it colours. And the conservation or static attitude has to give place to unrest in the process of creative evolution. If I am in the islands of the blest, why should I depart? Pains appear, therefore, in sentient life as important promptings toward change." [1] They and their implied conflicts are necessary to a world in travail. Alike in the depths masked by natural objects and in the fields of familiar sentient life, they forbid that too speedy achievement of the static which entails stagnation. They help to sap the old to the evolution of the new, and, again, infect the new as soon as its part in the creative epic has been played. Unfortunately there is a great mass of pain which seems useless, and which is tolerated, I suppose, in the trust that, on the whole, all is, or will be, well with the world. But the enlightened mankind of the future will require a more substantial diet than hope. Disillusioned, it may decree, as pessimists have told us, the birth-strike. Hence, intellectual interests apart, philosophy, in helping us to bear our burdens, may prove of great practical worth in the days to come.

In the heteropathic laws of nature the aspect of creation, as we saw, dominates. And in causation, as viewed by us from the inside, that is to say, in our own histories, in those productions which contrast most with conservative habit and ideo-motor response, a veritable transformative magic, remarked, indeed, even by Hume, is at work. The origination of "Hamlet" was cited as a case in point. Something which cannot be taken as "latent," *aliquo modo*, in the conditions, has begun to be. It is well to accent this creative magic. We get well away from the view that, given any one fact, one ought, theoretically speaking, to be able to "deduce" every other one from it.[2] In creation there is not *mere* extraction of a pre-existing metal from its ore, but the making of the metal itself. Manifestation and improvisation concur.

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 600 ff., "The uses of pain."

[2] "Perfect apprehension of systematic reality would be able to deduce from any one fact in the universe every other fact" (Professor A. E. Taylor).

§ 7. "Cause" is a term whose meaning turns often on barely practical considerations. The worshippers of Osiris, Sir J. G. Frazer tells us, used to regard the corn sprouting from the buried effigies of Osiris as the cause of the growth of the crops. A motorist may speak of the cause of a stop as being the absence of sparking. Even the law-finders or generalisers of science accent only selected features in causal situations; those conditions of events which they mention are insufficient to produce the events. Bradley and others, desiring to leave no conditions of events unconsidered, contend that the cause, to be complete, must take in the universe; what we call the future being included. This view creates grave difficulties peculiar to itself and need not delay us.[1] World-systems may exist which do not influence our cloud of star-dust at all. And within our own system the general connectedness of things is compatible with "looseness."[2] Each content is penetrated by much else, but there is no Bergsonian interpenetration "of all by all" in an impartial way. An ant carrying a seed in India, a gorilla sneezing in a tropical forest, do not penetrate the complex of "conditions" operative in my composition of a poem. The "conditions" of the poem belong, of course, to the same world-system as do those of the ant-transport or sneeze, but obviously, and this is overlooked, at a considerable remove. Let us glance at another event. Is it seriously contended that, in accounting for Caesar's death, I am to "take in" antecedent events, such as, say, the movements of a sword-fish in the Pacific or the appearance of a pimple on an Eskimo's nose? Theorists are nearing the absurd. The "conditions," which meet in the decision of Brutus, are very numerous. But they are a limited group ancillary to the *focal transformative act*, or *causa causans*, which consists in Brutus *imagining* what the State would be like without Caesar. Observe that, at the time of the decision, even such potential "conditions" as kindly memories of Caesar have no influence; they are excluded from the contents of the imaginal act,

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 373-6. [2] *Ibid.* pp. 333-6.

which, holding attention finally and reinforced by a thousand ancillary influences, issues in Caesar's death.

The popular view of cause limits the "conditions" unjustifiably. But it is right in holding that different events have different causes.[1] I repeat that all agents of our world-system are not on an equal footing in mediating any particular event. Each influences much else, but not all else. Each has its influence modified in a unique way by other agents. And the causal dynamic operates only on such contents as compenetrate or, to cite once more a phrase of Shelley's, "mingle" in one another's being. A metaphor may not be amiss at this stage. In a world made up of connected rings, each ring would not lie in the regions of all the others. Not everything in it would be available to act at any given point.

§ 8. We must be careful not to overlook fundamental pre-existing conditions and so not to refer to creation or improvisation more than it "effects." And, in the case, more particularly, of heteropathic causation we must be ready to allow that a certain assemblage of *known* conditions may serve incidentally as occasion for the manifestation of very important conditions not previously in view. Such occasions may be given on all levels of evolution; features of "physics" or "chemical combination" may furnish illustrations of surprising interest. "Sense-qualities at least have to be recognised as independent universals, εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα, according to the Platonic phrase, in the spatial and temporal system—having their exits and their entrances, no doubt, in accordance with definite causal conditions, but wholly unexplained in their essential nature and origin." [2] Strike a match in the dark, and you are able to exemplify this truth.[3] The *imaginal* of colour declares its presence in the new fact, set,

[1] If the cause the whole universe or even the whole of antecedent reality, this belief would not be true.

[2] Professor J. S. Mackenzie, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 363. I should prefer, for reasons to be assigned, to speak of "imaginals" rather than of "universals." Cf. Chap. VIII. § 3.

[3] "The particles of all objects that are really red may vibrate with a certain

however, in a creative context; no fact ever resembling exactly a former one of its kind. The "origin of species," the births and lives of particular animals and men, the history, religious, moral, political, industrial, artistic, etc., of societies, furnish fields in which "waiting conditions" are continually being manifested as occasions, afforded by other conditions, permit. A materialist, who resents such intrusive influences, will prefer to regard Plato as the "function of a brain," supposing that the known terrestrial conditions, believed to issue in physical birth, suffice also to account for the beginning of this new sentient life. The unapparent is ignored. "A man is what he eats" and what his parents ate before him is one version of the error; in this case even what the man *is* is ignored! Such utterances rouse merriment, but they involve also a risk. If, as theorists, we ignore these waiting realities, prompt to embody themselves as occasion permits, we shall fail to achieve an adequate interpretation of life. The belief that evolution is creative would not enable us to explain the transition from lower to higher by the supposition of a very long series of unsupported leaps. We cannot get beyond Spencerianism after this fashion. For us humans there is no rich fancy in the absence of a pre-existing rich memory. For the macrocosm there is no rich creation in the absence of rich supporting conservation. The story of evolution presupposes divine creative fancy, but enduring or waiting elements, many all too easily overlooked by men of science and philosophers, concur with novelty during every stage of the process. These elements insert themselves into the creative flux and are transformed then along with it. *There results an evolutionary movement which gathers strength at once from above and below.*

We have indicated these very important waiting conditions

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frequency, and the sole function of this may be that it is a factor in causing us to become aware of the redness that is always present in these objects" (C. D. Broad, *Mind*, April 1920, p. 264). The match is really coloured when burning: it shows the colour-imaginal.

in the course of a few sentences. They will be presupposed by every portion of this and ensuing essays.

§ 9. Mill defines cause in one place as "the assemblage of phenomena, which occurring, some other phenomenon invariably commences, or has its origin." [1] We could not skim surfaces in Mill's way, but the word "origin" has an interest for us also. There are more or less distinct groups of conditions within Divine Imagining. And, however superficial or deep are such conditions, creative "origins" or new beginnings are arising in every quarter. They are portions of that concrete time-content which sprouts in a world-process. And since this content is being made, a certain flexibility or indeterminism is provided for even in Nature. These new beginnings, of such fair promise, but also, as we shall see, such foul portholes for evil, bring us back to an old topic: that of the discrete "steps" of change. Perception and our most private experience seem to many full of such "steps." [2] But there are thinkers who disdain to believe at all with the plain man. For them a causation which moves in discrete "steps" will never do.

Bradley holds that, if causation is not continuous, we could carve slices, theoretically speaking, off the flow of events; slices which would contain no change. "If so, however, you would have your cause enduring unchanged through a certain number of moments and then suddenly changing. And this is clearly impossible, for what could have altered it? Not any other thing, for you have taken the whole course of events. And, again, not itself, for you have got itself already without any change." Not to stress the empirical evidence in favour of discrete change, let us emphasise once more an old oversight present in a new form.[3] Note the words "flow of events"; you will observe that content alone, not consciring,

[1] *Logic*, Bk. III. ch. v. § 7. This definition is framed to cover possible cases in which the cause and effect are not successive: the effect coinciding in time with the "hindmost of its conditions." It suffices for a law of succession that an event should begin.

[2] "To our perceptions," allows Bradley, "change is not properly continuous." Cf. § 2, Appendix on continuity.

[3] Cf. Chap. IV. § 4.

is in view. And what is the truth ? The truth is that a flow of events does not cause itself and its transitions. Each " origin," or new beginning, in the flow reveals the activity which is in, but also beyond, events : the conscious cosmic activity and finite consciring on which we laid such stress. No matter whether this and that content last unchanged awhile or not. The " origin," or new beginning, will never be the work of the content, and cannot be prejudiced by the latter's changelessness at a given moment. It is by consciring that (what, from the side of content, seems) a discrete series is grasped. And the acts of the universal consciring, and of the numberless finite continuing centres of consciring, are expressed in the changing appearances of content. Hence neither the " gaps " supposed to part members of a discrete series nor, again, the predicament of the members themselves need excite our concern. Divine consciring is adequate even to such minor problems.

The divine consciring and its numberless continuing centres are operative at every point. A world-catastrophe, a trembling leaf, the oscillation of an electron, attest them. We must be ready to allow that the " continuing centres " include indefinitely many sentients of indefinitely many grades, subhuman and superhuman, of whose reality workaday folk never even dream. The prison-walls of sense are not quite opaque ; the intimations of a Leibnitz and a Fechner are not to be disdained. And, as Bradley allows, we can set no bounds to the types of powers that may exist in the cosmos.

§ 10. In the causal dynamic, the sphere of succession, there is a real process of cosmic completion in time ; a movement which comes to an *end*, chronologically speaking, when its *end*, teleologically speaking, has been realised or bodied forth in the content of which it consists. The causal process is not prolonged indefinitely to no profit ; it is a teleologic transition marking incessant violations and restorations, in general and in detail, of the harmony of the changing whole or world-system under survey. An imaginal world-system is such as to justify the saying of Renouvier that causation is directed

towards harmony and beauty. By this hangs the supreme hope of mankind. There is never a call for pessimism. Whatever vicissitudes await imperfect worlds and sentients, a great creative evolutionary system endures to the achieving of success—at a price. A modern agnostic, looking at surfaces, in this our minor earth-world, may talk solemnly and uninformingly of "functional relations between the elements of experience," varying thereby a trifle the phraseology of Mill. But even these humdrum relations mask the very process of equilibration which a movement to harmony and beauty must show: the very process which is securing from moment to moment, despite innumerable and unforeseeable disturbances, the best *imaginable*, *i.e.* the best possible, harmony of this world. We have to suggest anon how the vast order, in which our solar system is a point, came to be. And we shall return then to this matter of the harmonising causal dynamic with advantage.

§ 11. Needless to discuss here the minor issue as to how we come by the principle or, better, postulate, as Bain calls it, of causation. That, in a universe such as we have been considering, every "origin" is dependent on conditions other than itself is almost certainly true, but one seems hardly able to assert more offhand. The uniformity of causation, again, has been guaranteed, in the view of men who do not themselves believe in a real succession, by the "law" of identity applied to the successive. Wherever x in a time-series is x, it behaves as x; or, as Bosanquet puts it, "a thing does what it is its nature to do under given conditions, and cannot do otherwise except by some change in the conditions." [1] But what if the "nature" of a "thing" *is* to vary, as, say, the entire universe of imagining might be conceived to vary? It has then no exactly assignable character at any moment at which you may speak of it. In preserving its "nature," it might act differently "to the same thing in the same relation," if, indeed, as a "thing" (*i.e.* content) it was capable of action at all.

[1] *Logic*, ii., 2nd ed., 174-5.

We require fewer principles of "abstract truth," which may be quite inapplicable to fact, and more insights into reality. The x formula is sterile. Only in cases where x is found, or made, rigorously stable does it recur at all.[1] Wherever anything is "done," the embarrassing x_1 shows its nose. It seems more useful to say—like conditions tend to issue in like events. There is a like conservation of like elements.[2] But there is also creation, and, accordingly, rigid causal uniformities cannot obtain in the flowing of events.

§ 12. The critique of causation lures us to the problems of "free will" and "chance." The former, as exemplified in processes of deliberation and choice, belongs to another essay. But two quarters, in which this phase of freedom can be watched, deserve mention. Freedom is displayed (1) in the creation of alternatives, and (2) in the sort of harmony with which a "decision," the imaginal solution, replaces conflict. No effect or result, we agreed, is to be explained adequately as produced by a *nisus a tergo*: everywhere there are new origins or beginnings. The facts adduced in support of what is called free will concern a particular kind of new origins, when the direction of our creation is in view.

We have dealt with "chance" elsewhere.[3] A mere glance at the world prompts us to suppose it. To save the face of the Absolute, Hegel himself had to invoke it, as did the Stagirite, in whose system, however, "chance" and "spontaneity" are hardly at ease.

Even believers in, what James called, a "Block-Universe," complete, perfect, and finished, are staggered at times. They have supposed a systematic reality of such a character that exalted wisdom could deduce from any one fact all the others which go to determine it. The winged migratory thistle-seed

[1] Bergson makes the true type of logical universal the "relation of an abstract statement to examples which repeat its tenor wholly without variation."

[2] A side glance at the Imaginals (Chap. VIII. § 3) might be worth while at this stage.

[3] *World as Imagination*, pp. 377-85.

that I find entangled in a spider's web, the fifty million oyster eggs which perish that a single male and a single female may mature,[1] the chamois caught by the points of the horns on an inch-broad ledge and starved to death on the cliffs of the Stockje ;[2] facts of these sorts rescued from an "unreal" time, are referred somehow to the frozen fixity of the Absolute ; as necessary fragments of Its eternal self-determinate unity. We smile and we frown also, for the world comprises too much that is beyond toleration in any setting. There remain the alternative suppositions already discussed in this essay.

"Chance" and some conditions, independent of causation, contributory to it, can be considered under two main heads.[3] (1) Nature-activity comprises the deeds of indefinitely many minor agents or sentients. And, despite their constancy of action which allows us to frame "laws," these remain at bottom centres of imagining with possibilities of sudden, unforeseeable variation on call. "Chance" is a feature of imagining as it works on low levels of evolution ; levels of extreme division and conflict. Such imagining may bring "many inventions" into minor portions of a system : may also "run amok." This natural anarchy of initiative, potent for weal or woe, begins early ; it is continued, as we see, into animal and human history. Chance-happenings emerge in the ordinary causal dynamic, not as "mutations" arising in many places at once, but rather as isolated responses with which special environmental influences are met. (2) The ordinary causal dynamic presupposes, what Mill calls, "co-existences independent of causation." This is important. "Thus the determinist tells us airily that conditions A, B, C . . . 'meet' in the solar system, which 'results' necessarily from them. We have noted flaws in this contention ; we are to note yet another. How is it that the conditions 'meet' in this way at all ? Well, obviously, to account for their 'meeting,' we shall have

[1] "Case of the American Oyster," Sir Ray Lankester, F.R.S.
[2] Whymper, *Scrambles amongst the Alps.*
[3] *World as Imagination*, pp. 384-5.

to work back and back in thought until we reach the primitive agents, their numbers, characters, and relations. But if *these* were 'co-existences *independent of causation*,' all subsequent conditioning of events must be reconsidered in the light of this fact. The primeval situation has imposed conditions, not themselves 'caused,' on the future." [1] Causal law concerns *a succession in which phenomena begin one after another*. It does not "reign" amid pre-cosmic conditions which are immune from change.

"Pre-cosmic," of course, means prior in respect of the starry heavens, etc., peculiar to the evolved or generated world-system—one perhaps among innumerable others—in which we live and move. These pre-cosmic conditions declare the glory of Divine Imagining, and differ by the breadth of being from the happenings previously referred to as "chance." But, as original conditions continued into, and modified in, the world-process, they lend themselves to new initiative, and feed "chance" with elements not to be causally explained in full.

The co-existence of Mill's "original natural agents" was regarded as ranking "among merely casual concurrences," though it was urged that "even the most capricious combination of agencies will generate a regularity of some sort," given stable "laws." Here then is a very important field for thought; one too often ignored by philosophers. Our task is set clearly. We have to ask what was the initial form of our world-system, and to suggest, if possible, how the causal dynamic concerned with its successions, as experienced by us, began. We notice that causation presupposes agents, for which its "laws" do not account, and we have to inquire, accordingly, into their standing. We cannot believe that they are "casually related," just because they were not the result of causal changes such as we observe in space and time to-day. For they belong, after all, to an imaginal system which embodies plan. And their *relative independence*—here is another riddle. Were they not, at the outset, aspects of content rather than

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 384-5.

" agents " existing over against one another ? These highly interesting questions and others will be answered when we come to discuss the Creative Appulse.

The primitive world-system, which is older even than the relatively independent natural " agents," falls, we shall see, into change. And its original features survive in part amid, and unexplained by, the transformations of the causal welter. The tendencies, at one extreme to deny causation altogether, and at the other to explain everything in terms of causation, must be set aside. Causation is real, but it is a manner in which a world exists that might be conceived as existing otherwise.

§ 13. We now pass to the consideration of an interesting, though purely speculative, question. We have discussed Conservation and Creation with its implied real succession in time. We have now to ask : Is Divine Imagining, taken as the unity of conservation and creation, to be regarded as at bottom unchanging or as altering inevitably as the aeons flow ? Or, again, as unchanging and changing, in some unintelligible manner, at once ?

It is well to bear in mind that we may be confronting a problem to which our ordinary intellectual criteria do not apply. Let us beware even of our logical dogmatism. Thus the maxim of contradiction, which is of value for human judgments, does not determine, withal, what actual experiences are exclusive of others. It condemns (for us) the concept of a blue-yellow petal. That is to say, blue and yellow being empirically-known exclusives, the maxim urges us to treat them in our propositions as such. But if there are anywhere sentients for whose consciring blue and yellow are not opposed, but compossible at the same points of space and time, then for them the concept of the blue-yellow petal will stand. It might be, then, that a humanly interpreted " law " of contradiction would condemn a genuine concept based on actual fact. We avoid this risk by deposing the " law," as stated previously (§ 1), and enthroning the " maxim."

The formalist, with the "law" of contradiction in view, will urge that ultimate reality cannot both endure changelessly and change. But we might ignore his logic and fall back on the "maxim." For the "law," after all, cannot determine whether in Divine Imagining the attributes are factually *exclusive* or not. Only that radical empiricism, which consists in being Divine Imagining, is competent to do so. We might leave the matter so, declining to ask speculation to soar too high. And, provided that change was accorded its full rights in some harmony passing our understanding—a harmony not "intelligible," but imagined directly in Divine Experience—we could rest provisionally content. The solution would then be as follows. Divine Imagining includes real change; and, in some manner quite unimaginable *by us*, this is compatible with Its enduring without change.

But there is no call for the cult of the changeless, even if, in some way unimaginable by us, it includes change. It is the glory, not the defect, of Divine Imagining that It changes. Why not? The ocean of the infinite seems tranquil, but surely it feels the storms that stir its surface. True, we have suggested that the immature riotous world-systems are insulated or "encysted," and that, only when grown harmonious and beautiful, do they enter into the "joy of the Lord." But even their insulation and their later reception make differences; and, caught up into the divine, they bring with them histories, of which novelty is the very heart. A world-system, merging in the divine, penetrates that which welcomes it; and innumerable such systems, each fraught with endlessly varied novelty, may be homing back. To some of us comes the thought of a solemn and sedate Power changing almost imperceptibly as the aeons roll. But others, impatient of the rhythms of finite thought, may dream other dreams: of a Dionysus, aglow with creative joy, love, and beauty, an ocean of laughing life, an ecstatic, infinitely versatile player who ranges from glory to glory, donning and doffing splendours in the mood of a sunset cloud. He possesses much that, by its very

nature, is immune from change—marvellous, stable treasure that is a delight, like mathematical wisdom, for ever—but also he destroys much, and his fancy is full of ever new world-adventures, stirring, terrible, and fecund in surprise. What game so enthralling as the guidance of these worlds ever about to break away, using their very conflicts to bring them to harmony and peace. A blithe vision and one according to my heart's desire :

> Not to me
> The Unmoved Mover of philosophy
> And Absolute still sum of all that is,
> The God whom I adore—not this !
> Nay, rather a great moving wave of bliss,
> A surging torrent of dynamic love
> In passionate swift career,
> That down the sheer
> And fathomless abyss
> Of Being ever pours, his ecstasy to prove.[1]

But with the passing of the ages I may come to dream more truly still.

§ 14. Mention of destruction raises an issue which deserves to hold our attention awhile. Divine Imagining and subordinate continuing centres, which create, can also, in the measure of their influence, destroy. If, in the sphere of Divine Imagining, to *conscire* is to sustain, create, and grasp with awareness, to cease to conscire is to reduce to zero-intensity, to banish from reality, to annul. Even we puny sentients attempt to " kill out " undesired passions and memories by refusing to " attend to " them ; our difficulties are that their roots lie beyond ourselves. Divine Imagining is, however, master. And, since It guides the world to harmony and beauty, It will tolerate in the end only such contents as conspire to a " divine event " ; transforming or destroying outright what perfection cannot incorporate. Much of our own betterment hinges on learning to ignore or forget the squalid and more odious aspects of the world. To conserve all con-

[1] Evelyn Underhill in *Theophanies*.

tents that are, were, and shall be, would foul eternity. It is the doom of the Absolute of some philosophers that It has to do so. "No feeling or thought of any kind can fall outside its limits," says Bradley. And, if It finds certain contents as bad as we know them to be, It cannot escape them. It is above time.

Destruction connects with the beautifying of the Past; and a question now arises as to the standing of the Past,[1] as also of the Future. In the "specious" or psychical present I am aware of reality *in the making*, in so far as that making is achieved at the growing-point of a finite sentient life. This reality swirls away into the past or "passed," *i.e.* into that which has *passed* into the sphere of made, or approximately made, reality as conserved in Divine Imagining. Bergson is of opinion that "as the past grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its preservation." We have, however, already suggested a limit, viz.: that elements in the past, not in themselves values or capable of inclusion as subordinate members in a whole that is harmonious and beautiful, will not be conserved. Part of the price paid for an artistic triumph is that much has to be cast to the heap. Is it otherwise on the great scale?

The minor problem, of my past and my intermittent memory of parts of it, is not holding us here. It need not be dealt with out of its place.

The cosmic past is reality which has "*passed*" through the stage of creative becoming into that of conservative or static being. It is thus that, as Blake could say, "the ruins of Time build mansions in Eternity": language open indeed to criticism, but suggestive at the same time. The meaning is that imagined world-content, once created or "made," may endure indefinitely. Aye: and it may not; there is surely a conservation of values, not of dross. And, as already said, there are unalterably hideous facts in life that make it well that the past can be altered or even expunged, leaving not a

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 252-6.

rack behind. Divine Experience, Whose consciring supports all contents and sentients, is not at the mercy of evolution. What we call the past, that which, over and done with for our perceptions, has passed into a wider domain, is present to Its consciring. It ceases to conscire and a block of history ceases therewith even to " belong to the past." The made has been unmade utterly.

The future, *in so far, at any rate, as the work of indefinitely many sentients, superhuman, human, and sub-human, is concerned,* is reality which is not made and is not yet being made. It is located, nevertheless, popularly in the direction where our new perceptions are starting forth, and is spoken of as if it also, in some rudimentary way, were real. It may be that discoveries regarding comparative time-spans would be of enormous interest in this regard : and meanwhile we shall do well to remain open to possible evidence. Empirical facts, not theoretical considerations, are wanted.

