UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_170370

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 701/P18C Accession No. 30547

Author Pandey, K.C.

Title Comparative aesthetics

30547

or before the date

THE

CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT SERIES

STUDIES VOL. II

A part of the Thesis, approved for the Degree of D. Litt. in Philosophy by the University of Lucknow.

COMPARATIVE ÆSTHETICS

VOL. I

INDIAN ÆSTHETICS

BY

DR. KANTI CHANDRA PANDEY,

M. A., PH. D., D. LITT., M. O. L., SHASTRI.

Sissendi Raj Reader, Lucknow University.

THE

CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT SERIES OFFICE,

VIDYA VILAS PRESS, P. O. Box No. 8.

BANARAS.

1950

[ALL RIGHTS RESERVED BY THE PUBLISHERS.]

Printed by

RAMESHWAR PATHAK,

The Tara Printing Works, Banaras.

1950

Price Rupees Sixteen only.

Dedicated

To

Rana Shivamber Singh Bahadur,

Taluqdar,

Khajurgaon Raj.

FOREWORD

I had the pleasure of examining Dr. K. C. Pandey's Thesis on Comparative Æsthetics for the D. Litt. degree of the Lucknow University and I recommended the award of the degree. His work deals with a relatively unexplored section of Indian thought and his handling of the original sources and sympathetic interpretation of Æsthetic doctrines are remarkable. No student of Indian Æsthetics can afford to neglect this important work. When the projected second and third volumes appear, Dr. Pandey would have done work of an enduring character.

23-12-1950. S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

Calcutta.

CONTENTS

	Page.
Introduction.	XV
List of Abbreviations.	XX

CHAPTER I.

HISTORY OF INDIAN ÆSTHETICS. ...	1
Preliminary.	1
The Scope.	1
Religious Origin of Drama.	2
The Questions attempted by Bharata in his Nāṭya Śāstra.	3
Problems of Æsthetics solved in the above answers.	7
Bird's-eye view of the Nāṭya Śāstra. ...	8
Limitations of the work.	10
Rasa as Æsthetic object.	10
Importance of Rasa in the eyes of Bharata. ...	11
Constituents of Rasa, the Æsthetic object. ...	12
Explanation of the Technical Terms. ...	13
Vibhāva.	14
Two aspects of Vibhāva.	15
Anubhāva.	16
Bhāva.	17
Vyabhicāribhāva.	19
Sthāyibhāva.	19
Importance of Rasa from different points of view.	20
Bharata's conception of Rasa.	21
The Relation of the constituents of Rasa. ...	21
Æsthetic object not an imitation.	23
Distinction of Rasa from Sthāyibhāva etc. ...	24
Importance of Rasa in the eyes of Bharata. Another point of view.	25

	Page.
Voluntarism of the Śaiva.	85
Ābhāsavāda.	89
The category of Śakti (consciousness) as Camatkāra.	91
The context of the problem of Camatkāra. ...	92
Śaiva conception of Bhoga.	98
The Absolute in the context of "Bhoga". ...	98
The individual subjects.	99
The qualities of individual subjects.	100
Power and quality distinguished.	100
Sattva, Rajas and Tamas and pleasure, pain and senselessness.	102
Qualities of individual subject and Bhoga. ...	104
The conclusion.	104
Limitations of Individual subject.	105
Kalā (Limited power of action).	105
Vidyā (Limited power of knowledge). ...	106
Rāga (General objective desire).	108
Niyati (Subjection to causal law).	109
Kāla (Time).	110
Time as a standard of measure.	110
Levels of experience.	112
Subject in deep sleep: (Śūnya Pramātā). ...	113
Inconsistency of Hegel.	117
Śūnya Pramātā of Abhinava.	118
Apavedya Suṣupta and Turīya differentiated. ...	121
Distinction between Turīya and Turīyātīta. ...	122
Savedya Suṣupta and Prāṇa Pramātā. ...	122
Æsthetic experience from sense level to objectless level.	124
Meaning of Rasa.	130
Epistemic technique of Ābhāsavāda.	132

Page

Unchanging nature of the Ābhāsa. 136
Time and space as the basis of Particularity. ... 136
The implication of universalisation (Sādhāraṇī-karaṇa) according to Ābhāsavāda. ... 137
Kathartic level in the light of epistemic theory of Ābhāsavāda. 138

CHAPTER III.

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF ÆSTHETICS 139
Kathartic level. 139
Triadic relation. 141
Constituents of the Æsthetic object as a configuration. 142
The essential nature of the Æsthetic object as revealed by psychological analysis. ... 144
Dramatic presentation is not an illusory object. ... 146
Is Æsthetic object a "reflection" (Pratibimba) ? ... 147
It is not a partial representation. 147
Æsthetic object from spectator's point of view. ... 148
Unworldly nature of the Æsthetic object. ... 149
The constituents of Æsthetic personality. ... 149
Taste or Rasikatva. 149
Sahṛdayatva or Æsthetic Susceptibility. ... 150
Power of Visualisation. 151
Intellectual background. 152
Contemplative Habit (Bhāvanā or Carvaṇā). ... 152
Psycho-physical condition. 153
Capacity to identify. 153
Æsthetic attitude. 154
From sense-level to self-forgetfulness. ... 155
From self-forgetfulness to identification. .. 156

Page

Process of identification. 156
Philosophical explanation of elimination of time etc. 159
From identification to Imagination. 161
The development of æsthetic image. 161
From Imagination to emotion. 162
From Emotion to Complete Katharsis ... 163
The source of terror. 165
Impediments to Æsthetic Experience. 166
Inability to get at the meaning. 166
Subjective and objective limitations of time and space. 166
The influence of personal joys and sorrows. ... 167
Lack of clarity due to insufficient stimulus. ... 167
Subordination of the principal. 167
Dubiousness of the Presentation. 167
The conclusion. 168
The aim of the Dramatic Presentation. ... 168
Æsthetic experience not truly emotive. ... 169
Abhinava's approach to the problem of number of Rasas. 171
Dhanañjaya and Abhinavagupta on Śānta Rasa. ... 176
The text of the Nāṭya Śāstra. 178
Evidence of the Abhinava Bhāratī. 178
Opposition to Śānta on Textual Basis. ... 180
Its criticism. 180
Opposition to Śānta independently of the text. ... 180
Opposition on the basis of the indirect evidence of Bharata. 181
Its criticism. 181
Semi-textual opposition to the semi-textual exponents of Śānta. 182

	Page
Its criticism by Abhinava's predecessors ...	183
Criticism of the above.	184
Expositions of Śānta on the basis of indirect evidence of Bharata.	185
Nirveda as Sthāyin of Śānta.	185
Its criticism.	186
Philosophical conception of Vairāgya and its Relation to self-realisation (Tattvajñāna). ...	187
Para or higher vairāgya.	190
Relation between Nirveda and Tattvajñāna in the light of Nyāya system.	191
Dhanañjaya on Nirveda as Sthāyin of Śānta. ...	191
Any one of the eight accepted Sthāyins as the Sthāyin of Śānta.	192
All the eight together as Sthāyin of Śānta. ...	193
The view on Śānta with slight difference from that of Abhinavagupta.	193
Dhanañjaya on Śama as Sthāyin of Śānta. ...	194
Additional reason for unpresentability of Śama. ...	194
The view of Śānta based on another conception of Śama.	195
Abhinavagupta's theory of Śānta.	196
Śānta state.	196
Śānta in Practical life.	197
The hero of Śānta Rasa.	197
The Self as the Sthāyin of Śānta.	198
Why is Tattvajñāna (Śama) mentioned separately?	199
Why does Bharata use the word Śama and not Tattvajñāna ?	200
Other constituents of Śānta.	201
Other Sthāyins in the context of Śānta. ...	201
Discussion on Rasa in the Nāgānanda. ...	202

Page

Manuscript Authority. 205
The nature of Æsthetic experience of Śānta. ... 205

CHAPTER IV.

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF MEANING. 207
Language and Æsthetic configuration. ... 207
History of Dhvani. 208
The presence of the suggested meaning in the earliest poetic production. 210
The probable time of the discovery of the spiritual meaning. 214
The Chief exponent of the spiritual meaning of Language or Dhvani. 214
The theory of meaning before the acceptance of the theory of Dhvani. 217
An illustration of Dhvani. 219
Can Lakṣaṇā explain the negative meaning conceived by hearer on hearing the positive statement under discussion? 221
Unsoundness of the opponent's position. ... 221
Review of the position of the opponents of the theory of suggested meaning. 222
The views of the opponents of the theory of suggested meaning summarised. 225
The Arguments of the opponents of the theory of Dhvani. 227
The position of the exponent explained. ... 230
The various meanings of the word Dhvani and their origin. 231
Abhinava's conception of poetry. 233
The position of the Lakṣaṇāvādin explained. ... 234

	Page
Lakṣaṇāvādin's position criticised.	235
The process analysed.	236
Another conception of Lakṣaṇā and its criticism. ...	237
Lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā as substitute for Dhvani. ...	239
Lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā criticised.	240
Criticism of Lakṣaṇā summarised.	241
Sahakāri Bhedācca Śaktibhedaḥ.	241
The Anvitābhidhāna theory of the Prābhākaras. ...	241
Criticism of the Anvitābhidhānavāda. ...	242
Necessity of admission of the Instrumentality of consciousness of one meaning in the rise of another.	244
Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's explanation of the consciousness of the suggested meaning and its criticism. ...	246
Dhvani distinguished from figures of speech. ...	248
Figure Samāsokti defined.	248
The distinctive spheres of Upamā and Rasavat Alaṅkāra on the one hand and that of Rasadhvani on the other.	251
Embellishments and Æsthetic presentation. ...	253
The psychological basis of the classification of the suggested meaning.	254
Vastudhvani.	255
Alaṅkāradhvani.	255
Rasadhvani	256
Bhāvadhvani	256
Avivakṣita vācya and vivakṣitānyaparavācya. ...	257
The situation.	258
Arthāntara Saṅkramitavācya.	259
The situation.	259
Atyantatiraskṛta vācya.	261
Śabdaśaktyudbhava.	262
Arthaśaktyudbhava.	264

Page

The situation. 265

Classification of the suggested meaning, according to the means of suggestion. 265

Suggestive poetry distinguished from unsuggestive. 266

The distinction of the suggestive poetry from the embellished. 267

Dhvani Chart. 269

CHAPTER V.

MAHIMA BHAṬṬA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI AND A REPLY. 270

Dhvani as a controversial problem. 270

An introduction to Mahima Bhaṭṭa. 271

The purpose of the Book. 274

His attitude towards Dhvanikāra. 274

Kashmir Śaiva Tendencies of Mahima Bhaṭṭa. ... 275

(I) His reference to Parā 275

(II) His reference to the Śaiva theory of Ábhāsavāda. 276

(III) His admission of the three means of knowledge. 282

(IV) His reference to the Causal theory of Kashmir Śaivaism. 284

His theory of Æsthetics. 285

Charm in poetic presentation. 286

His conception of Rasa as a reflection of a Sthāyin. 287

His answers to the objections against the inferential theory of Æsthetics. 287

His advance on Śrīśaṅkuka. 289

His conception of Camatkāra. 290

The background of the theory of Meaning. ... 290

Mahima's approach to the problem of Meaning. ... 292

His division of words 292

Page

His reference to and rejection of the view that function is the basis of the use of a noun for an object. 293
His division of Meaning. 296
Anumeyārtha 298
His conception of Kāvya in the context of the criticism of Bhaṭṭa Tauta's definition of it. ... 298
His conception of Gamyagamakabhāva. ... 300
Ānanda Vardhana's points of view. 300
His criticism of the theory of Dhvani. ... 301
His refutation of other powers of word than the conventional. 302
(a) His criticism of Lakṣaṇā. 303
(b) His criticism of the Tātparyaśakti of words. ... 307
(c) His criticism of Abhivyakti. 307
Dhvanivādin's position explained. 312
Ten defects in the definition of Dhvani Kāvya. ... 313
(I) Criticism of the adjunct of 'Artha'. ... 314
Dhvanivādin's position explained. 315
His criticism of the word 'Artha' in the definition of Dhvani. 315
(II) Criticism of the use of the word 'Śabda'. ... 316
Dhvanivādin's position explained. ... 318
(III) Criticism of the adjunct of 'Śabda'. ... 318
'IV) Criticism of the masculine gender in the pronoun 'Tam'. 319
(V) Criticism of the dual in 'Vyaṅktaḥ.' ... 319
(VI) Criticism of the use of 'Vā'. 320
(VII) His Criticism of the suggestive power of word, indicated by 'Vi-añj' in the definition. 320
(VII) Criticism of the use of the word 'Dhvani' for poetic composition. 322

Page

(IX) His Criticism of Ānanda Vardhana's conception of the particular Kāvya (Kāvya viśeṣa). 324
Dhvanivādin's position explained. 326
(X) Criticism of the use of the subject of the predicate 'Kathitaḥ'. 327
The necessity of inclusion of 'Abhidhā' in the Definition. 327
Dhvanivādin's position explained. 328
His conception of incongruity (Anaucitya). ... 329
His Criticism of Kuntaka's theory of Vakrokti. ... 332
His Criticism and rejection of some of the types of Dhvani. 332
His Criticism of Vastu and Alaṅkāra Dhvani. ... 332
His Criticism of the division of Kāvya into Dhvani and Guṇībhūta Vyaṅgya. ... 333
Ruyyaka 334

CHAPTER VI.

THE TECHNIQUE OF SANSKRIT DRAMA 336
Æsthetic object. 336
What does the Dramatist present ? 338
Incongruity. 338
Action in Sanskrit Drama. 340
Rules of Dramatisation and Dramatic Genius. ... 341
Method of Dramatisation. 344
Presentable and unpresentable in drama. ... 347
Unities of time, place and action. 348
Difference between Sanskrit and English Dramas in respect of action and emotion. 350
Analysis of the Main plot. 354
The conception of the five stages elaborated. ... 356
The Beginning (Prārambha). 358

Page

The effort (Yatna). 359
The effort situation. 360
The Height (Prāptyāśā) 361
Prāptyāśā Situation. 362
The Consequence (Niyatāpti). 366
The Close (Phalāgama). 368
The Means to the end (Arthaprakṛti). ... 368
The Seed (Bīja) and its Psychological necessity. 369
The recollection of the motive force (Vindu (B ?) 373
Sub-plot (Patākā). 375
Minor Plot (Prakarī). 376
The Resources (Kārya). 377
Sandhis (Parts) in Sanskrit Drama. 378
Mukha Sandhi (Birth of the seed). 380
Pratimukha (Opening of the seed). 381
Garbha. 382
Avamarśa. 383
Nirvahaṇa (Fruition). 385
The Sandhyaṅga defined. 385
The general purpose of Sandhyaṅgas. ... 385
The purposes of Sandhyaṅgas from the point of view of Dramatist. 387
Freedom in the use of Sandhyaṅgas. ... 387

CHAPTER VII.

ÆSTHETIC CURRENTS IN POETICS. ... 389
The dramatic and the poetic experiences differentiated. 390
Bhāmaha. 391
Bhāmaha's conception of poetry. 392
His conception of poetic experience. ... 393
Bhāmaha's conception of guṇas. 394
The poetic qualities in the eyes of Bhāmaha. ... 395

Page

Bhāmaha's indebtedness to Bharata in the conception of Vakrokti. 395
Difference between Lakṣaṇa and Alaṅkāra. ... 397
Lakṣaṇa defined. 398
Difference between Bharata and Bhāmaha. ... 399
Other conceptions of Vakrokti. 400
His scanty treatment. 400
Daṇḍin's conception of poetry. 401
Difference of opinion on the qualities of poetry explained. 402
Vāmana's conception of poetry. 405
Vāmana's contribution. 407
Udbhaṭa's position. 408

APPENDIX A

The Textual Authority indicated by foot-notes. ... 411
Index. 471

INTRODUCTION.

The following pages fulfil the promise, made to the reader in the introduction to my *Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study*. Here the word 'Æsthetics' stands for 'Science and Philosophy of Fine Art'. For, the texts, on the basis of which 'Indian Æsthetics' is presented in the following pages, have approached the problem from both, the technical and the philosophical points of view. Here the problem of æsthetics is studied from the points of view of the dramaturgists and the poeticians. Although the School of Æsthetics, represented by Bharata and Abhinavagupta, regards all other arts, whether fine or mechanical, as auxiliaries to the dramatic art, yet the authorities on two arts, (i) Music and (ii) Architecture, assert the independence of these two fine arts in giving rise to æsthetic experience. Thus, in India, there are three schools of the Philosophy of Fine Art: (i) Rasa-Brahma-Vāda, (ii) Nāda-Brahma-Vāda and (iii) Vāstu-Brahma-Vāda. The latter two will be dealt with in a subsequent volume on the subject.

In this volume also, as in the case of the previous, Sanskrit texts have been studied from the historical and the philosophical points of view. It is primarily concerned with the presentation of Abhinavagupta's Theory of Æsthetics against the background of the History of Æsthetic Thought in India and in proper setting of the system of the monistic Śaiva Philosophy of Kashmir, as propounded by him in his two famous and voluminous works, (i) Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī and (ii) Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī or Bṛhati Vimarśinī.

The latter work is a commentary by Abhinavagupta on Utpalācārya's own commentary on his own Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā. It was available only in MSS. at the time when the present work was undertaken, though its publication has recently been completed by the Research Department of Kashmir. But the original commentary of Utpalācārya seems to be irrecoverably lost. For, not only my search for this valuable work in private and public collections of MSS. all over India has failed to trace it out, but also that of the Research Department of Kashmir, with all the resources of Kashmir State at its disposal. The published text tallies with MS. No. 464 of 1875-76 in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, so much so that the same portions are missing in both.

In the absence of the original, it is exceptionally difficult to follow the commentary closely. But Abhinavagupta's method of commenting is such as gives to his work some sort of independent value. At the beginning of his commentary on each Kārikā he gives his own interpretation so as to bring out clearly its full meaning. On many important philosophical points, referred to by Utpalācārya in the course of his lost commentary, he enters into fairly lengthy discussions. Some of these are very important for a proper understanding of his theory of æsthetics. In the present work they have been utilised for the first time.

The Abhinava Bhāratī has not yet been fully published. Only the first two volumes, which cover first 18 Chapters, have been brought out by our learned friend, Rama Krishna Kavi. It is the most important and the biggest work on Indian Æsthetics. And without a careful study and thorough understanding of its contents, it is not possible to write on Indian Æsthetics so as to

show the importance of Abhinavagupta's Theory of Æsthetics in a comparative light. In this work the whole of the Abhinava Bhāratī has been used for the first time to solve different problems connected with Æsthetics, such as those of the unities of time, place and action in Sanskrit Drama: and why is there no tragedy in Sanskrit in the strict Shakespearian sense of it.

The scholars, who have so far written on Abhinavagupta's Theory of Æsthetics, have either completely ignored the philosophical aspect of the problem, as Dr. Sankaran has done in his *Some Aspects of Literary Criticism*, or have attempted to present it in terms of the Vedānta philosophy, as has been done by P. Panchapagesa Shastri in his *Philosophy of Æsthetic Pleasure*. Such an attempt is as good as interpreting the Æsthetic Theory of Hegel in terms of the philosophy of Kant. He has, however, followed the tradition, which developed, in ignorance of the philosophy of Abhinavagupta, of interpreting his Æsthetic Theory in terms of the Vedānta.

In spite of this it would be wrong to minimise the importance of the substantial contributions, which these learned scholars have made to the revival of Indian Æsthetics. And it is but natural to a student of the subject, to feel extremely thankful to them.

In presenting the views of Indian Æsthetic thinkers, fidelity to the original Sanskrit texts has been my guiding principle. In order, therefore, to convince the reader of this fact, I have not only occasionally incorporated the relevant texts in the book itself, but also have referred to other texts in the foot-notes, and have given them in full in an appendix at the end of the book.

For the information of the reader I may add here the following few important notes :—

1. The Roman figures, coming after abbreviations, unless otherwise indicated, stand for the number of volume. The number, coming immediately after the Roman figures, as in some cases, or immediately after an abbreviation, as in others, indicates the number of page.

2. In the appendix, I have given, in some cases, a few more textual authorities than those, indicated by foot-notes, and have not hesitated to repeat the same authority, when necessary.

3. The arrangement of the subject-matter of the Nāṭya Śāstra under chapters, differs with different recensions. Even between two published editions of the Nāṭya Śāstra, one in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series and the other in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, there is such difference.

The references in chapter VI 'The Technique of Sanskrit Drama' to the MS. of the Abhinava Bhāratī are mostly from two chapters (I) Daśarūpa-vidhāna and (II) Sandhyaṅga-vikalpa. As the various recensions of the Nāṭya Śāstra and the Abhinava Bhāratī differ on the numbers of the chapters, I would, therefore, suggest to the reader to ignore the numbers. He will find it easier to hunt up the references in the MSS. of the Abhinava Bhāratī if he looks for the title of the chapter rather than its number.

4. Foot-notes are of two kinds, (i) those the texts of which are given in the appendix and (ii) the texts of which are not given. The latter are marked with "X"

Here I feel in duty bound to acknowledge my indebtedness to the authorities of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona : and the Adyar Sanskrit library, Madras, for lending their Mss. and allowing them to be copied.

I am deeply indebted to Prof. S. N. Dasgupta, ex-Principal, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, for suggesting the addition of a chapter on 'Mahima Bhaṭṭa's Criticism of Dhvani' : to Prof. N. K. Sidhanta, for very helpful suggestions on 'Katharsis': to Prof. K.A.S. Iyer, for the questions on the 'Theory of Meaning': to Dr. Raj Narayan and to Mr. D. Mitra, for reading some parts of the work, either in type-script or in proofs, and suggesting some formal modifications.

Now, the smiling image of late Dr. N. N. Sengupta stands before my mind's eye. I humbly bow. He was the Guide.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

Abh. Abhinavagupta : An Historical and Philosophical Study (Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1935).

A.Bh. Abhinava Bhāratī
(Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, 1926).

A.Bh. (MS.) (Adyar Library, Madras).

Bh. G. Bhāva Gaṇeśavṛtti (on yoga Sūtra)
Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1921.

Bh. V. Bhoja Vṛtti (on Yoga Sūtra).
Chowkhamba, Banaras.

B. V. Bṛhatī Vimarśinī (MS.)
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.

Dh. L. Dhvanyāloka Locana.
(Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1928.)

D. R. Daśarūpaka.
(Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1917.)

I. P. V. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.
(Kashmir Sanskrit Series, 1928.)

I. P. V. V. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī.
(Kashmir Sanskrit Series, 1938).

Jha. Ganganath Jha's English Translation of the Tantra Vārtika. (Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1924.)

J. S. Jaimini Sūtra.

K. A. Kāvyālaṅkāra.
(Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1928).

K. A. S. Kāvyālaṅkāra Saṅgraha.
(Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1915.)

K. P. Kāvya Prakāśa. (Calcutta, 1886.)

K. Prad. Kāvya Pradīpa. (Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1891.)

K. S. Kāvyālaṅkāra Sūtravṛtti. (Jivananda, Calcutta, 1922.)

K. Sam. Kumāra Sambhava.

M. B. Mahā Bhāṣya.

M. P. Maṇi Prabhā (on Yoga Sūtra).
Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1921.

N. Nirukta. (Venkateshvara Press, Bombay.)

N. Comm. Nirukta : Commentary by Durgācārya.

N. D. Nyāya Darśana.
(Jivananda, Calcutta, 1911)

N. Ś. Nāṭya Śāstra.
(Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1929.)

N. S. Nyāya Sūtra. (Jivananda, Calcutta, 1911.)

N. V. Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa Vṛtti.
Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1921.

P. V. Parātrimśikā Vivaraṇa.
(Kashmir Sanskrit Series, 1918.)

R. G. Rasa Gaṅgādhara.
(Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1930.)

R. T. Rasa Taraṅgiṇī.
(Gopal Narayan, Bombay.)

S. C. Śabdārtha Cintāmaṇi.
(Sajjan Yantralaya, Udayapur, 1917.)

S. D. Sāhitya Darpaṇa.
(Jivananda, Calcutta, 1916.)

S. K. Siddhānta Kaumudī.
(Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1908.)

S. Ka. Sarasvatī Kaṇṭhābharaṇa.
(Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1934.)

S. P. Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa,
(Madras, 1924.)

T. A. Tantrāloka.
(Kashmir Sanskrit Series, 1921.)

V. P. Vākya Padīya.
(Chowkhamba, Banaras.)

V. P. Comm. Vākya Padīya : Commentary by Helārāja.

V. R. Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa.
(Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay.)

V. S. Vedāntasāra,
(Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1925.)

V. V. Vyakti Viveka (Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1936.)

V. V. Comm. Vyakti Viveka : Commentary by Madhusudana (Madhusūdanī).

V. V. V. Vyakti Viveka Vyākhyāna by Ruyyaka.

Y. S. Yoga Sūtra.
(Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1930.)

CHAPTER I.

HISTORY OF INDIAN ÆSTHETICS.

PRELIMINARY.

The problem of æsthetics or philosophy of art in India, has been studied, not with reference to music, or plastic or pictorial representation, but mainly in the context of the dramatic presentation. In the main, music and scenic representations have been regarded as auxiliaries to the drama. The reason is obvious. The varied situations of life, which Art makes its province to depict, lend themselves to a more successful representation in drama than in any other class of art. For, drama appeals to the eye and the ear, the senses, which are regarded as pre-eminently 'æsthetic'. Drama marshals all other arts, including that of poetry, to its aid.

The problem has been approached from three different points of view, namely, of the dramatist, of the actor and of the spectator. The study from the former two points of view has naturally been confined to the ways and means of presentation of drama and the latter has been concerned with the analysis of psychological process involved in the enjoyment of the Drama as a whole and with the interpretation of its essential nature.

THE SCOPE.

The view, presented above, is based on a study of the available literature on æsthetics. There are no doubt references in the texts, which do not deal directly with art, to other works on æsthetics than those to which we can have access. For instance, two works on dramaturgy in

Sūtra form, one by Śilāli[1] and the other by Kṛśāśva, are referred to in Pāṇini Sūtras 4,3,110-111. Since their contents are not known to us, we shall begin our historical account with Bharata (Circa 500 A. D.), whose work is the earliest available work on the subject. And we shall end our account with Abhinavagupta, (950-1020), whose solution of the problem has been accepted by all the subsequent writers of repute.

Thus, the history of Indian æsthetics extends over a period of five hundred years. During the first three hundred and fifty years of this period, that is, from the time of Bharata (500 A. D.) to that of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa (Circa 850) the problem of æsthetics was mainly one of technique. In fact, the sole aim of Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra is to instruct[2] the dramatist, the stage-manager and the actors in regard to the ways and means of producing the drama, to tell them the necessary constituents of the drama and the manner and material of their presentation. The point is made very clear by the frequent use of such words as "Tamabhinayet" and "Yojyam" etc.

Religious Origin of Drama.

Origin of drama is closely connected with the Hindu Religious Trinity, (1) Brahmā (2) Viṣṇu and (3) Maheśvara. Bharata, in the very beginning of his Nāṭya Śāstra, pays obeisance to Brahmā[3] and Maheśvara for no other reason than that he recognises the former to be the originator of drama and the latter to be the originator of dance. This[4] is a view, expressed by Abhinavagupta himself, as stated in the course of his interpretation of the verse in question. Bharata mentions Prajāpati, the originator of drama, first,

1. S. K., 253.
2. A. Bh. Vol. I. 7.
3. A. Bh. Vol. I. 1.
4. A. Bh. Vol. I. 2.

because he recognises dance to be simply an embellishment of Drama.

There is another piece of evidence also in support of the view that Maheśvara was the originator of dance. For, Hindu religious tradition recognises him to be the greatest dancer. He is called Naṭarāja. And there is an ancient temple at Chidambaram in South India, where he is enshrined in the posture of the greatest dancer (Naṭarāja). And, as if it were, in recognition of him as originator of dance, the various rhythmical dance poses (Karaṇas) stand even to-day cut on rocks, with the appropriate verses from the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata inscribed underneath each posture in the compartments of the eastern and western Gopuras of the temple. Similarly Viṣṇu is recognised to be the originator of different styles of acting.

Further, Brahmā,[1] in originating the Nāṭya Veda, is represented to have borrowed its various aspects from different Vedas and their subsidiary branches. Thus, he is said to have borrowed the art of effective speech from Ṛgveda, music from Sāmaveda, acting from Yajurveda and Rasas from Atharvaveda. And the treatise on Dramaturgy is called Nāṭya Veda in order to give it the same status as that of the recognised four Vedas. It is called the fifth Veda and is meant not only for the privileged three castes, but also for the fourth caste. Śūdra is as much entitled to study it as any Brāhmaṇa.

The Questions Attempted By Bharata In His Nāṭya Śāstra

The following questions were put to Bharata by his

1. N. S., 2.

pupils after they had witnessed the first drama staged by him :—

1. What[1] were the circumstances, which led to creation of the fifth Veda ; and for whom was it created ? The reason why they put this question may be stated as follows :—

The pupils had witnessed the drama and they had analysed the effect that it had on them. They had realised that it brings about identification with the focus of the dramatic situation, to the effect that the audience realise through experience (because of identification) that the four recognised objects or goals of humanity, (1) Dharma (2) Artha (3) Kāma and (4) Mokṣa, ought to be pursued. Thus, they had known that it instructs and that, therefore, the work, dealing with the ways and means of presenting it, was rightly called the Veda. Hence the question arose in their minds "Why has the Nāṭya Veda been created ?" For, its purpose to instruct people as regards[2] the desirability of pursuing the well recognised goals of human life was already served by the existing four Vedas. Creation of the fifth Veda, therefore, seemed to them unnecessary. Therefore, they asked the question "why was the fifth Veda created ?" But if there be some, who cannot be instructed through the Veda, "who are they ?" Hence the subsidiary question "For whom is it created ?"

2. Into how many parts is this Nāṭya Veda divided ? Are there so many parts that it cannot be fully grasped ?

3. What are the various arts, necessary for the presentation of drama ? Of how many parts is drama made ? Is it an organic whole or merely a jumble ?

---

1. N. S., 1. 2. A. Bh. Vol. I,, 6.

4. What are the various means of knowledge, necessary for knowing the different parts of drama ? And if drama is an organic whole and not a mere jumble, "Is there any special means of knowing the inter-connection of parts ?" And if so "What is it ?"

5. How are the different parts of drama to be presented. These and allied questions Bharata attempts in his Nāṭya Śāstra or Nāṭya Veda.

The answers to first three questions are given in the very first chapter. The answer to the first question may be stated as follows :—

The circumstances, which led to the creation of Dramaturgy, were the products of time. During Tretā Yuga, when Vaivasvata manvantara was running, the gods, headed by Indra, approached Brahmā with a request to him to create a play-thing, which may be pleasing to both the eye and the ear and lead people automatically to follow the path of duty, without the need of any external compulsion, such as the order of a king. The reason why there arose the necessity for such a play-thing was that Tretā Yuga is domineered over by Rajas, the quality of action, prompted by selfish desires and emotions, and, therefore, the common experience is a mixture of pleasure[1] and pain, during this Yuga. The need for a play-thing arises only among those, whose experience is a mixture of pleasure and pain, the latter being proportionately more than the former. For, play-thing is for diversion. And one desires to divert the mind only from what is painful.

Such a diversion was necessary for humanity. For, humanity, being under the influence of Rajas, was deviating from the right path, pointed out by the Vedas, and was ignoring the rites due to Gods. They, therefore, felt the

1. A. Bh. Vol. I. 10.

necessity of bringing humanity to the right path. This could not be achieved through Vedic instruction[1]; because the Śūdras were excluded from the circle of Vedic study. The gods, therefore, wanted an instrument of instruction such as could be utilised for instructing all, irrespective of caste, and such as would be different in form from that of categorical imperative, would not be a mere command, which is unpleasant to hear and equally unpleasant to carry out ; but such as would delightfully instruct, would cover the undesirable tone of command under pleasant sights and sounds, would administer the bitter[2] pill of instruction under the sweet coating of sugar, would mix the bitter medicine of instruction in sweet milk[3] so as to make it palatable.

These were the circumstances, which led to creation of the fifth Veda by Brahmā at the request of gods. It was created for those, who did not readily follow the path pointed out by the Vedas,/or the Śūdras, who were debarred from reading and hearing the Vedas.

The reply to the second question "Into how many parts is the Nāṭya Veda divided ?" is that primarily there are four parts, dealing with the following topics (1) Art of effective speech (Vācikā-bhinaya). (2) Art of music (3) Art of acting and (4) Rasas. And reply to the third question "How are the various parts connected ?" is that drama, with the science or theory of which the Nāṭya Veda is concerned, primarily presents Rasa, and the three arts are the means of its effective presentation. Thus, it is an organic whole. /

The reply to the fourth question is that it is apprehended

---

1. A. Bh, Vol. I. 11. 2. A. Bh., Vol. 1. 10.
3. A. Bh., Vol. 1. 11.

directly through eyes and ears. And the reply to the last question covers the whole work.

Problems Of Æsthetics Solved In The Above Answers.

If we look at the traditional account of the origin of the Nāṭya Śāstra from modern point of view, we find that it contains relevant answers to some pertinent questions that arise in modern minds as they approach the problem of æsthetics.

1. The first question, that is answered here, is "What are the æsthetic senses?" And Bharata declares that æsthetic senses are only two (i) eye and (ii) ear. He excludes touch, taste and smell from æsthetic senses, operating in getting æsthetic experience from dramatic presentation. For, the former are the only senses, which can operate in relation to an object that is common to many. What is the object of touch or taste of one cannot be the object of the same senses of other persons. But whole audience[1] can have in eommon what is addressed to eyes or ears.

2. Another question, that is answered here, is "What is the end of dramatic art?" And the reply is that the end of dramatic art is instruction, not directly, but indirectly, through presentation of what is pleasing to eyes and ears. It does not directly command, but it makes the audience experience the goodness of virtuous path, through identification with the focus of the dramatic situation. It administers the medicine of instruction, but it either coats it with sugar or mixes it up with the milk of pleasant sight and sound so that bitterness of medicine is not experienced.

3. Bharata maintains that the aspect of sensuous pleasure is undeniable in the experience from dramatic

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 10.

presentation. But it constitutes only the starting point. Thus, he gives right place to both (i) Hedonistic and (ii) Pedagogic theories of art in his æsthetics.

4. He holds that drama is simply a play or play-thing, which is meant for diverting the mind from what worries or troubles it.

5. The most essential subjective condition for æsthetic experience, according to him, is that the mind of the spectator should not be occupied with excessive personal pleasure or pain.

6. He recognises the importance of women on the stage. For, the correct expression of emotion, for instance, blush at the sight of the object of love, is not possible unless the emotion, from which such a physical change proceeds, be actually present in the heart. But there are certain[1] feelings, which are peculiar to fair sex only. Hence for their accurate and life-like presentation women are necessary for stage.

Bird's-Eye View of the Nāṭya Śāstra.

Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra is divided into thirty-six chapters, according to some recensions, and into thirty-seven chapters, according to others. The recension, which Abhinavagupta had before him, while commenting on it, had thirty-seven chapters. And he refers to one of the thirty-six categories of Kashmir Śaiva Philosophy in the benedictory verse at the beginning of each chapter. In the beginning of the thirty-seventh chapter he refers to *Anuttara*.

The broad division of the subject-matter is into (i) what drama presents i. e. Rasa and (ii) the means of its presentation. The latter is technically called Abhinaya (acting) i.e. that which brings what is intended to be presented, as if it

1. A.Bh., Vol. I. 21-2.

were, face to face with the spectator[1] : that which leads to as certain a knowledge as that to which the directly present leads. It is divided into four types (i) Āṅgika i.e. acting, consisting in the movement of the parts of body. (ii) Vācika i.e. acting, consisting in the appropriate movement of speech-organs, involved in effective recitation. (iii) Sātvika i.e. acting, consisting in the action of mind, involved in the various emotive states, such as find expression in involuntary physical changes, such as change of colour, tremor and horripilation etc. (iv) Āhārya i.e. all the means of presentation other than those belonging to the psycho-physical constituents of the actors themselves. It includes (i) all that is used for giving appropriate look of the characters of a drama to individual actors, such as paints, dress and ornaments etc : (ii) all that is necessary for presenting scene of action : (iii) all the mechanical contrivances to present such means of transport and communication as Vimāna (Aeroplane) etc.,

It also deals with construction of the stage and method of its management. There is considerable space given to sections on dance and music, both instrumental and vocal. Necessary qualifications of actors and the stage-manager are also given at some length.

It discusses ten types of drama, extending from one act plays to ten act plays. It deals with the method of dramatisation and types of hero, heroine and adversary. It also states the recognised types of æsthetic experience, different persisting and transitory emotions and psycho-physical movements and situations, necessary to arouse them.

In the course of our presentation of Indian Aesthetics we shall confine ourselves to some of the topics, mentioned in the last paragraph.

1. N. S., 98.

Limitations Of The Work

Bharata wrote his work with a view to giving necessary instructions to dramatists and actors. Larger portion of the work is devoted to the four types of acting (Abhinaya). For the present we shall restrict ourselves to expounding his view from the point of view of the dramatist. We shall, therefore, attempt to state (i) What is it that the dramatist presents in his drama (ii) What are its constituents and how are they related. (iii) What is the method of dramatising an imaginary or historical plot. (iv) What are the subjective conditions, necessary in the spectator, for getting æsthetic experience from dramatic presentation.

Rasa as Aesthetic Object.

The word "Rasa" in Sanskrit is used in a variety[1] of meanings. In common language, which follows the Vaiśeṣika system, it is used for the quality, cognisable through the sense of taste. As such it is of six kinds, sweet, sour and saltish etc. In Ayurveda it is used for a certain white liquid[2], extracted by the digestive system from the food. Its main seat is the heart. Therefrom it proceeds to arteries and nourishes the whole system. It also stands for liquid in general, extracted from any fruit or flower etc., inclination, liking or desire, mineral or metallic salt and mercury.

In the context of æsthetics, however, it stands for the æsthetic object. It has a highly technical meaning, though even in the technical sense it retains the element of original meaning, namely, the object of relish, not sensuous but æsthetic.

---

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 289. 2. S. C. IV. 71.

Importance of Rasa in the Eyes of Bharata

We have already stated that the main topics, dealt with in the Nāṭya Śāstra, are four only, acting, dance, music and Rasa. The first three are the means, primary or secondary, of presentation of Rasa. All the subsidiary topics, on which Bharata has written, have a direct or indirect bearing on it, in so far as they are talked about in respect of their relation to the presentation of Rasa. Thus, when he recommends the midsized theatre, thirty-two "Hastas" in length and sixty-two "Hastas" in breadth (i. e. 48 by 96 feet) his one concern is Rasa. For, if the theatre be too long it will make the Rasa, that is presented in terms of speech and various facial expressions of internal[1] states, indistinct to the spectator.

In his treatment of dance he recognises different kinds of dance to be the sources of different[2] types of Rasa. He also holds that subtle intonations in the song, which accompany dance, represent what remains unpresented in language[3]. Thus, according to him, dance also is a means of presenting Rasa.

After dealing with the importance of general introduction to drama, which consists of Nāndī, a brief introduction to drama and songs, he gives a rule that it should not be too long. For, if it be too long, the actors will get tired[4] and, therefore, shall not be able to clearly present Rasa; and similarly the spectator, being bored by inordinate length, will not be able to relish Rasa.

Thus, most of the things, that Bharata talks of, are

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 53-4.
2. A. Bh., Vol. I. 182.
3. A. Bh., Vol. I. 175.
4. A. Bh., Vol. I. 248.

only the means of presenting Rasa. Rasa, therefore, being the final end of all that he talks about, is the most important thing from his point of view. The question, therefore, naturally arises "What is Rasa ?"

CONSTITUENTS OF RASA, THE AESTHETIC OBJECT.

Rasa, the æsthetic object, is essentially a product of dramatic art and is not to be found in the creations[1] of nature. It is not pure unity, but unity in multiplicity. The unifying factor in the multiplicity is a basic state of mind (Sthāyibhāva) which binds together in an organic whole, (1) the emotive situation in human setting, consisting of the physical cause of the basic mental state (Vibhāva) (2) the mimetic changes, which are inspired by the aroused basic mental state and as such are indicative of the internal state (Anubhāva), and (3) the transient emotions (Vyabhicāribhāva). The basic mental state is the central and the most important phase of this configuration. The rest are simply necessary accompaniments, very much like the paraphernalia of a king. They raise the basic mental state to prominence just as paraphernalia does the king. And just as in the midst of the entire paraphernalia it is the king, who is the centre of attraction of the spectator, so is the basic mental state to the audience. Therefore, when it is stated that the basic mental state is the æsthetic object (Sthāyi bhavo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ) the implication is not that other constituents of the æsthetic configuration do not figure in the consciousness, but simply that they appear as subordinate.

For a clear understanding of the essential nature of Rasa it is necessary to grasp the full implication of the technical terms, given in the brackets.

---

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 292.

Explanation of the technical Terms.

We know it on the basis of our common experience (i) that in actual life an emotion, which is the mainspring of a series of actions, that is directed to the achievement of an end, is aroused by a situation with a focal point, and therefore, situation is recognised to be the cause of emotion, (ii) that this emotion, which lasts through the series of actions till the end is achieved, expresses itself in various physical changes, e. g. the peculiar movements of eyes and eyebrows, change of colour and gentleness and tenderness in general behaviour in love; these changes, therefore, are the effects of the emotion and (iii) that the persisting emotion is invariably accompanied by transient emotions, e. g. love in separation from its object expresses itself in the emotions, which spring from it, such as self-disparagement (Nirveda) languor (glāni) and fear etc.: and they are recognised to be its natural accompaniments.

But in the case of the persisting emotion, which is presented on the stage and which is experienced by the spectator, the situation, which the actor, representing the hero of the piece, faces, cannot be spoken of as the cause of his emotion; nor can it be spoken of as the cause of the emotion, that the spectator experiences. For, neither to the actor nor to the spectator as such, is the situation related in the manner, in which it was related to the historical character, that is represented. For instance, Sītā, as an historical person, as the daughter of King Janaka, cannot be looked upon as the object of love either by the actor or the spectator, because the religious association with the historical character, the name of which the focus of the situation bears, will prevent the rise of such an emotion and will, on the contrary, arouse emotions of quite different nature from that of love, such as respect and veneration. The cause, therefore,

being absent, the effect cannot arise. Hence the facial and other changes, which actor may exhibit, because of the particular training, which he may have received, cannot be spoken of as effects of emotion of love. Nor can the transient states of mind, the physical signs and movements of which the actor may show, be looked upon as the invariable accompaniments of the persisting emotion. It is to indicate this difference in the relation of situation, physical changes and invariable accompaniments to the emotion as presented by the actor, that they have not been called cause, effect and invariable concomitants (Kāraṇa, Kārya and Sahacāri). Instead they have been given technical names, Vibhāva, Anubhāva and Vyabhicāri bhāva.

VIBHĀVA.

Vibhāva stands for the emotive situation, which is presented on the stage and which in actual life would be responsible for the emotion, which is shown by the hero, but the relation between situation and emotion is not that of cause and effect. (Reason for this has already been stated in the preceding section.) The relation is that of a medium to a state of mind, as in the case of mystic medium and the experience, which is got through it.

We often see a child riding a stick and enjoying a horse-ride as it were. He shows most of the physical signs and motions of a rider of horse. He tightens bridle, whips and makes it gallop. The question, that arises, is "Is horse the cause of the experience of horse-ride ?" How can it be so in its absence ? The experience, therefore, is due to medium, through which the child works himself up so as to experience[1] horse-ride; just the same is the case with the situation, presented on the stage. It is only a medium,

1. D. R. 97.

through which the actor works himself up to a certain emotional pitch and consequently shows the signs, which are natural to an emotion.

Thus, the word "Vibhāva" stands for the dramatic situation, which is not the cause but only a medium, through which emotion arises in the actor. But emotion in the spectator is due to identification with the hero. Vibhāva is so called, because it arouses emotion in[1] a manner quite different from that, in which emotion arises in actual life.

Two Aspects Of Vibhāva.

Emotion always has an objective reference. It can arise only in the presence of an external stimulus. As every thing exists only in some place and at a certain time, spatial and temporal factors are distinguished from the object as such. Accordingly Vibhāva is represented to have two aspects (i) Ālambana, the object, which is primarily responsible for the arousal of emotion, on which emotion depends for its very being and which is its mainstay : and (ii) Uddīpana, the environment, the entire surrounding, which enhances the emotive effect of the focal point, the object which primarily stimulates emotion.

If we recall to our minds the scene from the Abhijñāna Śākuntalam, in which love in Duṣyanta is represented to arise for the first time, the distinction between two aspects of Vibhāva will become clear. Duṣyanta is in the neighbourhood of Kaṇva's hermitage. He sees Śakuntalā, accompanied by her two friends, watering the plants of hermitage garden. She asks one of her friends to loosen the breast-cover of bark, which, she complains, has been too tightly tied by the other. The other immediately retorts in a befitting manner: "Why do you find fault with me, when

1. A. Bh, Vol. I. 285.

the fault lies, not with me, but with your rising youth ?" Here Śakuntalā, who has been brought to focus by the aforesaid talk and becomes the object of love of Duṣyanta, is the Ālambana Vibhāva and the entire forest scene with beautiful hermitage garden at its centre and pleasant breeze, gentle sun-shine and the sweet companions, which off-set her beauty and make it more bewitching, are Uddīpana Vibhāva.

ANUBHĀVA.

All the physical changes, which are consequent on the rise of an emotion and are in actual life looked upon as the effects of emotion, are called Anubhāvas, to distinguish them from the physical effects of emotion which arise in real life. They are called Anubhāvas, because they communicate the basic emotion to the characters, present on the stage, or make known the nature of emotion in the hero, as also because they make the spectator experience an identical emotion (Anubhāvayati).

The physical changes and movements, which follow the rise of an emotion, are of two kinds (i) voluntary and (ii) involuntary. There are some movements and changes, which are definitely willed by the person in emotion, which are wilful expressions of emotion, such as the movement of eyes and eyebrows, which spring from the intention of the person, swayed by emotion, to communicate it to others. But there are other changes and movements, which automatically follow the rise of emotion, such as change of colour, horripilation and blush etc. The voluntary physical changes are called simply Anubhāvas ; but the involuntary ones are called Sātvikabhāvas. The former can be produced by an effort of will even though the emotion, with which they are supposed to be causally connected, may not be present in the heart. They, therefore,

are not the infallible signs of emotion. But the latter can take place only when the emotion, of which they are recognised to be the effects, is actually present in heart. They are the infallible signs of emotion. They are eight[1] in number. They are included in the list of forty-nine Bhāvas, admitted by Bharata.

In regard to the presentation of Vibhāva and simple Anubhāvas, Bharata does not give any instruction; nor does he define them. He simply says that in representing them one has to be faithful to what is found in actual life and, therefore, they have[2] to be learnt from the same source.

Forty-nine bhāvas, however, (including (i) eight Sāttvika Bhāvas, which are nothing more than Anubhāvas, but are classed separately, because they are involuntary and, therefore, are unmistakable reflexions of inner emotive state; (ii) thirty-three transient emotions and (iii) eight persisting emotions) are dealt with exhaustively, because of their special utility in giving rise to æsthetic experience. Let us, therefore, state clearly the meaning and function of Bhāva.

Bhāva.

The word "Bhāva"[3] in dramaturgy is used in the sense of mental state only, which, as we have shown in the preceding section, is of forty-nine types. And although the word "Bhāva" is used at the ends of compounds, standing for situation and mimetic changes (Vibhāva and Anubhāva), yet they cannot be put under "Bhāva", because Bharata has used this word in a technical sense and has definitely fixed the number of "Bhāvas".

The mental states are called "Bhāvas" for two reasons: (i) because they bring Rasa into being, make Rasa an

1. N. S. 95. 2. N. S. 80.
3. A. Bh., Vol. I. 343.

accomplished fact, by means of three types of acting (Vācika, Āṅgika and Sāttvika) and (ii) because they pervade, intensely affect, the[1] minds of the spectators. The first meaning is applicable to the word when it is used with a view to instructing the dramatist or the actor. The second meaning is implied when the word is used to explain how the mental states, called "Bhāvas", affect the spectator.

The idea may be elaborated as follows : —

There are two recognised meanings of "Bhāva" in Sanskrit (i) one that causes something to be (Bhāvana) and (ii) one that affects (Vāsana). In both the cases it has causal sense. Thus, Bhāvas (mental states), present in the actor, when represented by means of three types of acting, bring into being, produce, Rasa (relish or relishability) in the stage-presentation. Similarly Bhāvas, present in the dramatist, when represented in appropriate language, expressive of various physical movements and changes, in which they find natural expression, produce Rasa. In these cases Bhāva is used in the first sense of one that causes something to be.

But if we take "Bhāva" in the second sense of pervading, we have to confine ourselves to the spectator's point of view. We know[2] that a sweet-smelling thing, like musk, pervades substantially other things, which are in contact with it. It is due to substantial pervasion by musk that cloth, in which it is put, acquires the fragrance of musk. This process, by which a thing, which has no strong perceptible smell of its own, acquires the smell of another, is known as "Bhāva" or "Bhāvana". Thus, the mental states are called "Bhāvas" from the point of view of the spectator, because they pervade the mind of spectator exactly as does musk the cloth, with which it is in contact.

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 347. 2. A. Bh., Vol. I. 345.

VYABHICĀRIBHĀVA.

Vyabhicāribhāvas are transient emotions. They are so[1] called, because they come as it were face to face with the spectator in the course of æsthetic experience of various kinds. Inspite of the fact that they are mental states, they appear as it were embodied, when they are acted out by means of various types of acting in a befitting situation. They are called Vyabhicārins for another reason also. That is, they bring the different Rasas as if it were face to face with the spectator. For, when a transient mental state is acted out in a befitting manner in a befitting situation, there remains no doubt about the basic mental state, from which the transient one springs. The presentation of basic mental state in terms of the transient emotion and involuntary and voluntary physical changes in an appropriate situation, raises the Sthāyin from being a mere matter of inference and brings it as it were directly before the spectator. For, inference is inference only so long as it is drawn from the perception of any one of the three (1) cause (2) effect and (3) concomitant. But when all the three are distinctly present and perceived, the inference ceases to be inference and borders on direct perception in so far as the element of doubt, which is ordinarily associated with it, disappears, because[2] of the multiplicity of evidence.

It may be pointed out here that the word "brings" (Nayati) is used in the present context, not in its literal, but only in conventional sense, just as in the case of the statement "Sun brings the day".

STHĀYIBHĀVA.

The reason why an emotive state of mind is called Sthāyin (persisting or basic) may be stated as follows :—

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 356-7. 2. A. Bh., Vol. I. 285.

Drama presents a complete action. And completeness of action consists in its having five stages: (i) fixing upon an objective (ii) effort to realise it (iii) reversal (iv) overcoming of opposition and (v) achievement of the objective. But action in its physical aspect springs from a definite state of mind, which is aroused by a particular situation, in which the agent finds himself. It is necessary that the state of mind should persist through all the stages of action. For, otherwise action would end abruptly at any one of the intermediate stages and will remain incomplete. It is also natural that with the change in situation and reversal in fortune or favourable turn in the course of events, other mental states arise, but they can have no independent being; nor can they rise in isolation from and unaffected by the original and basic or persisting mental state, which was responsible for fixing upon the objective. In fact, other mental states arise simply because the basic mental state is there. They are like waves, which rise from the ocean of the basic mental state and subside into the same.

There are eight basic mental states. Their appropriate situations, the mimetic changes, in which they find expression, and the accompanying transient mental states are given in full detail in the 7th chapter of Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra. Unfortunately Abhinavagupta's commentary on it seems to be irrecoverably lost.

Importance of Rasa from Different Points of View.

Rasa is the most important of all the constituents of drama from the points of view of dramatist, actor and spectator. For, the dramatist cannot proceed with the effective[1] presentation of the situation, the mimetic changes and the transient emotions, unless he fixes upon particular Rasa, that

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 273.

he intends to present. Actor also can make choice of dress and general make-up and can fix upon his reaction to situation only when he knows the Rasa, which he is expected to present. And spectator goes to theatre for nothing but the experience of Rasa. In his mind the constituents of Rasa, situation etc., do not figure independently and in isolation from one another, but as merged in the basic mental state, brought to a high pitch by the accompanying transient states of mind. The end of dramatic presentation, the instruction of the spectator, is realised through Rasa only. For, drama does not instruct through categorical imperative, but through identification with the focus of the situation and, therefore, through making the spectator experience the experience of hero, in which æsthetic experience (Rasāsvāda) consists. Therefore, from whatever point of view we look at Rasa, it strikes us as the most important.

Bharata's Conception of Rasa.

With Bharata the problem of æsthetics was not a philosophical problem. He was not influenced in his conception of Rasa by the philosophical implication of it, such as is presented in the Upaniṣadic passages like "Raso Vai Saḥ" He was concerned with it as an object, which is responsible for æsthetic experience, with showing what are the necessary constituents of it and their mutual relation and with the means and methods of its presentation. No doubt, he talks of the subjective conditions necessary for relishing it, but that he does, because the object, with which he is primarily concerned, is after all for the enjoyment by spectator.

The Relation of Constituents of Rasa.

We have already stated that the æsthetic object is a configuration of (i) situation with human focus (ii) mimetic

changes, both involuntary and voluntary (iii) transient emotions and (iv) persisting or basic emotion. The question, therefore, that naturally arises is "Is the æsthetic object a mere juxtaposition of constituents : is it a mere jumble : or, are the constituents connected with one another in any systematic manner ?" We hinted at Bharata's answer to this question, when we said that Rasa, according to him, is an organic unity. The precise nature of relation of the constituents is attempted to be brought out by him by means of analogy of what he calls *Ṣāṇḍava Rasa*. It may be described as follows :—

The ingredients of Ṣāṇḍava Rasa are (i) condiments, such as black pepper, cardamom. curd and sour gruel (Kāñjī) etc. (ii) herbs (Oṣadhi) such as tamarind, crushed wheat, turmeric (Haridrā) and saffron etc. (iii) substances (Dravya) such as Guḍa and salt etc. and (iv) rice. We know that each of them has a distinct taste. They are severally sweet, bitter, astringent, sour and saltish. When they are put together in due proportion and cooked properly by an expert cook, a new flavour, which is more relishable than that of any one of them[1] separately, arises. This new flavour and the juice, which has it, both are called Ṣaṇḍava Rasa.

The relation of situation and mimetic changes etc., as presented in Drama, is similar to that of various ingredients of the juice, which gives the peculiar flavour, Ṣāṇḍava Rasa. Just as Ṣāṇḍava Rasa can rise only when various ingredients are so blended together through cooking by an expert that they give rise to a flavour, which is distinct from that of any one of them in itself, so Rasa, as presented in drama, can rise only when situation, mimetic changes, transient emotion and persisting emotion are so harmoniously

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 289.

united together in due proportion by a poetic genius that they present something that is quite different from what each one of them is separately.

It may be pointed out here that Bharata does not mention "Sthāyin" in his aphoristic definition of Rasa. Nor does he mention in his analogy the thing that corresponds to Sthāyin. This omission has been interpreted by different commentators in their own ways. We shall discuss this point in proper context.

ÆSTHETIC OBJECT NOT AN IMITATION.

The constituents of the æsthetic configuration are not the products of nature:[1] they are the creations of art, which does not imitate nature, but reproduces, in all possible details, a poetic vision.

Kaverantargatam bhāvam
Bhāvayan bhāva ucyate.
N. S. 79

Trailokyasyāsya sarvasya
Nāṭyam bhāvānukīrtanam.
N. S., 8.

The constituents should be presented not in the actual historical setting, but as perfectly free from all elements of historical reality. This is the point, which Bharata has emphasised in the reply, that he has put in the mouth of Brahmā, to pacify the demons, enraged at the presentation of their fall in the first dramatic performance.

Naikāntatotra bhavatām
Devānāṁ Cānubhāvanam.
N. S., 8,

The æsthetic object is not a product of imitation, if the word imitation implies the production of a mere

1. A. Bh. Vol. I, 292.

shadow or exterior, which lacks the substance of the original, as in the case of "imitation jewel". The imitation jewel is an imitation of a jewel because, while it has the look of a jewel, it lacks the substance. Æsthetic object, however, ceases to be æsthetic object if it lacks any one of the aforesaid contents, particularly the accompanying psychic states, which are the causes of the varying facial and other physical[1] changes such as horripilation etc., which are directly perceptible. In fact, this is the one reason that is adduced in justification of introduction of women on the stage. For, no training can enable a man to acquire that psychic frame, which is natural to a woman in a certain situation.[2] The presentation, which is confined to the imitation of the external form and movement and lacks the usually accompanying psychic state, merely excites laughter[3]. No doubt Bharata uses the words "Anukaraṇa"[4] "Anucaraṇa"[5] and "Anukīrtana"[6] etc., which are ordinarily used for imitation. But the contexts, in which these words occur, leave no doubt that they are used by Bharata in a special sense, as we have explained above.

DISTINCTION OF RASA FROM STHĀYIBHĀVA ETC.

Thus, it is clear that Rasa is the æsthetic object, which, as a configuration, is different from the basic mental state, which is only one of its constituents. It is also different from the æsthetic experience (Rasāsvāda) which is consequent upon its apprehension. The latter position is further supported by the fact[7] that Bharata stresses the idea that jātis should be introduced to further specify the Rasa. According to Bharata, every Rasa expresses itself in a particular combination of tones. Such tonal associates

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 21-2-3. 2. N. S., 72.
3. N. S., 81. 4. N. S,, 307-8. 5. N. S.. 247.
6. N. S., 8. 7. N. S., 330.

of Rasas are called jātis. The former position also can further be supported by the fact that the expressions of eyes in representing a basic mental state, as enjoined by Bharata, are different from[1] those which he enjoins to accompany complete æsthetic configuration, the Rasa.

Importance Of Rasa In The Eyes Of Bharata. Another Point Of View.

The "production" of Rasa, the æsthetic configuration, is the chief concern of Bharata. All the instructions, that he has given to actors, stage-manager or dramatist, are to enable[2] them to contribute their individual share towards the same. And a person is supposed to be qualified to become an actor in proportion to his capacity, not so much of reproducing the physical conditions of an emotion in an emotive situation, as of orienting[3] his mind in such a manner as to have the necessary mental states, from which the physical conditions automatically follow.

The Nature Of The Æsthetic Object.

The æsthetic object, therefore, as presented by Bharata, cannot be classed with any object that we ordinarily meet in the world. It cannot be called real: firstly because it is not a creation of nature and secondly because its causal efficiency is not the same to all the percipients as it is in the case of a jar. Nor can it be called unreal in the same sense as that in which the sky-flower is unreal, because it has its existence. It cannot also be classed as illusory, because, in its essential nature, the illusion is not what it appears to be, but the æsthetic object apparently and essentially is what it appears to be. In short, it has its independent being in its own world, which is different from

1. N. S., 102. 2. A, Bh., Vol. I. 273-4.
3. A. Bh., Vol. I. 16.

the world of daily life and may be called the æsthetic world.

The Seat Of Rasa.

Rasa or the æsthetic fact is a configuration or pattern, of which Vibhāva, Anubhāva, Vyabhicāribhāva and Sthāyibhāva are the constituents. Only a human being can represent their fusion. Thus, the æsthetic configuration is in the human focus of an emotive situation, according to Bharata. For, he speaks of ocular expressions consequent on the completion of Rasa-configuration (Rasajā dṛṣṭayaḥ).

Thus, the problem of Bharata is purely practical and his solution is based upon a full analysis of all the factors of mental life and dramatic technique. This is the traditional view of Rasa, which is found in Daṇḍin's Kāvyādarśa. This very view, without any modification, is maintained by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa. The criticism of it by Śrīśaṅkuka from the spectator's point of view cannot affect its correctness in any way.

From The Spectator's Point Of View.

But Bharata has not totally ignored the spectator, because the æsthetic object is after all for the spectator. He has, in fact, stated in detail the qualifications of the spectator in the 27th chapter of his Nāṭya Śāstra. There he gives a clear idea of the subjective conditions, necessary for æsthetic experience. The most important of them[1] are as follows :—

1. Intellectual background, consisting in the knowledge of arts and literature in general and of the dramatic art in particular.

2. Knowledge of the various types of æsthetic configuration, of the accompanying psycho-physical states

1. N. S. 312.

and of the subtle distinctions among them.

3. Knowledge of various languages, including the provincial dialects, which are used in drama.

4. The capacity of concentration.

5. The power of quick understanding.

6. The capacity to maintain impartial attitude.

7. Character and breeding.

8. Interest in the presentation.

9. And above all the capacity to identify with the human focus of the situation so as to have the identity of experience.

The aforesaid are the common subjective conditions, necessary in the spectator for the æsthetic experience. But every individual spectator, though possessed of the above qualities, cannot get æsthetic experience from every æsthetic presentation. The age[1], the inborn tendencies and the psycho-physical conditions at the time of witnessing a dramatic performance, are great factors in æsthetic experience. An old man, for instance, cannot have the æsthetic experience, the basic mental state of which is youthful love; nor can one, who is a coward at heart, have an empathic apprehension of the representation of the heroic emotion; for the simple reason that they are by nature incapable of identifying themselves with the presented human focus of the situation.

Thus, it is clear that Śrīśaṅkuka's theory, that the æsthetic experience is due to inference of the basic mental state from its external physical signs by the spectator, is not supported by Bharata. According to Bharata, as stated above, æsthetic experience is due to identification

1. N. S., 313.

with the personality in the focus of the spectator's attention and consists in consequently having identical experience. This is exactly what Abhinava maintains. Thus, we find Abhinava to be more faithful to Bharata in his exposition of the æsthetic theory than any other commentator of the Nāṭya Śāstra.

COMMENTATORS ON THE NĀṬYA ŚĀSTRA

There was quite a large number of commentaries on the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata. But all of them are unfortunately lost, excepting the Abhinava Bhāratī of Abhinavagupta. In fact, our only source of information about them and their authors is the Abhinava Bhāratī itself. For the available information about them the reader may refer to pages 120 to 129 of Abhinavagupta : An Historical And Philosophical Study.

From the point of view of our present undertaking, the presentation of Indian Æsthetics, besides Abhinavagupta, there are only three commentators (i) Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa (ii) Śrī Śaṅkuka and (iii) BhaṭṭaNāyaka, who are important. For, their theories have been presented by Abhinavagupta at some length in the course of his exposition of Bharata's aphoristic definition of Rasa.

BHAṬṬA LOLLAṬA'S PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW

We have discussed the date of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa in an earlier work.[1*] He was a contemporary of Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, the author or publisher of the Spanda Kārikā. He commented not only on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra but also on the Spanda Kārikā. He, therefore, inherited both the dramaturgic and the philosophical traditions from his predecessors. In interpreting him we have to keep this fact in mind.

There are two places where Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's interpretation of the aphoristic definition, of Rasa Sūtra, is given. (1) Abhi-

1*. Abh. 126-9.

nava Bhāratī Vol. I, 274. Here the name of the interpreter is given. (2) Dhvanyāloka Locana (p. 68). Here the interpreter's name is not given. But the view is substantially the same. The relevant portion in the Abhinava Bhāraṭī runs as follows : —

Tena Sthāyyeva Vibhāvānubhāvādibhirupacito Rasaḥ. Sthāyī bhāvastvanupacitaḥ. Sa ca mukhyayā vṛttyā Rāmādāvanukārye, Anukartari ca naṭe Rāmādirūpatānusandhānavalāt. A. Bh , Vol. I, 274.

Here the commentator (Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa) is discussing the seat of Rasa. His question is "Where is Rasa?" or "Where does Rasa reside ?". And his answer is that primarily Rasa is in the original historical character, who is represented on the stage. And only secondarily it is in the impersonating actor. The reason, which explains why Rasa is secondarily in the actor, may be stated as follows :—

The actor identifies himself with the (dramatised ?) historical character and, therefore, is able to unify the elements of his experience so as to produce the mental construct which corresponds in every way to that of the original hero.

We have stated above that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa was both a literary man and a philosopher. He knew the Śaiva Philosophy. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that the word "Anusandhāna", which he uses here, has the only meaning that was recognised in the contemporary philosophical circle. That the word "Anusandhāna" was synonymous with "Yojana" and not "Abhimāna" or "Āropa" is evident from the following verse of Utpalācārya in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā and Abhinava's commentary on it :—

Kādācitkāvabhāse yā
Pūrvābhāsādi*yojanā*

Saṁskārāt Kalpanā proktā
Sāpi bhinnāvabhāsini.
I. P. V. Vol. I- 256.

Kādācitkaḥ Kadācidbhavaḥ ajñātadeśakālākāraḥ avabhāso yasya dehādeḥ svalakṣaṇarūpasya, tatra yā pūrvābhāsena bālādiśarīrābhāsena *yojanā* Yoham Bālaḥ sa evādya yuvā *ityanusandhānam*.

Thus, we find that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa was not concerned with the spectator's point of view of Rasa. In his commentary, as we learn it from Abhinava's presentation of his view, there was no reference to the spectator. The word, "Pratīyamānaḥ" implying the spectator, has been introduced by Mammaṭa, with very slight amendation of the text of Abhinava, which we have already given above. Mammaṭa's amendation runs as follows:—

"Mukhyayā vṛttyā Rāmādāvanukārye,
Tadrūpatānusandhānāt
Nartakepi pratīyamāno Rasaḥ"
K. P. 31.

Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's Theory.

His point of view is essentially practical. His purpose is to analyse the æsthetic object into its constituents and to point out how they combine in the production of the æsthetic object on the stage. According to him, therefore, ***Rasa*** (æsthetic object) is nothing but the unity of a basic mental state in the midst of multiplicity of (i) emotive situation, (ii) mimetic changes and (iii) transient emotions. The basic mental state is the element of unity in the total configuration of Rasa; because all the three constituents of Rasa, mentioned above, are related to the fourth, the basic mental state, in one way or another. The stimulative situation is the cause of the basic mental state. The mimetic

changes are the effects of the latter. By mimetic changes here are meant only those of the human focus in the stimulative situation. Such mimetic changes as arise out of a fully developed basic mental state are not referred to in this context. The transient emotions are related as subsidiaries to the basic mental state.

The besic mental state, though ordinarily it arises only when there is a real cause, yet the actor with the help of his training and dramatic environment on the stage so identifies himself with the character of the poet's conception that he acts, moves and feels like the latter so as to have the same emotion also as that with which the poet associates the hero. The causal relation of the situation to the basic mental state is the same as that of a mystic symbol to mystic experience. Thus, æsthetic object, according to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, is the unity of Sthāyibhāva in the multiplicity of Vibhāva etc., when it is supported, strengthened, intensified or brought to predominance by these very constituents of multiplicity.

This is the traditional view of Rasa (æsthetic object). There is nothing original of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa in it.

Its Criticism.

From the practical point of view the correctness of the above view is unchallengeable.

This view, however, has been criticised adversely upon theoretical considerations. For a clear understanding of the nature of the objection of the critic, it is necessary to keep in mind the following fundamental assumptions of the objector :—

1. Æsthetic experience is due to the objective perception of what is presented.

2. Consciousness of all the constituents of the æsthetic object is necessary for æsthetic experience, though various methods may be employed for the purpose.

3. Mental states cannot be known directly: nor are they directly expressible in conventional language.

The objector attributes a theoretic motive to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, while the latter's outlook is essentially practical. According to him, the view of Rasa, stated above, is unsound, because it does not hold good in regard to Rasa, as appearing in the spectator's consciousness. The basic mental state, which is the most essential constituent of Rasa, is not directly apprehended. How does it then find its way into the mind of the spectator? The conventional language proves inadequate for explaining how the basic mental state of the hero is induced in the spectator's mind. The conventional language can convey only the usual imagery of daily life and not the sense of the ideal. If then the most essential constituent of Rasa be absent in the spectator's consciousness, how can Rasāsvāda (Æsthetic experience) be possible? Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's theory, therefore, is unsound. It cannot meet the theoretic considerations, put forward by Śrīśaṅkuka, based on the three assumptions, stated above.

We may point out another interesting fact in this connection. After the central point in Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's view of Rasa, had been misrepresented by Śrīśaṅkuka, it suffered further misrepresentation in the hands of subsequent writers on poetics, chiefly the commentators on the earlier works on poetics. They have gone a step further and have attributed to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa a theory of æsthetic experience, as a correlate of the objective perception, as follows:—

According to this view, art creates illusion on the stage by means of its skilful representation of what appears in poet's imagination. Therefore, just as at the time of illusory knowledge of silver at the sight of brilliance of mother of pearl, there is the same experience for a moment as at the sight of real silver; so, on the objective perception of the stage representation of the historic, there is for a moment an extremely pleasant experience very much the same as at the sight of the real, For, the spectator is aware of the presence of an emotive state in the focus of the situation, the hero, though it is really not there.

This illusion-theory of art is also maintained by some of the western writers on æsthetics. We shall deal with their theory in the second volume.

And much more interesting is the criticism of the opponents of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's supposed explanation of the[1] æsthetic experience in the spectator. These late commentators knew and had accepted Abhinava's elaborate theory of art. They, therefore, knew that æsthetic experience is not due to the objective cognition of a basic mental state in union with the situation, the mimetic changes and the transient emotions and that it arises from subjective realisation. Their chief criticism of the explanation of æsthetic experience, attributed to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, therefore, naturally is that æsthetic experience is not possible on the basis of a mere objective cognition of a basic mental state. For, if it be so, there is no reason why we should not have æsthetic experience from an emotive situation in daily life.

THE CAUSES OF THE MISUNDERSTANDING.

It is not difficult to account for the attribution of the

1. S. D. Comm., 69.

above view to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa. Bharata was a pure dramaturgist; and as such he has defined *Rasa* (*æsthetic object*) as presented on the stage. He has, however, used the same word for the mental representation of the æsthetic object on the part of the spectator, which forms the objective aspect of the total æsthetic experience. For, the constituents in both the cases, whether it be an *æsthetic object* or its mental representation, are the same. But he has not accounted psychologically and philosophically for the appearance of all the constituents of æsthetic representation in the spectator's consciousness, because he was primarily a dramaturgist and not a philosopher or a psychologist. The writers on poetics, who came after Bharata, such as Daṇḍin, their subject being poetics and not æsthetics, refer to the æsthetic conception of Bharata, as found in his work, only by the way. His first commentator, whose view on *Rasa* is available through Abhinava's reference to it in his Abhinava Bhāratī, faithfully followed the original. When, therefore, Śrīśaṅkuka, took up the problem from theoretical point of view, i. e., Rasa, not as presented on the stage, but as the ultimate æsthetic experience in the spectator, he found the definition defective. For, the appearance of basic mental state is not possible in the spectator through objective perception of the presented. And when the basic mental state is not there, its union with situation and mimetic changes etc., is out of question. He, therefore, criticised Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, as he found in the latter's commentary the word Rasa used for both the presentation and the experience without any distinction having been pointed out. This naturally implied that, to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Rasa, both as presented and as experienced, is the same. He, however, found that the sameness was not accounted for. Hence he criticised it and put forth his theory, with which we shall deal shortly.

Similarly we can account for the attribution of an explanation of æsthetic experience from æsthetic object to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa by late compilers on the basis of early works on poetics, such as Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha. From the time of Śrīśaṅkuka to the present day, Rasa has been studied as an experience rather than as an æsthetic object. Most writers, led by Abhinava, have dealt with Rasa as an experience. Out of the four theories discussed in detail in the Abhinava Bhāratī, three are primarily concerned with Rasa as an experience. And the fourth also is criticised from the point of view of experience. A tradition, therefore, probably grew of attributing some sort of explanation of æsthetic experience to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa also. This assumed final form in the commentaries of the later compilers of works on poetics. The attribution of a view to the writer of the original, which the latter did not hold, is very common in the history of Sanskrit literature. How otherwise Bādaṛāyaṇa's Vedānta Sūtra could be the basis of three systems of Vedānta, Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaitādvaita ?

It is noteworthy that Abhinava does not himself criticise Lollaṭa, probably because he understood his real position. The criticism is attributed to Śrīśaṅkuka.

The adverse criticism of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's traditional view of Rasa by Śrīśaṅkuka is due to the misunderstanding of the former's position. He defined the æsthetic object and not the æsthetic representation, in the spectator, though this definition is applicable to the latter also, if rightly understood. The epistemological consideration, as regards the ways and means of cognising the presented, as well as the metaphysical consideration regarding the ultimate nature of the æsthetic experience, were foreign to the minds of the traditional interpreters of Bharata's aphorism. But Śrīśaṅ-

kuka's criticism is based on them. In short, the criticism is due to the confusion of the dramaturgic point of view with the philosophic.

ANOTHER OBJECTION TO BHAṬṬA LOLLAṬA'S THEORY.

Another objection that Śrīśaṅkuka brings against Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's interpretation of the Rasa Sūtra of Bharata, refers to the distinction that the latter draws between Sthāyibhāva and Rasa. We know that, according to him, the very Sthāyibhāva becomes Rasa,[1] when it is developed by Vibhāva, Anubhāva and Vyabhicāribhāva. The objection is that if development be responsible for converting Sthāyibhāva into Rasa, there being innumerable stages in the development, there would be innumerable variety of each Sthāyibhāva. Thus it would be absurd on the part of Bharata[2] (i) to talk of only six types of Hāsya : for, who can deny the innumerability of stages of Hāsya or for that matter of anything that grows and (ii) to maintain Śṛṅgāra to be of two types only (1) Sambhoga and (2) Vipralambha, when he himself, following the authority of Kāmasūtra, enumerates ten stages of Vipralambha Śṛṅgāra ; for, these stages being sub-divisible into further stages, it would be not of two or ten but of innumerable types. Even if Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa be admitted to hold that only the highest stage in the development of Sthāyin is Rasa, the objection, that Śrīśaṅkuka raises against him, is that in that case Karuṇa Rasa shall have to be rejected. For, its basic emotion, the grief, (śoka) by its very nature is such that it is most intense only in its first stage and diminishes with the passage of time. Therefore, the talk of developing it to the highest pitch and thus converting it into Rasa is out of question.

1. A. Bh. Vol. I. 274. (2) A. Bh. Vol. I, 315-6.

Similarly anger, heroic enthusiasm and love, the basic mental states of Raudra, Vīra and Śṛṅgāra respectively, weaken when the feeling of insult or injury is obliterated due to some change in the situation, or firmness of determination is shaken or lack of devotion on the part of the object of love is felt. Therefore, according to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, those portions of drama shall have to be considered devoid of Rasa, and, therefore, unfit for the place that is given to them. But such a presentation of anger, heroic enthusiasm and love is necessary either because relief has got to be provided or because it is an important part of the original plot, which fixes the direction of the development of plot. And such parts are found in all good dramas. Hence Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's conception of Rasa as the basic mental state at a high pitch is unsound.

Śri Śaṅkuka's Contribution.

By his criticism, howsoever unacceptable, he made a very important contribution to æsthetics inasmuch as he gave a new point of view for the study of the æsthetic problem. He may, therefore, be regarded as the founder of æsthetics, which reached its culminating point in the writings of Abhinava.

He was a younger contemporary of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and belonged to Kashmir. He also commented upon Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra. But unlike his older contemporary he studied the problem of æsthetics as one mainly of theory, i. e. he was concerned not with the production of æsthetic object but with elucidation of the manner in which the æsthetic experience arises from the æsthetic object.

We may state at the very outset that, according to him, æsthetic experience is due to the objective perception of the æsthetic object and that this theory is maintained by

some western æstheticians also. We shall deal with this theory of western æsthetics in the second volume.

He is the first writer to point out the difference between Rasa as an æsthetic object on the stage and Rasa as an æsthetic representation in the spectator's consciousness, and to account for the latter. According to Bharata, constituents of *Rasa*, whether in the hero of the piece on the stage or in the spectator, are the same; for, he uses the same word without pointing out any distinction. Śaṅkuka's problem, therefore, was: how does a complete æsthetic representation arise in the spectator? For, the basic mental state is a purely mental state and as such it cannot be cognised in the same manner as other constituents of the æsthetic object. He, therefore, put forward the theory of inference. According to him, the basic mental state is inferred from the situation etc., which are directly perceived, much as fire, hidden in a cluster of trees at the top of a mountain, is inferred from the rising smoke. *But the basic mental state in the actor* is a matter of indirect imitation. For, while other constituents of æsthetic object can be presented very clearly by the actor; the situation, for instance, through vivid poetic[1] description, mimetic changes because of their display through training and transient emotion by somehow reviving one's own past experiences; the basic mental state cannot be presented by any of these means. And because it is a matter of indirect imitation, therefore, it is given a different name, Rasa, to signify the fact of indirect imitation.

His theory may briefly be stated as follows :—

The scenic arrangements together with skilful acting give rise to the consciousness of identity of the actor with the hero, he impersonates. This consciousness is not of the

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 274.

nature of an illusion. For, illusion is quick to disappear. Nor is it of the nature of a doubt. For, the spectator's mind does not oscillate between the personality of the actor and that of the hero. The experience cannot be classed as either true or false. It is similar to one that we have at the sight[1] of a lifelike picture of a particular horse and formulate the judgement, "It is that horse." The appreciating spectator thus, taking the actor to be the hero, infers the basic mental state from the situation etc., as stated above. This inferred basic mental state, because it is simply an imitation of a real basic mental state of a real hero, such as Rāma, and because it is associated with the enchanting situation, it adds to itself a peculiar charm and develops into an enjoyable condition of the spectator's mind. It is called *Rasa* because of its enjoyability.

Śrīśaṅkuka's Psycho-Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Æsthetics.

Śrīśaṅkuka approaches the problem of æsthetics from the psycho-epistemic point of view. He is, therefore, naturally concerned with (i) the nature of the object of the æsthetic experience (ii) the means of knowing it and (iii) the final judgement and its nature. According to this (i) The basic mental state in æsthetic object is an imitation (ii) The means of its knowledge is inference (iii) The judgement is an unanalysed flood of conflicting judgements such as cannot be brought under any one of the judgements of the well known accepted forms, though it is mainly recognitive, and (iv) The experience is due to objective cognition of the presented. His exposition of Bharata's aphoristic definition of Rasa is based on (i) illusion and (ii) inference theories of art and (iii) the analogy of painted

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 275.

horse. He divides the contents of the æsthetic object into two classes (i) illusive and (ii) inferrable. Situation, mimetic changes and transient emotions are illusive, because their successful artistic presentation on the stage illudes the spectator to take them to be real. The indirectly imitated basic mental state, however, which does not admit of direct perceptible presentation, is inferred from what is directly perceived, but it is wrongly taken to be real. In his exposition of theory of æsthetics he adopts the technique of the ancient Logic (Prācya Nyāya). It is, therefore, necessary to have a clear idea of the following conceptions of the Nyāya :—

(i) The conditions of knowledge.

(ii) Means of right knowledge.

(iii) Theories of error, doubt and knowledge based on similarity.

(iv) Theory of recognition.

I. Conditions of Knowledge.

The Nyāya is a realistic system. The objects of experience, according to it, are not mere illusions or subjective ideas in the mind of knowing subject. They have existence and reality independently of the subject. It upholds the point of view of common sense. It makes use of logical methods to establish the reality of external objective world. It examines the objects of knowledge by means of the cannons of logical proof. It describes the mechanism of knowledge at great length and shows the hollowness of sceptic conclusion that nothing is certain. It holds that the individual souls are substantial beings and that subject and object interact on each other.

All knowledge, therefore, according to Nyāya, implies the following conditions. (i) cognising subject (Pramātā), (ii) the object of cognition, to which the cognitive activity is

directed (Prameya), (iii) the resulting state of knowledge (Pramiti) (iv) means of knowledge (Pramāṇa), and (v) connecting links between the subject and the object. For, the soul does not come into immediate contact with the object. Its contact is mediated by (a) Manas and (b) Senses.

Individual Soul or Subject.

There are as many individual souls as there are cognising subjects. Each is an eternal and all-pervasive substantive being. It is pure substance, possessing the qualities of desire, aversion, volition, feelings of pleasure and[1] pain and knowledge. It cannot be directly apprehended. It is only inferrable through its transient qualities. For instance, when a person has known from experience a certain object to be source of pleasure, there arises in him at a subsequent time desire to acquire it. This can be explained only on the basis of assumption of a subject that persists through the fleeting time, retains the idea of pleasantness of the object and longs for it. It experiences the external world when it comes into contact with it through the mediating links of Manas and senses and consequently quality of cognition is produced in it.

Manas and Senses.

If the soul is all-pervasive, it is always in contact with everything and, therefore, it should always know everything. It should be omniscient. To get out of this difficult situation, into which Nyāya is landed, because of its admission of the all-pervasiveness of the soul, it admits that objective cognition is dependent on two additional factors (i) Manas and (ii) Senses.

Manas is atomic and eternal. It is a mediating link between the soul and the senses. It is the means of know-

1. N. D. 19.

ing internal states and external objects. Its atomicity accounts for limited knowledge in the knowing subject. For, the soul, inspite of its all-pervasiveness, can know only what comes to it through the Manas. As the Manas is atomic and the soul is entirely dependent on it for all knowledge, it can know only that with which it is put in indirect limited contact by the Manas. It also accounts for succession in sensuous knowledge. For, the senses, though five in number, each having a distinct object of its contact, cannot convey their impressions simultaneously to the soul, because only that sense can communicate its impression to the soul, which is mediated by Manas. And Manas, being atomic, can link up only one sense with the[1] soul.

The Object of Knowledge (Prameya).

Generally speaking, all that is not the means of knowledge is the object of knowledge. Thus soul, body, senses, the objects of senses, knowledge, Manas, physical, mental and vocal action, attachment and aversion, rebirth[2], pleasure and pain as the fruits of action and liberation are all objects of knowledge. Taking, however, the word "object" in a restricted sense of the world of nature, Nyāya, like the Vaiśeṣika, holds that it is made up of eternal, unchanging and causeless atoms and that it exists independently of thought.

Means of Knowledge (Pramāṇa).

Nyāya admits four means of knowledge (i) Direct perception (Pratyakṣa) (ii) Inference (Anumāna) (iii) Comparison (Upamāna) and (iv) Verbal testimony (Śabda).

Direct perception, Pratyakṣa, as a means of knowledge, is

1. N. D. 221-3.
2. N. D. 18.

nothing but direct contact of a sense-organ with its respective object. The knowledge arising from it is inexpressible[1] in words, unerring and well-defined.

Inference (Anumāna) as a means of knowledge necessarily presupposes direct perception. It consists in knowing indirectly what is not directly present to senses from the directly perceived. This rise to the knowledge of what is not perceived from the perceived is, according to Gautama, possible in three ways (i) Pūrvavat (ii) Śeṣavat and (iii) Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa (1) Pūrvavat consists in inferring the imperceptible effect from the perceptible cause e.g. when we see dark and thick clouds in the sky we infer that there shall be rain.

(2) Śeṣavat consists in inferring the unperceived cause from the perceptible effect, e.g. when we see a river in flood, we infer that there has been heavy rainfall in upcountry.

(3) Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa[2] consists in inferring one of the concomitants that is imperceptible from the other, which is generally experienced as concomitant with it : e.g. we know from ordinary experience that every horned animal has a tail. Therefore, when we see the horned head of an animal we infer that it has a tail. We may add here that Vātsyāyana gives a different illustration of Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. It may be stated as follows :—

We know from ordinary experience that change of place of a body is preceded by movement. Therefore, when we see that the sun changes its place we infer the movement of the sun, which is not directly perceived by us. But we have given a different illustration to bring out that Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is not based on causal relation as

1. N. D. 13.

2. N. D. 15.

Pūrvavat and Śeṣavat are. It is based on uniformity of experience.

Error or Illusion (Vyabhicāri Jñāna)

"Unerring" (Avyabhicāri) is an essential part of Gāutama's definition of valid perception. It is, therefore, in the commentary on definition of valid perception that Vātsyāyana discusses the Nyāya Theory of error. Error[1] consists in taking an object to be what it is not; taking "not-a" to be "a". For instance, when the hot rays of the summer sun come into contact with the sands of a desert and heat, rising from the heated sands of desert, vibrates, and comes into contact with the eyes of a person at a respectable distance, there arises the perception of water. This perception is an error, because in this case the percipient takes a thing to be what it is not.

The causes of error may be stated as follows.—

Every perception involves (i) the object (ii) the external medium such as light in the case of visual perception. (iii) the sense-organ, through which the object is perceived, (iv) Manas and (v) the cognising subject or soul. If any one of them does not function properly or be defective in any way, illusion arises. Thus the defect in the case of the object may be that it has close similarity with something else. For instance, mirage, because of its close similarity with water, is taken to be water: or mother of pearl, because of its similarity in respect of brilliance with silver, is taken to be silver. The defect in the medium, such as light in the case of visual perception, may be its dimness, because of which we cannot see clearly. Thus a person in dim light takes the dry trunk of a tree to be a man. The defect in the case of an organ of sense-perception may be that it suffers from some disease. A person, suffering

1. N. D., 14.

from jaundice, perceives even conch to be yellow. The defect of Manas may be that it is preoccupied with some ideas. Thus it happens that when we have lost a companion in a fair and are looking for him, we mistake a person with slight resemblance with one, we are searching for, to be our companion, because our minds are preoccupied with the lost friend.

The defect of cognising subject may be that he is swayed by an emotion. Thus we find Kālidāsa's Yakṣa in Meghadūta, taking the insentient cloud to be a sentient being, capable of taking his message to his darling.

Error is subjective. It does not lie in the object. For, the object remains what it is even when it is taken to be something else. The flickering rays of the sun, which are taken to be water, are the same at the time when they are mistaken to be water, no less than when they are viewed correctly as rays. And error exists[1] only so long as it is not set aside by valid knowledge. For instance, when a person takes mother of pearl to be silver and proceeds to pick it up, the error exists till the moment when he comes close enough to discover the true nature of the object and finds the object to be incapable of serving the purpose that he thought it would. Thus, error is error only when it is discovered to be so, at least from the point of view of the erring subject. For, if he had known it to be such, his erroneous knowledge would not have been followed by activity towards the object of error. It is the practical point of view, the utilitarian attitude, which expresses itself in action, that destroys the error.

The Nyāya theory of error, technically called Anyathākhyāti is distinct from (i) jñānākāra khyāti of yogācāra.

1. N. D. 290.

(ii) Asatkhyāti of Mādhyamikas. (iii) Anirvacanīyakhyāti of monistic Vedānta and (iv) Vivekākhyāti of Prābhākaras. In fact, all other theories of error have been adversely criticised by the authorities on Nyāya. The Nyāya theory of error is logical and free from metaphysical bias.

Doubt (Saṁśaya).

There are many situations, in which doubt arises. But there is only one, which is relevant to our purpose. We may state it as follows :—

A person sees an object possessing qualities, which are common to more than one object. Accordingly more than one image, corresponding to two objects, which can possess the qualities, directly apprehended, arise in the mind of the percipient. He is not able to decide whether the stimulating object is this or that. His mind oscillates between two images. This state of oscillation is doubt.

Recognition (Pratyabhijñā).

Recognitive form of consciousness, "This is the same man as that I saw before" is admitted by all systems of thought. They, however, differ as regards its nature, whether it is simple or complex. Buddhists hold it to be a mechanical compound of presentative and representative states of mind. Prābhākaras look upon it as one cognition, which is partly perception and partly memory. The Nyāya combats both the views as follows :—

The view that it is a single compound of presentative and representative mental states is not sound. For, it is neither due to sense-impression alone, as there can be no sense-contact with the past object : nor is it due to residual trace (Saṁskāra) only, as recognition involves the consciousness of "Thisness". It cannot be maintained to be a combined product of the two. For, each of them operates separately and produces a distinct form of consciousness.

Nyāya, therefore, holds that recognition is a kind of qualified perception. It gives us knowledge of the present object as qualified by the past. When we see an object, discover it to be the same as that which we saw on a previous occasion and fuse the two images together much as we do the perception of a jar with that of blackness, recognitive form of consciousness arises.

Now that we have given a brief account of the relevant Nyāya technique, which Śrīśaṅkuka adopts in the course of his exposition of the æsthetic theory, let us elaborate it.

The basic mental state, (Sthāyibhāva) known through inference from an imitative presentation of the real, not cognised as such, is called Rasa for the simple reason that it is an imitation.

He applies the inferential technique of ancient Nyāya in inferring the basic mental state. We have already stated that the Nyāya accepts three methods of inference. (i) of effect from cause (Pūrvavat) (ii) of cause from effect (Śeṣavat) and (iii) of one of the two concomitants from the other (Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa). He, therefore, maintains that the inferential knowledge of the basic mental state arises in the spectator, when he is aware of three types of inferential reason (Hetu), presented on the stage.

(i) Situation with human focus (Vibhāva)[1] the cause of the basic mental state.

(ii) Mimetic changes, the perceptible physical changes, voluntary or involuntary, the effects of basic mental state (Anubhāva).

1. A. Bh, Vol. I. 274.

(iii) Transient emotions, the invariable *concomitants* of the basic mental state.

THE NECESSITY OF INFERENCE.

The chief content of Rasa, according to this theory, is the basic mental state. But it is beyond the reach of the imitative art to present it directly.[1] The imitative art has only two means of presentation.

1. The literary language, which is the primary means of presentation of the situation. The stage-limitations are such as do not allow the scenic presentation to go as far in the representation of the real as the language can.

2. The psycho-physical training to bring about physical changes, in which an emotion expresses itself, or which invariably accompany it. By this means the effect of the basic mental state, the mimetic changes, and the invariable concomitants of it, the transient emotions, are presented. The basic mental state does not admit of presentation even in words, hence the necessity of inference.

Thus, according to Śrī Śaṅkuka, the basic mental state is known through inference only. And he holds that in maintaining this view he has the support of Bharata himself. For, Bharata, in his aphoristic definition of Rasa, does not mention the word "Sthāyin" though it is the most important, inasmuch as Rasa is nothing but Sthāyin itself inferred from situation, mimetic changes and transient emotions. He interprets the aphorism of Bharata to mean that the basic mental state, inferred from Vibhāva etc., is Rasa. (Vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicāribhyaḥ (Sthāyinaḥ) Saṁyogāt—Anumānāt, Rasasya niṣpattiḥ—anumānajanyā pratītiḥ). The dissolution of the compound makes it clear

1. A. Bh. Vol. I. 275.

that the word "Sthāyin", if it had been used by Bharata, would have been put in a different case from that of vibhāva etc. For, while the latter would have been in oblative case, the former would have been in the genitive. But inspite of the[1] different case, in which it was to be used, and consequent necessity of using it, he omits it altogether. The omission is not without its significance. It implies that, according to Bharata, Sthāyin, as a content of spectator's consciousness, appeared in a cognitive form different from that of vibhāva etc. The latter are known through direct perception, but the former is a matter of inference only.

Thus, according to this theory, the basic mental[2] state is known through inference only. But this inference may be called erroneous inasmuch as the basic mental state does not exist in the imitating actor. The æsthetic experience, however, results from it exactly as does fear from a rope mistaken for a serpent.

Nature of the Inferential Judgement.

The judgement is reached through inference. Therefore, both the place where the thing is inferred and the thing itself figure in the judgement. Further, the judgement tends to be of recognitive nature. Naturally, therefore, both the imitated and the imitating figure in it. In the case of inference of love from imitative presentation on the stage, the form of judgement, therefore, tends to be "that happy being (e. g. Rāma) is this".

We have given in a previous section the Nyāya view of recognition. It is qualified perception. It is fusion of two images, the one stimulated by the stage-presentation

1. A. Bh., Vol. I., 275.
2. A. Bh. Vol. I. 275.

and the other, that was constructed by the spectator, when he heard or read about the hero, who is now artistically presented on the stage. The latter fuses with the former and figures in the consciousness as a quality of the same. Hence there arises qualified perception "that happy Rāma is this."

Unclassifiability Of The Recognition In Art.

But[1] recognition ordinarily involves the element of certainty. It is certain knowledge, such as prevents the recognition of the same in many. If one has recognised "X" in "A", recognition of the same in "B" is out of question. For, in the latter case the former recogntion shall have to be declared invalid. The fact, however, according to the exponents of the imitation theory of art, is, that the imitated is recognised in all successful imitations. The recogniton in art, therefore, is devoid of that element of certainty, which would prevent the recognition of the imitated in all successful imitative presentations.

Recognition In Art Is Not Erroneous.

While discussing the Nyāya theory of error we stated (i) that error may be due to some defect in the object such as close similarity with something else, (ii) that it consists in taking the directly perceived to be something that it is not, (iii) that it is subjective and does not lie in the object. (iv) that error is error only when it is discovered to be so, at least from the point of view of erring subject and (v) that it is the practical point of view, the utilitarian or purposive attitude, that destroys the error.

If we keep these points in mind, we can understand why Śrī Śaṅkuka holds that recognitive æsthetic judgement is not an error. He is concerned with explaining the essen-

1. A. Bh. Vol. I. 275.

tial nature of æsthetic experience. He, therefore, confines himself to the psychological process, which is involved in the course of its rise. He has nothing to do with the point of view of unæsthetic observer of the æsthetic object. Thus, according to him, the spectator, when he comes to theatre, has either got the image of the hero in his mind, if the hero is an historical character, or such an image is generated in his mind by description, contained in the general introduction to the drama, if the hero is an invention of the genius of dramatist, as in the case of Cārudatta in Śūdraka's Mṛcchakaṭika. Therefore, when the dramatic hero appears on the stage, the spectator mistakes him for the historic or fictitious character, because of close similarity between the mental picture in the spectator and the stage-presentation.

But the spectator's attitude is not practical; on the contrary, it is æsthetic. His psychic activity does not pass into physical. He does not verify facts. He does not put himself in practical relation with the presented. Therefore, error is no error to him, because it is not contradicted by any subsequent cognition that he, as an æsthetic observer, has. His recognition may be erroneous from the point of view of unæsthetic observer, but surely it is not so to him, because his attitude is not practical. Hence Śrī Śaṅkuka holds that æsthetic recognitive judgement is not erroneous.

Æsthetic Judgement Not Dubious.

We have stated in a preceding section that the characteristic feature of doubtful cognition is the oscillation of mind between two images, one that is generated by the object, which is directly present; and the other, which arises because of similarity with it, in consequence of defective perceptual condition, such as dimness of light etc. As in the case of recognitive æsthetic experience there is no

oscillation of mind between two images ; on the contrary, there is fusion of them, it cannot be said to be doubtful.

It Is Not A Cognition Of Similarity.

In the cognition of similarity there are two distinct images in the mind of beholder, one that serves as standard of comparison and the other, which stands as subject of comparison. As in the case of recognitive æsthetic apprehension, the two images do not stand apart from each other, but fuse together as substance and its quality, it cannot be spoken of as cognition of similarity.

Influence Of Painting On His Æsthetic Theory.

It appears that at the time when Śrī Śaṅkuka wrote his commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata, there was a recognised view of experience, got from painting. For, he cites the analogy of experience, arising from a horse, painted by an expert artist, to explain the nature of æsthetic experience from dramatic presentation. And only a well known fact is cited as analogy. The analogy of painted horse implies that the æsthetic cognition is unique in itself and, therefore, is different from every accepted type of cognition in the system of Nyāya, which presents common sense point of view; that it is a special type of recognition, which cannot be classed as true, false or dubious; that it is not a mere consciousness of similarity of the artistically presented with something that is already well known, but fusion of the image, already in the mind, with the one that is generated by artistic object and that such a recognition yields artistic satisfaction. Śrī Śaṅkuka, therefore, holds that æsthetic recognition is an unanalysed flood of cognitions of the opposing nature and, therefore, no question about its nature can be raised. It is a unique experience. The consciousness of the imitated arises from an imitative

dramatic presentation exactly as does that of a horse from a pictorial or plastic presentation of it.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THEORY :—

1. Indefinability of the experience.
2. Unpresentability of the basic mental state in language.
3. The doctrine of contradiction in experience.

ITS CRITICISM.

The imitation and inference theories of art cannot go together, if the inference has reference to the basic mental state, that is, if Rasa be held to be due to objective consciousness of an imitated basic mental state, got through inference from three types of reasons, cognised as imitations.

The imitation theory of art is maintained by some of the western æstheticians also. We shall discuss the western point of view in the second volume. Here, therefore, we shall confine our attention to Śaṅkuka's theory only. His imitation theory aroused immediate opposition from Abhinava's teachers in poetics and dramaturgy, Bhaṭṭtendurāja and Bhaṭṭa Tauta, who were probably his younger contemporaries, because Abhinava clearly attributes the criticism to his teachers[1]. It can briefly be stated as follows :—

Critics[2] raised the question of the point of view, viz., from whose point of view is art an imitation ? Is it from the point of view (i) of spectator (ii) or that of actor (iii) or that of a disinterested analyst, who aims at finding out the real nature of dramatic presentation (iv) or is it that it is the view of Bharata himself, as expressed somewhere in his Nāṭya Śāstra ? Let it be remembered that Śrīśaṅkuka's imitation theory of art refers to the basic mental state only.

1 A. Bh. Vol. I., 275.
2. A. Bh. Vol. I. 275-6.

(i) Imitation theory cannot be maintained from the spectator's point of view. Firstly, because consciousness of imitation presupposes direct perception of what is spoken of as an imitation. As for instance, when a certain person drinks milk in a certain way, and says "Thus X drinks wine", drinking of milk, which is directly perceived by the spectator, is taken by him to be an imitation of wine-drinking of X. Now, in the case of æsthetic object, what is there in the actor, who is considered to be imitating, that is directly perceived and is taken to be an imitation of Sthāyī? His body, various kinds of mimetic changes and physical states that he exhibits and variety of articles of dress that he wears, are the only things, which are directly perceptible. But nobody will be prepared to accept them as imitation of a basic state, because of essential difference in their nature; the former are physical, but the latter is primarily mental. There is difference in the means of their cognition also. In the one, eyes play an important part, but the other is purely the work of mind.

And secondly, because the consciousness of imitation presupposes the knowledge of both the imitated and the imitation. But the basic mental state of the imitated historic person, the spectator cannot be supposed to know, because of his being very far distant in time. As for its knowledge through literature, Śrīśaṅkuka himself holds, as we have already stated, that language can give only a conventional image of basic mental state of ordinary run, but not the ideal one.

(ii) The second argument disposes of the second question, namely, does the actor imitate? For, just as a spectator requires the knowledge of the imitated to have the consciousness of imitation, so does the actor to imitate. But just as the one cannot have it so cannot the other either.

Leaving aside the external factors, which are responsible for the consciousness of imitation, if we analyse spectator's consciousness of basic mental state, caused by dramatic presentation, we find that consciousness is not of an imitated emotion, but that of real one. For, if we take the inference of the basic mental state as the inference of an effect from the cause, the situation; or as of a cause from the effect, the mimetic changes, or as of a major term from that which is invariably concomitant with it, the inferred mental state would be the real basic mental state and not an imitation of it.

It cannot be urged that the situation etc., are real only in the case of the historic, the imitated, but in that of the hero on the stage, they are only creations of art. Therefore, the basic mental state also, that is inferred from them, would be only that of the artistic imitation of the real. For, then the exponent of the imitation theory will be asked whether the situation etc., as artificially presented on the stage, appear to the spectator to be artificial or real. In the former case, inference of basic mental state will be impossible. In the latter, the consciousness of the inferred being an imitation will be out of question.

Nor can the exponent support his position as follows :–

It is a well known fact that scorpions come into being in two ways. They are not only born but also spring from cowdung, preserved under certain conditions. The two, the one born and the other sprung from cowdung, differ in certain respects, so that an expert eye can know the origin from appearance. Thus, from effects, apparently similar, different causes are inferred by experts. Therefore, in the same way, from the artificial situation presented on the stage the inference of an artificial basic mental state is but natural to a man of critical judgement.

For, this is an indefensible position. The possibility of inference of different causes from two effects apparently similar, we do not dispute in those cases, where there is real material causal relation, as between scorpion and cowdung. But where there is no causal relation of what is similar to the effect with what simply has similarity with the cause, the inference is not possible. A heap of China roses (Japā kusuma), for instance, looks very much like fire; so does the mist like smoke. But does a man, knowing the mist as such, infer a heap of China roses from it ? The inference, therefore, of basic mental state, as an imitation, from perception of artificiality of the situation etc., is impossible.

(iii) From the point of view of an impartial analyst of the dramatic presentation also the basic mental state is not an imitation, but is an identical reaction to the situation etc. (Anuvyavasāya), due to identification with the historic through the instrumentality of the situation etc., as we shall show in the following pages, dealing with Abhinava's æsthetic theory.

(iv) As[1] regards the alternative that the imitation theory is based upon the authority of Bharata, we have to say only this, that there is no passage in the Nāṭya Śāstra, which, taken in proper context, supports the imitation theory. All relevant passages establish the identical reaction (Anuvyavasāya) theory. Thus, Śrī Śaṅka's theory that æsthetic object is an imitation is unsound from all points of view.

CRITICISM OF THE IMITATIVE JUDGEMENT :—

In[2] respect of the æsthetic judgement, consequent upon cognition of the æsthetic object also, his theory is equally

1. A.Bh., Vol. I. 277-8. 2. A.Bh., Vol. I. 278.

unsound. According to him, "Rasa" is a judgement. It is an expression of the consciousness, which cannot be classed with any one of the well known different forms of consciousness. But this is an indefensible position. For, if consciousness of the æsthetic object, as expressed in judgement, implies consciousness of presence of Rāma at the time of presentation only, it is a valid cognition, because it is not contradicted by any subsequent cognition. But if it is subsequently contradicted then certainly it is wrong knowledge. And even if there be no contradiction, it will in reality be only wrong knowledge. Therefore, the judgement, as stated above, cannot be expression of consciousness of a peculiar type, because there is no such consciousness.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST IMITATION OF STHĀYIN SUMMARISED.

Śrī Śaṅkuka's theory in the main is that Sthāyin is imitated by the hero, who represents an historical character, such as Rāma. And because it is imitated and not actual, therefore, it is called Rasa. The difference, according to him, between Rasa and Sthāyibhāva is only this that Rasa is only imitated Sthāyibhāva, while the real Sthāyibhāva is actual and not imitated.

The argument against this view is that imitation has two chief characteristics (i) it presupposes the direct perception of the imitated and (ii) it is a presentation of the original in a medium different from the material, of which the original is made up. As there is no possibility of direct perception, on the part of actor, of the historic person, who is far removed in time, no imitation of him and much less of his basic mental state is possible. If it be said that it is imitated in terms of situation and mimetic changes etc., the position is untenable, because they belong to a category different from that of the Sthāyin, inasmuch as they are

directly perceptible while the Sthāyin is not so. But if it be said that the actor has actual emotive state such as that of love, through imaginary identification with the hero, the image of whom he is able to construct with the help of poetic presentation of him, as given by the dramatist: in that case there being no difference in the medium, there being the absence of distinct object of imitation in the actor's consciousness, his emotive state cannot be spoken of as imitation (Anukaraṇa); on the contrary, it is identical reaction (Anuvyavasāya).

CRITICISM OF ANALOGY OF PAINTED HORSE.

It appears that soon after Śrī Śaṅkuka, the illusion theory of art of painting was substituted by that of similitude. Possibly the latter was contemporaneous with the former. Abhinavagupta and his teachers accepted the latter. Hence the criticism of Śrī Śaṅkuka's analogy is based on it. According to the theory of similitude, the paints represent the various parts of the body of the original in such a manner that they, taken together, look very much like the original and give rise to the consciousness of similarity of representation with the original.

Accordingly criticism[1] of Śrī Śaṅkuka's position is that painted horse is an imitation of a living horse, because the former bears similarity with the latter: but Vibhāva etc. cannot be taken to be imitation of the basic mental state, because there is no similarity between them in any way. Therefore, Śaṅkuka's theory, that Rasa is nothing but imitated basic mental state, is wrong, because no imitation of the latter (basic mental state) is possible.

SĀṄKHYA THEORY OF ÆSTHETICS.

Another[2] theory, that is summarily treated, is the one

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 278. 2. A. Bh., Vol. II. 278.

that was advanced in the light of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. According to this, there is causal relation between the situation etc. and the basic mental state. The former constitute the sum total of external causes and are responsible for the being of the latter, which is essentially an inner state of pleasure or pain. Obviously the exponents of this theory took the basic mental state to be identical with æsthetic experience. Hence they have gone not only against the fact of experience but also against the textual authority of Bharata, according to whom the two are very distinct from each other.

CRITICISM OF THE EARLIER THEORIES.

