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BY

G. P. GOOCH, D.LITT., F.B.A.

AUTHOR OF 'HISTORY AND HISTORIANS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY,' 'HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE, 1878–1919,' ETC.

FOURTH IMPRESSION

WITH A SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER ON THE REVELATIONS OF 1928–9

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PREFACE TO THE FOURTH IMPRESSION

THE call for a fourth impression provides the opportunity for a survey of the revelations of 1928–9 (see pp. lxi–ccxi). The eight large volumes of Austrian official documents on the years 1908–1914 appeared too late for notice in these pages.

If the demand continues, I hope to merge the supplements in a revised version of the original work.

G. P. G.

December, 1929.

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PREFACE TO THE THIRD IMPRESSION

THE demand for a third impression of this book has encouraged me to attempt a brief survey of the relevant publications of 1927 (see pp. xi–lx).

The text remains unaltered ; but I am glad of the opportunity to correct two mistakes. Sazonoff, not Izvolsky, was the brother-in-law of Stolypin (page 100) ; and the first Director of the *Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen* was Ernst Sauerbeck, not Alfred von Wegerer (page 12).

It may be of interest to note that, of the works mentioned in the first edition, the *Letters of Francis Joseph*, the *Memoirs* of Rodzjanko and Liman von Sanders, and Brandenburg's important volume, *From Bismarck to the World War*, have recently appeared in English dress. The translation of the latter incorporates the new matter in the second German edition, and includes a critical appendix on the Memoirs of Lord Grey.

G. P. G.

February, 1928.

PREFACE

THIS little book has been written in the hope of aiding students of the World War and its causes to keep pace with the almost bewildering accumulation of material. It has grown out of a paper read to the British Institute of International Affairs on December 12, 1922, and published in the *Journal* of the Institute for January, 1923. A reprint met with a considerable demand at home and abroad, and I have been pressed from many quarters to bring the survey up to date. The political and diplomatic revelations of the last four years are no less significant than those reviewed in the original address, and many of them remain unfamiliar to English readers. I have confined myself to publications subsequent to the outbreak of war, and illustrating the period from the accession of William II to the Treaty of Versailles. Magazine articles are only mentioned when they are of exceptional importance.

Though the main purpose of this volume is to summarise the testimony and arguments of other men, I have often ventured to express my own views on books, persons and events. I do not ask every reader to agree with them ; but some of my fellow-students may perhaps care to learn my opinions, as I am always glad to know theirs. What is offered is a *causerie*, not a bibliography. The title is stretched to include studies of character and temperament when first-hand material is available, and when such knowledge facilitates the interpretation of policy. Purely military writings are excluded, and no attempt has been made to map the literature bearing on

the economic and social history of the struggle, which may be studied in the ever-increasing array of monographs published by the Carnegie Endowment. It is scarcely necessary to add that I shall be grateful to friends or correspondents who may assist me to render this brief survey more accurate or, within its specified limits, less incomplete.

G. P. G.

January, 1927.

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SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER ON THE REVELATIONS OF 1927

THE revelations of 1927 are well up to standard in bulk and importance, and our survey may once again begin with Germany.

Fresh light is thrown on the diplomacy of the early years of the reign of William II by the closing chapters of the second volume of the *Denkwürdigkeiten* of General von Schweinitz. The invaluable diary and letters of the German Ambassador at Petrograd supplement his despatches published in *Die Grosse Politik*, and vividly portray the new orientation of Russian policy which was accelerated, though not caused, by the fall of Bismarck, and led to the formation of the Dual Alliance. The momentous decision of Caprivi not to renew the secret treaty of 1887 was reluctantly approved by Schweinitz on seeing the text of the secret treaty with Roumania ; but he regretted the rejection of Giers's reiterated request for 'something on paper, just a few lines,' to take its place. 'I am a living anachronism, a Don Quixote of Legitimacy,' lamented the veteran diplomatist after the tumultuous welcome of the French fleet at Cronstadt in 1891 ; 'my political activities of thirty years end with the collapse of all the principles for which I have laboured.' When he left the Russian capital on December 16, 1891, the German hegemony in Europe, which he had helped Bismarck to erect, was at an end.

The opening phases of the Kaiser's reign have been further illustrated by the massive volume *Aus dem Briefwechsel des Generalfeldmarschalls Grafen von Waldersee.*

The first instalment of the correspondence of the soldier who succeeded Moltke as Chief of the Staff covers the years 1886 to 1891 and forms a valuable supplement to the well-known *Denkwürdigkeiten*. For the student of European diplomacy the most profitable portion of the work is the correspondence of the Field-Marshal with the German Military Attachés abroad, especially with Engelbrecht in Rome and Deines in Vienna. The antagonism between the military and the civilian representatives of Germany, so familiar to us from the interior of Carlton House Terrace during the decade of Anglo-German naval rivalry, centres in this instance round the problem of a preventive war of the Central Powers against Russia in the later 'eighties, when the slow mind of Alexander III was turning towards France. The soldiers, led by Moltke and Waldersee, argued that the Franco-Russian alliance looming on the horizon should be averted by force, as Frederick the Great had boldly struck at the coalition of 1756 ; and it required all the incomparable authority of Bismarck to frustrate their warlike aims.

The same overmastering problem of the relation of Germany to Russia and Austria forms the main theme of Prince Lichnowsky's apologia, *Auf dem Wege zum Abgrund*. The major portion of these volumes consists of a reprint from *Die Grosse Politik* of the Ambassador's despatches during the years 1912–1914 ; but there is some new material of considerable interest, and some scathing criticism of the foreign policy of Imperial Germany.

The message of the book is proclaimed with power and passion in the Introduction, in which not only the Kaiser and his advisers, but the Iron Chancellor himself falls under the lash. After completing the unification of Germany, argues the Prince, Bismarck's diplomacy lost its sureness of touch. His supreme error was the decision in 1879 to avert imaginary dangers by leading his country into real and imminent peril. The Emperor, not his Chancellor, emerges as the one wise man. 'He

alone was right in struggling against the crazy alliance with Austria which brought us to destruction. Had he only stood fast and allowed Bismarck to go, the greatest catastrophe in history would have been impossible.' The unhappy Triple Alliance led inevitably to the Dual Alliance. 'The Diadochi regarded the Triplice as the foundation of our policy, the last word of wisdom. In reality it was a monstrosity hallowed by a great name. No ground of friction existed with Russia if we gave up our senseless Eastern policy.' The rift began in 1875. 'First we drove Russia into the arms of France, then into the arms of England.'

Once the false step had been taken it proved impossible to retrace it, and a fresh error of equal magnitude, the estrangement of England, was committed. The Anglo-French Entente was the fruit of the Morocco crisis which was staged by Holstein, 'though Delcassé, who really overestimated my influence, in a two-hour conversation after a dinner at the German Embassy in May 1904 declared himself ready to negotiate with us about Morocco,—to the fury of Holstein, who did not desire an agreement with England.' Holstein, he adds, was not normal, and lived in a world of illusions. 'The almost uncontrolled director of policy since Bismarck was a national misfortune, the real father of the world-war.' German statesmen never desired the war ; yet the war was the result of a false political orientation, of levity and blindness. 'The methods of the era of the Epigoni led straight to war, sooner or later.'

Passing to his own share in the drama, Lichnowsky explains that his book is not an apologia, since history has been his justification. 'Among our diplomatists I alone uttered continual warnings and correctly foretold events.' He always reported that England would not allow a second Sedan. 'Our senseless armaments disquieted our neighbours and provoked their combination. We could obtain almost anything from Grey, who was ready to meet us at every point. Only one thing I could not achieve. I could not hold him back when

we declared war on France and violated the neutrality of Belgium. That was the tragedy of my mission.'

The Introduction concludes with a formidable catalogue of blunders. The cutting of the wire to Petrograd in 1890 ; the challenge to Japan in 1895 ; the Kruger telegram ; the repulse of Chamberlain's approaches ; 'the mad navy policy, the madder Morocco policy and, worst of all, the Bosnian crisis' ; Agadir ; the failure to accept Grey's neutrality formula in 1912 ; the Liman Mission ; the rejection of Grey's mediation in July 1914 ; the declaration of war on Russia ; the attack on Belgium ; the U-boat campaign of 1917 : such are some of the counts in this fierce indictment. A treaty with Russia, on the other hand, would have avoided the danger of war on two fronts and rendered alliances and armaments unnecessary. This line of argument is reiterated later in a series of 'Aphorisms' inspired by the *débâcle*. 'We could have had a thousand years of peace if we had gone with Russia instead of with Austria.' The Triplice was a whim of Bismarck, a fit of sulks against Gortchakoff, his greatest error except the Berlin Congress. 'Dangers threatened us neither from Petrograd, Paris nor London, only from Berlin and Vienna.' 'The Entente was our own doing, a partnership resting on mutual insurance against the danger of war.'

A short dissertation, entitled 'England before the War' written directly after the outbreak of hostilities, anticipates the famous brochure, *My Mission to London*, which is reprinted in these pages. He begins with a talk with Bethmann after the Kiel regatta and the news of Serajevo, in which he once again informed the Chancellor that, though England was pacific, 'a war with France was a war with England.' Paul Cambon, he adds, had become alarmed by the Anglo-German *rapprochement* on the Bagdad railway and the Portuguese colonies ; and on one of the last days of peace he had observed : 'Les Anglais interviendront, mais ils le feront quand il sera trop tard.' If Belgium had not

been attacked, comments Lichnowsky, he could probably have kept England out of the fray for a while. The problem of responsibility is pursued in a tract entitled *Wahn nicht Wille*, written in January, 1915. Russia, he argues, had no choice in 1914. Germany would have been better off without Austria if not in control of the alliance, for Austria was unfit for a big war. England and Russia mattered to Germany, not Austria or France.

A few points of interest may be gleaned from letters to the papers reprinted in these volumes. The Prince was never told of the Grey-Cambon correspondence and other secret material in the possession of the Wilhelmstrasse. The control of foreign policy, he adds, was almost wholly in the hands of Stumm, 'the worthy successor of Holstein,' who, 'wishing to be my successor in London, did his utmost, with the willing support of Jagow, to thwart my work in every possible way.' He was not even told of Ballin's mission to London in July, 1914. Thus the Ambassador confirms the belief that he was not in the full confidence of Berlin; but he dismisses the fantastic legend that his employers were deliberately working for war behind his back. No reader of these volumes can fail to be impressed by the Prince's passionate sincerity and by the justice of many of his criticisms. The weakness of his argument is that his enthusiasm for a Russian partnership appears to have blinded him to the dangers of dependence on a semi-civilised autocracy. Even his conspicuous services to his country and to the cause of peace in 1912–1914 do not entitle the Ambassador to pronounce such summary judgment on Bismarck's difficult decision in 1879, or compel his readers to accept without reserve every slashing verdict on his erring contemporaries.

Pourtalès, like Lichnowsky, has reprinted his despatches from *Die Grosse Politik*, though he confines himself to the brief period covered by his published diary, *Am Scheidewege zwischen Krieg und Friede*. The despatches and the diary have now appeared in a

well-printed volume entitled *Meine letzten Verhandlungen in St. Petersburg Ende Juli 1914*, which enables the reader to reconstruct the drama as seen through the spectacles of the German representative at the most exposed point of the diplomatic front.

No retired German diplomatist wields such a sprightly pen as Eckardstein, who, after a silence of several years, has supplemented his brightly tinted memoirs by a chatty little volume entitled *Persönliche Erinnerungen an König Eduard*. It is easy to understand why the King enjoyed the company of the tall and handsome Guardsman, for his pages sparkle with anecdote and fun. The monarch appears in a very pleasant and human light, keenly enjoying the pleasures of the table, loving the unforced talk of Soveral and other intimates, yet never for a moment forgetting his royal dignity or allowing incautious friends to overstep the invisible barrier. That he was anti-German is stoutly denied by Eckardstein, who attributes most of the friction between him and the Kaiser to the monumental tactlessness of the latter. Ruffled vanities, we are told, weighed more heavily than high politics, and the smoothing away of such personal differences kept Hatzfeldt and Eckardstein busy. Despite the pacific influence of Sir Ernest Cassel and the Rothschilds, the relations of uncle and nephew grew steadily worse, and the exasperation of the former proved at times too strong to conceal.

In the second half of the volume Eckardstein recalls some memories of his later life and throws new light on the crisis of Agadir. In the middle of April, 1911, Bassermann informed him that Kiderlen had at last been persuaded to play trumps in Morocco. On May 3 the news was confirmed by Erzberger, who added that a squadron of three or four warships would probably soon be despatched to Mogador or Agadir. Eckardstein, both furious and alarmed, published the information, and provoked an official *démenti*. He had hoped that the plan would now be abandoned ; but the despatch of a gunboat was at any rate less disastrous than the original

design. Though the author was an old friend of Kiderlen, he does not mince his words, and denounces his action in 1911 as an example of the 'clumsiness and boundless levity of our diplomacy.' Eckardstein is always the hero of his own dramas; but this characteristic he shares with the majority of the autobiographical tribe.

Another literary warrior re-entered the lists in 1927 in the person of General Bernhardi, whose massive *Denkwürdigkeiten* reflectively survey the rise and fall of the German Empire. The character of his countrymen, he declares, reveals a striking dualism. On the one hand we find the highest intellectual capacity and physical courage; on the other, lack of political insight and the flagging of energy when deprived of leadership. Starting with these assumptions, it is natural that he should date the decline from the fall of Bismarck. Waldersee, some of whose letters appear in these pages, understood the European situation, but he was powerless. Bethmann-Hollweg was 'a man without marrow or nerve,' and the humiliations of the second Morocco crisis destroyed the remains of German prestige. It was as a warning and a trumpet-call to his countrymen that he wrote *Germany and the next War* in 1912, when he had convinced himself that a conflict was inevitable, and that the Fatherland must trust not to decrepit Austria nor to treacherous Italy but to its own right arm.

In turning over these pages we might be listening to the plaintive accents of Conrad von Hötzendorf; for the German soldier, like the Austrian, laments that the timid and bungling civilians vetoed a preventive war. In an interesting passage he quotes Tschirschky as saying in May, 1907, that King Edward, though not desiring war, desired the humiliation of Germany, which Germany could not allow. War was therefore inevitable and Tschirschky was quite ready to have it. He was working hand in hand with Moltke, Chief of the Staff, but he foresaw difficulties with Bülow and the Kaiser. 'There was a group of men in Germany,' continues Bernhardi,

'who wished to launch the inevitable war while there was a prospect of success, who saw through the policy of Edward VII and realised the bellicosity of France. Unfortunately they had no party behind them and stood absolutely alone. The War Minister was with them, but he could not enforce his will against the overwhelming majority of the German people. Tschirschky, like a true statesman, realised war to be inevitable and worked for it with all his might, and he was supported by the Chief of Staff. But as soon as his course was observed, he was removed from his post and replaced by the peace-loving Schön ; for the Kaiser strove for peace at any price, and cherished the strangest illusions to justify this policy to himself. In this effort he was supported by Bülow and the mass of the German people, which marched with closed eyes towards its doom.' Despite the fatal neglect of the military oracle by short-sighted civilians, Bernhardi consoles himself in the days of adversity with the conviction that Germany deserved to win the war. 'Greed and ambition united our enemies, and our Kaiser rightly declared that the war was a struggle of two philosophies,—one purely material, the other striving above all for the mental and moral advance of mankind.'

The stature of Albert Ballin grows with our knowledge of the wisest and most disinterested of the Kaiser's friends. The interest aroused by Huldermann's biography is sustained by the volume of P. F. Stubmann, a business colleague and devoted friend. The most valuable portion is the correspondence, which, though only discussing politics incidentally, reveals the judgment and insight of the writer. His sharpest criticisms are reserved for Kiderlen, 'a man of genius but dangerous because unrestrained.' 'He has played his cards without allowing for the English,' observes Ballin during the Agadir crisis. 'It is a mercy that the Liberals are in power. If the Unionists were there, we should have a Fashoda or war. . . . If we only want the open door in Morocco and a bit of the Congo, why do we send

a ship to Agadir and excite the whole world to white heat?' On Kiderlen's death he wished for Bernstorff as his successor in the Wilhelmstrasse. His admiration for the Kaiser did not prevent him from gradually recognising his weaknesses, and on October 27, 1918, he cries aloud: 'Why does he not resign in favour of his grandson?' The keynote of his policy was friendship with England, and we may regret that lack of political ambition held him back from his rightful place in the centre of the stage.

The Reichstag Committee of Inquiry, to which we already owe so much information on the war, has recently published five substantial volumes of evidence and written statements entitled *Völkerrecht im Weltkrieg*. Among the topics are the devastations in Northern France during the voluntary retirement of 1917 and the forced retreat of 1918; the deportation of Belgian workers to Germany and the part played by Belgian civilians in the national defence; the gas war, the air war, the submarine war and the economic war; the treatment of prisoners; the violation of the Geneva and Hague Conventions. The verdict of the Committee, accepted by the representatives of all the parties except the Communists, is that the prohibitions of International Law were observed by Germany. Haber, for instance, the celebrated director of the chemical department of the Prussian Ministry of War, pointed out that the Hague Declaration craftily forbade only shells whose 'sole purpose' was to emit poisonous gases, adding that he would have refused his services for any project forbidden by the law of nations. In addition to attempting to rebut the charge of 'atrocities,' these volumes carry the war into the enemy's camp by a legal analysis of the violation of Greek neutrality by the Allies.

We have had long to wait for the testimony of Prince Max of Baden, but we have not waited in vain. His original intention, he tells us, was to write an apologia, rebutting the charge that he was in large measure responsible for the German collapse. Second thoughts

proved best, and he has turned the long years of enforced leisure to good account. His *Erinnerungen und Dokumente*, a massive volume of nearly 700 pages, takes high rank among the notable books produced by the War, and will be studied so long as the human family retains an interest in the greatest of its quarrels. It is at once a storehouse of material of the highest importance and a revelation of the author's attractive personality. It is, moreover, admirably written.

On the outbreak of hostilities the heir to the Baden throne was on the staff of the fourteenth army corps, but in the first autumn of the war his health compelled him to leave active service. On regaining his strength he joined the Red Cross and devoted himself henceforth to the care of prisoners. His humane activities brought him in touch not only with foreign suffering but with foreign opinion. In his own conversations with prisoners of different nationalities, and through his family connections with Russia and elsewhere, he learned what the enemies of the Central Powers were thinking. He had never been, and he never became, what the world calls either a pacifist or a radical ; but he was a kindly and thoughtful man, to whom the violent passions of war were temperamentally uncongenial. It was impossible for one in his position not to occupy himself with the problem of how the struggle could be brought to an end, and after the hopes of an early triumph had melted away he convinced himself that a moral and political offensive was no less necessary than the maintenance of the troops in the field.

The efforts of Prince Max and the group of publicists with whom he worked to obtain a satisfactory declaration on Belgium were as fruitless as those to avert the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare at the opening of 1917. The Chancellor was in close accord with the author on almost every question, but he was too weak and too timid to impose his will. He disapproved the decision which involved the belligerence of the United States and the almost certain loss of the war;

but he convinced himself that his resignation would still further increase the overweening authority of the Generals, and he lingered on for a few months with waning prestige. 'I must confess,' writes Prince Max, 'that the events of January, 1917, destroyed any uncritical reverence for the directors of our fortunes. Where was the far-sighted will? I was appalled at the disproportion between statesmanlike considerations and military necessities.' Yet the fall of Bethmann seemed to the author at the time, as it seems to him in retrospect to-day, a national catastrophe.

The appointment of Michaelis was obviously a temporary expedient. When the majority parties declared that the Chancellor must go the Kaiser was advised to appoint Prince Max, but replied that he could not take as his chief counsellor a junior member of the princely clan. The aged Hertling was installed in the Wilhelmstrasse, and drifted helplessly along in the swirling current of events. The preparation of the grand offensive in the spring of 1918, in the opinion of Prince Max, so far from rendering diplomacy superfluous, increased the desirability of stating the aims of Germany in a manner which would strengthen the home front and perchance weaken the resolution of the foe. This line of thought was elaborated in a long Memorandum entitled *Ethical Imperialism*, drawn up on the eve of the offensive, presented to the Kaiser and the Chancellor, and reproduced in these pages. At a moment when almost all his fellow-countrymen were expecting a final decision, he argued that complete victory was impossible; that Germany's allies might fall away; that England would never compromise on Belgium; that there was a middle way between victory and defeat; that a clear declaration on Belgium might possibly bring a Lansdowne Ministry and a negotiated peace; and that if the present opportunity was neglected it would never recur. He now adds that Metz might have been restored to France in exchange for colonial compensation.

The moment passed, and for a brief space the voice of compromise and concession was drowned by the thunderous acclaim of Ludendorff's victories. Peace, however, was no nearer, and Prince Max argued that the tide might turn and that the wonderful opportunity to negotiate should be seized. So little indeed was he dazzled by the military advance that on May 19 he extracted a promise from Ludendorff that he would inform the Government before he launched his final offensive, adding that then would be the time to make peace. 'Stop before you bring your last horse out of the stable.' The collapse of August 8, the 'Black Day' in the annals of the German army, convinced Ludendorff that peace must be sought; and Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, who had shared Prince Max's scepticism as to the great offensive, advised an immediate peace offer including the compensation of Belgium and the conditional cession of French Lorraine. Prince Max, on the other hand, believed that a change of Government would do more for peace than a peace offer. Hertling did nothing, and in the second week of September the author wrote to offer his services to the Kaiser. 'No one in his senses could believe that I acted from ambition.' His name and programme, he believed, would tend to division abroad and union at home, and he added significantly that it was the last chance for the rescue of the monarchical idea. The Kaiser replied that their views were much the same, and that he was acting in the sense of the Prince's letter. After this polite snub there was nothing for it but to wait till the situation grew even more desperate. Bulgaria capitulated, and on September 30 Hertling was forced to resign. The post was offered to Payer, the Vice-Chancellor, who, in declining, recommended and secured the appointment of Prince Max.

The new Chancellor took office on October 1, and held it till the revolution of November 9. We already knew a good deal about the inner history of these hectic weeks from the memoirs of Payer, Erzberger

and Scheidemann, the papers of Conrad Haussmann, the White-book on the Preliminaries of the Armistice, and Ludendorff's replies. Not until now, however, has the veil been completely lifted by the principal actor in this tragic drama. The Chancellor entered on his task with a programme to which he had given prolonged and anxious thought. Its chief items were democratisation at home, the revision of war aims, and the determination to fight to the end against dishonourable terms. 'The last thing you need expect from me is a peace offer,' he remarked to his sister, the Duchess of Anhalt, with whom he was staying when he was summoned to Berlin. But it was precisely this step which he was instantly compelled to take by a decision reached at Headquarters on September 29. On hearing of this momentous decision, which toppled over his whole political programme, Prince Max decided to resign, and it was only after an agonising struggle that he was persuaded to remain. He requested Hindenburg's opinion in writing, and the Field-Marshal confirmed the opinion of Ludendorff. Bombarded by appeals from the military leaders and his own colleagues, the Prince consented on October 3 to sign the appeal which he was unable to prevent. The bitterness of the decision was increased by the experience of the following weeks, in which the front held and Ludendorff recovered his nerve. But when once the request for an armistice had revealed both to the enemy and to the German people the plight of the German army, there was little hope of resisting any conditions which the Entente might decide to impose. 'I thought I had been summoned at five minutes before twelve,' wrote the disillusioned Chancellor to his cousin, the Grand Duke of Baden, 'but I found it was five minutes after.' The shadow of what he then thought and still thinks to have been a ghastly blunder darkens the whole narrative of his chancellorship.

The author relates in detail the military and political discussions which accompanied the drafting of the various Notes to President Wilson. His own fixed intention was

to go to the utmost limit of compromise, but to summon the German people to a desperate effort if the armistice terms appeared unendurable. His aim was approved by Headquarters and by most of his Cabinet colleagues, but the current was sweeping along at such a pace that the pilot could no longer control the course of his ship. No German desired to accept dishonourable conditions as the price of peace ; but whereas the Government and Headquarters regarded a superhuman national effort as the only alternative to a humiliating surrender, it dawned on the nation that there might be an easier way of escape. President Wilson had repeatedly declared that he was at war with a system, and his October Notes hinted with almost brutal plainness that the Kaiser's power, if not the Kaiser himself, must go.

There are no more dramatic pages in this striking work than those which describe the efforts from various quarters to persuade the Kaiser to abdicate, and the story of unheeded warnings reminds us of the closing weeks of the reign of Nicholas II. Here was a new complication for a distracted Chancellor, whose constitutional ideal was a compromise between the quasi-autocracy of the Bismarckian model and the effacement of an English king. Within the limits of the constitutional changes which were hurried through the Reichstag during October there would still be room for the personality of the ruler to make itself felt. Moreover, though these limitations were intensely distasteful to the Kaiser, Prince Max believes that he would have continued the loyalty which he displayed to the short-lived experiment of October, 1918. The Chancellor was a monarchist by conviction no less than by birth, and from the moment that the demand for abdication was raised he exerted himself to the utmost to save both the ruler and the throne.

The key of the situation was in the hands of the Socialists ; for if they officially demanded abdication and were rebuffed, they would withdraw from the Coalition, and the Government would fall. There was

no majority for a Government of the Right, and the Prince declined to rule without the support of organised Labour. In this predicament he urged Scheidemann and Ebert to avert or, if that proved impossible, to postpone a formal demand. The Socialist leaders consented, and the breathing space was utilised in attempting to persuade the Kaiser to save the Monarchy in the only manner in which, as it was now becoming clear, it could be saved, namely, by abdication. The endeavours, which are vividly described in these pages, proved fruitless ; for the two men who might have forced a decision were for different reasons unable to act. Hindenburg firmly refused to advise the step, and warned his master that the army might go to pieces if it were taken. The Chancellor, again, as a friend and a relative, declined to force his sovereign's hand by a threat of resignation or to cut the knot by anything in the nature of a *coup d'état.*

On November 6 General Gröner informed the Chancellor that an armistice must be requested within three days, and on the home front the mutiny at Kiel was the beginning of the end. The monarch had declared that he would only yield to force, and even when, on October 8, the Chancellor telephoned 'Your abdication is essential to avert civil war,' he refused to move. The threatened revolution in Berlin had been held back from November 8 till November 9, and on that historic day it was a race against time. At 9.15 the news was telephoned from Spa that the Generals had resolved at once to inform the Kaiser that the army would not support him in a civil war. At 11 the news arrived that the Kaiser had resolved to abdicate, and that the formula would reach Berlin in half an hour. Meanwhile the workers were pouring into the streets, and the deposition might be proclaimed at any moment. When the half-hour elapsed without the promised formula from Spa, the Chancellor vainly endeavoured to reach the monarch by telephone. As a last chance of saving the monarchy he announced that the Kaiser had

decided to resign ; that the Chancellor would only remain in office till the questions involved in the resignation of the Kaiser, the renunciation of the Crown Prince and the institution of a Regency were settled ; that he intended to propose to the Regent the appointment of Ebert as Chancellor and the election of a Constituent Assembly by universal suffrage. This declaration was known in the streets at midday, but it was too late to affect the course of events. At 2 p.m. Scheidemann proclaimed the Republic from the Reichstag building. A few minutes after 2 the declaration arrived from Spa, in which, however, the Kaiser abdicated as Emperor, but not as King of Prussia. The crazy formula was worthy of the ruler whose short-sighted obstinacy had frustrated the efforts of the last of his Chancellors to rescue the throne and dynasty.

When Prince Max lays down his pen, Karl Friedrich Nowak takes it up. His latest volume, *Versailles*, maintains his reputation as one of the most brilliant historians of the great conflict ; but it is not his fault that for the larger part of his story he is compelled to summarise familiar facts. The book opens with a dramatic account of the mission of Erzberger and his party to beg for peace from Foch ; but English readers who are acquainted with the deliberations and the differences of the Allies may hurry on to the second German mission, when Brockdorff-Rantzau and his colleagues were summoned to Versailles to learn their fate. It is not the habit of the author to quote authorities for his statements ; but it is no secret that in this, as in his three previous works, he has obtained information from makers of history and eye-witnesses by the score. The closing chapters of this volume rival in dramatic interest and literary skill the best pages in his earlier writings, and provide the most authoritative account of the experiences and bitter emotions of the German delegates.

The hero of the drama is the Foreign Secretary himself, on whose portrait Nowak lavishes all the

resources of his art. The figure of Brockdorff-Rantzau, nobleman and democrat, patriot and internationalist, dominates the stage, and every step of his thorny path is described with admiring sympathy. His policy, from which he never flinched, was to hold the victors to their promises, to reject terms which it was impossible to fulfil, and to dare them to do their worst. Erzberger, on the contrary, argued incessantly that it was useless to kick against the pricks. Thus within the framework of the larger struggle emerged the conflict between defiance and surrender, which coloured the discussions of the Scheidemann Cabinet and broke it up when the Weimar Assembly, forced to choose between unspeakable humiliation and the renewal of hostilities, accepted the former alternative. Though our author admires Brockdorff-Rantzau as much as he dislikes the boorish Erzberger, he fairly presents the rival policies for which they stood. Among the valuable features of these eloquent chapters is the tribute to the services of Dr. Simons, the most trusted and helpful adviser of the Foreign Minister during the days of purgatory at Versailles, as he had been of Prince Max during the dying convulsions of Imperial Germany.

The Archduke Joseph's large volume, *The World War as I saw it*, based on his diary and official papers and published at Budapest, is at present only available in Hungarian. By a curious coincidence the most valuable Austrian revelations accessible to Western readers are the work of two Military Attachés whose official lot was cast in the Near East. The name of Baron Giesl passed automatically into history with the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum on July 23, 1914; but his autobiography, *Zwei Jahrzehnte im nahen Orient*, reveals him as a man of experience and ability, whose story is worth telling and well told. The curtain rises on Hamidian Turkey in the 'nineties, of which we hear some sensational stories, and the stage widens till almost all the personal factors of the Balkan problem are brought within our grasp. The crowned diplomatist at Sofia

always tempts to portraiture, and Ferdinand once more appears as a first-class intellect and a third-class character. His conversation was brilliant but malicious, the sharpest satire lurking behind apparently innocent phraseology. King George of Greece presents himself in his usual rôle of the victim of the injustice and indifference of Europe.

Exchanging his military duties for the wider field of diplomacy, Giesl was appointed Austrian Minister to Montenegro in 1910. The little Court at Cettinje, with its semi-savage but *rusé* old monarch, is brilliantly portrayed, and we pass once again through the hectic emotions of the Balkan wars of 1912–13. The interest of the book culminates in the chapter on Belgrad, to which the author was transferred at the end of 1913. Information about Hartwig is always welcome, and the picture of the Russian Minister is drawn with an unexpectedly sympathetic hand, despite the sharp antagonism of national policies. Any lingering suspicion of foul play or quick words at the Austrian Legation should be set at rest by the straightforward account of the Minister's sudden collapse. Unlike most Austrian officials, Giesl did not feel war to be inevitable at the moment of the Serajevo murders; but the swelling tide of anger and revenge in the following days converted him to the arbitrament of the sword. The account of the presentation of the ultimatum, of the slow passing of the two allotted days, of the receipt of the reply, and of the hurried departure of the Legation staff is a welcome addition to our knowledge of some of the most fateful hours in history. Giesl regards the Serbian reply as a clever evasion of the demand without which the promises would have remained waste paper; but it is interesting to learn his opinion that the Russian Minister could and would have secured the unconditional acceptance of the Austrian terms. 'If Hartwig had been alive on the fateful 25th of July, the world-war would not have broken out.'

When Giesl exchanged the position of Military

Attaché in the Turkish capital for the Legation at Cettinje, he was succeeded by Pomiankowski, whose large and richly illustrated work, *Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches*, is a valuable addition to our knowledge of the decline and fall of the Turkish Empire. The Austrian Pole had served his apprenticeship in the Near East as Military Attaché at Belgrad, but his narrative opens with the new situation created by the Young Turk revolution. At no moment of the ten years covered in his Memoirs does he speak with much admiration of the Young Turks, and he repeatedly criticises the superficiality and ruthless egotism of the triumvirate Enver, Talaat and Djemal. His special aversion is Enver, whose one thought was himself, and who seemed utterly incapable of adjusting his plans to the resources of his country.

The sorely needed reorganisation of the army had hardly begun when the Balkan States fell upon Turkey, and a second period of reorganisation opened with the arrival of Liman von Sanders at the end of 1913, which the Russian Military Attaché excitedly described as a veiled annexation of the Straits. The author was convinced that the defeat of Turkey would be followed in due course by an attack on Austria, and that in the ensuing world-war Turkey would play a leading part as the ally of the Central Powers. This consideration did not escape the Russians, and he connects the prospect of a thorough reorganisation of the Turkish army with Russia's decision to fight in 1914. Liman's efforts were in some measure frustrated by the jealousy of Enver, who was supported by Wangenheim, the German Ambassador; but the result of his devoted labours receives repeated praise.

For the student of high politics Pomiankowski's record is of far higher value than the parallel narrative of Liman, since he was in close touch with his Embassy throughout the struggle. It is interesting to learn the opinion of Pallavicini, that the annexation of Bosnia was the cardinal error of Austrian policy and the beginning

of evil. 'This wholly unnecessary act was the first attack on the integrity of Turkey, for the partition of which Aehrenthal gave the signal.' The author agrees with his chief, but adds that a still graver error was the passivity of Austria during the Balkan war. 'Berchtold failed to recognise that the existence of Austria demanded the prevention of the Balkan war and a further weakening of Turkey. Her veto in 1912 would hardly have led to a world war, since Russia was not yet ready and Italy was weakened by Tripoli. Even had the intervention of the Monarchy led to a general conflagration, our chances were decidedly better than in 1914.'

The larger part of this volume is devoted to the war, and to the uneasy relations of Turkey with the Central Powers. The friction with Germany was incessant. Liman and the veteran von der Goltz, who was recalled to the scene of his former exploits, receive the author's unstinted admiration ; but Enver's crazy schemes were encouraged by Wangenheim, who possessed the ear of Berlin. On Wangenheim's death in 1915 the wire to Berlin worked less easily, and his successor, Count Metternich, was recalled after a year at the express demand of Enver, who resented his open disapproval of the Armenian massacres. The Turks were well aware of the danger of their country becoming a German satrapy in the event of complete victory, but at the Austrian Embassy hopes of a dictated peace never soared very high. Feldmarschalleutnant Pomiankowski makes the impression of a thoughtful and well-informed observer, whose opinions of individuals and situations are entitled to respect.

The contribution of Russia to the revelations of 1927 is of the first importance, and Sazonoff's apologia, which appeared simultaneously in Russian, French and German (*Les Années fatales* and *Sechs schwere Jahre*), stands at the head of the list. Masses of documentary material have come from the Russian archives under the Bolshevist régime ; but till now we have had no authoritative explanation of Russian diplomacy in the years

immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities, corresponding to the works of Lord Grey, M. Poincaré, Bethmann-Hollweg and Giolitti. It is fortunate that the ex-Foreign Minister lived just long enough to complete his task.

The narrative opens with the author's appointment by Izvolsky as his chief assistant in May, 1909. The acute phase of the Bosnian crisis was over, and the Foreign Minister, we are told, was extremely depressed owing not only to the check to his ambition but also to his notorious weakness for discovering personal injustice and ill-will in the contacts and conflicts of life. Moreover, he had made the mistake of trusting Aerenthal, and the memory of this grievous blunder paralysed his spirits and his will. 'He had only one wish, one dream—to exchange Petrograd for one of the less responsible Embassies.' At the first interview Sazonoff was informed that his chief had decided in principle to resign, and that he was to succeed him. During the eighteen months that elapsed before the death of Nelidoff opened the doors of the Paris Embassy to Izvolsky, his assistant controlled the Foreign Office for no less than seven months owing to the absence of his chief.

Sazonoff's first duty on assuming responsibility in the late autumn of 1910 was to accompany his master on a visit to Potsdam. The Kaiser expressed his pleasure at the disappearance of Izvolsky; Bethmann made a more favourable impression than later experience was to confirm; and Kiderlen's grossness was in some measure compensated by his very limited sympathies for Austria. The author explains the sacrifices to which he consented in regard to the Bagdad railway by his desire to restore friendly relations with Berlin, and by Stolypin's reiterated warnings that European complications must be avoided at any price for many years, at least till Russia had reorganised her means of defence. 'I never suffered from Germanophobia,' adds Sazonoff, 'even in the mildest form of this political disease.' He had German

blood in his veins, and he recognised the debt to German culture of civilised mankind.

The visit of the Kaiser to Baltisch Port in 1912 was memorable for an extraordinary conversation in which he counselled Sazonoff to turn his gaze towards the East. 'The Yellow Peril has not ceased to exist, but is more threatening than ever, above all for Russia.' The only way to avert the danger was for Russia to develop the military strength of China as a breakwater against the Japanese tide. Sazonoff rejoined that it was impossible for Russia to turn her back on Europe, and that she had no wish for another tussle with Japan. Since her defeat in the Far East Russia had definitely returned to Europe, and it was with the Near East that the new Minister was speedily compelled to occupy himself. The historical mission of Russia having been fulfilled by the emancipation of the Balkan States from the Turkish yoke, they could now, he explains, work out their salvation. They were not yet, however, strong enough to dispense with Russian aid if bellicose Germanism were to attack their national existence. 'Her sole aim was to prevent the Balkan peoples, liberated by the sacrifices of centuries, from falling under the influence of hostile states and becoming the tool of their political intrigues.' The Balkans for the Balkan peoples,—such was the unselfish policy of Petrograd. He adds that a necessary aim for Russia was to secure free access to the Mediterranean, and at the same time the defence of her Black Sea coast against the threat of a raid through the Straits.

Though Sazonoff's Balkan policy appeared obvious and inevitable in Russia, M. Poincaré, on visiting his ally in the summer of 1912, read with dismay the text of the Serbo-Bulgar treaty concluded under Russian auspices in the previous February, and exclaimed 'C'est une convention de guerre.' Sazonoff makes no attempt to slur over the difference, but argues that he had no alternative. 'Not to help Serbia and Bulgaria to realise their aims meant not only the abandonment by Russia of her historical mission, but the surrender without a

struggle to the enemy of the Slav peoples of positions won by the efforts of centuries.' He adds that he realised the possibility of a war, 'with all its possible complications,' but that the Balkan states could not be expected to neglect the golden opportunity of the Tripoli war. A conflict being thus inevitable, it was the duty of Russia to diminish the risks of defeat for her Balkan *protégés* by facilitating their union. 'It was impossible for us to turn our back on the Balkan Slavs at a critical moment and to divest ourselves of the obligations imposed upon us by the whole past of Russia as the leading Slavonic Power.' Turkish rule in the Balkans, he adds, was a hideous anachronism, and an obstacle to the natural growth of the young national organisms. From this frank confession we learn that Russia was as ready to risk a European conflagration in 1912 as was Austria in 1914; for the veto she reserved to herself on the action of Sofia and Belgrad proved to be a mere scrap of paper.

The Balkan war produced the tension that was anticipated. Sazonoff sharply blames Hartwig for encouraging Serbia to seize and hold a port on the Adriatic, and it was his unpleasant duty to inform the victorious Serbs that he declined to fight for Durazzo. The passionate excitement of Serbia, however, spread to Russia, where the nationalist press shouted for war, and at the opening of 1913 the Minister feared that he might lose control of the situation. He found support in Kokovtsoff and the Tsar; but the imminence of a European war during 1912–1913 has never been more vividly described. That large sections of public opinion in Russia were thus spoiling to support Serbia in a war of aggression is an impressive reminder of the danger to the peace of the world involved in the emotional relations between the Big Brother and the Hotspurs of Belgrad.

The chapters on the *rapprochement* with Roumania and the Russian attempt to introduce reforms into Armenia contain valuable information which is very little known; but with the Liman Mission we return

to the beaten track. The despatch of a German General with extensive powers to Constantinople in the autumn of 1913 filled Sazonoff with the same fierce anger which the annexation of Bosnia had inspired in his predecessor. These, we are told, were the two great political aggressions of the Central Powers. Constantinople was the one place in the world which Russia watched with jealous eyes, and where she could tolerate no changes threatening her vital interests. The German excuse that the mission was military, not political, is brushed contemptuously aside. The Turkish capital would pass into the control of Germany, and at a critical moment 'the ambassadors of the Triple Entente would run the risk of physical dependence on a German General.' The shrill protest led to the diminution of Liman's powers; but Sazonoff argues that the compromise was far less satisfactory than it appeared, since the pursuit of the Berlin-Bagdad programme required the domination of Turkey and the control of the Straits. The alarming situation was discussed at the historic Crown Council of February 8, 1914, the resolutions of which are interpreted in a purely defensive sense, and an attempt was made to strengthen the Entente by turning it into an alliance. The invitation was declined by England, but the project of a Naval Convention was approved.

The longest chapter in the book is devoted to the outbreak of hostilities. The initiative, declares the author, came from Austria, not Germany, where neither the Kaiser nor his Chancellor desired a breach. Berlin is charged not with a will to war, but with ignorance of the situation, criminal levity in throwing the reins on the neck of the Austrian steed, and timidity in the feeble eleventh-hour attempts to slacken its headlong career. The Serbian Government, he declares (and he makes no reference to the Jovanovich revelations), was wholly ignorant of the Serajevo plot; and no responsible person in Russia ever dreamed of launching a war for the control of the Straits at a time when her arma-

ments were only beginning to recover from the shattering catastrophe in the Far East. Yet even though, in the words of King Carol, Vienna had lost its head, it was still possible to avert the conflagration by an unequivocal British declaration on the model of Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech. On this point the author is absolutely clear. The actual narrative of the negotiations contains little that is fresh ; but the account of the interview in which the Foreign Minister persuaded the peace-loving Tsar to decree General Mobilisation is dramatic in the extreme. We also learn that the ruler, of whom Sazonoff speaks with affectionate devotion, invited the Kaiser to refer the dispute to the Hague Tribunal without consulting or informing his Minister.

The later part of this striking volume deals with the problems arising from the outbreak of the war. The first was the question of the Straits. That the Western Powers withdrew their historic veto on the Russian occupation of Constantinople was announced in 1915 ; but we discover from these pages how difficult a task it was to secure even the grudging assent of France. We learn, moreover, that Sazonoff himself, unlike most of his countrymen, had no wish to make the Turkish capital a Russian city. The second pressing problem was that of securing new allies. The Russian statesman is disgusted at the ingratitude of Bulgaria and the greed of Rome and Bucharest. When Roumania at last entered the war he was no longer at the helm, and he deplores the pressure which transformed a benevolent neutral at a peculiarly inconvenient moment into a compromising liability. The two closing chapters describe with grief and indignation the triumph of ' the dark forces ' over the feeble will of the Tsar, which led to the fall of the Foreign Minister, the rejection of his healing policy for Poland, the overthrow of the Empire, the Bolshevist revolution and the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. Sazonoff's volume bristles with controversy and has already provoked a sharp rejoinder entitled *Russland und der Weltkonflikt*, by Friedrich Stieve and Graf

Montgelas. A further reply to his strictures on the Central Powers is about to appear in a co-operative volume by highly placed makers of history, among them Count Berchtold, who has at last been induced to break his long and regrettable silence.

Savinsky's *Recollections of a Russian Diplomat* add to our knowledge of three successive Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The story opens with Lamsdorff, whom the author greatly admires, and whose opposition both to the Japanese war and to the Björko Treaty he heartily approves. Among his duties was the deciphering of the Kaiser's telegrams, on which he comments freely in these pages, and which he supplements by some of Lamsdorff's conversations with the Tsar. The most interesting events of his service in the Foreign Office were the visits of his master to Mürzsteg, Racconigi and Potsdam, though the official saw little more than the façade of events. More important is his account of the journey of Izvolsky to Paris and Berlin in October 1908, when the Foreign Minister failed to induce the Kaiser to discuss the Bosnian crisis. 'Izvolsky was very discouraged, especially as he had found neither in France nor in England the support he had expected.' Moreover, he was upset by Stolypin's message that Russian opinion was incensed and that he must furnish explanations on his return. He observed to the author that it was impossible to retain his post, and that he would ask the Tsar for an Embassy. At the end of the crisis in 1909, the disgruntled statesman expressed a desire for Madrid, where he could avoid taking part in great affairs and could write his Memoirs, hoping to re-emerge in a few years.

Savinsky's recollections during his decade at the Foreign Office are scrappy and occasionally inaccurate; but on his appointment to Sofia at the end of 1913 his testimony becomes of first-rate importance. He received only verbal instructions from his new chief Sazonoff, but they were clear enough. 'Stand aloof from the Radoslavoff Government and work for its

downfall. If possible, help to overthrow it,—if without risk of exposure, all the better. Then negotiations can be resumed.' Never had he had so many failures with anybody as with the Bulgars in 1913, added Sazonoff, to emphasise the difficulties of the post. Since the Embassy archives were burned by order when war broke out in 1915, and the documents at Petrograd were pilfered and disarranged, the account based on the Minister's diary, which embodied the chief telegrams, despatches and reports of conversations, is of unusual interest.

Despite King Ferdinand's German sympathies and the venality of the Government, the entire country, declares Savinsky, was Russophil. No one would admit the possibility of war against Russia, and money and letters were sent to him from the remotest villages. The King and Radoslavoff were polite but chilly. Despite his assurance that the Tsar's feelings towards the nation would never change, the Minister was powerless, since his advice to his superiors was ignored. When he argued that only a Franco-Russian loan could avert a German loan, Sazonoff replied, 'Not unless there is a change of Cabinet,' and only relented when it was too late. When the Duc de Guise was sent on a mission from France in January 1915, the King kept his cousin waiting for a week in a hotel opposite the Palace, and remained obstinately silent. In July Savinsky reported that only the occupation of Macedonia would secure Bulgarian support. 'If eventually Bulgaria joined our enemies,' comments the exasperated Minister, 'it was entirely our own fault.' The narrative closes with the account of 'an extraordinary, almost incredible visit' paid by the King to the Minister, who was detained in Sofia by illness after the outbreak of war. 'It is I,' declared Ferdinand, 'who have destroyed with my own hands the bridge between the two countries, but it is I alone who can rebuild it.' Was it an intimation of hypothetical treachery to his new allies if fate were to play havoc with his plans?

The unskilful wooing of Ferdinand described by Savinsky forms one of the themes of *Das Zaristische Russland im Weltkriege*, a stout volume of documents from the Russian archives on the entry of Turkey, Bulgaria, Roumania and Italy into the war, with a useful introduction by Professor Pokrowski, the well-known editor of the *Krasny Archiv*. This volume, the German edition of which we owe to the *Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen*, supplements the earlier collection of documents on the negotiations with Greece, not yet translated, and the two works reveal Russia's diplomatic attempts to secure the glittering prize of Constantinople. It is surprising to discover that on August 9, 1914 (despite the secret Treaty with Germany signed a week before), Enver informed Giers, the Russian Ambassador, that Turkey was not yet tied to the Central Powers ; that he desired an alliance with Russia ; that he was prepared to move Turkish troops from the Caucasus to Thrace and to fight one of the Balkan states, or, in union with Bulgaria, to wage war against Austria ; and that, if an agreement were signed, he would on the same day expel all German officers in the Turkish service. His terms were the restoration of Western Thrace and the Aegean Islands, and a treaty of defensive alliance for five or ten years. Giers urged instant acceptance of the offer—'any day may be too late.' But Sazonoff declined, hoping to win Bulgaria for the approaching struggle with Turkey, and not seriously fearing a Turkish attack.

The documents on Bulgaria reveal Ferdinand and Radoslavoff playing a waiting game, both well aware that Macedonia could only be won by war. Serbia was not easy to squeeze, and Spalaikovich, the Serbian Minister in France, sulkily declared that he would rather surrender the whole country to Austria than even a fragment of Macedonia to Bulgaria. At the end of August, 1915, Pasitch was alarmed, and negotiated with Sofia on his own account ; but he offered too little to avert hostilities. This section is enriched by some stolen

despatches from the Austrian Minister at Sofia and some surreptitiously deciphered telegrams from Madjaroff, the Bulgarian Minister at Petrograd. The Roumanian section exhibits Bucharest in the same attitude of greedy expectancy as Sofia ; Russia indignant at Bratiano's demands ; and France, impatient with the obstinacy of Sazonoff, hinting that she cannot support Russian claims on Constantinople and the Straits unless her ally plays her cards more skilfully in the Balkans. In the Italian section Russia envisages Italy as the rival of Serbia, disapproves British suggestions of a high price for her assistance, and speaks of ' admitting ' her to the war. Throughout this volume Sazonoff appears stubbornly indisposed to any sacrifice of Russian aims or of the aims of his Serbian *protégé* ; but he is no worse than the other participants in the great game of grab which is illustrated in these unsavoury pages.

Passing from foreign to domestic politics, the sinister figure of Rasputin continues to arouse universal interest, and we can now reconstruct every detail of the murder plot and its execution. The diary of Purishkevitch, published in a French translation with the title *Comment j'ai tué Rasputine*, may be compared with the more elaborate work of his fellow-conspirator, Prince Youssoupoff, entitled *Rasputin*, which appeared in English dress at the end of 1927. The Introduction is chiefly remarkable for the importance attached to Anna Vyrubova, whom the Prince describes as sincerely but not disinterestedly devoted to the Empress. ' Cunning, servile and hysterical,' she turned her mistress against everybody, isolating her from other influences in order to increase her own. Too unintelligent to have any definite political designs, she was intoxicated by her power, and Rasputin used her as his willing pawn.

From no other source do we learn so much about the personality, methods and views of the uncrowned ruler of Russia as in these pages. The first idea of removing him occurred to the Prince in 1915, and as the plan took shape he cultivated his acquaintance, pretended to be his

follower, and encouraged him to talk. The more he knew of the man and his influence, the firmer grew his conviction that the arch-enemy of his country was too strongly entrenched in the favour of the Empress to be removed except by force. Reported conversations are always touched up, but there is no reason to doubt the general fidelity of the picture. 'I can do anything I want, and everybody obeys me. All the Ministers do as I tell them.' The Empress, he declared, was a wise ruler, a second Catherine. His contempt for the Tsar was openly expressed. 'Alexandra shall be Regent for her son, and we'll send him (the Tsar) to Livadia for a rest.' Rasputin had been opposed to the war, and was always trying to end it; but he laments that he had made no converts at Court, where the Tsar was, on this point at any rate, immovable. On the vexed question whether the impostor was actually in German pay these pages, which are largely devoted to the gruesome details of the murder, throw no direct light, though some secret agents whom the Prince once saw in Rasputin's flat may possibly have been German spies.

The character of Nicholas II is established beyond controversy, and the new testimony merely serves to confirm the old. *The Memoirs of Baron Wrangel, 1847–1920*, offer slight but vivid reminiscences of Russian history from the days of serfdom to the Bolshevist Terror. The only imposing figure on his stage is Witte, who, he declares, was a greater and better man than his *Memoirs* would suggest. Though Wrangel detests not only Lenin but Kerensky, he is well aware of the faults and follies of the old régime, and the last of the Tsars is contemptuously dismissed with the rhetorical question: 'What can one say of a nonentity?'

Count Paul Benckendorff's little book, *Last Days at Tsarkoe Selo, March 1–August 1, 1917*, translated by Maurice Baring, is a simple and touching record of adversity which, though not strictly undeserved, was bravely borne. The General A.D.C. and Grand Marshal of the Court and his wife shared the captivity of their

ex-rulers, and would have accompanied them to Siberia had they been allowed. The Count loved his master, and was pained by the visits of Kerensky, whom he disliked ; but he is well aware of the indecision and other failings which rendered the Tsar exceptionally unfit to govern a mighty Empire.

Kerensky's book on the Korniloff rebellion was not easy to read and was little read ; but his considered apologia, *The Catastrophe*, is a spirited performance, carrying us at almost breathless speed through the eight months which separated the downfall of the Emperor and the rise of a new tyranny. So rotten did the structure of Imperial Russia appear to the author that he believes the war to have postponed, instead of accelerating, the revolution which was due in 1914 or 1915. No more vivid account of the March days has yet appeared, and we watch the formation of the patriotic and humane Government of Prince Lvoff with eager sympathy. But the sky darkens with ministerial dissensions, and Miliukoff is quickly evicted from the Foreign Office. 'The Russia which had to declaim daily about the Dardanelles and the cross on St. Sofia ceased to exist on March 12, 1917. Russia was not only physically tired of the war. New Russia revolted spiritually against further bloodshed.' The unexpected German attack on the Stokhod, however, 'ended the pacifist period of the Revolution,' and 'the period of defence' began, in which Kerensky concentrated the chief offices of State in his own hands and organised the Brusiloff offensive. 'My entrance into the War Ministry marked the end of the period of destruction and the beginning of the period of construction, not only in the army but in the country as a whole.' Like most other makers of history, Kerensky knows how to pile incense on his own altar.

The story of his single-handed and superhuman work of reconstruction is suddenly interrupted by 'the mad mutiny of Korniloff, which opened the doors of the Kremlin to the Bolshevists and to Brest-Litovsk.' The Commander-in-Chief, he asserts, was the tool of the

Right, and the blow was struck rather at the Revolution than at himself. Lenin quickly completed what Korniloff had begun, and these baleful architects of ruin tore down the edifice which the master-builder had constructed with skilful and unselfish hands. 'This tragedy came to pass exactly at the time when all our sacrifices were about to find their justification. The Austro-Hungarian Government, having realised that the situation of Austria-Hungary was untenable, addressed to the Provisional Government a request for a separate peace. The move was made without knowledge of Berlin. It was particularly significant, because the Foreign Minister Terestchenko had long been preparing, with the co-operation of the diplomatic representatives of the United States in Bulgaria and Turkey, a plan for negotiations which would have meant the exit of Bulgaria and Turkey from the war. There could be no doubt, with Austria's example before them, that similar peace proposals would have followed soon from Sofia and Constantinople. The exit to the Mediterranean would have been opened for Russia. The blockade of Russia would have been broken, and Germany would have stood completely isolated in Europe. Russia was on the verge of her greatest victory.' The sincerity and patriotism of Kerensky are beyond cavil ; but the critical reader will probably feel that the hues of the picture are a little too bright and will regret that the nature of Austria's peace offer, which reached Petrograd two days before the Bolshevist *coup*, is not described.

Our knowledge of the psychological soil from which the Serajevo murder sprang is enriched by a brochure entitled *Gavrilo Princips Bekenntnisse*, containing two very short manuscripts of the murderer, with notes of his conversation recorded by an Austrian psychiatrist attached to the prison. The two passages written at the wish of Dr. Pappenheim, dated May and June, 1916, are reproduced in facsimile with a translation into German. The first describes a discussion of the social revolution with his friends, who, like himself, 'though we had read

socialist and anarchistic writings,' troubled themselves little with this question, 'since we held that each of us had another duty, a national duty.' The second passage is concerned with the Komitadjis or armed bands, Turkish, Serb and Bulgar. Of much wider scope and importance are the doctor's notes of his talks with Princip in the first half of 1916, relating to his life, studies, and aims, as well as to his fellow-conspirators and the preparation for the plot. In these disjointed confessions and musings we seem to be listening to the very heart-beats of the Jugoslav unity movement. Princip is described as an intelligent youth, consumed by patriotism as he understood it,—a sentiment composed in equal measure of love and revenge. He alone was responsible for the plot, and he did not regret his deed, since he was convinced that the world war would have come without his aid. We breathe the same unwholesome air of conspiracy and murder in the latest work of Boghitchevich, *Le Procès de Salonique*, which analyses in minute detail the trial of Colonel Dimitrievich in 1917, and calls for a revision of the verdict 'in the interest of truth, law, morality and justice.' From Bulgaria we have Madame Petroff's chatty *Trente Ans à la Cour de Bulgarie*, which exactly covers the reign of Ferdinand, but adds more to our knowledge of the surface than of the meaning of events.

The event of the year in France was the appearance of the fourth volume of M. Poincaré's memoirs, entitled *L'Union Sacrée*, which carries us from the opening of 1914 to the outbreak of war. The author is well aware of the fierce attacks that have been made upon his conduct and statesmanship, not only by foreigners but by his own countrymen, and he puts forth his whole strength to rebut the terrible charge of having helped to start the avalanche on its course. The negative argument for his innocence is that he was President of the Republic, not Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary, and that he was in consequence nothing more than an ornamental figure-head. He complains bitterly of his 'inactive and cloistered magistracy'; of his 'dungeon,

the Elysée, an observatory of the political heavens'; of the daily penance of duties which he was condemned to perform. He envied Loubet and Fallières, who had regained their freedom, while he, after so recently controlling the destinies of France, chafed at his impotence even to reply to the venomous attacks of Clemenceau and other foes. 'All the Ministers recognised that I scrupulously conformed to the constitutional rules.' The only exception to his dignified impersonality was his constant endeavour to keep up the standard of national defence; for the sky was full of dark and driving clouds, and the Liman crisis had revived the tension between Russia and the Central Powers. On January 27, 1914, Bethmann-Hollweg asked Jules Cambon whether the relations of the two countries were not a little more difficult than they were a month ago, adding that Germany needed expansion, and that to attempt to thwart her in Asia Minor would be dangerous. The French Ambassador was impressed by the gravity of the conversation, which reminded him of the eve of Agadir.

Oppressed by such indications of stormy weather, the President watched with anguish the Caillaux-Calmette quarrel and other trivialities which diverted national attention from the stern realities of the European chessboard. He was, however, as he assures us again and again, merely an onlooker, with a right to information but without power to act. The journey to Russia, which almost synchronised with the outbreak of war, was arranged on the advice of Doumergue, the Prime Minister, as far back as January, and was nothing more than the traditional visit of every President in turn. The sinister significance of Izvolsky, 'toujours prêt à se mettre en avant,' is once more dismissed as a legend, and Sazonoff, like his master, is credited with a sincere devotion to peace. The visit to Petrograd, already described in outline in the author's earlier work *Les Origines de la Guerre*, is here recorded in superabundant detail, and we are informed that the Tsar gave no

indication of expecting serious trouble. 'The impression that he left on M. Viviani and myself was very reassuring. He was a faithful ally and a sincere lover of peace.' The charge that he himself poisoned the mind of his Imperial host is dismissed with frigid contempt. 'I can hardly imagine a French politician, who had become President of the Republic for seven years, allowing himself to be blinded by some absurd ambition to the point of urging the absolute sovereign of a foreign country to the most formidable of wars. But I affirm that if, in a fit of madness, I had so far forgotten myself, the Emperor would gently but promptly have put me in my place, and made me understand that his conception of his duties to humanity was not mine.'

The news of the ultimatum to Serbia reached the President and the Premier on their way home, and on regaining French soil at Dunkirk on July 29 war seemed to be probable, if not inevitable. At this point the author turns aside to disprove the rumour that when asked on landing whether he thought a conflict could be avoided, he replied 'Ce serait grand dommage ; jamais nous ne retrouvions conditions meilleures.' Senator Trystram, to whom the words were supposed to have been addressed, denies that anything of the kind was said, and his statement is confirmed by the Mayor of Dunkirk, who was at the President's side while he conversed with the Senator. Returning to Paris, the President was again immured in the Elysée, while Viviani, 'faithful guardian of my constitutional irresponsibility,' and his Cabinet colleagues steered the ship of state. 'All that I know,' he wrote in his diary on July 31, 'I know only through them ; all that I think I can confide to them alone. I must leave to the Ministers entire freedom of action. If not, I should betray the spirit of the Constitution and expose the country to governmental anarchy.' His only initiative in those terrible days was the suggestion, approved by the Cabinet, that he should write a personal letter to King George, since the Cambon brothers reported that nothing

but the assurance of British intervention would hold back Germany and avert a general war. The President shared and continues to share their conviction that an earlier declaration of British policy would have kept the peace, though he doubts whether public opinion would have supported the Government before Belgium was attacked.

M. Poincaré is convinced that the Central Powers were responsible for the catastrophe, and he never questions the right and the duty of Russia to defend her Serbian *protégé* even at the cost of a world war ; but he is outspoken in his criticism of Russian policy at a moment when the spirit of the alliance, to say nothing of ordinary courtesy, demanded the most intimate co-operation. The General Mobilisation, to which Germany made the anticipated reply, was decreed and announced without the knowledge of the French Government, which 'regretted this measure and deemed it precipitate.' France, indeed, had definitely advised against any step which might provoke Germany to mobilise. 'So we did not expect the ukase, for which nothing prepared us and of which we only learned several hours later.' The compromising sentiments attributed by Izvolsky to Messimy and de Margerie in his telegram of July 30, encouraging Russia to push on secret preparations, are denounced as an invention of the Ambassador. 'Once again he put his own words into the mouth of other people.' Moreover, the Russian excuse that the rumour of German mobilisation published in the *Lokalanzeiger* was a factor in the decision of the Government is dismissed as unproved.

The account of the crisis in these pages is not only very much fuller and better informed than in the author's earlier volume, but also more critical in spirit. His admission that Russia took the fatal step of General Mobilisation without consulting her ally and in spite of her warnings, is a damaging indictment, though he endeavours to minimise its result. If the governing purpose of the first four volumes of his *Memoirs* is to

vindicate the pacific attitude of his country and himself, their incidental effect is to exhibit Russia in the light of a disloyal ally, whose policy in 1912, and again in 1914, played an important part in precipitating both the lesser and the larger catastrophes.

The successive instalments of M. Poincaré's apologia have failed to silence his critics, who have continued to demand the unveiling of the secrets of the Quai d'Orsay. The example of other countries and the pressure of public opinion have at length prevailed, and on January 5, 1928, the appointment was announced of a Commission to deal with the publication of documents relative to the causes leading to the outbreak of war. The Commission will be presided over by M. Charléty, Rector of the Académie de Paris, and will include twenty-four historians and specialists, six diplomatists, six former Ambassadors and Ministers Plenipotentiary, and seven Members of the Institute.

By far the most important diplomatic revelations of 1927 from the English side are contained in *British Documents on the Origin of the War, 1898–1914*, the first two volumes of which end with the Anglo-French Treaty of April 8, 1904. The earliest novelty in chronological order is Salisbury's proposal to Russia for a delimitation of spheres of influence in China and Turkey,—a promising overture abruptly terminated by the seizure of Port Arthur. The negotiations of 1898 relating to the Portuguese Colonies, hitherto known only from the German side, are followed by the so-called Treaty of Windsor, the date and nature of which were hitherto unknown, and which turns out to have been the offspring of Kruger's ultimatum. The second volume contains three contributions to historical knowledge of first-rate importance. The chapter on the negotiations for an Anglo-German alliance in 1901 gives the British version of the story outlined in *Die Grosse Politik*, ascribes the initiative to Germany, and reveals Salisbury's unbending antagonism to continental entanglements. The chapter on the alliance with Japan

illustrates our first departure from the tradition of 'splendid isolation,' and the long chapter on the reconciliation with France records a decision which was to have still more decisive results. In these two cases the story has never been told from either side, for the *Hayashi Memoirs* are incomplete and untrustworthy. In neither case did the initiative come from Great Britain. The abandonment of our traditional policy thus proves to be less of a deliberate resolve than had been generally believed, and more in the nature of a willing response to pressing invitations from abroad.

The Foreign Office documents reveal the unsleeping interest of King Edward in foreign affairs, though they afford no confirmation of the belief still current in foreign countries that he pursued a policy of his own. That he acted in agreement with his constitutional advisers, passing on to them any information that he received and seeking their counsel when weighty decisions were required, is proved by a mass of fresh material in the second volume of the official biography, commenced by Sir Sidney Lee and efficiently completed with the aid of material which he had collected and on the lines which he had laid down. The work as a whole lacks the magic of the biographer's art; but it is a careful and business-like record of an influential career, the pages of which are enriched by copious quotations from *Die Grosse Politik* and other foreign sources. King Edward shared the growing conviction of his subjects at the opening of the new century that the days of isolation were over, and he thoroughly approved the alliance with Japan. His contact with high politics, however, was largely on the personal and social plane, on which he excelled, and we hear much of his visits and his guests, his likes and dislikes. The famous tour of 1903, culminating in the conquest of Paris, was decided, we are told, on his own initiative, and the itinerary was chosen by himself. French statesmen, when, like Clemenceau and Delcassé, they happened to be Anglophils, were peculiarly congenial,

and Francis Joseph commanded his affectionate reverence till the Bosnian *coup* shattered his ideal. He had the Englishman's instinct for fair play, and, though an easy-going man of the world, there were certain things which he had no mind to condone. It was by his wish that diplomatic relations with Serbia were promptly broken off in 1903, and he made no secret of his disapproval of the character and misrule of King Leopold.

The irritation which the Kaiser inspired in his uncle was due more to provocative letters and tactless remarks than to any political cleavage. With a man whom he was unable to trust King Edward could never be at his ease. The frequent meetings of the sovereigns, though they usually passed off better than was anticipated, never provided unalloyed satisfaction, since the King never knew what surprise the impulsive ruler had up his sleeve. 'The Tangier incident,' he wrote in hot anger to Lord Lansdowne, 'was the most mischievous and uncalled-for event which the German Emperor has ever been engaged in since he came to the throne. He is no more nor less than a political *enfant terrible*, and one can have no faith in any of his assurances. These annual cruises are deeply to be deplored, and mischief is their only object.' The only large political issue in which they agreed was the limitation of armaments, which they both regarded as moonshine. The Morocco crisis convinced the King, as it convinced his Ministers, that the long-standing quarrel with Russia must be healed as quickly as possible, and he threw himself into the Reval visit of 1908 with the same zest as he had done into the visit to Paris in 1903. The official journey to Berlin in 1909 was outwardly a success; but a few weeks earlier he had written to Lord Knollys: 'I know the German Emperor hates me,' and it was in this year, after the dramatic termination of the Bosnian crisis, that the possibility of a European war for the first time crossed his mind. The portrait painted in this volume is not that of a superman, a far-seeing thinker or a Macchiavellian schemer, but a plain and

kindly Englishman of good natural abilities, passionately devoted to the welfare and greatness of the British Empire, yet at the same time, according to his lights, a good European, anxious that all nations alike should enjoy the blessings of prosperity and peace.

The battle between soldiers and civilians in reference to the conduct of the war goes merrily forward. After listening to the bitter complaints of Sir William Robertson and the biographers of Lord Haig, we turn with eager anticipation to the counter-attack by Mr. Winston Churchill. *The World-Crisis, 1915–1918*, is a worthy continuation of the earlier volumes, and the completed work forms the most brilliant contribution to the literature of the great struggle from the British side.

The two new volumes are a sustained indictment of military strategy, not in one country alone or on one side only of the swaying lines. The work opens with a sharp attack on French military preparations and on French generalship during the opening phases of the war. The first of the soldiers to be set in the pillory is Joffre, whose burly frame and sluggish brain would make him almost a comedy figure but for the tragic character of the drama in which he was fated to play a leading part. But the French Generalissimo was no worse than his British colleagues or his German foes ; for the offence common to them all was their incorrigible habit of frontal attacks on strongly fortified positions. Loos, the Somme, the Chemin des Dames and Paschendael on the one side, Verdun and the offensive of March, 1918, on the other, are exhibited as classic examples of attacking the strongest foe in the strongest place instead of the weakest foe in the weakest place. Falkenhayn, for instance, should have said 'Roumania' instead of 'Verdun' in 1916, and we should have broken down the easier enemy defences in the East instead of battering at impregnable strongholds in the West. The whole work constitutes a passionate and contemptuous indictment of the military handling of the conflict, and of the wasteful slaughter that it involved.

Though the main theme of the book is the struggle of armed forces on land and sea, there is some political information to be gleaned, and we obtain occasional glimpses behind the scenes. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Lloyd George were the first Liberal supporters of the demand for conscription, and in the rivalry between Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George our author's sympathies are with the latter. Mr. Lloyd George was the pilot to weather the storm, and these pages offer eloquent tribute to his services. Indeed, pending the appearance of his long-deferred apologia, Mr. Churchill's narrative may be regarded as a preliminary statement for the defence. He is as firm a believer in the primacy of the statesman over the soldier as Bismarck himself, and he applauds Mr. Lloyd George's desire to be master in his own house. In an evil moment, it is true, the Prime Minister consented to Nivelle's offensive ; but the tragedy of the Chemin des Dames effected a rapid conversion, and the horrors of Paschendael, which he detested but was unable to prevent, led him to keep large reserves at home till they were needed in 1918. He was wrong, it is true, in believing that the Western front could resist the first rush ; but he was convinced that if they were sent to France before the offensive began they would be wasted in frontal attacks. Though Sir William Robertson, as the leading Westerner, receives the hardest knocks, in the closing chapters Ludendorff joins the prisoners at the bar and receives a sentence no less severe. The winter of 1917–1918, declares Mr. Churchill, was a favourable opportunity for peace negotiations. It was the last, and Ludendorff lost it. The March offensive was the suicide of Imperial Germany. Though the author was excluded after 1915 from the higher direction of the war, his work at the Ministry of Munitions and his friendship with the Prime Minister enabled him to know what was going on and at certain moments to offer advice.

No one can close Mr. Churchill's incomparable

narrative without forming a high impression of his intellectual strength ; but his conviction of his quasi-infallibility is not generally shared, and it is not surprising that his fierce polemics should provoke a reply. In *The World Crisis : A Criticism*, five distinguished specialists launch a vigorous counter-attack. Lord Sydenham dissects his claim to be a military historian ; General Sir Frederick Maurice defends the strategy of Joffre with the aid of the French official history ; Sir Charles Oman challenges the estimate of the respective losses in the long-drawn battle of the Somme, which he declines to regard as a fruitless expenditure of blood ; and Admiral Bacon champions Jellicoe against his accuser's sledge-hammer blows. The upshot of this spirited controversy is a problem rather for the military specialist than for the student of high politics ; but the latter will probably be confirmed in his opinion that Mr. Churchill, like other makers of history, should be regarded rather as a witness than as a judge.

Sir Henry Wilson, declares Mr. Churchill categorically, was the most comprehensive military mind of our day in Great Britain ; and the publication of his *Life and Diaries* by his friend Major-General Sir C. E. Cattwell tends to corroborate this statement. The volumes contain more indiscretions than any prominent work since Mrs. Asquith took the world into her confidence ; yet their historical importance is not less than their personal interest. Sir Henry kept a full daily record of his doings. Although his biographer assures us that he has omitted a good deal of material unsuitable for early publication, he has provided enough to reveal the unvarnished opinion of men, policies and events entertained by the clever, high-spirited, cocksure, acrimonious Ulsterman.

A preface by Marshal Foch pays homage to 'one of my dearest friends,' and claims immortality for him in a lapidary sentence : 'It was entirely due to his prevision that the British army was enabled to disembark rapidly in France and to take part with effect

in the campaign.' The organ note struck in the preface is sounded again and again throughout the work by Sir Henry himself, his biographer, and other men in high place. We hear very little of the services of Lord Haldane, the creator of the Expeditionary Force, to whom Lord Haig paid a striking and well-deserved tribute at the moment of victory. This glorification of the soldier at the expense of the civilian, however, is typical of the whole work, which breathes a lofty disdain of the breed of statesmen, and suggests that wars would be much easier to win but for sins of omission and commission on the part of the Cabinet. We breathe the same atmosphere as in Sir William Robertson's *Soldiers and Statesmen*, and many a passage might have come straight from the pen of Ludendorff himself. To all alike the 'Frocks' are necessary evils, to be coached, vilified or shunted by the superior wisdom and foresight of the supermen in uniform. The truth of the matter is that both soldiers and civilians committed costly blunders, but that both parties may claim to have done their best in circumstances of overpowering difficulty.

As Commandant of the Staff College from 1907 to 1910, and Director of Military Operations from 1910 to 1914, Wilson was in a position to prepare for the struggle which he had come to regard as inevitable. He made the acquaintance of Foch in 1909, and introduced him in 1910 as 'the man who is going to command the Allied armies when the big war comes on.' He ardently supported the campaign of Lord Roberts for compulsory service, and he was dissatisfied with the loose texture of the Entente. The Agadir crisis led him to advocate 'an offensive and defensive alliance of England, France, Belgium, Denmark and Russia.' He loved France next to his own country, and when the hour of fate sounded, he joined the little group of Unionist politicians and journalists who mobilised their own leaders to put pressure on the Cabinet. 'But for me England would never, could never have gone to

war, and therefore it was the literal truth that I had saved France.' These words were addressed to him by General Castelnau in 1916, and they no doubt voiced the opinion of the army chiefs in France. However the influence of Sir Henry be finally assessed, it is agreed that he worked with all his soul and all his strength to prepare the Expeditionary Force for its dread ordeal, and to proclaim the necessity of standing by France in her hour of need.

The caution of Sir Edward Grey at various times during the years of peace prompted the diarist to hasty censure ; but it is not till the war was in full swing that his measureless contempt for civilian statesmen breaks forth. Mr. Asquith's conduct of affairs is roughly condemned, and the first Coalition is described as 'the Government of all the indecisions.' For a time Mr. Lloyd George was Sir Henry's hero ; but Milner was on the whole the most congenial of the 'Frocks,' and repaid his approval by saluting him as 'by far the ablest soldier in the army.'

Wilson was not much of a success during his short command in the field, and it was as one of the architects of the Supreme War Council and as our military representative thereon that he rose to his full stature. Orlando called him 'le Rothschild des bons espoirs,' and his certainty of victory led him to denounce peace feelers from Austria and peace talk at home during the later phase of the conflict. The chief honour of securing unity of command in the crisis of 1918 is here assigned to Wilson, who succeeded Robertson as C.I.G.S. in February 1918 after the disagreement of the latter with the Cabinet. Sir Henry had no great opinion of the British Generals, and was sceptical as to the wisdom of the 'Westerner' policy. With the coming of peace the despised 'Frocks' regained control, and we find him railing at President Wilson as 'a dangerous visionary' and 'an ass,' and contemptuously dismissing the League of Nations as 'nonsense.' The later chapters of the second volume show the Field Marshal to have been as

pathetically incompetent to handle the complex problems of the post-war world as Ludendorff himself, whom he resembles in his contempt for the civilian mind and in his preference for cutting knots instead of untying them.

In a democratic age journalists are often makers of history, and from time to time the veil which hides their activities is partially withdrawn. Mr. J. A. Spender's *Life, Politics and Journalism* is not only a singularly modest record of an honourable career but a definite contribution to our knowledge of high politics. During the decade which followed the return of the Liberals to power at the end of 1905, the Editor of the *Westminster Gazette* was far more than a skilful interpreter of the politics of his party. He has indeed been wittily described as a Minister without portfolio, and if he had been more inclined to blow his own trumpet his importance in the history of our time would have been more widely recognised.

The chapter entitled 'The Men of 1906' will long be read by those who seek to visualise the personalities of the Liberal team. He has a kindly word for them all, though Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey and Mr. McKenna receive the highest marks. The chapters on Foreign Affairs are a sustained tribute to the Foreign Secretary, with whom his relations 'were rather those of a friend than a journalist.' Contrary, however, to the gossip of the Chancelleries, he steered an independent course. 'The Germans appeared to think that he used me to test opinion and to throw out ideas which it was inconvenient to espouse officially. . . . I cannot remember a single occasion on which Grey asked me to write an article or prompted me to say one thing and not another. . . . He faced everything and discussed everything in an extraordinarily impersonal way, as if he were off the scene and bringing the cool judgment of the impartial outsider to bear on it.'

Mr. Spender's portraits of the Ambassadors bring some notable figures clearly before our eyes,—the courtly Cambon, the 'distinguished' [illegible]

agreeable Mensdorff, the magnificent Whitelaw Reid, the beloved Walter Page. Count Metternich receives the affectionate tribute that he deserves. 'He was a very honest man and very loyal servant of his Government, so loyal that he would never admit even in private that any step that he was instructed to take was open to question. . . . But it has since come out that no German abroad was more faithful in warning that Government of the peril they ran when they threatened Britain at sea.' In view of the legends that cling round the name of Kühlmann, it is useful to have the opinion of a shrewd observer who knew him well. 'He was a very able man of somewhat enigmatic character, but the notion that he was a deep kind of anti-British intriguer is, I believe, unfounded. . . . He was neither pro-British nor anti-British, just doing the business of his country, and doing it, according to his own lights, with great dutifulness. . . . I think his judgment was undoubtedly that friendship with us was politically desirable for Germany, but if so there was no sentiment about it, and he never pretended that there was.'

Among the author's contacts with foreign affairs none was more interesting than his visit to Germany with other British journalists in 1907. In 'an astonishing conversation' at Potsdam the Kaiser, seated on an enormous horse, complained bitterly that Englishmen did not come to Berlin. 'Go back and tell them to come; tell your Government people to come; tell Sir Edward Grey to come.' The impression left on him was 'that this Emperor on the high horse was clearly a very human kind of human being. He evidently had a grievance. It was just as if a newcomer was complaining that the county did not call on him. It was incredible to us that the great German Empire, by far the strongest thing in Europe, thought itself slighted and side-tracked. But so it was.' A longer conversation followed with Bülow in his official residence, where he was surprised to meet the formidable Holstein, who had fallen from power in the previous year.

Of no less interest is the chapter in the second volume on the last days of peace. On July 15, Baron Franckenstein arrived from the Austrian Embassy at the author's house late at night, 'in a state of great anxiety.' The Austrian Government, he declared, had satisfied itself that the plot against the Archduke had originated in Serbia, and it felt bound to obtain satisfaction from the Serbian Government. Would the Editor of the *Westminster Gazette* use his influence against encouraging the Serbians to resist? On the following night Herr von Schubert arrived from the German Embassy in a similar state of anxiety, and declared that Germany would feel compelled to support her ally. A more important communication reached him on August 1, when he received a personal telegram from Bethmann-Hollweg, begging him to publish his despatch of July 30 to Tschirschky exhorting the Austrian Government to negotiate with Petrograd. He instantly determined to publish the document, which was omitted from the German White-Book; and despite the charge that he was playing the German game, he never regretted his decision.

Sir Valentine Chirol's *Fifty Years in a Changing World*, a work of equal modesty, covers a longer period and a wider field; but we are only concerned with the chapters which deal with the recent history of European diplomacy. As correspondent of *The Times* in Berlin in the 'nineties, the author made the acquaintance of Holstein, of whom he writes with a friendly appreciation rare either in his own country or abroad. Some of the material relating to Germany has already appeared in *The Times*, but it is useful to possess it in permanent form. The British journalist trusted Caprivi, who, like Bismarck, was 'satiated'; but he had no confidence in Marschal, who informed him that the Kruger telegram was 'eine Staatsaktion,' and that it was high time to give us a lesson. Still less does he admire the plausible Bülow, with whom he had a disagreeable experience in 1901. Accepting an invitation from Holstein to visit Berlin for a discussion of Anglo-German relations with

the Chancellor, Sir Valentine listened to the outline of a scheme of a defensive alliance. Bülow was extremely cordial, and he promised his visitor, in tones of impressive sincerity, that he would never allow the anti-British sentiments of an ignorant public to deflect him from his friendly course. Shortly after he indulged in his stinging rejoinder to Chamberlain's criticism of the German army in 1870, and all the dogs of the German press began to yelp in chorus. This little episode convinced the author that the Chancellor was a false friend, and coloured the tone of *The Times* during the years when he was its Foreign Editor.

The most novel and important chapter in the book is entitled 'A War Mission to the Balkans.' In June, 1915, Sir Valentine was invited by the Foreign Office to visit the Balkans on a semi-official mission, the main object of which was to secure the aid, or at least the neutrality, of King Ferdinand. At Nish he found the Serbian authorities desperately suspicious of their neighbour and loth to make concessions; but the main responsibility for the loss of Bulgaria is placed on the statesmen of the Great Powers. 'The Allies never pulled their weight because they never tried to pull all together at the same time and in the same place.' The British Government, moreover, should have substituted O'Beirne for Bax-Ironside at Sofia, and have employed the services of Mr. G. H. Fitzmaurice, whose long experience as Oriental Secretary at Constantinople rendered his judgment of unique value, at a much earlier date. The situation was complicated by the Secret Treaty of London, the provisions of which had quickly filtered through to Serbian soil. 'If the Adriatic is to be an Italian lake,' argued the Crown Prince Alexander, 'how can we let Bulgaria hold the line of communication with the Aegean down the Vardar valley? If Serbia could have Albania and reach Durazzo, she could find compensation for Macedonia.' Sir Valentine advised that the Tsar should issue a solemn appeal to Serbia to make the necessary sacrifices; but nothing was done,

and 'the fox of the Balkans' naturally sold himself to the highest bidder. It is a pitiful story of fumbling diplomacy and divided counsels.

In the United States 1927 has been a lean year. Two volumes of the official biography of Woodrow Wilson by Ray Stannard Baker have appeared; but they only bring the story down to 1910, and are entirely concerned with his personality, his ideas and his academic career. Though his interest in American politics was keen, there is no sign in these pages of any serious study of the European situation. Till he entered the White House in 1913 he was interested in government, not in diplomacy, in progressive reform, not in the establishment of a new international order.

David F. Houston's detailed narrative, entitled *Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet*, supplements the testimony of his colleagues Bryan, Lansing, Daniels and Franklin Lane, but adds little of high significance. As Secretary of Agriculture, and later as Secretary of the Treasury, he loyally supported the policy of his chief, though he desired his country to enter the war at an earlier moment, and regrets that the President did not return home after inaugurating the Peace Conference. The most interesting portion of the book is the elaborate estimate of Woodrow Wilson at the end of the second volume. 'I worked for him and with him for eight years with ever-increasing affection, respect and admiration.'

More important for our purposes, though more limited in scope, is the article entitled 'Three Days in Belgrade: July, 1914,' contributed to *Foreign Affairs* in January, 1927, by Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Based to a large extent on the testimony of Grouitch, Serbian Minister in London during the Balkan Wars, and at this time Secretary-General of the Foreign Office, the narrative describes the events and the atmosphere at the Serbian capital from the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum on July 23 to the departure of Giesl on July 25. It is not surprising to learn that there is no truth in the rumour that a model draft arrived from

Paris. The reply was mainly the work of Stojan Protitch, but its terms were minutely discussed by the whole Cabinet after the hurried return of the Premier to Belgrad. A notable article contributed to the *Political Science Quarterly* in June, 1927, by Michael T. Florinsky, entitled 'The Russian Mobilisation of 1914,' contains two brief letters from Sazonoff to the author, the first relating to the partial mobilisation of 1912, the second to the false report of German mobilisation in the *Lokal-anzeiger*. With such transatlantic crumbs do we have to assuage our hunger till Stannard Baker's hero enters Washington in triumph, and Professor Seymour presents us with the final volumes of the secrets of Colonel House.

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER ON THE REVELATIONS OF 1928–9

THE call for a fourth impression provides the opportunity for a survey of the revelations of 1928–9, which are inferior neither in number nor interest to those of 1927. Indeed it can now be said that we know the face and mind of Europe during the twenty years before the war as we know no other period in the history of mankind.

I

Beginning our tour as usual with Germany, we may first note the latest performance of William II. *My Ancestors* is the shortest and least significant of his books, and indeed the interest is personal rather than historical. The Hohenzollerns pass in rapid procession, and with the exception of Frederick William II they all receive high marks from the Imperial showman. The volume is a political sermon, and, though the narrative ends with the Emperor Frederick, the author is constantly thinking of himself. His ideal for Germany, and apparently for all other countries, is an enlightened autocrat, 'le premier domestique de l'Etat,' standing high above parties and classes, and instinctively acting for the good of the whole. His measureless scorn for democracy has in no way diminished since the proud days when he bade it defiance from the stronghold of Potsdam.

