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Proceedings of the Third Unofficial Conference on British Commonwealth Relations London 17 February to 3 March 1945

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PREFACE

THE Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institutes in the Dominions and India submitted sixty-two papers as preparatory material for the British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1945. These ranged in size from books, like Mr. Grant Dexter's *Canada and The Building of Peace,* and Dr. L. P. Mair's *Welfare in the British Colonies,* to short memoranda of a few pages. It was my duty as Recorder of the Conference to summarize these documents in a survey designed to trace the main trends of thought displayed in this mass of pre-Conference material. The survey which I produced was available to the delegates a few days before the opening of the Conference and is now printed as the first part of this Report.

At previous Conferences the reports of the Recorders of the committees or round tables were accepted by the Conference and included in the published Report. This time, however, the discussions were such that the Conference felt that their significance could not be adequately presented in that way. In several cases argument in a plenary session elucidated discussion held in a committee, and the delegates came to the conclusion that the Recorders of the committees had not been in a position to give the complete picture of the discussion of each subject. I was therefore instructed to write a general report of the discussions. In doing so I have made great use of the reports written by the Recorders of the committees and I should like here to acknowledge my gratitude to them. I have used Professor K. H. Bailey's report of the discussions on international organization exactly as he wrote it, and Professor A. G. B. Fisher has kindly rewritten his report of the economic sessions for inclusion in this volume. The other Recorders were Professor R. G. Trotter, Mr. N. C. Mehta, Professor S. H. Frankel, Major M. S. Comay and Dr. W. P. Morrell. My thanks are due to them all.

The Conference was not designed to pass resolutions and no attempt was made to direct the discussions towards conclusions to be generally accepted. Opposing views were left unreconciled and divergencies of opinion provided much of the interest of the discussions. For that reason the section of this Report which deals with the work of the Conference, particularly the chapter on Defence and Foreign Policy, has a vagueness about it which the reader may perhaps find troublesome. He must remember, however, that the Conference was designed to provide an opportunity for an interchange of views, not to produce policies or plans.

Knowledge of representative opinion is essential for those who are concerned with framing policy. The function of such a Conference is to provide such knowledge, and the duty of the Recorder is to report both harmonies and differences of opinion without attempting to produce a synthesis which the Conference itself did not attempt to achieve.

The Steering Committee of the Conference appointed Professor A. G. B. Fisher, Dr. W. P. Morrell and Major M. S. Comay to form, with me, an Editorial Committee to supervise this Report. I am extremely grateful to them all for giving so much time and thought to the work. I should like to acknowledge a particular debt of gratitude to Professor A. G. B. Fisher, who, as my colleague at Chatham House, has been always available and willing to give time for discussion. His appreciation of the various attitudes expressed in the Conference has been of the greatest value to me in my attempt to interpret the essential elements in the discussions.

RICHARD FROST

1946

INTRODUCTION

THE third unofficial Conference on British Commonwealth Relations met from 17 February to 3 March 1945, at Chatham House, St. James's Square, London, the home of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The first Conference of the series was held at Toronto in 1933 and the second at Lapstone, near Sydney, in 1938. These Conferences are convened by the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institutes of International Affairs in the Dominions and in India. The delegates attend at the invitation of the Institutes, each in his or her individual capacity, although they are chosen as representing as many aspects of public life in their respective countries as possible. The discussions are held in private and the delegates are thus able to speak freely and openly without any embarrassing fear of being taxed with statements out of context on their return home. This third Conference was particularly fortunate in its Press Committee, which, under the chairmanship of Sir Walter Layton, kept the Press informed of the turn of the discussions and the more important features of the arguments. The Conference was also fortunate in receiving most excellent co-operation from the Press, whose representatives ably carried out the difficult job of telling the public about a Conference which excluded reporters and published no conclusions!

In January 1944 representatives of all the Institutes who met in New York as a Committee on Arrangements and Agenda had agreed that the main theme of the third Conference should be the individual and common interests of the member nations of the Commonwealth, and the contribution which they could make, individually and collectively, to the success of a future world organization for security and economic and social progress. The Conference was to have been held in September 1944 but the progress of the war in Europe made it necessary to postpone it until February 1945. A few days before the Conference met the Report of the Yalta Conference was issued, and the announcement that representatives of the United Nations would meet together at San Francisco added point to the deliberations of this unofficial Conference.

During the Conference, which was opened by Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, opportunities were afforded the delegates in the evenings of meeting leading personalities in British life and foreign Ambassadors. At the beginning of the proceedings Lord and Lady Kemsley entertained the delegates to a dinner at Claridge's Hotel at which ten Cabinet Ministers were present. The principal speech was made by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Towards

the end of the Conference the leaders of the delegations were received by His Majesty the King at Buckingham Palace.

The Conference met in a series of Committees of the Whole, with a few plenary sessions for general discussion and consideration of the reports of the Recorders. This method ensured that, although not every delegate was able to contribute specialized knowledge to every committee, all were able to hear the arguments of the experts in each particular subject and thus to acquire a general picture of the attitude of the Commonwealth nations to the more important of the problems which face them in the future.

The second Conference met under the shadow of the Munich crisis; this third Conference was confronted by the imminence of victory over the Nazi system of government. Professor R. G. Trotter, the Recorder of the sessions on Security, attended both Conferences, as well as that held at Toronto in 1933. During one of the plenary sessions he told the Conference that he saw a marked contrast in approach to the problem of security between this Conference and the earlier Conferences of 1933 and 1938.

'In 1933', he said, 'there was a confidence which under all the circumstances was perhaps a bit naive in the collective security system of that day, and some of the discussion on the future prospects of the Commonwealth have been proven by history to have been academic. In 1938 the League of Nations was tottering, but the period of definition of status within the Empire was so recent that, if I remember aright my reading of the reports of that Conference, there was still a tendency on the part of some members of the Conference to stand aloof from the world struggle and thus escape them. There was a negative attitude towards the Commonwealth as if the best thing that could still be done to the Commonwealth was to destroy what was left of it, to carry the logic of the very recent history of the definitions of status to what seemed its logical conclusion.'

But, he said, there had been significant happenings since 1938; the war had come. Now, he continued, 'throughout the United Nations we are faced with the prospect, even if not in all respects completely hopefully, of having a chance to work for collective security. And as I went through my notes, I could find no evidence that anyone in this gathering was giving second place to his hopes for world peace through as much of a system of world security as could be obtained. I could find no evidence that anyone had, in the final analysis, little but despair for a world in which collective security should again fail. It seemed to me also that, making all allowances for differences of opinion and methods, the Conference as a whole this time was impatient with ideas of whittling away and was determined to be constructive as to how best the countries of

the Commonwealth, which were now a very great reality in the world, could make, each, their best contribution towards building a world in which each could live, let alone move towards larger welfare and larger freedoms.'

When the delegates examined the internal development of the Commonwealth they were able to notice the great advance which has taken place in the machinery for consultation within the Commonwealth since the Conference of 1938. There has been a tremendous increase in the number and range of methods and agencies which are now in use. This is partly due to rapid improvements in the means of communication—particularly, of course, the radio telephone and the aeroplane. It is also due to the war, which in many directions created new and urgent needs for consultation between members of the Commonwealth. One example of recent developments is the daily meeting in London between the Secretary of State for the Dominions and the Dominion High Commissioners, at which a representative of the Foreign Office is also present. Another is the fact that the Australian High Commissioner in London, as the accredited representative of the Australian Government, has sat with the War Cabinet of the United Kingdom.

A delegate from the United Kingdom wondered whether the large amount of information which is sent from London to the Dominion capitals was being fully used. He told the Conference that, although proposals for policy to be initiated by the United Kingdom are always communicated to the Dominions, it frequently happens that Dominion leaders complain that their opinion as a Government is not sought until a decision has become urgent, and that at such a late stage it is often impossible to muster in time the information which is available in the files. Several of the Dominion delegates agreed with this assertion, but they emphasized that to a very large extent the fault and its remedy lay in the Dominions themselves. A Canadian delegate remarked, for example, on the contrast between his country and the United Kingdom in respect of the readiness of Government and electorate alike to make decisions on questions of world affairs. Britain was experienced and prompt. In Canada, Government and people hesitate long to form a definite view or to make any specific commitment. Other Dominion delegates thought that this comment applied to their own countries also. Quite apart from this, it was pointed out that effective consultation demands much more than the mere supply of information. At the receiving end, an adequate organization is necessary for digesting and appraising it, and for ensuring that it obtains adequate consideration at ministerial levels. These needs, it was stated, are being increasingly realized, and increasingly provided for, in the Dominions. The Departments of External Affairs

are being rapidly enlarged, partly with a view to staffing diplomatic or quasi-diplomatic missions abroad but partly also with a view to the more effective handling at home of questions of world affairs.

Service members of the Conference pointed out that effective organization at the Dominions end is just as necessary, and valuable, in order to secure full consultation and collaboration in military affairs as in political matters. The closest current consultation between planning staffs who have been available has shown what can be done, if the Governments are prepared to provide the personnel.

A United Kingdom delegate said that from time to time cases have occurred in which action by Dominion governments has made people in Great Britain wonder whether the obligation of consultation is really regarded throughout the Commonwealth as reciprocal. He was anxious that both the advantages and the responsibilities arising from Commonwealth connexion should be appreciated throughout the Commonwealth. These discussions of the institutions of the Commonwealth and their adequacy, which were held towards the end of the Conference, naturally turned attention to a consideration of the nature and purposes of the Commonwealth. Reference was made to Lord Halifax's speech at Toronto in January 1944 and to Mr. Mackenzie King's comments in reply, and the general opinion of the delegates seemed to be that the present development of institutions for consultation among equals would be able to meet the requirements of the Commonwealth. Their differences seemed to be mainly on emphasis. On the one hand there were those who regarded the possibility of differing policies, which is inherent in the present method of the Commonwealth, as an indication of weakness and on the other hand there were those who regarded that possibility as one of the great sources of the Commonwealth's strength. It was possible, however, for delegates, wherever they might place their emphasis, to unite in a desire to see the existing methods and institutions of consultation between the member nations not only maintained but even developed.

Equality of status was not discussed; it was assumed. Differences of geographical position, industrial development and strategic needs were appreciated. The fact that the nations of the Commonwealth alone stood together in 1940 in defence of certain ideals was taken as proof that the bonds of the Commonwealth are forged by more than material interest, but the fact that alliance with Russia and the United States was necessary to achieve victory against the Axis Powers was accepted as showing the international nature of the questions of the future. The occasional noise of an exploding rocket bomb gave an added sense of reality and urgency to the quest for enlightenment in solving the problems of international relationships.

CONTENTS

APPENDICES

I. SURVEY OF PREPARATORY PAPERS

The Future Development of the Commonwealth

THE British Commonwealth is unique in history. Never before have a group of independent nations been united by a common allegiance to a single Crown. Never before has the world seen an association of nations, scattered over the whole globe, whose representatives meet together every day to share the information which they have acquired and to show each other the communications between their Governments and foreign Powers.

Equality of status between them is no longer questioned. As Grant Dexter says in his book, *Canada and the Building of Peace,* which is the main Canadian contribution to the Conference papers, 'The struggle for equality of status was won decisively in 1919'. The neutrality of Eire during the war is the strongest possible proof of the independent sovereignty of the member nations, and, although this neutrality has created many anomalies, it has apparently not altered the status of Eire as a member of the Commonwealth. Communications from the Government of the United Kingdom are still addressed to her through the Dominions Office. The interest of to-day does not lie in a struggle for an independence which has been unquestionably achieved but in a growing consciousness of interdependence. The history, the traditions, the geographical circumstances, the political structure and the composition of their peoples have led this association of nations to approach the problem of interdependence each in its own way and, indeed, there has even been considerable variation of action upon the Statute of Westminster itself, ' the legal basis of the equality of status which they enjoy'.

The Balfour Report of 1926 defined Dominion status but at the same time, referring doubtless to the fact that the major share of responsibility in foreign affairs and defence rested on the Government of the United Kingdom, it declared that 'the principles of equality' and similarity, appropriate to status, do not universally extend to function'. Since then the Dominions, although by no means equally, have appointed representatives in foreign countries. Their own Departments of External Affairs have grown in experience and significance. But it still cannot be universally claimed that equality of function has been achieved. The Foreign Office in London still exercises an influence and responsibility which in

some ways are greater than those of the Departments of External Affairs in any of the Dominions, but through the machinery existing for consultation its knowledge and its policies are available to all the Governments of the Commonwealth. By means of the same machinery the intelligence gained by the diplomatic representatives of the Dominions is made available to Downing Street. The sharing of information and the machinery for consultation and co-operation which exist among the nations of the Commonwealth give an indication of a realization of their interdependence: the part played by the Dominions in the organizations which have been set up by the United Nations for war and post-war purposes is an earnest of their individuality. The contribution which the Commonwealth can make to the peace and progress of the world will depend on the right synthesis of these two characteristics, individuality and co-operation.

Other changes of great significance are in process of development. India and Burma are on the threshold of Dominion status; Southern Rhodesia is in an advanced state of self-government; and Newfoundland will not always remain under a Commission Government. ' There has been, moreover/ as a Conference paper points out, 'throughout the Commonwealth and Colonial Empire a trend towards larger local responsibilities in Government. It seems clear that the Empire is in process of transformation into a wider Commonwealth.'

During the recent war the position of India was recognized by representation in the War Cabinet where the representatives of India have the same status as the representatives of the Dominions. Within the Commonwealth India is represented by High Commissioners in the United Kingdom and South Africa and by Trade Commissioners in Canada and Australia. Outside the Commonwealth she is represented by an Agent-General with the rank of Minister in Washington and by Trade Commissioners in New York, Buenos Aires and Alexandria. She also has representation on many of the councils which have been formed for the prosecution of the war and the organization of peace. Since 1941 the Central Government of India, the Viceroy's Council, has had an Indian majority, defence and foreign affairs, however, being reserved subjects, and from July 1937 provisional autonomy was operating in the eleven provinces. Difficulties which arose at the. beginning of the war, however, led to the resignation of eight of the provincial ministries and the Government took over the administration, although in the case of three provinces it was found possible later to return to constitutional practice.

Frequent attempts were made during the war to break the political deadlock in India in order that Dominion status 'of the Statute of Westminster variety', as the Viceroy expressed it, might

be attained as soon as possible after the war, and in March 1942 the War Cabinet, trying 'to clothe these general declarations with precision', sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India with a Draft Declaration for discussion with the leaders of India's various groups and parties. It was hoped that it would be possible to solve the vexed questions which complicated the situation and to create an Indian Union which, if it wished, should have power to secede from the British Commonwealth. The offer failed to secure the approval of Congress, while the Moslem belief that the British Government's desire was the establishment of a single Indian Union failed to convince the Moslem League that their demand for Pakistan would in fact be granted. The leaders of the Depressed Classes feared that the scheme would condemn them to a Hindu rule which would be entirely unacceptable to them. The Sikh Community regarded the offer as a betrayal of their position, and the Princes had misgivings about certain aspects of the scheme. Unacceptable to all parties, the Draft Declaration therefore fell to the ground. 'The attainment of independence', said Mr. Gandhi, 'is an impossibility until we have solved the communal tangle.' But the Cripps offer still remains open and is, as the Viceroy said in February 1944, 'a solemn pledge of the Government that India should have full control of her own destiny among the nations of the Commonwealth and the world'.

India's geographical neighbour Burma has, like her, the promise of Dominion status at the earliest practicable date. The Japanese invasion of Burma caused grave social and economic problems and the immediate task, now that the country is liberated, is to repair the damage and rebuild the foundations of the economic structure; but the policy of His Majesty's Government remains unaltered. On 22 April 1943 the Secretary of State for Burma explicitly stated in answer to a parliamentary question that 'the aim of His Majesty's Government is to assist Burma to attain complete self-government within the British Commonwealth as soon as circumstances permit'.

In a more distant future Dominion status will be extended to territories at present under colonial administration.

The growth of individual national consciousness has always been the guiding force of the British Commonwealth and Empire. Loyalty to democratic principles, sentiments and interests shared in common, and individual interests peculiar to each member, characterize this association of nations. Great constitutional changes have taken place in the past within the Commonwealth. In the future developments of no less significance are soon to be resolved, as the bounds of the free association extend to embrace the territories of the dependent Empire.

Economic Interests

THROUGHOUT the preparatory papers there is agreement that neither any individual country nor the Commonwealth acting as a group could be self-sufficient in the modern world, and that the economic policies of any nation will directly or indirectly affect economic conditions elsewhere. At the same time the view is expressed that membership of the Commonwealth can confer economic advantages by affording opportunities for harmonizing policies and concluding mutually helpful arrangements; but there is general agreement that if intra-Commonwealth policies were adopted which adversely affected world trade and tended to retard the improvement of standards of living in other countries, however advantageous they might temporarily seem to be to the nations of the Commonwealth, in the long run they would be seen to have done a damage greater than any short-lived benefits they might have provided.

To every member nation of the Commonwealth world economic conditions and policies of trade and finance are of concern; but different circumstances in different parts of the Commonwealth give each nation an individual point of view and an individual priority of interests. To Australia, for instance, the wool industry is a matter of paramount importance. Although South Africa and New Zealand are also great producers of wool, 'for Australia', to quote a paper submitted by the Australian Institute,

> the future of wool has a greater significance than for any other country. Wool is the one commodity in which both in quality and quantity Australia enjoys undisputed primacy. Her flocks, which to-day number 125 million, comprise one-sixth of the world's sheep, produce more than one-quarter of the world's wool and over one-third of the world's clothing wool. Australia, moreover, is responsible for 50 per cent of all wool entering international trade.

The markets of the wool growers of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were assured for the duration of the war and one full season after it by an agreement under which the Government of the United Kingdom undertook to purchase the wool clips of those three Dominions for that period. This intra-Commonwealth agreement will prevent the full impact of the post-war wool situation being felt by those Dominions for some years, but it is recognized in the same paper that

> even an elementary recognition by Australia of its obligation to share in the burden imposed on Great Britain by strict adherence to the terms of the Wool Purchase Agreement should lead to the acceptance by the

Australian Government and wool growers of some degree of responsibility for the disposal of our wool production and surplus stocks once hostilities cease.

The problem of wool is worth noticing a little further, because it is a clear example of the interplay of the three classes of needs and interests—national, Commonwealth and international. Wool is of paramount importance to Australia. An assured supply of wool was of great advantage to the United Kingdom during the war, and an assured market for some years is of value to the Australian producers; but the Commonwealth cannot absorb all the production and the Australian problem demands ultimately an international solution.

> Of the demand for wool there will not be the slightest question; of the satisfaction of that demand there is more doubt. The problem is the age-old one of bringing a world surplus of a raw material to peoples hungry for it.

An arrangement within the Commonwealth has been found to be of benefit to the members of the Commonwealth but not to provide the final solution of the problem. That depends upon world prosperity, in the promotion of which the nations of the Commonwealth have a common interest. To quote an Australian paper:

> Although the Australian wool industry occupies such a commanding position in respect of both quality and quantity of production, its future cannot be dissociated from that of the wool industry as a whole, nor from general international conditions, even though the effect of those conditions has been masked by the operation of the Imperial Wool Purchase Agreement. The problem of wool's future is not, as is frequently assumed, whether Australia's present wool clip will be marketable concurrently with the liquidation of war-time wool stocks, but rather the *price* at which it will be consumed. That price will be determined by *(a)* the competition of synthetic fibres, *(b)* world demand for wool which will be influenced by that competition and *(c)* marketing and tariff policies of both producing and manufacturing countries, and the success attending measures to ensure full employment arid to raise standards of living.

A potent and uncertain factor is the protectionist tendencies of the farming interests in the United States. If they are strong enough to force the Administration to impose high tariffs against agricultural products, Australia will be faced by great difficulties. Although wool is her main product, wheat also has a large place in her production and both would suffer from high American tariffs. It is realized that, unless a reasonable international plan for higher standards of living in general can be implemented, a succession of good seasons in North America would once again produce an

unmanageable world surplus with correspondingly low prices. An Australian paper sums up Australia's position as follows:

> Australia feels that, broadly speaking, the prosperity of her rural industries is dominated by surpluses of crop and animal products, and is acutely aware that the maintenance and development of primary industries is very largely dependent upon the expansion of foreign markets. Ability to compete in world markets is, however, controlled in the long run by costs of production; and costs of primary production, under Australian conditions, by tariff and wage policies.

New Zealand's economy is based on grassland farming and, as she is not richly endowed with the raw materials required by heavy industries, her main manufactures are light consumer goods and processed farm products. Australian uneasiness over the development of fibre substitutes for wool have their counterpart in New Zealand, not only in the same fears for the position of wool in the world's markets but also from the competition of margarine with butter. The New Zealand farmer also wonders whether the expansion during the war of farm production in the United Kingdom and the United States may have an adverse effect on New Zealand's exports in the future. But at the same time it is realized that the United States, Russia and Canada are becoming increasingly industrialized. If this process continues it may, as a New Zealand paper says,

> ease the pressure on agricultural surpluses at large. On the other hand, if it threatens the capacity of United Kingdom exports to expand, the first direct effect will be disadvantageous to New Zealand, and only in the long run advantageous if new markets are opened up. The question ties up with that of the industrialization of less advanced areas such as China, parts of South America and parts of Europe, which may be a potent factor in sustaining world demand for farm products, either directly or indirectly.

But it is appreciated that the farm *bloc* in the United States may be strong enough and unimaginative enough to insist on the retention of American protection against the import of farm products, including butter and meat in which New Zealand is particularly interested, and on official maintenance of prices; and it is feared also that in Europe, with its long tradition of peasant proprietorship, there is no certainty that 'agrarian protectionism … is a lost art'. A revival and continuance of agrarian protectionism, which closed markets to those countries that could supply farm products cheaply as a result of commercial methods of farming, would 'delay the promise of freedom from want for the world as a whole* and cause grave damage to countries like New Zealand, whose economy

is based on farming and whose rural population would suffer from an irremediable surplus if their export trade were curtailed. Therefore for New Zealand international collaboration on a world-wide scale is essential, although specific agreements with individual countries might profitably be concluded also. It is suggested that such agreements might be regarded as a logical extension of the contracts for sale to the United Kingdom Government which were concluded during the war.

The United Nations Food Conference which met at Hot Springs, Virginia, in May 1943 was of great importance for New Zealand as a producer of primary agricultural products. One of its most significant features as a hope for the future was its agreement that 'the first cause of hunger and malnutrition is poverty' and its recognition of 'the importance to nutrition and agricultural prosperity of general measures promoting full employment and the expansion of production and purchasing power, and of the removal of trade restrictions and abnormal fluctuations in exchange rates'.

The expansion of purchasing power must apply to Asia as well as to the other continents, if the full value of international planning is to be realized. A New Zealand paper explains how higher standards of living in the East would help New Zealand and Australian agricultural export trade by an indirect rather than a direct method, which emphasizes the world-wide nature of prosperity.

> The main benefit to New Zealand of the economic development of China and other Pacific countries would be in the increased purchasing power of United Kingdom, European and United States markets because of the stimulus given to export industries, though some moderate increases in the consumption of New Zealand's products in the East might result. The process might be expected to facilitate transfers from agriculture to industrial and other occupations in the countries whose export trade was expanded.

Such a programme of development would fail unless international economic conditions were more favourable than between the two world wars,

> both because many industries so developed would require export markets and because annual financial commitments would have to be liquidated in exports. On the other hand, it is equally true that such a programme once effectively launched would relieve the pressures making towards a revival of economic nationalism.

If the Atlantic Charter is a true indication of future international policies, its Clause 4 which promises to

> endeavour with due respect for [their] existing obligations, to further the

enjoyment by all States, great or small, victorious or vanquished, of access on equal terms to trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity,

and its Clause 5, which expresses a

desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all an improved standard of labour, economic advancement and social security

might reasonably lead to the hope of a future world economy in which trade controls might be considerably relaxed. It has, however, been indicated by political leaders in New Zealand that they do not regard their country's pre-war policy as being inconsistent with their adherence to the Charter. That policy was by no means free. To revise it would be difficult for both political and economic reasons. Politically it would be difficult, a New Zealand paper explains,

because vested interests have been established on the reasonable assumption that import control and other instruments of commercial policy would be continued and because strong pressure groups would resist their removal. Economically because a reorientation of production would be required, raising difficult problems of adjustment, and because the abolition of import and exchange controls would limit the financial policy of the Government in the use of Reserve Bank Credit for long-term purposes.

Long before the outbreak of the present war the Dominions were becoming increasingly able to finance their own capital development. Indeed by the end of 1934 Canada had accumulated more than 2,000 million dollars of investments outside her own borders, and, although here, as in other ways, Canada was in a class by herself, the other Dominions also had expanded their local capital markets. But, even so, it has been estimated that at the end of 1936, out of a total of British overseas investment of £3,240 millions, £1,342 millions were invested in the Dominions, Newfoundland and the Rhodesias, £438 millions in India, Burma and Ceylon and £201 millions in other parts of the Empire.

The war had a marked effect on this position. Some parts of the Commonwealth have taken the opportunity of repatriating much, or even all, of their debt to the United Kingdom by means of sterling balances, accumulated from the sale to Great Britain of goods or services for which no immediate return was possible by way of imports. Up to June 1943 no less than £260 millions of Indian sterling loans had been repaid, and elsewhere considerable repatriation of debts had been carried out. One paper suggests that Britain will need to develop new overseas connexions for capital

investment in order to build up again a source from which to finance an excess of imports over exports, but for some time her funds available for overseas investment will be extremely limited and the Dominions will probably not stand high on the list of priorities. It is interesting in this connexion to notice an opinion given from the opposite standpoint. An Australian writer believes that

> the disturbing effect of overseas investments upon the Australian economy in times of difficult trade have been a severe lesson to governments in this country, and it is not likely that public opinion would support any substantial programme of overseas borrowing. In addition, Australian public opinion has also been rather sensitive about the operations of overseas companies in this country, owing to the fact that a conflict of interest may arise between overseas shareholders and the interests of the Australian public.

But a paper on the Australian balance of payments believes that Australia will have

> reserves totally inadequate for the free play of trade fluctuations in peacetime.

It is probable that the development of the Colonial Empire will be regarded as a major responsibility by the United Kingdom and that much of the available capital will be invested there. An international investment agency would be of value to all the members of the Commonwealth, for all of them are interested in the development of world trade, and, if it is realized that in this connexion no less than in regard to the question of migration, which will be discussed in a later chapter, the Commonwealth cannot be exclusive, it is important that all the Dominions should appreciate the extent to which they could help or hinder its success.

Canada's geographical position has given her an intimate economic relationship with the United States and her outlook has naturally always been more international than those of the other Dominions. Canadians hold large blocks of United States securities and at the beginning of the war United States investments in Canada were estimated at £930 millions. Before the first definite proposal for the creation of an international lending organization was announced in October 1943, a good deal of discussion along such lines had been going on in various countries, not least in Canada. A Canadian paper has explained the importance of foreign lending as follows:

> Undeveloped countries or countries which require to increase their capital equipment are as a rule debtor countries. That is, they need to

import more than they export. Their surplus, available for export, will not bring enough in outside markets to enable them to buy the ordinary goods they need to maintain their standard of living and the capital equipment they need to increase their home production. If they are unable to borrow abroad on reasonable terms, their only alternative is to cut down their imports, lower their standard of living, and use the additional sums thus made available from their exports to buy the capital goods they require.

A Conference organized by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in December 1943 studied this question as an integral part of the organization of peace. It was agreed that Canada, having a great interest in the success of post-war reconstruction, should be in favour of long-term lending, but it was admitted that the average Canadian did not appreciate that Canadian participation would necessitate a decision on fiscal policy. The issue is explained in a Canadian paper in these words:

> It is all very well to say that we favour long-term lending because it will raise the standard of living of the world and help assure peace. It is equally beside the point to say that we favour this course as a means of finding markets for our surplus production.
>
> The real point is that, on the long view, Canada must be prepared to accept payment of foreign loans in goods—in imports. If we are not prepared to reduce our tariffs and other protectionist devices and to stop thinking of imports as being the cause of unemployment and, therefore, to be scanned critically, there is little sense in our going in for long-term foreign lending.
>
> Foreign lending which results in the sale of Canadian production, or which improves the purchasing power of foreign countries, would be in the nature of an investment in our exporting industries. That is one form which post-war lending may take. Alternatively, if Canada is not ready to accept payment for foreign loans in goods—in imports—the sensible thing would be to use the money at home in re-fashioning our economy on lines of self-sufficiency. The industries which produce export surpluses should be cut down and the man-power transferred to new industries which would produce goods now imported from abroad. An extreme illustration would be to invest in greenhouses for the production in Canada of oranges and bananas. It is, of course, not suggested that there should not be great expansion in our industry. It is suggested that the test would be whether the new industries would be uneconomic in the sense that the goods they produced would cost more than the imported goods which were supplanted.
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> If Canada goes into the proposed long-term foreign lending organization, it should be with a clear realization of what this will mean in terms of trade.

In some quarters the proposal is criticized on the ground that Canada should pay off her external debt before lending abroad. Canada is now a creditor country on balance, but we still owe some $5 billions abroad, chiefly in the United States. Why not pay off our American creditors before committing ourselves to foreign lending? The answer here is that, if we were to try to speed up the retirement of our debt in the United States, it would add to the difficulties of post-war reconstruction. The United States is to-day the world's greatest creditor country. All countries are and will continue to be keen to obtain United States dollars. Our own position in this regard has been discussed in earlier sections. If we were to add to this scarcity by striving to buy United States dollars in greater quantities than our normal requirements, we would only be intensifying the scarcity and increasing the strain on all post-war international organizations. The monetary organization would be one of the first to suffer. Also, this policy would be a step toward self-sufficiency and would involve a move toward internal readjustments of the kind already discussed.

Throughout the preparatory papers the United States looms large. Her commanding position in the world is understood, but there seems to be a general uncertainty, implied rather than formally expressed, as to whether her policy will be guided by a true appreciation of the international situation. A short-sighted view might lead her to adopt selfish policies which, although they might bring immediate prosperity to herself, would ultimately plunge the world and herself with it into another great depression. A Chatham House Study Group wrote:

After the war the United States will be the principal creditor nation. Whether she will become the leader of world economic expansion remains to be seen. Economic disaster would certainly result from a policy of high tariffs such as was adopted after the last war and it is to be hoped that the United States will leave the traditional policy which she followed while she was still a debtor nation and will institute a policy of foreign investment and the encouragement of world trade by a general reduction in tariff barriers.

Restrictive American economic policies and a tendency to desire profit without responsibility consort strangely with American idealism, but their existence in the past has to be remembered in considering policies for the future. In the opinion of a New Zealand writer:

It is the United States rather than Russia which is now the great enigma. In international economics as well as in security, the world hopes not only that the United States will exercise enlightened and early initiative, but also that it will thereafter pursue liberal and consistent investment and trade policies. The family of nations, who look towards the United States, do so, not as importunate poor relatives, but as *fellow sufferers* from the

temperamental vagaries of the American economy and *as joint beneficiaries* (who will also contribute their share towards it) from the economic expansion and improvement in living standards which depend largely in the first instance on the domestic and international economic programmes of the United States. While the promotion and continuance of full employment in the United States is vital to a similar condition in other countries, it is also true that this cannot be achieved by the United States unless other economies are able to establish and maintain a similar condition. This is the sort of platitude which is understood and accepted in all countries but they do not always express it consistently in their commercial policies.

A similar doubt comes from India in these words:

It may perhaps not be uncharitable to say that American liberalism has never become unambiguously free from the influence of American economic practice. The consequences of American capitalist enterprise to the economic conditions of such lands as it flourishes in, cause sometimes an uneasiness in Asiatic minds about the entire philosophy of Americanism.

There is also firm agreement on another point. For economic reasons as well as for reasons of military security there must be agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. A Research Group in Melbourne stated that,

if Britain and the United States fail to agree on the objectives of a common economic policy, as well as on the methods of realizing these objectives, world stability would still be remote.

And again:

Australia has a great deal to lose in any clash of policy between Britain and U.S.A. The isolation of her geographical position and the imperative necessity for maintaining the strongest strategic alliance with both countries must impel the Australian Government to use its influence for collaboration rather than collision in Anglo-American relations. All economic considerations must be outweighed by this need. The American Administration realizes that a policy of world industrial expansion and collaboration will prove of greater economic benefit to the world as a whole, and a greater guarantee of durable peace, than a reversion to economic non-co-operation in which Britain can prosper only if the rest of the world is depressed.

Australia has most to gain from a world economic system working at a high level of industrial activity; and will have the greatest possible security when British and American policy is co-ordinated. If Britain and U.S.A. pursue policies aiming at full internal employment, and if the major national economies agree upon policies of freer trade, the resulting level of industrial activity should be the highest attainable and should develop less

friction than competitive nationalistic policies, and the greatest general benefit should result.

The belief in the vital necessity of the retention of harmony between the United Kingdom and the United States is seen in papers from Canada, India and New Zealand as well as from Australia; and a United Kingdom paper declares that

it should be a major aim of policy to continue in the time of peace the collaboration which has been created by the necessities of war.

Canadian opinion feels that Canadian policy must be in harmony with the policies of these two Great Powers. Discord between them would give a difficult task to those who had to frame the policies of the Dominion. While harmony between the two great English-speaking nations is essential to Australia also, the results of diverging opinions between them seem perhaps rather more remote there. The Australian outlook is less impartial than the Canadian. The Research Group in Melbourne believed that 'in the economic situation likely to exist after the war Australia's greatest concern will be a speedy rehabilitation of Great Britain by the restoration of world trade', and an individual Australian writer thinks that in the future, as in the past, Australians will continue to buy British rather than American goods if the price and quality are comparable.

The importance of monetary policies is generally recognized in the preparatory papers. A Canadian survey, for instance, when mentioning the Ouchy Agreement of 1932, says:

The lesson of Ouchy, perhaps, lies in the demonstration of the need of currency stability as a prerequisite of tariff reductions. It tends to show that the present-day priority given to consideration of the monetary question is right.

The same Canadian paper describes the part played by the monetary system in the history of Canada and the importance of it to the future of the Dominion:

To begin with, Canada is the child of the international monetary system. The lines upon which this country was fashioned and grew to its present maturity were laid prior to 1914 when a world monetary system existed and operated. Our standard of living, our very way of life, is the result of the international system. The Canadian economy is based on the assumption that we should produce the things we can best produce. Our production in these staple lines—such as wheat, foodstuffs generally, newsprint, metals—far exceeds our own capacity to consume. We have always exported our surplus and used the proceeds to purchase abroad the things we require to support our standard of living. The important point, here, is that we have never had to balance our trade with individual coun-

tries. Our economic life was based on the assumption that the proceeds derived from sales to one country could be converted into the currency of some other country from which we desired to buy. Thus we have always had a large credit balance with the United Kingdom which we promptly converted from sterling to dollars to pay our debtor balance with the United States. Any attempt to make our trade balance with each country would result in disaster at home. There is no country on earth with a greater stake than Canada in this matter.

The attitude of the Commonwealth nations towards sterling naturally occupies a prominent place. To quote a United Kingdom paper:

In the long run British interests clearly demand the restoration as speedily as possible of the pre-war multilateral convertibility of sterling. The substantial advantages which the British economy derived from its ability .to render the rest of the world valuable services in the organization and finance of trade and international capital movements was dependent upon the maintenance of this characteristic of sterling, which in particular provided the strongest inducement to the members of the sterling *bloc* to maintain that association. The circumstances of the world at the end of the war will, however, put any immediate action for this end out of question, and a fundamental problem, both for the British economy and for the sterling *bloc* as a whole, will be to devise means which, while protecting sterling from the risks of a precipitate return to multilateral convertibility, will not place impediments in the way of the later realization of this objective. So long as the Dominions retain their interest as large-scale exporters to the British market—and this interest is likely to be permanent—they, too, will have an interest in immediate post-war measures to ensure the stability of sterling, but their interests will naturally not be identical or uniform. Much British thought on post-war currency policy would, for example, prefer to relegate gold to a very subordinate place in the picture, reserving for it, at best, an honorific position where it could do the least possible harm. South Africa, however, has an obvious interest in seeing that the process of 'debunking' gold is not carried too far, and while the interest of Canada and Australia in this matter is not so strong, these countries are also concerned with the future of gold. New Zealand, on the other hand, had before the war inaugurated an independent policy of exchange control of her own, which the Prime Minister of the day hoped would be permanent, and so long as the principles on which this policy was then based are maintained, New Zealand's attitude towards structural changes in the sterling *bloc* will differ from that of countries which regard exchange control as a more temporary device. The impact of war conditions upon the Canadian economy will moreover not diminish Canadian interest in the United States dollar, or increase the chances of her seeking membership in the sterling *bloc.*

A survey of Indian currency problems discusses the courses which are open to India. It would be possible to link the rupee with sterling or with the dollar, to place the rupee upon a formal gold standard basis, or to have a 'free' currency. Objections to a link with sterling will be affected by the future course of British monetary policy as regards exchange control and the manipulation of the domestic price-level. An Indian paper examining this course says:

the announced intention of the British Government is not to permit of a violent rise in prices in the post-war period. As regards the free exchangeability of sterling, it is true that there will continue to be control of capital-movements, even under the proposed International Monetary Fund, but 'current international transactions' are to be freed from control, in principle, within a period of some years from the coming into force of the Fund. As against these considerations, also, there must be weighed the direction of Indian trade in the post-war period and the extent of the sterling area itself. Obviously, if a large part of India's trade is with the Empire or with the sterling area, sterling receipts and sterling expenditure will play a large role in the finance of Indian foreign trade, and this tendency will increase the larger the sterling area itself is: for instance, if the Scandinavian, Belgo-Dutch and French monetary systems are formally or informally linked to sterling, this will obviously increase the desirability of holding sterling balances and decrease any disadvantages that might attach otherwise to a link between the rupee and sterling.

The other possibilities are also discussed. To link the rupee with the dollar, it is said, would necessitate the previous building-up of a strong reserve fund and, apart from the various technical difficulties involved,

there is one other aspect of the matter which would require serious consideration: American economic activity tends to swing through a very wide arc. In so far as linking one currency with another involves the linking also of cost-and-price structures in the countries concerned, an additional element of instability might be imparted to Indian economic life, which is already exposed to variability arising out of the cyclical swings of the prices of primary products.

It is appreciated that a number of formidable problems would be raised if the rupee were placed upon a formal gold standard basis. It is true that gold will not become valueless, but it is very uncertain how many countries are likely to adopt a formal gold standard, and 'in the absence of large-scale adherence, linking the rupee to gold might mean a fluctuating relationship to many important currencies, e.g. sterling', while if the rupee were merely stabilized in terms of gold 'the resulting situation might not differ

markedly from that which would prevail if the rupee were linked to the United States dollar, so long as the latter was also pegged to gold, formally or informally'. The danger of a free currency is that in years of depression attempts to insulate the economies of nations by means of free exchange variations degenerate into a process of cumulative depreciation leading to increasing barriers to international economic intercourse. On the whole it is suggested that a *de facto* stabilization will be advisable and it seems to be inferred that a link with sterling would be the wisest policy for India to adopt.

This view is not shared by another Indian paper, to the author of which any measures which had a British connexion would appear to be suspect. He visualizes an India 'dragged' to a peace conference 'as the glorious appendage of British Imperialism', where economic policies, 'catastrophic as far as the well-being of four hundred million Indians is concerned', will be imposed. He demands that, instead of this,

> India's overseas trade, both on the export and import sides, must be permitted to run in channels which are not blocked by the sediment of sentiments relative to the British connexion. Indian currency and exchange must again be left untrammelled by the most disastrously artificial rupee-sterling link, especially in view of the fact that India is now stated to have emerged at least on paper as a creditor nation.

In his opinion it is essential to end the arrangement whereby 'for at least fifty years in particular England had reaped the advantages of tying up India with her own currency system'.

The future of India's sterling balances also is a matter on which the Indian preparatory papers disagree. It is suggested in some papers that they should be used to finance the development of Indian industries after the war, but it is assumed in others that these products of 'the sweat and toil of nameless millions of Indians' will probably be repudiated or at best so tied up in a way favourable to Great Britain that India will not have the full benefit of them. To one Indian writer the position is that

> our sterling credits in London are of substantial import to our economic well-being and our international trade in the post-war period. At the moment, these credits are blocked and combined in the sterling *bloc* of countries dominated by the United Kingdom, completely cut off from the dollar and without any provision for a specific date and method for repayment by the United Kingdom.

The Indian papers by their divergencies show that the discussion of economic problems is complicated by the existence of political sentiments and support the warning made in one of them that 'it would be folly ... to overlook the fact that it is not possible, under

Indian conditions, to avoid the intrusion into monetary discussions of issues of much wider significance*.

It is worth noticing a United Kingdom appreciation of what are regarded as significant and deeply rooted trends in British public opinion:

> Bearing in mind the experience of the Great Depression, it is certainly for the most part firmly opposed to the re-creation of any rigid link between sterling and gold, the existence of which is held by many, whether rightly or wrongly, to be largely responsible for the economic troubles of Great Britain during that period. Opposition is also strong against any formal rigid link between sterling and the dollar, though freedom here is thought of perhaps more as an insurance against the risks of close association with a violently fluctuating currency than as an indication of any intention to use variations in exchange rates as a deliberate instrument of policy.

Another matter of general concern is the future of Imperial preference. That system unfortunately was based, not upon a reduction of tariffs among the nations of the Commonwealth, but upon an increase of tariffs against other countries. In the future it may be that Imperial preference will be retained, but in a form less harmful to general world trade, by lowering tariffs within the Commonwealth rather than by raising them against the rest of the world. A United Kingdom paper pointed out the possibility of another change:

> The probable post-war British balance of payments problem has already been described. It imposes upon Great Britain an urgent necessity to maintain and expand her exports. The effort of expansion will cause considerable strain, and any relaxation offered by preferential outlets inside the Commonwealth may therefore be gratefully welcomed. Whereas in 1932 the Dominions were in the greatest trouble, and therefore snatched most eagerly at the prospect of relief, which in some respects turned out to be illusory, it is not impossible that after the war it will be Great Britain which will feel the greatest need for support in a disorderly world whose main trends will be difficult either to predict or to control.

The New Zealand attitude towards protection and Imperial preference is discussed in a New Zealand paper. It is suggested that the New Zealand public will find it hard to abandon the belief that imports from countries with a low wage rate are more dangerous to standards of living in such a country as New Zealand than would be imports, equally cheap, from countries with high standards of living and methods of mass production. So long as this fallacy persists, New Zealand will always be disposed to impose protection against such countries; while, so far as the rest of the world is

concerned, her policy will depend on the extent of international agreements to lower trade barriers and the amount of reciprocal advantage she expected to acquire in markets for her primary products. It is also thought that there may be a fairly strong desire to continue the system of Imperial preference. This desire will be affected by the extent of the difficulties caused to the United Kingdom by her balance of post-war payments and the consequent scale of restrictions which may be imposed on British imports with the need for paying correspondingly greater attention to Dominion markets for manufactured goods.

The attitude of the Australians is explained in one paper which says that

> they are gradually beginning to realize that the Ottawa Agreements, and Imperial preference, do not offer a solution of this problem of their export production. Their attitude towards the whole question of Imperial preference is, therefore, slowly changing, and it might not be too much to say that they would be quite prepared to scrap Ottawa, provided that they got satisfactory compensation. On the other hand, here, as in the political sphere, they are inclined to hold on to preferential relations within the Empire unless they feel assured that adequate concessions are going to be made by other countries, particularly America, in return for abandoning their system of preference.

Australia is beginning to think, on the whole, that, in view of the fact that markets outside the Empire are essential for her future prosperity, preferential arrangements within the Empire which antagonize other countries are not in the long run in the interests of the Commonwealth countries themselves.

The changed economic relationship between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, which has been accentuated and speeded by the war, will perhaps lead to a new outlook on Commonwealth affairs. In the past, talk about economic harmony has been apt to mean, not harmony between the policies of one Dominion and another but an attempt to make the policies of the United Kingdom harmonize with the separate and unrelated policies of each Dominion.

In many important world markets the Dominions are strong competitors with each other; the spirit in which their mutual economic relations have been approached has in some important respects not been markedly different from that which has marked their relations with foreign countries.

London is not in so unique a position as a financial centre as it has been in the past and the Dominion markets might at some future time come to rival in importance that of the United Kingdom. If as a result there is a reorientation of economic thinking

in the Commonwealth, it may lead to a greater sense of equality in other aspects of Commonwealth relations.

A United Kingdom paper makes another point of great importance. The effects of the policies and actions of the United Kingdom have always been and will continue to be much greater than those of any of the Dominions.

> Any wilfulness displayed by a small economy in following a narrow view of its own interests which neglects the rest of the world will be less damaging than a similar wilfulness on the part of a large and powerful economy. From this standpoint British policy is and will long remain much more important than the policy of any single Dominion. Any aberrations on the part of British statesmen, who are by no means immune from such lapses, will therefore have much more far-reaching effects than similar aberrations on the part of Dominion statesmen. The Commonwealth link increases, however, the influence and therefore the responsibility of each of its members. Each Dominion can play a more active part in world affairs than other economies outside of comparable size and economic strength, for in addition to the results of its own unaided efforts, it can exert some pressure upon and through British policy.
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> There thus rests upon the Dominions a special responsibility to ensure that such pressure is wisely applied, and that Great Britain is not encouraged or incited to follow courses which, however harmless when practised by her smaller partners, may have disastrous consequences if applied on a more extensive scale.

Problems of Race and Migration

ACCORDING to one Indian paper ' freedom from want in South-East Asia rests largely on freedom of emigration'. In South and East Asia shortage of food which has for long been a critical problem will have been greatly aggravated by the Japanese occupation. Half the human race lives in that area, where the population during recent years has increased annually by eight millions. For many of the inhabitants of Asia underfeeding is chronic; for all the prospect of future undernourishment is threatening. In India the food available is 16 per cent short of the quantity required for an adequate diet and, unless the area of cultivated land from which India draws its food is increased on an unprecedented scale, the deficiency will grow steadily greater. An immense and complex problem exists, in the solution of which emigration, agricultural policy and industrial progress all have a part to play.