We have so far discussed two theories (i) the theory of inference, which is apparently from the point of view of the Naiyāyika, and (ii) the Sāṅkhya theory of æsthetics. The common question which can be raised about them is whether the basic mental state (Sthāyī), according to them, is cognised in the actor or arises in the spectator. Neither of the two positions is defensible.

For, in the former case, this cognition, being in no way different from ordinary wordly cognitions, will naturally arouse ordinary[1] attitudes and responses. And admission of this will mean denial of an independent value to art. In the latter case, that is, if we admit the rise of basic mental state in the spectator,it will mean condemnation of all tragic presentation, for, we will have to admit the rise of the tragic feeling of sorrow in the spectator, which, as such is not relishable. In fact subjective rise of a basic mental state from the art-presentation is not possible. The reason may be stated as follows :—

Suppose we are attempting psycho-epistemically to account for the rise of Rati (love) from the presentation of

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 278.

Rāma and Sītā on the stage. How can love arise in the spectator ? For, Sītā has not the same value to him as she had to Rāma. The spectator does not look upon Sītā as an object of love. In fact the historical and religious associations, which surround the personality of Sītā, will prevent the rise of such feeling from such a presentation.

Intellectual Background of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was an immediate predecessor, or an older contemporary, of Abhinava : for, he was king Śaṅkara Varman's contemporary (883-902 A. D.). He, therefore, lived in the same literary atmosphere as that in which Abhinava lived. By his time the two important factors in the evolution of the form, which the æsthetic theory assumed in the hands of Abhinava, had come into being. (1) Ānanda Vardhana had propounded the theory of Dhvani, the power of language to convey the spiritual meaning (Dhvani) and (2) Śaiva metaphysics also had been well systematised by Utpala in his detailed commentary, the Vivṛti, on his own Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā. But Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka did not come under the influence of either. He was an avowed opponent of the spiritual meaning theory and wrote a work, Hṛdaya Darpaṇa, with the expressed object of demolishing it. And he seems to have simply ignored the Śaiva Philosophy. He followed the Vedānta school and based his theory upon the same school of philosophy.

Vedāntic Tendencies of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's date and place we have discussed in in an earlier work. (Abh. 128-30). He had Vedāntic tendencies. For, in the course of his commentary on the very first verse of Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra, he refers to the Vedāntic conception of the phenomenal world. He points out its similarity with the dramatic presentation. According to him, the activities of Rāma and Rāvaṇa etc. (in stage-

presentation) shine wonderfully, though they are actually non-existent. They are mere creations of imagination and therefore, are without any fixed form and are capable of millions of imaginative additions. They are different from objects of dream and illusion etc., and therefore, are capable of fully captivating the heart. They are products of actors, who in the course of production do not abandon their essential nature, exactly as Brahman does not give up his essential nature when he creates the phenomenal world. But inspite of all this they are capable of giving rise to æsthetic experience and thus serve a human purpose. Just so this phenomenal world, which is nothing but mere name and form, which really do not exist, serves the highest human purpose,[1] through reflection and contemplation.

He also makes use of the Vedāntic conception of Ānanda, as predominance of pure Sattva, free from all admixture of Rajas and Tamas. He represents the æsthetic experience to be akin to the mystic realisation of Brahman. He, however, does not thoroughly stick to Vedāntic technique in his exposition of the æsthetic theory. We shall briefly give an account of Vedāntic and allied conceptions, utilised by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, in proper context.

BHAṬṬA NĀYAKA'S CRITICISM OF OTHER THEORIES.

He rejects the theory that dramatic presentation gives rise to emotive experience in the spectator as related to their individuality. For, in that case presentation of sorrow shall have to be admitted to arouse an unpleasant experience. Further, the experience of personal emotion is not possible, because historic character, such as Sītā, is not related to him as a stimulus to his personal emotion. The personal emotion cannot be said to be due to recollection of the object of his own love, at the sight of stage-presentation, on the

1. A. Bh. Vol. I. 5.

part of the spectator, for, it is against the fact of experience; there is no such remembrance.

He also rejects the theory that the cognition of emotion in the presented is due to inference or verbal presentation. For, such a cognition cannot give rise to æsthetic experience. On the contrary, it will give rise to the feelings of envy, shame and hatred etc., just as such sights do in actual world. He equally rejects the theories that Rasa is effected or that it is suggested.

His New Technique.

Common criticism of the above theories is that even if the psycho-philosophical objections be waved aside, no man, who has had the æsthetic experience, will agree that they give a true picture of the experience. Æsthetic presentation is never the cause of painful feeling. Tragedies also enliven. It does not arouse those responses, which the real does. This needs explanation. Hence the adoption of a new technique, not applicable to ordinary worldly experience.

This new technique was adopted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. According to him, as according to all his predecessors in the field of æsthetics, æsthetic experience is due to objective cognition of the presented. Unlike, however, his predecessors, he maintains, and rightly too, that both, the cognising self and the cognised object, are free from all limitations, which give individuality. And the resultant subjective state is, according to him, a state of perfect rest of the self within itself because of the predominance of the quality of Sattva and total relegation of the qualities of Rajas and Tamas to the background. Hence that state is characterised by the absence of all conscious physical, psychological and volitional activities and so by freedom from all attachment to and aversion from all that can enter into consciousness.

The reason[1] is obvious. All volitional and so conscious psycho-physical activities are due to predominance of Rajas. Similarly all lack of consciousness is due to Tamas. All knowledge, however, and consequent state of rest of the self, in which Bliss consists, is due to Sattva. Rajas and Tamas being overwhelmed by Sattva and so volitional, psychological and conscious physical activities being out of question and the state of ignorance being impossible, there arises a state of the self as described above.

HIS BASIC ASSUMPTIONS :—

He maintains that the poetic language has three powers.

1. Abhidhā, the power to arouse the conventional image, associated with a word in the mind of the hearer.

2. Bhāvakatva, the power, which frees the presented, the æsthetic object, from all relations, in which a similar object in ordinary life stands, and so universalises it.

3. Bhojakatva, the power which throws the two qualities of the percipient of the æsthetic object, namely, Rajas and Tamas, into the background and brings Sattva to the forefront.

The quality of Sattva is thus brought to predominance, according to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, by the last of the said prowers, technically called 'Bhojakatva. The last two powers he attributes to the poetic language in addition to the generally accepted Abhidhā, the power of giving rise to the conventional image. The second of the said powers, namely Bhāvakatva, also cooperates with the last in bringing about this state, inasmuch as it frees the presented from all limitations and so universalises it. Thus, Rajas does not work, because the presented is free from all limitations and is universalised. The presented is

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 278-9.

thus incapable of giving rise to any desire to gain or shun it. And desire being the motive force of all psycho-physical activities, the latter cannot take place. Rajas is thus relegated to background. As for the Tamas, it can be as little effective at the time when the Sattva is working as darkness can be in the presence of light. Hence there arises a state of simple awareness or consciousness of the presented, which is akin to the mystic experience of the Brahman in so far as it is a conscious state but free from all volitional, psychological and physical activities. It is, however, different from the mystic experience of the Brahman, because it is a limited experience, though without the consciousness of limitation at the time when it takes place; because the universalised æsthetic object still affects the universalised subject. It cannot be classed with the ordinary experiences, got through perception or remembrance etc., because it is not a determinate cognition, inasmuch as there is no determinative activity of carving an image out of the presented. Nor is it indeterminate, because there is the subsequent recollection of the æsthetic experience.

Thus, according to this school, the æsthetic experience is the experience of the universalised æsthetic object by universalised subject in the state of *perfect bliss*, due to the predominance of Sattva.

Its Contribution.

The problem aroused by the imitation-inference theory was "If the basic mental state is known objectively as associated with the imitated individual on the stage, why is there no rise of the natural attitudes and responses due to the objective cognition ?" This new theory explains the non-rise by presenting the cognising subject above the response-level, inasmuch as the power to respond, the Rajas, is perfectly inoperative, because of the universalisation of the

presentation by the assumed particular power of the poetic language, called Bhāvakatva. Response is due to the cognition of the particular, that being absent, it does not arise. Hence there arises the state of the subject with the predominance of Sattva, in which the Bliss consists. The constituents of the experience, therefore, according to this theory, are the universalised subject and the universalised æsthetic object.

The following question arises here :—

"How are the subject and the object related ?"

To answer this he postulates a new cognising activity, called Bhoga, and the experience, he represents to be Ananda. Let us, therefore, see what are the implications of these expressions in the known schools of philosophy.

Vedānta Metaphysics And Ānanda.

The variety of ordinary experiences can be brought under three heads, (i) pleasure (ii) pain and (iii) insensibility. Similarly states in the life of a conscious being can be put under three heads, (i) the state of knowing (ii) of acting and (iii) of senselessness. But in ordinary life pleasure, pain and insensibility are not unmixed, nor are so knowledge, action and senselessness.

The ultimate cause of both the sets, mentioned above, is the triad of qualities, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, which constitutes the Avidyā or ignorance.

There is no moment in the life of an individual, in which they are inoperative. There is no determinate knowledge, which does not arouse attitudes and responses. And determinate knowledge of one thing means the ignorance of others. At some moment, however, one is predominantly operative and at others another. Thus in ordinary life one

of them is always shrouded by the other two. Still occasionally one of them attains predominance over the rest. Predominance of Sattva is pleasure, of Rajas pain and of Tamas insensibility. Bliss (Ānanda), therefore, in its technical restricted sense is not possible to an individual so long as the individuality persists.

The[1] universal self, as admitted by the Vedānta to explain the phenomenal world, is also associated with the Avidyā, but that is not individual, that is sum total of all the individual Avidyās, that is the root cause of every thing which is the object of experience. The universal Avidyā also is constituted by the same three qualities. But in this triad there is the predominance of the perfectly pure Sattva. This perfect purity is due to the fact that Rajas is totally inoperative, because the field of its operation, the limited objective world in its full development, does not exist for the Self: and the Tamas, being the opposite of the Sattva, is as inoperative as the darkness is in the presence of light. This universal Avidyā with the predominance of pure Sattva is Ānandamayakośa of the Universal self. Bliss (Ānanda), therefore, as distinct from pleasure (Sukha), according to the Vedānta, is predominant and perfectly pure Sattva, as related to the Universal self. The predominance is due to inoperation of the other two, because of absence of the limited phenomenal world.

SĀṄKHYA CONCEPTION OF BHOGA.

Bhoga[2] involves the following four :—

(i) Puruṣa, identified with its reflection, falling on the Buddhi.

(ii) Buddhi, which receives the reflection of Puruṣa from within and that of the object from without.

1. Ved. S. and Comm. 9-11. 2. I.P.V.V., Vol. I., 153.

(iii) **The reflection of object on the Buddhi.**

(iv) Ahaṅkāra[1] which is responsible

(a) for the unification of the two reflections of the subject and the object,

(b) for identification of the reflection of the subject with the subject itself,

(c) for the use of this union of the subject and the object for practical purposes,

(d) for the rise of consciousness "I know this".

THE PROCESS.

1. The Buddhi receives reflection of object from without.

2. The reflection of the subject comes from within.

3. Ahaṅkāra unites them.

4. The two reflections merge into each other.

5. The object shines. This shining of the object, because of union with the subject, is the culminating point of the process, described so far. Hence it is spoken of as the fruit of the cognitive activity. It is called Jñāna.

Union of reflections of the subject and the object, when used for practical purposes by Ahaṅkāra through giving rise to the consciousness "I know this", which refers the object to the subject without recognising the difference between the subject and its reflection, is called *Bhoga*. Because it involves union of the two reflections in the common ground of the Buddhi and also because the consciousness, that has been aroused by Ahaṅkāra, has the common substratum with the reflection of the Puruṣa.

1. I.P.V.V., Vol. I., 155.

The Conception of Bhoga, According to Yoga System.

"Sattvapuruṣayoḥ atyantāsaṅkīrṇayoḥ[1] Pratyayāviśeṣo Bhogaḥ". Sattva in Yoga terminology means Buddhi. It is insentient. And Puruṣa is sentient or sentiency itself. They are thus of opposite nature. Therefore, no such union between them is possible as between lotus and blue. In intellectual reaction to a stimulus, however, in practical life, there is no consciousness of difference between them. This consciousness of identity of Buddhi and Puruṣa in practical life is technically called Bhoga.

Vaiśeṣika Conception of Bhoga.

Accooding[2] to the Vaiśeṣika also, knowledge (Jñāna) is distinct from self. Bhoga, the reference of knowledge to the self, therefore, is explained in terms of relation of inherence. Thus, according to the Vaiśeṣika also, relation is involved in Bhoga, though not Saṁyoga, as according to the Sāṅkhya, but Samavāya.

The Criticism of the New Technique.

From the above explanations of Bhoga and Ānanda it is clear that the two cannot go together. Bhoga, according to all systems of thought, involves subject-object relation. But Ānanda, which is nothing but the predominance of pure Sattva, is not possible so long as the subject-object relation persists. Bhoga is the opposite of Mokṣa, which consists in Ānanda. Thus the new theory is unsound, because it brings in the contradictory conceptions to explain the æsthetic experience.

It may be stated here that there is no essential difference in the conception of æsthetic experience, admitted

1. I. P. V. V., Vol. I. 156-7.
2. I. P. V. V., Vol. I. 155

by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, as stated in the preceding paragraphs, and that, admitted by Abhinavagupta, as dealt with in all details in a subsequent chapter. In fact, according to Abhinava's own statement in A. Bh. Vol. I., P. 280,[1] his theory is not different from that of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, but simply an improvement upon it in the following respects : —

1. Æsthetic experience is not due to an objective perception of the presented, but to the identification of the spectator with the human focus of the situation. The spectator consequently has almost the same psycho-physical conditions as those of the hero of the piece.

2. Abhinava accounts for the universalisation of the presented in terms of psychological factors and does not explain it away by simply assuming an additional power of poetic language, called Bhāvakatva.

3. Abhinava admits that the cognitive process leading to the ultimate æsthetic experience is different from that involved in ordinary perception and remembrance etc., but he psychologically accounts for it and maintains that assumption of the third power of the poetic language, called "*Bhojakatva*" is unnecessary.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's Position Explained.

The history of Kashmir literature of the period, to which Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka belonged, clearly explains the influences which were responsible for the new turn that he gave to the theory of Indian æsthetics. For five hundred years, from the time of Bharata (circa 500 A. D.) to that of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, (the latter half of 9th century) æsthetics was studied purely from the artist's point of view. The problem of the writers on æstehtics during that period was, therefore, practical. Their task was to show how to

1. A. Bh., Vol. I , 280.

present dramas so that the audience might have the desired æsthetic experience. Śrīśaṅkuka, a younger contemporary of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, took up the study of æsthetics from the spectator's point of view. He was a follower of the Nyāya school, and therefore, did not himself have the æsthetic experience.(?) Or rather, he could not have it, because, he approached the problem of æsthetics from the point of view of laymen, represented by the Nyāya. His theory, therefore, is very unsatisfactory, because it is not based on experience and, what is more, is against the facts of experience. This point was noticed and criticised by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (close of the 9th and beginning of the 10th century A. D.)

At this time the monistic Śaiva philosophy, technically called "Trika", or Realistic Idealism, as I have called it elsewhere, had just arisen. *Utpalācārya* had just systematised the Pratyabhijñā system, and Abhinava had not spoken on the subject; the Sāṅkhya philosophy was still dominant in Kashmir. Ānanda Vardhana's theory of *Dhvani*, the spiritual meaning of language, as different from both the conventional and the secondary, had not yet been well established. It was rather being vehemently opposed by a set of learned scholars, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka himself probably being the leader of the opposition, as is testified by his work, the *Hṛdaya* Darpaṇa, which was written with the avowed object of demolishing the theory of *Dhvani*. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory of æsthetics, therefore, could not be other than what it was.

Every advance on a theory is an outcome of the progress that is made by all allied branches of learning at a particular period of the literary history of a country. And every important period in the literary history develops certain characteristics, which distinguish all the literary

productions of that period. The rise of Śaiva philosophy in the 9th century marks the beginning of a tendency to give an important place to personal experience in the formulation of a theory, and to interpret the literary authority in the light of the same Thus a new point of view for looking at the æsthetic problem having been given by Śrīśaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka attempted the problem in accordance with the new tendency and formulated his own theory. It is correct in respect of the essential nature of æsthetic experience. But the technique that is adopted to account for it, is defective. The defect was due to the fact that the tendency for phenomenological observation, which culminated in the peculiar theory of 'Ābhāsavāda' of the Śaiva philosophy, had not fully developed. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, therefore, was naturally under the influence of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta systems of philosophy. He failed to explain the essential nature of the subjective and objective aspects of the æsthetic experience and to account for the essential nature of the experience, for the obvious reason that the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta systems do not supply the necessary principles, point of view and mechanism of psychological analysis as is necessary to explain the æsthetic experience in all its details.

The new Factors, which Influenced Abhinava-gupta's Æsthetics

The two scholastic generations, which intervened between Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinava, prepared the ground for Abhinava's æsthetic theory, which, because of its soundness, has well stood the test of the long time of more than one thousand years. This was a period of intense psychological study. During this period the psychological analysis of human experience became the basis of all theories and postulates. The literary authority was relegated to the

background. Even reason was given only a secondary place as the basis of a theory. What more, even metaphysical conclusions were based upon the same psychological analysis of human experience. In fact, the chief characteristic of the 'Trika' school of Śaiva philosophy is that its metaphysics, in marked constrast with that of the Vedānta and other schools of Indian philosophy, is based, not upon an ancient authority, but on a very accute psychological analysis of the same human experience. Utpalācārya's Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā is an unmistakable proof of it: for, in this he declares and proves that without *All inclusive universal consciousness*, technically called Maheśvara, neither perceptual experience nor remembrance is possible. This school gave a new point of view, viz., the phenomenological, that of *Ābhāsa*, for studying the outstanding problems of experience. Utpalācārya is primarily responsible for it.

Utpalācārya's method and point of view was followed by the next generation not only in the sphere of philosophy as did Lakṣmaṇagupta, Abhinava's teacher in philosophy, but also in the sphere of poetics, when any problem relating to human experience had to be attempted, as did Bhaṭṭa Indurāja and Bhaṭṭa Tauta, Abhinava's teachers in Dhvani and Nāṭya Śāstra, respectively. No doubt, we have not got any literary record of the views of these scholars, but Abhinava's own statements in the introductions to his three works, (i) Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī (ii) Abhinava Bhāratī (iii) Dhvanyāloka Locana, make it perfectly clear that much of what he gives there, is what came to him as literary inheritance from his teachers.

At this time in the literary history came Abhinavagupta, with a rare combination of gifts of both poet and philosopher and with no other interest in the world but the literary. He specialised in three branches of learning,

philosophy, Tantra and poetics and acquired all that the tradition had. With this intellectual equipment he was able to appreciate better and to follow the new point of view to attempt the æsthetic problem and to ultimately formulate a new æsthetic theory from the phenomenological point of view of the Śaiva Philosophy in such details that it is really difficult to substantially improve upon it. For a proper understanding of Abhinavagupta's æsthetic theory it is necessary to have full knowledge of his philosophical background. We shall, therefore, in the next chapter, give a brief account of the philosophical doctrines, which influenced his æsthetics.

CHAPTER II.

THE ŚAIVA BASIS OF ABHINAVA'S ÆSTHETICS

IMPORTANCE OF ABHINAVAGUPTA.

Abhinavagupta is of main importance to us, because our object in the present volume is to present his æsthetics, as we know it from his writings, both in print and in Mss. If we have discussed other theories, that is because they form the necessary background and show the various stages in the evolution of the crowning phases of Indian Æsthetics. He gave the final shape to the philosophy of beauty. And his views are followed by all subsequent writers on the subject, with the exception of just a few, who attack him on isolated points, such as Mahima Bhaṭṭa and Pandit Jagannātha. His theory stands to gain and not to lose in importance, if it be compared with that of any ancient or modern æsthetician in the West. To bring out the full importance of his theory in the light of comparison with those of the Western Æstheticians, we are devoting a separate volume to a presentation of the allied æsthetic currents in the West; and another to a detailed comparison of the views of Indian and European Æstheticians.

He was an encyclopædic thinker. We know of forty-five works from his pen, of which we have given an account in the Second Chapter of our earlier work, entitled "Abhinavagupta". Though mainly a commentator on earlier works, he has shown great originality and founded new schools of Metaphysics and Æsthetics. His Æsthetic theory is based on the Śaiva Metaphysics and epistemology. He was not a follower of the Vedānta, as has wrongly been

thought by some. He was a critic of the Vedānta. His æsthetic theory accordingly is not based on the Vedānta but on the Śaiva Philosophy. We shall, therefore, give a brief account of his general philosophy, with a little detailed exposition of those points which have a direct bearing on his æsthetics.

Rational Mysticism Of Abhinavagupta.

Abhinavagupta may be spoken of as a mystic in so far as he discards all pluralism in his system and holds the Reality to be Absolute unity, thoroughly indescribable, identical with the equally indescribable essence of human soul and to be realisable through intuition, attainable through disciplined life. But he is a rationalist also, inasmuch as he rationally justifies what mystic vision reveals. Thus he is a rational mystic, because his philosophical ideas are based not only on super-sensuous experience but also on Reason.

His Idealism.

He may also be called an idealist in so far as he holds (i) that Reality is ideal and not sensuous, (ii) that all knowledge is conceptual ; that the object of knowledge is nothing more than a mere configuration of universals, (iii) that the universal is real; it is not subjective; it is not a product of individual mind; it has an independent being and is known through reason alone, (iv) that Reality is distinct from appearance, the former has absolutely independent being, but the latter depends upon the former, (v) that thought and being are identical; there is nothing apart from thought; thought itself is thing, (vi) that objective and subjective reasons are identical; the process of the world-reason is identical with that of the reason operative in the individual mind.

Place Of Othfr Schools Of Thouht in Abhinava's System.

Like Hegel, Abhinavagupta also assigns definite places to other systems in his philosophy. Thus he holds that the highest spiritual principle, grasped by the Vedāntins, the Brahman, is nothing but the Sadāśiva, the third category of his system. Buddhism in general, he places at the level of Buddhi Tattva. The highest principle of Nihilistic Buddhism he identifies with Śūnya Pramātā. And the ultimate principle of the Sāṅkhya he holds to be the same as the Puruṣa Tattva, as conceived by him. The fact is that he has incorporated in his comprehensive system, the fundamentals of both the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta systems. Thus he borrows twenty-four categories and Puruṣa from the Sāṅkhya, the Māyā from the Vedāntin and adds to them ten more categories; five of which are transcendental and the remaining five are limitations of the individual subjects. Thus we have the thirty six categories of his system. At the top of them all he places his Absolute (Anuttara), of which the categories are mere manifestations.

Mystic Conception Of The Absolute (Anuttara).

We have already said that Abhinava is a rational mystic. His Absolute is not only what reason by its very nature is forced to admit, but also what pure spiritual experience reveals. From mystical point of view it is the Reality, beyond which there is nothing. It is, therefore, free from all limitations. It is indefinable in terms of ordinary everyday life. It cannot be spoken of as "this" or "that" or as "not—this" or "not-that". The limited mind cannot grasp it, and, therefore, no talk about it is possible. It is not a thing to be perceived or conceived, but simply to be realised. Whatever word or words we may use to indicate its nature, we fail to convey the idea of its real

nature. For, words stand for definite ideas, but it is indefinite, not in the sense that it is shadowy nothing or nihility but that language cannot adequately present it.

The western mystics also such as Plotinus, talk of the Highest Reality in the same tone, as we shall show in the fourth Chapter of the Second Volume.

This Reality can be realised through spiritual discipline only, which leads the follower of the mystic path through regular stages to the final goal. The discipline is meant for freeing the individual soul from various impurities, which attach to it and constitute the limiting conditions, which alone differentiate the individual soul from the Absolute.

THE IMPURITIES OF THE SOUL.

There are three impurities, which attach to soul and constitute its bondage.

1. Innate ignorance (Āṇavamala). It conceals the real nature of soul. It consists in the loss of universality and consequent forgetfulness of its true nature. It is mere conciousness of supposed imperfection. It is beginningless, though destructible.

2. Indefinite desire (Kārmamala). The former, the impurity of innate ignorance, is the condition of indefinite and limitless desire. Perfect soul, for which nothing apart from or outside it exists, can have no desire. For, desire has objective reference and, therefore, presupposes some imperfection and limitation in the desiring subject. Kārmamala, therefore, is potential desire, which, as such, has no definite object, but, when it actualises, is responsible for countless associations of the self with creations of Māyā. It is distinct from Karma Saṁskāra, which is nothing but

an effect, left on the mind by various mental and physical actions of the limited self.

3. Psycho-physical limitation (Māyīyamala). All that the self is associated with, because of the aforesaid two impurities, which limit its psycho-physical capacity, is technically called Māyīyamala. This is constituted by five limiting conditions of the individual subject: (i) Kalā, (ii) Niyati iii) Rāga (iv) Vidyā and (v) Kāla and the categories from Mahān to Pṛthvī. We shall discuss them in a subsequent section.

SPIRITUAL DISCIPLINE FOR FREEDOM FROM IMPURITIES.

Just as there are three impurities, so there are three distinct types of spiritual discipline to get purified from them. We have stated the impurities in descending order. The purification, however, takes place in ascending order. We shall, therefore, state the means of purification in the same order.

1. Kriyopāya is that path of liberation, in which external things, such as repetition of a certain religious formula (Mantra) is used as means of self-realisation. It is called Kriyopāya, firstly because the follower of this path has clear consciousness of both the self and the objective world, and secondly because the physical activities, such as repetition of a Mantra, are very important in it. It is the means of freedom from gross impurity of Māyā.

2. Path of contemplation (Jñānopāya). It consists in making repeated attempts at realisation of the Ultimate Unity through contemplation. Thus a man may begin with contemplation "The self alone is all this": and by repeated attempts at elimination may be able to rise to the unshakable consciousness "The Self". It is called Jñānopāya, because the mental activity of contemplation is

the most important in it. It is the means of freedom from the impurity of potential desire. For, it destroys the duality of subject and object and thus leaves no field for operation of desire.

3. Path of will (Icchopāya).

It consists in the exercise of will-power, without any serious effort at contemplation, to realise the Ultimate reality. It is the highest means and is responsible for freedom from the greatest impurity.

4. Path of grace (Anupāya).

For fuller information about these the reader may refer to "Abhinavagupta" (182-190.)

Background Of His Metaphysics.

Rationalism is concerned with the explanation of the why, the what and the wherefrom of the entire field of experience. Abhinava is not a rationalist of the Kantian type, according to whom metaphysics is not possible. On the contrary, he belongs to the Hegelian type and devotes serious attention to the problem of ultimate origin and nature of the world of experience.

He completely rejects logical realism of Nyāya and atomistic pluralism of Vaiśeṣika both in details and fundamentals. He holds that these systems present only the layman's point of view. His difference from the Realistic Dualism of the Sāṅkhya, the subjective Idealism of the Bauddha and the monistic Idealism of the Vedānta, is confined to the fundamentals only. He incorporates in his system the twentyfour categories and the Puruṣa of Sāṅkhya, the doctrine of momentariness of the Bauddha and the Māyā of the Vedāntin with suitable modifications.

He rejects dualism and pluralism in all forms, because they present an unbridgeable gulf between the self and the

not-self. If the subject and the object are completely cut off from each other, are of nature, essentially different from each other, and have mutually exclusive and independent existence, they can as little meet each other as can the two logs, which are being carried by two currents, which separately lose themselves in the sands.

In regard to the Buddhistic doctrine of momentariness his position is slightly different. He accepts Buddhistic doctrine of momentariness of ideas, but rejects the doctrine of momentariness of the subject. For, if there be no permanent subject, capable of retaining the memory of objective ideas, if the subject be momentary and, therefore, were to disappear with the disappearance of each idea, the unification of ideas, necessary for consciousness of a combined whole, would be impossible.

Similarly in regard to the Vedantic conception of the Māyā he holds that it is wrong to say that Māyā is neither of the nature of being nor that of not-being and, therefore, indefinable. For, the Vedāntin lands himself into contradiction when he says that this indefinable is the cause of the phenomenal world. Is not the assertion that Māyā is the cause of phenomenal world, in itself a definition ? He. therefore, holds the Māyā to be real, as power of the Ultimate, and maintains identity of power and its possessor. We will deal with this point in detail in its proper context.

He was very much influenced in his conception of the transcendental categories by the Indian Philosophy of Grammar. He recognises Bhartrhari, the author of the Vākyapadīyam, a very authoritative work on the Philosophy of Grammar, to be a great authority and frequently quotes from this work to support his own views. He, however, naturally follows the view of Somānanda, as presented in the third chapter of the Śiva Dṛṣṭi that Parā is distinct from

and not identical with Paśyantī, as Bhartṛhari maintained in his Vākyapadīyam. For, Bhartṛhari admitted only three aspects of speech (Vāk) (Trayyā vācaḥ param padam. V.P. 115) and recognition of Parā, as distinct from Paśyantī, by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa and his followers, was due to the influence of the Śaivāgama, as pointed out by Professor Surya Narayana Shukla in his commentary on theVākya Padiyam P. 97. Accordingly Abhinavagupta uses the word 'Parā' as synonymous with Svātantrya Śakti, Pratyavamarśa, Vimarśa, Sphurattā and Mahāsattā. He identifies Māyā with Parā Vāk and calls it Mahāmāyā at the transcendental level. Similarly he identifies Paśyantī with the third category "Sadāśiva" of the monistic Śaivaism.

RATIONALISTIC CONCEPTION OF THE ABSOLUTE.

Abhinavagupta was a mystic. And the tradition, as recorded by his followers and commentators, tells us that he had realised the Absolute. And the spiritual discipline, as we have stated already, was concerned, according to him, only with the removal of impurities. Mystic experience, therefore, he held to be nothing but realisation of the *Self*, free from all impurities, which constitute the individuality of the individual self. This implies the identity of the individual and the universal in essential nature. This means that the universal is essentially the same as the individual. His conception of the Universal, the Absolute, is therefore, based upon the analysis of human mind.

The analysis of human mind reveals two undeniable aspects of it.

1. It receives reflection of, or is affected by, external object, no less than by the residual traces of past experience. In this aspect, it is simply a substratum of the psychic

images, which are merely its modes or forms, due to either external objects, as at the time of perception, or the revived residual traces as at the time of remembrance, imagination and dream. Abhinavagupta is not an Empiricist; the effect of an external stimulus on the mind, therefore, according to him, is not like that of seal on wax. On the contrary, it is like that of an external object on a clear mirror. The point that the analogy of mirror is intended to bring out, is that mind shows the affection as one with itself, without losing its purity or separate entity. The point of distinction, however, between the mirror and the mind is that the former, in order to receive reflection, requires an external light to illumine it. A mirror in darkness does not reflect any image. But the latter is self-luminous. It receives reflection independently of external illuminator. Thus the first aspect of mind is that it is a self-luminous entity, which receives reflections and makes them shine as identical with itself. This aspect is technically called "Prakāśa".

2. The other aspect of mind is that it knows itself in all its purity, as in the case of mystic experience; it is free to analyse and synthetise the varying affections; it retains these affections in the form of residual traces; it takes out, at will, anything out of the stock of memory to reproduce a former state, as in the case of remembrance; it creates an altogether new construct, as in the case of imagination. This aspect is technically called "Vimarśa". This is the characteristic aspect of human mind. For, it is this which distinguishes mind from such self-shining things as crystal and Maṇi etc.

Thus human mind is self-luminous and self-conscious. It shines independently and knows that it so shines. And because there is identity of the individual and the universal

mind or the Absolute, the Absolute, therefore, is Self-shining and Self-conscious.

Admission of Vimarśa or self-consciousness in the Absolute by the Śaiva, is the point of distinction between the Śaiva and the Vedāntic conception of the Ultimate Reality. The latter holds that the Brahman is Śānta i. e. without any activity. It is static and not dynamic. It is self-shining but not self-conscious. For, all consciousness is activity and, therefore, self-consciousness also is an activity and as such would disturb the peace, (Śānti) perfect restfulness, the inactivity. The Brahman is indeterminate (Nirvikalpa) And, therefore, thinking that admission of self-consciousness, would mean admission of determinacy, the Vedāntin holds the Brahman to be self-shining only (Śuddha Cinmātra).

The Śaiva maintains that the Absolute is not only self-shining but also self-conscious and at the same time maintains it to be indeterminate (Nirvikalpa). He explains his position as follows —

Determinacy (Vikalpa) consists (i) in unifying a multiplicity into unity, as when a person combines a number of simple percepts into a complex whole (ii) in contradistinguishing the object of cognition "this" from "not this" (iii) in interpreting a stimulus in a variety of ways and accepting one interpretation to be correct[1] and rejecting others as incorrect. Thus determinacy in all cases is dependent on the consciousness of multiplicity either for unification or for consciousness of distinction. Therefore, in the case of absence of consciousness of multiplicity determinacy is not possible. Since in the case of transcendental self-consciousness there is nothing to be contradistinguished from Self,

1. B. V. Mss. 477. (1, 6, 1.)

as there is no "not-being" from which "being" is to be distinguished, it cannot be spoken of as determinate consciousness.

But one may say that the conception of determinacy, as given above, is not traditional but original. For, tradition recognises determinacy to consist in the use of expression (Sābhilāpaṁ Vikalpākhyam). And because in the case of transcendental self-consciousness there is the use of the expression "Aham" or "I", how can its determinacy be denied ?

To this the Śaiva replies that it is only the gross expression, which is consequent on the movement of speech-organ, or the clear and distinct consciousness of expression, which brings in determinacy. But expression is not necessarily always gross. Expression (Vāk or Abhilāpa) in its ultimate form is the subtlest. This is what the grammarians speak of as "Parā vāk" and as such, identical with the Ultimate Reality. The self-consciousness that the Śaiva admits is not gross, but identical with "Parā vāk" and as such is free from all determinacy.

The Śaiva position in regard to the Absolute is that it is Unity as grasped in mystic experience. But this unity, when viewed by the eyes of logic for a rational grasp and intelligible interpretation, is conceived as it were a duality consisting of self-luminosity and self-consciousness. In reality, however, self-consciousness is as identical with self-luminosity as fire is with its so-called capacity to burn. The two are inseparable. Self-luminosity (Śiva or Prakāśa) is never without self-consciousness (Śakti or Vimarśa).

From the rationalistic point of view, therefore, the Absolute is not pure identity but identity-in-difference. This conception of the Absolute is represented in Art by a figure

one half of which represents Śiva and the other half represents Pārvatī (Ardhanārī Naṭeśvara).

CONCRETE MONISM OF THE ŚAIVA.

The Absolute of Abhinavagupta is not a pure unity. For, such a conception of the Absolute, would make the manifestation of multiplicity impossible. If there is no multiplicity in any form in the Absolute, how can it proceed from it? The multiplicity, however, which is admitted in the unity of the Absolute, is not gross or actual, but subtle or potential. It is in the form of absolute Free Will (svātantrya Śakti), which, in the state of non-manifestation, is simply subtle self-consciousness (Sūkṣma Aham Vimarśa). The multiplicity of the manifestable, is in as potential identity with the Absolute as the images, which figure in the dream of an individual subject, are with him in the wakeful state. Or if we take up a more realistic analogy, the potential manifestable multiplicity is as identical with the Absolute as the creation, that a great Yogin brings about, is with him before he actually creates.

VOLUNTARISM OF THE ŚAIVA.

Śaiva Voluntarism (Svātantryavāda) holds that the Ultimate,[1] as universal free will, manifests all from itself, in itself and by itself. All that constitutes the world of experience whether unity or diversity or unity in diversity, whether subjective or objective or the relation between them, such as that of causality or action etc., is the manifestation of the Absolute free will. The Free Will is the ultimate reality of all.

Thus the position of the voluntarist comes to this:—

1. The entire world of experience is in identity with

1. I. P. V. V., Vol. I. 3.

the Absolute, just as the object of desire of an individual subject, who is responsible for initiation of action, is identical with him.

2. What is identical with the Absolute is manifested as distinct from the same.

3. The so-called cause of manifestation in diversity and distinction is the Will.

4. The manifested diversity rests in the Ultimate itself and is essentially identical with it.

This position gives rise to the following questions :—

1. How do we know, how can we prove, that the entire world of experience rests in the Ultimate, as the voluntarist holds ?

2. If the Will manifests the world of experience externally from itself, the statement that it manifests the diversity in itself or that diversity rests on it, ceases to have much meaning. For, is it not self-contradictory to say that the world of experience is manifested as external to the Ultimate and yet it is within the Ultimate or rests in the same ?

3. The voluntarist maintains that the manifested diversity is in essential identity with the Ultimate Unity. But how can that, which has diversity, be in the relation of identity with that which is essentially a unity ? For, unity and diversity are fundamentally opposed to each other.

4. Why does the Will manifest the subjective and the objective variety ? Is the manifestation due to some cause ? If not, the diversity of manifestation should be endless or it should not at all arise.

The voluntarist answers these questions from a strict logical point of view.

1· The question "how can we get over the contradiction involved in the voluntarist's position that the Ultimate manifests the diversity externally from itself but still the diversity is within it and rests in it ?" is answered as follows :—

Consciousness of both "being" and "not-being" of the object of consciousness depends upon its being a fact of consciousness. Unless the object be a fact of consciousness, there can be no determinate cognition either of its being or of its not-being. And being a fact of consciousness means identity of the object with consciousness.

The statement that objects shine (Prakāśante) means that they are in the same relation with the consciousness as the individual subject is with the universal. Just as the individual subject, though in relation of identity with the Universal, is yet the individual, so the object of consciousness, though in identity with the consciousness, is yet an external object. Externality does not mean not-consciousness. For, that would mean its essential difference from consciousness and landing into the difficult position of the dualist : because what is not-consciousness and, therefore, does not shine, can never be made to shine. The essential nature never changes : and if it changes it is not essential. Hence, according to the voluntarist, external manifestation of the objective world does not mean that it is not-consciousness. And if it is essentially non-different from consciousness how can the essential identity of the Ultimate and its manifestation be denied ?

Thus the objective variety is represented to rest in the Ultimate conscious principle, because it shines as related

to, resting on, consciousness. It does not shine independently.

2. The manifested variety is maintained to be within the universal consciousness, because every experience is unity in multiplicity and the unification of multiplicity into unity presupposes a common basis. The Śaiva, therefore, holds that just as the objects of dream constitute a unity, only because they are within a single dreaming subject, though manifested externally from him ; so the objective world of multiplicity is a unity, because it is within one consciousness, though it is manifested externally from it. The universal consciousness is the permanent substratum of all that is objective. The objective world can have no more existence apart from it and independently of it than a reflection can from a mirror, or a dream can from the dreaming subject. The manifestation is connected with the manifesting universal consciousness exactly as rays are connected with flame. This is very much like what Plotinus says about the relation of the Ultimate Reality and its manifestation. For, he also believes that the manifested world of multiplicity is connected with the Ultimate exactly as rays are with the sun, as will be shown in the Second Volume Chapter V.

3. As regards the question, "How can the manifested diversity be in relation of identity with the Ultimate and yet not destroy its unity?" the reply of the voluntarist may be stated as follows:—

The Ultimate Unity is not an abstract unity[1] but a concrete unity. It is not only the unity of opposites, as Hegel maintains his Absolute to be, but also the unity of distincts, as Croce, improving upon Hegelian position, maintains his

1. I. P. V., Vol. II., 26.

Absolute to be. (Second Volume, Chapters XI nnd XII) If the Absolute be pure unity, the deduction or manifestation of multiplicity from it would be impossible. If there is no multiplicity in the Absolute, how can it be deduced, or proceed from it? The Śaiva rejects the pure monism of the Vedāntin on the same ground as that, on which Hegel rejects abstract monism of Spinoza.

4. In reply to the question, "Why does the Will manifest the subjective and the objective variety?" or "Is the manifestation due to some cause?" the voluntarist says that causality explains nothing. The causal explanation is pure dogmatism. For, the first cause is itself an inexplicable mystery. In fact, the voluntarist admits free Will, simply because he finds causal explanation extremely unsatisfactory. It is the essential nature (Svabhāva) of the Will to manifest itself.

ĀBHĀSAVĀDA.

Just as the Śaiva metaphysical theory is called voluntarism (Svātantryavāda) from the point of view of the Ultimate principle, so it is called Ābhāsavāda from the point of view of manifested variety. In the Absolute, the entire variety, that we find in the objective world, is in a state of perfect unity, exactly as the whole variety of colours that we find in a full-grown peacock is in a state of perfect identity in the Yolk of peacock's egg. This analogy, which is very frequently employed in the Śaiva literature to explain the absolute unity of all variety in the Ultimate, is technically called "Mayūrāṇḍa rasa nyāya".

All that emanates from or is manifested by the Absolute is called Ābhāsa, for the simple reason that it is a manifestation and, therefore, has some sort of imperfec-

tion or limitation. Thus even the highest category "Śiva"[1] or "universal being" is an Ābhāsa, because it has limitation, inasmuch as it represents a disturbance in the absolute unity of the Absolute. It represents coming into predominance of one aspect. It represents the "Prakāśa" aspect of the Absolute. It is self-luminous mirror, in which everything is reflected. It is the background of the entire variety that can ever come within experience. It is the "I" in relation to which alone things, that shine in consciousness, can do so. This is an undeniable presupposition of all experience. It is the presupposition even of its denial.

But this light, the "I" is only self-luminous. It represents an analytical view of the Absolute. It represents only self-luminosity of the Absolute and not its conscious aspect. It represents Self in Self-consciousness. "Self" and "Consciousness", however, are inseparable. There can be no self without consciousness, nor can there be consciousness without self. The two are always in union, just as fire and its capacity to burn are. The category of "Being" is accepted by Hegel also as the highest category, because the idea of "Being" is the most common idea, that the logical mind can think of. The Śaiva, however, admits it to be the highest category, because it represents the highest level of mystic experience. It is a level at which consciousness also is merged in the Self. There is no consciousness, self alone shines. It is light or flame, without the least flicker.

But there can be no self without at least potential consciousness. There can be no light without the capacity to go into waves. Consciousness, the capacity of aware-

1. I. P. V., Vol. I., 1.

ness of the Self, technically called "Śakti", is therefore admitted to be the second category.

Abhinavagupta puts the æsthetic experience at this level. We shall, therefore, deal with it in detail, in order to show what is the essential nature of the æsthetic experience and how it cannot be explained in terms of the Vedānta, in the light of which its explanation has been attempted by scholars, who have written so far on the subject. The fact is that the tradition of the Monistic Śaivaism died out very early outside Kashmir and the Vedānta acquired supreme position in the philosophic thought of India. In ignorance of Abhinava's system, therefore, scholars attempted to interpret Abhinavagupta's æsthetic theory in the light of the system, which was known to them as the best. The main object of the volumes, which are being written on Abhinavagupta, is, therefore, to revive the Monistic Śaiva tradition and to put his æsthetic theory in the proper perspective of his general philosophy.

The Category of Śakti (Consciousness) as Camatkāra

Abhinavagupta, in the course of his presentation of the essential nature of the æsthetic experience, says that it is nothing but the basic mental state (Sthāyin) which figures in the consciousness, which is free from all impediments (Vītavighna pratītigrāhyo bhāva eva Rasaḥ). And while explaining the implication[1] of "consciousness, free from impediments", he adds that it is nothing but "Camatkāra". He explains "Camatkāra" as an activity of the subject which has got merged into "Spanda", which is essentially a wonderful "Bhoga".

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 281.

Bhuñjānasya-adbhutabhogātmakaSpandāviṣṭasya"

(1) Camatkāra (2) Bhoga and (3) Spanda are very important technical terms in Abhinavagupta's philosophy.

1. He deals with the conception of "Camatkāra" in the proper contexts in his commentary on the Vivṛti of Utpalācārya on the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā at three places, in the course of his exposition of (1) "Svabhāvamavabhāsasya" (I, 5, 11). (2) "Citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā parā vāk" (1, 5, 13). (3) Pṛthagdīpaprakāśānām (II, 3, 8).

2. On the conception of "Bhoga" he writes in the course of his exposition of "Svasvarūpāparijñānamayo" (III. 1, 30). But he draws distinction between ordinary "Bhoga" and wonderful "Bhoga." The latter he calls the highest Bhoga (Paramabhoga) also. He deals with it in his Bṛhatī Vimarśinī on 1, 5, 11 and 1, 5, 12.

3. And the philosophical implication of "Spanda" is fully brought out in a branch of the Monistic Śaiva system, called by the same name "Spanda". The works on this subject are (i) Spanda Kārikā (ii) Spanda Sandoha etc.

We shall take them up one by one in the order, in which they have been mentioned here.

The Context of the Problem of Camatkāra

The problem of Camatkāra is discussed in the context of the metaphysical theory of the Śaiva. We know that the Śaiva voluntarist holds that the entire limited world emanates from the Absolute exactly as the creation of a great Yogin is manifested by him from within ; that it is perfectly independent of any material cause such as atoms, admitted by the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika ; that all that is manifested is potentially within the Absolute exactly as

the ideas, which figure in dream, are within the limited individual dreaming subject and that it is the Will, which is responsible for external manifestation of what lies within the Absolute. Further, the voluntarist maintains that the manifestable variety is within the Absolute, exactly as the jar that is intended to be produced by a potter is within him in the form of an idea. For, it is this idea which is responsible for directing his physical activity towards the production of the jar, to the exclusion of everything else. The only point, that has to be remembered in this connection, is that before the rise of the Will it is in a state of identity with the Absolute in the former and with the limited subject in the latter case.

Thus the voluntarist holds that the objective world is a manifestation of the Absolute-will. This Will, however, is nothing but the "Vimarśa" or "Āmarśa" as we have discussed in the preceding pages. The question, therefore, arises that if the Will has objective reference and as such is presentable in linguistic terms, is not this position inconsistent with the admission of the Absolute as free from all determination ?

The verse 1, 5, 11, in which the conception of Camatkāra is discussed, is a reply to the above question, which may be stated as follows :—

The Absolute is not only self-shining or self-luminous but also conscious of its luminosity. It is the consciousness that constitutes its essential nature and distinguishes it from such things as quartz (Sphaṭika) and other self-shining gems.

This "Vimarśa" is characterised by "freedom" (Svātantrya) And the Will, that the voluntarist admits, is nothing but this very Svātantrya, the perfect independence

of anything external to it, the freedom to manifest what lies potentially within it or to bring back to state of potentiality what has been actually manifested. This freedom is the essential nature of the Absolute. And the Will is nothing but this freedom. It is nothing but emergence of this freedom of the Absolute to manifest itself. At this stage, there is yet no reference to anything external. It is only a little growth in the unbroken and eternal universal Self-consciousness, inasmuch as its aspect of freedom comes into predominance. It is, therefore, not possible to attribute any determinacy to it. For, determinacy is limited consciousness, which has reference to an object with spatial and temporal limitations, as distinct from the subject. As space and time are the creations of Māyā and Freedom transcends Māyā, and as the "This" is not yet distinct from the "I" but identical with it, determinacy at this stage is out of question.

Now in this context, Utpalācārya, while stating that if the Absolute be without "Vimarśa" (freedom of Will) and be only self-luminous (Prakāśa), it would be insentient like quartz, (Sphaṭika maṇi), instead[1] of using the word "Vimarśa" uses the word "Camatkṛti". This gives Abhinavagupta an occasion to discuss the conception of Camatkāra in its metaphysical and æsthetic implications.

He starts the discussion by referring to the ordinary use of the word "Camatkāra" in the sense of Ānanda, which consists in the action of the experiencer on attaining to an enjoyable experience. And he distinguishes the technical sense, in which it is used in the Saiva philosophy, from the ordinary. He points out that "Camatkāra" in its technical implication is nothing but perfect self-conscious-

1. B. V. (Mss.) 407. (1-5-11.)

ness; i. e. consciousness of the Self, free from all limitations; it is nothing but "Vimarśa" in its universal implication, which is the most essential aspect of "Prakāśa" and which distinguishes it from self-luminous substances like gem. As such it is also called Ānanda.

The point may be elaborated as follows :—

A person, who identifies his whole being with his body and, therefore, is a limited subject, has empty stomach, is extremely hungry and is completely overwhelmed by intense desire for some eatable, which is not yet within his reach. The mental energy, the thought-power, of such a person naturally runs to eatables and cannot be centred on his personality. He is, therefore, without "Ānanda". But as soon as his belly is full, his mental energy turns back to himself and he experiences freedom from want and desire. Such a person, in ordinary language, is said to be full of "Ānanda", happiness, But human nature is such that its thought can never rest on itself. It always has some unfulfilled desire and runs after its object in order to secure it. For instance, the person, whose belly is full, will naturally think of a beautiful woman to embrace. Thus the attainment of the worldly objects of desire never brings peace, happiness, rest on one's own self or "Ānanda". For, the attainment of object of one desire either leads to a desire for another, or anxiety for its preservation, or fear of its loss. Hence the so-called "Ānanda" that a person gets on acquisition of a worldly object of desire is imperfect, because it immediately leads to other states of mind, such as that of anxiety for its preservation or desire for something else. An iota of bliss, however, which is experienced in the attainment of an object of desire, is due only to consciousness of Self for a moment, e. g. a man of fine sense of taste, when he relishes a deli-

cious dish, and does not simply devour it, but rests on the pure subjective aspect of himself as affected by particular flavour ; i. e. primarily experiences the subjective aspect, is happy, has "Ānanda" for a moment. A person in such a state of rest on his subjective aspect is technically called "Bhuñjāna".

Similarly a man of fine æsthetic susceptibility, attains to the state of rest on Self, when he sees a good drama presented on the stage. The distinction of the state of rest on Self in æsthetic experience from a similar state in the experience of flavour by a man of fine sense of taste, lies in the following facts :—

1. In the experience of taste the objectivity of flavour persists.

2. The object of taste is related to the individual subject as identified with sensitive aspect.

3. But in the case of æsthetic experience at the highest level, the objectivity is totally absent. The basic mental state (Sthāyin), which is only in the sub-conscious, has no objectivity. It is not related to the hero of drama. It is simply a revived "Vāsanā" which has sunk back into the sub-conscious. It is free from all relations, which involve duality.

4. The experiencing subject also in æsthetic experience is free from all limitations of individuality. He is universalised. His experience is free from all impediments (Vighna) which are discussed by Abhinavagupta in the course of his presentation of his æsthetic theory in his Abhinava Bhāratī and which we shall present in the next chapter.

5. Æsthetic experience involves complete elimination of objective consciousness and is characterised by predomi-

nance of the "Vimarśa", the continuous realisation of universalised "consciousness", which is called "Rasanā" "Carvaṇā" "Nirvṛti" or "Pramātṛ viśrānti". "Camatkāra", therefore, according to Abhinavagupta, is the realisation of "Consciousness" or "Vimarśa" which is inseparable from "Self-luminosity" or "Prakāśa" in its universality and, therefore, of freedom from all limitations, not once for a moment but continuously and without any impediment. This "Camatkāra" is synonymous with "Rasa", "Ānanda" and "Paramabhoga".

In conclusion, therefore, we may say that while in the case of the experience of flavour, the impediment in the form of object of experience is there ; in the case of the æsthetic experience such an impediment is totally absent. Though the residual trace of what is presented on the stage and occasions æsthetic experience is undeniable ; yet the person, possessed of fine æsthetic susceptibility, rises above such residual traces, does not let them remain in the fore-ground of consciousness and, therefore, is able to experience "Paramānanda".

We know that the second category of the Śaiva is characterised by predominance of "Vimarśa" and that Vimarśa is synonymous with "Ānanda" and "Paramabhoga". Now that the preceding discussion has shown that "Camatkāra" and "Rasanā" are identical with "Vimarśa" the view of Abhinavagupta that æsthetic experience belongs to the level of the second category of the Śaiva, the Śakti, is beyond doubt. That this was the philosophical background of his theory of æsthetics is made clear by himself in the course of his exposition of Camatkāra, where he explicitly refers to the Abhinava Bhāratī and his view on Rasa, presented in it.

Śaiva Conception of Bhoga.

The Śaiva conception of "Bhoga" is discussed in the Tattva Saṅgrahādhikāra of (i) the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā (ii) a commentary thereon, called Vivṛti, by Utpalācārya and (iii) two commentaries on the above, called Vimarśinī and Vivṛti Vimarśinī, by Abhinavagupta. In this section, as the title indicates, a bird's eye view of the system is given. It begins with the presentation of the Absolute in relation to the conditions of "Bhoga", the experience of pleasure and pain, by individual subject. It discusses (i) the rise of individual subject (ii) the qualities (Guṇas) which characterise it and (iii) the experiences to which it is subjected as a consequence of the limitations, "Bhoga". We shall take up these points one by one.

The Absolute in the Context of "Bhoga".

The Absolute in the context of "Bhoga" is technically called "Maheśvara", "Supreme Lord". He is one. He is the self-consciousness of all the sentients. As such He is not a totality of individual self-consciousnesses. On the contrary, He is the one unbroken Self-Consciousness that experiences all the forms of "this" as reflected on Himself and, therefore, as shining identical with Himself. He experiences all the variety and multiplicity as identical with Himself. His experience is "I am this" "Ahamidam". He experiences "This" not as something external to Himself but as His own manifestation. He is identity in difference, unity in multiplicity and Universal in individual. He is the manifester of the manifested in the field of knowledge and action. All the multiplicity is in Him exactly as are the ideas in the individual mind.

The fact that He is the self-consciousness of all

sentient beings is established as follows :—

It is a fact of experience that the insentients do not shine independently. The supposition that they do so is beyond experience and as such it is inadmissible. Whenever and wherever the insentients shine, they are related to self-consciousness, they rest on it. The insentients, therefore, are without self-consciousness. The sentients alone possess it. This self-consciousness, as such, is identical with the universal and is free from temporal and spatial limitations; for, they apply to what is objective in nature, such as body and vital airs, which, as we have just stated, do not shine independently. How can they, which have no independent "being", delimit that, on which their being depends? Thus, the Absolute, the universal self-consciousness, Maheśvara, is the self-consciousness in all the sentients. He is "free", He manifests within Himself all the multiplicity that is referred to as "this" and, therefore, He is perfect (Pūrṇa), because the whole of "This" is within Him and shines as identical with and not as external to Him.[1]

The Individual Subjects.

Here the following question arises :—

If the Absolute (Maheśvara) is the self-consciousness in all the sentients and is free from limitation, there is no question of bondage, for liberation from which the Śaiva system is propounded?

This is replied as follows :—

The process of manifestation is the process of concretisation of the Universal. And concretisation means the rise of distinction, differentiation and limitation. It means splitting up of the unity into multiplicity, breaking of "this" into

1. I. P. V., Vol. II, 250-1.

"thises". Amongst "Thises" there are body, intellect (Buddhi) and vital airs (Prāṇa). The concretisation of the Universal self-consciousness consists in identification with the multiplicity of "thises" severally and consequent rise of multiplicity of self-consciousnesses as limited by different bodies, intellects and vital airs. It involves ignorance of the essential and true nature of self-consciousness. It is what is technically called "Svarūpākhyāti". This ignorance of the essential nature of Self-consciousness and identification with body etc., constitutes the individual subject. As there is multiplicity of objects of identification so there is multiplicity of individual subjects. They are in bondage, because they are ignorant of the real nature of self-consciousness. The system, therefore, is meant for their liberation.

The Qualities of Individual Subjects.

We know that, according to the Śaiva, the Absolute, in the context of knowledge and action (Jñāna and Kriyā), has three powers (i) of knowledge (ii) of action and (iii) of obscuration or concretisation (Jñāna, Kriyā, Māyā). When, therefore, the universal individualises or concretises, as we have explained in the preceding section, these universal powers also get delimited and are called not powers but qualities (i) Sattva (ii) Rajas and (iii) Tamas.

Power and quality Distinguished.

If Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are nothing more than the powers of Maheśvara, with the only distinction that they are limited in the case of the individual subjects, the question arises "Why are they looked upon as distinct from the individual subject, and are not called powers (Śaktayaḥ)

but qualities[1] (Guṇas) ?"

Reply may be stated as follows :—

While the Naiyāyikas maintain the power and its possessor to be essentially distinct from each other, the Śaivas hold them to be identical (Śakti Śaktimatorabhedaḥ). Further, the characteristic of the powers of knowledge and action is that their manifestations are not distinct from but identical with them. It is their essential nature to manifest their objects without any gap or intermission and their objects are identical with them. Therefore, if Sattva, Rajas and Tamas were accepted to be the powers of individual subjects (i) their knowledge and action would have to be admitted to be eternal and without any gap, but they are not so, (ii) freedom of the individual subject from them would have been impossible, because power and its possessor are identical and inseparable (iii) The last twenty-three categories of the Śaiva (Manas, Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, ten senses, five subtle and five gross elements) are the effects or manifestations of Sattva etc. But if the Sattva etc. were powers of the individual and as such identical with him, the world of nature would have been regarded as manifestation of the individual and would have shone as identical with and not as distinct from him. In such a case he would cease to be individual and would be Maheśvara. The Śaivas, therefore, admit Sattva etc. to be qualities and not powers. The distinction between them consists in this that while the latter are identical with the possessor, the former are distinct or separate from and external to the subject; they are only the means (Upakaraṇa). In the context of discussion on the individual subject, whose individuality is due to non-recognition of his true nature, Sattva etc. are to be regarded as qualities and not as powers.

1. I. P. V., Vol. II. 255-6

SATTVA, RAJAS AND TAMAS AND PLEASURE, PAIN AND SENSELESSNESS.

We have stated in an earlier section that the powers of knowledge, action and obscuration (Jñāna, Kriyā and Māyā) of the Absolute appear in the case of the individual subjects as Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. This point is presented in a subsequent verse in another way as follows:—

The Supreme Lord is free to be[1] (Bhavane Svatantraḥ). This freedom to be is technically called "Sattā" "Sphurattā" and is inseparable from consciousness "Vimarśa" which refers to nothing else than this very freedom to be and, therefore, may be called "action" (Kriyā). Action in this context includes the activity of knowing also. For, the difference between Jñāna and Kriyā is confined to greater predominance of the objective manifestation in the case of the latter than in that of the former. This very Vimarśa is called Ānanda also, inasmuch as it refers to nothing external and is characterised by the rest on the inseparable aspect of itself, "Prakāśa" or "Sattā".

Now in the case of individual subject, the inseparable "Prakāśa" and Vimarśa" or "Sattā" and "Ananda" appear as its qualities, because they are obscured by Māyā, so that there is negation of both "Sattā" and "Ānanda". The limited appearance of Sattā and Ananda in individual subject is the quality of Sattva. It is limited light of knowledge. It has limited objective reference. It illumines some object to the exclusion of the rest. This much is due to the limited "Prakāśa" aspect. But "Prakāśa" is inseparable from Vimarśa: and Vimarśa, resting on "Prakāśa", is "Ānanda". Therefore, the other

1. I. P. V., Vol. II. 257-8.

aspect manifests itself in the form of rest of the conscious aspect of individual on his limited self. This rest is distinct from that of the Supreme Lord on Himself, which is technically called "Ānanda". To distinguish it from "Ānanda" it is called "Sukha". Thus "Sattva" is limited self-luminosity and limited illumination of the objective world. In so far as it represents the aspect of "Prakāśa" and "Sukha", it represents the aspect of "Ānanda".

"Tamas" is complete obscuration of both, "Sattā" and "Ānanda" in their limited manifestation. It is, therefore, characterised by absence of both the limited light of knowledge and Sukha. It is utter darkness, total ignorance. It is a negative quality. It is negation of both pleasure and pain. It is utter senselessness.

Rajas is the mixture of the two. In it light and darkness are in union. In it being and not-being shine together exactly as do light and shade in a picture or as various colours do in the plumage of a peacock. It is characterised by restlessness and therefore, it is of the nature of pain. For, pain is nothing but absence of rest. It is not purely negative. It has positive element also in it. It is action inasmuch as it is a combination of being and not-being and, therefore, involves succession, which is the chief characteristic of action.

Pleasure and pain have objective reference. In pleasure the object shines in all its aspects, desired by the perceiving subject. Thus we are pleased when we see our sons possessed of all the qualities which we desire in them. But when we see them suffering from some ailment and do not find them in perfect health, as we desire them to be, we are pained. In the former case there is the consciousness of "being" only. In the latter case consciousness of "being" is mixed up with that of "not-being".

Qualities of Individual Subject and "Bhoga".

Thus "Bhoga" is nothing but experience of pleasure, pain and senselessness, which are forms of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas respectively. It is due to the ignorance, on the part of individual subject, of his essential nature, of his identity with the Supreme Lord. The Śaiva draws a distinction between "Bhoga" and "Parama Bhoga". The former is the experience of limited subject and consists in pleasure, pain and senselessness. The latter is the experience of universal subject. It has no objective reference. It is perfect rest of the Universal within Himself.

The Conclusion.

The aim of our presentation of the Śaiva conception of the Absolute and its first two manifestations, Śiva and Śakti, was to determine the spiritual level at which Abhinavagupta places the æsthetic experience. These discussions justify our position that he was influenced in his exposition of the theory of Æsthetics by the Śaiva system and not by the Vedānta. And our object in presenting the Śaiva conception of qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas was to show that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, who explained æsthetic experience in terms of predominance of "Sattva" and identified it with "Ānanda" failed to grasp the true nature of Æsthetic experience. For, if his conclusion be accepted the æsthetic experience would belong to the sphere of Māyā, because the qualities, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, are the constituents of Māyā, according to the Vedāntin, whom he follows.

According to Abhinavagupta, æsthetic experience is a transcendental experience. It does not belong to the sphere of Māyā. It does not admit of explanation in terms of qualities of individual subject. It is beyond Sattva and its

predominance. It is free from all qualities. It is the experience of itself by the Universal. It is the rest of one aspect of the Absolute on the other. It is consciousness, free from all external reference and resting on its inseparable aspect, the "Self", and as such it is "Ānanda",

LIMITATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT.

In an earlier section we have stated that individuality is due to identification of the Universal Subject with the limited objective manifestations, such as body, vital airs and intellect (Buddhi) etc. and that the powers of the Universal are obscured by Māyā. The question, therefore, that arises is "How can the individual know and act if the powers of knowledge and action are completely obscured ?" To answer this the Śaiva admits five limiting conditions of the individual subject (i) Kalā (ii) Vidyā (iii) Rāga (iv) Niyati and (v) Kāla.

1. *Kalā.* (Limited power of action.)

Māyā obscures the true nature of the subject. It brings about the state of deep dreamless sleep as it were in him. Under its influence, therefore, his powers of knowledge and action are as it were non-existent. But this would mean reducing him to the level of the insentient object and, therefore, reign of complete darkness in the world. The Saiva, therefore, admits five categories, which we have stated above. They are the limited powers of individual subject and constitute his limiting conditions. Kalā is the first of them. It is the limited power of the subject to act. The subject and his limited power to act are not in inextricable union with each other. They simply embrace each other, so that when a person rises to a higher spiritual level through spiritual discipline, this embrace is relaxed and he attains freedom from it. Kalā can, thus, operate only

in connection with the subject, exactly as a seed can develop only in contact with earth, air, and water etc. It is a product of Māyā alone and not a joint product of both Māyā and limited subject. For, the subject as such is changeless and the material cause[1] can produce an effect only through a modification of itself. It is the causal agent which prompts the limited subject to definite acts. Dawn of knowledge of distinction between this limiting condition (Kalā) and the subject that is delimited by it, enables the latter to transcend the level of Māyā and to attain freedom from the bondage of Karma. The knowledge of distinction between Kalā and the limited subject is distinct from that[2] between "Buddhi" and "Puruṣa" as conceived by the Sāṅkhya. The latter, according to the Saiva, does not mean freedom from the bondage of Karma and attainment of a spiritual level beyond Māyā.

Kalā, as accepted by the Saiva, is the metaphysical recognition and explanation of the limited reach of human action. Man, howsoever great, can accomplish only certain things and not all. This fact, in Śaiva terminology, is due to the limited power to act, because of the limiting condition constituted by Kalā, which partly restores to the limited subject his power to act, which is at first completely obscured by Māyā. The word "Kalā" in Sanskrit means a part. It is, for instance, used for the sixteenth part of the total luminosity of the moon. It is used by the Śaiva to signify a part of the total universal power of action operative in humanity.

2. *Vidyā* (Limited Power Of Knowledge)

But action has objective reference. It presupposes a knowledge of the object, towards which it is directed. The

1. T. A. Ah. IX. 138. 2. T. A. Ah., IX. 140-1.

Śaiva, therefore, admits another limiting condition of the subject, which restores to it the limited power of knowledge, technically called "Vidyā". It distinguishes the technique, which the Saiva adopts for explaining the phenomenon of knowledge, from that, followed by the Sāṅkhya, which may be stated as follows :—

The Sāṅkhya explains the phenomena of knowledge in terms of (i) Puruṣa (ii) Buddhi (iii) senses and (iv) external objects.

1. "Puruṣa" the sentient subject, is the principle of pure sentiency. It remains unaffected by the affection of Buddhi It is inactive. It simply shines.

2. Buddhi is made up of three qualities (Sattva, Rajas and Tamas). It is like a mirror, which is capable of receiving reflection on both sides, so that reflection on one side can meet that on the other. Buddhi, thus, is the meeting ground of the light of Puruṣa,[1] coming from one side, and of the reflection of the external object coming from the other. But external objective reflections fall on Buddhi only in succession. Because Buddhi is enveloped in the darkness of Tamas. And Rajas is able to remove the veil only partly, so that Sattva, though in itself luminous all round, is able to receive the reflections of external objects only in succession, according as they come within the focus. Thus knowledge, according to the Sāṅkhya, is nothing but reflection of external object on Buddhi, illumined by the light of Puruṣa, coming from within.

But the Śaiva admits vidyā, because the technique of the Sāṅkhya, cannot explain determinacy in knowledge, or consciousness of distinction of one affection from another. For, consciousness of distinction presupposes a comparison

1. I. P. V., Vol. I., 72–6.

of the present affection with the past. Buddhi, however, being insentient, cannot do this. The reflection of the light of Puruṣa on it cannot be supposed to bring sentiency to it, exactly as the reflected fire cannot bring to mirror the capacity to burn. It is Vidyā, the sentient principle of limited knowledge, which alone can explain the consciousness of distinction and determinacy. It is an active principle and not passive like the mirror of Buddhi. It apprehends what is reflected on Buddhi. It revives the residual traces of similar past experiences, compares them with the[1] present, recognises distinction of the latter from the former and thus brings determinacy and certainty to it. It is the subjective means of discrimination and determination of the affection of Buddhi.

3. Rāga (General Objective Desire)

We have shown above that "Vidyā" is accepted as a limiting condition of the individual subject to account for the objective reference, involved in his limited action. But individual act has definite objective reference. It implies choice of one object to the exclusion of the rest. To explain this the Śaiva admits another limiting condition, called "Rāga". It is innate tendency to objective relation. The idea will become clear if we draw a distinction between Rāga[2] Tattva of the Śaiva and Rāga, as admitted by the Sāṅkhya.

(i) Rāga Tattva, as the Śaiva admits it, is desire with general objective reference and without reference to any specific object. It is a mere feeling of want in general, without clear consciousness of the wanted. It expresses itself as "May something happen to me" (Kiñcin me bhūyāt).

1. T.A.Ah. IX., P. 151.
2. T.A.Ah. IX. P. 157-8.

(11) But "Rāga" as admitted by the Sāṅkhya, is merely an attribute of Buddhi (Buddhi Dharma). It is negation of freedom from attachment to the objective world. It is attachment to definite objects. It has direct reference to definite things so as to be responsible for definite desire, such as desire for food, water, wine and woman etc.

Thus, Rāga of the Sāṅkhya is a further stage in the development of Rāga Tattva of the Śaiva, which itself grows out of Icchāmala. The relation of the three conceptions with one another may be stated by means of the analogy of seed, sprout and plant. The first is the seed, the second is the sprout and the third is the full grown plant.

This conception of Rāga Tattva is closely related to the Śaiva conception of final emancipation (Mokṣa). According to the Śaiva, detachment from the objective world (Vairāgya) is also an attitude of the subject and, therefore, it is Rāga and not true Vairāgya. It does not mean true or perfect emancipation, but only partial. It raises the individual above the level of nature (Prakrti), but it does not mean freedom from all limitations. True freedom is realised only when the individual is free from even the Icchāmala. This point we have discussed in Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study.

All emotions, of which Bharata talks, whether they be basic or transient, arise from[1] this innate tendency or inclination towards the objective world.

4. *Niyati* (SUBJECTION TO CAUSAL LAW).

Human action always aims at an effect. But in the production of the intended, humanity is not free. Man cannot produce any effect out of any thing. He is subjected to causal law. This subjection to causal law is technically called Niyati and as such it is a limiting

condition of the individual subject. Thus, if he desires to have a mango he has to look for mango-seed, and to grow it in accordance with the causal law, before he can have the desired fruit.

(v) KĀLA (TIME).

The word kāla is used in Śaiva philosophy for (1) An aspect of the omnipotence of the Absolute, (2) A limiting condition of the subject and (3) A standard of measure. As an aspect of the omnipotence of the Absolute, it is the power, which is responsible for succession or simultaneity in the manifested. As such it is called[1] Kāla Śakti. This philosophical conception is represented in Hindu religion as goddess Kālī. As a limiting condition of individual subject, it is his limited power, which experiences succession[2] at first in what he identifies himself with, such as body, vital air and Buddhi etc., and then attributes succession to external objects of experience, according as they happen to be apprehended together with a certain link in the chain of subjective consciousness. It is very much like "time" which Kant represents to be a form of sensibility. It is a determination or relation, which is inherent in the form of intuition only and, therefore, in the subjective nature of our mind. Without it such a predicate as time would never be ascribed to anything. It does not have an independent objective existence. It is not a determination or relation of things such as would belong to them even if they were not perceived.

TIME AS A STANDARD OF MEASURE.

Time, as a standard of measure, is merely a concept, which is based on a construct, that is unity in multiplicity. We observe certain phenomena happening in a regular

1. B. V., (MSS). 864. 3--1--9.
2. T. A., Ah. VI, 6.

order. We accept them as standards of measure. There are other things which happen without any regularity. The latter we measure in terms of the former. The judgement consequently reached is "A is six years old". Taking a concrete instance to make the point clear, we would put the proposition as follows:—

X sees the sun rising at a particular spot and setting at another. This happens with absolute regularity. He sees other events which lack this regularity. For instance, he sees a student going to college. It means his seeing the student as associated with different places. This lacks regularity. But he wants to get a correct idea of the irregular succession, involved in going. He, therefore, puts it before his mind's eye by the side of the regular succession, involved in the movement of the sun, measures it in terms of the latter and says: "He takes two hours to reach college." Thus we find that the concept of time is based upon a construct, which is unity in multiplicity; the latter inasmuch as it is made up of the successive manifestations of the sun, as associated with different spots, and those of X as appearing at different points of space; and the former because the whole forms one object of apprehension. Thus we find that in the case of time, only multiplicity exists outside but the unity exists only within.

We talk of time in a number of ways, We talk of hours, days and weeks etc.. We also talk of quickness and slowness, priority and posteriority, and present, past and future. These sub-concepts are also, like the general concept of time, based on a mental construct of the same nature. For instance, when a person says: "X studies for 2 hours" he is calculating the activity of X in terms of that of the sun. The only thing to be remembered in this connection

is that because of long established convention, the movement of the latter over a fixed distance is called 'hour'. Similarly, when one says, "X will go", one relates the possible activity of one's own vital airs with that of the possible movement of X. Thus in all experiences of time, it is found that the activities of two things are related.

Levels Of Experience.

We have shown that Æsthetic experience, according to Abhinavagupta, belongs to the second level of spiritual experience, the level of Śakti, Ānanda, Vimarśa or Spanda. In order to show the comparative distinction of æsthetic experience from others, it is necessary to state briefly what other levels are recognised by him. Broadly speaking he recognises five levels. (i) Wakeful (Jāgrat) (ii) Dream (Svapna) (iii) Deep sleep (Suṣupti) (iv) Transcendental (Turīya) and (v) Pure (Turīyātīta). Distinction of one level from another depends primarily upon the experiencing subject (Pramātā). Of these five levels of experience, the last two belong to the universalised subject; and the first three belong to the individual subject.

We have shown (1) that the individual is essentially the Universal, but for the ignorance of its essential nature and the consequent loss of the universal powers of knowledge and action, the loss of perfect freedom (Svātantrya) (ii) that this does not mean fall to the level of insentiency, but that the universal powers of knowledge, action and obscuration or ignorance (Jñāna, Kriyā and Māyā) are manifested in limited form as Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, which account for experiences of pleasure, pain and senselessness (Sukha, Duḥkha and Moha.) and (iii) that the limiting conditions of individuality are the five covers or sheaths, Kalā, Vidyā. Rāga, Niyati and Kāla, which account for its limited powers of action, determinacy in experience,

attachment to the objective, consciousness of and obedience to causal law and consciousness of temporal succession respectively.

SUBJECT IN DEEP SLEEP: (ŚŪNYA PRAMĀTĀ).

The constitution of the subject is different at different levels. The most simple and undeniable experience, that the limited subject has, is that of deep sleep (Suṣupti). And as the distinction of the transcendental state (Turīya) from deep sleep is just on one point, let us discuss the constitution of the subject in the experience of deep sleep.

We know that when a person wakes up from deep sleep, he recollects his experience and expresses it as "I knew nothing" "I had good sleep" (Na kiñcidavedişam: Sukham aham asvāpsam). These are two distinct experiences and, therefore, are related to two personalities, which are merged into one. This fact will at once be recognised if we distinguish between deep sleep and fainting fit. For, in the latter case there is no experience of pleasure (Sukha). It is on the basis of duality of personality and consequent duality of experience that deep sleep is recognised[1] to possess two aspects (i) total negation of objective experience and (ii) experience of pleasure. Let us first consider the negative aspect in terms of the constituents of personality.

Personality that experiences the negation in deep sleep is limited. The limitation is constituted by an impurity, which is technically called Āṇavamala. There are two aspects of it (i) loss or complete obscuration of freedom of will (Svātantryahāni) and (ii) ignorance of it also. Each of the two is responsible for the rise of a separate personality. We remember that the Absolute has two aspects (1) Self and (2) Consciousness or freedom

1. B.V. (Mss). 878. 3-2-1.

of will (Prakāśa and Vimarśa or Svātantrya). When the Absolute free will, which in the sphere of duality is technically called Māyā, obscures its aspect of consciousness, there remains only the self or Prakāśa without consciousness or Vimarśa i.e. freedom of will. There is multiplicity of such selves. They are not universal, but limited beings. These beings correspond to the Buddhistic conception of the subject, technically called Ālaya Vijñāna. And because they are "Prakāśa" without "Vimarśa", they are technically called "Vijñana kevala". At this stage there is no consciousness of loss or obscuration of the power of free will. Attainment of this stage is recognised by the Bauddhas to be liberation (Mokṣa or Kaivalya).

But when the other aspect of Āṇavamala, the ignorance of freedom of will, is operative, there arises a different personality, which is characterised by negation of knowledge (Ajñāna or Abodha). It is completely dissociated from the objective world, and, therefore, it is contentless, empty or blank. And as such it is called 'Śūnya Pramātā, It is constituted by the Self as identified with absence of knowledge (Ajñāna),

The idea of 'Śūnya Pramātā' will become clear to the students of the western philosphy, if we compare it with Hegel's conception of natural soul which may be stated as follows :—

Hegelian system is a system of triads : but the whole system itself is concerned with a single triad of (i) Idea (ii) Nature and (iii) Spirit. This triad represents three stages of the mind.

I. The primal mind, the mind as it is before the manifestation of the world, the mind, which is entirely abstract, is the subject matter of his Logic.

2. Nature, which is the expression or manifestation of the Mind into its opposite, the mindless, the irrational, the crude external world, is the subject matter of his Philosophy of Nature.

3. The Spirit, which has three stages, (a) Subjective (b) Objective and (c) Absolute, is dealt with in his Phenomenology of Mind.

In his Phenomenology of mind he takes up the problem of soul. According to Hegel, soul is the first manifestation of Spirit. It is the first stage of the subjective spirit, the human mind, viewed subjectively as the mind of an individual Subject. It is a stage that precedes both "Consciousness" and "mind". It is the lowest conceivable phase of the Spirit. It is a stage that manifests itself into three stages. (l) Natural soul (ii) Feeling soul and (iii) Actual soul. It is so rudimentary a stage that it has not yet reached sense-perception. It is hardly recognisable as human. It is hardly above the level of mere animality.

Hegel seems to start the analysis of the human mind at the point where life for the first time becomes manifest in the human body in mother's womb. His soul represents a stage just above that of mere animality and just below that whereiń the perception develops. The soul level in itself involves three levels, as has just been stated. Its position in the Phenomenology of mind is just like that of "Being" in the Logic and of "Space" in the Philosophy of nature,

The first starting point of the spirit is the Natural soul. It is immediate and, therefore, can be characterised as mere "being", free from all determinations. Nothing can be said of it excepting that it "is". If we remember the instance that Hegel gives of the second stage of the soul, the feeling

soul, namely, that of the child in mother's womb when its feelings are not its own but those of the mother, we may justly say that Hegel had the child in the womb before the development of feeling as his illustration of the first stage. At the first stage, the soul is entirely empty and homogeneous. It has no distinction of any kind. It is mere homogeneous Blank. It has no distinction within itself. It has no conscious relation to anything. It is undifferentiated unity. No category is applicable to it, excepting that of being. There is no consciousness of anything external to it. It is for itself the totality of all existence.

At the next stage, however, there is the slight rise of distinction within it. The mode, in which it is affected by the environment, appears within it as the mode of its being, as the quality which it has.

But the mode of affection may change. The consciousness of this change in the mode of affection is the third, the stage of physical alteration. Hegel compares the first stage in the appearance of the soul, with the next two. While in the former case the soul is entirely empty, a mere blank, in the latter case there is implicit distinction between the soul, as mere blank, and the affections of the environment, which appear first as physical quality and then as physical alterations within it. The former is the state of deep dreamless sleep, and the latter is the state of waking. As the distinction between the empty, or blank, and the affection of the environment grows, there is the rise of sensations and feelings, of course, in a sense different from that in the ordinary use.

Thus the soul is distinguished into (i) immediate being, blank and undifferentiated homogeneous universality and (ii) content, sensations and feelings, a multiplicity of diversified particulars. The coalescence of these two is the actual

soul. It arises from realising by the soul of distinction between itself as such and what belongs to its environment and regarding the content as not something alien to itself but itself.

The soul, therefore, according to Hegel, in its immediacy, is a mere blank, an undifferentiated homogeneous universality. The question, therefore, of plurality in regard to it cannot arise. As such it is the same in all without any distinction. The apparent plurality of souls is due to the coalescence or identification of the blank with the limiting conditions.

Inconsistency of Hegel.

Hegel seems to be inconsistent in his conception of the first stage of the soul. On the one hand he speaks of it as immediate and, therefore, having no characteristic except that of being; having no distinction within it; not mediated by anything outside it and, therefore, free from all relations. On the other hand, he talks of it as blank and empty. "Being" and "Blank" or "empty" are ideas of the opposite nature. "Being" is positivity; blank or empty is negation. The former is immediacy, The latter is mediation. Negation without reference to something negated is meaningless and inconceivable. Negation has both a substratum and a positive counterpart which is negated.

Further, if the natural soul be immediate, how can it be distinguished from the Absolute? And if it be non-different from the Absolute, how can the various modes in which it is affected by its environment, appear in it as qualities which it has? How can there be the awareness of distinction of one mode of environmental affection from another, so that at a subsequent moment there be the

awareness of physical alterations ? On the contrary, there should be the experience of perfect identity with all.

Two points have to be carefully noted here.

(i) In the context of the Natural soul, Hegel is dealing with only an abstract state of mind. It is an abstraction of the same type as "bare sensation" of the psychologists. It is rather a thinner abstraction than even "bare sensation". It does not exist in men.

(ii) Hegel's dialectical method means that higher stages are implicit in the lowest. Hence all the later stages of spirit, even the highest, are implicit in the Natural soul. Thus all the future stages such as those of sensibility, feeling consciousness, intellect, self-consciousness, appetite, representation and recollection etc. are implicit in the natural soul.

As a logical assumption, it contains an illogical element. What is immediate cannot at the same time be blank or empty. And the conception of the presence of future states, implicitly in the first, cannot explain the attribution of blankness or emptiness to it. Emptiness and blankness presuppose duality, the substratum of negation and the negated.

Śūnya Pramātā of Abhinava.

Abhinava also speaks of a stage in the spiritual manifestation of the Absolute, which he represents to be empty, blank or Śūnya. But, according to him, it is not the first stage, nor is it immediate. It is, on the contrary, the seventh stage and it is mediate. In fact it is to remove the doubt about the immediacy of Śūnya[1] that he emphatically asserts it to be mediacy.

The experience of Śūnya Pramātā is a negative

1. I. P. V., Vol. I, 246-7.

experience and as such is determinate experience. For, negation involves duality. It is elimination of something. The meaning of Śūnya in the present context, therefore is not absolute not-being but relative not-being. In the case of the negative experience of deep sleep (Apavedya Suṣupta), negation refers to all that is apprehended through internal or external senses. "The I", the self, is related to or identified with something that is not the object of internal sense, such as "Prāṇa" and "Sukha" nor with that which is the object of external sense, such as body and other physical objects. It is identified with mere limitation, the Āṇavamala, inoperation of its power of knowledge and, therefore, negation of knowledge. (Saṅkocamātra rūpam eva cidrūpam Śūnyam B. V. 496).

The word 'Sūnya' is used in this context on the analogy of "Ākāśa". Just as Ākāśa is not absolute not-being and is yet spoken of as Sūnya, so is the case with Śūnya Pramātā. There is another point also on which analogy with Ākāśa holds good. It is all pervasive. Just as there is nothing with which Ākāśa is not related, so there is nothing, that is objective, to which this limitation, Ajñāna, does not refer.

Now the question arises "Is there any object to which the inoperation of power of knowledge refers?" The Śaiva replies to it as follows:—

The state of deep sleep is the state of emptiness of the subject, because in that state there is absence of what is called object in the wakeful state; there is negation of the common object. But negation is always on the basis of something that figures objectively in consciousness; because it is determinate cognition and, therefore, refers to two (i) that which is eliminated and (ii) that from which something is eliminated. The Śaiva, therefore, holds that

there is rudimentary consciousness of the residual trace (Saṁskāra) of objectivity in general, which was experienced in the wakeful state, and that negation refers to gross objective variety of waking experience. Apavedya Suṣupta, therefore, is not total negation of objective consciousness, but only that of well differentiated and gross objective consciousness. Accordingly the difference between the experience of Vijñānākala and that of Śūnya Pramātā is only this that in the former case "I", self-consciousness, predominates and the negative consciousness occupies a subordinate position to it; but in the case of the latter the position is reversed.

The personality in deep sleep (Apavedya Suṣupta) is, therefore, constituted by the Prakāśa aspect of the Absolute, with Vimarśa aspect obscured by the principle of ignorance, the Māyā. But this does not mean total negation of Vimarśa. It is partly restored to the subject in the form of vidyā, the power of limited objective knowledge. This personality, though limited by all the five limiting conditions, imposed upon it by Māyā, is characterised by inoperation of three (i) Kalā (ii) Niyati and (iii) Rāga, because they presuppose the existence of definite object, which is absent in deep sleep. There are, therefore, only two powers of the limited subject (i) Vidyā and (ii) Kāla, which function in deep sleep. The first is responsible for consciousness of negation of the gross objective world and the second accounts for consciousness of time, because of which the negative experience of deep sleep is referred to the past time, when it is recollected in wakeful state.

This negative experience (Śūnya) characterises three types of experience (i) Universal annihilation (Pralaya) (ii) intense concentration on negation (Na iti abhāva samādhi) and (iii) deep sleep without gross objective consciousness (Apavedya Suṣupta).

These types of experience are due to the absence of gross objectivity because (i) objective world has not yet risen (ii) it[1] has been negated by intense concentration (iii) it has been disregarded, respectively. When "The I", the subjective consciousness, is related to this general negation of objectivity, which is without any distinction in itself, is devoid of all forms, cognisable in the objective world, and is a mere affection of the subject and, therefore, does not touch the ordinary level of objectivity, it is called Śūnya.

APAVEDYA SUṢUPTA AND TURĪYA DIFFERENTIATED.

But if the absence of gross objectivity is the common feature of[2] the experience of Śūnya Pramātā in (i) Pralaya (ii) Apavedya Suṣupta and (iii) Samādhi; what is the distinction between Apavedya Suṣupta and Turīya ? The level of Turīya is distinct from that of Apavedya Suṣupta in this that while in the latter case "The I", "The Self" is identified with "negation" (Śūnya) and, therefore, is limited and accordingly does not shine in its transcendental light; in the former case this identification ceases. In Turīya, therefore, the self shines in its true light. This difference is also stated in terms of qualities (Guṇa). In the case of Suṣupta "The I" is obscured by Tamas. But in Turīya the veil of Tamas disappears and the Self shines in the light of Sattva.

The distinction between Apavedya Suṣupta and Turīya[3] depends on the predominance of objectivity and subordination of subjectivity in the former. In the latter, however, the position is reversed. In the former case the Āṇavamala persists. But in the latter it disappears temporarily.

1. B. V. (Mss). 897. 3-2-13.
2. B. V. (Mss) 878. 3-2-1.
3. B. V. (Mss). 893-4. 3-2-12.

Distinction Between Turīya And Turīyātīta.

We have shown that in the case of Turīya the objectivity is subordinated to subjectivity, which is conscious of its true essential nature of being eternal, self-luminous and perfect. In the case of Turīyātīta, however, the subjectivity does not simply predominate, but rises as it were above the objectivity. But Turīyātīta is of two types (i) in which the objectivity persists in the subconscious and (ii) in which there is total absence of objectivity. The first is called "Vyatireka Turīyātīta" and the second is called "Avyatireka Turīyātīta". The latter is the highest stage, from which there is no descent.

The distinction between Turīya and Turīyātīta is tried to be brought out by means of the analogy of chemical process by which gold is melted. We know that gold, when it is subjected to chemical process along with another metal, silver for instance, there is a stage, at which it is penetrated by the lineal forms of chemical or the other metal that is put with it in fire and that the final stage is a homogeneous liquid, in which the distinction is lost to the extent that one remains only as an affection of the other. The stage, in which the lineal form of melted silver enters into melting gold so that the distinction between the two still persists, is the stage to which Turīya is comparable. For, in this, distinction between the subject and the object still remains. But Turīyātīta is comparable to that stage in which the two are so melted together that they form a homogeneous unit and one remains only as an affection of the other. This statement applies to Vyatireka Turīyātīta in which objectivity remains, though only as sub-conscious affection.

Savedya Suṣupta and Prāṇa Pramātā.

We have discussed in the preceding pages the nature

of Apavedya Suṣupta and have explained how the experience of absence of all knowledge arises there. But we have divided Suṣupta into two types (i) Apavedya and (ii) Savedya. Let us, therefore, take up the second now.

The experience of Savedya Susupta, which finds expression as "I had good, sound or pleasant sleep" "Sukham aham asvāpsam" is closely connected with Śūnya Pramātā. We remember that Śūnya Pramātā is nothing but "The I" identified with negation. Now the pure subjective aspect, which is an element in the constitution of Śūnya Pramātā and as such is above the physical vital air, intellect and body (Prāṇa, Buddhi and Deha), descends to physical level and manifests itself as general internal power or activity (Sādhāraṇī āntarī vṛtti), which is distinct from the powers of senses of perception as well as from those of the organs of action, which operate in the perception of external objects and in moulding them according to individual desire This power is responsible for division of the air in the physical system into five types such as Prāṇa and Apāna etc. It is this power, which, through internal air, inspires life into senses of perception and organs of action, which in themselves are insentient and lifeless. Thus the pure subjective aspect of Śūnya Pramātā, manifesting[1] itself as general activity or power in the physical system is called Jīva.

Therefore, when "The I" identifies itself with the general internal power, which is responsible for what we call life[2] in the physical system and as such is ordinarily called "Prāṇa", it is called Prāṇa Pramātā.

The conception of Prāṇa Pramātā, is occasionally based upon the identification of the Self with vital air, which is

1. B. V., (MSS). 899, 3-2-14.
2. I. P. V. Vol. II., 236.

known through the subjective power of internal touch or organic sensation. (Sparśanendriya gamye). This power is nothing but particularisation of the general power, of which we have spoken above. It pervades all the centres of sensation and organs of action and is at the basis of specific[1] sensation and action. It is responsible for the awareness of feeling of pain in back-bone, which is due to strong strokes of internal wind.

When this power of organic sensation is identified with the wind, that functions in heart, and the self is identified with the latter, it is called Prāna Pramātā. Thus when in deep sleep this power senses, experiences, the smooth[2] working of the physical system we have Savedya Suṣupta. The second type of Suṣupta, therefore, is due to Prāṇa Pramātā of the latter type.

Dream and wakeful states are too well known to need any explanation. We, therefore, now proceed to show what are the various levels of experience, through which we pass to the culminating point of aesthetic experience and locate it definitely in one of the levels, which we have discussed above.

Æsthetic Experience From Sense-Level to Objectless Level.

Abhinavagupta's treatment of the problem of æsthetics is very comprehensive. He analyses æsthetic experience into different levels, each of which leads to what follows, and allocates various conceptions of æsthetic experience at separate levels. His analysis begins at the sense-level. He admits that æsthetic experience begins with direct perception of the pleasant objects of sight and hearing, the two

1. B. V. (Mss) 495. 1-6-4.
2. I. P. V., Vol. II. 238.

senses, which alone are accepted by him to be æsthetic. But he recognises the æsthetic object to be only a medium and not the object of æsthetic experience. For, æsthetic experience is not merely a mental picture of the obejcts of æsthetic senses, related to an empirical subject, who evaluates it in terms of pleasure and pain. A layman may be satisfied with pleasant sensation and may identify æsthetic experience with it, but a real æsthete will never recognise an object to be beautiful if it simply pleases the senses and does nothing more.

A true æsthetic object does not simply stimulate the æsthetic senses. It primarily stimulates imagination, of course through senses. It simply presents only broad outline of a picture, which has to be completed in all necessary details by the imaginative power of the spectator. The second level of æsthetic experience, therefore, is imaginative.

As the æsthete rises from the level of sense to that of imagination, his personality changes. He is concerned not with the sensibly present but with the imaginatively grasped. He has his being in a world, different from the gross. This world is his own creation. In it he meets with a dramatic personality, which is the focal point in the whole. He finds in it nothing to disapprove. It is the ideal realised. He, therefore, slowly and gradually identifies himself with it. His personality is substituted by that of the focus. He views everything as does the hero. He incipiently reacts to the situation exactly as does the hero. He looks upon the deeds of hero, in a variety of situation, as his own and derives the same satisfaction from them as does the hero. Thus, if the hero acts in strict accordance with a moral principle in a situation, that would tempt an ordinary person away from the right path, though it means great suffering and sacrifice

of what is near and dear, and feels inner satisfaction in suffering and distress, the spectator also feels the same. At the level of identification with an ideal hero, there is the experience of moral satisfaction. Drama, therefore, improves the spectator morally, not through sermons, but by making him experience moral satisfaction and realise its superior value.

But the situation, in which hero is called upon to act, is emotive. It arouses an emotion in him and develops it to a high pitch. And because spectator is identified with hero, therefore, there is identity of emotion of the former with that of the latter. This constitutes the emotive level in æsthetic experience. Here the æsthete experiences an emotion at a high pitch.

It is, however, an undeniable fact that an emotion at a high pitch makes the emotively affected person completely forget himself. It deindividualises the individual. It frees him from those elements, which constitute his individuality. It raises him to the level of the universal. This may be spoken of as the Kathartic level, not in Aristotelian but in Hegelian sense. At this level, emotive experience is completely freed from all objective reference as also from temporal and spatial relations, which are due to limitations of individuality. Emotive experience at this level consists in nothing more than the condition of heart and mind of the deindividualised æsthete.

This is the stage of æstheic experience, of which Dhanañjaya talks, in his Daśarūpaka when he says :—

"Just as the verb, whether spoken[1] or understood, when combined with noun etc., is the essence of a sentence, so the basic mental state, (Sthāyibhāva) when combined with situation etc., is the essence of drama. This very basic mental

1. D. R. 95.

state is Rasa, because[1] it is relishable. This relish consists in the experience of blissfulness of the subject, that is free from limitations of individuality; it arises from the realisation of the full meaning of the presented, whether it be expressed, indicated or suggested. Although Rasa is only one, because the universal subjective[2] blissfulness has no variety, yet, because of variety of emotive affections of mind as also of accompanying conditions of heart, it is divided into four primary Rasas. Thus the blissful state of universalised subject is accompanied by blooming (Vikāśa) of heart in Śṛṅgāra, by broadening of it (Vistara) in Vīra, by tossing of it (Kṣobha) in Bībhatsa and by violent agitation of it in Raudra".

Æsthetic experience, according to Dhanañjaya, who follows Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, consists in the realisation of blissfulness of the universalised subject, affected by an universalised basic mental state and accompanied by a corresponding condition of heart.

The emotive nature of æsthetic experience is emphasised by Paṇḍita Jagannātha[3] also in his Rasagaṅgādhara, when he states Abhinavagupta's view of Rasa and points out how his view differs from that of Abhinava gupta. Æsthetic experience, according to Abhinavagupta, Paṇḍita Jagannātha holds, is the experience of a basic mental state such as Rati, with the universalised Self (i. e. Cit freed from all obscuring limitations) as its attribute. His own view differs from the above inasmuch as he maintains that the Self is not an attribute of the basic mental state; on the contrary, it is the substantive of which the Sthāyin is an attribute.

Abhinavagupta's view of æsthetic experience, which marks the culminating point, is not what has been attributed

1. D· R., 96.
2. D. R. 97.
3. R. G. 22-3

to him by Paṇḍita Jagannātha. He does not hold that æsthetic experience is the experience of Sthāyin, related to the Self, (Cit) as the attribute of itself (Cidviśiṣṭaḥ Sthāyyeva Rasaḥ). He holds that substance-attribute relation cannot[1] be attributed to the Self. (Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva mukhena yo vyavahāraḥ sa ātmani nopapadyate). He comes to this conclusion as follows :—

The Śaiva view of the Self is that it is introvert and not extrovert. It is neither both, as the Baudhas maintain that it is introvert, because it is self-shining and it is extrovert, because it illumines external objects. For, then it will be difficult to account for the objectivity of object and its externality from the subject. Hence it is introvert only. It is neither objective nor external. There is nothing which can be put on a par with it. And the relations of predominance and subordination, of substance and attribute and of adjunct and noun depend on the consciousness of both being on the same par. Thus we say "This cloth is white" meaning that the latter is an attribute of the former, because both of them shine on the same par of objectivity. Therefore, it is wrong to talk of the Self in terms of relation of substance and attribute, for, it is an attribute of none: and none is its attribute. In fact he points this view out as a mark of distinction between the Śaiva and the Naiyāyika conception of the Self.

He states his own view, clearly asserting that[1] this view is his own. (Asman mate tu Saṁvedanam evānandaghanam āsvādyate). He holds that æsthetic experience at its highest level is the experience of the Self itself, as pure and unmixed bliss. And in regard to the position of Sthāyin in it, he maintains that it is in the sub-conscious and that it

1. I. P. V. V. 147.

is on the basis of this varying sub-conscious element that it is divided into various types, such as śṛṅgāra and vīra etc. The function of drama is only to awaken this sub-conscious element.

He admits that there[1] is a stage in the process of æsthetic experience, in which the Self experiences itself as affected by the Sthāyin ; but asserts that it is not the final stage. In the course of discussion on Camatkāra, on which we have already thrown a little light in an earlier section, he definitely asserts that æsthetic experience, which arises from witnessing a dramatic performance or reading a good poem, is distinct from the experience that we get from objective perception of a pleasant object : because æsthetic experience is characterised by freedom from all elements of individuality. It is an experience, in which the self-luminous aspect of the universalised subject is thrown into background. Hence æsthetic experience is the experience of Ānanda, Vimarśa or rest of universal subject in itself.

Here he distinguishes between two levels in æsthetic experience and refers to Abhinava Bhāratī, in which he discusses the problem in detail.

1. The level, at which the universalised basic mental state is apprehended, as it were objectively, the so-called objective apprehension is due, not to the inference of a basic mental state in the focus of the dramatic situation, the hero, but to the fact that it is awakened from the sub-conscious (Saṁskāra) by dramatic presentation. It awakes because the æsthete has completely identified himself with the hero.

2. The other level is that, in which the duality of

1. B. V., (Mss), 408. 1-5-11.

subject and object disappears through intense introversion and utter disregard of the basic mental state. At this level, the basic mental state sinks back into the subconscious. Thus, the final stage in æsthetic experience, according to Abhinavagupta, is that in which there is the experience of Paramānanda and even the basic mental state, awakened by dramatic presentation, sinks into the sub conscious. Æsthetic experience, therefore, according to Abhinavagupta, in its final stage, belongs to the level of Vyatireka Turīyātīta, in which all objectivity merges in the sub-conscious and the Subject, the Self, shines in its Ānanda aspect.

Meaning of Rasa.

In the course of his treatment of the problem of æsthetics, he chiefly centres his attention on the first of the two levels, which we have just mentioned. The second he discusses only occasionally and so briefly that, unless the reader be very careful, it is likely to escape his notice. The following points have to be carefully noted in this connection :—

1. He uses the word "Rasa" in both the cases, but with a different meaning. In the case of the first level, in which the universalised basic mental state is realised objectively as it were by the universalised subject, Rasa means "The object of relish (Rasyate iti Rasaḥ) : because it is the basic mental state that is relished and, therefore, it is Rasa. In the case of the second level, in which the basic mental state sinks into the sub conscious, and there is the experience of the Ānanda aspect of the Self consisting in its introversion and, therefore, rest within itself, (Niravacchinna svātma parāmarśa ; Svātma viśrānti) Rasa means the act of relishing (Rasanam Rasaḥ).

2. Although the basic mental state is predominantly experienced at the first level, yet he holds that it is a mistake

to say that it is experienced in isolation from situation, mimetic changes and transient emotion. He, accordingly maintains that Śrīśaṅkuka was wrong[1] in saying that basic mental state, inferred from situation etc., is Rasa, because of its relishability. He definitely states that Rasa is different from the Sthāyin. (Sthāyi vilakṣaṇo Rasaḥ). Its distinction from Sthāyin is due to the fact that it is not Sthāyin as such, which is the object of experience, but Sthāyin harmonicusly mixed up with situation etc., in the same manner, in which various ingredients of Pānaka Rasa mix with one another so as to give rise to a flavour, different from that which each ingredient has in isolation.

In dealing with the philosophical back-ground of Abhinavagupta's theory of æsthetics, we have so far confined ourselves to the discussion of such metaphysical doctrines as explain the final phase of æsthetic experience. But, as we have already stated, æsthetic experience, according to him, begins at the sense-level and it is only through imagination, emotion and Katharsis that it rises to the transcendental level. To explain the entire process, that is presupposed in the realisation of the final phase, it is necessary to deal with the epistemic technique of Âbhāsavāda.

Epistemic approach of the Âbhāsavādin to the phenomenon of knowledge is concerned with its analysis into its elements. This analysis reveals the following four :—

1. Means of knowledge (Pramāṇa).
2. Subject of knowledge (Pramātā).
3. Knowledge itself (Pramiti).
4. Object of knowledge (Prameya).

Âbhāsavādin's conception of these elements is different from those of other systems. Let us, therefore, state

1. A. Bh. Vol. I. 285.

briefly what these terms signify and imply in the Śaiva system.

Epistemic Technique of Âbhāsavāda.

Pramāṇa:—Ābhāsavādin's conception of Pramāṇa, the means of knowledge, is different from that of the Sāṅkhya. It is not, as maintained by the Sāṅkhya, the Buddhi, which is perfectly independent of and different from the sentient principle (Cit or Puruṣa) and is simply the insentient meeting ground of the light of Puruṣa, coming from within, and the reflection of external object, coming from without. The means of knowledge, admitted by the Âbhāsavādin, is not devoid of self-luminosity. For, how can that, which in itself lacks luminosity, illumine another. On the contrary, it is sentient. It is the light of Cit itself, as a limited manifestation of the Universal consciousness. It proceeds towards the object and receives its reflection.

2. Pramātā:[2]—Cit has two aspects (i) It sends its light towards the object and, as such, it is the means of knowledge. (ii) But it is self-conscious also and as such it is the subject of knowledge, *the knower*. It persists even when there is no cognitive activity going on, when there is no objective world to cast its reflections. As such it is self-luminous. It is like a flame, which keeps burning irrespective of the fact whether there is anything to illumine or not. Kalā, Niyati, Rāga, Vidyā and Kāla are its limiting conditions.

3. *Pramiti*:[3]—When this steady flame reacts on the reflection of the object, when there arises the inner

1. I. P. V., Vol. II. 64.
2. I. P. V., Vol. II. 67.
3. I. P. V., Vol. II. 68.

expression in it, it is called knowledge (Pramiti).

4. *Prameya* :—Metaphysical implication of the epistemic technique of Âbhāsavāda is that everything, excepting the Ultimate is Âbhāsa. All Âbhāsas are the manifestations of the Ultimate. Thus, the subject, the object, the means of knowledge and knowledge itself is an Âbhāsa. Âbhāsa is an isolated[1] manifestation, for which, in practical life, a single expression is used.

In the light of the above metaphysical implication, let us see what is the object of the cognitive activity (Prameya). The cognitive activity is of two kinds : (i) the primary and (ii) the secondary.

i. *The primary* :—The primary activity begins with the movement of the light of the limited self towards an isolated objective Âbhāsa. The light receives the reflection. The activity terminates with the mental reaction, which consist in the rise of the inner expression. (Pratyābhāsam pramāṇa-vyāpārah). Thus, the object of primary cognition is very much like the universal, which the Vaiyākaraṇas hold to be the meaning (Artha) of an expression. As such it is free from limitations of time and space. It is not primarily given in objective time and space. The isolated Âbhāsa, which is the object of primary cognitive activity, is real ; (i) because it is the object of the primary cognitive activity only (ii) because it alone is the object of mental reaction, and (iii) because the causal efficiency of an object in practical life depends entirely on it.

ii. *The Secondary* :—The[2] secondary cognitive activity consists in mere unification of the various Âbhāsas, separa-

1. I. P. V., Vol. II. 70-1.
2. I. P. V., Vol. II. 72-3.

tely cognised by the primary activity. It is responsible for bringing about a configuration of Âbhāsas, which is the object of action, (as distinct from that of mere knowledge,) inspired by the purposive attitude of the cogniser. An object of action is not an isolated Âbhāsa. It is a configuration of innumerable Âbhāsas. It is made up of as many Âbhāsas as may be the words, used by different cognisers from different points of view.

The causal efficiency[1], or the use of an object for practical purposes, depends on the unification of some of the constituent Âbhāsas of an object into a whole. This whole is called by a word, standing for the most needed or desired Âbhāsa.

The[2] constituents of an object are not always the same to every person. They differ with the difference in individual (i) predilection (Ruci) (ii) purposive attitude (Arthitva) and (iii) the capacity to know (Vyutpatti).

Time[3] and space are not always the necessary constituents of an object of cognition. Everything is not always necessarily cognised in temporal and spatial relations. (i) Fire and smoke, for instance, at the time of the acquisition of the idea of their invariable concomitance, are not associated with external time and space. (ii) Nor is the object of apprehension so associated at the time of acquisition of the conventional expression. The object, which is the meaning of conventional expression, is a universal.

The[4] Âbhāsa, as an object of primary cognitive activity is as good as a universal (Sāmānyāyamāne Pramāṇa-Vyāpāraḥ). But object, the configuration of Âbhāsas, is related

1. I. P. V. V., Vol. I. 139.
2. I. P. V., Vol. II. 86-7.
3. B.V. 2-3-7. (MSS). 713.
4. B. V. 2-3-3. (MSS). 704.

to time and space, when it is desired to be made an object of practical utility. Hence, when there is no such desire, it is free from the external time and space.

The Âbhāsavādin holds that, in ordinary life, an expression such as "jar" is used for an external object, which is a configuration of many ābhāsas looked upon as one. It is unity in multiplicity. Its apprehension as unity presupposes perception of multiplicity and is due to appearance of all, that is separately cognised, on a common basis. The configuration is called after that particular constituent of it, which, because of the attitude of the perceiver, figures as the most important.