Divine Imagining is the ground, as well as the Platonic " spectator, of all time and all existence " ; has all reality that has been " made " present to It. Thus It comprises that past to which even popular speech refers as somehow real, and which is of one tissue with reality as it is being " made " for me. Divine artistry, like ours, creates that it may contemplate. But now we moot a formidable question. In what form is the past conserved ? It is reality " made " originally in most intimate union with *sentient lives.* Has this erst pervasive sentiency died away ? Does the past exist for Divine Imagining only as content ? Let us consider a concrete case. Are the Jews who were crucified after the fall of Jerusalem struggling on their crosses ? That part of the history of the planet has been " made," is so far fixed, and its details are fixed with it. And we cannot suppose that it is a frozen fixity which is conserved. " A piece of music," observes Professor Mackenzie, " has a movement of successive phases, all of which contribute to the significance of the whole. But the piece as a whole does not move. It contains time, but exists

eternally." [1] We should prefer to say that it contains time-succession and *endures*, as a whole of *time-content*, indefinitely. But anyhow the enduring is not to the loss of the phases. Similarly the conservation of history in Divine Imagining does not mean that the "successive phases," connected therewith, are abolished; it means that these successions remain fixed stably just as they were originally "made." Idle to proceed further, if this contention be not understood. A whirling wheel conserved, with its setting in the past, whirls still. It does not come to a stop: such a stoppage would in fact be the happening of something new.

Jew-forms, we reply, are struggling on their crosses. But Jew sentients themselves no longer agonise in that which, for us, is past, but which belongs, withal, to the presentedness within Divine Imagining. The inferno "which was" has been deserted by its victims. What remains of this past is a world of *content*, richly present to Divine Imagining, though not to any finite sentient that took part in it and helped to "make" it. And with this we begin to descry the outlines of a great truth.

The numbers of the finite sentients superhuman, human, and sub-human, in whose "specious" presents reality was being "made" when Jerusalem fell, were past counting. Every stone, leaf, and drop of water in visible Nature masked myriads of them. The planet of that date lived through the collective living of these hosts upon hosts of sentients of all grades. We may compare the hosts to coral workers active in an area of upheaval. These creatures are born, build, and die; and ever as they die a greater and greater block of "made" reef is thrust upwards. Millions and millions perish, but other millions work on to the slow growth of the reef that needs them all. The main mass of the reef ceases to harbour workers after it is *made*; but where there is new rock in the *making*, there also are new live workers and all is astir.

The quadrillions of sentients, centres of consciring, whence

[1] *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 452.

proximately the activities of Nature and History proceed, are at work on a world-adventure. At the creative level where they work, the adventure grows. But where they have ceased to work—to create—there you have the "made" reef, that accomplished result which, enduring stably in Divine Imagining, is for us the past. This result, built up at the cost of the sentients, has now "set"; has become like a cell-world from which its bee-constructors and denizens have fled.

Divine Imagining possesses this "past," just as It possesses a world-system before any of the sentients allied with it come to be; to wit as *content*, no aspect or area of which is aware of itself.[1] Even so I possess the content of my own fancy, in which the forms of men, animals, etc., exist for me and not for themselves. We shall suggest anon how the blue serene of world-imagining first became starred with sentients. We are noting now how these stars have faded out of the blue which we call the past; a region which, lacking henceforth awareness of itself, no longer, in short, present to itself, remains present, withal, to Divine Imagining.

The Jews struggling on their crosses belong to the past, to a scene in the tragi-comedy of life staged in the theatre of time. Playing with such grim realism they move us to groans; all in a sorry plight, martyrs unconscious of their uses, are thrown aside contemptuously, as it seems, to die. Nevertheless all the while the drama is continued into new scenes and acts; fresh players (or do I see the souls of the old looking through their eyes?) are swarming on to the stage, most of them terribly in earnest, as if convinced that the interest of the play must lack for nothing. And, perhaps, after all, their parts, thankless as they appear, may be worth the playing. The separate, and often foul, scenes are not all; the players, again, are not tasked merely to divert Moloch or the Hegelian Idea. In a universe of Imagining all moves at last towards the beautiful and the labours of the ages cannot be ill spent.

In Bergsonism an opposition exists between two currents

[1] Cf. Chap. IX. on the dawn of a world-system.

of thought. For one the past is "essentially that which acts no longer."[1] For the other the past is gathered up in the changing present, is pressing ceaselessly on the "now," is, in short, intensely active. Thus "it is with our entire past . . . that we desire, will, and act."[2] This marks a tendency to confuse the mass of the "made" reef with the level at which the coral workers are "making" more. The real past is inactive, because it has been deserted by the finite sentients—by the centres of conscIring which "did" everything originally within it. It exists idly, and uncreatively, for Divine Imagining. What Divine Imagining does, or may do, to it raises a further issue. It may be that even finite sentients, such as we, are to contemplate, in some remote future, the entirety of this world-romance that stretches back so marvellously into the unknown. Nay, this past, revealed to us at a glance, may form a prelude, or contribution, to the splendours of the divine event; of the restful ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας, of which Dr. Schiller writes. Assuredly; but is this long chapter of evolution, foul as it is in part, such as to be worth conserving for ever? May not the interest which it has for us be outgrown? Are there not possible levels of achievement which its too stubborn persistence might mar? The reader, being, like the writer, entirely ignorant in such matters, will answer the question as he lists. Only let there be no cocksureness in his answer, and, above all, let him recognise the possibility that the ladder of evolution may be destroyed below us as we mount. We live and move and have our being within Imagining. Agreed. Then let us bear the fact well in mind.

It will be noticed that we do not support the view that time-forms are to disappear. And at this stage a caution seems requisite. Attempts have been made to show that even terrestrial man escapes at intervals from time. Cases like that of Mozart are cited.[3] But Mozart simply describes how

[1] *Matter and Memory*, Eng. transl., p. 74.
[2] *Creative Evolution*, Eng. transl., p. 6.
[3] *E.g.* "Mystic, Philistine and Artist," Gustav T. Holst, *Quest*, April 1920.

he was aware of the whole of a musical composition at once. In this whole were phases "going on"; notes that were simultaneous; and the experience endured so that it could be recorded. Thus the three main time-forms, succession, simultaneity, and duration, persisted bravely. An alteration of the time-span has been noted: nothing more and nothing less.

A change in my intuition of duration, enlarging the "now" or "specious present," whose normal time-span is one of a few seconds, would be of great interest, but it would not deprive a symphony, heard all at once, of its successions. Even my normal "now" includes successions, which are somehow simultaneously present: consider the percept of a revolving cycle-wheel. A god, whose time-span embraced geological aeons, would perceive occurrences in what for us is an immemorial past. And for Divine Imagining, time, successive and other, seems not transcended, but to be a lasting form or manner in which Its wealth is conscired.

§ 15. We have now completed our observations on causation and the vital, enormously significant, problems that are connected therewith. In the course of the discussion of destruction, which involves the unmaking of what has been created, evolved, or "made," we were led to consider the special time-problem propounded by the, even popularly accredited, reality of the past. We have reached important results. The reader, however, may now inquire, not unreasonably, how it is that we have been silent so long on the topic of space, and why, in view of its prominence, we are not remedying our neglect of it at once. The reply, made from the standpoint of Imaginism, will prove satisfactory and even suggestive. Space, unlike time, does not, perhaps, condition the beginnings of the particular world-system, of which it is an aspect. It may be one of the first great *imaginal solutions*, or inventions, by which the conflicts, essential to creative evolution, are harmonised. It appears when the oppositions, breaking out within the new system, become so intense that

not mere time-simultaneity but co-existence also is required as a field of relation, the "manner of togetherness," of these clashing differences. While conflict is not literally, as Heracleitus urged, the father and lord of all things, we shall contend, nevertheless, that it is in the process of the harmonising or reconciliation of opposed agents that a vast portion of creative evolutionary achievement has come to be. Space is among these many harmonising inventions, though, doubtless, not invented first in connexion with the world-system, which Science explores and which we appropriatively label "ours." The universe has comprised many, perhaps indefinitely many, such systems. Having tendered this explanation, we proceed to discuss that general evolutionary process in which the spatial content in question is to appear.

NOTE ON MILL'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN "LAWS OF COMPOSITION" AND "HETEROPATHIC LAWS" IN CONNEXION WITH AN ALLEGED MENTAL CHEMISTRY.

In distinguishing these two different kinds of issue from the conflict or mutual interference of agents in causation, Mill had at first "outward objects" in view. (It is not clear what these objects, when discussed as "permanent possibilities of sensation," exactly are.) But he held also that the "laws of the phenomena of mind" are sometimes analogous to laws of composition, sometimes to the heteropathic laws.[1] And, in connexion with the latter, he made much of the idea of mental chemistry. The combination-idea, however, must itself be clarified and determined anew. For, if we are right, chemical combination itself implies a striking *creative* "*step*," as well as often the manifestation of the "waiting conditions" discussed in § 8.

More than this. Creative "steps" are of many grades; and caution is required in likening a higher "step" to a lower. Even if the reader believes with us that the world is an imaginal process, he will reject the view that the "combinations" issuing in a poet's fancy resemble closely those, say, which give rise to carbonic acid or water. And he will resent, of course, on principle an attempt, such as vitiates Spencer's "synthetic" philosophy, to derive the higher and richer from lower and poorer contents; these last being in part invented, in part abstracted from the very concrete process which they are used to explain.

[1] *Logic*, Bk. VI. ch. iv., "Of the Laws of Mind," § 3.

NOTE ON THE USE OF THE WORD "EVENT," § 3.

Causation is discussed very frequently as the law of the succession of events. But these events include not only "instantaneous" and very rapid changes, but also objects that endure more or less stably, and certain effects, *e.g.* the poem "Arethusa," that need not suffer alteration at all. A theory of causation, however, is a way of accounting for phenomena that have an origin, and even "Arethusa" had a beginning. The word "event" serves to point attention usefully to this fact.

CHAPTER VII

THE EVOLUTION OF WORLD-SYSTEMS

"Each Morn a thousand Roses brings, you say;
Yes, but where leaves the Rose of Yesterday?"
FITZGERALD'S *Omar Khayyám.*

"We have no right whatever to speak of really unconscious Nature, but only of uncommunicative Nature, or of Nature whose mental processes go on at such different time-rates from ours that we cannot adjust ourselves to a live appreciation of their inward fluency; although our consciousness does make us aware of their presence." . . . . "All this finite consciousness shares with yours the character of being full of fluent processes whose tendency is twofold,—in one direction towards the formation of relatively stable habits of repetition, in the other direction towards the irrevocable leaving of certain events, situations, and types of experience behind—I suppose that this play between the irrevocable and the repeated, between habit and novelty, between rhythm and the destruction of rhythm, is everywhere in Nature, as it is in us, something significant, something of interest, something that means a struggle for ideals."—ROYCE, *The World and the Individual*, 2nd series, pp. 225-6.

"And then all those things which we, with our present senses, can only know from the outside, or, as it were, from a distance, will be penetrated into, and thoroughly known, by us. Then, instead of passing by hills and meadows, instead of seeing around us all the beauties of spring, and grieving that we cannot really take them in, as they are merely external: our spirits shall enter into those hills and meadows, to feel and enjoy with them their strength and their pleasure in growing."—FECHNER, *On Life after Death.*

". . . Except in relation to our ignorance we cannot call the least portion of Nature inorganic."—F. H. BRADLEY.

§ 1. WE have now conceived Divine Imagining sufficiently well to provide a radiant truth to light our severe thinking and graver emotional life. In this principle, ceaselessly *re-*"newing" or sustaining content, in so far as It is conservative, and, again, "newing" this content, perhaps as ceaselessly, in so

far as It is creative, we have, what Schopenhauer sought and failed to find, viz. the Power at once beyond reason and adequate to all the aspects of purpose or plan embodied in the world. We might say, diverting to our use the language of Spinoza, that It has a " self-preserving nisus which is identical with its very existence." Only as creative does It realise ends which require a process. A light is cheering us at last. Features of chance and anarchy, peculiar to evolution, are nearing their explanation ; and, speaking generally, we may contend that the riddle of evil will be solved. We have done with the traditional Absolutes; retaining accordingly belief in a metaphysics which is to be favourable to ourselves. We are able to save certain values of popular theology which promote the higher life, to incorporate them in a world-view which leaves no aspect of our very complex aspirations ignored. Thus, regarded alike from intellectual and emotional points of view, the thesis of Divine Imagining brings genuine satisfaction and peace. The philosopher, whose concern is to see things together, is not sent empty away. The man of religion infers that all will be well with a world in which the main causal movement, swallowing and ingesting malign local initiatives, must needs be in the direction of harmony and beauty. And he is right. In a universe of Imagining the " best imaginable " solutions of all problems, presented by creation or evolution, will be reached sooner or later. The evils which, as present to our narrow time-span, seem chronic, are either indispensable to the imaginal dynamic or fruit of local initiatives in finite centres, major and minor. They come and they go, impotent to stain for ever the content of That which has power to destroy or change whatever happens and develops amiss.

§ 2. It remains now to try to indicate in very general terms the manner in which a particular creative adventure or evolving world-system begins. And first let us dispose of a difficulty. We are not of those who believe in Cosmic Nights and Days ; concepts which ignore all methods of verification, direct and indirect, open to us. In the regions of creative evolution we

notice, indeed, an oscillation "from tension to *vis viva*, from *vis viva* to tension," as Tyndall put it; and a crude modern symbolism has emphasised the "rhythm of motion" with just such phenomena in view. Some may find in these phenomena support for the belief in alternating non-creative and creative eras, the Pralayas and Manvantaras of a mysticism inspired by the East. But the inference is overbold.[1] Plotinus and his followers, opposing a like contention of the Stoics, urged that the phenomenal order, whatever redistributions occur within it, had no temporal beginning, and will have no temporal end.[2] Their emanationism was not a narrative of successive events. Imaginism replies somewhat differently as follows: "Our particular world-system, the *insulated* phenomenal order which includes Kant's 'starry heavens' and their related unseen levels, had, surely, a beginning. But this beginning of a special system, however vast, is, after all, a mere incident in the universe. It is consistent with the view that there was no absolute beginning, that there are no absolute pauses, and that there will be no absolute end, in so far as the indefinitely, or infinitely, many phenomenal orders, present to Divine Imagining, are concerned. Special phenomenal orders may begin and end, although creative evolution, on a cosmic scale, never ceases. The Oriental conceit of the Nights and Days, based on human experience of being tired by the day's work and wanting sleep, ought not to mislead us. It suggests no "necessity" by which Divine Imagining at least is constrained.

The consciring, which conserves, creates, and is aware of content, is not, like European Labour, overcome by a six or eight hours' day. Even as conservative, it is active. Its very being is to be active. Such being may imply further that it is creatively active without pause.

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 417-19.

[2] Plotinus held that "universal intellect" produces the cosmic order, which includes every form and grade of being, necessarily; hence it cannot be active and inactive by turns. He did not apparently entertain the important idea that there may exist insulated world-systems.

§ 3. The indefinitely, or rather infinitely, many world-systems are not supposed by us at a venture. They express the variety native to Imagining: variety which any one system, or even millions of millions of systems, would hardly tap. Perhaps no numerable collection of systems could express fully the overflowing into creation of the Divine Life. What one system has to exclude another displays. These simultaneous, but initially insulated, systems recall thus one of the functions of the time-succession within our own limited world-system: they render compossible within creation orders and features which must be parted in order to appear at all.[1] Their plurality, therefore, is essential to the variety; and we who cannot perceive, are nevertheless driven to accept, them as real.

§ 4. Of all these, perhaps infinitely many, systems we are concerned, perforce, now only with our own; with the one (whose mere physical level was mistaken by Laplace for the "universe") comprising the starry heavens and hosts untold of sentients among whom, at an ignoble level too reminiscent of the ape and hog, figure our petty selves. A few who have learnt to think, to take an interest in the wider reality in which we live and move, sympathise with quests such as this. And to these I would say, as regards the present adventure,—be impersonal. We are not primarily concerned to gather in facts which may be pleasant to ourselves or even new facts of any category. We are rather interpreters of facts with which plain men are acquainted already, facts which lie to hand, but lack a sufficiency of meaning for those who collect them. In former chapters we have been discussing reality at large. We are to suggest now the general manner in which, within this reality, the genesis of our particular world-system came to pass. In doing so we take all the laws and facts requisite from the sciences whose business is to supply them, but we are not concerned with any one science as such. Thus the business of metaphysics is "not to pen a history of the

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 416-17.

evolution of a particular Milky Way, solar system, planet, or kind of organism; not to raise debates about the doings of mice, men, the denizens of Mars, 'ethereal' and 'super-ethereal planes'—these matters and the like fall to the province of science, as ordinarily understood, or as expanded to cover new fields. We have no special interest in Borderland mysteries, leaving, indeed, this domain mainly to 'met-empirical physics' and psychology. We do not ask with the modern Magus (an authority on unseen worlds *only*) what modes of telepathy obtain in the seventh heaven, or whether 'transfinite cardinals,' on the 'astral plane,' wear red robes."[1] We are not astronomers, physicists, chemists, psychologists, etc., but "spectators of all time" interested in the metaphysical frame, within which the laws and facts, discussed by scientific inquirers, must fall. We are attending not to particular things, nor to mere regions of particular things, whether these be solar systems, jungles, the abodes of the gods or of the "dead," but rather to the whole of which these things and regions of things are trifling fragments. We are seeking, in fine, a synoptical view of the world as Divine Imagining surprised, as it were, amid the storm and stir of one of Its adventures. And beside this topic, issues looming large in the sight of men of science and the market-place cease to hold attention and fade into the obscure background.

§ 5. The duration of the phenomenal order is without beginning as Hellenic Platonists and the Neo-Platonists averred. But this order consists, we agreed, of, perhaps, infinitely many phenomenal orders or world-systems, all in process of being created or "evolved"; and each of these systems begins and ends; passes into the sphere of the phenomenal and, after vicissitudes outranging our fancy, passes out. This passing into creative evolution is what we called elsewhere the Metaphysical Fall. It is a sundering, an exclusion, from the concrete unity of Divine Imagining; insulation of a sub-whole,

[1] *World as Imagination*, p. 403.

which is to give birth to astonishingly novel sentients and contents, but which, in doing so, may burgeon awhile into grim and unforeseeable complications, fouling and infecting all related existence. The newly born system does not fall away completely from Divine Imagining; that were to vanish and leave not a rack behind. It still presupposes that consciring by and through which all else persists. But this consciring wells up in part in the hosts of finite sentients which arise within the system; and, to the extent to which these sentients become independent, Divine Imagining abandons Its throne. Conflicting imaginal initiatives break the original harmony; struggles become possible which can be overruled but not prevented. We speak advisedly, then, of the need for insulating, or encysting, this system in its immature stages. A "cyst" often imprisons morbid matter which must not be allowed to poison the organism. And the foulness of a young world-system must not be allowed to poison the general Divine Life; or to infect other world-systems, the less mature of which are already, perhaps, too septic and faring amiss. Hence the penetration of another system by its contents, the "influencing" or inflowing presupposed by causation, does not occur. And the system, evolving novelty for weal and woe, is left in a grim solitude overruled by such divine creation as its activity allows. Is it well that the new legions of sentients should come to be? You say—it is well. All in the end, within Divine Imagining, will be well. Recognise, however, the colossal risks of a world-adventure, look around and see the inferno of life on this planet in 1920; and reflect that, within the world-system, which contains this small planet, thousands of more important regions may be in even worse case. A great price has to be paid if a system is to mature. But, maturing slowly, it moves toward a stage when the insulation is to cease. It begins to influence, and to be influenced by, other maturing systems, and the hour will strike when it will pass utterly out of the sphere of imperfection and conflict into the "joy of the Lord." This return to the

harmonious concrete life — the true paradise — of Divine Imagining is its " redemption " as philosophically understood. Nothing short of this achievement will eliminate conflict and its implied pain. Nothing else will stay the imaginal dynamic which guides it toward the " divine event " ; to reunion with the ocean of the infinite, to intermingling of its being with the Imagining which is Delight, Love, and Beauty (Chap. V. § 2). An adventure, a cosmic romance, has to be accomplished in full. Insulated primarily as *content*, the system returns as a *consciring* whole ; to find its fulfilment in the radiant reality in which it arose. We need not suppose, withal, that this reunion is achieved at the close of any one cycle of creative evolution ; for the particular system there may be indefinitely many alternations of conservative " rests " and creative " steps " ; this, indeed, is what is suggested by the already remarked oscillations from " tension " to " *vis viva* " and " *vis viva* " to " tension," repeating, as it were, the great alternations in the detail of action's storm. The particular system may assuredly enjoy such " rests " ; it is only the general creative life of Divine Imagining which, we may contend, never ceases. Let us pause awhile in our thinking and enjoy the outlook. The prospects of the denizens of our world-system will appear to us grandiose beyond compare. And the day will dawn when enthusiasts from societies inhabiting interstellar space and the planets of remote suns will join with us in acclaiming the wonder and glory of the system in whose bosom we live. A common rapture will unite the new patriots and make one host of the dwellers in the Milky Way.

The earlier history of an insulated, or encysted, system resembles a nightmare : the rioting of imagination which, broken and divided against itself, has escaped from central control and run amok. And what is true of the system as a whole is true also of its pettiest members or parts. Thus the earth of 1920, failing the philosophical vision, inspires very properly Bertrand Russell's gospel of despair. It is a phase of the nightmare which has always, so far, prevailed in human

history. The noble life, based on the philosophic vision, consists, above all, in raising ourselves creatively so that we may help, in however humble a way, to bring this inevitable and long-drawn-out tragedy to a close. And in Earth-enthusiasm, not in mere devotion to his own and wider human interests, the true mystic will show his love of the Divine. For the reality which he adores must be served pre-eminently where It appears; and, for all his dreams, he cannot escape yet from the birth-place which is common to us all.

§ 6. The world-system—our own—under survey is one among many; is finite throughout its content-aspects, *in omnibus generibus*, as each insulated system within the phenomenal order must be. It fell into this order, extruded into the time-process from the harmoniously restful complex within Divine Imagining. But how? We are to indicate the sort of answer, but we do no more. We do not attempt to discover details ourselves, and we are not even borrowing extensively from astronomer, physicist, chemist, and the rest. Our remarks, in the main, will be complementary of such generalities of science as may be cited. There is an excellent reason, apart from the character of our outlook, why we should not discuss details. We are incompetent. We try to tell the truth about reality. And being very ignorant as to what happens in the depths masked by perception, but happily being aware of our ignorance, we are taking few risks. Assuredly there is nothing in the content of Nature which is not present to Imagining of cosmic range, but we, at any rate, are not in a position to imagine in this eminent way. We intellectuals can barely sip where a god might drink his fill. Lacking his vision and lacking also the power to communicate it, if we had it, we take refuge in silence and seek compensation for our defects in the search for width of view.

But we are better off than gropers in the dark, like the relativity-physicists whose ultimate concepts, we are told, "are of a nature which must be left undefined; we may describe how they behave, but we cannot state what they *are*

in any terms with which the mind is acquainted." [1] The elementary analytical concept, used in this symbolism, viz. the point-event, has a nature "outside the range of human understanding"; and the relativity-theorist's "World," or "universal substratum of things," is nothing but an aggregate of these unintelligibles, endowed with four dimensions. Such a "World" is a conceptual ghost, of use to workers in physics, but not to be confused with the "World" as it is; with the concrete, indefinitely varied, complex present to Divine Imagining, the "universal substratum" of previous chapters. Scientific speculation of this kind must not lure us into conceptual worlds where we lose touch with the wider reality. It becomes then an idol of the cave. At the outset, however, the main interest is that the symbolism should work in practice; this assured, an attempt to get beyond it may lead inquirers directly to the metaphysics which is interesting us here. As Professor Eddington observes, the analysis into point-events may not be final. There is hope, accordingly, that the relativity-theorists may yet learn what they are talking about. And his suggestion that the "apparent atomicity of matter" results from "*quanta of Action*" [2] shows that, in one region at least, the symbolism is wearing thin. It may be that "Action" is to be interpreted later, not in terms of working concepts, but as that Consciring on which we have laid such stress. And then the researches of physicist and metaphysician will certainly converge.