The other side of the shield is presented with unflinching realism in the *Letters of the Empress Frederick*, edited by Sir Frederick Ponsonby. The supreme interest of the book lies in the revelation of a gifted Englishwoman

at war with her Prussian environment ; but for the purposes of our survey we are only concerned with the later chapters of her life. While Bismarck is of course the arch-enemy, his fall brought the widowed sufferer no comfort ; for, as she had written in 1889, he was determined to prevent war, and his place was taken by that most tragic of figures, an autocrat unequal to his destiny. 'William is so green,' she wrote to Queen Victoria, 'that he makes blunders which take one's breath away.' '"Look before you leap," I should like to write in big letters over his table, though it would be of very little use, I fear.' 'I wish I could put a padlock on his mouth.' 'He is perfectly delighted with himself.' 'He has no heart.' Such was the slashing indictment of a gifted but ill-balanced ruler by a broken-hearted mother, who had lost in a moment everything which made life worth living, and who looked with jaundiced eyes on the raw occupants of the Imperial throne. Though the Iron Chancellor and 'his dreadful son' had disappeared, Waldersee, whom she believed to have set William against her, enjoyed high favour ; and he was almost as 'imprudent and thoughtless' as his master. The ex-Empress was told nothing of the inwardness of foreign affairs, and the letters of the last decade, except those which briefly describe the risky visit to Paris in 1891, add nothing to our knowledge of diplomacy. No reader of these outpourings of a bleeding heart would accept the writer's verdicts as deciding the issue, for she divided mankind too sharply into friends and foes. Yet no student of the last of the Hohenzollerns can wholly ignore the testimony of one whose undazzled eyes pierced the tinsel veil of pomp and ceremony.

To the German edition of the letters the Kaiser added a Preface, a translation of which appeared in the *Evening Standard* on February 12, 1929. In language of faultless tact and unruffled dignity the fallen monarch pays homage to the brilliant qualities and exalted ideals of his mother, while gently reminding the reader that 'the Prussians were not Englishmen,' and that her 'passionate

temperament' did not facilitate the task of 'the unhappiest woman who ever bore a crown.' Future generations, he concludes, would read the letters with emotion, and would pronounce a just verdict. In making no direct attempt to rebut her scalding indictment, he is obviously wise; for piety and policy in this case coincide.

The histrionic figure of William II continues to attract the gaze of writers and readers. The *Memoirs* of his sister, Princess Victoria of Prussia, whose love for the chivalrous Battenberger had once threatened to embroil two mighty empires, are singularly lacking in interest; but *Daisy, Princess of Pless*, by Herself, is not only a chatty record of the adventures of a vivacious English girl married to a wealthy Silesian nobleman, but a contribution to the story of Anglo-German relations. The Princess endeavoured in her unconventional way to mediate between the two countries, and her efforts were never resented by the Kaiser, whom she describes as a kind and faithful friend. Her narrative confirms what has now become the accepted reading of his character, namely that he wished to keep the peace without knowing how it could be done. The establishment of Headquarters on the Eastern front often brought him to Pless, where his virtual dethronement by the war-gods was as obvious to his hostess as it was humiliating to himself. The Princess watched with anxious foreboding the gathering of the storm and confided her apprehensions to Lord Rosebery, whose letter of January 25, 1912, is perhaps the most interesting document in the volume. 'I am indeed uneasy as to our position, for we seem to be bound on the Continent by some invisible and formidable bonds. But as this is the settled policy apparently of both political parties, it is not easy, perhaps not possible, to put things right. Anyhow I cannot. I have tried and found it a task both thankless and fruitless.'

The success of the Diaries of General von Schweinitz, briefly described in the Supplement for 1927, encouraged his son to publish a selection from his father's correspondence. The *Briefwechsel des Botschafters General*

von Schweinitz is like skimmed milk after cream ; but the chapters on the reign of William II, which alone concern us, contain one document of outstanding importance. On August 28, 1895, the General lunched with the Kaiser and afterwards listened for an hour to a description of the celebrated interview with Salisbury at Cowes, whence he had recently returned. Salisbury, began the Kaiser, had declared that Turkey's day was done and that she must be partitioned. Russia was to have Constantinople, the Dardanelles and a piece of Asia Minor ; Austria was to receive Salonika, Italy Tripoli and perhaps Albania, England Egypt, France nothing. 'What do we get ?' queried Schweinitz. 'We shall get something in Africa ; the chief thing is that France gets nothing and therefore falls out with Russia.'

At this point Schweinitz attempted to convince his master that Turkey would not willingly allow herself to be carved into slices, that the Turkish army was strong, and that Russia would incur grave difficulties if she embarked on a new Turkish war. The Kaiser replied that she could send her ships through the Bosphorus any day and anchor before the Palace. The Sultan knew his weakness and would yield to fate. He hated the English and feared the Russians, but he consoled himself with the idea that other Moslem rulers, such as the Emir of Bokhara, lived comfortably under a Russian protectorate. When Schweinitz expressed his doubts as to Russia's ability to force the Bosphorus, the Kaiser replied that he had seen the defences himself. 'I told the English not to be surprised if one fine day a Russian Admiral makes a treaty in Constantinople with the Sultan before they can arrive.' Schweinitz admitted the possibility, but denied the feasibility of a bloodless partition of Turkey or the Balkans, adding that he was surprised that Salisbury should surrender a fundamental principle of British policy, namely the closing of the Straits. Salisbury, replied William, could not resist the movement for the Armenians aroused by Rosebery, Gladstone and Argyll. England, rejoined Schweinitz, would be mis-

taken if she expected Russian support for the Armenians, whom Pobiedonostseff described as the Poles of Asia; nor would she like the union of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets and their co-operation with the French in the Mediterranean. And what would be Austria's position in Dalmatia and Herzegovina if the Russian fleet entered Cattaro? 'I am not sure of Salisbury's goal,' retorted the Kaiser, 'but in any case he is down on the Sultan. My chief aim is not to be drawn into war about the Straits. I should greatly prefer if Russia expanded in Eastern Asia.' He had written to tell the Tsar he could trust to his word of honour to keep his flank safe. There would be no objection if Russia were to take Korea and Port Arthur. 'Of course we should also ask for a good port.' 'Any special place?' inquired Schweinitz. 'Wei-hai-wei' was the reply.

Before we come to the official publication of new documentary materials, the appearance of an abridged edition of *Die Grosse Politik* must be gratefully recorded. Fifty-four volumes of the larger work—the delight of scholars and the despair of amateurs—re-emerge in four double volumes of about 800 pages each under the title *Die Auswärtige Politik des deutschen Reiches, 1871–1914*. The idea of an abridgment was suggested by Hindenburg and Stresemann, and was carried out by the Institut für Auswärtige Politik in Hamburg under the supervision of the editors. But while the *Grosse Politik* was in the main the work of Thimme, the larger part of the burden of the *Auswärtige Politik* has been assumed by his colleague Mendelssohn Bartholdy. The principle of selection has been to concentrate on the governing tendencies of German policy, that is on the motives and the decisions of the Wilhelmstrasse and the confidential correspondence of the Ministers of the Triple Alliance, rather than on the documents which flowed in from its agents in every quarter of the globe. The Preface closes with the expression of the Editors' desire that the abridgment may help their countrymen and the wider world to a deeper understanding of the causes of the world war, since the

chief problem of the pre-war period, the division of Europe into groups, emerges with special relief in the smaller edition.

The Reichstag Committee of Inquiry continues its unwearying labours, and we may now study in detail the period of the Armistice and the work of the Armistice Commission in *Der Waffenstillstand, 1918–1919*. The Preface to the first volume, which deals with the Armistice of Compiègne and its successive prolongations, explains that, since widely different opinions are held in regard to the conduct of the German representatives, it was decided to publish the records in full. It is not surprising that the first of the documents presented to the student is the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. The second volume is devoted to the discussions involved in the execution of the various agreements. The third is by far the most interesting to the general reader, for it contains the report of the Committee, presented to the Reichstag as long ago as 1920, on the activities of the Armistice Commission. These reports are sometimes rendered so colourless by the desire to secure unanimity that they possess little interest; but in the present case there is no division of opinion and consequently no mincing of words. During the execution of the hard armistice conditions, we are told, no attempt at understanding was displayed by the Allies. Decisions were announced, and protests were commonly ignored. 'Foch, as the victor, dictated, guided by the will to annihilate and the sentiment of revenge.' It was only in regard to secondary matters that the Germans could obtain a hearing. The Allies ignored the terms of the armistice in relation to Alsace-Lorraine, Poland and other parts of the wide political and economic field over which their authority extended. The concluding pages of the report are a bitter indictment of broken promises and ruthless administration, and the loudest complaints receive the doubtful compliment of large print. The impression we derive from these documents is that Erzberger and his colleagues did what they could in a game in

which their opponents had all the winning cards in their hands.

Of wider interest and even larger bulk are the volumes of the Reichstag Committee which continue and conclude the investigation of the collapse. The first three volumes of *Die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruches im Jahre 1918*, relating to the military disaster, were noticed in an earlier edition. The sequel, in seven volumes devoted to the internal catastrophe, is a formidable meal even for a healthy stomach ; but some of the courses are appetising enough. The very readable monograph entitled *Der deutsche Reichstag im Weltkrieg*, by the jurist Professor Bredt, Member of Parliament, which now appears as volume 8, was written at the wish of the Sub-Committee, and was published before the investigations were complete. His thesis is that the Reichstag could have averted the catastrophe and carried out the policy of the Majority in the teeth of the military Chiefs, had it possessed a firmer will. He trounces the Right with extraordinary vigour for its blind championship of antiquated principles, above all the Prussian franchise. 'There was the cause of the revolution.' His verdict on the Centre is scarcely less severe. If it had pursued a consistent course, he argues, and had leaned steadily either to the Right or the Left, the Reichstag would have become a real force. But first it supported the submarine campaign, then the Peace resolution, and then trimmed its sails once again. Bredt's survey was discussed at length by several of the Ministers and principal figures of the Reichstag, whose contributions are published in the seventh volume. Count Westarp, the Conservative leader, denounces the Majority and its policy as one of the chief agents in undermining the patriotic will of the nation, and thus leading straight to the abyss. Stresemann, who succeeded Bassermann as leader of the National Liberals in 1917, complains of Bethmann, 'a born pessimist,' and grieves that Bülow was not appointed his successor. David for the Socialists contends that nothing could be done with the Reichstag,

whose limited powers made it a sham. Kühlmann and Michaelis explain their policy in relation to the Papal Note of August, 1917, and their refusal to promise the unconditional liberation of Belgium. These outspoken testimonies and criticisms, straying over the whole field of domestic and foreign policy, form an instructive symposium on the decline and fall of the Empire.

The fourth and fifth volumes, which are concerned with the general causes and nature of the collapse, contain speeches by members of all the important parties, and an appendix of letters and diaries from the front. The Resolution of the Sub-Committee, passed on November 3, 1927, summarises the factors and expressions of discontent in the light of the mass of evidence passed under review, without reaching clear-cut decisions on the fundamental issues. 'The question whether Germany's opponents would have modified the conditions of the armistice had the German people shown themselves ready to fight to the last is unanswered. The acceptance of the Armistice conditions carried with it the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles; whether the conditions of the latter, despite the military impotence of Germany, could have been modified by political opposition remains a subject of controversy.' The sixth volume contains monographs by General von Kühl, Colonel Schwertfeger, Delbrück and other specialists on the vexed question of the *Dolchstoss* or stab in the back to which the Right attributes the final catastrophe, while the Left denies its occurrence. In this vast encyclopædia of information on the civil side of the *débâcle* everything is grist which comes to the mill, and the arguments of soldiers and publicists are followed by a lengthy report drawn up by the Ministry of Health a month after the Revolution on the devastating results of the blockade on the health and life of the nation. The unanimous Resolution of the Sub-Committee declares that the Reichstag possessed no decisive influence on the conduct of war under the Constitution of 1871, and indeed was powerless till the autumn of 1918, since the Government and Right blocked the path to constitutional

reform. Thus the contention of Bredt that the German Parliament might have made more of its powers is rejected, and responsibility is transferred to the shoulders of those who strove only too successfully to keep it in leading-strings. The gigantic collection concludes with two sprawling volumes, numbered 9 and 10, on the share of the navy in the national collapse. Lengthy memoranda by specialists cover every inch of the ground from the first signs of trouble in 1917 to the Kiel revolt; and the diary of the sailor Richard Stumpf, serving on the *Helgoland*, which runs to not less than 300 pages, is printed as a specimen of what the crews were thinking as the months rolled slowly past. The Resolution of the Sub-Committee, opposed by the Communist member alone, ends with the customary non-committal verdict. 'Of all the formulas explaining the collapse by a single cause none has stood the test of investigation; the guilt can only be found in the interaction of manifold causes.'

Count Westarp's *Die Regierung des Prinzen Max von Baden und die Konservative Partei, 1918*, contains the whole of the evidence submitted by the Conservative leader to the Reichstag Committee, of which only a part was published in the seventh volume of *Der Zusammenbruch*. The book is a sustained indictment of the last Chancellor of the Empire and of the parties which supplied him with a majority; for in his eyes it was the duty of the Government, even in the moment of military defeat, to refuse the sacrifices which it had been indisposed to make while there was still a hope of victory. It was, in his view, a monstrous error to ask for peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points, which included the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and other 'impossible' demands. It was equally unnecessary, in his opinion, to introduce Parliamentary Government, to abolish the Prussian three-class franchise, or to urge the abdication of the Kaiser. When the terms of the Allies proved to be as stern as he anticipated, it was the duty of the Government, he argues, to summon the country to a final desperate effort, which, he believes, would have secured better treatment and

would at any rate have saved the honour of Germany. The most valuable pages of Count Westarp's record are those which describe his interviews with Prince Max and Vice-Chancellor Payer, Hindenburg and Ludendorff. But its chief interest lies in the revelation of a mentality which refused to recognise disagreeable facts, and which, by fighting a compromise settlement and internal reform, forced the strongest Power in the world to drink the cup of humiliation to the dregs.

The Herculean labours of the Reichstag Commission have provoked criticism as well as gratitude. The volumes on *Völkerrecht in Weltkrieg* discussed the breach of Greek but not of Belgian neutrality, though such burning questions as the *Franctireurs* and the deportations were among its themes. To fill this gap Professor Bredt, author of the above-mentioned *Der Reichstag im Weltkrieg*, wrote *Die Belgische Neutralität und der Schlieffensche Feldzugsplan*, a cool and comprehensive study of the question from the historical, juridical and military points of view. The chapter on the Schlieffen plan of 1905, the most important in the book, throws new light on the formation of the scheme and its drastic modification by his successor. That he intended to march through Dutch Limburg was already known ; but we now learn that he designed to force his way through Belgium without being the first to violate her neutrality. No ultimatum was to be sent. Liège was to be captured, not by a sudden rush, but after ten or twelve days of overt preparation, which, he believed, would induce the French to prepare for the coming attack by massing on the line of the Meuse south of Namur. Though Schlieffen reckoned on the intervention of England, whether the German troops marched through Belgium or not, he was well aware of the odium which the tactics approved by his successor would provoke. Though the adoption of the Schlieffen plan involved political consequences of immeasurable significance, Prince Bülow has informed the author that he was never officially consulted on the matter. Professor Bredt regrets the alteration of the original plan in regard

to Liège ; but, once made, the action of Germany in 1914 appears to him to have been as inevitable as the Belgian response. 'Neither one side nor the other had any choice.' Of the later chapters the most useful is that devoted to the evolution of the 'Belgian question' during the war.

A valuable addition to our knowledge of German policy from 1900 onwards is contained in the handsome quarto, *Aus meinen Akten*, printed for private distribution by Paul von Schwabach, head of the financial house of Bleichröder since he succeeded his father in 1898. Though above all a man of business, the author of these letters and memoranda rightly describes himself as taking a practical and passionate interest in politics ; and the chief revelation of this remarkable book is the important political rôle played by him in the years before the war. The relations of Germany and Great Britain form the main theme of the letters, most of which are addressed to Baron Alfred de Rothschild. Though we are only presented with one side of the intimate correspondence, we quickly discover that the two men were inspired by the same ideals and were working along similar lines. Both were good patriots and good citizens of the world ; both desired nothing so much as harmony between London and Berlin ; and both were in constant touch with the rulers and Ministers of their respective countries. When we read of 'my friends' and 'your friends,' we are listening to the voices not of subordinate officials but of the men who were shaping the destinies of the world. The publication of this volume sets Paul von Schwabach and Alfred de Rothschild beside Sir Ernest Cassel and Albert Ballin in the little group which strove to avert a catastrophe by removing misunderstandings and counter-working suspicions. Fewer in number but not inferior in interest are the letters to Sir Eyre Crowe, a friend from student days, in which sharp differences of opinion are fearlessly argued in tones of unchanging affection. No one understood more fully than his Berlin correspondent that Crowe, despite his German affiliations, was British by duty and conviction.

The first and larger section of the volume, covering the years 1900–1914, traces the curve of Anglo-German relations. Signs of co-operation, such as the Yangtze agreement and the Windsor visit of 1907, are greeted with delight, and the refusal to join the Bagdad enterprise in 1903 is recorded with regret. The resignation of Salisbury is welcomed as making way for Balfour and Chamberlain, from whom greater friendliness is expected, just as a year or two later the coming of the Liberals is hailed with satisfaction. The *Times* is sharply denounced as a dangerous mischief-maker, and Bertie's Germanophobia is exposed to view; but the fire-eaters of the Flottenverein, who made the flesh of their countrymen creep with legends of sudden attack, also hear the crack of his whip. Schwabach understood England too well not to condemn the Tirpitz policy, and he assures us that Holstein, of whom he speaks throughout in the friendliest terms, entirely shared his disapproval. Believing a British attack extremely unlikely but not absolutely impossible, he desired a fleet large enough to defend the German coasts and small enough to arouse no fear of aggression.

While highly critical of the naval policy of his country, Schwabach stoutly supported the German side throughout the Morocco controversy, in which he himself played an active mediatorial part, and which supplies the theme of several of the most valuable letters and memoranda in this book. Like Holstein and Bülow, he argues that German rights were deliberately ignored by Delcassé; that in demanding the maintenance of the open door Germany was asking no special privileges for herself; and that neither in intention nor in fact was her action unfriendly to Great Britain. A Paris banker, to whom Delcassé explained that he had squared the signatories of the Treaty of Madrid, namely England, Italy and Spain, interjected 'and Germany?' and received the reply 'Avec l'Allemagne, jamais de la vie!' This story, which Schwabach heard from the lips of the French banker himself, confirms his conviction that the policy of

the Wilhelmstrasse was purely defensive. It is interesting to learn that Holstein was horrified at the Kaiser's utterances at Tangier; but the conversations of the author with William II during the Algeciras Conference and later, reported in this volume, exhibit him as a man of peace. New light is thrown on the dismissal of Delcassé, on which Rouvier appears to have resolved some weeks before the Wilhelmstrasse joined in the hue and cry. An urgent request from Alfred de Rothschild to induce the German Government to express a wish for the retention of Delcassé was politely declined. That the fall of the Foreign Minister was not followed by the expected *détente* is explained by the discovery that the Moroccan policy of France continued to be controlled by Révoil and other Delcassists of the Quai d'Orsay, and that the accommodating Rouvier was not master in his own house.

The material illustrating the second Morocco crisis is no less valuable than that relating to the first. Schwabach presents German policy as the defensive answer to the violation of the Treaty of Algeciras by France, and, while unreservedly admitting that the British Government had no wish to make trouble, deplores the menacing declaration of Mr. Lloyd George. An argumentative letter to Crowe, dated July 28, 1911, was written with Kiderlen's consent; the reply was forwarded to him; and the rejoinder of August 11 was composed after discussing Crowe's points with the author of the Agadir *coup*. The complaint that no reply was made to Sir Edward's communication to Metternich of July 4 is met with the assertion that Berlin was unaware that an answer was expected or required. Carrying the war of argument into the enemy's camp, Schwabach quotes the opinion of circles 'neither Anglophobe nor chauvinist' that England was behaving as if she was *arbiter mundi* or France a British Protectorate. The French, he added, were now assured that they could reckon on British help in any dispute with Germany, whether peaceful or otherwise; and this conviction filled him with anxiety for the future.

He had several interviews during the autumn with Caillaux, who regretted the Mansion House speech, and believed in the possibility of a lasting understanding with Germany. It was clear from certain observations of the Premier that he felt a little embarrassed by the warmth of the British embrace.

The first section of the volume ends with an affectionate and sorrowful letter of farewell to Alfred de Rothschild, dated August 1, 1914. 'What troubles me most is my certainty that England will also draw the sword. You and I have done our best to improve the relations of our countries. May those who are responsible for this sad event reconcile their actions with their consciences!' The second part of the book, which covers the years of war, reveals Schwabach, as might be expected, serving his country at the front and at home, opposing the cry for wholesale annexations, warning his countrymen not to bring the United States into the field, and urging the need of constitutional reform. The third part extends to 1926, and, so far as it deals with passing events, is beyond our scope; but it also contains memoranda on the years before the war enriched by vivid memories of Bismarck and his successors. Students who are unable to procure the volume will find an admirable analysis of the first part by Frederick Thimme in *Europäische Gespräche*, June, 1929.

The legend of a Crown Council held on July 5, 1914, which decided to precipitate a world war, has long been discredited; but we may none the less welcome Kurt Jagow's narrative, *Der Potsdamer Kronrat*, published in the *Süddeutsche Monatshefte* of August, 1928. New evidence is supplied by some of the principal actors, including the Kaiser, Count Hoyos, who brought the appeal of Francis Joseph, and Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who, in the absence of Jagow, was in control of the Wilhelmstrasse; and the dry entries in the diaries of the Court officials on duty at Potsdam on July 5 and 6 are reproduced in full. We can now reconstruct every incident of those fateful days on

which the Kaiser saw in succession the people whom under the circumstances it was his obvious duty to see. The encouragement of Austria to enter on a very dangerous course was a decision which will always give rise to divergent judgments ; and the expectation, which appears to have been sincerely entertained, that Russia would not intervene in no way diminishes the responsibility involved in taking that step. Democratically governed countries would naturally expect some consultation of the elected representatives of the people on an issue of such capital importance ; but Germany had not yet reached that stage in political evolution. There is nothing in the story as now fully revealed to suggest either a closeting of conspirators or a will to war. Among the crumbs of fresh information perhaps the most interesting are the Kaiser's testimony to the difficulty with which Bethmann persuaded him to leave for his yachting tour, and Count Hoyos' expression of his personal opinion to Zimmermann that Serbia should as far as possible be partitioned between Albania, Bulgaria, Roumania and Austria. This suggestion was disapproved by Tisza, who caused Berchtold to disavow it. The remaining and larger part of the brochure is devoted to the origins, growth and demolition of the legend of a Crown Council at Potsdam.

Scheidemann's *Memoirs of a Social Democrat* add a good many details to the picture painted in his earlier book, *Der Zusammenbruch*, without substantially modifying our reading of events or our impression of the author ; there is moreover a certain flatness in listening twice to the same witness. Like most other actors in the drama, the Socialist leader looks back on his work and cries aloud : Behold, it is good ! His sleek complacency is a greater trial to his readers when buttered lavishly over 800 pages, and his querulous attacks on old friends and colleagues leave a disagreeable taste in the mouth. 'I have never bowed the knee to any man, to King or President,' he proudly declares ; 'as I have always striven to do my duty, I had a right to hold my head erect.' He adds stiffly that his book will not please all

its readers and was not written with that intention ; its purpose was to tell the truth. The early chapters introduce us to the Socialist party and its chiefs in the last years of peace, above all to Bebel, ' half lion, half fox,' whose detestation of Tsarism, we are assured, would certainly have led him to support the military credits in August 1914. He adds, however, that a self-governing Germany would have been able to avert the war. He pours scorn on the firebrands who, like Erzberger, called for the arrest of Socialist editors, and, like Stresemann, shouted for annexations in East and West. Bethmann, on the other hand, appears throughout as a moderate, oppressed by acute anxiety as to the outcome of the struggle and longing for what came to be known as a Scheidemann peace, while fearing to proclaim aloud what he whispered to Socialist visitors. On receiving Scheidemann and two of his colleagues on November 21, 1914, the Chancellor sadly confessed that Germany had rated Austria too high and her enemies too low. The Russians, he added, were well armed and their mobilisation was a surprising success. The French offensive was beyond expectation, and Joffre was an excellent chief. The achievement of the English was a surprise, for nobody had imagined that fresh troops would cross the Channel every day. The vigorous resistance of the Belgians was also an astonishment. The Chancellor, he adds, was in an almost intolerable position. ' Every word he uttered was interpreted as surrender by the Right and Imperialism by the extreme Left. To myself and my more intimate friends it was clear that he was really convinced that he had done all that was humanly possible to prevent the war, and that he was honourably desirous of ending it as rapidy as possible.' He was too weak to enforce his will, and threats of resignation are only of use to indispensable men. The launching of the submarine campaign in 1917 was vigorously opposed by the author, who saw in its adoption the doom of his country. He was convinced at the time, and is convinced to-day, that a give-and-take settlement was possible, though the Stockholm

Conference, again described at length, proved a great disappointment.

The second volume takes its place among our chief sources for the two crowded years which stretch from the fall of Bethmann to the forced acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles ; for Scheidemann was now at the summit of his fame, and became for a time a maker of history. He angrily denounces the pious Michaelis who, in qualifying his acceptance of the Reichstag Peace resolution with the phrase 'as I understand it,' 'trifled with the vital interests of the German people.' That such a mediocrity would know how to deal with the opportunity provided by the Papal Note was too much to hope. On the fall of the feeblest Chancellor that Germany ever possessed, Bülow's name was put forward by the Prince and his friends. When pressed to meet the candidate, Scheidemann refused, and only yielded to renewed entreaties. There is nothing in these volumes more curious than the contemptuous account of the wooing of the Socialist leader in the Hotel Adlon. All the arts and crafts of which the veteran *charmeur* was a master were exercised in vain. 'He said Yes to everything, and approved everything that I asked.' At parting he held the hand of his visitor long in his own, and insisted on helping him into his coat. The sole effect of a conversation lasting two and a half hours was to convince Scheidemann that the Prince was past his prime.

With the arrival of Max of Baden our author found himself at length a Minister, and it is interesting to compare his record of the last Imperial Chancellorship with the Memoirs of his chief. Prince Max made no secret of his dislike of Scheidemann, and the Socialist leader hits sharply back. 'He was certainly one of the cleverest of the German Princes, though that does not say much. Flatterers had told him that he was a great politician, and he probably came to believe it. Yet never in my whole political career have I met a man so utterly dependent on others.' In Scheidemann's

eyes he was a well-meaning amateur, utterly lacking in judgment of men and seeking counsel from advisers as ignorant of the political stage as himself. That the Prince liked Ebert and eulogises him in his book is an added offence ; for we learn from these pages that Scheidemann's opinion of his more famous collaborator was not very flattering. After his brief impromptu speech proclaiming the Republic from a balcony of the Reichstag on November 9, 1918, and thereby, in his belief, saving Germany from Bolshevism, Scheidemann returned to finish his soup. Ebert was purple with anger on hearing what had occurred, struck his fist on the table, and shouted 'Is it true?' When Scheidemann rejoined that it was not only true but inevitable, Ebert retorted : 'You have no right to proclaim the Republic ! Whether Germany is to be a Republic or something else a Constituent Assembly must decide.' What then seemed so astonishing became intelligible later, when it appeared that Ebert had engaged in compromising discussions of which Scheidemann knew nothing ; and Prince Max himself relates that on the historic ninth of November Ebert begged him to remain in Berlin as Reichsverweser, or Administrator of the Realm. Thus our author presents himself as the father of the Republic, dragging his reluctant and muddle-headed colleague in his train. When Ebert became the first President and Scheidemann the first Chancellor, the former's conception of his position, we are told, was that the President should determine policy and the Chancellor should cover it with his authority. A final disappointment came when Ebert, after repeatedly declaring that he would under no circumstances accept the Treaty of Versailles, allowed Erzberger to convert him to what Scheidemann regards as a shameful surrender, and thereby to terminate the author's political career.

Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria was above all a soldier, and the three handsome volumes of *Mein Kriegstagebuch* are primarily a contribution to the annals of the Western

front. But the Commander of the Sixth Army was also a cultivated, travelled, far-seeing man, and scattered through the thousand pages of his published diary are political records and jottings of considerable interest. For the heir to the throne of the Wittelsbachs was a personage of importance, in close touch with the rulers, the statesmen and the soldiers of Imperial Germany. On the other hand, though informed of everything, he was not quite high enough to secure the acceptance of his advice, and the book in consequence is filled with sorrowful complaints. He is aware of the 'rather melancholy' impression it is calculated to make, and cautions his readers to remember that he naturally confided to his diary his anxieties rather than his exultations. The root of the trouble, he believes, was the lack of unified control; for there was no civilian will in Germany to match the soldiers, and the Supreme Command interfered—and sometimes was compelled to interfere—in regions beyond its grasp.

The diary begins on August 5, 1914, with the assertion that the Bavarian troops were eager for the fray; but the author was well aware that the path to victory would be neither short nor smooth. Two decades before the war, he tells us in the Preface, he doubted the durability of the Hapsburg Monarchy, built as it was on the ideas of bygone centuries. 'The frontiers of common language and common sentiment are the natural frontiers of States.' Another interesting confession, jotted down on January 27, 1917, throws light on his opinions in the last years of peace. 'How differently might the war have ended had we had the right men in the right place! Knowing our lack of them I was always for avoiding war.' Big Industry had in large measure controlled foreign policy, and profits of companies, as in Morocco, had counted for almost as much as the welfare of Germany. His apprehensions were fully realised. The Kaiser appears once more as a well-meaning figure-head. Bethmann was the last pilot in the world to weather the storm. 'What struck

me most in his conversation,' he writes after a visit of the Chancellor in October, 1915, 'were the continual doubts which cropped up in almost every sentence, and I formed the impression that he could hardly reach positive decisions for thinking of the difficulties involved.' The Prince felt indeed as if he were in a rudderless boat in a swift current with rocks on both banks. His view of Bethmann was shared by all the soldiers, but he had scarcely more confidence in the military chiefs. Falkenhayn struck him as hasty and restless, and he helped to procure his dismissal. He opposed the short cuts to victory dear to the military mind, such as the air raids on London, and he was fully aware of the potential reactions of the submarine campaign. After two years of fighting he began to fear that the war might not be won and that, without careful steering, it might be lost. He challenged Hindenburg's description of the situation in October, 1916, as excellent. When, in the same month, the Crown Prince pressed him to urge the Kaiser to make a separate peace with Russia, giving her back Russian Poland and adding East Galicia as the German strength was ebbing away, he responded to the idea if not to the plan. 'I fully agree, and I am beginning to fear our troops are no longer equal to large-scale offensives. If we are to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion, we must compromise with one of our opponents in order to throw all our forces against the other and more dangerous foe. But I should only wish to restore Russian Poland.' On the last day of 1916 he noted that he could no longer believe in a complete military decision.

From the middle of 1917 onwards the record becomes less exclusively military, for since the Reichstag Resolution every citizen and soldier was thinking out terms of peace. The Prince found Michaelis, the stopgap Chancellor, cool-headed and sensible; but, like Prince Max of Baden, he regretted with increasing vehemence the refusal of the Government to make the unequivocal declaration on Belgium without which the

British Empire would fight to the bitter end. In February, 1918, he actually found the Kaiser arguing that the Flemings desired union with Germany, and that the solution of the problem of peace was the partition of Belgium between Germany and France ; and as late as July 19, 1918, Hertling was bent on securing economic concessions as the price of independence. There is no more interesting conversation in these volumes than that with Czernin on August 12, 1917. The war and revolution, declared the Austrian Foreign Minister, were running a neck and neck race. Turkey and Bulgaria were no longer to be depended on, and a speedy peace was urgently needed. The Reichstag Resolution had removed the apprehensions entertained in Austria that German annexationist designs might prolong the struggle. Russia, however, had no dependable government with which to negotiate, and he had little hopes of England, the toughest enemy of the Central Powers. An approach must therefore be made to France, the most exhausted of the Allies. Germany should offer the French-speaking portions of Lorraine, receiving in compensation a preponderant influence in a Poland ruled by a German Prince, to which Austria would add Galicia. From Serbia he would only ask a slight rectification of frontier, from Montenegro the cession of Mount Lovchen. Italy was in difficulties, and he was not in favour of buying a separate peace by territorial sacrifices. Ludendorff was a first-rate officer but no statesman, and the Central Powers might well be satisfied with the restoration of something like the *status quo ante*. The Prince listened to Czernin's review with interest and a good deal of agreement ; but he had long been convinced that the Hapsburg Empire was in decline, however much ' this monstrous political structure ' might be buttressed from without.

Though the defeat of Germany was so sudden and unexpected that the nation was stunned by the blow, Prince Rupprecht had seen it all in advance. In vain did he criticise the ' ostrich-like ' policy of Ludendorff,

who was intoxicated by the fleeting success of his last offensive. He rejoiced in the appointment of Prince Max, while regretting that the call came so late. When the Kaiser appeared to stand between his sorely-tried people and an armistice, he desired that the German Princes should jointly urge him to abdicate. The Prince loyally accepted his place in the Imperial system ; but Bavarian Particularism crops up again and again, and he was more concerned with the throne of the Wittelsbachs than with the fate of William II or the Crown Prince. In the letters which fill the opening section of the third volume we find additional evidence of his efforts to save the vessel before it dashed against the rocks. A long letter to Hertling of July, 1917, urged that German terms should be communicated to the King of Spain or the King of Sweden, these terms to be limited to the *status quo ante bellum*. Even the failure to recover the colonies should not be allowed to jeopardise the coming of peace. Nearly a year later, on June 1, 1918, he implored Hertling to take the only path to peace by promising to restore the complete independence of Belgium. 'We must be content with what we have won in the East. Even a peace which brought us no gains in the West would be a victorious peace.' There was no time to lose, he concluded ; but before the rulers of Germany had realised this elementary truth, the opportunity of the *status quo ante* had gone for ever. If the territories of the Republic are smaller than those of the Empire, no one can fairly attribute any portion of the blame to Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria.

General Hoffmann, the real hero of Tannenberg and the soul of the German campaign on the Russian front, recorded his experiences and reflections in *The War of Lost Opportunities*, noticed in an earlier edition ; and the interest aroused by that remarkable book has led to the publication of his diaries of the Russo-Japanese conflict and the World War. *Die Aufzeichnungen des Generalmajor Max Hoffmann*, recently translated as *War*

Diaries and other Papers, opens with an intimate biographical study by his admiring friend, the editor, Karl Friedrich Nowak. The larger part of the first volume is filled by jottings of the years 1914–18, which may be regarded as the raw material for his apologia. Unlike his fiery chief Ludendorff, who could see nothing ahead but victory or catastrophe, the cool-headed Hoffmann quickly realised that another alternative was not only possible but probable. 'Defeat I consider to be out of the question,' he wrote in March, 1915, 'but it is equally unthinkable that we shall be able to dictate terms,—as I have told the Chancellor.' The Congo State should fall to Germany, but he was opposed to large annexations in East or West. Liège might perhaps be retained, and some frontier rectification should be made on the Eastern front ; but the fewer non-Germans inside the new Empire the better. With these views he naturally found Bethmann 'very sensible' ; and indeed his diary is free from the scolding attacks on distracted Chancellors with which we are peppered by the Ludendorff-Tirpitz school. He regretted indeed that he could not reach decisions and that in consequence German policy appeared to have no fixed goal ; but a far greater evil, in his opinion, was the influence of Falkenhayn, who not only committed such terrible blunders as the attack on Verdun, but kept the Kaiser in ignorance of the real situation.

In 1914 Hoffmann declares that though everyone was aware that the Chancellor was too weak for his post, there was no one better within sight ; and the same might be said of Jagow. Ludendorff possessed the energy that Bethmann lacked, but Ludendorff was no politician. 'He is too impulsive. With him something must always be done at once, whereas the politician must know how to wait.' Unlike most of the belligerents on either side, Hoffmann's views were not reactions to the military barometer. At the end of 1917, when Russia was out of the picture and all hopes were centred on the coming offensive in the West, he wrote :

'I am convinced that we cannot be beaten, but also that we cannot defeat the English; and therefore I am for a compromise peace.' In the most curious entry in the diary he notes: 'We cannot beat England—at any rate not yet. I shall live to see it, but not in this war.' The volume closes with an essay entitled 'Thoughts on 1914.' He is convinced that the real aggressors were Russia and France, who, unlike Germany, coveted foreign soil; but he is equally clear that the danger could have been averted by statesmanship at Berlin. 'German policy ought never to have allowed the two great antagonists, England and Russia, to unite. It was easy to prevent, all the more since England at first preferred Germany to the Franco-Russian alliance.' To this irreparable blunder errors of a military nature were added. A larger proportion of German manhood should have been trained to arms, and Austria should have been pressed to greater efforts. With two more army corps in August, 1914, it is probable that no Russian soldier would have trod Prussian soil; but the Marne might have been lost none the less, since bad generalship was the cause of the defeat, not shortage of troops. Thus the diary and the essay echo the refrain of the political testament which is reprinted as the second volume of the *Aufzeichnungen*.

Readers of Victor Naumann's striking *Profile*, noticed in an earlier edition, will welcome the supplementary volume *Dokumente und Argumente* which records in chronological sequence the author's unique experiences during the war. No German statesman or publicist knew more—perhaps none knew so much—of the inner thoughts of the ruling circles in the Central Powers; for he was continually flitting between Berlin, Munich and Vienna, with frequent visits to the minor German Courts, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Belgium and the front. It is a record of almost bewildering activity, set forth partly in the form of reminiscences, partly in lengthy memoranda and letters. Though in a special degree the friend and confidential agent of Hertling, to whom

most of his reports are addressed, he was almost as much at home in the Ballplatz and the Wilhelmstrasse as in the Bavarian capital. He must have been an impressive talker, for conversations were often followed by a request for a written memorandum, with which he promptly complied. The book is a little wearisome to read, for it is full of repetitions ; but it is indispensable to a study of the diplomacy of the Central Powers throughout the whole period of the war.

No portion of the narrative is more arresting than the opening chapter, which describes the author's experiences in Vienna during the last days of peace. He records his conversations with Count Hoyos, Berchtold's Chef de Cabinet, on the day after the Serajevo tragedy and again after his fateful mission to Berlin. Hoyos had been convinced since 1911 that the decisive struggle was at hand ; and, though in his opinion there was just a chance that Russia might not intervene, he believed that the Monarchy must be ready to fight for its life. He added that the evidence pointed with increasing clearness to the complicity of the Serbian Government. Naumann remained in Vienna till July 12, when it was realised that Russia and France would almost certainly intervene ; but the neutrality of England was taken for granted, while Italy was not expected to attack her ally in the opening stages of the conflict. Moreover Macchio, the first Sektionschef, in reply to the author's inquiry as to the state of the army, declared that the Slav troops of the Monarchy could be relied on to do their duty. When Naumann read the ultimatum to Serbia he realised in a flash that the last chance of peace was gone. 'Austria was absolutely right in her action ; but that Russia would use it as a pretext for war was as certain as the Amen after the prayer.' The author was in the Wilhelmstrasse on August 4, when the news of the British declaration of war arrived, and the look of anguish on Jagow's face never faded from his memory. Despite all warnings and probabilities, it seems that the statesmen of Berlin had been unable to

convince themselves that in the hour of destiny Great Britain would stand by her friends.

When the storm broke Hertling, the Bavarian Premier, invited Naumann to assist him with political information and advice. There were many outstanding problems between Germany and Austria, he explained, which official diplomatists alone would be unable to solve, and which demanded the services of men enjoying the confidence of both countries. 'I should be genuinely grateful if you would report to me everything you consider of importance. Munich can mediate between Berlin and Vienna if our information is kept up to date.' The author accepted his commission, and performed his duties with exemplary energy and skill. His reports are a mine of information on persons, policies and events, and he never hesitated to express his own views or to tender unpopular advice. Though a convinced supporter of the war he was acutely aware of the mistakes of the Central Powers before and during the conflict, both in domestic and foreign affairs ; and he watched with regret the wearing friction between the allies. In the settlement of Poland, which the defeat of Russia rendered a burning issue and which fills many pages in this volume, he strongly supported the Austrian solution, on the ground that the heavy-handed Protestant Prussian did not understand how to manage the Catholic Poles. In the larger field of war aims, though himself a Prussian and a Protestant, he was also on the Austrian side ; for his frequent visits to Vienna convinced him as time went on that the Monarchy must make peace or disappear, and that the war could only be ended by compromise.

Naumann regards the submarine campaign as absolutely justified, while regretting that it was launched at the wrong time ; and from the moment the United States entered the fray he bent all his energies to the necessity of a settlement like 1763 or 1866. He speaks with admiration of Czernin, whom he supports against his master and the Parma influences, and who com-

bined a desire for a moderate peace with untarnished loyalty to the German ally. When Hertling and Kühlmann were installed at Berlin it seemed as if his hopes of statesmanlike action might be realised. But the collapse of Russia tempted her conquerors to the spectacular folly of Brest-Litovsk, and the Ludendorff offensive revived the waning hopes of victory ; and the aged Chancellor, to the author's intense disappointment, proved unable to break the domination of the military chiefs. The unambiguous declaration on Belgium, for which Naumann continually pressed, was never made, and when Kühlmann confided to the Reichstag that the war could not be won on the field of battle, Hertling allowed him to be thrown to the wolves. Thus the German people, unlike the broken Austrians, lived in a fool's paradise till the roof cracked and broke over their heads. Prince Max was called in too late, and in any case he, like Bethmann and Hertling, was too 'soft' a nature to save even a fragment from the wreck. During the long struggle the Entente countries were called on to admire the majestic unity of political and military control which their enemies were supposed to enjoy ; but in Naumann's realistic reports we see how constant was the friction between Vienna and Budapest, Vienna and Berlin, Berlin and Munich, for the old antagonism of North and South played its disintegrating part within the fabric of Imperial Germany. It is scarcely necessary to add that the Kaiser, who with different qualities might have exercised some useful supervision, appears once again as a gilded marionette, who counted for little more in the supreme decisions than the meanest of his subjects. His chief contribution to history in the closing stages of the conflict was his rejection of the advice, tendered by Naumann and other clear-sighted counsellors, to abdicate at a moment when a personal sacrifice would in all probability have rescued the dynasty and averted the revolution.

The tangled diplomacy of the Balkan States before and during the war is gradually emerging into the light

of day, and the Memoirs of Richard von Mach, *Aus bewegter Balkanzeit, 1879–1918*, enlarge our knowledge of Bulgaria at some of the turning points of her history. He has known the country since its birth, served it with sword and pen, and interpreted it to his own countrymen through the columns of the *Kölnische Zeitung*. He has seen all the actors on the stage, and, though he has his favourites, he has counted friends in every camp. The first part of the volume presents an attractive picture of the warrior Prince Alexander; the second describes in vivid terms the dictatorship, the overthrow and the murder of Stambuloff. The shadow of Russia broods over the scene where the fierce personal animosities of Balkan politics are fanned to white heat by the feud of Russophiles and Russophobes. Though an intimate friend of Stambuloff the author realises that he had become impossible, and that Ferdinand's policy of reconciliation with Russia was right. He points out that the Prince, who had French, German and Hungarian blood in his veins, was a man without nationality, and therefore well equipped to form an unbiased view of the country's interests. The third part of the volume, dealing with Bulgaria during the war, is that which chiefly concerns us in the present survey. The people and the Church, he assures us, remained Russophil in 1915; but the King and the Radoslavoff Government were deeply estranged by Russia's patronage of Serbia, and by her virtual veto on a French loan without the implied condition of political vassalage. The money was supplied by Germany, and the signature of the loan contract on July 12, 1914, was an unmistakable indication of the new course. With an Entente loan, comments the author, Bulgaria might have found herself, under another Ministry, fighting against the Central Powers. When the die was cast by the signature of a treaty with the Central Powers on September 5, 1915, Radoslavoff remarked to the author: 'It is done. Let the blessing of God, the Lord of chance and destiny, rest upon it. God and the Germans—we have con-

fidence in both.' The detailed narrative of the wooing of Sofia is supplemented by extracts from the author's confidential reports to the *Kölnische Zeitung*, the most interesting of which describes the protest of the Opposition leaders against the decision to join the Central Powers. Stambuliski's dramatic warning to the King and Ferdinand's reply are familiar to us all. We now learn that the impression left by the interview of September 17, both on the King and the Prime Minister, was profound. The Minister of War proposed to telegraph to Berlin to suggest the postponement of mobilisation. The panic passed ; but the Ministers expected disturbances among the Russophils when the secret was revealed.

Even more interesting, because less familiar, is the story of Bulgaria's retirement from the fray. With all his affection for the people the author is well aware of their faults. The Bulgarian, he confesses, is something of an Oriental, full of suspicions and extremely difficult both as negotiator and partner, while the Prussian is not exactly a model of tact and consideration. Friction on the economic plane was incessant, and the conquest of the Dobrujda by German, Bulgarian, Austrian and Turkish troops gave rise to embittered squabbles concerning the administration and the future boundaries of the province. The resignation of Radoslavoff in June, 1918, was the direct result of these difficulties, and the accession of Malinoff to power was the beginning of the end. The Bulgarian peasant was tired of the war, and the approaching defeat of Germany led to a *sauve qui peut*. The dissolution of partnership was attributed by the Prime Minister, in a secret session of the Sobranje on October 5, 1918, to the cessation of subsidies and munitions from the Central Powers, and to Hindenburg's refusal of German troops to withstand the expected offensive in Macedonia. Malinoff's explanations were criticised and supplemented by Tontcheff, ex-Minister of Finance, but not a voice was raised for the continuance of the strife. Bulgaria's retirement from

the fray, concludes von Mach, cannot be described as treason ; for her men had been almost uninterruptedly under arms since 1912, and the Germans themselves discovered a few weeks later that there were limits to human endurance.

II

Interest in the Hapsburg dynasty shows no sign of flagging, and the last two years have produced a rich crop of biographies. By far the most important is Josef Redlich's *Emperor Francis Joseph*, the first serious study of the man, the ruler and the system. Drawing largely on his researches for his monumental volumes *Das Oesterreichische Reichs- und Staatsproblem*, he portrays the boy Emperor learning the lesson of autocracy from Schwarzenberg and Kübeck, and, after the death of the former in 1852, taking the reins firmly into his own hands. We close the volume with a heightened respect for his character and abilities. Without being in any sense a great man or a great ruler, he was far more than a mere machine. Everyone, declares Redlich, was won over by his simple yet impressive personality. But the precocious self-confidence which enabled the young man to confront his gigantic task prevented the veteran from recognising the signs of the times as the decades rolled by. His mind was unimaginative and therefore sterile. In the Hapsburg realm nationality counted for more than democracy, and as the mounting tide of nationalism swept round his throne he could only gaze with uncomprehending eyes. The Magyars alone were strong enough to enforce their demands, and the Compromise of 1867, in meeting their claims, sowed dragon's teeth. The Emperor's longevity proved a curse, for an unchanging mind in a changing world becomes a misfit and a misfortune. We must do him the justice to remember that the ruling of a polyglot empire in an age of democracy and nationality was by far the most difficult task which fell to the lot of any European ruler of

his time, and that it was easier to talk of the necessity of contenting the racial minorities than to agree how it could be achieved. It is the tragedy of his reign that the man whose religion was the maintenance of his realm was guilty of errors of commission and omission which brought the stately edifice crashing to the ground within two years of his death.

The closing decades of the reign are treated by Redlich in far less detail, but it is here that the author enriches his pages from his own experience. As a Member of Parliament, an active publicist and a scholar of European reputation, he was personally acquainted with most of the figures on the public stage from the Emperor downwards. In November, 1912, when Turkey was staggering under the blows of the Balkan League, he journeyed to Belgrad to discuss with Pasitch the improvement of Austro-Serb relations and the vexed question of a harbour on the Adriatic. Though the visit was made with the sanction of Berchtold, the Foreign Minister omitted to follow it up, and the efforts of Baernreither and Masaryk to persuade him to receive Pasitch in Vienna were in vain. The question as to how far Francis Joseph was aware of and responsible for the transactions of the years of war receives in these pages an authoritative reply, based in large measure on the evidence of the author's friend, Koerber, who succeeded the murdered Stürgkh as Prime Minister in 1916. The Emperor had been weakened by the grave illness of April, 1914, which first made inroads on his iron strength; but he followed everything with attention to the end. He retained a general control of the machine, though never attempting to interfere in the management of the war. Here Conrad was supreme, though he never fully trusted him, describing him in his concise manner as clever but not prudent. The most impersonal of rulers is no theme for a Titian or a Rembrandt; but Redlich's incomparable analysis of the last of the dynastic autocrats will be read when more brightly-tinted biographies have fallen into oblivion.

While Redlich is concerned above all with the analysis of a system, Eugen Ketterl's *The Emperor Francis Joseph* deals only with the man. His testimony contradicts the aphorism that no man is a hero to his valet; for Ketterl, whose raw material has been worked up by Cissy Klastersky, has nothing but affectionate admiration for the kindly and venerable master whom he served for nearly thirty years. He is a miniature Margutti, and the accounts of the two witnesses who saw the Emperor at close quarters tally very closely. They are convinced that he was in his heart opposed to the war, and Ketterl declares that he never saw him smile after the commencement of hostilities. Immured in Schönbrunn, he only gradually came to realise that hunger was stalking through the land and that his peoples had lost their stomach for the fight. According to Ketterl he had an interview with Koerber on the morning of the day on which he died. After hearing from the lips of the Prime Minister that the people were growing more and more rebellious under the stimulus of privation, the valet, who was in the next room, heard his master reply: 'If that is the case we must make peace without taking my ally into consideration at all.'

Two other studies of the Emperor, though sketched from a greater distance, call for brief notice. Karl Tschuppik's *Franz Joseph: Der Untergang eines Reiches* is the work of an experienced Liberal journalist who is proud to declare that six generations of his family served the state. 'We loved the old Hapsburg realm,' he writes in his Preface 'but we were too modern not to mix criticism with our love.' This antagonism of sentiment and judgment, he adds, is reflected in his work. We are presented in this sensible and well-informed though not very striking volume with a friendly and almost affectionate picture of the ruler whose chief fault was that he failed to realise the passage of time. The author is more at home in domestic than in foreign affairs, but in the latter field we are never in doubt where he stands. Goluchowski, he argues, was as right in avoiding

risks as Aehrenthal was wrong in taking them, for Austria was too weak to confront the measureless hazards of a European war. A conflict with Serbia was not inevitable, and Berchtold should have followed up Masaryk's *pourparlers* with Pasitch at the close of 1912. Conrad and 'the war party' were still worse offenders, and indeed they were the principal authors of the conflagration. The condemnation of the Ballplatz is almost as severe as that meted out in Kanner's *Katastrophenpolitik*, though expressed in more moderate terms.

If the work of Tschuppik, the German Bohemian, is primarily the history of a reign, that of Eugene Bagger, an Americanised Hungarian, attempts to visualise the life and temperament of the man. The Preface to the German edition, dated May, 1927, declares with truth that no full biography of the Emperor existed, and that not even a careful study of his character had been essayed. But his own attempt, *Francis Joseph, a Personal Study*, based on a survey of printed and a few unprinted sources, fails to supply the need. 'I owe more insight to my hours in the Hofburg, Schönbrunn and Ischl,' he writes, 'than to any published or unpublished material.' His method, indeed, is frankly impressionist, with the vivid colouring and the risky generalisations common to that school. The estrangement between the Emperor and his wife, which Redlich frankly declares himself unable fully to explain, is confidently traced to the monarch's sexual trespasses. Except, indeed, for his conscientious industry, Bagger finds little to admire. Francis Joseph, he declares, was 'quite un-Austrian in his pedantry,' and indeed a mere Robot, resisting every political reform as long as he could and, 'like a true Hapsburg,' only giving way when it was too late. Bagger is readable enough, but there is little solid nourishment in his six hundred pages.

Pending the long-deferred publication of the papers of Francis Ferdinand, we must be grateful to the men who help us to read the riddle of the sphinx. The interesting volume by his secretary Nikitsch-Boulles, noticed in an earlier edition, was neither a biography nor

a political interpretation, and the field was clear for the veteran publicist and historian Theodor von Sosnosky. *Franz Ferdinand* is the first authoritative study of the career of the tragic figure whose murder provoked the world war. Readers of Sosnosky's larger works are aware of his devotion to the *ancien régime ;* and the preface to his latest effort frankly confesses his sympathy for the man who seemed destined to stop the dry rot in the Hapsburg Empire by modernising its institutions and substituting leadership for drift. The author has used the Archduke's correspondence with his stepmother in the early years of his marriage, and the letters show him in a more human light than that in which he is usually revealed. The book derives additional interest from the fact that, when a writer was sought who might contribute a sketch of the Archduke to an official co-operative volume issued in 1913, Sosnosky's name was preferred by Francis Ferdinand, who subsequently expressed his satisfaction with the result. A vivid conception of the Archduke emerges from these chapters—the most forceful of the Hapsburgs since Joseph II, strong-willed, self-confident, passionate. The inertia of the aged Francis Joseph exasperated his hot-blooded and autocratic nephew, who had his schemes of reform all ready for the longed-for day which never dawned. It is a story of unremitting conflict in which the heir to the throne sometimes reached his goal, as in his marriage and in his promotion of Conrad, but more often failed to sway the Emperor, who supported Aehrenthal's toleration of Italy's infidelities and tacitly accepted Tisza's treatment of the Roumanian and Jugoslav minorities. Sosnosky demolishes the legend that Francis Ferdinand was a Chauvinist, and explains that the so-called war-party in Austria consisted of a single man, Conrad. Far from desiring to fight Serbia, the Archduke wished to form a Jugoslav unit within the Empire ; and, instead of fighting Russia, his dream was to revive the Three Emperors' League, autocratic Russia taking the place of faithless Italy in the system of alliances.

Sosnosky's pioneering effort was followed a year later by a far more detailed and intimate study of character and policy. *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinands Wirken und Wollen*, by Baron Leopold von Chlumecky, is the work of a member of the Archduke's innermost circle, who not only approved his policy but helped to shape it and fought his battles in the *Oesterreichische Rundschau* and other organs. The author's diary and reminiscences are supplemented by the diary of his distinguished father and by copious extracts from the correspondence of Major Brosch, head of the Military Chancery of the heir to the throne, whose *rôle* is revealed for the first time in these pages. The most valuable of the many documents in this striking work is Brosch's analysis of his master's character and views, written in 1913,—the most elaborate and authoritative that we possess of a man who is described as richly endowed, and yet, unlike William II, underestimating rather than overestimating his gifts. When the author learned of the tragedy of Serajevo he wrote to a friend : 'That is the end of Austria.' The whole volume is a sermon on this gloomy text ; for he is convinced that, despite the deterioration and fragility of the Monarchy in the later years of Francis Joseph, it could and would have been saved by the adoption of his hero's plans. Everyone knows of the personal and temperamental antagonism between the Emperor and his heir, but never before has the case of the younger against the older man been argued with such sympathy and inside knowledge. The first chapter contains a ruthless exposure of the obstinacy and sterility of Francis Joseph, whose gravest offence against his country and dynasty was to have allowed Taaffe to misgovern Austria for fifteen years. 'Seventy years of neglected opportunities !' he exclaims, and in his shrill cry of distress we catch the echo of his master's voice. 'Hardening of the arteries' had set in ; and the Archduke, who was as convinced of the gravity of the disease as he was of the efficacy of his remedies, waited with feverish impatience for his accession to the throne.

The campaign against Francis Joseph, which opens with a preliminary bombardment in the first chapter, is continued throughout the book ; for the political life of the heir is the story of a losing fight against his uncle's unbending will. The Emperor, who had lost the power to create, retained in full measure the capacity to resist. Abroad and at home, we are told, he chose men who were either born blind or sinned against the light. A detailed survey of the field of foreign policy leads the author to the conclusion that his hero, though above all a soldier, was a far better statesman than Aehrenthal, who was rash when he should have been cautious and weak where he should have been strong. To be more precise, the Archduke was equally opposed to the annexation of Bosnia and to the timid handling of faithless Italy. Yet, though he shared Conrad's contempt for Aehrenthal and distrust of the Italian ally, he rejected his audacious recipe of a preventive war. His ideal was to regain the friendship of Russia by facilitating a settlement of the question of the Straits, which he believed to be of infinitely graver significance to the great Slav Power than the patronage of Belgrad. With the wires to Petrograd once more in working order, Italy could be quickly dropped. It was the unpardonable offence of Aehrenthal, in the eyes of the Archduke and his interpreter, to have by the same stroke incurred the passionate resentment of Russia and intensified the brooding hostility of the Jugoslavs. It was in vain that Berchtold, of whose character and capacity the author speaks with unusual respect, attempted to unravel the tangled skein placed in his unwilling hands. The wooing of Bulgaria succeeded, but the attempt to hold Roumania was frustrated by a stronger will in Budapest.

The second half of the volume is devoted to the Jugoslav and Hungarian problems, to which the Archduke gave unceasing attention. 'First order at home, then a foreign policy in proportion to our strength!' In describing Austrian misrule in Dalmatia Chlumecky speaks with the authority of an old civil servant, and in

the far more important province of Croatia the situation was even worse. 'If things go on as they are,' observed the Archduke to the author at the end of 1913, 'the Croats will one day be driven into the arms of Serbia.' In Bosnia, where there was no trace of Jugoslav nationalism till the turn of the century, the blindness of Burian and other Hungarian administrators sowed dragon's teeth which were soon to spring up as armed men. The programme of the Archduke, which included his coronation at Prague, was to give every nationality its place in the sun, and thereby, in his own words, 'to awake understanding and sentiment for the common Fatherland.' Autonomy had no terrors for the unloved and misunderstood man who impotently surveyed the seething discontent of his countrymen. The important part played by ill-health in his early manhood is authoritatively explained in *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand* by his doctor, Viktor Eisenmenger, who describes his efforts to overcome the obstinacy and the melancholy of the heir to the throne.

No book on the later Hapsburgs compares in personal interest with Graf Polzer-Hoditz' massive volume *Kaiser Karl, aus der Geheimmappe seines Kabinet-Chefs*. Conceived as a reply to 'baseless legends and unfounded attacks,' the work grew into a study of the reign and a picture of the collapse of the Empire. Karl, declares the Count, has always been misjudged. Having known him from childhood, he proceeds to sketch a high-souled, open-minded, hard-working, capable and lovable young man, confronted by an almost impossible task and surrounded by short-sighted counsellors who smothered his statesmanlike designs. Writing as a convinced believer in the old supernational Austrian state, based as it was on 'renunciation and conciliation,' he speaks with sorrowful indignation of the unjust stewards who dissipated a great inheritance. The reconciliation of the nation, he declares, was both the tradition and the interest of the dynasty, in contrast to the new states, 'born in hate,' which have been erected on its grave. Unfortunately

the insight of Vienna was nullified by the blindness of Budapest. 'The Austrian problem was in large measure the problem of Hungary.' Magyar policy was poisoned by vanity, and the Magnates were the ruin of the realm. Since the compromise of 1867 the Monarchy was stricken by mortal sickness ; for whereas Dualism met the wishes of Germans and Magyars, Federalism alone could have reconciled the Slavs. Much was done for them in the Austrian half of the Empire, and more would have been given but for Hungary. Tisza was the great obstacle. No one realised more clearly than the Emperor Karl that the Monarchy must scrap Dualism or die ; but he soon realised with equal clearness that he was impotent. The supreme interest of this book lies in the revelation of his gallant and fruitless efforts.

Count Polzer-Hoditz was in some degree the political mentor of Karl before his accession, and in 1915 the heir to the throne invited him to become his Chef de Cabinet when his hour should come. In those early days he struck the author as intelligent, thoughtful, eager to learn and to do right. Francis Joseph and Karl were warmly attached to one another ; but the young man saw with regret that the real ruler was Tisza, and that Austria was controlled from Berlin and Budapest. In particular he regretted the domination of military justice which saw an enemy or a traitor in every Slav. Hardly was the breath out of the body of the old Emperor when Tisza appeared at Schönbrunn and persuaded Karl not to delay his coronation as King of Hungary, on the ground that only a crowned King could lawfully sanction the economic agreement with Germany which was the indispensable preliminary to peace. The real reason for his action was that when once the new ruler had sworn to the Constitution he would be unable to effect a change. It was generally known that Francis Ferdinand had resolved to postpone the ceremony till he had transformed the Constitution, and Tisza was determined to avoid such a risk. Thus the Dictator used the young Monarch's ardent desire for peace to strengthen his

own position and the system in which he passionately believed.

If Tisza was Karl's misfortune, Czernin was his fault. As everyone was aware, he had been destined by Francis Ferdinand for the Ballplatz, but it was none the less a disastrous choice. The author burns with anger when he thinks of the monstrous vanity of the Foreign Minister and of the rudeness with which he treated his young and considerate master. Karl often complained that he was almost unbearable, but lamented that he could not dismiss him in time of war. The stage is crowded with actors ; but in essence the drama unfolded in these pages is the conflict of Karl and his Private Secretary with Tisza and Czernin, the former sabotaging the efforts to solve the Jugoslav problem, the latter blocking the avenues to peace. Working with the Emperor for hours every day in the Imperial Chancery, the author found him quick, clear-headed and of more than average ability. 'I know—and not I alone—how strenuously he pursued his aim to build the Monarchy on modern foundations.' The Count, like his master, laments that he could find no Minister with the courage to carry through his statesmanlike policy of reform.

For the purposes of the present survey the most interesting portions of the volume are those devoted to foreign affairs. The author dismisses the stories of intrigues by the House of Parma as mere Pan-German propaganda, and presents Karl's policy as inspired by the true interests of the State. Like Francis Joseph, he had never expected victory. He found the aged ruler in tears when Italy's declaration of war was announced ; and the old Emperor sorrowfully remarked to Bolfras, 'That means we are done for.' On the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, which he vainly opposed, Karl observed to the author, 'If America intervenes, we shall and must be beaten.' We are provided with a full account of the Sixtus negotiations, and of the relations with Germany which necessitated their secrecy. The author accompanied Karl on his visit to the Kaiser at Homburg in

April, 1917, and notes the latter's inability to believe the reports of Austria's sufferings. The Count was heart and soul with his master in the desire to make peace while there was still time. He even defends the famous letter to Sixtus, written without the knowledge of Czernin, on the ground that peace was impossible without some concrete step, and that Czernin had not the courage to take it. No 'treason' to Germany was involved, for Karl's duty was to think of Austria. Moreover, it was no worse for him to encourage France's desire for Alsace-Lorraine than for Germany to approve Italy's demand for the Trentino in 1915. On the other hand, he blames Karl for yielding to Czernin's threat to commit suicide unless he denied the letter.

Koerber, whom Karl found in office, opposed his wish to summon the Reichsrat, arguing that it would not work and that he would have to revert to personal rule. 'Perhaps he is right,' rejoined the Emperor. 'Perhaps Austria is too sick for anything but palliatives. But I cannot admit it in the first year of my reign.' Koerber made way for Clam-Martinitz, who in turn was unequal to the situation. The Emperor now offered the Premiership to the author, whose autonomy programme he fully approved; but the Count replied that success was impossible without the support of Czernin and Hungary, which was not forthcoming. Karl then turned to Redlich; but at this moment Germany intervened to prevent a ministry of peace and decentralisation. The next offer was to Lammasch, who declared that the burden was too heavy for him to bear. Thus Seidler carried on, and the distracted ruler exclaimed to his friend: 'Mine is a terrible heritage.' Caporetto momentarily converted Karl to a belief in victory, and enabled Czernin and Tisza to secure the dismissal of the author as a pacifist and federalist. The Count was convinced that Caporetto was only a flash in the pan, but for the time being his policy had no friends. The two men remained on affectionate terms, meeting from time to time, and the Emperor never lost faith in the

policy of autonomy and a compromise peace. It is interesting to learn Karl's opinion of William II in time of war. 'The Kaiser, like myself,' he observed in September, 1917, 'is a poor prisoner in his own realm.' When the news of the Bulgarian surrender arrived in September, 1918, Karl declared that, if there were any justice in the world, nobody could bring the slightest reproach against William II. 'He was the only man in high place in Germany who understood the situation from the beginning aright, and shared my views on attempting to make peace. If he had had his way, we should have had peace long ago.' The author watched with sorrow but without surprise the collapse of the Empire which he had striven to save, and the dethronement of a ruler who suffered for the sins and errors of older men.

The publication of Sazonoff's Memoirs induced Berchtold to break his long silence in the most authoritative of the contributions to a co-operative volume of Austrian apologetics entitled *Rings um Sasonow*, edited by Eduard Ritter von Steinitz. He was moved to utterance by what he regards as the failure of the Russian statesman to understand the policy of Austria, and by a bitterness of tone surprising in one whose sympathetic personality inspired agreeable memories. He finds the explanation in the evil tradition of Izvolsky which led his successor astray, and fixes on what he regards as Sazonoff's damning confession that the rivalry of the two Powers in the Near East was bound to lead to a collision. No Austro-Hungarian statesman, he comments, had ever spoken thus or even entertained such thoughts. 'We always tried to find ways of agreement and to avoid war, for which the mutual respect of vital interests was of course the necessary condition.' He denies the charge that Aehrenthal was bent on the complete subjection of Serbia to Austrian influence, explaining that he only decided on annexation in consequence of the constitutional difficulties raised by the Young Turk revolution, and that he hoped formal

recognition of the actual situation in the two provinces had liquidated the problem. As the host at Buchlau, where Aehrenthal and Izvolsky held their fateful parley on September 16, 1908, Berchtold speaks with authority on one of the most controverted incidents of contemporary history. Aehrenthal, he relates, described the conversation to him in detail the same evening ; and on the following day Izvolsky's account confirmed the accuracy of the record, so that a misunderstanding seemed to be impossible. Aehrenthal was willing to accept a Conference for the registration, but not for the discussion of the changes. When Izvolsky asked for time to prepare opinion in Russia, Aehrenthal pointed out the danger of delay, but promised a written notification of the date. That this communication was late in reaching Izvolsky was due not to treachery but to the fact that the Russian Minister was on his travels. Thus the Buchlau discussions were not, as Sazonoff affirmed, general negotiations, but concrete agreements.

Berchtold illustrates the difference between the provocative policy of Russia and the 'eminently conservative' policy of Austria by the story of the Balkan League concluded under Russian auspices, and described by Poincaré himself as 'une convention de guerre.' When Russia had thus started the avalanche, Austria invited the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin to join in keeping the peace. The attempt failed ; but throughout the Balkan wars Austria's policy was inspired, not by ill-will to Serbia or desire for territory, for she was absolutely 'satiated,' but exclusively by considerations of national security. 'Nothing was more hateful to us than the nightmare that we might be dragged into war by the upset in the Balkans which had taken place against our wishes.' Russia, on the other hand, pursued a policy of aggression, which, though veiled by high-sounding phrases, led straight to bloody upheavals. 'Reaction at home and revolution abroad : these conflicting extremes sent Holy Russia to her doom, dragging us along with her in mortal conflict to the grave.'

Passing to the outbreak of war, Berchtold challenges the reader to find in the ultimatum to Serbia a single unfounded accusation or unjustifiable demand. The information available in July, 1914, he adds, has been more than confirmed by the revelations of Stanojevich and Ljuba Jovanovich. 'The Serajevo crime was simply one of the latest examples of the work of destruction organised against us, of the sapping and mining which was to blow up the home in which we dwelt. The Monarchy was faced by the alternative : A free hand for the house-breakers or the demand for security. On the rejection of the latter a struggle for existence was all that remained.' The Serbian reply, he explains, was not, as Sazonoff suggests, a virtual acceptance, but was filled with reservations which rendered the guarantees altogether nugatory. Berchtold wields a practised pen, and his comments on Sazonoff increase our desire that he should issue a more sustained defence of his policy.

The Foreign Minister's apologia is followed by a contribution from his Chef de Cabinet, Count Hoyos, who also contrasts the policies of Russia and Austria. He summarises Sazonoff's Panslavism as a virtual declaration of war against Austria, and adds that war must have broken out earlier if his predecessors had pursued the same dangerous path. With the formation of the Balkan League, the Serbian victories in 1912–13, and the *rapprochement* with Roumania, Russia's diplomatic position in 1914 was excellent. Austria, on the other hand, under Andrassy and his successors, pursued a policy of defence against Russia and the Slav world. With the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina she was territorially satiated, and no one in a responsible position since that time had thought of an advance to Salonika or the conquest of any part of the Balkans. On the other hand, she could not allow Serbia to dominate the Balkans and thus become the Piedmont of the Southern Slavs. The necessity for the formal incorporation of the provinces was proved by the angry passions which it aroused ; but the relief was only temporary.

The Treaty of Bucharest appeared to Austria like the capture of a vital portion of the defences in time of war, which, if defeat was to be avoided, must be retaken at any cost ; and her action in 1914 is exhibited as justifiable self-defence. Germany's mistake was to drive England by her naval policy into the Franco-Russian camp ; but for this fatal error, which ruined the position of the Central Powers, Austria was in no way responsible.

The defence of Austrian policy is continued by Baron Macchio, who, in his long experience of diplomacy in the Balkans, found the representatives of Russia everywhere on the offensive. The ultimate aim was the control of the Straits, to which the vassalage of the Balkan States in the name of orthodoxy and Panslavism was an essential preliminary. King Milan's failings were Russia's trumps, and Russia's influence at Belgrad was growing even while the last Obrenovich sat upon his shaking throne. Austria's *rapprochement* with Russia in 1897 and 1903 altered nothing, and the Russian agents continued to bully the Courts to which they were accredited. Macchio contests the argument that Austria's historic *rôle* was finished when she drove back the Turk, for the Russian danger succeeded the Turkish. Austria's *Drang nach Osten*, he maintains, was purely commercial, and the coveting of Salonika a legend. The Monarchy was not an anachronism but a structure admirably adapted to the economic interests of the peoples of the middle Danube. Yet Russian propaganda was everywhere at work along the frontiers, above all in Galicia, planting the seed of revolt in the hearts of the racial minorities. Thus the ultimatum to Serbia was the only alternative to a lingering death.

Count Szapary confirms the testimony of his colleagues as to the ever-growing anxiety of Aehrenthal and Berchtold, since Serbian irredentism under Russian patronage was incompatible with the integrity of the Austrian Empire. If, as Sazonoff declared, a conflict was inevitable, and if there was no probability of an abatement of Pan-Serb activity, why should Austria

ignore the challenge of Serajevo and wait while her declared enemies were steadily increasing in strength? Speaking as Austrian Ambassador in Petrograd in 1914, he argues that the postponement of the delivery of the ultimatum till Poincaré had left the Russian capital was intended to facilitate the preservation of peace, since Vienna, rightly or wrongly, held the French President to be more bellicose than his hosts. None of the Cabinets, he believes, desired a European war; but Russia was the prisoner of her own diplomatic and military programme, of her big words and her incautious promises, and thus she was driven step by step along the path of intervention which enlarged a local quarrel into a world-wide catastrophe. Nothing could have held her back save plain speaking from the Western Powers, who, though not desirous of war, lacked the courage to prevent its outbreak.

The article of Freiherr von Spitzmüller, Finance Minister during the war, asks the question, 'Was Austria aggressive?' His answer consists in part of a series of testimonials to the ruler and his Ministers. Francis Joseph, he declares, had no ambition but to keep what he had got. Francis Ferdinand was equally disinclined to a war with Russia, and in the early summer of 1912 he told the author that he would make considerable sacrifices in the Balkans to prevent its occurrence. The name of Berchtold suggests patience and a certain passivity, not forceful initiative or aggression. Tisza consented to the ultimatum only when he was convinced that nothing else could secure the Monarchy against the danger from Serbia; and even after the outbreak of war he urged that Austria-Hungary should demand no part of Serbian territory. Conrad stood alone in urging a preventive war, and he had been compelled by Aehrenthal to resign his position as Chief of the Staff. The financial demands of the War Ministers of the last years of peace, Schönaich and Krobatin, were so modest that they provoked the anger of the army chiefs. Finally, the banks, on which Spitzmüller speaks with

special authority, were thoroughly conservative and strongly opposed to 'Imperialist' adventures. Taken together these articles afford the most adequate exposition of the official Austrian standpoint which has appeared.

No better work has been written on the Hapsburg Empire during the war than *Die Katastrophe* by Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau. He tells us that he has laboured for ten years, and that many of the actors have helped him with information. As an officer on active service during the long struggle and as the present Director of the War Archives, he speaks with special authority on military affairs, and his most vivid pages describe the misery of the army in 1918 and the battle of Vittorio Veneto, for which he drew up the Emperor Karl's Army Order—the last he ever issued. Next in importance is the very full account of the sentiments and activities of the nationalities of the Empire at different periods of the conflict. As a loyal and devoted servant of the Empire he is deeply moved by the story of its decline and fall; but he speaks as a rule in quiet tones, though almost every mention of Michael Karolyi moves him to wrath. He quotes General Cramon's testimony to his fidelity to the German alliance; yet he is highly critical of Falkenhayn's strategy, and regrets that Conrad was not allowed a freer hand. But it was the price of German aid in an Austrian quarrel that Austrian interests, military and political, should be sacrificed to the predominant partner. Yet he never spares criticism of his own countrymen. Czernin's vacillations are deplored, and Tisza's policy was condemned by events. While admiring Karl's simplicity and good intentions, he regrets his combination of obstinacy with undue submission to personal influences such as that of the anti-German and anti-Magyar Count Polzer-Hoditz. He is deeply interested in the Smuts-Mensdorff conversations of December, 1917, 'the most important peace-move of the war'; but he is by no means sure whether the Hapsburg Empire could have saved itself by deserting its ally. Both countries, he believes, were the victims

of a false war-policy, which failed to realise what could and could not be attained.

The first instalment of Joseph Baernreither's *Fragments of a Political Diary* fulfils the expectations of those who held the author to be the most intelligent statesman of the closing years of the Dual Monarchy. A sympathetic biographical sketch by his friend and editor Joseph Redlich introduces us to the Civil Servant, Deputy, Minister of Commerce and Member of the Upper House; but the present volume is mainly concerned with foreign affairs during the last six years of peace. The first part, entitled 'Jugoslav Policy,' is an illuminating contribution to the history of a problem which Baernreither was one of the few Austrians to study on the spot. Revisiting Bosnia early in 1908, after sixteen years, he was distressed to find how completely the attempt to Austrianise the province had failed, how imperfect the boasted material improvement, and how rapid the growth of Pan-Serb propaganda. The juristic anomaly of 'occupation' had prevented the grant of a Constitution, but annexation, he declared, was inevitable. Annexation, however, without reform was useless; for though the Austrian Serbs had not yet embraced the Pan-Serb faith, they would require very careful handling if their loyalty was to be maintained. Aehrenthal called the author of the pamphlet, *Bosnische Eindrücke*, a thought-reader, for he was about to proclaim the incorporation of Bosnia in the Hapsburg dominions.

In the momentous interview at Buchlau between Aehrenthal and Izvolsky Baernreither believes that neither played a straight game, and the fact that no written record was made confirms his suspicions. Friends and foes alike of the annexation realised that it was a turning point, and even the old Emperor seemed excited when he read the King's speech in the Delegations at Budapest. It was an anxious winter, but peace was preserved. 'One must have lived through these days to realise the feeling of relief and hopeful

anticipation which the clever diplomatic solution of the conflict inspired. Aehrenthal seemed destined to lead us out of the lethargy and shallows of our policy.' Diplomacy, however, had only prepared the way for the statesman whom Baernreither summoned to 'win Bosnia'; but no statesman answered his call. To win Bosnia it was necessary to win Serbia; but the Central Powers coveted the support of Turkey. Aehrenthal ignored the approaches of Milovanovich, the Serbian Foreign Minister, which the author reported to him at the end of 1909; and the tragic blunders exposed in the Friedjung trial widened the gulf which began to yawn in 1908.

The second part of the volume, entitled 'Before the War,' covers the period from the Balkan Wars to the early summer of 1914, and, like the first, is mainly concerned with the problem of the nationalities. The victories of Serbia over the Turk aroused not only the enthusiasm of the Bosnian Serbs but hopes of Jugoslav union. In the new situation created by the partition of European Turkey, the statesmen of the Dual Monarchy had two courses open to them—to trample on Serbia or, as Milovanovich desired, to make friends. Aehrenthal and Berchtold did neither. Baernreither urged a Zollverein with the enlarged Balkan States, and supported the demand for access to a neutralised harbour; but even the Balkan wars failed to open the eyes of Tisza, Wekerle and other Magyar leaders to the significance of the Yugoslav problem. The Ballplatz was little wiser, for Berchtold repulsed the offers of Pasitch which Masaryk brought from Belgrad in December 1912, and which Baernreither strongly supported. Berchtold, like his master, had no wish for war, but he lacked the courage to pay the price of peace. Roumania, meanwhile, was edging away from Austria owing to the maltreatment of Transylvania by Budapest, which the Ballplatz was utterly unable to prevent. And all the while Conrad was pressing for war, speaking gaily even of the reconquest of the 'Quadrilateral' from

Italy, which Baernreither found in 1913 'modern,' prosperous and self-reliant. The war party, ignorant of the growing strength of its prospective enemies, became so violent that Frau Schratt was commissioned to warn Francis Joseph. Francis Ferdinand desired the restoration of the Dreikaiserbund, but for personal and other reasons he had no great following. The real ruler of the Dual Monarchy was Tisza, who had learned nothing and forgotten nothing. It was in vain that William II urged greater consideration for the Roumanians at Budapest and for the Serbs at Vienna. It was equally in vain that Baernreither, who understood the needs of the Monarchy better than anyone else, raised his warning voice in the Delegations, for he was never recalled to office after middle age. We close this fascinating work—a political testament in the form of a diary—with the vision of an Empire drifting hopelessly to its doom for lack of statesmen who understood the signs of the times within and beyond its frontiers, and possessed the courage to change the course of the ship before it dashed itself to pieces on the rocks.

No recent publication is more welcome than Tisza's *Briefe*, the first volume of the German edition of the correspondence of Hungary's iron Premier during the years of war. The monument raised to his memory by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences includes his more important speeches and writings ; but there is no present intention of presenting this mass of material to foreign readers, and the German version of his letters omits many concerned with purely Hungarian affairs. The selection, we are told by the editor, Oskar von Wertheimer, has been governed by their political importance and their value as illustrating the qualities of the man. An instructive biographical Introduction exhibits Tisza not only as the greatest Hungarian since Andrassy, but as one of the supreme embodiments of the genius of his race. Though free from vanity and personal ambition, he felt himself born to rule, hoping to restore the sentiments of duty, hard work and

patriotism to their former high estate. He despised Austria's political incapacity, and hoped after a victorious war to see Hungary more than ever in command of the Dual Monarchy, not by constitutional change but by force of fact. The melancholy spectacle of an Austria torn by racial quarrels strengthened his determination to keep the Magyars firmly in the saddle at Budapest.

The volume opens with Tisza's well-known Memorandum of July 1, protesting against Berchtold's intention to seize the opportunity of the murder of the Archduke for a reckoning with Serbia. A fortnight later he had changed his mind ; but the few letters written before the outbreak of war throw no light on the causes of his rapid conversion, which the editor attributes to Berchtold's crafty exaggeration of Germany's promise of support. 'It is bitter for me to take part in the direction of such a great war,' he wrote on August 26 ; 'the noose was round our neck, with which, unless we sever it now, they would have strangled us at their own time. We could not act otherwise, but it is grievous that it had to be.' He found comfort in the belief that, after terrible ordeals, a better future would dawn for Hungary. For twenty years he had been tormented by the thought that the Monarchy and the Hungarian nation were doomed ; but the last year or two had brought a change, and the pious Calvinist felt assured that his beloved nation would not be condemned by Providence to death. Having burned his boats, he never looked back, and this volume, which covers the first year of the conflict, vibrates with patriotic emotion and virile resolve. Next to the pressing task of defeating the Russians and Serbs, on which he has much to say, there was the problem of keeping Roumania and Italy, 'the two friends,' as he calls them in bitter irony, out of the fray. At first he was loud in assertion that cessions of territory were unthinkable, partly because there appeared to be no military need, and partly because the mere suggestion would be taken as a revela-

tion of weakness, not only by the enemy and the neutrals but by the German ally. For, though a convinced believer in the Dual Alliance, Tisza was determined to resist German patronage and 'preponderance.' He was certain of victory, and believed that a heavy defeat of Russia would bring Bulgaria into the field. So long as King Carol lived a treacherous attack seemed inconceivable, despite Czernin's reports from Bucharest that she might yield to the temptation of Russian offers. On the other hand, it would be madness to allow Roumanian troops to occupy the coveted land of Transylvania under the pretext of keeping the Russians out. Italy, again, could be kept in order were she told from Berlin that if she sprang at her ally she would find Germany in her path. Suggestions in the German press of territorial concessions moved him to protest, and Prince Bülow's mission filled him with angry alarm.

At the turn of the year, with a new monarch enthroned at Bucharest, the Austrians chased out of Serbia, and the Russians streaming over the Carpathians, the tone of the letters grows a trifle less confident. Tisza was informed by Burian, the Hungarian representative in Vienna, that Italy would very likely attack at the beginning of March ; but they both continued to oppose the offer of the Trentino, believing that its sole effect would be to encourage the Consulta to ask for more. The negotiations, declares Tisza, should be carried on in Vienna, and Francis Joseph should announce—for the benefit of Germany and Italy alike—that he would yield nothing. The sky, however, looked so threatening that he advised the Emperor to entrust the Foreign Office to stronger hands. He explained his action to Berchtold, who, far from taking offence, smilingly remarked that he would be most grateful if Tisza could make his master believe what he had constantly told him himself. Francis Joseph was not surprised, and promptly offered the post to the Hungarian Premier, who declined it and recommended—with somewhat excessive laudations—his friend Burian.

With a steadier hand at the helm his confidence revived. Italy, he wrote to Conrad on January 15, was out for a bargain and in her heart peacefully inclined, while an attack from Roumania seemed to him extremely improbable. A frontier rectification in Bukovina might be made as the price of Roumania's active support. 'After many sleepless nights,' he wrote on January 24, 'I feel at last that the worst is over.'

At the opening of March Tisza woke up to the gravity of the situation. 'I beg you in Heaven's name,' he wrote to Burian, 'see to it that the two robbers do not combine in a joint assault. If we must satisfy Italy with the Trentino it is a blow; if we must give more and even throw Roumania a bone, it is a catastrophe.' On April 11 he wrote to Avarna, the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, 'as a friend of Italy to a friend of Austria-Hungary,' pointing out that if Italy joined the Entente Russia might establish her hegemony beyond the Adriatic and France in the Mediterranean. Acceptance of Austria's offers, on the other hand, would secure real friendship and steady support in all the great issues essential to her future development. The time for such blandishments had gone by, and on April 16 Tisza wrote to Conrad a letter which sounds like a cry of despair. Italian neutrality was only to be had at a cost of far greater sacrifices. 'If Italy declares war, Roumania will promptly follow suit, without our being able to count on Bulgaria. Then all the devils will be loose, and there will be nothing for Germany and us but to make peace as quick as we can.' Next day he told Burian that much more must be offered to Italy, for the existence of the Monarchy was at stake; but even at this moment he refused to contemplate the loss of Trieste. Ten days later he added that if Italy intervened the idea of victory must be given up and the Entente must be asked for peace. From this momentary panic he recovered when the smashing of the Russian front at Gorlice removed the haunting fear that Roumania would strike at the same moment as

Italy. He now believed that if Roumania remained neutral victory was assured ; and when Czernin warned him that Bucharest might declare war at any moment, he expressed his readiness for concessions in Bukovina. The sacrifice of Transylvania, however, would destroy the position of the Monarchy in Eastern Europe as a Great Power, which nothing could justify but total defeat. When Erzberger, fresh from his mission in Rome, of which we learn some new details, begged Tisza to grant concessions to his Roumanian subjects, he was sharply snubbed for his pains. The volume closes in the summer of 1915, when the Magyar statesman had regained his equipoise.