The view that India's population problems can only be solved by plans which include large-scale emigration is, however, not shared

by all the Indian papers. Another writer infers that there is a good chance of success for schemes of economic planning which aim at raising the income of the rural workers and harmonizing the development of agriculture and industry. He says that the land must and can produce not only enough food for all the inhabitants of India, but must grow all the raw materials needed to enable Indian industries to supply the home market, which will be increased by a higher income rate among the agricultural population, and to have a surplus for export. In addition, agriculture must supply enough raw materials for a growing export market after the needs of expanding Indian industries have been met. This writer estimates that ' about 100 million acres of new land could be brought into cultivation and that, with the adoption of technological improvements, the yield of crops could be increased many times'. If Indian industry can make full use of Indian agricultural raw materials and so increase the standard of life of the agricultural population, an immense home market will become available for its products and, as industry expands, it will be able to draw off the surplus population from agriculture and so redress the unequal balance between agriculture and industry which at present is a serious obstacle to a prosperous Indian economy.

At the same time it is an indisputable fact that in India and elsewhere food provides problems of extreme gravity. In May 1943 the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture was held at Hot Springs, Virginia, and admitted the international character of the problems it met to consider. If, as is feared, it is no exaggeration to say that there is a very real danger of the world's supply of food running short of its requirements, international planning of agriculture will be essential. This fundamental problem glaringly lights up the complex international necessities of the future. Monetary policy, trade policies, questions of transport and other aspects of international intercourse are involved. The preparatory papers indicate a growing realization that only international action can give a satisfactory solution to these problems and they unite in affirming that the Commonwealth cannot be self-sufficient.

But whether or not freedom of migration is essential to a solution of the problem of Asia's food, questions connected with migration will undoubtedly have to be faced. The British Commonwealth and Empire are in a particularly important position with regard to migration because of the large areas of thinly peopled country which they contain. The Conference papers give a striking illustration of the different points of view which can be held by people in countries which contain undeveloped land and by others in countries with a superabundance of population. One Indian paper sees the solution to the population difficulties and the dangers of in-

adequate supplies of food in South and South-East Asia in a combination of agricultural planning and migration to North Australia and the islands of the East Indies and the South Pacific. Australian papers on the other hand, believing in the White Australia policy, would not accept that solution of the difficulty.

This Indian paper claims that tropical areas are unsuitable for colonization by white races and that there are consequently large areas of South-East Asia and North Australia which can never make a reasonable contribution to the solution of the world's food problems unless they are thrown open to free movement of coloured peoples or, if they are at present inhabited only by white people, to immigration by coloured races. In the Caribbean, the Rhodesias, Brazil and Queensland the white communities have colonized only the lands at the edge of the tropics or the high plateaux in the tropics. It is claimed that about 4-2 million square miles of land in tropical and subtropical areas could be immediately given over to the plough, but that in these areas white settlers would be unable to thrive. These lands are largely in the Pacific area not far from 'the vast reservoirs of humanity in South and East Asia where food shortage and unemployment have now become chronic'. The monsoon lands in Eastern Asia, the Malay Peninsula and the Philippine Islands are still comparatively empty and the soil there, for ages enriched by layers of humus, is exceedingly favourable for agriculture/ But there are other aspects that would have to be considered. A large problem would have to be tackled before any extensive immigration were permitted. A campaign would have to be waged against malaria, including drainage schemes of great magnitude. If immigration were allowed in any quantity before this work was carried out, the prevalence of disease in South-East Asia would be greatly increased with disastrous results over wide areas. This point is one of many illustrations which might be given to show the complex nature of the many problems which will have to be faced. Clearly international planning and action will be necessary.

China and India are the two countries to which emigration to these areas makes the greatest appeal, but there and in other places regulations exist which prevent them from becoming settlers. In the north, Chinese immigrants are barred from settling in Outer Mongolia, and the Japanese reduced to very small proportions Chinese colonization in Manchuria. Since the beginning of this century the United States have passed measures to exclude Chinese from the Philippine Islands, largely by the regulations which have been introduced to regulate the holding of land. The French in Indo-China discouraged Chinese settlers by heavy taxation and, although the policy of the Netherlands East Indies was much more

open than that in the British or French dependencies, there also Asiatic immigration has been severely restricted by systems of quota.

The claim of one Indian paper is clearly stated:

> If there is to be freedom from want for all peoples and the improvement of their standards of living and at the same time if the present world food shortage has to be effectively abolished or mitigated, the present unequal distribution of population in the Pacific region and the uneven utilization of land resources as shown by the great disparity in the size of agricultural holdings have to be abolished.

It is claimed that in every part of the undeveloped tropics to which Indians and Chinese have gone they have helped to adjust the available resources to the needs of the population, and have done much to train the indigenous inhabitants to become intensive farmers either as tenants or as independent proprietors. Small-scale farming is suggested by one paper as the next stage in planned economic development in South-East Asia and the Pacific Islands and it is asserted that in face of a chronic shortage of labour the success of this development will depend to a large extent on the introduction of Asiatic settlers. It is further claimed that large parts of Australia, New Zealand, East Africa and South Africa will never be suitable for development by white peoples and that, unless they are thrown open to Chinese and Indian immigrants, agricultural development which is necessary for the future of the world as a whole will be proportionately impeded. 'Population adjustment in South-East Asia and the Pacific', it is claimed, 'is the corner stone of peace in both the East and the West.'

Another Indian paper, however, shows appreciation of the fact that claims for freedom of migration might have a boomerang effect. In discussing the future of China this paper says:

> If living conditions in China do not improve materially and quickly after its deliverance from Japan all countries bordering upon China towards the south are bound to be subjected to considerable pressure resulting from the competition of cheap, capable and easily trainable Chinese labour. This might necessitate a very rigid code of immigration laws which would from every point of view be not only undesirable but deplorable. It is, therefore, everybody's interest and particularly that of India to see that China with its huge population attains economic equilibrium as quickly as possible after the cessation of hostilities in the East. India has its own complicated and thorny problems to tackle in the immediate post-war period and would have every desire not to be burdened with more of them arising from conditions prevailing in the territories of its great neighbour towards the north.

An Australian paper which examines the question of migration concludes that for the rest of this century the total white population of Australia and New Zealand will not be more than fifteen millions. 'Is this then', asks the writer of this Australian paper,

an argument for opening the doors to coloured immigration? The answer is in the negative. There may be an urgent need for some amendment of Australian immigration laws to eliminate any taint of race prejudice from them, but this does not imply forgoing the right to control entries to this country—a right recognized as legitimate by leaders in Asiatic countries. Immigration to Australia—and New Zealand—can do little to solve the problem of 'over-population* in Asia. That problem is too vast to be solved in this way. The only solution lies in a policy designed to spread the benefits of modern industrialization and its basis of agricultural efficiency to the Eastern world. Such a policy would result in a tremendous increase in numbers in the Eastern world by eliminating the wastage of human life through disease and famine. There are signs that this cycle of growth and industrial development has already begun. It cannot be checked; it must be encouraged until the East has completed the full cycle, just as the West has done. The task of bringing Asia through this cycle with the minimum of friction will be the most stupendous ever faced by the Western world, and upon its success will depend the safety and well-being not only of the 15 million white people of the South Pacific, but of all the white nations. Australia's energies and her resources must be devoted to promoting co-operation between white and coloured in the solution of the problem of 'over-population' in the East.

The other documents written for the Conference reveal no solution of the differences of opinion shown in these Indian and Australian papers. It would be generally agreed that the resources of the Commonwealth in experience, in scientific research and in expert personnel ought, as is suggested in the Australian paper just quoted, to be put at the disposal of India, if she wishes to have them. But whether or not it is possible to solve India's problem of food in this way, the question of the desire of Asiatic people to emigrate, if they think that emigration will improve their circumstances, will remain. On the one hand, unless national thinking is radically changed, there will be the policy of Australia and other white societies discriminating against Asiatic immigration, and on the other hand the very natural resentment of the peoples of densely populated regions at being excluded from scantily peopled lands. The preparatory papers give a clear picture of these divergent points of view: a Canadian paper reveals, but does not try to solve, the fundamental difficulty:

With respect to labour, colonial and immigration policies, one aspect, indeed in an international sense the most important aspect, has been

ignored—race. At bottom, all these questions raise the problem of racial equality.

The need for an expanding world economy and for greater freedom of trade is accepted in the Conference documents and they agree on the necessity for realizing the principles of international collaboration which have been repeatedly proclaimed by the United Nations: but, as a Canadian paper asks, will these things be possible unless greater freedom of movement is allowed to populations?

Racial problems are among the most formidable which will have to be tackled in the future. The main Canadian paper faced the issue in an important paragraph:

> Of all the problems which will confront the United Nations when the war is over, the problem of racial equality will be easily the most difficult and the most perilous to the future peace of the world. If the impression that this is a white man's world is not to be deepened, fundamental changes in policy must be introduced at the top level, i.e. by the collective action of the leading nations, rather than by the action of individual nations. If the policy of racial inequality becomes yet more firmly embedded in the laws and practices of the white nations, then the outlook for the world will indeed be grim. There is no need, here, to theorize as to the ultimate consequences. Certainly the Chinese, the Japanese, the Indians—all the nation-states composed of non-whites—sooner or later will make common cause against the self-chosen superior whites.

Even without the complication of colour prejudice the problems of racial minorities are difficult and full of danger. They exist in the British Commonwealth just as much as in Central and Eastern Europe. In some areas, such as British Columbia, colour prejudice enters in as well. Many of the white inhabitants of that Province deeply resent the presence of Chinese and Japanese groups. There in 1931 out of a population of 694,263 there were 50,951 Orientals. Many of those springing from Japanese stock have never seen Japan and are Canadians by birth and upbringing, but in both parliament and the country an intention is steadily growing to deport them after the war.

These domestic difficulties, more acute than in 1918, will affect international policy. Resentment against racial prejudice is common to all non-whites. It is the point upon which all agree. In 1919, it was Japan that raised the issue at the peace conference—Japan being one of the victor powers. This time it may well be China.

The Nazi method of dealing with minorities, by deportation or massacre, is an offence against God and at the same time no real solution. Such methods sow the seeds of war and it is indisputable

that international repercussions result from the way in which every nation treats its minorities. 'There is plainly', says a Canadian paper, 'need of an international agreement covering the treatment of minorities.'

This is perhaps a field in which the British Commonwealth could lead the world by its example. If among its own members it could find some constructive method of approach to the problems of race and of minorities it would make a notable contribution to the cause of peace. Even for narrower reasons, however, it is suggested that the Commonwealth should earnestly attempt to find an answer to this unhappy question. It is stated in one paper indeed that this problem may decide India's choice whether to stay in the Commonwealth or to go outside it. It is a problem which, if not solved, will present ever-recurring difficulties in the future. Some of its implications have been pointed out by a Chatham House Study Group which wrote:

> One of the principal aims of British policy towards colonies and dependencies is to train the native populations in the arts of government and political responsibility in order that at a future date they may be able to govern themselves. The success of this policy will bring about a fundamental change in the Commonwealth. Hitherto the Commonwealth has been composed of self-governing nations of the white races, but in the future it will comprise also self-governing nations of coloured peoples. This will have an important bearing on the various outlooks of the existing member nations, who will then have to accustom themselves to new ways of thinking and to a fresh conception of the British family of nations.

In this connexion the most pressing issue for the Commonwealth is the status of Indians in the Empire. It has always been complicated by political pressures and mistrust. It has been argued, for instance, that in any disputes concerning the status of Indians in the Colonies, the Colonial Office, as advocate for the Colonies, has always had the better of the India Office and, although the number of Indians outside India but in the Empire is only three and a half millions, which seems a small figure when compared with the four hundred millions of Indians in India—as an Indian paper says:

> Certain principles are involved which to the Indian mind are vital, not merely in relation to India's position in the Commonwealth as a whole, but also in relation to her position *vis-a-vis* the British Government. No amount of argument based on hard practical considerations is likely to shake Indian attachment to these principles, certainly not so long as her dispute with the British Government remains unresolved. Moreover, in certain cases, particularly that of South Africa, Indians are convinced that the disabilities from which their countrymen suffer offend against not only

principles of fundamental importance, but also the barest demands of plain justice and logic. Principle (sometimes rather theory perhaps) and legal justice are considerations which exercise a very powerful influence upon Indian thought, and where they are felt to be outraged or denied the arithmetical size of the incident becomes of no consequence at all.

In Canada the only complaint is that the franchise is refused to Indians in British Columbia; in Australia, apart from the whole question of Australian policy on immigration, Indians suffer few disabilities; and in New Zealand there is no discrimination against them at all. In South Africa the situation is unfortunately very different. Indentured Indian labour played an essential part in developing the plantations in Natal, but political steps were taken to withhold from these Indians rights of permanent settlement and citizenship. The Government of India, after much effort on behalf of the labourers, prohibited indentured labour to Natal in 1911, but by then the damage was already done and the problem created. Such a prohibition forty years earlier might have meant the economic ruin of Natal, but there are grounds for arguing that that would have been the lesser of two great evils and the more easily mended. Indian traders also in South Africa suffer many disabilities and ' are segregated by every social means that can most wound their human sentiments', but in spite of all things, 'the Indian community', it is claimed, 'has demonstrated unmistakably that they regard South Africa as their home'. In South Africa the presence of a large native population and the existence of historical memories naturally make colour prejudices more acute than in some other parts of the world, and jealousy of successful cheap trading methods has been the cause of economic discrimination.

In the dependent Empire the status of Indians varies considerably from colony to colony, but in most colonies in which Indians are to be found there are difficulties over the franchise and economic regulations. Denial of the franchise is perhaps the greatest cause for complaint, and it is worth quoting the arguments advanced and the conclusion suggested on this matter in the Indian preparatory paper which deals with it.

If … it is legitimate to expect every Indian settler to reach a clear decision whether he belongs to India or to the country where he has settled, it is equally legitimate for the Indian who decides in the latter sense to claim complete identification and not a grudging recognition which, in effect, perpetuates racial differentiation. The answer, frequently given in the past, that this will encourage similar claims from African or other natives, is no answer at all. Presumably objection is taken to the latter on the ground that they are not yet sufficiently advanced to exercise the franchise intelligently and with a sense of responsibility. No such argu-

ment is available in the case of Indians, who, in their own country, not only have been exercising the franchise for many years but have the firmest and most specific promise of Dominion self-government at the earliest practicable date. This is an outstanding example of the weight which must be attached to sentiment. Much has been said of the undefined but powerful bonds which cement the units of the Commonwealth. These are in effect bonds of sentiment. If India is to remain in the Commonwealth and give it the large additional strength which it lies in India's power to give, Indian sentiment must also be encouraged to find advantage in the bonds that bind it.

The problem is far from simple. In Malaya, for instance, as a United Kingdom contribution points out, 'the indigenous Malayan people are now outnumbered by Chinese and Indian immigrants, from whom they are divided by both racial and religious differences'. The indigenous population would not welcome a franchise which placed them in what might be a permanent minority in their own natural country.

The question of migration, then, and the racial factors which complicate it are not problems merely affecting the relationship between white and coloured peoples. The colour question is an additional source of difficulty; it is not the basic trouble. As a United Kingdom paper explains,

> Indian interest is in the utmost freedom of her nationals to settle in other parts of the Commonwealth and in their attainment of equal political status with other communities in the territories where they settle. In Africa, for instance, this interest conflicts with the aims of both Europeans and Africans. The former are afraid of being politically outnumbered; the latter fear that the Indian community may obtain a monopoly of trade and skilled labour and thus block what should be the normal economic development of the African.

A solution of this most complicated problem seems to be a necessary factor in the peaceful development of the Commonwealth.

During recent years unceasing attempts have been made to solve the problems of India's political future and there is no doubt that the negotiations will continue until a satisfactory conclusion has been reached. India will then be free to take her place as a member of the British Commonwealth equal in status with the other members or, if she prefers to do so, to cut her connexion with the Commonwealth altogether. The Commonwealth would regret and would suffer from her departure if she chose to leave. The whole Commonwealth has a common interest in the solution of the problems that vex relations with India and, as the same paper points out, if India is regarded as being of importance to the

Commonwealth 'agreement should be, and indeed must be, forthcoming'.

The Commonwealth is composed of free nations equal in status. Whether or not they are equal in function is open to question and does not affect their sovereign independence. But equality of status, it might be argued, demands an absence of discriminaton and, says an Indian paper,

> so strong is Indian sentiment upon this point, and so compelling the conviction in Indian minds that their claims are just, that rather than accept any position of inferiority or qualified membership India is likely to consider seriously forgoing other advantages which she might obtain. If this is correct, and if indeed it is a matter of concern to the Commonwealth that India should become a willing partner, it is worth while attempting to formulate both the demands that India will make and the concessions to which she must agree.

Problems connected with the movement of Asiatic peoples and the status of Indians in the Commonwealth and Empire will require patient treatment. The problem of white migration into the Dominions is of an entirely different character. Unless white immigration can be continued, the Dominions may well be faced with-a decline in their white population. There was a time when the question was one of effecting a better distribution of the white population within the Empire, but now the birth-rates in every part of the Commonwealth, with the exception of French Canada, have fallen below the level necessary to keep their future populations stable.

The main Canadian preparatory paper shows that without any question Canada will have to revise the immigration policy which was in force before the outbreak of war, although the correct policy for the future is not indicated. In the nineteen-twenties there was on the whole a substantial amount of immigration into Canada, but it was found impossible to supply from the British Isles and Northern Europe all the immigrants who were required and Canada, not altogether willingly, had to receive an increasingly large proportion from Central and Southern Europe. Throughout that period the emphasis in immigration was on agricultural settlement. In the nineteen-thirties the world depression was the cause of a rigidly enforced policy of exclusion. After this war Canada will probably desire expansion in immigration, but her problem will be complicated not only by a probable scarcity of the immigrants whom she would be most ready to welcome but also by the opposition of the people of Quebec, who at present number 30 per cent of the population of Canada and who do not wish their proportion of the total population to be lowered by large-scale immigration.

The myth of the 'wide open spaces' was exploded during the years of depression before the war. The spaces are certainly wide but, if immigration policies fail to give due consideration to world trade and economic conditions, they will be peopled only by the bones of false hopes.

It seems to be fairly certain that Great Britain will only be able to supply a small number of emigrants, so small that they will not have any appreciable effect in helping to solve the population difficulties of the Dominions. But it is thought that, as a short-term policy to assist demobilization, a small amount of migration to the Dominions may be considered by the British Government, but the much more fundamental problem as regards migration on any large scale is likely to be the question whether there will be an expanding world economy to which the Dominions can adjust themselves. Canada's capacity for absorbing immigrants has for many years depended in part on the capacity and willingness of the United States to accept immigrants from Canada herself. Since 1931, however, the United States has placed restrictions on this immigration of Canadians, and if these restrictions are maintained it seems to be possible that the urban centres of Canada herself will have to absorb her surplus rural population, and the immediate problem for Canada will be not to arrange immigration but to develop her industries and secure an expansion of foreign markets for her surplus agricultural products. It has been suggested that the problem of her own rural surplus, which before the war could not be absorbed into industry, may make the United States unable to accept the surplus population from Canada's rural areas.

Australia may be more ready than Canada to accept immigrants and indeed is likely to need them to offset the steady decline in the Australian birth-rate between the years 1922 and 1934. Australia's policy, however, will be complicated by economic factors. A considerable increase in the mechanization of agriculture has been taking place during the last few years and the rural birth-rate has been fairly high. Technical advances in industry during the war may, at any rate in the immediate future, impose new limits on the absorptive capacity of industry. If this is so, Australia will now have the same problem as Canada had before the war, a surplus rural population which her industries cannot absorb. An Australian paper, in discussing the question of immigration from European sources, says:

there is the important consideration that a policy of full employment and industrial expansion will of its own accord create new jobs and a constantly growing demand for labour. Such conditions should attract individual migrants without any question of planned immigration schemes.

Migrants of this type would undoubtedly be welcome, as there is a deep-rooted feeling that the country needs a larger population and that the migrants are acceptable provided they can find an immediate job and are readily absorbed without setting up national groups.

New Zealand is not likely to be able to accept a large number of immigrants. She too will have a surplus rural population and the possibilities of her accepting immigrants will depend to some extent upon her ability to expand her light industries. Past experience has suggested that the country-born Australians and New Zealanders provide the most satisfactory labour for their countries' rural needs. It is immigrants with industrial experience and above all with technical knowledge that these two Dominions will most welcome, but now that every effort of the United Kingdom will have to be employed in a struggle to increase her export trade, those are the very people she will least be able to afford to lose. This fact is appreciated in papers from New Zealand and Australia. Another complicating factor in the immediate post-war years will be the problems caused by demobilization in the Dominions themselves.

An Australian paper suggests that a great deal of good might be accomplished for the benefit of all the countries of the Commonwealth by arrangements for the employment of small numbers of particular types of people in whatever place in the Commonwealth their services might be required. For example, a skeleton staff of skilled operatives might be transferred from the United Kingdom to Australia to establish a factory there and then might either return to the United Kingdom or go to another part of the Commonwealth if necessary. * The extent of the movement would depend upon the degree to which post-war development indicated that labour in particular industries was redundant in one country and in short supply in another.' Social security benefits and pensions are becoming more uniform throughout the Commonwealth. This is a factor which would be essential for any such scheme as that just suggested. It is, however, not likely that a scheme of this kind would absorb any large number of immigrants although it might have a value in increasing the volume of industry of the Dominions and so making possible a larger absorptive capacity in the future.

It is recognized that emigration from the United Kingdom in the future is likely to be small, nor will the birth-rate of the democracies of Western Europe allow much emigration from those countries either. The only European surplus upon which the Dominions could draw to any large extent are the populations of Central and South-Eastern Europe, the parts of the European continent whose emigrants the Dominions have in the past been least willing to receive. Even that source is not certain to be available,

because it is possible that European economy will demand a revival of industry in Central Europe and that the surplus population of the European continent would probably prefer to move to a neighbouring country than to emigrate across the world. If they were available, however, the opinion of a New Zealand paper is that a small infiltration of people from Southern Europe, and even from certain parts of Asia,

would have a stimulating influence on New Zealand culture and economic techniques, but the problems of absorption and fears of competition from those accustomed to lower standards of living would raise strong objections in New Zealand to immigration of these peoples on any scale.

Another New Zealand paper maintains that

A healthy international economy remains a better safeguard of New Zealand's prosperity and security than any rapid increase in population.

The hope is expressed in one Australian paper that Americans may settle in Australia especially as a result of knowledge of Australian conditions gained during the war. American immigrants, it is believed, would have energy and the pioneer spirit and sufficient capital to tide them over the first period when they would be getting established in Australia. At the same time complicating factors were envisaged by a Research Group in Melbourne who believe that Australia will be expected to accept a certain number of dispossessed people as settlers, but they are of opinion that an international arrangement would be necessary to finance these immigrants during their first non-productive years.

In this connexion an Australian view on the relation between employment policy and Asiatic immigration might be quoted:

A policy of full employment will be likely to strengthen the anti-immigration attitude of the community by bolstering up the old Trade Union principle of limiting membership to ensure enough jobs to go round. This attitude will probably find its immediate outlet in opposition to the immigration of Eastern races. It must be admitted that from a logical standpoint of labour supply there would be undoubted advantages in the admission of controlled numbers of Asiatic migrants for particular industries. But such a policy would at once bring them all the disadvantages of a quota system of immigration as well as the special problems associated with mixed races. In the circumstances there seems little likelihood of a change in Australia's attitude towards coloured immigrants.

The dependence of migration upon world economics is generally recognized. An Australian paper points out the change of outlook which has taken place since the days of the Dominions Royal Commission of 1913 to 1917. It says:

That Commission undertook a survey of the resources of British countries, but was concerned only with the extent to which they could be developed for the benefit of the Empire as a whole. Any survey in the future must be the concern of each country, and the possibilities of markets must be considered outside as well as within the ambit of the British Commonwealth. A recognition of that diversity of interest among British countries is essential. The problem of markets must be considered internationally. The development of Canada must be considered in relation to America, and the development of Australia in relation to Asia, as well as to the United Kingdom or to the other Dominions.

It must be inferred from the tenor of the same paper that the phrase 'the development of Australia in relation to Asia* refers solely to matters of trade and does not imply any relaxing of the White Australia policy. A United Kingdom paper, on the other hand, appreciates the international nature of the problem of migration and at the same time hints at a necessity for changes in racial policies:

If migration to the Dominions is to be on any large scale after the war it seems probable that increased attention will have to be given to the emphasis by the Overseas Settlement Board in their Report of 1918 as regards the shift in centres of population pressure, and that consideration will have to be given to the question of migration to the Empire from areas both in Europe and elsewhere suffering from the burden of overpopulation. From this point of view it seems likely that both in the interests of the Empire itself and of the world in general the peopling of the Empire may have to be regarded, at least in part, as an international problem, of which the importance is obvious, for a satisfactory solution may well prove to be a significant factor, not only in the expansion of world economy, but also in the maintenance of friendly international relations.

The Commonwealth and the Colonies

THE largest part of the dependencies of the Commonwealth is under the administration of the United Kingdom, but Australia and New Zealand also control some dependencies and administer territories under mandate, and South Africa accepted the mandate of German South-West Africa after Germany's defeat in 1918. The Colonies offer to the nations of the Commonwealth great opportunities for co-operation in the service of the colonial peoples; they present strategic opportunities and responsibilities; and they necessitate international organization and action of various kinds. In the past colonies have been made the cause, perhaps sometimes the excuse, for international disputes, but, if colonial problems are

tackled with wisdom in the future, they may well be one of the means of inculcating a sense of international co-operation.

Speaking in the House of Lords on 3 December 1942, Lord Cranborne said: ' The ultimate objective of our policy is to promote self-government in the Colonies. We seek to retain all that is good in the existing social and political system, but we aim also to graft it on to modern ideas and the lessons of our own experience, so that finally the peoples of even the most backward colonies may become fit for free institutions, self-government by the people as a whole. … It must clearly be our aim to equip colonial peoples to administer their own affairs, whether this goal is near or far.' The position of the Colonies along this road varies immensely. Ceylon, for instance, is not far from the goal; Southern Rhodesia has full responsible government in internal affairs, subject to certain formal safeguards in regard to native policy, while others are in the very early stages. With certain exceptions, such as Malta, they fall geographically into six regions—the Caribbean, East Africa, West Africa, South Africa, South-East Asia and the South Seas. In the colonial sphere, as in so many others, thought has been developing recently along regional lines, and the preparatory papers accept a regional approach to colonial problems as the right method for the future. One idea is common to all these papers: the regional organizations, whatever their functions are to be, must include representatives of countries outside as well as inside the British Commonwealth, though, at the same time, it is suggested in one contribution that possibilities of co-operative work are open to the nations of the Commonwealth to an even greater degree than can exist in respect of people of other nationalities.

It is an accepted principle of colonial administration throughout the British Commonwealth that the welfare of the native peoples must be the first object of colonial administration. There are difficult problems to be solved. One is the attitude of the white settlers and employers, which is sometimes conditioned by a greater desire to acquire private profits than to advance the civilization of the natives. One Australian paper says:

> The dependence of Europeans on cheap indentured labour also means their views on what is good for the natives are usually opposed to those of educationists and others interested in training them for self-government. All sorts of excuses are made for discouraging the establishment of schools, for example, and even medical services are in some quarters frowned upon as unnecessary pampering.

The same pamphlet gives a vivid description of the European employer's sense of pride and feeling of superiority:

> It is difficult to see how the native can discover much about us when all

but a small—though notable—minority of island employers look upon him as a ' stupid kanaka' or a ' bloody nigger' and, far from cultivating his acquaintance, do not learn to speak to him even in correct pidgin English.

But it is not only the antagonism of some of the white employers that has to be overcome by an administration which aims at the improvement of native welfare. Sometimes the native peoples themselves fail to understand the purpose of regulations introduced for their benefit, and the administration finds itself opposed by both natives and Europeans. A study written in New Zealand instances difficulties of this kind which the New Zealand colonial service has had to meet:

New Zealand has deliberately adopted a policy in all her dependencies of regarding the welfare of the natives as a first charge on her administration, and liberal financial assistance has been forthcoming to advance this policy. There are limits, however, to its success. In the Cook Islands and Western Samoa there has been recurring friction with the white population, who naturally have been somewhat irate at seeing their interests relegated to second place. Again, the natives themselves have not always taken kindly to the measures intended for their welfare, probably, in part, because these measures have not always been put into operation with sufficient tact and gradualness, nor their likely repercussions adequately studied. The prolonged troubles in Western Samoa were a striking example of the difficulties involved, for there both European and native discontents were joined.

One conclusion that must be drawn from a study of the preparatory papers is that no nation in isolation can fulfil its obligations to native peoples under the principle of trusteeship. Lord Hailey discusses the meaning of ' exploitation' in his book on *The Future of Colonial Peoples,* which is included in the Royal Institute's contributions to the documentation of the Conference. He shows how the word, as used in connexion with colonies, has two meanings. On the one hand, he says,

it represents in general terms the sentiment that a controlling Power should seek no special advantage from the exercise of its trusteeship. Reduced to more concrete terms, exploitation may in practice take two forms. In the first place it may . . . involve the use of political control to secure monopoly rights or discriminations in favour of the commerce of the colonial Power. That is not a matter which concerns only the interest of international trade, or the availability of raw materials in the world's markets. It may have a reaction on conditions in the dependency itself, since it may restrict the return its people can obtain for its products, or may limit their capacity to purchase imported commodities. It is in the

latter respect that its influence may be most important, since it may curtail the supply of articles necessary for raising the standard of native life.

On the other hand, it means the use of foreign capital in a colony and, in his opinion,

if a correct and enlightened policy can be guaranteed in this respect, then the colonies require not less but more 'exploitation* by foreign capital. It is often the chief source from which an administration can obtain the means of expanding the social services in a colony. There is, moreover, in many cases a very striking contrast between standards of native life in areas in which foreign capital has been engaged and those which have been dependent on purely native production.

A New Zealand paper discusses the development of potential colonial resources in these words:

This greater use of resources is potentially beneficial not only to the people of the world in general but to the natives of the territory, in so far as they participate in it and achieve the necessary adjustments. But can the rest of the world wait till they feel moved to act themselves ? This is posing an artificial question, for without outside pressure and contacts there would be little reason to expect change. In this whole question the complicating factor is that economic development in colonial regions has been in the hands of private enterprise seeking profit, with native development taking a secondary place. Governments have restricted the activities of private enterprise in the native interest, but the important fact remains that in all the countries involved in the government of South-West Pacific dependencies the economic system remains substantially on a basis of private enterprise working for profit. Attempts to develop the economic level of the natives to a point where they would enjoy real equality would not be regarded with favour, because of the conflict with the system of private enterprise. Even modest attempts in the past, such as government aid in marketing native produce, have revealed this. Thus to native conservatism is added private European interest as an obstacle to progressive change. This constitutes a great difference from the conditions under which it is recorded that rapid changes in the economic level of backward peoples, accompanied by cultural and political development, have been achieved in the Soviet Union, involving the pangs of change but liberating the majority of the people concerned into participation in a larger world. Economic development under the conditions of the South-West Pacific must involve some disrupting effects on the native structure from the outside. In so far as the natives respond to these outside economic demands they tend to become in some degree hewers of wood and drawers of water. The experience of those who participate does not usually lead to developments among their own people. Where the natives do not

respond, a labour problem arises with the possibility of the added complication of imported indentured labour. So long as either of these conditions prevails, autonomy of an island dependency would in practice mean the autonomy of a European community, with improved facilities for exploitation of a subject people.

In the economic field there is no disagreement in any of the preparatory papers with the assertion that international participation is necessary and that international consideration of colonial needs is essential. The papers appreciate that foreign capital, which is necessary for colonial progress, will not be attracted to the dependencies unless it is likely to receive an adequate interest, and that reasonable policies must therefore be evolved to harmonize the interests of the natives and the foreign investor. This harmonization must be brought about because, in the words of an Australian paper, ' it is apparent that after this war, as before it, the colonial question, in its international aspect, depends basically on the degree of international economic collaboration that is attainable'. The same paper goes so far as to advocate that international commissions, somewhat similar to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations but applying to colonial dependencies as well as to mandated territories, ' should be directly responsible for planning and financing economic development, direct investment by individuals or other private interests being excluded unless with the respective commission's unanimous approval'.

From an examination of the other preparatory papers it seems to be by no means certain that such definite powers would gain general acceptance, although it would be agreed that 'the acid test of the sincerity of our enunciations of the trustee principle to-day will be whether the advanced states are willing to limit their claims to the extent which the paramountcy of native welfare requires'. The point at issue is the functions of the regional councils and of any central international colonial bureau which may be set up after the war.

There has been much argument in many countries about the authority which regional councils ought to have. Should they be purely advisory ? Should they have the right of inspection and of reporting on the administration and condition of colonies to a central international body ? Should they themselves administer the colonial territories which are now administered by individual nations ? A good deal of the discussion has been brought about by reason of American criticism, which, as one United Kingdom paper observes, often underrates the problems of colonial administration and ' fails to appreciate the point of view of the colonial peoples themselves'. It was American criticism which caused Mr. Churchill

to make his most outspoken declaration that Britain would continue to be responsible for the administration of her colonial empire. This question of responsibility has been much discussed and both the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Colonies have categorically stated that the responsibility for the administration of dependencies should remain with the United Kingdom. With this judgement the three political parties seem to agree. Certainly experience of international executive responsibility has not suggested that it would produce efficient administration or be to the advantage of the colonial peoples themselves. The native Press and political elements in some of the dependencies of the United Kingdom have shown strong opposition to the suggestion of introducing international administration. This has been particularly so in the West Indies, where the people have always had a strong liking for British institutions, but in West and East Africa also educated native opinion has felt that the promotion of self-governing institutions is more likely to be advanced by the British Government, which they know, than by an international body with which they have had no previous contact.

It is reasonable to assume that regional councils will be set up and that they will be advisory in character. They are likely to be composed of representatives not only of the colonial powers but of other nations with interests in the regions concerned. A Canadian group which discussed colonial questions came to the conclusion that Canada had certain interests in colonies, although she did not administer any. This group decided that Canada had a humanitarian interest in seeing that colonies were well administered and decided that some kind of international supervision was necessary, but yet there was disagreement on the question whether Canadians should enter the colonial administrative service. But Canada's main interest in colonies seemed to be concerned with economic opportunity, including markets, access to foodstuffs and materials not available in Canada, and investment of surplus capital. It is recognized in all the Conference papers that American co-operation particularly on the economic side is likely to be an essential factor in the success of regional councils. The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission is a hopeful foundation for a true regional council for that area and, as one paper says, 'if the step-over from Anglo-American domination to true regional collaboration can be accomplished rapidly, it has a chance of bringing to the peoples a measure of prosperity unattainable under the narrow exclusiveness of purely local or purely imperial rule'.

There also seems to be fairly general agreement that the native peoples themselves ought to be represented on whatever regional councils are created. It is realized that, unless this were so, the

councils would be in danger of advocating measures which might not be acceptable to the native peoples.

Within the framework of international councils for the development of colonial areas particular opportunities are open for co-operation among the nations of the Commonwealth itself. In this connexion it is important to take account of the differences of opinion which are held in the Commonwealth on the subject of the relations between white and indigenous peoples, and account must also be taken of the fact that some of the Commonwealth countries have had less experience in colonial matters than others. An Australian paper goes so far as to say that the Australian people as a whole have been intensely apathetic towards their dependencies and mandated territories. It might have been expected that the attachment to Australia of that part of New Guinea which was conquered during the last war would have led to 'an extension of the Australian horizon'. In fact, however, in the opinion of an Australian paper, it did nothing of the sort. This writer hopes that the experience of the present war may have produced new interests in the Australian mandates and dependencies. He says:

> This, at any rate, may be said with some certainty, that the problem of the New Guinea natives cannot be solved in the future in that atmosphere of public unconcern which existed before the war. Whether the new interest will be advantageous or not to the individuals concerned, it is too early to determine.

In this connexion also some paragraphs from a United Kingdom paper are worth quoting:

> Informed opinion in Britain, which is interested in colonial questions as a whole, favours the view that the indigenous peoples of the colonies should have equal opportunities, economic and political, with any immigrant groups, and this is generally regarded as a principle of British colonial philosophy.
>
> How far this principle has been upheld is a matter of controversy. In the case of East and Central Africa, the friends of the African assert that the immigrant European communities are over-represented politically and receive more than their share of the services which the State provides. The representatives of the white communities for their part consider that their interests are neglected and their needs not understood by a British public and bureaucracy which is remote from their problems, and demand further extension of their political power with self-government at an early date as their goal. In Northern Rhodesia, with its large mining industry, the demand for an industrial colour bar has begun to be made. British Governments up to now have stood firm on two principles—that responsible government is not to be conceded until the native peoples can share

in the responsibility, and that legislation imposing an economic colour bar is not to be introduced in British dependencies.

The attitude of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia on this matter is diametrically opposed to this view. South Africa's political and economic policy makes the maintenance of European culture and preservation of European supremacy its first aim. In pursuit of this aim South Africa has established separate political institutions for Africans and passed a complex of legislation reserving skilled industrial employment for the white population.

Southern Rhodesian policy closely resembles that of the Union, though here the colour bar is maintained by custom rather than by law. This policy finds considerable sympathy among the white populations of the British dependencies and a sympathy which is expressed in the movement for the amalgamation of the Rhodesias, and in a vaguer way in the references to 'looking towards South Africa' which emanate from time to time from Kenya.

The basis of this attitude is perhaps a belief that the white inhabitants of Africa are the natural leaders of the black peoples of that continent. The latest expression of this feeling is a motion passed in the Kenya Legislative Council in the first weeks of this year, asking that a conference should be convened under the leadership of the Union to include non-official representatives from Kenya Colony to discuss post-war plans. The proposer of the motion putting it forward, said: ' Planning for Africa must be done in Africa.'

It is not known whether Australia will adopt a colonial philosophy resting on a colour bar when she sets about the reconstruction of New Guinea. If her former apathy changes to interested concern for the development of her dependencies it is to be hoped that with this change there will go an increasing sense of the moral obligation of white civilization towards coloured peoples, which one Australian writer believes to be absent from the thought of his countrymen. No analogy can be drawn in this connexion from the White Australia policy and the past treatment of the aborigines in Australia herself. From New Zealand comes an opinion that 'greater co-ordination is necessary in the administration of the islands of the Pacific', and that in spite of different cultures and backgrounds all the native groups 'have the common problem of adaptation of an ancient culture to the changed conditions of the modern world'. The conclusion is drawn that ' if the principle of trusteeship is to be recognized, the common duty of all administrations must be to cushion the shock to the natives and make the transition as painless as possible, so that the changes do not leave the native with his old world shattered and without firm foundations in the new'.

Consideration of national points of view is essential if it is to be

possible, as a United Kingdom paper hopes it will be, to use 'the advice and co-operation of other members of the Commonwealth in the development of those dependencies which are still the direct responsibility of the Mother Country', and if conversely the colonial experience of the United Kingdom is to be of use to the Dominions, and if the experience of one Dominion is to be of help to another. This United Kingdom paper goes on to say that

there is also the point of view of the Dominions to be considered. There have been a number of pointers (including the Canberra Conference and various utterances by Field-Marshal Smuts) which indicate that the Dominions feel that the time has come when they, as members of the Commonwealth, should have some say in future policy regarding those colonies which lie in the region in which they have special strategic or economic interests, or both. This is a very reasonable contention, strengthened in the case of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, by the fact that they themselves, as mandatories, are directly responsible for certain dependencies or mandates in these regions.

A Chatham House Study Group examined the question of Commonwealth co-operation within an international framework. They concluded that there might be a place for

an organization, purely Commonwealth in membership, possibly a Consultative or Advisory Committee comparable to the Commonwealth Air Transport Council, which should meet and exchange views on colonial problems before such views are discussed at conferences of the international colonial organization.

They explained that

These Conferences would make it possible for the philosophies of colonial government held by various nations of the Commonwealth to be discussed in a Commonwealth circle, in order to minimize divergencies and evolve constructive policies before colonial problems were taken for discussion to an international arena. Dominions without colonial dependencies might well be members of such a Commonwealth organization.

With regard to trade, this Group concluded that it would be desirable to increase Dominion trade with the colonies

in the general interests of expanding world trade as well as in the general interests of the colonial peoples, but Trade Agreements must take account of the international situation, since the Commonwealth as a whole is dependent on the outside world. In the same way, even though an international bank were not to function, it would be impossible as well as undesirable to attempt to work without the United States, which is and will be the chief investment country, although some purpose might be

served by the creation of a Commonwealth Development and Investment Board.

In the spheres of administration and welfare this Chatham House Group saw a clear field of usefulness open to co-operation among the nations of the Commonwealth. They stated that

In this connexion regional councils composed of representatives of many nations will be able to pool the experience of their constituent members and also to arrange for the services of technical experts to be used to the best possible advantage for the whole area. At the same time the nations of the Commonwealth have a particular opportunity for assisting the development of colonial peoples, because of their similarity of outlook on many problems.

Under a colonial policy in which the administration of dependencies remains in the hands of the metropolitan Power, recruitment to its administrative services will probably be confined to its own nationals. Arrangements have been in existence for some years whereby British subjects resident in the Dominions can be selected in their own country for appointment to the Colonial Services and a number of candidates have in fact been recruited from this source. This scheme provides a basis of increased co-operation in the administrative services which would not exist in respect of other nations.

In the technical field there is room for even closer co-operation and joint services can be organized. In the South Pacific there has for some time been close co-operation in the health services. The Central Medical School in Fiji, which draws its finances from American (largely Rockefeller) as well as from British sources but which is under the authority of Fiji, trains native medical practitioners from dependencies of the United States as well as of New Zealand and the United Kingdom. This central training provides for a common approach to the health problems of the area. A more recent development is the Agreement made in 1944 between New Zealand and the United Kingdom, through the Government of Fiji, establishing a Joint Public Health and Medical Service for dependencies of the two Powers in the South Pacific area.

This suggestion for both international and Commonwealth co-operation, if it materialized, would do something to solve a problem which has faced the Colonial Services of New Zealand. This problem can be best explained by a quotation from a New Zealand contribution:

The difficulties which postponed the establishment of the Central Medical School at Fiji for some years and which still prevent its adequate extension are rooted in the divided political control and the various policies operating in the islands of the Central and South-West Pacific. This is

but one illustration of a situation which seriously limits effective development in these islands.

New Zealand's administration in the dependencies has suffered from this situation. She has had to supply administrative staffs without experience in tropical problems. There has been no source from which she could draw a supply of trained men and no place, except the dependencies themselves, to which she could send men for training. From the hard results of experiment and failure her administrative staffs have had to cull their experience.

An essential improvement is the provision of some central Pacific Institute which will do for administrative staffs what the Central Medical School has attempted to do for native medical trainees. Both white staffs and an increasing native group from each dependency could be catered for. Such an Institute would, of course, have to be sponsored by as large a number as possible of the governments having Pacific responsibilities. From such a venture a unified Pacific policy might well emerge based upon an adequate sociological and experimental knowledge.

It is interesting to note that this New Zealand paper suggests the *training* of administrative staffs on an international basis. The Chatham House Group felt, as has already been said, that the *employment* of administrative staffs would have to remain on a Commonwealth basis.

A South Seas Regional Commission is proposed by the Canberra Agreement and much valuable work could be done by it for the benefit of the dependencies of the two Pacific Dominions, but it is recognized that there are problems connected with economic development and strategic problems, especially concerning air bases, which must be discussed in a wider assembly.

Three main conclusions can be drawn from the preparatory papers. In the first place, there is a general acceptance of the principle that the welfare of the native peoples and their development in the direction of self-government must be the primary concern of the controlling Power. In the second place, it is agreed that international collaboration on a regional basis is essential from the point of view of both the colonial peoples and the more advanced races. In the third place, there is evidence to support the claim that within an international order there is room for special collaboration by the member nations of the Commonwealth among themselves. If the goal which is set before the Colonies is self-government, they will, when that goal is reached, presumably be free to leave the Commonwealth or stay in it as self-governing Dominions. A new outlook on the question of racial equality may become necessary. The answer to the question whether the dependencies when they are granted self-government will choose to remain in the

Commonwealth or to go outside it lies in a distant future; but if the British nations truly carry out the principles of trusteeship, it ought not to be in doubt. As Lord Hailey says in the work already quoted:

> as regards the British dependencies, it may be permitted to me to hold that there is in the Commonwealth of the United Kingdom and the British Dominions a union of people which is not only a great force in the world, but is distinguished by conceptions of social order and of political liberties which need not fear comparison with those held by any other nation or community of nations. The prospect of admission to membership of that commonwealth of free peoples should afford to the British colonial peoples an ideal which should inspire them to create for themselves the conditions which justify the grant of independence; it should no less serve to guide them in the use which they may determine to make of the independence they have achieved.

Methods of Consultation and Co-operation

AN example of the special relationship which exists among the nations of the Commonwealth is given by the desire which was shown and the attempts which were made early in the war to form an Imperial War Cabinet in London. Such an Imperial War Cabinet as met during the war of 1914-18 did not, however, assemble during the present war. In October 1939, missions from all the combatant Dominions and India began to arrive in London to discuss the co-ordination of their war efforts, but, although the ensuing gathering was important and valuable, it did not contain the elements necessary for an Imperial War Cabinet and its activities soon came to an end. The most insistent demand for a War Cabinet with Dominion representation came from Australia, and from February to May 1941 the Prime Minister of Australia was a full member of the War Cabinet on equal terms with the British members. But obvious difficulties arose from the continued absence of a Prime Minister from his own country and, although in the summer of 1941 the Prime Minister of New *Zealand* sat in the War Cabinet in London where he was followed by the Prime Minister of Canada in the autumn, and although Field-Marshal Smuts attended in the autumn of 1942 and again in 1943, it was not found possible to form a Commonwealth War Cabinet composed of Cabinet Ministers of each of the member nations. The Canadian Premier declared himself to be satisfied with the existing arrangements and said:

> With regard to an Imperial Cabinet we have in actual practice the most perfect continuous conference of cabinets that any group of nations could

possibly have. I cannot conceive of more effective means of communication than we have at present.

The possibilities for consultative machinery have certainly changed fundamentally since 1918. Radio and long-distance telephones give opportunities for consultation at a distance which were not available then.

When the war with Japan broke out, Australia felt the necessity for closer association with the central direction of the war and Mr. Curtin, the Prime Minister, in a New Year broadcast from Canberra on 27 December 1941, made a clear statement of the importance of American help to Australia in the war in the Pacific and pointed out that strategic considerations inevitably caused Australia to turn to the United States when considering that theatre of war. 'Australian external policy', he said, 'will be shaped towards obtaining American aid and working out, with the United States as the major factor, a plan of the Pacific strategy along with British, Chinese and Dutch Forces.' This declaration stressed a strategic necessity which resulted in the establishment of the Pacific War Councils in London and Washington. The Australian Government, however, still wished for continuous membership of an Imperial War Cabinet. When Dr. Evatt, the Minister for External Affairs, was temporarily in London, he sat in the War Cabinet. In June 1942 the Australian High Commissioner in London was appointed as Australian representative in the War Cabinet, and, in order to carry out his duties there, delegated a large part of his work as High Commissioner to a deputy. He set up an office and staff on the premises of the War Cabinet. New Zealand also requested similar representation on the War Cabinet. The British Government agreed to her request, but the New Zealand Government, in actual fact, nominated her High Commissioner as her representative on the Pacific War Council in London instead. When Mr. Walter Nash was in London as a member of the New Zealand Cabinet, he sat in the British War Cabinet.