This convergence, which recent stressing of "Action" by philosophers and philosophical physicists suggests, is furthered much by a work such as Professor Whitehead's *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, to which we referred specially in § 9 of the Foreword. Whitehead notes three streams of thought, relevant to the search for natural knowledge, the scientific, the mathematical, and the philosophical. He allows his due to the mathe-

[1] Professor A. S. Eddington, F.R.S., *Mind*, April 1920, "The Meaning of Matter and the Laws of Nature according to the Theory of Relativity," p. 146.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 158.

matician, and no more.[1] In respect of philosophy, concerned in the main with Nature, the object of perceptual knowledge, he approaches his task as an inquirer interested primarily in the problems of speculative physics. "The successive labours of Larmor, Lorentz, Einstein, and Minkovski have opened a new world of thought as to the relations of space and time to the ultimate data of perceptual knowledge"; and he desires, accordingly, to provide a "physical basis" for the views born of their work. The need of this basis, in view of the confused thinking prevalent in science, is urgent indeed, and, in discussing it, Professor Whitehead approximates in some interesting respects to views entertained by advanced modern metaphysicians. But to approach metaphysics—and nothing less can suffice for a philosophy of Nature—from his quarter in quest solely of the "coherence of the known" in perceived Nature, invites the criticism already mentioned (Foreword, § 9). While important truths may be ascertained about the perceived, the abstraction involved is too sweeping. The world-content, after all, has its affective aspect; is implicated, further, with divine and finite consciring. To overlook these pervasive truths is to fail to understand adequately Nature itself.

§ 7. This present creative phase of our world-system may be its first; or it may be one of many like prior adventures which have alternated with rest-phases. This consideration, unfortunately for our convenience, cannot be ignored. For, if the system has gone through prior creative phases, it has had time in which to evolve superior orders of sentients and possibly that very exalted society of sentients which constitutes a limited or finite god. And these powers, entering into its present creative phase, must be making a vast difference to it. On the other hand, if it be a young system in its first

[1] The contributions of mathematics to natural science are summed up as follows. They "consist in the elaboration of the general art of deductive reasoning, the theory of quantitative measurement by the use of number, the theory of serial order, of geometry, of the exact measurement of time, and of rates of change" (Preface).

creative phase, it may possess as yet no higher sentients of its own. We know that our own and animal bodies, the organism begins a long while before a conscious agent shows. Nature similarly precede god; the finite god who arises and matures at a late stage in suns? There remains, withal, the suggestion that the superior sentients might come from without the higher levels of which may not be so evolved or "encysted" as the lower. It seems that god may appear in a plurality of lives. Might he appear in a plurality of systems, continuing his life on a great scale? At any rate such reflections have their value.

It is convenient to arrange the exposition of this essay as follows. We shall consider (1) the system before its first appearance in the phenomenal order or time-process, and (2) the process of formation into Nature up to the stage wherein the first organisms are evolved. This mere glance will scarcely indicate the ground covered in my former work. We shall then return to the problem of the limited god and the minor sentients or minor gods that may be allied with the former. And, finally, (4) we shall close the essay with some observations bearing on the riddle of the individual: that issue of supreme interest which will constitute the subject of a later work.

Topic No. 1 is to occupy us in the course of the present chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

STEM BEFORE THE METAPHYSICAL FALL

resolution of a complex uniformity into simpler and
has an apparent tendency to diminish the number of
ınd really does remove many properties from the list ;
of this simplifying process is to trace up an even greater
effects to the same agents), the farther we advance in this
.ter number of distinct properties we are forced to recognise
t.. .. same object : the co-existences of which properties must
be ranked among the ultimate generalities of nature."—JOHN
.LL.

ıy be that after unsuccessful attempts to bend Nature to our ideal
ı spite of herself, we shall be submerged by the ever-rising flood of
.ches and compelled to renounce all idea of classification—to abandon
and to reduce science to the recording of innumerable recipes."—
CARÉ.

THE INITIAL SITUATION

Riddles of the Sphinx a germinal world-system has been
/ed by Dr. Schiller in the form of monads existing pre-
ally in a " timeless solitude." These become related
ɔw to one another and to a dominating god-monad, of
ɔut limited power, who constrains them to co-operate in
g " some sort of whole " ; a more or less orderly world-
s or cosmos. This view has the merit of taking into
ıt the variety, conflict, and incoherence noticeable in the
, but it leaves, withal, grave difficulties on our hands.
s it that there exist all these grades of associable monads,
'ıe chance-enthroned limited god downwards : how is it

that originally separate monads have contents such as can concur to form the "sort of whole," in which the proportions and distributions of qualities are correct; and how, if primitively unrelated, could the monads become related at all? We indicated elsewhere what we believe to be the ground of relations (Chap. IV. § 8): it is the universal consciring, not mere chance or a Democritan void. But, of course, our cosmology must not rest content with this. It must not merely explain the relatedness of what Dr. Schiller calls "monads" and we here sentients, centres of consciring or experiencing. We must account for the variety, conflict, and incoherence on which this uncompromising pluralist so very properly insists. The Absolutist cannot face the facts. Is the Imaginist in better case?

The world-system, as we conceive it, exists first as part of the conservative complex of Divine Imagining: the merest fragment of Its inexhaustible treasure. Since it "perseveres in its existence" or endures, since it has aspects which are simultaneous, it cannot be described as above time. It is "pre-cosmic" in the sense that it pre-exists to its fall into creative evolution. It may even comprise changes as a symphony comprises them, but, like the symphony, it is stable; it is not, as a whole, itself in process of change. *This stable or conservative whole is, therefore, by no means a frozen immobility: it is like a composition, as Mozart heard it, when that gifted musician was aware of all its contents, including its successions, together.* Sustained thus by divine consciring, the initial situation is a harmony of compenetrant contents which, regarded as a whole, suffers no change. It is a radiant splendour present to Divine Imagining as part of Itself. But take note that it is present only as content, just as a poem might be present to a human sustaining fancy. It comprises at first no sentients. It will comprise indefinitely many. And on this change will hang other changes of enormous significance; in fact, the beginning and continuance of the differentiation of the phenomenal order. Nay, the entire imaginal dynamic,

whence causation in Nature, presupposes the arising of these sentients, which become active in the contents of every fragment of the system. It seems, indeed, as Professor Eddington has observed (Chap. VII. § 6) that "Action" is to afford the clue to the riddle of the "atomicity of matter and the more general atomicity that underlies all quantum phenomena." True, but the explanation belongs to metaphysics, not to symbolic physics. "Matter," of course, was brushed out of our path long ago. It is a name for the element of *resistance* in the sphere of Nature; and there is very much else in the natural order besides this mere result of relation and conflict. A more interesting reflection is this. The related and conflicting agents involved are precisely the minor sentients. Let us add that all the differentiating and dissociative influences operative in the conflict at creation's dawn implicate these self-conserving and mutually resisting sentients in their very numerous grades and on their various strata of action.

Is it needful for us to repeat that "matter," "energy," and "forces," as these concepts function in common sense and popular scientific thought, cannot be treated by metaphysics as constituents of a primitive world? They are inventions, which belong not to the dawn of creation, but to the history of creative human thought.

How does the embryonic system, the harmonious complex present to Divine Imagining as part of Its content, pass from its conservative or stable state into the "corruption"[1] of time-succession or creative evolution with all its imperfections, miseries, and conflicts? We shall reply shortly, but let us first consider certain further features of the system as it exists before the Metaphysical Fall.

§ 2. It is a system which does not merely unfold into our cosmos of the starry heavens and the rest. Creative evolution, with its improvisations not derived solely from the stream of

[1] "Time succession must be called a Corruption of Eternity, just as Becoming is a Corruption of Being" (Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, p. 257). But it is a "corruption" essential to a superb creative achievement.

events, will transform it; sentients innumerable, not without unforeseeable initiatives of their own, will arise in it and modify it. All sorts of novel variations will be worked out: the seeds of variety will become growths that are variable still. But emphatically the system lacks that "homogeneity," or all-alikeness, from which certain sages want to educe everything.[1] The ideal of such simplifiers—tabulation of the fewest assumptions whence the course of the world can be deduced—is interesting, but only with practical ends in view. For simplification, in any theoretically defensible sense, is not to be reached. "The ultimate laws of Nature," observes Mill, "cannot possibly be less numerous than the distinguishable sensations or other feelings of our nature—those, I mean, which are distinguishable from one another in quality, and not merely in quantity or degree." And if there are so many irreducible laws in the field of human experience, what of the expanse of the entire system, which we merely sample? Causal laws, indeed, do not obtain in the stable germinal system, since causation is a principle of the beginning of phenomena; a law of new origins, of creative succession. But the harmonious content-field, which pre-exists to such laws and renders their varied hosts, as evolved later, possible, must needs be very varied itself. It is the field of the primitive imaginals, which differ from one another radically and cannot be simplified by intellectual dodges such as we mortals affect. It comprises the manifold elements by which the creative achievement in the world-process is conditioned: the original plan embodied in the contents themselves as the manner in which they conspire to harmonious unity: the limiting possibilities by which the future sentients will be circumscribed. And its primitive "heterogeneity" must be correspondingly rich.

This initial situation, the stable harmony which expresses a particular form of the variety of the Divine Life, comprises, we agreed, no laws of causal succession, *i.e.* no laws of new origins or beginnings of phenomena. This is to say that we

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 436-9.

are in the sphere of the real primitive existents "independent of causation." Mill refers to such existents in his *Logic*[1] as we had occasion to note before, though his "primitive natural agents," which presuppose space and the sphere of Nature, are at a considerable remove from the level which is interesting us now. He contends that the existence, commingling, and distribution of these agents exemplify no laws or uniformities even of co-existence. A significant conclusion this when we consider for how much these facts count in the world! The real primitive contents of the Germinal System, at a stage when space and nature had not been evolved, are not, however, together by chance; they embody plan or design. Their differences are not fortuitous; their proportions display a divinity of measure; their penetrations conspire to harmony and beauty, though none of these are "causally explicable" as, in the sphere of time-succession, a stone, tree, storm, or socialism is said to be. Take note, however, that even these last things are not fully "explicable" in the manner in which they are held vulgarly to be. No effect flows solely from its antecedent conditions in the time-series; and, as is now evident, even the antecedent conditions themselves presuppose remote conditions "independent of causation" which are not taken into consideration by the vulgar view. Our previous survey of causation is bearing fruit.

§ 3. The Germinal System is the home of imaginals, the *primitive* of these being "independent of causation." What do we mean by imaginals? They are proffered as our version of such truth as belongs to the Platonic theory of the Ideas.[2] They are content-"universals," but have to be distinguished sharply from the intellectualised phantoms which incur the criticisms of the *Parmenides* and Aristotle. We desire to be rid of the "universal" which, as Hegel avers, is "neither seen, nor heard, its existence is the secret known only to the

[1] Bk. III. ch v. § 8, ch. xvi. § 2. For some previous remarks of our own cf. Chap. VI. § 12.

[2] *World as Imagination*, pp. 392-8, 442-4.

mind." The imaginal is not something removed from perception and fancy so that it attains the level, so ardently admired by Hegel, of being "visible only to reflection." Nor, again, is it, as Plato conceived, parted by a gulf from sensible things; nor, most assuredly, is it immune from change. Let us make our position quite clear.

The Germinal System—the harmonious whole which antedates Nature and sentient history—is not a concept, *i.e.* a substitute-fact which stands for, is "of" or "about," a reality *other than itself*. It is itself a reality: imaginal reality which has the concrete richness for which we have to look to perception. We might call it on this account the Grand Imaginal; it is concretely present to Divine Imagining as an orchard, a sea-scape, or Swiss valley might be to some finite experient. The Grand Imaginal is very unlike abstract thinking; and no "ideas," in the sense of the abstract concepts or "universals" of thinking, exist within it. What do exist are aspects of imaginal reality, facts (not concepts "of" anything) which are, or may be, exemplified in multiplicity. These are the imaginals; and they exist, not in solid singleness, but intimately intermingled with one another in the continuity of the embryonic system or Grand Imaginal. And they will be subject to change as later creative improvisations require.

Schopenhauer has discussed the Ideas, as standing midway between his "Will," or ultimate world-principle, and the particulars coming and going in the causal flux.[1] Our world is "nothing but the manifestation of the Ideas in multiplicity." But his Ideas, like Plato's, are immune from change; and there is no way of connecting them clearly with successive and complex events in the flowing of time. Why is changelessness thus exalted at all costs?

Schopenhauer, however, contrasts the Idea usefully with the merely conceptual "universal." The distinction is far too often overlooked. "The *Idea* is the unity that falls into multiplicity . . . the concept, on the contrary, is the unity

[1] *World as Will and Idea*, Haldane and Kemp's transl., i. 219-20, 276, 332-3.

reconstructed out of multiplicity by the abstraction of our reason ; the latter may be defined as *unitas post rem*, the former as *unitas ante rem*." [1] Many of the higher " universals " of philosophical writers are of the class " *post rem*." We shall clarify our thought effectively if we treat the Ideas as imaginals and consider one of these in the regard of a familiar experience, that of colours.

I perceive a red, a blue, a yellow and other colours : these are distinguished within, not " referred to," sensible reality as some writers affirm. Later there is formed the concept of colour ; and we may easily misinterpret the character of this step. We ought not to say, with Russell, that " awareness of universals is called conceiving and a universal of which we are aware is called a concept " ; [2] for what we call the concept, and use in our judgments or propositions, is merely the *unitas post rem*, a poor substitute-fact, even though it is our own. The initial awareness of the " universal " is rather of the nature of perception or intuition. It acquaints us, in a limited sphere, with the *unitas ante rem* ; a unity, however, which is present, along with characteristics exemplifying other imaginals, in all visible objects.

This imaginal is the *unitas ante rem* : the whole of colours, in all their phases, ordered and distributed in the world-system or Grand Imaginal, and present as such to Divine Experience. The term " universal," which we reject, seems banal and even misleading. The term " imaginal " denotes a unitary reality, of multiple members or parts, sustained by Imagining of cosmic range. It seems strictly appropriate. This term could also be used at need to denote " the Idea of the individual " : a whole of many phases, in which Schopenhauer did not believe, but which Plotinus regarded as an eternally distinct existence rooted as deeply as anything can be. Such an imaginal is sure to interest us in the course of the next essay.[3]

[1] *World as Will and Idea*, Haldane and Kemp's transl., i. 303.
[2] *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 212.
[3] It may be well to glance in passing at what seems, to some, a difficulty.

A complete theory of the imaginals ought to draw a distinction between those that are primitive and those which arise creatively during evolution; also between those which seem rooted in reality and those which arise in the phenomenal order only to disappear, perhaps not to be conserved even in what is called by us the past (Chap. VI. § 14). And other distinctions might be emphasised. Plato's theory of the Ideas, the remote ancestor of our doctrine of the imaginals, was stated at first, and inevitably, in a somewhat crude form. Hence the objections to it noted by Plato himself and by Aristotle. Hence Proclus, impatient of the view that all things, having a common name, are formed in the likeness of an Idea, refused to believe in Ideas of evils and of the things of the "instrumental arts." But there is no answering the difficulties raised until we revise radically the principles of metaphysics. And then, in the light of Imagining, conservative and creative, we shall obtain the insight required.

Let us agree at once that very many evolved imaginals have no existence outside the multiple things which exemplify them, here and now. Fly-paper, curling-tongs, powder-puff, and the "bed" and "table" of Plato's *Republic* had assuredly no archetypes of their own in the Initial Situation. They are meeting-points of primitive imaginals, contrived by human initiative. Other imaginals seem to descend, modified creatively, into the time-process. "Natural kinds," like "Animal"

A friend demurred to the reference to the colour-imaginal in *World as Imagination*. The objection was that colours are "vibrations" which only become something more in *brains*. We, on the contrary, credit the entire world-system (or Grand Imaginal) with colour, and are bold enough to believe that even Divine Imagining is not blind! Let me cite C. D. Broad's words again: "We must remember that it is only one particular interpretation of the scientific theory . . . that the vibrations in some sense produce the colour. They may, after all, simply direct our attention to the colour already present in a physical object. The particles of all objects that are really red may vibrate with a certain frequency and the sole function of this may be that it is a factor in causing us to become aware of the redness that is always present in this object" (*Mind*, April 1920, p. 234). In an imaginal world-system the "vibrations" are viewed as accompaniments of the redness existing actually in Nature.

and "Oxygen," parted by insurmountable walls of differences, suggest themselves at once. And some writers, I suppose, would assert the like even of ordinary species. "There is an ideal form," observes Ruskin, "of every herb, flower, and tree; it is that form to which every individual of the species has a tendency to attain, freed from the influence of accident or disease"—that which the painter (as Schopenhauer would agree) tries to reproduce. Bergson, again, speaks of creative changing *in definite directions* as "an effort common to most representatives of the same species, inherent in the genus they bear rather than in their substance alone, an effort thereby assured of being passed on to their descendants." But we are wandering, remember, in a jungle of problems. With every remove from the Initial Situation arise fresh creative complications transforming the imaginals which meet. And the Grand Imaginal itself is changing. Hence the task of framing a complete theory of its subordinate imaginals may prove too difficult for inquirers of our limited powers. These imaginals, penetrating, furthering, hindering, dominating, using, etc., one another are to-day the seats of sentients, ranging from "mentoids" to gods. And this formidable complex action obtains alike in visible and (to us) invisible worlds. We have to content ourselves with fragments of knowledge.

This mention of "sentients" indicates a further field of distinctions. Thus all sorts of conscious powers, some vastly superior to ourselves, are working in Nature, clothed or bodied forth in imaginals. Other such powers are at work in imaginals which show in our History. Between imaginals of this rank and "kinds" or groups of things, like mats, shaving-brushes, and ink-pots, yawns a gulf. Powers, working through an imaginal of the animal world, could create the famous "mutations" in all or most members of a species at once. But you would not expect sentients of that grade to act selectively through an ink-bottle or mat. These things exist to realise ends of no cosmic scope, but of specially human imagining. They are made and endure, only here and now;

and their stability implies no more than that of societies of minor and minimal sentients and of the general world-order on which these latter depend.

Decidedly the original theory of Ideas requires revision and supplementation on a great scale. We can only indicate possibilities here.

§ 4. We now turn to a consideration of equally high interest. If we were fond of merely physical metaphors, we could say that the Initial Situation was one of "equilibrium." But not wishing to use such metaphors in a wrong province, we will state the truth otherwise, citing a passage which suits our intention well. In doing so we shall descry the well-springs of the imaginal dynamic, which takes its rise at the fringe of the primitively stable world-system.

This system "expresses statically an immanent design; the *characters*, *measures*, and *relations* of its imaginals being harmonious. And this original situation limits, though in no inelastic manner, the possibilities which are open to creative process. . . . With respect to measure (which recalls Mill's observations about the mysterious 'proportions' in which the 'co-existences independent of causation' concur) we cannot suppose that *mere* chance prevails here. There is no qualitative content which has not its definite quantity, and this qualitative quantum is what Hegel has discussed *abstractly* in his logic as measure. 'To the Greeks the *divinity of measure*, especially in respect of social morality, was represented by Nemesis. That conception is founded upon a general theory that all human things, riches, honour, and power, as well as joy and pain, have their definite measure, the transgression of which involves ruin and destruction.'[1] There is so much of every sort of quality, beyond which the world tolerates no expansion.[2] We are now discussing the

[1] Wallace's *Logic of Hegel*, "Doctrine of Being," p. 172.

[2] Cf. Plato, *Republic*, bk. viii., Jowett's transl., ". . . an excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite direction; and this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable and animal forms, but above all in forms of government."

situation before the time-process began. But note that, in this Initial Situation, the 'divinity of measure' is of vital moment, *a mark indeed of the immanent divine design.* It is essential to the static harmony. And it is to control very largely the future of the creative process, come what striking improvisations there may. There are bounds set to achievement in the case of any one world-romance: bounds set by its creation lasting only a finite time and bounds due to the limited content-conditions present at its birth. Our 'principle of movement,' as will be seen, is not a magician able to construct novelties out of a void. It improvises, like Shakespeare among ourselves, on a basis of given conditions which impose genuine, though elastic, restrictions on creative power." [1]

The "equilibrium" of the Initial Situation is thus a spiritual harmony, characterised by the divinity of measure. It is interpreted amiss, if we think of it in a mechanistic way; hence terms like "balance," "equipoise," "adjustment," "compensation," "equilibration," "unbalanced," etc., convenient in discussing this harmony, its violations and re-establishments, must be used with discretion. The harmony, being a case of unimpeded activity or consciring, of ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας, is attended with pleasure. It is conflict, we shall see, supervening on this primal harmony or "equilibrium," that ushers in creative evolution; a long-drawn-out, indefinitely complicated series of disturbances of, and returns toward, a state of stability; these alternations repeating, as it were, *within* the creative time-process the great-scale alternation of conservative and creative phases which characterises the career of the system. Now within the time-process harmony, with no qualitative contents in defect or excess, is never fully attained; hence the unrest of the causal dynamic which is to continue, in general and in detail, until a new and fully harmonious state of the entire system—"the divine event"—is reached. This "divine event" may be regarded

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 445-50, "Immanent Design and the Initial Situation."

as the *imaginal solution* of the conflict which broke the primal harmony; and in attaining it, the system has passed through the vicissitudes of an extremely fruitful cosmic adventure. Each re-approximation, in general and in detail, to harmony within this adventure calls for imaginal creation, such as we considered when inquiring into the nature of causation. Causation, even as exemplified in my voluntary decisions, issues in comparatively stable imaginal solutions of conflict; in new equilibria, if you like the term, which, however, may themselves conflict with the decisions of others or with yet wider activities, in which case further creative harmonisation is required. It is in the interests of the cosmic adventure, at any rate on its lower levels, that a paradise, a state of joy not to be disturbed from within or without, is never to be found. Is the reason so far to seek? It has been said that the most contented peoples are the semi-barbarous. They are nearest to a stable paradise. And, being nearest, they show the defect of their quality; they are kept out of the stream of changeful progress. The pain of the imaginal dynamic is more potent a prompting to creation than is joy. Conservation is the *mot d'ordre* of the happy sentient. And those who discuss pessimism will do well to credit this truth with its full importance. God says to Mephistopheles in *Faust*:

> Man's efforts lightly flag, and seek too low a level.
> Soon doth he pine for all-untrammelled sloth,
> Wherefore a mate I give him, nothing loth,
> Who spurs and shapes and must create though Devil.[1]

The original harmony, once broken, tries to reassert itself, even in the heart of the time-process. We note this in the tendency of every physical system, a portion of Nature of which we are aware from the outside, to attain an "equilibrium" or stable state, only to be disturbed by agencies in its surround. Suppose that this stable state is disturbed. "There will ensue a series of changes which, in the absence of further interference from without, will terminate in recovered stability. These

[1] A. G. Latham's translation.

changes will partly consist in readjustments within the system and partly in readjustment to environing conditions. But whatever share the environment may take in it, the process is self-determining in so far as it follows on loss of balance and is directed towards recovery of balance . . . So long as the end is not attained, the process goes on spontaneously ; when it is attained, the process ceases. In so far as equilibration involves interaction with environing matter, there is scope for what we have called indirect self-determination. In living bodies equilibrium depends on certain specific processes of this nature. Vital function is perpetually sustained by interaction between organism and environment, and this interaction, so far as the organism takes part in it, is itself the discharge of vital function." [1] Let us add, that, on penetrating below surface-phenomena, we find the " interaction " to be such that mechanistic categories are unsatisfactory. Equilibration masks the reattainment by a psychical complex of psychical harmony. Perhaps the following citation will prove helpful in illustrating this point. It serves, further, to interpret on our lines an important class of phenomena to which the symbology of " energy " has been applied.