In Hungary there is little else to record. The Archduke Joseph, called Father Joseph by his soldiers, has followed up his volume on the Russian front by a similar collection of documents and extracts from his diary relating to the Italian front ; but these books are only available in the Hungarian language. A journal entitled *Responsibility for the War*, with the sub-title, *Quarterly Review for Diplomatic and Contemporary History*, was founded in 1928, with Professor Jeno Horvath as editor. Though most of the contents are in Hungarian, contributions in English, French and German have also appeared. Its purpose is in some degree to provide an apologia for Hungarian policy ; but in so doing it offers foreign students fresh materials and new points of view.

Readers of President Masaryk's book, *The Making of a State*, will find a great deal that is familiar to them in Dr. Edward Benes' massive volume, *My War Memoirs*. We are fortunate indeed to possess such detailed and authoritative records of the steps, the stages and the stratagems by which Bohemia was transformed from an Austrian Province into the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia. Benes, as all the world knows, was the chief colleague of Masaryk in the work of national emancipation. The two men had believed in democratic institutions and national self-determination before the war, and they saw

in the world-wide conflagration the opportunity of destroying an Empire whose existence had, in their opinion, become an unhealthy anachronism. Whatever may be thought of their aim, no one can deny the high-minded sincerity and courage of these scholar-patriots who risked their lives for their principles as much as any soldier in the field. For Benes the goal of the war was the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire; for Frenchmen, Englishmen, and Americans, on the other hand, the supreme aim was the defeat of Germany. If it had been possible to ensure or accelerate the overthrow of Germany by detaching Austria, the Allies would have been only too glad to pay the price of keeping her alive. The 'danger' was averted by the long duration of the struggle, the firm grip on Vienna by Berlin, the refusal of Austria to make the necessary sacrifices, and the unflagging efforts of Masaryk and Benes (and their friends in London and Paris) to convert the Allies to the gospel *Delenda est Austria*. The conversion was only effected in 1918 just in time for the claims and authorities of the new State to be recognised before the collapse of the Central Powers. How different would the result have been, muses the author, 'if, the differences of interest and opinion among the Allies being what they were, and in view of the unfamiliarity with conditions in Central Europe, they had negotiated about us and not with us.' The volume ends with the Armistice, and we are promised further instalments on the Peace Conference and the post-war policy of the Czecho-Slovak Minister.

III

The publication of the Tsaritsa's letters to her husband was followed by a Russian edition of *The Correspondence of Nicholas and Alexandra Romanoff*, edited by Pokrowsky. *The Letters of the Tsar to the Tsaritsa* are now available in English, though not in the English he employed, for they have been re-translated from the

Russian version. A few unimportant telegrams have been omitted, and a few intimate passages suppressed. An Introduction by Dr. Hagberg Wright summarises the impression which the volume will make on most of its readers. The Tsar, he concludes, emerges unscathed as a man and an ally, while his unfitness to rule is stamped all over the work. His letters are not only fewer and shorter than those of his wife, but far less readable. They are, indeed, almost as dull as his diary. The worst of the Tsar's mistakes was his decision to take command of the army in 1915, since his departure left the Tsaritsa in virtual control of the home front. The most interesting letter is that of August 25, 1915, which describes the assumption of the Supreme Command and the rather painful parting with the Grand Duke Nicholas. The scanty political references show that the ruler lived at Headquarters in a world of illusion. 'The behaviour of some of the Ministers,' he wrote in September, 1915, 'continues to amaze me. Always living in town, they know very little of what is happening in the country as a whole. Here I can judge correctly the real mood among the various classes of the people.' He never shared his wife's infatuation for Rasputin, and occasionally attempted to pour water into her wine. 'Our friend's opinions of people are sometimes very strange, as you know yourself,' he wrote in September, 1916; 'therefore one must be careful, especially with appointments to high offices.' A few weeks later, he remarks that Protopopoff is said to have been not quite normal for a time, and that it was risky to leave the Home Office in such hands at such a time. On the very eve of the revolution he gently rebuked the importunity of his neurotic wife. 'You write about my being firm—a master. That is quite right. Be assured that I do not forget; but it is not necessary to snap at people right and left every moment.' A few days later the 'master' and his imprudent adviser found themselves prisoners, and the mournful correspondence ends on March 7, 1917.

Our knowledge of the Russian Court under Nicholas II has been enlarged by the voluminous Memoirs of General Spiridovitch, *Les Dernières Années de la Cour de Tsarskoie-Selo*. Appointed during the anxious winter of 1905–6 to secure the personal safety of the Tsar, the author fulfilled his responsible duties with utter devotion for more than a decade, accompanying him on all his journeys by land and sea, official and unofficial, and co-operating throughout with the secret police. There is singularly little political information to be gleaned from his artless and prolix record of nearly a thousand pages, which carries us to the outbreak of war ; but the harmonious and unpretentious life of the Imperial Family lives again before our eyes. 'I have had the great happiness and the great honour,' writes Spiridovitch in his Preface, 'to watch over the noblest of monarchs' ; and the instances he gives of the Tsar's spontaneous kindness to humble folk in distress go far to explain the devotion he inspired. While the hysterical Tsarina fills him with pity, her only friend, Anna Vyrubova, is depicted as a self-seeking intriguer, disliked by the Princesses and closely linked with the dissolute Rasputin in the pursuit of their common interests. With the exception of Stolypin we hear little of the statesmen, for Spiridovitch is no politician. Guchkoff is castigated for scheming a Russo-German war as a means of overthrowing autocracy. On the other hand, the dying Prince Mestchersky, the intimate friend both of Nicholas II and his father, implored his Sovereign in 1914 to avoid entanglement in the Balkan labyrinth, reminding him that the last venture in that quarter of the world had brought Russia little but ingratitude and ill-will.

The *Correspondance Diplomatique du Baron de Staal (1884–1900)*, admirably edited by Baron Meyendorff, covers the closing professional years of the veteran Ambassador who had represented his Court in many lands. No one would place him beside great diplomatists such as Marschall, Pauncefote, Paul Cambon,

Hartwig and Barrère, who were themselves makers of history; but he was an experienced observer, and his soberly tinted reports from London, though less interesting than those of Hatzfeldt during the same period, throw welcome light on British policy and the tangled Anglo-Russian relations during the Salisbury era. In the second volume, which opens with 1889, it is curious to find Rosebery busying himself with the idea of disarmament and sounding St. Petersburg in 1894, four years before the Tsar invited the nations to the Hague. The Premier, reported Staal, regarded the Emperor Alexander as the strongest guarantee of general tranquillity, and would take no step without his moral support. Giers replied that he must consult his master; that 'this vast project' bristled with difficulties requiring prolonged study; and that in consequence a sympathetic but non-committal reply was all that could be given at the moment. Encouraged by the hints that any practical plans for the limitation or reduction of armaments would be favourably considered at St. Petersburg, Rosebery wrote to Staal to suggest a conference of the Great European Powers. 'The Emperor of Russia by his high, pure character and his single-minded desire for peace is the Sovereign who appeals to me to be marked out as the originator of such a meeting.' A few months later Alexander III was dead, and it fell to his son to summon the Conference of which the British Premier had dreamed. Next in interest to this abortive proposal is Osten-Sacken's report of his sensational conversation with the Kaiser in Berlin on January 13, 1900, relating to concerted action against Great Britain, of which a portion was published for the first time by Sir Sidney Lee in the official biography of Edward VII under the wrong date.

As the *Livre Noir* developed into Stieve's edition of Izvolsky's correspondence, so Siebert's collection of documents, published in 1921, has blossomed into *Graf Benckendorffs Diplomatischer Briefwechsel.* The Preface contributed by the publisher informs us that Siebert

had determined not only to revise the translation but to add new material, to substitute chronological sequence for arrangement by subjects, and to call his work by the name of the Ambassador who composed or received most of the despatches. When Siebert died in 1926 his task was completed by his publisher. The new edition, which fills three volumes, is provided with indexes of persons and things which were lacking in the first. The collection, which contains over a thousand items, only covers the later years of Benckendorff's long residence in London, for there is nothing before 1907, and only eight documents before 1909. The last item is dated July 23, 1914. It is regrettable that no indication is given of the documents which have been added in the new edition.

The most illuminating recent analysis of the years before the war is furnished in Baron de Taube's *La Politique Russe d'avant la Guerre et la Fin de l'Empire des Tsars (1904–1917)*. Unlike Witte, Izvolsky and Sazonoff, whose main preoccupation in their apologias is the vindication of a career, Taube watches events as the simple spectator seated in the second row of the Ministerial box. He claims in his Preface absolute impartiality for the evidence he is about to give before the tribunal of history, and indeed no more independent work is to be found in the literature of the war. He stands above the battle and surveys the drama from the standpoint of a good European. The narrative opens with the International Commission of Inquiry on the Dogger Bank incident. The illustrious Martens, the veteran Legal Adviser to the Russian Foreign Office, was convinced that his country had no case, and delegated the disagreeable task to the admiring pupil who had succeeded him at the University of St. Petersburg. Towards the end of the wearisome discussions the young jurist was chosen by Delcassé as the channel of a significant communication. 'Happily this war will not last for ever, and then we must think of a natural extension of the *Entente Cordiale*.' When Taube inquired whether

he might report this observation to Lamsdorff, Delcassé replied 'I expressly authorise you to do so. To speak formally to Nelidoff (the Russian Ambassador) would no doubt be premature. The question is not ripe. I only wished to mark out the ground.' The message found no response in Petrograd, where Lamsdorff stiffly informed the author that he would continue his 'policy of independence,' and that he would never take a step towards either Potsdam or Buckingham Palace. With such views it was natural that he should oppose the Treaty of Björko, which, however, Taube declines to regard as a German snare, since the Tsar was as eager for the pact as the Kaiser himself. *Volenti non fit injuria.*

The change in 1906 from the timid, modest, conservative Lamsdorff, 'a perfect gentleman and a perfect mediocrity,' to the brilliant, ambitious, adventurous Izvolsky opened a new chapter in European history. 'A complete egoist, intelligent, but without heart,' writes Taube, whose dislike for his new chief mounted with his knowledge of his vanity, snobbery, and morbid ambition. Moreover, his Anglophilism alarmed Taube, who, when asked for his opinion on the new programme, replied that it might involve Russia in trouble with Germany. While Russia, in his view, needed many years of repose before she could afford to play for high stakes, Izvolsky was burning to make history, and vainly attempted to secure the cancellation of the veto on the fortification of the Aland Islands and the passage of Russian warships through the Black Sea. Ignoring Taube's advice *Quieta non movere* he plunged into the Buchlau morass, from which he emerged bedraggled and embittered. No other work presents such a detailed and damaging indictment of Izvolsky's statesmanship and character.

The appointment of Sazonoff in 1910 was a welcome relief to the officials of the Foreign Office, where Taube had succeeded Martens as Legal Adviser in 1909. The new chief, he declares, possessed scarcely any of

the faults or the merits of his predecessor. Modest, disinterested, honourable and deeply religious, he was better fitted to be Procurator of the Holy Synod or even a prelate than Foreign Minister; for he was swayed by his feelings, weak, changeable, inexperienced and short-sighted. He allowed the fiery Hartwig to create the Balkan League, and vainly endeavoured to hold back the avalanche which it set in motion. Compared with the inflammable and provocative Izvolsky at Paris he was pacifist, though less so than Kokovtzov, the President of the Council, who stoutly opposed all steps tending to war. The Monarch, after wavering for a moment during the intoxications of the first Balkan war, came to realise the danger of premature activity, and resolved to utilise his visit to Berlin in the summer of 1913 for the marriage of Princess Luise to propose to the Kaiser as the foundation of their policy the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Near East. This renunciation of the schemes for opening the Straits, which had fascinated the gaze of Russian statesmen since the humiliation in the Far East, was urged in correspondence and conversations by his friend Prince Mestchersky, the Germanophil editor of a reactionary journal. We are furnished with a few quotations from the letters of the Tsar to his unofficial adviser, which will be fully utilised in a forthcoming biography of Witte.

The good seed sown at Berlin never ripened, for the outbreak of the third Balkan war changed the face of the map, and Sazonoff encouraged Serbian dreams of a Promised Land within the Hapsburg realm. The dismissal of Kokovtzov in February, 1914, removed a bulwark of peace, and Sazonoff, angered by the Liman incident, moved towards the party of action. In a historical lecture delivered in March, 1914, Taube, now Minister of Education, indirectly but unmistakably warned the Monarch, who was among his hearers, of the danger of drifting into war. The volume ends with a critical and dispassionate analysis of the immediate causes of the conflict. No Russian, he declares, could

have admitted that the Austro-Serb quarrel did not concern his country. Sazonoff's supreme offence was the general mobilisation, which he compelled the distracted and peace-loving sovereign to accept. But the most culpable of Russians, in our author's eyes, was Izvolsky, 'who evidently desired war,' and who observed to a relative of the author a few days after the commencement of hostilities, 'Félicitez-moi, madame, c'est ma petite guerre qui commence.' The main impression left by this volume is that Witte was by no means the only statesman who proclaimed the dangers of a policy which was likely to involve a collision with the Central Powers before Russia had recovered from the catastrophe of 1905.

It is to be hoped that Count Kokovtzov, the only survivor of the Tsar's chief counsellors, will one day publish his recollections. Meanwhile we may read in Michael Florinsky's article in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1929, entitled *Russia and Constantinople: Count Kokovtzov's Evidence*, a considered statement, dated April 23, 1929, of his relation to Sazonoff and his policy. It has been generally assumed that Stolypin's successor was the strongest advocate of a conciliatory and unadventurous policy, and that the Foreign Minister, though not a chauvinist, was at any rate more of a 'nationalist' than his colleague. This assumption is now emphatically repudiated by Kokovtzov himself. 'During the term of almost three years when I was the President of the Council of Ministers, no divergency of opinion on any question of importance arose between myself and M. Sasonov.' The Foreign Minister, he testifies, was never in favour of an aggressive policy against Turkey. His famous report to the Tsar in the last winter of peace, which has been widely interpreted as evidence of a bellicose spirit, is pronounced an 'academic discussion of future preparations absolutely remote from the idea of directing Russia along the path of immediate and aggressive policy in the Turkish question.' Holding this view of Sazonoff, he denies

that his own retirement in February, 1914, was utilised by the Foreign Minister to pursue a more spirited policy. The importance of this statement is obvious, and Mr. Florinsky, who obtained it, accepts it as a vindication of the anodyne character of Sazonoff's statesmanship. Some critics, however, may prefer to suspend judgment till the publication of the Russian archives supplies sufficient contemporary material for a confident verdict. A further article by the same author, entitled *Russian Military Leaders and the Problem of Constantinople during the War*, published in the *Political Science Quarterly* of March, 1929, analyses a collection of letters (which recently appeared in the *Krasny Archiv*) addressed to Sazonoff by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Army Headquarters.

Part of the enforced leisure of exile has been employed by Trotsky in writing his reminiscences, which began to appear in the *Observer* in August, 1929. For the student of diplomacy the essential portion of the narrative is that which describes the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, in which we are informed of the ability of Kühlmann, the mediocrity of Czernin, and the truculence of General Hoffmann. A volume entitled *The Red Archives*, edited by C. E. Vulliamy and furnished with an Introduction by Dr. Hagberg Wright, contains selections from the *Krasny Archiv* illustrating the years 1915–1918. The place of honour is given to police reports on the daily life of Rasputin, and the coming of the revolution is reflected in diaries and correspondence. Some letters of Madame Rodzianko describe her husband's plain speaking at Tsarskoye Selo, and its ungracious reception by the misguided monarch.

Passing to the soldiers, we may note that Daniloff, ex-Quartermaster-General of the Russian army, has followed up his earlier work by a shorter volume entitled *Dem Zusammenbruch Entgegen*. The Preface attributes the collapse above all to the weakness of the feeling for the State, and to the false policy of ignoring the voice of the masses. The Government, he roundly declares,

was obstinate, insincere, short-sighted and increasingly influenced by dark forces. The narrative opens with the dismissal of the Grand Duke Nicholas, whom Daniloff admires as the outstanding personality of the Romanoff family. The jealous Tsaritsa detested him, and at Court he was sometimes ironically nicknamed Nicholas III ; but the author assures us of his absolute loyalty. Sukhomlinoff was not a traitor, though an utter failure at his work. The Sovereigns liked old Goremykin to be Prime Minister because he always yielded to their will. Alexeieff, the Tsar's Chief of Staff, was a competent soldier, but lacking in resolution. After thus sketching the protagonists Daniloff jumps back to the last years of peace. Was Russia prepared for war? He replies that she was utterly unready ; that the reconstruction necessitated by the *débâcle* in the Far East had only begun ; that Russia was a colossus with feet of clay, and needed many years of peace and reorganisation. Sukhomlinoff's famous pronouncement in the spring of 1914, 'Russia desires peace but is ready for war,' was mere bluff. It was impossible to win a war with a ruler like Nicholas and a worn-out reactionary like Goremykin. In an elaborate portrait of the Tsar, whom the author knew well, we are told that he was friendly, simple and patriotic, and that he never wavered from the autocratic faith. He was a complicated nature, adds Daniloff, and no one has penetrated his secrets. The murder of Rasputin came too late to save the dynasty or the country.

The most dramatic portion of the book is the closing account of the abdication of the Tsar, of which a French translation was published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of January 1, 1929. Daniloff had been recently appointed Chief of the Staff of the Armies of the North under Russky, whose headquarters were in Pskov. When the Revolution broke out the Monarch travelled thither at once. Russky and Daniloff visited him in his train and found him calm. He wished to return to Tsarskoye Selo, but the way was blocked. During the

night Rodzianko, President of the Duma, telephoned to Russky that the Tsar must abdicate, and on the following morning a similar communication from Alexeieff in the name of the Generals arrived. The message was delivered by Russky in presence of the author, and both, when asked for their opinion, confirmed the necessity. After a painful silence, with trembling lips, the Tsar said in a firm voice : 'I have decided to abdicate in favour of my son.' When Guchkoff and Shulgin arrived with a message from the Duma that the Tsar must abdicate, he replied that he had already done so, adding that he had transferred the crown to his brother Michael, since the doctor had told him that the illness of his son was incurable. With the abdication of Michael, which quickly followed, we reach the end of the Monarchy and the end of Daniloff's vivid narrative.

There is a family resemblance between the reminiscences of Russian Generals who took part in the world war. All of them declare that their country was unfit for a struggle with a Great Power ; all agree that victory was virtually impossible with such a ruler ; and each of them complains of the errors of the rest. The *Mémoires* of Broussilov, published after his death with a Preface by General Niessel, open with an outspoken chapter entitled 'Before the War.' The quarrel with Japan, a tragic error, ended all the reforms of the two preceding decades. He describes the Fourteenth Army Corps, which he was appointed to command early in 1909, as lacking in the most elementary requirements, and he is convinced that the others were in no better state. 'It would have been impossible to fight even if Germany had wished to annex Poland or the Baltic Provinces.' Sukhomlinoff was plausible but superficial, and though he rendered some service to the army, the supply of munitions was sadly neglected. The author's hero, and, if we are to believe him, the hero of the army, was the Grand Duke Nicholas ; but he had no power. A struggle with the Central Powers, declares Broussilov, was inevitable, but the material preparation was inade-

quate and there was no moral preparation at all. The people were deliberately kept in ignorance, and the seeds of revolution were sown throughout Russia. 'The German reigned in every field of national life.'

When the conflict began the Tsar should have granted a real Constitution, promised liberty to Poland, and rallied the nation around the throne. But his pathetic incompetence was now revealed, no longer merely to the few who saw him at close quarters but to all eyes. When he visited the ranks he had no idea what to say to the soldiers, and the sole result was to destroy an illusion. Broussilov was not one of his favourite generals, and we must bear this in mind in weighing his evidence; but no work contains a more scathing indictment of Nicholas II. The eviction of the Grand Duke Nicholas destroyed all chance of victory, for Alexeieff, though useful enough as Chief of Staff, lacked the resolution necessary for a Generalissimo.

The partial success of the large-scale offensive on the south-west front increased the prestige of the General, and in the following winter he wrote to Count Fredericks, the Grand Chamberlain, a letter imploring him to realise that if Russia was to be saved a constitution must at once be granted. To this appeal, intended of course for the eyes of the Tsar, he received neither reply nor acknowledgment. The Grand Duke Michael, of whom the author speaks in warm terms, agreed with his view of the need of a drastic change, and promised to urge it when he saw the Tsar; but he added that he had no influence whatever. 'My brother has been besieged with warnings and appeals of this sort. He is subject to an influence and to pressure which nobody can break.' When the inevitable crash occurred and when Alexeieff and Rodziansky invited the Generals to telegraph to the Tsar to counsel his abdication, none of them responded with more alacrity or less circumlocution than Broussilov. The revolution came too late. The General was appointed Commander-in-Chief by the Provisional Government; but he was speedily replaced

by the dare-devil Korniloff, and there was soon no longer an army to command.

IV

The Balkan states continue their contributions to history, and we owe to them an ever-deepening insight into the aims and rivalries of the Great Powers in the Near East. Beginning with Serbia, whose destinies were most closely linked to the causation of the war, we find at the top of the list the massive work *Die Auswärtige Politik Serbiens, 1903–1914*, edited and translated by Bogitschevich, whose previous writings have been noticed in earlier editions. We may now trace the authentic development of the policy of Belgrad from the time that the accession of Peter Karageorgevich made Serbia one of the pivots of European diplomacy till the outbreak of the world war. The views of the editor, some of whose despatches from Berlin are here published, are indicated both in notes and in the large print by which he calls attention to certain passages; but though his opinions, first expounded in his little book *The Causes of the War*, are not to the taste of Entente readers, the student will welcome this rescue of hundreds of important documents from the obscurity of an unfamiliar tongue.

The collection, which is strictly chronological, opens with the telegrams exchanged by King Peter and Francis Joseph on the accession of the former, and with the protocol of what may be called a Crown Council in Belgrad in 1905 to discuss the principles of foreign policy; but the consecutive story begins with the annexation of Bosnia. A few of these reports and despatches were published in the appendix to the editor's *Causes of the War*; but the new material usefully fills in the gaps. The conversations of Gruitch and Milovanovitch with Grey and Hardinge are full of British exhortations to Serbia to confine herself to

'reasonable' demands, and Hardinge argued that Serbia had interests involved rather than rights. The reports from Rome show Tittoni and the King definitely on the side of Russia against Austria; but Aehrenthal had the winning cards in his hand, for he knew as well as the aggrieved Izvolsky that Russia was utterly unable to fight. When Pasitch, during his visit to Petrograd, quoted the Tsar as declaring that he would not recognise the annexation, Izvolsky rejoined that, if his master had really said so, he could not have fully considered the matter. The advice both from diplomatic and military circles to Belgrad was to wait for better days, and indeed similar counsel was volunteered by friendly onlookers all over Europe. Giolitti is reported as wishing that Serbia should become the Piedmont of the Serb stock; and Izvolsky, while declaring that even an Austrian occupation of Serbia would not cause him to fight, realised that a struggle with Germanism was ultimately inevitable. Meanwhile Serbia could without difficulty promise a change of policy; and she was exhorted from many quarters, as the first step in her military and diplomatic ascent, to seek a close understanding with Bulgaria. The effect of these documents is to suggest that the danger of war was less than was commonly believed at the time, but that Aehrenthal's Bosnian *coup* none the less planted the seeds of aspiration and revenge which ripened to the harvest of 1914.

The larger part of the volume is devoted to the graver crisis of the Balkan wars. The obvious rejoinder to Austria's triumph in 1909 was a Balkan *bloc* under Russian patronage, and it is with the formation of this *bloc* that many of the documents are concerned. The difficulties were great, for Ferdinand was believed to be Austrophil, and the sentiments of King Nicholas towards Belgrad were not exactly cordial; but the Tripoli war, aided by the diplomacy of Hartwig, cemented the discordant elements into a fighting unit. Meanwhile dust was thrown in the eyes of Austria and Turkey by categorical denials; and when the Austrian Military Attaché

in Sofia asked whether a Bulgar-Serb agreement was under discussion, General Fitcheff blandly replied that such an understanding was impossible. It was agreed that hostilities should under no circumstances begin till the autumn of 1912 ; and while statesmen in the West were endeavouring to bring the Tripoli campaign to an end, the Balkan plotters, with Gueshoff at their head, strove to keep it alive. The Serbian Minister in Sofia, for instance, warned the Turkish *Chargé d'Affaires* that the surrender of Tripoli would teach others how easy it was to make a meal off Turkey. It was in vain that Sazonoff and Kokovtzov uttered warning after warning not to plunge into the fray, since Russia was still unready for the ordeal. But there was never any doubt where her sympathies lay, and Nekludoff, her Minister in Sofia, shed tears of joy when the efforts of the Powers to avert hostilities were ignored. Moreover the Tsar was rumoured to have said that public opinion would almost inevitably compel him to intervene if fortune were to frown on the arms of the Balkan League ; and he remarked to Suvorin, the Editor of the *Novoe Vremya*, that the annexation of Bosnia had been such a humiliation for Russia that a repetition was impossible. The Russian Government, however, remained throughout a moderating influence, despite the growing excitement of irresponsible opinion, and Serbia was advised to content herself with less than her full demands. As Sazonoff explained to the Minister in Petrograd at the end of 1912, Serbia should regard the existing situation as merely a stage, since the future belonged to her. When, a month later, at the height of the dispute about the frontiers of Albania, he bluntly declared 'We will not fight over Djàkova,' Pasitch telegraphed back his 'consternation that no one is capable of defending us from Austrian demands.' The advice of Sir Edward Grey not to commit suicide was far less resented ; but the soreness passed away when Russia took the side of Belgrad in the Bulgar-Serb conflict. With the Treaty of Bucharest Bulgaria moved out of the Russian orbit,

and Serbia became her recognised *protégé*. It is indeed the steady growth of the Russo-Serb partnership which gives a certain unity to the mass of documents collected in this instructive volume.

A second volume, entitled *Diplomatische Geheimakten aus Russischen, Montenegrinischen und Sonstigen Archiven*, collects the most important documents relating to Serbia which have appeared in the *Grosse Politik*, the correspondence of Izvolski and Benckendorff, and the official publications of various States. The most arresting novelty is a long letter from Plamenatz, ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs in Montenegro, dated May 23, 1917. Montenegro, he declares, came out of the Bosnian crisis with deep rancour in her heart. Bosnia was lost for the time, but the Sanjak could still be saved. To save it, it must be taken from Turkey. Turkey could only be beaten with outside help; but the Serbo-Montenegrin Treaty of September 23, 1912, was aimed above all at Austria. The war with Turkey was rendered more difficult by the fact that in 1911 Russia had suspended her subsidy for the army; for 'Pasitch, by his intrigues, had supplanted us at Petrograd, and established a monstrous legend that King Nicholas was Austria's man.' Appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in April, 1913, Plamenatz vainly implored Petrograd for money at any rate to pay the officers. A year later, in April, 1914, he was agreeably surprised to learn from the King that Russia would renew the subsidy, pay the arrears, and supply arms and clothing for 50,000 men. The King made inquiries as to the reason of this *volte-face*, and was informed that a war against Austria was not far off. When the news of Serajevo reached Cettinje, the Serb Minister observed prophetically to Plamenatz 'This cartridge will bring liberty to the whole Serb race.' Russia, he added, in response to a question, would stand by them. Plamenatz argues that Pasitch, 'un fourbe sans foi ni loi,' had staged the murder in order to furnish a *casus belli*. But we may welcome his testimony without accepting his interpretations.

In addition to his larger work Boghitschevich has published a little volume entitled *Le Colonel Dragoutine Dimitrievitch Apis*. In a former volume, *Le Procès de Salonique*, he had described the trial and execution of the man who was the embodiment of Serbian nationalism in its most ruthless and militant form, and he now traces the earlier phases of a stormy career. 'Dimitrievitch,' he writes, 'was the instigator of the Serajevo plot, and thus caused the world war.' He adds that a growing number of his fellow-countrymen are coming to attribute to him the principal merit of Jugoslav unification, and in consequence to resent the conduct of the Pasitch Government in hounding a great patriot to death by methods even worse, juridically and morally, than those of the Dreyfus trial. His narrative is based on the unpublished memoirs of a comrade of Dimitrievitch, whose name he thinks it better to conceal, and also on personal knowledge. The book is a curious mixture of eulogy and blame, but the former predominates. The name 'Apis,' he asserts, is inseparably linked with the regeneration of Serbia. 'His greatness resides in his spirit of revolutionary nationalism. He breathed the revolutionary flame into the officers' corps.' Yet his footsteps were stained with blood from the terrible night of June 11, 1903, when he, the soul of the conspiracy against King Alexander, was gravely wounded by bullets in the chest, to the world war, which was the price of the fulfilment of his aims. Though Peter Karageorgevitch was compelled by diplomatic pressure to frown on the regicides, the influence of 'Apis' among the officers remained predominant. The dynasty felt itself eclipsed by him, and for the next decade Pasitch and 'Apis,' the Government and the Black Hand, fought one another for control. The crafty Premier won, for he was supported by Prince Alexander. It is the conviction of Boghitchevich that the conspiracy against the life of the Crown Prince at the end of 1916 was a mare's-nest, and that the pretext was seized to silence a witness who knew too much. In these pages we learn fresh details

of his greatest achievement, the Serajevo plot; but, despite the obvious bias against Pasitch and Prince Alexander and the tendency to exaggerate the *rôle* of a figure of romance, the book helps us to visualise the cross-currents of Serbian politics during the troubled reign of Peter Karageorgevitch.

No more enthralling book has reached us from the Balkans than Loncarevich's *Jugoslaviens Entstehung*, which records the struggles and aspirations of Serbia from 1903 to 1914. As the Belgrad representative of the official Vienna Telegraphic News Agency, an Austrian citizen but a Serb by blood, he stood at the heart of events, in closest touch both with the Serbian Government and the Austrian Legation. Though Serbia can do no wrong in his eyes and Austria no right, the author has so much to say that he carries us through his long journey without fatigue. If we desire to know how the bitter and protracted Austro-Serb quarrel, from which the world war arose, appeared to men living in the meridian of Belgrad, we shall discover the secret in these vivid pages. Loncarevich owed his appointment to the murder of King Alexander, and, despite his unconcealed disapproval of the policy of the Ballplatz, he retained his post till the outbreak of war. His thesis is that the accession of Peter Karageorgevitch opened a new and glorious era in the life of the Serbian people; that it was his desire to live on friendly terms with Vienna; that Austria could never forgive him for discarding the tradition of Milan and Alexander and declining to be a pawn or a vassal; that the little Balkan State was bullied and threatened till its sturdy patriotism seethed up in passionate hatred of the oppressor; and that war was rendered inevitable by the inexorable determination of Vienna to cut the knot with the sword. In the opinion of the author Serbia was as fortunate in her statesmen as Austria was ill-equipped. King Peter appears as a hero, the restorer not only of national self-respect but of constitutional liberty; and the two chief pilots of the ship of state, Milovanovitch and Pasitch, appear as

skilful, high-minded and pacific men, who exhibited admirable patience in face of ceaseless provocation. Aehrenthal and Berchtold, on the contrary, had a perfect genius for making mistakes and neglecting opportunities. This confrontation of the wolf and the lamb over-simplifies the issue. Moreover, the almost entire omission of the factors of Jugoslav nationalism and Russian encouragement throws the whole picture out of focus. But when all allowance is made for a pervading bias, the narrative constitutes a damaging indictment of Austrian statesmanship.

King Peter, we are told, realised that the peaceful renaissance which his country needed was only possible on the basis of good relations with Austria, and he sought an invitation from Francis Joseph before visiting any other Court. It was the first of Austria's many errors to reject his advances ; and when he was at last invited to Budapest several years later public opinion compelled him to cancel his acceptance. The next costly blunder was the attempt to bring Serbia into economic subjection by closing the frontier to Serbian pigs. When asked for his opinion on this measure by the Austrian Councillor of Legation, the author replied that it would strengthen the national resistance. 'You are wrong,' rejoined von Löwenthal ; 'when the peasant finds he cannot sell his animals, Serbia will be on her knees within a month.' 'On the contrary,' retorted Loncarevich, 'he regards the closing of the frontiers as a threat and will resist.' He was right, for Serbia refused Austria's conditions and found markets for her pigs elsewhere.

A yet graver mistake in the author's opinion was the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 'the rape of the two Serb lands,' which he describes as a Pyrrhic victory ; for it enlarged the Serbian into a European problem, and transformed the union of the Jugoslavs from a dream into a programme. Every Serb was aware that the struggle for Bosnia was merely postponed, not ended, and that the ensuing years must be spent

by the nation in preparing and steeling itself for the final reckoning with the last hereditary enemy. When the author asked Pasitch his opinion, he replied without hesitation, 'It is war.' A remarkable declaration was made by Milovanovitch, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to a few friends when the collapse of Russian resistance brought with it the submission of Belgrad. 'The fate of us Serbs is hard indeed. We must give way. They recognise our rights, but tell us they cannot help us to gain them. Europe, too, is in a bad way, and cannot go on much longer as it is. Violence will bring its nemesis. How the upheaval will occur we cannot tell. But one thing, my dear friends, I do know. Bosnia and Herzegovina will not remain long in possession of Austria. It may be two, three or several years. But I stake my head that by 1920 Bosnia will long be free. Which of us will see it? It will be a grand time. But it is still far away.' Milovanovitch died in 1912, and of the little group which listened spellbound to his prophetic musings the author alone survives. The long chapter on the Bosnian crisis is of exceptional interest, and not least the summary of the reports to the Skuptchina in secret session of the diplomatic missions of Milovanovitch to the Western capitals, Pasitch to Petrograd, and Novakovitch to Constantinople. We shall only understand the conduct of Serbia in the winter of 1908–9 when we realise that, unlike the rest of Europe, she had regarded Austrian occupation of the provinces as provisional.

Austria's errors continued without interruption, among them the disgraceful episode of the Vasich forgeries, which is described in detail. Loncarevich is amazed at the folly of the Monarchy in sending as its representative to Belgrad a man like Count Forgach, who made no secret of his contemptuous hatred for Serbia; and when, after a discreet interval at the Court of Saxony, he became Berchtold's principal adviser on Balkan policy, the Serbs expected him to recommend and carry through a policy of revenge. How different, reflects

the author, was Hartwig, the model diplomatist, who loved Serbia and gained her love! That the Ballplatz was incorrigible both in hostility and stupidity was proved again and again during the Balkan wars. In regard to the celebrated Prohaska case, which was used to whip the Dual Monarchy to a paroxysm of fury, we are told that the Consul had made himself hated, and that a demonstration was held against him, but that he received no sort of personal insult. Masaryk hastened to Belgrad to learn and report the truth, and brought back an offer from Pasitch to visit Vienna and clean the slate. Austria was to recognise Serbia's right to a commercial harbour on the Adriatic, while Serbia was to enter into a lasting friendly relationship with Austria, granting her economic concessions, and assuming the same attitude to the Jugoslav subjects of Francis Joseph as Germany adopted to the Austrian Germans. With the rejection by Berchtold of this advance, which the author believes to have been entirely sincere, the last chance of a *détente* was thrown away. The closing sections of the volume describe the author's experiences during the hectic weeks of July, 1914. Pasitch and his colleagues, he assures us, were absolutely pacific, and he accepts the Premier's belated denial of the statement of Ljuba Jovanovich that he was aware of the plot. When the ultimatum arrived, Serbia promptly sought counsel in Petrograd; and had a discouraging reply arrived, or no reply been received in time, Loncarevich declares that the Austrian demands would have been unconditionally accepted, since resistance without Russian support was unthinkable. The mere possibility of acceptance was a terror to Giesl, who stoutly declared that no state could accept it. With the severance of diplomatic relations the author's mission was at an end. He returned to Vienna and heard from Forgach's own mouth that the demands had been framed in such a manner as to ensure rejection. In the opinion of Loncarevich it was the last and the greatest error of them all.

The outstanding contribution from Greece is provided by the *Political Memoirs, 1914–1917*, of Prince Nicholas, which supplement and complete the earlier volume of his reminiscences. The book is dedicated to the memory of King Constantine, 'in the hope that it may clear the name of a man cruelly wronged, a great King, a great gentleman and soldier, and a great Hellene.' The Foreword strikes the note of indignant remonstrance which reverberates through every page. His brother, he declares, was grossly slandered. It was only in order to save his country from disaster that he kept out of the war. His idea was to enter the struggle not at the outset but at a later period when a united nation, after preparing its army for the fiery ordeal, would have been able to hold its own against Turkey and Bulgaria, its traditional foes. When war broke out Nicholas was in Petrograd on his annual visit to his mother-in-law, the Grand Duchess Vladimir ; and the Tsar, of whom he always speaks with respectful affection, expressed his conviction that England was bound to come in. The Prince shared the universal indignation at the violation of Belgian neutrality, and interpreted it as a warning that all the belligerents would display a heartless disregard of International Law. Returning home at the end of August he found Constantine angered by the attitude of the Kaiser, who had appealed to him as a brother-in-law and as a Marshal of the German Army to stand by his side. 'Does he take me for a German ?' exclaimed the King. 'Besides he forgets his geography—forgets that Greece would cease to exist within twenty-four hours after she had declared herself Germany's ally. For the present it is imperative that we should remain neutral. As to joining Germany, that is and will always be an impossibility.' The King and the General Staff, explains the author, expected a long war, Venezelos a short one. The Premier was blind to military considerations, whereas Constantine, whose neutrality he with gross injustice labelled pro-Germanism, saved his country. The King never doubted that Turkey and

Bulgaria would join the Central Powers, and that it would be useless to yield Kavalla in return for vague promises in Asia Minor, which Greece could neither conquer nor hold. His personal popularity was proved by the wonderful demonstrations of affection during his dangerous illness in 1915 and at the moment of his eviction in 1917; and his policy was approved by a nation which was no more pro-German than himself. The charge of claiming to govern by Divine Right is dismissed as absurd, for with an impulsive Premier it was his duty to save his people from the abyss.

The second and most important part of an interesting volume describes the author's mission to Russia in the summer of 1916. The King sent Andrew to Paris and London, and Nicholas to Petrograd to explain the impossible situation in Greece which followed the landing of the allies at Salonika, and to counterwork the legends invented by the Venezelists and swallowed wholesale by the Entente. 'I want you particularly to give Nicky my word of honour,' observed the King, 'that I never thought of attacking the Allies in the rear. Were I to do so, Greece would cease to exist forty-eight hours later. Tell Nicky also that I never have had and never will have any secret understanding with the Bulgarians, and how hurt I am that Sarrail's groundless suspicions should be believed, while I pass for a liar and a traitor.' The Prince found the Tsar as affectionate and cordial as ever, and indeed, so far as the ruler was concerned, he was forcing an open door. His instructions were to remove doubts as to Constantine's policy and to beg the Tsar to mitigate Franco-British coercion. The Tsar declared that he had never approved pressure on Greece to sacrifice Kavalla to Bulgaria, and had never believed in the rumour of a secret agreement with Sofia. When the Prince complained of the Russian press campaign against his brother, the Tsar authorised him to tell the Premier his wish that 'this slanderous campaign' should be stopped. At the end of their first interview Nicholas rose, put his hands on the shoulders of his visitor, and

looking him in the eyes, said : ' I have entire confidence in Tino. I know how true and loyal he is. I trust him implicitly. I shall do all I can for him.' The Tsar, however, was not master in his own house, and when the Prince explained the situation to Stürmer, the elderly Premier went to sleep. Though telegrams from Constantine were received and communicated to the Tsar, the mission was a failure ; for every month tightened the grip of the Western Allies on helpless Greece.

Nicholas returned to Athens in time for the conflict of December 1, 1916, when French shells went shrieking over his house. He criticises the narrative of Admiral Dartige, who paints the Greeks as the aggressors, and attributes the bloodshed to the Allied policy of attempting to impose Venezelos on the country by force. Venezelos, indeed, is the black sheep of the drama, though Sarrail runs him close ; and he is not surprised that, when the most eminent of Greek statesmen assured the Western Powers that Greece wanted to fight and that Constantine was pro-German, they believed what they were told. The narrative closes when the Prince followed his brother into exile. ' Constantine,' he declares in taking leave of him, ' was a monarch and a soldier who loved his people and was beloved by them.' Whatever allowances may need to be made for the warmth of fraternal affection, the Prince's testimony is an effective refutation of the wilder legends of the period, and in effect a weighty condemnation of the policy of coercion to which their acceptance gave birth.

We have heard so little from Roumania that the testimony of Diamandy is particularly welcome. In his articles published in the *Revue des deux Mondes* on December 15, 1927, and January 1, 1928, entitled *La Grande Guerre vue du versant oriental : un nouvel homme malade en Europe*, he asserts that in the opinion of Roumanians the determining cause of the struggle was to be found in the internal situation of the Dual Monarchy. He quotes with approval the celebrated prophecy of

Albert Sorel : ' Quand la Turquie aura quitté le lit de l'homme malade, c'est l'Autriche qui viendra l'y remplacer.' With the decline of Islam, he argues, Austria lost her historic mission as Defender of the Faith, and the rise of new States in the Balkans was a parallel process of no less historic significance. The foundations of her strength were crumbling, and she was unfitted for the searching test of war. This pessimistic diagnosis was confirmed by a physician who might have been expected to take a milder view of the condition of the patient. Visiting his colleague, Jagow, in Rome on November 24, 1912, Diamandy was electrified to hear from the lips of a German Ambassador opinions identical with his own. ' There is, my dear Minister, a new " Homme Malade " in Europe,—our Austro-Hungarian ally. The internal situation of the Dual Monarchy is very grave. Anything may occur. What a difficult position for you in regard to Transylvania, and for us with Bohemia ! ' He added, as if talking to himself, ' But Galicia must be left to Russia.' Jagow went on to observe that now they all saw the annexation of Bosnia to have been a mistake. Shortly after this unsolicited declaration by the man who was soon to be called to the Wilhelmstrasse, the Roumanian Minister at Constantinople reported a very similar conversation with Wangenheim. The growing weakness of the Hapsburg realm was openly confessed at the end of 1913 by the Austrian Ambassador in Rome in a farewell conversation with Diamandy, on the transference of the latter to Petrograd. ' Till now,' began Merey, ' our relations have rested on a tacit accord not to speak of Transylvania. To-day all that is changed, and our good relations will only continue if we do speak of it.' The prospects, he added, were disquieting. If Austria were to fight, she would have to punish some Polish and Czech regiments, but she was quite strong enough to win. ' But if we wait some years longer our domestic situation threatens us with complete paralysis. What is the good of a fleet and an army, and what will remain of our power without the

possibility of expansion towards the South? We should be a big Switzerland and nothing else.' In such records of conversation we can never be sure that we have the *ipsissima verba*, but there seems no reason to suspect their general tendency.

The next point of interest is a letter of John Bratiano, written in 1927, in reply to a question by his friend Diamandy as to what occurred during the visit of Francis Ferdinand and his wife to King Carol at Sinaia on July 10, 1909. The Archduke, we learn, breathed fire and fury against the Magyars,—*misérables* who could only be convinced by force. He had no wish for his son to succeed him, as he believed that his nephew Karl would continue his policy. His aim was not to break up Hungary but to federalise it and to reduce its power. He desired a close alliance with Roumania, which would help him in his struggle with the Magyars. The soft words of the heir to the throne were in vain, for he was powerless, since Tisza, the arch-enemy of the Roumanians, was in control. Bratiano informed King Carol in 1913 that if he were called to power he would be unable to renew the treaty with the Triple Alliance. In the same year he told the German Chargé d'Affaires that events in the Balkans had revealed a real divergence of interests between Roumania and Austria-Hungary, and that the treatment of the Roumanians in Hungary was such that, despite the treaty, Roumania would not fight beside Hungary.

When 1914 dawned Roumania had drifted far away from Vienna; but the two countries were still united to some extent by a common distrust of Russia, whose seizure of Bessarabia was unforgotten. It was one of the major objects of Sazonoff to win back Bucharest, and with this aim in view the Tsar and his Foreign Minister visited Constanza in June, 1914. The interviews of the Monarchs were cordial, but high politics were left to Sazonoff and Bratiano. A notable feature of the visit was an excursion of Bratiano and Sazonoff from Sinaia across the frontier into Transylvania,—an

event, as Diamandy remarks, that was not without savour. On the journey back from Sinaia to Bucharest a conversation of extreme interest took place. 'We know you are bound by treaty to the Triple Alliance,' remarked Poklewski, the Russian Minister at Bucharest, to Bratiano after reading despatches from Vienna describing the growing anger with Serbia ; 'but what would you do if Austria-Hungary were to attack Serbia? Would the *casus foederis* arise?' Suddenly confronted with this point-blank question, Bratiano and Diamandy tried to turn the conversation ; but Poklewski returned to the charge, and Sazonoff joined in. Bratiano then asked Sazonoff if he intended war. 'No, but if Serbia were to be attacked Russia would not stand aloof.' Bratiano had now had time to prepare his answer. 'If, unfortunately, Poklewski's sombre apprehensions are realised, Roumania would act according to her interests.' The train had now reached Bucharest, and the Roumanian statesmen breathed a sigh of relief. 'You heard the Muscovites?' observed Bratiano. 'If they are to be taken seriously,' replied Diamandy, 'we must prepare to defend ourselves, for the storm, I fear, is about to break.' 'Yes,' rejoined the Premier ; 'I was afraid Albania would provoke a conflict, but I agree with you that we must now watch the Danube.' On the strength of this conversation Bratiano reported to Berlin that Russia would not stand aloof if Serbia were to be attacked.

A new instalment of Diamandy's Memoirs, entitled *Ma Mission en Russie, 1914–1918*, opened in the *Revue des deux Mondes* of February, 1929. When the news of the Austrian ultimatum arrived Sazonoff remarked that if a Conservative Government were in power in England, he could count on them, but that with a Government of Radicals there was no hope. When Diamandy argued that Germany should moderate her ally, Pourtalès always replied : 'Austria is a Great Power ; we cannot dictate to her.' He added that no one must intervene and that the Serbian nightmare must be ended. When war began the German Ambassador remarked to Sazonoff:

'I fear both your sovereign and mine will lose their crowns.' As early as August 5 Sazonoff gave Diamandy the draft of a military alliance, promising to fight till the territories of the Dual Monarchy inhabited by Roumanians should be united to Roumania. Bratiano replied that he could not at present go beyond neutrality; but he was already, the author assures us, favourable to action. On October 2 Sazonoff made a further approach, suggesting a treaty of benevolent neutrality, Russia engaging to oppose attempts on the territorial integrity of Roumania and recognising her right to annex the Roumanian territories of Austria-Hungary, with the exception of Bukovina, whenever she wished. According to Bratiano, King Carol secretly approved the plan, though Sazonoff believed he was not informed. The closing pages contain extracts from the scrappy diary of the distracted King from the fateful June 28 to October 9, two days before his death.

An article contributed to the volume *Rings um Sasonow* by Dimitry Jotzow, former Bulgarian Consul in Hamburg, comments bitterly on the Russian statesman's account of the Balkan wars. Sazonoff, he complains, deserted the Bulgarophil policy of San Stefano, listened to Serbian whisperings of 'the Austrian danger,' and in creating the Balkan League sought to dominate the peninsula. Sazonoff, we are reminded, confided to Poincaré that the victory of Turkey was desirable since her advance could at any moment be held up, whereas a resounding Bulgarian success would involve not only a disturbance of the balance of power in the Balkans, but also the intervention of Austria. How much, asks the indignant author, is there left of his Slav sentiment after such a confession? He stands revealed as a false friend, hating King Ferdinand and hostile to Bulgaria as a potential obstacle to Russian ambitions. The third Balkan war is attributed to Russia's encouragement of Serbia to demand the revision of the Serbo-Bulgar agreement and to claim the cession of Macedonian territory as a *solatium* for exclusion from the Adriatic. Thus when Russia

proffered her services it was not as an impartial arbitrator but as a partisan in whom Bulgaria could place no trust. 'Expect nothing more from us,' exclaimed Sazonoff to the Bulgarian Minister in Petrograd on June 25, 1913. His advice was taken by the Bulgarian people, and when he asked Sofia for help two years later it was too late. An important work on the Balkan wars by Toscheff, Minister at Belgrad from 1908 to 1913, is at present only available in Bulgarian ; but we are indebted to the *Kriegsschuldfrage* (March, 1928) for a translation of a selection of documents relating to the outbreak of the world war from the two-volume Orange-book, published at Sofia in 1920, which remains inaccessible except to readers of Bulgarian.

The writings of Djemal and Mukhtar, which enabled us to survey the world war through Turkish eyes, are usefully supplemented by the *Denkwürdigkeiten* of Marshal Izzet Pasha, who held at various times all the highest military and civil offices of state—Chief of the Staff, Minister of War, Commander-in-Chief, Grand Vizier, Foreign Minister, and Minister of the Interior. A biographical Introduction by his friend and translator Karl Klinghardt explains that Izzet, an Albanian noble, belongs to the old rather than to the Young Turks, holding aloof from party politics and dedicating himself to the service of his country alone. His training in Germany and his wide reading enable him to understand the development of the European situation, and the long introductory chapter on the deeper causes of the war displays a vision not usually associated with the unimaginative Turk. The root of the evil he finds in the system of alliances ; and he blames the Central Powers for driving England into the Franco-Russian camp, thus tilting the Balance of Power in favour of the Entente. In the following chapter, which discusses the position of the Ottoman Empire in relation to Europe, he condemns the compromising intimacy with Germany, which alienated the Entente Powers without obtaining an assurance of military aid in the event of war.

The detailed narrative begins with the Young Turk revolution, of which, though he detested Abdul Hamid, he speaks without enthusiasm ; and, indeed, the whole volume is a sustained criticism of the Young Turk leaders. Izzet had won fame in the Yemen and now became Chief of the General Staff. He shared the universal indignation of his countrymen at the action of Austria and Bulgaria ; but when the question of war was discussed by the Army chiefs, and Ghazi Mukhtar, the hero of 1877, volunteered for the front, he explained to the Grand Vizier that the state of the army, above all the lack of munitions, would involve disaster. He was convinced, however, that a Balkan war was inevitable, and desired to diminish the danger to Turkey by securing the alliance or at any rate the neutrality of Greece. His advice was neglected by the Dictator Shevket, whose centralising policy he sharply condemns ; and it is interesting to find him contending that Turkey might have averted the Tripoli war by allowing Italy to undertake the economic exploitation of the province under the Turkish flag. A graver mistake was to allow the struggle to continue long after all chance of avoiding territorial sacrifice had passed away, and thus to give time to the Balkan States to organise the combined attack which otherwise would probably not have taken place. Izzet returned from a second term of command in the Yemen at the end of 1912, when the early battles of the Balkan war had sealed the fate of Turkey in Europe. No one knew better than the Chief of the Staff that the army was not yet equal to a life and death struggle ; and it is his gravest indictment of the Young Turks that their policy led straight to a conflict for which the empire was militarily unprepared. If any small chance of victory existed it was thrown away by the offensive of Nazim, who declined to wait till the army had gathered in its full strength.

When Shefket was murdered in 1913 Izzet succeeded him as Minister of War ; but he was unable to prevent the Mission of Liman von Sanders, remarking

bitterly that if the command of the army was given to a German, the posts of Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister could equally well be entrusted to foreign hands. The antagonism of the European groups was increasing, and when the author accompanied Talaat on a visit to Yalta in 1914, he learned from certain remarks of the Tsar, and from the tone in which they were delivered, how deep was the hatred of Germany at the Russian Court. On the breaking of the storm, which he considers that Germany alone of the Great Powers seriously attempted to avert, he once again urged the safer policy of neutrality, at any rate for a time. He was supported by almost all the Ministers, but Enver's 'ironical smile' showed that his mind was made up. 'Our entry into the war was a colossal error, indeed a grave crime against the nation. . . . The will of a single man—not particularly clever—sufficed to hurl our poor, sorely-tried people once more into a catastrophe greater than any which had preceded it.' Enver's military performances during the war, in which the author fought on the Caucasus front, were as disastrous as his political decisions, and the volume ends with a bitter outcry against the architects of national ruin. The Young Turks, he declares, were responsible for the moral dethronement of the Empire, and made it the plaything of the ambitions of Enver and his friends. 'Thus we steered for the abyss, till the world war came and gave us the *coup de grâce*.'

V

The contribution of Italy to our knowledge has been so scanty that Salandra's *La Neutralita Italiana* is a pearl of great price. Called to power in March, 1914, on the advice both of Giolitti, the outgoing Premier, and Sonnino, the Conservative leader, Salandra occupied a strong position; for he was as representative of public opinion as it was possible for an individual to be. His documented narrative of events from the Serajevo

murders to the close of the year is of first-class importance, but of even greater interest is the revelation of his innermost thought. A war with Austria, he declares again and again, was inevitable, for the two peoples were animated by feelings of mutual aversion. 'Italy felt herself incomplete. Each one of us carried in his heart a germ of irredentism.' Though the Triple Alliance was prematurely renewed at the end of 1912 instead of in the summer of 1914, there had been no increase of intimacy, and new causes of friction had been added to the old. Albania was the source of continual strife between the Allies, and the diplomatists increased instead of diminishing the tension. Salandra confesses that Aliotti, the Italian Minister at Durazzo, exceeded his instructions, but explains that public opinion prevented his recall; while Merey, the Austrian Ambassador in Rome, had earned the cordial dislike both of Giolitti and his successor by tactless interference and querulous complaints. The situation was described in a remarkable despatch from the Italian Ambassador in Berlin dated July 5, 1914. The smallest incident, declared Bollati, might cause grave complications. To keep the *Triplice* in being was like the labour of Sisyphus, and the disappearance of the Italophobe Francis Ferdinand would bring no improvement. 'I see no means,' he concluded, 'of an efficacious and lasting remedy.' In his old age Garibaldi had urged his countrymen to prepare for the inevitable war with Austria; and Salandra argues that the gravest fault of Giolitti was that he failed to organise the country, morally and materially, for the conflict.

Italy, as we know, was deliberately kept in the dark by her allies during the fateful weeks in which the ultimatum to Serbia was planned and drawn up; but an unauthorised communication by the German Ambassador at Constantinople to his Italian colleague lifted something more than a corner of the veil. On July 15, according to Garroni, Wangenheim, on his return from Berlin, uttered the ominous words *Nous sommes à la*

guerre, and proceeded to explain that Austria was about to send an ultimatum to Serbia which the latter could not accept. Wangenheim's authority no longer stands so high as when his description of the imaginary Potsdam Crown Council of July 5 deceived Morgenthau, the American Ambassador, and through him more than half the world; but his forecast of the character of the coming ultimatum stands on a different footing. Curiously enough Garroni only reported this conversation to his chiefs on his return to Rome in September, 1915, after the breach between Italy and Turkey; and, when both Salandra and Sonnino lectured him for failing to communicate at once information of such intrinsic importance and polemical utility, he explained that the conversation was confidential, and added that he assumed that the Consulta was fully informed by Bollati from Berlin.

Salandra's picture of the closing days of July is of surpassing interest. San Giuliano was at Fiuggi for his health, and Flotow, the German Ambassador, was at the same hotel. The Prime Minister was paying his colleague a visit when the text of the ultimatum was telephoned from Rome. The Premier and the Foreign Minister listened with exclamations of protest and surprise, and even Flotow could not help exclaiming: *Vraiment, c'est un peu fort.* Salandra and San Giuliano promptly decided that the *casus foederis* did not arise, and indeed Austria had not dared to ask her ally for support. Parliament was not sitting, the politicians were on holiday, and the responsibility for a decision of incalculable significance rested on the two statesmen closeted at Fiuggi. Yet there was not a moment of doubt that neutrality must be proclaimed. It was impossible, explains Salandra, that Italy should assist to procure the domination of the Adriatic for the Central Powers. 'Public sentiment corresponded with the calm consideration of our vital interests. The subjection of Serbia with or without diminution of territory, and her reduction to impotent vassalage, would signify the definite hegemony

of Austria, the triumphant invasion of the Balkans by Germany, the end of all possibility of expansion, and the loss, commercially and militarily, of the Adriatic.' Italy, he adds, had always been treated by her Allies as an inferior, and if they proved victorious the relationship would become more galling still. Last but not least, the Italian statesmen were convinced that England would intervene, and Italy had long ago informed her partners that she could never expose her coasts to the guns of the British fleet. It was in vain that an aide-de-camp of the Kaiser hurried to Rome and had audiences of King Victor Emmanuel. Merey was informed that the equilibrium of Europe, of the Balkan Peninsula, and of the seas which girdled Italy was of vital importance ; and Barrère's feverish anxiety was allayed by the comforting assurance of the Premier, *Vous n'avez rien à craindre de nous*. The country was relieved and grateful. Giolitti and the veteran Visconti-Venosta telegraphed approval. Sonnino did not angrily denounce neutrality on the platform of the railway station at Rome, as has been asserted, but expressed his doubts privately and in friendly form. The Ambassadors were divided. Tittoni had urged neutrality from Paris on July 27. Avarna in Vienna and Bollati in Berlin desired to join the Central Powers, while Garroni at Constantinople openly disapproved the decision of his Government. Imperiali, on the other hand, who was ' fascinated ' by Sir Edward Grey, desired to join forces with the Entente. A letter from Bülow to his old friend San Giuliano, written more in sorrow than in anger, argued that the best policy for Italy was to seize the opportunity of realising her dreams on the coast of Africa and throughout the Mediterranean. He added the acid reminder that Germans had long memories.

The most important of Salandra's revelations is that the battle of the Marne converted him to intervention on the side of the Entente. ' The historical moment had arrived to complete Italian unity, and to extend Italy to the boundaries consecrated by nature and tradition.' During the following months, as he admits, his Govern-

ment appeared hesitant and vacillating, for in the summer of 1914 Italy was utterly unfit for war. A long period of neutrality was therefore needed, during which public opinion and the army could be steadily though not too obtrusively prepared for the plunge. He depicts the decision for war as no less inescapable than the provisional decision for neutrality. 'It is an occasion which may never occur,' he wrote to the King on September 30, 'for the completion and aggrandisement of the country.' San Giuliano, he repeatedly assures us, though commonly regarded as a pillar of the Triplice, entirely agreed with him ; and Sonnino, who had at first regretted the decision for neutrality, fully accepted the policy of war in the spring when, on San Giuliano's death in October, he took over the reins at the Consulta. The Premier explains that the famous phrase *sacro egoismo*, which echoed round the globe, was mystical, not cynical in character; but his version of the steps by which he secretly prepared for war is as cold-blooded in its deliberation as Giolitti's narrative of the months during which he was engineering the raid on Tripoli. 'Macchio is a bit suspicious,' wrote San Giuliano five days before his death ; 'we must lull him to sleep.' The prescription was faithfully carried out, and every attempt on the part of the Entente to accelerate the decisive step was politely declined. Thus the Tsar's offer to release the Italian-speaking prisoners taken from Austria on condition that Italy should look after them during the struggle produced the evasive reply that the question would be examined ; and when Sir Edward Grey invited Italy to assist in assuring the neutrality of the Suez Canal, Italy declined on the ground that such action would involve war with Turkey and possibly with the Central Powers. The same negative attitude was assumed when Wangenheim informally suggested to Garroni the formation of a League of Neutrals with a view to bringing the belligerents into conference ; for, as Salandra frankly confesses, he did not wish to end the war before Italy had joined in and reached her goal.

The volume ends with the close of 1914, and, though the sphinx continued to keep her secret, there were mutterings of the coming storm. 'Italy has vital interests to defend, just aspirations to sustain,' exclaimed the Premier in Parliament on December 3, and the words were greeted with a storm of comprehending cheers. On December 9 Avarna put forward in Vienna demands for compensation under article 7 of the Triple Alliance. On December 19 Bülow, who had just arrived in Rome to save what he could from the wreck, paid his first visit to the Premier, and found the position worse than he expected. The Trentino, he suggested (though it was not his to give), might be discussed, but Trieste, which meant far more to Italy, was impossible. Thus began the negotiations, partly in Vienna and partly in Rome, which screened the preparations for the attack. The Cabinet, records its chief, never discussed the question of war, but all its members felt it must come. 'We never had any illusions as to the result of the discussions.' Though most of them were past middle age, 'the idealism of the *Risorgimento* lived on in us old men.' There is no talk in these realistic pages of right and wrong, no suggestion that Italy was in danger of being attacked or despoiled. 'If we are given an opportunity,' remarked Frederick the Great on the death of the Emperor Charles VI, 'shall we not use it?' The invasion of Silesia was the answer. Salandra gives a similar reply; and the next volume will complete the story of the 'moral and military' preparations for the attack which had been settled in principle on the bloodstained fields of the Marne. The first volume of the General Staff history, *L'Esercito Italiano nella grande Guerra*, which traces the development of the army from 1861, may be read as a supplement to the political narrative of the Premier.

Less important but scarcely less interesting is the testimony of Alessandro de Bosdari. *Delle Guerre Balcaniche, Della grande Guerra* contains the experiences and reflections of a diplomatist of courage and conviction

at various European capitals during a stormy decade. The story opens in London at the beginning of 1908, with the author acting as Italian Chargé d'Affaires. When Aehrenthal announced the concession for a railway through the Sanjak, Bosdari correctly interpreted his move as the end of the Concert. Unlike the large majority of those who saw Sir Edward Grey at close quarters, the Italian observer formed a low opinion of his capacity and statesmanship. The Foreign Minister, he declares, was vacillating and difficult. 'I was in intimate contact with him for more than three years, and I was more than once surprised at his levity of judgment, at his inconceivable ignorance of the historical and geographical details of the questions he had to treat, and at the facility with which he contradicted himself.' He speaks of the perpetual timidity and uncertainty of the Cabinet, and records Paul Cambon's conviction that he could always bend England to his will. He noted that the Anglo-Russian Entente was already assuming the character of an alliance, and quotes Sir Charles Hardinge's remark that an Austrian attack on Serbia would involve a great war.

A quiet year at Budapest convinced Bosdari of the weakness both of the Hapsburg Empire and the Triple Alliance. Wekerle, the Premier, openly denounced Austria, and at his first visit volunteered the information that she was secretly building two Dreadnoughts, which were obviously aimed against Italy. Kossuth, the Minister of Commerce, was even more vehemently anti-Austrian, while Apponyi made no secret of his dislike of Italy. Transferred in 1910 to Sofia, the author was plunged into the Balkan whirlpool, where he was destined to spend the most harassing years of his life. During his residence of two and a half years in the Bulgarian capital he only saw the King four or five times, but he received a vivid impression of his sinister personality. He despised all his Ministers, but he was an adroit flatterer of foreign Powers. He never met the French Minister without telling him that he felt himself French

in every fibre of his being, and equally effusive tributes to the Tsar Liberator spiced his conversations with the representative of Russia. Yet Bosdari was informed in December, 1912, by 'a person in the innermost circle' that, though the King might at times appear to be anti-Austrian, his final decisions would always be based on a secret agreement with Austria concluded in 1898. The Minister accepted the confidence as the master-key to the King's policy, and held to it tenaciously through the coming years when the Entente Powers believed that he could be won over by bribes or threats. He heard the King read his Declaration in the Sobranje on the eve of the first Balkan war in an 'artfully tremulant voice'; and he carried away with him the impression of a Renaissance Prince of the approved Macchiavellian type.

The larger part of Bosdari's reminiscences is devoted to Greece, whither the author was transferred at the opening of 1913. His belief in Ferdinand's commitment to Vienna served him as a compass; and when Austria, after the first contest of the third Balkan war, informed Greece that she could not allow the destruction of Bulgaria, he knew that it was more than bluff. Though he detested Venezelos, then at the height of his power, as an enemy of Italy, he advised his Government that the delimitation of the Albanian frontier was not worth the embittered alienation of Greece. From the outbreak of war he understood the attitude of Constantine, which the French and British representatives wrongly attributed to German sympathies. While the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street with ever-increasing vehemence championed Venezelos and his policy of intervention, the Consulta realised that the King of the Hellenes was pro-Greek and nothing else. He was convinced that Germany would win, and expressed his surprise to Bosdari that Italy should dare to enter the fray. If Greece had followed the advice of Venezelos, the country would soon have been overrun by the Central Powers, and her harbours would have passed into German and Austrian hands. Agreeing with this reasoning, Bosdari argued

that Greek neutrality was more useful to the Allies than her belligerence; and he never believed that Greece secretly assisted German submarines with supplies. He reports some interesting conversations with the King, who continually reiterated his conviction of the matchless superiority of German arms.

For the character and statesmanship of Venezelos the Italian diplomatist has nothing but hard words. It was useless to negotiate with him, he declares, and when he was out of office he was determined to prevent the Entente reaching an agreement with anyone but himself. Scarcely less severe is the scolding of the representatives of France—Guillemin, the Minister at Athens, Admiral Dartige du Fournet, and General Sarrail—who were bewitched by his Ententophil sympathies and danced to his seductive tunes. Bosdari's despatches to Sonnino denounce 'the violent and offensive policy of France and England,' 'the fatal interference in Greek affairs,' the intrigues of Venezelos against Italy, sowing discord between the Allies. When France urged Venezelos to raise the banner of revolt, Bosdari counselled his Government to break with her policy; for Greece had no desire to intervene, and Venezelos knew that he would be beaten in a General Election. The veteran Zaimis was driven to resign by the impertinence of Guillemin; anti-Venezelists were arrested by Anglo-French police agents in their own capital; and 'incidents' were created by Venezelos and Guillemin. He defends the Greek Government against the charge of treachery in the tragic events of December 1, 1916, since the intention to refuse the delivery of the guns was known to the Allies. He does not believe that the Greek troops fired first; if they did it was only when the invaders endeavoured to occupy public buildings. Bosdari's anger flames ever fiercer as the area of encroachment extends. French nervosity, he declares, was more than ridiculous, and the bad faith of France prevented any agreement with the Entente. The Jonnart mission, culminating in the deposition of the King, was too much for the

Italian Minister, who would have liked Greece to resist, —' so greatly did I grieve to see the country thus humiliated and trampled on.' France had on several occasions vainly attempted to secure his recall, but after the eviction of the King he voluntarily resigned, since Sonnino no longer stood up to France. The Foreign Minister had hitherto instructed his representative to do everything in his power to avoid a rupture with the Greek Government, and had stood aloof from all the harsher measures of coercion ; but the breach had now occurred, and the will of France and Venezelos was the law of the land. Moreover, as Sonnino explained in reply to the author's expostulations, Italy now depended on England and France for the means of carrying on the war. The main interest of Bosdari's reminiscences is to be found in his attitude of unsleeping hostility to France, which he regards as fundamentally a rival and only temporarily an ally.

Every scrap of information on the bloody deed which precipitated the world war is welcome, and *Il Dramma di Serajevo*, by Luciano Magrini, provides some important evidence. During the retreat of the Serbian army in 1915 the author, a war correspondent, made the acquaintance of Tankosich, the actual organiser of the murder. The Major frankly acknowledged that he armed the conspirators, and that he waited with feverish impatience for the consummation. Magrini is convinced that the Serb Government was also aware of the plot, for explicit statements to this effect, he tells us, were made to him during the retreat by Major Georgevich, son of the ex-Premier. According to this informant, who is said to have enjoyed the confidence of Pasitch, the news of the plot began to circulate in high quarters some time before its execution. When the Premier learned of it in the first week of June he desired to avert the crime, and, on discovering that the conspirators had crossed the frontier, he instructed his Minister in Vienna to warn Berchtold in some manner of the danger. Magrini was informed during the retreat

by the ex-Military Attaché in Vienna that Jovan Jovanovich, unable to give any precise information and not altogether a *persona grata* with the Foreign Minister, conveyed the warning to Bilinski in general terms. Scarcely less interesting is the record of a conversation with Count Fredericks at Helsingfors after the Revolution, describing the struggles of the distracted Tsar against the demand for general mobilisation in 1914.

VI

It is a real satisfaction to welcome the first instalment of the great series of volumes *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, which are to reveal the diplomatic secrets of France from 1871 to the outbreak of the world war; and it is interesting to compare the French enterprise with the German and British publications. The French Commission, of which M. Charlèty, Rector of the University of Paris, is President, consists of over fifty names, who are grouped under the three heads of historians and specialists, diplomatists, and Members of the Institut. It is an imposing list, and indeed, it contains so many men who have helped to make history, such as Jules Cambon and Camille Barrère, Pichon and Paléologue, that apprehensions have been expressed that the publication might in consequence be less full and frank than in the case of the German and British documents. These suspicions are met in the Introduction, signed by M. Charlèty, which assures us that the choice has been made by historians; that it has been determined by no interested motives; and that, in accordance with the intention of Parliament and the Government, the publication is inspired by a spirit of strict impartiality.

In the choice of starting-point the French Commission has naturally followed the German model, for 1871 inaugurated a new era for both countries. This decision involves an enterprise of about the same magnitude as *Die Grosse Politik*. But the French editors, like the German, realise that the main interest of their task

lies in the later years, and they accordingly divide it into three series, the first extending to the end of the nineteenth century, the second to the signing of the Morocco and Congo agreements on November 4, 1911, and the third to the outbreak of war. The three series will march abreast, so that within a few years we shall be able to read the French version of the drama which culminated in 1914. But while the German model is followed in regard to dates, the British precedent has been favoured in reference to notes. The editorial annotations in *Die Grosse Politik*, which increase in number and scope as the work advances, form a conspicuous feature of that colossal enterprise ; and though they are often of real interest and utility, the argumentative tone of some of them has been sharply criticised in France. The British editors decided to confine their notes to elucidations of the text, while abstaining from any expression of opinion, and the French are following the same course. In one important particular the *Documents Diplomatiques* strike out a path of their own. Both the German and British material is grouped into chapters and sections dealing with particular issues, so that the reader may follow the development of a problem or a crisis at every stage. The convenience of this method is obvious ; but the French Commission prefers the strictly chronological method adopted many years ago in the long series of volumes, still unfinished, on the diplomatic origins of the war of 1870. Their argument is that only in this way can we reconstruct the international situation in all its baffling complexity as it presented itself at any given moment to the men responsible for the conduct of national policy. There is much to be said for both systems ; and the difference between them is minimised by a classified list of the documents in each volume relating to the main subject of interest. By consulting this table the reader may, if he likes, escape from the bewilderment of parallel negotiations, and treat the volume as if it consisted of a series of chapters on particular issues.

The present instalment, containing six hundred documents and extending over three months, opens with the end of the second Morocco crisis, and closes with the departure of Lord Haldane for Berlin. With the removal of the spectre of war, which had kept the nerves of statesmen on edge since the voyage of the *Panther* to Agadir, no single issue dominated the stage; but Europe was full of combustible material and troublesome controversies. The Morocco-Congo Settlement did not please everybody in France, Germany, or elsewhere. Belgium disliked the promise of Paris to consult with Berlin if the Congo State were to come into the market; Austria desired to bargain her acceptance in return for a French loan; and Spain proved difficult to square in the negotiations which dragged on through a large part of 1912. The Tripoli war, which everybody, including the Turks, had expected to be brief, was settling down into an obstinate tussle, in which Italian attacks on Albania and the Straits might at any moment bring Austria or Russia on to the scene, and confront Europe with a general conflagration. Though the catastrophe was avoided, the opportunity was seized by the Balkan States to prepare for the combined attack on Turkey which had long been their dream; the seizure of French ships in the Western Mediterranean led to a sharp exchange between Paris and Rome; and the so-called Tcharykoff kite supplied fresh evidence that the question of the Straits was the dominating preoccupation of Russian statesmen ever since the defeat of their ambitions in the Far East.

Perhaps the most interesting documents in this volume are those which are classified in the table of contents as relating to the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. Every student of this melancholy period is aware not only of the quarrels of the rival groups but of the suspicions which members of each entertained of their partners. In the one camp France and Great Britain were alarmed when Russia and Germany seemed to approach nearer to one another, and France was horrified when London and Berlin appeared likely to

settle their feud. In the other Germany and Austria formed an Inner Cabinet, and even Berlin and Vienna were not always on the best of terms. There are some striking despatches from the French Ambassador at Vienna describing Aehrenthal's scarcely concealed determination to emancipate Austria from the tutelage of Berlin. It is true that he had a concrete object in view in the shape of a loan on the Paris market, which explains his almost gushing friendliness towards France ; but he had always resented the position of 'brilliant second' assigned to his country by the predominant partner. His struggle to maintain friendly contact with Italy, despite the opposition of Conrad von Hötzendorff and Francis Ferdinand, was one aspect of the policy of diminishing his dependence on Berlin, and his approaches to France were another. Crozier took them very seriously, as he has explained in his Memoirs, and urged his Government to seize the chance of isolating Berlin. But Poincaré, who became Premier and Foreign Minister towards the end of the period covered by this volume, rejected the hand that was held out, arguing that a French loan would be spent, indirectly if not directly, on armaments which might one day be employed against France. The more we learn about the fatal system of alliances, the more clearly do we realise that, at any rate after the Bosnian crisis, the main lines of advance were marked out, and that it was virtually impossible for any of the Great European Powers except Italy to overstep them.

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the *Entente Cordiale* as a factor in world politics, and every scrap of information in regard to its origin and development is worth having. The British documents are now available, and we may hope for the French version in a year or two. Meanwhile we may turn to General Huguet's *L'Intervention militaire Britannique en 1914*, which is dedicated to the memory of Sir Henry Wilson, 'l'initiateur et le préparateur de l'intervention militaire Anglaise en 1914.' Part I, entitled *L'avant-guerre*,

recalls the situation when the author was appointed Military Attaché in London at the end of 1904. The British army, he declares, was at that time considered by the French War Office as somewhat archaic, and nobody imagined that it could ever be of any use to France from the military point of view. The improvements, however, introduced in 1905 led him to believe that its help would be precious in the next round of the conflict between France and Germany; and Paul Cambon informed him of his own apprehensions in regard to Germany's attitude in Morocco. Accordingly in the course of the autumn he began the detailed study of the effectives which Great Britain could provide in the event of a European war, with the conditions of mobilisation and transport. His estimate was 150,000, whose transport could not be completed before the thirtieth day. He soon after learned from General Grierson, Director of Military Operations, that the British Staff was studying the same question. His estimate of numbers was correct, but mobilisation and transport would be much quicker than he had calculated. The Ambassador, who had estimated the maximum at 30,000, was delighted not only by the figures but by the fact that the War Office was studying the eventuality of military co-operation at the moment when France was beginning to envisage its need. Having obtained permission from Rouvier to open official *pourparlers* with the British Government, Cambon secured that the studies independently begun should be secretly pursued between General Grierson and Colonel Huguet, though the discussions were not to bind the British Government. 'We were a little surprised by the readiness of the response. Assuredly Campbell-Bannerman, Grey and Haldane were too clever not to realise that the studies now to be pursued would—whatever the qualifications—constitute a sort of moral engagement, and later, in fact, this consideration played its part in the decision of 1914. They knew too that France was a little disquieted by the accession to power of a party reputed to

be pacifist to the extreme, and they doubtless did not wish to decline the first request made to them by the French Embassy.'

For some time the studies advanced slowly, as the British army was being overhauled. Moreover, in July, 1906, General Grierson was succeeded by an officer whom Huguet describes as little inclined to assume responsibility, and who, he declared, during his four years as D.M.O., never spoke to him of the tasks which should have been performed in common. Discussions, however, were carried on by subordinates. The British General Staff wished to land at Antwerp, since the idea of the despatch of the army was bound up with the defence of Belgium. Long discussions were needed to convert it to the plan of landing in France, and the Admiralty rendered assistance by undertaking to bar the entrance to the Channel. Considerable progress was made by the end of 1908 ; but even then the French thought that it was merely a paper arrangement, and this fear prevailed till 1910, when Wilson was appointed D.M.O. and every detail was gradually settled. It is hardly surprising to read the opinion of the French Military Attaché that, for the officers engaged in these exhaustive discussions, the moral obligation to intervene emerged so clearly that it became impossible to ignore.

Compared with Germany and Great Britain, Republican France has been singularly unproductive in autobiographies and apologias. The *Mémoires* of Auguste Gérard, with an affectionate Introduction by Hanotaux, form a pleasant record of the career of a diplomatist who was also a scholar ; but as the author's chief posts were in Pekin and Tokio his testimony adds very little to our knowledge of European politics. Beginning as a *protégé* of Gambetta and as French Lecteur to the Empress Augusta, Gérard passed from capital to capital in three continents. His longest sojourn in Europe was at Brussels from 1898 to 1906, and we find in these chapters a vivid account of the Court, the parties and the problems of Belgium ; but on foreign policy

he has little to say. The devoted friend and admirer of Hanotaux was treated with extreme coldness by Delcassé, of whom he draws a very unflattering portrait both as a man and as a muddle-headed diplomatist. Happening to find himself in Paris at the time of Delcassé's fall, he was present at the Quai d'Orsay on the evening of King Alfonso's departure. The Minister and his family stood almost alone, while Rouvier and his other colleagues were the centre of large groups. It was visible to the naked eye that he was isolated and vanquished, and on the following morning he resigned. Gérard was again in Paris at the moment of the Agadir crisis, during an interval of service in Japan. Travelling home via Petrograd and Berlin he found Jules Cambon, though constitutionally optimistic, in low spirits. He was oppressed by the Parliamentary 'anarchy' in France, by the growth of Pan-German appetites, and by the apparent readiness of Caillaux for economic concessions and territorial sacrifices in the Congo. During the anxious days following the arrival of the *Panther* at Agadir he was in close contact with de Selves and his staff, and believes himself to have been of some service to the Quai d'Orsay. The rapid recovery of national self-confidence filled him with satisfaction, and the summer of 1911 appears to him in retrospect as the first general mobilisation of French patriotism, accompanied by 'a clear demonstration of close and absolute solidarity by our Russian and English allies.'

Colonel Lamouche's *Quinze Ans d'Histoire Balkanique* (1904–1918) records his impressions as a member of the International Mission for the reorganisation of the Turkish Gendarmerie in accordance with the Mürzsteg agreement. Balkan specialists always have their favourites, and the author's choice is Bulgaria—a country which, as he points out, unlike Greece, has had few champions in France. Worse than the indifference of Paris was the ill-will of Petrograd, which seemed unable to forgive the young state for throwing off Russian tutelage when it came of age. He has warm praise

for General Degiorgis, the first head of the reformed Gendarmerie, of whose staff he was a member. The Powers worked well together, and some useful work was accomplished. It was impossible, however, to overcome the passive resistance of the Turks, led by Hilmi Pasha himself, whose studied courtesy made pressure difficult to apply. 'I am convinced that, with a population wearied by years of confusion and terror, a fair policy on the part of the Ottoman authorities, aided by the support of the Powers, would have secured the pacification of the country. It seemed, on the contrary, that they preferred to keep up the agitation in exciting the different Christian elements against one another.' With the coming of the Young Turks in 1908 the Gendarmerie Commission was transferred from Salonika to Constantinople, and its members entered the Turkish service. Lamouche blames King Ferdinand and General Savoff for the insane attack on the Serbian troops in June, 1913; but he argues that a large part of the responsibility rests on the Powers whose duty it was, 'after an impartial inquiry,' to delimit the territories ceded by Turkey. 'One cannot be sure that all conflict would have been averted, but it was clear that if the Balkan States were left to themselves a collision was inevitable.' The author was horrified at the indifference of Russia, and observed to the First Secretary of the Russian Embassy at Constantinople that the Bulgarians would have to drape the statue of Alexander II at Sofia. Quitting the Turkish service at the end of 1913, he returned home *via* Sofia, where he expressed his sympathy with the national misfortunes. He was impressed by the *sangfroid* of the people, but noted that all the animosity had been diverted from Turkey to Serbia and Greece. 'No one, of course, palliated the fatal attack of June 29, but everyone felt that the Allies had carefully prepared for the conflict and set the trap into which the unsophisticated Bulgars had fallen. Having lived so long in Macedonia, I could perfectly understand those sentiments, for I myself profoundly regretted that these

territories, which I knew to be so ardently Bulgarian, had passed into Serb and Greek hands.' The author's sympathies survived the world war, and he confesses his inability to understand how France, on the morrow of regaining Alsace-Lorraine, could sign treaties which reproduced similar injustices.

The fifth volume of Poincaré's Memoirs, entitled *L'Invasion 1914*, carries us through the opening months of the war ; but despite the tragic intensity of its theme, it is the least interesting of the series. The thin voice of diplomacy is drowned by the roar of guns, and the author's habit of copying pages from his diary without weighing their historical significance grows upon him. Yet there is gold as well as dross in the five hundred pages, and some of his pen-pictures linger in our memory. The diplomatic situation, he felt, had never been so good, but it was not always easy to entertain the unquestioned confidence in victory which the President of the Republic was expected to display. The first task appeared to be to strengthen one of the weakest Ministries that France had ever known. 'But if I open the door,' objected the distracted Viviani, 'far too many candidates will try to enter, and I shall be smothered,'—a complaint which prompts the author to the caustic observation that the number of men who judged themselves indispensable to the country at this moment was beyond computation. Among the would-be pilots whose portraits are vividly drawn in these pages the figure of his old and formidable enemy Clemenceau stands out in sharpest relief. In the earliest days of the conflict the Tiger paid some friendly visits to the Elysée, accompanied by Sabini, the Italian Commercial Attaché. Detesting and despising Austria to a degree unusual in France, he was willing to consider Italian demands which to the President and Ministers appeared premature and extravagant. The friendly mood soon passed, and the volcano began again to belch forth smoke and flame. The defeats in Lorraine, he cried, were due to Castelnau, a 'Jesuit' General. The

Tiger could never master his tongue, and on August 27 he lost all control of himself during a visit to the Elysée. As the frenzied old man, trembling with passion, poured forth a torrent of incoherent invective, the President watched him with stupefaction, and contented himself at parting with the words, 'Vous êtes fou, ce qui s'appelle fou.' The revelation of this painful episode is the author's deadly revenge for a thousand bitter attacks by tongue and pen, and is a sufficient explanation of the fact that the Tiger was not called to power till 1917.

Among other clamorous aspirants to high office was Delcassé, who was not disposed to hide his light under a bushel, and who cried with shrill insistence: 'Mon nom a une signification que personne ne peut contester; c'est ma politique qui triomphe aujourd'hui. Tout le monde m'attende au Quai d'Orsay.' His ambition was gratified in the reconstructed Viviani Cabinet at the expense of Doumergue, who modestly effaced himself, and who divides with Léon Bourgeois the grateful eulogies which the author bestows on 'the rare class of men who serve cheerfully in the post assigned to them.' The President, indeed, had much to complain of, and no incident was more painful than the flight of the Government to Bordeaux, which provoked the cruel charge of cowardice,—a taunt all the harder to bear since he had fought the decision in vain. The Chief Magistrate was held responsible—and not by Clemenceau alone—for everything that went amiss, whereas in reality he remained the Prisoner of the Elysée. Throughout these agonising months of anxiety and misunderstanding he was supported by the deep-welling patriotism which gives a certain unity and dignity to an inartistic book. 'If doubts assailed me,' he writes on the last day of 1914, 'I just asked France to sustain and comfort me. Day and night I felt her presence. The greater her sufferings, the more she appears to me a living being with features that I know. I see her, erect before me, still marked by the wounds of 1870, but calm, proud, resolute; and I hear her say, in a tone admitting of no

reply: "Since I have placed you in this post and you have accepted it, you must set the example. Hold fast till the end." ' Nerved equally by the love of France and hatred of the invader—among the illustrations is a picture of his ruined villa at Sampigny—Poincaré responded bravely to the call.