Thus, according to him, ordinary object of cognition is a whole. But this whole admits of analysis. Analysis, however, will reveal only a whole within a whole, Âbhāsa within Âbhāsa. And the constituents so revealed differ, according to the analysing individual's inclination or tendency, attitude and knowing capacity.

For instance, if we analyse our experience of a jar, we find that though ordinarily it is taken to be one Âbhāsa, the object of knowledge, it embodies as many Âbhāsas as there are words, which can be used with reference to it by various analytical perceivers, looking at it from different points of view. To an ordinary perceiver it is a combination of Âbhāsas of roundness, materiality, externality, blackness, existence and so on. But if a scientist were to do an atomic or electronic analysis of the same, how many perceptual acts will he have to do and how many words will he require to describe the results of his analysis ? Can any body say that the atoms or electrons are not the constituents of what is ordinarily taken to be one thing ? The Âbhāsavādin, therefore, holds that ordinary object of cognition is a collocation or configuration of a certain

number of Âbhāsas, each of which requires a separate mental process to cognise, and that its causal efficiency (Artha-kriyā-kāritva) depends on its determinate cognition and the latter also depends upon the inclination, immediate need and cognitive capacity of the individual. Âbhāsavādin holds that human mind is so constituted that it begins its cognitive activity with apprehension of and reaction to isolated constituents of the presented. Each constituent, as it is apprehended separately, is an Âbhāsa, a universal, which marks the farthest limit of cognitive activity.

But practical[1] life is entirely dependent on the unification of Âbhāsas. The isolated Âbhāsa has no practical utility. In order that it may be an object of action, as distinct from that of mere primary cognition, it must be united with some other Âbhāsas, at least the external time and space.

Unchanging Nature of the Âbhâsa

The[2] Âbhāsa does not change even when it is united with others. It is of generic form. For instance, the Âbhāsa, for which the word "Jar" is used, does not imply any matter, such as clay or silver, of which it may be made. Therefore, even when it is united with other Âbhāsas e. g. red, earthen and high etc. and appears as distinct from the generic form, because it is looked upon as the substantive of the attributes "red" etc., it does not change its essential nature of generic form.

Time and Space as the Basis of Particularity.

The common basis, on which the constituents of multiplicity unite when the object is purposively viewed, is constituted by external time and space. They do not figure

1. I. P. V., Vol. II. 90.
2. B. V. 2-3-7.

in *free* and *conventional* cognitions (Yathāruci, Yathā vyutpatti). They figure only in the purposive cognition. They do not figure when we are visualising the conventional meaning of a linguistic expression, for, according to the philosophy of grammar, the linguistic symbol stands for the universal alone. Even the word "this" (Ayam) stands for the universal 'This' which is common to all that is objective (Sarvabhāvagatedantā sāmānya) and not for the particular. And the free cognition would cease to be free if it be limited by time and space.

THE IMPLICATION OF UNIVERSALISATION (SĀDHĀRAṆĪKARAṆA), ACCORDING TO ÂBHĀSAVĀDA.

We have discussed above, the essential nature of the universal and the particular. Particularity consists in the temporal and spatial relations of the Âbhāsa. And the universal, the isolated Âbhāsa, is free from such relations. The particlar is a configuration, a unity in multiplicity, (Ekānekarūporthaḥ). And the Abhāsa is the universal, not such as is due to the generalisation, based on the perception of a persistent element in a number of different objects, but such as, united with others, constitutes the very being of a particular object.

But, we have shown above, that unification of an Âbhāsa with temporal and spatial conditions, is due to the purposive attitude of the cogniser. Therefore, if the cogniser is free from such an attitude, his cognitive activity will terminate at its primary stage and will not proceed to relate the apprehended to temporal and spatial conditions. Thus, the æsthetic object, as it figures in the consciousness of an æsthete, is universal, because he approaches it disinterestedly, because his attitude is not practical but æsthetic.

KATHARTIC LEVEL IN THE LIGHT OF EPISTEMIC THEORY OF ÂBHĀSAVĀDA.

Âbhāsavādin rejects the two powers of language, which were admitted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka to explain the subjective and the objective Katharsis (Universalisation) in æsthetic experience. His epistemic technique is such as explains it without recourse to such powers. He holds that subject and object have no fixed constituents. Their constituents are different in each separate type of experience. Thus, not only the subject and the object are different in æsthetic experience from what they are in ordinary worldly experience, but the reaction of the subject and consequent form of experience also are different. We may summarily state the difference as follows :—

1. The subject is free from practical attitude. His attitude is not utilitarian, but æsthetic. He is not interested in those aspects of the presented, which make it useful for practical purpose. He is, therefore, free from all those aspects of individuality which come into play in practical life. He is free from the limiting conditions of individuality.

2. The æsthetic object also has its own peculiarities. It is free not only from temporal and spatial limitations but also from all that gives particularity to the object.

3. The subjective reaction also to the presented is different inasmuch as it is not determined by the subjective categories, because the subject is free from all limitations.

4. Hence the resultant experience also is different from what we have in ordinary life. We shall elaborate these points in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III.

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF ÆSTHETICS.

We have dealt with the highest level of Æsthetic experience, according to Abhinavagupta, in the preceding chapter and have shown that it is nothing but Ânanda. This conception of Rasa is in perfect harmony with the assertion made in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (II, 7) "Raso vai Saḥ". At this level the Self shines in its aspect of Ânanda, Vimarśa, or Sphurattā. Here there is no affection of even the basic mental state in its universality. Here even the universalised æsthetic object sinks back into the subconscious. This level is recognised to be "Rasa", not because æsthetic object figures as an affection of the self, but because it emerges from the one where the self is so affected.

KATHARTIC LEVEL

The level, at which the self is affected by sthāyin, is lower than that of Ânanda. This is what we have called "Kathartic level". Because, though there is duality, though the object shines as distinct from the subject, yet both are free from all elements of individuality, both are universals. Here universalised subject experiences universalised object. Here the process of universalisation of subject and object is complete. Here the object is apprehended but not determined. Here the cognising subject is not conscious of "not this". It is, therefore, the level of indeterminacy so far as the objective aspect of experience is concerned; because the object is not contra-distinguished from anything else. But it is not the level of complete indeterminacy or immediacy, because the object, though completely universalised, yet stands against

thing essentially different from it, something that the mind constructs with the help of what is presented to optical sense, something[1], in the determinate apprehension of which, the directly present image, statue or picture, is only a medium. Similarly in the case of æsthetic experience, the æsthetic object which is presented on the stage, does not figure in the spectator's consciousness in the form, in which it is directly presented, but in one, which is essentially different from it, which the imaginative mind of the spectator, stimulated by artistic presentation, constructs. The æsthetic object is only a medium, which helps the imaginative mind to have free play in the world of imagination.

This is the view of the æsthetic object, which Bharata himself held, as we have already stated in the first chapter. It is on the basis of recognition of the constituents of æsthetic object as a medium to the rise of basic mental state that they have been called Vibhāva, Anubhāva and Vyabhicāribhāva,

We stated that, according to Abhinavagupta, universalisation of the æsthetic object and subject is effected through dramatic technique. Let us, therefore, find out what are the constituents of the subject and the object in the æsthetic field, and what is that particular method of presentation of the object, which leads to the universalisation.

CONSTITUENTS OF THE ÆSTHETIC OBJECT AS A CONFIGURATION.

We have presented Bharata's view of the æsthetic object. Abhinava simply polishes it. The constituents of æsthetic object, as polished by Abhinava, may be presented as follows :—

A.(1) The æsthetic object is necessarily a situation, in which one or more human beings are involved.

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 288.

(ii) Though from the point of view of a disinterested observer of the whole situation, there is a general stimulus situation, yet to the human beings involved in the situation, its power to affect is limited to the eyes and the ears by the artist's skill in the presentation. For, the tactile and other affections immediately precipitate the motor tendencies and thus make the universalisation of the presented (Sādhāraṇībhāva), on which the æsthetic experience chiefly rests, impossible.

(iii) The stimuli in most cases have a *spiritual meaning* (*Dhvani*) in addition to the conventional or primary and the secondary.

(iv) The situation has a focus, on and around which every thing else revolves.

The entire situation, as emotively affecting the central figure in it and arousing a basic mental state in him, is technically called Vibhāva.

B. (v) When more than one human being is involved in an emotive situation, each human being is a stimulus to others. The human personality, either as a whole or in any of its aspects, gives rise to social consciousness, which leads to the expression of the emotive effect of the total situation by means of the mimetic changes These serve to stimulate other beings and establish mental communication between individuals so that all become parts of one situation. The *mimetic changes* are technically called *Anubhāva.*

C. (vi) As these changes take place and the situation develops, transient emotions arise and find expressions in characteristic deeds and apparent involuntary physical changes. These *transient emotions* are technically called *Vyabhicāribhāvas.*

D. (vii) In every situation there is a habitual set to react. And because it is the determining factor of all the varying psycho-physical responses to the subsequent changes in the situation, it is called *basic mental state*, technically *Sthāyibhāva*.

Thus the æsthetic object as a configuration is made up of four principal constituents, (i) the situation with a focus, (ii) the mimetic changes, (iii) the transient emotions and (iv) the basic mental state. (Vibhāva, Anubhāva, Vyabhicāribhāva, and Sthāyibhāva).

The Essential Nature of the Æsthetic Object as Revealed by Psychological Analysis.

In order to ascertain the essential nature of the æsthetic object through psychological analysis, one has to look at it either from the point of view of the artist or from that of the spectator, who possesses æsthetic susceptibility (Sahṛdayatva). Further, while judging the æsthetic object from the former point of view, both the internal and the external aspects of the presentation have to be taken into account. For, the presentation consists, not only of what appeals to the eyes and the ears, the emotive situation and the mimetic changes, but also of the transient emotions, which cause the latter, and the basic mental state, which directs all psycho-physical reactions to the emotive situation. In fact the internal aspect, consisting of the transient emotions and the basic mental state, is more important than the external, because the æsthetic experience depends more on the realisation of the former through empathic reaction than on the perception of the latter.

The Indian writers on dramaturgy have acknowledged that dramatic presentation to be the best which represents a well known event. Let us, therefore, consider the basis

of the representation, that is, what the actor does when he represents an historical character. Does he imitate? Is the dramatic presentation an imitation of the real?

To answer this question let us consider the nature and the constituents of imitation.

(i) It presupposes a knowledge of the original.

(ii) It is always a partial representation of the original i. e. it lacks the essential or spiritual elements of the imitated.

(iii) The most successful imitation at its best is only an illusion, so that the knowledge of it that we get at first sight is contradicted by a subsequent one on closer observation.

(iv) When one human being imitates another, the former is aware of the latter as totally distinct from himself. Hence the imitator can never succeed in completely reproducing in himself the mental states of the original.

If we accept this view of imitation as correct, we cannot maintain the dramatic presentation to be an imitation.[1] Firstly: the actor can never have the direct knowledge of the historic person that he represents, because of his being too far removed from the latter in time. His acting at best is based upon what in itself is a representation, namely, the acting of the predecessors. Secondly: the æsthetic object is a configuration of all the essentials of the emotive life, the emotive situation, the mimetic changes, the transient emotions and the basic mental state. But the idea of imitation implies lack of inner essence. For, one, who imitates, is an imitator only if he lacks the spirit of the character whose external look he assumes. Hence the actor cannot be said to be imitating an historic person, because he does not lack the spiritual

1. A. Bh. Vol. 1. 3.

elements of the latter. Thirdly: the consciousness, that is aroused by it, is not contradicted by a subsequent one. And fourthly and lastly: in the actor there is no consciousness of the imitated as distinct from that of himself. For, in that case the acquisition of the psychic state of the historic person, which is the most essential constituent of the æsthetic configuration, would be impossible.

DRAMATIC PRESENTATION IS NOT AN ILLUSORY OBJECT.

That object is illusory which, because of the possession of some quality, which is common to another object of greater value, gives rise to the consciousness of the latter, because of the needy attitude of the observer. Every determinate consciousness is made up of the objective and the subjective elements, i. e. partly of the stimulus received from outside and partly of the material from the stock of memory. Hence the difference between the right knowledge and illusion lies in this that, while in the former the objective elements predominate, in the latter, the subjective elements preponderate. Hence the latter is negatived by a subsequent closer observation, as in the case of consciousness of silver at the sight of brilliance of mother-of-pearl. Therefore, when the question, whether the dramatic presentation is illusory, is raised, the point of inquiry is, whether the dramatic presentation as an æsthetic object is an object, which, because of the possession of some external quality, the look, for instance, of the represented historic person or scene, gives rise to the consciousness of the latter, exactly as mother-of-pearl does that of silver. The spectator with æsthetic susceptibility will at once say 'no' to it. For, he does not supply a greater portion of what forms æsthetic consciousness from the stock of memory. He is simply a passive recipient of all that enters into consciousness. Further,

the consciousness, aroused by the æsthetic object, is not negatived by any subsequent observation or reflection.

Is Æsthetic Object A "Reflection" (Pratibimba)?

Here we are using the word 'reflection' in a special sense. Ordinarily it means an image that is cast by a certain object in a mirror or any other smooth surface. Here, however, we are using this expression in the sense of total reproduction of an historical character in respect of paraphernalia, speech, situation, mimetic changes, transient emotions and the basic mental state. The question, therefore, is whether the dramatic presentation is a correct representation of historical event in all its aspects. To this question also reply would be in the negative, whether we look at it from the point of view of the actor or that of the spectator. The reason is obvious : neither the actor, impersonating the hero of the piece, Rāma for instance, looks upon the person representing the heroine, Sītā, as the historic Sītā : nor does the spectator look upon the presentation as reflection ; because in that case consciousness of the reflected as distinct from the reflecting being necessarily there, the presented would look unreal, and, therefore, the identification with the presented and consequent empathic reaction would be impossible.

It Is Not A Partial Representation.

That the dramatic æsthetic object is not a partial representation of the historic goes without saying. It is not, for instance, a representation of the external appearance only, like the pictorial or plastic representation : nor is it a reproduction of the set words only, like recitation. We can neither class it with the production of magic nor with the feat of jugglery.

ÆSTHETIC OBJECT FROM SPECTATOR'S POINT OF VIEW.

Looking at the æsthetic object from the point of view of the spectator, we find it difficult to class it with any object of the ordinary world. We can get an idea of the essential nature of the object from this standpoint, only if we analyse the true nature of his experience. Let us, therefore, suppose that the spectator is seeing a drama, the hero of which is Rāma and try to find out what his experience of the presentation of Rāma is.

1. The figure that appears in his consciousness is neither exclusively of the historic Rāma nor that of the actor as 'X', or Devadatta; for, the former is inhibited by the time factor and the latter by the external look and paraphernalia. It is, therefore, a configuration of some elements of the one and some of the other.

2. The content of spectator's experience is not "the actor in the guise of Rāma," because such a consciousness would make the identification with the focus and so the empathic reaction and æsthetic experience impossible. For, this consciousness depends upon an objective perception of the presented.

3. The object does not figure in the spectator's consciousness as an error, because of the exact external similarity between the presented and the historical, as in the case of the twins in the Twelfth Night. For, the presence of a subconscious idea, that there is an actor acting a part, cannot be denied.

4. Nor does the figure, appearing in the spectator's consciousness, involve any kind of superimposition of the historic on the actor, because of the qualitative similarity, as at the time when a person is addressed as "Ass" on account of his stupidity.

5. Nor is the actor imagined to be the historic person because of the causal attributes, just as a poet imagines a lovely face as the "moon" because it gives the same delight to the percipient as does the moon. The reason for not classifying the spectator's consciousness of the object with the last two is again the same, namely, that they involve an objective perception of the presented.

UNWORLDLY NATURE OF THE ÆSTHETIC OBJECT.

The question that arises now is, if the æsthetic object cannot be classed with any real or illusory object of ordinary experience, what is it? The answer that the majority of æstheticians have given is that it is *unworldly*, (Alaukika). It does not mean that it is transcendental, supernatural or shadowy nothing. What is meant by this, is that the essential nature of the æsthetic object is such as does not allow it to be classed with any one of the accepted types of the objects of the world of daily life. It is an object of the æsthetic world and as such has only æsthetic reality and that too for those only who breathe and have their being in that world. It is a world, which is a creation of poetic genius. Its subject and object both, as configurations, are very different from those of the common world. The objects are neither pure creations of mind nor reproductions of the historic facts; but a harmonious mixture of both. Similarly its subjects are those to whom such objects appeal, when presented, as having a peculiar reality of their own; a reality which is no less a reality than the common world reality, simply because it is æsthetic reality.

THE CONSTITUENTS OF ÆSTHETIC PERSONALITY.

1. Taste or Rasikatva.

Taste is the inborn faculty of discerning the æsthetic elements in a presentation and of finding great satisfaction in æsthetic contemplation.

II. Sahṛdayatva or æsthetic susceptibility.

The æsthetic experience at the second level is the realisation of a basic mental state at a high pitch due to the identification with the focus of the presented. It presupposes, therefore, an experience of the emotive situations, similar to those presented on the stage, in ordinary life, on the part of the spectator. In the absence of similar emotive experiences in ordinary life, the æsthetic presentation will have as little meaning as the sight of a very delicious fruit has to one who sees it for the first time and is perfectly ignorant of its taste. A love scene, for instance, will have no meaning to a life-long celibate. The following few lines will make it clear how practical experiences, similar to those æsthetically presented, help in æsthetic experience :—

Every[1] group of sensations, apart from the transient immediate effect in leading to a certain experience, has more lasting effect on the percipient inasmuch as it affects his vitality, the power to react, so as to make it better fitted for reaction to a similar stimulation in future. Thus, after a few experiences of the same kind, the nervous system, like a trained body of soldiers, gets ready for all the appropriate responses at the stimulation by any part of the total situation. Let it be clearly understood that this response is involuntary and more or less mechanical, because it does not presuppose any psychic function. When the vital forces are so affected by a series of practical experiences, the response to the stimulation by any part of an emotive situation is such as if the whole situation

1. P. V., 47-9.

had stimulated it. The constituent of personality, which is responsible for this type of reaction is technically called Sahṛdayatva. It brings about identification[1] with the focus of the situation. It presupposes close and frequent application to the study of drama and poetry and occasional visits to the theatre.

III. Power of Visualisation.

But the æsthetic susceptibility can supply only one side of the total emotive state, namely, the physical, which is responsible for the physical reaction to the stimulating situation. But the experience is essentially psycho-physical. Another subjective pre-requisite of the æsthetic experience is, therefore, the power of visualisation. The real æsthetic image is not what is given. The given is only one third of the total. The suggested elements and the spiritual meaning, which are not given, are supplied by this power of visualisation which partly removes the shifting opaque barrier which divides the unconscious from the conscious and brings about the union of the suggested elements and the spiritual meaning, which come from the unconscious, with the given and thus completes the image. This image is different from that which arises in a determinate cognition, inasmuch as the latter is determined by the purposive attitude of the percipient. But in the former case, the æsthetic attitude, which is characterised by freedom from all individual purposiveness, is the determining factor. Hence the æsthetic image has life, which a mere cognitive image totally lacks. This power of clear visualisation of the æsthetic image in all its fullness and life is technically called 'Pratibhā[2]'.

1. Dh. L., 11.
2. Dh. L., 29 and B. V. (MSS. 785) 2-4-11.

IV. Intellectual Background.

But the power of visualisation, in order that it may function and complete the æsthetic image, presupposes the unconscious. And the unconscious is only what was once experienced. Therefore, æsthetic experience is not possible unless the spectator has had the consciousness of all those elements, which are necessary to complete the image, in some form.

V. Contemplative Habit. (Bhāvanā or Carvaṇā)

Æsthetic experience, in respect of the process involved in its acquisition, is very much like the religious mystic experience, got through contemplation. The elements of the mystic experience, resulting from contemplation, are not exclusively or entirely those which constitute the object of contemplation, but are rather those which are mostly subjective, but appear objectively because of the force of contemplation. The contents of the æsthetic experience also are similar and similarly they become objectified. Further, one or two days' religious contemplation does not result in mystic experience: nor does the very first æsthetic contemplation lead to æsthetic experience.

The contemplative process, involved in the rise of æsthetic experience, is conceived on the analogy of chewing the cud by an animal, a cow for instance, (Romantha). It consists in calling back the experiences, which an æsthete has from an æsthetic object, but which, as they come in succession, sink into the sub-conscious. It consists in reflecting over what has been so called back to conscious level; in holding up before the mind's eye these experiences separately; in realising their true nature as such and in grasping the whole, which because of mutual affection of

1. Dh. L., 30.

experiences by one another, appears as something different from what each isolated experience is separately.

VI. Psycho-physical Condition.

Every experience presupposes a certain psycho-physical state. The charming music, which is ordinarily pleasant, is positively unpleasant when gloom sits on the heart. The sportive movements of a beautiful lady similarly do not give rise to that experience in an old man which they naturally arouse in a young man. Æsthetic experience, therefore, because it is a result of contemplation and is consequent on identification with the focus of the presented situation, requires the absence of all deep rooted ideas which the music may not be able to drive away, whether they be pleasant or unpleasant. A man, for instance, who has just lost a relative or is arm in arm with his beloved, cannot have æsthetic experience. Further, æsthetic experience of all types cannot be got at all times of life. Experience of perfect tranquillity (Śānta) is not ordinarily possible in youth, nor that of the erotic (Śṛṅgāra) in old age. Hence suitable psycho-physical conditions are also necessary for æsthetic experience.

VII. Capacity to Identify.

Identification consists in the unification of the self-forgetful self of the percipient with the human focus of the situation, which, being freed from the elements of time, place and all that constitutes individuality, is a mere set of certain psycho-physical conditions. We shall discuss this topic in detail in a subsequent section.

We have presented above the two aspects, the objective and the subjective, of æsthetic experience. We have now to show how these two aspects play their part in giving rise to æsthetic experience at the second level, which

Abhinavagupta recognises to be similar to the level of "Iśvara" which is characterised by the experience of universal "This" by universal "I" and which is presented in Sanskrit as "Aham Idam." At this level the "This" is the predominant element in the experience as a whole. At the empirical level this type of subject—object relation is found in identification, in which the subject merges in the object, loses itself in the object, and becomes the object. This appearance of the universalised subject so related to the universalised object as to shine as the latter is the characteristic of æsthetic experience at the second level. Let us, therefore, find out how we ascend from the sense-level to this: what are the other levels through which we pass to this ?

We have stated that Abhinavagupta recognises five levels:—

1. Sense,
2. Imagination,
3. Emotion,
4. Katharsis,
5. Transcendency.

He psychologically explains how we rise from the empirical level to the æsthetic level as follows:—

I. Æsthetic Attitude.

The mental process, involved in the rise of æsthetic experience from a dramatic presentation, begins with the rise of the attitude of play at the time of determination to go to the theatre. This attitude differs from the practical attitude in ordinary life inasmuch as it is marked by total absence of expectation of being called upon to act in reality. It consists in the expectancy of a short life in the ideal world

of beautiful sights and sounds. This attitude is responsible for the percipient's self-forgetfulness as soon as the music starts. All ideas, therefore, connected with worldly life are inhibited. The introductory scene further determines his attitude. The determination consists in (I) the supervention of the basic mental attitude, with which he is to face the entire presentation (II) tendency to identify with the focus of the situation and to perceive the presented through the eyes and ears of the latter. Thus, when the presentation of the plot begins, the elements of time and place, the idea of reality or unreality of the presented, and all those mental processes, which are involved in the rise of consciousness of right, wrong, dubious and possible, are inhibited from the intellectual apprehension of the presented.[1]

II. From Sense—Level to Self-forgetfulness.

With an attitude of play the æsthete reaches the theatre. But still the ideas, connected with the world, haunt him to some extent. As he sits down, looking on the outer side of the stage or something else and expecting the commencement of the drama, music starts. His attention is fixed and other ideas automatically tend to disappear. Soon after the music the stage-manager comes with his wife and attendants and announces the play that is going to be staged, introduces song, dance and music so as to bring about a state of self-forgetfulness in the audience and retires announcing the arrival of the hero or some other character. That the music in the introductory scene in a drama, transports the audience from the ordinary world to that of the art, is the opinion of no less an authority than Kālidāsa, who puts the following statement

1. A. Bh. Vol. I., pp. 36-37.

in the mouth of the stage-manager in the introductory scene of his Abhijñāna Śākuntala.

"My mind has been forcibly "carried away" by your beautiful song, like king Duṣyanta by a swift-running deer."

The psychic effect of such an introductory procedure is obvious. The music at the beginning draws the oscillating attention of the audience to the stage and fixes it there. The appearance of the stage-manager prepares the audience to receive what is coming, as a work of art (i) by giving rise to the necessary attitude; (ii) by making a habitual set ready to react to the situation that is arising; (iii) by telling the essential nature of what is before, namely, that the presented is not a fact of the ordinary world but that it is an artistic fact, and (iv) finally by removing all possible affections of consciousness by an interesting musical performance.

III. From Self-Forgetfulness to identification.

Æsthetic experience at the second level is essentially an experience of a basic mental state which, being affected by situation etc., is different from what it is in its purity. It is due to empathic reaction through identification. But identification consists in the merging of one's individuality into that of another and so in having another's emotive experience. Let us, therefore, analyse the process of identification.

Process of Identification.

The presentation of the plot begins, when the æsthete is at the level of self-forgetfulness, which has been brought about through an appeal to æsthetic senses. The æsthete sits charmed by what has been presented to his eyes and ears. Thus, when the hero appears in the midst of an extremely interesting situation, with his artistic external

look, paraphernalia and the psychic state, as indicated by the gestures and grimaces, no element of the actor's personality is distinctly perceptible. Therefore, we cannot recognise the actor in the presented figure. The figure to all intents and purposes is an historical figure. But the time and some other factors do not permit the recognition of the historic person in him. The presentation is thus made up of the conflicting elements.

What happens then is this. The mind by its nature is so constituted that once it is drawn to a situation and feels pleasure in it, it ignores all that is dull and conflicting in it. There is the famous saying "there is no rose without its thorn." Does it, therefore, follow that there is no beauty in nature? No, the mind that loves natural beauty, while appreciating the rose, ignores the thorn, though both are presented simultaneously. Hence at the presentation of an æsthetic situation, the mind, because of the æsthetic attitude of the audience, rejects all that is conflicting in the presentation and retains the rest.

Thus the three conflicting elements in the presented, the time, the place and the person, as has already been stated, are inhibited and the rest affects the consciousness of the audience. In short, the æsthete is affected by the presented psycho-physical condition of the hero, free from all elements of individuality, time and place. This freedom of the presented from the above three elements is what is technically called universalisation or Sādhāraṇībhāva of the objective aspect.

But identification is the union of the self-forgetful self of the percipient with the psycho-physical conditions of the hero. How this happens in the case of an æsthetic observer is not difficult to explain. We have already stated that the state of self-forgetfulness is brought about in the spectator, possessed of æsthetic suscepti-

bility, by the charming music of the introductory scene. In other words, the consciousness is freed from the elements of individuality. We have also explained the reasons of the inhibition of the individual, time and place elements of the presented from coming into the spectator's consciousness. Thus the self-forgetful self on the subjective side and the psycho-physical conditions of the hero on the objective side united together bring about a state which is known as the state of identification, technically called "Tādātmya".

But identification is a slow process. It does not take place all at once. The process of identification begins at the moment of freedom of the self of the spectator from everything that constitutes individuality. At this moment he has no purpose, no bodily or mental attitude, no disposition and consequently he is not making psycho-physical responses. When at this stage the hero appears in certain psycho-physical conditions in the midst of a befitting situation, the first thing that he does is to draw the entire attention of the audience to himself. He then inspires the spectator with his purpose. This leads to the formation, on the part of audience, of mental and bodily attitudes and so of disposition towards the rest of the presented exactly like those of the hero. Then, the æsthete sees and hears all that is going on, on the stage, as if it were through the eyes and the ears of the hero. Thus the level of identification is reached when the æsthete evaluates the entire situation in which the hero is placed, exactly as does the hero himself. The following two points have to be remembered in this connection :—

(1) Identification is a state of oneness in duality. It is a state of oneness inasmuch as the constituents of both the experiencing entities, the æsthete and the hero, are the same. But duality still persists. For, otherwise the

association of the experience, consequent upon identification, with the individual self and subsequent remembrance of the æsthetic experience, will not be possible.

(2) We are talking of the identity of the actor and the spectator only in reference to æsthetic experience, but the actor is not simply an æsthete like the spectator. Hence, while they are identical as experiencers, the former differs from the latter inasmuch as one is what the other is not. This difference is constituted by the consciousness of a *task* and the consequent *action attitude* in the actor. Hence all the above processes are involved in the experience in the actor; but they are only incipiently aroused in the spectator. Firstly, because they come upon the mind of the latter without preparation ; and secondly, because while the former identifies himself with the historical character primarily through organic feelings, *action attitudes* etc., the latter does so primarily through visual and auditory experiences, which give rise to the organic attitudes.

Philosophical Explanation of Elimination of Time Etc.

We have said that, according to Ābhāsavādin, every object is unity in multiplicity. It is made up of a number of Ābhāsas, "the universals". Every Ābhāsa, that figures in the consciousness of a particular cognising subject, need not necessarily appear in every other percipient. The constituents of the objective aspect of experience differ with the difference in the *attitude*, that the subject takes towards the object. The attitude is the main factor in apprehending the contents of the objective aspect of experience. The objective time, the time, the consciousness of which depends upon viewing the given in relation to a standard of measure, such as the sun, is not necessarily a content of every objective experience.

The elimination of the given objective time relation is recognised by the Mimāṁsakas also. Abhinavagupta himself refers to this view in the course of explanation of the process of universalisation. The Mīmāṁsaka[1] admits that from such statements as "Tām agnau prādāt" and "Rātrim āsata", the hearer, with a certain attitude and inclination, has finally an experience, from which the time, given in the statements, is eliminated. The final form of hearer's consciousness, has no reference to the past time indicated by the words "Āsata" or "Prādāt". On the contrary, it is the present time that figures in his consciousness, as is indicated by the expression "Pradadāmi", in which the final form of consciousness, aroused by the said statement, is expressed. It is not only the elimination of the given time element, which the Mīmāṁsaka admits: he admits the elimination of person also that may be given in a statement. For instance, in the above statements it is the third person that is given. But in the final experience of the hearer, with requisite attitude and inclination, it is eliminated, it is substituted by the first person as indicated by the words "āse" and "Pradadāmi".

Abhinavagupta, therefore, holds that the elimination and substitution of the given objective elements is not a peculiar doctrine of the Ābhāsavāda. It is admitted by other systems also. Therefore, just as, according to the Mīmāṁsaka, the experience of the hearer is different in form from that which is presented in a statement, which stimulates it, as in the case of "Tām agnau prādāt", so from a poetic statement also there arises in the hearer, with æsthetic attitude, an experience, which is characterised by elimination of temporal and other elements and substitution of some and addition of others.

1. A. Bh., Vol. I., 280.

IV. FROM IDENTIFICATION TO IMAGINATION.

In the preceding pages we have dealt with the process, which is involved in the æsthetic experience, up to the point of identification with the human focus of the presented situation. Identification, as has already been stated, consists in the unification of the self-forgetful self of the percipient with the human focus of the situation, which, being freed from the elements of time, place and all that constitutes individuality, is a mere set of certain psycho-physical factors. Let us, therefore, now analyse the constituents of this set and find out how they are responsible for the peculiar nature of the æsthetic experience.

As a rule, the appearance of the hero on the stage is never without a well defined purpose. As every purpose has an objective reference, it naturally involves a certain psycho-physical attitude. When, therefore, the spectator, identified with hero, faces a situation, the disposition comes to the forefront and the following constituents of the æsthetic personality are evoked .—

1. Taste not only keeps the attention fixed on the presented, but also does not allow any idea, that might arouse the consciousness of individuality in the spectator, to come to the foreground.

II. THE POWER OF VISUALISATION (1) partly removes the shifting opaque barrier that divides *the unconscious* from the conscious: (2) unites the given with what is exposed from behind the barrier: and (3) puts the image so formed against the *intellectual background* and so constructs the world of imagination.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ÆSTHETIC IMAGE.

It may be pointed out here that the dramatic presentation is but an idealised representation of historical or

some other events. Therefore, as in the case of history so in that of drama, the situation, which leads to the chief or central event, develops but slowly. The completion of the æsthetic image is accordingly reached by a slow process. It develops as the dramatic presentation proceeds.

A state of self-forgetfulness having been brought about by the extremely interesting dramatic preliminaries and identification with hero having taken place at his appearance in the aforesaid manner, the situation affects the audience exactly as it does the hero. This kind of affection of the audience with the presented is what may figuratively be spoken of as the first strokes in the making of an æsthetic image.[1] This, with additional strokes in the form of empathic reaction and emotive responses, reaches the state of fully developed æsthetic image when the dramatic climax is reached. Æsthetic experience, therefore, does not persist throughout the presentation because the æsthetic image, on which it depends, slowly develops. Hence it is a climactic experience. It arises when the image reaches completion, when the basic emotion rises to the highest relishable pitch.

V. From Imagination to Emotion.

All the three, the poet, the actor and the spectator have, according to Indian æstheticians, almost the same experience (*Samānonubhavaḥ*). The process involved in the rise of the experience and its subjective and objective constituents also, therefore, must be almost the same. We have already stated that æsthetic experience is due to identification with the focus of the presented situation. The psycho-physical condition of the æsthete in æsthetic experience is similar to that of the actor himself. Purpose, mental and

1. Dh. L. 57.

bodily attitudes and dispositions are inspired directly by the actor, and the given also is received through him.

Thus when the æsthete, assisted by *taste*, *intellectual background* and *power of visualisation* arranges and moulds the sensations, unites with the given the necessary elements from the unconscious and so builds up a world of imagination in which he lives and has his being, another subjective power, the æsthetic susceptibility, is evoked and requisitioned. Its harmonious working and arrangement with other subjective constituents leads to the formation of complete æsthetic image. Appropriate responses follow. And emotive state is the result.

VI. From Emotion to Complete Katharsis.

While the experience of the spectator on the physical plane is identical with that of the focus of the situation, because his heart is beating and so nerves are responding to the situation exactly like those of the focus, for the reason that he is possessed of æsthetic susceptibility; and the same is the case with the experience on the intellectual plane, because the 'pratibhā', assisted by intellectual background, has populated the field of imagination with more or less the same figures; another and the most important aspect of the æsthetic experience also develops along the same line to the same pitch, on a higher, the spiritual, plane.

How the presented situation with a focus together with automatic physical changes is responsible for the development of the spiritual suggested meaning on a higher plane, is explained by Abhinavagupta in his Abhinava Bhāratī. He takes the illustration from Kālidāsa's famous drama, Abhijñāna Śākuntalam.

The process may be explained as follows :—

The æsthetic personality has been prepared by the introductory scene to receive the presented in the æsthetic manner. It has been freed from the elements of individuality by the preliminary music. A state of self-forgetfulness exists. At this stage presentation begins.

The scene is a part of the holy forest in the vicinity of Kaṇva's hermitage. A hermitage-deer appears, pursued by King Duṣyanta in his chariot. It is running for life from the arrow of the king. It is in very great fear. As such, it is represented to be responsible for the development of the suggested spiritual meaning "Terror", Bhayānaka, in the king and through him in the spectator, who has identified himself with the former.

The process begins with the intellectual apprehension of the presented. The contents of consciousness are beautifully put in the following verse :—

Grīvābhaṅgābhirāmam muhuranupatati syandane baddhadṛṣṭiḥ,
Paścārdhena praviṣṭaḥ śarapatanabhayād bhūyasā pūrvakāyam.
Darbhairardhāvalīḍhaiḥ śramavitatamukha-bhraṁśibhiḥ kīrṇavartmā.
Paśyodagraplutatvādviyati bahutaraṁ stokamurvyām prayāti.

The spectator hears it. The consciousness of the meaning of the verse as a whole arises in him through conventional and intentional powers of language (Abhidhā and Tātparya). The inner visualisation of the whole takes place. The elements of time, place and so forth are inhibited. The time is the chief factor in the causal efficiency of the individual.[1] That having been inhibited, the inhibition of the

1. A. Bh., Vol. I., p. 36

individual naturally follows. The consciousness at this stage may be spoken of as "Terrified" (Bhītaḥ). The "Terrified" presupposes the cause of the terror. That in the present case being without any objective reality and, therefore, the "Terrified" being free trom the objective relation, is reduced to "terror" (Bhayam). This terror, appearing in the consciousness of the spectator, who is free from all elements of individuality, affecting his heart so as to seem penetrating it, and being visualised so as to seem to be dancing as it were before the eyes, is the spiritual suggested meaning, technically called Bhayānaka Rasa which develops on the spiritual plane.[1]

THE SOURCE OF TERROR.

Here it may naturally be asked, where does this terror come from? In reply to this, Abhinava says that it does not come from outside. It springs from within the self. The soul is beginningless and the tendencies of love and fear etc. (Vāsanās) are innate in it. These tendencies manifest themselves in such a way as to get clearly visualized within, when a man, possessed of æsthetic susceptibility finds himself in a situation which pleases the eye and the ear. When this happens in an æsthetic situation, it constitutes the suggested spiritual aspect of the meaning of æsthetic situation. In support of this view he cites the authority of no less a person than Kālidāsa.[2]

Thus we find that at the Kathartic level the process of universalisation is completed and that æsthetic experience at this level is nothing more than the experience of the universalised object by the universalised subject. The objective aspect, however, predominates, just as in

1. A. Bh., Vol I. p. 280. 2. A. Bh., Vol. I., p. 281.

the case of the fourth spiritual category of the Ābhāsavāda, "Iśavara". The experience at this level is "Ī am this" (Aham idam).

IMPEDIMENTS TO ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

There are seven impediments[1] to the æsthetic experience. The co-operation between the subjective conditions of the spectator with the peculiar nature of the æsthetic presentation, removes them all. They may be stated as follows :—

1. Inability to get at the meaning (Pratipattāvayogyatā Sambhāvanā virahaḥ).

It arises from the idea of impossibility of the presented

To get over this two things are necessary :

(a) Sahṛdayatva on the subjective side and

(b) on the objective side, the presentation of a well-known event in the case of the social drama and in that of the transcendental (lokottara) the name of a person, the idea of the historic reality of whom has taken deep root in the hearts of those who are seeing the presentation, because of the persistence of the tradition. Such a name has the capacity to arouse a flood of associated ideas, which prevent the rise of the idea of impossibility of the presented.

(2, 3) Subjective and objective limitations of time *and space.*

(Svagata-paragatatva-niyamena deśakālaviśeṣāveśaḥ).

The means of eliminating the objective and the subjective limitations :—

(i) The dramatic technique, (followed in the presentation of the introductory scene, which introduces the actor

1. A. Bh. Vol. I. 281-85.

as such and then concealing his identity with suitable dress, paints and speech with peculiar intonation, such as fits in with the historic associations of the name, that is given to the hero,) is the means of universalising the presentation. (ii) Similarly music etc., which are well known to bring about the self-forgetfulness in the hearer, are the means of subjective universalisation.

4. THE INFLUENCE OF PERSONAL JOYS AND SORROWS.

(Nija-sukha-duḥkhādi-vivaśībhāvaḥ.)

Self-forgetfulness, brought about by music etc., is the means to get over it.

5. LACK OF CLARITY DUE TO INSUFFICIENT STIMULUS.

(Pratītyupāya-vaikalya-sphuṭatvābhāvaḥ).

The mind does not get restful satisfaction if the knowledge is due to the inferential signs or linguistic symbols. To bring about the sufficiency in the stimulative capacity of the dramatic presentation, acting is introduced which has the stimulating effect almost as good as that of the really directly present.

6. SUBORDINATION OF THE PRINCIPAL.

(*Apradhānatā*)

The mind does not get the restful satisfaction in what occupies a subordinate position. Its natural tendency at the presentation of the subordinate is to seek for or run to the principal,

In order, therefore, to give the restful satisfaction, the Sthāyī is given the predominant position in the midst of the situation etc.

7. DUBIOUSNESS OF PRESENTATION.

(Saṁśaya-yogaḥ.)

The situation etc. have no fixed definite meaning in isolation from other constituents of the dramatic presentation. In order to obviate this dubiousness, the situation, mimetic changes and transient emotions are presented together.

THE CONCLUSION.

The æsthetic experience at the Kathartic level in the light of Ābhāsavāda, is not the objective cognition of a basic mental state in the hero, but the self-experience of the self, free from all limitations, as identified with the basic mental state becoming patent through the rise of Vāsanā due to identification with the focus of the situation.

THE AIM OF THE DRAMATIC PRESENTATION.

The Indian dramatist aims at presenting an emotive experience and not action, as do the European dramatists. This experience is not an ordinary daily experience of the common run of men, but that of an ideal man in an ideal situation. And because experience is an inner state of the self and as such does not admit of being directly presented, the physical situation, mimetic changes and involuntary physical states are introduced as the only means of presentation of the inner state. Further, the experience that the dramatist attempts to present, being essentially emotive, presupposes a situation, without which the presentation would be but partial. Hence the situation is introduced not as an independent centre of attention but only as a means of realisation of the emotive experience.

Full appreciation of an Indian drama is, therefore, not possible through objective perception of the external situation and physical states, because they are only means to an end, So far as the experience itself is concerned, its objective perception is a psychological impossibility;

because experience is never objective; it is essentially subjective. And how can this be known but through identification, as stated before? Hence there is fundamental difference between the point of view of the school of Indian dramaturgy, that we are presenting here, and that of some of the European dramatic theories. We can bring out the difference by stressing the spectator's point of view according to each of these.

To the European spectator the whole of the presented, including the hero, is an object of perception from the point of view of an unprejudiced and impartial spectator; and so there arise feelings of pity and sympathy for the hero in his trials and sufferings. The Indian spectator identifies himself with the focus of the situation, on and around which everything else revolves, and sees the rest of the presented as does the hero and has the same experience as the latter. The feelings, therefore, which characterise the European dramatic experience, are different from those aroused by an Indian drama.

ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE NOT TRULY EMOTIVE

It is a little misleading to call æsthetic experience at the Kathartic level, with which we are dealing here, an emotive experience. For, in what is understood as "emotion" the physical aspect is very much emphasised; in any case, much more than the psychological. The organic changes are more intense in it. But in the æsthetic experience at the Kathartic level, it is the mental aspect which is more emphasised. Further, in the emotive experience it is the directly perceived, which serves as the stimulus; but in the æsthetic, the directly perceived is simply a medium, through which the real object of experience is conveyed, much in the same manner as that in which the object of mystic experience of a devotee is

brought before his mind's eye through the medium of a statue or something similar to it.

It is different not only from the ordinary emotive experience in ordinary life but also from the experience of another's emotion by a yogin at a lower level. (yogi-pratyakṣaja-taṭastha-parasaṁvittijñāna).[1]

According to Patañjali, there is a spiritual discipline, which brings to a yogin the power to know the states of mind of another person.[2] This power is got through concentration and contemplation on and merging in the state of mind, which is known through external expressions of it And we know that æsthetic experience at the Kathartic level is experience of a state of mind of the hero of the piece. One may, therefore, ask "Is it of the type of experience of another's mental state by a Yogin ?" That it is not so will become clear, if we remember that æsthetic experience at Kathartic level is the experience of the universalised mental state by universalised subject. It is, therefore, distinct from the knowledge of another's mental state by a yogin. For, in the latter case both the subject and the object are individual. In the former both are universal. In one case the mental state is definitely associated with another individual, In the other case it is free from such relations.

In one case the mental state is known as such, free from all associations with its cause.[3] In the other case the mental state is not experienced as such, but as something different from itself, because of its transformation into something else by relation with Vibhāva etc. In æsthetic experience we do not experience Sthāyin but Rasa.

1. A. Bh., Vol, I., 286.
2. Y. S., 3-19.
3. Y. S, 3-20.

ABHINAVA'S APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF NUMBER OF RASAS.

1. Bhānudatta in his Rasa Taraṅgiṇī maintains the number of Rasas to be nine. But he holds that Nirveda is the Sthāyibhāva of Śānta and that Śānta with Nirveda as its sthāyibhāva, does not admit of stage-presentation. He also mentions four more Rasas (i) Vātsalya (ii) Laulya (iii) Bhakti and (iv) Kārpaṇya, but only as a prima facie view (Pūrva pakṣa). He does not accept these additional Rasas as independent. He asserts that (i) tenderness (Ārdṛtā) (ii) yearning (Abhilāṣā), (iii) faith (Śraddhā) and (iv) desire to acquire (Spṛhā), which are accepted to be the basic mental states (Sthāyibhāva) of the said Rasas, are not independent: on the contrary, they are identical with Rati, when it appears as a Vyabhicārin (a transient state of mind that accompanies the basic) in some other Rasa than Śṛṇgāra. He holds that (i) Rati is called Vātsalya, when it appears as Vyabhicārin and expresses itself in tenderness in the context of Karuṇa; (ii) it is called Bhakti when it figures as Vyabhicārin and manifests itself as faith in the context of Śānta; (iii) it is spoken of as Laulya, when it figures as Vyabhicārin of Hāsya and shows itself as yearning for an object of desire, which is yet to be acquired: (iv) if, however, Rati appears as Vyabhicārī of Hāsya and expresses itself in intense desire for preservation of what is in one's possession, it is called Kārpaṇya.[1]

His view in regard to Śānta may be stated as follows:—

He holds that Śānta admits of the stage-representation also; but the situations etc. in this case are different. In the case of dramatic presentation of Śānta, its

1. R. T. 33.

sthāyibhāva is the wrong knowledge that has been revived (Prabuddha mithyājñāna). The implication of this assertion is that the hero in the context of Śānta has to be one, who has reached the transcendental level, but has temporarily descended to the empirical level, because of the revival of ignorance, due to Karma-saṁskāra. Its Vibhāva can be any worldly situation, in which the hero may be pursuing any worldly objective, irrespective of the fact whether it brings to him merit or demerit.

But in the case of poetic presentation of Śānta, its Sthāyin is Nirveda; its Vibhāva is freedom from evil effects of surroundings; its Anubhāvas are tears of bliss (Ānandāśru) and horripilation etc.[1]

(II) King Bhoja, in his Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa, admits Śṛṅgāra to be the only Rasa, according to a quotation from the first chapter, given in the summary of the work, in the introduction. Here he mentions ten Rasas, including (1) Vatsala and Śānta, as maintained by others.[2]

In his Sarasvatī Kaṇṭhābharaṇa, however, he admits twelve Rasas, Here he recognises (i) Preyas (ii) Śānta (iii) Udātta[3] and (iv) Uddhata, in additon to generally accepted eight Rasas. According to him (i) Sneha, (ii) Dhṛti (iii) Tattvābhiniveśinī mati and (iv) Garva are their Sthāyibhāvas respectively. He holds that Śama, which is maintained to be the Sthāyin of Śānta by some, is but a form of Dhṛti.[4]

(III) Dhanañjaya, the author of the Daśarūpaka and his brother-commentator, Dhanika, admit the number of Rasas to be nine, including Śānta. We shall state in detail the difference of opinion between Dhanañjaya and

1. R. T., 49.
2. S. P., VI.
3. S. Ka., 595.
4. S. Ka , 598-9.

Abhinava on Śānta in a separate section.

(IV) Abhinavagupta maintains that the number of Rasas is only nine. Of these, four are the principal and the rest are subordinate. Those Rasas are principal, which are due to basic mental states, which lead to any one of the four recognised aims of human life. Thus, Śṛṅgāra has Rati as its basic mental state, which leads to the attainment of Kāma and consequently to Dharma and artha; Raudra springs from Krodha and leads to Artha; Vīra is based upon Utsāha and leads to Dharma and Artha; Śānta is based upon Tattvajñāna and leads to Mokṣa. These four, therefore, are the principal Rasas. Though occasionally they may be found to occupy a subordinate position, yet it is an undeniable fact that there are dramas, in which each of them is separately found to be the principal. As Hāsa etc. do not independently lead to any Puruṣārtha, but do so only as parts of Rati etc., they are recognised to be subordinate.[1]

Abhinavagupta admits only eight Sthāyibhāvas. For, they are such mental states that no human being can be without them; they are basic and do not presuppose any other mental state for their being; they are natural; we cannot question "why do they rise? e. g. we can question, why is a person tired; but can we similarly question why is he enthusiastic?

He definitely asserts that there are no more than nine Rasas. These are the only Rasas fit for exposition. For, they are related to objectives of human life and are extremely interesting to human mind. He admits Rasas to be nine, not because this number was recognised in the literary circle,[2] to which he belonged, but because no

1. A, Bh., Vol. I., 283-4. 2. A. Bh., Vol. I., 341.

other mental state admits of so interesting a presentation, nor is so closely connected with the objectives of human life.

He refutes the view of those who admit Vātsalya, Laulya and Bhakti etc. to be independent Rasas. His refutation is based upon his conception of Rati. He draws a clear distinction between Rati (love) in ordinary life and that which art presents. It may be presented as follows :—

There are three distinctive features of love in ordinary life.

1. It is between two persons of opposite sexes, each being the object of desire and so of enjoyment to the other,

2. The judgement of the on-looker about the couple is "She is his wife". The resultant feeling, therefore, that is aroused by such Rati in the spectator, is that of yearning for the enjoyment, which the couple is imagined to have.

3. It does not persist It lasts only so long as does the state of infatuation and the judgement, therefore, about it is "it is a transient state".

Rati in poetry is of essentially different nature. The characteristic features of it may be stated as follows :—

1. It persists through all states, presented poetically or dramatically, till its fruition.

2. The ultimate fruition of it is perfectly free from all elements of pain and sorrow. Its fruition is in perfect happiness.

3. Its fruition is in the erotic æsthetic experience, technically called Śṛṅgāra. While in the experience of the Rati in ordinary life the most important constituent is the external objective fact; the erotic æsthetic experience

is characterised by total absence of such a fact. It is purely subjective.

This point may be clarified as follows :—

Amorous sport, in the world of reality, is a thing between two persons of opposite sexes in a state of infatuation. It represents the culmination of the stream of pleasant experiences. The beautiful world, presented by a poet, has no reality of the ordinary world inasmuch as it is purely imaginary. In this world of imagination there is no insentient object of enjoyment as in the ordinary world of reality. The culminating point in the stream of enjoyment is presented, not by physical union of the two in love, but in the spiritual union of two groups of ideas, which consists in mutual[1] merging of the two in each other so as to lose duality. It is such a love as makes the couple look upon each other as the very life. It is just what Rāma says in separation from Sītā "My effort of breathing is a mockery, Jānakī is my life". It is dedication of the whole being of the lover to his object of love.

If we keep this conception of Rati in mind, we shall at once realise that Vātsalya, which is admitted by some to be an independent Rasa, with tenderness as its basic mental state, is nothing but Śṛṅgāra and tenderness is nothing but Rati, inasmuch as Sneha consists in completely merging one's being into another and, therefore, is essentially Rati. For instance, a son, towards whom his father has tenderness, if it is true, will ultimately express itself in looking upon the son as the very life of himself and in denying to himself everything for the sake of the son i.e. completely merging his whole being into that of the son.

---

1. A. Bh., Vol. I., 303.

Similar is the case with Laulya and Bhakti. For, their basic mental states are only subvarieties of Rati, Hāsa or some other basic[1] mental state. Their mutual difference is due to the object of their respective psycho-physical activity. Thus on closer analysis we find that Laulya is nothing but Rati expressing itself as intense desire for acquisition of a certain object in the context of Hāsya, Similarly Bhakti is nothing but extreme devotion to an object that is held in high esteem and dedication of the whole being to it.

Abhinavagupta summarily dismisses the views of those who admit more than nine Rasas He gives only one paragraph to their criticism. He, however, devotes a whole section to the discussion of the essential nature of Śānta Rasa and its establishment as the most important and independent of all Rasas. He criticises a view, which is very similar to what Dhanañjaya holds on Śānta, though he does not mention any name. We shall therefore, deal in some detail with his theory of Śānta and his criticism of a view allied to that of Dhanañjaya.

Dhanañjaya and Abhinavagupta on Śānta Rasa.

Dhanañjaya and Abhinavagupta were contemporaries. The former was older. For, he and his brother graced the Court of King Muñja (974-995 A D.), while the earliest dated available work of the latter, the Kramastotra, belongs to 990 A.D.

The former did not come under the influence of the latter's æsthetic theory. For, the Dhvanyāloka-Locana and the Abhinava Bhāratī belong to the second period of his literary activity and, therefore, could not have been written before the commencement of the 11th century.

1. A. Bh. Vol. I., 341-2.

Dhanañjaya partly followed Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, who belonged to the close of the 9th and the beginning of the 10th century A.D. and had written a commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata. In this section we shall discuss how Dhanañjaya differs from Abhinavagupta on two fundamental points, on one of which undoubtedly he follows Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.

Both, Dhanañjaya and Abhinavagupta, have written on dramaturgy. Both follow the authority of Bharata. The former has simply summarised the views of Bharata in the Daśarūpaka. The latter has written an extensive commentary on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra, known as Abhinava Bhāratī. Both knew the views of earlier authorities on dramaturgy. Though in the case of the former there is only indirect evidence in support of his knowledge, because these earlier views are quoted by his brother, Dhanika, only in his commentary on the Daśarūpaka. Dhanañjaya's attitude towards the theory of Dhvani was antagonistic. He, therefore, generally criticises the views of Ānandavardhana, presented in the Dhvanyāloka.

The difference between Dhanañjaya, as interpreted by Dhanika, and Abhinavagupta is very pronounced on the two fundamental points.

1. The number of Rasas. The former admits only eight Rasas and refutes the view that Śānta is the ninth Rasa such as could be presented on the stage. The latter takes particular pain to establish it as an independent and the most basic Rasa and holds the number of Rasas to be nine.

2. The former does not accept the theory of Dhvani and, following the authority of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, holds that the rise of the basic mental state (sthāyin) in the spectator is due to the contextual power of the language. (Tātparyā

natirekācca vyañjakatvasya) and that the universalisation (Sādhāraṇībhāva) of the subjective and the objective aspects of the æsthetic experience is due to the two powers of the poetic or dramatic composition, which had been assumed by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka for the first time.

There are many other minor points, on which they differ, such as the conception of Nāṭya, Bindu and Pratimukha etc.

The text of the Nāṭya Śāstra.

A careful study of the Abhinava Bhāratī clearly reveals the fact that there were two recensions of the Nāṭya Śāstra (i) earlier and (ii) later. In the former, Bharata's text on Śānta did exist. In the latter, it did not. These two recensions are clearly reflected in the two published texts of the Nāṭya Śāstra.

(1) Published along with the Abhinava Bhāratī in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series and

(2) published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series. In the former we find the text on Śānta. In the latter we do not.

In both the recensions, however, some stray remarks on Śānta were present, as we know on the authority of Abhinava Bhāratī, such as, "Kvacicchamaḥ" and "Mokṣe Cāpi Virāgiṇaḥ". But they are so few and short that they did not draw the attention of the less careful and uncritical readers.

Evidence of the Abhinava Bhāratī.

The text of the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata, as given at the top of each page of the Abhinava Bhāratī, published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, does not present correctly the text of the Nāṭya Śāstra as Abhinava had before him

while writing his commentary. The reasons in support of this view may be stated as follows : —

1. The introductory portion of the text on Śānta "Śama sthāyibhāvātmako mokṣa pravartakaḥ," was not there in the text that Abhinava had before him. Because on page 340 (A.Bh.) he says :—

> Tathā ca cirantanapustakeṣu Sthāyibhāvān
> Rasatvam upaneṣyāmaḥ ityasyānantaraṃ
> Śāntonāma śamasthāyibhāvātmaka ityādi
> śānta lakṣaṇam paṭhyte"

The Vibhāva, Anubhāva and Vyabhicāribhāva, as given in this edition, were omitted in Abhinava's text. Because, the Vibhāva etc., as given by him in his commentary, are very different from those given in the published text. It runs as follows :—

> Sa tu tattvajñāna-vairagya-āśayaśudhyādi-
> bhiḥ vibhāvaiḥ samutpadyate— — —
> Vyabhicāriṇaścāsya nirveda-smṛti-dhṛti-
> sarvāśramaśauca-stambha-romāñcādayaḥ".

Abhinaya states the Vibhāva etc. of the Śānta as follows;—

> "Tattvajñāna-lakṣaṇasya ca sthāyinaḥ
> samastoyaṃ laukikālaukika-cittavṛtti
> kalāpo vyabhicāritāmeti— — —
> vibhāvā api kathamīśvarānugraha prabhṛtayaḥ".

II. If the subsequent portion of the prose passage of the Nāṭya Śāstra, as given in G. O. S. existed in the manuscript that he had before him, he would not have mentioned other Vibhāva etc. of Śama, than those given in the original.

III. He quotes two of the Saṅgraha Kārikās in full in his commentary, namely, "Mokṣādhyātma Samutthaḥ" and "Svaṁ Svaṁ nimittamādāya" which are found as

No. 104 p. 334 and No. 108, p. 336 of the G. O. S. If these kārikās had been in the manuscript before him, he would not have quoted them in full.

IV. It was only the last kārikā "Evam ete Rasāḥ" which was there in his manuscript. To it he refers and comments on it (A. Bh. 342).

1. Opposition To Śānta on Textual Basis.

Orthodox followers of Bharata, to whom only the later recension of Bharata's text was available, rejected Śānta on the basis that Bharata does not define Śānta, nor does he state the situation (Vibhāva) etc. in the context of which it is to be presented. This view is referred to in the Locana (176) and the Avaloka on the Daśarūpaka (92).

Its Criticism.

In the latter it is simply stated but not criticised. In the former, the untenability of the opponent's view is shown (i) on the ground of experience as well as (ii) on the textual ground, allowing the opponent the advantage of maintaining that the later recension only is authoritative, In the first place, it does not matter it says, if Bharata does not define and state the situation etc. of it. We have to admit it because we experience it when all the desires for the worldly objects cease. In the second place there is the evidence of Bharata's text also to show that he accepted it, for, he says "Kvacicchamaḥ",

II. Opposition to Śānta Independently of the Text.

There is just one view, mentioned in the Avaloka (92) but not directly referred to by Abhinava, which denies Śānta independently of Bharata's text. It says that there is no such æsthetic experience as is assumed by some under

the name of Śānta, because attachment and aversion, which have been associated with the self from time immemorial, cannot totally be uprooted. The statement is so brief that its implication is not quite clear. If, however, it be supposed to imply that in no case and under no circumstances can they be totally uprooted, it would mean that the fourth object of human life, the final emancipation, is impossible, a view which no follower of the orthodox systems of Indian thought, excepting of course the Cārvāka and to some extent the Mīmāṁsaka can accept, much less can a Saiva like Abhinavagupta. But if it means that such a state of freedom from all desires and aversions is not possible in the spectator, it would mean that no æsthetic experience is possible, because such a state of freedom is involved in all, a position which the opponents themselves will be most unwilling to hold.

III. Opposition on the Basis of the Indirect Evidence of Bharata.

Bharata, while defining Ḍima, one of the ten types of drama, says that in it only six Rasas ought to be presented and that Śṛṅgāra and Hāsya have to be totally excluded from it. Because Bharata mentions only eight Rasas here, six to be presented and two to be excluded, some opponents take it as an evidence of Bharata's non-admission of Śānta. They argue that if Bharata had accepted Śānta as an independent Rasa, he would have surely included it in the list of either presentable or unpresentable Rasas in Ḍima. Hence they conclude that there is no Śānta Rasa.

Its Criticism.

Abhinava refutes this view as follows:—

Bharata's definition of Ḍima, rather than being an

evidence against his acceptance of Śānta, is in favour of it. The mistake of the opponent is due to his having taken only a part of the definition into account. He ignores the two important parts of the definition.

1. It originates from a composition, wherein a Rasa, involving excitement, predominates ("Dīpta rasa Kāvyayoniḥ").

2. It is written in styles technically called Sātvatī and Ārabhaṭī ("Sātvatyā-rabhaṭīvrtti Sāṁyuktaḥ"). The first part excludes the possibility of the introduction of Śānta in Ḍima wherein a Dīpta Rasa predominates. If there had been no Śānta Rasa what could it have meant to exclude? If, on the other hand, Śānta be accepted, then and then alone, after the statement that in Ḍima there are to be presented only six Rasas excluding Śṛṅgāra and Hāsya, the question arises "what about Śānta"? And the first part is meant to exclude it.

It cannot be urged here that that part is meant to exclude Karuṇa, Bībhatsa and Bhayānaka. For, they are excluded by the second part.

IV. Semi-Textual Opposition to the Semi-Textual Exponents of Śānta.

It is difficult to say what were the contents of Bharata's text on Śānta Rasa, as discovered by Abhinava in the earlier recension. Two things, however, are clear from Abhinava's own statement. (i) Whatever else may or may not have been the content of Bharata's text on Śānta, it surely stated the Sthāyibhāva of it. (ii) The statement came before the exposition of all other Rasas. It is, therefore, impossible to say how far the first and probably the earliest view of the exponents of Śānta, cited by Abhinava in the Abhinava Bhāratī, had the support

of Bharata's authority. One thing, however, is clear, namely, that it had the support of Bharata in the admission of Śama as Sthāyibhāva. For, a reference to it is found even in the later recension, as has been stated above.

According to this view,

1. Śama[1] is the basic mental state of Śānta.
2. It is to be presented in the context of the situation, constituted by practice of austerity and contact with yogins etc.
3. Its action is confined to the presentation of not-being of all such passions as those of love and anger etc.
4. Its transient emotions are patience etc.

ITS CRITICISM BY ABHINAVA'S PREDECESSORS

(a) The[2] acceptance of Śama as a basic mental state is contrary to Bharata's view, according to whom the number of Bhāvas is only forty-nine; while if Śama be accepted as Sthāyibhāva, the number would come up to fifty.

(b) The situation of a basic mental state constitutes the fringe-experience in the case of the accepted Rasas such as the Śṛṅgāra. But such is not the case with austerity etc. in relation to Śānta.

If it be said by the exponents, "we speak of austerity etc. as the cause (Vibhāva) of Śama, not because of their immediate causality to Śama, but because of their causality to the realisation of the Ultimate, which constitutes an element in the experience of Śānta:" the reply

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 333.
2. A. Bh., Vol. I. 333-4.

is that in that case the causality of the austerity etc. to Śama will be indirect and as such unfit to be represented as the Vibhāva of Śānta.

(c) The absence of passions such as love and anger, cannot be spoken of as the Anubhāvas of Śānta, because it cannot be distinguished from Śama, which is supposed to be the cause and, therefore, different from Anubhāva, which is its effect. Further, the absence, being of the negative nature, cannot be presented and, therefore, cannot serve as the sign through which Śama could be known. As to the presentation of deep sleep and senselessness, they are presentable through deep respiration, fall and lying on the ground etc.

(d) The transient emotions of Śānta, such as Dhṛti, which consists in the use of the available, are impossible in the context of Śānta

(e) Further, drama is supposed to have a moral purpose. It is meant to instruct the spectators such as the princes. But what instruction can the presentation of the ways and means of the realisation of the Ultimate impart to them ? For, if they attain a state, akin to what one gets through the realisation of the Ultimate, they would transcend the empirical level and so would become indifferent to sufferings of others.

Therefore there is no such Rasa as Śānta.

Criticism Of the Above.

Abhinavagupta takes up the problem of Śānta Rasa at this point. He replies to the point, mentioned in the last paragraph, as follows :—

The audience is to be instructed not only in regard to the empirical and semi-empirical aims of human life, such

as the triad of Dharma, Artha and Kāma, but also in regard to the transcendental and highest aim, namely, the final emancipation. In fact, it is well known that all the systems of philosophy no less than the various Smṛtis and Itihāsas are primarily meant to instruct people in regard to the highest aim of human life. Therefore, just as the basic mental states necessary for the attainment of the first three objects of human life, such as Rati etc., if well presented on the stage, are responsible for the æsthetic experiences, known as Śṛṅgāra etc., so the basic mental state, necessary for the attainment of the highest aim of human life, if equally well presented, is responsible for the arousal of the corresponding æsthetic experience in such spectators as are possessed of the necessary æsthetic susceptibility.

Having thus established Śānta to be a Rasa, he raises the question "what is its basic mental state ?"

V. Expositions of Śānta on the Basis of Indirect Evidence of Bharata.

I. Nirveda as Sthāyin of Śānta.

Some maintain Nirveda to be the Śthāyin of Śānta as follows :—

They[1] distinguish Nirveda, that is due to poverty etc., from that which is due to the realisation of the Ultimate. The difference, they hold, is due to difference, in the causes. They maintain that Bharata intended Nirveda to be taken as a Sthāyin, as is clear from the fact that he mentions this as the first of the Vyabhicārins. But for this intention he would never have begun his list of Vyabhicārins with such an inauspicious word. Further, Bharata excludes Jugupsā as a Vyabhicārin from

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 334.

the presentation of Vipralambha Śṛṅgāra. This makes it clear that Bharata intended all the Bhāvas to be used as either Sthāyin or Vyabhicārin. Hence there can be no textual objection to presenting Nirveda as a Sthāyin.

That Nirveda, which is due to the realisation of the Ultimate, is more permanent than the directly mentioned eight Sthāyins, because it is capable of driving them all away. How could it do so unless it were more permanent than the accepted Sthāyins, as has just been stated ?

ITS CRITICISM.

According to those who hold that Nirveda, due to the realisation of the Ultimate, is the Sthāyin of Śānta, the realisation of the Ultimate should be the Vibhāva of Śānta and not the causes of Vairagya, as pointed out in Y. S. 1-15. (Dṛṣṭanuśravika viṣaya vitṛṣṇasya vaśīkārasaṁjñā vairāgyam) For, the causality of Vairāgyabīja to Nirveda is indirect and admission of the indirect cause as Vibhāva will make the conception too wide. And even if the realisation of the Ultimate be accepted to be the cause of Śānta Rasa, it would cease to be presentable, because its situation, the realisation of the Ultimate, is unpresentable.

Further, the causal relation between Nirveda and Tattva Jñāna has been totally misconceived. For, what is Nirveda after all ? Is it not complete indifference to all the worldly objects ? If so, it is rather the cause of Tattva jñāna, the chief characteristic of which is the freedom from all attachments. For, a person, who is free from all attachments, makes such efforts as lead him to the realisation of the Ultimate which is responsible for liberation. It is never the case that a person realises the Ultimate first and then comes to the realisation of the futility of pursuit of all worldly objects, which ultimately leads to liberation.

PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTION OF VAIRĀGYA AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-REALISATION (TATTVAJÑĀNA).

According to the Yoga system, the mental attitudes towards the objective world are determined by predominance of any one of the three qualities (Guṇas). 1. Sattva 2. Rajas and 3. Tamas.

1. When Sattva predominates over Rajas and Tamas and the latter two are in the condition of equality with each other, the mind[1] is drawn to the acquisition of supernatural powers and sweet sounds etc.

2. When Tamas predominates over Sattva and Rajas, the mind is drawn to acts, based on lack of faith in religion and ignorance. It is then excessively attached to the worldly objects (Avairāgyopagama) and experiences disappointment everywhere.

3. When, however. darkness of Tamas disappears and Rajas co-operates with Sattva, the position is reversed. The mind then is drawn to the acts, based on faith in religion and true knowledge of facts. It is then indifferent to the objects of the world (Vairāgyopagama) and feels no disappointment.

4. But when the Sattva is perfectly free from the impurities of Rajas and Tamas, the consciousness of distinction between Buddhi and the Self dawns.

5. The consciousness of distinction between Buddhi and Puruṣa consists in perfect freedom of the Sattva from the impurities of Rajas and Tamas, and, therefore, is identical with it. The Self-realisation, however, is different from it. For, in perfect self-realisation, even the consciousness of Buddhi, involved in the consciousness of distinction (Vivekakhyāti) must disappear : the conscious-

1. Y. S. (M. P.) 5

ness of distinction between Buddhi and Puruṣa also, therefore, has to be discarded. When, therefore, a Yogin becomes indifferent even to this distinction i. e. rises above the level of all affections, attains the higher Vairāgya or Guṇavaitṛṣṇya, he attains perfect Self-realisation.

Vairāgya, therefore, is of two kinds (i) lower and (ii) higher. The former consists in the indifference to the objects of the world even when they offer themselves for the enjoyment and is due[1] to the disappearance of Tamas and consequent co-operation of Sattva and Rajas, It is a means to control the affections of the mind and to concentrate the mind on the object of meditation to attain Samādhi. The Samādhi so attained is technically called Samprajñāta, inasmuch as it involves objective reference. The object of concentration in this case may be gross or subtle.

Samprajñāta Samādhi, the concentration with objective reference, has four well defined stages (i) Savitarka (2) Savicāra (3) Sānanda and (4) Sāsmita. (i) When the concentration is on gross matters and involves organisation of the sense-data together with the consciousness of expressions, standing for the different constituents, and their meaning, as when a person concentrates on a certain deity, with definite form, such as four-armed Viṣṇu, the Samādhi is technically called Savitarka. But when concentration involves neither the organisation of sense-data nor the consciousness of expressions and their meanings, it is called Nirvitarka.

(ii) When the concentration is on the subtle objects such as the internal sense (Antaḥkaraṇa) and the subtle elements (Tanmātras) involving the consciousness of the

1. Y. S., (N. V.) 20.

temporal and spatial order, it is technically called Savicāra. But when the consciousness of the temporal and spatial order is not involved, it is called Nirvicāra.

(iii) When the concentration is on the Sattva, tinged by Rajas and Tamas, and Sattva predominates and the self is thrown into the background, it is called[1] Sānanda Samādhi inasmuch as the predominant Sattva, on which the concentration is practised, is essentially *bliss* and light (Sukhaprakāśamayasya Sattvasya bhāvyamānatvāt). The persons, who firmly stick to this samādhi, do not realise the higher objects, the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa. They, however, cease to identify themselves with their bodies and hence are called Videhas.

(iv) When the concentration is on the Sattva, perfectly free from the impurities of Rajas and Tamas, the Self predominates, and the Sattva is thrown into the background, the consciousness is limited to mere *Being* (Sattāmātra). Hence it is called Sāsmita. The yogin, who finds satisfaction in this Samādhi, is not able to realise the Self. His Buddhi, however, merges into its origin, the Prakṛti. Hence he is called Prakṛtilaya.[2]

In the Samprajñāta Samādhi, therefore, there is no self-realisation. The final stage of it is simply responsible for the merging of the Buddhi into its origin. The lower Vairāgya therefore, is not the direct cause of the Self-realisation. It leads to the Samprajñāta Samādhi only.

Therefore, the position of those exponents of Śānta, who hold Nirveda, the realisation of the unfitness of the worldly objects as the objects of human pursuit, to be the basic mental state of Sānta, and maintain the Self-realisation to be

1. Y. S. (Bh. V.) 20-1. 2. Y. S. (M. P.) 24-5.

the cause of Nirveda, is not sound. For, what is Nirveda after all ? Is it not the realisation of the unfitness of the worldly objects as the objects of human pursuit ? If so, such a realisation (Vairāgya) is the cause of the self-realisation (Tattvajñāna) rather than the effect of it. For, a person who has become indifferent to the worldly objects makes such efforts as lead him to the Self-realisation. Further, the lower Vairāgya is the cause of Prakṛtilaya only, as explained above. It is never the direct cause of Self-realisation.

Para or Higher Vairāgya

When a yogin, after learning the essential nature of the Self from teacher or scripture or through inference, makes persistent efforts to concentrate on it, his Sattva gets purity through freedom from the impurities of Rajas and Tamas and, therefore, there[1] arises in him the knowledge of distinction between the Buddhi and the Self. Thus, when after the rise of consciousness of the distinction, the yogin realises the rejectability of the Buddhi and becomes indifferent to it, he attains the higher or para Vairāgya. This Vairāgya has no objective reference whatsoever. It is simply a higher stage of purity of consciousness.

Hence the position of those who maintain that Nirveda (Vairāgya) which is due to self-realisation, is the basic mental state of Śānta and cite the authority of Patañjali's aphorism (Tatparampuruṣakhyāterguṇa vaitṛṣṇyam) is not sound. For, in this aphorism the author is not talking of the lower but higher Vairāgya, which has no objective reference and which is simply a higher stage of purity of consciousness.

---

1. A. Bh. Vol. I., 336.

Relation Between Nirveda And Tattvajñāna In The Light Of Nyāya System.

It is[1] also wrong to seek the support of Gautama's aphorism "Duḥkhajanma" etc. to assert the causality of Tattvajñāna to freedom from attachment to the worldly objects (Nirveda) on the ground (1) that it mentions Tattvajñāna (Mithyājñānāpāya) as the cause of Vairāgya, (Doṣāpāya) and (2) that Vairagya is nothing but Nirveda, and therefore, to maintain Nirveda to be the basic mental state of Śānta. For, Nirveda, according to Bharata, is nothing but a continuous flow of the current of grief and, therefore, is a distinct state of mind and as such is very different from Vairāgya, the destruction of all mental affections such as Rāga and Dveśa.

Even if Nirveda be taken to be synonymous with Vairāgya it would still be not right to maintain its causality to the final emancipation. For, though Nirveda may thus be said to come after Tattva jñāna, yet, even according to Gautama, it is not the direct cause of Mokṣa. There are other causes of Mokṣa, mentioned in the Sutra itself. Hence Nirveda cannot be accepted to be the Sthāyin of Śānta. Another fact that may be pointed out, is that the opponent confuses the Vedāntic conception of Tattvajñāna with that of the Nyāya. For, according to the Nyāya, Tattvajñāna is not self-realisation but knowing different things in the true perspective. If, however, he were to take it in Vedāntic sense his position is reduced to simply fighting for the word "Nirveda" instead of Śama, without any difference in meaning, inasmuch as he will have to admit Nirveda as due to Tattvajñāna, the self-realization.

Dhanañjaya on Nirveda as Sthāyin of Śānta.

He rejects Nirveda as the ninth Sthāyin. In so doing, he

1. A. Bh. Vol. I. 336.

seems to have ignored the realisation of the Ultimate as its cause. He seems to have taken it in the strict sense of the term i.e. self-dissatisfaction, self-disrespect or self-contempt (Svāvamānana). For, Dhanika, in the course of his interpretation, talks of anxiety (Cintā) etc. as its Vyabhicārins, which are impossible in a state of mind, caused by the realisation of the Ultimate. His reason for the rejection is that the definition of Sthāyin, as a state of mind, the continuity of which is not broken either by such states of mind as harmonise with it or even by those which are antagonistic to it, does not apply to it, because its continuity is really broken by anxiety etc. He definitely refutes the view, according to which the ground for its rejection as a Sthāyin is its incapacity to lead to any one of the well recognised goals of human life. For, then, he says, we will have to reject Hāsa etc. also to be the Sthāyins, because they also do not directly lead to any goal.

2. Any one of the Eight Accepted Sthāyins as the Sthāyin of Śānta.

Others hold that any one of the eight accepted basic mental states can be the Sthāyin of Śānta. Any one of these if presented in the context of a situation different from that to which Śṛṅgāra etc. are due (i.e. in the context of the means of the realisation of the Ultimate, such as hearing of the lectures on the nature of the Ultimate) will arouse a different æsthetic experience, called Sānta. Thus, uninterrupted devotion to the Self, to the exclusion of all the rest, may be the means of liberation. Hence Rati may be presented to be the Sthāyin of Śānta. Utsāha etc. also can similarly be treated. Their view is supported, its exponents maintain, by the Gītā, which says "Yaścātmaratirevasyāt". The view that such Vibhāvas were meant to be introduced in the context of Rati etc. is attributed by the exponents of

the theory to Bharata, who, they hold, implied them by the use of the word "Ādi" at the end of the enumerated Vibhāvas.

This view Abhinava criticises as follows :—

This means that there is no definite Sthāyin of Śānta. And multiplicity of Sthāyins would involve the multiplicity of Rasas also. The identity of effects of all these cannot be advanced as a reason for the identity of Rasas arising therefrom. For, in that case Vīra and Raudra also will have to be looked upon as identical, because of the identity of their effects.

3. All the Eight Together as Sthāyin of Śānta.

Still others hold that all the Sthāyins, unified in the manner in which the different ingredients are unified in the Pānaka Rasa, are the Sthāyin of Śānta. This view also is untenable. For, the different basic mental states do not occur simultaneously, because of their being of essentially opposite nature.

VI. The view on Śānta with Slight Difference from that of Abhinavagupta.

(1) Śama as Sthāyin of Śānta.

Some maintain that Śama, the absence of all affections of the mind, is the Sthāyin of Śānta. But this view also is not sound. Because the total not-being of yearning, being of the nature of total negation, cannot be rightly spoken of as a Bhāva. If, however, the exponents mean by "Tṛṣṇā asadbhāva" not total absence of yearning but the presence of a state of mind, which in its nature is quite opposite to yearning, we perfectly agree with them.

Dhanañjaya on Sama as Sthāyin of Śānta.

He holds that though Śama as the basic mental state of Śānta may be presentable in poetry; it is certainly not presentable in drama. Because drama is primarily meant to be presented in action. Such a presentation, however, is not possible in the case of Śama, beeause it consists in cessation of all activities.

According to him, there is no drama wherein Śama is represented to be the basic mental state. The position of those who maintain that in the Nāgānanda, a drama from the pen of Harṣa, Śama is the basic mental state, is, according to him, untenable: (i) because such a view is inconsistent with the love for Malayavatī and the attainment of sovereignty of the Vidyādharas: and (ii) because there is no instance of a drama, wherein both, the attachment to and aversion from the worldly objects, are represented as due to one and the same situation in which the original hero, represented in the drama, is involved. He holds that in the Nāgānanda, the basic mental state is Dayāvīrotsāha: because only in relation to such a Sthāyin, the erotic æsthetic experience can occupy a subordinate position and also because with it alone attainment of sovereignty harmonises.

Additional Reason for Unpresentability of Śama.

According to him, Śama, the basic mental state of Śānta at its highest pitch, is not presentable. For, such a state of mind is reached only at the final emancipation, which consists in the merging of the individual into the Universal. It is a state, which, according to the well-known authorities, is characterised by freedom from pleasure and pain, attachment and aversion, and anxiety and desire. It is of the nature of negation of all, for which the words stand. No linguistic presentation of it is, therefore, poss-

ible. Even if it be somehow presented, no æsthetic experience from it is possible. For, there is no person possessed of the necessary æsthetic susceptibility for Śānta,

If, however, Śānta be identified with the means of attaining it, such as Muditā etc., it implies the admission that the æsthetic experience of Śānta does not involve a state of mind distinct from those involved in the first four primary Rasas such as Śṛṅgāra etc. Therefore, the nature of its experience being included in those of the first four, it does not require a separate statement.

These views are refuted by Abhinava in the course of exposition of his own theory.

2. The View of Śānta Based on Another Conception of Śama.

Still others, who have noticed the verse of Bharata "Svaṁ Svaṁ nimittam" etc. (Dh. L. 177) assert that nature of Śānta is common to all Rasas. For, all other Rasas arise from the unaffected state of mind. They are due to the specific causes e.g. Śṛṅgāra is due to beautiful women in befitting situation. According to them, therefore, the basic mental state of Śānta is the state of mind before the rise of any affection due to external causes.

This view, Abhinava says, is not very different from his own. There is just a slight difference. It consists in the fact that while, according to the opponent, it is the absence of affection preceding all affections. According to Abhinava, it is the freedom from affections consequent on the destruction thereof. The latter position is sound inasmuch as it has the support of Patañjali, who says "Vītarāga janmādarśanāt."

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF ŚĀNTA.

ŚĀNTA STATE.

It is a state of mind or Buddhi. It consists in the continuous flow of the current of pure Sattva, perfectly free from the tinge of impurities of Rajas and Tamas. It is reached through the following stages:—

1. Realisation of unfitness of the worldly objects as objects of human pursuit.

2. Indifference to the worldly objects.

3. Concentration of mind on gross elements and gross senses.

4. Concentration on the subtle elements.

5. Concentration on the predominant Sattva, tinged by Rajas and Tamas.

6. Concentration on the predominating self with pure Sattva in the back-ground.

7. Dawning of the consciousness of distinction between the Sattva or Buddhi and Puruṣa.

8. Realisation of rejectability of Buddhi.

9. Merging of pure Buddhi Sattva into its origin i. e. its being reduced to a mere residual trace.

10. Subordination of the residual traces of the objective cognitions by the residual trace of the pure Buddhi Sattva.

11. Attainment of the State of total unaffectedness (Asamprajñāta Samādhi).

Thus when a yogin is in Asamprajñāta Samādhi, he is *Śānta* inasmuch as his Buddhi Sattva, which has now merged into its origin and is, therefore, no better than a mere residual trace, has continuous uninterrupted flow of pure Sattva. His Buddhi is perfectly free from the impurities of Rajas and Tamas as well as from all external affections

whatsoever, not excluding the affection by the consciousness of distinction between the pure Buddhi Sattva and the Self. Continuity of this state depends on the depth of the effect of Asamprajñāta Samādhi[1] consequent on its continuous practice. It is a stage in the Self-realisation, which immediately precedes Kaivalya, the perfect Self-realisation.

Śānta in Practical Life.

This continuous flow of the under-current of the pure Sattva in residual trace (Śānta) is possible only so long as the Asamprajñāta Samādhi lasts in initial stages. But when a yogin steadily repeats it, the effect of it on the current of Buddhi Sattva is so great that it continues to flow in the same manner even after the Samādhi has been broken and the Yogin enters the practical life. This flow, however, is occasionally[2] interrupted by the residual traces of the objective experience when they assert themselves. A yogin then behaves like an ordinary man in practical life.

The Hero of Śānta Rasa.

The æsthetic experience at the Kathartic level, according to Abhinavagupta, is the experience of the Self free from all limitations, but affected by a basic mental state at a high pitch, through identification with the focus of the situation, the hero. Śānta, as has been shown above, is essentially a transcendental state of mind. The Drama, however, is primarily concerned with the presentation of action. Śānta, therefore, being cessation of all physical and mental activities, does not admit of dramatic presentation. Hence some have rejected Śānta as the ninth Rasa.

Abhinavagupta's exposition of Śānta is based on deep insight, close study and practical experience of Yoga.

1. Y. S., (Bh. V.) 123. 2. Y. S., (Bh. V.) 205.

According to him, Śānta is never to be presented as the principal Rasa. It has always to occupy a subordinate position to either Śṛṅgāra or Vīra. For, Bharata enjoins that in Nāṭaka only such action is to be presented as leads to prosperity and happiness, because the presentation of such a life only as is occupied with the action of the said type, can bring about identification of all classes of people. But if so, the question arises where is the room for the presentation of Sānta ? His reply is that a dramatist, who intends to present Śānta Rasa, has got to be very careful in the choice of the hero of the piece. The hero ought to be a Yogin, who has practised Asamprajñāta Samādhi and is at the stage, immediately preceding the Kaivalya, the perfect Self-realisation. For, such a hero will naturally have the flow of the current of the pure Sattva (Praśānta vāhitā) even after the rise from Samādhi. The dramatist has to take further care to choose only that portion of hero's life for dramatisation wherein the flow of the current of pure Sattva in the residual trace is temporarily checked by the revival of the residual traces of the objective experience ; when he lives the life of a prrctical man pursuing a practical goal. In such a presentation Śṛṅgāra or Vīra is related to Śānta exactly in the manner in which Hāsya is related to Śṛṅgāra.

THE SELF AS THE STHĀYIN OF ŚĀNTA.

The realisation of the Ultimate is the only means to liberation. Therefore[1], when the latter is to be presented as the hero's object of attainment, the former has necessarily to be presented as the Sthāyin. The realisation of the Ultimate is nothing but the realisation of the Self. In the realisation of the Self, the latter (Self) does not appear as a distinct object, as in the case of the objective cognition

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 337.

through senses at the empirical level. This point is discussed in his commentary on "Mātrāsparśāstu" etc. (Bh. G. Ch. 2, V. 15). The word Tattvajñāna, therefore, according to him, means nothing but the Self itself as pure knowledge and pure bliss and free from all determinate experiences. Such Self is the Sthāyin of Śānta.

He replies to an anticipated objection that it will mean going against the authority of Bharata, who does not mention the Self in the list of Sthāyins as follows :—

It should not be mentioned as Sthāyin like Rati etc. For, the latter are spoken of as Sthāyins, because they are comparatively more permanent than the transient emotions, inasmuch as they affect the self so long as the situations responsible for their rise persist. They are to the Self what a picture is to a picture-board. The Self as such is the most permanent of all the Sthāyins. This relegates all the basic mental states such as Rati to the position of the Vyabhicārins. Its permanence is natural and real but not comparative. It is, therefore, unnecessary to mention it separately in the list of Sthāyins. For, nobody includes the genus in counting the parts of a thing which is subsumed under it.

The aforesaid argument disposes of the objection that the assumption of a separate Sthāyin of Śānta will increase the accepted number of forty-nine Bhāvas.

Why is Tattvajñāna (Śama) mentioned separately?

As to the question, "why is Śānta and, therefore, Śama counted separately", he replies that because it is æsthetically experienceable in a manner distinct from that in which Rati etc. are experienced. It is separately mentioned for the additional reason that just as Rati etc., in all their purity, are experienceable at the empirical

level so is not the pure Self. Even that indeterminate experience of the Self, that a Yogin has after the rise from Samādhi, is not altogether free from all kinds of affection. It is, however, unimportant to discuss this question here. For, even if we accept the Self in its purity as experienceable at the empirical level, it does not affect our position. Bharata[1] in his enumeration of the basic permanent states of the mind does not mention all such mental states as can possibly be represented as permanent, because all of them are not necessary in the rise of the accepted types of the æsthetic experience. His object in mentioning them separately as Sthāyins is only this that they may not be misconceived as definable in terms of the definition of the Vyabhicārin. In the case of the Śama however, there is no possibility of such a misconception. Hence it is not included in the general list of Sthāyins. This justifies the text of Bharata which mentions the Bhavas to be forty-nine.

WHY DOES BHARATA USE THE WORD ŚAMA AND NOT TATTVAJÑĀNA ?

As[2] to the question why does Bharata substitute Śama for Tattvajñāna as the Sthāyin of Śānta, his reply is that it is not because there is the possibility of the pure Self being looked upon as transient, nor because it is incapable of giving rise to distinct æsthetic experience, nor even because it is not fit to be presented as Sthāyin ; but because he wants to point out that Śama is not a distinct state of mind, but the Self itself.

The case with the word 'Nirveda' is, however, different. In the context of Śānta Nirveda cannot be similar in its nature to that which arises from such a distinct situation as poverty. And only that which is similar in nature to the

1. A. Bh , Vol. I, 337. 2. A. Bh., Vol. I, 338.

original conception of a word, though it may be due to a different cause, is to be represented by the word standing for the original conception. For instance, Rati, etc. which are similar in nature to the original conceptions of these words, though due to different causes, are represented by the same words. Nirveda, therefore, because it is intended to mean a very different thing from what it originally means, is not the right word to stand for the basic mental state in the context of the Śānta. Hence it is not mentioned by Bharata as a substitute for Tattvajñāna.

Thus Tattvajñāna and Śama mean the Self itself, because they represent the very nature of the Self. That Śama is the very nature of the Self is made clear by the fact that a person, who has realised the Self in all its purity through undisturbed Samādhi, experiences Śama even after the rise from Samādhi, in spite of the rise of impurities in the form of mental affections. This view is supported by Patañjali who says "Tasya Praśāntavāhitā Saṁskārāt". (3-10).

Other Constituents of Śānta.

As for the constituents of Śānta other than the Sthāyin, Abhinava holds that all the transient states of mind, whether empirical or not, may be represented as its Vyabhicārins. All the Anubhāvas of the said mental states, coupled with Yama and Niyama may be presented as its Anubhāvas, as also those which are spoken of as Svabhāvābhinaya in the three chapters dealing with the Aṅgikābhinayas of Upāṅgābhinayas. Such Abhinayas are given the epithet "Svabhāva" for the simple reason that Śānta only is their sphere. Its Vibhāvas are the favour of the God and so on.

Other Sthāyins in the Context of Śānta.

Rati etc. are experienced in the context of Śānta as

being on the verge of destruction. But they are never so predominantly experienced as is eagerness in the context of love in separation or even in union and so on. For, just as in disgust, which involves a state quite opposite to that involved in attachment, eagerness etc. are never experienced, so cannot be the growing love in Śama.

There is, however, closer relationship between Śānta and Utsāha, consisting in the effort, arising from desire to do good to others, and, therefore, synonymous with pity (dayā). For, a person who has attained all that is attainable, is naturally to work for others. It is because of this that some speak of it as Dayāvīra and others as Dharmavīra.

Discussion on Rasa in the Nāgānanda.

It cannot be objected in this context that enthusiasm (Utsāha) arises from egoistic consciousness, but Śānta is free from such consciousness. For, even the opposite is not altogether unfit to be presented as the Vyabhicārin, as for instance, Nirveda in Rati. In fact, in the Nāgānanda, Śānta is found together with Utsāha, as in "Śayyāśādvala" etc. There is no condition marked by total absence of enthusiasm. For, in the absence of will and effort a person would be no better than a stone. And just because the persons, who have attained the highest peace and have realised the Highest, have nothing more to do for themselves, therefore, their parting with all their possessions is not inconsistent with ama.

As for the teaching "Protect thy body", it enjoins the protection of such bodies as have still to attain their objectives. So far as the men of renunciation are concerned, they have nothing to do with the protection of their bodies. They have somehow to give up their bodies. For, the instruction to a man of renunciation is that he

should end his body by falling into fire, water or pit. The best thing to do for him is, therefore, to sacrifice his body for the sake of others.

The objection that Jīmūtavāhana etc. have no perfect self-control, does not affect our position. For, what we are trying to establish is that they had realised the Ultimate. And this they had surely done; for, those who identify themselves with their bodies and so prize them above all things, can never sacrifice them for the sake of others as a matter of religious duty.

As regards the sacrifice of the body in the battle-field, it may be said that it is not totally selfless. For, a warrior is prompted to do so with the object of defeating the enemy. Similarly in the case of the ending of the body by fall from a cliff, the desire to get a very much better body is predominantly present. (A. Bh. Vol. I, 339).

Hence all the self-less efforts for the good of others, from imparting instructions to others to the sacrifice of the body for the sake of others, are not inconsistent with Śama. Jīmūtavāhana etc., therefore, were men of self-realisation. And such men, according to both Śruti and Smṛiti attain liberation, irrespective of the stage of life in which they may be. There are, however, to be found instances of men of self-realisation such as Bodhisattva who, because of the intention of doing good to others with the object of attaining religious merit therefrom, have got the befitting bodies.

It cannot be said that if in the Nāgānanda also it is Vīra that is primarily presented, Śānta ceases to be a Rasa. For, the æsthetic experience is possible from a Sthāyin, even when it is presented as occupying a befitting subordinate position, as for instance, from the

obedience to father's order by Rāma, which occupies a subordinate position to Vīra. In the Nāgānanda, therefore, Śānta is a subordinate Rasa, because the objectives attained by the hero are Dharma, Artha and Kāma. With this very object in view the sage, while defining Nāṭaka as "Ṛddhivilāsādibhirguṇaiḥ", has said that in drama prosperity and enjoyment are to be primarily presented as leading to one of the two objects of human life, Artha and Kāma, which bring about the identification of all. This is also the reason why the sage does not mention the physical action accompanying the Śānta. The view, therefore, that there is no Śānta Rasa, because the sage does not mention any jātyaṅgakas of it, is not sound. Thus it is proved that in the Nāgānanda the enthusiasm characterised by pity is the chief Sthāyin.

That Vyabhicārins come in the context of Śama according to the occasion, is a view, which has the support of Patañjali, who says "Tacchidreṣu" etc. Thus the view, that Śama is characterised by freedom from action and, therefore, there can be no Anubhāvas of it, has been refuted.

No doubt Sama at its highest stage is not fit for presentation, because then the mind is free from all affections. But the same is the case with Rati and Śoka etc.

As for the identification of the audience with the focus of the situation of Śānta, there is no doubt about it that those who have the residual traces of the Tattvajñāna get identified. This is supported by the authority of Bharata who says "Mokṣe cāpi Vīrāgiṇaḥ".

The question "how could the æsthetic experience of Vīra, etc. be possible on the presentation of Śānta" is baseless. For, whenever Sama is presented Śṛṅgāra or

Vīra, as leading to the attainment of one of the objects of human life, has necessarily to be presented along with it. The æsthetic experience of Śṛṅgāra etc. therefore, depends upon that of the Sānta. Even in the case of Prahasana, wherein Hāsya is primarily presented, the experience of Hāsya depends upon that Rasa which is presented along with it.

Thus the existence of Sānta Rasa is established in every way.

MANUSCRIPT AUTHORITY.

The view that Śānta is the ninth Rasa is supported by old manuscripts wherein after "Sthāyibhāvān rasatvamupaneṣyāmaḥ" Śānta Rasa is found defined as "Śānto nāma Śamasthāyibhāvātmakaḥ" etc. Every Rasa-experience is very much like that of Śānta. For, it is nothing but the experience of self, free from all limitations. And Śānta is nothing more or less than that. The empirical objects are never the contents of æsthetic experience, because it consists in the predominance of Self-consciousness, free from all limiting conditions. This freedom comes from freedom from objective affections. The difference between Śānta and other æsthetic experiences at the Kathartic level is only this that in the latter case the Self is affected by the innate tendencies such as love etc. It is just because Śānta is involved in all Rasas that it is mentioned by the sage first of all.

THE NATURE OF ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE OF ŚĀNTA.

Just[1] as the white string, whereon gems of different kinds are loosely and thinly strung, shines in and through them, so does the pure Self through the basic mental states

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 341.

such as Rati and Utsāha, which affect it. The æsthetic experience of Śānta, consists in the experience of the Self as free from the entire set of painful experiences, which are due to the external expectations, and, therefore, is blissful state of identity with the Universal. It is the experience of Self in one of the stages on the way to perfect Self-realisation.

Such a state of Self when presented either on the stage or in poetry, and therefore universalised, is responsible for the arousal of a mental condition which brings the transcendental bliss.

CHAPTER IV.

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF MEANING.

LANGUAGE AND ÆSTHETIC CONFIGURATION.

Æsthetic configuration has been described in the preceding pages as a configuration of the emotive situation, the mimetic changes, the transient emotions and the basic mental state, not as they are ordinarily met with in every day life, but as they figure in a poetic vision. The constituents of the configuration in the poetic vision differ from those of daily experience because of their ideality. Language, by common consent, is admitted to be more expressive than paint, lime or marble. Hence Indian æstheticians from as early a time as that of Bharata have acknowledged it to be the only medium of externalisation of a poetic vision. The stage, with its scenic arrangement and presentation of different actors in proper form and with necessary accompanying mental states, simply serves to clarify the meaning of what they speak with proper accent, intonation[1] and emphasis.

The question that will naturally arise here in the reader's mind is "what is that in the poetic vision, which no other expressive material can externalise and why is it that language alone can do so ?" And the reply is, that it is the ideal element in the poetic vision, which no other expressive material can express, at least so well as can the language. And the language is capable of doing so because of its suggestive power, the power that conveys the suggested or spiritual meaning, the meaning which represents the very soul of the poetic vision and without which the presentation would be

1. N. S. 169.

like a body without the enlivening soul. This meaning and the power of language that gives rise to it, both are technically called Dhvani.

We shall discuss this question in detail under the following heads :—

1. History of Dhvani.

2. Distinction of the suggestive power of language from its other two powers, namely (i) the power to convey the conventional meaning and (ii) that to convey the secondary meaning.

3. Its distinction from the expressive power of different figures of speech (Alaṅkāra).

4. Justification of its independent being.

5. The essential nature of the constituents, supplied by the suggested meaning to the æsthetic configuration.

6. The necessity of such constituents for æsthetic experience.

7. Its different varieties.

History of Dhvani.

Poetics and linguistics are allied sciences, because both of them deal with linguistic expression. The difference between them is only this, that while the latter deals with the linguistic expression in general, the former confines itself to the poetic expression only. In fact, some of the problems are common to both the sciences, the problem of meaning, for instance. This problem was first studied as a purely linguistic problem. It was only about the 8th century A.D. that it was taken up as a poetic problem.

Poetics is an embodiment of the discoveries of the ways and means of the linguistic expression of the ideal contents of a poetic vision, for which the conventional language is

inadequate. The progress of this science has, therefore, been marked by the discoveries of more and more ways and means of this type of expression. It began with the discovery of some figures of speech. They have the capacity of adding to the conventional image certain attributes, which it lacks, by putting one conventional word in some relation with another, the meaning of which possesses those attributes, which that of the former lacks.

Let us, for the sake of convenience of exposition, call the one "Main" and the other "accompanying". Thus, only that part of meaning of the accompanying word is joined with that of the "main" which is necessary for the completion of the incomplete image conveyed by the conventional meaning of the latter. The two mental images fuse together and so completely represent that aspect of the poetic vision, which the conventional meaning is inadequate to represent. In simile, for instance, what happens is that only some attributes of the standard of comparison e.g. the capacity of the moon to give intense delight etc. figure in the consciousness on hearing the word *'moon'*. The appearance of other things is inhibited by the word *"like"*. These attributes fuse with the "face" and thus add to the latter the element that it lacks standing by itself, and make the configuration exactly correspond to the image of the face in the poetic vision.

Every discovery of such means marks the progress of poetics. Every poetician of repute has made some such contribution to it. It is thus that the number of figures of speech has increased from four[1], of which Bharata talks, to 124, as discussed by Appaya Dīkṣita. The discovery of the power of language, which arouses the suggested meaning, is the last contribution to the science.

1. N. S., 206.

The Presence of the Suggested Meaning in the Earliest Poetic Production.

Every theory is based on facts, which it tries to explain. The facts exist even when their existence is not recognised. The exponents of the theory of the suggested meaning, maintain that the fact, of which they talk, has been the most important in all poetic productions from the earliest times, though it was not recognised by early literary critics. And, what is more, its existence, even when pointed out by later critics, was denied by those who followed the earlier school of literary criticism.

The Rāmāyaṇa by common consent is admitted to be the earliest work of classical Sanskrit. Its author, Vālmīki, therefore, is recognised to be the first writer of the classical poetry. In fact he himself narrates in the Bālakāṇḍa of the Rāmāyaṇa, the incident which was responsible for the poetic inspiration and consequent utterance in well formed metre. It is as followes :—

Once Vālmīki went to the river, Tamasā, for his mid-day bath. He was pleased at the sight of clear water. He took the bark-garment from his pupil, who was carrying it, and began to walk in the beautiful forest. As he[1] was roaming about in the forest, he saw a couple of birds, called Kraufica in Sanskrit. It was mating season for them. They were, therefore, enjoying amorous sport. As the sage stood gazing at this interesting sight, Lo ! there came an arrow from behind and killed the male bird. What a bad luck ! What a terrible shock to the surviving female ! But what could she do ? The intensity of grief at this sudden change of fortune and her state of utter helplessness, changed her twitter into shriek. The pleasant sight was, in a moment, changed into a pathetic one. The

1. V. R., 172, 4-15.

change was so sudden and touching that the sage could not but be moved by it. He was moved and moved to the very depth of his heart. His basic mental state of grief was aroused. He was so touched that he completely forgot himself and was for the moment completely identified with the helpless sorrowing female. Then spontaneously flowed forth the expression of grief as follows :—

"Hunter, may you never get any peace. You have killed one of the pair of Krauñcas in the state of infatuation with love."

Here the following questions may be raised :—

1. How can Vālmīki's experience be called 'æsthetic experience' ? Because it is due to the facts of nature and not to a work of art, presented in any artistic medium, such as paints, lime, stone, musical sounds or words of a language ?

2. If Vālmīki identified himself with the female Krauñca, how is it that this identification did not find expression in words such as female Krauñca would have spoken ? Why did he say "you have killed one of the pair of Krauñcas" and not "You have killed my mate ?"

3. Are there any texts to show that these objections had been anticipated and answered ?

In reply to the first question we may say that the view that æsthetic experience is possible from a work of art and not from nature (Nāṭya eva rasaḥ na loke) refers to actor and spectator only and not to the artist himself. The original experience of an artistic genius, which he represents in a work of art, is not from art itself. It is from a fact of life and nature, which the genius transforms into an artistic fact with his imaginative and other gifts. That this is the view of Abhinavagupta himself, is made clear by his use of expressions "Vibhāva"

and "Anubhāva" for the directly perceived, in the following statement :—

"Sa eva tathābhūta-vibhāvatadutthā-krandādyanubhāva carvaṇayā hṛdaya saṁvāda tanmayībhāvanā kramādāsvādyamānatām pratipannaḥ." DH. L, 27.

This view is further supported by the admission of Indian æstheticians that the experiences of the poet, the actor, representing the hero of the piece, and the æsthete are identical. If the experience of the poet also had been due only to a finished product of art and not to nature looked upon as art, separate mention of the poet would have been unnecessary and superfluous.

In reply to the second question we may say that æsthetic experience involves universalisation. In it the individuality of the focus of the situation also disappears. The expression "my mate" would have been indicative of the individuality of the focus of the situation being in tact. Hence it is substituted by "one of the pair of Krauñcas", which is more general than "My mate".

In reply to the third question we may say that so far we have not discovered any texts, which show that these questions were directly raised and answered, and that replies to such questions are to be found in the existing text through implication, as we have stated in reply to the first question.

Vālmīki himself has stated the basic mental state, which was responsible for the said utterance, as follows :—

"Metrical utterance proceeding from me, over-powered by grief, could not be other than this."

The above narrative makes the following two points clear :—

1. The inspired poetry is an expression of a basic mental state, aroused because of identification with the focus of the situation.

2. In the utterance this basic mental state is not directly expressed but is simply suggested. The aforesaid utterance of Vālmīki, for instance, though an expression of grief, does not contain any direct expression of it in the conventional language. There is only a suggestion of it.

He speaks, not as Vālmīki, but as female Krauñca universalised. He views the situation as the latter. He, therefore, experiences the loss of what was the dearest and the most precious. This has meant to him the irrecoverable loss of the peace of mind. He looks upon the hunter as the author of his perpetual grief. He feels his helplessness against the enemy. And, therefore, in the characteristic manner of a widowed woman, whose husband has been killed, in the course of amorous sport with her, by a cannibal simply because of his cannibalistic tendencies, he curses the hunter with a lot very much worse than his own.

Thus we find in the aforesaid lines of Vālmīki an expression of grief without the use of the word "grief" or any one of its synonyms. Such an intensity of grief cannot be conveyed directly by means of conventional language. This kind of expression is technically called Dhvanikāvya, because of the presence of the suggested or spiritual meaning therein. This meaning, in different contexts, is conveyed by a full sentence, a phrase, a word or even a particular affix to it, as we will show later.

The exponents of the theory of the suggested meaning, therefore, maintain that the basic mental state has been the most important factor in poetry from the earliest times and that it has always been conveyed through suggestion.

The Probable Time of the Discovery of the Spiritual Meaning.

Every theory presupposes the facts, on which it is based and which it tries to explain. And the exponents of the theory of the spiritual meaning of the poetic language maintain (i) that the fact, which they account for by their theory, is the soul of the poetic language (ii) that a poem without this element is like a body without soul; and (iii) that this fact constituted the essential element of the first utterance of the first poet, Vālmīki, and has always characterised the poetic works of all the subsequent poets of repute.

Who was the first person to discover this distinctive element of the poetic experience, we have no evidence to say anything. But it would not be unreasonable to suppose that this distinctive element of the poetic experience was vaguely marked by some one, possessed of the power of poetic visualisation (Pratibhā), some time in the first half of the 8th Century A.D. He must have talked of it to his contemporaries, some of whom must have agreed with him and others must have differed from him.

Thus the controversy must have started. This is the probable explanation of its representation as identical with the secondary meaning by Udbhaṭa and Vāmana in the later half of the 8th century.

The Chief Exponent of the Spiritual Meaning of Language or Dhvani.