" The plant-body, which can build from what comes to it with the chemical agents, water, carbonic acid and ammoniacal salts, is, in the main, a storer of ' energy,' *i.e.* it relates psychical existents complexly, so that, in breaking away later from their complexes, they do things which can, also, subserve an overruling life. *Sic vos non vobis !* The animal-body, assimilating plants or the tissues of other animals or both, utilises these break-aways and ' degrades ' energy, as the phrase goes, therewith. It is a place of oxidation. And oxidation for the psychical existents concerned is *a move toward a state of restful combination—toward a more or less harmonious situation which reduces the possibilities of further change.* We see in this descent to the simpler compounds how the animal body works. It realises its quasi-purposive

[1] Stout, *Analytical Psychology*, i. 149-50.

life by letting the minor sentients follow, with a certain overruling direction, their bents, and its utilisation of them is limited by the limited number of obstacles which lie between their complex combinations and a state of relative rest. The stimuli, on which 'energy' is released, are all at bottom psychical, and every action of a natural agent is a varying towards harmony explicable in terms of psychics." [1]

The species of animals and plants, as well as the stable organic structures and functions, which further their persistence, illustrate comparative "equilibria" or conservative stabilisations. But the mechanistic symbolism, which works so conveniently in discussions about lower levels of Nature, is less helpful in the sphere of biology. Thus the "interaction," during which organisms evolve, as we say, arrangements such as the eye, reveals what Bergson very properly calls the "solution of problems"; or, as we affirm, creative imaginal invention which reaches stable results through difficulties.[2] Hence materialist theory, shambling across the stage of knowledge, fails absurdly in biological inquiries. Only those with prejudices to save can respect it. If now we pass to the sphere of human sentients [3] and their societies, we shall note this tendency to "equilibration" once more. But "equilibration" has now, perforce, to be interpreted in terms of psychics; of an imaginal dynamic which moves through disturbances to harmonisation, creatively achieved. In this sphere either conservation or creation may prevail to excess. The conservation of habits, of the individual, group, or nation, is often malign. The patriarchal folk of the grasslands reached a harmony with their surrounds too easily and too securely: the promise of evolution for them was therefore poor. "Viewed from the social standpoint, Chinese contentedness (involving

[1] *World as Imagination*, p. 536.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 544-5.

[3] The neural accompaniments of human consciring resemble physical systems in general. "What in its physical aspect we call the direction of mental activity towards an end, is, on the physiological side, the tendency of disturbed neural arrangements to equilibrium" (Stout).

approximate harmony with the surround) is the antithesis of progress and interdicts it." [1] A satisfactory blending of conservation and creation was that marking the birth of the ancient Greek civilisation.[2] The European nations, whose " equilibrium " was disturbed from without by the Great War, tend, so far, toward excess of creation, of revolutionary innovation, and incur corresponding risks. But were not unrest general, harmonisation of conflicts and social progress would be lacking. Harmonisation in this quarter flows obviously from creative imagining. " Ideals, once they have taken firm possession of the national mind, are the guiding motives, the permanent forces, the lodestars of nations. The whole French revolution is contained in Rousseau. The whole English free trade policy in Adam Smith. English radicalism is contained in Bentham and Mill." [3] Notable conflicts marked the imaginal dynamic during the realisation of these particular ideals. They were experimental, but proved, on the whole, of signal worth. Fervid emotions, such as attend conflict and its attendant pains, support the realisation.

A similar movement to " equilibration " or harmonisation obtains in the case of the intellectual life. " The stimulus to the function of thought must be sought in a situation in which the elements conflict, in a state of reciprocal tension, which would lead to the dissociation of experience, were the reorganising work of reflective thought not to intervene and re-establish the equilibrium of the system, causing distinctions to arise in the heart of the primitive non-differentiated totality. In the work of restoration and reintegration (redefinition, re-relation) lies the whole meaning of the logical function, whose antecedent is therefore always to be found in a conflict between the various parts of the world of physical, social, or intellectual experience. This situation, which constitutes the starting-point, with its tensional elements remains some-

[1] A. H. Smith, *Chinese Characteristics*, p. 165.
[2] Cf. Chap. VI. § 5.
[3] Dr. Sarolea, *The Anglo-German Problem*, p. 149.

thing objective, but is, inasmuch as it sets thought a problem, suggestive of the subjective phases of another system, that is, which at present appears to us to be the more or less uncertain solution of the conflict." [1] In our present essay the theoretic function, which is a makeshift, solves its problem best by reaching a " solution " which favours a maximal economy of future effort. But, in the case of philosophy, the economy must be compatible with some grasp of reality itself.

Avenarius called the initial disturbance of equilibrium the " vital difference " and the process of recovering it the " vital series." These vague phrases serve to hide from us the actual imaginal dynamic concerned. Is the achieving of harmony, after the initial disturbance of the Minoan civilisation, understood the better by being called a " vital series " ? Is the restoration of the balance of exports and imports in a country's international trade, the production of water, protoplasm, an eye, " Adonais " or a State made clear to us thereby ? Or was Avenarius, like Bergson with his similarly vague " Vital Impulse," unable to see what, in some quarters, stares him in the face ?

When my blood is not properly oxygenated, the " divinity of measure," needful to the well-being of the body, is menaced : the conspiring of minor sentients in the medulla is quickened and actions ensue which tend to restore harmony. The world at large is the place of harmonising compensations of this sort : describable not as " vital series," but as changes in an imaginal whole moving towards harmony ; a whole which, despite the incessant disturbances incidental to creation, preserves, in the highest degree possible, the " divinity of measure." A simple, but quite remarkable, case is that of the conservation, amid creative change, of the proportions of the constituents of air. A mere trace of CO_2, of approximately uniform quantity, is found in this air ; and yet on this trace depends, directly and indirectly, terrestrial life such as interests the biologist.

[1] Aliotta on Dewey's pragmatism, *Idealistic Reaction against Science*, Eng. trans., p. 177.

Let us suggest that the balancing of the natural agents is none the less impressive because it is secured, in the main, in what we call "natural ways." [1] In this, indeed, consists part of the miracle of the cosmic order. The disturbances, which break harmony, at once set in motion agencies which conspire to reinstate it. And this power of recovering from disturbance reveals, in very satisfactory fashion, the sanity of the dynamic that works at the heart of the world.

We have now said all that, not being witnesses, we can say usefully about the world-system or Grand Imaginal as it existed before the Metaphysical Fall: the fall into the processes of creative or evolutionary change. And, for the most part, conformably with our undertaking, we have limited ourselves to considering the general manner in which its content can be supposed to exist. Questions relating to god and the higher sentients have been ignored. This was, perhaps, a necessity of procedure. But, philosophically speaking, these questions are of very great importance. And there are religionists, who, from their special points of view, would welcome discussion of a power less remote from them than seems Divine Imagining. This attitude is intelligible and indeed timely. We shall have to reckon with it as soon as the fundamental problem, propounded by the evolution of the world-system, has been solved.

[1] *I.e.* by way of those actions of minor sentients, the constancy of which enables science to frame laws about the surface-phenomena of Nature. But "in the main" is important.

CHAPTER IX

THE EVOLUTION OF NATURE

"Nature, in a fashion whose details are still only faintly hinted to us men, constitutes a vast society."—ROYCE.

"If then . . . any given physical process, as we know it, is also a mode of enjoyment, it may be urged that there are qualitatively different modes of enjoyment in vapour, in liquid, and in solid; and that there is a specific water-enjoyment, as contrasted with an oxygen or hydrogen enjoyment."—Prof. LLOYD-MORGAN.

> "Concordes animae nunc et dum nocte premuntur,
> Heu quantum inter se bellum si lumina vitae
> Attigerint, quantas acies stragemque ciebunt!"
>
> VIRGIL.

"They made the earth of Ymir's body, the sea of his sweat, the hills of his bones, and the trees of his curly hair. Of his skull they made the firmament, and of his brain the clouds which float below. Then out of the giant's eyebrows the gods formed Midgard (Middle-garden), the dwelling-place of the children of men, who yet unborn slept in the lap of time."—*Asgard and the Gods.*[1]

§ 1. NATURE, like other aspects of the world-system, presupposes Divine Imagining, but its standing is by no means obvious at first. As known from the outside by mere human experients, it enters perception in condensed, abbreviated, and very defective forms, sufficiently rich in content, withal, to guide our actions. The sun and a grain of sand conceal indefinitely more than they reveal. Considered, however, as a phase of the world-system, Nature, even at this instant, is

[1] Adapted from the work of Dr. W. Wägner by M. W. Macdowall and edited by W. S. W. Anson.

a radiant splendour; the "disorganised immortal" of Blake, wonderful indeed, and yet giving birth to "screaming shapes" and "Urizen's army of horrors," included in which are the creatures "who reptilise on the earth." Blake has sighted the "immortal" in the disarray of the Metaphysical Fall; in what F. C. S. Schiller has called the "corruption" of Being in the time-process. This corruption, seen by us as through a glass darkly, shows very much, however, in which an artist can take joy, and is even welcome, if believed to be the mark of creation in travail. It may be that the "army of horrors" will be demobilised, and that in a remote future will dawn the reign of beauty and joy. Vindication of the natural order is not to be achieved here and now; it must be looked for in the reality which may declare itself in the divine event.

The perceptions, in which many descry a mechanical Nature, are outward and visible signs of divine imaginal process, aglow with sentients which, on its higher levels, pursue definite ends and, on its lower, are sunk in almost blind appetitive action. Modern writers have accustomed us to the view that *social concepts*, as Royce puts it so excellently, are applicable "to the interpretation of the inner life of Nature." Society shows us a "type of unity in variety, and of variety recalling us always to the recognition of unity." The valley of dry bones, which pleases the mere mathematician, is restored to life. In all quarters which thrust content on to us and feed perception, the actions are those of sentients of different grades. Nature might be likened to that "intelligible world" of Plotinus which "may be presented to imagination as a living sphere figured over with every kind of living countenance"; [1] or, again, to a psychical stream, every drop of which is an eye. But this is the Nature on which we are gazing in May 1920, not the Nature which issued from the world-system or Grand Imaginal at creation's dawn. To fathom the mystery of the beginning we must go even deeper. These minor sentients—the higher are not yet in question—did

[1] T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*, 2nd ed., p. 63.

not exist in the harmonious unity of the world-system, as it pre-existed to the Metaphysical Fall. What, then, are the standing and meaning of Nature, and how came Blake's "immortal" to be "disorganised" and corrupted in the Becoming?

§ 2. Bergson has suggested that the natural order arises from "detension." Cosmic consciousness, inverting its original tension, "creates at once extension in space and the admirable order that mathematics finds there." This inversion implies a "*diminution* of positive reality," comparable to a deficiency of will. A man, reading a poem, relaxes his attention. His undivided action ceasing, the poem loses its wholeness and dissolves into broken particulars. Thus from "negative direction of relaxation" arise order and complexity of details.[1] We are supposing, on the contrary, that evolution of the natural order implies an increase of positive reality. And we deal with the general problem involved as follows.

§ 3. Nature feeds our perceptions, is that part of the world whose contents become, in a special sense, the regions of the minor sentients, such as are masked by soil, rocks, trees, clouds, grass, rivers, and other familiar objects of sense. But the content of which these things are made is, after all, only transformed sub-imaginals of the primitive Grand Imaginal, just as is the content which we regard as characteristic of animals and ourselves, so that the division between Nature-contents and contents of other parts of the world is somewhat artificial. Contents and the areas of consciring, or sentients, exhaust nameable reality in every quarter; and their fundamental resemblances override their differences. Nature, however, displays the insulation of the world-system in its most pronounced form. Not only is it "other than" the residual content of Divine Imagining, but within itself it shows that tendency of its parts to exist outside one another, which has been called "self-externality." Nature begins with the appulse to change, the creative appulse about to be discussed;

[1] Cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 453-8, for a criticism of this concept of "detension."

with the birth of real time-succession and the surprising differentiation and opposition that this entails. It is thus at that extreme where the " budding-off " of the creative world-system is most marked. " The descent of this nascent world into the storms of conflicting multiplicity, the unrest of change, is the genuine Metaphysical Fall ; the price of a new creative episode. ' Universe ' seems almost to have passed into ' multiverse ' . . . one part of Nature becomes more or less *exclusive* of another, though loss of continuity can never, it is true, be quite complete. It is a misconception of this self-externality which lends such support to the mechanistic hypotheses of reality." [1] Having now made clear to ourselves what we mean by Nature, let us endeavour to understand how Nature began.

Divine Imagining conserves actively the static harmony of the Grand Imaginal or world-system : conscires it, shall we say, as *ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας*. Though the system thus conserved is harmonious, it comprises a manifold ; the many related imaginals and their many immanent differences. Note well that it is a system of content only. Let us now liken it to a beautiful poem whose parts some gifted mortal imagines as present simultaneously, much as Mozart used to hear musical compositions in their undivided completeness. Let us suppose, further, that the poem comprises numerous characters like the *Odyssey* which is the home of Circe, the Cyclops, Nausicaa, etc. These characters are present to the poet, but they are not, for that, more than imagined contents ; they are things of which he is conscious, but which are not conscious of him. However clearly he is aware of an undine, it does not follow that the undine, imaginatively created, is aware of her creator. She remains, in this sense, content : present only to his consciring. All the characters in this poem remain, of course, docile creatures of the poet, wholly under his control. The poem, moreover, though it comprises successions, endures as a whole, just as it was imagined at first. Even so endures the poem of the Grand Imaginal within Divine

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 409-10.

Imagining. Its different aspects are contents subordinate to their whole : are not more or less independent *agents* which may be opposed. Divine Imagining enjoys a splendour which is utterly under Its control. Creative time-succession, with its multiple agents or sentients, is unborn.

The Duchesse d'Abrantès said of Napoleon's minions, after the return from Elba, " Ces hommes n'étaient pas les siens, ils étaient eux-mêmes." With the birth of the sentients Divine Imagining surrenders in part Its control. The sentients are not wholly Its, but also " eux-mêmes " ! And on this depend strange developments.

Conceive now the characters (which answer to content-differences in the Grand Imaginal) of the poem as coming to exist *for themselves*, as sentients, as areas of consciring, " eux-mêmes " in their own right, thus *detaching themselves* in a manner from the poet and compromising the former enduring harmony of his work. The poem, shaped by the new initiatives and freed in part from central control, is launched on a career of change. This concept serves well to illuminate our account of the beginning. The Grand Imaginal, which was itself a thing of beauty that just endured, in becoming a region of innumerable sentients, all in their degrees centres of creative imagining, passes into the phase of disturbances and local initiatives. The birth of the sentients is the " original sin," if you like the phrase ; but it is a falling away from harmony rendered possible only by a great abdication. For in the region of the world-system Divine Imagining divides Itself in part into insulated sentients ; and the shadows of evil lengthen with the coming of strife. The primitive " equilibrium " has been lost ; it will be restored fully only with the redemption of the world.

Why this abdication ? Could not Divine Imagining enjoy Its creations without making them the places of our weal and woe, could It not have evolved a world-order, innocent of finite sentients ? To suppose so would be to forget Its aspect of Delight, Love, and Beauty (Chap. V. § 2) ; to lose

sight of the truth that the most perfect creations of content rank below the possibilities of conscious lives. It is in these conscious lives that creation attains its triumph. Nay, it is in and through them alone that very much of the variety, woven by imagining, is possible.[1] Needless to labour this almost obvious point. The parts on the stage of life must be played by actual sentients, if variety is to blossom to the full. A German philosopher has said that the question as to *why* and *how* the world came to pass cannot be answered. Is the "why" so entirely obscure? True, we cannot suppose that deliberation and choice were concerned: deliberation, we saw, is a secondary phenomenon within a world, and one necessary to ignorance and weakness alone. But if we say that Imagining, as we have described It, creates as a lark sings, have we not returned an adequate answer? And the "how," again, does not seem to be delaying us at all.

The Creative Appulse

§ 4. The activity which conserves the harmonious Initial Situation is also the activity which is to disturb it. For the degree of this activity is not fixed. The activity, recall this well, is CONSCIRING—the active aspect, as we saw, of Divine Imagining. There is, let us allow frankly, a riddle of the Sphinx unanswered in this quarter. All of us are "conscious energy" and aware of what we are up to a point, but none of us has reached the level at which consciring reveals

[1] The following illustration of this truth is worth citing. "To a being whose experiences never passed through the transitions which ours undergo—first divested of the strength and vividness of impressions, again reinvested with them and brought back from the faint world of ideas—the sharp contrasts of 'now' and 'then,' and all the manifold emotions they occasion, would be quite unknown. Even we, so far as we confine our activity and attention to ideas, are almost without them . . . the present alone and life in a succession of presents, or, in other words, continuous occupation with impressions, can give us no knowledge of the present as present. This we first obtain when our present consciousness consists partly of memories or partly of expectations as well" (Ward, *Psychological Principles*, p. 210).

fully its secret. What is called "attention" is a form of consciring, but those, like Ward, who have emphasised it most, hold also that it is not presented, or, as we should prefer to say, not fully present to itself. Consciring remains thus in part an enigma. But, in so far as it shines for us at all, it shines in its own light. What we know of it directly is not inconsiderable and it is final. Hence consciring, when regarded as furnishing the Appulse to Change, is in no sense an *ignotius* by which an *ignotum* is explained.

The harmony of different contents in the Grand Imaginal endures conservatively. But suppose the sustaining activity—the consciring—increased. The intensities of the contents and of special regions of these contents are increased therewith. *The intensities increase until "thresholds" of consciousness are reached.* And now the regions of content are no longer differences contributory to, and absorbed in, a total imaginal *content*. They are raised to the level of *sentients*; of psychical agents whose "sciring" insulates them in a manner within the parent system. The Many, immanent in the Grand Imaginal, but subordinated before as mere content-aspects of a total content, now have their turn. They cease to be mere differences, of which Divine Imagining is conscious, and become *discrete centres* in the hitherto unbroken world-system. They are the "primitive natural agents," the very remote ancestors of those mentioned by Mill. And in them is sunk a portion of the consciring which sustained the original system.

When I "attend to," or conscire focally, a presentation, I increase its intensity. But before I can attend to it, it must possess an intensity of its own; the intensity which expresses consciring of sources beyond my sphere—divine consciring and that of the centres, major, minor, and minimal, in which it is continued. Were this wider consciring to fail, I should have nothing to "attend to" at all. My objects would vanish and leave not a rack behind. The consciring, which is expressed in intensities of these objects, is the same power which, at

creation's dawn, raised intensities above the "thresholds" so that subordinate sciring began.

Writing of the "threshold" in connexion with human and animal sentients, Fechner observes (*On Life After Death*): "Consciousness is extinguished whenever the bodily activity, on which it depends, sinks below a certain degree of strength called the threshold. The more extended this activity, the more it will be weakened and the more easily it will sink below the threshold. There is such a threshold for our consciousness as a whole—the limit between sleeping and waking—and a particular one for every particular sphere of the mind. Hence, in the waking state, the one or the other idea will rise up or sink in our mind, according as the particular activity on which it depends rises above, or sinks below, its respective threshold." Complications, the consideration of which is foreign to this essay, invest the problem of human consciring. But we can point out one very interesting and fruitful consideration at once. We are now in a position to understand the essential meaning of death. What did the birth of the primitive natural agents or sentients express? The universal consciring, which having sustained contents of stable intensities, raised them to that intensity-level whereat they are "scious" or conscious themselves. What would be the death of the contents thus raised to the level of agents or sentients? Their return, whether redistributed or not, to the level of mere content. Consider, then, the case of the human sentient. What is called his soul is a content-complex which, when he is "alive," is not merely content, but conscires. At death it ceases temporarily to conscire and returns to the level of mere content—that of something present to divine consciring and its continuing centres. A renewed conscious life after death presupposes the "degree of strength" requisite to a new "threshold." Thus the career of a soul, which may require a series of changing organisms, is only at intervals a conscious one. A conservative influence holds sway still. The archaic state of mere content tends to be repeated; and this repetition,

however transitory, is death.[1] It is only gradually that a permanently conscious life can be attained; an achievement, indeed, hardly contemplated by most petty sentients like ourselves.

"Thresholds" are among the disregarded wonders of our world-system. And, while they remind us of our present dependence, they secure us also from untold possibilities of evil. There is a limit to the suffering which any sentient can undergo: he or his organism will refuse to tolerate persistently excessive pain. The cosmic adventure is one of limited liability after all.

The primitive natural agents, avant-couriers of the legions of finite centres yet to appear, are below the level even of the "mentoids" (electrons) of Professor Larkin. Centres of immediate experience, of very brief time-span, and seats of pleasurable and painful feeling, they must lack, nevertheless, most of the characteristics which we, more advanced sentients, connect with the concept of mind. But they have surely complex aspects; each of them exemplifying many imaginals and each being aware of a minimal region of the world-system. How are their regions delimited? These may express a phase of the immanent design. Psychologists refer us to discrete acts of "attention" within our wider human "attention"; we can suppose like discrete acts of consciring, conservative or creative, within the wider consciring that sustains the world-system.[2] The regions, which are to become sentient, may be primitive, but, on the other hand, they may be creatively improvised. Who shall say?

[1] Experiments go to show that our awareness or consciring, even during workaday waking life, is never unbroken, but intermittent, arising and ceasing incessantly. This depends proximately and in part on the minor sentients related in the complexes of the brain, but it illustrates the same basic repetition exemplified more impressively in death.

[2] Cf. Ward, *Psychological Principles*, p. 72, a "plurality of presentations to which attention is directed—or on which it is concentrated—thereby tends to become a unity, to be more or less definitely 'synthesised' or 'integrated' as one 'situation' or one complex whole of some sort." "Attention" is a form of consciring, as noted in human experience. But observe the delimiting possible even in this sphere.

Aliotta has asked how it is that such sentients do not become reciprocally transparent and fuse. The answer is, perhaps, to be found in this. These sentients are not directly related: they exist, are at once united and kept apart, in a setting which is still merely content for Divine Imagining. It is possible, as we know, for two co-conscious experients to be allied with the same human brain. So long as they are insulated by their setting, they remain two, but, if the cerebral insulation breaks down, they become confluent. If now we consider the complex which is symbolised as an "atom" and treated as a system of "electrons," the latter are not in any way crowded; and the suggestion is that they are indirectly related.[1] And the constituents of the "electron" are probably indirectly related as well. In the connective tissue, which unites and separates these complexes and members of complexes, we have a content-field present to Divine Imagining; a continuum in virtue of which:

> thou can'st not stir a flower
> Without troubling of a star.

We may regard this continuum as territory which Divine Imagining did not cede to the new sentients when the great abdication came to pass. It is such as to connect the members of the world-system and, also, to detach or insulate this system from others. In this way the evils of the system are carried, so to speak, by its own sentients and compromise nothing beyond them. And a man, in disposing of a bath bun, is not in the embarrassing situation, overlooked by some forms of idealism, of eating the divine—he is merely part of a change taking place within an undivine, fallen and "encysted" world. With this reply are answered many questions.

Aliotta[2] urges further that, if the sentients interact, they

[1] "If an electron is depicted as a speck one-hundredth of an inch in diameter . . . the space available for the few hundred or thousand of such constituent dots to disport themselves inside an atom is comparable to a hundred-feet cube" (Sir O. Lodge, *Electrons*, p. 201).