The *Souvenirs de Belgique*, by Klobuchowski, the French Minister, though utterly undistinguished, are of some little interest for the last years of peace. Arriving in Brussels in 1911, he found Belgium alarmed by the attempt of Germany to secure a reversionary interest in her vast colony—an attempt which the Franco-German settlement of November 4 appeared to Belgian eyes rather to encourage than to repress. The Government, indeed, was of opinion that the *status quo* had been profoundly modified, since the question of the Congo might one day be reopened. Soothing syrup was ladled out from Paris, but confidence was not wholly restored. Belgium, indeed, felt painfully conscious of her isolation and of the precarious nature of her guarantees both in Africa and Europe. The growing economic influence of Germany, the journalistic propaganda, and the concentration of troops on the frontier, increased the *malaise* which King Albert determined to counterwork by raising the effectives from 42,000 to 200,000. The law was carried through, but could not mature before 1918, and meanwhile the activities of Germany were watched with growing apprehensions. 'If the atmospheric tension increases,' reported Klobukowski to his Government in June, 1913, 'there is a very definite feeling that Germany will take the offensive like a storm suddenly unloosed.' The fortresses were utterly unprepared for a serious attack, and a Belgian patriot complained bitterly to the French Minister that neutrality had taught the nation to look to others for its safety instead of to itself.

The central part of the volume consists of extracts from Klobuchowski's diary from July 24 to November, 1914. He himself expected a German attack; but the Belgian Government, he assures us, believed up to the

last moment that Berlin would modify a plan which would bring Great Britain into the arena. He adds the interesting information that on the morrow of the German ultimatum the Dutch Government declared that it would have no objection to the sending of a fleet up the Scheldt by Great Britain as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality—an offer which was withdrawn when Great Britain became a belligerent. The subsequent British attempt to save Antwerp aroused no gratitude. The evacuation, declares the French Minister, was unwisely postponed out of deference to the British Government. 'The counsels of Mr. Churchill were dangerous, his succour tardy.' The hero of the book is King Albert, who in the conversations with the French Minister appears as wise as he was brave. When the latter foolishly argued that Germany must be broken up and Prussia reduced to a miniature state like the former Electorate of Brandenburg, the King replied in a low voice, as if speaking to himself, 'Even after defeat the Germans will still be very strong.' After the transfer of the Belgian Government to Havre the extracts from the diplomatist's diary come to an end, and the flow of narrative up to his departure in 1918 dwindles to a trickle. The only incident of diplomatic interest on which light is thrown is the account derived from the Premier, de Broqueville, of the German approach through von Lancken in 1917, in which the author saw nothing but a clumsy snare.

The authorship of a series of three well-informed articles in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* was revealed when they appeared in book form as *Les Trois Ambassades à la veille de la Guerre*, by François Charles-Roux, the well-known historian. An interesting Preface by Jacques Seydoux, himself an ornament of the Quai d'Orsay, contains warm eulogies of the Cambon brothers and Camille Barrère. Never in French history, he exclaims, was there such an ambassadorial triumvirate. He recalls a conversation with Mühlberg, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, during his service at the French

Embassy at Berlin. 'He pointed out the dangers of our accord with England. On the table was a large volume called *Alsace-Lorraine*, with a picture of Strasbourg Cathedral on the cover. As Mühlberg marshalled all the advantages of a defensive Entente against British ambitions, I could not help placing my hand on the engraving. He saw—and was silent.' When Seydoux returned to Paris at the end of 1905 he reported that it was impossible to work with Germany. The first of the three articles, entitled *Veillée d'armes à Londres, June 22–August 4, 1914*, is based on the author's personal experiences as Second Secretary of the Embassy in London. Apart from the picture of Paul Cambon, whose courage, dignity and skill left an abiding impression on his mind, the main interest lies in the grateful record of the British visitors who brought tidings and encouragement to the beating hearts in Albert Gate. 'The first Englishman to put his hand in ours' was George Lloyd, now Lord Lloyd, who described his efforts to mobilise the leaders of the Unionist party. He was followed by Mr. Amery and Mr. Maxse, Lord Charles Beresford and Mr. Wickham Steed.

Of greater historical importance is the second article, *L'Italie et l'Agonie de la Paix en 1914*, a paean to Barrère, to whom the volume is dedicated, and whose despatches and information have been at the author's disposal. The Ambassador, we are told, conceived his aim of weaning Italy from her partners and drawing her into the orbit of the Western Powers while still at Bern, as Paul Cambon had resolved to win the friendship of England before he left Constantinople. Barrère employed 'all the resources of diplomatic therapeutics' in healing the sores; but money, we are told, played a very minor part, for the secret service fund would not have kept a single-sheet journal for a month. He cultivated leading men in all parties and all circles, and was warmly attached to Victor Emmanuel. His task of conversion was facilitated by the King's hearty dislike of the visits and the ways of the Kaiser. Months before

the war San Giuliano had told him that if France were attacked Italy would be neutral, as indeed she was pledged by the secret agreement of 1902; but when the storm broke he was filled with anxiety, since San Giuliano had the reputation of a keen supporter of the Triple Alliance. He was, moreover, in a lonely position, for the Russian Minister was a nonentity and Sir Rennell Rodd was unable to commit his Government. His prestige, nevertheless, surpassed that of all other members of the diplomatic world, and it was music to his ears when a Minister, on leaving the Council which decided to remain neutral, declared, 'The Triplice is the first casualty in this War.' The third article, *Fin d'Ambassade à Berlin, 1912–1914*, which contains a warm eulogy of Jules Cambon, is of less importance. This interesting little book gives some idea of the feast which the correspondence between the gifted brothers, if it is ever published, would provide for the historian.

We owe a valuable addition to our knowledge of the establishment of unified command in March, 1918, to General Mordacq's article, *Le Commandement unique: Récit d'un Témoin*, published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of April, 1929. During the terrible days which followed the German offensive the author was the inseparable companion of Clemenceau, and it is to him that the chief merit of the change is assigned. At a Conference at Compiègne on March 25 the Premier informed Milner that unity of command was a matter of life and death to the Allies. Milner asked for a further conference on the morrow, at which Haig and Wilson could be present, and Clemenceau confided to the author on the journey back to Paris that he had good hopes. On March 26 Mordacq accompanied his chief, who was in excellent spirits, to Doullens. Foch, 'superbe de conviction et de confiance,' remarked to Clemenceau: 'My plan is simple enough,—it is to fight. I shall finish by beating the Boche. He is neither cleverer nor stronger than we.' The Premier's face lit up with joy,—he had found a man of action.

Milner, Haig and Wilson arrived an hour later, and Milner secured Haig's consent to the promotion of Foch before the conference began. At Clemenceau's wish Milner proposed that Foch should 'co-ordinate the action' of the armies, and the plan was accepted. Haig, whose features had been drawn and tired, was transformed, and every face was radiant. The dream of the French had at last been realised, the British opposition overcome. 'There was an immense faith in victory in us all.'

Doullens was the beginning, not the end. Mordacq proceeds to describe subsequent meetings at Clermont, where Pershing came to place himself and his troops at the disposition of Foch, and at Beauvais whither he transferred his headquarters. The Generalissimo was so gloriously confident that Clemenceau hugged him in a long embrace. Mr. Churchill, who had come to discuss munitions, asked Mordacq whether he shared Foch's confidence. 'Absolutely,' was the reply, 'but on condition that his powers are extended.' On their way back to Paris the Premier remarked: 'I hope you are satisfied—things are not going badly.' 'Not at all satisfied,' rejoined Mordacq. 'We saw to-day that Haig was embarrassed when Foch insisted on the employment of the third and fourth British army. It is clear that the English do not consider co-ordination the same as supreme command. It must come.' Clemenceau thought that the goodwill of Foch, Haig and Pétain would allow the continuance of the *status quo*, but doubted whether the British were ready for further sacrifice. Mordacq replied that a Commander-in-Chief was indispensable, though he might bear another name. 'Find a formula,' replied the Premier; and Mordacq hit on the phrase 'strategic direction' which was accepted by the British at a Conference at Beauvais on April 3. The dominant impression left by this vivid narrative is the personality of Clemenceau, with a will of steel and the spirits of adventurous youth, delighting in the 'agreeable surprise' of falling shells.

The figure of the French Generalissimo emerges with increasing definition. *En écoutant le Maréchal Foch*, of which the English translation is entitled *Foch Talks*, presents a vivid picture of an energetic and attractive personality, but contains nothing of political interest except his petulant denunciations of the Treaty of Versailles. 'On November 11, 1918, I handed to them an instrument with which they could have done what they liked. They did not know how to make use of it. They have destroyed what I gave them. They missed their opportunity.' Equally flamboyant in its hero-worship but of far greater significance is the volume *Marshal Foch: His Own Words on Many Subjects*, in which Raymond Recouly records his conversations between 1919 and 1928. The core of the book is the fierce indictment of the Treaty of Versailles and of Clemenceau who signed it. These chapters were submitted to and approved by the Marshal, who made a few additions. According to Foch, his appointment to the Supreme Command was mainly due to Haig, whereas Clemenceau could only remark 'You have got what you wanted.' Acute disagreement between the two men arose when the Premier, exasperated by the tardiness of American help in the field, desired to urge President Wilson to order Pershing to bestir himself or to remove him from his post. In answer to the criticism that he should have continued the war to the bitter end, Foch replied that the Armistice enabled the victors to impose any terms they liked, since Germany was rendered powerless. The fault lay with the Politicians, who sacrificed the security of France by allowing Germany to retain the larger part of her territory on the left bank of the Rhine; and when Foch protested that the Rhine must be the new frontier, he was snubbed by Clemenceau and told to mind his own business. Poincaré and Jules Cambon, we are told, shared his opinion, but were equally powerless to prevent the 'hateful' settlement. It is no wonder that the old Tiger, who is denounced in these pages as a domineering Jacobin,

should emerge from his lair and prepare to hurl back the Marshal's rebukes.

A curious story, which may be regarded as an appendix to his masterpiece on the Peace Conference, is told in Tardieu's documented volume *Le Slesvig et la Paix, Janvier 1919–Janvier 1920*, written in collaboration with the Danish historian and publicist F. de Jessen. Compiled primarily for Danes and first published in Danish, it was a wise decision to make it available to wider circles ; for in addition to describing the solution of a minor territorial problem, it illustrated the mentality of the victorious allies. The defeat of Germany provided an opportunity for the plebiscite in North Slesvig promised after the campaign of 1864 and cancelled in 1878 ; and early in October, 1918, Professor Friis, the eminent historian, and some other prominent Danes, at the suggestion of the Government, drafted a declaration to the effect that Denmark desired North Slesvig and nothing else. The armistice was not yet in sight, and the British Government warned Denmark of ' the grave danger of placing herself on the side of Germany at this moment.' A few days later the Danish Minister in London was informed that the Allies would deeply regret any arrangement negotiated between Denmark and Germany behind their back. Despite these warnings, the Zahle Cabinet despatched Professor Friis to Berlin, directly the Armistice was signed, for unofficial discussions ; and an agreement was reached without difficulty for a plebiscite in the northern zone. Among the innumerable tasks of the Peace Conference was that of deciding whether the November agreement should stand. Denmark was invited to state her wishes before the Council of Ten. As Chairman of the Commission on Danish claims and on the execution of the Treaty of Versailles Tardieu can justly claim that no one was better placed to know the history of the negotiations. The Danish Government informed the Allies of its wish for a plebiscite in the north and also in part of the centre of the province if the inhabitants of the latter zone

desired to vote. The Commission was astonished at such moderation, and other demands were presented by representatives of Slesvig organisations. The Chairman was filled with resentment as he contemplated the 'sabotage of Slesvig's claims by the Germanophil Cabinet,' and he supplies his readers with what appears to him to be the explanation. 'Before and during the war Germany had fascinated half the world. The Zahle Government furnishes the most complete instance of this fascination. The fear of Germany decided them to be content with a solution which Germany had accepted in advance.' As we listen to Tardieu, *plus royaliste que le roi*, denouncing the 'policy of national abdication,' we are back in the fevered atmosphere of 1919, when to short-sighted statesmen it seemed axiomatic to seize every opportunity—however little it might be desired by the party principally concerned—of diminishing the territory and population of the German foe.

Readers of Baron Beyens' well-known work, *L'Allemagne avant la Guerre*, will welcome his articles in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, which supplement the earlier account of his residence at Berlin as Belgian Minister from 1912 to 1914.[1] His predecessor, Baron Greindl, who had represented his country at the Russian capital for twenty-four years, was Germanophil. Beyens declares that he arrived with an open mind, and he was certainly no Germanophobe. A long term at Bucharest had won him the friendship of Kiderlen, and Zimmermann was invariably courteous. His hero among the diplomatic corps is Jules Cambon, with whom his relations were of the closest. The political atmosphere was described to the newcomer in different tones. Goschen made no secret of his pessimism, while his Dutch colleague, on the other hand, regarded the situation without a tremor of anxiety. He reached Berlin during a momentary lull, for the Morocco crisis was over and the Balkan war

[1] February 15, March 1, May 15, June 1, 1928; April 1, May 1, July 1 July 15, 1929.

was still to come. Zimmermann remained unruffled when France and Russia concluded a Naval Convention, remarking that the new Russian fleet existed only on paper; nor did the situation in Turkey cause him the alarm which it inspired in the French Ambassador. When Montenegro gave the signal for hostilities, Beyens found the Turkish Ambassador beaming with satisfaction. His expectation of victory was shared by Kiderlen, who was 'stupefied' by the triumph of 'an army of peasants' at Kirk Kilisse. The Foreign Minister, however, believed that the Turks would recover, and, 'being a very bad Christian,' as he remarked with a smile, he ardently hoped they would win. The first diplomatic effect of the war was to bring Berlin and Paris into closer relations, since both countries desired to localise the conflict. 'There is no doubt,' reported Beyens to his Government on November 30, 1912, 'that the Emperor, the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister are passionately pacific.' Kiderlen's sudden death at the end of the year seemed to his friend a veritable disaster. 'I have heard him criticise the adventurous policy of Aehrenthal so sharply that I incline to think he would not have allowed Germany to be taken in tow by her ally.' His regret was shared by Kiderlen's old adversary, Jules Cambon. His successor, 'le petit Jagow,' as Kiderlen called him, finds no favour in the eyes of the Belgian Minister: 'I felt a wall of ice between us'; and Beyens had no serious political talk with him till July, 1914. Jagow struck him as not very favourable to Belgium, but in any case the new Foreign Minister made no attempt to lead.

It is the deliberate judgment of Beyens that the German Military Law of 1913 marks 'the beginning of the drama.' While the first Balkan war witnessed a *détente* between Paris and Berlin, the new military effort created a fresh tension which never slackened. Poincaré was assumed to be almost as powerful as the President of the United States, and the appointment of Delcassé to Petrograd increased the suspicions of

Germany. Jules Cambon began to expect the worst, though he made no forecast as to when the storm would break; and Beyens came to share his apprehensions. He noted the revival of hostility to France, and the angry surprise aroused by the French response of the Three Years law. When the Scutari crisis arose, Germany, while not egging on her ally, was willing to support her; and the atmosphere of Berlin was charged with electricity. The Lunéville and Nancy incidents, though trifles in themselves, aroused neurotic excitement, and the German press became menacing and contemptuous. When the Kaiser celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of his accession Beyens reported that, though he had no wish for war, he could not be regarded as a firm pillar of peace.

The Carnegie series on the social and economic history of the war rarely strays into the strictly political sphere; but Pirenne's *La Belgique et la Guerre Mondiale* is necessarily more political than most of its fellows. While the distinguished historian, himself a victim of the German occupation, reveals no diplomatic secrets, he illustrates the character of the occupation, sketches the reaction of national feeling, and traces the stages through which the policy of the invaders passed. He dismisses the *francs-tireurs* as a baseless legend. At first the German Government had merely a temporary occupation in view; but plans of annexation soon cropped up, and finally schemes of administrative partition arose. The volume is an indictment not only of the enemy but of the Belgian citizens who became his tools. Cardinal Mercier described the Activists as 'a handful of traitors without a mandate'; and the Professor, though slightly less exuberant in his language, has nothing but scorn for the men who played the enemy's game when they thought they were playing their own. Bissing was not an Alva, and he vainly struggled against ruthless exploitation of the country; but his successor Falkenhausen was a mere agent of the General Staff. We hear much of the Council of

Flanders and the transformation of the author's own University of Ghent into a Flemish centre. The Activists, he declares, were used and despised by the invaders. The moral of the story, told with the author's usual verve, is that, despite differences of race and tongue, Belgium is one and indivisible.

VII

Once again by far the most important contribution from the British side is contained in the further instalments of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, edited by Gooch and Temperley with the assistance of Miss L. M. Penson. The third volume, entitled *The Testing of the Entente, 1904–6*, is devoted to the first Morocco crisis, which began with the Kaiser's visit to Tangier and ended with the signature of the Act of Algeciras. The sharp quarrel between Paris and Berlin was already known to us in its main outlines from the *Grosse Politik*, but the part played by the British Government is here displayed for the first time. We learn that in April, 1905, Lansdowne, fearing that the German Government might ask for a port on the Moorish coast, authorised Bertie to inform Delcassé that we should be prepared to join the French Government in offering 'strong opposition' to such a proposal. The anticipated demand was never made, but the situation continued to arouse anxiety. On May 17, accordingly, Lansdowne observed to Paul Cambon that the moral of recent incidents seemed to be 'that our two Governments should continue to treat one another with the most absolute confidence, should keep one another fully informed of everything which came to their knowledge, and should, so far as possible, discuss in advance any contingencies by which they might in the course of events find themselves confronted.' The substance of this important conversation was repeated by the Foreign Secretary in a letter to the French Ambassador dated May 25. There is no

trace of an offer in the British archives by the British Government of an alliance or of armed support, and the origin of this fantastic but widely accepted legend remains a mystery. Curiously enough there is no record in the Foreign Office of the warning which Lansdowne conveyed to Metternich in an interview on June 28, in which, after a categorical denial that an offer of alliance had been made to France, he added, according to the German Ambassador, that if Germany light-heartedly provoked a war with France it was impossible to say how far public opinion would compel the Government to support France.

Of no less interest is the chapter on the military conversations with France and Belgium which were authorised by the new Liberal Government at the opening of 1906. A good deal of information about the former had been revealed in the biography of Campbell-Bannerman, the Memoirs of Lord Grey and Lord Haldane, and the diary of Colonel Repington ; but the correspondence of Colonel Barnardiston with General Grierson describing the Anglo-Belgian conversations is wholly new, and gives the British side of the story which startled the world when the Germans published General Ducarne's report in the autumn of 1914. The inquiries to be addressed by our Military Attaché at Brussels to the Belgian military authorities were to concern 'the manner in which, in case of need, British assistance could be most effectually afforded to Belgium in the defence of her neutrality'; and neither side has any reason to be ashamed of such purely precautionary discussions. A third item of exceptional interest is Sir Eyre Crowe's massive Memorandum on 'The Present State of British Relations with France and Germany,' dated January 1, 1907, which surveys and severely criticises the recent policy of Germany. A somewhat more indulgent view of the activities of the Wilhelmstrasse is presented in the observations of the veteran Lord Sanderson which were inspired by the study of this indictment.

The fourth volume, entitled *The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement, 1903–7*, describes the dramatic transformation of a dangerous rivalry into the beginnings of a diplomatic partnership. We learn that in the autumn of 1903 the Russian Ambassador in London was instructed to discuss the points of friction between the two Powers in Asia, namely China, where Russia had a special interest, and Persia, in which both were interested. Since Benckendorff had no instructions to offer a detailed scheme, Lansdowne proceeded to outline a possible arrangement. Russia would be expected to recognise Afghanistan as entirely within the British sphere of influence, and to undertake not to send agents into Tibet. Great Britain would recognise the preponderance of Russia in North Persia, while the province of Seistan must be recognised as entirely under British influence. These conversations were interrupted for nearly two years by the Russo-Japanese war, but were reopened in the autumn of 1905, when the Treaty of Portsmouth and the repudiation of the Björko Pact by the Russian Government removed the last obstacle to a *rapprochement*. Thus when the Liberals took office at the close of the year, they had merely to build on the foundations laid by their predecessors. Detailed negotiations began in the spring of 1906, when Izvolsky succeeded Lamsdorff, and Sir Arthur Nicolson, whom King Edward regarded as the best diplomatic horse in the British stable, was transferred to Petrograd with the draft of a Tibetan agreement in his pocket. Curzon's celebrated despatch, dated September 21, 1899, which opens the chapter on Persia, breathes the same spirit of suspicion as Crowe's Memorandum, though with a different objective; but in 1906 Great Britain and Russia were equally anxious to let bygones be bygones. No more striking evidence of a *détente* could be found than the conditional withdrawal of our veto on the passage of Russian warships through the Straits. The change of front was indicated in a memorandum by Sir Charles Hardinge, the successor of Sanderson as

Permanent Under-Secretary, dated November 16, 1906, and announced by Sir Edward Grey on March 19, 1907, in reply to the challenge of Benckendorff. This concession, however, which made Izvolsky 'beam with pleasure,' found no place in the Anglo-Russian Convention, which only dealt with the Middle East, just as Izvolsky declined to include a recognition of the special interests of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. Compared with the difficulty of reaching an agreement with Russia, the renewal and extension of our alliance with Japan in 1905, described for the first time in these pages, was plain sailing.

The fifth volume, entitled *The Near East, 1903–9*, after a series of chapters on Turkish misrule and the consequential intervention of the Powers in Macedonia, continues the story of the Anglo-Russian *rapprochement*. Sir Charles Hardinge's elaborate report on King Edward's historic visit to Reval in June, 1908, is of particular interest in view of the rumours and reverberations to which the public reconciliation of Great Britain and Russia gave birth throughout Central Europe and the Near East. We pass rapidly to the Young Turk revolution and to the annexation of Bosnia for which it provided a welcome excuse. The larger part of the volume is devoted to the crisis which dragged through the six winter months. Perhaps the most interesting incidents in this prolonged drama are Izvolsky's visit to London in October, 1908, a few days after Aehrenthal's short-fuse bomb had exploded in Paris, and the spectacular intervention of Germany in March, 1909. In the former case Sir Edward Grey informed Izvolsky in an official Memorandum that the British Government regarded the opening of the Straits as fair and reasonable, but that the proposal to give Russia and the riverain Powers exclusive rights was impracticable, and that no pressure must be put on Turkey to consent to any arrangement which she disapproved. Such a guarded acceptance was worthless for a Minister eager to present his countrymen with some tangible advantage which

might balance the aggrandisement of Austria. Henceforward Izvolsky fought a losing battle against his hated adversary, and the *coup de grâce* was administered from Berlin on March 22, 1909. The German Ambassador, Pourtalès, always denied that the message of which he was the bearer was a threat; but the words and bearing of Izvolsky as reported and depicted by Sir Arthur Nicolson confirm the prevailing impression. The German communication was described by the Minister as a 'diplomatic ultimatum,' and the British Ambassador found him 'in great alarm' and 'rudely shaken.' Aehrenthal, explained Izvolsky, was browbeating Russia through Germany, and he had succeeded. Nicolson's indignation at this 'surrender' was divided between its authors and its victim, who had capitulated without consulting his friends and allies. 'Our entente, I much fear,' he wrote excitedly to his chief, 'will languish and possibly die.' When Metternich inquired whether the British Government would yield the same unconditional assent to the annexation, Sir Edward stoutly replied that he could give no such assurance until the Serbian question had been settled in a pacific and satisfactory manner. Though Metternich rejoined that this was 'a very grave decision which imperilled peace,' the Foreign Secretary refused to be hustled, and carried through the agreed formula of Serbia's submission for which he had been working before the German *démarche* brought the crisis to a head.

Lord Newton's *Life of Lord Lansdowne* compresses into a single volume a record which might have tempted other pens to an infinity of detail. For the purposes of the present survey the kernel of the book is to be found in the chapters which describe his tenure of the Foreign Office from 1900 to 1905, during which he —more than King Edward VII or anyone else—gave a new orientation to British policy. The full story of the momentous change from the perils of Isolation to the dangers of Continentalism has been told in the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, edited by

Gooch and Temperley, from which Lord Newton freely quotes, supplementing them from private memoranda and correspondence. Thus we find notes of conversations with the Kaiser on Russia at the time of the death of Queen Victoria; fresh light on Prince Ito's mission while the Anglo-Japanese alliance was in the making; a contemporary hint as to the menacing character of the Bjōrko pact; an expression of regret that the Foreign Minister had been forced to yield to an 'insensate outcry' when co-operation in the Bagdad railway was discussed in 1903. A letter from Mr. Balfour, written in 1915, dismisses as 'a foolish piece of gossip' the attribution of the policy of the *Entente* to Edward VII, and adds: 'During the years in which you and I were his Ministers, he never made an important suggestion of any sort on large questions of policy.' The fall of Delcassé is described by Lansdowne as 'disgusting' and as sending 'the entente down any number of points in the market'; but Bertie, our Ambassador at Paris, explained that he would have fallen without German menaces, though not perhaps so soon. 'His elimination from the Cabinet was in great part due to his treatment of his colleagues. He did not keep them fully informed of what he did and proposed to do. He had got to consider himself indispensable.' King Edward's admiration of Delcassé was known to all the world; but it was indeed, as Lord Newton observes, a very unusual step when from his yacht in the Mediterranean he telegraphed to Paris, through the Governor-General of Algiers, pressing the Minister not to resign. It is scarcely necessary to add that the biographer has found no trace in Lansdowne's private papers of the rumoured promise of armed assistance and the offer of an alliance in 1905; and a letter of Lord Sanderson, written in 1922, confirms this negative result.

A curious letter from Mr. Balfour, dated November 6, 1908, records that Asquith had privately informed him that the European situation was the gravest of which we had any experience since 1870. 'He said that,

incredible as it might seem, the Government could form no theory of the German policy which fitted all the known facts except that they wanted war. . . . I said that, quite apart from the entente, we should, as I understood it, be involved under treaty obligations if Germany violated Belgian territory. Asquith assented, and said that (as we all know) the Franco-German frontier is now so strong that the temptation to invade Belgium might prove irresistible. He gave me no information and, I believe, had no information which is not in the newspapers, but I was very much struck by the pessimistic tone in which he spoke of the position. I told him he might count upon the Opposition in case of national difficulty.' Lansdowne approved the assurance given by the Leader of the Opposition, and added: 'It is almost inconceivable that the Germans should provoke a European war, but the Emperor is becoming more irresponsible with every year that passes.'

On the outbreak of war Lansdowne was taken into the counsels of the Cabinet. A note of a conversation with Haldane on August 4 reveals him expressing the strong opinion that it would have been desirable, if possible, to send out the Expeditionary Force, or a portion of it, to the seat of war at the very outset. Haldane replied that the Cabinet had considered the matter and still had in mind the possibility of despatching it, but that they thought it would have been unwise to take this step at the very outset, for reasons which he proceeded to explain. As this opinion conflicts with his published statement that he urged the immediate despatch of all the six divisions, Lord Newton suggests that he was perhaps only expressing the views of the majority of the Cabinet. The full account of the genesis, publication and reception of the so-called Peace Letter of 1917 forms one of the most interesting chapters of the book. We knew that the document refused by *The Times* and published by the *Daily Telegraph* on November 27 was practically identical with a confidential memorandum written for the first Coalition Cabinet

in the autumn of 1916. We now learn that its author only decided to publish it after Mr. Balfour, in a friendly letter reproduced in these pages, had deprecated a peace debate in Parliament. Though violently denounced by a section of the press, the Lansdowne letter was approved by many eminent men, among them Lords Loreburn, Haldane, Sanderson, Esher, and the Archbishop of Canterbury. His follower and friend, who agrees with them, regrets that it was published too late, and believes that the end of 1916 and the spring of 1917 offered more favourable prospects for the discussion of a negotiated peace. 'On the whole, it seems not inconceivable that a future generation may take the view that Lord Lansdowne was right after all.'

Next in importance among biographies for the purposes of this survey comes the *Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice*, delightfully edited by Stephen Gwynn. Though not one of the greatest of our Ambassadors, he was the prince of our latter-day letter-writers, and many readers of these fascinating volumes will rank him above Walter Page. No diplomat of his generation was more convinced that a war of the Titans was at hand, and no one laboured with more passionate devotion to prepare his countrymen for the dread ordeal. The most important chapters of the first volume are those which describe his residence at Berlin from 1895 to 1898 and at Petrograd from 1903 to 1905. Arriving in the German capital on the eve of the Kruger telegram, he discovered with alarm the depth of popular hostility to his country; but he believed that good might come out of evil. 'This Government thought we had no kick left in us and that they might insult us as much as they liked. They have done it with a vengeance for the last year or so. Now they have found out their mistake.' The moral of the incident appeared to Spring Rice to be the desirability of a *rapprochement*. 'I hope that we shall recognise our real friends and shake hands again with Germany. . . . If the Teutons quarrel now, the world will be Slav, as Bismarck said long ago.' Further

experience of Berlin dispelled the hope of a reconciliation. 'We stand in their way everywhere,' he wrote in December, 1897; . . . 'if England is not prepared to pay blackmail, she must be prepared to defend herself.' Like his friend Chirol, the *Times* correspondent in Berlin, he carried away with him a haunting sense of menace which coloured his thoughts till the day of his death.

Of greater direct importance to the historian are the chapters on the Russo-Japanese war, when for the first time in his career his advice was sought in questions of high policy. For he was the bosom friend of Roosevelt, and his correspondence with the President and John Hay would alone render the book indispensable to students. Durand, our well-meaning but ineffective Ambassador in Washington, was never *en rapport* with the White House, and for a time the wire from Washington to Whitehall passed through Petrograd. No more scathing indictment of the Tsarist regime is to be found than in the vivid letters of Spring Rice. 'This country has no real government,' he wrote in August, 1904; 'each Minister acts on his own, doing as much damage as possible to the other Ministers.' He quickly learned to despise the Power whose hostility had once filled him with apprehension. The Tsar—'a religious madman almost'—could neither fight nor negotiate, and the virile intervention of Roosevelt was needed to end the hopeless struggle. 'It is a fact beyond any question,' he wrote to Mrs. Roosevelt soon after the Treaty of Portsmouth, 'that the President single-handed effected the Peace, against the wishes of the Japanese people and the Russian Government. Had Meyer not had his interview, the Emperor would never have consented to part with half Saghalin.'

The second volume opens with the tragic winter of 1905–6, during which Spring Rice was in charge of the Embassy at Petrograd, and humiliating defeat in the Far East was followed by an abortive revolution at home. Our Entente with France, of which he warmly approved,

led naturally to a *rapprochment* with Russia; but, however logical the process, he was sceptical as to the value and permanence of the new relationship, and his experiences at Teheran during 1906 and 1907 increased his detestation for the remorseless foe of a country struggling to its feet. His promotion to Stockholm in 1908 brought him back into the path of the gathering storm; and for four years he lived among a people who feared Petrograd as much as he feared Berlin, and sought shelter behind the German shield. As he surveyed the world during the Bosnian crisis he was appalled. 'Well, what do you think of Europe now?' he wrote to Roosevelt. 'If ever there was an object-lesson to the text, the strong man armed shall keep his goods till a stronger than he cometh, it is now. . . . Now we have a state of things which is a return to the primeval—the reign of force.' The Swedes were convinced that the struggle was near and that England would go down in the fight. The introduction of compulsory service appeared to Spring Rice the need of the hour, for he was haunted by apprehensions of a sudden attack on an unready nation. 'I think moderate people should remember what the danger is and be prepared to meet it,' he wrote to Gerald Balfour at the end of 1909. 'They know the typhoon season is coming on, and they should make up their minds what they will do and how they will do it. . . . If we fail, the fall is final. We are not like Russia or China; we are a Parthenon, not a pyramid.'

His appointment to Washington in 1913 opened by far the most important chapter in his life, and the record of the next four years fills the larger part of a closely packed volume. He had longed for the post, and no British statesman except Bryce could count more distinguished or devoted friends beyond the seas; but the care-free happiness which his sensitive soul had failed to find in the old world eluded him in the new. The return of the Democrats to power rendered it inadvisable to see much of Roosevelt, and brought to the White House a President whom the British Ambassador could

never understand. Mr. Gwynn, who carries on a running fight with Colonel House and the editor of his papers, believes that it was the fault of the unapproachable Wilson, who, while maintaining relations of 'icy courtesy,' kept him at arm's length and transacted serious business over his head. Yet even in these pages there is evidence of a quick temper and overstrained nerves; and the sudden termination of his career in the last winter of the war revealed the conviction of the British Cabinet that men of less quivering sensibilities were needed for the effective co-ordination of Anglo-American efforts. Whatever may be thought of his personal efficiency and his ambassadorial technique, Spring Rice's fidelity as a reporter of American opinion is beyond dispute. 'I am sure you will remember that the rights we are defending are our existence,' he wrote to the President in the first autumn in the war; but this argument awoke little response in the United States. The Ambassador, though disappointed and annoyed, was scarcely surprised. 'We have no right to count on the good-will of Americans,' he wrote to Lord Newton rather bitterly at the opening of 1916. 'They could count on ours, but we cannot count on theirs. The reason is that we wrongly suppose, because they talk our language, they are an Anglo-Saxon people. As a matter of fact they are a foreign nation, or rather several foreign nations.' This was precisely what Page appeared to forget and what the President was bound to remember. Till 1917 America was anti-English as well as anti-German, and nothing but the folly of Berlin could ever have brought her into the fray. Though Spring Rice had no love for Wilson, he confesses that the momentous decision could hardly have been made at an earlier date. Even when the die was cast, he warned his Government that the President was 'absolutely determined to maintain his full and complete independence.' The mail-bag of the British Ambassador confirms the impression derived from the testimony of Bernstorff and Colonel House, namely that ordinary prudence on the part of Germany

would have kept the United States out of the war and thereby have averted her catastrophic defeat.

Lord Ronaldshay's *Life of Lord Curzon* only touches European diplomacy during our period at intervals; for his term at the Foreign Office belongs to the post-war world. The first volume reveals the confident young Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs endeavouring to 'ginger' his experienced chief,—'that strange, powerful, inscrutable, brilliant, obstructive dead-weight at the top.' He succeeded in securing the lease of Wei-hai-Wei as a rejoinder to Russia's swoop on Port Arthur; but he panted for a wider sphere and found it on his appointment as Viceroy of India in 1898. The second volume, which is entirely devoted to the greatest Viceroyalty since Dalhousie, takes us into the very heart of the Anglo-Russian quarrel, and helps us to understand what a diplomatic revolution was involved in the Convention of 1907. His soul was filled with angry suspicions of the Muscovite, whose insidious approach towards the Indian frontier through Persia and Tibet he was determined to block. 'An agreement with Russia,' he wrote in 1903, 'is one of those sentimental hallucinations that it is impossible to remove from the British mind.' It was his policy to meet encroachments, not by compromise or concessions, but by the unflinching demonstration of British power in the Persian Gulf and on the uplands of Tibet. With such convictions it is not surprising that the disciple of Disraeli found the Anglo-Russian Convention deplorable. 'It gives up all that we have been fighting for for years . . . the efforts of a century sacrificed, and nothing or next to nothing in return.' He was doubtless unaware that the Liberal Government had merely built on the foundations laid by its Conservative predecessor; and he failed to realise that during his seven years in the East the European chessboard had changed almost beyond recognition.

Lord Haldane's posthumous *Autobiography* is above all the revelation of a many-sided personality and a creative mind, and it carries its readers into fields far

removed from the dusty highway of politics ; but it also adds a few scraps of information to the account of Anglo-German relations which formed the main theme of his apologia *Before the War*. A Memorandum describing in detail the formation of the Campbell-Bannerman government is followed by the familiar story of the military conversations of January, 1906, his own army reforms, his two visits to Berlin and the Kaiser's visit to Windsor. Of his closest friend he writes a little more critically than in his earlier work. 'Just in his outlook and intensely desirous of preserving the peace of the world, I think that he was hampered by want of knowledge of the sources of German mentality. . . . Grey was splendidly conscientious and just, but he seemed to doubt whether the Germans were genuinely good people, and they of course knew that he doubted it. . . . I did what I believed I could to help in his attitude towards Germany, but Grey was in spirit a pure Briton and I was a good deal less so, and consequently I could not prevail with him against the tendencies of his Ambassadors and his advisers in London. Moreover the Germans were interpreting his policy most unjustly, and were becoming increasingly difficult.' The Agadir crisis is more fully treated than in the earlier work, and a vivid picture is drawn of the historic meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which revealed a yawning gulf between War Office and Admiralty plans in the event of a conflict. The most piquant novelty in the pages devoted to the outbreak of war is the story of Ballin's visit in July, 1914, when war began to loom in sight. 'We had invited Grey and Morley to meet him, for we knew how desirous he was of helping to preserve peace. . . . After dinner he spoke to Grey and myself separately about the position of Great Britain, and our relations with Germany. We both told him that so far these were quite good, but that their maintenance was dependent on Germany not attacking France. In such a case Germany could not reckon on our neutrality.' After his return Ballin wrote from Hamburg on August 1 a letter which its recipient

declined to publish during the war, partly because it was a private communication and partly because he did not wish Sir Edward Grey to be dragged into the hysterical attack which was beginning to develop against himself. Ballin combated the assertion that the Kaiser and Bethmann, to whose love of peace he paid a warm tribute, were precipitating a preventive war, and closed with the expression of his hope that it would still be possible for England to preserve a friendly neutrality in return for certain guarantees. The letter, which did not appear to Haldane of importance, only arrived on August 3 and received no reply.

Lord Oxford was a master of language and could write very well when he chose ; but none of the three books which together form his apologia is worthy of his fame. The *Memories and Reflections, 1852–1927*, on which he was at work when he died, suggest that his hand was losing its grip ; but the extracts from his diary (in the first chapter of the second volume) during the days of decision in July, 1914, jejune as they are, must always be consulted by students of British diplomacy.

The first reference to coming events is Sir Edward Grey's account of the situation on July 24. 'Austria has sent a bullying and humiliating ultimatum to Servia who cannot possibly comply with it. This means almost inevitably that Russia will come on the scene in defence of Servia, and if so it is difficult for Germany and France to refrain from lending a hand. So that we are within measurable distance of a real Armageddon.'

July 26. 'The news is that Servia has capitulated on the main point, but it is very doubtful if any reservation will be accepted by Austria who is resolved on a complete and final humiliation. The curious thing is that on many, if not most, of the points Austria has a good and Servia a very bad case, but the Austrians are quite the stupidest people in Europe. There is a brutality about their procedure which will make most people think that this is a case of a big Power wantonly

bullying a little one. Anyhow it is the most dangerous situation of the last 40 years.'

On July 29 the Prime Minister noted that Great Britain, though the only Power who had made a constructive suggestion for peace, was blamed by both Russia and Germany for causing the outbreak of war. On the following day he records that the City, which was in a terrible state of depression and paralysis, was for the time being strongly opposed to intervention ; and on July 31, after describing an indecisive discussion in the Cabinet, he comments ' Of course everybody longs to stand aside.' When the news of Russia's general mobilisation arrived the Prime Minister, aided by Sir William Tyrrell and others, set to work to draft a direct appeal from the King to the Tsar, which he took to Buckingham Palace about 1.30 A.M. ; the King was hauled out of bed, while the Prime Minister read the message. On August 1, we learn, Mr. Lloyd George was for peace and for keeping the position still open, Mr. Churchill very bellicose and demanding immediate mobilisation, while the Prime Minister himself was still not quite without hope.

Sunday, August 2, was scarcely less the day of decision than Tuesday, August 4. When Lichnowsky appeared at breakfast time Asquith told him that he had no desire to intervene, and that it rested largely with Germany to make intervention impossible by abstaining from the invasion of Belgium and from sending her fleet to attack the unprotected north coast of France. A brief description follows of the morning Cabinet, which agreed with some difficulty to tell Cambon that our fleet would not allow the German fleet to make the Channel a base for hostile operations. Mr. Burns at once resigned, but was persuaded to stay at any rate till the evening Cabinet. ' There is a strong party against any kind of intervention in any event. Grey, of course, will never consent to this, and I shall not separate myself from him. Crewe, McKenna and Samuel are a moderating intermediate body. . . . Happily I am quite clear

in my mind as to what is right and wrong. (1) We have no obligation of any kind either to France or Russia to give them military or naval help. (2) The dispatch of the Expeditionary Force to help France at this moment is out of the question and would serve no object. (3) We must not forget the ties created by our long-standing and intimate friendship with France. (4) It is against British interests that France should be wiped out as a Great Power. (5) We cannot allow Germany to use the Channel as a hostile base. (6) We have obligations to Belgium to prevent it being utilised and absorbed by Germany.' What was impossible on August 2 seemed inevitable on August 4, when the news that the Germans had entered Belgium 'simplified matters,' and our ultimatum to Berlin was dispatched.

Next to the pages devoted to the outbreak of war the most valuable portion of the book is the chapter entitled 'The Break-up of the First Coalition,' contributed by Lord Crewe and dated December 20, 1916. Lansdowne had drawn up a Memorandum, dated November 13, and we are told that the *causa causans* of the final break-up may possibly be traced to this 'striking paper,' the apprehensions of which were to some extent echoed in Lord Robert Cecil's Memorandum of November 27. Lansdowne regretted the famous 'knock-out interview' of September 4, adding: 'To many of us it seems as if the prospect of a knock-out was, to say the least of it, remote,' and concluding with the suggestion of careful stocktaking, domestic and international. Lord Oxford's nature was singularly placable and the tone of his diaries is level and even dry. But he had his likes and dislikes, and he defends Kitchener as warmly as he censures Sir Henry Wilson.

While Lord Oxford's diary traces the evolution of the majority of the Cabinet, Lord Morley's *Memorandum on Resignation* presents the first account of the attitude of the dissentient minority; for Mr. Burns withholds his testimony, though he assisted his senior colleague in the revision of his narrative. The Introduction by the

Editor, his friend and biographer Mr. Hirst, remarks with truth that the Memorandum bears the mark of much labour and art ; and indeed the veteran statesman in his spacious library at Wimbledon never wearied of reviewing the transactions of the agonising days which ended his official career. His pages, studded as they are with memorable phrases and charged with grave emotion, are not only a record of events but a political testament. His message is the old Manchester doctrine that Great Britain should abstain from Continental adventures and commitments ; for in foreign affairs Morley was a Cobdenite, not a Gladstonian.

The story opens with the memorable Cabinet meeting of July 27, 1914, when the Foreign Secretary ' in his own quiet way, which is none the less impressive for being so simple, informed his colleagues that the time had come to decide between intervention and neutrality if, as seemed likely, a conflict was to break out in a few days. If the choice was for neutrality, he was not the man to carry it out.' Morley followed on the other side, but was unable to gather in which direction opinion was moving. During the discussions of the following days the Cabinet was pressed to examine our obligation to Belgium, but the question was forced into the background by more urgent apprehensions for the fate of France. The neutrality party was shepherded by Harcourt, who was the first to speak of resignation ; but the anti-interventionist argument was presented above all by Morley, the acknowledged leader of the group. Something indeed of the old cleavage of the Boer war, which had slumbered since 1905, began to reappear, with Mr. Lloyd George and Sir John Simon not far behind, the President of the Council and Mr. Burns once more as resolute as in 1899. The latter indeed refused to approve the contingent promise of naval action if the German fleet came through the Channel or the North Sea to attack the French coast, while Morley thought such a warning defensible. Every Minister accepted the Entente ; but when the time for

action approached rival interpretations emerged and struggled for mastery. Morley had welcomed the termination of our feud with France in 1904, but had watched with apprehension the growth of an intimacy which seemed likely to engage us in the quarrels of our new friends. 'An entente was evidently more dangerous for us than an alliance. An alliance has definite covenants. An entente is vague, rests on points of honour, to be construed by accident and convenience. . . . Here we were confronted by engagements that were vast indeed because indefinite and undefinable.' Morley determined not to be sucked into the whirlpool, and on the Sunday evening he told the Premier he must go. At Asquith's request he slept over it, but finally resigned on the morning of August 3. He writes without bitterness of his old colleagues, not only of those who, like 'the splendid condottiere at the Admiralty,' were interventionists from the beginning, but also of the little group which during the earlier stages of the crisis had followed his lead.

The publication of the Morley Memorandum provoked some of the survivors of the Liberal Cabinet of 1914 to utterance. In a comment published in the weekly edition of the *Manchester Guardian* on October 26, 1928, Mr. Lloyd George dismisses his record as 'a complete distortion of what actually occurred.' 'With the exception of Mr. Burns, the members of the Liberal Cabinet who were opposed to the war were all in complete agreement that if Germany invaded Belgium the position would be completely changed. At the various consultations we had together, we all agreed that in such an event we should have to take up the position, which Mr. Gladstone assumed in 1870, that Britain was in honour bound by her treaty obligations to defend the integrity of that little country. Lord Morley never dissented from that view. I was just as opposed as he was to intervention in the Russian quarrel with Germany and Austria, but an act of aggression against a country whose independence we were definitely pledged to defend was

another matter. When it was clear that Germany intended marching her forces through Belgium I felt that we had no alternative but to stand by our treaty obligations. When I put that to Lord Morley he agreed. "But," he said, "if there is war I shall be of no use in the Cabinet. I have not got the war mind, and I shall be in the way. I shall therefore resign in any event, but there is no reason why you should go." Not one of the members of the Liberal Cabinet who were opposed to war changed their minds, and it is unfair to them to suggest, as Lord Morley does in his Memorandum, that we deserted him at the last moment. As a matter of fact it was he who deserted us when we had come to a painful decision.'

Mr. Lloyd George's criticism is echoed by Lord Beauchamp in a letter published in *The Times* on October 29, 1928. He points out that there were two problems before the Cabinet, the Anglo-French Entente and Belgian neutrality, and that it was possible to hold Morley's views on the former without sharing them on the latter. Lord Beauchamp was converted to intervention by the German attack on Belgium; and it is the failure of Morley to pay sufficient attention to that 'insensate act' which in his eyes vitiates his reasoning.

The fullest and most valuable of the comments evoked by the publication of the Morley Memorandum is the article by Sir Herbert Samuel published in the weekly edition of the *Manchester Guardian* on October 26, 1928. While Morley's narrative suggests the division of Ministers into interventionists and abstentionists, Sir Herbert indicates that there was a middle group to which he himself belonged. The Belgian issue, he explains, was scarcely discussed, since no serious difference of opinion existed. On the far more complicated issue of intervention on the side of France if the neutrality of Belgium was respected, he did not find it necessary to make up his mind. 'For my own part I spent no anxious hours in endeavouring to decide how we ought to meet that situation, for I felt sure that it

would not, in fact, arise. The information which was before us was categorical that the German strategic plan did involve the invasion of Belgium, and that there was no likelihood that it would be changed in any circumstances or on any conditions. There was every reason to believe that the Belgians would resist. Lord Oxford mentions that in the debates in the Cabinet Lord Crewe, Mr. McKenna, and myself were "a moderating intermediate body." So far as I was concerned I did not associate myself with those who thought that this country should not take part in the war no matter what the circumstances might be, because I held that our obligations under the Belgian treaty were definite and unavoidable, and I believed that the case contemplated by that treaty would certainly arise. I did not associate myself with those who held that our duty and our interest would require us to enter the war for the assistance of France, because it appeared to me that the case was not clear; and although we might possibly be obliged to decide in that sense it was unnecessary to divide the Cabinet by pressing the point when the other issue, that of Belgium, would settle the matter without destroying its unity.'

In the first instalment of his Memoirs, entitled *Politicians and the War, 1914–1916*, Lord Beaverbrook sets out to describe and to emphasise the civilian aspect of the direction of the war, which, in his opinion, most writers tend to neglect. The hero of an essentially good-natured book is the author's fellow-Canadian Bonar Law, to whose ability, foresight and unselfishness he pays affectionate and reiterated homage. It is indeed from this cherished friendship that the volume derives its main value. When hostilities appeared to be inevitable Mr. Churchill, seeing the Cabinet to be divided, worked with his friend, Mr. F. E. Smith, for a coalition. The scheme was rejected by Bonar Law, who regarded it as the last step, not the first, thus revealing at the outset his superior wisdom. To the question whether the Unionists would fill up vacancies when the Pacifists

resigned, he objected to Mr. Churchill as the medium, and indeed to any direct negotiation, remarking that if Mr. Asquith wanted help he could ask. Mr. Balfour's attitude to Lord Beaverbrook's hero was 'not helpful,' a 'slightly cold but absolute correctitude' forbidding any thought of genuine confidence or intimacy. The portrait of Mr. Lloyd George is drawn in detail with a recognition of his qualities not always found among his political opponents. 'He lives for fame. Fame is the passion of his soul and the light of his life; it has supported him in his terrible labours and nerved him against cruel attacks.' No one can judge Mr. Lloyd George fairly unless he realises, like the author, the extraordinary complexity of his character and temperament. The most valuable portion of Lord Beaverbrook's reminiscences is that which describes the fall of the Liberal Government in 1915. The cause, we are told, was not, as the public believed, the revelation of the shortage of shells, but Bonar Law's refusal to tolerate the continuance of Mr. Churchill at the Admiralty after the resignation of Fisher. By an ironical fate the first and strongest champion of Coalition thus became its earliest victim. The first Coalition Government, however, was by no means to the author's taste; for Asquith kept the best places for Liberals, and Bonar Law had to content himself with the Colonies. The Prime Minister, indeed, 'hopelessly underrated Bonar Law's talent and character,' while equally overestimating Curzon. Even though not taken very seriously by his chief, Bonar Law was able by cogent arguments to secure the evacuation of Gallipoli. The first volume ends with the death of Kitchener, who, we are told, had gradually disenchanted all his colleagues.

A few crumbs of information may be gathered from J. D. Gregory's chatty but rather unsubstantial reminiscences of his years in the Foreign Office, *On the Edge of Diplomacy*. The most significant contribution relates to the British Mission to the Vatican at the end of 1914—the first since the Reformation—of which Sir Henry

Howard was the leader and the author the Secretary. Writing as a Catholic, he is naturally able to see—what was hidden from most supporters of the Entente—that Pope Benedict XV and Cardinal Gasparri, who emerge as shrewd, cool and well-informed men, never swerved from the neutrality which they publicly professed. Next in importance is the account of his experiences as Private Secretary to Sir Valentine Chirol in his mission to the Balkans in the spring of 1915,—a mission doomed to failure, since, as the author believes, King Ferdinand had decided his course of action before the arrival of his visitors. The best of the pen portraits is that of Sir Eyre Crowe, whom his old subordinate describes in a lapidary sentence : ' Crowe and the Foreign Office were one and indivisible.' Sir Arthur Hardinge's chatty volume, *A Diplomatist in the East*, the sequel to his *Diplomatist in Europe*, may be read for the long chapter on Persia, which depicts that unhappy country during the period of its subservience to Russia from 1900 to 1905.

The concluding volume of Mr. Churchill's brilliant narrative, entitled *The World Crisis : the Aftermath*, carries his apologia down to the fall of the Coalition Government in 1922, and it is only with the earlier chapters that the present survey is concerned. The curtain rises on the night of the armistice, when the author dined alone with Mr. Lloyd George in Downing Street. ' The conversation ran on the great qualities of the German people, on the tremendous fight they had made against three-quarters of the world, on the impossibility of rebuilding the world except with their aid.' Defeat and famine might drive them into Bolshevism, and the author suggested rushing a dozen large ships crammed with provisions into Hamburg. The Prime Minister favoured the project, but the songs and cheers of the multitude could be remotely heard like the surf on the shore. ' The war of the giants has ended, the quarrels of the pigmies have begun.' It is satisfactory to discover from these pages that Mr. Churchill, like

many of his countrymen, deplored the abandonment of the generous and statesmanlike intuitions of Armistice night.

Transferred from the Ministry of Munitions, whose work was done, to the War Office on January 4, 1919, Mr. Churchill saw something though not very much of the making of peace. Summoned to Paris for the first time on February 14, the day on which Wilson was due to leave for the United States, he appealed for a decision as to the policy to be pursued towards Russia while the President was away. During his brief visit he attended three sessions of the Supreme Council, and takes the opportunity to correct the 'airy constructions of fancy,' so far as they affect himself, in Stannard Baker's controversial pages. A second visit witnessed a historic meeting of the British Empire Delegation when the Prime Minister was struggling to mitigate the terms of peace. General Smuts made a powerful appeal for clemency, to which the author gave his support. 'Though there were many gradations of opinion the will of the Delegation was unanimous.' It was resolved that Mr. Lloyd George should press for concessions, especially plebiscites in doubtful cases on the Eastern frontier of Germany, the right of Germany to enter the League of Nations at an early date, the modification of the reparation clauses, and the fixing of Germany's liabilities. If reluctance should be met in the Council of Four, the Delegation authorised the Prime Minister 'to use the full weight of the entire British Empire, even to the point of refusing the services of the British army to advance into Germany or the services of the British Navy to enforce the blockade.' The results of this meeting are written on the Eastern frontiers of Germany, and Mr. Churchill believes that his chief could have improved the Treaty still further but for the memory of his reparation pledges. 'The crazy echoes of the General Election were a humiliating handicap, both to the Prime Minister and to Great Britain.' Mr. Keynes himself has not condemned more sharply

'the absurd and monstrous economic and financial chapters of the Treaty'; but Mr. Churchill has no apologies to offer for remaining a member of the Cabinet which accepted and enforced the Treaty of Versailles. 'A fair judgment upon the whole settlement, a simple explanation of how it arose, cannot leave the authors of the new map of Europe under any serious reproach. To an overwhelming extent the wishes of the various populations prevailed.' The chapters on the making of the peace enhance the author's reputation as a statesman who could look beyond the blinding mists of the moment, and as a writer whose grave and sustained eloquence secures him a place apart among the myriad contributors to the literature of the world war.

We may hope in time to learn in detail how the war appeared to the Dominion statesmen who helped to wage and to win it. Meanwhile Mr. Hughes has embodied in his eloquent paean to the Empire, *The Splendid Adventure*, some reminiscences of the struggle and the settlement. The Australian Prime Minister enjoyed a reputation for blunt speaking which these pages show him fully to have deserved; for no man of our time was less in agreement with Renan's opinion, *La vérité est dans les nuances*. Arriving in England in the spring of 1916 with the Dominion Premiers to discuss the situation, he was occasionally summoned to attend a Cabinet, and formed a very unflattering opinion of its head. Mr. Asquith, we are informed, made it a point to be at least a quarter of a century behind the times; he loved doing nothing; he regarded action as a kind of disease; and he was perhaps too perfectly civilised to conduct a war. Mr. Lloyd George, on the contrary, saved Britain and the Empire, and under his auspices the Dominions came of age. The author took an active part in the discussion of the future of the German Colonies which took place between the Armistice and the Peace Conference, and he did his best as a member of the British Delegation and Vice-President of the Reparation Commission to secure that Germany

should drink the cup of humiliation to the dregs. To such a man Wilsonian ideals naturally made no appeal. The President, we are told, saw several of his cherished Fourteen Points go down one after another like skittles in a bowling alley; but his insistence on 'the League first and Peace second' held up the settlement for months. 'If the Peace had been made in December, 1918, as it could and would have been but for the Fourteen Points, the world would have faced its great task in earnest and without delay.' Though he does not explicitly denounce the Fourteen Points, it is clear that he regards them as typical of the flabby sentimentalism which it was his special mission to oppose.

Lord Grey has enriched a popular edition of his *Twenty-five Years* by a brief Introduction, dated September, 1928, in which, while making no further revelations, he reiterates his conclusions and replies to certain criticisms. What more could the British Government have done, he asks, in the years that preceded the war? Conscription, he replies, would have precipitated the struggle before the larger army was ready. It was equally impossible to deal in a different way with the European groups, for the danger of complete isolation was even greater than was realised at the time. Moreover, isolation would not have kept us out of war unless we had withdrawn the guarantee of Belgium before the conflict or ignored it when the storm broke. In reply to the argument that Germany was unable to control Austria, he rejoins that Austria appeared to him more absolutely dependent on Germany than Germany upon Austria, and that in consequence the final word, for instance in regard to the acceptance or refusal of a Conference, must rest not with Vienna but with Berlin. He regrets the insertion of Article 231 in the Treaty, but declares that it cannot be cancelled. 'If there be over-statement in the article as it now stands,' he adds, 'it is less far from the truth than it would be to say that Germany and her Allies had no responsibility for the war at all.'

Miss Meriel Buchanan's *Diplomacy and Foreign Courts* may be regarded as a supplementary chapter to her father's Memoirs. In an admirable Introduction on the character and work of the last British Ambassador to Imperial Russia Sir Bernard Pares argues that Buchanan has been underestimated ; that he played his difficult part with consummate skill ; and that he rendered conspicuous service both to the development of constitutional liberty and to the prosecution of the war. His moral influence with the Duma leaders was enormous, but he never entertained direct political relations and never worked for a Parliamentary regime. He was a close personal friend of Sazonoff, and it was at the advice of the latter that on the two occasions when he warned the Tsar of the danger of revolution he made no reference to Rasputin. He realised the weakness of Russia at an earlier stage of the struggle than his countrymen at home, and remarked to Professor Pares, 'I wish we did not ask them to do too much.' Kerensky's offensive—the result of the Allies' clamour—was a costly mistake. The Introduction is the best part of a very slight volume, which supplements the author's earlier work *Petrograd: the City of Trouble*. There is a vivid picture of a lunch party at the British Embassy on July 28, 1914, when the host told the German Ambassador that Russia would not climb down again as she had done in 1909. 'Count Pourtalès, Russia means it.' He repeated the words, and proceeded to point out the danger if Germany encouraged Austrian intransigence. His visitor—himself one of the mildest of men—was horrified, exclaiming, 'A World War! War with England! Impossible! Unthinkable!' Miss Buchanan defends her father against the assertions of General Waters that he was unduly swayed by his friendship for Sazonoff, whom the General regards as disloyal to the Allies and the evil genius of his country.

Admiral Bacon's breezy biography of Lord Fisher adds nothing of political consequence to the volumes of reminiscences published by his hero. We hear a little

more of the criminal plan to 'Copenhagen' the German fleet and of the eccentric design to land troops on the shores of Pomerania. We are told once again of the blackness of Lord Charles Beresford, the greyness of Mr. Churchill, the whiteness of King Edward and Mr. McKenna. But it is now abundantly clear that the great sailor was a child in politics, and that he never exerted the slightest influence on British policy. Perhaps his most interesting excursion into the realm of high politics was the conversation with Izvolsky during his visit to London in 1908, recorded and developed in a letter to the Russian statesman dated October 15. He urged a quadruple alliance of Russia, England, France and Turkey as 'an obvious necessity' for all four Powers. The alliance with Japan was 'the very worst thing that England ever did for herself.' Russia and England should take care not to weaken or alienate the Turks. Izvolsky was advised not to mention the Dardanelles at present, as a great agitation in England would arise. 'Wait some little time, and then let Russia make her own private arrangements with a grateful Turkey, and you may rest quite sure that England won't then object, for the simple reason that anything that will bind Russia, England and Turkey together is to England's advantage and far outweighs any objections to what Russia naturally and rightly wishes in regard to the Dardanelles.' Fisher, like other people, was reckoning without the Young Turks.

Pending the appearance of Haig's diaries and papers we may turn with advantage to Brigadier-General John Charteris' intimate tribute, *Field-Marshal Earl Haig*, in which the author portrays a hero as wise in action as he was stainless in character. Like Sir William Robertson and his beloved chief he is an ardent 'Westerner,' denouncing Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill for their Eastern heresies, and railing at the ineptitudes of 'civilian interference.' When the great offensive of 1918 fell like a thunderbolt on Gough's attenuated lines, Haig saw that the severance of the French and British

armies could only be averted by taking control out of the hands of Pétain and giving it to Foch ; for Pétain wished to retire and cover Paris,—a plan even more alarming than the German attack itself. Though the statesmen are treated in these pages with the contempt customary in military biographies, Haig and his chronicler are scarcely less critical of Sir Henry Wilson, whom they regarded as lacking in judgment and prone to intrigue. Indeed this authoritative study of the inarticulate Haig may serve as a partial antidote to the diaries of the eloquent Irishman.

VIII

The authoritative work entitled *American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy*, edited by S. F. Bemis, has reached its conclusion with the publication of the ninth and tenth volumes. The former opens with the Spanish war and closes with the Presidency of Taft. The archives of the Department of State were available up to the death of Hay in 1905, and unpublished material has been used for the studies of Root and Knox. Perhaps the most valuable of the monographs is that by Professor Dennis on Hay. The short and anonymous study of Bryan, the father of the Arbitration Treaties, opens the tenth volume, and is followed by a detailed and flattering portrait of Lansing by Julius W. Pratt, who was allowed to consult official material destined for the forthcoming supplements to *Foreign Relations of the United States*, as well as manuscripts lent by Lansing himself. The discussions of maritime rights with Great Britain and Germany are familiar enough, but there are a few glimpses of *pourparlers* with the Central Powers. In the autumn of 1917 Frank E. Anderson was sent to Holland to explore conditions in Germany. After meeting some Germans there he moved to Switzerland, where he attempted to arrange for a meeting with Apponyi. When the Hungarian statesman failed to

appear, he obtained a safe-conduct to Vienna and Budapest, where he was informed that the Central Powers were ready for peace on Wilson's terms, but not on those of France and Great Britain. The visit to enemy countries was unauthorised, the cable forbidding it not having reached him in time. Equally fruitless was the mission of Mr. Henry Morgenthau and Professor Felix Frankfurter in June, 1917, to sound the Turks, though they were not at war with the United States, in reference to a separate peace. The travellers went no further than Gibraltar, where they met British and French Zionists, as a rumour of their mission had spread and the project was dropped. A few notes on the Peace Conference from the Lansing manuscripts supplement the statesman's published volumes on the subject without adding anything of importance. The studies of Colby and Hughes, which conclude the series, are beyond the chronological limits of the present volume. Much of the ground covered in the *American Secretaries of State* is more intensively tilled by Professor Dennis in his substantial and illuminating work *Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896–1906*. With the aid of the archives of the State Department and the private papers of Olney, Roosevelt and Hay, he has reconstructed the policy of his country from Venezuela to Algeciras ; and though many of his chapters have no reference to European diplomacy, his studies of Roosevelt's mediation in the Russo-Japanese war and in the first Morocco crisis add to our knowledge of the troubles of our own Continent.

The annual volumes entitled *Foreign Relations of the United States*, which correspond to our own *British and Foreign State Papers*, continued to appear as usual during the war ; but it was impossible at that time to publish a mass of confidential material which there is no longer any reason to conceal. The pledge conveyed in an editorial note to the volume on 1914, 'diplomatic correspondence concerning the world war will be printed in separate volumes,' is now in process of being fulfilled.

The supplementary volume on 1914, edited by Dr. Joseph V. Fuller, opens with the detailed reply by Secretary Bryan, dated January 20, 1915, to a letter of Mr. Stone, Chairman of the Senate Commission on Foreign Relations, which complained of breaches of neutrality during 1914. This lengthy Memorandum forms a useful introduction to the large collection of papers on neutral rights which fills the bulk of the volume. The more purely diplomatic material is collected in Part I, entitled *The Outbreak and Spread of the War, Projects of Mediation.* The few documents on the last week of peace, beginning with July 25, add nothing essential to our knowledge of events ; but it is interesting to read the telegram of the American Ambassador in Berlin, dated July 31, 4 P.M. : ' In my opinion Russia's mobilisation makes war inevitable.' The first suggestion of mediation from Washington occurs on July 28, but it was quickly realised that the belligerents were in no mood for compromise. When in December, 1914, Spain asked Wilson if he thought the time had come for peace discussions, since Spain desired to co-operate with the United States, there could only be one reply. The volume on 1915, like its predecessor, is mainly devoted to neutral rights ; but once again Part I, *Continuation and further Spread of the War, Efforts towards Peace,* contains material of direct political interest such as the reports from the capitals on public opinion, which ebbed and flowed with the tide of military success. Though during 1915 Wilson made no further attempt to stop the carnage, we hear something of two famous American citizens, Jane Addams and Henry Ford, who travelled to Europe on unofficial and unsuccessful missions of peace.

The third and fourth volumes of the *Intimate Papers of Colonel House* equal in human interest and surpass in historical importance the first instalments. That he was the close and chosen friend of Woodrow Wilson was known at the time to all the world. That he was not merely the mouthpiece and the agent of the

President, but his partner and often his guide, has been revealed through the publication of his papers. It is now abundantly clear that he was a statesman and a diplomat ; that he inspired confidence and affection to a degree unusual among public men ; and that he is entitled to a substantial share of the merit which accrues to his chief for the organisation of the United States for war and for the foundation of a new international order. Professor Seymour has accomplished his editorial task with remarkable skill and judgment, never concealing his sympathy with Wilsonian idealism, yet never falling to the level of the partisan.

The immediate task of the United States Government on entering the war was to mobilise its resources and to co-operate with the Allies in pursuit of victory. The latter presented greater difficulties than the former, and hundreds of pages are devoted to the search for its solution. To uninitiated readers the important *rôle* of Sir William Wiseman, Chief of the British Intelligence in Washington and afterwards *liaison* officer between the British and American Delegations at Paris, will come as a surprise. Spring Rice was delicate and overstrained, and in any case the volume of business would have transcended the energies of a superman. One emissary accordingly followed another across the Atlantic—Northcliffe, Lord Reading, Lord Balfour—and in every case found a pillar of strength in House. 'Wilson's power is absolute,' reported Northcliffe, 'and House is a wise assistant. Both are pro-English.' He added that House always saw three months ahead. With Lord Balfour, whom he described as 'the most liberal member of the present British Cabinet,' House formed a warm and enduring friendship. The Reading Mission arrived in September, 1917, and House greeted with delight 'this imperturbable negotiator with his fine diplomatic touch.' The situation demanded the best brains of both countries if the cause of the Allies was not to fail. 'We seem on the verge of a financial disaster,' telegraphed Lord Balfour to House on June 29,

1917, 'which would be worse than defeat in the field.' If it is too much to say that America won the war, it is clear enough that it could not have been won without her aid.

While the Allies in the old world were too engrossed in the deadly grapple to think much about anything but victory, Wilson and House never lost sight of the need for a new international order and for a settlement which would render possible such a beneficent revolution. As the watchword of the soldiers of the French Revolution was 'war on the castles, peace to the cottages,' so Wilson's voice proclaimed unceasingly 'war on the German Government, peace to the German people.' Readers of the earlier volumes will remember House's appeals to Allied statesmen during his visits to Europe to contemplate a moderate settlement; and the entrance of the United States into the fray, so far from attenuating this desire, rendered it the principal object of American policy. No more, it is true, was heard of peace without victory; but even in his declaration of war on April 2, 1917, Wilson declared that Americans had 'no quarrel with the German people and no feeling towards them but one of sympathy.' From this attitude he never departed, for 'force without stint or limit' was to be applied in order to remove the obstacle to a statesmanlike peace.

The most interesting portions of the book describe the unceasing endeavours of Wilson and House to prevent the abuse by the Allies of the sweeping victory which was rendered possible by American help. It was, no doubt, much easier for a Power which only became a belligerent in 1917, and whose existence was never endangered, to preach the gospel of an equitable peace; but even making allowances for the smaller provocation and the lesser strain, there was a real difference in the quality of statesmanship between the two sides of the Atlantic. Such men as Lord Grey and Lord Lansdowne, Lord Cecil and General Smuts were not impervious to the arguments and considerations

which weighed so heavily at Washington ; but some of them were swept from office before America entered the war, and the brunt of the fight for a reasonable peace fell on Wilson and House. It was in large measure in order to decline responsibility for the secret treaties, of which he was informed by Lord Balfour on his mission in April, 1917, that the President defined the United States as the associate, not the ally, of the Entente belligerents.

The first opportunity for stressing the American standpoint came with the Pope's peace proposal of August, 1917, which House implored his chief to utilise for his own purposes. 'The mistake has been made over and over again in the Allied countries in doing and saying the things that best helped the German militarists. The German people are told and believe that the Allies desire not only to dismember them, but to make it economically impossible to live after the war. They are therefore welded together with their backs to the wall. . . . What is needed, it seems to me, is a firm tone, full of determination, but yet breathing a spirit of liberalism and justice that will make the people of the Central Powers feel safe in your hands.' The President had at first felt inclined to take no notice of the Pope's action ; but he finally adopted the advice of his friend and held out to the German people the possibility of 'a covenanted peace' when their present rulers disappeared. It was to prepare the ground for such a settlement that House was commissioned to create and direct a group of experts whose labours were compendiously described as 'the Inquiry.'

British emissaries to the United States were not enough, and in September, 1917, Mr. Lloyd George begged for an American Mission. House agreed that it was desirable, and accepted the invitation of the President and of leading statesmen in London and Paris to be at its head. 'His interest in the final settlement,' writes Professor Seymour, 'was much greater than in administrative problems connected with the war,' and

during his crowded weeks in London and Paris he never lost sight of the wider aim. The efforts of the Mission to secure material co-ordination, however, met with greater reward than those of its chief to convert the Allies to his view of the settlement and of the various means by which it might be attained. His interest was far from being merely academic, for he was genuinely alarmed at the situation created by the Caporetto disaster and the withdrawal of Russia from the war. The crisis was expected in the spring of 1918, and House was convinced that diplomatic no less than military preparations must be made to meet the event. 'Unless a change for the better comes,' he wrote in his Report to the President, 'the Allies cannot win, and Germany may.'

It was the failure to achieve diplomatic unity between the United States and the Allies that led Wilson to act on his own responsibility. On December 18, 1917, House described his efforts 'to join in formulating a broad declaration of war aims that would unite the world against Germany, and would not only help to a solution of the Russian problem but would knit together the best and most unselfish opinions in the world. I could not persuade them to do this, and now it will be done by the President.' Working on the material provided by the experts of the Inquiry, the two men drew up the Fourteen Points, which were duly announced in the historic utterance of January 8, 1918. The speech echoed round the globe, but it was not till the following autumn that the Allies were persuaded to accept it as the basis of the coming settlement. Of this celebrated document, which looked beyond the din and passions of the strife, House, as we may read in these pages, was part author.

The final volume opens with two valuable chapters on the antecedents of the Covenant, in the making of which House took an active share. A curiously doctrinaire letter from Lansing, written in April, 1918, argued that no people desires war, particularly an aggressive

war; that peace could only be guaranteed by self-governing institutions; and that the urgent task of statesmen was to make democracy universal, not to construct a League of Nations. Wilson and House knew history and human nature better, and aimed at a body exercising real authority. The Phillimore plan was too weak for their taste, but they were glad to adopt useful proposals from whatever quarter, such as the Council and the system of Mandates. Before, however, the President could concentrate his attention on the structure and functions of the League the war had to be won and the Allies to be converted to the Fourteen Points.

When the end was in sight House was dispatched to represent the President in the councils of the Allies. He had often reminded Wilson that with the approach of victory his power to control the situation would wane. His Mission is described by Professor Seymour as the most difficult and the most important of his career; for he had to maintain Wilsonian principles without causing a break in the unanimity of the Allies and, if possible, without any loss of cordiality. He had no instructions, because the President remarked on parting, 'I feel you will know what to do.' Reaching Paris on October 28, 1918, he was just in time for the Armistice conferences. He took little part in the discussion of the military and naval terms to be imposed on Germany, but fought with all his strength for an explicit acceptance of the principles proclaimed by Wilson to the world. 'I am proud of the way you are handling the situation,' cabled the President on October 31. The Allies declined to swallow the whole dose; but the Fourteen Points were finally accepted as a basis for the settlement, subject to reservations on reparations and the freedom of the seas. On the latter, to which House attached as much importance as his chief, there was some very plain speaking.

Even after the President's arrival House remained a leading figure not only of the American Delegation but of the Conference as a whole. His friendship with

Clemenceau, Lord Balfour, Lord Cecil, and other leading negotiators was of eminent service, and the clamorous throng which gathered in Paris to divide the spoils of victory flocked to his rooms. The spirit of compromise needed for a rapid and enduring settlement was rendered difficult not only by the torturing experiences of the conflict but by the passions of the victorious peoples, whom the statesmen had lashed to madness and were now too weak or too timid to control. Nerves were badly frayed, and on one occasion, when Wilson resisted the demand for the Rhineland and the Saar Basin, Clemenceau called him a pro-German and abruptly left the room.

'It is now evident,' wrote House in his diary on March 3, 'that the peace will not be such a peace as I had hoped.' The elections of November, 1918, had weakened the hands of the President as much as the British elections of December had strengthened those of Mr. Lloyd George. Clemenceau was impregnable, and Sonnino as obstinate as a mule. 'I dislike to sit and have forced upon us such a peace as we are facing,' wrote House. 'We shall get something out of it in the way of a League of Nations, but even that is an imperfect instrument.' Compromise was indeed the sole alternative to disruption; but in his eulogy of the President Stannard Baker has charged House with flabbiness and something like treachery. To the grotesque accusation that he combined with the Allies to counterwork the principles and policy of the President during his brief visit to the United States in February and March, the reader will find a complete reply in the chapter entitled 'Speeding the Settlement.' House had been empowered by Wilson to go ahead with the discussions, and the situation was reported to him by cable every day. 'No commitments had been made for him in his absence,' declares Professor Seymour; and a long British Memorandum, drawn up at the instance of Lord Balfour and here published for the first time, blows into thin air the legend of plot or intrigue. Wilson

himself realised the necessity of compromise soon after his return, and was converted to the inclusion of pensions in Reparations at the cost of eating his own words. Indeed, he finally yielded so much that he has been denounced ever since—and not by Germans alone—for breaking faith with the German people, who had surrendered on the promise of a Wilsonian settlement. There is no reason for the friends of House to attack Wilson, or for the champions of Wilson to censure House. Both did their best to secure the peace they desired, and both lamented the necessity of accepting some of the terms. The judgment recorded by House in his diary on the day following the signature of the Treaty recalls the somewhat similar declaration of General Smuts. 'I am leaving Paris, after eight fateful months, with conflicting emotions. Looking at the Conference in retrospect there is much to approve and much to regret. It is easy to say what should have been done but more difficult to have found a way for doing it. . . . How splendid it would have been had we blazed a new and better trail. . . . While I should have preferred a different peace, I doubt whether it could have been made, for the ingredients of such a peace as I would have had were lacking at Paris.' With this verdict most readers of these absorbing chapters will probably agree, for they confirm the impression left both by Stannard Baker and by Tardieu.

The testimony of Colonel House is supplemented by David Hunter Miller's richly documented volumes, *The Drafting of the Covenant.* In a modest Preface the learned jurist explains that he merely describes what he knew and saw. 'I beg to tell how and by whom and when the Text of the Covenant was written.' The balance is redressed in an Introduction by Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, who compares the work to Madison's notes on the making of the American Constitution. Beginning with the scheme of the Phillimore Committee, 'the first formulation of League of Nations suggestions in a definite text,' we pass on to the House, Smuts and

Cecil plans, Wilson's four drafts, and the Hurst-Miller revisions. The larger part of the first volume reports the meetings of the Commission on the League of Nations, which held its meeting on February 3, 1919. At the end of his impersonal narrative, in a chapter entitled 'Looking backward,' the lawyer emerges as a man of flesh and blood and joyfully surveys the great edifice which he helped to build. 'The wisest of Wilson's many wise decisions was to put and keep the League in the Treaty of Peace. . . . If not written in 1919 as a part of the Treaty of Versailles, no Covenant would have been written at all, no League of Nations would have existed. Perhaps in some other generation some union of civilisation would have come about, for that is the trend of history; but not now, not in our time.' He speaks with sorrowful severity of the lies and legends invented and believed by his countrymen in 1919–1920, and with disdain for the aloofness displayed by the Government of the United States. 'This was too absurd to last. Our contacts with the League are now close. . . . If the League goes on, we join. The time is uncertain, but with no less certainty of the fact.'

RECENT REVELATIONS OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

CHAPTER I

GERMANY

AMONG the manifold results of the war of 1914 has been the opening of the archives. The defeat of Germany, Austria and Russia and the eviction of their dynasties created the demand and provided the opportunity to explore the secret recesses of the Chancelleries. But the collapse of the three Empires did more than break the official seals ; for one after the other of the leading actors in the drama has endeavoured to convince the world that the responsibility for the catastrophe does not rest upon his shoulders. The revelations, documentary, biographical and autobiographical, are already of enormous bulk and of surpassing interest. Complete agreement as to the manifold causes of the conflagration will never be reached ; but deeper knowledge has already brought a more sympathetic understanding of the motives and mentality both of individual statesmen and of the nations in whose name they spoke.

It is not surprising that Republican Germany should have taken the lead in the campaign to elucidate the origins of the conflict, or that the Socialist Government to which Prince Max of Baden transferred the reins on November 9, 1918, should have taken action within a few days of their accession to office. The four volumes of despatches covering the weeks from the Serajevo murders to the outbreak of war, commonly known as

the Kautsky documents, were the first-fruits of the opening of the German archives. The collection made by Karl Kautsky, the veteran Socialist scholar, was edited by General Count Montgelas and Professor Walther Schücking, and a translation was published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace under the title *Outbreak of the World War*. If the documents are studied as a whole, their message becomes perfectly clear. The Kaiser's neurotic *marginalia* are one more proof that he was temperamentally unfitted to rule ; but they do not suggest that he desired to drown the world in blood. His wish was for the prompt and the exemplary punishment of a semi-savage, regicide State by his outraged and venerated ally ; but on reading Serbia's reply to the ultimatum he exclaimed that all cause for war had disappeared. Yet though he had no craving for war, he felt no intellectual or moral repugnance to ordeal by battle. He was well aware that support of Austrian policy might set the avalanche in motion, and in the days of destiny he took no effective steps to arrest its descent. The Kautsky volumes, in fact, lead us to substitute one indictment for another. They disprove the legend that the directors of German policy, with cold-blooded deliberation, unleashed a war for the conquest of the world and opposed every attempt to avert it. On the other hand, they prove the Kaiser and his Chancellor to have been short-sighted blunderers, encouraging an ally to enter on a path which was almost certain to lead to the abyss, and claiming no share in shaping a policy which involved the fate of the civilised world.

This impression is confirmed by the *Bayerische Dokumente*, edited by Dr Dirr at the wish of his fellow-members of the Bavarian Landtag, one of which has been the theme of heated controversy. A fortnight after the conclusion of the war, Kurt Eisner, chief author of the Bavarian Revolution and first President of the Bavarian Republic, published a despatch from the Bavarian representative in Berlin to the Premier, Count Hertling,

dated July 18, 1914. On the strength of information supplied by the Under-Secretary Zimmermann, the forthcoming ultimatum is outlined, which, it was added, Serbia could not possibly accept. The resolve to seize the favourable moment, even at the risk of war with Russia, was fully approved. Austria, declared Zimmermann, was now the sick man of Europe, and Russians, Italians, Roumanians, Serbs, and Montenegrins were waiting to divide his possessions. Vigorous action against Serbia would restore the vitality of the State. After the assassination of Eisner it was discovered that he had omitted important parts of the long despatch ; and we may now read it as it was written, with comments on Eisner's handiwork, which was designed to suggest that Germany desired a world-war, not a localised conflict. A second edition of this valuable collection contained a long Introduction by the Editor, also published separately as *Schuldfrage und Bayerische Dokumente.* A third edition added the despatches of the Bavarian Military Attaché at Berlin between July 29 and August 3. The War Office and the General Staff, reported General von Wenninger on July 29, were wrestling with the Chancellor and the Foreign Office, and demanding military measures corresponding to the political tension. The Chief of the Staff was particularly insistent, pointing out that the military situation was peculiarly favourable for German arms.

When the German Government in the summer of 1919 commissioned General Montgelas and Professor Schücking to publish the documents collected by Kautsky, it had already resolved to reveal the secrets of German diplomacy during the years preceding the catastrophe. The onerous task was entrusted to Professor Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Dr Thimme and Dr Lepsius ; but it is an open secret that the main burden has fallen on the shoulders of Dr Thimme. Before the editors had proceeded far with their task they realised that it was useless to begin with the Balkan wars, or the annexation of Bosnia, or the Morocco crisis of 1905, and that the

tendencies and forces leading up to the world war could only be explained by tracing the policy of the Great Powers back to the creation of the system of alliances which sprang from the Franco-German collision in 1870. The consent of the Wilhelmstrasse to large-scale operations was secured without difficulty, and by the end of 1926 the gigantic edifice stood erect in fifty-four stately volumes. 'In deciding to open its archives,' wrote the editors in the Preface to the first instalment, 'the German Government has taken a step which constitutes a precedent in the history of European policy. To reveal the most secret and confidential documents, which in the ordinary course would slumber till the scholars of a future generation broke the seals, is such a novel resolve that it must form an epoch in the history of the methods of government. A Government and a people which thus reveals its secrets displays unbounded confidence in the power of truth to reconcile and to heal.'

The character and aims of the publication were further explained and defended by the principal editor in 1924.[1] The announcement that the secrets of the Foreign Office from 1871 to 1914 were to be exposed to the world's gaze created alarm not only among the older diplomatists but also in conservative circles which feared that discredit might fall on the Imperial regime and the monarchical system. Their apprehensions were increased by the polemical use which had been made of the Kautsky documents, and in particular of the impressionist *marginalia* of the Kaiser. Moreover, Kautsky himself had issued a commentary, *The Guilt of William Hohenzollern*,[2] which was hailed with delight by the enemies of Imperial Germany at home and abroad. Other critics of the decision of the Government argued that the time was not yet ripe ; that passions would be

[1] 'Die Aktenpublikation des Auswärtigen Amtes und ihre Gegner' in *Archiv für Politik und Geschichte*, June, 1924. *Cp.* Professor Mendelssohn Bartholdy's article, 'Kleine Missverständnisse über eine grosse Publikation,' in *Europäische Gespräche*, July, 1926.

[2] Foreign books translated into English are cited under their English title.

intensified rather than allayed ; that the volumes would be used less for the purposes of impartial history than as an arsenal for political missiles ; that official documents alone afforded an incomplete picture of events largely shaped by oral discussion ; and finally that the victorious Powers, untroubled by revolutions, would decline to follow suit. Unmoved by such craven arguments the editors proceeded on their way, serenely confident that their activities were not only essential to a determination of responsibility, but would sooner or later shame the victors into a similar revelation of their secrets. Their governing principle was the selection of the most important documents, without regard to the interpretations or misinterpretations to which they might give rise. The Kaiser's marginal notes, for instance, however extravagant in their phraseology, are printed whenever they possess the slightest significance, only expletives, puns and similar trivialities being omitted.

A task of such dimensions necessarily exposes a large surface to attack. It is a compliment to the editors that they have been credited by the Right with the design to attack, and by the Left with the desire to shield the Imperial Government. A few voices have complained of this or that detail of editorial technique, but the *bona fides* of the enterprise is universally recognised. Nor is there any serious difference of opinion in regard to the value of the explanatory notes with which many of the documents, particularly in the later volumes, are enriched. That the editors occasionally express their own opinions is their good right. In the rapidity with which the task has been carried out, in the skilful arrangement of the overwhelming mass of material, and in the practical utility of the annotations, the work reflects the highest credit on the distinguished editors who have borne the burden and the heat of the day. Their best reward is that their stately volumes have already given birth to a flourishing progeny of monographs, and have inspired historical students all over the world to pursue the critical study of contemporary history with fresh zeal.