As in the case of the æsthetic experience or Rasāsvāda so in that of the spiritual meaning or Dhvani, Abhinava has spoken the last word and has been followed by all the subsequent writers in the field of Sanskrit poetics. No doubt Mahima Bhaṭṭa, who was probably a younger

contemporary or immediate successor of Abhinava, wrote the Vyakti Viveka, in which he does not accept Abhinava's view. But nobody has taken him seriously. The reason why Abhinava's theory of the spiritual meaning of the poetic language found general acceptance is that it is based upon acute psychological analysis of the different types of mental images, which the poetic language arouses. The mental presentation of the spiritul meaning, as we understand, according to its psychological analysis by Abhinava, is so different in its essential nature from those of the conventional and the secondary meanings, technically called the Vācyārtha and Lākṣaṇikārtha respectively, that it is impossible to identify the former with either of the latter.

Thus we find that the history of Dhvani covers a period of about three hundred years, i.e. from about the first half of the 8th century A.D. when some predecessor of Udbhaṭa discovered the suggested or spiritual meaning for the first time, to the middle of the 11th Century A.D. when Mahima Bhaṭṭa made a futile attempt to demolish the Dhvani theory.

It was during this period that Ānanda Vardhana wrote his famous Dhvani Kārikā and a commentary on it. He was the first to give a systematic form to the theory of Dhvani. Abhinava's contribution to this theory consists in offering psycho-philosophical explanation. We are attempting the problem of æsthetics primarily from the philosophical and psychological points of view. We have, therefore, to refer to Abhinavagupta more often than to Ānanda Vardhana. We find the material for our work almost exclusively in the Locana, we have accordingly represented Abhinava, as the chief exponent of the theory of Dhvani. We do not. however, mean to minimise the

importance of Ānanda Vardhana, but for whom probably there would have been no Abhinavagupta's theory of meaning. Just as probably there would have been no Monistic Vedānta of Śaṅkara, but for Bādarāyaṇa's Vedānta Sūtra.

The writers of this period can be divided into three groups as follows :—

1. The supporters of the theory.
2. Its opponents.
3. Those who considered it to be identical with Lakṣaṇā.[1]

Among those of the first class are included also those, who believed that there was something like Dhvani, though they could not properly define it.

Before the writer of the Dhvani Kārikā, there was no book presenting the views of either the exponents or the opponents.[2] This, however, does not mean that the earlier thinkers of Sanskrit poetics had no idea of Dhvani. The fact, on the contrary, is that the theory was well formulated and had its opponents too, long before the time of the Kārikā, but all that was simply a matter of oral tradition, handed down from generation to generation.[3] The thinkers of the third school, in marked contrast with the above two, more or less, recorded their views in the books, which we still possess. To this class belong such early writers on poetics as Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa, and Vāmana.[4] The view of the school of opponents also had begun to be systematised before Ānanda Vardhana

1. Dh., L., 3.
2. Dh. L., 3.
3. Dh. L , 3.
4. Dh. L., 10.

wrote his works, as is apparent from a quotation attributed to a poet, Manoratha, who, according to Abhinava, was Ānanda Vardhana's contemporary.[1] But it appears from Abhinava's wording that only stray verses were written by one writer here and another there, and there was no book presenting the opponents' views systematically. For, he seems to have purposely used the word "Śloka". It was only after Ānanda Vardhana's learned exposition of Dhvani in his Dhvanyāloka, that there appeared two books of the opponents' school, one from the pen of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, whom Abhinava so much criticises, and the other from that of Mahima Bhaṭṭa, who was probably Abhinava's successor or younger contemporary.

THE THEORY OF MEANING BEFORE THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE THEORY OF DHVANI.

Before the theory of Dhvani was finally established by Abhinava, only three powers of language were admitted.

1. *Abhidhāśakti* or the power of word to arouse a conventional image of an object in the mind of the hearer, because of the age-long association of that particular set of sounds with that image.

2. *Tātparyaśakti.* The individual words of a sentence arouse individual images completely cut off from one another. In the speaker's mind these images, of which the words are symbols, are connected with one another in a certain way. This relation is partly indicated by various case terminations and other affixes. For instance when a man says :—

"Potter makes a jar."
"Kulālaḥ ghaṭaṁ karoti"

1. Dh. L., 8.

the relation of jar with the potter's act of making is indicated by the case termination "*am*" in Sanskrit, though in English this is indicated simply by the position of the word. This relation is the relation of an object with the subject, the potter. Now a further question arises; how is this relation related with the jar ? Therefore, the followers of the Nyāya philosophy and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas maintain the additional power of the word, namely, the Tātparyaśakti, that is, the power which establishes the relation of objectivity with the object (vṛttitā) and similar other relations necessary for the conception of the ideas, conveyed by different words of a sentence, as a united whole.

It may be added here that some philosophers, the Prābhākaras for instance, maintain that the conception of such a power[1] of words is unnecessary. Hence they are technically called *Anvitābhidhānavādins* as distinguished from the Naiyāyikas and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas who are called *Abhihitānvayavādins*.

3. *Lakṣaṇāśakti* or *the secondary power of words.*

Often we find in the existing literature linguistic constructions, which convey a complex of ideas, which the two aforesaid powers of words cannot explain. The following illustration will clear the point in hand:—

Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ

(Hamlet on the Ganges.)

Here the aforesaid powers of words, Abhidhā and Tātparya Śaktis, are too insufficient to arouse the intended complex idea in the hearer's mind. The former power will arouse the image of *the current of water* and that of a hamlet, for which the words Gaṅgā and Ghoṣa stand respectively : and the latter (Tātparyaśakti), together with

1. K. P., Comm., 6-7 and K. Prad. 20.

the case terminations, will put the two images in the necessary relation. But the complex would be a meaningless jumble of ideas and not a harmonious whole, because it would stand for what in actual experience is not possible. For, a hamlet cannot exist on a current of water. Such sentences are, however, found in the standard works, not only in Sanskrit but in other languages also. And tradition finds a meaning, and a good one too, in them. For instance, when the aforesaid sentence is used, it is understood to mean that the hamlet is situated on the bank of the Ganges and that it is cool and holy. To explain this the third power of words, the *Lakṣaṇāśakti*, is postulated.[1] When some such words are intentionally used as do not arouse a harmonious complex of meanings in the mind of the hearer by means of conventional power of language: on the contrary, the meaning of one opposes that of another; under such circumstances the function of the secondary power of language (Lakṣaṇāśakti) is to arouse such additional ideas as are necessary to put them in harmonious relation and to reveal the purpose of such use by the speaker. Thus the additional idea of the bank, aroused by this power, removes the lack of harmony; and the purpose of the speaker in using such coustruction is understood to be to convey the idea of coolness and holiness of the hamlet.

An Illustration of Dhvani

There is a garden on the bank of river Godāvarī. It is far from public haunt. A pair of lovers fixes it for a secret meeting at a particular time. One of the pair comes to this place a little before the fixed time. She sees a religious minded man going about here to collect flowers for worship. His sight is not quite welcome. She

1. S. D., 36-8.

wants to drive him away without letting him know her intention.

A ferocious dog used to be kept here. She knew that the man was very much afraid of it. This dog, for some reason, is away from this place. She cleverly tries to explain the absence so as to scare him away and says :—

"O religious minded man ! you can now roam freely over this place. For, the dog, of whom you were so afraid, has been killed to-day by the proud lion, who, as you know very well, lives in the impervious thicket on the bank of Godāvarī."

It is not difficult to understand what meaning such a statement will have to such a person, as above described. Will the man, who fears a dog, freely move about at a place, where a lion, which has given a positive proof of his ferocious nature by killing the dog, is abroad ? Will he, after hearing the above statement, stay on in the garden, or will he run away as quickly as possible ? If the latter, is it not because of the negative meaning understood by him in a positive statement ? And if so, the question arises ; why does a positive statement have a negative meaning ? The exponents of the fourth power of the language maintain that the negative meaning, which the hearer gets, is due to Dhvani. In the following pages, therefore, we shall attempt to explain how yielding of such meaning by the language cannot be explained by the aforesaid ordinarily accepted three powers of language.

In Sanskrit the statement is worded as follows :—

Bhrama dhārmika viśrabdhaḥ
Sa Śunakodya māritastena
Godāvarīkūlalatāgahanavāsinā dṛptasiṁhena.

DH. L., 16.

Can Lakṣaṇā explain the negative meaning, conceived by hearer on hearing the positive statement under discussion?

The opponents of the theory of Dhvani maintain that it can, as follows:—

The statement contains expressions such as "proud lion" (dṛptasiṁha) and "religious man" (Dhārmika). The meanings, conveyed by these, cannot be so related as to form a harmonious whole, if they be associated with positive assertion "roam about freely". For, how can a religious man freely and fearlessly roam about at a place where a lion has come in place of the dog, which he used to fear, and has given a proof of his ferocious nature by killing the dog? The incongruity in the ideas so conveyed will, therefore, by the force of Lakṣaṇā, convey the idea of negation instead of that of assertion and thus present the complex as[1] a harmonious whole.

UNSOUNDNESS OF THE OPPONENT'S POSITION.

Let us take the two instances, (i) the classical instance of Lakṣaṇā "Gaṅgāyām Ghoṣaḥ" and (ii) the one, under discussion, together and see if the impossibility of any harmonious mutual relation of the ideas, conveyed by them, is the same in both the cases. No doubt it is impossible to relate the hamlet with the current of water in terms of the relation of location and located (Ādhārādheyabhāva). But can any body say that the roaming about of pious Brāhmaṇa is equally impossible when the dog, of which he was afraid, has been killed? Are the primary meanings, as they arise in the consciousness after hearing the words, as impossible of being put in a harmonious relation as Gaṅgāyām and ghoṣaḥ?

1. Dh. L., 16.

Is there no power of visualisation involved in getting the idea of negation ?

After disposing of the opponents' criticism of the theory, we shall discuss the necessity of the additional power of language, Dhvani, to explain how a negative meaning arises from a positive assertion.

Review of the Position of the Opponents of the Theory of Suggested Meaning.

The various poetic theories in general are the results of a critical study of existing literature. The creative period in every literary history precedes that of the critical study, for the simple reason that critical study requires facts and they are supplied by the creative minds. As the facts are studied more and more thoroughly and from different points of view, more and more accurate conclusions are reached. Accordingly different theories are formulated, one improving upon another, according as they are based upon new facts, discovered by their exponents, as a result of more intensive and extensive study with different intellectual equipments and gifts of nature.

But when a theory is formulated by a genius, who discovers certain facts unknown before, and reveals them to others, who are less gifted than himself, he gets a following. Thus a tradition is formed and is followed till a greater genius comes, finds out fresh facts and formulates a theory which, though apparently different from those of his predecessors, is yet simply an improvement upon theirs, inasmuch as it has to take those facts also into consideration, on which the previous theories were based. Thus every later writer is substantially helped by the discoveries of the earlier workers in the same or similar fields of literary activity.

Some of the literary facts, however, are not like the scientific ones. For, while the latter are objective and their existence can be demonstrated to the naked eye by various scientific appliances, the former are purely subjective and can be known through introspection only. And the introspection also can reveal those facts, if it is helped by necessary psycho-physical conditions and the proper intellectual background. Further, these facts, in order that they may be recognised, require an appreciative attitude. For, unless the mind is free from previous intellectual bias, it is not in the necessary condition to see them. Hence it is that there is always a great controversy when a new theory, based upon facts, which are purely subjective, is promulgated for the first time.

Who was the first discoverer of the suggested meaning in the total experience, stimulated by a poetic composition, we do not know. But the theory was well known and had its opponents also, long before the time of the Dhvani karikā. But it was simply a matter of oral tradition. It had no systematic form. It was probably based on insufficient data. The theory, as found in the Dhvanyāloka of Ānanda-Vardhana, is, however, fully developed in all details after refuting all the possible objections of the various types of opponents. It is, therefore, natural to believe that Ananda Vardhana took up the problem of Dhvani after all other poetic theories, which are taken into consideration and refuted, had been formulated and well established. Apparently, therefore, the facts, which enabled him to give such a fine systematic form to the Dhvani theory must have been of the latest discovery.

The earlier poetic theories were based upon objective facts and therefore, could establish themselves easily and had a wider appeal. The earliest opponent of the theory

of Dhvani, whom Abhinava takes into consideration, is the one, according to whom the following four are the only constituents of both, the poetry and the poetic experience.

1. Word.
2. Meaning.
3. Attributes of words and meanings (Śabdārthaguṇas)
4. Embellishments of words and meanings (Śabdārthālaṅkāra).

This theory represents a very early stage in the development of the art of literary criticism. It is based on the objective perception and all the facts, taken into account by it, are objective. It was well established before the Dhvani theory was able to win for itself the position of supremacy. It had its staunch followers, who maintained that (i) either there were no elements other than the four mentioned above or (ii) if any, they could be categorically brought under the above. For, the difference between other elements and the aforesaid, could not be such as would justify their being categorised separately. (iii) But if there be really any such poetic element, noticed by some, which is essentially different from the above, that, being different from the traditionally recognised ones, had to be dismissed as unpoetic and, therefore, not essential.

These are just the three positions of the opponents of the Dhvani theory, who totally deny the existence of the Dhvani element in poetry, as we have stated above. Evidently their opposition was based upon the ignorance of the most important subjective fact. And their inability to realise it in the experience was due to the bias of the earlier traditional poetic theory, which they were following.

The first and the third of these positions do not require any separate criticism. The establishment of the

suggested element as the central fact in the poetic experience would naturally mean their demolition. But the second does. It is represented by the Ālaṅkārika school of poetic criticism, which maintains that the poetic embellishments are the most essential elements of poetry and, therefore, holds that the suggested meaning (Dhvani) is nothing more than a subordinate element in an embellishment, called *Rasavat Alaṅkāra*. We will deal with it in a separate article, *The distinctive spheres of Upamā and Rasavat Alankāra on the one hand and that of Rasa-Dhvani on the other*. But before doing so let us summarily state the views of the opponents belonging to different schools.

THE VIEWS OF THE OPPONENTS OF THE THEORY OF SUGGESTED MEANING SUMMARISED.

The objections of the three main schools of opponents can be summarily stated as follows:—

(i) A word, in order that it may convey some meaning to the hearer, presupposes an established convention as to its significance. As there is no convention regarding the suggested meaning, no word can serve as its vehicle. Hence, there is nothing like the suggested meaning.

(ii) No doubt often, on hearing a word, we grasp a meaning which is not quite conventional.[1] But that is not the suggested meaning. That is the secondary meaning. Often a couple of words is employed to convey a unitary meaning. And because the primary meaning of the first word is inconsistent with that of the following, it forcibly gives rise to the secondary meaning in the hearer's consciousness. Hence it is technically called *Bhākta*. A classical example of this is *Gaṅgāyāṁ Ghoṣaḥ*. In strict accordance

1. Dh. L., 4.

with convention this means, "Hamlet on the Ganges". But as the word "Ganges" conventionally means "current" and as the existence of a hamlet on a current is not possible, the word "Ganges" forcibly arouses the additional, the secondary meaning, *the bank of the Ganges.*

(iii) The words stand as symbols of certain ideas. In order that they may serve their symbolic purpose, it is necessary that the ideas should be familiar to those, to whom the words in question are intended to serve as symbols. If there be no familiarity with the idea and the relation between the symbol and the symbolised be unknown, the word fails to arouse any meaning. As for instance, the words expressive of amorous joy cannot convey the desired meaning to a girl, too young to know the joy of conjugal life.

It has to be pointed out here that the secondary meaning also, in order that it may be conveyed to the hearer, presupposes some kind of convention ; though not so common as that which is responsible for the arousal of the primary meaning. It must, however, be very well recognised among those in whom its consciousness is intended to be aroused. It may, therefore, be called literary convention or secondary convention. Thus the opponents of the theory of the suggested meaning have been divided into the following three classes:—

1. Those who totally deny it.

2. Those who include it within the secondary meaning.

3. Those who maintain that it is not communicable.

Those of the first class can further be subdivided into the following three classes:—

1. The suggested meaning is maintained to be the main source of the literary beauty by the exponents of the

theory. But the opponents of the first class maintain that the beauty of a literary piece consists in the beauty of words as sounds, and of images, simple or complex, that they arouse in the hearer's mind. Beauty of both, the word and the meaning, is due to the qualities (Guṇa) and the embellishments (Alaṅkāra) of words and meanings. They, therefore, maintain that there is no source of literary beauty other than those recognised by them. The opponents, who hold this view, represent the first subdivision of the first class.

2. Others among them, however, hold that they have said the last thing on the sources of literary beauty and that what they have not included in the list of such sources does not at all add any beauty to literary work. They represent the second subdivision.

3. Still others maintain that if there be something, which is not included in their list of the sources of literary beauty, it will fall under something or the other in their list. Even if there be some difference from what has been mentioned by them, that is bound to be as insignificant as the difference between one kind of metaphor and another. Therefore, there is no justification for mentioning it as an independent source under a different name. They represent the third subdivision. Thus there are five views against the theory of the suggested meaning.

The Arguments of the Opponents of the Theory of Dhvani.

A literary work is distinguished from a scientific by its beauty. Dhvani, therefore, in order to justify its acceptance, must be proved to contribute to the literary beauty in some way or another. But we find that it is not admitted to add to the literary beauty. For, the generally accepted

definition of poetry (Kāvya) is that it is a body of words and meanings.

"*Śabdārthaśarīraṁ Kāvyam.*" (Dh. L., 5.)

Therefore, if the exponents of the theory were to accept this definition, their position would amount to nothing more than giving the body of the words and meanings a peculiar name "*Dhvani.*" But if the position of the exponent be that Dhvani, though it stands for word and meaning yet, being an essential element of poetry, is the main source of a separate literary beauty, he will find it difficult to establish the entity of Dhvani as distinct from that of the literary qualities and embellishments of words and meanings (Śabdārthaguṇālaṅkāra). The literary beauty lies either in words and meanings as such, or in a number of letters of a certain sound value properly arranged. The former is due to embellishments of words and meanings and the latter arises from the qualities of the letters. Thus there is left no source of literary beauty which could distinctly be referred to by the word Dhvani.

As for the diction (Vṛtti) and the style (Rīti), they also do not have an independent individuality of their own, because diction (Vṛtti) is nothing but certain types of verbal embellishments collectively so called. For this reason it is that in Bhāmaha's works this word is not found. And although Udbhaṭa uses it, yet he also does not imply thereby anything very distinct from verbal embellishment. And the style (Rīti) also is nothing but a harmonious blending of such literary qualities as are necessary for the production of the intended affections of mind (cittavṛtti). As such it does not have an independent status of its own.

Thus literary production, even when analysed for the

sake of analytical study, does not reveal anything, which could distinctly be called by the separate name "Dhvani".[1]

Even if, for the sake of argument, we were to accept the Dhvani as something different from literary qualities and embellishments, the exponent will find it impossible to establish the Dhvani as he conceives it. According to him, it is the soul of poetry. In order that his view may be accepted, his conception of poetry must conform to what is established by age-long tradition. But the tradition does not recognise any other element as the essential of poetry than the words, the meanings and their qualities and embellishments.

Śabdārthau tadguṇā-laṅkārāśca.
Dh. L., 7.

Dhvani, therefore, as conceived by its exponents, is not identical with any one or more of the essential elements of poetry, (as it is maintained that it is not,) and, therefore, cannot be accepted by those who uphold the traditional view of poetry.

Further, even if we were to set aside the traditional view and analyse our poetic experience, we would not find anything in it, corresponding to what is spoken of as Dhvani, the soul of poetry. It may be that the exponents do recognise some element in the experience, which they call Dhvani, but so long as it is not recognised by those also who are born and brought up in the tradition, its being cannot generally be accepted.

The position of that section of the opponents, who hold that Dhvani represents just a subordinate element in some of the literary embellishments, which has not so far

1. Dh. L., 7-8.

been recognised, and, therefore, is without sufficient justification to be given a big name and to be represented as the soul of poetry, will be elaborated when we shall point out the distinctive spheres of the embellishments like the *Rasavat* and the Rasadhvani.

THE POSITION OF THE EXPONENT EXPLAINED.

In order to help the reader in easily understanding the refutation of the views of the opponents, we may state the position of the exponents of Dhvani briefly but clearly as follows :—

1. Words and meanings, (Śabdārthau) their literary qualities and embellishments (Śabdārtha guṇālaṅkāra) and style and diction (Rītivṛtti) are all necessary, according to the need of the occasion. But the most essential thing in a literary piece, the very soul of it, is the suggested meaning (Dhvani).

2. The secondary power of the language (Lakṣaṇā) cannot account for the rise of the suggested meaning in the reader's consciousness.

3. Nor can the Prābhākara theory of Anvitābhidhānavāda explain it.

4. The explanation of it, offered by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, is equally unsatisfactory.

5. The sphere of the suggested meaning is distinct from that of such embellishments as Rasavadalaṅkāra.

But before we dilate on these points, let us give a very clear idea of the different meanings, in which the word "Dhvani" is used by Abhinava and state the source of his inspiration.

THE VARIOUS MEANINGS OF THE WORD DHVANI AND THEIR ORIGIN

The word Dhvani was first used by grammarians in the following meanings for the following reasons:—

1. It was used for articulate sound because of its producing sound waves very much like the ring of a bell. The grammarians explain the sound sensation as due to the contact of one of the sound-waves, proceeding in a regular series from the source, with the drum of the ear. The exponents of the theory of the suggested meaning have used the word for the suggested meaning, because of the similarity in the process, involved in the coming of this meaning to consciousness. Just as sound comes to the hearer's consciousness through a succession of sounds, the sound waves, so the suggested meaning comes to the literary critic's consciousness through succession of meanings, the conventional, the contextual and the secondary.

2. Very much like the Śaiva's all—inclusive Universal Consciousness, the Vaiyākaraṇas believe in the universal sound, called *Sphoṭa*. There are various subdivisions of it, such as Pada-sphoṭa etc. According to them, the awareness of the Sphoṭa of a word, is necessary for the consciousness of meaning of a word, exactly as the consciousness of a genus (jāti) is necessary for recognising the individual belonging to it. In fact, the "*Pada-Sphoṭa*" of the grammarians is very much like the generic concept (Jāti) of the Naiyāyikas. This sphoṭa is an essential part of the universal sphoṭa, and is manifested or revealed by the consciousness of the last sound of the group of sounds, of which a word is made, when this last sound is grasped in association with mental impressions of the sounds immediately preceding. They use the word Dhvani for the last sound of the word, which is primarily

responsible for the manifestation of the Sphoṭa. The exponents of the theory of the suggested meaning, following this use by grammarians, have used the word Dhvani *for both the suggestive word and the* suggestive *meaning*, for the simple reason that just as the last sound brings the Sphoṭa to the hearer's consciousness, so does the suggestive word or the suggestive meaning the suggested meaning.[1]

3. We hear the same word uttered by two persons; the constituent syllables in both the cases are the same. The effort, therefore, required for utterance is the same in both the cases. But one moves the speech-organs slowly and the other quickly. Consequently we have the consciousness of the syllables, having come to our ears slowly in one case and quickly in the other. The activity, which is responsible for slow or quick succession of syllables in speech, is called Dhvani by the grammarians, because it is an additional activity. The exponents of the theory of Dhvani have called the *additional function* of *word* to arouse the suggested meaning by the same name, because certain words discharge this function in addition to those of arousing (i) conventional (ii) contextual (iii) and secondary meanings.

4. This[2] word is used for a literary work also, which contains this element, and, as a whole, serves as an instrument of conveying the suggestible meaning.

Thus the word Dhvani is used for (i) conventional symbol, the articulate sound (ii) conventional meaning (iii) the power of word to convey the suggestible meaning[3] (iv) the suggestible meaning itself and (v) the poetic work, containing the suggestible element.

---

1. Dh. L., 47.
2. Dh. L., 47.
3. Dh. L., 48.

ABHINAVA'S CONCEPTION OF POETRY.

The suggested meaning is undoubtedly maintained to be the soul of poetry. It would, however, be a mistake to think that it alone is poetry. The presence of a suggestible element in a statement provides as little justification for calling it poetry, as the presence of the all-pervading Self in a jar does for calling it a limited self or jīva. Logically there is nothing to prevent us from calling a jar a jīva, because Self within certain limitations is so called. And, as the Self is all-pervading, its presence must be admitted within the jar as much as it is admitted within a human body. However, the latter alone is so called and not the former. Therefore, just as a human or any other living body in a certain condition, with the presence of the Self within, is alone called jīva and not everything wherein the Self is present, so, that body of words and meanings alone, with a suggestible element in it, is called poetry, which possesses the beauty lent to it by the suitable qualities and embellishments of words and meanings[1] (Sabdārtha guṇālaṅkāra). Hence it is that Gaṅgāyāṁ Ghoṣaḥ or Siṁho māṇavakaḥ (the lion boy), inspite of the presence of the suggestible element in them, cannot be looked upon as poetry. The relation between the suggestible element in the literary production and the words and meanings, their qualities and embellishments and the style and diction, is very much like that which exists between the body and the soul. Just as human qualities and ornaments are not necessary for the very being of a man, so are not the poetic embellishments and qualities for poetry. And just as the different human qualities and ornaments add to the personal beauty of a man only if they fit in with the

1. Dh. L., 17.

time, the place and the state of the self or mental state of the individual, so do the linguistic qualities and embellishments. The former, if manifested at a wrong time and situation or used at a wrong place, positively destroy the personal beauty, so do the latter the poetic beauty. But just as soul is necessary for the very being of an individual, so is the suggestible element for a poetic production.

The Position of the Lakṣaṇāvādin Explained.

We have stated in a preceding section the various meanings, in which the word Dhvani has been used by the exponents of the Dhvani theory. There it has been made clear that this word is used not only for the suggested meaning but also for the power of the language that arouses it. The Lakṣanāvādins do not deny the existence of the so called suggested meaning. Their opposition to the Dhvani Theory is chiefly against the acceptance of the Dhvani as a separate power of language. They maintain that the arousal of the so called suggested meaning can also be explained by Lakṣaṇā, the secondary power of language. They also admit the difference between the power of language to arouse a meaning and the meaning itself. The former they call "*Lakṣaṇā*" and the latter "*Lākṣaṇikārtha*".

If we analyse the position of these opponents, we find that their opposition is based on one of the following three assumptions :—

1. Dhvani is identical with Lakṣaṇā, i. e. the words "Dhvani" and "Lakṣaṇā" are synonymous and, therefore, refer to the same thing.

2. The secondary meaning is the characteristic mark of Dhvani, the suggested meaning, i. e. wherever there is the former, the latter has necessarily to be there.

3. Lakṣaṇā implies the Dhvani also.

LAKṢAṆĀVĀDINS' POSITION CRITICISED.

1. The identity of Dhvani as a power of language and Lakṣaṇā is indefensible, because they are essentially different from each other. Their spheres are different. The sphere of Dhvani is that where both, the word and the meaning, are mainly intended to convey the suggestible image, as in the illustration discussed above. The sphere of Lakṣaṇā, however, is that where a certain point is exaggerated or greatly emphasised as in "Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ" or "Siṁho māṇavakaḥ". In the former case it is the nearness of the hamlet to the Ganges that is, exaggerated and in the latter the similarity with a lion Further, it often happens that when a certain statement is made, the fourth power of the language, namely, that of conveying a suggested meaning, which is different from the third, namely, that of Lakṣaṇā, does not operate, though its operation is possible. The fourth meaning, the suggested, though it can be got from the statement, yet, being unnecessary, it is totally ignored, so that it does not figure in the hearer's consciousness. The interpretative, process stops immediately after the consciousness of the secondary meaning. Thus, if one power of linguistic expression can operate while the other is inoperative; if Lakṣaṇā can operate and give rise to the secondary meaning[1] while Vyañjanā is perfectly inoperative, though there is room for it to operate, how can then the two be identical ?

2. The secondary meaning cannot be represented to be a characteristic mark of Dhvani. For, there are innumerable instances in the existing literature, wherein the words are used in the secondary sense simply because of the established usage, but there is no suggestible

1. Dh. L., 51.

meaning conveyed, because none is intended, as for instance,

"Facts speak for themselves."

Here no suggestible meaning apart from the secondary is intended to be conveyed. The word "speaks" is used simply because the usage requires it. And in the *'Asaṁlakṣya krama vyaṅgya'* the secondary meaning does not at all enter into consciousness, because the suggestible meaning rises in consciousness immediately. Hence, because there is no general concomitance between the suggestible and the secondary meaning, the latter cannot be regarded as the characteristic sign of the former.

3. The distinction of Dhvani from Lakṣaṇā as an idependent function or power, has been pointed out above in respect of the sphere, that is, the meaning aroused by the former is different from that aroused by the latter. Every power operates in a certain way. One power is recognised as different from another, not only because of the different results that they produce but also because of the different manners in which they operate. The position of the opponent that Dhvani and Lakṣaṇā are identical cannot stand, because the manners[1] in which the two powers function, are different.

THE PROCESS ANALYSED.

1. The secondary power of language leads to the arousal of the secondary meaning through

(a) Consciousness of the conventional meanings of two words.

(b) Experience of contradiction between the two meanings.

(c) The rise of the secondary convention in the consciousness.

---

1. Dh. L., 55.

(d) The rise of the idea or ideas which remove the contradiction.

(e) The consciousness of the full secondary meaning.

2. But the suggestive power of language leads to the rise of the suggestible meaning

(a) Not always through the consciousness of conventional meaning, in a certain context, of the two words, but of even a single word, nay, even a part thereof.

(b) There is necessarily no experience of contradiction between the meanings of the two suggestive words, if in some cases the number of the suggestive words happens to be two.

(c) Often there is no consciousness of the secondary convention.

(d) The ideas, which subsequently arise, are not such as simply remove the contradiction[1]; but they represent the unexpressed and inexpressible in the context.

(e) Rise of the complete suggested meaning.

ANOTHER CONCEPTION OF LAKṢAṆĀ AND ITS CRITICISM.

Lakṣaṇā is defined by some as a power of language, which arouses the consciousness of any meaning that is different from the conventional, but has invariable concomitance with it. (Abhidheyāvinā bhūtapratītiḥ). The followers of this definition deny the difference of the suggestible meaning from the secondary. This definition, it is to be noted here, refers not to the process, involved in the arousal of the meaning, but to the meaning itself. The opponents, therefore, maintain that in the case of the so

1. Dh. L., 54.

called suggestible meaning, in the arousal of which the different stages from the conventional to the contextual and from that to the secondary are not noticeable, is really the Lakṣaṇā meaning; because the so called suggestible meaning also is one that has invariable concomitance with the conventional. Hence the consciousness of the central fact in the æsthetic experience is aroused not by Dhvani but by Lakṣaṇā as defined above. For, æsthetic experience involves the consciousness of the basic mental state, which cannot be conveyed through the conventional power, which presents the situation and the mimetic changes etc. But it is unnecessary to admit a fourth power of language to arouse a fourth type of meaning. For, Lakṣaṇā, as a power, capable of arousing all the meanings, which are invariably concomitant with the conventional, is sufficient to explain the rise of the basic mental state also, for which a separate power of language, called "Dhvani," is admitted.

A little careful reflection will make the unsoundness of the opponent's position clear. It is well known that the law of association leads the consciousness of one thing to that of another, associated with it. When, for instance, a person is made conscious of smoke by hearing the conventional word for it, in the language of his land, the idea of "fire" is naturally aroused through association. The latter is associated in the memory with the fire's power to warm and so on. The follower of the aforesaid definition of Lakṣaṇā will have to take all that as a secondary meaning and will have to admit indefiniteness of the aroused meaning. But if he were to say that the word "smoke" has the capacity of arousing only one particular meaning, because its capacity is so limited that it conveys its peculiar meaning and not all those meanings which are

associated with its particular meaning; such an admission of the limited expressive power of individual expression, will land the opponent into difficulty. For, this would imply the necessity of some factor, which would be responsible for the arousal of the secondary meaning. If it were said that it is the impossibility of, or lack of coherence in the conventional meanings of the two words in a particular context, which is responsible for it, that would mean the admission of the secondary meaning as distinct from the suggestible, because in the case of the suggestible meaning[1] no such impossibility is necessarily involved.

Lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā as Substitute for Dhvani.

In the preceding paragraph, we have stated the position of the opponent, who holds that postulation of Dhvani is unnecessary. For, if the secondary power of the language be supposed to arouse all the ideas, which are associated, in any way, with the conventional meaning, the so called suggestible meaning also will come under the secondary. And in the course of its criticism, we pointed out that such a hypothesis would mean indefiniteness in the meaning in all cases and that admission of any factor to account for definiteness in some cases such as "Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ" would mean the admission of the suggestive power. The opponent, therefore, tries to explain the definiteness by assuming a variety of Lakṣaṇā, the secondary power, called *Lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā*.

His position may be stated as follows :—

The ordinary secondary meaning is got out of a construction by simple Lakṣaṇā, for instance, the meaning of "Gaṅgāyāṁ Ghoṣaḥ" as "Gaṅgātīre ghoṣaḥ". But

1. Dh. L., 56.

the meaning that "Ghoṣaḥ" is cool, holy and so on, is got by *Lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā*. That is, the secondary power of language, after having aroused the secondary meaning, *the bank*, works again to arouse the additional ideas of *coolness* etc. The rise of the suggestible meaning, therefore, according to the opponent, can be explained by assumption of the said variety of Lakṣaṇā.

LAKṢAṆALAKṢAṆĀ CRITICISED.

The opponent has to make the following two points clear:—

1. Does the Lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā arouse all the ideas, which, according to the Dhvanivādin, the suggestive power arouses, by a single operation or a number thereof, according to the number of ideas which are aroused ?

2. Does it require contradiction in the ideas, aroused by the primary and the secondary powers, as precedent condition for its operation ?

If Lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā be supposed to function only once and in that unitary function the experience of contradiction between the ideas, of which the hearer is conscious, be not a necessary condition for its operation, it would be simply another name for Dhvani and it would be unjustifiable to treat it as a variety of Lakṣaṇā. For, the chief characteristic of Lakṣaṇā is that it functions only after the consciousness of contradiction (Skhaladgati). But if it be said that consciousness of contradiction is a necessary condition, that it functions as many times as an additional idea is aroused, and that for the arousal of every such idea the experience of contradiction is a necessary condition, the[1] position becomes indefensible, because it means

1. Dh. L., 18.

argumentum-ad-infinitum. Another thing that the opponent forgets is that in the case of the consciousness of the suggested meaning there is necessarily no experience of contradiction.

CRITICISM OF LAKṢAṆĀ SUMMARISED.

The function of Lakṣaṇā is simply to bring in the additional idea to remove the apparent contradiction, implied by different words used in a sentence: for instance, the idea of "*bank*" in "*Hamlet on the Ganges*'" or that of "like" in "lion boy". The ideas, which moved the speaker to use such contradictory expressions, are aroused by an altogether different power. For, the conception of a power is based upon the function that it performs. And when the conditions, required for one power to function, differ from those of another and the result achieved is also different, difference of such powers from one another has naturally to be accepted.

"SAHAKĀRI BHEDĀCCA ŚAKTIBHEDAH".

The ideas, which the suggestive power of words is intended to arouse, are certainly different from those which the secondary power is said to give rise to. The necessary condition for the power to operate in the latter case is the apparent lack of harmony in the different constituents of a sentence. But the former does not presuppose this condition. If a statement is intended to suggest what is not directly expressed, or rather under the circumstances cannot be so expressed, but is suggested by a peculiar arrangement and choice of the words, it requires the power of visualisation (Pratibhā) in the hearer, and not simply the knowledge of the secondary convention (Lakṣaṇā). Hence distinction between Lakṣaṇā and Dhvani has got to be admitted.

THE ANVITĀBHIDHĀNA THEORY OF THE PRĀBHĀKARAS.

In opposition to the Abhihitānvaya theory of the

Naiyāyikas and Bhāṭṭas, which Abhinava accepts and which we have briefly stated in the preceding pages, the Anvitābhidhānavādins, Prābhākaras, maintain that there is no necessity of admitting the additional power of words called the Tātparyaśakti, admitted by the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas, and Dhvani, as maintained by others. Abhidhāśakti alone serves the purposes of all. They argue as follows :—

Just as the power of an arrow to hit more and more distant objects depends upon the power and the skill of the archer, so the power of words to signify things, not ordinarily indicated, depends upon the skilful use that the writer or speaker makes of them. Just as in the case of the arrow the assumption of different powers is unnecessary to explain its hitting near and distant objects, so the assumption of more than one power of words is unnecessary to account for their conveying different ideas in different contexts.

CRITICISM OF THE ANVITĀBHIDHĀNAVĀDA.

The conception of difference of one power from another is based upon the difference of functions performed by them. And one function is regarded as different from another, according as its sphere and the means, wherewith it is performed, are different. Now, the question, that the Anvitābhidhānavādins have got to answer, is, whether the far-reaching power of words discharges only one function or many. The former position cannot be maintained, because it extends over different spheres. At one time it gives rise to one meaning at another time to another. This certainly involves difference in the means. If, therefore, it be admitted to perform more than one function, it will have necessarily to be admitted to be of different kinds. And if so, the position of the unity of power becomes indefensible, because, as we have already stated, the conception of

plurality of powers is based upon the difference of functions performed.

But if the Prābhākara were to say that by far-reaching power he means that in certain constructions the word or words convey the so called suggestible meaning directly, without passing through the intermediate stages of arousing the primary and the secondary meanings, he assumes an indefensible position. For, the word, not being associated with that meaning by the convention, how can it arouse that ? The reason is obvious. The word is conventionally associated with the primary meaning only. It can, therefore, directly give rise to that alone and not to the suggestible, because the former serves[1] as an instrumental cause for the arousal of the latter. If then the opponent were to say that the consciousness of the suggestible meaning arises independently of that of the conventional, he has to answer the following questions :—

Is the consciousness of the conventional meaning in any way necessary for that of the suggested, i.e. does the consciousness of the former serve as a stimulus for the latter or not ? If not, why then only some words and not others give rise to certain suggestible meanings ? But if it does, it has then to be clearly stated whether the consciousness of the former precedes that of the latter or follows it.

If the opponent were to admit that the suggested meaning rises immediately after hearing the suggestive word and that the consciousness of the conventional meaning, which is a stimulus to it, simply follows, his statement would apparently be as good as saying that the grandson is

1. Dh. L., 18-9.

the cause of his grand-father[1]. The former position would mean the acceptance of our view.

But if the opponent, in order to get out of the difficulty, were to say that the instrumentality of the conventional meaning to the rise of "the suggested" in the hearer, does not depend on the hearer's actually becoming conscious of it, but on the fact that he has the residual trace[2] of the acquisition of the conventional meaning: in this case his assumption is of no psychological value, because it cannot explain, as we pointed out above, why only certain words arouse certain suggestible meanings and not others. But if he admits consciousness of the conventional before the suggested, the position would again mean the acceptance of our theory.

Further, the association of the words, according to the Anvitābhidhānavāda, is not with the simple and unrelated meaning but with the related. For, that is the only difference between the Anvitābhidhānavāda theory and Abhihitānvayavāda. Therefore, the opponent cannot talk of the acquisition of conventional meaning, because, according to him, there can be no consciousness of unrelated word, and consequently its unrelated meaning. Now[3] if the opponent were to admit the consciousness of isolated and unrelated word and its equally unrelated meaning through the process in acquisition of such a meaning, which is technically called "Āvāpodvāpa" and if he were to maintain that the word is associated with the unrelated meaning he immediately becomes a convert. Anvitābhidhānavāda, therefore, is untenable.

Necessity of Admission of the Instrumentality of Consciousness of one Meaning in the Rise of another.

Even the Mīmāṁsaka cannot do without the admission

1. Dh.L. 18-9. 2. Dh. L., 19. 3. Dh. L., 19.

of the instrumentality of the consciousness of one meaning in the rise of that of another for the following reasons:—

1. He admits the distinction of the primary meaning from the secondary. If the former be not instrumental in the arousal of the latter, how can the distinction between the two be maintained ?

2. He admits that where there is a coalition of Direct[1] Declaration, Indicative power, Syntactical Connection, Context, Position, and Name, that which follows is always weaker than the one preceding it; because it is more remote from the purpose in view x[2], i.e. indication of the use of Mantra.

As no comparison can be made when each of them treats of different subjects, they have to be taken in the present context as referring to one and the same subject. For, the sūtra speaks of their 'Samavāya,' 'coalition', which implies their bearing upon a single subject.

Among x[3] these six, that which follows is weaker than that which precedes it, as they are more and more remote. Because in the case of all of these it is universally considered necessary to admit that there is the corroboration of a Direct Assertion, laying down the necessary application; and the cognition brought about by this corroborative Direct Assertion varies in its proximity to each of the six means of cognition in question.

For instance, in the case of Indicative Power x[4], there in no pointing out of the use, until there is a prior inference

1. J.S., 3-3-14.
x2. Jha, 1164.
x3. Jha, 1175.
x4. Jha, 1178.

of the Direct Assertion (laying down that use); and hence in this case there is a certain degree of remoteness, which is not present in the case of Direct Assertion, wherein the declaration of the use having been duly cognized, it is the presence of this use that leads to the inference of the necessary capability. In all cases where the two means of knowledge proceed towards a common objective, that which is found to take more time in reaching it, is taken as remote from it, and as weaker in its authority than the other. Thus it is clear that the Mīmāṁsaka admits that Śruti and Liṅga etc. are different from one another as regards their strength or weakness to indicate the utility of a particular Mantra on a certain occasion. And this admission is based on the recognition that one is more remotedly connected with the indication of the use of Mantra than another. This means that he recognises difference in the causality (Nimitta) as sufficient ground for differentiation. Therefore, he has no justification in criticising the distinctive nature of the Dhvani as admitted by the followers of the theory of Dhvani. Because the suggested meaning is admitted to be different from others just for the reason that the means of conveying it (Nimitta) are different from those which are employed in conveying the conventional or the secondary.

BHAṬṬA NĀYAKA'S EXPLANATION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE SUGGESTED MEANING AND ITS CRITICISM.

We have dealt with the æsthetic theory of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in the first chapter. We have adduced historical reasons to show how the points of agreement between him and Abhinavagupta are more than those of difference, regarding the problem of æsthetics, viewed from the point of view of experience. His difference from Abhinava on the problem of Dhvani also is of the same nature. He

recognises the existence of a meaning which the exponents of the Dhvani theory call "the suggestible." But he explains the rise of this meaning in the hearer's consciousness in his own way. His views on this point have a special reference to the verse, which has been given in the beginning of this chapter as an illustration of Dhvani. "*Bhrama dhārmika.*" It has been discussed in the preceding pages how the negative meaning, that comes to the hearer's consciousness, cannot be explained in any other way than by the assumption of *the suggestive power of language*, called Dhvani. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's position, however, is different from those of the other opponents and may be stated as follows :—

The poetic statements are made to one another by characters involved in the presented æsthetic situation. But their æsthetic value is to be judged from the effect that they have on the hearer outside the situation. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, therefore, argues that the mere capacity of words to arouse the suggestible meaning is insufficient to bring the negative meaning from the verse under discussion to the consciousness of the hearer. The arousal of such a meaning presupposes the consciousness of the timid nature of the person so addressed. And that is possible only through the æsthetic experience of the emotion of terror on hearing the words proud lion (Dṛpta siṁha) on the one hand and religious minded (Dhārmika) etc., on the other[1].

Abhinava accepts the position. He maintains the power of visualisation on the part of both, the poet and the hearer, to be the most essential factor in the production of a suggestive sentence and its understanding respectively. But what he means to point out is, that the acceptance of

1. Dh. L., 19.

the suggestive power is in any case necessary to get the negative meaning. Because the experience of the æsthetic emotion of terror is naturally in the spectator and not in the person so described. For, in the latter case it is simple terror that is aroused. And this æsthetic emotion is due, even according to the opponent, not to the conventional meaning. How can it then be aroused unless the suggestive power be admitted ? Thus the opponent, while fighting against the Dhvani theory has simply been establishing it.

V. Dhvani Distinguished from Figures of Speech.

The opponents, belonging to the Ālaṅkārika school, maintain that figures of speech are of two types (i) those without any suggestible elements and (ii) those in which the suggestible element is a necessary constituent. The suggestible, therefore, is an element in the figures of speech of the latter type. It has no independent existence. It is, therefore, necessary here to discuss one of the figures of speech which, according to the Ālaṅkārika, has the suggestible element as a necessary constituent. Let us take, for instance, the Samāsokti and analyse the illustration, which Ānandavardhana himself has given, to find out how far the position of the opponent is sound.

Figure Samāsokti Defined.

If a statement contains adjuncts with double meaning, the meaning, that is not applicable to what is directly mentioned, suggests something else similar to it and thus enhances the æsthetic value of the statement as a whole. Such a statement is technically called *Samāsokti*, because of its being of compressed nature.

The following illustration will make the point clear :—

"Upoḍha rāgeṇa vilolatārakam
Tathā grhītam śaśinā niśāmukham
Yathā Samastaṁ timirāṁśukaṁ tayā
Puropi rāgād galitaṁ na Lakṣitam."

Here most of the words have got double meaning as the following table will show :—

Upoḍharāgeṇa.	(i) Ruddy
	(ii) Loving.
Vilolatārakam.	(i) With twinkling stars.
	(ii) With tremulous eyes.
Grhītam.	(i) Illumined.
	(ii) Caught to kiss.
Niśāmukham	(i) The commencement of night.
	(ii) Red-lotus-like face.
Samastam.	(i) Mixed.
	(ii) The whole.
Timirāṁśukam	(i) Light and darkness.
	(ii) Thin dark garment.
Puraḥ.	(i) In the East.
	(ii) In the front.
Rāgāt.	(i) After the twilight.
	(ii) Because of love.
Galitam	(ii) Ended or subdued.
	(ii) Dropped.

It is a description of the rise of full moon in all her glory in a clear evening. Ordinarily the approach of night is marked by two distinct stages. (i) twilight and (ii) dusk. But the beauty of the lines, under discussion, consists in their presentation of a poetic vision that just when the evening was ruddy with the rays of the sun below the horizon and a few stars had just begun twinkling, the moon arose so clear in all her brightness that the darker

stage of twilight, the dusk, was not at all noticeable even in the East.

Here the points to be specially noted are the following :—

1. The word for moon in Sanskrit, Candra, is used in the masculine and not in the feminine gender, like the word "moon" in English.

2. The word for night, *Niśā*, is feminine.

3. Niśāmukha is a recognised expression for the commencement of night.

4. Most of the words in the verse, under discussion, have double meaning as stated above.

Now let the reader arrange the second meanings of the words of the above list in the following order and find out what they suggest :—

(Śasī) the lover, so caught to kiss the red lotus-like face of loving Niśā, the beloved, with tremulous eyes, that she did not notice the thin dark garment that fell in front, because of the intensity of her love.

Let the first meanings also be similarly arranged as follows :—

"The moon so illumined the ruddy commencement of night, with a few twinkling stars, that the mixed light and darkness after the twilight, the dusk, was not at all noticeable even in the East."

Thus a statement, which arouses another image besides the one directly stated, because the adjuncts possess double meaning and, therefore, are applicable to the suggested, is called Samāsokti, because the two meanings have been condensed together.

Now let the reader analyse his experience after hearing

the verse under discussion and find out through introspection the relation, in which the two sets of images stand to each other. He will come to the following conclusion : —

The image, constituted by the first meanings, predominantly figures in the consciousness. The other, which is suggested by the skilful use of the words with double meanings, when put together with the first, enhances its beauty very much like the standard of comparison in a simile and, therefore, occupies a subordinate position to the first, like an embellishment (Alaṅkāra).

The exponents of the Dhvani theory admit that in some Alaṅkāras the suggested element does occupy a subordinate position. But there are innumerable instances in the existing literature, in which the Dhvani holds an independent position.

The distinction of the suggestive poetry from the embellished is, therefore, not difficult to understand. What the exponents of the theory of the suggested meaning say is that though some of the figures do suggest what is not directly mentioned, yet the suggested in all these cases occupies a subordinate position to the directly expressed in the total æsthetic configuration. The suggestive poetry (*Dhvanikāvya*) is that, in the total æsthetic configuration aroused by which, the suggested occupies the predominant position and the directly expressed[1] is reduced to the subordinate position.

The Distinctive Spheres of Upamā and rasavat Alaṅkāra on the one hand and that of Rasadhvani on the other.

That linguistic presentation is suggestive, that is, possessed of Dhvani, the experience aroused by which, when analysed, is found to have a suggested basic

1. Dh. L., 35-6.

mental state or a transient emotion etc. as its central meaning. It has both the verbal and the ideational[1] embellishments and qualities as subservient to it. But when the central meaning is other than the basic mental state etc. and the latter simply lends some charm to the former, that is an instance of the embellishment, called *Rasavat*. In a Dhvani Kāvya simile and other ideational embellishments (Arthālaṅkāras), though apparently they embellish a conventional meaning, yet ultimately they also embellish only the suggested, inasmuch as their embellishing the suggestive consists in imparting to it the capacity of[2] suggesting the suggestible.

An earlier authority maintained that a poetic composition, which is exclusively given to the description of the insentient, is the sphere of the ideational embellishment, because in that the introduction of the element of the basic mental state is not possible. It may be stated here that this authority did not believe in the suggested meaning. Naturally enough, therefore, it held that the description of the sentient is the sphere of the embellishment Rasavat, of which the Rasa is only an element. This view, according to the Dhvani School, is not sound, because there can be no description of the insentient, which ultimately does not have any reference to the sentient as a stimulant or an indicator of a basic mental state (Vibhāva or Anubhāva) and, therefore, there will be left no sphere for ideational embellishment like the simile and so on. But if the opponent were to maintain that even when there is relation of the described insentient to the sentient, the poetic composition remains an exclusive sphere of simile etc., he will be landed in the difficult position of having to accept the most æsthetic linguistic presentation as totally unæsthetic, because,[3]

1. Dh. L., 71. 2. Dh.L,5. 7 . 3. Dh. L., 76.

according to him, Rasadhvani is invariably concomitant with the embellishment, called Rasavat ; and therefore, if there be no Rasavadalaṅkāra in a composition, it shall have to be accepted as unæsthetic. All those compositions, which describe the insentient, will have, therefore, to be admitted by the opponent as devoid of æsthetic element.

Embellishments and Æsthetic Presentation.

The embellishments are of two kinds[1] (i) verbal (śabda) and (ii) ideational (artha). Alliteration etc., are included in the former, and simile etc. in the latter. In the linguistic presentation of the æsthetic object frequent laboured introduction of the verbal embellishment, alliteration of the same kind, does not tend to suggest the inexpressible. Rather, because of its forcefully drawing the attention of the hearer to itself and exciting his wonder at its frequent appearance, it interferes with the æsthetic experience. It is equally bad for the poet. For, it disturbs his concentration on the delineation of the æsthetic object, because it necessitates conscious search for the necessary words. Hence, though occurrence of an alliteration here and there, without any conscious effort on the part of the poet, lends some external charm to the composition, its frequent laboured introduction has to be avoided.

The case with the ideational embellishments (Arthālaṅkāra) is different. Because the introduction of only those embellishments has to be avoided in a linguistic æsthetic presentation, which requires a mental effort of such a nature as drives the inspired picture of the æsthetic object out of the poet's mind. The frequent introduction of alliteration, as experience tells us, does necessitate such an effort. But the ideational embellishments come spontaneously to the

1. Dh. L., 85-6.

poet's mind. It is natural that they should come in that manner, because the central point in the æsthetic object is only suggestible: and the suggestible can be suggested only through the particular types of expressibles by means[1] of the expressions which stand for them. And such expressibles are the ideational embellishments. Hence they are part and parcel of the æsthetic picture in the poet's mind and do not require for their introduction in the presentation any mental effort, which involves diversion of attention. Their introduction, therefore, is necessary.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUGGESTED MEANING.

The suggested meaning and the suggestive power are classified on two bases: (i) according to the nature of the suggested and (ii) according to the relation of the conventional meaning with the suggested. The poets have classified the poetic world into (i) embellishment (Alaṅkāra) and (ii) the embellished; (iii) transitory emotions and (iv) æsthetic configuration. The suggested meaning and the suggestive power have accordingly been classified on the first basis as follows[2]:—

Pertaining

(i) to the embellishable (Vastu Dhvani)
(ii) to the embellishment (Alaṅkāra Dhvani)
(iii) to the transient emotion (Bhāva Dhvani)
(iv) to the æsthetic configuration (Rasa Dhvani)

The latter two have each a sub-division, according as the emotion (Bhāva) is responsive or not. In the latter case they are technically called,

(a) Bhāvābhāsa and
(b) Rasābhāsa.

1. Dh. L., 86-7. 2. Dh. L., 15.

1. *Vastudhvani* is the suggestive power, which operates to arouse the suggested idea, which refers to all that goes by the name of Vibhāva and Anubhāva, according to the broad division of the poetic world, which stimulates mental states. This power (a) may arouse a negative meaning when[1] the statement, in strict conventional language, is positive or vice versa. (b) It may give rise to a meaning, which is neither positive nor negative, when the statement is clearly positive or negative.[2] (c) Or when the statement is meant for not the one, to whom it is addressed, but for the other, to whom the situation, in which the person addressed is involved, has to be explained in order that the latter may spare the former: it may give rise to a meaning quite different from that which the statement has for the addressed.[3]

Thus, according to the situation, the skill of the speaker and the powers of understanding and visualisation of the hearer, the suggestive power gives rise to innumerable kinds of suggested meaning referring to Vastu. The constituents of the aesthetic configuration can be divided into two classes, the objective and the subjective. By the objective we mean those which represent something that exists outside the mind. And by subjective we mean mental states. The objective is divided into two classes according as it stimulates an emotion or indicates some mental states by gestures and grimaces. The former is called Vibhāva and the latter Anubhāva. A suggested meaning that refers to what is objective of either kind is included in the *Vastudhvani.*[4]

(2) Alaṅkāra Dhvani is that suggestive power of word, the suggested idea aroused by which, is a poetic embellish-

1. Dh. L. 20
2. Dh. L., 21-2.
3. Dh. L., 23.
4. Dh. L., 66.

ment (Alaṅkāra). This idea, though it may have been presented in some other contexts as occupying a subordinate position, as an embellishment to the meaning of a sentence, is yet called Alankāradhvani, when it is presented, not as an embellishment of something else, but independently, though it is still recognised as such.

(3) *Rasadhvani* is that suggestive power which floods the mind with a host of ideas, not always clearly definable, which are necessary for such completion of the aesthetic image as is necessary for suggesting the basic mental state at a high pitch and bringing about complete self-forgetfulness in the[1] hearer, in which the aesthetic experience consists. An important point of distinction between this suggestive power of word and the rest is that while the ideas suggested by the other two somehow admit of expression in conventional language, those aroused by this can[2] never be so expressed.

(4) *Bhāvadhvani.* The subjective constituents of the aesthetic configuration, the mental states, are divided into two classes, the basic mental states and the transient emotions. The former are technically called Sthāyibhāvas and the latter Vyabhicāribhāvas. Accordingly we have Bhāvadhvani when the suggested idea is a transient emotion.

These emotions are righteous in some cases and otherwise in others. Love of Rāma for Sītā, for instance, is righteous, but of Rāvaṇa is not. Thus, when a basic mental state is unrighteous, the suggested ideas, giving rise to it, are called (i) Rasābhāsadhvani. Similarly when transient emotion is so, the suggested ideas, responsible for it, are called (ii) Bhāvābhāsadhvani.

1. Dh.L.62. 2. Dh.L.24.

Often it is found that the consciousness of a sudden termination of a mood, involved in a basic mental state, is the source of æsthetic experience, as for instance, in the situation described in :—

"*Ekasmin śayane etc.*"

The[1] suggested ideas, which arouse the consciousness of such a termination of a mood, are technically called (iii) *Bhāvaśāntidhvani.*

The classification on the basis of the relation of the conventional to the suggested tells us of the antecedent conditions of the consciousness of the suggested. There are two main divisions of this class :—

(i) Avivakṣitavācya, that is, that which throws the conventional meaning into the background or subordinate position as not having been intended to be conveyed by the speaker and (ii) Vivakṣitānyaparavācya, that is, that which puts the conventional meaning in relation with something else than that with which it is apparently connected in the statement.

The following illustrations will make the point in hand clear:—

Suvarṇapuṣpām pṛthvīm cinvantipuruṣāstrayaḥ,
Śūraśca kṛtavidyaśca yaśca jānāti sevitum.

(Only three persons, the brave, the learned and the one who knows how to serve, pluck the gold flowers of the land that produces them.)

Here the conventional meaning, as given in the last part of the above statement, is contradicted by our direct knowledge of the world. We do not know of any land that may be literally producing flowers of gold. Their

1. Dh. L., 24.

plucking, therefore, is out of question. It has, therefore, naturally to be supposed to imply, through similarity (Sādṛśya), land abounding in requisites of prosperity. The reason why this portion of the statement is taken in this sense is the understanding of the suggested meaning, as revealed by the combination of words, namely, the praiseworthiness of the three kinds of persons, the brave, the learned and the one who knows how to serve. The value of this praiseworthiness, because it is not directly stated, is enhanced, very much like that of the beautifully covered breasts of a lady. The verse under discussion is an instance of the first of the two kinds of the suggested meaning, because the conventional meaning is not intended to be conveyed; the speaker does not mean that actually there is a land, which produces the flowers of gold, and that the brave, the learned, and the one who knows how to serve, pluck them. What he means is that these three types of persons deserve the highest praise and reward.

The following is the illustration of the second kind of Dhvani:—

"Śikhariṇi Kva nu nāma Kiyacciram
Kimabhidhānamasāvakarottapaḥ
Taruṇi yena tavādharapāṭalam
Daśati bimbaphalam śukaśāvakaḥ"

(O young lady! in which peak and for how long, an austerity of what name has this young parrot done that he is enjoying the fruit of Bimba, red like your lower lip?)

THE SITUATION.

A young lady is fondling her pet young parrot. A young man chances to pass near by. He is struck with love for her. He envies the lot of the parrot and desiring to express his own feeling of love for her and

trying to ingratiate himself into the lady's favour, makes the above statement.

Here the conventional meaning, unlike in the previous case, is intended to be communicated. But its purpose is not to get a reply to the questions, which are included in it, but to convey his feeling of love for her and to flatter her. This feeling at the very first sight could not be directly expressed. Hence he adopted the method of carrying it through suggestion. Thus, in this case, the conventional meaning is intended to be conveyed. The purpose, however, of conveying such a meaning is not the apparent, it is concealed. The conventional meaning, in the situation, described above, simply reveals it. This type of the suggested meaning is, therefore, called Vivakṣitānyaparavācya, because here the conventional meaning is intended to be conveyed but with a purpose different from the apparent.

Avivakṣitavācya is subdivided into the following two :—

1. When the conventional meaning is not altogether out of the place in a[1] certain context, but in itself does not serve the intended purpose and, therefore, because of the force of the context, is associated with so many ideas that it looks as something altogether different from itself, it is technically called

Arthāntarasaṅkramitavācya.

The following illustration will make the point in hand clear :—

THE SITUATION.

Rāma is in exile. His extremely dear wife, Sītā, has been carried away by Rāvaṇa. He is feeling the pang of separation. At such a time arise dark clouds. Cranes come

1. Dh. L., 61.

flying in a row. Peacocks begin cooing. Gentle breeze, surcharged with spray, begins blowing. The pang of separation becomes more and more intense and the memory of Sītā gets more and more vivid. He realises the unbearability of the existing condition, remembers the past vicissitudes of fortune and the effect that they had on his heart. He also realises the effect of the past experiences in developing an attitude of not taking such things too much to heart. Still he feels intensely the effect of the situation and patiently bearing it says :—

"There are the clouds imparting a peculiar beauty to the sky by their charming darkness and the cranes are flying in them. There are the breezes surcharged with spray. And there are also the joyous cooings[1] of peacocks. Let them all be. I am *Rāma*, utterly devoid of feeling. I bear all."

Here the word *Rāma* does not simply arouse the conventional meaning of a son of a certain king, but suddenly surrounds it with all the pictures of the past unhappy events such as being exiled just on the day when he was to be crowned, life in the forest, his devotion to Sītā, his losing her and so on. But the skilful arrangement of words does not allow the other events, the happy ones, such as the winning of Sītā, to rise in the consciousness, because that is prevented by the words, " utterly devoid of feeling" (Dṛḍham kaṭhora hṛdayaḥ). These pictures so fuse with one another that they form one whole, in which the conventional meaning pales to such insignificance that it is not clearly noticed. It is because of this process in the rise of the suggested meaning that this is called *Arthāntarasaṁkramitavācya*, as explained above.

1. Dh. L., 61.

(II) Often it so happens that the conventional meaning does not fit in with the context. It is simply a means of arousing the suggested. Therefore, as soon as the suggested meaning has risen in the consciousness, it disappears and so does not form a constituent of the total meaning, as it does in the other case, discussed in the preceding page.[1] It is because of the discarding of the conventional by the suggested meaning that it is called

ATYANTATIRASKṚTAVĀCYA.

The following illustration will make the point clear :—

Ravisaṁkrāntasaubhāgyaḥ
Tuṣārāvṛtamaṇḍalaḥ
Niḥśvāsāndha Ivādarśaḥ
Candramā na prakāśate.[2]

(The moon, whose beauty has passed into the sun, with her digit enveloped in the mist, is not shining, like a mirror blinded by sigh.)

This is the description of the Hemanta season by Rāma in Pañcavaṭī. The word *Andha* (blind) conventionally means one who has lost his sight. But here it is used in the secondary sense of inability to receive the reflection of external object and, therefore, suggests its extreme dullness and uselessness etc. The conventional meaning of the word, "blind", does not form a constituent of the total meaning. The former simply arouses the latter. Hence it is an illustration of the type of the suggested meaning under discussion.

The second main division of the suggested meaning, Vivakṣitānyaparavācya, is also subdivided into the follo-

1. Dh. L., 61. 2. Dh. L., 63.

wing, according to the difference in the process involved in the rise of the suggested meaning :—

When the conventional meaning is intended to be conveyed, but has an ulterior purpose than its mere arousal, hat is, has for its sole aim the arousal of the suggested, here are two processes through which the suggested arises. i) In the one the transition from the conventional to the uggested is not at all noticeable. This is technicall ycalled *asaṁlakṣyakrama.* All kinds of Rasādidhvani arise in his manner. (ii) In the other case, the transition from he conventional to the suggested is clearly noticeable.[1] It s, therefore, technically called *Kramadyotita.*

The Kramadyotita is further subdivided into the follow-ng three kinds (Ayamapi dvividha eva Dh, L. 94-5) :—

(i) That which is due to the power of word *Sabdaśaktyudbhava*).

(ii) That which is due to the power of the conven-ional meaning (Arthaśaktyudbhava).

(iii) That which is due to both, *Ubhayaśaktyudbhava,* Śabdārthaśaktyākṣiptopi. Dh. L. 134).

Śabdaśaktyūdbhava.

Certain words have more than one conventional mean-ng. Further, often the words are so joined together that nore than one way of their separation is possible and the roup yields more than one meaning, as for instance,

"Sarvadomādhavaḥ"

an be split up as either

"Sarvadā umādhavaḥ" or as *"Sarvadaḥ mādhavaḥ"*

Thus when a composition consists of words with two neanings due to either[2] of the two causes and each refers to

1. Dh. L., 64. 2. Dh. L., 95.

a distinct object, it is a case of pun or śleṣa. At times, however, it happens that the two meanings do not refer to two distinct objects but stand for the attributes of one and the same, as in the following case :—

Tasyā vināpi hāreṇa
Nisargādeva hāriṇau
Janayāmāsatuḥ kasya
Vismayaṁ na payodharau."

Here the word *hāriṇau* has got two meanings :—

(i) Heart captivating.

(ii) Garlanded.

But both of them refer to the breasts of the lady as its adjuncts. The second meaning coming together with *vināpi hāreṇa* (even without garland) gives rise to the consciousness of false contradiction, "garlanded even without garland." That such a false consciousness of contradiction is intended to be directly conveyed is made clear by the word "*api*" (even). This quotation, therefore, has both the embellishments, Śleṣa and Virodhābhāsa.

But when the words have two conventional meanings and they do not refer to two distinct things, nor the purpose of the second meaning is to convey the idea of an additional embellishment, as revealed by any such word as "*api*" in the above illustration and yet the second meaning serves to beautify the first, that is an instance of *Alaṅkāra-dhvani*, and the suggestion of the additional embellishment is due to the suggestive power of word.

I. Śabdaśaktyudbhava.

The following will illustrate the point in hand :—

"Atrāntare kusumasamayayugam upasaṁharan ajṛmbhata grīṣmābhidhānaḥ phullamallikādhavalāṭṭahāso mahākālaḥ."

This is the description of the advent of the summer. Here the last two compounds have two meanings each. The first means :—

(i) In which turrets look beautiful, because of the flowering Mallikā creepers.

(ii) Whose laughter is white like full blown Mallikā.

The second (Mahākāla) also means :—

(i) of long days.

(ii) God Mahākāla, a name of Śiva.

The relation of the second meanings of the above two words is not indicated by any separate word such as "Api" in the earlier illustration. Hence the power of the compound words itself suggests the relation of these meanings as an embellishment to the first meanings and presents God Śiva[1] with his white laughter as a standard of comparison.

II. Arthaśaktyudbhava.

In some cases the conventional meaning, conveyed by words, forcibly suggests something. The thing so suggested is called

"Arthaśaktyudbhavadhvani",

that is, the meaning suggested by the power of the conventional meaning.

The following is a good illustration of the point under discussion :—

"Evaṁvādini tatrarṣau
Pārśve pituradho mukhī
Līlākamala patrāṇi
Gaṇayāmāsa Pārvatī."

(when the sage said this, Pārvati, who was sitting near her father, began counting petals of the play-lotus.)

1. Db. L., 99-100.

THE SITUATION

Pārvatī practised hard austerities to win Śiva's favour. One day, when she was sitting with her father[1], sage Aṅgiras came with a message from Śiva for marriage. As he was delivering the message, she was overpowered with the feeling of shyness, natural to a young girl, and so to conceal it from her father began counting the petals of the play-lotus that she was holding in her hand.

The above lines, said in the situation, as just described, after conveying the conventional meaning suggest the feeling of shyness, with which Pārvatī was overpowered, by first reviving the memory of austerities, practised by her for securing Śiva's love. Here the stages of transition from the conventional to the suggested are clearly noticeable. And the rise of the suggested meaning is due to the force of the[2] conventional meaning. Hence it is an illustration of Krama-dyotya artha-śaktyudbhava dhvani.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUGGESTED MEANING, ACCORDING TO THE MEANS OF SUGGESTION.

Another basis of classification of the suggested meaning is the means of suggestion. From a letter[3] to the entire work serve as means of suggestion, according to the need. The illustrations of all these types of suggested meaning are given in the third chapter of the Dhvanyāloka. Kuntaka in his Vakrokti jīvita, while talking of Vakrokti as the soul of poetry, is simply repeating what Ānanda Vardhana has said in the third chapter. The former is presenting from the objective point of view what the latter has done from

1. K. Sam, VI. 65.
2. Dh. L., 102-3.
3. Dh. L., 123.

the purely subjective. In fact he repeats the illustrations of Ānanda Vardhana in many cases.

Suggestive Poetry Distinguished from Unsuggestive.

A meaningful composition of words, possessed of the appropriate qualities and embellishments of words and meanings, is called suggestive poetry (Dhvanikāvya), provided that both, the words and their conventional meanings, suggest the suggestible meaning and in the total æsthetic configuration occupy a position subordinate to the suggested.

Thus, it is clear that the suggestive poetry is different from that which possesses the poetic qualities and embellishments of words and meanings. For, while the[1] latter is concerned with words as sound symbols and their conventional meanings, the former is characterised by the predominance of the suggested meaning. Hence the latter cannot include the former.

1. The experience, stimulated by the suggestive poetry, is different from that which is aroused by the unsuggestive poetry. In the former case, it consists in the subjective realisation of a basic mental state through complete self-forgetfulness and consequent identification with the focus of the presented situation. In the latter case it consists in the objective visualisation of the presented. Thus, while in the former case, one always has the experience of one of the eight or nine types of emotive state; in the latter only the feeling of wonder and the sense of admiration are aroused.

(II) The latter may be called an imitation of the former; because the most essential characteristic of an

1. Dh. L., 33.

imitation is that it lacks the most essential element of the imitated. A life-like wax-figure of a man is acknowledged to be an imitation, because, while externally it is exactly like a man, it lacks the enlivening principle, the soul. Similarly a poetic composition, possessed of poetic qualities and embellishments, is called "Citra" or imitation, because it lacks the soul of poetry, the suggestiveness.

(III) From the point of view of the essential difference between the conventional and the suggested meanings also the non-suggestive poetry is distinguishable from the suggestive, inasmuch as the former, in respect of meaning, consists of only the directly expressible ones, while the latter has both.

(IV) From the point of view of the productive powers also the difference between the two is clear. While the former is a product of mere knowledge and skill in the use of poetic technique, in the production of the latter the poetic genius plays the most important[1] part.

The Distinction Of The Suggestive Poetry From The Embellished

The embellished poetry is of two kinds:—

1. That which stimulates only such ideas as are symbolised by words, which form its body, as for instance, the one having Simile.

2. That which arouses the consciousness of some meanings which are not symbolised in words, but are

1. Dh. L.34

simply suggested by them, as for instance the one having the following figures:—

1. Samāsokti.
2. Ākṣepa.
3. Anuktanimittaviśeṣokti.
4. Paryāyokta.
5. Dīpaka.
6. Apahnuti and
7. Saṅkara etc.

The opponents of the theory of the suggestive power of words, therefore, maintain that though the suggestive poetry cannot be brought under the former type of embellished poetry, it can certainly be included in the latter.

To this the exponents reply, as has been stated above, that the conception of the suggestive poetry, as distinct from the embellished, is based upon the suggested element being the principal constituent of the total configuration of meanings. No doubt, in the configuration, presented by the figures of speech, mentioned above, there is a suggested element, but it occupies only a subordinate position, inasmuch as it further beautifies that which is directly expressed. But the suggestive poetry (Dhvanikāvya), according to us, is that in which the directly expressed meaning occupies subordinate position to the suggested. Therefore, if we take the two experiences as aroused by the two kinds of poetry into consideration and analyse them, we find them to be quite distinct from each other. Hence we maintain[1] the stimuli also to be different.

1. Dh. L., 35,

DHVANI CHART. (Dh. L. 119)



CHAPTER V.

MAHIMA BHATTA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI AND A REPLY.

DHVANI AS A CONTROVERSIAL PROBLEM.

The problem of meaning in the context of Æsthetics engaged the minds of great Kashmirian thinkers for about four hundred years from the 9th to the 12th Century A. D. The point, on which the controversy primarily raged, was the suggestible meaning (Dhvani). It was raging even before Ânanda Vardhana wrote his famous Dhvani Kārikās and a commentary on them with the object of establishing the suggestible meaning as distinct from other recognised types of meaning no less than from such figures of speech as Samāsokti etc.

Soon after the appearance of the Dhvanyāloka to establish the theory of Dhvani, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka undertook to demolish it in his Hṛdaya Darpaṇa, which we know from references only in the works of the subsequent writers. Abhinavagupta, in his commentary, the Locana, on the Dhvanyāloka, adduced convincing psycho-philosophical reasons to demonstrate the unsoundness of Bhaṭṭa nāyaka's position. But, before Abhinava wrote his Locana, there was another commentary, the Candrikā, which again we know from references only. The name of the author of this commentary, is altogether unknown. From a reference in the Locana, however, it is clear that he[1] was an ancestor (Pūrvavaṁśya) of Abhinava himself.

1. Dh. L. 185.

After Abhinava, Kuntaka attempted, from the objective point of view, the problem of Dhvani, which had been ably dealt with by Ânanda and his commentators from the subjective. In fact Mahima Bhaṭṭa[1] points it out that Kuntaka's definition of Vakrokti is nothing more than that of Dhvani. It is made evident by an additional fact that he divides and subdivides the Vakrokti exactly as Ânanda does the Dhvani and cites the illustrations of Ânanda as examples of different types of Vakrokti.

Mahima Bhaṭṭa came next. He attacked the Dhvani from both, the subjective and the objective points of view. He criticised both Ānanda and Abhinava, who attempted the problem from the former, and Kuntaka, who took it up from the latter point of view. His critical approach is from the logical point of view of the Monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir and not of the Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika, as we shall show in a subsequent section.

But Ruyyaka, who came after Mahima Bhaṭṭa and has commented upon the Vyakti Viveka, has answered all the main objections against Dhvani and re-established it.

An Introduction to Mahima Bhaṭṭa.

Though it is not possible to state the exact dates of birth and death of Mahima Bhaṭṭa, his position in the literary history of Kashmir is certain. He belongs to the middle of the 11th century A. D. For, he came after Abhinavagupta and Kuntaka, whom he criticises, and before Ruyyaka, who comments on the Vyakti Viveka. For a proper understanding and appreciation of his work nothing more is needed.

1. V. V. 126.

He was a house-holder and had sons and grandsons. His father's name was Śrī Dhairya. His teacher's name[1] was Śyāmalaka, who was a great poet. The name of one of his sons was Bhīma. He wrote the Vyakti Viveka for grandsons, who were well known among the nobles for their good manners.[2] He was a teacher. He was asked[3] to point out the defects in the works of others. Accordingly he took up the destructive critical attitude, though he was conscious of the fact that it is not the path of the good and that it falls to the lot of the unfortunate.

He was also conscious of the fact that his own work is not free from defects But he asserts that his position is like that of a physician, who prescribes the rules of health to others, though he himself violates them.

He was extremely proud of his learning. In comparison with himself he did not count another as anything more than a straw[4]. It was because of his arrogance that he was not respected anywhere, inspite of his learning. He was very anxious to attain literary fame suddenly[5]. In fact it was his desire for such a fame which was at the bottom of his undertaking the criticism of so well recognised authorities on the literary criticism as Ānanda Vardhana and Kuntaka. He looked upon himself as the sun of the literary world. He was aware of the fact that his work would not get the unanimous approbation of all; that it would arouse the anger of the supporters of the theory of Dhvani; that it would delight those who are of his way of thinking and that it would depress his rivals[6]. His work,

---

1. V. V. 456 2. V.V. 456 3. V.V., 152-3
4. V.V. Comm. 149. 5. V.V. 6 6. V.V. 4

according to his own statement, is for those whose intellectual equipment and tendency are like his own. He knew that the very fact that he took up the work of so great and renowned a man as Ānanda Vardhana for criticism would establish his importance in the literary circle. He was in a dreadful hurry to establish his litarary fame, so much so that he did not care to read, as he himself says, the earlier work of the school of opponents of Dhvani, the Hṛdaya Darpaṇa by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka ; nor did he study the expositions of the Dhvanyāloka such as the Candrikā[1] etc. He knew that it was a serious defect in his intellectual equipment, which would lead him into many mistakes. But it was his passion for the literary fame that compelled him to this hasty step of entering into adverse criticism of the Dhvani, as presented by Ānanda Vardhana. He compares his intellect to a lady, who, under the compelling influence of passion of love, hurriedly starts to meet her object of love, without caring to look into the mirror to see if all her ornaments are rightly put on.

He realised that the problem of the suggestible meaning (Dhvani) is extremely difficult and, therefore, a person, who attempts it, is most likely to err on many points. Accordingly he craves the indulgence of his learned readers and requests them to ignore the flaws and to concentrate[2] on what is good in his work.

He had no respect for his predecessors whom he criticises. His reference to Kuntaka clearly indicates this, as pointed out by Ruyyaka.[3] He tries to misrepresent his opponents and to throw dust[4] into the eyes of the critical

1. V. V. 6. 2. V. V. 6-7 3. V. V. 243
4. V. V. V. 81.

readers. He recognised Ānanda Vardhana to be a great thinker and was convinced that his acquaintance with the views of such a person will itself bring him to predominance among the intellectuals.

The Purpose of The Book.

The Vyakti Viveka, as its very name indicates, is concerned with the criticism of the fourth power of word, technically called "Vyakti", the power to convey the suggestible meaning. Here an effort is made to demolish the theory of meaning, propounded by Ânanda Vardhana and to show that it is included in the theory of inference, presented by him.

It may be interesting to note in this connection that this theory of inference had been propounded by Śrī Śaṅkuka in the course of his interpretation of the aphoristic definition of Rasa by Bharata. Mahima Bhaṭṭa mostly repeats that very view with almost the same arguments in the context of meaning. Most of these arguments had been shown to be unsound by Abhinavagupta in the course of the refutation of Śrī Śaṅkuka's interpretation of the Rasa Sūtra in the Abhinava Bhāratī, where the theory of inference has been fully exploded. Though there is enough evidence to show that Mahima Bhaṭṭa read the Locana of Abhinavagupta ; for, he quotes from this work in his Vyakti Viveka : yet there is no evidence to show that he read the Abhinava Bhāratī also. For, after reading the Abhinava Bhāratī, the theory of inference, as presented by Mahima Bhaṭṭa, looks absurd.

His Attitude Towards Dhvanikāra.

His fundamental difference from Ánanda Vardhana

is that he does not recognise Vyakti or Dhvani as an independent power of language and holds that it admits of inclusion in the inference. He does not differ from Ananda Vardhana on all points. He does admit the soundness of some views and refers to them with approbation. But when after a critical analysis of Ānanda Vardhana's views he discovers them to be opposed to his, he has no hesitation in criticising them adversely.[1]

KASHMIR ŚAIVA TENDENCIES OF MAHIMA BHAṬṬA.

The modern interpreters of Mahima Bhaṭṭa, because of their being out of touch with the Realistic Idealism (Ābhāsavāda) of Kashmir, generally think him to be a Naiyāyika and interpret his work, the Vyakti Viveka, in terms of the system of Nyāya. A closer study of his work reveals him to be a follower of the Kashmir school of Monistic Śaivaism. This becomes evident if we take the following facts into account :—

(I) HIS REFERENCE TO PARĀ

In the benedictory verse at the beginning of his work, he offers obeisance to Parā Vāk. We have already pointed out in ch. II, that Bhartṛhari had recognised only three aspects of speech and looked upon the Paśyantī to be the highest; that it was Somānanda, who established the Parā as distinct from and transcending the Paśyantī; and that the later Vaiyākaraṇas, like Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, have borrowed it from the Śaiva. His reference to Parā at the commencement of his work is, therefore, a definite indication of his being a Kashmir Śaiva.

1. V. V., 5

His Reference to the Śaiva Theory of Ābhāsavāda

Mahima Bhaṭṭa divides words into five classes: Noun, verb, prefix, conjunction and Karmapravacanīya. And noun he subdivides into four classes, according to the four reasons for the use of nouns for different objects, such as genus, quality, function and substance But subsequently he seems to modify this view and discusses at length the view that the reason for the use of a noun for an object is just one, i·e. the act of attaining the characteristic being, "Ghaṭanañca tadātmatvāpattirūpā kriyā matā" (V.V. 33)

He refers to another view of the reason for the use of a noun for an object, which has close similarity with his own, in order to distinguish his view from it, as follows :—

According to some thinkers, the reason for the use of all such nouns as 'ghaṭa' etc. for respective objects is the action, the general idea expressed by the root from which a particular word is derived. The argument in support of the view may be stated as follows: —

If the words such as 'ghaṭa' have to be acknowledged to signify definite objects, there must be a reason why they do so. This reason must be internal such as is identical with the thing and not external. For, if the reason that is external, such as the genus, be looked upon as sufficient to explain why the word 'ghaṭa' stands for a particular object, that externality being common to another object, e. g. a piece of cloth, there is no reason why 'ghaṭa' should not signify it.[1] Hence the reason for the use of

1. V. V. 23.

'ghaṭa' to signify a particular object is the action or the general idea, indicated by the root, from which the word is derived and with which the object is identical or which is its essential nature,

The defect in this view, however, is apparent. It was discovered by the Upādhivādins. If the reason for the use of a noun for an object be the action that is signified by the root, from which the noun is derived, the noun 'gauḥ' should not be used for the object 'cow' at the time when she is not going, but is perfectly at rest; because at that time she does not do the act of going, which alone is the reason for the use of the word 'gauḥ' for it.

Mahima Bhaṭṭa, therefore, holds that the reason for the use of a noun for a particular object is not the action, which is signified by the root, from which the noun is derived and which is being done by the object, for which the noun is used. Ruyyaka, commenting on the verse, under discussion, definitely asserts that the action, signified by the root, represents just an aspect of the reason for the use of a noun such as Ghaṭa for a particular object. (Ghaṭiḥ acpratyayāntaḥ pravṛttinimittaikadeśābhidhāyī. V. V. V. 33). Accordingly he holds that the reason for the use of a noun, such as 'ghaṭa', for an object, such as jar, is the attaining or realisation of the being, which consists in the natural character, form or true constitution and which is non-different from it. i. e. shining as jar in its characteristic form. (Svarūpībhūta-ghaṭatvāpattilakṣaṇam hi ghaṭa-śabdasya pravṛtti-nimittam V. V. V. 33).

But it may be objected here that 'attaining' 'realisation' and 'shining' are also acts. How can they, therefore, be attributed to the insentient objects like jar etc. ? For, action

presupposes an agent, who is free, whose essential nature is determinative consciousness (Svatantraḥ kartā). Action springs from free consciousness: Svātantrya is the basis of action: but how can any body talk of it in relation to the insentient jar, to justify the view that the reason for the use of a word for a particular object is the performance by it of the action, though it may be that of attaining the characteristic being ?

To answer this question Mahima Bhaṭṭa introduces the Kashmir Śaiva metaphysical doctrine that everything is the manifestation of the Absolute. He resorts to the Śaiva theory of Âbhāsavāda. His language is a mere adaptation of the famous Kārikā of Utpalācārya's Īśvara Pratyabhijñā (II, 1, 4.)

Kramobhedāśrayo bhedopyābhāsa-sadasattvataḥ
Ábhāsasadasattve ca Citrābhāsakṛtaḥ prabhoḥ.

Tha reader may satisfy himself on this point by comparing the second half of this verse with the following line in the Vyakti Vivek :—

Mūlañca tasyāścitrārthābhāsāviṣkṛtirīśituḥ.

(V.V. 33)

His argument as elaborated by Ruyyaka may be stated as follows :—

Even though we may admit the existence of the objects external to and independently of the knowing subject, yet admission of such an existence is as good as admission of non-existence. For, it would not explain the practical life of man. Because an object in order to explain the practical life of the subject must have its being in the subject, must shine in him. Now if we admit the object to be external to, independent of and, therefore, essentially different from

the subject, it would mean that the object is of the nature of not-consciousness (Aprakāśa). And if it be so, how can it shine in consciousness, become a fact of consciousness? For, to shine in consciousness implies shining as identical with it. But how can that, which is essentially different from consciousness, shine as identical with it? For, the essential nature cannot change; and if it changes it is not the essential nature. The objects, therefore, have to be admitted to be essentially of the nature of consciousness[1]. Therefore, if we admit the objects to be essentially of the nature of consciousness, as we must in order to explain the practical life of humanity, the objection against the view that the reason for the use of an expression for an object is its action of attaining the characteristic being is answered. For, the objector raised the question "How can we attribute action to an insentient object like jar, because action is recognised to spring from a conscious and free subject only?" Now if we admit the object to be essentially of the nature of consciousness, the admission of freedom (Svātantrya) as its essential nature automatically follows; because 'Prakāśa' and 'Vimarśa' are inseparable; there is no consciousness without freedom.

In corroboration of this view Ruyyaka quotes a line which appears to be from a Vedāntic text, because the word 'Brahman' occurs in it. 'Pradeśopi Brahmaṇaḥ Sārūpya-manatikrāntaścāvikalpyaśca' (V.V.V., 34). It asserts that even a part (pradeśa) of Brahman is essentially identical with it and cannot be fully determined.

The reason that has been given above, is an epistemic

1. V.V.V., 33.

reason. There is a metaphysical reason also. It may be stated as follows:—

There are three distinct, though allied, views of action (kriyā) in the Śaiva philosophy of Kashmir. (I) As an aspect of the Ultimate metaphysical principle. As such it is the power, which is responsible for the manifestation of the entire variety that we find in the objective world in temporal and spatial order. As such it is called Kriyāśakti. It is in itself above temporal limitation and, therefore, it is not successive.

(II) As a concept. As such it is a unity in multiplicity. It is based on the recognition of identity in the midst of successive differences. For instance, we see a certain body such as that of X associated with a number of spatial points in temporal succession. It is looked upon as different at each moment, because of its relation to different spatial points. But still it is recognised to be the same body of X. Action, therefore, is a concept which is due to the unification by the determinative mind of a number of successively perceived facts into unity; because of recognition of the element of identity in all.

(III) As an external series of phenomena, on which the concept of action is based. Kashmir Śaivaism is not subjectivism. It admits that there are things external to the individual mind, such as stimulate the mind through senses or rather supply the basis for concepts that the mind forms. They are the manifestations of the Absolute Free Will. They have their being in the universal Will before their manifestation.

Thus, when a series of momentary phenomena is manifested in temporal succession (Kālakrama) so that the

being of one member of the series means the not-being of what comes immediately before it, but still essential identity of all the members of the series is recognisable inspite of differences, it forms the phenomenal basis of the concept of action. It is called Laukikī Kriyā.

The *Śaiva* view, in brief, is that the succession, which is the chief characteristic of action, as an external fact, depends on variety, consisting in the being of one and the not-being of another, and that the being and the not-being are the manifestations of the Free Will, which manifests the variety of manifestations. These manifestations are essentially identical with that which manifests them, exactly as the creations of a dream are with the dreaming subject. They are, therefore, essentially of the nature of consciousness and 'free' (Svatantra). Hence the talk of action, which presupposes freedom (Svātantrya) in that which acts, is not unreasonable in relation to even 'jar' (Ghaṭa) from the point of view of the Śaivaism, if we remember that the root of all manifestations is the Free Will and that the manifested is essentially identical with its root and, therefore, is free. Thus, on the basis of the Śaiva metaphysical principle, Mahima Bhaṭṭa holds that whatever may be the basis of knowledge of derivation, the reason for the use of a noun to signify a particular object is the action only[1] which is nothing but 'attaining the characteristic being' 'Sattāsādana-lakṣaṇā'.

Accordingly he suggests that to all nouns, standing for a standard of comparison, the affix 'Kvip' is to be affixed, not in the sense of 'acting like' (Upamānādācāre), according to 'Sarvaprātipadikebhyaḥ kvib vā vaktavyaḥ', but in the sense of simple action of 'attaining being', while the noun

1. V. V. 34.

is to be understood to stand for an 'agent' (Kartā) and not for a standard of comparison. For, it is this meaning which is directly apprehended, while the other, namely, 'acting like', is got through implication. For instance, in the case of "Aśvati bāleyaḥ" the meaning, that is directly apprehended, is that the ass attains the characteristic being of a horse; and then through implication the meaning that he acts like a horse is got for the simple reason that one whose action is not similar cannot attain the characteristic being.

In this context Mahima Bhaṭṭa again refers to the Śaiva metaphysical doctrine[1] to explain how we can talk of action in relation to the insentient object and asserts that we do it because the insentients also are the manifestations of the Free Will and hence, being essentially identical with it, are 'Free' 'Svatantra' and, therefore, are doers (Kartā).

In this connection he quotes the view of Pāṇini also, which implies that even the insentients act, 'attain being'. For, how otherwise could he assert the meaning of the root Gaḍi' to be a part of the face (Gaḍi vadanaikadeśe)?

(III) His Admission of Three Means of Knowledge.

He admits only three means of right knowledge (Pramāṇa): (I) Direct perception (Pratyakṣa) (II) Inference (Anumāna) (III) Verbal testimony (Śabda). Other means of knowledge such as Analogy[2] (Upamāna) and implication (Arthāpatti) he includes in the inference. For, the mental grasp of one thing at the sight of another can be logically admitted in those cases only in which there is invariable concomitance of the two: otherwise there will be no reason why any other thing than that which can rightly be admitted to be apprehensible, should not be grasped at the sight

1. V. V. 35. 2. V. V. 78-9.

of any one. And whatever is known because of invariable concomitance or any other kind of relationship is nothing but inferred.

He refutes the view of the Mīmāṁsaka that Arthāpatti is an independent means of knowledge. While discussing how do we get the meaning 'shows' from the use of the word 'Vadati' in 'Kṛśāṅgyāḥ santāpam vadati visinīpatra śayanam,' he refers to the explanation that can be offered in the light of the philosophy of Mīmāṁsā as follows:—

"If it be said that the use of the word 'Vadati' cannot be explained in any other way than through the assumption that it implies the action of showing, which is similar to that for which 'Vadati' stands".

And he refutes it by asserting that if it be admitted that the meaning 'shows' figures in consciousness, because otherwise the use of the word 'Vadati' cannot be justified, then the meaning 'shows' is nothing but inferable. For, Arthāpatti[1] is included in inference.

Hence in this case as well as in that of 'Gaurbāhīkaḥ', where the identification of the two cannot be explained otherwise than through the assumption that the similarity of 'Bāhīka' with 'Gauḥ' is implied, the non-conventional meaning is got through inference only.

This view of the number of means of right knowledge (Pramāṇa) is different from that of the Vaiśeṣika. The Vaiśeṣika does not recognise the[2] verbal testimony (Śabda) to be an independent means of knowledge. It brings Śabda under inference. The validity of the scriptural statements, according to it, is an inference from the authoritative character of the speaker. But Mahima Bhaṭṭa recognises Śabda to be an independent means of knowledge.

1. V. V. 112. 2. V. D. 168-9.

This view is also distinct from that of the Nyāya.[1] For, while the Nyāya accepts Upamāna to be an independent means of knowledge, Mahima Bhaṭṭa does not. His view of the number of the means of right knowledge is the typical Kashmir Śaiva view, as presented by Utpalācārya in his Īśvarapratyabhijñā in the course of his exposition of Prāmāṇa. (I. P. V. Vol. II. 74-84).

(IV). His Reference to the Causal Theory of Kashmir Śaivaism

Mahima attempts to refute the theory of the Illuminative power (Dyotakatva) of words. And when the question 'what about the illuminative power (Dyotakatva, or Vyañjakatva) of prefixes, like 'Pra' in such words as Prāptam' is raised, he replies just in the same way as that in which he replies to a similar question about the suggestive power of words. He asserts that the prefixes are said to be illuminators (Dyotaka) in the secondary sense of the word.

He refutes the view that the roots stand for action in general (Kriyāsāmānyavacanaḥ), according to which every particular action of cooking is the meaning of the root 'pac' and the prefixes 'Pra' etc. are simply illuminators of a particular meaning and not its signifiers (Vācaka). He asserts that if the exponent of the view of the Dyotakatva of prefixes were to obstinately stick to his position, he will be landed into the difficulty of having to deny the relation of substance and attribute. For, if all particulars be supposed to be included within a universal, for which a word stands and under which they are subsumed, and accordingly any expression that is used to arouse the consciousness of a particular be not 'Vācaka' but only Dyotaka, the word blue, which is used to arouse the cons-

1. N. S., 11

ciousness of a lotus of a particular colour, should be looked upon as Dyotaka.

In this context he refers to the causal theory of Kashmir Śaivaism. In order to strengthen his view that the prefixes are not Dyotaka in the primary sense of the word, he asserts that if it be admitted that every word, that refers to what already exists, is only a Dyotaka and not Vācaka, no word would be Vācaka: for, every thing, for which a word may stand, is within the Universal Consciousness and, therefore, has being[1] (Sattva). Hence all words would have to be admitted to be Dyotaka. For, according to the monistic Śaiva metaphysical theory of manifestation (Ābhāsavāda) every object of experience is simply a manifestation of what is already within the universal consciousness and when a thing is said to have been effected, the statement does not mean anything more than that what was within the Universal Consciousness, has emerged to the objectivity of both the internal and external senses. (Sāntarviparivartinaḥ ubhayendriya-vedyatvam. I. P. V., Vol II, 140).

It is, therefore, wrong to think that Mahima Bhaṭṭa is a follower of the Nyāya, simply because he very frequently employs the logical technique and because he is the exponent of the inferential theory of æsthetics. For, Kashmir Śaivaism also has a logical technique connected with the inference, which includes the Buddhistic and the Nyāya technique. The four points discussed above reveal him to be a follower of the Śaiva school of Kashmir.

His theory of æsthetics.

He is a follower of Śrīśaṅkuka and upholds the

1. V. V. 131.

inferential theory of aesthetics. He holds that the relation between the situation (Vibhāva) and the basic mental state (Sthāyin) is that of cause and effect. The difference, however, between the cause and the effect at the empirical level and those at the æsthetic level, is that in the former case the cause is real, but in the latter case it is a mere artistic imitation of the real. Accordingly the basic mental state, which is inferred from an imitatively presented cause, is not the real but only a reflection of[1] it. For, the inference of the real effect from an unreal cause is illogical. And he points out that it is to emphasise the unreality and imitative nature of the cause and the effect in the context of æsthetics that they are given different names, such as Vibhāva, Anubhāva, Vyabhicāribhāva and Sthāyibhāva. Thus, he asserts that there is a succession not only in the experience of the suggested meaning from the conventional, but also in the experience of a Sthāyin from a Vibhāva; because in both the cases an æsthete infers the one from the other, because of the causal relation between them.

Charm in Poetic Presentation.

Following the authority of his predecessors, like Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Ānanda Vardhana, he asserts that poetic language is capable of adding a charm to what is directly perceptible or inferable, so that an empirical fact does not give so much delight to an æsthete when it is directly present as it does when it is poetically presented; and further, that a mere descriptive presentation in poetic language also is not so charming to the æsthete as a presentation which simply leads to the inference of the central fact of the presentation.

---

1. V. V. 79.

His conception of Rasa as a reflection of a Sthāyin.

He holds that a Sthāyin can come in a poetic composition either as a persisting or as a transient emotion. He points out that the definitions of Sthāyins, as given in the 7th chapter of the Nāṭya Śāstra, called the Bhāvādhyāya, give the definitions of the Sthāyins appearing as the Vyabhicārins. For, otherwise their definitions are meaningless. For, Rasa is essentially nothing else than an imitation of a Sthāyin and, therefore, the definitions of the essential nature of the Sthāyins can be known from the definitions of the various Rasas; because the Rasas are nothing but reflections of the Sthāyins[1].

His answers to the objections against the inferential theory of Æsthetics.

(I) He attempts to answer the objection of the Dhvanivādin that in the Æsthetic experience the basic mental state is experienced not in isolation or succession from the situation, the mimetic changes and the transient emotion, but simultaneously and in union with them: how can then the theory of inference and, therefore, of the succession in the experience of the different constituents of Rasa be maintained?

He denies the simultaneity in the experience of the situation etc. and the basic mental state. He asserts that the relation between them is that of cause and effect; that the one is inferred from the other; that the idea of simultaneousness in the experience of all is erroneous.

(II) And to the objection "how can there be a pleasant experience of the inferred basic mental state at the æsthetic level; because a similar state of mind is not experienced as

1. V.V.72.

such when it is inferred at the empirical level ?" he replies as follows :—

What are called Vibhāva etc. in the context of æsthetics are distinct from what are known as cause etc. at the empirical level. The latter are real; but the former are mere products of arts. The latter are to be met with at the empirical level but the former are experienced at the æsthetic level only. They are essentially different from one another and have their distinct spheres. From the situation, which is a product of an art and, therefore, unreal, the basic mental state that is inferred may be spoken of as unreal. But because the æsthete is free from practical attitude, he does not proceed to ascertain the true nature of the inferred i.e. whether it is real or unreal.[1] For, such an effort is altogether useless from the æsthetic point of view. It is just to emphasise this distinction of the inference at the æsthetic level from that at the empirical that the inferred is called Pratīyamāna or Gamya rather than Anumīyamāna or Anumeya. Mahima Bhaṭṭa, accordingly asserts that æsthetic experience is nothing but the consciousness of a basic mental state that shines in an æsthete in consequence of the apprehension of the situation etc. (This point has been refuted by Abhinava in the course of refutation of the inferential theory of æsthetics, propounded by Śrī Śaṅkuka). He points out that the basic mental state (Sthāyin), which is inferred from a situation that is a product of art, is experienced to be pleasant, because it is inferred from a cause, which is essentially different in its nature from that with which we meet at the empirical level and the basic mental state inferred from which is unpleasant. He says that the pleasantness of the basic mental state at the æsthetic level is a fact of experience which cannot be questioned[2].

1. V.V.75. 2. V.V.74.

(III) The theory of imitation, as presented by Mahima Bhaṭṭa, implies that the æsthete experiences a basic mental state which is not real, inasmuch as it is inferred from the situation etc, which in themselves are not real but only artistic imitations of them: because from the unreal there can be the inference of the unreal only. The question, therefore, arises: "Does the æsthete know the basic mental state to be unreal?" To this the reply of Mahima Bhaṭṭa is 'No'. The æsthete does not know it to be unreal. The fact is that he does not know it to be either real or unreal. But then it may be asked "Is not the ignorance of the true nature of the presented a kind of error (Mithyā-jñāna)? And if so, how can it have the causal efficiency of bringing about the moral improvement of the spectator, which is the chief aim of dramatic presentation?" Mahima Bhaṭṭa replies that such an error in certain contexts has the causal efficiency. For instance, on the path of worship, the object of worship is not what the devotee thinks it to be and, therefore, his idea of the object of devotion is erroneous; yet this erroneous idea also has the causal efficiency of bringing about the spiritual improvement: just the same is the case with the error in the æsthetic experience[1].

His advance on Śrīśaṅkuka.

We know very little of what Śrīśaṅkuka wrote. Our main source of information about his inferential theory of Æsthetics is the reference to it by Abhinava in his Abhinava Bhāratī. From what we find there, it is not clear whether he recognised any distinct subjective condition of æsthetic experience or whether he recognised the inferential experience at the æsthetic level to be essentially non-empirical, though he asserts its unclassifiability and predominantly recognitive

1. V. V. Comm. 74.

nature. Mahima Bhaṭṭa seems to present an advance on Śrīśaṅkuka in so far as he (I) recognises a distinct subjective condition of the æsthetic experience, which, following Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, he calls 'Sahṛdayatva' and which alone makes æsthetic experience possible[1] and (II) draws a distinction between the inferential experience at the empirical and that at the aesthetic level. The latter is characterised by 'Camatkāra'. He recognises the æsthetic experience to be non-empirical (Alaukika). He seems to follow Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in his conception of the ultimate nature of the æsthetic experience, as is evident from his quoting from the Sahṛdaya Darpaṇa, wherein Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka has clearly defined Rasa. This verse is attributed by Abhinava in his Abhinava Bhāratī to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka[2].

His conception of Camatkāra.

Suppose a painting, that is put in thick darkness, is illumined by a flash-light. There can be no difference of opinion on this that from the sight of such a painting we experience a peculiar delight, the like of which we do not get if the same be put in the broad day-light. This peculiar delight Mahima Bhaṭṭa calls Camatkāra[3]. A similar delight, he holds, is experienced when we hear of something, that admits of direct linguistic presentation, presented in terms of inference.[4] It may be remembered that the conception of Camatkāra, as presented by Abhinava in the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī, is different. (Vide Chapter II).

The background of the theory of Meaning.

The theory of Meaning in India was originally developed in the context of the Philosophy of Grammar. The well recognised work on it, is the Vākyapadīyam of Bhartṛhari. But Bhartṛhari himself declares that what he presents is

1. V. V. 66. 2. A. Bh. 279. 3. V. V. V., 53. 4. V. V. 74.

based on an ancient tradition. He traces the tradition back to Pāṇini. He refers to a work, covering one lakh of Granthas, written by Vyāḍi, to expound the system of Pāṇini[1]. This work, however, was lost due to the neglect of it by the students of Grammar, because of its big size. Patañjali, therefore, in order that the tradition of 'Vyākaraṇa Smṛti' may not be broken, wrote his Mahābhāṣya, which closely followed the work of Vyāḍi. The followers of Patañjali, however, lost touch with it. The Mahābhāṣya, therefore, remained only in a book in South India. Thus again the tradition of the system of Grammar was lost.

Sometime later a Brahamarākṣasa brought the original Vyākaraṇāgama, written by Rāvaṇa, from a place in Triliṅga in the mountain Trikūṭa, to Candrācārya and Vasurāta, who, after properly understanding it, expounded it in many ways to his pupils. Vasurāta, the teacher of Bhartṛhari, wrote a digest of the said Vyākaraṇāgama. Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīyam is based on the same. It consists of three chapters (I) Brahmakāṇḍa (II) Vākyakāṇḍa and (III) Padakāṇḍa.

The study of Grammar, both as a science and as a system of philosophy, was very popular in Kashmir from a very early time. Kalhaṇa in his Rājataraṅgiṇī (I, 176) says that the study of the Mahābhāṣya was popularised in Kashmir by Abhimanyu (Circa 336 B. C.) Puṇyarāja in his commentary refers to the digest of the second chapter of the Vākyapadīyam, written by Rājānaka Śūravarman[2]. Somānanda criticises Bhartṛhari in his Śiva Dṛṣṭi. Ānanda Vardhana was inspired in his conception of Dhvani by the Sphoṭavāda of the Philosophy of Grammar. Works of Abhinavagupta and Mahima Bhaṭṭa are full of quotations from the Vākyapadīyam.

1. V. P. 283. 2. V. P. Comm., 291.

Thus, it was because of the thorough familiarity of the Kashmir thinkers with the philosophy of grammar that the theory of Meaning developed in its various aspects primarily in their hands.

MAHIMA'S APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF MEANING.

He approches the problem of Meaning very much like Bhartṛhari, with whom he is thoroughly familiar. Bhartṛhari divided Śabda broadly into two (I) Pada (word with a case or a personal termination) and (II) Vākya (Sentence), as is clearly indicated by his two chapters (I) Padakāṇḍa and (II) Vākyakāṇḍa. Mahima Bhaṭṭa accepts this division and quotes Bhartṛhari in support of his conception of Vākya[1]. He follows Bhartṛhari in the division of the meaning into two types, but with slight modification. Bhartṛhari divided the meaning into two (I) Primary (Mukhya) and (II) Secondary (Gauṇa). Mahima Bhaṭṭa substitutes 'Gauṇa' by 'Anumeya[2], which has wider implication so as to include the meaning which is ordinarily called 'Secondary'. Bhartṛhari did not recognise the Vyaṅgya 'the suggestible' as a separate type of meaning: and Mahima Bhaṭṭa not only does not recognise it but has also devoted one third of his work to refute the view of Ānanda Vardhana, who asserted the independent being of Dhvani. He asserts that the meaning of a word is always primary: because it has no parts which can be split up into the premises and the conclusion. But the meaning of a sentence is both, primary and inferable[3].

HIS DIVISION OF WORDS.

From a very early time words have been classified differently. Thus, some divided them into two and others into four, five or six classes. Pāṇini divided them into two

1. V. V. 38. 2. V. V., 39. 3. V. V. V., 40.

classes according as they end in the case or the personal terminations (Suptiṅantam padam 1-4-14.). Yāska[1] and Patañjali[2] advocate the division into four. Durgācārya refers to the division into six also in his commentary on the Nirukta.[3] But Mahima Bhaṭṭa divides them into five (I) noun (II) verb (III) upasarga (IV) nipāta and (V) karmapravacanīya. Although the last three possess the common characteristic of not signifying an accomplished fact[4], yet, because of their functional difference as well as of the difference of their position in a sentence, they are classified separately. He holds that the nouns are of four types, because the reasons why different nouns are used for different objects are just four. A noun may be used for an object (I) because it stands for the genus under which the object is subsumed (II) because it represents a quality (III) because it denotes a function or (IV) because it signifies a substance. (I) Ḍittha (II) Śukla (III) Pācaka and (IV) Daṇḍin are respectively the instances of the four types. He differs from the Vaiyākaraṇas in so far as he holds 'Dandin' to be a 'Dravyaśabda'[5] but the latter look upon it as 'Guṇaśabda'.

His reference to and rejection of the view that function is the basis of the use of a noun for an object.

While discussing the various reasons for the use of nouns for different objects, he cites a view, according to which function[6] alone is the basis of the use of nouns for objects. We have briefly stated this view in an earlier section "His reference to the Śaiva theory of Abhāsavāda".

It is elaborated by Mahima Bhaṭṭa as follows:—

A noun such as 'ghaṭa', signifies an object, for no

1. N. 8. 2. M. B. 39. 3. N. (Comm) 8.
4. V. V. 37. 5. V. V V. 22. 6. V. V. 23.

other reason than that the object does the action for which the root, from which the noun is derived, stands. It is wrong to assert that the reason why an object is signified by a particular noun is that the object belongs to the genus, for which the noun stands. For, genus has no independent being; it is invariably concomitant with the action. Though one may admit the genus to have an independent being and to exist in an object even though the object may not be capable of performing the characteristic function, yet the object would not be signified by the word, which 'signifies' an action. For, in that case non-performance of the action being common to all other objects, there will be no reason why the word should not apply to others. No one uses the word 'Pācaka' for one who does not cook. Hence it has to be admitted that the genus 'ghaṭa' is nothing but the characteristic function, for which the word stands, and, therefore, function of the object alone is the basis of the use of the expression for it.