South African representation in the War Cabinet in London was also spasmodic. In October 1942 Field-Marshal Smuts was able to come to London, which he visited again a year later, and on both occasions he took part in the deliberations of the War Cabinet.

The fact that it was not possible at any time during the war to arrange for an Imperial War Cabinet to be formed in London, containing Cabinet Ministers from each of the Dominions, was only to be expected, as the duties of such Ministers would inevitably keep them in their own countries; but the fact that the desire for such a Cabinet was so often expressed in certain parts of the Commonwealth indicates the bonds of common interest which unite

the member nations. The machinery for consultation and the close military liaison which were evolved enabled the war effort of the Commonwealth to be directed to the best advantage, but, even so, it was felt necessary in the spring of 1944 to arrange a meeting of all the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth, with the exception of neutral Eire. This gathering was not a session of an Imperial War Cabinet, although in actual fact the Prime Ministers of the Dominions did attend a meeting of the British War Cabinet during their stay in London. Nor was it a meeting of the Imperial Conference. It was a meeting, at the highest level, of the representatives of the member nations of the Commonwealth, including the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia and representatives of India, convened to discuss topics of war and peace. Some of the results of the meeting were published in a Declaration, while many conclusions remained undisclosed. In the House of Commons on 24 May Mr. Churchill said:

> I could not pretend that we have arrived at hard-and-fast conclusions, or precise decisions upon all the questions which torment this afflicted globe: but it can fairly be said that, having discussed a great many of them, there was revealed a core of agreement which will enable the British Empire and Commonwealth to meet in discussion with other great organisms in the world in a firmly knit array. We have advanced from vague generalities to more precise points of agreement, and we are in a position to carry on discussions with other countries within the limits which we have imposed upon ourselves. . . . Nothing was more remarkable than the cordial agreement which was expressed by every one of the Dominion Prime Ministers in the general conduct of our foreign affairs and in the principles which govern that conduct.

The Prime Minister of New Zealand explained afterwards that discussions were not 'concerned so much with constitutional machinery as with specific purposes to be achieved'.

A great deal of work was done during the war by Councils and Combined Boards but the majority of these Boards and Councils was not confined to Commonwealth membership alone. The United States was a member of most of them. One of the outstanding points which could be seen in the organization for the prosecution of the war and the preparations for the organization of peace was the close relationship which existed between the United States and the members of the British Commonwealth.

The policies of Lend-Lease and Mutual Aid were fundamental in the plans made during the war for the distribution of munitions and materials of many kinds. The first step in this direction was taken by the United States Government when it was still neutral.

On 11 March 1941 the Lend-Lease Act was authorized. All the belligerent Dominions as well as the United Kingdom were eligible to receive Lend-Lease. Australia and New Zealand, as well as the United Kingdom, and—to a less extent—South Africa exercised this right, but Canada declined to make use of it because she had no lack of United States dollars. Reciprocal aid started with the arrival of large numbers of United States troops in the various theatres of war, and the United Kingdom and the Dominions concerned supplied reciprocal aid on a very large scale, including such items as the provision of food and other local supplies to the United States Forces and expenditure on their behalf for such capital works as aerodromes, camps and barracks.

Canada provided a remarkable amount of financial assistance, largely to the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand and also to Russia, China and the French Committee of National Liberation. The Canadian Prime Minister explained that the Mutual Aid Act was based on the realization that the provision of materials to the common cause of the United Nations was a duty no less vital than the provision of fighting men. In the financial year 1944-5 Canada voted for this purpose a sum of 800 million dollars. Lend-Lease and Mutual Aid were based upon the desire to avoid the creation of huge war debts between one country and another, which had such an adverse effect after the last war. The principle was clearly stated in various Mutual Aid Agreements which, like that signed between Canada and New Zealand, affirmed the desire of the contracting Governments 'to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between their countries and throughout the world', to save post-war trade from the burden of huge debts and to bring about the economic objectives set out in the Atlantic Charter. As the Australian Minister for External Affairs said in reference to the Mutual Aid Agreement between Australia and Canada, 'this is a further step in pooling the common resources of the United Nations strictly according to the Australian Government's view of further international economic collaboration'.

Membership of the four economic Combined Boards which were set up during the war to facilitate the efficient supply and distribution of food and of materials and goods needed for the prosecution of the war was at first confined to the United Kingdom and the United States, but in November 1942 Canada became a member of the Combined Productions and Resources Board and in October 1943 she also became a member of the Combined Food Board. The four economic Boards were designed to produce materials and goods for the prosecution of the war: the Munitions Assignment Board was created to distribute the entire munitions resources of

the United States and Great Britain which were regarded as being in a common pool.

Broadly speaking, though with some exceptions in detail, these Boards regarded the British Commonwealth and Empire as a unit in their consideration of the distribution of supplies. To facilitate their working, the Commonwealth Supply Council, the London Food Council, and the Empire Clearing House were created to provide co-ordinated pictures of the resources and the requirements of the Commonwealth and Empire.

This method of approach to international problems among the United Nations was to some extent paralleled in the methods which were developed for military co-operation during the war. Here too the forces of the United States and the Commonwealth were co-ordinated and the Supreme Commanders in each theatre of war were in command of both British and American Forces, but within this international framework the British Commonwealth had its own liaison facilities for common training and co-ordination of plans.

Other councils and committees were created, on which the member nations of the Commonwealth, the United States, and many other nations were represented. Among these organizations were the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the United Nations Commission on War Crimes. No combined picture can be given of their membership. It is not possible, for instance, to say that on all the Supply Boards membership was confined to the United States and the United Kingdom, while the United Kingdom was able to present a picture of the resources and requirements of the other nations of the Commonwealth when holding discussions with the United States. Canada was a member of two of these Boards but not of others, while none of the other Dominions were members of any of them. Internationally also some of these organizations had a wider membership than others. But although the picture is not clear-cut, it does show that, in relation to the world as a whole, the nations of the British Commonwealth were regarded as having special relations peculiar to themselves alone. This state of affairs worked well during war and was not taken amiss by any of the nations outside the Commonwealth. Whether these war-time arrangements will be regarded as precedents for peace-time organization in the economic field is a matter for speculation.

A Canadian writer says that this kind of co-operation is for Canada a particularly suitable method of international collaboration. He is talking about purely international collaboration; but such organizations as the Commonwealth Air Transport Council show that the same kind of co-operation can be used within the narrower orbit of the Commonwealth. He says:

. . . Canada stands closer to the great powers than to the small ones and if only by reason of this position is deeply concerned with the development of techniques whereby powers both great and small can be organized.

It will be found that the formula is simple. It is commonly described as a new principle in international relations—the functional principle. Actually, it is not new. It has been used on various occasions in lesser international organizations, such as the Wheat Advisory Committee. But it has never before been applied in a world-wide organization. The experience at Geneva in the inter-war years was of no help. The formula developed at Geneva was the panel system and it is commonly regarded as unsatisfactory.

The credit for the advancement of the functional principle goes to Canada. It was first advocated by Prime Minister King in the House of Commons on 9 July 1943. Mr. King spoke as follows:

' It is too early for me to attempt even a shadowy outline of the form of the international settlement, political and economic, which may follow the ending of hostilities. It may be useful, however, to say a word about one of its aspects. The strong bonds which have linked the United Nations into a working model of co-operation must be strengthened and developed for even greater use in the years of peace. It is perhaps an axiom of war that during actual hostilities methods must be improvised, secrecy must be observed, attention must be concentrated on victory. The time is approaching, however, when even before victory is won the concept of the United Nations will have to be embodied in some form of international organization. On the one hand, authority in international affairs must not be concentrated exclusively in the largest powers. On the other hand, authority cannot be divided equally among all the thirty or more sovereign states that comprise the United Nations, or all effective authority will disappear. A number of new international institutions are likely to be set up as a result of the war. In the view of the Government, effective representation on these bodies should neither be restricted to the largest states nor necessarily extended to all states. Representation should be determined on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries, large or small, which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question. In the world there are over sixty sovereign states. If they all have a nominally equal voice in international decisions, no effective decisions are likely to be taken. Some compromise must be found between the theoretical equality of states and the practical necessity of limiting representation on international bodies to a workable number. That compromise can be discovered, especially in economic matters, by the adoption of the functional principle of representation. That principle, in turn, is likely to find many new expressions in the gigantic task of liberation, restoration, and reconstruction/

Radio, the long-distance telephone and air travel have revolu-

tionized the possibilities of consultation. Daily exchange of information is possible, and on matters of great importance and urgency the Prime Minister of one member nation can talk by telephone with his fellow Prime Ministers throughout the Commonwealth. Such conversations are not conferences, however, and there are some who think that more frequent meetings of Prime Ministers are desirable. The development of air travel may make them possible.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (Viscount Cranborne) stated that 'in many ways the crown of the structure which [had] . . . been built up' was the daily meetings in London of the Dominion High Commissioners, the Secretary of State for the Dominions, with senior members of his staff, and a high official of the Foreign Office. The activities of the Foreign Office were there reported to the High Commissioners, who were able also, through the Foreign Office representative, to acquaint the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with any views which Dominion Governments might hold on specific matters. This daily conference was supplemented by the distribution by the Dominions Office to the Dominion Departments of External Affairs of Foreign Office secret documents, telegrams and other communications. There was a similar service of information from the Dominion Departments of External Affairs to the Dominions Office and also a pooling of intelligence in the various capitals of foreign countries where the Dominions and the United Kingdom have representatives. The arrangements for the sharing of information on foreign affairs and matters of mutual interest were in fact very extensive. In this connexion, however, a criticism contained in a Canadian paper might well be noted:

> It is perhaps worth noting that though there are advantages to the Dominions in the special treatment accorded by the Dominions Office, there are some disadvantages in having Dominions affairs dealt with apart from the main stream of British foreign relationships.

In addition to the liaison between the High Commissioners and the Dominions Office, direct consultation between equivalent Government Departments in the Dominions and the United Kingdom grew up during the war. It was a significant development and, like other measures called into being by the urgency of war, it may well have an important future.

Before the war the machinery for consultation within the Commonwealth was considerable. During the war it increased greatly, especially along functional lines. There is room for a still greater increase. On page 40 reference has been made, for instance, to the suggestion given in a preparatory paper for the creation of a Commonwealth Colonial Committee. The Commonwealth Air

Transport Council, which is one of the more recent additions to the machinery of Commonwealth consultation, is likely to give valuable service in the future.

Papers from every member nation show an appreciation of the future significance of air travel and its many attendant problems of bases and international regulations. The fact that so many strategically placed bases are in Commonwealth possession is an asset which, however, will need very careful treatment. A United Kingdom paper refers to the possession of bases as holding the seed of possible friction with the United States. At the same time the possession of these bases is a source of strength and its significance is clearly understood in a Canadian paper which says:

> . . . Canada's chief bargaining counter in the negotiations of the post-war aviation policy is the possession of essential bases. Canada, for some time to come, will produce little traffic in comparison with the larger countries. The Canadian airplane industry is relatively small. Our great neighbours possess large airplane industries and are the chief originators of traffic. From the Canadian viewpoint, the hub of the matter is: What should we seek in exchange for the use of our bases ?

The future of civil aviation is inevitably related to problems of defence, a fact which makes the provision of adequate machinery for consultation within the Commonwealth all the more important. It is stated in an Australian paper that 'the growth of air transport in Australia is to be measured against the background of Imperial and domestic military requirements'. And again, in discussing Australian policy, the same paper says that 'it is from the proceedings of successive Imperial conferences that the main elements of external air transport policy are to be found'.

When the future of aviation was being discussed in the United Kingdom during the war, the Secretary of State for Air pointed out that in the period after the war Britain would either be in a world dominated by one of the two Great Powers, the United States or the Soviet Union, or the centre of a great Empire bound together by air routes. That sentence forces a consideration of the broad outlines of the future world and the pattern which international organization may take. It is a consideration which involves questions of defence and foreign policy. Those are political questions of the highest order, and any discussion of the machinery which is involved can best be treated in the-chapter devoted to them, because in that connexion machinery and principles are too closely interwoven to be treated separately.

Regionalism as an Approach to Security

THE preparatory papers agree that an international organization is essential for the preservation of peace. Every effort must be made in conjunction with the other countries of the world to bring such an organization into being and to help it to fulfil its purpose. From Canada comes an emphatic sentence in support of the principle of collective security with its necessary corollary of machinery for peaceful change. * Collective security has become synonymous with all the freedoms.' But the experience of recent years has shown that collective security may break down. To admit that does not absolve any nation from its obligation to strive to the utmost to make collective security a success. It is perhaps natural that it is in a paper from the United Kingdom with its memories of 1940 that the wish for a second line of defence should be most clearly expressed. The United Kingdom has commitments all over the world. The security of her sea communications is essential for her existence and necessary for the fulfilment of her responsibilities. Her geographical position and her world-wide risks condition her approach to the problem of security. Collective action through an international organization is accepted without question as the only final solution. But, says a United Kingdom paper,

> A nation which accepts the desirability of a world security organization and is determined to contribute all it can towards making it a success should recognize that to do so it must maintain adequate strength. This is also essential as a measure of re-insurance against the possibility that the international organization might once more fail to fulfil its purpose.

Australia, too, has been in danger of invasion and it is natural that she should feel a similar desire to organize alternative measures of defence on which to fall back if collective security failed. It is advised in an Australian paper that it would be imprudent to rely on collective security without taking other measures as an insurance for Australia's safety. Closer relations with the United States as an addition to membership of the Commonwealth and defensive strategy based on the Pacific islands might, it is suggested, afford the security desired.

These considerations bring two questions to the fore. One concerns the position of the Great Powers in a world security organization; the other asks to what extent regional arrangements could assist the general international scheme for the maintenance of peace. Canadian opinion is insistent on the rights of the smaller Powers; but an Australian writer, while believing that the wishes of the smaller Powers have a right to consideration, has misgivings about the future organization of the nations and fears that, if the Great

Powers keep the formulation of policy in their own hands, the outlook and wishes of the smaller nations will not be adequately recognized. A Chatham House Study Group is more emphatic and reading the indications of the time, asserts that it is a regrettable fact that politics in the present state of the world are based on power and that in the immediate future the Great Powers will dictate the organization of security. In the opinion of this Group the hope of the smaller nations to have an equal vote in the international organization will not as a matter of fact be fulfilled, and so they are concerned to ask how, as the United Kingdom will be much less powerful than her two great partners, it may be possible to enable the voice of British democracy to command respect in the supreme council of the Powers. The United Kingdom has interests and responsibilities all over the world. This Group concluded that regional organization might enable each Dominion to play a full part in the defence of its own area, while at the same time the wider plans of Imperial defence strategy would show the dependence of each region on the security of the lines of communication which connect one region with another and are vital to the fulfilment of Britain's world-wide commitments and responsibilities.

Regionalism as an aid to the attainment of security is an idea favoured by an Australian writer, who at the same time points out that this approach is in 'contrast to the standpoint apparently developing in the Dominion of Canada', where, he says,

> the global organization of an international community appears to be presented as an alternative to either Canadian or Imperial policies. It is safe to say that no such alternatives are present to the Australian mind, and so far as that mind has envisaged international policies at all, they are of a regional character which raises less conflict in the Imperial affiliations.

A Chatham House Group believed that the regional interests of the Dominions and the United Kingdom are severally shared by one or more of the Dominions 'quite apart from their Commonwealth ties or their membership of a wider international economic and political system'. They pointed out, for instance, that

> the Indian Ocean is a region in which Australia, India, South Africa and Great Britain are all deeply concerned, but their common interest in the security of that region links them together in a global sense. Great Britain could not play the part expected of her by the Dominions in the Indian Ocean unless her position in the Mediterranean were secure and her bases maintained round the coasts of Africa and the Persian Gulf.

The idea of regional organization, of breaking down the problem of security into smaller pieces is, from the point of view of the

United Kingdom, a practical way of enabling the other nations of the Commonwealth to co-operate with her in defence, because she realizes that her own forces can no longer guarantee the commitments which have fallen on her in the Commonwealth and Empire. To the average Australian, it is suggested in an Australian paper, an organization for the Pacific area seems to offer the best security for the defence of his homeland. Before the war his connexion with the United Kingdom led him to look at the problems of strategic defence from a European point of view. He thought of East Asia as the Far East rather than as the Near North. The war has naturally had a marked effect in this connexion. The hitherto Far East has indeed become the uncomfortably Near North. In the past Australia has, perhaps, thought little of collective organization and it may be that she still does not think of it in a world-wide way, but she has found that in the South Pacific she is not isolated and that Australians live in a region where danger is very real. This attitude has been expressed clearly in a memorandum on *The Australian Citizens Attitude to Problems in the Pacific:*

> The Australian would feel no discomfort or illogicality in rejecting as impracticable a global security system, and at the same time welcoming a regional system for the Pacific, nor would he be particularly conscious in making such a choice that he was expressing a preference for regionalism over global organization. He would perhaps expressly justify himself by reference to the immediate practical connexion between the strategical dangers and defence problems of the Pacific and his own country. He could probably also feel such a regional organization would provide the bridge on which both Great Britain and the United States might be led towards his own felt needs.

This Australian writer is probably right in thinking that a regional approach to the problem of security has appealed less to Canada than to some other parts of the Commonwealth, but yet a Canadian preparatory paper shows a keen appreciation of the regional interest of Canada in the North Atlantic. In that area many nations are interested and, as the author says,

> The United Kingdom and Canada largely share between them to-day the guarding of the North Atlantic route, but they do so not merely as Commonwealth partners but as members of the North Atlantic Group among the United Nations, in which the United States has an interest that has impelled it recently to accept direct responsibilities in Greenland and Iceland as well as to co-operate with Commonwealth Forces in the area. The French, the Dutch, the Norwegians, and the Danes and Icelanders, also have special interests in relation to the North Atlantic regional problems. Portugal, although not a belligerent, is on the fringe of this regional

group through her ancient and still important association with Britain, and the key situation of the Azores on North Atlantic air routes.

But geography inevitably gives the Canadian an outlook very different from the Australian's. The idea of a North Atlantic or a Pacific regional interest is more remote than the knowledge of a three-thousand-mile frontier with the United States, and the habit of looking at the globe from the British Isles, which before the rude awakening of the war was characteristic of Australians, has no parallel in Canadian thought, which sees clearly that Canada stands in close proximity to Russia and the United States as well as to Great Britain. She is an American nation, and 'recognized even before the war that to safeguard her own identity she must always pull at least her proportionate weight in continental defence'. The success of her policy in this respect was seen in the establishment in August 1940 of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, on which she enjoys equality with her much more powerful neighbour. Her position has been appreciated in an Australian paper which describes her as ' the Dominion inseparably wedded to the United States by geography, strategy and history'.

To quote again from the principal Canadian contribution to the Conference papers:

> Another peculiarity of Canada's position arises from the fact that the French Canadian element, which is a third of the total population, forms the chief centre of French tradition and culture outside of France. The conventional view that French Canada cares nothing for France has been disproved by the extent to which the latter's political problems have been reflected in Canada since the summer of 1940. French Canada might not necessarily take up arms for the defence of France, but it would hardly be persuaded to take up arms against France. A cardinal aim of Canadian foreign policy, therefore, must be to see that France and Great Britain do not fall into opposing camps.

In addition to her strategic and economic ties with the United States and her cultural bonds with France, Canada is on the direct air route between the United States and Russia, whose shores she faces across the Northern Pacific. She must balance her policies with those of both the United States and the United Kingdom and adopt a policy towards Russia that will harmonize with the relationships existing between those three Great Powers. She has a cardinal interest in seeing that good relations exist between them, because any signs of discord between them would be an indication of danger to herself.

!* Until recently Canadians believed with reason that Canada's geographical position isolated her from the dangers of war arising

from Europe or the Far East. It is now realized that the progress of aviation has fundamentally changed her position. As a Canadian paper puts it, 'the idea that Canadians live in a "fire-proof" house has gone the way of England's moat*. The writer goes on to say:

without desiring to be alarmist, the fact to-day is that we are a small power existing between great powers. Aviation has made us a buffer state. All the aviation routes to North America pass across Canadian territory. In the air world we are the cockpit of North America. The roof on the 'fire-proof house has vanished.

As another Canadian paper explains:

Canada's northern position also qualifies her role among the countries of the Western Hemisphere, since she is at least as significantly part of the Northern Hemisphere as part of the Western. Among the nations of the Americas, furthermore, she is the only one whose national position is not identified in its own tradition with a revolutionary severance of old world connexions. Her distinctiveness among American nations is reflected in the fact that the Pan-American union, being confined to the American Republics, does not include Canada.

The geographical fact of facing onto two oceans and her remarkable economic progress have on the whole given Canada an international sense of a global rather than a regional kind. Australia, on the other hand, has been on the verge of the abyss and if collective security seems remote, protection based on the fringe of islands which lie between her and the Asiatic danger seems much more valuable. Moreover, although

theoretically Australia was a small and strategically vulnerable community which should have had everything to gain and little to lose by combining in an effectively operative security system, the scepticism of a frontier community had full play on the international plane.

The effect of the war seems to have been to expand the frontier but not yet to break it down. And then, too, the danger from the southward advance of the Japanese was averted by the United States at a time when Australians and United Kingdom troops were fighting together against the common enemy elsewhere. The result has been to dispel the Australians' belief in the security afforded by isolation in the southern seas and to make them feel that their future safety depends on agreements with the United Kingdom and the United States and a defensive screen protecting Australia and New Zealand, with whom she has admitted her common interests in the Canberra Agreement. For the idea of collective security in a global sense there is still apathy in the

mind of the average Australian. To quote once more from the Australian paper on problems in the Pacific:

> How far have war experiences, including immediate danger of a conspicuous character, affected the national attitude to the problem of collective security? Can it be said that the threat of invasion, and revealed dependence upon the forces of two great Powers, have directed the public mind towards the advantages of a general system of collective security, in which the inadequacies of local resources may be compensated by mutual assistance in time of need? It is fairly clear that the war experiences have engendered no such point of view. The total discussion in Australia up to the present time upon the shape and nature of the post-war world has been inconsiderable, and of such discussion as has taken place little has been concerned with the problem of collective security. War experience has had little effect in modifying either the scepticism or the apathy which previously existed.
>
> It is not to be supposed that any effective opposition, or even expressed criticism, would emanate from the public as a whole, or the Government, if actual discussions between important Powers should result in the promulgation of new global security plans. Australia would go along with proposals mutually acceptable to Great Britain and the United States. On the other hand, the public would be disinclined to consider universal schemes of security as offering practical alternatives to the combination of self-help and alliances which may be said to form the hazy and unannounced basis of Australia's future security policy. It is difficult to estimate how far the war experiences have strengthened those sections of the British public who believed in the possibility of organizing a genuine collective system, and how far the same experiences may have added substantial followers to the pre-existing group whose *a priori* reasoning had led them to promulgate these doctrines. It may be, indeed, that experience has directed attention away from constitutional frameworks of a general nature. On the other hand, it may be that the public will be more convinced by the reiteration of adherents to the League, who are able now to add evidentiary support—'we told you so'—to the somewhat arid elaborations with which they have previously decorated the problem. Whatever may be the course of opinion in Great Britain, it is safe to say that less, rather than more, attention has up to the present been paid to the problem in Australia.
>
> Much of the foregoing demonstrates an unconscious resistance in the Australian public mind to policies based upon broad ideological principles. In this, perhaps, the Australian democracy is not as different from those overseas as enthusiastic sections would have us believe. It is more remarkable, however, that the experiences which followed the fall of Singapore were unable to achieve any more conspicuous effect than ideologica enthusiasts had been able to achieve in their turn. It would be satisfying,

but unconvincing, to explain this result as the product of a national *sang froid.* It is more likely that the public mind has become convinced that only close association with the United States and Great Britain can solve its otherwise insoluble strategic difficulties.

A belief that Australian security depends to a large extent on close relationship with the United States is a prominent feature of the papers submitted by Australian writers, who understand the reciprocal advantages of Australian-American collaboration. It may well be that past American policy will be reversed and that the United States will fortify her western Pacific islands, thus having a strong chain of fortifications across the ocean, but, even so, there would be great strategic advantages to America in an arrangement which made it possible for her to use additional bases in Australia and the Australian dependent territories. ' Australia has agricultural and industrial resources to support armed forces in times of emergency/ it is pointed out, 'whereas the western Pacific islands are essentially outlying fortifications and cannot be self-supporting/ Another paper, examining the factors in the defence of Australia, says that the future attitude of Australia will inevitably be affected by the gratitude due to the United States in the recent war and in consequence, although as far as equipment and material are concerned British models and patterns will continue to be Australia's first choice, co-operation with America will in the future be a fundamental consideration in plans for the defence of the Southern Pacific because ' we will always have in the back of our mind that it may not be wise to put all our eggs in the British basket'. The joint strategic interests which Australia shares with New Zealand have been put on record in the Canberra Agreement, which also expressed a realization of the need for agreements with the Netherlands East Indies with whom the two Dominions have common interests.

A New Zealand paper on *Collective Security in the Pacific* naturally supports the Australian recognition of the necessity for American co-operation in the South Seas. It shows how serious a dilemma New Zealand would be placed in if there were friction between Great Britain, with whom she has the closest economic links, and the United States, on whom, as the war has just shown, she must rely primarily for her defence. The same paper clearly states the case for a regional strategy for the defence of the South Pacific.

The security of Australia and New Zealand depends ultimately upon control of the fringe of islands north and north-west of Australia and stretching across to western Samoa and the Cook Islands, and the use of their own and of international forces from those bases. With these islands

effectively held as air bases supported by naval forces, any incursion to Australia and New Zealand can be checked, and even allowing for the great range of modern aircraft sporadic raids could be made costly. Hence the proposal in the Canberra Pact that 'within the framework of a general system of world security, a regional zone on defence comprising the South and South-West Pacific areas shall be established, and that this zone should be based on Australia and New Zealand', and that 'it would be proper for Australia and New Zealand to assume full responsibility for policing, or sharing in policing, such areas in the South-West and South Pacific as may from time to time be agreed upon'.

The paper goes on to say that the defence of New Zealand could be facilitated by the existence of an international air force under international control working from bases on the Pacific islands.

Three Indian papers deal with the defence of India and conclude that a regional arrangement is the only answer to India's strategic needs. A Chatham House Study Group recognized that for the United Kingdom also it is * a strategic vital interest that the entrances of the Indian Ocean should be commanded by herself or by her undoubted friends' and that ' Australia and New Zealand are primarily concerned with the security of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean', while of course South Africa cannot be apathetic to the affairs of the Indian Ocean, which is a region in which a large part of the British Commonwealth is thus vitally interested. For India herself the security of the Indian Ocean is essential. As an Indian preparatory paper points out, 'Over 90 per cent of the external trade of India is carried over these oceanic routes'. It has always been so. India is cut off from the rest of Asia by the world's highest mountains and her economic life has consequently always been dependent on the sea. The writer of the same paper is alive to the possibilities of future dangers. An effective system of world collective security would neutralize such risks, but the writer has examined them with a view to a regional insurance scheme in case of a breakdown of a wider international system. He looks at Russia and says:

> The old claim of Russia was for access to the Aegean, but the absolute control of the Mediterranean which is bolted and barred at both ends renders this access, even if achieved, only a partial realization of Russia's urge to the sea. It is to open waters of the individual sea that she seeks entry, and with the shifting of economic life to the east of the Urals and with the development of Central Asia her eyes must perforce be turned to the Persian Gulf.

The possibility of Russian expansion southwards was in the minds of a United Kingdom Group also, and they, like writers in

Canada and Australia, are of opinion that the most essential need of the future is a harmony of policy between the United States, Russia and the nations of the British Commonwealth. India's geographical position naturally forces her to think deeply about the great power of the Soviet Union. Another Indian paper remarks that the Middle East has become more important strategically to the Commonwealth than ever before, and that the significance of the area between the Levant and India has only recently begun to receive the attention which it deserves.

The eastern and western entrances to the Indian Ocean are examined in an Indian paper:

> Not only China, but an America believing in its manifest destiny, with her base at Corregidor—with a continental policy closely co-operating with the States bordering on the Pacific Mediterranean, can force an entry into the Indian Ocean. The first prerequisite for oceanic defence for India is, therefore, the freedom of Indo-China and Thailand and its guarantee by the Commonwealth.
>
> A second danger from the Pacific may come from the islands of the South Seas. If after the war America acquires Rabaul, or bases on Dutch New Guinea or Portuguese Timor, there is nothing to prevent her with the enormous naval power she has developed from sailing the Indian Ocean unchallenged. But the lack of effective bases outside the Dutch East Indies whose neutralization is a primary interest of the Commonwealth would render such an entry futile from the point of offensive operations.

Another Indian paper, on the other hand, maintains that 'India has confidence in America and has no fear of the bogy of American domination', while in other Conference documents the immense strength of the United States is accepted without question as a strategical asset, although in the economic sphere it is realized in both United Kingdom and Australian papers that, if American policy were framed by narrow and short-sighted minds, American power might have to be carefully watched.

The Indian paper quoted above continues:

> The challenge from the Atlantic, especially if related to an entry from the south-eastern side also could be a very serious danger. But with an outpost in Mauritius and land support from South Africa this entry can be guarded. Mauritius has been always a key-point. Its development as a naval and air base, providing an advance post for the Indo-British navy, is essential for our future security.

The solution of the problem in the view of the same writer lies in a regional strategy based on the power of the Commonwealth with India playing a major part.

It requires a clear naval policy based on the mainland of India and drawing its strength from the industrial and human potential of India. The vital question for the future is, can India shoulder her share of such a responsibility? On this depends her own political freedom and independent existence.

And he concludes that 'the defence of the Indian seas must therefore be a joint concern of India, Great Britain and the other units of the Commonwealth bordering on the Ocean'.

Another Indian paper develops this idea even further. The author reads as one of the lessons of the recent war that 'regional problems have to be studied with reference to the forces operating in those areas'. He believes that the events in South-East Asia are proof that opinion in the United Kingdom was so sensitive to the position in Europe that it did not allow those who were responsible for imperial defence to devote sufficient attention to other vulnerable and strategically important parts of the Empire. It is worth recalling in this connexion that, as has already been mentioned, an Australian paper admits that even Australia looked at the world strategically from the British Isles until the Japanese advance forced a new orientation on her. 'This weakness', to quote this Indian paper, 'was inherent in the policy of the Empire, which having a world-wide Dominion to defend considered itself in its foreign policy a purely European power.' The remedy advocated is that the defence of the Commonwealth and Empire should be studied regionally in the light of the interests and the potential of those parts of the Commonwealth included or concerned in each region. Then in order to ensure that each region received adequate attention, in whatever part of the world it might be situated, regional Councils of Defence should be instituted. The type of Councils envisaged must be described in the author's own words:

A Council of Asia based on India, a Council of the Pacific based on Australia, a Council of the Middle East based on Palestine, in which, apart from Britain, the Empire countries will be represented both politically and by an economic and service staff, may be able to undertake this work. The necessity of political representation does not require to be emphasized. War is too serious a matter, as Clemenceau remarked, to be left to the Generals. The regional Councils should be under a Minister of State of eminence. The choice, it need hardly be said, should not be limited to the ranks of British politicians, but should be from the country immediately concerned. The service chiefs should not merely have experience of the areas which are under the Council, but special qualifications for the post they hold.

These Councils, whose activities should be co-ordinated by a

central organization in London, would require economic staffs because it is felt that the resources and industries of each region must be planned and developed from a regional point of view. In order to avoid such tragic events as the invasion of Malaya and Burma each region should be made militarily and economically self-sufficient.

The entrances and coasts of the Indian Ocean are commanded by the Commonwealth, and India lies in the centre of its shores. This geographical fact might well lead to the view that regional councils for defence, confined to Commonwealth countries, organized as economically and strategically self-sufficient units, might secure the defence of the British peoples; but other Conference papers show clearly that to other members of the Commonwealth such a scheme would seem to be inadequate. Australia and New Zealand are situated in the southern Pacific, a region which cannot be defended on a purely Commonwealth basis, but the idea of economic self-sufficiency on an international footing as distinct from a purely Commonwealth basis is seen in some degree in an Australian paper already quoted, which stresses the value for times of emergency of Australia's agricultural and industrial possibilities. The nations of the Commonwealth have much to give to and much to gain from regional organizations for defence in which they will be associated with other Powers. But as a United Kingdom paper reminds us,

> one must not refuse to recognize the difficulties which attempts to settle the problem of security on regional lines present, such for instance as the effect of a regional settlement on adjacent areas and the problems connected with adjustment between the military requirements of regional defence and the strategic plans for security made by the world security council.

It is understood in most quarters that peace is in fact indivisible and that in consequence, whatever use may be made of regional schemes and local arrangements, the security of the world must be looked at as a whole by some central organization.

World Security and Foreign Policy in the Commonwealth

A CANADIAN paper, in a survey of the events between the formation of the League of Nations and the collapse of collective security in the nineteen-thirties, calls attention to the blindness of the peoples and governments of the world who refused to accept their responsibilities under the Covenant while 'the tragedy of the lost peace

was played out act on act full in the eye of the world'. The Canadian attitude is examined and the conclusion reached that

> The Canadian people-heartily approved of Canada's policy on collective security, and theirs is the final responsibility.

From the start Canada, like many other countries, tried to water down the principle of collective security as embodied in the Covenant. Efforts were made to have Article 10 removed, and, when these failed, an attempt was successfully made in 1923 to secure an interpretation of it which rendered it non-effective in fact. The vital paragraph of this interpretive resolution said:

> It is for the constitutional authorities of each member to decide, in reference to the obligation of preserving the independence and the integrity of the territory of its members, in what degree the member is bound to assure execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces.

This resolution made collective security no longer a collective obligation but left each member of the League free to decide whether to act against an aggressor or not. Some years earlier a Canadian representative at Geneva had said that

> Canada, keenly alive to all the horror that was involved in the World War, will look with critical eyes indeed on a clause [Article 10] so easily susceptible of being read as making everybody's wars their wars.

This Canadian attitude towards collective security was unfortunately not peculiar to Canada, To quote a paper by a Chatham House Study Group:

> Most of the nations earnestly desired to avoid a second World War, but they were blind to the real implications of that aim. They seemed to forget that peace demands sacrifice and that at the present stage of world development security can only be based on power and collective security on the knowledge by a potential aggressor that aggression would at once evoke an expression of collective power. The fear of becoming involved in war proved too strong for the members of the League and, because of individual narrowness of outlook and freedom of national decision, collective security became a dangerous delusion. The nations signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument of policy, but although the Pact had the value of associating the United States with the nations of the League, the day had not come when the making of a national promise necessarily meant the fulfilment of it; and the Pact abstained from placing on its signatories the obligation to wage war against an aggressor. The Locarno Treaties had been an attempt to lay on the signatories specific obligations to keep peace in Europe, but no treaties or pacts can guarantee security unless it is known that they will be enforced by adequate

power. At some future time, one may reasonably hope, morality will be the general basis of action, but until that time comes security will depend on power. The nations who had built up totalitarian systems on the economic distress which the absence of international planning had left national selfishness free to create, took the measure of their neighbours and, led by Japan in 1931, embarked on the course of aggression which led to the attack on Poland and the second World War.

The second world war has undoubtedly brought about a change in national thinking on collective security, but it is not certain whether this change is as complete in some countries as in others. It is suggested in some Australian quarters that the conception that peace is indivisible and that aggression in any part of the world is really aggression against every nation in the world has not yet been appreciated by the Australian public. That conception is perhaps not yet fully appreciated in all other countries either, but it is probable that it is understood in Canada as much as anywhere else. The Canadian Minister to the United States doubtless had the backing of most of his countrymen when he said in a speech in 1942:

> The longer we are in the war the clearer becomes the picture in our minds of the kind of world we want to create. We have all come to see that no nation is sufficient unto itself, no continent and no hemisphere great enough in its own strength to maintain its freedom. We have all come to see that the cause of freedom in the world is a single cause; that neutrality has become a snare and isolation a delusion. No American country is in a better position to appreciate the truth of this than Canada. Four years of the last war and three years of this have taught us that there can be no security in a world half-slave, half-free; and no peace in this hemisphere if aggression is permitted to run rampant elsewhere throughout the world. . . . Peace is indivisible.

But the smaller nations are not altogether happy. Their uneasiness is expressed in an Australian paper which says:

> In the political field it has been noted that the vague foreshadowings of a real international security organization in the Charter and the Moscow Agreement are fading before another looming vision. The new vision is of a world policed by three or four Great Powers, among whom in September 1944 agreement still seemed unattainable on so basic a question as the right to veto joint action for the preservation of peace.

Canada has shown distinct opposition to a hegemony of the Great Powers and her Prime Minister has advocated the organization of peace by an assembly based on the equality of all the nations composing it. There are, however, certain facts which cannot be

ignored. The views of the governments of the three Great Powers have been indicated in the suggestions published by the conference which met at Dumbarton Oaks. World security, it seems to be suggested, must be based on an alliance of the Great Powers. To the Great Powers it no doubt seems reasonable that, as the major effort involved in any war to stop aggression would fall on them, they should have the major say in the framing of policy for the preservation of peace. Australians, it is said on the other hand, watched with some misgiving the exclusive conferences held between President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill. 'They observed', one paper also remarks,

> that President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and President Chiang Kai-shek, in December 1943, took vital decisions concerning Pacific Islands apparently without prior consultations with the Australian Government.

One may sympathize with the fears of the smaller Powers, it is suggested in a United Kingdom paper, but yet, this paper goes on to say, it would be unrealistic to refuse to face facts and, unless the world organization for security is very different from the indications, the Great Powers will in fact have a much greater influence than the smaller nations.

It was with this thought in mind that a Chatham House Study Group approached the problem of the security of the United Kingdom as a member nation of the British Commonwealth. This Group described the requirements of the United Kingdom as follows:

> The plain fact is that Great Britain is not strong enough by herself to guarantee against every possible combination of powers either the safety of her own territory or the communications on which it depends or the integrity of her Colonial Empire or of the Dominions of the British Commonwealth, to whose help she would go without question if any of them were attacked. That predicament is not peculiar to the United Kingdom. It is doubtful whether any state in the modern world could be strong enough to base its security upon its own power. Therefore until such time as obedience to a fundamental law of right, or the ' common conscience of mankind', becomes the universal guide to national action, unchallenged by creeds that deny its existence, security must be based on collective strength, on what the Prime Minister has called 'a world order equipped with all the attributes of power'.

The controlling body of an organization for the preservation of peace must have, as Marshal Stalin has stressed, 'the minimum of armed forces required for the prevention of aggression'. All the member states will have to contribute what is needed, but, Marshal Stalin believes—and there are indications that he is not alone in his belief—the organization will be effective only if the Great Powers

who are to-day allied against the Axis * continue to act in a spirit of unity and concord in the future'. There is certainly a possibility that 'the peace of the world may depend on Britain's relations with the two great Western and Eastern Powers, the United States and Russia'.

The same United Kingdom paper examines the relative power of the principal nations and says:

> The pattern of power has changed during the years following the peace settlement at the end of the last war. That change, which was taking place gradually between the two wars, has been greatly accelerated since 1939. In comparison with the power of Great Britain the power of the United States and Russia will be far stronger at the end of the war than at the beginning. The influence of Great Britain arising from her traditions, her contribution to democratic government, her culture, and her present prestige in Europe will be great, but at the back of world politics is the element of power and in power the United Kingdom by herself will not be the equal of the other two partners. If she had to depend on her own national resources alone, it would be difficult for her to be a Great Power in the company of the United States and Russia. She might continue to be a balancing power between the two great nations of the west and east, but she would have lost a certain freedom of action. She is committed to Europe by her geographical position and she must appear as a Great Power on the European stage. She can do so only if her authority as a world power is commensurate with her responsibilities.

The Group who wrote this paper probably shared the opinion of the authors of some Australian and Canadian papers, that an organization based on power is far from ideal, but they found the indications of the times unmistakable and concluded that for some time to come power would be the foundation of security. 'It is not the ideal certainly', they wrote, 'but, taking men and conditions as they are, it would be a dangerous delusion to refuse to accept the premise that any system aiming at security must be based upon power.' They felt some uneasiness about the disparity in power between the United Kingdom and her two great colleagues in the future world security council.

The United Kingdom is a European power. She cannot escape geography. It is inferred in an Australian paper that realization of the value of their Commonwealth connexion has made Australians appreciate the importance to them of Britain's position in Europe. Most Australians, it says, would agree with Dr. Evatt when he said in the Australian Parliament in October 1943:

> Twice Australia has taken a prominent part in a world war that commenced because of European questions. With Britain vitally involved, so

are once more we. We must have some say in taking steps to prevent wars, and in changing the conditions likely to cause wars. In short we cannot contract out of Europe.

If this reading of Australian opinion is correct, Australians would agree with the statement of a United Kingdom Group that 'the position of all the other nations of the Commonwealth would be fundamentally affected if [Britain] were to lose her authority in Europe'. If, then, this Group says, the European position of the United Kingdom is of importance to the other nations of the Commonwealth and if, as the Group believes, Britain's position as a Great Power in Europe depends to a large extent on her strength as a world power, her policies must have a backing and rest on a strength greater than she alone can supply. She needs the support of the whole Commonwealth. And if, again, this Group is right in thinking that the influence of power will be felt in the deliberations of the supreme council of the world organization, then in the Group's words,

it is essential ... for the Commonwealth that it should be a Great Power, or that one of its members should be a Great Power, commanding the highest attention in the company of the greatest Powers. And so the security and the common interests of the Commonwealth demand either that there should be among the members of the Commonwealth some form of union for purposes of foreign policy and defence or that the United Kingdom should be in a position to present effectively the claims of the security and common interests of the Commonwealth in the supreme council of the nations. She can only do that if the power of the whole Commonwealth is behind her and if the world realizes that the policy which she follows has been agreed with her partners in the Commonwealth and is regarded by them as affecting the security of them all.

One of the Indian preparatory papers says without qualification that 'in matters of foreign policy the Empire can no longer be satisfied with the machinery now in existence'. It goes on to say that 'the defence of the Empire has to be reckoned as being indivisible'. This paper appreciates that a really effective Imperial General Staff would be impossible among an association of independent and democratic nations because, if it were to be effective, parliamentary responsibility would have to be swept aside. It was for these reasons that the writer of this paper advocated the Regional Councils of the Empire, which have already been mentioned, with a central organization in London.

'For one reason or another', this paper declares,

the scheme of an Empire Federation is ruled out. But clearly the principle of a co-ordinated policy at the centre and freedom for the units can be

reconciled only by the acceptance of a limitation of national sovereignty of the units and an over-riding authority in certain specified matters vested in an organization created by the units themselves—a sort of Council of the Empire.

This Council would be a sort of permanent Council of Prime Ministers who would be represented on a permanent basis by deputies resident in London, but the possibilities of air travel should be used to enable the actual Prime Ministers themselves to meet in conference, perhaps even as frequently as four times a year. The opinion of this paper is that the present machinery for imperial consultation is inadequate and does not make possible a sufficient co-ordination of Imperial policies and that the history of the last few years has proved the need for further development.

This question has during the last few years been the occasion of deep argument and extensive discussion. The speech which Lord Halifax made in Toronto on 24 January 1944 caused intense controversy in Canada, where a considerable body of opinion thinks that attempts to bring about closer co-ordination of foreign policy among the nations of the Commonwealth would be most undesirable, harmful to the individual members of the Commonwealth, and objectionable to other Powers, especially to the United States, whom Canada would not wish to antagonize. The suggestions which Mr. Curtin, the Prime Minister of Australia, has made, notably in a speech at Adelaide on 14 August 1943, were no more acceptable to that large section of Canadian opinion. 'I do not think', Mr. Curtin said,

> that the Mother country can manage the affairs of Empire on the basis of a Government sitting in London. I believe some Imperial authority must be evoked so that the British Commonwealth of Nations will have, if not an executive body, at least a standing consultative body with all the facilities for communication and meeting. Those consultations must be frequent in the years to come, so that all the Dominions and the Motherland can have, not conferences at long intervals, but a quick and immediate consultation on any urgent matter when it does arise. Unless decisions are made quickly, delays will produce either inertia or complete inaction, with the result that when decisions are taken they would be of no value.

He has since then elaborated this plea. The Imperial Council which he advocates would not always meet in London but would move among the various capitals of the Dominions, while a permanent secretariat would ensure its continuity. 'The aim of all machinery', he has said, 'must be to provide for full and continuous consultation.' He has, however, stressed that 'this consultation must be consistent with the sovereign control of its policy by

each Government*. He does not ask for federation but for the closest co-operation between the sovereign nations of the Commonwealth, based on continuous consultation and discussion.

These proposals have usually been interpreted as advocating the formulation of a common foreign policy for all the member nations of the Commonwealth, a renunciation of their individuality of action necessitating a limitation of their national sovereignty, and as being aimed against the rest of the world. It is by no means certain that this interpretation is correct. A more correct interpretation might be that the purpose of the proposals is not to try to persuade all the Commonwealth Foreign Offices or Departments of External Affairs to think alike, but to prevent any policies from being launched by any government in the Commonwealth before the views of the other governments had been heard; that the proposals in short are intended not to produce unison but to prevent discord. If it is true that although equality of status has been achieved, equality of function has not yet been attained and perhaps never will be, then such proposals as those made by Mr. Curtin would, if accepted, very much increase the individual influence of the Dominions. If this interpretation is correct, it would remove the objection which perhaps underlay the conclusion of a Canadian round table that ' there was a general desire for close co-operation within the Commonwealth but an unwillingness to move towards centralization'. This interpretation would also harmonize such proposals as Mr. Curtin's with the opinion expressed in another Canadian paper that ' there is in fact no single voice that can speak with authority for the whole Commonwealth'. This same paper contains the following instructive paragraph:

> Commonwealth policy is complex and multiple rather than simple and unitary. It is essential to remember that each member of the Commonwealth, by practical necessity as well as constitutional definition, is a member in its own right of the general society of nations. It follows that the character of each member's Commonwealth relationship is partly determined by the necessities of its own particular position in the world at large. In studying Commonwealth policy, then, it is not enough to consider intra-Commonwealth organization. It is necessary to examine those peculiar relationships which each member nation, because of its geographical position or other circumstances, has with countries outside the Commonwealth.