[2] *Idealistic Reaction against Science*, p. 427, Eng. transl.

cease to be merely "minds" and become "bodies as well"; "their activity would not be merely psychical, but would partake of the physical as well. Thus instead of simplifying the problem of matter, we should clearly have rendered it more complicated, since, while we should still have to explain the nature of matter as a system of bodies, we should also have to ascertain the nature of the psychical life of these monads. The consciousness which we might reasonably ascribe to them would be too rudimentary to afford us an explanation of the intricacy and rational co-ordination of their actions." We have dealt with this problem, though in another connexion, before. Aliotta's difficulty springs from the perennial confusion, so often noted, between conscious and content. The sentients *are* "bodies as well," in the sense that their contents are present not merely to them, but belong to the "body" or content-field of the entire world-system. Nay more, if the intensities of these contents were to sink below the respective "thresholds," the sentients would cease to be, but the contents, at lower levels of intensity, would remain. The simile of the sparks and the burnt, black sheet of paper (Chap. VI. § 3) is relevant once more. The sheet does not presuppose the sparks that traverse it.

The sentients interact in an environment which is not the less "real" in that it is a psychical one. "Bodies" in the world-system are not matter, as we have insisted *ad nauseam*. They are concrete psychical complexes, as real as any "realist" could desire, present to Divine Imagining. And the actions of the "bodies" in this system are not "co-ordinated" by the sentients of its lowest levels. They are "co-ordinated," despite disturbances violating the initial harmony, by Divine Imagining and Its continuing superior powers. The principle, so-called, of the "heterogony of ends" is worth citing here.[1]

[1] This asserts that the end attained objectively tends to realise more than the end which the sentient originally has in view. This generalisation was made by Wundt, but the notion conveyed is familiar to students of Hegel, who speaks even of the "cunning" of the *Idea* in using sentients.

What the lower sentients help to bring to pass collectively is not what they are striving for as units. To suppose, for instance, that astronomic regularities are due solely to the lower sentients, masked by nature, would be absurd. As well credit the sentients, masked by my pen and hand, with the composition of this essay.

Sentients on the animal and human levels appear in the time-process aeons after the birth of the primitive natural agents. In the idealism of Royce human life is regarded as a "differentiation" from the larger life of Nature, which, again, is psychical throughout.[1] Royce did not believe that Nature began. We do; and we have to suggest that the roots of human sentients lie far back among primitive imaginals that pre-existed to the Metaphysical Fall. Plotinus held that every individual has his "ideal form" (what we should call his special imaginal), rooted in "Universal Mind." And Plato in the *Phaedrus* refers to the harmonious state ere souls fell into the world of change and were entombed in bodies. Theirs then was the ecstatic joy of knowing the Ideas. But we have to go very warily. "Several bodies might be organs to a higher unknown soul," as Bradley has remarked; and the roots of present empirical individuals might not have been all distinct. Further, the supposition that the roots were conscious, and not mere regions of content, seems disputable. But we can only glance at such issues here, taking leave of them with a warning. When we come to discuss the riddle of souls, do not let us suppose that the solution is going to be a simple one. The contents of the human soul come from many quarters; very different influences and levels conspire to its evolution. The "waiting conditions," which we emphasised in our account of causation (Chap. VI. § 8), complicate the obvious conditions which empirical psychologists find forced on their notice and to which, therefore, they are apt to assign undue weight.

The so-called "fiat," by which a decision of mine issues

[1] *World and the Individual*, 2nd Series, p. 236.

in realising action, may seem to resemble—at a distance—the consciring which issues in the primitive natural agents. But the resemblance of ideo-motor activity, such as it is, is closer. For there is no preludial conflict of motives in the case of the cosmic "fiat"; it creates, in fact, as the lark sings. What, however, is worth notice is that the "concentrated attention" of the "fiat" is consciring and that the realising action is just the continuation of this.

§ 5. With the birth of the primitive natural agents or sentients creation dawns. Time-succession begins with the changing of contents. And the imaginal dynamic begins with it. The different contents, present to the different sentients within the Grand Imaginal, are no longer at peace. The divinity of measure, the primitive harmony or "equilibrium," has been lost. The quickening of these contents quickens also their interpenetrations, their mutual invasions or interminglings in the continuum of the Grand Imaginal. From being *different* they become—and it is part of the immanent design that they shall become—in part *opposed*, incompatible, or mutually destructive. At this stage we are reminded of Hegel's saying that contradiction "moves the world." But not to marked profit. For, in the first place, contradiction is only a minor phase of conflict between statements, as its etymology implies. The truth of statement A excludes or contradicts that of B. But conflict again (*πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ*, said Heracleitus), is not in itself a principle of fecundity. It is preludial to harmonising innovation. "And this innovation once more is the work of the creative imagining *which responds to the discordant situations with fresh content*; the so-called *transformations* of the world-process. At once the true 'principle of movement,' the imaginal principle, is revealed to us. Given a situation of inner discords, transformation is the resource which serves to reduce the discords, as much as is possible, to harmony. But the reduction, again, produces a new situation which becomes in its turn the seat of inner discords, which tend to increase, whereupon is created a fresh transformation equally pro-

visional. *The world-process is thus forced along the path of imaginal or creative evolution.*" [1] The innovations arise in Divine Imagining and in the new sentients or areas of consciring, conservative and creative. At the outset transformation in the direction of harmony proceeds apace; conflicts are used to subserve world-building; and the sentients, not intelligent in the human sense of the term, are, in fact, instruments under more or less complete central control. One is reminded of what occurs in a much later stage of evolution; of the "chaos" of collisions which takes place in liquids and gases, the "mad rushing hither and thither of an altogether disconnected swarm of molecules moving in every direction at once";[2] a tumult, however, which exemplifies, withal, approximately stable laws. But with the coming of higher orders of sentients, creating by birthright of imaginal freedom, the central control of the world weakens and concurs with that "irrationality" which dismays panlogism. We may, we must, regret the resulting infernos. But the consciring, sunk in the world-system and dissipated in finite areas, creates still and it creates in large part amiss.

Any content, in acquiring intensity, tends also to overflow into content beyond itself. And it may overflow into a region or regions beyond that of the sentient where it is first. "A toothache, as it becomes sharper, influences my whole conscious present; a rising emotion spreads itself into my gestures, physical action, and beyond. The emotions of sullen men stream forth at last into the French Revolution. Taine held that in the sphere of thinking every idea tends to grow into an illusion or hallucination, and each is kept from doing so *by collision with opposite ones*, and thus 'something like sanity is preserved by an equilibrium or balance between many lunacies.' In the sequel of the primitive struggle, which we observe in Nature to-day, everything is seen to press on something else which limits it. Even the nations themselves continue the pressure one against another, often

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 463-4. [2] Professor Soddy.

becoming incompatible at a certain point of space and time; an *impasse* of discords met all too frequently by a 'solution' enforced by war." [1]

The interpenetrating contents insist on themselves, but existing within the Grand Imaginal, which is finite, they expand excessively and tend to collide. We can appreciate now the rôle of conflict and that of the transformations supervening on it. Unrest and creative novelty are secured. But conservation is also present. Hence there arise new, but also stable, connexions of content in those laws of change which we call "causal"; all of which refer us to the behaviour of active sentients within the Grand Imaginal, which is now generating the first stages of the processes of Nature. The seeming fatality of Nature, as Ravaisson urged, grew out of originally free action repeated; and what is habitual, let us add, at this moment will not remain so when a new direction of cosmic activity shall be required.[2] Causation belongs to the creative interval between the loss of harmony ("equilibrium") by a world-system and its restoration. It combines conservation and creation in all instances said to exemplify it; is no dark necessity of unrest, but the pulses of an imaginal dynamic making for beauty and harmony. The Whole, *i.e.* the Grand Imaginal or world-system, in being stabilised, exercises a pressure on every subordinate system within it. Here are the "mills" that grind so slowly, but will grind, despite all opposition, till their work is done.

The imaginals, which meet in all contents present to sentients, provide a core of comparative stability. But they are themselves changeable as the life of the whole requires.

Extraordinary attempts have been made to evade recogni-

[1] *World as Imagination*, p. 466.

[2] Royce (*World and the Individual*, 2nd Series, p. 220) urges that the processes of our conscious communication resemble those "vast and pervasive" series of natural processes classed as wave-movements by science. "In both cases the tendency is one towards *the mutual assimilation of the regions of Nature involved* in the process. In both cases the process of communication has, in general, an at least partially irreversible character." Note the continuance of the primeval aggressions of content.

tion of the pervasiveness of creative change. Some we have criticised. Herbart's monads or "reals" mark a further attempt of the sort. Substituted for our lower sentients, they have only self-conservative acts to build with. "Reals," however, on our human level, are so obviously creative that Herbart's suggestion is discredited at the outset and we return to the variety of the natural order with profit. We are driven to some form of Imaginism in sheer respect for the facts.

With the evolution of Nature the Grand Imaginal, initially varied and complex, is launched on an adventure which is making it more varied and complex still. As more and higher imaginals and sentients show in the time-process, the complications of creation, the so-called "derivative" uniformities of succession, multiply in every quarter. And, emergent from the imaginal dynamic, dawns Space. Space is that order "in which the livened *in*tensity of differents within the [Grand] Imaginal becomes *ex*tensity properly so-called. Space, concrete space, is an *invention* by means of which differents, not harmonised by being altered, *i.e.* still maintaining contrary characters, are rendered, in Leibnitzian language, 'compossible.'"[1] Space is not, as in the Kantian subjective idealism, a mere form of finite experience, nor, again, is it an entity which could exist by itself without being a form of anything; it is just a manner (or manners) in which certain different qualitative contents occupy together the field of the world-system or Grand Imaginal. It is a form into which simultaneously existing and conflicting differents are forced; an imaginal transformation, whereby the simultaneity of warring incompatibles becomes their full-blown externality to one another; their *co-existence* as differents having different positions.[2] The combination of continuity and "looseness" in Nature is now

[1] *World as Imagination*, p. 474.

[2] Thus primitive space (or spaces) is (or are) secondary to those qualitative contents which are said often to be related "in it" (or "in them."). We are concerned with cosmic space or spaces. The abstract space or spaces of commonsense and some mathematicians are not in question, being very recent inventions belonging to the history of human thought.

fully provided for; of continuity, since the differents still belong to the same content-field; of "looseness," since they acquire a comparative independence within it. Movement, for instance, is now possible; and many moving objects strike the mind as being almost *imperia in imperio*.

There is, however, another possible interpretation of space which we might entertain seriously. It is to the effect that space is not originated within the time-process, but that, in some manner, it pre-existed germinally in the Grand Imaginal. So far we have regarded it as an imaginally-modified time-simultaneity, and we may be wrong. It might be urged that the primitive form of content we ought to suppose is not time, but rather time-space. But even the space-aspect of time-space would not be the full-blown co-existence of positions as noted in Nature, and we may be content, perhaps, to leave the matter so. Co-existence, then, remains one of the early cosmic triumphs of the imaginal dynamic. It begins on the Nature-level of the world-system, and it will be continued into the heart of our own intimate psychical lives. For even the mountains, seas, and plains of my fancy are spatial; and the land of dreams has its directions and distances, like this Swiss valley now in view. But the space of my fancy is at a considerable remove from Nature-space and is, perhaps, nearing that point at which time-simultaneity and co-existence are no longer distinguished sharply.

Plotinus had a view of space which, though bound up with an outworn theory of "matter" (the unextended, receptive principle emanated by the "One" as the indeterminate field for "forms"), is not without interest for us. One form showing in "matter," itself formless, *excludes* another, with the result that they appear in different positions. It is to be noted in this connexion that, when there is no conflict between contents, or none of marked intensity, the spatial invention, which parts exclusives, is not required. Hence, even as psychological observations go, "two colours cannot be simultaneously presented unless they are differently localised, but

several partial tones may form one complex whole, within which they, as partial tones, are distinguishable though spatially undifferentiated." [1] On the other hand, this complex of sounds has its place in cosmic space, just as it has its date in cosmic time-succession, so that its defective internal spatiality does not remove it from the general spatial field.[2]

This wonderful invention of space widens yet again the kaleidoscopic possibilities of novelty. Incidentally a few bounding lines limit it to forms of beauty. And now movement, with its changing distances and directions and its varied velocities, furthers incessantly fresh creative situations. "Space or co-existence, while modifying the conflict of the minor sentients or agents, *brings no complete harmony*. These sentients remain *not wholly* external to one another; they are of one tissue, on their content side, with the [Grand] IMAGINAL, and are still subject to the mutual penetrations or invasions expressing the continuity of the [Grand] IMAGINAL. These penetrations prolong that unrest which is indispensable for the world-process. The perfectly stable or static state is always unattainable. The lives of the sentients are furthered and thwarted by the contents which are thrust upon them. And in the *act* of conserving themselves they move *towards* other furthering sentients and *away from* thwarting ones—there are born those first 'attractions' and 'repulsions' ('tractating' and 'pellating,' as certain cautious men of science would say) which have been so often misdescribed as 'original forces.'" [3] From this point past the origin of the attraction-complexes symbolised as "electrons," "atoms," etc., through the "integrations" and "differentiations" of physical, chemical, astronomic, geologic, etc., evolution you must reconstruct

[1] Ward, *Psychological Principles*, p. 127.

[2] We are not pursuing psychological inquiries in this essay. Still "extensity" as it figures in psychology, may seem to demand a word of comment. In our opinion it is a name for an experience already spatial but awaiting further development; an experience at first answering inadequately to the spatial reality already present in Nature. Of this more elsewhere.

[3] *World as Imagination*, p. 478.

Nature, as best you can, in the light of science. It is our task to suggest a general way of reinterpreting the facts and "laws": to discover these latter falls to the lot of others better informed. We have been grubbing at the roots of our world-system, regarded as a whole; we are not fathoming the mysteries of physics nor touring through the starry heavens; least of all, are we encroaching on the domains of those sciences which treat specially of the earth. But there is a very important caution which the serious reader must needs respect. Do not suppose that ordinary science has very sharp eyes; do not believe that your workaday perceptions and your current university-psychology provide an adequate outlook on to the facts of the world-system. The levels invisible are more varied and more important than the visible. They too originated in the differentiation of the Grand Imaginal; but, though some of us know, in one way or another, that they exist, we know very little about them of relevance here. In the present essay, in view of the predominant importance of first principles, we have sought to refer as little as possible to debatable topics connected with the detail of these "other worlds." In our next work we shall be free to moot such issues at will.

As regards movement and the "laws of motion," we have little to add to what was said elsewhere. Movement, in a psychical system, cannot, of course, be regarded as a transferable "thing"; it is a change of place accompanying psychical activity within the equilibrative processes of subwholes and wholes. And, like change in general, it may be discrete and show "steps" (Chap. V. § 3). "Few instances," writes Mackenzie, "of a motion apparently continuous could be more striking than that of a ray of light; and yet it appears to be definitely known that the physical movement that is involved in this case is broken up into waves that are discrete and that may be said to leap from point to point, just like Achilles. The motion of a cannon-ball may—and indeed almost certainly does—consist of similar leaps. If so, we, of course, come upon another of the paradoxes of Zeno—viz.

that 'the flying arrow rests.' If the flight of the arrow is discontinuous, this may be interpreted as meaning that it *is* successively at the points A, B, C, . . . but is never moving between them. But is this a serious objection? If it occupies these points successively, it *does* move from one to another. Its motion would not be made any the less real by the fact that it did not occupy any intervening positions. The fact that there is no cardinal number between 2 and 3 does not make the transition between 2 and 3 any the less real; nor does the fact that there is no letter between C and D make it any more difficult to pass from the one to the other. Such considerations may at least serve to show that there is no reason for denying that the number of parts in the subdivision of any concrete thing may be finite." [1] But this discreteness of motion (whose "steps" or pulses repeat, perhaps, the great alternations in the life of the total world-system) does not mean that motion, *as perceived by us*, is discrete. James called such concrete motion a "continuous feeling." [2] It is so, in the first place, because natural processes are abbreviated or condensed in our perceptions, which reveal no "steps" in many cases of motion. But, even if discrete "steps" were revealed always, they would be present to the continuum of "feeling"; a word which refers us here, as so often, not to impressional content, but to conscíring. Motions as conscired by Divine Imagining are, perhaps, best regarded as at once discrete and continuous. Primary motions are, above all, psychical happenings in a psychical universe; and all analyses, overlooking this truth, are provisional.

§ 6. The differentiation of Nature—a stratum of imaginal reality in which "self-externality" and oppositions are specially pronounced—from the Grand Imaginal recalls the Norse legend of the giant Ymir, from whose dissociation were born the heavens, the earth, and the depths beneath. Ymir answers to the stage of relatively unevolved Nature and is

[1] *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 418.
[2] *World as Imagination*, p. 480.

hence the monster slain in the war issuing in order. His sons, the Frost-giants, are the great forces of Nature, who survive but not uncontrolled. These forces, again, are the Titans, who in the *Iliad* are " sons of Heaven " and yet are imprisoned in Tartarus. They dethroned their father: the primal harmonious unity, but are themselves to be subjected to the new order. The great differentiation is glimpsed by Blake, the bard of Imaginism, as we can gather from that at last fully intelligible utterance :

> For when Urizen shrunk away
> From eternals, he sat on a rock,
> Barren; a rock, which he himself
> From redounding fancies had petrified.

Urizen is the " maker of dead law and of blind negation " ; the " God of this world," as W. B. Yeats tells us.[1] He is at war in every quarter with Los, the divine formative principle. Urizen is Nature, as it is evolved from the world-system which itself becomes insulated, or " shrinks away," from the general life of Divine Imagining. He is the god of the conservative uniformities that, indispensable as they are, often frustrate and mar evolution. He contends everywhere with Los, *i.e.* with creative imagining; Shelley's spirit, whose " plastic stress " compels " all new successions to the forms they wear." He sits on a barren rock or relatively unevolved system ; the system he has petrified from " redounding fancies," *i.e.* which has reached a more or less settled or stabilised form, as sequel of aeonian conflicts within cosmic imagining.

§ 7. Urizen, as this strange vision has it, beheld himself later " compassed round and high-roofed over with trees," from a banyan-like tree of mystery which had shot up under his heel by the rock. Nature becomes the seat of ever multiplying " uniformities of coexistence and succession," as logicians might say. The earlier attraction-complexes working loose in concrete space, and integrated anon in superior attraction-complexes, form the first " bodies " of physics and

[1] Introduction to *Poetical Works of William Blake*, xliv.

chemistry. On the mutual furtherances and thwartings of these "bodies" depend most of the processes which we refer to "inorganic" Nature. Conflict remains indispensable. The qualities of the attraction-complexes, as Herbart said of those of his monads or "reals," may be directly or indirectly opposed, disparate, and similar or equivalent. Only those of the first class ensure the disturbances which stay the drift to equilibrium and provoke fecund change. The Nature-stratum, not being the only one within the world-system, and not being parted definitely from the others, is open to influences from what we should call invisible quarters, should these be in being during the process of its evolution. This possibility must never be overlooked; and our next chapter will indicate the reasons why. The different strata of an imaginal system are not separated, as were the "spiritual" and "material" of old-world theologising, by the breadth of being. Teleologic needs may require their interaction. A further consideration, valuable to a Nature-philosophy, is this. The facts suggest that there are two great sorts of imaginals exemplified in Nature. There are imaginals that tend to become embodied at definite points and those, like colour, for instance, which, while they show in the realm of Urizen, retain also their mobility and freedom as world-ranging servants of Los.

A conservative aspect of "bodies" and the one which we select, owing to its "permanence" and consequent practical interest for us, as constitutive of the instrumental concept, matter, is that of resistance: their resistance to being moved and their resistance to being stopped when moving. But, in selecting this quality, the mere element of resistance in sensibly perceived objects, to form a concept, we create at once an artificiality which represents no original existent *in rerum natura*. For (1) the "bodies" *may* resist, but they will be much more than merely resistant. Further (2) they will resist only in certain relations; a body, existing by itself, would not be resisting at all. Lastly (3) in speaking of resistance, we note a surface-phenomenon, but we do not know

intimately what is resisting and what is being resisted. And we can never know, unless we are to have that direct acquaintance with "bodies" which a god may enjoy. The concept of matter is thus purely instrumental and irrelevant to a Nature-philosophy which is discussing what the things integrated in "bodies" really are.

A superhuman visitor might possess a visible form. But if he penetrated a wall, without meeting with resistance to his movement, he would not, of course, be "material" in the sense in which the table, in respect of the wall, is "material." But the table, in respect of him, is "immaterial" too. For it does not resist in this relation, and, conformably with the current definition, what does not resist cannot be matter. An embarrassing conclusion which furnishes its own commentary.

We cannot as yet know intimately what kind of *contents* are present, in the case of an electron or "mentoid" which excludes another "mentoid" from the place in concrete space which it fills. There are involved seemingly (1) two central areas, (2) two spheres of influence. The spheres of influence, as the known surface-phenomena attest, extend indefinitely in all directions. But the one central area is never penetrable by the other; and the resistance to this penetration cannot be overcome.[1] What is this area? It is the area of cosmic consciring whereby the electron exists: the area which must be conserved, if it is to remain a reality at all. This is the ground of the uncompromising active resistance displayed. But as to the core of content, present to this consciring, we had best, being too ignorant for the task, say little. The core in the case of a "mentoid" may be fairly stable, but, even granting this, we cannot say precisely what it is. Qualities in legions may fall beyond our present perceptions. The core is the meeting-

[1] Take as many free "negative" electrons as there are in a gram of hydrogen. Two such quantities of electricity, placed at the N. and S. poles of the earth, would "pellate," or repel one another, so strongly that a steel cable, capable of supporting 35 tons, would be necessary to keep them from moving apart (Soddy). Placed close together, they could not be kept in position at all.

point of imaginals and the seat of pleasures and pains, but these must, perforce, be left unspecified.

The temptation to re-survey, from the point of view of Imaginism, the problems presented by the evolution and the periodic classification of the chemical "elements" (of which there are true species, genera, and families), by chemical affinities and the absence of them, valency, the astonishing carbon atom and its power of "self-saturation," stereo-chemistry, sound, light, and heat hypotheses, atomic social systems,[1] gravity, cohesion, and what not, will be resisted. We see as through a glass—very darkly. Certain guiding conceptions will be found in the *World as Imagination*, but Nature-philosophy, in any tolerably satisfactory form, is far to seek. This statement, so true of physics, chemistry, etc., is true also, but in a less degree, of biology. The suggestiveness of Imaginism, in respect of biology, is, nevertheless, very marked. Being concerned in the present essay to restate the general case for Imaginism, freed from the historical and controversial matter which cumbered its presentation in my previous work, I will not transfer discussions, which could not be abridged, to these pages.[2] This, however, must needs be said. The reader, who looks to biology to illustrate conservative and creative imagining, will have no cause to regret the step, and may come to revise many theories with which explanatory experiments, Darwinian and other, have been made. *Inventiveness* will be found in every quarter from the properties of plastic, delicately balanced, colloids that further new directions of change, to the contriving of eyes, ears, nervous systems, and instincts; it seems probable, moreover, that this inventiveness has many sources; centres of conscring

[1] "Dr. Schiller, who observes that certain experiments, *e.g.* those of Sir W. Crookes, irresistibly suggest that there are 'individual differences and individual characters' among the 'atoms' or early 'spiritual beings' of the evolutionary process, urges that, even on this level, we can infer 'individual entities combined with others into social systems'" (*World as Imagination*, p. 505). Royce urged us persistently to regard Nature as a "vast society."