The aforesaid view of the functional basis of the use of a noun for an object is distinguished from that of the Vaiyākaraṇas. For, although the latter derive the nouns from roots, yet they do not recognise function to be the basis of the use of a noun for an object. The Vaiyākaraṇas, as the very word implies, are concerned with the analysis of words into roots and affixes. They[1] are not concerned with the reason why a noun is used to signify an object. For, the Pravṛttinimitta is distinct from the Vyutpattinimitta. Thus, according to the Vaiyākaraṇas, the action of a thing is the reason why the word, that stands for it, is derived from a particular root.

1. V. V, 25.

And because the nouns are derived from the roots, therefore, the affix 'Ktvā' in 'Vipacya ghaṭo bhavati'[1]. (which indicates that the action, indicated by the root to which 'Ktvā' is added precedes another which is subsequently mentioned) indicates the precedence of the action, indicated by the root to which 'Ktvā is added, in relation to the action, indicated by the root from which the noun 'ghaṭa' is derived and not in relation to the verb 'to be' (bhavati), just as in the case of 'adhiśritya pācako bhavati'. The verb 'to be' is not necessarily always directly mentioned; very often it is undersood, because the objects necessarily have a being. But in neither case the precedence of the action indicated by the root, to which Ktvā is affixed, is in relation to it. For, the verb to be is external and, therefore, if the precedence be related to it, the meaning would become absurd. For instance, in the case of 'Śrutvāpi nāma badhirah' if we hold the precedence of the action of hearing to be in relation to the verb 'to be', the meaning would be absurd; because the act of being is not subsequent to that of hearing but simultaneous with it.

When, however, there are many actions, indicated by many nouns, the precedence of the action, indicated by the preceding, to that which is indicated by the succeeding has to be admitted; because in all cases the same affix, indicative of an agent, is used, e.g. 'Here there are many actions such as' "Vipacana ghaṭana and bhavana".

In some cases, because the action appears in the guise of a noun inasmuch as the word indicative of it is derived from a root with a Kṛdanta affix and, therefore, appears as an attribute of an agent, there arises the illusion of its connection with another agent. For instance in 'Śiśira-

1. V. V., 25-7.

kālamapāsya' etc., although the precedence of the action, indicated by 'Apāsya'[1] is in relation to 'Harasya', yet Mallinātha has presented it to be in relation to the action of being, which, according to him, is understood here.

Very often an action is related to an agent as his possession and as such is expressed by a noun. Hence there arises the illusion that it is not an action, e. g. 'Smara saṁsmṛtya na śāntirasti me'. Here the action of enjoying peace appears in the guise of a noun. Hence there arises the error of not looking upon it as action. The fact, however, is that Ktvā in Saṁsmṛtya is in relation to Śam in Śānti.[2]

Mahima Bhaṭṭa does not accept the view discussed above. The way to its rejection had been paved by the Upādhivādins. His view, as we have already stated in the section "His reference to the Śaiva theory of Ābhāsavāda," is that the reason for the use of a noun, such as 'ghaṭa' for an object is the attaining or realisation of the being, which consists in the natural character, form or true constitution and which is non-different from it.

His division of Meaning.

The meaning is of two types: (I) primary and (II) inferable. The meaning of a word is settled either by the usage among the elders or by convention. That meaning, the association of which with a word is fixed by either of the two, is the primary. But the meaning, which is not connected with the word either by the usage or by convention, but to which the primary meaning is related as the premises to the conclusion, is the inferable. This is of two types according as it is inferred directly from the primary meaning or inferred from the inferred meaning. Mahima

1. V. V. 29. 2. V. V. V. 39.

Bhaṭṭa includes both the secondary and the suggestible meaning in the inferable, because the sphere of inference is wider than that of Lakṣaṇā or Vyañjakatva or both taken together.

From another point of view, namely, that of the nature of the inferred, he subdivides this meaning into three types (I) Vastu (II) Alaṅkāra and (III) Rasa etc[1]. Here he follows Ānanda Vardhana and like the latter asserts that though the first two admit of the direct presentation, the last is always inferable only.

A word in isolation has primary meaning only, because it has no parts which can be split up into premises and conclusion. Accordingly it has no inferable meaning. But a sentence has parts, which are related as subject and predicate and the elaboration thereof (Vidhyanuvāda-bhāvena) : and what is predicated may be such as may or may not need the support of reason. Thus, the meaning of a sentence is of two types according as what is predicated need or need not be proved.[2]

Therefore, when the predicate is such as does not need the support of reason, the elaboration is simply a representation of matter of fact, e g. 'astyuttarasyām'. But when what is predicated is such as needs the support of reason, it becomes the point to be proved ; and the elaboration assumes the form of proof. The consciousness of the relation between premises and conclusion depends upon the knowledge of the invariable concomitance of the two.

One point has to be clearly understood in this connection, that is, the distinction between 'upapādana[3]', and 'anumāna'. Upapādana in this context is not inference, because here the reason does not arouse the consciousness

1. V. V. 39. 2. V. V. 40. 3. V. V. V. 40.

of something that is not already known. But it simply corroborates what is already known, like the Arthāntara nyāsa, as defined by Udbhaṭa. The Anumāna (inference), however, as conceived by Mahima Bhaṭṭa, is different from it. It is very much like what Udbhaṭa has called Kāvyahetu i.e. here what enters into consciousness in consequence of hearing a statement serves as a reason for the remembrance or inference of something else.[1] The relation, however, of premises and conclusion (Sādhyasādhanabhāva) between the parts of the meaning of the sentence is common to both the cases.

ANUMEYĀRTHA.

The inferable meaning is of two types : (1) Directly inferable (Anumeyārtha) and (2) Indirectly inferable, i. e. inferable from a meaning that is itself inferred (Anumitānumeyārtha), as for instance, when from the transient emotion, which is inferred from the presentation of the situation and the mimetic changes, the basic mental state is inferable, e. g. 'Patyuḥ śiraścandrakalām' or 'Evaṁvādini tatrarṣau'.

HIS CONCEPTION OF KĀVYA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CRITICISM OF BHAṬṬA TAUTA'S DEFINITION OF IT.

Bhaṭṭa Tauta, Abhinava's teacher in dramaturgy, wrote a work on poetics, the Kāvya Kautuka, of which we know from Abhinava's reference in the course of his discussion on Śānta Rasa in the Locana. Therein Bhaṭṭa Tauta defined Kāvya as 'an activity of a poet', (Tasya karma smṛtaṁ kāvyam). Mahima Bhaṭṭa does not accept the definition[2]. He holds that not any activity of a poet but only that which is concerned with such a presentation of the

1. K. S. 75. 2. V.V.V. 95

situation etc. as 'suggests' the Rasa is Kāvya. He elaborates this point as follows :—

Kāvya instructs people what to do and what not to do, exactly as does the Śāstra. Therefore, its aim is the same as that of the Śāstra. The two are only different means to the same end. Kāvya is meant for those, who are intellectually incapable of understanding the difficult Śāstras.

Kāvya is of two types (I) presentable on the stage (II) unpresentable on the stage.[1] The former directly presents the well-known deeds, which are objects of injunction or prohibition, according as they are associated with the hero or the adversary, through imitation. It is meant for the moral instruction of those who are entirely incapable of understanding the Śāstras and for whom women, dance and music have very great charm. Such persons have to be given moral instruction by first presenting to them what they like most. It administers the bitter medicine of moral instruction to them as it were after giving some palatable sweet in the form of Rasa, dance and music. For, otherwise they will have no inclination for it, and, therefore, their receiving any instruction would be out of question.

The latter, that which is not to be presented on the stage, is meant for the moral instruction of the prosperous, such as the princes etc., who have tender intellect and are averse to hearing the Śāstra.

Therefore, he who desires that the poetic composition should serve the end for which it is meant, should admit that the soul of poetry is Rasa ; because it is this that arouses the inclination for the Kāvya in those for the moral improvement of whom it is meant. In fact

1. V. V. 96.

the Dhvanivādin gives the poetic composition the name of Dhvani simply because it presents Rasa. The definition of Kāvya, therefore, as an activity of a poet is wrong.

His Conception of Gamyagamakabhāva.

There is usually a perceptible succession in the apprehension of premises and conclusion. It is clearly perceptible when they are presented in a sentence. It is also clearly perceptible in those cases where the inferable is either a situation or a figure of speech. But it is not clearly perceptible in those cases where the inferable is a Rasa. The relation in such cases is not that of reason and conclusion but that of the illuminator and the illuminable (Gamyagamakabhāva). The simultaneousness in the experience of both the illuminator and the illuminable in these cases is an error. For, logical analysis of the experience reveals the succession in it. As in the case of the theory of Dhvani, the relation of the suggestive and the suggestible is based on this error of thinking the two experiences to be simultaneous, the theory is erroneous[1].

Mahima Bhaṭṭa has no objection to the use of the word Dhvani for Anumitānumeyārtha, provided it is used in the secondary sense with the purpose of indicating that this meaning produces Camatkāra (æsthetic experience) in the æsthete.

Ānanda Vardhana's points of view.

Ānanda Vardhana speaks from two points of view (I) logical and (II) æsthetic. While speaking from the former point of view he uses such language as justifies the attribution of the theory of inference to him. And

1. V.V. 53.

Mahima Bhaṭṭa cites such passages in corroboration of his theory of inference. But Ānanda Vardhana had fully realised the distinction of the æsthetic experience from the logical. He knew that in æsthetic experience there is no logical process from the premises to the conclusion; that æsthetic experience is free from temporal and spatial relations and that, therefore, no consciousness of any logical category is involved in it. On this point there is complete agreement between him and some of the Western æstheticians like Hegel.

His criticism of the theory of Dhvani.

In his Vyakti Viveka, Mahima Bhaṭṭa attempts a logical analysis of the suggested meaning (Dhvani), accepted by Ānanda Vardhana and his great followers, like Abhinavagupta. Ānanda Vardhana recognised this meaning as distinct from all other meanings such as the primary, the secondary and the contextual, for the primary reason that it is characterised by its figuring in the consciousness of the æsthete without the apprehension of any succession from the primary. Mahima Bhaṭṭa's criticism is primarily directed against this basis of assumption. He asserts that logically the succession from the primary to the suggested is undeniable. The consciousness, therefore, of the simultaneousness in the grasp of the two meanings is an error. Hence the theory of Dhvani is erroneous.

Ānanda Vardhana uses the word Dhvani, as has been shown in the preceding chapter, for (I) conventional symbol, the articulate sound that suggests the suggestible, (II) conventional meaning that suggests the suggestible, (III) the power of word to convey the suggestible meaning, (IV) the uggestible meaning itself and (V) the poetic work contain-

ing the suggestible meaning. Mahima Bhaṭṭa attempts to show that it is wrong to use the word Dhvani in any one of the senses, given above : firstly because the words have no other power than to convey the conventional meanings: they, therefore, cannot suggest the suggestible : secondly because there is no suggestible meaning in the primary sense of the word, therefore, it is absurd to talk of the conventional meaning as suggestive of the suggestible: thirdly because the conception of Dhvani as a power of word (Abhivyakti) is illogical, therefore, to say that the words suggest the suggestible is meaningless: fourthly because there is no suggestible meaning : and fifthly because the poetic works do not admit of particularisation in terms of Dhvani. We will elaborate these points as we proceed.

(I) His refutation of other powers of word than the conventional.

Mahima Bhaṭṭa holds that words have only one power, that of arousing the conventional meaning ; accordingly they have only one function. Other functions, such as that of arousing the suggested, or more correctly, the inferred meaning, belong to the meaning only and not to the word. Words cannot be spoken of as possessing many powers. For, the powers, which have a common substratum, are independent of one another as well as of the law of succession in the discharge of their functions, e. g. the powers of fire to burn and to illumine. But many powers, which are admitted by Ānanda Vardhana and his followers to belong to words, are not seen to so discharge their functions, nor are they admitted to be capable of doing so by them; because consistently and regularly other powers are seen to function only after the power to arouse the conventional meaning. Hence the substratum of other powers has to

be admitted to be other than the word only.[1] As the meaning is of two types only so there must be only two powers to arouse them: and as the one is accepted to belong to word only, the other must necessarily belong to the conventional meaning.[2] Further, because there are only two powers (I) to arouse the conventional meaning (II) to lead to the inference, other powers, namely, Lakṣaṇā and Tātparya, therefore, must be included in the power to lead to inference. We will show in the following sections how Mahima Bhaṭṭa justifies their inclusion in the power of meaning to lead to inference.

(a) His Criticism of Lakṣaṇā.

Mahima Bhaṭṭa includes the secondary meaning (Gauṇa or Lākṣaṇika Artha) in the inferable (Anumeya). Accordingly he denies the second power of words, technically called Lakṣaṇā. He explains the secondary meaning in terms of his inferential theory of meaning. He asserts that in an instance like "This Punjabi is a bull (Gaurbāhīkaḥ)" the identity of the meaning of the word 'bull' with that of 'this Punjabi' is against the fact of experience. But just because the identity of the two is contradictory to all experience and is not possible otherwise than through the assumption of the speaker's intention to imply similarity of one with the other in some aspect; it leads to the inference of the meaning that the Punjabi resembles a bull in some aspect. For, no man, who has not lost all sanity[3], would ever anywhere in any way talk of the identity of the two, between which he sees no similarity whatsoever. Hence the hearer, who is thoroughly familiar with the personality of the speaker, is justified in inferring similarity only as the cause of attribution of

1. V. V. 109. 2. V. V. 110. 3. V. V. 110.

identity to the two and not in looking upon them as truly identical.

The identity shines in consciousness just for a moment only as the convential meanings of the expressions shine in the consciousness of the hearer when he hears them. But the process of knowing cannot end with this; because it is contradicted by the fact of experience. The use of such expressions is, therefore, the cause of the rise of consciousness of similarity. And the purpose of such a use of expressions is to arouse quickly the consciousness of 'stupidity' etc. (jāḍya) as attributes of the Punjabi. The use of a word in another meaning than the conventional, is a recognised way of conveying the secondary meaning. This is called 'Gauṇa' by some[1].

Similarly in 'The fact that the slim lady is lying on the leaves of lotus, tells that she is suffering from love-fever', the word 'tells' (Vadati) secondarily arouses the consciousness of 'shows' (Prakāśayati) through inference. For, inference is nothing but the rise of consciousness of another thing from that of what is directly given. It presupposes the knowledge of invariable concomitance of the two. And the consciousness of the meaning 'shows' arises from 'tells' in the manner of inference in the present case, because the two are connected as cause and effect and are known as invariably concomitant inasmuch as "to throw light" or "to illumine" is the well known effect of speech. The meaning "Illumines" cannot be spoken of as the conventional meaning of 'tells' because the convention does not recognise it and the two are not identical. It cannot be said that in the above instance there is the consciousness of the conven-

1. V. V. 110-11.

tional meaning only; because it is contradicted by the direct experience.[1]

Similarly from the expressions 'Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ' (Hamlet on the Gaṅgā) the meaning 'Hamlet on the bank of the Gaṅgā' is got through inference. For, the meaning 'a current of water', cannot reasonably be represented to be the substratum of a hamlet, because that is contradicted by the fact of experience. Hence from the word 'Gaṅgā' simply because its use cannot be explained in any other way than through the assumption that the meaning 'a current of water' has been identified with 'bank of the river' simply because of the relation of the two, and that the former implies the latter, which is capable of being a substratum of a hamlet, we get the meaning 'the bank of the Gaṅgā' through inference, because not only similarity but also relation of proximity is recognised to be a basis of identification.

The explanation of the rise of the secondary meaning, offered by those who admit the power of word to arouse the secondary meaning, is not sound. For, the word Gaṅgā exhausts its expressive power in giving rise to the meaning 'a current of water'. It knows nothing about 'bank of the Gaṅgā' etc. nor is it related to the same in any way. Hence it is incapable of giving rise to the secondary meaning.

The purpose of such a use of words in the present case is to arouse the ideas of holiness and coolness in association with the bank, on which the Gangā is superimposed. Hence this purpose is distinct from that of arousing the consciousness of similarity, as in the case of 'Gaurbāhīkaḥ'. But in

1. V. V. 112.

both the cases the consciousness of purpose arises in the hearer because of identification, which is due either to the relation of proximity or of similarity or something else[1].

Mahima Bhaṭṭa asserts that the consciousness of purpose, whether it be holiness and coolness as in the case of 'Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ' or mere similarity as in the case of 'Gaurbāhīkaḥ' arises through inference only. For, the two, purpose and identification, are known to be invariably concomitant from the ordinary experience. Hence he concludes that the admission of Vyakti is unnecessary to explain the rise of such a meaning.

But it may be asked here how does a word, which is associated with a certain fixed meaning through the convention, give rise to another meaning (secondary) in consciousness? The rise of a meaning that is not conventional must be due to some cause. Is not that cause the word itself? Mahima Bhaṭṭa's reply to it is that the word has the power of arousing the coventional meaning only. The arousal of the secondary meaning is beyond the power of the word. The rise of the secondary meaning, however, is not without a cause. That cause[2] is the entire set of circumstances, necessary in the rise of the secondary meaning, such as the knowledge of the true personality of the speaker etc. This set of circumstances he calls 'Liṅga' and accordingly what is known through it he calls 'Anumēyā'. He asserts that it is beyond the power of word to arouse the secondary meaning[3]; because the former has no connection with the latter. Hence consciousness of the secondary meaning does not spring from the consciousness of word.

---

1. V. V. 114. 2. V. V. 118. 3. V. V. 116.

(b) HIS CRITICISM OF THE TĀTPARYAŚAKTI OF WORDS.

Those who admit the Tātparyaśakti of words assert that the meaning of the words of a sentence is all that which is intended to be communicated through them by the speaker. Accordingly they maintain that when such a statement as "Eat poison, but do not eat at his house" is understood to mean, not enjoining eating of poison but simply warning the man against eating at a certain person's house; the meaning "Eating at his house is worse than eating poison" is not got through the conventional power of words; because convention does not associate such a meaning with the words used in the sentence. But it cannot be denied that the meaning, such as has been stated above, is got through them. This needs an explanation. The Tātparyaśaktivādins, therefore, admit the Tātparyaśakti of words as distinct from the Abhidhā to explain the rise of such meaning.

Mahima Bhaṭṭa admits only one power of word, namely, the conventional. He, therefore, criticises the Tātparyavādin as follows :—

In the case of the instance, cited above, the meaning "Eating at his house is worse than eating poison" is got through inference from the situation, in which the statement is addressed by a particular speaker to a particular hearer ; the situation, which is clearly pictured up in the minds of both[1].

(c). HIS CRITICISM OF ABHIVYAKTI.

The Dhvanivādins have accepted a distinct meaning, which they call Dhvani, primarily because they hold that the process, through which this meaning arises, is different from that which is involved in the rise of other meanings.

1. V. V. 121-2.

They have technically called it Abhivyakti, which is only another name for Dhvani in its implication as a process or function. They define the Abhivyakti as follows :—

Abhivyakti[1] consists in the arousing or the rise of the consciousness of the suggested meaning, whether it be real or unreal, simultaneously with the suggestive, without the intervention of memory and consequently the consciousness of any relation between them such as that of the premises and the conclusion.

He criticise this view as follows:—

Abhivyakti, becoming manifest, coming into being or coming to light of those which already exist, which are of the nature of being, is of three types.

(I) The effect exists in the cause as its capacity and, therefore, is imperceptible. When, therefore, it becomes manifest, comes to light, becomes perceptible, it is said to have become Abhivyakta. Thus, curd, for instance, potentially exists in milk and becomes manifest from it. This is according to the Satkāryavāda. The Asatkāryavādins, however, who do not admit the potential existence of the effect in the cause, say that curd is produced from milk.

(II) Suppose the effect has been manifested by the cause but is enveloped in darkness and, therefore, is imperceptible. It is said to have come to light, to become Abhivyakta, when it is illumined by a light such as that of a lamp and shines together with it, the light of course occupying a subordinate position to the illumined (Svarūpamprakāśayan).

(III) Suppose an object has been experienced before and exists in the mind in the form of residual traces. When

1. V. V. 76

the residual traces of such an object are revived because of either perception of another object, which is invariably concomitant with that experienced before, or because of hearing a word that stands for it, the object is said to have become manifest, 'Abhivyakta'. Thus, for instance, fire is said to become manifest (Abhivyakta) at the sight of smoke, which is invariably concomitant with it; or the cow and the like are said to become manifest from reflective imitative presentation thereof in the works of pictorial, plastic or poetic art.

But the Abhivyakti of that which has no real being is of one type only; e. g. that of rainbow, because of the rays of the sun. Mahima Bhatta asserts that the term 'Abhivyañgya' cannot be used for the suggestible meaning in the first two senses of the word: because that would imply that the suggested meaning is directly perceptible like curd or that it shines directly, simultaneously with the conventional, exactly as does jar with light. But that is impossible. As for the third sense, it is nothing more than[1] inference. It is not the sense which is attributed to the word 'Vyakti' by the Dhvanivādins. For, the consciousness of the suggested meaning from the conventional is not possible without the consciousness of the relation of invariable concomitance of the two. Otherwise the consciousness of the suggested meaning from the apprehension of the conventional should arise in all[2] persons irrespective of the fact whether they know the invariable concomitance of the two or not. Further, the consciousness of the suggested meaning is never simultaneous with that of the conventional but always in temporal sequence like that of fire from smoke. Hence the definition of Abhivyakti, as admitted by Ānananda Vardhana and his followers, is impossible.

1. V. V. 78. 2. V. V. 79.

Nor can it be said by the Dhvanivādin in his defence that his definition of Abhivyakti applies to Rasadhvani, wherein the experience of the situation etc. is simultaneous with that of the basic mental state; firstly because in that case the definition would not apply to Vastudhvani and Alaṅkāradhvani inasmuch as in these two cases admittedly there is temporal sequence in the consciousness of the suggested from the directly presented; and secondly because even in the case of Rasa the simultaneous apprehension of the situation etc. and the basic mental state is logically impossible[1].

(It may be pointed out here that the Dhvanivādin admits the importance of the knowledge of invariable concomitance of the two but asserts that it is not operative but potential in so far as it is in the form of residual trace).

Mahima Bhaṭṭa points out that the illuminator is of two types. (I) It is as if it were an attribute of that which it illumines (Upādhirūpaḥ) so that the illumined can be perceived only as enveloped in the illuminator, e.g. a jar can be perceived only as enveloped in the light. (II) It is independent (Svatantraḥ) in so far as it does not serve as a mere attribute of the illumined. The illumined is apprehended not simultaneously with the illuminator but in succession therefrom. Such an illuminator is nothing but sign (Liṅga) or reason (Hetu) : and what is known from it is nothing but inferred.

Now the Dhvanivādin cannot hold that his conception of the illuminator in the context of the theory of suggested meaning is that of the first type; because that would imply that, according to him, poetry is only that composition which arouses its meaning directly through convention[2].

1. V. V. 79. 2. V. V. V. 80,

Such an admission would defeat the very purpose, for which the conception of illuminator (Prakāśaka) is introduced in the theory of the suggested meaning. For, that would exclude all the compositions with the suggested meaning from the sphere of poetry.

And the other type of the illuminator is nothing but a sign (Liṅga). Therefore, the Dhvanivādin's definition[1] of Abhivyakti as 'Prakāśakena sahaikaviṣayatāpattiḥ' is untenable. Further, Ānanda Vardhana himself does not admit the figuring in consciousness of the primary meaning simultaneously with the suggested in all types of Dhvani; because he himself says :—

"Nahi vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicāriṇa eva Rasaḥ etc.[2]"

Now in order to get out of the defect of impossibility in the definition, if the advocate of Dhvani were to eliminate the idea[3] of simultaneous apprehension of the illuminator and the illumined (Prakāśaka and Prakāśya) from the definition of Dhvani, the definition would apply to inference also; because in the case of inference of fire from smoke there is the apprehension of fire through smoke, which occupies a subordinate position to fire, inasmuch as the former is only a means of knowing the latter.

But if it were said that the application of the definition to inference will be prevented by the idea of not-being (Asat) as an attribute of the suggested, because the fire is not a not-being, the definition would not apply to the analogical instance of lamp and jar. And if in order to keep the definition applicable to the instance, just mentioned, he were to eliminate the idea of not-being (Asat) from the definition, the definition would not apply to the

1. V. V. 80. 2. V. V. 80. 3. V. V. 81.

instance of rainbow; because it is not-being. If both the ideas of 'being' and 'not-being' were eliminated, it would be a definition of inference only. That is just what the critics of the theory want.

Further, the attribute of the illuminable, viz, 'being or not-being' is not logical: because it leaves nothing, to which the definition cannot apply. Furthermore, if that suggestive poetry alone be said to be Dhvani Kāvya, wherein the conventional meaning alone is suggestive, the definition would not apply to those poems wherein the suggested meaning itself becomes suggetive of another[1].

Dhvanivādin's position explained.

Very often Mahima Bhaṭṭa attributes a view to Ānanda Vardhana, though the latter does not hold it, and then criticises such a view at length. The definition of Abhivyakti, as has been stated by him and attributed to the Dhvanivādin, is a typical instance of this tendency. For, although Mahima Bhaṭṭa talks in detail of the six types of Abhivyakti; (five types being related to what has being and one type being related to what has no being but simply appears) yet, as has been pointed out by Ruyyaka, Dhvanivādin accepted it to be of only one type such as is related to what has being[2] and is based on the analogy of a lamp and a jar. And it is well recognised that an analogy is introduced to refer to just a particular point of similarily. Thus, the point that is tried to be explained by the Dhvanivādin by means of the analogy, under discussion, is that the experience of the suggested is never without that of the suggestive[3]. Hence the entire criticism of Mahima Bhaṭṭa in the context of the attributed definition of Abhivyakti is baseless.

1. V. V. 82. 2. V. V. V 76-7 3. V. V. V. 58-9 and 81.

TEN DEFECTS IN THE DEFINITION OF DHVANI KĀVYA.

Ānanda Vardhana defined Dhvani, as a poetic composition as follows:—

"Yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā tamarthamupasarjanīkṛtasvārthau.

Vyaṅktaḥ kāvyaviśeṣaḥ sa Dhvaniriti sūribhiḥ Kathitaḥ".

Mahima Bhaṭṭa points out ten defects in the definition of Dhvani Kāvya, as given by Ānanda Vardhana. According to him, hardly any word in the definition is correct. They may be enumerated as follows:—

(i) The adjunct of the meaning (Artha), namely, which subordinates itself to another, is useless.

(ii) Word (Śabda) ought not to be included in the definition.

(iii) The adjunct of 'word', namely, which reduces the 'meaning' to subordinate position is automatically redundant after the inclusion of what it qualifies has been pointed out to be erroneous.

(iv) The masculine gender in 'Tam' is unjustifiable.

(v) Dual in the predicate 'Vyaṅktaḥ' is wrong.

(vi) The use of the conjunction 'Vā' is indiscriminate.

(vii) The use of the root Vi-añj in the sense intended by the author makes the definition too wide in one respect and too narrow in another.

(viii) Through the word 'Dhvani' only another name is given to poetic compositions and, therefore, it is useless.

(ix) The assertion of particularity in a poetic composition (Kāvya viśeṣa) is baseless.

(x) The inclusion of the subject of the predicate 'Kathitaḥ' in the definition is useless.[1]

1. V. V. 104.

(I) CRITICISM OF THE ADJUNCT OF 'ARTHA'

The adjunct of meaning (Artha), namely, 'which subordinates itself to another' is useless. The usefulness of an adjunct in a definition lies in its making the definition so precise that it applies to the acknowledged instances only and excludes others from the sphere of its application. But the adjunct of meaning, mentioned above, has no delimiting value. For, whenever a meaning suggests another, it occupies a subordinate position; because it is a means of bringing the suggested to consciousness. And the means is always subordinate to the end.

It cannot be asserted by the author of the definition that the conventional meaning also occupies a predominant position in Samāsokti and Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya; the use of the adjunct, therefore, is that the definition does not apply to them. For, the predominance is of two kinds: (I) Due to the context; (II) Due to the predominant nature of the thing itself. And the predominance of the conventional meaning in Samāsokti (e.g. Uyoḍharāgeṇa) is due to the context and not to its own predominant nature; because independently of the context the conventional occupies only a subordinate position in relation to the suggested[1]; because the former is only a reason for the inference of the latter. Hence the predominance of the conventional, due to the context, even if it be admitted, is not sufficient justification for the use of the adjunct. Now if it were asserted that in the case of Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya the conventional meaning, because of its being charming, reduces the suggested meaning to a subordinate position, that also would not justify the use of adjunct. For, even in Guṇī-bhūtavyaṅgya, the conventional meaning does not necessarily always predominate on account of

1. V. V, 10-12

its charm. Mahima Bhaṭṭa asserts that in the so called Guṇībhūta vyaṅgya also the suggested meaning has the charm in some instances. Therefore, the adjunct remains useless[1].

DHVANIVĀDIN'S POSITION EXPLAINED

A meaning is represented to be 'subordinated', (Apradhānīkṛta) for the following three reasons :—

(i) because it is a means to arouse another meaning;

(ii) because it is less charming than the other (the suggested);

(iii) because it does not rest within itself and, therefore, does stand in relation of a helper to the charm of another.

Mahima Bhaṭṭa's objection is sound in so far as it is based on the first two reasons. But Dhvanikāra had the third in his mind. By the adjunct of 'meaning' (Artha) under discussion he wanted to exclude the Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya, where the conventional meaning is not subordinate in the sense that it does not stand to another in relation of a helper to its charm. Hence the use of the adjunct is perfectly justifiable[2].

HIS CRITCISM OF THE WORD 'ARTHA' IN THE DEFINITION OF DHVANI

He raises the question "what does the word 'Artha' mean in the verse 'yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā' ? Does it mean the conventional meaning only or both the conventional and the suggested ?" He points out the flaws in both the cases as follows :—

In the former case the definition would not apply to the well recognised instance 'Evaṁ vādini tatrārṣau':

1. V. V. V. 12. 2. V. V. V. 13.

because here Rati is suggested, not by the conventional meaning "With her face gone down", but by the sense of bashfulness that is suggested by the aforesaid conventional meaning. In the latter case the definition would become too wide and would apply even to those instances where it is merely a situation, and not a basic mental state, that is suggested through one, two or three situations which are themselves suggested. But such instances are not included within the sphere of the definition of Dhvani; because they are not recognised to have poetic beauty. For, poetic beauty is recognised only in those instances wherein the suggested meaning is aroused by either a transient emotion or a figurative presentation; and connoisseur alone is competent to declare a particular composition to be beautiful or otherwise. He cites the instances of the different types of the suggested meaning under discussion.

He also points out in this connection that Ānanda Vardhana does not consistently use the word 'Artha' in the sense of both the conventional and the suggested meaning. Although in the verse 'Arthaḥ sahṛdayaślāghyaḥ' he uses the word 'Artha' as signifying both the meanings, yet in the course of the interpretation of the words 'Tamartham' he definitely says that the word 'Artha' stands for the conventional meaning only 'Artho vācya viśeṣaḥ[1]'.

(II) CRITICISM OF THE USE OF THE WORD 'ŚABDA'

The word 'Śabda' ought not to be included in the definition[2]; because Śabda has no other function than that of conveying the primary meaning; and the primary meaning cannot be reduced to the subordinate position to words unless the words are mere imitations of the sounds, e. g. 'Tam.....Rāme śrīrnyasyatāmiti.'

1. V. V. 82. 2. V. V.. 13,

But it may be asked that if the imitation represents the sounds only of the words, how does the hearer get at the meanings of the words from their imitative presentation ? In reply to this Mahima Bhaṭṭa says that the words, which are the objects of imitation, are of two kinds : (1) meaningless and (2) meaningful. The imitative presentation of the words, which possess meanings, gives rise to the consciousness of the original words and thus it is the imitated (anukārya) and not the imitation that arouses the consciousness of the meaning[1]. As for the imitated words, they are separated from the rest of the words by the word 'iti' and, therefore, stand for the sounds only and not for the meaning.

As regards the words, which are not imitations, they stand for their meanings and, therefore, necessarily occupy a subordinate position, because they are used for arousing the meanings. And whatever is used for the sake of something else, occupies a subordinate position, just as a pitcher does to water, for fetching which it is used. For, otherwise the determination of the relation of the principal and the subordinate will have no rational basis.

Thus, Mahima Bhaṭṭa holds that the definition is impossible, (Asambhava) because the primary meaning can never occupy subordinate position to words.

Common criticism of the adjuncts of both the word and the meaning (Śabda and Artha) is that even if we accept the position of the Dhvanivādin that in the case of Gūṇībhūta vyaṅgya the conventional meaning dominates and, therefore, it is to be excluded from the sphere of application of the definition of Dhvani by the adjunct of Artha : similarly if word be accepted to have more power than one to arouse different types of meaning, there

1. V. V. 14-15.

will be the possibility of its subordinating the conventional meaning; the use of the adjunct would be a mere repetition of what is known from the fact that the conventional meaning and the word are used for arousing the suggested. Nor can it be said that the adjuncts clarify what is known through implication, because such a clarification also is a type of repetition[1].

Thus, according to Mahima Bhaṭṭa there can be no suggested meaning, which springs from a power of word, because word has no other power than that of arousing the conventional meaning. Therefore, there is no causal relation between word and suggested meaning. Hence to talk of Śabdaśaktyudbhava Dhvani and to illustrate it by such verse as 'Suvarṇapuṣpām' is to commit the logical fallacy of talking of the causal relation between the two where it does not exist.

(Asiddhasādhyasādhanadharmānugam)[2].

DHVANIVĀDIN'S POSITION EXPLAINED

Dhvanivādin admits more than one power of word to arouse different types of meaning. Therefore, according to him, there are cases in which the conventional meaning, that is aroused by a word, is subordinate to the suggested, which also is aroused by the same. Hence the adjunct is not useless[3].

(III) THE CRITICISM OF THE ADJUNCT OF 'ŚABDA' (GUṆĪKṚTĀRTHA)

According to Mahima Bhaṭṭa, 'word' has only one power, the conventional. Therefore, the explanation that has been given by Abhinava i. e. the word, that subordinates

1. V. V. 17. 2. V. V. 17 3. V. V. V. 18

the conventional meaning to the suggested, is absurd. Mahima Bhaṭṭa accordingly holds that the use of the adjunct brings to the definition the logical fallacy of the 'impossible' (Asambhava). Further, even if for the sake of argument the view of the Dhvanivādin, that word has more power than one, be accepted, the adjunct will still remain useless. For, what is said about the 'meaning' through its adjunct can be understood to hold good of the word also through implication[1].

(IV) Criticism of the masculine gender in the pronoun 'Tam'

A pronoun, as a rule, is used in the same gender as that of its antecedent. But in the verse under discussion there is no antecedent to which it refers. And if we take the context into consideration we find that the antecedent is in the neuter, e. g. 'Sarasvatī svādu tadarthavastu'. Mahima Bhaṭṭa, therefore, suggests that the antecedent should be put in the masculine e. g. 'Sarasvatī svādutamaṁ tamartham' and the masculine in the Kārikā may be retained[2].

Here it may be observed in the defence of Dhvanikāra that he has used two expressions for the suggested meaning, 'vastu' and 'artha'. In the preceding verse he has used the masculine 'Sorthaḥ' and following that he uses 'Tamartham' in the subsequent verse, which defines Dhvani.

(V) Criticism of the dual in 'Vyaṅktah'

If in the verse, which defines Dhvani, the word 'Vā' be admitted to have the sense of 'option' then the dual number

---

1. V. V.90 2. V. V. 91

in the predicate is indefensible. But the use of the dual has been defended by Abhinava in his Locana, Mahima Bhaṭṭa refers to this defence, but dismisses it with the convenient and very frequently used expression, 'erroneous[1]' (Bhramamūlam).

(VI) Criticism of the use of 'Vā'

In regard to the use of 'Vā' in the verse that defines Dhvani, Mahima Bhaṭṭa raises the question "Does the word 'Vā' mean 'option' or 'conjunction' ?" It cannot mean the former. For, it has already been established that word has only conventional power and not the suggestive. And even if for the sake of argument it be admitted that it has suggestive power also, the dual in the predicate 'Vyaṅktaḥ' is indefensible, because with the subjects, which are connected by 'Vā' in the sense of option, only singular is used, e. g. Śiraḥ Śvā kāko vā Drupadatanayo vā parimṛśet.

It cannot mean the latter (conjunction) also; because in that case all those instances in which the suggested meaning arises either through word alone or meaning alone, shall have to be excluded from the sphere of Dhvani, which is very unwelcome to the Dhvanivādin[2].

(VII) His criticism of the suggestive power of word indicated by 'Vi-añj' in the definition

The words have no power other than that of arousing the meanings which are associated with them by the convention. They, therefore, cannot arouse the suggested meaning. It cannot be established with reason that the

1, V. V. 90-1 2. V. V. 89-90.

words have the power, technically called Vyañjakattva; nor can we establish any other relation between the word and the suggested meaning to account for its rise from the word. And if meanings other than the conventional be supposed to be aroused by words without any fixed relation between them, it would be impossible to fix the limit of meaning; because there will be nothing to restrict. Nor can it be said that the relation between words and meanings (basic emotions) is natural, just as between a song of a particular type (geya) and an emotion. For[1], in that case, there will arise the possibility of the æsthetic experience in all, whether they know or do not know the meanings. Nor can it be said that the suggested meanings also are associated with the words through convention. For, the rise of the suggested meaning depends upon the conditions such as time, space, and the character and the mood of the speaker etc. which are not fixed and cannot be fixed by convention, and therefore, cannot be exhaustively stated[2]. We learn from experience that the same word, because of different conditions, gives rise to different meanings, e.g. the word Rāma in (i) Rāmosmi Sarvaṁ sahe and (ii) Rāmeṇa priyajīvitena. The conditional nature of the suggested meaning is accepted by Ānanda also. Hence it has to be admitted that it is the conventional meaning and not the word, which, because of the presence of certain conditions, gives rise to the suggested meaning. It is, therefore, wrong[3] or useless to use Vi-añj as the predicate of Śabda in the definition of Dhvani.

But it may be objected here that if the words have no power, technically called 'Vyañjakatva' how can we talk

1. V. V. 127-8 2. V. V. 128. 3. V. V. 129.

of 'Vyañjakatva' of the prefixes 'Pra' etc. in such words as 'Prāptam[1]'? We cannot talk of the meanings aroused by prefixes as conventional; because in that case there is no reason why there should be no 'Yaṅ' affixed to them, according to the rule of Pāṇini 'Ekāco halādeḥ' etc.

Mahima Bhaṭṭa replies to it as follows:—

He admits the Vyañjakatva of the prefixes 'Pra' etc., but says that the prefixes are Dyotaka, not in the primary sense of the word, but in the secondary. The purpose of the use of the word in the secondary sense is to convey the idea that the prefixes clarify the conventional meaning. And the cause of clarity of the conventional meaning in the consciousness of the hearer, is the simultaneous apprehension of both the substantive and the adjunct, because of their coming into consciousness with extreme quickness in succession and, therefore, of the succession remaining unnoticed[2].

(VIII) Criticism of the use of the word 'Dhvani' for poetic composition.

Ānanda Vardhana asserted that a poetic composition, in which both the words and their meanings mainly suggest the suggestible, is called Dhvani; because the relation between the suggestive words and meanings and the suggested Rasa is similar to that which exists between the consciousness of the sound of the last letter of a word, as affected by the residual traces of those of the previous ones, and that of the Śabda-sphoṭa. For, the relation between them is not that of succession but that of simultaneousness. Ānanda Vardhana, while making this assertion, had the Kārikā of

1. V. V. 129. 2. V. V. 131.

the Vākyapadīyam "Pratyayairanupākhyeyaiḥ" in his mind, as pointed by Abhinava in his Locana[1].

Mahima Bhaṭṭa criticises this by making a counter-assertion that not only there is succession in the consciousness of words and their primary meanings and that of the suggested meaning, but also in the consciousness of the sound of the last letter, affected by the residual traces of those of the preceding ones, and that of Śabda-sphoṭa. For, in the latter case also the relation of the two is that of the illuminator and the illumined, which is based on the causal relation.[2] For, the light is the means whereby the object is made to shine: and the end succeeds the means. This view seems to be supported by the text, because Bhartṛhari uses the word standing for the illuminator in the instrumental case and definitely uses the word 'prāakśite'. Mahima Bhaṭṭa, therefore, asserts that it is wrong to call poetic composition 'Dhvani'; because the simultaneity in the experience of the suggestive and the suggested, on the basis of which the poetic compositions are intended to be called Dhvani Kāvyas, is not possible. Nor is it possible in the case of the analogy of Dhvani and Sphoṭa. Further, the accepted general definition of Kāvya is that it has Rasa as its soul: accordingly there is no justification to speak of the particularity of Kāvya (Kāvyaviśeṣa). Therefore[3] to call the poetic composition (Kāvya) by the word Dhvani, is nothing more than calling the same thing by another name.

But it may be pointed out here that the Kārikā, quoted above, admits of an interpretation, which seems to support the view of Mahima Bhaṭṭa, only if it is taken out of the

1. Dh. L. 47. 2. V. V. 57. 3. V. V. 101.

context. We should, however, not forget the fact that there were different views about the relation of Dhvani and Sphoṭa, to which Bhartṛhari himself refers, e.g. "Sphoṭarūpāvibhāgena Dhvanergrahaṇamiṣyate Kaiścit". From this it is clear that there was a difference of opinion among Sphoṭavādins themselves as regards the simultaneousness or succession in the apprehension of Dhvani and Sphoṭa, on the analogy of which the theory of Dhvani is based. Mahima Bhaṭṭa followed the school, which held that the two are apprehended in succession.

(IX) His Criticism of Ānanda Vardhana's Conception of the Particular Kāvya. (Kāvyaviśeṣa)

He holds that Ānanda Vardhana's view that Dhvani is a particular Kāvya is untenable. For, according to the conception of Kāvya, as has been presented in the preceding section, no composition can be called a Kāvya unless it presents Rasa and we cannot ascribe particularity to Kāvya because of particularity of the same (Rasa).

(I) We cannot say that particularity belongs to a Kāvya because it presents a particular Rasa[1]. For, in that case the definition of Dhvani, would become too narrow so that it will apply to those compositions only, which present a particular Rasa or Rasas and would not apply to any composition, presenting any other Rasa.

(II) Nor can it be said that particularity of a poetic composition is constituted by the fact that it suggests Rasa and, therefore, is distinct from those which suggest either a situation (Vibhāva) or a figure of speech (Alaṅkāra). For, the suggested meaning is of three types, Vastu, Alaṅkāra and Rasādi. The reason may be, elaborated as follows :—

1. V.V. 97.

According to the view "Rasa is the soul of poetry", no composition, which does not present Rasa, can be spoken of as Kāvya. Therefore, a composition, however well may it be polished with the qualities of sound and meaning and however well may it be decked with the ornaments of figurative words and meanings, cannot be called Kāvya unless it presents Rasa. Therefore[1], a composition, which suggests Vastu or Alaṅkāra, is not Kāvya in the primary sense of the word. Hence it is absurd to talk of particularity in relation to it.

(III) Nor can the particularity be ascribed to Kāvya on the ground that in it a Rasa is suggested by a suggested situation or a suggested figure of speech. For, they are merely causes of the manifestation or coming into consciousness of Rasa. And it is illogical to ascribe particularity on the basis of the cause of manifestation (Abhivyaktihetu)as much as it is to ascribe particularity to the genius 'gau' on the basis of the calf of variegated colour[2].

(IV) And if the particularity be ascribed to Kāvya on the basis of the cause of manifestation of Rasa, it will mean that that poetic composition alone, in which a figure of speech or a situation or both are suggestive, can be called Kāvya and not that which presents Rasa independently of the said causes. Thus the definition of Dhvani will become too narrow. Further, it will apply to Prahelikā[3], in which the situation alone is suggested. Thus the definition would become too wide also. Hence the word Dhvani, should be used for all Kāvyas in general and not for any particular type of Kāvya. And Samāsokti and similar other figurative presentations also should not be excluded from the sphere of Dhvani. For, they also present Rasa. Further, the

1. V.V. 98. 2. V.V. 99. 3. V.V. 100.

suggested meaning should be admitted to be of two types only, (I) Vastu and (II) Alaṅkāra; because Rasa belongs to a different category from the other two. Rasa is the general concept of Kāvya, but Vastu and Alaṅkāra are the particulars, which are subsumed under it. Hence the former ought not to be classed with the latter.

(V) Nor can the particularity be ascribed to a poetic composition on the ground that it presents Rasa primarily[1]. For, Rasa cannot be spoken of as subordinate to or a constituent of any thing else. For the five reasons stated above, Kāvya in general ought to be maintained to be referred to by the word Dhvani but not any particular Kāvya, because we cannot ascribe particularity to Kāvya.

Dhvanivādin's position explained.

A definition is always given on the basis of well recognised illustrations of it. And we find two well recognised types of Kāvya: (I) the principal and (II) the subordinate. The principal is that in which the suggested meaning predominates. And the subordinate is that in which the suggested meaning occupies a subordinate position, as for instance in the case of Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya etc. Both of them have to be accepted to be Kāvyas, because they have been recognised as such from time immemorial. Hence Dhvanivādin talks of Kāvyaviśeṣa, in order that Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya etc. may not be called Dhvanikāvya. The existence of Kāvya, with the suggested meaning occupying a subordinate position to the primary, cannot be denied; because we do find Kāvyas, in which Rasa is either not very clearly presented or does not occupy the predominant position. It cannot be said that because Rasa is essentially that wherein the mind finds rest, therefore, it cannot be spoken of as subordinate. For, though Rasa in

1. V. V. 101.

itself is such as the opponent presents it to be, yet it is an undeniable fact that it does occupy a subordinate position to a more pervading Rasa. And Bharata admitted the fact that Rasa also occupies a subordinate position; because his conception of Rasa as persisting and transient is based upon such an admission[1].

(X) Criticism of the Use of the Subject of the Predicate 'Kathitah.'

The subject of the predicate 'Kathitaḥ' can be either general or particular. In either case it need not be mentioned. For, in the former case, as there can be no predicate without subject, it will be known through implication. In the latter case, the particular subject can be known from the context wherein a particular type of function of word and meaning, which is recognised by a particular set of poeticians, is under discussion. Hence the statement of the subject is redundant[2].

The Necessity of Inclusion of 'Abhidhā' in the Definition.

In this context Mahima Bhaṭṭa uses the word 'Abhidhā' as synonymous with 'Alaṅkāra'. He seems to follow Kuntaka, the author of the Vakroktijīvita. He holds that Alaṅkāra is nothing but a peculiar Abhidhā (Vicitraivābhidhā vakroktirityucyate, V. J. 22). In fact he borrows the term 'Bhaṅgibhaṇiti' from Kuntaka's verse 'Vakroktireva Vaidagdhyabhaṅgībhaṇitirucyate' (V. J. 22).

Thus, taking the word 'Abhidhā' to stand for Alaṅkāra in general, he asserts that just as 'Śabda' and 'Artha' are included in the definition, so Abhidhā also ought to be included For, otherwise, in those cases, in which the

1. V. V, V. 103. 2. V. V. 103-4

poetic figures such as Upamā etc. are brought to consciousness by the poetic figure 'Dīpaka', will have to be excluded from the sphere of application of the definition of Dhvani and, therefore, the definition would become too narrow. If it be said by the supporters of the definition that such cases are excluded by Dhvanikāra himself from the sphere of application of the definition. For, he himself says that though in some instances one poetic figure may be brought to consciousness by another, yet if the conventional meaning is not primarily intended to suggest the suggestible, such instances are not the instances of Dhvani. Mahima Bhaṭṭa replies as follows :—

Such an assertion has the logical fallacy in so far as it is based on reason that does not exist. For, the instances, under discussion, are tried to be excluded from the sphere of application of the definition of Dhvani on the ground that the conventional meaning does not primarily suggest the suggestible. But this ground has no existence ; because the figures of speech such as Dīpaka etc. are accepted to be expressions of a peculiar type (Bhaṅgibhaṇiti), just for the reason that they mainly bring Upamā etc. to consciousness. And because the poetic figure, that is brought to consciousness by another, possesses exceptional charm, and a composition is called Dhvani because it possesses such a charm, the exclusion of Dīpaka etc. from the sphere of application of the definition of Dhvani is unjustifiable[1].

Dhvanivādin's position explained.

Kuntaka, whom Mahima Bhaṭṭa follows in his conception of Alaṅkāra as an expression of a peculiar type, (Bhaṅgibhaṇiti), came very much later than Ānanda Vardhana. Ānanda Vardhana's conception of the poetic figures,

1. V. V. V. 18-20.

therefore, is based on the authority of earlier poeticians like Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa. And they admit the poetic figures to belong to words and meanings and not to 'Abhidhā'. For, Abhidhā, according to them, is either a power of word that is inferred from the fact that word gives rise to the consciousness of meaning; or it is a power of uttering word. And poetic figure is not a variety of it. On the contrary, poetic figure is a charm of a peculiar type, technically called 'Vaicitrya', which shines in the consciousness of the Connoisseur. Hence the poetic figures belong to words and meanings and not to Abhidhā. And the distinction of poetic literature from the philosophic lies, not in the peculiarity of Abhidhā but in that of words and meanings. Therefore, when Ānanda Vardhana says 'where words and meanings are suggestive,' the suggestivity of the poetic figures, which belongs to them is necessarily implied and, therefore, need not be separately mentioned.[1]

And the view that there is a logical fallacy in the assertion that in the poetic figures Dīpaka etc. the conventional does not primarily suggest other poetic figures such as Upamā etc., namely, that Atatparatva is a reason which has no being, is due to the misunderstanding of the position of the Dhvanivādin. For, he maintains the subordinate position to be of three types, as has already been pointed out. And his assertion of Atatparatva of the conventional meaning implies that the suggested meaning does not predominate and is based on the fact that in this case the suggested Upamā does help in lending charm to the conventional meaning, which presents the poetic figure Dīpaka.

HIS CONCEPTION OF INCONGRUITY (ANAUCITYA)

Mahima Bhaṭṭa deals with the incongruities in the

1. V. V. V. 18-9.

poetic composition in the second chapter of his work. The incongruity in general consists in unfitness of either word or meaning. It is of two types: (I) internal and (II) external. The internal incongruity consits in the presentation of the situation, mimetic changes and transient emotions such as are not in perfect harmony with the basic mental state. It has been exhaustively dealt with by Ānanda Vardhana. Mahima Bhaṭṭa, therefore, does not discuss it. He confines himself to the treatment of the latter. The external incongruities, according to him, are many[1]. He begins with broadly dividing them into five types: (I) Vidheyāvimarśa (II) Prakramabheda (III) Kramabheda (IV) Paunaruktya and (V) Vacyāvacana. Subsequently he points out their subdivisions.

Ruyyaka points out that these defects are not the original discoveries of Mahima Bhaṭṭa and that they had been noticed by earlier thinkers such as Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali[2] etc. To support his view Ruyyaka quotes from these authorities at every step.

(I) Vidheyāvimarśa consists in reducing to a subordinate position that which is intended to be presented as the principal. Mahima Bhaṭṭa cites as an illustration of this defect a verse, which is from the pen of Kuntaka and which Kuntaka wrote to illustrate how words, befitting the context, give rise to the æsthetic experience (Cetanacamatkāra). He points out three main defects in it[3] : (1) Negative compound in 'Asaṁrabdhavān', (2) The use of the words 'Yosau' without the use of the corresponding 'Tat', (3) Genitive compound in 'Ambikākeśarī.

(II) Prakramabheda is a type of Śabdānaucitya. It consists in the break or want of symmetry in the use of

1. V. V. 150. 2. V. V. V. 151. 3. V. V. 154.

expression. Thus, if a particular action has been referred to by a particular root in a composition, the congruity of symmetrical expression requires that the same root should be employed if the same action is again to be referred to, e. g. if the root 'Bhās' has been used in a sentence to express the act of speaking, the same root and no other, such as 'Lap', should be used if the same act is to be referred to again. The want or lack of symmetry in the use of expression is like a pit and as such causes unpleasant feeling in the hearer and stands in the way of æsthetic experience[1]. To use the symmetrical expressions is not to commit the fault of repetition. For, the spheres of the two are different. It is of many types.

(III) Kramabheda consists in the use of a pronoun, without first stating the antecedent, for which it may be thought to stand ; e. g. in 'Tirthe tadīye' the word 'tadīye' is intended to stand for 'Gaṅgā' though the word has not come before.

(IV) Paunaruktya consists in the repetition of the same idea in the same words over and over again. It may be pointed out here that, according to Mahima Bhaṭṭa, if there be only a verbal repetition without there being the repetition of the idea, it is no defect. This defect had been recognised by Akṣapāda in his famous aphorism, quoted by Ruyyaka :

'Śabdārthayoḥ punarvacanam punaruktam anyatrānuvādāt'.

(V) Vācyāvacana consists in not referring to a thing in the manner in which it ought to be referred to. For instance, in the famous verse in the Vikramorvaśīya of

1. V. V. 244.

Kālidāsa "Navajaladharaḥ sannaddhoyaṁ na dṛpta niśācaraḥ", the absence of reference to lightning by the word 'this' (Idam), after referring to other things, doubt about which is removed, by 'Idam'[1], is a defect which is technically called 'Vācyāvacana'.

Such defects in composition as are pointed out by Mahima Bhaṭṭa, are found, according to the illustrations given by him, even in the immortal writings of Kālidāsa. Such defects, therefore, cannot be seriously counted as such. Mahima's cleverness lies in suggesting the amendments.

His Criticism of Kuntaka's Theory of Vakrokti

The meaning of Vakrokti, on analysis, is discovered to be either congruity (Aucitya) or Dhvani. In the former case it ought not be mentioned separately. For, it is implied in the definition of 'Kāvya itself. In the latter case, being identical[2] with Dhvani, it is included in 'Anumiti' which is the main point which Mahima Bhaṭṭa tries to establish in his work.

His Criticism and rejection of some of the types of Dhvani.

Mahima Bhaṭṭa discussses the classification of Dhvani at a great length. Some of the types of Dhvani he accepts:[3] others he rejects. He asserts that there are defects in the definitions of the sub-divisions of Dhvani but does not count them.[4]

His criticism of Vastu and Alaṅkāra Dhvani.

The use of the word Dhvani, in the case of Rasa, is based upon the error that in this case the premises and the

1. V. V. 332. 2. V. V. 127. 3. V. V. 429.
4. V. V. 104.

conclusion are apprehended simultaneously and, therefore, there is no apprehenison of the causal relation, though it is admitted to be present there also. But in the case of Vastu and Alaṅkāra there is not even the error of simultaneous apprehension of the premises and the conclusion. Therefore, there is not even a shadow of justification to use the word Dhvani in relation to them.[1]

His criticism of the division of Kāvya into Dhvani and Guṇibhūtavyaṅgya.

He holds that the distinction, which Ánanda draws between one poem and another on the basis of the predominance of the suggested meaning and the subordination thereof, is unnecessary inasmuch as it does not relate to the professed aim of the work, the presentation of the essential nature of the Kāvya; and also because there is no difference in the æsthetic experience of Vastu, Alaṅkāra and Rasādi due to such predominance and subordination[2].

Some of the types of Dhvani, which Mahima Bhaṭṭa rejects, are (I) Avivakṣitavācya (II) Vivakṣitānya paravācya[3] (III) Arthāntara-Saṅkramitavācya (IV) Atyantatiraskṛtavācya[4] and (V) Śabdaśaktimūlānuraṇanavyaṅgya.[5] The space does not permit us to discuss the views of Mahima Bhaṭṭa on these and allied topics. His position, in brief, is that the concept of Dhvani is included in that of Aunmiti, as stated by him; that the accepted types of Dhvani, therefore, are nothing more than the types of Anumiti and that all the illustrations of Dhvani admit of explanation as those of Anumiti.

---

1. V. V. 57. 2. V. V. 136. 3. V. V. 143.
4. V, V. 147. 5. V. V. 446-7

RUYYAKA.

His Date.

There is no controversy about the date of Ruyyaka; because he belongs to a literary period in the history of Kashmir literature, the dates of the writers of which can be fixed with certainty in relation to Abhinavagupta, who mentions the dates of composition of at least three works of his. And Kuntaka was a younger contemporary of Abhinava. Mahima came after both, whom he quotes and criticises. Ruyyaka, being a commentator on Mahima's work, came after the latter. But the fact that deserves special notice is that Ruyyaka came fairly long after Mahima Bhaṭṭa. For, by the time Ruyyaka took up the Vyakti Viveka to write a commentary on it, there were already different readings of many passages, to which he refers[1]. He may therefore, be admitted to belong to the middle of the 12th century A. D.

Ruyyaka was a very great defender of the school of Dhvani. He was a well-read scholar of cool thinking. He not only answers all the main objections of Mahima Bhaṭṭa against the theory of Dhvani, as propounded by Ānanda Vardhana, and clarifies the position of the Dhvani-vādin, but also points out the errors of Mahima Bhaṭṭa himself. He also refers to the self-contradictions of Mahima Bhaṭṭa in the Vyakti Viveka. He refutes the view that the word 'Dhvani' should be used for poetic composition in the secondary sense. He shows that those defects, which Mahima Bhaṭṭa points out in the verse of Kuntaka "Saṁrambhaḥ Karikīṭa" etc. are present in his own verse 'Kāvyakāñcana' etc., which so smells of arrogance. He wrote many works to which he refers in the course of his

1. V. V. 260.

commentary: (I) Nāṭaka Mīmāṁsā (II) Sāhitya Mīmāṁsā[1] (III) Harṣacarita Vārtika[2] and (IV) Bṛhatī[3].

After reading his replies to Mahima Bhaṭṭa's objections against the Dhvanivādin, one is convinced of the soundness of the theory of Dhvani and of the hollowness of the objections, raised against it. We have stated these replies in their proper contexts.

———

1. V. V. V. 243. 2. V. V. V. 302.
3. V. V. V. 305.

CHAPTER VI.

THE TECHNIQUE OF SANSKRIT DRAMA

ÆSTHETIC OBJECT.

Abhinavagupta holds that the products of no other fine art than those of the dramatic can strictly be called "æsthetic" He maintains that the particular experience, which is the basis of the study of the problem of æsthetics, is not possible from any other artistic presentation than the dramatic.

Accordingly he has approached this problem from the following points of view :—

1. Spectator's point of view.

It has already been dealt with in the third chapter of the present work.

2. Dramatist's point of view.

From this point of view the following aspects have been studied :—

(a) Language.

(b) The subject-matter.

(c) Division of plot and its arrangement.

(d) Presentation of the different basic mental states.

(e) Different kinds of dramatic presentation, according to the difference in the subject-matter, the hero and the basic mental state.

(f) Different kinds of hero and heroine and the manner of delineating their character.

3. The stage-manager's point of view :—

From this point of view the following aspects have been studied :—

(a) The size, the construction and the management of the theatre.

(b) Choice of actors according to the temperament, height, complexion, facial cut, morality, intellectual back-ground and general life of the persons to be represented.

(c) The nature of the physical, moral, intellectual and spiritual training to equip the actors for doing full justice to the parts allotted to them.

(d) Life of the actors.

(e) Social conditions necessary for the dramatic presentation.

(f) Importance of woman on the stage.

(g) Necessity of dance and music on the stage.

(h) The necessities of presentation.

4. The social point of view.

From the social point of view the following aspects have been studied :—

(a) Moral purpose of drama and the manner, in which it is fulfilled.

(b) The cultural and not the commercial basis of the dramatic presentation.

In the course of this chapter we are concerned with the point of view of the dramatist. We shall show what are the guiding principles, which the dramatist has to keep in mind in writing a drama. The first aspect of the problem from the dramatist's point of view i.e. the language, has been discussed a little in the fourth chapter. We, therefore, begin here with the subject-matter.

What Does the Dramatist Present ?

The subject-matter of a drama is naturally a certain part of the life of a person, historical, contemporary or imaginary. The question, therefore, which the dramatist has to decide, is, "What is it that he primarily aims at presenting ?" On this there is a fundamental difference between the Western and the Indian dramatists, for the simple reason that the experiences which they intend to arouse are, as we have stated elsewhere, essentially different. Accordingly, while the Western dramatists, Shakespeare etc., for instance, present the character, manifesting itself in action ; the Indian dramatist presents a basic mental state at its highest relishable pitch in an ideal situation. Thus, while according to the former, the character is the central fact for presentation in drama ; according to the latter the basic mental state occupies the central position. The manner of treatment of the subject-matter, however, in both the cases, is very similar.

Incongruity.

The fundamental principle of all presentations is the avoidance of all that is incongruous with the central fact. The incongruity is due to the following :—

1. Introducing a situation or any constituent thereof, which does not fully accord with the central fact, the basic mental state, for instance :

(a) Introduction of a love-situation (Śṛṅgāravibhāva) when the quiescence is being presented (Śāntarasanirūpaṇe).

(b) When the object of love is angry in a love-quarrel, presenting the lover as pacifying her by a talk of the unreality and transitory nature of the world, a talk which suits Śāntarasa only.

(c) In a love-scene, when the beloved feigns anger, presenting the lover as overpowered by anger and assuming a terrific form.

2. Unnecessary dilation.

The hero is necessarily placed in a situation. The situation affects him in a certain way. It is made up of various constituents. Too much dilation on any one of the constituents interferes with the growth of the basic mental state. It has, therefore, to be avoided. Suppose a lover is separated from his beloved and is placed in a beautiful valley. If he is made to describe the hills, surrounding him, in an appreciative mood with the frequent use of puns and other embellishments, that will certainly be incongruous with the central fact, because that will bring about the disappearance of the emotive state.

3. Termination of an emotive state at a wrong time. Suppose, for instance, that two persons love each other from the cores of their hearts. Their mutual love is known to each other in all its intensity. A chance has brought them near each other[1]. At such a time to represent them, without sufficient reason, occupying themselves with something else

1. Dh L. 161-2.

than the thought as to how to get united, will certainly be contrary to the basic fact and, therefore, unpleasant.

4. Expression of an emotion at a wrong time. Suppose a person of heroic disposition is in love with a certain lady. But on a call of duty he has gone to the battle-field. A terrific battle is raging. Hundreds of the veteran soldiers have fallen. He is on the post of duty and, therefore, is intended to be presented as a hero and not as a lover. At such a time to represent the hero, without sufficient cause, as indulging in[1] a talk of separation from his beloved is incongruous with the basic fact.

5. Intensification of the developed emotion.

When a basic mental state has reached the point at which it is relishable to the audience through empathic reaction, its further intensification destroys it, just as intensive stimulation has a paralysing effect.

6. Incongruity of behaviour.

Suppose two persons love each other: they have met on appointment. At such a time direct expression of the sex-desire, instead of its indirect expression through certain beautiful gestures and facial changes, is unæsthetic.

These are incongruities from the point of view of the spectator and not from that of the historian. The aim of a poet is not to present facts as they are, but as they will give rise to æsthetic experience in the hearer or the spectator. He has, therefore, to modify the historical facts accordingly. On what lines the modification should be made, we shall show as we proceed.

Action in Sanskrit Drama.

The Sanskrit dramatist attempts to present primarily a basic mental state at its highest relishable pitch in an ideal

1. Dh. L, 163.

situation, and not the action or character manifesting itself in action, as does Shakespeare, according to his modern critics like Bradley. It is well known that an intense activity of the mind, or mental occupation, dulls, if it does not kill physical activity. Naturally, therefore, in a Sanskrit drama there cannot be found that amount of action as is found in an English drama. This difference between the two in itself, however, is not the positive proof of superiority or inferiority of either to the other. It is due, as has just been stated, to the difference in the object of presentation.

It is interesting to note in this connection that in English dramas also, when the dramatist attempts to present a mental state, action naturally becomes slow, or stops. For instance, in Shakespeare's Hamlet, action does not proceed when the dramatist attempts to reveal the struggle that is going on within the hero of the piece. Some critics seem to incline to think that that portion is not quite dramatic or rather that Shakespeare has not been quite successful in the presentation of that part of the hero's life. But is it not that that portion is looked upon by most of the readers as the best of Shakespeare's productions? And is it not that at the time of presentation we enjoy that part most, without feeling any lack of action therein? The fact is that a mental state, if presented well, is no less enjoyable than any action. But the two experiences which arise from them, are essentially different, because the stimulus in each case is different, and so are the subjective conditions required for the visualisation of each of them.

RULES OF DRAMATISATION AND DRAMATIC GENIUS.

The beauty of drama depends on the choice of the material and the skill in its use. The object of presentation

of a Sanskrit dramatist being different, his choice of the material also has got to be different. His presentation is meant for an audience, which seeks æsthetic experience, which is due to the subjective realisation of the central fact in the presentation, the basic mental state, and not that which comes from the objective perception of the presented.

He has, therefore, so to present the æsethetic object, that the public, to whose taste he caters, may have the desired experience. We propose to state in the following paragraphs how Bharata, as interpreted by Abhinavagupta, would like the original material for a dramatic presentation to be handled.

Let this, however, be clearly understood that Bharata does not lay down any hard and fast rules, which have to be blindly followed. They are for the guidance of the dramatic genius. He allows perfect freedom to the dramatist in every matter. The dramatist can exclude, as much as he likes, out of what Bharata has pointed out as the constituent elements of a drama. He also can bring in as much as he likes of what is not mentioned by Bharata. What Bharata says is this much only, that the dramatist must maintain harmony and unity in his production. All that he presents on the stage and all that he makes the different characters speak, must perfectly harmonise with the basic mental state of the focus of the situation, which is primarily intended to be presented.

The so called rules, laid down by Bharata, refer to the general elements of a dramatic work, as discovered after a careful analysis of a very large number of dramas, which must have existed long before the time when the Bharata Sūtras, assumed their present form. The consti-

tuent elements of drama are given there in such details that it is really difficult to believe that such a scientific treatise could be written without any varied and sufficient material, the results of the analysis of which are contained in the work. It is as good as believing that Pāṇini wrote his famous treatise on grammar long before the Sanskrit language, about the different aspects of which he lays down his rules, came into existence. On this point Abhinava is very clear. He draws a distinction between the crude drama and the refined one. The former he calls "Bhāṇḍa" and the latter "Nāṭya"[1]. Similarly he distinguishes an actor in a refined drama from one who acts in what is crude. The former he calls "Mahānaṭa" and the latter "Bhāṇḍa". Further, he very clearly says that from the time of Bharata to his days the line of succession of great actors was unbroken[2].

The question will naturally arise : if Bharata does not lay down the rules for actors and dramatists, what does he do ? Abhinava has answered this question in the very beginning of his commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra. What he says may be put as follows :—

A genius, in order that he may produce finished pieces, requires special guidance on the right lines. The genius of to-day cannot be looked upon as the first of his kind. There have been geniuses and there will be. What a genius of a particular age does is to improve upon the earlier productions of geniuses in the light of the additional facts that have been brought to light. It is, therefore, necessary that a person, who is specially gifted for the production of dramatic literature, should know all currents of thought in the field of drama. He should know the

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 3. 2. A Bh., Vol. I. 4.

lines, on which his predecessors in that particular field have worked. This kind of information has got the same value to a would-be dramatist as the information regarding all places of halt, men and material taken with, as also those, which were rejected at different stages, in short, the entire experience of the past expeditionists to the Nanga mountain, is necessary for all the future expeditionists to the same, whatever be their zeal, enthusiasm and earnestness about the task and howsoever well they may intellectually and physically be equipped for it. Such information will surely make their task easier up to the point, which was reached by their predecessors, and place the destination within easier reach. Thus, the Nāṭya Śāstra is meant to give special instructions in the light of the experiences of the past geniuses to a person, who is really gifted and has particularly got the dramatist's inclination. Just as a special course of lectures to one, who is taking up a special line of research, does not stop him from showing his genius, rather, as experience tells us, considerably helps him in doing so, so does the instruction in dramaturgy.[1] And it was with such a view that Bharata wrote his Sūtras.

Method of Dramatisation.

Let us, therefore, see on what lines, he wants the would-be dramatists to be instructed. Suppose some one, specially gifted to write a drama discovers a story, historical or otherwise, fit in every way for dramatic presentation. The question arises: what should he do to dramatise it? Should he reproduce all the historical facts or should he modify them in some way? If the latter be the case, on what lines should the modification proceed?

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 4.

The purpose of a Sanskrit drama is not merely entertainment but the preservation and raising of moral standard in the society. The maintenance of a moral standard is necessary for the healthy growth of the society, for the safety of the individual person and property and for making the attainment of the human goals, recognised by the society, as easy as possible. There are four goals which have been recognised as worthy of pursuit of human life by the Indian society from the earliest time : (i) The religious merit (Dharma), (ii) The wealth (Artha), (iii) The object of love (Kāma) and (iv) The final emancipation (Mokṣa). History is full of instances of persons who have achieved these. In contemporary life also there are found persons ardently pursuing and attaining them. Scripture too shows the sure path to them. But the achievement of the goal through the path, pointed out by history, contemporary life or scripture, looks very difficult. It looks so full of obstacles and unmixed suffering that it scares those away, who are not heroically inclined.

The reason may be stated as follows :—

An event has a different meaning to an indifferent observer, who views it objectively, from what it has to the person, involved in it. One and the same event arouses feelings and responses in the former quite different from those in the latter. This difference is due to the difference in the subjective conditions. Have not the events, which lead a martyr to death, got a different value for him from what they have for the persecutors ? And if so, Why ? Is it not because of the difference in the subjective conditions ? Is the so called suffering of a martyr an unmixed one to him as it is to one who inflicts it ? Does not each event,

that brings him suffering, bring also so much glory or religious merit that the painful feeling pales into insignificance ?

The Sanskrit dramatist, therefore, aims at the preservation of the existing standard of morality as also at raising it by presenting human life in its struggle for the attainment of any one of the said goals in such a manner as to make the audience, possessed of the necessary subjective conditions, merge their personality into that of the focus of the situation so as to have the same experience as the latter has and thus, on subsequent reflection, to feel encouraged to follow the path of morality.[1]

Therefore, the first thing for dramatisation of a set of events, historical, contemporary or imaginative, is to fix upon what is going to be the object of achievement, and who is to be represented to achieve it. In short, first of all the plot should be analysed with a view to fixing upon the hero of the piece and the object of the achievement. The value of such an analysis is obvious. Once the hero is chosen, he has naturally got to receive more attention and has to be kept in the forefront, relegating all others, whatever their importance, into the back-ground. Such a question, therefore, as is generally raised in the case of Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, "Who is the hero of the piece, Brutus or Caesar ?" cannot arise in the case of a Sanskrit drama.

Once the plot has been analysed in the above manner, more attention has naturally to be given to the central theme. The main story represents the hero achieving one of the goals, recognised by the Indian society. But no achievement is possible without any serious effort on the

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 4

part of the ambitious. Action, therefore, is an essential part of the story. Hence the question that naturally arises, is, how is the action to be presented or what is the method to be followed in the presentation thereof, i.e. what method does Bharata, as interpreted by Abhinava, suggest for adoption in this case ?

PRESENTABLE AND UNPRESENTABLE IN DRAMA

The reply is that the presentation of action has to be in consonance with the basic mental state, which is primarily intended to be presented. Therefore, only as much action as can go with such a mental state, lead to it and reveal it as far as possible, admits of presentation in a Sanskrit drama. It is, however, necessary for maintaining the unity of the story as a whole, not entirely to ignore or leave out those portions, which do not go with the intensity of emotion or feeling. Accordingly the action has to be divided into two kinds : (i) that which is to be actually presented on the stage (Dṛśya) and (ii) that which is simply to be hinted at or communicated (Sūcya).

The former is to be kept very distinct from the latter. For, it is on this basis that the dramatic story is divided into acts (Aṅka) and the informative scenes of different kinds which, according to the need of the occasion, are introduced either in the beginning or at the end of different acts, such as (i) Viṣkambhaka (ii) Cūlikā (iii) Aṅkāsya (iv) Aṅkāvatāra and (v) Praveśaka. Accordingly such actions as long journey, battle, rebellion, feast etc. are not to be presented. We shall be able to understand better the importance of this method of presentation in the eyes of Sanskrit dramatists, if we take into account the following facts :—

The Sanskrit dramatist takes the greatest possible care

not to introduce anything on the stage, which is likely to shock the spectator's sense of reality of the presented. The stage, being of the limited size and the drama being intended to be presented within a fixed duration of time, he does not present on the stage all such things as do not fit in with the temporal and spatial limitations of the stage-presentation. He, therefore, naturally has to content himself with giving information about such things as big battles, long journeys and rebellions etc., through the informatory scenes.

UNITIES OF TIME, PLACE AND ACTION

He has to maintain the unity of time and consequently of space within each act of a drama. For, the dramatic action, according to the Indian dramaturgist, has to be divided into five parts, on the basis of five stages of action; and each stage has to be presented in a separate act. The continuity of the dramatised story has to be maintained, after the end of an act through introduction of[1] Bindu (recollection of purpose) which is like a thread and strings together the various stages of action, presented separately in separate acts.

The action and events, presented in an act ought to be such as do not extend over more than five Muhūrtas[2]. For, that is just the duration of time, for which the actors can act and the spectators can[3] witness the performance at a stretch, without feeling any inconvenience, due to interference with the daily natural routine. Thus, if the events and the action, connected with one stage of action, be such as, consistently with the unity of time, cannot be presented in one act, there are two ways of dealing with such a part of the story :

1. A. Bh., Ch. 19 (20 ?) V. 13 (MSS). 2. S. C., 635.
3. A. Bh, Ch. 19 (20 ?) V. 24. (MSS).

(i) it may be split up into two acts,

(ii) the less important parts of it may be presented in an informatory scene.[1]

It may be pointed out here that the informatory scene also cannot cover a period of more than a year[2]. And even if in the original story the events be scattered over a longer period, the dramatist has to modify the plot so as to compress them within the prescribed time.

Just as the principle of unity of time is maintained within an act, so the principle of unity of place also is upheld within the same. The scenes of action within an act cannot lie so far apart from one another as cannot be reached by the hero within the time necessary for the presentation of the act. If they be far distant, from one another they have to be presented in separate acts. If after an event or action that is presented in an act, there is to be presented another which is related to a far distant place, so that the hero cannot reach within the time limit of an act, the act should terminate with the presentation of the hero as starting on his journey. But if the hero has got the means of transport e. g. æroplane, such as can enable him to reach far distant places within the prescribed time, the scenes of action lying far apart may be presented within the same act[3].

Thus, it is clear that the statement of Professor Keith in his "Sanskrit Drama" that Sanskrit dramatists were ignorant of the principles of unities of time and place, is based upon his own ignorance of the dramatic technique of the Sanskrit drama.

---

1. A. Bh. Ch. 19 (20 ?) V. 30 (MSS). 2. N. S. 228.
3. N. S. 228.

As regards the principle of unity of action in Sanskrit drama, we have to say only this much that if there is a principle that a Sanskrit dramatist cannot violate, it is this principle. We have partly discussed it in the section, entitled "Incongruity". The Sanskrit dramatist aims at presenting a basic mental state in such a manner as to bring about the identification of the æsthete with the focus of the situation so as to make him experience the emotion of the hero. He, therefore, cannot introduce any action, which is not in harmony with the basic mental state.

In the case of a Sanskrit drama, presentation of action is not an end in itself. It is only a means to the presentation of the basic mental state (Sthāyibhāva) of the hero and to the arousal of identical emotive state in the æsthete.

Unity of action in a Sanskrit Drama is both *subjective* and *objective*. It is subjective in so far as the whole series of actions springs from a single subjective principle, the basic emotion. It is objective in so far as the series of actions is logically related to a single end. The Sanskrit conception of the unity of action presents an advance on Greek and English conceptions. For, the latter recognise the objective unity only.

Difference between Sanskrit and English Dramas in Respect of Action and Emotion.

In order to understand the difference between Sanskrit and English dramas in respect of the actions that they present and emotions that they arouse, we have to keep the following points in mind :—

(I) The capacity of an action or an event to arouse a

particular emotion differs according to (i) the relation, which the percipient has or establishes with the person, who is the agent of action or to whom something happens: and

(ii) the qualities of head and heart and their manifestation in action, with which the person is associated in the mind of the percipient.

Thus, when one looks upon a man, to whom some evil has happened, in the light of distant social relations and his services to society; his moral, political and social principles, his physical, intellectual and moral greatness and their beneficial effect on society; and his achievements and his weaknesses and failures figure predominantly in one's consciousness; one has social emotions such as sympathy and pity. But when one views the person in closer relation of family, one has an emotion which is deeper and more intense, such as grief. If the percipient completely identifies himself with the sufferer, he has identical feeling and emotion. Thus, an event, howsoever great, is not capable of arousing definite feelings or emotions unless it is viewed in the proper perspective. Hence there is the necessity in dramas to put the important events, which are intended to arouse certain feelings, in the necessary background. This seems to have been the idea in the mind of Bradley, which has been responsible for the following statement :—

"The story depicts also the troubled part of the hero's life, which precedes and leads up to his death; and an instantaneous death occurring by accident in the midst of prosperity would not suffice for it." (p. 7).

In the presentation of this background of the central event of a drama, different nations of the world have got different literary traditions. The fundamental

difference between the Sanskrit and the English dramatists in this respect is that while the former presents the events in such a manner as leads to the identification of the spectator with the focus of the situation so as to arouse the same feelings in him as arise in the focus ; the latter tries to transport the spectator from the ordinary situation, in which he may be, to the dramatic situation so that he views the central figure objectively as he may have been viewed by one not directly involved in it. The idea that the presented is an artistic presentation is attempted to be kept in a subconscious state by both.

(II) Emotions can be divided into two types: (i) social and (ii) personal or individual. The former are less intense than the latter. For, the larger the group of persons, by which a feeling or an emotion is shared, the less intense it is. Sympathy, for instance, has not got that intensity which grief has. Nor does pity have that lasting effect on mind and body which a personal loss has. It is because the former are social and the latter are individual,

(III) One noteworthy fact about the personal emotion is that beyond a certain point the more intense a feeling or emotion the greater is the loss of activity of the nervous system and of the mind of the individual, affected by it, and accordingly there is less activity, loss of coherent activity or perfect inactivity, according as the emotion is at a higher or lower pitch.

If we keep these points in mind, the distinction between Sanskrit and English dramas will become very clear.

(a) A Sanskrit drama arouses identical feelings and emotions. The hero in this case is not an ordinary individual, A, B or C, but the individual of the poet's imagination who is universalised at a latter stage. But an English drama

arouses social feelings and emotions, which in no way differ from those aroused in the persons, who were actual percipients of the event as a whole, not as any one of those, involved in the situation, but as spectators of the whole.

(b) There is accordingly less action in the former, because it is primarily a presentation of a basic mental state at its highest relishable pitch through successive stages. In the latter there is more action, because it tries to present the æsthetic configuration for the arousal of the social feelings and emotions; and the social interest can be aroused only by means of action. In English dramas also, where there is an attempt to present the intensity of feeling, the action comes to a stand-still. This is, for instance, what we find in the case of Hamlet. It is interesting to note that some critics, not knowing the psychological reason for Hamlet's inactivity, have criticised Shakespeare for lack of action in that portion of the drama.

(c) The methods of presentation, followed by the Sanskrit and the English dramatists, are accordingly different; the former present all that is necessary for the arousal of the basic mental state in the focus of the situation and through him in the audience. And because an emotion at a high pitch diminishes the capacity to act, if it does not totally inhibit it; there is not much presentation of action as such, but only as much of it as is necessary for the presentation of the basic mental state. And because the basic mental state does not admit of the objective cognition and can be realised subjectively only through identification with the focus of the situation, therefore, the presentation of all such things is avoided as will stop the progress of identification. Hence in Sanskrit dramas appeal is always to the highest æsthetic senses, the eye and the ear; and appeal to touch and taste is totally avoided. The

reason is obvious. Any number of persons can view and hear the same thing from the same point of view without requiring any conscious activity, which involves the consciousness of the individuality of the individual, or any fresh object. But that is not the case with touch or taste.

In English dramas, however, because the emotions, intended to be aroused, are social emotions, such as sympathy and pity, which are due to the objective perception of the presented and do not require any identification with the focus, therefore, all the senses are appealed to, and there is much presentation of activity. The reason is that when the interest in the objective presentation is to be sustained, it is necessary then to present action, because the object as such ceases to be interesting as soon as it has been seen.

ANALYSIS OF THE MAIN PLOT.

We have discussed above how the main plot is to be separated from the subordinate and how the presentable action has to be kept apart from the informable. The question that now arises, is: how is this main plot to be presented? Here again, as before, the analytical method is to be followed. And the analysis of the action has to be made in relation to what it ultimately results in. This is the method which is pointed out by the analysis of the existing dramatic literature and the instructions of Bharata, which are followed in it.

Any action, if conceived as complete, has five parts. (i) Before any action, that is to lead to any considerable achievement, is actually begun, there has to be a clear consciousness of what is intended to be achieved, eagerness and determination to get it and decision as regards the ways and means of attainment. (ii) Once the action is

planned out, the next stage will naturally be the actual beginning of the execution of the plan. (iii) This will naturally give rise to some hope of attaining the objective. These three stages are common to every action, whether it is going to be a failure or a success. (iv) After this stage there arises the difference between the tragic and the comic or non-tragic action. In the former case the ambitious reaches as near his goal as he ever can and then he meets some such obstacle or hindrance as he can never get over and, therefore, begins to recede from it. This can be represented to be the fourth stage of action. (v) And then he meets his doom. But in the comic or non-tragic action, though undoubtedly the pursuant of the goal meets difficulties, yet they are not such as he cannot overcome; or, such are his inner and outer resources that he gets over all of them and becomes certain to achieve the objective. The final stage is naturally the realisation of what he set his heart on.

In a good drama, which has to present action as a unity, and the action of which has to be complete in itself, these five stages are clearly distinguishable. In all Shakespearian dramas, all these stages of action are clearly distinguishable. In fact, each of the five acts of a drama is intended to present one of the five stages of action. In is interesting to note in this connection that this is just the basis of division of the main plot into acts (Aṅkas) in Sanskrit drama. And a good drama (Nāṭaka) can never have less than five acts. When there are more than five acts, each additional act presents an aspect of one of these five stages, which could not be well presented in one act. But more than two acts can never be occupied with the presentation of the same stage.

It is because of this that the number of acts in a drama can never exceed ten[1].

In English, the stages of a comedy are generally called (i) cause (ii) growth (iii) height (iv) consequence and (v) close. In the case of a tragedy, however, the last two are differently called, because of the difference in the turn that the action takes. They are called (i) fall, because it represents the fall of the hero from the height which is reached by him; and (ii) catastrophe, because herein he meets his doom. In Sanskrit also they are called by words which have almost the same implications as the first five, mentioned above. They are (i) Ārambha (ii) Yatna (iii) Prāptyāśā (iv) Niyatāpti and (v) Phalāgama[2].

This is, however, to be noted here that there is nothing in Sanskrit, corresponding to fall and catastrophe in English tragedy, because in Sanskrit we have no tragedy in the strict sense of the word. We shall explain later on why we have no tragedy in Sanskrit.

THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIVE STAGES ELABORATED.

Bharata does not generally illustrate the rules, which he lays down for the dramatist. It is because of the very nature of the work. He writes aphorisms or Sūtras, the most important characteristic of which is the extreme brevity. In fact, no writer of the aphoristic literature illustrates the rules. In Pāṇini's grammatical book, Aṣṭādhyāyī, for instance, no illustrations are found. The point in hand, however, does not become clear without illustration. We will, therefore, illustrate the five stages by examples, taken from the story of Ratnāvalī of Harṣa, from which illustrations have been chosen by most of the

1. D. R. 7. 2. D. R. 5.

writers. The reason seems to be that probably King Harṣa in his Harṣa Vārtika, a commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra, probably the first one, gave illustrations from his own drama and the later commentators have simply followed him. It is, therefore, necessary to give the plot briefly here so that the illustrations may well be understood.

Udayana was an amorous king. He was extremely handsome. He took very little interest in the affairs of the state. But fortunately he had a very capable and whole-heartedly devoted minister, Yaugandharāyaṇa, and therefore, he had left the entire administration into the latter's hands. Therefore, while the king was enjoying amorous sports in the palace, his minister was planning conquests and was winning victories. His plans were such as did not interfere with the king's sports. The situation in which the first act begins, is as follows :—

A sage has prophesied that the person who would marry Ratnāvalī, the princess of Ceylon, will become an emperor. Yaugandharāyaṇa, therefore, seeks her hand for King Udayana. But the King of Ceylon does not agree to the proposal, because Udayana already has one wife, Vāsavadattā. Yaugandharāyaṇa, therefore, manages to get the rumour set afloat that the queen perished in the fire that broke out at Lāvaṇaka and again makes the proposal for Ratnāvalī's marriage with King Udayana. The King of Ceylon agrees to it now, and sends his daughter to Vatsa in a ship, accompanied by his minister, Vasubhūti, and chamberlain of Vatsa, Bābhravya, who was sent to make the proposal. But unfortunately, or fortunately, her ship is wrecked on the way. She catches hold of a mast and is drifted to the shore. And with the assistance of a businessman of Kauśāmbī, who saw her in

that helpless condition and, through the pearl necklace, recognised her to be a princess, she reaches Kauśāmbī and is introduced to Yaugandharāyaṇa. She narrates her story and Yaugandharāyaṇa takes her to the palace and puts her in the harem, giving her a different name, Sāgarikā, as the personal attendant of the queen. She is put in charge of a Maina bird. The queen, knowing full well the amorous tendency of the king, keeps Ratnāvalī away from his sight, because of her beauty. Vasubhūti and Bābhravya also somehow manage to reach the shore and join Rumaṇvān, the commander-in-chief of Udayana in the war against Kośala.

I. THE BEGINNING (PRĀRAMBHA).

There are two situations, in which the action of a Sanskrit drama is found to begin : (i) either the means, wherewith the goal is to be reached, have already been got through the favour of the providence, or through personal effort, or (ii) they have yet to be acquired. In the former case, the action begins with the recollection of the means and the ascertainment of their sufficiency to lead to the desired object and consequent determination to utilise them. In the latter case, i.e. if the means are not at hand, there is a mental effort to find them out and an anxiety to secure them after the ascertainment of their efficiency.

This beginning need not necessarily be made by the hero. If the hero has entrusted the care of his affairs to his minister, the action will be begun by the latter, as in the case of Ratnāvalī, wherein the action is begun, not by the hero, but by his minister, Yaugandharāyaṇa. The action, according to the nature of the situation in which it opens, can be begun not only by the hero or his minister but also

by the heroine or the adversary or even by some divine being[1].

The first act of Ratnāvalī very well illustrates the point in hand. The basic mental state, tried to be presented in it, is the erotic; naturally, therefore, King Udayana is represented to be an amorous king. His affairs are managed by his faithful minister. He himself is always busy with amorous sports. The action, therefore, is begun by Yaugandharāyaṇa, the minister. The end to be achieved is the union of the king with Ratnāvalī. The conquest of Kośala is subsidiary to the main plot. The means to that end have mostly been secured. Ratnāvalī has been got and put in the palace and so within the easy reach of the hero. The views of the King of Ceylon about the union are well known. And the providence seems to be very favourable. Here, therefore, action begins with the recollection of the means to the desired end and the expression of satisfaction with them as regards their capacity to bring about the realisation of the aim.

What other elements of action are found in the beginning, we shall state in the detailed analysis of the drama under the heading *Sandhyaṅgas*. Let us, therefore, now take into consideration the next stage of action.

II. The effort (Yatna).

The beginning may be made by any one of the persons, mentioned above. But the effort has to be made by the central figure of the piece. It consists in finding out the only way to the speedy realisation of the desired end and in following it with whole heart. In the case of Ratnāvalī, the dramatist has shown very great dramatic skill in presenting this part of the piece. The full value of it can

1. A. Bh. (MSS.) Ch., 19. V. 9.

be realised by taking into consideration the effect of it. For, the effort in itself is very innocent and insignificant, but it is quite in keeping with the helpless situation, in which the focus of the situation, the heroine, is placed, as also with her basic mental state.

THE EFFORT SITUATION.

Ratnāvalī is in Udayana's harem as a keeper of Vāsavadattā's pet bird. It is the day of celebration of the spring festival. Every one in the palace is in the festive mood. Grand preparations have been made for the celebration. The King is coming to receive the love-offering from the queen, according to the age-long custom. Sāgarikā, who is no other than Ratnāvalī in disguise, also comes to see the celebration. But the queen, fearing the effect of her beauty on the amorous mind of the king, sends her away to look after the bird. Sāgarikā, however, impelled by the youthful curiosity, sees the celebration, concealing herself behind a tree of the palace garden, the scene of festivity.

On this occasion it is customary to worship Cupid. The queen has invited the king as usual to come to accept her offering. The king comes. But such is his natural beauty that Sāgarikā thinks that Cupid himself has come, and, as any young girl would do, prays that his sight may not go altogether futile. The celebration ends and a bard announces the presence of the subordinate Rajas in the audience-hall to pay their respects to King Udayana. This announcement reveals the identity of the king to Sāgarikā, who so long mistook him to be Cupid. She immediately remembers that to him it was that her father gave her in marriage. What effect such a situation will have on the mind of a young unmarried princess, it is not difficult to imagine. Which girl

would not have as her husband, one whose beauty led her to mistake him for Cupid, particularly when she knows the views of her parents in favour of it ?

Naturally enough, she immediately falls in deep love with the king. But she is in a foreign land in the house of a stranger. Her position is simply that of an attendant on the queen, as a keeper of her pet bird. The queen has already given a hint of her feeling of jealousy by driving her away from the scene of festivity. Sāgarikā could imagine what her own fate would be, if the queen somehow could know of her love for King Udayana. She could not freely move about so as to get at a place wherefrom she could have a glance at the object of love. Intensity of love made her deeply think of all possible ways of getting a sight of the king, but she could not find any, which could put the king within her ken.

At last, finding no way to see the person of the King, she decides somehow to satisfy her desire by seeing him in a picture drawn by herself. Accordingly, she repairs to the plantain bower and sits down to draw a picture. This is the effort. The full[1] value of it can be realised by the reader only when he takes into account the ultimate effect of such an effort. The reader, familiar with the plot, knows that it was this simple effort of the heroine, which was ultimately responsible for her union with her object of love.

III. The Height (Prāptyāśā).

The effort leads to the organisation of all the characters of a drama into two groups, if they are not already so grouped : (i) one which helps the central figure in the attainment of the object and (ii) the other which tries to put obstacles in the way to the realisation and to frustrate all efforts. The third stage of action, therefore, represents the

1. A. Bh. (MSS) Ch. 19, V. 10.

struggle between the two contending parties. For some time, therefore, the cause of the central figure is seen to advance and then it gets a reverse. Again it advances and then again it gets a set-back and so on. Thus, in this stage the central figure is represented to be full of hope of success with the means at the disposal, but this hope is mixed up with the fear of failure, because of the existence of the opposite party, which frequently shows its determination to frustrate all designs of the hero or heroine of the piece. It is because of this that this stage is technically called PRĀPTYĀSĀ.[1]

PRĀPTYĀŚĀ SITUATION.

Ratnāvalī is sitting in the plantain bower of the garden, completing the picture of the king on a picture-board. Hardly has she completed it when her friend comes and becomes aware of Ratnāvalī's intention in drawing the picture, from the situation, picks up the drawing pencil and draws the picture of Ratnāvalī by the side of that of the king. This surprises Ratnāvalī, who tries to conceal the matter by a show of anger. Her friend, Susaṅgatā, however, pushes herself into confidence. She appreciates Sāgarikā's feeling, promises all help and tells her of the very probable help from the Maina in the matter.

As they are talking, the feeling of love in Ratnāvalī gets more intense and she faints. Susaṅgatā brings her back to her senses. Hardly has she recovered her senses when they have to rush for safety from a monkey that has got loose. They leave the picture-board behind. In the meantime, the bird, of which Ratnāvalī is the keeper, flies away. Knowing, therefore, full well how dear the bird is to the queen and how angry she would be if it were lost,

1. D. R. 6.

both of them run after the bird. At this time the king comes with the fool to the garden and sees the picture-board. As they are surmising the cause of such a drawing, the Maina, as anticipated by Susaṅgatā, repeats the entire talk between Sāgarikā and her friend. This reveals the whole secret. The effect of such a revelation on the king needs no statement. As they sit, talking over the picture, Sāgarikā and her friend return to the bower to pick up the picture-board. The voice of the king and his fool is heard by them from a little distance. They conceal themselves behind a tree and overhear the conversation. Hope is naturally inspired into the heart of Sāgarikā.

Susaṅgatā then goes to the plantain bower under the pretext of picking up the picture-board, and informs the king of the presence of Sāgarikā nearby. The king rushes to the spot and the lovers meet. Hardly a few moments pass when the fool separates them by arousing the fear of the queen's arrival by a clever quibble: "Here is another queen Vāsavadattā." Sāgarikā and her friend run away. The king soon understands the quibble. And while the King is reprimanding the fool, the queen actually arrives with her attendant. The fool conceals the picture-board in his arm-pit. The royal couple begins talking. A remark of the queen in the course of the talk makes the fool so elated that he begins to dance with his hands lifted up. The picture-board, that he is hiding in his arm-pit, therefore, falls down. It is picked up by the queen's attendant and is shown to the queen. It startles the queen. She asks the king all about it. He tries to explain it away. But she is not satisfied: on the contrary, she fully understands the situation and goes away, saying that the picture-board has caused her headache, and immediately commits Sāgarikā

to the charge of one of her attendants, who is no other than Susaṅgatā, who, unfortunately for the queen, but fortunately for Sāgarikā, is pledged to bring about the union. Thus, all the characters of the drama are arranged in two opposite groups and the struggle between the parties begins.

The queen and her attendants, Kāñcanamālā and Madanikā, form one party, the opposition, and Sāgarikā, the king, his fool and Susaṅgatā the other. The king is lying love-sick. And Sāgarikā, as her friends know very well, is finding it hard to live. The queen, as has already been stated, has taken all the possible precautions to prevent the meeting of the king and Sāgarikā, by committing her, but unfortunately for herself, to the charge of Susaṅgatā. The fool, however, in consultation with the latter, conspires to bring about the union. It is arranged that Sāgarikā will be disguised with the queen's dress, presented to Susaṅgatā as a mark of favour, and Susangatā will disguise herself as Kāñcanamālā, the queen's favourite attendant, and both will be taken to the king by the fool. Thus the cause of one party advances.

But the other party is not entirely idle. Kāñcanamālā discovers the plot and informs the queen of it. It is agreed between them that they would anticipate Sāgarikā. Accordingly, the queen and Kañcanamālā come to the appointed place a little earlier than Sāgarikā and her friend in disguise. The fool, not knowing that the plot has been discovered and that the queen has anticipated Sāgarikā, takes them to the king. The king, mistaking the queen for Sāgarikā, congratulates her on the supposed successful disguise and begins the profession of his love. This exasperates the queen. She reveals her identity and in anger leaves the king, inspite of the latter's efforts at reconciliation. Thus, the cause of Sāgarikā gets a reverse.

Sāgarikā comes to know of the discovery and of the manner, in which the queen has taken it. Her life loses all its charm for her. She decides to commit suicide by hanging herself and goes to a tree to do so.

The king in the meantime decides to go to the queen to reconcile her. As he is proceeding towards her residence, the fool catches sight of Sāgarikā, in the guise of the queen, and thinking that she, in anger, is putting an end to her life, asks the king to rush to save her life. The king rushes forward, removes the noose from her neck, discovers her to be Sāgarikā, and, therefore, naturally throws his arms round her neck. Thus the lovers meet once again and the cause of the heroine advances.

In the meantime, the queen, thinking that she was too rude to the king, feels repentant and starts to reconcile him. She hears the voice of the king from a little distance and makes up her mind to spring a pleasant surprise on him by throwing her arms round him from behind. As she steps forward, she hears the name of Sāgarikā and, therefore, decides to overhear the king and Sāgarikā from behind The love-talk between them enrages her and she goes forward and remonstrates. He attempts to placate her, but she does not listen to him. She gets Sāgarikā arrested and leaves the scene. Thus the opposition once again asserts itself and the cause of the heroine gets a set-back.

Thus, the third stage of action can be viewed from two points of view, (i) the action and (ii) the mental state From the point of view of action it is a struggle between the two opposite parties, in which the success of one alternates with the failure of the other. And from the point of view of the mental state, it is a stage, in which there arises the hope of success in the mind of the central

figure of the situation, because of the discovery of the means to the desired end. But it is always coupled with the fear of failure, because of the consciousness of the existence of the powerful opposition. This state of mind finds a beautiful expression in the words of Sāgarikā when she has found the disguise as the means of meeting her lover.[1]

IV. The Consequence (Niyatāpti)

We have seen that the third stage of action involves assertion by the opposition of its powers, which means a serious set-back to the cause of the central figure of the situation. This naturally leads to the search for the possible means to attain the objective on the part of the hero, heroine or their helper, and to marshalling of all resources to overcome the opposition or to remove the obstacle, that has so far stood in the way of the realisation of the goal. In the case of Sanskrit drama, the hero is always presented to be able to get over the difficulty, which for sometime stands in his way and frustrates all his plans and designs, because, as we have already stated, there is no tragedy in Sanskrit.

The removal of the obstacle is effected in two ways: (i) either by completely destroying it, as in the case of all the dramas, in which the recovery of Sītā from Rāvaṇa forms the subject-matter ; in such a case the basic mental state, primarily presented, is the heroic; or (ii) by reconciling the leader of the opposition, as in the case of Ratnāvalī. In such a case the basic mental state is the erotic. The latter case is beautifully illustrated by that portion of Ratnāvalī, which begins with the king's fixing upon the reconciliation of the queen as the only way to the union with[2] Sāgarikā. (Vayasya devīprasādanam muktvā nānyamatropāyam paśyāmi).

1. R. 6. 2. D. R. 6.

The reconciliation does not mean immediate union or the attainment of the object. That would be undramatic. From this point to that of the actual union, the drama is occupied with the disentanglement of the plot, or clearing of the mystery that surrounds it.

Once the queen is reconciled, the disentanglement is beautifully effected in Ratnāvalī. It begins with the arrival of Vijayavarman with the message of victory over the king of Kośala, from the king's commander-in-chief, Rumaṇvān, who was in charge of the Kośala war. Hardly has he finished his message when a magician is introduced to show his skill. This brings about the appearance of the reconciled queen with the King to see the magic. Hardly the performance has proceeded a little when Vasubhuti, the army-officer of the king of Ceylon, is introduced. He is conducted to the presence of the king by the fool. He sees the necklace of jewels of Ratnāvalī round the neck of the fool and notices its marked similarity with the one, given to Ratnavalī at the time of her departure for the palace of Udayana. He, therefore, suspects the presence of the princess in the Palace. His suspicion, however, is set at rest by his companion. He is brought to the presence of the king and narrates the unfortunate story of Ratnāvalī's ship-wreck. Hardly has he finished his sad tale when there is heard the confused noise, due to the breaking out of fire in that part of the palace, wherein Sāgarikā is kept confined. The report bewilders the queen. She informs the king of the chained Sāgarikā in the harem, now enveloped in the flames. The King, unmindful of his life, rushes into the flame-enveloped harem. The queen, the fool and the army-officer of the king of Ceylon, with his companion, follow him to rescue Sāgarikā even at the cost of their lives. They reach

Sāgarikā's room. As the king touches her body to remove her from the fire, the fire, which was a work of magic only, goes out. All feel surprised. Vasubhūti, the war-officer of the king of Ceylon, recognises Sāgarikā to be Ratnāvalī and the plot is revealed. Then comes Yaugandharāyaṇa and explains the purpose of the secrecy that he maintained about the identity of Ratnāvalī and the plot is completely disentangled.

V. The Close (Phalāgama).

The stages of action are so presented that one naturally leads to another till the fruition of the action. The last stage does not take much time. The adversary having been defeated or the obstacle having been overcome, and the plot having been disentangled, the fruition of the action should not take time. In the present case it is represented by the attainment of sovereignty by the king and his union[1] with Ratnāvalī.

The Means to the End (Arthaprakṛti)[2]

The analysis of the existing dramatic literature reveals the existence not only of the main plot, which has been analysed above into five stages of action, but also of some additional elements, which cannot strictly be spoken of as the component parts of the main. These additional elements are found not only in Sanskrit dramas but in English dramas also, for instance, in those which are the products of the mature genius of Shakespeare. In them we find not only the five component parts of the dramatic action, discussed above, but, in addition to these, very frequently a sixth also, the introduction or exposition, containing, as it were, the *seed* or circumstances, from

1. D. R., 6. 2. A. Bh. (MSS) Ch 19, V. 19.

which the business arises. In Julius Cæsar, for instance, the first scene is of an introductory nature. The poet seems to take us in medias-res, while he is in reality building up the foundation of his plot. Further, in "As you like it" we find sub-plots:

1. The love-story of Celia and Oliver.
2. The love-story of Phebe and Silvius.
3. The love-story of Touchstone and Audrey.

Similarly in Sanskrit drama we generally find an introductory scene in the very beginning, technically called Viṣkambhaka, as for instance in Ratnāvalī, which is very much like the introductory scene in Julius Cæsar, mentioned above. Further, in most of the dramas of which Rāma is the hero, we find sub-plots, such as the story of Vāli and Sugrīva or that of Śravaṇakumāra.

The question naturally arises : what is the dramatic purpose of introducing these additional elements ? The dramaturgists in Sanskrit have given only one answer to this, i. e. they are the means whereby the wished-for object is reached. They are technically called *Arthaprakṛti*, the means to the end. According to the Sanskrit dramaturgists, there are five such means: (i) Bīja (ii) Vindu (iii) Patākā (iv) Prakarī and (v) Kārya. The end, to which they lead is the attainment of the desired end by the focus of the situation.

(I) THE SEED (BIJA) AND ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL NECESSITY.

Æsthetic experience from the Indian point of view is due to the subjective realisation of a basic mental state. The spectator is a passive recipient of the presented. In this experience the faculty of independent judgement is prefectly

inactive and there is total suspension of the personal volitional power. All this is necessary because the subjective realisation of the basic mental state is due to identification with the focus of the situation. His attitude and judgement, no less than his will, are determined by the presented. He looks upon the presented not as an individual A, B, or C would do so independently, but as the focus of the situation or the dramatist would have it looked upon. The Dramatist, therefore, has got to take the earliest opportunity of determining the attitude of the audience towards what he is going to present. An Indian dramatist, following the age-long tradition, does this, not in a blunt manner, but dramatically. This means of determining the attitude of the audience is called *seed* (*Bīja*).

The seed has more than one purpose to serve or function to perform. The aforesaid is only one of them. The other is simply informative. The main plot presents only a certain portion of the hero's life. It is, therefore, necessary that the audience should know the circumstances from which the action arises. To inform the reader or the audience of such circumstances, is the other purpose of the seed.

If we analyse the introductory scene of Ratnāvalī, the double purpose of the dramatist is revealed. It inspires a fatalistic attitude in the audience. It makes them take the presented events as mostly predetermined by the arbitrary decree. It sets their quest for the cause of the presented events at perfect rest. This is what the very first verse does by saying, "The fate, when favourable, brings the wished-for object from another island, as also from the ocean, nay, even from the end of the quarter."

To understand the full value of such a remark in the very beginning of a drama and its effect on the audience,

we must take into account the social status and importance of the person from whom it comes. The drama was written by King Harṣa. The democratic ideas of to-day were foreign to his mind as well as to those, before whom the drama was intended to be presented. We know the importance of the chief minister in an Imperialistic Government. Above all things, he is the leader of the most predominant thought of the people. The mental value of such a statement from such a person will undoubtedly be very great in determining the attitude of the audience towards the presented.

The second purpose also is beautifully served by the passage that immediately follows and is connected with what precedes as an illustration of it. It informs the audience of the circumstances, from which the action is to arise. It says "How else the princess of Ceylon, who got ship-wrecked in the ocean, could catch hold of a mast, be drifted to the shore and be brought to me by the merchant, returning from Ceylon, recognising her to be a princess through the necklace of jewels. I also, in putting her in charge of the queen,[1] have done what was the only right thing under the circumstances etc."