The Canberra Agreement between Australia and New Zealand was a clear demonstration of national sovereignty by those two Dominions. Mr. Curtin himself described as its main objects, first, agreement between Australia and New Zealand ' to take the primary part in applying to the countries of the South and South-West

Pacific the principles of freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom from repression', and, second, 'to enhance the voice and authority with which the two countries speak in the world at large'. This Agreement was made between two Dominions, independently of any action by the United Kingdom or the rest of the Commonwealth, and it affects both the Commonwealth and other nations by its clauses dealing with the security of the South Seas and the rights of Australia and New Zealand in that area. It could hardly be supposed that the Prime Minister, whose Government negotiated that Agreement which stresses the independence of action which is open to the sovereign nations of the Commonwealth, would at the same time desire to establish machinery which would submerge the individual interests of the member nations into a single policy and make all but one of their number inarticulate before the world. But there is relevance to this question in the clause of the Canberra Agreement under which the two Governments gave mutual assurances that, 'on matters which appear to be of common concern each Government will, as far as possible, be made acquainted with the mind of the other before views are expressed elsewhere by either'. In this connexion an Australian preparatory paper is very well worth quoting:

> Many people have regarded Mr. Curtin's proposals for new imperial machinery as a spectacular *volte-face* in traditional labour party policy. This is not necessarily the case. Mr. Curtin's advocacy of a more efficient standing consultative body might be rather directed to assuring adequate consideration of the Australian viewpoint during the formative stages of policy-making. Any effect of such an innovation in increasing'or decreasing Imperial unity would be incidental. The contrast with the Canadian viewpoint, though still real, may thus be by no means as sharp as is generally conceived. Canadian resistance to the creation of such a body may also be dictated by a desire to avoid the submergence of her own interests in the conduct of a single imperial policy. By reason, however, of her close geographical, strategic and economic link with the United States, as well as by reason of the composition of her people, and her proximity to the Soviet Union in the West, Canada may feel that her best way of avoiding submergence is to preserve her *de facto* freedom to join or not to join in particular imperial policies. The Australian Government, on the other hand, starting from similar preoccupations might, nevertheless, since differently situated, prefer to seek a more real participation in imperial policy-making.

That Australian paragraph is worthy of careful thought and may be found to have a constructive bearing on the question of the United Kingdom Group who asked concerning the supreme council of the Great Powers:

Is Great Britain to sit on that Council representing the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland alone or is she to claim attention there as belonging to some wider group of nations, whose combined wishes she has been able to ascertain and embody in the policies which she advances, a group of nations willing to accept the responsibilities attaching to a partnership whereby their views can be expressed in the highest council of the world?

The British Commonwealth and the World

'THE proposition is peace . . . peace sought in the spirit of peace, and laid in principles purely pacific.' Burke's plea sums up the need of the post-war world. Failure to heed it when he made it caused the disruption of an Empire: failure to achieve its aim now might mean the extinction of a civilization.

The word 'peace' seems to have gone out of fashion and the talk is of long-term or short-term policies for security. In the period between the wars the word 'peace' was apt to be confused with the word 'appeasement'. There is no doubt that most of the nations at that time earnestly desired to avoid a second world war, but they were blind to the real implications of that aim. Forgetting that in an imperfect world peace demands sacrifice, refusing to admit that peace is indivisible and that collective security demands collective action, they allowed their individual selfishness and fear of becoming involved in war to lead them into a policy of appeasement. It was the old story of Ethelred and the payment of Danegeld. The totalitarian nations took the measure of their neighbours and, led by Japan in 1931, embarked on a course of aggression which culminated in the German attack on Poland and the second World War.

Peace does not merely mean an absence of war. It is a positive, not a negative, state. The problem of security was described in the following words by a Chatham House Study Group:

> Looked at from the widest point of view, the problem of security becomes the problem of achieving such economic well-being and social satisfaction and such an outlook of moral reason among all peoples that no nation would have the desire to resort to force.

All plans, therefore, should be guided by that ultimate policy. To quote again from the paper submitted by the Chatham House Study Group:

> In its widest sense, then, a policy for security must be a creative and moving force, aiming all the time at the attainment of a high economic and social standard among all peoples, at universal freedom from want and universal respect for one's neighbour.

The preparatory papers stress again and again a belief that isolation is impossible for a nation or for a group of nations; that the prosperity of each depends on the prosperity of all. There is a danger in slogans, however, whether they be concerned with political action or economic policy. The period between the wars showed the danger that under a plea of adherence to the principle of collective action the initiative for any action may be frustrated. A preparatory paper from the United Kingdom gives a warning against allowing selfish economic policies to hide behind a slogan. Full employment in every country is not only desirable but is essential for the attainment of world prosperity, but, this paper warns us, 'full employment* must not be allowed to be used as a slogan to cover policies which might work against the attainment of world prosperity.

Only the fact that the phrase had not then been invented prevented its use in justification of all the economic policies of the inter-war period, whose results in retrospect can now be seen to have been so disappointing.

In this connexion it is interesting to notice a paragraph in an Australian paper which says:

The apparent disagreement at the I.L.O. Conference in 1944 on the Australian proposal for the adoption by the United Nations of a policy of full employment, and the defeat of the proposals under the leadership, notably, of the British and American delegations, have also caused perplexity in many quarters. There is no little consciousness of the possible meaning of this in relation to the prospects of expanding the demand for primary products according to the excellent plans of the International Food Conference. The fact that this rejection may have turned on differences of view as to the modes of achieving full employment was not widely appreciated in Australia.

Within the narrower circle of the Commonwealth, as in the wider sphere of world commercial relations, progress towards real and lasting prosperity would probably not be based on firm foundations

. if each part of the Commonwealth decided first to ensure full employment by the internal policy which happened to suit it, and only afterwards to give serious attention to economic relations with its fellow-members.

Such at any rate is the opinion expressed in a paper from the United Kingdom, which advocates that what is required is discussion between the member nations of the Commonwealth for the purpose, not of producing a common economic policy, but of harmonizing and preventing discord between their individual economic policies. That principle must be carried further if prosperity is ever to be universally achieved. The harmonization must be on a

world-wide scale, but it is suggested that the member nations of the Commonwealth can serve the wider cause by harmonizing their policies among themselves before discussing economic relations in a world-wide circle, where the possibilities of disagreement must inevitably be greater. There is a great difference between the creation of a Commonwealth *bloc* formed for the purpose of maintaining against the rest of the world policies which seem to be for the advantage of the Commonwealth, however harmful they may be to other nations, and the discussion of economic policies among the members of a Commonwealth fully aware of the wider aspects of international trade. There is a typical admission in one Australian paper of 'the complete dependence of the various industries on the pattern of economic organization in the post-war world'. So long as that dependence is understood, there should be no danger of exclusive economic policies on the part of the Commonwealth.

The fact that economic policies—and other policies too—may be at issue between nations is well realized, and from every part of the Commonwealth comes an appreciation of the fact that such differences will not necessarily be discussed only in a world assembly where all nations are represented. The necessity for harmony between the United Kingdom and the United States is frequently stressed in Canada, and the same thought is now to the fore in Australia and New Zealand also. The hope expressed by the Dominions, that conflict between the policies of these two Great Powers should be avoided, assumes that policies of individual nations will not always be considered only in a world forum, but that they will sometimes be debated between one nation and another or within a small group. This principle of international action seems to be generally accepted and its acceptance nullifies any charge of disloyalty to the principle of general international collaboration in intra-Commonwealth discussion on economic or other subjects. The relationship required is neatly expressed in the Canadian paper which reported a ' desire for close co-operation within the Commonwealth but an unwillingness to move towards centralization'.

Apprehension of the difficulties which would arise from serious disagreement between the United Kingdom and the United States has always been strong in Canada, but it was not until the danger of Japanese invasion dispelled any illusion of isolation that its full implications became apparent to New Zealand and Australia. A New Zealand paper may be quoted to illustrate how clearly the position is understood now:

> New Zealand, therefore, would seem to be faced with a possibility of conflicting loyalties, on the one hand towards Great Britain, in whose

economic sphere she must probably remain, and on the other hand towards the United States, who will dominate the strategy and politics of the Pacific. It has been the fervent, if seldom formulated, hope of New Zealand and Australian statesmanship that these Dominions may never be forced to choose between these two mighty friends. There is little hope in a collective system for New Zealand if it does not presuppose harmony between Britain and the United States.

And again:

New Zealand's interest, then, demands that the collective system of the future shall be on a world basis, though perhaps with local adaptations; but above all with a moral basis which will avoid conflict of policy between Britain and the United States of America, the respective guardians of her economic and strategic security. It demands, too, a system in which small powers may find freedom for expression of their views as well as full consideration of their interest, and one which rules out the artificial distinction between politics and economics. A world order which gave New Zealand protection from military attack but exposed her to economic disaster would be a mockery.

Among a group of sovereign nations there are naturally many interests peculiar to each individual member, interests sometimes conflicting, sometimes even difficult to harmonize. An Australian paper wisely says that 'the real danger to Commonwealth unity* lies in ' failure of the Dominions and the United Kingdom to give sufficient attention to the actual or potential disharmonies in their respective interests'. The same paper points out, however, that there are deep harmonies within the Commonwealth and that 'the ordeal of the . . . war has given a spectacular demonstration of that depth arid reality'. Attack from the outside is the surest way of calling forth an expression of the unity within. Another Australian paper, in discussing the future economic position of the United Kingdom said:

... a strong section of American thought believes that, for completely coordinated world recovery, pressure must be brought to bear on the British school which believes in 'the Empire first'. A strong section of British thought believes that American policy is being oriented towards using the war and Lend-Lease to strengthen the post-war leadership of U.S.A. It would not help current discussion to ignore a clash of interests that is evident even during the most critical phases of the war. As Alvin Hansen has put it, 'The United States is not morally obligated to support the United Kingdom (to keep the Empire together) after the war; and the United Kingdom is not ready to go on a pension. The post-war question for Australia turns on Britain's security and her standard of living. The world needs a prosperous and strong, that is, a productive Britain. Lend-Lease as a grant in aid, without any prospect for repayment in any form,

is charity. Perpetual Lend-Lease is neither possible nor desirable.' Considering Britain's achievement in saving the United States from isolation in a Nazi world, this American point of view is bound to be galling to Britain and the Dominions. The British nations are a long way from being prepared to accept the arbitration and implied control of an American Grants Commission.

But while subservience would not be acceptable, the preparatory papers, as has already been pointed out, show a keen desire on the part of all the nations of the Commonwealth to be in the most friendly relationship with the United States. A Chatham House Study Group, for instance, while admitting that the future is bound to present economic and political difficulties between Great Britain and the United States, recorded their opinion that such difficulties must be ' faced and tackled in a spirit of creative goodwill, which in the long run is the greatest guarantee of security'. The experiences of the war showed how closely and how harmoniously the Commonwealth nations and the United States can work together. It should be a cardinal aim of future policy to realize that 'peace hath her victories no less renowned than war' and to strive in all goodwill to ensure that the British Commonwealth and the United States do all to help and nothing, through discord, to hinder their achievement.

Although great stress is laid on the need for friendship with America, there is also recognition of the importance of close and good relations with Russia, France and other Powers. The necessity of world-wide collaboration is appreciated throughout the preparatory papers; the need for harmonious understanding with Russia is acknowledged; but there is a general feeling that economically, strategically and culturally a unique relationship exists with the United States.

It has been shown in other chapters of this survey that in the preparatory papers submitted to the Conference, in spite of many diversities due to individual and national points of view, Commonwealth consultation and common action can serve a purpose useful both to the members of the Commonwealth and to the wider society of nations. It is accepted in all the contributions to the Conference that such collaboration within the Commonwealth must be guided by a realization that standards of living, commercial prosperity and security are world-wide in character. They all acknowledge that policies which attempt to gain national profit at the expense of other nations are doomed to failure in the long run and, what is far more serious, are bound to have grave international repercussions. Peace and the whole structure of peace—economic well-being, social contentment and moral reason—are indivisible.

An example of a valuable intra-Commonwealth field of co-opera-

tion has been cited in the chapter on 'The Commonwealth and the Colonies', where it is suggested that a Commonwealth colonial council could achieve results which would be of benefit to colonial peoples through co-operative channels in which for political or other reasons citizens of other nations might find it hard to share. A New Zealand paper might be quoted in this matter:

> In some fields, technical and functional organizations, on the lines of those connected with the League of Nations, might have considerable value within the Commonwealth, e.g. in the field of colonial administration and in technical research. But they should be dovetailed into any similar international organizations.

Functional co-operation by people of diverse nationalities is a useful way of inculcating the spirit of international collaboration, which is a prerequisite of international action in the major sphere of defence and security. There collective action may even involve agreement to use their armed forces collectively and, as the story of the nineteen-thirties showed, without a truly co-operative spirit collective security is a false hope. At the same time also functional organizations like the International Labour Office, by helping to improve social, economic and cultural conditions, are bringing the world nearer to that state of society in which alone peace can be assured. Intra-Commonwealth co-operation on functional lines, many of the papers would agree, by harmonizing the policies and activities of the British nations, can lessen the task of harmonization on a world-wide scale.

In the field of defence it has been suggested in the last chapter that some of the Dominions, realizing that the foreign policy of the United Kingdom is bound to produce results which will affect them closely, wish to be better able to make their views and desires known in London during its early formulative stages. Similarly it is possible that the United Kingdom and the Dominions might welcome procedures which gave them a better opportunity than exists at present of discussing proposed Dominion policy. A paper submitted by Chatham House claims that, although a world security organization is the goal to be aimed at, a wise nation will have alternative measures for defence in case the world organization at any time fails to provide security. The Group who wrote this paper argued that the defence of the Commonwealth and Empire is the concern of all its parts. They looked at the problem from the point of view of the United Kingdom, a country whose history and responsibilities make the question of security world-wide in extent. As a European power she is the outer bastion of the Commonwealth against aggression from Europe, an advanced base whose value has been proved during the present war; but, they wrote,

it is not only in Europe that the members of the Commonwealth need bases. They need each other and they need the strategic advantages of the Colonial Empire. Great Britain must have these scattered bases to maintain the security of her sea communications and the positioning of her defensive ground and air forces; but these sea communications, which are vital to Great Britain, are essential also to the other members of the Commonwealth, to all of whom the freedom of each and all to move on the seas and to have bases of operation is fundamental to security. Imperial defence is indivisible and it can only be assured on a co-operative basis. Imperial defence is an Imperial commitment.

They then turned to the question of bases and training and decided that, although there have for a long time been arrangements for the common use of bases, like the naval base at Halifax, and although there has been common training of the armed forces according to common principles, Imperial defence has not been organized on sufficiently broad principles, and they believed that

essential developments like the Empire Air Training Scheme were largely the result of agreement at the last moment and that is a far less satisfactory way of dealing with the problem of security than agreement made in advance on general principles and detailed schemes would be.

In the opinion of that Group the co-ordination of defensive plans within the Commonwealth would not mean the creation of a Commonwealth *bloc,* but would be a co-operative measure of defence by a group of nations sharing common ideals, which they consider worthy of preservation.

In the end it is the things of the spirit that count. Policies will remain ineffective and organizations, however intricate may be the details with which they are planned, will be unable to function, unless behind them there is an ideal for which men are willing to die. In September 1939 the nations of the Commonwealth demonstrated to the world that their common ideals were deeper and more vital than the interests which divided them, and that their individuality was not a negation, but an enrichment, of their common standard of values. 'Here', says a Canadian paper,

was demonstration of the values of a common historic tradition which, despite its checkered history, was bound up with the continued existence of a community of peoples more diverse and more widely scattered than those included in any previous political system. It was a tradition which had come to mean the peaceful co-operation of scattered communities, each living its own life but all linked by institutions and by sentiments in a political fellowship in which they took for granted not only peace among themselves but the permanence of their fellowship. Thus a threat to their system roused them to defend it together, while the character of its

political institutions made it possible to take effective initiative to that end. Despite the prophets of disintegration, the group proved to be more than the sum of its parts.

An Australian memorandum, looking round at the world after five years of war and noticing the indications of the future peace, concluded that

> more and more, the unity of free peoples in face of disaster seems to dissolve into ignoble and selfish conflicts of peoples in face of victory.

Seen from Australia, it said, 'one feature . . . has been the apparent waning of idealism'.

Never before, perhaps, in all its history has the world been in such need of idealism translated into practical politics. The promotion of a dynamic democracy is an aim common to all the members of the Commonwealth. They all desire to promote employment, social security and the other essentials of a democratic life. One Indian paper calls for a comprehensive scheme for social security; another urges plans to bring about 'the economic uplift of the people'. In all the Dominions the wish to achieve social security and full employment, with, it is to be hoped, a realization of the international implications, is a guiding force. In the United Kingdom 'much has been done during recent years to make democracy a reality and not merely a theory of polities'. Plans which have been announced and courses which have been suggested show that the nation is more determined than ever to ensure social justice and free and democratic institutions and rights. A United Kingdom paper claims that it is generally appreciated that

> the ideal cannot be achieved in isolation. It depends on the growth of prosperity and freedom in other lands also, on trade and tolerance, on scientific collaboration, on financial goodwill and spiritual development.

The British nations would be false to their history and their institutions if they did not believe that they share ideals of justice and co-operative, dynamic freedom which are worth preserving. Experience has shown that it is easy to bring an organization into being to serve a clear purpose in time of danger, but that to keep such an organization alive when the danger is less apparent is a more difficult matter. That is the danger which the nations of the world will have to face in the future. To quote from the contribution of a Chatham House Study Group:

> It is inevitable that the interests of nations will clash from time to time, that the commercial activities of one member of the international organization will be thought by another member to be harmful to its national interests, and that even strategic security itself may be at issue between nations.

The experience of the past holds out no hope that all such issues will be peacefully settled simply because the nations concerned have joined a common organization for the maintenance of peace. Something much more positive is required, a policy which will not only make peace certain in the near future, but will at the same time create forces strong enough to resist the dangers of disunion and conflicting interests, which may appear when the horrors of war have become tales to be read about instead of experiences to be actively remembered.

The preparatory papers contributed to the Conference have suggested practical ways in which the member nations of the Commonwealth can be of service to the cause of progress, the betterment of human welfare and the cause of peace. But material improvement, although essential, is not enough. ' Where there is no vision, the people perish.' To quote once more:

Of course there are differences of detail and approach to the problems of social betterment and democratic expression among the members of the Commonwealth, but their aims are the same in essence. We should lack faith in our common ideals if we did not believe that the Commonwealth has a contribution to make to the future of the world.

II. THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

General Considerations

THE Conference assembled within a few days of the announcement that in two months' time the United Nations would meet in conference at San Francisco. This knowledge sharpened the central theme chosen a year before by the Committee on Arrangements and Agenda, which had decided that the discussions of the Conference should be related to the problem of the place and contribution of the Commonwealth in a world society. One delegate pointed out towards the end of the Conference that the international situation had seemed to some members to suggest the existence of an antithesis which other members of the Conference considered false. Is it more important at present, circumstances seemed to ask, to try to build up Commonwealth relations or international relations? To many delegates this conflict seemed to be false, because intimate relations already exist within the Commonwealth and they would like to see those relations regarded not as an antithesis to, but as a useful factor in, the creation of effective international institutions. But delegates who agreed that there was no necessary antithesis between international and Commonwealth organization were by no means agreed on the reasons for this.

One Australian delegate, for instance, said that in the last resort the Commonwealth and world interests are one and the same, that the interests of the Commonwealth can be served only within an actively and successfully functioning world order, and that the Commonwealth with its wisdom, its experience and its ethical force can give a powerful lead in the right direction. Another Australian delegate, however, told the Conference that it should not be thought that his colleague's views reflected the whole of Australian opinion and that many Australians were anxious to see effective Commonwealth machinery for the protection of Commonwealth interests in case the world organization failed to achieve its purpose. A United Kingdom delegate who agreed that there was no antithesis between Commonwealth and international interests, but for a different reason from that advanced by the first of the two Australians, thought that in the British Commonwealth of Nations, when it is functioning as a Commonwealth, there is what Raleigh would have called 'a lively portrayal' of the world order which all would like to see. The function of the Commonwealth, he said, lies in its tremendous power to be ' a lively portrayal' of such a world and its ability

to be so depends on its structure. The influence and strength of the members of the Commonwealth is directly enhanced by their Commonwealth association. The Australian delegate then clarified his meaning by saying that, unless a world organization were set up, the outlook for all nations and for the British Commonwealth of Nations would be dark and that therefore the interests of the Commonwealth and the world are the same. Further discussion on the point showed that a number of delegates agreed that the Commonwealth could flourish best as an active partner of an international organization aiming at world security, but they would not accept the view that, if the world order broke down, the Commonwealth would inevitably collapse, and they would not like to see the Commonwealth merged into the world organization in such a way that it lost its identity.

Some members of the Conference insisted that the Commonwealth is not a functioning political entity, but it was generally agreed that it has an identity of its own. Although its members speak with a multiplicity of voices, the common ideals which they share and the constant consultation in which they participate will in practice tend to create a harmony between their individual policies and produce common action in defence of their ideals. A point with which some of the United Kingdom delegates were much concerned was that this positive relationship should be appreciated by the rest of the world. It was pointed out that in 1914 and in 1939 all the nations of the Commonwealth, with the exception of Eire in 1939, did in fact fight together, but that on neither occasion were other nations certain that they would do so. One delegate at least was in favour of central organs for providing a single Commonwealth foreign policy and for ensuring the defence of the Commonwealth according to plans drawn up by representatives of the Commonwealth as a whole, and it should be noted that Mr. Lionel Curtis's book, *World War: Its Cause and Cure,* was distributed to the delegates as the author's contribution to the preparatory arguments. Other delegates, while not accepting the federal idea, suggested that it was essential that the rest of the world should recognize more clearly than in the past the significance of the habits and institutions of Commonwealth co-operation. Perhaps, one delegate suggested, the most fruitful line of advance would be to pursue intra-Commonwealth functional organization to the utmost extent possible. So long as one tried to analyse the nature of the Commonwealth there would always be differences of opinion, but through the prosecution of functional organizations a working solution might be found to this most difficult of problems.

The discussions as a whole confirmed the belief that a great deal of a co-operative nature can be done within the Commonwealth

which might produce apparently irreconcilable theoretical differences if debated in an abstract way. They also showed that both within the Commonwealth and outside it national self-interest is still a guiding principle of national action, although an international outlook at times affects policy. One delegate, to whom the Commonwealth was a basic fact in considerations of defence, advocated willingness to make economic sacrifices on behalf of needy nations outside the Commonwealth if the general welfare of the society of nations seemed to demand them, but on the other hand some delegates who insisted that a purely international approach to the problems of security was the only reasonable method of dealing with them were ready to accept whatever advantages the Commonwealth could give them in the economic sphere. It was, in fact, impossible to see a consistent approach to every aspect of the relationships of the individual member nations to the Commonwealth and the world, because, expediency still being an important force behind policy, long-term and short-term views are not always kept distinct.

Although it is undeniable that national self-interest is still a guiding principle both in international relations and in the relationships between the member nations of the Commonwealth, the Conference itself was an admission that the Commonwealth is a fact, and it became increasingly clear as the Conference progressed that the bonds uniting the nations of the Commonwealth are more enduring and more intangible than the bonds of material advantage, important as these are. One of the most significant remarks was contributed by an Indian delegate, who said that 'only on a basis of common ideals can the Commonwealth rise to its full stature'. At different times during the Conference delegates from every member nation expressed a similar thought, and at the end of the Conference it was much more evident than at the beginning that it is because the individual nations share a fundamental moral purpose and appreciation of spiritual values that they continue to form a Commonwealth in which there exist special relationships. It is true, for instance, that, although Canada has a much greater degree of understanding, common interest and day-to-day consultation with the United States than with South Africa, yet it is taken as a matter of course that she should also meet to discuss policies with the nations of the Commonwealth before attending the great international conferences which are shaping the future structure of the world.

Looking at the discussions as a whole it seems clear that the majority of the members of the Conference felt that their nations were connected with one another by forces which were absent from their relationships with any other states. An idea of the Common-

wealth which was acceptable to all the delegates was built up gradually as the Conference progressed, and the considerable measure of disagreement which seemed to exist at the beginning was found in part to be based on misunderstanding of what was at the back of people's minds. It happened that the discussions on security at the beginning of the Conference were largely concerned with the policy of the United Kingdom in Europe. The Dominion delegates were unanimous in agreeing with the United Kingdom members that Great Britain's geographical position made it essential that she should take a leading part in the rehabilitation, development and defence of the continent of Europe. It was unfortunate, however, that the existing machinery for consultation within the Commonwealth was hardly mentioned during the first week's discussions, with the result that more attention was directed to debating whether or not the Dominions should commit themselves to support the policy of the United Kingdom than, in the light of the Conference proceedings as a whole, that question was seen to deserve. Any member nation of the Commonwealth, however, is able to initiate foreign policy. Through the machinery for consultation, policies are discussed by, or at any rate presented for comment to, the other members. Europe is a region in which the United Kingdom is geographically placed and it will naturally happen that policy there will be initiated by her, but it will be discussed step by step with the Dominions, and the issue which seemed to be before the Conference as to whether the Dominions should or should not make commitments to the United Kingdom seems to have little relation to the manner in which policy is worked out in practice.

It was perhaps inevitable that the magnitude of the European problem should cause the discussions of foreign policy to be mainly concerned with affairs in Europe, but it would have been salutary if there had been more occasion for discussion of policy in other regions in which one of the Dominions might play a principal role and in which the United Kingdom might be asked to support the policy of a Dominion. It was not until the end of the Conference that full attention was paid to the intimate and continuous possibilities which exist for consultation between the member nations and it was perhaps not until then that those whose questions had seemed to indicate a desire for commitments in advance fully appreciated how far the practice of constant consultation has diminished the importance of formal undertakings. It would seem that the certainty of support being given to the action of each member nation by the other depends upon an appreciation of the two factors which were brought out by the discussions: national self-interest and common ideals. So long as the nations of the Commonwealth

share a general conception of political justice and international collaboration, and so long as the system of consultation is maintained, there is little likelihood of any member feeling unwilling to support the actions of one of the other nations of the Commonwealth.

The majority of delegates seemed to feel that what is required in addition is not so much fresh machinery as a clearer realization, not only within the Commonwealth but by the world as a whole, of the essential nature of the methods by which the common purposes of the Commonwealth nations are worked out. No member of the Conference doubted the vitality of those purposes, and it was pointed out as significant evidence of the general attitude of mind that the announcement which had just been made, that representatives of the Commonwealth nations should meet together before going to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco, had caused no surprise. Such a meeting was regarded as entirely natural, and the delegates to the Chatham House Conference unanimously hailed it as an indication of the unabated determination to fulfil the common purposes of the Commonwealth.

One of the main points which emerged from the discussions of the Conference, whether in matters of defence or of economic policy, was the need within the world organization for special co-operation with the United States of America. Strategically the connexion between the United States and Canada is obvious, and the war has shown the importance of American co-operation in the defence of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. In the economic field also American co-operation is an essential part of international prosperity, and in colonial matters recognition was given to the need for American help in the economic, social and humanitarian spheres.

Emerging from all the discussions could be seen the conception of the Commonwealth as a developing association, evolving to meet the requirements of changing conditions both within itself and in the world as a whole. In the latter connexion the question which concerned the Conference was how to enable the special relationship of the Commonwealth nations with one another to promote the vitality of international relations. Within the Commonwealth the great problems of the future seem to be how to develop the relationship between national individuality and common interest and how to lead the units or groupings of the Colonial Empire into free partnership within the Commonwealth. This involves the fundamental question of racial relationship and the fears, prejudices and disharmonies which are bound up with it. It is certainly one of the most important issues and perhaps the most difficult of all the problems facing the Commonwealth in the future.

The approach of the Indian delegates to economic as well as

strategic problems was conditioned by their views on this question, and it is clear that India's attitude to such matters will be coloured by considerations of political status until it has been possible to find a solution to her constitutional difficulties and to settle the relationship between her and the other nations of the Commonwealth. India is needed by the rest of the Commonwealth for strategic and economic reasons, and members of the Indian delegation to the Conference believed that India's future could'be most happy and secure if she remained a partner in the Commonwealth. With regard to India in the near future and other parts of the Empire in a more distant future, the question of race sets a problem which democratic statesmanship must face and which, the Conference hoped, the Commonwealth would not fail to solve.

Defence and Foreign Policy

THE sessions which were devoted to defence and security showed clearly that at the present stage of Commonwealth development a large body of opinion in the Dominions is strongly opposed to any effort to induce the members of the Commonwealth to commit themselves in advance to collective action on a Commonwealth basis. Those who take this view regard with some concern the tendency which they see in some quarters in the United Kingdom, and which is in part intended to build up a second line of defence in case a world system of security fails to function effectively, to press the nations of the Commonwealth to agree to common action, made possible by previously accepted joint plans and preparation. The discussions were long and at times discursive, but the different points of view became clear as one looked at the discussions as a whole. It would perhaps be best to begin this survey by outlining the extreme points of view before trying to describe the many different shades of opinion within those limits and the variety of thought held on points of detail.

For the most part the United Kingdom delegates refrained from presenting any detailed statement of what, from their point of view, would have represented an 'ideal' Commonwealth defence policy. A Canadian delegate, however, outlined a point of view which he believed was held by many people in the United Kingdom, was expressed in the United Kingdom preparatory paper on security, and evident in the remarks made at the Conference by some of the United Kingdom delegates.

It was argued, he said, by those who held this point of view that the United Kingdom, as one of the three Great Powers, would have a major part in framing the future pattern of international security.

By herself she would not be strong enough to play the part adequately, and her own resources must therefore be increased by the backing of the Dominions. The acceptance of this outlook implies some form of central organization for the Commonwealth which would make it possible for the United Kingdom to feel sure of the support of the Dominions at any future time of crisis, and would leave no doubt in the minds of other nations that conflict with one member of the Commonwealth would mean conflict with the others also. Only with such a background could the United Kingdom exert an influence in the world security council in any way commensurate with that of the United States of America or the Soviet Union; only so could she play the leading part in Europe which the Dominions would be glad to see her play; and only so could the Commonwealth have a sense of security in the event of a breakdown of the world security system.

This point of view, said the Canadian delegate, was based on four fallacious assumptions. They are, first, a belief in the necessity for an equality of power at the disposal of each of the Big Three; secondly, an idea that the nations of the Commonwealth must speak with a single voice in order to have any substantial effect in the world; thirdly, a suggestion that the Commonwealth is, or can become, a functioning political entity; and fourthly, the assumption that the Commonwealth could be made the basis of an effective system of regional defence. The first of these assumptions seemed to this Canadian delegate to be extremely dangerous. He viewed with alarm an idea that the success of the world organization depended on the ability of each of the Big Three to speak for approximately the same quantum of power. Such a system, he said, would have within itself the seeds of its own early destruction, because a dynamic world required a system sufficiently elastic to deal with or disregard shifts of power. The influence of the United Kingdom was not to be measured merely in terms of material power. The second fallacy was the belief that the influence of the British nations would be greater if they spoke with a single voice than if they spoke each for itself alone. In actual fact, he said, the opposite was true.

This particular question was touched on here and there throughout the Conference and it would perhaps be wise to examine it now before noticing the other two fallacies which this Canadian delegate believed to be implicit in the class of opinion to which he referred. Would the strength of the Commonwealth be increased and the interests of the world as a whole be best served by presenting a united front to the rest of the world or by retaining for each of its members the right to present its own views in its own way? Those who answer that the independent presentation of views, which by

no means necessarily implies a diversity of views, is in fact the surest way of making the influence of the Commonwealth nations usefully felt in the world, argue somewhat like this. If any of the Dominions support British policy in any of its aspects, their views are likely to command much more respect from the rest of the world if every one understands clearly that they have been independently adopted than if it is thought that they have been accepted merely because they are also the views of the United Kingdom. Already at Bretton Woods and in connexion with UNRRA clear evidence has been forthcoming of the value of independent interventions by the Dominions, which by no means conflicted with British policy, but have sometimes offered a useful means of harmonizing British views with those of other countries in a way which would not have been possible if the habit had been formed of always presenting Commonwealth views as those of a unified *bloc*. It was moreover felt that the only certain way of ensuring peace was to create and maintain a world organization under which, and under which alone, local or regional schemes of defence might be worked out. That being so, any system which appeared to be exclusive and to impose on its adherents a loyalty to an exclusive group of nations would be an impediment to the international solution of the problem of security. The special place allotted in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals to regional arrangements for defence also creates difficulties for a closely integrated Commonwealth policy. No nation would be able to get the full benefit of regional arrangements or contribute adequately to them if its neighbours felt that it was not whole-heartedly participating in the regional scheme, but was at the same time committed to such future action as loyalty to some other groups of states might require. The strength and regional friendships of each member nation of the Commonwealth can only be fully developed if their neighbours regard them as entirely independent and free from other commitments. Only so, if some issue arises which affects the ideals which they hold in common and which involves them all in war, will they be able to contribute to the full to the common effort. Those who hold this opinion believe it to be the only truly realistic one open to the members of the Commonwealth, and they feel that any attempt to draw the nations of the Commonwealth into closer union would not only weaken their individual, and therefore their collective, strength, but would also in the long run tend to drive them further apart and perhaps end in disrupting the Commonwealth altogether.

The third assumption implicit in the plea for a more closely integrated Commonwealth was said to be the idea that the Commonwealth is, or will ever become, a functioning political entity. Against this it was argued that the Commonwealth is a group of functioning

entities, which could not speak with a single voice unless they formed a federation; and a federation, most delegates thought, is outside the realm of practical politics. The discussions as a whole, however, showed a great variety of shades of opinion between the extremes of federation and complete individual independence with a connecting link based on little more than adherence to the democratic way of life and devotion to the cause of peace and progress. Many of the delegates thought that, although the Commonwealth is certainly not a functioning political entity in the same sense as an individual nation with its own parliament and system of national institutions, it is nevertheless something more than the sum of its individual members and that its peculiar character is gradually finding adequate expression in the system of consultation and discussion of policies which has been immensely developed during the war. Another Canadian member expressed the opinion that, although it would not be possible for the nations of the Commonwealth to speak on foreign policy through a common voice, they should have the closest possible consultation and agreement on the defence of their sea and air routes. Close co-operation and collaboration, he said, would not be inconsistent with loyalty to an international collective system and to discard the known Commonwealth connexions and cling only to a still unformed system of world security would not appeal to what he thought to be a large body of opinion in Canada and elsewhere.

The fourth fallacy was the belief that in some way or other the Commonwealth could be made the basis of an effective regional system for defence. It .was not a defensible unit, the Canadian critic argued; a more effective line of development would be for Australia and New Zealand to try to extend the idea embodied in the Canberra Pact, so as to bring in American sea-power as a reinforcement of the fleets of the Commonwealth, and for Canada to try to broaden the defence arrangements between herself and the United States. Those delegates who believed that the Commonwealth, as a group of nations, does present a defence problem contested this criticism on the grounds that, although the Commonwealth is not a geographical region, it is in fact a collection of nations who in time of war must be able to communicate with each other and who therefore have a common problem in securing the defence of the sea routes which connect them. No member of the Conference thought that the nations of the Commonwealth by themselves could guarantee the safety of their sea communications, but many of them believed that they ought to do as much as was reasonably possible in that connexion, concerting their naval plans with those of the United States of America, with whom, as it was pointed out, the United Kingdom had for many years had a close understanding

on matters of naval strategy. With confidence in the continued friendship of the United States, it was claimed by a Service member of the United Kingdom delegation, the United Kingdom and the Dominions and India could defend their communications, if the bases which they held throughout the world were used widely and if they looked at the problem from the standpoint of the local defences of each region in which a member of the Commonwealth was situated.

In the United Kingdom, Australian and New Zealand delegations were Service officers of experience. They were all in agreement on the main features of this problem of the defence of the Commonwealth and the need for defensive planning and preparation in time of peace. But defence is not merely a technical question. Behind it lie the more fundamental issues of foreign policy, and the various views advanced by other members arose from political considerations which reflected their attitudes towards foreign policy and towards the problem of the character of the Commonwealth itself.

On the ultimate objective of policy there was no divergence of opinion. It is clear that the majority of people in all the nations of the Commonwealth believe that a world-wide arrangement is the only really satisfactory solution of the problem of peace. All the delegates were conscious of the obligation which that belief imposes on every country which holds it—the obligation to make every effort to ensure the success of the world organization. It was admitted that after the war of 1914-18 the idea of collective security had degenerated in many quarters into military unpreparedness, backed up by a hope that some one else would do the fighting. An Australian delegate pointed out that, when it came to framing the terms of collaboration in the world security organization, the Dominions would have to be far more specific about their defence commitments than they had been in the past. Indeed, as a United Kingdom member said in this connexion, any unwillingness to make commitments in advance of events would take the linch-pin out of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, in which it was laid down that all members of the organization would undertake to carry out the decision of the security council and to say what armed forces they were prepared to contribute on demand. Another member said that to start a discussion of defence from the standpoint of international organization did not mean a refusal to realize that international organization as contemplated at Dumbarton Oaks, would be an experiment, which might perhaps break down. Rather, just because they believed that an effective international organization was a desperately urgent necessity, whose realization was still quite uncertain, many thought that Commonwealth relations could

be most fruitfully discussed from the standpoint of the contribution which the Commonwealth could make to that objective. Another delegate suggested that, bearing in mind this consideration, the nations of the Commonwealth could, with benefit to the world organization and to themselves, come to an agreement among themselves about their defence forces and defensive preparation in harmony with the proposal in the Dumbarton Oaks scheme that members of the organization should discuss among themselves what military, naval or air force contingents they would offer to provide. This suggestion would seem to be a practical application in policy of the belief of an Australian delegate that the nations of the Commonwealth, by remaining members of the Empire and enjoying the benefits of Commonwealth co-operation in its many fields and the security which it could provide, admitted an obligation to accept the responsibilities of membership, and of the New Zealander who said that New Zealand, while wishing to be an independent member of the world organization, appreciated the advantages which she derived from her association as a partner in the Commonwealth and must share *pro rata* in the responsibility for the defence of her own geographical region, of the Commonwealth as a whole, and of world peace through the international security organization. This delegate went on to describe New Zealand as a country having the strongest cultural, historic and economic ties with the United Kingdom, but also as a Pacific nation having important strategic links with the United States. Such an interplay of interests is common to all members of the Commonwealth, as other speakers showed. That situation led this New Zealand delegate to conclude that, although the armed forces of the Commonwealth were and would remain independent, they could only satisfy the various interests which required their support if they were integrated in some way on a Commonwealth basis, trained according to a joint plan and linked together through the most experienced of their number, which happened to be the United Kingdom. He saw in the gradual abandonment of sovereignty by all nations one of the main hopes for the world. For the nations of the Commonwealth, in his opinion, this meant not only some relinquishment of sovereignty to the world authority but also willingness to pool their sovereign claims within the Commonwealth if they were to continue to play the important part in the world which was open to them.

It was admitted by other delegates also that the part which the United Kingdom would play in international society was bound to be much greater than that played by any of the Dominions. As has already been indicated in Part I it was also advocated by all that the United Kingdom, as a European Power, ought to assume

a position of leadership in Europe, having perhaps some sort of strategic arrangement with the western democracies. Members of the United Kingdom group told the Conference that they believed that the influence which the United Kingdom would be able to exert in Europe would depend to a great extent on her position as a world Power and that her position as a world Power would depend on her association with the Dominions and India. In the earlier sessions of the Conference there was a certain amount of argument arising from what some of the Dominion members took to be an assertion by some of the United Kingdom members, that the United Kingdom could only play a leading part in Europe if the Dominions would commit themselves in advance to support her policy there. The desire that the United Kingdom should concern herself in Europe was unanimous. As one Canadian expressed it, Canada's security depends upon peace in Europe, and in the interest of the Dominions as well as of herself, Britain should give a lead towards finding a lasting solution of the problems of Europe. Other delegates, elaborating this theme, explained that peace in Europe would depend on economic prosperity as well as on military security against aggression, and that Britain would have to exert herself in helping to effect a healthy economic reconstruction of the devastated Continent. There was a good deal of discussion on the subject of Britain's future role in Europe, which would have been more realistic and more harmonious if the system of consultation which has developed within the Commonwealth had been taken into greater account at that stage of the Conference. Expressed baldly, the argument took some such form as this. Some of the Dominion members said, 'The United Kingdom must enter wholeheartedly into the affairs of the European continent', to which the United Kingdom members answered, 'We agree, but we shall need your support'. The Dominion members then declared that the Dominions would not commit themselves in advance to support the United Kingdom's policy. In actual fact, however, the Dominions would be kept informed of Britain's policy in every stage and would be asked to comment on it from the beginning. This would lessen the risk that the United Kingdom might find herself in a position where she needed, but was denied, the collaboration of .the Dominions.

If the Commonwealth were united by material interests alone, its members would hold together only for so long as those interests seemed to them to be of value. Neither solemn commitments nor constitutional machinery would then prevent its dissolution. But the bonds which hold its member nations together are not only material. There are spiritual values and common traditions and methods of government which are the abiding links. So long as

they remain true to their common ideals, their policies will not differ in fundamentals beyond the possibility of reconciliation. An Australian delegate told the Conference that he was sure that the Australian Government and people agreed in general terms with the sort of approach to problems of foreign policy and Britain's role in it which seemed to be emerging in the United Kingdom. Not long ago the Australian Ministry for External Affairs declared that Australia could 'not contract out of Europe'. The basis for that statement, an Australian told the Conference, was, first, that two generations of Australians had faced war in Europe and, secondly, that the recent experience of Australian soldiers in Greece, Crete and the Middle East had demonstrated that Australia was interested both directly and through the United Kingdom in any settlement involving Europe and the Mediterranean area. Australia, he continued, would hesitate to be more specific, because as yet she was hardly aware of the complexity of the problems facing the United Kingdom. Indeed, as United Kingdom delegates said, the problems of Europe could not yet be assessed and no one could say what calls would be made on Britain's leadership. The same Australian delegate argued that such inevitable uncertainty made it impossible for any Dominion to give prior commitments to back whatever action Britain might feel it her duty to take, but he thought that they would all be aware of the importance of Britain's security to their own safety and would act in accordance with that appreciation.

Looked at as a whole, the sessions devoted to defence and foreign policy could be seen to reflect the uncertainty which existed about the form and effectiveness of the hoped-for world organization. Every now and then some delegate would suggest to the Conference that his country would not be satisfied unless security were planned on a global basis. Such a reminder was usually intended for those United Kingdom delegates who were intent on assessing the possibilities of common defence of the Commonwealth in the event of a breakdown of the international system. They, however, assured the Dominion delegates that Britain's first aim was the establishment and support of a world organization for the achievement of security and economic prosperity, and reminded them that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom played no small part in creating the Dumbarton Oaks scheme; but they could not be unaware that in 1939 collective security had failed. If every nation did its duty to the scheme, collective security would not fail again, but they could not forget the past and they thought that the nations of the Commonwealth, while doing everything possible to ensure the success of the world system of security, should be prepared to defend their common ideals against any

aggression which might face them if the world organization were at any time to fail to keep the peace.

Regional planning for defence also seemed to the Conference an important contribution to the future of peace, and in many aspects of economic life it was suggested that valuable developments might proceed along regional lines. At the same time it was realized that if the Commonwealth is to continue to have any identity as an association of nations devoted to a common way of life and to the practical application of common ideals, its members must pay attention to the security of the communications which link them together. In this connexion, stress was laid, particularly perhaps by members of the United Kingdom delegation, on the importance of maintaining a large and efficient merchant navy and also of being in the forefront of air development. A truly international organization on air transport seems to many people to be the most desirable solution, but many delegates agreed that, failing the achievement of a world-wide arrangement, the nations of the Commonwealth ought together to do all that they can to retain at the highest level and on a Commonwealth basis standards of research, design and technical efficiency in civil aviation.

Delegates from South Africa tried to assess public opinion in the Union. One of them told the Conference that he believed that many of his countrymen would say, when peace came, that the war had been fought to bring peace and that they ought not to be asked in peace-time to train and equip military forces. Others, however, did not agree with him that appreciation of the meaning of collective security was so completely lacking in South Africa, but they did think that South African opinion regarded the Union's contribution to the preservation of peace from a local point of view. South Africa, they understood, would try to keep her own shores as safe as possible against invasion, but she would not be willing to commit her forces in advance for overseas service, whether the demand were made by the world authority or by a Commonwealth planning organization. They all thought, however, that South Africans appreciated the value to themselves of their connexion with the United Kingdom. Indeed one of them expressed the view that on a regional basis there was a greater natural tie connecting South Africa to the United Kingdom than any which linked the United Kingdom and the other Dominions. South Africa is in a part of the world where no other member of the Big Three Powers has a strategic interest, but where the United Kingdom is vitally concerned on account of the sea route round the Cape between herself and India and the Pacific Dominions and also on account of the great block of British territory to the north of the Union. With the Commonwealth as a whole South Africa seemed to wish to have

the widest possible means of consultation but to avoid any commitments which would limit her freedom of decision. Her unwillingness to suggest what sort of support she would give to the policy of the United Kingdom in Europe was conditioned by the same feeling of uncertainty as troubled the delegates from Australia. One of the South African members, however, put forward a suggestion which differed, at any rate in emphasis, from the Australian opinion that the Dominions could not 'contract out of Europe'. He contended that Europe was becoming a region of ever-diminishing importance, especially in view of the developments of communication by air, and that the United Kingdom ought not to pay so much attention to the affairs of Europe as to become blind to the potentialities of the Commonwealth and Empire, but that she ought rather to do her utmost to develop those potentialities. From the strategic point of view such an approach to the future would put South Africa in the centre of the most important routes of communication across the world and would substantiate South Africa's claim that the African continent south of the Sahara must be regarded as a single region with its defence and economic development planned on a continental basis.