In the successive instalments of Schwertfeger's *Wegweiser durch die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette* students will find a useful *précis*, and the arrangement of the documents in chronological order enables us to visualise the European situation at any particular moment. An abridged edition of the whole work will contain the most important documents in full and brief summaries of the rest.

The first six volumes of *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Mächte, 1871–1914*, covering the period from the close of the Franco-German war to the fall of Bismarck, were of an introductory character ; but they revealed the principles on which the enterprise has been conducted throughout. The editors wisely rejected the strictly chronological method, and grouped their material in such a form that we can follow the course of German policy in regard to the chief problems it had to face. Thus the first volume is devoted to the relations with France in the years following the war ; the second to the Eastern Question up to the Congress of Berlin ; the third to the foundation of the Bismarckian system of alliances ; the fourth to the relations of Great Britain to the Triple Alliance ; the fifth to the Bulgarian crisis ; the sixth to the closing years of the Iron Chancellor. Their supreme attraction is that they enable us to watch the greatest of all diplomatists at work. The editors assure us that they have published everything worth publishing, regardless of whether a document told for or against their country. Assuming this to be true, as their reputation entitles us to do, our belief is confirmed that from 1871 till his fall in 1890 Bismarck was the pillar of European peace. Not only had he no desire to initiate further conflicts, but it was his strong arm alone which prevented Austria and Russia from flying at each other's throats. Since France alone could never reverse the verdict of Sedan, his policy was to keep her in quarantine by understandings with all the other Great Powers. The Emperor William I watched the performances of his Chancellor with a mixture of admiration

and terror. 'I should not care to be in your skin,' he remarked; 'you are like a Japanese conjuror who keeps tossing five balls into the air and catches them every time.' Such a *virtuoso* appears once in a century or two, and with the dismissal of Bismarck the control of German policy fell into the hands of lesser men, who failed to maintain the isolation of France.

With the second instalment, covering the seven years from the fall of Bismarck to the fall of Marschall von Bieberstein, the documentation becomes fuller and the stage widens to the ambitions and entanglements of *Weltpolitik*. The Bismarckian system of limited liability was scrapped, and the abandonment of the secret treaty of reinsurance with Russia in 1890, followed by the Franco-Russian agreement of 1891, created a new chess-board for the diplomatists.

After the fall of Bismarck there were four policies open to the Kaiser and his counsellors. The first was to continue the Bismarckian system of keeping on good terms both with Great Britain and Russia by avoiding any attempt to thwart their dominant ambitions; but such self-denial was scarcely to be expected from the strongest military Power in the world in the age of Imperialism. Secondly it was feasible to push forward economic enterprise and political influence in Turkey, while discounting the danger of Russian resentment by the maintenance of cordial relations with Great Britain,—a course favoured by Caprivi and by the Kaiser himself in the early years of his reign. A third possibility was to risk the antagonism of the Mistress of the Seas by the construction of a large fleet, at the same time disarming Russian antagonism by facilitating her policy in the Near East. It was this line of advance which the Kaiser himself, after a few years' experience of rule, would have preferred; for the passion of his life was to build a fleet, and there are frequent indications in his correspondence and table-talk of a desire to resuscitate the Bismarckian league of the Three Emperors as a bulwark against the spectre of British or Anglo-Saxon

dictation. Yet the short-sighted monarch never really attempted to disarm the hostility of his Eastern neighbour; for Russia's eyes were fixed on Constantinople, which Bismarck had been ready to yield but which the Kaiser preferred to dominate. It was a period of perilous experiment in South Africa and the Far East, of conflicting counsels and divided control, in which decisions were shaped by the combined or competing efforts of the Emperor, Caprivi, Marschall, Hohenlohe and the mysterious Holstein.

The third instalment carries the drama from 1897 to 1903, when unity of control was in some measure restored by the appointment of Bülow; but the improvement of the machinery of government was outweighed by embarking on a policy involving the estrangement of the British Empire. To English readers no chapters in this vast collection are more arresting than those which describe the course and the failure of the negotiations for an Anglo-German alliance. With the fourth instalment, covering the ill-fated Björko treaty and the hollow triumphs of Algeciras, the clouds begin to gather over Berlin. The fifth traces the creation of the Triple Entente, the sixth its testing in the fires of Bosnia and Agadir, the seventh the opening stages of the Balkan war, the eighth the last year of an armed and precarious peace.

Though every aspect of German policy is illumined in these crowded volumes, one of the most dramatic incidents in contemporary history remained obscure. Since the official papers at the Foreign Office failed to solve the mystery of the Kruger telegram, Dr Thimme turned to the representatives of the actors in the historic scene, and with the aid of the materials supplied by the respective families told the full story of that 'diplomatic impromptu' in his article 'Die Krüger Depesche,' published in *Europäische Gespräche*, May, 1924. In Marschall's diary for January 3, 1896, we read: 'Conference with His Majesty, which the Chancellor, Hollmann, Knorr and Senden attend. His Majesty makes curious proposals. Protectorate over the Transvaal,

which I at once turn down. Mobilisation of the Marine infantry. Despatch of troops to the Transvaal. When the Chancellor objects "That would be war with England," His Majesty says "Yes, but only on land." It is then decided to send Schele to the Transvaal to reconnoitre. Also an unfortunate idea. Finally His Majesty, at my suggestion, sends a congratulatory telegram to President Kruger.' The diary of Admiral von Senden, Chief of the Naval Cabinet, adds that it was decided to discover what was needed for the mobilisation of the two naval battalions. The verbal testimony of the widow of Kayser, Director of the Colonial Department, claims for her husband both the idea and the first draft of the telegram, when the Foreign Minister left the conference room for a few minutes to discuss the situation with his advisers. Prince Hohenlohe confided to his son that he had agreed to the telegram 'to avert something worse.' Thus the Kaiser, contrary to the impression conveyed in his *Memoirs*, was held back instead of being goaded on by his Ministers.

The testimony of the archives has been supplemented by the labours of a Committee of the Reichstag appointed in 1919. This body divided into four Sub-Committees, the first dealing with the causes of the war, the second with reasons for not ending it sooner, the third with acts of disobedience and disloyalty to the political authorities, the fourth with cruelties committed during the struggle.

The first Sub-Committee proceeded to draw up and circulate a searching *questionnaire* relating to the Austro-German conversations at Potsdam and Berlin on July 5 and 6; the attitude and instructions of Tschirschky; Bethmann's and Jagow's knowledge of the progress of the inquiry at Serajevo; the existence of military and financial preparations in Germany before the ultimatum to Serbia; the extent of the Wilhelmstrasse's knowledge of the forthcoming ultimatum; the dates on which the ultimatum was handed to Tschirschky, was sent by him to Berlin, and reached the Foreign Office; the date and means by which the ultimatum became known to the

Bavarian and Saxon Governments ; the reason why the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrath did not meet. The high civil and military officials, bankers, captains of industry and other witnesses to whom these questions were sent were selected by the Sub-Committee. Their written replies—the first-fruits of the Reichstag inquiry—were published in 1920, and a translation was issued in the first volume of *Official German Documents relating to the World War*, published by the Carnegie Endowment.

The Sub-Committee pronounced no judgment on the testimony it had invited, for the evidence was brief and clear, and the legend of a Crown Council of guilty conspirators at Potsdam disappeared for ever. On the ultimatum itself Bethmann repeats Jagow's complaint at the time to the Austrian Ambassador that it was too severe. No part of the evidence indicated that Tschirschky exceeded his instructions. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrath had not been summoned because Bavaria did not exercise her statutory right to propose it.

The task of the second Sub-Committee was to discover whether the war could have been terminated at an earlier date, and it was to the American peace moves of the winter 1916–1917 that it first turned its attention. The evidence of Bernstorff, who had already told his story in his impressive work, *My Three Years in America*, Bethmann, Zimmermann, Helfferich, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and other actors fills hundreds of pages in the two volumes of *Official German Documents relating to the World War*, published by the Carnegie Endowment ; and cross-examination of the witnesses rendered the inquiry unusually complete. In this case the Sub-Committee passed judgment on the material, six of the seven members finding that the action of President Wilson was sincere, that peace parleys were a possibility, and that the chances were ruined by the decision to recommence unrestricted submarine warfare. Among the documents are the memoranda of four distinguished experts. Dietrich Schäfer, the leading Pan-German

Professor at Berlin, approves the U-boat decision. His colleague, Professor Hötzsch, a moderate Nationalist, admits the possibility of peace, and attributes the failure not to the submarine policy but to the political incapacity of Bethmann. The Liberal Professor Bonn argues that the German peace offer was a fatal mistake and ruined the chances of peace, while the diplomatist Freiherr von Romberg maintains that peace was ruled out by the unbending attitude of the Entente. No chapter in the history of German diplomacy during the war is now so fully known as that which forms the subject of this exhaustive inquiry. At the end of 1926 a similar inquiry was opened into the causes of the failure of the Pope's peace move in 1917.

New light is thrown on the political no less than on the military history of the last year of the war in the evidence collected by the third Sub-Committee in the three stout volumes entitled *Die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruchs im Jahre 1918*. The report is presented in a series of numbered paragraphs, the most important of which were not approved unanimously. The majority find no ground for blame in any direction. The Supreme Command, they assert, correctly estimated the flow of American troops, and the spirit of the German forces justified the decision to attack. As soon as the events of August 8, 1918, proved victory to be impossible, the Government did all in its power to end the war. Its failure was due to the military situation, for the defection of Germany's allies rendered profitable negotiation hopeless. Prince Max inherited a situation in which he did everything that circumstances allowed. Thus the Generals and the statesmen, the old Cabinet and the new, are alike exonerated. Of far greater importance than this whitewashing report are the proceedings of the Sub-Committee and the voluminous memoranda of experts. Colonel Schwertfeger renews the familiar military indictment of the Government, while Professor Delbrück once again trounces Ludendorff as the supreme architect of ruin. 'We were not strong enough for the great

offensive, which was also badly carried out. And when the impossibility of success became clear, he ought to have told the Government at once, instead of waiting till September, and then acting in needless panic.' The task of the Reichstag Committee is not yet finished, and no item in its programme is likely to arouse more general interest than the great collection of memoranda on *Schuld und Recht im Weltkrieg* by an army of experts.

In addition to the labours of the archivists and the Reichstag, students of war origins are indebted to the *Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen*, founded in 1921 under the direction of Alfred von Wegerer. The modest bibliographical *Wochenberichte* developed in 1923 into the indispensable monthly *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, in which new material is brought to light and discussed, and to which scholars and statesmen of many nationalities have contributed. A parallel series of *Beiträge zur Kriegsschuldfrage* includes translations of Dobrorolski's narrative of the Russian mobilisation and the diary of the Russian Foreign Office in July, 1914, and enlarged editions of the Russian Orange-book and the French Yellow-book. The object of the Central Bureau, declares the Director in a recent survey, *Zum fünfjährigen Bestehen der Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen*, is the scientific investigation of the question of war guilt. 'It will continue in this course till a political exploitation of the results becomes practicable. In all its activities it is inspired by the great idea of putting an end to the slandering of Germany on the subject of war guilt.' To readers in Western Europe perhaps its most valuable feature is the close attention which it devotes to publications in the Slavonic tongues. Next to the *Kriegsschuldfrage* no German periodicals are so useful to the student of the war and its origins as the *Europäische Gespräche*, founded and edited by Professor Mendelssohn Bartholdy, the Director of the Hamburg Institut für Auswärtige Politik, and the *Archiv für Politik und Geschichte*.

William II has unconsciously drawn his own portrait

not only in his marginal annotations on official documents but in his letters and telegrams to the Tsar, for the publication of which we are indebted to the Bolshevists. The former may be read in *The Kaiser's Letters to the Tsar*, edited by N. E. Grant, but are better studied in the edition of Professor Walther Goetz, of Leipzig. The latter are to be found in the little volume published by Herman Bernstein in New York in 1918 under the misleading title of *The Willy-Nicky Correspondence*. Though these curious documents as a whole bear the unmistakable impress of their author's histrionic personality, the more important of them were revised and in some cases drafted in the Wilhelmstrasse. 'They were never despatched,' writes the Kaiser in his *Memoirs*, 'without the knowledge of the Chancellors, and sometimes at their wish.' There is no scrap of evidence in them to confirm the once popular delusion that he was engaged throughout his reign in planning an attack on his neighbours. On the other hand, they strengthen the impression that he was a disturbing factor in the life of the world, and the story of the Pact of Björko, the most sensational of their revelations, leaves a disagreeable taste. The deep distrust of British policy mirrored in these pages, his unmeasured contempt for the French Republic, his morbid horror of democracy, his restlessness, his credulity and his suspicions have convinced many of his late subjects, no less than more distant observers, that he was incurably unfit for the high office to which he was born.

The Kaiser's *Memoirs*, which in their drab colours present a strange contrast to the lurid hues of the letters and telegrams, follow the familiar practice of apologias in transferring responsibility for mishaps to other shoulders. There is no suggestion that he ever made a mistake, and we are assured that he protested against the worst blunders of his counsellors, which as a constitutional monarch he was unable to prevent. We know from Schön's *Memoirs* that his master disliked the Tangier demonstration, and the Agadir coup was exclusively the

work of Kiderlen-Wächter. It is, however, impossible to accept his plea that he was innocent of the Kruger telegram, and his letter to the Tsar of January 2, 1896, proves that he was, to say the least, as angry and excited as any of his advisers. He writes with dignity about Bismarck, and with gratitude about Caprivi and Hohenlohe ; but his chapters on Bülow and Bethmann-Hollweg are filled with sharp criticism. Bülow, he declares, was a valued friend and an accomplished Parliamentary manager, but his handling of the *Daily Telegraph* crisis destroyed his master's confidence. Bethmann, he notes, was slow in decision and played the schoolmaster, while his policy of buying back British friendship by a naval agreement was doomed to failure. The Haldane mission is dismissed as a political manœuvre, and the wisdom no less than the energy of Tirpitz is warmly extolled. The author stoutly denies that he or his Ministers or his soldiers or his people desired war, and portrays Germany as a profoundly pacific State wantonly attacked by the Triple Entente, a thesis as unconvincing as the rival superstition that Germany was the only wolf in the European sheepfold.

A more agreeable impression is derived from the Kaiser's second book, *My Early Life*, which is commendably free from the self-righteousness and censorious tone of the first. The account of his diplomatic missions to Russia enables him to emphasise the fact that war was in sight in 1887 and that the rift within the lute began in his grandfather's reign. The arid pages of the *Comparative Tables, 1878–1914*, compiled for his own use in 1919, privately printed in 1920, and published in 1921, add nothing to our knowledge of events, and derive their meagre interest solely from the light they throw on the outlook of their nominal author. Their misstatements, mistakes and suppressions are pointed out in pitiless detail by Appuhn and Renouvin in their volume *Introduction aux Tableaux d'histoire de Guillaume II*, which accompanied the French translation of the work.

A very unflattering picture of William II is painted in most of the diaries, correspondence and reminiscences of his subjects. The third volume of Bismarck's *Recollections* is written with a pen of gall, and throws at least as much discredit on the author as on the monarch whom he hated and despised. The three volumes of *Denkwürdigkeiten* of Field-Marshal Count Waldersee, Moltke's successor as Chief of the Staff, and Commander-in-Chief of the international force in China in 1900, are available in an abridged translation by Mr Frederick Whyte. They reveal with extraordinary vividness the charm of the young Prince before his accession to the throne, and the growing disappointment of the diarist when power revealed the morbid egotism and unbalanced judgment which filled both friend and foe with apprehensions. An even more convincing picture of the Kaiser is painted by the most intimate friend he ever possessed, Prince Philip Eulenburg, whose autobiography, *Aus Fünfzig Jahren*, makes Bismarck live again, and whose diary and correspondence have been utilised in Professor Johannes Haller's fascinating work *Aus dem Leben des Fürsten Philip zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld.* 'Phili,' whose unique favour found expression in the grant of the princely title and in being addressed by the familiar *Du*, was not only a poet, a musician and a *charmeur*, but an accomplished diplomatist and a clear-sighted political adviser. Whatever may be thought of Professor Haller's gallant attempt to rebut the accusations against his private character which led to his social ostracism, the documents he has published set the Prince's relation to the Kaiser in a new light. The cringing courtier of popular legend largely disappears, and we discern the affectionate and courageous friend whose services were continually invoked to avert a *faux pas* or to limit the range of its repercussion. In these poignant pages 'the poor dear Kaiser' provokes sympathy with his loneliness rather than anger at his costly mistakes. Eulenburg was a consummate letter-writer, and his reports from Munich and Vienna are full of colour and

life ; but it is above all as a record of the secret history of the first half of the reign of William II that this volume will retain a conspicuous place among the revelations made possible by the eviction of the dynasty.

If Waldersee and Eulenburg enable us to watch William II through the spectacles of his chosen friends, the diaries of Count Zedlitz offer a picture of the monarch as he appeared to the undazzled eyes of a palace official. *Twelve Years at the Kaiser's Court* emphasises his defects more sharply than any other work written from close personal observation, and these cold entries between 1898 and 1910, which the author assures us have not been touched up since the *débâcle*, present a damaging indictment of the fallen ruler. We hear little of the bewitching charm and alert intelligence which struck visitors received in audience, and find instead the touchy and trivial figure-head of a Byzantine court, increasingly averse to business as the years roll on, and indulging in outbursts of uncontrolled violence against King Edward and any other *bête noire* of the moment. Scarcely less severe is the picture of Bülow, who is depicted as clinging to office at the price of his self-respect, a brilliant courtier as destitute of backbone as was his master of balance. It would be unfair to accept these portraits as the verdict of history ; but the testimony of the disillusioned official cannot be wholly neglected in making up the final account.

A more friendly though less finished picture of the Imperial Court is painted by Freiherr von Reischach in his artless volume, *Under Three Emperors*. His greatest admiration is reserved for the Empress Frederick, whom he served as Hofmarschall throughout her widowhood. As Master of the Horse to William II from 1905 to 1914, and thereafter as Oberhofmarschall, he writes with sympathy of the monarch, while freely criticising Holstein and Marschall, Bülow and Tirpitz. While Bethmann is often denounced for listening to the Left, in these pages he is censured for yielding to the Right. The author describes a dramatic scene at Pless on January 9,

1917. 'I entered the room and found him sitting utterly broken. To my horrified question, Have we lost a battle? he replied, "No, but Finis Germaniae. I have spoken for an hour against the submarine war, which will bring in the United States. That will be too much for us. When I had done, Admiral von Holtzendorff jumped up and said, I guarantee on my word as a naval officer that no American will set foot on the Continent." ' 'You should resign,' commented Reischach. 'I cannot sow dissension,' rejoined the Chancellor, 'just when Germany is playing her last card.' From this moment Reischach ceased to believe in victory.

The activities and emotions of the Kaiser from the turn of the tide in August, 1918, till his flight across the frontier are depicted with photographic realism and genuine sympathy by his adjutant Alfred Niemann in his little book *Kaiser und Revolution*, and described with dramatic skill in Nowak's *Chaos*. Niemann's fidelity survived his master's fall, and in his *Wanderungen mit Kaiser Wilhelm II* he records his conversations in the quiet days of exile. The monarch finds nothing of which to repent. He defends the rejection of the British offer of alliance on the ground that it involved a break with Russia, and argues that if Germany had not stood by her ally in 1914 Panslavism would have produced some other weapon from its armoury. Accepting the interpretation of events presented by his exalted companion, the author expresses his regret that the German people never really learned to know their ruler. Of less political interest, but tinged with the same affectionate emotion, are the *Erinnerungen* of Dr Dryander, Court Chaplain in the sunshine of Imperial glory, and spiritual comforter in the days of eclipse. The vast mass of published material has been brilliantly though mercilessly utilised by the practised pen of Emil Ludwig in his biographical study *William II*.

The Crown Prince William has followed his father's example by entering the ranks of authorship. His

Memoirs were skilfully edited by Karl Rosner, the novelist, who had shown his sympathetic interest in the Imperial family by his poignant study of the last weeks of Hohenzollern rule entitled *The King*. The jottings of the lonely exile in the foggy little island of Wieringen began in March, 1919. 'It is evening. Not a soul, not a sound.' He consoles himself with the memories of a happier past. He dwells lovingly on the devotion of his mother and his wife, but frankly confesses to friction with his father, adding that it was a Hohenzollern tradition. They differed, he explains, both in views and temperament; but he speaks with respect of the Emperor's idealism, high personal character and love of peace. Bülow, he declares, was much the biggest of Bismarck's successors, and he would probably have achieved a tolerable peace had he returned to the Wilhelmstrasse after the fall of Bethmann, who had become impossible. On both occasions in 1917 when a new Chancellor had to be found, the Crown Prince urged his claims, and we learn that the Kaiser, contrary to the general belief, was ready to accept him. Failing Bülow, the author's alternative was Tirpitz. He writes with warm appreciation of King Edward; but the most interesting pages in the book describe the Kaiser's moral and physical collapse during the *Daily Telegraph* crisis in 1908. Summoned to Potsdam the young man found his father in bed, looking years older, broken and alone; and he expresses the view that the Emperor never fully recovered from the shock. The book, written at intervals between 1919 and 1921, has been widely read in Germany. Its sequel, entitled, *My War Experiences*, is of military rather than political interest. A supplementary volume, entitled *I seek the Truth*, sketches the foreign policy of the Empire from beginning to end, with the aid of the newly published materials, but without revelations of his own. The author has no difficulty in answering some of the common charges against his country, and he assures us that he was 'an almost daily witness that nothing weighed so heavily with the Emperor as the maintenance

of peace' ; but the picture of almost lamb-like innocence is a little overdone.

The foreign policy of Germany since Bismarck has been authoritatively described from different standpoints by skilful pens. Count Reventlow's fanatical hatred of England—'the Vampire of the Continent'—is known to everybody ; but he is a man of some ability, who during his public career has gathered information at first hand from Kiderlen-Wächter and other makers of history. The first edition of *Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik*, published in the spring of 1914, was followed in 1916 by a revised and enlarged version, dealing in greater detail with the years immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities. The author's explanations of the motives of foreign, and particularly of British, statesmen are often grotesque ; but he is never afraid to condemn the performances of his own rulers—above all their inveterate habit of provocative interventions, followed by humiliating retreats. On Germany's defeat he published a supplementary volume, of inferior value but not without interest, *Politische Vorgeschichte des Grossen Krieges*, in which he sought to discover the operative forces that had led to the cataclysm, and, needless to say, reached the conclusion that Great Britain had been the villain of the piece. European politics since 1890, he argues, are the story of England's struggle, first by diplomacy and then by arms, against a peaceful commercial rival.

When the revised edition of Reventlow's history was issued in 1916 it was fiercely attacked by a young Freiburg Professor, Veit Valentin. 'It is a classic example of historiographical demagogy,' he wrote in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, 'and we have no choice but to warn the public against the book and its author.' The article, reprinted as a pamphlet, created a sensation, for the Professor had recently been commissioned by the Foreign Office to write a history of German foreign policy based on the official papers. The fruits of his labours appeared in 1921, under the title of *Deutschlands*

Aussenpolitik, 1890–1918. Since scarcely more than a hundred pages are devoted to the narrative of events before 1914, his work in no way superseded Reventlow, who halts at the outbreak of war. Its value lies in the comprehensive survey of Germany's relations to the Great Powers on the eve of the catastrophe, and in the penetrating discussion of the events of July, 1914,—the most dispassionate analysis of the problem of responsibility which had yet appeared in Central Europe. He places Russia first among the offenders, Austria second, France, England and Germany third. France, he argues, had for years stimulated Russia's will to war. Sir Edward Grey did his utmost to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, but he was blind to the danger of Russian chauvinism. Germany's error was in imagining that an Austro-Serb conflict could be localised. 'None of the Powers,' he concludes, 'was wholly innocent, none alone guilty. The world spirit was ready for the world war.' From this condemnation Belgium is excluded, and he pays a warm tribute to the loyalty with which she discharged her obligations of neutrality.

Of far greater value than Reventlow or Valentin is the series of volumes in which Otto Hammann, for many years head of the Press Department of the Foreign Office, has described German policy from the fall of Bismarck. Three volumes of reminiscences, *Der neue Kurs*, *Zur Vorgeschichte des Grossen Krieges*, and *Um den Kaiser*, bring the story down to the fall of Bülow in 1909. A supplementary work, entitled *Der missverstandene Bismarck*, summarising the material in the preceding volumes relating to foreign affairs, has appeared in a revised form, and has recently become available to English readers as *The World Policy of Germany, 1890–1912*. A fifth volume, *Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit*, portrays Kiderlen-Wächter and Bethmann-Hollweg and revealed important documents, among them the Kaiser's report of the Cronberg conversations with King Edward and Sir Charles Hardinge in 1908 and the 'ultimatum' to Russia in March 1909. Among the most valuable

features of this series are the story of the British offer of alliance during the Boer war, the scathing analysis of Holstein's activities, the affectionate study of Bülow's personality, and the full-length portrait of William II. The latter is perhaps the most impartial and penetrating characterisation of the monarch that we possess. The Kaiser, he complains, never grew up, and never learned from his own mistakes ; but his desire for the maintenance of peace was absolutely sincere. He was a stage hero, not a warrior. His real responsibility for the war is to be found in the pretentious and menacing utterances, public and private, which caused the world to believe that he aimed at conquest. 'The deepest tragedy of the Peace Kaiser in shining armour is that he will never understand his own share in producing the situation which led to the war.'

While Hammann's volumes, embodying as they do so much of the inside history of the Wilhelmstrasse, must always retain their value, Reventlow's survey has been in the main superseded by the far more authoritative and impartial work of Erich Brandenburg, *Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege*. No other country possesses such a masterly delineation of its foreign policy during the last generation of peace. The Leipzig Professor, who had already displayed his powers of judgment and research in his classical volumes *Die Reichsgründung*, was permitted to utilise the archives up to the outbreak of war. The earlier part of the work offered a useful summary of the documents already published in *Die Grosse Politik* ; but the later chapters, covering the years which had not yet been reached by Dr Thimme and his collaborators, formed a contribution to history of the highest value when published in 1924. Here for the first time was a narrative of German foreign policy during the last years of peace based on the official documents. The author's frank criticisms of the Wilhelmstrasse have not pleased all his compatriots, and his verdicts on the diplomatists of the Entente do not always carry conviction beyond the German frontier ;

but his book is a striking example of independence and courage. Like many other experts in Germany and elsewhere he reserves his sharpest censures for Bülow, who declined Chamberlain's advances, drove the British Empire into the orbit of the Dual Alliance, intensified French hostility by his Moroccan bluff, and squandered what was left of the friendship of Russia by outpacing her in Turkey and by backing Austria throughout the Bosnian crisis. On the other hand the Professor, unsparing though he be in his condemnation of the clumsy performances of Bismarck's successors, finds no evidence whatever of a will to war in the Kaiser or his responsible advisers. His story is a record of blunders, not a revelation of criminal intent.

The same independence and a good many similar verdicts meet us in the critical narrative of Theodor Wolff, entitled *Das Vorspiel*. The brilliant editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, who served his apprenticeship as the Paris Correspondent of his paper, can boast of being wise before instead of after the event. Beginning his survey in 1900 he finds little but a series of costly errors to record. He was against the fleet policy, against the Morocco menaces, against the annexation of Bosnia. The *Einkreisung*, he holds, was Germany's own fault. Though the volume is a sustained indictment of his statesmanship, the magnanimous Bülow, who appears in these pages in a singularly attractive light, has honoured the fearless journalist with his friendship, and the most valuable pages are those which record his opinions and reminiscences. In a striking letter, dated July 10, 1923, the Prince enumerates his reasons for refusing the Chamberlain offer, which his correspondent would have desired him to accept. In *The Case for the Central Powers* General Montgelas not only supplies a clever summary of the European situation since 1907 and an expert analysis of the problem of the outbreak of war, but also contributes to our knowledge from the Reichsarchiv at Potsdam and other sources. We learn, for instance, that Germany, like Italy, refused to co-operate

in the punitive measures against Serbia suggested by Austria to her allies in July 1913.

Though Prince Bülow's masterly survey, *Imperial Germany*, first published in 1913, appeared in a new form in 1916, the addition of a chapter on 'German Militarism' and the omission of anti-Socialist criticism do little to alter its character or increase its value. His adroit apologia is supplemented by the important work of Spickernagel, *Fürst Bülow*. The biographer, who compares his hero to Hardenberg, describing him as 'a political Grand Seigneur, perhaps the last in Germany,' defends his policy, and summarises the latest evidence relating to the *Daily Telegraph* interview. But by far the most valuable portions of the book are from the pen of the ex-Chancellor himself. While the name of his successor was never mentioned in *Imperial Germany*, Bethmann's apologia, on the other hand, opened with a hint that the situation he inherited was almost hopeless. This grave accusation was promptly and sharply repudiated by the Prince in a long letter to the editor of the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, reprinted in these pages. After defending his rejection of the British offer of an alliance, his campaign against Delcassé and his support of Austria in 1909, he carries the war into the enemy's camp. Agadir, he asserts, was far more resented in France than the Tangier speech, and the Liman mission was much more disastrous to Russo-German relations than the so-called ultimatum of 1909. Bethmann's conviction that the war was inevitable recalls to his critic the rejoinder of Napoleon to a defeated General's excuse: 'La Fatalité, Sire!' 'La Fatalité, l'excuse des maladroits et des incapables.' Of equal interest and larger dimensions is the correspondence with Bassermann, the eloquent leader of the National Liberals, who stood in the same sort of relation to Bülow as Bennigsen had stood to Bismarck. The letters cover the period from 1911 to 1915, and are filled with criticisms of 'poor Bethmann,' whom the Prince compares to Caprivi. The curtain falls on the failure of the

mission to Italy. 'They should have sent me to Rome four months earlier. I am like a doctor who is only called to the bedside at the last moment.' The Prince's letters from the Villa Malta are supplemented by a detailed and vivid account of the development of Italian policy by the German Military Attaché in Rome, based on his despatches from October, 1914, till the declaration of war against Austria in the following May. Our knowledge of Bülow's principal henchman in the Reichstag is increased by the volume *Ernst Bassermann*, an intimate record by his daughter Karola. 'In what hands is the Reich!' wrote the spokesman of the National Liberals in 1912, whom the weakness, inexperience, and misplaced idealism of Bethmann filled with anxiety, and whose thoughts were continually directed to strengthening the armaments of his country for the approaching struggle.

The unwisdom of the policy pursued by Bülow and his master has been exposed by Professor Johannes Haller, with a skill and pungency rare in German political literature. His little book, *Die Aera Bülow*, is the expansion of a magazine article which appeared as far back as January, 1917, when the German people believed that it would win the war. 'Germany,' he declares in his preface, 'was strong; but the strongest becomes weak when he undertakes a task beyond his strength. Germany pursued a policy which tempted fate. It was known as *Weltpolitik*, and its track lay across the waves.' The true cause of British hostility, he adds, was the construction of the German battle-fleet, and nothing else. That elementary truth was repeatedly pointed out by the Ambassador in London, Count Wolff-Metternich; but the men in Berlin were deaf and blind. 'We never wanted war with England,' declares Haller, 'but we provoked her to fall upon us.' Bülow's sin against the German people was that he allowed his country to drift into a danger-zone, regardless of warnings, and that he needlessly incurred the suspicion and enmity of a nation which had no greater desire than to remain a friend. The accusation that Germany

desired and planned a war is rejected by Haller as decisively as by the most orthodox of German apologists ; and for proof of his contention he points to the entire absence of a fixed policy and of diplomatic preparation for the life-and-death struggle which ensued.

No recent political autobiography contains so many piquant revelations on the Bülow era as that of Baron von Eckardstein, who played a prominent part in the social and political life of England at the turn of the century. His *Lebenserinnerungen* have been abridged and translated with rare skill by Professor George Young with the title *Ten Years at the Court of St. James's;* but students require the three volumes of the original, which contain correspondence between London and Berlin of the highest value. The story of the attempts of Chamberlain, warmly backed by Lord Lansdowne and the Duke of Devonshire and tepidly approved by Lord Salisbury, to make an alliance with Germany on the eve and during the course of the South African war, had been outlined by Hammann in the second volume of his reminiscences ; but the details of the negotiations were first revealed by the tall and handsome Guardsman who came into diplomatic prominence during the prolonged illness of his ageing chief, Count Hatzfeldt. It is a curious irony that when Bismarck proposed an alliance he met with no response in Downing Street, and that when we returned the compliment some years later we met with no effective response from Berlin. Our offer was prompted by our isolation, arising from the apparently unchanging hostility of France and Russia and intensified by the world-wide condemnation of the Boer war ; and the cause of its repulse was the fear that an alliance with Great Britain would involve Germany in the traditional quarrel between London and Petrograd. The main author of its rejection was the inscrutable Holstein, on whose half-crazy activities Eckardstein throws a shaft of blinding light ; but Bülow himself was almost equally convinced that it was best for Germany to keep her hands free.

We are now able to check Eckardstein's spicy

narrative by the corresponding volumes of *Die Grosse Politik*, which, in addition to convicting him of certain editorial liberties with his material, diminishes the importance of his *rôle* and enlarges that of Count Hatzfeldt, his official chief. With the aid of these two works Dr Eugen Fischer, Secretary of the Reichstag Committee of Inquiry, has reconstructed in elaborate detail the story of the discussions which began in 1898 and ended in 1901. His massive volume, *Holstein's Grosses Nein*, though containing no fresh material, is of the greatest assistance to the study of the evidence on which it is based. Writing with unusual spirit and force, Fischer charges Berlin with missing a heaven-sent opportunity of averting the world war and the downfall of the Empire. He differs from the editors of *Die Grosse Politik*, not only in treating the Eckardstein evidence with greater respect, but in attributing to the British Government a keener desire for the alliance of which Chamberlain was the most active sponsor. His title is explained by the fact that behind the pliable Bülow stood Baron von Holstein, the *Eminence Grise* of the Wilhelmstrasse from the fall of Bismarck till his dismissal in 1906. Since the Kaiser was not informed of everything that was going on, and Bülow had a difficulty in making up his mind, the momentous decision, he declares, lay to a large extent in the hands of the permanent official, who expected war between England and Russia with the confidence of an astronomer awaiting an eclipse. When the hour struck England would seek help from Berlin, whose price would be raised to the full extent of her suppliant's need. Till that fateful moment arrived offers of an alliance were merely deep-laid but happily transparent schemes to use Germany as a catspaw. Such was the perverse and fanatical logic of Holstein, and such was the system which he compelled his superiors to adopt.

No one who has followed the diplomatic revelations of recent years would accuse Fischer of exaggerating the importance of the Mystery Man of the Wilhelmstrasse.

The scanty references in the diaries of Hohenlohe and Busch conveyed but little notion of his activities. The public learned something of the character of the suspicious recluse from the brilliant study by his friend Maximilian Harden in the first volume of his *Köpfe*; but it was not until the Imperial system lay in ruins that the almost incredible story was revealed by Hammann and Eckardstein and confirmed by the papers of Prince Eulenburg, who knew him first as an intimate friend and later as the deadliest of foes. Our knowledge has been enlarged by an elaborate study in the autobiography, *Aus meinem Leben*, of Prince Alexander Hohenlohe, who, as private secretary to his father during his Chancellorship, had abundant opportunities of observing the despot of the Foreign Office. The picture of wrongheaded activity has been completed by the publication in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, in December 1925, of a selection from the vast number of letters to his banker in which Holstein made use of official knowledge for the purposes of speculation. The revelation is the more paradoxical from the fact that the old bachelor lived in great simplicity in a distant and unfashionable quarter of Berlin.

Bülow suggested Bethmann-Hollweg as his successor, but he lived to confess his mistake. The unsullied character and love of peace of the fifth German Chancellor are as incontestable as his incapacity for his post. He knew nothing of foreign affairs at the time of his promotion in 1909, and the lack of unified control was increased by his recommendation of the masterful Kiderlen as Foreign Secretary. The first volume of his *Reflections on the World War*, admirably translated by Professor George Young, is pitched throughout in a minor key. We seem to hear the plaintive accents of Hamlet lamenting that the times were out of joint and that he was called to set them right. Since Russia was irrevocably lost, he explains, the only chance of escape from *Einkreisung* was an agreement with England. His policy was to meet British demands in regard to the fleet in

return for a neutrality pact, but neither side proved willing to make the sacrifice needed for a bargain. The Kaiser, with Tirpitz and the Pan-Germans behind him, refused serious naval concessions, and the British Government, closely linked to France and Russia, merely promised not to make or join in an unprovoked attack. The negotiations began in 1909, were interrupted by the Agadir crisis, were resumed by Lord Haldane at Berlin, and broke down after the prolonged discussion which followed his return. Though the British and German Governments co-operated in maintaining the peace during the Balkan wars, and a new confidence, mirrored in the Bagdad Railway and the African agreements, began to prevail, the division of Europe into two camps was in no way modified. Thus when the murder of Francis Ferdinand provided Austria with the desired pretext for a final reckoning with Serbia, Bethmann, like his master, accepted his ally's contention that the termination of Serb intrigues against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy was a matter of life and death and that the *casus foederis* was therefore involved. We have as much or as little right to blame Germany for standing by Austria at this moment as to blame France for her unconditional support of Russia. But the Chancellor should have insisted on being consulted at every stage of a perilous enterprise, instead of handing a blank cheque to the incapable Berchtold. This assumption of unlimited liability, combined with the ostentatious surrender of control, deprives Bethmann of all claim to statesmanship ; for when he tried to rein in the runaway Austrian steed he found that it was too late. His pages on the outbreak of war depict a good man struggling with a situation to which he was unequal, and contributing by his blunders to the catastrophe which he was as anxious as any man in Europe to avert. Like the pacific Aberdeen in 1854, he drifted into war. He naturally allots the main blame to Russia for declining to localise the Austro-Serb conflict ; but it was his business to be aware that Russian prestige would almost certainly forbid it to be localised.

The *Memoirs of an Ambassador*, by Freiherr von Schön, Foreign Secretary from 1907 to 1910 and thenceforward Ambassador at Paris till the outbreak of war, belong to the post-Holstein era at the Wilhelmstrasse. The position of Foreign Secretary in Germany has never been one of the coveted posts, involving, as it usually does, responsibility without power. On occasion, as in the case of Bülow under the aged Hohenlohe, and, Kiderlen-Wächter under the inexperienced Bethmann, the Minister may make himself felt ; but as a rule he is nothing but the understudy of the Chancellor. Schön, indeed, the most modest of men, never attempted to be anything else. His term of office, however, synchronised with important events, including the Kaiser's visit to Windsor in 1907, the Bosnian crisis, and the *Daily Telegraph* incident, on all of which, as on the days of decision at Paris in 1914, he throws fresh light. His verdict on the Kaiser closely resembles that of Hammann. ' He was denied the gifts which would have been of most use to him as a ruler, such as a capacity for cool, careful and prudent reflection. He was a man of great merits but considerable shortcomings. His was not a well-balanced mind. He was inspired by an earnest desire to administer his exalted office faithfully, full of ambitious ideas, and confident that he would be given strength to carry them out. But his restless activity repeatedly came to a standstill, unknown to the general public. He was seized with fits of despondency, and had thoughts of abdication. In public life the imperious pompous ruler, in the quiet of his home life a human being like others, a good man, whose simplicity and refreshing candour were very attractive. It would be difficult to decide which was most consistent with his true character.'

No two men could differ more widely in character and temperament than Schön and his successor in the Wilhelmstrasse. That the former was a good-natured mediocrity is as undeniable as that Kiderlen-Wächter was one of the ablest, if not the ablest, of German diplomatists of the post-Bismarckian era. Every one was

aware that his rise in the hierarchy had been cut short by the sudden loss of Imperial favour ; that he had spent ten years in quasi-banishment at Bucharest ; and that, when the Kaiser's stubborn opposition to his return had at last been overcome by Bethmann-Hollweg, he had less than three years of life to show his mettle at the Foreign Office. The curtain has now been lifted by Ernst Jäckh, whose volumes, *Kiderlen-Wächter*, *Staatsmann und Mensch*, enriched by the lively letters and telegrams to Hedwig Kypke, the inseparable companion of his middle and later years, reveal the rough-mannered Swabian in a gentler light. The publication of his political correspondence and memoranda has on the whole enhanced his stature, though few readers are likely to share the enthusiasm of his biographer. ' He came too late and went too soon,' writes Jäckh, ' to succeed in his task of averting the great catastrophe by his Europeanisation of German policy.' It is true that he coached Bethmann-Hollweg in the rudiments of Anglo-German *rapprochement*, ' the most difficult of all questions,' as the new Chancellor phrased it, before he himself reigned in the Wilhelmstrasse, and that he described himself as an opponent of Tirpitz, ' because I fear his policy will bring us war with England.' Yet he remains for all time the man of Agadir, the sole author of a *coup* which, though not unprovoked by the blunders of French diplomacy, brought war with England within sight and tightened still further the bonds which bound us to Paris and Petrograd. Neither in the so-called ' ultimatum ' to Russia of March, 1909, which he drafted for Bülow, nor in the Panther's spring did he seek for war ; but his blows on the diplomatic table were little calculated to create confidence in the pacific aims of the German Empire. The most attractive aspect of his political character was his sturdy independence. Like his friend Holstein he was untainted by Byzantinism, and his nickname of ' the eel ' for Bülow and ' the worm ' for Bethmann reveal his contempt for the type of statesmen which the Imperial system produced. Further unflatter-

ing comments on his colleagues and snapshot pictures of his own activities are to be found in the curious letters to a Russian lady which Caillaux has printed in a lengthy appendix to the second edition of his volume *Agadir*.

The warnings of Count Metternich from Carlton House Terrace to his Government are recorded in *Die Grosse Politik*; but the ex-Ambassador has recently thrown new light on the efforts of Bethmann to hold Tirpitz in check. When the *Novelle*, drawn up by the German Admiralty at the end of 1911, threatened still further to widen the gulf that had yawned at Agadir, the Chancellor asked the Ambassador to set forth the objections to the scheme. *Meine Denkschrift über die Flottennovelle*, published in *Europäische Gespräche*, in February, 1926, is a document of the highest importance, embodying as it does the convictions of the experienced diplomatist whose opportunities of observation were unique. 'A *Novelle* will drive England again to the side of France, and there she will stay. We can no longer hide from ourselves that the English Entente system and her hostile policy towards us rest primarily on the fear of our growing strength at sea. A navy policy going beyond the Navy Law leads in my opinion to war.' In rescuing from oblivion this solemn warning, dated January 10, 1912, Count Metternich draws the obvious conclusions from the results of its neglect. 'To East and West were two powerful nations united and allied against us. In this dangerous situation we ought not to have forced England by a superfluous and unlimited *Flottenpolitik* to have drawn ever closer to them. To the naval policy we owe in the first place the war, in that it drove England into the arms of our opponents, who, without the hope of English support, would not so lightly have risked the struggle. To it we owe also the defeat, thanks to the unlimited submarine war, which, undertaken with insufficient resources, provoked the entry of America and thereby sealed our fate. When the statesman is compelled to yield to the soldier in peace or war, a people is usually doomed.' England's anxiety,

he testifies, began in 1904, and was noticed by him at Kiel in that year. Prince Bülow was too clever not to recognise the danger of unlimited construction, and was working for its limitation when he fell. Bethmann longed for the friendship of England, but accepted the Navy Law and its pendants as sacrosanct, instead of attempting to alter a course which was contrary to the interests of the State.

Lichnowsky's famous brochure, *My Mission to London*, confirms the conviction of his British friends that from the moment of his arrival in 1912 he worked for peace with whole-hearted devotion, and throughout the Balkan wars and the colonial negotiations, which occupy a leading place in his narrative, left no stone unturned to restore friendship and confidence. Moreover British readers received with special pleasure his affectionate tribute to the lofty character and attractive personality of Sir Edward Grey. On the other hand the legend that Kühlmann was a traitor in the camp dies hard. Having failed to persuade him to tell his own story, Mr Thomas Rhodes entered the lists on behalf of his friend in 1925. *The Real Kühlmann*, though an ill-constructed little book, explodes the absurd fable that a bellicose Councillor of Legation plotted with a bellicose Wilhelmstrasse behind the back of a pacific Ambassador. 'Kühlmann was never on good terms with the German Foreign Office,' writes Lichnowsky himself in a letter to the author which forms by far the most valuable portion of the book. 'The war was not premeditated, and therefore he could not be a party to a plot which never existed.' Kühlmann's reading of the situation in fact was exactly the same as that of Wolff-Metternich and Lichnowsky. The familiar charge that he was sowing tares in Ulster on the eve of the war is countered by the assertion that he never visited Ireland in his life, and by the production of holiday letters written from his Bavarian home during the last weeks of peace. His pacific programme was expounded in the striking anonymous brochure, *Deutsche Weltpolitik und Kein*

Krieg, written as a counterblast to Bernhardi by Dr Plehn, the correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung* in London, and published in 1913.

The efforts of official diplomacy to bridge the widening gulf between Great Britain and Germany were supplemented by the semi-official mediation described at length in Huldermann's *Life of Albert Ballin*. The famous director of the Hamburg-America line had no political ambitions, and he declined the Kaiser's offer of a ministerial portfolio ; but he threw himself with the utmost zeal into the task of averting a collision in the North Sea. When the movement for a big navy began he lent it his active assistance ; but as soon as its disastrous consequences became manifest in the estrangement of the British Empire, he opposed the naval race. The policy of co-operation and compromise which he favoured in the conduct of his business appeared to his practical mind as wise in the sphere of high politics as in the shipping world. Conversations between Ballin, the friend of the Kaiser, and Sir Ernest Cassel, the friend of King Edward, began in 1908, and the Governments were kept fully informed of their progress during the following years. His efforts were gratefully acknowledged by Bethmann ; and when the negotiations for a naval agreement and a neutrality formula finally broke down in 1912, he urged a meeting between Mr Churchill and Tirpitz. He described the war as ' the most stupid of all wars,' and declared that no Bismarck was needed to prevent its occurrence.

The German side of the story of the Bagdad Railway may be studied in the writings of Karl Helfferich, whose full-length biography of his father-in-law, Georg von Siemens, describes the early struggles of the enterprise, and who himself played a leading part in the financial negotiations for the construction of the final portions of the line. His description of the long negotiations with the French group, of its withdrawal, and of the collective effort of German and Austrian bankers to find the capital, forms the most valuable portion of his slender volume,

Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges. The larger story of Germany's activities in Turkey is authoritatively summarised in his brochure, *Die Deutsche Türkenpolitik*, which rebuts the accusation that German policy in Turkey was in any sense the cause of the war, and illustrates its readiness for compromise by the conciliatory settlement of the Liman crisis and by the equitable agreement with Great Britain in 1914.

Jagow's *Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges* covers part of the same ground as that of the Chancellor under whom he served, but deals more in detail with the last year of peace. Appointed to succeed Kiderlen-Wächter at the beginning of 1913, the new Foreign Minister entered energetically into the negotiations with Great Britain which followed the failure of the naval and neutrality discussions. On more than one occasion he publicly testified to the revival of Anglo-German confidence; but, like Bethmann, he now declares that Sir Edward Grey was too closely enmeshed in the Dual Alliance to be a free agent. 'A convinced adherent of the Balance of Power,' he writes, 'he fell into ever closer dependence on the Entente Powers, and thus, though unconsciously, fostered the aggressive policy of France and Russia.' Jagow's growing confidence in Great Britain received a rude shock when he discovered the Anglo-Russian negotiations for a Naval Convention in the early summer of 1914. He had no more desire for a world war than Bethmann or the Kaiser; but his writings leave the impression that he saw little chance of averting it, since, in his opinion, Austria was bound to ward off the Serbian menace, since chauvinism was in the saddle at Petrograd, and since Great Britain was tied to the chariot-wheels of the Dual Alliance.

In addition to supplying his own version of the causes and outbreak of the war, Jagow has twice entered the lists in criticism of his contemporaries. On the appearance of Lichnowsky's *My Mission to London* he published a sharp reply in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 23, 1918, of which a translation appeared

in June, 1918, in *International Conciliation*, No. 127, the monthly journal of the American Association for International Conciliation. He argues that to have ignored the vital interests of Austria, as Lichnowsky had urged, would have been to drive her into the arms of Russia and to sacrifice Germany's economic interests in Turkey. While acknowledging that Sir Edward Grey pursued a policy of mediation during the Ambassadors' Conference and during the Balkan wars, he denies that he separated himself from his Entente associates. Germany was also a mediator, giving moderating counsels to Vienna to a far greater extent than Lichnowsky was aware. 'It seems to be his constant and sole anxiety that Russia should not be humiliated. A humiliation of Austria is obviously a matter of indifference to him.' The Ambassador, he declares, saw everything through his London spectacles, and in the colonial negotiations strong pressure was needed to induce him to represent the desires of his Government with more emphasis. Lichnowsky's narrative, he concludes, is so full of inaccuracies, distortions and slanders that neither his statements nor the conclusions which he bases on them can be accepted.

The publication of Lord Grey's *Twenty-Five Years* recalled Jagow to the fighting line with his interesting little volume *England und der Kriegsausbruch*. Confining himself to the brief period between the Serajevo tragedy and the British declaration of war, the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs taxes him with ignorance of conditions on the Continent, such as Russo-Serb intrigues against the integrity of the Austrian Empire, and of subsequent documentary revelations, such as Serbian complicity in the murders. Admitting that the British statesman desired to maintain peace and never directly encouraged Russia and France to fight, why, he asks, did he not try to hold them back? Believing direct Austro-Russian negotiations to be the best method, why did he not urge Russia not to interrupt them? To Lord Grey's plea that he had no *locus standi*, Jagow retorts with the

inquiry whether the peace of Europe did not constitute a justification. Moreover, did Russia's interests in Serbia, based on Imperialist aspirations to protect the Slav peoples, compare in importance with the vital interest of Austria to defend herself against the disintegrating intrigues and ambitions of her neighbour? Again, if Germany had held back Austria, her only ally, in a vital question, would not the latter have turned away from this useless alliance? Germany did not accept the proposal for a Conference, because she did not consider it fair for the friends of Russia—and Italy was one of them—to sit in judgment on Austria in a matter which, unlike the issues presented to the Ambassadors' Conference in the Balkan wars, affected her existence. Even had Germany agreed, Austria would probably have declined.

In addition to explaining the mind of the Wilhelmstrasse in July, 1914, Jagow adds to our information on two important points. His conversation with Sir Edward Goschen on June 16, 1914, in reference to Sir Edward Grey's vague declaration on the Anglo-Russian naval negotiations, was intended as a polite warning to let them drop. Secondly, the Chancellor's bid for British neutrality on the evening of July 29 was, he explains, completely misunderstood in Downing Street. Bethmann was compelled to consider the possibility of war, as he feared that Russia might attack Austria. The Kaiser believed, and Jagow agreed, that Russia and France would not initiate a conflict unless they reckoned on British help, and by seeking an assurance of British neutrality the German Government chose the best means to avert war. The Chancellor was not prepared for Sir Edward Goschen's question on the same evening as to the fate of the French colonies, and Jagow admits that his impromptu reply was not altogether happy.

We are fortunate in possessing the testimony of the German, the French and the British Ambassadors in Petrograd in the days of decision. The full and very valuable diary of Pourtalès from July 24 to August 1,

Am Scheidewege zwischen Krieg und Frieden, portrays Sazonoff and the Tsar as weak men personally inclined to peace but swept along by the irresistible current of chauvinism. 'From the beginning of the crisis I realised that the chief danger to peace lay in the large-scale military preparations immediately set on foot. I am still convinced (he is writing in 1919) that a peaceful solution of the Serbian conflict was possible if Russia had listened to the friendly warnings of Germany and had abstained from military measures while negotiations were in progress.' The Russian mobilisation, he adds, was a deliberate challenge to Germany, who did not desire war. No one has ever charged the veteran Ambassador with chauvinism, and the story of his efforts to keep the peace makes sad reading. The most dramatic pages describe the final conversation with Sazonoff, who on this occasion created 'an absolutely helpless impression, which confirmed my view that in the last phase of the crisis he allowed himself to be carried down by the stream and had made himself the mere tool of the fire-eaters.'

The testimony of Pourtalès is supplemented by the brochure of Lieutenant-Colonel Bernhard von Eggeling, *Die Russische Mobilmachung und der Kriegsausbruch.* After describing the far-reaching reforms of Sukhomlinoff and the unblushing chauvinism of military circles, the German Military Attaché narrates his official activities from the moment when the news of the Austrian ultimatum reached Petrograd on July 24. He courageously avows his astonishment that the Wilhelmstrasse allowed the despatch of a document 'which indubitably conjured up the danger of war'; but his gravest censures are reserved for the Russian authorities who, while inaugurating preparations for mobilisation as early as July 25, systematically deceived him in regard to their decisions. The driving forces, we are told once again, were not the vacillating Tsar nor the timid Sukhomlinoff, but the Grand Duke Nicholas and Januskevich, the Chief of the Staff; and Eggeling lays the blame of the catastrophe on

the men who ordered general mobilisation in the middle of hopeful negotiations.

Dr. Mühlon's Diary made a considerable stir in Entente countries when it was published early in 1918 ; for the 'Kautsky documents' had not yet enabled the world to understand the policy of the Wilhelmstrasse in the last weeks of peace. The ex-Director of Krupp's, who had given up the profession he 'loathed' at an early stage of the war, and had taken up his residence in Switzerland, related that on a visit to Berlin on July 17, 1914, he had learned that the Kaiser had given his ally *carte blanche*—a piece of information which appeared to him to indicate not only the imminence but the will to war. A vigorous censure of the violation of Belgian neutrality is followed by denunciatory extracts from the author's diary to the end of 1914.

The strongest figure in German politics since the fall of Bismarck is Tirpitz, whose *Memoirs* describe his long career and his efforts to create a German High Seas fleet. He bitterly assails those who stood in his way or those who, like Bethmann-Hollweg, failed to afford him the requisite support. His standpoint, like that of Reventlow, is that Germany required sea-power ; that its attainment involved at any rate the temporary jealousy and antagonism of Great Britain ; that attempts to purchase her amity were a waste of effort ; and that in consequence friendship with Russia should be maintained or regained. The weakness of his argument is that Russia, if not irrevocably lost, could at best only have been reconciled by acceptance of her ambitions in the Near East, involving as a consequence the virtual dissolution of the Austro-German partnership.

Tirpitz' powerful and deeply interesting book, published as it was soon after the war, has been widely read at home and abroad, and a cheap abridgment has enjoyed an enormous sale in the Fatherland. The historian, however, will find greater documentary treasures in the Admiral's massive work, *Politische Dokumente*, the first volume of which, *Der Aufbau der Deutschen*

Weltmacht, carries the story from 1905 to the outbreak of hostilities. The Preface strikes the note of impenitent realism which colours every page in the book. A great people, he declares, can only be made and kept safe by Power, since Might has always gone before Right. The downfall of Germany was due not to an excess of *Machtpolitik*, but to a lack of *Machtsinn*. Mainly owing to the Kaiser's support, the construction of naval power was methodically carried through ; but the development of the army lagged far behind both the needs of the situation and the resources of the taxpayer. With a stronger army and a wiser attitude towards Russia, the position of the nation would have been unassailable. Moreover, the creation of a powerful battle-fleet, instead of rendering war with England probable or inevitable, was the best means of keeping the peace, since no gentler argument would compel the Mistress of the Seas to respect the interests of other Powers. Its object was not war but 'an independent position in the world.' A danger-zone had to be traversed while the growing navy was still weak enough to invite a sudden attack, and a temporary increase of the estrangement originated by commercial rivalry was inevitable ; but the perils of a premature conflict were averted, and by 1914 England had grown accustomed to the German fleet.

The narrative is presented as a drama of four acts,—the first fleet crisis of 1905–6, the second of 1908–9, the third of 1911–12, and the *détente* of 1912–14. 'England's love of peace and consideration of our interests grew *pari passu* with our fleet, as was proved by her concessions in the era inaugurated by Lord Haldane's mission to Berlin. In so far as any German was responsible for the war, it was Bethmann-Hollweg, who sacrificed the interests of national defence for the *beaux yeux* of perfidious Albion. It is the fashion nowadays to contrast the conscientiousness of Bethmann with the frivolity of Bülow. I reply, Bülow would have prevented the war.' The restrained criticisms of Tirpitz in

Bethmann's *Reflections* are in strange contrast to the full-blooded denunciations of his *bête noire* and the corroding poison of his 'policy of impotence.' The battle which raged so fiercely at Berlin was reflected, as we learn from these pages, in Carlton House Terrace, whence Count Metternich sent home eloquent warnings and the Anglophobe Naval Attachés secretly denounced him as 'a national misfortune.' In no German work do we find such a devastating picture of disunion in high places. Even Bülow, laments the author, was beginning to listen to the siren voice of the Ambassador at the end of his Chancellorship. The final impression we are intended to carry away is that of the Grand Admiral standing at bay against a host of weak-kneed civilians and finding steady support in his Imperial master alone.

The second and still larger volume of *Politische Dokumente*, with the provocative title *Deutsche Ohnmachtspolitik im Weltkriege*, carries the Admiral's story through the war. While the first volume argued that the building of the fleet was in no sense the cause of the war, the second maintains that there was no need to lose the game. Confining himself in the main to the naval struggle, he bitterly laments that the fleet did not play for high stakes at the outset, and that the submarine weapon was not vigorously applied in the summer of 1915. What was the cause of this fatal inertia? 'I had expected that the direction of naval warfare would be confided to my charge, or at any rate that I should have a deciding influence. It was not to be. I found myself relegated to the uneasy position of a mere adviser and spectator.' The responsibility for this humiliating exclusion is charged not to the Kaiser, 'whose judgment in great questions was usually sounder than that of his *entourage*,' and who was surrounded by 'a Chinese wall,' but to his inveterate enemy the Chancellor. Bethmann, declares the Admiral, ought to have pressed his resignation at the outbreak of war, as the Kaiser in his heart desired; for his retention of his post involved the loss

of the war. He had run after England in time of peace, and he continued to do so when the two nations were locked in a deadly embrace. He saw the world, not as it was, but as he wished it to be, for the meaning of Power was hidden from his eyes. The struggle with England, he believed, was a passing storm, after which his well-meant efforts at reconciliation would be resumed. For this reason the war must be waged on the principle of limited liability, and the fleet must be kept in cold storage to serve as a pawn in the peace negotiations. The technical superiority displayed by the German fleet at the battle of Jutland confirmed the Admiral's conviction that a fearless policy of attack might have worked wonders in the early months of the war.

The main interest of this formidable volume lies in the contention, which is pressed as strongly by Tirpitz as by Ludendorff, that the chief cause of defeat was the lack of the will to victory in the civilian rulers. Not that the author idealises every naval uniform, for some of his sharpest arrows are aimed at his brother Admirals. It was the fault, however, of the Government that the best brains in the service were not fully utilised, and that the national enthusiasm of a 'horribly unpolitical people' was not properly nourished. The fall of the temperature was the inevitable result of the refusal to employ all the weapons in the armoury of a people fighting for its life. The real enemy was not Russia, with whom there was no reason for Germany to quarrel, but England, the strongest and most ruthless of her foes. The first half of the volume describes the vain efforts of the author to set in motion the High Seas fleet, the second his demands for the continuous employment of the submarine weapon against the heel of the English Achilles in 1915 and 1916. The Kaiser's adoption of the advice of the Chancellor to keep the United States out of the war as long as possible reduced the submarine campaign to a farce, and after two resignations were refused in 1915 a third was pressed in March, 1916. Though he had possessed no influence during the conflict, explains the

Admiral, the public did not realise his position, and he could no longer cover with his ministerial responsibility a situation which had become impossible. The Kaiser's chilly annotations on the letter of resignation show that he parted with the greatest of his Ministers without reluctance. The closing chapter records the adoption of the Tirpitz policy of unlimited submarine warfare in January, 1917, when it was too late to reap its advantages. Though all the leading figures on the German stage appear in this volume, no letters are more interesting than those of Ballin, who agreed with Bethmann in desiring to save the High Seas fleet and with Tirpitz in wishing a remorseless blockade of England in 1915.

The attacks on the Tirpitz policy have been reinforced by a distinguished member of his own profession. In a brochure published in 1908, Admiral Galster argued that Germany's defensive needs would be better served by light cruisers, submarines and coast-defences than by the construction of battleships which, however unaggressive in intention, were bound to arouse the suspicions of England. Bülow was impressed by the reasoning, and brought it to the attention of Tirpitz, who replied that to change the course would be interpreted as climbing down. When the German fleet was at the bottom of the sea Galster recalled his warnings and traced the result of their neglect in his spirited volume, *England, Deutschland und die Flotte*, which deals faithfully with the Grand Admiral's arguments. 'In Tirpitz's eyes a State which co-operates with England is her vassal. He confounds friendship with patronage. The fleet did not cause the war, but it caused the ranging of the Powers against Germany and Austria.' Neither the German nor the English Government or people, he adds, desired war, and England endeavoured to prevent it. 'England was not the enemy that Tirpitz painted. He turned her into one. Defence of trade, coastal defence, the preservation of peace were not his motives. His fleet was to be an instrument of world-policy.' The less spectacular naval policy recommended by the author in 1908, he reflects

sadly, would have left the German Empire and German frontiers intact.

We are fortunate in possessing a number of works which, taken together, explain the political conduct of the German Government throughout the conflict. The main interest of the second volume of Bethmann's *Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege*, as of his first, is the story of his unsleeping conflict with the military advisers of his master. Before the war the enemy was Tirpitz ; and when Falkenhayn, who never meddled in politics, fell in 1916, Bethmann's days were numbered. Ludendorff regarded the Chancellor as unequal to his task and incapable of keeping the home front unbroken. His fall was postponed by his surrender to the demand for the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare ; but the respite was brief. When in July, 1917, Erzberger announced his belief, hitherto confined to the Socialists, that the war must end in a compromise, and framed a peace resolution repudiating annexations, the Generals secured the resignation of the Chancellor by threatening their own. The story is told at length by their victim, who concludes his narrative with the bitter observation that henceforth Germany was governed by the military. Among the topics discussed by the fallen Chancellor is the entrance of the United States into the war ; and his brief account should be compared with the detailed narrative of Count Bernstorff. The Ambassador's book, *My Three Years in America*, is one of the most convincing apologias of our time. He argues that in January, 1917, President Wilson was both willing and able to secure an acceptable peace, and that he was only prevented by the mad resolve to resume unlimited submarine warfare. His belief in the President's sincerity was shared by the Chancellor ; but the latter, agreeing in this respect with Ludendorff, failed to detect any signs of readiness for a compromise on the part of the Entente, which had angrily repudiated the Peace Offer of the Central Powers, and had responded to the President's request for a statement of terms by an opulent programme of annexations and partitions.

More detailed and scarcely less authoritative is the narrative of Helfferich in his two stout volumes *Der Weltkrieg*. He had already served an apprenticeship in high politics by negotiations connected with the Bagdad Railway, and when the young Director of the Deutsche Bank became Minister of Finance and Vice-Chancellor, he loyally supported Bethmann in his struggle against the Generals. No prominent actor on the German stage during the world war except Ludendorff creates a greater impression of ability and resource. His book, which is of first-rate importance for the economic as well as for the political history of the conflict, is too little known in England.

When Bethmann fell in July, 1917, the Chancellorship was offered to Count Hertling, Prime Minister of Bavaria, and the Nestor of the Catholic party. He refused, and the post was given to a little known Prussian official, who describes the confused intermezzo which followed in his autobiography, *Für Staat und Volk*. When the war broke out Michaelis was Under-Secretary of Finance, and in the following year he was appointed to the post of food controller. In these colourless pages we find no clue to the mystery why a thoroughly second-rate man, destitute alike of intellectual distinction and political prestige, was called to the helm at a time of storm and stress. His clumsy handling of his first problem, the Reichstag Resolution, aroused the distrust of the majority parties, to whose hostility he succumbed after three months. The most valuable portion of the long chapter on his Chancellorship describes the discussions arising out of the Pope's peace note to the Powers of August 2; and his report on the Crown Council in Schloss Bellevue on September 11, when the attitude of the German Government towards Belgium was first officially defined, is of considerable interest. On this occasion the Kaiser revealed himself once more as variable but not unmanageable; and the author devotes a special chapter to the praises of 'a noble, idealistic and deeply religious man and a true friend of

peace.' As a staunch Conservative he expresses relief that his resignation saved him from having to support the bill for the reform of the Prussian franchise, which Bethmann had persuaded his master to promise.

Michaelis required a very short period to demonstrate his incapacity, and when in the autumn of 1917 Hertling was again invited to shoulder the burden, he could no longer decline. The story of his Chancellorship was told after his death by his soldier son, who was recalled from the front to serve as his secretary. The record published under the title of *Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei* is of the highest interest for the conflict between the military and the civil authority. We derive the same impression as from the testimonies of Bethmann and Helfferich—the all-devouring activity and brutal strength of Ludendorff, the moderation but also the powerlessness of the Kaiser. When the *débâcle* of 1918 led to a Parliamentary Cabinet, the tired old Conservative withdrew from his hopeless struggle with foes abroad and critics at home. An attractive picture of the scholar-statesman is painted in Viktor Naumann's *Profile*, which contains interesting studies, based on personal knowledge, of various German and Austrian celebrities.

Our knowledge of German policy during the war is supplemented by Erzberger's adroit apologia, *Erlebnisse im Weltkriege*. The South German schoolmaster had made himself a force in the years of peace, and during the struggle he became not only the leading spirit of the Catholic party but the most influential member of the Reichstag. His aid was sought by the Government in its efforts to keep Italy out of the war ; and the pages in which he describes the unavailing struggles of Prince Bülow and himself in Rome in the opening months of 1915 are a real contribution to history. Of no less importance is the record of his activities in carrying the Reichstag Resolution of July, 1917. At the opening of the conflict he had shouted with the annexationists ; but he quickly changed his course and became the most eloquent champion of a compromise peace. When

Germany was confronted with defeat in the autumn of 1918 he became a Secretary of State, headed the Armistice delegation, and with infinite difficulty secured a majority in the National Assembly at Weimar for the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles. Few of his contemporaries, indeed, made so much history in so short a time as this ambitious and rather unrefined man who feared neither responsibility nor unpopularity.

Scheidemann speaks for the Socialists as Erzberger for the Catholics ; but the two apologias differ as widely as their authors. On the eve of war the Socialist leader was on holiday in South Germany, and, in anticipation of great events, purchased a large diary. When all was over he published selections from his entries under the title of *Der Zusammenbruch*. While other writers work up their material and dramatise their activities, Scheidemann photographs the scene as it moves. Though never officially employed, he was in close touch with the Government, and some of his pictures, such as those of the Stockholm Conference and the Chancellor crisis of 1917, rank as original authorities. From the commencement he envisaged the conflict as a war of defence, in which even victory should not justify annexations, and he was denounced by the Right for his advocacy of a 'Scheidemann Peace.' When the Empire fell in ruins he aided Ebert in curbing the wilder elements of the revolution, and became head of the Coalition Ministry which carried the Republic through the first half of 1919.

The diary of the Socialist leader was supplemented in 1921 by a valuable brochure entitled *Papst, Kaiser und Sozialdemokratie in ihren Friedensbemühungen im Sommer 1917*. The new evidence, declares the author, proves the Kaiser to have been as eager for peace in the early summer of 1917 as the Socialists themselves,—he wishing to use the Pope for the purpose, they their fellow-workers abroad. The monarch's conversation with the Nuntius Pacelli at the beginning of July, if accurately reproduced in these pages, reveals him as encouraging the Vatican to work for peace as the

best organ for its attainment. The Pope, declares Scheidemann, took up his mission from motives of the purest humanity, and carried it out with zeal and skill ; but his promising initiative was sabotaged by reactionary influences at Court. ' The more objectively one judges the Kaiser, the graver become the charges against his *entourage*.' When it became known that his mind was moving towards peace, he was haled back by anonymous letters and by assurances that England was on the rocks. As a member of the Committee of Seven, appointed to prepare a reply to the Papal Note, Scheidemann pleaded for an unambiguous declaration on the question of Belgium as the first and indispensable step. The Foreign Minister sent for him and argued that it would be ' a mistake to give away our only card,' adding that the Pope did not expect it, and that negotiations with England in regard to Belgium would soon begin. Scheidemann remained unmoved, for he knew that the opinion of the Vatican coincided with his own. That the possibility of peace in 1917 had been much greater than was known at the time to the Reichstag leaders increases the author's indignation against the malefactors working in the dark who pulled the strings to which the Kaiser danced.

Less influential and less familiar to the outer world than Erzberger and Scheidemann, was the veteran South German Liberal Payer, who served as Deputy Chancellor under Hertling and Prince Max of Baden, and whose well-informed memoirs, entitled *Von Bethmann bis Ebert*, repay careful study. An ex-President of the Württemberg Chamber and a member of the Reichstag since 1882, Payer was an outspoken champion of Parliamentary government ; but he frankly confesses that few shared his opinion before or during the early stages of the war, and adds that if Germany had won self-government would have had long to wait. His story begins with the Peace Resolution of July, 1917, when he became chairman of the Inter-Party Committee of National Liberals, Catholics, Democrats and Socialists set up after the

Chancellor crisis. The narrative becomes fuller with the fall of Kühlmann a year later, and is of special value for the period of Prince Max. Like other civilian chroniclers he denounces both the methods and the policy of the Supreme Command. The Kaiser, he declares, had no real influence on Hindenburg and Ludendorff. 'The former he revered too much, the latter he feared too much.' He has, however, little sympathy with the monarch, who detested the Reichstag, and scandalised a private meeting of party leaders by declaring that the struggle then in progress would be followed by a war of all the European peoples under his leadership against England. For Payer the question of Monarchy or Republic was not a matter of principle, unlike the reform of the Prussian franchise, which barred the way to liberty. He attributes the overthrow of his friend and hero Bethmann rather to the latter's support of franchise reform than to his handling of foreign affairs, and declares the Generals scarcely less responsible than the Junkers themselves for the postponement of a change promised in the Kaiser's Easter message of 1917 but unfulfilled when the revolution swept away its purblind antagonists. Payer was a convinced Liberal, and enjoyed universal respect ; but he lacked the ability and the driving power needed to grapple effectively with the Powers of Darkness.

Payer's opinions were shared by his bosom friend and fellow-Württemberger, Conrad Haussmann, whose letters and diaries during the war were published after his death under the title of *Schlaglichter*. Like Payer he championed Bethmann against his rancorous foes, and strongly supported the Reichstag Resolution of July, 1917. As a member of Prince Max's Cabinet his evidence becomes important for the closing weeks of the struggle, and he rendered valuable service to the new régime as Chairman of the Committee which drew up the Weimar Constitution. Men like Payer and Haussmann were Good Europeans, but their testimony reveals afresh the tragic impotence of German liberalism.

The development of the plans of the General Staff, in preparation for the war on two fronts which it was their professional duty to consider, is authoritatively described in the opening chapters of the first volume of the official work, *Der Weltkrieg, 1914–1918*, compiled by the staff of the Reichsarchiv. While the elder Moltke desired to remain on the defensive in the West, Schlieffen resolved to remain on the defensive in the East, striking at France through Southern Belgium. The intervention of Great Britain in a Franco-German conflict was anticipated, whether or not Belgian neutrality was violated, and a British force was expected to land in Antwerp.

When Moltke died 'of a broken heart' in 1916, his widow set to work to vindicate his fame; but the substantial volume entitled *Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente*, published in 1922, has failed to modify the popular verdict. The nephew of the great Battle-thinker had accepted the office of Chief of the Staff on the resignation of Schlieffen on condition that the monarch refrained from interference; but when the days of destiny arrived the fair-weather compact broke down. The correspondence with his wife extending over many years reveals a likeable personality, by no means of the 'blood and iron' type; yet when the blunders and obstinacy of the politicians had brought war within sight, the Chief of the Staff demanded rapid decisions. In a Memorandum of July 28, 1914, he argued that the interference of Russia in the Austro-Serbian dispute rendered war inevitable, and urged that France and Russia should be asked if they intended to fight. When Russia ignored the German ultimatum, a telegram from Lichnowsky reported that England would keep France out of the conflict if she were not attacked. The Kaiser jumped at the offer, and decreed that war should be waged against Russia alone. When the Chief of the Staff pointed out that such a dislocation of elaborate plans was technically impossible, he was roughly overruled, though his advice to demand the

occupation of Verdun and Toul was accepted. The brief crisis ended when it was learned that no such British offer had been made ; but his widow assures us that he never recovered from the agonising conflict provoked by the Kaiser's endeavour to hold up the military machine. After Moltke's official career was rudely terminated by his failure at the Marne, he drew up an apologia during his melancholy convalescence at Homburg. Among other revelations we learn that he had omitted from the Schlieffen plan the determination to march through the south of Holland as well as through Belgium, and that his draft of the ultimatum to Belgium contained a conditional promise of territorial expansion which the Foreign Office struck out.

The story of the war has been authoritatively told from the military side by the leading actors. Ludendorff's *My War Memories* were the first to be written and the first to be translated, and they have been read all over the world. The later chapters contain a good deal of political information ; for as the struggle continued Germany's super-man obtained an increasing control over every department of Government. We feel his driving force, not only in his apologia but in the memoranda collected in its sequel, *The General Staff and its Problems*, the object of which is to prove that ' a peace of understanding ' was unattainable, and to reveal how much important information was withheld from the Supreme Command by the Imperial Government. The most valuable portions of these volumes concern the peace offers and efforts of 1916–1918. Ludendorff's sudden conversion in the early autumn of 1918 from confidence in victory to certainty of defeat increased the difficulties of his Government ; and the controversy between the soldier and the civilians is fought out in the official publication on the events leading to the surrender and in his documented rejoinder. The *Preliminary History of the Armistice*, translated by the Carnegie Endowment, was issued by the German Government in 1919 ' to refute the spreading of false reports.' The documents

cover the period from the historic Conference at Spa on August 14, 1918, till the end of hostilities on November 11. 'These documents,' declares the Preface, 'should facilitate the formation of an impartial judgment on the discussions between the Supreme Army Command and the political leaders during the closing stages of the war.' The White-book contains all the representations made by the Generals, and the Preface sharply condemns the 'undecided and in fact contradictory opinions' of Ludendorff. To this pointed indictment he at once replied in three little volumes entitled *Entgegnung auf das amtliche Weissbuch: Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstandes*, in which he endeavoured to shift the blame on to the shoulders of his political superiors.

Ludendorff argued his case afresh in *Kriegführung und Politik*, which, to civilians at any rate, is the most interesting of his books. The best results, he argues, are secured when war and policy are controlled by a single hand, as with Alexander, Frederick the Great and Napoleon; but the model partnership of Moltke and Bismarck was scarcely less effective. The greater struggle of 1914, on the other hand, was lost by anaemic civilians who never understood that wars cannot be run on the principle of limited liability. The cause of Germany's defeat was 'politics,' only too faithfully embodied in the nerveless Bethmann, whose course was dictated by the Socialists and Democrats of the Reichstag. It was the Chancellor who kept the fleet inactive, who allowed pacifists and revolutionaries to undermine the home front, who interrupted the U-boat campaign in 1915 in the vain hope of placating America, who encouraged the enemy by the Peace Offer of 1916, and was the spiritual father of the Reichstag Resolution of 1917. With such a leader who could not lead Ludendorff contrasts in envious admiration the super-men of the Entente, who ruthlessly stamped out defeatism and raised propaganda to a fine art. Faced by such resolute foes there was never a possibility of a compromise peace. The alternatives before Germany were victory or humilia-

tion. To the charges that the military chiefs prevented a settlement by their extreme war-aims, and that they coerced the civil Government, he replies that their programme differed little from that of the Wilhelmstrasse, and that Bethmann and Hertling preferred to take their orders from the Reichstag. 'The undefeated army' went down before the treacherous attacks of its blinded fellow-countrymen, not before the sword of the enemy. 'Germany lost her nerve five minutes before the hour of decision.' In this manual of stern and unbending Prussianism it is scarcely necessary to say that anti-semitism plays a prominent part. The moral of the author is that wars can only be won by men like himself who understand the rules of the game and are given a free hand by the Government and people whom they serve.

To complete our survey of Ludendorff's writings we must mention the tiny brochure *Französische Fälschung meiner Denkschrift von 1912 über den drohenden Krieg*. The General denies the authorship (with which he had been charged by the *Temps*) of the sensational document on the strengthening of the German army, dated March 19, 1913, and published in the French Yellow-book of 1914, and denounces it as a clumsy mystification. 'The trains of thought were not born in a German brain, and in no way correspond to the ideas of the then Chief of the Staff.' General von Moltke, he adds, was thoroughly pacific, and his greatest fear during the winter of 1912–13 was to be dragged into a European war by some rash step on the part of Austria, where, in his opinion, a powerful party was urging a conflict. This brief vindication is accompanied by Ludendorff's own Memorandum of December, 1912, afterwards reprinted in *The General Staff and its Problems*, on the military situation and the necessity for an increase of the German army, in which the bellicose sentiments of the apocryphal document are conspicuous by their absence.

Hindenburg's autobiography, *Out of My Life*, like its writer, has been overshadowed by the dominating personality of his nominal subordinate. Its appearance,

he explained, was due not to any personal inclination to authorship but to the pressure of his friends. Nothing was further from his mind than to write a controversial treatise, much less an essay in self-glorification. The veteran Field-Marshal, who had fought at Sadowa and witnessed Sedan, was no super-man, and he is modestly aware of the fact. He was surprised at the call which came to him in 1916, and he never mentions the Kaiser without reverence. Austria, he shrewdly remarks, was capable of far more than she herself believed. The Turks were fine fighters, but they turned a deaf ear to German appeals on behalf of the Armenians. Even more colourless is the work of Falkenhayn, *General Headquarters and its Critical Decisions, 1914–1916*, which records the activities of the General Staff from the time that he superseded Moltke, after the battle of the Marne, till the moment when he was himself replaced by Hindenburg and Ludendorff on the entry of Roumania into the war in August, 1916. Writing in the third person, like Julius Caesar, the Chief of the Staff is explanatory rather than controversial, and political references are rare. He considered himself, in fact as well as in name, the servant of the Emperor, and made no attempt to dictate to the Government ; but, like other prominent soldiers, he fretted at the division of authority. During the spring and summer of 1916 he repeatedly requested to resign, on account of ' differences of opinion between the highest authorities on the weightiest questions of policy and the prosecution of the war,—a situation he could do nothing to change.' On hearing that the Kaiser had asked Hindenburg for advice he promptly resigned his post. In the interesting survey with which he concludes his narrative he argues that the situation bequeathed to his successor was serious—' it had never been anything else '—but was in no sense desperate. His apologia is supplemented by General Zwehl's biography, *Erich von Falkenhayn*, which utilises the family papers and endeavours to correct the popular impression that as Chief of the Staff he was a failure.

It is interesting to learn that he—and he alone of the military leaders—realised that the chances of complete victory vanished at the Marne.

Though his name was little known among the Allies during the conflict, the memoirs of General Hoffmann prove him to have played a part of unsuspected importance. The title of the book, *The War of Lost Opportunities*, prepares the reader for a critical attitude towards both the military and the political leadership. In the former sphere Falkenhayn is the whipping-boy, blind in his strategy, jealous of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and unwilling to co-operate loyally with Conrad. A devoted colleague of Ludendorff from the outset, Hoffmann became Chief of the Staff to Prince Leopold of Bavaria, who was appointed to the command of the Eastern front when the great Twin Brethren assumed control in 1916. Even then mistakes continued. The U-boat campaign was begun before there were enough submarines to make it a success, and Ludendorff should have remained on the defensive after the attack on Amiens in 1918 and advised negotiations for peace. But the statesmen were as blind as the soldiers. When Bethmann visited the Eastern front at the end of 1914 he asked Hoffmann how peace could be restored. 'The first condition,' replied the General, 'is that you declare that we do not wish to keep a single square yard of Belgian soil.' 'You are the first soldier who has told me that,' rejoined the Chancellor; 'it is entirely my own opinion, but if I were to say so in the Reichstag, I should be swept away by public opinion.' 'I was deeply distressed,' comments the author, 'that the Chancellor did not dare to say what he thought right for fear of losing his post.' In his account of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, where he represented the Supreme Command, he demolishes the fairy tale that he banged his fist on the table, and assures us that he reminded the Bolshevist delegates of the inexorable facts of the military situation without even raising his voice.

No German work on the war flames with such

volcanic passion as Colonel Bauer's *Der Grosse Krieg in Feld und Heimat*. 'My aim,' writes the *fidus Achates* of Ludendorff, 'is to show that Germany could have won the war, and that she succumbed not to her enemies but to the weakness of the Government and the criminal activities of political radicalism.' He states that Schlieffen resigned his position as Chief of the Staff in 1906 because his advice to choose that moment for the inevitable war was rejected. 'With him as our leader and Ludendorff as his right-hand man,' he meditates, 'we should have achieved the highest.' Bauer worked for years under Ludendorff in the Mobilisation Department of the General Staff. 'Even then he was the great man, seeing what was coming and trying to prepare for it.' Only a spirited policy, however, could have broken down the *Einkreisungspolitik* of the enemies of Germany, and Bethmann was not the man for such a task. As a member of the General Staff throughout the war, and the author of many of the documents published by Ludendorff, the Colonel throws fresh light on the bitter struggle with the civil Government. Dismissing the complaints about 'political Generals' as without foundation, he blames Hindenburg and Ludendorff for waiting so long before telling the Kaiser that Bethmann or they must go. 'Bethmann was instinctively the enemy of everything that savoured of manly strength, such as attack or fighting for victory. He had no comprehension of the German soul. Compromises and negotiations, with his eyes turned backwards—that was his way, and his guilt for the downfall of Germany is great. He will be remembered as Germany's grave-digger. Had a strong man been in his shoes, we should have won. Instead of leading, he was led by the Reichstag majority. His only talent was speaking.' It is a poor comfort to the writer that he took a leading part in his overthrow; for the change came too late to be of much use. Michaelis, who worked well with the General Staff, was quickly chased off the stage, and the aged Hertling was no better than Bethmann.

Colonel Bauer condemns the civilian chiefs not only for failing to mobilise the spiritual energies of the nation, but also for omitting to strangle political and economic *sabotage* in its cradle. He himself expected a revolution since 1916, when Ludendorff dismissed it as impossible, and the Kaiser, fed with sugary reports, turned a deaf ear to all warnings. The Crown Prince, who also realised the need of energy, declined to work against his father, and Ludendorff rejected Bauer's plan to overthrow Hertling. Under these circumstances the revolutionaries had free scope for their fell designs. When the tide of war turned on August 8, 1918, a Dictator might still have saved the country ; but instead of a Dictator there appeared Prince Max, the tool of Ebert and Scheidemann, as Bethmann had been the puppet of Erzberger. Even then something might have been saved from the wreck, for the military strength of the Entente was exhausted by the prolonged offensive ; but at this moment, when a supreme effort was required, the revolution stabbed the army in the back and laid Germany prostrate at the feet of her foes. An infantry division stood ready to fight the revolution, and only needed the Kaiser's word to advance ; but the monarch was falsely informed that it was too late. ' God punish the murderers of the German people,' cries the Colonel in the bitterness of his broken heart.