It may be stated here that in Sanskrit dramas also the introductory scene is not always necessary. Much depends upon the subject-matter. When the subject-matter does not need it, it should not be introduced. The main action can begin immediately. The introductory scene is necessary only when the introductory portion of the dramatised story has no æsthetic value, when it is *Nīrasa* Such a portion has got to be dealt with in the introductory scene. But when the story from the very beginning has the æsthetic value, i.e. when the beginning also is *Sarasa*[2]

1. D. R., 5. 2. D. R., 70.

the introductory scene is unnecessary. In the famous drama of Kālidāsa, Abhijñāna Śākuntalam, for instance, we have no such introductory scene.

It is necessary here to point out the distinction between the general introduction to every drama and the special introduction to a particular type of drama, in which the beginning of the story lacks æsthetic value. The general introduction is presented by the characters, common to all dramas, such as Nāndī, Sūtradhāra and his wife and attendants. This is necessary in all Sanskrit Dramas. It is called Prastāvanā. The special introduction is that in which one or more characters of the main plot appear and talk of the unpresentable part of the story in the beginning. It is technically called Viṣkambhaka. The latter may or may not be in a Sanskrit drama, according to the need of the subject-matter, but the former has got to be there in any case. It is the latter which is comparable to the introductory scene in some of the dramas of Shakespeare. There is nothing like the former in the Shakespearian dramas. The dramatic necessity of such a general introductory scene we will explain when dealing with it in detail.

Another point which needs mention here is that when the subject-matter of a drama does not need the special introduction, one of the two functions of such introduction, i. e. the determining of the attitude of the audience, is performed by the general one.

If we analyse the introductory scene in Shakespeare's Julius Cæsar, we find it similar to the special introduction in Sanskrit Dramas. It tells us of the chief cause of the presented action. It informs us of the circumstances, in which the action begins. We know that the main-spring of the whole action in this drama is the fickleness of the

crowd or commoners. The fickleness is as it were the seed, which is responsible for the development of the action, which culminates in the tragic end of the hero. It is very clearly presented in the introductory scene so that the audience can very well foresee the uncertainty of everything that depends on so uncertain a thing as the attitude of the commoners. Thus, on both the points, the introductory scene in the Shakespearian drama is similar to that in Sanskrit drama. And its occurrence in some and non-occurrence in others seems to be governed by the same principle as that which guides the Sanskrit dramatist.

II. The Recollection of the Motive force (Vindu)

The action and events, presented in a drama, have to lead to the furtherance f either the main or the subsidiary purpose. The main purpose cannot be achieved unless the conditions, favourable for its achievement, are brought about. But it is the realisation of the subsidiary purpose that brings them about. The events, therefore, which lead to its achievement, have necessarily to be presented. Thus they throw, for the time being, the main action into the background and bring in a sort of gap. The problem under these circumstances that the dramatist has got to face is "how to begin or resume the presentation of the main events ?" The practice of the Sanskrit dramatist, as stated by Bharata, has been to make the hero recollect the motive force of action as often as the interruption of the main plot may occur or as many times as the situation might change, so that the hero may be able to so adjust himself to the changed[1] circumstances, to so utilise the resources at his command and to so deal with the existing situation that he may get nearer the goal. This recollection of the motive

1. A. Bh. (MSS). Ch. 19., V. 24.

the introductory scene is unnecessary. In the famous drama of Kālidāsa, Abhijñāna Śākuntalam, for instance, we have no such introductory scene.

It is necessary here to point out the distinction between the general introduction to every drama and the special introduction to a particular type of drama, in which the beginning of the story lacks æsthetic value. The general introduction is presented by the characters, common to all dramas, such as Nāndī, Sūtradhāra and his wife and attendants. This is necessary in all Sanskrit Dramas. It is called Prastāvanā. The special introduction is that in which one or more characters of the main plot appear and talk of the unpresentable part of the story in the beginning. It is technically called Viṣkambhaka. The latter may or may not be in a Sanskrit drama, according to the need of the subject-matter, but the former has got to be there in any case. It is the latter which is comparable to the introductory scene in some of the dramas of Shakespeare. There is nothing like the former in the Shakespearian dramas. The dramatic necessity of such a general introductory scene we will explain when dealing with it in detail.

Another point which needs mention here is that when the subject-matter of a drama does not need the special introduction, one of the two functions of such introduction, i. e. the determining of the attitude of the audience, is performed by the general one.

If we analyse the introductory scene in Shakespeare's Julius Cæsar, we find it similar to the special introduction in Sanskrit Dramas. It tells us of the chief cause of the presented action. It informs us of the circumstances, in which the action begins. We know that the main-spring of the whole action in this drama is the fickleness of the

crowd or commoners. The fickleness is as it were the seed, which is responsible for the development of the action, which culminates in the tragic end of the hero. It is very clearly presented in the introductory scene so that the audience can very well foresee the uncertainty of everything that depends on so uncertain a thing as the attitude of the commoners. Thus, on both the points, the introductory scene in the Shakespearian drama is similar to that in Sanskrit drama. And its occurrence in some and non-occurrence in others seems to be governed by the same principle as that which guides the Sanskrit dramatist.

II. The Recollection of the Motive Force (Vindu)

The action and events, presented in a drama, have to lead to the furtherance of either the main or the subsidiary purpose. The main purpose cannot be achieved unless the conditions, favourable for its achievement, are brought about. But it is the realisation of the subsidiary purpose that brings them about. The events, therefore, which lead to its achievement, have necessarily to be presented. Thus they throw, for the time being, the main action into the background and bring in a sort of gap. The problem under these circumstances that the dramatist has got to face is "how to begin or resume the presentation of the main events ?" The practice of the Sanskrit dramatist, as stated by Bharata, has been to make the hero recollect the motive force of action as often as the interruption of the main plot may occur or as many times as the situation might change, so that the hero may be able to so adjust himself to the changed[1] circumstances, to so utilise the resources at his command and to so deal with the existing situation that he may get nearer the goal. This recollection of the motive

1. A. Bh. (MSS). Ch. 19., V. 24.

force has to be there from the time of fixing upon an objective to that of actually achieving it. This is necessary at every important turn in the events, because so long as he does not mentally survey the entire situation from the beginning to the particular point, at which important changes have taken place, in the context of his purpose, it would not be possible for him to utilise his resources well.

If we take the Tāpasa Vatsarāja for example, we find that the king remembers his love for Vāsavadattā[1], the motive force of the action in the drama, in every act. But Ratnāvalī will probably better illustrate the point. After the introductory scene of the drama, in which Yougandharāyaṇa speaks of the circumstances, from which the action is to arise, the festive scene is introduced to introduce all the main characters of the piece to the audience. But after this there seems to be a break in the story. The bards are, therefore, introduced to reveal the identity of the king to Ratnāvalī, who has so far taken him to be Cupid. This revelation makes her remember that to this king it was that she was given by her father and the main action consequently begins.

It may be pointed out here that this recollection of the motive force is not always by one and the same person. No doubt when the realisation of the end depends on the action of only one person, he alone is made to recollect it on all important occasions. But when the achievement is due to the co-operation of more than one, anyone of them, according to the need of the occasion, is presented to recollect. For instance, in the case of Ratnāvalī, it is the king who[2] is presented to remember his love for Ratnāvalī in every act and adjusts his resources according to the need

1. A. Bh., (MSS.) Ch. 19. V. 24.
2. A. Bh., (MSS.) Ch. 19. V. 24.

of the occasion, because Ratnāvalī herself is in an utterly helpless condition.

This recollection of the motive force is found in the dramas of Shakespeare also. For instance, in Hamlet we find Hamlet remembering the murder of his father, the motive force of all his actions, every time the situation changes.

This recollection of the motive force for the resumption of the main action of the drama is technically called Vindu on the analogy of a drop of oil, dropped on the surface of of a sheet of water. For, just as a drop of oil, fallen on the surface of water, spreads over the entire sheet, so the recollection of the motive force of action spreads over the entire drama[1].

III. Sub-plot (Patākā)

Very often we find that the success of the central figure in a drama depends on the co-operation of others, who are not his dependents, like the ministers or other servants. They are independent persons, but they join hands with the hero for some personal reason or even without any prominent personal objective. For instance, as we have already stated, in the dramas with Rāma as the hero, the recovery of Sītā from Rāvaṇa depends on the co-operation of Sugrīva. But Sugrīva has his own end to achieve and does actually achieve it i. e. the recovery of his kingdom through responsive co-operation of Rāma. Thus, a sub-plot, the main character of which helps the hero of the main plot and attains some end of his own also through the co-operation of the latter, is technically called Patākā.

1. A. Bh., (MSS.)Ch. 19., V. 24.

This kind of sub-plot we find in the Shakespearian dramas also. In *As you Like It*, for instance, the story of Celia can be presented to be very much like that of Sugrīva inasmuch as she helps Rosalind in her own way, and, while so doing, herself attains her end, the union with the object of her love, Oliver. For, the story of Celia and Orlando is brought about,

1. By Celia accompanying Rosalind into Banishment.

2. By the banishment of Oliver.

3. By the meeting and reconciliation of Oliver and Orlando.

4. By the wound of Orlando, which prevents his keeping his appointment with Rosalind. He sends Oliver to explain his absence. Oliver and Celia meet and fall in love with each other.

IV. Minor Plot (Prakarī).

But when the main character of a sub-plot achieves no end of his own and his action simply helps the central figure in some way, it is called Prakarī.[1] While the former, sub-plot, is closely connected with the main and extends from the time of its introduction to the third or fourth stage of action in the drama, the latter comes in just at one point and ends there. It may, therefore, be called *Minor plot*: as for instance, the story of Kṛishṇa[2] in the Veṇī Saṁhāra.

The minor plots in the dramas of Shakespeare are more or less of this nature; for instance, the story of Duke Frederick in *As You Like it.*

The chief point of distinction between the sub-plot and the minor plot, the Patākā and the Prakarī, is that

1. N. S., Ch. 21. V. 25-6. 2. A. Bh. (MSS) Ch. 19 V. 25.

the former receives more attention of the dramatists and is treated like the main plot in a less elaborate manner inasmuch as it has fewer Sandhis than the main. The latter receives very[1] scanty treatment and has no Sandhi.

It is interesting to note in this connection that Dhanañjaya's conception of the minor plot (Prakarī) is slightly different from that of Bharata, as interpreted by Abhinavagupta. According to the former, the distinction of Prakarī from Patākā consists only in the shortness of its story as compared to that of Patākā.[2] He ignores the idea of the disinterested help, that the hero of the minor plot renders to that of the main plot.

Accordingly he cites the story of Śravaṇa Kumāra in the Rāmāyaṇa as an illustration of Prakarī.

V. The Resources (Kārya).

The last of the five means to the end, that the dramatist represents the hero to achieve, is the[3] set of physical, mental and material resources, which are his personal possessions and which he employs in the realisation of his goal. The word Kārya here is used in the technical sense of all that, being in one's possession, is utilised for the attainment of the end, on which one has set one's heart (Kāryam, karaṇīyam, prayoktavyamityarthaḥ) (A. Bh., Ch. 19. V. 24). No drama can be found without this, because, the object of every drama is to present a certain portion of the hero's life, in which he attains something, therefore, reference to his various resources, by means of which he realises his goal, is absolutely essential.

It may be stated here that all of these five *means to the* end (Artha Prakṛtis) are not necessary in every

1. D. R., 70. 2. D. R., 4.
3. A. Bh., (MSS). Ch. 19. V. 25.

drama, as are the five stages of action. Therefore, it is that in different dramas, only as many of the means, as are necessary for the achievement of his end by the hero, are found. When for instance, the hero is intended to be presented as independently achieving his objective, the sub-plot and the minor plot (Patākā and Prakarī) are unnecessary. But the (i) Seed (Bīja)[1] (ii) the recollection of motive force (Vindu) and (iii) resources (Kārya) have got to be in every drama.

SANDHIS (PARTS) IN SANSKRIT DRAMA

Sanskrit drama has been conceived as a sentient being. The different constituents of it, as revealed by a careful analysis from different points of view, are, therefore, represented to be connected with one another exactly as the various constituents of a sentient being are actually connected. An effort also has been made to give the various constituents, as far as possible, the names of parts of a human body.

The subject-matter of a drama and the language which presents it, are spoken of as the body. The latter is said to be the body simply because it represents the meaning and also because the meaning, is superimposed on it. It is also so spoken because it has no value independently of the meaning.[2] And the basic mental state (Sthāyibhāva or Rasa) is represented to be the soul, because just as it is the soul, which is primarily responsible for the manifestation or appearance of the body, so it is the basic mental state, to which the plot, as presented in the drama, owes its being. Just as every[3] sentient being presupposes

1. A. Bh., (MSS) Ch. 19., V. 25.
2. A. Bh., (MSS) Ch. 19., V. 1.
3. A. Bh., (MSS) Ch. 19., V. 1

the enlivening soul, so every drama presupposes a basic mental state.

The body is made up of parts, such as the face, the shoulders and the belly etc. And for a complete body all the parts are essential. A good drama, therefore, being conceived as a human body, naturally must have all the essential parts. These parts of the drama, following the analogy of the human body, have been called, as far as possible, by those very names, by which the parts of human body are called. The first part, for instance, is called Mukha, the second Pratimukha and the third Garbha. The fourth and the fifth, however, are called by names which do not stand for any part of the human body, probably because by no stretch of imagination, any such names could be applied to those parts. They are called Avamarśa or Vimarśa and Upasaṁhṛti.

The following points have to be kept in mind in this connection :—

1. Only in a perfect drama, Nāṭaka or Prakaraṇa, all these[1] parts are necessary. In imperfect dramas all the Sandhis are not found. In Ḍima and Samavakāra only four are found; in Vyāyoga and Īhāmṛga only three and in Prahasana and Bhāṇa only two are employed.

2. Dhanañjaya in his Daśarūpaka, does not correctly present the view of Bharata when he says that one of the five stages of action (Kāryāvasthā) joined with one of the five means to the end (Arthaprakṛti) in the order, in which they are mentioned by him,[2] give rise to the five Sandhis. Bharata never meant such an order. For, as we have already stated, according to him, the sub-plot and the minor

1. N. S. 241.
2. D. R., 6.

plot (Patākā and Prakarī) are not necessary in every drama. And the fact is that they are not found in every drama. According to Dhanañjaya's conception of the Sandhis, there should, therefore, be no such Sandhis as involve the sub-plot and the minor plot, in those dramas, which are without the latter. But the fact is that all the necessary Sandhis[1] are found in every Nāṭaka, irrespective of the fact of the presence or absence of the sub-plot and minor-plot.

3. This analysis of the drama into different Sandhis is from the point of view of the subject-matter (Itivṛtta); just as the analysis into Kāryāvasthas is from the point of view of the action and into Arthaprakṛtis is from that of the means.

1. Mukha Sandhi (Birth of the Seed).

That part of the subject-matter of a drama, which represents the Bīja, marks the beginning of the action and presents all that which, being directly or indirectly connected with the action or seed, needs presentation and is responsible for the rise of various basic mental states to a certain pitch, is called Mukha Sandhi. The portion of Ratnāvalī from the beginning to the recognition by Ratnāvalī of King Udyana as such, beautifully illustrates it. It clearly illustrates all the points mentioned above. It presents the seed in both of its aspects discussed already. It involves the beginning of the action. It presents various events such as the celebration of the spring festival. It also beautifully depicts the basic mental states of the important characters[2] of the drama at different pitches in the context of the existing situation. For instance, the heroic basic

1. A. Bh, (MSS) Ch. 19. V. 27.
2. A. Bh. (MSS) Ch. 19., V. 39.

mental state of the minister, the erotic feeling of the king and the marvel of Sāgarikā are well brought out in this.

2. PRATIMUKHA (OPENING OF THE SEED).

It may be pointed out at the very outset that on this point there is difference of opinion between Dhanañjaya and Abhinava. In fact, Abhinava criticises the view, expressed by Dhanañjaya[1] on this point by attributing it to "*some*" (Kecit). Whether by "Kecit" he means Dhanañjaya or some other authority, whom the latter follows, it is difficult to state. Dhanañjaya's conception of the Pratimukha may be stated as follows :—

The Pratimukha consists in the development of the seed, partly perceptible and partly imperceptible. The second act of Ratnāvalī illustrates the point in hand. Here the seed, the love of Sāgarikā, the main cause of her union with King Udayana, is developed. It is partly seen and partly unseen. It is seen in as far as it is known to her friend, Susaṅgatā, and the king's friend, the fool. But it is unseen inasmuch as it could only be inferred by the queen from the picture-board.[2]

Abhinava, following the authority of his teacher (Upādhyāya) does not accept this conception. According to him, the various Sandhis represent the different states of the seed[3], and the visibility is the only thing to be presented in the Pratimukha.

His view, therefore, is that the partial visibility and partial invisibility of the seed is meant to be presented in the Mukha Sandhi. This is exactly what we find actually presented in the first act of Ratnāvalī.

1. A. Bh. (MSS) Ch. 19.. V. 40.
2. D. R. 11.
3. A. Bh. (MSS) Ch. 19, V. 40.

Here the activity of Sāgarikā, mentioned by the Minister, which is of the nature of the seed, because all the future developments are its outcome, is thrown into the back-ground by the introduction of the festive scene. This scene covers her activity much as does the earth a seed. And just as the earth, while covering a seed, actually helps it in its growth, so does the festive scene the action of Sāgarikā.[1] Thus the seed of action in the first act, which is at first clearly visible, is rendered as if it were invisible by the festive scene. The Pratimukha, therefore, according to him, is primarily concerned with total unfolding of the seed, that is presented in the Mukha, which though seen is yet, being thrown into the back-ground, remains as if it were unseen.

This is called Pratimukha for the simple reason that in it the attempt of the dramatist is quite opposite[2] to that involved in the Mukha. For, while in the latter his attempt is to keep the seed concealed, in the former his efforts are concentrated on unfolding it.

3. GARBHA.

The Garbha Sandhi represents a further stage in the development of the seed than the one reached in the Pratimukha. The latter represents the sprouting but the former the embryonic fruition. It consists in the presentation of the central figure achieving the wished-for and then losing it and then again getting and losing it also and so on for a number of times. Every time the wished-for is lost there is a search for it. If we take the second act of Ratnāvalī and a part of the third to illustrate the point, it will become fairly clear. It is here that the first meeting of

1. A. Bh. (MSS) Ch. 19. V. 40.
2. A. Bh., (MSS) Ch. 19. V. 40.

the king and Sāgarikā takes place in the garden, where the picture-board was left. But soon there is separation because of the coming of the queen. In the disguise-scene there is again the supposed attainment of the objective and it is again followed as if it were by the loss in consequence of the revelation by Vāsavadattā of her identity. Again in the noose-scene there is meeting and again there is parting, because of the arrival of the queen.[1] The presentation of the loss of the attained is the essential part of Garbha Sandhi. For, if there be no loss it will in no way be different from Avamarśa wherein the attainment is finally freed from all shadows of doubt about it.

4. AVAMARŚA.

Avamarśa essentially involves doubt. For, it consists in reflecting or pondering over a situation that does not seem to lead to the goal. This being so, the introduction of it at a stage, when hope has already been aroused in the mind of the hero and the goal has been presented to be within the region of fair probability of realisation, seems to be against the facts revealed by the study of human psychology. On an analysis of ordinary experience we find that (i) doubt (ii) probability and (iii) certainty follow one another. Further, Avamarśa has as its constituent the Niyatāpti. How can Niyatāpti and Saṁśaya go together ?

The critic, whose view is stated above, has apparently taken a different psychological fact into consideration, from that on which the introduction of doubt in Avamarśa is based. The object of Avamarśa is to present the climax. And the climax is reached only when the situation, presented, brings out at its best the chief characteristic of the

1. A. Bh., (MSS) Ch. 19. V. 41.

hero. This comes out at its best only when the struggle, in which he is engaged, is the keenest and the obstacle, that he overcomes, is the greatest that he has ever to face. Further, the best qualities are forced to come out only when, after the facts have conspired to arouse a strong hope, there arises the obstacle, which dashes it to the ground and arouses grave doubts in the hero about his success. It is thus based on the fact of experience. But it has to be understood that it is not the reflection at the first sight of the object of desire, but consequent on the rise of obstacle after hope has been aroused. Avamarśa fits in very well with Niyatāpti inasmuch as it involves overcoming of the last obstacle. At the beginning of Avamarśa, some obstacles are put on the way of the hero so as to bring out his best qualities. The Sandhyaṅgas, which have been mentioned thereunder, fully bear out this assertion. Whether the theme of a drama be love or heroism, the dramatis personea have to be arranged into two opposite groups. That is, to say, in all dramas, there has to be presented the conflict of interests at least in the beginning. It is, therefore, natural that one of the contending parties, finding its path obstructed by the other, should speak ill of it, that there should be exchange of hot words between them when they meet, that one of them should kill or arrest those primarily responsible for the obstruction and so on. Thus, when a very important member, such as the deputy leader, of one party is killed or arrested by the leader of the opposition, there arise grave doubts in the mind of the hero about his success to achieve the objective. He, therefore, exerts himself to the utmost. This brings out his best qualities.

That[1] portion of Ratnāvalī which represents the

1. D. R. 21.

brooding of the king over the situation created by Vāsavadattā in arresting Sāgarikā in anger, till the fire-scene, is a good illustration of Avamarśa.

5. NIRVAHAṆA (FRUITION)

That Sandhi, in which all that is introduced in the presentation of the first four stages of action, of the means, employed so far, and of all the previous Sandhis, is shown to contribute to the production of the one result, the presentation of the attainment of which by the hero is the chief aim of the dramatist, is the Nirvahana. The portion of Ratnavali, following the fire-scene till the end of the drama, illustrates this point.

THE SANDHYAṄGA DEFINED.

A Sandhi represents a part of the whole drama. This part is further subdivided into single actions and incidents. These sub-divisions of Sandhis are called Sandhyangas. They are enumerated by Bharata in a certain order. All these actions and incidents, when put together in a certain order, not the one, in which they are enumerated, but that which makes them fit for presentation on the stage, bring the so called Sandhis into being. Hence, because they are the constitutents of a Sandhi, they are called its parts (Sandhyaṅga)[1].

THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF SANDHYAṄGAS.

The purpose of Sandhyaṅgas is to facilitate the task of the presentation both by the dramatist and the actors and to enable the spectator to follow it easily. It is a matter of common experience that when a thing, which is long and complex, is tried to be presented, the best method is to divide the presentable into parts. This is just what

1. A. Bh. (MSS) Ch. 19, V. 52.

a good essayist does. He first jots down the points, which he has to elaborate. This is what we find in the modern books. The contents of a book are divided under broad shoulder-headings. This kind of division helps in the presentation and in the apprehension. It is the experience of every teacher that, when a complicated problem has to be attempted in the class, the best method of putting it before the class is to split it into parts and to present each part separately.

This kind of division is more necessary when the presentation is to be attempted by a number of persons of different intellectual equipments, of different sexes, of different ages, speaking different languages, as in the case of the dramatic presentation. We know that in staging a drama utmost precision is necessary in presenting physical movements, voluntary and involuntary changes in the facial and other physical expressions, intonation of and emphasis on words, the manner of delivery and above all the basic mental state together with the transient, which is the main spring of all. It is, therefore, necessary for each actor to know how much and no more he has to speak and act and in what state of mind. This is made easy to know by the division.

This facilitates the task of the dramatist also inasmuch as it enables him to find out easily as to what stage-instructions to give to a particular character, in what language to put his statement and what to contain in it. And because the division makes it possible to attend to every part, it naturally, therefore, adds to the clarity of presentation. Thus the division helps all, the spectator, the actor, and the dramatist.

THE PURPOSES OF SANDHYAṄGAS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF DRAMATIST.

1. To present the subject-matter in such a manner that it may give rise to the æsthetic experience.

2. To slowly reveal the plot.

3. To put the plot in such a manner that each part of it may in itself become interesting; and all together may make one another more interesting, when viewed as related, than what they could separately have been.

4. To present a familiar and, therefore, uninteresting event in such a manner that it may surprise the audience by novelty of presentation.

5. To present what is absolutely necessary for arousing the required mental state.

6. Not to bring on the stage what is unfit for it.

Just as a person who is without limbs cannot fight, so a drama, without Sandhyaṅgas, cannot be well presented on the stage.

Even when a drama does not present the attainment of any very great thing by the hero, as in the case of a comedy, still if its parts (aṅgas) are well arranged, it can beautifully be presented, because of the parts being well-defined. Even though a drama be presenting the attainment of the highest goal of human life, yet, because it is not well divided into clear parts and, therefore, is not quite fit for good presentation, it does not interest any body, the dramatist, the actor, or the spectator[1].

FREEDOM IN THE USE OF SANDHYAṄGAS.

Bharata, as interpreted by Abhinava, has allowed

1. N. S. 242 and A. Bh. (MSS) Ch. 19, V. 54.

considerable freedom to the dramatist in the use of the Sandhyaṅgas.

The following facts have to be kept in mind to avoid confusion :—

1. The Sandhyaṅgas are mentioned in a certain order. The order of Bharata is different from that of Dhanañjaya. But no order is meant to be kept in their presentation. Any one of the Sandhyaṅgas can come anywhere in the Sandhi, according to the need of the Dramatist.

2. It is not necessary that every one of them should come in a Sandhi. Any one of them can be left out, according to the need.

3. In one Sandhi, any one of its Sandhyaṅgas can be brought in more than once, if the necessity for doing so be felt. This is what, we find, has actually been done by so many dramatists, from whose works illustrations have been chosen. We find that while illustrating a particular Sandhyaṅga from the same work, two authorities, Abhinava in his Abinava Bhāratī and Dhanika in his commentary on the Daśa Rūpaka, give different illustrations. This can be explained only on the aforesaid assumption, e.g. Drava. But there should not be too much of a repetition: one can be repeated at the most thrice.

4. Sandhyaṅgas of one Sandhi can be introduced in another.

5. Two Sandhyaṅgas can be compressed into one, when there is the purposive unity between the two.[1]

The separate treatment of each Sandhyaṅga requires more space than can be given in this volume. We, therefore leave it only to take it up well in some future work.

---

1. A. Bh. (MSS). Ch. 19. V. 71.

CHAPTER VII

ÆSTHETIC CURRENTS IN POETICS.

In the preceding chapters we have dealt with the problem of æsthetics from the point of view of Bharata and his commentators. They studied this problem with the sole reference to the dramatic art and regarded all other arts as subsidiary to the dramatic. Thus poetry was, according to them, only a hand-maid to drama.

There are, however, schools of poetics, which maintain that poetry has an independent status. The conception of poetry, according to each school, is different. But the difference generally refers to the question:—"What is the soul or essence of poetry ?" If we survey the history of poetics, we find the conception of poetry slowly evolving, till in the final stage, Rasa, which was established to be the soul of drama by Bharata and his followers, is accepted to be the soul of poetry also. In this chapter we shall trace the evolution of the conception of the soul or essence of poetry from Bhāmaha, the first Ālaṅkārika, whom we know from his work, to Udbhaṭa.

The Poeticians differed from the Dramaturgists not only in regard to the essence of poetry but also in respect of the experience that it arouses. Although the early available works on poetics, Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra for instance, are so fragmentary that it is difficult to state definitely on their basis, the poetician's conception of æsthetic experience : yet there are vague indications such as the use of different expressions for the experience which is admitted to arise from poetry. Bhāmaha, for instance, uses the word Prīti for this experience and not

Rasāsvāda, which Bharata uses with monotonous regularity.

The Dramatic and the Poetic Experiences Differentiated.

The æsthetic experience, of which we have talked in the foregoing pages, is essentially an experience, in which the elements of individuality of both, the subject and the object, are eliminated. It is a subjective realisation of a universalised basic mental state (sthāyin), unified with the situation (vibhāva), etc. It is due to identification of the spectator with the focus of the situation. This is primarily dramaturgic conception of æsthetic experience. The earliest available authority, that mentions it, is Bharata. The poeticians, however, had a different conception of it. According to them, it is not an immediate experience, as according to the dramaturgists, but a judgement. It arises, therefore, not in consequence of self-forgetfulness of the audience and their identification with the focus of the presented situation : on the contrary, it is due to the appreciative attitude towards, and the objective apprehension of, the presented. On the objective side also it is different from that of the dramaturgists. Its object need not be an emotive situation. Any linguistic presentation, provided it is not a mere matter-of-fact description of a thing as it appears to an ordinary man, but possesses some crookedness (Vakratva) and is recognised to have some element of art and to represent an object as it figures in poetic imagination and, therefore, is capable of arousing the interest of an appreciative audience of fine taste, is sufficient for the æsthetic experience, as conceived by the poeticians. Thus the poetician's conception of æsthetic experience is quite different from that of the dramaturgists in respect of its essential nature as well as

in its subjective and objective aspects.

The fact seems to be, as it is revealed by a careful study of the available literature, that poetics and dramaturgy developed in earlier stages as two independent sciences. The object of the latter was the analysis of the æsthetic object, technically called *Rasa*, as presented in drama. The former, however, aimed at an analysis of all forms of artistic expression in language, not excluding even Muktaka, which is concerned with the presentation of an isolated object as it is poetically apprehended. The writers on poetics attempted to find out a characteristic of poetic expression, which may be found in all forms of artistic presentation in language. They differ from one another. They severally hold that the means of externalisation of poetic vision, the figures of speech (Alaṅkāras), the poetic qualities (Guṇas) or the style (Rīti) etc., are the essence of poetic production.

BHĀMAHA

In giving an historical account of the æsthetic currents in the poetics in respect of both, the experience and its stimulus, we have to begin with Bhāmaha; because he is, by common consent, the earliest available authority on poetics. No doubt he refers to earlier authorities such as Rājamitra, Rāma Śarmā, Acyutottara and Śākhāvardhana etc. and explicitly states that his work is based upon a critical study of the older authorities on the subject. But they are not accessible to us. The authorities, on which his work is based, are those on poetics and not on dramaturgy. Though the earliest available work on dramaturgy, the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata, treats of matters, which form the special sphere of poetics, namely, the poetic figures or Alaṅkāras, yet

Bhāmaha does not refer to it. The earliest authority, to which he refers, is the one, according to which there were only five[1] poetic figures. Bharata is apparently an earlier authority than this, because, according to him, there are only four poetic figures[2].

Thus, it is evident that Bhāmaha deals with the 'poetic conception' (Kāvyalakṣma) of poeticians and not that of the dramaturgists[3]. Hence Rasa, the treatment of which is the primary concern of the dramaturgist, has no place in Bhāmaha's work. In any case *Rasa is not*, according to him, the *Soul of poetry*. On the contrary; he maintains that a poetic composition, though delineating Rasa, is often as bad as a raw fruit of wood-apple[4]. No doubt he talks of Rasa in poetry (Kāvyarasa) as Bharata does of Rasa in drama (Nāṭyarasa) as also of all Rasas as essentials of a Mahākāvya[5], still Rasa is not so important a thing in his eyes as it is in those of Bharata or the post-Abhinava poeticians.

Bhāmaha's Conception of Poetry.

His conception of poetry is substantially the same as that of Daṇḍin, though a little differently worded. Undoubtedly, the latter's presentation of the concept is more accurate than that of the former. According to *Bhāmaha*, words and meanings together form poetry. This definition of poetry, however, is too wide, because it can apply equally to all linguistic productions. He, therefore, after enumerating the various kinds of poetic production, maintains that the mode of presentation of ideas in[7] words, which gives æsthetic pleasure to those who are possessed of æsthetic

1. K.A. 8. 2. N.S. 206. 3. K A. 48.
4. K.A. 38. 5. K. A., 32. 6. K. A., 3.
7. K. A., 4.

susceptibility and which he technically calls Vakrokti, is the essential element of poetry. A composition without Vakrokti, though written in a good style and so possessed of the qualities such as sweetness and clearness, is not poetry. It is like a song which pleases the ear only.[1] Thus, according to Bhāmaha, embellishment (Alaṅkāra) is the most essential element of poetry and it consists in the striking manner of putting a striking idea in equally striking words.[2]

HIS CONCEPTION OF POETIC EXPERIENCE.

He is silent on the æsthetic experience. It was natural for him to be so, because his object in the work was not to discuss the nature of the æsthetic experience,[3] but to state the poetic embellishments[4]. There are only two accidental statements which give some idea of his conception of æsthetic experience. According to one, it is a certain pleasant experience. No doubt,[5] according to the context, this experience refers to the poet's experience and not to that of the appreciating hearer or reader; but we know from later psychological analysis of the æsthetic experience by Abhinava that the two experiences are very similar. Hence what Bhāmaha has said with regard to poet's experience may be said to hold good of that of the reader. At another place he distinguishes this pleasure from that resulting from a mere sensation, such as the one from song or music. Further, this was recognised to be due to the objective perception or cognition of the presented and not to the subjective realisation of a basic mental state at its highest pitch, because he compares embellished speech to a tastefully decked lady.[6] The

1. K. A., 4.
2. K. A., 39.
3. K.A., 40.
4. K.A., 1.
5. KA., 1.
6. K.A , 25.

pleasure arising from it can, therefore, be reasonably held to be similar to that arising from the perception of the latter.

Bhāmaha's Conception of Guṇas.

As in the case of poetic embellishments or Alaṅkāras so in that of the poetic qualities, Bhāmaha's source seems to be different from that of the subsequent poeticians, Daṇḍin etc. In this case also Bhāmaha ignores Bharata. For, while, according to Bharata, there are ten qualities of poetic composition, Bhāmaha mentions only three, sweetness, clearness[1] and forcefulness (Mādhurya, Prasāda and Ojas). Further, the latter's conception of these qualities also is different from that of the former.

1. Sweetness, according to Bharata, consists in such a presentation of the same meaning in more than one way in[2] succession as pleases the mind of the reader or the hearer of the composition. But, according to Bhāmaha, it consists in the sweetness of sound and simplicity, i. e. freedom[3] from complexity, of meaning.

2. Clearness (Prasāda) according to the former, consists in that particular arrangement[4] of words and meanings, which clearly conveys to the reader what is not directly expressed. But, according to the latter, it consists in such clarity of meaning that from the learned to the child, all are equally able to grasp it[5].

3. Powerfulness (Ojas), according to the former, consists in the use of compounds, the syllables[6] of which are necessarily related and involve some alliteration. But

1. K. A., 8. 2. N. S., 212. 3. K. A., 8.
4. N. S., 211. 5. K. A., 8. 6. A. Bh., Vol. II. 340.

according to[1] the latter, it consists in the mere use of compounds.

It is interesting to note in this connection that Mammaṭa accepts only three poetic qualities, mentioned by Bhāmaha, and not the ten, admitted by Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana. He definitely states that the poetic qualities of composition are three and not ten[2]. It is probably because some of the rest of the qualities are nothing more than absence of certain flaws and others are included by him among the poetic embellishments.

THE POETIC QUALITIES IN THE EYES OF BHĀMAHA.

According to him, Vakrokti is the chief characteristic of poetry. The poetic qualities (Guṇas) which, according to him, are only three, (Mādhurya, Ojas and Prasāda) are not essential in a poetic production :[3] they have only the musical and not the poetic value. A composition that lacks Vakrokti and has the said qualities is only a song.

BHĀMAHA'S INDEBTEDNESS TO BHARATA IN THE CONCEPTION OF VAKROKTI.

Vakrokti is not a production of the originality of Bhāmaha. According to the information, available from the existing literature, he is indebted to Bharata. In fact, the manner, in which he talks of Vakrokti clearly shows that he regarded it to be a very well-known concept. He does not care even to define it. Had he thought it to be his own contribution or something that was not known to and accepted by all, he would have certainly tried to define it clearly and would have tried to justify it as Ānanda Vardhana has done in the case of Dhvani.

1. K. A., 8. 2. K. P. 183. 3. K. A., 4.

We have already stated that, according to Bharata, there are only four Alaṅkāras. But according to the latest Ālaṅkārika, Appayya Dīkṣita, their number is 124. The question, therefore, that naturally arises, is, did Bharata know only of four linguistic decorations ? Was the pre-Bharata dramatic language so inornate ? The evidence of the literary history is against such a conclusion. We have stated before that the Nāṭya Śāstra assumed its present form sometime about the 5th century A. D. We know of so many dramas, which are acknowledged to be of earlier dates, the dramas of Bhāsa, for instance. We find in these dramas more linguistic embellishments used than those of which the author of the Nāṭya Śāstra talks. The question, therefore, is, did he not take all the literary facts into consideration before making any statement regarding them ? A closer study of the work leads us to a totally different conclusion.

It may be stated as follows :—

Bharata draws a distinction between Alaṅkāra and Lakṣaṇa. According to Bharata, Alaṅkāras are only four, but Lakṣaṇas are thirty-six.

Ṣaṭ triṁśat lakṣaṇānyevaṁ kāvyabandheṣu nirdiśet (N. S., 200).

It may be pointed out in this connection that Bharata's text, as given in the Chowkhamba edition, quoted above, is different from that, given at the top of the pages of the Abhinavabhāratī, published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series. The latter runs as follows:—

Ṣaṭ triṁśadetāni tu lakṣaṇāni
Proktāni vai bhūṣaṇa sammatāni
Kāvyeṣu bhāvārthagatāni tajjñaiḥ
Samyak prayojyāni yathārasantu

A. Bh., Vol. II. 295.

Abhinava comments on this and brings the definition of Lakṣaṇa out of it. And what is more, he cites Bhāmaha's verse:—

Saiṣā sarvaiva vakroktiranayārtho vibhāvyate.

(K.A. Ch. II. V. 85)

The fact is that there existed two different readings of the earlier part of the Chapter, dealing with Lakṣaṇa, The other reading also is given in both the editions.

But Ālaṅkārikas like Bhāmaha, have ignored this distinction, and have included almost all Lakṣaṇas under the head of Alankāra. Further, Bharata, according to Abhinava's interpretation, does not exhaust the list. It would, therefore, be wrong to say that Ālaṅkārikas discovered any new Alaṅkāra, of which Bharata was ignorant. Hence, they are indebted to Bharata in every way.

Difference between Lakṣaṇa and Alaṅkāra.

The distinction that Bharata has drawn between Lakṣaṇa and Alaṅkāra is based on the analytical study of the process of externalisation of poetic vision as well as of that of its apprehension. In reality there is no distinction of Alaṅkāra, Guṇa, Vṛtti and Lakṣaṇa from one another. In fact Daṇḍin counts some Alaṅkāras under Guṇas. But the distinction is assumed to facilitate the production of poetry and its appreciation[1]. There is a difference of opinion among the analysts, as is evident from Abhinava's reference to them in the course of his commentary on the verse, in which Bharata defines Lakṣaṇa.

Abhinavagupta compares the different stages in the production of poetry to those in building up of a palace. According to him, the introduction of Lakṣaṇas in poetic

1. A. Bh., Vol. II, 295.

production is like the construction of walls;[1] and the use of Alaṅkāras in it is like adorning them with paintings. Alaṅkāra, therefore, presupposes Lakṣaṇa. Further, Lakṣaṇas are the beautiful characteristics, which belong to and are the essential aspects of what the poet presents, like the plumpness in the case of breasts[2] or the slenderness in the case of waist. But Alaṅkāra is something that exists apart from what is the object of presentation; for instance, the moon, which is brought in as a standard of comparison in the course of a linguistic presentation of a beautiful face. Alaṅkāra in poetry is like a garland which is different from the body, which it serves to beautify.[3] But Lakṣaṇa is the beautiful characteristic of the body itself which is beautiful independently of the ornaments.

LAKṢAṆA DEFINED.

Lakṣaṇa is the meaning, which is given such a peculiar pleasing turn by the process of externalisation of poetic vision (Kavivyāpāra) as makes it look different[4] from the ordinary worldly one so that it becomes a befitting constituent of the æsthetic configuration and makes æsthetic experience possible. It is, according to Bharata, the most essential constituent of poetry[5] (Kāvya) which is solely concerned with the presentation of æsthetic object[6]. For, it is this that distinguishes the æsthetic from the unæsthetic.

It is of thirty-six kinds, as stated by Bharata. But this number does not exhaust all the varieties[7]. It represents those which are ordinarily met with. But the fact is that Lakṣaṇa is of innumerable kinds.

1. A. Bh., Vol. II, 292.
2. A. Bh., Vol. II, 297.
3. A. Bh., Vol. II. 321.
4. A. Bh., Vol. II, 321.
5. A. Bh., Vol. II. 298.
6. A. Bh., Vol. II. 295-8.
7. A. Bh., Vol. II. 298.

It is this very Lakṣaṇa which is spoken of as Vakrokti by Bhāmaha in his Kāvyālaṅkara and is represented to be the most essential element of all poetic embellishments, which, according to him differentiate poetic expression from the[1] ordinary.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BHARATA AND BHĀMAHA.

But there appears to be this difference between Bhāmaha and Bharata that while, according to Bharata, a composition is poetic only if the meaning, presented through Kavivyāpāra, presents the æsthetic situation with a focus, the mimetic changes, and the transient emotions[2] in such a manner as to bring about the relishability of the basic mental state ; the former does not seem to attach so much importance to Rasa. According to him, a linguistic expression, provided it has the crookedness (Vakrokti), irrespective of the fact whether it presents a complete æsthetic configuration or not, is fit to be called poetry.

The fact is that Bhāmaha represents the tradition of the poeticians as distinguished from that of the dramaturgists. And it is an historical fact that Rasa was able to establish its position of supremacy in poetry only after Ānanda Vardhana and Abhinava had spoken on it.

There is no denying the fact that there is some kind of delight to be got from hearing a composition that presents a poetic vision, even of a constituent of an æsthetic configuration. It is another matter that the experience from the apprehension of a complete æsthetic configuration is different from that, got from a part thereof. This difference was noticed later, probably first of all by Ānanda Vardhana. The early poeticians, therefore, represented by Bhāmaha, held Vakrokti, irrespective of delineation of complete

1. A. Bh., Vol. II. 298. 2. A. Bh., Vol. II. 297.

æsthetic configuration, to be the most[1] essential element of poetry.

Other conceptions of Vakrokti.

Daṇḍin, however, uses the word Vakrokti as a class-name for a set of poetic embellishments. According to him, the poetic embellishments are of two kinds, (i) natural (Svabhāvokti) and (ii) artistic (Vakrokti). After him this word is used in a limited sense. It is the name of a poetic figure. The earliest writer to do so was Vāmana. He uses it as the name of that poetic embellishment, in which a word is used in the secondary sense, because of the similarity[2] of the meaning, ascribed to it by the poet, with the one, which is associated with it through convention. But Bhoja, in his Sarasvatī Kaṇṭhābharaṇa, uses the word for one of the sub-divisions of that class of poetic embellishments which represents a conversation of two or more individuals who intentionally misunderstand each other[3]. Ruyyaka and other writers follow Bhoja. Kuntaka is the only writer who again uses the word in almost the same sense as that in which Bhāmaha used it.

His Scanty Treatment.

He is, according to his own statement, concerned with what is essential for all kinds of composition, which he brings under Kāvya. According to him, a treatise on any one of the arts as well as the one dealing with[4] any Sāstraic matter is Kāvya. And Mahākāvya is no less a Kāvya than stray verses or stories are. The last two he calls Anibaddha[5]. He does not say which of the Kāvyas is superior or inferior to any one of those, mentioned in his list. What he says is that the common distinctive

1. K. A., 17. 2. K. S., 129. 3. S. K., 296.
4. K. A., 2. 5. K. A., 4.

feature of all these is a certain crookedness in Śabda and Artha. He simply mentions other types of composition without stating any distinctive features of them, excepting what is most apparent. Of Rasa he talks in connection with Mahākāvya only. On Nāṭaka he does not say anything at all. For, according to his own statement, others have exhaustively dealt with it. By "others" he apparently means Bharata and his followers. His position, therefore, seems to be that, leaving aside the consideration of superiority or inferiority of different types of composition to one another, a composition can, and rightly too, be called Kāvya, provided there is Vakrokti in it. This is surely a very comprehensive definition of Kāvya and its correctness has not been questioned by any subsequent writer, including Abhinava himself, who is the greatest exponent of the Rasa and the Dhvani theories, on which the latest definitions such as "Kāvyaṁ rasātmakaṁ vākyam" are based. What the later writers have done is simply this that they have classified the different types of Kāvya according to their superiority, inferiority or unfitness to be called Kāvya, according as the spiritual meaning, the Dhvani, occupies the predominant or the subordinate position or is totally absent. They are technically called (i) Dhvani (ii) Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya and (iii) Citra Kāvyas.

Daṇḍin's Conception of Poetry

Next after Bhāmaha, from the point of view of both, the chronology and the evolution of the conception of poetry, comes Daṇḍin. His conception of the body of poetry is the same as that of Bhāmaha, though he words it more precisely than his predecessor. He, however, differs from Bhāmaha on the following points :—

1. His study of the regional poetry is very much

deeper than that of Bhāmaha. Hence, while the latter does not acknowledge any difference between the two styles (Rīti), (i) Vaidarbha and (ii) Gauḍīya[1] and looks upon this distinction as foolish ; the former, through analytical study, has finally established[2] it.

2. He is more under the influence of the dramaturgic school of Bharata than Bhāmaha. For, while the latter talks of only three poetic qualities or attributes and looks upon them as non-essentials of poetry ; the former accepts all the ten, discussed by Bharata, and represents[3] them to be the very life of the Vaidarbhī style.

3. While, according to Bhāmaha, Rasa holds an independent status only in the case of Mahākāvya, and elsewhere it is only subservient to the poetic figures, such as Preyas and Rasavat etc. : Daṇḍin, from his conception of the poetic attribute, Mādhurya, seems to have discovered Rasa as an important element in all poetic presentations. For, according to him, sweetness of style (Mādhurya) consists in the inclusion of such words and ideas in the composition[4] as reveal the Rasa.

Daṇḍin thus appears to represent a more advanced school of literary criticism than Bhāmaha.

Difference of Opinion on the Qualities of Poetry Explained.

There are two views on the qualities of poetry (Guṇa). According to one, they belong to word or meaning or both. According to the other, they belong to the æsthetic experience and, therefore represent the state of the self at the time of æsthetic experience. Further, there is a

1. K. A., 4. 2. K. D., 39. 3. K. D., 40. 4. K. D. 50.

difference of opinion among those who maintain the former view. According to some, all the ten poetic qualities, enumerated and defined by them, belong to both the word (Śabda) and the meaning (Artha). To this class belong Bharata, Vāmana and Abhinavagupta. But according to others, some of the qualities belong to word only, such as Śleṣa, others belong to the meaning only, such as the Prasāda or clearness, and still others belong to both the word and the meaning. Daṇḍin represents this view.

There are two opinions on the number also of these qualities. According to one, they are only three in number, namely, Prasāda, Mādhurya and Ojas. This view is first found mentioned in the available literature on poetics in Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra. It is adopted by Ananda Vardhana in his Dhvanyāloka and vigorously defended by Mammaṭa in his Kāvya Prakāśa against Vāmana's view of the ten qualities. According to the other, there are ten poetic qualities. The earliest known writer, who maintains this view, is Bharata. He is followed by Vāmana and Daṇḍin etc.

Abhinava's position in regard to both the number and the relation of these qualities is a little interesting. His views are expressed in the commentaries on two works; one on dramaturgy, the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata, and the other on poetics, the Dhvanyāloka of Ānanda Vardhaaa. In the former he maintains and defends the view that there are ten qualities and that they belong to both the word and the meaning. It may be interesting to note in this connection that in so doing he follows Vāmana. For, not only does he put the substance of Vāmana's Sūtras in the course of his interpretation of the Bharata Sūtras on Guṇas but also gives in all cases those very verses as illustrations which are given by Vāmana. In the latter,

however, that is, in his Locana, he maintains that there are only three poetic qualities and that they belong to the æsthetic experience and as such represent a state of the self at the time of the said experience.

It appears that there were two independent traditions about the poetic qualities, represented by the two early authorities, Bharata and Bhāmaha. One belonged to the dramaturgic school and the other to the poetic. The fact is, as pointed out by[1] Abhinava, that the division of means of poetic expression is not based upon any principle. It is made for the convenience in instructing novices. The two traditional authorities, therefore, divided the means of externalisation of poetic vision into two classes: poetic embellishments (Alaṅkāra) and poetic qualities, according as the one or the other was looked upon by each as the essential means of poetic expression. The comparative position of the two sets of means is different, according to each of the two authorities. According to the former, Guṇas are the essentials and Alaṅkāras are the non-essentials of poetry.[2] Hence some of the means of poetic expression, which are included in the list of Alaṅkāras by the Ālaṅkārikas, are counted among the poetic qualities, by the dramaturgists. The number of poetic qualities, therefore, according to them, is larger. The poeticians, on the other hand, maintain the poetic embellishments to be the most important elements of poetry.[3] They have, therefore, included in their list of poetic embellishments some of those means of poetic expression which are included in the list of poetic qualities by dramaturgists.

The difference of opinion between dramaturgists and poeticians in regard to the relation of the qualities to the word and the meaning or to the æsthetic experience, is not

1. A. Bh., Vol. II. 295. 2. A. Bh., Vol. II. 322.
3. K. A., 2.

inexplicable. When the poeticians talk of the poetic qualities as belonging to the word and the meaning, they do so from the ordinary conventional point of view. According to them, sweetness (Mādhurya) etc. are the qualities of words and meanings, exactly as in common language sweetness is a quality of milk. When the later exponents of Rasa in the light of the monistic Śaiva Philosophy say that the poetic qualities (Guṇas) belong to the æsthetic experience, they do so from the philosophical point of view. Undoubtedly, poetic sweetness is an experience and as such it cannot belong to the word or the meaning : but so is the sweetness of milk. Can anybody say that one who talks of sweetness of milk is talking absurdly ? Thus, the difference between the dramaturgists and the poeticians in regard to the relation of the poetic qualities is due to the difference in their points of view from which they talk. Both are right in their own respective ways.

VĀMANA'S CONCEPTION OF POETRY.

From the point of view of the chronology and from that of the evolution of the conception of poetry, Vāmana comes next after Daṇḍin. His conception of poetry presents a very great advance on that of Bhāmaha. He is the first in the history of Sanskrit poetics to talk of the soul of poetry as distinct from the body. His conception of the body of poetry is identical with that of[1] Bhāmaha. But in presenting the Rīti as the soul of poetry he[2] maintains not only Vakrokti but Rasa also to be an essential element of poetry.

Rīti, according to him, is a peculiar style or mode of linguistic presentation. The peculiarity of it consists in the possession of the following qualities or distinctive features,

1. K.S. 5. 2. K.S. 14.

technically called Guṇas :—

(i) Ojas (ii) Prasāda (iii) Śleṣa (iv) Samatā (v) Samādhi (vi) Mādhurya (vii) Saukumārya (viii) Udāratā (ix) Arthavyakti and (x) Kānti[1].

These qualities are common to both the word and the meaning (Śabda and Artha). And, according to him, the best poetry is that which possesses all of them It is because of this that he enjoins that the[2] Vaidarbhī style should be followed. For, it possesses[3] all the qualities. He rejects the other two, namely, Gauḍīyā and Pañcālī, because they have only a few of the said qualities.

Of the said ten qualities, the two qualities as defined by Vāmana, require clear definitions here. The one places his conception of poetry on a par with that of Bhāmaha and the other represents an advance of his idea on that of the latter. The one is Mādhurya and the other in Kānti. Bhāmaha's idea of Vakrokti, which, according to him, is the most essential element of poetry, is included in Vāmana's conception of *Sweetness of meaning* (Mādhurya), because it consists in presenting the meaning or idea in such a manner that it may have an interesting[4] peculiarity (Vaicitrya) of its own. This is just what Bhāmaha means by Vakrokti. The word *Vaicitrya* is used by Kuntaka, a distinguished follower of Bhāmaha, as synonymous with Vakratva. Vāmana's conception of the quality, Kanti, represents an advance, because the Kānti involves the presentation of the æsthetic configuration, Rasa, as conceived by Bharata, as an essential element of poetry. Kānti[5] consists in having the various Rasas well delineated.

1. K.S., 70. 2. K.S., 20.
3. K.S., 21. 4. K. S., 92.
5. K. S. 94.

VĀMAN'S CONTRIBUTION.

Vāmana's poetic theory presents an advance on those of his predecessors in the same field in the following respects :—

1. In his conception of poetry, he brings in the poetic qualities also. According to him, poetry is not a body of merely words and meanings with certain crookedness, as according to Bhāmaha, but of words well polished (Saṁskṛta) with the embellishments and qualities[1].

2. His study of regional poetry is wider and more thorough. While Daṇḍin was able to point out a clear distinction between the poetic productions of only two regions, Vidarbha and Gauḍa; he does so in the case of three, including Pāñcāla.[2]

3. For the first time in the history of literary criticism of the poetic branch, he speaks of the soul of poetry (Kāvyasyātmā). And that soul, according to him, is the style (Rīti)[3].

4. He settles the comparative importance of the qualities and the embellishments in poetry. He has conceived poetry not on the analogy of a beautifully decked lady, who though beautiful, would not look to be so in the absence of ornaments, as Bhāmaha has done. For, according to the latter, the poetic embellishments on the body of poetry have the same importance as have the ornaments on that of a beautiful lady. According to Vāmana, poetry is like a picture. And the comparative importance of the embellishments and the qualities in it is the same as that of paints and lines respectively in a picture.[4] Just as the beauty of a

1. K. S., 5. 2. K. S., 15. 3. K. S., 14.
4. K. S., 20.

picture depends upon the lines, of which the sketch is made, and the paints simply enhance it, so the beauty of the poetic production depends upon the poetic qualities, which are the essentials, of the style, and the poetic embellishments simply enhance it.[1] This view of the poetic embellishment appears to be opposed to that of Daṇḍin, who maintains the poetic beauty to be due to embellishments.

(Kāvyaśobhākarān dharmān alaṁkārān pracakṣata).
K.D. 100

But according to Vāmana there can be no poetic beauty without poetic qualities.[2]

5. He has come more under the influence of the Dramaturgic school of Bharata than even Daṇḍin. For, not only does he accept the ten poetic qualities of Bharata but also maintains that among the Sandarbhas drama is the best.[3]

6. In regard to the spiritual meaning (Dhvani), his position, according to Abhinava's own statement in the Locana, is better than that of the Ālaṅkārikas. He is counted not amongst those who totally deny the existence of the spiritual meaning, but amongst those who were conscious of its existence, but maintained that the secondary power of the language was sufficient to arouse its consciousness'[4]

UDBHAṬA'S POSITION.

The view of Udbhaṭa, on what a poetic composition should be, marks the last stage in the conflict of the poetic and the dramatic ideals. We have seen that with the lapse of time the views of the dramaturgic school, represented by Bharata, have slowly been gaining ground among the poeticians and the opposi-

1. K. S., 68-9. 2. K. S., 70. 3. K. S., 35.
4. Dh., L. 10.

tion to the dramatic ideal has been losing strength. After Bhāmaha, according to whom the Vakrokti was the only distinctive feature of the poetic productions, Daṇḍin asserted the importance of the poetic qualities and Vāmana represented the style to be the soul of poetry. Udbhaṭa's conception of poetry, therefore, coming historically after that of Vāmana, represents another and probably the last but one stage in the evolution of the conception of poetry. For, after him the two conceptions, of poetry and of drama, have lost all the difference, excepting that the one is intended to be presented on the stage and the other is simply to be recited.

Udbhaṭa's position may summarily be stated as follows :—

1. He, for the first time in the history of poetics, talks of Vṛttis, (i) Paruṣā (ii) Upanāgarikā and (iii) Komalā.[1]

2. His position regarding Dhvani, according to Abhinava, is the same as that of Vāmana. That is, he holds that the spiritual meaning (Dhvani) can be aroused by the secondary power of language (Lakṣaṇā).

3. His attitude towards Rasa, the æsthetic configuration, is very interesting. We know on the authority of Abhinavagupta that he commented on both, the Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha and the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata. He was, therefore, in close touch with both the schools of literary criticism, the poetic and the dramatic. Neither of his two commentaries is available. We, therefore, cannot state, on their basis, his views on Rasa. His independent work, Kāvyālaṅkāra Saṅgraha, is, however, published. Therein he seems to have well-nigh accepted the conception of the Kāya, propounded by the dramaturgic school

1. K.A.S., 5—6

of Bharata.

His conception of the poetic embellishment, Rasavat, is not very different from that of Bhāmaha. It consists in the clear[1] delineation of the various Rasas in terms of (i) the basic mental state (ii) the transient emotions (iii) the mimetic changes, and (iv) the situation. But Rasa is not the soul of poetry, according to him. It is only an embellishment (Alaṅkāra).

But one interesting fact has to be noticed in this connection. At the time when Udbhaṭa flourished, the theory of Dhvani was not well established. In fact, as we have already stated, he is represented to belong to one of the schools, opposed to the theory of Dhvani. He, therefore, naturally held that all the constituents of the æsthetic configuration, not excluding even the basic mental state, admit of linguistic expression (Svaśabdasthayi) through Lakṣanā, a view which has been so adversely criticised by the exponents of the Dhvani.

Between Udbhaṭa and Ānanda Vardhana there is no literary critic, who has made any important contribution to the critical thought. In fact, these are the only writers whose views have been taken into consideration by Ānanda Vardhana and Abhinava. From our point of view, therefore, it is unnecessary to deal with the rest here.

THE END

1. K.A.S., 49.

APPENDIX A.

The Textual Authority indicated by foot-notes.

पृष्ठ २.

१. पाराशर्यशिलालिभ्यां भिक्षुनटसूत्रयोः । ४.३.११०.
·····शैलालिनो नटाः ।
कर्मन्दकृशाश्वादिनिः । ४.३.१११
·····भिक्षुनटसूत्रयोरित्येव·····कृशाश्विनो नटाः ।

२. एवं प्रश्नपञ्चकात् कविप्रयोक्त्रोरुपदेशपरं शास्त्रमिति लक्ष्यते तेन यदिह (यदि हि) तस्मात्कर्तुर्द्रष्टुः प्रयोक्तृरुपदेशपरमिदं शास्त्रम्·····इति, तत्र द्रष्टुरित्यसत्, न ह्यनेन सामाजिको विनीयते, अयोग्यत्वात् ।

३. प्रणम्य शिरसा देवौ पितामहमहेश्वरौ ।
नाट्यशास्त्रं प्रवक्ष्यामि ब्रह्मणा यदुदाहृतम् ॥

४. एको हि विजिगीषुर्नाट्यप्रवर्तयितेति देवो भगवांस्त्वानन्दनिर्भरतया क्रीडाशीलः सन्ध्यादौ नृत्यतीति नाट्ये तदुपस्कारिणि च नृत्ये तदुपज्ञं प्रवृत्तिः ।

पृष्ठ ३.

१. जग्राह पाठ्यमृग्वेदात् सामभ्यो गीतमेव च ।
यजुर्वेदादभिनयान् रसानाथर्वणादपि ॥
वेदोपवेदैः सम्बद्धो नाट्यवेदो महात्मना ।
एवं भगवता सृष्टो ब्रह्मणा ललितात्मकम् ॥

पृष्ठ ४.

१. नाट्यवेदः कथं ब्रह्मन्नुत्पन्नः कस्य वा कृते ।
कत्यङ्गः किंप्रमाणश्च प्रयोगश्चास्य कीदृशः ॥

२. वीराद्भुताभ्यां वीरशृङ्गारहास्यैः वीररौद्रभयानक-करुणैः वीरबीभत्सशान्तैश्च प्रतिनायकगतरसान्तरसान्तरतया सातिशयचमत्कारगोचरीभूतैः हृदयानुप्रवेशं विदधद्भिः धर्मादिचतुष्कोपादेयधियम् अधर्मादिभ्यश्च निवृत्तिं निःशङ्कां विधत्ते ।

पृष्ठ ५.

१. क्रीडनाय हितं क्रीडनीयकम्·····
चित्तविक्षेपमात्रफलमिति यन्न ज्ञायते तच्च क्रीडनीयकं सुखितदुःखित एव भवति·····यतः ईर्ष्याक्रोधादिभिः संमूढोऽधिवासितहृदयः ।

पृष्ठ ६.

१. न वेदव्यवहारोऽयं संश्राव्यः शूद्रजातिषु ।
तस्मात्सृजापरं वेदं पञ्चमं सार्ववर्णिकम् ॥

२. इदमस्माकं गुडप्रच्छन्नकटुकौषधकल्पम् ।
३. क्षीरमध्यावस्थितौषधोपयोगवत् ।

पृष्ठ ७.

१. दृश्यं श्रव्यञ्चेति.....एकवचनेन सर्वसाधारणतयैव यद्योग्यम् । तच्च स्पृश्यादिरूपं न भवति । दृश्यश्रव्ययोस्तु बहुतरसाधारण्योपपत्तिः ।

पृष्ठ ८.

१. कैशिकी श्लक्ष्णनैपथ्या शृङ्गाररससंभवा ।
अशक्या पुरुषैः सा तु प्रयोक्तुं स्त्रीजनादृते ॥
स्त्रीजनादृते इति ।
यावन्निजहृदयरसविलसद्भिकस्वरनिर्वारचमत्कारपवित्रता न जाता भगवत इव तावत् शिक्षाशतैरपि वैचित्र्यमनाहार्यम् ।

पृष्ठ ९.

१. अभिपूर्वस्तु णीञ्धातुराभिमुख्यार्थनिर्णये ।
यस्मात्पदार्थान्नयति तस्मादभिनयः स्मृतः ॥

पृष्ठ १०.

१. रस इति क इत्यादिना । मधुरादौ पारदे विषये सारे जलसंस्कारे अभिनिवेशे क्वाथे देहधातौनिर्यासे वायं प्रसिद्धः न त्वन्यत्र । तेन रस इति पदस्य शृङ्गारादौ प्रवर्तितस्य कोऽर्थः ।
२. सम्यक् पक्वस्य भुक्तस्य सारो निगदितो रसः ।
स तु द्रवः सितः शीतः स्वादुः स्निग्धश्चलो भवेत् ॥
सर्वदेहचरस्यापि रसस्य हृदयं स्थलम् ।
समानमारुता पूर्वं यदयं हृदये धृतः ॥
आरुह्य धमनीर्गत्वा धातून् सर्वानयं रसः ।
पुष्णाति तदनुस्वीयैर्व्याप्नोति च तनुर्गुणैः ॥

पृष्ठ ११.

१. अत ऊर्ध्वं न कर्तव्यः कर्तृभिर्नाट्य मण्डपः ।
यस्मादव्यक्तभावं हि तत्र नाट्यं भवेदिति ॥
मण्डपे विप्रकृष्टे तु पाठ्यमुच्चरितस्वरम् ।
अनभिव्यक्तवर्णत्वात् विस्वरत्वं भृशं व्रजेत् ॥
यश्चाप्यास्यगतो भावो नानादृष्टिसमन्वितः ।
स वेश्मनः प्रकृष्टत्वात् व्रजेदव्यक्ततां परम् ॥
२. सुकुमारो मसृणोऽनुसृतो यस्य तं दर्शयति, शृङ्गाररसस्य सम्भवो विद्यमानत्वमस्मिन्, शृङ्गाररसाच्च परिपूर्णात् संभवो यस्य ।
३. यत्तु काव्येन नोक्तं स्यात्तद्गीतेन प्रसाधयेत्.....इतिप्रकृतिचित्तवृत्तिकथावस्थादिसूचकोऽस्त्युपयोग ।

४. कार्यो नातिप्रसङ्गोऽत्र नृत्तगीतविधिं प्रति ।
गीतवाद्ये च नृत्ते च प्रवृत्तेऽतिप्रसङ्गतः ॥
खेदो भवेत्प्रयोक्तृणां प्रेक्षकाणां तथैव च ।
खिन्नानां रसभावेषु स्पष्टता नोपजायते ॥

पृष्ठ १२.

१. ये त्वतथाभूतास्तेषां प्रत्यक्षोचित-तथाविधचर्वणालाभाय नटादिप्रक्रिया स्वगतक्रोधशोकादिसंकटहृदयग्रन्थिभञ्जनाय गीतादिप्रक्रिया च मुनिना विरचिता, सर्वानुग्राहकं हि शास्त्रमिति न्यायात् । तेन नाट्य एव रसा न लोक इत्यर्थः ।

पृष्ठ १४.

१. क्रीडतां मृण्मयैर्यद्वद्बालानां द्विरदादिभिः ।
स्वोत्साहः स्वदते तद्वच्छ्रोतृणामर्जुनादिभिः ॥

पृष्ठ १५.

१. तत्र लोकव्यवहारे कार्यकारणसहचरात्मकलिंगदर्शने स्थाय्यात्मकपरचित्तवृत्त्यनुमानाभ्यास एव पाटवादधुना तैरेवोद्यानकटाक्षवृत्तादिभिर्लौकिकीं कारणत्वादिभुवमनतिक्रान्तैः विभावनानुभावनासमुपरञ्जकत्वप्राणैः अत एवाऽलौकिकविभावादिव्यपदेशभाग्भिः प्राच्यकारणादिरूपसंस्कारोपख्यापनाय विभावादि नामधेयव्यपदेश्यैः ।

पृष्ठ १७.

१. स्तम्भः स्वेदोथ रोमाञ्चः स्वरसादोऽथ वेपथुः ।
वैवर्ण्यमश्रु प्रलयः इत्यष्टौ सात्विकाः स्मृताः ॥
२. विभावानुभावौ लोकप्रसिद्धावेव लोकस्वभावोपगतत्वाच्चैषां लक्षणं नोच्यते ।
३. भावशब्देन तावच्चित्तवृत्तिविशेषा एव विवक्षिताः, तथा च एकोनपञ्चाशता भावैरित्यादौ तानेवोपसंहरिष्यामः ।
ये त्वेते ऋतुमाल्यादयो विभावाः वाष्पप्रभृतयश्चानुभावा ते न भावशब्दव्यपदेश्याः ।

पृष्ठ १८.

१. वागङ्गमुखरागेण सत्त्वेनाभिनयेन च ।
कवेरन्तर्गतं भावं भावयन् भाव उच्यते ॥
नानाभिनयसंबद्धान् भावयन्ति रसानिमान् ।
यस्मात्तस्मादमी भावाः विज्ञेया नाट्ययोक्तृभिः ॥
रसयोग्यान् चित्तवृत्तिविशेषान् भावयन्ति गमयन्ति बुद्धिविषयान् प्रापुवन्ति इमान् सामाजिकान् भावयन्ति ..... इयमेव च अधिवासनात्मा भावना ।
२. केवलं कस्तूरिकाद्रव्यमेव तावद्रूपदेशचेतन्याक्रमणस्वभावं वस्त्रादिकेऽपि तथाप्रतिपत्तिमाधत्ते तद्वत् प्रकृतेऽपि ।

पृष्ठ १९.

१. विविधमाभिमुख्येन रसेषु चरन्ति इति व्यभिचारिणः ।
वागङ्गसत्त्वोपेतान् प्रयोगे रसान्नयन्तीति व्यभिचारिणः ।

२. बन्धुविनाशो यत्र विभावः परिदेविताश्रुपातादिस्त्वनुभावः चिन्तादैन्यादिर्व्यभिचारी सोऽवश्यं शोक एव ।

पृष्ठ २०.

१. अतो व्याख्यातृनटसामाजिकाभिप्रायेण तस्यैव प्राधान्यमिति रस एव तावत् पूर्वमुद्दिष्टः ।

पृष्ठ २२.

१. पाडवादय इति । लोकप्रसिद्धेभ्यः परस्परविविक्तेभ्यः मधुरतिक्ताम्ललवणकटुकषायेभ्यो मिश्रेभ्यश्च विलक्षणः पाडवशब्दवाच्यः । तत्प्रधाना बहुतरा रसनयोग्याः क्रियन्ते । तथैव नानाभूतैर्विभावादिभिरुप समीपं प्रत्यक्षकल्पतां गता लोकापेक्षया ये स्थायिनो भावास्ते रस्यमानतैकजीवनं रसत्वं तत्र प्रतिपद्यन्ते ।

पृष्ठ २३.

१. तेन नाट्य एव रसा न लोक इत्यर्थः ।

पृष्ठ २४.

१. न भावहीनोऽस्ति रसो न भावो रसवर्जितः ।
परस्परकृता सिद्धिस्तयोरभिनये भवेत् ॥ ना. शा. ७२.

२. कैशिकी श्लक्ष्णनेपथ्या शृंगाररससंभवा ।
अशक्या पुरुषैः सा तु प्रायोक्तुं स्त्रीजनादृते ॥
स्त्रीजनादृत इति । अयं भावः । यावन्निजहृदयरसविलसद्विकस्वरनिर्वार-चमत्कारपवित्रता न जाता भगवत इव तावच्छक्राशतैरपि वैचित्र्यमनाहार्यम् ।
अभि. २१. २.

३. अनेन भाण्डेन राजपुत्रस्यान्यस्य वा(ग)नुकृतेऽन्यादिबुद्धेरभावात्, तद्धि विकारणमिति प्रसिद्ध हास्यमात्रफलम् मध्यस्थानाम्, येनाभिप्रायेण मुनिर्वक्ष्यति परचेष्टानुकरणाद्धासस्समुपजायते । अ.७.१६. इति ।

४. देवतानामृषीणाञ्च राज्ञामथ कुटुम्बिनाम् ।
कृतानुकरणं लोके नाट्यमित्यभिधीयते ॥

५ देवतानामृषीणाञ्च राज्ञां लोकस्य चैव हि ।
पूर्ववृत्तानुचरितं नाटकं नाम तद्भवेत् ॥

६. त्रैलोक्यस्यास्य सर्वस्य नाट्यं भावानुकीर्तनम् ।

७. एवमेता बुधैर्ज्ञेया जातयो दशलक्षणाः ।
कार्या यस्मिन् रसे याश्च ताश्रमे सन्निबोधत ॥

पृष्ठ २५.

१. रसजा दृष्टयो ह्येता विज्ञेया लक्षणान्विताः ।

अतः परं प्रवक्ष्यामि स्थायिभावसमाश्रयाः ॥

२. अतो व्याख्यातृनटसामाजिकाभिप्रायेण तस्यैव प्राधान्यम् ।

३. ग्रहणधारणसामार्थ्यं गुह्यत्वेनाध्यात्मोपनिषदर्थवदवधारणकौशलेन रसाद्युपयोगिसात्त्विकसंपादितसामर्थ्यम्, यद्वक्ष्यति—सत्त्वं मनःप्रयत्ननिर्वर्त्यमित्यादि ।

पृष्ठ २६.

१. अतः ऊर्ध्वं प्रवक्ष्यामि प्रेक्षकाणां तु लक्षणम् ।
चारित्रभजनोपेताः शान्तिवृत्तश्रुतान्विताः ॥
यशोधर्मरताश्चैव मध्यस्था वयसान्विताः ।
षडङ्गनाट्यकुशलाः प्रबुद्धाः शुचयः समाः ॥
चतुरातोद्यकुशला नेपथ्यज्ञाः सुधार्मिकाः ।
देशभाषाविधानज्ञाः कलाशिल्पविचक्षणाः ॥
चतुराभिनयज्ञाश्च सूक्ष्मज्ञा रसभावयोः ।
शब्दच्छन्दोविधानज्ञाः नानाशास्त्रविचक्षणाः ॥
एवंविधास्तु कर्तव्याः प्रेक्षका नाट्यदर्शने ।
अव्यग्र्यरिन्द्रियैः शुद्ध ऊहापोहविशारदः ॥
व्यक्तदोषोऽनुरागी च स नाट्ये प्रेक्षकः स्मृतः ।
यस्तुष्टौ तुष्टिमायाति शोके शोकमुपैति च ॥
दैन्ये दीनत्वमभ्येति स नाट्ये प्रेक्षकः स्मृतः ।

पृष्ठ २७.

१. तुष्यन्ति तरुणाः कामे विदग्धा समयाश्रिते ॥
अर्थेष्वर्थपराश्चैव मोक्षेष्वथ विरागिणः ।
नानाशीलाः प्रकृतयः शीले नाट्ये प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥
शूरा बीभत्सरौद्रेषु नियुद्धेष्वाहवेषु च ।
धर्माख्यानपुराणेषु वृद्धास्तुष्यन्ति नित्यशः ।
बाला मूर्खाः स्त्रियश्चैव हास्यनेपथ्ययोः सदा ॥
एवं भावानुकरणैर्यो यस्मिन् प्रविशेन्नरः ।
प्रेक्षकस्तु स मन्तव्यो गुणैरेतैरलङ्कृतः ॥

पृष्ठ ३३.

१. अरजतीभूतायामपि शुक्तौ उभयगतचाकचक्यसंदर्शनेनाज्ञानात् रजतत्वारोपे तस्या अपि अर्थक्रियाकारितया यथा तत्र प्रवृत्तिर्जायते, तथा शकुन्तलादिगोचरानुरागात्मिका दुष्यन्तादेः रतिरभिनेतरि अवर्तमानाऽपि तस्य अभिनयपाटववशेन तत्स्थत्वेनावगम्यमाना रसिकसामाजिकचेतश्चमत्कुर्वती रसरूपतामाधत्ते ।

पृष्ठ ३६.

१. तेन स्थाय्येव विभावानुभावादिभिरुपचितो रसः ।
स्थायीभावस्त्वनुपचितः ।
२. षड् भेदाश्चास्य विज्ञेयास्तांश्च वक्ष्याम्यहं पुनः ।
स्मितमथ हसितं विहसितमुपहसितं चापहसितमतिहसितम् ॥

पृष्ठ ३८.

१. विभावा हि काव्यबलानुसन्धेयाः, अनुभावाः
शिक्षातः, व्यभिचारिणः कृत्रिमनिजानुभावार्जनबलात् ।
स्थायी तु काव्यबलादपि नानुसन्धेयः । रतिः शोक इत्यादयो
हि शब्दा रत्यादिकमभिधेयीकुर्वन्त्यभिधानत्वेन, न तु
वाचिकाभिनयरूपतयावगमयन्ति ।

पृष्ठ ३९.

१. किन्तु सम्यङ्मिथ्यासंशयसादृश्यप्रतीतिभ्यो विलक्षणा चित्रतुरगादिन्यायेन
यः सुखी रामः असावयमिति प्रतीतिरस्तीति ।
तदाहः--
प्रतिभाति न सन्देहो न तत्त्वं न विपर्ययः ।
भीरसावयमित्यस्ति नासावेवायमित्यपि ॥
विरुद्धबुद्धिसंभेदादविवेचितसंप्लवः ।
युक्त्या पर्यनुयुज्येत स्फुरन्ननुभवः कया ॥ इति ॥

पृष्ठ ४१.

१. इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गम् ।

पृष्ठ ४२.

१. ज्ञानायौगपद्यादेकं मनः । ३.२.६०.
न युगपदनेकक्रियोपलब्धेः । ३.२.६१.
आलातचक्रदर्शनवत्तदुपलब्धिराशुसंचारात् । ३.२.६२.
यथोक्तहेतुत्वाच्चाणु । ३३.६३.
२. आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयम् ।
१. १. ९.

पृष्ठ ४३.

१. इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् । १.१.४.
२. तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानम् पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टं च १.१.५.

पृष्ठ ४४.

१. ग्रीष्मे मरीचयो भीमेनोष्मणा संसृष्टाः स्पन्दमाना दूरस्थचक्षुषा सन्निकृष्यन्ते, तत्रेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादुदकमिति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, तच्च प्रत्यक्षं प्रसज्यते

इत्यत आह अव्यभिचारीति। यदतस्मिंस्तदिति तदव्यभिचारि, यत्तु तस्मिंस्तदिति तदव्यभिचारि प्रत्यक्षमिति।

पृष्ठ ४५.

१. मिथ्योपलब्धिविनाशस्तत्त्वज्ञानात् स्वप्नविषयाभिमानप्रणाशवत्प्रतिबोधे।

पृष्ठ ४७.

१. तस्माद्धेतुभिर्विभावाख्यैःकार्यैश्चानुभावात्मभिः सहचारिरूपैश्च व्यभिचारिभिः प्रयत्नार्जिततया कृत्रिमैरपि तथानभिमन्यमानैरनुकर्तृस्थत्वेन लिङ्गबलतः प्रतीयमानः स्थायिभावो मुख्यरामादिगतस्थाय्यनुकरणरूपः।

पृष्ठ ४८.

१. विभावा हि काव्यबलानुसन्धेयाः, अनुभावाः शिक्षातः व्यभिचारिणः कृत्रिमनिजानुभावार्जनबलात्। स्थायी तु काव्यबलादपि नानुसन्धेयः। रतिः शोक इत्यादयो हि शब्दा रत्यादिकमभिधेयीकुर्वन्त्यभिधानत्वेन, न तु वाचिकाभिनयरूपतयावगमयन्ति।

पृष्ठ ४९.

१. अत एव स्थायिपदं सूत्रे भिन्नविभक्तिकमपि नोपात्तम्।
२. तेन रतिरनुक्रियमाणा शृङ्गार इति तदात्मकत्वं तत्प्रभवत्वं च युक्तम्।
अर्थक्रियापि मिथ्याज्ञानदृष्टा।
मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोर्मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतोः।
मिथ्याज्ञानाविशेषेऽपि विशेषोऽर्थक्रियां प्रति॥

पृष्ठ ५०.

१. न चाऽत्र नर्तके एव सुखीति प्रतिपत्तिः, नाप्ययमेव राम इति, नचाप्ययं न सुखीति, नापि रामः स्याद्वा न वायमिति, न चापि तत्सदृश इति। किन्तु सम्यङ्मिथ्यासंशयसादृश्यप्रतीतिभ्यो विलक्षणा चित्रतुरगादिन्यायेन यः सुखी रामः असावयमिति प्रतीतिरस्तीति तदाह :—
प्रतिभाति न संदेहो न तत्त्वं न विपर्ययः।
धीरसावयमित्यस्ति नासावेवायमित्यपि॥
विरुद्धबुद्धिसंभेदादविवेचितसंप्लवः।
युक्त्या पर्यनुयुज्येत स्फुरन्नुभवः कया"॥

पृष्ठ ५३.

१. तदिदमप्यन्तस्तत्त्वशून्यं न विमर्दक्षममित्युपाध्यायाः।
२. अनुकरणरूपो रस इति यदुच्यते तत् किं सामाजिकप्रतीत्यभिप्रायेण उत नटाभिप्रायेण, किं वा वस्तुघृत्तविवेचकव्याख्यातृबुद्धिसमवलम्बनेन, यथाहुर्व्याख्यातारः खल्वेवं विवेचयन्तीति। अथ भरतमुनिवचनानुसारेण। आद्यः पक्षोऽसंगतः। किञ्चिद्धि प्रमाणेनोपलब्धं तदनुकरणमिति वक्तुं शक्यम्। यथा एवमसौ सुरां पिवतीति सुरापानानुकरणत्वेन पयःपानं प्रत्यक्षावलोकितं प्रतिभाति, इह च नटगतं किं तदुपलब्धं यदनुकरणतया भातीति चिन्त्यम्।

तच्छरीरं तन्निष्ठं प्रतिशीर्षकादि रोमाञ्चगद्गदादिकादि भुजाक्षेपवलनप्रभृतिभ्रूक्षेपकटाक्षादिकं न रतेश्चित्तवृत्तिरूपतयानुकारत्वेन कस्यचित्प्रतिभाति, जडत्वेन भिन्नेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वेन भिन्नाधिकरणत्वेन च ततोऽतिवैलक्षण्यात्। मुख्यामुख्यावलोकने च तदनुकरणप्रतिभासः। न च रामगतां रतिमुपलब्धपूर्विणः केचित्। एतेन रामानुकारी नट इत्यपि निरस्तः प्रवादः।

अथ नटगता चित्तवृत्तिरेव प्रतिपन्ना सती रत्यनुकारः शृङ्गार इत्युच्यते, तत्रापि किमात्मकत्वेन सा प्रतीयत इति चिन्त्यम्। ननु प्रमादादिभिः कारणैः, कटाक्षादिभिः कार्यैः, धृत्यादिभिश्च सहचारिभिर्लिङ्गभूतैर्या लौकिकी कार्यरूपा कारणरूपा सहचारिरूपा च प्रतीतियोग्या चित्तवृत्तिः तदात्मकत्वेन सा नटचित्तवृत्तिः प्रतिभाति। हन्त तर्हि रत्याकारेणैव सा प्रतिपन्नेति दूरे रत्यनुकरणतावाचोयुक्तिः।

ननु ते विभावादयोऽनुकार्ये पारमार्थिकाः, इह त्वनुकर्तरि न तथेति विशेषः। अस्त्वेवम्, किन्तु ते हि विभावादयोऽनन्तकारणानन्तकार्यानन्तसहचररूपा अपि काव्यशिक्षादिबलोपकल्पिताः कृत्रिमाः सन्तः किं कृत्रिमत्वेन सामाजिकैः गृह्यन्ते न वा। यदि गृह्यन्ते तदा तैः कथं रतेरवगतिः।

नन्वत एव तत्प्रतीयमानं रत्यनुकरणबुद्धेः कारणम्। कारणान्तरप्रभवेषु हि कार्येषु सुशिक्षितेन कारणान्तरप्रभवत्वज्ञाने वस्त्वन्तरस्यानुमानं तावद्युक्तम्। असुशिक्षितेन तु तस्यैव प्रसिद्धस्य कारणस्यानुमानम्। यथा वृश्चिकविशेषाद् गोमयस्यैवानुमानम्, वृश्चिकविषयत्वेन तज्ज्ञानं केवलं मिथ्याज्ञानम्। यत्रापि धूमलिङ्गज्ञानं मिथ्या तत्रापि न तदाभासानुमानं युक्तम्। न हि वाष्पाद्धूमत्वेन ज्ञातात्तदनुकारप्रतिभास्यमानादपि लिङ्गात्तदनुकारानुमानं युक्तम्। धूमानुकारत्वेन हि ज्ञायमानान्नीहारान्नाग्न्यनुकारजपापुष्पप्रतीतिर्दृष्टा।

पृष्ठ ५६.

१. न च मुनिवचनमेवंविधमस्ति क्वचित्स्थाय्यनुकरणं रस इति, नाऽपि लिङ्गमात्रार्थे मुनेरुपलभ्यते।

२ यच्चोक्तं रामोऽयमित्यस्ति प्रतिपत्तिस्तदपि यदि तदात्वे इति निश्चितं तदुत्तरकालभाविबाधकवैधुर्याभावे कथं न तत्त्वज्ञानं स्यात्। बाधकसद्भावे वा कथं न मिथ्याज्ञानम्। वास्तवेन च वृत्तेन बाधकानुदयेऽपि मिथ्याज्ञानमेव स्यात्। तेन विरुद्धबुद्धिसंभेदादित्यसत्।

पृष्ठ ५८.

१. यच्चोच्यते वर्णकैर्हरितालादिभिः संयुज्यमान एव गौरित्यादि, तत्र यद्यभिव्यज्यमान इत्यर्थोऽभिप्रेतः तदसत्। नहि सिन्दूरादिभिः पारमार्थिको गौरभिव्यज्यते प्रदीपादिभिरिव। किन्तु तत्सदृशः समूहविशेषो निर्वर्त्यते। अत एव हि सिन्दूरादयो गवावयवसन्निवेशसदृशेन सन्निवेशविशेषेणावस्थिता गोसदृशताप्रतिभासस्य विषयाः, नैवं विभावादिसमूहो रतिसदृशताप्रतिपत्तिग्राह्यः। तस्माद् भावानुकरणं रस इत्यसत्।

२. येन त्वभ्यधायि सुखदुःखजननशक्तियुक्ता विषयसामग्री वाह्यैव साऽलौकिकी सुखदुःखस्वभावो रसः, तस्यां च सामग्र्यां दलस्थानीया विभावाः, संस्कारकाः अनुभावव्यभिचारिणः, स्थायिनस्तु तत्सामग्रीजन्या आन्तराः सुखदुःखस्वभावा इति, तेन स्थायिभावान् रसत्वमुपनेष्याम इत्यादावुपचारमङ्गीकुर्वता ग्रन्थविरोधं स्वयमेव बुध्यमानेन दूषणाविष्करणमौर्ख्यात् प्रामाणिको जनः परिरक्षित इति किमस्योच्यते, यस्त्वन्यन्तं नः प्रतीतिवैषम्यप्रसङ्गादि तत्किंयदत्रोच्यताम् ।

पृष्ठ ५९.

१. रसो न प्रतीयते नोत्पद्यते नाभिव्यज्यते, स्वगतत्वेन प्रतीतौ करुणे दुःखित्वं स्यात् । न च सा प्रतीतिर्युक्ता । सीतादेरविभावत्वात् रत्नकान्तास्मृत्यसंवेदनात्, देवतादौ साधारणीकरणायोग्यत्वात् । .....न च शब्दानुमानादिभ्यः तत्प्रतीतौ लोकस्य सरसता युक्ता, प्रत्यक्षादिव नायकयुगलकावभासे हि प्रत्युत लज्जाजुगुप्सास्पृहादिस्वोचितचित्तवृत्त्यन्तरोदयः स्यात्, तत्र प्रतीतिरनुभवस्मृत्यादिरूपरसस्य युक्ता । उत्पत्तावपि तुल्यमेतद्दूषणम् ।

पृष्ठ ६१.

१ भट्टनायकस्तु "ब्रह्मणा परमात्मना यदुदाहृतमविद्याविरचितनिस्सारभेदग्रहे यदुदाहरणीकृतं यन्नाट्यं तद् वक्ष्यामि । यथाहि कल्पनामात्रसारं तत एवानवस्थितैकरूपं क्षणेन कल्पनाशतसहस्रसहं स्वप्नादिविलक्षणमपि सुष्ठुतरां हृदयग्रहनिदानमत्यन्तस्वालम्बनब्रह्मकल्पनटोपरचितं रामरावणादिचेष्टितं कुतोऽप्यभूतादद्भुतवृत्त्या भाति, तथा भाव्यमानमपि च पुमर्थोपायतामेति । तथा तादृगेव विश्वमिदमसत्यनामरूपप्रपञ्चात्मकमथ च श्रवणमननादिवशेन परमपुमर्थप्रापकमिति ।

पृष्ठ ६३.

१. तस्मात् काव्येन दोषाभावगुणालङ्कारमयत्वलक्षणेन नाट्येन चतुर्विधाभिनयरूपेण निविडनिजमोहसङ्कटतानिवारणकारिणा विभावादिसाधारणीकरणात्मनाऽभिधातो द्वितीयेनांशेन भावकत्वव्यापारेण भाव्यमानो रसोऽनुभवस्मृत्यादिविलक्षणेन रजस्तमोऽननुवेधवैचित्र्यवलाद् हृदि विस्तारविकासलक्षणेन सत्त्वोद्रेकप्रकाशानन्दमयनिजसंविद्विश्रान्तिविलक्षणेन परब्रह्मास्वादसविधेन भोगेन परं भुज्यत इति ।

पृष्ठ ६६.

१. आनन्दप्रचुरत्वात्कोशवदाच्छादकत्वाच्चानन्दमयकोशः ।
अहङ्कारादिशरीरोत्पादकसंस्कारमात्रावशिष्टजीवगताज्ञानस्याऽपि कारणशरीरत्वमिन्द्रियतद्विषयाभावेन व्यासङ्गाभावादानन्दबाहुल्यादानन्दमयत्वमात्माच्छादकत्वात्कोशत्वं च युक्तमिति । नानाजीवगतनिकृष्टान्तःकरणव्यष्ट्युपा-

ध्यपेक्षया समष्ट्युपाधेरस्य वैलक्षण्यं दर्शयति इयं समष्टिरिति। विगतरागादिदोषसकलकार्यप्रपञ्चस्य जगत्कारणभूतस्याज्ञानस्य समष्टिभूतोत्कृष्टोपाधिकत्वेन विशुद्धसत्त्वप्राधान्यमिति भावः।

२. बुद्धिरूपं यत्सत्त्वं तस्य यतो नैर्मल्यं रजोऽपसारणसहिष्णुता तदीयतमोभागस्य, न तु नीलादाविव अनपसारणीयत्वम्, ततो हेतोरुभयीमपि आत्मनो विषयस्य च सम्बन्धिनीं रूपच्छायां संवेदननीलमयतामनुकरोति तदाकारधारितया भासते नीलरक्तपटमध्यगतसितवस्त्रवत्, ततो हेतोस्तत्प्रतिबिम्ब आत्मविषयप्रतिबिम्बे यतो युज्यते, ततो विषयबोधस्वभावो भोगः सिध्यति। स हि ग्राह्यस्य ग्राहकस्य च यो मेलनात्मा सम्बन्धस्तद्रूपतयैव लक्षितः, न अन्यदस्य रूपमिति आशयः। ननु बुद्धौ यदि द्वयप्रतिबिम्बयोगः आत्मनो विषयस्य च, कथं भोक्तृभोग्यरूपव्यवहार इत्याशङ्क्य आह 'सा च' इति। सा भोगसिद्धिर्भोक्तृभोग्यभावे आत्मा भोक्ता विषयो भोग्य इति व्यवहारे हेतुर्हि यस्मात्, तस्मात् तयोरात्मविषययोर्भोक्तृभोग्यतायोग्ययोर्बुद्धितत्त्वे संबन्धो यावद्दृति परस्परारूपमेलनात्मा वासगृह इव यूनोः यः स एव भोक्तृभोग्यभावः।

पृष्ठ ६७.

१. ननु अहंकारेण एवात्मा भोक्तृत्वेन अभोक्तैव सन् व्यवह्रियताम्। व्यवह्रियमाणस्य तु कथमसौ भोगो भवेत्। उपचारो हि न उपचार्यस्य स्वात्मनि विशेषः कश्चित्, अपि तु उपचरितुरेव तथाभूतबुद्धिशब्दविशेषप्रतिलम्भात्मा व्यवहारः, अन्यथा अनन्तप्रमातृभेदेन युगपदुपचर्यमाणाग्निजलादिविरुद्धभावभेदितवपुर्माणवकोऽपि अनन्तविरुद्धरूपतामेकत्रापि क्षणे प्रतिपद्येत। तदेतत्परिहरति 'अहंकारव्यवहार्यात्मना' इति। केन एतदुक्तं चिद्रूपताधिकः कश्चित्पुरुषस्य भोग इति। बुद्धिबोधं हि यदात्मनि अविशिष्टतया अहंकारो व्यवहरति स एव अयं भोगः

पृष्ठ ६८.

१. सत्त्वपुरुषयोरत्यन्तासंकीर्णयोः प्रत्ययाविशेषो भोगः, परार्थस्वार्थसंयमात्पुरुषज्ञानम् (यो. सू. ३ ३५) इति सूत्रम्। अस्य अर्थः, सत्त्वं यत् बुद्धिशब्दवाच्यम् यः पुरुषस्तयोर्जडचिद्रूपतया नीलमुत्पलमितिवदन्योन्यमभिन्नकक्ष्याधिशयनेन अन्योन्योपरागलक्षणं संकरमसहमानयोरपि यः प्रत्यये बौद्धेऽध्यवसाये अविशेषो भेदानध्यवसायेन अभेदाध्यवसायविश्रान्तेन व्यवह्रियमाणमैक्यम् स एव भोगः।

२. काणादादिदर्शनेऽपि हि ज्ञानात्मको गुण आत्मनोऽन्यः। कथं तस्य भोगः। समवायादिति चेत् संबन्धमात्रे तर्हि भोगरूपतायां कारणमिति उक्तं भवति।

पृष्ठ ६९.

१. तस्मात्सतामत्र न दूषितानि मतानि तान्येव तु शोधितानि।
पूर्वप्रतिष्ठापितयोजनासु मूलप्रतिष्ठाफलमामनन्ति॥

पृष्ठ ८३.

१. देहादिसंकोचशून्यस्य प्रकाशस्य य आत्मा सारस्वभावो निर्विच्छेदोऽन्तरभ्युपगमस्वभावोऽनन्यवदनालोकिस्वातन्त्र्यविश्रान्तिमयः परः प्रतिष्ठात्मा अहमिति प्रत्यवमर्शः, असौ विकल्पो न भवति । कुतः पुनरियं विकल्पत्वाशंका । आह । वाग्वपुरपि श्रोत्रग्राह्यरूपातिरिक्तान्तरवभासमानसंविद्रूपावेशिवाच्याभाससतत्त्वशब्दनात्मकशब्दशरीरोपीत्यर्थः, कस्मादसौ न विकल्पः, आह, स हीति, विविधा कल्पना भिन्नस्यापि गुडदधिमरिचादेरिव योजना, एकस्यापि वैविध्येन कल्पना. विविधस्य च शङ्कितस्य रूपान्तरस्य कल्पनं विच्छेदनं निर्भज्यान्यतश्च्यावनं प्रमातृबुद्धिकोशे प्रवेशनेन दार्ढ्यापादनपर्यन्तं परिपालनं विकल्प उच्यते निश्चयश्च, अत्र च सर्वत्रावश्यन्तदतद्रूपद्वयेन भवितव्यम् , अन्यथा किं योज्यते किञ्च विभज्यते किं च शङ्क्यते इति सूत्रार्थः ।

पृष्ठ ८५.

१. स्वस्मादिति आत्मनः सकाशात्, स्वस्मिन्निति आत्मनि एव स्वयैव च इच्छया अवभासमाना अन्योन्यावहानेन भेदात्मना निर्भासमानाः संपादिताः, अशेषाः शुद्धाशुद्धमिश्रणरूपाः, लोकाः प्रमातृप्रमेयाः तेषां च यात्राः प्राक्तयः परस्परसंबन्धाः कार्यकारणभावक्रियाकारकभाववैचित्र्यादयः, तेषामात्मा पारमार्थिकः स्वभावो यः स एव शिवः ।

पृष्ठ ८८.

१. विरोधमविरोधं च स्वेच्छयैवोपपादयन् ।
भेदाभेदौ च यो मन्त्रतत्त्ववित्तं स्तुमः शिवम् ॥

पृष्ठ ९०.

१. निराशंसात्पूर्णादहमिति पुरा भासयति यद्-
द्विशाखामाशास्ते तदनु च विभङ्क्तुं निजकलाम् ।
स्वरूपादुन्मेषप्रसरणनिमेषस्थितिजुष-
स्तदद्वैतं वन्दे परमशिवशक्त्यात्म निखिलम् ॥

पृष्ठ ९१.

१. सुतरां रसपरिपोषाय सर्वेषामनादिवासनाचित्रीकृतचेतसां वासनासंवादात् । सा चाविद्या संवित् चमत्कारस्तज्जोऽपि कम्पपुलकोल्लुकसनादिविकारश्चमत्कारः । तथा हि स चाऽऽनृप्ति व्यतिरेकेणाऽच्छिन्नो भोगावेश इत्युच्यते । भुञ्जानस्याद्भुतभोगात्मस्पन्दाविष्टस्य चमतः करणं चमत्कार इति ।

पृष्ठ ९४.

१. ननु विमर्शाभावाज्जडता स्यादिति वक्तव्ये चमत्कृतेरभावादिति कथं वृत्तिः, चमत्कृतिर्हि भुञ्जानस्य या क्रिया भोगसमापत्तिमय आनन्दः स उच्यते इत्याशङ्क्याह स एव चेति । यः प्रकाशस्य प्राणत्वेनोक्तः । एतदुक्तं

भवति–स्वरूपस्य स्वात्मनः परिपूर्णनिजस्वभावप्रकाशनमेव परामर्शमयतां दधदानन्द इत्युच्यते, तदा देहादिसंकोचकलुषाऽपरिपूर्णप्रत्यगात्माऽहंभावनिष्ठत्वेन शरीरस्य रिक्ततया क्षुधातुरस्य व्यतिरिक्तान्नाभिलाषविवशीकृतमतेरात्मपरामर्शाऽयमेकघनवृत्त्या यतो न संभवति ततोऽयमनानन्द इवास्ते । स चात्मपरामर्शमयं स्वानन्दं। यदा त्वन्नपरिपूर्णजठरतास्य तदा तद्रिक्ततोद्रेकरूपा तावदपूर्णता विनष्टा, संस्काररूपतया तु तदानीं यदभिलषणीयं कान्तालिङ्गनादि परामर्शनीयम् स्थितं यथाह गुरुः पतंजलिः 'न हि चैत्र एकस्यां स्त्रियां रक्त इत्यन्यासु विरक्तः' इत्यादि, तद्योगादपूर्णोयमानन्द इति परमानन्दोयं न भवति । सांसारिकश्च सर्वोऽस्यानन्दो

'लाभे भावियोगभीरु'

इति,

विषयो विषयान्तरार्थितां जनयन् जनयेत्कथं सुखम् ।

इति च न्यायेन व्यतिरिक्ताकांक्षाविच्छेदमयतां सर्वात्मना न स्वीकुरुते इति ततोप्यपूर्ण एव । यस्त्वानन्दतांऽशस्तत्र स्वात्मपरामर्शरूपितैव प्रयोजिकेति तत एवोक्तम्:—

त्रैलोक्येप्यत्र यो यावानानन्दः कश्चिदीच्यते ।

स बिन्दुर्यस्य तं वन्दे देवमानन्दसागरम् ॥

इति श्रीभट्टनारायणेन । तथा च मधुरादौ रसे औदारिकाभ्यवहारवैलक्षण्येन प्रवृत्त इदमित्थमिति प्रमातरि विश्रमयन्प्रमातृभागमेव प्रधानतया विमृशन्भुञ्जान इत्युच्यते । यत्राप्यत्यन्तम् अन्यथाभावमतिक्रम्य सुखमास्वाद्यते अर्जनादिसम्भाव्यमानविघ्नान्तरनिरासाद्वैषयिकानन्दविलक्षणशृङ्गारादौ नाट्यकाव्यादिविषये तत्र वीतविघ्नत्वादेवाऽसौ रसना चर्वणा निर्वृत्तिः प्रतीतिः प्रमातृताविश्रान्तिरेव, तत एव हृदयेन परामर्शलक्षणेन प्राधान्याद्व्यपदेश्या व्यवस्थितस्यापि प्रकाशभागस्य वेद्यविश्रान्तस्यानादरणात् सहृदयतोच्यते इति निर्विघ्नास्वादरूपा च रसना । तदगोचरीकार्याः चित्तवृत्तयो रसा न वेद्ययमर्थोऽभिनवभारत्यां नाट्यवेदविवृतौ वितत्य व्युत्पादितोस्माभिरिति तत्कुतूहली तामेवावलोकयेदिह तु प्रकृतविघ्नकारित्वान्न विततः । तस्मादनुपचरितस्य संवेदनरूपतानान्तरीयत्वेनावस्थितस्य स्वतन्त्रस्यैव रसनैकघनतया परामर्शः परमानन्दो निर्वृतिश्चमत्कार उच्यते । तस्माद्युक्तमाह चमत्कृतेरभावात् । मधुरादिरसास्वादे तु विषयस्पर्शव्यवधानम् । ततोपि काव्यनाट्यादौ तद्व्यवधानशून्यता । तद्व्यवधानसंस्कारानुवेधस्तु तत्रापि । परंतु तथोचितव्यवधानांशतिरस्क्रियासावधानहृदया लभन्ते एव परमानन्दम् ।

पृष्ठ ९९.

१. इह जडास्तावच्चेतननिमग्ना एव भान्ति, इदमिति हि जडपरामर्शोऽहमिति संवित्परामर्श एव विश्राम्यति । ततश्च जडा निरात्मान इति जन्तव

एव जीवाः सात्मानस्तेषां च महेश्वर एव स्वात्मा, स एव महेश्वरो न त्वन्यः कश्चित्, यतः संवित्स्वभावोऽसौ। संविदश्च न देशेन न कालेन न स्वरूपेण कोऽपि भेदः, कामं देहप्राणादयो भिद्यन्ताम्। ते तु जडपक्ष्याश्रेतननिमग्ना एव इत्येक एव चिदात्मा स्वातन्त्र्येण स्वात्मनि यतो वैश्वरूप्यं भासयति ततो महेश्वरोऽन्तर्नीतामिदन्तां कृत्वा परानुन्मुखस्वात्मविश्रान्तिरूपाहंविमर्शपरिपूर्णः।

पृष्ठ १०१

१. ननु चैवं सति यथा परमेश्वरस्य ज्ञानक्रियामाया अव्यतिरेकिण्यः शक्तयः इत्युच्यन्ते तद्वत्पशोः सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि प्रसज्यन्ते, व्यतिरिक्तानि च तानि पुंस्तत्त्वाद्गण्यन्ते तदेतत कथम् इति संशयं शमयतिः—

भेदस्थितेःशक्तिमतः शक्तित्वं नापदिश्यते।
एषां गुणानां करणकार्यत्वपरिणामिनाम् ॥

सत्यम्, एवं स्यात् यदि भेदग्रहो न भवेत्, भेदव्यवहारस्त्वयं विचार्यते। तत्र च संकुचितस्वभावः पुरुषो नाम्य नैसर्गिकं भावविषयं प्रकाशनादिरूपम्, सर्वदा तत्प्रसङ्गात्, अपि त्वन्यसम्बन्धकृतम्। ततश्च तस्मात् पशोः शक्तिमत्त्वेन शङ्क्यमानाद् भेदेन यत एतानि सत्त्वादीनि ततः शक्तयो व्यतिरेकमुक्ता इति नोच्यन्ते, किन्तूपकरणत्वात् गुणा इत्युच्यन्ते।

पृष्ठ १०२

१. इह तावत् पतिर्विश्वस्यावभासमानवैचित्र्यलक्षणेन सृष्ट्यादिना पालयिता स्वप्रकाशस्वभावः तस्य विश्वपतेर्या सत्ता भवनकर्तृता स्फुरत्तारूपा पूर्वं व्याख्याता "सा स्फुरत्ता महासत्ता" ई. प्र. १ ए. १४ इत्यत्र, सैव प्रकाशस्य विमर्शाव्यतिरेकात् विमर्शात्मकचमत्काररूपा सती क्रियाशक्तिरुच्यते, परौन्मुख्यत्यागेन स्वात्मविश्रान्तिरूपत्वाच्च सैव आनन्दः, तदेवं भगवतश्चिदात्मतयैवेयद्रूपता। पशोस्तु सत्तानदभावश्च आनन्दश्च तदभावश्च संकुचितत्वद्रूपत्वात्, तेन योऽसौ सत्तानन्दभागस्तत्प्रकाशसुखवृत्ति सत्त्वम्, यस्तदभावस्तदावरणमोहरूपं तमः, एते च ते सत्त्वतमसी नीलानीलवत् परस्परपरिहारेण यद्यपि वर्तेते कार्यत्वकारणत्ववत् तथापि एकपरामर्शगोचरीकार्यधर्मापेक्षया चित्रपतंगभंगतनीलानीलात्मकरूपन्यायेनान्योन्यमिश्रतयापि भानः, अतो योऽयं द्वयात्मा मिश्रस्वभावः तद्रजो गुणः। अत एव प्रकाशाप्रकाशस्वरूपयोः सत्त्वतमसोरत्र श्लेषेणावस्थानम् इति दुःखत्वम्। प्रिय पुत्रादेरेकघन एव हि प्रकाशः सुखम्, एकघन एवाप्रकाशो मोहः। यस्तु कथञ्चित्प्रकाशो यथा सत्र्याधिकदेहरूपतयानभिमतया, कथञ्चिच्चाप्रकाशो यथा गतगदकल्याणधर्मयोगितयाभिमतया तदेव दुःखत्वम्। अयमेव च पूर्वापरीभावस्य क्रियापरमार्थः।

पृष्ठ १०६.