The necessity of realizing that Europe might not always be as important in the pattern of the world as it had been in the past, and as it still remained, was also stressed by an Indian delegate. He too suggested that the United Kingdom should be careful not to let her preoccupation in Europe—although every one appreciated that it was her duty to play a leading part in the rehabilitation of the Continent—blind her to the possibilities of development in the Empire. Other members of the Indian delegation said that the present war had proved the strategic importance of India as a base and arsenal in any world conflict. India, they said, is determined to develop her industries and, provided she remains in the Commonwealth, the strength of the Commonwealth will be immeasurably enhanced by such a development. One Indian member developed this idea by saying that the defence of the Commonwealth was indivisible, but that each unit had its own particular problems. These two considerations demanded that each member of the Commonwealth should be developed to the highest possible pitch of national efficiency and strength, which would contribute to regional security, while at the same time, if the system of consultation within the Commonwealth were developed to meet the needs of strategic planning as a whole, the strength of each unit would be a contribution to the security of all the others. He thought that it was necessary to look at the problem of security from a Commonwealth point of view, because it would be some time before the international organization, which every one must sup-

port, had sufficient prestige to ensure security throughout the world.

It was impossible to find a bridge to connect the outlook of those who believed that the Commonwealth as a group of nations had its own defence problem with the outlook of those who shared the opinion of a section of the Canadian delegation that the problem of defence was either international or regional and would be hindered rather than helped by any plans peculiar to the British Commonwealth. This divergence was seen most clearly when the discussion turned to questions of military training and the production of armaments. A member of the United Kingdom delegation told the Conference that Britain's military strength depended largely upon the draft she could make on the industrial potential and training capacity of the Dominions and India. Would that possibility remain open to her? he asked. Canada's approach to the problem, one of the Canadian delegates declared, would be international and her efforts would be turned to securing an international solution of the problem of security. As a second line of defence she would base her security on defence arrangements with the United States and might help to prevent the United States from becoming apathetic about international questions. Many Canadians, he continued, would feel that direct participation in a Commonwealth scheme of defence would cause grave dissension within Canada herself. Another Canadian delegate told the Conference that the existence of joint arrangements with the United States was the most important fact in Canadian defence policy and that Canadian public opinion would be against the assumption of any obligation which was contrary to the spirit of the Canadian-American Pact. Canada, therefore, would be unable to make any commitments which were not sympathetic to the United States. A delegate from New Zealand then asked whether Canada would feel that it was necessary for her to obtain the approval of the United States before agreeing to receive airmen and mechanized units from the United Kingdom for training. In answer another Canadian delegate pointed out that before the war a Commonwealth Air Training scheme had been proposed but had been refused by the Canadian Government. He thought that the reasons for the refusal were two: first, that politically such a scheme would seem to commit Canada to a Commonwealth policy which would have been met with disapproval by large sections of the Canadian public and, secondly, because it was understood that the suggestion produced unfavourable reactions in the United States. Another Canadian added weight to this argument by saying that it would be hard to mobilize any public opinion in Canada in favour of independent action unless Canada was assured of the support of the American public opinion as had been the case in 1939.

These views were not shared by all the members of the Canadian delegation, for another member of that group said that he did not see why there should be any difficulty with the United States about any reasonable arrangements which Canada might wish to make with the other members of the Commonwealth. He had no doubt that the United States did not regard Canada or the British Commonwealth as a whole as anything but a friendly Power.

At this point a member of the United Kingdom delegation said that it was well recognized that for war purposes Canada must be integrated with the United States but that he felt that she also had a role to play in the Commonwealth and that the requirements of Commonwealth defence demanded joint planning in peace-time. To leave joint defence arrangements until some aggression against the interests of the Commonwealth nations was imminent did not provide an adequate measure of defence.

It seemed to other members of the Conference that the insistence laid on American susceptibilities by certain members of the Canadian delegation failed to take account of the close relations between the United States and other members of the Commonwealth, and failed also to recognize that the primary aim of the United Kingdom and of all the other Dominions was to create an effective world organization for the promotion of peace.

On the third day of the Conference a discussion was held about sea and air communications. It is worth noting the main points which emerged. First the point of view of the armed services of the United Kingdom was described. This point of view was based on the assumption that a world organization is the essential safeguard of permanent peace; but international collective security might perhaps break down, and the armed services must plan an alternative scheme of defence for the nations and dependencies of the Commonwealth and for the lines of communication between them. Empire defence policy has always been based on two facts. One is a recognition that every part of the Empire must as far as possible be responsible for its own local defence and the other that the communications by sea and air throughout the Empire must be maintained. There would be no such thing as the Commonwealth and Empire unless men and merchandise could be freely moved; and in time of war the United Kingdom would be able to exist only for a few months if her maritime communications were cut. The other members of the Commonwealth, although not so susceptible to starvation by blockade, must be prepared in the event of war to hold out alone until help arrived by means of sea and air. The defence of their communications is mainly the responsibility of the naval and air forces and therefore the defence of the naval and air bases is a vital factor in imperial defence. The war in the Far East had shown what disasters can follow the loss of these bases, and, as

a whole, the war proved the power of small but highly trained mobile forces possessing the necessary bases. Defence of such a kind, it was said, requires long-range planning and training. The training of troops, the provision of bases and dockyards, and the production of equipment take time and cannot safely be left until a crisis is imminent. Warships and a merchant navy, air-power and air transport planes are the protection of the arteries of the Commonwealth, and the close collaboration between the defence services of the Commonwealth which had been achieved during the last five years must be maintained and expanded. Such a point of view was elaborated by Service delegates and great store was laid on the need for a large amount of merchant shipping. A Canadian delegate then asked whether, when plans were made, it would be assumed that the American fleet did not exist or whether the United States would be regarded as a potential enemy or probable friend. A Service member from the United Kingdom replied that it was well understood that neither the United States navy nor the combined fleets of the British Commonwealth could alone safeguard the communications of the world, and that the policy and the plans of the United Kingdom had for long been based on the assumption of a friendly American fleet. The Canadian member then asked whether the most effective contribution which Canada could make would not be for her to try, through the Canadian-United States Defence Board, to extend the scope of American collaboration and the areas in which the United States would assume responsibility for security. Another United Kingdom Service member replied that the world organization would be the correct authority to decide in what proportion this responsibility should be divided between the United States and the British Commonwealth.

£ Throughout the Conference it was evident that all the Commonwealth nations appreciate the need for understanding and co-operation with the United States. The position of Canada, both defensively and economically, is obvious, and the recent war has shown that British sea-power in the Pacific may be insufficient to defend Australia and New Zealand in a world war when British forces are engaged in Europe. One of the Canadian delegates who did not share the fears of his colleagues that schemes for the training and equipment of Commonwealth forces would be regarded with disfavour by the United States, nevertheless recognized the difficulty which faced Canada so long as the patterns of weapons and methods of training were different in the United Kingdom and the United States, and Canada had responsibilities for joint defence with the United States of the North American continent. The same difficulty, though in a less acute form, was mentioned by an Australian delegate in connexion with the defence of the Pacific; but he and

others agreed that modern air forces and mechanized land forces need training-grounds which the United Kingdom cannot supply and that the proximity of the United Kingdom to the continent of Europe makes it necessary to plan industrial production as well as military training on an international basis. To many delegates this meant planning on the basis of the Commonwealth. Scientific research was discussed also and it was generally agreed that something more than a national basis was required. Here too a pooling of experience between the nations of the Commonwealth seemed the practical solution, and in research, as well as in the production of munitions, every one agreed that, failing general agreements among all the United Nations, the closest possible liaison with the United States was necessary for the security of the Commonwealth.

Economic Policy

(By Professor A. G. B. Fisher)

IN many respects discussion of Commonwealth economic policy raises issues of essentially the same kind as arise when the future political development and defence policies of the Commonwealth are under consideration. Should our main purpose at the present time be a closer integration of the policies of the different parts of the Commonwealth? Or, finding the true significance in the modern world of the Commonwealth relationship in the part it can play in helping to rebuild a stable world order, should we try to harmonize the policies of Commonwealth members within a still wider international framework instead of aiming first at a closer integration within the Commonwealth itself? Most of the specific Commonwealth issues which have recently been discussed can easily be seen to illustrate these alternative methods of approach.

In both cases already before 1939 experimental steps were taken in the direction of harmonizing the policies of the members of the Commonwealth, and for this purpose more or less formal institutional devices were evolved—in the economic field the machinery of the Ottawa agreements and of the sterling *bloc*—the effectiveness of which can now be more accurately assessed in the light of the experience of the inter-war period. The experience of the war has, moreover, made some fundamental changes both in the material background of the members of the Commonwealth, and in the outlooks and dominant purposes of their peoples, and the Conference spent some time in surveying the changes in their economic conditions imposed by the war. For the purposes of this Report it is not necessary to reproduce the results of this survey in any detail, except so far as is necessary for a correct assessment of general

trends of policy, and it is perhaps sufficient to say that, as might have been expected, the survey revealed conditions of the widest diversity, ranging from Canada, almost embarrassed by a phenomenal expansion of production in nearly every direction, which has raised her exports to an unprecedentedly high level, through the United Kingdom, where equally remarkable increases in production have been accompanied by serious deterioration in many important types of capital equipment and the loss of a large part of her overseas assets and other sources of income from which imports used to be financed, to Burma, whose whole economy has, under enemy occupation, been so thoroughly disrupted that it will be necessary for many purposes to make a completely fresh start.

In the economic field the sense of the importance of close connexions with other countries outside the Commonwealth shown in the Conference was no less keen than in the political field. Uncertainty about the line which other powerful economies may ultimately be disposed to take—not to mention the other innumerable uncertainties which also have to be taken into account—makes the formulation of clear-cut concrete policies a matter perhaps even more hard to predict in the sphere of economics than in the realm of defence. For some of the Dominions indeed uncertainty about the future policy of the United Kingdom is a factor scarcely less important than uncertainty about the policy of the United States.

The diversity of fundamental interests, as well as the varied consequences of the impact of the war, does not necessarily lead to any ineradicable contradiction or conflict between the post-war policies of the members of the Commonwealth. Indeed in some cases it was largely a matter of chance from which delegation some member happened to give a formal expression of approval to one or other of the general points of view which colour much of the current thinking on post-war policy. It happened, for example, that it was a United Kingdom delegate who insisted that technical discussions should not ignore the new facts in the world situation, the ideas expressed in the Atlantic Charter, the growing realization that prosperity is indivisible, and the increasing importance of international organizations already in existence, such as the International Labour Office and UNRRA, and of similar organizations which are still under discussion; and it happened to be an Australian delegate who elaborated the theme that limited collaborative policiescould not be effective apart from a joint policy designed to ensure the maintenance of high levels of employment. But these were not peculiarly or distinctively United Kingdom or Australian views, and members of other delegations might well have made the same points, though no doubt in a different form. But the emphasis is naturally placed upon many important issues at very different

points by the peoples and governments of the different parts of the Commonwealth, and this difference of emphasis may even have the effect of making formal agreement about ultimate general objectives somewhat illusory. Probably few members of the Conference would have dissented from the proposition that an effective international agreement to ensure stability in exchange rates would be advantageous for their economies, but there would not have been such unanimous agreement about the obligations which each member might have to assume if such an agreement was to be brought into being.

It was not the purpose of the Conference to bring to a head all the complex issues involved in a consideration, from the standpoint of Commonwealth interests, of post-war economic policy, and much less was it its purpose to evolve an agreed body of doctrine to which delegates in general could subscribe. Many important points were inevitably touched upon very lightly, and if a sketch of this part of the Conference proceedings leaves an impression of inconclusiveness, this is no doubt at least in part because few of those who took part in them were prepared to suggest confident solutions for all the knotty and delicate problems, to many of which they were able to give only a rapid glance.

Like a great many other fundamental concepts, economic policy is indivisible, and no discussion of any one of its facets is likely to be very fruitful unless its links with other parts of the whole broad field are constantly kept in mind. The economic discussions of the Conference may nevertheless be conveniently divided into two sections, the one dealing with commercial policy, the other with monetary policy and capital investment. In dealing with either section it is not necessary constantly to recall the important fact, of which the Conference was several times reminded, that in the last resort there must of necessity be a close interdependence between economic and political decisions. In the absence of a system of international political security national economic policies would be something very different from what they would be if confidence in such a system were strong.

Commercial Policy

The discussion of commercial policy began with a consideration of the question how far experience has shown the Ottawa Agreements to constitute such a valuable contribution to the economic development of the Commonwealth and of the rest of the world that their preservation should be regarded as an objective of major importance in post-war policy. The answers given to this question were not always very precise, but there is little risk of distorting the views of any of the delegates in saying that if the individuals

assembled at the Conference are to be regarded as representative of Dominion opinion on this subject, the Dominions are no longer disposed to regard the maintenance of the Ottawa system as the ark of the covenant, in no circumstances to be called into question. There was indeed no sign of any light-hearted willingness carelessly to abandon the privileges which Ottawa had been intended to ensure without the most careful examination of the *quid pro quo* to be offered in exchange. All the economies concerned have already undergone more or less far-reaching structural adjustments to the market prospects which emerged from Ottawa, and these adjustments are not easily or quickly reversed or turned in new directions. Nevertheless even the most cautious bargaining attitude is something entirely different from a firm determination to maintain Ottawa as the corner-stone of post-war economic policy.

The Conference generally felt that it would be unprofitable now to spend much time in debating whether or not the Ottawa agreements were open to criticism at the time of their signature. A New Zealand delegate in particular argued that it was not useful to discuss whether Ottawa had in itself been good or bad. The important question to decide was the direction in which policy would move from the point reached before the war. The real danger, he felt, is economic nationalism, and policy proposals for the future should be judged from that standpoint. He also emphasized the importance of the *quid pro quo* which other countries might be prepared to offer in return for the abandonment or substantial modification of imperial preference. As he said, a trifling change in the United States tariff would not make such a modification worth while, and there was general agreement that sudden drastic changes of policy would be undesirable and probably impossible.

An Australian delegate indicated that opinion in Australia is mixed, differing views being held by producers of primary products almost wholly absorbed by the British market, and producers of products, such as wool, the country's main export, which are dependent on world markets. At the moment the question is in suspense, and is considered as largely academic, until the broad lines of future international security and economic collaboration have emerged. After the close threat of enemy invasion, Australia is intensely conscious of the security problem, to a degree which must inevitably affect economic policy. She hopes greatly for the achievement of a trustworthy international security system within which she would be able to develop the country on strictly economic and welfare lines, with a rising standard of life. If economic collaboration, as envisaged in the Atlantic Charter, were a part of this system, it would seem that imperial preference would be outmoded in a wider

expanding economy. But if present attempts at collective security fail, or are deemed untrustworthy, Australia will be compelled, he said, to make home defence the overriding consideration. She will then undoubtedly seek to build an economy based on strategic considerations, requiring self-sufficiency in all the necessities of siege, even at the expense of her hoped-for standards of living. When other delegates were sceptical as to whether real defence could be achieved by such means, and inquired whether the cost of self-sufficiency had been calculated, it was admitted that the cost had not generally been assessed. Nevertheless it would be politically impossible, if a security system failed to materialize, to do other than take all such economic steps possible for defence purposes. Likewise, if international economic collaboration broke down, Australia, like other countries, would be forced into an employment policy based on a restriction of imports and maximum industrialization. In such circumstances it is very doubtful whether she would be able to concede the industrial markets necessary to sustain the continuance of the Ottawa principles.

The Canadian interest in the restoration of a multilateral world trading system was emphatically expressed, and it was suggested that the qualifying clause, 'with due regard to existing obligations', which was carefully inserted in the Atlantic Charter, itself imposes a moral obligation not to extend existing preferences. One Canadian, however, felt that it would be difficult to persuade some of his countrymen to accept lower tariffs if this threatened to increase the risks of unemployment. Canadian opinion concerning the Ottawa agreements was reported as not being unanimous. Many Canadians feel that the advantages which have accrued are 'minimal', but others believe the principle to be valuable for other than economic reasons. Some delegates also pointed out that Ottawa has been widely interpreted in Europe as serving notice to distressed Continental economies that they can expect no substantial support from Great Britain, and that it may be difficult to reconcile the view that the United Kingdom should take a bold position of leadership in that continent with the retention of the pre-war impediments to export trade from Europe.

A South African delegate maintained that his country was more dependent upon world trade than any other Dominion. The development of manufacturing in South Africa has actually increased her dependence on the world outside, for 50 per cent of the raw materials which are used are imported. South Africa, therefore, also has a lively interest in the restoration of multilateral trading, and though it was reported that the Government would probably support to the maximum the secondary industries which have developed in recent years, it was also pointed out from South Africa

that a policy of exclusiveness would not necessarily increase the power of the Commonwealth.

An Indian delegate thought that existing industries could not be sacrificed for the benefit of other members of the Commonwealth, and while in the Indian view there is no reason why the aggregate volume of trade between India and the United Kingdom should contract, it is necessary that United Kingdom exporters should prepare themselves for drastic changes in the type of export to be sold in India. The plans which were strongly supported by some members of the Indian delegation for a radical reshaping of the Indian economy to accelerate the emergence from medievalism which is necessary if India is to cease to be—as one delegate described his country —a vast slum of four hundred million people, contemplate indeed a very drastic reduction in Indian imports of many types of consumers' goods, which, it is hoped, Indian industry will itself soon be able to supply.

United Kingdom thinking on post-war commercial policy is inevitably much influenced by a keen awareness of the immense difficulties created by the liquidation of a large fraction of her overseas capital assets during the war, the uncertainties of the other traditional 'invisible' credit items in her balance of payments, and the accumulation of debts which the prosecution of the war has obliged her to incur. It has been frequently said that if something approximating to the pre-war volume of imports is to be assured, an increase in British exports of at least 50 per cent will be necessary, and this will obviously be a matter of the utmost difficulty in view of the war-time losses of traditional market connexions—the volume of exports in 1943 was only 29 per cent of the volume recorded for 1938—and the difficulty of ensuring a speedy rehabilitation of the capital equipment and labour force of British export industries. In this difficult situation, the United Kingdom would naturally be reluctant to sacrifice any advantages which it at present enjoyed in Imperial export markets, unless it were assured of a very substantial *quidpro quo* in return. Some United Kingdom delegates, who agreed that Ottawa did not have the effect intended at the time of lowering trade barriers generally, nevertheless believed that it might be possible to devise a different kind of Ottawa which would in fact have this beneficial effect. One of them, who thought that close collaboration was possible even if the volume of trade was small, also believed that as a result of modern developments in applied science there was now an inevitable long-term trend in the direction of self-sufficiency. It was, however, also pointed out that it might be embarrassing if the doctrine of the inevitability of self-sufficiency were too whole-heartedly embraced in the United States, which might feel itself in a position to practise the doctrine

without the risk of much loss to itself long before the rest of the world had had time to make the necessary adjustments.

Attention was drawn to the special interest in imperial preference of some of the Colonies, such as the West Indies, and the distinction was also made between the nominal value of preferences for commodities of which the Commonwealth has a surplus which must be sold in world markets, and their more substantial value in relation to commodities of which no such surplus exists. Some of the nominal modifications which were made in the original Ottawa agreements just before the war were due to a realization that the former type of preference is scarcely worth retaining.

Several delegates were a little impatient of a discussion of commercial policy in terms of tariffs and preferences. This they felt to be out-of-date and unrealistic, the requirements of the times demanding a more dynamic and positive attitude. For the Most Favoured Nation principle, in particular, they had little respect, one United Kingdom delegate condemning it as a barrier to progress, though a Canadian delegate also pointed out the dangers which would arise if the United States were provoked into abandoning it. Another Canadian delegate insisted that international trade after the war must be planned with a view to expansion, and for this purpose urged the adaptation of war-time methods, such as governmental bulk purchasing. Yet another Canadian delegate, however, believed that such devices could be too easily used as merely another instrument for protection, and a New Zealand delegate drew attention to the risks for small economies that in striking bargains of this kind there would be a strong tendency for those who happened to have the greatest power to insist on being given the best terms.

It was also pointed out to those who were eager for broad expansive views that effect could be given to them only by means of a large number of separate decisions on a large number of particular and perhaps small cases, and that in making these decisions, the issues which arose in discussions of tariffs and preferences could not be brushed aside. The nature of the problem, it was pointed out, is not changed by the invention of new techniques of trade policy. The important thing is whether or not adequate opportunities are to be afforded for low-cost and efficient producers to sell in the world's markets. A Canadian delegate thought tariff reductions of little importance unless they are made where they threaten to hurt. A South African, who also disliked discussions in terms of the traditional terminology, asked for a more careful examination of the costs of industrial change as a matter vital for both commercial policy and general economic expansion, and invited the United Kingdom to give a lead in working out methods for re-

moving the obstacles to enterprise which are everywhere checking expansion.

Monetary and Capital Investment Policy

Many delegates were of opinion that if in the field of commercial policy definite decisions must be made about the Ottawa agreements, the future of the sterling *bloc* similarly demands consideration as an instrument of monetary policy. The analogy between the two is, however, far from being exact, for the pre-war sterling *bloc* was never regarded by anyone as an obstacle to the rebuilding of a healthy international economic order. It was not indeed, strictly speaking, a Commonwealth institution. Canada was never a member of it, while several important non-British countries found it no less convenient than Australia or New Zealand to attach their currencies to sterling. More important, it was suggested, is the fact that the war has, at least temporarily, completely transformed the character of the sterling *bloc.* It has for the time being become a strictly Commonwealth affair, though with Canada still outside it, and sterling, instead of being, as before the war, entirely at the free disposal of its holders, has become a blocked currency, the holders of which have only a limited freedom in deciding what to do with it. The Bretton Woods conference, moreover, has presented the world with formal proposals for new international institutions in the spheres of currency and capital investment, to which governments everywhere must shortly define their attitudes.

The United Kingdom attitude towards these issues was as much influenced as in relation to post-war commercial policy by the fundamental change imposed by the war upon the character of the balance of payments to which the British economy had become accustomed, a process, moreover, which was still going on. The peculiar structure of British import trade, it was pointed out, makes the British standard of living a very peculiar thing. Food and raw materials form such a large part of Britain's imports that there is no possibility of cutting off a relatively small fraction of the import trade without serious damage to the standard of living of the great mass of the population. Even during the war the value of British imports, excluding munitions and taking price changes into account, was still in 1943 only 21 per cent less than in 1938, and a considerable fraction of these imports were financed by Lend-Lease or Mutual Aid. Without implying anything so foolish as the idea that the rest of the world has a duty somehow or other to provide the conditions necessary for the maintenance of British living standards, it is still proper to point out that the character of British imports is such as to make a catastrophic decline in these standards very easy, but a moderate decline much more difficult to arrange.

In these difficult circumstances authorities in the United Kingdom naturally examine with unusual care the character of any obligations which they might be asked to assume as members of any international economic organization. Anything which had the appearance of creating a new link between sterling and gold is regarded in many quarters with deep-rooted suspicion. Doctrines of 'cheap money' have been elevated almost to the status of a new orthodoxy, and there is considerable reluctance to undertake general commitments which there is any reason to fear might limit the country's freedom to practise these doctrines or by other suitable means to ensure the maintenance of a high level of employment. With all the uncertainties which face the inquirer in every direction, it is not surprising that there are many important issues in these and related fields upon which public opinion in the United Kingdom is not yet finally crystallized. Practically all members of the Conference agreed that from a long-run standpoint it is a primary British interest to re-establish a world economic system in which the United Kingdom could again, as in the past, enjoy the substantial benefits likely to accrue from multilateral trade exchanges. But everybody was also agreed that for a period, the limits of which cannot at the moment easily be forecast, a substantial part of the control machinery set up during the war, and in particular of the foreign exchange control machinery, must be maintained. Formal approval of a multilateral system does not therefore necessarily mean very much, for some people who would like to maintain controls indefinitely are quite happy to pay lip service to a multilateral system to be established in a remote future if by so doing they could allay the suspicions of some of their critics. Especially in view of the many uncertainties ahead, the value to Great Britain of the sterling *bloc* connexion was at least no less than it had been before the war, and drawing attention to the risks of instability inherent in a close association with the dollar, one United Kingdom delegate asked his Dominion colleagues whether they might not take a similar view, regarding the advantages to be gained from a more permanent link with a probably more stable sterling currency as sufficiently solid to induce them to maintain the sterling *bloc* connexion.

There is in fact no serious expectation that Canada will vary its traditional policy in this field, for it is generally agreed that there are no reasons sufficiently strong to induce her to abandon the middle position dictated by her twofold interest in both sterling and the dollar. The contrast between the 'active' Canadian balance of payments with the United Kingdom and her 'passive' balance with the United States, both of which were more sharply defined during the war, gives Canada the very strongest interest in

the speediest possible restoration of a multilateral trading system such as was envisaged at Bretton Woods. Her embarrassments would be very great if the right to convert the sterling received for her exports to Great Britain into the dollars needed to pay for her imports from the United States were to be permanently restricted.

South Africa has an obvious interest in measures which would maintain a steady demand for gold, for gold is still a vital part of South African economic life, and at present accounts for 73 per cent of her export trade. For Australian currency the link with sterling was held to be of the utmost value, and one Australian delegate believed that in the last resort the policy of his country in regard to the International Monetary Fund proposed at Bretton Woods would probably follow the lead given by the United Kingdom. His opifiion was favourable to the proposal for an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development but more hesitant about the Monetary Fund. The final decision on this matter, it was felt, must necessarily depend largely on the terms on which it seems probable that world trade in general will be restored, but while there was also some concern lest membership of the Fund should impose an inconvenient rigidity upon rates of exchange, the balance of advantage was thought to be in favour of Australian adherence to the Fund.

So far as could be gathered from the points which the Indian delegates felt it most useful to press at the Conference, there is less interest in India in the general character of the post-war international monetary structure than in the problem created by the large so-called 'blocked' sterling balances now accumulating to India's credit in Great Britain. These were described by one delegate as a non-interest-bearing loan to the United Kingdom, and it was suggested that the extent to which they have been used to repatriate capital assets in India which were previously owned in the United Kingdom should not be exaggerated, as many of the most profitable Indian enterprises are still in British hands. In the minds of those who favoured large-scale and long-range plans of industrialization for India, the 'blocked' sterling balances problem was closely tied up with the problem of the provision of capital equipment. The hope was expressed that the balances would speedily be made available for the purchase of capital goods for shipbuilding, electrical and railway development, and other purposes connected with a planned industrialization, though one Indian delegate was concerned at the possibility of these plans being used to facilitate Indian capitalist domination over the rest of the population and entered a plea for the utilization of part of the balances for the provision of more consumers' goods.

Indian thinking on these questions was also closely linked with questions arising out of the continued struggle for a new and more satisfactory political status. It was repeatedly insisted that harmonious economic relations between India and the United Kingdom are dependent upon the expeditious implementation of the guarantees of political status which have already been offered to India. British capital, it was explained, need not be apprehensive when plans for Indian industrial development are presented to the world. The fact that some of the most influential sponsors of the Bombay Plan are active members of the political party which formerly proposed the repudiation of foreign debts is a clear indication that this party has now repudiated the doctrine of repudiation. There is, however, in India the strongest feeling that foreign investment, whether from Great Britain or elsewhere, should be quite free from any suggestion of political influence, and delegates said that British investors should be warned that they must be prepared to make adequate use of Indian directors and Indian personnel.

On the United Kingdom side, it was pointed out that India's interest in the liquidation of her 'blocked' balances is shared in varying degrees by several other economies, both inside and outside the Commonwealth, and there will therefore be other claimants able with equal justice to press for immediate post-war priority of access to the United Kingdom's then inevitably limited resources. An American opinion was quoted which compared the embarrassments likely to arise from the accumulation of sterling war balances in London with the problems of inter-Allied debts and reparations that had bedevilled international relations during the inter-war period. 'That England should have to bear it alone', this writer has said, 'is just as questionable from the standpoint of equity as was the inter-Allied debt.'

If the change in Great Britain's creditor-debtor position creates serious immediate difficulties for the financing of her imports, much more of course does it affect her capacity to finance long-term foreign investments in accordance with past practice. The relative importance as sources of capital supply of the countries which played the most active part in the international capital market before the war has in general changed to such an extent as to demand a critical re-examination of the traditional institutions of this market. The United Kingdom would not for some time have at its disposal anything like the same volume of resources as once made the London money market such a convenient reservoir of capital for the Dominions and other parts of the Empire. Even if there had been no balance of payments difficulties one delegate thought that the maintenance of high levels of taxation might make it difficult to maintain the^ effectiveness of some of the pre-war

machinery of the London money market. The Conference realized that at least for some years to come the United States will be the most obvious large-scale source of capital supply for foreign investment, and the adequate handling of the problem as a whole will demand even more clearly than the other issues which were raised at the Conference some machinery of international organization. Though necessarily on a much smaller scale, there are also indications that Canada might increasingly assume the responsibilities of an international creditor economy. The war has made Canada a creditor on current account, the annual value of the exports financed by Mutual Aid being equal by 1944 to the annual value of the whole of Canada's pre-war exports. One Canadian delegate stated that Canada would be anxious to lend to the United Kingdom; others also visualized the possibility of Canada taking a more lively interest in international investment in general. A United Kingdom delegate, who was particularly concerned with the responsibility of his country to the Colonies, and who believed that the provision contemplated in the Colonial Development Act would be inadequate for the requirements of the Colonies, and would therefore have to be supplemented by private capital, inquired whether the Dominions would be prepared to collaborate in the provision of such capital. One Canadian delegate thought that Canadian investment houses would need some education and guidance before they felt thoroughly at home in the foreign investment field, and stated that it should not be too much taken for granted that the small savers whose importance has greatly increased during the war would not wish to use most of their war-time savings for purchases within Canada.

There are, indeed, considerable variations in the degree of interest felt in different parts of the Empire in maintaining effective access to such supplies of capital as may in future still be available in Great Britain. The need for capital in many of the colonies is pressing, and may not easily be met to anything like the full extent from purely British sources. At the other extreme there was no longer any pressing necessity for Canada to look to the United Kingdom for further capital supplies. The other Dominions are not yet so far advanced, and in particular it was pointed out to the Conference that the type of equity capital necessary for the peculiar conditions of gold-mining development in South Africa cannot be fully supplied from local resources, so that it was there felt to be advantageous to maintain the traditional contacts with the London money market. A South African delegate urged strongly that there should be no post-war controls to impede the movement of capital between the several parts of the sterling area. The needs of the Empire and home needs should, in his view, be regarded in the United King-

dom as one. The capacity of all the Dominions, as well as of India, for becoming responsible for satisfying their own capital needs had, however, greatly increased both before and during the war, and some profound modifications in the traditional lender-borrower relation between Great Britain and the Dominions would therefore conform fairly closely to the changed supply and demand conditions on either side of this relation.

Race and Migration

THE problem of racial distinctions emerged from time to time during other sessions as well as during those specifically concerned with its discussion. It emerged, for instance, during the discussions on security and defence in connexion with the part which India might play in the future as a base and arsenal in the East. It appeared again in sessions devoted to international and Commonwealth institutions and to those concerned with the study of the future of the Colonies. It would be generally agreed, no doubt, that the question of race and particularly the question of colour is one of the fundamental problems not only in the Commonwealth but in the world as a whole. The preparatory papers submitted before the Conference were evidence that the importance of this question is widely understood and is in fact regarded as one of the greatest dangers for the future peace of the world. As the main paper submitted by the Canadian delegation said, 'The Chinese, the Japanese, the Indians—all the nation states composed of non-whites—sooner or later will make a common cause against the self-chosen superior whites.'

During the discussions of the Conference a United Kingdom delegate spoke in strong terms of the world-wide significance of the racial problem and instanced the question of negroes in the United States and the discrimination of caste and race in India herself. Implicit throughout the discussions, though not clearly stated, it was possible to see the fundamental reaction which was shared by the representatives of the four Dominions. There seems to be no doubt that in all the Dominions there is an equally powerful impulse to preserve their identity as white communities and to maintain the high standard of living which they enjoy at present. But there is also an important distinction which was clearly expressed in the discussions. In Australia, New Zealand and Canada this impulse to preserve their white identity can be seen in the refusal to consider an influx from more densely populated regions, especially in Asia, which are inhabited by other races, but in South Africa the same impulse manifests itself internally in the refusal to grant equal

status and opportunity to the coloured peoples who make up four-fifths of her population.

The problem as it emerged during the discussions seems to be one of enabling the European races to maintain their standards of living and traditional culture and at the same time affording the opportunities required for the peaceful progress of those other much larger sections of the human race. It was impossible to disagree with the Indian delegate who said that prosperity and peace would never be promoted by methods which enabled some nations to become rich at the expense of others. He pointed out that in the recent past ideas of racial superiority had been the cause of war and world-wide suffering. The Nazi philosophy, he said, was the logical outcome of a doctrine which had been practised by most European countries for two centuries, and he believed that war would recur until it was firmly established that no race or people was entitled to dominate or exploit any other.

During the sessions reserved for discussions on problems of race and migration the question of the status and the treatment of Indians in other parts of the Commonwealth was the main issue with which the Conference dealt. No report of the matter would be complete unless it were made quite clear that, taken as a whole, the Conference was fully aware of the wider international significance of the racial question. Delegates from India told the Conference that India regards, and will continue to regard, any discrimination against Indians elsewhere as her concern and that her resentment on this score has become mainly focused on South Africa. The main Indian spokesman on this subject gave the Conference a vivid picture of the conditions of people of Indian extraction in Natal. They were originally introduced into Natal from 1860 onwards at the request of the white sugar planters. The fact that they first went to South Africa because South Africa asked for them in order to save her economy during one of its most difficult periods, and that many Indians have subsequently expressed their desire to become South Africans and to make South Africa the permanent home of themselves and their families, is a fundamental factor in the Indian protest at the discriminations which are enforced against them. Those Indians who live in Natal, and number as many as 220,000, are not allowed to move to other parts of the Union. In Natal, the Indian spokesman said, there is no compulsory education for Indians; 40 per cent of the Indian population of school age are "not in school, secondary education is limited, and there is for them no higher education. The result is that although 90 per cent of the Indian people living there were born in South Africa and are of South African nationality, if they wish to study medicine or law fhey have to go to India or the United Kingdom. Unlike other

South Africans they have no old age or invalidity pensions. The social discriminations, he said, which result from the colour bar persist throughout the Union. He admitted that within South Africa there are many people who were not in agreement with the discriminatory regulations and he paid a special debt of gratitude to Mr. Hofmeyr for his support of the case of non-Europeans, whether Indian or native. He also told the Conference that some of the churches in South Africa have protested against the colour bar which is maintained in the Dutch Reformed Church and the provisions which deny Indians equality in Church or State.

This Indian delegate then turned to certain specific arguments used against Indians in South Africa. In Natal, Indians at one time had the franchise, but it was later taken away from them and it is said that, if the franchise were restored, it would have to be given also to- the natives. The Indian answer to that argument is that 'two wrongs do not make a right'. It is also said that the Indians would swamp the European vote in Natal. The Indian answer to that assertion is that the Union Government could solve the problem of Natal, where Indians and Europeans are about equal in number, by removing the barriers which prevent migration between the Provinces. The danger of intermarriage, he said, is very slight, as has been shown in India herself, and he expressed the view that on this matter Indians have quite as strong feelings as Europeans. On the economic side it is feared by South Africans that the removal of restrictions would result in a lowering of the standard of living of the European population, which would fall more nearly to the level of that of Indians. The Indian answer to that fear is that an effort should be made to raise the standard of living of the Indians by improving the conditions in which they are forced to live and removing the sense of insecurity which is engendered by anti-Asiatic legislation. India, he said, is tired of waiting for a gradual change of public opinion in South Africa and as long as a European has a vote and the Indian is disfranchised the Indian problem will persist. The solution which this Indian delegate demanded is that the franchise, both municipal and political, should be restored and given to the Indians on the same terms as to Europeans; without that, he said, the Indian will continue to be taxed without representation. Secondly, he said that in the Indian view provincial barriers should be removed in order that Indians might migrate from Natal to the Orange Free State, the Transvaal, and to the Cape. Thirdly, he said, the Cape Town Agreement of 1927, which had been drawn up between the Governments of South Africa and India but has never been fully implemented, should be put into practice. He stressed the fact that feeling in India is very high indeed on the question of the treatment of Indians in South

Africa, and that it is of concern to the future of the whole Commonwealth.

This delegate also mentioned the position of Indians in Kenya, where, he said, although the restrictions are fewer than in South Africa, the reservation of highlands for Europeans is looked upon with grave suspicion and distrust. Passing to the other Dominions he recorded the liberal treatment now accorded to Indians in New Zealand and their liberal treatment in Australia. In Canada the number of Indians involved is extremely small, he said, there being only about 1,600 and those almost entirely in British Columbia where they are affected by restrictions intended originally for groups of Japanese and Chinese. Although the Dominion Government is willing to grant them the franchise they are not entitled to it until they obtain the provincial franchise, which is at present withheld from them in British Columbia. It was suggested by both Indian and Canadian delegates that High Commissioners should be exchanged between the two countries, that a treaty should be negotiated between them which as the first step might grant entrance to categories which present no problem, such as students, doctors, merchants and missionaries, and the Canadian delegates expressed the hope that the franchise disabilities might be removed by legislative action in British Columbia. The same Indian delegate concluded his remarks by saying that the really essential thing is for India to obtain self-government herself, and expressing the view that international or Commonwealth machinery is required to settle the difficult question of the status and treatment of Indians in other countries. A South African delegate in reply assured the Indian delegation that nowadays there is a strong body of liberal-minded opinion in South Africa but that they have been unable to make much headway, because the Indian problem is so closely tied up with the whole colour complex and cannot be solved by political means alone. In his mind, the basis of a solution is the peaceful improvement of the economic condition of the Indians and the native peoples. He went on to say that progress is bound to be slow because of fears which have their roots deep in the past, and, although many people are beginning to understand that these fears are groundless, economic difficulties are hard to overcome. He begged Indians not to discuss this problem as though it were merely a matter of prestige and expressed the fear that any external pressure which was brought to bear on the South African Government would aggravate rather than improve the situation.

Another South African delegate pointed out that an important point had been reached in the evolution of the Commonwealth, Hitherto only white communities have had Dominion status; now, however, other communities are fast progressing to that position

and India as the first would set a new precedent. This delegate realized the importance of the problem and the necessity for constructive thinking. The difficulty for South Africans, he said, is the local concentration of Indians in Natal, because although it is true that only 2½ per cent of the total population of the Union is Indian, the concentration of Indians in Natal makes the Indian and European population there almost equal and, by reason of the Indian birth-rate, the Indian community there is likely to exceed the European community. He admitted that a solution for the problem might in principle be found by removing the barriers between the Provinces, but he said that the other Provinces were unwilling to add to their difficulties by an influx of Indians, all parts of South Africa being in any case so full of racial troubles. He also stressed the economic aspect of the problem and the necessity of raising the standard of living, which, he said, was actually being done, and he urged that the improvement should not be lost sight of in the consideration of the Indian question. He went on to say that the Indian problem cannot be divorced from the general racial complex. In Natal, he said, the Indians are outnumbered by the natives by about eight to one, and a colour distinction was deeply embedded there before they arrived. Looking back over the last few years he could see that largely for economic reasons these distinctions and prejudices were beginning to break down. He welcomed that change of attitude but thought that to force the pace would in actual fact retard the development. A large number of people in South Africa, many of them in responsible positions, are anxious to find a solution to the problem, and he reminded the Conference that Mr. Hofmeyr, the Deputy Prime Minister, said not long ago in public that the time had come for a fresh round-table conference between India and South Africa in which representatives of the two nations could try to find a further basis for advance.

Another South African delegate endorsed this view of his colleague, but an Indian member replied that Indians regard the question as one which touches their national honour and are exasperated because a solution has been delayed so long. They expect, as a natural corollary to membership of the Commonwealth, that everywhere the fundamental rights of citizenship will be conceded to them—the right to earn a living, the right to own property and the right to vote. He expressed the view that rights and obligations of citizenship in the Commonwealth are united by allegiance to the Crown and that instead of local citizenship there should be a Commonwealth citizenship, giving all the citizens of the Commonwealth the same rights throughout the Commonwealth. He quoted freedom and human treatment for all as fundamental principles of the Atlantic Charter. Then, turning to the African question, he

pointed out that again and again it has been said that Indians in South Africa are South Africans and that India has no right to intervene on their behalf. India, he said, would not need to do sc if they were treated as South Africans and given the full rights of citizenship.

Some Indian delegates expressed resentment that the United Kingdom did not intervene on behalf of Indians in South Africa, A United Kingdom delegate examined that point and explained the difficulty which faces the United Kingdom in this connexion. She is deeply concerned in India because she values the integrity and the unity of the Empire, but at the same time if she were to intervene with the internal affairs of any Dominion, she would be cutting away one of the strongest planks on which the structure of the Commonwealth rests. As a South African delegate said in another connexion, complete freedom and absence of pressure under which South Africa was able to face the question of participation or neutrality in the war has convinced even those South Africans who were least friendly to the Imperial connexion that Dominion status does really mean national freedom. It would not be in the interests of India herself, or of the Commonwealth as a whole, if Great Britain did anything to injure that principle. The same United Kingdom delegate went on to say that in discussions which have been held at various times on the future of the Indian constitution there has been objection to the idea of reserving power for the protection of minorities and he pleaded that if India feels so deeply on that question, she should appreciate that South Africa would feel it no less strongly.

The question of future Indian migration was raised and delegates from Canada, Australia and New Zealand all indicated that for economic reasons as well as on account of the difficulties of racial assimilation, their countries would not welcome large-scale Indian immigration. To this an Indian member replied that India did not wish to regard herself as an emigration country (or as one Indian preparatory paper put it—'as a world emporium for unskilled labour'), and did not question the principle laid down by the Imperial War Cabinets of 1917 and 1918, to the effect that each Commonwealth country should enjoy complete control over the composition of its own population by means of restriction of immigration. This should not mean, however, that British Indians should be more severely restricted than non-British Europeans. He suggested that each Dominion (except South Africa) should fix a small quota for Indian immigration, but Australian and Canadian spokesmen preferred a bilateral treaty, while a New Zealand member felt that that country should continue to deal with applications on their individual merits.

It was left to a United Kingdom delegate to point out that the Committee had neglected to discuss what he regarded as the most important issue before it. India's huge population is still increasing at the rate of five million a year. What outlets, he asked, were going to be found to relieve this pressure? For lack of time this issue was not pursued further, but reference to the preparatory papers shows that Indian opinion is itself divided about the need for such outlet. The seriousness of the food problem is admitted, but while one writer foresees an adequate solution in the planned development of India herself, others regard large-scale emigration as essential. This movement, it is contended, should be directed chiefly towards those tropical regions of South and South-East Asia which are not well suited to white settlement, and it is recognized that China might have a similar interest in relieving her overcrowding. One paper would go further, and include the less-favoured areas of Australia and New Zealand, East Africa and South Africa. It is clear that none of the present Dominions would be willing to accept this, but an Australian paper suggests that their attitude towards the problem cannot be a purely negative one. Nations like Australia should help to promote the agricultural and industrial development of the densely populated areas, providing some of the necessary scientific and technical assistance. It is evident that the unequal distribution of population is one of the fundamental disharmonies of the world.

When the Conference turned to consider the question of white migration within the Commonwealth itself, the discussions were affected by a realization that the centre of world population pressure is changing and that the change is of great significance, not only for the individual members of the Commonwealth but for the British Commonwealth of Nations as a whole. From the point of view of both defence and economic expansion there was, however, great uncertainty as to how the members of the Commonwealth could most effectively adjust themselves to the change in the population map of the world. There seemed to be general agreement that British migrants would be preferred in the Dominions to any others, but it was pointed out that in many cases the type of immigrants who would be welcomed in the Dominions were those whom the United Kingdom might be least able to spare, such as industrial workers and technicians, who would be of particular value to the United Kingdom herself in the post-war period, in which she would have to build up her export trade in the face of strong international competition. Moreover, the Dominions would want immigrants in age-groups under thirty and several delegates felt that in this connexion also the people required by the Dominions would be those of greatest use to the United Kingdom. As one United

Kingdom delegate put it, 'most of the Dominions would like the United Kingdom to be a nursery, but if you take the youth, the nursery will cease to exist and become an old age home'. Those who held this view believed that the policy of the United Kingdom should be directed to giving its younger generation the possibilities of advancement and improved social conditions which would tend to an increased birth-rate at home. On the other hand another delegate suggested that the birth-rate in the United Kingdom was kept down by a sense of insecurity and lack of opportunity in an overcrowded country, and that if a substantial number of young men and women emigrated to the Dominions an impetus would be given to an increased birth-rate in the United Kingdom. Yet another United Kingdom delegate quoted figures to show that on the whole the United Kingdom had become a country of immigration rather than of emigration.

Looking at the question from an international point of view some delegates pointed out that any restrictive legislation on the movements of population was apt to be unwise policy and that since 1914 such legislation had been responsible for serious economic maladjustments, leading to unemployment in the areas of heavy population. Economic considerations, it was said, dependent upon the general conditions of the world economy, govern the capacity of the Dominions to receive immigrants, because their capacity for increased population depends upon the condition of the international markets, in which they have to sell their primary and secondary products.

An indirect source of migration to the Dominions, though not on a large scale, was seen in the necessity for the training in the Dominions of the air and mechanized ground forces of the United Kingdom. It was felt that many of the members of the Royal Air Force who had been trained in the Dominions under the Empire Air Training Scheme would wish to return to the Dominions and settle there after the war, and it was hoped that many of those who may be trained in the Dominions in the future will be equally appreciative of the possibilities of life in the newer countries. A Canadian delegate pointed out that in Canada there are reasonable prospects of a gradual increase in the population. He admitted, however, that it must be conceded that, looked at from the world point of view, Canada contains large areas which could be highly productive but which are, in fact, scarcely developed. He drew attention to the fact that from 1920 to 1932 there was a gross immigration of 1,500,000, including a large number of United States citizens with considerable capital resources. He stressed a point made by many other Dominion delegates that immigration would have to be carefully supervised, since the fact that * distant

fields look green' has been responsible for an enormous misdirection of migration and of avoidable hardship. The main problem is one of overcoming the innate resistance to immigration. In addition to the usual vested interests, and to the difficulties involved in assimilating peoples of different stock, the greatest single factor of resistance is the fear of unemployment resulting from the Great Depression. He did not agree that this fear is justified, but it typifies the difficulty of getting across to the Canadian people the need for immigration. Those who think that immigration is not likely to be in the interests of their country are apt to pick on any current facts which they can use as arguments against it. An instance of this was the view more prevalent in some quarters in the Dominions that immigration should not be encouraged, and in fact should be made difficult, until the problem of rehabilitating ex-Service men returning to their own countries has been satisfactorily solved. A Canadian delegate said that in his opinion plans for immigration should take account both of the needs of the returning Service men and women and of the desirability of attracting new immigrants, but he admitted that the task of educating the public in this matter is far from easy. lie said that he thought that the argument in favour of the movement of people from devastated Europe to the newer countries of the world is almost irrefutable. The problem, he suggested, is connected with economic expansion in the recipient country. Some people in Canada, he said, declare that economic expansion is not sufficient to enable Canada to accept immigrants and that her natural increase of population is satisfactory.