The same lament that the Government failed to govern is voiced, though in less acrid tones, by General von Wrisberg, Director of the Supply Department of the War Office. The first volume of his memoirs, entitled *Der Weg zur Revolution*, was written to show ' the thinking portion of the German people by whom they were handed the poison bowl.' Germany, he declares, was defeated on the home front. The patriotic unity of the Socialists began to fail in 1915 ; pacifist agitation commenced in 1916, and was fostered by the Reichstag Resolution of 1917. Like Bauer he flagellates Bethmann for failing to keep up the spirit of the people and for tolerating defeatist propaganda. ' I wrote several memo-

randa on the domestic situation and its needs,' he cries plaintively, 'but the Kaiser never saw them. Nor was I ever summoned for an audience. He wished the best, but how could he intervene if he was not informed?' While civilian writers complain that power passed into the hands of the Supreme Command, Wrisberg regretfully records how the Reichstag gradually gained an influence 'to which it had no right, and became more or less the Government.' Both civilian and military witnesses agree in their picture of the Kaiser as a mere figure-head, destitute alike of power, policy or will. The naval mutiny of 1917, and the general strike of January, 1918, both fully described in these pages, inaugurated 'the systematic preparation for revolution and peace' under the lead of the Minority Socialists, whom their Majority rivals lacked the courage to resist. An appendix of press extracts and manifestos is added to confirm the thesis that Imperial Germany was ruined not by militarism but by democracy.

The same instinctive contempt for democratic ideas and institutions appears in General von Stein's apologia, *A War Minister and his Work*. Beginning with an interesting sketch of Schlieffen, 'the acutest intellect I ever knew,' he gives a friendly but less admiring picture of the younger Moltke, who told him that the Kaiser had been strongly opposed to the war and had only consented with a heavy heart. We meet the usual complaints of the flabby Bethmann, 'whereas a true statesman is afraid of nothing,' and of the tired Hertling; but the most interesting pages are those in which he trounces his allies. The Austrians were frivolous and incompetent. 'It was a favourite trick in Vienna to cry "We can't go on," when they wanted something which could only be obtained by special pressure.' The Austrian press was full of attacks on Germany, while the Emperor Karl was ruled by his wife and was rumoured to receive foreign gold. If Austria was effete and disloyal, Hungary was difficult and ungrateful. The Bulgarians wanted everything and would give nothing in return. The Turks

were inefficient and corrupt. 'All our allies proved weak and unable to provide for themselves. For fear they might desert us, we treated them with far too much consideration.'

The autobiographies of two other well-known soldiers are worthy of notice. In *Menschen und Dinge* General Freytag-Loringhoven claims to have devoted more study to the subject of war than any other officer in the German army. Like other colleagues of Schlieffen he speaks with affectionate admiration of the famous Chief of the Staff, on whom he has published a valuable monograph. In Bülow he missed a 'warm, big, German heart,' and he censures his policy in Morocco. On the outbreak of war he was selected to represent the German army at Austrian headquarters, where he found Conrad cordial and the Archduke Frederick charming. Appointed Quartermaster-General a few months later, he formed an unusually high opinion of Falkenhayn, and expresses his pity for the lonely figure of the Kaiser who asserted his authority in time of war too little rather than too much. General Keim's *Erlebtes und Erstrebtes* embodies the creed of an impenitent militarist, who slashes out, not only at the pacifists and Parliamentary opponents of the Armament Bills, but at the Government itself. The cause of the collapse, argues the President of the Wehrverein, was not the 'too much' of his organisation but the 'too little' of the responsible authorities.

The German contribution to the story of the settlement is to be found in the two large-scale series, *Materialien betreffend die Waffenstillstandsverhandlungen* and *Materialien betreffend die Friedensverhandlungen*. The first describes the negotiations from Erzberger's historic visit to Foch till the armistice melted into the peace. The second contains the documents and correspondence exchanged between the German Delegation at Versailles and the Allies, including the well-known *White-book Concerning the Responsibility of the Authors of the War*, drawn up by Professors Delbrück, Mendelssohn—Bartholdy and Max Weber and General Count Montgelas

and translated by the Carnegie Endowment. The official declarations of Brockdorff-Rantzau from his acceptance of the Foreign Office in December 1918 till his resignation in June 1919, when the Weimar Assembly decided to accept the Treaty of Versailles, were published by him under the simple title of *Dokumente* in 1920, and appeared in an enlarged edition with a preface by Professor Delbrück in 1922. From beginning to end, declares the author, his policy was consistent. Having accepted the Fourteen Points, on the strength of which Germany had laid down her arms, in letter and in spirit, he declined to sign a treaty in which they were violated, or to shoulder obligations which it would be impossible to fulfil. As Minister to Denmark he had won the reputation of an able and liberal-minded man ; and students of these pages will probably agree that no German diplomat could have presented the demand of the new Germany for fair play with greater argumentative skill. A useful summary of the events in Paris from the German standpoint is provided in Margarethe Rothbart's *Die Grossen Vier am Werk*.

The story of the revolutionary movement which started at Kiel and kept the country in anxious turmoil for many months has been authoritatively told in Heinrich Ströbel's *The German Revolution and After*, Eduard Bernstein's *Die deutsche Revolution*, and Gustav Noske's *Von Kiel bis Kapp*. All these witnesses are Socialists. The spirited apologia of the latter, the most important of the three, describes his drastic measures for the suppression of anarchy, which earned him the undying hatred of the Spartakist and Communist minority.

CHAPTER II

AUSTRIA

AUSTRIA'S contribution to the revelations which enable us to write or rewrite recent European history, though smaller than that of her ally, is none the less of the greatest importance. When the realm of the Hapsburgs had ceased to exist Professor Pribram obtained leave from the Government of the Austrian Republic to publish the Secret Treaties concluded by Francis Joseph since the creation of the Austro-German Alliance in 1879. Among the jealously guarded treasures now exhibited to the public gaze are the five treaties of the Triple Alliance ; the League of the Three Emperors concluded in 1881 and renewed in 1884 ; Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in 1887, which was concealed from Francis Joseph at the wish of the Tsar ; the Austro-Serb Alliance of 1881 ; the alliance of Roumania with the Central Powers in 1883 ; the two Mediterranean agreements between Great Britain, Italy and Austria in 1887, and the Austro-Russian agreement relating to the Balkans in 1897. The value of his work, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, is enhanced by a masterly record of the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the Triple Alliance in 1882 and its successive renewals and modifications, based on the official material in the Vienna archives. A translation has been published by the Harvard University Press under the skilled supervision of Professor Coolidge. A popular sketch of Hapsburg diplomacy before and during the war is supplied in Professor Pribram's admirable little book, *Austrian Foreign Policy*.

With the substitution of Aehrenthal for the easy-going Goluchowski in 1906, Austrian foreign policy entered on a period of activity and enterprise unknown since the days of Andrassy. The achievements of his six years at the Ballplatz are excellently summarised by Berthold Molden's friendly pen in *Graf Aehrenthal*, and in the second volume of Friedjung's last and unfinished work, *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus*. The greatest of recent Austrian historians was not conspicuous for balanced judgment; but he was for some years on friendly terms with Aehrenthal, and his chapters on the Bosnian crisis, utilising unpublished documents of the greatest value, offer the most authoritative account yet written of a vital chapter of European diplomacy. The true story, it need hardly be said, is very different from that which was current in England at the time and is still widely believed; for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was secretly arranged with Izvolsky, who claimed in return the opening of the Straits to Russian warships. The case against Aehrenthal as it appeared to the *Times* correspondent in Vienna may be found in the first volume of Mr Wickham Steed's lively and controversial autobiography, *Through Thirty Years*.

While numberless pictures have been painted of the last of the Hohenzollerns, Francis Joseph, the most impersonal of men, remains in some degree an enigma. When Mr Wickham Steed sought information from men who had worked with him for many years, they frankly replied that they were unable to gratify his curiosity. Was the head of the Hapsburgs to the end the real ruler of his dominions, or had he become with advancing years and misfortunes little more than a machine, conscientiously grinding out the routine business of his exalted station? For an answer to such questions we have no Waldersee or Eulenburg to guide us, no Imperial *marginalia* to dispel the gloom. *Franz Josef in seinen Briefen*, selected and edited by O. Ernst, is meagre and colourless. The object of the publication is to exhibit the man, not to explain his policy; and the impression

we derive is that of a prosaic, almost wooden personage, utterly lacking in intellectual and artistic tastes, incapable of expressing and perhaps even of feeling deep affection, and finding his keenest happiness in the mountains with his gun at Ischl and Mürzsteg.

We learn more from Margutti's volume, *The Emperor Francis Joseph and his Times*, in which the author, a member of the Aides-de-Camps' Department of the Imperial Household, depicts a great gentleman, dignified, kindly and diligent, at once so simple in character and so instinctively conscious of his Imperial position that the Byzantinism of Potsdam was unthinkable at the Hofburg and Schönbrunn. Yet though Margutti was in almost daily contact with him for seventeen years, he never penetrated behind the veil which hid the inner life of his master. The most interesting pages deal with the breaking of the storm. Nothing was so important to him, we are told, as the maintenance of peace ; and Margutti describes the Emperor's agitation and dismay at Ischl on July 25 while awaiting and on receiving the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum. He had assumed that the demands would be accepted, and was horrified when the policy of the Ballplatz bore its inevitable fruit. Margutti's assertion, however, that Francis Joseph was against the war is much too strong, and is contradicted by the testimony of Conrad and other witnesses. Had he cared to join hands with Tisza, the most powerful personage in his dominions, in the first week after Serajevo, there can be little doubt that the two men could have arrested the fall of the avalanche ; and his omission to do so involves his full responsibility for all that followed. To him as to his advisers the conflict was for the defence, not the extension of his dominions, and at the outbreak of hostilities he observed to Frau Schratt that the Dual Monarchy would be lucky if it escaped with a black eye. The best sketch of the ruler and the reign is to be found in Friedjung's essay 'Franz Josef' in his *Historische Aufsätze*. The distinguished historian had learned much

secret history from prominent actors on the political stage and at Court. The Emperor, he declares, had come to regard war as inevitable, though he had no wish for it, and after Serajevo he resolved to fight. He had, however, no illusions, and in the second year of the war he gravely remarked : 'The struggle is beyond our strength.'

There is a useful summary of the career of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand in the third volume of the *Neue Oesterreichische Biographie* ; but for his personality and policy we must turn to the testimony of his admiring private secretary, Paul Nikitsch-Boulles. In *Vor dem Sturm : Erinnerungen an Erzherzog Thronfolger Franz Ferdinand* the luckless Archduke appears as an energetic and far-seeing man, his portfolio filled with projects of reform which, in the author's opinion, might have saved the Dual Monarchy, but which the exasperating inertia of his uncle refused to entertain. If the conflict between the Hofburg and the Belvedere is the main theme of this volume, the Ballplatz fares no better at the critic's hands. Franz Ferdinand was allowed no influence in foreign affairs, and it was only on the rarest occasions that he attempted to intervene ; yet he made no attempt to conceal his convictions. He condemned the annexation of Bosnia as needless and provocative ; but if in 1908 the Government appeared too rash, in 1912 it incurred his wrath by its short-sighted timidity. As a close friend of King Carol and a sharp critic of Magyar domination, he desired to maintain the Roumanian alliance in full vigour, and favoured the marriage of the future Emperor Karl with a Roumanian princess. When in the early summer of 1912 King Carol informed the Ballplatz that the Balkan States were planning to attack Turkey, he begged the Archduke to support his suggestion of an Austro-Roumanian warning that no weakening of Turkey in Europe would be allowed. The Emperor, after consulting his German ally, who denied the danger of a Balkan attack, informed his nephew that he intended to remain a peaceful ruler. The resentment of the

Archduke at this decision was scarcely less than that of King Carol, whose country was in consequence drawn into the orbit of the Triple Entente. The Archduke was equally incensed at the rejection of his advice and that of Conrad to inform Italy on the outbreak of the Tripoli war that Austria could not tolerate the slightest weakening of Turkey, even in her overseas possessions.

The sensational legend of Konopischt recorded by Mr Wickham Steed in *The Nineteenth Century*, February, 1916, like the fable of the Potsdam Crown Council, melted away on the publication of the report of Baron Treutler, Prussian Minister in attendance on the Kaiser, by Jäckh, in the magazine *Deutsche Politik*, May 14, 1920. The conversation turned mainly on Roumania and on the tension between Turkey and Greece. The host, giving rein to his usual Magyarophobia, denounced Tisza's treatment of the Roumanians in Hungary, and begged his guest to secure its modification. The Kaiser promised to instruct Tschirschky continually to repeat to Tisza, 'Sir, Remember the Roumanians.' In place of two plotters carving up the map of Europe for the benefit of the disinherited children, we find the Kaiser endeavouring to calm his excitable host and to modify his dislike of Turks and Magyars. A valuable addition to our knowledge of the Archduke's thoughts and plans is to be found in Professor Lammasch's record (in the memorial volume entitled *Heinrich Lammasch*) of the discussions to which he was invited as a legal expert in 1910 and 1911, and which dealt with such thorny problems as the title of his wife and the revision of the *Ausgleich*. We shall learn still more of an interesting personality from the forthcoming memoirs of Count Polzer-Hoditz.

Sir Edward Grey regarded Aehrenthal as the stormy petrel of European politics; but to Conrad von Hötzendorff, who was appointed Chief of the Staff in the same year that the new Foreign Minister was installed, he appeared as an incorrigible pacifist. Conrad was discovered and promoted by the Archduke Francis

Ferdinand; and from the moment that he assumed office he bombarded the Foreign Office and the Crown with exhortations to go to war. When the Empire which he had served lay in ruins he sat down to restate his convictions and to describe his manifold activities. *Aus meiner Dienstzeit* is the largest collection of materials for history produced by any of the prominent actors on the stage of the world-war. In describing his work as 'a mosaic, not a picture,' the author forestalls the complaint of the reader that he has to fight his way through thousands of pages in which political nuggets of the highest value are imbedded and sometimes almost lost in towering slag-heaps of military detail.

In a striking Preface Conrad proclaims himself an impenitent realist. The individual, he declares, counts for little in history, for men and nations alike are dominated by the struggle for existence. Force is the law of life, and the statesman must shape his course accordingly. He proceeds to depict the situation of Austria at the time of his appointment, with no fewer than four hostile neighbours on her borders,—Russia, Roumania, Serbia and Italy. Serbia and Italy were the two most immediate dangers, and Aehrenthal's coup of 1908 provided a golden opportunity of removing the first. 'If Austria desired to retain Bosnia, war with Serbia was inevitable. Russia was behind her, but in 1908–9 neither Russia nor Serbia was ready to fight. Austria was ready, but she missed her chance.' For the annexation crisis, which grouped the antagonists for the coming fray, the first volume, covering the years from 1906 to 1909, will always remain an indispensable authority.

The second volume, which carries us to 1912, finds Italy in the foreground of the picture. Convinced by prolonged observation and travel that she was only biding her time to fall on her ally, Conrad demanded timely measures of defence. Aehrenthal, however, was in control, and the opportunity of falling on her flank while entangled in the sands of Africa was allowed to

pass. In November, 1911, the Emperor, angered by the importunity of the Chief of the Staff, summoned him to his presence and lectured him like a naughty boy. 'I forbid these attacks on Aehrenthal,' he cried. 'They are directed against myself. I make the policy. My policy is a policy of peace. It is possible, indeed probable, that there will one day be war, but it will not occur till Italy strikes.' The Chief of the Staff was removed from his post and appointed 'Inspector of the Army'; but Aehrenthal was a dying man, and three months after his victory he was dead. Berchtold proved 'more open to ideas,' and on the outbreak of the Balkan war Conrad was reinstated as Chief of the Staff at the express wish of his old patron Francis Ferdinand. Among the plums of the second volume is the account of a mission to Bucharest in November, 1912, to arrange for military co-operation in case of need. Not only King Carol, whose loyalty to the Central Powers was never in doubt, but the public opinion of Roumania, reported Conrad, was ready to join in the struggle against Russia if hostilities broke out.

The third volume, covering 1913 and the first half of 1914, revolves round Russia and Roumania. Germany's devotion to peace throughout the Balkan war, argues the author, was bad for Germany herself, bad for Austria, and bad for the cause of European peace. For in 1912 it was still possible to destroy Serbian irredentism in the germ, though the opportunity was less favourable than in 1908–9. 1913, he adds, was the last moment that the operation had any chance of success. 'I tried to get it used, but in vain. After the Treaty of Bucharest I ceased to urge war, and indeed attempted to postpone it till our military preparations—the only chance of saving Austria—improved. We could now merely wait till our enemies attacked us. The initiative had passed to the Entente.' Austria was despised as timid and weak. Roumania, recently so friendly, was now lost. The Triple Entente displayed an enviable unity and clearness of aim, unfettered by scruples or hesita-

tions. While Conrad desired to postpone a conflict till the Austrian army was stronger, Moltke, whom he visited at Karlsbad in May, 1914, argued that delay diminished the chances of the Central Powers, since Russia was steadily regaining strength.

The fourth volume, though covering only the last month of peace and the first two months of war, contains material of primary importance for the question of responsibility. The murders of Serajevo, argues Conrad, were not the act of an isolated fanatic, but Serbia's declaration of war against Austria. Such a ringing challenge could only be answered in one way—a war not of vengeance but of self-defence. The patience of Austria had already diminished her prestige and encouraged her enemies in their fell designs. To take no action at such a moment would have stimulated the disruptive tendencies within the empire. There was no choice. That Francis Joseph agreed to war proves that it was in truth inevitable. 'The monarchy was seized by the throat, and faced the alternative of being strangled or making an effort to ward off the attack.'

The memoranda of the Chief of the Staff make welcome additions to our knowledge of official opinion in Vienna. On receiving the news of the murder Conrad urged instant mobilisation. He told the Emperor that the time was bad, but that it would become worse. Berchtold argued that the result of the inquiry must be awaited. Tisza, whose vision was dominated by the interests of the Magyar aristocracy, at first opposed war on the ground that Roumania would attack Hungary, and that annexations of Serb territory would diminish Magyar influence. Baron Giesl, the Austrian Minister at Belgrad, preached war on the ground that Serbia not only hated but despised Austria. Francis Joseph was not a pawn, and was quite aware of what he was doing. These attitudes were generally known at the time; but Moltke's intervention at Vienna is a piquant revelation. 'Austria must at once mobilise against Russia, Germany

will mobilise,' he telegraphed early in the morning of July 31. At the same time the Austrian Military Attaché wired from Berlin : ' Moltke says the situation is critical unless Austria mobilises at once against Russia. Refuse England's new peace offer. Germany unconditionally with you.' These telegrams were shown by Conrad to Berchtold, who exclaimed in astonishment, ' Who is in command ? Moltke or Bethmann ? ' Berchtold had interpreted a telegram of the Emperor William to Francis Joseph on the previous evening as a sign of retreat ; ' but now I have satisfactory assurances from the highest military authority.' Later on July 31 came a further telegram from Moltke, ' Will Austria leave Germany in the lurch ? ' These frantic appeals were unknown to the Chancellor and produced no immediate result ; for Austria postponed her declaration of war against Russia for a week for her own military convenience.

The fifth volume, covering the last three months of 1914, was published after the death of the author in August, 1925. Disdaining the attempts of his contemporaries to ' veil their failures and focus the lime-light on their own successes,' Conrad prefers to send his diary and portfolios to the printer, exhibiting the actors without their masks,' and enabling the reader to view the military situation as it developed day by day. But with the outbreak of war the book loses its main political interest and becomes a quarry for the military specialist. The volume ends with a retrospect from which we learn that the author was not informed of the real character of the great catastrophe on the Marne ; that his advice to transfer the main struggle to the East was refused by Falkenhayn ; that Berchtold secured the diversion of a needless number of troops to Serbia from the Galician front, where they were urgently needed. Thus, despite his promises, he follows the customary practice of attributing the downfall of his country to the neglect of his advice before and during the conflict. The mistake of the Central Powers, he concludes, was that they lived

in a world of illusions. 'A policy which aims only at peace is doomed, for it tries to dodge the struggle for existence which holds us all in its grip. While the pacific ruler thinks to maintain peace by alliances, treaties and royal visits, the man of action makes straight for his goal, cuts the knots and attains his end. Contrast the negative policy of Francis Joseph and the no less pacific William II, aiming only at the preservation of their territory, with the energetic policy of a Poincaré, the aggressive policy of a Pasitch, the sly policy of a Bratiano, the deceitful policy of a Salandra, and the forward policy of the Russian Panslavists, and one understands the isolation and defeat of Germany and Austria.' Thus the veteran warrior passes from the scene with the bitter cry on his lips that his countrymen and their allies were lured to their downfall by the pacifist mirage.

No recent work from an Austrian pen surpasses in political interest Szilassy's autobiography *Der Untergang der Donau-Monarchie*. Appointed to Petrograd when the Austro-Russian Entente in the Balkans was scrapped by Aehrenthal, the Baron testifies to the popularity of his chief, Count Berchtold, and recounts his own efforts to restore the wires to Vienna. When Izvolsky summoned the Chargé d'Affaires to his presence and shrieked at him, 'Non, le Baron d'Aehrenthal n'est pas un gentilhomme,' Szilassy, instead of telegraphing the insult to Vienna, related the incident to Sazonoff, who observed: 'Vous avez très bien fait de ne pas prendre au sérieux ce que vous a dit M. Izvolski.' When Sazonoff became Foreign Minister he assured the author that the relations of the two countries would now improve. Berchtold's nomination to the Ballplatz filled his subordinate with apprehension, not on account of his views, which were still Russophil, but because his terrifying incapacity made the appointment seem like 'a bad joke.' His fears were confirmed when the new Minister, on the outbreak of the Balkan war, called him to his side at the Ballplatz. 'To my horror I discovered in Vienna that a large party desired war with Serbia and, if necessary,

with Russia as well. Most of the officials were aggressive and played with fire. The Minister vacillated between sensible and bellicose inspirations.' The soul of the war party was Conrad, whom Francis Joseph described to the author as 'clever but not wise,' and against whose driving power 'the absolutely childlike mentality' of Berchtold had no chance. The pressure of the Chief of the Staff became so strong that the harassed Minister invited the author to argue the case for peace with Conrad at his house. That a conflagration was averted in 1912–13 was due neither to Berchtold nor to Conrad but to Francis Joseph and to Francis Ferdinand, both of whom were strongly pacific. The outbreak of the world war, which he attributes in part to the waning energies of the aged Emperor, found him far away in the Legation at Athens; but on his return to Vienna in 1916 he endeavoured by memoranda and personal interviews to strengthen the hands of the Emperor Karl, who hated the war no less heartily than himself, but lacked the power to overcome the obstacles to peace.

The crisis of 1914 found Berchtold no longer new to his task or distracted by uncertainty, but as fully resolved as Conrad himself to punish Serbia for her intrigues against the integrity of the Hapsburg dominions. The *Austrian Red-book* published in 1919, of which Allen & Unwin published a translation in three small volumes, enables us to reconstruct the diplomacy of Vienna from the Serajevo murders to the outbreak of war, as fully as the Kautsky volumes reveal the activities of Berlin. Berchtold appears determined on war with Serbia, even at the cost of a world-wide conflagration; and the protocols of the Crown Councils which decided on the ultimatum show that his views were shared by all his colleagues except Tisza, who, however, quickly withdrew his opposition. The acceptance of the ultimatum was neither generally expected nor desired at Vienna, which possessed painful experience of the value of Serbian promises, and where it was believed that a tactical surrender would merely postpone the inevitable

Russo-Serb attack. Not less significant than the Crown Councils before the despatch of the ultimatum is that held after the declaration of war against Serbia, when Bethmann joined Sir Edward Grey in exhorting Vienna to moderation. It was now agreed to avoid a direct refusal, but to add that, while the Austrian advance into Serbia must continue, the mobilisation of Russia must cease. Thus the readiness of Austria for an eleventh-hour compromise, of which much was heard at the beginning of the war, melts into thin air. The materials contained in these volumes enabled Roderich Gooss, who was commissioned by the Republican Government to examine the archives, to compile the first authoritative record of the diplomacy of the Ballplatz in the critical weeks. Perhaps the most interesting portion of *Das Wiener Kabinett und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges* is the narrative of the drafting of the celebrated Memorandum on the European situation which accompanied the appeal to Berlin.

The silence of Berchtold was broken by his brief telegraphic replies to four questions addressed to him by Karl von Wiegand (an American correspondent who had met him on the Isonzo front, where the Count was serving as a cavalry captain and dispatch rider), arising out of Gooss' volume on the outbreak of the war.

i. Why did he alter the records of Cabinet meetings? 'Because the report was not made in shorthand, and therefore required to be corrected.'

ii. Did Tschirschky give him the impression that Berlin wanted war with Serbia? 'Repeated conversation with Tschirschky could create no other impression than that his Government expected warlike action on our part against Serbia. Especially a conversation I had with him during the early half of July convinced me that if we did not show this time we were in earnest, then on the next occasion Berlin not only would not support us but would in fact "orient" itself in some other direction. What that would have meant for us, in view of the ethnographic composition of the Dual Monarchy

and the territorial aspirations of our neighbour States, need not be explained.'

iii. Was it true that he did not give Tschirschky the text of the ultimatum? 'Tschirschky was informed of the material points before the final redaction of the note, and the text was given him two days before it was presented.'

iv. Was it true that he gave no answer to Lord Grey's last proposal for mediation forwarded by the German Government? 'We accepted in principle Lord Grey's last mediation proposal, with two reservations which the military found necessary.'

These replies were published in the *Chicago Herald* on October 10, 1919, and are reprinted as an appendix to *The Inner Story of the Austro-German Intrigue*, by the Slovene Joseph Goricar, an ex-member of the Austrian Consular service. Finding himself on leave in the summer of 1914 he urged Forgach, the strong man of the Ballplatz, to avert war, made no secret of his admiration for Russia, and after the outbreak of hostilities transferred his services to the cause of the Entente. His polemics illustrate afresh the triumph of racial sympathies over political allegiance in the Slavonic portions of the polyglot empire.

The atmosphere of official Vienna in the last weeks of peace is faithfully reproduced in the volume of Freiherr von Musulin, *Das Haus am Ballplatz*. 'It was the tragedy of my career,' he writes, 'that I rose high enough to be able to see how things occurred but not high enough to share in their direction.' The minor tones of his autobiography, however, suggest that he was fitted for observation rather than for action. Entering the Foreign Office in 1903, after filling a series of diplomatic posts abroad, he was struck by the contrast between the policies of Goluchowski and Aehrenthal, or, as he phrases it, between pessimism and optimism. The former, believing the Dual Monarchy to be incapable of a great effort, played for safety, while the latter was prepared to incur the gravest risks. The annexation of

Bosnia, we are told, was planned as the overture to a far-reaching structural transformation in the direction of trialism ; but its author died too soon to carry out his scheme, and left the international position of Austria worse than he found it. Berchtold fought against his own nomination, and he vainly endeavoured to resign when the Balkan wars created a situation that was obviously beyond his control.

The most valuable chapters of a rather slight though interesting volume cover the period from the Serajevo murders to the outbreak of war. When the news reached Vienna the universal feeling was expressed in the words, ' We can't stand that sort of thing any more ; something must be done.' Public opinion, indeed, was more resolute than the Ballplatz, where the Serbian Government was held morally, rather than directly, responsible for the plot. Though the military authorities never doubted that war was inevitable, the Foreign Office, according to Musulin, hoped to avoid an appeal to arms. Serbia, he argues, might have averted an ultimatum had she taken vigorous measures after the crime. ' We felt, not that we must attack, but that we must defend ourselves. In contemplating action we believed that right was on our side and that we should have the sympathy of Europe.' As the draftsman of the ultimatum in its successive stages, and as a listener to the discussions of its contents, he argues that it did not necessarily involve war. ' The Minister did not suggest making it unacceptable. No demand was incorporated till it was agreed that it could and would be accepted. The Foreign Office really anticipated acceptance, though a few pessimists were of opinion that Russia would not allow Serbia to yield. When the Serbian reply arrived, not a single Austrian soldier had been mobilised. The leading statesmen of Austria believed that in 1914, as in 1903, the solidarity of conservative and dynastic interests would manifest themselves, above all in Russia.' Tisza imagined that at the worst Russia would engage in limited hostilities to save her face, if Austria left the integrity and

sovereignty of Serbia unimpaired, and would soon consent to an honourable compromise.

As the draftsman of the ultimatum Musulin's opinion of the Serbian reply as 'the cleverest piece of diplomacy I ever saw' is of peculiar interest. It was, in his opinion, a brilliant sham, since it rendered the Austrian demands illusory while appearing to yield to them. Yet, though the answer was utterly unsatisfactory, the timid official desired to accept it; for Europe, which, to the surprise of Vienna, had exaggerated the sharpness of the ultimatum, would now over-estimate the tameness of the response. 'The game was lost,' he comments sadly. Austrian diplomacy had been out-manœuvred, and he had little hope that its mistakes would be rectified on the field of battle. The artless confessions of Musulin seem to breathe the spiritual paralysis of a dying empire.

A second high official of the Ballplatz, who knew better than Musulin what was going on in Berchtold's mind, excites instead of satisfying our curiosity. Count Hoyos, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister, was chosen to carry the Emperor's appeal for support to Berlin after the Serajevo murders, and to bring back the momentous response on which the fate of the Dual Monarchy was to depend. Yet all he tells us of his mission in his little book, *Der deutsch-englische Gegensatz und sein Einfluss auf die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns*, is that he and Szögeny, the Austrian Ambassador, formed the impression that the German Government wished immediate steps to be taken against Serbia, though they were well aware that a world-war might ensue. He argues, nevertheless, that the policy of the Central Powers was purely defensive. 'The Balkan war was the first stage in a grandiose Panslav design for the union of all Slavs under Russian rule and therewith the dissolution of Austria.' Serbia was the tool of Russia, and Austria would have been wiser, he remarks, had she solved the Jugoslav problem when Russia was engaged elsewhere. He disclaims all aggressive intentions on behalf of the Dual Monarchy, which asked only for the right to live.

'Cet animal est très méchant : quand on l'attaque, il se défend.'

Count Szecsen, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, has described in the *Kriegschuldfrage*, February, 1926, his attempts to avert war in 1914 by informing the French Government of Berchtold's intimation to Russia that there was no intention of infringing the sovereignty and integrity of Serbia. He communicated this information in the evening of July 31 to M. Berthelot, who, 'to my great surprise,' assured him that he knew nothing of it, and added that it was now too late for negotiations, since Austria and Serbia were at war. The Ambassador rejoined that negotiations could be reopened through a neutral Power. 'From the whole bearing of my interlocutor I gathered the impression that the Quai d'Orsay considered a peaceful solution of our conflict with Serbia impossible and did not desire it.' On the following day he informed Izvolsky of Austria's pledge, but the Russian Ambassador also replied that he had no knowledge of it. A similar effort was made on August 1 by the Roumanian Minister in conjunction with the Swiss Minister.

Berchtold's main task after the outbreak of war was to avert or at worst to postpone the belligerence of Italy ; but his incapacity was equalled by his obstinacy, and in January, 1915, he resigned the office which he was less fitted than any of his predecessors or successors to hold. Baron Burian, who had succeeded Kallay as Joint Finance Minister and Administrator of Bosnia in 1903, begins his solid and instructive record, *Three Years*, with his summons to the Ballplatz, when Italy was trembling on the verge. The Central Powers, he confesses, did not expect their ally to join them in a European war after the Algeciras Conference and the Racconigi plot, and indeed 'the presence of England among our foes was decisive for Italian policy.' He complains not of her neutrality but of her use of it as a screen for preparations to fall on her allies. In regard to Austria's other partner he declares that the alliance proved itself in war as well

as in peace. It was formed for defence, and it was used for defence. 'Austria wished to fight out her quarrel with Serbia alone, and it was not her fault if Russia intervened.' The most novel part of his story describes the genesis and development of the Peace move of the Central Powers. As early as July, 1916, he planned a concrete offer, to be made at a favourable turn of the military wheel. Action was postponed by the entry of Roumania into the fray ; but Francis Joseph approved in September and Bethmann was consulted in October. The Chancellor expressed general agreement with the proposed terms, but declared that they must not be divulged, since German opinion was deeply divided and it would be difficult to accept less than had been publicly offered. Burian's demands for Austria were for modifications in her favour of the Russian, Roumanian, Serb and Italian frontiers, with the sole object of practical security. The German refusal to announce the terms of the Central Powers ruined the chances of the offer, as he had always argued that it would. It was generally believed at the time that Burian had to make way for Czernin when the young Emperor succeeded in November, 1916. We learn from his own lips that at the death-bed of Francis Joseph he was invited to remain, and that the cause of his resignation a month later was his opposition to the renewal of the ruthless submarine war, which Karl disliked but felt unable to resist, and which he himself regarded as involving the inevitable intervention of the United States, followed by the certainty of defeat. Recalled to the Ballplatz in the summer of 1918, on the fall of Czernin, Burian found little left to do but to hoist the signal of distress.

While Burian's apologia is the testimony of a conscientious official, that of Czernin is a work of art. The ex-Foreign Secretary modestly describes his book, *In the World War*, as 'snapshots' of the great drama ; but his portraits of Francis Ferdinand and Tisza are full of life and colour, and his conception of the Kaiser as a well-meaning blunderer, ruined by the Byzantinism

of Imperial Germany, is not far from the truth. The description of his efforts to persuade Germany to sacrifice Alsace-Lorraine lest worse should befall, and of his share in the peace of Brest-Litovsk, is of the highest interest. The thoughtful and cultivated statesman whom Francis Ferdinand, on the eve of his last journey, pointed out to his friends with the words, 'There is my future Foreign Minister,' stands out from among the crowd of mediocrities who flit across the European stage during the Great War ; but he lacked the gift of winning the confidence of those with whom he worked, and Karl parted from him with unconcealed relief.

The most sensational diplomatic revelation during the war was that of the negotiations between the Emperor Karl and the Entente. The first task of the young ruler on his accession was to get in touch with his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte of Bourbon, who was fighting in the Belgian ranks. Of the Prince's journeys to Austria, his conversations with Poincaré and Ribot in Paris, his visits to Downing Street and Buckingham Palace, Karl's letter recognising the 'just claims' of France to Alsace-Lorraine while refusing to make substantial sacrifices to Italy, and the consequent failure of the negotiations, we may read in the interesting work, *The Austrian Peace Offer*, written by Manteyer from materials supplied by the Prince. When Clemenceau published Karl's most compromising letter in *facsimile*, Germany angrily accused her ally of treachery ; but Bethmann was informed of the negotiations, though not of the name of the negotiator, and the German Government was urged to terminate the war by surrendering Alsace-Lorraine, finding territorial compensation at the expense of Russia.

The respective parts played by Karl and his Foreign Minister in their approaches to the Entente have been revealed in a new light by Demblin, an ex-official of the Ballplatz, in his brochure *Czernin und die Sixtus-Affaire*. 'With the exception of the Emperor and Czernin,' he declares, 'I alone know the truth' ; for he was the sole channel of communication between them in the critical

days which preceded the breach. Czernin, he testifies, was a sharp-tongued and difficult chief, but he was not the 'liar' of Clemenceau's historic outburst. The indictment of the French Premier should have been directed against the Emperor Karl, who in his own handwriting recognised the *justes revendications* of France to Alsace-Lorraine. The letter was written without the knowledge of Czernin, and its author, after lying to his Minister, actually allowed him to issue a *démenti*. When his trick was exposed by the photographic reproduction of the autograph letter in *L'Illustration*, Czernin decided that he could no longer serve such a master. So shattered was he, indeed, by the revelation that he proposed the temporary withdrawal of Karl from the direction of affairs and the establishment of a Regency. The embarrassed Emperor, we are told, seemed not disinclined to follow his advice; but the Empress intervened and Czernin resigned. Karl, adds Demblin, also corresponded secretly with the Vatican, while Czernin's gloomy report on conditions in Austria in 1917, written for the confidential use of the German Government, was communicated to Erzberger, with Karl's assent, probably through a member of the Parma family. That Czernin was a difficult Minister as well as a difficult chief, nervous, overworked and excitable, cannot excuse his inexperienced master for playing with fire behind his back.

The diplomatic improvisations of the young Emperor have been subjected to a detailed and damaging analysis in Professor Richard Fester's treatise, *Die Politik Kaiser Karls und der Wendepunkt des Weltkrieges*. The distinguished Halle historian has supplemented the printed sources by 'concrete questions to all accessible witnesses,' among them Ludendorff, Helfferich, Zimmermann, Cramon and Count Wedel, Tschirschky's successor at Vienna. His book is a sustained indictment of the House of Bourbon-Parma and of 'the *seraglio* of the Hofburg,' led by the Empress Zita and her mother. Karl emerges as a hopeless mediocrity, ready for any

treachery to Berlin and even lying to Czernin, the Minister of his choice. Prince Sixtus, on the other hand, is presented as the brain of his family, a born diplomat, with an astonishing clearness of aim, not an agent, as the world has believed, but a principal. His goal, indeed, was a Bourbon restoration, to be prepared by the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, Germany's sacrifice being facilitated by Austria's cession of Galicia to a Polish kingdom within the Teutonic orbit. Austria and her ruler, in fact, were merely pawns in the game of the Pretender 'and his Talleyrand, Jules Cambon,' who longed to enlarge France at the expense of Germany and to free Austria from the tutelage of Berlin. The episode of Prince Sixtus is followed by a record of the less known negotiations of Colonel Armand with Count Revertera, and of General Smuts with Count Mensdorff. In this powerful and rather bitter book there are no heroes. Czernin, 'that absurdly over-praised man,' was almost as treacherous as his master; Erzberger was always ready to play the Austrian game, and Bethmann was an irresolute *doctrinaire*. With such politicians and such allies not even Hindenburg and Ludendorff could win the war.

It is a relief to turn from the discordant cries of the soldiers and statesmen to the noble figure of the last Austrian Premier. The memorial volume entitled *Heinrich Lammasch*, edited by his daughter Marga and his colleague Professor Hans Sperl, is of importance both for the domestic history and the foreign policy of Austria. The famous jurist, who had represented his country at the Hague Conferences and had taken part in several cases referred to the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal, reached the conviction at an early stage of the war that the Dual Monarchy must be reconstituted on a federal basis, and that the struggle must be ended by the creation of a League of Nations. When the young Emperor and the elderly Professor met in 1917 they were deeply impressed by one another, and Lammasch was offered the Premiership, which he declined on the ground

of inexperience. Regarding with equal dread the complete victory of either side, he secured Karl's approval of the plan of announcing federal autonomy for the races of the Empire under the auspices of President Wilson, and discussed the scheme with Professor Herron, an unofficial emissary of the President, in the house of Dr Mühlon at Bern in February, 1918. Peace, he believed, could be restored by the Emperor and the President working together, and by them alone. The negotiations are described in these pages by both parties, and filled Lammasch with joyful expectation of a rejuvenated Austria and a speedy end to the carnage. The decree was prepared, but the Emperor pleaded for delay and finally succumbed to the warnings of Berlin. When the Professor was called to the Premiership at the end of October, it was too late. The war was lost, the Empire was in disruption, and the only service which the man of peace could render to his country was to arrange a bloodless transfer of power to the Socialist leaders, Dr Renner and Viktor Adler. The events of this heartbreaking fortnight are narrated with a master hand by Professor Josef Redlich, his Minister of Finance and life-long friend. A shorter chapter describes the work of Lammasch as member of the Austrian Delegation at St Germain, and his fruitless efforts to save South Tirol.

Bilinski's Memoirs, published in Polish at Warsaw in 1924, and not yet translated, cover a long career of public service. The first volume, bringing the narrative down to 1914, becomes valuable during the last two years of peace, when the Polish nobleman was Joint Minister of Finance and *ex officio* Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Being on friendly terms with Jovan Jovanovich, the Serbian Minister at Vienna, Bilinski was consulted by Berchtold during the Balkan wars; but the policy of the Ballplatz incurs his outspoken criticism. The gravest mistake of the Foreign Minister was to decline the offer of Pasitch to come to Vienna at the end of 1912, and indeed Bilinski goes so far as to

suggest that the great catastrophe might have been averted by a different response. The second volume covers the period of the war and the evening of his life, which ended in 1922.

The third volume of the monumental *Erinnerungen* of Ernst von Plener, though mainly devoted to internal affairs, contains a few points for the student of diplomacy; for the veteran statesman began life as a diplomat. The chapter on the reign and character of Francis Joseph supplies a not unsympathetic estimate of his old master, who, he believes, did not work for war and was at the end of his life the tool of his advisers. When Aehrenthal sent for him on August 18, 1908, as an ex-Minister and an influential member of the Herrenhaus, and informed him of his intention to annex Bosnia, Plener strongly opposed the plan. In 1914 he found himself again out of sympathy with the Ballplatz, since he desired the acceptance of the Serbian reply. His opinion of the later Foreign Ministers of his country is low. Berchtold was 'a passive, indolent nature'; and when Count Wedel arrived from Berlin in January, 1915, to persuade the Ballplatz to buy off Italy, Burian was unable to realise the danger in time. The moral of most Austrian apologias, whether drawn by their authors or by their readers, is: Too late!

No foreign critic of Austrian diplomacy is more merciless than Heinrich Kanner, whose *Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik* records his unremitting efforts by tongue and pen to avert the coming storm. The editor of *Die Zeit* had the courage of his opinions, fearlessly denouncing the policy of the Ballplatz before and during the war, till he was silenced in 1917. His acquaintance, however superficial, with the principal actors in the drama makes him a witness as well as a critic, and his acid pages help us to visualise Aehrenthal and his successors at the Ballplatz. His most finished portrait is that of Berchtold, the aristocratic *dilettante*, whose thoughts turned constantly to the race-course, and who took scarcely less interest in his clothes than a society

beauty. The Minister's tragic incapacity was strikingly revealed when in December, 1912, at the high-tide of Serbia's success against the Turks, Masaryk unofficially informed him that Pasitch was willing to come to Vienna to arrange a *rapprochement* between the two countries. Without taking a moment to reflect, Berchtold rejected the advance. When Kanner asked a mutual friend to discover the reason of his action, the Minister explained that he had heard that Masaryk was a ' poor devil,' who was probably anxious to ' earn something ' by his errand. It is also interesting to learn that on July 21, 1914, Francis Joseph, when asked by Bilinski whether the ultimatum might not have far-reaching consequences, replied : ' Russia cannot swallow it. There's no mistake about it, it will be a big war.'

The utter lack of co-ordination in the highest spheres of Government during the war is described in a brochure entitled *Der Politische Zusammenbruch und die Anschlussfrage*, by Freiherr von Spitzmüller, ex-Minister of Finance. Austria and Hungary, he bitterly complains, were the only belligerents where the heads of the internal departments were not in contact with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and War. ' There was no organic institution for creating a common state-will.' Of some of the most important acts of the Ballplatz, for instance, he only learned when the war was over. Systematic Cabinet discussions, he believes, might have prevented some of the worst mistakes committed by an invertebrate Government. For instance, in view of the almost universal disapproval of the resumption of the unlimited submarine campaign, a joint protest by the Ministers could hardly have been overruled. A similar impression of the invertebrate character of the State is derived from the thoughtful volume, *Der Untergang der Oesterreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie*, by Kleinwächter, an ex-official of the Ministry of Finance. A sombre picture of the crumbling of the home front has been painted in *Die Oesterreichische Revolution* (of which an abridged translation has appeared with the title *The Austrian Revolution*)

by Otto Bauer, Foreign Minister in the first Republican Government. Only the fear of a German invasion, declares the Socialist leader, kept the Hofburg from making a separate peace at an earlier date.

The most authoritative survey of the functioning of the Government machinery during the testing-time of the war is in Dr Josef Redlich's masterly volume, *Oesterreichische Regierung und Verwaltung im Weltkriege.* Though the work forms part of the Carnegie Series on Economic and Social History, its interest is mainly political. While the Generals complain of the anæmia of the Government, the Professor denounces the military dictatorship which lasted till the accession of the Emperor Karl,—'the baneful political activity of the Supreme Command, which was more responsible than all other factors for the disintegration of the structure of the Monarchy and consequently for the inevitable collapse.' In no other belligerent country, he declares, was the suppression of civilian and constitutional rule so complete. Francis Joseph was too old to grasp the reins, and the sole idea of the Premier, Count Stürgkh, 'the classic embodiment of the Austrian system,' was to prostrate himself at the feet of the omnipotent Conrad. Since Parliament was never summoned, all touch with the racial minorities was lost, and the rulers in Vienna and Budapest seemed determined to show that the war was a struggle for preserving the hegemony of the Germans and Magyars. Thus vanished the last hope of the racial minorities for a brighter future within the Monarchy, and the soil was prepared for the subversive propaganda of the Entente. The murder of Stürgkh, the death of Francis Joseph, the dismissal of Conrad, the summoning of Parliament, and the amnesty of political offenders produced a gratifying atmospheric change ; but it was too late for the young ruler to repair the errors of the past, and Karl's choice of advisers was ill-judged. As a member of the Reichsrat and later Minister of Finance in the short-lived Lammasch Cabinet, the author ranks as an eye-witness as well as a recorder of the decline and

fall of the Hapsburg Empire. The debt of historical students to Professor Redlich will shortly be increased by his publication of the voluminous diaries of Joseph Baernreither, one of the wisest and most respected of Austrian statesmen, which will throw welcome light not only on foreign and domestic policy during the last years of peace but on the personality of the aged Emperor.

We are fairly well supplied with first-hand information as to Austria's share in the war. An excellent bird's-eye view is presented in the work of General Cramon, the representative of the German General Staff, entitled *Unser Oesterreichisch-Ungarische Bundesgenosse.* The three main actors in the drama are Francis Joseph, the Emperor Karl and Conrad ; and we become conscious of an atmospheric change, a cooling of Austro-German sympathy, when the young Emperor succeeds the old. How the struggle appeared to Conrad we learn from Nowak's book, *Der Weg zu Katastrophe*, based on material supplied by the Chief of the Staff and certified by him as a correct account of events. In the second volume, entitled *The Collapse of the Central Powers*, to the English version of which Lord Haldane has written a Foreword, Nowak continues his narrative from the dismissal of Conrad to the end of the war. Though few of his readers are likely to share the author's lyrical enthusiasm for Conrad, who is presented as the great figure of the war, no student can afford to neglect these brilliant volumes or their sequel *Chaos*, which describes the actual crash of the Teutonic Empires. Nowak abstains from detailed references, but he assures us that his statements rest on the direct testimony of the principal actors in the political and military drama.

The unity of control on the side of the Central Powers, with which the hard-pressed Allies used enviously to contrast their own disharmony, was more apparent than real. German Generals made no secret of their contempt for the performances of the weaker ally, and Austrian commanders resented their subordination to the pundits of Berlin. The intensity of emotion which animated

Conrad is vividly pictured by General Stürgkh, brother of the Austrian Premier, who represented Austria at German Headquarters during the first year of the war, in his unadorned record, *Im deutschen grossen Hauptquartier*. Himself most anxious for cordial co-operation, he watched with grave anxiety the growth of sentiments in the bosom of the Austrian Chief of Staff which boded ill for victory. 'Well, what are our secret foes, the Germans, doing?' asked Conrad bitterly at the opening of 1915, 'and what of that comedian, the German Emperor?' The aggrieved soldier went on to complain of the German officers who were 'sniffing about like spies.' So deeply did the humiliation of dependence on German arms rankle in the breast of his chief that Stürgkh resigned the task of *liaison* which such a mood rendered sterile. Nor did 'the Prussian temperament' facilitate the discharge of his duties. Moltke, modest and mediocre, but a *persona grata* with Conrad, was quickly superseded by the masterful Falkenhayn, who cared nothing for the susceptibilities of his allies. The Kaiser, a mere bundle of emotions, deeply wounded in his pride by the invasion of East Prussia, impatiently and angrily demanded an Austrian offensive to relieve the strain. The initial Russian successes in Galicia, indeed, destroyed the romance of a brotherhood in arms, Conrad complaining that Germany had left him in the lurch, while the Germans openly blamed their allies for the loss of Lemberg. Even more wounding to Austrian pride were the reiterated counsels to part with portions of her territory. The Kaiser told Stürgkh that South Tirol must be sacrificed to purchase Italian neutrality, and Bethmann blandly urged the cession of part of the Bukovina as a *douceur* to Roumania.

The first of the Austrian commanders to take the public into his confidence was General Auffenberg. *Aus Oesterreich-Ungarns Theilnahme am Weltkriege* records his experiences of an intolerable situation as commander in Serajevo 1909–1911, where almost every month frontier conflicts arose, provoked by Serbs, Montenegrins

and Turks. Serbia, he declared, should have been attacked directly after the murder of the Archduke, when instantaneous action might possibly have averted European complications. *Aus Oesterreichs Höhe und Niedergang*, a longer and far more important volume, describes at length the author's work during fifteen months as Minister of War in 1911–1912. The Dual system, he admits, made Austria's neighbours her enemies, and it was vital to create a Jugoslav State within the Empire while there was still time. The chief obstacles were the Magyars, with their 'crass national egoism and provincialism.' He agreed with Conrad that Italy would join their enemies in the event of a European war, and urged the Emperor to terminate an alliance which created a false sense of security and thereby impeded the strengthening of the army. Like Conrad, again, he had no confidence in the Ballplatz. Aehrenthal's belief in Italy seemed to him insane, and his welcome of the Tripoli war as diverting attention from Trent and Trieste equally revealed his lack of foresight. At his first meeting with Tschirschky Auffenberg told him that the Dual Monarchy would have to fight the world, and the German Ambassador agreed with him. The most interesting pages in this volume are devoted to Francis Ferdinand, to whom the General owed his appointment as Minister of War, and whom he portrays as by far the ablest of the Imperial family. Had he come to the throne it would, he declares, have been a great, if not a happy reign ; for he was at all times more feared than loved.

The relations between the military leaders of the Central Powers were much easier in the later than in the earlier stages of the struggle. Falkenhayn fell in August, 1916, and Conrad was dismissed from his post in March, 1917. His easy-going successor General Arz, in his book *Zur Geschichte des Grossen Krieges*, tells us that he was glad to be under the supreme direction of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and indeed he has a good word for everybody. The most surprising feature of

his narrative is his picture of the Emperor Karl, who, he assures us, was incomparably abler than was generally believed. The young ruler is described not only as clever, quick and humane, but as possessing genuine military talent. His visits to the front, revealing his qualities of bravery and kindliness, were of the utmost value in counter-working the poison of racial propaganda, and the last days at Schönbrunn revealed true greatness of soul. Karl's personal charm is confirmed by many witnesses ; but we cannot accept his superior abilities on the evidence of General Arz alone.

No Austrian soldier complains so bitterly of civilian errors as General Alfred Krauss. *Die Ursachen unserer Niederlage* is the Austrian equivalent of Ludendorff's *Politik und Kriegführung* ; for while Ludendorff sets Bethmann in the pillory, Krauss aims his javelin at Czernin. The causes of defeat, he argues, were political, not military. Himself a successful commander, he pays a high tribute to his troops, and devotes half his pages to their exploits ; but their heroism was in vain, for one political error followed another. Bethmann's confession of wrong-doing in Belgium presented the Entente at the outset with a moral victory ; Germany's cold-blooded neutrality when Italy stabbed Austria in the back lost the opportunity of a decisive campaign against the faithless ally in the autumn of 1915 ; Tisza, the only strong man in the Dual Monarchy, thought more of the interests of Hungary than of the Empire ; the accession of Karl, with his 'almost morbid desire for peace,' paralysed the will to victory, while his insane political amnesty restored traitors and defeatists like Kramarsch and Rasin to the scene of their nefarious activities. The faults of the young Emperor were inexperience and a weak will, but Czernin was clever enough to forecast the result of his actions. His despairing Memorandum in 1917 ought never to have been written, for it was unjustified by the military situation ; and its revelation by Erzberger destroyed the last chances of a negotiated peace. Czernin was a brilliant talker, and nothing more.

That his lugubrious prophecies came true was largely the result of his own actions. 'This man was the misfortune of Austria, of the Emperor Karl, and of the German people.' Again and again the author sighs for a Clemenceau or a Lloyd George, who won the war in the only way in which wars can be won,—by possessing and expressing the will to victory.

The Hungarian side of the story is far less known than that of Austria proper ; but some of the Magyar magnates have entered the witness-box. Count Julius Andrassy's little book, *Wer hat den Krieg verbrochen?* published in 1915, surveyed the political map of Europe before the war. Inheriting his father's Russophobia he declared that the true cause of the conflict was the ambition of Russia, 'which has long hung over us like the sword of Damocles.' The unchanging goal of Russian ambition was hegemony over the whole of the Balkans. Russian patronage of Serbia—in other words interference in the Western Balkans—meant war. Austria, on the other hand, played the game fairly, for neither Andrassy nor any of his successors ever dreamed of Salonika. He admits that the mistakes of Austria strengthened the emotional tie of Serbia and Russia and added to the prevailing tension ; but the Bosnian crisis was much ado about nothing, since 'the Russian Protector, to my knowledge, offered us these provinces unconditionally on seven occasions between 1876 and 1908.' He does not believe that Russia wanted war in 1914, but he argues that her policy made it inevitable sooner or later. On reaching the Serajevo murders he remarks that it was impossible to wait a moment longer. 'The duty of self-preservation commanded us to act. I say this, not knowing whether we shall win.'

When the verdict was pronounced Andrassy wrote a larger and more important work, *Diplomacy and the War*. Like other Austro-Hungarian statesmen, he traces the explosion to Russo-Serb intrigues against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy. On the other hand, he is an unsparing critic of the policy of Germany, who, he

maintains, ought to have chosen between the North Sea and Bagdad ; and he sharply condemns the attack on Belgium. In October, 1918, when the German retreat and the surrender of Bulgaria announced the approaching doom of the Central Empires, he succeeded Burian at the Ballplatz. But the situation was past recall, and the harassed Minister held for a month the high office which his father had adorned for eight years. His latest work, *Bismarck, Andrassy, and their Successors*, offers a thoughtful commentary on the development of the European situation since 1871, based to a large extent on *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, and enriched by personal memories of the Iron Chancellor and other actors in the drama. The volume extends to 1905, and it is the author's intention to continue his story till 1914. The sub-title in the German original is *Betrachtungen zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges* ; and the standpoint of Count Andrassy is sufficiently detached to give interest to his musings. He makes no attempt to divide the Powers into the sheep and the goats, merely remarking that the German Government took least trouble to veil the selfish aims and interests which guided all the nations alike.

For the inner history of Hungarian policy and sentiment before and during the war we must await the completion of the publication of the papers of Tisza by the Hungarian Academy. His critical attitude towards the policy of the Ballplatz in the first half of July, 1914, was unknown to his countrymen as well as to the world till after his death, when the story was outlined in documentary form by Bishop Fraknoi in his little book *Tisza und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges*. From this we learn that the Hungarian Premier, on reaching Vienna on the day after the Serajevo murders, was horrified to find Berchtold resolved to provoke a war with Serbia ; that Hoyos was despatched to Berlin without securing his assent ; and that he finally assented to the ultimatum, finding no support either with the Emperor or with the civil and military chiefs. If Tisza had sat in the seat of

Berchtold, comments Fraknoi, there would have been no war. His great and indeed unpardonable error was that he did not resign on the failure of his policy of peace, for at the head of a powerful opposition he might possibly have prevented or shortened the strife. During the conflict he continued to oppose the annexation of Serbia, not from any tenderness to the despised Serbs but because he had no wish for more Slavs in the Monarchy.

A little additional information is supplied in Professor Marczali's article, 'The Papers of Count Tisza,' in the *American Historical Review*, January, 1924. The distinguished Hungarian historian relates a striking conversation with the fallen Minister. '"What did you do after Serajevo?" asked the Professor. Tisza rose, and, with a voice full of emotion, said, "My whole being revolted against the horror of war. Religion and patriotism alike commanded me to avert this infernal trial from humanity and our country. I was sure that, if the conflagration began here, it would spread all over the world, and I did everything I could to avert its outburst."' When Marczali sent a record of this conversation to Tisza, the latter replied (January 25, 1918): 'I never dreamed that the assassination would lead to war. To my infinite regret and grief I was obliged to conclude from the investigations which established the guilt of the Serbian Government, and the statements of Pasitch and the Serbian diplomatists as well as of the whole Serb press which ridiculed and belittled the Monarchy, that we should have to proceed against Serbia. I urged that our first note should not be an ultimatum. I joined in the ultimatum, but modified the text, and at the Council on July 19, when it was decided to send the ultimatum, I wished to substitute for the first condition, i. that we would guarantee the integrity of Serbia if the Entente did not intervene, and ii. that, even in the event of a general war, Austria would make no territorial conquests except isolated strategical rectifications of boundary.' Whether or not these

revelations of protest and surrender enhance his reputation the reader may decide for himself.

In the same year, 1924, the Hungarian Academy published Tisza's letters, telegrams and speeches from June, 1914, to the end of the year, of which a brief summary appeared in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, December, 1925. 'My conscience is quiet,' he wrote to his niece on August 26. 'The noose was round our necks, and, had we not cut it, we should have been throttled. We could not do otherwise, but I grieve that we had to do what we did.' A month later he writes that he had decided to share responsibility for the war with a heavy heart.

Most of the autobiographies produced by the war mix criticism of the hero's erring fellow-countrymen with attacks on enemy Powers; but Count Michael Karolyi's arrows are exclusively directed against the statesmen of the Dual Monarchy and their allies in Berlin. Written in exile his book is well named *Against the Whole World*, for it is a story of unceasing conflict. No prominent actor in the great drama has been so bitterly attacked as 'the Judas Iscariot of Hungary,' the Magyar magnate who broke away from the feudal traditions of his peers, who denounced the bungling diplomacy of the Ballplatz, who ingeminated peace while his countrymen expected victory, who grasped the helm at Budapest when the Empire of the Hapsburgs crumbled into dust, and whose brief rule smoothed the path for the criminal antics of Bela Kun.

Proud of the rebel traditions of his family and glorying in the memories of 1848, Karolyi's earliest aim was the reform of the franchise; but he gradually learned that the franchise problem was bound up with the grouping of the Powers, since the Dual Alliance of 1879, like the *Ausgleich* of 1867, perpetuated the suppression of the racial minorities. In 1913 he determined to 'approach the nations with which the Prussian alliance must one day bring us into conflict.' Desiring to reach Russia through her ally, he explained in Paris his policy of

freeing Hungary from the German entanglement by the achievement of independence, and a *rapprochement* with the Slavonic races by the grant of universal suffrage. When war broke out he argued that the victory of the Central Powers would rivet the German yoke on both halves of the Hapsburg Empire, while defeat would spell dismemberment. To avert these horrifying alternatives he advocated a compromise peace while there was still time, if necessary at the cost of leaving Germany in the lurch. Convinced that victory was impossible Czernin permitted a mission to Switzerland in 1917, where he took soundings in French and American latitudes. The Emperor Karl, pacific, democratic and vacillating, needed no conversion ; but the failure of the Sixtus negotiations restored him to the grip of his imperious ally. In the summer of 1918, when the sands were running out, Karolyi demanded a separate peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points ; but Tisza, Andrassy and Wekerle scouted the notion of territorial sacrifices.

The closing chapters are intensely dramatic, and the picture of the Emperor Karl, worn out with fatigue and conflicting counsels, haunts the reader's memory. After at last screwing up courage to appoint Karolyi Premier, he promptly proceeded, without a word, to nominate somebody else, and Karolyi finally received his investiture from the Archduke Joseph. The passing of the old regime at home and abroad was symbolised by the murder of Tisza,—'the first bloodstain on our glorious revolution.' No such brilliant picture of the Magyar triumvirate—Tisza, Andrassy and Apponyi—in the last days of their power has ever been painted ; and though their blind and selfish policy is ruthlessly exposed, they remain dignified and honourable exponents of an outworn creed. The author, like most other autobiographers, is a little too much of the stainless hero, but his ambition is yoked to the ideal of peaceful and self-governing nations. For the inside history of the short-lived Karolyi regime we must await the second volume of his Memoirs, contenting ourselves meanwhile

with *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary*, in which the distinguished scholar and publicist Professor Oscar Jaszi, Minister of Nationalities, describes the brief and depressing interlude of democratic rule.

The *Memoirs* of Prince Ludwig Windischgraetz, which cover the same ground as those of Count Karolyi, are no less vivid and controversial. Attacks on his public and private character induced him 'to tell the story of my criminal career, and to tell how I tried to save Austria-Hungary, an Empire and its peoples, aye and its throne too, when it was far too late.' Though the grandson of the soldier who suppressed the Revolution in 1848, and a hereditary member of the House of Magnates, he entered public life a few years before the war as a free lance, sharply attacking the Tisza dictatorship and the Slavophobe policy of the Ballplatz. Berchtold, he declares, should have made friends with Serbia and have accepted the offer of Pasitch to discuss a *rapprochement*. The most valuable part of the story is reached with the accession of the Emperor Karl, who appointed him Food Minister in the Wekerle Cabinet in January, 1918, and with whom he was in close contact until the end. It is impossible to read these graphic pages without sympathy for the young ruler, who cried aloud 'We cannot go on, we cannot go on,' but was unable to achieve the peace for which he longed. The author paints a terrible picture of the enmities and rivalries of the leading figures on the Hungarian stage, whose discordant appeals to their monarch rendered impossible any consistent policy at home or abroad. Andrassy, he declares, should have been taken as pilot from the first. He has no love for Tisza; but it is against Karolyi, once his friend, that his fiercest accusations of treachery and selfish ambition are hurled.

Though we are now aware that the most formidable foe of the Hapsburg Empire was Masaryk, it was the leader of the Young Czechs in the Reichsrath who appeared to Austrian patriots in the heat of the struggle to be the arch traitor within the gates. *Dr. Karl*

Kramarsch, Der Anstifter des Weltkrieges, by Dr Friedrich Wichtl, conveys its message both in its flamboyant title and in the frontispiece, which portrays him gazing prophetically at a map of Central Europe across which sprawls an elongated Czechoslovakia. The authors of the war of 1914, as of the Balkan wars, we are told, were the leaders of the new Pan-Slav movement, founded in 1907 by Kramarsch to liberate the 'oppressed' Slav races of Turkey and Austria. Independent Czechoslovak and Jugoslav States were to be erected on their ruins with the aid of Russia, under whose aegis they would live. Kramarsch was an Austrian subject with a Russian wife and a Russian heart, who wrote for Russian Pan-Slav journals and was in touch not only with the Tsar and his Ministers, but with every notorious Austrophobe in England and France. This angry volume is based on the evidence presented during the long trial of the Czech leader for treason in 1915–1916, when the documents seized in his house and the testimony of a large array of witnesses revealed his anti-Austrian machinations in peace and war.

We are fortunate in possessing a narrative of the creation of Czechoslovakia by its principal founder. Among the vast number of autobiographies produced by the war Masaryk's *Die Weltrevolution, Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen, 1914–1918*, soon to appear in English dress as *The Making of a State*, occupies a place apart. 'I never wished to be a Professor,' he writes of his youth; 'my plan was to be a diplomat and politician.' He had to wait decades for the fulfilment of his dream, but the time was not wasted. His lectures at Prague made him the oracle of Czechoslovak and Jugoslav youth; his books carried his name all over Europe; his travels taught him to know 'cities and men'; his years in the Landtag and the Reichsrath introduced him to the problems of domestic and foreign policy with which the Dual Monarchy was vainly endeavouring to cope. It is a truism that without a world war Bohemia would have remained an Austrian province; but it is

almost equally certain that without Masaryk—thinker, scholar and man of action—there would have been no Czechoslovakia.

The revelation of the Austrian forgeries in the Friedjung Trial convinced the Professor that the Monarchy was an unclean thing, and Berchtold's contemptuous rejection of the advances of Pasitch at the end of 1912 proved that it was blind. While the great majority of his fellow-countrymen would have been content with the coronation of Francis Joseph at Prague as King of Bohemia, Masaryk had come to believe that there was no future for his people under the yoke of a dynasty 'morally and physically degenerate,' and that Austria must die in order that Czechoslovakia might live. The outbreak of war supplied the opportunity, and he seized it with both hands. Crossing the frontier in December, 1914, the author began his four years' Odyssey through Italy, Switzerland, France, England, Russia, Siberia and America, which ended in his return to Prague as President of the Czechoslovak Republic. It is an astonishing story of mental effort, of physical endurance, of successful propaganda, of organising capacity, of hairbreadth escapes. Unlike the Russophil Kramarsch and the majority of his countrymen, he knew that the Russian colossus had not only feet, but body and head, of clay, and he therefore determined to seek salvation in the West instead of the East. The little Balkan peoples, he declares, were to Russia no less than to Austria a means to an end. He pays generous tributes to his two chief helpers, Dr Benes and General Stefanik ; to the scholars and journalists in France and England who procured him a hearing, above all Professor Denis, Dr Seton-Watson and Mr Wickham Steed ; to M. Briand, the first Prime Minister to sympathise and encourage. The partition of Austria, he argued in public and private, was the chief task of the war ; but the world was still Austrophil, the history of Bohemia was little known, and it needed three years to convert the Allies. He frankly confesses that with a less tardy

victory of the Entente the Czechs would not have won their independence. No part of his story is more romantic than the creation of a Czech army in Russia in 1917 and 1918, which, though it never fulfilled its aim of fighting in France, convinced the world more than anything else of the existence of a Czech nation. The narrative is enriched by numberless observations of a singularly well-stored and reflective mind on the character and society, the thought and the literature of the countries through which he passes in his arduous pilgrimage; and the volume closes with reflections on Democracy and Humanity, culminating in the encouraging assertion that the former is the political embodiment of the latter. From Dr Benes we are soon to have a narrative which will supplement but in no way supersede the philosophic apologia of his deeply revered chief.

CHAPTER III

Russia

No sooner was Kerensky evicted by the Bolshevists in November, 1917, than a stream of revelations began to flow from the Russian reservoir with the avowed object of discrediting capitalist diplomacy. In his little book, *The Secret Treaties and Understandings*, published in April, 1918, Mr Seymour Cocks introduced English readers to the Treaty which brought Italy into the war, the agreements relating to Constantinople, Asiatic Turkey, and the left bank of the Rhine, and other commitments. The most sensational of pre-war items was the protocol of the Russian Crown Council of February 8, 1914, in which comprehensive preparations for the seizure of the Straits during a world war were discussed and approved. This and over fifty other documents, published in Russian between December, 1917, and February, 1918, appeared in an abridged translation in 1919 by Émile Laloy under the title *Les Documents Secrets publiés par les Bolcheviks.*

The first large-scale contribution to our knowledge of Russian diplomacy in the last years of peace was the massive volume of despatches published at Berlin, in 1921, by Siebert, and translated with the title *Entente Diplomacy and the World, 1909–1914.* The text was in German, but the editor declared that the originals could be produced if its accuracy were challenged. He does not explain where and when he procured the documents, but he was for some years Secretary to the Russian Embassy in London. Professor Valentin informs us that copies of all the important despatches

which passed between London and Petrograd between 1908 and 1914 were forwarded to Berlin, where they were translated by Professor Schiemann ; and, though he does not say from whom they came, the name of Siebert has been freely mentioned. It is of no special importance who betrayed the secrets of Russian diplomacy, for the authenticity of the documents has not been challenged. The work opens with the Bosnian crisis, passes on to the creation of the Balkan alliance of 1912, deals at length with Anglo-Russian co-operation in Persia, throws a flood of light on the prolonged negotiations relating to the Bagdad railway, reveals Russia's *rapprochement* with Italy at Racconigi, emphasises afresh the tension of the Balkan wars, records the neurotic excitement created in Petrograd by the mission of Liman von Sanders to Constantinople, and traces the discussions of 1914 in regard to a secret Anglo-Russian Naval Convention. The volume is as indispensable for the study of British as for that of Russian policy, for Benckendorff's despatches report innumerable conversations with Sir Edward Grey and the Downing Street officials. Though no very sensational disclosures are made, the volume presents a depressing panorama of the anxieties and the jealousies, the suspicions and the ambitions of the Great Powers.

A valuable supplement to Siebert appeared under the ominous title *Un Livre Noir*, containing the telegrams and despatches of Izvolsky from Paris, whither he was sent at the end of 1910, on ceasing to be Foreign Minister. In this case there is no mystery, for the Soviet Government published in 1922 (in Russian) *Materials for the History of Franco-Russian Relations, 1910–1914*, and placed the State papers at the disposal of the editor and translator, René Marchand, who received the assistance of Professor Pokrovsky, Director of the Archives. The first volume of the *Livre Noir* covers 1911 and 1912, the years of Agadir and the first Balkan war. As a professional diplomatist Izvolsky looks down on the ignorance and incompetence of the

French Foreign Ministers, Cruppi and de Selves, with whom he had to deal, and rejoices when the reins are grasped in the firm hands of Poincaré, who was 'not afraid of responsibility.' His opinion of the French Press is indicated by his demands for a bribery fund, following, as he explains, the successful operations of Austria in the same field. The second volume, published a year later, contained Izvolsky's correspondence from the beginning of 1913 to the outbreak of war, and added the reports of Sazonoff to the Tsar on the Potsdam meeting of November, 1910, Poincaré's visit to Petrograd in August, 1912, the Foreign Minister's conversations at Balmoral in September, 1912, and similar notable occasions. Among other treasures in this storehouse are memoranda on the Straits and foreign loans and the Protocols of the Franco-Russian Military Conferences in 1911, 1912, 1913.

A more complete collection of Izvolsky's letters and telegrams has been published in a German translation by Friedrich Stieve, an official of the German Foreign Office, under the auspices of his department. *Der Briefwechsel Izvolskis* fills four volumes, mainly based, like *Un Livre Noir*, on the official *Materials for the History of Franco-Russian Relations, 1910–1914*. Over five hundred new documents are added, but the fresh material is not of outstanding importance. A companion volume by the Editor, entitled *Izvolsky and the World War*, weaves the correspondence into a narrative of Izvolsky's activities in which the Ambassador is represented as the guilty accomplice of Poincaré. 'Izvolsky worked for the world-war since 1911, Poincaré since the autumn of 1912, and from the end of 1913 Sazonoff saw in European complications the path which should lead Russia to the Straits.' A supplementary volume by the same editor, entitled *Izvolski im Weltkriege 1914–1917*, provides over three hundred documents, mostly new, dealing with the attempts of the Entente to procure allies in the desperate struggle, and with the cognate problem of war-aims. Five-sixths illustrate

the war months of 1914, and after May, 1915, the stream shrinks to a trickle. 'The so-called defensive war against the German aggressor,' writes Stieve in a closing chapter summarising the contents of the volume, 'was in reality a war of conquest in the grand style, a strong concentric onslaught on the political equilibrium of Europe, the status quo, the maintenance of which was in the interests of the Central Powers alone.' Whatever may be thought of their highly-coloured editorial reflections, students of the world war cannot but feel grateful to Marchand and Stieve for translating into familiar tongues such a mass of important evidence, and for enabling us to know the innermost thoughts of the clever but disagreeable Izvolsky during his memorable tenure of the Paris embassy as we know the mind of no other statesman of our time.

Though a history of Russian diplomacy during the last generation of the Empire has still to be written, materials for that much-needed enterprise are rapidly accumulating. The first volume of Lamsdorff's Diaries, covering the years 1886–1890, has recently appeared in Russian with an Introduction by Rotstein. It is unfortunate that Izvolsky only lived to complete the first volume of his *Memoirs*, which brings the narrative down to his appointment as Foreign Minister in 1906. Fragment as it is, however, the autobiography paints vivid pictures of Russia during the Japanese war, including the Dogger Bank incident, the Treaty of Björko, the creation of the Duma, and the rise of Stolypin, the friend and brother-in-law of the author. An affectionate Introduction by his daughter describes the closing years of the author, who transferred his home from Paris to Biarritz when the Russian revolution ended his official career. The *Memoirs* of Witte, who died in 1915, could not be published till Nicholas II had ceased to reign, and meanwhile the interest of the book was in large measure forestalled by the appearance in 1918 of Dr Dillon's volume, *The Eclipse of Russia*, which was dedicated to Count Witte, 'my friend and

Russia's unique statesman,' was based on the Count's confidences, and supplied the first detailed account of the Treaty of Björko. Witte's autobiography is on the whole rather disappointing ; for his memory plays him strange tricks, and his monotonous depreciation of the men with whom he worked leaves a disagreeable impression of his powerful but uncouth personality. He despised the Tsar, and the Tsar detested the greatest of his Ministers. Alone of Russian statesmen, Witte had the insight to realise and the courage to proclaim that the Russian Empire was too rotten to wage war either with Japan or with the Central Powers.

Baron Rosen's *Forty Years of Diplomacy* will always rank high among the authorities for the collapse of the Russian Empire. A statesman of the school of Witte, he represented his country at Tokio, whence he sent home reiterated but unheeded warnings as to the inevitable result of thwarting Japanese ambitions in Korea. Of the policy of Izvolsky and Sazonoff, which sought compensation in the Near East for humiliation in Further Asia, he has no better opinion. Russia, he argues, was unfit for war, and should have kept aloof from the quarrels of the Powers. Her initial mistake in tying herself to France and thereby needlessly antagonising Germany was followed by an endeavour to secure hegemony in the Balkans, which involved the hostility of Austria. Such a policy, he declares, led straight to war. His contempt for Sazonoff is unbounded, and he saddles him and Sukhomlinoff with the crime of deciding on general mobilisation, which, as he frankly confesses, involved war. From the outbreak of the struggle he foretold revolution, and laboured to convert the Tsar and his Ministers to the idea of a general peace before it was too late. No more damaging indictment of the diplomacy of Imperial Russia is to be found than in these volumes, marked as they are by profound insight and rare independence of thought.

Nekludoff's *Diplomatic Reminiscences* are scarcely less interesting than Baron Rosen's autobiography.

Appointed Russian Minister to Sofia early in 1911, he took part in the formation of the Balkan League which in 1912 fell upon Turkey and in 1913 quarrelled over the spoils. On taking leave of the Tsar a remarkable incident occurred. 'Only once did the Emperor assume a solemn and dictatorial manner. After an intentional pause, stepping backwards and fixing me with a penetrating stare, he said: "Listen to me, Nekludoff. Do not for one instant lose sight of the fact that we cannot go to war. It would be out of the question for us to face a war for five or six years, in fact till 1917. If the most vital interests and the honour of Russia were at stake, we might accept a challenge in 1915, but not a moment sooner,—in any circumstances or under any pretext whatever. Do you quite understand me?"' On reaching his post he found the Balkans in a ferment, and endeavoured to penetrate the mind of the suspicious and irresolute Ferdinand. Though the Tsar himself had no desire for war, the Serbo-Bulgar pact concluded under Russian auspices lit the fuse; and at the fête of the Shipka veterans on August 24, 1912, the Minister realised that the moment was near. 'One saw pale faces, shining eyes, tears coursing down the cheeks of aged men. All eyes were bent on the Flag of Samara; the veterans gathered round it; with tears in their eyes they kissed the staff, the drapery, the streamers. A thought flashed like lightning through my mind: it is war, I thought. Certainly and undoubtedly it is war. When I drove to the Legation I was cheered with cries of Hurrah! and Russia for ever!' For the break-up of the Balkan League he holds the obstinate and short-sighted Daneff mainly responsible, and sharply condemns the treachery of Bulgaria. The second half of a fascinating volume describes the author's residence at Stockholm from 1914 till the fall of the Tsardom in 1917.

Our knowledge of Russian policy in the critical days of 1914 has been largely increased since the outbreak of the war. *The Falsifications of the Russian Orange-book*,

edited by Baron Romberg, established the fact that the official publication was disfigured by numerous alterations, and prints the original and the published version of the despatches between Paris and Petrograd in red and black ink. The object of the changes, it is clear, was to remove passages suggesting a pacific tendency on the part of the Central Powers or an absence of such tendency on the part of Russia. The publication of the documents in their original form confirms the impression that France, though not desirous of war, made no attempt to hold back her ally. A fuller edition has been published in a German translation, with a preface by Alfred von Wegerer, entitled *Das Russische Orangebuch von 1914*. The volume issued by the Russian Government at the outbreak of war contained 79 documents, the new edition 208. All the documents that passed between Paris and Petrograd known to the Centralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen, of which Wegerer is the director, are given, and a few of them, though none of great importance, appear for the first time. But the collection is not yet complete, and the editor begs the Soviet Government to fill up the gaps.

A most welcome addition to our knowledge of Russian policy on the eve of war has been made by the publication in 1923 of the Foreign Office Diary from July 16 to August 2. A German version, with a preface by Wegerer, comments by Pourtalès, and a brief reply by Baron Schilling, appeared in 1924, an English translation, with the title *How the War began*, in 1925. In a brief Foreword Sazonoff emphasises the value of the diary as a contemporary record compiled without thought of publication, and rebuts Jagow's conjecture that it was put together at a subsequent date. Russia, he adds, was pitifully and hopelessly backward in strategic railways, and her belated attempts to improve them were no menace to Germany, who was thoroughly prepared. He disclaims all desire for war on the part of his country, whose offer to guarantee the integrity of Turkey in return for neutrality, he argues, rebuts the charge that

she desired a conflict in order to secure control of the Straits. Sazonoff's testimony to the value of the diary is followed by the author's Introduction. 'I made notes,' writes Baron Schilling, 'while Director of the Chancellery of the Foreign Office and Chef de Cabinet to the Minister. After seeing the Tsar, the Ambassadors or his colleagues, he told me all that he had said or done. These separate sheets, written or dictated day by day, were probably disturbed during the period of confusion, for some which I remember are not here. The diary is a direct and unimpassioned relation of events from July 16 to August 2, written as they occurred, without any ulterior object, and every unprejudiced reader will find in it fresh evidence of the sincere efforts of the Russian Government to prevent war.'

Perhaps the most interesting document in the collection is the long undated report of Sverbeiev, Russian Ambassador in Berlin, probably written during his long journey home, describing events from his return to Berlin on July 29 till his departure on August 2, and summarising his conversations with Jagow, whom he paints in unyielding mood. On July 18 the Austrian Ambassador, 'gentle as a lamb,' told Sazonoff that there was no intention whatever of rendering relations with Serbia more acute. 'His assertions,' commented Schilling, 'were so positive that they entirely removed the Minister's apprehensions.' When, however, Sazonoff heard of the ultimatum a few days later, he cried 'C'est la guerre européenne.' We learn that the Roumanian Minister was invited to join the British Ambassador at the French Embassy for discussion with Sazonoff when the ultimatum became known, and was asked to urge his Government to concert action with the Entente. The exact chronology of the telegrams exchanged between the Kaiser and the Tsar is established, and we discover that on July 30 a telegram to London urged the detention of the two Turkish warships as a matter of immense importance to Russia. The diary exhibits Sazonoff as anxious for peace, though quite prepared to fight for Serbian integrity and independence.

The military testimony to the events of the critical days is remarkable both for quantity and quality. The echoes of the dragging Sukhomlinoff trial, which began in August, 1917, were only faintly heard in Western Europe during the turmoil of war, and indeed it was no easy task to piece together a coherent story from newspaper reports of the speeches of the fallen Minister, his principal enemy, Yanuskevich, Chief of the Staff, and other witnesses. The most sensational episode of the trial was the defendant's confession that he had disobeyed the Tsar's instructions to countermand the first order for general mobilisation. This astonishing assertion, which was apparently advanced to rebut the charge of slackness in the hour of danger, was later disproved by the testimony of Dobrorolsky ; but the general effect of the proceedings was to confirm the prevalent conviction of the inefficiency and dishonesty of the military chiefs. The evidence was analysed at length in Robert Höniger's controversial but useful article, *Untersuchungen zum Sukhomlinow-Process*, in the *Deutsche Rundschau*, April, 1918.

The Sukhomlinoff trial revealed that general mobilisation was ordered on July 29, that the order was modified by the Tsar on receiving a conciliatory telegram from the Kaiser, and that the military chiefs, in despair at the difficulties of partial mobilisation, ignored the Imperial command. With one important exception this version was confirmed by General Dobrorolsky's authoritative brochure, *Die Russische Mobilmachung*. The Director of the Mobilisation Department explains that partial mobilisation was a technical impossibility and a strategical danger ; but the decision remained throughout in the hands of the Tsar. On July 28, the day of the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, ukases for general and partial mobilisation were prepared for signature, and on the morning of July 29 Yanuskevich, Chief of the Staff, handed to Dobrorolsky the ukase for general mobilisation, signed by the Tsar. After securing the signatures of the Ministers of War, Marine and the Interior, he proceeded to the central telegraph office about 9 P.M. to

despatch telegrams throughout the empire. 'But at this moment, about 9.30 P.M., Yanuskevich called me to the telephone and ordered me to hold back the telegrams, as the Tsar had commanded the substitution of partial for general mobilisation.' Orders were accordingly telegraphed to the four military districts affected by partial mobilisation. That the Minister of War and the Chief of the Staff disobeyed the Tsar's decision to countermand general mobilisation was untrue ; but on the following morning, July 30, Yanuskevich convinced Sazonoff of the dangers of partial mobilisation, and at 1 o'clock the Foreign Minister telephoned to the Chief of the Staff that his master had again ordered general mobilisation. Sazonoff, fearing that the wavering Tsar would once again change his mind, added, 'Give your orders, and then disappear for the rest of the day.' Dobrorolsky's chronology disposes of the contention that the order for the general mobilisation was only given after the arrival of the false report in the *Lokalanzeiger* that Germany had ordered mobilisation. It is also of interest to note that Dobrorolsky regarded the general mobilisation, which it was his professional duty to initiate, as the equivalent of war. 'It was the beginning of the great time,' he observes, 'the prologue of the great drama. The time of mobilisation mechanically determined the beginning of the war.' A few additional details of the critical days were given by the General in an article in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, August, 1924.

In Dobrorolsky's pages the Minister of War is depicted as a man doubtful of Russia's readiness for the struggle, who sought to avoid responsibility and desired the Chief of the Staff to represent the military authorities. In his own *Erinnerungen* Sukhomlinoff claims the chief merit for the reform of the army after the Japanese war, disclaims all share in the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, and flatly denies the charges which led to his fall and imprisonment. The voluminous autobiography becomes interesting with the author's appointment to the War Office in 1909. However difficult it may be to take him

at his own high valuation, he was doubtless a fairly competent official, content to obey his master's orders and leave politics alone. He denies that his famous declaration in 1914, 'Russia is ready, France must be ready too,' was either a boast or a threat. Far from being a pace-maker in the critical days, he was deliberately kept in the background by the partisans of war. Sazonoff, he complains, addressed his inquiries not to the Minister of War but to the Grand Duke Nicholas and to the Chief of the Staff, 'my subordinate, who went behind my back and declared that the army was readier than it really was. The Tsar knew my view, and for that reason Sazonoff and the Grand Duke dealt with Yanuskevich over my head. Of the latter's doings I knew nothing.' His anger, however, is directed far less against his disloyal subordinate than against the Grand Duke Nicholas, whom he repeatedly denounces as the chief author of Russia's misfortunes no less than of his own. The army, he declares, was only equal to a war of six to eight months; but the Tsar was at the time under the domination of his uncle, though his failure in the field was soon to destroy the illusion of his military capacity. The Russian people sought for a scapegoat in 1915, and instead of finding one in the Grand Duke its wrath was skilfully diverted against the innocent Minister of War, who was condemned to life-long imprisonment. This rather unconvincing apologia leaves a disagreeable taste of quarrels, ambitions and intrigues.

A very different portrait of Sukhomlinoff is painted by his colleague Daniloff, the Quartermaster-General, in his large and important work *Russland im Weltkriege, 1914–15*. Written in exile, like that of Sukhomlinoff, the volume is less querulous and more interesting. Russia, he declares, was pacific. 'War seemed so improbable that I started in the middle of July, 1914, for the Caucasus on my usual tour of inspection, and the head of the Department of Operations on the western front also went on leave to a Crimean spa. I offered to

postpone my journey, but Yanuskevich refused.' When the Crown Council of July 25 agreed to mobilise against Austria if the situation grew worse, Sukhomlinoff, he argues, should at once have protested against so dangerous a decision. Returning to the capital next day, he found the General Staff in great doubt whether it could thus risk upsetting the plans for general mobilisation. He thereupon secured a meeting of experts, who forwarded a report to the Tsar, pointing out that partial mobilisation would be a mere improvisation, since it had never been worked out. When partial mobilisation had been ordered on July 29, he endeavoured to convince Sazonoff through Basili, a high official of the Foreign Office and a *persona grata* to the Minister, that to delay general mobilisation beyond July 31 would be dangerous. Nowhere do we see so clearly as in these pages how large a part in the Tsar's final decision was played by the technical arguments of the military authorities. Unlike Dobrorolsky Daniloff denies that general mobilisation meant war.