[2] *World as Imagination*, pp. 525-65.

conspire to creation from all directions of the metaphysical compass. Conflict continues; and the elimination of faulty organisms shows plainly to what extent "trial and error" obtain in the ways in which disturbing agencies are met. With respect to the concurrence of conservation and creation the following passage, cited from Ward,[1] is significant and lends support to the contentions put forward in the *World as Imagination*. Geoffrey St. Hilaire and Cuvier having emphasised respectively unity of plan and diversity of types, "Lucas synthesises the thesis and antithesis of these two disputants. In creation he finds two co-ordinate laws—a law of 'invention' and a law of 'imitation': the one analogous to imagination or improvisation and suggesting Plato's Ideas, the other analogous to memory and suggesting repetitions and routine. When we pass from creation to procreation the same two laws, he held, reappear; albeit with a more limited range and with other names. Procreation cannot transgress the bounds fixed by the species; but, within the limits of these, two laws are manifest—that of *heredity*, answering to imitation and perpetuating the species, and that of *inneity*, answering to invention and originating the individual. 'La Nature,' he says, 'ressaisit, dans la procréation de l'individualité, l'originalité qu'elle perd dans l'espèce; . . . mais dans les limites mêmes où elle est circonscrite . . . il semble en vérité que toute sa liberté d'imagination et de composition lui reste.'" Lucas is using "imagination" in the too narrow psychological meaning of the term (which would not, by the way, "suggest" the stable Platonic Ideas, types of strict conservation as they are). But his insistence on two co-ordinate "laws" of invention and imitation makes clearly towards what the imaginal hypothesis prepares us to find. In the case of the individual, whose career does not begin, perhaps, with the procreated organism, we shall note differentiating factors other than those which biologists are wont to discuss. "Nature," meaning that stratum of the world-system whose

[1] *Psychological Principles*, p. 451.

contents are, in a special sense, the regions of the minor sentients masked by earth, water, trees, flames, clouds, etc. (§ 3), is certainly not the source of all the originality which distinguishes a Plato or Kant. But it co-operates with other factors. And it co-operates in that creative way which resembles imagining in our private lives.

I will close this chapter with a quotation from the *World as Imagination*.[1] It had been pointed out that the "variations," culminating in the particular beech which I see before me, were neither eliminated nor produced by natural selection. "Let us suppose a spectator capable of looking back at the entire organic ancestry of the beech and of seizing this long story as a whole. He would perceive a bit of primitive life-stuff altering, with interminable assimilations, reproductions and transmutations, from one form into another, like those unstable images of fancy which we cannot hold unchanged before the mind. And, on Darwin's admission, this magical varying is the work of the life-form, flaming as its 'nature' dictates, in response to the 'spark' which merely ignites.[2] Would not our spectator trace the real mystery of the flaming back to an 'internal activity' or principle such as, *e.g.*, was contemplated in Kant's definition of life? The body itself is acting thus wondrously, or, at any rate, is the channel through which some creative power, not derived from the body's surroundings, is at work. Its changes resemble a long series of experiments, such as might be *imagined* by an inventor, which are thrown off lavishly to be tried and passed or condemned by Natural Selection. This thought will not strike us, so long as we are obsessed by the slowness with which variations occur according to *our* standards of time. It will occur to the superhuman spectator at once."

We must never forget that there is no Chinese wall dividing

[1] P. 541.

[2] "The nature of the conditions is of subordinate importance in comparison with the nature of the organism in determining each particular form of variation—perhaps of not more importance than the nature of the spark, by which a mass of combustible matter is ignited, has in determining the nature of the flames" (*Origin of Species*, 6th ed., p. 8).

the regions of Nature from the regions of our sentient life. Yon stretch of alp up which the pines climb, thick at the base, thinned out near the clouds, like stormers in a forlorn hope, and the high-grazing cattle, the tinkling of whose bells reaches me ever and anon across the river, are, as Prospero would have said, "such stuff as dreams are made of," though such dreaming is not yours or mine, but that of the Power which is reality itself. The alp and the cattle belong alike to the Nature within Divine Imagining. True, in the cases of the cattle there are concerned sentients of grades superior to those of the sentients specially allied with things such as rocks, stones, and water. And the characters of the bodies, which biologists call "living," differ, in notable respects, from those of bodies to which they refuse this name. But, in last resort, all things are drops of the same ocean; and all, whatever be the phases of cosmic variety which they express, are wonderful. The same imaginal activity shows in alp and cow, but in the latter divisions, which are obtrusive in "inorganic" Nature, have been overcome; and the new whole, comprising the cow-sentient, its body, and the implied co-operating lower sentients or "mentoids," has attained a unity which, on merely "inorganic" levels, would be sought for in vain.

NOTE ON DISSOCIATION, § 4.—The dissociation, whence the conflicts of the Metaphysical Fall, is continued often on the small scale when man is dreaming. The cosmic past is echoed thus in facts otherwise most perplexing. Conservation, again, subrational but instructive! Dissociation is continued with purposiveness in the organism, which *divides into "cells"* (cf. Doncaster, *Introduction to the Study of Cytology*, p. 3), and in the differentiating of the presentation-continuum. But even here much may happen amiss.

NOTE ON MOTION, § 5, p. 203.—The view that an object moves with alternating rests and leaps (repeating, as it were, the rhythm of the world-system itself) renders a much discussed mathematical continuity-theory inapplicable. There is no "gradual transition through an infinite number of intermediaries"; no "compact" series without consecutive terms. No empirical evidence exists to be set against us; indeed, as Russell says, "a world in which motion consisted of small finite jerks would be empirically indistinguishable from one in which motion was continuous" (*Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 140). The mathematical theory, with its "compact" series, seems irrelevant to the solving of the riddles of actual motion, and becomes thus a by-interest of constructive private imagining.

CHAPTER X

GOD AND THE GODS

"Oh, Thou, who Man of baser Earth didst make,
And ev'n with Paradise devise the Snake:
For all the Sin wherewith the Face of Man
Is blacken'd—Man's forgiveness give—and take!"
FITZGERALD'S *Omar Khayyám.*

"Foul, Master Kassapa, is a pit of mire, foul and counted as such, stinking, repulsive, and counted as such."

"Even so, Prince, are human beings in the eyes of the gods, foul and counted as such, stinking, disgusting, repulsive, and counted as such."—*Dialogues of the Buddha* (Part II. translated by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS and C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, p. 355).

"The course of natural phenomena being replete with everything which, when committed by human beings, is most worthy of abhorrence, any one who endeavoured in his actions to imitate the natural course of things would be universally seen and acknowledged to be the wickedest of men."—JOHN STUART MILL.

"Every fragment of visible Nature might, so far as is known, serve as part in some organism unlike our bodies."—F. H. BRADLEY.

§ 1. THE qualitative phases of experience are those that hold most of us. There are abstract thinkers, and more especially mathematicians, who seem to flout them and, for purposes of their own, to bleed reality white. They remain aloof from our deeper interests. They deal, of course, with relations of high moment; relations, however, to which it is possible to be indifferent and yet to live richly and well. Very many men are satisfied with such grasp of order and quantity as

comes to them unsought or, if sought, such as suffices for their aesthetic and practical needs. They respect the maker of mathematical abstractions. But they feel dimly that his world is artificial and un*whole*some: that what is desirable ultimately is not a realm of shades, but an experience of which workaday perception or concrete poetic fancy suggests the type. Intellectual shorthand, they are convinced, is tedious and may become vicious. Faust grows weary of concept and analysis, he is worse off in many ways than the illiterate and unsophisticated man. Marguerite is worth more than Aristotle. One must hope, indeed, that Faust's thinking, valuable as a discipline, is to be replaced later by intuitive imagining. Abstract thinking, treated as a cult, is unsatisfying; is found, in the end, to conflict with its object and thus to compel us, if we would have peace, to seek harmony beyond it.

Metaphysics, as we have discussed it, aids and abets plain men in their dislike of the abstract. It reinstates their qualitative worlds within a larger but similar system present to Divine Imagining. Whatever surprises of detail research may have in store for them, theirs are, not mathematician's worlds, but parts of a spiritual universe. And with this assurance goes another. All action in these worlds presupposes sentients. "A return to Paganism in an enlightened form seems inevitable; once more clouds, air, sea, fire, dry land, and the 'undiscovered countries,' as yet veiled from most mortal eyes, will be found peopled with these beings, none the less real because some of their *habits* have been recorded in the useful shorthand which men respect as uniformities or laws of Nature. Once more Nature, psychical throughout, will be known as consisting not of mere contents, like the contents of our experience, but also of conscious powers, whose activity is the urge and drive of change." [1] Sentients inferior to ourselves swarm in every molecule of water, or grain of sand. And, further, sentients, superior to ourselves, obtain assuredly, as James and Fechner surmised, in legions. "We can set

[1] *World as Imagination*, p. 506.

no bounds to the existence or powers of sentient beings," is the opinion of Bradley, though he has failed, even after this admission, to grasp the true significance of the world-system thus richly ensouled. A superstition, however, is condemned and not too soon. The assumption that humankind, terrestrial or discarnate, occupies the highest level of finite conscious life may be dismissed, in fact, as absurd. Man, both in respect of body and soul, is a creature of very lowly grade, almost negligible, perhaps, by superhuman societies not connected with this special solar system. The writers, mostly German, who hail him as the sphere, wherein the Absolute attains self-consciousness, provoke laughter.

There is nothing to be said against belief in superhuman agents, of all sorts of grades. But it is equally certain that claims made on behalf of any particular alleged agent, of whatever grade, cannot be tested too severely. The reality of the agent is to be inferred from the evidence, *i.e.* from such marks of purposive action as a selected portion of reality may present. Inference from marks—experienced only by myself—of a non-perceptual order, emotional changes, inspiration, etc., is very risky. Inference would be least fallible in the cases of minor superhumans who might appear in perception with bodies resembling in respects our own. Animal, human, and superhuman " ejects " alike are to be believed-in on the evidence of marks. But in the cases of the higher superhumans the marks will not leap to the eye ; and the sceptic is able, therefore, to enjoy his attitude of denial undisturbed. An ant-critic might find it venturesome to infer me as the power behind the movements of this pen.

Vistas of great speculative and even practical importance are opened up with the recognition of superhumans. But the possibilities of the lie being endless, and superstition of weed-like fecundity, care must be taken to assent to no particular beliefs about them on trust. The priest and the fool are not the sole afflictions of gullible mankind.

Neo-platonic gossip concerning gods daemons, and angels

is helpful in widening our outlook, but it must indicate very poorly the vast intervals that lie between us men and the highest form of finite conscious life. Human sentients probably belong to very low levels of consciring, taking themselves often too seriously for serious philosophy. At the extreme, near which we lie, the *detached sentient* is merely in process of growth: towards the other, having benefited by all such experiences as insulated life can give, it is losing its hardness of outline, and preparing, *at its own good pleasure* and to the end of self-realisation in a fulness beyond itself, for the harmonisation of the last discords: those of sentients and groups of sentients which have still over against them conscious powers which are not themselves. This last opposition can hardly endure. Even the higher powers of this world-system "may be above the life of insulated personality; of the separate 'I' which contrasts its particular stream of experience with other particular streams in which it believes, but which it does not include. Sir Edwin Arnold in *Death and Afterwards* bade us conceive 'coalesced existences' as superior to persons as the tree is to the cells of which it is composed; the *exclusive* human conscious life being a mark, as it is, of weakness and defect. . . . The higher conscious powers of our world-system —I do not say of minor worlds such as the solar system and its unseen complementary levels—are, perhaps, not separate persons, but enjoy a being which comprises associated agents. Just as in my experience I grasp very many contents, so a power of this sort may grasp and include very many conscious centres along with its contents. It would hardly be possible to reach any exalted stage of conscious life, unless the one-sidedness of the insulated agent is to be surmounted in this way. Insulated personality, in short, means grievous limitation and defect."[1] And though these higher powers are themselves insulated, and though God, *i.e.* the supreme society of sentients of our world-system, is Himself also insulated (seeing that He is the God of a *particular* world-system and

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 508-9.

not, we may be sure, inclusive of all the sentients or contents within it), still the movement towards harmony, towards the great "imaginal solution" closing opposition, has become very pronounced. Hegel avers that we regard the world "as ruled by Divine Providence: implying that the division between the parts of the world is continually brought back and made conformable to the unity from which it has issued." [1] This is so. Divine Imagining has dissociated Itself, so to say, into the discrete sentients, which are not "monads" or radically multiple "egos," but centres of consciring able, in due season, to become confluent.[2] The "coalesced existence" of a higher level of this world-system is a phase in the healing of "division." It implies, of course, what Hegel and neo-Hegelians incline to deny, viz. the conservation or continuance of sentients; a belief which does not mean that the human individual is "immortal" at present.[3] But belief in such conservation seems to us a mark of sane philosophy, lacking which thinkers must have blundered badly. With the discrediting of this belief either philosophy, or the world-order of which it treats, is discredited.

§ 2. "There is nothing," writes Dr. M'Taggart in his lucid and valuable *Some Dogmas of Religion*, "perhaps, which should prevent us from giving the name of god to each of several beings, simultaneously existing, or to one such being existing simultaneously with others, who equal him in wisdom and power, but not in goodness. It may not be impossible to revert to Polytheism, or to conceive god as striving against other persons who equal him in everything, but goodness." If we mean by "god" any conscious power sufficiently wise, powerful, and good to rank above, say, the divinities of the popular religions, we shall have to allow that our world-system is the home of many gods; gods of this solar scheme and

[1] Wallace, *Logic of Hegel*, p. 306.

[2] An issue for the work on the Individual.

[3] The human individual is not "immortal," since its deaths and even its dreamless sleeps show that it ceases at intervals to be. The deathless condition has to be won.

gods, indefinitely more numerous, of the vast world-system which includes it. And there may be many such powers, which, while wise and powerful, are not beneficent; are such as, in regard to us and our possibilities of development, would be called evil. Whether such great powers, beneficent, indifferent, or hostile, are to be called "gods" is a matter of convention. There is no magic or sanctity about the word "god." Etymologically, if Schopenhauer is right, it is connected with Odin, Wodan, Guodan, Godan; and it has served, as we know, to designate powers of ignoble and banal types. Even the famous combination of terms, "personal god," which has been the centre of so much controversy, has an absurd ancestry; belongs to incompetence rather than to philosophy.[1] There is no reason, in short, why we should not use the word just as we list, giving it, however, a definite meaning or meanings in the process. Odin, Wodan, or god can serve our purposes, if we succeed in making our meanings plain; one counter is as good as another. And our convenience will be consulted best, perhaps, thus.

We will call the higher conscious powers in this world-system the gods. Were one to appear visibly to the inhabitants of this planet, he (or "they") would certainly be acclaimed and probably worshipped as divine. To be very wise and very powerful would suffice to secure him devotion; the plain man, as we know, is not very exacting as regards the moral qualifications of his gods. Consult the scriptures of the popular religions, Western and Eastern, and compare the morals of the god or gods in question with those of the finer types of human beings that you know. You will note that cruelty, vanity, jealousy, anger, revenge, etc., are commonplace characteristics of these gods, but that their worshippers—only some few thou-

[1] "*Persona* was a term of Roman law meaning a legal entity, a person with rights, a citizen. The Latin Church Father Tertullian, who was a lawyer by profession, first used the term as an equivalent for the Greek highly philosophical concept *hypostasis*, and so the entirely inadequate vocable 'person' when applied to the divine hypostasis started on its career in Western theology" (G. R. S. Mead, M.A., *The Quest*, April 1919).

sands of years removed from the stone-age—have not thought the worse of them on this account. And you will find that there are rare human souls, superior in moral excellence to any divinity whom scriptures extol.

We will reserve the term "God" for the supreme society of sentients which constitutes the greatest conscious power of this world-system. There is one such power for every mature or maturing world-system. It is not a single experient, but a "coalesced existence," as Sir Edwin Arnold would have said. But in other respects It fills the place in the system of the finite or limited God argued for by John Stuart Mill, William James, F. C. S. Schiller, R. H. Dotterer, and others, and is thus the "invisible King" of H. G. Wells. If there are, as we believe, innumerable world-systems, there are also innumerable such Kings, but none so potent as to command all the conditions that compass Him about. The actual occurrences of life suggest or show that He is a struggler or striver who cannot mould everything after His desires. This planet, for instance, is a place of foulness and filthiness, of which no power, worthy of being called divine, can be the all-sufficient source and support. We have seen *why* it is so foul. In God we recognise a great agency which is helping, perhaps against many gods, to make it better. He is not all-powerful, not, perhaps, as regards even His own world-system, all-wise; just the highest expression of the conscious life which obtains within the system which is His body. And, like all sane sentient powers connected with a body, He is concerned for its excellence, as also for that of the subordinate sentients which are active in it. He is engaged, as Bernard Shaw suggests, "in a great struggle to produce something higher and better" within His province. And this province? It is that of the content-whole which we discussed as the Grand Imaginal: the primitively segregated whole which buds off from Divine Imagining: Blake's "disorganised immortal" passing into temporary conflicts that it may be the generating-place and nursery of sentients. As the Grand Sentient God

might be called the Child of Divine Imagining: but we must not use metaphor in a spirit of compromise with vulgar faith. The resemblance between the evolution of God and the genesis of a human child is not a close one.

The "only God worthy of the name must be finite," urged James. Regarded from the intellectual point of view, the case for the infinite "sum total of all Reality and Perfection," as examined by Kant, broke down completely. There is no argument for Scholastic Theism to be taken quite seriously.[1] The most popular of the arguments, surveyed by Kant, that based on alleged design, cites facts which bear a very different interpretation. Divine Imagining is not an infinite person, but It is immanently purposive. And, within any one of Its world-systems, there are legions of sentients, higher and lower, who pursue purposes. The "ends," detected by us in Nature and the history of mankind, are merely stray instances of the end-seeking which, everywhere and in legions of guises, characterises the world-order.

§ 3. The world is not God's world, but the world God wants to right. Mill, looking at the facts, inferred God as "of great but limited power, how or by what limited we cannot even conjecture; of great and perhaps unlimited intelligence, but, perhaps, also more limited than his power." The facts suggest, to our thinking, great limitation of power. Further, God is probably aware only of a portion of the contents of the world-system, these being condensed in His particular time-span just as they are in ours;[2] and He has to experiment freely in His exalted sphere. Unlike Mill, we can understand in a general way how He is conditioned and can learn to be loyal to Him as the great Ally. It is this great Ally that plain men have desired, and desire still, when they adhere to the belief, other-

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 49-61.

[2] *World as Imagination*, p. 511. "Would not the whole of history be contained in a very short time for a consciousness at a higher degree of tension than our own, which should watch the development of humanity while contracting it, so to speak, into the great phases of its evolution?"—Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, Eng. transl., p. 275.

wise indefensible, in a "personal God," a "Father in heaven." And this Power, which is not a single experient but indefinitely superior to anything which a single evolved experient could be, is eminently such as meets their want. Their fierce protest against materialism, "there is a God," springs from need; but, on the other hand, the saying in question implies, as critics have not failed to remark, that God is limited. But, though limited, He is a sure Ally, for the world-system or Grand Imaginal is His body; and, as the focus of the movement towards harmony, He cannot neglect any aspect of what the harmonisation of the system requires. Nevertheless, acting for the world-whole, He cannot dispense with provisional sacrifices and mutilations of inferior sentients. He is no merely contemplative Deity, but a striver who may have to act "ruthlessly," to all seeming, at need. Compassion and inflexibility are not divorced in a Power who, unlike us, has unified His psychical being thoroughly; hence the "transformations of energy," *i.e.* the balancing towards divinity of measure, take place at once regardful and regardless of what they crush. The world-whole has to be evolved. But a God, who did not place the world-whole first, would be no God whom we could adore. In the end, too, the evolution is for us. The world-process, observes Dr. Schiller, is "the process of the *redemption* alike of God, of the world, and of our own selves. To promote the attainment of Perfection, therefore, must be the supreme motive and paramount obligation of conduct, the supreme principle of life, in comparison with which all others sink into insignificance. And to have risen to the consciousness that they *can*, and *ought*, and *must* cooperate with the Divine Purpose in order to accelerate the attainment of Perfection, must surely be equivalent to doing so with all the strength and insight they possess, in all beings worthy of the name of rational." [1] And again, "We are now ourselves the subjects of the world's redemption; we can ourselves assist in our own salvation; we can ourselves co-

[1] *Riddles of the Sphinx*, p. 432.

operate with God in hastening the achievement of the world-process, co-operate in the inspiriting assurance that no effort will be rejected as too petty or too vain, that no struggle will lack divine support . . . it is evident that it would be difficult indeed to imagine a creed more apt than this to fortify the best elements in the human soul, or one to appeal more strongly to all the higher interests of our nature." [1]

Like the risen Osiris, who after an interval of struggle, suffering, and defeat, died that he might live again in glory, the Grand Imaginal descends into imperfection and conflict; and re-arises, is redeemed and redeems itself, as a conscious God. And since God is a society of finite sentients, and finite sentients are, each and all, evolved, the evolution of God is seen to be the compensation for that "corruption of eternity" with which the world-process began. George du Maurier in *Peter Ibbetson* writes of God, as "in the direct line of a descent from us, an ever-growing conscious Power, so strong, so glad, so simple, so wise, so mild, so beneficent that what can we do even now but fall on our knees with our foreheads in the dust, and our hearts brimful of wonder, hope, and love, and tender shivering awe and worship of a yet unborn, barely conceived and scarce begotten Child—that which we have been taught to worship as a Father—that which is not now, but is to be—that which we shall all share in and be part of in the dim future—that which is slowly, surely, painfully weaving itself out of us and the likes of us . . . and whose coming we can but faintly foretell by the casting of its shadows on our own slowly, surely, painfully awakening souls." But this view needs supplementation. Superior sentients may have been already unified and harmonised as God. God may be, not merely "begotten," but an existing cosmic power of enormous, though limited, might. In this case He is not to descend from us, but is simply to grow in richness as we come to Him. And this coming is hardly for to-morrow. We at least are poor creatures; and aeons of evolution may find us

[1] *Riddles of the Sphinx*, p. 357.

below the level of "value" required. Renan depicted to us a Divine Individuality "acquiring strength" by absorbing millions on millions of lives, but surely the point of moment is, not the number of lives, but their capacity to bring to It something vital that It lacked before. A sentient or group of sentients on a very high level would bring unique and enriching novelty with it. But the fact of immature development excludes. And even sentients, exalted in some respects, but averse from confluence with other sentients, will remain outside Its pale. Their choice may be justifiable. In an imaginal universe a choice must be left to be justified or condemned by events. The unsatisfactoriness of the insulated life, if inevitable, may prove decisive at last. Whether it is thus inevitable, experiment would have to show.

This God, Whose rank is not the gift of chance and Whose interests, if we take a long view, are also ours—those of a supreme love-lit society of which we are potential members,—differs entirely from the magnified man of theology. Even Mill's God, were He a single experient, eternally and inexplicably lifted above all other lives, would be a despot, justifiably offensive to those who yield no homage save to greatness that has been won. Recent political and social development, which makes men increasingly impatient of masters, prepares them also to reject a God Who rules simply by "divine right." We sympathise with this revolt. Each sentient is a prospective Demiurge; it has to drain cup after cup of minor satisfactions in many places and, tiring of all these at last, will be borne by its desires towards a wider being. Let us renounce at this point verbiage, such as delvers into Eastern lore and mystics of the cruder sort affect: let us be rid of phrases such as "killing out desire," "extirpating desire," and the like. The sane sentient, in a changing world, cannot "kill out" desire.[1] All endeavour towards an end, not directly attainable, implies desire; and desire must glow the fiercer when our superior ends come into view. God Himself,

[1] A desire to "kill out" desire is a needful preliminary!

so far as conditions impede and thwart Him, desires, and desires with an intensity which we petty strivers cannot imagine concretely at all.