Some of the difficulty possibly arises from badly organized immigration in the past. Canada has often taken immigrants 'in large gulps', as one of the delegates put it, and has found them difficult to digest. Less immigration and better assimilation would have been preferable at the time and would have produced a better background to the present problems. This delegate mentioned five types of immigrants who would be especially welcomed in Canada from the United Kingdom. First, there are the men from the Air Force, trained under the Empire Training Scheme. Secondly, there will be the British wives of Canadians who have married in the United Kingdom and who will be returning with their families. It is hoped that if these British women become happily settled in Canada they will perhaps attract other people from the United Kingdom, who will then be able to go out under the best auspices, having relatives or friends to tide them over the initial stages. Thirdly, there is the possibility—bat the numbers are very small—that some of the children evacuated from the United Kingdom might wish to return to Canada. Fourthly, he said that he thought

Canada would welcome members of the Women's Land Army, not in order that they might settle down as operating farmers but because they would make excellent farmers' wives. Fifthly, Canada would welcome urban workers of the right type.

The Australian view as expressed in the preparatory papers, and during the Conference discussions, typifies the fundamental contradictions of Commonwealth population aspirations and demographic facts. The large estimates of the number of immigrants which some quarters in Australia desire—when they speak of Australia attaining a population of twenty or thirty million people within the next two or three decades—indicate two fundamental disharmonies: *(a)* the conflict with the population interests of the United Kingdom, and (6) the economic disharmonies which would have to be overcome in Australia herself if, primarily for defence purposes, she should embark upon such vast immigration schemes. The ability of Australia to absorb immigrants after the war is mainly governed by the conditions of world trade, and past experience does not support optimistic judgements concerning the possibilities of mass migration. Increased markets for Australia's primary products would help to absorb some of Australia's surplus rural population and thus increase the immigrant requirements of secondary and tertiary industries. Overseas migrants appear to be most readily absorbed into the latter. An expert Australian view therefore suggests that a great deal of good might be accomplished for the benefit of all the countries of the Commonwealth by measures designed to make it easier for labour to move from one part of the Commonwealth to another. This would help to prevent bottlenecks in industrial labour supplies in any individual country. The increased mobility should not take the form of a one-way movement. It should be a genuine reshuffling of labour forces based on the realization that different types of labour are complementary to each other and that surplus or shortages in them in one country should be smoothed out by facilitating migration and eliminating existing obstacles to it.

Delegates from New Zealand pointed out that the capacity "of their country to absorb immigrants is proportionately smaller than that of Australia because her industrial potential is still restricted. In her case the demographic dilemma is further pronounced by her desire to restrict immigration almost entirely to British stock and her fears that she cannot tackle the problem of her ex-Service men while at the same time encouraging immigration. The view was expressed that she would support child migration on the basis of the Fairbridge Farm School scheme.

Delegates from other Dominions also agreed that children who grow up and receive their training in the country of immigration are apt to make the best immigrants, but they were unable to suggest

any satisfactory solution of the human problem of separating children from their parents. This particular problem of course would not arise in the case of orphans.

In South Africa immigration problems are accentuated by the presence of a large unskilled non-European population, and by political difficulties and fears. But there is a growing realization that skilled labour of various types is necessary for the Union's industrial development. There is reason to believe that many of the members of the forces which were stationed in South Africa will make their home in the Union.

It was realized that the problem of migration is much more than a Commonwealth problem and limitation of time compelled the Conference to confine its attention to migration within the Commonwealth, but it was realized that the generally declining birth-rate in the Commonwealth raises issues of world-wide significance. It was also appreciated that freedom to move to new opportunities to better one's condition has been nullified by extreme nationalistic beliefs which are really based on fear. These irrational fears, as one delegate remarked, are responsible for the failure of peoples generally to see in migration a beneficial, normal economic process without which world productivity cannot be increased.

The Colonies in the Commonwealth

THE organizing committee of the Conference in drawing up the agenda decided that a Conference on Commonwealth Relations would be incomplete unless adequate time were allowed for discussion of the problems presented by the dependencies within the Commonwealth and the policies of the Commonwealth nations on colonial questions. The Conference as a whole endorsed this decision and a member of the United Kingdom delegation opened the discussion by outlining the modern conception of colonial needs and the problems which these gave to the administrating Powers.

What, he asked, from the Commonwealth point of view was the real problem of the Colonies? He explained that he was using the word 'Commonwealth' to mean all that lay within the orbit of the British Commonwealth and Empire. In that broadest sense the Commonwealth has three distinct sections: first the society of peoples, comprising the United Kingdom and the Dominions, which found its formal recognition in the Statute of Westminster, with their Western ideas; secondly, India and Burma, on the verge of Dominion status but with a culture and social life different from those of the United Kingdom and the Dominions; and thirdly, the group of peoples comprising the Colonial Empire. This assemblage

of nearly sixty units with a population of some sixty-five million people, mainly situated in the tropics, should be looked at, he said, from the standpoint of the modern, scientific world. The really significant point about the Colonies is not their technical classification into Crown Colonies, protectorates, or mandated territories, but their backwardness in standards of social life, in natural resources, and in many of the qualities of citizenship, although a wide difference separates the vanguard from the rearguard in the march of progress. In consequence of this two difficulties emerge. The first is the impression made on many outside observers of a lack of balance in the Commonwealth, occasioned by the differences existing between its three main sections. Observers are apt to feel that the moral force of the contribution which the Commonwealth could make to a world order is impaired by the existence within it of so many units without political independence and with standards of life so far below those of the more highly organized or, as they would say, civilized peoples of the world. The second is that many people feel that the contribution which the Colonies could make to the material resources of the Commonwealth, and therefore the influence which it could exercise on the security and on the welfare side of an international organization, must be much less than would be the case if they were more fully developed.

This delegate went on to say that he believed that very few people held the extreme view that all Colonies alike should be freed at once from outside control. According to British tradition the accepted road to self-government leads through the progressive adoption of democratic institutions. The British people would not feel that their responsibility had been met unless they educated colonial peoples in the arts of government. But, this delegate went on to say, a flexibility of methods which would pay due regard to the feelings of colonial people about their own constitution is as important as the speed of advance which they are able to make towards self-government, although it is important that the pace of development should be as rapid as is in keeping with fulfilment of British responsibilities. Equally allied with the question of political development is the question of social and economic improvement, and many of those in Great Britain who are the most fervent advocates of political advance believe that the grant of self-government would be unreal and even harmful unless it were built upon a social and economic basis. Poverty, in fact, is the great problem of the Colonies and this in part is due to the poor quality of many of the tropical soils, the absence of minerals in so many Colonies, and the fluctuating prices of the primary products on which tropical economy so largely depends. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which contemplates an expenditure of £120 million in the next

ten years, is a promising indication of our future policy but, said this delegate, this provision can only be regarded as the priming in the machinery of development, and since the standard of living of any people depends to a great extent on the natural resources of the country and their capacity to make the best use of them, it is now recognized that there will have to be a much more systematic campaign of economic development by the direct stimulation of secondary industries as well as by the improvement of primary products.

This delegate pointed out to the Conference that the economic significance of the Colonies to the Commonwealth is often misrepresented. Their trade is not more than 8 per cent of the total of Commonwealth trade. Before the war 47 per cent of their exports went to the Commonwealth, including 32 per cent to the United Kingdom, and 44 per cent of their imports came from the Commonwealth, including 21 per cent from the United Kingdom. Moreover, the Colonies are not a protected market for investment, and in fact only 7 or 8 per cent of the total overseas investment of the United Kingdom went to the dependencies. What really counted before the war was not preferential tariffs but familiar trade and banking connexions, by which the Colonies gained more than they gave in return, but there is no doubt that such products as rubber and palm-oil gave valuable support to sterling.

In conclusion, this delegate said that he believed that public opinion in the United Kingdom was coming more and more to look on the Colonies, not as dependencies of empire but as units in the Commonwealth, and that although the main responsibility lay with the United Kingdom, their future was a concern of all members of the Commonwealth who had an interest in seeing that the whole Commonwealth should play its full part in the world.

Another United Kingdom delegate suggested that a great responsibility rested upon the citizens of all advanced countries because of their demand for the products of tropical lands. In earlier times these were principally cotton, sugar and tobacco, while in more modern days rubber and other tropical products have also taken a leading place. Demand for these goods produced the monstrous evil of African slavery, which was a direct result of the civilized demand for sugar, cotton and tobacco. Slavery has been ended, but fluctuations in prices of primary products and other causes have more recently turned the Colonies into the world's depressed areas. Everyone, said this delegate, who uses these tropical products has a responsibility towards the native peoples who produce them and, little by little, this moral responsibility must be translated into a practical responsibility. The responsibility, this delegate believed, rests upon all members of the Commonwealth and, indeed, on

citizens of all countries who enjoy, and whose economies thrive upon, the primary products of the Colonies. It would be difficult to say to the large rubber industries of the United States that they must pay more for their rubber because the standard of living of vast numbers of people in the East depended upon it. It would also be difficult to say to the people of the United Kingdom that they must pay more for their cocoa and palm-oil because the economic welfare of colonial peoples was at stake, but all civilized peoples, he said, must face the fact that standards of living in the Colonies cannot be raised until the material resources of the producers are increased. This delegate appreciated the task which lay upon the world organization and the need for making the United Nations understand their duty in this respect but, he said, in the long run people are really made to face responsibility by bearing it, and therefore the greatest duty lay with the United Kingdom and the members of the Commonwealth.

A South African delegate expressed the view that the fundamental issue is not that of making gifts and distributing largesse to colonial peoples, but that it means giving the less advanced peoples of the world a full opportunity to play their part in the economy of the world. This means that responsibility in an economic sense involves the creation of administrative organs designed with that object. The mere expenditure of large sums of money is not enough. Therefore the metropolitan Powers have a responsibility for developing such institutions, but in the view of this South African delegate all other advanced countries have a duty in this connexion also. They must realize that progress in these colonial territories and the raising of their standards of productivity is essential to world prosperity. The difficult problems of organization involved in economic development must be squarely faced. The colonial peoples need guidance and control and admixture of persons of skill and enterprise who can help them to develop the potentialities of their countries but, he said, these processes of development of the resources and raising the standards of living in the Colonies ought not to be regarded as a white man's or a civilized man's burden, but as a process essential to civilized man's own development.

A number of delegates agreed with the view that the kind of things which we condemn in Africa and elsewhere are the very same things that we condemn in Europe. The Colonies are, in fact, an increasingly important part of an indivisible whole. These considerations led to a discussion about the movement of populations. One delegate suggested that peoples of territories which have no natural resources should be moved elsewhere, as was done in the Tennessee Valley scheme. He argued that the fact must be faced

that the development of the modern world could not be suited to existing political boundaries and no economist could accept the argument that a particular tribe or nation could be guaranteed a standard of living by any outside authority if there were no resources in their place of abode. But other delegates pointed out the immense difficulties involved in moving peoples from their indigenous environment. A difficult problem seems to be involved in reconciling the economic, social and humanitarian arguments on this point.

An Australian delegate then returned to the question of responsibility. The widening of the base of responsibility which had been alluded to, he said, would involve a widening of the base of government. But he thought it possible, while retaining the existing narrow base of government, to widen it on the economic side and thus bring about an enormous improvement in standards of life. The existing dependence of the world on certain basic natural products was being challenged. He suggested that it might be necessary to hold the position of these commodities, on which such large numbers of backward peoples were dependent, until long-term development programmes got under way. Could there be, for example, commodity banks in some relation to the international banking system? There was a widespread fear of a movement away from the division of labour principle to internal development and balanced economies, and there was room for thought as to how these problems could be met by united action. On this point an Indian delegate asked if it was in fact possible to isolate the British colonial problem. If the world were asked to raise the price of colonial products in order to raise the standards of British colonial administration, the problem would necessarily become international.

Another Australian delegate remarked that opinion in the United Kingdom in these matters was very far ahead of opinion in the Dominions, or at any rate in his Dominion, which was only beginning to realize the full implications of trusteeship and colonial responsibility and thus did not understand the point of the suggestion that an international understanding was really necessary to cope with these problems. Later in the discussion, a third Australian delegate agreed that Australia was somnolent so far as the major problems were concerned, but said that three aspects touched Australia directly—the problem of the aborigines, which was no longer regarded with carelessness, but with genuine interest; Papua, where Sir Hubert Murray's administration gained the confidence of the natives and was a model to the world; and New Guinea, where the attitude of the natives during the war had evoked real sympathy, which would influence policy.

A Canadian delegate at this point in the discussion outlined what

he thought to be the typical Canadian attitude to the colonial problem, and said that the Canadians are apt to look on colonial questions from a point of view of complete disinterestedness, coupled with a critical outlook on some elements in the situation. While believing that it would be impossible to divide executive responsibility for the administration of Colonies, he thought that if certain problems could be dealt with internationally and if the question as a whole could be viewed not so much as a colonial problem affecting a large number of trustee states, but as part of the international problem of how to raise the standard of living of depressed areas, Canada might be willing to co-operate. Another Canadian delegate, however, said that he believed that most Canadians thought that Canada is not a colonial Power and that she should keep her hands clean from all contact with colonial affairs. It was pointed out, however, that in respect of the Red Indians and Eskimos Canada is, in fact, a colonial Power. Her people are becoming increasingly interested in the problems of her northern lands, and the unofficial part which she has played in the detailed work of collaboration in the work of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission has shown an appreciation of the obligations resulting from her long-standing economic connexion with the West Indies. One of the Canadian delegates expressed the hope that the Caribbean Commission might not only be the means of preventing any Anglo-American friction in the Caribbean but might also help American opinion to appreciate the realities of colonial problems and policy.

Some of the New Zealand and Australian delegates discussed the proposed South Seas Regional Commission. There one of the problems which has to be faced is how best to bring home to the Australian people the long-term international trends which have been evolving so steadily of recent years. One Australian delegate thought that the best education in this respect would be regional collaboration in practical matters, such as improvement of the agriculture of the islands and of the health and education services. A New Zealand delegate, however, was doubtful about the advisability of regional working. In his view the main practical problem is to avoid devastating fluctuations in prices of primary products. He suggested that the problem cannot be tackled on a regional basis so much as through world-wide economic planning and, although he recognized the usefulness of the Caribbean Commission in meeting some of the demands of war, he doubted the advisability of continuing such international Commissions in time of peace. He suggested that regional bodies within the British Commonwealth might be very useful but he told the Conference that he thought that at least half his fellow-countrymen would not care to see the

establishment of an organization in the South Pacific through which the French and the Americans, on the basis of their small holdings in the area, would have the right to suggest policies for Fiji, Tonga and Samoa. It was pointed out to him that the functions of the suggested South Seas Regional Commission would be purely advisory and supervisory, but a United Kingdom delegate wondered whether in actual fact such consultative bodies might not develop into something more, and he suggested that there might be a danger that through such organizations the colonial peoples, instead of being the objects for whose welfare the regional organizations existed, might be used as pawns in power politics among the nations.

Another New Zealand delegate, however, argued that the South Seas Regional Commission proposal had to be considered against the background of the Canberra Agreement as a whole, certain other features of which were probably not very acceptable to the United States. He also thought that New Zealand would gain by participation in the South Seas Regional Commission, though more especially by the closer association with British colonial administration in the Pacific.

The general topic of international collaboration in relation to the Colonies was introduced by a United Kingdom delegate. He discerned two strands of thought, one leading towards the conception that all Colonies should be removed from the control of the existing colonial Powers and handed over to an international body, the second to the view that they should remain with the existing Powers but that these should have the assistance of an international body. The idea of international collaboration goes back to the Congo Basin treaties of 1885, though these were not accompanied by the creation of any body to see that their stipulations were observed. The Versailles treaties marked the next stage. There was then a body of opinion, especially amongst English and French Socialists, favouring international responsibility but this was not very influential. Certain points, such as non-militarization and respect for native rights were, however, secured by the Mandates and an authority was set up to see that there was no breach of them. A third stage was reached in the period of ' appeasement' when, in response to the German demand for return of their Colonies, the view that Colonies should be handed over to an international body won wide support, while others favoured wider powers, through extended powers of inquiry and supervision, not executive powers, for the Mandates Commission. It was soon realized, however, that these proposals would not satisfy the Germans. A fourth stage was due to United States criticism of 'colonialism'. Americans, who had never seen eye to eye with us on the interpretation of trusteeship, had supported the 'principle of accountability'.

At the present time, this delegate said, there is virtually no support in Great Britain for the transfer of sovereignty of the existing Colonies to an international body. There are two reasons for this. One is because the new programme for social and economic advance of the Colonies has diverted attention from political considerations and the other because the colonial peoples themselves, particularly in Africa, have expressed strong opposition to it. They understand, he told the Conference, even though they may not appreciate, Britain's objectives, and they believe that they will attain self-government more rapidly under the present system than they would if they were transferred to an international administrative body, but he thought that those people in Britain who consider that some change is necessary are on the whole in favour of the extension of the mandates system. Its supporters claim that it enables the Colonies to be administered in accordance with settled and declared principles, that it ensures publicity through the reports of the Mandatory Powers to the Mandates Commission and that by providing for equality of opportunity in economic affairs it prevents exploitation by the colonial Powers. Critics of the system argued that principles which can be given so wide a range must necessarily be of a very general character; that the 'mandate' idea tends to legalism; and that the system is apt to make Mandatory Powers avoid criticism rather than invite co-operation. The United Kingdom delegate who outlined these arguments said that he himself, believing that the Mandates Commission had failed on the co-operative side, was in favour of the idea of regional commissions or councils which would have the advantage of promoting co-operation and consultation and providing for administration in accordance with certain principles, and of embodying the principle of accountability, through being composed of representatives not only of the colonial Powers but also of other major Powers interested in the region. They would, he said, be advisory, not executive.

The regional principle received strong support from the Observer from Southern Rhodesia as well as from delegates from South Africa. It was agreed that the problems of Africa are continental and the international boundaries are highly artificial. Disease and malnutrition, said the Southern Rhodesia Observer, are the most serious obstacles to social and economic development in Africa and once these obstacles are removed the latent talents of the Bantu, who have a very special contribution to make to African development, would be released. As he said, insect pests and disease are no respecters of boundaries and the need for common regional association is not a question of abstract political theory but of very real and practical needs. He thought that District Officers and technical advisers might well be exchanged and that, instead of attempting to

set up any cut-and-dried pattern of co-operation, regional development should advance on a basis of knowledge and experience. He assumed that Great Britain would take the lead but hoped that the United States, whose citizens have already done so much unofficially for education and health in Africa, would be brought in to any co-operative schemes. A South African delegate dealt with the Union's attitude towards colonial peoples. He told the Conference that South Africa is fast realizing the economic interdependence of the African territories and that this process of realization has been speeded up since the army has travelled to all parts of the continent. He admitted that on the colour question the attitude of the Union and Southern Rhodesia is very different from that of the United Kingdom. There are, however, many points of contact between the two, and opinion in the United Kingdom does not always appreciate the changes which have taken place in opinion in the Union. Nowadays it is not true to say, he explained, that South African policy is static or uniform or that there is an unbridgeable gulf between it and that of the territories further north. Stress is turning from political considerations to economic and social policy and in the Union itself people are beginning to realize that there are not just two million South Africans but that there are ten million South Africans, two million being of European stock and eight million of native origin, and that the Union cannot progress industrially unless the standards of living are raised for all of them. There, he said, is the basic problem of the Union: it is not race or politics, but poverty and low productivity. The classic argument of segregation or no segregation is dead, he went on to say, because the natives are now divided between the native reserves and the urban areas. In these reserves with their three million native inhabitants the Union may be said to be a colonial Power, facing the same problems as arise in other backward colonial territories in Africa. The Native Affairs Department is, in fact, a Colonial Office in miniature. lie ended by saying that with regard to the mandate area, South-West Africa, South Africa hopes that this territory will become a fifth province of the Union.

An Indian delegate who had been in close touch with Indians in South Africa questioned these conclusions about the trend of South African native policy. He drew attention to the continuing opposition of the natives of the South African protectorates to transfer to the Union and said that both Indian and African opinion in East Africa objects to the idea of closer co-operation for fear that it might increase the influence of the European settlers in Kenya. He thought that regional councils, if subject to a supervisory body, might be beneficial provided that they contained representatives of the Indians, and he pointed out that in the mandated territory of

Tanganyika there are far fewer restrictions on Indians and Africans than exist in the neighbouring colony of Kenya. He said that he regarded publicity as the great advantage of the mandate system, which, however, he criticized for being somewhat wooden and rather slow in advancing native self-government, in which connexion he said that Indians have always accepted the paramountcy of native interests.

The remarks of this delegate caused a brief discussion of the question of the transfer of the South African protectorates to the Union. A South African delegate said that everyone in the Union realized that their transfer would entail a serious responsibility but that as a matter of prestige there was considerable support for their inclusion. Personally, he said, he was in favour of the transfer and thought that opinion against it in the territories has to some extent been manufactured. He went on to say that he thought any attempt to create a native opinion would be unwise. An Indian delegate challenged the suggestion that native aversion to transfer from United Kingdom to South African administration was manufactured. The South African delegate, however, pointed out that large numbers of Basutos have in fact come into the Union and it was suggested that the success of the system of indirect rule operated by the Union Government in Ovamboland is a clear proof of South African capacity for that kind of administration. But it was submitted that agitation by the Union for the inclusion of the Protectorates would be unwise. The time might come when everybody would agree that their inclusion was desirable, and the issue would be clouded if prejudice had been created against the Union in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom delegate who took part in this African discussion, said that he was profoundly convinced of the truth of Rhodes's belief that the only solution of South African problems lay in the elimination of the 'imperial factor'. He said that in his opinion a satisfactory basis for permanent settlement of the relations of black and white in South Africa will be an impossibility until an informed white opinion has been evolved and that, he said, is hampered by lack of responsibility and by the distrust of the United Kingdom shown in the matter. For that reason, he said, he would like to see the territories transferred to the Union and he thought that the transfer would have an important psychological effect on public opinion in South Africa.

A regional approach to colonial problems in general appealed to most members of the Conference, although certain differences of interpretation were expressed. The main issue on this score was concerned with the relationship of the regional councils to national governments. If the metropolitan Powers accepted the principle of accountability, should they report to the world organization through

the regional councils or direct? One view which was expressed is that regional councils should send reports to some world organization and that those reports should express the agreed wishes of the Powers represented on the councils. The delegate who advocated this view said that he regarded the regional councils as a co-operative effort for joint action in specific fields. Another view, however, which seemed to receive greater support from the members of the Conference, was that the regional councils should exercise continuous pressure on the individual administrations and that the governments themselves should report direct to the international organization and not through the regional bodies. The Australian delegate who put forward this proposal said that in his opinion regional councils should not be regarded as an alternative to an international organ of accountability; they would be separate from such an organ but both would be necessary for colonial advance in the future. He thought that his advocacy of an international organ of accountability was supported by three legitimate international interests in the Colonies. In the first place, he argued, the administration of dependent peoples is a trust of 'civilization' and such a view implies the right of other civilized peoples to satisfy themselves that the trust is being properly discharged. In the second place full development of colonial territories is essential to an expanding world economy. In the third place, he pointed out, everybody is convinced that an international organization is the only means of maintaining peace and security and that, as such an organization will be asked to accept responsibility for the security of dependent territories, it must have the right to be associated with their development. What form, he asked, ought such an organization to take? It should be aloof from and independent of the administrations concerned and have means of satisfying itself that the territories under review were being well administered economically, socially and politically, and it should be such that its independent judgement would carry the weight of conviction not only with the metropolitan Powers and non-metropolitan Powers such as Russia and the United States, but also with minorities in the dependent territories themselves. It should, therefore, he claimed, be a permanent expert body analogous to the Mandates Commission. One great difference, however, he would like to see: there should be no restrictions as under the mandate system on fortifications and the use of dependent territories as bases for defence.

This delegate and others from the Dominions applauded the constructive idealism shown by the United Kingdom in the treatment of dependent territories. The world is ready, said one delegate, for another great step forward in colonialism and he hoped

that the United Kingdom would give a lead in respect of both collaboration and accountability. The United Kingdom delegate who opened the discussion said that he believed that the best opinion in Great Britain was ready to accept the principle of accountability and would be glad to be associated with the United States in the development of British colonial territories. He thought that there ought to be some international colonial body linked with the world social and economic council in order that the world organization could, through these two councils, deal with the whole question of backward peoples, whether in colonies or in sovereign states, but he doubted the wisdom of creating a body which would exert over colonial Powers authority which was not exerted in other directions. He said that he thought it essential that colonial peoples should know where to look for the seat of authority and he believed that a super-bureaucratic intermediary would not be to their advantage and would lessen the pressure which they could bring to bear on their own governments.

Another United Kingdom delegate wished that the principle of accountability had been as fully accepted by the United Kingdom Government as his colleague had suggested. He deprecated any idea that regional organization would obviate the need for international organization and advocated the view that regional bodies should be arrangements between the 'holding Powers' for dealing with colonial problems, and that there should be also a system of accountability to a world organization. Such an international body, he said, ought to have powers of supervision, to be able to study reports, and to make suggestions to the governments of metropolitan Powers, and he would welcome a Colonial Commission as part of the Dumbarton Oaks scheme. He would also like to see an international colonial convention, setting out agreed principles of administration. An Indian delegate emphasized the importance of these questions for the Commonwealth. He told the Conference that in his opinion they would be the acid test of whether the Commonwealth still had a contribution to make to the march of humanity, which was the only justification for its existence. Method is important, he said, but so also is pace, and it will be essential in the future to convince peoples of the Colonial Empire that they will benefit from continued participation in the Commonwealth. Otherwise he feared that the Commonwealth might split on the rock of racial and colonial problems.

The final topic discussed by this Committee was the place of the Colonies in the Commonwealth as they attained self-government. Would their population, interests and resources enable them to attain that control over external as well as internal affairs which 'Dominion status' now implied? A United Kingdom delegate

answered this question by asking another. Was it in the interest of the world that we should add sixty fresh sovereign nations to it? Something might be achieved by the federation of neighbouring units—which, an Australian delegate reminded the Committee, had preceded Dominion status in most of the Dominions—but even so we should have, the United Kingdom delegate thought, to think out some new form of affiliation to the Commonwealth which would enable them to participate in such questions as external affairs and defence. But he believed that the resources of the constitutional carpenter and joiner would be equal to devising some permanently satisfactory structure.

World Organization

(By Professor K. H. Bailey)

'FREE institutions are the life-blood of the Commonwealth,' said the Balfour Report in 1926, 'free co-operation is its instrument.' But the discussions in the Committee of the Whole on Security had shown agreement that the Commonwealth cannot to-day, by its own action alone, maintain either its security or its welfare. The security and welfare of the Commonwealth alike demand world organization, world co-operative institutions. Immediately before the Conference opened, the Yalta Declaration pledged the British, American and Russian Governments to an attempt at a Conference of the United Nations at San Francisco in April 1945, to establish world institutions along the general lines of the tentative proposals put forward last year at Dumbarton Oaks. On the very morning when this Committee began its session, it was announced that discussions between the member nations of the Commonwealth would be held before the San Francisco Conference met. This gave a sense of practical immediacy to the Committee's work.

The Committee discussed first the adequacy of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, from the point of view of the members of the Commonwealth; and secondly, the types of regional institutions that would be appropriate, for security and for welfare.

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals

The fact that the proposed Charter of the United Nations would be based on 'the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States', and would thus be in substance an attempt to reconstruct a League of Nations, though purged of some of the defects inherent in the League's structure, did not escape challenge. One of the Conference papers was Mr. Lionel Curtis's latest book, *World War: Its Cause and Cure.* His theme, already well known throughout the

Commonwealth, is that an organization based on compacts between sovereign States cannot be trusted to secure the world against a renewal of war, and that a beginning should be made with international government on federal lines. This view found supporters. In particular it was urged that a large proportion of the young men and women in the Forces were impatient for an attack more thorough-going than the Dumbarton Oaks plan on the problem of how to prevent war. The answer was made that the paramount object of policy for the present generation must be to bring into an international organization the present Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. There was no possibility, it was said, of obtaining their support for any federal solution—even supposing that other Governments were prepared for such a step.

Turning to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals themselves, the Committee discussed a number of possible changes. Throughout, stress was laid on the fact that the text is still only a paper plan. The task of getting it accepted lies still ahead. The general object of policy must be to create conditions of confidence in which the plan can be accepted by all the prospective member States, great and small. It is certainly necessary to avoid the grave defect that afflicted the League of Nations through the non-adherence of some of the Great Powers. Only by the adherence of all the Great Powers can any international organization provide for the exercise of a sufficient preponderance of power. Moreover, the effective functioning of the organization is expressly made to depend on the nature of the military undertakings into which the members agree to enter as between themselves. From this point of view the contribution of the smaller Powers will frequently be indispensable (e.g. in the provision of bases). The fact that, in the Commonwealth, only the United Kingdom ranks as a Great Power naturally directed a great deal of attention to the place of the smaller Powers in the Dumbarton Oaks plan, and to the conditions under which they would be most likely to become active and willing members. At no point could psychological factors be left out of account.

Feeling was general in the Committee that fuller recognition should be given to, and fuller scope found for, the interest of the smaller Powers in maintaining peace and security. When it came to suggestions for specific amendments in this direction, however, no proposal commanded unquestioned support. Opinion was by no means divided by countries, or as between delegates from the United Kingdom on the one hand and the Dominions on the other. These facts are in themselves something of a tribute to the realism and practical good sense expressed in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, compromises though many of them undoubtedly are.

Composition of the Security Council

Attention was directed to the position of the five permanent members of the Security Council by the assertion of an Indian delegate that, on all grounds save that of political status, India had claims at least comparable with those of China to a permanent seat. It was recognized that in fixing the present list considerations of history and of sentiment as well as of military weight, actual and potential, had played a part. Suggestions were made, with general approval, for the incorporation in the Charter, from the beginning, of the revisionary principle in relation to the list of permanent members. At the same time, the Committee recognized the practical difficulty of removing any State from a category which could be regarded as the sign and symbol of its status as a Great Power. The Dumbarton Oaks list could be accepted as a fairly just reflection of the probable distribution of world responsibilities for the next generation or so.

For the numerous States outside the 'Big Five' the Dumbarton Oaks proposal (six non-permanent elective seats for a term of three years) was recognized to be a very narrow basis of participation. If seats were made to rotate generally, many secondary Powers, whose strategical and industrial position would probably involve them in substantial responsibilities in the maintenance of peace, would be very largely unrepresented in the Council.

To meet this difficulty, one suggestion was to group the smaller Powers by regions, and divide the non-permanent seats among the States elected as representing the different regions. In practice however, this plan seemed likely to create important difficulties of its own. On the one hand, geographical propinquity cannot be taken as the sole determinant of groupings for political purposes. On the other hand, an effort to base representation upon politically coherent regional groups would probably require an undue enlargement of the Council itself.

Another suggestion was the creation of a new category of semi-permanent members. For instance, a list might be made of, say, nine States of intermediate or near-great status, three of which should always be members of the Security Council. In favour of taking this course was the strong argument that it would give some assurance of effective representation to States which were likely to have to carry substantial and active responsibilities in the maintenance of security and the organization of defence. This would sensibly lessen, in their case, the anxieties which all States must feel about the possibility of being committed by major decisions, in the making of which they have had no opportunity of participating. But it had to be admitted that no precise tests for the assessment of power were likely either to be ascertainable or to be accepted. The

fear was expressed that the plan under discussion would create a further arena of struggle for status and prestige.

A kindred, but less formal and more pragmatic, approach to the same problem was represented by suggestions that, even without specifically altering the Dumbarton Oaks framework, the General Assembly should, as it were by constitutional convention, establish the rule of choosing the non-permanent members of the Council; from among those who were likely to have to carry major responsibilities in the maintenance of security. This would import a certain amount of flexibility into the constitution of the Council. In particular it would make useful provision for considering important short-term factors, derived from the immediate situation in hand, in addition to long-term factors of a more formal or abstract character. This pragmatic approach seemed to be particularly appropriate in relation to the initial elections to the Council, covering the first disturbed years of post-war conditions.

Voting Procedure in the Security Council

The Dumbarton Oaks text contained the statement that the rules proposed for voting procedure in the Security Council were still under consideration. According to newspaper reports, the delegations of the Four Great Powers had agreed that decisions of the Security Council calling for enforcement action should usually require the concurrent vote of all the permanent members, though only a majority of the Council as a whole. One exception was said to have been supported by the United States, China and Britain: a permanent member would lose its vote in a case where it was itself accused of conduct threatening the peace. The Soviet delegation was reported to have consistently opposed this exception.

At the subsequent meeting of the ' Big Three' at Yalta, agreement was reached on this question. Pending the concurrence of France and China, the Yalta solution was withheld from the public and, at the time of the Committee's discussions, had still not formally been made known. Confident Press assertions had been made, however, that the ' Big Three' had agreed:

(i) that all decisions of the Security Council should require a majority of 7 out of the 11 members;
(ii) that on procedural questions the prescribed majority would suffice, however constituted;
(iii) that on all other questions, with one important exception, the five permanent members must form part of the majority;
(iv) that in disputes *not* involving an immediate threat to peace, a permanent member which is a party to the dispute will not be required to concur in the decision of the Council;

(v) that in matters which *do* involve an immediate threat to peace, the rule requiring the concurrence of all the permanent members is to be maintained.

The Committee assumed that the agreement reached at Yalta would be in sufficiently general terms, and would be of a sufficiently provisional character, to warrant further preparatory discussion before the San Francisco Conference.

Several delegates warned the Committee not to overrate the importance of this procedural issue. On the one hand, it was important not to press, as against the Soviet Union, a view which might imply distrust of her. From this point of view it might be said that success in reaching agreement with the U.S.S.R. was really more important than the actual terms of the agreement reached. On the other hand, it was urged that in actual working practice the voting rights of a Great Power were not really as important as might appear on paper. Broadly speaking, the Dumbarton Oaks security plan rested on the possibility of agreement between the Big Five. It was improbable that any major decision could be put into operation against one of the Big Five without grave risks of world war. This was more plainly true with regard to enforcement action than elsewhere. Any attempt, therefore, to preserve on paper the right of the Security Council to enforce a decision against the negative vote of a Great Power would in practice be nugatory.

The Committee was nevertheless uneasily aware that any text which appeared to subject a sm^ State to the jurisdiction of the Security Council, but to leave the Big Five judges each in its own cause, would offer powerful arguments to the opponents of the plan. There was a strong feeling that every effort should be made to restrict the area within which a Great Power would be able legally to veto the action of the Security Council in a dispute in which it was itself a party. It was suggested that the Dumbarton Oaks text itself pointed the way to a possible compromise. Apart from matters of mere internal procedure, the text provided that situations, disputes or conflicts which, potentially or actually, threaten peace and security are to be dealt with by methods which may be described, broadly speaking, as peaceful adjustment on the one hand and enforcement action on the other. Included in the former category are procedures such as preliminary investigation, reference to a judicial tribunal or submission to procedures of conciliation or arbitration. Enforcement action is the sphere of sanctions, whether economic or military. The concrete suggestion that emerged from discussion was that the ' veto' might well be restricted to decisions involving the imposition of sanctions. In effect, there-

fore, a permanent member of the Council would not be able to prevent, by its own mere negative vote, the discussion or investigation by the Council of a situation or dispute in which it was itself concerned, nor would it be able to preclude the Council from recommending procedures for peaceful settlement, or even the actual lines of a proposed adjustment. Only at the point where the Council was moved to direct the imposition of sanctions would the opposition of the permanent member concerned prevent the Council from registering a valid decision.

Responsibility for Sanctions

As the Dumbarton Oaks text stands, all members will obligate themselves to accept the decisions of the Security Council, and to carry them out in accordance with the Charter. The nature and extent of the forces which the members will place at the disposal of the Security Council for this purpose will depend in all cases on agreements to be made between the members themselves. Subject only to these agreements, the proposal is that each member should be bound to take whatever enforcement action, whether economic or military, the Security Council directs. It was pointed out, however, that the proposals do make some provision for drawing into consultation a member of the Organization which is specially affected by any decision of the Council, either as a party to the dispute or otherwise, but which is not a member of the Council. The plan also provides that the Military Staff Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Council, shall invite any member of the Organization, not permanently represented on it, to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires that that member should participate in its work.

The suggestion was made that possibly it might be a desirable amendment to require that a decision of the Security Council directing the imposition of sanctions, while immediately binding all members of the Security Council itself, should not be binding upon nonmembers of the Council until it had been adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly. The argument in support of this suggestion was, in substance, that once the Big Five were committed there would in actual practice be little hesitation on the part of the small Powers to join in. The fact, however, that the Charter gave to States not members of the Council even a formal freedom of action, until the Assembly had reached a decision, might well have a great psychological advantage for them. It would show, at any rate, that the Organization was not merely a League of big Powers.

Against this was set the possibility, inherent in the suggestion, of conflict between the Council and the Assembly. Both civilian

and Service members of the Committee emphasized, moreover, the importance of direct prior commitments, and the necessity under modern conditions of providing for swift enforcement action. The proposed Charter, it was admitted, did envisage a prolonged procedure in the case of ordinary political or economic disputes between States. But in face of an actual breach of the peace or a decision to impose sanctions it did clearly postulate swift and decisive action by the Council, backed by the world community as a whole.

The Place of the Social and Economic Council in the Dumbarton Oaks Plan

As it stands, the Dumbarton Oaks plan makes the General Assembly and, under its authority, the Economic and Social Council responsible for facilitating the solution of international economic, social and humanitarian problems and promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. No organic connexion is proposed between the Security Council and these institutions for international economic and social co-operation. The Economic and Social Council would consist of representatives of eighteen States, and would take decisions by simple majority vote. The Social and Economic Council would itself be a political and not a functional body, but would co-ordinate and report upon the work of all kinds of functional bodies in the economic, social and humanitarian sphere.

This separation of the organizations for security on the one hand and for welfare on the other was criticized by a delegate who himself had had practical experience of the working of international organizations on the economic side, during the period between the wars. He feared that, under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, economic collaboration would not be able to secure its proper place in the plans of those who were responsible for maintaining security. He felt that the present text rested on an altogether arbitrary exclusion of economic matters from the security field. He preferred, on this point, the League of Nations structure, under which the Council was the supreme body, responsible alike for the economic, political and military aspects of the organization of the world community. He thought that the plan in its present form was largely accidental, and resulted from a possibly tardy decision to graft institutions for economic collaboration on to an organization which was originally designed only for the maintenance of security, in the narrow sense. Another explanation was that the Social and Economic Council had been devised in order to provide for the General Assembly some more substantial and important functions than were assigned to it in respect of the security side of the Charter. Another delegate suggested that the Dumbarton Oaks plan was

linked with the movement in the League of Nations, shortly before the outbreak of war, to sever the economic and technical work of the League from its political activities and place it under the aegis of an *ad hoc* organization which would not be responsible for security, strictly so called. The reason for this was that, as things then were, even the most technical of economic and social matters tended to be discussed under the shadow of restrictive political and strategic preoccupations.

On the one hand discussion thus disclosed a fear that the Security Council would become the guardian of the *status quo* if there were a complete severance between the organizations responsible for security on its military and economic sides respectively. On the other hand was precisely the opposite fear—that economic and social collaboration might be retarded if it had always to be discussed by bodies which ran the risk of being divided by political controversies and military fears. The predominant opinion in the Committee, however, seemed to be definitely in favour of the creation of an organic link between the security and the economic organizations envisaged by the Charter.

The Functions of the General Assembly

Apart from its exclusive functions in supervising the Economic and Social Council, and its powers in relation to membership, elections, finance, and the like, the Assembly is envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks plan as having, in matters connected with peace and security, the right of discussion only, and then only when and in so far as the matter is not being dealt with by the Security Council.

Some delegates felt it would be dangerous to enlarge the functions of the Assembly, because to do so would only result in blurring the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of security, and introduce possibilities of conflict, delay and confusion. Other delegates emphasized the long-term importance on the other hand of mobilizing world opinion in the'political as well as in the economic sphere and contended that only in the General Assembly could world opinion really be made to count. They claimed that, in view of the very small size of the Security Council, it was unsatisfactory to permit only such restricted opportunities of participation to the great body of States, which would feel themselves largely disenfranchised.

This division of opinion remained unresolved. No suggestion was made for any specific enlargement of the powers of the Assembly which would not run the risk of fettering and embarrassing the Security Council. There was evidently a strong feeling, however, that the possibilities ought to be further explored.

Miscellaneous Matters

Numerous other matters were mentioned and a few were briefly discussed: among the latter, one of the innovations in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as contrasted with the League of Nations—i.e. the establishment of a Military Staff Committee, as an organ of the Security Council. Perhaps the most interesting feature of this discussion was the confidence of the Service members of the Conference in the possibilities of the effective working of such a Committee—given, of course, the continuance of mutual trust on the political plane. War-time experience within the United Nations was stated to have been very impressive in this regard.

Discussion did not solve the puzzle of what would happen if this international Military Staff Committee had to devise plans, in concert, for resisting aggression on the part of each other. The fact is, of course, that the whole organization is based on the assumption of agreement between the Great Powers in maintaining peace and security and to abstain from aggression. On that assumption, this particular problem would never arise except in an academic sense.

Underlying the whole public discussion hitherto of the Dumbarton Oaks plan, at any rate in the smaller States, has been the fear that under the leadership of the 'Big Three* the Security Council may slip into the role of world dictator. Some of the suggestions discussed by the Committee would tend to lessen that risk. Another suggestion, which has been publicly put forward but which was not discussed by the Committee, is to include in the proposed Charter a declaration as to the general principles on which the Security Council is to act. Such a declaration would presumably include a stipulation for some of the essential human and political rights specified in the Atlantic Charter and in the Crimean Declaration itself—e.g. the right of a State to choose its own form of government.

Regional Institutions

The Committee devoted a session to the discussion of regional institutions, both on the military and on the economic side, and their relation to the world organization sketched out in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

The discussion showed that there is a good deal of scope, both in the sphere of defence and in the sphere of welfare, for regional agencies and arrangements. It also showed, however, that regional boundaries have an uncommonly awkward habit of disappearing altogether. It seems to follow that the wise course is to proceed experimentally, selecting *ad hoc* those matters which seem for the time being most capable of regional handling and not attempting too much in the way of a systematic universal framework.

The discussion also served to show that there are few purposes for which the Commonwealth as a whole can be organized as constituting in itself a ' region'. The necessity of including other States constantly obtrudes itself and breaks up any exclusively Commonwealth pattern.

The danger appears to be that any regional organization will tend to become exclusive and defensive with consequent adverse reactions among outside States. For this reason it is specially desirable that in one form or another regional organizations should all be developed within the framework of the general international Charter.

The Dumbarton Oaks plan does not specifically suggest regional institutions in the social and economic sphere. But it does permit (though it does not either expressly or impliedly require) regional agencies or arrangements in the sphere of defence and security. It insists that both constitution and the activities of any such arrangements or agencies shall be consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization, and to this end requires that the Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed. Subject to these safeguards, it directs the Security Council to encourage the settlement of local disputes through regional agencies or arrangements either on the initiative of the States concerned or by reference from the Security Council itself. The plan also authorizes the Security Council to utilize the regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action whenever it thinks fit. The proposed Charter, however, does not give any indication of what areas may be suitable as the basis of regional arrangements.

Some of the requirements for a suitable regional arrangement were disclosed by a brief discussion in the Committee on the possibilities of regional organization in the Balkans. The general opinion was that there was not sufficient political coherence, mutual confidence or consciousness of common purposes to enable the Balkan States as a whole to set up an effective regional agency there.

The arrangements proposed in the Canberra Agreement between the Governments of Australia and New Zealand were quoted as an example of the kind of regional arrangement that the Dumbarton Oaks plan envisaged. The two Dominions had proposed that a defence zone should be recognized in the South-West Pacific and that the defence of this zone should be undertaken by means of mutual arrangements between all the Governments with direct territorial interests in the area concerned. This group would presumably comprise not only the two Dominion Governments themselves but also the United Kingdom, the United States, France, the Netherlands and Portugal. It was stated that the two Governments (in January 1944) had probably not contemplated the use of any

regional defence authority which might be set up under the arrangement for any such political purposes as the settlement of local disputes. The plan appeared rather to have assumed that decisions of this kind would fall within the sphere of the world organization responsible for security in its wider aspects. The regional bodies were contemplated as being concerned merely with what might be called the functional aspects of defence, strictly so called, the carrying out locally of measures decided on by the world body responsible for security generally.

The assumption underlying the Canberra Agreement, on the regional defence side, was that it would not be wise for regional bodies to deal, on the political level, with situations which might eventually endanger the maintenance of peace. The effective handling of such a dispute would probably require the action of the Security Council. It would be unwise either to give any of the 'Big Five' an excuse for standing aloof from a dispute in a distant region or on the other hand to run the risk of compromising, by regional action, any of the members of the Security Council itself. If, therefore, a regional agency were to undertake anything in the way of the settlement of a local dispute, it seemed preferable that it should do so by way of reference from the Security Council itself, rather than on its own initiative.

It was suggested that a regional arrangement for defence purposes would enable the parties to move towards an agreed reduction in their armaments. This, it was remarked, was one of the objectives placed under the aegis of the Military Staff Committee in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

On the social and economic side, it was pointed out that there are many matters which are well suited for collaboration on a regional basis. Certain aspects of medical research, the labour problems of a particular area and the organization of transport on one of the great international rivers, were given by way of examples. At the other end of the scale, there are economic matters with regard to which the case for regional treatment was admitted to be weak—the monetary matters, for instance, dealt with at Bretton Woods. Trade agreements, on the other hand, are more controversial. In the Committee of the Whole on Economic Problems, discussion had brought out the fact that Commonwealth countries had found the Ottawa Agreements having an adverse effect on the total volume of their overseas trade. In an increasingly interdependent world, attention has increasingly to be paid both to producing and to consuming interests beyond the borders of any regional grouping. On the other hand the history of the World Economic Conference of 1927 was referred to by way of support for the thesis that to attempt a commercial agreement on a world

scale was to run grave risks of getting no agreement at all, or an agreement so attenuated as to be worthless.