Though the testimony of Daniloff is of most value for the last few days of peace, his comments on men and things are of considerable interest. The five years following the Japanese war, he asserts, were a period of military impotence. Army reform only began in 1910, and in 1914 Russia was even less prepared than Sukhomlinoff suggests. Germany was aware of the situation, and decided not to wait ; but ' the collision of the peoples of Europe was inevitable sooner or later.' Russia was uncertain of England and not absolutely certain of France, and it was expected that Germany would march through Belgium. Sukhomlinoff is portrayed as clever but frivolous, obstinate, suspicious and revengeful, not a traitor yet utterly unfit for his post. The Grand Duke Nicholas, on the other hand, was very popular with both the army and the people, and his dismissal is described as a gigantic mistake.

A no less unfriendly portrait of Sukhomlinoff is painted in the Memoirs (hitherto untranslated) of his

assistant and successor, General Polivanoff, who holds his chief mainly responsible for the military failures of the war. That he had his faults, but that he had raised the level of the army and was in no sense a traitor, is the verdict of General Lukomski, whose *Erinnerungen* carry us through the war, the revolution, and the anti-Bolshevist campaigns.

Russia's readiness for war is carefully discussed with the aid of unpublished documents in *Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg*, by Gunther Frantz, once a member of the German General Staff and now employed in the State archives at Berlin. He believes that Sukhomlinoff had carried out a comprehensive and in large measure successful reorganisation of the army, and that in certain respects Russia was more ready for war than any other Power—in the number of her mobilisation tests, in eliminations of seasonal weakness, and by accelerating mobilisation through the institution of the Period of Preparation for War. The Russian army, in fact, was quite up to the general level, and the German General Staff was aware of the fact. 'In 1914 an army organised on thoroughly modern lines took the field, with excellent artillery and commissariat.' The most important of his new documents is a lengthy memorandum by General Daniloff, written in March, 1914, dealing with Russia's strength, speculating on the plans of the Western Powers, and expressing the opinion that England would take part in the event of a European conflagration.

The *Journal Intime de Nicolas II* is of negative rather than positive interest, revealing, as it does, an amiable mediocrity, totally destitute of the qualities of mind and will required in a ruler of men. The enormous manuscript preserved in the Moscow archives, from which the Russian editor Melgounov published a volume of extracts at Berlin in 1923, covers the period from 1890 to the end of December, 1917, six months before his death. Each year fills about a hundred pages, and the integral publication of the journal is unnecessary, since the entries are of the driest and baldest character. Even

the passages selected from the most eventful years of his reign, the period of the Japanese war, the revolution of 1905 and the world war, oppress the reader by their deadly monotony. The weather, the walks, the family and official visits, the reviews and other happenings of each day, however trivial, are recorded, and it is but rarely that an audience is described, an idea or an emotion expressed. The ruler of scores of millions appears as an automaton rather than an autocrat, discharging the routine business of his office in a mechanical, impersonal way, and resignedly accepting murders, disasters and defeats as 'the will of God.' From time to time, however, we stumble on interesting entries, such as those which record the happy meeting with the Kaiser at Björko in 1905, and the tragic days of March, 1917, when, 'surrounded by treason, cowardice and knavery,' the last of the Romanoffs went down before the storm.

The poignant and pathetic *Letters of the Tsaritsa*, enriched by an admirable Introduction by Sir Bernard Pares, covering the period from the outbreak of war to the end of 1916, reveal both the devotion of the unhappy invalid to her family and her unceasing interference in affairs in defence of the supposed interests of the autocracy. The volume is dominated by the sinister figure of Rasputin, who appears as The Holy Man, an oracle of wisdom human and divine. Indeed a thick cloud of oriental superstition hangs over the scene, paralysing the efforts of the Duma to win the war and to save the State. The Imperial couple wrote to one another in English and the Tsaritsa's letters were first published with a Russian version at Berlin. The voluminous correspondence, including the Tsar's replies, appeared in a Russian translation in 1926. Our knowledge of the narrow but affectionate domestic life of the Imperial family is enlarged in the unpretentious work of the devoted French tutor of the Tsarevich, Pierre Gilliard, entitled *Thirteen Years at the Russian Court*, and the *Memoirs* of Anna Vyrubova, the Empress' sole intimate friend, whose commonplace intellect and colour-

less personality belie the legend that she was a political tool of Rasputin and dominated her neurotic mistress.

A volume of letters covering the last decade of the Tsar's reign, published in Russian in 1925 and in a French translation in 1926, entitled *Lettres des Grand-Ducs à Nicholas II*, throws light on the character, position and influence of the leading members of the Imperial family. The most interesting are perhaps those of the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch, the historian of the Romanoffs, who aspired to represent Russia in the peace negotiations, and who, like several other Grand Dukes, adjured the ruler in the plainest terms to avert the approaching revolution by calling to office men in whom the sorely-tried nation could put its trust.

No witness has so much to tell us of the personal factors of the revolution as Rodzjanko, whose *Erinnerungen* appeared after his death. The volume is a record of the dramatic struggle between the President of the Duma and 'the dark forces' which led Russia to her doom. Nowhere do we find so much authentic material on the crapulous Rasputin, and nowhere is his all-pervading influence so vividly portrayed. If the author's reports of his audiences are to be trusted, he repeatedly and fearlessly informed the Tsar of the real character of the illiterate, filthy, drunken and immoral adventurer whom the neurotic Tsaritsa worshipped and obeyed. The Tsar appears as a kind, good man, earnestly desiring to do right, and on occasion grateful to the President of the Duma for the frank expression of his views. Had Nicholas been master in his own house, it is clear that the reign of Rasputin would have been brief. But he was completely dominated by his wife, whose influence waxed with the growing peril of the State. The unavailing efforts of the sterling patriot, loyal alike to the Monarchy and the Duma, to avert defeat and revolution by the creation of a Ministry enjoying the confidence of the Duma and the people, make sad reading. The murder of Rasputin, whom he believes (without adducing evidence) to have been a tool of Germany, made the

situation worse instead of better, for henceforth his protégé, Protopopoff, backed by the Empress, reigned supreme. At the last audience on February 10, 1917, the Tsar replied to the President's familiar complaints by an angry threat to dissolve the Duma. 'There is still time,' rejoined the unshaken Rodzjanko; 'a responsible Ministry can still be appointed. But Your Majesty does not agree with me, and everything will remain as it is. In my opinion that will lead to revolution and anarchy.' The Tsar made no reply, and coldly dismissed his visitor. A month later he was a prisoner in his own palace, and the exciting narrative comes to an end. A small Russian volume on Rasputin, extracted from the Memoirs of Beletzky, Director of Police in Petrograd, adds to our knowledge of the charlatan who, in the author's opinion, possessed no political ideas, and thought of nothing but how to maintain himself at the giddy eminence to which he had climbed.

The apprehensions of approaching doom during the last years of peace are mirrored in the *Journal de la Générale Bogdanovitch*. Though her salon was the meeting-place of high officers and high society, her diary of three reigns, 1879–1912, recording the comments and opinions of herself and her guests, darkens as the years advance, and closes with angry denunciations of 'the reptile' Rasputin. In her *Memories of a Shipwrecked World* Countess Kleinmichel, once known as 'the mother of diplomats,' and the presiding genius of a rival political salon at Petrograd, tells us far less than we have a right to expect; but the chapter on Count Fredericks records an interesting conversation with the veteran Court Chamberlain in regard to the outbreak of war. The Tsar, we are told, was urged on by Sukhomlinoff, Yanuskevich and the Grand Duke Nicholas. Count Fredericks advised his master not to mobilise; but Sazonoff argued that war was the only means to preserve his life and to hand on his throne to his son. 'I have the courage,' added the Foreign Minister, 'to assume the responsibility for a war which

will make Russia stronger than she ever was.' Such reminiscences of conversation are of very doubtful value, and the Countess was no special friend of the Entente ; but we may probably assume that the Count played a moderating *rôle* throughout the crisis. Baron Shelking's *The Game of Diplomacy*, written after the author's escape from Russia in 1917, though full of errors, makes a few additions to our knowledge of Russian and German statesmen from 1890 to the outbreak of war. His twenty years' experience in the diplomatic service, mainly in Berlin under Count Osten-Sacken, followed by political journeyings as the correspondent of leading Russian newspapers, put him in touch with many of the makers of history in Central and Eastern Europe. Like most other witnesses, he charges Izvolsky with snobbishness and egotism, and tells us that his nickname in the salons of Petrograd was the Prince of the Bosphorus. Sazonoff is more gently handled, but his chief bouquets are presented to Witte and the aged Goremykin.

The fullest narrative of the brightly tinted dawn and the darkening close of the first year of the Revolution is to be found in Mrs Tyrkova-Williams' important work, *From Liberty to Brest-Litovsk*. The authoress, herself a Russian, looks at events through the spectacles of the Cadets, in whose counsels she had played an active part, and whose overthrow she witnessed with profound regret. Kerensky's contribution to the history of the same tragic period is confined to his evidence on the Korniloff episode before the Commission of Inquiry set up by the Government of which he had become the chief. The thesis of the volume, *The Prelude to Bolshevism : the Korniloff Rebellion*, is announced in its title. It was Korniloff, he argues, not himself, who prepared the way for the Bolshevists, though the brave soldier erred through political inexperience, not from any lack of devotion to Russia. General Sir Alfred Knox, on the other hand, our Military Attaché and later *liaison* officer, champions Korniloff and denounces Kerensky's 'colossal vanity' in his instructive work *With the Russian Army*.

In *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia* Professor Alfred Dennis provides the first comprehensive record of Bolshevist diplomacy from the revolution of 1917 and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Peace Conference and beyond. The work of the American scholar, which is filled with quotations from official documents and speeches, comments severely on the ignorance and vacillation of the Allies in their dealings with the new regime. The latest large-scale revelation of Tsarist diplomacy, published in Russian in 1926 by the Soviet Government and edited with an Introduction by Professor Adamoff, is entitled *Constantinople and the Straits*. The first of the two large volumes contains the diplomatic correspondence in reference to the recognition by the Allies of Russian claims, while the second describes the plans for the joint operations for the seizure of the Turkish capital and the British campaign in Gallipoli. An enlarged edition of the Second Russian Orange-book, (an English version of the original of which is included in the *Diplomatic Documents* published by the Carnegie Endowment,) was issued in 1926 by Stieve, the editor of the Izvolsky Correspondence, with the title *Das Russische Orangebuch über den Kriegsausbruch mit der Türkei*.

Scarcely inferior in importance to the larger documentary publications of the Bolshevist Government are the revelations in the successive volumes of the official *Krasny Archiv*. Among many valuable contributions to history are Baron Schilling's above-mentioned diary of the Foreign Office on the eve of war ; the correspondence of Lamsdorff, Osten-Sacken (Ambassador at Berlin), and Nelidoff (Ambassador at Paris), during the various stages of the Björko negotiations, translated in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, November, 1924 ; and the correspondence of the Tsar and Francis Joseph during the Bosnian crisis. Several important contributions to knowledge still await the translator, among them Roman Dmowski's narrative (in Polish) of his endeavours to interest the Allies in the aspirations of his race.

CHAPTER IV

The Near East

The world war originated in the Near East, and every member of the quarrelsome Balkan family has contributed in larger or smaller measure to our knowledge of causes and events.

In *The Aspirations of Bulgaria* the Serbian statesman Stephan Protich, concealing himself under the name of Balkanicus, describes the break-up of the Balkan alliance in the spring of 1913, and traces it to the systematic treachery and the vaulting ambitions of Bulgaria. With the aid of a wealth of Bulgarian documents he sketches the development of a policy of aggression till the sudden attack on the Serbs and Greek troops in Macedonia on June 29. The villain of the piece is King Ferdinand; but General Savoff's active participation in the crime is established, and the statement of Daneff, the Premier, that he had no knowledge of or responsibility for the fateful order is received with a good deal of scepticism. Even the relatively pacific Gueshoff, the chief author of the Balkan League, who was dismissed to make way for Daneff, does not emerge unscathed. 'It seems as if duplicity was more or less the characteristic attribute of all the Bulgarian statesmen and politicians.' Such sweeping indictments, however unconvincing, help us to visualise the fierce racial hatreds which complicate the problems of the peninsula.

Recent revelations from Serbian sources have diminished the warm admiration at one time entertained by the Allies for a gallant little nation in its hour of trial. As Witte and Rosen dared to oppose the forward policy

in the Near East which they believed would drag Russia into a disastrous war, so Bogitshevich, Chargé d'Affaires of Serbia at Berlin during the last years of peace, sharply criticises the adventurous policy of his country in his little book *Causes of the War*. The conflict, he argues, arose from the antagonism of Russia and Austria, in which the former played an aggressive, the latter a defensive part. While Austria, after the formal annexation of Bosnia, desired nothing so much as the maintenance of the status quo, Serbia, 'financially tied to France and politically mortgaged to Russia,' planned to extend her boundaries at the expense of Turkey and Austria successively. Convinced by his intercourse with Kiderlen and Jagow of the desire of the Wilhelmstrasse for peace, and by his conversations with Pasitch of his desire for war, he attributes the main responsibility for the conflagration to the ambitions of Russia and her latest Balkan *protégé*. A brief but valuable appendix of documents illustrating his arguments contains reports and declarations of Serbian and Russian statesmen from the Bosnian crisis to the outbreak of war in 1914.

The planning and execution of the murders at Serajevo were described by Prinzip, Cabrinovich and the other conspirators at their trial in the Bosnian capital in October, 1914. *Der Prozess gegen die Attentäter von Serajevo*, edited by 'Professor Pharos,' with an introduction by the Berlin jurist Professor Josef Kohler, (1918), contains a German translation of the evidence of the conspirators, who spoke with the greatest frankness of their career, opinions and ideals, while reports of General Potiorek and Count Harrach, the principal witnesses who accompanied the Archduke and his wife, recalled the last affecting scenes of the tragedy. The complete record of the evidence, we are told, is likely to appear in the near future.

The soil from which murder sprouted is analysed in Jevtic's *Memories and Impressions of the Attentat of Serajevo*, published at Belgrad, and translated into German in the *Kriegsschuldfrage*, October, 1925. The

author interprets and approves the murder and the conspirators, whom he describes from personal knowledge. 'Serajevo,' he begins, 'was the work not of an individual, but of the whole youth of Bosnia,—not an improvisation but a deed of long design.' Young Bosnia, he adds, was the child of despair. The peasants being too primitive to conspire, the lead was taken by poets, journalists, and university students. In reading of Gacinovich, the chief preacher of 'the cult of assassination,' and his young colleagues, we are transported back to the exaltation and desperation of the Italian *Risorgimento*. The record of the movements of Prinzip, of his doubts and moods in the days and hours before the fatal act, is a convincing study of the political criminal.

Our knowledge of the part played by Serbian citizens in the events leading up to the Serajevo murders has been increased by a series of sensational revelations. In his brochure, *Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand*, translated from the Serbian and edited by Hermann Wendel, (1923), Professor Stanojevich, a well-known historical scholar, describes the foundation of the two societies of National Defence and Union or Death. The former was public and constitutional, the latter, commonly known as the Black Hand, secret and revolutionary, controlled by Dimitrievich, one of the regicides of 1903. The Colonel, who, we learn, planned to murder Francis Joseph or his heir in 1911, Ferdinand of Bulgaria in 1914, King Constantine and the Crown Prince of Serbia in 1916, was the leading organiser of the crime of Serajevo. As Chief of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff, he declares, he was informed by the Russian General Staff that at Konopischt the German Emperor had promised to support the plan of Francis Ferdinand to fall upon Serbia, and he believed that the removal of the Archduke was the only means to avert the attack. When at this moment two youths from Bosnia presented themselves as the representatives of a group which had resolved on the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, Dimitrievich instructed his

factotum, Tankosich, to teach them the use of arms. The Colonel informed the executive of his organisation of the plan, but nearly all the members expressed disapproval. He therefore promised to countermand the murder ; but either it was too late or the order was disobeyed. Further details relating to the activities of this turbulent malefactor, obtained at his trial at Salonika in 1917 on the charge of conspiring against the life of the Crown Prince of Serbia, for which he was condemned to death and shot, are summarised in Miss Durham's *The Serajevo Murder.*

Still more sensational was the revelation made by Jovanovich, Speaker of the Skupshtina, in an article published in Belgrad in 1924 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the outbreak of war. A translation, entitled *The Murder of Serajevo*, appeared in 1925 under the auspices of the British Institute of International Affairs. ' At the end of May or the beginning of June, 1914,' declares the author, at that time Minister of Education in the Pasitch Cabinet, ' the Prime Minister said to us that there were people who were preparing to go to Serajevo to kill Francis Ferdinand, who was to go there to be solemnly received on Vidov Dan (St. Vitus' Day, June 28, the anniversary of the battle of Kossovo). M. Pasitch and the rest of us said, and Stojan Protich (Minister of the Interior) agreed, that he should issue instructions to the frontier authorities on the Drina to deny a crossing to the youths, who had already set out from Belgrad for that purpose. But the frontier " authorities " themselves belonged to the organisation, and did not carry out Stojan's instructions, but reported to him (and he afterwards reported to us) that the order had reached them too late ; for the young men had already got across. Thus the endeavour of the Government to prevent the execution of the plot failed, as did also the endeavour made on his own initiative by our Minister in Vienna, Joca Jovanovich, in an interview with the Minister Bilinski, to dissuade the Archduke from the fatal journey which he contemplated. . . .

On the afternoon of Vidov Dan an official telephoned to me from the Press Bureau, and told me what had happened at noon at Serajevo. Even though I knew what had been prepared there, nevertheless I felt, as I held the receiver, as though someone had dealt me an unexpected blow.'

This categorical and circumstantial assertion by a Cabinet Minister that the Serbian Premier informed some of his colleagues of the conspiracy a month before the event, and took no steps to warn Vienna, aroused delight among the foes of Serbia and consternation among her champions. After allowing Pasitch several months to reply, Professor Seton-Watson appealed to him through the columns of the *Times* to disprove the terrible charge if he could. No response came from Belgrad, and it was not till April, 1926, that the veteran statesman publicly denied the statements made by his colleague in August, 1924. Nothing more has been heard of the project of supplementing the Serbian Blue-book by a larger collection of documents from the State archives.

The testimony of Jovanovich is discussed in the learned volume, *Serajevo*, by Professor Seton-Watson, who reaches the paradoxical conclusion that he invented the story. Whether or not we accept his exculpation of the Serbian Government, we owe him gratitude for the new light which his researches and oral inquiries have thrown on the aspirations of the Jugoslavs, and in particular of the Bosnian student circles among whom the idea of assassinating the Archduke originated. Jugoslav nationalism is presented in a very different light in Miss Edith Durham's lively works, *Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle*, and *The Serajevo Murder*. What the one traveller and student regards as a new *Risorgimento*, claiming the approval of all friends of its Italian model, appears to the other an incident in a vast Pan-Slav uprising against the Teutonic Powers of Central Europe. The most recent survey of the history and aspirations of the Southern Slavs is to be found in Hermann Wendel's

Der Kampf der Südslaven um Einheit und Freiheit, a massive volume distinguished by its Jugoslav sympathies and its mastery of the whole mass of Slavonic materials.

None of the Balkan States presents such difficulties to the student as Greece, where the mass of conflicting testimony and the passions of the rival camps render truth unusually difficult to obtain. During the conflict, and indeed until the Greek electors recalled Constantine in 1921, Venezelos was regarded in Western Europe as the brain and voice of his country. Everyone knew that he was on the side of the Entente, and everyone believed that the King was in league with our enemies. When the former returned from Salonika to Athens in 1917, supported by the bayonets of the Allies, he presented his case to the world in two collections of documents. The Dictator's great historical survey in the Chamber in August, 1917, formed the kernel of a volume translated under the title of *The Vindication of Greek Policy*, 1912–1917. A more formidable propagandist influence was exerted by the two Greek White-books, covering the years 1913–1917, of which an English translation was published by the American-Hellenic Society. The most sensational items were the confidential communications of the King and Queen with the Kaiser during the winter of 1916–1917. After the fateful collision with Entente troops outside Athens on December 1, 1916, Queen Sophie in desperation turned to her brother and inquired when the offensive against the Entente army in the Balkans would begin. The Kaiser replied with a command to attack Sarrail's left wing, to which the Queen rejoined that the distance was too great, and that an attack would only become possible if Sarrail was driven south by the Central Powers. On January 6, 1917, Constantine, answering an inquiry of Hindenburg, explained that Greece would be crushed the moment she began to move, and inquired of Hindenburg whether an offensive against Sarrail was contemplated. To this question no reply was received.

After Constantine's death and the political extinction of Venezelos, the tide turned and ran strongly the other way. We now realise that the Minister was not always and necessarily right or the King always and necessarily wrong. The volume entitled *A King's Private Letters* contains letters of Constantine to Paola, Princess of Saxe-Weimar, from 1912 till his death in 1923. In the opening weeks of the first Balkan war he foretells an inevitable struggle with Bulgaria ; and the refusal of aid to Serbia in 1915 is vindicated by Serbia's refusal when Greece had asked for support in the early summer of 1914, in view of a then imminent struggle with Turkey. Only a few letters illustrate the world war, but Admiral Mark Kerr, the head of the British Naval Mission in Greece, who contributes a laudatory preface, testifies that the monarch never contemplated the possibility of fighting on the opposite side to Great Britain.

The recent vicissitudes of the country have been graphically described from the Royalist standpoint by Prince Nicholas in *My Fifty Years*. The autobiography becomes of importance with the Balkan war, and provides first-hand material on Greek politics till the overwhelming catastrophe of 1922. Throughout these moving pages the impulsiveness, short-sightedness and insolence of Venezelos are contrasted with the cautious statesmanship and prescient patriotism of Constantine. The Minister, we are told, was utterly lacking in judgment, at one moment timidly urging the cession of Cavalla as a sop to the Bulgarian Cerberus, at another plunging into the highlands of Asia Minor in quest of glory and empire. Prince Nicholas describes himself as a friend of the Entente from the outset, and dismisses as a childish calumny the legend that his brother was pro-German. The King's policy, he argues, was clear and consistent throughout,—to maintain neutrality or, if neutrality was to be abandoned, to support the Entente on the basis of minimum risks and agreed conditions. That he ever for a moment contemplated the support of the Central Powers is disproved by the notorious

fact that Greece would immediately have become the helpless prey of the Powers in command of the sea. The King, argues Prince Nicholas, was throughout the true spokesman of the nation's sentiments, and the devotion he inspired was revealed in the amazing blockade of the Palace when M. Jonnart ordered him out of the country in 1917.

The first attempt, based on Greek sources and private information, to explain the policy of the King was made in *Greece and the Allies, 1914–1922*, by G. F. Abbott, whose spirited defence of the character and statesmanship of Constantine is sponsored in a sympathetic Foreword by Admiral Mark Kerr. The return of Constantine in 1921 enabled Royalist historians to supplement the White-books of Venezelos by their own researches in the archives. The task of describing the part of his country during the world war was entrusted to Frangulis by Baltazzi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, 'shocked by the legends of the Great War,' invited him to reveal the truth with the aid of the Foreign Office papers and his own. Himself an ex-Minister, an international lawyer, a historian, and a delegate to the Geneva Assembly, Frangulis is well fitted to discuss the juristic complications of his theme. The two volumes of his large-scale and richly documented work, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale*, are a fierce indictment of Venezelos, whom he charges with recklessness abroad and faction at home. The King, he believes, was not only the better statesman in desiring to save his little country from the risk of annihilation, but the truer interpreter of the national sentiment. The Minister, he declares roundly, worked for his personal ends, and the eviction of Constantine was followed by a veritable reign of terror.

No less eloquent a champion of the King is Cosmin, whose *L'Entente et la Grèce pendant la Grande Guerre, 1914–1917*, based on the Greek archives, argues that 'there was never the slightest shadow of truth in the formidable charges of the Entente against neutral Greece.' An immense edifice of injustice, he declares, was erected

to justify the punishment of a little people whose right to remain neutral it was necessary to override. The King was on more than one occasion ready to join the Allies ; but, unlike his headstrong Minister, who combined great intellectual qualities with gross faults of character, he was not inclined to plunge into war at a moment when disaster was inevitable. The volumes form a sustained indictment of French policy in the Near East and of the celebrated statesman who, we are told, completely lacked the moral sense. 'Posterity,' cries Cosmin, 'will retain the word Venezelism as a synonym of opprobrium and treason.' The Minister, for instance, invited the Allies to embark at Salonika without telling the King. The noble Constantine, on the other hand, whom Venezelos denounced as 'Boche from the crown of his head to the sole of his foot,' but who is credited by our author with 'perfect loyalty to the Entente,' appears as a martyr King who unselfishly saved his country from invasion and ruin at the cost of his throne. The Greeks were Ententophil to a man, but they had no wish to fight except for their own vital interests. The Entente, we are assured, spent far larger sums in propaganda than the notorious Baron Schenk.

After these passionate polemics it is a relief to turn to the closing volume of the monumental *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce*, in which Lhéritier and Driault have described the relations of Greece and the Powers from the revolt of 1821 till the expulsion from Smyrna a century later. The fifth volume, covering the eventful years 1908 to 1923, is the work of Driault, the leading French specialist on the history of 'the Eastern Question.' He has supplemented his researches in the Foreign Office at Athens, which he declares to be of extraordinary richness, by the testimony of leading actors from both camps, among them Politis, Baltazzi and Streit. Refusing to rake up old quarrels, he pays homage both to Venezelos and to the King, and salutes Greece as 'the great nation of the East.' Constantine,

he declares, was very popular with his subjects, and both Italy and Russia were angered by his deposition.

Next to Greek sources we owe most to French witnesses and actors. In *L'Entente, la Grèce et la Bulgarie*, Gabriel Deville, French Minister at Athens since 1909, sketches the *début* of Venezelos and the first year of the war, at the end of which he was recalled by the Bulgarophils at Paris, who were attempting to attach Bulgaria instead of making sure of Greek support. A later stage of the drama is presented in *Mes Souvenirs de Guerre, 1914–1916*, of Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet, Commander of the French squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean, who was recalled for his handling of the situation on December 1, 1916, when French troops marching from Peiraeus to the capital were shot down with impunity. A third chapter is reached in Raymond Recouly's little book, *M. Jonnart en Grèce et l'Abdication de Constantin*, which is virtually an official record of the mission of the High Commissioner despatched by France, with the qualified assent of Great Britain, after the recall of the Admiral in 1917. General Sarrail's querulous apologia, *Mon Commandement en Orient, 1916–1918*, presents a bewildering picture of the jealousies and intrigues which rendered the large inter-allied forces on the Bulgarian front comparatively ineffective. A very different picture of the French Commander-in-Chief is painted in Luigi Villari's *The Macedonian Campaign*, in which his military capacity, his political indiscretions, and his private character are sharply assailed.

That the personality and policy of Venezelos were regarded in Italy with feelings very different from those so loudly proclaimed in France and England may be seen in the work of Colonel Caracciolo, *L'Intervento della Grecia nella Guerra mondiale e l'Opera della diplomazia alleata*, with a preface by the Nationalist Senator, Enrico Corradini. The Military Attaché in Athens shared the deep-rooted distrust of the Dictator entertained by his Chief, Count Bosdari, and indeed by Sonnino himself, who scented the rival rather than the ally. Behind

Venezelos, he believes, stood France, who desired the aggrandisement of Greece, not for the *beaux yeux* of the Dictator, but to act as a make-weight in the Balkans and the Adriatic against the ambitions and interests of Italy. The Russian view of these tangled transactions must be sought in the White-book, *The European Powers and Greece in the Great War, from the secret materials in the ex-Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, published in Russian at Moscow in 1922 with a preface by Adamov.

Two Bulgarian Premiers have made contributions to our knowledge of the highest interest. In his book, *The Balkan League*, of which an English translation appeared in 1915, Gueshoff describes the crowding events of 1912–1913, when the intoxication of victory was swiftly followed by the bitterness of defeat. 'As the treaties were concluded in Sofia, Bulgaria standing at the head of the Balkan Alliance and making for it during the war against Turkey greater sacrifices than all the other allies put together, it is only right that the Bulgarian statesman who conducted the negotiations should be the first to break silence and tell what he did for that alliance, how hard he tried to save it from destruction, and how little was the Bulgarian nation responsible for its downfall.' Having witnessed the 'Bulgarian atrocities' in 1876 and having convinced himself that the Young Turks were aiming at the extermination of the Macedonian Bulgars, Gueshoff approached Serbia in the autumn of 1911 as the first step towards the formation of a Balkan League. A month later negotiations began with Greece, whose desire for an agreement had been unofficially communicated through Bourchier, the famous Balkan correspondent of the *Times*. When victory was achieved and the treaty with Turkey was signed, Gueshoff resigned. 'My policy of coming to an understanding with our allies without bloodshed, of keeping the Balkan Alliance intact, of having recourse to arbitration with Serbia and Greece, did not meet with approval. I was not in unity with the Crown.' His worst fears were realised, for on June 29, without the

knowledge of the Daneff Cabinet, 'the Second and Fourth Bulgarian armies, acting on orders from Headquarters, attacked the allies. Is it possible to make the nation answerable for a criminal folly, accomplished without the consent of the legislative body and even without the knowledge of the responsible Government?' A new edition of this valuable work, with a new preface, was published at Bern in 1919 under the title *La Genèse de la Guerre Mondiale*, adding the Serbo-Greek treaty of May 19, 1913, by which the signatories agreed to partition Macedonia and to support each other in the event of Bulgarian resistance. As an *alumnus* of Owens College, Manchester, and a life-long Anglophil, Gueshoff deplores the intervention of his country on the side of the Central Powers in the world war.

Innumerable secrets are locked up in the bosom of ex-King Ferdinand, and the voluminous Bulgarian Orange-book on the negotiations of 1914–1915 is accessible only to the few who can read Bulgarian. In these circumstances we should be particularly grateful to Radoslavoff, whose volume *Die Weltkrise* not only sets forth the Bulgarian point of view of the Sofia Government, but furnishes important documentary material. Summoned to the premiership when the crazy adventure of the third Balkan war ended in the Treaty of Bucharest, Radoslavoff, in agreement with his master, gave a sharp turn to the wheel. Russia, he argues, had never intended to hold the balance fairly between Bulgaria and Serbia in 1912, and in 1913 'the high protector of Slavism' encouraged the non-Slav Roumania and Greece to enter the fray. The Treaty of Bucharest—the second partition of the Bulgarian people—registered the bankruptcy of Russophilism, and further co-operation was impossible with Serbia, who had deliberately plotted to cheat her ally of Macedonia. Whither, therefore, could Bulgaria turn but to the Central Powers? Austria alone had protested against the harsh settlement of Bucharest, and German banks supplied a much-needed loan.

Still smarting under the Treaty of Bucharest when Bulgaria was 'broken and humiliated by the Great Powers,' Radoslavoff watched with scornful eyes the wooing of his country on the outbreak of the world-war. Copious extracts from the Bulgarian Orange-book reveal the bribes and threats with which Russia in vain endeavoured to recover lost ground; for the patrons and allies of Serbia were unable to make the clear-cut promise of Macedonia which secured the Bulgarian sword for the Central Powers. In accepting the offer, 'which fully satisfied the national aspirations, the Government acted in the firm belief that it was fulfilling its holiest duty to the Fatherland.' The Chamber and the people were delighted, and the author assures us that the Bulgarian troops were welcomed in Macedonia as deliverers. Writing when the iron dice of war had driven his country to unconditional surrender and condemned his master and himself to exile, Radoslavoff continues to uphold the decision of 1915. The most interesting feature of the later chapters is the account of Bethmann's attempt to enter on negotiations with Russia through the medium of the Premier's son-in-law Rizoff, the Bulgarian Minister at Berlin, who journeyed to the Scandinavian capitals both before and after the fall of the Tsar. It is a curious feature of this book that Ferdinand, whom we should expect to find dominating the stage, is seldom mentioned, and then without either praise or blame.

The efforts of official, semi-official and unofficial champions of the Entente to secure the aid or at any rate the benevolent neutrality of Bulgaria have been described by British and French witnesses. In *The Experiences of a Military Attaché in the Balkans*, Lieut.-Colonel H. D. Napier tells a story of lost opportunities. His own policy from the beginning was to win Bulgaria 'at any price'; but his views were opposed by his chief, Sir Henry Bax-Ironside, who objected to forcing sacrifices on Serbia in Macedonia. When O'Beirne succeeded the Serbophil Bax-Ironside at the Sofia Embassy in

July, 1915, he realised the urgency of the situation; but it was too late. An appendix contains extracts from the trials for High Treason in 1921–2 of the Bulgarian Ministers who had brought the country into the war. The narrative of the British Military Attaché is supplemented in *L'Été Bulgare*, in which Marcel Dunan, the correspondent of the *Temps*, utilises his despatches and his diary from July to October, 1915. King Ferdinand appears as a thorough realist, convinced that the Central Powers would win, hating Russia, and dreading Pan-Slav hegemony in the Balkans. Radoslavoff is presented as an ignorant mediocrity, who might have described himself, like Giers, as 'the pen of my master.' Further light on the wooing of Ferdinand is thrown by Mr Noel Buxton, the Bulgarophil Chairman of the Balkan Committee, in *Balkan Problems and European Peace*, in which he describes his semi-official mission to the Near East on the outbreak of war. Lady Grogan's life of Bourchier adds a few particulars from the papers of the famous *Times* correspondent, who found in Bulgaria his spiritual home, and who returned after the war to lay his bones among the people he had loved and served.

In his book, *La Turquie, l'Allemagne et l'Europe, 1878–1914*, General Moukhtar Pasha offers a thoughtful discussion of the relations of his country with the Powers in the generation before the war. Writing in 1924 he is acquainted with the published material, and he makes valuable additions from his own experience and from the archives of the Porte. His thesis is that Turkey owed her downfall to the Germanophil policy pursued both by the Old and the Young Turks, instead of co-operating with England and the Entente, whose enmity was mortal. The argumentative record becomes of historical value in 1908, when the author, as Commander of the First Army at Constantinople, witnessed the Young Turk revolution and defended it against a series of minor revolts. After the failure of the counter-revolution of 1909 the new regime degenerated into a corrupt military dictatorship, whose mania for centralisation set the

empire aflame. His pet aversion is Mahmud Shevket, who suppressed the counter-revolution of 1909, but whom he accuses of weakening the army and its discipline. As Minister of Marine at the outbreak of the Tripoli war, he testifies that the Cabinet discussions displayed a complete lack of clarity and courage ; that the Government was caught unawares ; and that Shevket had recently removed troops from the threatened province for service on the Yemen. The Porte was equally unsuspecting in 1912, and neither Germany nor Austria, though aware of the Serbo-Bulgar pact, gave a timely warning to their friends on the Bosphorus. Appointed Minister of War in the summer of that disastrous year, Moukhtar urged the need of immediate reforms, and strove to avert a conflict in which he knew that his country would be defeated. It was cold comfort when Bethmann informed him later that Germany would have acted differently had she foreseen the issue of the struggle.

Moukhtar, who had commanded at Tchatalja when the Bulgarian onslaught was checked, was appointed Ambassador at Berlin in 1913. He claims credit for the re-occupation of Adrianople, telegraphing the news that the Greeks had landed at Dedeagach, and exhorting the Porte to ignore the orders of the Powers. His distrust of Germany was confirmed on discovering that the Wilhelmstrasse was discussing with the Powers the partition of the empire into zones of influence. Turkey, he argued in his despatches in 1913, must buy off the enmity of Russia with concessions in the Straits, as the only way to avert the attack planned for four or five years ahead. The Tcharikoff negotiations for the Russo-Turkish alliance, on which these pages shed fresh light, seemed a step in the right direction ; but the Ambassador was recalled and disavowed at the bidding of England and France. The author's final charge against the Young Turks is that they omitted to make peace in 1917, when the Russian claim to Constantinople was withdrawn.

The military association of Germany and Turkey, beginning with the mission of General von der Goltz, was renewed in 1913 when, at the request of the Young Turks, General Liman von Sanders was sent from Berlin to aid the recovery of the army from the disasters of the Balkan war. The General has told the story of Turco-German co-operation during the great struggle in his unpretentious but valuable book, *Fünf Jahre Türkei.* Of less purely military interest are Djemal Pasha's *Memories of a Turkish Statesman*, the only presentation of the drama from the Turkish side. The most interesting of his revelations is that as early as August 2, 1914, Turkey signed a treaty with the Central Powers pledging herself to intervene on their side. Thus the negotiations with the Entente, which are described in the British White-book containing Sir Louis Mallet's despatches from Constantinople and in the second Russian Orange-book, were nothing but an elaborate farce in which the Grand Vizier's peaceful assurances were designed to cover leisurely preparations for attack. The most revealing chapter in a striking volume describes and discusses the Young Turk policy of solving the Armenian problem by exterminating the Armenians. No man was less of a religious fanatic than the cool-headed Talaat, the organiser of massacre, before whose consummate achievements the prentice efforts of Abdul Hamid pale and fade into insignificance. The legend that Christian Germany watched the fiendish cruelties of her Mussulman ally, without lifting a finger to save the hapless victims, is dispelled by the Consular reports and other documents collected and discussed by the well-known Armenophil Johannes Lepsius in his substantial volume, *Deutschland und Armenien, 1914–1918.* British testimonies to the same colossal tragedy are collected in *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–1916*, edited by Mr A. J. Toynbee, and issued as a Blue-book in October, 1916.

Though Bratiano was in command of the Roumanian vessel when the tempest broke, the most travelled and

cultivated of the Conservative leaders was not without influence in shaping its course. A brochure entitled *L'Origine de la Guerre*, published in 1915, announced and explained the whole-hearted devotion of Take Jonescu to the cause of the Entente, and on the conclusion of peace he published a selection from the 'thousands' of articles written by him during the conflict. The volume, entitled *Some Personal Impressions*, is described by the author as a mere preface to the Memoirs on which he was engaged. As the author is dead and the Memoirs have never appeared, we have to content ourselves with these snapshots of Goluchowsky, Aehrenthal, Berchtold, Czernin, Bülow, Kiderlen-Wächter, Venezelos, Talaat, Lichnowsky, Mensdorff, and other celebrities. After the Treaty of Bucharest Take Jonescu, at that time Prime Minister, assured the President of the French Republic that the events of the summer had made it certain that Roumania would never fight on the side of the enemies of France. The war, he argues, was mainly due to Austria, for whose statesmen—the mediocre Goluchowsky, the ambitious Aehrenthal, the vapid Berchtold—he expresses profound contempt. Some of his most vivid pages describe his painful conversations with the royal family at Sinaia on August 2, 1914, on the eve of the Crown Council whose decision for neutrality broke a Hohenzollern heart. From neutrality to intervention was but a step, and on the eve of hostilities Czernin, the Austrian Minister, astonished the author by remarking that if he were a Roumanian he would attack Austria. 'It is your interest and your duty.' Of German statesmen, above all his intimate friend Kiderlen-Wächter, he has a much higher opinion; but it is Venezelos alone whom he admires 'without restriction.'

Roumania's diplomacy from the outbreak of war to her entry into the struggle must be studied in the Austrian Red-book, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke betreffend die Beziehungen Oesterreich-Ungarns zu Rumänien in der Zeit von 22 Juli, 1914, bis 27 August, 1916*. The

well-written despatches of Czernin vividly describe the attempts of the Prime Minister to postpone action till he could secure his maximum terms, and be reasonably sure which side was going to win. The King is described as a tool in Bratiano's hands. The last and most sensational telegram, written after the breach had occurred, reveals that on August 24, 1916, Russia sent an ultimatum to Bucharest, offering Transylvania, the Banat and the Bukovina as the booty, and strengthening the appeal with a threat of invasion with 100,000 men. It was for Roumania to choose whether the troops should come as friends or foes. It is Czernin's opinion that the calculating Bratiano would have preferred to wait a little longer. A full and vivid account of the debate at the Crown Council at Cotroceni, which decided to abandon neutrality, was written the same evening by one of its members, and is reproduced in Raymond Recouly's *Les Heures tragiques d'avant Guerre*.

The story of the short-lived principality of Albania created by the Powers after the Balkan wars has been outlined by Prince William of Wied in his *Denkschrift über Albanien*, privately printed at Berlin in 1917. It is a pitiful record of domestic anarchy, fostered by the greed of Albania's neighbours and the rivalries of the Powers. Knowing the difficulties in the way the Prince at first refused the offer of the throne ; but he finally yielded to the wishes of Italy and Austria, from whom the suggestion had come. Essad Pasha appears as an accomplished villain, while Italy pulled the strings to which he danced. A month after the outbreak of war the Prince left Durazzo, whose empty coffers there was no means of replenishing, but without resigning the throne. His endeavours to keep in touch with Albania were frustrated as far as possible by Austria ; and though the Prince was convinced that his subjects desired his return, the Ballplatz spoke neither of independence nor of the Prince of Wied but of autonomy. Thus the *Denkschrift*, which opens with the intrigues of Italy, closes with the ambitions of Austria.

CHAPTER V

France

The student of recent European history is indebted to the French Government for three *Livres Jaunes* of the highest importance, *L'Alliance Franco-Russe*, *Les Accords Franco-Italiens*, *1900–1902*, and *Les Affaires Balkaniques*, *1912–1914*. But it is possible for scholars to be grateful without being content. It is the wish not of her ancient foes alone, but also of well-tried friends, that France may fall into line with the other Great Powers, and reveal more of the jealously guarded treasures of the Quai d'Orsay. No civilised State is likely to suffer as much in the good opinion of a democratic world from disclosures of its diplomacy as it does by permitting the suspicion that it has guilty secrets to conceal.

The most important French work on the causes of the conflict is the substantial volume by Émile Bourgeois and G. Pagès, *Les Origines et les Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre*. A truculent preface explains the purpose which the authors have had in view. 'For seven years Germany has refused, in spite of evidence and in spite of defeat, to admit that she concerted with Austria the sanguinary enterprise of 1914, not in self-defence but to accomplish the plan of subjecting Europe and perhaps the world to her laws. . . . The archives of Berlin and Vienna, in which William II and Francis Joseph counted on keeping for a long time the secret of their ambitious designs and their responsibility, have been opened after the downfall of their power. Written in their own hand, they reveal the history of their plot against the peace of the world. It will not do to leave to time and

to the German people, the accomplice of its master, the means of attenuating the effect of those proofs which are the equivalent of confessions. That is the principal motive of the work which we offer to the public to-day.'

Despite its total lack of judicial temper, the work is indispensable to students, owing to the new material which it contains. In its original form it was written at the request of the Senatorial Commission of Inquiry into the causes of the war, and was printed in the *Journal Officiel* of January 9, 1921; but the permission to study the archives at the Quai d'Orsay, added to the documentary revelations from Central Europe, necessitated re-writing on a larger scale. The longest and most valuable portion of the work narrates the relations of the French Republic with the German Empire from 1871 to 1914, and is illustrated by frequent quotations from the despatches of the French Ambassadors at Berlin. Employing with equal effrontery both blandishments and menaces, the aim of Germany, we are told, was to create a situation in which no obstacle could thwart her will. 'And was not this ambition, resting as it did on continually increasing strength, enough to render the German peace a burden to Europe and the germ of possible conflicts?' To such a threat the Triple Entente was the only possible reply. The separate study of the outbreak of war is also enriched by quotations from unpublished despatches and telegrams; but it is easily surpassed in range of knowledge, in fairness of temper, and critical technique by the much fuller study of events from June 28 to August 4, 1914, in Pierre Renouvin's *Les Origines immédiates de la Guerre*, based on a course of lectures at the Sorbonne in 1922–1923 and published in 1925,—the first-fruits of a chair at Paris devoted to 'the critical study of the sources of the history of the world-war,' and founded on the initiative of the Société de l'Histoire de la Guerre. In his most recent work, the fourth volume of his well-known *Manuel historique de politique étrangère*, Émile Bourgeois

has made further use of the archives of the Quai d'Orsay for the years 1878–1919.

Pending the appearance of the memoirs or papers of the famous triumvirate, Paul Cambon in London, his brother Jules at Berlin, and Camille Barrère at Rome, we must content ourselves with the testimony of French diplomatists at Petrograd and Vienna. A French view of the Treaty of Björko may be found in an article in *La Revue de Paris*, May 15, 1918, by Louis Maurice Bompard, Ambassador to Russia from 1902 to 1908. The Tsar, he declares, was loyal to the Alliance, and fell a victim to a carefully laid trap. Lamsdorff is painted in attractive colours, and Witte's attitude is clearly explained. The Russian Minister, rightly convinced that his country was unfit for a European war, desired to render it impossible by an alliance with Germany, into which France would enter voluntarily ; but since the Björko pact was concluded without consulting her, Bompard had no hesitation in combining with him to annul it.

The name of Georges Louis, Political Director of the Quai d'Orsay and later the successor of Bompard as Ambassador to Russia, is far better known after his death than during his life, for the closing scenes of his long career have become the theme of embittered controversy. His champions opened the attack with a little volume entitled *Poincaré a-t-il voulu la guerre ?* in which Gouttenoire de Toury argued that the Ambassador had been recalled because he attempted to counterwork the bellicose policy of Russian and French Imperialists. This grave indictment was pressed home in the volume entitled *Georges Louis*, by the veteran journalist, Ernest Judet, with the aid of the diplomatist's papers, and an almost hysterical eulogy of ' le plus droit et le plus adroit de nos Ambassadeurs ' is combined with passionate denunciations of his enemies at Paris and Petrograd. ' He was sacrificed to a desperado eager to set Europe aflame in consolation for his mistakes, and to a Minister on his knees before the insatiable demands of

Panslavism.' The conspiracy to bring about his recall was with difficulty frustrated in 1912 by Ribot, Bourgeois and other friends at home, but was successfully renewed early in 1913, when he was replaced by the fire-eater Delcassé. The prime mover, in the opinion of the Ambassador and his biographer, was Izvolsky, while Sazonoff and Poincaré danced to his tune; for Izvolsky thirsted for the Straits, and Poincaré encouraged his ally to adventures in the Near East. Georges Louis, on the other hand, believed that the Franco-Russian alliance should be used only for common interests, and that the one partner had no more right to invoke it for Constantinople than the other for Alsace-Lorraine. The neglect of his warnings was speedily followed by the realisation of his fears. Germany, declared Louis, started the war, but Izvolsky supplied the pretext which she sought. The ex-Ambassador, we are told, died a broken-hearted man, while maintaining a patriotic silence to the end.

'He was a modest man,' writes his Austrian colleague Szilassy, 'and this damaged him in the eyes of Court society; but few knew Russia so well as he.' Whatever may be thought of his efficiency as the representative of France at Petrograd, there can be no doubt as to the interest of his conversations with the chief actors in France and Russia. *Les Carnets de Georges Louis*, published in 1926, cover the period from 1908, when he held the important post of Political Director of the Foreign Office, till his death in 1917. Though his recall from Petrograd in 1913 prematurely ended his official career, he continued to receive and record the confidences of highly placed friends. Some of the most prominent men who figure in his pages have denied the accuracy of his reports; but a *démenti* does not always convince the world that indiscreet statements were never made. Among his countrymen who throng the crowded stage are Poincaré, Clemenceau, Ribot, Bourgeois, Delcassé, Deschanel, Pichon, Paléologue, and Jules Cambon. In Russia we listen to the talk of the Grand Duke Nicholas, Izvolsky, Sazonoff, Kokovtseff,

Sukhomlinoff, Witte and the Countess Kleinmichel. Among other foreign celebrities we are introduced to Lord Bertie, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Sir George Buchanan, Tittoni, Radolin and Pourtalès. The volumes leave an acid impression of ambitions and intrigues, backbiting and personal hatreds. The author's *bête noire* is Poincaré, to whom he attributes the encouragement of Russian chauvinism ; and if we can in any degree accept his testimony, his view was widely shared. The portrait of Izvolsky, who greeted the catastrophe with the historic words ' C'est ma guerre,' is painted in equally sombre hues. Kokovtseff, as usual, emerges as an honourable and peaceful man. The embitterment of the elderly diplomatist after his recall darkens his pages, and renders the later part of the diary of less historical value than the earlier.

The other side of the picture is presented in the opening chapters of Paléologue's diary, *An Ambassador's Memoirs*, which finds the enemies of peace not in Paris or Petrograd but at Berlin. Of the many books describing Russia during the war there is none to compare in literary skill with that of the scholarly Frenchman, who not only records his experiences and conversations but makes us feel the moral instability which rendered our ally a broken reed. Throughout these three fascinating volumes the Tsar appears as the kindliest of men, whose loyalty to his allies and will to victory never wavered for a moment. The Empress, we are assured, was equally hostile to Germany, and there is no foundation for the charge that she intrigued with the Central Powers. She was, nevertheless, the evil genius of her impressionable husband. When Sazonoff, of whom the Ambassador always speaks with admiring affection, was dismissed in 1916, he sadly observed, ' The Emperor reigns, but the Empress governs—under the inspiration of Rasputin.' The melancholy story closes with the author's return to France after the revolution of 1917.

A good deal of information, not only on Austria under Aehrenthal but on the relations of the Powers,

is to be found in four long articles entitled *L'Autriche et l'avant guerre* contributed to *La Revue de France* (April, May, June, 1921) by Philippe Crozier, who was appointed French Ambassador at Vienna in 1907. It is of ironical interest that Izvolsky was delighted with Aehrenthal's appointment to the Ballplatz, and observed to the author 'C'est tout à fait un ami.' The Russian Minister soon discovered his mistake; but Crozier writes as a friend of Aehrenthal, whose efforts to escape from German tutelage he warmly encouraged. The French Ambassador, who was denounced by the Pan-German press as the Barrère of Vienna, explains his plan, 'while leaving the skeleton of the Triple Alliance intact, to empty it of substance.' What Barrère had accomplished with the Consulta, he endeavoured to achieve with the Hofburg. Nor did the task appear by any means hopeless; for Aehrenthal could only regain freedom of action within the Triple Alliance by cultivating cordial relations with London and Paris. Austria's good-will was displayed in 1908 when she mediated in the Casablanca crisis, and the hurricane of Agadir found her benevolently neutral. A similar policy of *rapprochement* was pursued by Sir Fairfax Cartwright, who succeeded Sir Edward Goschen at the end of 1908, and was free from his predecessor's dislike of the Austrian Foreign Minister. So independent of Germany did Aehrenthal seem to have become that in 1911 the French Ambassador advised his Government to allow an Austrian loan to be raised at Paris, in return for an assurance of Austrian good-will in Morocco. The narrative closes with the rejection of his advice, on the ground that a loan to Austria was a loan to Germany, and with his recall from his post. 'Poincaré and Paléologue (the successor of Georges Louis at the Quai d'Orsay) were Balkanics; I was French and European.' The weakness of his policy was that it hinged on the ebbing life of Aehrenthal, whose haughty independence of Berlin was not certain —and indeed hardly likely—to be maintained by his successors.

A vivid picture of Vienna on the eve of war has been painted by Alfred Dumaine in *La Dernière Ambassade de France en Autriche*. Appointed in 1912, after Crozier's recall, the Ambassador had two years to observe the scene on which the Emperor, the Heir Apparent and the new Foreign Minister were the principal actors. Francis Joseph, he tells us, was in full possession of his bodily and mental powers, and took no pains to conceal his dislike of his nephew, whose anticipated accession to the throne inspired general dread. Berchtold, we are informed, was an aristocrat of perfect manners, without any vocation for politics. Ignorant, bored by his work, and incapable of decision, he was a tool in the hands of stronger men, among them Count Forgach, the arch-enemy of the Serbs. The villain of the piece, in the eyes of the French Ambassador, was Tschirschky, of whose overbearing manners and unbridled Serbophobia he writes with detestation.

Several recent Prime Ministers have entered the lists to explain and vindicate their handiwork. On quitting office in January, 1912, Caillaux at once began to compile a massive work, stuffed with confidential documents. The treatise was designed to appear after his death, or at any rate after the lapse of years,—the author in the meantime submitting to insults and calumnies, ' la tête haute et la bouche close.' The outbreak of war, however, decided him to epitomise his apologia, and the small but weighty volume *Agadir*, written in 1915, appeared in 1919. The valuable sketch of French policy in Morocco is a story of lost opportunities and belated advances to Germany, such as Rouvier's offer of Mogador and its hinterland in November, 1905. With his accession to office on the eve of the Panther's spring, Caillaux's narrative becomes an invaluable record of the main incidents in the cut and thrust of the long-drawn crisis, in which his onerous task was complicated by the inexperience of his Foreign Minister de Selves and the levity of the Quai d'Orsay. That the Premier was right in assuming control of

the negotiations few readers of his narrative will doubt ; and the preservation of peace with honour, when peace hung on a razor's edge, was a small price to pay for the sacrifice of the *amour propre* of the Foreign Office. That he was prepared to fight rather than allow Germany a foothold in Morocco was made clear throughout, and German resentment at the November Treaties was the measure of his success. He received repeated congratulations on his handling of the crisis from Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, whose praise was praise indeed ; and he closes his narrative with the proud words : ' It will be the honour of my life to have prevented the outbreak of the Great War in 1911, despite the obstacles which crowded my path.' A second edition is enriched with a second part, of which the most piquant morsel is the intimate correspondence of Kiderlen with a Russian Baroness. *Mes Prisons*, the very inferior sequel to *Agadir*, describes the persecutions to which the ex-Premier was subjected during the war, and is of interest less for its facts than for its opinions. It is argued for instance that France should have held back Russia from general mobilisation in 1914, and have tried for a moderate peace in 1915. A convenient survey of the Morocco problem from the Tangier visit to the outbreak of war is provided by the ex-Ambassador Louis Maurice Bompard in *La Politique Marocaine de l'Allemagne*, which illustrates the difficulties confronting the French authorities from the papers of Karl Ficke and other German agents seized after the beginning of hostilities.

Briefer and more popular than the treatise of Bourgeois and Pagès is Poincaré's *Origins of the War*, a reprint of six addresses delivered in 1921. The first three offer a bird's-eye view of French policy from 1871 to the eve of the conflict, in which the pages allotted to the Balkan war of 1912, when the author was Premier and Foreign Secretary, are the most valuable. The second half of the volume deals with events from the murder of Francis Ferdinand, and is one of the most

important of our authorities. By what was intended to be a clever move, Berchtold timed his ultimatum for the moment that Poincaré and Viviani had concluded their official visit to Petrograd ; and the President's picture of their long voyage home, with the wireless messages pouring in on them and anxiety increasing every hour, lingers in our memory. He was greeted on July 29 at the Gare du Nord by the words of Messimy, Minister of War : ' Vous allez voir Paris, Monsieur le Président : c'est splendide.' The closing lecture portrays with deep feeling and consummate art the emotions and activities of the crowded days and nights which followed his return to the Elysée.

The lectures on the origins of the war were only the prelude to a far more ambitious effort when the defeat of the *Bloc national* in the elections of 1924 provided the ex-President with a leisure which he had not enjoyed for many years. Planned on a generous scale, richly supplied with documents, written with the charm of an Académicien and the forensic skill of an eminent lawyer, *Au Service de la France, Neuf Ans de Souvenirs*, seems likely, if completed, to rank with the Memoirs of Guizot in the first class of French political apologias. No one can accuse the author of turning a blind eye to the charges which have been brought against him by a swarm of critics at home and abroad, or of ignoring the new materials on which the judgment of history will in large measure rest.

The first volume, *Le Lendemain d'Agadir*, opens with the fall of Caillaux and the formation of the first Poincaré Ministry in January, 1912; and two large volumes (translated and abridged by Sir George Arthur) describe the crowded year which ended with the elevation to the Presidency. In reply to the charge that he changed the orientation of French policy and ruled like an autocrat, he rejoins that his policy was absolutely pacific ; that he informed the Cabinet of every detail ; and that all his colleagues spoke with emotion of their harmonious collaboration with their chief. His first task was to

carry through the Moroccan settlement which he inherited from Caillaux, to choose Lyautey to inaugurate the Protectorate, and to conduct the wearisome negotiations with Spain. His second was to avoid dangerous friction with Italy during the difficult months of the Tripoli war. His main permanent preoccupation, however, was Germany, which the despatches of Jules Cambon and Colonel Pellé, the Military Attaché, described as pacific, but nervous, liable to sudden change, and disinclined to accept another humiliation like the Moroccan treaty.

To diminish the danger from beyond the Rhine it was necessary to draw closer the ties with England, a process on which this volume throws welcome light. We knew from the *Livre Noir* that the French Government attempted to limit the Anglo-German *rapprochement* initiated by the Haldane mission to Berlin ; but we now learn the astonishing fact that its intervention was due to the private initiative of Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador, who saw in the Anglo-German negotiations nothing but a German trap, and urged the Premier to prevent a declaration of neutrality. The protest was followed by the expression of a wish for a formula defining the relations of the two countries—not a treaty but an exchange of declarations. 'That is what we should have done in 1905 with Lord Lansdowne,' commented Paul Cambon, 'had not the resignation of Delcassé cut short our conversations.' Sir Arthur Nicolson approved the suggestion, but no action was taken till the request was renewed, a few months later, after the Mediterranean agreement supplied a new argument for a definite understanding. The Grey-Cambon letters, however, fell short of French desires. 'In Lord Lansdowne's time,' wrote the Ambassador, 'this would have been the beginning : it is the last word of the Liberal Government. The fall of Delcassé perhaps destroyed the chance of a real alliance.' Sazonoff's statement that the French Premier told him that England had contracted to support France is denied ; and the

recall of Philippe Crozier, the French Ambassador, from Vienna is justified on the ground that the loans to the Dual Monarchy for which he pleaded would have been spent on armaments.

We are now introduced to the sinister figure who dominates the later chapters of the first volume and the whole of the second. Izvolsky, 'this turbulent and prolix diplomat,' had deeply offended official circles in 1911 by warning the Government not to fight, since Russian opinion would grudge military support for Morocco. Despite the Tsar's assurance, 'Of course we are loyal to our obligations,' Neratoff, who directed foreign affairs during the long illness of Sazonoff, was almost as chilly as Izvolsky. After this alarming experience the Quai d'Orsay could never be sure whether the Russian Ambassador was obeying or evading his instructions. Indeed Poincaré openly expresses his dislike and distrust of the man who has often been represented as his *alter ego*; but he adds that he never heard a word from his lips to suggest that he did not sincerely desire peace. Nor, we are told, was Izvolsky responsible for the campaign against Georges Louis, whose recall was due to Sazonoff alone, and whose policy, as set forth in his own despatches, differed in no respect from that of the French Premier and his colleagues.

The second volume, entitled *Les Balkans en Feu*, is one long complaint against Russia and her Ambassador. While France stood for the integrity of Turkey and the status quo in the Balkans, her ally encouraged the formation of a Balkan League, which Sazonoff falsely described as a strictly defensive alliance, but which the horrified French Premier, on seeing the documents during his visit to Petrograd in August, at once characterised as 'une convention de guerre.' The treaty, he added, contained in germ not only a war against Russia but a war against Austria. Though the author expresses his resentment in measured language, no graver indictment has ever been brought against Russia than of taking such a dangerous step without consulting her ally, and of

setting in motion forces which she proved unable to control. The larger part of the volume describes at almost wearisome length the efforts of the author first to prevent and then to localise the struggle by the collaboration of the Powers. Every step that he took was approved by the Cabinet, Parliament and the press. Never once, he declares, did he go beyond a promise to carry out the obligations of the alliance, and he expressly reserved liberty of action in the event of an Austrian attack on Serbia. He also denies that during his visit to Petrograd he consented to restore the Three Years' military service.

The third volume, *L'Europe sous les Armes*, which opens with the author's elevation to the Presidency and covers the whole of 1913, is of far less interest and value than its predecessors, and scores of pages are wasted on the details of official journeys, speeches and receptions. The President was now the ceremonial head of the nation, and he assures us that he never for a moment overstepped the bounds of his constitutional authority. Nor was he at any time tempted to do so, since his successors, Briand, Barthou and Doumergue, continued his firm out pacific policy. Like other Presidents he was told everything of importance, but decisions were made by the Ministers alone. It was the Briand Cabinet, for instance, which decided on the revival of the Three Years' law, owing not to pressure from Russia but to the menacing increase of the German army. It was the Briand Cabinet again, not the President, which recalled Georges Louis and sent Delcassé to mend the wire to Petrograd. The author renews his complaints against Russia, and indeed his apologia is in large measure a defence of France at the expense of her slippery ally. Sazonoff was incurably addicted to acting or threatening action without consulting the Quai d'Orsay, and his proposals for separate action by Russia alone or by the Triple Entente required to be checked by France, who throughout the Balkan crisis stood unwaveringly for the Concert of Europe. The name of Izvolsky is rarely

mentioned without expressions of personal dislike, and he is charged with systematically misreporting the expressions and opinions of the author, ' by accident or otherwise.' The oft-quoted passages in the *Livre Noir* on which hostile critics base their accusation that he secretly plotted with Izvolsky against the peace of the world are dismissed as a travesty of his words, due mainly to the Ambassador's incorrigible habit of magnifying his influence with the leading figures on the political stage. Indeed the President felt more at ease with Schön, the German Ambassador, and with Kokovtseff, the Russian Minister of Finance, who was well aware of the failings of the Russian Ambassador. The impression made by the first three instalments of this skilful and hard-hitting apologia on critics and readers at home and abroad depends on whether and to what extent they accept his assertions and denials in preference to the compromising statements of witnesses who have passed away.

Viviani's *As we see it*, though it was published serially in many journals of the Old and New World, is the slightest and most uncritical of the contributions by the Prime Ministers of Europe. Writing in 1922, the author is still at white heat, and the chief interest of the book is its revelation of the mentality generated in France by the maddening horrors of the struggle. In attacking the *Memoirs* of the Kaiser, ' who wields the pen even worse than the sword,' he is slaying the slain ; but his testimony becomes important with his appointment as Premier and Foreign Minister on June 13, 1914. The visit to Petrograd was undertaken by the President and the author ' with peace in our hearts, not to concert war. Like our predecessors we agreed to maintain the alliance in dignity and peace.' Schön is described as pacific, honourable, courteous and a genuine lover of France, clearly embarrassed by the *rôle* which he was compelled to play. For himself Viviani claims that he did everything that was possible to preserve peace, including a warning to Russia to give Germany no pretext for war.

Interviews, unless explicitly confirmed, are suspect

to the critical reader ; but we may perhaps assume that the highly important conversations recorded by the eminent French publicist, Raymond Recouly, in *La Revue de France* in 1921, and reprinted in *Les Heures tragiques d'avant Guerre*, were submitted and approved before publication. The series opens with Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, who, convinced that the ultimatum to Serbia rendered war inevitable, could merely show the world that Germany was its sole author. When he told Jagow that England would take part, the Foreign Minister replied that the German Government was sure of English neutrality. Sir Edward Goschen agreed with the forecast of his French colleague, but added that unfortunately he was not authorised to say so. 'That was the great misfortune,' comments Jules Cambon ; 'if Germany had known that England would fight, I am convinced that she would not have risked the conflict.' The conversation with the elder brother, Paul Cambon, recalls the open divisions of the British Cabinet. A majority of the Ministers at first opposed intervention, which was strongly desired by the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill and the King. Mr Lloyd George, who at first favoured intervention, was temporarily converted by the City. These hours of uncertainty, declares the Ambassador, were the darkest of his career. There was no treaty obligation to which he could appeal, and the veteran diplomatist, himself an architect of the Entente, could only appeal to the point of honour. 'Is there not a moral obligation on you,' he asked Sir Edward Grey on August 1, 'to support us, at any rate with your fleet, since it was at your advice that we transferred our own ?' The answer was given on the following day in the promise of the support of the fleet against a naval attack. A third conversation was with Messimy, the Minister of War in the Viviani Cabinet, who allowed his visitor to examine his papers for himself.

We are at present singularly lacking in authoritative presentations of French policy during the war. Viviani stops with the outbreak, and of his successors Ribot

alone has lifted much of the veil. His *Letters to a Friend*, written in 1920, were published in 1924. 'I am not writing a history in these letters,' he explains; 'I am merely giving some random impressions without claiming to reveal any secrets.' This informal substitute for a full-dress narrative begins on August 26, 1914, when the author was appointed Minister of Finance in the reconstructed Broad Bottom Ministry of Viviani, and deals mainly with French and inter-allied financial difficulties and experiments until he became Premier in March, 1917. More interesting to the general reader are his comments on his colleagues. He blames the flight to Bordeaux, which he attributes to the desire of Viviani to avoid a debate on the military situation. A high tribute, on the other hand, is paid to Poincaré, who, though not constitutionally responsible for policy, was held broadly responsible by the country. 'He always shewed the greatest *sang-froid* on learning the gravest news. He never let it be suspected that he could have the least doubt as to the final outcome. Whatever may be thought of his policy before and after the war, no one can fail to render homage to the force of character that he displayed during these long years.' Delcassé was a disappointment at the Foreign Office, telling his colleagues little, fumbling over Turkey and Bulgaria, and resigning when French troops were sent to Salonika. On the fall of Viviani in October, 1915, Ribot was offered and declined the Premiership. The burden was assumed by Briand, whose portrait in some respects recalls Mr Keynes' celebrated picture of the British Premier in 1919. 'He brings despatches to the Cabinet without having formed an opinion, reads them aloud, watches the faces, anticipates the objections which he scents, and adapts his own opinions to those which he sees emerging.'

The letters which describe the author's brief Premiership in 1917 with the aid of official documents are the most valuable in the book. We learn more of the Doumergue negotiations with the Tsar, of which his

colleague Lord Milner was kept in ignorance. The French Cabinet was unanimous against granting passports for the Labour conference at Stockholm, despite the wishes of Albert Thomas and Kerensky in Petrograd, and of Mr Lloyd George in London. In narrating the negotiations of Prince Sixtus Ribot describes his interview at Folkestone with Mr Lloyd George, who cried 'We are on the road to peace,' and suggested that Italy might have Smyrna instead of Trieste,—a scheme that was wrecked by the unyielding Sonnino at St. Jean de Maurienne. The Armand-Revertera negotiations which followed were authorised by Painlevé, the Minister of War, without the knowledge of the Premier, who also sharply condemns Briand's unauthorised negotiations with Baron Lancken. On the succession of Painlevé to the Premiership, Ribot remained at the Foreign Office, his official career ending a few months later when Clemenceau, for whom he has no affection, grasped the reins in his iron hand.

While Ribot covers the whole field of his Ministerial activity, Painlevé's apologia, *Comment j'ai nommé Foch et Pétain*, is confined to the military crisis of 1917. The story begins at the end of 1916 with the appointment of Nivelle, the hero of Verdun, to be Commander-in-Chief on the North and North-East front. In March, 1917, Ribot succeeded Briand, with Painlevé as his Minister of War, on the eve of the offensive on the Chemin des Dames which Nivelle had planned and to which most of his subordinates looked forward with unconcealed dismay. If the great attack was for a time wrapped in mystery, the clouds are ruthlessly dispelled in these pages. The battle was lost as soon as it began, and the casualties of the 'massacre' exceeded the maximum expectation threefold. 33,000 were killed, mostly on the first morning of the attack, and the army was angered at being set an impossible task. In answer to the fable that some deputies witnessed the slaughter and persuaded the Government to stop it, M. Painlevé asserts that there was no trace of intervention by

the Government or the Chamber. When, however, the dimensions of the catastrophe were discovered, he promptly proposed the supersession of Nivelle by Pétain, the Chief of the Staff, whose post should be filled by Foch. Nivelle at first expressed his readiness to resign at any moment; but he changed his mind, and mobilised his friends in the Cabinet, the Chamber and the press against the Minister of War. Meanwhile mutinies broke out, and we learn that there were only two dependable divisions between Soissons and Paris. 'It was the worst moral crisis of the war.' After an agonising struggle, in which Painlevé forced his colleagues to choose between Nivelle and himself, Pétain was placed in control and the *morale* of the troops was gradually restored. Of 150 mutineers condemned to death 23 were executed. His proposal to Mr Lloyd George and Lord Milner in August, 1917, that Foch should become Chief of an Inter-Allied Staff was approved by the two British statesmen but by nobody else. The volume concludes with the author's two months' Premiership and the Conference at Rapallo, where the creation of a Supreme War Council gave hopes of securing unity of command. Another veiw of the crisis of 1917 is provided in General Mangin's *Comment finit la Guerre.*

No books on the French Higher Command have been so widely read as the brilliant volumes in which Jean de Pierrefeu has depicted—or, as some would say, unmasked—his chiefs. His task of drawing up the daily bulletin for publication enabled him to know everything that was going on in the Grand Hôtel Condé at Chantilly, where, though 'a soldier for the moment,' he remained 'a civilian at heart.' The hero of *French Headquarters* is Pétain,—in the author's view the man who won the war. The companion volume, *Plutarch Lied*, supplements the record with the wittiest of persiflage. Lightly dismissing the charge of 'sacrilege' in breaking down the conspiracy of silence about the 'heroes,' he boldly asserts that for the critical spirit there are no closed doors and no forbidden ground.

In an amusing chapter 'On the small Credit that should be given to Historians of the War' he lives up to the challenging implications of his title. Joffre emerges as a very ordinary human being, disinclined to mental exertion and surrounded by a camarilla. Foch is transformed from the cool calculator of victory into an 'excitable Gascon,' whose mentality and policy were summed up in the word *Attack*. Whatever may be thought of the justice of his criticisms there is nothing in the literature of the war quite so sparkling as *Plutarque a menti*. After the fireworks of Pierrefeu, Mermeix's *Fragments d'Histoire 1914–1919* are relatively dull reading; but they contain a mass of documents on the relations of the Government and the Higher Command. The fifth volume summarises *Les Négotiations Secrètes*, while the seventh, *Au Sein des Commissions*, usefully describes the work of the Army, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and other Committees of the Legislature.

The story of the settlement has been authoritatively told from a French point of view in the work of Tardieu, *The Truth about the Treaty*, which is enriched with a laudatory preface by Clemenceau. The earlier writings of the eminent publicist on Morocco, valuable as they are, yield in importance to this massive semi-official record of the diplomatic war waged by France with her allies after victory in the field. The masterful Premier kept the President in the background, and even Pichon, the Foreign Minister, was allowed no initiative. His right hand was Tardieu, whose wide knowledge, ready pen and tireless industry lightened the burden and earned the lasting gratitude of his chief. Next to Clemenceau indeed Tardieu was the chief French architect of the Treaty of Versailles.

Though the tone is courteous, the whole work breathes resentful astonishment that the British and American Delegations resisted proposals which, in the author's view, could alone guarantee the permanent security of France. If Foch was more outspoken than the civilians, there was general agreement that German

rule should end at the Rhine, and that the separation of the Left Bank from the Fatherland was the only solid guarantee against future invasions. This argument is set forth with passionate conviction in the elaborate memoranda drawn up by Tardieu at the bidding of Clemenceau, in which we hear the plangent accents of historic France. The impetuous advocacy of *les frontières naturelles* broke before the Anglo-Saxon defences, Mr Lloyd George taking the lead in opposing the creation of a new Alsace-Lorraine, and President Wilson in frustrating the annexation of the Saar. How a compromise was found in a temporary occupation of the Rhineland and a temporary exploitation of the Saar mines ; how the German comments on the Treaty scared the British Premier ; how 'the second and worst crisis' began ; how, in the absence of support from President Wilson, 'reason resumed her rights and the amendments vanished one after another,' will be read for generations in the pages of this brilliant epic. Nor will posterity quickly lose interest in the personality and methods of the Big Three who made the treaty,— 'an astonishing contrast of natures the most opposite one could conceive. Wilson argued like an academician who criticises a thesis. Lloyd George discussed like a sharp-shooter. Clemenceau's dialectic proceeded by massive affirmations often animated by fascinating emotion. That one duped the other is a legend. From the beginning they discussed with a profound desire to agree.' To compatriots who complain that France had always yielded Tardieu replies that 'it was the French point of view which generally prevailed.'

De la Guerre à la Paix, the scrappy and querulous memoirs of Klotz, Minister of Finance in the Clemenceau Cabinet, adds little to the testimony of Tardieu. He complains bitterly of Mr Keynes, 'le Germanophile,' who led Mr Austen Chamberlain by the nose, and infected other members of the British Delegation. 'Mr Hughes was one of our few friends, and he alone stood up to Lloyd George.' His judgment of the settlement

is far more severe than that of Tardieu. 'The peace has been sabotaged. The German Government retrieved in driblets what it surrendered in bulk.' Léon Bourgeois' volume *Le Traité de Paix de Versailles* contains the report presented to the Senate by the Committee of Foreign Affairs on October 3, 1919, and the Chairman's speech in the Senate on October 9. No fresh information is embodied in this rather colourless volume, which accepts the treaty as 'a peace of vigilance,' needing to be supplemented by alliances and armaments. Of equally little interest is *Le Traité de Versailles*, the work of another ex-Foreign Minister, Gabriel Hanotaux. An expert reply to Mr Keynes is attempted by Raphael Georges Lévy in *La Paix Juste*.

This chapter may close with a brief reference to the foundation of the Société de l'histoire de la Guerre, and to its organ, *Revue d'histoire de la Guerre Mondiale*, of which the first number appeared in April, 1923. Under the skilled editorship of Renouvin the new quarterly has won its place beside the *Kriegsschuldfrage* as an indispensable companion to the student, by its articles, its documents and its reviews.

CHAPTER VI

Belgium, Italy and Spain

The chief contribution of Belgium to the political literature of the world-conflict is Baron Beyens' *Germany before the War*. Appointed to Berlin in 1912, the Belgian Minister found himself in a singularly oppressive atmosphere. 'We walked on sinking soil,' he records, 'as if on the edge of an active volcano.' The most valuable parts of the volume are character-studies of the Kaiser and his political advisers, Bethmann, Jagow and Zimmermann, of the currents of public opinion, and of 'la semaine tragique' which brought his mission to an untimely end. It will be long before the world ceases to read this pathetic story of his last experiences in Berlin, of his visits to the Wilhelmstrasse, of his conversations with his diplomatic colleagues, of the sudden and terrible awakening from the 'false tranquillity' of the first three weeks of July. When on August 1 the Minister read to the Under-Secretary Zimmermann a despatch stating that Belgium had scrupulously fulfilled her duties as a neutral, and in view of the reiterated assertions of friendship, counted on her territory remaining inviolate, 'the embarrassed smile' of the listener told as much as any words. Though writing during the first months of the war, and sharing to the full the righteous indignation of his countrymen, Beyens is not blinded by passion, and testifies that Germany was divided into a pacific majority and a bellicose minority.

While Beyens narrates the lighting of the fuse in Berlin, Albert de Bassompierre describes the shattering explosion at Brussels. The poignant brochure entitled

La Nuit du deux au trois Août, 1914, au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de Belgique, enables us to visualise the emotions of the Foreign Minister Davignon and the officials of the Foreign Office who received the ultimatum. There was not, he assures us, a moment's hesitation as to the reply. 'La situation était nette. Elle ne prêtait ni à tergiversations ni à interprétations.' The Council sat from nine in the evening till nearly four in the morning with King Albert in the chair, with an interval for the drafting of the response. 'Le Gouvernement belge, en acceptant les propositions qui lui sont notifiées, sacrifierait l'honneur de la nation en même temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs envers l'Europe.' When the author read these ringing words to a member of the British Legation who had come for a copy, he was almost overmastered by emotion; and the Englishman, seizing both his hands, exclaimed 'Bravo les Belges!' A briefer but no less haunting narrative of these terrible days may be found in the Interview with Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy, Political Director of the Foreign Office, in Raymond Recouly's volume, *Les Heures tragiques d'avant Guerre*.

The story of the struggle itself has been told in the sumptuous and richly illustrated work *La Belgique et la Guerre*, of which the fourth and last volume, with a preface by Baron Beyens, is devoted to diplomacy. Though the author, Alfred de Ridder, was Director-General at the Foreign Office, we learn but little from his pages. It is interesting, however, to read that King Albert informed the German Military Attaché of the conversations between General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston in 1906. The relations of Belgium with Holland are usefully summarised in Japikse's *Holland im Weltkriege*.

In addition to the records of conversations between British and Belgian officers in 1906 and 1912 found by the Germans on entering Brussels, a selection from the despatches of the Belgian Ministers in London, Paris and Berlin was printed by the German Government in

1915 with the title, *Belgische Aktenstücke, 1905–1914*. The publication was purely for purposes of propaganda, the editor selecting despatches which testified to the pacific character of German policy and to the chauvinism of the Entente. This selection was supplemented after the war by four volumes of diplomatic circular letters issued by the Foreign Office at Brussels to its representatives abroad and summarising the information received from various capitals. The work, entitled *Zur Europäischen Politik, 1897–1914*, was undertaken by Schwertfeger as chief editor, at the order of the German Government. The introductions are highly controversial ; but the historian is glad to possess such a mass of reports and impressions from all parts of Europe from 1897, when the practice of compiling the circulars began, to 1914. A fifth volume contains despatches of the years 1886–1893 relating to the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance. The sharp criticism of the Triple Entente, in which some of the Ministers, and particularly Baron Greindl in Berlin, indulge, was acclaimed in the Central Empires as proof positive of the evil designs of their enemies ; but it may equally well serve to dispel the belief that Belgium had been previously involved in the political system of her future protectors.

None of the Great Powers of Europe has contributed so little to the elucidation of the origins of the war as Italy. No one could tell so much as Tittoni, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1903 to 1909 and Ambassador at Paris from 1910 to 1916, where he continued to exert considerable influence on Italian policy, since at critical moments his opinion was invited by San Giuliano. He has given us, however, nothing but a few tantalising peeps in a little volume of speeches and articles entitled *Who was responsible for the War ?* He reveals his active part in preventing the Bosnian crisis developing into a European war by the plan of a Conference limited to the points on which the Powers were agreed, and regrets that his proposal, which had been

welcomed by the Chancelleries, should have been wrecked by an 'ultimatum' from Berlin. 'Even now I do not understand it.' He proceeds to describe the visit of the German Ambassador on March 25, 1909, who announced 'a most important communication,'—namely a demand for the immediate recognition of the annexation of Bosnia. Tittoni expressed surprise, since his plan of a Conference had been approved. 'That is needless,' replied Count Monts, 'since Russia, at the request of Germany, has recognised it already.'

A second important revelation recalls a later Balkan crisis, when Austria seemed on the point of coercing Montenegro without securing the approval of Italy. On April 13, 1913, San Giuliano telegraphed to Tittoni, now Ambassador at Paris, suggesting that if Austria took action in the northern Adriatic, Italy should make a temporary landing in the south. If Austria occupied any part of Montenegro, replied Tittoni, Italy must go to Durazzo or Valona, even without her consent. 'The day on which Austria in any way disturbs the equilibrium of the Adriatic,' he added, 'the Triple Alliance would cease to exist.' The danger was averted by an international occupation of Scutari; but the ultimatum to Serbia in July, 1914, appeared to him as the breach of an alliance which required mutual consultation, stood for peace, the balance of power and territorial disinterestedness, and enabled Italy to live at peace with France and England. In answer to the charge of treachery he rejoins that it was the policy of Austria, not the policy of Italy, which had changed.

The declaration of neutrality secured Italy a breathing-space, and for the moment her responsible statesmen were content to mark time. It was, however, argued in certain quarters that the Central Powers would never forgive their recalcitrant ally, and that now she was off with the old love it was time to be on with the new. It was in this spirit that Sabini undertook the negotiations, described in his volume, *Le Fond d'une Querelle: Documents inédits sur les relations Franco-*

Italiennes, 1914–1921. Its publication was due to the author's regret that the two countries appeared to be drifting apart. As an ex-member of the Italian Embassy at Paris, and as an old champion of a Franco-Italian alliance, Sabini hurried to the French capital on the outbreak of war. 'On my initiative and personal responsibility I took the first steps to associate the countries in the war and to arrange an alliance.' Reaching Paris on August 6 he visited his old friend Clemenceau, who agreed that Italy must be brought into the war as soon as she was ready for the fray. Clemenceau took him to the Élysée, where Poincaré's blessing was obtained. The plan was not only for a fighting partnership but for a permanent political alliance to keep the opulent territorial compensations demanded as the price of her support. The scheme was further discussed with Briand, Bourgeois, Deschanel, Delcassé, Pichon, Millerand, Barthou and other French statesmen, and then with Barrère, the chief architect of the Franco-Italian *rapprochement*, in Rome. For a time it seemed likely that the plunge might be quickly taken ; but the road was blocked by Tittoni, who cautioned his Government against the impatient envoy. By October Sabini realised that the hands of the clock could not be moved forward, and desisted from his efforts.

No recent work from an Italian pen approaches in historical importance the *Memoirs* of Giolitti, the dominant figure in Italian politics between the fall of Crispi and the rise of Mussolini. Nigra once observed that Italy and Austria must be either allies or enemies ; but these pages suggest that they were both at the same time. The Italian Premier, for instance, subsidised the Italians in the municipal elections of Trieste, in which the Slavs were routed despite the support of the Austrian Government ; and when Aehrenthal secured a concession for the Sanjak railway, his ally worked for a line from the Danube to the Adriatic in company with Serbia, Russia and France, the diplomatic foes of the Ballplatz.

The dramatic interest begins when Giolitti returned

to power in March, 1911. 'I had for some time reflected on the Libyan question,' he writes, 'with the firm intention of solving it at the first opportunity. If we had not gone to Tripoli, some other Power would.' The task was easiest, he adds, when France and Germany were busy disputing about Morocco. Only San Giuliano, his Foreign Minister, was told of his designs; but Sir Edward Grey was informed on July 25 that Italy would probably be compelled to take action, and promised not to oppose. Germany and Austria were only told after Great Britain and France, and their attempts to hold Italy back decided the Premier to act at once. Giolitti's complacent picture of himself and his Foreign Minister spending the summer in the country far from Rome, 'to show nothing was in the wind,' will always remain a *locus classicus* in the annals of secret and cynical diplomacy. The most striking feature in the relations of Italy to the Powers during the struggle was the cordiality of Russia, who urged her to give the Young Turks a good lesson and to smite the enemy in a vital part. Such action was vetoed by Aehrenthal, and Sir Edward Grey disapproved the naval attack which resulted in the closing of the Dardanelles. When, however, Sir Edward proposed that the Powers should invite Italy to abstain from operations in or near the Dardanelles, Sazonoff refused to co-operate. Meanwhile sharp discussions proceeded with Austria in reference to Article 7 of the Triple Alliance. The Wilhelmstrasse was much less unfriendly; but Marschall and Wangenheim, his successor at Constantinople, were openly Turcophil, and encouraged the Porte to resist as long as possible the cession of sovereignty by which alone the war could be brought to an end.

Giolitti's opposition to the attack on Austria in 1915 was not due to tenderness towards his ally, for the pages of this cool-headed realist are filled with denunciations of her policy. Merey, the Ambassador in Rome, was so rude and contemptuous that the Premier and San Giuliano were often tempted to throw him out of the room, and

the Balkan wars of 1912–1913 caused scarcely fewer sparks to fly between the Consulta and the Ballplatz than the Tripoli campaign. Jagow told the Italian Ambassador in Berlin that he had had to intervene more than once at Vienna to stifle rash resolutions, and Giolitti proudly recalls how he held back his ally from attacks on Montenegro in March 1913 and on Serbia a few months later when attacked by Bulgaria. When in the latter case Austria pleaded the *casus foederis*, Italy coldly replied that her proposed action was offensive, not defensive.