Difficulties, insuperable for folk on our level, arise when it is asked, And when did God begin to be? He began to be with the slow coalescence of the superior sentients of a world-system. But when? Considering the history of my present life, I find that my appearance as a conscious individual began long after the first stage of the formation of my body. And it might be urged that God arose similarly long after the origin of this changing world-system of content which is His body. But there are counter-considerations to be borne in mind. Even I may have had a history prior to my present life. And God may have had a history which began in a prior world-system and may thus have come to our particular system, not as du Maurier's "barely conceived and scarce begotten Child," but as an evolved Cosmic Power that can contract astronomic ages into an intuition, for Whom a thousand years are very much less than a day. We take note of such a possibility, if only to discourage attempts to dogmatise on such topics. We are not in a position to solve such problems. Our private imagining, as we might say, is not adequate to cosmic imagining; and modesty enjoins reticence. The attempt to assign a date for the origin of God—the God of our particular world-system—can be ignored.

§ 4. We may be asked at this stage how this view of God is related to the old-world doctrine of the "Logos."

"Logos" meant originally "gathering."[1] It signified later both speech and reason, which were not distinguished for long by the Greeks. It is this reason which figures so prominently in the Hellenistic notion of the "Logos," which was invented to meet a difficulty created by absolutist philosophy. The "Logos" is just a connecting or mediating power which serves to relate the inertly contemplative Absolute to the phenomenal order. One notes here once more the cult

[1] Max Müller.

of the changeless which assigns to an inferior, acting we know not where outside the Absolute, all dealings with the sphere of change. Absolutism and the cult of the changeless being false philosophy, we can dispense with this connecting "Logos"; containing the grounds of all created things. Divine Imagining Itself shows in each world-system and in the changes thereof; though, as previously urged, we have to allow freely for local initiatives. The identification of Christ with the "Logos" utilised an unsound philosophical invention. And to-day, mystics, taking over the invention uncritically, have offered it to us as a portion of their occult lore. With the history of philosophy before us, it is well not to be in a hurry.

Plato's so-called myth of the Demiurge or world-architect, who works on chaos in the light of the Ideas, presupposes both a beginning of the world-order and a kind of dualism. This Demiurge becomes for Plotinus the second hypostasis or "Universal Mind," with, however, the important reservation that Plotinus disallows a beginning. The suggestion of this Demiurge, or single finite experient, confronted with chaos, seems to us an experiment rather than a "myth." For Plato's changeless "Idea of the Good" (which became the "One" of Plotinus) and the other changeless Ideas supply a poor foundation on which to erect a world. An attempt to breathe life into this scheme was exacted by the pressure of change. (See Note, p. 234.)

Divine Imagining is not an inert principle existing at the "back of beyont"; which has deputies, in the form of "Logoi" or Demiurges, to do Its work. And It comprises no indeterminate primeval "chaos"; merely those conflicts incidental to the creative appulse already discussed.

Divine Experience includes and supports the Grand Imaginal before its fall into imperfection and change. And, despite the great abdication of which we have spoken, It includes and supports it amid the storms of change. It, and no other source, supplies what the "Logos" was invented to supply, viz. the grounds of all created sentients and things.

Everything happens, even in the case of an insulated world-system, within Divine Experience, and not outside It. The insulation is from other systems, not from Divine Experience.

§ 5. But, it may still be urged, although the world-system is sustained by Divine Imagining, cannot the region thus sustained be regarded as *primitively* a conscious whole, as existing for itself as well as for Divine Imagining? The metaphysical fall could then be regarded as literally the temporary vanishing or death of Osiris, who is to be resurrected to renewed conscious life in the form of what we have called the evolved God. In this case the consciring or conscious energy, which is Osiris, might be conceived as redistributed so as to give birth to the new sentients.[1] The conscious energy, thus redistributed, raises content-areas above the degrees of intensity, at which the "thresholds" requisite to their consciring are passed, and in this way sentients are born.[2] But at the same time the "energy" deserts Osiris, who, on this showing, is sacrificed or sacrificing Himself to the end of creation; a love passing human imitation being implied. He sinks into division and conflict, but, as one safe within Divine Imagining, to be raised anew to glory, enriched with all that creation shall bring. It is at this cost that the great eternal spirit is to rejoice in those He loves.

Professor Mackenzie, writing about the "eternal spirits" of worlds, which he too regards as imaginative constructions, observes, that "each eternal spirit, in setting out to realise the requirements of the scheme, would begin, if we may so

[1] "Attention," which for many psychologists = consciousness, is discussed as "redistributable." And Dr. Ward in distinguishing what he calls its two degrees, "attention" and "inattention," treats these as "degrees of one process. For, obviously, every concentration of attention in one direction involves, *ipso facto*, an equivalent excentration in another . . . in other words, concentration and diffusion of attention are but inverse aspects of one act" (*Psychological Principles*, p. 63).

See also on the "redistribution of energy." Cf. Chap. IV. § 17 of this work.

[2] Cf. Chap. IX. § 4. Sir W. Hamilton regarded consciousness as nothing but "mental modes" which are "above a certain degree of intensity." But this intensity itself, we contend, depends on consciring beyond finite spheres.

express it, by descending into particularity and separation from the whole, and would then ascend by degrees through all the varied forms of existence up to the contemplation of the realised perfection, from the general plan of which it set out. The return to perfection would at the same time be the starting-point for the reconstruction of the whole." [1] Each adventure, however, would be a real time-succession, comprising alike creation and destruction. The "eternal spirit," again, supplies problems which, in view of our present position in the scale of being, are perhaps insoluble. To what level does Osiris sink? Is He, like the Norse Ymir, totally dissolved awhile in the world-process, or does He maintain Himself always, albeit with diminished brightness, in the background; a portion only of Him being sacrificed for the siring of the new order? The continuity, requisite to this order, does not seem to necessitate more than the presence of the order to Divine Imagining, which could sustain it assuredly simply as content. But the concept of the "eternal spirit," maintaining itself still in the background, has its charm. And, if we adopt it, we shall have to modify the view of the evolution of Nature adopted in Chap. IX. It will now be evident how needful it was to discuss that evolution at first without reference to complications imported by the consideration of God and the gods. We have to simplify in the interests of exposition, but reality is never simple and the attitude taken up originally may be bettered as we proceed.

If God or the "eternal spirit" was conscious before the *first* metaphysical fall, the world-process remains none the less, in Dr. Schiller's language, the redemption of Him, Nature, and ourselves. And the attainment of Perfection, however remote that may be, remains still the "paramount obligation" of conduct. But the tragic aspect of a world in travail is heightened for us; and the words "love of God," so often a mere phrase, promise to become invested with a tremendous meaning. Nothing ever imagined by man could be compared

[1] *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, pp. 437-8.

with the initial sacrifice involved. And nothing in the sphere of earth's affections and likings ought to dim the love which goes out to God. We cited the enthusiastic passage from *Peter Ibbetson*, though the writer had only the redemption-process in view: the vision of an evolved God that is not, but *is to be*. Had du Maurier been considering an Osirian sacrifice, he would hardly have found words in which to express his wonder, love, hope, and "shivering awe." The sacrifice, observe, is not of the type which renounces for renouncing's sake. That way lies folly. It is to issue in fulness and richness of living for all concerned—for Osiris grown greater still.

It is on belief in the continuance of individuals, in the plurality of their lives and in their eventual confluence in a divine society—in the God of joy and love who rises sublimely out of the world-process—that the hopes of humanity depend. The creeds, made in stuffy professorial studies, which deny the individual's persistence after physical death, are not only ludicrously, fatuously untrue;[1] in a practical regard they foredoom all the great schemes of social betterment to failure and menace moral, economic, political, artistic, religious, scientific, and philosophical interests alike with a common ruin. It may be possible for a few mathematicians, neo-Hegelians, or men of science to follow ideals of "high living" with Bertrand Russell's gospel of despair in view. But such men will be very exceptional. The writer is certainly not of this select and solemnly comic group; being profoundly convinced that, in the absence of a larger hope, the wisest and best counsel he can give to others is to proclaim the birth-strike, to pluck carelessly such poor joys as earth affords and to end the tragi-comedy later at a minimal cost. Those, and they are many, who find life insupportably tedious or cruel, have the remedy to hand; and they can show their contempt for the creative process by quitting it. Bankruptcy and ruin await our civilisation, if a banal secularism shuts out

[1] As the actual experience of some of us can attest. Of this more elsewhere.

the light. We have grown out of the possibility of being satisfied with the Barmecide feast of terrestrial life. The man in the mine and the drudge of the study would both be cheated by an existence that simply ends, and, sooner or later, they will realise this and act accordingly. In India the vanity of terrestrial life, considered as an end in itself, has long been an established, and even obvious, belief, but inspiriting religious and philosophical doctrines provide the counterblast. In Europe the belief has become very general—an inarticulate discontent, of grave moment to politicians, represents it in unreflective minds—and the risks created thereby are formidable. Nothing but a larger hope, established on sure intellectual foundations, and fortified, where possible, by empirical verification, will bear us successfully through the struggles to come.

§ 6. A mere repopularisation of belief in a future life will not, however, suffice; there is nothing of value in the mere fact of survival, which pessimists might admit and regard as, in the long run, a disaster; and accordingly there is nothing truly illuminative in the surface-phenomena which interest us in spiritism and ghost-land. That individuals survive death may be considered now as proved empirically, but the *value* of this truth remains problematical and has yet to be appraised in the dry light of philosophy. I may rejoice at first to know that my friend has re-awakened to consciousness after death, but anon reflection supervenes. I incline to infer now that he may persist a very long while, perhaps (though clearly this outruns the evidence) in some form for ever, that he and I shall meet again at no distant date, and that we shall be well content. But I have allowed my joy at the promise of the near future to prevent me from asking whether, in the long run, it is well that we two should persist at all. I am, perhaps, weary of the trivialities, petty satisfactions, and squalor of earth-life, but I may weary of life elsewhere, and anon of one new kind of life after another; so that my friend and I may live on simply to be companions in suffering. This is hardly an agreeable prospect. And it is one of the reasons, of course,

why the merely spiritistic outlook on life is so totally inadequate to what meliorism, based on philosophical insight, must require.

The outlook magnificent of the Imaginal Hypothesis is needful. My life is a series of adventures, for which this earth, the Borderland, and the fearfully and wonderfully named levels of the occultist, provide episodes; is a romance, passing the creativeness of poet or novelist, which brings me ever nearer to the dazzling conscious life of God. All that I have dreamed about wisdom, truth, and beauty is nothing beside that experience in its concrete, mobile splendour. Questions as to the value of life cannot arise in that region: their answers, one might say, are presented in fact. Those who have enjoyed experiences, rare but illuminative beyond cavil, of one of the higher levels of conscious life, will understand readily what I mean. Beyond God, again, lies the ocean of the infinite. Our sails cannot be spread to its winds, but the mystery of its possibilities is upon us and as God we shall look forth on its glory and its beauty undismayed.

We sink again to earth.

§ 7. The evils of our minor world of humankind are minimised by ordinary academic philosophy, out of touch with life as it is in so many respects. The Absolute, observes one writer, contemptuous of the evidence, is "perfect in all its details, it is equally good and true throughout." But even Plato in the *Laws* was sufficiently impressed by these "details" to moot the hypothesis of an evil world-soul, and certain Gnostics inferred an imperfect, even malevolent, creator. A suggestion of this sort was entertained by Hume, while many recent writers, turning from the "details" in disgust, have told the Absolute, frankly though impolitely, what they think of it. The Absolute indulges, in sooth, in strange "theophanies." Thus the episode of a man being eaten alive by ants falls below our standard of perfection. Still, everything being a "detail" of the Absolute, everything must be held to reveal it.[1] We

[1] In the eighteenth century in Christian France, A. M. Derues, a murderer, whose legs had been crushed in the "boot" till the bones were smashed, was

are unable, therefore, to whitewash this Absolute in the manner of Bradley or Royce, and must regard Plato and the Gnostics as making a braver effort to interpret the facts.

We have discussed the abominations of life frankly elsewhere, and suggest that the reader should inquire whether any hypothesis, save the imaginal, has room for the facts; that is to say, if the facts are to be regarded as consistent with trust in the universe and a larger hope. "Imaginism," an acute thinker writes to me, "offers the only conceivable way out of our difficulties." It exonerates the world-principle; it abolishes the call for an indictment of God. The initiatives, that sprout in all quarters, cannot be fore-ordained, if there is to be a creative process, and hence an evolution of us sentients, at all. The way to paradise is through infernos, in which even a "voluptuous pleasure in cruelty" is, if not exactly primitive, at least normal, as natural as hunger and thirst.[1] And the cruelty of beast and man may be surpassed by the joyful malevolence of beings superior to us in wisdom and

broken on the wheel publicly. Each time the executioner struck him with the iron bar "a fearful cry came from the culprit. The customary three final blows on the stomach were inflicted, but still the little man lived. Alive and broken, he was thrown on to the fire" (H. B. Irving, *A Book of Remarkable Criminals*, p. 154). Conceive the inferno of malice revealed in the criminal, executioner, judicature, and the public alike—in the Hegelian State itself. And this abomination is to be accepted as phase of a timelessly perfect Absolute. Faugh!

[1] Cf. Bain, *Dissertations*, who asks, "Is there such a thing as Pure Malevolence?" and answers yes. It is for him "natural and primitive" and supplies intense pleasure in the absence of countervailing sympathies. Animals as well as men (*e.g.* the African leopard, F. G. Aflalo, *The Book of the Wilderness and Jungle*, pp. 188-9) seem to display it.

In her theosophical pamphlet *Man's Place and Functions in Nature*, pp. 8-9, Mrs. Besant, in an effort to vindicate the ways of Nature, assures us that man "was responsible for lions, tigers, and other carnivorous creatures," not originally intended to eat flesh, but trained by him to do so. The biologist and palaeontologist may have something to say touching this astonishing statement. But, ignoring their views, let us say that the doings of the great carnivores are a very minor portion of the grim facts that stain reality; and that flesh-eating, at any rate, is sufficiently primitive to be noted among the *Infusoria*. (Cf. Binet, *Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms*, transl. Open Court Cpy., p. 54, on the hunting of a *Paramecium* by a *Didinium*.)

power. Since insulated sentients cannot feel directly the pangs which they inflict, and since life's struggle represses sympathy, not merely aggression, but cruelty, comes to be habitual. And among the harder men and even supermen cruelty may be valued as sport. Curiosity to see how beings behave when hurt, joy in power, the pleasure of watching disturbances as amusing, perhaps, as a cinema-film, prompt to mischief. This sort of creativeness is sure to arise as well as others.

As soon as separate sentients come to exist, the possibility of counter-initiatives, often so grim, is open. The praying mantis of Fabre's *Hunting Wasps*, which is seen to eat a wasp, which itself is robbing a tortured bee, illustrates well the initiatives that clash in Nature. Imagining has run amok. *Hinc illae lacrimae.* Schopenhauer declares that "the true sense of tragedy is the deeper insight, that it is not his own sins that the hero atones for, but original sin, *i.e.* the crime of existence itself." [1] Of course but for the birth of sentients there would have been no division, no conflict, and no pain. But what if existence is not a crime? In this case, we might accept life's tragedies without murmuring. A world-order, if worth continuing, must be continued inflexibly, whatever evils infect its story. And there are evils which are transformable into good. Unfortunately there are many which are sheerly bad; and these bring us to the consideration of our last problem.

Darwin cites Helmholtz in respect of the imperfections of the human eye, and comments himself on the defect of the bee's sting.[2] And R. A. Proctor observed that "millions of otherwise healthy and well-formed mothers and children have been killed, because of the shortening of the front to back diameter of the pelvis"; a bad flaw in the procedure by which the human body was evolved.[3] Facts such as these—and many could be cited—prepare us to look for failures in the domain

[1] *World as Will and Idea*, Haldane and Kemp's transl., i. 328.
[2] *Origin of Species*, 6th ed., p. 163.
[3] On "Upright Man" in *Universe of Suns*, pp. 349-50.

of history as well; and these prove to be very numerous. It is difficult to select, when so much invites comment, but the illustration that follows has its worth.

We smile at the absurd migration of the lemming, which has multiplied exceedingly just to plunge blindly into the ocean and drown. But what are we to make of the fact that "throughout Asia and formerly in most European countries in which the labouring classes were not in personal bondage there is, or was, no restrainer of population but death"?[1] And excessive multiplication achieves no valuable end; though, as in the case of the toiling Chinese, it enables man to "reduce poverty to a science"! Turn to this grim picture. "The disasters of flood and famine are of periodical occurrence in all parts of the Empire. The Chinese desire for posterity is so overmastering a passion that circumstances that ought to operate as an effectual check upon population . . . appear to be in China relatively inefficient for that purpose. The very poorest people continue to marry their children at an early age, and these children bring up large families, just as if there were any provision for their maintenance. The result of these and other causes is that a large proportion of the population lives, in the most literal sense, from hand to mouth. This may be said to be the universal condition of day-labourers, and it is a condition from which there appears to be no possibility of escape. Hopeless poverty is the most prominent fact in the Chinese Empire, and the bearing of this fact in the relations of the people to one another must be evident to the most careless observer. The result of this pressure for the means of subsistence, and of the habits which the pressure cultivates and fixes, even after the immediate demand is no longer urgent, is to bring life down to a hard materialistic basis, in which there are but two prominent facts. Money and food are twin foci of the Chinese ellipse, and it is about them as centres that the whole social life of the people revolves."[2] A dark region this, even in our corner of an immature world-

[1] Mill.

[2] A. H. Smith, *Chinese Characteristics*, p. 195.

system. Defective "providential" guidance, if nothing worse, is indicated; this long-drawn-out failure is what we may call irrational, meaning that it frustrates the ends of rich and full human living and subserves no other purpose of a high order. Clearly a world, thus divided against itself, a world which evolved the parasite, the weasel, the Gaboon viper, and the sawfish, and drove the South Sea islander, through pressure of population, to cannibalism, cannot be regarded as wholly divine. It belongs to the sphere of the divisions, where imagining, freed from central control, has run amok; and it can only be raised gradually to something worthy of the homage of love.

We need not repeat here our description of the dark side of our minor world. But what we desire to emphasise is that it seems even darker than philosophy might incline us to expect. There appears to be defective providential guidance on the part of the higher sentients allied with it and even positive opposition, on the part of certain of these, to its betterment. The facts which support this view are not far to seek; they exist in every quarter, but are most impressive, no doubt, in the sphere of history: a domain suggestive at once of the realisation of spirit, of experiments that succeed and of others that fail, of blunders that make for disaster and even of diabolism. Is not history "the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals have been victimised"?[1] We are justified, perhaps, in inferring from such facts that the corner of the world-system in which we live is, cosmically speaking, of recent origin; that it and its guiding higher sentients are immature; that its return to the divine may be only beginning and lags, it may be, behind that of the greater process to which it belongs. Only empirical facts can be used in shaping such conclusions, but the facts are plentiful and, for those who believe in the superhuman, can hardly be interpreted in any other way. Accordingly when the general philosophical

[1] Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, Sibree's transl., p. 22.

explanation of evil seems remote from our workaday life, we have to remember that many of the agents which it discusses are sentients, not very unlike ourselves, who are active at this moment in prolonging the world's travail, and that other higher sentients, our allies, may be unable, from lack of wisdom or power or both, to bring to pass always what they desire. A supplementary view of this sort ought not to be overlooked. In the end all will be well, but the young sub-system, which forms a stage for so many kinds of players, cannot escape the trials and misadventures incidental to its youth.

NOTE ON THE PLATONIC DEMIURGE, cf. § 4, p. 224.

The Idea or Form of the Good, which Socrates, in the *Republic*, treats as ground of knowledge and being, is not mentioned again in the Platonic dialogues. (Cf. Burnet's delightful *Greek Philosophy*, Part I., p. 169.) For Plato the Demiurge remains the highest God. In the *Timaeus*, which is much later than the *Republic*, the details are "mythical" (Burnet, *ibid.*, p. 342; Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*. Longmans, 1909, pp. 150-52), but the Demiurge presides at any rate over a time-process. Change then has come into its own! One more remark. The Idea of the Good, treated as all but unknowable, is provisional. It is a distant view of what we have discussed as Divine Imagining.

APPENDIX

§ 1. The Domain of Logic

(Cf. p. 66 of the text.)

Divine experience comprises, we agreed, *stable* or conservative connexions, but there is no call to dub these "logical." As immediacy of imagining, reality rather than truth, It has no place for reasoning, and therewith a guiding logic, of Its own. On the other hand, human and like experients in a time-process are forced to reason; their direct acquaintance with reality is fragmentary and what they know about it is in great part menaced by change. Logic helps somewhat to lessen the number of mistakes with which actual reasoning teems. It promises best, perhaps, when regarded as "a branch of psychology treating of the processes which issue in inference, and having special regard to the exigencies of proof" (*World as Imagination*, p. 615); the more fundamental issues sometimes discussed by logicians being turned over to metaphysics and general psychology. Reasoning is a way of supplementing direct experience; is experimental and has to take its risks. The "rigorous deductions" which I bring to bear on rocks, couloirs, and ice-slopes will not secure me against possible mishaps; they merely serve to guide my imagining *ad hoc*. But unless I make inferences, however fallible, I shall not be able even to begin my climb. Logic, as we have to live it, is a form of tentative imagining.

The formal logic, which ignores psychology, will resent, of course, our definition. Lost in verbalism, dominated by a mistaken notion of what constitutes proof,[1] this logic drifts, as its tormentor, Dr. Schiller, has shown so effectively, to the meaningless, to "nonsense."[2] It pretends, and it cannot hope, to be the science

[1] The ultimate test of truth is agreement with reality. And, for all logical principles can say, reality may include even "contradictions."

[2] *Formal Logic*, p. 390.

and art of reasoning; its abstractness and artificiality keep it at too great a distance from this reasoning. "Psychologic" could be at once a science and, in a much higher degree, of practical use. It remains to say a word about that alleged pure logic which, clad in symbols, affects to look down with lordly disdain on the empirical world. *Immune from ordinary "testing"* owing to its very aloofness, it fuses with abstract mathematics. "Logic is the youth of mathematics and mathematics is the manhood of logic."[1] Construction with the alleged resources of this logic originates a new cult of intrinsic worth. We need not quarrel with its assumptions, the spurious "law" of contradiction,[2] the formal validity of the syllogism, and so forth. The cult has a right to its assumptions. And, viewed thus and being assuredly productive, it has its place in the treasure-house of creative imagining.

Rigorous deduction is the delight of the logistician. But just here's the rub. The soul of this so-called pure deductive logic, of which mathematics is the manhood, lies, in fact, not in methodical formal reasoning, but in that "logical imagination" and "philosophic vision" to which even Russell himself appeals in a stray passage that reveals the truth.[3] The formalism clothes a *consistent* imagining that does the work. It wears deceptively the appearance of being itself the creative power. An ideal object X having been imagined first in schematic fashion, elaboration of it and the ascertaining of its relations to other ideal objects by way of "method" complete the effort. It is the first step that costs so much.

Such imagining need not be "about" realities that "correspond" to it. There may be none such. On this level it may generate or discover the realities themselves. Its "meaning," consequently, lies not beyond itself, but is inseparable from what, in its systematic consistency, it is.

A *reality* of inspection may stand higher than a system of merely reasoned *truth*.

Logic, as conceived by the mathematical logician, Dr. Whitehead, takes flight into the recondite, but remains, withal, the guide of human reasoning wherein it figures unambiguously as the "logic of discovery" and the "logic of the discovered." Mathe-

[1] Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 194.

[2] Cf. Chap. VI. § 1 of this work.