१. माया हि चिन्मयाद् भेदं शिवाद्विदधती पशोः।

सुषुप्ततामिवाधत्ते तत एव ह्यदर्कक्रियः ॥
कला हि किञ्चित्कर्तृत्वं सूते स्वालिङ्गनादणोः ।
तस्याश्चाप्यणुनान्योन्यं ह्यञ्जने सा प्रसूयते ॥
उच्छ्रुनतेव प्रथमा सूक्ष्माङ्कुरकलेव च ।
बीजस्याम्बुमृत्कम्बुतपयोगात् प्रसूतिकृत् ॥
यथा बीजस्य प्रथमावस्थाम्बिकोच्छ्रनता तदनु सूक्ष्मो वाङ्कुरांशो जलादियोगादेव स्वकार्यं कुर्यात्, तथा मायाकार्यं कलादि पुयोग एवेति ।

२. एवं च उभयोरपि कर्तृत्वे प्रयोजकव्यापारविशिष्टः प्रयोज्य एव पुमान् साक्षात् क्रियां प्रति स्वातन्त्र्ययोगात् प्रधानभूतः कर्तेति तदुक्तम्·····
एककर्तृकारकीभूतत्वेनालक्ष्यान्तरत्वेऽपि भगवदनुग्रहात् कस्यचित् यदानयोर्विवेकज्ञानं जायते तदासौ मायापुंविवेकः,सर्वकर्मक्षयात् विज्ञानाकलता च भवेद्येनाय पुमान् मायाधो न संसरेदिति तदाहः—
अलक्ष्यान्तरयोरित्थं यदा पुंस्कलयोर्भवेत् ।
मायागर्भेशशक्त्यादेरन्तरज्ञानमान्तरम् ॥
तदा मायापुंविवेकः सर्वकर्मक्षयाद् भवेत् ।
विज्ञानाकलता मायाधस्तान्नो यात्यधः पुमान् ।
धीपुंविवेके विज्ञाते प्रधानपुरुषान्तरे ॥
अपि न क्षीणकर्मा स्यात् कलायां तद्धि संभवेत् ।
अतः सांख्यदृशा सिद्धः प्रधानाधो न संसरेत् ॥
कलापुंसोर्विवेके तु मायाधो नैव गच्छति ।

पृष्ठ १०७

तत् तत्त्वानन्तरं सत्त्वप्रधानत्वात् प्रतिबिम्बोपग्रहयोग्यं तमसाच्छादितत्वात् सकलप्रतिबिम्बनतो व्यावर्तितम् भागे रजसा तमसोऽपसारणात् किञ्चिदेव प्रतिबिम्बकं गृह्णाति तदेव बुद्धितत्त्वम् उच्यते । अर्थप्रतिबिम्बोपग्रहश्च ज्ञानम् अस्य वृत्तिरूपं पूर्वव्यपदेशतिरोधायकदध्यादिपरिणामविलक्षणपरिणतिविशेषात्मकम् । एवम् अर्थस्य तावत् रूपं बुद्धिः धारयति । इयच्च सत्त्वादीनां सुखदुःखमोहतया भोग्यत्वात् जडम् इति दर्पणवत् अप्रकाशम्, न च भोग्यस्य अप्रकाशस्य तद्विरुद्धभोक्तृतारूपप्रकाशात्मकस्वभावसंभवो युक्त्यनुपाती इति तद्विलक्षणेन भोक्त्रा भवितव्यम् । स च प्रकाशः इत्येतावत्स्वभावः, स्वभावान्तरं हि अप्रकाशरूपं भोग्यं कथं भोक्तुः स्वभावतया संभाव्येत ।

पृष्ठ १०८.

१. बुद्धिस्तु गुणसंकीर्णा विवेकेन कथं सुखम् ।
दुःखं मोहात्मकं वापि विषयं दर्शयेदपि ॥
२. किंचित्तु कुरुते तस्मान्नूनमस्त्यपरं तु तत् ।
रागतत्त्वमिति प्रोक्तं यत्तत्रैवोपरञ्जकम् ।

न चाऽवैराग्यमात्रं तत्तत्राप्यासक्तिवृत्तितः ।
विरक्तावपि तृप्तस्य सूक्ष्मरागव्यवस्थितेः ॥
किंचिन्मे भूयात् इति सामान्येनाभिष्वङ्गमात्रं रागतत्त्वमन्यस्तु पुनः तस्यैव प्रपञ्चः इति प्राङ्निरूपितप्रायमित्यल बहुना ।

पृष्ठ १०९.

१. रागं व्याचष्टे कर्तुरिति । मत्सरादेरिति, अभिधर्मादौ भरतादौ च दर्शितश्चित्तवृत्तिगणो रागमूल एव, अत एव वीतराग इति द्वेषोद्धर्षमत्सरादिविगमोप्यस्य प्रतीयत एव ।

पृष्ठ ११०.

१. प्रथमोङ्कः प्रमादः । एतन्निर्दिष्टस्य ग्रन्थस्य पूर्वपत्रेण सह सम्बन्धः ।
२. काली नाम परा शक्तिः सैव देवस्य गीयते ।
यन्नाम परस्य प्रकाशस्य कालेन योगः सास्य शक्तिः ।
स्वेच्छावभासितस्य प्रमातृप्रमेयाद्यात्मनो जगतस्तत्तद्रूपतया कलने सामर्थ्यम् ।

पृष्ठ ११३.

१. उभयरूपेति । सवेद्यान्या च । आणवसंज्ञो योऽज्ञानात्मा मायाकृत एव मलविशेषः, यद्वक्ष्यते 'मायाशक्त्यैव तत् त्रयमिति', तस्यातिस्फुटतां संवेदनभागे कुर्वन्बुद्धौ तमोगुणमुद्रेचयति भिन्नाभासयोगं संहरति भगवान् रुद्रः। अधिष्ठातृतामेव स्पष्टयति तस्येत्यादिना, अत्र चेति सर्वसंहारात्मनि प्रमातृमात्रे, स एवेति भगवान् रुद्रः ।

पृष्ठ ११८.

१. देहे बुद्धावथ प्राणे कल्पिते नभसीव वा ।
प्रमातृत्वेनाहमिति विमर्शोऽन्यव्यपोहनात् ॥
विकल्प एव स परप्रतियोग्यवभासजः ।

पृष्ठ १२१.

१. इह संवित्तत्त्वम् स्वरूपमावृण्वानं ज्ञेयात्मना बुद्ध्यादिना देहान्तेन घटादिना चाभाति । एकमेव चेदं स्वातन्त्र्यविजृम्भितम् न तु अत्र क्रमो वा भेदो वा वस्तुतः । भाति तु स्वातन्त्र्यादुभयमपि । एवं स्थिते चित्तत्त्वस्य यः स्वरूपावरणांशः स एवोत्तरभागान्तरानुदयप्रध्वंसानादरयोगेन प्रलयसमाधाननिद्रामूर्च्छादिष्विव तदसंकीर्णाभासः परिस्फुरन् विश्राम्यति । तत्रैव चाहन्तारूपं कर्तृतायाः पदं परामर्शस्य स्फुटत्वाभावादीषद्ग्रहणासारेण संस्कारात्मना लोकप्रसिद्धरूपाभावात् अरूपेण वा वेद्येन निषेध्यात्मना युक्तं यदा भवति तदा सा दशा नेत्येव परामर्शशेषा अकिंचनोऽहमितिप्रतिपत्तिवदाक्षिप्तसामान्या संस्कारशेषीभूतज्ञेयरूपा शून्य इत्युच्यते ।
२. ननु समस्तवेद्यक्षयश्चेद्वृत्तस्तदेव परमपदमिति का खलवन्या तुर्यदशा सुषुप्तातिरिक्ता स्यादित्यत आह तत्र चेति । क्षीणेऽपि वेद्यान्तरे वेदकतत्त्वस्य

सर्वोत्तीर्ण–सर्वमय–सर्वेश्वरतादिधर्मभाजनस्याद्यापि वेद्य एव शून्यादौ समुपहितसंवित्संकोचयोगात्परमार्थप्रकाशो नास्तीति प्रकाशसारायास्तुर्यदशाया युक्तमेव वैलक्षण्यम् ।

३. यदा पुनः कर्तृताया मुख्यत्वं तन्नान्तरीक एव च शून्यादेर्मेयतांऽशस्य गुणीभावस्तत्र च चिद्रूपे गुणीभूते स्वातन्त्र्यस्याप्यबोधतेति यो मलव्यापारोऽभूत् तस्यापहस्तनाबोधस्यापि चिदात्मनश्चिद्रूपतायां प्रधानस्वभावस्य मुख्यत्वं तदेतदज्ञानरूपमलप्रतिद्वन्द्वितया समावेशलक्षणं सत्यस्वरूपे सम्यगासमन्तात् प्रवेशलक्षणं ज्ञानं यल्लाभेन ज्ञानी, यदभ्यासेन च देहप्राणादावनन्तसंविद्धर्मात्मकविभवसमासादनाद्योगी भवति । एतदुक्तं भवति, यदाहंभावः स्वातन्त्र्यादिशैव व्यापित्वनित्यत्वादिपरामर्शबलाच्छून्यादेः प्रमेयीकृतात् उन्मज्य इव आस्ते तदा तुर्यातीतता । तदापि च शून्यादिसंस्कारोप्यस्तीत्यव्यतिरेकतुर्याऽतीतसमतैव । यदा तु परामृष्टनित्यत्वव्यापित्वादिधर्मकैश्वर्यघनात्मनाहंभावसिद्धरसेन शून्यादिदेहधान्वन्तं विध्यते येन प्रमेयत्वात् च्यवत इव तदा तुर्यदशा । यदापि विद्धोसौ प्राणदेहादिधातुः संविद्रसेनाभिनिविष्टोऽत्यन्तं कनकधातुरिव जीर्णः क्रियते येन स द्रुतरस इवभाति केवलं तत्संस्कारस्तदापि तुर्यातीतदशा सा भवति । सेयं द्वयप्यि दशा समावेशः, यल्लाभाय अन्यदुपदिश्यते । यद्दीतम् मय्यावेश्य मनो य इत्युपक्रम्य अथावेशयितुं चित्तमिति । तस्यैव च पल्लवभूताः परमेश्वरस्तुतिप्रणामध्यानपूजादयः । तेषां हि ब्रह्मीभावः स्वात्मगुणीकरणं परशेश्वररूपप्रधानतापादनं तत्त्वम् । अभ्यासेऽप्यसमर्थस्सन्मत्कर्मपरमो भव इत्यादि । देहपाते त्वेकघनैव शिवतेति तदा समावेशादिव्यवहारो न कश्चिदिति ।

पृष्ठ १२३.

१. शून्यप्रमातुरेव वक्तव्यशेषमाचक्षाणो द्वितीयसुपुप्तस्य भूमिकां करोति साक्षाणामान्तरीति सूत्रेण । एष शून्यः प्रमाताहन्तारूपया कर्तृतयाभिषिक्तो विद्याकलाशक्तिप्रपंचरूपस्य बुद्धिकर्मेन्द्रियवर्गस्य बाह्यविषयालोचनविषयनिर्माणलक्षणातो बाह्यवृत्तेः प्रत्येकमसाधारणरूपायाः विलक्षणा याऽसौ आन्तरी वृत्तिर्यया वायुरेकः प्राणनापाननादिक्रियापंचकप्रपंचितः पंचात्मकतामभ्येति । तां वृत्तिं जीवनलक्षणां तस्याक्षवर्गस्य जडस्य यतः करणवर्गोयमिति न्यायेन स्वावेशवशादुत्थापयञ्जीव इत्युच्यते । सा तथाभूता या वृत्तिस्तस्य शून्यस्य तथोत्थापिका सा जीवनक्रिया । इन्द्रियशक्तीनामेव वा या आन्तरी साधारणरूपा प्राणनादिक्रियोत्थापिका वृत्तिः सा परमार्थतः कर्तुरेव वृत्तिर्न जडानामिति एतदेव जीवनम् । यदा तु प्राण एवाहन्ता तदाप्येवम् । तदा तु प्राण एव जीवः तत्रैवाऽहन्ताऽऽवेशात् ।

२. एवं शून्ये एवाहन्ता अक्षचक्रोपोद्बलिका जीवनम् इति स शून्य एव जीवः संसरति । यदि वेन्द्रियशक्तीनामेव यान्तरी साधारणप्राणनात्मिका प्राणशब्दवाच्या प्राणादिमारुतविशेषप्रेरणामयी सैव अहम् इत्यधिशयाना जीवनम् । तदा प्राण एव जीवः संसारी स एव शून्यः ।

पृष्ठ १२४.

१ प्राण इति व्याख्यातुं या वृत्तिरान्तरे वा स्पर्श इति तां व्याचष्टे प्राणस्येति, स्पर्श इति, स्पर्शेन्द्रियगम्ये इत्याशयः, अन्यथा देहे चक्षुरादिगम्ये बुद्धिवृत्तौ चान्तःकरणगम्यायामस्वहन्ताभिमानः, आन्तरे पुनर्वायौ केनाधिगतस्तथाभिमान इति शङ्कयेत, शरीरस्य च विषयीभूतस्य सत्यां भोग्यं प्रत्याधारतायामहमिति भोक्तृत्वमारोपितम्, बुद्धेस्तु सत्यां भोग्यं प्रति कारणतायाम्, तद्वदेवान्तरस्य स्पर्शस्य करणतायामेव सत्यां भोक्तृत्वमारोपितमिति निरूपयति न चात्रेति । अस्थिशूल हि वायुना अस्थ्नोऽभिघातजनितस्तीव्रतमस्पर्शो दुःखवेदनादायी, येन तत्र करणतास्पर्शः वायौ, आन्तरत्वमिति अबाह्यत्वम्, यावदिति अन्तरङ्गत्वादप्यान्तरत्वमित्याशयः। सर्वाणीन्द्रियाधिष्ठानानि व्याप्नोति तत एव त्वगेवैकमिन्द्रियमव्यतिरेकादिति मन्यन्ते, ततोऽयं प्राणस्सर्वतो देहादेरुत्कृष्टः सकलकरणमार्गाधिष्ठानात्। अत एवेति। अहमिति यतः प्रमातृरसेनायमभिषिक्तस्ततो हेतोरान्तरो वायुर्नासिकाभ्यां प्रवेशनिस्सरणधर्मा यः स एव न (?) प्राण इत्युच्यते। अपितु तत्राधिकं रूपमस्तीत्यपि शब्दः। जीवतीत्येवं जीवनशब्दवाच्यो यत्प्रमातुर्ज्ञस्य सतो व्यापारात्मा स प्राणनक्रियालक्षणोक्तः प्राणाख्ये प्रमातर्यस्ति । कीदृश्यसौ क्रिया, आह, सर्वाभिरिन्द्रियशक्तिभिरनुस्यूतं यत्पुर्यष्टकं तस्य सम्बन्धिनी, अत्र च विशेषद्वारेण विशेषणं बोद्धव्यम् । तस्य अनुवेधकत्वेन वर्तमानानामिन्द्रियशक्तीनां सम्बन्धिनी आन्तरी यासौ वृत्तिः सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्चेति निरूपिता सा यस्मिन्प्रकृता फलत्वेन प्रस्तुता । अत एव वेति । यत एवंरूपोऽसौ व्यापारस्तत आन्तरत्वं सर्वानुवेधकत्वमप्यभिमतम् । यतः प्रमातुः शक्तिरूपाणि यानीन्द्रियाणि प्रमाकरणानि यद्योगात्प्रमाता, तेषां या भूमिरन्तर्मुखरूपं तत्रावस्थितोऽसौ व्यापारस्तेनाबहीरूपत्वादन्तरङ्गत्वात्सर्वानुवेधकत्वाच्चान्तरत्वं प्राणस्येति तात्पर्यम् ।

२. प्राणसुषुप्ते तु स्पर्शकृतस्य सुखदुःखादेर्भावात् मायाख्यमस्ति मलम् इति सवेद्यं तत् ।

पृष्ठ १२६.

१. वाच्या प्रकरणादिभ्यो बुद्धिस्था वा यथा क्रिया ।
वाक्यार्थः कारकैर्युक्ता स्थायी भावस्तथेतरैः ॥

पृष्ठ १२७.

१. रसः स एव स्वाद्यत्वाद्रसिकस्यैव वर्तनात् ।
नानुकार्यस्य वृत्तत्वात्काव्यस्यातत्परत्वतः ॥

२. स्वादः काव्यार्थसंभेदादात्मानन्दसमुद्भवः ।
विकाशविस्तरक्षोभविक्षेपैः स चतुर्विधः ॥
शृङ्गारवीरबीभत्सरौद्रेषु मनसः क्रमात ।

३. यद्वा विभावादिचर्वणामहिम्ना सहृदयस्य निजसहृदयतावशोन्मिषितेन तत्तत्स्थाय्युपहितस्वस्वरूपानन्दाकारा समाधाविव योगिनश्चित्तवृत्तिरुपजा-

यते, तन्मयीभवनमिति यावत्। आनन्दो ह्ययं न लौकिकसुखान्तरसाधारणः, अनन्तःकरणवृत्तिरूपत्वात्। इत्थं चाभिनवगुप्तमम्मटभट्टादिग्रन्थस्वारस्येन भग्नावरणचिद्विशिष्टो रत्यादिः स्थायी भावो रस इति स्थितम्। वस्तुतस्तु वक्ष्यमाणश्रुतिस्वारस्येन रत्याद्यवच्छिन्ना भग्नावरणा चिदेव रसः। सर्वथैव चास्य विशिष्टात्मनो विशेषणं विशेष्यं वा चिदंशमादाय नित्यत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वं च सिद्धम्। रत्याद्यंशमादाय त्वनित्यत्वमितरभास्यत्वं च। चर्वणा चास्य चिदावरणभङ्ग एव प्रागुक्ता, तदाकारान्तःकरणवृत्तिर्वा। इयं च परमब्रह्मास्वादात्समाधेर्विलक्षणा। विभावादिविषयसंवलितचिदानन्दालम्बनत्वात्।

पृष्ठ १२८.

१. स्वप्रकाशमात्ररूपमेव आत्मतत्त्वं सांख्यानाम्। सौगतानां तु स्वप्रकाशत्वेन अन्तर्मुखं बाह्यनीलादिप्रकाशत्वेन च बहिर्मुखम्। न च एकस्य अन्तर्बहिर्मुखता उपपन्ना, स्वपरयोरैक्यापत्तिप्रसंगात्। न च सा युज्यते, बाह्यस्य अर्थस्य ग्राहकात् विच्छेदेन अवभासादिति ग्राहकोऽन्तर्मुख एव। अत एव बाह्यत्वग्राह्यत्वायोगात् न तेन तुल्यकक्ष्यतया परं किंचन चकास्ति। तुल्यकक्ष्यताप्रतिभासकृतश्च गुणभावप्रधानभावाभ्यां धर्मधर्मिभावविशेषणविशेष्यभावोपधानोपधेयभावादिव्यवहारः। तथा च पटोऽयं शुक्ल इति पटाभासशुक्लाभासयोर्बहिर्भूमौ तुल्येदन्ताग्राह्यभावेन स्थितयोः पटाभासोपरक्तः शुक्लाभासो विपर्ययो वा भवतीति युज्यते। तेन अत्र गुणभूतो विशेषणमन्योपधेयरूपत्वात्, अन्यत् स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तमुपधेयं स्वात्मना अनुरञ्जनीयं रूपं विशिष्टलक्षणं येनेति, प्रधानभूतस्तु विशेष्योऽन्येन उपधेयं विशेषणेन उपरञ्जनीयं रूपमस्येति। एवं च विशेषणविशेष्यभावमुखेन यो व्यवहारः स आत्मनि न उपपद्यते इति न असौ कस्यचित् धर्मः, नापि तस्य कश्चित् धर्म इति। ज्ञानं नाम यद्यपि बुद्धिरूपं तथापि न आत्मनो धर्मं इति नैयायिकादितो भेदः।

आस्मिन् पृष्ठे अपरेण एकाङ्केन निर्दिष्टो ग्रन्थः मूल एव दत्त इति नेहोपन्यस्यते। अयञ्च अभिनवभारतीप्रथमभागे २९३ पृष्ठे अवलोकनीयः।

पृष्ठ १२९.

१. तथा च मधुरादौ रसे औदारिकाभ्यवहारवैलक्षण्येन प्रवृत्त इदमित्थमिति प्रमातरि विश्रमयन्प्रमातृभागमेव प्रधानतया विमृशन्भुञ्जान इत्युच्यते। यत्राप्यत्यन्तम् अन्यथाभावमतिक्रम्य सुखमास्वाद्यते अर्जनादिसंभाव्यमानविघ्नान्तरनिरासाद्वैषयिकानन्दविलक्षणश्रृङ्गारादौ नाट्यकाव्यादिविषये, तत्र वीतविघ्नत्वादेवासौ रसना चर्वणा निर्वृतिः प्रतीतिः प्रमातृतावि श्रांतिरेव, तत एव हृदयेन परामर्शलक्षणेन प्राधान्याद् व्यपदेश्या, व्यवस्थितस्यापि प्रकाशभागस्य वेद्यविश्रान्तस्याऽनादरणात् सहृदयतोच्यते इति। निर्विघ्नास्वादरूपा च रसना। तद्गोचरीकार्यां चित्तवृत्तयो रसा न वेत्ययमर्थोऽभिनवभारत्यां नाट्यवेदविवृतौ वितत्य व्युत्पादितोऽस्माभिरिति तत्कुतूहली तामेवावलोकयेदिह तु

प्रकृतविघ्नकारित्वान्न विततः । तस्मादनुपचरितस्य संवेदनरूपतानान्तरीयकत्वेनाऽवस्थितस्य स्वतन्त्रस्यैव रसनैकघनतया परामर्शः परमानन्दो निर्वृतिश्चमत्कार उच्यते, तस्माद्युक्तमाह चमत्कृतेरभावात् । मधुरादिरसास्वादे तु विषयस्पर्शव्यवधानम्, ततोपि काव्यनाट्यादौ तद्व्यवधानशून्यता, तद्व्यवधानसंस्कारानुवेधस्तु तत्रापि । परंतु तथोचितव्यवधानांऽशतिरस्क्रियासावधानहृदया लभन्ते एव परमानन्दम् ।

पृष्ठ १३१.

१. स्थायिविलक्षणो रसः, न तु यथा शङ्कुकादिभिरभ्यधीयत 'स्थाय्येव विभावादिप्रत्याय्यो रस्यमानत्वाद्रस उच्यते' इति, एवं हि लौकिकेऽपि किं न रसः, असतोऽपि हि यत्र रसनीयता स्यात्तत्र वस्तुसतः कथं न भविष्यति । तेन स्थायिप्रतीतिरनुमितिरूपा वाच्या न रसः । अत एव सूत्रे स्थायिग्रहणं न कृतम् , तत्प्रत्युत शल्यभूतं स्यात् । केवलमौचित्यादेवमुच्यते स्थायी रसीभूत इति ।

पृष्ठ १३२.

१. यस्य वशात् सामर्थ्यात् वस्तु नीलसुखादिकं व्यवतिष्ठते, नियतां प्रकाशमर्यादां न अतिवर्तते, इदमिति स्वरूपेण एतादृक् इति च विशेषणभूतनित्यानित्यत्वादिधर्मान्तरयोगेन तल्लोके प्रमाणम् इति स्थितम् ।

२. तेन शून्यधीप्राणदेहाद्युपाध्याश्रयस्वीकारात्मसंकोचपरिग्रहसंकुचितात् मायाप्रमातुः अनन्तकालान्तर्मुखसंवेदनरूपात् स प्रमाणाभिमत आभासो यावत् प्रमेयोन्मुखतास्वभावः तावत् प्रमेयस्य देशकालाकाराभाससंभेदवत्त्वात् सोपि तथैव क्षणे क्षणे अन्यान्याभासरूपः सृष्टिशक्त्या सृष्टव्यः, तदुक्तम् अभिनवोदयः इति ।

३. कासौ प्रमा, फलस्वभावा इति चेत् , आह, स एव बोधरूप आभासो मितिः प्रमाणफलम् इति संबन्धः । ननु एवं पर्यायत्वमुक्तं भवेत् ननु फलस्वरूपम् , आह, वाह्योन्मुखतया प्रकाशरूपतया तत्र तत्प्रमाणम् । या तु तस्यैव अन्तर्मुखात्मा विमर्शरूपता प्राक् उपपादिता तत्स्वभावेन केवलं विषयदशासंकुचितेन स एव बोधः फलम् ।

पृष्ठ १३३.

१. इदम् इति विमर्शबलेन च यतः प्रमाणम्, विमर्शश्च शब्दजीवितः, शब्दश्च आभासान्तरैः देशकालादिरूपैरनामृष्टे सामान्यरूपे इदम् इति निर्विकल्पके ज्ञाने एकत्रैव आभासमात्रे प्रवर्तते घट इति लोहित इति, ततो देशकालाभासयोः स्वलक्षणत्वार्पणप्रवणयोः अनामिश्रणात् सामान्याद्यमाने आभासे प्रमाणं प्रवर्तते, अयम् इत्यपि हि आभास आभासान्तरानामिश्रे पुरोवस्थितावभासमात्रे इति उक्तं श्रीमदाचार्यपादैरेव ।

२. स्वलक्षणं तु तदाभाससामानाधिकरण्याभासरूपम् आभासान्तरम् एकम् अन्यदेव, तत्र च पृथगेव च प्रमाणम्, तत्परं मिश्रीकारेषु नेषु आभासेषु गृहीतग्राहि न प्रमाणम् इति अग्रे भविष्यति, अध्यवसायस्य अस्मदुक्तनयेन

शब्दप्राणितस्य प्रत्याभासविश्रान्तौ तदपेक्षमपि प्रामाण्यं वदता प्रत्याभास-निष्ठमेव प्रामाण्यमुपेत्यम् , इत्यास्ताम् , किमवान्तरेण ।

पृष्ठ १३४.

१ सिद्धान्तिदर्शने तावदनन्त आभासवर्गो नियतिशक्त्या मिश्रीभूतः सन् पदार्थेऽर्थक्रियाकारी, तस्य रुचितेन अंशेन व्यपदेशो भवति ।

२. यथारुचि यथार्थित्वं यथाव्युत्पत्ति भिद्यते ।
आभासोऽप्यर्थ एकस्मिन्ननुसन्धानसाधिते ॥
यद्यपि घट इति बहिः परिदृष्ट एकोऽर्थः तथापि तावानेव असौ न, अपि तु पृथक् निर्भज्यमानतामपि सहते । तथाहि स्वतन्त्रं वा विवेचनम् अर्थित्वानुसारेण वा पूर्वप्रसिद्ध्युपजीवनेन वा । तत्र त्रिधापि विवेचने क्रियमाणे प्रथगेव भान्ति आभासाः ।

३. यद्यप्यनेकाभासयोग उक्तस्तथापि न पूर्णता स्वलक्षणस्येति तस्यापीत्यपि शब्दः, ततश्चान्यदपि देशकालाभासरूपं तत्र योज्यमिति द्वितीयोऽपि शब्दः, तद्योजनं विना तु न पूर्णता, तद्योजने त्वन्यायोजनेऽपि पूर्णता स्वलक्षणस्येत्याह—देशकालभेदादेवेति ।

४. येन विमर्शसामर्थ्येन सा एवंभूता भवति पृथ्वादिता या सन्निवेशमात्रे मृण्मयत्वराजतत्वाद्यनपेक्षिणि व्यवहृता, कीदृशी भवति, आह, अग्न्यैराभासैर्मृण्मयो लोहित उन्नत इत्यादिभिर्विशिष्टैरेकरूपे विशेष्यरूपत्वादेव केवलसन्निवेशसामान्याभासाद्विलक्षणाभासेऽपि भवन्ती पूर्वप्रतिपन्नात् सामान्यात् सन्निवेशमात्राकारादभिन्ना, एवं मृण्मयता । एतदन्यत्रातिदिशति एवम् इति । महत्त्वादि यदेकैकमनामिश्रमनेकं सामान्यं तद्विषयत्वेन ये निश्चिताः परामर्शास्ते पुनरेकस्मिन्स्वलक्षणे प्रवर्तमानास्तं सामान्यात्मानं विशेषीभूतमपि पूर्वं सामान्यप्रतिपत्तिव्यवहारकाले प्रतिपन्नेन विविक्तेनाऽनामिश्रेण बहुसंख्याकेन तदेकपरामर्शविषयेण सामान्येनैकतां नयन्ति ।

पृष्ठ १३६.

१. इत्येवं तत्र आभासानां भेदः, एकस्वलक्षणन्तु एकस्मिन्देशाभासे कालाभासे च विश्रान्तेः । देशकालाभासावेव हि सामान्यरूपताप्रयोजकव्यापित्वनित्यत्वखण्डनाविधानसविधवृत्ती विशेषरूपतां वितरतः ।

२. गुण्यते आरोप्यते हृद्यतादिधर्मेण साधर्म्यादिति गुणः आरोप्यमाणः, यत्र आरोप्यते स गुणी । ततः औपचारिकमेवमादि सामानाधिकरण्यमिति उक्तं भवति ।

पृष्ठ १४०.

१. साधारणोऽन्यथा चैशः सर्गः स्पष्टावभासनात् ।
विकल्पहानेनैकाग्र्यात् क्रमेणेश्वरतापदम् ॥
ऐश्वरः सर्गो द्विधा, साधारणश्च घटादिरसाधारणश्च अन्यथाहृतिनिर्दिष्टो द्विचन्द्रादिः, तस्य च सामान्यलक्षणं स्पष्टावभासनं नाम । सोऽयं सर्गो यदा

क्किल्पहानक्रमेण तस्मिन्निर्विकल्पकपरिगृहीत एव स्पष्टाभेऽर्थ एकाग्र्यत्वमवलम्ब्य अहमिदम् इत्यैश्वर्यपरामर्शपदं भवति तदा अन्तर्लक्ष्यबहिर्दृष्टिनिमेषोन्मेषपरिहारोपदेशदिशा क्रमेण अभ्यासतारम्येन पशोः पशुत्वं प्रतिहन्तीश्वरत्वं च दर्शयति ।

पृष्ठ १४१.

१. वाग्धेनुर्दुग्ध एकं हि रसं यल्लाभ (यद्वाल ?) तृष्णया ।
तेन नास्य समः स स्याद् दुह्यते योगिभिर्हि यः ॥
तदावशेने विनाप्याक्रान्त्या हि योगिभिर्दुह्यते ।

पृष्ठ १४२.

१. तत्र च नटो ध्यायिनामिदंध्यानपदः । न हि तत्रायमेव सिन्दूरादिमयो वासुदेव इति स्मरणीयप्रतिपत्तिः, अपि तु तदुपायद्वारेणातिस्फुटीभूतसङ्कल्पगोचरो देवताविशेषो ध्यायिनां फलकृत्, तद्वन्नटप्रक्रिया ।

पृष्ठ १४८.

१ नाट्यं नाम लौकिकपदार्थव्यतिरिक्तं तदनुकारप्रतिबिम्बालेख्यसादृश्यारोपाध्यवसायोत्प्रेक्षास्वप्नमायेन्द्रजालादिविलक्षणं तद्ग्राहकस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानभ्रान्तिसंशयानवधारणाऽनध्यवसायविज्ञानभिन्नघृत्तान्तास्वादनरूपसंवेदनसंवेद्यं वस्तु रसस्वभावमिति वक्ष्यामः ।

पृष्ठ १५०.

१. एकेनैव च रूपाद्यन्यतमेन उद्रिक्तप्राक्तनबलोपबृंहितस्य सर्वविषयकरणीयोक्तक्षोभकरणसमर्थत्वम् ।.....तथा च तद्वीर्यानुपबृंहितानाम् अविद्यमानतथाविधवीर्यविक्षोभात्मकमदनानन्दानां पाषाणानामिव रमणीयतरतरुणीरूपमपि नितम्बिनीवदनघूर्णमानकाकलीकलगीतमपि न पूर्णानन्दपर्यवस्यायि । यथा यथा च न बृंहकं भवति तथा तथा परिमितचमत्कारपर्यवसानम् । सर्वतो हि अचमत्कारे जडतैव । अधिकचमत्कारावेश एव वीर्यक्षोभात्मा सहृदयता उच्यते ।

पृष्ठ १५१.

१. येषां काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशाद्विशदीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यता ते हृदयसंवादभाजः सहृदयाः । यथोक्तम् :—
योऽर्थो हृदयसंवादी तस्य भावो रसोद्भवः ।
शरीरं व्याप्यते तेन शुष्कं काष्ठमिवाग्निना ॥
इति ।
२. प्रतिभा अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा, तस्या विशेषो रसावेशवैशद्यसौन्दर्यकाव्यनिर्माणक्षमत्वम् ।
अथ च
प्रतिभाविशेषोऽनन्तजन्माभ्यासमूलः ।

समाश्रितम्, येनान्तर्द्वयोऽपि हृदयवैमल्यप्राप्त्या सहृदयीक्रियते। उक्तं हि दृश्यं श्रव्यं चेति। ४।

किञ्च प्रतीत्युपायानामभावे कथं प्रतीतिभावः। अस्फुटप्रतीतिकारिशब्दलिङ्गसम्भवेऽपि न प्रतीतिर्विश्राम्यति, स्फुटप्रतीतिरूपप्रत्यक्षोचितप्रत्ययसाकाङ्क्षत्वात्। यथाहुः सर्वा चेयं प्रमितिः प्रत्यक्षपरेति। स्वसाक्षात्कृते आगमानुमानशतैरप्यनन्यथाभावस्य स्वसंवेदनात्। अलातचक्रादौ साक्षात्कारान्तरेणैव बलवता तत्प्रमित्यवधारणादिति लौकिकस्तावदयं क्रमः। तस्मात्तदुभयविघ्नविधातेऽभिनया बोधकधर्मिवृत्तिप्रवृत्युपस्कृताः समभिव्यन्ते। अभिनयनं हि सशब्दलिङ्गव्यापारविसदृशमेव प्रत्यक्षव्यापारकल्पमिति निश्चेष्यामः। ५।

अप्रधाने च वस्तुनि न कस्यचित् संविद्विश्राम्यति। तस्यैव प्रत्ययस्य प्रधानान्तरं प्रत्यनुधावतः स्वात्मनि अविश्रान्तत्वात्। अतोऽप्रधानत्वं जडे विभावानुभाववर्गे व्यभिचारिनिचये च संवेदात्मकेऽपि नियमेनान्यमुखप्रेक्षिणि संभवतीति तदतिरिक्तः स्थाय्येव तथा चर्वणापात्रम्। तत्र पुरुषार्थनिष्ठाः काश्चित्संविद इति प्रधानम्। ६।

तत्रानुभावानां विभावानां व्यभिचारिणां च पृथक् स्थायिनि नियमो नास्ति, वाष्पादेरानन्दाश्रुरोगादिजत्वदर्शनात्, व्याघ्रादेश्च क्रोधभयादिहेतुत्वात्, श्रमचिन्तादेरुत्साहभयाद्यनेकसहचरत्वावलोकनात्। सामग्री तु न व्यभिचारिणी। तथाहि बन्धुविनाशो यत्र विभावः परिदेविताश्रुपातादिस्त्वनुभावः चिन्तादैन्यादिर्व्यभिचारी सोऽवश्यं शोक एवेत्येवं सशयोदये शङ्कात्मकविघ्नशमनाय संयोग उपात्तः। ७.

पृष्ठ १७०.

१. योगिप्रत्यक्षजतटस्थपरसंवित्तिज्ञानात् सकलवैषयिकोपरागशून्यशुद्धपरयोगिगतस्वानन्दैकघनानुभवाच्च विशिष्यते। एतेषां यथायोगमर्जनादिविघ्नान्तरोदयात्तटस्थ्यस्फुटत्वविषयावेशवैवश्येन च सौन्दर्यविरहात्।
२. प्रत्ययस्य परचित्तज्ञानम्।
३. न च सालम्बनं तस्याविषयीभूतत्वात्।

पृष्ठ १७१.

१. ननु वात्सल्यं लौल्यं भक्तिः कार्पण्यं वा कथं न रसः, आर्द्रताऽमिलाषश्रद्धास्पृहाणां स्थायिभावानां तत्र सत्त्वादिति चेन्न, तेषां व्यभिचारिरूपात्मकत्वात्। ननु कस्य रसस्य ते व्यभिचारिणो भवेयुरिति चेत्सत्यम्, वात्सल्ये करुण एव रसो लौल्ये हास्यो भक्तौ शान्तः कार्पण्ये हास्य एव।

पृष्ठ १७२.

१. लक्षणं च प्रबुद्धमिथ्याज्ञानवासनामायारसो मिथ्याज्ञानमस्य स्थायिभावः। विभावाः सांसारिका भोगार्जकधर्माधर्माः। अनुभावाः पुत्रकलत्र-

विजयसाम्राज्यादयः ..... नाट्याभिनये परं निर्वेदस्थायिभावकः शान्तोऽपि नवमो रसो भवतीति ।

२. शृङ्गारवीरकरुणाद्भुतरौद्रहास्य-बीभत्सवत्सलभयानकशान्तनाम्नः ।
आम्नासिषुर्दशरसान्सुधियो वयं तु शृङ्गारमेव रसनाद्रसमामनामः ॥

३. शृङ्गारवीरकरुणरौद्राद्भुतभयानकाः ।
बीभत्सहास्यप्रेयांसः शान्तोदात्तोद्भटा रसाः ॥

४. स्नेहस्थायिभावो ..... प्रेयानिति प्रतीयते । धृतिस्थायिभावो ..... शान्त इत्यभिगीयते । अन्ये पुनरस्य शमं प्रकृतिमामनन्ति । स तु धृतेरेव विशेषो भवति । तत्त्वाभिनिवेशिनी मतिः उदात्तरघुरूपेण निष्पद्यते । गर्वप्रकृतिरुद्भटो नाम रसः ।

पृष्ठ १७३.

१. एवं रत्यादीनां प्राधान्यम् । हासादीनां तु सातिशयं सकललोकसुलभविभावतयोपरञ्जकत्वम् इति न प्राधान्यम् ।

२. पुमर्थोपयोगित्वेन रञ्जनाधिक्येन वा इयतामेव उपदेश्यत्वात् । तेन रसान्तरसम्भवेऽपि पार्षत (द ?) प्रसिद्ध्या संख्यानियम इति यदन्यैरुक्तं तत्प्रत्युक्तम् ।

पृष्ठ १७४.

१. एतदुक्तं भवति-रतिक्रीडा सार्धं च परमार्थतः कामिनोरेव, तत्रैव सुखस्य धाराविश्रान्तेः । अपरस्य ऋतुमाल्यादिविषयसौन्दर्यस्य कविना कृतस्य संकल्पत्वात् संवेदनाद्वितीयान्योन्यनिमज्जनात्मकसीलनाख्यो हि परमो भोगः, संविद एव प्रधानत्वात्, अन्यत्र तु जडस्य भोग्यत्वात् । अत एवाह श्वासायासविडम्बनैव वपुषि प्राणाः पुनर्जानकी ।

पृष्ठ १७६.

१. आर्द्रताख्यायिकः स्नेहो रस इत्यवयन्, स्नेहो ह्यभिष्वङ्गः स च सर्वः रत्युत्साहादावेव पर्यवस्यति । तथाहि बालस्य मातापित्रादौ स्नेहोदयो विश्रान्तो यूनोर्मिथुनजने ..... एषैव गर्वस्थायिकस्य लौल्यरसस्य प्रत्याख्याने सरणिर्मन्तव्या, हासे वा रतौ वा अन्यत्र पर्यवसानात् । एवं भक्तावपि वाच्यम् ।

पृष्ठ १८३.

१. तत्र केचिदाहुः शान्तः शमस्थायिभावात्मकस्तपस्यायोगिगम्यकादिभिः विभावैरुत्पद्यते, तस्य कामक्रोधादि भावरूपैरनुभावैरभिनयः, व्यभिचारी धृतिमतिप्रभृतिः इति ।

२. एतदपरे न सहन्ते शमशान्तयोः पर्यायत्वादेकाक्षपद्माशदभावा इति सङ्ख्यात्यागात् । किञ्च विभावा ऋतुमाल्यादयस्तत्समनन्तरभाविनि शृङ्गारादावनुसन्धीयन्ते न्युक्तम् । तपोऽध्ययनादयस्तु न । शान्तस्य शमनस्य ये हेतवः ते तत्त्वज्ञानस्यानन्तरहेतव इति चेत् पूर्वोदिततत्त्वज्ञानेऽपि तर्हि प्रयोज्यतेति तपोऽध्ययनादीनां विभावताऽयुक्ता स्यात् । कामाद्यभावोऽपि

समाश्रितम् , येनाहृदयोऽपि हृदयवैमल्यप्राप्त्या सहृदयीक्रियते । उक्तं हि दृश्यं श्रव्यं चेति । ४ ।

किञ्च प्रतीत्युपायानामभावे कथं प्रतीतिभावः । अस्फुटप्रतीतिकारिशब्दलिङ्गसम्भवेऽपि न प्रतीतिर्विश्राम्यति, स्फुटप्रतीतिरूपप्रत्यक्षोचितप्रत्ययसाकाङ्क्षत्वात् । यथाहुः सर्वा चेयं प्रमितिः प्रत्यक्षपरेति । स्वसाक्षात्कृते आगमानुमानशतैरप्यनन्यथाभावस्य स्वसंवेदनात् । अलातचक्रादौ साक्षात्कारान्तरेणैव बलवता तत्प्रमित्यवधारणादिति लौकिकस्तावदयं क्रमः । तस्मात्तदुभयविघ्नविधानेऽभिनया बोधकधर्मिवृत्तिप्रवृत्युपस्कृताः समभिपिप्यन्ते । अभिनयनं हि सशब्दलिङ्गव्यापारविसदृशमेव प्रत्यक्षव्यापारकल्पमिति निश्चेष्यामः । ५ ।

अप्रधाने च वस्तुनि न कस्यचित् संविद्विश्राम्यति । तस्यैव प्रत्ययस्य प्रधानान्तरं प्रत्यनुधावतः स्वात्मनि अविश्रान्तत्वात् । अतोऽप्रधानत्वं जडे विभावानुभाववर्गे व्यभिचारिनिचये च सांवेदात्मकेऽपि नियमेनान्यमुखप्रेक्षिणि संभवतीति तदतिरिक्तः स्थाय्येव तथा चर्वणापात्रम् । तत्र पुरुषार्थनिष्ठाः काश्चित्संविद इति प्रधानम् । ६ ।

तत्रानुभावानां विभावानां व्यभिचारिणां च पृथक् स्थायिनि नियमो नास्ति, वाष्पादेरानन्दाश्रुरोगादिजत्वदर्शनात् , व्याघ्रादेश्च क्रोधभयादिहेतुत्वात् , श्रमचिन्तादेरुत्साहभयाद्यनेकसहचरत्वावलोकनात् । सामग्री तु न व्यभिचारिणी । तथाहि बन्धुविनाशे यत्र विभावः परिदेविताश्रुपातादिस्त्वनुभावः चिन्तादैन्यादिर्व्यभिचारी सोऽवश्यं शोक एवेत्येवं संशयोदये शङ्कात्मकविघ्नशमनाय संयोग उपात्तः । ७.

पृष्ठ १७०.

१. योगिप्रत्यक्षजतटस्थपरसंवित्तिज्ञानात् सकलवैषयिकोपरागशून्यशुद्धपरयोगिगतस्वानन्दैकघनानुभवाच्च विशिष्यते । एतेषां यथायोगमर्जनादिविघ्नान्तरोदयात्तटस्थ्यस्फुटत्वविषयावेशवैवश्येन च सौन्दर्यविरहात् ।
२. प्रत्ययस्य परचित्तज्ञानम् ।
३. न च सालम्बनं तस्याविषयीभूतत्वात् ।

पृष्ठ १७१.

१. ननु वात्सल्यं लौल्यं भक्तिः कार्पण्यं वा कथं न रसः, आर्द्रताऽमिलाषश्रद्धास्पृहाणां स्थायिभावानां तत्र सत्त्वादिति चेन्न, तेषां व्यभिचारित्यात्मकत्वात् । ननु कस्य रसस्य ते व्यभिचारिणो भवेयुरिति चेत्सत्यम् , वात्सल्ये करुण एव रसो लौल्ये हास्यो भक्तौ शान्तः कार्पण्ये हास्य एव ।

पृष्ठ १७२.

१. लक्षणं च प्रबुद्धमिथ्याज्ञानवासनामायारसो मिथ्याज्ञानमस्य स्थायिभावः । विभावाः सांसारिका भोगार्जकधर्माधर्माः । अनुभावाः पुत्रकलत्र-

विजयसाम्राज्यादयः ..... नाऽभिन्ने परं निर्वेदस्थायिभावकः शान्तोऽपि नवमो रसो भवतीति ।

२. शृङ्गारवीरकरुणाद्भुतरौद्रहास्य-बीभत्सवत्सलभयानकशान्तनाम्नः ।
आम्नास्मिपूर्दशरसान्सुधियो वयं तु शृङ्गारमेव रसनाद्रसमामनामः ॥

३. शृङ्गारवीरकरुणरौद्राद्भुतभयानकाः ।
बीभत्सहास्यप्रेयांसः शान्तोदात्तोद्धता रसाः ॥

४. स्नेहस्थायिभावो ..... प्रेयानिति प्रतीयते । धृतिस्थायिभावो ..... शान्त इत्यभिगीयते । अन्ये पुनरस्य शमं प्रकृतिमामनन्ति । स तु धृतेरेव विशेषो भवति । तत्त्वाभिनिवेशिनी मतिः उदात्तरूपेण निष्पद्यते । गर्वप्रकृतिरुद्धतो नाम रसः ।

पृष्ठ १७३.

५. एवं रत्यादीनां प्राधान्यम् । हास्यादीनां तु सातिशयं सकललोकसुलभविभावतयोपरञ्जकत्वम् इति न प्राधान्यम् ।

२. पुमर्थोपयोगित्वेन रञ्जनाधिक्येन वा इयतामेव उपदेश्यत्वात् । तेन रसान्तरस्यभावेऽपि पार्थत (द ?) प्रसिद्ध्या संख्यानियम इति यदन्यैरुक्तं तदप्रयुक्तम् ।

पृष्ठ १७५.

१. एतदुक्तं भवति-रतिक्रीडा साधं च परमार्थतः कामिनोरेव, तत्रैव सुखस्य पारमार्थिकान्तेः । अपरस्य ऋतुमाल्यादिविषयसौन्दर्यस्य कविना कृतस्य संकल्पत्वात् संवेदनाद्वितीयान्योन्यनिमज्जनात्मकसीलनाख्यो हि परमो भोगः, संविद एव प्रधानत्वात् , अन्यत्र तु जडस्य भोग्यत्वात् । अत एवाह श्वासायासविडम्बनैव वपुषि प्राणाः पुनर्जानकी ।

पृष्ठ १७६.

१. आर्द्रतास्थायिकः स्नेहो रस इत्यवसेयः , स्नेहो ह्यभिष्वङ्गः स च सर्वो रस्यत्वाह्लादावेव पर्यवस्यति । तथाहि बालस्य सातापित्रादौ स्नेहोदयो विश्रान्तो युवतौमित्रजने ..... एवैव गर्वस्थायिकस्य लौल्यरसस्य प्रत्याख्याने सरणिर्मन्तव्या, हासे वा रतौ वा अन्यत्र पर्यवसानात् । एवं भक्तावपि वाच्यम् ।

पृष्ठ १८३.

१. तत्र केचिदाहुः शान्तः शमस्थायिभावात्मकस्तपस्यायोगिसम्पर्कादिभिः विभावैरुत्पद्यते, तस्य कामक्रोधा भावरूपैरनुभावैरभिनयः व्यभिचारी धृतिमतिप्रभृतिः इति ।

२. एतदपरे न सहन्ते शमशान्तयोः पर्यायत्वादेकान्नपञ्चाशद्भावा इति सङ्ख्यात्यागात् । किञ्च विभावा ऋतुमाल्यादयस्तत्समनन्तरभाविनि शृङ्गारादावनुसन्धीयन्ते न्युक्तम् । तपोऽध्ययनादयस्तु न । शान्तस्य शमनस्य ये हेतवः ते तत्त्वज्ञानस्यानन्तरहेतव इति चेत् पूर्वोदिततत्त्वज्ञानेऽपि तर्हि प्रयोज्यतेति तपोऽध्ययनादीनां विभावताऽयुक्ता स्यात् । कामाद्यभावोऽपि

नानुभावः, शान्ताद्विपक्षादव्यावृत्तेः अगमकत्वात्प्रयोगासमवायित्वाच्च । न हि चेष्टाव्युपरमः प्रयोगयोग्यः सुप्तमोहादयोऽपि हि निःश्वासोच्छ्वासपतनभूशयनादिभिश्चेष्टाभिरेवानुभाव्यन्ते । धृतिप्रभृतिरपि प्राप्तविषयोपभोगः कथं शान्ते स्यात् । न चाकिञ्चित्करत्वमात्रेण तत्त्वज्ञानोपायो व्युत्पाद्यते विनेये । नैते परदुःखदुःखितमनसो दृश्यन्ते सम्यग्दर्शनसमावस्थाप्राप्तौ अपि तु संसारे । तन्न शान्तो रस इति ।

पृष्ठ १८५

१. तत्त्वज्ञानोत्थितो निर्वेद इति केचित् । तथाहि दारिद्र्यादिप्रभवो यो निर्वेदस्ततोऽन्य एव हेतोस्तत्त्वज्ञानस्य वैलक्षण्यात् । स्थायिसञ्चारिमध्ये चैतदर्थमेवायं पठितोऽन्यथा माङ्कलिको मुनिस्तथा न पठेत् । जुगुप्सां च व्यभिचारित्वेन शृङ्गारे निषेधन्मुनिर्भावानां सर्वेषामेव स्थायित्वसञ्चारित्वचिन्तनात्तावत्त्वानुभावस्थत्वाश्रियोग्यतोपनिपातितां निश्शब्दार्थबलाकृष्टां वा नानुजानाति । तत्त्वज्ञानजश्च निर्वेदः स्थाय्यन्तरोपमर्दकः, भाववैचित्र्यसहिष्णुभ्यो रत्यादिभ्यो यः परमस्थायिशीलः स एव हि स्थाय्यन्तराणामुपमर्दकः ।

पृष्ठ १८७

१ चित्तं हि ज्ञानसुखादिशीलत्वात् प्रवृत्तिगुणादिमत्त्वात् आलस्यदैन्यादिमत्वाच्च सत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणकं भवति । तत्र सत्त्वात्किञ्चिदूने रजस्तमसी मिथः समे यदा भवतः तदा सत्त्वात् तज्ज्ञानाभिमुखं भूत्वा तमसा तत्पिधाने सति रजसैश्वर्यं कामयमानं विषयप्रियं भवति विक्षिप्तम् । यदा तु तमःप्रधानं चित्तं मूढं तदाऽश्रेयोऽधर्माऽज्ञानाऽवैराग्याऽनैश्वर्यमुपगच्छति ।.....यदि पुनः सत्त्वप्रधानं वितमस्कं सरजस्कं भवति तदैकाग्र्यं संप्रज्ञातयोगसिद्धयोर्मध्यमयोगिनोश्चित्तं धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यवद्भवति । यदा तु विधूतरजस्तमोमलं शुद्धसत्त्वं चित्तं तदानीं विवेकख्यातिं कृत्वा पुरुषमात्रध्यानं धर्ममेघाख्यं करोति तत् परं प्रसंख्यानमित्याचक्षते ध्यायिनः ।..... विवेकख्यातावपि विरक्तं सच्चित्तं तां निरुद्ध्य संस्कारमात्रशेषं भवति चतुर्थस्य योगिनः, सोयमसंप्रज्ञातसमाधिः ।

पृष्ठ १८८.

१. तत्परं पुरुषख्यातेर्गुणवैतृष्ण्यम् । उक्तवैराग्यदृढतरगुणपुरुषविवेकज्ञानाद् धर्ममेघसमाधिरूपाद्धेतोरुत्पद्यमानं.....यद्वैतृष्ण्यं चित्तस्य ज्ञानप्रसादावस्था निष्पन्नात्मज्ञानतारूपा तत्परमुत्कृष्टं वैराग्यमित्यर्थः ।

पृष्ठ १८९.

१. यदा तु रजस्तमोलेशानुविद्धमन्तःकरणसत्त्वं भाव्यते तदा गुणभावाच्चित्तवृत्तेः सुखप्रकाशमयस्य सत्त्वस्य भाव्यमानस्योद्रेकात् सानन्दः समाधिर्भवति । अस्मिन्नेव समाधौ ये बद्धधृतयः तत्त्वान्तरं प्रधानपुरुषरूपं न पश्यन्ति ते विगतदेहाहङ्कारत्वात् विदेहशब्दवाच्याः ।

२. भवप्रत्ययो विदेहप्रकृतिलयानाम् । १९ ।
अव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारपञ्चतन्मात्रेषु प्रकृतिष्वात्मत्वभावनया लीनाः प्रकृतिलयाः ।

पृष्ठ १९०.

१. विषयेष्विव ज्ञानेऽपि विनाशित्वादिदोषदर्शनसत्त्वेऽपि अविद्यानिवृत्त्याख्यप्रयोजनवशेन तत्र नालं बुद्धिरूपं वैराग्यम् । सम्यग्ज्ञानेनाविद्यानिवृत्तौ च तेनैव दोषदर्शनेन तत्राप्युपेक्षारूपं वैराग्यमिति भावः । यो. सू., ना. वृ. २०.

पृष्ठ १९१.

१. ननु मिथ्याज्ञानमूलो विषयगन्धस्तत्त्वज्ञानात्प्रशाम्यतीति 'दुःखजन्म'सूत्रेणाक्षपादपादैर्भगवद्भिर्मिथ्याज्ञानापचयकारणतत्त्वज्ञान वैराग्यस्य दोषापायलक्षणस्य कारणमुक्तम् । ननु ततः किम् । ननु वैराग्यं निर्वेदः । क एवमाह । निर्वेदो हि शोकप्रवाहप्रसररूपश्चित्तवृत्तिविशेषः । वैराग्यं तु रागादीनां प्रध्वंसः । भवतु वा वैराग्यमेव निर्वेदः, तथापि तस्य स्वकारणवशान्मध्यभाविनोऽपि न मोक्षे साध्ये सूत्रस्थानीयतेत्यपादचारी एव । किंच तत्त्वज्ञानोत्थितो निर्वेद इति शमस्यैवेदं निर्वेद इति नाम कृतं स्यात् ।

पृष्ठ १९७.

१. तस्य प्रशान्तवाहिता संस्कारात् । ३–१० ।
तस्य चेतसो निरुक्तान्निरोधसंस्कारात् प्रशान्तवाहिता भवति । परिहतविक्षेपतया सदृशप्रवाहपरिणामि चित्तं भवतीत्यर्थः ।

२. तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः । ४–२७ ।
तस्मिन् समाधौ स्थितस्य छिद्रेष्वन्तरालेषु यानि प्रत्ययान्तराणि व्युत्थानरूपाणि ज्ञानानि तानि प्राग्भूतेभ्यः व्युत्थानानुभवजेभ्यः संस्कारेभ्यः अहं ममेत्येवंरूपाणि क्षीयमाणेभ्योऽपि प्रभवन्ति ।

पृष्ठ १९८.

१. इह तत्त्वज्ञानमेव तावन्मोक्षसाधनमिति तस्यैव मोक्षे स्थायिता युक्ता । तत्त्वज्ञानं च नाम आत्मज्ञानमेव । .....तेनात्मैव ज्ञानानन्दादिविशुद्धधर्मयोगी परिकल्पितविषयोपभोगरहितोऽत्र स्थायी । न चास्य स्थायितया स्थायित्वं वचनीयम् । रत्यादयो हि तत्तत्कारणान्तरोदयप्रलयोत्पद्यमाननिरुध्यमानवृत्तयः कचित्कालमापेक्षिकतया स्थायिरूपात्मभित्तिसंश्रयाः स्थायिन इत्युच्यन्ते । तत्त्वज्ञानं तु सकलभावान्तरभित्तिस्थानीयं सर्वस्थायिभ्यः स्थायितम सर्वा रत्यादिकाश्चित्तवृत्तीर्व्यभिचारीभावयन् निसर्गत एव सिद्धस्थायिभावमिति किं तत्प्रवचनेन । अत एव पृथगस्य गणना न युक्ता । न हि खण्डमुण्डयोर्मध्ये तृतीयं गोत्वमिति गण्यते । तेनैकान्न (कोन) पञ्चाशद्भावा इति अव्याहतमेव ।

पृष्ठ २००

१. तथापि न संभवन्मात्रस्थायिनां गणनम् , रसेषूक्तेष्वनुपयोगात् , अपितु व्यभिचारिलक्षणीयत्वं विज्ञायते नेति । तथा ह्येकान्नपञ्चाशता भावैरित्येकप्रघट्टकोपपत्तिः ।

२. न चास्यात्मस्वभावस्य व्यभिचारित्वसंभवादवैचित्र्यावहत्वादनौचित्याच्च शमशब्देन मुनिना व्यपदेशः। यदि तु स एव शमशब्देन व्यपदिश्यते निर्वेदशब्देन वा तत्र कश्चिद्भावः केवलं शमश्चित्तधृत्यन्तरं निर्वेदोऽपि दारिद्र्यादिविभावान्तरोत्थितनिर्वेदतुल्यजातीयो न भवति। तज्जातीय एव हेतुभेदेऽपि तद्व्यपदेश्यो रतिभयादिभिरिव। तदिदमात्मस्वरूपमेव तत्त्वज्ञानं शमता च।

पृष्ठ २०५.

१. तत्त्वास्वादोऽस्य कीदृशः। उच्यते, उपरागदायिभिरुत्साहरत्यादिभिरुपरक्तं यदात्मस्वरूपं तदेव विरलोन्मिषितरत्नान्तरालनिर्भासमानसितसूत्रवदाभातस्वरूपं सकलेषु रत्यादिकेषूपरञ्जकेषु तथाभावेनापि सकृद्विभातोयमात्मेति न्यायेन भासमानं परोन्मुखतात्मकसकलदुःखजालहीनं परमानन्दलाभसंविदेकत्वेन काव्यप्रयोगप्रबन्धाभ्यां साधारणतया निर्भासमानम् अन्तर्मुखावस्थाभेदेन लोकोत्तरानन्दानयनं तथाविधहृदयं विधत्ते।

पृष्ठ २०७.

१. वाचि यत्नस्तु कर्तव्यो नाट्यस्येयं तनुः स्मृता।
अङ्गनेपथ्यसत्त्वानि वाक्यार्थं व्यञ्जयन्ति हि॥

पृष्ठ २०९.

१. उपमा रूपकं चैव दीपकं यमकं तथा।
अलंकारास्तु विज्ञेयाश्चत्वारो नाटकाश्रयाः॥

पृष्ठ २१०.

१. स मुहूर्तं गते तस्मिन्देवलोकं मुनिस्तदा।
जगाम तमसातीरं जाह्नव्यास्त्वविदूरतः॥
स तु तीरं समासाद्य तमसाया मुनिस्तदा।
शिष्यमाह स्थितं पार्श्वे दृष्ट्वा तीर्थमकर्दमम्॥
अकर्दममिदं तीर्थं भरद्वाज निशामय।
रमणीयप्रसन्नाम्बु सन्मनुष्यमनो यथा॥
न्यस्यतां कलशस्तात दीयतां वल्कलं मम।
इदमेवावगाहिष्ये तमसातीर्थमुत्तमम्॥
एवमुक्तो भरद्वाजो वाल्मीकेन महात्मना।
प्रायच्छत मुनेस्तस्य वल्कलं नियतो गुरोः॥
स शिष्यहस्तादादाय वल्कलं नियतेन्द्रियः।
विचचार ह पश्यंस्तत् सर्वतो विपुलं वनम्॥
तस्याश्यासे तु मिथुनं चरन्तमनपायिनम्।
ददर्श भगवांस्तत्र क्रौञ्चयोश्चारुनिस्वनम्॥
तस्मात्तु मिथुनादेकं पुमांसं पापनिश्चयः।
जघान वैरनिलयो निषादस्तस्य पश्यतः॥

तं शोणितपरीताङ्गं वेष्टमानं महीतले ।
भार्या तु निहतं दृष्ट्वा रुराव करुणां गिरम् ॥
वियुक्ता पतिना तेन द्विजेन सहचारिणा ।
ताम्रशीर्षेण मत्तेन पत्रिणा सहितेन वै ॥
तथा तु तं द्विजं दृष्ट्वा निषादेन विपातितम् ।
ऋषेर्धर्मात्मनस्तस्य कारुण्यं समपद्यत ॥
ततः करुणवेदित्वादधर्मोऽयमिति द्विजः ।
निशाम्य रुदतीं क्रौञ्चीमिदं वचनमब्रवीत् ॥
मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमः शाश्वतीः समाः ।
यत्क्रौञ्चमिथुनादेकमवधीः काममोहितम् ॥
तस्यैवं ब्रुवतश्चिन्ता बभूव हृदि वीक्षतः ।
शोकार्तेनास्य शकुनेः किमिदं व्याहृतं मया ॥
चिन्तयन्स महाप्राज्ञश्चकार मतिमान्मतिम् ।
शिष्यं चैवाब्रवीद्वाक्यमिदं स मुनिपुङ्गवः ॥
पादबद्धोऽक्षरसमस्तन्त्रीलयसमन्वितः ।
शोकार्तस्य प्रवृत्तो मे श्लोको भवतु नान्यथा ॥

पृष्ठ २१६.

१ काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति बुधैर्यः समाम्नातपूर्व-
स्तस्याभावं जगदुरपरे भाक्तमाहुस्तमन्ये ।
केचिद्वाचां स्थितमविषये तत्त्वमूचुस्तदीयम्
तेन ब्रूमः सहृदयमनःप्रीतये तत्स्वरूपम् ॥

२. बुधस्यैकस्य प्रामादिकमपि तथाभिधानं स्यात्, न तु भूयस्यां तद्युक्तम् । तेन बुधैरिति बहुवचनम्, एतदेव व्याचष्टे परम्परयेति । अविच्छिन्नेन प्रवाहेण तैरेतदुक्तम्, विनापि विशिष्टपुस्तकेषु विवेचनादित्यभिप्रायः । न च बुधा भूयांसोऽनादरणीय वस्त्वादरेणोपदिशेयुः, एतत्त्वादरेणोपदिष्टम् । तदाह सम्यगाम्नातपूर्व इति । पूर्वग्रहणेनेदं प्रथमता नात्र संभाव्यत इत्याह व्याचष्टे च समाख्यातः सम्यगाम्नातः ख्यातः प्रकटित इत्यनेन । तस्येति, यस्याधिगमाय प्रत्युत यतनीयं का तत्रासंभावना । अतः किं कुर्मः अपारं मौर्ख्यमभाववादिनामिति भावः ।

३. न चास्माभिरभाववादिनां विकल्पाः श्रुताः । किन्तु संभाव्य दूषयिष्यन्ते । अतः परोक्षत्वम् ।
अविच्छिन्नेन प्रवाहेण तैरेतदुक्तम् । विनापि विशिष्टपुस्तकेषु विवेचनादित्यभिप्रायः ।

४. भट्टोद्भटवामनादिना । भामहोक्तं शब्दश्छन्दोभिधानार्थं इत्यभिधानस्य शब्दाद् भेदं व्याख्यातुं भट्टोद्भटो बभाषे शब्दानामभिधानमभिधाव्यापारो मुख्यो गुणवृत्तिश्च इति । वामनोपि सा सादृश्यालक्षणा वक्रोक्तिः इति मनाक्स्पृष्ट इति तैस्तावद् ध्वनिदिगुन्मीलिता ।

पृष्ठ २१७.

१. तथा चान्येन कृत एवात्र श्लोकः ।
यस्मिन्नस्ति न वस्तु किंचन मनःप्रह्लादि सालंकृति
व्युत्पन्नै रचितं च नैव वचनैर्वक्रोक्तिशून्यं च यत् ।
काव्यं तद् ध्वनिना समन्वितमिति प्रीत्या प्रशंसज्जडो
नो विद्मोऽभिदधाति किं सुमतिना पृष्टः स्वरूपं ध्वनेः ।
तथाचान्येनेति । ग्रन्थकृत्समानकालभाविना मनोरथनाम्ना कविना ।

पृष्ठ २१८.

वाच्य एव वाक्यार्थे इत्यन्विताभिधानवादिनः ।
अन्वितानामेव अभिधानं शब्दबोध्यत्व तद्वादिनो मीमांसकाः : तेषां मते अन्वितघटादावेव घटादिपदानां शक्तिः । शाब्दबोधे तु आकाङ्क्षादिवशात् वृत्तितादिविशेषरूपमेव भासते इति नापदार्थो वाक्यार्थः ।
अथ च
वाच्यादयस्तदर्थाः स्युस्तात्पर्यार्थोऽपि केषुचित् ।
.....केषुचित्—न्यायादिनयेषु । नतु मीमांसकादिमतेष्वपि ।
न्यायादीति, आदिना वैशेषिकभाट्टनयसंग्रहः । मीमांसकाः प्राभाकराः अभिमताः।

पृष्ठ २१९.

१. मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्युक्तो ययान्योऽर्थः प्रतीयते ।
रूढेः प्रयोजनाद् वासौ लक्षणाशक्तिरर्पिता ।

पृष्ठ २२१.

१, ननु तात्पर्यशक्तिरपर्यवसिता विवक्षया दक्षधार्मिक–तदादिपदार्थान्वयरूप-मुख्यार्थबाधकबलेन विरोधनिमित्तया विपरीतलक्षणया च वाक्यार्थीभूत-निषेधप्रतीतिमभिहितान्वयदशा करोतीति शब्दशक्तिमूल एव सोऽर्थः । एव-मनेनोक्तमिति हि व्यवहारस्तन्न वाच्यातिरिक्तोऽन्योऽर्थ इति ।

पृष्ठ २२५.

१. सदपि वा तत् अभिधाक्षिप्तम् , शब्दावगतार्थबलाकृष्टत्वाद् भाक्तम् । तदना-क्षिप्तमपि वा न वक्तुं शक्यम्, कुमारीष्विव भर्तृसुखम् अतद्विस्तु ।

पृष्ठ २२९.

१. तस्मात्प्रवादमात्रं ध्वनिः, न त्वस्य स्रोदक्षमं तत्त्वं किंचिदपि प्रकाशयि-तु शक्यम् ।

पृष्ठ २३२.

१. एवं घण्टादिनिर्ह्रादस्थानीयोऽनुरणनात्मोपलक्षितो व्यङ्ग्योऽर्थो ध्वनिरिति व्यवहृतः । इत्येष प्रकारोऽव्यक्तशब्दानामेव वर्तते । व्यक्तशब्दानां तथा श्रय-माणा ये वर्णा नादशब्दवाच्या अन्त्यबुद्धिनिर्ग्राह्या स्फोटाऽभिव्यञ्जकास्ते ध्वनिशब्देनोक्ताः । यथाह भगवान् स एव

प्रत्ययैरनुपाख्येयैर्ग्रहणानुग्रहैस्तथा ।
ध्वनिप्रकाशिते शब्दे स्वरूपमवधार्यते ॥
इति । तेन व्यञ्जकौ शब्दार्थावपीह ध्वनिशब्देनोक्तौ ।

२. किं च वर्णेषु तावन्मात्रपरिमाणेष्वपि सत्सु, यथोक्तम्:—
अल्पीयस्यपि यत्नेन शब्दमुच्चारित मतिः ।
यदि वा नैव गृह्णाति वर्णं वा सकलं स्फुटम् ॥
इति । तेषु तावत्स्वेव श्रूयमाणेषु वक्तुर्योऽन्यो द्रुतविलम्बितादिवृत्तिभेदात्मा प्रसिद्धादुच्चारणादिव्यापारादभ्यधिकः स ध्वनिरुक्तः, यदाह स एवः—
शब्दस्योर्ध्वमभिव्यक्तेर्वृत्तिभेदास्तु वैकृताः ।
ध्वनयः समुपोहन्ते स्फोटात्मा तैर्न भिद्यते ॥
इति । अस्माभिरपि प्रसिद्धेभ्यः शब्दव्यापारेभ्योऽभिधातात्पर्यलक्षणारूपेभ्योऽतिरिक्तो व्यापारो ध्वनिरित्युक्तः ।

३ पञ्चधापि ध्वनिशब्दार्थे येन यत्र यतो यस्य यस्मै इति बहुव्रीह्याश्रयणेन यथोचितं सामानाधिकरण्यम् सुयोज्यम् ।

पृष्ठ २३३.

१. ननु घटेऽपि जीवव्यवहारःस्यात्। आत्मनो विभुत्वेन तत्रापि भावात्। शरीरस्य खलु विशिष्टाधिष्ठानयुक्तस्य सत्यात्मनि जीवव्यवहारः, न यस्य कस्यचिदिति-चेत्, गुणालङ्कारौचित्यसुन्दरशब्दार्थशरीरस्य सति ध्वननात्मन्यात्मनि काव्य-रूपताव्यवहारः । न चात्मनोऽस्मारता काचिदिति समानम् ।

पृष्ठ २३५.

१ यत्र लक्षणाव्यापारात् तृतीयादन्यश्चतुर्थः प्रयोजनद्योतनात्मा व्यापारो वस्तु-स्थित्या संभवन्नप्यनुपयुज्यमानत्वेनाऽनाद्रियमाणत्वादसत्कल्पः, यमर्थमधि-कृत्य प्रवर्तते तद्धि प्रयोजनलक्षणम्, तत्रापि लक्षणास्तीति कथं ध्वननं लक्षणा चेत्येकं तत्त्वं स्यात् ।

पृष्ठ २३६.

१ प्रयोजनावगमस्य सुखसंपत्तये हि स शब्दः प्रयुज्यते तस्मिन्नमुख्यार्थे । यदि च सिंहो वटुः इति शौर्यातिशयेऽप्यवगमयितव्ये स्खलद्गतित्वं शब्दस्य, तत्तर्हि प्रतीतिं नैव कुर्यादिति किमर्थं तस्य प्रयोगः, उपचारेण करिष्यतीतिचेत्तत्रापि प्रयोजनान्तरमन्विष्यते, तत्राप्युपचारेऽनवस्था । अथ न तत्र स्खलद्गतित्वम्, तर्हि प्रयोजनेऽवगमयितव्ये न लक्षणाख्यो व्यापारः । न चासावभिधा सम-यस्य तत्राभावात् । यद्व्यापारान्तरमभिधालक्षणातिरिक्तं स ध्वननव्यापारः ।

पृष्ठ २३७.

१. तत्र लक्षणा तावद्मुख्यो व्यापारः, ध्वननञ्च प्रयोजनविषयम् । न च तद्वि-षयोऽपि द्वितीयो लक्षणाव्यापारो युक्तः । लक्षणासामग्र्यभावात्, इत्यभिप्रा-येणाह 'अपिच' इत्यादि । मुख्यां वृत्तिमभिधाव्यापारं परित्यज्य—परिसमाप्य, गुणवृत्त्या—लक्षणारूपया अर्थस्यामुख्यस्य दर्शनं प्रत्यायना सा यत्फलं कर्म—

भूतं प्रयाजनरूपम् उद्दिश्य क्रियते तत्र प्रयोजने तावद् द्वितीयो व्यापारः। नचासौ लक्षणैव, यतः स्खलन्ती बाधकव्यापारेण विधुरीक्रियमाणा गतिः—अवबोधनशक्तिर्यस्य शब्दस्य तदीयो व्यापारो लक्षणा। न च प्रयोजनमवगमयतः शब्दस्य बाधकयोगः, तथाभावे निमित्तान्तरस्य प्रयोजनान्तरस्य चान्वेषणेऽनवस्था स्यात्।

पृष्ठ २३९.

१. ननु किं बाधया, इयदेव लक्षणास्वरूपम् 'अभिधेयाविनाभूतप्रतीतिर्लक्षणोच्यते' इति। इह चाभिधयानां विभावानुभावादीनामविनाभूता रसादय इति लक्ष्यन्ते, विभावानुभावयोः कारणकार्यरूपत्वात् व्यभिचारिणां च तत्सहकारित्वादितिचेत् मवम्, धूमशब्दाद् धूमे प्रतिपन्ने ह्यग्निस्मृतिरपि लक्षणाकृतैव स्यात्। ततोऽग्नेः शीतापनोदस्मृतिरित्यादिरपर्यवसितः शब्दार्थः स्यात्। धूमशब्दस्य स्वार्थविश्रान्तत्वान्न तावति व्यापार इति चेत्, आयातं तर्हि मुख्यार्थबाधो लक्षणाया जीवितमिति। सति हि तस्मिन्स्वार्थविश्रान्त्यभावात्, न च विभावादिप्रतिपादने बाधकं किंचिदस्ति।

पृष्ठ २४०.

१. व्यापारश्च नाभिधात्मा। समयाभावात्। न तात्पर्यात्मा तस्यान्वयप्रतीतावेव परिक्षयात्। न लक्षणात्मा। उक्तादेव हेतोः स्खलद्गतित्वाभावात्। तत्रापि हि स्खलद्गतित्वे पुनर्मुख्यार्थबाधा निमित्तं प्रयोजनमित्यनवस्था स्यात्।

पृष्ठ २४३.

१. योऽप्यन्विताभिधानवादी 'यत्परः शब्दः स शब्दार्थः' इति हृदये गृहीत्वा शरवदभिधाव्यापारमेव दीर्घदीर्घमिच्छति, तस्य यदि दीर्घदीर्घो व्यापारस्तदेकोऽसाविति कुतः, भिन्नविषयत्वात्। अथानेकोऽसौ, तद्विषयसहकारिभेदादसजातीय एव युक्तः। सजातीये च कार्ये विरम्य व्यापारः शब्दकर्मबुद्ध्यादीनां पदार्थविद्धिर्निषिद्धः। असजातीये चास्मन्नय एव।

पृष्ठ २४४.

१. अथ योऽसौ चतुर्थकक्षानिविष्टोर्थः स एव झटिति वाक्येनाभिधीयते इत्येवंविधं दीर्घदीर्घत्वं विवक्षितम्। तर्हि तत्र संकेताकरणात् कथं साक्षात्प्रतिपत्तिः। निमित्तेषु संकेतः नैमित्तिकस्त्वसावर्थ इति संकेतानपेक्ष एवेति चेत्, पश्यत श्रोत्रियस्यानुवाकहतबुद्धेरुक्तिकौशलम्, यो ह्यसौ पर्यन्तकक्षाभागर्थः प्रथमं प्रतीतिपथमवतीर्णस्तस्य पश्चात्तनाः पदार्थाः निमित्तभावं गच्छन्तीति नूनं मीमांसकस्य प्रपौत्रं प्रति नैमित्तिकत्वमभिमतम्।

२. अथोच्यते पूर्वं तत्र संकेतग्रहणसंस्कृतस्य तथा प्रतिपत्तिर्भवतीत्यमुया वस्तुस्थित्या निमित्तत्वं पदार्थानाम्, तर्हि तदनुसरणोपयोगि न किंचिदुक्तं स्यात्। न चापि प्राक् पदार्थेषु संकेतग्रहणम्, अन्वितानामेव सर्वदा प्रयोगात्।

३. आवापोद्वापाभ्यां तथाभाव इति चेत् संकेतः पदार्थमात्रे एवेत्यभ्युपगमे पाश्चात्यैव विशेषप्रतिपत्तिः ।

पृष्ठ २४५.

१ श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रकर्षात् ।

पृष्ठ २४७

१. यत्तु भट्टनायकेनोक्तम् इह दृप्तसिंहादिपदप्रयोगेऽपि धार्मिकपदप्रयोगे च भयानकरसावेशकृतैव निषेधावगतिः, तदीयभीरुधीत्वप्रकृतिनियमावगममन्तरेणैकान्ततो निषेधगम्यभावात् इति, तन्न केवलार्थसामर्थ्यन्निषेधगतेर्निमित्तमिति, तत्रोच्यते, केनोक्तमेतत् 'वक्तृप्रतिपत्तृविशेषावगमविरहेण शब्दगतध्वननव्यापारविरहेण च निषेधावगतिः' इति । वक्तृप्रतिपत्तृप्रतिभासहकारित्वं ह्यस्माभिर्द्योतनस्य प्राणत्वेनोक्तम् । भयानकरसावेशश्च न वर्ण्यस्य । भयमात्रोत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमात् । प्रतिपत्तुश्च रसावेशो रसाभिव्यक्त्यैव । रसस्य च शब्दवाच्यत्वं तेनापि नोपगतमिति व्यङ्ग्यत्वमेव ।

पृष्ठ २५१.

१. अर्थो गुणीकृतात्मा गुणीकृताभिधेयश्च शब्दो वा यत्रार्थान्तरमभिव्यनक्ति स ध्वनिरिति तेषु कथं तस्यान्तर्भावः, व्यङ्ग्यप्राधान्ये हि ध्वनिः ।

पृष्ठ २५२.

१. रसभावतदाभासतत्प्रशमलक्षणं मुख्यमर्थमनुवर्तमाना यत्र शब्दार्थालङ्कारा गुणाश्च परस्परं ध्वन्यपेक्षया च विभिन्नरूपा व्यवस्थिताः तत्र काव्ये ध्वनिरिति व्यपदेशः ।

(अधस्तनो ग्रन्थः पञ्चसप्ततितमे पृष्ठे उपलभ्यते)

२ उपमया यद्यपि वाच्यार्थोऽलंक्रियते तथापि तस्य तदेवाऽलंकरणं यद्व्यङ्ग्यार्थाभिव्यञ्जनसामर्थ्याधानमिति ।

३. यदि तु चेतनानां वाक्यार्थीभावो रसाद्यलंकारस्य विषय इत्युच्यते तर्ह्युपमादीनां प्रविरलविषयता निर्विषयता वाऽभिहिता स्यात्, यस्मादचेतनवस्तुवृत्ते वाक्यार्थीभूते पुनश्चेतनवस्तुवृत्तान्तयोजनया यथाकथंचिदभवितव्यम् । अथ सत्यामपि तस्यां यत्राचेतनानां वाक्यार्थीभावो नासौ रसवदलंकारस्य विषय इत्युच्यते, ननु महतः काव्यप्रबन्धस्य रसनिधानभूतस्य नीरसत्वमभिहितं स्यात् ।

पृष्ठ २५३.

रसाक्षिप्ततया यस्य बन्धः शक्यक्रियो भवेत् ।
अपृथग्यत्ननिर्वर्त्यः सोऽलंकारो ध्वनौ स्मृतः ॥

रससमवधानेन विभावादिघटनामेव कुर्वंस्तु कविः नान्तरीकतया यमासादयति स एवात्रालंकारो रसमार्गे नान्यः, एतेन वीरादद्भुतादिष्वपि चेदासादयति यमकादि, कवेः प्रतिपत्तुश्च रसविघ्नकार्येव तत् । सर्वत्र गड्डरिकाप्रवाहो-

पहतसहृदयधुराधिरोहणविहीनलोकावर्जनाभिप्रायेण तु मया 'शृङ्गारे विप्रलम्भे च विशेषतः' इत्युक्तमिति भावः ।

यमके च प्रबन्धेन बुद्धिपूर्वकं क्रियमाणे नियमेनैव यत्नान्तरपरिग्रह आपतति शब्दविशेषान्वेषणरूपः ।

पृष्ठ २५४.

१. अलंकारान्तराणि हि निरूप्यमाणदुर्घटनान्यपि रससमाहितचेतसः प्रतिभानवतः कवेरहंपूर्विकया परापतन्ति, यथा कादम्ब्यां कादम्बरीदर्शनावसरे, यथा च मायारामादिशिरोदर्शने बह्वलायां सीतादेव्यां सेतौ। युक्तं चैतत् । यतो रसा वाच्यविशेषैरेवाक्षेप्तव्याः, तत्प्रतिपादकैश्च शब्दैस्तत्प्रकाशिनो वाच्यविशेषा एव रूपकादयोऽलंकाराः । तस्मान्न तेषां बहिरङ्गत्वं रसाभिव्यक्तौ, यमकदुष्करमार्गेषु तु तत्स्थितमेव ।

२. तत्र प्रतीयमानस्य तावद्द्वौ भेदौ, लौकिकः काव्यव्यवहारगोचरश्चेति । लौकिको यः शब्दवाच्यतां कदाचिदधिशेते, स च विधिनिषेधाद्यनेकप्रकारो वस्तुशब्देनोच्यते । सोऽपि द्विविधः । यः पूर्वं क्वापि वाक्यालंकारभावमुपमादिरूपतयान्वभूत्, इदानीं त्वनलंकाररूप एवान्यत्र गुणीभावाभावादपूर्वप्रत्यभिज्ञानबलादलंकारध्वनिरिति व्यपदिश्यते ब्राह्मणश्रवणन्यायेन । तद्रूपताभावेन तूपलक्षितं वस्तुमात्रमुच्यते। मात्रग्रहणेन हि रूपान्तरं निराकृतम्। यस्तु स्वप्नेऽपि न स्वशब्दवाच्यो न लौकिकव्यवहारपतितः किं तु शब्दसमर्प्यमाणहृदयसंवादसुन्दरविभावानुभावसमुदित-प्राङ्निविष्टरत्यादिवासनानुरागसुकुमारस्वसंविदानन्दचर्वणव्यापाररसनीयरूपो रसः ।

पृष्ठ २५५.

१ स हि कदाचिद्वाच्ये विधिरूपे प्रतिषेधरूपः । क्वचिद्वाच्ये प्रतिषेधरूपे विधिरूपः ।

२. क्वचिद्वाच्ये विधिरूपेऽनुभयरूपः ।

३. क्वचिद्वाच्याद्विभिन्नविषयत्वेन व्यवस्थापितः ।

४ यदा तु विभानुभावावपि व्यङ्ग्यौ भवतः तदा वस्तुध्वनिरपि किं न सह्यते ।

पृष्ठ २५६.

१. तच्चासंख्यत्वादभिधाव्यापारेणाशक्यसमर्पणम् । क्रमेणार्प्यमाणमप्येकधीविषयभावाभावान्न चित्रचर्वणापदमिति न चारुत्वातिशयकृत् । प्रतीयमानं तु तदसंख्यमनुद्भिन्नविशेषत्वेनैव किं किं रूपं न सहत इति चित्रपानकरसधूपगुडमोदकस्थानीयविचित्रचर्वणापदं भवति ।

२. वस्त्वलंकारौ शब्दाभिधेयत्वमध्यासाते, तावद्रसभावतदाभासतत्प्रशमाः पुनर्न कदाचिदभिधीयन्ते, अथ चास्वाद्यप्राणतया प्रतिभान्ति, तत्र तु ध्वननव्यापारादते नास्तिकल्पनान्तरम्, स्वलक्षणत्वाभावे मुख्यार्थबाधादेर्लक्षणानिबन्धनस्यानाशङ्कनीयत्वात् ।

पृष्ठ २५७.

१. तदङ्गभावभाजश्चित्तवृत्तेः प्रशम एव प्रक्रान्तायां हृदयमाह्लादयति यतो विशेषेण, तत एव तत्संगृहीतोऽपि पृथग्गणितोऽसौ ।

पृष्ठ २५९.

१. योऽर्थ उपपद्यमानोऽपि नावतेवानुपयोगाद्धर्मान्तरसंवलनयान्यतामिव गतोऽपि लक्ष्यमाणोऽनुगतधर्मसूत्रन्यायेनास्ते स रूपान्तरपरिणत उक्तः ।

पृष्ठ २६०.

१. स्निग्धश्यामलकान्तिलिप्तविषयतो वेल्लद्बलाका घना
वाताः शीकरिणः पयोदसुहृदामानन्दकेकाः कलाः ।
कामं सन्तु दृढं कठोरहृदयो रामोऽस्मि सर्वं सहे
वैदेही तु कथं भविष्यति हहा हा देवि धीरा भव ॥

पृष्ठ २६१.

१. यस्त्वनुपपद्यमान उपायतामात्रेणार्थान्तरप्रतिपत्तिं कृत्वा पलायत इव स तिरस्कृत इति ।

२. अत्यन्ततिरस्कृतवाच्यो यथादिकवेर्वाल्मीकेः ।
हेमन्तवर्णने पद्मवर्ज्यां रामस्योक्तिरियम् । अन्ध इति चोपहतदृष्टिः, जात्यन्धस्यापि गर्भे दृष्ट्युपघातात् । अन्धोऽयं पुरोऽपि न पश्यतीत्यनभ्यन्तर तिरस्कारो अन्धार्थस्य नत्वन्यन्तम् । इह त्वादर्शस्यान्धत्वमारोप्यमाणमपि न सह्यमिति अन्धशब्दोत्र पदार्थस्फुटीकरणाशक्तत्वं नष्टदृष्टिगतं निमित्तीकृत्यादर्शं लक्षणया प्रतिपादयति, असाधारणविच्छायत्वानुपयोगित्वादिधर्मजातमसंख्यं प्रयोजनं व्यनक्ति ।

पृष्ठ २६२.

१. असंलक्ष्यक्रमोद्द्योतः क्रमेण द्योतितः परः ।
विवक्षिताभिधेयस्य ध्वनेरात्मा द्विधा मतः ॥
मुख्यतया प्रकाशमानो व्यङ्ग्योऽर्थो ध्वनेरात्मा ।
स च वाच्यार्थापेक्षया कश्चिदलक्ष्यक्रमतया प्रकाशते कश्चित्क्रमेणेति द्विविधो मतः ।
क्रमेण प्रतिभान्यात्मा योऽस्याऽनुस्वानसन्निभः ।
शब्दार्थशक्तिमूलत्वात्सोऽपि द्वेधा व्यवस्थितः ॥ ध्व.९४.
शब्दार्थशक्त्या वाच्यसो व्यङ्ग्योऽर्थः कविना पुनः । ध्व १२४.

२. यस्मादलंकारो न वस्तुमात्र यस्मिन्काव्ये शब्दशक्त्या प्रकाशते स एव शब्दशक्त्युद्भवो ध्वनिरित्यस्माकं विवक्षितः । वस्तुद्वये च शब्दशक्त्या प्रकाश्यमाने श्लेषः ।

पृष्ठ २६४.

१. तस्य द्वितीयार्थस्य प्रतिपन्नस्य प्रथमार्थेन प्राकरणिकेन साकं या रूपणा तावद् भात्येव, न चान्यतः शब्दादिति सा ध्वननव्यापारात् ।

पृष्ठ २६५.

१. अथाङ्गिरसमग्रण्यमुदाहरणवस्तुषु ।
ऋषयो नोदयामासुः प्रत्युवाच स भूधरम् ॥

२. इह तु पद्मदलगणनमधोमुखत्वं चान्यथापि कुमारीणां संभाव्यत इति झटिति न लज्जायां विश्रमयति हृदयमपि तु प्राग्वृत्ततपश्चर्यादिवृत्तान्तानुसरणेन तत्र प्रतिपत्तिं करोतीति क्रमव्यङ्ग्यतैव ।

३. व्यञ्जकमुखेनापि भेदः सर्वथैव न न प्रकाशितोऽधुना पुनः शुद्धव्यञ्जकमुखेन । तथाहि व्यङ्ग्यमुखप्रेक्षितया विना पदं वाक्यं वर्णाः पदभागः संघटना महावाक्यमिति स्वरूपत एव व्यञ्जकानां भेदः, न चैषामर्थवत्कदाचिदपि व्यङ्ग्यता संभवतीति व्यञ्जकैकनियतं स्वरूपं यत्तन्मुखेन भेदः प्रकाश्यत इति तात्पर्यम् ।

पृष्ठ २६६

१. अनेन वाच्यवाचकचारुत्वहेतुभ्य उपमादिभ्योऽनुप्रासादिभ्यश्च विभक्त एव ध्वनेर्विषय इति दर्शितम् ।

पृष्ठ २६७.

१. विभक्त इति गुणालंकाराणां वाच्यवाचकभावप्राणत्वात् अस्य च व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावसारत्वाच्चास्य तेष्वन्तर्भावः ।

पृष्ठ २६८.

१. यतो लक्षणकृतामेव स केवलं न प्रसिद्धः. लक्ष्ये तु परीक्ष्यमाणे स एव सहृदयहृदयाह्लादकारि काव्यतत्त्वम् ततोऽन्यच्चित्रमेवेत्यग्रे दर्शयिष्यामः । यदप्युक्तम् कामनीयकमनतिवर्तमानस्य तस्योक्ताऽलंकारादिप्रकारेष्वन्तर्भावः इति तदप्यसमीचीनम् । यतो वाच्यवाचकमात्राश्रयिणि प्रस्थाने व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जक समाश्रयेण व्यवस्थितस्य ध्वनेः कथमन्तर्भावः, वाच्यवाचकचारुत्व हेतवो हि तस्याङ्गभूताः, न तु तदेकरूपा एवेति प्रतिपिपादयिष्यमाणत्वात् ।

प्राधान्यं च यद्यपि ज्ञस्रौ न चकास्ति 'बुद्धौ तत्त्वावभासिन्याम्' इति नयेनाखण्डचर्वणविश्रान्तेः, तथापि विवेचकैर्जीवितान्वेषणे क्रियमाणे यदा व्यङ्ग्योऽर्थः पुनरपि वाच्यमेवानुप्राणयन्नास्ते तदा तदुपकरणत्वादेव तस्यालंकारता। ततो वाच्यादेवोपस्कृताच्चमत्कारलाभ इति । यद्यपि पर्यन्ते रसध्वनिरस्ति, तथापि मध्यकक्षानिविष्टोऽसौ व्यङ्ग्योऽर्थो न रसोन्मुखीभवति स्वातन्त्र्येणापि तु वाच्यमेवार्थं संस्कर्तुं धावतीति गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यतोक्ता ।

पृष्ठ २७०.

१ चन्द्रिका कारस्तु·····इत्यलं पूर्ववंश्यैः सह विवादेन बहुना ।

पृष्ठ २७१.

१. द्वितीयपक्षपरिग्रहे पुनर्ध्वनेरेव लक्षणमनया भङ्ग्याभिहितं भवति, अभिन्नत्वाद्वस्तुनः ।

पृष्ठ. २७२.

१. श्रीधैर्यस्याङ्गभुवा महाकवेः श्यामलकशिष्येण ।

व्यक्तिविवेको विदधे राजानकमहिमकेनायम् ॥

२. आधातुं व्युत्पत्तिं नसृणां क्षेमयोगभाजानाम् ।
सत्सु प्रथितनयानां भीमस्याभिमतगुणस्य तनयानाम् ॥

३ छात्राभ्यर्थनया ततोद्य सहसैवोत्सृज्य मार्गं सतां
पौरोभाग्यमभाग्यभाजनजनासेव्यं मयाङ्गीकृतम् ॥
स्वकृतिष्वनियन्त्रितः कथमनुशिष्यादन्यमयमिति न वाच्यम् ।
वारयति भिषगपथ्यादितरान्स्वयमाचरन्नपि तत् ॥

४. अयं महिमभट्टाचार्यः परमाहङ्कारी स्वसमक्षमन्यान् तृणाय मन्वानः उद्दण्डतया क्वापि समादरमलभन् ।

५. सहसा यशोऽभिसर्तुं समुद्यताऽदृष्टदर्पणा मम धीः ।

६. युक्तोऽयमात्मसदृशान्प्रति मे प्रयत्नो
नास्त्येव तज्जगति सर्वमनोहरं यत् ।
केचिज्ज्वलन्ति निकसन्यपरे निमील-
न्त्यन्ये यदभ्युदयभाजि जगत्प्रदीपे ॥

पृष्ठ २७३.

१. ध्वनिवर्त्मन्यतिगहने स्खलितं वाण्याः पदे पदे सुलभम् ।
रभसेन यत्प्रवृत्ता प्रकाशकं चन्द्रिकाद्यदृष्ट्वैव ॥

२. किन्तु तदवधीर्यार्यैर्गुणलेशे सततमवहितैर्भाव्यम् ।

३. अत एव 'कुन्तकेन' इति ख्यातस्याप्युल्लुण्ठवचनम् ।

४. अतश्च 'अथैतद्दोषभयात्' इत्यादिना यो धूलिप्रक्षेपः कृतः स स्वमनीषिकया शङ्कितपक्षदूषणप्रपञ्चो निरुत्थान एव ।

पृष्ठ २७९.

१. इह संप्रतिपत्तितोऽन्यथा वा ध्वनिकारस्य वचोविवेचनं नः ।

पृष्ठ २७६.

१. तथा हि घटादिशब्दाः स्वार्थे प्रवर्तमाना घटनादिक्रियामेवान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभावेनावलम्बमाना दृश्यन्ते । न घटत्वादिसामान्यम् ।.....
न च सत्यपि घटत्वसामान्ये स्वयमघटन् घटात्मतामनापद्यमान एवासौ घटव्यपदेशविषयो भवितुमर्हति । एवं हि पटोऽपि घटव्यपदेशविषयः स्यात् ।

पृष्ठ २७९.

२. इह खलु घटादीनां पदार्थानां बहिः सिद्धावपि प्रमातर्यसिद्धावसिद्धिरेव । बहिः सत्तामात्रेणाग्रकल्पेन व्यवहर्तृणा व्यवहारासिद्धेः । प्रतिपत्तरि सिद्धिः प्रकाश एव ।.....

पृष्ठ २८१.

१. यः कश्चिदर्थः शब्दानां व्युत्पत्तौ स्यान्निबन्धनम् ।
प्रवृत्तौ तु क्रियैवैका सत्तासादनलक्षणा ॥

पृष्ठ २८२.

१. सत्तायां व्यावृतिश्चैषा चित्रत्वपरिनिष्ठितेः ।
सङ्गच्छते जडस्यापि

२. उपमानादीनां तत्रैवान्तर्भावात् ।

पृष्ठ २८३.

१. अर्थापत्तेरनुमानान्तर्भावाभ्युपगमात् ।

२ एतेन शाब्दं व्याख्यातम्

पृष्ठ २८४.

१. प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि

पृष्ठ २८५.

१. एवञ्चान्तर्मात्रविपरिवर्तितया सिद्धसङ्गावानां घटादीनां घटादिशब्दाः अपि द्योतका एव स्युर्न वाचकाः इति वाच्यवाचकव्यवहारोऽस्तमियात् ।

पृष्ठ २८६.

१ न च रसादिष्वपि विभावादिप्रकाशनसहभावेन प्रकाशनमुपपद्यते । यतस्तैरेव कारणादिभिः कृत्रिमैर्विभावाद्यभिधानैरसन्त एव रत्यादयः प्रतिबिम्बकल्पाः स्थायिभावव्यपदेशभाजः कविभिः प्रतिपत्तृप्रतीतिपथमुपनीयमानाः हृदयसंवादादास्वाद्यत्वमुपनयन्तः सन्तो रसा इत्युच्यन्ते । न च कारणादिभिः कार्यादयः प्रतिबिम्बकल्पाः सहैव प्रकाशितुमुत्सहन्ते ।

पृष्ठ २८७.

१. यत्तु भावाध्याये स्थायिनां लक्षणमुक्तं तद् व्यभिचारिदशापन्नानामेव तेषामवगन्तव्यं नान्येषाम्, लक्षणवचनस्य वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । स्थाय्यनुकरणात्मानो हि रसा इष्यन्ते, ते च प्रधानमिति तल्लक्षणमुखेनैव तेषां स्वरूपावगमसिद्धेः, तेषां बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावेनावस्थानात् ।

पृष्ठ २८८.

१. तेनात्र गम्यगमकयोः सचेतसां सत्यासत्यविचारो निरुपयोग एव । काव्यविषये च वाच्यव्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतीनां सत्यासत्यविचारो निरुपयोग एव ।

२. यत्र विभावादिमुखेन भावानामवगमस्तत्रैव सहृदयैकसंवेद्यो रसास्वादोदय इति वस्तुस्वभाव एवायं न पर्यनुयोगपदवीमवतरति प्रामाणिकानाम् ।

पृष्ठ २८९.

१. भ्रान्तिरपि संबन्धतः प्रमा ।
भ्रान्तिरपि भ्रमात्मकं ज्ञानमपि, सम्बन्धतः प्रमा प्रमाणम्, अर्थक्रियाकारिणीति यावत् भवति । यथा 'असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते' इति भावः ।

पृष्ठ २९०.

१. सहृदयैकसंवेद्यो रसास्वादोदयः ।

२ भावसंयोजनाव्यङ्ग्यपरसंवित्तिगोचरः ।
आस्वादनात्मानुभवो रसः काव्यार्थ उच्यते ॥
३. उपचारस्य प्रयोजनं सचेतनचमत्कारित्वं नाम । तद्धि मुख्ये चित्रपुस्तकादौ व्यक्तिविषये परिदृष्टमेव ।
४. 'चित्रपुस्तकादौ' इति । आलेख्यलेख्यादौ सन्तमसावस्थिते प्रदीपादिना प्रकाशिते झटित्यद्भुतार्थप्रकाशनाच्चमत्कारो जायते । तद्वद्रसादौ ।

(इति व्यक्तिविवेकव्याख्याने पृ. ५३.)

पृष्ठ २९१.

१. प्रायेण संक्षेपरुचीनल्पविद्यापरिग्रहान् ।
संप्राप्य वैयाकरणान् संग्रहेऽस्तमुपागते ॥
कृतेऽथ पतञ्जलिना गुरुणा तीर्थदर्शिना ।
सर्वेषां न्यायबीजानां महाभाष्ये निबन्धने ॥
यः पतञ्जलिशिष्येभ्यो भ्रष्टो व्याकरणागमः ।
काले स दाक्षिणात्येषु ग्रन्थमात्रे व्यवस्थितः ॥
पर्वतादागमं लब्ध्वा भाष्यबीजानुसारिभिः ।
स नीतो बहुशाखत्वं चन्द्राचार्यादिभिः पुनः ॥
न्यायप्रस्थानमार्गांस्तानभ्यस्य स्व च दर्शनम् ।
प्रणीतो गुरुणास्माकमयमागमसंग्रहः ।
काण्डे तृतीये न्यक्षेण भविष्यति विचारणा ।
४. विद्वज्जनानां यः खलु सर्वत्र गीयते ।
तत उपसृत्य विरचिता राजानकशूरवर्मनारना वै ।

पृष्ठ २९२.

१ साकांक्षावयवं भेदे परानाकांक्षशब्दकम् ।
क्रियाप्रधानं गुणवदेकार्थं वाक्यमिष्यते ॥
२. अर्थोऽपि द्विविधो वाच्योऽनुमेयश्च ।
३. तत्र पदस्यार्थो वाच्य एव नानुमेयः, तस्य निरशत्वात्साध्यसाधनभावाभावतः। वाक्यार्थस्तु.....

पृष्ठ २९३.

१. तान्येतानि चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्याते चोपसर्गनिपाताश्च ।
२. चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताश्च ।
३. चत्वारीति, चतुर्ग्रहणमवधारणार्थम्, नकं पदजातं यथार्थः पदमैन्द्राणामिति । नापि द्वे, यथा सुबन्तं तिङन्तञ्च । नापि त्रीणि निपातोपसर्गावेकतः कृत्वा । नापि पञ्च षड् वा, यथा गतिकर्मप्रवचनीयभेदेनेति ।
४. असत्त्वभूतार्था उपसर्गादयः,। तेषामसत्त्वभूतार्थत्वाविशेषेऽपि व्यापारनियमात् प्रयोगनियमाच्च त्रैराश्योपगमः ।

५. ये तु द्रव्यसम्बन्धादर्थान्तरे वर्तन्ते ते द्रव्यशब्दाः दण्ड्यादयः। वैयाकरणानान्तु गुणशब्दाः एवमादयः।
६ केचित्पुनरेषां क्रियैवैका प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमिति क्रियाशब्दत्वमेव सर्वेषां नामपदानामुपगच्छन्ति।

पृष्ठ २९४.

१. सत्यमिष्यते भवद्भिः, किन्तु सा शब्दस्य व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तं न प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम्। अन्यद्धि व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तम्, अन्यच्च प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम्।

पृष्ठ २९५.

१. तदपेक्षमेव च विपच्य घटो भवतीत्यादौ विपाकादिक्रियायाः पौर्वकाल्यं क्त्वाप्रत्ययस्य विषयो वेदितव्यः;.....

पृष्ठ २९६.

(अधस्तनो ग्रन्थः सप्तविंशे पृष्ठे उपलभ्यते)

१ कुचोप्मणः कर्तुर्हरणक्रिया।

(अयञ्च एकोनत्रिंशे पृष्ठे उपलभ्यते)

२. क्वचित्कर्तुः सम्बन्धितामुपगतासौ भ्रमहेतुः। यथा स्मर संस्मृत्य न शान्तिरस्ति मे इति।

पृष्ठ २९७.

१. अर्थोऽपि द्विविधो वाच्योऽनुमेयश्च। तत्र शब्दव्यापारविषयो वाच्यः। स एव मुख्य उच्यते।.....तत एव तदनुमिताद् लिङ्गभूताद्यदर्थान्तरमनुमीयते सोऽनुमेयः। स च त्रिविधः। वस्तुमात्रमलङ्कारो रसादयश्च।
२. तत्र पदस्यार्थो वाच्य एव नानुमेयः। तस्य निरंशत्वात् साध्यसाधनभावाभावतः। वाक्यार्थस्तु वाच्यार्थस्यांशपरिकल्पनायाम् अंशानाञ्च विध्यनुवादभावेनावस्थितेः विधेयांशस्य सिद्धासिद्धतयोपपादनानपेक्षसापेक्षत्वेन द्विविधो बोद्धव्यः।
३. उपपादनञ्चात्र नानुमानम्, अप्रतीतप्रतीत्युत्पादनाभावात्। अपि तु शब्दप्रतीतस्यैवार्थान्तरन्यासनयेन समर्थनम्। ततश्चोद्भटकाव्यहेतुन्यायेन अनुमानं व्यवस्थितम्। अर्थान्तरन्यासनयेन तूपपादनम्।

पृष्ठ २९८.

१. श्रुतमेकं यदन्यत्र स्मृतेरनुभवस्य वा।
हेतुतां प्रतिपद्येत काव्यलिङ्गं तदुच्यते॥
२. अनेन कवेः कर्म काव्यमिति काव्यकौतुकविहितां काव्यस्य शब्दव्युत्पत्तिं कविमूलकाव्यत्वप्रतिपादिकां दर्शयति। तत्र ह्युक्तम् 'तस्य कर्म स्मृतं काव्यम्'..... इति।
तत्पुनरस्य ग्रन्थकृतो नावर्जकम्, अप्रातीतिकत्वात्, कविव्यापारश्च न सामान्येन, किन्तु विभावादिघटनास्वभावः। अत एव नियमेन रसापेक्षी।

पृष्ठ २९९.

१. तच्चाभिनेयानभिनेयार्थत्वेन द्विविधम् ।
.....अपरं पुनरनुकारक्रमेण साक्षात्तत्प्रदर्शनात्मकम् ।

पृष्ठ. ३००.

१ यथा च वाक्यार्थविषये साध्यसाधनभावे साध्यसाधनयोः सुलक्षः क्रमः तथा वस्तुमात्रादावनुमेयविषयेऽप्यवगन्तव्यः, केवलं रसादिष्वनुमेयेष्वयमसंलक्ष्यक्रमो गम्यगमकभाव इति सहभावभ्रान्तमात्रकृतस्तत्रान्यपां व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावाभ्युपगमः, तन्निबन्धनश्च ध्वनिव्यपदेशः । स तु तत्र औपचारिक एव प्रयुक्तो न मुख्यः । तस्य वक्ष्यमाणनयेन बाधितत्वात् । उपचारस्य प्रयोजनं सचेतनचमत्कारित्वं नाम ।

पृष्ठ ३०३.

१. यत्पुनरस्यानेकशक्तिसमाश्रयत्वाद् व्यापारान्तरपरिकल्पनं तदर्थस्यैवोपपद्यते, न शब्दस्य, तस्यानेकशक्तिसमाश्रयत्वासिद्धेः । तथा हि एकाश्रयाः शक्तयोऽन्योन्यानपेक्षवृत्तयोऽपाकृतपौर्वापर्यनियमा युगपदेव स्वकार्यकारिण्यो दृष्टाः । यथा दाहकत्वप्रकाशकत्वादयोऽग्नेः । न च शब्दाश्रयाः शक्तयस्तथा दृश्यन्ते अभ्युपगम्यन्ते वा, नियोगतोऽभिधाशक्तिपूर्वकत्वेनेतरशक्तिप्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् । तस्माद्भिन्नाश्रया एव ता न शब्दैकसमाश्रया इत्यवसेयम् ।
२. यश्चासावाश्रयो भिन्नः सोऽर्थ एवेति तदव्यापारस्यानुमानान्तर्भावोऽभ्युपगन्तव्य एव ।
३. नह्यनुन्मत्तः कश्चित् कचित् कथञ्चित् साधर्म्यमनुत्पश्यन्नवाक्यात् तत्त्वमारोपयतीति परिशीलितवक्तृस्वरूपः प्रतिपत्ता तत्त्वारोपनिमित्तं सादृश्यमात्रं प्रतिपत्तुमर्हति न तत्त्वम् ।

पृष्ठ ३०४.