A United Kingdom delegate stated a strong case not only for regional economic institutions in post-war Europe but for treating as one region the whole of non-Soviet Europe. The starting-point would be a European Economic Authority, established under the authority of the United Nations. Its first tasks would be to administer relief, to manage reparations and to direct, organize and supervise the re-establishment of normal economic life. It would begin with the supplies of necessaries such as food, clothes or coal on a prescribed basis of priorities. It would reorganize transport. It would have to proceed at an early stage to set up some control of Europe's heavy industries, if necessary restricting production here and expanding it there. This could be done the more easily since the European steel industry had been organized as a whole for twenty years in the International Steel Cartel. Sooner or later, the authority for regional bodies exercising functions of economic control would have to come from the States of Europe themselves. Meantime, however, under the direct authority of the United Nations, useful habits of collaboration could be developed, and the necessary institutional framework could be built.

III. SPEECHES

Opening Ceremony at Chatham House, 17 February 1945

THE VISCOUNT ASTOR, Chairman of the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs: On behalf of the Council and the Members of Chatham House, I take this opportunity of welcoming those who have travelled thousands of miles to take part in this third Conference on British Commonwealth Relations.

The British Commonwealth and Empire is a perpetual source of wonderment to foreigners with logical minds. They remain in a condition of bewildered incredulity. Many of our own people who read only the history of the past are unaware of present-day developments. Their state is too often one of wishful thinking based on lack of knowledge.

Chatham House is an unofficial fact-finding body. This is the third occasion on which we and our sister Institutes scattered throughout the Commonwealth have met to discuss what contribution each of our countries can make towards world peace and prosperity. The groups are not nationalist. They will not merely sing a British or an Indian or a South African song. The members of each delegation have been selected to represent a cross-section of opinion.

We trust that after our fortnight together we shall have collected material of value for our respective publics without whose instructed opinion statesmen cannot tackle the problems facing us all.

We are fortunate in having a person to open the proceedings who has taken an outstanding part in moulding world opinion on the subject before us, namely Lord Cecil. Lord Cecil was himself the leader of the United Kingdom Group at our first Conference, the one held in Canada in 1933. Lord Cecil is a President of Chatham House. He has, during the past twenty-five years, been one of our staunchest friends and most reliable guides.

THE VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD, K.C., Founder of the Royal Institute of International Affairs: This is the third Conference of this nature. The first was at Toronto in 1933, which also I had the honour of attending. The main result of that Conference internationally was support for the collective system. In the second Conference I gather from the records that the attitude was less definite. It was held in 1938 and the war followed in the next year.

Now we are meeting on the eve of victory and of peace. While the war lasts the Commonwealth policy is clear enough. We must win the war as quickly as we can. Afterwards we shall have to face great difficulties and immense responsibilities; for on the terms of the peace then made may well depend the future happiness of the world. The losses we have suffered during the past five or six years have been prodigious. The expenditure has been colossal. Great areas of the globe have been devastated. In many countries the machinery of government has been destroyed. Everywhere commerce and credit have been dislocated. Above all, a great mass of human misery and degradation has been suffered, for it has been the cruellest war waged for centuries, at least by the Germans. It has left inevitably mountains of hatred and on hatred nothing can be built. No doubt there are compensations to us in the marvellous courage and endurance of our fighting forces and the undaunted spirit of our peoples. It is on them that we must rely to mitigate the great floods of human suffering that still remain and to re-establish the national governments on the lines indicated by the Crimea Conference.

But we must do more than that. Our chief task is to take precautions against the renewal of war in the future. That is an imperative duty incumbent on all and certainly not least on those who have inherited the great traditions and aspirations of the British Commonwealth. What, then, should be our aim?

The Crimea Conference has sketched in broad lines the policy which it recommends and its recommendations have been received with general approval. I am not going to attempt to examine or even refer to most of what was there laid down. I propose only to direct attention to those proposals which directly bear on the maintenance of future peace. Even within those limits much must remain unsaid. The first thing that the Crimeans stressed is the extirpation of Nazism. As to that, there will, I imagine, be no disagreement. It is clearly essential. That involves the occupation of Germany and its administration from Berlin. It is also probably necessary that the Three Powers, with France, should have zones allotted to them with a central international control. I do not see what other arrangement could be made. It will be a pretty severe test of the solidarity of the Allies and it will be a practical reminder of the need for close co-operation between them if peace is to be maintained.

But it would be a mistake to imagine that the control or coercion of Germany is all that is needed. No doubt for the immediate future that is urgent. But we must look further afield than that. We have got to erect or at least lay the foundations of a system which will preserve peace permanently. Unless we do that we shall have

failed in our chief duty. Do not assume that there will never arise some would-be imitator of German ambitions. Consider history. What country can say with truth that it has never had an aggressive policy? I was reading the other day the defence of the policy of Henry V which Shakespeare puts into the mouths of that king's episcopal advisers. It is pure aggression. Or look at the account of the Spain of Charles V, or the France of Louis XIV, or the Sweden of Charles XII, not to speak of the prolonged threats to the peace of Europe which arose more than once from the East. I leave out the history of Napoleon because there are many who believe that Hitler deliberately formed himself on the characteristics of that sinister genius, so that in a sense the defeat of Hitler is the defeat of the Napoleonic idea.

It is quite true that in each of the cases I have mentioned the aggressor ultimately failed. In a sense that makes their example all the more dangerous, for it shows that experience is insufficient to deter an ambitious ruler from a career of conquest. The lure of acquiring world domination is so attractive that we should be reckless to assume that once we have got rid of the German danger, all will be safe. However completely we knock out Germany, we cannot safely trust that she will have no future imitators. Moreover, I have not yet seen any scheme which would make the seventy or eighty million Germans for ever powerless. Our enemy is not only Germany—it is the spirit of aggression.

That does not mean that I am against the use of force to disarm and keep disarmed Germany. You do not cure crime by putting the criminals in prison or even by hanging them. But you do contribute to the safety of those who are not criminals—so long at least as there is general support for the system of criminal law.

There is another school which tends to believe that social reform—meaning the establishment of a social and economic system on lines which its advocates approve—will exercise the combative spirit of man.

I wish I thought so. It is a far more attractive belief than the laborious erection of a system by which the aggressive minority is kept in check by the peaceful majority.

But I am afraid that neither recent nor more remote history gives any encouragement to the view that material prosperity is an infallible prophylactic against war.

So we are driven back, as it seems to me, on the broad principle that the most hopeful plan for preventing war is the creation of an organization of peaceful Powers who shall bind themselves to prevent and arrest aggression from whatever source it comes. That was the foundation of the League of Nations, which itself only put into more precise and practical form the conceptions which under-

lay numerous previous international proposals. But it will be said that the League failed to prevent war. Certainly it is true that the League did not prevent it and it is of the utmost importance that we should satisfy ourselves why that happened. Was it due to some defect in the League machinery? We hear many criticisms of the Covenant—generally not very precise. It is said that the Members of the League talked too much. But I have never seen any distinct allegation that their loquacity produced or failed to stop an international crisis. Then it is suggested, rather vaguely, that a system by which the smaller Powers had as great a position as the larger was bound to come to grief. That would be a more formidable criticism if it could be shown that some failure of the League was due to the action of the smaller Powers. But the facts show just the reverse. On more than one occasion it was the rejection of the advice given by smaller Powers—as, for instance, a British Dominion—by the influence of the Greater Powers that created the difficulties which ultimately resulted in war.

But the commonest charge is that the League relied too much on persuasion and remonstrance and too little on armed force. Indeed, it is often erroneously said that, under the Covenant, the League had no force, or, more popularly, 'no teeth'. I cannot go into this allegation at length. I will only say I believe it to be quite baseless and I am sure that the failure to stop war was not due to that cause. It is pleasanter in the face of a great catastrophe to say: 'It was not our fault. What could we do with such a wretched machine as the League?' It is a bad workman who finds fault with his tools and the League was no more—could be no more—than an instrument to be used by its Members for the prevention of war. Apart from its Members it had no effective existence and it was their neglect or refusal to use its powers which brought about the disaster. Had they, and particularly the Greater Members, used it courageously and firmly, the war could have been stopped.

I do not wish to say the League was perfect. It certainly was not. But that was not the cause of its failure. Now we have the plan drawn up at Dumbarton Oaks and approved generally at the Crimea Conference. I believe it to be, on the whole, an improvement on the League. But I have no doubt that faults can be found with it. I have no time to examine it in detail, nor is it necessary to do so before such an audience as this. Indeed, I don't know that the details of the scheme matter very much. In many respects it follows the lines of the League and as I hold that the League could have been successfully worked, I have no doubt that that is equally true of the Dumbarton Oaks scheme, or what eventually comes out of it. The whole question is—let us never forget it—is there in the civilized world sufficient will for peace to put into

effective action the peace-keeping machine ? I cannot feel absolutely certain about it. I remember the history of opinion in this country about the League. At first everyone, or almost everyone, professed himself to be in its favour. The only important opponents were the bureaucrats, who had a professional dislike of any new organization for peace, and the militarists, who sheltered themselves behind the Latin tag, *Si vis pacem, para helium,* and were inclined to accuse supporters of the League of being pacifists in disguise. It was during this period that the then Duke of Northumberland—an admirable and patriotic militarist—said that the League was a scheme for putting the British Commonwealth under the heel of Monsieur Leon Bourgeois! Later, our opponents abandoned the idea that we were pacifists and described us as war-mongers, so that when we took a ballot of the people as to whether they were in favour of the League, it was described as a 'Ballot of Blood' !

These seem to be inconsistent accusations. It is no doubt difficult to be both a pacifist and a war-monger. But the truth is—and that is why I recall these facts—both charges rested on ingrained reluctance to limit national sovereignty. And when I look round the world and see the strength of the devotion to nationalism and the splendid heroism which that sentiment has inspired, I cannot doubt that we may see a recrudescence of hostility to any plan for the international organization of peace. If that spirit triumphs, it is inevitable that the Dumbarton Oaks scheme or any other with similar objects, will also fail and we or our successors will have to face a fresh bid for world domination, without any solid or well-prepared international protection. The essential thing is the realization of the necessity for World Peace. It used to be said that peace was the greatest of British interests. That usually meant that there was no national interest which would probably be served by going to war. Such a doctrine is quite impossible to put into practice unless we can secure a general peace. Once serious war has begun, unless it is forthwith stopped, it will, without doubt, force us to join in. For the old days in which each nation could live its own life irrespective of what other nations might do are gone for ever. We are now all one community and every day we get nearer to one another.

If this doctrine can be made part of the political axioms which all educated British citizens automatically accept, if by our example we can induce all other nations likewise to agree, then the international organization of peace can be made successful. Surely the British Commonwealth is well fitted to bear its part in such a task. May we not say, without undue boasting, that we have a great history and great achievements, that more than once we have led

the way in political progress, and that we have therefore a special responsibility in this crisis of world history ?

EDGAR J. TARR, K.C., Chairman of the Canadian Delegation: Canada, 1945, is markedly different from the Canada of 1938. The differences are economic, social, political and psychological.

In the first war our agricultural economy was greatly expanded with relatively little industrial development. During this war, while there has been a marked shift in primary production to live stock and dairy and poultry produce, the great expansion has been in industry. A high level of employment cannot be maintained after the war without a much greater industrial production than pre-war. At the same time it has become a national interest for Canada to increase its imports from Britain so as to help sustain British purchasing power. To be constructive in the world situation this must not be done by restrictive measures, more particularly because such measures would bear down upon the other of our two best customers. This dual problem would seem to be insoluble unless we are to operate within an expanding world economy.

The marked rise of a socialist party should be noted, not only because of the party itself but because of its influence upon the social and economic outlooks and policies of the other parties. In international affairs its influence is strongly for broadly-based co-operation.

The war has made Canada ' air-conscious ' in a peculiar sense. Many a string has been stretched across many a globe with surprising results. From almost any place to almost any other place in the northern hemisphere such strings run across Canada. We are commencing to realize that if we are to live in a war world we are prospectively a Belgium. There is as a consequence particularly keen interest in the development of international control of aviation.

The creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence by the United States and Canada was a development of great moment, and note should be taken of the word 'Permanent'. The defence of North America will become more and more integrated and geography dictates that it should be. The arrangement is one of great mutual advantage and Canada is appreciative of the unfailing co-operation and understanding of its great neighbour.

Internal tensions in Canada have recently increased. The reasons for this have not been generally understood abroad. Divisions have been to a considerable extent along racial lines, but I am an optimist so far as the future is concerned. Calm comparison with the last war justifies optimism. We are a more united nation than we were last time and the long-term trend is in the right direction. The need is for mutual understanding and reasonable compromise.

Government policy will inevitably and properly be based upon the recognition of the facts of Canadian life.

The need for an international security organization possessing a great preponderance of world power is widely recognized and the desire that Canada should adequately participate is general.

Canada, as one of the bigger small Powers, is developing a feeling of responsibility in that role. Experience during the last few years at official international gatherings indicates that there is coming to be amongst other Powers a realization of the fact that Canada to a remarkable degree is free of special interests. Having no special 'axe to grind' its influence, such as it is, can be exercised without arousing suspicions which might be aroused if it were less fortunately placed.

During the period under review there has been a significant building up of capable personnel in central banking, economics and external affairs, and this development is continuing, so that we shall be better equipped for participating in useful co-operation than we have been in the past.

May I mention in conclusion another development which is equally significant for each of the other members of the Commonwealth. Eire has remained neutral in this war. During the early years particularly, this was a distressing embarrassment. The experience, however, has a most valuable plus. It has constituted convincing evidence to the world at large and to any ' doubting Thomases' within any of our own borders, that freedom within the Commonwealth is a reality and not merely a high-sounding phrase. Let us now with great solemnity and all respect duly embalm and tuck away in some forgotten crypt beyond the possibility of resurrection, the word 'status' in so far as it is used in an intra-Commonwealth sense. May we never again at a Commonwealth Conference spend time in examining into the nature of the Commonwealth but rather devote ourselves, as I am sure we shall at this Conference, to examining how each member may best contribute, first, to world security and betterment, and second, to mutually helpful co-operation amongst ourselves.

PROFESSOR K. H. BAILEY, Chairman of the Australian Delegation: At Lapstone in 1938 we used to 'contrast' Australia's position in the Commonwealth with Canada's. To-day it would be more accurate to ' compare' the two. The difference springs directly from the war, and especially the war in the Pacific.

Australia's place in the British Commonwealth in 1938 could be likened to that of a grown-up son, working at his own job but living still with his parents. In 1945, our place is rather that of the son who has married, and set up a home of his own. He must now

carry different and wider responsibilities, engage in new and distinct activities, enter into fresh relationships with others. But he is still in every sense a full member of the family. The ties that have united him and the other members remain unbroken, and may even be added to.

I shall illustrate the change at three points. First, Japan's initial victories shifted the strategical foundation of Australia's national life. Her security against invasion had always depended on British sea-power, resting in its turn on bases in South-East Asia. When that system broke in 1942, and Japanese forces swept down to our northern shores, a new strategy of national existence had to be organized. American sea-power, brilliantly exerted, has been the major factor in preserving Australia's integrity. Without hesitation we put all our own available forces under the command of General MacArthur. Australia has been glad to be the base from which great American forces could commence victorious operations. Her debt to the United States will never be forgotten.

Looking to the future, Australians assume that, north of the equator at any rate, the war will result in the permanent transfer to the United States of the major responsibility for security in the Pacific. They are glad and proud just now that their ports are being made the bases for the re-entry of British sea-power into the Pacific. But they expect that in future the realities of defence must keep Australia, like Canada, in close and direct military, and therefore political, relationship with the United States.

Secondly, Australia has engaged, on a rapidly widening scale, in diplomatic activities. This process had started even before 1939. The war has greatly accelerated it: not only in the case of Washington, Chungking and Moscow (and for a time Tokyo), but also the Netherlands, France, Canada, New Zealand and the republics of South America. Further extensions of our diplomatic representation are inevitable. Consulates, too, are being established. So are news and information agencies. These activities all betoken appreciation, by ourselves and others, of our distinct Australian interests, as one of the Pacific Powers.

Thirdly, the Australian-New Zealand Agreements of 1944 broke new ground in British Commonwealth affairs. Hitherto, relations have been few between Dominion and Dominion, as contrasted with relations between Mother Country and Dominion. These agreements were a conspicuous instance of direct relations between two Dominions at the highest political levels—i.e. in matters of foreign policy and defence. They sprang from a clear sense of common interests—in the territorial settlements in the Pacific, in the eventual defence arrangements for the south-west region, in the welfare of the native races of the Pacific islands, in the place of

the small Powers in the proposed General International Organization. They sprang from the desire of small Powers to participate in the making of decisions by which they will be vitally affected.

Some of these changes have been due, no doubt, to the fact that Australia has had, throughout the war against Japan, a Government drawn from the Labour Party, which has always emphasized Australia's nationhood more than its opponents do. Some of the changes may be attributed directly to the energy and capacity of the present Minister for External Affairs, Dr. Evatt. But in essentials I think the changes I have described are fundamental, and represent a permanent national reaction to changes in our real position in the world.

Since the early days of 1938, Australia has geared her life to total war. All told, we have enlisted a million men and women in the Forces, out of a population of seven and a quarter millions. We have produced munitions on scales never before dreamed of—building tanks and aeroplanes where before we had not made so much as a motor-bicycle. We have been producing food for twelve million people. The inevitable difficulties of the reconstruction period at home, together with a desire to make sure that Australia will be able to play an effective part in post-war international affairs, have directed special attention to the balance of constitutional authority between the federation and its component States. That problem is not yet solved.

Australia's present attention is concentrated on the war in the Pacific. This is natural. The defeat of Germany will bring her no respite, in the field or at home. But I should not like to leave the impression that the Australian outlook has become regional, in any negative or exclusive sense. On the contrary, the war has brought home, as never before, that Australia cannot, if she would, contract out of Europe. Her fighting men have been involved on all the fronts, from Murmansk around to New Guinea and the Philippines. Her war-time industrial development, and her realization afresh of her need for increased population, will require her to enter into new international arrangements. So will her Government's insistent emphasis on the maintenance of a high level of employment and on the achievement of greater social security at home. So will her need for stabilized supplies of vital raw materials such as cotton and rubber.

These changes teach one clear lesson. The problems of Australia's national existence are not capable of any merely domestic solution. They are not capable of solution by action within the British Commonwealth alone. They can only be solved as the nations of the Commonwealth make their contribution to the organization, on a world basis, both of security and of prosperity.

DR. W. P. MORRELL, Chairman of the New Zealand Delegation: The years that have passed since the British Commonwealth Relations Conference met at Sydney in September 1938 have been dominated first by preparations for war and then by war itself, the greatest and grimmest war that history has known. What is true of the world as a whole is true also of New Zealand. She knew that she would be involved in war if it came, and when it came she committed herself without one moment's hesitation. In point of law she regarded the United Kingdom's declaration of war as binding; but in point of fact she was bound by her own choice. The experience of 1914-18 had given her Government and people some understanding of the military effort, the economic strains, the personal sacrifices that would be required of her; yet few, if any, New Zealanders foresaw that this time war would bring their own country within measurable distance of invasion, still less that it would be saved from invasion not by British but by American power.

New Zealand's destiny and New Zealand's modes of thought cannot fail to be affected by what happened in the first few months of 1942. Having faced without flinching a direct threat of invasion and conquest, she cannot fail to have in future a consciousness of adult nationhood such as in political questions at least, in spite of constitutional theories, she hardly possessed before. Yet before 1942 New Zealand had already passed through a searing experience. Already, in the summer of 1940, the foundations of New Zealand's political thinking had been shaken by the danger to these islands. They were shaken; but they stood. New Zealanders saw Britain's danger from a distance: their own men were here, sharing the danger: but they had faith that Britain would emerge from the danger, ' bloody but unbowed', and when many good friends of Britain outside the Commonwealth doubted, they are entitled to take some pride in their faith. So when their own moments of greatest danger came in 1942, they were encouraged by Britain's example, and they knew that their danger was due not to Britain's neglect or Britain's incompetence but to Britain's continuing danger. Their new self-consciousness as a Pacific nation, the new closeness of association with the United States, are not therefore accompanied by any resentment against Britain or by any desire to lessen Commonwealth ties.

In economic matters the war has brought many changes upon New Zealand, but none so fundamental as the new political maturity just mentioned. New Zealand has manufactured for herself many things she never thought of manufacturing before, and especially, of course, munitions of war; but she has nothing comparable, even allowing for her smaller population, to the great

armaments industries of Canada, Australia and South Africa. She has not the iron and steel industry on which to found them. Though manufactures have notably increased, the primary industries—wool, meat, butter and cheese—have remained dominant in her economy. The fundamental changes—the cessation of reliance on overseas borrowing, the transition from a relatively free to a highly controlled economy—came earlier, though they were accentuated by the war, for which in some ways they were an appropriate, though an unconscious, preparation.

What, then, is New Zealand's outlook upon the future? She knows that she is still dependent upon export markets, and among these, though other markets may supplement it, she still looks upon Britain as the chief. She looks to closer economic and cultural as well as political and military relations with the United States, but as supplementing, not as supplanting, her ties with Britain and with the Commonwealth. She knows that she is vitally interested in avoiding violent fluctuations in prices, and she has perhaps a new awareness of the part American policy will play in determining such questions. She is prepared to play her part, in arms as well as conference, in upholding security in the Pacific. For that purpose she has already made a specially close association through the Canberra Pact with her co-partner, Australia. She hopes that such arrangements will form part of a wider international organization of security. But she does not intend to be argued out of her family relationship with Britain and the British Commonwealth of Nations.

PROFESSOR S. HERBERT FRANKEL, Chairman of the South African Delegation: The delegates who have spoken before me have referred to the great changes which their countries have experienced as a result of the part they have played in the tasks which have faced the Commonwealth, the Empire and the Allied nations in these tragic years of war. We in South Africa in answering the call to assist in saving our common civilization have likewise mobilized our physical and spiritual resources to the full. Never before in our history have we undertaken so vast a common effort. Almost at a moment's notice, we had to throw an army into action from one end of the African continent to the other, and to supervise the defence of long lines of communications along the coasts of Africa. At the same time we had to fulfil our traditional role of half-way house between West and East by victualling the great armies which were convoyed from your shores and from the other Allied countries to the battle-fields of East Africa, North Africa, the Middle East and Asia. We built up not only our own Air Force but participated to the full, together with our sturdy neighbour Southern Rhodesia, in the great Empire Air Training Scheme.

At the same time we had for vital strategic economic reasons to maintain the output of our important gold-mining industry. In consequence we have experienced a vast industrial expansion based on the rapid training of thousands of additional workers of all races. This was paralleled by the expansion of our transport services to move the greatly increased coal and other supplies needed by the ships which thronged our ports on their way to and from the battle fronts. Thousands of workers were transferred to these ports for ship repairs and even for building vessels for mine-sweeping and other purposes. In effect South Africa became the repair shop of the African continent and an important source of supplies of industrial and other goods for the Allied forces.

We have had to fulfil these tasks in the face of great shortage of materials and manufactured products which we used to import. Lastly, but not least, we had to carry through these efforts in a society which is racially diverse and culturally at different levels of development.

No wonder, therefore, that the years since the last Commonwealth Conference have witnessed the birth of great new spiritual movements in our country. For the first time thousands of our men and women made personal contact with the peoples and problems beyond our borders in Africa and elsewhere. For the first time thousands of South African families got to know men and women from the Allied nations who, passing through the old 'tavern of the seas' and—from the beautiful Cape—beyond to Durban, received, and I may say enjoyed much gladly given hospitality. South Africa has indeed been on the march. There has grown up in its armed forces a new spirit of racial co-operation which I believe will permeate throughout our country. It is a constructive spirit. It looks both inwards and outwards. At home it has given rise to much discussion on, and the creation of new institutions for, social uplift, social security and increasing productivity, and for raising the standard of well-being of all sections and races of our community. This demand for new constructive action has created a far more intense awareness of the economic, scientific and ecological problems common to the African continent. We see our own tasks in these fields against the background of Africa as a whole. We realize that we and our neighbours must hammer out a new co-operative approach in our common task of conquering our environment, in meeting the demands of defence and in dealing with African indigenous peoples.

Looking across the seas we realize that our responsibilities have become continental and that the continent of which we form a part occupies a strategic and economic position in the new air-age which demands our constructive co-operation with the British Common-

wealth of Nations in the building of world political and economic security. It is in that spirit that our delegation is pleased to be privileged to take part in the important deliberations of this Conference.

THE HON. SIR MUHAMMAD ZAFRULLA KHAN, K.C.S.I., LL.B., LL.D., Chairman of the Indian Delegation: The principal changes that have taken place in India since 1938 are mainly related to the war. The war has brought to India a forcible and vivid realization of her own strategic importance, and indeed of her potential strategic domination in all the vast area of oceans and lands that lie between Australia and the west coast of Africa. Early during the war, long before Pearl Harbour, India had become the principal base of supplies in that area.

The entry of Japan into the war served still more to emphasize India's vital position in that respect. India has not only proved to be one of the main sources of supply in respect of primary products and raw materials, but has, through the rapid mobilization of her manufacturing capacity and industrial resources, become the principal arsenal of the United Nations in that part of the globe.

Some idea of India's great effort in this respect may be gathered from the fact that during the last five years, from being a debtor country, India has converted herself into a creditor nation with large sterling balances. In respect of man-power also, India's effort has been no less remarkable. Without the aid of any measure of compulsion whatsoever, she has succeeded in putting into the field two and a half million men, largely officered by their own nationals, who have given and are giving a splendid account of themselves in many theatres of the war. If need arose, this number could easily be doubled and perhaps even quadrupled, and India will in that eventuality also have called out only 2½ per cent of her total population.

The contribution that India has thus made towards preserving the liberties of the nations of the Commonwealth and safeguarding the future peace of the world has not been achieved without creating serious ferment in many directions. The repercussions on India's economic life have been grave, but are also full of beneficent possibilities. Both the supply effort and the man-power drive have created a much larger number of technical and skilled personnel than India has ever possessed before though the number still falls grossly short of its potential requirements.

This is a very welcome change which should go a long way towards helping India in her efforts to balance her economy in the post-war years. But the repercussions are not confined to the economic sphere—indeed they are making themselves felt very

strongly in other directions. India is growing impatient of her political dependence on Great Britain. Her sense of disappointment and frustration in the political field is being aggravated by the fear that she may be relegated to a position of inglorious obscurity in the post-war arrangements, the proposals concerning some of which will form the subject-matter of discussion in this Conference.

The appreciation of India's position in this behalf may, perhaps, be helped by instituting a comparison between India and China. China is to-day freely recognized as one of the four big nations upon whom will devolve the principal responsibility for safeguarding world peace and shepherding and directing human effort into beneficent channels after the horrors of the war have been brought to a close and the miseries engendered by it have to some degree been softened. India does not compare unfavourably with China in respect of population or area. India is the home of four hundred million human beings, one-sixth of the total population of the world.

I have no desire to disparage China in any respect, nor do I wish for one moment to discount an iota of the praise and admiration justly due to that great country for her heroic resistance to Japanese aggression during the last eight years, but it will, I am sure, be freely recognized that in respect of natural resources and their development, manufacturing capacity, industrial potentials, technical and mechanical skill, capital investments, literacy and higher education in the arts and sciences, communications, public health and veterinary services, the maintenance of law and order and the administration of justice and a host of similar matters, India stands far ahead of China, whatever may be its position *vis-a-vis* the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. What is it then that makes the claim of China to be ranked among the great nations irresistible and makes the same claim on behalf of India unacceptable and unentertainable? China no doubt possesses an ancient culture, but so does India, and China will be the first to acknowledge the debt that it owes to India in the cultural field.

It may be said that China's claim is admitted on account of its potentialities, but India's potentialities are, I venture to submit, even greater. It may be objected that India suffers from divisions and conflicts, but the divisions and conflicts in India do not threaten to prove more intractable than the differences that divide the Communists and the Kuomintang in China. Though often made a victim of aggression, India has throughout her long history never been guilty of aggression herself. She is no less willing and eager than China to assume and is in a far better position than China to discharge adequately the obligations that her inclusion among the great nations, a position to which she is justly entitled, may entail. Is not then the distinguishing feature between China

and India only this, that for good or for ill, China stands on her own political feet, contending against the storms that have threatened and may threaten to overwhelm her independence, while India is politically dependent upon Great Britain? Statesmen of the Commonwealth, does it not strike you as an irony of the first magnitude that India should have two and a half million men in the field, fighting and struggling to preserve the liberties of the nations of the Commonwealth, and yet should be a suppliant for her own freedom? How long do you think will she be prepared to wait? India is on the march. You may help her, or you may hinder her, but none shall stop her.

India shall be free. Within the Commonwealth, if you will let her and accord to her the position that is justly her due; without the Commonwealth, if you will leave her no alternative.

THE HON. SIR HTOON AUNG GYAW, Chairman of the Delegation of Observers for Burma: I come from Burma. Burma is not a Colony; it has never been a Colony. It is not yet a Dominion, though on the verge of becoming one.

We from Burma are very grateful for the invitation given to us to attend this Conference. We recognize, in such an invitation and participation in this Conference, a sign of the changing position and status of our country towards the full stature of a Dominion.

A signal event that has happened since 1938 has been, of course, the invasion of Burma and its occupation by an enemy. Those of you who have come from Australia and New Zealand must recognize the feeling of horror and revulsion that spread through the land at the prospects of an invasion; that we in Burma have actually suffered an invasion and are enduring an occupation by an enemy along with an untold amount of suffering and privation to the people, and with tremendous loss of life and property. That is the cardinal fact. It is a fact which all of you in this Conference, all of you within the British Empire, have realized, because it is the first, and let us hope the last occasion which will ever happen that a country within the British Empire has been invaded by an enemy, and occupied by an enemy, as long as three years.

This, of course, brings us immediately face to face with many and very serious problems. The problem will be of facing the facts as they are, and setting the responsibilities where responsibilities lie.

Under the present constitution the defence of Burma was not and is not a Burmese responsibility but the responsibility of the British. This has resulted in tremendous suffering to our people, the Burmese people. I do not want to rub this in, but I am only trying to state a fact. I would certainly like for the future to see this responsibility for defence, whether it be in Burma or any other

part of the Empire, to be fully and squarely laid first and foremost on the people of the country, and then that to that end the full power and might of other nations that form the British Commonwealth will come to their aid.

This is also the reason why we from Burma will follow up all the future discussions on security of the British Commonwealth and Empire with great interest, whether as part of or even independent of any plan of world collective security.

The second aspect is the necessity of reconstruction, reconstruction of the whole of the life and the whole of the economy of Burma. The whole of the national life and economy has broken down. We were dependent in the past on three industries: first, the production of rice; second, the production of timber; and, third, the production of oil. In all three there is at present merely chaos.

Burma, which used to produce six and a half million tons of rice, out of which she consumed less than half, and exported the balance to other parts of the world, is at present producing much less than her own actual needs. Therefore, our neighbours, like India and Ceylon, Malaya and other parts of the world, who are now suffering very great shortages of rice and looking to Burma to make up the deficiency, will, I am afraid, find that their expectation will not be fulfilled, certainly not during the next three or four years.

Our forests are dependent on a force of trained elephants. I am afraid the elephants have to a large extent disappeared or been destroyed, and the production of timber for quite a number of years will also be delayed.

As for the oil, it is in the hands of very large companies, and there will be delay in arranging for machinery. In other words, the whole economic life of the country is at present dead. It will be necessary to resuscitate the whole life of Burma, and any help that we can get, either in the form of advice or material from whatever sources, will be very welcome.

For that reason I am very grateful to the Council for inviting some of us from Burma to state the position of our country before an audience like this.

MAJOR LEWIS HASTINGS, M.C., Observer for Southern Rhodesia: Southern Rhodesia is one of the smallest self-governing communities in the British Empire. And when I hear something of the accomplishment of the great self-governing Dominions in the common war effort, I feel a minnow among the tritons.

But within the limits imposed by her population and her resources, the little country I speak for has no reason to feel abashed. When the signal came in 1939 she sprang to arms wholeheartedly without pause or reservation or debate.

In point of fact, Southern Rhodesia is the only country I've ever heard of that within a few short weeks of the declaration of war had to impose a conscription Act for the sole purpose of preventing virtually her total able-bodied male population joining the armed forces. Something had to be done to keep a minimum of European man-power working at essential industries, and this could only be done by compulsion.

But the African population—far more numerous—has been just as forthcoming. But as agriculture is a vital war industry the number that could be released for active service was bound to be limited. Nevertheless, regiments of Africans from both Matebeleland and Mashonaland have seen active service in Abyssinia and the Desert. And very many others have left their villages to serve in the King's African Rifles and in African formations overseas.

The biggest single contribution that Rhodesia has made is her substantial share in the creation and upkeep of the Rhodesian Training Unit of the Royal Air Force. Her aid to that, in money terms alone, amounts to more than one-third of her total revenue before the war. It may be imagined what an impact upon the life of the country with its white population of a hundred thousand this enormous organization has made. But the Rhodesian air contribution is not confined to finance. Something like 50 per cent of the European youth of the country of the appropriate ages are either in their own Fighter and Bomber squadrons or are scattered throughout the R.A.F. on all the war fronts.

Rhodesians, too, have played a prominent part in training and leading African regiments from West and East Africa—they are in the majority as officers of the splendid African Division in Burma. They are an important proportion of the personnel of the Sixth Armoured Division in Italy, and they are to be found in every branch of the services abroad, as well as in the Navy.

Back in the country itself the imperatives of war have stimulated some branches of activity and paralysed others. A great deal of economic readjustment will be necessary when victory has come. But, on the whole, I would say that the chief effect of the war upon Rhodesians has been to enlarge their mental horizon. All these young men who have ranged from the Pacific to the Atlantic will return with a clear idea of the greater brotherhood to which they belong—that of the Commonwealth.

And one thing more, they will have discovered the essential unity of the African continent. They will have learnt every track and every skyway that links the Limpopo and the Zambesi with the Great Lakes and the Nile. They will have learnt something of the artificiality of political boundaries. They will have realized that the riddle of Africa is pretty much the same over millions of square

miles, and that problems common to all her parts are best met by some greater measure of association and understanding.

THE LORD HAILEY, G.C.S.L, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation: Following as I do, and as you thought I should, my colleagues of the other delegations, and hearing them as I have, I feel how difficult it would be for me to attempt to put before you a complete picture of the change that has taken place in Great Britain in these last few years. Our history has been so crowded, our life has been affected at so many facets, our activities have been so multiplex, that it would be difficult indeed for me to paint that picture.

Moreover, during this war so much of the limelight of publicity has been on the United Kingdom, to the advantage or disadvantage as it may be, as compared with some of the countries represented here, that I fear that if I attempted any such summary of change, I should only be referring to much that is already known to you.

But let me say this. Like Lord Astor, we of the British delegation are fully aware—for we also have passed through the world on our occasions during this war—of the inconveniences that our colleagues must have suffered in coming so far to this Conference.

But I feel that we can at least offer them one compensation. It is a vision of a changed, almost a new England. Let me carry your minds back to the circumstances under which the second Commonwealth Conference was held at Lapstone in 1938.

Over our horizon was then hanging the ever-darkening cloud of Hitler's threats to European peace; the Runciman Mission had left for the Sudetenland a few days before the British delegation started from this country; the Munich Agreement was concluded a fortnight after the Conference ended.

What was the impression that must then have been formed by many of the state of Great Britain? You will recall the attacks that had been directed in Axis quarters against what was called our decadence, our seeming willingness to suffer almost any external threat rather than risk any interruption of our easy way of life, or a sacrifice of our wealth.

If I say that you will to-day see a new England, it is not because I can ask you to view the scars that war has left on our towns or on our historic buildings. It is because I know you would look in vain to-day for any evidence of the apathies, the hesitation to sacrifice, sacrifice of either life or property, with which our critics charged us. You will see an England poor in so far that she has lost much of her invested wealth, but an England rich in the knowledge that she has surrendered it without complaint in the fight for the liberties of mankind. Nay more, it is an England which has learnt to see in

wealth not a source of private enjoyment or of national pride, but the one means of ensuring an adequate standard of life to the less privileged of her population.

Our cities have suffered; but evacuation has revealed to us shortcomings in our social life which we had been slow to realize before, but which we are now determined to remedy. There were many in the world and perhaps some in the Dominions who believed our democracy was so stratified by class distinctions as to be a nominal democracy only. Look to-day, and you will find that, where all have passed through the fire of war, we are nearer than ever before to the ideal of a social democracy. Only a people that had the true spirit of democracy could have adopted of its own free will those almost totalitarian restrictions on our private liberties which were necessary to defeat totalitarian aggression.

So much then of ourselves. What change will you find in our attitude to other members of the Commonwealth and Empire? In the presence of Dominion representatives, I do not venture to speak of the changes of which they themselves must be the best judges. I speak of one thing only—the greatly increased desire of our public to know more of Commonwealth affairs, and the far greater attention that is now paid to their study in our schools.

As for India, I regard what has happened rather as evolution than as change. Sir Zafrulla Khan feels that it has left India still with a sense of frustration; but for our part let me say this: we regard ourselves as now only awaiting the day when India herself will provide the consummation of the policy of full self-government held out in the Declaration of 1942.

As for the Colonial Empire, you will see a new note in our Imperialism; for you will find that our people to-day, already not lightly taxed, have readily undertaken the obligation to provide the finance needed to raise colonial standards of life to a level which can make self-rule a reality to the people of the Colonies.

There, then, are the changes you will see—changes, I hope, that will give you a new vision of what Britain herself can contribute to the part which the Commonwealth can play in the re-shaping of the destinies of the world.

Dinner at Claridge's Hotel, given to the Delegates by the Lord and Lady Kemsley, 19 February 1945

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs: Lord Astor, my Lords, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to thank you most sincerely for the toast you have just drunk, and, in particular, Lord Astor for the far too kind terms in which he has proposed it, although I thought I noticed one painfully barbed shaft about barbarians and the Press, which I took in the spirit in which it was intended.

This is a notable occasion and it is also a very notable gathering. I must confess I feel very considerable diffidence in rising to speak on Empire relations to an audience which has made a lifelong study of this particular subject and most of whom, at any rate, can speak with far more authority on the subject than I can myself. If my remarks appear elementary, or even jejune, I hope you will receive them with that good nature and amused tolerance which I have noticed experts always reserve for the words of politicians.

Let me repeat, it is a great privilege to me to come and address you. The Royal Institute of International Affairs is not very old in years compared with many of our institutions in this country, but it has already, I think, built for itself a position unique within the Empire—I would go further and say a position unique in the world. It and allied institutions in the other countries of the Empire who are represented here constitute a forum where all those of light and leading in the various countries of the Commonwealth can meet and exchange views. Out of the deliberations of these societies and institutions I think there has already come a great deal that is of value in moulding the thoughts and ideas of the younger generation. It is not, of course, an official body, and that to me is its particular merit. In far too many countries nowadays there is only one view allowed, and that is the view of the government. As a result that evolution of thought which is the result of the exchange of free opinion is entirely stifled. At the conferences of the Institute of International Affairs, on the other hand, the views of governments are conspicuous by their absence. Delegations speak for themselves, and for themselves alone. Indeed, ladies and gentlemen, I feel that I, as a Minister of the Crown, should not be talking to you here at all to-night—but I am most grateful for the invitation extended to me.

An after-dinner speech is not a particularly suitable occasion for a serious pronouncement upon the Empire, but there are one or two comments I should like to make, speaking strictly for myself, on some of the broad issues that face you.

First of all, I should like to pose to you, what I have often posed

to myself, one very simple yet fundamental question which I feel should be in the minds of all of us who are engaged in the consideration of inter-Imperial subjects. The question is this: What is the function of the British Empire? Why did it come into being? Why has it survived when so many other empires have crumbled into ruin? The origin of this confederation of States, if I may so call it, to which we belong is, I think, one of the strangest phenomena in the whole of history. Other empires of the past, or the great majority of them, have tended to follow something of a common pattern. They have come into being through the dynamic personality of some single man, some great leader, or by one of those strange effervescences of energy which occur in nations from time to time, when their boundaries become too narrow to contain them, and they overflow into the territories of their neighbours. We can recall the empires of Alexander the Great and Napoleon and others. They were acquired by force. They were maintained by force. But they did not endure. Directly the iron grip of the dominant nation was relaxed, the subject peoples rose and threw off their oppressors. Now that, ladies and gentlemen, with the possible exception of the Roman Empire, may be said to be the normal pattern of the empires of the past.

But the British Commonwealth and Empire has grown up in a quite different way. It has come into being gradually over a long period of centuries, as a result of no deliberate policy, and indeed almost, as it were, by chance. I would not say—you would contradict me if I did—that no part of the Empire came under the British flag as a result of warlike operations. But it would be true to say that in the great majority of cases they did not come in as the result of a deliberate, planned policy of imperialist expansion but rather as a by-product of defensive wars which we waged in Europe against other great Powers that were attempting to dominate the Continent. We took up arms originally in the great majority of cases to defend the liberty and independence of our own country. When we succeeded and the enemy had been defeated by ourselves and our Allies, a portion of the possessions of the enemy came into our own hands.

In any case, whatever may be said about these portions of the Empire, it is only a comparatively small part which has been acquired in that way. For the most part, I should have thought, the motives of the founders of the Empire were very different. The pioneers of empire in America, in Africa and in Australia were not interested in imperialistic expansion. They did not regard themselves as Herrenvolk. They were quiet, peaceable people who went to those far-off lands for the purposes of trade or inspired by the missionary spirit. They settled down and founded establish-

ments and later, as a result of agreements with the local rulers, these territories came under the suzerainty of the British Crown. The main object of these pioneers and of the administrators who followed them was not to dominate but to co-operate with the local rulers and inhabitants. Had we depended on force, as the empires of the past depended, the Empire would have dissolved long ago. We could never have held down those vast areas with the resources at our disposal.

No doubt it will be possible to quote examples not covered by the definition I have given, but it is fair to say that practically speaking our method has been, and is, the method of government by consent, and our tradition has been the tradition of steady, peaceful progress. That is why, I believe, the existence of the British Empire has been willingly accepted, both by the countries themselves where the British flag flies and by the outside world. It has been universally recognized as presenting no dangers to its neighbours.

It follows from what I have said that the British Empire constitutionally is in a state of constant evolution and development. As each separate community has grown in age and experience, it has followed from the principle of consent that it has assumed, more and more, responsibility for its own affairs. That has happened and is happening all the time.

The peoples of the more backward Colonies still need our guidance and protection. Others, more advanced, have attained a wide measure of self-government. But the fullest development has come in what are known as the Dominions, the Overseas Dominions of His Majesty the King, just as we here are the Metropolitan Dominion of His Majesty. These Dominions, which started as scattered communities one, two or three centuries ago, have grown with the passage of time into a great Commonwealth of nations, equal in all respects to ourselves, bound to us only by the ties of loyalty to the King and of common tradition. The final statutory recognition of this equality of status is enshrined in the Statute of Westminster. It seems to me that the enactment of the Statute of Westminster was not merely a landmark in the history of the world. It was, once and for all, a repudiation of the old Imperialism, the doctrine of force which was the basis of the empires of the past; and it was a substitution for it of something better—a completely free relationship based on mutual interest and mutual affection.

That, as I see it, is the relationship that binds us together now. It has survived the test of two long wars and will, I believe, survive the strains which will be put upon it by the post-war world. It would be idle to say it does not face us with new problems, problems which you gentlemen have come here to discuss. It is not to be

supposed that five independent British countries, situated in different parts of the world, looking at international affairs from different angles, will always take the same view, but it is certain that if the nations of the British Commonwealth are to play their full part in moulding the future they must act as far as possible together. That, to my mind, is absolutely essential.

How is this to be ensured ?

There are, as I understand it, three main schools of thought with regard to this problem at present.

First of all, there are those who have been driven to the conclusion that it is impossible to achieve true unity of policy under the present loosely-knit relationship, and therefore they advocate a federal structure for the Commonwealth—a single government, as I understand them, and a single legislature, to deal with external and inter-Imperial affairs. I do not for a moment deny the attractions of such a proposal as that. If it was generally acceptable, it would ensure that the Commonwealth always spoke with one voice in the councils of the world, which is in itself an extremely laudable objective. But I have now sat for three or four years in the chair of the Dominions Secretary, and in that period I have never once heard the federal solution advocated by any responsible Empire statesman. On the contrary, those gentlemen who have come to see me have always emphasized the necessity for every Empire country to come to its own decisions, and I have come to the conclusion that, whatever the future may bring, the federal solution is at present not practical politics. I may be wrong. If I am, no doubt other people will prove it to me.

The second school of thought accepts the fact that federation is impracticable; but it would like to see a more elaborate structure of inter-Imperial collaboration built up in the form of regular machinery for Ministerial and official meetings, backed up by a standing joint committee.

Now as to the third school of thought. The third school of thought is completely content with the present machinery. It wants no change of any kind. Lately, I have noticed yet another body of opinion emerging, which regards even the present machinery as rather too rigid and would prefer a greater freedom for the component parts of the Commonwealth.

These are the four schools of thought on this particular subject. I know these are extremely controversial questions, and it would be very unwise in me, a visitor to your councils, to give vent to any dogmatic opinions on the subject. I propose merely to confine myself to the following general observations.

I think it will be generally agreed, if I may borrow words used lately in a broadcast by an eminent Canadian publicist, that the

policies of the Commonwealth should march together. If that phrase has any reality at all, it means constant consultation between the various countries of the Empire. I would therefore lay it down as a cardinal principle that it must be the aim not only of the United Kingdom but also of other Empire countries to facilitate that consultation in any way they can. That is the most vital thing at the present time. We may not reach agreement on every single issue, because individual issues are very often coloured by the geographical factor, which we must not underestimate in this connexion. But we shall establish, I believe, broadly speaking, a common point of view, and that is what is most important, for all of us.

There is already extremely elaborate machinery in active operation to-day for inter-Imperial consultation. I do not think it is realized generally how elaborate that machinery is. It covers everything. Every day, sheaves of telegrams go out from the Dominions Office on all and every subject of mutual interest—foreign affairs, economic developments, military co-operation, even domestic issues here which are likely to interest our partners. We tell them everything we can, and we consult them on every point that arises of any importance in the international field. I freely admit that, in the rather hectic conditions of war-time, occasions arise when it is not possible to consult the Dominions before decisions are taken. That is quite inevitable: but it does not happen very often. The only way to avoid it would be to set up an Imperial War Cabinet in London. But that, as you know, was not acceptable to more than one Dominion Government, and I recognize that it presents very real difficulties. Except, however, for the few occasions when decisions have to be taken without consultation, the system of consultation we have built up works in practice extremely well. I do not say it cannot be improved. Personally I am looking forward to hearing the result of your deliberations. It may be that you will have some ideas that have evaded us. But you will find that different views are held on these questions in different Empire countries, and that harmonizing these different views is not always quite as easy as it looks from outside.