[3] *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 241. Cf. also Chap. III. p. 37 of this work.

matics is that complicated deductive reasoning of the " logic of the discovered " which concerns more especially number, quantity, and space. Certain problems which he regards as " logical " would fall for us under metaphysics or general psychology, but this is of minor importance. And certain propositions, which for him are assured truths, are for us just command-propositions or even, as in the case of the " law " of contradiction, mere maxims. Again we have a leaning to concrete imagining rather than to the " abstract " or " logical " imagining which, clothing itself in symbols, exists in a rare atmosphere aloof from the main stream of life. But what of this ? It is well that all worthy phases of imagining should find favour among finite sentients ; the poet and mathematical logician are equally required to exploit the possibilities of the world-principle so that it may blossom lavishly within our particular system.

Dr. Whitehead sees clearly that mere knowledge of " valid types of reasoning " does not make the reasoner. " The art of reasoning consists in getting hold of the subject at the right end, of seizing on the few general ideas which illuminate the whole, and of persistently marshalling all subsidiary facts round them." [1] But yet more remains to be said. The successful worker is often indifferent to method ; or, having reached valuable results he knows not how, proceeds, as an afterthought, to contrive a logical route to them. Faraday indeed, who was not an expert in mathematical analysis, left the road-making in part to others. " It is in the highest degree astonishing," observed von Helmholtz (Faraday Lecture, 1881), " to see what a large number of general theorems, the mathematical deduction of which requires the highest powers of mathematical analysis, he formed by a kind of intuition, with the security of instinct, without the help of a single mathematical formula." This notable example indicates, even to the most rigorous logician, that there is a sphere of the *superlogical* ; a sphere, moreover, not to be described appropriately as " instinctive." Intuition (Chap. II. § 2, Chap. III. § 3) is intuitive imagining ; and this live, direct imagining may disdain the help which logic affords to imagining of the plodding sort. Once more, then, we note that it is not the fecundity of " forms," but of the imagining which uses these " forms " and is called " logical " accordingly by Russell, that is fundamental. Deduction in the form of a workaday " prac-

[1] *The Organisation of Thought*, p. 82.

tical inference," *e.g.* my inference (or "bringing into" perception) that the snow gully is safe, is obviously creative imagining; deduction in the form of "severe reason" is essentially an extension of the same thing. And it is just this extension which rescues "logical deduction" from the familiar charge of being barren. The premisses employed are not the sole source of the "consequences" said to be "drawn from them." Premisses, in sooth, are never other than guides to imagining, concrete or abstract; here as elsewhere "antecedents" never quite suffice to explain novel "consequences," whatever these be. The fact that some of these special inferences are about ideal objects and serve to build up stable or conservative structures makes no difference.

Let us cite an example of highly abstract procedure; of the "logical imagination" concerned with the arithmetic section of that logic which discusses the relations of definite propositions to each other "just as arithmetic deals with definite numbers." The passage occurs in one of Whitehead's works.[1] "Consider any definite proposition; call it '*p*.' We *conceive* that there is always another proposition which is the direct contradictory to '*p*'; call it 'not-*p*.' When we have got two propositions, *p* and *q*, we can *form* derivative propositions from them, and from their contradictories. We can say, 'At least one of *p* or *q* is true, and perhaps both.' Let us call this proposition '*p* or *q*.' . . . We have thus got hold of four new propositions, namely, '*p* or *q*,' and 'not-*p* or *q*,' and '*p* or not-*q*,' and 'not-*p* or not-*q*.'" And so on, the propositions being multiplied endlessly. These terms "*conceive*" and "*form*" (italics ours), interpreted in the light of our view of truth, reveal much. The multiplying of propositions is our own act. And the string of propositions created is not, as logicians suggest to us, concerned with "truth-values." An unapplied, untested proposition, which merely "coheres" with other untested propositions, is neither true nor false. The "logical imagination," conditioned by abstract assumptions, accounts for the multiplication. A new kind of imaginal reality is being made, and one free from internal conflict. Its "abstract objects" are of primary interest to us. They *mean* no more than what they and their system *are*. They are not truths which mean something other than the asserting propositions: they are parts of a factual con-

[1] Whitehead, *Organisation of Thought*, p. 117.

struction like rocks, rivers, or suns, present to divine or human fancy. We have not to say whether such facts ought to interest us more or less than other facts—comets, glaciers, or Neæra's hair. Tastes differ; and the world-principle is justified of all its noble manifestations and creations that endure. Even the "arid logic," detested by the poet, is disliked mainly because the poet is incompetent in this regard. It is a sphere of austere beauty to the logician. On the other hand, the logician, if he cannot write poetry, can at any rate understand and appreciate it. He belongs, therefore, in this respect to a level superior to that of his critic. Let us allow that the excellences of others enrich the world; are not to be cut down to match the Procrustean bed of our defects.

§ 2. Continuity

(Cf. p. 72 and elsewhere.)

Continuity is a concept which, as framed originally, comprised metaphor. The primitive notion is that of "holding together," as of separate sticks by a woodman. This "holding together" does away with the intervals between the sticks; and thus they lie together forming a compact aggregate unbroken by anything which is not a stick. This crude notion is modified and refined by its applications during the history of thought. For such notions are not unalterable, but belong themselves to creative evolution. The "appercipient" metaphor-notion, which greets a novel experience, itself suffers change.

Continuity, symbolised by the "holding together," and discreteness, symbolised by the separate sticks, ought to show even in the refined concept. But men oscillate much between the aspects of any complex thought. And certain physicists and mathematicians have had the sticks—discreteness—mainly or entirely in view to the ignoring or minimising of the riddle as to how they are together at all. They try to conjure somehow unity out of multiplicity.

What is our treatment of Continuity? In the first place, we urge that it denotes a feature of consciring and, as such, a fundamental condition of the universe. All modes of being, present to consciring, are related, directly or mediately, actually or potentially. Continuity of this general sort "holds together"—to prolong the original metaphor—even the most disparate and mutually indifferent contents: triangles and spice, purple and infinite numbers,

square roots and steel filings. It is compatible with partial insulations, disjunctions, and breaks of all sorts. Observe that cosmic consciring itself has an aspect of discreteness: the finite sentients which appear to themselves insulated or detached. But, in this sphere as elsewhere, the discrete are not barely detached existents, but also "held together."

In the second place, continuity is assertable of *contents* as related *inter se*. Continuity and discreteness are compresent in all modes of content, but the interests guiding human attention tend to throw now one, now the other feature, into relief. Thus a tendency to "atomise" reputed and solid-seeming wholes into detached existents and happenings has found great favour in many provinces of science. Nay, the material ether, imagined by various poets of science as an all-pervasive connecting medium, was re-imagined at last by another as discrete, as consisting of rigid granules containing travelling hollows.[1] What are we to say of this? Well, the facts, which favour "atomicity," are statable and enforce therefore recognition in some fashion. At the same time, once over-emphasised, they create difficulties; whereupon a complementary side of things is thrown into relief. Thus the merely discrete "atom" or "electron" fails us; its contents, more or less stable, belong also to the psychical continuum of Nature, exemplify imaginals (Chap. VIII. § 3), are the "meeting places of universals," as some would prefer to say. We talk much of detached "natural units," but remember that the very presentation, which feeds our imagining, comes first as a continuum. Natural sequences, again, despite their "jumps" or spurts of creative change,[2] cohere intimately with manifesting imaginals and the general cosmic life. Like discrete "jumps" occur in our own fancy and yet not aloof from the rest of our psychical being. As to the ether, what is material ether, continuous or discontinuous, after all? The "outcome," urges Dr. Whitehead, "of a metaphysical craving. The continuity of nature is the continuity of events."[3] And of these last "every event extends over other

[1] Professor Osborne Reynolds.

[2] Cf. Poincaré, as cited by Sir O. Lodge, *Continuity*, p. 38: "A physical system is susceptible of a finite number only of distinct conditions; it jumps from one of these conditions to another without passing through a continuous series of intermediate conditions."

[3] *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 25.

events which are parts of itself, and every event is extended over by other events of which it is part," [1] these events in one another's being mingling, as Shelley's immortal phrase might declare yet once more.

Such intermingling infects all the discretes. And in so far as they thus overlap and penetrate one another, contents are continuous *inter se*. This, indeed, is the continuity described by Bergson as " at once the multiplicity of elements and the interpenetration of all by all." [2] Since, however, there obtain " elements," disparate and disconnected *inter se*, we ought to write rather of an interpenetration of " each by very many " ; their compresence to the universal consciring is not the same as their intermingling ; a point urged by us elsewhere. But definitions conflict. In the view of continuity favoured by James, both our first sort of continuity (which is presupposed by all contents, whether compenetrating or not) and the sort implying compenetrating contents are ignored. Anything is continuous " when its parts appear as immediate next neighbours with absolutely nothing between." An iceberg may be sensibly continuous in this sense. Similarly we can discuss the continuity of a Democritan atom, emphasising a solid singleness devoid of sudden changes or " jumps," or the " discontinuous " spectrum of bright lines, separated by dark intervals, which a gaseous nebula transmits to the photographic plate. Note that sun and planets, which are discrete on James's showing, are also continuous as we interpret the term. Note, further, that there are mathematical series, said to have continuity as a property, in which the terms have no " next " terms at all. For those interested in the " abstract imagination " (the expression is that of Russell) of mathematicians, the ideas of Cantor and Dedekind invite study. But these ideas not concerning, we are told, " actual existence," *i.e.* the main stream of cosmic fact relative to metaphysical interests, seem irrelevant here. They are inapplicable to the empirical world around us. Space and time, *e.g.*, are not " continuous " in Cantor's meaning of the word, not possessing the required $2^{\aleph 0}$ points and instants : space and time aspects are numerically finite. Such ideas belong to a sphere apart : a sphere of great charm wherein " abstract imagination " is not about reality, but—a consideration of primary interest—is the developing reality itself.

[1] *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 61.
[2] *Creative Evolution*, Eng. transl., p. 171.

Continuity offers the student a field for hard thinking. We are clear as to the general cosmic continuity ensured by *consciring*. And so far, so good. But we saw that continuity, as ascribed to *contents*, has been defined in conflicting ways. Nevertheless we shall not be far wrong, if we look to modes of interpenetration, as yet not fully understood, as constituting, in the main, such continuity of contents as is of interest to metaphysics. The continuity of " nextness " is of secondary interest. And the continuity which emphasises multiplicity, to the ignoring of unity, shows us indeed the densely packed sticks, but it leaves the riddle of their bundle altogether unread.

Royce (*World and the Individual*) and Taylor (*Elements of Metaphysics*) incline to apply mathematical continuity, as conceived by votaries of the " abstract imagination," to the world of general experience: though some of these poets of mathematics have denied that they have " actual existence " in view. Certain pluralists might well favour the project, which, however, only a very sanguine maker of experiments can entertain.

§ 3. Metaphysics and Number

(Cf. p. 39 of text and elsewhere.)

The topic of Number can be approached in two ways. Thus Dedekind considers the number-concept " an immediate result from the laws of thought . . . numbers are free creations of the human mind; they serve as a means of apprehending more easily and more sharply the difference of things. It is only through the purely logical process of building up the science of numbers and by thus acquiring the continuous number-domain that we are prepared accurately to investigate our notions of space and time by bringing them into relation with this number-domain created in our mind. If we scrutinise closely what is done in counting an aggregate or number of things, we are led to consider the ability of the mind to relate things to things, to let a thing correspond to a thing, or to represent a thing by a thing, an ability without which no thinking is possible." [1] On this foundation he builds the science of number: of the number-system which shows an aloofness and independence reminding us of a Platonic Idea. And Russell, disdainful of the empirical, declares that " in a synthetic, deductive treatment these

[1] *Essays on Number*, Open Court Cpy., 1909, pp. 31-2.

[logical] fundamentals come first, and the natural numbers are only reached after a long journey." [1] This mode of treating the problem from above contrasts strangely with the empirical way of approaching it from below. The empiricist will urge, not without force, that, if the natural numbers had not been reached first through experience, this supplementary "deduction" of them from pure logic could not have been entertained. We are like observers of a waterspout, which is explained by one mariner as due to a force descending from the sky and by another as due to the sea ascending from below. It may be that both factors have to be taken into account.

Common sense and Euclid regard numbers as pluralities of units taken together; 0 and the unit, taken separately, being ignored. And we have to recognise that, failing distinguishable units, such a statement as $2+2=4$, as used by most men, would become meaningless, a *flatus vocis*. A case of $2+2=4$ is primarily not a *truth* of inference, which implies other truths from which it is deduced; it is, in essentials, a *reality of inspection* which can stand by itself; a whole in which discrete units, interesting in respect of this very discreteness, are conscired. And we ought not to call this whole, in the undiscriminating modern fashion, a "collection," or "aggregate," since there is no action of the sort suggested always implied. When I add two sentients or two emotions to two others, I am aware of these together in a certain way relevant to the pursuit of an end: there is no physical collecting or aggregating in view. When I say there are over a thousand million human sentients on this planet, I merely take note of them in an act of consciring or conscious grasp. I am interested in their discreteness, as separate beings, which bears upon a passing discussion. I do not want to make pemmican of them.

Two such empirical unit-wholes are equal when the units of the one, paired with those of the other, leave no remainder. And the units? There are units which conscire and units which are "made" by consciring. Consider the "made" units. Nature, inflowing as the presentation-continuum, comes at first to us unbroken; and what are called unitary objects of perception are carved out of this "felt mass." Some of these objects coincide with more or less stable complexes in Nature, which are referred to as natural units; others are obviously artefacts, *e.g.* units of heat, delimited as we

[1] *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 195.

require them. All serve our interests: an already delimited complex can be *re-conscired* as one or many as these interests dictate. The consciring is controlled, withal, by this: actual, plural differences in Nature are presupposed by the distinctions of the units "made." [1] The unit of content, thus delimited, and treated as what lasts or may last through changes, is an imaginal creation. Even so it reflects the unity and centrality of consciring as the pale moon displays its borrowed light. It is a unit at a remove, existing for the creative consciring, but not for itself. Sentient units, on the other hand, though themselves delimited within Divine Consciring, shine also in their own light. They are units that act as wholes and are aware that they do so. And these primary units invent the secondary units. They use numbers, to appropriate Dedekind's language, in order to the apprehending of differences "more easily and more sharply." There is no call to label this "free creation" logical. The creation did not resemble at first our reasoning and its guiding logic. It was superlogical show of that imagining which underlies all else in the world; things that pass and things that endure alike. This imagining is present throughout all stages of genetic evolution.

We can thus observe the foundations of the $2+2=4$ of the text (§ 4, Chap. V.). And we repeat that this statement cannot be tested and verified, unless the stable empirical units implied are available. But the number-system of the pure mathematician, conceived in aloofness from "actual existence," stands apart. It repels all such verification. $2+2=4$, as a relation within this system, is well—a part of it. And, *truth* being left out of account, it remains *real* as feature of this larger coherent reality. There are innumerable realities which are not truths, and, as we agreed, reality—Divine Imagining—as a whole is Itself beyond truth. In an abstract number-system even 0 can be included, *e.g.* as the class whose only member is the "null-class," also 1, while finite or inductive numbers can be supplemented with infinite, and so on. The "abstract imagination" seeks to be consistent, but also to be free; and it invents accordingly its special logical poem. The

[1] "When we come to the inanimate world, it seems to become purely a matter of our own subjective interest what we shall call one thing and what we shall call many. That is one which may be regarded as acting as one whole in respect of its bearing upon any interest of ours" (Professor Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 127).

problem of meaning, in the form which may vex some critics, does not arise. The poem disdains verification from without. A sphere of imaginal reality may have a meaning and value of its own.

Opinions will differ as to whether the abstract number-system is a "free creation" of mathematicians or a discovery. But, whether created or merely discovered by man, its appearance to the ordinary user of numbers is "from above." It does not grow out of primitive psychological antecedents: it comes to them. We agreed that all fresh appearances come to their antecedents; are not merely educed from forerunning events in the time-process. The advent of numbers and the abstract number-system illustrates once more what takes place on the cosmic scale. To recur to the simile of the waterspout: As the water rises skyward the powers of the sky descend to meet it. And the wise man will add that, unless the powers of the sky move first, the seeming initiative of the water would not occur at all.

A "pure" number-system, independent of the finite sentients who discover it, might be called a conservative feature of Divine Imagining. "Logical" seems an adjective out of place. For we should be considering not a system of reasoned *truth*, but a *reality* of direct inspection; a whole present to an immediate intuition, not a twilight of "principles," "concepts," and deductive process. But who is to say whether the number-system is a free creation of finite sentients or not? We are inclined, it is true, to suspect that, outside the "abstract imagination" of mathematicians, there are no numbers which are not numbers of differents, sentient and other, present to, and delimited within, Divine Conseiring and Its continuing centres. And, if in so doing we incur a risk, we are content. No human thinker seems to be in a position to correct our mistake.

§ 4. Instinct and Imagining [1]

The failure of the Darwinian and what are called "naturalistic" theories of instinct is now obvious—to any one without a mechanistic creed to save. These theories will not stand the test of being applied, by observers such as J. H. Fabre, to the facts. Entomology alone, as studied by Darwin's "incomparable observer," shows that they

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 560-65.

minimise and overlook altogether too much. "Instinct overwhelms me with its variety," writes Fabre. And what was the view forced on this unwearied student? When discussing the "rough and ready implements" of certain insects, he tells us: "The same notched mandible that reaps cotton, cuts leaves and moulds pitch, also kneads mud, scrapes decayed wood and mixes mortar; the same tarsus that manufactures cotton and disks cut out of leaves is no less clever at the art of making earthen partitions, clay turrets and gravel mosaics."

What then is the reason of these thousand industries? In the light of facts, I can see but one: "*imagination* governing matter."[1] We have to add that the nerve-structures, labelled "matter," are themselves parts of imaginal Nature. What is acting is that "fundamental power" at the roots of the sentient (§ 3 Chap. III.) which goes straight to its mark. Fabre's view is a middle principle which fits excellently into the imaginal hypothesis, from which it could have been deduced.

Bergson, again, who has profited by the facts collected by Fabre, rejects equally the makeshift-theories of mechanistic science. Instinct prolongs the organising life that works in the body; is also "knowledge at a distance"; a "sympathy" which teaches from within.[2] He assures us that "all goes on as if the cell knew, of the other cells, what concerns itself; as if the animal knew, of the other animals, what it can utilise—all else remaining in the shade."[3] Difficulties, however, arise. There could be knowledge at a distance, owing nothing to outward perception, only in cases in which the animals are conscious of what they do. Has the present-day *Sphex*, that stabs a cricket, a clairvoyant knowledge of its anatomy? Again, is it knowledge at a distance that makes a crab cherish a destructive parasite instead of its absent eggs?[4] Does this knowledge guide the female *Lycosa* spider, watched by Fabre, which solemnly "fastens to her spinnerets and dangles, by way of a bag of eggs, a ball of cork polished with my file, a paper pellet,

[1] *Bramble Bees and Others*, pp. 352-3.

[2] The "feeling of vulnerability might owe nothing to outward perception, but result from the mere presence together of the Ammophila and the caterpillar, considered no longer as two organisms, but as two activities" (*Creative Evolution*, Eng. transl., p. 183).

[3] *Creative Evolution*, Eng. transl., p. 176.

[4] Cf. the case cited *World as Imagination*, p. 562.

a little ball of thread" ? Does it tutor the mason-wasp which "plasters up the spot in the wall where the nest which I have removed used to stand, when she persists in cramming her cell with spiders for the benefit of an egg no longer there and when she dutifully closes a cell which my forceps has left empty, extracting alike germ and provisions" ?[1] There is a stupid, unplastic fatality, which surely excludes knowledge, about all this. A dog, again, that curls round and round before settling down on the mat, displays instinct, but hardly knowledge at a distance. And assuredly many of the very numerous human instincts do not presuppose this knowledge.[2] Some of these, too, do much more than prolong the organising life of the body. Is the body as such modest, gregarious, or playful ? Has not Bergson been considering rather the exceptional cases of animal instinct such as stir our wonder in the pages of Peckham and Fabre ?

Instinct may be defined as action (in part, or quite, independent of teaching), common to members of a species, which resembles the pursuit of ends, but which is accompanied by no clear, sometimes by no purposive, representation of these ends. The instinct of the bird, which has made a nest half-a-dozen times, has been swathed with knowledge and is a secondary phenomenon. The end is represented more or less clearly. Human instincts are rapidly swathed with knowledge and so far transformed.

The nature-objects called animal bodies are complexes within cosmic imagining. The instincts, that direct them, are forms of imagining as well ; hence the controlling imagination which Fabre detects. This instinctive "response" to "stimulus" is at first free action, but takes on by degrees the fatality of habit that repeats itself ; even when the awakening stimulus, like the cork ball dangled by the spider, is a cheat. It may show first as a stray variation or as a "mutation," common to a group. It may be complete at birth. Thus the hunting wasps, that disarm and paralyse the *Tarantula* by two stings, could not learn their trade slowly—by accumulated chance variations preserved and co-ordinated by natural selection. They must enter fully armed and trained into a fray otherwise fatal to them.

It may be that exceptional perceptions, special insights into

[1] *Bramble Bees and Others*, p. 202.

[2] Check this statement by the long list of instincts noted by James, *Principles of Psychology*, ii. 383-441.

Nature processes, are wanted for the birth of certain instincts, Anyhow, such instincts have to provide guidance; and they will not consult always our psychological conventions in doing so. And at this growing-point—the point of the original free making of the instinct—consciring will be intense. With the consolidation of the instinct by repetition, the fatality of habit supervenes. The burden of the now stabilised action is transferred from the *chief sentient* of the organism to the *minor sentients* which are masked by the structures and functions of nerves and the rest. The action will now be repeated, as we say, "automatically" even on a "stimulus" which evokes a futile "response." The spider may hug a sham egg-bag; the caged squirrel may hoard useless objects, and so on. The *body* in these cases behaves in a more or less irrational way—*i.e.* a way that subserves no end of value—and what is done finds an echo and little more in the chief sentient allied with it. The animal seems sometimes merely a spectator, and a dull one, of what is being thrust on its notice. And yet even at this extreme pole of conservation nothing re-occurs untinged by novel complicating circumstances.

The least impressive instinctive "response" to a "stimulus," a trivial "compound reflex" to the young physiologist in a hurry, conceals a problem. And there are all sorts of instincts, banal and marvellous, comparatively simple and highly complex; the more remarkable of these carrying thought very far. The world, we said, dances like a ball on the jets of creative imagining; and the source of this fountain lies deep. The world's changes, sometimes violent and abrupt, reveal a balancing of qualities. Let us repeat Bradley's saying: "We can set no bounds to the existence and powers of sentient beings." Very many grades of such beings, superior and inferior to ourselves, may be concerned with the processes of "organic" and "inorganic" evolution. This indeed was the surmise of A. R. Wallace, Darwin's co-exploiter of natural selection, and, needless to say, is among the possibilities allowed for by imaginist philosophy. "Local initiatives" may proceed from all manner of overlooked agents, super- and subhuman; not to take account of these will be to leave many riddles, even of this sphere of instinct, unread.[1]

Natural selection, that fetish of mechanistic biology, concerns

[1] Cf. *World as Imagination*, pp. 549-55, on Local Initiatives.

merely the business of elimination;[1] variations come to it which it does not make. The problem of the origin of these variations is more important than the fact that some of them survive the test of struggle, while others do not. Their causation may refer us to all sorts of agents from "mentoids" to gods; from what have been called the "fortuitous happenings" of a low psycho-physical level to the purposiveness of superhumans working with a creative fancy in view. Current factors of organic evolution, as discussed by science, are assuredly most defective. And the biological treatment of instinct well exemplifies the character of the knowledge with which, so far, we have been compelled to make shift.

[1] *World as Imagination*, pp. 538 ff.

THE END

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