१ तद्धि वाच्यतयोपक्रम एव भासते, न प्रतीतिपर्यवसानाम्पदं भवितुमर्हति । तस्य बाधोपपत्तेः । तस्य चैवं विधस्योपक्रमस्य निमित्तं साधर्म्यमात्रप्रतिपादनम् । प्रयोजनञ्च लाघवेन वाहीकादौ गवादिगतजाड्यादिधर्मप्रतिपादनं यस्मादतिदेशप्रकारोयमर्थान्तरे शब्दविनिवेशो नाम । यदुक्तम्:—
जातिशब्दोऽन्तरेणापि जातिं यत्र प्रयुज्यते ।
सम्बन्धिसदृशाद्धर्मात्तं गौणमपरे विदुः ॥

पृष्ठ ३०८.

१. न च वदतेः प्रकाशो वाच्य इति शक्यं वक्तुं तस्य तत्रासमितत्वात् प्रकाशस्य चातत्त्वात् । न चायं स्वार्थमेव प्रतिपादयति तस्य बाधोपपत्तेः ।

पृष्ठ ३०६.

१. स हि तत्साम्यतत्स्वामीप्यादिनिबन्धनत्वाद्बहुविधः ।
२. गुणवृत्तौ गिरां यावत्सामग्रीष्टा निबन्धनम् ।
सैव लिङ्गत्तयास्माभिरिष्यतेऽर्थान्तरं प्रति ॥

२. यच्च निमित्तं तदेवास्माभिरिह लिङ्गमित्याख्यातम् । युक्तञ्चैतत् । शब्दस्य तत्र व्यापाराभावात् । व्यापाराभावश्च संबन्धाभावात् । लिङ्गाच्च लिङ्गिनः प्रतीतिरनुमानमेवेति न गुणवृत्तावर्थान्तरप्रतीतिः शाब्दी ।

पृष्ठ ३०७.

१. विषं भक्षय मा चास्य गृहे भुङ्क्थाः इत्यादावपि यदेतद्विषभक्षणानुज्ञानं तदर्थप्रकरणादिसहायमेतद्गृहे भोजनस्य ततोऽपि दारुणतरपरिणामत्वमनुमापयति.....

अवगतवक्तृप्रकरणादिस्वरूपः प्रतिपत्ता विषभक्षणानुज्ञानादेव तद्गृहे भोजनस्यात्यन्तमकरणीयत्वमनुमातुमर्हति ।

पृष्ठ ३०८.

१ सतोऽसत एव वार्थस्य प्रकाशमानस्य संबन्धस्मरणानवेक्षिणा प्रकाशकेन सहैव प्रकाशविषयतापत्तिरभिव्यक्तिरिति तल्लक्षणमाचक्षते ।

पृष्ठ ३०९.

१. न चैतल्लक्षणं वाच्ये संगच्छते । तथा हि—सतोऽभिव्यक्तिराद्ययोरर्थयोर्लक्षणम्, न तत् प्रतीयमानेष्वेकमपि संस्पृष्टुं क्षमते, तस्य दध्यादेरिवेन्द्रियविषयभावापत्तिप्रसंगात्, घटादेरिव वाच्यार्थसहभावेनेदन्ताप्रतीतेरसंभवात् । न च स्वरूपासंस्पर्शि लक्षणं भवति । तृतीयस्यास्तु यल्लक्षणं तदनुमानस्यैव संगच्छते न व्यक्तेः ।

२. न च वाच्यादर्थादर्थान्तरस्य प्रतीतिरविनाभावसंबन्धस्मरणमन्तरेण संभवति, सर्वस्यापि तत्प्रतीतिप्रसंगात् । नापि सहभावेन धूमाग्निप्रतीत्योरिव तत्प्रतीत्योरपि क्रमभावस्यैव संवेदनादित्यसम्भवो लक्षणदोषः ।

पृष्ठ ३१०.

१. अथ रसाद्यपेक्षया तयोः सहभावेन प्रकाशोऽभिमत इत्युच्यते, अव्याप्तिस्तर्हि-लक्षणदोषः, वस्तुमात्रालङ्कारप्रकाशस्य प्रकाशकासहभावेनाव्याप्तेः । न च रसादिष्वपि विभावादिप्रकाशनसहभावेन प्रकाशनमुपपद्यते ।

२. द्विविधो हि प्रकाशकोऽर्थः उपाधिरूपः स्वतन्त्रश्चेति । तत्र शब्दज्ञानप्रदीपादिरुपाधिरूपः । .. .. अन्यः स्वतन्त्रो धूमादिः । तत्राद्यस्तावद् भवद्भिर्नाभ्युपगन्तव्य एव, प्रत्यक्षाभिधेययोरेवार्थयोः काव्यतापत्तिप्रसङ्गात् ।

पृष्ठ ३११.

१. अन्यस्य तु लिङ्गत्वमेवोपपद्यते न व्यञ्जकत्वम् ।

२. न च त्रिविधस्यापि व्यङ्ग्याभिमतस्यार्थस्य प्रकाशकसहभावेन प्रकाशस्तस्यापि ध्वनिकारस्याभिमतः ।

३. अथैतद्दोषभयात् सहभावानपेक्षमेतल्लक्षणमुच्यते तथाप्यनुमानेऽतिव्याप्तिः । तत्राप्युपसर्जनीकृतात्मना धूमादिना प्रकाश्यस्य प्रकाशोऽस्त्येव ।

पृष्ठ ३१२.

१. किञ्च यत्र वाच्यस्यार्थस्य व्यञ्जकत्वं स चेद्ध्वनिस्तर्हि तदनुमितस्य व्यञ्जकत्वे ध्वनित्वं न स्यात्, तस्य वाच्यत्वाभावात्।

२. तत्र व्यक्तिवादिना घटदीपन्यायेन सद्विषया व्यक्तिरङ्गीकृता। यथा च न दोषस्तथोपपादितम्।

३. तत्र व्यक्तिवादिनो व्यङ्ग्यत्वाभ्युपगमेऽयमभिप्रायः.....

पृष्ठ ३१३.

१. अर्थस्य विशिष्टत्वं शब्दः सविशेषणस्तदः पुंस्त्वम्।
द्विवचनवाशब्दौ च व्यक्तिर्ध्वनिनाम काव्यवैशिष्ट्यम्॥
वचनञ्च कथनकर्तुः कथिता ध्वनिलक्षणगीति दश दोषाः।
ये त्वन्ये तद्भेदप्रभेदलक्षणगता न ते गणिताः॥

पृष्ठ ३१४.

१. यत्पुनरस्य क्वचित् समासोक्त्यादौ प्राधान्यमुच्यते तत् प्राकरणिकत्वापेक्षयैव न प्रतीयमानापेक्षया.....व्यभिचारेऽपि वैफल्यादनुपादेयमेव।

पृष्ठ ३१५.

१. वाच्यस्य प्रतीयमानापेक्षया चारुत्वनिमित्तं प्राधान्यं व्यभिचारः। तत्र सत्यपि तस्य व्यावृत्त्यर्थं विशेषणमयुक्तं निष्फलत्वात्, यतो यत्र गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्ये व्यङ्ग्यापेक्षया वाच्यस्य चारुत्वं तदिह व्यावर्तनीयम्। न च तत्र वाच्यस्यैव चारुत्वमिति नियमः, व्यङ्ग्यस्यापि प्रकृष्टचारुत्वदर्शनात्।

२. अत्र व्यक्तिवादिनोऽयमभिप्रायः—यदेतदर्थस्य गुणीकृतात्मत्वं तदर्थान्तरप्रत्यायकत्वेनोपायत्वादप्राधान्यम्, प्रतीयमानापेक्षया अचारुत्वम्, अविश्रान्तत्वेनार्थान्तरानुपकार्यत्वञ्चेति त्रयः पक्षाः सम्भवन्ति। तत्राद्यं पक्षद्वयमनूद्य कामं दूषितम्।..... .....तृतीयस्तु पक्षो गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यनिरासाय सिद्धान्तितः। तथा हि समासोक्त्यादौ प्रतीयमानोऽर्थो वाच्यार्थोपयिकोऽपि न स्वात्मनि विश्रान्तिं भजते, प्रत्यावृत्य वाच्यार्थोपस्काराय प्रवृत्तत्वात्..... ततश्च गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्ये वाच्यस्य स्वविश्रान्तत्वेनार्थान्तरोपकार्यत्वं व्यावर्त्यमिति विशेषणमुपपन्नम्।

पृष्ठ ३१६.

१ किन्तु तमर्थमिति तच्छब्देनानन्तर्यात् प्रतीयमानस्यार्थस्य परामर्शे सति पारिशेष्याद् 'अर्थो वाच्यविशेषः' इति स्वयं विवृतत्वाच्च अर्थशब्दो वाच्यविषय एव विज्ञायते नोभयार्थविषय इति तदवस्थो दोषः।

---

1. The text, as found in the Chowkhamba edition, is corrupt. It does not fit in with what follows. Could it have been 'अविश्रान्तत्वेनार्थान्तरोपकारित्वञ्च'?

२. शब्दः पुनरनुपादेय एव तस्य स्वार्थाऽभिधानमन्तरेण व्यापारान्तरानुपपत्तेरुपादयिष्यमाणत्वात्। न च तस्यानुकरणव्यतिरेकेणोपसर्जनीकृतार्थत्वं सम्भवति।

पृष्ठ ३१७.

१ कुतस्तर्हि तदर्थावगतिः। अनुकार्यादिति ब्रूमः। तस्य सार्थकनिरर्थकत्वभेदेन द्वैविध्यतः। न त्वनुकरणात्, तस्येतिना व्यवच्छिन्नस्य स्वरूपमात्रेऽवस्थानात्। अन्यस्य तूपसर्जनीभावाऽव्यभिचार एव।

पृष्ठ ३१८.

१ व्यभिचारसम्भवयोरपि वा यत्स्वार्थयोरुपसर्जनीकृतत्ववचनं तत्पुनरुक्तम्, तयोरर्थान्तराभिकृत्यर्थमुपात्तयोस्सामर्थ्यादेव तदवगतेरित्युक्तम्। न च स्वरूपमात्रानुवादफलमेतदिति शक्यं वक्तुम्। तस्य पुनरुक्तिप्रकारत्वोपपादनतः।

२. एवञ्च यत्सुवर्णपुष्पां पृथिवीमित्युदाहरणमुपदर्शितं तदसिद्धसाध्यसाधनधर्मानुगमित्यवगन्तव्यम्।

३. व्यक्तिवादिनःपुनर्मते शब्दस्य शक्त्यन्तरसमर्थनात् स्वरूपेणोपादानस्य सार्थकत्वं विवक्ष्यते। तस्य चोपसर्जनीकृतार्थत्वं विशेषणं सप्रयोजनमेव। तथाहि दृष्ट्या केशव गोपरागहृतया इत्यादौ . . .

पृष्ठ ३१९.

१. शब्दस्य च विशेषणमनुपादेयमेव स्याद्, अर्थस्य विशिष्टत्वेनैव तदवगतिसिद्धेः।

२. किञ्च तमिति तदः पुंस्त्वेन निर्देशोऽनुपपन्नः। तस्यानन्तरप्रक्रान्तार्थपरामर्शिनस्तल्लिङ्गतापत्तेः। न चात्र तल्लिङ्गताविशिष्टः कश्चिदर्थः प्रक्रान्तः। वस्तुतो नपुंसकलिङ्गस्यानन्तरं प्रक्रान्तत्वात्।

पृष्ठ ३२०.

१. व्यङ्क्तः इति द्विवचनेनेदमाह.....
"अर्थः शब्दो वेति तु विकल्पाभिधानं प्राधान्याभिप्रायेण" इति यदाहुस्तद्भ्रान्तिमात्रमूलम्।

२. किञ्च वाशब्दो विकल्पार्थो वा स्यात् समुच्चयार्थो वा। न तावद्विकल्पार्थः, पक्षान्तरासम्भवस्य व्युत्पादितत्वात्। सम्भवे वास्य द्विवचनानुपपत्तिः, तयोः समुच्चयाभावात्.....
समुच्चयार्थत्वे यत्र शब्दार्थयोरेकैकस्य व्यञ्जकत्वं तत्र ध्वनित्वमिष्टं न स्यात्।

पृष्ठ ३२१.

१. नापि शब्दस्याभिधातिरेकेण व्यञ्जकत्वं व्यापारान्तरमुपपद्यते, येनार्थान्तरं प्रत्याययेत्, व्यक्तेरनुपपत्तेःसम्बन्धान्तरस्य चासिद्धेः। तदभावेऽपि तदभ्युपगमे

तस्यार्थनियमो न स्यात्, निबन्धनाभावात्। न ह्यस्य गेयस्येव रत्यादिभिर्भावैः स्वाभाविक एव सम्बन्धः, सर्वस्यैव तत्प्रतीतिप्रसंगात्।

२. नापि समयकृतः व्यञ्जकत्वस्यौपाधिकत्वात् उपाधीनाञ्चार्थप्रकरणादिसामग्रीरूपाणामानन्त्यादनियतत्वाच्च प्रतिपदमिव शब्दानुशासनस्य समयस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात्।

३. नचानयोरन्यः सम्बन्धः संभवतीति, तस्याः सामग्र्या एव संबन्धबलात् तद्गमकत्वमुपपन्न न शब्दस्येति नार्थापत्तादस्य कश्चिद्विशेषः इति व्यर्थस्तत्पत्तोपन्यासः।

पृष्ठ ३२२.

१. ननु यदि शब्दस्यार्थनिरपेक्षस्य व्यञ्जकत्वं नेष्यते तत्कथं प्रातिभस्यादौ प्रादीनां द्योतकत्वमुक्तं न वाचकत्वम्। ..... उक्तम्, उपचारतो न परमार्थतः इति। तस्य प्रदीपादिनिष्ठस्य वास्तवस्य शब्दार्थविषयत्वस्य प्रतिक्षेपात्।

२ तस्माद् भाक्तमेव द्योतकत्वमुपगन्तव्यं न मुख्यम्। भक्तश्च प्रयोजनं वाच्यार्थस्य स्फुटत्वप्रतिपत्तिः। निमित्तं च विशेषणविशेष्यप्रतीत्योराशुभावितया क्रमानुपलक्षणात् सहभावप्रतीतिः।

पृष्ठ ३२३.

१. व्यक्तशब्दानां तथाश्रूयमाणा ये वर्णा नादशब्दवाच्या अन्त्यबुद्धिनिर्ग्राह्याः स्फोटाभिव्यञ्जकाः ते ध्वनिशब्देनोक्ता यथाह भगवान्स एवः—

प्रत्ययैरनुपाख्येयैर्ग्रहणानुग्रहैस्तथा।
ध्वनिप्रकाशिते शब्दे स्वरूपमवधार्यते॥

२ अत एव श्रूयमाणानां शब्दानां ध्वनिव्यपदेश्यानामन्तःप्रविवेशिनश्च स्फोटाभिमतस्यार्थस्य व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावो न सम्भवतीति व्यञ्जकत्वसाम्याद्यः शब्दार्थात्मनि काव्ये ध्वनिव्यपदेशः सोप्यनुपपन्नः। तत्रापि कार्यकारणमूलस्य गम्यगमकभावस्योपगमात्।

३. इत्थञ्च काव्यस्य विशिष्टतानुपपत्तावितरलक्षणविधायिमतातिरिक्तं न किञ्चिदनेनाभिहितं स्याद्, अन्यत्र ध्वनिव्यपदेशमात्रात्।

पृष्ठ ३२४.

१. न च रसानां वैशिष्ट्ये तदात्मनः काव्यस्य विशिष्टत्वमिति युक्तं वक्तुम्, अव्याप्तेः। एवं हि प्रतिनियतरसात्मन एव तस्य ध्वनित्वं स्यात्, नान्यरसात्मनः वैशिष्ट्याभावात्। इष्यते च तत्रापीत्यव्याप्तिर्लक्षणदोषः।

पृष्ठ ३२५.

१. अत एव च न गुणालङ्कारसंस्कृतशब्दार्थशरीरं तावत्काव्यम्, तस्य यथोक्तव्यङ्ग्यार्थोपनिबन्धे सति विशिष्टत्वमिति शक्यं वक्तुम्। तस्य रसात्मताभावे मुख्यवृत्त्या काव्यव्यपदेश एव न स्यात् किमुत विशिष्टत्वम।

२. नच रसात्मनः काव्यस्य वस्तुमात्रादिभिर्विशेषः शक्य आधातुम। तेषां

विभावादिरूपतया रसाभिव्यक्तिहेतुत्वोपगमात् । न च व्यञ्जकानां वैचित्र्ये व्यङ्ग्यस्य विशेषोऽभ्युपगन्तुं युक्तः शावलेयादीनामिव गोत्वस्य ;

३. ततोऽस्य विशिष्टतोपगमे वा यत्र तयोरुभयोरेकैकस्य वा व्यङ्ग्यता तत्रैव ध्वनिव्यपदेशः स्यात्, न केवलरसात्मनि काव्ये, वैशिष्ट्याभावात् । इष्यते चासौ तत्रापि । प्रहेलिकादौ च नीरसे स्यात् । तत्राप्युक्तक्रमेण वस्तुमात्रादेरभिव्यङ्ग्यत्वेनेष्टत्वात्

पृष्ठ ३२६.

१- न च तस्य तदङ्गभावो भणितुं युज्यते अङ्गित्वेनेष्टत्वात् । इति काव्यत्वमेव ध्वनिव्यपदेशविषयोऽभ्युपगन्तुं युक्तो न तद्विशेषः ।

पृष्ठ ३२७.

१. अत्र व्यक्तिवादिनस्त्वयमाशयः—इह प्रसिद्धं लक्ष्यमाश्रित्य लक्षणं प्रवर्तते । लक्ष्ये च द्विविधं काव्यं दृश्यते, मुख्य गौणञ्च । तत्र मुख्यं यत्र व्यङ्ग्यस्य प्राधान्यम्, शिष्टं गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यादि गौणम् । उभयञ्च ग्राह्यमनादिकालव्यवहारसिद्धत्वात् .....तत्र च गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यनिरासाय विशेषग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् ।

२. किञ्च सूरिभिः कथितः' इति कथनक्रियाकर्तृनिर्देशः पक्षद्वयेऽप्यवाच्य एव ।

पृष्ठ ३२८.

१ किञ्च यथाभिधेयोऽर्थस्तद्विशेषणञ्चोपात्तं तद्वदाभिधाप्युपादानमर्हति । अन्यथा यत्र दीपकाद्यलकारादलङ्कारान्तरस्योपमादेः प्रतीतिस्तत्र ध्वनित्वमिष्टं न स्यात्तल्लक्षणेनाव्याप्तेः । अलङ्काराणाञ्चाभिधात्वमुपगतं तेषां भङ्गिभणितिभेदरूपत्वात् । .....

पृष्ठ ३२९.

१. अत्र व्यक्तिवादिनोऽयमाशयः । इह चिरन्तनैरलङ्कारप्रजापतिभिः भट्टोद्भटप्रभृतिभिः शब्दार्थधर्मा एवालङ्काराः प्रतिपादिताः नाभिधाधर्माः । यतोऽर्थप्रतिपत्युन्नेयः शब्दव्यापारः शब्दोच्चारणव्यापारो वाऽभिधा..... ततश्च तन्मताश्रयणेन शब्दार्थयोर्व्यञ्जकत्वमुच्यमानं तद्धर्माणामलङ्काराणामपि पर्यवसितमिति तत्स्वीकारार्थं पृथगभिधानग्रहणे न किञ्चित् ।

पृष्ठ ३३०.

१. अपरं पुनर्बहिरङ्गं बहुप्रकारं सम्भवति तद्यथा—
२. पूर्वैरेवंविधदोषोद्भावनरूपस्य विचारस्य प्रणीतत्वात् ।
३. अत्र ह्यसंरब्धवानिति नञ्समासस्तावदनुपपन्नः ।

पृष्ठ ३३१.

१. प्रक्रमभेदोऽपि शब्दानौचित्यमेव । स हि यथाप्रक्रममेकरसप्रवृत्तायाः प्रतिपत्तृप्रतीतेरुत्खात इव परिस्खलनखेददायी रसभङ्गाय पर्यवस्यति ।

पृष्ठ ३३२.

१. वाच्यस्यावचनं यथा 'कनकनिकषस्निग्धा विद्युत् प्रिया न ममोर्वशी' इति । अत्र

हि भ्रान्तौ निवृत्तायां तद्विषयभूतयोः सुरधनुर्धारासारयोरिव विद्युतोऽपीदमा परामर्शे वाच्ये यत्तस्यावचनं स वाच्यावचनं दोषः ।

२. तेन ध्वनिवदेषा वक्रोक्तिरनुमा न किम् ।

३. अर्थशक्तिमूलः पुनरुपपद्यत एव ।

४. ये त्वन्ये तद्भेदप्रभेदलक्षणगता न ते गणिताः ।

पृष्ठ ३३३.

१. आद्ययोस्तु क्रमस्य स्फुलक्षत्वाद् भ्रान्तिरपि नास्तीति निर्निबन्धन एव तत्र व्यङ्ग्यव्यपदेशग्रहः ।

२. यत्तु तदनाख्यायैव तयोः प्रधानेतरभावेन प्रकारद्वयमुक्तं तदप्रयोजकमेव..... न हि तयोः सामान्यविशेषयोस्त्रिष्वपि वस्तुमात्रादिष्वनुभेयेषु चेतनचमत्कारकारी कश्चिद्विशेषोऽवगम्यते ।

३. किञ्च यदविवक्षितत्वाच्यो विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्यश्चेति ध्वनेः प्रकारद्वयमुक्तम्, तत्र किमिदमविवक्षितत्वं नामेति तात्पर्यतोऽस्यार्थो वक्तव्यः ।
.....कथमस्य ध्वनिप्रकारत्वोक्तिर्युक्तिमती । .....
यद्वाच्यस्य विवक्षितत्वमन्यपरत्वञ्चोपगतं तद्विप्रतिषिद्धं विवक्षितान्यपरत्वयोर्विरोधात् ।

४ अर्थान्तरसंक्रमितवाच्योप्यनुमान एवान्तर्भवति । .....अत्यन्ततिरस्कृतवाच्यस्तु पदार्थोपचार एव यथा गौर्वाहीक इति । तस्याप्यनुमानान्तर्भावः समर्थित एव ।

५. शब्दशक्तिमूलाया अर्थान्तरप्रतीतेरनिबन्धनायाः पराकृतत्वान्न तन्मूला पदवाक्यप्रकाशता सम्भवति ।

पृष्ठ ३३४.

१. प्रक्रमभेदनियमं प्रतीति तु पाठ

(अयं ग्रन्थः २६९ पृष्ठे लभ्यते)

पृष्ठ ३३७.

१. नाटकमीमांसायां साहित्यमीमांसायां च तेषु तेषु स्थानेषु प्रपञ्चः प्रदर्शितः ।

२. एतदस्माभिर्हर्षचरितवार्तिके विस्तृत्य प्रतिपादितम् ।

३. अस्माभिश्चैतत्प्रपञ्चो बृहत्यां करिष्यते ।

पृष्ठ ३३९.

१ विरोधिरससंबन्धिविभावादिपरिग्रहः ।
विस्तरेणान्वितस्यापि वस्तुनोऽन्यस्य वर्णनम् ॥
अकाण्ड एव विच्छित्तिरकाण्डे च प्रकाशनम् ।
परिपोषं गतस्यापि पौनःपुन्येन दीपनम् ॥
रसस्य स्याद्विरोधाय वृत्त्यनौचित्यमेव च ।
प्रस्तुतरसापेक्षया विरोधी यो रसस्तस्य संबन्धिनां विभावानुभावव्यभिचा-

रिणां परिग्रहो रसविरोधहेतुरेकः संभवनीयः । तत्र विरोधिरसविभावपरिग्रहो यथा शान्तरसविभावेषु तद्विभावतयैव निरूपितेष्वनन्तरमेव शृङ्गारादिवर्णने। विरोधिरसभावपरिग्रहो यथा प्रियं प्रति प्रणयकलहकुपितासु कामिनीषु वैराग्यकथाभिरनुनये । विरोधिरसानुभावपरिग्रहो यथा प्रणयकुपितायां प्रियायामप्रसीदन्त्यां नायकस्य कोपावेशविवशस्य रौद्रानुभाववर्णने । अयं चान्यो रसभङ्गहेतुर्यत्प्रस्तुतरसापेक्षया वस्तुनोन्यस्य कथञ्चिदन्वितस्यापि विस्तरेण कथनम् । यथा विप्रलम्भशृङ्गारे नायकस्य कस्यचिद्वर्णयितुमुपक्रान्तस्य कवेर्यमकाद्यलङ्कारनिबन्धनरसिकतया महता प्रबन्धेन पर्वतादिवर्णने । अयं चापरो रसभङ्गहेतुरवगन्तव्यो यदकाण्ड एव विच्छित्तिः रसस्याकाण्डे च प्रथनम् । तत्रानवसरे विरामो यथा नायकस्य कस्यचित्स्पृहणीयसमागमया नायिकया कयाचित्परां परितोषपदवीं प्राप्ते शृङ्गारे विदिते च परस्पराऽनुरागे समागमोपायचिन्तोचितं व्यवहारमुत्सृज्य स्वतन्त्रतया व्यापारान्तरवर्णने ।

पृष्ठ ३४०.

१. अनवसरे च प्रकाशनं यथा प्रवृत्ते प्रवृद्धविविधवीरसंक्षये कलपसंक्षयकल्पे सङ्ग्रामे देवप्रायस्यापि तावन्नायकस्यानुपक्रान्तविप्रलम्भशृङ्गारस्य निमित्तमुचितमन्तरेणैव शृङ्गारकथायामवतारवर्णने ।

पृष्ठ ३४३.

१. तस्य शास्त्रं शासन वाद्यभाण्डनाट्या दैवैलक्षण्येन सम्यक्तत्स्वरूपावगमोपायम् ।

२ किन्तु प्रथमनाट्यावसरक्रमप्रवृत्तविरिञ्चवचनप्रवर्तकभरतमुनिशासनानुवर्तिशिष्यपरम्परापरिचयागताद्यतनकालावधिमहानटजनस्वकप्रवृत्तिविशेषोपदेशपरम् ।

पृष्ठ ३४४.

१. तावन्नानेन किञ्चिदुपदिश्यते तं प्रत्युपकाराद्दते ।

पृष्ठ ३४६.

१. यदृच्छादेव पुमर्थोपायावगतिं करोति ।

पृष्ठ ३४८.

१ तस्य बिन्दुसूत्रस्यूतस्य प्रारम्भाद्यवस्थापञ्चकचारिणो यदा प्रारम्भाद्यवस्था पूर्णत्वमेति तदाङ्कच्छेदो बिन्दुद्वारानुसन्धीयमानद्वितीयाङ्कामिधेयरूपोविधेयः । एवं प्रयत्नाद्यवस्थाचतुष्टयेऽपि ।

२ मुहूर्तः द्वादशक्षणात्मके काले, त्रिंशत्कलात्मके काले,
दण्डद्वयात्मके काले, मुहूर्तं घटिकाद्वयमित्युक्तेः ।
अक्षिपक्ष्मपरिक्षेपो निमेषः परिकीर्तितः ।
द्वौ निमेषौ त्रुटिर्नाम द्वे त्रुटी तु लवः स्मृतः ॥
द्वौ लवौ क्षण इत्युक्तः काष्ठा प्रोक्ता दशक्षणाः ।

त्रिंशत्काष्ठा कला प्रोक्ता कलात्रिंशन्मुहूर्तकः ॥

३. अंकस्य प्रयोगकालपरिमाणमियदिति दर्शयति एकदिवसप्रवृत्तम् इति ।····· एकदिवसेनेति मुहूर्तपञ्चकेनैव, यतस्तावन्त कालमावश्यकानि भोजनादीनि शक्यनिरोधानि। ततः परं प्रयोगकालश्चेत् तत्प्रेक्षकप्रयोक्तृणां तदाप्यावश्यकस्य सन्ध्यावन्दनभोजनादेरविरोधेनेत्येवं कार्यानेकत्वमेकत्राङ्के निषिद्धम् ।

पृष्ठ ३४९.

१ दिवसावसानकार्यमिति । दिवसे अवसानं समाप्तिर्यस्य तत्सर्वं काय यद्यङ्के प्रत्यक्षेण प्रदर्शयितुं न युज्यते, तदाङ्कच्छेदं कृत्वा प्रवेशकैर्दर्शनीयम् । अदृष्टमप्यर्थं हृदि प्रवेशयन्तीति ।

२. अंकच्छेदं कुर्यान्मासकृतं वर्षसंचितं वापि ।
तत्सर्वं कर्तव्यं वर्षादूर्ध्वं न तु कदाचित् ॥
यत्र हि यत्ननिष्पाद्यं संचितं तदेव वर्षं गण्यते ।

३. यः कश्चित्कार्यवशात् गच्छति पुरुषः प्रकृष्टमध्वानम् ।
तत्राप्यङ्कच्छेदः कर्तव्यः पूर्ववत् तज्ज्ञैः ॥
डिमादि नायकस्य तु दिव्यस्य आकाशयानकादिना सर्वं युज्यते ।

(अभि० भा०)

पृष्ठ ३५६.

१. पञ्चाङ्कमेतदवरं दशाङ्कं नाटकं परम् ।

(अयं ग्रन्थः ७१ पृष्ठे उपलभ्यते)

२ अवस्थाः पञ्च कार्यस्य प्रारब्धस्य फलार्थिभिः ।
आरम्भयत्नप्राप्त्याशानियताप्तिफलागमाः ॥

पृष्ठ ३५९.

१ महतः प्रधानभूतस्य फलस्य युज्यमानस्य तत्तन्नायकोचितस्य यद्बीजम् उपायसंपत्, तत्र यदौत्सुक्यमात्रं तद्विषयं स्मरणोत्कण्ठारूपमनेनोपायेनैतत्सिद्ध्यतीति, तस्य बन्धो हृदये निरूढिः प्रारम्भः। स च नायकस्यामात्यस्य नायिकायाः प्रतिनायकस्य दैवस्य वा ।
(अस्य प्रतीकं एकविंशेऽध्याये दशमश्लोके चौग्धभाषासंस्करणे समुपलभ्यते)

पृष्ठ ३६१.

१ अपश्यत इति । तदुपायव्यतिरेकेण फलप्राप्तिमपश्यतः फलदर्शनं संभाव्यमानं विवेचयतः फलमुद्दिश्य यो व्यापार उपायविषयपरमौत्सुक्यगमनलक्षणस्तेन विनेदं फलं न भवति, तस्मात्स एव उपायोन्वेष्य इत्युपायविषयस्मरणेच्छासन्तानस्वभावः स प्रयत्नः ।

पृष्ठ ३६२.

१. उपायापायशङ्काभ्यां प्राप्त्याशा प्राप्तिसंभवः ।

पृष्ठ ३६६.

१. यथा रत्नावल्यां तृतीयेऽङ्के वेषपरिवर्ताभिसरणादौ समागमोपाये सति वासवदत्तालक्षणापायशङ्कायाः 'एवं जदि अआलबादाली विअ आअच्छिअ अण्णदो ण णइस्सेदि वासवदत्ता' इत्यादिना दर्शितत्वादनिर्धारितैकान्ता समागमप्राप्तिरुक्ता ।

२. अपायाभावतः प्राप्तिर्नियताप्तिः सुनिश्चिता ।
अपायाभावादवधारितैकान्ता फलप्राप्तिर्नियताप्तिरिति ।

पृष्ठ ३६८.

१. समग्रफलसंपत्तिः फलयोगो यथोदितः ।
यथा रत्नावल्यां रत्नावलीलाभचक्रवर्तित्वावाप्तिरिति ।

२. तत्रार्थः फलम्, तस्य प्रकृतयः उपायाः, फलहेतव इत्यर्थः ।

पृष्ठ ३७१.

१. स्वल्पोद्दिष्टस्तु तद्धेतुर्बीजं विस्तार्यनेकधा ।
स्तोकोद्दिष्टः कार्यसाधकः पुरस्तादनेकप्रकारं विस्तारी हेतुविशेषो बीजवद्बीजम् । यथा रत्नावल्यां वत्सराजस्य रत्नावलीप्राप्तिहेतुरनुकूलदैवो यौगन्धरायणव्यापारो विष्कम्भके न्यस्तः ।
यौगंधरायणः, कः सन्देहः, द्वीपादन्यस्मात् इत्यादिना प्रारम्भेऽस्मिन्स्वामिनो वृद्धिहेतावित्यन्तेन ।

२. अपेक्षितं परित्यज्य नीरसं वस्तुविस्तरम् ,
यदा संदर्शयेच्छेषं कुर्याद्विष्कम्भकं तदा ।
यदा तु सरसं वस्तु मूलादेव प्रवर्तते ।
आदावेव तदाङ्कः स्यादामुखात्तेषसंश्रयः ॥

पृष्ठ ३७३.

१. अथ बिन्दुं लक्षयति प्रयोजनानां विच्छेद इति । प्रयुज्यते फलं यैरुपायानुष्ठाने तेषाम्, इतिवृत्तवशादवश्यकर्तव्यताभिर्विच्छेदेऽपि सति यदनुसन्धानात्मकं प्रधाननायकगतं सन्धि·····व्यज्ञान ।
विन्दुर्ज्ञातविचारणं फललाभोपायत्वात् यावदविच्छेदः प्रत्यनुसन्धानेन न कृतस्तावन्न किञ्चिदपि कार्यं निर्वहति ।

पृष्ठ ३७४.

१. एतदुक्तं भवति । सकलोपायप्रतिजागरणनिमित्तं ह्यनुसन्धानं यावद्धि मुख्यनायकेन प्रत्यनुसन्धानेन न क्रियते तावज्जडाजडरूपः सर्वोऽप्युपायोऽनुपायकल्प एव । तथाहि तापसवत्सराजे वासवादत्ताप्रेमातिशयानुसंधानं राजमुखेन प्रत्यङ्गं दर्शितम् ।

२. तत्र प्रधानसिद्धिरायत्तसिद्धिरुभयसिद्धिरिति । प्रधानसिद्धावयं बिन्दुः, आयत्तसिद्धिस्तु राज्यप्राप्तिलक्षणा, तस्यामात्यवर्गकृतमेवानुसन्धानं बिन्दुः, उभयसिद्धौ तु उभयकृतं येन यत्प्राधान्येनाऽभिसंहितं स एव तदनुसन्धत्ते ।

पृष्ठ ३७५.

१. इत्येवं प्रधानानुसन्धानचेतनव्यापारः कारणानुग्राही स्वयं च परमकारणस्वभावस्तैलबिन्दुवत् सर्वव्यापकत्वादपि बिन्दुः बीजं च मुखसन्धेरेव प्रभृत्यात्मानमुन्मेषयति ।

पृष्ठ ३७६.

१. यदुक्तं हि परार्थं स्यात् प्रधानस्योपकारकम् ।
प्रधानवच्च कल्प्येत सा पताकेति कीर्तिता ॥
फलं संकल्प्यते सद्भिः परार्थं यस्य केवलम् ।
अनुबन्धेन हीनस्य प्रकारीं तां विनिर्दिशेत् ॥
यस्य संबन्धि यत्तं संविदनुसंधानं परस्य प्रयोजनसंपत्तये भवदपि स्वप्रयोजनं संपादयति, अत एवाह प्रधानवच्च कल्प्येतेति। सचेतनानुसंधाना पताकासिद्धिः प्रधानस्योपकारिणी । एवं सुग्रीवविभीषणप्रभृतिरपि रामादिनोऽर्थक्रियामारभमाणो रामादेरात्मनश्चोपकाराय प्रभवमाने प्रसिद्धिप्राशस्त्ये संपादयति इत्येवमौचित्यज्ञानोपयोगिता(?) न पताकामात्रवदुपयोगित्वादियं पताकेति चिरन्तनाः । फलं प्रकल्प्यते यस्या इति । यतिश्च यतः (?)

२. परार्थमेव केवलं सर्वमनुतिष्ठति सा प्रकरी । यथा कृत्यारावणे कुलपतिः, वेणीसंहारे भगवान् वासुदेवः प्रकर्षेण स्वार्थानपेक्षया करोतीति ।

पृष्ठ ३७७.

१. पताकावृत्तमप्यूनमेकार्थैरनुसन्धिभिः ।
अङ्गान्यत्र यथालाभमसन्धि प्रकरीं न्यसेत् ॥

२. सानुबन्धं पताकाख्यं प्रकरी च प्रदेशभाक् ।

३. प्राज्ञैः प्रधाननायकपताकानायकप्रकरीनायकश्चतनरूपैः यद्वस्तु फलरूपं प्रयुज्यते संपाद्यते संपाद्यत्वेनानुसन्धीयते तत्फलप्रयोजनो यः संपूर्णतादायी पूर्वपरिगृहीतस्य प्रधानस्य बीजरूपोपायस्य फलमारभत इत्यारम्भशब्दवाच्यो द्रव्यगुणक्रियाप्रभृतिः स सर्वोऽर्थः सहकारिकार्यमित्युच्यते । चेतनैः कार्यते फलमिति व्युत्पत्त्या । सम्यगिति, प्रभुमन्त्रोत्साहशक्तित्रयसंपन्नैरित्यर्थः । तेन जनपदकोशदुर्गादिकव्यापारवैचित्र्यं सामान्युपायवर्ग इत्येतत्सर्वं कार्येऽन्तर्भवति ।

पृष्ठ ३७८.

१ ननु प्रारम्भादिवदासामर्थप्रकृतीनां किं सर्वत्र सर्वासां संभवस्तथार्थप्रकृतिसन्ध्यवस्थाभिस्सह किं यथासख्यनियमस्तथा किं स्वात्मन्यासां कर्तृक्रम इति शङ्कात्रयमपाकर्तुमाह एतासामिति । पञ्चकवर्गत्रयं परामृश्यते एकैकस्य वर्गस्यैकशेषेण । तदयमर्थः । न सर्वत्र प्रारम्भादिवत् सर्वा अर्थप्रकृतयोऽपि तु यस्य नायकस्य येनार्थप्रकृतिविशेषेण प्रयोजनसंपत्तिरधिका तदेव प्रधानमन्यत्तु भवदपि गुणभूतमसत्कल्पम् । यथा स्वपराक्रमबहुमानशालिनां पताकाप्रकर्यावविवक्षिते एव । बीजबिन्दुकार्य्याणि तु सर्वत्रानपायीनि ।

२. अर्थतादात्म्यादथरूपताध्यासादर्थैकज्ञाननिवेशितत्वादर्थोपरञ्जकत्वादर्थनिमित्तत्वाद्वा इतिवृत्तार्थैकयोगक्षेमत्वं वागात्मनां शब्दानामिति तदाशयेन "वाचियत्नस्तु कर्तव्यो नाट्यस्यैषा तनुः स्मृता" इति पूर्वमुक्तम् । इह तु शरीरमिति दर्शितमित्यविरोधः ।

३. रसाः पुनरात्मा शरीराविर्भावकाः ।

पृष्ठ ३७९.

१. एते हि सन्धयो ज्ञेया नाटकस्य प्रयोक्तृभिः ।
तथा प्रकरणस्यापि शेषाणां च निबोधत ॥
व्यायोगेहामृगौ चापि त्रिसन्धी परिकीर्तितौ ।
न तयोरवमर्शस्तु कर्तव्यः कविभिः सदा ॥

२. अर्थप्रकृतयः पञ्च पञ्चावस्थासमन्विताः ।
यथासंख्येन जायन्ते मुख्याद्याः पञ्च सन्धयः ॥

पृष्ठ ३८०.

१. न सर्वत्र सर्वा अर्थप्रकृतयोऽपि तु यस्य नायकस्य येनार्थप्रकृतिविशेषेण प्रयोजनसम्पत्तिः ।.....पताकाप्रकर्यावविवक्षिते ।

२. एतदुक्तम् । प्रारम्भोपयोगी यावानर्थराशिः प्रसक्तानुप्रसक्तया विचित्रास्वाद आपातितः तावान्मुखसंधिस्तदभिधायी च रूपकैकदेशः । यथा रत्नावल्यां प्रथमोऽङ्कः । तथा हि अमात्यस्य वीरो वत्सराजस्य शृङ्गारादद्भुतश्शृङ्गार इति ।

पृष्ठ ३८१.

१ तदाचार्यो न सङ्गतमिति । स्यात् दृष्टैव प्रतिमुखोपयोगिनी नष्टतात्ववमश एवेति, केचित् उत्तरोत्तरविकासतारतम्यं दृष्टनष्टत्वमाहुः । पूर्वावस्था हि दृष्टाप्युत्तरदृष्टविकासापेक्षया नष्टा एवं (?) संमृष्टोपविकास उत्तरापेक्षयेति मन्यते । अत्रापि इवार्थो न संगच्छत एव । न कार्यजननं शक्त्या (?) ।

२ लक्ष्यालक्ष्यतयोद्भेदस्तस्य प्रतिमुखं भवेत् ।
विन्दुप्रयत्नानुगमादङ्गान्यस्य त्रयोदश ॥

३. बीजस्योद्घाटनं यत्रेति । कार्यतया दृष्टं कारणतया नष्टमिति केचित् । उपादेये दृष्टं प्रतिनायके नष्टमित्यपरे । नचैतत्समञ्जसम् एकविषयतामन्तरेण सन्धानायोगात्, नाशस्यापि च हेयादिविषयस्य प्रारम्भवशेन दृष्टतयैव पदग्रहसंपत्तेः (?) । तस्मादयमर्थः, बीजस्योद्घाटनं तावत्फलानुगुणो दशाविशेषस्तदृष्टमपि विरोधिसन्निवेर्नष्टमिव पांसुना पिहितस्येव बीजस्याङ्कुररूपमुद्घाटनम् ।

पृष्ठ ३८२.

१. तस्मादत्रार्थः । दृष्टं नष्टमिव कृत्वा तावन्मुखे न्यस्तं भूमाविव बीजममात्येन सागरिकाचेष्टितं वसन्तोत्सवकामदेवपूजनादितिरोहितं नष्टमेव । सागरिकाचेष्टितस्य हि बीजस्येव तदाच्छादकमप्युत्सवादिरूपं भूमिरेव (रिव ?)

प्रत्युद्घोधकम्, तस्य दृष्टनष्टं तुल्यं कृत्वा न्यस्तस्यात एव कुङ्कुमबीजस्य यदुच्चाटनं तत्कल्पं यत्रोच्चाटनं सर्वत्रैव कथाभावसमूहे स प्रतिमुखम् ।

२. प्रतिराभिमुख्येन यतोऽत्र वृत्तिः पराङ्मुखता हि दृष्टनष्टकल्पनादि रत्नावल्यां दर्शितम् ।

पृष्ठ ३८३.

१. उत्पन्युद्घाटनदशाद्वयविशिष्टस्य बीजस्य यत्रोद्भेदः फलजननाभिमुखत्वं स गर्भः । उद्भेदमेव विवृणोति प्राप्तिरित्यादिना । प्राप्तिर्नायकविषया, अप्राप्तिः प्रतिनायकचरिते, पुनश्चान्वेषणमित्युभयसाधारणम् । अन्ये तु वीररौद्रविषय एवैतस्यार्थस्य भावाद्व्याप्तित्वादेतदाहुः, प्राप्तिरप्राप्तिरन्वेषणमित्येवंभूताभिरवस्थाभिः पुनः पुनर्युक्तो गर्भसंधिः । प्राप्तिसंभवाख्यावस्थया युक्तत्वेन फलस्य गर्भभावात् ।

पृष्ठ ३८४.

१. क्रोधेनावमृशेद्यत्र व्यसनाद्वा विलोभनात् ।
गर्भनिर्भिन्नबीजार्थः सोऽवमर्शोऽङ्गमङ्ग्रहः ॥
अवमर्शनमवमर्शः पर्यालोचनम् , तच्च क्रोधेन वा व्यसनाद्वा विलोभेन वा भवितव्यम् । अनेनार्थेनेत्यवधारितैकान्तफलप्राप्त्यवसायात्मा गर्भसंध्युद्भिन्नबीजार्थसंबन्धी विमर्शोऽवमर्शः । यथा रत्नावल्यां चतुर्थेऽङ्केऽग्निविद्रवपर्यन्तो वासवदत्ताप्रसक्त्या निरपायरत्नावलीप्राप्त्यवसायात्मा विमर्शो दर्शितः ।

पृष्ठ ३८५.

१. सन्धीनां यानि वृत्तानीत्यादि शोभामेति न संशय इत्यन्तमर्थभागराशिः संधिरित्युक्तम् । तत्र सन्धीनां संबन्धीनि यानि वृत्तानि संविधानखण्डानि । अनुपूर्वेश इति, नतु लक्षणनिरूपणप्रसङ्गपरिकल्पितेन । प्रदेशेष्वादिमध्यान्तभागेषु वर्तनेनाङ्गानि । कुत इत्याह स्वस्याङ्गिनः सन्धेर्या संपत्तिर्निष्पत्तिः, तत्र गुणवत्त्वे शेषभावे यतो युक्तान्युचितानि, सन्धिसंपादकत्वादङ्गानीत्यर्थः।

पृष्ठ ३८७

१. इष्टस्यार्थस्य रचना वृत्तान्तस्यानुपूर्वशः ।
रागप्राप्तिः प्रयोगस्य गुह्यानां चैव गूहनम् ॥
आश्चर्यवदभिख्यानं प्रकाश्यानां प्रकाशनम् ।
अङ्गानां षड्विधं ह्येतदुक्तं शास्त्रे प्रयोजनम् ॥
इष्टस्येत्यादिना प्रयोजनमाह । अभीष्टस्य प्रयोजनस्य रसास्वादकृतो रचना विस्तारणा वृत्तान्तस्यानुपूर्वशक्रमेण स्फुटत्वादयशलाकाकम्बलत्वाभावः । एतत्प्रयोजनं सर्वसाधारणम् । प्रयोगस्येतिवृत्तस्य स्वयं परस्परस्यापि रागप्राप्तिः रञ्जनायोग्यत्वभावः । एतत्प्रयोजनं सर्वसाधारणम् । प्रयोगस्थापनयोगाद्यादिना पौनरुक्त्याद्याभासावाद्ये गृह्याः (?) ।
सत्यादरणीया आर्यास्तेषां संचर्वणं पुनः पुनः श्रुतमपि यदभिख्यानमितिवृत्तं तत एव नाश्चर्यकारि तदप्यङ्गप्रयोजनायामपूर्वनामिवाद्भुततामेति । तदाह

आश्चर्यवदिति । यच्च व्युत्पत्तौ सातिशयोपयोगि तत एव प्रकाश्यं तस्य प्रकाशनं विस्तारणम् । आद्यं तु प्रयोजनम् चमत्कारकृतं स्मृतिदृष्टमपि प्रत्यक्षविशेषसिद्धमेव, नतु सन्ध्योपासनादिवददृष्टम्, नतु पूर्वरङ्गाङ्गवदुभयरूपमित्यर्थः । शास्त्र इति नाट्यात्मके वेद इत्यर्थः । एषां प्रयोजनानामङ्गलक्षणेपूदाहरणं वर्णयिष्यामः ।

पृष्ठ ३८८.

१ पुनरशब्दो विशेषद्योतकः, लक्षण एवायं क्रमो न निबन्धन इति यावत्, तेन यदुद्भटप्रभृतयोऽङ्गानां सन्धौ क्रमे च नियममाहुःतदुक्तागमविरुद्धमेव । तथाहि "संप्रधारणमर्थानां युक्तितस्त्वभिधीयते" इति यन्मुखसन्धौ पञ्चममङ्गं वक्ष्यति तत्सर्वेषु संधिषु तावच्चिबन्धनयोग्यम्, न च तथा निवेश्यमानमदृष्टकृतं विदध्यात्, न च लक्ष्ये न दृश्यते । यत्तु सन्धिनैयत्येनाभिधानं तत् सन्धाववश्यंभावित्वख्यापनार्थम् । कानिचित्त्वङ्गानि स्वरूपबलादेव नियमभाञ्जि यथोपक्षेपो मुखसन्धावेव । प्रथममेव वचनं ह्यनुपक्षिप्ते वस्तुनि (न ?)किञ्चिदपिशक्यक्रियम्, यत्तूच्यते चतुःषष्ठ्यङ्गसंयुक्तमिति तेन संभवमात्रमेषामुक्तं नतु नियमः । यच्च प्रतिसन्ध्यभिधानं तद्बाहुल्येन तथा दर्शनात् । तथाप्युपक्षिप्तेऽर्थे विस्तारिते निश्चितगुणादभिलषिते संभावनीय उपायादिविषयः । सप्रधारणमित्युपक्षेपपरिकरपरिन्यासविलोभनहेतुत्वाद् अन्यान्यभिधाय युक्तिरुक्ता । नतु तत्रैव सद्भावानन्तर्यनियमश्च मुनेरेवाभिमतो लक्ष्यते ।

पृष्ठ ३९२.

१. अनुप्रासः सयमको रूपकं दीपकोपमे ।
इति वाचामलङ्काराः पञ्चैवान्यैरुदाहृताः ॥
२. उपमादीपकं चैव रूपक यमकं तथा ।
अलङ्कारास्तु विज्ञेयाश्चत्वारो नाटकाश्रयाः ॥
३. अवलोक्य मतानि सत्कवीनामवगम्य स्वधिया च काव्यलक्ष्म ।
सुजनावगमाय भामहेन ग्रथितं रङ्क्रिलगोमसूनुनेदम् ॥
४. अहह्यमसुभि (नि) र्भेदं रसवत्वेऽप्यपेशलम् ।
काव्यं कपित्थमाम्रं च केषाञ्चित्सदृशं यथा ॥
५. स्वादुकाव्यरसोन्मिश्रं शास्त्रमप्युपयुञ्जते ।
प्रथमालीढमधवः पिबन्ति कटु भेषजम् ॥
६. युक्तं लोकस्वभावेन रसैश्च सकलैः पृथक् ।
७. युक्तं वक्रस्वभावोक्त्या सर्वमेवैतदिष्यते ।

पृष्ठ ३९३

१. अपुष्टार्थमवक्रोक्ति प्रसन्नमृजु कोमलम् ।
भिन्नं गेयमिवेदं तु केवलं श्रुतिपेशलम् ॥
२. तदेभिरङ्गैर्भूष्यन्ते भूषणोपवनस्रजः ।

वाचां वक्रार्थशब्दोक्तिरलङ्काराय कल्पते ॥

३. इति निगदितास्तास्ता वाचामलङ्कृतयो मया ।
वहुविधकृतीर्दृष्ट्वाऽन्येषां स्वयं परितर्क्य च ॥

४. काव्यालङ्कार इत्येष यथाबुद्धि विधास्यते ।

५ प्रीतिं करोति कीर्तिं च साधुकाव्यनिवन्धनम् ।

६ गिरामलङ्कारविधिः सविस्तरः स्वयं विनिश्चित्य धिया मयोदितः ।
अनेन वागर्थविदामलङ्कृता विभाति नारीव विदग्धमण्डना ॥

पृष्ठ ३९४

१ लोकोत्तरचमत्कारकारित्वैचित्र्यसिद्धये ।
काव्यस्यायमलङ्कारः कोप्यपूर्वो विधीयते ॥
माधुर्य्यमभिवाञ्छन्तः प्रसादं च सुमेधसः ।
समासवन्ति भूयांसि न पदानि प्रयुञ्जते ॥
केचिदोजोऽभिधित्सन्तः समस्यन्ति बहून्यपि ।
यथा मन्दारकुसुमरेणुपिञ्जरितालका ॥

२. वहुशो यच्छ्रुतं वाक्यमुक्तं वापि पुनः पुनः ।
नोद्वेजयति यस्माद्धि तन्माधुर्य्यमिति स्मृतम् ॥

३. श्रव्यं नातिसमस्तार्थं काव्यं मधुरमिष्यते ।

४ अप्यनुक्तो बुधैर्यत्र शब्दोऽर्थो वा प्रतीयते ।
सुग्वशब्दार्थसंयोगात्प्रसादः स तु कीर्त्यते ॥

५. आविद्धदङ्गनावालप्रतीतार्थं प्रसादवत् ।

६. समासवद्भिर्वहुभिर्विचित्रैश्च पदैर्युतम् ।
सानुरागैरुदारैश्च तदोजः परिकीर्त्यते ॥

पृष्ठ ३९५.

१. केचिदोजोऽभिधित्सन्तः समस्यन्ति बहून्यपि ।

२ माधुर्य्यौजः प्रसादाख्यास्त्रयस्ते न पुनर्दश ।

३ अपुष्टार्थमवक्रोक्ति प्रसन्नमृजु कोमलम् ।
भिन्नं गेयमिवेदं तु केवलं श्रुतिपेशलम् ॥

पृष्ठ ३९७.

१ दण्डिनापि 'काव्यशोभाकरान्धर्मानलङ्कारान् प्रचक्षते' इति ब्रुवता गुणमध्य एव प्रसादादीनभिदधता च गुणालङ्कारविभागोप्यसंभवीति सूचितम् भवति, सत्यमेतत्, किन्तु विरचनविवेचनसामर्थ्यसमर्थनायावश्यं कारुपनिकोऽपि विभाग आश्रयणीयः ।

पृष्ठ ३९८.

१ यथा प्रासादकुड्यादिके कर्तव्ये प्रथमं भूमिः तद्वत्काव्ये निर्मातव्ये ·····
भित्तिस्थानीयं लक्षणयोजनं चित्रकर्मप्रतिममलङ्कारगुणनिवेशनम् ।

२. यथा च पीवरत्वं स्तनयोर्लक्षणं मध्यस्य तु कुलक्षणम्, एवं किञ्चिदभिधीयमानं केनचिद्रूपेण रसोचितेन विभावादिरूपेण तमेव पदार्थक्रमं लक्षयल्लक्षणम्।

३. काव्ये तावल्लक्षणं शरीरं तस्योपमादयस्त्वयोऽर्थभागे, यथा हि पृथग्भूतेन हारेण रमणी विभूष्यते तथोपमानेन शशिना तत्सादृश्येन वा कविबुद्धिचञ्चलतया परिवर्तमानत्वात्पृथक्सिद्धेनैव प्रकृतवर्णनीयवनितावदनादि सुन्दरीक्रियत इति तदेवालङ्कारः।

४. एवं कविव्यापारवलाद् यदर्थजात लौकिकात्स्वभावाद् भिद्यमानं तदेव लक्षणमित्युक्तम्।

५. अत एव काव्ये सम्यक्प्रयोज्यानीति विषयस्तेषामुक्तः।

६. षट्त्रिंशदेतानि तु लक्षणानि
प्रोक्तानि वै भूषणसंमतानि।
काव्येषु भावार्थगतानि तज्ज्ञैः
सम्यक् प्रयोज्यानि यथारसं तु॥
यथारस ये भावा विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिणः तेषां योऽर्थः तं स्थायिभावरसीकरणात्मकं प्रयोजनं गतानि प्राप्तानि, यदभिधाव्यापारोपसंक्रान्ता उद्यानादयोऽर्थाः तद्रसविशेषविभावादिभावं प्रतिपद्यन्ते तानि लक्षणानीति सामान्यलक्षणम्।

७. षट्त्रिंशदिति च नान्यदिति वारणपरम्, कविहृदयवर्त्तिनामपराणामपरिसंख्येयत्वात्। किन्तु बाहुल्येन तावदियता लक्ष्यं व्याप्तम्, इयति च कविनावधातव्यमिति संख्यानिरूपणम्।

पृष्ठ ३९९.

१. भामहेनापि
'सैषा सर्वैव वक्रोक्तिरनयार्थो विभाव्यते' इत्यादि, तेन च परमार्थे व्यापार एव लक्षणम्।

अभि० भा० (२) २९०.

(अथ च)

वक्राभिधेयशब्दोक्तिरिष्टा वाचामलङ्कृतिः।

२ तत्र चित्तवृत्त्यात्मकं रस लक्षयंस्तत्तद्रसोचितविभावादिवैचित्र्यसंपादकस्त्रिविधोऽभिधाव्यापारो लक्षणशब्देनोच्यते।

पृष्ठ ४००.

१. सैषा सर्वैव वक्रोक्तिनयार्थो विभाव्यते।
यत्नोऽस्यां कविना कार्यः कोऽलङ्कारोऽनया विना॥

२. सादृश्यालक्षणा वक्रोक्तिः।
बहूनि हि निबन्धनानि लक्षणायाम्, तत्र सादृश्यालक्षणा वक्रोक्तिरसौ इति।

३. उक्तिप्रत्युक्तिमद्वाक्यं वाकोवाक्यं विदुर्बुधाः।

द्वयोर्वक्त्रोस्तदिच्छन्ति बहूनामपि सङ्गमे ॥
ऋजूक्तिरथवक्रोक्तिर्वैयधिकरण्योक्तिस्तथैव च ।
गूढं प्रश्नोत्तरोक्ती च चित्रोक्तिश्चेति तद्भिदा ॥

४. वृत्तदेवादिचरितशंसि चोत्पाद्यवस्तु च ।
कलाशास्त्राश्रयश्चेति चतुर्धा भिद्यते पुनः ॥

५. अनिबद्धं पुनर्गाथाश्लोकमात्रादि तत्पुनः
युक्तं वक्त्रभावोक्त्या सर्वमेवैतदिष्यते ॥

पृष्ठ ४०२.

१. वैदर्भमन्यदस्तीति मन्यन्ते सुधियोऽपरे ।
तदेव च किल ज्यायः सदर्थमपि नापरम् ॥
गौडीयमिदमेतत्तु वैदर्भमिति किं पृथक् ।
गतानुगतिकन्यायान्नानाख्येयममेधसाम् ॥

२. अस्त्यनेको गिरां मार्गः सूक्ष्मभेदः परस्परम् ।
तत्र वैदर्भगौडीयौ वर्ण्येते प्रस्फुटान्तरौ ॥

३. श्लेषः प्रसादः समता माधुर्यं सुकुमारता ।
अर्थव्यक्तिरुदारत्वमोजःकान्तिसमाधयः ॥
इति वैदर्भमार्गस्य प्राणाः दश गुणाः स्मृताः ।

४. मधुरं रसवद् वाचि वस्तुन्यपि रसस्थितिः ।
येन माद्यन्ति धीमन्तो मधुनेव मधुव्रताः ॥

पृष्ठ ४०४.

१. दण्डिनापि 'काव्यशोभाकरान्धर्मानलङ्कारान्प्रचक्षते' इति ब्रुवता गुणमध्य एव तत्र प्रसादादीनभिदधता च गुणालङ्कारविभागोऽप्यसम्भवीति सूचितं भवति, सत्यमेतत्, किन्तु विरचनविवेचनसामर्थ्यसमर्थनायावश्यं काल्पनिकोऽपि विभाग आश्रयणीयः ।

२. गुणशून्यं तु न काव्यं किञ्चिदर्पयति च महापुरुषो दृष्टान्तः, अहेयत्वप्रदर्शनार्थमेव हि प्रसादादीनां गुणवाचोयुक्त्या व्यवहारः, तद्विना काव्यरूपत्वाभावात । सुन्दरास्पदं तु शरीरमुपलक्षणम् । उपमाद्यन्तरेण तु भवति काव्यमिति प्रकटीकर्तुमुपमादीनामलङ्कारत्वेन व्यवहारः ।

३. न कान्तमपि निर्भूषं विभाति वनितामुखम् ।

पृष्ठ ४०५.

१ काव्यं ग्राह्यमलङ्कारात् ।
काव्यं खलु ग्राह्यमुपादेयं भवति अलङ्कारात् ।
काव्यशब्दोऽयं गुणालङ्कारसंस्कृतयोः शब्दार्थयोर्वर्तते ।

२. रीतिरात्मा काव्यस्य । (६)
रीतिर्नाम इयम् आत्मा काव्यस्य, शरीरस्य इव इति वाक्यशेषः ।

पृष्ठ ४०६.

१. ओजःप्रसादश्लेषसमतासमाधिमाधुर्य्यसौकुमार्य्योदारतार्थव्यक्तिकान्तयो बंधगुणाः ।

२. तासां पूर्वा ग्राह्या गुणसाकल्यात् । (१४)
तासां तिसृणां रीतीनां पूर्वा वैदर्भी ग्राह्या गुणानां साकल्यात् ।

३. न पुनरितरे स्तोकगुणत्वात् । (१५)
इतरे गौडीयपाञ्चाल्यौ न ग्राह्ये स्तोकगुणत्वात् ।
ओजः कान्तिमती गौडीया ।
ओजः कान्तिश्च विद्येते यस्यां सा ओजःकान्तिमती गौडीया नाम रीतिः ।
माधुर्य्यसौकुमार्य्ययोः अभावात् समासबहुला अत्युल्वणपदा च ।
माधुर्य्यसौकुमार्य्योपपन्ना पाञ्चाली ।
माधुर्य्येण सौकुमार्य्येण च गुणेन उपपन्ना पाञ्चाली नाम रीतिः । ओजः कान्त्यभावात् अनुल्वणपदा विच्छाया च ।

४. उक्तिवैचित्र्यं माधुर्य्यम् । (१०)
उक्तेर्वैचित्र्यं यत् तत् माधुर्य्यमिति ।
दीप्तरसत्वं कान्तिः ३. २. १४.

५. दीप्ता रसाः शृङ्गारादयो यस्य स दीप्तरसः ।

पृष्ठ ४०७.

१. काव्यं खलु ग्राह्यमुपादेयं भवति अलङ्कारात् ।
काव्यशब्दोऽयं गुणालङ्कारसंस्कृतयोः शब्दार्थयोर्वर्त्तते ।

२. सा त्रिधा वैदर्भी गौडीया पाञ्चाली च ।

३. रीतिरात्मा काव्यस्य ।
रीतिर्नाम इयम् आत्मा काव्यस्य, शरीरस्येव इति वाक्यशेषः ।
का पुनः इयं रीतिः इत्याह विशिष्टा पदरचना रीतिः ।
विशेषवतः पदानां रचना रीतिः ।

४ एतासु तिसृषु रीतिषु रेखासु इव चित्रं काव्यं प्रतिष्ठितमिति ।

पृष्ठ ४०८.

१. काव्यशोभायाः कर्तारो धर्मा गुणाः ।
ये खलु शब्दार्थयोर्धर्माः काव्यशोभां कुर्वन्ति ते च ओजः प्रसादादयः न यमकोपमादयः, कैवल्येन तेषाम् अकाव्यशोभाकरत्वात्, ओजः प्रसादादीनान्तु केवलानामस्ति काव्यशोभाकरत्वमिति ।
तदतिशयहेतवस्त्वलङ्काराः ।
तस्याः काव्यशोभाया अतिशयस्तदतिशयस्तस्य हेतवः । तु शब्दो व्यतिरेके । अलङ्काराश्च यमकोपमादयः ।

२. पूर्वे नित्याः ।
पूर्वे गुणा नित्याः, तैर्विना काव्यशोभानुपपत्तेः

३. सन्दर्भेषु दशरूपकं श्रेयः ।
सन्दर्भेषु प्रबन्धेषु दशरूपकं नाटकादि श्रेयः ।
कस्मात् ? तदाहः—
तद्धि चित्रं चित्रपटवद्विशेषसाकल्यात् ।
तद्दशरूपकं हि यस्मात् चित्रं चित्रपटवत् विशेषाणां साकल्यात् ।
ततोऽन्यभेदकल्पिः ।
ततो दशरूपकादन्येषां भेदानां क्लृप्तिः कल्पनमिति । दशरूपकस्य एव हि इदं सर्वं विलसितम् । यच्च कथाऽऽख्यायिके महाकाव्यम् इति । तल्लक्षणञ्च नातीव हृदयङ्गममिति उपेक्षितमस्माभिः । तदन्यतो ग्राह्यम् ।

४. भट्टोद्भटवामनादिना भामहोक्तं 'शब्दश्छन्दोभिधानार्थः' इत्यभिधानस्य शब्दाद्भेदं व्याख्यातुं भट्टोद्भटो बभाषे शब्दानामभिधानमभिधाव्यापारो मुख्यो गुणवृत्तिश्च इति । वामनोऽपि 'सा सादृश्याल्लक्षणा वक्रोक्तिः' इति मनाक्स्पृष्ट इति तैस्तावद्ध्वनिदिगुन्मीलिता ।

पृष्ठ ४०९.

१. शषाभ्यां रेफसंयोगैष्टवर्गेण च योजिता ।
परुषा नाम वृत्तिः स्यात् ह्रह्लाद्यैश्च संयुता

पृष्ठ ४१०.

१. रसवद्दर्शितस्पष्टशृङ्गारादिरसोदयम् ।
स्वशब्दस्थायिसंचारिविभावाभिनयास्पदम् ॥
रसाः खलु तस्यालङ्काराः ।

---

*

INDEX

Ābhāsa, 72, 89, 90, 133 134, 135, 136, 137, 159.
Ābhāsavāda, 71, 89, 131, 133, 160, 166, 168, 275, 278, 293, 296.
Ābhāsavādin, 131, 132, 135, 136, 138, 159.
Abhidhā, 63, 164, 307, 327, 329.
Abhidhāśakti, 217, 218, 242.
Abhihitānvaya theory, 241.
Abhihitānvayavāda, 244.
Abhihitānvayavādin, 218.
Abhijñāna Śākuntalam, 15, 156, 163; 372.
Abhilāṣā, 171.
Abhimanyu, 291.
Abhinava Bhāratī, 28, 29, 34, 35, 72, 96, 97, 129, 163, 176, 177, 178, 182, 274 289, 290, 388, 396.
Abhinavagupta, 2, 8, 20, 28, 33, 34, 53, 56, 58, 60, 69, 70, 71, 72 73, 74, 75, 76, 79, 81, 82, 85, 91, 92, 94, 97, 98, 104, 112, 118, 124, 127, 130, 131, 139, 140, 142, 154, 160, 163, 165, 173, 176, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 184, 195, 197, 201, 211, 215, 216, 217, 224, 230, 242, 247, 274, 288, 289, 290, 291, 298, 301, 318, 320, 323, 334, 336, 342, 343, 347, 377, 381, 387, 392, 393, 397, 399, 401, 403, 404, 408, 409, 410.
Abhinaya, 8, 10, 201.
Abhivyakti 302, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312.
Abhivyangya, 307.
Abodha, 114.
Absolute, 76, 77, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100, 102, 104, 105, 110, 113, 115, 117, 120, 278, 280
Act 348, 349, 355, 356, 357,
Action 281, 282, 294, 295, 296, 338, 341. 348, 350, 353, 354, 355, 356, 358, 359, 365, 368, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 378, 380, 382, 385.
Action attitude, 159.
Actor, 212, 337, 343, 348, 385; 386
Actual soul, 115, 117.
Acyutottara, 391.
Advaita, 35.
Aesthete, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162, 163, 212, 286, 288, 289, 300, 301, 350.
Aesthetic, 253, 287, 288, 289, 290, 336, 398.
Aesthetic attitude, 151, 154, 157.
Aesthetic Contemplation, 132.
Aesthetic Configuration, 251, 254, 255, 353, 398, 399, 400, 406. 409, 410
Aesthetic experience, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 51, 52, 61, 62, 64, 68, 69, 70, 71, 91, 96, 97, 104, 112, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128,

129, 130, 131, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 156, 159, 161, 162, 169, 170, 178, 180, 181, 185, 194, 195, 197, 200, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 211, 212, 214, 238, 247, 253, 256, 257, 287, 288, 289, 290, 300, 301, 321, 330, 331, 333, 342, 369, 387, 389, 390, 393, 398, 402, 404.

Aesthetic image, 151, 152, 162, 163, 256.

Aesthetic level, 154.

Aesthetic object, 125, 137, 138, 139, 142, 144, 145, 147, 148, 152, 253, 342.

Aesthetic personality, 149, 164.

Aesthetic pleasure, 392.

Aesthetic presentation, 253.

Aesthetic reality, 149.

Aesthetics, 215 246, 285, 286, 288, 289.

Aesthetic senses, 125, 156, 353.

Aesthetic situation, 157, 247.

Aesthetic susceptibility, 144, 146, 150, 151, 157, 163, 165, 185, 195, 393.

Aesthetic theory, 176.

Aesthetic value 248

Ahaṅkāra, 67, 101.

Āhārya, 9.

Ajñāna, 114.

Ākāśa, 119.

Akṣapāda, 331.

Ālambana, 15, 16.

Alaṅkāra, 208, 227, 251, 252, 254, 256, 297, 324, 325; 326, 327, 328, 391, 393, 394, 396, 397, 398, 404, 410.

Alaṅkāra Dhvani, 254, 255, 256, 263, 310.

Ālaṅkārika, 225, 248, 396, 397, 404, 408.

Alaukika, 149.

Ālaya Vijñāna, 114.

Alliteration, 253.

Āmarśa 93.

Ānanda 61, 65, 66, 68, 94, 95, 96, 97, 102, 103, 104, 105, 112, 129, 130, 139.

Ānandamaya kośa, 66.

Ānanda Vardhana, 60, 70, 177, 215, 216, 217, 223, 248, 273, 274, 275, 286, 291, 292, 297, 300, 301, 309, 311, 312, 313, 316, 321, 324. 328, 329, 330, 333, 334, 395, 399, 403, 410.

Āṇava mala, 77, 113, 119, 121.

Āṅgika, 9, 18.

Āṅgikābhinaya, 201.

Anibaddha, 400.

Anirvacanīya khyāti, 46.

Aṅka, 347.

Aṅkāsya, 347.

Aṅkāvatāra, 347.

Antaḥ-karaṇa, 188.

Anubhāva, 12, 14, 16, 17, 26, 36, 47, 142, 143, 144, 172, 179, 184, 201, 204, 212, 252, 255, 286.

Anukārya, 317.

Anumāna, 42, 43, 282, 297, 298.

Anumeya, 288, 306.

Anumeyārtha, 298.

Anumitānumeyārtha, 298, 300.

Anumiti, 332, 333.
Anumīyamāna, 288.
Anupāya, 79.
Anuttara, 76.
Anuvyavasāya, 56, 58.
Anvitābhidhānavada, 230, 244.
Anvitābhidhānavādin, 218, 242.
Anyathākhyāti, 45.
Apāna, 123.
Apavedya, 123.
Apavedya suṣupta, 119, 120. 121. 123.
Appayya Dīkṣita, 209, 396.
Aprakāśa, 279.
Ārabhaṭī, 182.
Ārambha, 356.
Ardhanārī Naṭeśvara, 85.
Ardṛtā, 171.
Aristotelian, 126.
Artha, 4, 173, 185, 204.
Arthakriyākāritva, 136.
Arthālaṅkāra, 253.
Arthāntaranyāsa, 298.
Arthāntara saṅkramita vācya, 259, 260, 333.
Arthāpatti, 282, 283.
Artha Prakṛti, 369, 377, 379, 380.
Arthaśaktyudbhava, 262, 264.
Arthavyakti, 406.
Arthitva, 134.
Artist, 211.
Artistic fact, 156, 211.
Asambhava, 317, 319.
Asaṁlakṣya krama vyangya, 236, 262.
Asamprajñāta Samādhi, 196, 198.
Asatkāryavāda, 308.
Asatkhyāti, 46.
Aṣṭadhyāyī, 356.
As you like it, 369, 376.
Atatparatva, 329.
Atharvaveda, 3.
Atomistic pluralism, 79.
Attitude, 159.
Atyanta tiraskṛta vācya, 261, 333.
Aucitya, 332.
Audience, 184, 353, 370, 371, 372, 374, 387, 390.
Audrey, 369.
Avaloka, 180.
Avamarśa, 379, 383, 384, 385.
Avidyā, 65, 66.
Avivakṣitavācya, 257, 259, 333.
Avyatireka turīyātīta, 122.
Āyurveda, 10.
Babhravya, 357, 358.
Bādarāyaṇa, 35, 216.
Basic mental state, 185, 190, 191, 194, 195, 197, 199, 201, 205, 207, 211, 212, 213, 238, 252, 256, 257, 338, 339, 340, 342, 347, 350, 353, 359, 360, 366, 369, 378, 380, 381, 390, 393, 399, 410.
Bauddha, 79, 114, 128.
Beginning, 358, 359.
Being, 90, 115, 116, 117, 189.
Bhākta, 225.
Bhakti 171, 174, 176.
Bhāmaha, 228, 389, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 397, 399, 400, 401, 402 ,403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 409, 410.
Bhāṇḍa, 343.
Bhaṅgībhaṇiti, 327, 328.
Bhānudatta, 171.

Bharata, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 48, 49, 52, 53, 56, 59, 60, 69, 109, 141, 142, 177, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 191, 193, 195, 198 199, 200, 201, 204, 207, 274, 327, 342, 343, 344, 347, 373, 377, 379, 385, 387, 389, 390, 391, 392, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 401, 402, 403, 404, 406, 408, 409, 410.
Bharata Sūtra, 342, 403.
Bhartṛhari, 80, 81, 275, 290, 291, 292, 323, 324.
Bhāṭṭa, 242.
Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, 28
Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, 2, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 69, 70.
Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka, 218.
Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, 60, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71, 104, 138, 140, 177, 178, 217, 230, 246, 247, 273, 286, 290.
Bhaṭṭa Tauta, 53, 72, 298.
Bhaṭṭendurāja, 53. 72.
Bhāva, 17, 18, 183, 186, 193, 199, 200, 254.
Bhāvābhāsa, 254, 256.
Bhāvadhvani, 254, 256.
Bhāvakatva, 63, 65, 69.
Bhāvanā, 152.
Bhāvaśānti dhvani, 257.
Bhayānaka, 164, 165.
Bhoga, 66, 68, 91, 92, 98, 104,
Bhoja, 172, 400.
Bhojakatva. 63, 69.
Bhuñjāna, 96.
Bībhatsa, 182.
Bīja, 369, 370, 378, 380.
Bindu, 178, 348.
Blank, 118.
Bodhisattva, 203.
Bradley 341, 351.
Bṛhatī, 335.
Bṛhatī Vimarśinī, 92, 290.
Brahmā, 2, 3, 5, 6, 23.
Brahmakāṇḍa, 291.
Brahman, 61, 64, 76, 83, 279.
Brāhmaṇa, 3.
Brutus, 346.
Buddhi, 66, 68, 76, 100, 101, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 132, 187, 188, 189, 190, 196.
Buddhisattva, 196, 197.
Buddhism, 76.
Buddhist, 46.
Buddhistic, 114, 285.
Buddhitattva, 76.
Cæsar, 346.
Camatkāra, 91, 92, 93, 97, 129, 290, 300.
Camatkṛti, 94.
Candrācārya, 291.
Candrikā, 273.
Capacity to identify, 153.
Cārudatta, 51.
Cārvāka, 181.
Carvaṇā, 97, 152.
Catastrophe, 356.
Cause, 356.
Celia, 369, 376.
Cetana camatkāra, 330,
Character, 338, 341, 342.
Cintā, 192.
Cit, 127, 128, 132,
Citrakāvya, 401.
Close, 356.
Comedy, 356.
Comic, 355.

Congruity, 331, 332.
Consequence, 356.
Contemplation, 152, 153,
Contemplative habit 152,
Contemplative process, 152.
Contextual, 231, 232, 238, 301.
Convention, 321.
Conventional, 225. 231, 232, 238, 286, 302, 303. 304, 305, 306, 307, 309, 312, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 320, 321, 322, 328, 329.
Conventional language, 208, 213.
Conventional meaning 208, 209, 215, 232, 236, 237, 238, 239, 243, 244. 246, 248, 252, 254, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263,
Conventional power, 238.
Conventional symbol, 232.
Croche, 88.
Cūlikā, 347.
Dance, 2, 3.
Daṇḍin, 26, 34, 392, 394, 395, 397, 400, 401, 402, 403, 405, 407, 408, 409.
Daśarūpaka, 126, 172, 177, 180, 379, 388.
Dayā, 202.
Dayāvīra, 202.
Dayāvīrotsāha, 194.
Deśādhvā, 140.
Determinacy, 83, 84, 94.
Dhanañjaya, 126, 172, 176, 177, 377, 379, 380, 381, 388.
Dhanika, 172, 177, 192, 388.
Dharma, 4, 173, 185, 204, 345.
Dharmavīra, 202.
Dhṛti, 172, 184.
Dhvani, 60, 70, 72, 143, 177, 208, 215, 216, 217, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234, 235, 236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 246, 247, 248, 251, 252; 273, 275, 291, 292, 300, 301, 302, 307, 308, 311, 313, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 328, 332, 333, 334, 401, 408, 409, 410.
Dhvanikāra, 315, 319, 328.
Dhvani Kārikā, 215, 216, 223,
Dhvani kāvya, 213, 251, 252, 312, 313, 323.
Dhvanivādin, 240, 287, 300, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312, 318, 319, 320, 326, 329, 334, 335.
Dhvanyāloka, 177, 217, 223, 273, 403.
Dhvanyāloka Locana, 29, 72, 176.
Dima, 181, 182, 379.
Dīpaka, 328, 329.
Dīpta Rasa, 182.
Disentanglement, 367.
Doctrine of momentariness, 80.
Doṣāpāya, 191.
Drama, 337, 338, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 361, 364, 366, 367, 368, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 376, 378, 379, 380, 384, 386, 387, 389, 408.
Dramatisation, 346.

Dramatist, 336, 338, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 346, 347, 349, 350, 352, 356, 359, 370, 373, 377, 382, 385, 386, 387, 388.
Dramaturgist, 348, 369, 390, 392, 399, 404, 405.
Dramaturgy, 5, 177, 344, 391.
Drava, 388.
Dṛśya, 347.
Durgācārya, 293.
Duṣyanta, 15, 16, 156, 164,
Dvaitādvaita, 35.
Dveṣa, 191.
Dyotaka, 322.
Dyotakatva, 284.
Emotion, 352, 353, 354.
Emotive response, 162.
Emotive situation, 207.
Empathic reaction, 144, 148, 156, 162, 340.
Empirical level, 154, 184, 199, 200.
Empiricist, 82.
English, 350,
English Drama, 352, 353, 354, 368.
Erotic, 366, 381.
Error, 44, 45, 50, 51, 289.
Exposition, 368.
Fall, 356.
Feeling soul, 115, 116.
Figures of speech, 208, 209, 248.
Final emancipation, 181, 185, 191, 194.
Free will, 85, 114, 280, 281, 282.
Gamya, 288.
Garbha, 379, 382, 383.
Garva, 172.
Gauḍa, 407.
Gauḍīya, 402, 406.
Gauṇa, 292.
Gautama, 43, 44, 191.
Genius, 23, 149, 211, 222, 342, 343, 344.
Gītā, 192.
Grammarian, 231, 232.
Greek, 350.
Grief, 351, 352.
Growth, 356.
Guṇa, 98, 101, 121, 227, 391, 395, 397, 402, 403, 404, 405.
Guṇa vaitṛṣṇya, 188.
Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya, 314, 315 317, 326.
Hamlet, 341, 353, 375.
Harṣa, 194, 356, 357, 371.
Harṣacarita Vārtika, 335.
Harṣa Vārtika, 357.
Hāsa, 173, 192.
Hāsya, 36, 171, 176, 181, 182, 198.
Hedonistic, 8.
Hegel, 76, 88, 89, 90, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 301.
Hegelian, 114, 126.
Height, 356.
Hero, 340, 341, 346, 349, 350, 351, 358, 362, 366, 370, 373, 375, 377, 378, 384, 387.
Heroic, 366, 380.
Hetu, 310.
Hṛdaya Darpaṇa, 60, 70, 273.
Icchāmala, 109.
Icchopāya, 79.
Identification, 123, 126, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 168, 197, 198, 204, 211, 212, 305, 306, 350, 352, 353, 354, 370, 390.

Īhāmṛga, 379.
Illusion, 145, 146.
Illusion-theory, 33, 58.
Imagination, 82, 125; 131, 161, 163, 352.
Imitation, 23, 24, 145, 286, 287, 289, 299, 316, 317.
Imitation-theory of art, 50, 53, 56.
Immediacy, 139.
Incongruity, 329, 330, 338, 340, 350.
Indefinite desire, 77.
Indeterminacy, 139.
Indian Aesthetician, 207, 212.
Individual, 194.
Individual mind, 280.
Indra, 5.
Inferable, 296, 297, 298, 300, 303.
Inference, 190, 283, 286, 287, 290, 297, 301, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 309, 311, 312, 314.
Inference theory of art, 53.
Innate ignorance, 77.
Inner expression, 133.
Inspired poetry, 212.
Internal sense, 188.
Introduction, 368, 372.
Introductory scene, 155, 166.
Īśvara, 140, 141, 154, 166.
Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, 278, 284.
Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā, 29, 60, 72, 92, 98, 140.
Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, 72.
Itihāsa, 185.
Itivṛtta, 380.
Jagannātha, 74, 127, 128.
Jāgrat, 112.
Janaka, 13.
Jānakī, 175.
Jāti, 24, 231.
Jātyaṅgaka, 204.
Jīmūtavāhana, 203.
Jīva, 123, 233.
Jñāna, 67, 100, 102, 112.
Jñānākārakhyāti, 45.
Jñānopāya, 78.
Jugupsā, 185.
Julius Cæsar, 346, 369, 372.
Kaivalya, 114, 197, 198.
Kāla, 78, 105, 110, 112, 120, 132.
Kalā, 78, 105, 106, 112, 120, 132.
Kālakrama, 280.
Kāla Śakti, 110.
Kalhaṇa, 291.
Kālī, 110.
Kālidāsa, 45, 155, 163, 165, 332, 372.
Kāma, 4, 173, 185, 204, 345.
Kāmasūtra, 36.
Kāñcanamālā, 364.
Kant, 110.
Kānti, 406.
Kaṇva, 15, 164.
Karaṇa, 3.
Karma, 106.
Kārmamala, 77.
Karma Saṁskāra, 77, 172.
Kārpaṇya, 171.
Karuṇa, 36, 171, 182.
Kārya, 369, 377, 378.
Kāryāvasthā, 379, 380.
Kashmir Śaiva, 8, 275, 278.
Kashmir Śaivaism, 280.
Katharsis, 131, 138, 163.
Kathartic level, 126, 138, 140, 141, 165, 168, 169, 170, 197, 205.
Kātyāyana, 330.

Kauśambī, 357, 358.
Kavivyāpāra, 398; 399.
Kāvya, 228, 323, 324, 325, 326, 332, 333, 398, 400 401, 409.
Kāvyādarśa. 26.
Kāvyahetu, 298.
Kāvyakautuka, 298.
Kāvyalakṣma, 392.
Kāvyālaṅkāra, 389, 399, 403, 409,
Kāvyālaṅkāra Saṅgraha, 409.
Kāvyarasa, 392.
Kāvya viśeṣa, 323, 326.
Keith, 349.
Komalā, 409
Kośala, 358, 359, 367.
Kramabheda, 330 331.
Kramadyotita, 262.
Kramastotra, 176.
Krauñca, 210, 211, 212, 213,
Kriyā, 102, 112, 280, 281.
Kriyā śakti, 280.
Kriyopāya, 78.
Kṛśāśva, 2.
Kuntaka, 273, 327, 328, 330, 334, 400, 406,
Lakṣaṇa, 396, 397, 398, 399.
Lakṣaṇā, 216, 221, 230, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239 240, 241, 303, 409, 410.
Lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā, 239, 240.
Lakṣaṇāśakti, 219.
Lakṣaṇā-vādin, 234.
Lākṣaṇikārtha, 215, 234.
Lakṣmaṇagupta, 72.
Laulya, 171, 174, 176,
Level of identification, 158.
Liberation, 192, 198, 203.
Liṅga, 306, 310, 311.
Linguistic expression, 208.
Linguistics, 208.
Literary criticism, 210.
Literary convention, 226.
Locana, 180, 215, 274, 298, 320, 323, 404, 408.
Logic, 114, 115.
Logical realism, 79.
Lokottara, 166.
Lollaṭa, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34.
Madanikā, 364.
Mādhurya, 394, 402, 403, 405, 406.
Mādhyamika, 46.
Mahā Bhāṣya, 291.
Mahākāvya, 392, 400, 401, 402.
Mahāmāyā, 81.
Mahān, 78.
Mahānaṭa, 343.
Mahāsattā, 81.
Maheśvara, 2, 3, 72, 98, 99, 100, 101.
Mahima Bhaṭṭa, 74, 214, 215, 217, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 283, 284, 285, 288, 289, 290, 291, 293, 296, 298, 300, 301, 302, 303, 306, 309, 310, 312, 313, 315, 317, 318, 319, 320, 322, 323, 324, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335.
Malaśodhana, 140.
Malayavatī, 194.
Mallinātha, 296.
Mammaṭa, 30, 35, 395, 403.
Manas, 41, 42, 44, 45, 101.
Manoratha, 217.
Māyā, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 94, 100, 102, 104, 105, 106, 112, 120.
Māyīyamala, 78.
Meghadūta, 45.

Mīmāṁsā, 283.
Mīmāṁsaka, 181, 244, 246, 283.
Mimetic changes, 207.
Mind, 114, 115.
Minor plot, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380.
Mithyā jñāna, 289.
Mithyā jñānāpāya, 191.
Mokṣa, 4, 68, 109, 114, 173, 191, 345.
Monistic idealism, 79.
Monistic Śaivaism, 91, 92, 275.
Monistic Vedānta, 216.
Moral purpose, 184.
Mrcchakaṭika, 51.
Muditā, 195.
Muhūrta, 348.
Mukha, 379, 380, 381, 382.
Mukhya, 292.
Muktaka, 391.
Muñja, 176.
Mystic experience, 81, 82, 84, 90 152, 169.
Nāgānanda, 194, 202, 203, 204.
Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, 81, 275.
Naiyāyika, 59, 101, 128, 218, 231, 242, 275,
Nāndī, 11, 372.
Nāṭaka, 198, 204, 355, 380, 401.
Nāṭaka mīmāṁsā, 335.
Naṭarāja, 3.
Natural soul, 115, 117, 118.
Nature, 114, 115.
Nāṭya, 178, 343.
Nāṭyarasa, 392.
Nāṭyaśāstra, 2, 3, 7, 8, 11, 20, 26, 28. 52, 53, 56, 60, 141, 177, 178, 287, 343, 344, 357, 391, 403, 409.
Nāṭyaveda, 3, 4, 5, 6.
Nihilistic Buddhism, 76.
Nīrasa, 371.
Nirukta, 293.
Nirvahaṇa, 385.
Nirveda, 171, 172, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191, 200, 201, 202.
Nirvicāra, 189.
Nirvitarka, 188.
Nirvṛti, 97.
Niyama, 201.
Niyatāpti, 356, 383, 384.
Niyati, 78, 105, 109, 112, 120, 132.
Not—being, 119.
Nyāya, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46. 47, 49, 52, 70, 79, 92, 191, 218, 275, 284, 285.
Ojas, 394, 403, 406.
Olivèr, 369, 376.
Organic attitude, 159.
Orlando, 376.
Padakāṇḍa, 291, 292.
Padasphoṭa, 231.
Pānaka Rasa, 131, 193.
Pāñcāla, 407.
Pāñcālī, 406.
Pāṇini, 2, 282, 291, 292, 322, 330, 343, 356.
Parā, 80, 81.
Paramabhoga, 97, 104.
Paramānanda, 97, 130.
Parā Vāk, 84. 275.
Paruṣā, 409.
Pārvatī, 85, 265.
Paśyantī, 81, 275.
Patākā, 369, 375, 376, 377, 380.
Patañjali, 170, 190, 195, 201, 204, 291, 293, 330,

Paunaruktya, 330, 331.
Pedagogic, 8.
Phalāgama, 356.
Phebe, 369.
Phenomenology of Mind, 115.
Philosophy of grammar, 80, 137, 290, 291.
Philosophy of Nature 115.
Pity, 351, 352.
Plot, 346, 349.
Plotinus, 77, 88.
Poet, 340, 352, 400.
Poetic experience, 214.
Poetic expression, 208.
Poetician, 327, 389, 390, 392, 399, 404, 405.
Poetic inspiration, 210.
Poetic language, 215.
Poetic production, 210.
Poetics, 208, 209, 214, 216, 389, 391, 405, 409.
Poetic vision, 207, 208, 209, 397, 398, 399, 404.
Poetry, 389, 392, 393, 395, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 405, 406, 407, 409, 410.
Power of visualisation, 151, 152, 161, 163, 214, 222, 241, 247.
Prābhākara, 46, 218, 230, 242, 243.
Pradhāna, 189.
Prahelikā, 325.
Prajāpati, 2.
Prakaraṇa, 379.
Prakarī, 369, 376, 377, 380.
Prakāśa, 82, 84, 90, 94, 95, 97, 102, 103, 114, 120.
Prakramabheda, 330.
Prakṛti, 109, 189.
Prakṛtilaya, 189, 190.
Pralaya, 120, 121.
Pramāṇa, 41, 42, 131, 132, 284.
Pramātā, 40, 131, 132.
Pramātṛ viśrānti, 97.
Prameya, 41, 42, 131, 133.
Pramiti, 41, 131, 132.
Prāṇa, 100, 119, 123.
Prāṇa pramātā, 123, 124.
Prāptyāśā, 356, 362.
Prasāda, 394, 403 406.
Praśānta vāhitā, 198.
Prastāvanā, 372.
Pratibhā, 151, 163, 214, 241,
Pratimukha, 178, 379, 381, 382.
Pratīyamāna, 288.
Pratyakṣa, 42, 282.
Pratyavamarśa, 81.
Praveśaka, 347.
Pravṛtti nimitta, 294.
Preyas, 172, 402.
Primary, 292, 296, 297, 301, 316, 317, 322, 325.
Primary meaning, 243, 245.
Primary power, 240
Prīti, 389.
Problem of meaning, 208, 292.
Process of identification, 156.
Process of Universalisation, 160.
Puṇyarāja, 291.
Purification, 140, 141.
Purposive attitude, 151.
Puruṣa, 66, 67, 68, 76, 79, 106, 107, 108, 132, 187, 189, 196.
Puruṣatattva, 76.
Pūrvavat, 43, 44, 47.
Rāga, 78, 105, 108, 109, 112, 120, 132, 191.
Rāga Tattva, 108, 109.

Rājamitra, 391.
Rājānaka Śūra Varman, 291.
Rajas, 5, 61, 62, 63, 64, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 112, 187, 188, 189, 190, 196.
Rājataraṅgiṇī, 291.
Rāma, 57, 60, 147, 148, 175, 204, 256, 259, 260, 261, 369, 375.
Rāma Śarmā, 391.
Rāmāyaṇa, 210, 377.
Rasa, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 47, 48, 53, 57, 58, 62, 97, 127, 130, 131, 139, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 193, 195, 197, 198, 203, 205, 252, 274, 287, 290, 297, 299, 300, 310, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 332, 333, 378, 389, 391, 392, 399 401, 402, 405, 406, 409, 410.
Rasābhāsa, 254.
Rasābhāsadhvani, 256.
Rasadhvani, 225, 230, 253, 254, 256 262, 310.
Rasagaṅgādhara, 127.
Rasajāḥ dṛṣṭayaḥ, 26.
Rasanā, 97.
Rasasūtra, 274.
Rasāsvāda, 21, 24, 214, 390.
Rasa Taraṅgiṇī, 171.
Rasavat, 230, 252, 253, 402, 410.
Rasavat Alaṅkāra, 225.
Rasikatva, 149.
Rati, 59, 127, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 185, 192, 199, 201, 202, 204, 206, 316.
Rationalism, 79.
Rational mysticism, 140.
Ratnāvalī, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 362, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 374, 375, 380, 381, 382, 384, 385.
Raudra, 37, 127, 173, 193.
Rāvaṇa, 60, 256, 259, 291, 366, 375.
Realistic dualism, 79.
Realistic Idealism, 70, 275.
Reality 75 76, 77.
Reflection, 147, 286, 287.
Ṛgveda, 3.
Rīti, 228, 230, 391, 402, 405, 407.
Romantha, 152.
Rosalind, 376.
Ruci, 134.
Rumaṇvān, 358, 367.
Ruyyaka, 273, 277, 278, 279, 312, 330, 331, 334, 400.
Śabda, 42, 282, 283.
Śabdānaucitya, 330
Śabdārtha guṇa, 224, 228, 230, 233.
Śabdārthālaṅkāra, 224, 228, 230, 233.
Śabdaśaktimūlānuraṇanavyaṅgya, 333,
Śabdaśaktyudbhava, 262, 263, 318.
Śabdasphoṭa, 322, 323.
Sadāśiva, 76, 81,
Ṣāḍava[1] Rasa, 22.
Sādhāraṇībhāva, 143, 157, 178.

1. Saṇdava is a misprint.

Śāgarikā, 358, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 381, 382, 383, 385.
Sāhitya mīmāṁsā, 335.
Sahṛdaya Darpaṇa, 290.
Sahṛdayatva, 144, 150, 151, 166, 290
Śaiva, 60, 74, 75, 83, 84, 88, 90, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 119, 128, 140, 181, 231, 281, 282, 284, 285, 293, 296.
Śaivāgama 81.
Śaivaism, 81, 281, 285.
Śaiva Philosophy, 70, 71, 72, 73, 280, 405.
Śākhāvardhana, 391.
Śakti, 91, 97, 104, 112.
Śakuntalā, 15, 16.
Śama, 172, 179, 183, 184, 193, 194, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204.
Samādhi, 121, 188 189, 197, 198, 200, 201, 406.
Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, 43.
Samasokti, 248, 250, 314, 325.
Samatā, 406.
Samavakāra, 379.
Samavāya, 68.
Sāmaveda, 3.
Samprajñāta Samādhi, 188, 189.
Saṁśaya, 383.
Saṁyoga, 68.
Sānanda, 188, 189
Sandhi, 377, 379, 380, 381, 382, 385, 388.
Sandhyaṅga, 359, 384, 385, 387, 388.
Saṅgraha Kārikā, 179.
Śaṅkara, 216.
Śaṅkara Varman, 60.
Sāṅkhya, 59, 68, 70, 71, 76, 79, 106, 107, 108, 109, 132.
Śānta, 83, 153, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206.
Śānta Rasa, 298, 339.
Śānti, 83.
Sarasvati Kaṇṭhābharaṇa, 172, 400.
Sāsmita, 188, 189.
Satkāryavāda, 308.
Sattā, 102, 103.
Sattāmātra, 189.
Sattva, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 112, 121, 187, 188, 189, 190, 196, 197, 198, 285.
Sāttvika, 9, 18
Sāttvikabhāva, 16, 17.
Sātvatī, 182.
Saukumārya, 406.
Savedya, 123.
Savedya suṣupta, 123, 124.
Savicāra, 188, 189.
Savitarka, 188.
Secondary, 231, 232, 238, 292, 297, 301, 303, 305, 306, 322, 334.
Secondary convention, 236, 237.
Secondary meaning, 208, 214, 215, 225, 226, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 243, 245, 246.
Secondary power, 230, 236, 239, 240, 241.

Seed, 370, 373, 380, 381, 382.
Self, 90, 95, 105, 127, 128, 129, 130, 139, 187, 189, 190, 192, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 205, 206, 233, 234.
Self-contempt, 192.
Self-consciousness, 90, 94.
Self-disrespect, 192.
Self-dissatisfaction, 192.
Self-realisation, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 197, 198, 203, 206.
Śeṣavat, 43, 44, 47.
Shakespeare, 338, 341, 346, 353, 368, 376.
Shakespearian, 355, 372, 373, 376.
Śilāli, 2.
Silvius, 369;
Simile, 209, 253
Śiva, 85, 90, 104, 264.
Śiva dṛṣṭi, 80, 291.
Śleṣa, 403, 406.
Smrti, 185, 203.[1]
Sneha, 175.
Śoka, 204.
Somānanda, 80, 275, 291.
Soul, 115, 116, 117.
Space, 115.
Spanda, 91, 92, 112.
Spanda Kārikā, 28, 92.
Spanda Sandoha, 92.
Spectator, 181, 184, 185, 336, 340, 348, 352, 369, 385, 386, 387.
Sphoṭa, 231, 232, 323, 324.
Sphoṭavāda, 291.
Sphoṭavādin, 324.
Sphurattā, 81, 102, 139.
Spinoza, 89.
Spirit, 114, 115.
Spiritual meaning, 151, 207, 213, 214, 215.
Śraddhā, 171.
Śrīśaṅkuka, 26, 27, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 70, 71, 131, 274, 285, 288, 289, 290.
Śṛṅgāra, 36, 37, 127, 129, 153, 171, 172, 173, 175, 181, 182, 183, 185, 192, 198, 204, 205.
Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa, 172.
Śruti, 203
Stage, 348, 355, 356, 359, 361, 362, 365, 366, 368, 376, 378, 385.
Stage-manager, 337.
Sthāyi bhāva, 12, 19, 24, 26, 31, 36, 47, 126, 144, 173, 182, 183, 256, 286, 350, 378.
Sthāyin, 23, 48, 54, 57, 58, 59, 91, 127, 128, 131, 139, 167, 170, 172, 185, 186, 191, 192, 193, 194, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 286, 287, 288, 390.
Subjective Condition, 341, 345, 346.
Subjective idealism, 79.
Subjectivism, 280.
Sub plot, 369, 375, 376, 378, 379, 380.
Subtle element, 188.
Sūcya, 347.
Śūdra, 3, 6.
Śūdraka, 51.
Suggested, 301, 308, 309,

1. Smriti is a misprint.

310, 311, 312, 314, 315, 316, 318, 319, 320, 321, 323, 324, 325, 326, 329, 333,
Suggested meaning, 163, 207, 208, 209, 210, 213, 223, 225, 226, 227, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 237, 241, 243, 246, 252, 254, 255, 257, 258, 261, 262, 286.
Suggestible, 297, 300, 301, 302, 309, 322, 328.
Suggestible, image, 235.
Suggestible, meaning, 232, 237, 238. 240, 243, 247, 273, 274.
Suggestive, 300, 308, 312, 320, 322, 323, 325, 329.
Suggestive meaning, 232.
Suggestive poetry, 257, 312.
Suggestive power, 207, 208, 237, 239, 240, 241, 247, 248, 254, 255, 256, 263, 284.
Suggestive word, 232, 237, 243.
Śūnya 118, 119, 121.
Śūnya pramātā, 76, 114, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123.
Surya Narayana Shukla, 81.
Susaṅgatā 362, 363, 364, 381.
Suṣupti, 112, 113.
Sūtradhāra, 372.
Svabhāva, 201.
Svabhāvābhinaya, 201.
Svabhāvokti, 400.
Svapna, 112.
Svarūpākhyāti, 100.
Svatantra, 281, 282, 310.
Svātantrya, 93, 114, 278, 279, 281.
Svātantryaśakti, 81, 85.
Svātantryavāda, 85.
Svāvamānana, 192.
Sympathy, 351, 352.
Tādātmya, 158.
Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 139.
Tamas, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 112, 121, 187, 188, 189, 190, 196.
Tamasā, 210.
Tanmātra, 188.
Tantra, 73.
Tantrāloka, 140.
Tāpasa Vatsarāja, 374.
Taste, 149, 150, 163, 342.
Tātparya, 164, 303.
Tātparyaśakti, 217, 218, 242, 307.
Tātparyaśaktivādin, 307.
Tattvābhiniveśinī mati, 172.
Tattvādhvā, 140.
Tattva-jñāna, 173, 186, 190, 191, 199, 200, 201, 204.
Theory of inference, 38, 39.
Theory of meaning, 292.
Touchstone, 369.
Tragedy, 356, 366.
Tragic, 355.
Transient emotion, 183, 199, 207, 252, 254, 256.
Tretāyuga, 5.
Trika, 70, 72.
Trikūṭa, 291.
Trilinga, 291.
Turīya, 112, 113, 121, 122.
Turīyātīta, 112, 122.
Twelfth Night, 148.
Ubhayaśaktyudbhava, 262,
Udāratā, 406.
Udātta, 172.
Udayana, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 367, 380.
Udbhaṭa, 214, 215, 216, 228,

298, 329, 389, 408, 409, 410.
Uddhata, 172.
Uddīpana, 15, 16.
Ultimate, 80, 85, 86, 87, 88 133, 183, 184, 185, 192, 198, 203, 280.
Ultimate Reality, 79, 83, 84.
Ultimate Unity, 78.
Unæsthetic, 398.
Unity of action, 350.
Unity of time, 348, 349,.
Universal, 206.
Universal Consciousness, 132, 231, 285.
Universalisation, 142, 143. 157, 178,212.
Unworldly, 149.
Upādhirūpa, 310.
Upādhivādin, 277, 296.
Upamā, 225, 328, 329.
Upamāna, 42, 282, 284.
Upanāgarikā, 409.
Upāṅgābhinaya, 201.
Upapādana, 297.
Upasaṁhṛti, 379.
Utpala (Ācārya) 60, 70, 72, 92, 94, 98, 140, 278, 284.
Utsāha, 173, 192, 202, 206.
Vācika, 9, 18.
Vācikābhinaya, 6.
Vācyārtha, 215.
Vācyāvacana, 330, 331, 332.
Vaicitrya, 329, 406.
Vaidarbha, 402.
Vaidarbhī, 402, 406.
Vairāgya, 109, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, (Para) 190, 191.
Vaiśeṣika, 10, 42, 68, 79, 92, 283.
Vaivasvata, 5.
Vaiyākaraṇa, 133, 231, 275, 293, 294.
Vakratva, 390, 406.
Vakrokti, 332, 393, 395, 399, 400, 401, 405, 406, 409.
Vakroktijīvita, 327.
Vākyakāṇḍa, 291, 292.
Vākyapadīyam, 80, 81, 290, 291, 323.
Vālmīki, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214.
Vāmana, 214, 216, 395, 400, 403, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409.
Vāsanā, 96, 165.
Vāsavadattā, 357, 360, 363, 374, 383, 385.
Vastu, 297, 324, 325, 333.
Vastudhvani, 254, 255, 310.
Vasubhūti, 357, 358, 367, 368.
Vasurāta, 291.
Vatsala, 172.
Vātsalya, 171, 174, 175.
Vātsyāyana, 43, 44.
Veda, 3, 4, 5, 6.
Vedānta, 46, 60, 71, 72, 74, 75, 79, 91, 104.
Vedānta Sūtra, 35, 216.
Vedāntic, 191.
Vedāntin, 76, 79, 80, 104.
Veṇī Saṁhāra, 376.
Vibhāva, 12, 14, 15, 17, 26, 31, 36, 47, 49, 142, 143, 144, 170, 172, 179, 180, 184, 186, 192, 193, 201, 211, 252, 255, 286, 288, 324, 390.
Vidarbha, 407.
Videha, 189.
Vidheyāvimarśa, 330.
Vidyā, 78, 105, 106, 107, 108, 112, 120, 132.
Vidyādhara, 194.
Vijñānākala, 120.

Vijñāna-kevala, 114.
Vikramorvaśīya, 331.
Vimarśa, 81, 82, 83, 84, 93, 94, 95, 97, 102, 112, 114, 120, 129, 139, 279, 379.
Vimarśinī, 98.
Vipralambha Śṛṅgāra, 186.
Vīra, 37, 127, 129, 173, 193, 198, 203, 204, 205.
Virodhābhāsa, 263.
Viśiṣṭādvaita, 35.
Viṣkambhaka, 347, 369.
Viśvanātha, 35.
Vivakṣitānyaparavācya, 257, 259, 261, 333.
Vivek khyāti, 46.
Vivṛti, 60, 92, 98.
Vivṛti Vimarśinī, 98.
Voluntarism, 85, 89,
Voluntarist, 92, 93.
Vṛtti, 228, 230, 397.
Vyabhicāribhāva, 12, 14, 19, 26, 35, 142, 143, 144, 179, 256, 286.
Vyabhicārin, 171, 185, 186, 192, 199, 200, 201, 202, 204, 287.
Vyāḍi, 291.
Vyākaraṇāgama, 291.
Vyākaraṇa Smṛti, 291.
Vyakti, 306, 309.
Vyakti Viveka, 215, 274, 275, 278, 301, 334.
Vyaṅgya, 292.
Vyañjakatva, 284, 297, 321, 322.
Vyañjanā, 235.
Vyatireka turīyātīta, 122, 130.
Vyāyoga, 379.
Vyutpatti, 134.
Vyutpatti Nimitta, 294.
Will, 86, 89, 93, 94.
Yajurveda, 3.
Yāska, 293.
Yatna, 356.
Yaugandharāyaṇa, 357, 358, 359, 368, 374.
Yoga, 68, 197.
Yogācāra, 45.
Yoga system, 187.
Yogin, 188, 189, 190, 197, 198, 200.