But, indeed, ladies and gentlemen, there is no need for absolute uniformity of machinery as between one Dominion and another. One Dominion may require certain facilities: another may require others. I do not see why each of these Dominions should not have what it wants. We only desire to provide what is needed, what is asked for by each. At the same time, some measure of uniformity of machinery is no doubt necessary if the Commonwealth is to be more than a name. We are anxious as far as possible to move in step with the Dominions. It is equally important that they should move as far as possible in step with us. We should all, therefore, avoid

taking independent action in matters of common concern until every effort has been made to achieve the common view. That may seem a platitude, but it is more important than may appear. It is in the interests of all Empire countries alike. So long as we make our guiding principle 'consultation and yet more consultation' we shall not go far wrong.

I am afraid I have already spoken to you far too long for an occasion such as this, but there is one thing which I think in conclusion I ought to add. It may appear to some of you that my remarks have been too much confined to inter-Imperial relations and that they have ignored the equally important aspect of the relationship between the Commonwealth and the outside world. That has certainly not been my intention.

It would be absurd to suppose after our experiences in the last thirty years that any nation or combination of nations could isolate themselves from the rest of the world. We must aim at—it must be the cardinal aim of our policy to get—an efficient world organization. On the other hand, I believe it would be equally wrong for us to assume that combinations of States within a world system must necessarily be detrimental to that organization. It depends on the purposes for which the combination is intended. Combinations of States within a world organization, so far from being detrimental to that organization, may indeed strengthen it, may be the chief buttress of the system. In particular, I would suggest that the part which the British Commonwealth has to play in the new World Order is essential to the success of that Order. We can make a contribution which no one else can. This results not only from our long history and mature experience, but also from a much simpler reason—our geographical situation. Other great Powers, however great they may be, however vast their powers of production, have their territories concentrated in one part of the globe. The outlook of these Powers, even the greatest of them, may be continental, or at any rate, hemispherical. But the territories of the British Empire and Commonwealth are scattered over the whole of the earth's surface. Our outlook can have no such limitations. Anything that happens anywhere affects us. Individually, members of the Commonwealth may be European nations, or African nations, or Pacific nations, or American nations. Together, we encompass the globe, and we are bound to take the global view. We belong to the Old World and the New World. We belong to the West and the East. There is no problem of race and colour of which we have not had practical experience.

We have made a great contribution to the world in the past. We have an even larger one to make in the future. But we shall only do so if our consultation is close and constant. To the all-important

object of finding ways and means of ensuring and improving that consultation we, the members of the Empire Governments, and you, the members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, are alike devoting attention. I wish you the very best of luck, for upon your endeavours may depend the future peace and prosperity of the world.

THE HON. SIR MUHAMMAD ZAFRULLA KHAN, K.C.S.I.: I am fully sensible of the graciousness on the part of our hosts of the evening and those responsible for the arrangements in connexion with this most hospitable function which has prompted their choice of the Delegate who should reply to the toast that has just been proposed by Lord Astor, and which has been responded to by all of you with such enthusiasm. Though I personally feel greatly embarrassed by the honour, I make no doubt that my selection is one more of the indications that have been noticeable on every occasion of the friendliness and sympathy towards India that inspires the representatives of the United Kingdom as well as those of the Dominions, which is so characteristic of Chatham House and of which I have had personal experience over a period now extending to twelve years.

This Conference is symbolic of the way in which the free democracies of the Commonwealth go to work. We find gathered here for free discussion among themselves, not representatives of Governments, committed to speaking to set briefs, but men of wisdom and foresight, drawn from all sections and parties, who bring to bear upon the problems that confront the nations of the Commonwealth, the light of their knowledge and experience acquired in various spheres in the far-flung countries of the Commonwealth.

I hope I shall not be thought impertinent if I were to say that Mr. Curtis and those who laboured in association with him a quarter of a century ago at Paris to lay the foundations of Chatham House (I mean, of course, the Institute and not the building in which it is housed) built more wisely than even they perhaps were able then to foresee. And may I here utter a word of tribute to Chatham House and all those who have been connected with it during the last twenty-five years, for the most valuable work that it and they have accomplished and carry on. Here is an organization that arranges for the objective study of difficult and important problems that may from time to time confront the Commonwealth on the highest intellectual level, and endeavours to prepare public opinion upon them in advance, so that those upon whom may rest the ultimate responsibility for taking decisions and carrying them into effect should have available to them the barometer of an informed and enlightened public opinion from which they may draw guidance and assistance in setting their course.

The relations between Chatham House and its sister Institutes in the Dominions and India are again typical of the free spirit of the Commonwealth and its institutions. Each of the Institutes has, I have no doubt, had to pass through periods of crisis and has developed along its own lines, but I have equally no doubt that each has been enriched by the labours and experience of the other Institutes.

I am sure I am speaking for every one of the Delegates in our group when I say that conferences like these are of the utmost value to India. As India advances steadily but surely to occupy her due place among the nations of the Commonwealth, she must begin to look more and more around and outside of herself. In the past there has been too great a tendency in my country for public opinion to concentrate itself on India's political relationship to Great Britain, and too little attention has, I fear, been paid to world affairs. These conferences provide valuable opportunities for India to extend and strengthen her contacts with the United Kingdom and the Dominions on a purely non-official and absolutely equal level. That is why India has always been at pains to arrange to be represented at these conferences, and to make her due contribution to their deliberations.

Some concern has been expressed in certain quarters regarding the part that Great Britain is to play in post-war arrangements for security. There has been a note of anxiety, perhaps even of pessimism, running through some of the speeches and writings on the subject. I cannot help feeling that a satisfactory solution of the Indian problem would serve more than any other single factor to allay apprehension and anxiety on that score. Would it be too much to hope that this Conference might be able to furnish some guidance in that respect? I am aware that the best minds in this country fully appreciate the tremendous importance of that question, and some of them are engaged in grappling with it. Nevertheless, it would be a matter of great satisfaction and gratification and would indeed be a great achievement if this Conference could throw some light on the problem and give a lead towards its solution. The attitude of His Majesty's Government appears to be that they having announced their policy regarding India, it is up to India now to make the next move. I do not deny that the responsibility for the next move does rest upon India, but failing a move from that direction, is Great Britain released from all further liability concerning India? In the interest of the United Kingdom itself, in the interest of the Commonwealth, and I will make bold to add in the interests of world peace and security, the situation must not be permitted to deteriorate any further.

The strains and stresses imposed by the war upon the United

Kingdom have not prevented her from making big strides in many directions. She has not been too timid to tackle tremendous and intricate problems of social security at home, and is now engaged upon rearing an admirable structure of social security. In the matter of the Colonies, she has furnished a new orientation to the whole question, and has set herself and the other Colonial Powers a new objective in that field. Herself she is already moving out of strength towards achievement of that objective. In the sphere of foreign relations she has struggled through to an understanding with the United States, and what is still more satisfactory, with the U.S.S.R. Is she content to accept defeat only in the case of India?

I am not unmindful of what are known as the Cripps Proposals, but whatever their merits, they have failed to resolve the deadlock. Is no further effort to be made by the United Kingdom? May I appeal to you, who are gathered here from all parts of the Commonwealth, to bring constructive minds to bear on this problem with the solution of which are bound up so many grave and important matters bearing upon post-war arrangements, so that when victory is achieved, which consummation happily seems to have been brought so much nearer in this month of February 1945, the Indian question may also have been settled. Surely that is well worth striving for.

The problem, as we all know, is both difficult and complex. The various parties in India have taken up mutually exclusive and irreconcilable positions. I have only one suggestion to put forward to-night. Would it not be feasible for His Majesty's Government to announce that it would be prepared to implement any agreed settlement that might be put up on behalf of India, within a period of one year from the cessation of hostilities against Japan, but that failing such a settlement within that period, His Majesty's Government would place before Parliament itself proposals concerning the future constitution of India, designed to place India on a footing of complete equality with the Dominions? It would have to be made perfectly clear that the solution that His Majesty's Government may arrive at would only be provisional, and would continue in force only so long as Indians themselves were not agreed upon an alternative. When an alternative is agreed upon, it would take the place of the provisional constitution. Any decision that His Majesty's Government may arrive at with regard to this provisional constitution will no doubt fail to give complete satisfaction, inasmuch as the claims of every one of the parties in India would have to be subjected to a good deal of pruning to make them fit into any workable constitution. But I am not without hope that, if His Majesty's Government were to undertake this responsibility upon

its own shoulders, it would either result in accelerating agreement among the parties in India or in persuading them to accept and work the constitution framed by His Majesty's Government over a long enough period to discover in what respects it was susceptible of improvement.

I would beg you earnestly to forgive me for taking up so much of your valuable time over India, but this matter of a settlement between Great Britain and India lies very close to my heart and that which lies so close to one's heart is bound to well up on an occasion like this. Believe me, issues far more momentous and vital to the future of peace and civilization hang upon a solution of this problem than is perhaps being appreciated at this moment.

Turning now to the question of post-war security arrangements, which is the principal item set down for discussion on the Agenda of the Conference, may I be permitted to say how happy a coincidence the timing of the Conference has proved to be. The Conference has followed quickly after the Crimea Conference and just long enough ahead of the projected San Francisco Conference to invest the question with a sense of reality and to enable the Conference to discuss it in all its concrete aspects.

It has been made abundantly clear that every member of the Commonwealth may be relied upon to come into the new security organization in its individual capacity. On this there can be no manner of doubt. But need it stop there? The nations of the Commonwealth have learnt to work together, and to fight together; they understand each other so well that surely there is a great deal of room for co-operation and collaboration within the Commonwealth with regard to world security. The Commonwealth has a very valuable contribution to make by way of constructive proposals and effort in the setting up and implementing of the proposed world organization. May not the Commonwealth, with all its experience of the growth and development of free peoples in voluntary association for certain beneficent purposes, be in a position to point the way to an effective and efficient world organization? Would it not bring to the service of the new body that is about to be born, not only the resources of its strength, but also 'the wealth of its experience and knowledge? Our contributions of strength may perhaps have to be individual (though even these, if co-ordinated, would be far more valuable than their mere sum total); but surely our moral and spiritual contributions would be based upon our common ideals and standards of culture and civilization that we are all anxious to see established and safeguarded. How many times the value of these contributions could be multiplied if the Indian question could be settled in advance, may easily be imagined.

Was it not William Pitt who said' England will save herself by her exertions and save Europe by her example' ?

Would not the Commonwealth, having saved itself by its combined strength, make its full contribution towards safeguarding the post-war world with the help of its united strength, experience and knowledge?

APPENDICES

Appendix A

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS CONFERENCE 1945

LIST OF PREPARATORY PAPERS AND CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

ALL the following papers are available at Chatham House and at the headquarters of the Commonwealth Institutes, the Newfoundland Branch and the Cairo Group.

All these papers have also been sent to the following Libraries in the British Isles: The British Museum, London, W.C.I; the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh; the National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth; Trinity College Library, Dublin; the Bodleian Library, Oxford; and the Cambridge University Library, Cambridge.

Documents

B.C.R.C.2. Selected Bibliography (1938-44). Compiled by Margaret Cleeve, O.B.E.

B.C.R.C.2a. Addendum to Selected Bibliography: Articles in Periodicals, 1943-4. Compiled by Margaret Cleeve, O.B.E.

B.C.R.C.3. Second Supplement: 1938-44, to Consultation and Co-operation in the British Commonwealth. By G. E. Palmer.

B.C.R.C.4. International Security: A Selection of Authoritative Statements by Spokesmen of the United Nations, 1939-February 1944. Compiled by J. R. Bracken.

B.C.R.C.5. Social Security in the Dominions. Prepared in the Information Department of Chatham House.

B.C.R.C.io. Brief Survey of the Preparatory Papers. By Richard Frost.

Preparatory Papers

AUSTRALIA

1. Four papers on Australian Views on Post-War Reconstruction:
   - (i) The Internal Pressures. By G. L. Wood,
   - (ii) The Australian Citizen's Attitude to Problems in the Pacific. By P. D. Phillips,
   - (iii) Australian-British Relations in the Post-War World. By H. Burton,
   - (iv) Political-Economic Relations of Australia and the U.S.A. By Walter Hill.
2. Requirements of an Expanding Economy for Australia. By a Member of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.

3. The Australian Balance of Payments. By L. F. Giblin.
4. Australian Interest in Post-War Air Transport. By G. Packer.
5. Problems of Migration and Demography. By W. D. Borrie.
6. Colonial Trusteeship in Transition. By Julius Stone. (Sydney, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1944.)
7. Development and Welfare in the Western Pacific. By H. Ian Hogbin and C. Wedgwood. (Sydney, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1943.)
8. The Conditions of Post-War Trade Policy for Australia. By the Melbourne Research Group of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.
9. The Australian Wool Industry in the Post-War World. Byl.Clunies Ross.
10. Brown and White in the South Pacific. By the Rev. J. W. Burton. (Sydney, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1944.)
11. Australian Agriculture in the Post-War World.
12. (i) Australia's Attitude to the Post-War Government of the Pacific Dependencies. By P. D. Phillips.
    (ii) Australia as a Pacific Power. By W. MacMahon Ball. |
    (iii) A Security System for the Pacific. By a Member of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.
13. Epilogue to the Australian Papers: Harmonies and Disharmonies in Intra-Commonwealth Relations. By Julius Stone.

BURMA

Burma: The Political, Social and Economic Background.

CAIRO

The Interests of the Commonwealth in the Middle East. By a Study Group of the Cairo Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

CANADA

1. Canada and the Building of Peace. By Grant Dexter. (Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1944.)
2. National Interests in the British Commonwealth. By R. G. Trotter.
3. Commonwealth Machinery.

INDIA

1. A Treaty between India and the United Kingdom. By Sir Syed Sultan Ahmed.
2. India's Trade and Commerce with Commonwealth Countries. By Dr. Lanka Sundaram.
3. Planning of Social Security in India. By B. P. Adarkar.
4. Technical and Economic Co-operation. By N. R. Sarker.

5. Imperial Organization. By K. M. Panikkar.
6. The Strategic Problems of the Indian Ocean. By K. M. Panikkar.
7. Population Problems in South-East Asia. By Radhakamal Mukerjee.
8. The Status of Indians in the Empire. By An On-looker.
9. India and the United States of America. By Sir G. S. Bajpai.
10. India and Aviation. By An Indian Airman.
11. Indian Currency. By Sir Theodore Gregory.
12. Problems of Indian Currency and Exchange. By N. R. Sarker.
13. Indian Currency in Retrospect. By G. D. Birla.
14. The Indian States.
15. Planned Economic Development for India. By S. R. S. Raghavan.
16. India and the Gulf. By An Indian Muslim.
17. India and China. By Sir Muhammad Zafarulla Khan.
18. Development of Common Ideals in the British Commonwealth. By Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer.
19. The Indian States. By Mir Maqbool Mahmood.

NEWFOUNDLAND

Studies in the Economy and History of Newfoundland. Edited by R. A. MacKay. (Toronto, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1945.)

NEW ZEALAND

1. Reconstruction in New Zealand. By Horace Belshaw.
2. (i) Collective Security in the Pacific. By J. O. Shearer, F. L. W. Wood and R. W. McGechan.
   (ii) New Zealand and the British Commonwealth. By W. T. G. Airey, A. G. Davis and J. Rutherford.
3. (i) New Zealand's Dependencies and the Development of Autonomy. By W. S. Lowe and W. T. G. Airey.
   (ii) The South Seas Regional Commission. By Ernest Beaglehole.

SOUTH AFRICA

The Statute of Westminster and its Effect on Canada. By C. J. Burchell. (Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, 1945.)

UNITED KINGDOM

1. Commonwealth Economic Problems. By A. G. B. Fisher.
2. Security: The Position of the United Kingdom. Report by a Chatham House Study Group.

3a. The Future of Colonial Peoples. By Lord Hailey. (London, Oxford University Press, 1943.)

3b. International Action and the Colonies. Report of a Committee of the Fabian Colonial Bureau. (London, Fabian Publications and Victor Gollancz, 1943.)

3c. The Commonwealth and the Colonies. By a Chatham House Study Group.

4. United Kingdom Social and Economic Developments. By the Hon. Hugh Wyndham and Miss D. P. Etlinger.

5. Welfare in the British Colonies. By L. P. Mair. (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944.)

6. Migration within the Empire. Prepared in the Information Department of Chatham House.

Additional Papers circulated

The British Commonwealth and World Order. By Sir Walter Lay ton. (Sydney Ball Lecture, 3 March 1944.)

World War; Its Cause and Cure. By Lionel Curtis. (London, Oxford University Press, 1945.)

Appendix B

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS CONFERENCE 1945

DAILY PROGRAMME

SATURDAY, 17 FEBRUARY

11.15 a.m. Opening Session.
Chairman: Viscount Astor.
Opening of the Conference by Viscount Cecil.
2.30 p.m.-4 p.m. First Plenary Session (Administrative Meeting).
4.30 p,m.-6.30 p.m. Session.

SUNDAY, 18 FEBRUARY

Private Meetings of Delegations.

MONDAY, 19 FEBRUARY

10 a.m.-12.3o p.m. Session.
3 p.m.-6 p.m. Session.
7.45 p.m. for 8 p.m. Dinner at Claridge's Hotel for Delegates.
Hosts: Lord and Lady Kemsley.
Special Guest: The Rt. Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

TUESDAY, 20 FEBRUARY

10 a.m.-12.3O p.m. Session.
3 p.m.-6 p.m. Session.
7.30 p.m. Small informal dinner party at Chatham House for selected Delegates.
Special Guest: H.E. Dr. E. N. van Kleffens, Netherlands Foreign Minister.

WEDNESDAY, 21 FEBRUARY

10 a.m.-12.3O p.m. Session.
3 p.m.-6 p.m. Session.
7.30 p.m. Small informal dinner party at Chatham House for selected Delegates.
Special Guest: The Rt. Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, D.S.O., M.C., M.P., Minister of Production.

THURSDAY, 22 FEBRUARY

10 a.m.-12.3O p.m. Session.
3 p.m.-6 p.m. Session.
7.30 p.m. Small informal dinner party at Chatham House for selected Delegates.
Special Guest: The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

FRIDAY, 23 FEBRUARY

10 a.m.-12.30 p.m. Session.
3 p.m.-6 p.m. Session.
7.30 p.m. Small informal dinner party at Chatham House for selected Delegates.

Special Guest: Col. the Rt. Hon. Oliver Stanley, M.C., M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

SATURDAY, 24 FEBRUARY

Free.

SUNDAY, 25 FEBRUARY

Free.

MONDAY, 26 FEBRUARY

10 a.m.-12.3o p.m. Session.
3 p.m.-6 p.m. Session.
7.30 p.m. Small informal dinner party at Chatham House for selected Delegates.

Special Guest: H.E. Monsieur Rene Massigli, French Ambassador.

TUESDAY, 27 FEBRUARY

10 a.m.-12.3O p.m. Session.
3 p.m.-6 p.m. Session.
7.30 p.m. Small informal dinner party at Chatham House for selected Delegates.

Special Guest: H.E. Baron de Cartier de Marchienne, Belgian Ambassador.

WEDNESDAY, 28 FEBRUARY

10 a.m.-12.3o p.m. Session.
3 p.m.-6 p.m. Session.
6 p.m. Dominions Office Reception, Dorchester Hotel.

THURSDAY, i MARCH

10 a.m.-12.3O p.m. Session.
3 p.m.-6 p.m. Session.
7.30 p.m. Small informal dinner party at Chatham House for selected Delegates.

Special Guest: The Rt. Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Burma.

FRIDAY, 2 MARCH

10 a.m.-12.30 p.m.	Plenary Session.
3 p.m.-6 p.m.	Plenary Session.
7.30 p.m.	Small informal dinner party at Chatham House for selected Delegates.
	Selected Guest: The Rt. Hon. Richard Law, M.P., Minister of State.

SATURDAY, 3 MARCH

10 a.m.-12.30 p.m.	Final Plenary Session.
3 p.m.-6 p.m.	Commonwealth Institutes' Meeting.

Appendix C

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS CONFERENCE 1945

OFFICERS OF THE CONFERENCE

Chairman	The Viscount Astor.
Vice-Chairman	Edgar J. Tarr, K.C.
Honorary Treasurer	Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E.
Secretary	Ivison S. Macadam, C.B.E., M.V.O.
Assistant Secretary	Margaret E. Cleeve, O.B.E.
Recorder	Squadron-Leader R. A. Frost, M.B.E.

CHAIRMAN AND RECORDERS OF THE CONFERENCE MEETING AS A COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Subject	*Chairman*	*Recorder*
Security	Sir Frederick Whyte	Prof. R. G. Trotter.
Economic Problems	B. K. Sandwell	Prof. Allan G. B. Fisher.
Civil Aviation, Shipping and Communications	L. B. Unwin	N. C. Mehta.
Migration	R. J. F. Boyer	Prof. S. H. Frankel.
Racial Problems	R. J. F. Boyer	Major M. S. Comay.
Colonies	Miss Kathleen D. Courtney	W. P. Morrell.
Co-operative Institutions	Edgar J. Tarr	Prof. K. H. Bailey.

Appendix D

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS CONFERENCE 1945

WHO'S WHO OF THE CONFERENCE[1]

OFFICERS

Chairman

ASTOR, VISCOUNT. Chairman of Council, Royal Institute of International Affairs, since 1935. Born 1879. Educated Eton (Captain of the Boats) and New College, Oxford. Member of Parliament (Conservative) for Plymouth, 1910-19. Inspector of Quarter-Master General Services, 1914-17 (mentioned in dispatches). Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1918; to the Ministry of Food, 1918; to the Ministry of Health, 1919-21. British Delegate to the League of Nations Assembly, 1931. Chairman of the Committee on Nutrition, League of Nations, 1936 and 1937. Chairman of the Departmental Committee on Tuberculosis. Chairman of the State Medical Research Committee. Lord Mayor of Plymouth, 1939-44.
Publications: *Land and Life: The Economic National Policy for Agriculture,* with K. A. H. Murray (1932); *The Planning of Agriculture,* with K. A. H. Murray (1933); *The Agricultural Dilemma,* with B. Seebohm Rowntree (1935); *British Agriculture: the Principles of Future Policy,* with B. Seebohm Rowntree and others (1938).
Address: 9 Babmaes Street, Jermyn Street, London, S.W.I.

Vice-Chairman

TARR, EDGAR J., K.C., LL.D. Chairman, Canadian Delegation. President, Monarch Life Assurance Company, Winnipeg; Director, Bank of Canada. Honorary President, Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Chairman, Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942-5. Member, Canadian Delegation, British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1933; Chairman, Canadian Delegation, British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1938.
Address: 85 Harrow Street, Winnipeg, Canada.

Honorary Treasurer

JONES, SIR RODERICK, K.B.E. Formerly Principal Proprietor, Chairman and Managing Director of Reuter's. Member of Council, Royal Institute of International Affairs, and of Council, Empire Press Union. Director of Propaganda in 1914-18 War; to safeguard Reuter's in the national interest converted it into a private trust, 1916; completed negotiations with the Press Association for its transfer by stages to the newspapers of the United Kingdom as a body, 1926; retired 1941

[1] The details given are as at the date of the Conference.

when this process was accomplished and control was vested in trustees representing equally London and provincial newspapers under a chairman nominated by the Lord Chief Justice.

Publications: Papers and lectures; articles in *Nineteenth Century* and other publications.

Address: Rottingdean, Sussex.

Secretary

MACADAM, IVISON STEVENSON, C.B.E., M.V.O., A.M.I.MECH.E. Secretary, Royal Institute of International Affairs, since 1929. Born 1894. Educated Melville College, Edinburgh, King's College, London, Christ's College, Cambridge. Fellow of King's College, London. Served War 1914-19; O.B.E. (Military) and mentioned in dispatches thrice. A Founder and Trustee of the National Union of Students of the Universities of England and Wales. Member of Council of King George's Jubilee Trust. Secretary of the British Commonwealth Relations Conferences, 1933 and 1938. Assistant Director-General and later Principal Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Information, 1939-41.

Address: 32 Chesham Place, Belgrave Square, London, S.W.i.

Assistant Secretary

CLEEVE, Miss MARGARET ELISABETH, O.B.E. Deputy Secretary, Royal Institute of International Affairs, since 1941, and Secretary, Library and Publications Department since 1929. Assistant Secretary of the Institute, 1921-9; Acting Secretary, 1939-41. Editor, *International Affairs*, the Journal of the Institute. Served with American Y.M.C.A. in France, 1917-19.

Address: Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, London, S.W.i.

Conference Recorder

FROST, SQUADRON-LEADER RICHARD AYLMER, M.B.E. (Military). British Commonwealth Research Secretary, Royal Institute of International Affairs, since October 1944. Born 1905. Educated Westminster School, Christ Church, Oxford (Dixon Scholar) and Harvard University (University Fellow). Worked in the National Council of Social Service and subsequently engaged in writing the Imperial section of a history of *The Times*. Commissioned in the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve, 1940. Temporarily released from active service in October 1944 for preparatory work in connexion with the British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1945.

Address: Cowstocks, Dane Hill, Sussex.

AUSTRALIA

BAILEY, PROFESSOR KENNETH HAMILTON, M.A. (Oxon.), B.C.L. (Oxon.), LL.M. Chairman, Australian Delegation. Professor of Public Law, University of Melbourne, since 1931. At present serving as consultant in Department of the Attorney-General, Canberra. Member of Council, Australian Institute of International Affairs. Born Melbourne, 1898. Educated Wesley College, Melbourne, University of Melbourne and Corpus Christi College, Oxford; Rhodes Scholar for Victoria, 1918. Served with the and Australian Field Artillery, 1918-19. Called to the Bar by Gray's Inn, 1924. Constitutional Adviser to the Australian Delegation at the Imperial Conference, 1937. Member of Australian Delegation to League of Nations Assembly, 1937. Member of the Australian Delegation to British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1938.

Publications: Articles on constitutional and international matters.

Address: The University, Melbourne, Australia.

BOYER, RICHARD JAMES FILDES, M.A. Director, American Division, Commonwealth Department of Information, since 1941. Commissioner, Australian Broadcasting Commission since 1940. Born New South Wales, 1891. Educated Newington College, University of Sydney. Served as Lieutenant, Australian Imperial Forces, Gallipoli—France, 1915-18. President, Graziers Association of Queensland. President, Graziers Federal Council of Australia, 1942. Member Australian Woolgrowers Council. Member British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1938. Australian delegate, League of Nations Assembly, 1939. Vice-President, Australian League of Nations Union. Leader, Australian Delegation, Institute of Pacific Relations Conferences, 1942 and 1944.

Address: 1225 Pacific Highway, Turramurra, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.

GORMAN, BRIGADIER EUGENE, M.C., K.C. Head of Department in charge of Repatriation of Australian Prisoners of War, England. Educated St. Joseph's College, Sydney. Served in A.I.F., 1914-18. Barrister-at-Law, Melbourne; King's Counsel, 1929. Served in A.I.F. in Palestine, Egypt, Libya, Greece and Syria, 1940-5. Chief Commissioner of Australian Comforts Fund in Middle East. Chief Inspector of A.I.F., 1942-4. Appointed Consul-General to Netherlands East Indies in 1942 but was unable to take up post owing to Japanese invasion.

Address: Cumberland Hotel, Eastbourne, Sussex.

REID, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ANDREW THYNE, **B.A., A.M.I.CHEM.E.,** A.M.I.E.A. Chairman and Technical Director of James Hardie & Co. Ltd., and of the Hardie Rubber Co. Ltd. Born 1901. Educated

Sydney Church of England Grammar School, Sydney University. Engineer to James Hardie & Co. Ltd., and to Hardie Rubber Co. Ltd., 1927-39. Enlisted in A.I.F., 1939. Served in England, 1940; Middle East, 1941-2. Transferred to R.E.M.E. with rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, July 1943.
Address: Madingley, Church Street, Carlingford, N.S.W., Australia.

ROWELL, MAJOR-GENERAL SYDNEY FAIRBAIRN, C.B.E. Director of Tactical Investigation, War Office, since January 1944. Born 1894. Educated Adelaide High School, Royal Military College, Duntroon. Served with A.I.F., Gallipoli, 1915; Colonel and G.S.O.i, 6th Australian Division, A.I.F., 1939; Brigadier and B.G.S., 1st Australian Corps, A.I.F., 1940; served in Libya, Greece and Syria, 1941; Major-General and Deputy Chief of General Staff at Army H.Q., Melbourne, 1941; Lieutenant-General and Corps Commander, April 1942; G.O.C. New Guinea Force, August 1942; G.O.C. A.I.F., Middle East, and Australian Liaison Officer at G.H.Q., Middle East Forces, February 1943.
Address: 81 Kerford Street, East Malvern, Victoria, Australia.

AUSTIN, FLIGHT-LIEUTENANT MERVYN NEVILLE, M.A. (Melbourne and Oxford). Secretary, Australian Delegation. War Service with Royal Australian Air Force. Born 1913. Educated Melbourne Church of England Grammar School, University of Melbourne, Christ Church College, Oxford. Rhodes Scholar for Victoria, 1936; Senior Classical Master at the Melbourne Church of England School.
Address: R.A.A.F., Kodak House, Kingsway, London, W.C.a.

BURMA (OBSERVERS)

CLAGUE, SIR JOHN, C.M.G., C.I.E. Special Officer on Burma questions in the Information Department of the India Office, London. Member of Imperial Committee, Royal Institute of International Affairs. Born 1882. Appointed to the Indian Civil Service, 1905, and served in Burma. Military Duty, 1918-19. Chief Secretary, 1928. Commissioner, Shan States, 1931. Retired 1937. Adviser to the Secretary of State for Burma, 1937-42.
Address: India Office, Whitehall, London, S.W.i.

GYAW, THE HON. SIR HTOON AUNG. Chairman, Burmese Delegation. Burmese Adviser to His Excellency the Governor of Burma at Simla. Finance Minister in Burma until 1942.
Address: Care of Government of Burma, Simla, India.

TAIT, SIR JOHN. Managing Director, Steel Bros. & Co. Ltd., London. Formerly General Manager in the East. Born 1890. Member, Indian Legislature, 1931-2. Formerly Chairman, Burma Chamber of Commerce, and Member of Senate of Burma Legislature.
Address: 139 St. James's Court, Buckingham Gate, London, S.W.i.

CANADA

BREWIN, FRANCIS ANDREW. Barrister. Vice-President and Chairman of the Executive of the Ontario C.C.F. Member of National Council of the C.C.F. Born Hove, Sussex, 1907. Educated Radley College, England. Called to the Ontario Bar in 1930; Counsel for various trade unions. Honorary Secretary of the Civil Liberties Association in Toronto. Federal candidate in Toronto, St. Pauls.
Address: 54 Rathnally Avenue, Toronto, Canada.

IRWIN, W. ARTHUR. Managing Editor, *Maclean's Magazine,* Toronto. Born Ayr, Ontario, Canada. Educated at Public and High Schools in Ontario and Manitoba, University of Manitoba, University of Toronto. Editorial Staff, *Toronto Mail and Empire,* 1920-3. Parliamentary Correspondent, *Toronto Globe,* 1924-5. Associate Editor, *Maclean's Magazine,* Toronto, 1926-42. Member of National Executive and Research Committee, Canadian Institute of International Affairs; former Chairman, Toronto Branch.
Publications: Contributions on current affairs to magazines.
Address: in Eastbourne Avenue, Toronto, Canada.

MICHENER, DANIEL RONALD, K.C. Barrister, Ontario Bar and Middle Temple. Born Alberta, Canada, 1900. Educated University of Alberta and Hertford College, Oxford. Rhodes Scholar for Alberta, 1919. Served R.A.F., 1918. Canadian representative of Rhodes Scholarship Trust. Canadian Liaison Officer for Colonial Service Recruitment. Member of National Executive, Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Chairman of National Commission, Canadian Association for Adult Education. Former member of Council, Toronto Board of Trade. Progressive Conservative candidate, Ontario, 1943.
Publications: Contributions to the *Canadian Encyclopaedic Digest of Laws of Ontario.*
Address: 372 Bay Street, Toronto, Canada.

ROY, LIONEL VICTOR JOSEPH. Solicitor at the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, Ottawa. Born Quebec, 1905. Graduate of Laval University, Quebec. Postgraduate work at Paris, Oxford and Geneva. Professor of International Law at Laval University.
Address: 162 Daly Avenue, Ottawa, Canada.

SANDWELL, BERNARD KEBLE, HON. LL.D. (Queen's); HON. D.C.L. (University of Bishop's College). Editor, *Toronto Saturday Night,* since 1932. Member, Board of Governors of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Rector, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 1944. Born Ipswich, England, 1876. Educated Upper Canada College and University of Toronto. On the editorial staff of *Toronto News,* 1904. Associate Editor and Dramatic Editor of *Montreal Daily Herald,*

1905-11. Associate Editor and Editor of Montreal *Financial Times,* 1911-18. Assistant Professor of Economics, McGill University, 1919-23. Elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, 1925. Honorary Chairman of the Canadian National Committee on Refugees.
Publications: *The Privacity Agent* (1926); *Canada* (1941).
Address: 41 Spadina Road, Toronto, Canada.

SIFTON, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL VICTOR, C.B.E., D.S.O. President and Publisher of *Winnipeg Free Press;* President of *Leader-Post,* Regina; of *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix,* and of Trans-Canada Communications Ltd. Master-General of Ordnance, Ottawa, 1940-2.
Address: *Winnipeg Free Press,* Winnipeg, Canada.

TARR, EDGAR J., K.C., LL.D. Chairman, Canadian Delegation. Vice-Chairman of the Conference *(see under* Officers of the Conference, p. 181).

TROTTER, PROFESSOR REGINALD GEORGE, A.M., PH.D. (Harvard), F.R.S.C., F.R.HiST.S. Douglas Professor of Canadian and Colonial History and Head of the Department of History, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. Canadian organizer of the Biennial Conferences on Canadian-American Affairs at Queen's University and at the St. Lawrence University, 1935-41. Member of Canadian-American Committee on Education organized in 1944. Chairman of Kingston Branch, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and Member of National Council and National Research Committee of the Canadian Institute.
Publications: *Canadian Federation: Its Origins and Achievement* (1924); Contributions to the *Cambridge History of the British Commonwealth,* Vol. VI, *Canada and Newfoundland* (1930); *The British Empire-Commonwealth* (1932); *North America and the War: A Canadian View* (1940); *Commonwealth: Pattern for Peace?* (1944).
Address: 320 King Street West, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

UNWIN, L. B., M.C. Vice-President of Finance, Canadian Pacific Railway Company. President of Canadian Pacific Air Lines Limited, Montreal. Administrator of Consumer Rationing, 1942-3.
Address: 591 Argyle Avenue, Westmount, Quebec.

GEORGE, LIEUTENANT JAMES, R.C.N.V.R. Secretary, Canadian Delegation. Head of the Historical Section of the Royal Canadian Naval Mission Overseas, London. Born 1918. Educated Upper Canada College, and University of Toronto; Rhodes Scholar for Ontario, 1940.
Address: 270 Forest Hill Road, Toronto, Canada.

GRAHAM, MAJOR GERALD SANDFORD, M.A., PH.D., F.R.HiST.S. Secretary, Canadian Delegation. Associate Professor of History, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. Attached to Canadian Military Head-

quarters, London. Educated Queen's University, Harvard University, Trinity College, Cambridge, and at Freiburg-im-Breisgau. Instructor in History and Tutor, Harvard University, 1930-6; Guggenheim Fellowship in the U.S.A., 1941.

Publications: *British Policy and Canada, 1774-91* (1930); *Sea Power and British North America, 1783-1820* (1941); *Britain and Canada* (1943).

Address: Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

INDIA

BUTA SINGH, CAPTAIN THE HON. SARDAR SIR, KT., C.B.E. Member, Council of State since 1932. Member of All India (General Policy) Post-War Reconstruction Committee; Member Defence Consultative Committee for India; District Leader, National War Front; Joint Secretary, Punjab War Board, Recruiting and Man-Power Sub-Committee; Recruiting Officer for Amritsar, 1940-4; Member of the Central Selection Board for selecting Indian Commissioned Officers to H.M. Forces.

Address: Nowshera House, Amritsar, Punjab, India.

MAHMOOD, MIR MAQBOOL, B.A., LL.B. (Punjab), B.A., B.LITT. (Oxon.). Barrister-at-Law. Member of All India (General Policy) Post-War Reconstruction Committee since 1941. Secretary to the Chancellor, Chamber of Princes, since 1938. First President of the Oxford International Assembly, 1922-3. Visited the United States as member of the Oxford Debating Team, 1922. Member, Legislative Assembly (Punjab), 1923-30 and since 1937. Foreign Minister and Minister for Law and Justice (Patiala State), 1926-9. Chief Minister (Jhalawar State), 1930-3. Secretary to the Indian States Delegation to Indian Round Table Conference, 1932-3. Delegate at British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1933. Parliamentary Secretary-General to the Premier, Punjab, 1937-43. Joint Secretary, Punjab War Board, 1940-3.

Publications: *Co-operative Movement; India and the League of Nations; Dominion Status and the Indian States.*

Address: 4 Council House, New Delhi, India.

MEHTA, NANALAL CHAMANLAL, I.C.S. (Rtd.). Barrister-at-Law. Director in the leading industrial house of Juggilal Teamalpat or J. K. Industries, Cawnpore. Born 1892. Educated Saurashtra High School, Rajkot, Wilson College, Bombay, Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge. District Officer in the United Provinces; Director of Agriculture, of Land Records and of Statistics, and Inspector-General of Registration; Industries and Education Secretary in the United Provinces Government; Sugar Controller for India, 1942-4; Served on Deputation with the Gwalior State for a year. Secretary and Vice-Chairman

of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research; Honorary Correspondent of the Archaeological Survey of India.
Publications: *Studies in Indian Painting* (1926); *Gujarati Painting in the Fifteenth Century* (1931); *The Contribution of Islam to Indian Culture* (1933); *Bharatiya Chitrakala.*
Address: Kamla Cottage, Juhu, Bombay, India.

PANIKKAR, DIWAN KAVALAM MADAVA. Prime Minister, Bikaner State since 1944. Born 1895. Educated Madras Christian College and Christ Church College, Oxford (Dixon Scholar). Professor of Modern History, Aligarh University, 1919-22. Editor of *Swarajiya,* 1922-5 and of *Hindustan Times,* Delhi, 1925. Joined the Kashmir State Service as Secretary to the Maharaja, 1927; Deputy-Director of the Indian Princes Special Organization and Secretary to the Indian Princes Delegation to Round Table Conference, 1930-3; Secretary to Chancellor, Chamber of Princes, 1931; Foreign Minister, Patiala State, 1933-9; Vice-President of State Council and Foreign and Political Minister, Bikaner, 1940-4.
Publications: *Introduction to the Study of the Relations of Indian States with the Government of India* (1927); *The Portuguese in Malabar* (1928); *Federal India,* with Col. Sir Kailas Haksar (1930); *The Dutch in Malabar* (1931); *Caste and Democracy* (1933); *The New Empire* (1934); *His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner* (1937); *Hinduism and the Modern World* (1938); *The Future of South-East Asia* (1943); Contributions to the *Asiatic Review, Contemporary Review,* and *Les Nouvelles LitUraires* (Paris).
Address: Bikaner, India.

PILLAI, AIYAPPA KRISHNA. A founder member of the Radical Democratic Party of India. Educated University of Madras and Oxford. Called to the Bar by Inner Temple, 1930. Practising barrister at Madras. Delegate representing the Indian Federation of Labour to several international conferences, including the World Trade Union Conference in London, 1945. Member of General Council of International Federation of Trade Unions. For many years a Member of the All India Congress Committee but resigned in view of differences of policy on the war. Formerly Member of Legislative Assembly of Travancore.
Publications: *Law and Administration of Justice in India,* thesis adopted by International Juridical Conference at Berlin and published in English, French and German (1930); *History of Kerala and of the Congress* (1925); several political pamphlets.
Address: 180 Fleet Street, London, E.C.4.

SINGH, RAJA SIR MAHARAJ, C.I.E. Born 1878. Educated Harrow and Balliol College, Oxford. Served under Government in the United

Provinces and in the Government of India. Agent-General for India in South Africa, 1932-5. Visited many British territories, e.g. Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, British Guiana, Trinidad and Mauritius, in connexion with the problems of Indians settled there. Home member in the United Provinces Government, 1935-7. Prime Minister of the Jodhpur (1932) and Kashmir States (1943). Vice-Chancellor, Lucknow University, 1942.

Publications: Several reports dealing with Indians in South Africa, East Africa, British Guiana and Mauritius.

Address: Lucknow, United Provinces, India.

SINGH ROY, THE HON. SIR BIJOY PROSAD, K.C.I.E. President of the Bengal Legislative Council since 1943. Born Calcutta, 1894. Member of the Bengal Legislative Council, 1921-36, and of the Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1937-40. Minister in charge of the Departments of Local Self-Government, Public Health and Revenue in Bengal, 1930-41. President of the National Liberal Federation, 1941-3.

Publication: *Parliamentary Government in India* (1943).

Address: 15 Lansdowne Road, Calcutta, India.

SIVA RAJ, RAO BAHADUR NAMASIVOYEM. Barrister-at-Law, Madras. Member, All India (General Policy) Post-War Reconstruction Committee. Member of the Viceroy's National Defence Council. Born 1892. Educated University of Madras. Some time Professor of Law at Madras Law College. Member of the Madras Legislative Council, 1926-37. Member of the Indian Legislative Assembly (Central) from 1937. Regional Leader of the National War Front (Madras). Attended Eighth Institute of Pacific Relations Conference, 1942.

Address: 12 Andi Street, Royapettah Po, Madras, India.

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Publications: Editor of *Indian Cases,* 1916-32; *The Criminal Law Jour-*

nal of India (1916-32); *Reprints of Punjab Criminal Rulings,* Vol. IV; *Fifteen Years' Digest.*
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KIPPENBERGER, MAJOR-GENERAL HOWARD KARL, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. In command of New Zealand Expeditionary Force (United Kingdom) Reception Group for returning Prisoners of War. Sergeant with New Zealand Expeditionary Force, 1914-18. Appointed to command the 20th Infantry Battalion of the 2nd New Zealand Division, 1939. Served in Greece, Crete and 8th Army Desert offensive. Wounded, captured, and later escaped. Later commanded 5th New Zealand Brigade at Alamein, Tunis, and Italy. Major-General in command of the New Zealand Division at Cassino; severely wounded. Legion of Merit, Degree of Commander, 1945.
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Publications: *British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell* Ci93o); *The Provincial System in New Zealand, 1852-1876* (1932);

New Zealand (Modern World Series, 1935); *The Gold Rushes* (1940); *Britain and New Zealand* (1944); joint editor of *Select Documents on British Colonial Policy, 1830-1860* (1928).
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Publications: *Co-operation and Competition in the Marketing of Maize in South Africa* (1926); *The Railway Policy of South Africa* (1928); *Coming of Age: Studies in South African Citizenship and Politics,* with J. H. Hofmeyr and others (1930); *Africa in the Re-making* (1932); *Capital Investment in Africa: Its Course and Effects* (1938).
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Publications: Contribution to technical and official publications; *Economics of Agriculture* (1937).
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COATMAN, JOHN, C.I.E., M.A. North Regional Director of the B.B.C. since 1937. Member of Council and of Imperial Committee, Royal Institute of International Affairs; Chairman of Manchester Group, Royal Institute of International Affairs. Born 1889. Educated Manchester Grammar School, Manchester University and Pembroke College, Oxford. Joined Indian Police Service, 1910; served in the Mohmand, Tochi and Southern Waziristan Campaigns in the 3rd Afghan War, 1919, and on the Hazara Frontier, 1920; King's Police Medal and Bar. Director of Public Information to Government of India, 1926; Member of Indian Legislative Assembly, 1926-30; Honorary Professor of Political Science, Delhi University; Secretary to Liberal Parliamentary Delegation to Indian Round Table Conference, 1930-2. Professor of Imperial Economic Relations in University of London, 1930-4. Chief News Editor of British Broadcasting Corporation, 1934-7. Chairman of Convocation at Manchester University, 1941.
Publications: *Statement Exhibiting Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India,* 1925-30; *The Indian Riddle* (1932); *Years of*

Destiny (1932); *Magna Britannia* (1936); *India, the Road to Self-Government* (1941).
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Publications: *The Problem of the Commonwealth* (1916); *The Commonwealth of Nations* (1916); *Dyarchy* (1920); *The Prevention of War* (1924); *The Capital Question of China* (1932); *Civitas Dei*, Vol. I (1934); Vols. II and III (1937); in one volume as *The Commonwealth of God* (1938); *The Protectorates of South Africa* (1935); *Decision, Action* (1942); *Faith and Works* (1943); *The Way to Peace* (1944); *World War: Its Cause and Cure* (1945).
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Publications: *An African Survey* (1938); *The Position of Colonies in a British Commonwealth of Nations* (Romanes Lecture, Oxford, 1941); *Great Britain, India, and the Colonial Dependencies in the Post-War World* (1943); *The Future of Colonial Peoples* (1943); *Britain and her Dependencies* (1943); *The Colonies and the Atlantic Charter* (Anniversary Lecture to Royal Central Asian Society, 1943).
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Publications: *History of Barbados* (1927); *Christopher Codrington* (1928); *Critical Edition of Ralegh's Discoverie of Guiana* (1928); *Ralegh's Last Voyage* (1932); Contributions to the *Cambridge History of the British Empire.*
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Publication: *Trade Unionism To-day* (1928).
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Publications: *An Introduction to the Study of Prices* (1912); *Relations of Capital and Labour* (1914); various articles in reviews and journals.
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Publication: *In the Wake of the Tank* (1930).
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Publication: *When Men wore Muffs*, an historical account of clothing throughout the ages (1936).
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Publications: *Organized Labour in the War* (1940); *British Trade Unions* (published by British Council, 1942); *The International Labour Movement* (1945).
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1920-5. Political Adviser to National Government of China, 1929-32. Head of American Division, Ministry of Information, 1939-40. Leader of British Group at Institute of Pacific Relations Conference, Honolulu, 1927; attended Institute of Pacific Relations Conferences, 1942 and 1945.

Publications: *Asia in the Twentieth Century* (1926); *China and Foreign Powers* (1927); *The Future of East and West* (1932); Japan's *Purpose in Asia* (1941); *India: A Bird's-Eye View* (1944).

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Publications: *Some Problems of Wages and their Regulation in Great Britain since 1918* (1926); *Moscow Impressions* (1932); *The Clash of Progress and Security* (1935); Section on 'World Economic Affairs' in *Survey of International Affairs, 1937.*

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INDEX

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