On the outbreak of the world war Salandra consulted the veteran statesman, who advised neutrality,—unlike Sonnino, who favoured support of the Central Powers. To those who wished to join the Entente Giolitti replied that the struggle would last at least three years ; that Austria would doubtless make considerable sacrifices to preserve Italian neutrality ; that the Hapsburg Empire was in any case doomed to dissolution by racial discord and the stress of war ; and that Italy would thus obtain her share of the inheritance without the shedding of blood. He adds that the story of his intrigues with Bülow after his return to Rome in May 1915 is a pure invention ; that he met the German statesman once in the street and paid him a single visit ; and that on both occasions he avoided the topic of Italian policy, 'since I would not meddle with things for which the Government was solely responsible.' He further explains that he was not informed of the Treaty of London, which had already been signed.

The Green-book presented to the Italian Parliament on May 20, 1915, is available to English readers in the *Diplomatic Documents* published by the Carnegie Endowment, and should be compared with the corresponding Second Austrian Red-book in the same collection. It is scarcely necessary to say that the most important of the documents at that time reposing in the archives of the Consulta, the secret Treaty of London, was withheld, and was only revealed two years later by

the Bolshevists. The Green-book is supplemented by a collection of despatches, entitled *L'Intervento dell' Italia nei documenti segreti dell' Intesa*, published by the Bolshevists in 1923, and containing the correspondence between the Italian Ambassador in Petrograd and the Consulta. The announcement at the close of 1926 that the Italian Government has decided to publish a selection of documents covering the period 1871 to 1914 is good tidings for the historian, who, if he is to do his duty, must, like the judge, hear all the evidence in the case.

It was the duty of Nitti as the successor of Orlando to sign the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles ; but he was in no way responsible for its provisions, and the ex-Premier has employed part of his enforced leisure in denouncing its authors, its spirit and its results. His first indictment, entitled *Peaceless Europe*, created a mild sensation not by any revelation of Italian secrets but by publishing Mr Lloyd George's statesmanlike Memorandum of March 25, 1919, appealing for a peace settlement 'as if we were impartial arbiters, forgetful of the passions of the war,' and warning his fellow-negotiators against driving Germany into Spartacism and to a Bolshevist alliance.[1]

Though the Papacy was incapable of directly influencing the policy of the belligerents, its moral support was desired by both sides, and its utterances form part of the diplomatic background of the war. A convenient record of the actions and allocutions of Benedict XV may be found in *Il Vaticano, l'Italia e la Guerra*, by Ernesto Vercesi, a priest who combines impeccable patriotism with a sympathetic understanding of the position and responsibilities of the Vatican. The Pope, he admits, desired Italy to remain neutral throughout ; but the man denounced by Clemenceau as 'le Pape boche' is presented in these pages as the faithful and

[1] The Memorandum was in consequence published as a White Paper. 'Some Considerations for the Peace Conference before they finally draft their terms.' Cd. 1614. 1922.

disinterested servant of the Prince of Peace, raised by his august position above the din of battle, with equal love in his heart for the faithful on both sides of the trenches, working not for the triumph of either side but for a moderate settlement which would end the carnage at the earliest moment and lay the foundations of enduring peace. That the Papal Note of August, 1917,—the most important act of his pontificate—fell on deaf ears in no way diminishes the merit of its author, whom the angry Ludendorff charged with attempting to snatch victory from the grasp of the Central Powers. That the relations between the Vatican and the Quirinal remained normal throughout a period bristling with controversial issues is attributed by Vercesi to the tact and forbearance displayed by the authorities on both sides of the Tiber.

The most important of Italian military narratives of the war is Cadorna's *La Guerra alla Fronte Italiana*. The volumes, we are told in the preface, embody the ideas of the Supreme Command, and are written for readers who desire the truth, not for those who will continue to falsify the facts. His apologia, dedicated to 'my comrades in the holy war,' opens with a picture of Italy before she took the plunge. Like his military brethren in other countries, he denounces the civilians for having supplied him with so imperfect an instrument. The army, he declares, had been neglected during the long peace; baneful anti-social theories had spread; and the Government had thus been compelled to follow a timid foreign policy of renunciation and humiliation. When Salandra, in April, 1914, offered the War Office to General Pirro, the soldier declared that six hundred million liras for six years were indispensable. The Premier refused to promise such a large sum, and the General declined the post. When Cadorna succeeded Pollio as Chief of the Staff on July 27, 1914, he found a lamentable state of affairs. The campaign studies prepared by the experts in the event of war with Austria were exclusively defensive, and the plans for an offensive had to be

hurriedly improvised. 'Our military machine was unprepared to sustain even a defensive war, and *a fortiori* an offensive.' The country was no better fitted for a life and death struggle than the army. 'The necessity of the war was only understood by an intelligent minority of the nation. Italy was morally unprepared for such a great enterprise.' The constitutional régime had degenerated. The Chamber had been elected under the Giolittian dictatorship, and most of its members were opposed to the war. The instability of Governments, depending on votes and therefore compelled to tolerate defeatists, was a national danger. War requires the concentration of power in a single hand, and such concentration was never attained. Against this dark background of civilian timidity and neglect Cadorna's story of his own achievements stands out in bright and almost glaring colours. 'I have the satisfaction of having created a living organism, capable of leading Italy to victory, despite the half-heartedness of official Italy, impervious to the military spirit, incapable of belief in the heroic virtues of the people in arms, ignorant of the deepest and most wholesome foundations of the Italian race.' For the crushing disaster which terminated his command the General repudiates all responsibility. 'In Caporetto we discern the reflection of all the weaknesses and the passions which have distracted the Italian nation in its fifty years' life.' Cadorna's later work, *Altre Pagine sulla Grande Guerra*, contains four studies, of which the longest and most important is devoted to the operations in Albania and Macedonia.

Two distinguished Spanish statesmen have added a few bricks to the fabric of knowledge. Count Romanones, the veteran leader of a section of the Liberals and an ex-Prime Minister, has warmly defended the handiwork of his contemporaries and himself in *Las Responsabilidades Politicas del Antigua Regimen de 1875 á 1923*. The book was inspired by the *coup d'état* of September 13, 1923, which was excused by the Marquis d'Estella on the ground that the men who had

governed the Peninsula since the Restoration had failed. The first part describes the foreign policy of half a century from inside knowledge, and is dominated by the problem of Morocco, which was rendered more acute by the loss of Cuba and the Philippines. When, in 1900, Delcassé resolved on a forward policy, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, Leon y Castillo, reported that a solution would be reached 'with us or without us, and in the latter case against us,' and urged that Spain should have a finger in the pie. Long and difficult negotiations ensued between Paris and Madrid, and in November, 1902, Leon y Castillo and Delcassé reached an agreement. At this moment the Liberal Sagasta was succeeded by the Conservative Silvela, who, though in favour of the treaty, allowed himself to be convinced by his colleagues that it was dangerous to proceed without British approval. This decision is regretted by the author, who scented no danger and regretfully contrasts the recognition by France of Spain's right to Fez with her modest share under the treaty of 1904. In discussing the Agadir crisis Count Romanones recalls the explicit warning that if France marched to Fez Spain would take action. The caution was neglected, the request of Spain to share in the ensuing Franco-German negotiations was refused, and only after prolonged discussions was a new Franco-Spanish treaty signed in 1912. The sympathies of the Liberal leader, who was Premier for the second time in 1915–1916, were strongly with the Entente, and secret meetings were held with Pichon and Jules Cambon at San Sebastian. The strongest of Conservative statesmen, Maura, was on the side of the Central Powers; but when in 1915 the Kaiser asked Spain to join him or at any rate to afford indirect support, offering Gibraltar, Tangier and a free hand in Portugal, Dato, the Conservative Premier, declined, not only because he disbelieved in a German victory, but because the division of Spanish opinion rendered neutrality inevitable. A portion of the same ground is covered in detail by Leon y Castillo, Marquis

del Muni, in his autobiography, *Mis Tiempos*, the second volume of which describes at length the negotiations of the three Franco-Spanish treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1904, the chief events of his long and honoured tenure of the Spanish Embassy at Paris.

CHAPTER VII

Great Britain

The resolve to open the archives of the British Foreign Office for the years leading up to the outbreak of the world war was taken, though not publicly announced, by Mr Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, in the summer of 1924, and confirmed by his successor in the latter office, Sir Austen Chamberlain, when the Labour Government was defeated at the General Election in the autumn of the same year. The decision was made known in the form of an exchange of letters with Dr Seton-Watson. Historians, complained the Professor, had no authentic first-hand material on the British side, and were in consequence gravely handicapped when they came to deal with the charges and insinuations against British policy in the period preceding the war. 'As regards the publication of the official documents bearing on the general European situation out of which the war arose,' replied the Foreign Secretary on November 28, 1924, 'a collection of these documents will be edited for the Foreign Office by Mr G. P. Gooch and Mr H. W. V. Temperley, who will, I hope, be in a position to begin serious work at a very early date. The reputation of the editors offers the best guarantee of the historical accuracy and impartiality of their work.' At the suggestion of the Editors 1898 was chosen for the starting-point, since in that year British statesmen began to doubt the sufficiency of 'splendid isolation,' and to look round for trusty friends on the Continent. Two introductory volumes will illustrate the six years of transition culminating in

the Anglo-French Treaty of April, 1904, and eight further volumes will cover the last decade of peace in greater detail.

On the termination of hostilities an elaborate study of events from June 28 to August 4, 1914, entitled *The Outbreak of the War: A Narrative based mainly on British Official Documents*, was published by the Stationery Office. The author, Professor Oman, had been permitted to consult the unpublished documents, and to quote them in whole or in part. His narrative was enriched by information supplied by many of the actors, and was 'submitted for comment and correction to several of the persons most concerned in its accuracy.' The object of his substantial volume, which may fairly be described as semi-official, was 'to set forth the manner in which the development of the situation presented itself from day to day to the eyes of those responsible for the policy of Great Britain.' It supplemented Mr Headlam-Morley's well-known volume *The Twelve Days*, and remained the standard presentation of the British case till the opening of the archives after the war rendered possible a new and fuller analysis.

Before the decision to open the British archives was announced in 1924, Mr Headlam-Morley, Historical Adviser for the Foreign Office, had begun to collect the documents from the murder of the Archduke to the declaration of war on Germany. The editors of the larger series accordingly requested him to complete his collection and to issue it as the concluding volume of their enterprise. The British equivalent of the 'Kautsky documents,' published at the end of 1926, enabled the world to judge of the 'integrity and skill' of the compilers of the famous White-book issued in breathless haste two days after the declaration of war against Germany; added the relevant documents before July 22; and aided the student to reconstruct the atmosphere of the Foreign Office by the publication of the most important minutes by the officials whose duty it was to advise the Foreign Secretary during those fateful days.

Perhaps the most striking document in the volume is the memorandum of Sir Eyre Crowe to Sir Edward Grey on July 31, when it seemed as if the distracted Cabinet might choose the path of neutrality. 'The whole policy of the Entente can have no meaning if it does not signify that in a just quarrel England would stand by her friends. I feel confident that our duty and our interest will be seen to lie in standing by France in her hour of need. France has not sought the quarrel. It has been forced upon her.' The most interesting feature of Mr Headlam-Morley's Introduction is the revelation that early in July, 1914, Sazonoff proposed a mutual guarantee of the Asiatic possessions of Russia and Great Britain, to be expanded if necessary by the inclusion of Japan. Sir Edward Grey replied on July 20 that he was attracted by the idea of a triple guarantee, and that he would consult the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 'as soon as the Parliamentary and Irish situation gives them time.'

Though no adequate record of recent British policy can be compiled till the secrets of the Foreign Office are revealed, two attempts have been made at a provisional survey. The third volume of the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* embodies information derived from Cabinet Ministers, diplomatists and Civil Servants; and on the strength of information supplied by the Foreign Office it contradicts the statement that the British Government offered an alliance and armed assistance in 1905 when Germany was attempting to drive Delcassé from power. A slighter treatment of the same period is presented in A. L. Kennedy's *Old Diplomacy and New, 1876–1922*, a study of Salisbury, Lansdowne, Grey and Lloyd George, to which Sir Valentine Chirol contributed an Introduction. The most novel portion of a valuable book relates the not very edifying story of the attempt of the Allies to bring Bulgaria into the fold in 1914–1915.

Sir Sidney Lee's official biography of Edward VII when completed will solve the hotly debated problem of his influence in foreign affairs. The first volume

reveals him as an eager observer of the changing scenes of the play, sharing the successive emotions and animosities of the gallery, rather than as a far-seeing statesman with definite principles of policy. His dislike of William II is unmistakeable ; but the crude Germanophobia of his biographer somewhat distorts the picture of the diplomatic chess-board at the end of the century. His most sensational pages describe 'the Kaiser's plot' in the opening weeks of 1900. 'His nefarious plan was secretly to persuade Russia to initiate a coalition of the Powers which should take advantage of England's difficulties in South Africa by making war upon her during her time of stress.' This statement he bases on a report of the Russian Ambassador in Berlin of a conversation with the Kaiser on New Year's day, when the latter eulogised some recent experiments in mobilisation on the Afghan frontier. 'The Kaiser saw in it confirmation of his cherished opinion that Russia alone could paralyse the power of England and deal it, if need be, a mortal blow. This subject led the Emperor to declare with ardour that if ever our august master should be moved to order his armies against India, he would mount guard over our frontiers.' 'They are well aware of it in England, His Majesty added.' The plot, comments the biographer, missed fire, owing to the disinclination of Russia and France to move and to distrust of the Kaiser's methods and motives. The Kaiser's jealous dislike of England was notorious ; but his impromptu outburst to Count Osten-Sacken is a very inadequate foundation for the superstructure which Sir Sidney Lee desires to erect. He declares that on Muravieff's visit to Delcassé in October, 1899, 'no notion of joint action against England had been breathed'; but he gives no authority for this disputable statement. The value of this interesting chapter would have been enhanced had the author been more generous with his documents and more sparing of his invective. Whatever the ideas fermenting in the Kaiser's unbalanced brain, the policy of the German Government throughout the

Boer war was too neutral for the taste of the German people, who would have liked Kruger to have received the same official welcome in Berlin that he enjoyed in Paris. That the German Government encouraged the Boers to fight by holding out expectations of aid is rebutted by the reports of Dr Leyds himself printed in his volume, *Eenige Correspondentie uit 1899*. Nothing but sympathy was to be had, and if, on the eve of hostilities the envoy of the Transvaal allowed himself to entertain hopes of indirect assistance, they were placed not in Berlin but in Petrograd. 'The Russian Minister,' reported the Boer envoy from Brussels on October 4, 1899, 'says that the Emperor of Russia is much interested in our cause. He desires to be kept continuously informed. I have some hope that he is looking for an opportunity to prepare difficulties for England.'

The official biography of Lord Salisbury advances so slowly that we may have to wait years for the story of his later Ministries; but Mr Garvin's forthcoming volumes on Joseph Chamberlain will shew what an active share the Colonial Secretary took in the discussion of foreign affairs, and how eagerly his mind worked towards new solutions of the problem of national and Imperial security.

The change of Government in 1905 ushers in a period on which light has been thrown by most of the leading members of the Liberal Cabinets which ruled the Empire till 1915. The first to bear witness was Lord Loreburn, who resigned the post of Lord Chancellor in 1912 on grounds of health; but his book suggests that differences of opinion may also have played their part. *How the War Came* adds nothing to our knowledge of British diplomacy, but is not without importance as a revelation of opinion. The author sharply condemns as unnecessary and unconstitutional the secrecy with which Sir Edward Grey acted in January, 1906, when on the eve of the Conference of Algeciras he made important declarations to the French Ambassador and authorised conversations between the military experts of the two

countries. Like the majority of his Cabinet colleagues, Lord Loreburn only learned of these momentous occurrences some years later, when they had led to an entanglement in the quarrels of France and Russia from which it proved impossible to escape, and which, in his opinion, left the peace of Great Britain at the mercy of the Russian Court.

'Some of those who knew Campbell-Bannerman,' wrote Lord Loreburn, 'and were in close confidential communication with him in December, 1905, and January, 1906, will not believe that he understood the scope and significance of what was in fact done unless some evidence of it is given.' These doubts were shared by other friends and followers of the beloved chief of the 'Little Englanders'; but they were set at rest by the publication of J. A. Spender's official *Life of Campbell-Bannerman*, which proves that the Prime Minister was kept informed of all the steps that were taken. 'He had his misgivings as to the interpretation which might be put upon these communications; but he was made aware of all the circumstances and gave his consent to their going forward on the understanding that they were provisional and precautionary measures, and that the Government was not bound by their results. Thus limited, he regarded them as raising no new question, and therefore within the competence of the War Office.' After the Foreign Secretary's conversations with Paul Cambon on January 10 and January 15, the Prime Minister wrote to his colleague: 'Would you like the answer for the French to be confirmed by a Cabinet before it is given?' The suggestion was not adopted, and on January 31 the Ambassador received his answer. Two days later, on February 2, the Prime Minister confided his feelings to Lord Ripon, who, as Leader in the House of Lords, had been kept informed of the situation. 'I do not like the stress laid upon joint preparations. It comes very close to an honourable understanding, and it will be known on both sides of the Rhine. But let us hope for the best.'

Thus Lord Loreburn was wrong in suggesting that his chief was not fully cognizant of the discussions, but to some extent right in his surmise that the new departure was not altogether to his taste.

Lord Loreburn's unfavourable view of the policy of Continental entanglements was shared by Lord Morley, who employed the leisure which followed his resignation in completing his *Recollections*. Appointed to the India Office in 1905 he took an active and even eager share in the *rapprochement* with Russia embodied in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The pages in his letters to Lord Minto on this turning-point in diplomatic history, to which the Government of India, as we learn from John Buchan's delightful life of the Viceroy, submitted with a rather wry face, are tantalising in their brevity, as indeed are his references to the Kaiser's visit to Windsor in 1907. Resolved to abstain from public criticism of his old friends and colleagues, he ended his story with the passing of the Parliament Act in 1911. Lord Morley compiled from his diary a vivid narrative of the Cabinet discussions and disagreements from July 27 to August 3 ; but this unique document, which a few intimate friends were privileged to read, is included in the unhappy testamentary veto on the publication of his political papers. The closing chapters of Lucien Wolf's *Life of Lord Ripon* reveal the veteran statesman as not a little alarmed by the later developments of German policy, and full of confidence in the courage and capacity of Sir Edward Grey to confront the difficult situation which he found on assuming office.

Though Lord Fisher possessed a streak of genius and his name is sharply cut on the tablets of history, his testimony is singularly unreliable and his books are of interest rather as a revelation of a unique personality than as a storehouse of facts. He defines his *Memories* as ' a compromise between the No-book of Lord Fisher's inclination and the orderly, complete autobiography which the public wishes to possess. There is no plan

nor sequence. Just as the thoughts have arisen, so have they been written or dictated.' The chief figure in his portrait gallery is King Edward, who is depicted as 'a splendid and steadfast friend,' whose support encouraged him to carry through his drastic reforms. Mr McKenna and Mr Churchill receive their meed of praise as far-sighted First Lords of the Admiralty, and the letters to Lord Esher reveal a valued association. The most sensational revelation is that of his desire to 'Copenhagen' the German fleet in time of peace, on the model of 1807, before it grew strong enough to do any harm. 'Alas! we had no Pitt, Bismarck or Gambetta.' The timely intervention of such a statesman would, he believes, have averted the war. That it would have inflicted indelible disgrace on the country which approved it does not concern this British champion of blood and iron. The sequel, entitled *Records*, is confusion worse confounded, and yields even less raw material to the historian.

Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 Sir Edward Cook revealed the efforts of the British Government to abate the naval competition which was poisoning the relations between the two countries. *How Britain strove for Peace*, a brochure of forty pages based on official materials, claimed to prove 'first that England persistently strove to abate the pressure of armaments, and that each and every attempt was negatived by Germany; further that the conditions on which Germany was prepared to come to terms with England were that she should turn her back on her friendships with France and Russia, and agree to regard her treaty obligations to Belgium as a mere scrap of paper.' The most novel part of his story described the negotiations initiated by Bethmann on his appointment in 1909, which contemplated retardation of the German shipbuilding programme in return for British neutrality if Germany were to be attacked. The condition was declined on the ground that Germany could easily arrange that the formal inception of hostilities should rest with Austria,

and that in such case Great Britain would be debarred from assisting France or defending Belgium. When the discussions were resumed in the summer of 1910, the offer of retardation was withdrawn, and a proposal that there should be no increase in the German programme was vetoed by the Kaiser. The parallel search for a formula of conditional neutrality was renewed, and the negotiations, after a further interruption owing to the Agadir crisis, were concluded in 1912, when agreement was found to be impossible. A fuller account of the later discussions, arising out of Lord Haldane's mission to Berlin, was supplied in a Memorandum issued by the Foreign Office on September 1, 1915.

A similarly authoritative record of the long-drawn Bagdad Railway negotiations was supplied in an anonymous article in the *Quarterly Review* in October, 1917. The author, Mr Alwyn Parker, as Librarian of the Foreign Office, had played an active part in the later discussions which after many years had reached a conclusion satisfactory to both sides on the eve of hostilities. The most valuable part of a masterly survey extending over more than half a century summarises the fruitless negotiations with Turkey in 1911, the fresh proposals made by the British Government in the late summer of 1912, the agreement with Hakki Pasha in 1913, and the consequential negotiations with Berlin from May 1913 to June 1914. The agreements of Great Britain with Turkey and Germany were dependent on the conclusion of the conversations between Germany and Turkey, which were not completed when the war broke out. The discussions between England and Germany, testifies the writer, were conducted with candour and friendliness on both sides. The text of the Anglo-German Convention of June 15, 1914, which ended our ten years' antagonism to the Bagdad Railway, was supplied by Dr von Gwinner, of the Deutsche Bank, to Professor Earle, of Columbia University, who published it with elucidations in the *Political Science Quarterly* in March, 1923. The fullest summary of

the whole story is provided in Professor Earle's instructive volume, *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway*, which contains information derived at first hand from persons concerned in the enterprise.

The first British Minister to lift the veil on the crucial question of Anglo-German relations was Lord Haldane. The object of *Before the War* was 'to render clear the line of thought and action followed by the Government between January 1906 and August 1914.' His testimony is of peculiar value, not merely as an ex-Minister of War and later Lord Chancellor, but as the closest friend and counsellor of Sir Edward Grey. His exceptional knowledge of German life and thought made him a friendly but discriminating observer of Potsdam and Berlin, who combined a sincere desire for cordial relations with the determination to be ready for the worst. He writes in a temper of philosophical detachment which enables him to judge men and events without prejudice, and to preach the gospel of reconciliation with the reasoned conviction of a good European. The cardinal chapter on 'Diplomacy before the War' opens with the author's visit to Berlin in the autumn of 1906 at the invitation of William II, who allowed him to study the organisation of the War Office in view of the army reforms on which he was engaged. His frank conversations with the Kaiser, Bülow and Tschirschky, the Foreign Minister, convinced him that the German Government desired good relations with Great Britain. Of no less interest is the narrative of the Kaiser's visit to Windsor in November, 1907, when co-operation in regard to the Bagdad Railway was tentatively arranged, though the promising scheme was shortly afterwards rejected by the Wilhelmstrasse, which vetoed the participation of France and Russia in the discussion. Of still greater importance is the detailed record of the memorable mission to Berlin in February, 1912. The four principal actors in the drama—the Kaiser, Bethmann-Hollweg, Tirpitz and Lord Haldane—have described the discussions, and the differences of testimony turn not

on events but on their interpretation. To the British envoy the Chancellor was 'an honest man struggling with adversity,' Tirpitz a growing danger, with the impressionable Kaiser torn between the two. The atmosphere was very different from that of 1906, but the situation was not yet hopeless. The chief peril was that the pacific Chancellor might be dismissed or overruled, and the negotiations which followed in London soon illustrated afresh the lack of unified control which had ruined German policy since the fall of Bismarck.

Lord Oxford's book, *The Genesis of the War*, will always remain one of the chief authorities for British policy in the years preceding the great catastrophe. Its tone and temper are admirable; his criticisms of the Kaiser and other actors in the drama are expressed in moderate language, and he prefers sarcasm to denunciation. A few wild men like Count Reventlow still profess to believe that Great Britain built up a coalition with the deliberate intention to encircle and finally to fall upon a commercial competitor; but this silly fable is dying away as the passions of the struggle cool. For after the Boer war Great Britain entered the category which Metternich described as satiated Powers. Her sole ambition, like that of Austria, was to keep what she had got, which was only possible if she retained her supremacy at sea. The sincere and reiterated efforts of Campbell-Bannerman and his successor to secure a reduction or arrest of naval armaments are authoritatively described in these pages, and in the absence of effective response from Berlin there was no alternative but to prepare against possible danger. That these preparations were efficiently carried out no one can doubt who reads this narrative and studies the documents here printed for the first time. To the disciples of Lord Roberts the author replies that the adoption of compulsory service was not only politically impossible, but would have precipitated a German attack during the confusion of the transitional period had Germany, as this school of thought usually argued, already determined to strike.

While Lord Oxford may be congratulated on his vindication of the pacific aims of British policy and of his conscientious stewardship of the national defences, his excursions into the labyrinth of Continental diplomacy are much less successful. He never really grapples with the complaint of some of his own colleagues that we were involved more deeply than was necessary in the quarrels and ambitions of France and Russia, neither of whom even pretended to be satiated Powers. He is so accustomed to watching events through the spectacles of the Triple Entente that he blames Germany's action in Morocco without appearing to realise that it was in large measure the result of French provocation, and he denounces the anti-Serb policy of Austria without a word of blame for the anti-Austrian intrigues of Belgrad, encouraged as they were by influential circles at Petrograd. He mentions the complicity of Germany, but not of Italy, in the annexation of Bosnia, and is obviously unaware of the advances of Izvolsky in the summer of 1908. The analysis of the July days of 1914 suffers in the same way from over-simplification. When he describes and applauds Sir Edward Grey's heroic efforts to keep the peace he is on safe ground ; but his discussion of the diplomacy of the German and Russian Governments is vitiated by ignorance of the materials of an extremely complicated case.

No book on the war and its origins compares in sustained eloquence and literary distinction with Mr Winston Churchill's apologia, *The World Crisis*. Though most of its thousand pages are devoted to his work at the Admiralty from 1911 to 1915, the larger issues of European diplomacy receive frequent illumination, and the inside story of the Agadir crisis is a precious contribution to history. Four days after the Mansion House speech of June 21, 1911, Mr Lloyd George, who was strolling in St James's Park with the author, at that time Home Secretary, was summoned by Sir Edward Grey, who greeted him with the words, 'I have just received so stiff a communication from the German Ambassador that

the fleet might be attacked at any moment.' Warning orders were sent to the ships, and Mr Churchill, hitherto an active opponent of the Admiralty's demands, began from this moment to fear Berlin. He attended the meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on August 23, when a sharp difference arose between Sir Henry Wilson, Director of Military Operations, and Sir Arthur Wilson, the First Sea Lord. The former dilated on the practical certainty of German troops marching through Belgium in the event of war, while the latter argued that the British Army would be lost among the mighty hosts in a Continental struggle, and should be held ready for counterstrokes on the German coast. The divergence on fundamental issues led to the appointment of Mr Churchill to the Admiralty with a mandate to accept the War Office plans and to organise a Naval Staff. 'For the first time Germany had made British statesmen feel that sense of direct contact with the war peril which was never absent from Continental minds.'

When the crisis was past the author joined Mr Lloyd George in endeavouring to heal the smart, inviting Sir Ernest Cassel, with the approval of the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey, to visit Berlin. The Kaiser and the Chancellor welcomed the olive-branch, and Lord Haldane set forth on his mission; but when the negotiations broke down the far-reaching and alarming *Novelle* was countered by the Mediterranean Agreement. The naval conventions of 1912, like the military arrangements of the preceding years, involved no obligation to join France in the event of war, but were measures of precaution. Mr Churchill does not believe that Germany desired war in 1911; but 'the hammers that clanged at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven were forging the coalition of nations by which Germany was to be resisted and finally overthrown.' For a time the danger appeared to diminish, and the first half of 1914 is described as exceptionally tranquil. At Easter Ballin desired the Minister to meet Tirpitz, which he would have been

pleased to do; but Sir Edward Grey was of opinion that a visit might do more harm than good. When the crisis came at last, 'the Cabinet was overwhelmingly pacific. At least three-quarters of its members were determined not to be drawn into a European quarrel unless Great Britain were herself attacked.' In the author's eyes, on the other hand, as in those of the Foreign Secretary, we were morally bound to come to the aid of France. How the Empire played its part at sea in the long struggle may be read in the dramatic pages of these brilliant volumes, in the unadorned narratives of Lord Jellicoe, and in the official record commenced by Sir Julian Corbett.

Lord Grey's *Twenty-five Years* is far the most important contribution to our knowledge of European politics made by any British actor in the drama. Having lost the effective use of his eyes he requested his old friend and champion Mr Alfred Spender to select from the files of the Foreign Office the most important documents; but the new material in these stately volumes is of less interest than the revelation of the author's personality. The same cool detachment which distinguished his interventions in the party fight marks the considered account of his stewardship; and his temperamental serenity is reinforced by the frankly didactic purpose of his work. 'The main purpose and desire has been, not to make the vindication or condemnation of any country the final word. That would be a barren and unprofitable end. The endeavour has been made to present the facts in such a way as to discover, or help others to discover, and draw conclusions that may avoid another war of the same character. The military power in Germany chose the time and precipitated the war; but that is not the real and final account of its origin. The enormous growth of armaments, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them, it was these that made war inevitable.' These are no empty words, for no one who has known Lord Grey can doubt his devotion to peace: and his impressive *apologia* should destroy the

grotesque legend of a Macchiavellian intriguer bent on the encirclement and overthrow of a hated rival.

The story opens with his apprenticeship as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1892 to 1895, when he was content to be the mouthpiece of his political mentor Lord Rosebery. The famous 'Grey declaration,' however, warning France that an attempt to occupy any part of the Nile valley would be regarded as 'an unfriendly act,' was improvised, we are told, during the course of debate without authorisation by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Kimberley, or by the Prime Minister. The improvisation of an Under-Secretary, however, was approved by the country and became an axiom of British policy.

Returning to the Foreign Office ten years later as Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward found the Moroccan crisis in full swing and Paul Cambon knocking at the door. 'Germany had forced the dismissal of Delcassé, and intended to shake or test the strength of the Anglo-French agreement.' The momentous negotiations had been described in Mr Spender's biography of Campbell-Bannerman and in Colonel Repington's story of his dealings with Colonel Huguet, the French Military Attaché, in his *Vestigia*,—a narrative submitted to and confirmed by the authority of Lord Haldane, then Minister of War. The most notable addition to our knowledge made by Lord Grey is his letter to his wife immediately after the critical interview with the French Ambassador. That he was not stiffly anti-German on his accession to office is shown by his suggestion of January 9 to the Prime Minister that Germany might receive a port in Morocco, being unaware that in the previous year Lord Lansdowne had advised France against such a concession.

Unlike Poincaré, Lord Grey never mentions his critics, and he seems unaware of the number and importance of the diplomatic revelations of recent years. Moreover several passages have provoked critics at home and abroad to protest. The statement that the Anglo-

French Treaty of 1904 was all published 'except a clause or two of no importance' scarcely suggests that it led up to a secret treaty envisaging a partition of Morocco between France and Spain. In the analysis of the Bosnian crisis we hear nothing of the secret negotiations of Izvolsky with Aehrenthal, for whom the wrath of Downing Street was reserved. The verdict that 'the German action' created the Agadir crisis ignores the juridical strength of the German case in the Moroccan controversy, and the cumulative effect at Berlin of straining the Algeciras settlement. The unprovoked attack of Italy on Tripoli receives no censure. The importance of the naval conversations with Russia in 1914 is minimised. They were authorised, he asserts, on condition that the country remained unpledged; he made no subsequent inquiries at the Admiralty; and copies of private Russian letters which reached Berlin gave the affair an importance it did not possess. In declaring that our relations with France and Russia ensured that they would not enter on an aggressive or dangerous policy, he ignores the forward policy of Russia in the Balkans and the official encouragement of Serb designs on the integrity of the Hapsburg Empire. The mobilisation of Russia is described as a reasonable and necessary precaution. Though he disapproved Russian policy in Persia, which 'tried my patience more than any other subject,' he is less critical of Petrograd than Poincaré. Like other protagonists on both sides in the great drama, he has different weights and measures for the Central Powers and the Triple Entente.

Lord Grey's chapters on the outbreak of war, and the discussion of whether different action on his part at any moment of his tenure of office could have avoided it, will be pondered so long as the memory of the struggle endures. There is nothing censorious, cocksure or self-righteous in these philosophic musings, and he frankly expresses his regret that the Cabinet was not at once informed of his conversations with the French

Ambassador in 1906. Yet he believes that the formation and maintenance of the Triple Entente was the best available guarantee of peace. He flatly denies the statement of Sazonoff that he declared at Balmoral that England would fight against Germany in the event of a European war, explaining that he said that if we decided to intervene we should strike with all our force. Like Lord Oxford he argues that we retained to the end complete freedom of decision in any situation that arose, while at the same time we were no longer exposed to the perils of 'splendid isolation.' The main interest of the book as a revelation of policy ends with the outbreak of war; for during the conflict British policy had to be co-ordinated with and sometimes subordinated to that of our allies. Turkey's belligerency, we are told, was inevitable, and the decision of Bulgaria was dictated by military events, against which the pleadings of a Foreign Secretary could be of no avail. The rescue of Serbia in 1915 was beyond our power, and the sharp attacks provoked by the failure of our efforts were therefore unjustified. Lord Grey's momentous record ends with the fall of the Asquith Ministry in November, 1916, after eleven years of unceasing labour and anxiety.

Though the last British and French Ambassadors at Petrograd will always rank among the chief authorities for the decline and fall of the Tsardom, no two men could be more different. Paléologue professes to tell his story from the pages of his diary, and his testimony ought therefore to be more trustworthy than the recollections of Sir George Buchanan; yet the unadorned narrative of *My Mission to Russia* inspires greater confidence than the subtle impressionism of his more literary colleague. After some interesting years at Sofia Sir George reached Petrograd at the end of 1910 and at once established cordial relations with Sazonoff. The successor of Izvolsky is portrayed throughout as a staunch friend of England, where he had spent part of his diplomatic career, and as a man of peace; yet the relations of the two countries, now partners in the

Triple Entente, were marked by almost incessant friction. The Ambassador's first task was to announce that his Government was following the Potsdam negotiations 'with some anxiety.' The Tsar, we are told, was a loveable man and a loyal ally; but, though acting in good faith, he did not realise that his concessions in regard to the Bagdad Railway were incompatible with the support pledged to his diplomatic friends.

Russian policy in Persia was still worse, and produced 'acute divergence of views,' especially while Neratoff held the reins during Sazonoff's long illness in 1911. During the Shuster crisis Russia intended to occupy Teheran despite the warnings of Downing Street; and, if Persia had not yielded, 'the Anglo-Russian understanding would with difficulty have borne the strain.' After the eviction of the American reformer the Persian question lost much of its acuteness; but it continued to provoke constant friction and misunderstanding, since the Consuls in Persia favoured a forward policy in antagonism to that of Sazonoff and the Tsar. So intolerable did the situation become indeed that in June, 1914, Sir George was instructed to complain directly to the Tsar that the conduct of the Consuls was alienating British sympathies and causing grave anxiety to the British Government, since North Persia was becoming a Russian province, and Russian domination was extending to the neutral zone. The Tsar promised amendment; but Russian diplomacy inspired so little confidence in Downing Street that when Sazonoff wished to partition the central zone by an exchange of secret notes, the British Government played for time, not caring to see an extension of Russian influence. Russia, for her part, was aggrieved that we refused to make an alliance, and that in the conflict aroused by the appointment of Liman von Sanders to high command at Constantinople we only afforded a lukewarm support.

Neither the Tsar, nor Sazonoff, nor Russia, Sir George assures us, wished for war; but he does not conceal the fact that at the beginning of the Balkan

struggle in 1912 the monarch's mood varied, and that the pressure of the Grand Duke Nicholas and other Generals at an Imperial shooting-party gave a chauvinistic turn to his policy, till, on his return home, Kokovtseff and Sazonoff brought him back to the paths of peace. The account of the critical weeks in 1914 supplements the Ambassador's published despatches. Thrice did he urge Sazonoff not to precipitate hostilities by mobilisation, but to give England time to work for peace; yet he records his opinion that mobilisation was forced on Russia, and that the whole guilt of the catastrophe falls on the Central Powers. The author testifies to the unwavering loyalty of the Tsar to his allies,—a judgment that is confirmed by the artless diary of General Hanbury-Williams, entitled *The Emperor Nicholas II as I Knew him*, and by General Waters' volume, *Secret and Confidential*. The approach of the Revolution is vividly described by the Ambassador who, unlike Paléologue, was in touch with the Duma reformers. On January 12, 1917, Sir George adjured the Tsar, in his own name, though with the permission of his Government, to appoint a President of the Council whom the nation could trust. 'You must regain its confidence. You are going to the abyss, to revolution, to disaster. Protopopoff must go.' The Tsar, who had received the Ambassador standing instead of with the usual friendly familiarity, appeared to be shaken; but his evil genius, the Empress, intervened and the Imperial couple staggered blindly forward to their doom. To undertake a task so difficult and disagreeable was the work of an unselfish friend of the monarch, not of the designing accomplice of revolutionaries who bears the name of Sir George Buchanan in the pathetic but distorted *Souvenirs* of the Princess Paley, morganatic wife of the Grand Duke Paul.

Sir Rennell Rodd is our chief witness for Italy as Sir George Buchanan for Russia. The third volume of his delightful *Political and Social Reminiscences* is devoted to his residence in Rome, where from 1906 till the end of

the war he was British Ambassador. Though on friendly terms with Prince Bülow and Jagow, the German Ambassador, he was alarmed by the trend of German policy, and when the storm broke he joined Barrère in winning Italy for the Entente. As a lover of Italy, a scholar and a poet, Sir Rennell was *persona gratissima* at the Consulta and the Quirinal, and his practical sympathy encouraged our ally to persevere through the vicissitudes of the desperate struggle. Among the throng of statesmen and soldiers it is scarcely necessary to say that King Victor Emmanuel wins the highest praise.

The opening pages of Lord Bertie's *Diaries, 1914–1918*, stand out in odd contrast to the remainder of the handsome volumes. 'It seems incredible,' he wrote on July 26, 'that the Russian Government should plunge Europe into war in order to make themselves protectors of the Serbians. By what title, except on the exploded pretension that she is by right the protectress of all Slavs? What rubbish! And she will expect, if she adheres to her present attitude, France and England to support her in arms!' 'I cannot believe in war unless Russia wants it,' he added on July 27. 'I cannot think the German Emperor and his Government desire war. There is no war feeling here.' He had reckoned, however, without the Russian Ambassador. 'Izvolsky will do a great deal of mischief in fomenting the war spirit here,' we read on July 28; and on July 31 we hear that he goes about declaring that Russia is ready and war inevitable. 'What a fool, even if it be the truth!' Still more interesting is the entry on November 10, 1914. 'At the beginning of the war he claimed to be its author. *C'est ma guerre.* Now he says, "If I was in any way responsible for this war, I should never forgive myself."' When, however, the conflict is in full swing, the British Ambassador abandons himself to unmeasured denunciations not only of Germany but of all who desired a negotiated settlement.

A footnote to history is supplied by Mr Leo Maxse in his article, 'Retrospect and Reminiscence' in the

National Review, August, 1918. Starting with the assumption, natural to the editor of an ultra-Conservative monthly, that 'everything depended on His Majesty's Opposition,' he describes how a little group of determined interventionists, including Sir Henry Wilson, Mr Wickham Steed, Mr Amery, Mr George Lloyd and himself, mobilised the Conservative leaders on August 1 and 2, 1914, and secured the delivery of the brief but momentous letter of Lord Lansdowne and Mr Bonar Law at 10 Downing Street on the Sunday morning, in time to strengthen the hands of the interventionists in a divided Cabinet.

The most important military biography within the limits of our period is Sir George Arthur's *Life of Lord Kitchener*. The diplomatic interest begins with the second volume, where we find the Commander-in-Chief in India advising the Home Government on the *rapprochement* with Russia in 1907, and the British Agent-General in Egypt discussing the problem of the Mediterranean with Mr Asquith and Mr Churchill at Malta in 1912. The third volume, which is entirely devoted to the war, records the achievements and disappointments of a benevolent despot pitchforked by an unkind fate into a Cabinet of civilians, and condemned to work a military machine of which he was almost totally ignorant. For the outward record of a life of almost incomparable service to the Empire the official biography will retain its place; but to understand a singularly reserved and complex nature we must turn to Lord Esher's brilliant analysis, *The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener*. Though both the title and the contents of the book have provoked criticism on the ground that the shadows are too dark, the author's intimate knowledge, both of the War Minister and of the crowded stage on which he moved, compels us to consider if not finally to accept his verdict.

Lord French's apologia, *1914*, closes with a chapter entitled 'Ammunition,' in which the soldier utters the familiar complaint of the civilian. 'From the beginning

of the battle of the Aisne to the close of the battle of Loos at the end of 1915, the scanty supply of munitions of war paralysed all our power of initiative and at critical times menaced our defence with irretrievable disaster. Deep concern at the failure of the Government to appreciate and remedy our difficulties from this cause dominated all my work.' By making known the plight of the Army in May, 1915, he sacrificed his career; but he finds comfort in the reflection that the need was supplied, and that Mr Lloyd George, 'to whom we owe unmeasured gratitude,' became Minister of Munitions.

Of greater importance are the volumes in which G. A. B. Dewar and Lt.-Col. Boraston have sung the praises of his successor. *Sir Douglas Haig's Command, 1915–1918*, is a full-throated paean to the modest General who, in the opinion of his biographers, made a larger contribution to the victory of the Allies than any other soldier or civilian. In addition to his proper task of fighting the Germans, Haig was subjected to a double handicap,—Mr Lloyd George's conviction that the war could only be won in the East, and the subordination of the British command in 1917 and again in 1918 to French control. His repugnance to the Nivelle experiment was justified in spectacular fashion by the *débâcle* on the Chemin des Dames; but the unity of direction on the western front established in 1918 wears a very different aspect in these pages from that to which we have grown accustomed. In place of the belief that Foch was called in to save a situation to which Haig was clearly unequal, we learn that the main merit, both in the defence and in the attack, was due to the British forces and their experienced leader, and that on one occasion the French Generalissimo was saved from error by the protest of his British subordinate. If the civilian reader is unable either to confirm or to contest this lofty tribute to Haig's military genius, his trumpeters have at any rate enabled us to visualise more clearly the political difficulties involved in the performance of his onerous task.

Sir William Robertson's apologia, *Soldiers and*

Statesmen, 1914–1918, surveys in greater detail and with less reserve the ground that was covered in the later chapters of his autobiography, *From Private to Field-Marshal*. These sumptuous volumes, which make no pretence to eloquence but present their case with admirable clarity and dignity, are the most important literary production of any soldier on the side of the Allies. He begins with a reasoned complaint that no one had sufficiently thought out the organisation of Government and of a High Command for war purposes. The Cabinets are censured for their neglect, and Lord Roberts is blamed for not using his great authority to insist on the creation of a General Staff when the Boer war had revealed joints in our harness. But the ultimate responsibility is traced to the nation itself, which stubbornly refused to occupy its mind with the possibility of being compelled to take part in a European war. The author prints a memorandum, written in 1902 when he was head of the Foreign Intelligence section at the War Office, in which he argued that 'instead of regarding Germany as a possible ally, we should recognise her as our most persistent, deliberate and formidable rival.' The creation of a General Staff in 1905 and Lord Haldane's reforms improved the situation; yet we were inadequately prepared for the struggle in 1914. 'For months and even years these disadvantages hampered the consideration of practically every question that came up for decision, and only by keeping that fact in mind can the operations be properly understood or the triumphs ultimately achieved be rightly appreciated.'

Sir William's employment in France during 1914 and 1915, first as Quarter-Master General and then as Chief of the General Staff, taught him the defects of our war machinery; but it is with his return to Whitehall as Chief of the Imperial General Staff in December, 1915, that the most valuable part of his narrative begins. He refused the succession to French on the ground that Haig had the better claim, and at a later date he declined

the War Office on account of Parliamentary inexperience. His position as the chief military adviser to the Government afforded him the best opportunity of expounding the thesis that the war must be won in the West and by no possibility could be won anywhere else. This fundamental conviction made him the unwearying champion of Haig, and the inveterate enemy of 'side shows.' Though Mr Lloyd George's services in the supply of munitions and the creation of a War Cabinet are fully recognised, these volumes constitute a formidable indictment of his interventions in military affairs. The Prime Minister had little belief in Haig's capacity; but the root of the trouble was the antagonism between Westerners and Easterners. 'The General Staff continued to assert that the main road to victory lay straight ahead across the Rhine, while Mr Lloyd George insisted that the road was too hard, and that the best one lay, if not via Italy, Trieste and Vienna, then via the Mediterranean, Jerusalem and Constantinople. Throughout 1917 this dead-weight of disagreement grievously hampered the management of the different campaigns in which we were engaged; increased the difficulty of securing concerted action between the Allied armies; and, as winter approached, prevented suitable arrangements being made to counter the arrival in France of enemy reinforcements from Russia.' With the Prime Minister's appointment of an independent military adviser on the newly formed Supreme War Council at Versailles and his own consequent resignation the arresting narrative comes to an end. If the Allies won the war, despite civilian interference and the lack of unified command, it was, he declares, because even greater errors were committed by their foes. Sir William's apologia is the English equivalent of Ludendorff's *Politik und Kriegführung;* and the moral that we are asked to draw is that, both in preparations for war and in the conduct of operations, soldiers know their own business best.

The indictment of Mr Lloyd George's manage-

ment of the later stages of the struggle is pursued in General Sir Frederick Maurice's outspoken *brochure*, *Intrigues of the War*, in which the ex-Director of Military Operations counters the figures and arguments adduced by the Prime Minister in the historic 'Maurice debate.' Mr Lloyd George will no doubt reply to the charges of the soldiers at his own time; but meanwhile the critics have not had it all their own way. In his clever and controversial volume, *At the Supreme War Council*, Captain Peter Wright records the impressions of an official interpreter, and paints a very different picture from that drawn by Sir William Robertson and the biographers of General Haig. In these pages the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the British Commander-in-Chief shrink to very small dimensions, while Mr Lloyd George emerges as the man of vision and the author bows in reverence before the brain and genius of Foch.

Whatever may be thought of the conflict between Mr Lloyd George and the soldiers, there is general recognition of the value of his services in other fields. In his lively volume, entitled when first published *The Prime Minister*, Harold Spender painted the main achievements of an astonishing career in the glowing colours of an old and valued friendship. A fuller and more objective record of the later stages is provided in *Mr Lloyd George and the War*, by Walter Roch, a Liberal Member of Parliament and author of the Minority Report of the Dardanelles Commission. Some idea of the driving-power and resilience of the man may be derived from Dr Addison's volumes, *Politics from Within, 1914–1918*, in which the author describes the creation of the Ministry of Munitions, throws light on the fate of the First Coalition Government, and offers glimpses of the hard-worked members of the War Cabinet.

The vast dimensions of the Entente were a weakness as well as a strength; and it is on the efforts to overcome this weakness that Sir Maurice Hankey discourses with inside knowledge in *Diplomacy by Conference*, an address

to the British Institute of International Affairs in 1920.[1] Though British and French Ministers exchanged visits early in the war, it was not till July, 1915, that the heads of the two Governments met at Calais. In the following autumn it was decided to create machinery for co-ordinating the efforts of the Allies, and in January, 1916, rules for the establishment of an advisory Allied Committee were approved by the two Prime Ministers, consisting of the Premiers of any of the partners in the alliance, and of such members of the respective Governments and staffs as were required for the business in hand. The system of 'diplomacy by conference' developed rapidly when Mr Lloyd George, 'who had always been its enthusiastic advocate,' was called to the helm. At the opening of January, 1917, a conference at Rome, 'the most fruitful which had yet taken place,' considered a memorandum by Mr Lloyd George urging an Allied plan for meeting a concentration on the Italian front in the probable event of a Russian collapse. 'It was largely due to his persistency that plans were prepared in advance to facilitate the rapid transportation of British and French divisions to the Italian front ten months later after the disaster at Caporetto.' Of no less importance was the development of a new line of communications with Macedonia across the Adriatic. 'How many allied soldiers and sailors owe their lives to the development of the short sea route to the Balkans it is difficult to say.' Conferences followed in rapid succession, and at Rapallo it was decided to create a Supreme War Council. 'Thus in the hour of Italy's travail and distress was born an organisation destined to exercise the greatest possible influence on the history of the world. For the remainder of the war the whole of the higher strategy and policy of the Allies was concerted almost exclusively at the Supreme War Council.' When the victory was won the principle of diplomacy by conference was continued in the Council of Four. In this illuminating record Sir Maurice Hankey modestly

[1] The address was subsequently published by the Institute as a *brochure*.

omits all reference to the immense value of his own services as Secretary of the War Cabinet.

No record, official or semi-official, of the activities and policies of the British Delegation at Paris in 1919 has yet appeared ; but a good deal of material of varying importance is available. The six stately volumes of The *History of the Peace Conference*, edited by Dr Temperley, and published under the auspices of the British Institute of International Affairs, though in no sense official, were compiled mainly by members of the British and American Delegations, who were in close touch with events and whose expert knowledge in many cases helped to shape the decisions which they describe. As a record of events, an analysis of problems, and a collection of material this scholarly work will always remain indispensable to students of the settlement. Among individual contributions to the story Mr Keynes's *Economic Consequences of the Peace* towers above all competitors by its incisive brilliance. Long after his technical indictment of the 'Carthaginian peace' has lost interest for the general reader, his sketches of Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd George will continue to challenge and to delight. We shall understand better the atmosphere of excitement and intrigue in which the peacemakers were doomed to labour if we study the lively volumes of four British journalists. Of these Mr Wilson Harris's *The Peace in the Making* is the best written and the most balanced. Mr Sisley Huddleston's *Peace Making at Paris* is slighter in texture but breathes a similar spirit of humane Liberalism. Dr Dillon's *The Peace Conference from Within* reflects his boundless knowledge of the European chess-board, and is of special value on the claims and problems of Eastern Europe. Vernon Bartlett's little book, *Behind the Scenes of the Peace Conference*, though much less substantial, is a sparkling impressionist sketch of the lighter side of the drama and of the human weaknesses which the actors displayed.

Among the political diarists of the last few decades

two writers of very different stamp repay attention. Though Wilfrid Blunt won his spurs as a poet, his prose is of equally high quality, and his *Diaries* will probably be consulted when his verse is forgotten. If the martyrdom of Egypt is the text of his first volume, the storm brewed by competing Imperialisms darkens and dominates the second. The elderly invalid living in retirement in the country kept in touch with the great world through devoted friends, among them George Wyndham and Winston Churchill, who appear to have revealed the secrets of their respective parties with the utmost freedom. These remarkable conversations are brilliantly rendered in the diary which, we are assured, was written up every night ; but such unilateral records cannot be trusted to reproduce the *ipsissima verba*, and the embitterment of the gifted diarist imposes a double measure of caution. Of equal interest are the *Memoirs* of Sir Almeric Fitzroy. Between the radical *Frondeur* and the complacent Conservative there is a gulf ; but the Clerk of the Council, moving easily in Court and official circles, and spending his week-ends in the great country houses, used his opportunities to the full, and has drawn a picture of the rulers of England in the days of King Edward and King George which is not likely to fade. 'The new Greville' is less of a politician and more of a student than the old ; and among the celebrities who throng his pages it is significant that he dwells with greatest admiration on the venerable figure and mellow wisdom of Lord Morley. Mrs Asquith's autobiographical indiscretions are of lighter quality ; but there is a solid sediment beneath the froth, and her vivid pen helps us to visualise the Prime Minister and his colleagues who carried a united and determined Empire into war. From Colonel Repington's vivacious but rather cold-blooded diaries, entitled *The First World War*, we may glean some interesting gossip about soldiers, statesmen and society hostesses.

No British journalist since the heyday of W. T. Stead has played such an influential part in the shaping of policy

as Mr Wickham Steed, and no unofficial autobiography of our time is richer in interest and instruction than his polemical volumes *Through Thirty Years*. As the correspondent of the *Times* in Rome from 1896 to 1902 and in Vienna from 1902 to 1912, he recalls the strained relations of the partners of the Triple Alliance, records the confidences of Visconti Venosta and Nigra, and reviews Aehrenthal's stormy reign at the Ballplatz. Recalled to London by Lord Northcliffe as Foreign Editor of the *Times*, he exerted himself to the utmost to rally public opinion and the Government to the support of France and Russia in the struggle which he had for some years regarded as the inevitable outcome of German ambitions. The dominant theme of the second volume is the author's strenuous campaign for the dissolution of the Austrian Empire, the creation of Greater Serbia and the revival of Bohemian independence. The testimony of a man who has seen so much history in the making and has made not a little of it himself can never be neglected; but his judgment is not equal to his knowledge. His contention that the rulers of Germany willed the war is now abandoned by the experts, and the contrast between the severity of his verdicts on the Central Powers and his lenient handling of Russia impairs the confidence of the critical reader.

The campaign for the dissolution of Austria was pursued along a number of parallel lines. *The New Europe*, a weekly journal founded and edited by Dr Seton-Watson, laboured with skill and success to interest British readers in the problems of Eastern and East-central Europe, and no student of the diplomacy of the war can afford to neglect its pages, to which Mr Steed, Dr Ronald Burrows, Sir Bernard Pares and other specialists were frequent contributors, and in which Professor Masaryk expounded his Bohemian policies. When in the opening of 1918 the Government accepted Lord Northcliffe's suggestion of a propaganda department, the staff included Dr Seton-Watson and Mr Steed, under whose auspices the literary attack on Austria was

pursued and extended. The story of this campaign, and of the hesitating attitude of the Government towards it, has been authoritatively told in Sir Campbell Stuart's *The Secrets of Crewe House*. A German version of the book bears witness to the interest aroused in a country whose spokesmen lament the clumsy efforts of their own Government in the same difficult field. The attempt to interpret the history, literature and aspirations of Eastern Europe inaugurated during the war by Dr Seton-Watson and his friends has been continued in the scholarly pages of *The Slavonic Review*.

CHAPTER VIII

The United States

Though the United States in almost every case held aloof from the complications of the Old World until they plunged into the whirlpool in 1917, there are European gleanings to be made in the biographies and memoirs of their statesmen and diplomatists. The most valuable of these witnesses is Theodore Roosevelt, whose official biography by J. B. Bishop records not only his successful mediation between Russia and Japan in 1905 but his less known and not less meritorious endeavours to harmonise French and German claims in Morocco before and during the Conference of Algeciras. The detailed narrative of his triumphal progress through Europe in 1910, in the form of a letter to Sir George Trevelyan, contains some penetrating character studies. *The Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and H. C. Lodge*, 1884–1918, is also full of references to public affairs in both hemispheres. Both men were good haters, and they found a common object of their dislike in the personality and policy of Woodrow Wilson.

Roosevelt's share in terminating the Russo-Japanese war on terms tolerable to the defeated party has received more attention than any other aspect of his foreign policy. The correspondence and diaries of George Meyer, American Ambassador to Russia, edited by M. A. de Wolfe Howe, reflect the conflicting currents in the Russian capital throughout the struggle, and his weekly letters to the President, a close personal friend, are of the first importance. The latest contribution to the problem is Tylor Dennett's admiring narrative, *Roosevelt and the*

Russo-Japanese War, based on the Roosevelt papers, to which he was allowed unrestricted access. The most piquant revelation is that of the President keeping in touch with the British Foreign Office through his bosom friend Cecil Spring-Rice, at that time a member of the British Embassy at Petrograd. He had never established satisfactory contact with Sir Mortimer Durand, the British Ambassador at Washington, whose recent biography shows that he cared as little for Roosevelt as Roosevelt for him ; and the American Embassy in London was paralysed by the interregnum between the resignation of Choate and the arrival of Whitelaw Reid. The vigorous letters of the President to Spring-Rice, whom he eagerly desired to succeed Durand, range at large over European politics.

The biographies of American Ambassadors at the Court of St James's in the last years of peace throw more light on the character of British statesmen than on diplomatic secrets. Thayer's delightful *Life of John Hay* contains a few *obiter dicta* on the European situation, but his residence in London was brief. The biography of Choate, his witty successor, is equally barren, though he was longer among us. The second volume of Cortissoz's massive memorial to Whitelaw Reid, the sumptuous representative of the richest country in the world from 1905 till his death in 1912, contains selections from his correspondence with Roosevelt, Root and Knox, and describes his conversations with King Edward ; but it lacks enduring interest. David Jayne Hill's *Impressions of the Kaiser* provides scarcely more nourishing fare ; for the scholarly Ambassador at Berlin was never a *persona grata* at Court and knew little of the ruler whom he attempts to describe.

With the outbreak of war, on the other hand, American testimony becomes of the greatest importance to the historian. There is no lack of material for the study of the policy and personality of Woodrow Wilson, whom we have learned to know as intimately as Izvolsky himself. His secretary Joseph Tumulty, a warm-hearted

Irishman, has written a rather garrulous volume, *Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him*, in which foreign affairs play a minor part. No less laudatory and scarcely more informative is the shorter volume of Josephus Daniels, his Secretary of the Navy. Of higher value is *The True Story of Woodrow Wilson*, in which David Lawrence, a thoughtful journalist, draws freely on his own recollections and surveys his career as a whole with discriminating sympathy. The biography by William Allen White, though personally almost unacquainted with his subject, has been pronounced the best of the lives by Colonel House, who himself supplied valuable material to the author. In this penetrating study the President emerges as a man with two natures, the Irish and the Scottish, struggling within him, and producing a curious blend of generous emotions with repellent angularities. Some interesting details are added in James Kerney's sympathetic and well-informed biography, *The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson*.

Wilson's official utterances on foreign policy, and the negotiations between Washington and Berlin between 1914 and 1917, have been published in two of the sumptuous volumes of the Carnegie Endowment; but on the working of his mind and the evolution of American policy we learn far more from two works of rare historical and personal interest. *The Life and Letters of Walter Page*, by Burton Hendrick, took England by storm, and revealed to the uninitiated the character and services of a man whom to know was to love, and who possessed the gifts of an incomparable letter-writer. Wilson once described the letters of his old friend as the best he had ever read; and indeed it would be difficult to find political correspondence of such surpassing interest in its theme and such outstanding literary merit as that of the Ambassador who succeeded Whitelaw Reid at the Court of St James's, and returned home to die in 1918. Page was not a great man; but he had a great heart and his place in history is secure. A supplementary third volume, containing the letters to the President which

could not be published during his life-time, strengthened his hold on the affections of the British people. No British writer approaches this American observer in reproducing the tense atmosphere of the struggle, and in portraying the little group of men at the head of affairs.

Arriving in London in 1913 Page learned to know and to trust Sir Edward Grey before the breaking of the storm increased his admiration for 'this Lincoln-like man.' The democratic civilisation which England had invented and the United States inherited was, he believed, doomed to irrevocable ruin if the military autocracy of Germany were to triumph ; and he dedicated the remainder of his life to the task of compassing her overthrow. He has been described by Lord Grey as the most convinced believer in democracy he ever knew. Page would have liked his country to intervene at the outset ; but he was aware that it was impossible, and he devoted his whole strength to smoothing the dangerous friction created by British interference with American commerce. The time to strike, in his opinion, was when the *Lusitania* was sunk. What the President called patience, the Ambassador condemned as timidity, and later as cowardice. Knowing little of American opinion, and sharing the view of Kitchener and French that only the entry of the United States could turn compromise into victory, he became rather the interpreter of British views to Washington than the spokesman of the White House in Downing Street. Knowing in advance what his letters would contain, the President ceased to pay attention to them, and sent his most important communications to Downing Street through Colonel House, whose efforts to end the war by diplomacy rather than by the sword Page declined to assist. No chapter in these thrilling volumes surpasses in interest the story of the Zimmermann telegram of February, 1916, which invited Mexico, in the event of war, to join with Japan in an attack on the United States, and which, though despatched through four separate channels, was in each case intercepted and deciphered by British hands.

The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, published in 1926, are the most important contribution yet made to the diplomatic background of the war. 'My chief desire,' he explains in a brief Preface, 'is to let the papers tell their own story, and for this reason I have preferred to leave their arrangement in the hands of a historian.' The choice of Professor Charles Seymour for the task is justified by the skill with which he has transformed the raw material presented to Yale University into a readable narrative. Of no less importance than the letters and telegrams are the copious extracts from the diary in which the main events and conversations of each eventful day were recorded within a few hours of their taking place. The withholding of Wilson's share of the correspondence by his literary executors inevitably strengthens the impression that in foreign affairs Colonel House was the teacher rather than the pupil of the President.

The dangerous state into which Europe had drifted in the opening years of the century filled House with growing anxiety, and when President Wilson was installed his friend dreamed of using the good offices of the United States to diminish the tension between Great Britain and Germany. The essence of his plan was the co-operation of the Powers in developing the backward regions of the earth, combined with a limitation of armaments, an open door, and 'equal opportunity to everyone everywhere.' Encouraged by the President and fortified by the approval of Count Bernstorff, who emerges in these volumes as a broad-minded and trustworthy man, House started in May, 1914, on what he then and thereafter called The Great Adventure, already outlined in the life of Page but here related in detail. The Kaiser was favourable, and Sir Edward Grey entered eagerly into the plan of economic co-operation; but the British Minister was too much afraid of offending French and Russian susceptibilities to take action before the bursting of the storm.

Dominated by his conviction that a saner international

order was of greater importance than the satisfaction of territorial ambitions, that concrete issues would be easier to solve against a background of new international relationships, and that the indefinite prolongation of the war could only be averted by moderate terms of peace, House sailed to Europe in the spring of 1915 on his unofficial mission of peace. Sir Edward Grey, 'the one sane, big figure here,' agreed on the necessity of a moderate peace, followed by a reduction of armaments and a system of mutual guarantee. In Berlin the American envoy found the civil Government 'as sensible and fair-minded as in England, but they are for the moment impotent.' He hoped nevertheless, by confining contraband to munitions, to give Germany the freedom of the seas which she coveted, to relieve Great Britain of the submarine menace, and to remove the troublesome factor which had caused England and America to fight in 1812.

Peace parleys were blocked by the *Lusitania* crisis, and the growing danger that the United States might be sucked into the whirlpool suggested to House a plan to compel peace by declaring the intention of the United States to take arms against whichever side declined to accept American proposals for settlement. To explain and carry through this ambitious project he revisited Europe in January, 1916. Since Germany, he believed, would refuse the American terms, this was in effect a conditional offer to join the Allies ; but the latter, with the notable exception of Sir Edward Grey, were in no mood to forgo their dream of a knockout blow, and preferred to wait till American aid might perhaps be given without hampering conditions. Moreover the insertion by the President of the word 'probably' in the draft agreement raised the vital question whether he would be able to carry the American people with him in an appeal to arms. The revelations in these volumes of the mental atmosphere of Central and Western Europe, of the character of the rulers of Great Britain, Germany and France, and of the struggle between

moderates and extremists in each of the three capitals, renders the contemporary record of the visits in 1914, 1915, and 1916 a precious contribution to European history. Of scarcely less interest is the unique spectacle of a private citizen, armed with the affectionate confidence of the President, sailing back from the New World to redress the balance of the Old.

The Memoirs of W. J. Bryan contain a chatty autobiography carrying the story to the election of Wilson, and an account of his brief official career compiled from his papers by his widow. The President and the Secretary of State worked happily together till the outbreak of the war, which was soon to reveal a fundamental difference of standpoint. Both men desired to remain neutral, but Wilson never ruled out intervention, and his second *Lusitania* Note was too strong a dose for his pacific adviser to swallow. Moreover, since the ship carried munitions of war, Bryan believed that there was no case for a rupture. The President also rejected his advice to warn American citizens against sailing on belligerent vessels, and declined in the early stages of the struggle to issue an appeal for negotiations. Bryan's correspondence with Wilson relating to his resignation is by far the most interesting and important part of a rather disappointing book.

Though no other American witness during the Great War compares in importance with Page and House, several diplomatic representatives of the United States have made useful contributions to our store of knowledge. In *My Four Years in Germany*, and in its inferior sequel *Face to Face with Kaiserism*, Mr Gerard, as whole-hearted a democrat as Page but lacking his literary polish, portrays the rulers, statesmen and soldiers of the Fatherland, and sketches the growth of hostility to his country till the resumption of unrestrained submarine warfare produced its inevitable result. More substantial and more skilfully composed are the volumes *Belgium under German Rule*, in which Mr Brand Whitlock describes with poignant emotion the long agony of the innocent

little country whose only comfort in adversity was the sympathy of the world. The Minister's narrative is supplemented by the *Diplomatic Diary* of Hugh Gibson, the Secretary to the Legation, who was appointed to Brussels on the eve of the war, and whose testimony carries us to the end of 1914. In his *Secrets of the Bosphorus* Mr Morgenthau draws full-length portraits of the sinister Duumvirate, Enver, the Young Turk Napoleon, and Talaat, the cold-blooded murderer of the Armenians. His record is supplemented by the diary of his First Secretary, Lewis Einstein, entitled *Inside Constantinople*, which covers the critical months of the Dardanelles campaign. In *Ten Years near the German Frontier* Mr Maurice Egan watches the gathering and the bursting of the storm from his post at Copenhagen, 'the whispering gallery of Europe,' and describes at length his successful efforts in 1915–1916 to secure the purchase of the Danish West Indies by the United States before they could be snapped up by Germany.

If we owe much to American witnesses of the conflict, we owe them still more for the light they have shed on the making of the settlement. Ray Stannard Baker's *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* takes rank with Tardieu's masterpiece. The Chief of the Press Department of the American Delegation, who enjoyed exceptional opportunities of observation at Paris, was afterwards entrusted with the papers of the stricken statesman. The mass of material wrought into the two narrative volumes and the supplementary volume of documents would alone render the work of inestimable importance; but its value is greatly enhanced by the personal knowledge and literary skill of the narrator, who never hesitates to speak his mind about the men with whom the President worked, not excluding the Secretary of State and Colonel House himself. No one has a right to accuse the President of cynically turning his back on the Fourteen Points till he has studied this dramatic record of the difficulties with which he was confronted at Paris, and which he spent himself in

endeavouring to overcome. 'No one who really saw the President in action,' testifies Stannard Baker in his first intimate little sketch *What Wilson did at Paris*, 'fired at in front, sniped at from behind, will for a moment belittle the immensity of his task or underrate his extraordinary endurance, energy and courage. He worked longer hours, had more appointments, granted himself less recreation, than any other man, high or low, at the Peace Conference.'

Next to the vindication of the President by his chosen advocate comes the testimony of the Secretary of State. When Bryan resigned his post in 1915, his inevitable successor was Robert Lansing, whose knowledge of international law had proved invaluable during the prolonged controversy arising from the British blockade of the Central Powers. There was, however, no personal or intellectual contact between the idealist and the jurist, and the temperamental antagonism grew rapidly on French soil. Since Wilson shared his secrets with Colonel House alone, Lansing's volume, *The Peace Negotiations at Paris*, is less important than his membership of the Council of Ten would suggest; but it contains important documents, and the incisive comments on the League of Nations, Shantung and other controversial issues reveal the working of a keen though rather prosaic intellect. In the opinion of the Secretary of State the President's gospel of self-determination was responsible for many of the stumbling-blocks which the peacemakers found in their path. A supplementary volume, *The Big Four*, contains extremely vivid and discriminating portraits of the President, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando, with slighter sketches of Paderewski, Venezelos and other stars on the crowded stage.

The narratives of Stannard Baker and Lansing are usefully supplemented by the testimony of other members of the American delegation. In *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty* Baruch published a number of important memoranda, but adds

little commentary of his own. In *What Really Happened at Paris*, a series of informing lectures at Philadelphia organised by Colonel House and edited by himself and Professor Charles Seymour, General Bliss, Isaiah Bowman, James Brown Scott, and other experts describe their own experiences in different fields. In their joint volume, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, two of the Philadelphia lecturers, the Harvard Professors Haskins and Lord, sketch the historical background of the territorial problems on which their advice was sought, among them Poland and the Saar. A convenient chronological record of the negotiations is supplied in Thompson's *The Peace Conference Day by Day*. For the testimony of Colonel House we must await the second series of his *Intimate Papers*.

The domestic aspect of the struggle between the President and the Senate does not concern us here ; but the prolonged discussions of the Treaty of Versailles in Washington during the summer and autumn of 1919 occasionally illumine dark corners of European diplomacy. The bulky volume entitled *Treaty of Peace with Germany, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, contains not only the evidence and cross-examination of the President, Lansing, Baruch and other officials, but the testimony of private American citizens. The main attack was directed against certain articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and against the cession to Japan of Shantung. The President's declaration that he was unaware of the Secret Treaties concluded by the Allies until he reached Paris was so startling that it found little credence.

The threads scattered through the thousand pages of the Senatorial inquiry are firmly grasped in Senator Lodge's posthumous work, *The Senate and the League of Nations*. Disregarding the limitations of his title, the veteran Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee delivers a slashing attack not only on the foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson from Mexico to Versailles, but on his character, which, we are told, was disfigured by

timidity, vacillation, obstinacy, untruthfulness, and above all vanity. These polemical fireworks are less impressive than the narrative of events in which the author himself played a leading part. Lodge, like Lansing, desired to postpone the creation of the League ; but when the Covenant was imbedded in the Treaty he was prepared to accept it subject to certain amendments. Since the Lodge reservations, which involved the repudiation of the coercive measures, appeared to the President to knock the bottom out of the scheme, the Treaty remained unamended and therefore unratified. One side of the story of the duel, in which the fortunes of Europe were deeply concerned, is told in these pages with the aid of documents, among them the verbatim report of the memorable discussion between the Foreign Affairs Committee and the President at the White House on August 19, 1919. No one can blame the author for vindicating the constitutional rights of the Senate to share in the control of foreign affairs ; but few readers are likely nowadays to accept his party verdict on Wilson that ' the thought of self always overshadowed and effaced every other consideration.' The experiences of war and the controversies to which it gave rise stimulated the interest of the United States in the problems of Europe, many of which have been discussed by makers of history in *Foreign Affairs*, a quarterly founded in 1922 by the Council on Foreign Relations and edited by Professor Coolidge.

CHAPTER IX

Conclusion

Shortly after the termination of hostilities a high official of the Wilhelmstrasse urged his countrymen no longer to divide the belligerents into sheep and goats. 'From her own point of view Serbia was right in pursuing her national aims. Austria was no less right in seeking to retain her possessions. It was the duty of Russia to fulfil her promises to Serbia. Germany was bound to try to prevent the forcible dissolution of her only trustworthy ally. France and England were compelled to honour their treaty obligations.'[1] Fully to comprehend the World-War and its causes we must endeavour to stand 'above the battle,' and to realise the truth of Hegel's profound aphorism, 'Tragedy is the conflict not of right with wrong, but of right with right.'

Though the conduct of each of the belligerents appeared to its enemies to indicate a double dose of original sin, it was nevertheless in every case what might have been expected. It was natural that Serbia should aspire to unite under her sceptre the discontented Jugoslav subjects of her neighbour, should use their undoubted grievances in Croatia to foster the Pan-Serb idea, and should look to Russia for assistance, as Cavour in similar circumstances had looked to France. It was equally natural that Austria should resolve to defend herself against the openly proclaimed ambition to rob her of provinces which she had held for centuries. After the Bosnian crisis Serbia had promised to be a good neighbour; but she had not kept her word, and her intrigues

[1] B. W. von Bülow, in his book *Die Krisis*.

with Russia were notorious. To sit with folded arms and wait till her enemies felt strong enough to carry out their programme of dismemberment was to proclaim her impotence and to invite disaster; and the murder of the heir to the throne by Jugoslav assassins appeared to demand some striking vindication of the authority of the State. The ultimatum to Serbia was at best a gambler's throw; but it was envisaged by the statesmen of Vienna and Budapest as a strictly defensive action, offering the best chance of escape from a danger which was certain to increase and which threatened the existence of Austria as a Great Power.

The conduct of Germany was no less short-sighted but no less intelligible. Austria had set her heart on abating the Serbian nuisance; and Austria was the only Power, large or small, on whom Germany could rely, since Italy and Roumania were allies in nothing but name. If Austria ceased to be a Great Power through the loss of her southern provinces, Germany would stand alone in Europe, wedged in between a hostile Russia and a France bent on revenge. In the Bulgarian crisis Bismarck had bluntly told his ally that he would not fight for her Balkan ambitions; but the wire to Petrograd was at that time still working, and he possessed the friendship of England, which his successors had lost. Moreover Bismarck had repeatedly declared that the maintenance of Austria as a Great Power was a paramount interest for which Germany might fight with an easy conscience. The Kaiser's appearance in shining armour at the side of Francis Joseph in 1909 had compelled Russia to keep the peace, and it was hoped that a fresh demonstration of Austro-German solidarity might produce a similar result. If it did not, the Central Powers felt themselves strong enough to defeat the Dual Alliance; for they knew that the Russian colossus had feet of clay, and recent revelations in Paris suggested that France was ill-prepared for a struggle of life and death. There was, indeed, a risk that Great Britain might throw her sword into the

scales ; but Anglo-German relations had so greatly improved since the settlement of the Morocco problem that it seemed possible that her neutrality might be secured. Thus when Francis Joseph asked whether he could rely on the support of his ally, the Kaiser and his Chancellor replied that he could. Any other response, they believed, would have dissolved the partnership and have compelled Austria to seek for more profitable friendships. Neither of them desired a world-war ; but they were ready for all eventualities if Russia declined to permit the localisation of the Austro-Serb conflict. A struggle between the Teuton and the Slav was considered almost inevitable ; and if it was to come the General Staff preferred 1914 to a later date, when Russia's strategic railways on the Polish frontier would be complete and the Three Years Service system in France would be in operation. The Navy had not reached its full stature, but the deepening of the Kiel Canal was completed.

Russia's defeat by Japan had thrown her back on Europe ; and it was obvious that as soon as she recovered her breath she would once more pursue her historic ambition to dominate the Near East. Her inability to take up the challenge in 1909 was a bitter memory, and no one had a right to expect that she would submit to such humiliation again. By 1914 she had regained her self-confidence and was prepared to meet a serious challenge from any quarter, however uncertain she might be as to the result of an appeal to arms. As Berchtold saw the hand of Russia in the tragedy of Serajevo, so Sazonoff felt the ultimatum as a blow struck at Nicholas II not less than at Peter Karageorgevitch. Had she left her *protégé* to the tender mercies of Austria, she would have forfeited all claim to be the champion of the Slavonic races, and have handed over the Near East to the unchecked domination of the Central Powers. Though bound by no treaty obligation, Russia could no more be expected to remain neutral in face of an Austrian attack on Serbia than England in face of a

German attack on Belgium. The same instinctive pride of a Great Power which prompted Vienna to throw down the glove compelled Petrograd to take it up. It is true that while Austria fought under the banner of self-preservation, Russia, whom nobody threatened to attack, marched out to battle in the name of prestige; but in the accepted scale of national values, safety, honour and prestige are motive-forces of approximately the same weight. Moreover the support of Great Britain in the event of a general war was confidently expected.

The main cause of the conflict lay in the Near East, and its principal authors were Germany and Austria on the one side, Russia and Serbia on the other. 'I shall not see the world-war,' observed Bismarck to Ballin in 1891, 'but you will, and it will start in the East'; and his prophecy came true. But for a quarter of a century the destinies of France had been linked with those of Russia, and, when the long-anticipated crisis arrived, she took her place at the side of her partner with as little hesitation as Germany at the side of Austria. She had no desire for war, and took no step to precipitate it. Nor, on the other hand, did she seriously endeavour to keep the sword of her ally in its scabbard. She had never abandoned the hope of recovering the Rhine provinces, and for that reason could not be included among the 'satiated Powers' who at any given moment are the most effective champions of peace. The catastrophe feared, if not foreseen, by Jaurès had come to pass, and France was dragged into a desperate conflict to sustain the prestige of her ally. To have declined the summons would have constituted disloyalty to the spirit, if not to the letter, of her treaty obligations, increased the contempt for 'a decadent Power' entertained in certain German circles, and have left her defenceless against the victorious Teuton.

Of Belgium it is enough to say that her indignant response to a brutal attack was the spontaneous affirmation of her will to maintain the independence which she

had never abused, and to preserve unsullied the honour which is its surest guarantee.

It was as natural for Italy to stand out of the opening rounds of the conflict as for the five other Great Powers of Europe to take part. As far back as 1896 she had informed her allies that she could not fight on their side if Great Britain as well as France was among their enemies. In 1902 she had pledged herself by treaty to take no share in an attack on France. In 1909 she had promised support for Russian ambitions in return for Russian support of her own. Thus in 1914 she was connected by treaties or understandings with every member of the Triple Entente. On the other hand, though her relations with Germany were excellent, the longing for Italia Irredenta could only be gratified, and the mastery of the Adriatic could only be secured, at Austria's expense. There had never been any real identity of interest between the two Powers, and since her *rapprochement* with France Italy had only been a sleeping partner in the Triple Alliance. Austria was well aware of the sentiments of her southern ally, and she counted so little on her support that she neither communicated her designs nor asked for assistance till the Rubicon was crossed. No Italian statesman could have persuaded his countrymen to fight for the preservation of Austria as a Great Power or for the strengthening of her position in the Balkans.

If neutrality was the instinctive reaction to the outbreak of war, the next step presented far greater difficulty. Nowhere but in Greece was opinion so sharply divided, for nowhere did the scales of advantage and disadvantage hang so level in the air. *Sacro egoismo* was the watchword of Salandra and Giolitti alike ; but in the spring of 1915 there was no infallible oracle to decide how the formula should be applied. The elder statesman, temperamentally inclined to enterprises of limited liability, contended that a good deal might be squeezed out of hard-pressed Austria without the waste of blood or treasure. The younger, on the other hand,

argued that extorted promises are not always fulfilled, and that territorial concessions might under certain circumstances be forcibly revoked. If Italy stood aside the Central Powers might win ; and if they won she would be doomed to feed for ever out of their hand. Neutrality, like intervention, was charged with uninsurable risks. Trieste and the mastery of the Adriatic were glittering prizes, and the chance of winning them could hardly be expected to recur. Thus Italy, like other belligerents, chose the course most clearly indicated by her traditions, her ambitions and her interests, and decided to play for the highest stakes. The prophetic declaration of Count Nigra, that Italy and Austria must be allies or enemies, was fulfilled to the letter.

The course taken by Great Britain was marked out for her with equal clearness. ' My God, Mr Page, what else could we do ? ' cried the King. The violation of Belgian neutrality roused the country to righteous anger ; but it was the occasion rather than the cause of our entry into the war. For better or worse we had departed from our traditional policy of ' splendid isolation,' and become entangled in the quarrels and ambitions of our friends. Had we stood aside at Armageddon the Central Powers would have won an easy victory, and at the conclusion of the contest we should have found ourselves alone in Europe. France and Russia would have scorned us as false friends who, after years of diplomatic co-operation, expert discussions and resonant protestations of solidarity, deserted them in the crisis of their fate ; and the German menace, intensified by the collapse of the Triple Entente, would have compelled us to arm to the teeth on sea and land. Sir Edward Grey's assurance on August 3, 1914, that our hands were free was correct in form but inaccurate in substance ; and his whole speech breathed the conviction that we should be disgraced if we left France in the lurch. Mr Lloyd George was later to describe the relationship as an obligation of honour ; and such, I think, is likely to be the verdict of history.

The decisions of the other European countries which

entered the war after it had been for some time in progress were in like measure dictated by their supposed national interests and the diplomatic orientation of the last years of peace, not by the loftiest altruism or the blackest villainy as was proclaimed by shrill voices in the excitement of the fray. In Turkish eyes the offers of the Entente to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire were not worth the paper on which they were written. Was it not the age-long ambition of Russia to possess the key to the door of her house, and did not the moujik dream of the day when the Cross would be replaced on the church of Justinian? Had not England squatted in Egypt without leave from its overlord, and was she not perpetually claiming for the Christian subjects of the Sultan autonomies that led to independence? It was the interest and therefore the policy of Germany, on the other hand, to keep Turkey alive and intact, to train her army, to finance her railways, to content herself with influence and concessions. Moreover there was no irritating assumption of moral or religious superiority in the Kaiser, who at a critical hour had clasped the blood-stained hand of the Great Assassin, and had proclaimed himself the champion of three hundred million Mohammedans throughout the world. To Enver and Talaat exploitation was a lesser evil than partition.

The decision of the crafty Ferdinand was equally intelligible. Russia had transferred her patronage to Serbia, had left Bulgaria to her fate in 1913, and on the outbreak of the world-war had refused to ordain the surrender of Macedonia which was the recognised price of Bulgarian assistance. Macedonia was to the Bulgars what the Rhine provinces were to the French. Promises were not enough, for the Entente might be unable or unwilling to fulfil them. A bird in the hand was worth two in the bush. When, on the other hand, *carte blanche* was given to conquer the coveted province for herself, with the powerful aid of the Central Powers, Bulgaria joined the side which was at that moment in the

ascendant, and which, in the opinion of her ruler, was destined to ultimate triumph.

If Ferdinand of Bulgaria preferred the mountains and valleys of Macedonia to the dimming memories of the war of liberation, his namesake of Roumania forgot his Hohenzollern blood in his constitutional duty. The Treaty of 1883 with the Central Powers was unknown to the country, and Bratiano, like the Coburger, put himself up to auction. While the Central Powers could give him nothing that he craved save Bessarabia, the Entente could help him to Transylvania, the apple of his eye, with the Bukovina and the Banat thrown in. The risk of joining the losing side held him neutral for half the war ; but when at last he determined to plunge into the raging waters, it could only be in pursuit of the larger prize.

To explain the conduct of the statesmen of Europe in terms of national tradition or ambition is not necessarily to approve the policies from which the catastrophe arose. The root of the evil lay in the division of Europe into two armed camps, which dated from 1871, and in the doctrine of the Balance of Power, which is as old as the sixteenth century. The conflict was in large measure the offspring of fear. The Old World had degenerated into a powder-magazine, in which the dropping of a lighted match, whether by accident or design, was almost certain to produce a gigantic conflagration. No war, strictly speaking, is inevitable ; but in a storehouse of high explosives it required rulers of exceptional foresight and self-control in every country to avoid a catastrophe. It is a mistake to imagine that the catastrophe took Europe unawares, for soldiers and civilians alike had been expecting and preparing for it for many years. It is also a mistake to attribute exceptional wickedness to the Governments who, in the words of Mr Lloyd George, stumbled and staggered into war. Blind to danger and deaf to advice as were the statesmen of the three despotic Empires, not one of them, when it came to the point, desired to set the world alight.

But though they may be acquitted of the inexpiable crime of deliberately starting the avalanche, they must jointly bear the reproach of having chosen the path which led to the abyss. The outbreak of the Great War, however, is the condemnation not only of the performers who strutted for a brief hour across the stage, but above all of the international anarchy which they inherited and which they did little to abate.

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